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
July 21, 1980

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## **ON THE SCENE REPORT**

### **Grenadians Vow to Defend Their Revolution**



***South African  
Racists Launch  
New Angola  
Invasion***

**Nicaraguan Workers  
and Peasants  
Tighten Control  
Over Economy**

**Why Washington  
Has Turned Against  
Cuban Emigrés**

**Pope Deals Blow  
to Brazil Regime**

**New Setbacks for  
U.S. Campaign  
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## South African Troops Out of Angola!

By Ernest Harsch

Emboldened by Washington's tacit encouragement, the apartheid regime in Pretoria has escalated its blatant aggression against Angola.

By early July, more than 2,000 South African troops had crossed the border into Angola and were operating in two southern provinces. It was the largest and most sustained South African assault on Angola since the invasion of 1975-76.

Speaking before the United Nations Security Council on June 26, Angolan representative to the UN Elisio de Figueiredo revealed that by that time the South African troops had "killed over 370 men, women, and children. They have wounded more than 255 people, many of whom will succumb to their injuries. They have destroyed vehicles, bridges, houses. They have killed much of the livestock, depriving the remaining populace of its food and livelihood. They have mined roads and fields."

"These are not merely war preparations," de Figueiredo said, "this is war."

The invasion first began on June 7, when South African units based in Namibia struck across the border, backed up by helicopters, tanks, and armored cars. Film clips of the attack were shown on South African television, and Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha claimed that the troops had killed 200 fighters of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), which is struggling for the independence of Namibia from South African rule.

But the South African attacks have not been limited to SWAPO camps. According to Lucio Lara, a member of the Political Bureau of the ruling People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the apartheid regime is also seeking to weaken the Angolan armed forces, prevent Angola's vital Benguela railway from resuming full operation, and back up the guerrilla forces of the proimperialist National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

The South African attacks against Angola are in retaliation for the sanctuary and material support the Angolans have given to the Namibian freedom fighters. As de Figueiredo explained to the UN Security Council, the current invasion "is South Africa's warning to the Angolan commitment to liberation, self-determination, majority rule and a revolutionary path in national development. It is South Africa's answer to Africa."

Early in the invasion, South African Mirage jet fighters bombed a Namibian

refugee camp near Lubango, a major city more than 150 miles inside Angola. On June 5, a South African company attacked the village of Katomba, killing many of its inhabitants. In the following days, South African infantry battalions took the towns of Evale and Mongua and entrenched themselves in other parts of southern Angola. Ngiva, the provincial capital of Kunene, was encircled. Helicopter assaults were mounted against Mpupa.

By the first week of July, fresh units of South African troops had pushed into the eastern province of Kwando Kubango.

From the very beginning, Pretoria has been encouraged by the political stance adopted by Washington and its other imperialist allies.

On June 17, in the midst of the invasion, the U.S. Senate voted to lift restrictions on the provision of covert military aid to UNITA, which is seeking, with South African backing, to topple the Angola regime. On June 27, the UN Security Council voted to condemn the South African invasion—but the American, British, and French governments abstained, thus giving Botha their tacit approval. (Every time proposals have been made to institute mandatory UN-sponsored economic sanctions against South Africa, those same three governments have exercised their veto powers.)

In line with this imperialist policy, the major bourgeois news media have played down the seriousness of the South African invasion. Their coverage, in fact, has been based largely on Pretoria's claims.

Pointing to American and European complicity with the South African aggression, de Figueiredo stated that "for every child killed in Soweto, in Namibia, in Angola, responsibility must be accepted by those Western friends of Pretoria who help the apartheid regime to survive, and survive rather well."

He also pointed to the hypocrisy of Washington's attempts to impose sanctions against Iran—but not South Africa—

stating that "fifty people held hostage has plunged the Western world into a reassessment of policy, into a hunt for military bases, into military action. But thousands of people massacred by racists merit no response other than sactimonious resolutions without teeth?"

A statement issued by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity condemning the invasion stated that the "Western powers who have continued to support the South African regime share full responsibility for these crimes committed against the government and people of Angola."

As they did during the 1975-76 invasion, the Angolans are standing up to this latest South African aggression.

De Figueiredo affirmed that Angola would not be intimidated and stated that "our vast continent has no room for settler colonialists or overseas rule. We will not tolerate minority rule and apartheid. And we will fight imperialist attempts to destabilize our region."

Angolan troops have engaged the South African forces, and report shooting down three jets and one helicopter. In cities around the country, rallies are being held to condemn the invasion and to mobilize for the defense of the country. In Luanda, the capital, tens of thousands marched July 1, carrying banners that read "Hands Off Angola" and "Racists out of our country."

According to Lucio Lara, the Angolan government has not asked the Cuban forces stationed in Angola for combat assistance—but may do so if South African troops continue to push northward.

Cuba, meanwhile, has reaffirmed its solidarity with Angola. Speaking in the United Nations June 26, Raúl Roa Kouri, the Cuban representative to the UN, declared, "Angola is not alone in its heroic resistance to the invader. By its side are the peoples of Africa, the Nonaligned countries, and the progressive forces of the socialist camp. Whosoever attempts to conquer fraternal Angola will, as a patriot of Cuban independence put it, gather the dust of its land or perish in the attempt."

In a letter published in the July 6 issue of the Cuban English-language weekly *Granma*, Fidel Castro urged member states of the Nonaligned movement to "give Angola the material, moral and political solidarity needed to once again defeat racist aggression." □

## The Pope Deals a Blow to the Brazilian Regime

By David Frankel

Arriving in Brazil for a twelve-day visit June 30, Pope John Paul II lost no time in warning government officials that "those who are responsible for the common good . . . must seek in time the reforms" neces-

sary to avoid revolution.

Speaking in a Rio de Janeiro shanty town July 2, the pope declared: "The church in this Brazilian land wants to be the church of the poor. The church does

not want to serve those who create the tensions and cause the explosions of struggle among the people." He urged the wealthy to work "toward social equality; so that the unjust distribution of riches gives way to a distribution more just."

In São Paulo the following day, the pope told a gathering of 120,000 workers that Christian principles require "freeing the world from the domination of an oppressing economic order" through "peaceful reforms."

Metalworkers in São Paulo's industrial suburbs ended a six-week strike May 12 that had been carried out in defiance of the military government. São Paulo's Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns had drawn fire from Brazilian President João Baptista Figueiredo for his support of the strikers. But instead of rebuking Arns, as progressive church activists had feared, the pope endorsed the cause of the workers.

"The church proclaims and supports the rights of the workers because man and his dignity are at stake," the pope said.

Criticizing the social effects of capitalism in strong terms, the pope declared: "An exclusive economic logic, depraved by crass materialism, has invaded all fields of human existence, damaging the environment, threatening families and destroying all respect for the human person."

He insisted that "the civilization of love has no room for terror, torture, repression, inequality of income or other economic and social injustice."

Landless peasants in Recife were told by the pope that "Land is the gift of God which he gives to all human beings.

"It is not right therefore, because it is not according to God's design, to manage this gift in such a way that its benefits profit only a few while the rest, the immense majority, remain excluded."

Is this the pope who has been warning against political activity by priests? At the Latin American Episcopal Conference in January 1979, the pope explicitly condemned those who justified the activities of left-wing priests by trying "to show Jesus as politically committed, as one who fought against Roman oppression and the authorities, and also as one involved in the class struggle."

Before the pope's trip to Brazil, church activists expected him to make new moves to limit political activity in solidarity with the oppressed and exploited in Latin America. A letter to the pope was signed by 1,150 priests who declared that their own role in the transformation of Latin American society was "imperative" and "irreversible." Referring to the activities of ultrarightist Catholic groups, the letter said:

"The Latin American people find it repulsive that their assassins invoke their 'Christianity' to justify their killings, and that not a few bishops and even papal nuncios are their accomplices, at least in their passivity."

Moreover, the letter continued: "People in Latin America are not poor because of some natural destiny, their cause is essentially political. They want the return of what has been stolen from them . . . by a minority which is sustained by enormous political and economic power."

The pope's decision to speak out against some of the injustices in Brazil is powerful testimony to the depth of the crisis facing the ruling classes in Latin America. Even the Roman Catholic Church is being

forced to bend to the pressure of the masses.

As the pope repeatedly warned the Brazilian rulers, "Any society which does not wish to be destroyed from within must establish a just social order."

Millions of Brazilian workers and peasants gave an enthusiastic welcome to such messages. They saw the pope's words as a justification of their struggles. Regardless of the pope's intentions, his indictment has been a heavy blow to the Brazilian regime. □

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### Grenadians Join Militia to Fight Counterrevolution

By Steve Clark

ST. GEORGE'S, Grenada—The people of this small Caribbean country are mobilizing to defend their revolution, as imperialist-backed terrorist activity continues.

On July 4, a soldier of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) and a member of the militia were shot in the island's northern-most parish of St. Patrick's. PRA soldier Simon Layne and militiaman Danny Baptiste were rushed to a St. George's hospital in critical condition.

Layne and Baptiste were inside the Mt. Reuil Water Works building when they heard shouts from outside, telling them to "get ready to come out. Automatic weapons outside here. Guerrillas around."

When Layne opened the door to look out, he was shot in the chest. Baptiste was shot in the back as he ran for cover.

According to the Grenadian government, the four gunmen were followers of Kenneth "Buck" Budhlall and his brother Kennedy Budhlall, two former New Jewel Movement (NJM) members charged with plotting an aborted April 26 attempt to overthrow the new government. The Budhlall brothers had also been waging a "freedom to grow" campaign against government efforts to stamp out large-scale marijuana cultivation (see *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, June 16, p. 624). Kennedy Budhlall had been arrested when the April coup attempt was uncovered.

Of the four people identified as the gunmen in St. Patrick's, only one has so far been caught and arrested.

Members of the Budhlall gang were also behind the June 19 terrorist bombing of a mass rally at Queen's Park in St. George's. Two young women were killed and dozens of people injured in that vicious attack. The bomb had been intended to go off beneath a platform where Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and virtually the entire top government and New Jewel Movement leadership were scheduled to speak.

Keith S. Bernard, one of the key suspects in the Queen's Park bombing, was arrested shortly after the attack and another suspect, Strachan Phillip, was killed in a gun battle with government forces.

On July 2, Kenneth "Buck" Budhlall, Ronald Budhlall, and Russell Budhlall—widely known here as the three "Buckaneers"—were arrested on Mucche Kawe island, near Pearls Airport, while attempting to flee the country to evade the charges against them. Hundreds of rounds of ammunition had been discovered at the home of Russell Budhlall only a week before the June 19 bombing. (Nicholas William, another member of the Budhlall grouping,

was killed a week after the Queen's Park attack, when a bomb he was carrying accidentally went off.)

The NJM-led government has responded to the Queen's Park bombing with mass demonstrations across the island and a campaign to build and train a militia of 20,000—nearly one fifth of the island's population—to secure the revolution against its enemies at home and abroad.

New Jewel Movement leaders have stressed that behind the Budhlall gang and the marijuana growers stands a more powerful and more dangerous foe—U.S. imperialism. They have linked the right-wing violence in Grenada to Washington's threats against Cuba, CIA destabilization efforts and coup attempts in Jamaica, and the assassinations of Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador and political leader Walter Rodney in Guyana.

"We must not only root out remaining local counter-revolution," said an article on the arrest of the three "Buckaneers" in the July 5 *New Jewel*, "but must never forget the *foreign connection* which taught our 'local mercenaries' to make bombs. We must keep our eyes on the seas, our coastal lookout alert, our Militia active on our beaches, even while we safeguard our communities."

Grenada's leaders also explain that a successful defense of the country against imperialism is only possible because of the continuing social and political conquests of the revolution.

An editorial in the July 5 *New Jewel* said, "Once more, we have seen that a

#### Did Washington Know About Bombing Plot?

A dispatch by the Cuban news service Prensa Latina indicates that U.S. embassy officials in Barbados may have known beforehand about the attempt to assassinate top Grenadian leaders and assumed that it had come off as planned when news of the explosion first broke.

According to Prensa Latina, shortly after the Queen's Park incident spokespersons for the U.S. embassy in Bridgetown announced incorrectly that the bomb had gone off under the platform and that several people on the platform had been killed.

popular Revolution possesses tremendous strength to defend itself against aggression, from within or from without. That strength is the organized strength of the people who are prepared to come forward to defend the Revolution because they recognize the increased benefits the Revolution is bringing everyday."

Evidence that this perspective is being carried out is visible everywhere on the island. Articles in the U.S. big-business media attempting to sabotage tourism here by portraying Grenada as an intimidating armed camp are simply lies. But everywhere, posters can be seen calling on Grenadians to "join the militia and defend the country against the imperialist aggression."

Each night, people sign up at militia centers in towns around the country. Following Prime Minister Bishop's call for a militia of 20,000 for example, 225 people signed up during the first hour that tables were set up in the island's second largest city, Grenville.

At night, PRA soldiers and militia members patrol the beaches, set up some roadside checkpoints, and monitor large gatherings. Many were on duty at St. George's Regal Theatre June 18 for the opening of a Cuban film festival and the premier of a new Cuban-made documentary on Grenada, "A Big Revolution in a Small Country."

First-aid courses are also being conducted throughout the island in conjunction with the militia, drawing participation from thousands of Grenadians, young and old.

The determination of the Grenadian people to defend the gains of their revolution against imperialist attack was clear from a conversation between New Jewel Movement youth leaders and Andrew Pulley, Socialist Workers Party candidate for U.S. president. Pulley is on a week-long fact-finding visit here to bring back the truth about the Grenada revolution to the American people during the final stretch of the presidential election campaign.

Tarlie Francis, chairman of the National Students' Council, explained that prior to the Queen's Park bombing many Grenadians were not so aware of why they should be concerned about U.S. imperialism. But the murder of two young women, the injury of dozens of others, and the attempted assassination of government leaders has driven the danger home.

The imperialists "are our greatest enemies," Francis told Pulley. "No longer can we just think about beating their propaganda. We have to think about beating them physically now. Because they are disorganized, but they are more aggressive than ever."

Linghan Samuel, a leader of the NJM's National Youth Organization, jumped into the conversation. "If Washington tries to invade Grenada," he said, "it will be a second Bay of Pigs." □

## Nicaragua: Toiling Masses Tighten Control of Production

By Fred Murphy

MANAGUA—The mass organizations of workers and peasants here have launched campaigns to enforce decrees of the revolutionary government concerning wages, working conditions, and land use. Recalcitrant capitalists and landlords are the main targets, although bureaucratic administrators in some nationalized workplaces are also feeling the heat.

Following a drive spearheaded by the Sandinista-led Rural Workers Association (ATC) a law was adopted June 11 by the Council of State ordering an across-the-board wage increase of 125 córdobas per month for all workers earning less than 1,200 córdobas per month (10 córdobas equals US\$1 at the official exchange rate).

The wage hike effects about 300,000 of Nicaragua's lowest paid workers, including some 80 percent of the country's rural labor force. Over the objections of bourgeois delegates from the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), the Council of State further decided to make the wage hike retroactive to June 1.

Since the measure was adopted, many private employers have either stalled or flatly refused to pay the higher wages. Some state enterprises have also been slow in increasing salaries. So on July 1, the Intersindical—a coordinating body made up of the ATC, the Sandinista Workers Federation (CST), and the Independent General Workers Federation (CGT-i)—called on "all the workers of the country . . . to demand compliance with the conquests achieved through their own efforts by:

"1. Demanding in the workplaces the

C\$125 increase for all those workers earning less than C\$1,200.

"2. Reporting to the offices of the Intersindical or of the CST, CGT-i, or ATC all cases of noncompliance with this decree.

"3. Demanding that each and every one of the revolutionary laws benefiting the workers be complied with in the workplaces."

The CST itself has set forth a more ambitious "Plan of Struggle" as its main contribution to the celebrations of the revolution's first anniversary that will culminate on July 19. The CST's plan involves not only enforcing the wage increase decree, but also demanding compliance with industrial health and safety laws, labor contracts involving vacation and pension payments, and trade-union rights guaranteed by the revolution.

"To get compliance with the demands being raised," the CST plan states, "we will make use of all the forms of struggle we have acquired with the triumph of the revolution."

CST leader and Council of State delegate Jorge Rojas elaborated on this in a July 5 interview with *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*. "Our orientation for getting the wage readjustment enforced," Rojas said, "is to create vigilance bodies inside the unions that can denounce the places where the bosses are not complying and get them to respect us by means of our Ministry of Labor. And if in the last instance it is necessary to organize a protest mobilization against one employer or another, then we'll do that."

"In the Council of State," Rojas added,

"we are only a few representatives so it is not from there that we are going to make a law prevail. Rather, we have to base ourselves on the masses, on the rank and file."

### Background to Campaign

The need for the CST to pay closer attention to the question of wages and working conditions was brought home by strikes in several state-owned workplaces in June. These were cases in which the union ranks launched workstoppages for wage demands against the advice of CST leaders.

The most important occurred at the CANAL cement plant southwest of Managua and at the PLYWOOD plant in Tipitapa, east of the capital. At CANAL the Stalinist-led CAUS\* was able to gain ground at the CST's expense as a result of the conflict.


The strikes were all settled within several days, sometimes with wage concessions being granted. An article in the June 26 issue of the FSLN weekly *Poder Sandinista*—which usually focuses on questions involving the trade unions, production, and the economy—drew some lessons from the strikes:

"We have heard statements attributing the workers protests to the class enemy, saying that the CIA and others have manipulated them. We think objective causes exist that force wage pressures to arise.

"From the subjective point of view, there are weaknesses—the union is very new, certain activists commit errors of leadership, and so on.

"When the working class has a low political and organizational level, the danger naturally exists that the CIA and the rest of our class enemies will try to manipulate the spontaneous movements of the workers. But [class enemies] are not the cause of such developments. Much less are the workers counterrevolutionaries.

"What is lacking in these cases is political consciousness. The resolution of the difficulties in PLYWOOD and in the cement plant without any mediators, without any additional wage increase [that is, any increase above the government decreed C\$125], and with a series of measures aimed at defending real wages and increasing social wages means there is al-



CST delegates to Council of State. From left to right, Daniel García, Adrián Gutiérrez, José Bravo, Juan Antonio González, Jorge Rojas, and Donald Vargas.

\*Confederation of Trade Union Action and Unification, led by the Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCN), a sectarian pro-Moscow current. See *IP/I*, July 7, 1980, p. 710.

ready a serious commitment on the part of the workers to collaborate with the revolutionary government to improve the situation."

Part of the problem, as *Poder Sandinista* implies, lies in the shortage of experienced trade-union cadres that the FSLN faces. There was an explosion of union organization across Nicaragua following the July 19, 1979, victory and most of the new unions naturally affiliated to the CST. Many new and revolutionary-minded workers' leaders have been thrust forward. But inevitably there have been instances where the Sandinista union organization has failed to respond flexibly enough to the immediate concerns of the ranks. This in turn has enabled reformist or sectarian trade-union currents to outflank the CST by playing up wage demands while ignoring or opposing the broader political and economic proposals the Sandinistas have sought to introduce.

By launching its plan of struggle, the CST is seeking to cut the ground out from under its opponents in the unions on such questions. This by no means implies, of course, that the CST is giving up the orientation that from the outset has distinguished it from other union federations in Nicaragua: the defense of and education about the long-term strategic interests of the working class. The CST has led battles to impose workers' control and to fight decapitalization and sabotage in private workplaces; educated its ranks on the need to boost production and aid in the reactivation of Nicaragua's devastated economy; and played a key part in the national literacy campaign and in the organization of the Sandinista People's Militia.

As an editorial in the FSLN daily *Barricada* explained July 8, "The CST has learned how to combine adequately the struggle for workers' immediate demands with their strategic needs, in such a way that the former does not become an obstacle to the overall advance of the revolution but serves instead to strengthen the role of the workers as the motor force in the process."

#### ATC Versus Landlords

While helping to lead the Intersindical campaign to enforce the wage increase, the Rural Workers Association is engaged in a battle on another front as well. With the coming of the rainy season it is time to plant food grain and cotton. But in many parts of the countryside private landowners are refusing to rent land to poor peasants at the government decreed rent limit of 100 córdobas per manzana (1 manzana equals 0.7 hectare).

"The initial reaction of a majority of landlords has been to refuse to rent land," *Barricada* reported July 7. "By announcing that now they are the ones who will cultivate, they are not only attacking the nation's production, but also preventing hundreds of peasants from dedicating

themselves to the work that for years has been their means of livelihood.

"In no way can it be thought that these landlords have the experience or the ability to produce. Rather . . . they are taking a counterrevolutionary attitude, boycotting the production of basic grains, attacking the future sustenance of Nicaragua. Moreover, in most cases they haven't even the intention of producing."

In response to this situation, the ATC is organizing poor peasants to go ahead and plant on idle land, while continuing efforts to force the landlords into rental agreements. "Our position is to call for planting," ATC production secretary Wilberto Lara told *Barricada*. "Keeping in mind that it is necessary to pay the rent the law stipulates, we want to increase production, pay the rent, and respect private property. Once utilized, we will hand the land back to its owners."

Some landlords have reportedly accepted this eminently fair arrangement, but others will no doubt reject it. In the event of further landlord resistance, the Nicaraguan Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) can bring to bear the revolutionary government's Decree Number Sixteen which empowers INRA to intervene idle land holdings.

The new initiatives being taken by the CST and the ATC show the importance that the Sandinista leadership continues to place on the independent organization

and mobilization of the workers and peasants. Their revolutionary perspective on this question is summed up well in a speech by Commander of the Revolution Carlos Núñez that the FSLN has just published in a pamphlet entitled "The Role of the Mass Organizations in the Revolutionary Process."

Núñez states, "Under the leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front the mass organizations are guided . . . along two important lines. In the first place, our mass organizations must watch over and work to strengthen the political framework of the revolution. And in the second place, they must be true instruments for receiving, expressing, and conveying the most pressing demands of the masses.

"Starting from this premise, the mass organizations must take up and make their own the demands of their members and of their social sectors, and struggle to see that these are realized through the new mechanisms the revolution has instituted. . . .

"This means that the mass organizations, acting in the framework of the general line of the revolution, must have sufficient right to resort . . . to private criticism, public criticism, utilization of all the communications media, and even mobilizations to demand the measures necessary to guarantee that their concerns are heard." □

## 'Policy of Destabilization' Denounced

### Zimbabwe Ousts South African Diplomats

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe announced July 5 that he had ordered the South African diplomatic mission in Salisbury shut down. A few days later, the apartheid regime began withdrawing its diplomatic staff from Zimbabwe.

One of the reasons for the shutdown, Mugabe revealed, was that the mission in Salisbury had been used by Pretoria to recruit former Rhodesian soldiers and white settlers for military action against Black governments in southern Africa, including that of Zimbabwe.

"South Africa has a policy of destabilizing our region," Mugabe said, "mounting attacks, organizing sabotage and continuing to disrespect the principle of peaceful coexistence."

Mugabe first raised such accusations against Pretoria a month earlier, when he charged the apartheid regime with backing antigovernment elements in Zimbabwe. Two weeks later, Zimbabwean security officials gave further details about the South African recruiting operations.

The Zimbabwean decision to break diplo-

matic ties was answered by threats of South African retaliation. Much of Zimbabwe's economy is dominated by South African firms and about 90 percent of its trade passes through South Africa. Some South African officials have warned that those trade ties could be cut off, causing severe economic disruption in Zimbabwe.

Military threats have also been issued. One South African cabinet minister warned that if the Zimbabwean government allowed South African freedom fighters to set up bases in Zimbabwe, South African troops would immediately invade. The current South African invasion of Angola emphasized the seriousness of that threat.

Mugabe, nevertheless, has reaffirmed his government's policy of supporting the South African liberation struggle. Speaking before the annual summit conference of the Organization of African Unity in Sierra Leone in early July, Mugabe called on African countries to draw up "a definite concrete program" of aid, including military assistance, to the South African freedom fighters. □

# A Vietnam in Central America?

By Eduardo Medrano

BOGOTÁ—In the face of the revolutionary uprising of the Central American and Caribbean masses, the Pentagon is seriously pursuing the creation of a military intervention force based on the governments of the Andean Pact—Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela.

This revelation, which has caused great commotion in the Colombian media, was made by Colombian journalist Patricia Lara in an extensive article that appeared June 29 in the liberal Bogotá daily *El Espectador*.

Lara based her account on official sources in Washington and New York. According to her article, the idea of an Andean military force made rapid headway in high U.S. government circles after the Pentagon held a special meeting last spring to explore various courses of action to combat the insurgency in El Salvador.

In developing this plan, a "well-known and discrete" figure acting in the name of the Carter administration convinced Presidents Turbay Ayala of Colombia, Herrera Campins of Venezuela, and Lidia Gueiler of Bolivia to organize such an Andean military force. The same envoy also hoped to win recently elected President Fernando Belaúnde Terry of Peru and Ecuadorian President Jaime Roldós to this plan.

Along with sending Somozaist and anti-Castro mercenaries trained by the CIA in Guatemala to El Salvador (a plan that has already been implemented, and one that has been denounced since May 23 by some Latin American bourgeois newspapers), the idea of the Andean military force was seen as the most feasible in light of the region's political situation. Other proposals for action to stop the growth of the Salvadoran revolution were also raised, but were discarded for the time being. These included:

- Direct U.S. military intervention, which could unleash a massive anti-imperialist storm throughout Latin America.

- Joint Guatemalan-Honduran military intervention, under the pretext of some border conflict with El Salvador. As is well known, guerrillas are currently fighting the Salvadoran army all along these borders. But the Guatemalan and Honduran governments are faced with combative popular movements in their own countries.

- Creation of an inter-American defense force, which had already been proposed by Colombian President Turbay Ayala when the Sandinistas were on the verge of overthrowing Somoza. But this formula, discarded at the time in face of the popular

demonstrations against it, today would also have to reckon with the resistance of countries such as the Dominican Republic, which would probably prevent the Organization of American States (OAS) from obtaining the fourteen votes needed to create such an expeditionary corps.

In 1965 the Dominican Republic itself was criminally invaded by American imperialism, which used a similar kind of OAS cover. "But," says Lara, according to sources close to the OAS, "that country, through a deft political sleight of hand," would accept intervention in El Salvador by a different military force that was from neither the United States nor the OAS—an Andean military force, whose creation would have to be approved by the member-countries of the Andean Pact.

U.S. diplomacy is seeking to overcome the hesitations that remain among some Colombian political leaders. These hesitations are echoed by various sectors of the OAS, who have expressed disagreement with the Andean Pact playing a political role in addition to its economic functions. They fear that this could undermine the functions of the OAS itself.

But there is no doubt about Venezuelan President Herrera Campins's counterinsurgency aims. After the Christian Democratic election victory, the Venezuelan regime seriously impaired its relations with Cuba, to the point where, in a recent visit to Costa Rica, Herrera Campins proposed an aggressive policy against Cuba to his Christian Democratic colleague, President Rodrigo Carazo of Costa Rica.

In a related measure, the Venezuelan Ministry of Justice has affirmed that the Venezuelan government is ready—as a declaration of undeclared war against Cuba—to free the Cubans Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles and the Venezuelans Fredy Lugo and Hernán Ricardo. These are the Barbados assassins, the people responsible for planting the bomb that caused the mid-air explosion of a Cubana Airlines plane near Barbados in 1976, in which seventy-three persons died.

Furthermore, Venezuela has been carrying out a major arms build-up with help from the United States. In 1979 it spent \$587 million on armaments compared to \$401 million in similar expenditures by Peru, \$188 million by Colombia, and \$81 million by Bolivia.

The Venezuelan regime has also created an unusual "Special Forces Mobile Training Group," has agreed to the visit this year of a significant group of high U.S. military officers, and asked to be invited to

take part in the continental aspects of the U.S. "Solid Shield '80" military maneuvers in the Caribbean, which were directed against Cuba.

The willingness of the Colombian government to participate in an imperialist attack against the Central American and Caribbean revolutions should also surprise no one.

According to *El Espectador*, sources close to the Colombian Congress affirm that the Colombian Commission on Foreign Relations has already accepted the idea of the Andean military force for Central America. In addition, the Colombian government has threatened Nicaragua over the latter's claim to the San Andrés and Providencia archipelago and helped block Cuba from occupying a seat on the UN Security Council, measures that have worsened relations with both countries.

The Peruvian military government shamelessly lent itself to the imperialist game of discrediting the Cuban revolution through the incident involving its embassy in Havana. And there is little indication that the Peruvian president-elect wants to change that policy.

The report on the possibility of military intervention by the Andean Pact in Central America has caused considerable nervousness in Colombian public opinion. The implications of such an action were analyzed by Patricia Lara:

"... faced with military intervention in El Salvador to stop another revolution in Latin America... neither Nicaragua, nor Cuba, nor Grenada, nor many guerrilla organizations in the region, nor, perhaps, other countries, would stand by with folded arms. A Vietnam would come to the Andes, pushed forward, paradoxically, by the official conduct of the Andean and Latin American governments."

An editorial in the June 30 *El Espectador* sought to disavow the idea of an Andean army and to clear President Turbay and his chancellor, Diego Uribe Vargas of all suspicion in this regard. Nonetheless, in a June 29 report, Uribe Vargas admitted that the Vietnamization of Central America is a real danger, although according to him the conflict remains internal for now. But he suggested that if this ceased to be the case, some "external mechanism" would have to be brought to bear.

The exploited and oppressed masses of the Andean Pact countries and their compatriots abroad must be alert to any attempts by their governments to create any such military tool against the Central American and Caribbean revolutions. We must oppose even the slightest moves that they make in this regard.

At the same time, we must support with all our might those peoples who are struggling to throw off the imperialist and capitalist yoke once and for all.

June 30, 1980

## Why Washington Has Turned Against Cuban Immigrants

By Harry Ring

[The following article is taken from the July 18 issue of the U.S. socialist weekly the *Militant*.]

\* \* \*

After a secret hearing at the federal penitentiary in Talladega, Alabama, a U.S. immigration judge ordered eighteen Cuban émigrés deported as felons. U.S. officials claim they committed murder and other crimes in Cuba before coming here on the Mariel boatlift.

The June 24 verdict against the eighteen was the first round in a series of hearings that will be held for more than 1,000 of the Cubans who have recently arrived here.

Those émigrés charged as felons are being held incommunicado in federal prisons across the country. All will be subjected to the same type of secret hearings as the first eighteen.

State Department official Myles Frechette conceded that the findings against the Cubans were based solely on "confessions."

"We have no real proof against them," he said.

While anyone accused of having picked a pocket is in trouble, there may be exceptions to the ban on criminals.

"Now when you have somebody accused of wanting to kill Castro," observed Frechette, "you go into the grey area."

### Reporters Barred

Reporters were excluded from the hearings and are barred from talking to the prisoners. This was justified on the basis of the Privacy Act, which is supposed to protect those involved in exclusion or deportation hearings. That is, the defendants are supposed to have the right to choose a closed hearing.

Apparently a fan of *Catch-22*, the warden at Talladega said the Privacy Act and prison regulations barred him from permitting reporters to ask the prisoners if they wanted an open trial.

State Department and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials are vague about what they will do with those ordered deported. Since Cuba has made clear it will not accept the forced return of those who chose to come to the United States, the likelihood is that those branded felons will remain in U.S. jails for a long time.

The treatment of these Cubans is an outrage to human decency. As the June 15 weekly edition of *Granma*, the Cuban Communist Party newspaper, declared, "Not even our worst enemies were treated

this way in Cuba!"

The abuse of the Cuban émigrés represents a policy somersault by the Carter administration.

When Cubans were entering the Peruvian embassy in Havana last April seeking to leave the island, Carter hailed them for their alleged love of freedom.

But when the Cuban government opened the port of Mariel and said all who wanted to leave should go, Carter and the U.S. capitalist news media changed their tune. Suddenly the Cubans were portrayed as disease-ridden, criminals, and mentally retarded.

To justify their turnabout, some U.S. officials now point to the Cubans' characterization of those who are leaving as "scum" and "antisocial elements." Washington's new line is, in effect: "Look, even Castro says these people are criminals."

What are the Cuban government and the Cuban people actually saying?

First, Cuban authorities emphatically deny U.S. claims of jails being emptied into the boats at Mariel. And Washington has not produced a shred of evidence to back up its charges.

Second, the Cubans refuse to discriminate against ex-prisoners who want to go to the United States. They have the same freedom to leave as anybody else.

"I wouldn't really say they were criminals," Fidel said of them in a June 14 speech (see box), "because a criminal is a person who kills somebody and is in prison; after he serves his sentence, well that's it, he paid his debt to justice and the law and should have the same right as any other citizen to go to the United States."

Carter, of course, prefers the U.S. system of punishing convicted felons for life by denying them the vote, harassing them, and discriminating against them in employment even after they have served their time.

### Big Criminals Welcomed

Third, Castro pointed to the hypocrisy of the U.S. government on this question.

State Department and INS officials say that the eighteen are very likely the first Cubans ordered deported from this country since the Cuban revolution triumphed in 1959.

Castro pointed out that hundreds of killers and torturers from the ousted Batista regime, with the blood of thousands on their hands, have been welcomed to these shores by the capitalist rulers. And they brought pimps and big-time gang-

sters by the hundreds in their trail.

Many were put on the CIA payroll as mercenaries in the defeated invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Many continue to enjoy full government protection in their criminal activities today.

The government that accepted mass murderers and gangsters as heroes, Castro declared, now wants to draw the line at those convicted of relatively petty crimes.

Nor should the U.S. government's word be taken regarding those they now label as felons, especially considering the conditions under which "confessions" have been extracted.

The capitalist politicians and media have lied consistently about the recent arrivals, in part to smear the real accomplishments of the Cuban revolution.

The repeated assertions about Cuba's physically and mentally ill being shipped here have been flatly contradicted by the findings of health screening officials in Florida. In fact, the remarkably good health among the emigrants is testimony to Cuba's system of socialized medicine.

### Deserting Under Fire

What about the Cubans' denunciations of those leaving as "scum"? Does that entitle the U.S. government to treat them as less than human?

All Cubans face economic hardships caused by the legacy of imperialist exploitation, the vindictive U.S. blockade, and CIA sabotage. All face political and military threats from Washington because of the Cuban government's solidarity with revolutionary struggles in Africa, Central America, the Caribbean, and around the world.

The vast majority of the island's population, inspired by recent revolutionary victories in Nicaragua, Grenada, and elsewhere, are standing firm. The Cuban people are organizing and mobilizing by the millions to defend their own revolution and to aid others.

They do so knowing that sacrifice in their living standards—and possibly sacrifice of their lives—is the price imposed by U.S. imperialism for such revolutionary courage and intransigence.

The small minority that have buckled under the pressure, that have succumbed to U.S. propaganda and departed for what they think will be an easy life in the paradise of capitalism, are viewed as people who are deserting under fire. They are branded accordingly.

But since when has lack of revolutionary commitment, the absence of dedication to



the world struggle for socialism, been grounds for excluding or deporting people from the United States?

#### Anti-immigrant Campaign

The reason for the switch in U.S. government policy toward the Cuban émigrés has nothing to do with why they left Cuba, or with the presence among them of some individuals with prison records.

For generations, immigrants to this country have had to face legal and physical abuse by INS cops. Countless victims have been jailed or deported in unconstitutional star-chamber hearings similar to those being used against the Cubans.

The Cuban government, by making it possible for 100,000 people to come here, struck a blow for the rights of all immigrants.

The publicity around the Cubans played a big part in forcing the president to retreat from his intention of expelling thousands of Haitian refugees.

But easing immigration restrictions is the last thing the U.S. rulers want to do. It infuriates them. Their plans call for further tightening up immigration and narrowing the rights of immigrants. That's the course Washington is trying to whip up public support for, even if their propaganda against the Cuban revolution suffers somewhat as a result.

Carter is now trying to use the Cubans to inflame public opinion against all immigrants—especially Blacks and Hispanics. The portrayal of the Cubans as murderers, rapists, and mental cases is intended to smear all immigrants.

#### Our Rights at Stake

The attack on immigrants is part of making working people pay for the recession. Carter wants to gull us into believing that Mexicans, Cubans, and Haitians are responsible for unemployment, cuts in living standards, decaying cities, and rising taxes.

This theme also fits into Carter's plans for moving toward new Vietnam-style wars. He wants to blame our problems on foreigners instead of on the American big-business interests that profit at our expense.

New restrictions on our democratic rights are part of Carter's program. Whenever anyone can be thrown into a cell on no evidence, held incommunicado, and convicted at a secret hearing, we're all losers.

Working people have a big stake in

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defending the rights of all immigrants.

If the government is serious about dealing with Cuban criminals, let them apprehend the counterrevolutionary exiles who gunned down Eulalio Negrín and Carlos Muñiz, leading opponents of the U.S. blockade against Cuba.

## Castro Answers Carter on 'Criminal' Emigrés

[Fidel Castro made some remarks on the latest twist in U.S. government propaganda around the emigrants on June 14, when he participated in ceremonies opening the Ernesto Che Guevara Health Complex in Las Tunas, Cuba.

[The following excerpt is taken from the June 22 English weekly edition of *Granma*, published in Havana.]

\* \* \*

Now they have said we have sent some criminals. A lie, that's a lie!

We have not freed of responsibility and authorized the departure from the country of anyone sentenced for crimes involving bloodshed. That is a special category and they are being kept right here.

There may be someone who was guilty of such a crime a long time ago, who served his sentence and now, in an absolutely free manner, wanted to go to the Yankee paradise. We can only wish him the best of luck, what are we going to do.

Look at the imperialist mentality; they are horrified, apparently horrified, saying that we have sent some criminals over there.

Just take a look at the hypocrisy of the imperialists. When the Revolution triumphed on January 1, [1959] people who had murdered thousands of Cubans and tortured thousands of others—Ventura, Carratalá, Masferrer, all those people—were welcomed there with open arms. They were real criminals, responsible for thousands of murders and thousands of cases of torture.

The same thing happened in Vietnam, they took in many thousands of killers from there, and the same with Nicaragua; wherever there has been a bloody terrorist regime, they take in the criminals. And now they want to create a big scandal because they claim some criminals have gone over there.

Actually what went over there . . . I wouldn't really say they were criminals, because a criminal is a person who kills somebody and is in prison; after he serves his sentence, well that's it, he paid his debt to justice and the law and should have the same right as any


Let Washington apprehend those who keep bombing the Cuban Mission to the United Nations.

Let them jail those who shake down and intimidate members of the Cuban community in the name of anticommunism.

They're the ones who should be behind bars. □

other citizen to go to the United States.

Throughout our history thieves have taken refuge in the United States, but not chicken thieves, goat thieves or pig thieves. No, no, no, people who stole hundreds of millions of dollars from the economy. Where did Batista's supporters go with the money they had stolen in Cuba? And where did all the other



CASTRO: Imperialists 'welcomed with open arms criminals responsible for thousands of murders and thousands of cases of torture. Wherever there has been a bloody terrorist regime they take in the criminals.'

millionaires from the previous governments in our country go with their stolen money? They went to the United States, where they were welcomed with open arms.

Now they must take the lumpen, the chicken, sheep or pig thieves, and those who stole some other things.

Why take the others and not these? What is the morality of such a stand? Where is the morality of such a policy? It is outright hypocrisy.

## Why Kampucheans Want to See Pol Pot Forces Destroyed

[The following article by Milton Osborne appeared in the June 6 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. Osborne, a consultant to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, conducted a series of interviews with Kampuchean refugees in Thailand in March and April.]

\* \* \*

Concern with continuing major difficulties inside Kampuchea, and in particular with the problem of food distribution, has led various commentators to argue that the time has now come to stop blaming the overthrown Pol Pot regime for Kampuchea's troubles and instead to direct criticism at those who currently control the country.

From a very different point of view, those who support the Asean [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] stand of continuing to give diplomatic recognition to the representatives of Democratic Kampuchea insist that this policy is in no sense an endorsement of Pol Pot and his associates but rather a way of demonstrating disapproval of Vietnam's action in invading Kampuchea.

In their varying ways these two approaches to the Kampuchean crisis tend to minimise the importance of the years when Pol Pot and his associates ruled Kampuchea. At a time when only the Chinese Government is prepared to give wholehearted support to the Khmer Rouge there is a possibility that the import and significance of the Pol Pot regime's rule over Kampuchea will be either forgotten or misunderstood.

In a world that confronts one major crisis after another it is easy to forget that the Pol Pot regime was ousted from Phnom Penh a bare 16 months ago. Beyond forgetfulness there is an almost total international ignorance or disregard of the fact that it was only in the middle of 1979 that the Vietnamese forces fighting in Kampuchea finally succeeded in imposing broad control over most of the country's lowland regions. In short, the Khmer Rouge regime is a thing of the very recent past and it is far too early to think that the impact of its rule has faded in the minds of those who suffered under it.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the refugee camps of Thailand. There, with the notable exception of those who remain adherents to the Khmer Rouge cause, the Pol Pot years have had the most profound effects upon refugee attitudes. Among those who once formed part of the Kampuchean elite, the experiences undergone while Pol Pot was still in power, coupled with the confusion and disruption of the

period following the Vietnamese invasion, have led to an almost universal determination to seek resettlement in a third country. For those who were at the other end of the socio-economic scale, the period of Khmer Rouge rule has not brought a desire for permanent exile but instead a widespread unwillingness to return to Kampuchea as long as there is no guarantee of peace and stability.

Central to the formation of all these attitudes is a vivid memory of what happened after the Khmer Rouge won their victory in April 1975. And basic to that memory is an awareness of the enormous human cost of the Pol Pot years.

Short of a massive interviewing programme both inside and outside Kampuchea it seems unlikely that it will ever be possible to make a truly satisfactory estimate of just how many people died as the result of executions or because of hunger and disease between April 1975 and the end of major resistance to the Vietnamese in mid-1979.

The results of an in-depth interviewing programme carried out in the refugee camps of Thailand in an attempt to investigate the family losses of 100 refugees most certainly cannot be taken as the basis for precise estimates of deaths among the Kampuchean population as a whole. Given the nature of the sample interviewed, however, the picture that emerges is one further reason for concluding that loss of life took place on a massive scale while Pol Pot and his associates were in power.

Considerable care was taken to assemble a sample group of refugees that provided a reasonably wide reflection of occupations and locations in Kampuchea before 1975. So, 59 of the people in the sample had worked as farmers and fishermen, or as low-level urban workers (42 farmers and fishermen; 17 low-level urban workers). The sample group was composed of people who came from 14 provinces in addition to Phnom Penh and two locations outside Kampuchea. The refugees making up the sample came from eight different refugee camps.

Within the sample group no fewer than 40 people had lost close (nuclear) family members through execution to a total of 88 deaths. Of striking importance is the fact that of these 40 whose close relatives were executed, 27 came from the farmer-fisherman and low-level urban worker group. Certainly the evidence of the sample runs solidly counter to the arguments heard in the past that suggested that whatever executions took place under Pol Pot were only members of the former elite.

A smaller number of people in the sample reported the death by execution of relatives outside their immediate family. Thirty-three recorded such executions, with just under half of those who lost relatives coming from the farmer-fisherman low-level urban worker group. Because of the greater degree of uncertainty about exact numbers when refugees were discussing their more distant relatives, it is not possible to give a final total of those who died in this category. What is clear is that the number of more distant relatives who were executed exceeded 200.

Deaths through hunger and disease were lower than might, perhaps, have been expected. Only 20 members of the sample group reported members of their close families dying through hunger and disease during the Pol Pot period, to a total of 40 people. Once again, among the sample of refugees being discussed, it was not simply the elite who suffered in this way. Fourteen of the refugees who reported the deaths of their family members from hunger and disease were from the farmer-fisherman low-level urban worker group.

One further statistic deserves to be noted. Of the 100 refugees interviewed, no fewer than 42 reported having seen executions taking place. This figure is particularly important since one of the interesting pieces of information to emerge was that during the early part of the Pol Pot regime there was a pattern in which executions tended to be carried out in such a manner that they were not seen by the mass of the population. Many refugees, for instance, reported having seen the bodies of executed people but did not see the actual killings take place.

A strong impression emerges, however, that as the strains on the Pol Pot regime grew as the result of both internal factional rivalry and the growing conflict with Vietnam, concern to conceal executions vanished. In contrast to the procedures by which intended victims were taken away, the populations of agricultural cooperatives were brought together to witness offenders put to death.

Statistics are important to any understanding of the Pol Pot tyranny. But just as important are the subjective impressions that those who lived through that period hold today. These impressions add a human dimension to the dry facts and figures.

Over and over again refugees speak of the horror of life under Pol Pot. Life was "so bad that it is impossible to describe." In the words of one man who had lost his sister and brother through execution, the Pol Pot years were a time when "death

was always in front of them." For another, whose father and mother died from hunger during this period, it was a time when "men were like animals."

The other, chilling side of the picture is provided by the Kampuchean in refugee camps who have not renounced their allegiance to the Khmer Rouge. Such men will tell a questioner unblinkingly that the regime "only" killed those who "broke the rules," the "lazy people," and the "capital-

ists." With utter impassivity one former Khmer Rouge soldier spoke of the way in which he personally had killed three "new people" by pushing them over a cliff as well as perhaps 12 others whom he had put to death by throwing them into a well and then heaping earth on top so that they suffocated.

Failure to realize that continued recognition of Pol Pot flies in the face of the feelings of Kampuchean both inside and

outside Kampuchea suggests there is still far too little awareness of just how terrible the years of Khmer Rouge rule really were. The memory of those years and the force they exert on Kampuchean attitudes cannot be overestimated. Pol Pot still matters, not as one of the leaders of a group who have a role to play in the future but as a symbol of a past to which the overwhelming bulk of Kampuchean will never willingly return. □

## Relief Agencies Cut Off Aid to Khmer Rouge Forces

### New Blows to U.S. Campaign Against Kampuchea

By Fred Feldman

Washington's efforts to bring down the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea are in bad shape. New blows have come in the wake of the failure of the exile invasion launched from Thailand in June.

The Thai and U.S. governments attempted to pass off the invasion by Khmer Serei and Khmer Rouge troops as humanitarian "repatriation" of refugees. But even the July 7 *Business Week* admitted that Bangkok was "shipping armed Cambodian refugees back into their own country" in order "to bleed Hanoi."

On July 7 the government of India announced that it would establish diplomatic relations immediately with the Heng Samrin government.

The decision was a major breach in the diplomatic blockade that Washington has attempted to maintain against Pnompenh.

Three major relief agencies have indicated that they are cutting off shipments to areas along the Thai-Kampuchea border that are controlled by Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge forces. The UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Red Cross, and the UN World Food Program declared that they were "'fed up' with being used as food suppliers for a guerrilla war," according to a July 7 Associated Press dispatch.

Aid officials have been increasingly critical in recent months of Washington's backing for the Pol Pot and Khmer Serei forces against Heng Samrin and his Vietnamese allies. The latest decision marks a 180-degree shift by the three major relief organizations.

When the Heng Samrin and Vietnamese governments first brought them in last year to help fend off the danger of famine in Kampuchea, the United Nations and Red Cross—both of which continue to recognize Pol Pot's government—placed maximum obstacles in the way of helping Kampuchea.

They attempted to smear the Heng Samrin government, which was pleading for help, as the force responsible for blocking aid. At the same time, they refused to cooperate with Vietnam.

They cynically held up food shipments to Kampuchea on the grounds that some might be used by soldiers supporting Heng Samrin. Meanwhile, they enthusiastically acted as fronts for massive shipments of aid and arms from Washington, Bangkok, and Peking to the rightist outfits that were fighting the new government in Pnompenh.

The goal was to use famine as a weapon to force Heng Samrin to give way to a government more acceptable to Washington and Bangkok.

The attempt did not go over well with world opinion, however. Masses of people the world over did not buy the demand that Pnompenh meet political conditions

before food could be provided to starving people.

Oxfam, a British relief agency, broke through the curtain of lies by forging direct ties with Pnompenh and beginning aid shipments on its own. This demonstrated in action that the Heng Samrin government was cooperating fully with relief efforts. The propaganda campaign claiming the contrary began to collapse.

Under intense pressure, UNICEF, the Red Cross, and the World Food Program began to shift. When it became clear that aid to Kampuchea was beginning to have a real effect on reviving the economy and society in that shattered country, it became harder for the relief agencies not to cooperate with Pnompenh.

This shift gained momentum when reporters from around the world visited Kampuchea. Both opponents of the Vietnam war such as the London *Daily Mirror's* John Pilger, and virulent anticommunists such as the *New York Times's* Henry Kamm, found overwhelming support for the Vietnamese military role in toppling Pol Pot. They also found massive opposition to immediate Vietnamese withdrawal, and fear and hatred of the rightist coalition around Pol Pot at the Thai border.

Exposure of the terror, plunder, and hunger faced by refugees in Khmer Rouge and Khmer Serei camps made the aid program at the border an embarrassment to the international aid organizations.

By mid-1980, the only "relief" organizations which held that aid should be denied Pnompenh and funnelled through Pol Pot's murder squads were frenziedly anti-Vietnamese outfits like Joan Baez's Humanitas. Humanitas specializes on combining claims of imaginary atrocities in Kampuchea with idyllic reports on conditions at the Khmer Rouge prison camp for refugees at Sa Keo, Thailand.

Baez now has taken to hinting darkly that the host of reporters and aid officials who say differently (presumably including Henry Kamm and the Red Cross) are Vietnamese dupes.

The success of the Kampuchean people in winning large scale aid, and the exposure of the counterrevolutionary "aid" operations on the Thai border, are further victories for the Indochinese revolutions. □



## How Can Drug Addiction Be Eliminated?

[The following editorial was published in the June 10 issue of *Kargar*, the weekly paper of the Iranian Revolutionary Workers Party (HKE). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

\* \* \*

The appointment of Ayatollah Khalkhali as head of the campaign against drugs has become one of the most talked about events in the revolution. The support that the people have shown for resolute action to eliminate drug dealing and addiction reflects deep resentment among the masses at the timidity of government officials.

The broad masses demand determination and action. They are tired of words. They want decisiveness and action to eliminate problems such as inflation, the shortage of housing, unemployment, and the lack of social welfare measures. They want determined programs from the Jihad for National Reconstruction and other bodies.

The wide support the people have given to Ayatollah Khalkhali's measures indicates this feeling of the masses. The papers have reported that already large quantities of drugs have been seized, many drug dealers arrested, and many addicts put into detoxification programs. The people want Ayatollah Khalkhali to move with the same speed on the question of fighting higher prices.

No society that allows people to make money by producing and dealing in drugs, by spreading the seeds of the destruction of others, can claim to be dedicated to the education and protection of human beings. You will not find any narcotics in any country devoted to educating people about the dangerous social disease represented by drug abuse. But addiction is a persistent evil battenning on all oppressed groups and peoples.

From the British imperialist campaigns to spread opium addiction and opium trading in China in past centuries, to the growth of the drug problem in the dens and hovels of the Black ghettos of American cities, oppressed people everywhere have been confronted with this satan.

Although this is not always consciously planned, the drug problem is an inevitable result of imperialist and capitalist domination. In the same way, no society deliberately plans to widen the gap between the rich and the poor. But this is an inevitable result of the system. Thus, the problem of drug addiction, trafficking, and production that every group oppressed and exploited by capitalism faces is an intolerable result of imperialist and capitalist domination.

This child of the capitalist satan cannot

be eliminated without rooting out the evils that have created it. So, at a time when a widespread desire has arisen among the industrial workers and the working people to eliminate drug addiction and drug traffic, some basic points have to be made about the fight against drug abuse. The Muslim, militant, revolutionary, and socialist workers need to be reminded of the following facts:

- The fight against drug abuse and drug traffic cannot be separated from the struggle against world imperialism, whose influence permeates our society. In order to eliminate addiction, it is necessary to eliminate the factors that drive people to take up drugs.

- The pivot of any campaign against the spread of narcotics is systematic education through the mass media, especially radio and television. The removal of some individual producers and sellers of narcotics will not eliminate the persistent problem of drug abuse. This requires comprehensive and long-term programs.

- Essential to the elimination of the drug problem are the creation of jobs; the elimination of unemployment, the development of recreational facilities such as parks, sports clubs, and libraries; as well as vocational schools that will provide free training to the unemployed. Without such programs, all efforts to stop the drug traffic will lead to nothing.

But today we see that shock brigades for creating jobs, building houses and hospi-

tals, building roads, advancing vocational education, and dealing with the thousand and one needs of our society are not being formed with the same sort of speed as that with which Ayatollah Khalkhali's shock brigades are acting to find and confiscate narcotics and arrest the drug traffickers.

The Muslim and revolutionary militants must raise their voices in unison and demand that the president of the republic take action on these problems. We must demand that instead of talking about the problem of multiple centers of power, he work actively to create multiple centers of reconstruction, social activity, and social welfare. We must demand that instead of words, he offer action programs.

The responsibility for the fight against the drug traffic rests with the government. The government must offer a comprehensive program for dealing with this problem. It must eliminate the real causes of this problem. Otherwise, the present programs of the government will be like a saw directed at the shadow of the tree. They will make a lot of noise but in the end the tree of drug abuse will be left basically intact.

In his speech in Qum, Ayatollah Khalkhali said: "We must make every effort, the entire nation must strive, to eliminate this form of corruption." All of the people have declared their readiness to do this.

If the government were to present a national comprehensive program, this could coordinate the efforts of every factory shora, every unit of the Jihad for National Reconstruction, every Islamic Council, every unit of the Revolutionary Guards, and other bodies to rebuild the country and eliminate the problem of drug addiction. This requires that the government offer a revolutionary program. □

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# AROUND THE WORLD



## Haitian Refugees in U.S. Win Court Victory

The 30,000 Haitian refugees who are seeking asylum in the United States won a victory on July 2 when a federal judge ruled that the government had deliberately and systematically violated the rights of the Haitians. He ordered that no further steps be taken to deport them until the government presented an acceptable plan for reconsidering the Haitians' asylum claims.

The case resulted from a class-action suit against the Immigration and Naturaliza-

tion Service, he emphasized, was overriding: "The plaintiffs charged that they faced a transparent discrimination program designed to deport Haitian nationals and no one else. The uncontroverted evidence proves their claim."

Rev. Gerard Jean-Juste, the director of the Haitian Refugee Center, hailed Judge King's ruling as a "tremendous vindication." He affirmed, however, that the Haitian refugees still had to fight for full political asylum, the right to legal residence, and, for those who want it, U.S. citizenship.

Jean-Juste further added that final victory would come only when the U.S. government ended its backing for the repressive Duvalier dictatorship, when it "stops supporting one family—one gang—against a nation."

### Peru Deports Argentine Exiles

Three Argentine exiles in Peru were kidnapped on June 12 from their homes in Lima by Peruvian security forces acting in concert with Argentine authorities. The three—Inés Santos de Acabal, Julio César Ramírez, and Esther Giannotti de Molfino—were accused of being members of the banned Argentine Montonero organization, a left-wing Peronist grouping.

After nearly a week incommunicado, the three were taken to the Bolivian border and expelled from Peru. Peruvian authorities claim they were in Peru to establish coordination with local Marxist groups.

The Peruvian and Argentine repressive apparatuses have a long history of cooperation in dealing with exiles from their respective countries. In 1965 a secret pact was signed between the Argentine and Peruvian armed forces, in which each promised to provide the other with mutual aid in missions of political repression. Since then a number of Argentines have disappeared in Peru, only to be next seen in Argentine prisons.

### Zimbabweans Warn Bosses Against Firing Workers

White employers in Zimbabwe have begun dismissing hundreds of Black workers in response to a new minimum wage law.

The law, which was drafted following a wave of strikes by Black workers for higher wages, went into effect on July 1. It sets a minimum wage of \$45 a month for agricultural workers and domestic ser-

vants and \$105 a month for commercial and industrial workers, substantially higher than the previous wages of most Black workers in those sectors.

Rather than pay the new wage rates, however, some employers dismissed workers just before the law came into effect. According to Labor Minister Kumbirai Kangai, nearly 1,000 workers were fired around the country.

Kangai has warned employers that they would be punished, facing a maximum sentence of three months in prison and a \$1,590 fine.

### Walter Rodney's Brother Victimized

Following the June 13 assassination of Walter Rodney, the well-known Guyanese radical, the government of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham is moving against members of Rodney's family.

His brother Donald was in the car that was bombed. While Walter was killed, Donald was seriously injured and taken to a hospital. The police later went to the hospital, kidnapped Donald, and attempted to have him committed to prison. Under pressure, however, the government was forced to release him on bail.

Donald has been charged with unlawful possession of an "explosive device," to back up the regime's claim that Walter was not assassinated, but killed when a bomb he was carrying accidentally went off.

Very few people believe the government's story. Rodney's killing has been widely protested, both within Guyana and abroad. On June 23, some 30,000 persons flocked to his funeral—one of the largest actions ever held in Guyana.

According to the July 4 London *Latin America Weekly Report*, "... tens of thousands of Guyanese made their feelings known as people from all walks of life, age and racial background jammed Georgetown to bid the dead man farewell. Shouts of 'Walter Rodney lives' reverberated around the city as workers at private and public enterprises abandoned their jobs and poured on to the streets, bringing traffic to a halt."

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba sent a message to the Working People's Alliance—of which Rodney was a leader—condemning "the brutal murder of Dr. Walter Rodney, who in addition to being a notable Caribbean intellectual, dedicated his life to the fight for freedom."



Haitian dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier.

tion Service (INS) filed by the Haitian Refugee Center in Miami, Florida.

Judge James L. King wrote in his decision, "Haitians who came to the United States seeking freedom and justice did not find it." Instead, he said, they were confronted by the INS, which was determined to deport them "irrespective of the merits of their asylum claims."

Noting the testimony of witnesses about the torture and murder of Haitian refugees who had been deported back to Haiti, Judge King dismissed as "unworthy of belief" the government's claims that refugees who were sent back would not be harmed. He said that until the INS could assure that those returned to Haiti would not be subject to such treatment, "the brutality and bloodletting is its responsibility."

Judge King also blasted the racism of the government's policy toward Haitians. "The plaintiffs," he wrote, "are part of the first substantial flight of Black refugees from a repressive regime to this country."

# 1. The Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Forces

By Will Reissner

Mexican journalist Mario Menéndez Rodríguez traveled in El Salvador for some four months for the Havana-based Prensa Latina news agency. Working clandestinely, between February and April Menéndez was able to meet with underground leaders of three of the organizations fighting against the U.S.-backed Salvadoran junta—the Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Forces, the Communist Party of El Salvador, and the People's Revolutionary Army-Party of the Salvadoran Revolution—compiling some ninety hours of taped interviews and 1,600 photographs.

These interviews served as the basis for seventeen articles in the English-language Cuban weekly *Granma*, published between March 16 and June 5, 1980. Because the revolutionary struggle is reaching a show-down in El Salvador, *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor* has decided to summarize the Menéndez series to provide our readers with an idea of how leaders of three of the organizations struggling against the Salvadoran junta view the situation.

The first article in *IP/I* deals with the positions of the Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Forces (FPL), as contained in nine articles based on interviews with the head of the FPL, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, and others.

Two later articles will describe the positions of the Communist Party and the People's Revolutionary Army-Party of the Salvadoran Revolution (ERP-PRS), the two other groups Menéndez dealt with.

The Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Forces (FPL), named after the founder of the Salvadoran Communist Party, who was murdered in 1932, is the largest of the revolutionary forces fighting today in El Salvador. It has close links with the Revolutionary People's Bloc (BPR), a mass organization of some 100,000 members.

The FPL is led by sixty-year-old Salvador Cayetano Carpio, a long-time workers leader who was general-secretary of the Communist Party of El Salvador until he split with that organization ten years ago over its opposition to armed struggle.

Salvador Cayetano Carpio explained to Mexican journalist Mario Menéndez Rodríguez why he and others formed the FPL. "Concretely, the traditional organizations denied the possibility and necessity of the Salvadoran people undertaking the process of revolutionary armed struggle."

Carpio added that in his opinion it would not have been necessary to organize the Farabundo Martí FPL "if there hadn't arisen a stubborn majority" within the Communist Party of El Salvador and the organizations influenced by it that "at all

costs blocked the advance towards the political-military strategy that the people needed for moving towards new stages of struggle. . . ."

### Impact of Cuban Revolution

The FPL leader noted that before the FPL was established, "it was necessary to wage within the Communist Party and other organizations an ideological struggle that took many years; it began virtually with the victory of the Cuban Revolution, when the most clear-sighted people in those organizations began to feel that a dogmatic line could not lead the revolutionary process into the new stages that were required. . . ."

In late 1969 Salvador Cayetano Carpio and others made the decision that they would have to leave the Communist Party to begin the work of building a revolutionary organization. ". . . I resigned as general secretary of the Communist Party of El Salvador, a post I had held for a number of years," Carpio stated. "I made the move when it became evident that it wasn't possible to get the Party to understand the need for a political-military strategy, that is, an overall revolutionary strategy, and that this had to be demonstrated to our people in practice. . . ."

After resigning from the CP, Carpio and his supporters on April 1, 1970, began the work of building an underground structure. Two years later, this culminated in the public announcement of the formation of the Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Forces. He explained to Menéndez that they felt they had to prove they were capable of revolutionary activity before announcing their existence.

He recalled that "in previous years . . . we had fought against the theories of the archaic revolutionaries. . . . So we had to prove that we weren't going to be revolutionaries in words alone."

### Studied Failures of Guerrilla Organizations

In addition, he studied the experience of numerous organizations that adopted the guerrilla warfare road in the 1960s, learning from their failures.

These organizations, in Carpio's view, were motivated by "the good intentions of taking the road of the guerrilla struggle in the mountains; they would immediately speak of those aspirations to internationalist comrades from other countries, who helped them fraternally, so they could carry out the revolutionary project in El Salvador. . . . However, after a short time it became clear that those groups broke up, that they splintered."

The FPL, therefore, "didn't ask for aid of any kind from our comrades abroad," because they felt they had to first prove their viability.

Finally, in August and September 1972 the decision to announce the formation of the Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Forces was reached, and the FPL "began to influence and conduct propaganda among the masses. . . . Our objective," Carpio stated, "was to build a broad mass movement."

He noted that "from the start, we ruled out the guerrilla foco theory," according to which isolated guerrilla groups could establish rural bases and engage the rulers in an essentially military struggle. That theory, which had wide currency in the mid-1960s, was given perhaps its most extreme expression in Régis Debray's book *Revolution in the Revolution?*

The FPL's rejection of the foco theory, Carpio maintained, was largely the result of "the experience of some guerrilla movements in South America and in other countries that were removed from the people, that failed to reach out to them to organize them and that succumbed to militaristic designs. . . ." By contrast, from the beginning the FPL tried to build support groups and "attained a certain degree of influence among the working class and student movement" and had a big base among teachers.

In 1974, stated Carpio, "we were able to reach out to the agricultural workers and the impoverished peasants. A lot of them joined our organization, which gave shape to the relation[ship] between the guerrilla and the mass movement" and "enabled us to steer clear of erroneous plans that we had witnessed in other revolutionary organizations. . . ."

Carpio added that the background of the founders of the FPL was important in this regard, stating that "most of us in the Farabundo Martí [FPL] were workers, people of working class origin. We'd led very militant workers struggles and had accumulated experience and increased our awareness of the needs of the working class."

### Need for Revolutionary Party

Carpio explained that as the organization began to grow and gain in influence, and as a base developed for guerrilla struggle, they recognized that they needed "a political vanguard organized as a Party."

"Without a Party," he maintained, "it was impossible to direct such a ramified movement. We needed to adopt the struc-

ture and essence of a Marxist party of the working class."

The FPL, said Carpio, did not counterpose the guerrilla struggle to building a party, or guerrilla warfare to building mass organizations, but rather saw all those things as elements of a single political-military struggle. That struggle, in Carpio's view, must be "led by the working class in alliance with the peasants."

The key to success, said Carpio, is "the breadth and the correct leadership on the part of the working class Party, that guides the whole process, which includes the struggle of the mass organizations, the guerrilla, the militia, the army. . . . From the struggle for immediate, basic demands to military combats."

Salvador Samayoa was the minister of education in the first junta that replaced ousted Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero in October 1979. On January 2, 1980, Samayoa resigned, and six days later he announced his membership in the Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Forces. Mario Menéndez interviewed Samayoa on February 24. The former education minister has since been captured by the Salvadoran military and is now in jail.

Samayoa discussed many of the same points as Carpio. In regard to the guerrilla foco theory, Samayoa explained that "the falsity of the guerrilla foco theory has been demonstrated. An armed struggle that is not deeply rooted in the people and which fails to continuously generate and encourage the development of the mass movement, the mass front, is doomed to failure from the start."

He reiterated that "people often get the idea—and this is the result of systematic smear campaigns in the mass media—that the [FPL] is just a guerrilla force . . . engaging in armed actions and lacking in wholeness as a revolutionary organization."

"That is utterly false," Samayoa stated. "Our organization carries out integral political-military work. . . . It means serious and solid political training of cadres; hard work on organizational questions; international work; work to raise, in integral fashion, the consciousness and the standard of living of the masses and their political life. . . ."

"It isn't just conducting armed actions."

Salvador Cayetano Carpio summed up this viewpoint when he said that "if we had to begin with guerrilla warfare, it was a passing stage, part of an overall plan that conceived the people as mastering all means and forms of struggle. . . ."

"That conception took us far away from the idea that the guerrilla on its own can make a revolution, that the guerrilla, isolated from the people, replaces the people in their prime task of carrying out their own transformation."

#### Women Play Big Role in FPL

The second-in-command of the Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Forces is



Combate Popular

Banner in textile factory demands end to state of siege and repression. The BPR is El Salvador's largest mass organization.

a woman, who uses the pseudonym "Ana María." In addition, some 40 percent of the members of the Revolutionary Council, the highest body of the FPL, are women, according to Mario Menéndez.

The Mexican reporter noted, "The degree of women's participation in the leadership of the revolutionary war is especially surprising given the picture of social oppression, which is accentuated for the female half of the population." In his interviews, Menéndez learned that women play a "decisive" role in the National Military Commission of the Central Command as well.

Many women are members of the guerrilla and militia forces under the command of the FPL, and take full part in military operations.

#### How the FPL is Organized

Due to the fierce repression in El Salvador, the FPL must function in the strictest clandestinity. In fact, until Mario Menéndez's February 20 interview with Salvador Cayetano Carpio was published, most people in the organization had no idea that he headed it up. As Menéndez noted, "For ten years the identity of the top leader of the most important revolutionary political-military organization in this small nation at war was unknown." Carpio explained that now, "for political reasons, the organization feels my name should be revealed."

The clandestine character of the FPL is such that even within the Central Command, "the comrades who work daily in the top war command don't know each other's real names."

In 1975 a National Military Commission of the Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Forces was established to lead the FPL's military work.

FPL military operations are carried out by the People's Liberation Armed Forces, which is made up of three different organizations: the People's Liberation Army (EPL); local guerrilla forces; and local militia units, which were first established in 1976.

A member of the National Military Commission of the FPL explained to Menéndez

that the People's Liberation Army units "have a strategic nature, they are mobile, nationwide and centralized," while Farabundo Martí guerrilla units "operate in a specific zone, with the mission of supporting the actions of the EPL through permanent harassment and softening up the enemy on his territorial base."

The guerrillas are full-time fighters living "clandestinely in the midst of the people." While their military operations are limited to a specific area, they generally live in a different area.

#### Militia Units

In addition to the full-time fighters of the EPL and the guerrilla units, the Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Forces has organized local militia units made up primarily of "workers and peasants and other persons involved in production."

A leader of the militia explained its function. "The militia is a local organization. . . . found in the factories, the fields, the schools. . . . The members of the militia are engaged in production, they do not leave their daily tasks. . . . That's why the militia is local and lacks mobility. Only the leadership cadres of the militia are full-time professionals."

The purpose of the militia is to lead the armed self-defense of the masses, as well as to punish "the enemies of the people, in keeping with the demands of the people."

The militia leader told Menéndez: "You must keep in mind that the people's militia is a mass organization, that is, thousands of the most advanced working people belong to it. . . ."

#### The Revolutionary People's Bloc (BPR)

The Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Forces has a very close relationship with the Revolutionary People's Bloc (BPR), an organization of about 100,000 members.

The BPR is headed by twenty-four-year-old Juan Chacón, whom Menéndez also interviewed. Menéndez described the BPR as "the most powerful mass organization" in El Salvador.

Noting that there is confusion outside El

Salvador regarding the character of the BPR, with some people describing it as a party, Menéndez asked Chacón to explain the organization.

Chacón replied, "The BPR is a revolutionary mass organization made up of popular organizations representing the various social sectors of the Salvadoran people in strategic unity revolving around the worker-peasant alliance, with proletarian hegemony. . . ."

The BPR, which was founded on July 30, 1975, battles to defend the immediate and fundamental interests of working people, according to Chacón, and fights for "a democratic and revolutionary government. We could say that the BPR is the initial nucleus of the Mass Revolutionary Front," Chacón continued.

#### Organizations Making Up BPR

The BPR is made up of a large number of groups: the José Guillermo Rivas Trade Union Coordinating Committee and the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation, which represents some sixty unions; the Farm Workers Federation, which is made up of the Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants and the Farm Workers Union; the June 21 National Association of Salvadoran Educators; the Revolutionary Secondary School Students Movement; the July 19 Revolutionary University Forces; the Slum Dwellers' Union; the Neighborhood and District People's Committees; and the People's Culture Movement.

The BPR, in Chacón's words, tries to incorporate "into the revolutionary struggle, in a mass, organized, combative manner, the different sectors of the population, as part of the [FPL's] strategy of protracted people's war. . . ."

It aims to incorporate the "broad masses into the revolutionary struggle." The BPR builds organizations "among different sectors of the people to promote the struggle for economic, political and social demands" and to unite the "peoples' struggle on a Central American level for revolution and the construction of a just society, coordinating this on a Latin American and world level. . . ."

Chacón added that "Of course, all this stems from the worker-peasant alliance, with proletarian hegemony as the nucleus and basis for revolutionary unity among the various sectors and popular movements."

#### Internationalist Outlook

From its earliest days, the FPL has been intensely internationalist in orientation. For example, after Argentine police murdered sixteen suspected guerrillas in an alleged prison escape at the Trelew naval air base on August 22, 1972, the FPL blew up the Argentine embassy in San Salvador.

The FPL bases itself on the example of Augustín Farabundo Martí, for whom the Farabundo Martí FPL is named. Martí

fought with Augusto Cesar Sandino against U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. "The internationalist example of Augustín Farabundo Martí was reflected in actual practice," explained Carpio, "during the struggle of the Sandinista people of Nicaragua against the savage Somoza dictatorship, when a brigade from our organization . . . fought and shed their blood for the liberation of our beloved Nicaraguan brothers and sisters."

"Camilo," a member of the National Military Commission of the FPL, told Menéndez, "The revolution in Central America is one and indivisible, and the Salvadoran process cannot and must not be regarded in an isolated fashion, separate from the struggles unfolding in Guatemala and Honduras."

"Isabel," a top leader of the FPL, added that "the People's Liberation Forces look upon the 'Central-Americanization' of the revolutionary struggle as a key part of their strategy to confront imperialism."

She further stated that "the Farabundo Martí [FPL] support[s] all moves that effectively mean relief for the working people of our own country and of Central America. . . . And we will continue the fight to set up a people's revolutionary government working towards socialism. This mighty struggle in the area, especially since the victory of the people of Nicaragua, has turned Central America into a genuine revolutionary flash point with a main enemy: U.S. imperialism. . . . Hence, our organization defines the Central-Americanization of the struggle as a fundamental part of its strategy."

The leaders of the FPL and BPR were all aware of the danger of American intervention against the revolutionary struggle in El Salvador. But, Carpio warned, "If imperialism steps in directly, El Salvador will become another Vietnam and the grave of the marines."

#### FPL's View of a New El Salvador

The FPL sees the moves toward unity with other sectors struggling in El Salvador as a key step toward the formation of a "people's revolutionary government."

In a February 23 interview, Carpio explained that the people's revolutionary government "will not be a socialist regime but will be a government which, with the efforts of all the people, will build the economy on the basis of independence and sovereign development. . . ."

Its primary objective, the FPL leader maintained, is to put an "end to domination by the imperialists and the fourteen families in the political, military, economic, cultural and social spheres."

To do this it will "transfer to the people the basic means of production that will make it possible to lay the groundwork for the transition to a new society. . . ." Those basic means of production include "the large stretches of land, major means of transportation, electric power, the refin-

eries, foreign trade—coffee, cotton, sugar, shrimp and others."

In addition, the people's revolutionary government would destroy the military and paramilitary apparatus of the old regime and establish a people's army, Carpio stated, adding that "only the people in arms can guarantee the advance of the process towards socialism."

The people's revolutionary government would also pull El Salvador out of the Central American Defense Council "and other international bodies of the same type, created by imperialism to attack the oppressed peoples. . . ."

Carpio argued that a government of the workers and peasants alone would not be able to carry out the basic tasks of the anti-imperialist, antioligarchic Salvadoran revolution. "That," he stated, "explains the need of a revolutionary popular alliance. . . . Present in that alliance, in addition to the workers and the peasants, will be the small and middle farmers and businessmen, the teachers, students, employees, professionals, technicians and the priests and military who are on the people's side. . . . Thus, the government will not be made up of one class alone—although the workers in alliance with the peasants will play the leading role—but rather it will be a government of all social sectors except the fourteen families, the imperialists and their allies. . . ."

Salvador Cayetano Carpio believes that the people's revolutionary government should nationalize all big companies with imperialist capital; expropriate all the means of production in the hands of the fourteen families; nationalize the banks; centralize the planning of the economy; reform the tax structure so workers are not obliged to pay taxes; nationalize the main public services; carry out a thorough agrarian reform; increase real wages through raises, price cuts on vital goods and services, and state contributions to overall welfare; and establish a favorable credit policy for the small and middle property owners.

In the social sphere, according to Carpio, the new government would provide free medical care and build new hospitals and health care units. It would improve transportation; create jobs; promote the broad organization of the workers, peasants, and "middle sectors" into unions and social, cultural, sports, and other organizations; provide elementary and secondary education to all; and wipe out illiteracy in two years at the most.

Municipal government would be reorganized to provide mass participation by the people. In addition "people's power organs and bodies to defend the revolution" would be set up and the "organization of the masses will be institutionalized."

[The next article in this series will deal with Menéndez's interviews with Salvadoran CP leader Schafik Jorge Handel.]



## Miriam Daly

By Gerry Foley

Defenders of the rights of the Irish people and defenders of human rights in general responded to the June 26 murder of Miriam Daly as an attack on the entire movement against imperialist repression in Ireland.

Only a few days before she was killed Miriam Daly was elected to the executive of the National H-Block Committee, the defense committee for political prisoners in Northern Ireland. The committee issued a statement saying:

"Miriam Daly's killing comes at a time when there is increasing pressure on the British government to grant the prisoners' demands, and it is in this light that the killing should be viewed. The monumental work which she carried out on the prisoners' behalf will be continued by the rest of the national committee. A fitting memorial to Miriam Daly's memory would be the smashing of the H-Block."

On Irish TV, Bernadette Devlin McAliskey accused the British security forces of being involved in Daly's murder. She said that this assassination and the killing of Irish Independence Party leader John Turnly two weeks before were part of a new campaign against the anti-imperialist community.

The Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) said that the killing of Daly "removed a tireless campaigner for national

liberation and the political status of those in Long Kesh and Armagh prisons."

Daly's funeral oration was given by Osgur Breatnach, former editor of the IRSP paper the *Starry Plough*, who was recently released from prison after his conviction in a frame-up trial was thrown out by the appeals court. The republican newspaper *An Phoblacht* noted:

"He stressed Miriam's awareness of the international struggle for socialism, and in particular her feeling and work for Irish prisoners of war, North and South."

With her qualities of discipline and professionalism, Miriam Daly made an invaluable contribution to various campaigns against imperialist and neocolonialist repression. For example, she was a key figure in the Murray Defence Committee, which fought and defeated the attempt of the Dublin government to reinstitute the death penalty.

The Murray committee began its work in difficult conditions. The Murrays were an anarchist couple accused of killing a policeman during a bank robbery. It was not the sort of case to appeal to respectable civil libertarians. In fact, it was for that very reason that the Dublin government chose it to prepare the public for the return of hanging. Very few forces in the left and workers movement understood what was at stake.

In this situation, the well-organized, professional operation of the Murray Defence Committee, for which Daly was largely responsible, was a major factor in convincing potential supporters, especially outside Ireland, that the campaign was a serious effort and had a chance of success.

Thus, despite its very narrow initial base, the Murray defense grew into a broad campaign that forced the Dublin government to back off. This was perhaps the most important victory against the Free State's repression in the last ten years, prior to the release of Breatnach and the other IRSP prisoners.

Miriam was a constant visitor to political prisoners in the Belfast jails, despite the harassment and danger that frequently entails in Northern Irish conditions.

Although she was under terrible pressure from her own immediate work, she was prepared to give generously of her time to help visitors from abroad acquaint themselves with conditions in the prisons.

I remember that she took me to Crumlin Road jail to visit an Irish Trotskyist being held there. She was wise in the ways of the place and an indispensable help. But I could see that the continual toll of death and repression in Belfast and the feeling of fighting in isolation put a severe strain on her.

Immediately after dropping me at the jail, Miriam had to rush off to meet her children coming home from school. A few years later, her ten-year-old daughter returned from school to find Miriam bound and shot several times in the head.

But Miriam was not just an antirepression activist. She was a revolutionist. She became a leading member of the IRSP. She left the party shortly before her death as a result of some political disagreements, not because of any change in her revolutionary convictions.

As an outstanding academic who taught for a number of years in Britain, Miriam Daly could have escaped the oppression suffered by the people of the Belfast Catholic ghetto. She could even have convinced herself, as many others in her situation have, that she could best contribute to the advancement of the cause of national and social liberation by quiet and safe intellectual work. She chose instead to face the risks and pressures of active involvement in the struggle, to join the ranks of the fighters.

That decision, and the consistency with which she followed it, gave Miriam Daly great stature. She put her learning and talents to the service of the fighting people. She carried forward the tradition of the national struggle, apart from which there never has been and never will be any truth, understanding, or genuine humanitarianism in Ireland.

*Tá sí ameach ban-laochra na nGael.* She will always be remembered among the heroines of the Irish people. □



Miriam Daly (left) with Bernadette Devlin McAliskey.

## Rebuilding the Bourgeois State in Iran

By Michel Rovere

[The following is the first of a three-part series on the situation in Iran and developments in the Iranian revolution.

[This first article argues that there is a rightward shift on the part of the Iranian leadership and maintains that the events in Kurdistan over the last several months are confirmation of this turn.

[The second article will deal with the recent events on the universities and the continuing economic and social crises that are pushing forward the struggles of Iran's workers, peasants and oppressed nationalities.

[The third article will discuss the contradictions of the Iranian national bourgeoisie and take up how revolutionary Marxists should approach this leadership.]

\* \* \*

The election of the Iranian *majlis* (parliament) and its May 28 opening session marks the first transitional phase in the process of establishing institutions in the Islamic Republic. This phase had begun even before the victorious insurrection of February 9-11, 1979 that overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy.

But this "institutionalization" in the Islamic Republic remains quite weak. This was shown by the struggle over freeing the hostages, which counterposed various factions of the regime, followed by the Islamic Republican Party's (IRP) overwhelming victory in the elections and the recurring crisis between the IRP and Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr over Bani-Sadr nominating his own candidate for prime minister without consulting the IRP. Each day we see more pronounced crises within this bourgeois-nationalist leadership, a leadership that has not yet succeeded in sufficiently stabilizing its system of domination as it must. It still has a long way to go in rebuilding its state apparatus—particularly its repressive institutions—and especially in creating the *political and social conditions* for such a stabilization.

It is obvious that the main obstacle in its path remains the very high degree of mobilization and combativity of the Iranian masses, both in the cities and in the countryside. Despite the gap that continues to exist between their combativity and their forms of political expression, the Iranian masses have not yet suffered any decisive defeats.


There is deepening anti-imperialist sentiment among the Iranian masses, developing peasant mobilizations, a new rise of the struggles of the nationalities, and the

accumulation by the Iranian working class of a whole series of class-struggle and workers' control experiences. It is in this context that the regimes' last *rightward turn* takes place, a rightward turn that involves, in different forms, all the various components of the regime. The new military offensive against Kurdistan and the attacks against the universities are the two strongest indications of this turn.

This turn is seen in every aspect of social and political life, and has important repercussions, for example, in the confrontation with imperialism.

The unfolding of this new right turn and the necessary tactics that the revolutionary-Marxist vanguard in Iran and elsewhere must adopt as a result, in no way implies that we are predicting that this policy will succeed. It is not at all predetermined that this turn will result in a prolonged stabilization, or especially that there will be a qualitative reversal of the relationship of forces between the basic classes facing one another.

On the contrary, its probable failure can only strengthen the centrifugal forces and accentuate the class polarization. It could



Anti-imperialist sentiment is deepening among Iranian masses.

bring the anti-imperialist battles and anti-capitalist struggles to a new level.

### The Khomeini Leadership

From the beginning of the revolutionary process in Iran, we have pointed out the "exceptional" type of bourgeois-nationalist leadership that the Khomeini leadership represents. This "exceptional" character was seen on at least two occasions:

1. During the September 1978-February 1979 period, the Khomeini leadership showed it was capable of partially leading and riding the mass movement through to the end (i.e. until the monarchy's final overthrow), by constantly advancing one central slogan: "Down with the shah—down with the monarchy."

2. Since the U.S. embassy occupation in November 1979, the Khomeini leadership (by excusing, if not leading, the Muslim Students Following the Imam's line) has lifted the barriers to confronting imperialism as few other bourgeois-nationalist leaderships have done. This is so, even if you take into account the "maneuveristic" aspect of the U.S. embassy occupation, following the decisive defeat of the regime's first military offensive against Kurdistan.

The proof of its "exceptional" character is that the first aggressive military initiative attempted by the U.S. government since its 1975 resounding defeat in Vietnam was taken by Carter against the Iranian revolution.

Flowing from this analysis of the "exceptional" character of the Khomeini leadership we explained that one should not underestimate the special relations this leadership *still* maintains with large sectors of the mass movement, at least in the Persian provinces. This is especially so as regards the proletariat, the poor farmers, and the enormous mass of urban poor. It will be these very layers who together will constitute the motor force for any socialist transformation of the Iranian revolution.

But such an analysis in no way changed our judgment regarding the *strategic inability of any of the various components of this leadership* to resolve the basic problems posed since its beginnings by the development of the Iranian revolution: starting with democratic demands, such as breaking all ties with imperialism and providing solutions to the agrarian and national questions.

Just the opposite is the case. The Khomeini leadership has always been looking for a way to accomplish its class objectives—such as rebuilding the bourgeois

state, maintaining private ownership of the means of production, and reactivating the capitalist economy—although the proposed solutions have varied according to the sectors and factions in the leadership and how the situation has evolved.

Thus from the beginning, by opposing the concrete mass movements, this leadership was also acting as a leadership opposed to the deepening of the revolution. "The prestige of that leadership," stated the April 1979 resolution of the Fourth International, "is the key card which the ruling class in Iran can play in order to restore a stable state apparatus and a new bourgeois political leadership in order to crush the revolutionary process. . . ." (See *IP/I*, May 7, 1979, pp. 452-461.)

### Rebuilding the Rightist State

Even before the February 9-11 final insurrection, the Shi'ite hierarchy, with Khomeini at its head, was working to preserve what it could of the monarchy's old state apparatus.<sup>1</sup>

Khomeini's nomination of the Islamic Revolutionary Council upon his return to Iran, and then his designation of a "Provisional Revolutionary Government" headed by Mehdi Bazargan, was intended to avoid any "power vacuum" during the transition between the old and new regimes at the time when the days of the Bakhtiar government—the shah's last prime minister—were numbered.

The *decisive test*, confirming the class nature of this leadership, took place during the heat of the semispontaneous insurrection that could have definitively crushed the entire Pahlavi state. What we saw were negotiations that were initiated before and during the insurrection with sectors of the imperial general staff; the obstinate refusal by the Shi'ite leadership and Khomeini himself to call for the insurrection during the February 9-11 events, even though it had already begun; a desire to limit as much as possible the scope of combat and especially to limit the massive distribution of arms to the population; the order to turn in all arms at the end of the battles; and the refusal to dismantle what was left of the imperial army, despite demands from a section of the soldier's movement and the *homafars* (the skilled air force technicians).

Prior to the February 1980 elections for president of the Islamic Republic and this spring's legislative elections, the other main events marking the reestablishment of a rightist state were the March 30, 1979,

1. From late September 1978 to the February 1979 insurrection, neither Khomeini nor the leaders of the Shi'ite hierarchy ever called for a general strike, although in many places they gave support—above all financially—to people on strike. On the contrary, during his exile at Neauphle-Le-Château, near Paris, while continuing to call for the overthrow of the monarchy, Khomeini warned against "communist maneuvers."

referendum on creating an "Islamic Republic"; the August 3 fraudulent elections for a handpicked and powerless "Assembly of Experts"; and the drafting of the constitution and its ratification by the December 2-3, 1979, referendum.

The general orientation of reestablishing a rightist state is completely clear, whatever the vicissitudes in its application.

Thus the famous *Velayat-e-Faguih*<sup>2</sup> clause in the text of the constitution—establishing theocratic control over the state and its laws by the Imam or a council of religious figures (*ulamas*)—was obviously nothing but a religious cover for an attempt to establish a strong state and stabilize a Bonapartist-type regime.

### Khomeini's New Year Speech

The beginning of the Khomeini leadership's new turn can be easily dated—starting with Khomeini's speech for the Iranian New Year (Now Rouz), which fell on March 21 by our calendar. For the first time since his return to Iran, Imam Khomeini's "Message to the Nation" denounced "international communism" as an equally dangerous threat to the country as "American imperialism."<sup>3</sup>

In his speech, not one word was said about the conflict with Washington regarding the extradition of the shah and the question of the hostages, while long passages were devoted to attacks on the Soviet Union.

Three days earlier, Khomeini had issued an amnesty decree for all collaborators of the former regime, except those who had been directly responsible for bloody crimes or corruption. Hundreds of royalists and thousands of former SAVAK agents were released from prison. If rehabilitated, they could even be reintegrated into the administration of the republic. In contrast, anyone who opposed this measure, or tried to take justice into their own hands, could henceforth be subject to the Islamic courts.

In a March 20 speech, Khomeini declared that the parliamentary election results—in which the IRP won a majority of seats—were valid. Not one word was said about the violations of democratic rights that had characterized these elections, as

2. The *Velayat-e-Faguih*—literally government of religious guides—is the title of Khomeini's book on "Islamic government," which describes a political system where power belongs exclusively to God and where law is the order decreed by God.

Originating from this interpretation of tradition, it is projected that the class of theologians must exercise the highest level of political power. This is expressed in the Iranian constitution by the fact that the laws, and more generally all acts of executive, legislative, and judicial power, are subordinated in the final analysis to the Imam or to a council of Islamic jurists. (See, Yann Richard, *Le Chiisme en Iran*, published by Jean Maisonneuve, pp. 28-29.)

3. *Le Monde*, March 23-24, 1980.

well as the presidential elections—restrictions on the right to radio and television time, and attacks against opposition organizations, in which several hundred Mujahedeen and Fedayeen members were injured during confrontations with thugs from the Islamic far-right. In addition, sporadic clashes were continuing in Kurdistan during this period.

Khomeini's March 21, 1980 "Message to the Nation" contained thirteen points that went even further when it identified the major lines governmental policy must follow in the coming year. Among the main points were:

1. Henceforth, strikes would be prohibited and those who went on strike could be brought before the Islamic courts as "counterrevolutionaries."<sup>4</sup>

2. Land seizures and the distribution of personal property and estates that belonged to the *taghoutis* ("idol worshippers"—a reference to those who prospered under the former regime) could only be carried out on orders from the Islamic prosecutor general or qualified judges.

3. Higher education should be "Islamized" and "professors who are in contact with the East or the West" should be removed. Describing this measure, the *Le Monde* correspondent added that "since most of the supporters of the former regime have already been thrown out of the high schools and universities, it is the leftist teachers, whether Marxist or not, who could bear the brunt of this new witch-hunt" (*Le Monde*, March 23-24, 1980).

Always in the name of the struggle against "imported ideologies from the West and the East," Khomeini would attack certain press organs that were accused of excessively criticizing the clergy.

The Imam then took up a charge that has been harped on for a long time by officials in the regime, accusing the "Islamic-progressive" Mujahedeen of "mix[ing] Islamic ideas with Marxist ideas and hav[ing] created a concoction which is in no way in accordance with the progressive teachings of Islam."

Explaining that the 1980-1981 Persian year would be one of restoring "order" and "security," Khomeini called on the Muslim population to fight against armed groups. This is directed primarily against the Fedayeen, but also the Kurdish organizations.

The Imam instructed Iranian President Bani-Sadr to "vigorously punish" all those in government departments, the armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards, and the police and gendarmerie who engage in acts of indiscipline, insubordination, or negli-

4. "The people of each city, as soon as they learn of a strike at a factory, should go to that factory, should go to that place and see what they want. You should identify the counterrevolutionaries and make them known to the people"—from Section 5 of Khomeini's March 21, 1980, speech. The entire text of that speech was printed in English in the June 1980 *Merip Reports*.—*IP/I*

gence. Every disruption or act of disobedience would be "firmly prosecuted" by the revolutionary courts which would implement "God's punishment."

All the foreign observers remarked that Khomeini's speech was directed less against the "great Satan—American imperialism" than against communism: "My dear friends," Khomeini stated, "you should know that the danger from the communist powers is not less than from America. . . ."

Khomeini also stated: "We are fighting against international communism to the same degree that we are fighting against the Western world—the devourers led by America, Israel and Zionism."

And it was also in this speech that for the first time since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Khomeini vehemently denounced "the plunderers and occupiers of the aggressive East." He hoped that "the Muslim and noble people of Afghanistan will as soon as possible achieve true victory and independence and be released from the grip of these so-called supporters of the working classes."

*Le Monde* special correspondent Eric Rouleau, commented on Khomeini's New Year's speech and Bani-Sadr's statements: "It is undoubtedly premature to talk about a turn in Iran's domestic and foreign policy, especially since new sudden shifts cannot be excluded. Nevertheless, it can be pointed out that Imam Khomeini and especially President Bani-Sadr want to down-play the anti-American agitation that they judge to be unproductive and devote themselves to consolidating the Republic's new institutions, while keeping leftist forces from power."

The events that followed—beginning with Kurdistan and then the incidents at the universities—would show that indeed, a turn was taking place (a turn whose limits have already been mentioned previously). It is interesting to note that the viewpoint expressed by the major bourgeois newspaper in France has since then been adopted, with some slight differences, by most European foreign ministries. These diplomats, as we shall see, chose to adopt a policy of putting "pressure" on the Iranian regime regarding the problem of the hostages, pressure that did not jeopardize Bani-Sadr's efforts, rather than adopting a policy of complete destabilization like the Carter administration's policy. At the time of the Tabas raid, American officials openly explained that they felt the entire Iranian regime and government had become "unviable" and was headed for disaster.

#### The War in Kurdistan

For more than a month, a real civil war has been going on in the southern Kurdish towns of Sanandaj, Baneh, Sardasht, and Saqqez. This struggle is pitting regular units of the *peshmergas* ("those who face death"—the Kurdish guerrillas) and mil-

itia units of the Kurdish National Resistance against battalions of the Iranian army, reinforced and controlled by *Pasdaran* (Revolutionary Guards) who have been mobilized to liquidate the Kurdish strongholds. The nature of the Khomeini leadership's orientation is clearly revealed here.

For the time being only the cities in southern Kurdistan are subjected to the 120-millimeter mortar barrages and are being fired upon by helicopter gunships and U.S.-made Phantom jets. But that limitation is simply based on tactical, political, and military considerations on the part of the Tehran government.

Perhaps at the beginning, Bani-Sadr and the Revolutionary Council undoubtedly made a political decision to attack those areas where the most radical organizations of the Kurdish resistance (such as the Komaleh) were particularly influential,<sup>5</sup> hoping to leave the door open for negotiations with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) or at least counting on future divisions within the Kurdish resistance.

The battles that were suspended last October, following the defeat of the government's August military offensive, have now resumed. And for several weeks, all negotiations between Tehran officials and representatives of the Kurdish population have been suspended.

The autonomy proposal presented by the Kurds explicitly stated that Kurdistan would remain an integral part of the Islamic Republic. But this proposal was dismissed by Bani-Sadr and the Revolutionary Council. While negotiations were at an impasse, Kurdish representatives became nervous about the Iranian army and the Pasdaran's open military preparations, and in January these Kurdish leaders privately expressed to me their concern that battles would soon start up again. (See *IP/I*, March 24, 1980, p. 300.)

Bani-Sadr's bellicose statements right after his election confirmed these fears. In an interview with *Middle East* magazine, the president of the Islamic Republic's analysis of the contents of the Kurdish autonomy proposals showed how he was

5. The main Kurdish resistance forces are: the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), a nationalist party whose leadership has ties with the international Communist movement; the Komaleh, which was founded by former Maoist-populist activists, but since then has broken all ties with China; the Fedayeen; and Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini's network of committees. Hosseini, the main Kurdish religious figure, is, along with KDP General Secretary Abdul Rahman Qassemloou, the major political leader of Kurdistan. Despite big growth by Komaleh over the last several months as a result of its adoption of more radical positions, the KDP still has hegemony in Kurdistan, at least on the military and electoral level. In the last general elections, KDP candidates received 82.6% of the vote in Piranshahr-Sardasht; 57.7% in Saqqez-Baneh; 80% in Mahabad; and 96% in Naqadeh-Oshnaviyeh—running against the regime's candidates (*Le Monde*, April 22, 1980).

ready to adopt a firm stance:

"I have just received a letter from the KDP proposing an autonomy plan. There are several good points and I agree that this region should administer its own cultural and economic affairs," the Iranian president said.<sup>6</sup> But Bani-Sadr just as quickly explained where the real problem lay—the question of maintaining "Persian" police and gendarme units in Kurdistan and especially the "non-Islamic" (meaning not linked to the Khomeini leadership) character of the political forces that have hegemony in Kurdistan.

"They also want to keep control over the police and the gendarmerie," Bani-Sadr continued in the interview. "Where else in the world does that kind of autonomy exist?"

"If they want autonomy within the framework of Iran then they must be part of the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic. They must be Muslims. How could we grant autonomy within the framework of an Islamic society to those, like them, who do not consider themselves tied to Islamic law. . . ."

We can be certain that Bani-Sadr's concern has less to do with worrying about whether the Kurds would accept and practice the five rules of faith for every good Muslim,<sup>8</sup> than with whether they would accept the political yoke of the institutions and leaders of the Islamic Republic.

In a menacing tone, Bani-Sadr concluded the interview with this naked threat: "If they say 'Give us what we want or else we will fight,' then let's fight! Do you think that after having carried out our revolution we are afraid of such threats? In the name of the nation, I say that we will never accept the separation of a single centimeter of Iranian soil."

Several days after Khomeini's March 21 New Year's speech, the first military operations by the Iranian repressive forces began in Kurdistan. The most serious operation was in the Kurdish village of Qalatan where several inhabitants were massacred during a "police operation" by the Iranian gendarmes, supported by the Pasdaran.

On April 15 the military offensive against all south Kurdish cities began in earnest. *One-half* of the weakened units of the Iranian army, backed up by the best of the Pasdaran troops, were involved. But, they were unable to put an end to the fierce resistance they faced from the Kurdish *peshmergas*, who, while only possessing light arms, enjoyed the massive support of

6. *Middle East*, April 1980. Retranslated from French.

7. *Ibid.*

8. The five rules are: professing faith (I hold there is no god but Allah and Mohammad is his prophet); prayer (*nawaz*); the pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*); the yearly fast (*ramadan*); and the Koranic tithe (*zakat*).

the Kurdish population.

These military difficulties encountered in southern Kurdistan undoubtedly explain why the Tehran government has still not launched a general offensive against all of Kurdistan.

#### The Economic Blockade of Kurdistan

But the economic blockade imposed against Kurdistan and the latest statements by the Iranian leaders demonstrate that their intention is indeed to try to militarily and politically defeat the entire Kurdish resistance.

During the last few weeks, units of the Iranian army and the Pasdaran, backed up by "djacht" Kurdish elements (supporters of the Tehran regime), have been intercepting all food and even medical supplies headed to Kurdistan. In cities where fighting is taking place, the health and food situation is extremely disturbing. On some occasions, the Pasdaran even refused to agree to cease-fires of several hours duration so that the injured and civilian victims could be evacuated. This created the threat of devastating epidemics. More than 100,000 Kurdish refugees have fled from their cities and taken refuge in makeshift shelters in the mountains.

But the Tehran leaders, faced with their military setbacks and especially the beginnings of disintegration of the Iranian army involved in Kurdistan, have adopted an even shriller tone.

On May 16, Bani-Sadr called on Iranian soldiers "to pursue the battle with all their strength until the final victory and cleansing of the region." Explaining that the government "never intended to spill Kurdish blood" he nevertheless reaffirmed that what was taking place in Kurdistan was "Islam's struggle against blasphemy."

Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, the former "Friday Imam"<sup>9</sup> of Tehran and one of Khomeini's close associates, declared, "that there should be no more negotiations about Kurdistan, but rather the whole region should be cleansed by the army and the Revolutionary Guards."

So in the space of a few weeks, the Kurdish question again became one of the corner-stones on which the regime—in all its different components—chose to test its ability to rule all of Iran in its own way. And it acted in this way because of two central elements involved in the Kurdish question.


1. First, because of the deepening and radicalization of social movements in Kurdistan itself, which are expressed by agrarian mobilizations, the arming of the population, and the development of independent organization.

2. In addition, there are decisive stakes involved in Kurdistan in relation to the

9. The "Friday Imam" (*Imam Jomeh*) is the mullah who leads the large Friday prayer meeting and gives the sermon.

Khomeini/Bani-Sadr leadership's plans to rebuild the bourgeois state. This involves the political and military weakness of the Iranian army and Pasdaran, as well as the maintenance of "territorial integrity" in the face of demands by Iran's oppressed nationalities.

As to the first point, today there is an obvious difference from what existed during the first military offensive in Kurdistan in August 1979. In August, there were only localized peasant movements, and localized land occupations and distribu-



Gerry Foley/IP-I

Mahabad, one of main Kurdish cities.

tions. This was primarily because in the name of "national unity" the KDP—the most important political formation—opposed a radical and immediate agrarian reform. What they meant by "national unity" included unity between the big landowners and Kurdish tribal chiefs on the one hand and the poor peasants on the other, in face of the Tehran regime. The peasant *shoras* (committees) that had developed were rapidly undermined once the first military operations began.

Today, the movement to occupy and redistribute the land is much more widespread and even encompasses areas controlled by the KDP.

As a result of the August-October war and the Kurdish population's widespread defiance, if not hatred, towards the central government in Tehran, the Kurdish political organizations (the KDP, Komaleh, the Fedayeen, and Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini's political bureau) today enjoy much greater and more active support from the population.

This is seen on two levels:

First, in the increased arming of the population. There are 5,000 to 7,000 peshmergas—organized into regular, permanent units (each peshmerga receives between 150 and 350 toman [\$14 to \$30] per month depending on each family situation). Alongside the peshmergas a real militia has been formed, composed of some 50,000 fighters of the Kurdish National Resistance.

Second, it is seen in the development of independent organization. This is especially the case in the southern Kurdish cities where the bulk of the Kurdish "proletariat" is concentrated. These Kurds do not work in Kurdistan, where there is no industry, but they comprise the immigrant laborers who are concentrated in the big industrial concentrations—in Tehran and in the oil regions.

It is in these southern Kurdish cities, besieged by the army, where the combination of the far left's hegemony and the needs arising out of the military resistance led to the development of real neighborhood committees—the *baqehs*—similar to the Nicaraguan civil defense committees during the civil war there. These committees are charged with the tasks of food distribution, carrying out limited health measures, as well as basic neighborhood administration and self-defense.

For the Tehran government there are two things at stake. First, it must prevent the Kurdish example from spreading to other non-Persian nationalities in Iran, who, along with the Kurds, comprise more than 60 percent of the country's population.

The specific characteristics of the Kurdish nationalist movement—its agrarian movement, its armed population, its specific political structure, and its capacity to militarily resist a long-term offensive—place it in the vanguard of the movements mobilizing various oppressed nationalities in Iran.

This explains why the conflict with the Kurdish movement developed so soon after the Bazargan government was established following the fall of the monarchy.

Even before the August military offensive, confrontations between the Kurds and the Pasdaran and army took place as early as March 1979, only five weeks after the Bazargan government began functioning. These confrontations in Kurdistan were followed by others in Turkmenistan and then in Khuzestan, where the Pasdaran and army repressed the movement of the Turkomen and Arab nationalities.

#### The Crisis in the Iranian Army

The second thing at stake for the regime in these confrontations is, of course, the army, and in a more general sense the regime's entire repressive apparatus—the Pasdaran, gendarmerie, and the police. There are 150,000 Pasdaran alone, with heavy military equipment. But their mil-

itary prowess has not lived up to the hopes placed in them by the regime.

From the day of his election as president, Bani-Sadr explained that putting the army back into order was his first priority. He quickly got Khomeini to appoint him as head of the Iranian armed forces.

In the previously cited interview in *Middle East*, Bani-Sadr stated: "The armed forces of the Islamic Republic must be different than the imperial armed forces, both in form and essence. A fundamental reorganization of these forces is therefore necessary and is the first priority; this will involve a partial purge, but a purge that must be carried out in a fair way so it won't be detrimental.

"We know that numerous members of the armed forces are raising just demands, but they must be expressed in an orderly fashion. The republic's armed forces must be based on order and an iron discipline; the question of supplies of military materiel is a secondary problem. The priority is reorganization. We must be ready to defend our country and I have asked the armed forces to develop and improve order, discipline, and efficiency within its ranks."

The problem of the army is a real headache for the rulers of the Islamic Republic.

How can they control, and even more importantly, fully utilize this body when—according to well-informed sources—80 to 90 percent of the officer corps can barely hide its hostility to the new regime and looks toward the "great Satan," the United States, where many of them received their training.

This "pro-Americanism" is directly related to the two-decade long history of the Iranian army's dependence on Washington.

First of all, there was a material dependence. The Iranian army heavily depended on America for its material supplies and its system of sophisticated arms. The only exceptions were its Soviet transport vehicles, its British Chieftain armored tanks, and the light ammunition manufactured under license in Iran.

In 1976 and 1977, Iran accounted for more than half the total American arms sales abroad; and after 1974 the shah alone acquired more than 35 percent of the total American military industry's exports.<sup>10</sup>

In order to maintain and use these arms systems they needed the assistance of large numbers of American military "advisers"—either members of regular American military assistance missions or, more often, under "civilian" contract.

The number of U.S. military advisers rose from 16,000 in 1972 to 40,000 in 1978. And their number was scheduled to reach 60,000 in 1980!

In 1978 there was nearly one American

adviser or technician for every ten Iranian noncommissioned and junior officers, a situation analogous to the network of "U.S. advisers" in the South Vietnamese army before the massive intervention in 1965!

Today, as a result of the U.S. blockade against spare parts and the departure of U.S. military advisers more than eighteen months ago, the Iranian military potential has been very substantially weakened.

Aside from armored tanks, and to a certain degree air force equipment, other branches of the armed services, beginning with the navy, suffer from a lot of unreliable equipment.

In addition, Iranian officials have a real problem "reconverting" Iran's military apparatus, reorienting it towards defense tasks and maintaining order, although a segment of the army units whose mission was counterinsurgency broke up after the insurrection. This was the case with the Javidan (the Imperial Guards) and most of the Ranger units. Only the paratroop units and the gendarmerie were less affected.<sup>11</sup>

But the principal obstacle facing the Khomeini/Bani-Sadr team is political. "Their heart is no longer in it," especially in the officer corps. In the course of several months, these cherished and coddled children of the Pahlavi regime lived through the experience of seeing how repression was unable to contain the mass movement. Then, even before the shah's departure, the fall of General Azhari's military government—appointed November 6, 1978—signaled the end of the regime.

Organized in an extremely centralized and vertical fashion around the shah, the Iranian army saw itself "abandoned" by the Iranian monarch at the decisive moment. And the emissaries sent by Washington pleaded with the army to seek a compromise with Bazargan's representatives.<sup>12</sup>

When you also add the trauma of the February 9-11, 1979, insurrection, followed by the trial and execution of dozens of particularly bloody generals and officers, you can understand the "malaise" of the Iranian officers.

While the present government is trying

11. The imperial army of 435,000 troops had a distinctly dual character. Alongside the three conventional branches of the armed forces (the navy, air force, and army) there were several elite corps (the Rangers, paratroops, and Javidan) who specialized in counterinsurgency tasks. These latter forces totalled some 70,000 men, all volunteers.

12. General Robert Huyser, commander-in-chief of the joint NATO forces, went to Tehran in January 1979 to convince the Iranian generals not to make a useless last stand. The shah's memoirs and the revelations of the students occupying the U.S. embassy show that Huyser made contact with Bazargan and served as an intermediary between the religious opposition and certain Iranian generals in order to prepare the transition in power.

to use all forms of nationalist rhetoric about the need to defend the integrity of its territory against foreign or domestic enemies to rally what remains of the army, neither side has any real confidence in the other.

We saw an example of this around the operation in Tabas. The first reaction of the Iranian population was to wonder why the army and its radar detection network were not able to detect an 800-kilometer incursion into Iranian territory by the airplanes and helicopters of the "Blue Light Force."

The questions were so widespread that Ayatollah Khalkhali—who is quite renowned for his rapid methods of dispensing "justice"—publicly demanded a new purge of the general staff members involved. And a commission of inquiry, presided over by former Minister of the Interior Ayatollah Rafsanjani, was officially set up.

Moreover, the successive crises within the leadership and the weaknesses shown by the Khomeini/Bani-Sadr team in trying to bring a semblance of lasting calm to the country feeds the crisis within the Iranian army.

#### Desertions and Refusals of Orders

This was seen last year in connection with the confrontations in Khuzestan and Kurdistan and is developing again on a new scale in this second Kurdish war. Many officers are refusing to carry out orders or are only going through the motions. They argue that there is a worrisome precedent, and they are asking the authorities in Tehran what guarantees they have that tomorrow the government will still be intact and that they won't run the risk of being tried and executed for having obeyed orders, as happened to their counterparts who were executed after the fall of the monarchy.

This second civil war in Kurdistan is beginning to have some devastating effects. "Even if it was based on the most elementary logic," wrote *Le Monde's* special correspondent from Tehran, "Mr. Bani-Sadr's decision to call on the military to reestablish order in a province that has already shown its determination, was risky in that he was asking a disillusioned and ravaged army to reenter the Iranian scene by participating in what can only be called a civil war."<sup>13</sup>

And, the *Le Monde* correspondent adds, "we know now that he gambled and lost, and lost badly."

This judgment may be a bit too strong

13. *Le Monde*, May 21, 1980. This judgment is also shared by the Kurdish leadership: "The army doesn't fight because it is totally demoralized and it spurns this regime. Although many superior officers have been killed or were retired, many of those who are still in the armed services remain in touch with those in exile and with the shah's associates who are ferociously hostile to

10. Ahmad Farouhy and Jean Loup Reveriez, *L'Iran contre le chah*, published by Jean Claude Simoën, pp. 103 and *passim*.

and, above all, premature. But it is true that the growing number of reports of cases of desertion and executions of officers for refusing to obey orders tends to highlight this opinion.

Kurds have witnessed the spectacle of helicopter pilots firing their rockets and ammunition at deserted mountain tops before returning to their base, claiming "mission accomplished." Ninety-two officers and soldiers who refused to fight were put before firing squads in Ahwaz.<sup>14</sup>

Several dozen soldiers of all ranks, including officers and even a colonel, went over to the peshmergas with their arms and equipment during the siege of Sanandaj. In that same city, thirty-seven other soldiers were arrested for collaborating with the enemy. Among them were a major and two captains who were accused of having destroyed two helicopters and killing several of their comrades.<sup>15</sup>

Several officers in Isfahan were arrested and sentenced to prison for collaborating "with counterrevolutionary forces."<sup>16</sup> The disintegration of the Iranian army is not yet at a very advanced stage, but these events led the regime to take some severe and above all *public* measures. First of all, the Pasdaran were given more and more responsibility for controlling units of the Iranian army (which led to new clashes and conflicts) and the high command was strengthened. And from now on Khomeini himself would follow the military more closely.

On May 11 the Supreme Council for National Defense was formed<sup>17</sup> and Khomeini appointed the new "Friday Imam" of Tehran, Hojate'islam Sayed Ali Khomeini (linked to the students occupying the embassy) and Defense Minister Mostafa Shamran (who was for pursuing the battles in Kurdistan last October) as his personal advisers on this council. They were to give him weekly reports on the work of the council and especially "on the internal situation in the various military garrisons in the country."<sup>18</sup>

Several days later, on May 19, the pro-

secutor general of the revolution issued a public call to the military authorities to deliver to him "any counterrevolutionary agent" guilty of agitation, plots, spying, or inciting rebellions.

President Bani-Sadr echoed these concerns, asking the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the armed forces to take "all necessary measures in order to maintain strict discipline and prevent any possibility of disobedience or negligence."

Bani-Sadr and the chief of staff, General Hadi Shadmehr, organized a series of speeches calling for strengthening discipline. This was directed particularly at the civilian forces that might attempt to weaken the troops' morale.

At the same time, a revolutionary military tribunal was set up to deal with cases of refusals to obey orders.

But the military impasse in Kurdistan and the crisis inside the Iranian army renewed the crisis and opposition within the ruling circles of the Islamic Republic. The crisis inside the army was highlighted by a new defection by an elite paratroop brigade. It returned from the small village of Nowsud, west of Sanandaj near the Iraqi border, without engaging in combat with the Kurds.

Back in mid-May, it appeared that Bani-Sadr and his circle of collaborators had accepted a six-point peace plan offered by the KDP. Darius Faruher, the former labor minister who had conducted some of the previous negotiations with the Kurds, had even been dispatched to Kurdistan to open talks with Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini, representing the Kurdish resistance.

But the intransigent opposition of the Islamic Republican Party, and of the majority of the Shi'ite hierarchy, who are for

war to the death, scuttled this attempt to regulate the conflict. Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, leader of the IRP and also secretary of the Islamic Revolutionary Council, explained that it wasn't a question of peace negotiations with the Kurds but rather of cleansing the entire western region of Iran. The opponents of negotiations argue that the previous truces and cease-fires were used by the Kurds to consolidate their political work and improve their military potential.

The conflict between those favoring and those opposing negotiations reached a point that the May 22 London *Financial Times* reprinted the remarks made by the Pasdaran in Sanandaj, which had been quoted in the IRP's daily newspaper *Islamic Republic*: "If a new special mission is sent to hold discussions with the anti-popular groups" [i.e. the Kurdish organizations], the Pasdaran said, "we will open fire on them with machine guns. . . ."

Right after this, unanimity was reached among the ruling circles to use what ever means necessary to rapidly and definitively put an end to the "Kurdish gangrene."

On May 23 a full and very large-scale military offensive was launched from Sanandaj, which had been retaken several days earlier by the Tehran forces. Several military columns equipped with heavy and sophisticated armaments headed towards the region "in order to win the total surrender of that rebellious province."

The night before this operation was launched, President Bani-Sadr met with Imam Khomeini to inform him of the situation in Kurdistan and the plans in preparation for the offensive.

May 23, 1980

Khomeini—and they do not want to get killed for him. Others in the armed services are patriots who believe that the army's role is to defend the borders. Among the junior officers and noncommissioned officers, in contrast, a fairly strong 'democratic' current is developing—not strong enough to attempt a coup against Khomeini, but sufficiently widespread to sabotage the war against the Kurds. And at the rank-and-file level, discipline is incredibly slack." (Interview obtained by C. Kutschera, in "24 heures" on May 1, 1980.)

14. *Le Monde*, May 21, 1980.

15. *Le Monde*, May 21, 1980.

16. *Libération*, May 19, 1980

17. According to the constitution, Khomeini is the supreme commander of the armed forces and has the power to declare war.

18. *Tehran Times*, May 12, 1980.

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# WORLDWIDE CAMPAIGN FOR AID TO NICARAGUA



## Year One of the Sandinista Revolution

Two recent publications provide valuable reading for those interested in reviewing the first year of the Nicaraguan revolution.

*Nicaragua: A People's Revolution*, by Philip Wheaton and Yvonne Dilling, is an attractively produced, 100-page, large-format paperback with plenty of photos, maps, and other graphics. It was produced by a task force of the Ecumenical Program for Inter-American Communication (EPICA).

The book consists of four sections. A brief introduction summarizes the history of U.S. imperialist intervention in Nicaragua, as well as class relations in the country. Part 1 opens with the assassination of anti-Somoza opposition leader Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in January 1978 and follows the development of the mass upsurge and revolutionary struggle to the end of that year. Part 2 carries the story forward to the July 19, 1979, insurrection that toppled Somoza. And Part 3 reviews the accomplishments of the revolutionary Sandinista-led government up to the end of December.

The booklet is readable, informative, and well documented. It includes a selected bibliography and glossary of organizations and terms.

The May-June issue of *NACLA Report on the Americas* contains a feature article on "Nicaragua's Revolution" by Roger Burbach and Tim Draymin. It is a useful complement to the EPICA book. While not so attractive or popularly written an introduction to the Nicaraguan revolution, it contains more current and detailed information and analysis. Much of the article is based on interviews with Nicaraguan political figures conducted during two visits there—in October-November 1979, and March-April 1980. The authors also quote extensively from the Sandinista daily *Barricada* and cite a variety of other sources, including *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.

The section of the article on "Unmaking the Bourgeoisie" provides valuable information on the current state of the economy, its organization, and the plans of the Sandinista National Liberation Front to restart vital production while advancing the fundamental transformation of class relations. Another section discusses the Sandinista-led and other mass organizations—unions, peasant organizations, the

women's organization, youth group, political parties, and so on.

The final section, "Enemy at the Door," explains how the new government is preparing to be in the strongest possible position to counter imperialist efforts to intervene against the Central American revolution.

Together with *The Nicaraguan Revolution* by *IP/I* correspondents Pedro Camejo and Fred Murphy, these two publications are a must for the bookshelves of supporters of the Nicaraguan revolution. The collection by Camejo and Murphy, published last November, contains an introductory essay; an interview with FSLN leader Jaime Wheelock on agrarian policy; the speech by Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega to the Havana Non-Aligned Conference; the Statute on the Rights of Nica-

raguans; and Fidel Castro's July 26, 1979, speech on the Nicaraguan victory. It can be ordered for US\$2.25 from Pathfinder Press, 410 West Street, New York, N.Y. 10014; or in Europe from 47 The Cut, London SE1 8LL. Please include \$.75 for postage in the U.S.

The EPICA booklet can be ordered from EPICA Task Force, 1470 Irving Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20010. The price is \$4.25 plus \$.75 postage in the United States, or \$1 postage overseas. Bulk orders of 10 or more can be purchased at \$3.75 per copy with the above postage.

The *NACLA Report on the Americas* can be ordered for \$2.50 with \$.50 postage by writing: North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), 151 West 19th Street, 9th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10011.

## Swedes Carry Out 'Light for Nicaragua' Campaign

By Peter Lindgren

VÄSTERÅS, Sweden—On June 16, Nicaraguan folk singer Carlos Mejía Godoy began a twelve-city tour of Sweden, together with the song group Los De Palaca Guina. Godoy is famous in Nicaragua and throughout Latin America, and has been a member of the Sandinista National Liberation Front since 1973.

The tour has been organized by the Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party, the National Federation of Trade Unions (LO), and the Workers Education League (ABF) as the culmination of their national "light for Nicaragua" campaign. The purpose of the campaign has been to raise money for lamps to be used in Nicaragua's literacy drive. More than 5 million kronor (\$1.20 million) has been collected in this campaign.

Godoy and his fellow musicians were billed as "representatives of the Nicaraguan revolution"—a description that they lived up to at the opening of the tour in Västerås. Among the songs in the program which ended with the singing of the "Internationale," were the "Anthem of the literacy campaign" and the "Anthem of Sandinista unity," both composed by Godoy, as well as a song about the guerrilla fighter Arlene.

The first night of the tour received wide-

spread publicity in the press and on national television. Margareta Grape-Linz, the national coordinator of the fund-raising campaign, announced that a new goal of two million kronor (\$482,000) had been set. The money will be used to buy paper for the literacy campaign.

In an interview just before his performance, Godoy said that he was working on a play to celebrate the first anniversary of the revolution July 19. Also, he noted that "the song group has many things to do at home. For instance, we are participating actively in the literacy campaign. Together with others we contributed to the LP-record that the Ministry of Culture has released for the campaign, an LP called *Convirtiendo la oscura en claridad* [Turning darkness into light]."

While expressing appreciation for the work of solidarity groups abroad, Godoy stressed that "naturally, we do not accept any strings attached to the support we get."

He added, "That the FSLN has sent us on this tour in spite of our tremendous tasks at home is an example of the importance that we place on the solidarity movement. It is wonderful that the campaign is continuing. There is really an enormous need for paper in Nicaragua." □