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**SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS
INVADE ANGOLA, MASSACRE
NAMIBIAN REFUGEES**

Carter's Threats and Plots Against Iran

By Janice Lynn

President Carter has threatened to prosecute former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and nine other Americans for going to Iran to participate in the June 2-5 international conference on U.S. intervention in Iran.

"My inclination," Carter told reporters aboard the presidential airplane June 10, "is . . . to go ahead and prosecute both Clark and the others who went against my directive."

The ten Americans traveled to Iran in defiance of Carter's unconstitutional travel ban. This restriction on the democratic right to travel is part of Washington's effort to prevent Americans from learning the truth about Iran:

- about the crimes of the shah;
- about how Washington put and kept this mass murderer in power;
- about the gains of the revolution; and
- about the feelings of the Iranian masses concerning the twenty-five-year reign of terror inflicted on them by U.S. imperialism.

One clear objective of Carter's threats of prosecution is to dissuade Clark from carrying through with the formation of a commission in the United States to investigate all these questions and bring its findings before the American people.

Among the facts that Washington is most eager to cover up is information about U.S.-backed coup attempts. Evidence revealed at the Tehran conference showed that the U.S. government had been planning a military take-over in Iran in early 1979 right after the shah fled.

Exposures such as these naturally raise additional questions about the exact aims of Carter's abortive military raid against Iran. Many Americans have already concluded that the lives of the hostages were the last thing on Carter's mind.

An article in the June 12 *New York Times* provided more insight into the Iranian counterrevolutionary exile groups that Carter has given free rein to operate inside the United States. Gen. Gholam Ali Oveissi, former commander of the shah's army, recently visited the United States. Oveissi said he had assembled "a small group of experts" who are working on a plan "to remedy the chaos in Iran."

"My goal and the goal of all the groups related to my movement is national unity, which means getting rid of Khomeini and the chaos he has created." Oveissi told *Times* reporter Richard Burt.

Oveissi acknowledged that he has "many American friends." And Washington officials admitted they have met with

aides to General Oveissi, although they were reluctant to talk about their discussions.

In Iran today, Oveissi is known as "the butcher." It was Oveissi who in September 1978 commanded the Iranian military forces that opened fire on antishah protesters, killing thousands in what has come to be known as "Bloody Friday."

Since he fled in early 1979, Oveissi has spent a portion of his time in the United States. In fact, a demand for his extradition, along with the shah, was one of the early demands of the students who occupied the U.S. embassy.

Burt reported that Oveissi has been successful in recruiting former military officers under the shah. In May, he met with Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat. (The shah is now living as Sadat's guest in Egypt and seems to have made a remarkable medical "recovery!")

There are also reports that Oveissi was given money and military equipment by President Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Oveissi has established a radio transmitter in Iraq that beams anti-Khomeini messages into Iran for three hours each day.

Groups of counterrevolutionary Iranian exiles have also been organized in France, Britain, and West Germany. The shah's niece, Princess Azzadeh, is one of the groups' political leaders. "Everything is

New Steps in U.S. Militarization Drive

By David Frankel

The U.S. ruling class took two big steps June 12 in its drive to escalate the militarization of American society and to prepare for war in the Middle East:

- the U.S. Senate approved a peacetime draft registration bill; and
- the U.S. Air Force announced that it will station a squadron of F-4 Phantom jets, along with 400 personnel, in Egypt.

The registration of nineteen- and twenty-year-old men is expected to begin in late July, after the final version of the bill has been worked out by Congress and signed by President Carter. Four million young men will be called on to register in what Senator Mark Hatfield called "the first step and a significant step" toward resuming the draft itself.

Barry Lynn, head of the National Coalition Against Registration and the Draft

being woven around Oveissi," she recently explained.

Shahpur Bakhtiar, who the shah appointed prime minister December 29, 1978, is also actively involved in the reactionary opposition. Bakhtiar publicly endorsed Carter's military intervention in Iran and pledged his assistance in any further U.S. military strikes.

The Carter administration has refused to rule out another raid. U.S. officials recently admitted that such plans are still being explored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And the Iranian government has announced that it has uncovered a number of plots to overthrow it in the weeks since the aborted raid in April.

The U.S. government has not given up its efforts to drown the revolution in blood and restore a government in Iran more open to accommodating Washington's interests in the Persian Gulf region. The U.S. rulers are convinced that the present government will continue to be unable to hold back the struggles by Iran's workers, farmers, and oppressed nationalities. As the masses press forward with their demands, Washington fears that there will be no force in Iran capable of containing the revolution.

It is this same fear that prompts Carter to call for the prosecution of the ten Americans who visited Iran. He must keep the American people from knowing the truth about Washington's complicity with the shah and its continued support to counterrevolutionary forces.

This two-pronged attack by Washington must be halted.

Stop all threats to prosecute U.S. citizens who exercise their democratic right to travel to Iran! Stop plotting to reverse the gains of the Iranian revolution! U.S. hands off Iran! □

(NCARD), warned that "the President will find it was much easier to convince the Senate to fund draft registration than it will be to get 19- and 20-year-olds to submit to draft registration."

It was no accident that the Senate waited until schools were on summer vacation before passing the measure. Antidraft demonstrations had taken place throughout the United States after Carter's original call for registration last January, reflecting the deep antiwar sentiment of students and young workers.

Despite this ruling-class maneuver, picket lines outside U.S. post offices have already been called by NCARD for the first Monday of the two-week registration period this summer. (Young people are supposed to register at their local post offices.)

In addition, NCARD has called for local

nationwide protests in mid-October and a national antidraft conference following the presidential election in November.

A Senate committee report on the registration bill cited "growing tension in the Persian Gulf area" as one of the justifications for the measure. Commenting on the stationing of U.S. warplanes in Egypt, Air Force Chief Gen. Lew Allen Jr. also pointed to "our capability to deploy to the Persian Gulf."

Allen said that the F-4 squadron would remain in Egypt for three months and that other U.S. units would be periodically sent to Egypt, including squadrons of F-15s, the most advanced U.S. warplane, and possibly B-52 bombers as well. Although B-52s have been flown into the Indian Ocean from the Pacific island of Guam as part of Washington's military pressure against Iran, General Allen complained that "it's a terrible way to fight a war."

Washington currently has about two dozen warships, including two aircraft carriers, stationed in the Arabian Sea off of Iran.

In July, seven cargo ships with arms, food, and supplies capable of supporting a force of 12,000 Marines are scheduled to arrive at the U.S.-British base at Diego Garcia Island, in the Indian Ocean.

According to General Allen, a primary objective of stationing additional forces in Egypt is to build up "an increasing tolerance" to the presence of U.S. military units in the region. Allen noted in particular Washington's desire for "constructive security arrangements" with the Saudi Arabian monarchy and said he hoped that joint exercises with the Saudis would begin in about a year, when they start flying F-15s provided by Washington.

Along with access to Saudi bases, Allen indicated that Washington wants the Omani regime to speed up U.S. access to bases there. Meanwhile, Washington is also pushing negotiations for military bases in Somalia and Kenya.

Not surprisingly, the masses of workers and peasants in the area want no part of such an imperialist presence. Allen mentioned the "delicate task of diplomacy" required to convince many of the governments involved to accept the domestic risks of fighting in step with Washington's plans.

Delicate diplomacy, of course, is not what U.S. imperialism plans to use against the Arab masses to hold back revolutionary upheavals. It intends to convince them with Phantom fighters and B-52s.

Finally, the U.S. ruling class faces the problem of a working class at home that is simply not willing to fight and die for the interests of Exxon and Texaco.

The latest moves by Washington indicate the vital stakes in the political tug-of-war between capitalist militarism and the antiwar attitudes of the American working class. □

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Troops Strike Deep into Angola

South Africans Massacre Hundreds of Namibians

By Ernest Harsch

With tanks, armored cars, and helicopters, a large force of South African troops struck deep into Angola during the second week of June, massacring several hundred Namibian refugees and freedom fighters.

The invasion, which ended on June 14, was billed as one of the largest South African military actions abroad since the end of World War II.


Like the South African invasion of Angola in 1975-76 and the numerous military incursions into that country since then, it was a flagrant violation of Angola's national sovereignty. It was also an indication of the white minority regime's concern over the growing strength of the Namibian independence struggle, which is led by the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO).

The South African version of the attack was given on June 13 by Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha, who also serves as defense minister.

Speaking before parliament, he claimed that the South African troops, striking from bases in Namibia, had killed more than 200 SWAPO fighters and captured more than 100 tons of military equipment.

The South African regime always claims that its targets in such raids are strictly military. But they are usually civilian refugee camps, of which there are many scattered through southern Angola, housing tens of thousands of Namibians who have fled the South African terror campaign in Namibia. In May 1978, South African troops murdered at least 600 Namibian refugees near the Angolan town of Cassinga. That, too, was billed as an attack against SWAPO guerrilla camps.

According to Luanda radio, in the Angolan capital, South African Mirage fighter-



bombers attacked a Namibian refugee camp near the provincial capital of Lubango on June 7. Both Luanda radio and the Portuguese news agency reported that Angolan forces shot down three of the South African jets.

The South Africans have admitted that sixteen of their troops were killed in the raid.

The attack into Angola was played up in the South African press and on television, in an obvious bid to boost white South African morale, which has been sagging in face of the mounting Black resistance in

in the wake of Zimbabwe's attainment of independence under a Black majority government.

A film of the raid shown on South African television showed hundreds of South African troops aboard armored personnel carriers and armored cars equipped with cannons taking part in the assault.

This most recent aggression against Angola and the Namibian population comes after a steady escalation of attacks into Angola in recent months. (See following article.)

It was also coupled with a major move by the South Africans to impose their own form of "independence" on Namibia, one that will exclude SWAPO. On June 12, a day before Botha revealed the attack into Angola, it was announced that a ministerial council would be formed in Windhoek, the Namibian capital, composed of pro-South African figures. Chaired by Dirk Mudge, a white settler, the council is another part of the South African regime's fiction that it is granting "self-rule" to Namibia.

The raid into Angola likewise comes at a time of increased repression against Black dissent within South Africa.

The U.S. State Department, which has tended to minimize similar South African raids into Angola in the past, felt compelled to issue a statement deploring the attack. However, this was watered down by equally condemning guerrilla actions by Namibian freedom fighters.

Washington's real policy toward the apartheid regime and its attacks against neighboring countries is evident in its voting record at the United Nations. Thus far, U.S. representatives have vetoed every proposal to impose UN economic sanctions on South Africa in retaliation for Pretoria's refusal to grant independence to Namibia.

On June 14, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim condemned the South African raid as "a grave violation of Angolan territorial integrity." □

Our Caribbean Coverage—It Takes Money

With the rise in the Caribbean revolution over the past year or so, *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor* has sought to keep our readers on top of the latest developments.

From the Grenada revolution to the mass mobilizations in Cuba against U.S. imperialism, from the coup in Surinam to the protests and strikes in Martinique against French colonial policies, *IP/I* has provided news, Marxist analysis, documents, translations, and other materials that are often difficult to obtain elsewhere.

In preparing our coverage of the Caribbean, we follow numerous publica-

tions: *Granma* from Cuba, *Révolution Socialiste* from Martinique, *Caribbean Contact* from Barbados, the *New Jewel* and *Free West Indian* from Grenada, and others.

We have also sought to obtain first-hand information by sending correspondents to the Caribbean. In the past eight months, Ernest Harsch and Jerry Hunnicutt have visited Grenada to report on the unfolding revolution there. Janice Lynn has traveled to Martinique and the Dominican Republic. Just last month José G. Pérez filed a report from Havana on the demonstra-

tions of five million Cubans to protest Washington's threats against Cuba.

All this costs money. The expenses for the trips alone came to several thousand dollars.

With inflation running as it is, we are finding it increasingly difficult to meet such expenses. To help us maintain the kind of coverage of the Caribbean—and the rest of the world—that we think you, our readers, deserve, we are appealing to you to help us out.

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South Africa Steps Up Angola Attacks

By Will Reissner

In recent months South African troops have stepped up their attacks on guerrillas struggling against South African rule in Namibia. In addition, major military operations have been launched against targets in neighboring Angola, where many Namibian freedom fighters are based.

The largest South African attack on Angola came on May 21, when South African troops penetrated forty-five miles into Angola from Namibia. In the operation involving helicopter gunships, armored cars, and artillery, more than 200 Angolans were killed and dozens more wounded.

When the South African forces withdrew, they took with them captured Angolan military equipment, vehicles, and an unknown number of kidnapped civilians.

According to the Angolan chief-of-staff, Commander Xietu, South African military actions against Angola escalated sharply in May. On May 12 the South African army attacked the country town of Chiede, twelve miles north of the Namibian border, killing some sixty Angolan soldiers and civilians, wounding dozens, and taking civilian prisoners back to Namibia with them. That attack involved eight helicopter gunships, which bombed the area and landed troops under air cover from French-built Mirage fighter planes.

In March and April there were nineteen South African bombing raids in southern Angola. Some of the attacks involved the use of napalm. During those two months South African aircraft violated Angolan air space 183 times.

The South African attacks against Angola are part of its larger campaign to defeat the freedom fighters of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), which has been struggling for nearly two decades against South African occupation of Namibia. According to South African military figures, since the beginning of the year 417 SWAPO guerrillas and thirty-nine South African troops have been killed in fighting inside Namibia.

There are up to 50,000 South African troops stationed in Namibia.

Until the end of World War I, Namibia, or South West Africa as it is also known, was a German colony. Following Germany's defeat in that war, the League of Nations handed Namibia over to South Africa to administer as a League of Nations mandate.

In 1966, the United Nations revoked the mandate and backed the Namibian demand for independence. But the white

supremacist Pretoria government rejected that decision and continues to occupy the mineral-rich territory. Ninety percent of Namibia's more than one million people are Black.

Along with its military operations against SWAPO and Angola—which aids SWAPO and allows it to operate from Angolan territory—the South African regime is also trying to politically counter SWAPO by bolstering a quisling movement called the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA).

This strategy is similar to the one that Ian Smith's Rhodesian white minority regime used when it became clear that Black rule could no longer be held back in Zimbabwe. Smith turned over nominal authority to the proimperialist Bishop Abel Muzorewa in hopes of building him up as an alternative to the guerrilla forces of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

But when elections were held in Zimbabwe in February, Robert Mugabe's ZANU swept the polls and routed Muzorewa. Similar results could be expected in Namibia if SWAPO is ever allowed to campaign freely against the DTA.

Following the election results in Zimbabwe, the South African regime began stalling even more on negotiations over a United Nations plan for elections in Namibia. As the May 14 *Washington Post* noted, South African authorities want "more time before an election is held to strengthen the authority and accomplishments of their black Namibian allies and improve their chances against the black nationalist guerrillas fighting the South African army in the territory."

South African attacks against Angola are designed to serve two functions. Most immediately, they are aimed at weakening SWAPO and pressuring the Angolan government into reducing its aid to SWAPO.

In addition, the South African attacks are designed to weaken the Angolan government, headed by the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which Pretoria had earlier tried to overthrow in 1975-76.

In pursuing these goals, Pretoria has relied not only on direct attacks by its own forces, but also on the guerrilla actions of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which operates in central and southern Angola.

The alliance between the proimperialist

UNITA and the South African regime dates back to mid-1975, when the UNITA forces worked closely with invading South African troops to try to prevent the MPLA from gaining control of Angola, which won its independence from Portugal that same year.

At the same time as the South African invasion, U.S.-backed Zaïrean troops invaded Angola from the north.

The MPLA, however, was able to turn back both invasions with the help of some 15,000 to 20,000 Cuban internationalist fighters, who arrived in Angola at the MPLA's request after the South African invasion began.

The MPLA forces and the Cubans drove the South African troops out of Angola by the end of March 1976. But the retreating South Africans left behind large stores of weapons and supplies for UNITA. Since then UNITA has continued to receive South African aid and training in its campaign against the Angolan government.

In return for this South African support, Savimbi has collaborated with Pretoria against SWAPO. In 1977, Savimbi told an American journalist that UNITA "will never let them [SWAPO] operate against the South Africans in Namibia again. Never!"

Savimbi has a long history of betraying anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles. Documents published in Portugal have revealed that Savimbi had collaborated with the Portuguese colonial army and PIDE, the Portuguese secret police, as early as 1971. He provided the Portuguese army with guides to MPLA operational zones, facilitating Portuguese military attacks against the MPLA.

In return, the Portuguese called off all military operations against UNITA for long periods and even supplied Savimbi with some arms to use against the MPLA.

Savimbi still denies his earlier ties with the Portuguese colonialists, but he readily admits that UNITA is now receiving South African backing. Savimbi has also been openly soliciting greater support from the American and British imperialists. While on a tour of the United States in late 1979, he met with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former CIA chief James Schlesinger. In London he had discussions with various Tory officials.

Inside Angola itself, however, UNITA's base of support has declined even further. Even in former UNITA strongholds, the MPLA has been able to set up party offices in small villages.

Given UNITA's weakness, the South Africans have been forced to carry out more and more of their own dirty work. □

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Protests and Strikes Challenge Apartheid Regime

By Ernest Harsch

Despite the arrests of hundreds of Black demonstrators—and the police murder of two Black youths in Cape Town on May 28—the South African regime has not been able to crush the wave of student protests and labor strikes that have been sweeping the country since April.

By early June, the student boycotts, which have been called to protest the apartheid regime's racist system of segregated education, had even spread into parts of Namibia, a mineral-rich country just north of Cape Province that is militarily occupied by South African troops and administered as a virtual South African colony.

The bulk of more than 100,000 student protesters are from that section of the Black population classified by the government as Coloured (of mixed ancestry), although African and Indian students in some cities have also joined in.

On June 5 it was announced that an ad hoc group of student leaders in the Western Cape had decided to call off the nationwide student boycott, but protests still continued.

In Cape Town, which has been at the center of the student upsurge, police attacked demonstrating students. They arrested about 250 of them. In Durban, another 200 were arrested by riot police as protesters attempted to call out other students from their classes.

On June 3, for the first time during the current strike wave, Black gold miners struck. About 4,500 workers at the Stilfontein gold mine walked off their jobs and staged protest actions. The police moved in with helicopters and dropped tear gas on

the miners.

Hit by a high inflation rate and a decline in their real standards of living, Black workers began moving into action on a major scale in May, after the student boycotts had already begun.

The strike wave started in Durban, which has a tradition of labor militancy. Thousands of textile workers struck the Frametex Company. The management responded by firing 6,000 strikers and calling in armed police.

In Cape Town, more than 6,000 Black workers in the meat and clothing industries also walked off their jobs. The strike by the meat workers in particular won wide popular support. A consumer boycott of red meat was launched in Cape Town's Black townships in solidarity with the strikers.

On May 24, some 4,000 Coloured students held a demonstration at several supermarkets in white residential areas of Cape Town to protest South Africa's "exploitative" economic system and to show their support for the striking meat workers.

Against this background of widespread urban unrest, Black guerrilla forces fighting against the white minority regime staged their most spectacular action to date.

On the night of June 1-2, bombs were set off at three separate energy installations southeast of Johannesburg, igniting fuel storage tanks whose fires could be seen for many miles. The installations, near Sasolburg and Secunda, produce synthetic fuel, a particularly vital industry for a country that has no known oil reserves of its own. The regime estimated that the bombs caused more than \$7.3 million in damage.

Although army, police, and civilian commando units were quickly deployed to the installations and roadblocks were set up throughout the area, none of the guerrillas were caught. In London, the outlawed African National Congress claimed credit for the action.


As it has done during previous periods of Black resistance, the apartheid regime has sought to clamp the lid back down through open repression.

Well over 1,000 students have been arrested since the student boycotts began to spread throughout the country in mid-April.

Police have frequently attacked demonstrating students with clubs and tear gas. In Cape Town on May 28, they resorted to automatic weapons, leaving two young Blacks dead.

Numerous prominent Black leaders have

been briefly arrested or detained indefinitely without charges under the regime's various "security" laws. They include Curtis Nkondo, former president of the Azanian People's Organisation; Bishop Desmond Tutu, general secretary of the anti-apartheid South African Council of Churches; Neville Alexander, a lecturer in Cape Town who had previously been imprisoned for many years on Robben Island; Johnny Issel, a former leader of the



BOTHA: Sends police against students.

now-banned South African Students Organisation; and many others.

On June 10, the government announced the expulsion of all boycotting students from fifteen colleges for Coloureds.

Director General of Manpower Utilisation Jaap Cilliers, a top government official in charge of Black labor affairs, has warned that some Black trade unions may be outlawed.

The South African army has, for the first time, been placed on a war footing within the country. Not even during the mass urban uprisings of 1976 and 1977—which were put down by the police and paramilitary forces—was the regular army placed on such an alert. By doing so now, the apartheid regime has indicated the seriousness with which it views the situation today.

But the resurgence of mass Black protest so soon after the police massacres of 1976—and the regime's current difficulties in containing the student boycotts and labor strikes—underlines the growing inability of the apartheid authorities to maintain white supremacy through force of arms. □

Soweto Anniversary Actions Banned

Fearing that mass rallies would be held around the country to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the June 16, 1976, student revolt in Soweto, the Botha regime issued a proclamation on June 13 banning all political and commemorative gatherings in twenty-four different locations. It was one of the severest restrictions on political activity in many years.

Previous anniversary actions have involved many thousands of Blacks in Soweto alone.

When several hundred Blacks gathered in Soweto to mark the anniversary in defiance of the proclamation, riot police attacked the demonstrators with clubs, dogs, and tear gas.

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Losing the Battle of Love and Hate

New Setbacks for Nicaraguan Capitalists

By J. Milan

MANAGUA—Nicaragua's capitalists are seeing their margin for maneuver systematically reduced. They have been forced to retreat from anti-FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) mobilizations to the territory of morality.

Lengthy discussions about love and hate fill the pages of *La Prensa*, the main capitalist daily here, and are broadcast over the radio stations still in capitalist hands.

The argument of the wealthy runs as follows: We made the revolution so that everyone, rich and poor, could love each other. But the Sandinistas are now dedicating themselves to encouraging class hatred rather than conciliation between the classes. This is unleashing the baser instincts of the lower classes. The rich are being unjustly coerced and threatened by the enraged masses, and their property and possessions are now endangered.

"To love is to hate the exploiters" has been the theme of the opposing ideological campaign carried out by the FSLN.

The Sandinistas have been carefully explaining that the base of the revolution is the workers and peasants—that is to say, the vast majority of the population. Approaching all disputes from this point of view, the FSLN unmasked the capitalists' claim that antagonistic classes have the same interests, and that they should love each other.

But the struggle is not taking place only in philosophical terms. While the capitalist press and radio stations pontificate about love, counterrevolutionary bands were attacking a Sandinista police headquarters, killing one police officer.

In the week following this attack, dozens of counterrevolutionaries were detained. Many of those arrested were previously or are now members of COSEP (the Superior Council of Private Enterprise) or were directly tied to COSEP through the Cattle-men's Association. Large quantities of arms and money were found in the possession of those arrested. Their confessions have implicated the "loving" capitalist, who now find themselves in a tight spot.

Alfonso Robelo, leader of the bourgeois Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), had to suspend a demonstration that had been announced for June 8 in Nandaime, with embarrassed excuses about the climate of violence in the country. Instead, several thousand attended a demonstration organized by the FSLN in the same location, on the same day, in order to commemorate the first anniversary of the insurrection against the Somoza dictatorship.

Many small towns and neighborhoods have issued proclamations against Robelo and have launched important mobilizations against him and his bourgeois followers. On June 9, Robelo had to leave Chinandega; militants of the FSLN, who provided Robelo with protection, had to hold off hundreds of demonstrators.

The setbacks for the capitalists are indicated not only by the dismantling of their armed bands or their loss of the battle of love and hate. Robelo, who had initiated a course of confrontation with the FSLN, has been forced to draw back and accept a seat in the Council of State appointed by the FSLN.


Robelo's confrontationist course has failed, and he will now try to play the role of a "parliamentary" opposition, while regrouping his forces. But this time he must operate from a far weaker position than before. The sectors he had hoped to

lead are more divided than ever and have no immediate perspective for advancing their interests.

Of course, the dangers of counterrevolution have not disappeared. It is just that the internal base for such an undertaking is weaker than two months ago, when Robelo broke with the Junta of National Reconstruction precisely over the question of the Council of State. He has now been obliged to enter the body he previously boycotted, with his head bowed and his ranks divided.

Moreover, Robelo's recent activities have enabled the FSLN to further clarify who the forces of counterrevolution are, as well as their real objectives. It has exposed the anticommunist campaigns of the capitalists and their maneuvers with imperialism, and it has spurred further important gains in the organization of the masses—particularly in the Sandinista Defense Committees and the popular militias.

Mass mobilizations continue on a daily basis. Currently Nicaraguans are beginning the celebrations of the first anniversary of the mass uprising against Somoza. To give only one example, in Masaya, a town of 50,000, some 30,000 people took part in such a meeting. □



Amnesty International Expresses 'Admiration'

Nicaraguans Reject Use of Death Penalty

MANAGUA—The Swedish section of Amnesty International has sent a letter to the Junta of National Reconstruction and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN):

"With great appreciation and admiration we have observed that during the revolution being carried out in your coun-

try, you have happily managed to avoid the death penalty and the violence of torture. With this, an example has been established for the world and hope has been given to other countries."

In contrast to Carter and his ill-named policy of "human rights" and before the "junta of criminals, assassins, and genoci-

dists," as Comandante Daniel Ortega characterized the military junta of El Salvador, there is the clear model of how the Sandinistas apply their well-known slogan of "implacable in combat, generous in victory."

In recent months, hundreds of Somocista guards and collaborators have been judged by revolutionary tribunals and have generally received sentences of more than twenty years in jail under a law that establishes the maximum penalty of thirty years. They have commonly been brought up on charges of "atrocious assassination" and "criminal conspiracy." Such charges certainly characterize the genocidal Na-

tional Guard of Somoza, installed and aided by American imperialism for decades.

On May 29 the Council of State discussed the possibility of making an exception in the case of assaults against and murders of members of the National Literacy Crusade by imposing the death penalty as the maximum punishment. Popular sentiment was running high after the cold-blooded torture and murder of campesino Gregorio Andrade, father of five small children and an assistant in the literacy campaign, and expressed itself in demonstrations calling for "*Paredón!*" (the wall).

But the Council of State rejected the death penalty after taking into considera-

tion the opinion of the FSLN delegation that the Sandinista people's revolution has sufficient moral and political authority to confront its enemies without resorting to such extremes.

Comandante Bayardo Arce, speaking for the position of Sandinism, said, "We have noted the popular sentiment. We understand it because as revolutionaries we have felt in the deepest way the anger and indignation that these criminal, counterrevolutionary acts produce." He added, however, "We are of the opinion that one of the best arguments in defense of our revolutionary process before its multitude of enemies has been the undeniable generous character of our revolution." □

Nicaraguan Government Releases FO and CAUS Members

By Lorraine Thiebaud

MANAGUA—Seventeen members of two ultraleft sectarian currents that had come into conflict with the Sandinista-led government in Nicaragua were recently released from custody. Those released include twelve members of the Nicaraguan Communist Party (PCN) and its trade-union organization, the CAUS, and five members of the Frente Obrero (FO) and *El Pueblo*, the newspaper associated with it.

At a June 5 news conference, Dr. Rafael Córdova Rivas, newly appointed member of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction, pointed to the release of these prisoners as further evidence of the revolution's generosity.

Several days earlier, on May 30, members of the PCN, CAUS, and families of the prisoners had held a demonstration in front of the offices of the Managua daily *Nuevo Diario* and then marched to the Ministry of the Interior. Manuel Pérez Estrada, the PCN's delegate to the council of State, claimed that twenty-eight PCN and CAUS members had been detained and demanded their release. The wife of prisoner Yader Sánchez said that on May 13 Comandante Tomás Borge had released six prisoners, recognizing their years of struggle, and promised to expedite the release of the remaining twenty-two.

Later that same day, after speaking with the demonstrators, Comandante Borge ordered the immediate release of the twelve prisoners in Managua and the rapid processing of the ten held in León, Matagalpa, and Carazo.

A letter appearing in *Nuevo Diario* the following day, signed by the families of the twelve who had been released, said:

"We are very pleased. And we know how to interpret and welcome the revolutionary spirit of the honest and just decision of Comandante Tomás Borge in setting our families free. We know that the working

class, the poor campesinos, the broad sectors of the people, will recognize this just decision as an authentic revolutionary act."

At his June 5 press conference, Dr. Córdova Rivas read a decree of pardon for the five members of Frente Obrero and *El Pueblo*. Set free with complete civil and political rights were Melvin Wallace, Carlos Cuandra, Isidro Téllez, Juan Alberto Enríquez, and Ricardo Guevara.

At the news conference, Comandante Jaime Wheelock explained that he and

Borge had been commissioned by the National Directorate of the FSLN to seek closer relations with other political, trade-union, and professional organizations. In this capacity, they had both held discussions with members of the Frente Obrero. He said that the discussions had been positive and that the possibility of involving members of the FO in carrying out the tasks of the revolution was being studied. Wheelock said that their right to dissent would be respected, but not their right to obstruct the revolutionary process. □

Public Transport Strike Wins Massive Support

Dominican Workers Fight Austerity Plan

By Claudio Tavárez

SANTO DOMINGO—A strike by drivers has paralyzed public transport throughout the Dominican Republic. The strike, which began May 29, was called by the United Drivers Union of the National District and the National Drivers Union to protest against a 54 centavo per gallon increase in the price of gasoline. (The Dominican peso is on a par with the U.S. dollar.)

The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) government, headed by the landowner Antonio Guzmán Fernández, responded by deploying more than 5,000 soldiers and national police. They took control of this capital city armed with automatic weapons and tear gas.

But the people came out into the streets in support of the strike, blocking roads, burning tires, and defending themselves with stones against the repressive forces who fired on the demonstrators. In the course of five days, there were five deaths,

more than thirty wounded, and more than 1,000 arrested in the confrontations with the army and police.

Local headquarters of political parties were broken into and the offices of the drivers' unions were militarily occupied. In addition, on May 31 the two principal left-wing leaders—Narciso Isa Conde, general secretary of the Dominican Communist Party (PCD), and Franklin J. Franco, president of the Anti-imperialist Patriotic Union (UPA), were imprisoned. The leaders of the strike were forced to go underground in the face of the government's political persecution.

The Dominican Union of Solidarity With Latin America, an organization that defends trade-union and political rights, launched a campaign for the freedom of those arrested and in defense of the rights of the striking workers. Telegrams of protest condemning the repression were sent

from Puerto Rico and the United States.

Finally, due to popular pressure, Isa Conde and Franco were released. The others arrested have mostly been set free in groups of 100 because the prisons could not hold them all.

The basic cause of the popular protests is the series of emergency measures decreed by President Guzmán to get the country out of its current economic crisis. Guzmán wants to impose an austerity plan on the people that includes halting the creation of new jobs and freezing the salaries of public employees; an increase in electricity rates; and the 54 centavos per gallon increase for gasoline, raising its price from P1.85 to P2.39, an increase of almost 30 percent.

Guzmán has said that the increase in the price of gasoline "is irreversible," because it is due to the rise in the price of oil decreed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. But the increases announced by Venezuela, which supplies most of the Dominican Republic's oil, will cost the country 20 million additional pesos, while the rise in the price of gasoline decreed by Guzmán will result in 64 million additional pesos, according to the government's own estimates.

Won't the difference go into the pockets of the imperialist monopolies, such as Shell, which control the distribution of fuel in the Dominican Republic? Won't it be paid for by the people?

With the austerity plan, and the repression unleashed by the government against the transport strike, working people are seeing more and more the true proemphoy and proimperialist character of the Guzmán government. They are beginning to realize that workers are not responsible for the crisis, and that what is needed is a united response that represents our class interests and not those of the employers.

While the capitalists are organized in a National Council of Businessmen, openly demanding the right to continue exploiting the workers, the main Dominican workers organizations have constituted the National Council of Trade-Union Unity (CNUS). Participating in this are the General Federation of Workers (CGT), the Autonomous Federation of Class Struggle Unions (CASC), the National Federation of Metallurgical Workers, the Union of Falconbridge Mine Workers, the National Union of Telephone Workers, the National Union of Workers of the Dominican Electricity Corporation (SINTRACODE), and sixty more trade-union organizations.

The formation of the CNUS can be the first step toward the calling of a mass assembly—broadly-based, united, and democratic—where all trade-union and political organizations can come together to discuss a plan of struggle to defend the workers' standard of living in face of the attacks by the bosses and the government.

This plan of struggle could include the following basic demands:

- Nationalization without compensation

of the share of the Dominican Petroleum Refinery that is in the hands of Shell and of the fuel distribution network that is controlled by Shell, Arco, and Esso. The nationalized enterprises should be administered by the workers.

- Automatic readjustment of the salaries of all workers to the actual level of the cost of living.

- Freezing of prices of basic necessities, because the workers can no longer pay with their hunger for the profit rates of the capitalists.

Workers not only need trade-union unity. The CNUS can be the basis for carrying out the urgent task of constructing our own labor party based on the trade unions and the popular organizations, in order to fight in the political arena against the bosses and their parties.

This is the best answer we can give to the assault unleashed by the government against the unions and the working people as a whole.

June 12, 1980



President Antonio Guzmán

DOCUMENTS

Guatemalan Revolutionaries Announce Unity

On May 7, the four main organizations involved in armed struggle against Guatemala's ruling military dictatorship met to initiate a process of joint activity.

The four organizations are the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), which initiated the meeting; the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR); the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA); and the Guatemalan Party of Labor (PGT), which is the Communist Party in Guatemala.

At the conclusion of their May 7 joint meeting, leaders of the four organizations drafted a letter to Fidel Castro describing the progress made at the meeting and outlining the place of the Guatemalan

revolution in the general struggle in the Caribbean and Central America.

At a broad Conference in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala, held in Costa Rica May 19-21, the four groups issued their first joint public statement. That statement outlines the shared perspectives of the groups regarding the unfolding of the revolutionary struggle in Guatemala.

Because of the importance of these two documents, we are reprinting them below. The letter to Fidel Castro is reprinted from the June 8 issue of the English-language Cuban weekly *Granma*. The joint statement was reprinted in English from Guatemala by *IP/I*.

Joint Statement by Four Organizations

Tens of thousands of Guatemalans have fallen in more than half a century of popular struggles against dictatorships at the service of the most reactionary and repressive ruling classes, backed, armed, and manipulated by U.S. imperialism. But all the blood shed, all the efforts and all the suffering of our people, has not been in vain. The Guatemalan revolutionary process vigorously advances, and we can state with a certainty born of daily and incessant struggle that centuries of exploitation, repression, and discrimination of our

people are coming to an end, that the victory of our people's heroic struggle is closer now than ever before.

A decisive element behind our belief in a revolutionary triumph is the unitary process now under way among the four political-military and guerrilla organizations in our country. On the path to unity, many problems remain to be solved, but we have assumed before our people and the peoples of the world our firm commitment to work ceaselessly toward the construction of the

unitary vanguard which can lead our people to final victory. The unitary process moves forward based on the revolutionary strategy of popular war, in which the struggles of all the popular and democratic sectors merge with the combative self-defense tactics of the masses and the decisive role of guerrilla warfare.

Our people's struggle advances triumphantly on all levels. Worker, peasant, popular, and democratic struggles for economic, social, and political demands have not been stopped in spite of the genocidal repression of the Lucas Garcia government. On the contrary, the popular and democratic struggle takes root every day, not only due to the level of organization and militancy of our people, but because the solidarity and brotherhood generated in the heat of combat gives rise to the creation of a broad popular and democratic front. This front will be able to coordinate all the efforts to overthrow the criminal Lucas government and install a revolutionary, popular, and democratic government. The combativeness of the masses of working people is growing, and organized self-defense tactics have begun to strike back at the government's repressive forces, rescuing kidnapped compañeros, blocking repressive activities in workplaces and neighborhoods, and protecting the different mass activities.

On a military level, our people's struggle has made qualitative leaps in the last few years. All the efforts and all the lives invested in this heroic struggle have at last borne fruit in the development of guerrilla warfare throughout most of the country. In San Marcos, Petén, Huehuetenango, Sololá, Escuintla, Quezaltenango, El Quiché, Suchitepéquez, Alta Verapaz, and Chimaltenango provinces, in Guatemala City, and in many other places, the guerrilla actions of the Guatemalan people are unstoppable. Take-overs of towns and plantations and other armed propaganda actions, sabotage, massive distributions of revolutionary propaganda, actions to wear down and harass the army and other repressive forces, ambushes, recuperation of all kinds of arms, and head-on combat

with the army have become everyday activities in which the guerrilla forces have dealt serious blows to the enemy. All these political-military actions have been stepped up in recent months, causing numerous losses to the reactionary army, while the army has not managed to inflict any serious blows on the armed forces of the people.

Our people's struggle within the country has been stimulated and backed by the struggle of the fellow peoples of Central America. The victory of the Sandinist Revolution is an example of what a people can achieve when it decides, arms in hand, to fight for its definitive liberation. The exemplary struggles now being waged by the heroic Salvadoran people stimulate us to redouble our efforts and advance in our own revolutionary process.

And international solidarity on the part of the democratic peoples and governments of the world toward the Guatemalan people's struggle is also a decisive step for victory. With our daily efforts and with the coherence of our acts, we are responding to that solidarity. All our brothers and sisters throughout the world can be sure that our people will not let them down, that we will know how to carry our struggle to final victory.

The sum of all the above-mentioned factors—guerrilla warfare, worker, peasant, popular, and democratic struggles, and international solidarity—have backed the genocidal Lucas government into a dead end. All the revolutionary, popular, and democratic forces must establish unitary tactics which will allow us to successfully wage the upcoming decisive battles. In this democratic, popular, and revolutionary alliance, the greatest in our history, lies to a great extent the key to victory. The political-military and guerrilla organizations of Guatemala are ready to carry out our historic role, firmly determined to fight until victory.

Forward until victory!

To win or die!

We live to fight! We fight to triumph!

For Guatemala, the revolution, and socialism!

has been gained and consolidated in revolutionary terms and destroying or neutralizing our peoples' processes of struggle and liberation.

We feel the reactivation of this policy of aggression, which affects all of us, makes it more necessary than ever before to strengthen and coordinate revolutionary, popular, democratic, and progressive forces in the area in order to meet and defeat this new imperialist maneuver. All of our forces must be aware of the gravity of the situation and the implications involved.

We feel that even though the situation has become more acute, conditions for the development of general and particular struggles in the area and our countries are still favorable and positive in the world balance of forces. This means we must be ready for more difficult and stronger combat.

We would like to take advantage of the opportunity to inform you of the first agreements reached at the meeting of the four organizations:

1. To send, in these times of struggle, a militant, fraternal greeting to the Cuban Revolution, its Communist Party and commander-in-chief.

2. To express our revolutionary backing, great respect, and admiration for the Cuban Revolution and reject indignantly the plots of imperialism and the reactionary press to attack and discredit it.

3. To express our absolute and militant solidarity in the face of the warmongering threats of U.S. imperialism against the Cuban people and their Revolution.

4. To reiterate our willingness to take whatever actions necessary and within our means to help defeat the imperialists' policy of aggression in the area.

5. To be represented at the historic March of the Fighting People on May 17.

We would also like to take this opportunity to tell you that, in spite of the most criminal repression and all enemy efforts to halt our people's struggle, more than ever before the people are advancing along the firm path of revolutionary war. We would also like you to know that all of us involved in the process in one way or another are willing to do everything necessary to obtain unity based on principles and to achieve victory.

We realize that there are still important problems to be faced and worked out in the unity process which we are promoting, and in which we have made notable progress. However, we reaffirm our profound conviction of unity. We feel it is highly significant that the first meeting of our four organizations should have taken place in the framework of solidarity with the glorious Cuban Revolution, from whose example our people have gained added strength to wage their own struggle for definitive liberation.

We sent our warmest greetings to the leadership of the Cuban Revolution and you in particular. □

Letter to Fidel Castro

Delegates from the leadership of the four Guatemalan revolutionary organizations have met today for the first time, in the framework of an ongoing process of unity which we all feel is promising.

This meeting has been convened by the comrades of the national leadership of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) to discuss the present international situation, especially the situation in our area, which has lately been marked by an increase in the imperialist policy of aggression and the constant threats against the Grenadan

Revolution, the progressive part of the Caribbean, and the revolutionary movements in Central America.

In our discussions and talks, we have reached the main conclusion that the response of the most aggressive sectors of imperialism to the defeats the imperialists have suffered all over the world, from Vietnam to Nicaragua and Iran, has been to implement a threatening policy clearly aimed at intervention in the Caribbean and Central America. This policy is aimed at undermining and damaging that which

Support Grows for Imprisoned Abadan Oil Workers

By Saeed Motamed

[During the last weeks, the campaign to free four imprisoned oil workers has gained increased support within Iran.

[The four—Mousa Souri, Hajala Shahkari, Abdullah Jafari, and Ahmed Golisourani—were arrested April 10 in Tehran where they had come to discuss the oil workers' grievances with Iranian president Abolhassan Bani-Sadr.

[The following article is excerpted from the June 9 issue of *Kargar*, weekly newspaper of the Iranian Revolutionary Workers Party (HKE).]

* * *

During the first week of June, a petition eight meters long, containing 5,000 signatures of Abadan oil workers, was sent to Imam [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini. The petition asked for the release of the four Abadan oil worker leaders.

This was part of the stepped-up defense campaign calling for freedom for the four oil workers.

In the petition, the oil workers also reiterated their previous demand for a debate between the union of anjomans (associations) and Islamic shoras (committees) of the oil industry on one hand, and Oil Minister Ali Alkar Moinfar on the other. They also called for purging the oil industry of all holdovers from the old regime [of the shah].

The defense effort in Abadan included a June 2 letter urging the oil workers' release. The letter was signed by the Pasadaran (revolutionary guards) of Abadan; the Abadan Construction Corps (part of the crusade for reconstruction of Iran); the headquarters of the Islamic Arabic Tribes of Abadan; and the Islamic anjomans of the Abadan high schools.

Addressed to President Bani-Sadr, the letter called for the immediate and unconditional release of the four oil workers. It said in part:

"It is now close to two months that four members of the Islamic Shora of Oil Workers and the Islamic Anjoman of Oil Workers in Abadan have been bitterly imprisoned in Tehran.

"During these two months the Union of Islamic Anjomans of Oil Workers, the Islamic Shora of Oil Workers, Abadan representatives to the Islamic Majlis [parliament], and other revolutionary Islamic and dedicated workers following the Imam's line have made great efforts to have this matter looked into. But no steps have yet been taken to free and return these

imprisoned brothers.

"The oil industry is definitely the most vital and important branch of industry in this country. Unfortunately, after the victory of the revolution, not much attention has been paid to establishing norms and taking measures that are in tune with the revolution.

"Therefore, the slightest neglect or tardiness, God forbid, may deal the same blow to the government and hence to the revolution that was dealt to the shah's corrupt regime."

During the two months that have passed since the four oil worker's arrest, not one statement has been issued from the offices of the Islamic Prosecutor or the Ministry of Oil concerning their arrest. The only statement was one that appeared in the newspapers based on a telephone interview with Moinfar in which he called the four oil workers "position seekers."

The four oil workers, well known among

their fellow workers, are longtime leaders of the oil workers and of the oil workers' strike that was instrumental in breaking the back of the shah's regime.

Immediately after their arrest there had been a general assembly of oil workers and employees of the oil industry in Abadan to inform all the workers about the arrest.

The Central Shora of the Oil Refineries sent a delegation to Tehran to meet and discuss their imprisonment with Bani-Sadr.

Support for their freedom has also come from outside Abadan. The federation of Islamic shoras in Tehran called for their release in a May 1 statement distributed at the Tehran May Day demonstration. They declared, "We see their imprisonment as a threat to all shoras in other industries."

Kargar has publicized the case of the four oil workers and calls for their immediate freedom. □

Students and Guards at Embassy Condemn Attacks

Behind Assault on Mujahedeen Rally

By Janice Lynn

A right-wing attack on a June 12 rally in Tehran received wide coverage in the international capitalist media. The rally was organized by the Mujahedeen and was attended by some 100,000 people. One member of the Mujahedeen was killed, and hundreds of people were injured.

Reports of the attack from the various wire services were unclear and contradictory. Information from socialists inside Iran helps clarify what actually happened.

The Mujahedeen rally was held in the large Avjadeh stadium next to the occupied U.S. embassy. It was called to commemorate the eighth anniversary of the death of the well-known anti-shah Mujahedeen fighter Reza Rezai and other Mujahedeen martyrs.

As some media accounts accurately reported, the Mujahedeen rally was physically attacked by right-wing thugs. These thugs, known as *hezbollah* ("the party of god"), are the same rightist forces that have physically attacked other Mujahedeen rallies; carried out the violence on Iranian campuses in April; and broke up

meetings and destroyed the headquarters and bookstores of socialists and other left-wing groups last year.

Some reports in the media, such as that in the *New York Times*, created the false impression that the Muslim Students Following the Imam's Line and the *pasdaran* (revolutionary guards) guarding the occupied U.S. embassy were involved in the attacks on the Mujahedeen rally.

Socialists in Iran report that public statements by the *pasdaran*, the Ministry of State, and individual students from the occupied embassy have all confirmed that such reports are not true. In fact, these statements condemn the right-wing *hezbollah* for instigating the violence.

The students in the embassy explained that organizers of the Mujahedeen rally had informed them there was a possibility of disruption at the stadium. As a precaution, the students had asked the *pasdaran* to increase security around the U.S. embassy. The students' statement strongly denounced attempts by the official govern-

ment media to implicate the pasdaran in the clashes.

In a Tehran television interview, the head of the pasdaran unit at the embassy disassociated the guards from the right-wing hezbollah who attacked the rally. He condemned the attacks, as well as attempts to link the pasdaran to the hezbollah.

He explained that in order to protect the embassy, the pasdaran had fired their rifles and tear gas into the air hoping to prevent the incidents from escalating. At one point, he said, crowds surged towards

the embassy, one of the pasdaran was disarmed, and the rope protecting the embassy was broken.

Both he and the students suggested that in the future the government provide alternative locations, not so close to the embassy, for other meetings and rallies.

Mostafa Mir Saleen, political and social undersecretary in the Ministry of State and deputy of police, criticized the pasdaran's intervention in the events but confirmed that the pasdaran were not involved in the rally attacks.

Mir Saleen said that the Mujahedeen

rally had taken place with official permission and had conformed to all regulations. He stated that the clashes were consciously provoked by "organized elements" and called for an investigation to identify those involved.

The son of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Ahmad Khomeini, also denounced the violence and called for the immediate arrest and prosecution of the attackers. According to the June 15 *New York Times*, Ahmad Khomeini called the attack "a disgrace to God and a disgrace to Islam." □

Iranian Students Organize to Combat Imperialist Blockade

By Parvin Najafi

[The following article is from the May 29 issue of *Kargar*, newspaper of the Iranian Revolutionary Workers Party (HKE). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

* * *

Despite the government's opposition to shutting down the universities, the Islamic Councils of University and High School Students have started a boycott of classes. In order to prepare the students to participate in the Jihad [Holy War] for Organizing the Country, the Islamic student councils have begun setting up Camps for Rallying Our Forces. In these camps, instructors and advanced students are training the volunteers in such fields as electricity, agriculture, veterinary medicine, motor repair, civil engineering, welfare work, the teaching of reading, and so on.

In order to better acquaint our readers with these camps, we had a short discussion with one of the organizers of the camp set up by the Islamic Council at the College of Science and Industry in Tehran.

Question. May I ask where the camp was set up? How many persons are involved? What are the fields of instruction? And what is the daily program of the participants?

Answer. The College of Arts and Sciences camp has been set up on the college campus itself. I think that about 1,200 people from the school have signed up and that about 400 students are now involved in training programs.

The fields being taught are reconstruction, medicine, various trades, and the teaching of reading. The daily program of the participants includes military training to prepare them to participate in building "the army of twenty million," ideological training, and instruction in the work skills I mentioned.

I should note some points. To begin with, this is not the first such camp, and it will not be the last. If I am correctly informed,

the programs are in the process of being developed, and the courses given at this camp will be repeated. Second, these camps are not just for students. People in all walks of life can sign up for them. I think that a program especially for younger high school students is being studied and will begin after the experimentation has been completed.

Q. Now that these camps have been set up, what is the situation of the students? Are old-style classes still being run? Is the university still running in the old groove?

A. Absolutely not. The college has been shut down. That is, no classes are going on. Only those students graduating this year and those with incompletes can come and take their exams.

Q. In order to run a camp, no matter how simple and no-frills an operation it is, some minimum budget is necessary. You need facilities and equipment. How have these camps been run? Has the government given you an appropriation?

A. The government has not yet made any definite decision about this. The camp here has used some equipment that was in the university. And the Jihad for Organizing the Country has given us some financial help and equipment.

But as you know, the situation of the Jihad campaign is not very good, and it is wrestling with various shortages. I think that in some places, the Revolutionary Guards are helping the Camps for Rallying Our Forces. But this scattered aid is far from enough to meet our needs.

In our camps, in some areas we do not have the minimum necessary. Sometimes we have to wait to get a screwdriver, or a screw, or some very simple tool. There are shortages on all levels. But we are trying to make up for these material insufficiencies through collaboration, solidarity, and creativity. We will not permit these material shortages to dampen our enthusiasm or to obstruct our progress on our holy

road forward.

Our collaboration with the Jihad for Organizing the Country has been very helpful in getting these camps going. The Jihad has not only aided us financially. We have tried to make it a reciprocal relationship and to coordinate our work and thinking with that of the Jihad campaign. They tell us what their needs are, and we try to train specialists to deal with these. In short, we have tried to utilize the experience that the campaign has accumulated in its one-year history as a basis for starting our work.

I should add that in this university and in others where the students have had the necessary knowledge and opportunity, they have immediately embarked on practical programs. This is true of advanced students in veterinary medicine, civil engineering, medical schools, and others. In our camp, courses have been organized in electricity and electromechanics.

The Jihad for Organizing the Country sends various kinds of motors here for repair. They are fixed and then sent back to the villages.

Q. Could you describe the feelings and thoughts of the brothers and sisters who are working in these camps?

A. They are all very eager to begin their practical work as soon as possible. And as organized groups with a program, we can help to organize the country.

Economic independence is the first thing on the minds of our brothers and sisters most of the time. We must be economically independent. We must show the entire world, especially all the downtrodden of the world, that another economic blockade will not be effective.

We have to demonstrate that not only can we live without American and European goods, but what is much more, we can assure a decent life for the deprived majority of our society. We want to advance as rapidly and effectively as possible along that road. □

Kwangju Revolt Opened New Stage in S. Korean Class Struggle

By Jun Yazaki

TOKYO—The ten-day uprising in Kwangju and its subsequent repression have once again spotlighted the basic contradictions that have been developing rapidly in South Korea since the assassination of dictator Park Chung Hee last October 26.

The assassination of Park by his long-time political crony Kim Jae Kyu, then director of the Korean CIA, came on the crest of a wave of antigovernment protests.

A big student demonstration in the southern industrial city of Pusan on October 16 had developed into a confrontation with the riot police on the next day. The Park government had proclaimed an emergency martial law decree in Pusan, sending in one infantry division on the night of October 18. In spite of this harsh measure, which in the past might have set back the opposition at least temporarily, demonstrations spread to the industrial city of Masan, where many workers joined in. The Park regime had to declare a special state of siege in the Masan area. During four days of violent confrontations between demonstrators and the military, a total of 4,207 people were arrested. Student demonstrations also spread to the South Korean capital of Seoul.

Opposition leaders—including Kim Dae Jung, Yun Po Sung, and Han Sok Hon, who earlier had formed a National Alliance for Democracy and National Unification—demanded revocation of the martial law decree. The New Democratic Party (NDP), the only parliamentary opposition party, also spoke out against the government measures.

These events apparently created a division within the Park regime over how to deal with the mounting opposition. These differences led to the assassination of the dictator. Whatever the exact character of the division within the ruling clique, one thing was certain—that the eighteen-year-long one-man dictatorship was dead and, as a result, the whole governmental apparatus was plunged into a deep crisis. The strong military circle on which Park had based himself—and which controls almost all political and even economic life with huge aid and support from the U.S. imperialists—was not immune from this crisis.

Coup Within the Military

After Park's death, acting President Choi Kyu Hwa proposed a course of "democratization" under military control, including a constitutional revision and elections, while on the other hand proclaiming martial law all over the country.

The opposition forces around the Na-

tional Alliance for Democracy and National Unification demanded that a presidential election be held within three months to form a democratic government. They held an initial open rally on November 24 at Myongdong Church in Seoul, followed by a student demonstration demanding immediate democratization.

On the side of the ruling party, the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), Kim Jong Pil was selected as the chairman to replace Park Chung Hee. Kim was regarded as a "liberal" leader who would initiate a number of "democratic reforms" under U.S. pressure to clean up the dictator's image.

After his election to the presidency under the existing Yushin Constitution, Choi Kyu Hwa lifted the notorious, repressive Presidential Decree No. 9 on December 8 and released most political detainees, except those detained under the Anti-Communist Law. Kim Dae Jung was freed from house arrest, and many students and opposition leaders returned to their campuses. The famous dissident poet Kim Chi Ha, however, was still kept in prison.

Less than a week after this first "democratization" measure, an abrupt coup inside the military brass was disclosed in Seoul. On December 12, Maj. Gen. Chon Too Hwan, army security command chief and a hard liner said to be a close follower of Park Chung Hee, took control over the whole military by arresting his opponent, Gen. Chung Seung Hwa, martial law commander and army chief of staff. In carrying out the coup, Chon had mobilized the Ninth Division, without the prior consent of the U.S. military command, and this division engaged in an exchange of fire with troops loyal to Chung Seung Hwa. Defence Minister Ro Jae Hyun was also dismissed. After a series of other arrests among high-ranking officers, Chon Too Hwan emerged as a strongman.

The coup represented a major attempt by the ruling military clique to reestablish its control over the political developments touched off by the assassination of Park and to reorganize the military hierarchy, which had been shaken by the divisions created after Park's death. In short, it was an attempt to create another military dictatorship under a new leader, Chon Too Hwan.

Divisions Among Oppositionists

With the government promising reforms, the opposition politicians responded with moderate proposals that fostered illusions in the "democratization" process. Kim Young Sam, head of the NDP, said in a

newspaper interview in January that the NDP now had to play the role of a potential government party to help stabilize the situation, rather than its previous role as a militant opposition. Kim Dae Jung, after being freed from house arrest, proposed reviving the 1963 constitution drafted by the first Park regime and stressed the importance of national security against North Korea.

Personal rivalry between these two bourgeois oppositionists led to a split over who should become the presidential candidate in the coming election. Kim Dae Jung, regarded as the most likely candidate with the greatest popular support, left the NDP, now basing himself entirely on the National Alliance. From February to April, the two Kims made extensive campaign tours around the country.

On the government side, Kim Jong Pil, head of DRP, also made an extensive presidential campaign tour.

These new political alignments, combined with the return of former detainees to campus and the subsequent reactivation of the universities, created an atmosphere of a "democratic spring" in South Korea.

Crisis of South Korean Economy

The myth of a rapidly developing South Korean economy was already being undermined prior to Park's assassination. The Park dictatorship had created a rather rapid economic expansion by concentrating resources in export-oriented industries. A large part of the growth in Gross National Product that had led to the myth was due to this expansion of exports, including those produced in several free-trade zones.

This growth, although rapid, especially in the southeast and east coast regions, has had very little impact on the basic living standards of the South Korean masses. They have been used as a pool of cheap labor to be exploited by foreign multinationals.

The contradiction between the export-oriented economy and the crisis in the world capitalist system has been aggravated by the energy crisis. The GNP growth rate, according to government sources, will go down to 3-5% in 1980 from 7.1% in 1979. Unemployment is now expected to reach more than 5.1%, and the consumer price index will rise by 40%. In face of the crisis in South Korea's vital export field, the new government devalued the currency by 19.8% in January. This will further increase the trade deficit, which was already



Rebels in Kwangju with captured army vehicles.

reaching \$4,000 million in August 1979.

In this situation, the South Korean working class has come to the forefront in national politics for the first time. Even before the death of Park, there had been several cases of workers struggles that developed into confrontations with the repressive government apparatus and were coordinated with other opposition forces.

In August of last year, about 170 women workers at the YH Trading Corporation in Seoul organized a strike and a sit-in at the NDP headquarters. They were all arrested after a bloody intervention by the police that resulted in many injuries of striking workers and NDP members.

One of the main demands of South Korean workers, besides wage increases and democratization, is removal of the yellow union leadership of the Korean Labor Federation. These leaders have hired thugs to break workers struggles.

The downfall of Park further encouraged the workers. In April of this year, a workers struggle for the first time developed into an occupation and violent clash with the police. On April 21, about 4,000 coal miners in the town of Sabuck in the northeast went on strike demanding a 45% pay raise. Angered by the union leadership's acceptance of the company's 20% offer, the miners fought with local police who tried to "protect" the union leaders. The next day, the miners occupied the whole town, which has a population of 7,000. The occupation continued for four days.

Later the same month, a steel plant in Pusan was also occupied.

In all these cases, the workers succeeded in winning their initial demands by resort-

ing to such militant forms of struggle. And it was this working-class development that scared the new regime of Chon Too Hwan and Choi Kyu Hwa.

First Test of Strength

On April 14, President Choi Kyu Hwa appointed Chon Too Hwan to be the acting director of the KCIA. By this appointment, Chon got control of the regime's entire intelligence and security machine, both civilian and military. This made him the most powerful man in the government. It was clear that this appointment of the top military strongman to also be the KCIA director could only nullify any form of "democratization." Because even if the martial law were lifted, Chon can still dominate the country using the powerful KCIA machine, which has been the main tool for repression against the opposition.

Students were the first to respond to this move. On May 1, several thousand demonstrated in Seoul and Taejon to demand the ouster of all "Yushin remnants," meaning all those connected to the Park administration. They already knew quite well that the "democratization" was merely a façade to promote another military dictatorship represented by Choi Kyu Hwa and Chon Too Hwan. The student demonstrations rapidly spread to other cities. The number of demonstrators grew day by day.

On May 14-15, the protests reached their peak. Fifty thousand students flooded the streets of Seoul, violently clashing with the riot police, and another 10,000 took to the streets in other cities. It was a well-coordinated national action to expose the real nature of the so-called caretaker regime.

Faced with ever widening opposition, the government declared the extension of martial law throughout the country on May 18 and banned all political activity, shutting down all universities and colleges—and even the parliament. Besides Kim Dae Jung, DRP chief Kim Jong Pil was also arrested for "instigating disorder." NDP chief Kim Young Sam was put under house arrest. The South Korean "spring" seemed to have ended in less than seven months, and the students seemed to have been strangled into dead silence.

But that was not the case. The proclamation of nationwide martial law was followed by the Kwangju uprising, an occupation of a city of 750,000 people by the armed masses for ten days!

What's Next?

Is it true that the uprising in Kwangju reflected an historical antagonism between Cholla and Kyongsan provinces? Park Chung Hee, who originated from Kyongsan Province, had consolidated his dictatorial power by promoting people from his own province. Those coming from ill-fated Cholla Province were given only minor opportunities in every field. Kim Dae Jung, on the other hand, is from Cholla Province. Bloody repression by paratroops who came mainly from Kyongsan had angered the people of Kwangju.

But the significance of the Kwangju uprising reaches far beyond such provincial frictions. It was the first case in which almost the entire population of a city joined the students and raised the demands for democratization. It was the first case in which the students and other citizens had attacked the army warehouse and armed themselves.

In spite of their defeat by the huge and well-trained martial law troops, their heroic resistance against the new military dictatorship, together with the growing militancy among the working class, has raised the South Korean class struggle to a new stage.

Although it is still too early to predict the tempo of future developments, one thing is sure: It will be the working class, together with the students, who will be in the forefront of the struggle, not the bourgeois democratic politicians. The leadership that will be created through the coming class confrontations will certainly raise the most fundamental question in South Korea—that of the unification of the Korean peninsula.

As the dissident poet Kim Chi Ha, who is still in jail, once pointed out, "The spring in Athens should be followed and will surely be followed by a spring in Prague, thus the whole Korean peninsula will be covered by the spring." □

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'150,000 Votes for a Workers Government'

[The following statement on the results of the May 18 general elections in Peru has been issued by the Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), Peruvian section of the Fourth International. The translation and footnotes are by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

* * *

The process of *transferencia*¹ has concluded with the election of the People's Action Party (AP) candidate [Fernando Belaúnde Terry], with a resounding defeat for the APRA,² and with a decline in the vote cast for the left.

However, given the overall decline in the left vote, the PRT's share stands out for having been coherent and conscious.

The Vote for Belaúnde

That Belaúnde's vote surpassed the 36 percent mark surprised even the architect's own supporters.³ All the analysts were expecting that a political crisis would open up in the country after May 18 owing to a political vacuum caused by the lack of a president directly elected by the people.

But Belaúnde was elected: not on his own merits, but rather because of the shortcomings of others and the anti-APRA, antimilitary vote cast by the Peruvian people. His victory does not give the bourgeoisie a guarantee nor mean the recognition of its leadership of the nation as a whole.

The APRA showed its quasifascist traits, from its top candidate down to its hordes of *búfalos* (thugs). The worst thing for APRA was that it paid the price of discreditment for having cooperated with and supported the hated dictatorship during its final period. Also the death of its leader⁴ deprived the APRA of its Bonapartist chief: factional struggles were unleashed and the vacuum Haya left could not be filled.

The Christian People's Party (PPC) had also gone through the Constituent Assembly supporting the military junta. Its op-

1. The process of changeover to civilian rule initiated by the military dictatorship after the July 19, 1977 general strike.

2. American People's Revolutionary Alliance, Peru's oldest bourgeois party.

3. According to Peru's new constitution, a candidate had to receive at least 36 percent of the vote to be elected president. Otherwise, the election would have had to be decided by the newly elected Congress. Belaúnde is an architect by profession.

4. APRA founder and supreme arbiter Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre died in 1979.

only right-wing positions failed to awake the most minimal sympathy among the Peruvian people. The lawyer for Cromotex⁵ could not even draw the votes of the upper middle class away from the architect.

The left lost to Belaúnde not on May 18 but earlier, when it became divided. The splitting up of the revolutionary forces allowed the bourgeoisie to go into the electoral game betting on three different candidates, any one of which was sure to be a winner—Belaúnde, Bedoya, or [APRA candidate Armando] Villanueva.

The ARI was a lost opportunity, and not by fault of the PRT.⁶ When sectors of the masses felt that there was no united leadership among the forces of the revolutionary left, they sought in a confused way to bar the way to the APRA.

The Next Belaúnde Government

Historically, the AP represents the rise of the industrial sector of the bourgeoisie allied with Yankee imperialism. It should be recalled that during the entire period of the reformist bourgeois Velasco regime, the only organized sector of the ruling classes that resisted was the Industries Association, which is today the sector that aims at regaining all the mechanisms of the state so as to impose its domination of the country.

We can foresee the reprivatization of important sectors of the economy, starting with the daily newspapers and continuing with other state enterprises. Also to be expected is a massive influx of Yankee capital to exploit our natural resources.

In complicity with the dictatorship and the judicial apparatus, the AP wants to rapidly assure itself of an absolute majority in the chambers of Congress and thus shore up its domination over the legislative power. The leaders of the AP think the stability of the future government depends only on having a majority in parliament; thus they are stepping up the vote fraud and playing their other card as well by embracing the Bedoyistas.

Whether Belaúnde gains control over parliament with Bedoya or not, the stability of the coming regime will not be guar-

5. PPC presidential candidate Luis Bedoya Reyes was a lawyer for the Cromotex textile factory in Lima, where striking workers were brutally attacked by the police in February 1979.

6. Earlier this year the PRT and other political currents united to form the Revolutionary Left Alliance (ARI), which was to have backed PRT leader Hugo Blanco for president. The ARI subsequently collapsed, owing mainly to provocations by Maoist forces in the front. See *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, April 7, p. 341.

anteed. The Peruvian masses are accustomed to struggling in spite of and against bourgeois parliaments. Even the most stable parliaments have had to yield before the onslaught of the masses.

It is precisely in the mass struggle where Belaúnde's weakness begins. The AP is less a political party than an electoral club of notables. If the ARI had continued to exist, the bourgeoisie probably would have had to utilize the APRA's shock forces against the left. But today, Belaúnde is betting his success on the single card of the division of the revolutionary forces. No one can guarantee the architect that this will remain the case; on the contrary, it is well known that the left has been able to unite around concrete steps in the struggle, as in the historic general strike of July 19, 1977.

The Crisis We Face

A year ago, the country was living through the most difficult phase of the economic crisis. The generals were then complacently applying the recipes of the International Monetary Fund and waiting for economic recovery.

The 1977-78 recession left in its wake the destruction of small property-holdings, the concentration of capital in the hands of the big enterprises, the impoverishment of the masses, and an overall increase in the rate of exploitation. These elements could provide a little breathing space to the capitalists. Supporting themselves on imperialist aid to the new government, they will try to launch an economic upturn.

This new effort at recovery is based on the concentration of capital in the financial and export sectors. But prices on the world market have been so variable as to preclude economic stability for the country. Thus the bourgeoisie is launching its effort at economic recovery in a hesitant and uneven way. Achieving their objectives will actually require sinking the wages of the Peruvian proletariat to starvation levels.

The IMF will find a new team to apply its prescription, but all now depends on the mass movement defeating the impending economic plans of the new government.

The Losers on the Left

These elections have also given harsh lessons to the opportunists. First of all, to Señor Ledesma, who joined with us to create the FOCEP⁷ and at that time upheld

7. Genaro Ledesma organized the split of a small faction from the Workers, Peasants, Students, and People's Front (FOCEP), which was originally a bloc of Trotskyist and other forces

class independence. With the blessings and aid of the military junta, Sr. Ledesma came to be presented as the "chief" of the left. Later, the dictatorship awarded him the FOCEP's name—despite the fact that the FOCEP was the 300,000 votes cast for S-3, for Hugo Blanco.⁸ Further down this road, Ledesma arrived at an agreement with the generals' PSR and with the CP (*Unidad*).⁹ But they fell out over a few parliamentary seats more or less. The FOCEP barely won a single senator and was even defeated in Pasco [Ledesma's home province]. This is the price that must be paid by those who are guided by convenience rather than by convictions.

What remained from all that was the Left Unity coalition. The CP (*Unidad*) and the PSR had each received 6 percent of the vote in the Constituent Assembly elections, but this time scarcely achieved together 2 percent of the vote for president.

The CP (*Unidad*), a workers party with more than fifty years of history, committed one of its worst errors: supporting a general linked to a junta that starved and massacred the people. How could the people identify with a general in these elections held under the military boot? They couldn't, and they didn't.

In these elections, the workers certainly did say, "Without generals."

The Vote for the Revolutionary Left

For an entire year, the masses have been witnessing a process of splits and divisions in the UDP¹⁰ and the FOCEP.

When the unity of the ARI was at stake there was no strong mobilization of the masses. The whole problem remained the responsibility of the leaderships, and these proved incapable of realizing the desires of the masses. A decisive aspect in the difference in the left vote between the Constituent Assembly elections and those of this year is that the former took place at a time when the class struggle was at one of its most acute points, while at present there is a climate of relative quiescence broken only by the municipal workers' strike.

around a program of working-class independence for the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections. Ledesma's splinter group was granted legal recognition and a spot on the ballot by the military regime.


8. "S-3" was Hugo Blanco's ballot designation when he ran on the FOCEP slate in the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections.

9. The Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR), a bourgeois-nationalist grouping led by ex-military officers who held top posts in the Velasco regime, and the pro-Moscow Communist Party (*Unidad*) participated in the elections in a popular front known as Left Unity (UI). Ledesma's FOCEP was originally part of this bloc as well.

10. Democratic People's Unity (UDP), a bloc of centrist forces whose main components today are the Revolutionary Vanguard (VR) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR).

The revolutionary left could have participated in these elections as a group, under the policy of class independence that the ARI represented. That this did not happen was not our fault—we had been fighting for unity for a long time. Rather, blame is to be placed on the sectarianism of *Patria Roja*,¹¹ which could not see a Trotskyist heading its front; and on the excessive ambitions of the UDP, which only wanted to take advantage of Blanco.

This has to be said very clearly in



La Prensa
Hugo Blanco casting ballot.

drawing a balance sheet of the ARI, to avoid the confusion of those who want to portray themselves as victims. The PRT fought up to the last minute for unity; the UNIR was the first to break the front.

Nonetheless, the forces of the revolutionary left have managed to preserve the support of important sectors of the masses. The total vote for the UNIR, PRT, and UDP in many heavily populated districts surpassed that of other parties such as the APRA. An alliance would not only have gained these votes but made them more powerful.

The UNIR has begun a boastful campaign about its few tenths of a percent margin [over the rest of the left]. For them, everything that happened was a victory and all they have to do is keep on congratulating themselves.

The UDP, with pessimism exactly equal to its earlier optimism, now views everything as lost. They say they lost their president [Alfonso Barrantes, who went with the Maoist bloc UNIR] and their candidate [Blanco], and that everyone is attacking them.

In the votes for the two latter fronts there is an outstanding fact that we want

11. The Communist Party of Peru (PC del P), which publishes *Patria Roja* (Red Homeland), is a sectarian Maoist current that is the main component of the Revolutionary Left Union (UNIR).

to analyze—the absolutely differentiated vote. [The UNIR and the UDP received considerably higher votes for their Congressional slates than for their presidential tickets.] As Hugo Blanco has said, the UNIR and UDP voters—unlike those of the PRT—voted with the tree or torch in one hand and the lantern in the other.¹² Last year the UDP called its vote "militant"—some militants the UDP has!

In reality, what has happened is that these parties failed in their election campaign.

The UNIR carried out a reformist campaign around its slogan of a "nonaligned government," calling on the "patriotic sectors" of the bourgeoisie. For its part, the UDP started out defending unity and then adopted an ultraleft political approach, all the while calling for a "people's government" with the presence of "progressive" sectors of the bosses.

The line of the UNIR and the UDP misled their voters; their illusions in sectors of the bosses did not educate the masses who listened to them in a policy of intransigent opposition to the bourgeoisie.

The PRT, on the other hand, received a vote that in its overwhelming majority was coherent—votes that were more for a party than for a personality; more than for a strike call, they were for the battle cry of "Workers to power!"

Campaign of the PRT

More than 170,000 persons marked their ballots three times [for president, Senate, and Chamber of Deputies] for the PRT fist—a coherent, conscious vote for a workers government without generals or bosses.

The PRT began this election campaign with many things against it. Not only did the right wing launch a propaganda campaign to discredit us, but the chorus was later joined by the left's own periodicals *Marka* and *Amauta*. We had many problems and deficiencies that we had to overcome in the course of the campaign itself.

Nonetheless, we have achieved more than we ourselves had expected. In two months of campaigning, fifty rallies were held throughout the country, attended by some 250,000 persons. Four thousand new persons have affiliated to the party. We produced eight television broadcasts and published six editions of our newspaper during the campaign.

Organizationally speaking, the election campaign has been a success for the PRT. We are today a party of nationwide scope, and we have made the slogan "workers to power without generals or bosses" part of popular consciousness. We have trans-

12. Because many illiterates were being allowed to vote for the first time in Peru's history, voting in the May 18 elections was by party symbol and not by name. The UDP's symbol was a tree, a torch represented the UNIR, and Belaúnde's People's Action Party was symbolized by a lantern. The PRT's symbol was a fist.

formed sympathy for an individual into active militancy in a revolutionary party.

Thus we are satisfied with the campaign: with having been able to use the democratic opening to build our party, with having learned in practice to overcome many errors, and with having opened the possibility to extend our influence still further.

The PRT's vote remained high in impor-

tant working-class areas such as Lima and Chimbote, where we gained a plurality of the left voters. In the south, provinces such as Puno and Tacna continue giving us support. If we have declined quantitatively in comparison with the votes cast for S-3 in the Constituent Assembly elections, we have made qualitative gains with a more political, more coherent, more socialist vote.

We are opening the way between the errors of the left and our own errors, retaking the road of unity by beginning with the direct struggle of the masses. We are preparing the conditions for launching a unified mass struggle against the new bourgeois government. In the midst of all this, we are building a party—more and more, we are PRT militants throughout the country. Of that we are certain. □

Interview With Hugo Blanco

'Cuba a Paradise Compared With Peru'

[The following interview with Hugo Blanco, presidential candidate of the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), Peruvian section of the Fourth International, was obtained in Lima on May 15 by Alán Martín. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

* * *

Question. What are the goals of the PRT in this campaign?

Answer. The main goal is to present to the people a way out of the social and economic crisis Peru is in.

There are various alternatives being presented by the right-wing parties, the most important being the APRA, the PPC, and the AP.* They represent the interests of the big imperialist companies. These three parties have the aim of replacing the military dictatorship in the service of the big companies. Their plans for government are not essentially different from the economic policies followed by the Morales Bermúdez government—that is, the policies of the International Monetary Fund, which amount to safeguarding the profits of the big companies through the impoverishment of our people.

The elections are being held because of the heroic struggles carried out by our people. Alarmed by these struggles, the imperialists have seen the need to replace the military dictatorship with a civilian government, so that what happened in Cuba and in Nicaragua does not happen here. In those countries, the people rose up against dictatorships that did not want to leave and swept away not only the dictatorships but also imperialist domination.

So, what we have to show the people is that there really is a way out of the crisis—not one based on the interests of the big companies but one that goes against the interests of the big companies. That means socialization of the economy, orienting it toward meeting the needs of our people

and not toward the needs of the big imperialist corporations.

Q. What kind of a reception has the PRT received from the workers and peasants during its election campaign?

A. We have had quite large meetings everywhere. Here in Lima our main rally drew some 50,000 people, despite inadequate publicity. And we have also had local rallies in the various districts on the outskirts of Lima that have been quite important. Nearly one-third of the country's population is concentrated in the city of Lima—there is a brutal centralism owing to the imperialist oppression our country suffers, so the majority of factories and public offices have accumulated in the capital, forcing the people to migrate here.

We have also had big rallies in other provinces. In most of these, not only has the attendance been large but there has also been great enthusiasm and support expressed for our party. That shows us that the people really are tired of bosses and generals.

Q. In April a great many supposed "refugees" arrived in Peru from Cuba—those who had sought asylum in the Peruvian embassy in Havana. What is the PRT's position on these "refugees"?

A. In the first place, we view this whole affair as a part of the general strategy of U.S. imperialism for smashing the revolution in Central America. It represents a move in the U.S. chess game in which the Peruvian government has been no more than a pawn.

This maneuver has also been used by the Peruvian government and the right wing to discredit a socialized economy, to discredit a workers government. However, this has not turned out too well, since the majority of these refugees wanted to go to the United States and not remain in Peru.

Certainly in Cuba there are still great limitations, owing fundamentally to the economic backwardness of the country at the time of the revolution—backwardness caused by the imperialist deformation of

the economy. And it is certain that because of the U.S. blockade, Cuba has not yet been able to overcome all those economic difficulties. This means that in some respects a Cuban can live better in the United States than in Cuba.

But it is also certain that living standards in Cuba are far, far higher than in Batista's time and much higher than those of any other Latin American country. These Cubans want to go to the United States; I don't think they want to stay here.

I was saying that this didn't turn out too well for the Peruvian government, because while they may have been able to discredit the Cuban workers state before the masses, some statements by the refugees have also made people see that things are better in Cuba.

For example, one Cuban was complaining that in Cuba one could only eat meat three times a week. The Peruvian people would certainly like to eat meat three times a week—only the upper classes can do that. It's well known that here in Peru a large part of the population of the marginal neighborhoods lives on things like Nicovita—a type of birdseed that is harmful to human beings.

Another Cuban woman was complaining that children there are only provided with free milk up to the age of eight. Well, that would be a paradise compared with Peru, where the only milk many children have ever had was their mothers' milk, and where baby bottles are usually filled with some kind of tea.

It was said by another Cuban that because education is free, people have to study a lot and work hard. And that seems like heaven here in Peru where the majority of people cannot learn because of the high cost of education and where half the economically active population is unemployed or underemployed.

Q. Is there anything you would like to say to the workers movement abroad about this election campaign?

A. It is inspiring to us that in countries like the United States, France, and Sweden the workers movement is stepping up its struggle against our common enemy—imperialism and the big companies based in the United States, Europe, and Japan. We hope our struggles can be more and more united and coordinated and that together we can defeat this enemy. □

*APRA—American People's Revolutionary Alliance; PPC—Christian People's Party; AP—People's Action Party.

Spanish Politics Four Years After Franco's Death

By Angel Muñoz

Among the millions of people around the world who celebrated the death of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco four years ago, not even the most pessimistic could have imagined what the situation in the Spanish state would be like in 1980.

We can begin to understand the situation by looking at a single example. Today there are more people unemployed in the Spanish state than there are union members.¹ In fact, the morale of the workers movement and its level of self-confidence are at their lowest point in ten years.

There are a number of reasons why revolutionary militants must study the present situation and its causes. First of all because there is no reason to think that the situation is going to make a sharp turn for the better. There is no reason to think that this is just a bad dream, that we will soon wake up and find ourselves in the midst of a big rise in the mass movement.

On the contrary, we will be faced with hard, and we can also predict long, battles of resistance against the rightist offensive, and we must establish the conditions needed for a counteroffensive by the workers.

We should also study the situation because it is essential that revolutionists not wall themselves off into a comfortable ghetto of simply issuing denunciations and abstract propaganda. Revolutionists must not become mere spectators who sit back and wait for "better days."

There is not now nor will there soon be political or social "stability" in the Spanish state. The bourgeoisie has won a number of important partial victories over the workers movement. But the bourgeoisie has not solved either the economic crisis or its crisis of political leadership.

Thousands of militant workers and activists in other social movements are beginning to reflect on their experiences. They are beginning to understand that the setbacks they have suffered and their present and future difficulties are not due to the enemy's strength and skill, but rather to the catastrophic policies put forward by

the main leaders of the workers movement.

This realization, together with the enormous and still undefeated capacity for resistance, characterizes the slow and uneven process of reorganization and regroupment of forces that is now taking place in the factories and working class neighborhoods, within the unions, the women's and youth movements, in the radical nationalist parties, and in the workers parties.

Finally, it is useful for revolutionists in other countries to study the Spanish experience of recent years, and it is especially useful for those in countries now ruled by dictatorships which may follow the "Spanish road to democracy." We hope this article will be of some aid to them in their struggle to prevent the imposition of the "Spanish road" in their countries.

The Last Stage of the "Reform"

Until the new constitution was approved in late 1978, political activity in Spain was characterized by a "consensus" between the bourgeoisie and the reformist workers parties. The workers parties signed a "social pact" with the government wherein they agreed to limit their economic and social demands in return for the establishment of "democracy."

Of course the trade-off was extremely unequal. Under the "social pact"—called the Moncloa Pact—in 1977 and 1978 the share of wages in national income declined 0.9% and 1.3% respectively.

But the democracy established by the constitution contained severe attacks against basic freedoms and rights. In particular the constitution denied the right of the oppressed nationalities within the Spanish state to self-determination. The constitution also retained the whole political and military apparatus that had existed under the Francoist dictatorship as well as the monarchist character of the new regime.

This policy of working out a "consensus" with the bourgeoisie seriously disoriented the workers movement and lessened its attractive power among other social movements. This was especially true among the oppressed nationalities, who viewed the two big workers parties—the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the Communist Party—as being in clear complicity with the ruling conservative Democratic Center Union (UCD).

Despite this, the majority of workers accepted what Felipe González of the PSOE and Santiago Carrillo of the CP told and promised them. According to the PSOE and CP, the workers had to seek

partial gains while also agreeing to make "sacrifices" in order to achieve first the stabilization of democracy as quickly as possible, and above all to establish the left parties as an alternative that could win in the elections against the UCD and take the political leadership out of the hands of the right wing.

The partial gains won since the death of Franco included some real gains won by the peoples struggles, such as the amnesty and the legalization of parties and trade unions, as well as nebulous political reforms and ill-defined promises for things like municipal elections, autonomy statutes for the oppressed nationalities, and the like.

In the first stage of the "reform" that followed Franco's death, the majority of the workers accepted these premises, and on that basis they placed their confidence in the PSOE and CP.

But the UCD's victory in the March 1, 1979, general elections inaugurated a second stage of the "reform," which has profoundly changed the characteristics that the Spanish political situation had manifested since 1977.²

Once the bourgeoisie no longer needed the "consensus," they dropped it in the most unfavorable way possible for the workers movement. The UCD needed to be free to use its victory in the 1979 elections to definitively and uncompromisingly confront the reformist left on three critical questions: economic policy; the national and regional question; and institutional stabilization of the regime. In order to carry out this offensive against the workers movement, the bourgeoisie has to establish a unified and solid front and has to reestablish its attractive power over the middle-class layers and the social movements.

Economic Policy

Given the scope of the economic crisis, the bourgeoisie's gains from the Moncloa Pact, which the government and the workers parties signed in October 1977, were modest and were threatened by the coming international recession. The aim of the Moncloa Pact was to raise overall productivity, improve the competitiveness of Spanish industry, and increase profit rates by setting wage ceilings, adopting a res-

1. The official figure for unemployed workers at the end of 1979 was 1,334,000 people. There is no reliable figure for the number of members of the various unions. The figures provided by the trade-union federations are notoriously exaggerated. An approximate calculation would give the following results: Workers Commissions, 700,000; UGT, 400,000; other unions, 100,000. The maximum number of union members therefore is 1,200,000, about 14% of the active wage-earning population.

2. See "Initial Balance Sheet of Spanish Elections," a March 3, 1979 statement by the Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), published in the April 16, 1979, *IP/I*, p. 395. This document remains by and large valid in the present situation.

trictive monetary policy, and holding down public spending.

In return for the PSOE and CP's acceptance of the Moncloa Pact, the bourgeoisie agreed to make a few marginal revisions in its economic program, such as making the wage ceiling less rigorous and accepting some vague concessions that would make the pact more palatable to the working class.³

Following its victory in the March 1979 general elections, however, the UCD government moved to satisfy the demands of the powerful Spanish Confederation of Employers Organizations (CEOE). It moved to correct what had been a glaring omission until then in the austerity policy—it is now attempting to change the legal framework and methods of labor relations.

The government had drawn some conclusions from the imposition of the wage freeze decree in late 1979: while the wage freeze had succeeded in holding raises below the inflation rate,⁴ it had provoked opposition from the two main union federations—the Workers Commissions (COs) and the General Workers Union (UGT)—and had led to big workers mobilizations. Although these mobilizations were tightly controlled by the union bureaucrats, there was always the danger that they could lead to generalized and united mass struggles against the government, since it was the government that had imposed the decree.

For the future, the government is emphasizing employer/union agreements. The aim is to establish a "division of labor" between the UCD and the CEOE in the attempt to put the bourgeoisie's economic policy into effect.

In August the Government Economic Program (PEG) was published. Its general

3. For more on the Moncloa Pact and its economic aspects, see "Spain—One Year After the Moncloa Austerity Pact," by Jesús Albarracín and Pedro Montes in the March 5, 1979, *IP/I*, p. 216.

4. The average rise in wages in 1979 was 13.9%. This is lower than the limits imposed by the government and also lower than the rise in the cost of living, which was 15.6%. For the third straight year the percent of national income going to wages fell, this time about 2%.

The failure of the workers movement's fight against the wage ceiling imposed by the government is one of the most important facts of the present situation, which we have not given enough weight to. It was obviously the result of the orientation of the leaders of the Workers Commissions and the UGT, who refused to see the struggle as a generalized and centralized response by the whole workers movement against the government's policy.

Nonetheless there was a united attitude by the Workers Commissions and the UGT and some very important mobilizations took place. The workers defeat under these conditions could not help but effect their morale and it speeded up trade-union disaffection. The UGT is cynically using that experience to justify its present line.

line incorporated this new orientation. The program is not a real economic plan. Rather it is a sort of declaration of principles concerning the government's basic economic objectives. In addition to reaffirming and deepening the "austerity" policy (with the rise in public expenditures consistently remaining below the rise in the Gross National Product), the two most important aspects of this program concern "labor relations."

For example, the plan asserts that "the factory manager must have the means to act as such, organizing the structure of production and arranging the productive factors in line with the demands of the market." The seemingly sophisticated technological language does not hide the real intention, which is to reestablish the authority of the "factory manager," the big demand of the employers.

In addition, the government is renouncing what it calls the "policy of intervention" regarding work conditions. From now on, the government will establish by decree the conditions for public employees,⁵ and it will "encourage" pacts between the employers and the labor federations, playing solely an "advisory" role in establishing the upper limits of these pacts in terms of the "public interest."

The real significance of this program can already be seen in practice, especially in the Labor Statute and the Interconfederational Basic Accord (AMI). The Labor Statute singles out public employees. It establishes that the minimum wage will be set by the government and that the legal workweek is 43 hours. Above all it establishes conditions that make it very easy to lay workers off.

Initially the draft of the Labor Statute contained a whole series of measures limiting the right to strike and making it easier to carry out lockouts. But in order to get the PSOE to vote for the law in the Cortes, the UCD agreed that those latter points would be taken out of the Labor Statute and would instead be covered by other laws.

The CP, following long negotiations in the course of which it stressed the positive aspects of the law, ended up voting against it when the CP's modest amendments were rejected.

The Interconfederational Basic Accord establishes guidelines for wage negotiations limiting wage hikes to between 13 and 16 percent. At the same time it includes a series of clauses allowing the bosses to establish raises of less than 13

5. We should point out the government's peculiar "flexibility" on this question. The wage ceiling imposed on government workers as a whole is 12.5%. But the wages of the Civil Guards were increased 18 percent and those of the rest of the police 21%.

We do not know the figures for the army, but we feel confident that they too benefited from this "flexibility."

percent.

The stated objective of the AMI is "to increase productivity in order to reestablish company profits." In practice one of its objectives is to drastically reduce supplementary remuneration (bonuses, overtime pay, etc.). These make up a considerable portion of the real wages of Spanish workers.

The Labor Statute provoked one of the biggest workers mobilizations seen in recent years, despite the UGT's opposition. (In July 1979 the UGT had concluded an agreement with the CEOE, and it abandoned its overall opposition to the proposed statute, contenting itself with supporting the amendments the PSOE put forward in the Spanish parliament.)

In the Basque country, the December 7 general strike against the statute exceeded the scope of all previous mobilizations (which is saying something in the Basque country). In Madrid a demonstration of more than 300,000 people took place. In all, more than 2 million workers took part in mobilizations against the statute in early December. Among them were many UGT members who did not follow their leadership's opposition to the mobilizations.

Despite all this, the statute did go into effect. This shows that the COs line of "applying pressure for negotiations" is not only reformist, but in the present situation is also totally ineffective.

The second aspect of the Government Economic Program would have even more serious effects. The program's objectives regarding wages, productivity, and the like, while important, were not as decisive as the challenge it posed to the Spanish workers movement's traditions of mobilizing around wage demands. This tradition was challenged by the establishment of nationally established "limits" on wage increases, nationally established productivity clauses, and so on.

Furthermore, because the Workers Commissions had refused to sign the Interconfederational Basic Accord, while the UGT did sign, this meant that the fight over that agreement took on the aspect of a battle against the Workers Commissions. The government and the bosses, with the collaboration of the UGT, threw all their weight into that fight.

The UGT's willingness to collaborate in the fight against the Workers Commissions meant that the UGT and the employers quickly reached agreements covering whole branches of industry or individual factories. In these accords the employers made relatively substantial concessions on wage levels, although these were largely compensated for by the general provisions in the application of the AMI and by the projected inflation rate for that year.

The government immediately gave these agreements the status of law even though the UGT by itself was generally a minority in the negotiating committees.

For their part, although the COs carried

out actions to pressure the employers and denounced the UGT, they ended up signing accords that fell far short of their initial proposals and in fact were in line with the UGT-employer agreements. In their opposition to the AMI the COs never presented the fight against the accord as a central battle of the whole workers movement, a battle whose immediate objectives should be part and parcel of an overall plan to resist the right wing and win a victory over it.

We can already judge the results of the first quarter of 1980. More than 260 agreements were signed, involving about 4 million workers. The average wage increase was 15.54% (according to official figures which do not correspond to reality). We must, however, take into account that this raise is higher than in the previous year and is close to the 1979 inflation rate, which was 15.6%.

Some 60% of the agreements were signed for a two-year period. This was one of the objectives of the employers, who want to get away from the tradition of annual agreements. The great majority of the agreements fall within the general guidelines established by the Interconfederal Basic Accord.

On the other hand, 10 million hours of work were lost in January and February due to strikes, which was less than the figures for the same period in 1979. This tendency remained in force during the month of March as well. The figures are particularly striking if we exclude the Basque country and Catalonia. Excluding these two regions from consideration, during the first quarter of 1980 there were 80.74% fewer hours of work lost in strikes than in the corresponding period of the previous year.

The significance of these facts is clear: the offensive against the workers has had some success. The workers movement has suffered a new and serious setback. Under these conditions the right-wing offensive will continue, and in the coming months two new labor laws will threaten the workers: the Basic Employment Law and the Strike Law.

The draft of the Basic Employment Law is a real provocation, which has worried some sectors of the bourgeoisie. This law, in addition to introducing temporary work contracts and part-time work contracts, and in addition to using subsidies for capitalists who establish jobs as the only form of fighting unemployment, also projects a big reduction in unemployment

compensation for all workers who have not been in the social security system for three consecutive years. The draft law does not include any meaningful aid for young people who are seeking their first job, of whom there are nearly 800,000 in the Spanish state. We should remember that according to official figures 10.14% of the total active population, and 16% of the active wage-earning population, are presently unemployed.

Sixty percent of these unemployed are young people between 16 and 24 years of age, and 34% are women.

Only 41% of the unemployed receive unemployment compensation, and only 25% of unemployed women. Expenditures for unemployment compensation in 1979 were only 1.6% of the Gross National Product, while subsidies, tax credits, and other forms of aid to private business represented 4.3% of the GNP!

The CP and the Workers Commissions proposed to the PSOE and UGT that there be united action against the Basic Employment Law on the basis of counterproposals, particularly on the question of unemployment compensation. This proposal was rejected, and the PSOE was content to put forward slight amendments to the law.

The content of the draft Strike Law is not yet known.

The National and Regional Question

In regard to the national and regional question the government has had to carry out two relatively contradictory operations. The first was to achieve "consensus" in regard to the Catalan and Basque autonomy statutes. The elections in Catalonia and the Basque country in March 1980 and the events since then have shown that in the Spanish state, bourgeois political leadership can only be exercised if it is shared between the UCD and the bourgeois nationalist parties of the Basque country and Catalonia—the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and the Democratic Convergence coalition (CiU) led by former banker Jordi Pujol.

So there is no alternative but to develop some agreement between the UCD and the bourgeois nationalist parties, and such a pact must be fundamentally based on the autonomy statutes.

But this means that the UCD must carry out a radical turn in the autonomy policy it has followed since 1977. That policy has been to encourage the appearance of "autonomist" demands in all the nationalities and regions of the Spanish state. The obvious objective of this demagogic policy

was to create divisions and confrontations between peoples, and especially to create enmity against the Basque people, while at the same time trying to strangle the strongest national aspirations by using the argument that "certain groups of people should not have special privileges."

Once the consensus was reached regarding the Basque and Catalan statutes (without too much trouble), the UCD switched gears and began to carry out what it cynically called "rationalization" of autonomy statutes for the other peoples of the Spanish state.

In fact, the bourgeoisie is now trying to establish the maximum possible degree of centralization in the rest of the Spanish state. To this end it is placing big obstacles in the way of the development of the radical nationalist movements that, under different forms, are getting stronger among various nationalities and regions (Canary Islands, Galicia, Andalusia).

The PSOE initially collaborated enthusiastically with the government in this task. With the aid of the PSOE, the government was able to win approval in the parliament for a legal mechanism that in practice forces autonomy to take place along the so-called slow path except in the unavoidable cases of the Basque country, Catalonia, and Galicia.

The constitution had established two paths toward autonomy: Article 143 (called the "slow path") and Article 151 (the "rapid path"). Neither of these articles accept the right of self-determination. But while Article 151 is the basis for the regimes now in place in Catalonia and the Basque country, Article 143 only allows for some administrative decentralization.

Moreover, there are real obstacles placed in the way of most nationalities in Spain utilizing the "rapid path" of Article 151. In the "historic nationalities"—Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia—all of which were under autonomy statutes in the 1930s, a simple majority vote is required to approve the autonomy statutes.

But for the other nationalities there is a jungle of obstacles to using Article 151. The severest obstacle is the so-called initiative referendum. Under it, in order to follow the "rapid path," an absolute majority of all registered voters (whether they vote or not) must vote in favor of using the "rapid path" in each province of the nationality or region in question.

This means that all those who don't vote, for whatever reason, are counted as voting "no." If "yes" does not receive a majority of all eligible voters in each province, the "slow path" of Article 143 immediately and automatically takes effect.

This is what happened in the referendum in Andalusia on February 28. There, "yes" received the votes of 55.8% of all registered voters, despite government appeals for abstention. But in one of the eight provinces involved, the "yes" vote

Overall Comparison of Strikes, 1978 and 1979

| | 1978 | 1979 | Percent |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|
| Number of Strikes | 1,356 | 1,789 | up 31.33% |
| Workforce of factories effected | 5,634,215 | 10,068,712 | up 78.80% |
| Number of workers on strike | 3,633,004 | 5,752,304 | up 58.23% |
| Hours of labor lost | 128,738,478 | 171,067,049 | up 32.87% |

was only 47 percent of all registered voters and therefore the "rapid path" was defeated. If the same criteria had been followed in Catalonia, the autonomy statute would have failed there, since the "yes" vote was less than 50% in the province of Tarragona.

The discussion on the draft statute for Galicia marked a turning point in the UCD's so-called autonomy policy. In contrast to Catalonia and the Basque country, in Galicia the centralist right wing, particularly the UCD, has an overwhelming parliamentary majority. In the March 1, 1980, elections in Galicia, twenty-nine members of the UCD were elected to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, compared to nine members of the PSOE and five members of the People's Alliance (AP).

Therefore the UCD felt it did not have to seek a "consensus" with Galician bourgeois nationalist forces and was able to impose a statute tailored to its concepts. The draft statute, which the people of Galicia have called the "statute of chieftains," falls far short of the one for Catalonia or the Basque country. In particular, it gives the central government much greater control over the future local government. The date of the referendum on the Galician draft autonomy statute has not yet been announced.

This draft statute has provoked big mass mobilizations against it. Nearly all the parties, except for the centralist right, announced from the beginning that they will vote "no" in the referendum. That could be the jumping off point for an offensive to break the political hegemony of the reactionaries in Galicia.

Meanwhile the UCD is trying to reach an agreement with the PSOE in Galicia on the basis of a "broad" interpretation of the

Results of Elections in Catalonia

(Parties that elected members of parliament)

| Parties | Gen. Elections June 15, 1978 | Gen. Elections March 1, 1979 | Catalan Elections March 20, 1980 | Difference 1979 to 1980 |
|-------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| CiU | 522,060 16.8% | 483,432 | 754,896 23.0% | +271,464 |
| PSC/PSOE | 880,539 28.4% | 875,550 29.2% | 609,884 23.0% | -265,666 |
| PSUC/PCE | 564,574 18.2% | 512,906 17.1% | 509,606 19.0% | -3,300 |
| CC/UCD | 521,419 16.8% | 570,958 19.1% | 287,904 11.0% | -283,054 |
| ERC | 141,959 4.5% | 123,474 4.1% | 241,771 9.0% | +118,294 |
| PSA | — | — | 72,186 3.0% | — |
| Abstentions | 21.7% | 31.6% | 39% approx. | |

Other parties: "Unity for Socialism" (electoral coalition of the LCR, MC, PT, and OCE (BR) got 35,000 votes in the March 20, 1980 elections (1.5%). The "Left Nationalists" and BEAN, two radical nationalist formations, got 46,500 and 14,500 votes respectively.

Initials: CiU—Convergence and Union (coalition around Democratic Convergence); PSC-PSOE—Socialist Party of Catalonia-PSOE; PSUC-PCE—United Socialist Party of Catalonia (the Catalan CP); CC-UCD—Catalan Centrists-UCD; ERC—Republican Left of Catalonia; PSA—Andalusian Socialist Party.

provisions of the statute—which it will probably achieve—in order to assure itself a majority in the referendum.

This was the first move in the UCD's centralist offensive. Other and more serious moves were to follow, as in Andalusia, where we have already described how autonomy was defeated despite receiving a majority vote.

A short time before the referendum in Andalusia was to take place, the UCD announced that it was calling for abstention and it launched a reactionary campaign that tried to link a "yes" vote to

"Marxism." The referendum then turned into a battle between the right and left. This overshadowed the choice between the two alternative constitutional paths toward autonomy, despite the desire of the PSOE and especially the CP to remove any political content from the confrontation.

The results of the vote were, in fact, a victory for the people of Andalusia and a defeat for the UCD, although due to the rules mentioned before the "rapid path" was defeated. In Andalusia the confluence of an explosive social situation and a growing consciousness of the existence of special oppression will undoubtedly lead the Andalusian people to become one of the most active elements in the resistance to the right in the future.

But without question the March 9 Basque elections and the March 21 Catalan elections were the two most serious defeats the government has suffered since 1977, not only in terms of the "autonomy" question, but in general terms as well (see tables).

Despite differences between the two elections, we can draw basically similar conclusions from both. These conclusions can be summarized in the following manner.

The government's centralist policy suffered a serious defeat. If we add the situation in Galicia and Andalusia, and the conflicts that are developing on the question of autonomy in the Canary Islands, Valencia, and Aragon, the result is that the UCD's whole autonomy policy is in danger.

But to understand the real significance of the government's defeat and its consequences, we must take three things into account.

The first point is that the UCD's poor

Results of Elections in Basque Country

(Parties that elected members of parliament)

| Parties | Gen. Elections June 15, 1978 | Gen. Elections March 1, 1979 | Basque Elections March 9, 1980 | Difference 1979 to 1980 |
|-------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| PNV | 303,931 | 275,292 | 350,283 37.59% | +74,991 |
| HB | — | 149,685 | 152,162 16.32% | +2,477 |
| PSOE | 267,753 | 190,235 | 130,542 14.00% | -59,693 |
| EE | 64,126 | 80,098 | 90,064 9.66% | +9,966 |
| UCD | 129,590 | 168,607 | 78,310 8.40% | -90,297 |
| AP | 71,916 | 34,108 | 43,853 4.70% | +9,754 |
| PCE | 46,003 | 45,893 | 37,051 3.97% | -8,802 |
| Abstentions | 15.96% | 31.35% | 41.18% | |

Other parties—EMK (MC): approx. 10,000; LKI (LCR): approx. 5,000; PTE: approx. 3,500.

Initials: PNV—Basque Nationalist Party; HB—Herri Batasuna; PSOE—Spanish Socialist Workers Party; EE—Euskadiko Eskerra; AP—People's Alliance; PCE—Communist Party of Spain; EMK (MC)—Communist Movement; LKI (LCR)—Revolutionary Communist League; PTE—Labor Party of Spain.

results in the elections among the various nationalities are not identical to the results that the UCD would get in general elections in the same areas. There are undoubtedly a large number of bourgeois voters who have "dual loyalty," depending on what kind of elections are taking place. Certainly some of the votes that the UCD lost to the bourgeois nationalist formations in the Basque and Catalan elections will return to the UCD in the general elections.

The second point to keep in mind is that the PSOE was the other big loser in these elections.

And the third thing to note is that the winners were the bourgeois nationalist parties. This means that although the government suffered a defeat, the bourgeoisie in general did not!

As was already mentioned, the big winners were the PNV in the Basque country and the CiU in Catalonia. These parties obviously have quite different traditions and operate within the context of different sociopolitical situations. But their objective function is the same: each is the main bourgeois party within its respective nationality, and both are prepared to assume their role within the framework of an uneasy alliance with the central bourgeoisie.

The homogeneous governments that each has established correspond to this objective, with the CiU acting with considerably more reserve in this regard.

Finally, we should note that in Catalonia the bourgeoisie approached the elections as a class battle aimed expressly at ending the electoral majority that the working-class parties maintained until then among Catalans. The employers poured hundreds of millions of pesetas into propaganda against a "Marxist vote."

PSOE leader Felipe González responded to this campaign by respectfully asserting that he felt the campaign was in "error," that the bosses "should spread their risks and not place all their bets on one horse." The policy reflected in that sentence is what led the PSOE to disaster in the elections.

There can be no doubt that the PSOE bears the greatest responsibility for the defeat that the entire workers movement suffered in Catalonia. The Socialist leadership tried to explain away its poor results by pointing to the high level of abstention.

It is true that a very significant portion of PSOE voters in Catalonia abstained, and it is also true that a significant portion in the Basque country voted for the PNV. As a result of this switch, the PNV came in first in areas such as Baracaldo where the workers parties have traditionally dominated, just as the CiU became the number one party in votes in Tarrasa and came in second in Sabadell.

But the high level of abstentions primarily resulted from the PSOE's suicidal policy. The PSOE has been in the vanguard

of procentralism in the Basque country (using the pretext that socialism's historic reason for existence is to fight against all forms of nationalism). In Catalonia the PSOE has been the main workers party since June 15, 1977, but it did not carry out the responsibilities that go with that.

The CP's losses were less serious than those of the PSOE. It retains a solid base in Catalonia and remains a marginal force in the Basque country, where for the most part its political space is occupied by Euskadiko Eskerra (Basque Left).

But the isolation of the CP in the Basque country has been primarily the result of its policy of opposing ETA (Basque Nation and Freedom), a nationalist group that carries out armed actions, and its de facto support for the police. This policy was notably illustrated by Carrillo, who went so far as to say during the campaign that Herri Batasuna (People United), a pro-ETA political formation, reminded him "of the German Nazi Party in its early period."

Finally, although the Basque Trotskyists of the Revolutionary Communist League (LKI) and the far-left Catalan "Unity for Socialism" ran excellent election campaigns, in both regions the workers parties of the revolutionary left received nearly identical marginal vote totals (about 1.5%).

These vote totals reflect an objective fact. The present situation and the present stage of the workers movement have a major effect on the parties that are not strong enough to be seen as a practical alternative to the reformist leaderships. And in the Basque country we have had to add the complete polarization of the elections around the national question, with the result that people who are struggling for a radical solution to national oppression often cast a "useful" vote for the revolutionary nationalist parties.

In Catalonia the revolutionary nationalist organizations are only embryonic, while in the Basque country their weight was reconfirmed.

Basque Revolutionary Nationalist Organizations

More than ever, Herri Batasuna is a heterogeneous movement that encompasses a number of very different attitudes, all of which reject the existing situation in the Basque country. Herri Batasuna's political orientation focuses on the struggle for the immediate and total democratization of Basque political life, which is concretized around a five-point peace plan it presented to the central government (amnesty, legalization of the proindependence parties, withdrawal of the Forces of Public Order from the Basque country, Basque government control over the armed forces stationed in the Basque country, and improvement of the living standards of the workers).

Outside the framework of this peace

proposal, Herri Batasuna refuses to participate in the "institutions of the reform," ranging from the central parliament in Madrid to the Basque parliament. This stance has given the PNV an absolute majority in the Basque parliament.

"Peace" quite obviously means the end of activities by the Military-ETA, with which Herri Batasuna maintains relations of unconditional mutual support. Within Herri Batasuna there are a gamut of positions running from those who favor pressure on the PNV and are clearly oriented toward a "national front" (*frente abertzale*) of the PNV, Euskadiko Eskerra, and Herri Batasuna, all the way to the sectors most closely tied to the working class and oriented toward struggle against the bourgeoisie, including the Basque bourgeoisie.

The existence of this gamut of positions should not lead us to forget Herri Batasuna's fundamental significance. It is a rejectionist movement that involves the majority of the most combative sector of Basque youth and a considerable fringe of workers.

Euskadiko Eskerra saw continued growth in its vote total, which corresponds to the growth of its political influence, particularly within the working class. Its line could be characterized as Basque Eurocommunist. In fact, Euskadiko Eskerra's adaptation of the central theses of Eurocommunism to the Basque country has had an effect within the CP itself, with three members of the CP Central Committee in the Basque country going over to the Euskadiko Eskerra during the election campaign.

Euskadiko Eskerra is continuing to increase its orientation toward the working class. This means that its evolution will be one of the most significant factors in reshaping the workers movement in the Basque country.

In Catalonia the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC—Republican Left of Catalonia) did very well in the elections, winning nearly as many votes as the UCD. The ERC is the old Esquerra, which won the only previous Catalan election in 1932, before the outbreak of the Civil War. The ERC today is led by Josep Tarradellas, the key man in the "reform" in Catalonia and until recently head of the Generalitat (local government) in Catalonia, and it has little in common with the old Esquerra led by Francisco Macià and Luis Companys.

What is most significant about the ERC's results is that the Esquerra won many votes that in the previous elections had gone to the PSOE. This is additional evidence that sectors of the petty bourgeoisie who voted for the reformist workers parties in 1977 were disappointed and are now turning toward different types of nationalist parties.

The Esquerra will now try to play the role of a "bridge" between Pujol's CiU and

the Socialists, while drawing closer to Pujol's party. The Esquerra supported Pujol's election as head of the Catalan government.

We should also note that the Andalusian Socialist Party (PSA) won seats in Catalonia. The PSA waged a campaign aimed at Andalusian emigrant workers living in Catalonia. These results are of particular concern in regard to the additional division they introduce into the workers movement.

Finally, the abstention rate was one of the central factors in both elections. This was especially the case among emigrant workers from other areas who are working in the Basque country or Catalonia. It is another example of what it is currently fashionable to call the "disenchantment" with Spanish politics. In fact the abstention rate results from political disorientation and disappointment in a context where the living conditions of the working class are deteriorating.

In order to organize resistance to the right, it will be necessary to find ways to remobilize these layers of workers.

The strength of the nationalist bourgeoisie rests in its ability to present itself as the standard bearer of nationalist demands, and not only in the Basque country. Virtually throughout the Spanish state the national question will continue to be a decisive political question. The unity of the workers movement can only be built on the basis of providing a radical response to the national question.

Institutional Stabilization of the Regime

Finally, in addition to solving the national question, the institutional stabilization of the regime requires the establishment of legislation furthering the bourgeoisie's aims in areas such as divorce, abortion, education, local reforms, and mass media. And above all, reform of the coercive apparatus (the army, police, the judicial and penal systems, and so on) must be completed.

Undoubtedly the basic problem will be the army. The officer corps is in fact a quite homogeneous reactionary grouping. Some 80% of new officers are the sons of officers, which accentuates the caste spirit within the army.⁶

In recent declarations to the Italian newspaper *Il Messaggero*, King Juan Carlos maintained that unity of the army under his command would be decisive for the success of the "reform." Up to now, in fact, this "decisive role" has consisted of the military hierarchy setting itself up as a force that exerts constant reactionary political pressure on the government and

slows the government down any time it goes "too far" in its compromises with the left.

The reformist leaders of the workers movement have been turned into a force within the mass movement that insures that the pressures by the military officers will be accepted.

In certain conflicts between the government and the military hierarchy, the king has intervened, forcing compromises, each of which has increased the government's control over the army.

The result of these complex relations is that on the key political problems (the national question, public order, international policy, etc.) the government must always achieve a consensus with the military hierarchy. Although the general tendency of the UCD's policies has been to keep moving further to the right, serious conflicts still develop quite often between the military hierarchy and the government.

The stability of the regime's state apparatus requires that the government carry out a replacement of the military chiefs. But it must make absolutely sure that this replacement does not take the form of any sort of "purge" and it must give the key positions to men who the government has confidence in but who also have authority within the military hierarchy.

Resistance and Counteroffensive

These, then, are the three grand objectives of the offensive that the bourgeoisie unleashed against the workers following its March 1, 1979, victory in the general elections.

But the left's victory in the April 1979 municipal elections was a striking demonstration that it was possible to organize resistance to the right-wing government. For a time it seemed that the workers' desire for unity would force the reformist leaders to change their policies. May Day 1979 was a symbol of the unity and renewed confidence of millions of workers who hoped that the errors that had led to the UCD's March 1 victory would be corrected. But what followed was another predictable disappointment.

The Twenty-Eighth Congress of the PSOE, held in late May 1979, showed that the Social Democratic leadership was also ready to make a turn. But the turn it had in mind was to manage the economic crisis for the bourgeoisie, while looking for a direct confrontation with the CP. At the September 1979 special congress of the PSOE these positions won hands down.

From the beginning the UGT leadership enthusiastically supported the PSOE's right turn and, in mid-1979 the UGT reached an agreement with the CEOE, the employers organization. This agreement contained all the elements of the "social pact" line that was later carried out.

The leaders of the CP and the Workers Commissions sought to profit from the

PSOE's right turn. To this end they put forward a line that called for unity and was more militant. But their stated objective was and remains a return to the policy of "consensus." For that reason there were very strict limits to the "unity" and "militancy" that CP-leader Santiago Carrillo and CO-leader Marcelino Camacho claimed to favor.

For example, in a recent speech Carrillo proposed both a general political unity pact with the PSOE, and the PSOE's entry into the Suárez government "to prevent the government from continuing to evolve to the right." That is also why the numerous mobilizations called by the COs in recent months were limited to demonstrations that lacked a battle plan or clear political objectives.

With this orientation it will be impossible to carry out the fight against the policies put forward by the Social Democratic leadership. Furthermore, this policy will cause the most combative sectors of the workers movement to become frustrated. These sectors have looked to the COs as the basic instrument for confronting the rightist offensive.

The leaders of both the PSOE and the CP, in their own ways, were to contribute to deepening the negative effects that the "consensus" has already produced in the workers movement. The government and the employers therefore had good conditions to launch their offensive in mid-1979.

Since then there have been numerous large mobilizations and events, too many to be listed here. There have been mobilizations of students and teachers, including struggles in response to the ever increasing fascist attacks. There have been struggles in response to the steadily increasing police repression and attacks by the government on basic civil liberties.

But the two central questions that continue to dominate political life are undoubtedly the government's social offensive and its centralist offensive.

New Conditions

After nearly three years of a "constituent period," the "reform" has been completed. The regime has now been "constituted." The bourgeoisie has been able to maintain its political leadership during the entire process. The policy of revolutionaries must respond to the new conditions.

In this article we have pointed to different manifestations of the crisis of bourgeois leadership—from the internal problems in the UCD (it took Suárez three weeks to work out an agreement among the various clan chiefs to set up a new governmental team that was very similar to the preceding one), all the way to the conflicts with sectors of the state apparatus and with the bourgeois nationalist parties.

There are obviously many points of friction in the regime's mechanisms, and frequent applications of "monarchist oil"

6. As a result of repression and of the disappearance of the "Democratic Military Union," which was made up of some young officers in the last years of Franco's rule, there are no organizations of this type today as far as we know. The soldiers organizations that had ties to the far left a few years ago have also disappeared.

are needed to keep it functioning.

But are González and Carrillo correct when they maintain that "democracy is in the process of decaying" or that we are moving toward infiltration of "dictatorship"?

The problem is not that "democracy is rotting." The problem is that this regime, this bourgeois parliamentary democracy that the PSOE and CP leaders decisively helped to create, has to function in this manner. It was set up to function like this—with its corruption, its fascist assassinations carried out with impunity, its torturers heading up the police, its denial of basic democratic rights, the social and political offensive being carried out by the government and the employers—and it cannot function any other way.

In other words, this regime can only be governed by the right.

This conclusion and the political consequences that flow from it must be explained to the workers, and that is precisely what González and Carrillo do not want to do.

Clearly there are sectors of the state apparatus who have been and continue to apply pressure for a "Bonapartist solution." A repeat of "1934"—when the army was called in to savagely repress the workers and nationalist movements—is always possible. But that is not the bourgeoisie's policy today. The only way we can anticipate and destroy the threats against freedom is by systematically fighting the bourgeoisie's policy.

That is why, as the LCR's May Day declaration asserted, it is necessary "to change the policy that has led the workers movement up to now. Because that policy is the source of the disenchantment and disunity that we now suffer from."

This is the central problem for all revolutionists, a problem that is confirmed in daily experience. Take one recent example. On May Day the fascists in Madrid assassinated a leader of the tenants movement, Arturo Pajuelo. This was the fifth fascist assassination in Madrid since the beginning of the year.

The reaction of the workers and common people was very significant. There was a demonstration of several thousand people, a general strike in the neighborhood where the murdered comrade lived, other strikes, and so on. The PSOE and the CP felt they had to do "something." So they called a demonstration for . . . May 29!

Many things are decaying in the country. But there are also living processes, changes and renewals going on, as was revealed in the response to Arturo's murder. These changes and renewals are today scattered throughout the factories, among the youth and women, in all the demonstrations against the right. That is where we must battle against the movement's disunity and disorientation. That is where a revolutionary party can be strengthened. That is where the LCR must be. □

As Election Date Approaches

Bolivian Coup Rumors Abound

By Will Reissner

As Bolivia's June 29 presidential elections approach, the country's political life has been dominated by rumors of military coups and by rightist terror attacks against left-wing and trade-union organizations. These events have overshadowed the election campaign.

The most vicious rightist attack was the bombing of a plane carrying five prominent members of the Democratic People's Unity (UDP) slate, including the UDP's vice-presidential candidate Jaime Paz Zamora, who was the only survivor. Hours earlier, Paz's home had been bombed.

The UDP's presidential candidate, former President Hernán Siles Zuazo, had been scheduled to be on the plane that was blown up, but cancelled his plans at the last moment.

The UDP is an electoral coalition made up of Siles's Left Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, which is a bourgeois nationalist grouping, along with the Bolivian Communist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which has ties to international Social Democracy.

In recent weeks, major army garrisons have been placed on alert by the high command. The armed forces also sent a letter to interim President Lidia Gueiler demanding that elections be postponed for a year in order "to reorganize the nation before the citizens go to the polls."

A military coup was apparently planned for May 31, but was cancelled after U.S. Ambassador Marvin Weissman made the plans public and warned that the coup would not have Washington's blessing at this time.

U.S. officials fear that a coup before the elections could spark a full-fledged civil war. They worry about a repeat of the unsuccessful November 1979 coup. At that time, Col. Alberto Natusch Busch seized power but was forced to step down after sixteen days of fierce resistance organized by the Bolivian Workers Federation (COB).

In the fighting against the Natusch coup more than 300 people were killed before the military was forced back into their barracks. Since then, armed groups and committees have been organized in working-class neighborhoods and in the unions to resist another coup.

In the present crisis, the COB has ordered its members on to a full alert. The National Committee in Defense of Democracy has called on the population to prepare for a general strike in the event of an attempted coup.

While it is not certain that the military will strike before the June 29 elections, few observers believe that the elections will



lead to any degree of political stability. If they take place, they will be the third presidential elections in as many years.

In 1978 the election results were annulled due to flagrant fraud. In 1979, no candidate got 50 percent of the vote, and the congress elected an interim president, Walter Guevara Arce. Guevara was then overthrown in November by Natusch, who in turn had to step down and was replaced by the current interim president, Lidia Gueiler.

Underlying Bolivia's political instability is the country's desperate poverty and ongoing economic crisis. There is no capitalist political formation with sufficient authority among the masses to get them to accept the brutal attacks on their living standards that the capitalists need to survive.

At the same time, the Bolivian workers are well organized and have a tradition of militant struggle. Their strength, relative to the weakness of the capitalist forces, means that the military is constantly called in to save capitalism by attempting to crush the workers movement.

But the victory of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and the rise of revolutionary struggles throughout Central America and the Caribbean are providing the Bolivian workers and peasants with a powerful example of how the crisis can finally be resolved in their favor.

Revolutionary Marxists in Bolivia are calling on the COB to become the organizational pole for mass resistance to a future coup, and they are working in the unions and neighborhoods to strengthen the military groups and committees that are being established. □