

# Intercontinental Press

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Vol. 19, No. 16

May 4, 1981

USA \$1

UK 40p

## *Northern Ireland*

# British Take Hard Line as Mass Protests Back Hunger Strikers



April 26 Belfast demonstration was Northern Ireland's largest in a decade. March demanded political status for republican prisoners.

## **U.S. Government, Socialists Battle in Court**

- **FBI Revives its 'Terrorist International' Slander**
- **Immigration Cops Threaten to Deport Socialists**

## New Attack by Immigration Cops on U.S. Socialists

By Michael Baumann

Protests around the world are urgently needed to halt a renewed attack on the rights of foreign-born persons in the United States.

In a countermove in the midst of the Socialist Workers Party's (SWP) trial against government spying, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) served notice that it "has begun a review of the nature of the Socialist Workers Party to determine whether its members or affiliates are excludable or deportable." The INS is one of the federal police agencies whose crimes against democratic rights are being exposed by the socialists' lawsuit.

This move is based on immigration legislation passed in the 1950s. Such legislation has been used in the past to deport members of the U.S. Communist Party, as well as to exclude from the United States prominent labor and socialist figures, including leaders of the Fourth International.

Officially the attack is directed against the hundreds of foreign-born members and supporters of the SWP and Young Socialist Alliance, which are currently suing the FBI, CIA, INS, and other government police agencies demanding a halt to all illegal spying, harassment, and disruption.

In reality, it is a threat to every union, political organization, and foreign-born resident in the country.

The witch-hunt era legislation was dusted off in federal district court in New York City April 24, at the close of the fifteenth day of the socialists' trial against government spying.

The timing of the move left no doubt that it was intended as part of the Reagan administration's counterattack to the socialists' legal offensive.

It followed on the heels of testimony in which Gaudencio Thiago de Mello—the noted Brazilian jazz guitarist and a longtime supporter of the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA)—publicly stated his membership in the SWP.

In documents presented to the court at the close of the day, INS official Glenn A. Bertness said:

"In light of the materials reviewed in response to the litigation currently pending [that is, the socialists' suit], the INS concluded that there is good reason to believe that the Socialist Workers Party of the United States is an organization that advocates the economic, international and governmental doctrines of world communism."

He continued: "As a result of this determination, the Investigations Division of

the INS has begun a review of the nature of the Socialist Workers Party to determine whether its members or affiliates are excludable or deportable."

Here is what this really means:

Under current U.S. legislation "advocacy of the doctrines of world communism" is defined solely as "advocacy of totalitarian dictatorship."

"Advocacy of totalitarian dictatorship" is by itself grounds for deportation.

The INS has already "concluded" that the SWP does advocate "totalitarian dictatorship."

This conclusion was reached without the

## Haig's 'New Direction' on Human Rights

By Ernest Harsch

In two recent speeches, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig outlined the Reagan administration's "new direction" in foreign policy.

As has already become evident in the White House's intervention in El Salvador, that "new direction" involves stepped-up aid to right-wing dictatorships and the labeling of any struggle for independence and social justice as "terrorism."

In the process, Reagan and Haig have been employing an even more perverted concept of "human rights" than the previous Carter administration. Haig spelled this out in a March 31 "off-the-record" speech that he gave before the Trilateral Commission in Washington.

In applying this "human rights" policy, Haig said, "the first imperative is to strengthen the U.S., its allies and friends, the main safeguard against the spread of totalitarian aggression."

As a result, Haig stressed, "we must be discriminating in our actions" in denouncing human rights violations. It is necessary, he said, "that we examine the credentials and program of the opposition as well as the government."

To justify this approach, Haig tried to draw a distinction between "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" regimes. The former, he implied, were all those that were hostile to or critical of U.S. policy; they should be opposed. The latter were not so bad, he suggested, since they wielded "absolute authority in only a few politically sensitive areas"; they should be encouraged to evolve "toward a more democratic form" through the provision of U.S. assistance.

SWP ever having the right to view, examine, or challenge supposed evidence that it advocates totalitarianism—the polar opposite of the party's consistent record in defense of democratic and trade-union rights.

Additional grounds cited by Bertness for stepping up efforts to deport SWP members make clear that virtually any foreign-born resident could come under such attack.

"It is further the position of the INS," he said, that SWP members may not be "well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States as required by sections 316 and 335 of the [immigration] Act. . . ."

Plans are already under way in the United States to hold news conferences, rallies, and picket lines to protest this attack on the democratic rights of millions. Special appeals will be made for support from unions, civil liberties organizations, and international solidarity groups.

Protests from abroad can be especially helpful. These should be sent to: Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C. 20536. □

The real meaning of this dual approach has become absolutely clear in the White House's recent policy moves.

On the one hand, it has taken action against a number of regimes that it considers "totalitarian." Credits for wheat sales to Nicaragua have been cut off, food aid to Mozambique has been stopped, new threats have been leveled against Cuba, and pressures have been put on various European countries to deny economic aid to Grenada.

On the other hand, Washington has been establishing closer ties with such brutal "authoritarian" regimes as those in South Korea, Argentina, Chile, the Philippines, and El Salvador.

The speeches by officials like Haig are intended as clear signals to proimperialist dictatorships around the world that they have a green light from Washington to use any means necessary to keep down their insurgent populations.

In an April 24 speech, Haig also tried to revive a standard U.S. justification for its aggressive actions: the specter of a "Soviet danger."

Moscow, Haig charged, "is the greatest source of international insecurity today. Let us be plain about it: Soviet promotion of violence as the instrument of change constitutes the greatest danger to the world."

The real purpose of such attacks on Moscow is to smear any struggle for social change as nothing but an instance of Soviet-backed "terrorism" or "war by proxy"—to use Haig's words.

In an obviously coordinated effort to reinforce Haig's arguments, the new Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism

opened its hearings in Washington on the same day. The chairman of the committee, Senator Jeremiah A. Denton, began the hearings by reading a new CIA definition of terrorism that encompassed actions with "insurrectionary goals."

*New York Times* correspondent Charles Mohr commented, "This would seem to include some wars of national liberation."

A day earlier, Mohr also reported on steps by Washington to inflate its tally of "international terrorist incidents." By including "threats," the total number of such alleged incidents would be doubled to 7,000 over the last twelve years, in which 8,000 persons were said to have been "killed and wounded."

But while the Reagan administration is attempting to broaden its definition of terrorism, it is likewise seeking to keep it selective. Conspicuously absent from its tallies are terrorist actions carried out by numerous pro-American regimes:

- The Chilean military junta, which came to power in 1973 through a U.S.-backed coup, murdered some 20,000 workers and political activists in the wake of the coup.

- During the last months of the shah's tyranny in Iran, an estimated 60,000 men, women, and children were gunned down for demonstrating their opposition to the U.S.-backed butcher.

- Since the beginning of 1980, according to Catholic Church figures, some 19,000 Salvadorans have been killed or "disappeared" by the pro-American junta in that country.

These are only a few examples out of many. They all point to the actual "greatest source of international insecurity"—the imperialist government in Washington.

Haig's speeches have been aimed not only at foreign audiences. They are also part of Washington's ongoing campaign to try to undercut domestic opposition to the arms buildup and moves to intervene militarily in other countries.

By continually harping on a fictitious "Soviet danger," the U.S. rulers are hoping to confuse Americans about what is really going on in Central America, the Caribbean, Iran, and elsewhere.

But at the same time, they know that opposition to U.S. military moves abroad runs deep and cannot be turned around by wild charges of "international terrorism."

That is why they are now seeking to strengthen the powers of the FBI, CIA and other secret police agencies.

In his report on the steps to inflate the U.S. government's tally of "terrorist" incidents, Mohr commented that the new figures could "be cited by conservatives to justify increased surreptitious surveillance of political dissidents at home."

An indication of this came during the hearings of the Senate subcommittee. Senator Denton lashed out at "a story-hungry and sometimes gullible press" that he charged had fallen for a Soviet "disinformation" campaign.

Arnaud de Borchegrave, a former *Newsweek* correspondent who is a well-known publicist for the CIA, testified that there was "irrefutable proof" that Moscow was playing "a covert role in promoting the anti-nuclear lobby" in the United States. He specifically accused the Mobilization for Survival, a coalition of 140 groups opposed to nuclear energy and the Pentagon's arms buildup.

The antinuclear coalition replied that the Senate testimony was "reminiscent of the repression and intimidation of the McCarthy era."

But this is not the 1950s. As the frequent demonstrations, marches, and rallies against U.S. military intervention in El Salvador have shown, the American people are not being intimidated by the Reagan administration's propaganda drive. □

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Intercontinental Press (ISSN 0162-5594).  
Intercontinental Press, 410 West Street,  
New York, N.Y. 10014. Published in New  
York each Monday except the first in Janu-  
ary and the third and fourth in August.

**Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y.**

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Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

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material stands on the program of the Fourth International.

**To Subscribe:** For one-year subscriptions in the U.S. or Canada send \$35.00 (41.00 Canadian dollars) to Intercontinental Press, 410 West Street, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates for first class and airmail.

For air-speeded subscriptions to Australia: Write to Pathfinder Press, P.O. Box K208, Haymarket 2000. In New Zealand: Write to Socialist Books, P.O. Box 3774, Auckland.

For airmail subscriptions to Britain, Ireland, and continental Europe send \$50 for one year; \$25 for six months. Write for subscription rates to all other countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, 410 West Street, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Intercontinental Press is published by the 408 Printing and Publishing Corporation, 408 West Street, New York, N.Y. 10014. Offices at 408 West Street, New York, N.Y.

### French Voters Give Giscard a Stinging Rebuff

By Pierre Sylvain

PARIS—The results of the first round of the French presidential election, held on April 26, were a stinging rebuff to incumbent president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The 28.3 percent of the vote that he garnered was some 4 percentage points lower than his showing in the first round of the 1974 presidential elections.

Giscard's low vote total is all the more significant since he had the benefit of the one-sided support of the entire mass media. Giscard was closely trailed by François Mitterrand, the candidate of the Socialist Party, who received 25.9 percent of the vote. The two will meet in the second round of the election, which takes place on May 10.

The total votes received by rightist candidates added up to 49 percent, as against more than 51 percent in the first round in 1974. In that year the second round of the election, which also pitted Giscard against Mitterrand, was decided by the slimmest of margins, with less than 1 percent separating the two.

The results of the first round, therefore, confirm that Giscard is in serious trouble. He can be defeated in the May 10 second round.

This is all the more true because the vote total of Gaullist candidate Jacques Chirac, who polled some 18 percent of the vote, also reflects a disavowal of the policies of Giscard and his prime minister Raymond Barre. Chirac was able to more or less stop the erosion of the Gaullist vote, but only by stepping up his criticisms of Giscard, whom he had helped to elect in 1974 and whom he had served as prime minister from 1974 to 1976.

Because Chirac's campaign was marked by strong criticism of the incumbent president, some of Chirac's supporters are unlikely to vote for Giscard on May 10. Chirac himself is refusing to mobilize his supporters for Giscard. The Gaullist leader announced that he personally would vote for Giscard, but said he was leaving his supporters to follow their own consciences in casting their second round votes.

The Socialist Party was the big winner in the first round. Its 25.9 percent of the vote was the highest percentage it has ever received and continues the upward trend seen since 1974.

Many workers decided to vote for Mitterrand in the first round, even if they did not identify with the SP's policies, in order to better set the stage for his victory in the second round. This view also motivated the opportunist support to Mitterrand by an organization that describes itself as

Trotskyist, the Internationalist Communist Organization (OCI).

This also explains the low vote received by Michel Crépeau, the candidate of the Radical Left Movement (MRG), a very small bourgeois grouping with a special relationship to the Socialist Party (Crépeau received 2.2 percent of the total).

A significant number of traditionally Communist voters also cast their ballots for Mitterrand in the first round. In fact, the Communist Party's results were the party's worst since 1936. With 15.4 percent of the total, the CP lost the votes of nearly one-quarter of those who voted CP in the 1978 legislative elections and the 1979 European Parliament elections.

It is true that the presidential elections are not the most favorable forum for the CP, but the Communist presidential candidate in 1969, Jacques Duclos, nonetheless received more than 21 percent of the vote.

The main reason for the CP's poor showing is the dismay of many of its traditional supporters over the disunity campaign the CP has been waging for many months, with CP candidate Marchais centering his fire on the Socialist Party and refusing to state whether he would support Mitterrand in the second round.

Numerous CP members did not go along with their party's policies, which were setting the stage for Giscard's reelection. This forced the CP to change the focus of its election campaign in the final weeks. Instead of centering all his attacks on the SP, Georges Marchais of the CP began putting himself forward as the real anti-Giscard candidate and called for the establishment of an SP-CP government. But this last-minute change was none too convincing.

The CP, therefore, paid the price for its policy of increasing the disunity of the workers movement, which allowed François Mitterrand to seem like the candidate most favorable to unity.

A layer of CP voters, therefore, cast their first round votes for the Socialist Party candidate. Others preferred to abstain or to vote for the candidate of the United Socialist Party (PSU), Huguette Bouchardeau, or the candidate of Lutte Ouvrière (Workers Struggle), Arlette Laguiller.

The April 26 voting also confirms the continued existence of a layer of voters voting for candidates to the left of the SP and CP. While the PSU candidate received only 1.1 percent of the vote, that is largely explained by the fact that the PSU's main concern was to sidle up to the SP and CP

without radically criticizing their policies.

Arlette Laguiller, of the Trotskyist organization Lutte Ouvrière, received 2.3 percent of the total, clearly maintaining the level she reached in the 1974 election. This was a significant result, although Laguiller had hoped for a considerably higher total for her populist campaign, in which attacks on the capitalist system were often placed on the back burner. Laguiller also turned her back on the immediate central task for revolutionists in the campaign—mobilizing the workers for unity to insure the defeat of Giscard.

The Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), the French section of the Fourth International, had put forward Alain Krivine as its candidate. Krivine's campaign focused on the need for workers unity to defeat Giscard, but he was denied a place on the ballot.

The LCR is now using all the means at its disposal to fight for workers unity in the second round. Immediately after the first round results were announced, the LCR pasted up tens of thousands of posters around France stating "Now, all together, let's throw out Giscard!"

It also distributed hundreds of thousands of leaflets calling for the mobilization of all the forces of the workers movement so that not a single vote is lost to Mitterrand on May 10, and calling on the CP to wage a massive campaign for a vote for Mitterrand in the second round. The leaflet also called for the formation of an SP-CP government, without any bourgeois ministers.

By getting rid of Giscard on May 10, the workers would create a more favorable situation for advancing together in their struggles for their demands. □

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## LCR Calls for Vote for Workers Parties

By Will Reissner

More than 10,000 people attended an April 11-12 Festival for Unity in Paris sponsored by the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), the French section of the Fourth International. The festival had originally been planned as a campaign rally for Alain Krivine, the LCR's candidate for president of France in the current elections, which are being held in two rounds on April 26 and May 10.

But two days before the festival, the governmental election commission announced that Krivine would not be on the ballot. Krivine had previously been the LCR's presidential candidate in 1969 and 1974.

After the 1974 election the law was changed to make access to the presidential ballot more difficult. Whereas the old law had required candidates to get the "sponsorship" of 100 elected officials, under the new law a candidate needs 500 sponsorships, with a geographical distribution requirement. Socialist Party and Communist Party members of parliament had voted against the new law, branding it undemocratic.

Despite the stiffer measures of the new law, by February Krivine had secured the sponsorship of 580 elected officials. At that point, however, the national leaderships of the Socialist and Communist parties issued instructions to all their elected officials not to sign for the candidate of any other party. As a result, several hundred officials withdrew their sponsorship from Krivine.

The Giscard government also exerted pressure on local officials not to sign for minor-party candidates, issuing veiled threats that mayors who signed for such candidates would find it hard to get grants and other municipal aid.

Despite big efforts to overcome the effects of the several hundred withdrawals of sponsorship, the LCR was not able to climb back to the 500 mark by the April 7 filing date.

Although Krivine will not be on the April 26 ballot, the campaign he waged up to the filing date was highly successful. The LCR candidate addressed more than sixty large meetings in the principal cities and towns of France. His speaking engagements were widely reported in the regional press, and he was able to make a nationally televised speech.

The LCR's campaign focused on the need to force the leaders of the Communist and Socialist parties to abandon their sectarian policies. These have led to the total disunity of the workers movement

and its inability to mount a united response to the attacks that the government and employers have made against the rights and living standards of French workers.

The political divisions between the SP and CP are also reflected on the trade-union level in the rivalry between the two main union federations—the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and the French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT).

Krivine's campaign was designed to allow voters who have traditionally voted for the CP or SP to cast a first round ballot for a candidate who said it was time to stop the sectarian bickering and unite to defeat Giscard and the capitalist austerity programs. *Rouge*, the weekly paper of the LCR, noted in its April 10 issue that the reaction to Krivine's campaign indicated that this message "is understood by the workers and corresponds to their aspirations."

Large numbers of workers who belong to the CP, SP, CGT, and CFDT attended Krivine's meetings, which provided forums for discussing how the divisions in the workers movement could be overcome.

If Krivine had secured a place on the first round ballot, he would have had access to considerable television and radio time, and would have had his election platform distributed by the government to all registered voters. In that way he could have brought that same message to millions of working people, in addition to the tens of thousands reached so far.

But even without the benefits that ballot status provides for getting out the message that it is time to overcome the disunity, the LCR is continuing its campaign around that theme.

A special focus of the LCR's activity will be a campaign to pressure the various trade-union federations and workers parties to agree to sponsor joint May Day demonstrations this year.

May 1 falls between the first and second round of the election and could be a powerful show of strength and unity by the workers movement around whichever workers-party candidate makes it to the second round. For that reason it is of utmost importance that there not be a repetition of the situation last year, when each labor federation sponsored its own, conflicting May Day marches.

Arlette Laguiller of Lutte Ouvrière, an organization that describes itself as Trotskyist, succeeded in achieving ballot status

in the first round. The thrust of her campaign has been that it does not make much difference whether Mitterrand or Giscard is elected, although she feels it would be somewhat better to have Mitterrand, a "false friend" of the workers movement, than Giscard, a "real enemy."

The other major group that describes itself as Trotskyist, the International Communist Organization (OCI), is calling for a first round vote for Mitterrand.

Finally, the United Socialist Party (PSU), a left-social democratic formation, is also running in the first round. Its candidate is Huguette Bouchardeau.

At the April 11-12 Festival for Unity, Krivine explained the LCR's position on the first round of the election. He noted that none of the candidates of the workers parties are waging a campaign around the need for the unity of the workers movement against the offensive of the employers and the state. For that reason, Krivine says a call for a vote for any particular candidate would simply endorse their particular sectarian outlook toward the elections and the post-election period.

On the other hand, Krivine noted, "casting a spoiled or blank ballot would simply be grist for the mill of Giscard's policies."

So the LCR is calling on workers to vote for any of the working-class candidates, so that in the first round "workers candidates get 50 percent or more of the votes cast." It is also calling on all workers candidates to unconditionally agree to support whichever workers candidate makes it to the second round, in order to insure that incumbent president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is defeated.

Up to now, neither CP candidate Georges Marchais nor SP candidate François Mitterrand has explicitly stated they would back the other in the second round. Anything less than full support by the entire workers movement for whichever candidate does best in the first round could result in the reelection of Giscard.

The most likely situation is that the second round will feature Mitterrand and Giscard. In that situation the LCR believes that the CP has a special responsibility to call on all its supporters to vote for Mitterrand in the second round. One poll indicated recently that 20 percent of those voting for Marchais in the first round did not plan to vote for Mitterrand if he was the only workers candidate in the second round.

The LCR has no illusions that Mitterrand's election in and of itself would lead to major gains for the French workers movement. Mitterrand's program does not go much beyond class collaborationist generalities and proposals for modest reforms.

But his election would alter the political situation to the benefit of the workers movement and would lead to a revival of struggles against the effects of the capitalist economic crisis. □

## Thatcher Stonewalls as Northern Ireland Protests Mount

By David Frankel

Northern Ireland is building up to a political explosion.

Irish republican political prisoner Bobby Sands has completed his eighth week on hunger strike and is close to death.

On April 26 the largest demonstration in the past decade took place in Belfast as Sands's sister Marcella led a march to show support for the prisoners.

Rebellions of the oppressed Catholic population have broken out in cities throughout the British-occupied enclave—in Belfast, Derry, Newry, Lurgan, Strabane, and Dungannon.

In Belfast, thousands marched on April 19 to commemorate the heroic 1916 Easter uprising against British rule. Following a similar demonstration in Derry British troops responded to a group of stone-throwing youths by smashing their landrovers into the crowd, killing two teenagers.

As the priest presiding at one of the funerals bitterly remarked, "people whose occupation it is to uphold the law seem to want only to destroy the law."

Bernadette Devlin McAliskey, a leader of the campaign in behalf of the republican political prisoners warned the following day that "the wrath of the people will be vented" if Sands dies.

"By allowing Bobby Sands to die," she declared, "the British will have clearly established that they have no right to be in this country and are incapable of governing this country with any degree of humanity."

But British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is taking the same callous and unyielding attitude to the demands of the oppressed Catholic population in Northern Ireland as to the British workers suffering under her austerity policies.

### Policy of Provocation

Speaking in Saudi Arabia April 21, Thatcher took time out from a tour in which she pledged her support to some of the most backward, vicious, and dictatorial regimes in the world to give a self-righteous lecture to the Irish people.

"There can be no question of political status for someone serving a sentence for crime," Thatcher remarked. "Crime is crime. It is not political and there can be no question of granting political status."

Responding with flinty cynicism to an appeal by three leading members of the Irish parliament for a meeting on Sands's case, Thatcher declared that "it is not my habit or custom to meet M.P.'s from a foreign country about a citizen of the



Marcella Sands (right) marching in April 26 demonstration to back hunger strikers.

United Kingdom resident in the United Kingdom."

A further step in what is clearly a policy of conscious provocation by the British government came when the authorities refused to allow former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark and peace activist Daniel Berrigan to meet with Sands.

Such a meeting, the British said, "would serve no useful purpose."

At a news conference on April 23 Clark said the British government "knows it is confronted with a crisis in which lives could be lost."

"Doesn't it care?" he asked.

Saving lives, however, is the last thing on the minds of the British rulers. Much more important from their point of view is the question of how to crush the new upsurge in the struggle of the Irish people.

### Centuries of British Oppression

Behind the latest turmoil in Northern Ireland is a history of centuries of colonial oppression by the British. When Thatcher gives her hypocritical homilies on "crime is crime," she would do well to recall the record of her government.

When English armies finally conquered Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they established what came to be known as the Protestant ascendancy.

What was involved was not just religion. The Irish people had their own language, history, and culture, and the colonial rulers sought to stamp these out as part of the process of absorbing their new possession.

Land—the main form of wealth—was taken from the Irish and given to English overlords. In the north, where the resistance to the conquest had been the strongest, mass emigration of settlers from Britain was encouraged. This was how the current division between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland originated.

The native Irish were relegated to a life of poverty as tenant farmers on what had once been their own land. Irish Catholics were long forbidden to hold public office, and until 1869 they were forced to pay tithes to support the Protestant Church of Ireland.

But the Irish never stopped their struggle for self-determination, and in 1919 they launched a war of independence that forced the British to give up their hold on the bulk of the island. However, the British retained the six northern counties, with their historically proimperialist Protestant majority.

Northern Ireland was established in 1920 by an act of the British Parliament. Ireland had been partitioned against the will of the majority of the Irish people.

Within the British-ruled enclave, the Catholic population continued to face segregation in education and housing, discrimination in employment and governmental aid, and a rigged electoral system that effectively deprived it of any voice in government.

Moreover, the Catholic population faced regular pogroms carried out by Protestant gangs with the complicity and even the participation of the police.

### Rise of Civil Rights Movement

These conditions led to the rise of a civil rights movement in 1968 that was inspired by the Black struggle in the United States. Tens of thousands of Catholics were mobilized in the streets to demand an end to the discrimination they faced in their daily lives.

The civil rights protests were met by violence from the government and from gangs of right-wing Protestants. The Catholic population was forced to arm itself and to seal off the Catholic neighborhoods in self-defense.

In August 1969, following particularly heavy attacks on the Catholic areas, the British army was ordered into Northern Ireland. At first most Catholics welcomed

the British troops because they expected the British to protect them against the attacks of the Northern Ireland police and the rightist gangs.

It quickly became apparent, however, that the British were not about to do that. Instead, in the name of keeping the peace, the British forces began making raids and house-to-house searches to disarm the Catholic communities.

Proimperialist Protestants, in contrast, were able to legally own firearms by serving as reservists in the notorious Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR).

By the time the British introduced internment without trial in August 1971 there was no longer any illusions among the nationalist population about which side the army was on.

#### The Political Prisoner Issue

Internment was one of the weapons traditionally used against activists in the struggle for Irish self-determination. By invoking this hated measure, the British government served notice of its intention to crush the struggle in Northern Ireland.

British intentions were underscored on January 30, 1972, when army paratroopers opened fire on a civil rights demonstration of some 15,000 people in Derry, killing thirteen persons in cold blood.

But internment did not succeed in crushing the resistance of the nationalist population in the North. Furthermore, the imprisonment without trial of political activists was arousing more and more opposition internationally.

In response to this, the British officially ended internment in December 1975. Instead, they set up a system of special courts to try republican suspects.

Under the new system republican suspects could be held for up to one week in special "interrogation centers." The European Human Rights Commission issued an 8,400 page report in September 1976 accusing the British government of carrying out systematic torture of prisoners in these interrogation centers.

Using confessions obtained through these methods, the British would obtain convictions in the special juryless courts they had set up for precisely this purpose. On this basis, the British imperialists refused to continue the special status that republican prisoners had been previously accorded.

Or, as Thatcher puts it, "There can be no question of political status for someone serving a sentence for crime. Crime is crime."

#### Hunger Strike

Republican prisoners have carried out a five-year struggle against the British attempt to label them criminals. The latest stage of that struggle began in October 1980 when seven republican prisoners in the H-Block at Long Kesh prison went on

hunger strike.

The hunger strikers won massive support throughout Ireland. Supporters of the prisoners later found out that the assessment of the Northern Ireland police was that they would not be able to contain the protests in the event that one of the hunger strikers should die.

Faced with this situation, the British promised concessions to the hunger strikers and the prisoners called off their protest after fifty-three days. But the British reneged on the agreement and Bobby Sands resumed the hunger strike on March 1. He has since been joined by three other prisoners—Frankie Hughes, Ray McCreesh, and Patsy O'Hara.

Sands's election to the British Parliament on April 9 was an indication of how deeply the plight of the prisoners has stirred the Irish people. His election victory strengthened the hand of the hunger strikers and it highlighted the stakes in this fight.

#### Thatcher's Weakened Position

Thatcher hoped that by refusing to carry out the agreement after the last hunger strike she would succeed in demoralizing the prisoners and their supporters. That ploy did not work and it cannot be used a second time.

On the other hand, for Thatcher to back

down now would mean a gigantic defeat for the British government. It would mean a major shift in the political situation in Ireland to the advantage of the anti-imperialist movement.

It is in this context that Thatcher is carrying out her policy of provocation. British rule in Ireland has always depended on terrorism against the nationalist population, and the current struggle has brought that reality very close to the surface.

However, Thatcher is not carrying out her policy of brinkmanship in Ireland from a position of strength. This is especially clear if the situation in Britain itself is taken into account.

The economic crisis in Britain has resulted in a deep radicalization of the working class (see article on page 445). There have been massive mobilizations against Thatcher's hated austerity policies, unemployment, and nuclear weapons. The Labour Party has moved sharply to the left.

Objectively, the anti-imperialist fighters in Ireland are allies of the British working class in its struggle against the Thatcher government. And big struggles in Ireland may well lead growing numbers of British workers to adopt precisely this point of view. □

## 30,000 March in Belfast

BELFAST—Speaking to a crowd of more than 30,000 on the Falls Road here April 26, Bernadette Devlin McAliskey warned the nationalist population of the North that the coming weeks could be the hardest they have faced in the last eleven years.

It was an immense gathering—perhaps the largest demonstration in the history of the movement begun with the civil-rights demonstrations of 1968-69.

The protest reached out to embrace even the most conservative sections of the Catholic population of West Belfast.

"In this time of historic trial," McAliskey said, "what the Irish people need above all are courage, organization, unity, and discipline." She called on the population and on the young people especially not to waste their strength in futile confrontations with the security forces but to conserve it for the more decisive struggles to come.

Today hope is dwindling that republican political prisoner Bobby Sands can survive. The hunger striker's death is expected within a day or two at most.

The government has reacted to the crisis by launching a wave of repression. In the last few days, seven leading H-Block activists have been jailed. All were arrested under section 12 of the Special Powers Act, which allows the detention of "terrorist" suspects for up to seven days without charge or trial. However, those arrested are all well-known, public activists whose only crime is to have led street demonstrations in behalf of the republican political prisoners.

The atmosphere is extremely tense. Barricades have been erected throughout Derry city, and experienced activists say the situation resembles the period of "Free Derry" in 1969-72 when troops and police were kept out of the city.

In the next days, the pace of events will almost certainly accelerate quite rapidly. International solidarity with the republican prisoners, the jailed H-Block activists, and the entire nationalist population must be organized and mobilized.

—Gerry Foley

## The Struggle Against British Repression in Ireland

[The current hunger strike by nationalist political prisoners in Northern Ireland was preceded by a fifty-three-day hunger strike that ended last December. Bernadette Devlin McAliskey, a leader of the National H-Block/Armagh Committee which organized support for the republican prisoners, and the victim of an attempted political assassination by proimperialist thugs in January, gave the following interview to Gerry Foley in Coalisland, Northern Ireland, on March 19.]

\* \* \*

*Question. What sort of balance sheet would you make of the autumn hunger strike campaign?*

*Answer.* The H-Block campaign grew up around the single issue of political status for the prisoners, the prisoners' five demands. Following the end of the hunger strike, by January, it was clear that we had not achieved the five demands. Nonetheless, we had achieved a great deal.

The H-Block campaign mobilized the largest number of activists since the beginning of the civil rights movement, and more people. We had an opportunity of a second run. We had learnt from twelve years of mistakes.

Every locality that was involved had its own elected local committee. With very few exceptions, the method followed was to call a public meeting in an area. If there were signs that there was enough support, what we did first was hold informative meetings. That is, we would send in national speakers to speak on the issue and then ask people to come back to a working meeting. The people who came back prepared to work then elected a committee.

So, there was a much more democratic basis to the local committees than there was in the civil rights days. This made the whole campaign stronger, since it wasn't just a matter of the national committee calling people out onto the streets and then having no way to follow up the work.

The hunger strike itself was very important as a focus for mobilizing people. The numbers of people who came out on the streets were much bigger than we had believed possible in starting out or, in fact, than those that had been mobilized in 1968-69.

The increase in the political weight of the demonstrations was even greater. When people came out in 1968-69, they had no idea of the serious step they had taken, no idea that they were going to rock this country to its foundations. Whereas the people who came out this time knew the price that had been paid and that re-

mained to be paid for standing up to protest against oppression.

The people who came on the streets this time knew of Bloody Sunday, knew of people shot by the British army, they knew about the sort of harassment you face after you stand up and let yourself be counted. And yet they came out in bigger numbers.

There was another major advance beyond 1968-69. We made a breakthrough in building organized support in the South. Previous to this, there were a number of emotional upsurges in the South—the response to the burning of Bombay Street in 1969 and the flow of refugees across the border and the massive industrial shutdown that followed Bloody Sunday in 1972.

But there were just unorganized waves of emotion. They passed, leaving nothing to build on.

This time we got the South moving, and that was of crucial importance. We did not pull out tens of thousands of workers on the December 10 National Day of Action. We were not in a position to call a general strike. But we turned what had been an attitude of apathy and hostility into one of sympathy, and we began to organize it, and to organize it in the workplaces.

We threw the establishment off balance. At the height of the campaign, the church was afraid to go against us. The police were seriously divided among themselves about how to treat the demonstrations.

The Haughey government in Dublin was afraid to oppose the H-Block committees politically and found it necessary to keep up a whole pretense of concern by being readily available to the prisoners' relatives at all times. Our opponents were on the defensive.

Even those who at the start of the hunger strike had demanded that Britain not concede, that the prisoners be allowed to die, had turned into prison reformers by the end of the campaign. They were saying that they had always and ever been in favor of general prison reform, and that this should be implemented in order to resolve the situation.

*Q. You mentioned the walkouts in the South on the National Day of Action. Could you describe how these were organized?*

*A.* The strongest areas were those where we had the broadest and most effective local action committees. We did have a trade-union subcommittee. It worked very hard. However, it had a fundamental weakness. It was essentially made up of

representatives of left-wing organizations.

They were all earnest young men with beards. That's not to say that they weren't genuine trade unionists. They were. But with very few exceptions they were all members of revolutionary left organizations. With somewhat more exceptions, they were under the age of thirty-five.

They nearly all belonged to the higher class unions, the teachers unions, the journalists union. They worked very hard, but they got very little return for their work.

The main way that we got into the factories was through building local action committees that were so broad and therefore so representative of the community that some of the members worked in the local factories and took the campaign in there.

They got one or more supporters, raised the argument, pushed it, and were able to get the workers to walk out. Basically their credentials were sound enough, in that they were not strangers, they were not outsiders.

The walkouts were small by comparison with the total number of organized workers in the country. But from the standpoint of the historic relation between labor and the national movement in this country, they were significant. We actually had workers walking out in support of the prisoners, instead of walking out against them.

*Q. When did they walk out against them?*

*A.* At the height of the Peace Movement we had workers walking out of factories to support Betty Williams and to go on peace marches. That was in 1975-76. We had trade-union branches supporting the Peace Movement's resolutions and calling on the Provos [Provisional Irish Republican Army] to quit.

*Q. Where were the most significant walkouts?*

*A.* The best organized ones were in Cork and Waterford. What I found significant about the Waterford action, although it was not a big walkout, was that involvement in it extended through the union leadership.

Here, not only was the union leadership forced to go along with the movement but the middle layer—the secretaries of the areas committees of all three major unions—actually supported it.

Waterford is a Labour Party area and the mayor is a member of the Labour Party [which has a strongly proimperialist



line] and he was put in a position where he had to come out publicly and support an unofficial work stoppage in support of the prisoners, despite the fact that the union of which he is a member and the party of which he is a member were opposed to it.

*Q. To what do you attribute the strength of the Waterford walkout?*

A. I got to know Waterford fairly well during the campaign against entering the Common Market in 1971-72. In this area the republicans tend to be involved in the labor movement and the local union leaders tend to be republican. It is an area where there has not been the dichotomy between the labor movement and the anti-imperialist movement that exists most other places. That made it easier for the campaign to penetrate into the labor movement.

*Q. In Belfast, the local people say, the union leaders are republican but they leave their politics outside the union and the job. Why should Belfast be so different from Waterford?*

A. There has been a historic separation, since Connolly's death, between the labor and the anti-imperialist movements. Waterford is the exception to the rule.

In many areas, the shop stewards are members of the republican movement but leave their politics outside the unions. This has to do with what I call the subversive mentality that is acquired in the republican movement. You have a situation where

your ardent Sinn Féin member never raises republican arguments in the factory.

I think that one of the important things that we achieved in the H-Block campaign was that we finally won the argument with the republican movement that its members should function politically as entire human beings, that they had to take their politics into the workplace. In Sligo, for example, almost all the industrial work was done by the republican movement.

They woke up and discovered that they were all people who worked for a living, and members of trade unions, and that they could take the issue onto the job, and they did. Here, very much as in Waterford, we were able to draw the middle layer of the trade-union leadership in.

*Q. Don't you think that there is a special problem in Belfast because of the fact that Catholics are on the defensive in the workplace? It's mostly the Protestants who have the jobs.*

A. That worsens it. In the Antrim area, for example, you have the big ICI and Ankyon factory. Catholics who work there come in from small Catholic areas where there are local action committees.

But they daren't stay out from their work. Because if the National H-Block Committee organized a national day of stoppage and those people did not appear at their work, their work probably wouldn't be there for them the next day, nor would there be any chance of trade-union support, because they would be

completely isolated in Loyalist dominated unions.

*Q. The H-Block campaign could give impetus to the development of militant currents in the unions, couldn't it? You can make a breakthrough on this issue but then you quickly come up against the problem that the leadership of the trade-union movement in most cases is proimperialist. At a certain point you have to be able to offer an alternative to move forward. Moreover, proimperialist leaders would not be very good defenders of the workers' economic interests, especially in a period of international capitalist crisis.*

A. The need for offering an alternative came up not just in the trade-union movement. It was posed for Irish society as a whole. The campaign was polarizing the country.

If anyone ever doubted the fundamental importance of the issue of repression, of the prisoners, they should have realized it watching the effect this campaign had on political and social life in this country.

There was not a single organization—outside of Sinn Féin and People's Democracy—that was not rocked to its foundations over the question of what attitude to take toward the prisoners. And it became clear that those who were wrong on the question of imperialism could not fight effectively either for the interests of the groups they claimed to represent.

In the feminist movement, for example, we had to argue against feminists who were opposed to supporting the prisoners, and the more they objected, the more antifeminist they became.

For example, Gemma Hussey [the spokesperson on women's issues for Fine Gael, historically the more proimperialist of the Irish bourgeois parties] told me that in the H-Block campaign women were being used. The most politically aware women in Ireland, women who were fighting, were being used as a ploy of men. These women didn't have the political intelligence to see what they were doing.

She actually said that the women in Armagh prison were only going on hunger strike to emulate the men, that they had been ordered onto it by the men.

Here was a woman who had been arguing all her life that women were intelligent human beings. And then she fell back on the argument that the reason Máiréad Farrell was on hunger strike was that she didn't want to live without Tommy McKearney. Tommy McKearney is going to die and his sweetheart in Armagh prison, out of dumb loyalty, is going to lie down and die with him.

On the other hand, you had the trade unionists who did not want to support the prisoners turning to class-collaborationist arguments.

They would argue that while jobs were being wiped out in the North by the



Part of December 6, 1980, rally in Dublin in support of H-Block and Armagh political prisoners.

recession, we, the undefined Southern nation, were doing relatively well, and the problems of the North were not our concern. It's not good for us to be divided over what was going to happen in the North, that is not good for the national interest.

People had come in here and built a factory and were giving us jobs. And in the present recession keeping these jobs requires maintaining a certain level of productivity. And you're coming in here and creating an argument, you're dividing our workforce on something that is not wages and is not conditions, and if you continue to do that, then at the end of the day, you will anger our employer, and if you anger him he might take our factory away, and we will have no jobs.

Then you'd get the other side of the coin. Look at the people who support you, you have Fianna Fáil, it's a bourgeois party. We were supposed to be class collaborationists because Fianna Fáil people supported the prisoners. We got this argument from the Socialist Workers Movement. We cannot support you unless you raise a demand that will make it impossible for members of Fianna Fáil to support you. The slogan should be "We support the prisoners and democratic workers control." That way no terrible people like Fianna Fáil will be able to support it.

*Q. How did the various political groupings manage to work together in the campaign?*

A. There was a whole experience of learning how to work with each other. I think that we learned a lot that will be of tremendous benefit to the present campaign and to building in the future. It's surprising that although this is such a small area and such a close-knit community that the personal gulf was so wide, that the leaders of Sinn Féin did not sit down to talk on a personal basis with the leaders of People's Democracy or myself.

We went through a whole experience of learning to tolerate the mistakes of other organizations and to see our own mistakes from their point of view. We were able to just pitch in and work together and stick to the issues.

This created a new confidence in the mass movement after a history of fragmentation. It's the first time we've been able to hold the leadership of a single-issue campaign from the beginning right through to the end.

*Q. What did you think about the tactics followed by the hunger strikers?*

A. The hunger strike was started off by seven men and three women. I think that the way they were chosen on the inside was very effective and very political. It showed a great political ability on the part of the prisoners. The ones who were chosen were without doubt the best.

The prisoners were selected to represent

the various areas, and there was a great affinity of people in these areas with their own prisoner. This gave the lie to all the propaganda that the Provos were a military parasite, that people were just afraid of them.

The prisoner from this area was Tommy McKearney. There were very few people who didn't know him, didn't know him as a very good person. So, there was a great community affinity with the prisoners.

Moreover, the heroism of the prisoners was an important factor. I don't think that the people would have mobilized without this example. The emotion and the nationalism it drew out of the people frightened the establishment.

## Mass Trial of Kurdish Militants Opens

### Torture in Turkey—'Widespread and Systematic'

By David Frankel

On April 13 the Turkish military dictatorship opened the trial of 447 members of the Kurdish Workers Party. Military prosecutors are demanding death sentences for 97 of the defendants, who are accused of forming "armed gangs" and planning to "annex" the southeastern region of Turkey, where at least 8 million Kurds live.

"We have been tortured for the past three months," one twenty-year-old defendant charged as the trial opened. *Washington Post* correspondent Metin Munir reported that he "appeared barely able to stand."

The judge refused to listen to the protests of torture, at one point telling a defendant, "This is between you and the prison authorities."

Most of the defendants have no lawyers. And some of the defense lawyers who were on hand complained that they had not been allowed to talk to their clients.

One can imagine the cries of outrage in the capitalist press if such a trial were being held in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. However, as an April 10 Associated Press dispatch reporting on the sale of jet fighter planes to Turkey by the Reagan administration noted:

"[U.S.] Military officials regard Turkey as an indispensable ally on the southern flank of the Atlantic alliance, particularly with growing instability in the Persian Gulf region."

Torture in Turkey, according to an Amnesty International report issued in February, is "widespread and systematic." As of April 8, Amnesty International had the names of twenty people who have died in custody since the military coup last September. It has the names of twenty-two people who were tortured in the city of Denizli alone.

*Q. Well, do you think that the country was on the verge of a revolution or not?*

A. There was a feeling in the meetings, not that we would free Ireland by Christmas but that we were on the start of something the end of which was freedom and a united Ireland.

There was a long road between here and there but that we had started on that road again and we could see the end of it in our lifetime. It was a feeling that you could actually win.

It's like the beginning of the civil rights movement, when people felt like at least they had ended forever the days of quiet subjection. I don't think that that is something that can be underestimated. □

"Police in Turkey have always used methods that can be described as torture," one top Turkish official told *Christian Science Monitor* reporter Sam Cohen in an attempt to minimize the abuses of the new regime.

Unfortunately, the fact is that there has been a qualitative increase in the level of repression in Turkey. That was the purpose of the military coup in the first place. Examples are not hard to find.

- The Turkish daily *Cumhuriyet* reported February 18 that two young women were sentenced to five years and three years and four months imprisonment for putting up political posters.

- It was announced March 26 that former Minister of Public Works Serafettin Elci had been sentenced to two years and three months in prison for "making Kurdish and secessionist propaganda." He was convicted on the basis of published statements such as "I am a Kurd. There are Kurds in Turkey," and "the east has been left to underdevelopment, poverty, and misery."

- In another case, journalist Lutfu Oflaz was sentenced to a year and a half in prison for an article written before the coup in which he called for a ban on the neofascist National Action Party.

Repressive moves like these are aimed above all at the Turkish workers and peasants. With unemployment already at 20 percent, and inflation at more than 100 percent in 1980, the regime is carrying through a brutal austerity program.

Disk, the Revolutionary Workers Trade Union Confederation, has been effectively banned by the government and its leaders arrested. But even the progovernment lead-

ership of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions was forced to protest April 4 when the regime announced its new labor code, which provided for wage increases far below the rate of inflation.

The Turkish torturers received \$1.2 billion in economic aid from the imperialist

powers last year, more than half of it from the United States and West Germany. They are seeking \$1.5 billion this year. Under these circumstances, international protests can prove especially effective in defending the victims of the military dictatorship. □

## 'Citizens, You Must Control Your Own Fate'

### China: Workers Run Independent Election Campaigns

By Will Reissner

In recent years numerous unofficial magazines and journals have begun publishing in China. These publications are part of an ongoing struggle in China to establish and extend democratic rights.

On September 15, 1980, representatives from twenty-one such publications met in Canton to form the China National Unofficial Publications Association. The association now issues its own publication called *Duty*. By the end of January 1981, four issues of *Duty* had already appeared.

Most of those who are trying to establish democratic norms in China have been influenced by the convulsions of the Cultural Revolution. These factional struggles served to diminish the prestige of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong, convincing many workers, students, and farmers that they had to begin to find ways to exert direct control over their own destinies.

In issue number 3 of *Duty*, published in early January 1981, an article by Zheng Xing reports on a number of recent instances when candidates have run in local elections independently of the Chinese Communist Party and on the basis of specific platforms.

According to Zheng Xing, this development began in several universities in Shanghai, and then spread to other universities throughout China and to a number of factories as well.

*Intercontinental Press* previously reported (January 19, 1981) on an election at Peking University in which a student ran for a seat in the People's Congress on the basis of his support for jailed democratic activist Wei Jingsheng. The student was elected with 70 percent of the vote.

While the examples that Zheng Xing report are not as dramatic, they indicate that the idea of running independent election campaigns on the basis of programs is spreading to a number of areas of China.

According to *Duty*, "in Peking, almost all universities are involved in elections." The author adds that even more impressive is the fact that "after workers at the Shanghai Motor Factory started the precedent of workers running in elections, work-

ers all over the country are following the example."

On November 17, 1980, two young workers, one of whom is on the editorial board of an unofficial publication, ran as candidates from their factories in the Zhaoyang district to be people's deputies. They issued a joint election manifesto in which they stated:

"For up to ten ravaging years the Chinese people suffered from the Cultural Revolution; the state and the people suffered great devastation. This is a profound lesson which clearly demonstrates to the people that because the people do not have the power to rule the country or to control their own fate, all power has fallen into the hands of a minority whose errors caused all the people heavy sacrifices."

The manifesto issued by the two worker-candidates added that "it is the strong wish of the masses that people's deputies truly represent the people. The role of the people's deputies is to defend and fight for the basic interests of the people, to ensure that the work of the government meets the people's interests, and to supervise the ruling party's policies and measures."

Their program stated that the first priority in all fields must be to increase the population's standard of living. They stated that "overall socialist modernization must be achieved, and this includes modernization in democracy, ideology, consciousness, and the people's living." One of the candidates came in third in his factory, the other placed fourth.

In December 1980 workers at the Shaoguan Smelting Factory in Guangdong nominated a twenty-three year old worker, Zhong Yueqiu, for election to the Sixth People's Congress.

Zhong accepted the nomination and issued an election manifesto promising "to bring questions of the people's suffering onto the agenda of Shaoguan's Sixth People's Congress." He also promised to work to solve thirty specific problems facing the workers in the area.

According to *Duty* reporter Zheng Xing, the candidate received considerable support from the workers. But "the factory's

bureaucrats were highly alarmed by this . . . and arbitrarily cancelled Comrade Zhong Yueqiu's candidacy." The matter was still under appeal at the time *Duty* went to press.

In early January there were elections for people's deputies in a county in Hebei Province. After the official nominations were announced, a young worker named Wang Yifeng announced his candidacy and distributed an election manifesto entitled "Citizens, you must control your own fate."

The manifesto argued that the post of people's deputy should not be bestowed simply as an honor. Rather "people's deputies should be militants and servants of the people; they should dare to fight bureaucracy, to speak for the people, to work for the people. . . ."

Wang also pointed out that workers democracy was not possible unless people could campaign for election around concrete programs.

He stated that "experience in this country tells us that without campaigns, there cannot be elections, not to speak of deputies of the people. A campaign is the . . . process whereby all candidates (nominated or self-recommended) try to win by being the best in expressing, verbally and in writing, their different ideological levels and aspirations."

In explaining his own background, Wang noted that his experience in the army "made me understand that poverty is a general phenomenon caused by the underdeveloped state of the social system and of production. And so, my only ambition came to be to help realize the liberation of all the people in the world. . . ."

"From then on, I started to pay attention to social realities, study history, politics, philosophy, etc., and seek ways to change the world. Since I was twenty-six I have known that the science of Marxism is the ideological weapon to transform one-self and transform society. Since then, I have always used Marxist theories as a guide. . . ."

Wang made three specific campaign proposals: "1. I propose that a system to elect and dismiss the administrative leaders of units be drawn up and implemented at once. . . . 2. I propose that autonomy, accounting based on the units, and sharing of profits in addition to wages be drawn up and implemented at once. . . . 3. I propose that a system to shorten working hours of women and protect their health be drawn up at once."

When the authorities placed obstacles in Wang's way, he responded by lodging official protests.

The author of the article in *Duty* concludes that although the election campaigns run up against official obstacles, "all over the country more and more workers and students will participate in election campaigns. The election movement is unfolding and ascending." □

## FBI Revives 'Terrorist International' Smear

By Nelson Blackstock

[The following are major excerpts from an article that appeared in the April 24 issue of the U.S. socialist weekly *Militant*.]

\* \* \*

NEW YORK—After eight long years it's finally come down to a matter of a piece of paper so secret that only the judge and the government can see it.

It's a crude, secret-police type frame-up—a last-ditch bid to salvage its defense in the suit brought by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) against spying and harassment.

The socialists find themselves defending the Bill of Rights of the Constitution which, as SWP National Secretary Jack Barnes explained in his testimony, stands in contradiction to the sections that enshrine the privileges of private property.

At the same time, the government is following the logic of upholding the rule of a rich few. They are trampling on basic precepts of elementary decency and justice.

Sitting in the courtroom, you began to figure something fishy was going on when

Assistant U.S. Attorney Edward G. Williams suddenly veered off into a strange line of questioning during his cross examination of Barnes on April 9. It involved such things as a so-called Secret International Operational Center in Paris; and the alleged passing of several thousand dollars to a Bolivian revolutionary in a darkened Manhattan movie theater in 1967.

To understand what this was all about you needed to know that there is now a secret affidavit in the hands of Judge Thomas Griesa. It is so secret that none of the socialists or their lawyers can lay eyes on it. Not even Jack Barnes. Despite the fact that the affidavit accuses him of committing serious crimes. And despite the fact that the government lawyers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defendants not only have access to it—the FBI wrote it.

The government's last move is made from weakness. In fact, it proves the socialist case on the face of it.

After forty years of spying—and after almost eight years of court action around

this suit—during which the government was able to question SWP leaders for hundreds of hours, they were not able to produce evidence of one single illegal act.

Unable to come up with anything that can stand the light of day, the government has stooped to asserting that they have evidence of a crime. On this basis they are arguing that they should be allowed to continue their disruption of socialist political activity.

They claim they can't reveal the nature of the evidence because it is a "state secret," and to do so will violate "national security." They are hinging their defense on the assertion that although they have evidence of crimes by the socialists, it is more important to safeguard the "source" of their information than it is to prosecute the socialists for their alleged criminal acts.

This is a final gamble to keep the axis of the case off the fundamental issue—does the government have the right to "investigate" so-called subversives, or anybody else? Not because of anything they've done. But because of what they think.

In effect, they are trying to turn the trial into a criminal case—one in which the people accused of the crimes, the socialists, are unable to confront their accuser or refute the evidence.

### Totalitarian Methods


The methods they are trying to use are characteristic of a totalitarian regime—not a bourgeois democracy, in which you are supposed to be guaranteed the right to a fair trial. Under a totalitarian dictatorship, you can be accused, tried, convicted, and sentenced without ever knowing what you were supposed to have done.

As for the "investigation" they want to continue, the secret FBI files produced during this case prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it is merely a front for the disruption of legitimate political activity.

In order to understand this turn in the trial, it is necessary to recall how the case developed in recent months.

Until last fall the government had banked on an out-of-court settlement. But when it became clear the socialists weren't settling on their terms, the government had to figure out how to mount a defense at a trial. That's when the government suddenly proclaimed at a pre-trial hearing that they had "loads of illegal acts."

The judge asked for a list. After much stalling, it finally appeared in the form of the "Mandigo affidavit."



Jack Barnes speaking at a Denver, Colorado, rally on March 20.

The judge took one look and called it "completely useless." All it contained, he said, was "a lot of quotations from public sources, and a lot of history, which anybody could go to the library and find out.

"The real question that we were waiting with bated breath to know was if the FBI had any evidence of any illegal activity by these people." In the affidavit there was none.

At the same time, the FBI said they had another list of crimes, this one secret. They would only show it to the judge *in camera*, meaning privately; and *ex parte*, meaning with the proviso that its contents not be revealed to the socialists or even to one of their lawyers.

When Jack Barnes took the stand he testified along the same lines as Farrell Dobbs, former SWP national secretary and the first witness.

Both forcefully stated what the SWP stands for and what it does. Listening to them on the stand, it was clear they were ready to testify about anything and had nothing to hide.

Under direct examination by attorney

Margaret Winter, Barnes's testimony plunged right into areas of socialist activity the government considers most vulnerable from the standpoint of reactionary laws.

#### Fourth International

Barnes made clear the SWP's political commitment to the Fourth International. The only reason the SWP does not belong, he said, is because of laws that bar it.

The SWP participates fully in the political discussions and debates in the International.

The witness said he had been to every World Congress of the International since 1969. In 1979 "around eighteen" SWP members attended the World Congress, he said.

"I gave two reports," Barnes testified. "One was around the issue of the labor movement and the increased opportunities in the unions. The second was a report on the political resolution."

Barnes described the socialists' total support for the revolutions in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada, saying that the SWP

views the leaderships in these countries as "sister parties."

In the summer of 1960, Barnes testified, he met Che Guevara in Cuba.

In 1972 in Brussels, Belgium, Barnes met with Roberto Santucho, the most prominent leader of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), one of the guerrilla organizations that had sprung up in Argentina. Santucho, who had been a supporter of the Fourth International, was breaking with it at the time. He was treacherously murdered by the Argentine government in 1976.

In 1979, Barnes stated, he visited Nicaragua. Noel Corea, a Nicaraguan-born supporter of the revolution there, and Liam James, a leader of Grenada's New Jewel Movement, spoke to an SWP conference last summer.

Barnes also told of his meetings with a member of the Cuban delegation to the United Nations in New York last year to discuss a response to the terrorist bombings and other attacks on Cubans in the United States.

With the weakening of anticommunist

## U.S. 'Guardian'—'Marxism Itself Is on Trial'

[The following editorial appeared under the headline "SWP trial: The stakes are high" in the April 22 *Guardian*, a radical newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) case against the government now being tried in New York City could well lead to a landmark decision. At issue is the right to free speech in general, and specifically the right of socialists to hold and promote their ideas.

The case is the result of a lawsuit brought by the SWP in 1973 against the FBI, CIA and other government investigative agencies for burglary of SWP offices, wiretapping, mail tampering and other harassment. Even bourgeois newspapers have argued that in its surveillance "the FBI was tinkering with the process of democracy itself" (The Philadelphia Inquirer) and "stooped to police state methods" (St. Louis Post-Dispatch).

The trial, which began on April 2 before Judge Thomas P. Griesa, is one of the first important civil liberties battles of the Reagan era. An SWP victory would be a blow against the government's repression of political expression. A government win could open the door to a new McCarthyism, particularly given the Reagan administration's plans to lift the "curbs" on intelligence activity.

The government contends that it "may legally investigate individuals or organizations regardless of what their nature is." In over 40 years of investigation, the FBI has been unable to discover any illegal activities committed by the SWP. Therefore, the government has been concentrating on the SWP's political views.

Part of the government's defense has been to equate socialist views with "terrorism" and "violence." On a more basic level, the government has challenged the right of socialists to organize and express their views. The nature of a Leninist party, advocacy of revolution, the role of mass struggles, the functioning of democratic centralism and the right to have relations with socialists in other countries have all been raised by the government in their accusations against the SWP.

For its part, the SWP is challenging not only the illegal acts against it, but also the government's entire repressive apparatus. It is challenging the constitutionality of a number of repressive laws and executive orders which have been used to disrupt the left for 40 years. Among these are:

- The Smith Act, passed in 1940, which makes it illegal to advocate the revolutionary overthrow of the government.
- The "Loyalty program," first set up by President Harry Truman, which seeks to bar "subversives" from employ-

ment in "sensitive industries."

- The Voorhis and the Registration of Foreign Agents Acts which infringe on the rights of leftists and anti-imperialists in this country to maintain contacts or provide material solidarity to left and liberation forces in other countries.

- The Immigration and Naturalization Act which allows the government to deny entry to, or to deport, noncitizens on the basis of their political opinions.

These laws, most of them dating from the McCarthy era, are still on the books and are a dangerous threat to political expression.

The FBI and CIA's 40-year campaign of illegal, unconstitutional acts demonstrates the frailty of bourgeois democracy when the state's rule is even slightly contested. The government has stressed quite candidly that, where the rights of socialists are concerned, it is above the law.

While the *Guardian* differs politically with the SWP, the largest Trotskyist formation in the U.S., we believe it is incumbent upon left and progressive people to understand the far-reaching implications of the current trial. It is not just the SWP that must face the government's accusations. In a fundamental sense, it is Marxism itself that is on trial. All progressive people would bear the brunt of an adverse decision.



The real 'terrorist international.'

sentiment, the rulers have sought to conjure up another bogeyman—terrorism. Today the government tries to smear the SWP, and other opponents as well, with the terrorist label.

One of the ways they have done this is by charging that the SWP harbored a terrorist element within its membership—the Internationalist Tendency (IT), a minority grouping inside the party in the 1970s. Likewise, they accused the International Majority Tendency, which represented one side of a dispute in the Fourth International during those years, with advocating terrorism.

Barnes refuted both lies.

"Did the IT urge SWP members to advocate terrorism? To back terrorist groups?" Winter asked.

"No, they never did that," Barnes answered.

He explained the origins of the dispute in differences at the 1969 World Congress over the strategy of rural guerrilla warfare in Latin America.

In 1977, leaders of the international majority wrote a document sharply criticizing their earlier stance. The 1979 World Congress of the Fourth International voted to rescind the positions on guerrilla warfare in Latin America adopted in 1969 and subsequent years.

Winter asked Barnes about the socialists' policy of using false names, or pseudonyms, at international gatherings. The government has tried to use this to insinuate sinister, conspiratorial motives.

"A certain number of participants come from countries in which they would face

death or imprisonment if it were known that they had attended an international gathering of the Trotskyist movement," Barnes said.

To disguise the identity of some it is necessary to assign a pseudonym to all. Otherwise, those with false names would stand out.

This is a gravely serious matter. "Many have been killed in the last decade alone," Barnes testified.

The minutes of the 1979 World Congress list some of their names: Cesar Robles, a delegate to the 1974 World Congress from Argentina; nineteen other members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores murdered by the Argentine dictatorship. There are also names from Spain, Mexico, and Peru.

In several countries of Latin America ruled by United States-sponsored dictatorships, death squads roam freely. One only has to mention the name of Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador to make the point that no opponent of oppression is safe in some places.

"Under these circumstances I consider the use of pseudonyms to be an elementary human right and duty," Barnes later told the *Militant*.

Barnes told the court which pseudonyms correspond to the actual names of Americans. But he refused to testify at the trial as to the real names of socialists from other countries.

As a security measure, many participants at international events are known to the Americans and others only by their pseudonyms. Some of the more prominent figures in the international, however, are obviously known by their real names as well.

In pretrial proceedings the socialists turned over a list of those names they could recall, all of which are public knowledge to one degree or another—under the condition that it be placed under a special protective order. This means that the information is restricted to the court, and to government lawyers involved in the case. Stiff penalties will be assessed if evidence appears that the information has been spread beyond those authorized by the court to receive it.

#### Illegal Activities

During his testimony, Winter asked Barnes if "sections of the Fourth International ever engaged in illegal activities."

"Yes," he replied.

"What countries?"

"Since 1969 in South Africa, Nicaragua, Haiti, Iran, Argentina, Chile, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and China; Spain under Franco, and Portugal under Salazar, and many others," he answered.

Asked to describe some of the illegal activities, Barnes said: "It varies from country to country. Newspapers are sometimes illegal, demonstrations. In South Africa it's illegal for Blacks and whites to

meet in the same room. Presses and mimeographs are illegal in some places. Or they're registered with the government, so they have to be stolen. Sometimes passports have to be forged to travel to meetings. All these are illegal."

"What is the view of the SWP with regard to such activities?" Winter asked.

"We totally politically support it," Barnes answered. "We think it's the only way people in these countries with tyrannical governments can express their ideas."

#### Cross-Examination

Williams's cross-examination of Barnes ranged over several topics—often skipping backward and forward to the same subject.

Only when looked at as a whole—and in the light of the existence of the secret affidavit—does a lot of it make sense.

Williams's questions dwelled on the finances of both the SWP and the company that prints the *Militant* and other publications issued by the socialists.

Williams asked about expenditures when Barnes lived in Europe in the early 1970s. Who paid the bills and in what form?

Barnes answered that the SWP pays the expenses of its members when they are assigned to work abroad.

What Williams was driving at was the existence of an imagined slush fund.

Williams's probing on finances eventually dovetailed with another line of questioning:

Did Hugo González Moscoso attend the 1967 convention of the SWP in New York City? (González Moscoso is a leader of the Bolivian section of the Fourth International.)

Did Barnes, González Moscoso, and others go to see the film *Battle of Algiers* at this time? Did they see it at a theater in Manhattan? During the movie, didn't Barnes slip González Moscoso an envelope containing thousands of dollars?

Williams did not say where he got his information.

Barnes answered that most of what was being asked was true, as far as he could recall. Except for one thing: there was no money passed.

Williams also asked if it was not true that Hugo González Moscoso got into this country on false pretenses—to "visit the Mayo clinic"—when his actual purpose was to go to the SWP convention.

Barnes flatly denied this accusation. As he later told the *Militant*, González Moscoso was a very sick man. He had been tortured by the regime, and had sought medical help in this country (Then, as today, Bolivia was under the heel of a brutal military dictatorship.)

While branding Williams's charge that the SWP passed money to González Moscoso a lie, Barnes did not rule out the possibility that a committee set up to aid victims of repressive regimes had raised money here, which González Moscoso took back with him.

"In pre-trial testimony I told the government lawyers that when González Moscoso came to this country there was deep repression in Bolivia," Barnes said. "It was not long after the murder of Che Guevara in that country.

"The left wing of the labor movement was hit hard. Many miners were in jail.

"In a poor country like that, when the breadwinner goes to jail, a family of five or six finds it difficult to even survive," Barnes said.

"So it's entirely possible that people in this country would have raised money to help their families. González Moscoso may have gotten money from some of them.

"People here are willing to do such things. Look at the support for Nicaragua and El Salvador today. There's the eye-glasses for Nicaragua campaign of the steelworkers union. Catholic organizations are coming to the aid of the embattled workers and peasants of El Salvador.

"But the SWP did not give him any money, and he did not ask for any," Barnes said.

#### Sallustro Incident

Williams had an additional line of questioning revolving around yet another big lie.

Had Barnes ever heard of a man named "Sarrostro"? Williams asked.

The witness said no, he hadn't. But he had heard the name of an Italian Fiat executive named Oberdán Sallustro.

How did you hear of the kidnapping of Sallustro? Williams asked.

Barnes said that he had read about it in *Le Monde*, the Paris daily newspaper.

In 1972 headlines throughout the world flashed the story that Sallustro had been kidnapped and held for ransom by "Trotskyist guerrillas" in Argentina. He had been seized by the People's Revolutionary Army.

At the time, Barnes was living in Europe, working with the Fourth International, he told the court.

Williams asked a series of questions that implied the following: Barnes headed something called the "secret International Operations Center" in Paris during this time. Negotiations went on at the headquarters of the Ligue Communiste, the French section of the Fourth International, between Fiat executives and leaders of the Fourth International. Although Barnes opposed such negotiations, he nonetheless knew about them—thus supposedly being directly linked to an act of terrorism.

Barnes answered these fabrications in response to Williams and further questions by Winter.

Barnes explained his and the SWP's stance toward the Sallustro affair (see accompanying editorial from the *Militant* at the time).

"We thought it was completely wrong," he said in court, "an obstacle to the movement, for the fight in Argentina."

Did he have any knowledge other than what was in the press?

"No," he answered. He read that someone from Fiat came to the Ligue Communiste headquarters in Paris, but that they "were rebuffed and told to meet with the Argentines."

"Did you tell Ernest Mandel, and Pierre

### Ernest Mandel's Reply to 'Newsweek'

In his cross-examination of SWP National Secretary Jack Barnes, FBI attorney Edward Williams introduced a fabricated quotation taken from a 1972 *Newsweek* article.

The quotation, falsely attributed by *Newsweek* to Fourth International leader Ernest Mandel, attempted to smear both the renowned Marxist economist and the Fourth International as supporters of terrorism.

In reply to Williams, Barnes explained that Mandel had written an answer to the *Newsweek* article, protesting the publication of lies about him and the Fourth International. *Newsweek* refused to print the response, but *Intercontinental Press* did in its October 9, 1972, issue.

In later questioning, on April 10, Williams returned to the theme of terrorism. As his last, and what he apparently considers his most damning question, he read Barnes a few lines from another quotation and asked Barnes if

he agreed with them.

Barnes replied, "I think that paragraph is perfect," taken as a whole.

The following is the full text of the paragraph Williams read from. It is taken from Mandel's answer to *Newsweek*.

"It is true that in addition to its above-mentioned basic goals, the Fourth International firmly supports, in a spirit of solidarity with all victims of oppression and exploitation, popular mass resistance movements against oppressors, even if the rulers of these countries leave them no other avenue open for struggle but armed struggle. A similar position of support to such movements, e.g., in the Portuguese colonies, has recently been adopted by the World Council of Churches and the Swedish Social Democracy. You don't taint them with the brush of being 'terrorist organizations' for that support. There is no reason to taint us with that brush either."

Frank and Mary-Alice Waters that you thought the meetings in Paris between the PRT and Fiat were a big mistake?" Williams asked.

"That's totally false. I never knew or said anything like that to anyone."

"The PRT [Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores] was a section of the Fourth International at the time of the kidnapping of Sallustro, was it not?" Williams asked.

"There were at least five PRT's then," Barnes explained. "Which one was a section of the FI was a great debate."

Barnes said those who claimed responsibility for the kidnapping were moving rapidly away from the political positions of the Fourth International and already publicly identified with Stalinist leaders

such as Mao Zedong and North Korea's Kim Il Sung.

#### **Mandigo on the Stand**

The next witness, April 13, was Charles Mandigo, author of the Mandigo affidavit. An FBI agent assigned to the Washington headquarters, he is a man who appears to be in his mid-twenties.

Under questioning by Herbert Jordan, one of the socialists' attorneys, Mandigo adopted a tactic of filibuster and evasion. A lawyer himself, he cited reams of court decisions alleged to back up the FBI's claim to free rein in "investigating" the socialists.

This was not what the judge wanted to hear. "You are not the lawyer arguing the case," he reminded the witness at one point.

Under questioning by Jordan, Mandigo said that the file on the SWP had been originally opened in 1940—only a few months after a directive from President Roosevelt "dated September 23, 1939," instructing the FBI to investigate "subversive" activities.

(Jordan later brought out that the presidential directive was actually issued on a different date and does not even mention "subversive activities.")

At one point the judge took over the questioning of the witness. He zeroed in on what actions the FBI was looking for in its investigations.

"Now, did that not have to do with violations of American law?" Griesa asked.

"No, it did not," Mandigo answered. Dodging the question, he said it had to do with constitutional powers of the president

## **What the 'Militant' Said on Sallustro Kidnapping**

[The following editorial appeared in the April 21, 1972, *Militant*.]

The events surrounding the April 10 assassination of Argentine army general Juan Carlos Sanchez and the death of kidnapped Italian industrialist Oberdan Sallustro on the same day have demonstrated the hypocrisy of Argentine President Alejandro Lanusse and his government. The Sallustro kidnapping was reported to have been carried out by the People's Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo—ERP). Responsibility for the assassination of Sanchez was reportedly claimed by both the ERP and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—FAR), another guerrilla group.

Despite Lanusse's attempts to exploit the sympathy for Sallustro and Sanchez, it is clear that he had no concern for Sallustro's life. Nor does the Lanusse government care about the lives of the countless workers, trade unionists, students, and revolutionists who have been abducted by police, imprisoned without charge, and tortured. The *New York Times* reported April 11 that the Argentine military dictatorship holds at least 500 political prisoners at the present time and that many of those arrested have disappeared—presumably tortured to death. Lanusse's charges of "lawlessness" against the kidnapers are dwarfed by the hideous crimes of his own government.

Although a struggle against the criminal policies of the Lanusse regime is necessary, we oppose acts of individual terrorism, such as kidnapping and assassination, in the struggle for social

change. We believe such actions are harmful to the necessary task of mobilizing the masses of people in revolutionary action. As the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party said in its April 3 statement on the Sallustro kidnapping, "In place of powerful actions by the masses themselves, the ERP is attempting to substitute small actions by a tiny group."

History has proved that revolutionary changes occur only by the action of the great masses of people. To be effective, a revolutionary movement must use tactics that correspond with the general strategy of winning mass support and building a mass revolutionary-socialist party. Individual terrorist acts harm this strategy for several reasons.

First, actions against individual government officials or individual capitalists help to miseducate working people and in Argentina, the poor peasants, as to the real character of their enemy. The capitalist state does not consist of just a few capitalists or generals, and it is impossible to defeat this state by wiping out its individual agents or demanding reforms in return for the lives of these individuals. The capitalist system can only be defeated by a mass movement that sweeps away the entire repressive institutions of the capitalist state—the police, army, courts, and prisons.

Second, individual terrorist acts make it appear as though violent, antisocial actions come from the revolutionary left, rather than from the ruling class. They help to shift the blame away from the capitalist rulers of Argentina—who are responsible for the day-to-day violence

of police repression, exploitation of workers, and the poverty and malnutrition of hundreds of thousands of slum dwellers.

The task of revolutionists is to isolate the ruling class politically by helping the masses of people to understand the injustice and criminality of the ruling class. The way to do this is through building mass actions in defense of the rights of working people.

Third, terrorist acts by revolutionists serve to strengthen the hand of the ruling class by giving it a club with which to crack down on the entire workers movement. Since the kidnapping in Argentina, the government has unleashed a bloody wave of repression, sending army troops with dogs in house-to-house searches through the city of Buenos Aires. This repression will hurt the entire movement in Argentina.

The working people and peasants of Argentina are giving their answer to the Lanusse dictatorship through massive protest actions. April 4-7 witnessed an uprising in the city of Mendoza as well as a general strike that spread to Cordoba and San Juan.

Revolutionists must participate in mass actions like these. They must be deeply involved in the dynamics of the class struggle, and they must project demands that sharpen the struggle against the government, broaden mass support, and develop the confidence of the masses in their own power. Only through leading such struggles can a mass revolutionary-socialist party be built that is capable of overturning capitalism in Argentina.



"to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution."

Trying again, the judge asked, "Well, what would you be looking for? Would you be just looking for, among other things, any specific acts as distinct from just ideas?"

Mandigo rambled on about the "historical context" and "fascism, communism and other types of nationalistic tendencies in the United States," finally saying that the FBI was supposed to "conduct strictly intelligence investigations of subversive activities."

"Subversive activities being defined as what?" Griesa asked.

Mandigo started up again, explaining that there was subversion "from without the United States or subversion from within . . . to subvert the government's constitutional form of government."

"Well, again," Griesa responded, "I am trying to see if there was an attempt to uncover specific types of activities. The reason I am asking that is to determine if there is a blank, if there is nothing there. . . ."

"I assume that the FBI was spending its time and money trying to find out if there were that kind of activity engaged in."

"In other words, if somebody had been around engaging in sabotage, that would be of interest to the FBI, wouldn't it?"

"That's correct," Mandigo replied. "It would be a criminal investigation"—as opposed to a subversive one.

"I don't know what you are trying to get at," Griesa said. "Are you trying to convey to me that the FBI investigation wasn't related to activity?"

"We are dealing with a very complex problem here," Mandigo replied, proceeding to babble about "coequal branches of the government."

"That has nothing whatsoever to do with my question," Griesa said.

"Was the FBI interested in finding out if certain types of activity were engaged in? If so, what? I've asked you that about five times and you won't answer."

#### Out to Ban Ideas

The fact is that the investigation is not based on activity at all. The only thing the government has on the socialists is their ideas.

Through many years of the most intense investigation, the government has not been able to come up with a single illegal act. That's why they've been forced to concoct this secret affidavit.

Another important thing was established during Mandigo's stint on the stand.

In his questioning, Jordan was able to establish that Mandigo was not only the author of the public affidavit—he also put together the secret one as well.

In his questioning of Barnes, Williams had revealed some of the details on the secret affidavit frame-up.

Jordan now asked Mandigo if he found in the files "reference to something called the International Operational Center of the Fourth International."

Mandigo replied, "I have been directed by the Deputy Attorney General not to answer that question."

"We have an awkward situation," Judge Griesa said, "because he submitted two affidavits. One you have, and one you don't have. . . . I don't know really exactly what to do about it yet."

In his public affidavit, Mandigo noted that the FBI had classified information on James P. Cannon, Joseph Hansen, and Farrell Dobbs, as well as on Jack Barnes.

"Is that information contained in the [secret] affidavit?" Jordan asked.

"I can't answer that question," Mandigo replied.

Since he was under instructions not to testify on the secret affidavit, it can be deduced that there is in fact information in it on those leaders. This indicates a possible broader frame-up of the SWP leadership in the secret affidavit.

With few exceptions, the media has paid very little attention to this trial.

But the story that is unfolding here is amazing. Here you have a small socialist party taking on the secret police of the

most powerful ruling class the world has ever seen. The government has at their disposal virtually unlimited resources.

But cops are cops. And when it comes down to it, they come up with the same two-bit frame-ups they've been putting on unionists and socialists for more than a hundred years.

If they are allowed to get away with what they are trying to put over here, then no worker, no Black person, nobody who takes a stand against government policy is completely safe.

Such morally corrupt behavior is not the ordinary face the ruling class likes to present. But it breeds freely in the poisoned atmosphere of the secret political police apparatus the socialists are challenging.

The socialists are asking the judge to rule that the whole framework of thought-control legislation and presidential edicts on which this stuff is based is unconstitutional as applied to the SWP and YSA.

And if it's unconstitutional as applied to open revolutionary Marxists—who proudly admit, as the government claims, that they are "internationalist to the core"—then it can hardly be used against anybody else. □

## Reagan Policy Hit From Coast to Coast

### USA: Thousands Protest Intervention in El Salvador

In cities across the United States, thousands of persons demonstrated April 18 to say "No!" to Washington's intervention in El Salvador.

The date had been chosen by the Committee in Solidarity with the Peoples of El Salvador (CISPES) to mark the first anniversary of the founding of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) of El Salvador, which enjoys the support of the majority of the Salvadoran population and which is the target of a ferocious repression by the U.S.-backed military junta.

In Los Angeles, about 4,000 persons marched to protest U.S. intervention in El Salvador. In greetings sent to the rally, the head of the West Coast dockworkers' union reiterated the union's pledge not to handle any military cargo to El Salvador.

The same day, 4,000 demonstrated in Eugene, Oregon. On April 13, five days before the national actions, more than 3,000 protested in Seattle.

The April 18 march and rally in New York City, which ended at Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza near the United Nations, drew between 5,000 and 7,000 participants.

Ted Weiss, a New York congressman, pointed out to the crowd the extent of opposition to U.S. intervention in El Salvador. "Eight members of the House of

Representatives endorsed this march," he said. "Ten members of the New York City Council also endorsed it. Forty national labor organizations oppose the Reagan policy. Ninety-four percent of the mail in Washington is opposed to the Reagan policy in El Salvador."

Margie Albert, a representative of the Coalition of Labor Union Women, ridiculed the Reagan administration's claims that it is opposing terrorism in El Salvador. The government, she said, "would have us believe that Cuban and Soviet troops are getting ready to march down Fifth Avenue at any moment."

"There is real terror, though. The 200,000 auto workers laid off are feeling real terror, old people who will lose their benefits are feeling terror, the families of the young unemployed youth who see this for their children's future are in terror, there's terror in Atlanta. Because this is the real terror, the people of the U.S. will not accept intervention in El Salvador." □

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## How Capitalist Media Lied About Bay of Pigs Invasion

[April 19 was the twentieth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution's victory against the U.S.-backed mercenary invasion at Playa Girón near the Bay of Pigs. The counterrevolutionary Brigade 2506, which carried out the invasion, was supplied with five armed freighters, twenty-four B-26 bombers, twelve transport planes, and artillery and small arms by the CIA.

[But no less important than the arms, money, and training provided by the CIA was the propaganda support provided by the imperialist media, which has never ended its campaign of slander and disinformation against the Cuban revolution. The following article on this aspect of the Bay of Pigs invasion appeared in the April 19 issue of the English-language *Granma* weekly, published in Havana.]

\* \* \*

The image that the peoples of Latin America received of the mercenary aggression at Playa Girón, which was launched from Puerto Cabezas [Nicaragua] on April 13, 1961, was essentially the image that was presented by the mass media.

That image was almost completely designed and manipulated by the U.S. news agencies Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI). These agencies' ties to the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) clearly indicate that they are both instruments of U.S. imperialism.

During those days in April 1961, AP and

**'After Girón, all the peoples of the Americas were a little bit freer'**


**—Fidel Castro**

UPI applied the basic techniques of disinformation—the essence of imperialist propaganda—by:

- unscrupulously distorting or inventing facts;
- suppressing or concealing information about developments that went against U.S. imperialist policy; and
- misrepresenting probable outcomes.

AP and UPI's April "war diary" about the invasion of Cuba by mercenary forces in the pay of Yankee imperialism is frighteningly eloquent. In this "war diary," as improbable as they seem, were the following dispatches:

WASHINGTON, April 17 (AP).—Anti-Castro forces invaded Cuba today in three



places, and Santiago, the main city in the easternmost end of Cuba, may already be in the hands of the invaders. Castro's militia, as well as the army and navy, have gone over to the invaders.

GUANTÁNAMO, April 17 (UPI).—Sources say that a group of invaders landed near Santiago de Cuba, some 65 kilometers from Santiago (sic).

MIAMI, April 17 (UPI).—Stories are circulating that the Cuban navy has rebelled. Naval stations were heard communicating with navy headquarters in Havana for more than an hour.

MIAMI, April 17 (AP).—Most of the 400,000-man militia recruited by Castro has now deserted, and the decisive battle will take place within a few hours.

NEW YORK, April 17 (UPI).—The invading forces have occupied the city of Pinar del Río, the capital of the province of the same name. The invasion of the provinces of Matanzas and Santiago is progressing well.

MIAMI, April 17 (AP).—The Isle of Pines was taken by the rebels and 10,000 political prisoners were set free and joined the uprising.

MEXICO, April 17 (UPI).—Prime Minister Fidel Castro has fled and his brother Raúl has been captured. General Lázaro Cárdenas is negotiating political asylum for Fidel.

MIAMI, April 17 (AP).—News has been received that there is fighting in the streets in Havana.

NEW YORK, April 17 (UPI).—At 7:25 a.m., anti-Castro forces rose up in several places in the interior of Cuba. One of the centers of the activity was the province of Camagüey.

MEXICO, April 18 (UPI).—The luxurious Habana Libre Hotel, in the Cuban capital, was totally destroyed after an air attack on Havana.

NEW YORK, April 18 (AP).—Farmers, workers and militiamen are uniting with the invaders and cooperating with them in the liberated zone, which is expanding rapidly.

MIAMI, April 18 (UPI).—Invading forces today isolated the port of Bayamo, on the southern coast of Oriente province.

MIAMI, April 20 (UPI).—The prime minister was incapacitated during last Monday's air attacks and is suffering from physical and perhaps mental collapse. He is now under treatment.

Something very significant about these AP and UPI dispatches is that almost all of them have datelines outside of Cuban territory. Also, there is a deliberate omission in all of them: none of them say that the mercenary brigade was trained by the CIA in Guatemala and that the invasion was launched from Puerto Cabezas, on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast.

The bourgeois Latin American archives and newspapers of the time record the information campaign unleashed by the CIA.

A review of the Nicaraguan papers *Novedades* and *La Prensa* gives us an idea of what the peoples of Latin America were reading about the mercenary invasion of Playa Girón. There have been very few periods in which the AP and UPI wires have carried so much disinformation and infamy. The U.S. news agencies released an extraordinary number of irresponsible

statements, lies and slanders.

In Nicaragua, from whose eastern shores the invasion was launched, the headlines of *Novedades* and *La Prensa* participated actively in the disinformation campaign.

For example, on Tuesday, April 18, *Novedades* published a UPI dispatch datelined Miami on a request made by the Cuban Revolutionary Government for blood donations. The headline of the article read: "Castro Asks For Blood." On the same day, *La Prensa* printed a huge headline which said: "Invaders Receive Reinforcements."

The editorials of *Novedades*, run by the Somoza family, reflected the complicity of the regime. On April 18, the paper stated, "Far from respecting the democratic principles originally proclaimed by the anti-Batista revolution, Castro introduced right after his triumph the worst horrors and cruelties as a system of government." On April 19, when the outcome of the invasion was still unknown, *Novedades* made an appeal: "The responsibility of all of Latin America in view of the Soviet threat in Cuba is to support the United States morally and materially."

The first mention in the Nicaraguan

press of Puerto Cabezas being the base from which the invading ships left appeared in *Novedades* on April 20, after Brigade 2506 had been defeated, had surrendered and had been taken prisoner.

At that time, Luis Somoza categorically stated in an interview with *Novedades* that "At no time have there been revolutionary elements in Puerto Cabezas ready to invade another country."

It was precisely on April 20 that the absolute control the CIA had exercised over Puerto Cabezas for several weeks came to an end. □

## Interview With Fatima Fallahi

### Former Iranian Political Prisoner Tours U.S.

[Fatima Fallahi, a member of the Iranian Revolutionary Workers Party (HKE) is conducting a speaking tour of the United States during April and May.

[Fallahi gained international attention when she and thirteen other socialists were imprisoned for their political views in mid-1979. Fallahi spent ten months in jail. An international defense campaign that won support from labor leaders, trade unions, civil rights and civil liberties organizations, and thousands of working people throughout the world was instrumental in winning the socialists' release.

[Fallahi is visiting cities throughout the United States, describing the gains won by the Iranian workers and peasants since the revolution and explaining how the Iranian masses continue to press forward with their demands.

[The following interview was conducted by *Intercontinental Press* staff writer Janice Lynn in New York City on April 17.]

\* \* \*

*Question.* Three days ago was the first anniversary of your release from prison. Has there been any new information about your imprisonment that you have learned in the year since your release?

*Answer.* While we were in prison, we always had the feeling that maybe the CIA or SAVAK [the shah's secret police] were responsible for our imprisonment. I myself felt this especially when Mahsa [Hashemi, the other woman prisoner] and I were sentenced to life imprisonment.

I had been active in the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran (CAIFI) when I lived in the United States, helping to win the release of political prisoners from the shah. We knew then that SAVAK was always watching us. Then when we went back home to Iran right before the [February 1979] insurrection, we knew they were watching us there too.

After we were released, we found out that many of those involved in our imprisonment were in fact in collusion with SAVAK and the CIA. Today, many of these people are now in prison themselves or have fled the country.

*Q. Who are some of these people?*

A. One of them is Amir Entezam. He was a deputy minister under the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan and also ambassador to Sweden. He was the one who charged that we were involved in bombing oil pipelines. Of course we had already been in prison when these explosions took place. He openly said that if the socialists were freed, he would resign.

Today he is on trial for collusion with the CIA. He was arrested when the Muslim Students Following the Imam's Line in the U.S. embassy—or spy nest as we call it—found documents about his relationships with CIA agents.

Another one was Admiral Ahmad Madani. He was the governor of Khuzestan Province where we were arrested and imprisoned for most of the ten months. He was the one who was also arresting many of the Arabs. He headed up a committee that was always stopping us for selling newspapers and supporting the Arabs' struggles. The people in his committee would bring us in and ask us all kinds of questions.

Publicly, Madani stated he was opposed to our arrests. I read this in the newspaper. But this wasn't what he really thought. He didn't want socialists to be in the South—in Ahwaz and Abadan. When the revolution started to deepen, with the massive anti-imperialist mobilizations, he was one of the people who fled to France.

After the embassy occupation and all the threats against our revolution from U.S. imperialism, the people started to demand that all counterrevolutionaries and SAVAK agents be removed from their jobs

and cleaned out of the government.

So after Madani fled to France, word came out about the committee in Khuzestan that had been under his control. It was discovered that it was full of former SAVAK agents. So, the committee was shut down. This was the committee that had been responsible for arresting us.

*Q. Were there any other people involved?*

A. There was also the prosecutor of the court. He was Madani's representative. He left Iran for the United States. I think his name was Hashemi.

Then there was the chief of Karoun prison where we were held in Ahwaz—Esmaili. He was later put in jail himself for stealing money. He was always giving us a really hard time. He had been in prison during the shah's time, but not for political reasons. Then after the revolution, when he was released, he said he was a political prisoner. So, he was put in charge of the jail.

Then they found out who he really was—just a thief. So he was imprisoned in his own jail for six months. All the prisoners were very happy.

*Q. Did you have any idea while you were in prison of the extensive international defense campaign that was being waged on behalf of the fourteen socialists?*

A. Yes, because on the front page of the daily papers they would list the telegrams and letters that were being sent. Sometimes, when we were not allowed to read the papers, the other prisoners would tell us there were articles about us—famous people, and unions, and students from all over the world were sending telegrams.

The Revolutionary Guards would come to us and ask, "Who are all those people? How do they know you?" They were very impressed that so many working people

around the world were opposed to our arrest. And we would explain that although most of the people might not agree with all of our socialist ideas, they did agree that there should be no revolutionary political prisoners.

**Q. What impact did the defense campaign have for socialists in Iran?**

A. We gained a lot of political respect in Iran because of the defense campaign. For example, when our comrade Nemat Jazayeri was imprisoned last September for his political ideas, we waged a similar campaign and also won.

So, many workers look to us. They see how we care about our members, how we fight back, and how we win.

In Nemat's case, the workers in the factories began to see how his arrest was an attack against every worker. And the campaign we waged won support from many workers.

Now we are fighting the case of the firings of eleven of our comrades from different factories in Iran. We are waging the same kind of campaign—with petitions, resolutions, and statements against the firings. Several factory shoras and Islamic anjomans, which are the different workers' committees in the factories, have condemned the firings.

Under the shah, no one ever did this kind of thing—with petitions and resolutions—because of the severe repression. Now it happens more and more. We circulated petitions for Nemat. And when the Iraqi regime launched its invasion against our revolution, we helped circulate petitions asking for military training in the factories and for the workers to be able to go to the front to fight.

**Q. What is the situation with political prisoners in Iran today?**

A. When we were in prison, there were hundreds of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomans in prison as well. Today, most of them have been released.

When Nemat was released in March he told us that there were still political prisoners where he was in Evin Prison. They were from different political groups and sometimes just independent workers who came into conflicts with the bosses.

We think there should be a campaign around their release as well. For example, Mujahadeen leader Reza Saadati is still in prison.

Just recently, the editor of *Mizan* was arrested and the newspaper shut down. This is the newspaper that reflects Bazargan's procapitalist views. We condemn this.

**Q. What is the most pressing issue in Iran today?**

A. The most pressing issue is the fight against the Iraqi aggression against our country. It is an attack against our revolu-



FATIMA FALLAHI

tion. I would like to appeal to all the readers of *Intercontinental Press* to condemn the Iraqi invasion which is supported by U.S. imperialism and all the reactionary regimes in the region.

**Q. What kind of relations does the Iranian government have with Cuba?**

A. A few months ago the Cuban ambassador, Alberto Velasco, visited our country to discuss how relations between Iran and Cuba could be strengthened. I think we have a lot to learn from Cuba's twenty-one year battle against U.S. imperialism. After the victory of the Cuban revolution, the U.S. government launched the same kind of campaign it has been launching against our revolution.

Velasco met with the head of the Iranian Central Bank to discuss the possibilities of trade between Cuba and Iran. I think it would be really beneficial to both our revolutions if we could provide Cuba with oil in exchange for Cuban sugar.

It was reported in the newspapers that the Cuban ambassador also met with our Minister of Agriculture, who indicated that we could learn a lot from Cuba's agricultural progress, particularly the cultivation of sugarcane, which we grow in the South.

Velasco also met with representatives in the Ministry of Health to talk about medical and health care.

I think collaboration between our two great anti-imperialist revolutions would be a big step forward. □

## Company Tries to Cover Up Massive Radioactive Leak

### 'Three Mile Island' in Japan

One of Japan's worst nuclear accidents—in which fifty-six workers were exposed to dangerous levels of radioactive contamination—took place on March 8. It was not revealed, however, until April 20, as a result of an attempted cover-up by the Japan Atomic Power Company.

The accident at the Tsuruga power plant on the Japan Sea, nearly 200 miles west of Tokyo, has become a major issue in Japan, the only country to have ever suffered a nuclear attack.

The first signs of the accident were discovered after government inspectors found abnormally high radioactivity in soil and water samples near the plant, after it had been shut down April 1 for a routine check and maintenance period.

They then discovered that on March 8 at least forty-five tons of radioactive waste water had overflowed a filter tank at the plant.

Fifty-six plant employees were ordered to mop up part of the spill with plastic buckets and rags. The company claimed the workers were exposed to only small amounts of radiation, but this was disputed by officials of the Ministry of Trade

and Industry, which regulates Japan's nuclear plants.

Some of the spill seeped into the general sewage system, which carries water into nearby Urazoko Bay, a rich fishing ground.

The company's crude attempt to stifle news about the accident was the second such cover-up effort this year. In January it tried to suppress knowledge about two incidents of leakage caused by cracks in a water heater.

Once it had been caught, the company shifted tactics and tried to minimize the seriousness of the accident. Akira Machida, the plant's general manager, claimed that it was "no where near as serious as America's Three Mile Island." Officials also proclaimed that the incident had been magnified by "Japanese emotionalism toward anything nuclear."

Such "emotionalism" has already resulted in the stalling of construction on new nuclear plants following the widely publicized near-meltdown at the U.S. Three Mile Island plant in 1979.

Japan's own "Three Mile Island" at Tsuruga will undoubtedly bolster the movement against nuclear power in that country. □

## The Shift to the Left in the British Labour Party

By Steve Potter

LONDON—The map of British politics is rapidly changing. Workers' resistance to austerity, particularly the victory of the miners against pit closures in February, has critically weakened the Thatcher government.

A new Social Democratic Party (SDP) was formed on March 26 with the declared aim of providing "a stable framework" for industry and commerce. The Labour Party has shifted to the left, a shift reflected in the election of Michael Foot as its leader.

Those who fail to realize the significance of these events will surely lose their way. For, at long last, the political crisis in Britain has started to correspond to the depth of the social and economic crisis.

Nowhere is this increased rate of political change more evident than in the Labour Party. The extent of the victories won by the left of the party has produced a frenzied reaction from the bourgeois press, which has singled out Tony Benn as the author of these triumphs.

Benn was a cabinet minister in the two Labour governments led first by Harold Wilson and then by Jim Callaghan between 1974 and 1979. These governments presided over a tripling of unemployment, large cuts in welfare spending, and the sharpest reduction of living standards in the twentieth century.

Yet the circumstances under which the first Labour government in 1974 came to power were auspicious ones: the fall of the Heath government at the hands of the miners and the election of the Wilson government on the most left-wing manifesto adopted by the Labour Party since the Second World War.

### 'Alternative Economic Strategy'

It was the desertion of this manifesto which formed the basis for Benn's critique of the experience of 1974-79. The manifesto itself was a program for the institutional reform of British capitalism.

Its central features were the creation of a body, the National Enterprise Board, to acquire important sections of industry for the state and the conclusion of planning agreements with the private sector. This was combined with a wide-ranging program of public expenditure combined with import controls and a voluntary incomes policy to curb the inflationary tendencies of such a program.

This program, dubbed in its essentials the "alternative economic strategy," has since been further elaborated and now forms the basis for the policy of both the Labour Party and the Trades Union Con-



Demonstration against nuclear weapons in London. Labour Party called for unilateral nuclear disarmament in October.

gress (TUC), the central union federation.

The diagnosis adumbrated by Benn for the failure of the Labour government to implement this program was the undemocratic structure of the Labour Party. He outlined a platform for the transformation of the party centered on the following three planks: reselection of Labour members of Parliament (MPs) by their local parties; the elections of the leader of the Labour Party by a franchise wider than the Labour MPs; and for the election manifesto of the party to be drawn up and finalized by the National Executive Committee of the party rather than by the leader and the cabinet or shadow cabinet.

### Growing Strength of Labour Left

This program won massive popular support in the rank and file of the Labour Party and among trade unionists, on the basis of never wanting to return to governments of the Wilson/Callaghan type.

In a series of four conferences held in the

space of sixteen months the first two of these reforms were won.

Tony Benn accurately summed up this process as "the rank and file beginning to control the party as opposed to the parliamentary leadership controlling the rank and file."

While the decision on the drawing up of the manifesto was lost, the October 1980 Blackpool conference adopted extremely radical policies. This conference voted to:

- Campaign for a thirty-five hour workweek without loss of pay and to resist closures;
- To nationalize important sectors of British industry and to renationalize any state-owned firms sold off by the Tories;
- To withdraw completely from the European Economic Community;
- To implement a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament and a massive cut in military spending;
- To abolish the House of Lords, the unelected second chamber of the British Parliament.

The combined effect of the reforms of the party and the radical policies adopted at Blackpool has been to bring much closer for thousands of working-class militants the prospect of a government actually implementing these sorts of policies. The results of these Labour Party conferences have been to provide not only an alternative in the eyes of the working class to the right-wing policies of Callaghan and Wilson, but also to the "monetarist" policies of the Thatcher government.

The increased interest in the Labour Party policies and its shift to the left has been marked by the recruitment of 80,000 new members to the party in the past year. The individual membership of the party presently stands at between 335,000 and 365,000; exact figures are difficult to get. The membership affiliated through the unions stands at more than 6 million.

### Ruling Class Hysteria

If the reaction of the working class has been favorable to these developments inside the Labour Party, the reaction of the ruling class through the press and media has verged on hysteria.

The principal efforts of the media have been devoted to promoting the formation of the Council for Social Democracy within the Labour Party, assiduously publicizing its intention to split unless the trend of left victories inside the Labour Party was halted, and then promoting the split and boosting the Social Democrats as an independent party when this ploy failed to

moderate the demands of the rank and file of the party.

The formation of the Social Democrats into an independent party was a step welcomed by nearly all the leaders of the daily press. Without a change in the electoral system it has little chance of forming a government. Nevertheless, it does have the possibility of denying the Labour Party office.

Speculation about the outcome of a general election has an astonishingly urgent air about it, since the Tories are not yet two years into the five-year life of this Parliament. The urgency is derived from the fact that the government's project is visibly floundering.

The first signs of serious ruling class dissent with the course that the government was taking came last autumn, when the chairperson of the Confederation of British Industry, Terence Beckett, promised a "bare knuckle fight with the government."

Beckett's statement calling for a relaxation of the tight monetary controls imposed by the government was accompanied by a similar statement from the boss of Imperial Chemical Industries, a leading British multinational. "We expected a bracing climate," he said, "but we are freezing to death." He was announcing the first loss in the firm's history.

#### **Workers Fight Back**

Last autumn, too, came the first signs that the working class retreat in the face of unemployment was coming to an end. Victories were won against redundancy and layoff by dockers and engineering workers.

This trend toward a fight-back against unemployment came to a head with the challenge to the miners from the government, which threatened to close down a number of pits nationally as the beginning of a wider program of rationalization of the coal industry.

The reaction of the miners was immediate. The announcement was made by the National Coal Board (NCB) on February 10. By February 15 miners in South Wales were on unofficial strike. The strike rapidly spread in the next few days to Scotland, Kent, and pits in South Yorkshire.

The government's retreat was spectacular. The NCB plan was withdrawn and the government effectively promised to underwrite the cost of keeping the pits open. The Tories' retreat, albeit temporary, sent even their most slavish supporters into fits of rage.

Walter Goldsmith, director general of the Institute of Directors, called the Tories' *volte-face* a "scandalous surrender" and went on, "We might as well ask the miners' union when it wishes to have the next general election."

The dismay of the bosses was compounded by the budget produced by Chan-

cellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe. The budget, which hit out brutally at working class living standards through indirect taxation, nevertheless did little to meet industry's demands for lower rates of interest and a fall in the exchange value of the pound. It became well known that a majority of Thatcher's cabinet were either hostile to the budget or apprehensive about its unpopularity.

This unpopularity of the government is increasingly reflected in opinion polls that have shown Labour with up to an 11 percent lead over the Tories—enough to win a landslide majority in the event of an election.

The prospect of a Labour government coming to office under the present circumstances is viewed with little enthusiasm by ruling class circles. The importance of the Social Democratic Party and its insistence that it should not be regarded as a "center" party but as a "left of center" party derives from the fact that to have any use to the bourgeoisie right now it must take the largest proportion of its electoral support from Labour.

This is by no means guaranteed, however. One of the manifestations of discontent with the Tory Party's policy after the budget was the defection of a Tory MP to the Social Democratic group in Parliament, which up to that time had been exclusively composed of renegades from the Labour Party. More can be expected to follow. Opinion polls taken to estimate the degree of support for the new party showed consistently more Tory voters changing their political affiliation to the SDP than Labour voters.

It is in this context that there has been serious discussion of reform of the electoral system to proportional representation. This would be a drastic step for the ruling class, quite possibly permanently excluding the Labour Party from office under all normal circumstances on the one hand and on the other spelling the end of the alliance between big capital and the middle class base of politicians like Thatcher in the Tory Party.

At present, it seems that the decimation of the Tory Party is too high a price for most circles of bourgeois opinion, despite the undoubted advantages that permanent coalition government could offer.

However, these grand maneuvers at the level of bourgeois politics do not at all mean that the labor bureaucracy has given up the possibility of reversing the victories of the left in the party and making the party once again "a party fit to govern," that is, a party firmly dedicated to a policy of austerity and ardent defense of the capitalist order.

#### **Union Bureaucrats Maneuver**

The gains that have been made by the left in the party, while the product of a swing to the left in the membership, are also attributable to the inability of the

trade-union bureaucrats to veto the left advances in the party conference. This can be done easily from a numerical point of view. Six times as many votes are wielded by the trade-union bureaucracy on behalf of the affiliated members of the Labour Party in the unions than are represented by delegates from branches of the Labour Party.

In the 1950s the trade-union bureaucracy was able to crush the movement of the constituency parties led by Aneurin Bevan through the domination of the right wing over the largest unions. However the situation in the 1980s is different. Trade-union leaders under pressure from a militant rank-and-file leadership who support Benn's policy are compelled continuously to make concessions to the left. The disorganization of the trade-union bureaucracy left ample space for the left to press home their advantage.

However, the trade-union bureaucrats were quick to recover their wits. They promoted the candidacy of Michael Foot for the leadership of the party against Denis Healey, the candidate of the right. The leadership election was boycotted by Benn, since it was held under the old rules of election by MPs only.

The choice of Michael Foot was a clever one. Foot's past is probably the most radical of any senior Labour leader, particularly through his association with the issue of unilateral nuclear disarmament. At the same time, for ten years he was the faithful lieutenant of Wilson and Callaghan. He is the person most suited to place himself at the head of the left movement inside the Labour Party the better to derail it.

Foot literally carried through this project leading the two massive demonstrations called by the Labour Party against unemployment: 150,000 people in Liverpool on November 29 last year and 70,000 people in Glasgow in February this year. Workers on these demonstrations still see Foot as a left leader, an illusion that Foot strenuously promotes with calls to bring the government down and quotes from the poet Shelley "to rise like lions!"

However, the pace of events within the Labour Party has forced Foot more and more to the right. A new right wing, the Labour Solidarity Campaign, has been formed inside the Parliamentary Labour Party, consolidating the efforts of all those who are working to reverse the gains of the left in the party, particularly to restore the decisive role in selection of the leader to the Labour MPs, rather than the party and trade unions.

Foot sponsors this formation while pretending to be above factions. However, while the main target for Foot is Benn, he has also promised to take on the fight against the Militant tendency inside the party as well as others of the far left.

The pattern of events over the next period inside the Labour Party will in-



TONY BENN

creasingly be dominated by the regroupment of the right and an offensive against the left.

**Unions Move Toward Political Action**

However, the left is not at all helpless in resisting such an offensive. The greater part of the 80,000 people who have joined the party in the last year will find their way into the camp of the left in the party. At the same time, union militants are becoming drawn into the struggle in the Labour Party as their conferences debate which way to cast their vote at the next Labour Party conference in October.

It is this growing unity of action between militants in the unions and in the Labour Party that represents the key not only to left advance inside the Labour Party, but also to effective action against the Tories.

While the Labour Party has increasingly taken on a leading role in the struggle against unemployment and the cuts in social expenditure, the trade-union movement has started to play an overtly political role in the struggle against the Tories, the TUC taking the unprecedented step of calling a major and successful demonstration against an attempt to restrict abortion rights. Campaigns for joint trade union and Labour Party action to kick out the Tories therefore have a real resonance among both Labour Party and trade-union activists.

This growing interdependence between the struggle in the unions and in the Labour Party is also manifested by the joint meetings and platforms being organized between Benn (standing for the deputy leadership of the Labour Party next October) and Arthur Scargill, leader of the

South Yorkshire miners, who is running for the presidency of the National Union of Mineworkers in 1982.

A determined fight by the left in the trade unions to win the block vote over to rank-and-file control, in the first instance to defend and extend the gains of the last year, is an indispensable part of a strategy to beat the right wing of the labor movement.

At the same time it is impossible to build a left wing in the unions today without prioritizing the fight around the issues at stake in the Labour Party.

**Groups Outside the Labour Party . . .**

In this respect, those organizations outside and to the left of the Labour Party have signally failed to advance a strategy appropriate to today's conditions.

The Communist Party, far from benefiting from the crisis within the Labour Party, has continued its precipitate organizational decline. During the 1970s its membership declined from nearly 30,000 to under 20,000. Especially marked has been the decline of the CP in those areas that provided its not inconsiderable base in industry.

At least part of this decline recently has been the hemorrhage of its "Eurocommunist" inclined membership into the Labour Party. A debate has arisen in the pages of the ailing *Morning Star*, the CP's daily paper, as to whether the Communist Party has any reason for a separate existence from the Labour Party, given the similarity between the CP's program and that of left reformism.

In response, the CP has revived the notion, advanced by Lenin and the Second Congress of the Comintern, of affiliation of the CP to the Labour Party. Of course, the CP has no real intention of fighting for this proposal, in case it antagonizes the left bureaucrats whom they aim to ally themselves with.

The only purpose of this proposal, which has not met an unfriendly response from the left of the Labour Party, is to divert discussion from the lack of impact that the CP is having on developments in the Labour Party.

The existence of a strong unified far left could have undoubtedly had an impact on developments inside the Labour Party. However, the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in Britain, with its membership of 2,500, has both rejected any moves to unity with the next largest revolutionary organization, the International Marxist Group (British section of the Fourth International), and has attempted to play down the significance of events inside the Labour Party.

A series of articles in the press of the SWP has continued to emphasize that the class struggle in Britain is at its lowest ebb for decades, that the events in the Labour Party are ephemeral and will be ended with a massive swing to the right. The

SWP argues that the fundamental task is to rebuild the rank-and-file structures of the trade-union movement.

This mistaken conjunctural estimate, flatly contradicted by the miners' victory, is underwritten by a view that the SWP has on the nature of the hold of reformism. It argues in essence that the influence of the Labour Party within the working class has and will decline in relation to its capacity to grant reforms.

This theory ignores the fact that the Labour Party, while a bourgeois workers party, represents a massive step forward for the political independence of the working class—the fundamental reason why the working class looks to the Labour Party for political solutions in periods of deep crisis. Thus the SWP disdains the task of encouraging the organization of their supporters in the Labour Party, preferring to denounce "entrism."

**. . . and Those Within**

However, the organization of substantial numbers of supporters in the Labour Party is not an antidote to sectarianism, as the case of the Militant tendency shows. This tendency, which has been the main target of witch-hunts aimed at "Trotskyists" by the right wing of the bureaucracy over the last six years, has grown substantially in that period, now numbering its supporters at more than 1,500.

Leading figures of the Militant tendency have been in the Labour Party for up to thirty-four years. The necessity for all socialists being in the Labour Party has, over this period, been elevated by them into a principle, to the extent of denouncing socialists not in the party as "crossing class lines."

This prolonged exposure to the internal rhythms of the Labour Party has modified the politics of this once-revolutionary tendency. Today, they advocate a centrist notion of the expropriation of 250 monopo-



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lies through an "enabling act" of Parliament.

This schematic notion, which replaces the idea of socialist revolution through classical methods based on soviet-type bodies, goes hand in hand with the notion of transforming the Labour Party into a party of revolutionary change for the working class. Militant supporters are therefore not educated in the spirit that the Labour Party will be an obstacle on the road to socialist revolution because the bureaucracy will never surrender to those who fight for socialist revolution, but in the expectation of the Labour Party continuously moving to the left "under the hammer blows of events."

Such an objectivist view of politics imparts a propagandistic and sectarian character to the Militant's political practice, leading them to oppose mass coalitions like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament on the basis that it does not have a socialist program and to a consistent refusal to ally themselves in a real way with other left tendencies in the battles inside the Labour Party.

After the opposition of the Labour Party bureaucracy, it is the Militant tendency that constitutes the main obstacle to winning a revolutionary leadership for the Labour Party Young Socialists (LPYS), the Labour Party's youth organization. The LPYS has grown rapidly over the last period despite the leadership of the Militant, which has tended to inhibit the LPYS building mass actions and mobilizing youth and therefore has retarded its growth, keeping it far below its actual potential.


Supporters of *Revolution*, the youth paper in solidarity with the politics of the Fourth International in Britain, are beginning to pose an alternative to the Militant's leadership of the LPYS, opposing their rightist politics and promoting activity—particularly around building the campaign against nuclear weapons and for troops out of Ireland.

#### **Revolutionary Socialist Strategy**

Support for the struggles for democratic reforms inside the Labour Party and a nonsectarian attitude to organizing the widest possible forces behind these struggles has been a vital element of revolutionary socialist strategy in the last period. Increasingly, it is becoming necessary for substantial numbers of revolutionary socialists to join the Labour Party to gain the most direct contact with those involved in the fight.

At the same time, building a movement against the Tory government has entailed a fight around an action program capable of gaining support both in the Labour Party and in the trade unions. Such a program, a plan to beat the crisis, can be presented as the defense and extension of left victories inside the Labour Party.

The major elements of such a program



MICHAEL FOOT

include: the struggle for the thirty-five-hour week without loss of pay; the nationalization under workers control of all firms declaring redundancy; positive action in favor of women, Blacks, and youth to defend them against the unequal effects of the crisis; unilateral nuclear disarmament and withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the program of arms expenditure to be replaced by a program of useful public works; defense of democratic rights; immediate withdrawal of British troops from Ireland.

Such a class struggle program is counterposed to the left reformist "alternative economic strategy."

The depth of the political crisis has given increased urgency to the question of government. Winning any of the substantial demands of the program outlined above entails building a movement to bring down the Tory government. The preparation of such a movement, preparation in reality for a general strike, poses the question of what type of government should replace the Tories.

While a clear and unequivocal call for a Labour government without conditions is the starting point for explaining the alternative, it is also necessary to explain the need to prevent betrayals of the type committed by the Wilson and Callaghan governments.

Committing the next Labour government to a program of an anticapitalist type, a plan to beat the crisis, is therefore part and parcel of the struggle to defeat the Tories.

#### **Building a Class-Struggle Left Wing**

This fight to kick out the Tories and

replace them with a Labour government committed to socialist policies is the basis for starting to build a class-struggle left wing in the labor movement.

The most important place for building the foundations of such a class struggle left wing is the industrial unions. The miners have proven once again that, although the whole of the British working class is prepared to fight the Tories, it is in the battle with the industrial unions where matters will be decided.

Such a left wing based on the industrial unions has to be built both in the trade unions and in the Labour Party. Today, it is not possible to build an adequate left wing in the unions without actively engaging in the fight in the Labour Party, nor is it possible to win victories against the Labour Party bureaucracy without consciously and systematically organizing in the unions.

The erosion of the vast material reserves of British imperialism that has underpinned the political consensus and acted as a brake on revolutionary change in Britain is now a live and active factor at the level of politics today. Revolutionaries in Britain have their greatest opportunity to influence national political events in Britain since the early 1970s—if the dramatic import of the events of the last two years are grasped.

March 26, 1981

#### **Chilean Copper Miners Strike**

Nearly 10,000 Chilean copper miners walked off their jobs April 22, paralyzing operations at El Teniente, the world's largest underground copper mine.

The eight unions that represent the miners voted the week before to reject a new two-year contract that offered only a 2 percent pay increase. The miners are demanding a 16 percent raise.

Closure of the mine, which produces about one-fourth of Chile's copper, will cost the military junta about \$1 million a day.

But the mine workers face a difficult strike. The government-owned company, thanks to record production levels during the first three months of the year, has been able to stockpile considerable quantities of copper, thus minimizing the strike's impact on supplies and prices.

Moreover, under the repressive labor laws imposed by the military dictatorship, the company can hire temporary scab labor after thirty days from the beginning of the strike. After more than fifty-nine days, the strikers can face dismissals.

Under such conditions, solidarity will be extremely important for the El Teniente miners. The 11,000 copper miners at the Chuquicamata mine—although they are legally denied the right to declare a solidarity strike—have already sent messages of support to the El Teniente workers.



### Why Conservatives Won in Ontario Election

By Kim Boyd and Joan Campana

[The following article appeared in the April 6 issue of the Canadian fortnightly *Socialist Voice*. It has been abridged for reasons of space.]

\* \* \*

HAMILTON—The victory of a majority Conservative government in the March 19 Ontario elections spelled bad news for working people in the province. The Tories, led by Premier William Davis, won a total of 70 seats in the 125-seat legislature, up 12 from 1977. The Liberals held even at 34 seats while the NDP [New Democratic Party] fell from 33 to 21 seats.

Some have concluded the election signifies a sweeping turn to the right by Ontarians. The facts say otherwise.

Only 57 percent of the population voted, the lowest turnout since 1934. And only 25 percent of those eligible voted Tory. In many Toronto area ridings the Conservative vote stayed the same or even dropped. As William Johnson pointed out in *The Globe and Mail*, "The Tories gained a mere 80,000 votes over 1977, the Liberals only 8,000."

The fact that working people aren't moving right was shown by the angry protesters who dogged Davis's heels during the campaign: fired hospital workers and laid-off auto workers, people protesting chemical waste dumps, students against higher tuition, and gays fighting police brutality.

Workers aren't turning right. But they have been stunned by the last four years' austerity drive of the bosses, by the resulting mass layoffs, cutbacks in social services, declining wages and victimization of the most combative of their ranks, like the 28 workers fired and the 2,500 suspended during the recent hospital strike. Whole sections of the province—such as the Windsor auto manufacturing area—have been devastated.

During the election, working people saw no clear and convincing way out of the mess. Half the working class didn't even vote. And the angry militancy of many workers did not translate into a vote for the only party that is an alternative to the two boss parties—the New Democratic Party.

While voter turnout was low across the board, one of the most dramatic features of the election was the massive NDP loss—down 265,000 votes from 1977.

#### Behind the Loss in NDP Vote

The media tried to twist the results to show that there was a massive shift from the NDP to the Tories. The figures don't show that. And while its popular vote fell from 28

to 21 percent, the NDP held its key industrial centers. In five of them it increased its margin of victory over 1977.

However, NDP canvassers across the province report that thousands of NDP supporters simply did not vote.

NDP members were stunned by the loss. "Obviously we have to go back and examine what happened," said one defeated candidate. Initially a number of reasons were advanced for the huge drop in vote. They didn't, however, get to the heart of the matter.

Only a small part of the explanation, for example, lies in the Tories having spent three times more than the other parties. The Liberals spent a lot less than the Tories, but they gained votes.

#### No Clear Alternative

The real reason for the spectacular drop lies in the fact that the NDP leadership did not provide a clear and convincing alternative to the other parties. Although campaigns in some ridings were exceptions to this, the NDP leadership as a whole didn't attempt to mobilize working people in a powerful campaign to sweep Bill Davis from government. [Ontario NDP leader Mike] Cassidy himself admitted that "people across the province don't appear to have seen an alternative to the present government."

The program the NDP presented contained no real answers for Ontario's 300,000 unemployed workers. Instead of calling for strong action which could have a real impact on the ruined economy, Cassidy offered some small reforms: more joint government-business ventures, Crown corporations, and Canadian-based industries.

He even told Windsor auto workers March 16 that "the only two parties who want to nationalize Chrysler in this election are the Communist Party and the Liberal Party."

After six years' support for the minority Tory government, the NDP leadership would have had to change dramatically to convince workers it was changing its spots. It was during those very years, with the NDP helping keep Davis in government, that the workers suffered the most serious blows.

During the campaign the Cassidy leadership refused to offer strong support for victimized hospital workers.

Cassidy also avoided speaking out on other "controversial" NDP policies like abortion and gay and francophone rights for fear of alienating "middle class" support. They were "alienated" anyway, and so were thousands of traditional NDP supporters.

The severe blows suffered by Ontario workers, combined with the failure of the NDP and many union tops to fight for a program offering real change are the real reasons for the election results.

The Davis government will now move more to the right, attempting to solve the mess big business has made of the Ontario economy by taking it out of the hides of working people.

But it won't be easy. The protesters who tailed Davis won't vanish because the issues that brought them out haven't disappeared. One labor leader commented that if Davis tries to step up his attack, "there'll be some big confrontations."

A class polarization is occurring in Ontario: a ruling class moving to the right and a working class which more and more will have to fight to meet its own needs.

At NDP meetings held to evaluate the elections, more searching answers are needed than "dump Cassidy" or "blame the conservative mentality of Ontario workers." NDP activists and union members have to take a good look at the program the NDP advanced, its failure to drive for government with clear and convincing answers.

As part of the evaluation, we should look at the British Labour Party, where there is a deep-going process of democratization and where much tougher policies are being adopted. The British party has shifted to the left to better defend the real needs of workers. Its last convention called for a shorter workweek with no cut in pay, for a vast campaign to nationalize failing industries, and for unilateral disarmament.

The Labour Party had helped build massive demonstrations in Britain against unemployment. The mere threat of a miners' strike was enough to force the British Tory government to cancel plans for mine closures. A fighting leadership is emerging in the labor movement. Spearheaded by industrial workers and their unions, *this shift saw 80,000 new people join the Labour Party in 1980*. A few right-wingers left, but that was all to the good.

In Ontario we have a lot to learn from these developments. □

#### Attention Foreign Airmail Subscribers:

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## Interview With Brazilian Workers Leader 'Lula'

[We are publishing below major excerpts from an interview with Brazilian workers leader Luís Inácio da Silva ("Lula") that appeared in the July-August 1980 issue of *Cuadernos de Marcha*, a magazine published in Mexico City by Uruguayan exiles. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

*Question.* Since our readers are not very familiar with the details of Brazilian politics, I will ask you to begin by telling about your origins and how you came to be a trade-union leader.

*Answer.* I am the son of peasants. When my parents were still living in Pernambuco [a state in northeastern Brazil], they had a small plot of land that they farmed.

In 1952 my father decided to go to São Paulo; he left my mother in Pernambuco with her eight children. My mother left Pernambuco in 1952 and went to Santos. From there we all went to São Paulo.

In 1960 I began to work in the metal industry. In 1965 I took a job at the Villares factory, and in 1968 they invited me to join the union leadership. At that time my brother had been proposed for the leadership, but he did not accept, because he was planning to go to work in São Caetano. So he put me forward instead.

From 1969 to 1972 I was an alternate member of the union leadership. In 1972 I ran for election again, and then left the factory and went on the union payroll as first secretary. In 1975 I became president of the union and in 1978 I was reelected.

In 1979 the unions were put under government intervention because of a strike. We were put out of action for fifty-seven days. The same thing has just happened again, and we do not know if we will return to the union or not.<sup>1</sup>

*Q.* Do you see any difference in the government's 1979 position and its current stance?

*A.* I think the government was not so worried about the political aspect of the strike in 1979. I was a trade-union leader and was considered totally apolitical. When the government decreed the inter-

vention of the ABC unions,<sup>2</sup> it came under tremendous pressure, even from the bosses. When I was ousted from the union, the bosses sought to contact me for negotiations. So at that time there was a greater opportunity to return to the union.

There is a new detail this year, however: the intervention was a political one. The government is not really so concerned with Lula the trade-union leader. What worries the government is the organization of the Workers Party [PT], which is the only new party that has arisen in the country in recent years.

*Q.* So you think that when you were making strictly economic demands, you didn't represent the danger that you do now as a political leader?

*A.* Exactly. There was a qualitative leap in terms of what I call participation. For a certain period I was convinced that we first had to gain the confidence of the workers, since the Brazilian unions were totally discredited. No one denies that until 1977 Brazilian trade unionism was leaderless, subordinated to *peleguismo*, to the Ministry of Labor.<sup>3</sup>

So it was necessary to renew the workers' confidence in their unions. We carried on a purely economic struggle for three years. But then we began to realize that that was simply useless, that it was not enough to fight for economic demands alone.

It was quite simple for the bosses to give us a raise and then make up for it by raising their prices. They would come out ahead, while workers would be the ones paying for the price increases. A vicious circle was set up, encouraged by the wage policies of Roberto Campos and Delfim Neto [government ministers of economic planning].

So the workers began to realize that it was necessary to win some social demands. Trade-union rights, for example, shop stewards, and the right to organize workers politically.

It was not enough for us just to have a strong union, since the parties were weak when it came time for elections. The bosses would ask for our votes. We never chose the best candidate; we always chose the lesser evil, the one who had some kind of link to the workers.

2. The São Paulo industrial suburbs of Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, and São Caetano are often referred to as the ABC.—IP

3. *Peleguismo* refers to the practices of Brazil's government-paid trade-union bureaucrats, who are popularly known as *pelegos*.—IP

*Q.* Do you think this new conception of political action was a result of the post-1964 situation [after the military coup]?

*A.* Exactly. That was when the need to organize ourselves politically arose. The workers can only achieve their freedom, their emancipation, their equality, if they organize politically. If we want a more just society, an effectively egalitarian one where there exist neither exploiters nor exploited, we have to organize politically.

So that is why I think the current intervention [of the unions] has a strictly political aim. When the government decided to reform the political parties, it never imagined that the workers were going to organize themselves politically. The government thought that, at worst, the PTB or Tancredo Neves's PP might grow.<sup>4</sup>

But what happened with the party reform? The workers decided to go into politics—they considered themselves just as important as any other sector of society. Instead of begging or waiting for the exploiters to transform society, the workers themselves got organized to bring about that transformation.

*Q.* So you didn't want to be dragged along behind the old political groups . . .

*A.* Right. In Brazil it is an historic fact: The working class has always been subordinated to the parties of the elite. At election time the politicians would hold rallies, promise a whole lot of things, hand out free medical prescriptions to the workers, and so on. And the workers would vote. Then the politicians would disappear for four years.

The whole thing would start all over again four years later.

But now, on the other hand, we have discovered our potential strength if we organize politically—whether this be in the unions, the church communities, or the shantytowns. The important thing is to organize the workers right where they are—in the factory, the football stadium, the church, the bar. Wherever the workers are, there has to be the message that they should start believing in themselves.

For example, in São Bernardo do Campo we don't even rest on Saturdays or

1. This interview was conducted shortly after the Brazilian government ousted Lula and other metalworkers' leaders from their union posts in an attempt to break a strike by 150,000 metalworkers in the São Paulo suburbs in April and May 1980. Eleven of these leaders, including Lula, were convicted by a military court in February of this year and received jail terms ranging from two to three-and-a-half years. All have been released pending appeals.—IP

4. PTB—Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party), a populist bourgeois party founded in 1945 by dictator Getúlio Vargas. PP—Partido Popular (People's Party), a bourgeois party formed in 1979 by dissidents from both of the two legal parties established after the 1964 military coup, the Alliance for National Renewal (ARENA) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB).—IP

Sundays—we go to football games, to mass, to demonstrations. Wherever the workers are, we start discussing the need for them to begin to believe in themselves. We don't raise theoretical notions or sloganeering, like many people do. We just want to ask the workers to believe in themselves, in their power, in their weight as the most important sector of society.

Because they are the most important, but they also are the ones who are the least aware of their own potential.

So we are beginning to tell the workers that they must decide, through trade-union and political action. And that has brought results. The country is quite large, and in some states the thing has really taken off.

*Q. How do you view the uneven levels of consciousness among the various regions—for example, between the Northeast and the ABC district around São Paulo?*

A. The trade-union structure permits and even promotes such unevenness. In Brazil, the unions did not arise out of the needs or out of the organizing efforts of the workers, but rather as something handed down by the government.

Even today, right here in São Paulo—the most developed center of the country—the state government organizes rural unions. It learns that a district has no rural union; so the Labor Secretariat goes out there, sets up a headquarters, a dental clinic, the whole business, calls together half a dozen workers, and founds a union, which remains subordinated to the state from the beginning.

The unevenness you speak of exists because there is economic inequality in the country.

*Q. So in that sense the ABC workers are an elite layer within the working class?*

A. We can call the ABC workers an elite in economic terms, not because they are highly paid but because the rest are paid far less. It is not a question of earning a lot; they earn a lot only as compared with the poverty of their neighbors.

I think the ABC workers also make up an elite in the political sense, because their cultural level is considerable when compared to that of the agricultural laborers. To be a metalworker it is necessary to have gone to high school for three years. The job itself gives one a greater level of knowledge.

There is another very important thing—the level of exploitation is greater in the ABC area than in any other part of Brazil. The auto worker realizes that he is far more exploited than any other worker, because he produces much more wealth than a farm worker. The farm worker, for example, can take time to relieve his physiological needs whenever he has to. But on an assembly line at Volkswagen or Ford or Mercedes the workers sometimes even have to piss in a can, because they



LULA

Fred Murphy/IP

aren't allowed to move from the line. If they do leave, they have to conform to a schedule. If you spend five minutes in the toilet, the foreman is there with a card in his hand giving out warnings when you return.

So in reality the worker in that most modern productive sector is transformed into a slave. If he doesn't have a chain around his foot, it's because there's a production card, which is just the same or worse than a chain.

I was misinterpreted by some when I said that the wage policy the government imposed in 1965 discriminated against all workers. Brazilian workers were really put at a disadvantage with the new policy. Things got even worse, though, in São Bernardo do Campo. We not only suffered, but from 1970 on we began to lose what we had already achieved. Before, the workers had several wage readjustments each year. If you check the pay scale for a VW or Mercedes worker, there are several increases each year until 1970. From 1970 on there has been just one annual raise, conceded by the government.

So that's why I have said—without false modesty—that if anything is to happen in terms of transforming the workers' struggles, it will happen in São Bernardo do Campo. Not only because the workers are more developed culturally, but also because they feel the level of exploitation in their very bones. It is more intense than for any other sector of the society.

*Q. What were the main contributions of the 1980 strike that lasted forty-two days? Do you think it was a defeat or a victory?*

A. I have two different views on the

results of that strike. If we look at it from the economic standpoint alone, we have to conclude that we were defeated, since we obtained no more than what the Labor Court had already agreed to.

You have heard it said that we were immature, that when the court gave its verdict we should have accepted. What people do not understand and what the press did not print—why I don't know—is that the court's decision was worse than the bosses' offer we had refused to accept. They had offered us 5 percent above productivity, job stability for disabled workers (which was already won the year before), base pay of 5,904 cruzeiros a week [US\$79], and double time for Saturdays and Sundays.

But we did not accept, because we wanted double time not only for the weekends but also for overtime worked during the week. We were giving up an overtime base pay of 12,000 cruzeiros.

The court raised the productivity increase by 1 of 2 percent, but it withdrew 800 cruzeiros from the base pay, which meant giving us 1 percent and taking away 15 percent that had already been pledged to the workers. That left us with a base pay of only 5,000 cruzeiros [US\$67]. This is why I say the court decision was worse than what we had already agreed to with the employers.

*Q. So in what sense do you consider the movement victorious?*

A. I say victory because the metalworkers of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema are one of the few sectors of Brazilian society that can walk with their heads erect in this country. They showed that oftentimes a wage increase is not everything. The workers of São Bernardo do Campo today have gained dignity. They have discovered that the Brazilian bosses are just as harmful or worse than the multinationals. They have discovered that the government has no commitment to the people at all but rather to economic power. I think that all these things are elements that assure a victory to the working class—a victory in terms of class consciousness.

Anyone who witnessed May Day in São Bernardo, when despite the machine guns, artillery, and smoke machines deployed in the streets, the wives of the workers imposed their victory with rose petals, knows that that is something that neither 10 percent nor 15 percent nor 20 percent could overshadow.

That is why I say that if there is anyone in Brazilian society today who can be proud and say, "I won politically and morally, and today my conscience is clear because I had the courage to confront not only the intransigence of the bosses but also the ignorance of the government," it is the metalworkers of São Bernardo and Diadema.

It's interesting—last year, after we had

been on strike for fifteen days and won a wage hike of 6 percent, I asked the workers to go back to their jobs, and they did return. But they were still opposed to my proposal, because they did not want to go back despite having won 6 percent. This year, on the other hand, we also won a 6 percent increase. But I am sure that if I went to the Volkswagen gates this minute and called the workers out, we would strike Volkswagen once again. Because the workers have discovered what we call liberty.

We have discovered the power that we have if we get organized. That is why I believe our strike was a victory, because it was not only a strike against the regime itself. They did not manage to humiliate one single worker.

*Q. How important was the support given to the strike by the Church and by certain political leaders? The Church in São Paulo opened its doors to the workers. . . .*

A. I think the role the Church played was fundamental—the priests in ABC, Don Cláudio, Don Paulo, Don Ivo, Don Pedro Casaldáliga, Don Pelé—all the most progressive figures in the Church.<sup>5</sup>

At no time did the Church itself get directly involved in our movement. That has to be made quite clear, because the bourgeois press is trying to distort everything in its articles and editorials.

The Church did what it is supposed to do everywhere: it put itself on the side of the oppressed at all times. Historically, the Church was always more or less linked to the ones who held power. I have talked with those people in the Church, and I have told them that the day will come when the Church will be obliged to define itself.

As I see it, the Church cannot be the same thing to the torturer and the one who is tortured, or the same for the worker and for the boss. I do not think that my god is the same as the god of the one who owns Volkswagen, or that my god is the god of Fleury, or that the god of Vladimir Herzog is the same as the god of his murderer.<sup>6</sup>

We have to move toward a definition, and within that definition, I think that the

5. Lula is referring to five leading members of the Brazilian Catholic hierarchy: Cláudio Hummes, Bishop of Santo André; Paulo Evaristo Arns, Archbishop of São Paulo; Ivo Lorscheiter, Bishop of Santa Maria and president of the National Conference of Bishops; Pedro Casaldáliga, Bishop of São Félix do Araguaia; and José Maria Pires, the Black Archbishop of João Pessoa, who is popularly referred to as Pelé (also the nickname of the famous Brazilian soccer star).

6. Sergio Fleury was the notorious chief of the Rio de Janeiro Death Squads during the military dictatorship's most repressive days; Vladimir Herzog was a prominent Brazilian journalist who died in jail at the Second Army's São Paulo headquarters in 1975—the military alleged that he had "committed suicide."

Church is going to have to place itself squarely on the side of those who are truly exploited, those who are still slaves.

The role of the Church in our fight was of fundamental importance, but they did not try to intervene in the movement. It is simply that, after the police had closed all other doors to us—the unions, the football stadium, the municipal plaza—the Church opened its doors.

*Q. And the politicians?*

A. There are political politicians, and there are huckster politicians. Our opinion is that the ones who take politics seriously and who do not use their parliamentary mandate just to hand out patronage merit our respect. The help they gave us was also of fundamental importance, because by coming in person to our assemblies they prevented the police from expressing their resentment. The police saw an enemy in every worker.

*Q. How do you view the current trade-union legislation in Brazil? What are the prospects for changing it?*

A. The Brazilian trade-union structure was copied from Mussolini's fascist model. When Getúlio Vargas set up the trade-union structure, his idea was that it was necessary to give something to the workers. So he gave them labor legislation and established trade unions, which the workers lacked at the time. But Vargas did the same thing I do for my dog: I feed it well, but I keep it on a short leash. At the same time Vargas gave something to the workers, he blindfolded their eyes and put them on a leash.

The structure allowed union officials to consider the union an agency that gave them jobs. The function of the president, the union leader, was a job that he took on and would lose only when he retired or died.

That served to turn the union leader into a *pelego*, to transform him into a pernicious element.

With what is happening now, one cannot think in terms of the government initiating any improvements in the Brazilian union structure. And, I confess, I even have doubts about a large sector of the current leaders making any improvements. But what keeps me struggling is that the necessary changes in the trade-union structure will have to be carried out by the working class itself.

The workers are beginning to discover how pernicious, how evil, the current union structure is. I think that all the workers are going to set about doing what the metalworkers of the ABC have already done.

*Q. Is that why it became necessary to create the Workers Party?*

A. That was one of the things that led

us to act politically. But we also believe that the workers' participation should take place not only through the national parliament but through all the workers' organizations. It is important to understand that we can also help to organize the workers by using parliament.

At present, it is useless to call on the members of parliament to change the laws, since we know that it is our bosses who vote there. You go on struggling, you do things, and then when a proposal for changing something comes along, the bosses are there [in parliament] to prevent it. They don't intend to change anything.

*Q. What are the prospects for alliances between the PT and other popular sectors?*

A. An alliance between the PT and parties that represent other sectors of the society is not only possible but necessary. In the first place, because our concept of "worker" is a broad one. A worker is not just a metalworker or even just an industrial worker. My notion of workers encompasses the whole class of people who live subordinated to a wage, directly or indirectly. So it includes the liberal professional, the doctor, the journalist, the small proprietor.

I have this broad view because the PT seeks to be a party of the masses. I don't believe that by simply acting in parliament as the other parties do one can bring about a revolutionary transformation.

We want the party's activity in parliament to be the result of people's action at the rank-and-file level, in the communities. We don't want to do things *for* the workers; we want to express the result of what the workers *do*. We don't want to impose anything on the workers; we want the working class to be the one that imposes its will, above and beyond the positions of one or another of those who represent it.


*Q. Is there any relation between the PT and the Brazilian Communist Party [PCB], which arose in the 1920s and proclaimed itself a party of the working class, a Marxist-Leninist party?*

A. There is no link between the PCB of 1922 and the PT of 1980.

*Q. I'm not referring to a particular date; I'm referring to the PCB, which has continuity as a political party.*

A. There isn't any link. There is a basic difference, in that no one has the right to impose a doctrine on the working class. I think the Brazilian left has been in error up to now, because it has not been sufficiently able to grasp what has been put into the head of every worker or to elaborate an original doctrine on that basis. It's been just the opposite—here the left has always espoused ready-made doctrines and tried to impose them.

*Q. Specifically, what is your position*



Rius-Sempre

'It's more practical to divide the profits among 2,000 generals than among 100 million Brazilians.'

*regarding the Marxist left?*

A. The PT has nothing to do with the PCB, precisely for the reason that I mentioned. I do not know if the workers would accept a Marxist-Leninist doctrine. I don't deny that the PCB has played an important role for many years. But I do deny the justice of telling the workers that they have to be communists. The just thing to do is give them the opportunity to be what they find most favorable to them. We don't want to impose doctrines; we want to arrive at a just doctrine on the basis of the organization of the workers, as a result of our own organizing.

*Q. How do you view the experiences of working-class struggle in other countries?*

A. We have to accept historical experiences. History exists precisely so that we can avoid errors and accept historical achievements. It is logical that any foreign experience must be adapted to our own reality, adapted to the methods that we rely on in the struggles of the workers in our own country.

*Q. And the experiences of the socialist countries?*

A. I have a problem with the socialist countries. It is not clear enough to me what type of society is just in terms of the interests of the working class.

I am not speaking in a critical tone. I do not know if the Cuban regime is better. I do not know if one lives happily under the Cuban regime, because I never went to Cuba. I do not know if there is enough food or public health care, if the education system is for the people, if the people have the right to freedom of expression or not. I do not know if the Cuban regime is ideal.

What seems ideal to me is being able to create a society where no one is exploited, where there is democracy, where persons can at least have the right to disagree.

In the same way that I do not accept a dictatorship of the right, neither do I

accept a dictatorship of the left. I don't know if it is possible in the short- or medium-term, but I do know that in the long run we are headed toward a different society. Not even socialism, I think, has been defined thus far.

On the one hand there is socialism, and, on the other, social democracy. It seems clear that the latter provides better conditions of life for the people. In Germany, in Sweden, in Switzerland, the people undoubtedly have living standards that are much better than in other countries, either capitalist or socialist.

But I don't fail to recognize that social democracy exists only on the basis of the poverty imposed on other peoples. Germany can pay its metalworkers better wages on the basis of the miserable wages that German companies pay Brazilian workers. They present social democracy to us as a reasonable model, but they do not tell us that it can only survive so long as Africa and Latin America are kept under an exploitative regime. From the moment when such exploitation ceases, social democracy could go bankrupt, because the bosses or the governments would not be able to maintain the living standards of their people.

*Q. There is another party in Brazil that considers itself a party of the workers—the party of Vargas, of Jango Goulart, of Brizola—the Brazilian Labor Party [PTB], now transformed into the Democratic Labor Party [PDT]. What is the relation between this party and the PT?*

A. My disagreements with Brizola are based on an historic error: The PTB has never been a party of the workers. It is a party of the elite imposed on the workers. It was not a party of the workers, it was a party for the workers.

We want a party that arises out of the working class; if the class does not want it, there will be no such party. We do not want to build a party to organize society;

we want society to organize the party. I think that is the basic difference between the PT and the conventional parties.

*Q. What chances do you see for a workers party in the current conditions of Brazilian society?*

A. We have to take into account the proletarianization of sectors of the middle class. Of course, the middle class in Brazil has always been quite unstable. When Delfim Neto resumed his post as minister of planning, I was worried because I thought that, if not the entire middle class, at least a large part of it would be dragged along if Neto began to make certain concessions—the prospect of being able to buy two cars, color television, and so on.

But the government made a mistake and failed to even get off the ground. It proletarianized everyone.

In 1964 there was an enormous difference between a worker and a teacher, between a lawyer and a bank worker, for example. Today such differences have practically disappeared.

*Q. From the point of view of the working class, how do you see the growing weight of the multinational corporations in the economy?*

A. We cannot criticize the post-1964 governments alone for multinationals' predominance. Brazil opened its doors to them in 1955, during the government of Juscelino Kubitschek. I don't want to compare the current political system with the one of that period—they are totally different. That one was much better.

But the economic system was the same. It was the same in 1930, in 1940, in 1950, in 1960, and in 1970. It got worse in 1980. It got worse because it became more and more closed.

The businessman became more and more detached from his social function, which consists not only in providing employment but also in improving the workers' living conditions. What had been the social function of the businessman came instead to be that of the employee who was forced to work for low wages and still contribute to the country, when he should have been working for a just wage. Enterprises should contribute to the well-being of the country. No country is in good shape if its people are not. Thus the people of Brazil have a social function with respect to the state and the economic system, one much more important than that of the enterprises. The enterprises were supposed to promote social well-being, but they failed to do so.

It is true, though, that from 1964 on the government favored the multinational corporations still more, and opened their doors still wider to foreign capital.

*Q. Lula, do you believe that the organi-*

zation of the working class to gain its rights can be achieved in Latin America at the level of a single country? Or will it have to be achieved through integrating all the countries of Latin America, all of which have similar problems? Do you think there is an estrangement between Brazil and the other countries of Latin America, as has been said so often?

A. What is happening is that a different type of exploitation has been imposed on each country, according to the type of economic interest that each offers. I think that so long as Latin America and Africa remain underdeveloped, as they are now, it will be difficult to achieve continental unity.

It seems to me that it is necessary to bring about a change in the majority of the governments of those countries, so that there could be a pact among them to fight the savage capitalism of the North Americans, the Germans, the Japanese—international capitalism.

I think—although it seems like a dream to me—that the day will come when the workers of the world, not only in Latin America, will organize themselves to fight against capitalism.

*Q. You're referring to the workers of the capitalist world?*

A. Exactly. The kind of exploitation to which we are subjected is unjust for the workers of developed countries like England and France as well. So we have to move toward international trade unionism. Who knows—one day there may arise a workers' multinational to fight against the multinational corporations. Because it isn't right for an enterprise to treat the workers of Brazil, Argentina, or Mexico in one way and the workers of the United States or Germany in another. So those workers are going to have to organize themselves in the various countries to fight the exploitation to which they are subjected. And when they have to reach an agreement with the bosses, they won't make one agreement with Brazil, a different one with Argentina, and so on. They will reach a unified agreement among the workers of an enterprise in all countries; while of course respecting the economy of each country.

*Q. Finally, how do you see your future as the head of the trade-union struggle and the PT?*

A. I do not have any political pretensions. My only aim is to organize the workers. And for that, I don't need to be anyone special or to have some post. One cannot make predictions about what one is going to do. But right now my main goal is the organization of the workers at the political level, that is, the formation of the Workers Party. □

## Armed With Nuclear Weapons?

### Australia—Washington's New Bomber Base

By Ray Fox

[The following article is taken from the March 25 issue of *Direct Action*, a revolutionary socialist newsweekly published in Sydney, Australia.]

\* \* \*

Despite government claims that U.S. B-52 bombers to be staged through Darwin [Australia] will not immediately carry nuclear weapons, a future nuclear role for the aircraft is the intention of agreements signed by Minister for Foreign Affairs Tony Street while in Washington recently.

It now appears that Street signed two separate documents. The first, a formal agreement allowing Darwin to be used, leaves the question of what the bombers will carry entirely up to the U.S.

The second, a document only disclosed in Parliament after Street's return, says that no nuclear weapons will be carried unless the Australian government gives "consent".

The U.S. government has expressed its satisfaction with the agreements, indicating the weapons may not be essential to the initial role of the aircraft, which is officially acknowledged to be spying.

However, the fact that the bombers will be using Darwin makes it easier for the government to take the next step and agree to nuclear weapons being on board. It may even be able to do this in secret.

Both the U.S. and Australian governments are aware that the most important breakthrough against opposition to their

plans has already been achieved.

This is now openly acknowledged. In the March 18 *Age*, Russell Skelton quotes a Defence official at Canberra's Russell Hill defence establishment:

"The B-52 exercise is the thin edge of the wedge. The current exercise is designed to simply get us used to the idea of B-52s flying through the north. It's simply a softening up exercise."

A more accurate picture of the real role of the B-52s—which is likely to include carrying nuclear and conventional bombs, as well as spying—will come when the U.S. completes the next stage of its Indian Ocean military build-up.

This build-up ties together U.S. bases in Guam, Darwin, Diego Garcia, Kenya, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and off the coast of Oman.

At present the U.S. is spending millions upgrading the airstrip on the Diego Garcia base it leases from Britain, so that it can be used for B-52 flights from Guam through Darwin.

This plan will allow for B-52 bomber penetration and intimidation of countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South East Asia. It also enables the bombers to reach into the Soviet Union.

No one should be deceived by the government's "no nuclear weapons" story. There is only one purpose of the Darwin agreements: to increase the capacity for U.S. military aggression. □

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## Polish Bureaucrat Confronted by Party Activists

[At the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP, the Polish Communist Party) held in Warsaw March 29-30, top party leaders were instructed to conduct tours of factories and workplaces to meet with rank-and-file party members. Many of them were confronted with sharp criticisms from the party ranks.

[One of those who has faced the greatest opposition is Tadeusz Grabski, a member of the Secretariat and the Political Bureau, who has displayed open hostility toward the independent trade union federation, Solidarity. The following is an account of an April 9 meeting between Grabski and party members in Belchatow, a small city about 100 miles southwest of Warsaw. It is taken from an article by Andrzej Bajorek in the April 10 issue of *Zycie Warszawy*, one of Poland's main daily newspapers. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

At 5:30 p.m., after two-and-a-half grueling hours as the chairman of the meeting, it was suggested to Secretary Grabski that he propose a recess. This proposition brought a sigh of relief in the bare room.

But then the subjects under discussion aroused feelings more heated than in an ordinary meeting.

"Let the secretary answer us now!" someone shouted from the audience. He didn't want to take a break.

The hosts did not spare the secretary. They formulated sharp questions and explicitly criticized the policies of the Political Bureau and the final resolutions of the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee.

"Explain why you were among those members of the Political Bureau who submitted their resignations," asked Mirosław Rybarski of the Northern Electrical Assembly plant.

The greatest attention and critical comment focused on the lack of consonance between the top officials of the party and the party ranks. The party, as someone said, does after all belong to the masses.

Differences between leading party officials and members from various established fields have been shown in numerous pronouncements on recent events. They were evident during the Central Committee plenum, where one could hear Comrade Grabski intervene bitterly, speaking about a breakdown and a psychological crisis in the party, how today party members were living through "the doldrums."

In the meeting in Belchatow, Henryk Zaremba, from an electrical engineering enterprise, declared:

"I am with the workers. I look at everything now, and I feel differently.

"Again and again we—the ranks of the party—have been misled. We have gone through four renewals, four changes in the party. [Former party chief Edward] Gierek said to us, 'Help the people.' We greeted that appeal, believed in it, thought it was necessary. But now I look among you—which of you can we get to carry that through? Toward what have we led the country?"

Henryk Zewald, the secretary of the party branch in the Belchatow electric plant, stated:

"I have noticed, very painfully, that there is a lack of foresight, propriety, and quickness to act by some party leaders and members. We do not put to good use opportunities to take preventive action by means of mass involvement.

"On the eve of the Bydgoszcz crisis and the warning strike,\* what did we see on the daily television broadcasts? What we needed at that time was the appearance of competent and authoritative figures. But instead we had a display by two employees from Warsaw, one of whom reminded me of a crook. Does that make sense? I am not against putting mediocre people on television, but let's be bound by certain rules and common sense."

Zewald read a resolution drawn up by the party organization in the Belchatow electric plant. The resolution criticized the distortion of events in the country by the news media, in particular, according to the resolution's authors, on television. The party organization in the plant demanded the setting up of a public body to establish control over the gathering and dissemination of national and international news over television.

Why did the Central Committee adopt a position of not bringing news about the Bydgoszcz events out into the open?

"I am not an orator, just a simple worker," said Andrzej Olczak, a coal miner. "Things are organized bureaucratically. There are more people in the factories than in the offices, but the bureaucracy keeps on enlarging itself. Where are the responsible people, and what are they doing about this crisis?"

Many spoke about the upcoming Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP, the

\*On March 19, police in the northern city of Bydgoszcz attacked dozens of leaders and supporters of Solidarity and Rural Solidarity, the farmers' union. Three were taken to the hospital. In response, Solidarity called a four-hour "warning" strike on March 27 to protest the beatings. The strike was observed by millions of workers, and paralyzed the country.—IP

election of delegates, the preparations for the congress, and the agenda.

Mirosław Rybarski of the party branch in the Northern Electrical Assembly plant presented a proposal that the party congress be recessed so that delegates could go back to meet with the party members who elected them and rediscuss the questions and draft proposals facing the congress. As a result, they could then return to the congress sessions strengthened by the backing of the party ranks.

The discussion raged for four hours.

Rather than giving a summary speech, Franciszek Wojtak, the chairman of the Solidarity branch at the Belchatow electric plant, stated:

"I was invited here as a representative of Solidarity. This discussion has pleased me very much. My understanding of the party was way off, based just on what I had read and heard. But after seeing such an ongoing party discussion, I believe that the party is on the rise." □

## Japanese Trotskyists Sentenced

Watada Kumeo, a leader of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League (JRCL), Japanese section of the Fourth International, has been handed a ten-year prison sentence for his part in mass demonstrations against the Narita airport three years ago. Thirteen other persons, most of them JRCL members, were given sentences ranging from four to nine years.

The fourteen will appeal their sentences. Meanwhile, some 300 other demonstrators are awaiting trial.

Construction of the Narita airport has been a controversial issue in Japanese politics since the plans for it were announced in 1965. It was opposed by farmers who were slated to lose their land to the airport and by residents of the area and others concerned about its environmental hazards.

Construction of the airport was continually delayed by mass protests. On March 26, 1978, thousands turned out to demonstrate against its impending opening. Despite the largest police mobilization in Japan since the end of World War II, about a thousand protesters succeeded in occupying the airport, including the control tower.

Hundreds were arrested, including members of the JRCL who were active in the building of the demonstration. In the trial of the fourteen activists the government invoked a law designed for prosecuting hijackers, which carries particularly heavy sentences.

Letters of protest against the verdict and sentences can be sent to Judge Hanajiri, c/o Supreme Court, 1-1-4, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan, with copies to the Airport Opposition League, c/o Shinjidaisha, 5-13-17, Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan.

## The 21 Theoretical Errors of Comrades Clark, Feldman, Horowitz, and Waters

By Ernest Mandel

[Following the entry of Vietnamese forces into Kampuchea and the overthrow of the murderous Pol Pot regime there in January 1979, and the Peking regime's invasion of Vietnam the following month, differences arose within the Fourth International. A public debate was carried out over what political stance to take regarding the events in Indochina and over various theoretical questions raised in the discussion.

[The main documents in this debate are the following: "Behind Differences on Military Conflicts in Southeast Asia," by Ernest Mandel (see *Intercontinental Press*, April 9, 1979, p. 335); the majority and minority resolutions presented to the November 1979 World Congress of the Fourth International (see *Intercontinental Press*, June 4, 1979); and "War and Revolution in Indochina—What Policy for Revolutionists?" a reply to Ernest Mandel by Steve Clark, Fred Feldman, Gus Horowitz, and Mary-Alice Waters (see *Intercontinental Press*, July 16, 1979).

[The following article by Ernest Mandel is a continuation of that discussion. It originally appeared, along with the Clark, Feldman, Horowitz, and Waters article, in a special Summer 1980 issue of the French-language fortnightly *Inprecor*.]

\* \* \*

1. The state is an instrument for defending and reproducing the power of a ruling class. This is the essence of the Marxist theory of the state, as opposed to all bourgeois or revisionist theories influenced by the bourgeois ones. This theory implies a "hard-core" composed of at least the following elements: There can be no state without society being divided into social classes having conflicting material interests. Every state serves the interests of a *given* ruling class which must exist—i.e., there can be no feudal state without the existence of a feudal ruling class, no bourgeois state without the existence of a bourgeoisie. The existence of the state reflects the fact that the ruling class cannot tolerate that certain social functions should be exercised by all members of society, to begin with by members of the classes which do not rule. And the existence of the state manifests that there are social activities which the ruling class does not exercise automatically because it owns the means of production, but which it has to control if it wants to maintain and reproduce its class rule.

In other words, the existence of the state manifests the *autonomous* existence of the social superstructure, which the ruling class dominates in function of its control over the social surplus product and through many

mechanisms, some of which are rather complex.

Whoever challenges the universal validity of this "hard core" of the Marxist theory of the state as "schematic," in reality challenges the very essence of that theory. To believe that you can have, under whatever circumstances, a state without a physically existing ruling class, a bourgeois state without a bourgeois class, or even worse, the same state apparatus simultaneously or successively serving the interests of the bourgeois class and the working class, is exactly like believing that you can have a capitalist mode of production without wage labor and without the production of surplus value. This is not a more flexible application of Marxism. It is a revision of Marxism.

For that reason we cannot accept comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters's statement according to which our contention that you couldn't have a bourgeois state in Kampuchea without the existence of a bourgeois class, or even the slightest remnants of such a class, in the total absence of private property and even of money, is in any way "schematic."<sup>1</sup> It is a normal and traditional application of the Marxist theory of the state. By calling that application "schematic," the comrades in question begin to revise that theory.

2. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters compound that beginning of revisionism by writing:

This Marxist concept of the state is used in a twofold sense. It has a narrow meaning: the apparatus of coercion—armies, police, jails. And it has a broader meaning: the general socioeconomic system that the coercive apparatus upholds. [p. 724.]

This is wrong in both ways. The "narrow" meaning of the state as only a coercive apparatus is an uncalled-for oversimplification of Engels's statement: *in the last analysis*, the state is a body of armed men. It is precisely so only "in the last analysis." Normally, the state is a separate apparatus which is much more than just coercive. It involves administration, a currency and customs system, lawmaking, ideology, education, all necessary functions for a reproduction of class rule and production relations, which *cannot* be reproduced by coercion alone.

As for the "broader" meaning attributed

1. All references to Steve Clark, Fred Feldman, Gus Horowitz, and Mary-Alice Waters: "War and Revolution in Indochina: What Policy for Revolutionists? A Reply to Ernest Mandel," in *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, vol. 17, no. 27, July 16, 1979. The reference to our "schematism" is on p. 724.

to the state by comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters, this is an inadmissible concession to bourgeois and revisionist theories of the state. Marxists *do not* identify the state with "the general socioeconomic system," i.e., with society as such. The state is precisely a *special apparatus, separate and apart* from "the general socioeconomic system." This apparatus appropriates unto itself, in the interests of the ruling class, specific functions which, in a classless society, are not professional privileges of any particular group of people.

The said comrades have made this additional step on the road of revising the Marxist theory of the state because the wrong positions they have adopted on the class nature of the Kampuchean state under the Khmer Rouge regime force them to generalize embryonically revisionist positions previously adopted on China and Vietnam (and wavering positions on Yugoslavia too). They cannot accept anymore the classical position of Marx and Engels that state power and production relations, that social superstructure and social infrastructure (basis), are two *different* spheres of social reality, linked together by class rule, but not characterized by absolute homogeneity and even less by total identity.

A feudal (or semifeudal) state is a state which serves the interests of the (semi)feudal nobility. It is not a state which can only exist when you have nothing but feudal relations of production. A bourgeois state is a state which serves the interests of the bourgeoisie as a class. It is not a state which can only exist if you have "pure" and "total" capitalist relations of production. Likewise, a workers state (even under its most bureaucratized form) is a state which is an instrument of maintaining and reproducing those production relations of the transition period between capitalism and socialism (collective property of the means of production, planned economy, state monopoly of foreign trade, etc.) which correspond to the historical interests of the working class. It is not a state which can only exist when private property is suppressed 100 percent, or even less when all kinds of additional political and social conditions are being fulfilled. By changing this traditional and basic Marxist approach, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters open up a whole Pandora's box of revisions of historical materialism.

In passing, they start to question one hundred and thirty years of Marxist tradition which poses the need of the *conquest of state power by the proletariat* as an autonomous task, apart from and prior to that of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie. This tradi-



tion goes from the *Communist Manifesto* over Marx and Engels's polemics with Bakunin and the anarchists to the debates between revisionists and Marxists in the time of the Second International and between communists and social democrats during the rise of the Third International.

3. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters are obsessed lest one should consider "predetermined," "inevitable," "foregone," the outcome of a "transition period" between the destruction of the bourgeois state and the "emergence of new socioeconomic relations" (p. 724). But there is an obvious confusion here. We certainly agree with them not to have any "political confidence" in any of the CPs (whether they are Stalinist or of Stalinist origins) which have begun to challenge capitalist property relations without a mass proletarian revolution. More generally, we should not give a blank check of revolutionary virtue to *anybody* (including Bolsheviks and Trotskyists) as long as a victorious social revolution hasn't actually occurred under their leadership. But in what way can the *outcome* of open or incipient civil war modify our judgment about the *class nature* of the forces (and the states) involved?

The Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919 was defeated by counterrevolution after six months of existence. There was nothing "inevitable" about the outcome of that civil war. There was certainly no overall "emergence of new socioeconomic relations." Nevertheless, nobody can seriously argue that therefore the Hungarian Soviet Republic was not a workers state, the Hungarian Red Army not a workers army. Likewise, the Soviet Red Army could well have been defeated in the civil war in 1918 or 1919. Would that have changed the class nature of the Red Army as a workers army, of the Soviet state apparatus as a workers state?

In the opposite sense, a total victory of the Spanish workers against the fascists in July-August 1936, or a victorious crushing of Pinochet's coup by a workers insurrection in 1973 in Chile, would in no way have modified our judgment of the Spanish state under the Popular Front or of the Chilean state under the Unidad Popular as bourgeois states. For these victories would have been obtained not thanks to but in spite of the function of the existing state apparatus. And that remains the only basic criterion: the interests of what class does the state apparatus serve?

What was the role of the Kampuchean state apparatus (and the Vietnamese for that matter) after 1975? To consolidate and reproduce the rule of the bourgeoisie? To maintain a framework for the laws of motion of capitalism to function? Obviously not. But if the state has not that function but the opposite one, then it is not a bourgeois state, it is not an instrument of bourgeois class rule, irrespective of the final outcome of the national (and international) class struggle, which we consider by no means as

a "foregone conclusion."

In passing, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters have to shift their argument, jumping back and forth, in order to keep some semblance of links to the Marxist tradition:

As long as capitalist property relations *predominate*, the class nature of the state remains capitalist. Insofar as the new government apparatus . . . makes inroads (!) into economic power of the bourgeoisie—it should be designated a workers and farmers government. If that workers and farmers government mobilizes the masses and expropriates capitalist property, a new workers state will come into being. If not, the workers and farmers government will be toppled and the capitalist state apparatus reconstructed. (p. 724, our emphasis.)

As long as capitalist property relations *predominate*, the class nature of the state remains capitalist. Everybody agrees. Question: Did capitalist property relations *predominate* under Pol Pot in Kampuchea? Who can seriously argue along these lines? Question: Did the Pol Pot regime only "make inroads" into the economic power of the bourgeoisie? Answer: It utterly destroyed that power. The capitalist class was totally expropriated. But if that expropriation occurs, even without mass mobilizations, do you then still have a bourgeois state, with the bourgeoisie having disappeared as a ruling class? Yes, contend our said comrades, because then capitalism will in the end reappear. By a rather clumsy sleight-of-hand, the end of the paragraph actually asserts the opposite of the beginning. You now have a bourgeois state not only without the predominance but even without the existence of bourgeois property relations, simply because capitalist property relations *could* subsequently reappear.

When comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters assert that under Pol Pot "primitive accumulation was nonetheless proceeding," they clearly confuse the accumulation of consumer goods as use-values with the accumulation of *capital*. There is not the slightest proof—and the comrades in question cannot give a single example—of "primitive accumulation of *capital*" having occurred under the Khmer Rouge regime inside the bureaucracy, not to speak of primitive accumulation on the scale going on in Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union, Poland or Yugoslavia—all countries which we nevertheless consider bureaucratized workers states. So the whole argumentation is just without foundation. What these comrades defend is the revisionist thesis that you can have a bourgeois state not only without the *predominance* of capitalist property relations, but without the existence of private property, of a bourgeois class, or even of money. This is nonsense from a Marxist point of view.

4. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters believe that the situation in Eastern Europe between 1944 and 1949 justifies their concept that you can have transitional

situations in which the class nature of the state is unrelated to the question of which social class actually rules, of whose social class interests the state actually defends, and even of what social classes physically exist. They are quite mistaken. The experience of Eastern Europe between 1944 and 1949 strikingly confirms the correctness of the classical Marxist theory of the state—and the way in which we applied it to the case of Kampuchea.

To repeat it again: The state is an instrument of class rule. It is not necessarily always an efficient or successful defender of the interests of the ruling class; otherwise victorious social revolutions would be impossible. You can have stable bourgeois states. You can have extremely unstable bourgeois states. You can have bourgeois state apparatuses decomposed to the point where a small push can overthrow them (that was obviously the situation in Russia at the eve of the October revolution). What makes them bourgeois in each case is not their degree of stability or the outcome of the class struggles in which they are involved. It is the fact that their concrete function remains that of serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie and *that they have to be overthrown* (smashed)—however weak they have become—before another ruling class can be said to have taken power.

In traditional revolutionary Marxist language, we call the situation in which the state of the old ruling class in a given country is in rapid decay and the first elements of the state of a new ruling class are emerging a *situation of dual power*. History has taught us that there are at least three variants of situations of dual power, and there might be more (incidentally, it is a typical example of "schematism" to deny such possibilities, i.e. to jump from the universal relevance of the Marxist theory of the state to some additional set of universal preconditions for the emergence of a workers state, excluding in advance concrete variants produced by the living historical process).

The classical situation of dual power is of course the one in which a bourgeois state apparatus in full decay is challenged by *soviets* (workers councils), which centralize into an emerging alternative authority on a national scale.

There exists a variant of dual power which has occurred in all those cases where civil war—or at least its decisive phase—has preceded and not followed the overthrow of the bourgeois state as it did in Russia. In those cases, dual power can take the form of the bourgeoisie and its state still ruling in one part of the given country, while the emerging workers state has already full control over another part of the territory of that same country.

The main difference between that situation and the classical situation of dual power based on a nationwide network of soviets is that we do not have only an alternative emerging national authority and the nucleus of an alternative army (Red Guards,

workers militias etc.), while the decaying state apparatus of the old ruling classes still survives. We now have already a *fully developed alternative state apparatus* on part of the national territory (army, administration at local and regional level, different currencies, even enforcement of different laws, etc.) while on the same territory the state apparatus of the old ruling class has been completely destroyed. In other words: while there is still dual power at the level of the country as a whole, there is no more dual power in portions of the national territory where bourgeois rule has disappeared.

We would contend that this second variant of dual power existed in China at least starting with 1945 if not earlier,<sup>2</sup> in Yugoslavia since 1944, in Vietnam at least since 1951 if not since 1945-46.

Finally, the developments in Eastern Europe, starting with 1944, undoubtedly present us with a third variant of a dual power situation. In each of these countries, there survived a state apparatus of the old ruling classes in different degrees of disintegration or weakening (we say different degrees, for the Royal Romanian Army, to limit ourselves to that example, still counted 300,000 soldiers and officers in 1944-45, which isn't exactly a low figure). But these state apparatuses were challenged in a growing way by the *much more powerful occupation force of a degenerated workers state* which represented social interests historically incompatible with those of the old ruling classes of these countries. From a certain moment on, it tried—with the help of the local Stalinist parties and with different degrees of limited mass mobilizations—to wrest control over the whole country (in the first place its armed forces, its police and its economy) from the said old ruling class.

It could not do so without destroying the old state apparatus. King Michael of Romania or President Benes of Czechoslovakia could not administer a collectivized planned economy—any more than the Soviet bureaucracy and its local representatives could in the long run successfully guarantee its power and privileges in these countries with their economy remaining capitalist and integrated in the international capitalist economy. While the decaying old state apparatus (or decisive remnants of it) still survived—or, in the cases of Austria, Germany, and Czechoslovakia, the bourgeoisie tried to build up new bourgeois state apparatuses—the Soviet occupation forces and their local tools were at the same time starting to create state apparatuses of another social nature, in the image of that of the Soviet bureaucracy. During that whole period, a dual power situation subsisted in these countries—be it a dual power situation of a

special type. It would be solved by the question of which state apparatus (the power of what social class) would be eliminated by the challenging one.

In Kampuchea after 1975, we had nothing of a situation similar to that of Eastern Europe between 1944 and 1949. The state apparatus of the old ruling classes was completely smashed by the Khmer Rouge. One could say that a situation of dual power existed in Kampuchea (dual power of the second variant) between 1973 and 1975, when large parts of the national territory were already controlled by the Khmer Rouge, and large mass mobilizations were leading to a real social revolution there (incidentally, much larger mass mobilizations than in countries like Romania, Bulgaria, or Hungary in 1944-1949), while the bourgeois semicolonial state apparatus of Lon Nol still survived in the large cities and some parts of the countryside. But it is a grave error not to distinguish between a dual power situation in which the old bourgeois state apparatus still survives, be it in a state of advanced decay, and a situation in which that old apparatus has been utterly smashed. This is one of the many errors implied in comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters's position on the class nature of the Kampuchean state under Pol Pot.

5. The said comrades contend that, having changed our position on the moment when the "people's democracies" have become bureaucratized workers states, we now situate this qualitative change in 1946-47. They are mistaken. We believe that there is no general pattern, that each country has to be examined separately, and the "concrete analysis of a concrete situation" must always be based on the key criterion: when did the bourgeoisie lose state power? When was the bourgeois state apparatus completely destroyed? That moment is different from country to country, and the difference covers a span of at least four years.

In the first place, far from starting from the assumption that the outcome was "a foregone conclusion" (p. 723), we hold now, as we did during the discussion in the late 1940s (we were among the very few comrades to have defended that obvious fact, which comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters seem not to notice even now, more than thirty years after it occurred), that the bourgeoisie *did* successfully defend (or restore) its state power in at least two if not three countries where the above-sketches dual power situation had emerged in 1944-45: in Finland, in Austria and in West Berlin. In confirmation with the logic of the analysis, the Soviet occupation forces had to withdraw from these countries (or in West Berlin had to stop their attempts to integrate that city into that part of Europe dominated by the Soviet bureaucracy). In all these cases, the consolidation or reconstruction of a bourgeois state apparatus was pretty definite in 1948-49 (although the formal withdrawal of the Soviet troops from

Eastern Austria only occurred in 1955).

In the second place, in Yugoslavia, where a genuine popular mass socialist revolution occurred, involving millions of people (be it under bureaucratic control), the remnants of the bourgeois state apparatus were pretty well eliminated at the end of 1945 and a workers state came into existence at that moment.<sup>3</sup>

In the third place, in Czechoslovakia, the moment of the actual smashing of the remnants of the bourgeois state can be pinpointed even more precisely: it is February-March 1948.

In the fourth place, in Eastern Germany, you had the smashing of the previous state apparatus from the moment of the Soviet occupation. But no alternative centralized state apparatus was set up because the Soviet bureaucracy had not yet opted for the definite division of Germany and was still toying with the idea of a united German (bourgeois) state, in exchange for huge economic reparations extracted from the Ruhr. Here, the bureaucratized workers state came into existence with the creation of the German Democratic Republic in 1949.


In the remaining countries (Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) the concrete determination of the moment of qualitative change is a bit more difficult.<sup>4</sup> It might stretch from 1947 to 1948 depending upon the country which we examine. But the criterion remains in each case the same: when did the bourgeoisie lose the remnants of state power it still obviously had in 1945 and 1946, and not when was private property completely abolished (in Poland and Yugoslavia it is far from being completely abolished to this very day).

Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters are worried lest one *identify* the qualitative change in the social nature of the state with the idea of "who controls the armed forces." We fully share that preoccupation. As we said above, the concept of "state apparatus" is much wider than just army and police. It involves the judiciary, law, currency, customs system, administration, prevailing ideology, transmission of that ruling ideology through education and the mass media, etc. For sure, in a social revolution, all these

3. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters refer to the 1951 World Congress resolutions on Eastern Europe in support of their own formulations. They conveniently forget to mention that the resolution on Yugoslavia, adopted at that same World Congress, fixed the birth of the Yugoslav workers state at *October 1945*, with the breakup of the coalition government, which led to the *legal consolidation* in 1945-46 of the socioeconomic conquests of the Yugoslav revolution.

4. To give just one example: In Hungary, most observers fix the birth of the "people's democracy" only in 1948 with the repression against the social democrats. In 1947, there had still been parliamentary elections with a multiparty system and the CP not getting a majority. Large-scale nationalizations occurred in 1948. The bourgeois coalition ministers were ousted in 1947.

2. According to Derek J. Waller (*The Government and Politics of Communist China*, Anchor Books, 1971, p. 27), by 1945, the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army controlled territories with a population of 100 million. Other authors put that figure at 60 million.



apparatuses do not change simultaneously. But for those directly concerned by the concrete historical process, the change is pretty clear. Many Romanian or Czech bourgeois still believed they had some power in 1946. None believed it after the spring of 1948. All Chinese capitalists knew they were in power in 1947 (except in those territories controlled by the PLA). No Chinese capitalist believed he was in power in 1950, whatever portion of private property still survived.

By overreacting against a simplistic version of state power of the bourgeoisie, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters involve themselves in an unsolvable contradiction. Speaking about Eastern Europe they state (on p. 721) that the establishment of a workers state involves three "stages": the smashing of the bourgeois state apparatus; the establishment of a workers (or workers and farmers) government; and the expropriation of the decisive sectors of the economy.

But when dealing with Kampuchea, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters make a complete somersault. They admit that the bourgeois Lon Nol state apparatus was completely smashed (p. 705). They admit that there was expropriation of the old ruling classes (p. 723). But because there were no mass mobilizations, *in spite* of the smashing of the bourgeois state and *in spite* of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie (including its physical annihilation) . . . a bourgeois state survived in Kampuchea.

6. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters refer to the Pol Pot regime as "counterrevolutionary." But they leave the defini-

tion of that "counterrevolution" deliberately vague—and not by accident. For like all their other definitions of the Pol Pot regime, it faces them with a series of contradictions in function of their wrong analysis of the class nature of the Kampuchean state after 1975.

Did Pol Pot initiate a *social* counterrevolution? But that would imply that a victorious social revolution had already occurred previously, i.e. that a workers state already existed, something said comrades strenuously deny.

Did the Khmer Rouge perhaps stop, through a successful bourgeois counterrevolution, an ongoing social revolution which had not yet finally triumphed, after the pattern of Germany 1919, Spain 1936-37, or Portugal 1975? But that presupposes, (a) huge revolutionary mass mobilizations, which said comrades equally strenuously deny having taken place in Kampuchea, and (b) a defense of private property by Pol Pot (that was after all the social content of social-democratic and Stalinist counterrevolutionary policies in the above named cases). But far from defending private property, Pol Pot abolished it radically. Did the Khmer Rouge perhaps initiate a *political* counterrevolution comparable to that which the Stalinist bureaucracy realized in the USSR? This more credible version of Pol Pot's "counterrevolution" however also implies that previously a workers state had already been created or was in the process of being created. For you can't have a bureaucratic political counterrevolution, i.e. a counterrevolution which expropriates politically the proletariat . . . inside a bourgeois state.

Without answering in any way the arguments which we have already advanced against that analogy in our article against which they polemicize, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters again repeat: "What occurred in Kampuchea was indeed very similar to the type of situation foreseen by Trotsky in 1932 in an article titled 'Peasant War in China and the Proletariat'" (p. 720). The trouble with that analogy, as we pointed out before, is that Trotsky based the possibility of the violent clash between a peasant army and the Chinese proletariat on the need of the peasant army to *defend private property*:

Regardless of their origin in each instance . . . the conflicts between armed peasants and workers were rooted in one and the same social soil: the difference between the class position and training of the workers and of the peasants. The worker approaches questions from the socialist standpoint; the peasant's viewpoint is petty bourgeois. *The worker strives to socialize the property that is taken away from the exploiter; the peasant seeks to divide it up.* [Leon Trotsky on China, (New York: Monad Press, 1976), p. 524. Our emphasis.]

. . . in the peasant movement itself are very powerful *proprietary and reactionary* tendencies, and at a certain stage it can become hostile to the workers and sustain that hostility already equipped with arms. [Ibid., p. 528. Our emphasis.]

But in Kampuchea, far from defending private property, Pol Pot's army abolished it in the most radical manner possible. So the "peasant" character of that army does not correspond at all to the social definition Trotsky correctly gave of the material and historical interests of the peasantry as opposed to those of the proletariat.

7. According to comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters the Kampuchean workers and peasants had no stakes whatsoever in the social transformations which occurred under Pol Pot. "The policies implemented by the Pol Pot regime, to the contrary, constituted a brutal economic, social, and political *retrogression* for the Kampuchean workers and peasants" (p. 717). *All* the policies of the Pol Pot regime? A statement with far-reaching implications! Under Pol Pot, some form of civil war was still conducted by the counterrevolutionary Khmer Serei, with the support of the Thai government and the CIA, against the Pnompnh regime. If Pol Pot was "retrogression" for the workers and peasants, should they have been indifferent to the outcome of that civil war? Should they even have given critical support to the Khmer Serei? What about the expropriation of the imperialist plantations? Was that a "retrogression"? What about the expropriation of all industry and wholesale trade (expropriation of wholesale trade which, in the case of South Vietnam, has suddenly become the "decisive" criterion for the emergence of a workers state)? Had the workers no stake in that either? Should they be indifferent to the restoration of private property? What about the abolition of landlordship and land rent in the north of the country? Had the workers and

peasants no stakes in that either? Should they be indifferent to its abolition? Was that also a retrogression? By concentrating all attention on the barbaric part of the policies of Pol Pot (but, we repeat, no more barbaric than Stalin's!) and sweeping under the carpet all these progressive measures of social revolution which obviously occurred in Kampuchea, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters shift the definition of a workers state away from the basic criteria which the Trotskyist movement has used up to now, and get in dangerous vicinity of "state capitalist" or Shachtmanite positions, denying the historically progressive nature of the overthrow of capitalist property relations which obviously occurred in Kampuchea.

8. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters hotly deny that they think a new workers state has "popped up" in Kampuchea under the Vietnamese occupation (p. 725). But by trying to remain consistent with their schematic "preconditions" for the appearance of a workers state in Kampuchea, they have now tied themselves into knots which it will take them a long time to unravel.

One of the preconditions for the emergence of a workers state, if we understand them correctly, is

establishing a workers government or a workers and farmers government. That is, a government independent of the old ruling classes, which mobilizes the power of the workers and their allies to implement progressive social measures that more and more challenge the economic prerogatives of capital. [p. 721.]

But that condition is impossible to achieve in Kampuchea today, for the "economic prerogatives of capital" have already been *totally abolished* by the Pol Pot regime. We leave aside the fact—which we predicted—that there is not the slightest sign of "mass mobilizations" in Kampuchea under the regime of Vietnamese occupation, be it only because of the miserable famine conditions reigning in that unfortunate country, which the new regime in no ways has alleviated.

Paradoxically, for said comrades' schema to be applicable in Kampuchea, the Heng Samrin regime would first have to *restore* private property, and then find itself forced "by exceptional circumstances of imperialist aggression" to suppress it again through "mass mobilizations." We wonder whether comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters push their schematism to the point where they would actually foresee such a scenario. And if not, how could "a workers and farmers government stage" (with mass mobilizations) ever come into existence . . . when private property has already been eliminated from the start?

In the meantime, it remains a fact that the state apparatus of the Khmer Rouge has been completely smashed by the Vietnamese invasion and a new state apparatus created by an occupation army of 250,000

men. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters believe that this poses difficulty to our analysis. It doesn't in any way. Once the concept of possible wars between bureaucratized workers states is understood fully, it is not difficult to understand that a victorious invasion of a workers state by the bureaucracy of another workers state could completely smash the existing workers state apparatus to replace it by another bureaucratized workers state apparatus. In analogy (but it is just an analogy), a bourgeois state can be smashed by an invading army and be replaced by another bourgeois state (in most cases a colonial or semicolonial one; but in West Germany, even a new imperialist one).

But the difficulty really arises for the said comrades. They argue that Vietnam is a bureaucratized workers state. We agree. They argue that the Pol Pot state apparatus has been completely smashed by the Vietnamese army. We again agree. They cannot deny that the Heng Samrin regime is trying to build up (very slowly, and with great difficulties) a new state apparatus supporting itself nearly exclusively upon the Vietnamese army. Question: Can the army of a workers state rebuild from scratch a bourgeois state? Additional question: What has become of the analogy with Eastern Europe? Final question: If the new state apparatus, supporting itself on collective property and a huge army of a foreign workers state, is finally recognized as a workers state, without mass mobilizations having occurred "simultaneously" with the expropriations, for what mysterious reason was the Pol Pot state then no workers state?

9. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters sneer at our references to the traumatic shocks which the Kampuchean CP leaders suffered in the two decades between 1954 and 1973 and which, according to us, go a far way in explaining their extreme nationalism and distrust of the Soviet, Vietnamese, and probably also Chinese CP leaders. "Not conflicting class interests, but 'traumatic shocks' and 'infernal logic' are the stuff of comrade Mandel's 'more credible' explanation" (p. 705).

Our good comrades forget that the "traumatic shocks" we are referring to are neither of a psychological nor of a purely ideological nature. They were caused by political differences around central issues of the Kampuchean revolution. *Since when are such political issues divorced from the class struggle?*

In their haste to score debating points about our alleged underestimation of the class struggle, they suffer another loss of memory: the concrete contents of the political differences leading to those famous "traumatic shocks." Let us refresh that memory a bit:

A. The sell-out of the Kampuchean anti-imperialist resistance movement (or one could say of the Kampuchean revolution) by Moscow and Peking at the Geneva confer-

ence of 1954.

B. The shameful collaboration of the Soviet bureaucracy with the Lon Nol regime, when it was killing thousands of workers, peasants and communists starting with 1970.

C. The isolation of the Khmer Rouge when they tried to take Pnompenh, and to overthrow not only Lon Nol but also Sihanouk.

Now what was and what should have been *our* position as revolutionary Marxists towards these political differences? Weren't the Khmer Rouge, supposedly moved by "hatred of the socialist revolution in Vietnam" (p. 719), right on these three key issues of the Kampuchean revolution? Or do comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters believe that the interests of the Kampuchean revolution had to be subordinated to some "higher" goal, dictated either from Hanoi or Moscow? If they don't think so, as we know they don't, how can they then explain the *class nature of these political conflicts?* How come despicable petty-bourgeois Paris-trained intellectuals, preparing to administer a bourgeois state, took up more correct anti-imperialist and anticapitalist positions than the representatives of workers states, be it bureaucratized ones? How is it that revolutionary Marxists would have had to give them critical support against the leaders of these workers states? Isn't there something wrong there?

10. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters make a great deal of Pol Pot's counterrevolutionary alliance with the Khmer Serei and the Thai regime after his downfall. They write:

Doesn't Pol Pot's subsequent evolution throw even graver doubts onto the contention of those who believe that Kampuchea had definitively crossed the threshold of a workers state? [p. 719.]

No, it doesn't. It isn't something new either. When the Tito regime thought itself immediately threatened by a Soviet invasion in autumn 1950, it made a spectacular reversal of international orientation, moving from positions which were clearly to the left of Moscow's, to requests of arms from the imperialists and to supporting imperialism's war in Korea. When the Nagy regime in Hungary was on the point of being toppled by the invading Soviet army, it made last-minute desperate appeals to Western governments, and broke with the Warsaw Pact. After the invasion of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, not a few leaders of the Dubcek wing of the bureaucracy removed from power and forced to emigrate openly broke with Marxism and the defense of collective property and took probourgeois positions, the most prominent example being Ota Sik, the chief of economic policy under Dubcek. Did these various examples prove Stalin's, Khrushchev's, and Brezhnev's allegations that Tito, Nagy, and Dubcek had been from the beginning on a course of allying themselves with imperialism and of restoring capitalism in their respective coun-

tries? Did these acts in retrospect justify the blockade, military pressures, and even invasion used by the Kremlin? In no way whatsoever.

They only proved that in all these cases, Moscow's opponents were unprincipled bureaucrats, trained in the Stalin school of "socialism in one country," i.e. ready to make any maneuver, to ally themselves with anybody, to cynically sacrifice the interests of world revolution and of the international proletariat for the purpose of defending their own power and privileges. But it was power and privileges based upon collective and not upon private property, emanating from a postcapitalist and not from a capitalist economy and society. Whatever counter-revolutionary maneuvers they undertake when they are afraid of losing power or when they lose power can in no way change the Marxist criteria to judge the nature of the society and the state when they were running it. By these Marxist criteria, Yugoslavia in 1950, Czechoslovakia under Dubcek, Hungary under Nagy, were workers states in spite of above-mentioned counterrevolutionary maneuvers. By the same criterion, Kampuchea under Pol Pot was a bureaucratized workers state too.

11. When did China become a workers state? When was the social revolution victorious in China, i.e. when did state power pass from the bourgeois class (allied to the landlords) to the working class allied to the peasantry? Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters draw attention to a resolution of the International Executive Committee (IEC) of 1952, which states that China was not yet a workers state at that time (p. 724). They also draw attention to my polemics, as reporter on the Chinese question at that IEC, with the French comrade Favre-Bleibtreu, who stated that China had become a workers state in 1949 and that the question of the class character of the state "can be answered only as a function of a single decisive criterion: which class holds the essential elements of coercion?"

We believe today as we did at that moment that that "single decisive criterion" is too narrow. We used at that time as we do today a broader criterion: "what social class holds power," political power, state power being a larger notion than just controlling the police and the army. We used at that time as we do today the concept of "dual power" to characterize a situation in which two antagonistic social classes hold elements of state power on the territory of a single country. All that is quoted by Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters themselves (p. 724), without saying whether they agree or disagree with these criteria. But we also believe today—as we did from 1954 on—that by applying the correct criteria, the date on which China became a workers state has to be fixed at 1949-50. It would be hard to demonstrate for anybody "that the destruction of the state *power* of the Chinese bourgeoisie" had not been com-

pleted at that time, political power, state power being of course distinct from the survival of private property. The only part of Chinese territory on which the Chinese bourgeoisie still exercised state power after that date was Taiwan.

We were not alone with that opinion, nor only in a *post festum* bloc with comrade Favre-Bleibtreu. The Fourth World Congress of the Fourth International (FI) adopted "Theses on the Rise and Decline of Stalinism" in 1954—which the comrades of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), sympathizing with the then existing International Committee of the FI, do not recognize as documents for the whole movement, but which certainly expressed the opinion of the majority of the movement—in which the same opinion is expressed. And at the Reunification Congress of the FI of 1963 (Seventh World Congress), which comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters certainly do recognize as authoritative for the whole movement, we find in the basic document adopted, "Dynamics of World Revolution Today," the following passage:

The evolution of the workers' states as a whole, since the victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, and especially after Stalin's death in 1953, has therefore steadily removed the causes that fostered political passivity among the masses and their vanguard. [*Dynamics of World Revolution Today*, (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974), p. 43. Our emphasis.]

As we don't believe that comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters have been converted to the Menshevik two-stage theory of revolution, the formula: the "victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949" can therefore only mean the victory of a *socialist* revolution. And as there can be no *victory* of the socialist revolution without the conquest of power by the proletariat, i.e. without the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, we have to conclude that at least in 1963 there was no firm position that China became a workers state only in 1953-54 . . .

12. Motivated by the desire to defend the position that the People's Republic of China was not a workers state since its creation in 1949-50, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters give a content to Mao's "new democracy" policy which strangely conforms to the official Maoist version of it, and not to what they call "real Chinese history" (p. 723). This forces them, and not us, to "rewrite" that history. Here is what they say:

In reality the 'new democracy' policy had a definite political purpose. It was designed to assure the imperialists and native capitalists of Mao's interest in reaching an accommodation with them. This very real attempt to come to terms with the capitalist class is why confidence in Mao was not justified.

Only when Mao's offers to imperialism were rebuffed did his regime, under the pressure of the workers and the peasants, move against the last preserves of capitalism. [p. 725.]

The shifts in the reasoning, in the use of words, in the cover-up of real radical changes, is striking. It shows the weakest

side of said comrades' case.

In the first place, they try to hide the fact that the "new democracy" policy was formulated in 1940, while we are talking about what happened in China in the period of intense and generalized civil war, i.e. 1946-50. Nobody intends to give Mao any credit or any confidence for what he wrote and applied during his uneasy "pact-truce-and-war" with the Kuomintang in 1937-46. One could say that comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters's analysis by and large corresponds to what happened in China during that period (although even for that period it is too sweeping).

But does it correspond to what happened starting with 1946? Unleashing a generalized civil war is a peculiar way of "reaching an accommodation," to say the least. And the Korean War (which started in 1950 and not in 1952-53) was an even stranger way to "come to terms" with imperialism. What comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters deny is that a qualitative change occurred in the political situation in China starting with the generalized civil war. What they further deny is that the outcome of that civil war—the defeat of the capitalists and landlords, the victory of the People's Liberation Army, the proclamation of the People's Republic of China—in turn marked a qualitative change in the nature of the state, i.e. the passing of political power from one class to another. How they can deny both these changes, in the light of real Chinese history, not to speak of the Marxist theory of the state, is a mystery to us. But that is what lies at the bottom of their view of "recent Chinese history."

Did Mao continue to look for "accommodation" with imperialism (and even with sectors of the Chinese capitalist class) after 1949-50? Of course he did. So did Stalin . . . without this implying that the USSR was not a workers state. But there is accommodation and accommodation. There are "terms" and "terms." The French and Spanish People's Front, Thorez and Togliatti's policies in France and Italy after 1941, the Indonesian CP's policies which led to the disaster of 1965, the Chilean Unidad Popular, were all policies of "accommodation" and "coming to terms" with imperialism and capitalism, *within the framework of the bourgeois state* and without attacking the basic structures of bourgeois class power. Mao's policies (like those of Tito before him and Ho Chi Minh after him) were policies of "accommodation" and "coming to terms" with imperialism *while trying to destroy the bourgeois state* and building up an independent army and a state independent from and hostile to the bourgeoisie. A "minor" difference, undoubtedly.

The question is not abstract but very concrete and very "political." There were coalition negotiations between the Chinese CP and the Kuomintang. On what issues did they break down? On two key issues. Mao was unwilling to dissolve the PLA and the separate state apparatus he had set up in

the liberated territories. Chiang Kai-shek—with a keener class instinct, we must say, than these comrades—was adamant that no coalition government was possible without a dissolution (i.e. to quote Thorez, without “a single state, a single army, a single police” i.e. a bourgeois one). Chiang Kai-shek was resolute to crush the huge spontaneous peasant uprising against the landlords which was sweeping throughout Northern China starting with 1946. Mao, after some hesitation, changed his line in order to go along with these uprisings. (Strangely enough, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters who insist so much on “mass pressure” upon the bureaucrats, see the limited pressures of the limited mobilizations of 1952-53—unleashed by the party leadership itself—without taking notice of the huge, spontaneous uprisings of 1946-47, which involved tens of millions of people and were among the largest of twentieth century history.)<sup>5</sup> These two issues led to a generalized civil war instead of a coalition government. This was in complete contradiction with Mao’s previous and current theories. But it was a giant change in the objective situation. No, say comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters, this quite conformed with Mao’s theories. There was no basic change in the situation. In other words: generalized civil war equals generalized class collaboration; destruction of bourgeois state power equals consolidation of bourgeois state power. Aren’t “dialectics” stretched here to the point where they become vulgar sophistry?

What has the question of “confidence” in Mao to do with that? We note the changes and the dates of the changes. What “could” happen afterwards is another question altogether. Could capitalism have been restored in China after 1950? Of course it could. It could even be restored today. The change in the situation lies in the fact that, in order to restore it, a destruction of the state apparatus set up in 1949-50 would have been and remains necessary. Do the policies of the bureaucracy objectively undermine the conquests of the Chinese revolution? Of course they do, today as in 1949. But at the same time, these conquests were very real and very visible in 1949. A new state had come into existence which, according to the Marxist theory of the state and the Trotskyist theory of permanent revolution, could only be called a workers state.

Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters confuse the issue by suddenly introducing the term of moving “against the *last preserves* of capitalism.” This is not, and never has been, a criterion for determining the existence or absence of a workers state. As a matter of fact, “the last preserves of capitalism” have not been eliminated from Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and Yugoslavia to this very day. They had not been eliminated from the USSR until the late twenties, the early thirties. Yet nobody in

our movement denies that in these four cases we are confronting workers states. Why would the same definition be wrong for the People’s Republic of China, before the “last preserves of capitalism” had been eliminated? To jump from the “decisive sectors of the economy” to the “last preserves” is making the judgment of what class really exercises power practically impossible in most if not in all countries of the world.

We are firmly convinced that the dictatorship of the proletariat will not and should not eliminate “the last preserves of capitalism” from the moment of its establishment. Comrade Trotsky was of the same opinion. He wrote in 1934:

Once the Soviet government [in the USA] would be firmly in possession of the decisive heights of the economy (the banks, the fundamental branches of industry, transportation), farmers, small industrialists and merchants would have all the time necessary to think the situation over and take a decision. The rest would depend upon the successes obtained by nationalized industry [“Le Socialisme en Amerique,” *Oeuvres*, vol. 4, p. 200. Our own translation].

Should we now revise that judgment? Finally it ill suits comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters to make frivolous comments on an important theoretical issue:

Really? Mao’s “new democracy” line was just a rationalization to avoid recognizing that he had really been carrying out the socialist revolution? To avoid succumbing to the temptations of Trotskyism? [p. 724.]

We are not dealing with the “new democracy” line in general. We were dealing with the specific Maoist definition of the People’s Republic of China, proclaimed in October 1949, as a *state* of the so-called new democracy, part bourgeois and part working-class. For us, such a state has never existed, cannot exist and will never exist.

In China, Mao established a workers state *in spite* of his theory of “new democracy.” But the fact that he clung to this theory had disastrous consequences, in the first place for the Indonesian CP, who imitated his theory instead of imitating his practice. For that reason, bourgeois counterrevolution and not socialist revolution triumphed in Indonesia. The costs of that theory amounted to between half a million and a million communists, workers, peasants, youth, and intellectuals being massacred in Indonesia alone. There is no reason to crack cheap jokes on the issue.

Yes, the refusal to codify in theory what he had done in practice was a major political crime of Mao, certainly a much larger crime than to postpone the expropriation of the last Shanghai capitalists for a couple of years. (Most of the Shanghai capitalists fled from the mainland in 1949-50. They had voted with their feet on the question of the class nature of the People’s Republic of China. That vote was quite in conformity with their class interests and with our definition of their class nature). Yes, for a bureaucrat of Stalinist origin like Mao to admit that

Trotsky and the Left Opposition had been correct on the *basic strategic issue* for underdeveloped countries—the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat allied to the poor peasantry as the only way to solve the agrarian and the national question—proved to be more difficult than to overthrow capitalism in China. One can draw conclusions from that on the nature of the Maoist bureaucracy. But it is impermissible to draw conclusions therefrom as to the class nature of the People’s Republic of China—conclusions, furthermore, which would in practice imply that Mao had been right, and that the biggest peasant revolution in history could be successful . . . without the establishing of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

13. In order to remain fully consistent with their beginning revisionism of what determines the social nature of a state, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters have now to defend that revisionism towards the past. Without batting an eyelid they write:

Stressing the workers’ exercise of power through the soviets, they [Lenin and Trotsky] often (!) referred to the workers state as existing from the time the Bolshevik-led soviets took power in 1917, even prior to the economic transformations.

With the rise of Stalinism, however, the political conquests of the Russian workers and poor peasants were reversed in key areas. . . .

This put the spotlight on the importance of transforming property relations in the establishment of working-class rule. It was in this framework that Trotsky began (!) reviewing the transformation process in the Soviet Union, stressing the key economic measures that were accomplished only in 1918. [p. 721.]

There then follows a quotation from a polemical article written by Trotsky in 1933. A single quotation, opposed to *all* programmatic statements of the Bolsheviks, of the first congresses of the Comintern, of the International Left Opposition, and of the Fourth International itself, which *all* define the soviet power established by the October revolution as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Is that a serious way of dealing with Trotsky’s heritage, not to speak about that of Lenin?

Trotsky wrote several basic and detailed analyses of the Russian revolution, and of the October revolution in particular. Just to mention the most important ones: his monumental *History of the Russian Revolution*; his Copenhagen speech; his thesis “Workers State, Thermidor and Bonapartism”; his book *The Revolution Betrayed*; the passages on the USSR in the Transitional Program; the passages on the USSR in *In Defense of Marxism*; his article “Three Conceptions of the Russian Revolution.” In none of these basic texts—five of which, incidentally, were written *after* the article of 1933 quoted by said comrades—is there any revision of the classical position that the October revolution established the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia. The idea that you had a bourgeois state in Russia until the massive

5. The best source on that upheaval remains Jack Belden’s book *China Shakes the World*.

nationalizations of summer-autumn 1918 appears ludicrous in the light of that evidence.

*The Revolution Betrayed* is the most detailed and painstaking analysis of the USSR and of Stalinism written by Trotsky. Again, it is written after the 1933 article, at a moment when "the rise of Stalinism" and the fact that the political conquests of the Russian workers and poor peasants had been "reversed in key areas" was certainly understood by Trotsky. Yet we do not find there a single mention of the Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters theory that the dictatorship of the proletariat really started only in 1918, and that Russia remained a bourgeois state till late 1918. Instead, we find a quotation from the official program of the Bolshevik party of 1918, a quotation reprinted with full approval:

"The October revolution in Russia has realized the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . ." (Pathfinder Press, 1972, p. 58.)

Need one add any more comments?

14. The idea that there was no workers state in China after 1949-50 and no workers state in Russia between October 1917 and autumn 1918 leads to the strangest theoretical implications in the light of the momentous events which occurred at these moments.

In Russia, the Red Army was created before the massive nationalization measures of summer-autumn 1918. Question: Can you have a bourgeois state with a workers army? Further question: Was the Red Army a workers army from its inception? Additional question: Did the bourgeoisie rise up in arms against its own state? Final question: What role did the central state apparatus play in the civil war in 1918? What class side was it on? Was it "wavering"? Was it hesitant? Besides the army, foreign policy and constitutional law are among the main characteristics of a state. Was it a bourgeois state which concluded the Brest-Litovsk peace, which made the impassionate internationalist appeals to the international working class, or which boldly nominated the Scottish workers leader McLean consul of Soviet Russia in Glasgow? Was the Soviet constitution of summer 1918, promulgated before the "key economic measures of 1918," the constitution of a bourgeois state? Don't you see what ridicule you are heaping upon yourselves by trying to be "consistent" revisionists in the question of the moment of birth of workers states and the criteria used therefore?

Even clearer is the case of China. The Korean War broke out in autumn 1950, not in 1952-53. Yet comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters will have us believe that this was a war between a Chinese bourgeois state and world imperialism. Perhaps it was "only" an anti-imperialist conflict, a "war of national liberation"? Perhaps it was not pitching two distinct social orders and two antagonistic class camps one against the other? Who can seriously defend such a the-

sis in the light of the historical evidence? How can we, without falling into the trap of the Menshevik two-stage revolution theory, affirm that the People's Liberation Army which defeated U.S. (and international) imperialism in Korea was the army . . . of a bourgeois state (a state of the "new democracy" perhaps)?

15. We don't mention the Menshevik two-stage theory of revolution by accident. The logical implications of comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters's concept of what determines a workers state in a backward country are hammer blows against the theory of the permanent revolution.

This theory is summarized by Trotsky himself in the following formula:

With regard to countries with a belated bourgeois development, especially the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the theory of the permanent revolution signifies that the complete and genuine solution of their tasks of achieving democracy and national emancipation is conceivable only through the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . [The Permanent Revolution, Pathfinder Press, 1969, p. 276. Our emphasis.]

Now when was the agrarian question, as the main task of the national-democratic revolution, solved in Russia? When was the decree of partition of the land proclaimed? In late 1918? Or immediately during the October revolution? But if a bourgeois state is capable of emancipating the peasantry, if it is not the dictatorship of the proletariat which achieves that basic task, what remains of the theory of permanent revolution? Answering in advance comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters, in his polemic with Radek, Trotsky precises in *The Permanent Revolution*:

. . . the true democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, that is, the one which actually destroyed the regime of autocracy and serfdom and snatched the land from the feudalists, was accomplished not before October but only after October; it was accomplished, to use Marx's words, in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the peasant war—and then, a few months later, began growing into a socialist dictatorship. [Ibid., pp. 230-231.]

In other words, the dictatorship of the proletariat, far from coming into being only when "last preserves of capitalism" have been eliminated, is the precondition for the solution of the agrarian question, and grows over into an expropriation of the capitalists (which can be carried through in different stages). Otherwise, it would be identical with a proletarian revolution in an imperialist country, i.e. the whole specificity of uneven and combined development in relatively backward countries, which underpins it, would be lost.

The theory of the permanent revolution therefore does not presuppose a simultaneous solution of national-democratic and socialist tasks of the revolution. What it does presuppose is the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat as precondition for the solution of the national-democratic tasks, accompanied by a beginning—but by

no means a complete—solution of socialist tasks. Pushing back the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat until after the solution of the national-democratic tasks is over, even until all the socialist tasks have been solved, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters leave the theory of the permanent revolution suspended in mid-air. If the liberation of the peasants can be solved without the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, one wonders how the proletariat, as a small minority of the population could, under these circumstances, obtain or even maintain an alliance with even a significant part of the peasantry to establish its dictatorship.

16. Impelled by the desire of achieving "consistent incipient revisionism" (the inverted commas do of course not refer to a quotation), comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters have now come up with an amazing theory which generalizes a new "transition period" of "workers and farmers governments" between the smashing of the bourgeois state and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

That this is a new theory—i.e. a revision of the traditional theory of the Communist International and the Fourth International on the matter—cannot be doubted. It is sufficient to read the relevant chapter of the Transitional Program which says:

This formula, "workers' and farmers' government," first appeared in the agitation of the Bolsheviks in 1917 and was definitely accepted after the October revolution. In the final instance it represented nothing more than the popular designation for the already established dictatorship of the proletariat. [Leon Trotsky: *The Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution*, Pathfinder Press, 1977, p. 133. Our emphasis.]

The chapter further develops the pedagogical value of such an agitational slogan used by revolutionary Marxists, while the opportunist working class parties, still enjoying support by the majority of the workers, refuse to break their class collaboration with the bourgeoisie. And then it concludes:

Is the creation of such a government by the traditional workers' organizations possible? Past experience shows, as has already been stated, that this is, to say the least, highly improbable. However, one cannot categorically deny in advance the theoretical possibility that, under the influence of completely exceptional circumstances (war, defeat, financial crash, mass revolutionary pressure, etc.), the petty-bourgeois parties, including the Stalinists, may go further than they themselves wish along the road to a break with the bourgeoisie. In any case, one thing is not to be doubted: even if this highly improbable variant somewhere, at some time, becomes a reality and the workers' and farmers' government in the above-mentioned sense is established in fact, it would represent merely a short episode on the road to the actual dictatorship of the proletariat. [Ibid., p. 135.]

Our program therefore states clearly:

A. Normally, the workers and farmers government, inasmuch as it realizes an anti-bourgeois and anticapitalist program, is synonymous with the dictatorship of the proletariat (i.e. cannot fulfill that program

without destroying state power of the bourgeoisie and having the working class conquer political power).

B. Exceptionally, traditional class collaborationist workers organizations could establish such a workers and farmers government without previously smashing the bourgeois state. But this is highly improbable.

C. Even in that case, this would only be "a short episode" before the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This is nothing but a summary of what the Fourth Congress of the Communist International itself stated on the matter, in its Resolution on Tactics, section XI "The workers government," which —like all the programmatic documents of the first four congresses of the Communist International —are also part of our program. Leaving aside the cases of the "liberal (bourgeois) labor governments" and of social-democratic governments which stay within the normal boundaries of bourgeois society, we find in that resolution three final variants of "workers" (or "workers and farmers") governments: two mainly based upon the reformists, which *start* to break with capitalism but do not yet overthrow bourgeois state power; and the last one essentially based upon the communists, which is explicitly identified with the dictatorship of the proletariat. ("Theses, Manifestes, et Résolutions des Quatre Premiers Congrès de l'IC," Librairie du Travail, Paris, 1934, pp. 158-9)

Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters have now reversed all this. According to them,

A. Workers and farmers governments are never identical with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

B. Workers and farmers governments staying within the boundaries of the bourgeois state, instead of being "exceptional" and "highly improbable," become the general rule.

C. Instead of being limited to the case where traditionally class collaborationist parties constitute this variant of a "workers and farmers government," the combination of such a government with a surviving bourgeois state now is extended to all those cases where revolutionary parties, including the Bolsheviks themselves, are leading the revolution.

D. Instead of a "short episode," this combination of a "workers and peasants government" with a bourgeois state and without dual power (for some obscure reason, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters do not want to introduce that concept in any way into the analysis of what went on in all socialist revolutions, except the Russian one) now can last for years (three, four, or even five years in Eastern Europe, Vietnam, and China).

Such a sweeping revision of our traditional programmatic position on that question is motivated essentially by the need to "generalize" new experiences arising after World War II. But the only "new experience" which

justifies a slight modification of Trotsky's formulations is the case of Cuba. There we were confronted with a leadership which was neither revolutionary Marxist nor based upon the traditional workers organizations. It achieved, under conditions of huge mass mobilizations, a break with the bourgeoisie and with imperialism (incidentally conditioned by a split in its own ranks), which led to the establishment of a workers state late 1960. One could say that the "workers and farmers government" lasted for about a year, and that, from the point of view of the nature of the state, you had during that period a situation of dual power: rising organs of workers power (among them, in the first place, the armed militia); rapidly decomposing remnants of the bourgeois state (essentially in the realm of the central administration, law, and the education-ideology system).

In the cases of China and Yugoslavia, one could apply the notion of "workers and farmers governments" to very short periods when a "traditional workers party" was in power but had not yet completely destroyed the bourgeois state. This would cover around six months in the case of Yugoslavia (in 1945) and between six months and a year in the case of China (1949-1950). In each of these cases however, Trotsky's prediction came out as correct: these were only "short episodes" on the road of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Again, in order to remain consistent with the Marxist theory of the state, one could say that during these "short episodes" there was a situation of dual power in which the remnants of bourgeois state power were rapidly being decomposed and smashed and the elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat (of workers power, be it under an extremely bureaucratized form) rapidly put into place.

Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters deny that this was our approach to the Cuban question (p. 726). But the very quote they reprint from the Sixth World Congress document on Cuba clearly states the opposite. It points out that, beginning with spring-summer 1959 elements of workers power (militia and people's tribunal) had been created; that the capitalist state however had not yet been *completely* broken; and that it was completely destroyed by October 1960. If you want to call that "transition period" of around one year a "workers and farmers government" under conditions of dual power, we have no objection. But what has this to do with a workers and farmers government operating under a bourgeois state without dual power, without the rise of elements of workers power from the beginning of the "transition"?

One could argue that this whole discussion is a bit byzantine. Aren't we talking about the same process, even by using different terms? Such a comment would not take into account the dangerous political implications of the new *generalized* theoretical stand by said comrades. For if the smashing of the bourgeois state apparatus and the de-

struction of the capitalists (their being "wiped out" as these comrades express themselves in relation with Kampuchea on p. 719) is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of a workers state, we come dangerously near to the Maoist, subjectivist revision of Marxism for which some supplementary element, outside of the basic criteria of class power and class existence, replace these as "decisive." In the case of comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters, this "decisive" criterion is mass mobilizations (even if bureaucratically controlled ones). But this faces them with a grave problem precisely where they think their case is the strongest, i.e. in those countries where sweeping nationalizations of big capital did take place under the leadership of petty-bourgeois nationalists (p. 716).

Let us take the classical examples of Nasserite Egypt or Algeria under Ben Bella. What was the basic difference of these cases with Eastern Europe (except Yugoslavia of course) 1946-1949? The scope of the nationalizations? Certainly not. The absence of mass mobilizations? But the mass mobilizations in these two cases were *much larger* and not more limited than those of Eastern Europe. In fact, on several occasions, we witnessed in Cairo, mass demonstrations of several million workers and peasants, the largest in the twentieth century up to the Iranian revolution, and possibly equal to those ones.

The difference between Egypt and Algeria on the one hand, and Eastern Europe on the other hand, lies somewhere else. It can easily be stated in terms of the classical Marxist theory of the state. *The power of the bourgeoisie as a class was not broken.* There was no basic change in law making acquisition of private property of the means of production illegal. There was no suppression of the major part of private property which is private property of the land and of commercial shops (rural and urban), and not of industry or banking, in such backward countries. The bourgeoisie as a class had therefore not disappeared (only its top layers of monopolists had lost their property; and even they had received important compensation for the nationalized property in many cases). Therefore, petty-bourgeois officers in power would tend to use their positions to accumulate private capital (through corruption, theft, high salaries, high offices occupied in the nationalized sector etc.) on a large scale. Therefore, it was only a question of time till large-scale private capitalist entrepreneurs would re-emerge again, first in agriculture (where they had really never been suppressed, only reduced) and in construction, after that even in industry. All this proves, without any circular reasoning, that the state had remained a bourgeois state, that a bourgeois class remained in existence as a ruling class (even if its composition had changed), that the bourgeois state apparatus had never been smashed, and that those elements of dual power which had undoubtedly emerged embryonically in the case of Algeria, were





Vietnamese troops and Kampuchean militia members.

progressively neutralized and eliminated by that bourgeois state.

All the criteria for judging the different course of events in Eastern Europe on the one hand, and Egypt and Algeria on the other hand, are therefore the classical criteria of class rule, of existence of and rule by the capitalist class, of the bourgeois nature of the state in function of its defending and reproducing private property of the means of production and accumulation of capital as *social institutions* (which is quite distinct from maintaining private property in every single enterprise). If one abandons—be it only in the case of Kampuchea, not to speak of Eastern Europe and even other countries—these basic materialist criteria for some weird new schema, one will only create the greatest confusion among revolutionists the world over in judging the course of events—including revolutionary events—in other semi-colonial and relatively backward countries.

Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters try to make some capital out of the fact that the United Secretariat majority called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea in January 1979, at the same time as Peking and as the imperialists did (p. 708). This argument is worthless. We do not take our political positions just by saying the opposite of what the imperialists say. We adopt our positions in function of the overall interests of the world proletariat and of world revolution, on the basis of objective criteria of analysis. The positions adopted by imperialism are certainly an element of that analysis. But they are not the only one. In several occasions they are not even the main one.

In 1956, imperialism started a ferocious campaign in favor of withdrawal of Soviet

troops from Hungary. In Paris, there was a large right-wing street demonstration of tens of thousands of people, led by practically all bourgeois politicians marching under that slogan. This didn't prevent the overwhelming majority of Trotskyists—both those organized in the Fourth International and those acting under the banner of the International Committee of the Fourth International—to defend the same slogan.

When the invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred in August 1968, the same coincidence occurred (and supporters of the invasion among CP leaderships tried to make some capital out of that coincidence, like above-said comrades do now). The imperialists and all bourgeois forces throughout the world called for a withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact armies from Czechoslovakia. Unanimously, the FI did the same.

Let us add that both in the cases of Hungary and of Czechoslovakia, the imperialist campaign for withdrawal of troops was much larger, much more vociferous and much more unanimous than is the imperialist campaign in favor of withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

There is an ironic side to this question. One of the arguments raised by the SWP leadership to justify in 1953-54 its public break with the majority elected leadership of the Fourth International was the alleged hostility of Pablo, then the secretary of the International Secretariat of the FI, to raise the slogan of an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from the German Democratic Republic after the workers uprising of July 1953. We believe the SWP leadership's assessment of what the real positions of the IS of the FI had been on that occasion was wrong. We have explained several times that we were in favor of such a withdrawal. But

one has to admit that given the military situation in Central Europe and the cold-war situation at that moment the possibility that such a withdrawal would have been followed nearly immediately by an occupation of the GDR by West German bourgeois troops and by a return to capitalist property relations was certainly as large as the danger of an occupation of Kampuchea by the capitalist Thai army, or a return to capitalist property relations in Kampuchea in case of withdrawal by the Vietnamese.

18. The question of whether or not at certain moments it is possible for the international working class to take positions which *seem* similar to those of some imperialists—we say *seem* similar, for in all the above-mentioned cases, obviously, the dynamic of our demand for a withdrawal of troops of bureaucratized workers states from the territory of other workers states was part of an overall position tending to weaken imperialism and strengthen world revolution, part of an overall program and strategic line combining our struggle for permanent revolution in the colonies and semi-colonies, for socialist revolutions in the imperialist countries, for political revolutions in the bureaucratized workers states—is part of a larger question. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters state: "... in each case where a military conflict does erupt, it is necessary to look for a fundamental explanation in concrete circumstances of the class struggle. ..." (p. 714). Formulated in that absolute and one-sided way, the definition is wrong. It raises and revises again general problems of Marxist theory.

The class struggle is a key contradiction of the capitalist mode of production. But it is not the only contradiction. Capitalist competition, interimperialist competition, is another of these basic contradictions. It cannot be reduced to the class struggle between capital and labor. Indeed, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters themselves feel there is a problem here when they write: "Ours is the age of imperialist war and workers revolution" (p. 715). But imperialist wars, by definition, are not wars between capital and labor. They are wars provoked by conflicts inside the capitalist class (or, if one wants to be more precise, by those explosive inner contradictions of the capitalist mode of production which lead to violent conflicts between different imperialist powers).

Furthermore, wars of conquest of semicolonial countries by imperialist countries (like the Sino-Japanese war), although they certainly concern the working class and the peasantry, generally take, at least in their first stage, the form of a military conflict between different fractions of the world bourgeoisie: a section of the imperialist bourgeoisie trying to crush a section of the semicolonial bourgeoisie (intertwined with elements of precapitalist ruling classes).

So if we want to generalize that analysis, we have to say that military conflicts grow

out of the inner contradictions of the existing mode of production, and express themselves as conflicts *either between classes or between fractions (separate groups) of classes*. Otherwise, you could not explain the wars of colonial conquest or the inter-imperialist wars of the twentieth century.

Now why would that formula, applicable to two world wars, be inapplicable to the world reality of today in which different bureaucratic castes rule over different workers states? We know that comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters shrink back from the concept that the bureaucracy is a parasitic outgrowth of the working class. We shall come back to the serious theoretical mistakes which flow from such a denial. But it would be hard to deny that the military conflict between the Hungarian revolution and the Soviet bureaucracy—to take the clearest example—was a conflict between the working class and the bureaucracy, defending its power and privileges, and not a direct expression of the class struggle between Capital and Labor.

World capitalism certainly feared a workers councils republic in Hungary. In spite of all its demagogic shouting against the Soviet invasion, it was certainly not unhappy that the workers councils were crushed. But this does not mean that the military conflict was a conflict between imperialism and the working class. Moscow did not intervene in Hungary as a tool of imperialism, i.e. it did not restore private property and capitalism there. What we had there was a conflict between the working class and the bureaucratic layer, not between two different classes.

What is true for military interventions of the bureaucracy against political revolutions is even more true for interbureaucratic conflicts. Nobody denies that they are in some relation with the class struggle, in some relation with imperialism's counter-revolutionary endeavours on a world scale, etc. What we deny is that they are direct expressions of the class struggle. In these conflicts, the different bureaucratic castes defend their own material interests in the first place and not the interests of imperialism. Peking is neither a tool nor a stooge of Washington. Its main purpose is to defend and increase its own power and privileges. Its maneuvers with imperialism are a function of that main purpose. If one presents things otherwise, if one assumes that peaceful coexistence and, in a more general way, "sought-after alliances with imperialism" are not means to that goal of the bureaucracy's policies, but the basic ultimate goal of these policies itself, then one would break with historical materialism. For one then assumes that not material interests but some other mysterious factor is the basic explanation of the political activity of social forces, classes, sub-factions of classes or castes alike.

19. On the question of the possibilities of wars between bureaucratized workers

states, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters are in full retreat. In their initial contributions to the Indochina discussion, they practically ruled out such wars, except "border incidents."

Now they accept the possibility of such wars, be they limited ones. They write:

In summary: the bureaucratic castes act out of material self-interest and self-preservation. They can be forced to go to war to defend the workers state, from which they derive their privileges, against threats from imperialism. They can decide to go to war to put down a serious threat of developing political revolution. In order to advance their sought-after alliances with imperialism, they may even go to war to try to prevent the spread of socialist revolution.

On the other hand, the working class in the workers states is a formidable check on the ability of the castes to simply act as they like in the world arena. [p. 714.]

We fully agree with that assessment. But it is incomplete on at least two accounts—and therefore inconsistent. Of the three variants of wars conducted by bureaucratized workers states, the first one concerns a war against bourgeois states. This is nothing new to be discussed. But why reduce the possibilities of wars conducted by "bureaucratic castes" only to two cases, each one directed against an unfolding revolution (either a political or a socialist one)? If one accepts the formula: "the bureaucratic castes act out of material self-interest and self-preservation" in its substance, then there is no reason to assume that "bureaucratic castes" could never go to war against other bureaucratized workers states, even when there is no political revolution unfolding there but when the policies of that other workers state seriously threaten the defense of their own "power and privileges" as they understand it.

The argument of the working class of the said state being a formidable check on the abilities of the castes "to simply act as they like on the world arena" is real but relative. After all, we say the same thing for the imperialist bourgeoisie too. U.S., British, French, West German imperialists have not been able "to simply act as they like in the world arena" in recent years either, notably against the rising Iranian revolution, for that very reason. For sure, the bourgeoisie, as a class, has a greater autonomy of action on the world arena than bureaucratic castes as castes. But this does not mean that the bureaucracy has no autonomy of action whatsoever, and that every violent action it undertakes on the international scale is in the last analysis either in the interest of the working class or in the interest of the capitalists. After all, the Soviet proletariat could not prevent the military invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In fact, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters come very near to admitting this possibility of this third type of wars between workers states when they write:

Given the existence of separate and distinct bureaucratic castes in each of the workers states (ex-

cept Cuba), there is a material basis for divergent interests and, flowing from that, differences of policy and opinion. These divergences, even if they have nothing in common with a threat of political revolution, are nevertheless a constant challenge to each of the bureaucratic castes. . . .

Any bureaucratic caste affected by such developments would naturally like to put a stop to them. But it cannot always do so. Military action is a last resort and is itself fraught with dangers. [pp. 713-714.]

Again, we entirely agree. But doesn't this whole reasoning imply at least the *possibility* of such type of "military action"? And that is what the debate is all about. To try to cover one's tracks by stating that the bureaucracy cannot *always* go to war is a rather infantile debating trick. Did we ever say the opposite? In the same category of knocking down strawmen set up by themselves is comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters's "argument" (p. 713) that the Kremlin did not go to war against Romania which challenges its authority on some issues. Obviously. Who predicted such a war? We have painstakingly made the difference between inter-imperialist wars, which are rooted in the economic laws of motion of capitalism, and interbureaucratic wars, which are *not* rooted in the economic laws of motion of the society in transition between capitalism and socialism. We have certainly insisted on the fact that these wars are and remain the exception and not the rule. But the very fact that they are *possible*, that they have, in fact, already occurred, makes it necessary to take a principled stand towards them.

In order to *avoid* the adoption of such a principled stand, said comrades spot a "fatal flaw" in our argument:

He spotlights the tension between the bureaucratic castes, rather than the class struggle, which underlies this tension. He omits completely specific developments in the class struggle that can force the castes to resort to such extreme measures. [p. 713.]

It is already a bit strange to present the conflict between Hungarian and Czechoslovak workers and the Soviet bureaucracy as a "specific development in the class struggle." Were these workers rising against the capitalist class? Has the bureaucracy become a class? It is even stranger—and again infantile—to confuse the issue by suddenly introducing the word "omits completely" into the polemics. Where and when did we omit "completely" references to imperialism, world revolution, the working class, and the class struggle in our analysis of the invasion of Kampuchea by the Vietnamese army, of the invasion of Vietnam by the Chinese army, of the risk of an invasion of China by the Soviet armies? Wasn't our whole opposition against such invasions based upon the consideration that they harm the class struggle in the neighboring capitalist countries and on a world scale? That imperialism profits from them and that world revolution is the loser? Is such an analysis "completely omitting specific developments in the class struggle"?

What the real difference is about is nicely summarized by comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters themselves in the following paragraph:

The underlying initiatives for these wars did not come from the castes. The castes were not acting as independent historical agents. They were responding to pressures and initiatives from the two major contending class forces—the imperialists and the world working class. [p. 713.]

From the fact that the bureaucracy is not a class but a hardened parasitic social layer (a caste)—a fact on which we all agree—one can draw the conclusion that it has less autonomy on the international scene than both imperialism and the world working class. But said comrades extend this undeniable truth to the unwarranted, mechanistic and schematic conclusion that it has *no autonomy whatsoever*. That conclusion is wrong. It has been proved wrong by history, again and again. It will be proved wrong in the future. It disarms our movement. Instead of being an answer to the anticommunist propaganda of the bourgeoisie, it is so inadequate and so unrelated to reality that it in fact strengthens that reactionary ideological offensive.

Let us take some examples. When the Soviet army invaded Czechoslovakia and Hungary, it was certainly acting against the interests of the world working class, on that we all agree. Was it acting under the pressure or initiative of imperialism? But what was the goal of that military intervention? To stabilize the rule of the bureaucracy in these countries. Do comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters abandon our commonly shared thesis that imperialism's goal is to restore capitalism in Czechoslovakia and Hungary? So how can one explain that military intervention in terms of "pressures and initiatives from the two major contending class forces"? Wasn't that intervention mainly determined by the bureaucracy's wish to consolidate its power and privileges, i.e. wasn't it acting as an "independent historical agent"? Did the "initiative" come from Washington or Bonn, or did it come from the Kremlin?

When the Chinese armies invaded Vietnam, what was their goal? To restore capitalism in Vietnam? That's the goal of imperialism, isn't it? But wasn't Peking's goal to force Hanoi to align itself with Peking, or, what amounts to the same, to ultimately install in Hanoi a bureaucratic faction subservient to Peking (incidentally in the same way as Hanoi did in Kampuchea) *while maintaining a workers state in Vietnam*? And if tomorrow Soviet armies would invade China, would they restore capitalism there (certainly one of the main goals of "pressures and initiatives" of world imperialism)? Or would they install (if they were successful) a bureaucratic faction in power subservient to them, *while maintaining a workers state*? How can one then deny that in all these cases the bureaucratic castes "act out of material self-interest and self-preservation" and not just "responding to

pressures and initiatives from . . . imperialists and the world working class"?

To refer to a previous historical precedent: when the Soviet bureaucracy committed the crime of deporting literally millions of people from Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia at the end of World War II, was it "responding to pressures and initiatives from . . . imperialists and the world working class"? Or was it acting in a brutal and barbaric way to consolidate and increase its own power and privileges? If you try to argue the opposite, if you try to "convince" the Polish workers and peasants that really Washington and not the Kremlin was responsible for these crimes, or if you try to "convince" the German workers that Stalin and Ulbricht acted "under the initiative of world imperialism" in these cases, people will just laugh in your face. Nobody will believe the fairy-tale, because it just isn't true (as it isn't true that Stalin deported millions of Soviet peasants "under the initiative of world imperialism"). If you do not have the political and theoretical courage to argue that these are *crimes of the bureaucracy*, people—including tens of millions of workers—will have no alternative but to believe what imperialism wants them to believe: to wit that they are the products of socialism (of socialist revolutions). To say that they are crimes of imperialism is just barking at the moon.

Of course, we know that the very emergence of these bureaucratic castes is *in the last analysis* a product of the survival of the international imperialist system (of the isolation of the first victorious socialist revolutions). We also know that the crimes and barbarism of decaying capitalism are incomparably larger on a world scale, than those committed by the bureaucracies. But to jump from these obvious truths to the untenable conclusion that the bureaucracy's crimes are really imperialism's crimes, or that the bureaucracy committed them "under the pressure of the imperialists" is to lose all credibility in the eyes of the world proletariat—as the Stalinists throughout the world are finding out every day more and more. It would lead the workers movement into the blind ally of a crude "two camp" theory and practice. Only imperialism will gain from such an inability to counterpose to its ideological offensive a coherent and credible answer. And such an answer must incorporate the facts of life, confirmed by fifty years of world history: while not being a new ruling class, the bureaucratic caste has *some* autonomy on the world scene as a "historic agent." Some important events which occurred in that period cannot be explained just by "pressure" or "initiative" from the working class and imperialism, but by the bureaucracy trying to consolidate and extend its power and privileges. The crimes it committed must be laid at its door, lest they be attributed to socialism or to the labor movement as such.

20. An important question of principle is

raised by the possibility of wars between bureaucratized workers states. What should be our attitude towards them? Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters try to dodge that issue by saying that you have to analyse each one of them in the light of the concrete conditions of the class struggle, at each particular moment. In other words: they try to dissolve a general problem into a conjunctural one, a problem of principle into a problem of tactics. We believe they are wrong there, and do a serious disservice to our movement and the cause of socialism in general.

Again, in order to be able to dodge the issue, they introduce all kinds of diversions. The problem we raised has nothing to do with the question of the right and duty of workers states to support ongoing revolutions. It has nothing to do with pacifism. It has nothing to do with being "neutral" in a war between workers states either, if such a war does break out. We certainly were not "neutral" in any case. We were for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the GDR in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and from Czechoslovakia in 1968. We were for the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. We were for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam. We would be for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from China if they invade that country. We are for the right of self-defense of any attacked workers state, because we do not believe that any such attack serves the cause of world socialism. The question of who is the aggressor, which is meaningless in the case of interimperialist wars, stops being meaningless in the case of a war between workers states, because of our principled opposition to it.

We prefer the formula "withdrawal" to the formula "victory" of one side. Such a military victory could imply a military defeat of the other side, and that defeat raises the possibility of imperialism profiting from the situation to overthrow the workers state in the country whose bureaucratic caste has committed aggression against another workers state. We are for the defense of *all* workers states, and therefore against the military weakening of *any* of them.

The formula "withdrawal" is also preferable, because it leaves open the many variants of rising political revolution against the bureaucratic castes intertwined with these military conflicts. We were in favor of a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. But we certainly were likewise in favor of the Kampuchean workers and peasants overthrowing the despotic Pol Pot regime through a political revolution at the same moment—and accepting Vietnamese weapons and aid to do so. In fact, our basic criticism of the Vietnamese leadership is precisely that they substituted a full-scale military invasion and occupation for a policy of arming the Kampuchean masses and helping them to overthrow Pol Pot.

Our principled opposition to wars between workers states is based upon two basic arguments. First, no bureaucratic caste is *histor-*

ically more progressive than another, even if it might, at a given conjuncture, defend a progressive cause against another caste. None is able to qualitatively change the conditions of oppression of a given working class in a given bureaucratized workers state—not to speak of favoring the unfolding of world revolution, through such invasions. Second, no workers state based upon genuine proletarian democracy could ever impose through military invasion and occupation a genuine political revolution in a bureaucratized workers state. (Of course giving aid and comfort, including military aid, to an uprising of the majority of the workers of such a state against the ruling bureaucracy would be entirely justified. But that has nothing to do with a war between two workers states, nor with military invasion and occupation. It is a clear case of helping an unfolding revolution.)

Anybody who wants to argue otherwise should think carefully through all the implications of the argument. They are rather shattering.

A broader historical argument has also to be brought into play. Since its inception, the socialist movement has made of the fact that capitalism breeds war one of the main arguments of its general case against that social system. History has confirmed the correctness of that case. More than 100 million dead in wars unleashed by capitalism, in the twentieth century alone, support the indictment. From that indictment, socialists have always drawn the conclusion: the only way to avoid wars, to assure peace to mankind, is to abolish capitalism. Under socialism, there will be no war.

Today, that argument, which was accepted by a large part of the world proletariat for decades, has been seriously undermined not by imperialist propaganda but by the criminal military adventures of Moscow in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, of Hanoi in Kampuchea, of Peking in Vietnam. They have created tremendous confusion among the masses, the world over. Imperialist propaganda just feeds that confusion by insinuating: No, war is not rooted in capitalism or class society. It has "deeper" causes. There will be wars under socialism as there have been wars under capitalism.

Our answer is categorically *no*. Whatever wars cannot be laid directly at the door of imperialism in the last decades are caused by the privileged and parasitic bureaucracies which have usurped power in the workers states. They are not only not rooted in the postcapitalist societies. They are alien to them. When these bureaucracies are overthrown by victorious political revolutions, when there is genuine workers council power, soviet power, in these states, they will undoubtedly have to keep armies and other instruments for self-defense against imperialist aggression. *But there will be no wars between such workers states.* The working class directly exercising power in many countries and many nationalities *will be able to develop forms of international coop-*

eration, solidarity, and peaceful solution of sectorial and national differences of interests and policies which might arise among them—even if imperialism survives in part of the world.

What are the alternatives to that answer, which is the only one consistent with the Marxist tradition and the interests of the struggle for world revolution and world socialism? You could argue that direct workers power is impossible as long as imperialism survives—i.e. that the victory of the political revolution, at least in the main workers states before the overthrow of world capitalism, is a utopia, and that therefore wars between workers states will continue to be a possibility as long as capitalism survives elsewhere. You could argue that "under certain circumstances" genuine workers states would be justified in launching wars against other ones (bureaucratized ones). Or you could argue that material contradictions between nation-states, which will survive even under "socialism," have a war dynamic irrespective of the social nature of these states. Actually, the British CP has already started to argue along these lines.<sup>6</sup>

Is it necessary to draw out the disastrous implications of each of these alternatives for the struggle for world socialism? But how can you clearly make a case for the opposite position—there will be no wars between genuine workers states tomorrow—if you don't take a principled position against any war unleashed by a bureaucratized workers state against another one today?

To comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters, our position that wars between bureaucratized workers states are possible and that we should oppose them in principle seem to lead to great pessimism:

If Peking has an inherent drive "to establish its zone of influence over all the Asian workers states," if Hanoi "wanted an Indochinese federation under its own bureaucratic hegemony," if there is an organic need to make war for reasons like these, what then is really so different from capitalist wars? A different motivating cause, but similar results. What's the big difference in the final analysis?

If comrade Mandel's vision of the future is accurate, then the prospects for humanity are not so bright as the Fourth International had expected up until now. [p. 715.]

An amazing statement, leading to an even more amazing conclusion:

The workers can and will prevent the bureaucratic castes from making war as they would like, just as they must eventually wipe capitalism from the face of the earth. Yes, the rise of the world revolution will cause the bureaucratic castes to try to lash out; but wars between workers states will become *less likely* with each new victory in the class struggle on a world scale, because the working class, which is the *ruling class* in the workers states, will become stronger. [p. 716.]

We do not agree with that reasoning at

6. See *Marxism Today*, August 1979, especially the leading article by Monty Johnstone: *Conflicts between Socialist States*.

all. To put it bluntly: it is an expression of reformist illusions. The Second International thought the strengthening of the working class would be able to avoid wars, even if capitalism survives. The Third International after Lenin thought the strengthening of the working class would be able to prevent imperialist wars of aggression against the USSR, even if imperialism survives. Revolutionary Marxists answered in both cases that, in the long run, wars would be unavoidable if capitalism wasn't *overthrown* by socialist revolution, at least in its main bulwarks. In the long run, "pressure" by the working class—even if it is "tremendous"—isn't enough to avoid war. The social forces driving to war have to be eliminated.

By analogy, one would have to conclude: if we believe that wars between bureaucratic castes are possible (leaving aside the new diversion by comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters about "organic needs," which attributes to us exactly the opposite of what we said), then the "prospects for humanity are not so bright," provided the bureaucratic castes continue to stay in power for a long historic period. We would share that conclusion. Another half century, if not centuries of totalitarian bureaucratic dictatorship over one-third, one-half or all of mankind, are not a bright prospect for humanity at all, leaving aside the question of whether there would or would not be wars. Do comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters perhaps disagree and find that a "bright" perspective?

But contrary to these comrades, *we* are not and never have been tempted (not to say convinced) by the idea of "centuries of bureaucratic rule" over workers states. So *we* do not base our "optimism" on the question of possible or impossible wars between bureaucratic castes just upon the "pressure" or the "increased strength" of the working class in these states. *We base it upon the concrete perspective of victorious political revolutions, i.e. on the unavoidable overthrow of the bureaucratic castes.* Likewise, we base our "optimism" on the question of avoiding a nuclear world war (not exactly a "bright prospect" for humanity either) not on any line of "growing pressure" or "increased strength" of the international working class, but on the perspective of socialist revolutions *overthrowing* the imperialist bourgeoisie in its main bulwarks. In other words: *we only believe in "bright prospects" for humanity because we believe in world revolution, which today has to be seen as a combined process of permanent revolution in the semicolonies, socialist revolution in the imperialist countries, and political revolutions in the bureaucratized workers states.* If these revolutions do not occur or are defeated, then the future of humanity will not be "bright" at all, to say the least. It will be the triumph of barbarism.

Isn't it the historical goal of the Fourth International to organize and lead the international working class to *overthrow* the rule of imperialism, capitalism, and the totalitar-

ian bureaucratic dictatorship in the bureaucratized workers states? Isn't there an organic unity between the rise of socialist revolution and the rise of political revolution? Why has the political revolution suddenly disappeared from comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters's polemics on the "implications" of the possibility of wars between bureaucratic castes? And doesn't the possibility of establishing a world federation of socialist republics—the only realistic framework to assure that there will be no more wars of any kind—hinge upon the victory of political revolution too? Could these comrades seriously envisage the restoration of the unity of the world proletariat and its allies, while the bureaucratic castes still remain in power? Do they believe the possibilities of victory of political revolution are dim? So what's so pessimistic about acknowledging the facts of life, to wit that the danger of limited and exceptional wars between bureaucratic castes will only be eliminated with the victory of political revolution in the bureaucratized workers states?

21. One of the main if not the main theoretical difference underlying the ongoing debate is the difference on the *class nature* of the bureaucratic castes which rule in the bureaucratized workers states. It is a complex question, raising again key issues of Marxism, of historical materialism.

There have been many different bureaucracies throughout history: e.g. the bureaucracies of ancient slave-owner states, in the first place of the Roman Empire; the bureaucracies of empires based upon the Asian mode of production, of which the Chinese mandarin caste is the prototype; the feudal bureaucracies in the rising monarchies of the Middle Ages; the semifeudal bureaucracies of Absolutism; the bureaucracies of bourgeois states; the Soviet bureaucracy and other bureaucratic castes similar to it in China and elsewhere. Obviously, all these bureaucracies have a different class nature. What we are concerned here with is the class nature of the bureaucratic castes exercising totalitarian rule over bureaucratized workers states.

We all agree that the Soviet bureaucracy—in the rest of this point we shall just refer to the Soviet bureaucracy, but it is understood that the same analysis applies to all the hardened privileged bureaucratic layers in workers states which have to be overthrown by political revolutions and have the same fundamental social characteristics as the Soviet bureaucracy—is not a new ruling class but a caste. However, using that specific concept does not solve the problem of defining the bureaucracy's class nature. In a certain sense, several of the above-mentioned bureaucracies were also castes, but they have all a specific—and different—class nature. Again we are touching upon a basic element of Marxist theory. From a Marxist point of view, as long as we do not live in a classless society, there cannot be large social layers (encompassing several

millions of individuals in the concrete case with which we are concerned) which do not belong to a specific social class.

Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters quote Trotsky who states that the Soviet bureaucracy is petty bourgeois in its composition and spirit (p. 720). The concept "petty bourgeois," however, throughout Marxist literature, is used in a two-fold sense. It can mean describing these political forces (or social layers) among wage-labor which are wavering between capital and labor because of their higher incomes, because of their functioning as ideological transmission belts of bourgeois influence (and corruption) inside the working class. It then stands for all the proponents of class collaboration and class conciliation. In that sense, Trotsky's formula is certainly correct and unambiguous. One could speak of petty-bourgeois layers (or to use a term which sounds awkward in English but less awkward in other languages "petty-bourgeoisified layers") inside the working class, i.e. wage-earners which have a petty-bourgeois ideology and political orientation in function of the material privileges which they enjoy, which they want to keep, and which makes them rise above their class. The analogy with the labor bureaucracy inside the capitalist countries is then obvious and self-explanatory.

But the term petty bourgeoisie can also be used in a much more precise and scientific way: *as a specific social class, separate and apart from both wage-labor and capital*. As every social class, it is characterized by its specific place in the process of production and by its specific relations to the means of production. In that sense, the petty bourgeoisie as a class is the sum total of all those private owners of means of production and exchange who can produce (or exchange) without having to sell their own labor-power, but who do not exploit wage-labor, or do so only marginally and exceptionally. They can be producers of use-values (subsistence farmers). They can be engaged in petty commodity production (small and middle farmers, tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and owners of other small independent professional businesses).

With the rise of the so-called new middle classes, the term petty bourgeoisie taken as a class has been somewhat extended. But basically, the criteria for characterizing it remain the same. That class now includes all those higher managerial personnel and state functionaries who, through their place in the process of production and the state, have a material interest in the survival of private property, while not being direct exploiters of wage-labor in the real sense of the word. Their income is so much higher than that of a worker that they can accumulate modest amounts of capital, over and above the salaries they earn, without being able to go into capitalist business on their own account, i.e. without becoming buyers and exploiters of labor-power, except on an exceptional or marginal basis.

For sure, the precise contours of the petty bourgeoisie as a class are more blurred and less defined than those of both the capitalist class and the working class. Petty commodity production (and high salaries) can give rise to primitive accumulation of capital. Under favorable circumstances, the upper layers of the petty bourgeoisie are drawn into the capitalist class, i.e. become owners of capital and direct exploiters of wage-labor. At the other end of the scale—in much higher numbers—the lower layers of the petty bourgeoisie are being ruined (pauperized) as independent producers or proletarianized, i.e. in every case the differential between their income and the average price of labor-power becomes so reduced that accumulation of even a little capital becomes impossible. They then tend to be absorbed into the working class.

But whatever may be these parallel processes of erosion at both the top and the bottom of the petty bourgeoisie, it is a definite and specific social class, separate and apart *as a class* from both wage-labor and capital.

Now when we say that the Soviet bureaucracy is "petty bourgeois," we can interpret this in a dual way. We can either say that it is a petty-bourgeois layer of the working class, in the sense explained above. Or we can say that it is part of the petty bourgeoisie *as a class*, separate and apart from both the working class and the capitalist class. To make an obvious analogy: when Daniel DeLeon—with the strong approval of Lenin—called the trade-union bureaucracy "the labor lieutenants of Capital," he meant that it was an agency of the bourgeoisie *inside the working class*. He never meant that it was part of the capitalist class, i.e. composed of owners of capital directly engaged in the exploitation of wage-labor. (We will readily admit that some top union bureaucrats integrated in the Mafia having "gone legit" can fall into that last category. But for the trade-union bureaucracy as a social layer, this is an absolutely exceptional and marginal case, which doesn't apply to 99 percent of the trade-union bureaucrats the world over.)

It is our contention that Trotsky always referred to the "petty-bourgeois nature" of the Soviet bureaucracy in the first and not in the second sense of the word. And we contend that by making the statement that there are no links whatsoever between the bureaucratic castes and the working class, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters have now shifted the meaning of the "petty-bourgeois nature" of the Soviet bureaucracy towards the second sense, i.e. in the sense of it being part of the petty bourgeoisie as a class, separate and apart from the working class.

How else could one interpret formulas like:

The truth is that the Khmer Rouge army was in no way tied to the working class. It arose as peasant (that is, petty bourgeois) in origin and social composition and its leadership was Stalinist (also petty bourgeois) in ideology. Once in power it did not base itself on the revolutionary alliance of the

workers and peasants, but moved to crush them. And it remained petty bourgeois, as the governing apparatus of a state that remained capitalist." [p. 720.]

And even more precise:

After April 1975 the bureaucracy got its "specific form of remuneration"<sup>7</sup> from the surplus product of the peasants and the workers. *This did not transform it into a part of the working class any more than the Stalinist bureaucracy in the Soviet Union is working-class. It is, as Trotsky insisted, "petty bourgeois in its composition and spirit."* [p. 720. Our emphasis.]

Rejecting the theory of a new class, Comrade Mandel is thus put in the position of ascribing a working-class nature to the Stalinists, of considering the Pol Pot bureaucracy to be a working-class bureaucracy, and the Khmer Rouge army (the "army of the bureaucracy") as a working-class army.

All of these positions point in the direction of revising some of the main theoretical conquests of the Trotskyist movement. [p. 721.]

Now the idea that the Soviet bureaucracy is not a petty-bourgeois layer of the working class but part of the petty bourgeoisie as a class separate and apart from the working class far from being a "theoretical conquest of the Trotskyist movement," opens up a second Pandora's box of revisions of Marxism, of historical materialism.

The Soviet Union is a workers state. At the same time, political power is in the hands of the bureaucracy, which, to quote Trotsky, exercises a totalitarian dictatorship. Can one class rule through the agency of another class exercising a totalitarian dictatorship?

One could object that this occurs, after all, under fascism or military dictatorships. But the analogy has a decisive flaw. One characteristic of the petty-bourgeois agents of dictatorial rule under capitalism is precisely the fact that, while of petty-bourgeois origin, they can and do use their positions in the state apparatus to amass huge fortunes, to engage in primitive accumulation of capital. In other words, they become absorbed into the ruling class precisely in function of their privileged power positions.

Batista started professional life as a low-paid sergeant of a semicolonial army. He ended his career as a capitalist multimillionaire who, even according to U.S. standards, would be considered as belonging to the richest layer of the ruling class.

So there is no real contradiction here.

In the Soviet Union however, the stronger the dictatorship and the larger the privi-

7. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters obviously confuse the "specific form of remuneration" (i.e. salaries and advantages in the form of use-values exclusively in the field of consumer goods) with its source. This is all the more embarrassing, as all opponents of the Trotskyist theory of the USSR as a degenerated workers state will answer them in unison: and what is the source of the "specific form of remuneration" of the Soviet bureaucracy? Some mysterious source different from the surplus product of the peasants and the workers? What is the difference in that respect between the Pol Pot and the Soviet bureaucracy?

leges of the "petty-bourgeois" bureaucracy, the farther it gets removed from the working class as "ruling class." How can that fact be squared with the Marxist definition of a "non-ruling" class, that the members of that class exercise total political power and have, in addition, total control over the social surplus product?

If the Soviet bureaucracy is part of the petty bourgeoisie as a social class, then you would have to say that it has the same class nature as the petty bourgeoisie governing several capitalist states, starting with many semicolonial ones. But if a social revolution of a type similar to that of Vietnam occurs in these countries, one would then have to conclude that while class power is transferred from one class to another through such a revolution, members of a same class (neither the ruling class before the revolution nor the ruling class after the revolution!) would continue to exercise total political power, irrespective of the social revolution! A strange proposition, to say the least, from the point of view of historical materialism.

One of the basic tenets of Marxism is the assumption that the working class, and the working class alone, is historically interested in the abolition of private property and capable of achieving it. Now what is the position of the "petty-bourgeois bureaucracy" towards private property? Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters try to solve the difficulty by quoting Trotsky saying that the bureaucracy "continues to preserve state property only to the extent that it fears the proletariat" (p. 719). But this sentence is torn out of context where it appears clearly as a link in the historical chain of explanation of where the Soviet bureaucracy comes from and what it is today. On the page of *The Revolution Betrayed* prior to the one which contains the paragraph quoted by said comrades we find the following words:

It [the bureaucracy] is compelled to defend state property as the source of its power and its income. In this aspect of its activity, it still remains a weapon of proletarian dictatorship." [Pathfinder Press, 1972, p. 249.]

Can the petty bourgeoisie as a class be "a weapon of proletarian dictatorship"?

So it is clear that the Soviet bureaucracy preserves state property not only out of fear of the proletariat but because state property is the basis of its power and privileges. Likewise, when Trotsky explained why the Soviet bureaucracy would have to move towards an abolition of capitalism in the Eastern Polish territories it occupied in September 1939, he did not refer to "fear of the proletariat" but to collective property being the basis of the bureaucracy's power and privileges:

It is more likely, however, that in the territories scheduled to become a part of the USSR, the Moscow government will carry through the expropriation of the large land-owners and statification of the means of production. This variant is most probable not because the bureaucracy remains true to the socialist program, but because it is neither desirous nor capable of sharing the power, and the

privileges the latter entails, with the old ruling classes in the occupied territories." [In *Defense of Marxism*, Pathfinder Press, 1973, p. 18.]

Neither desirous nor capable, says Trotsky. We are far from reducing everything to "fear of the proletariat." And is the petty bourgeoisie as a class incapable of "sharing power and the privileges the latter entails" with landowners and big capitalists? Isn't it doing just that under many forms of capitalist dictatorial regimes?

One could ask a broader question: At least on three occasions—during the Second World War when Hitler attacked the USSR; at the end of World War II, when the Soviet armies occupied a large part of Eastern Europe; and at the moment of the Marshall Plan being launched and the parallel negotiations around the fate of Germany and the place of the USSR in world trade—the Soviet bureaucracy had a real possibility of going over to private property (not necessarily in the juridical but in any case in the economic sense of the word), on a large scale. Some minor sectors of the bureaucracy indeed opted in that sense (the Vlassov group among the officers caste, to quote the best-known example). But in its overwhelming majority, the Soviet bureaucracy did not. Why? Just for reasons of fear of the proletariat? Hadn't they reason to fear Hitler or Washington more than the atomized and politically passive Soviet proletariat at these precise moments of history? Isn't the only explanation compatible with historical materialism that, as a caste—as distinct from individuals or subsegments of the caste—their material interests were tied to collective property?

But if that is the case, one is faced with an unavoidable analytical choice: Either one concludes that it is a caste still tied to the working class (i.e. a parasitic cancer of the working class). Or one has to conclude that another social class, the petty bourgeoisie, can produce a caste which, under certain historical circumstances, is intent upon defending not private but collective property, like the working class.

Trotsky expressed himself unambiguously on the links of the bureaucracy with the working class:

If the state does not die away, but grows more and more despotic, if the plenipotentiaries of the working class become bureaucratized, and the bureaucracy rises above the new society. . . . [The Revolution Betrayed, *ibid.*, p. 55. Our emphasis.]

The conquest of power changes not only the relations of the proletariat to other classes, but also its own inner structure. The wielding of power becomes the specialty of a definite social group, which is the more impatient to solve its own "social problem," the higher its opinion of its own mission. [Ibid., p. 102. Our emphasis.]

In its social structure, the proletariat is the least heterogeneous class of capitalist society. Nevertheless, the pressure of such "little strata" as the workers' aristocracy and the workers' bureaucracy is sufficient to give rise to opportunistic parties, which are converted by the course of things into one of the weapons of bourgeois domination. . . .

Even if in the Soviet society "there are no classes," nevertheless this society is at least incomparably more heterogeneous and complicated than the proletariat of capitalist countries. . . . [Ibid., pp. 267-8.]

For sure, when we say that the Soviet bureaucracy is simultaneously a hardened caste and a cancerous growth upon the proletariat, the use of these alternative terms implies in and by itself different relations between that bureaucracy and the working class on the one hand, and the labor bureaucracy and the working class under capitalism on the other hand. Not only is the part of the social surplus product which the Soviet bureaucracy appropriates for itself incomparably larger than that which goes to the labor bureaucracy under capitalism. But the conditions of oppression of the proletariat introduced by the Soviet bureaucracy, the way in which it "freezes" its power and privileges by any means available, makes it incomparably more distant from the mass of the direct producers than the labor bureaucracy under capitalism. Nevertheless, all these distinctions being duly accounted for—and they fully justify the term "caste" or "hardened social layer"—it is still inescapable, from the point of view of historical materialism, to add: "hardened social layer" of the proletariat, which has not yet cut off all its ties with the working class.

Undoubtedly, the bureaucracy defends collective property while constantly undermining it. It constantly produces in its midst tendencies towards breaking up planning, tendencies towards primitive accumulation of capital, tendencies towards broadening the influence of the law of value, etc. But a balance sheet can be drawn after more than half a century of political expropriation of the Soviet proletariat. The totalitarian dictatorship of the bureaucracy, under the most variegated circumstances, has by and large conserved, strengthened and extended collective property, and not overthrown it. The reason can only be that, as a social layer, it is materially interested in doing so, whatever tendencies in the opposite direction it produced and continues to produce. The Butenko wing of the bureaucracy, to quote the Transitional Program, has historically proved to be a small minority, at least up to now. That is the lesson of history. So the conclusion is inescapable: either one believes that that behavior indicates that the caste is still a cancer upon the working class. Or one believes that another social class alongside the proletariat is interested in maintaining and extending collective property.

But if one rejects the first hypothesis and plunges for the second, then the characterization of the bureaucracy as part of the petty-bourgeois class just doesn't make sense. It goes against all historical evidence and Marxist tradition, which confirm that the petty bourgeoisie is socially tied to private and not to collective property. And then one has only one way out: the bureaucracy constitutes a new ruling class, tied to collective property like the working class, but at the

same time ferociously oppressing and exploiting the working class. Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters's refusal to accept that the bureaucratic caste is a cancerous growth upon the working class frees the road to that conclusion. For if a country is ruled for nearly five decades by a totalitarian dictatorship of people who, while defending collective property, "have nothing in common" with the working class, then the idea that they constitute a new ruling class becomes rather plausible.

After having largely opened the door to the theories of state capitalism by their positions on Kampuchea (you can still have capitalism, after a total abolition of private property of the means of production), they now open the window to the theories of bureaucratic collectivism (you can have a social layer which has "nothing in common" with the working class but maintains and extends collective property of the means of production). Such is the implacable dialectics of revising key elements of the Marxist theory of the state and of social classes.

The intentions of comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters are, of course, honorable. They reject with horror the idea that there is "an ounce of proletarian content in their [the Stalinists] counterrevolutionary orientation." They fear that thinking otherwise would mean making "a dangerous step in the direction of blurring the clear class line of demarcation between Stalinism and revolutionary Marxism" (p. 720). But this is of course a caricatural reduction of our views which they themselves quote in the very next paragraph.

We never said that the Stalinist bureaucracy is tied to the working class mainly through its continued reference to Marxism-Leninism (however distorted and falsified). We said that these references cannot be detached from the fact that the bureaucracy's privileges are still mainly acquired in the form of higher wages (in the sphere of distribution) and that it is still defending collective property of the means of production. For any supporter of historical materialism, ideology cannot be completely detached from material interests. No part of the capitalist class or of the petty bourgeoisie as a class can for decades educate youth, in a country in which it rules, in the spirit of defense of collective property, of opposition to private property, of hostility to capitalism as a system, of defense of socialism as a social system. The fact that that is the way in which youth are educated under the dictatorship of the Soviet bureaucracy—whatever may be the hypocritical, demagogical, lying, falsified, degrading, counterproductive forms of that education—is tied to the fact that the power and privileges of the bureaucracy do rest upon collective and not upon private property. The actual behavior of bureaucrats, and social reality of Soviet society, the oppression of workers, the monstrous growth of inequality in the sphere of distribution, introduce explosive contradictions both into the infrastructure and in the

superstructure of that society, including of course into the ideology. But the social nature of that ruling ideology is neither capitalist nor petty bourgeois.

Furthermore, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters forget a trifle. We all agree to call the Soviet state a bureaucratically degenerated workers state. The counterrevolutionary orientation, measures, and crimes of the Stalinist bureaucracy however are not applied by some mysterious ethereal agencies. *They are applied by agencies of that very state:* the KGB, the judiciary, the army, the diplomacy, the factory managers, etc. Even the Stalinist party apparatus as such has long since been fused with the state apparatus. Yet we continue to call that state a workers state, in spite of all these counterrevolutionary crimes. What is then the difference between calling the state—which commits all these counterrevolutionary measures—a degenerated workers state, and calling the bureaucracy which imposes them a degenerated labor bureaucracy?

But the state remains a workers state not in function of these crimes but in spite of them, only because it still maintains the socioeconomic conquests of the October revolution, comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters will reply at the top of their voices. True. But exactly the same reasoning applies to the bureaucracy which, after all, "was" the state.<sup>8</sup> The bureaucracy remains a degenerated labor bureaucracy (a petty-bourgeois cancerous growth upon the working class, and not part of any other class) not in function of its "counterrevolutionary orientation" or any of the crimes it committed and commits, but in spite of them. It remains so for the one and only reason that it has not yet transformed itself into a new ruling class, that it has not yet abolished collective property, while constantly undermining it. The parallel is complete. If it is not "a dangerous step in the direction of blurring the clear class line of demarcation between Stalinism and revolutionary" to continue calling a "degenerated workers state" a state which killed between ten and twenty million innocent people, introduced the harshest (anti)labor code known in the twentieth century, and has caused innumerable revolutions to be defeated throughout the world, why would the fact of calling the bureaucratic caste responsible for these crimes a degenerated labor bureaucracy indeed be such a "dangerous step"?

Comrades Clark-Feldman-Horowitz-Waters give us the advice not to advise the Vietnamese leadership. Hardened and unrepentant sinners as we are, we shall add another violation of the Eleventh Commandment to our previous sins. We advise them to stop and think, before they continue playing with theory, revising key elements

8. "The means of production belong to the state. But the state, so to speak, 'belongs' to the bureaucracy." (Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed*, ibid., p. 249)

of the Marxist theory of the state and of social classes. Marxist theory is characterized by an extreme degree of inner coherence, which they do not seem to be fully aware of. You loosen a few bricks in the foundations,

you take out another couple of bricks in the walls, and before you have time to turn around, the whole house will come crashing down upon your heads.

September 15, 1979

## Honduran Peasants Express Solidarity

### The Plight of Salvadoran Refugees in Honduras

By Lars Palmgren

LEMPIRA PROVINCE—A thousand people used to live in La Virtud, a small, forgotten, almost inaccessible village on the Honduran frontier with El Salvador. It had no electricity, school, teacher, or doctor.

Now 3,000 people live in La Virtud. The 2,000 new inhabitants are refugees from El Salvador. Another 6,000 to 7,000 refugees live in the surrounding area.

On March 18, more than 4,000 new refugees poured across the border. They are concentrated in a place called Los Hernández, an hour's walk from La Virtud, toward the Río Lempa that separates the two countries.

On our way to Los Hernández we met several groups of Honduran soldiers, and on the hill just above the camp we were stopped at a military checkpoint. No one without a special pass is let into the area.

When we descended into Los Hernández food was being distributed and the refugees were waiting in long lines. Volunteers from Caritas, the international Catholic relief organization, were measuring out rice, beans, corn, and oil provided by the UN High Commission on Refugees and transported here by mule.

Unsafe drinking water is a big problem in Los Hernández. Another problem is that few of the refugees have cooking utensils. Some of the refugees walked about for hours with their ration of food cupped into their shirt or skirt without finding any way to prepare it.

There are still no tents in Los Hernández. Plans have been made to move the refugees four kilometers in from the dangerous border, but the military has not yet given permission. So all the thousands of refugees are concentrated in a small enclosed area.

There are no latrines and the stink is terrible. Many people are sick and all of them are afraid and tense. They all sleep huddled together because they are afraid of being arrested by Honduran soldiers. This has already happened several times.

Two days before we arrived a refugee was shot to death by a Honduran soldier. "He did not stop when I told him to," was the motivation offered by the soldier.

Even more than Honduran soldiers, the

refugees fear Salvadoran soldiers and members of the right-wing paramilitary organization ORDEN, who have crossed into Honduras several times. The day we arrived in Los Hernández a Salvadoran plane flew over the area and dropped several bombs.

The biggest reason for fear, however, is what happened when the refugees crossed the Río Lempa. "We started to cross at night so they would not see us," an old man leaning on a stick tells us.

"In the beginning it was all right. But when the light came the hell started. They shot at us from the mountains, and airplanes came and shot at us too. In the end a helicopter hovered in the air above us for at least half an hour shooting, shooting. . . ."

No one knows how many died. Seven bodies have been buried on the Honduran side, but witnesses told us that several rafts carrying small children turned over and were swept away by the current.

One of the priests in the area told us that dead bodies are now found daily around Los Hernández. "Most of them were killed on the other side," he says. "How many died there we will never know." The many vultures circling overhead indicate that there were a lot.

"It could have been a new Sumpul," one of the leaders of the refugees says. The Río Sumpul was the site of a terrible massacre in June 1980. At least 600 people, mostly women and children, were killed there by Salvadoran soldiers and ORDEN members.

"The fact that it was not such a massacre this time," the refugee leader continues, "is mostly due to the fact that the Honduran army saw international volunteers and priests coming into the area."

Most of the new refugees come from the province of Cabañas in El Salvador, one of those the Salvadoran army has been attacking for the last two weeks. The army's destruction of houses and crops, and its killing of village leaders has meant an unbearable situation for women, children, and old people. Food shortages have caused malnutrition and disease.

Because of this a decision was made to evacuate the area in order to save lives.

The Honduran authorities have described what happened on the Río Lempa as a confrontation between the guerrillas and the army. It is true that guerrillas were there, but they were there to protect the refugees and make sure they got into Honduras.

The response of Honduran peasants to the refugees has been impressive. "They are our brothers," one man who now has his house and farm full of refugees says. "We must support each other."

A striking example of that support occurred March 24, the anniversary of the assassination of Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero. Hundreds of peasants came to the camp loaded with food for the refugees—pigs, chickens, vegetables, whatever they had to share. They had heard that the refugees did not have enough to eat.

The new refugees in Los Hernández brought the total number in Honduras to almost 40,000. Most are around La Virtud or in the area bordering the province of Morazán.

According to the United Nations refugee commissioner in Tegucigalpa, Charles Henri Bazouche, 40 percent of the refugees are less than seven years old. Another 40 percent are women, and the rest are mostly old men.

The refugees do not have any real political status in Honduras. They cannot leave the border area and do not have permission to work. The government recently decided the refugees must carry a special identity card at all times.

This contrasts sharply with the treatment given the 15,000 Somozaists who fled from Nicaragua after July 19, 1979. They were given residency cards and work permits.

In the beginning the Honduran government tried to concentrate all the refugees into one huge camp. Nestor, the director of refugee work around La Virtud, told us: "We were able to stop that by arguing that our refugee project could aid the general development of this forgotten area."

The situation is contradictory. La Virtud, which before had no doctor, now has several and even a small hospital. Those who work with the refugees say the Honduran population receives the same help as Salvadoran refugees. The population of La Virtud now has better social services than ever before. But that is hardly because of the Honduran government.

Before leaving Los Hernández we talked about the future with the refugees. "We feel a tremendous gratitude toward our Honduran brothers and sisters," one of them says, "and we hope we will soon be able to pay them back for their help."

"Because," he states with great seriousness, "we have no plans to stay here very long. This is a situation that must change. We all long to return to the struggle for our victory. And then we will remember those who helped us here." □