This column is open to all viewpoints on subjects of interest to our readers. Please keep your letters brief. Where necessary they will be abridged. Please indicate if your name may be used or if you prefer initials instead.

Allende and socialist unity

I read, and was impressed, by your November issue. Peter Camejo’s article analyzing the shortcomings of the popular Guevaraist tendency was particularly interesting. I was disturbed in that he didn’t substantiate his characterization of Allende’s government in Chile as a "bourgeois reformist" regime. It seems to me that the Socialist Unity coalition could provide a model for cooperation on the part of socialist groups in other countries.

Internecine conflict among socialists is one of the major weaknesses in the international left; this does not always constitute truly principled political discussion — it is, rather, often based on parochial considerations and long-felt hatreds (i.e., Stalinist vs. Trotskyist, "Bolshevik" vs. "communist" vs. "Menshevik" vs. "socialist," etc.). Or so it seems to me. I am interested in learning more about the various American socialist groups.

J.J.
Ithaca, N.Y.

In reply — Revolutionary socialists wholeheartedly favor the unity of all socialists in forming governments — provided they form anti-capitalist governments. We have seen many examples of Social Democratic, Labor, and even "Communist" parties administering capitalist states and defending the privileges of private property against the working class. Unfortunately the Allende regime in Chile stands closer to the Social Democratic administrations of Europe than it does to the revolutionary government in Cuba. The bourgeois army, police, and courts remain intact. The workers' organizations are unarmed while representatives of the capitalist army are given posts in Allende's cabinet. The essential core of domestic capitalist industry remains in private hands.

You mistakenly refer to a "Socialist Unity coalition" in Chile. Allende's governmental bloc, the Unidad Popular (People's Unity) does not have the word socialist in it, and for a good reason: it includes representatives of the procapitalist Radical Party. The bourgeois partners in the coalition have never endorsed socialist measures and have effective veto power. The official program of the UP does not even call for socialism in the future, but projects the vague formula of a "transformation of the traditional structures of dependent capitalism."

Regardless of the nature of Allende's regime, revolutionary socialists in this country should consider it their internationalist duty to unite in opposition to any imperialist moves against Chile on the part of the U.S. government.

The Editors
The October 1972 Bulletin of the Canadian "Set Them Free" Committee in Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners announces the formation of a cross-Canada defense committee for Ivan Dzyuba, a Ukrainian writer who is being held in a Soviet prison. Dzyuba is best known as the author of Internationalism or Russification?, a Marxist analysis of the Kremlin's nationalities policies.

The Committee To Defend Ivan Dzyuba is circulating a petition, which states:

"As part of a mounting campaign of arrests, which started in January 1972 against leading intellectuals in the Ukraine and throughout the Soviet Union, Ivan Dzyuba, prominent Ukrainian writer and literary critic, was held under house arrest from January, expelled from the Ukrainian Writers' Union in March and imprisoned in April. The victims, now including students and workers, and many of them long-standing members of the Communist Party, have protested that the actions taken against them are in violation of Soviet legality and of their democratic rights as guaranteed by the Constitution of the USSR. . . .

"We, the undersigned, condemn the arrest of Dzyuba and other Soviet political prisoners; we demand their immediate release and the implementation of civil liberties as outlined in the Constitution of the Soviet Union."

The committee is appealing for financial support and for people to help circulate the petition. For more information and copies of the petition, write: Committee To Defend Ivan Dzyuba, P.O. Box 187, Station "E", Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

In 1947 an article, melodramatically signed "X", appeared in Foreign Affairs, the quarterly journal of the Council on Foreign Relations. It spelled out the Cold War strategy of "containment":

"It is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies . . . designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."

It turned out that "X" was George Kennan, founder of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and a long-time ambassador to the Soviet Union. The Cold War was conducted along the lines of what came to be known as the "Kennan Plan."

It is, then, of more than passing interest to note that the October 1972 Foreign Affairs carries an article by Kennan entitled "After the Cold War." In it Kennan says, "The problem Russia presents for American policy-makers differs markedly, and in the main favorably, from what it was 25 years ago." The most favorable development is that "the highest priority in Soviet policy appears to be given today to the effort to resist encroachments by the Chinese on Soviet influence. . . ."

"One wonders whether the implications of this situation have been fully taken into account," Kennan muses. Using as an example the coexistence of Soviet and American navies on the high seas, he asks, "Could they not perhaps even collaborate occasionally on constructive undertakings?"

With cautious formulations and carefully-chosen words, the architect of Cold War policy attempts to prepare ruling-class circles for the acceptance of an era of detente that represents a significant strategic turn for American capitalism. Imperialism has no intention of abandoning its long-term aim of overturning the planned economies of the existing workers' states, and Kennan intimates as much in his article. But for the moment the advance guard of American policy-makers now consider it in their interests to exploit the Sino-Soviet split to the hilt by separate collaboration with the Moscow and Peking regimes on "constructive undertakings"; most notably on stemming the tide of the colonial revolution.

Once again on the "shift to the right" that Nixon's electoral triumph allegedly revealed and the subsequent "death of the radicalization" that the news media is proclaiming for the nth time. Not all journalists agree. Peter Jenkins, writing in the November 11 Manchester Guardian Weekly, sees the prospects for permanent class peace in America to be dim:

"There is something almost ominous in the fact that the ghettos are not in flames and the campuses not in turmoil. It is as if an iron hand is holding down the lid of a giant pressure cooker. For the injustices and inequalities, the squallor, corruption, and primitive barbarisms which exist within this great rich land seem sure to convulse it again before long."

CLIFF CONNER
Film is an art; it is also an industry. It is, in fact, a corporate art. True enough, painting and writing are regulated by the economics of the marketplace, too, but the individual artist still retains the ultimate veto over the nature of the artistic work. In the movie industry this is not the case. By its very nature, film is a collective enterprise. But in capitalist America it is businessmen and not artists who hold the ultimate regulatory powers over questions of aesthetic, moral, and political content—not to mention the question of who is and who is not allowed to work on films in the first place.

Thus, it is hardly surprising that the bulk of what comes out of Hollywood is hardly art at all. We have become so acclimated to garbage level productions that many people have actually come to enjoy the very worst of these films as campy, unwitting satires upon themselves—a tribute to the resiliency of the human animal under conditions of extreme adversity.

The real wonder of it all is that some art actually does manage to seep through the corporate bureaucracy’s clutches to finally get a showing in the commercial theaters. The integrity of many screen artists—directors, actors, scenarists, etc.—accounts for that as does the vagaries of the box office. Hollywood wants to convey calming messages of corporate liberalism to its audiences, but it also needs to produce a product that sells.

Audiences are highly conditioned through long exposure to accept the Hollywood norms so that they are an unreliable court of appeal, but the nature of the audience changes periodically and Hollywood is pressed into experimenting for the purpose of maintaining its profit margins—a fact of life that gives talented and committed artists some margin of leverage. Radical messages sometimes get through this way, too. Occasionally, the corporate bureaucracy will permit a radical content to pass its censorship—if there’s money in it.

These factors account for the recent spate of creative films that Hollywood has financed and distributed. There is a desperate search going on for new success formulas, since an estimated 70 percent of all films produced today are financial failures.

When the commercial film industry was first launched in America it was hardly in such straits. Audiences grew steadily. These early movies were designed for their audiences, too. The first pre-World War I film audiences were largely made up of immigrant workers who were still having difficulty with the English language. In fact if the movies had been born talking (in English) they might not have been so enormously popular right away. Their very voicelessness was an important point of appeal to people who couldn’t comfortably speak English. The more prosperous of the native-born Americans had the theater and vaudeville to entertain them, while

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the immigrant working people, concentrated in the cities where movies were first shown, and the indigenous poor had to turn to the silent movies.

Thus, in the effort to garner audience appeal these early nickelodeon movies frequently took the side of the poor against unscrupulous bankers, politicians, slumlords, and employers. However, the story lines kept well within "safe" boundaries by the introduction of unlikely individual solutions (usually through ruling-class benevolence which saves the day). The Celluloid Weapon: Social Comment in the American Film by David Manning White and Richard Aver- son (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972, $14.95), a new and generally excellent compendium on the "message" film, describes a typical movie of this type:

"In Edwin S. Porter's The Ex-Convict (1905), for example, poverty drives a man to rob a mansion to obtain food money for his sick child and malnourished wife. He is caught red-handed by the owner, but in a happy denouement he is 'saved' by the owner's daughter, a young girl whom the destitute man had prevented from being run over earlier in the day."

The Celluloid Weapon describes another movie dealing with labor conditions:

"In Children Who Labor (1912), an argument against the exploita-
tion of children, made by the Edison Company with the assistance of the U.S. National Child Labor Committee, we see the drudgery of children working in a mill. As the plot develops, the millowner's daughter accidentally gets lost on a train. She is found by an immigrant who is forced to send her to work with his own children in her father's sweatshop. The girl is eventually recognized by her father, but only after he agrees to free all of the children from their slavish employment does she return to him."

In any case, right from the start movies generally reflected the ideology of the status quo, interpreting that ideology to differing audiences in differing ways. When Griffith's "The Birth of a Nation" (1915), an overtly racist movie which depicts the Ku Klux Klan as the heroic saviors of the South after the Civil War. Griffith's artistry as a director made for a technically effective movie. The Birth of a Nation aroused racist passions in white audiences. It is hard to realize how affecting silent movies could be in their time, since when we view them now the absence of sound has a tendency to dampen our empathy. But white audiences for The Birth of a Na-
tion were several times so stirred up by the movie that they made mob attacks on Black communities right after leaving the theater. As a natural consequence, the film aroused the angry opposition of Black people. The Celluloid Weapon reports:

"Among the groups reacting bitterly to The Birth of a Nation was the young N.A.A.C.P. Some of the leaders of the association felt it urgent to make a film to refute the Griffith epic. Booker T. Washington's secretary, E.J. Scott, raised money for the project by selling stock to black businessmen and professionals. Photographed in Florida and Chicago, and taking three years to produce, the black-sponsored film was titled The Birth of a Race (1919). However, if its aim was to serve as an antidote to Griffith's film, it failed to attract substantial audiences."

In general, however, the movies have always stayed on the straight and narrow, dealing with subjects in ways that more or less unobtrusively convey the ideological norms of the status quo either through not questioning them or by depicting them in a rosy light. Virtually every movie that has no social message—supposedly—still manages to get across quite a lot about the proper attitudes one should have toward sex, marriage, the family, private property, law and order, American governmental forms, patriotism, the work ethic, the competitive spirit, class-race-sex roles, etc. In other words, even the most "escapist" fare has always projected the dominant ruling class world view. Dwight Macdonald, a
former revolutionary socialist who still considers himself to be something of a radical, disagrees. In his book, On Movies (Berkeley: Medallion, 1969), he expresses the notion that the movies don't convey ideas:

"In a larger sense, it seems obvious that the great directors and the great schools of cinema have changed our awareness of our environment as the impressionists and post-impressionists did: by showing us a new way of seeing the world — visual, not conceptual. Cinema, like music and painting — its closest, most incestuous relatives in the arts — is mute when it comes to expressing ideas (look at 'tone poems' and Victorian moralizing paintings). But there are too many ideas around in this scientized age, and not enough sensory perception of what's right in front of our noses or eyes (as against our brains). That's one reason I like movies."

While MacDonald is right when he says that the great schools of cinema have changed our awareness of our environment on the sensory level, it is the height of absurdity to claim that no concepts are conveyed or can be conveyed through the use of film. It would be hard to find a movie that lacked a message. Happy endings usually mean the hero and heroine get married, for example. Individual rather than collective solutions to life's problems are depicted as the only possible way out of bad situations (a man becomes rich, a woman becomes a movie star, etc.). Rebels either get co-opted or come to a bad end. One could name a raft of common themes in the Hollywood product all with obvious social implications. But these movies are not considered "propaganda," although movies that showed the other side of the coin would be. The truth is that all movies have a point of view and project ideas, but this quality is seldom noticed until the point of view somehow deviates from the stylized bourgeois norms.

By the time the First World War was over the movies had broadened their audience to the whole American population. Films had grown longer; technique had become more refined; theaters had grown more comfortable and elaborate. As the industry grew, it became more and more an overtly willing instrument of national policy. The postwar red-baiting and witch-hunting had its reflection in Hollywood in such films as Bolshevism on Trial (1919), The Ace of Hearts (1921), Orphans of the Storm (1921), and Rose of the Tenements (1926). The Celluloid Weapon describes one of these:

"Perhaps no film of this period was more vehement in its anti-Red message than Dangerous Hours (1920). The hero is an idealistic young man, a university graduate and a believer in the 'great freedom' expounded by Russian revolutionists he has read. In his zeal he supports the workers' strike at a silk mill and is recruited into a Bolsheviki espionage ring intent on sabotaging American industry. 'Boris Blotchi,' the leader of the conspirators and a Red Army officer, is, as a title in the film tells us, 'carried away with a wild dream of planting the scarlet seed of Terrorism in American soil.' At the conclusion the hero recognizes that he has been duped and exposes the plotters."

Other movies in the twenties tried to deal with the "new morality," as the postwar liberalization of sexual mores was called, in such pictures as Why Change Your Wife (1920), Forbidden Fruit (1921), Foot's Paradise (1922), and Adam's Rib (1923). These films both encouraged and delimited the "new morality" — a phenomenon which was happening anyway.

**The depression years**

The movies began to talk in 1927 and so the Talkies were virtually ushered in at the same time as the Depression. Movies in the thirties inevitably reflected the Depression, frequently by trying to deny its existence much as many of the commercial films still produced in neocolonial countries appear to be almost pathologically oblivious to the poverty and misery surrounding them. In the U.S. of the Depression years this phenomenon took its quintessential form in the Hollywood musical.

Nevertheless, the sociopolitical problems and passions of the thirties necessarily found an occasional direct reflection in the movies. American Madness (1932), for instance, had a plot centering around the question of bank failures. Wild Boys of the Road (1933) dealt with young people forced to leave home in order to find a way to eat through petty thievery and panhandling. Director King Vidor's Our Daily Bread (1934) deal with the efforts of uprooted and unemployed workers to make a life for themselves by going back to the land. Needless to say, these films all conveyed a becalming note of rosy optimism through their conventional happy endings.

Gabriel Over the White House (1933) reflects the kind of thinking that was being toyed with in ruling-class circles in the early years of the Depression. The film is described this way in The Celluloid Weapon:
"President Hammond (Walter Huston), who takes office as a typical machine-elected partisan, is injured critically in an automobile accident. While convalescing he is inspired by a vision of the Archangel Gabriel to become a dedicated leader who alone can cut the Gordian knot of problems besetting the land. Hammond dismisses his ineffectual Secretary of State as well as the rest of his cabinet, and just as he is about to be impeached in the Senate he seizes control of the government and assumes the authority of a dictator. But a benevolent one."

A new degree of realism became possible with the advent of sound and when Little Caesar (1930), starring Edward G. Robinson, brought thongs of people to the theaters, the studios quickly brought to the screen a whole succession of variations. Taking off from the headlines, Hollywood produced gangster pictures, movies about political corruption, and "exposes" of all sorts. The movies all displaced the blame for all these social problems from the system onto isolated, corrupt individuals, reassuring their audiences that everything could be solved by jailing, shooting, or otherwise eliminating the bad guys. Some of these pictures include The Big House (1930); The Front Page (1931); Quick Millions (1931); The Public Enemy (1931), starring James Cagney; The Secret Six (1931); and Scarface: Shame of a Nation (1932). They varied from the superficial and the sensational to the classic I Am a Fugitive From a Chain Gang (1932), which exposed the abominable conditions of Southern prisons—conditions which still exist. Although very dated on a technical level, I Am a Fugitive, which stars Paul Muni, is still a dramatically effective movie.

Several films in the "romance" category reflected Depression poverty as an outgrowth of their attempts to make their heroines more sympathetic within the framework of traditional morality. Marlene Dietrich, Greta Garbo, Barbara Stanwyck, and numerous other actresses frequently played the role of prostitute or rich man's mistress. But they were "good" women underneath it all because they weren't really doing it for themselves. They needed money to buy food for their children, medical care for their husbands, or an education for their sisters. Such films as Susan Lenox (1931), Blonde Venus (1932), and Letty Lynton (1932) were typical of this genre. "In their own way," points out Arthur Knight in his book The Liveliest Art (New American Library, 1957), "they were merely confirming the gangster theme that the only escape from depression-bred despair was to live outside the law." While it is doubtful that this is the message that Hollywood intended, it is certain that this is what was frequently read into them as the controversy over censorship of the movies in the early thirties makes clear.

Right-wing organizations and church groups passed resolutions condemning the industry. The Catholic Church hierarchy became especially menacing with its threats of organizing a boycott. More local censorship boards were established. Under sustained right-wing pressure the wave of gangster films began to subside. During 1933 it gradually began to merge with another cycle in which FBI agents and other cops were the new heroes. By the time G-Men (1935) was made, James Cagney himself had switched from his earlier roles and began playing the role of FBI man. By an ironic twist, the new cop heroes were simply gangsters in disguise, acting with as little concern for due process as the gangsters they were after. Hollywood told the truth, either as an accident of history or to justify the brutal reality—possibly for a combination of both reasons. The very moral right-wingers who objected to depicting the violence of sympathetic gangsters had no special qualms about the same thing with a badge on.

Reflecting the officially projected optimism of President Roosevelt's New Deal policies, the movies began to project a more positive idea of the possibilities people had in overcoming economic difficulties. Typical of the time were the plots of such musical comedies as Footlight Parade (1933) and 100 Men and a Girl (1937) in which groups of starving musicians, singers, and dancers were rounded up to put on a show which, naturally, turns out to be a hit.

Reflecting Roosevelt's attempt to deal with the radicalization of the Depression years by channeling it into a harmless reformation, Hollywood produced a series of "socially conscious" movies such as Black Fury (1935), Winterset (1936), Fury (1936), The Black Legion (1936), and They Won't Forget (1937). Massacre (1934) was one of the earlier movies in this cycle. White and Averson describe it this way:

"Although unduly melodramatic, Massacre does reveal the inequities fostered on the redman by whites who govern their reservation. A college-educated Indian (Richard Barthelmess) returns to his tribe, assumes its leadership, challenges the malefactors, and becomes the Federal representative at the reservation."

**The Production Code**

The movies were moved to the right in sexual and other matters in 1934 under pressure from the Catholic Church hierarchy and other right-wing forces. A new Production Code had been drawn up for the industry in 1930 by Father Daniel A. Lord, a Jesuit priest, but was only sporadically adhered to until the formation of the Legion of Decency by the Roman Catholic officialdom in 1934. The Legion directly threatened the industry with the specter of organized boycott of films which did not meet its standards of morality and propriety. The Code, with only minor revisions, remained in force until the middle sixties. Alexander Walker describes the event that broke the code in his book Sex in the Movies (Penguin Books, 1968):

"On 29 March 1965 a woman in an American-made film opened up her frock, exposed both of her..."
breasts to the full, unobscured eye of the camera, thereby broke Section Seven, Sub-section Two of the Motion Picture Production Code—"Indecent or undue exposure is forbidden"—and nevertheless succeeded in gaining the Hollywood censor's seal of approval. Quite a forbidden—and nevertheless successful quickening of breath. But this was the first time that nudity had been officially sanctioned in Hollywood.

The movie was *The Pawnbroker*, starring Rod Steiger and directed by Sidney Lumet. It is significant that the event that broke the back of Hollywood puritanism was a naked woman, rather than a man (which was not to be shown until years later). It is also significant that the actress involved was a Black bit player. These two facts say a lot about the sexist and racist nature of the movie industry.

Mae West was an early victim of the Legion of Decency. Her characteristic style of projecting the image of a woman who makes no pretense of fitting into puritan and sexist role stereotypes—a woman who is as tough as any man and as interested in sex—made her a prime target. *She Done Him Wrong* (1933), the biggest box-office draw of 1933-34, was the last straw for the Legion bigots. Thus, by 1936 her scripts had become so bowdlerized that her films lost their appeal with the public.

In general, movie stars were forced to live more virtuous screen lives—the gangster-as-hero and prostitute roles were out; "positive hero" roles on the side of law, order, and the Puritan way were in. Hollywood tried to find new success formulas that would be safe from censorship. A greater emphasis was laid on such escapist themes as the Western, Bible stories, historical films, the Cecil B. DeMille epics, and adaptations of the classics.

Treatment of the social scene tended more and more to stress the notion that the people's apathy and lack of civic mindedness was responsible for the Depression. These movies were undergirded with the notion that the problems of the Depression could be overcome if everyone were kind and generous to one another. *My Man Godfrey* (1936) and *You Can't Take It With You* (1938) are two movies of this sort. In *Mr. Deeds Goes to Town* (1936), a very clear example of this type, Gary Cooper plays Longfellow Deeds, an eccentric millionaire who wants to give away all of his money.

During the thirties, Hollywood managed to produce a few—a very few—films of explicit and direct social commentary (that only pulled their punches in very small ways). *The Grapes of Wrath* (1939), based on John Steinbeck's novel, is probably the best known of these films. It is now likely to strike the viewer as being a good film—John Ford directed it—but very weak tea so far as social commentary is concerned. Nevertheless, Twentieth Century-Fox's producer, Darryl F. Zanuck, had to screw up his courage in order to go ahead with the film because in Hollywood terms it was uncompromising.

**Hollywood and World War II**

As World War II drew nearer, Hollywood films began to depict the "joys" and "glamor" of military life. The studios soon discovered that the Roosevelt administration was willing to cooperate to the full in the production of these pictures.

By 1940 Alfred Hitchcock's *Foreign Correspondence*, a spy thriller, had its hero radioing the United States from London during a bombing raid: "The lights are going out in Europe! Ring yourself around with steel, America!"

During this period the movies began to reflect Washington's policies in preparation for entry into World War II. Hollywood produced a series of pro-British movies such as *A Yank in the R.A.F.*, which reached the screen in 1941 and several others which didn't get there until the U.S. had already entered the war in 1942: *This Above All*, *Mrs. Miniver*, and *Journey for Margaret*. Various anti-Nazi movies began to appear and, during the 1939-41 Stalin-Hitler pact, some anticommunist films as well. These included satires like *Ninotchka* (1939) and *Comrade X* (1940).

As soon as the United States entered the war, all restraints vanished. Germans and Japanese became the villains in film after film. At the same time, Hollywood began to paint a different picture of the Soviet Union. Favorable portrayals were conveyed in movies CONTINUED ON PAGE 40.
DEFENDING THE RIGHT TO ABORTION IN NEW YORK

BY DELPFINE WELCH

The following article is based on a report to the Twelfth National Convention of the Young Socialist Alliance held in Cleveland November 23-26. More than 1,200 persons attended.

In the November 22 New York Times, half of the women's page was devoted to an article entitled "Women Hammer Away at Male Job Bastions." The opening paragraph read as follows: "They still cannot be fathers. Or Canadian Mounties for that matter. But many of the other all-male bastions have come tumbling down in recent months as women have been hired for jobs that were once reserved for the hairy arms of men."

This is what is happening as the ideas of the women's liberation movement continue to take hold not only across this country, but all around the world. In France, widespread protest succeeded in forcing the dismissal of charges against sixteen-year-old Marie-Claire Chevalier, who was arrested for having an abortion. The government then put the young woman's mother on trial as an accomplice under the country's 162-year-old abortion law. The case became a national issue. Jacques Monod, the Nobel prize winner, testified at Ms. Chevalier's trial. He told the court that he had given Ms. Chevalier 3,000 francs to reimburse her, and had he known in time he would have arranged for and paid for the abortion—so they could jail him too as an accomplice. Simone de Beauvoir came to testify and proclaimed that she would provide money and addresses and open her home to women requiring abortion.

As a result of this protest Ms. Chevalier, who could have been sent to jail for five years, was fined $100 and freed. And even the $100 fine was suspended! Just as in France, the women's struggle is at present coming under sharpest attack around the abortion issue. The fight against the reactionary, inhumane abortion laws that exist in this country must therefore be a top priority of the women's movement.

On November 7 there was a referendum on the Michigan ballot that would allow legal abortion during the first nineteen weeks of pregnancy upon request of the woman. It was called Proposal B. An organization called the Voice of the Unborn spent $200,000 in a massive publicity campaign to defeat the referendum. They issued brochures, slides, and filmstrips arguing that abortion is murder. They took these materials to the colleges, high schools, parishes, and even went door-to-door. At Sunday Masses across the state, parishioners were instructed to vote against Proposal B for the sake of their very souls. A group called Lawyers for Life, which has ties with Voice of the Unborn, and whose activities are spearheaded by the Catholic Church hierarchy, did extensive advertising on billboards and buses. One billboard had a picture of Jesus Christ and the message "Stop Abortion. Thou Shalt Not Kill. Do Not Take the Life That I Have Given. Vote No on Proposal B."

The Catholic Church hierarchy and the government, working hand in glove, maneuvered to create a witch-hunt atmosphere. They raided the Women's Health Services. They arrested Dr. Edgar Keemer, a Black doctor who was an outspoken proponent of Proposal B, for allegedly performing and conspiring to perform abortions, in an effort to make all abortionists look like criminals and murderers.

For a while before the elections, the polls showed the referendum to have a narrow margin of support,
but as a result of the aggressive, effective campaign of the Right to Life forces, the referendum was defeated. This shows that abortion is still a complicated issue in many people's minds. They are not totally convinced by either side and therefore waver and change their minds. The proabortion forces cannot just accept the polls. They must counter the propaganda of the Right to Life people and educate around the issue of abortion.

The Michigan referendum is not an isolated example. It is a reflection of the general offensive that the reactionary so-called Right to Life groups have begun to wage over the past year. In some states their activity is aimed at rolling back the liberalized or even the liberally interpreted laws; in others they are trying to prevent antiabortion laws from being repealed or any reform laws from being passed; in others they are attempting to pass extremely strict and restrictive anti-abortion laws. But in all the states their aim is the same—to deny a woman her right to decide if and when she wants to bear a child.

The reactionaries in the capitalist government, along with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, want to maintain and perpetuate the oppression of women. They would rather see hundreds of thousands of women forced to seek back-alley butcher abortions, and have thousands die, rather than allow a woman the right to control her own body. They would rather murder women, than lose control of women!

The reactionary antiabortion forces have groups in nearly every state; their efforts are coordinated on a nationwide scale; and they have the financial backing of the powerful worldwide Roman Catholic Church.

In an interview with the New York Times, the executive secretary of the National Right to Life Committee told the reporter that the organization started around 1967 but "really got going in 1969 when the proabortionists started their push for abortion-on-demand." It has been the offensive by women and the proabortion forces, and the victories that we have won, that have led to the escalation of the activities of the right wing.

Look at some of the victories. In Washington a victorious state referendum replaced the state's antiquated criminal abortion law with a liberalized law. State courts ruled antiabortion laws unconstitutional in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Vermont. And public opinion has certainly been turned around. In 1968 only 15 percent of the American public favored legalization of abortion. In 1969 it rose to 40 percent. In 1971 it reached 50 percent. And a poll released on August 25, 1972, showed that 64 percent of the American people feel that the decision to have an abortion should be left solely to the woman and her doctor, and the majority of Catholics polled felt the same way.

And on November 22 a California court ruled that that state's abortion law was too vague to apply, which means essentially that abortion is available on demand. The proabortion forces will be able to launch a fight around whatever new law is proposed.

But by far the biggest victory that the proabortion forces have won is the liberalized New York abortion law. In 1970 the New York state legislature voted to replace the state's 1865 abortion law—one of the most strict in the country, a law that allowed abortions only to save the life of the pregnant woman—with a law that permits abortion on demand when performed by a doctor up to twenty-four weeks of pregnancy. Although setting this time limit, it is the only law today that recognizes a woman's right to abortion within that limit.

The passage of the New York law has implications for women all across the country. In the two years of its existence it has enabled more than 400,000 women to obtain safe, legal abortions. Of all the legal abor-
tions performed in the past year, two-thirds were for out-of-state residents and women from other countries. The maternal death rate—which is mainly caused by botched abortions—has been drastically cut and infant mortality has also sharply decreased.

The mere existence of the New York law has begun to change the attitudes of millions of people toward abortion. The opinion poll cited earlier is one indication of this. And a poll in November for New York state revealed that 70 percent of New Yorkers favor the legalization of abortion, including 58 percent of the Catholics. The New York law has helped dispel the myth that abortion is criminal, or a dangerous operation, or murder of the unborn. It has given hope to all those fighting for abortion law repeal, not only in the United States but around the world. As these victories were won, the right wing stepped up its attacks.

Last spring the New York law was threatened. The legislature voted to repeal the liberalized law, which would have taken New York back to the 1800s if Governor Rockefeller hadn't vetoed the bill. This threat occurred because the right-wing forces out-organized and out-mobilized the proabortion forces. They mounted a public, visible campaign that put pressure on the legislature. They used the kind of tactics that we know are effective in bringing about change. At one point they had a demonstration outside the Knights of Columbus convention that drew over 10,000 people.

Nixon added steam to the attack on the New York law by the Catholic Church hierarchy when he sent a personal letter to Cardinal Cook of the New York Archdiocese in support of the attempts by the right wing.

While the Right to Life forces were out aggressively organizing and mobilizing large numbers of people into action, much of the abortion-rights movement was supporting McGovern and other liberal candidates who they thought would vote "the right way." They counterposed working for candidates to organizing large-scale public actions by women. This had the effect of subordinating the abortion struggle to the elections. Shirley Maclaine articulated that position very precisely. She supports abortion law repeal, but felt that women had to be involved in "pragmatic politics" and the most important thing for women to do was to work to elect George McGovern. She said that for the election period abortion should be put "on the back burner."

The largest and most influential women's liberation organizations in the country took this approach. The leadership of the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the National Women's Political Caucus abstained from organizing an effective answer to the antiabortion reactionaries. Rather than making a visible protest and showing the power of women united in action when the New York law was threatened, a decisive section of the leadership of NOW preferred to work behind the scenes and keep everything quiet.

During the entire election period, the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) was the only women's group that consistently took up the fight for a woman's right to abortion. When the crisis hit last May in New York, WONAAC jumped right in and organized activities. It was no longer an abstract theoretical discussion of whether or not WONAAC should raise the demand for free abortion or legalized abortion. What WONAAC had to do was clear. It had to defend the right to abortion in New York. It had to defend the New York law from the antiabortion forces.

WONAAC took the initiative in organizing a counter-demonstration to the Right to Life demonstration; it organized women to go to Albany in a show of force; and it organized a demonstration of some 1,500 people on May 6 in New York City.

WONAAC was formed a year and a half ago to organize a nationally coordinated campaign to win the right of women to abortion. Since then WONAAC has done precisely that. It stood firm under the election pressures. It has withstood red-baiting attacks. And WONAAC can be proud of its record. With a program of action around the central demands of Repeal All Abortion Laws, Repeal Restrictive Contraception Laws, End Forced Sterilization, WONAAC has been successful in reaching out and involving women who want to carry out the kind of struggle that can be effective.

When the Supreme Court heard the Texas and Georgia suits, WONAAC was there with a picket line at the White House. "Respect Life Week," organized by the Catholic Church, was renamed "Women's Right to Choose Week" and WONAAC gathered women to picket the offices of the New York Archdiocese. WONAAC has carried out varied activities from the Abortion
Action Week last May, to the class action suits and the abortion referenda that appeared on the ballot in Michigan and Massachusetts.

Among the most successful activities sponsored by WONAAC were the abortion hearings in states all over the country on the weekends of October 21 and 28. They involved a fairly broad range of groups and prominent individuals, including representatives from various unions. The hearings made contacts with Black and Latino groups and involved some Black women and Latinas as individuals. Some of the most moving testimony was from high-school women. Through the hearings WONAAC offered women the opportunity to participate in, lead, and make decisions about an effective response to the situation in their state. Many volunteers became actively involved and took major responsibility on various aspects of the hearings. As a result, WONAAC was able to broaden its base and draw many previously uninvolved women into activity. This is the kind of participation that is needed to make WONAAC a strong and viable organization.

The Young Socialist Alliance played an important role in the formation of WONAAC and has been a consistent supporter and builder of its activities since its formation. We have fought to maintain WONAAC's struggle perspective and to keep up the fight.

What the YSA said a year and a half ago about the abortion fight has been proven true. Abortion has exploded onto the scene as a national political issue and women have begun to organize around it. The YSA recognized that abortion was the first big issue of controversy to emerge within the feminist movement and could be a key to advancing the entire women's liberation struggle. If women can win victories through struggle around the question of abortion, it will take the entire feminist movement a giant step forward. It will give women confidence in their power, and lay the basis for future struggle.

We realize that this is going to be a long, hard fight. And right now we are coming to the most crucial battle the women's movement has yet faced. The biggest gain that the abortion campaign has made to date is in danger of being overturned. The liberalized New York law that was almost taken away last spring is in clear danger of being rolled back to the 1865 criminal abortion law. The legislature that convenes in January has an antiabortion majority and may vote the law down. It is imperative that the feminist movement respond as aggressively as possible.

This is a challenge to the women's liberation movement to stand up and fight. To win, it will be necessary to rally the women's, abortion, and radical movements to the fight to defend a woman's right to abortion in New York. If the law is lost it will mean a tremendous setback for the movement. But it will be a bigger setback if we lose without putting up a fight!

The key to winning the fight is getting organized. WONAAC has put out a nationwide call to defend the right to abortion in New York. What is needed is an active, visible defense campaign on a national scale. The eyes of the entire country will be on what happens in New York. And what is done will be an example of how to fight for other countries as well.

The Young Socialist Alliance wants to do everything possible to take up the challenge that is being put forth. As revolutionists we understand the importance that victories have in spurring on the struggle and convincing women to have confidence in their power as a united force. As revolutionists we fight for the democratic right of women to have abortions all across the country. And when women win even the tiniest victories from this powerful ruling class, the YSA joins in the fight to defend those gains.

We don't know how long the fight for abortion law repeal will take in this country and around the world. We don't know how many individual battles will be won or lost along the way. But we do know that the YSA is in for the duration. More and more women are learning every day that to defeat the Right to Lifers the proabortion forces have to be as organized as they are. Women are learning through their experience that the right to abortion has to be fought for. The YSA has confidence in the masses of American women that if we begin the work of organizing now we can not only give the Right to Life forces a real battle in the short run, but we can win this fight for the right to abortion in the long run. This will be a truly historic fight and will shape the development of the entire women's liberation movement.
A BIG STEP FORWARD FOR
THE RAZA UNIDA PARTIES

BY JOSE G. PEREZ

The following article is based on a report to the
Twelfth National Convention of the Young Socialist
Alliance held in Cleveland November 23-26. More
than 1,200 persons attended.

In the recent general elections, Ramsey Muniz, the
Raza Unida Party candidate for governor of
Texas, received more than 200,000 votes. That
is enough to insure that in the next Texas election
Raza Unida candidates will be placed on the ballot
without having to get thousands of signatures on
nominating petitions.

In addition, the party won several local and county
offices in Texas, including five in Zavala county, where
Crystal City is located.

Raza Unida parties ran candidates in several other
states, notably Colorado, where Jose Gonzalez, Raza
Unida candidate for state legislature, won 18 percent
of the vote.

Independent Chicano parties also ran candidates in
California, New Mexico, and Arizona.

Not only did these parties run campaigns with such
impressive results only two and one-half years after the
first Raza Unida Party was founded, but the National
Convention of Raza Unida parties that met in El Paso
last September—and apparently all of the local parties
and candidates—refused to support either Nixon or
McGovern. This meant that the Raza Unida parties
posed themselves as clearly independent alternatives
to the capitalist parties, including the national Demo-
cratic and Republican parties.

At the eleventh Young Socialist National Conven-
tion in Houston [December 28, 1971—January 1,
1972], the YSA analyzed the election year pressures
and what effect they would have on the independent
movements. We concluded that there would tend to be
a decrease in the level of independent activity, as many
activists in the various movements would be duped into
believing that their work for a capitalist candidate could
result in meaningful social change.

Mirta Vidal, reporting on the Chicano struggle to
that convention, said:

"The ruling class can be expected to bring tremendous
pressure to bear on leading activists to tone down
their attacks on the two-party system and to come back
into the Democratic Party fold as the '72 elections de-
velop. . . .

"We would not rule out the possibility that this pres-
sure . . . will take its toll. . . . To many . . . sincere
activists, nonsupport to the Democrats or Republicans
remains a tactical question, not a necessary principle
for advancing the struggle." (From Young Socialist
Strategy for 72, p. 65.)

The question of the 1972 elections was posed in the
Chicano movement in a different way than in the other
independent movements because of the existence of Raza
Unida parties in parts of the Southwest. The question
before the Chicano movement was whether to support
Democratic or Republican Party politicians or to take
the road of independent political action by supporting
the Raza Unida parties.

One of the vehicles that was used to co-opt activists,
especially before the Democratic Party convention, was
supposedly "nonpartisan" caucuses, with a political
agenda and some sort of ongoing structure that would
endorse any person running for office who "endorsed"
the political agenda that came from the caucus.
The first attempt to do this among Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and other Latinos was the National Spanish Speaking Coalition Conference that was held in Washington, D.C., in October 1971 under the auspices of a number of Democratic Party senators and congressmen.

However, instead of the 150 hand-picked "sellouts" who had been invited to come to the conference, almost 1,500 Raza attended. They succeeded in passing motions calling for the building of an independent Chicano party, giving support to the Puerto Rican independence movement, and calling for immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Southeast Asia.

Herman Badillo, Democratic Party congressman from New York, was forced to admit in an interview shortly after this conference that it had been, from his point of view, "a disaster."

The second major attempt, the National Chicano Political Caucus, was held in San Jose, California, last April. This turned out even worse for the Democrats, as nearly 1,000 Chicanos, many of them young, took the conference completely out of the hands of the pro-McGovern forces who organized it. The young militants passed motions supporting the Raza Unida parties; calling for no support to the Democratic or Republican parties; for an end to deportations of undocumented workers, the so-called illegal aliens; for immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Southeast Asia; and for an end to U.S. imperialist domination of Latin America.

After the conference was over, the Mexican-American Political Association (MAPA) and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), which had been two major sponsors of the conference, issued a statement to the press that read in part, "We cannot, do not, and will not support La Raza Unida Party because we are nonpartisan organizations."

This statement is particularly cynical in light of the fact that MAPA has endorsed numerous Anglo and Chicano Democrats and Republicans.

This fall there were also two conferences that could have provided a vehicle for liberal Democrats to give themselves a "Chicano" cover—the MAPA endorsement conference held in California, and the National Land and Culture Congress, which was organized by Reies Lopez Tijerina and a number of Chicano Democrats and was held in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Neither McGovern nor Nixon was able to get the endorsement of MAPA because MAPA members who were Raza Unida supporters attended the conference and fought against any presidential endorsement.

The Albuquerque conference had been planned on an allegedly "nonpolitical" basis, but coming two weeks before the general elections it was clear that its effect, if carried out as planned, would have been that of projecting an image of love and peace between Chicano Democrats and Raza Unida Party militants.

Reies Tijerina, in his opening statement to the conference, appealed for "unity before ideas, leaders, or organizations." More than 300 conference participants jammed into a "unity" workshop and overwhelmingly voted to support the Raza Unida parties and to give no support to either McGovern or Nixon. Tijerina walked out of the "unity" workshop when this motion was passed and he also walked out of the general plenary when it overwhelmingly reaffirmed the workshop decision.

Although the great majority of Chicanos still supported Democratic or Republican candidates in 1972, and many Chicano activists still have illusions about the abilities of these two parties to change society, these
conferences represented clear defeats for Democratic and Republican Party supporters.

The pressure of the elections was also reflected within the camp of those who were active RUP supporters. Some Raza Unida Party activists thought it was possible to make gains from the capitalist parties by promising to support Nixon or McGovern in exchange for concessions.

The flaw of such a strategy is that the two major parties are controlled by the same class. A consistently independent strategy would call for breaking from these two parties as the only way real concessions can be won. As Corky Gonzales, leader of the Denver-based Crusade for Justice, says, "The two-party system is one animal with two heads that feed from the same trough."

Early in the summer, a National Convention of Raza Unida parties was called for El Paso over Labor Day weekend by José Angel Gutiérrez. Many participants in the Chicano movement and the Raza Unida parties expected the two strategies would be debated out fully at the conference and the issues clarified. This did not take place because the proponents of possibly giving support to either Nixon or McGovern did not put forth their views. Also the conference was not structured in such a way as to allow for the fullest free discussion of the issues.

The convention voted overwhelmingly for a position of complete political independence from the two-party system and voted specifically not to endorse either Nixon or McGovern. The conference therefore represented a victory for those forces that wanted no compromise with the Democrats and Republicans. It clearly projected the Raza Unida parties as an independent alternative to the Democrats and Republicans for masses of Chicano people. After El Paso, all reports indicate that no Raza Unida Party endorsed either Nixon or McGovern, and Raza Unida Party spokespeople like José Angel Gutiérrez continued to attack the Democrats and Republicans. Gutiérrez called them "animales," that is, "animals," on one occasion and in response to the attacks on the RUPs by Democrats and Republicans he branded them "damn liars."

The picture that emerges from the development of the Raza Unida parties over the past year is a positive one. Not only did these parties resist the election-year pressure and take a clear no-support stand toward both Nixon and McGovern, but they also ran against many Democrats and Republicans on the local and state-wide levels, and for U.S. Congress.

These independent Chicano campaigns helped to popularize the concept of independent political action, and also provided a vehicle for drawing many more Chicano activists into the work of building the Raza Unida parties.

The fact that RUP candidates linked up the electoral struggle with mass struggles in some cases also helped to strengthen the party. The Muniz campaign, for example, not only supported the Farah clothing workers' strike, but also helped build it by spreading the word about the boycott of Farah products called in conjunction with the strike. The Colorado Raza Unida Party launched its campaign at a demonstration of 5,000 Chicanos called to celebrate Mexican Independence Day.

The Raza Unida parties are beginning to have an impact on the political life of some areas where they ran campaigns. This can be seen by the fact that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference endorsed Ramsey Muniz for governor of Texas at their national convention. Also, the International Paper-Mill Workers Union in Texas endorsed the entire Texas Raza Unida Party slate.

To maximize their potential, the Raza Unida parties need to become mass parties, drawing into active participation tens and hundreds of thousands of Chicano people. The present Raza Unida parties are a nuclei of what could become mass parties. Even these small parties have developed unevenly: In Texas, more than fifty candidates were run, but only three candidates were fielded in California.

The building of a mass independent Chicano political party will be a complicated process. The exact form of this process will depend primarily on two factors: The first is conditions beyond the control of Chicano activists, like the economic situation and the tempo of development of the radicalization. The second is the difficult process of developing the necessary leadership. In looking at the concept of a massive independent
Chicano political party and what should be done to build it, the first thing that must be looked at is why there is a need for such a party.

Chicanos are an oppressed nationality within the boundaries of the United States. The origin of the oppression of Chicanos is the expansion of U. S. capitalism throughout what is now the Southwest during the mid-nineteenth century. The original core of what became the Chicano people were the *Mexicanos* then living in that area.

After the U. S. ripped off this land from Mexico, the rights of Mexicanos were systematically violated. Their lands and mines were stolen by the Anglos, and they were denied equal language, cultural, and other rights with the Anglo settlers.

Starting in the 1890s, many Mexicans emigrated to the U. S. looking for jobs and for a way to escape the economic misery and social turmoil of their homeland. This helped to increase the Chicano population of the Southwest, which was concentrated in rural and farming areas.

During World War II and the period after it, the need for more industrial labor resulted in a great urbanization of the Chicano population. Today, more than 80 percent of all Chicanos live in urban areas and constitute one of the most oppressed layers of the urban proletariat. There are, according to U. S. government statistics, more than 5 million Chicanos in the United States, and some scholars put the figure as high as 10 million.

The Chicano people are doubly oppressed: as part of the urban working class and as an oppressed nationality.

In response to this double oppression, a nationalist consciousness began to develop among Chicanos in the early 1960s. The first signs were the farmworkers movement and the movement to gain back lands stolen from Chicanos in New Mexico.

The late sixties and early seventies saw a growing nationalist movement, particularly among young Chicanos. There were struggles in high schools and colleges, and the massive Chicano antiwar demonstration in August of 1970 which mobilized 30,000 Chicanos against the war and was viciously attacked by Los Angeles cops. The first Raza Unida parties were launched less than three years ago, marking a qualitative leap forward in the Chicano movement. During the whole period of the late sixties and early seventies, Chicano students and youth have played a central role in the development of the movement.

A mass independent chicano political party would be a new stage in the development of the nationalist movement. It would be a tool of the Chicano people in their struggle against the racist oppression they suffer under capitalism. The central focus of such a party would be the struggle to win Chicano control of the barrios, as a concrete expression of the right of Chicanos to self-determination.

Such a party would be involved in fighting all aspects of the oppression of Chicano people. It would fight against the draft and the use of Chicano youth as cannon fodder by U. S. imperialism. It would lead struggles against the racist immigration policies of the U. S. government. It would mobilize support for the farmworkers and other struggles of Chicano workers, for Chicano student struggles, and in defense of political prisoners. It would develop an understanding of and lead campaigns against the triple oppression that Chicanas suffer as part of the working class, of an oppressed nationality, and of the oppressed sex. It would take up the struggle against any and every aspect of the oppression of Chicanos and Chicanas.

For such a party to be successful, it would have to follow a strategy of mobilizing masses of Chicanos around demands addressed to solving the problems Chicanos face in this society. It would use election campaigns as a way of publicizing and helping to build these mass struggles. Because its goal would be to involve masses of Chicanos in the struggle for self-determination, it would have to have a broad, open, democratic structure that would enable masses of Chicanos to fully participate in making decisions about the program and policies of the party. It would be a new type of party, totally unlike the Democratic and Republican parties which do not involve masses of voters in their decisions.

Some radicals argue that, because Chicanos are only a small percentage of the population and cannot make
Michael Harrington's presentation (summary)

"The debate, as far as I am concerned," Michael Harrington began, "is not about whether the Socialist Workers Party or the Socialist Party has best succeeded in creating a socialist cadre, a socialist sect, a group of socialists. If that were the debate, I would concede defeat at the outset." In his view, neither organization could claim proof that its program is correct on the basis of their "pathetic size" in relation to the power of American capitalism.

Rather than discuss the organizational successes or failures of the two parties, Harrington proposed to examine (1) "the perception of social reality on the part of the American Trotskyists"; (2) "the perception of reality on the part of the democratic socialists, for whom I speak"; and (3) "the strategy that follows from that perception of reality."

1. The Trotskyist view of American reality. Harrington singled out the following sentence from the main political resolution adopted by the Socialist Workers Party 1971 convention: "Today's radicalization is bigger, deeper, and broader than any previous radicalization." This analysis was disproved, he said, by the reelection of Richard Nixon by a substantial margin over his liberal challenger George McGovern. The vote indicated, he added, that "a significant section of the American working class... moved not to the left, but to the right."

Harrington gave his own view of the level of political consciousness of those sectors of the population that the SWP has contended are in the process of radicalizing. Students. Rather than having achieved "unprecedented social weight and power," as the SWP resolution had said, Harrington charged that the student movement has been "going downhill" since May 1970 and "almost voted by a majority for Nixon." Blacks. "The most conscious elements in the Black community. . . went overwhelmingly for McGovern." Workers. "The American working class did not join the American students on the Nixon question. The American working class was moving toward Nixon."

Harrington raised two principle objections to the conclusions drawn by the SWP on the basis of its view of, as he put it, "an America extremely radical." First, "the SWP campaign most consistently attacked one candidate: McGovern." Second, "you get what I find is the fantastic conclusion of this." Here Harrington again quoted the 1971 SWP convention report: "We [the SWP] have advocated as the correct method of struggle the mobilization of the largest number possible in the streets, and that has a logic of its own: the logic of independent political action which clearly points away from parliamentarism toward socialist revolution." The meaning of this sentence, Harrington charged, was that "elections and that kind of stuff are no longer really meaningful" and that the
question on the agenda is socialist revolution." "If you believe that," he added, "I think you have a version of America that is literally fantastic."

2. Harrington's view of American reality. "It is clear to me," Harrington stated, "that America needs profound social change. The question we are debating is: How do we get it?" The place to begin, he said, was with the American working class. "I do not mean the American working class as it should be. I mean the American working class as it is, organized in unions that it has built and to which most workers are loyal." In describing the working class "as it is," Harrington made this assessment of George Meany, the head of the AFL-CIO:

"Meany's foreign policy is, from my point of view, bad; his sitting out the election was terrible; but George Meany and the trade-union movement on tax policy, on national health insurance, on full employment, on planning, on social security, on poverty, on all of these issues they represent the mass left wing of American society. . . . Therefore, in my analysis, rather than to tell workers who have just voted for Nixon that we're on the verge of revolution and they should come into the streets, I want to win them back to the Democratic Party."

The oppressed national minorities, Harrington said, are "obviously, outrageously, and discriminatorily poor." But, "if all of the poor got together and organized and voted or did anything they could not transform this society." Their only hope is to be "part of a majority coalition." The "socialist strategy," he said, "has to be a strategy of emphasizing the class solidarity of Black and white workers for enough jobs for all . . . not to set Black and white worker against one another." He opposed the demand for Black control of the Black communities on the ground that it divided Blacks and whites.

As for students, they "still come from more privileged homes." The student movement is inherently "episodic." "It does not have, as the SWP thinks, unprecedented social weight. . . . [It] has within it a tendency toward elitism and righteousness which can even be expressed in terms of a commitment to the rhetorical working class and an opposition to real unions."

3. Harrington's tactical proposals. "As long as it is possible to have nonviolent parliamentary change," he argued, "I think it is absolutely criminal to talk about going into the streets." He insisted that there are significant differences between the Republican and Democratic parties: "I'm aware that they're both
representatives of capitalist ideology. One representative is a capitalist ideology naked, bare, reactionary; the other, a capitalist ideology in motion and a movement behind it which has elements of socialism.

The thing to do, he said, was to get "behind the liberal candidates of the Democratic Party . . . because if there's any hope for liberalism, that is the precondition of the hope for socialism. Socialism will not come out of a liberal defeat in this country." The real task for socialists, he asserted, is to "patiently reassemble a majority coalition to win the congress in '74 and to elect a president in '76."

In conclusion, Harrington cited Marx's opposition to the ultraleftism of the "true socialists" in the 1840s and his collaboration with "bourgeois liberal antisocialist trade unionists in England" in the 1860s. "And I propose to the radical of the 1970s to be as radical as Karl Marx was in his lifetime. And if unfortunately the struggle requires the socialists in America today, as it does, to fight for the victory of liberalism against conservatism in order to prepare the way for the possibility of socialism . . . that's what the radical does."

George Novack's presentation

There are two sorts of Social Democrats in this country. The conservative kind, such as Sidney Hook, who voted for the Communist candidates in 1932 and for Nixon in 1972. And the liberal type, like my opponent Michael Harrington, who enthusiastically endorsed McGovern.

However, there are genuine socialists around who have not and will not on principle support any capitalist party or candidate. Since 1948 they have run their own independent socialist presidential campaigns, as Debs did. These belong to the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance, and I shall discuss the road to socialism in the United States from their revolutionary Marxist standpoint.

My presentation will deal with three aspects of this topic: the character of the Socialist Party-Democratic Socialist Federation of which Michael Harrington is still a member; his approach to Marxism and the struggle for socialism; and then the positions of American Trotskyism.

The Socialist Party is part of the Second International which embraces political personages such as Willy Brandt, Harold Wilson, Guy Mollet, and Golda Meir. In his book Socialism, Michael Harrington states that the socialist movement aims "to socialize the already social means of production." This is correct. Why, then, have none of the Social Democratic parties from Germany in 1918 to England in the 1960s decided or dared to carry through the socialization of the means of production, as the Bolsheviks did after 1917 under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky, the mentors of our movement, or as the Castro leadership did in Cuba in 1961?

Instead, when in office, all of them have acted as caretakers of the capitalist regime and upheld private ownership and profiteering at the expense of the working people. The explanation for their political conduct was long ago given by Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky, and other revolutionary adversaries of reformist socialism. These parties are not interested in organizing the workers to abolish capitalist property relations, the aim of socialism. In their most radical flights they are proponents of the monopolist welfare-warfare state and never proceed beyond that point in political practice. Though they may retain a socialist label, and utter socialist phrases, they act as liberals and even, as in Michael Harrington's case, speak for liberalism. Harrington's party stands even to the right of the liberals.

The Socialist Party-Democratic Socialist Federation is a puny specimen of this species, as Michael Harrington himself indicates. It has all their negative and none of their positive features. The Second International parties of Western Europe, England, and Canada have a broad mass base, are linked with the trade unions, and have numerous parliamentary representatives. The Socialist Party here is nothing but a houseboy for the AFL-CIO bureaucracy and an off-stage noise in the Democratic Party.

"Imagine Marx's indignation at the spectacle of a so-called Socialist Party divided over which capitalist ticket to support in the most vicious capitalist country in the world!"

"Imagine Marx's indignation at the spectacle of a so-called Socialist Party divided over which capitalist ticket to support in the most vicious capitalist country in the world!"

in the Democratic Party.

The Socialist Party has been suspicious of or hostile toward all the progressive and militant currents of the developing radicalization. I don't say the revolution is here, or around the corner. What our party talks about is the developing radicalization. Any student knows the difference between the temper and action of the campuses in the 1960s and 1970s as compared with the 1950s. It's not the difference between night and day, but it's certainly the difference between total starlight and a very promising morning.

The Socialist Party opposes Black nationalism, Black control of the Black communities, and the formation of an independent Black party. It is equally opposed to the Chicano La Raza Unida parties. It has refused to advocate U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam when even the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street
MOST McGovern PROPOSALS ARE SOUND

AMERICA

By Max Green

NEW AMERICA, official publication of the Socialist Party, debates whether McGovern is too radical. Max Green, national secretary of the Young People's Socialist League, argues that McGovern is soft on Communism.

department policies than the left liberals.

Is this too harsh and unfair an indictment? Let us listen to the judgment of Harrington himself who has just quit as its cochairman. In his letter of resignation he wrote that "the Socialist Party . . . is today doing the work of Richard Nixon" because the party newspaper and some of its most prestigious leaders "bitterly attack the New Politics constituency" behind McGovern. The party has supported those who backed "reactionary anti-Communists as an alternative to communism," such as Chiang, Batista, Diem, and the generals in Indochina. "For some time now," he says, "the Socialist Party has refused to support American withdrawal from Vietnam." Speaking more plainly, this party, like its counterparts elsewhere, is pro-imperialist in deeds and has swung so far to the right that even a McGovern partisan like himself cannot remain silent about its reactionary course.

Despite his stated differences, Harrington is staying with the party. However, it is questionable how long he can peacefully coexist with a National Committee majority that has condemned him for making "irresponsible and misleading statements" which were "designed to do damage to our Socialist organization and to injure the reputations of individual members who have served it loyally." Social Democratic leaders have traditionally cherished its most right-wing elements and moved against any outspoken critics on its left. I can personally testify to this rule, having been expelled from the SP in 1937 along with other Trotskyists for objecting to its support of the Republican La Guardia for mayor of New York.

Harrington believes that the road to socialism in the United States runs through the Democratic Party. This is one of the most pernicious illusions and deceptions in American politics. The Democratic Party dates from 1860. It's the oldest political organization in the world. Before the Civil War it was a reliable agency of the slaveholding planters and after that of the capitalist rulers. In the twentieth century, every one of its men in the White House, from Wilson to Johnson, solicited votes with exorbitant promises of social reforms, and all without exception ended by taking the country into war. Harrington himself advised Lyndon Johnson's administration on how to conduct its fake "war on poverty." As he himself acknowledges, the gap between rich and poor is today wider and deeper than ever in the richest country of the entire capitalist world. Johnson wound down his antipoverty program as he escalated military intervention in Vietnam.

In his statement to the press, Harrington concluded, "In resigning the National Co-Chairmanship I hope—I feel—that I have vindicated the tradition of Debs and Thomas." This is not so. From the time he helped found the Socialist Party to the day of his death Debs never supported the Democratic Party which jailed him for his union activities and then for his ant-war stand. He carried on independent socialist electoral activities against "the gold-dust twins" of big business, just as the Socialist Workers Party did in 1972. The Jenness and Pulley ticket was the only one that "vindicated the real tradition of Debs" in this election.

In a half hour I cannot fully examine Harrington's conceptions of socialism, although his practice speaks louder than his theories. He professes, as you have heard, to be a follower of Marx, though not of Engels, and a faithful interpreter of his doctrines. But he portrays a Marx that resembles himself far more than the original. He tries to remake Marx, the tiger, into a tabby-cat, a moderate Social-Democratic reformist and gradualist who was unfortunately subject to fits of ultra-leftism, as in 1850 when he projected the process and program of permanent revolution and in 1871 when he hailed the Paris Commune and the dictatorship of the proletariat. At more sober times Marx was presumably a parliamentarian socialist who prefigured the Social-Democratic reformists from Bernstein to Harold Wilson, whose guiding principle was, as Engels said of the Fabians, "anguish before revolution."

Actually, as Engels emphasized in his speech at the graveside in 1883, "Marx was before all else a revolutionary. . . . His real mission in life was to contribute in one way or another to the overthrow of capitalist society and of the state institutions which it had brought into being, to contribute to the liberation of the present-day proletariat. . . . Fighting was his element." Imagine Marx's indignation at the spectacle of a so-called Socialist Party divided over which capitalist ticket to support in the most vicious capitalist country in the world! What a theme for satire!

Instead of contributing to its overthrow, Harrington himself conceives that his cothinkers in Germany and England became "so-
cialist administrators of capitalism." He seeks to explain away their cowardice and treachery to socialism on the ground that they had no alternative. He asserts that they at least made capitalism more humane, rational, and stable. Only the third claim is true. Although the Social Democratic governments have helped stabilize and in certain cases even save capitalism from the workers' revolution, they have not made it more rational or humane.

Harrington maintains that, according to Marx, "democracy is the essence of socialism." Marx certainly didn't teach that a bourgeois party like the Democrats was a means for realizing that essence, or even defending it. (Although as revolutionary socialists we will work together with anyone that wants to defend any democratic rights of the people.) Marx taught that the way to achieve democracy was by expropriating the capitalists through the direct action of the proletariat and its allies. By exalting democracy in the abstract and slighting the importance of its class roots and socioeconomic basis, Harrington slurs over the irreconcilable difference between bourgeois and workers' democracy that separates authentic Marxism from liberalism and its Social-Democratic shadow. Marx, like Lenin and Trotsky, fought against the big and little bourgeois democrats for their hypocrisy all his life whereas Harrington is at home with them.

In his presentation Harrington asked you to contrast our view of America with his. All right, let's look at his Social Democratic view of the contemporary world. It is enveloped in unreality in at least three main respects. First, he wipes out the significance of all the victorious socialist revolutions in this century from Russia in 1917 to Cuba in 1959. To believe him, humanity has not taken immense forward steps through the abolition of capitalist relations in fourteen countries over fifty years. All these peoples have allegedly plunged into a retrogressive "new form of class society" heralded by Bismarck that he calls "bureaucratic collectivism." The successful worker-peasant revolutions from Lenin to Castro have not only been anticapitalist but, according to him, even more: anti-socialist (something that the American and other capitalists have failed to recognize).

By making the possession of political authority the prime-determinant of the class nature of a social order Harrington's conception breaks with the Marxist method of historical materialism which singles out the property forms based on the predominant relations of production as the decisive criterion. For example, Italy has remained capitalist under the Savoy monarchy, Mussolini's fascism, and the present parliamentary republic. And, whatever the deformations of their political structures (which we recognize and fight against), the proletarian, anticapitalist, socialist essence of the Russian, Yugoslav, Chinese, Cuban, and Vietnamese revolutions, embracing one-third of the human race, is certified by their elimination of capitalist ownership and establishment of a planned economy and foreign trade monopoly.

Harrington contends that there is no chance for either a bourgeois revolution or a socialist one under present conditions in the colonial world because of their poverty and underdevelopment. What, then, are these peoples to do? They represent the majority of humankind! Harrington is very pessimistic about their prospects. The best he can recommend to the Third World and the socialist world is the promotion of capitalist farming as a mode of economic development, as recommended by Gunnar Myrdal, another Social Democrat.

Fortunately, the backward nations dominated and exploited by the imperialist giants (often administered by his Social-Democratic friends), have not and will not follow such defeatist advice. They have proceeded, wherever possible, to try and drive out the foreign and native capitalists and landlords and, I'll admit, under extremely adverse conditions, take the road toward socialism. There is no other road for them under the given conditions. It is true that, because of inherited economic and cultural backwardness, military, economic, diplomatic encirclement and even attacks of imperialism, and the policies of the Stalinist parties and regimes, these predominantly peasant lands suffer terribly from bureaucratic misrule and mismanagement and are far from the norms of workers' democracy promised by socialism. From their inception the Trotskyist move-

"Harrington assures us that George Meany has 'moved toward socialism with capitalist banners.' I refuse to admit that Meany is more of a socialist than I am."
North Vietnam, China, and Cuba. He is a sophisticated advocate of a nonexistent "third camp" which claims to stand above both the pro-imperialist and anti-imperialist forces contending for supremacy in the civil war raging there. When there's a civil war in progress, you've got to take sides. Which side are you on? The same as in a strike against the bosses. But when the chips are down, he refuses to side with the actual struggle of the oppressed against their oppressors in Vietnam—and not only there.

Now we come to Harrington's positions in domestic politics; you've already heard his own exposition of them. He claims that the Trotskyists have a fantastic vision of contemporary America. I'd like to point out that his views are even more unrealistic in theory and conservative in practice than those of the very practical-minded heads of the trade-union movement and the United States government. While he remains blind to the nature and achievements of the revolutions that have actually taken place since 1917 in other parts of the world, he has discovered—listen to this—that a new mass political party has emerged in the United States during the postwar period that no one but he has perceived. Under George Meany's auspices the AFL-CIO has created a "labor party of sorts" that he calls "the American Social Democracy" and defines as "a class political movement of workers which seeks to democratize many of the specific powers of capital but does not denounce capitalism itself."

No one but he has noticed and glorified this political prodigy—I don't think anyone else here in this room has noticed it. He terms it "the invisible mass movement" because it only exists in his imagination. This fantasy has a practical purpose. It serves to justify the submergence of the Socialist Party into the Democratic Party and its subordination to the policies of the union bureaucracy from Meany to Woodcock. The Canadian unions have built an independent labor party, the New Democratic Party. They participate in elections and call for votes in their own name, and through the recent elections acquired a balance of power in parliament. But the heads of many of the same international unions below the border find even McGovern too radical. Yet Harrington assures us that Meany and his ilk have "moved toward socialism with capitalist banners." Who's he kidding apart from himself? Most liberals, let alone radicals, recognize that Meany speaks for the most reactionary forces in the labor movement who hate and fear and even crush all manifestations of militancy, not to mention socialism, and consort at ease with the worst enemies of the working class and oppressed minorities. I refuse to admit that Meany is more of a socialist than I am and has worked more effectively for that end.

Harrington does point to the wrongs of capitalism and has a vision of socialism. He hopes to attain it by the gradual accumulation of structural reforms, stealthily stripping the capitalist owners of their privileges, property rights, and powers, and thus pass gently and quietly to the new order. He disregards the laws of the class struggle as enunciated by Marx, and rejects the strategy of the organization and action of the masses directed toward the conquest of power which is the heart of Marxism.

In his exposition Harrington attributed to us a caricature of what we mean by "going into the streets." Do you want to know what we mean, under present conditions, by "going into the streets"? Mobilizing as many people as possible against the war, and we've succeeded in doing that. We've succeeded, against the opposition of the Socialist Party, in building the most powerful anti-imperialist-war movement since the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, a movement which brought out more than 500,000 people in front of the national capitol building not so long ago. That's what we mean by going into the streets and not relying upon a Johnson or a McGovern to get peace for you.

Harrington also overlooks the lessons of the American War of Independence and the Civil War along with the experiences of all the revolutions and counterrevolutions of this century. What makes him think the imperialists who have inflicted such death and destruction on the Vietnamese freedom-fighters will abide by the peaceful progression to the socialist future he envisages for this country?

Harrington does not adhere to the best traditions of Debs as he claims, but rather to the miserable traditions of Bernstein, Millerand, the Mensheviks, Blum, and Attlee. His interpretation and application of socialism has no more in common with genuine Marxism than the Democratic Party he clings to has with the revolutionary democracy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Now I'd like to give you a brief account of what the Socialist Workers Party stands for. We carry forward the methods and ideas applied by Marx, Engels, Luxemburg, and Trotsky. The founders of our movement, James P. Cannon, Vincent Dunne, and others, were active in the IWW, the SP of the Debs days, and the early years of the American Communist Party. They transmitted the valuable gist of their experiences to us. As Fourth Internationalists, we defend as progressive...
the socialist economic base and all other gains of the fourteen countries where capitalism has been uprooted, but we oppose and criticize their bureaucratic regimes. We support the demands and moves of intellectuals, students, workers, and peasants in the postcapitalist countries to improve their situation and win democratic rights and decision-making powers in their economies and governments. We back any step of the colonial peoples to gain self-determination against imperialism and say that aim can be achieved only through a socialist revolution. This includes the struggle of the Palestinians against the Zionist state to return to their homeland.

Here at home the SWP and YSA do their best to participate in every movement of the poor and the oppressed to better their conditions and wrest concessions and reforms from the capitalist rulers and their state. We're not opposed to reforms; we fight for them. But like Rosa Luxemburg, we look upon them as steps that lead to the supreme objective of taking power. We have been among the most consistent builders of the antiracist actions, as I mentioned. We support the Black and Chicano liberation struggles and favor the launching of an independent Black party. We support La Raza Unida parties and independence for Puerto Rico. Our women members are among the hardest-working feminists and organizers for the repeal of antiabortion laws. Our party speaks out against any victimization of gays.

We call for an end to Nixon's wage-freeze and urge the formation of a class-struggle left wing in the unions to restore democracy to its ranks, which Meany and the others have deprived them of. We propose the building of a real labor party by the unions, not the fictitious alignment hailed by Harrington that keeps labor tied to the political machines of big business and is responsible for the reactionary attitudes of millions of American workers because they're not given any alternative by their union leaders or even by the spokesmen of the Social Democratic party.

All of our activities, from support of student rights to independent electoral campaigns are designed to promote a revitalized and honest socialist movement and build a revolutionary combat party that can transform itself from a group of propagandists for socialist ideas into an organization of mass influence capable of leading millions of people, Black, Brown, and white, female and male, to the overthrow of monopolist misrule and thereby bring a new birth of freedom to America.

**Harrington's rebuttal**

In his rebuttal, Michael Harrington dwelt on four questions: the nature of the Democratic Party; the possibility of socialist revolution in underdeveloped countries; the class nature of the Soviet Union; and the attitude socialists should take toward liberalism.

The Democratic Party, he said, is "a capitalist party containing practically the entire working class [and] radicalized sections of the middle class . . . American political parties offer radicals some possibility of working for significant change within them."

In the underdeveloped countries, Harrington argued, "I think it is basically patronizing to tell people who do not have the material preconditions for socialism: 'Go ahead and make a socialist revolution.' They don't have the possibility of socialism." As an example he cited the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam: "One of the reasons I don't dance in the streets about the Vietcong is that I remember what they did to George Novack's comrades . . . . You know what Ho Chi Minh did? He killed them [the Indochinese Trotskyists]."

On the Soviet Union Harrington commented: "George Novack says, why don't I talk about the way they've nationalized property? Because it is a nationalization against the working class, that's why." The USSR "is not the image of what I want. If you want to ask me about an image, I will give you Sweden, I will give you England, I will give you those countries which have democracy and social change."

On relations with liberals, Harrington concluded: "Liberals are the worst enemy of socialists. . . . In the same way that the German Communists and Trotsky slapped them for this—said 'The Social Democrats are the worst enemy . . . . they are social fascists . . . .' And I think that strategy in Germany in the 1930s, or in America in the 1970s, is a disastrous strategy. "Liberals are the mass left wing of American society . . . . If we are ever going to build a socialist movement in America we will not build it on the basis of principled hostility to liberals and their candidates, but on the basis of socialists participating with liberals and candidates in the struggle for immediate gains and generalizing those immediate struggles."
Michael Harrington will develop the point. Election campaigns at least give you the opportunity to tell the truth about socialist ideas and proposals to large numbers of people. If you abstain when you have an opportunity to engage in them, you are defaulting on a major educational as well as political and organizational obligation.

The socialist movement in this country, not to speak of the early years of the Communist Party, was built and attracted millions of very devoted people and voters because they broke loose from the Democratic Party and appealed directly to the people for an alternative along fundamentally different lines. That’s the tradition that we are carrying forward. As a matter of fact, we’re the only political organization that’s carrying it forward. Study the history of the socialist movement in this country. Look at what happened in the 1930s. The Communist Party in 1936 began back-handed support of Roosevelt. The Socialist Party in two segments; the old guard before the Second World War; the Socialist Party of Norman Thomas and Harrington after the Second World War went over and supported the Democratic candidate.

That’s one of the chief reasons for the discreditment, the disintegration, the weakening of the socialist movement in this country. The only way you’re going to have a fresh beginning is to break with that terrible capitulation to the major capitalist parties and build your own movement, because only the younger generation like yourselves are going to build it. If you don’t do it, maybe your generation won’t even survive in this atomic era. So it’s up to you to weigh the alternatives.

On the question of the students, Harrington argued that we overestimate the social weight of the students. We don’t think so. There are ten million students in this country. They are agglomerated in colossal institutions. They are the people who are going to have a large part in shaping the future, and even directing its political life. We have no argument that the working class is going to be the major vehicle of social change; neither one of us are partisans of Marcuse and his arguments. But what do you do until the doctor comes?

Meanwhile, the students are in motion. They need some guidance, don’t they? They need some organization. And anyone who doesn’t understand 1970, the greatest strike of students in all of human history, doesn’t understand the potential of the student movement, or its political influence.

The students were the backbone of the antiwar movement. They drove LBJ back to Texas and forced him to abdicate."

“Harrington argued that we overestimate the social weight of the students. We don’t think so. The students were the backbone of the antiwar movement. They drove LBJ back to Texas and forced him to abdicate.”

You have to understand these fluctuations. The trouble is that the Black movement, like the workers’ movement, has not yet found adequate leadership or political expression. And our duty is not to depreciate them, or the ups and downs in the situations, but to give advice and aid to them as best we can and as much as we can. That’s the function of a revolutionary socialist organization. Just as it’s the function of a socialist youth organization to give guidance to students and to young workers.

Harrington blames us for concentrating on McGovern as the main enemy. The reason is simple: because he’s more deceptive than Nixon. More people are fooled by him. In 1964 we considered Johnson to be more dangerous in regard to war and peace than Goldwater. Why? Because most people could see that Goldwater was hell-bent on taking expanded action in Vietnam. Johnson was doing it; he was preparing for it; but he wasn’t going to reveal that to the American people. He was telling them lies, and everything that has been printed, everything you have experienced since then, has shown it. That’s why we had the obligation to expose him and we did. We were the only ones who stood out against that, and history proved us right.
Neither of these books are "scholarly" works, although Terrill, at least, as a Research Fellow in Chinese affairs at Harvard's East Asian Center, has some credentials as a China expert. Both fall into the category of China travelogs, a genre that has burgeoned on the American book market since the thaw preceding Nixon's visit set in early in 1971. By their nature such books are disappointing. They reveal a tantalizing glimpse of the physical reality of today's China: what it looks like, how people dress, what they eat, how much they are paid. They provide a corrective to the purely documentary studies and to the gleanings of foreign and domestic policy available in the strictly controlled official Peking press. At the same time they are inherently structured by the brevity of the visit, the whirlwind tours, the omnipresence of official guides, the reluctance of individual citizens to speak freely with an unknown foreigner in front of party cadres, and the large areas of public and private life that are effectively off limits to visitors.

If the situation were reversed the difficulties of such reportage would be obvious. Suppose a Chinese journalist, speaking little or no En-
Maria Antonietta Macciocchi is a member of the Italian Communist Party and was elected to the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the CP ticket. She visited China briefly in 1954, and collected the material for the present book during an eight-week stay during October-December 1970. She and her husband, Alberto Jacoviello, a correspondent for the Italian CP newspaper Unità, were given routine tourist status. Neither of them spoke any Chinese. Nevertheless, they insisted on seeing themselves as unofficial diplomatic envoys imbued with the mission of restoring amicable relations between the Chinese and Italian Communist parties, which have not been on speaking terms since the Sino-Soviet rupture came out in the open in 1960-61. There is no evidence that their mission was accomplished.

All kinds of assumptions about Maoist China, many of which are explicitly contradicted by her own observations, are embedded in her text. The book is filled with such phrases as "The Chinese say..." (followed by the standard government epithets against Liu Shao-ch'i); "In an absolutely egalitarian society such as China appears to be..." (ignoring the press campaign which had already begun denouncing the advocacy of egalitarianism as a political crime); or "the line of Mao Tse-tung, which has been nourishing the Chinese masses for a half century." When she sees detachments of soldiers of the People's Liberation Army along the road, they are always, as she puts it, "on their way to help the peasants."

Nevertheless, there is a good deal of interesting information on the state of the universities, the nature of the famous May 7 cadre schools, the organization of power in the factories, etc.

A general picture of the accomplishments of the Chinese revolution emerges from these two books, as well as other recent additions to the literature, such as Klaus Mehnert's China Returns (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1972). It remains a poor, and in many respects an underdeveloped, country. But many of the most glaring evils of the capitalist underdeveloped world have been eliminated. Prostitution, opium addiction, starvation, and unemployment are things of the past. Food is plentiful and cheap. Wages remain low (60 yuan [US$24] per month for an average factory worker in the cities; about half that for agricultural workers on rural communes). But, as Macciocchi reports, "The best meat costs 1.60 yuan a kilo [2.2 pounds]; fish costs 70 fen [100 fen equal 1 yuan] a kilo; eggs, sold by weight, cost 18 fen a kilo; a kilo of chicken is 1.40 yuan." (p. 164) Rent may be as low as 1 yuan [US $.40] a month, and medical care is provided for a nominal charge.

More durable consumer goods are not cheap. A wristwatch or a bicycle cost about two months' pay for the average worker (120 yuan), but many families are able to afford them. Televisions, motorcycles, and automobiles, while available, are clearly beyond the reach of any ordinary citizen.

In comparison to other underdeveloped countries, particularly India, the progress in living standards and social welfare has been spectacular and fully vindicates the system of planned production made possible by the socialist revolution of 1949.

At the same time, the hand of the bureaucracy is evident at all levels of Chinese society.

Universities since the Cultural Revolution

Macciocchi visited Tsinghua University, a polytechnic college in Peking. It was administered by a Revolutionary Committee (the organizations that have effectively replaced the local government apparatus since the Cultural Revolution), composed of a "three-in-one" combination of industrial workers, military representatives, and school personnel (teachers, administrators, and students). Students in China have been suspect since the Red Guards threatened to get out of Mao's control at the end of 1966 and were replaced by the army as the principal enforcer of the political order. Macciocchi adroitly dodged any discussion of this sensitive issue, but her meeting with the Tsinghua Revolutionary
Committee confirmed that China’s student population is still only a fraction of what it was before the Cultural Revolution. One member of the committee told her:

"Before the Cultural Revolution this university had 10,000 students. When it reopened its doors as a socialist university on June 15, 1970, it readmitted 800 students on the basis of new admission standards. Now, at the end of October 1970, there are 2,800 students." (p. 54)

The new standards are supposed to favor the children of workers and peasants, but clearly when the total enrollment is so sharply restricted this can have little application for the Chinese masses. The new standards downgrade educational performance and replace it with the criterion of unwavering loyalty to the regime. Dissidents are frankly and openly denied the right to attend even if they happen to be workers or peasants. Liu Min-yi, a member of the university’s Revolutionary Committee, explained the screening process:

"In running the university we are guided by three principles. (1) We help all those whose ideas conform to Mao’s thought. (2) We help and re-educate all those who express ideas that to not conform to Mao’s thought. (3) We organize the masses for struggle against those who oppose Mao’s thought." (p. 64)

In addition to the decline in enrollment, the course of study has been reduced from seven to three years.

Terrill was in China some six months later, during the summer of 1971, accompanying Gough Whitlam, the head of the Australian Labor Party. His delegation, unlike Macciocchi’s, was given diplomatic status by the Chinese and he saw a number of things she did not, including Peking University, the most important institution of higher learning in China. He writes:

"After two or three years without classes, many universities began again last fall with a small, hand-picked enrollment. At Peking University... where there used to be 9,000 students, the new class of September, 1970, numbered 2,667. At Fu Tan in Shanghai, formerly with 9,000, there were 1,196; at S.Y.S.U. [Sun Yat-sen University in Canton], 547 where there were previously 4,700; at Hunan Normal College... 440 against 6,000 before the Cultural Revolution.... These hothouse students are a new breed. None come direct from Middle School, but only after two to three years at farm or factory. They must be ‘politically sound’ as well as bright and physically fit.... An astonishing number of the new students are members of the Party or the Communist Youth League. At S.Y.S.U., for instance, 229 of the 547 students are Chinese Communist party and another 240 are CYL members." (pp. 120-21)

While the universities have been restricted to party members, the regime has stepped up its campaign to deport masses of youth to the countryside. The Chinese press has insisted that there is nothing punitive about these transfers, but sufficient indications slip through to make this claim dubious. The displaced young people are not permitted to return to the cities. Nor is the official reason for their transfer to raise the educational level of the countryside. As the government news agency Hsinhua reported in its September 15-16, 1972, release: "Millions of educated youth from the cities have settled down in mountainous areas and countryside since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. They are maturing politically thanks to re-education by the poor and lower-middle peasants." The same article reported that "400,000 educated young people have settled in the Chinese countryside since the beginning of this year." In contrast to the overwhelming percentage of party members among the reduced university classes, the millions of young people sent to the countryside are regarded as suspect by the regime. One of the few statistics available appeared in a July 4, 1972, Hsinhua dispatch, which reported that of 20,000 "educated young people" sent from Peking to the Yenan area, only 118 have been admitted into the Communist Party.

In passing, Macciocchi confirmed the existence of one of the little-known methods used by the Maoist leadership to ensure political orthodoxy: the individual dossier. This apparently came into use in the form of files on government employees in the days when there were a great many holdovers from the Kuomintang regime. With the expansion of obligatory "self-criticism" circles on the job or at school, such
A Liuist work team was sent to the students, party cadres, and soldiers. Maciocchi was assured by a member of the Revolutionary Committees that large numbers of those accused of bureaucratism in the gastronomic arts. But that should not be confused with mass control over party or state. It was Lenin who said that every cook should learn how to govern. Under Mao every government official is taught how to cook.

The objection was not to the use of dossiers on individuals' character traits but only to "faked" dossiers.

The party and the Revolutionary Committees

The Revolutionary Committees (RCs) were hailed in the Maoist press at the time of their creation as new organs of workers' democracy, comparable to the Paris Commune. They were to be composed of direct representatives of the masses, party cadres, and soldiers. Maciocchi was assured by a member of the RC in the port of Tientsin that "In deciding how many delegates each of the three groups should send to the revolutionary committee, it was decided that the representatives from the revolutionary masses should comprise a majority." In the Tientsin port this worked out to a committee composed of fourteen party cadres, sixteen direct representatives of the revolutionary masses, and three from the PLA. On closer questioning, however, it turned out that of the thirty-three committee members, twenty-six were party members. (At the nearby Tientsin Textile Factory No. 2, all seven members of the RC standing committee were party members.)

The portworkers' committee was elected in 1968. Unlike the Paris Commune, which insisted on frequent elections and the right of recall, there had been no new elections in the two and a half years since. The RCs are supposed to be elected for a term of one year.

Macciocchi asked: "But before the Cultural Revolution, how were factory elections conducted?" The reply: "Union and party leaders in the factory used to be appointed from above."(p. 155)

The representative of the Tientsin portworkers' RC also indignantly repudiated the myth, nurtured by many Maoist sympathizers in the West, that large numbers of those accused of bureaucratism in the course of the Cultural Revolution were dismissed from the party:

"The bourgeoisie in the West and the revisionists have asserted in their propaganda that we made a clean sweep here. But in fact only a handful of people were replaced —those excluded from the party were no more than 1 percent. They also stupidly asserted that we destroyed the Communist Party . . . The Communists were always in charge at the factory, through their representatives on the revolutionary committee."(p. 156)

The turnover in the party bureaucracy during the Cultural Revolution, then, was slight. Nor were the masses represented directly in the Revolutionary Committees. The last line of defense of the uncritical boosters of the Cultural Revolution is that it reformed the bureaucrats through constructive labor among the masses and reeducation in the May 7 cadre schools. Maciocchi visited one of these schools near Peking. She was told that there are about 100 such schools in China with a total enrollment of about 90,000. They seem to be mostly populated by medium-level party and government functionaries. The minimum attendance is a year, and "students" (many of whom are middle-aged) who do not remodel themselves in that time may stay on indefinitely.

The Chinese Communist Party has anywhere between 17 and 30 million members. Clearly these "schools" are not for the party as a whole. The main item of study seems to be humility, with latrine cleaning and nightsoil collection high on the agenda of subjects, followed by agricultural production, cooking, etc. From every description, the candidates for such "remolding" seem to have been singled out for their insufficient appreciation for Mao's thought—that is, their insensitivity to the demands emanating from the pinnacle of bureaucratic power—not for their especially arrogant attitude toward the masses. Now there may be some social benefit to be derived from instructing party functionaries in the gastronomic arts. But that should not be confused with mass control over party or state. It was Lenin who said that every cook should learn how to govern. Under Mao every government official is taught how to cook.

Despite its syrupy sentimentalism, Maciocchi's book is useful when it sticks to direct observations. It is highly imprecise, however, and often in flagrant contradiction with the truth in its frequent references to prior events in the history of the Chinese workers' state. She misunderstands the character and intent of the Great Leap Forward of 1958, which she refers to as the year of "collectivization in the countryside." (pp. 122-23) This was indeed the year that the communes were created, but the communes represented...
new, larger administrative units, not "collectivization." Once landlordism has been abolished there are three possible forms of organization of the land in a workers' state: individual peasant holdings; collective farms, in which the produce of the land is owned privately but jointly by all the peasants in the collective; and state farms on which the land and crops are owned by the state and the agricultural workers receive a wage. The first form represents petty capitalist property relations in land. The second, which embraces the Chinese communes, is an intermediate property form, more advanced than individual farming but still short of full nationalization.

From the earliest days of the Maoist succession to power some state farms have coexisted with the other two forms. In 1950 there were 1,215 state farms, employing 19,000 persons. In 1958 this had climbed to 1,442 state farms, employing 990,000 persons, still a tiny minority of the peasant population. Thus the communes did not represent nationalization of the land. Even today the communes sell their produce to the state in- inding that they remain a form limited to cooperative agriculture. But collectivization of agriculture had already been completed long before the Great Leap Forward. By the end of 1956, 87.8 percent of the peasant households were members of Advanced Agricultural Production Cooperatives. The main purpose of the communes had nothing to do with "collectivization." Their intent was to put the villages, which were largely dominated by peasant clans, under a broader geographical jurisdiction, by amalgamating several collective farms into one commune, to ensure the collection of a larger grain surplus for the state. By subordinating the village to the larger commune the weight of the party administration in the countryside was increased.

Misapprehension of the anti-peasant purpose of the communes leads Macciocchi to outright falsification of the results of the Great Leap Forward in the countryside. She writes: "The fine crops of the years that followed testified to the superiority of the people's communes." (p. 235)

In fact there was massive peasant resistance to the grain exactions made by the party-controlled commune administrations. This was reflected in disastrous harvests for years afterward.

The only good harvest of the period was in 1958, the year the communes were introduced, when 207 million tons of grain were collected. But the 1958 crop had been planted before the communes were created. In 1959 the harvest fell to 163 million tons and went still lower in 1960, to 150 million.

Today's "communes" are a hybrid between the centralized commune of 1958 and the production cooperatives of 1956-57. The real decision-making unit in most communes today is the production brigade, usually contiguous with a village. This reflects the failure, not the success, of the government's efforts to sub-ordinate the clan-dominated villages to the party-dominated communes.

The Cultural Revolution, in addition to being a purge of the forces around Liu Shao-ch'i, aimed at striking a new compromise with the villages. In exchange for higher grain prices to the production brigades, the government stressed a general speedup in agriculture and industry. Macciocchi inadvertently documented this lengthening and intensification of the workday. Wan Shen-yin, a representative of the standing committee of the Revolutionary Committee at the Evergreen commune near Peking told her that the harvest that previously took two weeks was accomplished in 1970 in one week. Wan added:

"In the past when we had to go back to the fields at night, the members of the commune refused. Now even these sacrifices are made, and, as I said, the work has improved." (p. 246)

In Shanghai, one Maoist official told Macciocchi that in 1967 many workers "doubled or tripled their working hours" to promote production. (p. 340)

Some Maoist "proofs"

There seems to be no limit to Macciocchi's gullibility and eagerness to believe everything she is told. Here are a few examples:

Proposition: The cultural revolution promoted culture.

Proof: "The seven or eight revolutionary [theatrical] works are known by heart." (p. 189) She never thinks to ask why there are only
seven or eight plays being performed in a country of 800 million people with a millennia-old literary tradition.

**Proposition:** The Cultural Revolution spurred the emancipation of women.

**Proof:** All workers' wages were lowered to the point where women were forced to take jobs to help sustain themselves and their families. (As Macciocchi explains, the Maoists abolished Liu Shao-chi's policy of bonuses and high wages because these had permitted a man to subsidize his wife's needs and reinstated her in the traditional role of housewife.)

**Proposition:** The system of wage payments introduced into the communes through the campaign to emulate the T'achai production brigade constitutes "the application of the principle of socialist sharing." (p. 241)

**Proof:** Each peasant's share in the profits from the (privately-owned) crop is now computed monthly or yearly and paid as a salary as in Western capitalist factories rather than on a daily piece-work basis as before.

Something more should be said on this. The communes, like the collective farms in the Soviet Union, are a form of cooperative production. The peasants of each commune privately own their produce as a group and sell it to the state.

China and the USSR are noncapitalist countries not because of their agricultural economy, but because of their nationalized industry and banking and their monopoly of foreign trade. No form of profit sharing is "socialist," whether it is done on a daily basis or at some other interval. Because their income is tied to the fertility of their particular piece of land there are "rich" and "poor" communes in China with a very considerable spread in real earnings between them. This is not the case in nationalized enterprises under which workers' wages are established by a national plan. As for the actual change in the system of payment that Macciocchi makes so much of, its essentials are this:

Agricultural workers are paid on a ten-point scale depending on their political reliability, strength, and diligence. Previously the points were figured up each day on the basis of actual work done—a form of piecework. This kind of payment has been opposed by trade unions in the West since the beginnings of the organized labor movement because it pits workers against each other, leads to speedup, and discriminates against the weak and the old. Under the Tachai system, salaries are fixed periodically on the basis of workers' average skill and productivity—the most common method of payment used in capitalist industry in the West. Only the strong, politically loyal men are placed in the ten-point per day category. Women receive from 6.5 points for a married woman to 7 points for an unmarried woman.

It is true that the workers meet together to set their individual wages (in some cases at monthly meetings, in other cases at longer intervals such as yearly). But the total amount available for wages is fixed in advance by the commune's profits. Macciocchi also falsely implies that workers can vote themselves overall wage increases.

**Proposition:** The purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to destroy "the legal basis of private property." (p. 125)

**Proof:** "Liu Shao-chi supported the classical model of capitalist accumulation, that adopted by the USSR." (p. 121)

If, after thirty years as a member of a "Communist" party, Macciocchi still cannot discern the difference between nationalized and private property there is no reason...
to hope that mere facts will convince her of anything. But for the record, no private property was expropriated in the Cultural Revolution, for the simple reason that all major industrial means of production have been state property in China since the implementation of the First Five Year Plan (1953-57). The same holds true of the Soviet Union from 1919 onwards. The privileged bureaucracies that rule in both of these countries are malignant growths on the body of the workers' states, but they do not, by any criteria of material reality, rest on any "model of capitalist accumulation," classical or otherwise.

An Australian view

Ross Terrill's book is on the whole much more rewarding than Macciocchi's, and mercifully is less than half the length. He speaks and reads Chinese, and, as an officially accredited journalist, his tour was handled by the Foreign Ministry rather than by the tourist agency that guided the Italian CP members. He was able to interview Premier Chou En-lai and Kuo Mo-jo, the most prominent Maoist intellectual and a vice-president of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Moving in more rarified circles than Macciocchi, Terrill was able to look a little more closely into the assertion that Maoist China is "absolutely egalitarian."

He pays tribute to the accomp-

much of her working energy to her family," they answered. 'Those are individual chores. Should the collective have to pay for work not done in the service of the collective?''

He adds: "There is a logic to this. But so far as the unmarried women were concerned—and I saw them doing work of the heaviest kind in the fields—my hostesses would not be budged from their explanation that, since they aren't as strong as men, they aren't worth as much to the community."

The pay differential is quite considerable. A strong man earns about 450 yuan a year. A married woman only about 300.

lishments of the Chinese revolution: "In a magnificent way, it has healed the sick, fed the hungry, and given security to the ordinary man of China." (p. 9)

Terrill spent forty days in China, during which he visited seven major cities and a number of rural communes. He had been in China before, in 1964, and so had some standard of comparison for judging the changes wrought by the Cultural Revolution.

The Maoists effectively used egalitarian and antibureaucratic demagogy to isolate and defeat the then-head of state, Liu Shao-ch'i. Since 1969 this has been dropped. The promises of the Cultural Revolution remain essentially unfulfilled. The main political campaign of the government-controlled press, especially after the purge and death of Defense Minister Lin Piao, Mao's official heir, in September 1971, has been against "ultraleftism" and "egalitarianism." This has reached new heights since Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972.

At the Red Star commune near Peking Terrill observed wall posters (ta tzu pao) urging citizens to "defeat and smash the antirevolutionary, conspiratorial organization, May 16." (p. 65) The May 16 group was one of the formations that arose during the Cultural Revolution that attacked the bureaucracy from the left. Its most frequently cited "crime" was the advocacy of egalitarian wage leveling. Most of the targets of officially sponsored wrath appear to be youth, especially former students. Public personal attacks are part of the process. Terrill describes a wall poster denunciation of one such youth at the Red Star commune:

"The writer of the ta tzu pao chooses to expose a student whom he suspects of extremism. Wang Hsu-tung is a 'self-proclaimed student' from a technical institute who 'wears glasses' and 'first came to our commune toward the end of 1966.' He is denigrated as a 'mysterious character.' He 'went out early in the morning' from the high school dormitory where he slept, and 'came back late at night..."
Obviously he was engaging in some conspiratorial activities." (pp. 65-66)

Rewi Alley, the New Zealand expatriate and indefatigable Maoist propagandist, told Terrill, with some satisfaction, "Now it seems the old cadres are coming back from the correctional schools, and young ultraleftists are going in their place." (p. 210)

The regime was at war not only with the youth, but with intellectuals in general. Kuo Mo-jo explained to Terrill that all activities of the Writers Union had been suspended and that most of the country’s writers were undergoing “remolding” in May 7 schools. Terrill adds:

"The President of the Academy of Sciences [another of Kuo Mo-jo’s posts] acknowledged that research had been affected by the Cultural Revolution. The scientific sections never stopped work. But the humanistic and social-science sections have been suspended for a period of ‘struggle criticism, and transformation.’" (p. 70)

The availability of reading material in general reflected the anti-intellectualism of the regime. New bookstores carried nothing but a few Marxist classics and the works of Stalin and Mao, plus some technical and language texts. Used bookstores were for the most part closed. Terrill found none in Shanghai, the country’s largest city. There was one in Peking, but it stocked only engineering texts and dictionaries. In Canton he found a store that had a history section, but as a foreigner he was not permitted to enter it.

He was also denied the right to observe a law court in operation. Museums and libraries were closed to the general public everywhere he went.

Since his visit there have been reports that a few of the Chinese classics such as the famous historical novels Dream of the Red Chamber and Western Pilgrimage (published in the United States under the title Monkey) have been brought out of storage and placed on the market again.

Terrill observed severe restric-

The masses are encouraged to accept "plain living" and, under mass pressure during the Cultural Revolution, the regime decreed privilege. But despite their current low profile, the bureaucrats continue to live it up in their own circles. Terrill describes a banquet he attended in Canton, hosted by a representative of the city’s Revolutionary Committee:

"The restaurant, one of China’s finest, was the famous Pan Ch’i (now Yu I, ‘Friendship’). Its elegant balconies, furnished in ebony and mother-of-pearl, overlook a lake bordered with willows. Some quite fantastic sweetmeats were being served. One especially took my fancy—a spiced coconut puree wrapped in a hot pancake—and I ate several. The host, himself a hearty eater, tried to broaden my approach. ‘Do you know, Mr. Terrill, this restaurant has more than one hundred varieties of sweet cakes. Recently some foreign businessmen could hardly believe this. So I ordered all one hundred kinds brought to the table!’ Mr. Yang was ready to do the same for me, but my stomach was not equal to the challenge.” (p. 68)

Terrill got no higher than the table of a big city official. Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times was fortunate enough to be invited to dinner this June to the home of Soong Ching-ling, the widow of Sun Yat-sen and a vice-chairwoman of the Peking regime. This was a little closer to the peak of power in China. She lives, as he described it, in "a palace that once housed a Manchu prince on the banks of the Imperial Lakes." The many course meal included pigeon soup, Chinese prawns, fish, and duck. She apologized to Salisbury for the clumsiness of the servants, explaining:

"We must all serve ourselves because my waiters have all gone off to the rural training schools for political reorientation and the new ones just aren’t well trained." (New York Times, June 3, 1972.)
The Monterrey bourgeoisie provides a highly expressive example of the history of industrial development in Mexico. The marked peculiarities that have characterized the process of growth and consolidation of this considerable section of the Mexican bourgeoisie reveal its historical limitations very well.

When the revolution began, Monterrey was the leading industrial center of Mexico, with a population of 80,000, five times smaller than the capital city [Mexico City]. The construction of the Monterrey Iron and Steel Foundry in 1900 made Monterrey into the leading industrial city, not only of Mexico but of all Latin America. Its original productive capacity was for 90,000 tons of steel.

But the foundry, with an investment of 10 million pesos—an unprecedented investment for the period—was only the most spectacular manifestation of the industrialization of Monterrey. Earlier, in 1890, the Cuauhtémoc Brewery was founded; its development consolidated the industrial group that distinguished the city. In 1909 this group built the Glass Works and started on its way to the great vertical monopoly it holds today. The Monterrey bourgeoisie very quickly achieved a cohesion that is totally missing in the country's other capitalist sectors. Vigorously rooted in industrial development (largely of heavy industry), it constituted the closest approximation to the model of Western industrialization within Mexico.

But from the beginnings of the city's industrialization, modernization, and urbanization the classical liberal bourgeoisie that was going to direct this process showed its historical limitations. It proved to be, in great measure, an offshoot of U.S. monopoly capitalism. The specific motivating forces of the first industrial upsurge in Monterrey were defined in 1885 by Matías Romero, Mexican ambassador to the U.S.: "The McKinley Tariff imposed prohibitive duties on our silver-bearing lead that was going to be refined in the U.S., duties that resulted in the transfer to Mexico of the refining processes which had been carried on in the United States."

The geopolitical conditions in Monterrey were precisely those sought by the capitalists of the U.S. (and to a lesser degree, of France and Germany) for investment in the metallurgical industry; it was not only the most important Mexican city near the border but also the most important one near the industrial region of the Eastern United States. In 1890, just when President McKinley arranged a tariff barrier to imports there were three applications for concessions

1. The Mexican revolution of 1910 which overthrew the Porfirio Diaz regime. Diaz wielded dictatorial power for thirty-five years, 1876-1910. — ISR
to establish metallurgical plants. Among the applicants were various foreign capitalists.

These people, who became the unquestioned promotional element in the process, found in Monterrey a class of merchants who had been considerably enriched by the height of commerce in the decades just before the triumph of the Juárez republic. The end of the Civil War, in Mexico as well as in the U.S., was a hard blow for Monterrey as the Northern commercial city during the first half of the nineteenth century. The extension of the railroads was the blow that definitively closed this era of commercial prosperity. The entire northern region found the railroads to be easy and rapid channels of communication with the border, where U.S. industry offered cheaper and better products. Family-style smuggling from then on became a great flood that, drop by drop, impeded the rise of large-scale commerce and the strengthening of the consumer-goods industry in the city.

In the 1880s the rich Monterrey merchants saw their salvation in the beginning of industrialization that a partnership with U.S. economy provided them with. The mine owners of the American South and West, by pressuring the government in Washington to make the competition of Mexican metals more difficult, became godfathers of Monterrey's industrialization.

But from the beginning of industrialization, the Monterrey bourgeoisie was dependent on the American bourgeoisie. The suppliers of the scrap iron needed for the production of steel were Americans, as were also the owners of the Cerro del Mercado, in Durango, which supplied Monterrey with its iron ore.

Monterrey's capitalist development

Monterrey is a proletarian city, a city where capitalism in Mexico has achieved its most exemplary model. In its role as the "Pittsburgh" of Mexico, the city has enjoyed certain privileges resulting from the working of the law of combined and uneven development in the country's economy. During the 1920s, when the new regime3 initiated its industrializing and modernizing efforts, Monterrey was the only city that had already developed a base, permitting it to take advantage of the new trends most rapidly. The city quickly resumed many of its old prerogatives. Many industries shut down during the civil war, but they did not disappear. When it became active again, the city's bourgeois class already possessed an experience and a tradition that its counterparts in Mexico City and in other cities spring-

2. Benito Juárez, president of Mexico from 1858 to 1872. Juárez, vice-president in 1858 when a civil war broke out, assumed the presidency when the former president fled Mexico. In 1861 the civil war ended with Juárez's government victorious. In 1862 France began a war of conquest and controlled most of Mexico until 1867 when Juárez returned to power. — ISR

3. The regime resulting from the revolution of 1910 and the civil war that followed it. — ISR
Economists consider one of the most important indicators of development to be an industrial working population that represents some 50 percent of the economically active population. In 1960 Monterrey had practically attained this level. But it regressed in the next six years. The situation of the marginal urban population in 1972 and its obvious turbulence in the recent mobilizations, attest to the fact that the process of marginalization has been accentuated and not reduced.

The results of these changes in the distribution of income have provoked a scandalous outcome: Monterrey does not confirm the theory that increasing "modernization" reduces the inequalities in the distribution of income. If the city is characterized by anything, it is the growing inequality of income, a characteristic it shares with other "marginal" regions in the south and center of the republic. The "middle class," the alleged beneficiary of development and its most typical subproduct, has declined in importance in recent years. At the end of the last decade, the sector called "indigent" (the marginal population of the "lost cities") "has grossly increased in relative importance" on the scales of income distribution. (According to the economist Puente Leyva, who researched this problem in detail, "68 percent of the poorest population of Monterrey were receiving incomes that provided less than the minimum level of subsistence." And he pointed out that consequently the social stratum composed of "the indigents, the poor, and the transient poor" had increased its percentage of the total population from 34.4 percent in 1960 to 51.2 percent in 1965.)

It has been in the last decade, then, that the ephemeral historical privileges, which allowed the Monterrey bourgeoisie to nourish its arrogance toward the leadership of the revolutionary family, have begun to disappear. The intercapitalist conflict between the "Monterrey Group" and "the political-bureaucratic center" of the government is one of the fundamental conflicts of our contemporary political history.

False paradoxes

In Monterrey the Mexican bourgeoisie managed to reach or almost reach the economic levels of its Western models. Although the "Monterrey Group" is one of the principal pillars of the Mexican bourgeoisie, its economic strength and influence do not compare at all with its political influence, which has been extended with some difficulty to Nuevo León and, in fact, only with the rise of Governor Elizondo could be boasted of as "direct control of public affairs." What is the cause of this obvious anachronism? Is there really something mysterious in this paradox?

When the Monterrey bourgeoisie received Porfirio Diaz like a prince, competing with the sumptuous reception that had been given him by the Yucatán landowners, it was rendering homage to the ruler who provided the "conditions of peace" necessary for making Monterrey a first-class industrial center.

The Monterrey bourgeoisie (like Diaz himself) thought of themselves as representatives of the purest liberalism. It did not matter much that their liberalism was not likewise understood by the workers and

4. The succession of national regimes issuing from the 1910 revolution. — ISR
especially by the overwhelming majority of peons and peasants who were the real Mexican people. When the revolution of 1910 broke out, and especially during the civil war, the Monterrey bourgeoisie was not exactly in the vanguard of the struggle for democratic and constitutional rights. It always considered itself apart from the revolutionary process and its descendants inherited this alienation. Tightly bound to North American capitalism, the Monterrey bourgeoisie could never gracefully accept the breakup of the liberal bourgeois-democratic model that marked the dictatorial and populist regime which came out of the revolution. Its impotence, however, prevented it from going beyond mere pressuring whenever it believed that the regime was becoming excessive and was flirting with "Bolshevik extremism."

Such an unstable situation, which prevailed until the rise of Cárdenas, was nevertheless marked by the promotion of a new bourgeoisie by the Obregón faction and particularly by the Calles people. The bourgeoisie that already existed in Monterrey (practically the only fundamental section of the old ruling class that remained relatively intact), took good advantage of its opportunity.

But the embers of the class struggle were stirred into new life, and, in the thirties, the specter of civil war again hovered over the nation. The six years of Cárdenas witnessed the sharpening of these social tensions.

The workers’ struggle was expressed in its first stages through

a powerful drive toward union organization to prevent the working masses from being exploited to the limit of the laws of the market. That drive was massive and national, and had deep roots in the democratic struggles of the Mexican revolution (among others, the struggle for Article 123).

It was in the Monterrey Employers Center that the most inflexible and most class-conscious bourgeois tendency found its cohesive nucleus. The reforms offered by the Cárdenas government included an organized labor movement, although one controlled by the state. The Cárdenas policy, in direct contact with the aspirations of the masses, considered opposition to such a powerful mass drive to be utopian, and considered it a better idea to join it in order to "guide it." The tendency headed by the "Monterrey Group" did not agree, and offered a tenacious resistance to the organizing efforts of the official union headquarters of that period, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM). Several important conflicts took place between the federal government and the Monterrey section.

However, two of these conflicts were the decisive ones. The first took place in 1936 and resulted from the local elections in 1935. General Zuazua, supported by the Monterrey oligarchy and its Federation of Independent Unions (the class-collaborationist unions as opposed to the "red unions" of CROM and later of the CTM), opposed the son of Plutarcho Elias Calles. The election victory of the former was a hard blow for the Cárdenas policy, and Cárdenas was obliged to refuse to recognize the elections. A political crisis developed that culminated in a strike at the Glass Works organized by the CTM. The threat of an employers' "lockout" precipitated Cárdenas's arrival in the city in February 1936, after which enormous demonstrations led by the oligarchy convinced the federal government of the depth of the opposition. On that occasion, Cárdenas personally explained his reasons to the elite of the industrial oligarchy of the city, and the need for them to be more cautious. When their talks ended, he presented them with a kind of governmental ideological platform (the famous Fourteen Points), which is of great significance.

Although the Monterrey group gave support to the oil expropria-
All newspapers must take a stand. The Militant proudly admits that it sides with working people, Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicano people, women, youth, prisoners and all who are struggling against oppression.

While other papers print lie after lie about liberation movements in this country and around the world, The Militant prints the truth week after week.

[Enclosure details]

10. British and American oil companies were expropriated by decree of the Cardenas government on March 18, 1938. — ISR
the revolution" by themselves, they should not cut themselves off from potential allies by forming their own independent political party. They think that instead Chicanos should ally themselves with a "lesser evil" wing of the Democratic Party. Among the exponents of this view are the Young Workers Liberation League and the Communist Party.

Their viewpoint is antinationalist and antirevolutionary. Although it is true that Chicanos cannot by themselves make a revolution in the U.S., this does not mean that they should subordinate their struggle to the relative backwardness of other oppressed layers. Chicanos should wage their independent fight for self-determination and build their own independent political party. Not only is this the best way to win concessions from the government, but it will also spur, by its example, the struggles of other oppressed people in the U.S.

How could the development of a mass Chicano party affect the political power structure? Let's look at the recent election. In spite of the fact that Nixon won a landslide victory, the Democratic Party has not fallen apart, as was demonstrated by the local and congressional races, where the Democrats did well. But what if most Chicanos were voting for their own party? Without the support of Chicanos, the Democrats would have won fewer offices than they did.

The Black and labor movements, seeing that the Democratic Party could no longer win, and seeing the example of the Chicano people, would be encouraged to also set up their own independent parties.

A Chicano party, a labor party, and a Black party, each organized on a massive scale and each counting on its own independent strength, could make alliances. And these alliances would not be made at the expense of one or another group, because each has its own independent strength and each group's interests are not in conflict with the other two. The development of these independent political parties and of an alliance between them would be a death blow to the two-party system of the Democrats and the Republicans. It would seriously hamper the ruling class's ability to rule.

The whole dynamic of a mass independent Chicano political party is one that spurs not only Chicanos, but other even more massive forces to break with capitalist politics, establish their own independent parties, and wage massive struggles against this capitalist government.

The task that now faces Raza Unida Party activists in the Southwest is to deepen the gains that were made by the RUPs during the election year. The most effective way to do this is to maintain the clearly independent course of these parties and to involve masses of Chicanos in struggle. In this way the next step in the building of a massive Chicano political party can be taken.
like North Star (1943), Song of Russia (1943), and Days of Glory (1944). In Mission to Moscow (1943) Hollywood outdid itself. Stalin is pictured as the kindly, wise "Uncle Joe" who had omnisciently perceived what the Nazis were up to and had made a treaty with them only to buy time. The movie endorses the Moscow purge trial slanders that Trotsky and his followers had plotted with Hitler and the Mikado to sap Soviet military strength. Former American ambassador Joseph E. Davies appeared at the beginning of the picture to give his endorsement to its content.

The typical World War II picture displayed such a crude prowar jingoism that these films became an embarrassment after the war was over and the U.S. government was in the process of resurrecting the power of the German and Japanese ruling classes. Germans and especially Japanese were portrayed in a racist way as if something about their biological makeup had brought the war on. Political examination of the roots of the war is not to be found in movies made during World War II.

After the war was over Hollywood kept on producing films that reflected the democratic exhortations that it had projected in justifying American participation in the fighting. Anti-Semitism was derogated and exposed in Crossfire (1947) and Gentleman's Agreement (1947). Crossfire has an interesting history. According to The Celluloid Weapon:

"The production history of this film reveals an interesting insight as to when Hollywood considers the time ripe for discussion of certain kinds of social issues while eschewing others. In the novel by Richard Brooks on which Crossfire was based, the murder victim was a homosexual rather than a Jew. Obviously, 1947 was not a propitious time for even the use of the word 'homosexual' in a film, let alone an examination of paranoid fury against homosexuals. Even with the thematic change from homosexuality to anti-Semitism, the property was held by producer Adrian Scott for two years. When Dore Schary went to RKO as production chief the decision was finally made to go ahead."

Whatever Hollywood is, it is not fearless. This typical corporate liberal doctoring of reality was also reflected in such immediate postwar films as It's a Wonderful Life (1946), Boomerang (1947), and State of the Union (1948) which admitted that there was corruption in political life (as if no one knew), but indicated that this was more than balanced off by the "good" capitalist politicians (who only have reactionary politics).

By 1947 the Cold War was setting in. Witch-hunting became the fashion of the day. The House Un-American Activities Committee opened hearings into "subversion" in Hollywood. Wartime pro-Soviet propaganda like Mission to Moscow and Song of Russia were now brought forward as evidence that Hollywood was under Communist influence. A committee man made charges of subversion about Margie, a run-of-the-mill comedy using the postwar housing shortage as its starting point. The intimidation felt in Hollywood can be measured by Jack L. Warner's comment, after an uncomfortable session with the committee concerning his production of Mission to Moscow, that his studio would make no more pictures dealing with "the little man." The House Committee returned to witch-hunt Hollywood in the early fifties as a means of capturing a few headlines away from Senator Joseph McCarthy. Charlie Chaplin and other important talents were pressured out of the industry by the witch-hunt. Chaplin left the country. The House probes are one of the reasons that the fifties turned out to be Hollywood's worst decade, both artistically and politically.

During the fifties, Hollywood gave the witch-hunters a helping hand by producing an abundance of right-wing anticomunist films. Movies in this genre included I Was a Communist for the FBI (1951); My Son John (1952), with Helen Hayes playing the role of a mother who turns in her radical son; and Walk East on Beacon (1952), based on a book by J. Edgar Hoover. Big Jim McClain (1952) went so far as to make a congressional witch-hunter, played by John Wayne, its hero.

Impact of the radical movement

The relaxation of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and the gradual revival of the radical movement in the sixties provided a new sort of atmosphere for Hollywood and the movies began to reflect it. Dr. Strangelove (1964) ridiculed the White House, the Pentagon, and the Cold War. Seven Days in May (1964) depicted an attempt by the military to take over the government. The Cold War's relaxation was signaled by such movies as The Russians Are Coming, The Russians Are Coming (1966). However, numerous films simply substituted the Chinese for the Russians in the role of villain—no doubt this will now change after Nixon's visit to China.

Although basically tokenist and superficial, antiracist themes became accepted topics, and some of the grossest Amos and Andy kind of stereotypes that could be found in films from the twenties through the fifties were dropped. Movies of the new type included A Raisin in the Sun (1961), The Cool World (1963), Nothing But a Man (1964), The Chase (1966), In the Heat of the Night (1967), Up Tight (1968), and The Lost Man (1969). While these movies all showed that racism is a bad thing, they stayed clear of giving any real indication of racism's social roots.

In recent years there has been a whole boom of films with Black heroes coming out of Hollywood. One favorite "safe" theme of the industry is to portray the trials and tribulations of Black cops as in Tick . . . Tick . . . Tick (1970), starring Jim Brown.

The Graduate (1967) showed
Hollywood the way to whole new possibilities. It depicted the alienation from the status quo and rebellious moods of young people. Its enormous box-office success gave Hollywood pause. The result was the promotion of movies on the youth culture and youth radicalization such as Alice's Restaurant and Easy Rider in 1969, and Joe, The Activist, Getting Straight, The Strawberry Statement, RPM, and Antonioni's Zabriskie Point in 1970. The quality of these movies varied greatly from an artistic point of view, but the best of them remained ambiguous in their political and social implications.

But Wild in the Streets (1970) was not ambiguous at all in its attempt to defame and discredit the youth radicalization. The Celluloid Weapon describes the movie, which happens to be artistically terrible, this way:

"A 19-year-old pop singer is elected President of the United States after Congress is forced to lower the voting age to 14. That this is accomplished by putting LSD in the water supply is only one of the unorthodox techniques of persuasion used by the politicized youngsters. The new administration demands that adults retire at 30. At 35, moreover, the Senior Citizens are escorted by blue-jeaned security guards to rehabilitation camps where they are given compulsory soma. In its final satiric comment on Youth Power, Wild in the Streets poses the ultimate generation-gap joke: the 3-year-olds threaten to revolt against the 15-year-olds!"

Unfortunately, the movie is not as funny as White and Aiverson make it sound, nor was it intended to be funny.

The Vietnam War has been the only war that the U.S. has ever fought in that Hollywood has not gone all out for. The Green Berets (1968) is the only major prowar film Hollywood has produced. On the other hand, several pacifist films— which do not refer directly to Vietnam—have been made: M*A*S*H (1970), Catch 22 (1970), and Johnny Got His Gun (1971). This is a reflection of the depth of antiblack sentiment in this country and the desperation of the movie industry to make the kind of movies that will pay off at the box office.

The scramble for box-office success is what led to the breakdown of the Production Code; that and the changing climate of the country. For the first time Hollywood chose to treat the subject of homosexuality in a frank way in The Boys in the Band (1970), which, whatever its shortcomings, opened up the subject for the screen without overt patronization and with some degree of sympathy and understanding. The breakdown of the Code also allowed for wider variation in the outcome of a movie's plot. Whereas, it used to be that one could always know in advance how a movie was going to come out—the hero would win, the criminals would get their just desserts, etc.—this is no longer the case. The positive hero is also no longer mandatory and many films have featured antiheroes instead, as in Bonnie and Clyde (1967).

The Hollywood movie industry is now experimenting more and more with social realism in an attempt to find the themes and formulas that will move their product. Naturally, it will attempt to keep its messages as much within the confines of liberalism as it can. If it can't do that it will probably try to impose an element of obscurity so that the ideas will only come through to those who are already attuned to them. Hollywood is financially greedy, however, and that is a factor that should never be underestimated where capitalism is concerned. So we should not be surprised to find Hollywood producing an occasional unambiguous exposure of some aspect of bourgeois society or even upon rare occasions a clear revolutionary theme. The book publishing industry has long been forced to do this; the movie industry may have to follow suit.
UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY:

BY CLIFF CONNER

On June 17, 1953, workers in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) walked off their jobs and into the streets, sparking an upheaval that rocked the Stalinist regimes in Berlin and Moscow and sent shock waves around the world. As the prototype of mass action directed against parasitic bureaucracies in the workers' states, the historical import of the East German events of 1953 can hardly be exaggerated.

Nevertheless, surprisingly little has been written on the subject, especially in comparison with the voluminous literature detailing its sequels in other parts of the Soviet bloc. Arnulf Baring's book, then, fills an important gap. It was published in German in 1965, but only recently translated into English.

In his introduction, David Schoenbaum ranks the book with John Reed's classic Ten Days That Shook the World. The comparison is unfair. Although Uprising in East Germany falls short on that scale, it is not without value as an informative account of the June 17 social explosion and the buildup of tension during the preceding months. Baring affords some interesting glimpses into the dynamics of the mass movement; for example:

"It would seem that the crucial factor ... was whether, among the assembled company, there was one determined man capable of persuading his colleagues to walk off the job. Once one department of a factory had decided to strike, the other departments almost invariably followed suit, and once the personnel of a whole factory had marched out on to the streets, the men of other factories quickly joined them."

Although as an "active partisan of the Brandt government" in West Germany Baring is unsympathetic to the revolutionary socialist aspirations of the East German workers, he does put his finger on the principal reason for the failure of the 1953 upheaval to overturn the bureaucratic regime. He quotes Lenin's What Is To Be Done? to the effect that "no single revolutionary movement can endure without a stable ... leadership-organization." The absence of a centralized revolutionary workers' party condemned the spontaneous uprising to dissipation and defeat in face of the massive Soviet intervention.

But Uprising in East Germany has a number of limitations which deserve attention. One example of drawing erroneous conclusions from accurate facts is Baring's contention that the Kremlin was "restrained" in its response to the workers' actions: "... the Soviets reacted to the East German rising with equanimity and prudence ..." As evidence he points out that "only" twenty-one people were killed on June 17 in the whole of East Germany, "a very low figure considering the size of the demonstrations." A more cogent interpretation would focus on the 300,000 armed Russian troops confronting hundreds of thousands of East German workers brutally suppressing their general strike. East German Defense Minister Max Fechner (later deposed for being "too liberal") admitted that more than 50,000 people had been arrested. If "only" twenty-one were killed, it reflects the fact that the East German population was unarmed and unorganized, not that the Kremlin was "moderately" repressive.

Baring demonstrates that the American and West German governments were very uneasy about the uprising and did everything in their power to "cool it." It may surprise those mesmerized by Cold War mythology, but John Foster Dulles and Konrad Adenauer alike were opposed to giving any encouragement whatever to the rebellion. How can this apparent paradox be accounted for?

Baring answers: "The western attitude ... was primarily designed to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union ..." The Pentagon Papers revealed that American policymakers of that time had indeed included a certain fear of Soviet reprisal in their calculations over Vietnam. But that was only one factor in their reluctance to promote the East German rebellion and, in my opinion, it was not primary, but secondary.

As the socialist weekly The Militant wrote at the time: ["The Western officials"] enjoyment at seeing the apartment of a detested neighbor upstairs on fire was greatly tempered by their realization that they live in the same inflammable building." The liberal historian Arthur M. Schlesinger wrote at the time: "There is a particular reason ... for the Republican paralysis. ... The uprisings thus far have been working-class affairs. About the last thing the Eisenhower administration is capable of doing is to release the energy of the workers of Eastern Europe."

As further evidence, witness this report from the August 4, 1953, New York Post:

"West German business men, perspicacious people with an eye always peeled for a fast no-risk profit, were cancelling orders and..."
moving their commercial ventures as well. This was their reaction to the demonstrations of East Berliners. . . . Why? The demonstrations in East Berlin and in virtually all the large Soviet-held communities in East Germany were carried out by working men and women and by their banned trade union organizations. . . . These were workers in rebellion against authority. The men with investments . . . see the specter of workers rising in mass revolt and they conjure the nightmare a step further. Such ideas, some of these business men argued . . . might be translated one day against us. Thus to eliminate business risk and to show their disaffection for uprisings they have begun to take their business elsewhere."

With a quarter million unemployed workers in West Berlin alone, the social situation in West Germany was no model of stability. Although historians tend to ignore it and press reports were buried in the back pages, the revolt did have repercussions elsewhere. There were strikes in the Soviet Union and in several East European countries, but also, vindicating the per- spicacity of the above-cited business men, in West Germany as well. For example, the June 23, 1953, New York Times carried a picture from Munich noting that "10,000 persons rioted in front of the C & A Brennichmeyer textile shop" and fought the police.

Baring draws several highly debatable conclusions about the revolt. (1) It wasn't crushed by the Soviet Union; it "petered out" of its own accord. (2) It is highly unlikely that the workers will rise again.

Did the rebellion simply "run out of steam" as Baring asserts? Did it "come to a standstill before it had really got off the ground?" Actually, while the revolt was largely silenced by the Soviet intervention on June 17, widespread resistance continued for several weeks afterwards. At the end of the first week in July, for example, 100,000 workers in East Berlin were reportedly engaged in an organized "slow-down" that virtually paralyzed industry there. Eventually, of course, the Stalinist "pacification" prevailed, but it is an error to believe that the workers simply returned to their jobs and forgot their grievances on June 18.

Finally, can it happen again? Baring says, "The time is ripe for revolution and not for revolutions." That is to be expected from an admirer of Willy Brandt, especially since the prognosis was written in 1965, after almost a decade of relative stability in the Soviet bloc. But since then the world has witnessed revolutionary events in Czechoslovakia and Poland and the beginnings of new ferment in the Soviet Union itself. Who now would be so bold as to venture that the time is not ripe for revolutions? Would-be prophets of peaceful reform do not make a very convincing case.


BY ERNEST HARSCH

Vance Packard has written a number of books, such as The Status Seekers, that try to boil down the ideas of sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists into bite-size pieces for mass consumption. In this study he examines the causes of the rising rates of mobility among Americans; the effects of this endless shifting and moving on institutions such as the family, the small provincial community, and the large city; and the deeply alienating effects of constant moving on the individuals involved.

According to Packard, about 40 million Americans move at least once each year and in some cities the annual turnover rate reaches 35 percent. People become "rootless," as Packard calls them, for a variety of reasons, but usually they pack up and move on either to keep a present job or to search for a better one. As economist John B. Lansing said, "The geographic mobility of labor is one of the basic processes of adjustment in the economy of the United States."

Companies, particularly those not tied to "heavy" raw materials, increasingly move from one end of the country to the other, usually for economic reasons, dragging their employees along behind them. Migratory farmworkers, mostly Spanish-speaking, travel every year from southern Texas or California northward, following the plantings and harvestings of crops. Millions of young people, who either get drafted or join the army, fly from one base to another, from the United States to Germany to South Vietnam. Other millions of young people, propelled by the needs of a highly technological society, leave their families in increasingly large numbers to go to colleges and universities hundreds or even thousands of miles from their homes.

Scientists, engineers, and other specialists, particularly in the aeronautics and space industries, hop from New York to Houston to Los Angeles to fill the highly specialized job openings.

But not only those who move to other cities or states are affected. Those who live in small communities suddenly find themselves engulfed in the flood of urban sprawl, of America's exploding cities. Oppressed nationalities set off chain reactions of movement within the major cities in their searches for better housing.

All this mobility tears people up from what they considered their hometowns, from their friends and relations, and drops them off in new environments, among strange people, producing "a nation of strangers." The already pervasive alienation of this society, that erects the equivalent of barbed wire fences between individuals, becomes exacerbated. Familiar landmarks get lost, moorings break loose, causing some to withdraw into themselves for security, others to adapt to a free-floating life, and yet others to
search for solutions and to rebel. But all of this mobility also has its positive effects on those involved, particularly on young people who are more able to adapt and who feel less isolated in new situations. Mobility in such instances tends to help them broaden their outlooks, to look at the world more critically, and to throw away their provincial blinders.

Surely the high mobility of students has had an accelerating effect on the current radicalization. (Packard, whose mind rolls only along the approved, official roads, doesn’t examine this aspect of mobility. (Lessons learned in one part of the country are soon carried to another. New struggles in one area soon hear their echoes throughout the United States, and even beyond. Rapid mobility has thus given the radicalization of the 1960s and 1970s many more possibilities for growth.

In the same breath that modern capitalism, with its need for a high level of technology, creates a mobile labor force, it tends to weaken a number of the institutions that help prop it up.

The family, one of the main organs of instilling servility, fear of authority, and rigid sexual mores into children, strains and cracks under the hardships of constant moving. In the Western states, where mobility is double that of the Northeast, the divorce rate is four times higher than in the Northeast. And young people leaving home in larger numbers than ever before escape the patriarchal overlordship of the family convent and expose themselves to new, "subversive" ideas.

The small conservative towns often get swept away by rapid growth or by quickly changing population as a result of migrating corporations. Institutionalized religion fragments into shopping mall sermons and drive-in churches.

In fact, all established authority tends to lose its bite. "Unofficial social controls as traditionally enforced by disapproval of or ostracism from the community hold little terror for uprooted people," complains Packard. There is a new sense of immediacy, of wanting things to happen, to change now, not years in the future. "All the individual transience, I believe," summarizes Packard, "is adding up to an increase in community disruption and turbulence. And for the nation as a whole it is adding up to an ominous trend toward a fragmentation of the whole society."

Packard, of course, views this fragmentation of old values and of society as a threat. He sees the cracks spreading in the foundation and frantically tries to warn the rulers of this society.

He advises corporations not to move around so much, while they, pragmatically attuned to their immediate economic needs, continue to do so. He asks "responsible" Black leaders to try to slow down the search for adequate housing by Blacks, thereby stabilizing movement within the major cities. He counsels planners and real estate speculators to build "new towns" which would provide a greater sense of "community"—for those able to afford it.

Packard’s formulas for ending alienation are futile. He views alienation as the product of excessive mobility alone, rather than a product of the inequalities and frustrations of class society. He asks us to go back to the "good old days" of the typical New England towns, of the stable little communities where everyone knew everyone else—and where everyone knew their proper place.

Contrary to Packard, alienation will not be overcome under class society. Not until the overwhelming majority of people in this country control their own lives and their own communities and can put into practice their own solutions, not until people can freely move around as they wish, rather than from economic necessity, and not until we build a society based on mutual cooperation can alienation even begin to be overcome.

Ironically, modern capitalism, with its need for a high rate of mobility, only seems to be accelerating the process of its decay, thus strengthening the forces of those dedicated to building a new and better society on a socialist basis.


BY STEVE BECK

The transcript of a 1968 conference on the ecological aspects of international development, The Careless Technology contains fifty case studies that deal with the question: "To what extent have the ecological aspects of introducing technology affected the less-developed countries?" These studies make a strong argument for the view that technical aid from the advanced countries is a "rotten rope" currently incapable of rescuing the victims of underdevelopment.

Radical critics of Western aid programs will find the book a useful reference. The articles are authoritative and detailed without being incomprehensible to the general public, and are interspersed with summaries, photographs, and discussions.

Examples of technological myopia abound. The introduction of milk powder to deal with protein deficiencies has resulted in conditions such as Vitamin A deficiency and lactose intolerance. New irrigation canals in tropical countries have spurred the growth of snails that carry blood flukes. These worms have in turn infected humans with incurable bilharzia. Half the population of Egypt is so infected, according to one estimate.

As the title suggests the conference identifies technology as the main development problem. The industrial-
ized capitalist nations have yet to solve the problems associated with their own technology: artificial fertilizer, insecticides, automobiles, and nuclear power are no less troublesome in Africa or Asia than in the U.S. Some tropical ecosystems may even be more susceptible to disruption than the temperate areas for which these industrial techniques were adapted.

The solutions proposed are basically pleas addressed to the development establishment (USAID, World Bank, UNESCO, etc.) to be more attentive to ecologists and include social and environmental factors in cost-benefit studies. Beyond this, some ecologists cherish vague hopes for "international order" and a world government for "Spaceship Earth."

A few of the contributors to The Careless Technology go beyond such banalities. At one point there is an exchange between Barry Commoner of Washington University and food scientist Georg Bergstrom about "nutritional colonialism." Bergstrom explains that Europe and America are draining protein sources (fish from the Peruvian coast and oilseed from Africa) from impoverished nations to fatten cattle and poultry. The reason? "There is a greater profit margin in selling feed to the rich Western world than in selling food to impoverished Latin America."

During a discussion of the blood fluke disease, Taghi Farvar of Iran notes the tragic human cost paid by the rural poor for water development schemes "which are not even used to produce food as they are to produce cash crops like cotton and electricity." He asks: "How much should the peasant have to suffer in order to fulfill the whims of those who are ruling them from the cities? Who asks the peasants what price they are willing to pay?"

It is not only water, nutrients, plant, and animal life that are in dynamic interaction; the world ecosystem is also a flux of resources, currency, credit, knowledge, populations . . . and wars. Only the blindest would deny that the re-
sources, land, and labor of the "underdeveloped" world are manipulated by the advanced capitalist countries, whose earth-molding forces of technology are in the private hands of small elites. In this light, the blunders of the international development agencies appear not as "careless" acts, but the necessary creation of infrastructures capable of absorbing Western investment, regardless of human cost.

What force then remains to reverse the deterioration of the global ecosystem? One that is overlooked by virtually all of the academic ecologists: the oppressed masses of workers and peasants who in any number of countries have raised the demand for self-determination; for popular control over land, resources, and technology; and for the rational, democratically planned use of these all-important heritages. A socialist world is the only adequate vehicle for creating international cooperation, comprehensive planning, and a viable world federation that ecologists regard as necessary for the survival of Spaceship Earth.

Even when shackled by bureaucracies, the areas where capitalism has been abolished and national planning instituted have made considerable progress in eliminating hunger, controlling pollution, and dealing with urbanization. The conference did not contemplate this alternative method of development and in general pretended that the workers' states did not exist.

The Careless Technology does have some important lessons for those who retain a simplistic view of imperialism as the "haves" keeping the goodies from the"have-nots"; the goodies are poisonous. Particularly instructive is the case of the Aswan High Dam—the very symbol of modernization for the United Arab Republic—which in terms of blood fluke disease, nutrient loss, damage to fishing, and salt water encroachment has had some disastrous ecological effects.

But ecologists could still learn something from the doctrine of socialist agitator Eugene Debs, that "private appropriation of the earth's surface, the natural resources and the means of life is nothing less than a crime against humanity." Effective environmental action will require organization by the victims, not begging favors of the criminals.

BOOKS RECEIVED

AFRICA


BLACK STRUGGLE

Garvey: The Story of a Pioneer Black Nationalist by Elton C. Fax. Dodd, Mead. 305 pp. $7.95.


EASTERN EUROPE

The Changing Party Elite in East Germany by Peter C. Ludz. MIT Press. 509 pp. $15.00.


East Europe in Search of Security by Peter Bender. Translated by S. Z. Young. Johns Hopkins University Press. 144 pp. $3.00 Paper.

Honecker and the New Politics of Europe by Heinz Lippman. Macmillan. 272 pp. $7.95.

ECONOMICS


GENERAL

The Coming of Age by Simone de Beauvoir. Putnam. 585 pp. $10.00.


The First Five Years of the Communist International (two volumes) by Leon Trotsky. Monad Press (Distributed by Pathfinder Press) 374 pp. and 384 pp. $3.75 each Paper.


LABOR


LATIN AMERICA

Crisis and Repression in Argentina by Peter Camejo and Nahuel Moreno. Pathfinder Press. 23 pp. $.35 Paper.

MIDDLE EAST

The Other Israel: The Radical Case Against Zionism. Edited by Arle Bober. Doubleday. 264 pp. $2.50 Paper.

PHILOSOPHY

The Development of the Marxian Dialectic by Dick Howard. Southern Illinois University Press. 205 pp. $7.95.

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