

INTERCONTINENTAL PRESS

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 23, No. 24

December 16, 1985

USA \$1.25 UK £0.80



Recinos, second from left and shown here at 1980 Salvadoran left unity conference, briefly returned from five years in prison and exile.

El Salvador

Héctor Recinos Returns to Address Union Conference

South Africa

Apartheid's Great Land Theft



Black peasants have been pushed onto poor, overcrowded plots of land.

Philippines

An Economic Crisis 'Made in U.S.A.'

Greece

General Strike Protests Regime's Austerity Moves

New threats against Libya

By Steve Craine

Washington was already gearing up its long-running campaign of slanders, threats, and acts of aggression against the government of Libya before the November 23 hijacking of an Egyptian airliner en route from Athens to Cairo. Without a bit of evidence, the U.S. government quickly blamed the hijacking on Libya and sought to implicate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as well.

The Egyptian government, which did Washington's dirty work throughout the affair, massed troops along Libya's border in preparation for an invasion. The Libyan press agency reported that the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean had stepped up surveillance of the border area in order to help guide Egyptian troops.

These maneuvers are not idle threats. Ever since Muammar el-Qaddafi led a coup against King Idris in 1969, successive U.S. administrations have used political pressure, economic blackmail, and direct military attacks to try to destabilize the Libyan government. The aim of this bipartisan policy in Washington is to force Qaddafi to retreat from his support for anti-imperialist struggles in North Africa and the Middle East.

The Libyan regime has given backing to the Palestinians' struggle against Israeli occupation of their land and to forces opposed to neo-colonial regimes in such countries as Chad and Sudan. It also angered Washington by increasing the portion of Libya's oil income used for economic development, thus reducing the superprofits U.S. oil companies had been squeezing from the country before the 1969 revolution.

In 1977 Egypt and Libya fought a four-day border war in which Egyptian planes bombed and strafed targets inside Libya. In 1981 U.S. jet fighters shot down two Libyan planes over Libya's Gulf of Sidra. Washington has spent billions of dollars to build up Egyptian military strength.

In early November, the *Washington Post* revealed that President Reagan formally approved a CIA plan of covert action to overthrow Qaddafi.

According to the *Post*, the operation authorized by Reagan is "designed to disrupt, preempt and frustrate Qaddafi's subversive and terrorist plans" and possibly to "lure him into some foreign adventure or terrorist exploit that would give a growing number of Qaddafi opponents in the Libyan military a chance to seize power; or such a foreign adventure might give one of Qaddafi's neighbors, such as Algeria or Egypt, a justification for responding to Qaddafi militarily."

One administration official declared that the disclosure would not necessarily scuttle the plan. "We went ahead with the world's most

open covert operation against Nicaragua," the official bragged. "I would not assume that the opponents of this can kill it with leaks." Besides, the official continued, "Qaddafi probably already assumes we're doing this."

Such an assumption by Qaddafi would be fully justified. At least three attempts to assassinate or overthrow the Libyan leader have been carried out in the past year and a half.

Although the identities and demands of the hijackers of the Egyptian jet are still unknown, both the Egyptian and U.S. governments accused Libya of instigating and financing the action. And for good measure, they added the equally unproven accusation that a minor dissident Palestinian faction was involved. Both governments quickly initiated military moves against Libya.

Along with targeting Libya, Washington has used the hijacking to reinforce its "antiterrorism" campaign, directed primarily against the PLO. It seized on this opportunity in order to follow up on its own hijacking of an Egyptian airliner in October, an act of international piracy that was hailed by many imperialist governments as a blow against "terrorism."

While the hijackers were stalled in a Malta airport trying to get permission to refuel, a team of 25 Egyptian commandos arrived to "rescue" the passengers and crew.

It was later revealed that the Egyptian hit squad was accompanied by three high-ranking U.S. military personnel, including the head of the office of military cooperation at the U.S. embassy in Cairo.

The U.S. aircraft carrier *Coral Sea* was

alerted to provide cover for the commandos if necessary and to intercept the hijacked plane should it attempt to leave the island.

Three hostages were killed by the hijackers before the arrival of the Egyptian commandos, but the big majority of those killed in the incident — 57 — died in the "rescue" attempt. Investigations revealed that most of the deaths were due to smoke inhalation, not bullet wounds, and that the fire on board the airliner was caused by explosions set off by the Egyptian commandos.

The blood of those killed in Malta is on the hands of the Egyptian regime — and its backers in Washington.

Seizing on hijackings and similar incidents, the U.S. rulers seek to pin the label "terrorist" on all opponents of imperialist domination the world over. Besides trying to justify Washington's own terrorist actions, this propaganda offensive has paved the way for rightist terror attacks on political supporters of the Palestinian struggle.

The October 11 murder of Alex Odeh, an Arab-American activist in California who spoke out in defense of Palestinian rights in the wake of the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, is just one recent example. The Palestine Liberation Organization has been repeatedly victimized by this campaign.

PLO leader Yassir Arafat answered Reagan's lies on behalf of the PLO and other victims of the "antiterrorist" hysteria. In a November 7 statement in Cairo, Arafat stated: "The PLO reiterates its 1974 decision condemning operations conducted abroad and all forms of terrorism. It affirms that all its factions and institutions abide by this decision. . . . Furthermore, the PLO strongly believes that ending the occupation [of Palestine] is the sole means of establishing peace and security in the region." □

What came out of Geneva?

By Doug Jenness

President Ronald Reagan has received enthusiastic cheers from Washington's imperialist allies for his performance at the summit meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Democratic and Republican legislators in the U.S. Congress likewise praised the outcome of the November 19–21 talks, which Reagan claims have opened "a fresh start" in relations between the U.S. and Soviet governments.

Meanwhile, the 3,614 reporters who were on hand for the affair have been tirelessly chewing over what it all means.

What were the results of this first summit between the top U.S. and Soviet leaders in six years and the 15th such meeting in the past 50 years?

The most concrete known results were the restoration of some links between the two countries that were broken in early 1980 by President James Carter following the entry of

Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Reagan restored grain trade with the Soviet Union in April 1981, but many of Washington's punitive measures still remained in place going into the summit. The agreement concluded in Geneva renews scientific, medical, educational, cultural, and athletic exchanges and contacts. Moreover, the two leaders acknowledged that progress is being made in the negotiations to resume air services between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Reagan and Gorbachev also noted that their governments, in cooperation with the Japanese government, have agreed to a set of measures to promote safety on air routes in the North Pacific. These steps are supposed to help avoid a repeat of incidents such as the 1983 shooting down of a South Korean airliner over the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration utilized that incident to conduct a vitriolic propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union despite substantial evidence that the plane delib-

erately violated Soviet airspace, and that Soviet authorities thought they were shooting down a spy plane.

Gorbachev and Reagan agreed to meet again — next year in the United States and the following year in the Soviet Union — to maintain “an ongoing dialogue.”

The joint Soviet-American statement presented at the end of the meeting noted that the two leaders agreed that their governments would continue arms negotiations, including on “the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the USSR.”

No concrete arms reduction proposals, however, were agreed upon, and no framework for the discussions was set.

Reagan stubbornly refused to budge on the Pentagon’s development of a multi-billion-dollar program to put arms into space.

Gorbachev told the press at the conclusion of the meeting that the U.S. government’s insistence on going ahead with its Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known as “Star Wars,” remains a central obstacle to an arms accord.

Gorbachev also reiterated his appeal to Washington to join his government in instituting a ban on all testing of nuclear weapons. In August Moscow began a five-month moratorium on nuclear testing and urged Reagan to follow suit. Gorbachev stated that if Washington joined in, Moscow will extend its moratorium beyond December 31 when it is currently scheduled to end. Reagan continues to turn thumbs down on this proposal.

Reporting to Congress on November 21, Reagan candidly presented his framework for the summit talks and future discussions. “When I took the oath of office for the first time [1981],” the president declared, “we began dealing with the Soviet Union in a way that was more realistic than in, say, the recent past.” With the help of Congress “we began strengthening our economy, restoring our national will and rebuilding our defenses and alliances. America is once again strong — and our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost. We must not now abandon policies that work.”

These “policies that work” include a massive arms buildup and the reinforcement of the ring of U.S. air bases, nuclear-tipped missiles, and naval fleets that encircle the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Reagan repeatedly stated in the period leading up to the summit that the main problem he was concerned about is “Soviet expansionism” and the “use of force, subversion, and terror” by the governments of Nicaragua, Angola, Kampuchea, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. By a “strong America” he means one that stands up to these governments and their backers and helps organize and finance counterrevolutionary aggression against them. These reactionary wars, delicately referred to by the White House as “regional tensions,” were among the topics raised by Reagan with Gorbachev.

A top presidential aide told the *Wall Street Journal* that Reagan’s central aim was to con-

vey to Moscow Washington’s resolve to ensure that increased Soviet military aid to these governments will be met by sharp counter-moves by the Pentagon. “He essentially told them, ‘You can do it if you want to, but it will be costly,’” the aide said.

Since the meeting U.S. officials have played up what they have characterized as the Soviet diplomats’ “receptiveness” to discussing a political solution to the war in Afghanistan. “But, the officials said,” according to a *New York Times* reporter, “it had proved impossible in the final drafting sessions during the night to reach agreement on language covering Afghanistan.”

Soviet officials have said nothing on this matter since the meeting; and the joint statement states vaguely “that exchanges of views on regional issues on the expert level have proven useful” and should continue “on a regular basis.”

—IN THIS ISSUE—

Closing news date: December 2, 1985

BRITAIN	748	Conference on strategy for labor movement — by Ilona Gersh
	772	Labour Party left registers gains — by Redmond O'Neill
GREECE	750	General strike against austerity — by Bobbis Misailides and Argiris Malapanis
SOUTH AFRICA	752	Apartheid’s great land theft — by Ernest Harsch
LATIN AMERICA	763	Continental antidebt actions held
USA	765	Kanak leader completes tour — by Steve Craine
PHILIPPINES	767	Economic crisis “made in USA” — by Will Reissner
	770	Interview with former prisoner of Marcos — by Deb Shnookal
IRELAND	776	Pact maintains British rule in north — by Will Reissner
DOCUMENTS	760	Speech by Salvadoran unionist Héctor Recinos
	766	Colombian PSR denounces siege
	774	Shifts in the Chinese CP leadership

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women’s liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material stands on the program of the Fourth International.

Editor: Doug Jenness.

Contributing Editors: Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

Managing Editor: Ernest Harsch.

Editorial Staff: Steve Craine, Will Reissner.

Business Manager: Patti Iiyama.

INTERCONTINENTAL PRESS (ISSN 0162-5594) is published biweekly except for one issue in January and one issue in August for \$30 per year by Intercontinental Press, 410 West Street, New York, NY 10014. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INTERCONTINENTAL PRESS, 410 West St., New York, NY 10014.

Intercontinental Press is indexed by the Alternative Press Index, P.O. Box 7229, Baltimore, MD 21218; tel.: (301) 243-2471.

To Subscribe:

U.S. and Canada: Send US\$30.00, drawn on a U.S. bank, for a one-year subscription. Correspondence should be addressed to: Intercontinental Press, 410 West Street, New York, N.Y. 10014. Telephone (212) 929-6933.

Britain, Ireland, continental Europe: Write to Pathfinder Press, 47 The Cut, London SE1 8LL.

Australia: Write to Pathfinder Press, P.O. Box 37, Leichhardt, N.S.W. 2040.

New Zealand: Write to Socialist Books, P.O. Box 8730, Auckland.

Write to New York for subscription rates to all other countries.

Please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Intercontinental Press is published by the 408 Printing and Publishing Corporation, 408 West Street, New York, N.Y. 10014. Offices at 408 West Street, New York, N.Y.

Conference on strategy for labor movement

Prominent union, Labour Party activists in discussion hosted by 'Socialist Action'

By Ilona Gersh

LONDON — *Socialist Action*, the newspaper representing the Fourth International in Britain, hosted a conference here November 16-17 called "An Alliance for Socialism — A weekend of debate and discussion." Around 600 people attended.

The conference was organized to promote discussion on strategy and tactics among leaders of the Labour Party left wing, militant trade unionists such as the coal miners, and leaders of the Black struggle and the women's liberation movement. A number of prominent figures, including union leaders and members of Parliament, participated.

The program included workshops on the labor movement, including discussions on what kind of labor government is needed in Britain; trade unions and the law; defending Labour Party democracy; defending the National Union of Mineworkers; and youth in the labor movement.

Workshops were also held on the Black and women's liberation struggles. These were on Black people and the labor movement, defending the Black communities, building alliances for women, and a panel discussion by leaders of Women Against Pit Closures, which played a key role in the miners' strike.

Discussions on the anti-apartheid struggle, the crisis in Central America and the Caribbean, and the Irish independence fight made internationalism a central axis of the conference.

There was also a workshop on defending gay rights.

The keynote panel on Sunday, November 17, was called "An Alliance for Socialism." The speakers' platform included Tony Benn, a left-wing member of Parliament for the Labour Party; Diane Abbott, a member of the Labour Party Black Section and the party's Women's Action Committee; Narendra Makenji, of the Black Section National Committee; John Ross, editor of *Socialist Action*; and representatives of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) of El Salvador. A striking worker from Silent Night, Britain's largest furniture manufacturer, was also on the panel.

'We've got to re-create the socialist tradition'

Tony Benn explained the situation facing British workers: "There is an attack on living standards, on the unions, on women, on the Irish, on the Black community, on democracy, on civil liberties — and a technique of division is being practiced which is to some extent effective. The apparatus of the state is being used quite ruthlessly, and of course the media are

being used on a daily basis in order to maintain that division. . . .

"Britain is the last colony left in the British empire, and all the techniques of repression that were tried elsewhere are now being used against our own people."

Benn explained that elected Labour Party governments have served as "intensive care units for capitalism."

"When capitalism got in a real mess and the people who ran it could no longer control it," he said, "they invited a Labour government to take over, which used its capacity to win the loyalty of the working class to make the sacrifices to put the system right. That government then lost us the election and handed the system back, fully recovered, to the people who ran it in the first place. That intensive care unit role for Labour governments is an absolute distortion of the original function of the Labour Party."

Benn then explained that the Labour Party must build alliances with the sections of the working class involved in struggle if it is to break from its present course of class-colaborationism.

"Actually," he pointed out, "the miners' strike mobilized the very alliance that we're talking about at this conference today. The political consciousness, the central role of women in the strike as an independent reinforcing element, the link with the Black community, with the Irish struggles, and so on, came out of it. . . .

"We've got to open up new affiliations and we've got to re-create the socialist tradition within the labor movement. That is what I think our task is about. When you look at that and ask how do you actually do it, the answer is that we must root it in experience. . . .

"We have got to campaign for basic demands and build our broad alliance on the demand for jobs, the demand for homes, the demand for schools, the demand for health care, the demand for dignity when you're old, for equality and an end to discrimination, and the demand for peace. We have got to approach socialism through all forms of experience of exploitation. . . .

"Unless we open ourselves to those experiences in the way that the trade union affiliation opens up the party to working experience in factories and pits, we're not going to develop good policies."

Blacks in Labour Party

Diane Abbott is a leader of the Labour Party Women's Action Committee and the Black Section. The Black Section is campaigning for official recognition inside the Labour Party. It

demands the right to organize autonomously within the party, to elect its own leadership, and to have proportional representation on the Labour Party's leading bodies. Founded two years ago, the Black Section has won considerable support for its recognition from the National Union of Mineworkers, the National Union of Railwaymen, the National Union of Public Employees, and the Transport and General Workers Union.

Abbott explained that Blacks and women are necessary allies of the working-class movement. "It seems to me the key question," she said, "and one which the labor movement in this country has lost sight of since the 1945 administration [of Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee], is that we must be organizing for power, not just office. For years and years the Labour Party in this country has seemed to be simply about taking office: a bunch of white, male members of Parliament — barristers, retired trade union officials, that kind of person — taking office, endeavoring to manage British capitalism more humanely than it has been in the past.

"What we must be organizing for is to take power as a labor movement, to empower the working class. And when you address your mind to the issue of empowering the working class certain things become clear. It becomes crystal clear that you're not going to empower them via a parliamentary Labour Party which is all white, all male, and middle class. And it becomes clear that certain issues have to come higher up on the agenda than they have done in the past. . . .

"The classic preoccupation of the British Labour Party is the aristocracy of labor, the white male working class. Issues like low pay have until recently never been taken as seriously as they should have. But for working-class women, low pay is a crucial issue. We are nearly half the work force, but we are 80 percent of the low paid. Anyone who takes women's issues seriously will take the issue of low pay seriously."

Abbott also argued that an alliance between the labor movement and Black community is necessary for winning Black rights. She explained that "there is no way that you can disentangle issues of race from issues of class.

"I do think that a class framework is crucial, and I think that as much as anything because I am Black.

"You'll not empower the mass of Black people, you'll not help them, unless you empower the working class. To put it another way: anti-working-class politics are politics against the interests of Black people as a



Panel on lessons of miners' strike, with Jack Collins of Kent NUM speaking.

whole. It's one of the things which Black people bring to labor movement politics, because we are forced, we have no option but to keep going back to a class context."

Narendra Makenji, of the Black Section National Committee, spoke on behalf of two long-time activists in the Labour Party who have been threatened with expulsion from the party for their support to the Black Section.

Amir Khan is the central leader of a new chapter of the Black Section, formed a month ago in Sparkbrook. Sparkbrook was the site of recent police riots against the Black community. Kevin Scally is an activist in the Labour Party Committee on Ireland and has supported the Sparkbrook Black Section's fight to be recognized. A petition drive has been launched in their defense against the right-wing Sparkbrook Labour Party executive committee which threatens their expulsion.

Struggle is international

The conference gave Ben Turok of the African National Congress a standing ovation when he appealed for support from British workers in the struggle against apartheid. "Even though what I am going to say is about a struggle many miles away," he said, "it is clear that there are certain common themes that face people in struggle across the world, and it is my task today to suggest that the ANC and the people of Great Britain are indeed very natural allies in the struggle for socialism, in the alliance for socialism throughout the world."

John Ross of *Socialist Action* characterized the struggle against Thatcherism as an international struggle. "It should be stated calmly and coldly that if the struggle for socialism in Brit-

ain were a struggle between the British ruling class and the British working class then the ruling class would undoubtedly win. . . .

"Certainly the people of Central America, South Africa, and all those fighting imperialism throughout the world need solidarity in Britain. But even more, those fighting for socialism in Britain need the victory of the struggle of the people of Central America and South Africa. For without their victory we can never achieve socialism.

"Secondly, it must be constantly remembered that the British state has an 'internal colony' — the North of Ireland. Without the struggle to free Ireland, without an alliance between the working class in Britain and Ireland, based on the fight for complete independence of Ireland, the British working class can itself never be free."

Ross also echoed the support voiced on the speakers' platform for the struggles of the miners, the Black community, and women. "Any alliance for socialism," he explained, "can only be forged in struggle.

"The miners forged the most powerful and active social alliance seen since World War II. They achieved that because of the resolute leadership shown in the strike — and decisions like those to support women's self-organization and the Black Section — by Scargill and the National Union of Mineworkers leadership. It is only by creating the type of leadership which knows, in Tony Benn's words, which side you are on, that the social alliances necessary for the labor movement can be created. And 'which side you are on' applies not only to the national but to international class struggles."

The panel discussion on lessons of the miners' strike included Jack Collins, secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers in Kent; Betty Heathfield, of Women Against Pit Closures; Marc Wadsworth, vice-chair of the Black Section; Bob Clay, a Labour Party member of Parliament; and Dodie Wepler of *Socialist Action*.

Impact of miners' strike

Wadsworth traced the development of Black Sections throughout Britain. In two years, 35 chapters of the Black Section have been formed. He noted the support won by the Black Section at the recent Labour Party national convention, especially from the NUM. He pointed out that the Black Section has already inspired discussions inside the trade union movement on the importance of supporting Blacks in factory struggles, organizing trade union contingents in anti-racist actions, and supporting demonstrations against apartheid in South Africa.

Other speakers described how the miners' strike had acted as a catalyst to draw into action women, trade unionists, and layers of the Labour Party. Everyone who spoke linked the coal miners' strike and their struggles to other struggles around the world.

Jack Collins of the NUM ended his speech by saying, "The world doesn't begin and end in Britain. The working class doesn't begin and end in Britain. And yes, comrades, we might have been pushed back in Britain, but in Latin America, in Africa, in the Philippines and all over the world, the working class is winning and we are part of that victory."

Mac Warren, a leader of the U.S. Socialist Workers Party, was part of panel discussions in workshops on Blacks in the labor movement and building the anti-apartheid movement. He described how the civil rights movement in the United States overthrew the Jim Crow system of institutionalized racism in the South, and the political challenge facing Blacks in the United States today. Warren explained that Blacks are playing a leading role in the anti-apartheid movement, which is bringing into action large numbers of trade unionists and winning the support of hundreds of trade unions around the country.

During the week following the conference, Warren spoke to supporters of *Socialist Action* in London, Birmingham, Sheffield, and Manchester. There is heightened interest in Britain about the U.S. Black struggle, the ideas of Malcolm X and other Black leaders, and the National Black Independent Political Party since the recent wave of Black rebellions and actions against police brutality here. □

Don't you know someone who should be reading *Intercontinental Press*?

Why not ask a friend, family member, or co-worker to subscribe?

For rates, see inside cover.

General strike caps austerity protests

Workers answer government interference in unions

By Bobbis Misailides
and Argiris Malapanis

Working people brought Greece to a standstill on November 14 in the most massive general strike in the last decade. Hundreds of thousands of workers poured out into the streets of Athens and most other major cities.

These actions marked a high point in the developing movement of protest against the government's severe austerity measures.

The provocation for the current upsurge came a month earlier, on October 11, when the capitalist government of PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) announced a package of new austerity measures. In doing so, it disregarded the mass protests that hit earlier austerity moves (see *Intercontinental Press*, November 4, page 652.).

Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu canceled his scheduled visit to New York to attend the 40th anniversary celebrations of the United Nations in order to deal with the growing opposition to his administration's policies.

In a speech over national radio and television, he announced his government's intention "to curtail rapidly rising inflation and foreign indebtedness."

The drachma was devalued by 15 percent against the U.S. dollar. This second devaluation under Papandreu's administration (the first was in 1983) resulted in an estimated 15 to 18 percent increase in the prices of most imported consumer goods. The prices of imported raw materials, including fertilizers, fuel oil, gasoline, etc., took a comparable jump.

In a further attack on the standard of living of working people, Papandreu announced the cancellation of the cost of living adjustment (known as ATA) for the last quarter of 1985 and a 50 percent cut in the ATA for the first quarter of 1986. Prices during the same period are expected to increase by more than 10 percent.

Furthermore Papandreu declared that the rise in prices of farm products will be "lower than the projected inflation rate" while retroactive additional taxes of 3 percent to 10 percent will be imposed on farmers and small businessmen.

The next day the government announced plans to introduce a law making illegal any wage increases larger than the ones it has dictated. It is also proposing suspension of all collective bargaining for two years.

The PASOK government introduced deeper cuts in all social services — such as health care and education — totaling an estimated \$1.13 billion. Up to a quarter of the budgets of some social services will be eliminated.

The bourgeois daily *Eleftherotypia* reported

on October 12 that "diplomatic circles made it known that the European Economic Community (EEC) approves of the measures, and the way is opened for the \$4 billion loan that Greece has requested from it to support its foreign debt payments." The same paper reported that the Union of Greek Industrialists (SEB) also approves of the measures.

Besides PASOK, the other major bourgeois parties, New Democracy and Democratic Renewal (a recent split from New Democracy), hailed the measures as necessary to confront the economic crisis, while criticizing them for "not giving enough breaks to private initiative." Both Communist parties denounced the measures as a big blow to working people.

Economic crisis

These austerity attacks, coupled with the government's militarization drive are an attempt by the PASOK government to solve the deep social and economic crisis Greek capitalism is going through by putting the burden of this crisis on the shoulders of working people.

Greece, although having a less developed industrial economy, faces problems very similar to those of its West European imperialist allies.

Its foreign trade deficit is estimated at \$2.5 billion for 1985, a \$300 million increase over last year. Exports during the first four months of 1985 decreased by 12% compared with the same period in 1984. Industrial production for the first half of 1985 dropped by 2.2% relative to 1984. Investments in industry and other areas of the economy have stagnated over the last few years. In the nationalized sector — which accounts for 35% of the enterprises — 75% of the companies are operating at a deficit, losing an estimated \$1.5 billion in 1985 alone. The rate of growth of the gross national product (GNP) is steadily approaching zero. (It was 1.7% during 1979–81 and 0.9% in 1982–84.)

The official inflation rate of 18% is expected to increase to 23.5% in 1986, in large part due to the new measures. Unemployment is well over 10% and reaches 33% among youth, while underemployment is estimated between 15% and 18%. There are no prospects for lowering these figures in the near future. The country's foreign debt is estimated at \$13 billion and is steadily rising.

Response from workers and farmers

The ongoing mass mobilizations against the first wave of austerity attacks in September increased dramatically throughout the country after the announcement of the new measures.

On October 15, more than 80,000 workers marched and rallied in Omonia Square, at the center of Athens, to demand the cancellation of the austerity plan. Similar rallies took place in five other cities — Thessaloníki, Piraeus, Pátrai, Agrínion, and Lárissa. The rallies were called by 13 union federations and dozens of local unions.

At the Athens rally 18 members of the national executive of the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) called on the rest of the central leadership of GSEE to take the lead in the workers' mobilization. They issued a call for a one-day general strike as a first step in the antiausterity struggle. Most of these 18 GSEE leaders are identified with the Greek Fighting Union Movement—Supporters (ESAK-S) or the Renewed Workers Front (AEM), union groupings affiliated with Greece's two Communist parties.

Over the next two weeks a strike wave spread throughout the country. Athens, Thessaloníki, and 23 other cities were shut down on October 21, as workers in the garment, textile, pharmaceutical, and metal industries; in hospitals and banks; and in the state-owned telephone, electrical, and water companies, as well as teachers, bus drivers, and postal workers, went out.

The strikes were called by local labor councils in the respective cities. The major demand was the cancellation of the new economic measures.

The strike wave was accompanied by new marches and rallies protesting the government's antilabor measures. More than 100,000 workers rallied in Athens at Sintagma Square outside the Greek parliament on October 21. The same day the General Council of ADEDY, the 350,000-member Independent Democratic Union of Public Employees (the only union federation that is not affiliated to the GSEE), voted to issue a call for a one-day strike of its members on October 30. It was reported that the strike participation was 80 percent solid (*Rizospastis*, October 31).

Working farmers held tractorcades and rallies in many cities across the country. On November 6, a tractorcade several miles long filled the streets of Lárissa, the capital of the major farming region of the country.

The protest was called by the Federation of Farmers' Associations of Lárissa, the largest farmers' federation in Greece. The farmers demanded higher prices for their produce, compensation for their crops ruined by this year's drought, and cancellation of the austerity measures.

Under the impact of the growing mass mobilizations of workers and farmers through



ElieTherotypia

November 14 Athens demonstration: "No more burdens on the people. The crisis must be paid by the industrialists — Municipality of Néa Philadelphia."

September and October, central trade union leaders affiliated to the Panhellenic Trade Union Movement (PASKE), which follows the governing party, PASOK, openly denounced the government's economic policies.

On October 17, nine national union leaders — the president of ADEDY and eight members of the GSEE executive — were expelled from PASOK. On October 23, these eight GSEE leaders joined the other 18 members of the national executive to form a new majority of 26 on the 45-member body.

They called for convening the executive committee to discuss the confederation's position toward the mass workers' mobilizations. GSEE President Georgios Raftopoulos refused to convene such a meeting.

The 26 who called for the meeting stated that "by taking such an action Raftopoulos objectively ceased to be the president of the GSEE," adding that "the election of a new president is on the agenda." They denounced his actions as "an outright violation of the statutes and the constitution of the GSEE."

On October 29, the new majority of the GSEE national leadership held a meeting in which it deposed Raftopoulos and elected a new president, Giannis Papamichael. It then voted to call for the November 14 general strike and postponed a meeting of the General Council of GSEE from October 31 to November 18.

Government tries to split labor movement

On October 31 the government openly intervened through the bourgeois courts in the affairs of the labor movement. The Magistrate's Court issued an order reestablishing Raftopoulos as the president of the GSEE, claiming that the meeting called by the 26 was "in-

valid, groundless, and illegal."

With the government's support, Raftopoulos convened the General Council of GSEE the same day. Just 125 (including 15 members of New Democracy) out of the 235 members of the General Council showed up. This body denounced the majority of the national executive, called for "dialogue with the government," and supported the court's decision.

On November 1, four union federations appealed the Magistrate's Court decision to reinstitute Raftopoulos as the president of the GSEE. At the same time tens of thousands of workers gathered outside GSEE headquarters in Athens and marched to the parliament expressing their support for the majority of the executive and their outrage at the court's decision.

Intensifying its attempts to divide and demoralize the labor movement, the government also announced its intention to impose more strict measures against strikes. Minister of Labor Evangelos Giannopoulos stated that the government would alter articles of the labor law so that any union leadership that calls a public sector strike deemed illegal by a court will automatically be fired by order of the same court.

Prime Minister Papandreou went on a scare campaign to prevent any more mass mobilizations. In a speech made public on November 2, he slandered working people on strike as "irresponsible" and "causing an extended atmosphere of insecurity and chaos" that could lead to a new military take-over. He compared the political situation to the one in 1965-66 that led to a coup and a military dictatorship in April 1967. He further stated: "We are bound to consolidate legality, public order, and nor-

mality with determination and a strong hand."

Despite the slander campaign and Papandreou's "warnings," strikes continued in many cities around the country.

By November 14, the GSEE's strike call was supported by most union federations, over 40 local labor councils, and about 1,500 union locals, comprising 90 percent of the organized labor movement.

The participation in the strike that day was estimated at over 80 percent. It was the largest strike since 1975.

Early on the morning of November 14, thousands of workers began to gather in union contingents outside the national headquarters of the GSEE in Athens.

At the same time, rail workers sat on the tracks in the central rail station of Athens, blocking any scab trains from moving, while bus drivers blocked the entrance of the major bus depot in Athens with a tractor-trailer truck. The police attacked the pickets, arresting 21 unionists.

By noon hundreds of thousands of workers flooded the center of Athens around the GSEE's national headquarters and began to march toward the parliament. The GSEE's banner in the front of the march proclaimed the major demands of the workers' mobilizations: "Cancellation of the austerity measures" and an "End to the government's intervention in the labor movement."

This was the first time in the history of the labor movement in Greece that the government's interference in the affairs of the labor movement became a central issue. Slogans such as "For an independent, class-struggle GSEE," "Hands off the unions," "The workers fight united, we reject appointed leaderships," "No more burdens on workers," and "Take back your austerity measures" predominated on the march.

The fighting spirit of working people showed their determination to continue the struggle against the government's antilabor policies.

On November 17 about half a million people marched outside the U.S. embassy in Athens to commemorate the 1973 uprising that led to the downfall of the military dictatorship the following year. The major demands of the demonstration, which was called by the National Student Federation (EFEE) and was supported by the GSEE, were "Out of NATO, now and forever," "Money for education, not for NATO and the oligarchy," and "Out with the murderous U.S. bases."

As part of Papandreou's campaign to scare off the mass mobilizations of workers, students, and farmers, the police provoked confrontations with protesters during the march. After the demonstration was over, the cops cold-bloodedly killed a 15-year-old student.

The student federation, the GSEE, and both Communist parties blasted this murder and put the blame squarely on the government. The incident shook Papandreou's administration as well, leading to the resignations of the minister of the interior and the government press secretary. □

Apartheid's great land theft

How racist system keeps Blacks from farming

By Ernest Harsch

The people are starving. Famine is widespread and will become worse. The people have no land.

— Chief Sabata Dalindyebo¹

For centuries, land has been at the center of the struggle between South Africa's white rulers and its subjugated Black majority. The cry for land has been raised by Blacks time and again, from the earliest wars of African resistance through the current popular upheaval against the apartheid state.

Like the country's vast mineral wealth and extensive labor power, the bulk of the land is today controlled by a tiny class of white capitalist landowners, corporations, and real

This is the first of two articles on the land question in South Africa. The second article will focus on the resistance of Blacks to the apartheid regime's agrarian policies and their struggle to reconquer their land rights.

estate speculators. Originally taken from the indigenous African peoples through colonial conquest, 86.3 percent of South Africa's land is now reserved for "whites only." No African has the legal right to own or purchase land in these areas.

For Africans, who comprise some three-quarters of the entire population, a mere 13.7 percent of the land is set aside: the poor, overcrowded, and scattered fragments that make up the 10 rural reserves called Bantustans. The other two sectors of the Black population — Coloureds (those of mixed ancestry) and Indians — are also blocked from access to land, except for some small enclaves in the Cape and Natal provinces.

Deprived of their land and cattle and uprooted from their homes, millions of Blacks have been driven to labor for white employers at extremely low wages and under restrictive, slave-like conditions.

While whites enjoy the fruits of the land, Blacks are forced to live in the most abject poverty. The urban Black townships are plagued by disease, hunger, and unemployment. Yet conditions in the countryside are even worse. Agricultural laborers must live in

1. Sabata Dalindyebo was a paramount chief of the Tembu people in the Transkei who opposed the progovernment administration of that Bantustan. Faced with repression, he was forced to flee South Africa in 1980. This quote is taken from a Dec. 3, 1980, statement he made at a news conference in Lusaka, Zambia, at which he appeared alongside Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress.

wretched shacks and are legally bound to their white employers' farms. In terms of income, literacy, infant mortality, and disease, South Africa's Bantustans rank with the poorest countries of Africa. They are places of death and despair, where the apartheid authorities seek to dump the unemployed, women, the elderly, the young — all those not needed to labor in "white" South Africa.

The vast majority of those confined to the Bantustans either have no land or have plots so small that they cannot grow even enough food to subsist; they depend on the wages of Black migrant workers.

This extreme inequality in land ownership lies at the foundation of the entire apartheid edifice. It reinforces the repressive system of labor control. It is linked to the apartheid regime's denial to Blacks of their most basic rights to citizenship. And the political institutions set up to administer the Bantustans are intended to keep Africans divided along language and tribal lines and to separate them from Indians and Coloureds.

Along with the struggle for a democratic republic and for the freedom to forge a modern, unified nation, the fight of Blacks to reconquer the land is an integral part of South Africa's unfolding national, democratic revolution.

Colonial land wars

Before the arrival of the first white colonialists on South Africa's shores in 1652, the various indigenous peoples of the area had access to as much land as they needed.

There were the San hunters and gatherers, the Khoikhoi pastoralists, and the Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho, Tswana, and other peoples who practiced a mixture of settled agriculture and livestock herding. These African societies were poor and their conditions of production were primitive. But they were also relatively egalitarian; they were not plagued by extreme social inequities.

None of these peoples considered the land or other natural resources to be anyone's private property. The land was communally owned, by the people as a whole. Every family in a village or community had a right to as much land as it could cultivate. Land was divided up and allocated according to local conditions and needs by chiefs or *isibonda* (tribal "headmen"), who functioned as custodians of the land. Unused land reverted to the community for redistribution.

But through a series of wars launched by white colonial authorities and settlers, lasting more than 200 years, these indigenous social systems were shattered. The wars deprived Africans of their very economic foundation and

means of livelihood — land and cattle.

The first land war was launched against the Khoikhoi and San in 1658, just six years after the initial white employees of the Dutch East India Company settled near present-day Cape Town. That and subsequent wars took away most of the San hunting grounds and the pasture for the Khoikhoi's cattle. Whites seized livestock as well.

From the very beginning, the white settlers' land-grabbing was intertwined with their desire for cheap, subservient labor. They not only wanted the Africans' land, they also wanted Africans to work the land for them. Khoikhoi and San captives were initially reduced to slavery. When they were decimated by a smallpox epidemic, slaves from other African countries and from Dutch colonies in Asia were brought in.

The British takeover of the Cape Colony from the Dutch colonialists spurred greater white settlement and led to a rapid expansion of the areas under white control and domination. As the settlers drove east and north in search of additional land and labor, they clashed with more powerful African societies, such as the Xhosas, Sothos, and Zulus. One by one, those peoples were defeated. They lost their land, cattle, and independence and became subject peoples subordinated to the new white *baas* ("master").

The captured land, which had previously been the communal property of the African peoples, was transformed into either "crown" land (the property of the British colonial state) or the private property of white settlers, held through individual freehold tenure.

Some regions remained under direct African occupation and control, however. These areas were administratively designated as African "reserves," the predecessors of today's Bantustans. In them, the land continued to be communally owned for the most part. Since the white settler states were still financially and militarily weak, they preferred to govern these areas indirectly, through tribal chiefs who were induced to collaborate with the colonial authorities. Those chiefs who resisted were deposed. Those who went along with white dictates were rewarded with material privileges. The traditional role of the chiefs and headmen as custodians of the land, reflecting the interests of the African communities themselves, was subverted; they now became privileged functionaries acting on behalf of the white conquerors.

Sharecroppers, peasants, and workers

Before the turn of this century, capitalist relations in agriculture were still very rudimen-

tary in South Africa. Most white farmers did not yet employ Black labor for cash wages. After the abolition of slavery in 1834, most Black agricultural labor on white-owned farms was obtained through a variety of sharecropping and tenant arrangements.

Squatters — as African sharecroppers are known in South Africa — were peasants who lived on white-owned land and farmed part of it with their own seed and implements; as payment for use of the land, they gave the white farmer between one-third and one-half of their crops.

Labor tenants were Africans who worked for a white farmer for a specified length of time each year, ranging from three to nine months, in return for being able to live on the farm and cultivate and graze a certain portion of it.

In addition, there was the practice, known among whites as “kaffir farming,” under which African peasants directly rented white-owned land.

These arrangements gave Africans some continued, though restricted, access to land, which provided them with grazing pastures and land they could farm through their own efforts and those of their families. They greatly preferred this to working strictly for cash wages, without any access to land, and resisted the later drives to transform them into wage laborers pure and simple.

Also during the 19th century, communities of free African peasants emerged outside the reserves, farming land they had somehow retained or had bought from white farmers. Such land purchases were still allowed in the Cape, Natal, and Transvaal, though they were prohibited in the Orange Free State. Benefiting from the expansion of the domestic market, especially with the opening of the gold and diamond mines in the last quarter of the 19th century, these African peasants sold part of their produce. Some of them became moderately prosperous, and bought yet more land.

This process caused considerable alarm among the white authorities, who feared that the land they had obtained through conquest might revert to African ownership through the market.

The discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa marked a watershed in the country's economic development. Capital from Western Europe and the United States poured into the country. Capitalist production and market relations expanded rapidly. This further affected agriculture and altered the African peoples' relationship to the land.

The mining companies developed an acute need for Black labor in order to exploit South Africa's enormous mineral potential. But initially they could not attract enough Africans willing to work for cash wages — at least for the low wages the mine bosses were offering. Many Africans, moreover, were still able to draw their livelihood from the land and were not yet pulled into the market economy to the extent that they were dependent on cash incomes.

So to create a ready supply of African labor for the mines, the British colonial states in the



Ernest Harsch/IP

Farm worker's shack in Transvaal.

Cape and Natal and the Boer settler states of the Transvaal and Orange Free State enacted new measures, both in the reserves and in the “white” areas, to drive even more Africans off the land. These included antisquatting legislation, new land restrictions, the imposition of taxes, the tightening of pass and vagrancy laws, and the denial of credit and other assistance to African peasants farming for the market.

This offensive was highly successful, from the mine owners' vantage. The mine labor force on the Witwatersrand gold fields soared from 3,000 workers in 1887 to more than 100,000 Africans in 1899. The families of these workers were forced to stay behind in the impoverished reserves, while the workers themselves labored under restrictive contracts, for specified periods of time. All their movements and residency rights were strictly controlled through the pass laws and other repressive measures. When their contracts were over, or they became injured or too old to work, they were dispatched back to the reserves. This was the beginning of South Africa's migrant labor system, which has existed up to the present day.

The completion of the colonial subjugation of the indigenous African societies and the growth of capitalist relations with the mining boom gave new weight to the efforts of the British colonial authorities to politically consolidate the different states of South Africa under centralized white control. The military defeat of the Transvaal and Orange Free State as independent states during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 removed a further obstacle to this prospect. Finally, in 1910, the four separate states were unified into a single white-ruled South African state, which at the same time became formally independent of direct British colonial rule.

With the establishment of a single government, the way was also cleared for the white

authorities to eliminate the disparities in agricultural and land policy that had previously existed, and especially to close off further African access to land.

1913 land act

The 1913 Natives' Land Act — known among Blacks as the “law of dispossession” — opened a broad attack on the few surviving land rights of Africans. It included several main features:

- The act codified in law the white expropriation of the vast bulk of South Africa's land. More than 90 percent of the country was reserved for white ownership and control, including the richest farming and grazing lands, the forests, and all areas with known or potential mineral deposits. No African could own or purchase new land in these parts. Africans were only allowed to own land in those few areas they still effectively occupied and farmed, the areas formally designated as the reserves. At that time, these comprised a mere 7.9 percent of the country.

- The act prohibited squatting and “kaffir farming” on white-owned lands. It sought to transform some of the sharecroppers into labor tenants and others into urban and rural wage workers, while driving the rest (particularly nonproductive family members) into the reserves. Thousands of Africans were uprooted from land they had continued to cultivate, and were forced to migrate in search of work. But many white farm owners could not afford to lose this source of unpaid African labor or offer wages that were competitive with urban industry. So they ignored these provisions of the land act, and as a result squatting survived in some areas for several more decades.

- By outlawing new African land purchases in “white” South Africa and by moving against the squatting system, the 1913 act struck a mortal blow against the emerging African commercial peasantry. Many of those who had

already begun to farm for the market were driven out of business.

The white ruling class did not want Africans as free farmers; it wanted them as unfree laborers.

'Land must be in the hands of the white race'

This desire to push ever more Africans onto the labor market was a key motivation behind the land act. As the president of the Chamber of Mines commented the year before it was adopted, "What is wanted is surely a policy that would establish once and for all that outside special reserves, the ownership of the land must be in the hands of the white race, and that the surplus of young [African] men, instead of squatting on the land in idleness and spreading out over unlimited areas, must earn their living by working for a wage. . . ."

This goal was also recognized at the time by the newly formed African National Congress (ANC), today's vanguard liberation organization. Strongly opposing the land act, the ANC commented in 1916 that the act's aim was "to reduce by gradual process and artificial means the Bantu [African] people as a race to a status of permanent labourers or subordinates for all purposes and for all times with little or no freedom to sell their labour by bargaining on even terms with employers on open markets . . . [and] to limit all opportunities for their economic improvement and independence."

The employers at the same time did not want all Africans to be completely cut off from the land. The survival of the reserves played an important role in buttressing the migrant labor system: The minimal food cultivation in the reserves by the families of migrant workers made it possible for the employers to pay even lower wages. And the fact that these family members were living in the reserves, not in the cities, relieved the ruling class of the need to provide more housing, education, and social services for a larger settled urban working class.

But this ability of the reserves to subsidize the incomes of migrant workers was restricted by their extremely small size. Because of overcrowding, more and more Africans became landless, providing a greater spur toward African urbanization and toward the struggle for higher wages in the urban centers. The government's 1932 Native Economic Commission raised an alarm over the deterioration of economic and social conditions in the reserves.

As a result, the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 revised the land allocation provisions of the 1913 act. Promising to "alleviate pressure" in the African reserves, the government undertook to purchase additional land from whites and turn it over to African occupation. The legal limit on African-owned land was thus raised to today's proportion of 13.7 percent of the total land area (although not all of this has yet been incorporated into the Bantustans).

Much of this additional land, however, was already under de facto African occupation, so the 1936 act did little in practice to ease the overcrowding in the reserves. But it did extend

the prohibition on rural African squatting to the Cape and lengthened the amount of time that labor tenants were obliged to work for white farmers.

These two acts, of 1913 and 1936, provided the framework in which South African agriculture subsequently evolved. They laid the legal basis for the extreme social inequalities that mark South Africa's countryside today.

White farmers privileged

When the South African government talks about "farming," it has in mind only the white-owned commercial farms.

As of 1982, there were 71,000 such farms in the country, the vast majority of them owned by capitalist farmers or farming enterprises. These farms account for more than 90 percent of the farm produce sold on the market.

Because of the growth of South African mining and manufacturing industries, agriculture's share of the total economy has continued to decline, accounting for some 7 percent of the gross domestic product in 1981 and 9 percent of the value of all South African exports. These exports included wool, maize, sugar, tobacco, and livestock.

The white-owned farms, in 1978, covered more than 84 million hectares of land (one hectare = 2.47 acres). Of this land area, some 9 million hectares were devoted to crop cultivation and the rest to pasturage for livestock raising.² Meanwhile, the millions of Africans confined to the Bantustans must make do with a bare 2.3 million hectares of crop land and 12.3 million hectares of grazing lands.

And compared with the small farming plots of less than 4 hectares each in the Bantustans, these white-owned farms are enormous, averaging more than 1,000 hectares.

Actually, the size of white farms in South Africa varies greatly, with most ranging from under 200 hectares to 2,000 hectares or more. Some exceed 15,000 hectares. The South African government estimates that the top 25 percent of farmers and farm enterprises earn nearly 75 percent of the total net farm income.

The trend over the years has been toward greater concentration of farm ownership. While there are still some white working farmers, many of those of previous decades have been pushed off the land in favor of large-scale capitalist farming or have themselves become capitalist farmers. Between 1964 and 1982, the number of white farms fell by nearly a third, from 101,000 to 71,000.

As part of this process, industrial and mining capital is becoming increasingly involved in agriculture. In 1980, for example, the giant Anglo American Corp., the largest mining conglomerate, took control of a third of the country's sugar industry, including nearly 30 Natal sugar plantations.

2. Since much of South Africa is arid, and rainfall is erratic, less than 12 percent — some 14 million hectares — of the entire country is suitable for dryland farming. Of the proportion of this land in "white" South Africa, about three-quarters is actually under cultivation.

This decline in the number of white farmers will undoubtedly continue. Even in normal times, the Ministry of Agriculture deems those white-owned farms that are less than 200 hectares to be "subeconomic." But the drought of 1982–84 revealed just how economically precarious many of the white-owned farms are, including many above the 200-hectare threshold. A survey conducted in 1984 by the South African Agricultural Union, the main organization of white farmers, found that only 54 percent of all the white-owned farms in the country were still financially viable. These difficulties prompted some rallies and other actions by white farmers in early 1985 to protest the high costs of farm inputs.

Many of these white farmers would already have gone under were it not for the special measures taken by the regime to assist the commercial agricultural sector. According to Pretoria, one of the pillars of its farm policy is to "keep white farmers on the land." This is in sharp contrast to its opposition to Blacks seeking to farm.

The government's Land and Agricultural Bank provides loans, often at preferential rates, to white farmers (Blacks are excluded from such loans). Even white farmers who are not considered good credit risks have little difficulty obtaining loans from government agencies.

More than three-quarters of the white farmers' output is now marketed through state-supported marketing boards. Through these boards, as well as through tariffs, subsidies, export quotas, and other controls, the government has protected the white farmers to an extent from sharp fluctuations in the prices of agricultural exports on the world market. In fact, it has generally kept white agricultural prices well above competitive levels. In 1981, for example, South African maize farmers received \$150 per ton of maize, compared to the world price of \$111.

Government irrigation projects benefit white farmers almost exclusively. Out of the approximately 900,000 hectares of land that are now irrigated in South Africa, all but 26,000 are in white farming areas.

Extensive state assistance has also encouraged increased mechanization. Draft animals have now been almost completely replaced by machinery. As of 1977, there were some 285,000 tractors in operation in South Africa — an average of four tractors per farm, and representing about two-thirds of all tractors in use on the entire African continent. By 1982, total white farm assets had reached \$37 billion.

Agricultural laborers

Whether their operations are large or small, all white farmers in South Africa employ at least some Black farm laborers.

Because of the increasing mechanization of commercial agriculture, these farmers' Black labor needs have been declining, particularly over the past decade. While there were nearly 1.4 million African farm workers in 1971–72, their number had fallen to 973,000 by 1980. Besides Africans, there are about 250,000 Col-

oured farm laborers in the Western Cape region. And there are still some Indian farm workers on Natal's sugar plantations (to which the first Indians were brought a century ago as indentured laborers), although most have since gone into other occupations.

Wages for Black farm workers are extremely low. According to the 1976 agricultural census, the cash wages of all regular farm laborers averaged just 32 rands (at that time about US\$40) a month. In addition, farm workers generally also receive part of their payment in kind, an amount that varies greatly from region to region. This payment usually involves food rations, but Coloured farm workers are given as part of their wage several tots of wine a day (known in South Africa as the "tot system").

Working and living conditions for Black farm workers are miserable. They are often compelled to labor 14 or 15 hours a day, six or seven days a week. Farm workers' shacks are frequently constructed of dried mud and thatching, with corrugated iron sheeting for roofs; none have electricity.

Beatings with a *sjambok*, a whip made of ox hide, are fairly routine, even for minor infractions. As one white farmer wrote in a letter to a South African newspaper several decades ago, "If we want the natives to be law-abiding, let us speak to them in the language they understand: the language of the *sjambok*, administered frequently and with vigour." Such attitudes still prevail in the white farming areas. Virtually every year cases come to light of Black farm laborers who are beaten to death; usually the white farmers involved are let off with fines.

Though conditions and wages are poor, it is not easy for Black farm workers, in particular Africans, to leave. They are tied to the white farms in serf-like conditions. Sometimes this is because they have built up heavy debts to the farmers. But more generally it is due to apartheid laws. The pass system prevents rural Africans from freely moving to the cities in search of more remunerative employment. And once an African is officially registered as an agricultural laborer, it is extremely difficult to change job classifications.

Like all Black workers, those on the farms are also fettered by antiunion legislation. No unions of agricultural workers have been able to form in recent years.

'Blackening' of the countryside

Despite the colonial conquests, the land acts, and all the apartheid regime's repressive legislation and policies, millions of South African Blacks continue to cling to and farm whatever land they can. They do so not only in the Bantustans, but *outside* as well. The "white" countryside is not all that white.

Legally, these Africans have no proprietary or tenure rights to land outside the Bantustans. But the white minority regime has been able to enforce this prohibition only partially and with great difficulty.

Some of these African farming communities are on patches of land that were acquired be-



Workers on Natal sugar plantation.

fore the 1913 land act, and have survived since then. Other African peasants farm white-owned land, in regions where labor tenancy, squatting, and similar arrangements still persist.

In fact, with the increased urbanization of whites and the steady decline in the number of white farmers, the proportion of Blacks in the rural population increased markedly in the decades after World War II. More and more white farms were left to the sole occupancy of Black employees or tenants. By 1954, the department of police was estimating that one-fifth of all white farms in the country were occupied by Africans alone.

This trend caused much worry among government officials and apartheid strategists, who saw increased Black access to land as a factor threatening to weaken the overall system of white supremacy. For example, speaking in 1971 in Viljoenskroon, in the heart of a white farming district in the Orange Free State, President J.J. Fouché noted that the Black-white ratio in the district was 16.5-to-1. Such labor patterns on white farms could not continue, he said, because they were leading to a "verswarting" (blackening) of the countryside.

Just as the regime has been engaged in an ongoing effort through the pass laws and other residency control regulations to expel hundreds of thousands of "illegal" Blacks from the cities, it has waged an open war against this "blackening" of the countryside.

There are two main targets of this war: the abundance of Africans living on white-owned land and the hundreds of African farming communities that still exist in pockets of Black-owned land outside the Bantustans, areas called "Black spots" by the apartheid authorities.

During the 1960s, some 340,000 labor tenants and 656,000 squatters (including members of their families) were expelled from white-owned farms. By the early 1970s, the government was claiming that labor tenancy had been eliminated entirely in the Cape, Transvaal, and Orange Free State, and that only 16,350 labor tenants remained in Natal. In 1980, the last legal loopholes allowing labor tenancy in Natal were closed.

In addition, the government has also sought to reduce the number of Black wage laborers on the white-owned farms by establishing maximum quotas for given districts.

Although the government claimed to have virtually wiped out labor tenancy, in fact it still survives. Because labor tenants do not work for cash wages but in return for permission to cultivate or graze a section of a white-owned farm, some white farmers, particularly those facing financial difficulties, have employed subterfuge to avoid having to expel them. Many labor tenants are simply not officially registered as such, and are thus overlooked by the apartheid census-takers.

As of 1985, it was estimated that there were still some 500,000 African labor tenants and "superfluous" farm laborers who faced possible eviction.

Even with the expulsion of many Africans to the Bantustans, the "blackening" of the countryside continues. One reason is the proliferation of absentee landlordism. In 1981, in the Koedoesrand area of the northern Transvaal, just 320 out of 470 farms were actually occupied by their white owners; in Ellisras the proportion was only 251 out of 654. The remainder, occupied solely by African employees, were owned by white professionals and businessmen living in the cities. Two years later, Gene Louw, the administrator of the Cape, warned that the number of white inhabitants in the Cape's rural areas was declining "drastically," while there was a rise in the number of Coloureds.

Banishing 'Black spots'

After the labor tenants, the other main target of the government's offensive has been the "Black spots." In general, they are farming areas first bought by better-off African peasant farmers before the 1913 land act was introduced, when such purchases were still legal. The land in them is usually owned on the basis of freehold tenure, either individually or cooperatively. Some "Black spots" are on church-owned lands that were leased to African farmers before such renting out was prohibited.

Despite problems of overcrowding, some of these areas remain relatively prosperous — compared to the abysmal poverty facing the

vast majority of rural Africans.

The character of these "Black spots" can be seen from a few examples:

- Mgwali, in the Eastern Cape region, is a community of 5,000 people, originally founded on church land in 1857. It is well-irrigated, with three rivers flowing through it. The residents have practiced contour farming for more than a century, and as a result their land has never known soil erosion, unlike many parts of the Bantustans. About 150 landowners possess title deeds, while others are tenants. Farm laborers evicted from nearby white-owned farms have been able to settle in Mgwali.

- Mogopa, in the Transvaal, was first bought by a chief in 1911 on behalf of the Bakwena tribe. Until it was destroyed in 1984, it had three schools, four churches, and two water pumps, all built by the community itself. Occupying two communally owned farms covering 10,000 hectares, the people of Mogopa grew maize, sorghum, sunflowers, and other crops. They had adequate grazing land for their goats, donkeys, and cattle. They also owned a diamond mine on their property, which they leased out to a white miner.

- Mathopetad, also in the Transvaal, is a freehold area of about 1,360 hectares inhabited by 3,000 people. The land was first bought in

1912. According to a report in the Nov. 4, 1984, Johannesburg *Sunday Times*, "It is a thriving agricultural community.... The people grow mealies [maize], sorghum, beans, and vegetables, besides owning many herds of cattle. They are modern farmers with tractors and boreholes, and for many years have sold their surplus crops to the co-operative in Koster."

The apartheid authorities see the survival of such African farming communities as a direct challenge to their racist system, in which the only role allotted to Blacks is to work for a white *baas*. They have therefore slated these "Black spots" for elimination and have designated them for white occupation.

During the 1960s, some 97,000 residents of these farming communities were forcibly uprooted from their homes and resettled in the Bantustans. The pace of such forced resettlements picked up even more over the following decade.

According to a 1985 estimate by the Surplus People Project, which campaigns against forced resettlements, there are more than 1.3 million residents of "Black spots" and areas scheduled for Bantustan "consolidation" who still face the threat of eviction. In Natal Province alone, it is estimated that 245,000 residents of 189 "Black spots" confront such a

prospect.

Sometimes the removals are carried out with the "agreement" of tribal leaders and with promises of new land in the Bantustans. But only those who already own more than 17.3 hectares of land — a tiny minority — are actually entitled to compensatory land in the Bantustans. All owners of smaller plots, as well as tenants, are thus deprived of land through the resettlements, and must get rid of their livestock as well.

Usually, there is no agreement involved in the resettlements — just physical force. George Rampou, a leader of the expelled Mogopa community, explained: "They did not discuss with us.... They just come. They come in the middle of the night, all armed with revolvers. They come and surround your house as though you killed somebody. Then they forced you to leave your house without you knowing why, how you must go. They decide how much to pay you without talking to you about it. But you must accept because they already break your house.... They must be great cowards to come and surround people when they are all fast asleep to do these things."

The tenacious resistance of many of these African farming communities to forcible resettlement is an important aspect of the struggle going on today in South Africa's countryside.

Homelands of misery


According to the apartheid propagandists, it is in the 10 "national homelands," as Pretoria calls the Bantustans, that Africans can enjoy their political and social rights, including the right to own land and to farm it. But as the millions of residents of the Bantustans know, this is a fraud.

The Bantustans are so overcrowded, fragmented, and impoverished that they provide little possibility for the development of a modern class of farmers producing commodities for the market. In fact, they do not allow most Bantustan residents to farm at even a *subsistence* level.

Because of the regime's concerted drive to force as many Blacks out of "white" South Africa as possible, the total population of the Bantustans increased from 5 million to 11 million between 1960 and 1980 alone, rising to 54 percent of all Africans in the country.

None of the Bantustans are viable economic, social, or geographic units, let alone "independent" states, as Pretoria has proclaimed four of them (Transkei, Ciskei, Bophutha-Tswana, and Venda). Only the tiny Kwa-Ndebele and QwaQwa Bantustans are composed of single pieces of territory, while Kwa-Zulu consists of 44 patches of land separated from each other by white farming areas.

In recent years, the government has outlined plans to "consolidate" the Bantustans by reshuffling land among several of them and by substituting land that is now owned by whites for some Bantustan territory. Yet this will not alleviate the basic problems. Some Bantustans will gain more land as a result of the "consolidation," but still within the 13.7 percent limit



Resettlement camp in Natal. Several million Africans have been forcibly resettled and driven off their land.

set by the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act. The most immediate effect of this process will be to inflict yet more suffering on the hundreds of thousands of Africans who will be forced to move. As with the removal of the "Black spots," many residents of the areas affected by "consolidation" will lose their cattle and their access to land.

Another consequence of Bantustan "consolidation" will be to further deepen language and tribal divisions among Africans — a key goal of the entire Bantustan program. In the northern Transvaal, for example, the Sotho and Shangaan peoples had close social ties in the past and often lived in the same areas. But the imposition of artificial borders for the Lebowa and Gazankulu Bantustans — sometimes running through the middle of a single village — have fostered divisions and frictions between them. Shangaans who used to hire tractors for ploughing from their Sotho neighbors can no longer do so.


With more and more Africans forced to live in the Bantustans, they have become even more overcrowded than before. Between 1970 and 1980 alone, the population of KaNgwane increased by 204 percent, of KwaNdebele by 415 percent, and of QwaQwa by 515 percent. In 1970 the Ciskei had 66.4 people per square kilometer; in 1981 it had 126. The Bantustans as a whole are among the most densely populated regions of the entire African continent.

When the 1936 land act was adopted, it set a limit of 4 hectares of land per family — a tiny amount compared to even the smallest white-owned farms. But for most Bantustan residents, even a plot of that size is impossible to obtain. In the Ciskei, the average size of landholdings in the farming areas is only one hectare, which under the Ciskei's dryland conditions is not enough to feed one person, let alone a family. Just 27,000 of the 375,000 rural Ciskeians have enough land to enable them to also keep cattle. Nearly a third of the Ciskei's people have no land at all. In the Transkei, up to a quarter of the population is landless.

In KwaNdebele, some 200,000 people who had been expelled from the white areas were each allotted one-sixteenth of an acre of land, barely enough for a house and a small garden.

According to a reporter for the Johannesburg *Rand Daily Mail*, writing in the June 17, 1982, issue, "What strikes you most forcibly as you drive into KwaNdebele, is the way the land changes. As you leave Groblerdal behind, the silver sprays irrigating rich, white farmlands give way to scrubby bushveld and finally to dry, arid soil whose main produce appears to be thorn trees. Dust hangs in the air in the wake of every passing vehicle. . . . Looking around, you notice the bareness of the tiny residential plots, devoid of crops which could supplement the family income. But cows graze on the common land and there seem to be goats everywhere. But it is the aridity that impresses."

Not surprisingly, poverty, disease, and hunger are virtually universal in the Bantustans. Their per capita domestic products are smaller than those of most independent Afri-



can states. In the Ciskei, 40 percent of the population is unemployed, and 89 percent of the children suffer from malnutrition. In the Transkei, 95 percent of the population has cash incomes below the official subsistence level. In KwaZulu, one in every three boys is stunted in height and weight due to malnutrition, as is one in every four girls.

Given the overcrowding, the shortage of money for fertilizer and farm tools, the general lack of irrigation, and the fact that many adult males are away working as migrant laborers, overall productivity in the Bantustans is particularly low.

In some Bantustans, agricultural production reaches less than 3 percent of its potential. The Transkei alone could theoretically produce enough maize for all of South Africa, but today it does not produce enough even for its own needs. Throughout the Bantustans, the average per-hectare output for maize and other crops is only about a quarter of that on white-owned farms in the rest of the country.

South Africa's overall problem of soil erosion is even more severe in the Bantustans. Because of the scarcity of land, contour farming and crop rotation, which could help preserve the soil, are generally not possible. As early as the 1950s, nearly three-quarters of the land in the Bantustans was suffering from moderate to severe erosion. It has become worse since then.

Bantustan tenure

Formally, communal land ownership is still the norm in the Bantustans, applying to 94 percent of those who till the soil. But this is not the same communal system as of old. It has been greatly distorted by the expropriation of most African lands and by the apartheid regime's transformation of the tribal chiefs into appendages of the government administration.

Land tenure in the Bantustans has become frozen. Because of the extreme overcrowding,

land is rarely redivided as it was in the past, and instead remains in the effective possession of the same families, handed down through the generations with the eldest son as the sole inheritor. Younger sons can no longer obtain new plots of their own, and women have no land rights whatsoever. Newcomers, such as those deported to the Bantustans, cannot get any farmland.

Although this communally owned land may not be legally sold or rented, sharecropping is permitted, enabling those with land rights to draw a small amount of benefit from the labor of those who have none. And some chiefs have become corrupted; they sometimes demand portions of crops or cash fees in return for making land allotments, and they have made formerly voluntary tribal tributes compulsory.

But even this distorted communal system is subordinated, in the final analysis, to Pretoria. Families occupying plots of land must pay yearly rents to the local magistrate's office, making them in practice tenants of the state. The government, moreover, has the power to intervene in the Bantustans whenever it sees fit to deny land occupancy to any African. In the Bantustans that have been declared "independent," these powers were simply passed on to the Bantustan administrations. Yet even in these Bantustans, Pretoria can retain legal control over any lands added to them as a result of the Bantustan "consolidation" program.

A small layer in the Bantustans — about 6 percent — cultivates land on the basis of individual tenure, primarily in the Ciskei, Transkei, and KwaZulu. Like the "Black spots" outside the Bantustans, this land had originally been bought before the 1913 land act. It is mainly on these plots that the few self-supporting peasant farmers in the Bantustans can be found. They have higher yields and some even employ labor. While they may sell a surplus from time to time, most farm primarily to meet

their own needs and those of their families, rather than for the market.

'Master farmers'

With the direct support of the Bantustan administrations and the apartheid regime, a tiny layer of commercial farmers has also been created in the Bantustans in recent years. Known as "master farmers" or by other designations, they are often well-paid Bantustan officials or tribal chiefs who have used their positions to buy some land or to acquire personal use of communally owned land.

As early as 1974, BophuthaTswana's minister of agriculture, T.M. Molathlwa, was able to comment, "It is notable that in recent times a new breed of farming entrepreneur has emerged amongst the Tswana people. It is not uncommon to find farmers running herds of several hundred cattle. Stud breeders have also been forthcoming, and also in the field of crop husbandry, men owning tractor units and producing up to 6,000 bags of grain per annum are operating on portions of land leased from other farmers or on vacant government land."

In KwaZulu, prosperous sugar-cane growers now hire agricultural laborers from as far away as the Transkei. In the Transkei, Prime Minister Kaiser Matanzima and his brother have acquired several farms without any payment.

Whites have also rented land in the Bantustans to set up relatively lucrative commercial farms. In the Transkei alone, white-run farms covered more than 11,000 hectares in 1978.

Rather than reflecting a class differentiation of the rural population resulting from the operation of capitalist market forces, the emergence of this layer of commercial farmers in the Bantustans flows from a conscious effort by the government and the Bantustan officials to build up a political base of support. They are directly dependent on loans, marketing assistance, irrigation, and other favors from the Bantustan administrations.

In addition to these private ventures, the Bantustan administrations have launched other commercial farming operations of their own, including tea, cotton, coffee, and citrus farms.

Such commercial farms in the Bantustans are being developed on the backs of the masses of Bantustan residents. To acquire the necessary land for them, a new phase of land and cattle expropriations has been opened up within the Bantustans themselves, affecting several million Africans.

New taxes have been imposed on livestock, with those unable to pay facing the prospect of having their cattle confiscated. The KwaZulu Development Corporation has taken over the best available land in the Tugela Valley for cotton, wheat, and tobacco farms, while new irrigation canals will divert the river's waters away from tribal lands now under food cultivation elsewhere in the valley. In the Ciskei, the authorities are pressing for a compulsory land "consolidation" and for the imposition of a tax on those migrant workers who have land in order to force them to give it up. In Lebowa, elderly people are being offered tiny pensions

if they turn over their land rights.

Apartheid officials have pressed to transfer the occupation of plots of land from "inefficient to more progressive farmers." One official in Pretoria even favored reducing the number of those with land rights in the Bantustans to one-fifth or even one-tenth their present number. The "excess farmers" are to be resettled in urban townships within the Bantustans.

Through a combination of the mass expulsions from other parts of the country and the land expropriations now under way within the Bantustans, more and more Bantustan residents are without any land. In 1960, just 1.2 percent of the population of the Bantustans lived in urban areas; by 1980 17.1 percent lived in townships with an additional 41.6 percent living in "closer settlements" where virtually no farming or stockraising is possible.

Without land, these residents are even more dependent than before on wage labor outside the Bantustans. A 1983 study of migrant workers in Natal found that 46 percent had no land at all, not even shared land. In the Ciskei, three-quarters of all families now depend on money sent home by migrant workers. Seventy percent of the economically active population in BophuthaTswana must work outside the Bantustan, as must 50 percent of those in the Transkei.

Citing an official of the Lebowa Bantustan in the northern Transvaal, the May 14, 1983, London *Guardian* reported, "In Lebowa, says [Machupe] Mphahlele, land is scarce. Moreover, land that a few years ago used to grow food has now become too heavily populated. More and more able-bodied people have thus had to go to 'the factories in the south' — Johannesburg, Pretoria, and the Vaal triangle — to earn money. They must support themselves there."

Rather than the developing "national states" projected in government propaganda brochures, the Bantustans are becoming more than ever before mere settlement camps for migrant workers and their families. These Bantustan residents form a massive army of unemployed who are readily available as laborers for use by white industrialists and capitalist farmers.

Fetters on Coloureds and Indians

As oppressed Black peoples, Coloureds and Indians likewise face severe restrictions on land rights.

Many of those categorized as Coloureds can partially trace their descent back to the Khoikhoi people, who once roamed with their herds over most of what is today Cape Province and into parts of Natal. They were the first victims of the white colonialists' land wars, and were driven off the land more thoroughly than other African peoples (nearly 75 percent of all Coloureds live in urban areas today). But here and there, in small rural pockets, some of the descendants of the Khoikhoi live in what are termed "Coloured reserves."³

3. Unlike the Khoikhoi, the San (also called "Bushmen") were able to retain no land rights what-

According to a government report issued in 1976, there are 23 rural Coloured areas covering some 1.7 million hectares of land, with a total population of 58,000. Nearly half live in the more crowded reserves of the southern Cape, which consist of only 2.1 percent of the total land area of the Coloured reserves. As in the Bantustans, many residents of these reserves actually hold jobs outside of them, given the lack of sufficient land for farming. There are some Coloured peasants as well in the Transkei, Ciskei, and parts of Natal, generally owning their own plots of land.

Ownership of land in the Coloured reserves rests in the hands of local management committees, which, like the Bantustan administrations, are bodies dominated by political collaborators with the apartheid regime.

The residents of the Coloured reserves comprise only 11.1 percent of the total rural Coloured population, which numbers more than half a million. Most of the remainder are labor tenants, squatters, or agricultural laborers on white-owned farms. They face restrictions, difficulties, and conditions similar to those of Africans, although they do not have to carry passes.

Coloureds have no legal land rights in the "white" countryside. However, a few — those favored by the apartheid regime — may purchase white-owned land if they can obtain permits from the Department of Planning. In 1978, the president of the South African Agricultural Union argued for the scrapping of this restrictive permit system so that Coloureds could freely purchase such land; it was one of the very few times that this pro-apartheid organization of white capitalist farmers favored easing any of the land restrictions on Blacks.

South Africa's Indian population, which today numbers nearly 1 million, is also largely urban.

Yet the first Indians were brought to South Africa a century ago precisely to work the land — as indentured laborers for white sugar cane farmers in Natal. After their periods of indenture expired, many were allowed to stay on in South Africa. Most became workers. A few became urban merchants and businessmen. Some were able to buy or rent land, or acquired plots to farm as labor tenants or squatters. A handful of Indian sugar cane farmers have become relatively well-off, employing both Indian and African agricultural labor.

But like Coloureds and Africans, these Indian farmers are shackled by numerous discriminatory and segregationist laws. They are confined to designated areas and cannot purchase land elsewhere. They can obtain few loans, since credit is available almost exclusively for whites. And over recent decades they have had some 25,000 hectares of farm-

soever. Most of the San survivors were driven out of South Africa into what is today Namibia, but several hundred still live within South Africa's borders, mainly in the northern Cape. What remains of their hunting grounds is considered public property, and they must compete, at an extreme disadvantage, with whites who hunt for sport.



Peasants in Transkei. Most Bantustan residents do not have enough land for even subsistence farming.

land taken away from them through apartheid legislation and policies.

A backward agrarian system

The social inequities of South Africa's agrarian system are clearly reflected in the stark differences between the living standards of whites and Blacks.

Although a handful of whites have been affected by unemployment and reduced incomes in the past few years, none suffer from malnutrition. But among Blacks hunger and disease are prevalent, both in the squalid urban townships and especially the Bantustans.

It is estimated that nearly 3 million Blacks under the age of 15 suffer from malnutrition. Between 35,000 and 50,000 Black children die each year of illnesses related to or aggravated by dietary deficiencies. Overall Black infant mortality is high. In some rural areas, between 30 percent and 50 percent of children die before their fifth birthday.

The severe drought that swept South Africa in 1982-84 threw a particularly sharp spotlight on South Africa's social disparities. Its impact on whites and Blacks was very unequal.

Some white commercial farmers reported crop losses of up to 70 percent and a significant rise in their debts. But they were protected from the worst consequences of the drought by generous state assistance. They had funds from previous bumper crops to tide them over and had access to whatever irrigation was still available. And South Africa's state marketing boards continued to export maize and other grains.

But the peasants and other residents of the Bantustans, who were already living at the

bare edge of survival, lacked such state aid. For them, the drought was an unmitigated disaster.

Production of maize — the main staple food of rural Africans — "totally collapsed" in the Bantustans, according to an official of the white National Maize Producers' Organisation.

The March 14, 1983, *Durban Daily News* reported, "The worsening water shortage in Natal is fast spelling financial ruin and an end to the livelihoods of many black sugar-cane farmers. Cane production by African, Indian and Coloured farmers dropped by more than 40 per cent in the past year and unless the government came to the rescue of these victims of the prolonged drought many would have to quit the industry they helped to build up. . . ." Such aid was not forthcoming, however.

A week earlier, the *Durban Sunday Tribune* described the impact of the drought on Black farm workers: "The drought has left thousands of farm labourers battling for survival and without work. In some areas they now live a nomadic life and move from place to place in search of grazing and water for their dying cattle. There is no work for them on the farms and they have no means of making money."

By March 1983, an estimated 800,000 head of cattle had already died from the drought in the Bantustans of Lebowa, Gazankulu, Venda, and KwaZulu.

Around the same time, medical researchers in South Africa were estimating that hunger was killing Black children at a rate of at least one every 20 minutes.

This death and misery was caused only incidentally by the drought. Its real cause was the

white supremacist system that has deprived Blacks of their land and destroyed much of their agriculture.

South Africa's white rulers claim they brought "civilization" to the peoples of the region, and introduced "modern" farming systems and methods. But the technically advanced farming methods employed in commercial agriculture only serve to enrich the capitalist farmers, not to improve the lives of the oppressed Black majority.

The agrarian system that was introduced into South Africa is among the most socially backward in the world, a system in which the land has been seized by conquerors and the conquered peoples turned into virtual slaves. For the millions of South Africa's indigenous inhabitants, it has brought exploitation, hunger, and disease.

As part of their broader struggle against white racist rule, South Africa's Blacks are fighting to break this agrarian system and to return the land to those who work it. They know that only the overthrow of the apartheid state can unlock the wealth of South Africa's soil for the benefit of all its people.

[Next: *Land and the Black liberation struggle*]

**This Publication
is available in Microform.**

**University Microfilms
International**

300 North Zeeb Road, Dept. P.R., Ann Arbor MI 48106

Speech by Salvadoran union leader

Héctor Recinos addresses FENASTRAS convention in San Salvador

[An indication of the resurgence of El Salvador's trade union movement, which has been hit hard by repression in recent years, was provided by the November 7-9 convention of the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers Unions (FENASTRAS).

[FENASTRAS was able to hold its 17th National Convention openly, in a downtown San Salvador hotel. Some 300 delegates, as well as observers from other union federations and from the international labor movement, attended the gathering.

[A highlight of the meeting was the address by El Salvador's best-known trade union leader, Héctor Recinos. Recinos was arrested in 1980, along with nine other leaders of the waterworks union (STECCEL), and was held in jail until his release last year following an international protest campaign.

[Since his release from jail, Recinos has been in exile in Europe. But he was able to return briefly to El Salvador to address the FENASTRAS gathering.

[The text of Recinos' speech to the convention is printed below. The translation from a Spanish-language transcript distributed at the convention is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

El Salvador's workers are facing the most critical period in the recent history of the country. Whereas previously they found it extremely difficult to survive, to procure food, clothing, education, and health care for their families, today those tasks are almost impossible.

According to official figures, consumer prices have risen almost 15 percent every year since 1978. Between that year and 1983, the colon lost half its value.¹ Employment has been drastically reduced, dropping to extreme levels, and wages have remained static since 1980.

In short, the living conditions of the working-class population did not improve in 1979 or 1980² or under the present Christian Democratic government. Nor did the reforms decreed in 1980 lead to a change in the structural conditions of the working population.

Since 1979 no less than three economic

plans have been in effect, although there were no fundamental differences in the principal measures of any of them. The principal characteristic of all three was to concentrate the effects of the economic crisis in the working population and to appropriate the bulk of the state resources to the war.

Today the living conditions of the workers are precarious. Wages no longer cover the most elementary necessities, and an ever greater number of Salvadorans are forced to look for any source of income to make up for the lack of jobs.

Today, added to the traditional living conditions, there are the conditions that flow from the economic policy that protects big capital and sustains the war.

Since 1979, more than 50,000 Salvadorans have been killed and more than 3,000 have disappeared. The majority of them were workers, peasants, white collar workers, and small and middle proprietors.

It is impossible to continue mortgaging the country's future and the future of the majority of the population to the quest for a military victory, which only a minority and the U.S. government consider a real possibility.

El Salvador demands a national solution to the crisis.

An unjust socioeconomic structure

The most important traditional characteristic of the Salvadoran economy has been the high concentration of wealth in a few hands. Of all the companies that existed in the country in 1978, less than 1 percent took in more than half the profits.

The distribution of national income is extremely unjust. In 1979 a big capitalist received nearly 7,000 times the average income of a worker.

In our country there are 53 people with declared capital of more than 10 million colons. Taking into account the family groupings that exist among them, it turns out that about 110 families³ control and dominate nearly 2,000 nonagricultural companies and corporations.

The power of these families reaches even into the medium- and small-size companies. This is shown by the fact that they control more than one-third of the corporations with capital of less than 50,000 colons.

Far from having moderated, the reality of economic concentration has tended to become markedly more acute. The reforms established in 1980 did not break down this characteristic and fundamental feature of our society.

3. Sevilla, Manuel. *El Salvador: La concentración económica y los grupos de poder*.

The reforms made only a small dent in the concentration of the national wealth in a few hands. Industry, commerce, and exports, including agricultural production, continue to be concentrated in the hands of the 110 families.

Oligarchic property forms in our country originated in the years 1881-82, when the lands of the Indians passed by force into the hands of the monied families, who converted them into coffee plantations.

The resources and instruments of the state, which was also controlled by members of the coffee-growing families, were turned to satisfying the needs generated by the production and export of coffee. For example, the construction of ports, roads, and railroads took place as a result of the need to transport and export coffee.

El Salvador became one of the most important coffee-producing countries. But the living conditions of the majority of the population and national life were subordinated to the needs of coffee.

These structural characteristics smothered the possibility of national development. The coffee interests aborted even the most minimal conditions needed to encourage industrial activity.

Industrial development requires an agrarian reform, wage increases, and social security. The state, subordinated to the coffee-growing interests, only aided such development in a secondary way by supporting Central American integration and decreeing laws containing tax exemptions. But the root of the national

The distribution of national income is extremely unjust. In 1979 a big capitalist received nearly 7,000 times the income of a worker . . .

problem, the high concentration of property in a few hands, was never attacked. Nor is it approached seriously today. It is simply the subject of demagogic statements and speeches.

The oligarchical concentration of property in our country generated a forced migration from the countryside to the city. The peasants were forced to migrate to the cities to seek a solution to their problem of partial employment (about three or four months per year.)

But the extremely low wages in the city, poor social services, high rates of illiteracy, malnutrition, etc., resulted in a majority of the population being sunk in abysmal poverty, and the nation as a whole sank into foreign dependency.

1. Figures taken from the *Memoria de labores 1983-84* of the Ministry of Planning and Coordination of Economic and Social Development, June 6, 1984.

2. On Oct. 15, 1979, a group of young military officers overthrew the dictatorship of Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero. A five-man junta ruled until Dec. 13, 1980, when Christian Democratic leader José Napoleón Duarte was named president of the country. — IP

Although official statistics registered a growth in the economy, the living conditions of the population remained the same or were worse than before. This has been acknowledged by the Ministry of Planning itself. The ministry's summary of work for 1984 states: "The process of growth generated an unsustainable foreign dependency and vulnerability, a process of concentration of the means of production, a lack of state autonomy, a lack of ability to satisfy the basic needs of broad sectors of the population" (*op. cit.*, p. 5).

Conjunctural factors aggravating the socioeconomic situation

Prior to 1979, the majority of the Salvadoran people lived under difficult conditions. But now the situation has become truly dramatic. And yet the policies of the state do not include

The country's main problem is the situation of war . . .

any measures that point to the possibility of improvement.

The state's main efforts are directed to the war of extermination and payment of the foreign debt. The remaining funds and efforts are aimed at satisfying the big private interests and the U.S. politico-military projects.

The consequences of the war and state policies add to the workers' problem. According to a study by the Central American University (UCA), more than 400,000 Salvadorans are living as internal displaced persons. More than half of them are under the age of 16, and nearly 60 percent are illiterate. To this figure we must add one-half million refugees in Mexico and Central America and another half million in the United States.

The figures cited above indicate that the country's main problem is the situation of war. The war — combined with a state policy that does not seek to end the war but rather is an instrument of the U.S. desire to prolong the conflict in search of a military victory — has worsened the living conditions of the workers.

At present the living standards of the working population are at the same level as in 1962. For the sixth consecutive year the real per capita gross domestic product has fallen, to the present level of slightly more than 500 colons. Taking the year 1978 as a base of 100, prices reached nearly 200 in 1983 and rose to almost 240 in 1984.

Meanwhile, according to the Ministry of Planning, in 1984 only one-third of the companies in the capital increased their wages. The unemployed rate is around 40 percent.⁴ According to official figures, in 1984 the gross domestic product grew about 1.5 percent, which represented an improvement only for

the wealthiest sector of the nation.

Governmental policy

The present Christian Democratic government has not changed the economic policies of previous administrations. On the contrary, today there is more emphasis on the economic efforts aimed at the war and at placing the burden of the crisis on the shoulders of the working population.

The structural imbalances such as the oligarchical concentration of wealth, dependence on one or two export products, underemployment, and foreign dependency have deepened with the implementation of an economic plan of counterinsurgency war.

The present government points to the agrarian reform as its main attempt at change. This agrarian reform was to affect barely 30 percent of the country's cultivated land and would benefit one in every five Salvadoran peasants. However, the agrarian reform was aborted by canceling its main stage, Phase II, which was to affect properties of between 100 and 500 hectares [1 hectare = 2.47 acres]. The landlords pushed the maximum limit to 250 hectares in the new political constitution and allowed a long period to sell or pass on the excess.

In addition, the agrarian reform has been carried out thus far in such a muddled manner that even the official studies themselves have had to acknowledge that fact. Let us quote the Ministry of Planning: "The low prices paid for export products . . . the slowness in payments and settlement of accounts . . . the increases in the costs of production have been negative factors for the good functioning of the Phase I cooperatives. These factors have placed many cooperatives in default, putting them in danger along with the whole process of agrarian reform" (p. 43).

In the first year of the agrarian reform's functioning, more than half the cooperatives that received credit fell into default. In the second year the number grew. During the 1982–83 growing year, out of the approximately 300 Phase I cooperatives, one-quarter had no financing because of insolvency or abandonment.

Fundamentally, the agrarian reform has been a measure to intensify control and repression in the countryside, a way of politically organizing the counterinsurgency war in the rural areas as the U.S. practiced it in Vietnam.

The banking reform did not involve radical changes. The only significant change was to place the definition and implementation of financial policies in state hands.

Nor was the structure of credit fundamentally reoriented. Credit continues to be primarily directed toward private investment. It is no surprise that the cooperatives from the reformed sector insistently demand preferential attention from the state.

Regarding the reform of foreign trade, in practice this meant only the possibility for the state to gain control over all the foreign currency earned from the traditional exports.

In addition, the first year of economic man-

agement by the Christian Democrats provides no signs pointing to an overall reactivation of the economy. On the contrary, their principal objective is to strengthen the war effort, leaving reactivation of the economy to the aims of the private sector. As a result, they maintain an unjust taxation system that burdens the income of the working population.

The agrarian reform has been a measure to intensify control and repression in the countryside . . .

During the month of May 1985, the government appropriated 80 million colons just to subsidize a rise in the domestic price of coffee. This represents more than four times what it granted the small and medium enterprises and the reformed sector.

In addition the government granted a mortgage credit of more than 100 million colons to the Cotton Cooperative. This represents about five times what was granted to the small and medium sectors.

Then new foreign exchange measures were implemented that meant a devaluation of the currency, which had a direct impact on the income of the workers.

The Salvadoran government has permitted a 5 percent increase in the fee for transactions requiring a tax stamp. Referring to the tax-stamp hike, the Ministry of Planning states: "This measure has meant greater pressure on people with few resources, i.e., the majority of the population." Further, last August the government decreed another increase in the same tax.

State income is expended in the categories of defense and payment of the foreign debt. In the 1985 budget, defense expenditures absorb some 45 percent of total expenditures, while the investment expenditures in the same budget were reduced by more than 10 percent.

To cover the fiscal deficit, and mainly to sustain the war effort, the government went further into debt. A study sponsored by the U.S. Congress revealed that in 1983, \$3 out of every \$4 of U.S. aid to El Salvador went directly or indirectly to the military side.

Violation of the human rights of Salvadoran workers

In El Salvador between 1979 and 1983, some 5,000 trade unionists were victims of extrajudicial executions. Many more were arrested, tortured, or detained without trial.

The Salvadoran government bears full responsibility for the massive violations of human rights since 1979, including thousands of "disappearances," extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions without trial, and systematic torture.

In recent years no government in this hemisphere has had as bad a record regarding human rights. It is not without reason that the Salvadoran government has been condemned five consecutive times in the United Nations as

4. Ibisate, Francisco. *Características y resultados de la gestión económica*. ECA, May-June 1985, p. 357.

a country that violates human rights.

With the election of José Napoleón Duarte [in 1984] it was felt that the politico-social situation of the workers would improve; the U.S. embassy in San Salvador never tires of repeating that "the government does not utilize repression against the country's labor movement." Nonetheless, the repression continues, shifting from indiscriminate terror to selective terror.

Just in the period from Jan. 1 to Sept. 12, 1985, 41 cases of violations of the human rights of workers have been registered. This figure does not represent the total number of cases, which might be much greater. But it is representative of what is happening with the labor movement.

The Salvadoran unions have been recovering from the terror and repression unleashed against them in the early 1980s, and today they are reasserting their right to organize freely, collectively negotiate their work contracts, and actively participate in the national political life and the country's economic affairs.

This vigorous effort is taking place in the context of a counterinsurgency war unleashed by the United States and under the threat of governmental terror (legal or illegal, depending on whether the uniformed or plainclothes security bodies repress the workers).

In the face of this resurgence, President Duarte has resorted to the old gimmick of linking the union movement with the guerrillas in order to justify his antilabor policy in particular and his antipeople policy in general.

In his message to the nation last May, Duarte stated that the unions had been "infiltrated by the subversives." A little later, as the logical consequence of this reckless statement, he ordered the assault on the Social Security Hospital, in which various trade unionists were seized.

Nevertheless, the labor movement's response has been more organization and more determination in its struggles. This has won it popular support. The recent marches in San Salvador attest to this fact.

The Salvadoran unions have been recovering from the terror and repression unleashed against them in the early 1980s . . .

Nevertheless, the right to freely organize has cost the union movement highly esteemed lives. At the present time, for reasons of expediency, the persecution of Salvadoran unionists is more selective. It is aimed against outstanding leaders and against certain leaders who are again coming to the fore after a period of forced inactivity.

At least half the murders and detentions of unionists that took place last year and in the first half of this year were directed against outstanding workers' leaders. The unionists from trade unions critical of the ruling Christian

Democrats are constantly persecuted and under surveillance. They are forced to sleep in one house one night and another the next. Police persecution has separated them from their families. Murders are taking place at a pace of one per month.

The procedure of breaking workers' leaders or members of unions also continues, using an already known progression: capture—torture—"confession"—delivery to the Mariona jail. Statements by many detained workers reveal the savageness of the tortures they have been subjected to.

In the judicial legal sphere, the democratic rights of the workers have been almost totally suspended for many years under a series of states of siege decreed by the government.

Decrees have been established that practically annul those legal rights. For example, the latest decree, Decree 50 published in February, permits military tribunals to have jurisdiction over "crimes against the existence and organization of the state or against public peace."

Suspects can be arrested and held incommunicado for 15 days or more, during which time the security forces are authorized to exact extrajudicial "confessions" from them. Any trade unionist can be sentenced to five years in prison, assuming he is not murdered, on a charge of "subversive activity." Any peaceful protest is classified as terrorism.

Compañeros who call for the freedom of a detained worker easily fall victim to seizure and torture, if not assassination. In fact, with these arbitrary decrees virtually any person in El Salvador can be arrested on charges of "subversive activity."

The federations most hard hit recently are FENASTRAS, FUSS, and FESTIAVECES.⁵

We think that trade union organizations around the world can do a lot to press for respect for labor rights in El Salvador.

This has already been shown with the freeing of trade unionists due to international pressure. We appeal for a fight to annul the decree in El Salvador that considers all union activity criminal, and to force respect for the constitutional guarantees of the workers in the countryside and city.

The grave economic and social crisis the Salvadoran people have been going through since the beginning of the 1970s has been worsened to an intolerable level by the U.S. government's political and military intervention in El Salvador. It is a political situation in which the people see themselves threatened not only with more destruction and death, but also with more abject poverty, hunger, illiteracy, absence of medical attention, lack of housing, etc.

The Reagan administration-sponsored war against our people that has been waged in the past five years has not only increased their

poverty and suffering, but has allowed our people to see in all its crudity the absence of will and sell-out character of the different governments that, with changes in shading, have alternated in the state administration and carried out the White House's orders in our nation, submerging the people ever deeper into material and moral degradation.

The present government of José Napoleón Duarte has not even made an ounce of improvement in this grave social and political situation for the majority of the workers. Nor will it make such improvement.

The present Christian Democratic government does not represent the people's will. It solely represents the interventionist will of Ronald Reagan's administration and the rich sectors of the nation. The ones governing today have distinguished themselves for their docility, for knowing how to carry out treachery, for lying to and slandering the people, for fawning.

The working masses are not told about what new laws are being prepared, about what new actions against them are being decided, about what new taxes are going to be implemented. All that the people are informed of is the fights between Duarte and the other sectors who share the favors of the U.S. embassy.

The war, the social decomposition, the lack of hope are the products of a schema of government that excludes concrete political participation by the people who generate the riches, a schema that has surrendered the country's sovereignty.

This critical social situation for the working masses can be resolved by a government that truly represents their interests and demands, that would for this very reason be able to lift society as a whole out of the swamp.

The only government that could solve this task is a government that is not handcuffed by what might please or displease the United States and the oligarchy, a government that would be capable of turning its energies to resolving the national crisis, not to resolving the interminable battles with other economically powerful sectors and repressing the people.

The formation of such a government will only be possible on the basis of the broadest unity of all the social sectors in El Salvador: workers, peasants, students, professionals, merchants, honest businesspeople, etc., who are hit in one way or another by the crisis.

Only a government of broad unity and popular backing, a government of national consensus will have the strength and will to resolve the central and key problem of Salvadoran society today; achieving peace through a just political solution that would then permit it to turn to the tasks of economic, political, social, and moral reconstruction of our country.

FENASTRAS feels that only a *popular and democratic government* would be a real alternative to the present Christian Democratic government.

Our federation feels that it is of fundamental

importance that there be the patriotic unity of all forces interested in establishing a representative government of broad popular participation, one that would guarantee national independence, respect for sovereignty, and self-determination and that would take firm steps in implementing the transformations that would satisfy our people's needs.

A continuation and deepening of the national dialogue initiated in La Palma and Ayagualo⁶ is needed to reactivate the discussions that have started in different sectors of the national life on peace and ending the war.

It is necessary and vital that the Las Palmas and Ayagualo accords be respected and firmly implemented since they are an initiative that brought hope to our people by pointing to the only possible road to solving the country's crisis.

The Salvadoran people, in the factories, peasant cooperatives, and universities, have clearly expressed themselves in favor of continuing the process of dialogue, holding serious and honorable conversations that have concrete repercussions for peace.

FENASTRAS calls for a workers' forum where the problems of Salvadoran laborers can be discussed. Such a forum could lay the basis for the establishment of a National Forum of all the economic, social, and political forces. FENASTRAS calls for the establishment of a National Forum that would guarantee the broadest incorporation of views and opinions in order to point the way to a just and lasting solution to the national crisis.

This National Forum would have the strength to turn itself into an instrument for popular expression, which has thus far been denied to our people by the oligarchy and more recently by the intervention of the U.S. government based in the ruling Christian Democracy.

No one is excluded from the make-up of this National Forum, not even the big businessmen if they involve themselves in the task of national reconstruction with a sense of patriotism.

The formation of this National Forum will lay the basis for the establishment of a democratic and popular government that would be the organ of national recovery.

FENASTRAS calls on all political forces active in national life, as well as the unions, associations, etc., to form a broad national unity that takes up the programmatic platform of the people's movement. For your discussion we offer our platform, which can serve as the basis for a broad discussion on a national level. □

6. On Oct. 15, 1984, Duarte met with leaders of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in the town of La Palma. This marked the first meeting between government officials and leaders of the FDR-FMLN forces since the civil war began in 1979.

A second round of talks took place Nov. 30, 1984, in the Roman Catholic Church seminary of Ayagualo, a few miles south of San Salvador. — IP

Latin America

Continental antidebt actions held

Tens of thousands answer call of Havana conferences

[The following article appeared in the November 3 issue of the English-language weekly edition of *Granma*, published in Havana by the Cuban Communist Party. It formed a full-page spread in the paper, along with a cartoon and photographs from several of the antidebt actions. One of the pictures was of a rally of several thousand workers in Bogotá, organized by the Trade Union Confederation of Colombian Workers and other organizations affiliated with the Labor Union and Popular Coordinating Body.]

* * *

The great continental day of action against payment of the foreign debt was held on Wednesday, October 23, and proved to be a success all over a region burdened by an over \$360 billion debt and onerous interest rates.

In addition to the demonstrations, strikes, meetings, and other forms of struggle, various publications and figures from all social sectors of the continent and other parts of the world have spoken out with well-founded arguments against payment of the debt. They demand implementation of the New International Economic Order and rapid moves toward Latin American economic integration, without which there can be no complete, just, and last-

ing solution to the most serious problem facing the underdeveloped world today.

Argentina

Workers and students gathered in Buenos Aires in an enthusiastic demonstration of opposition to debt payment and condemnation of the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the government of the United States.

Alberto Piccinini, leader of the metallurgical workers, stressed the need to battle against the main enemy of all Latin American peoples because otherwise "imperialism will impose hunger and poverty on all the continent."

Mexico

More than 100 labor unions and political and social organizations marched through the streets of Mexico City as part of the day of action. From Hermosillo, near the border with the United States, to Mérida, near Central America, Mexican workers opposed debt payment.

University workers' leader Pablo Sandoval noted that the continental day of action was being held as a result of agreements reached at the trade union conference of Latin America and the Caribbean held in Havana.

The demonstrators handed in a document for the president and the chambers of deputies and senators demanding a total and immediate halt to payment of the foreign debt. They also urged Mexico to lead in forming a Latin American debtor front.

Panama

In spite of heavy rain, workers carrying signs and chanting slogans against the foreign debt marched through the main streets and avenues of the Panamanian capital to a rally in Porras Square.

The rally was organized by the National Council of Organized Workers, through its four labor confederations and 20 national unions, with 150,000 members.

Bolivia

No public rallies were held in this country because of the state of siege but, in accordance with an agreement of the national assembly of the Bolivian Workers Federation, there were half-hour work stoppages in mines and factories as part of the antidebt drive.

Meetings were held as leaders explained why the debt should not be paid and explained the scope of the problem for every country and person on the continent.

Peru

Thousands of workers, miners, peasants,

Trinidad unionists rally against debt, apartheid

Several thousand workers and farmers rallied October 23 in Port of Spain, Trinidad, to protest the Latin American foreign debt, South African apartheid, and conditions facing Trinidadian working people.

The rally was the highlight of a "national day of sacrifice and solidarity." Demonstrators converged on the capital city by car and truck caravans from several regions of the island. Some workers from the island of Tobago took part, too.

Represented at the event were members of 18 unions and farmers' associations, as well as many unemployed working people. Major speeches were given by union leaders in the sugar, oil, and aviation industries and by the president of the National Food Crop Farmers Association.

The rally adopted resolutions calling for boycotting sports and cultural events with ties to South Africa and for a one-day general strike against the antiworker practices of the Trinidadian employers.

students, and other sectors demonstrated through the streets of Lima, rejecting debt payment and condemning the IMF.

The workers were watched by a big police contingent backed by light tanks and water cannon.

Ecuador

Police surrounded the Central University of Ecuador and used tear gas and water jets against demonstrators trying to march on the palace of government to demand nonpayment of the debt. Small groups did reach the palace but were dispersed by a riot squad using tear gas. Unofficial reports indicate 30 people were arrested in the incidents in various parts of the capital.

The antidebt demonstration, sponsored by the main labor and student unions in the country, had been banned by the government, which said police would be out on the streets to enforce the measure.

Brazil

The two labor confederations led demonstrations of thousands of Brazilians. In Rio de Janeiro there was a rally and demonstration, and there were meetings in different parts of São Paulo.

Costa Rica

Members of cooperatives, students, peasants, and workers condemned the financial policy of Western countries and advocated a moratorium on the Latin American foreign debt.

For more than two hours, demonstrators from different social sectors gathered in front of the Legislative Assembly as part of the continental day of action, demanding a hemi-

sphere-wide moratorium and condemning IMF policy.

Cuba

All over the country, workers, students, farmers, and other sectors, more than 3 million in all, supported the national work stoppage called by the Cuban Workers Confederation against the foreign debt, as agreed at the Havana trade union conference.

Cuban workers advocated nonpayment of the debt, a New International Economic Order, and Latin American economic integration.

A large group of Cuban Christians participated in activities for the continental day of action against the foreign debt in response to the call of the Latin American Ecumenical Movement for Social Action in Cuba and the Church and Society Department of the Cuban Ecumenical Council.

"As Christians," it was said, "we feel it is our duty on this important day to demand abolition of the foreign debt and stress the need for a New International Economic Order and economic integration. It will be cause for prayer and denunciation.

"We cannot cut ourselves off but must unite in the face of the enemy that threatens the possibility of integral, material, and spiritual development of our peoples."

Spain

Spanish workers held a big rally to support the Latin American demand for nonpayment of the debt. The Madrid rally was one of 25 organized by worker commissions in the main Spanish cities.

Marcelino Camacho, general secretary of the worker commissions, linked the Latin American struggle to that of Spanish workers

against Spain's staying in NATO and against unemployment.

"There is a lot of talk of the mother country and the 500 years of the discovery. I think that the time has come for concrete action such as this solidarity with nonpayment of the debt, because we can be talking a lot about the mother country and 500 years while its children starve to death in Latin America."

France

French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, speaking at the UN General Assembly, spoke of the Third World debt burden as being unacceptable.

He noted that social unrest is developing as economies collapse and democracies totter in these countries.

"A solution to the issue has to be found in sharing the burden between creditors and debtors," he said. "A long-term solution can only be achieved through the establishment of a more just and more effective international economic and financial order."

Uruguay

In Uruguay the antidebt campaign was on the 22nd rather than 23rd, because a national census was held that day. There were big rallies denouncing the negative role of the unpayable foreign debt and the IMF.

The PIT-CNT [Inter-Union Workers Assembly-National Workers Convention] labor federation and tenants and retired people's organizations held demonstrations in Montevideo and other parts of the country as according to the Havana conference resolutions.

A document called "San Martín, Bolívar, Martí, Artigas, and Sandino show us the way" was read, calling for nonpayment of the debt. □

Ray Sparrow, 1914-1985



Ray Sparrow, a veteran leader of the U.S. Socialist Workers Party, died of a heart attack at his home in Mill Valley, California, November 16. He was also known by his pen name, Art Sharon.

Sparrow was 70 years old and had been active in revolutionary politics for more than 50 years. This included working in maritime unions on the East and West coasts of the United States.

Although reactionary legislation bars the SWP from formal membership in the Fourth International, Sparrow's contributions to the revolutionary movement included work in helping to build the Fourth International. From 1965 to 1968, Sparrow lived in Europe and served as a fraternal member of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

In a future issue of *Intercontinental Press* we will carry appreciations of Sparrow's life and contributions to the workers' and communist movements in the United States and internationally.

More lists than people

The U.S. Office of Technology recently conducted a survey in which it identified 85 computerized record systems used by government agencies for investigative and intelligence purposes.

It reported that there are a total of 288 million records on 114 million people. Some people apparently are considered suspicious enough to be on more than one list.

But there are even more lists. The survey did not include the Central Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency, the two federal agencies most heavily engaged in electronic and other kinds of spying on an international basis. These spy outfits weren't asked for their figures for "security reasons."

The technology office said its study of federal agencies found wide use of miniaturized closed-circuit television cameras, special night-vision devices, electronic beepers and sensors to track cars and people, and equipment to maintain a complete record of all calls dialed from a targeted telephone.

Kanak leader completes successful tour

Susanna Ounei describes 'apartheid in New Caledonia'

By Steve Craine

"The French government condemns the apartheid regime in South Africa, but at the same time it practices its own form of apartheid in New Caledonia."

This parallel between white minority rule in South Africa and French colonialism in the South Pacific was a major theme of the recent North American speaking tour of Susanna Ounei, a leader of the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS).

During the two-month tour, Ounei spoke to thousands of anti-apartheid activists and other working people in some 20 cities in the United States.

Despite the similarity between the oppression of the Kanak people of New Caledonia and of the Black majority of South Africa, the former struggle is not well known in the United States. The growing movement against South African apartheid and U.S. government support for it provided fertile ground for Ounei's message of the struggle of her people.

At the completion of her trip, Ounei told the socialist newspaper the *Militant* that the tour was "very positive politically." She pointed out that "people knew very little about our struggle and our people" before the tour. This was true, she said, "not only among the people as a whole, but even among radical activists. It is so important for us that people throughout the world know our story."

Some of her biggest audiences were at anti-apartheid protests, including rallies of 2,000 in Chicago and of 1,000 at the University of California at Berkeley. She also got a warm welcome from many other groups of oppressed people in France.

Assisting on the tour were representatives of such groups as the Southern Christian Leader-

ship Conference, the National Black United Front, Operation PUSH, and the Young Socialist Alliance. Tony Russo of the U.S.-Vietnam Friendship Society, Elombe Brath of the Patrice Lumumba Coalition, and Wabun Inini (Vernon Bellecourt) of the American Indian Movement were among the initial cosponsors of the tour.

When speaking in Harlem, in New York City, Ounei commented that racist policies are imposed on Blacks in the United States, as well as in South Africa and New Caledonia.

She told the Harlem meeting, which was chaired by Elombe Brath, that she had learned a lot about the conditions of Black Americans and other oppressed people in the United States. "For us, the United States is very, very far away," she told the *Militant*. "What's really been important is getting to know the American people."

Ounei is an official representative of the FLNKS and was a founder of the Group of Kanak and Exploited Women in Struggle (GFKEL), one of the FLNKS's 10 component organizations. Before beginning her U.S. tour in early September, Ounei had attended the international women's conference in Nairobi, Kenya, and spent several weeks speaking in Canada about the Kanak struggle.

Ounei left the United States for several days during the tour to visit the French colonies of Guadeloupe and Martinique in the Caribbean. There she was able to discuss with leaders of independence groups the experiences of the Kanak people in fighting for self-determination.

Because they are also oppressed by French colonialism, the people of Martinique and Guadeloupe have followed the struggle in New Caledonia closely. In January protest demon-

strations were held on both islands following the assassination of FLNKS leader Eloi Machoro.

Earlier this year a speech of Ounei's was printed in New Zealand as a pamphlet entitled *For Kanak Independence: The Fight Against French Rule in New Caledonia*. The pamphlet has been reprinted by Pathfinder Press in New York and has also been translated into Japanese.

'They have taken our land'

Wherever she spoke, Ounei described the conditions facing the native people of New Caledonia and pointed to the responsibility of French imperialism for their sufferings.

"James Cook 'discovered' New Caledonia in 1774 and named it after Scotland," she told a student audience in California. "I don't understand how he discovered it while we were there all the time. Then the French came and 'discovered' us again. They established apartheid in the South Pacific, and there has been no change since the French took control of the islands in 1853."

Some 200,000 Kanaks were living in New Caledonia when the French arrived in the mid-19th century; by 1920, French diseases and numerous massacres had reduced the population to 30,000. In a meeting hosted by the American Indian Movement and other Native American organizations, Ounei said, "They are trying to do to us what they did to you. They have taken our land. They are killing our people. They are bringing immigrants into our country, making us a minority in our own land."

Today, the 61,000 Kanaks on the island are outnumbered by French settlers and immigrants from Southeast Asia and other Pacific islands. Many of the Pacific islanders were brought to New Caledonia to work its rich nickel mines. Ounei explained to her U.S. audiences that Kanaks are not allowed to hold jobs in the mines. In fact, only 7,000 Kanaks hold any kind of jobs at all, she said.

Interest in the Kanak struggle has been growing in the past year since the Dec. 1, 1984, declaration of a provisional government of Kanaky under the leadership of the FLNKS. Ounei told a meeting at the national headquarters of the Nation of Islam in Chicago, "We have two governments in New Caledonia — one Kanaky, one French. Two governments like that, on one island, are too much. One of them has to go, and I think it is the French."

Since the declaration of independence, several leaders of the FLNKS have been assassinated, and Kanak institutions have been bombed. But support for the independence



Elizabeth Stone/MP

Ounei at anti-apartheid rally at University of California, Berkeley.

struggle is growing.

Ounei told the *Carolina Peacemaker*, a Black weekly in Greensboro, North Carolina, "Before, the majority considered us [supporters of independence] as subversives, but now they are solidly behind us. Even women and children are manning the barricades that have been thrown up against the French soldiers and colonial police," she said.

Opposition to nuclear testing

In New York the United Methodist Church Office at the United Nations organized a luncheon for Ounei. Attending were representatives of the World Council of Churches, Church Women United, the Quakers' UN office, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Mobilization for Survival, and other groups opposed to nuclear weapons.

Of particular interest to this group was the strong opposition of the FLNKS to nuclear testing in the Pacific. Ounei explained why New Caledonia and other South Pacific islands are becoming so important to U.S. and French military strategists. She pointed to the growing rebellion against the U.S.-backed Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines as well as the refusal of the New Zealand government to cooperate in U.S. military maneuvers.

The attitude of the French government to antinuclear protests in the Pacific was shown by the sinking of the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior*, Ounei said. But, as she pointed out in an interview with the Communist Party's West Coast weekly *People's World*, "if the French are not afraid to blow up a Greenpeace ship, imagine what they do to my home."

Ounei received a large amount of media coverage while in the United States. Articles in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and other major dailies reached millions of people. Black newspapers were particularly interested in what she had to say. Her tour was written up in Black papers such as the *Amsterdam News*, *City Sun*, *Daily Challenge*, *Big Red*, and *Haiti Progrés* in New York and the *Chicago Defender*. She was interviewed by National Public Radio and the Pacifica Radio Network.

The tour got less favorable coverage in France and in the French settler press of New Caledonia. *Les Nouvelles*, a settler newspaper in Nouméa, objected to Ounei's comparisons

of New Caledonia to South Africa. The paper said she was spreading lies through her speaking tours and her pamphlet.

Ounei told the *Militant*, "Even in France they are worried that the story of my people is being told to the world. [The French newspaper] *Le Figaro* said that the New Zealand government is anti-French, and that I am in the pay of the New Zealand government to spread lies about the French. They try to paint me to the French public as a terrorist."

DOCUMENTS

Colombian PSR denounces siege

'Government bears sole responsibility for deaths'

[The following is a November 7 statement by the National Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR), Colombian section of the Fourth International, on the government siege of the Palace of Justice, in which 100 people were killed. The English-language version of this statement is taken from the November 25 issue of *International Viewpoint*, a fortnightly review published in Paris under the auspices of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

With respect to the occupation of the Palace of Justice by a commando group of the April 19 Movement, the Revolutionary Socialist Party (the Colombian section of the Fourth International) makes the following statement to public opinion, the workers' and peasants' movement, and democratic forces:

1. We condemn the military operation launched by the Colombian army against the Palace of Justice and the April 19 Movement. This assault represents a crime against the lives of the judges and civilian personnel who were taken as hostages. The fact that the government ordered this action demonstrated that it wanted a military solution of the problem.

2. The resolutions voted by the Senate and the House of Representatives were totally hypocritical. A parliament that has done its ut-

In summing up the accomplishments of her U.S. tour, Ounei told the *Militant*, "What can stop the French government? Our fight, plus pressure on the French government from around the world. It's the reason I have traveled around the world. International solidarity is very important to our struggle. We cannot be isolated. So, when I get back, we are going to step up international solidarity work, organized from New Caledonia, using the contacts we have made." □

most to prevent the most minimal reform, which is against the process of political liberalization, a parliament led by the nose by the two traditional parties, has no moral or political authority to condemn the action of the April 19 Movement.

We have stressed that the violence in this country in the past and today has an *official origin*, that is, those responsible for it are the government, the army, the Liberal and Conservative parties, and the parliament that follows their orders.

3. We do not support the military action of the April 19 Movement. This was an isolated action carried out in disregard for the present state of the mass movement, which therefore obscures for the masses the role that they can and must play as an *organized* force in the struggle against the capitalist system and the government of Belisario Betancur.

Such actions by the April 19 Movement have served as a pretext for rightist forces, the army, and the government to step up their repression against the Colombian people and to increase the budgetary appropriation for the military. That is why these sectors are calling for a militarist solution in the long run.

4. The government of Belisario Betancur bears the sole responsibility for the deaths of the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Alfonso Reyes Echandía; of the Supreme Court judge María Ines Ramos; of the civilian personnel; and of the members of the April 19 Movement.

Thus, the major blow to the so-called "democratic" opening has come from the bipartisan government itself.

We call on the workers' and peasants' movement, on its parties, and on all democratic forces to demonstrate their condemnation of the bloody solution that the Betancur government and the army gave to the occupation of the Palace of Justice. We call on the exploited people to block the advance of militarism. It is necessary to continue the struggle for a genuine democratic opening, for the implementation of the accords signed with the guerrillas, for the dismantling of the paramilitary groups, and for the lifting of the state of siege. □

Socialist activist murdered in Colombia

César Flórez González, a Colombian socialist activist, was gunned down by unidentified assailants in the city of Ríohacha on October 29.

A lawyer, Flórez was well known throughout the northern coastal region of the country for his work on behalf of shantytown residents in the city of Cartagena, a large number of whom attended his funeral.

At the time of his assassination, Flórez was a leader of the Socialist Party, a recent

splitoff from the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR), Colombian section of the Fourth International. While still a member of the PSR, he had been subject to numerous death threats from anonymous representatives of the landlords. The Cartagena city police also harassed him regularly, arresting him illegally twice.

The murder of Flórez, apparently by hired gunmen, came just a week before the government's bloody assault on the Palace of Justice in Bogotá.

An economic crisis 'made in USA'

How IMF and World Bank policies caused the mess

By Will Reissner

Mass demonstrations in the Philippines regularly express their anger at the "U.S.-Marcos dictatorship."

At the same time, daily lines form at the U.S. embassy as Filipinos seek to emigrate to the United States. There is a backlog of more than 440,000 Filipinos who have applied to join over one-half million of their compatriots already living in the United States.

Both the protests and the emigration reflect Washington's tremendous continuing weight in the former U.S. colony.

For 300 years, the Philippines had been a colony of Spain. As the 19th century drew to a close, revolts against Spanish colonialism were under way in Cuba and the Philippines. Filipino nationalists had launched an armed struggle against Spanish rule in 1896.

But before the Cuban and Filipino patriots could win their independence, the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898. By the end of that year, Spain was defeated.

A treaty between Spain and the United States gave Washington control over Spain's remaining colonial possessions. Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines became outright U.S. colonies. Cuba gained formal independence, although the U.S. Congress had veto power over all actions of the new Cuban government.

The Filipino insurgents battling Spanish rule initially welcomed U.S. intervention in the fighting. They expected that a U.S. victory over Spain would result in independence for the Philippines.

When it became clear that they had exchanged one colonial master for another, many Filipinos continued fighting.

It took Washington two years of bitter counterinsurgency warfare before resistance to U.S. rule in the Philippines was crushed with the capture of insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo in 1901.

Direct U.S. colonial rule had a drastic impact on the Philippine economy. The establishment of free trade between the new colony and the United States in 1909 reinforced a pattern wherein the Philippines grew sugar, tobacco, copra, and other agricultural products for the U.S. market, while the free entry of U.S. manufactured goods into the Philippines prevented the development of domestic industry.

Access to the U.S. market for agricultural products spurred the development of large-scale plantation agriculture. The percentage of farmers working as tenant sharecroppers doubled between 1900 and 1935, as the plantation owners increased their holdings.

Many of the present ruling families of the

Philippines — the Kalaws, Laurels, and Aquinos, for example — had been leading planter families during Spanish rule who went over to serving the new colonial power, vastly enriching themselves in the process.

U.S. agribusinesses

U.S. corporations were quick to follow the flag to the Philippines, and continued to maintain vast holdings in agriculture and mining after the Philippines gained formal independence in 1946.

In the rubber industry, for example, three U.S. giants dominate 97 percent of Philippine rubber production. B.F. Goodrich established its first plantations on the island of Basilan in 1919. Goodyear came in 1929, and Firestone followed in 1957.

U.S. corporations also account for 99.8 percent of Philippine pineapple sales. Del Monte began pineapple production on the island of Mindanao in 1926, while its archrival, Dole, arrived only in 1963. Between them they now grow pineapples on more than 40,000 acres on Mindanao.

The banana industry is also totally controlled by foreign corporations: Del Monte, Dole, and United Fruit from the United States, and Sumitomo from Japan.

These four banana growers raise their crop, all of which is exported to Japan, on 66,000 acres of Mindanao.

Del Monte and Dole also have vast holdings in tomatoes, coffee, livestock feed, cattle-raising, deep-sea fishing, rice, glass manufacturing, land development, and banking.

The two largest export crops, sugar and coconuts, are dominated by Filipino capitalists and form the basis for much of the wealth of the Filipino ruling class.

Sugar production is concentrated in large plantations employing 500,000 field workers, who are kept in line by planter-controlled private armies.

Although sugar is grown on more than 33,000 farms, just 600 of them control 26.2 percent of the sugar land. Since 1977, sugar marketing has been monopolized by Roberto Benedicto, a crony of dictator Ferdinand Marcos. Benedicto has used his position to amass a vast fortune.

Coconut production primarily takes place on small farms, often cultivated by tenant farmers who must turn over as much as two-thirds of their crop to the landowner.

In the coconut industry, as in the sugar industry, marketing of the crop is monopolized by a Marcos crony, Eduardo Cojuangco, whose family began building its fortune with vast rice lands. Cojuangco, whose cousin

Corazon married Marcos-opponent Benigno Aquino, also heads the San Miguel Corporation, the largest company in the Philippines.

The present neocolonial structure of the Philippine economy reflects a conscious policy of the U.S. government both before and after Philippine independence.

In particular, the present economic structure reflects decisions made in the immediate postwar period, when the Philippines had just received its independence.

Postwar 'reconstruction'

World War II temporarily broke the close economic ties between the Philippines and the United States.

The Japanese military attacked the Philippines one day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japanese rule over the islands would last until October 1944.

The years of Japanese occupation broke the trade links that had tied the Philippines and the United States since free trade was established in 1909.

When trade with the United States became impossible during the war, much of the existing economic structure fell into decay. In particular the sugar plantations, totally dependent on the U.S. market, had fallen into ruins during the war years.

In addition, the Philippines suffered tremendous physical damage in the course of the U.S. reconquest of the islands from the Japanese.

Rehabilitation of the economy was a pressing task in the immediate postwar years. But the large inflow of U.S. dollars in the immediate postwar period — from spending by U.S. troops, U.S. government payments of salaries to local personnel, veterans' benefits for Philippine soldiers, and war damage payments — was squandered on imports of consumer goods. The prewar patterns of the Philippine economy were reestablished.

This neocolonial "reconstruction" had two causes: the corruption and venality of the Filipino ruling class, particularly the planters, whose wealth and power was based on the U.S. connection, and Washington's determination to reimpose a neocolonial economic structure on the Philippines.

U.S. economic control

The vehicle for U.S. control over the newly independent island nation was the 1946 Philippine Trade Act, usually known as the Bell Trade Act, which was drafted in the U.S. Congress.

The Bell Trade Act, which was passed in the months before the United States gave the

Philippines independence, was designed to protect the interests of U.S. investors.

It was eventually also passed by the Philippine congress, after heavy-handed pressure from Washington. The U.S. government insisted that the Bell Trade Act be adopted "as is" by Manila, and Washington made release of reconstruction funds from the U.S. Rehabilitation Act contingent on Philippine approval of the measure.

Under the terms of the Bell Trade Act, free trade between the Philippines and the United States was extended for 8 years after independence, followed by 20 years of gradually increasing tariffs.

The act also gave the U.S. government power over the value of the currency of the nominally independent country and enforced the right of U.S. corporations to send profits out of the Philippines. According to the act, "the value of the Philippine currency in relation to the United States dollar shall not be changed, and no restrictions shall be imposed on the transfer of funds from the Philippines to the United States, except by agreement with the President of the United States."

'Parity Amendment'

In order to receive reconstruction aid, the Philippine government was also forced to add a "Parity Amendment" to the country's constitution, giving U.S. citizens equal rights with the Philippine citizens in the economic sphere.

Under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, Washington got a 99-year lease on a number of military facilities in the islands, with the proviso that these facilities would be administered as if they were part of the territory of the United States.

This web of continued U.S. control over vital sectors of Philippine life made many Filipinos question whether the country had actually gained its independence in 1946.

The windfall of dollars into the Philippine economy dried up in 1949, leaving the country without the foreign currency needed to continue purchasing imports.

As a result of this crisis, the Philippine government got U.S. permission to impose foreign currency controls, under which no foreign payments could be made without the prior approval of the Central Bank, and all exporters were required to turn their foreign currency earnings over to the government in exchange for Philippine pesos.

As a result of the foreign currency crisis and the inability to continue importing consumer goods, a local "import substitution" manufacturing industry developed in the 1950s.

Although much of it simply involved assembly, finishing, or packaging of imported components, as a category manufacturing increased from 8 percent of national income in 1949 to 18 percent by 1965.

This import substitution could not, however, generate a sustained industrialization of the Philippines. For sustained industrialization to take place, major structural changes would have been necessary in Filipino society.

The biggest single constraint on industrial-

U.S. funds rightist unions

At the national convention of the AFL-CIO, the U.S. trade union federation, held in California in late October, a trade unionist from the Philippines was awarded the AFL-CIO's George Meany Human Rights Award and \$5,000.

In his speech accepting the award, Secretary General Ernesto Herrera of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines spent the bulk of his time attacking the left-wing KMU (May First Movement) trade union federation.

The award to Herrera was indicative of a much wider-ranging program, financed by the U.S. government and administered by the AFL-CIO, to counter the growing strength of militant trade unions in the Philippines.

In 1984 and 1985 alone, \$3 million from the U.S. government-funded National Endowment for Democracy has been channeled through the AFL-CIO's Asian American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) to counter the KMU and radical peasant associations.

Money from the AAFLI has been used to win union elections and finance radio stations and publications.

Bud Phillips, the AAFLI's administrator in the Philippines, stated that the U.S. government funds were crucial after the murder of Benigno Aquino, the anti-Marcos politi-

cian who was gunned down when returning to the Philippines from exile in the United States.

"If people hadn't had immediate assistance then," Phillips said, "the success of the political left in the trade unions would have been phenomenal."

The AAFLI administrator added that small amounts of money go a long way in the impoverished Philippines. "Imagine if you have \$100,000 to give out to families in \$500 chunks: Your stock goes way up, faster than the stock of any of the militant labor groups."

The Asian American Free Labor Institute has operated in the Philippines for 15 years, using U.S. government money from the AFL-CIO and directly from the United States Information Agency.

AAFLI works with high-level protection. When Joseph Lee, the labor attaché at the U.S. embassy in Manila, tried to get information on AAFLI's activities in the Philippines, State Department officials told him, "Lay off, it's none of your business."

According to a report in the July 30 *San Francisco Examiner*, AFL-CIO officials in Washington had complained to U.S. ambassador Steven Bosworth about Lee's prying and had threatened to get Lee fired.

— Will Reissner

zation was the small size of the domestic market. Certainly there are enough people in the Philippines to sustain a thriving domestic industry — the Philippines has about the same population as France.

The big brake on the size of the Philippine domestic market is the abject poverty of the masses and the concentration of wealth in a few hands. In 1970, for example, the top 5 percent of the population controlled 25 percent of the national income.

In addition, the traditional Filipino ruling class owes its wealth and power to its control over the land and to agricultural exports to the U.S. market. These oligarchs had no interest in a land reform that would boost the purchasing power of the rural masses, who still make up 70 percent of the country's population.

Nor did the oligarchs have an interest in foreign currency controls or protection of newly established local industry. The planters, after all, sold to the U.S. market and earned dollars. And they would much rather use their dollars to buy higher quality foreign goods than the protected products of local industries.

A heavy blow to the import substitution policy was dealt in 1962, when Washington forced the Philippine government to end import and foreign exchange controls. The U.S. government acted in response to complaints by U.S. investors seeking to repatriate their profits and U.S. exporters frustrated by protectionist measures.

The vehicles chosen by Washington to apply the pressure were the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.* The IMF forced Manila to carry out a severe devaluation of the peso relative to the dollar.

The rationale was that this devaluation would improve Philippine foreign currency holdings by lowering the price of Philippine exports and discouraging imports, which now became much more expensive in peso terms.

Big agricultural interests, such as the sugar planters, reaped a bonanza from the devaluation. Their sales to the U.S. market continued as before. But their dollar earnings could now be exchanged for many more pesos than previously.

The impact of the devaluation was severe on Filipino workers, who saw their real incomes drop 10 percent between 1962 and 1964, and on Filipino manufacturers, who now had to pay more in pesos for their imported raw materials and whose dollar-denominated loans now required far more pesos for repayment.

*For an absorbing account of the role of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the development of Philippine economic policy see *Development Debauch: The World Bank in the Philippines*, by Walden Bello, David Kinley, and Elaine Elinson (1982, Institute for Food and Development Policy). The book is based on more than 6,000 pages of confidential World Bank and IMF documents.

An estimated 1,500 Filipino manufacturers were forced into bankruptcy by the 1962 devaluation, while others survived only by entering joint venture agreements with foreign capitalists.

The impact of the devaluation on manufacturing can be seen by the fact that the number of manufacturing jobs in 1969 was virtually the same as it had been in 1963 — 1.3 million.

Nevertheless, the tariff protection for Filipino manufacturers that had been established in 1957 continued to provide some protection for local industry.

But the lifting of currency controls and the devaluation in 1962 were only the opening shots in the World Bank-IMF campaign to open the Philippines to greater penetration by U.S. capitalists.

When Ferdinand Marcos was elected president in 1966, he instituted programs to encourage foreign capitalists to set up industries in the Philippines, using cheap Filipino labor to assemble goods for export.

Gerardo Sicat, head of the National Economic Council, articulated the Marcos government's view, saying that "at this stage of development, it doesn't concern Filipinos who controls the resources and economy of our country."

Sicat also blasted local industrialists "who essentially considered it their vested right to exploit the domestic market."

In 1969 Marcos ran for a second term as president. His victory, following the most corrupt and violent election in Philippine history, set the stage for more direct intervention by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund into the Philippine economy.

In his successful attempt to buy the 1969 election, Marcos had exhausted the Philippines' foreign currency reserves, and he had to turn to the IMF and World Bank for new funds.

These imperialist institutions agreed to lend Marcos money, but only on the condition that he carry out another drastic devaluation of the peso. During his election campaign Marcos had vowed, "We have no intention of devaluing the peso because we would be hitting our low-income groups, especially daily wage earners and employees with monthly salaries."

Yet the IMF and World Bank insisted on a more than 60 percent devaluation of the peso before they would extend credit, and Marcos agreed.

As with the 1962 devaluation, the 1970 devaluation cut the living standard of workers, drove many local industries into bankruptcy, and provided a bonanza for the sugar planters.

The 1970 World Bank-IMF bailout of Marcos opened the door for more direct imperialist control of his economic policies. A joint Philippine Central Bank-IMF Commission was set up to develop economic policy. An IMF officer was even installed in the Philippine Central Bank to oversee its implementation.

The centerpiece of the World Bank-IMF policy was to destroy the remaining vestiges of protectionism for Philippine industry, a policy

described as economic "liberalization," and open the country's doors wide to foreign capital and export-oriented industries.

Martial law

Crucial to this strategy, which required the existence of a low-paid, docile labor force, was the establishment of martial law by Marcos on Sept. 22, 1972.

U.S. business interests in the Philippines were quick to hail Marcos' decree suspending democratic rights. A congratulatory telegram read: "The American Chamber of Commerce wishes you every success in your endeavor to restore peace and order, business confidence, economic growth, and well-being of the Filipino people and nation. We assure you of our confidence and cooperation in achieving these objectives. We are communicating the feelings of our associates and affiliates in the United States."

A memorandum by the World Bank noted with approval that the establishment of martial law led to the "renewed opening up of the economy to the inflow of foreign capital."

With the imposition of martial law, a flood of World Bank-IMF loans entered the country. Between 1950 and 1972, the Philippines had received a total of \$326 million in loans from the World Bank. But between 1973 and 1981, more than \$2.6 billion in World Bank loans poured in.

In the period following the imposition of martial law, the World Bank assumed effective control over Philippine economic policy. The bank's 1976 Country Program Paper for the Philippines bragged: "The Bank's basic economic report proposes a framework for future development, which the government has accepted as a basis for its future plans."

While the World Bank was happy with Marcos' new concessions to foreign capitalists in the export-oriented field and with the suppression of wages as a result of the martial-law repression against the trade union movement, the imperialist agency continued to press Marcos to further dismantle tariffs protecting local industry.

"Tariff reform is becoming increasingly urgent," the World Bank's East Asia Division warned in 1977, adding that the tariffs "appear to be sheltering various inefficient industries."

In 1979 the World Bank and IMF made a veiled threat to reconsider their financial support to the Marcos regime unless new steps were taken to eliminate protection of the Philippine domestic market.

Marcos' industry minister announced Manila's capitulation: "We are in agreement with the findings of the Bank that Philippine industry has suffered because of an overprotected system. We are determined to take the difficult and often painful decisions to dismantle some of the protective devices and thus to promote a free and competitive system."

The Marcos regime promised to cut the number of protected industries by two-thirds and significantly lower tariffs on the remainder.

With the World Bank-IMF strategy firmly

in the saddle, it is worth asking how well this model works and whether it is relevant for the rest of the semicolonial world. After all, as an article in the Oct. 10, 1985, *Far Eastern Economic Review* noted, "more than any other country in Southeast Asia, the Philippines has been the target for World Bank lending over the past 25 years, with project and programme borrowing totalling nearly US\$4.5 billion."

At the end of President Marcos' first term in office, just as the World Bank and IMF were consolidating their hold on Philippine economic policy, the country's foreign debt stood at about \$1.9 billion.

A decade and a half later, the country's foreign debt is estimated to be between \$24 and \$26 billion, and repayment of principal on the foreign debt has been suspended since October 1983.

Sharply depressed prices for coconut products and sugar have caused foreign currency earnings to plunge and have led to widespread misery in the countryside. Some 37 percent of the Filipino labor force is dependent on those two crops for their livelihood.

Unemployment has doubled in the past year, and industrial production has declined.

Over the past two years, the gross national product of the Philippines has shrunk by 10 percent. World Bank analysts predict that individual consumption cannot return to 1982 levels before the 1990s.

The two largest government banks — the Development Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank — are basically bankrupt, with 75 percent of their loans delinquent and 40 percent of their assets now classified as "nonperforming."

Many of those loans went to Marcos' cronies and were handed out, in the words of a Development Bank of the Philippines official, after "just a phone call from the right government official."

While the workers and peasants in the Philippines are experiencing real suffering in the current economic crisis, Marcos and his cronies have feathered their nests and are well taken care of. Raul S. Manglapus, who was foreign minister of the Philippines in 1957, recently noted that Marcos' political career "has culminated in the accumulation of documented tens of billions of dollars worth of properties in the hands of his family and his cronies in the United States alone." □

Your library should get *Intercontinental Press.*

Intercontinental Press is a unique source for political developments throughout the world. *IP* is the only English-language magazine with a full-time bureau in Managua, providing weekly reports on the development of the revolutionary upsurge in Central America.

Many of the documents, speeches, and interviews we publish appear nowhere else in English. Why not ask your library to subscribe?

Interview with former prisoner of Marcos

Father Brian Gore, accused of 'inciting rebellion'

By Deb Shnookal

SYDNEY, Australia — Brian Gore is an Australian Columban Catholic priest who was imprisoned in the Philippines in 1982 for "inciting rebellion" and then charged with the murder of the hated landlord, Pablo Sola, mayor of Kabankalan in Negros Occidental Province.

Two other priests, Niall O'Brien, from Ireland, and Vicente Dangan, a Filipino, as well as six lay workers, were charged along with Gore. The case, which became known as the "Negros Nine," received international publicity prior to their release in July 1984.

During the following interview, which I obtained here on October 26, Gore remarked with amusement that "in Ireland, it was referred to as 'the O'Brien case' while in Australia, the press called it 'the Father Gore case.' That's why we latched on to the name the 'Negros Nine.'"

Gore went to the Philippines in 1969 as a young missionary. After becoming disillusioned with what he called "the band-aid sort of stuff" traditional parish work involved, Gore admits, "we grew in our ideas and understanding."

"We found that the greatest contribution of the church was to encourage the people to be united to defend their land. And that did not endear us to the planters," he said.

The situation of the people of Negros was becoming increasingly desperate. A tiny handful of sugar planters owned most of the land, and with the international crisis in the sugar industry, hundreds of thousands of plantation workers or *sacadas* were being left destitute, with neither jobs nor land to provide for themselves.

They were also being terrorized by both the military and the growing number of extreme right-wing religious fanatic groups, which were often linked to the military and the landlords. So more and more workers and poor farmers were turning to the New People's Army (NPA) rebels for protection.

In 1982 the local church supported a three-month-long strike by 1,200 workers at the La Carlota sugar mill, organized by the National Federation of Sugar Workers, an affiliate of the May First Movement (KMU).

In one confrontation on the picket line 500 soldiers in full battle gear, backed up by 300 security guards, attacked 600 unarmed strikers. Bishop Fortich from Bacolod City challenged the military at that time, saying, "What do we have here, El Salvador?"

In 1980, the priests helped organize a big meeting of the local communities to discuss these problems. Gore related to me how "the

people got up and lambasted Mayor Sola's administration, and he really got mad."

"A couple of days later," he continued, "Alex and Herman, two leaders of an adjoining community, were picked up, killed, and buried. A few weeks after that seven more farmers were taken from a dance and were found buried at the mayor's hacienda." Mayor Sola was brought up on multiple murder charges.

Gore admits there was "a certain amount of coolness between myself and the mayor because of his rantings at the people and because he had brought a petition against me."

"The charge of 'inciting to rebellion' was wide enough to accuse anybody," said Gore. "They said they found a hand grenade sitting on top of my filing cabinet! They never believed they would have to go to court. They thought I would be deported."

However, the deportation attempt failed, and the murder charges had to proceed. They tried everything to discredit the priests. But, as Gore commented, "we both had very clean records. There were no scandals, no skeletons in the cupboard, no illegitimate children running around or things like that!"

For eight months the priests were held under house arrest, but later they insisted on joining the lay workers in jail. "Our attitude," explained Gore, "was that it was the legal system that was on trial. If we couldn't get justice then a lot of ordinary Filipinos would ask, 'Well, who can get justice?'"

Gore admitted he "used the occasion as it arose. We took advantage of their mistakes and we were very calculating about it. Our cell in the military compound produced papers on why we went back to jail. In other words we did a lot of propaganda work. We were going to make them rue the day they brought the charges. They provided the stage and we wrote the script!" laughed Gore.

* * *

Question. What do you think was the significance of the trial and the charges against you?

Answer. We were to be examples of a different type of church, emerging especially in the rural areas. We were not the only ones, but we had very strong support, shown by our organization of 10,000 people to confront the military.

They [the authorities] saw this as dangerous. They had done their homework on the radical church. They knew what was happening in South America, the Christian communities in Nicaragua which were very much involved, eventually, in the revolution. We were work-

ing at a legal level, and yet, as they saw it, we were preparing people to become involved in revolution. Our idea was a revolution that would mean people would not have to resort to violence.

The significance of the case was that it showed we were in jail because we were espousing the cause of the people.

The case was a nail in the coffin of the non-violence argument. Because here we were, doing everything through nonviolence, and yet we got hit. So what the government was really saying was that this is not the way to change things. And a lot of people took that message.

Q. How much do you think the assassination of Benigno Aquino in August 1983 affected your case?

A. I think it reinforced skeptics about our case, helping them to see that we had been framed. Among the rich people in the Philippines, we got a lot of support after Aquino was killed. In fact it was the "in thing" for the opposition people to visit us in jail. In January 1984 we had up to 400 or 500 visitors a day.

Q. One aspect of your trial was that it focused a lot of Australian attention for the first time on what is happening in the Philippines. Since you have returned to Australia you have been particularly outspoken against Australian aid to Marcos. Why do you think this is important?

A. I am concerned about all aid, but particularly about military aid, even though it is very small. I've seen what the military is doing. It was the military who accused us. There is just no military solution to the problem in the Philippines. The problem can only be solved by basic economic and political reforms.

Q. Bill Hayden [Australian Labor government foreign minister] has argued strongly that the military aid is only small and that it is necessary to help train the Philippine military in the right kind of norms.

A. Yes, the aid is only small, but it is symbolic.

How do we [in Australia] appear to the workers in Negros or the people in Escalante¹ who were mowed down, when we say: "we sympathize with your struggle for a better life, but here, Mr. Marcos, are the guns to shoot the

1. On September 20 police and soldiers opened fire on a demonstration of 4,000 in the town of Escalante, killing 27 people.

bastards"? We could be accused of hypocrisy, of saying one thing and doing another.

To withdraw even our small military aid would be an enormous moral victory. It won't alter the course of the revolution if we don't train Filipino officers, but it's going to question the whole military solution being propounded by Reagan and Marcos. The United States is giving something like A\$275 million [A\$1 = US\$0.70] a year in military support because they want to keep Marcos in power.

*Q. What was your response to the decision of the Australian government to pull out of the Samar project?*²

A. The economic aid question is not so easy for people to see.

For example, you can help farmers to grow better rice or corn, but what if they don't own the land? What if they can't protect the price of their rice and corn? They have no say in these things.

So unless there is an accompanying program of political growth there won't be economic prosperity for the poorest people. A road going through to a new area may be a good thing, if the people are organized and own their land. But if they don't, it may be devastating. For example, they may lose their land, which has now become accessible. Of course, the military can also use the road.

You hear how the governors and mayors are so happy with the road project. This makes you wonder who is benefiting from this program.

Q. What comment would you make about Hayden's statement earlier this year that Australian troops may be called upon under the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States] treaty to defend the U.S. bases in the Philippines should they come under attack?

A. That really worries me, and that's one of the things I talk to the young people about — the implication that we may be called on to support the American bases if they are threatened by the Philippine rebels.

The very people who would be killed by Australian troops are people who have through desperation and frustration joined the revolutionary movement — many of them were my parishioners.

I hope it's a long way off. Whether the Australian people would buy the argument that we have to "fight communism" in Southeast Asia, I don't know. What I hope I'm doing is sowing seeds for people to question such propaganda.

Of course there may be certain economic repercussions. Australia's present trade relations with the Philippines is \$100 million in our favor, which means there are pressures to just leave Marcos where he is. So economic and political interests dovetail.

2. Australia's largest overseas aid project was a \$58 million road-building program in northern Samar, where New People's Army rebels were active. In April 1985 some of the Australian workers on the project were detained by the NPA, and the project was subsequently suspended.

Q. Why do you think there is such international concern about the situation in the Philippines today?

A. When you look at a map you can understand why the United States is concerned. The Philippines is certainly strategically very important, because they've lost their toehold in Vietnam. The Philippine bases are halfway to Diego Garcia, which is the main link through to the Middle East.

Also don't forget that the Philippines owes \$26 billion to over 400 American banks. That's a major consideration. When people owe you money you don't let them off the hook too easily.


Q. How do you understand the recent pressure from the U.S. and Australian governments for reform?

A. Well, they're getting worried. And they should be worried. They've screwed up the situation yet again, a monumental screw-up, politically and economically. Because you can't support a dictator like Marcos. Call it what you like — a "benevolent dictatorship" — it's still a dictatorship.

With their blind backing of Marcos, they have admitted that they wrongly accepted the Philippine military's assessment. Now they are panicking. And there's even a doubt that the moderates would be able to come up with a government if Marcos went.

I believe it's the system, not just Marcos, that is rotten. And until there have been drastic economic and political reforms, the revolution won't stop.

A lot of the opposition are anti-Marcos, and



Six Catholic lay workers imprisoned in Negros Occidental Province along with Father Brian Gore and two other priests in the case known as the "Negros Nine."

they're anti-Marxist. They want the same system, but they just want their share.

There are also some very good people in the opposition who want drastic reforms. But that means the American banks will have to wait, or the debt has to be canceled, or some of the money which has been repatriated by Marcos has to be brought back to the Philippines. Now, I can't see that happening.

Q. Can Marcos survive without U.S. support? Imelda Marcos' latest visit to Moscow and the warnings about the bases agreement are obviously meant to be little messages to Washington.

A. Take [U.S. Senator Paul] Laxalt's visit to Marcos. That's what the Filipinos call "drama, drama." They can see through it. Marcos is completely powerless without American support. In our case it took Reagan putting the pressure on Marcos for them to drop the charges.

Q. Should Washington be so worried about the Philippines?

A. The Philippine revolution is a nationalist movement. It doesn't want domination by any foreign power. Things don't augur well for the Philippines, given America's reaction to Nicaragua — a small nation which achieved a revolution and which now has to fight America. The Filipino people may have to suffer for a very long time.

Why don't the Nicaraguans or the Filipinos have the right to independence, self-determination, or nationalism?

Q. Washington clearly has no confidence that Marcos has the NPA rebellion under control.

A. That's right. They haven't. But that's their own fault. Had they withdrawn their support for Marcos at the time of Senator Aquino's death, the moderate opposition might have had some chance of coming to power. Marcos was very sick, and he was worried that with Aquino on the doorstep there might be some push to put Aquino in, because Aquino would have been pro-American.

But now it's too much panic, too late. Because most of the people have given up the legal struggle. I got a letter from a priest on another island the other day, and he said that the people are fed up with marching. He asked: "How many years are we going to march?" Even the rich people have been marching since Aquino's death. The ordinary people have been marching since 1972. And look what happened at Escalante.

Time is running out. And it's too late to prevent the Philippines from becoming like Nicaragua.

Q. So you can see no obstacle to the victory of the revolution?

A. The only way you can stop the Philippine revolution is with justice. And justice means that Marcos goes; that the World Bank

doesn't get its money. That's what justice means.

Q. Are there any lessons from Nicaragua for the Philippines?

A. Nicaraguans won their revolution, and now they have to defend it. The Filipinos haven't yet won their revolution. If they do, they will probably have to defend it against those who don't want them to be independent. Nicaragua showed the way to a lot of people in a similar situation. They showed that it can be done. A small nation of 3 million people who

stand up to the most powerful nation, saying, "we want to be independent, and you have to deal with us as an equal nation."

The U.S. intention is to crush and destroy that example.

Nicaragua has shown that there are many people who are Christians who didn't give up their Christianity but joined the revolution.

Q. How do you see the futures of the Philippines and Central America as linked?

A. I think they realize that in the Philippines there could be a similar scenario, and so they

are doing their best to destroy Nicaragua.

It may suit the Americans to subdelegate and get ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] into the act — Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia — maybe even a few Israelis to subcontract the war, to give America some credibility.

But I don't know what I would do, because I could never accept a situation whereby my own country, Australia, was involved in such a war, killing people who are struggling for what I believe is their right. Then talking may not be enough. □

Britain

Labour Party left registers gains

Miners' strike still shaking labor movement

By Redmond O'Neill

[The following article is taken from the October 28 issue of *International Viewpoint*, a fortnightly review published in Paris under the auspices of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. Footnotes are by *International Viewpoint*; subheads are by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

This year's Labour Party conference, held at the beginning of October in Bournemouth, marked a key point in the developments inside the British labor movement following the 1984-85 miners' strike. It was dominated by two processes which will remain the key to Labour Party politics between now and the 1987 general election.

The first, quite obviously, was Neil Kinnock's (the leader of the party) campaign to make Labour "fit to govern" by turning its back on the miners, on cities like Liverpool,¹ and on the Black communities. Kinnock quite consciously used this conference to project himself as a candidate acceptable to the capitalists for prime minister and as a more effective "hammer of the left" than David Owen or David Steele (leaders of the Social Democratic Party [SDP] and Liberal Party Alliance).

The second process was the continuing emergence out of the miners' strike of a Labour left of a quite different type to anything seen since at least World War II. This "fighting left" — around the National Union of

Mineworkers (NUM), the Black sections, and the Campaign Group of MPs [Members of Parliament] — was a clear minority in the conference, but a minority which, because it is based on class struggle, was able to impose some important defeats on Kinnock.

Most importantly, the resolution moved by the NUM called for "the next Labour government to legislate to provide: a. a complete review of all cases of miners jailed as a result of the dispute [that is, the 1984-85 miners' strike]; b. the reinstatement of miners sacked for activities arising out of the dispute; c. the reimbursement of the National Union of Mineworkers with all monies confiscated as a result of fines, sequestration, and receivership."

Resolution aids miners

The resolution was carried by a vote of 3,542,000 for and 2,912,000 against. This was a clear defeat for Neil Kinnock, who himself summarized the debate for 20 minutes, attacking the entire course of the NUM leadership in the 1984-85 miners' strike. A resolution was also carried in support of the struggle of Labour-controlled local authorities like Liverpool and Lambeth, against the Tory government's laws limiting the powers of local government and imposing large cuts in services and jobs. In particular, it was agreed "to commit the next Labour government . . . to fully compensate those representatives of the Labour movement who have suffered personal loss, bankruptcy, disqualification, or whatever as a result of non-compliance with these laws."

For the first time in Labour Party history, a resolution was carried in support of lesbian and gay rights, against the recommendation of the Labour Party NEC [National Executive Committee]. The support of key unions for this resolution reflected the political impact that such campaigns as Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners were able to have on the trade unions during the 12-month strike.

A resolution was passed, also against the NEC recommendation, in support of women's reproductive rights. This specifically committed the Labour Party to end the situation where Labour's MPs' votes on issues like abortion are treated as matters of individual conscience rather than binding party policy.

On the question of the right of Black Labour Party members to organize in constitutionally recognized Black sections of the party, important progress was registered. Whereas in 1984 the NUM was the only union to support Black sections, at this year's conference the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), and one or two smaller unions added support. The resolution in support of Black sections was defeated, but this is now an issue of substantial support, and this was reflected in a big increase in the number of Black delegates at the conference and their role in supporting class-struggle issues under debate in the conference

Kinnock maintains dominance

Notwithstanding these successes on important individual questions and the resulting consolidation of a more advanced Labour Party left wing than at any time in recent decades, the overall result of the conference was that Kinnock was able to assert his dominance over the basic line of march of the Labour Party into the next general election and reduce this fighting left to a small minority on questions of overall direction of the party.

Kinnock and the fighting left are the forces whose struggle will dominate the life of the Labour Party between now and the general election. They represent the basic choices facing the labor movement.

Kinnock won the plaudits of the Tory press in Bournemouth by signaling that his program is *not* to reverse Thatcherism. Instead he aims to take Thatcher's chief planks as the starting point for any Labour government.

1. Liverpool City Council, which is led by supporters of the Militant tendency (see below) is the only council in the country which is still refusing to comply with the government's attempts to restrict the spending powers of local authorities through delimiting the amount they are allowed to raise through local taxation, that is, rates. Neil Kinnock has publicly denounced the stand taken by Liverpool, in particular in a speech delivered at the Labour Party Conference which received wide acclaim from the bourgeois media.

Hence the essential content of the economy debate was abandoning the objective of restoring full employment and the promise to renationalize the industries privatized by the Tories. On trade union law, the aim is to retain the key elements of Thatcher's anti-union legislation.² In addition Kinnock wants to be able to guarantee a deal with the unions to restrict pay increases.

In its fundamentals this program is the same as that of the Liberal-SDP Alliance. Where they differ is that the Alliance, unlike Kinnock, wishes also to break the links between the unions and the Labour Party, and, ultimately, to drive through a political split in the TUC (Trades Union Congress) itself.

But Kinnock's project is not viable unless two conditions are fulfilled. The first is to achieve a deal with the key sections of the trade union bureaucracy on pay policy and trade union law. Kinnock has made some progress on this front, but Ron Todd's (the leader of the largest union, the Transport and General Workers Union) impromptu defense of the NUM, in which he specifically ruled out pay restraint, showed just how far Kinnock has to go.

However, Kinnock's progress is based on the fact that Ron Todd, Jimmy Knapp (of the NUR), and Rodney Bickerstaffe (of the NUPE) don't have any alternative. They accept that Labour can only have a chance of winning the general election if it is united under the leadership of Neil Kinnock

'New realist left' supports Kinnock

The problem for those who accept this argument is that unity under Kinnock's leadership inexorably necessitates unity around his program and policies. This is why "the new realist left" — the Labour Co-ordinating Committee (LCC), *Tribune* (formerly a newspaper of left MPs inside the party), [David] Blunkett (Labour leader of Sheffield City Council), [Ken] Livingstone (leader of the Greater London Council), and so on — will not be able to maintain the position they argued at the conference: support Kinnock and the miners, support Kinnock and Liverpool.

In a cynical editorial, *Tribune* advocates voting with the NUM in today's "emotional light," following the strike, and betraying that vote when Labour forms a government. Thus has Kinnock succeeded in winning over a section of the left.

The trajectory of this "realigned" or "Kinnock left" is to the right. It is not a product of Kinnock's arguments. It reflects the impact of the miners' strike on the Labour Party and the failure of a section of the left to organize support for that strike, followed by the collapse of the majority of the opposition to the Tories' rate-capping laws.

This Kinnock left, in particular around

2. In September 1984 a whole series of anti-trade union measures went through Parliament. These included obligatory voting by secret ballot for industrial action and an obligatory ballot on unions' affiliation to the Labour Party.

Tribune and the LCC, is now the spearhead of his efforts to build up a base of support in the constituency parties and to undermine and coopt the campaigns around local government, CND [Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament], and women's representation within the party. This means a fight not only against *Militant* supporters³ but also against the Campaign Group of MPs, the [Arthur] Scargill leadership of the NUM, and their supporters.

This relates to the second fundamental condition for the viability of Kinnock's project: to win the Labour Party to turn its back on the type of social explosions which Thatcher's policies have provoked in British society. On this there can be no compromise.

No section of the British ruling class is prepared to countenance a government which defends what Scargill did in the miners' strike, or which stands for city councils defying the law in their confrontations with central government, or which defends Black youth involved in the greatest urban revolts in the 20th century in Britain. That is why Kinnock and his spokespeople have been so vicious in their denunciations of the miners' picket lines, of Liverpool, and of the youth of Handsworth, Brixton, and Tottenham (flashpoints of the recent riots).

But to win the Labour Party as a whole to turn its back on such struggles, Kinnock has to isolate and defeat the fighting class-struggle left — which has acted as the voice of these struggles within the organized labor movement. That is why Kinnock concentrated his fire on Scargill, Liverpool City Council, the Black sections, and the only section of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) which has supported them, the Campaign Group of MPs.

Left based on class-struggle forces

Kinnock will find it difficult to isolate and defeat this new Labour left minority precisely because they are based on, and express, social forces engaged in class struggles that embody a fundamentally different line of advance for the labor movement than Kinnock against the Thatcher government. As the Campaign Group's response to Kinnock explained: "We believe that the next general election will be won by uniting rather than condemning those in struggle against the current Tory government."

These forces represent something quite remarkable in the British labor movement. At the 1984 Labour Party conference, the NUM came forward in defense not only of its own members but in support of Black sections, in defense of gay and lesbian rights, and in support of women's demands for greater represen-

3. *Militant* defines itself as a Marxist paper for Labour, and its supporters are dominant in the youth section of the Labour Party — the Labour Party Young Socialists. At the 1983 conference of the Labour Party, five members of the *Militant* editorial board were expelled from the party. *Militant* supporters have been subjected to a continued witch-hunt which also threatens the whole of the left of the party.

tation. At this year's conference the Black section speakers took the floor in defense of the NUM, in support of the Women's Action Committee, which is campaigning for greater representation of women in the structures of the party, as well as in support of Black sections. The Campaign Group laid the ground for the conference through an enormous number of meetings in support of the NUM (over 1,000), the publication of Private Members Bills on questions such as miners' amnesty, Ireland, and racial attacks, and through giving 100 percent support to local councils like Liverpool and Lambeth actually fighting the Tories.

In the conference itself the Campaign Group was the only section of the PLP to stand up to Kinnock and [Deputy Party Leader Roy] Hattersley's attacks on those in struggle. Individuals like Dennis Skinner and Tony Benn went out of their way to spell out the kind of alliances for socialism that the miners' strike demonstrated are possible and necessary.

Expand Labour Party's base

Kinnock is leading the Labour Party to disaster by reviving the incomes policy which destroyed the last Labour government and by attacking the areas where Labour's support is strongest — in the big cities, in the mining communities, among Black people. The new fighting left which is emerging stands for expanding Labour's base by supporting those fighting the Tories, coming forward as the champion of women (including removing the obstacles to women representing the labor movement), defending lesbian and gay rights, opening up a dialogue with those fighting British rule in the Six Counties of Ireland, and so on.

Following the Labour Party conference, this course can be strengthened by pursuing the broadest possible united action with the entire labor movement on particular campaigns and at the same time hammering out the key policies and alliances necessary to build a long-term political alternative within the labor movement around the axis of building an alliance for socialism.

Within this framework, the tactics adopted have to correspond to the real balance of forces, not fantasy. So, for example, the proposal championed at the conference by *Labour Briefing* and *Socialist Organiser*⁴ that a key task is to run an alternative for leader or deputy leader of the party in 1986 is a nonstarter. Rather than strengthening the fighting left that emerged at this year's conference, such a course would allow Kinnock to destroy that new left. What is needed is not organizational gimmicks or kamikaze tactics, but a *political* alternative to the course pursued by Kinnock.

This is also one of the chief lessons of Liver-

4. *Socialist Organiser* is a revolutionary socialist newspaper within the Labour Party. *Labour Briefing* is a journal in the Labour Party which organizes large sections of the left wing opposed to the policies of Neil Kinnock. It is closely allied with the Campaign Group of MPs.

pool. Liverpool must be defended. But *Militant* supporters' objection towards Liverpool's Black organizations, and their reduction of all struggles to the economic, have weakened Liverpool's fight and facilitated Kinnock's at-

tacks.

What is needed in the run-up to the next election is a break not simply with electoralism but with the past racism, sexism, and British chauvinism of the Labour left — and serious

tactics to achieve broad united action and clear policies. Despite Kinnock's victories, steps were taken along that road by the new fighting left centered around the Campaign Group, the NUM, and the Black sections. □

DOCUMENTS

The shifts in the Chinese CP leadership

Editorial from Hong Kong Trotskyist 'October Review'

[The following is an editorial from the September issue of the Hong Kong Trotskyist monthly magazine *October Review*. The English translation is by *October Review*. The footnotes and subheads are by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The national convention of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) delegates held in September indicates that the CCP faces urgent problems that must be quickly solved. The speeches of Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and other leaders at the convention reveal policy differences among high-ranking leaders in the party and between central and regional interests.

They have to reconcile differences, alleviate tensions, make concessions, exchange personnel in reshuffles in the central organs, promote younger cadres and the children and relatives of aged cadres, replace certain aged leaders — all in the attempt to improve the situation of agedness and incompetence of the cadre ranks and the difficult application of central directives on the local level, and further on to solve long-standing crises and to restabilize the rule of the bureaucracy.

The official explanation that this was "to organizationally ascertain the continuity of our party's policies" reflects the worries of the CCP faction in power: if not to resort to organizational means and to strengthen personnel arrangements, the present policies may possibly be impeded. This shows that the present policies are subject to increasing pressure, resistance, or objection among the various ranks of party cadres.

The reforms of the Deng faction had initially brought hope for many people. It corrected Mao Tsetung's compulsive orders and strict control so that the stiffened economy was freed of some inhibitions.

Yet the excessiveness and rashness of the policies, including many wrong measures (in particular the open-door policy¹ has many serious wrongs), lead to disastrous effects after a period, and Chinese society and the economy are laden with new contradictions and prob-

lems. Concrete manifestations are:

Evil practices, old and new, are prevalent. The party, government, and army institutions and cadres turn to commercial activities, seek selfish ends by use of their power, hoard and speculate in goods and foreign exchange, bribe and are bribed. State and private enterprises evade taxes, squander money, raise prices arbitrarily, produce and sell substandard goods, and even manufacture and sell fake medicine and fake wine . . .

On the other hand, the state cannot control capital investments, and the enterprises go after quantity and neglect quality. This has added to tensions in raw materials, energy, and transport, and the economy cannot develop with coordination and stability. The original goals of the Special Economic Zones are frustrated, and the opening of the coastal cities induces or intensifies contradictions and tensions.

So, Deng Xiaoping is forced to change his affirmative evaluation on the Special Economic Zones. The regime has declared suspension of the opening of 10 cities (out of 14), and the open-door reforms will progress in a "wait-and-see" way.

'Get rich first'

The policy to encourage a minority of people to "get rich first" and the policy to "fully develop the commodity economy" induce accelerated polarization of society, more diversity in wealth, and unchecked pursuit of money. At the same time, prostitution, theft, burglary, and superstition revive. The social atmosphere turns worse. While there is improvement in the people's livelihood compared to previously, the cost of living is also increasing, and difficulty and discontent are generally rising.

In the reformist and open-door practice, clashes of interests and power between the central and regional forces inevitably intensify. Central policies are in fact rejected and resisted by the local cadres.

If these developments are unchecked, bureaucratic rule will be seriously endangered, and the interests of the bureaucracy as a whole will suffer. The top CCP leadership tries to avoid this.

the domestic market are designed to attract high technology industries.

Hence, although some leaders, represented by Chen Yun, have differences with the Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang faction on certain concrete questions, they for the moment seek compromises, "having in mind the general interests."

The national convention of the CCP delegates was held against this background and for this primary reason.

The CCP explains that the national convention of the CCP delegates was held according to the provisions of the party constitution. Yet, the party constitution adopted by the 12th National Party Congress does not provide that the convention of delegates has the power to change members and alternate members of the Central Committee, much less up to one-quarter of them. On the contrary, the party constitution clearly provides that members of the Central Committee are to be elected by the national congress; vacancies in the Central Committee are to be filled by alternate members successively in the order of votes they have obtained.

However, this time, the new Central Committee members were not filled according to the constitution's provision. The list of new members and alternate members was drafted by the top leadership and then adopted by the convention. "No one failed to be elected," Zhu Muzhi, official spokesman of the convention, said. This means the convention merely put a stamp on the fixed list. Besides, vacancies in the Politburo were not filled by the alternate members successively, but were filled by five other persons.

All these things show that the CCP leadership still rules by the will of the leaders. They do not follow the rules even when the rules are not formulated by a democratic process.

The party constitution provides that the national congress, if necessary, can be convened earlier than usual. Yet the faction in power was unwilling to go by this channel and took a special way. It also seems that "party delegates from various fronts," who constituted one-third of all the delegates, were not elected by the local organizations.

A struggle against 'agedness'

To justify these changes, the faction in power proposed various "reasons," which are, however, unjustified.

They said that the retirement of the aged

1. China's open-door policy toward foreign trade and investments includes the establishment of Special Economic Zones in a number of cities, where tax incentives, cheap land and labor, and some access to

cadres means the abolition of life tenure of leadership posts. Yet what replaces this is a feudal hereditary succession of the leadership posts. Moreover, after the aged cadres "resign," all their usual remuneration will remain unchanged, and it is guaranteed that they will have priority in improvement. This means the life tenure of privileges of cadres has not changed but is expanding.

Another "reason" is to have younger and more educated cadres in leadership positions. Yet powerful or representative leaders and their protégés, though they are very aged or lowly educated, are not subject to the change and need not be replaced. Double standards are applied, and "agedness" is only an excuse to get rid of dissidents. The so-called raising of the education level of the cadres is the replacement of some bureaucrats by technocrats according to the fondness of the leadership, for the purpose of strengthening the rule of the bureaucracy.

This is by no means the practice of democracy in the party or democratic election of the party leadership by the members, not to say the practice of socialist democracy when the whole laboring people democratically elect state functionaries.

Moreover, under the bureaucratized party system and political system, even if some younger and more educated cadres are promoted, they can be replaced at any time.

After such arrangements and changes, even if a certain faction and its supporters make up the majority in the central leadership, their predominance is not secure. The many factional struggles and reshuffles in the leadership since the CCP has exercised power prove this. It is a willful wish that one faction has obtained the "guarantee" that its policies can be steadily carried out, when bureaucratic factions continue to exist and wage open or veiled struggles.

The present compromise can only be temporary. When, in the near future, the social contradictions turn more acute, the people's discontent more serious, and the crisis of rule of the bureaucracy more severe, the differences in the CCP will aggravate and factional struggles will intensify. This is inevitable in the development of the bureaucratic system.

Only by radically changing the present bureaucratic political system and party system and by the people's genuine exercise of power can there be the guarantee of policies favorable to the people and of a genuine revival and steady development of the economy.

The speech of Deng Xiaoping at the convention again proves that the CCP under his leadership will not carry out reforms on political democratization. He reiterated the necessity of "serious persistence on the Four Basic Principles"² and "firm opposition to propaganda on bourgeois liberalization," a term generally used by the regime to describe freedom of thought and publication; in the field of ideology and culture, "party discipline must be imposed on party members who persist on their mistakes and refuse correction," which means dissidence is not allowed.

Such emphases show that the present faction in power, as in the past, will not practice party democracy or socialist democracy.

Yet without socialist democracy, socialism or socialist modernizations cannot be realized.

No illusions for any CCP faction in power! Continue the struggle for the realization of socialist democracy in China and in the world! These should be the unwavering orientations of struggle of the people of China. □

2. The "Four Basic Principles" are: "uphold the socialist road, proletarian dictatorship, leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought."

10 AND 20 YEARS AGO

Intercontinental Press

Africa Asia Europe Oceania The Americas

December 15, 1975

The British government declared the end to internment, or detention without trial, in Northern Ireland December 5. The last forty-six persons held under the detention policy, which was first adopted in August 1971, were released.

A government official said the detention policy had "outlived its usefulness." The right-wing Protestant leader Rev. Ian Paisley, who supported the end to the detention policy, was more specific about the reasons for its abandonment: "Detention without trial threw the entire Roman Catholic population into the hands of the I.R.A. [Irish Republican Army]. It was the best bonus the I.R.A. ever received."

In announcing the decision to end internment, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees declared that republican "terrorists" will not "escape the punishment due to them." Since the beginning of the year, 1,260 persons have been tried on charges of terrorism. "This is the accepted and tested method that we want to use instead of detention," Rees said.

WORLD OUTLOOK

PERSPECTIVE MONDIALE

("World Outlook," the predecessor of "Intercontinental Press," was not published from Oct. 29, 1965, to Feb. 4, 1966, due to the illness of its editor, Joseph Hansen. Until February 1986, we will be reprinting selections from 21 years ago.)

December 4, 1964

The belt-line workers on the 2 to 10 o'clock and 7:30 to 4 o'clock shifts at Cockerill-Ougrée, Belgium's biggest plant, stopped work November 25, the day after Belgian paratroopers landed at Stanleyville, to discuss the events in the Congo.

They passed a resolution in which they:

- Opposed foreign intervention, most particularly Belgian intervention in the Congo.
- Called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo, the paratroopers and others who risk causing the death of 600 Belgian nationals still remaining in the Stanleyville region.
- Denounced the attitude of the government in levelling threats of expulsion against the leaders of the Congolese students in Belgium because they spoke out against the Belgian intervention in the Congo.
- Expressed fear that the government attitude might provoke the extension of the conflict to such proportions as to threaten peace in Africa.
- Expressed solidarity with the Congolese people in their struggle for independence.

WE BRING YOU THE NEWS FROM AROUND THE WORLD!

In recent issues, INTERCONTINENTAL PRESS has carried on-the-spot reports from the Philippines, Grenada, Greece, the Dominican Republic, Australia, Britain, Ireland, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Puerto Rico, Argentina, Canada, New Zealand, India, Burkina, Ghana, and many other countries.

IP also features regular coverage from our Managua bureau, enabling our readers to follow the development of the Sandinista Revolution from close up.

If you subscribe to IP, you won't miss a single issue!

Yes, I want to subscribe. Enclosed is \$30 for one year; \$15 for six months; \$7.50 for a special three-month introductory subscription.

Name _____

Address _____

City/State/Postal Code _____

(See inside front cover for prices outside the United States and Canada.)

INTERCONTINENTAL PRESS, 410 West St., New York, N.Y. 10014

Pact maintains British rule in north

Dublin accepts 'Loyalist veto'

By Will Reissner

Irish Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald signed an agreement on November 15 with his British counterpart, Margaret Thatcher, setting up an ongoing "Intergovernmental Conference" on Northern Ireland. This pact maintains British colonial control of Northern Ireland while giving Dublin only a symbolic role in its affairs.

The British established a rump state in six of the nine counties of the Irish province of Ulster in 1921 when they found they could no longer maintain colonial rule over all of Ireland.

British rule in Northern Ireland was based on the existence of a pro-British Loyalist population that had been settled in northeastern Ireland to control the rebellious native Irish.

Following the partition of Ireland, the Loyalists, who now claim about 60 percent of the total population in the six counties and who are overwhelmingly Protestant, established a sectarian state that guaranteed the privileges of the Protestants while practicing open discrimination against Catholics. The "nationalists" of Northern Ireland — who favor reunification with the independent 26 counties of Ireland — are overwhelmingly Catholic.

For generations, successive British governments have stated that there will be no change in Northern Ireland's "union" with Britain until the Loyalist population agrees to that change.

The Irish constitution, however, asserts Irish sovereignty over the entire island, including the six counties of the north.

FitzGerald accepts 'Loyalist veto'

But in his November 15 agreement with Thatcher, Garret FitzGerald put his seal of approval on the so-called "Loyalist veto."

Article I of the agreement states: "The two Governments (a) affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; (b) recognize that the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland is for no change in the status of Northern Ireland."

In exchange for recognizing the "Loyalist veto," FitzGerald got a series of vague promises that "the United Kingdom Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland . . . insofar as those matters are not the responsibility of devolved administration of Northern Ireland."

The British government, however, has no obligation to accept such proposals from Dublin under the provisions of the agreement.

In exchange for the right to make sugges-

tions about the north to London, FitzGerald agreed to "enhancing cross-border cooperation on security matters," a polite way of indicating Dublin's willingness to cooperate more closely with British authorities in suppressing armed struggle against British rule in the north.

Thatcher satisfied

The British government has good reason to feel satisfied with the agreement. In return for minimal concessions to Dublin, none of which threaten continued British rule in Northern Ireland, Thatcher has secured Dublin's cooperation in opposing action for Irish reunification.

For its part, the FitzGerald government hopes that its consultative role in Northern Ireland will stem the radicalization of the northern nationalist population and the growing strength of Sinn Féin, the political party aligned with the Irish Republican Army.

A watershed in that radicalization was the 1981 hunger strike in the H-Blocks of Long Kesh prison, in which 10 young Irish nationalists starved to death because the British government refused to treat them as political prisoners.

One measure of that radicalization is the growing popular support for Sinn Féin and that party's increasing organizational strength. The Dublin government fears that the continued growth of Sinn Féin, which won 42 percent of the votes of the nationalist community in the 1983 Northern Ireland Assembly elections, could spell the end of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, a reformist formation that opposes armed struggle against British rule.

Sinn Féin's growing influence — in the south as well as the north — is particularly worrisome to Dublin because the party is a bitter foe of the proimperialist regimes that have governed the south since the 1921 partition.

Opposition in south

The leader of the main opposition party in the south, former prime minister Charles Haughey, blasted the November 15 agreement, describing it as "a severe blow for Irish unity and Irish nationalism."

Haughey added that Irish nationalists had suffered a "major setback" because the agreement marked the first time a government in Dublin had accepted the "legitimacy of the unionist [Loyalist] position" in an international pact.

Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams, an elected member of the British Parliament from West Belfast (Sinn Féin members refuse to take their seats in that body), warned at a November 18 news conference that the

FitzGerald-Thatcher agreement was "designed to isolate and defeat republicans," a term for those fighting for a united Irish republic.

Adams argued that the deal would fail in its objective and would "perpetuate the struggle" and "make things worse in the long term."

The Sinn Féin leader noted that in addition to giving tacit approval to continued British rule in the north, the agreement means the Dublin government is now "taking responsibility for show-trials, strip-searching," and other forms of British repression against the nationalist population.

In Washington President Ronald Reagan hailed the November 15 agreement, stating his hope that "we can help . . . in restoring sound economics" in Northern Ireland. Some figures in the State Department and U.S. Congress have called for a "mini-Marshall Plan" of \$250 million or more in U.S. aid to the British-ruled north.

Loyalists mobilize

The Loyalist forces made a massive show of their opposition to providing even a consultative role for Dublin.

At a November 23 Belfast rally of more than 70,000, Rev. Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, told the crowd: "Mrs. Thatcher tells us the [Irish] Republic may have some say in our province. We say, Never! Never! Never! Never!"

Loyalists struck down a 1974 agreement for London-Dublin cooperation and nationalist participation in the north's administration through a two-week general strike.

Sinn Féin's weekly newspaper, *An Phoblacht-Republican News*, pointed out in a November 21 front page editorial: "Unionist hostility to the deal demonstrates their inability to accept any change in the status quo and the fact that they are so blinded by sectarianism that they cannot see that the present deal is essential if the union [with Britain] is to be strengthened."

The paper added that the governments in London and Dublin have "embarked on a massive public relations exercise to brainwash the entire people of Ireland that this insulting deal is an advance on the road to justice."

"Republicans," the editorial continued, "must counter that propaganda. Failure to do so would allow the Dublin government and their British allies to isolate us and to create the climate in which massive repression can begin. It is our relevance to the communities in which we live which will ensure the failure of this latest Brit-inspired strategy to defeat the Irish struggle." □