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Iranian Revolution Under Attack

Mujahedeen Terror Campaign Plays Into Imperialism's Hands



Iranians demonstrate support for revolution

**POLISH WORKERS REJECT
CAMPAIGN OF INTIMIDATION**

Haig at UN: 'New strategy' or same old exploitation?

By Fred Murphy

Secretary of State Alexander Haig addressed the opening session of the UN General Assembly on September 21 to outline what he claimed was a "new strategy for growth" for the poor nations of the world.

Such a strategy would certainly be welcome. Hunger and malnutrition affect 570 million people in the underdeveloped countries. The number of adults who cannot read and write tops 800 million. Some 1.5 billion human beings lack regular access to medical care. These are only a few of the immense problems that result from the backward economic conditions in the Third World.

What did Haig have to offer? He presented a set of "principles," "to guide us through these austere and difficult times."

First, Haig said, "development is facilitated by an open international trading system." This was his way of saying that U.S. corporations don't want any tariff barriers put in the way of their exports. And efforts like that of the petroleum-producing countries to gain better prices for raw materials are not viewed with favor by Washington either.

Handouts to business

Economic growth "is best achieved through reliance on incentives for individual economic performance," Haig said. In other words, there should be more government handouts to private business.

Also, "a certain measure of security and political stability" is essential for development. This means keep the workers on a tight leash, and no nationalizations of foreign property.

To assure such "stability," Haig went on, the Reagan administration is "committed to maintain and, where possible, to increase programs essential to deter international aggression and to provide the domestic security necessary to carry out sound economic programs."

Haig may have had El Salvador in mind. But in that country the economy is at the point of collapse despite the tens of millions of dollars worth of aid Washington has poured in to prop up the bloodstained junta against its own people.

All this Haig speak was really a smokescreen for Washington's rejection of any "strategy for growth that depends on a massive increase in the transfer of resources from the developed to the developing countries"—which Haig termed "simply unrealistic."

Thus the secretary of state declared in advance that there will be no concessions offered to the poor countries when Reagan attends a summit conference in Cancun, Mexico, next month.

Many governments of underdeveloped

countries have been pressing for what they call "a New International Economic Order," in which more equal trade relations would be established and far larger funds for economic development would be made available to the Third World.

Some concrete proposals along these lines were presented to the United Nations two years ago by Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Addressing the General Assembly in his capacity as chairman of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries, Castro said on October 12, 1979, that what the poor countries really needed was "an additional contribution of not less than \$300 billion. . . ."

To finance such a vast undertaking, the Cuban leader said, would require "that a substantial part of the resources now devoted to arms, particularly by the major powers, be used for economic and social development."

Haig, who represents a government that has long been the world's biggest arms producer and supplier, of course finds such proposals "unrealistic."

Haig claimed that "private initiatives" will "promote better resource allocation and more rapid economic growth." After waiting for the past 100 years for the private profit system to produce economic growth, the peoples of the poor countries can be excused for skepticism about this point.

Fidel Castro refuted Haig's approach in his 1979 speech. He explained that "the investments required by the developing countries are enormous, and they need them primarily, and with practically no exception, in those branches of production that yield low profits and therefore do not appeal to private foreign lenders or investors."

Castro cited three key areas where this is the case: agriculture for food production, industrialization, and "attention to human beings, who should be the protagonists and goal of all development efforts." In the latter category Castro pointed to the vast gains his own country has made in education and health care by putting human needs above private profits.

The experience of underdeveloped countries with "private initiatives" in agriculture especially has been nothing short of catastrophic. In country after country, wealthy landowners have turned away from food production in order to plant cash crops for export. This has led to increasing malnutrition and in some cases to famine and outright starvation.

In the famine-stricken countries of sub-Saharan Africa, where millions died of starvation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, agricultural exports actually increased during the same period.

While Haig was telling the UN that "stronger international cooperation in food and in energy" is an essential goal, Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan was explaining to reporters in Washington that the U.S. government is totally opposed to the World Bank's plans for setting up a new lending fund to finance oil and gas exploration in poor countries.

Last July, Secretary Regan gave his views on how energy development in the Third World should be carried out: "If there is a pool of oil of any commercial value, the oil company that found it will exploit it, provided that it can reach a satisfactory return on its money." (*Washington Post*, July 16.)

Haig also suggested that the underdeveloped countries should become "creditworthy" and "borrow on international capital markets."

Under the current conditions of world economic crisis, poor countries are becoming less "creditworthy," not more. Fidel Castro explained in his 1979 speech why this is inevitable:

"While the prices of manufactured goods, capital goods, foodstuffs, and services that we import from the developed countries are constantly rising, the prices of the raw materials we export are stagnating and are subject to constant fluctuation."

The kind of "free trade" Haig appealed for can only make this situation worse. Just two months ago, for example, the Costa Rican government was forced to suspend payment on its international debts because of the stagnating world market price of coffee, a principal export.

To improve Costa Rica's "creditworthiness," the International Monetary Fund has demanded that the Carazo government take measures to boost unemployment, tighten credit, and halt the construction of schools, roads, and hospitals.

Haig's "new strategy for growth" is not new, nor will it foster development in the poor countries. It is a very old recipe for colonial and imperialist plunder that will only worsen the dire situation of the underdeveloped nations.

What is realistic

Fidel Castro's proposals were far more realistic. In a speech to a congress of economists in Havana last April, he pointed to the only way they can be truly realized:

"If the decisive power of a state and a society is not in the hands of the great majority of workers, none of these prerequisites for development will materialize. The kind of socioeconomic policy we need can only be the result of a political leadership representing the most genuine interests of the working people. . . ."

"Political power must go from the hands of a few to the hands of the creative majorities." □

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Grenada answers U.S. threats

[During the last weekend of August, thousands of Grenadians participated in military maneuvers in various parts of the country to help strengthen Grenada's ability to defend itself against U.S. aggression. The threat of an American attack had been underscored earlier in the month by massive U.S. military maneuvers in the Caribbean that included a practice invasion of a fictional country modeled on Grenada.

[The three days of maneuvers, which were called "Heroes of the Homeland," involved members of the People's Revolutionary Army, People's Revolutionary Militia, and other sectors of the security and the armed forces. At the end of the maneuvers, the participants and other supporters of the revolution rallied at Seamon and then drove across the island in a convoy to the capital of St. George's, where another rally was held.

[The following editorial appeared on the front-page of the September 4 *New Jewel*, the weekly newspaper of the New Jewel Movement, which led the overthrow of the Eric Gairy dictatorship on March 13, 1979.]

* * *

When we the people of Grenada, led by our party, overthrew the oppressive regime on March 13th, 1979, we did so in order to build a better life for our broad people. We immediately started programmes of reconstruction and restructuring, of building our infrastructure, our factories, fisheries, etc.

Having been the victims of three hundred years of colonial and imperialist exploitation and having suffered from the ravages of two decades of Gairyism, we knew that we had a lot of urgent development to do. Therefore, we knew that we needed to do our work in peace. Put another way, we knew that we needed peace to carry on our work. This has always been our policy—to carry out our socioeconomic programmes in peace.

We have threatened no one. We have provoked no one. On the contrary, we have always extended the hand of friendship and brotherhood to all people, except of course the racists, extreme fascists and aggressors. Naturally, our hand of friendship is based and has to be based, on the principles of mutual respect, good neighborliness, and non-interference.

We are a small, poor country and the last thing in the world we want is war. How will war help us to secure or advance our objectives? It is obvious that it cannot.

Yet, in spite of our deliberate policy of friendship, co-operation, brotherhood and peace, our peace-loving revolution has faced, and still continues to face, the great might of U.S. imperialism, an aggressive force with an abundance of resources at its command. Today the evidence of U.S. hostile intentions towards Grenada is so clear that even the blind can see.

What choices do we have as a people? Does

Reagan expect us to abandon our sovereign, progressive path? Does he want us to kneel down and beg pardon for pursuing the policies of our own choosing? Nonsense. In Grenada we know what our rights are and we shall assert and exercise them. We shall stand up and defend each and every one of them.

Our revolution will not yield an inch of ground; not one nutmeg pod, not a cocoa tree, not a hand of fig. Not a grain of sand. We shall defend our territory, including all our forty-

five white sand beaches, inch by inch.

We shall defend every infant who is too young to join the militia and any grandmother who is too old to fight. We shall defend every rock stone.

Our cause is just and we know it. It is the struggle of a whole people to defend their resources, to protect and maintain their collective honour, their dignity, their national independence. □

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Workers reject campaign of intimidation

Moscow, Warsaw issue new threats to Solidarity

By Ernest Harsch

For members of Solidarity, the two-week period between the close of the first phase of the union's national congress in Gdansk and the opening of the second on September 26 was a time of intensive discussions, touching on Solidarity's program, the character of its leadership, and the best way forward for the Polish workers and nation as a whole.

But for the authorities, it was a time of vicious slander and crude threats. Fearful that the second phase of the congress would only lead to a further consolidation of the union's strength, the rulers in Warsaw and Moscow opened up a concerted campaign of intimidation.

In a major speech before the Sejm (parliament) September 24 announcing a step-up in police and army activity, Prime Minister Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski virtually admitted that the purpose of the drive was to influence the decisions of the congress, which was set to reconvene two days later. The fate of Poland, he warned, would depend on the congress's outcome.

But the Polish workers would not be intimidated. They refused to be cowed by the repeated charges that the leaders of Solidarity were following a "counterrevolutionary" and "antisocialist" course.

The workers of the giant Ursus tractor factory outside Warsaw, for example, declared in a statement, "We shall not let anyone insult us and our union organization.

"The counterrevolutionaries and antisocialists are the rulers who have distorted history, destroyed culture and pushed the country to the brink of destitution."

Soviet letter

The lead for this most recent anti-Solidarity campaign came from Moscow.

Soviet newspapers, television, and radio now carry daily attacks against Solidarity, often in extremely menacing tones. Meetings have been organized at a number of large Soviet factories, at which prepared denunciations of the Polish union were presented. Soviet officials have threatened Poland with economic reprisals if the government does not crack down sufficiently on Solidarity's activities.

Although the Soviet authorities have cloaked their attacks in the guise of "defending socialism," their real concern is how to put the reins on the Polish workers. They fear that the example of Solidarity could spread—the example of a democratic movement that fights in the interests of workers and opposes all aspects of bureaucratic privilege and mismanagement.

The most threatening Soviet attack came in a letter to the Polish authorities, published in Poland September 18.

It charged that an "acute and unchecked campaign" of "anti-Sovietism" was being unleashed in Poland as part of a coordinated drive by the "enemies of socialism."

"The rabid propaganda against the Soviet Union emanates from the pages of various publications, from movie screens, from theaters and stages. It openly sounds in public enunciations—before mass audiences. . . ."

The letter did not limit its attacks to the Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR) and the nationalist Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), which Moscow has singled out before. It also lashed out at the entire ten-million-member Solidarity. It charged that the first phase of Solidarity's congress, which was held September 5-10, was a "tribune from which slanders and insults sounded against our state."

In the Kremlin's dictionary, demands by workers for democratic rights, control of their factories, and the power to make key economic, social, and political decisions is synonymous with "anti-Sovietism."

The letter also chastised the Polish authorities for not putting a stop to Solidarity's activities. It invoked the Polish government's "allied obligations" within the Warsaw Pact and stated, "We expect that the P.U.W.P. [Polish United Workers Party] leadership and the Polish Government immediately take the determined and radical steps in order to cut short the malicious anti-Soviet propaganda and actions hostile toward the Soviet Union."

Economic threats

According to reports from government sources in Warsaw cited in the September 19 *New York Times*, parts of the Soviet letter were not made public, including one section that specifically threatened reductions in oil, cotton, and natural gas that Moscow supplies to Poland.

A few days later, on September 22, PUWP Political Bureau member Stefan Olszowski confirmed these reports when he warned in a televised address that strategic raw materials from the Soviet Union, including oil, could be cut off unless "anti-Soviet" activity in Poland stopped. "The Soviet Union can manage without Polish supplies, but Poland cannot manage without Soviet supplies," he pointed out.

The speech by Olszowski, who is one of the most pro-Soviet figures in the Polish party leadership, came at the same time that a Soviet delegation headed by Chairman of the State Planning Commission Nikolai K. Baibakov

was visiting Warsaw to discuss Soviet-Polish economic agreements for next year and after.

In making such threats, the bureaucrats in the Kremlin have descended to the crudest form of blackmail. They have also revealed who their real target is: the Polish people as a whole. Since Poland is dependent on the Soviet Union for 13 million tons of crude oil a year, a cutoff, or even a reduction, could cripple Polish industry and lead to even greater economic suffering than Poles already face.

This is a danger that Solidarity leaders have already begun to think about. Even before Olszowski's declaration, Bronislaw Geremek, a key adviser to Solidarity, warned, "What will happen if the Soviets decide to employ economic aggression—when the oil and cotton stops coming and industry grinds to a halt? We must have a plan for that eventuality."

The East German and Czechoslovak governments, which have been as virulent as Moscow in their attacks against the Polish workers, have already begun to cut back on their deliveries to Poland.

Arrests and intimidation

Partly in response to the proddings from Moscow, the Polish authorities stepped up their own attacks on Solidarity.

Albin Siwak, a member of the PUWP Political Bureau and one of the most outspoken opponents of Solidarity, called on September 14 for the outlawing of the union.

Although other officials did not go so far, the Political Bureau issued a statement two days later accusing Solidarity of transforming itself into a "political opposition" and of pushing Poland toward a "new national tragedy." This, it warned, could lead to a "confrontation threatening bloodshed."

Solidarity promptly issued a statement in reply, declaring, "We will not accept the scenario of provocation."

In his address before the Sejm on September 24, General Jaruzelski announced that he had ordered the police and "specially detailed army forces" to put an end to "the deepening anarchist tendencies, to the unbridled hooliganism, to anti-Soviet and antistate excesses." As he was speaking, army detachments were already becoming more visible in the streets of Warsaw and other cities.

Just before Jaruzelski's speech, direct police provocations against union members had already been stepped up to their highest level in half a year.

According to Solidarity, the police have called in numerous activists—among them delegates to the Solidarity congress—for "inter-

views." Under the cover of a crackdown on the printing of "anti-Soviet" materials, Solidarity members in Czestochowa, Jelenia Gora, and Wroclaw have been arrested and charged on those grounds.

One of those picked up and then released on bail was Kornel Morawiecki, a delegate to the congress from Wroclaw and an editor of a regional Solidarity news bulletin in Silesia. He was charged with actions threatening "the alliances of the Polish People's Republic" for publishing an appeal, in Russian, explaining to Soviet soldiers stationed in Poland what was going on there and for printing greetings to the Solidarity congress from a Soviet workers' group. If convicted, Morawiecki could face up to ten years in prison.

Another of those arrested was Edmund Baluka, a Solidarity member at the Warski Shipyard in Szczecin. Baluka, who headed the strike committee at the shipyard during the large strike there in 1970, subsequently fled abroad, but came back to Poland earlier this year without official approval. He managed to regain his old job at the shipyard and joined Solidarity. Until now, the authorities had not deemed it expedient to move against him. According to Solidarity sources, Baluka will probably be charged with reentering the country illegally.

The censors, too, have moved against the union. They have prohibited two entire articles that were scheduled to appear in the September 18 issue of *Tygodnik Solidarnosc*, the union's national weekly newspaper. One was an editorial on the message of support for workers in Eastern Europe adopted at the congress, and the other was an open letter by transport workers in Warsaw to workers at a large auto plant in Moscow, inviting them to visit Poland to see for themselves what was happening there. "We think that workers of all countries have a common language," the letter said. "Let's talk, discuss, and explain everything to each other."

Parallel to these direct moves against Solidarity, the authorities have also been seeking to push through several pieces of legislation that Solidarity has opposed, including bills on censorship, factory management, and the trade unions.

The draft bill on trade unions, for example, envisages the possibility of outlawing a trade union if it violates its statutes or the law. It would also empower the Sejm to declare an indefinite ban on strikes. Lech Walesa, the president of Solidarity, has declared that the draft bill is totally unacceptable.

Authorities move cautiously

But despite the government's attempts to adopt a hard stance toward Solidarity, the authorities know that they must proceed carefully, given the union's overwhelming support among the population. That is why Jaruzelski and other top officials have coupled their threats with gestures of conciliation and offers to negotiate.



Martin Koppel/Perspectiva Mundial

Delegates at first phase of Solidarity congress in Gdansk. Authorities are trying to intimidate union activists.

One example of this came around the adoption of a law on self-management. Solidarity had been demanding the right of workers—organized in democratically elected Workers' Councils—to choose and dismiss the managers of enterprises. The government's original bill insisted that the managers be appointed exclusively by the central authorities, with the Workers' Councils having only a limited right to object if they disagreed with the choice.

But after the Presidium of the union's National Coordinating Commission (KKP) made a compromise proposal, the Sejm, on September 25, adopted a new version of the bill, which closely paralleled the Presidium's proposal (a proposal that still remains to be approved or rejected at the Solidarity congress itself).

Under the new law, the Workers' Councils and the state authorities would share the power to name managers in certain enterprises, and give the government the exclusive right of appointment only in certain "strategic" enterprises. In either case, both sides could appeal the choice to a special court.

Attempts by PUPW leaders in the Sejm to amend the bill more to the advantage of the authorities were defeated.

So rather than launching a frontal assault against Solidarity, the authorities at this time are still probing, looking for weaknesses, seeking to drive wedges into the solid wall of workers' unity that continues to confront them at every turn.

Above all, they are hoping that Poland's severe economic crisis will eventually weaken popular support for Solidarity and provide openings for more serious attacks. One constant theme of official propaganda has been to

blame Solidarity for the lengthening food lines, disruption of the consumer market, and drops in production.

Defiant speeches and militant mood

But most Poles, who have witnessed thirty-six years of economic mismanagement by the privileged bureaucrats who rule the country, know that Solidarity is not responsible for Poland's economic ills.

Jacek Kalabinski, a Polish radio commentator and president of the Warsaw chapter of the Polish Journalists Union, pointed to this in a column that appeared in the September 24 *New York Times*. "Many Poles blame the authorities for what is wrong with the country," he wrote, "and most young, professionally and politically active people are firmly behind Lech Walesa's union. No threats can change that."

The response of Solidarity members to the recent attacks has certainly not been to back off.

Many factories around the country issued statements repudiating the slanders emanating from Moscow, and terming the Soviet campaign of intimidation as interference in Poland's internal affairs.

In face of a step-up in police and army patrols in Gdansk, the Solidarity delegates reconvened there at the Olivia Sports Hall September 26 for the second phase of the national congress. Like the first phase, the opening was marked by defiant speeches and a militant mood. Like the first, huge crowds gathered outside to listen to the discussions relayed by loudspeaker.

As union members at a hospital in Tarnow emphasized several days earlier, "Solidarity won't let anybody scare it anymore." □

British colony gains independence

Military regime in Guatemala threatens invasion

By Arnold Weissberg

BELIZE CITY—There was a day of dancing and celebration here September 21, as the next-to-last colony on the American mainland achieved its independence from Britain. Only the colony of French Guiana remains.

On the main street of this city of 40,000, the country's largest, Belizeans formed impromptu lines of dancers and weaved their way through the crowds. Live bands provided the music, and where there weren't enough bands, records and tapes blasted out reggae rhythms over loudspeakers.

This is normally a quiet town, its shopping district is lined with small retail stores and punctuated by banks. Fishing boats tie up only yards from the center of the city, along a stream that runs in from the Caribbean.

But Belize City came alive for Independence Day.

110 years of colonial rule

Belize, once known a British Honduras, was ruled by Britain for more than 110 years. Its independence was a victory for the anticolonial movements in Latin America and around the world.

"As an independent nation, Belize will be a positive force and influence in strengthening the democratic, peaceloving, and progressive forces," Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop said at a new conference here.


The new prime minister of Belize is George Price, a proindependence leader for more than thirty years. Price has announced that Belize will seek membership in the Movement of Nonaligned Countries, as well as in the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

The new country will be part of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), an economic cooperation project made up of former British colonies, as well as a member of the British Commonwealth.

"Belize is a Caribbean and Central American nation that works and lives a revolution that is peaceful, constructive, new, and progressive, and Belizean," Price declared at the ceremonies in which the British formally turned power over to the new government on September 21. "It is our own with all our national attributes."

Governments from around the world sent delegations to the independence celebrations. Among the heads of state were Maurice Bishop of Grenada, Rodrigo Carazo of Costa Rica, Edward Seaga of Jamaica, and Sergio Ramírez of Nicaragua's Junta of National Reconstruction.

Ramírez was accompanied by a high-level



delegation, which, he explained, showed "the importance Belize has for Nicaragua." He pledged that Nicaragua would aid the new country "with deeds."

Revolutionary Nicaragua has supported Belizean independence, breaking with the policy of the Somoza dictatorship, which supported Guatemala's claims to sovereignty over the British colony. Price was a guest at the first anniversary celebration of the Nicaraguan revolution.

The U.S. delegation consisted of Florida Congressman Daniel Mica, a political nonentity; Air Force Lt. Gen. William Masterson, deputy commander of the U.S. Southern Command in Panama; and, as a last-minute addition, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders.

While expressing willingness to accept U.S. military aid and training for Belize's Defense

Forces, Price has refused to join in the State Department's crusade against Cuba. He declared he saw no threat from there, as Cuba was already a member of the international bodies that Belize hopes to join.

A government background handout for the press portrayed Fidel Castro, the late Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos, Mexican President José López Portillo, and a group of young Sandinista guerrillas from Nicaragua as "friends of Belizean independence."

Belize faces an immediate threat from neighboring Guatemala, where the blood-soaked military dictatorship of Gen. Romeo Lucas García claims that Belize is actually part of Guatemala. The Guatemalan regime broke diplomatic relations with Britain in protest against Belizean independence, and has closed the border, thereby cutting off land access to Belize.

Guatemala continues to threaten an invasion of Belize, something that Belizeans take very seriously.

Guatemala's claim is entirely without legal, political, or historical foundation. Belize was never part of the Spanish empire and was never ruled by any Spanish-speaking country. The population is overwhelmingly Black and English-speaking. The United Nations rejected Guatemala's claim last year by 139-0 vote.

Guatemalan revolutionary groups all support Belize's right to independence. One of the guerrilla groups occupied the national historical park of Tikal on September 19 to hold a meeting in solidarity with Belize.

The British are said to be leaving a force of some 1,500 soldiers and at least four warplanes "as long as necessary," as Price put it, presumably until Belize's own forces can provide an adequate defense or the Guatemalan government ceases its threats.

The Belize Defence Force—the national army—has about 500 members but no armor, artillery, engineers, or other specialized units. Its top officers are British, although a transfer process is under way.

Economic challenge

With a population of only 145,000 in an area the size of El Salvador, Belize inherits poverty and underdevelopment from its years of British rule. Housing is poor. Roads—even in Belize City—need paving. Medical care is hard to come by. Electricity service is, a government handout acknowledges, "unreliable."

"More could have been done" by the British, Price said at a news conference. "But with independence we are in a position to go forward."

"Going forward" will require economic development. The Belizean economy depends chiefly on agriculture, with citrus, sugar, and bananas the main exports. Only 15 percent of the cultivable land is currently farmed, and about 55 percent of the country's arable land belongs to the government. Most of the rest is concentrated in a handful of large private holdings. According to 1974 statistics, 3.3 percent of the landowners held 94 percent of the privately owned land. Only 7 percent of the latter was under active cultivation.

Belize enjoys little in the way of industry. The U.S.-based Williamson Corporation operates a garment factory with about 540 workers, "the majority female sewing-maching operators," according to a government press release.

The same source describes the operation, in which Williamson trucks in parts of clothing to be sewn together in Belize, as the company's "most profitable single garment plant."

Price's People's United Party (PUP) describes itself as Christian Democratic. Its program for economic development centers on attracting foreign capital. A central feature of the PUP's hopes for industrial development is precisely more "offshore assembly" plants of the

Williamson type.

In one sense at least Belize is relatively fortunate compared to its neighbors. It currently pays out the lowest percentage of foreign-exchange earnings for debt service of any Latin American country—1.7 percent. Nicaragua, in contrast, which inherited a mountainous debt from the Somoza dictatorship, pays out more than 28 percent.

The PUP has demonstrated overwhelming support at the polls. In the last national election, in 1979, it won thirteen of eighteen seats in the National Assembly, against the anti-independence United Democratic Party (UDP). And the following year the PUP swept the municipal elections in Belize City.

While the UDP was able to put on a small protest demonstration during the independence celebrations, it lacks any serious popular support. Its chief leader, Dean Lindo, is currently living in the United States.

"Independence—the first step" was the slogan on banners and stickers. That Belize has now achieved. "Independence today, liberation tomorrow" is the new watchword.

"It will be good for us to be working for ourselves," a young woman said. □

Kampuchea

Rightist exiles unable to unite

Singapore agreement not much help

By Steve Bride

The collection of rightist exiles that Washington hopes will someday be the government of Kampuchea are having their problems.

Chief among these appears to be deciding who—in the unlikely event they overthrow the present Kampuchean government—gets to control what.

The government in question is that of Heng Samrin, which was put in power in 1979 by Kampuchean insurgents and Vietnamese troops. It replaced the Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot, but not before the latter had slaughtered between two and three million of Kampuchea's inhabitants and brought the country to the brink of starvation.

Since then, Washington—supported mainly by the governments of China and Thailand—has attempted to block international efforts to feed the Kampuchean population, while struggling vainly to oust Heng Samrin.

Most recently, it engineered a September 18 vote in the United Nations that handed Pol Pot Kampuchea's seat in that body for the third year in a row.

Behind closed doors

Washington's latest try at forging an armed opposition to Heng Samrin began in a series of back-room meetings in New York and Washington, during a July 13-17 UN debate on

Kampuchea. Prominent at these gatherings were:

- Representatives of the Khmer Rouge, which has some 30,000 guerrillas camped in the Thailand-Kampuchea border area.

- Son Sann, prime minister of Kampuchea until 1967, when he was exiled by then-head-of-state Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Son Sann now commands the 5,000 or so troops of the right-wing Khmer People's National Liberation Front.

- To these was later added Sihanouk himself, who ruled Kampuchea (then called Cambodia) before 1970. Sihanouk today has some political backing in various foreign capitals, but nothing in the way of armies.

A meeting between the three factions was set for September 2, in Singapore, to try and iron out their differences.

This, however, proved difficult for several reasons.

First, the three factions have been shooting at each other longer than at the Vietnamese who help defend Kampuchea. Understandably, this has created some mistrust among them. (The Khmer Rouge, for example, say Son Sann's army does more black marketeering than fighting Vietnamese.)

Second, the Khmer Rouge, by virtue of its superior forces, would dominate any eventual coalition. The other two parties, whose sup-

porters the Khmer Rouge did its best to liquidate when it held power, doubt their chances of surviving such an arrangement.

Third, Sihanouk and Son Sann dread the political consequences of associating themselves with the Khmer Rouge, which is hated for what it did in Kampuchea.

Demands on Khmer Rouge

It is in this context that the squabbling over posts took place.

Sihanouk, who had three sons murdered by Pol Pot, wanted to be head of state again. If a Khmer Rouge-run coalition were ever to win, he remarked, "they would liquidate me."

Son Sann, who lost a wife and several other relatives to the Khmer Rouge, wanted a commitment from the U.S. to bring his forces up to parity with Pol Pot's. He also demanded the prime ministership, most cabinet posts, and the exile of top Khmer Rouge officials.

Washington's concern in all this was best put by the conservative London *Economist*: "The Americans are counting on a united front to dilute international abhorrence of the Khmers Rouges. . . ."

This view prevailed. The Singapore meeting went ahead as scheduled.

'Khmer Rouge are winners'

If the Khmer Rouge went looking for respectability in Singapore, they got as much as there was to be had. Their representative, Khieu Samphan, signed a statement in which he "agreed to express the desire to form a coalition government" in Kampuchea. The demands of the other two parties were referred to a committee that never met.

On a more pragmatic level, the agreement urged all three groups to avoid shooting at each other.

"The Khmer Rouge are the winners in Singapore," Son Sann said afterward. "They are not going to execute the agreement. They already got what they wanted."

"Inside Cambodia, there is very little chance of it [the agreement] being accepted," added Sihanouk (who had earlier abandoned his claim to the post of head of state). "My people may condemn me for joining the Khmer Rouge. To cooperate with the Khmer Rouge is to cooperate with the killers of the people of Cambodia."

Meanwhile, in Kampuchea . . .

What gives all this maneuvering something of an air of unreality is the fact that the existing government of Kampuchea shows absolutely no signs of collapsing. Indeed, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* says Sihanouk himself has admitted Kampuchean "live better now under the Heng Samrin regime than they did before."

Writing in the August 12 *Christian Science Monitor*, Paul Quinn-Judge of the American Friends Service Committee reported:

"When the Vietnamese arrived in Cambodia, they found a country whose human and physical resources had been devastated. Skilled Cambodians had been killed, had fled

the country, or were often too traumatized by the Pol Pot years to come forward.

"For the first year or so, while Vietnamese troops fought the soldiers of Pol Pot, Vietnamese officials kept the country together. Others trained a new generation of Cambodian administrators in three-to-six-week crash courses.

"Today things are beginning to change slowly. Cambodians handle most of the ad-

ministration. . . .

"Some advisors are being withdrawn, but on a strictly case-by-case basis. 'When they see we can do a job, they leave us to do it,' said one Cambodian functionary."

On the political front, there are other signs of growing stability in Kampuchea. Elections to a 117-seat National Assembly were held in the first week of May.

In an otherwise skeptical report on these, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* noted, "what was a surprise was that the election was held without any sabotage by the Khmer Rouge. . . ."

Pol Pot's forces had threatened such sabotage in the two-thirds of Kampuchea's territory they claim to operate in, but apparently don't. □

Morocco

Monarchy's 'national unity' comes apart

Opposition leaders arrested

By Jean-Pierre Beauvais

[The following article appeared in the September 18-24 issue of the French socialist weekly *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

On September 8 Abderrahim Bouabid, the first-secretary of the Socialist Union of People's Forces (USFP) of Morocco and Mohamed Monsour, the Socialist parliamentary deputy from Casablanca, were both jailed by the Moroccan monarchy. Their arrests mark a new stage in the crisis that has beset the Moroccan regime, a crisis that began with the general strikes and social upheavals of last June. [See *Intercontinental Press*, July 27, page 784.]

The arrests mark the end of the "national unity" that King Hassan II established in 1977 around his policy of reconquering and annexing the Western Sahara, a phosphate-rich former Spanish colony.

The jailings also show that the so-called democratization in which this "national unity" was cloaked was artificial and illusory.

But the way the split between the king and the country's main opposition force took place also indicates the deepgoing confusion that exists on the Moroccan left and in the workers movement.

When, in 1975, King Hassan embarked upon his quest to "regain the Saharan provinces" by waging war against the Saharan fighters of the Polisario Front,* there was a real consensus within Morocco behind that policy. The cement that held this consensus together was nationalism and national chauvinism. The USFP and the Party of Progress and Socialism [PPS—the Moroccan Communist Party], and even those small groupings that considered themselves part of the revolutionary far left, supported Hassan's policy.

Later, the mild measures granting a small degree of democratic rights that accompanied



KING HASSAN II

the 1977 legislative elections provided nothing but advantages for the monarchy: they institutionalized the consensus without challenging the absolute power of the king and his immediate entourage.

But as the war effort in the Sahara bogged down and it became clear that it was impossible to win a decisive victory over the Polisario Front, the regime began to face growing difficulties, despite this favorable political context.

Military stalemate, social explosion

The growing cost of the war, and the 40 percent of the budget that went to the military became too great a burden for the Moroccan economy to bear. The economy, dominated by foreign capital, has been hit by the full force of the international economic crisis.

The sharp decline in export income, especially income from the sale of phosphates, and

the growing cost of imported products, particularly arms, led to heavy Moroccan indebtedness to the imperialist powers and their international financial institutions. These institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), became nervous and forced the Moroccan government to impose drastic austerity measures. These measures rapidly led to a social crisis, capped off by the June 20 social explosion in Casablanca.

The Democratic Workers Confederation (CDT), which is the most militant union federation and is tied to the USFP, called a general strike for that day to protest the sharp increases in the prices of basic foodstuffs. The workers and the masses of the poor neighborhoods of Casablanca, which is the economic if not political capital of the country, turned out in massive numbers on the day of the strike.

Repression and 'national unity'

The scope of the repression during and after the June events shows how brutal the monarchy can be. According to a commission of inquiry sent to the scene by the League for the Rights of Man, 637 people were killed, 2,000 were charged with crimes, and more than 8,000 people were taken in for questioning.

Both outside and inside the country, Hassan II still had means to mask the depth of the crisis and the brutality of the repression. Although the French Socialist Party did issue a communiqué and complained about the "arbitrariness of the judicial repression," several weeks later Mitterrand's Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson went to Rabat for a "friendly get acquainted visit" with Hassan II.

Inside Morocco, the leaders of the USFP and PPS stepped up their criticisms of what they described as an "unjust" economic and social policy and denounced the "excesses" of the repression against their own members. But they did not break with the regime. Worse yet, several days later they agreed to take part in the Moroccan delegation to the Nairobi summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a delegation headed up by Hassan II himself.

*People's Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el-Hamra and Río de Oro.

On the highest political levels, the policies of "national unity" continued.

Nonetheless, at the Nairobi summit Hassan II announced a major turn in his Saharan policy.

New Saharan policy

The combination of the military stalemate, the economic stagnation, and the social explosions could spell the death of the monarchy. But none of those involved in the Saharan conflict, especially the Algerian government, wished for that outcome, which could have major unforeseen consequences within their own countries. Knowing this, Hassan II saw the possibility of an "honorable outcome."

He therefore proposed holding a referendum to consult "the Saharan population." This referendum would take place under the control of an interim administration established jointly by the OAU and the United Nations. The Moroccan administration and armed forces would remain in place until then.

Although the recent split between Hassan II and his "socialist" opposition took place against the backdrop of the social crisis and the repression, the *direct* cause of the split was the content of the king's new Saharan policy. The USFP, caught up in the nationalist and chauvinist logic of its adherence to "national unity," opposed the king's new orientation as "pacifist."

'Left' chauvinism

The USFP opposes the presence of an interim international administration and giving Saharan refugees in Algeria and Mauritania the right to vote in the referendum. It feels that the only way to preserve Morocco's national integrity and territorial unity is through a referendum in which "the whole Moroccan people" would be consulted and whose "democratic" character would be guaranteed "in the Saharan provinces by the presence of the Moroccan army and administration."

Abderrahim Bouabid, the main spokesman for the Moroccan "socialist" left and the local figure with the closest ties to the leaders of the Socialist International, was arrested specifically because he raised these criticisms of Hassan's plan, in this way breaking up the "national unity."

In the short run, paradoxically, Bouabid is again doing a service for his king: the person responsible for the Casablanca massacres can now portray himself as an enlightened monarch fighting his leftist opposition's chauvinist obscurantism on the Saharan question. But despite his talents as a political contortionist, Hassan II cannot sing in this key for very long. Abderrahim Bouabid's international reputation and ties force the social democracy and numerous governments to protest his arrest and demand his freedom. Through this vehicle the whole repressive policy of the Moroccan monarchy can, and must, be vigorously denounced.

More fundamentally, the conditions under which the "national unity" broke up highlight

the stunning bankruptcy of the nationalism and chauvinism in which the Moroccan left wallows, and in the name of which it has committed and justified the worst betrayals—betrayals of the struggles of the exploited masses of Morocco as well as the fight of the Saharan people for their national independence.

The bankruptcy of this policy must lead all organizations claiming to be part of the

workers movement to carry out a radical turn. They must break all collaboration with Hassan II and his regime. This is a prerequisite for any policy that really defends the interests of the exploited. It is also the precondition for insuring that there is no repetition of massacres like in Casablanca where the masses went into the streets to demand the right to have enough to eat. □

Fidel Castro denounces Reagan's war drive as threat to humanity

By Matilde Zimmermann

Representatives of the governments of the United States, Britain, China, and El Salvador walked out of the opening session of the World Union of Parliaments conference in Havana, Cuba, September 15. They were protesting a speech by Fidel Castro, in which he accused the leadership of the Reagan administration of thinking like fascists and said the U.S. government had used bacteriological warfare to introduce five epidemics into Cuba in the last three years.

Castro made it clear he did not think fascism existed in the United States: "I would never say that the people of the United States are fascist, nor its governmental institutions, nor its press, nor its numerous and creative social movements, nor what remains—and it's a great deal—of its noble democratic traditions and attachment to freedom."

"Our hope is based on our confidence that fascism cannot take over in the United States, nor in the world."

Castro charged that Reagan's war drive represented a threat to the very future of humanity. He said that Washington, through its in-

volvement in El Salvador, Lebanon, and Angola, was responsible for "the blood now being shed by three different peoples, on three totally different continents."

The Thatcher government came in for sharp criticism as well. Castro singled out for special praise the Irish patriots and martyrs, "who are writing one of the most heroic pages in human history."

"These aren't Marxist-Leninists or communists we're asking you to support," Castro went on. "They are Catholic militants."

Castro denied State Department charges that Cuban military advisors are fighting in El Salvador, and said that the Salvadoran people, unlike government forces, "are fighting with their own resources alone."

The real reason for revolutionary upheavals in countries like El Salvador, he explained, is the brutal exploitation workers and peasants suffer. Between 1970 and 1978, according to Castro, foreign corporations took out \$2.40 in profits for every dollar they invested in Latin America. U.S. corporations alone made profits of more than \$30 billion—\$4.50 for every dollar they invested. □

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Why defenders of 'democracy' go wrong

Radicals back imperialist destabilization campaign

By David Frankel

Over the past three months a wave of terrorist attacks has taken the lives of scores of top Iranian leaders and dozens of local officials. The attacks began shortly after the People's Mujahedeen Organization responded to the repression against it by announcing in mid-June that it was "launching war" against the Khomeini regime. Since then, more than a thousand Mujahedeen supporters have been executed by the Iranian government.

Mujahedeen leader Massoud Rajavi declared in a July 21 statement, "The reactionary dictatorship has completely consolidated the power of the state in its hands." Rajavi announced that he was joining forces with former President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr in a National Resistance Council, which he said would coordinate opposition to the Khomeini government.

Support for the bloc between Bani-Sadr and Rajavi was quickly expressed in an advertisement published in the July 24 issue of the Paris daily, *Le Monde*. Signed by such prominent left-wing intellectuals as Gérard Chaliand, K.S. Karol, Albert Soboul, Maxime Rodinson, Ken Coates, Lucio Coletti, and Laurent Schwartz, the ad deplored "the turning back of the revolution and the monopoly of a power-hungry minority."

Describing Iran today, the ad said: "The prisons overflow with men and women arrested on the flimsiest pretexts, the national and religious minorities are cruelly oppressed, thousands of paid thugs impose their reign of terror. . . . All free expression is muzzled. The President of the Republic [i.e., Bani-Sadr] has been driven out for having had the courage to confront all this. . . ."

"We, who all supported the struggle of the people against the Pahlavi regime, now call on the Iranian democratic forces to unite in order to triumph. We support all their efforts."

Democracy versus dictatorship?

A similar view of the struggle in Iran as one between democracy and dictatorship was presented in the July 1 issue of the *Guardian*, a left-wing weekly published in New York. As an article by Shahrzad Azad put it, "the defense of the democratic gains of the revolution has become the principal task of the Iranian left."

An editorial in the same issue of the *Guardian* declared: "At this point, in our opinion, supporters of the Iranian revolution should join in backing the militant left's resistance to the clerical dictatorship in order to save the gains won in the struggle against the shah and to forge a force capable of getting that revolution

back on the track before it's completely derailed."

Although later issues of the *Guardian* expressed some reservations about the bloc between the Mujahedeen and Bani-Sadr, there was no such hesitation on the part of Diana Johnstone, a regular contributor to the U.S. social democratic weekly *In These Times*.

Describing an interview with Bani-Sadr, Johnstone noted in the September 16-22 issue of *In These Times* that "the first elected president of the Islamic Republic thinks there is still a chance for the left to bring down the dictatorship of the mullahs and get the revolution back on its course of democracy and national independence."

As president of Iran, Bani-Sadr took responsibility for carrying out military operations against oppressed nationalities such as the Kurds, jailing socialists and others for their political ideas, and opposing the struggles by the workers for greater control of industry and by the peasants for land reform. Nevertheless, Johnstone praised Bani-Sadr's support for "organization of the country through democratic councils."

Also praised by Johnstone is the position of the ruling party in imperialist France, where she is based. She explains that "on Aug. 14 the French Socialist Party issued a statement highly favorable to the deposed president. . . ."

"This statement amounted to implicit endorsement of the position taken by Bani Sadr as true representative of a revolution betrayed."

No doubt the social democrats currently administering France's colonial possessions would also like to be able to pick and choose the "true representatives" of revolutionary movements in Martinique, French Guiana, and New Caledonia.

A faulty framework

By taking the Khomeini government and its repressive policies as their starting point, the Mujahedeen and their supporters end up with a political framework that leaves out of account two of the three most important political forces in Iran—imperialism and the Iranian working class.

This becomes evident if we recall the real gains of the Iranian revolution. Perhaps the most important of these was the organization of the working class. The general strike led by the oil workers was the final nail in the shah's coffin. Following the mass uprising in February 1979 that toppled the monarchy, *shoras*, or workers committees, were organized in factories throughout Iran. These *shoras* continue to exist under the Khomeini regime, as do peasant committees in many parts of the country.

Oppressed nationalities also improved their position as a result of the revolution. Kurds, Azerbaijanis, and others were able to arm themselves on a massive scale, and in the case of the Kurds they were also able to organize in their own independent organizations. Although these gains have been subjected to savage attacks by the Khomeini regime, they still exist.

In short, the oppressed and exploited masses in Iran are in a far stronger position to fight for their interests than was the case before the revolution.

Under the pressure of the workers and peasants, the government was forced to nationalize major industries and to pass a land reform law. Gains such as these have not been reversed, although the Khomeini regime—like any capitalist government—has done its best to limit the implementation of reforms and undercut them.

Even more dramatic was the turnaround in the relations between imperialism and Iran following the revolution. U.S. military bases were shut down and U.S. advisers were sent packing. The shah's support to the U.S.-engineered Camp David accords was repudiated and oil to Israel and South Africa was cut off. From a counterrevolutionary bulwark in the Middle East, Iran was transformed into a cauldron of revolutionary opposition to imperialism.

The imperialist threat

For the past two and a half years, U.S. imperialism has been operating full time to try to reverse this state of affairs. Since late 1979 it has been actively trying to overthrow the regime that issued from the revolution. That was the meaning of the shah's admission to the United States in October 1979, and the economic blows and military threats that followed the occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran.

In April 1980 President Carter launched his abortive commando raid against Iran, and in September 1980 the Iraqi regime—with encouragement from Washington—invaded Iran in hopes of toppling the Khomeini government.

But the threat from imperialism is not just present when U.S. warships are stationed off the Iranian coast, or when an imperialist-backed army is threatening to occupy the country's major cities. Such military actions are only the most dramatic and visible expressions of a much more pervasive form of domination.

Imperialist domination of Iran is continually reasserted through the day-to-day functioning of the capitalist economic system. Iran must buy machinery and spare parts for its factories

and oil refineries from imperialist corporations. It must export its oil in imperialist-owned tankers and sell it to imperialist companies.

Economic sabotage against the Iranian revolution was carried out openly by Washington and its allies during the year-long hostage crisis. On September 21 Bani-Sadr, the "true representative of a revolution betrayed," called on the imperialist powers to renew their economic boycott. In any case, Iran's economic dependence presents the imperialists with countless opportunities for carrying out operations within the country and for destabilizing its government.

Washington makes no secret of its hostility to the Khomeini government. But if U.S. officials are to be believed, it is not doing anything about it. One does not have to be a Marxist to find this unconvincing. Iran, after all, remains the second-most populous country in the Middle East, with enormous oil reserves.

Asked where he would put Iran on his "worst list" in an interview published in the September 13 issue of the *Washington Post*, Secretary of State Alexander Haig replied: "I would put Iran second only because of the strategic importance of Poland."

Haig ranked Central America third.

Fighters for democracy?

Although the Mujahedeen leadership has endorsed the bombing campaign that has wiped out dozens of top Iranian officials, it is clear that there are other forces involved as well.

No organization ever took responsibility for the blast at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) on June 28 that killed seventy-two government and IRP leaders.

After the August 30 bombing that killed President Mohammed Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammed Javad Bahonar, Mujahedeen leader Massoud Rajavi admitted that he did not know "exactly who planted the bomb," but he praised the action.

On the other hand a representative of Azadegan, a monarchist commando organization responsible for hijacking an Iranian gunboat in August, did claim to know who did the bombing, although he refused to give out any further information.

Azadegan is led by Gen. Bahram Aryana, the last chief of the shah's army. It also numbers among its members Adm. Kamal Habibolahi, the last head of the shah's navy, and has recruits currently inside the Iranian armed forces, as was shown during the hijacking.

Shahpur Bakhtiar, the shah's last prime minister, is known to have close ties with the Iraqi dictatorship. Bakhtiar has called upon his supporters in Iran to rally behind Azadegan as well.

According to Fred Halliday, writing in the September 26 issue of the U.S. liberal *Nation* magazine, "Bakhtiar would like to see a democratic monarchy in Iran on the British or Swedish model."

A true democrat, Bakhtiar "is not opposed to a republic if that is what the Iranian people



BANI-SADR

want."

Halliday does not bother to remind his readers that when the Iranian people were demonstrating in their millions precisely for a republic, Bakhtiar ordered the army to shoot them down.

We will come back to the question of dictatorship and democracy in Iran, but first let us take a closer look at the bombings.

Who is doing the bombing?

Unlike the usual street attacks carried out by the Mujahedeen, which have involved small arms and hand grenades, the bombings have been highly sophisticated operations. The first one on June 28 devastated the IRP headquarters in Tehran, the second on August 30 blew up the prime minister's office, and the third on September 5 destroyed the office of Iran's prosecutor general, Ayatollah Ali Ghodosi.

In each case the bombs were planted inside heavily guarded buildings and set to explode precisely at a time when the targeted officials would be meeting there. The last two, moreover, were sophisticated incendiary devices.

It is not too hard to figure out that members of the government's own security apparatus must have been involved in planting the bombs. And much of this apparatus, including the high command of the armed forces and the secret police, was taken over intact after the fall of the shah.

Johnstone goes so far in the *In These Times* article cited earlier as to claim, "An estimated 80 percent of old Savak agents work for Khomeini's new secret police, the Savami."

It never occurs to Johnstone to ask whether these ex-Savaki are also working for their old buddies in the CIA.

This omission is particularly striking since Johnstone herself points out, "In the past few

months, the top ranks of the mullocracy have been thinned with a deadly accuracy unique in the history of political assassination."

That's right. Not even the Vietnamese liberation fighters were ever able to pull off anything like it. But Johnstone is so impressed with the "true representative of a revolution betrayed" that she never asks what is behind this startling success. Certainly the Mujahedeen, however brave and self-sacrificing their ranks, were never so effective in their actions against the monarchy.

How the Iranian workers see it

None of the self-appointed defenders of democracy in Iran talk about the role of the working class in the recent events, and for good reason. Unlike the Mujahedeen, with their base among the students and intellectuals, and unlike the petty bourgeois radicals in the United States and Europe, the Iranian workers have not forgotten about the role of imperialism in their country.

"Death to America, the great Satan!" was the chant as a vast crowd estimated at between one and 2.5 million turned out in Tehran August 31 for the funeral of President Rajai and Prime Minister Bahonar.

The massive anti-imperialist mobilizations that have taken place following the bombings have been played down in the imperialist media, but it is clear that the Iranian workers and peasants see these bombings as attacks on their revolution.

In calling for a campaign of terrorism against the Iranian government the Mujahedeen, who have been unable to win the masses of workers and peasants to their political perspective, are trying to impose their program on the majority by force. In the process, despite the subjective desires of the Mujahedeen fighters, they are providing left cover for an imperialist-backed destabilization campaign.

Writing in the September 16 *Guardian*, Shahrzad Azad skirted the question of majority rule in a rather gingerly fashion. As Azad put it, "a surprising aspect of the Islamic regime is that it has survived the past two-and-a-half years at all. . . ."

"This may have much to do with their still sizeable base of support within the society. The pasdaran [Revolutionary Guards], for example, continue to get volunteers from among the urban and rural poor."

Noting that economic conditions for the masses continue to deteriorate, Azad continued: "This fact creates possibilities for left intervention on the political level, a necessity given the continuing support for the regime among a section of the masses. . . . How this can be carried out in the present conditions, however, remains to be seen."

Instead of helping to push forward the process of political clarification and independent organization among the workers and peasants, the Mujahedeen's resort to armed action against the government has hampered it.

Defending his bloc with Bani-Sadr, Rajavi declared in an interview in the August 16-17

issue of *Le Monde* that "we are united on one precise point, that of democracy and rejection of the dictatorship." In keeping with his explicit rejection of Marxism, Rajavi does not even pretend to start from a working-class perspective.

What about the question of democracy in Iran? It is certainly true that the IRP regime has carried out harsh repression. *But it does not follow that its overthrow would represent a step forward for the class struggle.* That depends on what forces carry out the overturn, and in what manner.

So far, despite extensive repression, Khomeini has been unable to launch a frontal assault on the workers organizations in the factories. The shoras still exist, and they carry out activities in defense of the workers interests.

U.S. imperialism would like to see a military takeover and a Chilean-style junta that would smash the workers organizations in Iran. That is what its destabilization campaign against the Khomeini regime is designed to lead to.

The Iranian workers correctly understand that they must defend the Khomeini regime against such attacks by imperialism.

Defense of the IRP government against attacks from the right is not the same as support to the regime's political course, however. This is a political distinction that seems to be beyond the capacities of the *Guardian* to understand.

Guardian staffwriter John Trinkl complained in the July 15 issue of that newspaper: "The Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the largest Trotskyist group in the U.S., notes the suppression of the left but nonetheless calls for the Iranian left to support the government—the very same force executing its members."

Does Trinkl think that the Bolsheviks supported the capitalist government headed by Alexander Kerensky during the Russian revolution? In August and September 1917 the Bolsheviks defended the Kerensky government against a rightist coup attempt by General Kornilov even though Kerensky had been responsible for suppressing workers' demonstrations, jailing Leon Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders, and driving Lenin underground.

Revolutionary socialists are *not* for the overthrow of the current capitalist government in Iran by Bani-Sadr, Bakhtiar, the Mujahedeen, or any other forces aligned with imperialism. We are for the mobilization of the workers and peasants and their taking of governmental power through their own organizations.

Calls for the overthrow of the Khomeini regime in the name of democracy at a time when the Iranian revolution has yet to run its course are *counterposed* to the perspective of fighting for a workers and farmers government in Iran. Defense of "democracy" is the propaganda line of U.S. imperialism in Iran. Socialists put forward a program of struggle around specific measures designed to advance the organization and interests of the workers and peasants, and fight for democratic rights within the context of this broader struggle.



Rescue workers dig in rubble following June 28 bombing of IRP headquarters in Tehran.

One of the factors that has led many on the left to see Khomeini as the overriding threat to progress in Iran and to ignore the far more reactionary role of imperialism is a non-Marxist analysis of the role of religion in the revolution. Instead of seeing the revolution and its forces in class terms, it views religious ideology as the central element.

The editors of the *Washington Post* talk about the conflict in Iran between "secular radicals" and "clerical zealots," not between classes and political parties. In the same way, the editors of the *Guardian* talk in their July issue about "the near-feudal Islamic fundamentalists who wish to restore social, economic and political practices that are in contradiction to the objective conditions facing Iran in today's world."

When the religious verbiage is stripped away from the policies pursued by the IRP, however, it becomes quite clear that these have nothing to do with restoring some kind of feudal economic or social system. The IRP government continues to export oil, to run a modern industrial sector, and to participate in twentieth-century institutions such as the

United Nations and the Movement of Non-aligned Countries.

More to the point, it continues to defend capitalist property relations, with all that is implied by such a policy. Capitalism, not religion, is the source of the IRP government's attempts to drive down the wages of the working class, to maintain the national and sexual divisions among the workers and peasants, and to suppress political opposition.

But in accepting the racist propaganda in the imperialist media against the religious "fanatics" and "mad mullahs" in Iran, the petty bourgeois leftists are led to support Bani-Sadr and the liberal capitalists as representatives of civilization. Thus, the *Guardian* credits Bani-Sadr with trying "to lead Iran into a form of modern economic and social development" and with trying "to prevent the clerics from imposing their almost pre-capitalist social and economic vision upon the Iranian masses."

Furthermore, figures like Bani-Sadr are seen as *more progressive than the toiling masses*. The latter are dismissed as being under the sway of religious fanaticism. Fred Halliday, for example, quotes without comment in a Ju-

ly 15-28 *In These Times* article the opinion that the masses "are dominated by 'medieval' forms of political ideology."

Religious ideology has a different content depending on which class is involved. The religious ideology of the rising bourgeoisie during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries expressed their revolutionary aspirations, while the religious ideology of the feudal landowners in the same period was counterrevolutionary.

In the same way, the Islamic ideology of the IRP leaders today is used to defend capitalist rule, while the Islamic ideology of the workers and peasants expresses their hatred of imperialism and their desire for social liberation.

Reliance on workers rejected

Because of their lack of confidence in the working class, the petty bourgeois opponents of the Khomeini government end up by placing their trust in the liberal capitalists. That is what we have seen with the bloc between the Mujahedeen and Bani-Sadr. And through reliance on the liberal capitalists, the political stance of the petty bourgeois leftists converges with the position taken by imperialism.

Diana Johnstone concludes her article by noting: "The liberal bourgeoisie and the bazaar were a main force behind the scenes in the revolution that overthrew the shah and the international parasite bourgeoisie around him. . . . The liberal bourgeoisie may succeed in regaining national leadership by championing freedom and democracy and channeling various grievances towards a moderate solution. Neither the left nor the monarchists have enough popular strength to win."

But it was neither the liberal bourgeoisie nor the "left" who overthrew the monarchy in the first place. It was the Iranian workers and peasants, who Johnstone never mentions. And it is the workers and peasants—not the liberal bourgeoisie or the Mujahedeen—who offer a way forward for Iran today.

The crisis in Iran

Everybody agrees that Iran is in a deep crisis. Industrial production has plummeted since the revolution while inflation and unemployment have increased enormously. A huge economic burden has been imposed on the country by the Iraqi invasion, and the Khomeini government has been unable to make any progress whatsoever in driving the Iraqi army out of Iran.

Meanwhile, the Iranian capitalists—just like the capitalists in Nicaragua—are sabotaging the economy by sending vast amounts of capital abroad, by refusing to import essential raw materials, by refusing to invest in needed maintenance and repairs for existing factories, by speculation and hoarding, and by laying off workers and closing down enterprises.

On top of all this, the government has proven incapable of defending itself against the imperialist-backed destabilization campaign. Its only answer has been acts of repression that have helped to isolate Iran internationally and

that are aimed as much against the workers and peasants as a whole as against the terrorists.

Iran has reached a dead end under the rule of the capitalist IRP and Khomeini. What is needed to get out of this impasse is the organization and mobilization of the workers and peasants. The Sandinista government in Nicaragua has set an example of the kind of measures needed to accomplish this.

- To begin with, it is necessary to carry out a revolutionary war against the Iraqi invaders and against the imperialist-backed destabilization campaign within Iran. This means arming, training, and mobilizing the masses under the direction of the shoras, the peasant committees, and other mass organizations.

Although the regime has taken token steps toward implementing such measures, which have been widely demanded, it has refused to carry out its promise to build an "Army of 20 Million."

An essential step in any revolutionary war against imperialism and its allies is a thorough purge of the military and governmental apparatus. The holdovers from the monarchy must be cleaned out.

- Organization and mobilization of the working class is key to solving the economic crisis as well as the political crisis posed by the counterrevolutionary military onslaught. The shoras, for example, have already attempted in many instances to counter capitalist sabotage by keeping tabs on production and on the business dealings of their enterprises, as the trade unions are doing in Nicaragua.

- Nearly one-third of Iran's workforce is still involved in agriculture. It is necessary to carry out the long-promised land reform under the direction of peasant committees in the countryside, and to make available cheap credit and technical assistance to the peasantry. This would inspire the poor and landless peasants and stymie the capitalists who are sabotaging agricultural production.

Such measures, in conjunction with the establishment of a state monopoly on foreign trade, would constitute a giant step toward overcoming the economic crisis.

- Roughly half of Iran's population is composed of oppressed nationalities such as Kurds, Azerbaijanis, and Arabs. Division along national lines was one of the main tools that imperialism used to perpetuate its domination over Iran. Failure of the government to recognize the rights of the oppressed nationalities and in particular to stop its war against the Kurds can only create new openings for imperialism.

A policy of recognizing the right of autonomy for Kurdistan, of providing immediate economic aid to compensate for the war damage there, and of helping to revive the cultural life of the area would bring peace to Kurdistan and help in the defense of the revolution against the Iraqi invaders and imperialism.

- Finally, to inspire the masses and encourage their mobilization, a broad program of progressive social and political measures is essential. The organization of the masses and their

participation in solving the crisis facing Iran requires complete freedom of assembly, association, and the press. It would be pushed forward by a massive literacy campaign such as the one organized in Nicaragua. And all of these measures would be inconceivable without the full participation of women, one half of the population, and the advancement of their rights.

Such policies are anathema to the IRP government, to the liberal capitalists grouped around Bani-Sadr, and to the U.S. imperialists. But the struggle to convince the masses of the need for such a program and to organize them around it offers the only road forward for the Iranian revolution—toward the establishment of a workers and peasants government that would rule in the interests of the vast majority instead of defending the privileges of the capitalist class.

Instead of cheering on one or another capitalist politician in Iran—like the signers of the *Le Monde* ad quoted at the beginning of this article—workers in the imperialist countries can make a contribution toward allowing the Iranian revolution to develop under the most favorable circumstances by exposing the role of imperialism and supporting the struggles of the Iranian people against imperialist intervention and destabilization. □

Sadat arms Afghan rebels

The U.S. government has been buying Soviet-made weapons in Egypt and sending them to rightist insurgents fighting against the Afghan government, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat confirmed in an NBC television interview in Cairo September 22.

In February 1980, White House officials admitted that the CIA was obtaining weapons for the Afghan rebels, but refused to say where they came from. Although the Sadat regime was long suspected of being one of the sources, Sadat's interview was the first official acknowledgement of that.

Washington approached the Egyptian regime "the first moment" Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan in late December 1979, Sadat said. "I opened my stores to them." The weapons were then flown from Egypt in American aircraft.

Although Sadat did not reveal what country they were flown to, another Egyptian official was quoted as saying that they went to Pakistan, which has a long border with Afghanistan and in which the most proimperialist of the Afghan guerrilla groups have their headquarters.

Besides providing the weapons to Washington, Sadat has also allowed training of Afghan insurgents in Egypt. Trainees have been sent back to Afghanistan with arms.

Sadat—who just a couple weeks earlier had arrested some 1,500 critics of his regime—boasted that he would continue the arms shipments to the guerrillas until the "Afghanis get rid of the Soviets."

Regime's offensive against the masses

Capitalists seek to impose their own solution to crisis

By Michel Rovere

[The following article appeared in the August 5 issue of the French-language fortnightly *Inprecor*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The Third Iranian Revolution unfolded against the backdrop of the bankruptcy of the shah's "White Revolution," which aimed to make Iran the Japan of the Near East before the end of the century, and the insurmountable economic and social contradictions caused by an industrialization based on the investment of oil income and growing dependence on the imperialist countries.

As they went into the streets against bullets from the Pahlavi monarchy's soldiers, the Iranian masses did not simply want to bring down a shameful regime, one that they saw as implicated with imperialism. They also wanted to change the material conditions of their daily existence.

Depth of the economic crisis

In the two years since it came to power, the Islamic Republic has been unable to solve any of the big problems posed by the country's underdevelopment and dependence and the worsening economic crisis resulting from the imperialist blockade and later the war with Iraq. This has fed the growing dissatisfaction of the masses toward a regime that they see as less and less able to "change their lives."

According to figures provided by the Iranian Central Bank, inflation has been 56 percent in the last three years, with a clearly upward tendency. Dr. Mohsen Nourbakhsh, who replaced Bani-Sadr ally Ali Reza Nowbari as head of the Central Bank, acknowledged that inflation would reach 30 percent for the current year.¹ In fact, inflation is hitting especially hard at food and basic necessities. These have in some cases doubled or tripled in the course of recent months.²

In the agricultural sector, despite a rise in crop prices, production has declined since the beginning of the revolution. Wheat imports have gone from 426,000 tons in 1978-79 to 2,000,000 tons in 1980-81.³ Food imports represented half the \$11.4 billion spent on all imports during the last year, according to the

Iranian customs service.⁴

The situation is no better in the industrial section. Despite the war effort, industry is not operating at much more than 40 percent of its productive capacity before the revolution.⁵ While construction of small private homes, primarily in the provincial towns, has undergone a slight improvement, most of the large projects that provided a big percentage of construction jobs have come to a halt.

In sum, the gross national product has fallen some 30 percent since the start of the revolution. Unemployment, according to official estimates, affects between 2.5 and 4 million people—not counting more than 1 million refugees from the war.

Is the crisis solely due to the impact of the war? War expenditures—including allocations for refugees as well as the cost of the fighting in Kurdistan—run about \$1 billion per month, of which \$400 million goes to purchase arms and spare parts (from North Korea, Libya, and also West Germany). Those imports that have been affected by the imperialist boycott, and which must now be rerouted through Dubai and the Persian Gulf emirates or other third world countries, have risen in price by 25 percent.⁶

According to the leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Party (IRP), the economic crisis is largely due to the decline in oil income and its consequences, given the Iranian state's weight in the country's economy.⁷ Just before the revolution, the Iranian state itself directly carried out nearly 50 percent of the industrial investments.⁸ Today the Iranian state also has control over several hundred enterprises that were nationalized or placed under state control after the departure of foreign investors or the flight of Iranian *taghoutis* [idol worshipers, the term often used to describe opponents of the Islamic Republic].⁹ About 1.5 million people are employed in one way or another in the public sec-

tor, out of an economically active nonagricultural population of 7.5 million workers.

Regime's economic measures

But the argument cuts both ways. Granted the Iranian state has such a degree of economic importance. Moreover the state is led by a single party that simultaneously controls the government and has a large majority in parliament. In addition, through the people it places in charge, it has direct control over the big foundations—like the Foundation for the Dispossessed—and the nationalized banks and industries. With this much concentrated power, we can concretely determine what orientation guides economic policy.

It is one thing to recognize the objective difficulties, arising either from the past or from the present situation. But we must also look at the general direction of the political and economic measures that have been taken, for which the leaders of the Islamic Republic are solely responsible. An examination of these measures is quite revealing.

- While the agrarian troubles and the land occupations have been spreading for a year and a half, the IRP in parliament and in the government refuses to apply the famous Article 3 of the Agrarian Reform Law, which makes provisions for the possibility of dividing the land.

- It is the same with a decree, under consideration since January 1980, that would establish a monopoly of foreign trade. The fierce opposition of the bazaar and its representatives within the IRP is keeping the wraps on a plan that would grant a monopoly of foreign trade to nine central purchasing agencies.

- A corollary to this decision not to nationalize foreign trade is the decision to maintain the exchange rate of Iranian rials at 75 rials to US\$1, although the inflation in Iran means that a rate of 100 rials to the dollar would be more accurate.

The Iranian state would in fact benefit from this change in the exchange rate. The state is the main exporter (particularly because last year oil represented 95 percent of the foreign currency earnings). The state budget, which is figured in rials, basically depends on oil income, which is paid for in dollars or on the basis of a "basket" of strong currencies. Therefore, each dollar earned from oil sales would provide more rials for the state budget. Furthermore, the rise in the rial price of certain imported products due to devaluation would encourage their eventual replacement through the development of Iranian industry.

But although this devaluation would appear to be reasonable and make good sense to any

1. *Financial Times*, July 22, 1981.

2. *Le Monde*, July 22, 1981.

3. "Iran's Economy: Between Crisis and Collapse," by Patrick Clawson, in *Merip Reports*, July-August, 1981.

4. *Afrique-Asie*, July 6, 1981.

5. Clawson, *Merip Reports*.

6. "Economic Sanctions and Iranian Trade," by Philip Shehadi, *Merip Reports*, July-August, 1981.

7. Interview with Ali Rajai, *Middle East*, July 1981.

8. Cf. Behrang, *Iran, le maillon faible*, Maspero.

9. Fifty-one industrial complexes were expropriated, 600 enterprises were nationalized, and about 100,000 apartment buildings, houses, apartments, most hotels, and halls were confiscated and turned over to the Foundation for the Dispossessed (*mustazafin*), according to *Le Monde*, July 24, 1981.

"developmentalist" bourgeois economist, it still seems too daring for the present leaders of the Islamic Republic. The truth is that devaluation would hurt the big import-export elements in the bazaar who derive big benefits from the overvalued rial! Even the engineer Sahabi, who is close to the "liberal" Bazargan, has attacked the exorbitant profits of the bazaaris. These totalled 1,200 billion rials last year, which is three times higher than in the best year under the shah. These profits amount to nearly half of last year's state budget.

By contrast, the government and parliament have taken recent economic measures that have a very specific thrust. That thrust is not toward greater independence from imperialism nor toward satisfying the needs of the Iranian masses.

The first aspect of these measures concerns relations with imperialism. To get the Iranian economy back on its feet, the present government is counting on stepping up oil production again and is trying to normalize its relations with certain foreign investors whose property had been nationalized.

For a long time the quantity of oil exported was viewed in Iran as a barometer indicating the extent of the country's foreign dependence. In addition, governmental plans to increase production from a daily level of 0.7-1 million barrels of oil to 2.5 million barrels has given rise to legitimate concerns regarding the regime's economic policy, given the absence of any real plan to struggle against economic dependence. These concerns have been heightened since there have been a number of agreements or commercial negotiations with the former imperialist partners and others.

For example, the Iranian government announced in July 1981 that it was ready to engage in negotiations regarding compensation with the Western banks whose holdings had been nationalized.¹⁰ It also took steps to compensate the German pharmaceutical trusts like Hoechst and Bayer that had joint-venture plants in Iran.

This attempt to partially normalize economic relations with some imperialist powers (France, Britain—whose trade with Iran doubled in 1980-81 compared to the previous year—West Germany, and Japan) allowed "liberals," especially Bani-Sadr, to attack the IRP for being economically inconsistent in its "anti-imperialism."

The debate over increasing oil exports and signing contracts with foreign firms was one of the biggest sources of polemics between the IRP and Bani-Sadr.

Offensive against gains of workers

The second level of this economic policy is a vigorous austerity offensive aimed especially against the gains of the Iranian workers. Today, at a time when repression in Iran is getting stronger, the new governor of the Central Bank Mohsen Nourbaksh tells that pillar of the bourgeois establishment the *Financial Times* that

"while not being an out and out monetarist . . . the struggle against inflation is carried out by reducing and controlling the mass of money."¹¹

Under the present conditions of the Iranian economy this means above all drastically reducing the budgetary deficit. The deficit reached \$11.4 billion last year (and the expenditures caused by the war with Iraq were only reflected in the second half of the Iranian fiscal year, which runs from March 1980 to March 1981). But the government is projecting a balanced budget for 1981-82.

One way the government plans to balance this budget is by increasing the present export of oil by 400 percent (since it is unlikely that there will be any major new rise in oil prices, given the international recession and the dumping by Saudi Arabia).

The other aspect of the Iranian government's plan to achieve a balanced budget is through sharply cutting expenditures for development, significantly increasing duties and taxes, and increasing the profitability of the public and nationalized sector, which involves such measures as freezing wages and even carrying out layoffs.¹²

Putting these economic plans into effect would quite obviously mean growing confrontations with the Iranian working class, which has not yet suffered big defeats. For several months the Iranian capitalists and government have been stepping up their skirmishing and their probes. This has been especially clear since Iraq began its war against Iran. The Iraqi aggression, which the workers saw as an attempt to overthrow the Islamic Republic, led to a widespread militant and political mobilization in the plants. In many factories the workers mobilized and organized themselves to control production in order to confront the war of aggression and the threats of counter-revolution. They demanded military training in the workplaces. In some instances they tried to control the price of rationed goods in the neighborhoods.

Faced with this political mobilization, the government conceded a little (regarding the organization of military training) in order to avoid the basic question: the workers were spontaneously demanding the massive arming of the population to defend "their revolution."

But at the same time, the bosses and the government (and this included Bani-Sadr's policies as well as those of the IRP) used the war-created climate of patriotism and national unity to try to challenge the economic gains the workers had won. In some factories the workday increased, rising from ten to twelve hours. In many instances the half-day off on Thursday (the Muslim sabbath is Friday) was eliminated. Not only were wages frozen, but "donations"

11. *Ibid.*

12. Direct or indirect layoffs since the state could now refuse to "nationalize" companies declared bankrupt by their owners, as it had done up to now.

for the fighters at the front or for the refugees were automatically deducted from wages.

Growing disaffection

It must be said that initially the working class was quite willing to accept these economic sacrifices.

But very quickly the workers realized that they were the ones paying the cost of the war and the economic crisis. Despite official declarations, the black market continued to flourish. The agrarian reform remained blocked. There was no national plan of industrial reconversion to concretize the hope that this war could be the means to definitively break with imperialism.

And above all the government refused to take the measures to conclude the war. Quite the contrary, the fighting in Kurdistan was pushed forward with greater force, although the Kurdish resistance movement had proposed that it fight the Iraqi invaders alongside the Tehran regime as long as that regime recognized the Kurds' right to autonomy and to keep their weapons.¹³

Both Bani-Sadr and the IRP refused to massively arm the workers. Each tried in every way to use the war to strengthen their own position within the state apparatus. Bani-Sadr based himself on the military hierarchy of the ex-Imperial Army. The IRP based itself on strengthening the Pasdaran corps.

The growing disaffection toward the regime was evident from December 1980. It was seen in early 1981 in a number of social movements, including strikes, especially when parliament decided to cancel the distribution of bonuses for the Iranian New Year (March 21). These bonuses had been instituted during the time of the shah, under the guise of workers participation in the profits of the companies. They often represent more than one month's wages.

There were other strikes for wage increases or for recognition of bodies representing the workers (shoras, delegates councils). Among such strikes were those at the Pars paper company, the Isfahan bus drivers, the Tehran electric company, the Kafch Melli shoe factory, and the Iran National auto plant.

But these struggles within the working class remained partial and limited. There is the pressure of the war, the argument that "you cannot strike without threatening to weaken the front," an argument that was particularly effective among oil workers, who work a few kilometers from the Iraqi big guns. There are the regime's intimidating maneuvers. And the workers have also been hindered by the slowness in building a united, nationally organized workers movement, as well as the Iranian proletariat's weak traditions of economic struggle.

13. See interview with Abdul-Rahman Qassemli, general secretary of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Iran, published in *Merip Reports*, July-August 1981. He repeats the points made in an interview with Marc Kravetz in *Libération* in January.

10. *Financial Times*, July 27, 1981.

gles, and the absence of a clear political alternative.

Meanwhile the government and the bosses used a whole range of methods to contain, limit, or stifle this reemergence of workers' agitation. They used layoffs and even selective arrests of the most visible vanguard workers. They used the war and unemployment as a means of pressure. They increased the powers of the *Anjoman Eslami* (Islamic associations) in the factories at the expense of the shoras. They systematically tried to divide the shoras along ideological lines and sometimes used gangs of thugs (*hezbollah* or Pasdars) to prevent strikes.

All this explains why the growing disaffection toward the regime has not yet led to broad social struggles and has been partially capitalized upon by the Mujahedeen, or turned to his profit by Bani-Sadr.

The strength of the Mujahedeen

In December 1980, and again in March 1981, Bani-Sadr was able to assemble hundreds of thousands of people at his meetings in Tehran and in the provinces. And his popularity stemmed less from the questionable, and questioned, role that he was playing in the war, than from the fact that he was increasingly open in criticizing the regime's inconsistent economic policies and especially the attacks on civil liberties (the prohibition of parties, the reestablishment of the "eye for an eye" *lex talionis* legal code, the closing of newspapers, the IRP's monopoly over the media, etc.).

But it has been the Islamic-progressive People's Mujahedeen movement above all that has capitalized on the growing discontent, especially among the youth. Already in 1980, the size of the meetings for Massoud Rajavi's presidential campaign had given an indication of the impact of this organization, which enjoyed a large degree of support as a result of its heroic past resistance to the shah and its avowal of Islam. The Mujahedeen also benefited from the Stalinist Tudeh Party's unquestioning support to the regime as well as the split in the Fedayeen (Majority) behind the leaders of the IRP.

The Mujahedeen have had contradictory relations with the regime. On the one hand they had important ties with a minority within the Shi'ite hierarchy (Ayatollah Taleghani and Sheik Ali Tehrani). Nonetheless, after the February 1979 insurrection they refused to turn in the enormous quantities of weapons they possessed. They supported the occupation of the American embassy. But their support to the movement of the oppressed nationalities, especially the Kurds, was a prime factor in the disqualification of their presidential candidate and then in the attacks to which they were subjected, especially at the time of the closing of the universities.

During the war against Iraq they participated valiantly in organizing the defense of the cities of Khuzestan during the Iraqi advance. At that time their newspaper *Mujahid*, which is not le-

gal, had a distribution of 200,000 copies. In early 1981 they concluded an agreement for united activity with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).

The popularity of the Mujahedeen also has to do with the fact that, with the exception of the movement of the oppressed nationalities, they have been the principal target of the repression, and especially since the closing of the universities.

The attacks carried out by the IRP-organized *hezbollah*, often with the direct complicity and consent of the Pasdaran, against Mujahedeen offices and meetings, the individual attacks against their known members and sympathizers caused more than fifty deaths and several hundred injuries in the Mujahedeen ranks in the year prior to the confrontations of June 1981.

In a May 2, 1981, letter addressed to Khomeini, the Mujahedeen protested against what was being done to them, explaining:

We take this occasion to note that our misfortunes are fundamentally the same as those of very vast layers of the "Nation." A nation that, more each day, feels that it lacks the most elementary things, as well as the principles and ideas it at least expected from the revolution that it made. The people are aware that the lands, as well as the riches and privileges, remain as they were, not divided. Freedoms are nonexistent, and regarding the struggle against imperialism, to the degree that the state is concerned it has not accomplished its task.

This situation stems first and foremost from this bitter truth: although in your own words 'everyone' made the revolution, its fruits have gone to a single group which is attempting to control nearly the whole media and means of communication to justify its actions by a propaganda onslaught. . . .

The letter goes on to mention the high cost of living, the unemployment, the attacks against civil liberties, the 1,200 billion rials in profits for the bazaar, the billions of dollars "that are taken from the dispossessed and go to the supposed creditors, the corrupt of the former regime, or to the Americans," and then asks for an interview with Khomeini to "lead to solutions, develop national understanding, rebuild the hope of a peaceful understanding, and in this way eliminate the internal troubles."¹⁴

This is the general context of the faction fight that has been taking place in the summits of the Islamic Republic.

There is, of course, good reason to criticize the support that the Mujahedeen have given to bourgeois groupings and figures, especially Bani-Sadr, who are put forward as a "lesser evil." There is also reason to fear that their ideological background and especially their populist outlook, as well as their tradition of activity, which has led them to underestimate the specific tasks of rebuilding a united, centralized, organized workers movement, could now push them to forms of armed confrontation with the regime in which they try to substitute themselves for the masses. All this, of

14. French-language *Modjahed*, May-June 1981.

course, weighs heavily on the future of the Iranian revolution.

This was explained in the resolution adopted by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International in July 1980:

In the coming struggles over questions that relate to their direct interest, the laboring masses will on many occasions go beyond the Khomeini leadership, will oppose it more or less directly, and will develop their own instruments of battle (shoras, committees, militias, etc.).

In the course of such developments and through the growing discontent among the people, forces like the Mujahedeen and Fedayeen have seen their audience and their strength grow.

However, without the existence of an alternative proletarian leadership, the masses will, despite everything, remain politically trapped in solutions that in the final analysis do not break with class collaboration.¹⁵

Stalinist betrayal

But the analysis made by the Stalinists of the Tudeh Party and their Fedayeen (Majority) co-thinkers of the present confrontations is a pure and simple falsification. They claim that we are seeing a confrontation between a "radical," "anti-imperialist" wing (the IRP and Khomeini) and the "liberal," proimperialist sectors of the Iranian bourgeoisie, embodied by Bani-Sadr. Loyal to the Stalinist-Menshevik concept of the revolution by stages and the Bukharinite theory of the "bloc of four classes," the Tudeh Party and the Fedayeen (Majority) argue that in Iran the struggle against imperialism is the current priority and that the rest (oppression of the nationalities, attacks against freedoms, blocking of the agrarian reform, anti-working-class repression) are only "secondary contradictions."

It is no coincidence that last January, in criticizing the Mujahedeen's activity, the Tudeh Party's paper *Mardom* wrote that their activities were similar to those of the Chilean far-leftists "who in that way contributed to the overthrow of the people's regime of Allende."¹⁶

And the general secretary of the Tudeh Party, Nurideen Kianuri has already explained, after the recent banning of *Mardom*, how far the Iranian Stalinists were ready to take their policy. "Even if our formation were to be outlawed and our members persecuted," Kianuri said, "we would continue to defend the line of Imam Khomeini, which is to battle imperialism and its local agents, the 'liberals' and 'Maoists.' Our position in this regard is not based either on partisan considerations or on tactical maneuvers. Our support to the revolution is of a strategic order."¹⁷

This declaration merits inclusion in an anthology of Stalinist betrayal, alongside similar declarations made in their time by the Iraqi,

15. Published in *Intercontinental Press*, December 1, 1980, page 1262.

16. Quoted by Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde*, July 23, 1981.

17. *Ibid.*

Egyptian, or Sudanese CPs. And we would bet that this "support . . . of a strategic order" has something to do with the interests of Soviet diplomacy in the region.

Kianuri has gone even further since the present wave of executions began. In a statement made to Agence France-Presse, the leader of the Stalinist party, having expressed satisfaction at the "progress [achieved by the regime] of a tendency to normalize relations with the socialist countries," explained (in a bureaucratic slip of the tongue?) that Bani-Sadr and Mujahedeen leader Massoud Rajavi should be "locked up together in a psychiatric hospital." Approving the executions, Kianuri declared: "The leaders of the counterrevolutionary groups are murderers and they deserve the death penalty." Regarding the "young people mixed up by the Mujahedeen propaganda . . . they should be reeducated in labor camps. . . ."

Revolutionary Marxists distinguish between the bourgeoisie of an oppressed country and the bourgeoisie of an oppressor country, even when the first is more concretely involved in the path of counterrevolution. Even today we would not take a neutralist, pacifist, or defeatist attitude in the event of aggression by some imperialist power against the regime of the Islamic Republic.

But from this we do not conclude that the national bourgeoisie, or one of its wings, would be more progressive and more revolutionary than the bourgeoisie of a noncolonial country in the period of the democratic revolution. The neocolonial yoke does not give a revolutionary character to the national bourgeoisie, to one of its components, or to its political representatives.

Imperialism, the bourgeoisie, and counterrevolution

As the previously cited resolution of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International explained regarding the Iranian situation:

The Khomeini leadership fulfills the function of a bourgeois leadership, whatever the struggles it led against the shah, whatever its present positions in the conflicts with American imperialism, and whatever confrontations take place between factions of the Shi'ite hierarchy and sectors of the bourgeoisie. The Khomeini leadership fulfills a bourgeois function through its very longstanding links with factions of the national capitalists (the great bazaar), through the Shi'ite hierarchy's economic resources, which includes the *waqf* religious endowment properties, through its economic, social and political program, through the ties it maintained with one or another sector of imperialism (European, Japanese), and through its role in maintaining the state apparatus.¹⁸

The lesson of all the colonial revolutions, starting with the victorious colonial revolutions (China, Vietnam, Cuba), is that no national bourgeoisie stands "equidistant" between imperialism and the exploited and oppressed masses of its own country, much less

is closer to "its" own workers and "its" own poor peasants than to the imperialist powers.

Therefore, as Trotsky explained:

The question of the nature and the policy of the bourgeoisie is settled by the entire internal class structure of a nation waging the revolutionary struggle; by the historical epoch in which that struggle develops; by the degree of economic, political, and military dependence of the national bourgeoisie upon world imperialism as a whole or a particular section of it; finally, and this is most important, by the degree of class activity of the native proletariat, and by the state of its connections with the international revolutionary movement.

A democratic or national liberation movement may offer the bourgeoisie an opportunity to deepen and broaden its possibilities for exploitation. Independent intervention of the proletariat on the revolutionary arena threatens to deprive the bourgeoisie of the possibility to exploit altogether.¹⁹

The IRP did not get involved in the battle against Bani-Sadr in order to be better able to struggle against imperialism (we have seen in detail what its economic policy was). Nor was it out of a pure "ideological" desire to concretely build a theocratic state (although it uses Islam as the moral argument to cover its activities and repressive legislation).

The confrontations within the bourgeoisie that have taken place in Iran reflect in a distorted manner the clash of basic class interests at play.

Lenin wrote in the theses on the national and colonial question adopted at the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920 that in the oppressed countries

two movements can be discerned which are growing further and further apart with every day that passes. One of them is the bourgeois-democratic nationalist movement, which pursues the programme of political liberation with the conservation of the capitalist order; the other is the struggle of the propertyless peasants for their liberation from every kind of exploitation. The first movement attempts, often with success, to control the second; the Communist International must fight against such control and [seek] the development of the class consciousness of the working masses of the colonies. . . .²⁰

The IRP has moved with such brutality against Bani-Sadr as well as its left opponents in order to provide a capitalist solution to the economic crisis and get capitalist accumulation going again. It is trying to wipe out the movement of the oppressed nationalities, to contain and break the thrust of the workers, poor peasants, and youth. As popular opposition to the IRP increases, it becomes increasingly vital for the IRP to control the *whole* state apparatus.

This does not exclude the possibility that the regime may make new tactical "turns" regarding Iraq or imperialism. But we must understand that the general room for maneuvering by the leaders of the Islamic Republic has

19. Leon Trotsky, *The Third International After Lenin*, Pathfinder p. 172.

20. *The Second Congress of the Communist International*, Vol. 1, New Park, pp. 117-118.

shrunk, which in turn restricts the maneuvers they can try.

Khomeini's personal involvement

Two events illustrate the shrinking room for maneuver. The "consensus," the "national unity" that the leaders of the Islamic Republic benefited from after the war with Iraq broke out was, in the final analysis, of very short duration compared to what happened after the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran.

This also explains why the IRP required the direct and personal involvement of Khomeini to be able to win its strong arm operation against Bani-Sadr, which was not the case when the Democratic National Front of Matin Daftari was outlawed in August 1979 or Bazar-gan was eliminated in November 1979.

Khomeini's continuing prestige among broad sectors of the people, or the deterrent that his prestige constitutes for certain sectors of the bourgeoisie and state apparatus, definitively tipped the scales in favor of the IRP. This will have important ramifications in the future since it marks a change in Khomeini's ability to play a Bonapartist role like the one he played between different wings of the clergy, between the various bourgeois factions, or even his partial ability to stand above the fundamental classes in Iranian society.

This is all the more so since the center of gravity within the IRP has shifted toward the most "fundamentalist" tendencies, symbolized by men like Ghaffari and Hassan Ayat (organizers of the attack against the universities last year) and Nabavi, who is close to the Mujahedeen-e Islam, a paramilitary group that is comparable to the Muslim Brotherhood.

However much the meaning of the latest developments have been masked by the people who support one side or the alliances developed by the other side, the latest developments bring nearer the time of an open head-on collision, in the most ruthless forms, between the revolution and counterrevolution in Iran.

July 27, 1981

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18. *Intercontinental Press*, December 1, 1980, page 1261.

The world situation and the tasks of building the Fourth International

[*Second of two parts*]

[In this issue *Intercontinental Press* continues publication of majority and minority documents debated at the May 7-14 meeting of the International Executive Committee (IEC) of the Fourth International. Translations of these documents from the French are by the Bureau of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

[The U.S. government directly intervened to prevent the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) from participating in the May IEC meeting. Government lawyers in the April-June 1981 trial of the lawsuit brought by the SWP against secret police spying and harassment subpoenaed cen-

tral SWP leaders who had planned to attend the IEC meeting and present counter reports there. Those subpoenaed were legally required to be available to appear in court on twenty-four hours' notice when the government began its case and could not leave the United States. Material reflecting the views that SWP leaders would have presented at the IEC meeting will be published in forthcoming issues of *Intercontinental Press*.

[The following resolution on the world situation was passed by majority vote of the IEC.]

V. The unity of the world revolution, the necessity of the Fourth International and the living relevance of its program

26. If the tasks of the socialist revolution are posed in a specific way in the different countries, in function of their particular social structures, they have a unity in the general objective of the workers taking power and then directly exercising it themselves.

The world character of the socialist revolution flows from the very nature of the problems it has to solve.

The increasingly accelerated internationalization of the productive forces and of capital implies an increasing internationalization of the class struggle itself, including at the level of immediate demands against the multinational exploiters.

Despite a series of partial revolutionary victories, the world market and the international division of labor remain dominated by capitalism as long as it maintains its power in the principal industrialized countries and benefits from an advance over the workers states concerning the average productivity of labor.

This is what permits the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries, much more easily than in the colonial countries, to restabilize its power and to go through phases of growth, even after important proletarian victories (like that of the Chinese revolution). That is why imperialism will not suffer a decisive defeat as long as it is not overthrown in its principal bastions of Western Europe, the U.S. or in Japan. A victory of the political revolution in the USSR or China would greatly facilitate a victory of the proletariat in these strongholds.

Furthermore, the international bourgeoisie will never resign itself to the definitive loss of any part of the world as a field of investment for its capital or extension for its markets. Coexistence between states of a different social nature is, for it, a truce imposed by a relationship of forces that it will try and break at an opportune moment. The survival of capitalism in the imperialist countries and the industrializing semicolonial countries continues to exert a constant pressure on the workers states. In this way it reinforces the bases of the process of bureaucratization.

Finally the growing internationalization of the productive forces comes into increasingly explosive contradiction with the maintenance of national states. It throws up decisive problems for the future of humanity, which can no longer be resolved either at the national or the continental level: to prevent nuclear war, to resolve the problem of hunger and malnutrition, the struggle against generalized pollution and the spread of deserts.

Only an international organization of resources in the framework of a planned economy is an adequate response to these colossal problems.

27. The fundamental confrontation on a world scale is not between "camps" or states but, in the last analysis, between two fundamental classes. It demands the political independence of the proletariat and the intransigent defense of its interests in all countries, to forge in practice the international unity of the workers necessary for the overthrow of the reign of the bourgeoisie and of the bureaucratic dictatorship.

For more than a century already, the founders of Marxism saw in the International the logical conclusion and organizational concretization of their program. The Second International became definitively bankrupt at the time of the First World War. The Third, after Stalinism had politically destroyed the party of the world revolution, was formally dissolved by Stalin in 1943.

The Fourth International is today the only organization which defends in a consistent way the historic interests of the proletariat of the whole world and supports their mobilizations in all countries.

Its program integrates the strategic and tactical lessons of the whole history of the workers movement on a world scale. Like any scientific theory, it is susceptible of being enriched by any new important development of the class struggle and by any new revolutionary experience. The Paris commune, the Russian revolution, the German revolutions, the Spanish, Yugoslav, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions have all contributed to the enrichment of this program, as well as the workers uprisings in the bureaucratized workers states.

This program has been enriched also by the flourishing of a whole series of very broad-based social movements in the course of the last few years—which pose key questions for the emancipation and the future of humanity: above all the women's liberation movement, but also the antinuclear, ecological, and youth movements.

But none of these new contributions puts into question the basics of the revolutionary Marxist program: analysis of the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, of its imperialist phase and its decline; the historic actuality of the world socialist revolution, the necessity to destroy the bourgeois state apparatus and to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat; the theory of the permanent revolution; the necessity of the independent organization and unity of the proletariat; the strategy of transitional demands and the tactic of the workers united front to unify the workers struggles and lead them to pose the question of political power; the nature of the workers states and necessity of the political revolution in the bureaucratized workers states; the nature of the bureaucracy and the means of fighting against it in the struggle for socialist de-

mocracy; the necessity of a vanguard party and a democratically centralized International.

28. Despite the long struggle against the current, the vitality of the Fourth International cannot be reduced to a tenacious defense of this program. It has also been proved by the test of practice, by its concrete attitude faced with the events and the tasks of the world revolution, in particular faced with new victorious revolutions. It has, without concessions towards their leaderships and without ever looking for a "new socialist fatherland," known how to bring its support to the Yugoslav revolution, as well as the Chinese, the Cuban, and the Vietnamese revolutions. It also understood the importance and the process of the Nicaraguan revolution and committed itself to its defense in an international campaign mobilizing all its forces. It is doing the same with regard to the struggles unfolding in Central America and Poland.

This differentiates it from tendencies like those grouped in the Parity Committee (International Committee) which combine opportunism towards the reformist or nationalist populist apparatuses with a dogmatic sectarianism towards revolutionary movements, indeed towards authentic revolutions like the Nicaraguan revolution. The split they provoked in the Fourth International in 1979 strongly reflects this sectarian refusal to recognize that the FSLN was leading the revolutionary process in Nicaragua, whatever might be its programmatic limitations.

29. Stalinism still constitutes the most formidable obstacle to the solution of the crisis of the subjective factor.

The social democratic bureaucracy bears the main responsibility for the failure of the revolutionary wave that followed the First World War. It also carries a big responsibility in the stifling of the revolutionary possibilities after the Second World War. More recently it was directly responsible for the restoration of bourgeois order in Portugal, from summer 1975 on. It has been the main political instrument for ensuring the relative stability of bourgeois order in the whole of Northern Europe.

But the maintenance and the periodic renaissance of social democratic influence inside the proletariat are in a large part a consequence of Stalinism. Without the reinforcement of the latter, the revolutionary crisis of the 1930s and 1940s would have resulted in the formation of mass revolutionary parties.

Stalinism is directly responsible for the crushing defeats of the proletariat, in particular in Germany in 1933, Spain 1936-39, Greece 1944, Iran 1945 and 1953, Indonesia in 1965, and Chile in 1973.

Even in the cases where it has not directly provoked bloody defeats, Stalinism has succeeded in sabotaging and causing the failure of mobilizations capable of ending in victory in a large number of imperialist countries (notably in France and Italy) and semicolonial countries. It has also alimeted divisions and accumulated disappointments in the broad masses. It has perverted the conceptions and practice of proletarian internationalism by identifying it with the defense of the diplomatic maneuvers of the Kremlin. More generally after several decades of class collaboration and miseducation of workers, one can say that Stalinism has worked in the sense of a fragmentation and a regression of the political consciousness of the proletariat in numerous countries.

Last but not least, in the beginning a product of the isolation of the Russian revolution and the bureaucratization of the workers states in conditions of socioeconomic backwardness, Stalinism became an active agent of this degeneration. It is responsible in the USSR and in the bureaucratized workers states for a political system which oppresses the workers to the point of depriving them of certain political and trade-union liberties that they have been able to win in the bourgeois regimes.

Daily repression, the absence of real political power for the masses, the military interventions against the political revolution in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia, the threats against the self-organization of the Polish proletariat, casts deep doubt and discredit on the meaning of socialism in the eyes of a significant part of the world proletariat. The more the bureaucracy does everything to define its regime as that of "really existing socialism" the more it facilitates the ideological/political campaign of the bourgeoisie which aims to disorient the working class and sow skepticism in its ranks.

30. In the framework of the rise and coming to power of the Stalinist

bureaucracy in the USSR, the Stalinization of the Communist International (CI) and the operation of subordination of the communist parties to the interests of this bureaucracy, were not extended at the same time and to the same degree in the whole of the international communist movement.

In the exceptional conditions of the decay of the ruling classes, the Chinese, Yugoslav, and Vietnamese CPs were led by teams formed at the time of the rise of Stalinism in the CI, marked by empiricism and bureaucratic cynicism but also by the will to take power. They led the revolution up to the overthrow of capitalism in their own countries, against the will, plans and orders of Stalin.

As contrasted with those CPs who accepted their role of agents of the counterrevolutionary politics of the Kremlin to the point of their own suicide or liquidation, these parties, under the pressure of the masses, knew how to lead the struggle at one and the same time against the occupier and imperialism *and* against their own bourgeoisie. In this sense they carried out a revolutionary role.

But due to their Stalinist education, their authoritarian relationship with the masses, the stifling of self-organization of the proletariat and their taking up of the theory of building socialism in one country, these new workers states were bureaucratic from their origin, in their functioning and constitution. This fact has considerably facilitated the rapid growth of a bureaucratic caste.

31. The Cuban revolution, which gave birth to the first workers state in the Americas, presents the particularity of having been led by a team of non-Stalinist origin.

Instead of banking on the building of socialism in one country, this leadership posed the problem of the extension of the revolution, at least on a continental scale. It has gone the furthest on the basis of its own experience, in developing in the 1960s a line concretized in the formula: "socialist revolution or a caricature of revolution"—which came closest to the orientation of the permanent revolution. It has established and maintained relations with the masses different from the bureaucratic control exercised by the Chinese or Vietnamese leaderships.

These initial characteristics of the Castroist leadership have evolved and continue to evolve in function of several factors: the imperatives of the defense of the Cuban workers state under the direct threat of the main imperialist power; the military and economic dependence on the Soviet bureaucracy; the fluctuations of the Latin American revolution, which has repercussions on the mobilizations and the state of consciousness of the masses in Cuba itself; and finally, the specific ideological weight of this leadership which has integrated significant elements of the Soviet bureaucracy's conceptions.

The bureaucratization of society, state and party under the effect of these factors has not resulted in a political counterrevolution and the birth of a crystallized bureaucratic caste. Cuba is therefore still a workers state with bureaucratic deformations.

In the framework of a period of rise, and not decline, of the world revolution, the Cuban leadership firmly supports the revolutionary struggles in Central America. It is capable of evolving, at the price of differentiations and ruptures, under the influence of new revolutionary victories.

Neither the degree of consolidation of bureaucratic privileges, nor the rupture between the masses and the leadership, nor the relations with the international bourgeoisie are such that they justify in Cuba the call for political revolution.

The question of the political revolution can only be posed when the concrete experiences and events of the class struggle have demonstrated that the possibilities of reform are exhausted: that an irredeemable gap has already been opened up between the masses and the leadership; that the bureaucracy, to defend its power and privileges, would crush the masses through its dictatorship; and that it has a counterrevolutionary function on an international scale.

To say that a political revolution, that is, the violent overthrow of a government, is not justified in Cuba does not mean at all that revolutionary Marxists must give up their own program faced with the Castroist leadership.

The program of the Fourth International cannot be divided up. It forms

a totality and as such the FI has to be built throughout the world.

32. The beginning of the political revolution in Poland has confirmed the unity of the world revolution in a particularly sharp way. To the extent that the fundamental confrontation puts the Polish proletariat strategically against the Soviet bureaucracy, the political revolution cannot definitively triumph within the frontiers of Poland. The support and the extension of the revolutionary movement of the Polish workers is not only necessary in Eastern Europe and in the USSR, but also in capitalist Europe and on a world scale.

In a situation where all the conservative forces of the world are joining forces against the most audacious actions of the Polish proletariat—from the Western bankers to the Kremlin, from the Vatican to international social democracy—the natural allies of this proletariat are the workers of all countries. It is urgent and necessary to make the latter conscious of the stakes involved in the coming test of strength.

VI. The present stage of building the Fourth International

33. The crisis of humanity is reduced, in the last analysis, to the crisis of the revolutionary leadership of the world proletariat.

The construction of mass revolutionary Marxist parties, on the basis of the program of the Fourth International, is an indispensable condition for revolutionary victory on a world scale. This is because of: the preponderant weight of the urban and rural proletariat in the explosions and mass mobilizations in nearly all countries of the world; the enemy that has to be defeated is much stronger on the socioeconomic and political level than in the victorious revolutions since the Second World War; and the enormous complexity of the tasks that have to be confronted in a revolutionary upsurge.

The battle for the construction of the Fourth International having a mass influence is a necessary condition for starting off along the way to the resolution of this historic task. It is difficult to fulfill this, due to the fact that the unfolding of the class struggle takes place in the framework of national or regional realities, inside quite different social formations, with all the obstacles and contradictions that flow from this on the level of the practice and consciousness of the proletariat.

In order to combine experiences and to progressively achieve a homogenization of the consciousness of the proletariat's ranks, there is no other way than the intransigent defense of the interests and struggles of the exploited and oppressed of each country, *in the three sectors of the world revolution*. This defense of the immediate and historic interests of the proletariat and the direct participation in its struggles in the three sectors, expresses in a practical way that the Fourth International and its program incarnates the overall interests of the world proletariat.

There is no pre-established priority between the three sectors of the world revolution. The history of the last decades has shown that pre-revolutionary and revolutionary crises break out periodically in each of these sectors in function of the specific contradictions of the particular societies involved. Revolutionaries must support all proletarian mobilizations. This support must not be subordinated to any so-called global priorities (priority of the defense of the "socialist camp," priority to the anti-imperialist struggle, priority to the struggle of the proletariat in the imperialist countries).

The development of the Fourth International is directly tied to the dynamic of mass anticapitalist activity and to the progression of the political class consciousness of the world proletariat. This explains, incidentally, the *objective causes* of its slow growth. These can be reduced to essentially the weakening of the average level of consciousness of the world proletariat, as the cumulative effect of the long series of defeats of the world revolution during the 1923-43 period, caused by social democracy and Stalinism. These effects were reinforced by their policy of betrayal during the new upsurge after the Second World War. Since 1968, the objective and subjective conditions for building the Fourth International have been modified. *First of all*, the weight of the proletariat and its methods of struggles became increasingly preponderant and the anti-bureaucratic dynamic became an ever-present element in workers mobilizations. *Then* in the very heart of the working class and its allies, a

A victory for the political revolution in Poland would stimulate its extension into the other bureaucratized workers states and a new rise of the socialist revolution in a whole series of capitalist countries. Conversely a defeat of this revolution by a brutal repressive intervention by the Kremlin would strike a very serious blow against the whole international workers movement, above all in capitalist Europe, North America, and Japan.

Certainly, the forces that have been liberated by the massive rise of the Polish proletariat since July-August 1980 are too broad for a defeat to be devastating as it was in Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the medium and long term, the continuation of the resistance and the deepening of the world crisis of Stalinism will be themselves a motor for the solution of the crisis of the subjective factor. However the immediate negative effects of a Kremlin intervention would be felt on a world scale and must in no way be underestimated.

layer of workers, political and trade-union militants began to emerge, through different channels and in an uneven fashion, as a function of the progression in the average level of class consciousness. The ideological and political hold of Stalinism, reformism and national populism on these militants began to be eroded.

On the political level this is expressed by punctual convergences between the positions adopted by these militants—grouped in the political organizations or occasionally in mass organizations—and those of the Fourth International. These two facts, interlinked, constitute the framework in which the Fourth International will be built at the present stage.

34. Since 1968, important progress has been made in the building of the Fourth International, even if this progression subsided in the 1976-79 period, a stagnation accentuated by the split in 1979. The Fourth International has gone through a significant geographical expansion. Several of its sections have acquired a sufficient size, apparatus, and implantation in the workers movement to ensure their political development and to begin to forge real national leadership teams.

Any progress in the building of the Fourth International is closely tied to developments in the class struggle and its capacity of political intervention and also to specific and important organizational aspects.

It is necessary to build sections with firm limits and solid structures, having a regular press and a stable apparatus. Only such organizations can have a real attraction to layers of advanced workers and other revolutionary organizations, and guarantee the viability of any regroupment process.

The complexity of the struggle and developments in class consciousness mean that revolutionary parties, and even more so a revolutionary International, cannot be monolithic. From the beginning they must be capable of ensuring a rich internal discussion, of accepting the existence of differences, and at the same time realize unity in action on the majority line.

Thus sections must include, from the start of their construction, two indispensable elements. *First* a clear defense of the right for minorities to defend their positions, up to the right of forming tendencies and factions within the limiting framework of discipline in action. *Secondly* a collective functioning must operate at all levels of the organization—it constitutes the guarantee of the rights of minorities, but also the most effective means of combating permanent factionalism, cliquism and other residue of a long period as propaganda groups. It follows from this that leaderships must struggle against any internal functioning which reduces them to a cartel of tendencies but instead they must be a leadership of the whole organization.

The construction of the International cannot be reduced to the sum of its sections. The comprehension of the fundamental characteristics of international politics, the organization of international campaigns of solidarity with the most important struggles, aid to the building of national sections, discussion and confrontation with new revolutionary currents capable of emerging on the national level—all that requires an Interna-

tional which does not function on a basis of a simple exchange of information but as a real organization. That means in particular, for the next period, taking account of the concrete stage of development of the International and its sections, the reinforcing of the International center, the growing involvement of the leaderships of the national sections in this center and in international activities, the establishment of a regular press of the International in the commonly used languages, and the setting up of political training of cadre at the international level, and a real collective functioning of the International's bodies.

35. The transformation of the sections into parties having a real implantation and influence inside the proletariat, is tied essentially to two factors. The first is the maturing of the political class consciousness of the workers vanguard and of the working class. The second is their capacity to give a concrete response to the economic, social, and political problems which the workers are facing in a situation of deep economic crisis and social/political instability.

From this flows the imperative of a very big effort to root our sections in the main industrial sectors. Leaderships must lead the policy of the "turn" in a systematic and centralized way to ensure that a majority of the sections' membership will be in industry. This effort should place the objective needs and preoccupations of the workers at the center of the leaderships' attention, with all the consequences that follow for transforming the functioning of the sections. It should allow us to tighten our organic links with the working-class vanguard and facilitate united initiatives both in struggle and on the trade-union level. It must facilitate our intervention towards the parties and trade unions, making possible an effective combination between united actions, political debates, and programmatic confrontations.

The proletarian implantation of our sections and their capacity to intervene on all questions being posed by advanced workers, permits us to win them to our battle. In this way the force of the challenge of this vanguard to the Stalinists, reformists, or national-populists will be able to be fully expressed.

Rooting ourselves in the workplaces is even more important given that workers struggles against austerity are going to become greater and left tendencies will continue to develop inside the trade unions. Building our sections will progress in a qualitatively different way according to whether we are present or not inside the workplaces and the unions where these struggles are taking place and according to whether we are capable or not of developing this radicalizing dynamic of workers and trade unionists in the reformist parties.

36. Working class youth (young workers, apprentices, youth in technical training, young unemployed, etc.) play an increasing role in youth mobilizations. As compared to the 1960s students no longer form the hegemonic component of the youth struggles, even if they are capable of initiating broad struggles.

Young workers have participated in struggles on quite varied questions: antiracism, for jobs, anti-imperialism, antimilitarism, demands of the women's movement (abortion), etc. This sensibility to diverse problems and more generally to the more flagrant aspects of imperialism and capitalist exploitation and bureaucratic oppression favors in turn the raising of the consciousness of the whole working class on social and political questions.

The hold of the apparatuses on these layers is less strong. The possibilities of fractions of working youth, in the context of a workers' upsurge, directly joining a revolutionary organization are greater. That reflects the different ways in which class consciousness is formed and radicalizes, which intersects partly with the succession of generations.

Historical examples confirm this.

Everything indicates therefore the urgency, for party-building, of the creation and reinforcement of *revolutionary youth organizations* (RYOs) in political solidarity with the sections but organizationally independent. They represent the most adequate instrument for recruiting young workers, for forming and educating the future cadre of a workers party.

They are a special instrument of intervention and defense of revolutionary Marxist ideas among student youth.

They permit the extension of the participation of revolutionary Marxists in the struggles against women's oppression, because they closely combine, especially among the youngest women, the rebellion against exploitation and oppression. Thus, in time, the youth organizations will facilitate the modification of the composition of the sections, by increasing the number of young women workers and in preparing them for leadership roles.

The youth organizations can also collaborate in the same way with the sections on trade union work, a good terrain for forming revolutionary worker militants.

In order to reach large layers of youth, the RYOs should concentrate their energies on national mass campaigns and on initiatives built through a lively national press. In this way they respond to the willingness to take action prevalent among radicalized youth.

The construction of youth organizations, linked to the effort to make the turn to industry, represents an important element in the formation of revolutionary leaderships with experience in leading struggles, with tactical sense, a sensibility to the needs of the working masses and the form in which they are expressed and armed with an assimilation of the revolutionary Marxist program.

37. Differentiations and tendency struggles inside reformist mass parties and trade unions, reflect, in a specific way, the heating up of the class struggle. Also, despite many deformations, they reflect the radicalization of significant layers of the proletariat affected by the inconsistency of the practical proposals made by the bureaucratic apparatuses.

By understanding the objective roots of these differentiations, which are still partial and limited, we can grasp, at one and the same time, the dynamic they can unleash and the political function of the more radical factions of the apparatuses when they ride a leftwards movement of a sector of the masses and take up its leadership. The leaderships of such currents cannot be identified with the embryo of a new leadership of the class struggle. Fundamentally they remain obstacles on the road to building one.

Such a conclusion must not in any way lead revolutionary Marxists to adopt a sectarian, denunciatory attitude when faced with the emergence of such oppositions. Indeed, the essential thing is to understand that their birth favors mobilizations, initiatives in the trade unions, and overall political debates—factors aiding the progression of workers consciousness.

Sections should support and encourage the workers movement to look for an alternative political solution, precisely because they do not confuse this social and political phenomenon with the projects and strategy of the recognized leaders (Benn in the Labour Party, left sectors of the PSUC, the Metalworkers Federation [FLM] in Italy, in the PS and the Belgian General Federation of Workers [FGTB] in Belgium).

This distinction, in the present period, is politically and practically important for three reasons. *First of all*, the situation of class conflict. Immediately a movement of struggles develops and mobilizes in a decisive way, even on limited demands, questions of anticapitalist strategy come up. So what will spring to the minds of many workers is the contradiction between the support given by these leaders to immediate economic demands and their refusal to organize and centralize the struggle, to develop its democratic self-organization and to put forward a political solution for it. *Then*, in the very heart of these left currents, as a translation of the modification of the relations between the bureaucratic apparatuses and a layer of advanced workers, we find militants ready, on the strategic and programmatic level, to draw the conclusions of the practical necessities of the struggle against austerity. *Finally*, because of the strength, albeit limited, of our organizations, and the audience for our concrete proposals we have the possibility of fighting for the political leadership of significant sectors of such oppositions. Their base as well as their intermediary cadre can evolve to the left of the leadership of these currents.

The interaction between political and trade-union questions as well as the fact is that these oppositions can draw their forces from the ranks of the working class, implies that the positions gained by the sections in the organization of trade-union opposition currents, their unitary initiatives

and conduct, largely conditions the possibility of influencing in a practical way the political evolution of the left currents. Without this trade-union implantation, there is a great risk of us becoming propagandist "advisors" to these oppositions with the sectarian or adaptationist dangers proper to this type of activity. The construction of a class struggle tendency is increasingly linked with the process of differentiation and political fermentation inside the reformist parties and will therefore be achieved as much inside the trade unions as in the reformist parties—albeit not necessarily simultaneously.

The sections must therefore link a capacity to intervene in these currents, to stimulate their development on the basis of concrete united action proposals, with a refusal to politically "melt away" there, to adapt to these currents. They must reply to the confusions introduced by the bureaucratic factions which lead them, propose initiatives adequate to the situation and on this basis debate strategic questions and the necessity for a revolutionary party.

The sections should grasp the many possibilities of opening up a dialogue with the members or even the cadres of the CPs and the SPs, of developing more or less permanent unity with sectors of these parties and their youth. This dialogue and unity of action are largely dependent on the sections' own capacity of political initiative, of the role played by their worker militants in the workplaces and the trade unions.

The programmatic and strategic debates unfolding in sectors of the reformist parties intersect with those that are at the origin of the political (and occasionally organizational) crisis of the *centrist organizations*. From now on, any offensive in their direction, any common initiatives must be inscribed within a united front approach. Regroupments or fusions with centrist organizations, which in relation to our forces still have a significant membership, implies a deepgoing clarification on the key strategic questions, on democratic centralism, and on a real battle for the necessity of building the Fourth International.

If we have clarity on the strategic tasks of the period, fusion or regroupment with centrist forces can then become a catalyst of differentiations in the reformist parties and trade unions.

Long-term fraction work inside the reformist organizations, within the fundamental perspective of building a revolutionary Marxist organization, can take on a real relevance according to the political developments going on inside them. It needs, however, in order to have any chance of good success, a very solid political preparation of cadre, careful leadership and a sufficiently strong initial organizational strength.

38. The counterrevolutionary course of the USSR and Chinese bureaucracies, the extreme gravity of the social/economic crisis in the semicolonial countries, the Polish explosion and the fissures in the systems of bureaucratic domination and the major developments in the world revolution encourage the emergence of political forces which, with their own particular features, break in practice with reformism, Stalinism, and populist nationalism. They converge with revolutionary Marxists on various points without for all that adopting their overall positions.

The policy of the Fourth International towards these currents forms a dimension of its construction and a test of its capacity to link itself to the real process of the vanguard's development.

The defense of the International and its program is the necessary condition for the political progress made by these vanguards not to be blocked or cancelled out. Without this political battle some militants and currents who draw closer to our positions can indeed either join a sectarian current of the Trotskyist tradition—which substitutes programmatic proclamations for links with real revolutionary processes—or stop halfway on crystallized political positions, or even regress towards positions that make large concessions to Stalinist conceptions.

A. The development of the revolution in Central America opens a breach in the isolation of the Cuban revolution in Latin America and opens up a new chapter in the experience of the class struggle in this region.

The experience of the FSLN and the FMLN has a particular interest for all revolutionaries on several points:

- The articulation between political organization, mass work (trade union in particular), and different forms of the armed struggle;
- The role and place of structures of self-organization, like the CDCs

or the popular committees for the preparation and launching of the insurrection;

- The close relationship, for the FMLN, between a programmatic position calling for the socialist revolution and the refusal of revolutionary organizations to swallow the reformist operations of October 1979 in which the social democratic Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) and the CP collaborated;

- The political and practical hegemony on the political, trade-union, and military level ensured by the revolutionary organizations within the framework of a front like the FMLN/FDR.

These contributions, as well as the organization of the class struggle, expresses a maturing of the conscious vanguard towards revolutionary Marxism. To know how to recognize this and to engage in a dialogue with these forces, as well as giving unconditional solidarity to their struggle, is a condition for the building of the Fourth International.

Organizations like the FSLN and the FMLN are the fruits of an original experience, in certain respects more rich and advanced than those of the Cuban revolution, accumulated through twenty years of persistent struggle. From the experience of the Cuban revolution they have integrated references drawing on the sources of the Vietnamese and Chinese revolutions. If they are mainly influenced by the Castroist leadership they have, nonetheless, their own history and political personality.

These organizations group mainly cadres and militants formed in the test of the revolution. They will be inevitably confronted with problems such as: their attitude to the bourgeoisie and the struggle for the political independence of the proletariat; the nature and role of the bureaucracy; the attitude to take to the struggle of the Polish workers; the role of the proletariat in the imperialist countries; the key problems of the transitional society . . . Their future is tied up with many powerful national and international factors, but it is not a question of drawing an a priori limit to their development and evolution.

From now on in Central America, revolutionary Marxists must be fully part of the combat of these organizations, of any project to build a vanguard party, inside of which they will defend all their positions. Thus they should be able to intervene in the developments and direction of these currents.

B. The extension of the revolution in Central America, the sharpness of the conflicts with imperialism, as well as the advantage of these organizations' concrete experiences could determine in turn, a new internationalist spurt and realignments inside the Castroist leadership.

In playing a front-line role in supporting the revolution in Central America, the Castroist leadership reinforces its prestige and authority as an anti-imperialist fighter and increases its attractive force for the revolutionary vanguards of numerous countries, particularly in Latin America. Revolutionary Marxists support this commitment. They learn from these experiences. But this does not imply any alignment on the conjunctural diplomatic positions of the Cuban state, nor silence when faced with wrong positions, opposed to the interests of the masses, taken by the Castroist leadership.

It is impossible to construct a revolutionary organization in Africa without supporting the Cuban military intervention against South Africa in Angola, but also impossible if one does not criticize the Castroist orientation to the leaderships and regimes of the MPLA and the Ethiopian Dergue. It is impossible to be really revolutionary in a number of Latin American countries without coming up against the Cuban policy of support for bourgeois parties such as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico. More clearly still, it is impossible to construct any sort of revolutionary force in Eastern Europe and link up with the emerging vanguards there without confronting the Cuban policy of support for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and its attitude on the events in Poland.

The Cuban leadership is revolutionary to the extent that it led the revolutionary process in Cuba and supports the extension of the revolution in certain countries such as today in Central America. But it is not revolutionary Marxist to the extent that, from the point of view of the world revolution as a whole, it vacillates between supporting the extension of the revolution on the one hand and the alignment on some of the main policy stands of the USSR's international policy on the other. This leads it to take positions that are opposed to the fundamental interests of the

working class—demonstrated by the attitude taken on the big struggles of the Polish workers or on certain political developments in the imperialist and semicolonial countries.

On various terrains, unity of action and collaboration with such a current is necessary. At the same time, political struggle for the defense of the overall interests of the working class and revolutionary Marxist positions, is the only way of ensuring the strengthening of the Fourth International into a mass revolutionary International.

C. In relation to an unfolding revolution, such as in Iran, the Fourth International makes a distinction between the dynamic of the class forces and the ideology which the masses identify with. Furthermore it understands the effects of the crisis of traditional nationalism and Stalinism, at a time when the revolutionary Marxist pole does not exist, and gets to grips with the uneven process of formation of independent proletarian consciousness within the vanguard. On this basis it can enter into a dialogue with forces that are going through a process of political clarification in the centrist and radical anti-imperialist currents, the vanguard in the shoras or the most radicalized fractions in the movements of the oppressed nationalities.

D. Poland is where the most favorable conditions exist for a renaissance on a relatively broad scale of a revolutionary Marxist current in the "People's Democracies" and in the USSR.

The formation of a revolutionary socialist current would necessarily involve a battle for the defense of Marxism and of clear anti-imperialist positions combined with determined activity to consolidate Solidarity, to ensure its democratic functioning and to clarify the strategic objectives for the Polish workers' struggle.

Within the unfolding struggle and gigantic effort of organizing Solidarity, leaders, vanguard nuclei—and also PUWP members who identify with Marxism—are emerging who are learning a great deal, quickly, in the school of practice.

The place of revolutionary Marxist militants is at their side, building common mass organizations and all united instruments of struggle against the bureaucracy. At one and the same time, the defense of the international positions of the Fourth International and of the program of political revolution as well as the organization of militants on this basis, are indispensable elements for preparing for inevitable new developments and tests of strength.

In China, the emergence of the Democracy Movement also represents one of the most important political developments of these last years in the bureaucratized workers states. Weaned on the experience of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution and the repeated mobilizations of the popular social sectors, tempered by the test of the ever-present, and occasionally severe, repression, the Democracy Movement has imposed itself on Chinese political life. It is still very diversified both in its activity and its ideological references. But the clearly Marxist wing of this movement often plays a motor role in its initiatives and in the deepening of the political debate within it. To link up with this wing and to participate in these programmatic debates are the conditions for the rebirth of an authentic revolutionary Marxist current in China.

39. The International and its sections must commit their forces to three decisive campaigns. One for the support of the revolutionary upsurge in Central America, another to give maximum support to the formidable antibureaucratic struggle of the Polish workers and the third against capital's international austerity and remilitarization offensive.

A. Since the counterrevolutionary intervention in Vietnam, imperialism has launched its most important counterattack in Central America and in the Caribbean. It is directly aiding various dictators and reactionary regimes. It aims to prevent the setting up and consolidation of workers states in Nicaragua and Grenada, to break the extension of the revolution in the area and in the first instance in El Salvador.

The defense of the Nicaraguan, Grenadian, and Salvadorian revolutions, support for the liberation fighters in Guatemala and Honduras, and the defense of the Cuban workers state are the central tasks of the International and its sections.

These campaigns must reinforce the actions and anti-imperialist consciousness of the workers of the imperialist countries.

They are also the opportunity to learn from the experiences of these

revolutions, of developing a dialogue with the forces who are in the front line of the struggle against the imperialist and bourgeois forces.

B. The Soviet and Polish bureaucracies will not let up an instant in their efforts to prevent the workers turning into reality the formula in the *Communist Manifesto*: "the emancipation of the workers will be the task of the workers themselves."

The CPs hope that bureaucratic order will be saved.

Imperialism has declared it wants "stability" in Poland, while preparing to make use of a Soviet intervention to justify its counterrevolutionary international operations.

Social democracy fundamentally adopts the same position, understanding that the action of the Polish working masses contradicts in practice its policy of stifling the workers struggles in the imperialist countries.

The Fourth International must broaden even further the international solidarity movement with Solidarity, its demands and the initiatives taken by the workers. Only revolutionary Marxists can consistently support the struggle of the masses for the overthrow of the bureaucratic dictatorship and for the setting up of workers councils power.

Its sections, above all those in Western Europe, must undertake systematic efforts to build and extend the links between Solidarity and the organized workers movement of their countries, in order to overcome the international isolation of the Polish working class.

In concrete terms our aim must be:

- To materially support Solidarity in order to favor its organizational consolidation;

- To make clear to the Soviet bureaucracy that there would be a massive response from the working class in the event of a military intervention;

- To demand from the imperialist governments that they accept a moratorium on the servicing of the Polish debt, or annul it, and take various measures (food aid, etc.) to alleviate the economic crisis in Poland;

- To show the leaders and cadres of Solidarity the necessity of systematically looking for the support of the working class of Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the USSR.

The Fourth International can thereby tighten many links with the workers' vanguard in Poland and stimulate the regroupment of forces defending the necessity of the political revolution within the framework of the advance of the world revolution.

It will defend, propagate, and enrich its conception of the political revolution and socialist democracy, largely validated by the rise of the masses against the bureaucracy of the PUWP and the state.

C. Capital's general austerity offensive against working people, which has been worldwide for several years, is now combined with a remilitarization offensive which makes the reductions in real wages and vicious cuts in social security, education, and public health spending particularly resented in the eyes of the broad masses.

The Fourth International will work hard to combine the struggle against austerity measures with the campaign against the remilitarization policies. Particularly in capitalist Europe, the link is clear between the struggle against unemployment, for the thirty-five-hour week, against all cuts in social spending, and the struggle against the stationing of Cruise and Pershing missiles, against the Neutron bomb, against NATO, for unilateral nuclear disarmament and for a massive reduction in arms spending. □

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Electrical workers lead fightback

Union takes up broad array of issues

By Nelson González

[The following article appeared in the October 2 issue of the U.S. socialist weekly *Militant*.]

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SAN JUAN—The U.S. government's devastating budget cuts and their catastrophic effects in Puerto Rico have provoked a massive response from nearly every sector of the island's population.

In this U.S. colony, the Reagan offensive is being implemented by Governor Carlos Romero Barceló, leader of the New Progressive Party (PNP), which favors making Puerto Rico a state.

As a result, a series of confrontations have broken out between the PNP administration and the labor movement and its allies.

The most decisive of the struggles taking place is that of the Puerto Rican electrical workers.

On August 20, the Union of Electrical Industry and Irrigation Workers (UTIER)—6,700 strong, among the most combative of Puerto Rican workers—mounted the picket lines in a strike provoked by the state-run Electrical Energy Authority (AEE).

In the more than thirty-five bargaining sessions that began last March, the AEE made initial wage offers of a zero increase in wages, then offered a three-cent hourly increase every year for three years, and then made a third offer of a forty-dollar monthly increase for each year of a two-year contract.

With inflation at an annual rate of 15 percent, these ridiculous offers by the AEE were calculated to provoke the strike.

In what has become an increasingly bitter test of strength, the government has responded with a campaign of slander, intimidation, and red-baiting. It is using the press and radio to brand the union as communist-dominated and terrorist, and to create the impression that a few scabs within the union represent a bona fide "back-to-work" movement. The police have also arrested several strike leaders for allegedly committing sabotage.

In response to this strikebreaking campaign, the union leadership called for a mass picket at the AEE's central headquarters in San Juan on September 17. More than 3,000 union members and supporters turned out.

The picketers then marched through the streets of San Juan. The sympathetic and enthusiastic response they received was clear proof of the public support that the strikers have.

A regional assembly of thousands of UTIER workers, held immediately after the march,

outlined plans to further strengthen the strike. This was further testimony to the combativity and high morale of the strikers.

Despite being involved in a very critical strike, the UTIER leadership is utilizing its strength and resources to play a critical leadership role in mobilizing the rest of the Puerto Rican population against other government attacks.

"For the first time in the history of the Puerto Rican labor movement, a labor union—the UTIER—is championing the demands of broader sectors of the population," was how one chapter president described UTIER's current involvement in the various struggles.

When the AEE announced several months ago that it would raise electrical rates and force consumers to pay nearly 70 percent more in electric bills, more than fifty civic, religious, labor, and other organizations joined together to organize a march of over 20,000 people at the governor's residence in San Juan in protest.

At the heart of this organizing effort was the leadership and membership of the UTIER. The UTIER workers were in the forefront, countering government propaganda about alleged AEE deficits caused by wages paid to the workers. They exposed the tremendous profits generated by the AEE exclusively for its shareholders, one of the largest of which is the Rockefeller-owned Chase Manhattan Bank in New York.

When the population of Aguada mobilized by the thousands to protest the projected installation of a coal-fired electric plant, which would have presented an environmental hazard and was totally unnecessary given Puerto Rico's underutilization of its present electric

power, again it was the UTIER that spearheaded this struggle.

During the week of September 13, under the intense pressure of continual mobilizations, the government conceded that the plant wasn't needed and canceled the project. This represented a tremendous victory for all consumers, as well as for the UTIER workers.

On another front, 5,000 students voted on September 3 to strike against a tripling of university tuition fees and other cuts in financial aid. Since that time, there have been continuous mobilizations involving thousands of students.

In an effort to deflect the impact of student organizing efforts, the university administration adopted a declaration making it illegal to hold meetings, marches, and other activities on campus. In response to this, the students called for a student assembly on the morning of September 22.

In many of these actions, the UTIER has sent representatives in support of the students. One of the most important questions currently being addressed in the union is the need for more solidarity between workers and students.

In a campaign to reach out to other sectors of the population, Committees of Support for the UTIER, composed of unionists, students, consumers, etc., are functioning in many parts of the island. They are attempting to create links between other struggles taking place and the strike.

Linking sections of the Puerto Rican labor movement with broader social struggles comes at a time when the economic crisis has precipitated anew a heated debate around the most explosive question in Puerto Rican politics. That is the question of Puerto Rico's relationship to the United States.

Given the direction of the labor movement in increasing confrontation with imperialist-imposed budget cuts, the conditions are being rapidly created for a resurgent independence movement linked with a radicalized labor movement. This would represent the biggest challenge yet to U.S. colonial domination of Puerto Rico. □



UTIER workers at strike rally.