

Intercontinental Press


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Part of crowd of 1.5 million at Havana May Day rally.

May Day Speech by Fidel Castro

**CUBA PREPARES TO DEFEND
REVOLUTION IN CARIBBEAN**

SWEDEN
Biggest
Labor Conflicts
Ever

YUGOSLAVIA
Strikes
and Workers
Self-Management
Today

PORTUGAL
Farmworkers
Lead Fight
Against
Capitalists

NICARAGUA
Council of
State Opens,
Capitalist
Parties
Boycott It

Cuba Prepares to Defend Revolution in Caribbean

By Steve Clark

In the space of less than two weeks, there were two demonstrations in Havana of more than a million people. The May Day rally of 1.5 million was the largest outpouring in Cuban history. And President Fidel Castro has predicted that 5 million Cubans will participate in the "March of the Fighting People" on May 17.

Why such an intensive month of mass mobilizations in Cuba?

Castro explained why in his May Day speech, printed elsewhere in this issue.

Such a massive display of commitment to the Cuban revolution, Castro said, is helping to tear away the veil of lies behind which Washington hopes to prepare military aggression in the Caribbean. The imperialists are concerned "by the revolutionary victory in Nicaragua and the growing upsurge of the revolutionary movement in Central America," he explained, so they have begun "to make their preparations to establish a capability to intervene."

Castro pointed to the need for "the broadest international support in order to stay the hands of the imperialists" in El Salvador. "These demonstrations of ours are part of the struggle not only in defense of our own integrity," he said, "but also in defense of the integrity of Grenada, of Nicaragua, in defense of the sovereignty of the countries of the Caribbean and Central America."

Joining Castro as featured speakers at the Havana rally were Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada and Sandinista Commander Daniel Ortega from Nicaragua.

The first section of Castro's speech answered point by point the imperialist slanders around the events at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana: who the emigrants are; why they want to emigrate; why Cuba has never deported anyone, but bars no one from leaving; why "socialism . . . is the task of free men and women."

The rest of the speech was aimed at preparing the revolutionary-minded millions who have remained in Cuba to meet the dangers of U.S. military intervention.

The scheduled U.S. Marine landing exercise at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Castro said, was "clearly a practice invasion of our country." His announcement that Washington had decided to call off the landing and scale down its Caribbean maneuvers was met by shouts of "Fidel, be tough, Cuba must be respected!"

Despite this victory, Castro said, the

May 17 "March of the Fighting People" would go on. If Washington ended its blockade, gave up Guantánamo, stopped spy flights over Cuba, and respected the sovereignty of Grenada and Nicaragua, then the Cuban people would call off their march.

Instead, Washington is still preparing to stop the Salvadoran revolution and strike blows at Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada. And, as Castro had warned the imperialists in a speech two months earlier, if they "try to hold things back, they'll create a colossal Vietnam in Central America, or bigger still, in the hemisphere."

Castro announced at the May Day rally that plans were under way to train every able-bodied man and woman as part of militias to defend revolutionary Cuba. They will be trained in how to survive a total imperialist military blockade of food and fuel entering the island.

A foreign army can enter Cuba, Castro said, "but if they are going to tangle with a people like this . . . it is much harder to then leave."

"Do you know what really makes us strong—us, and Nicaragua, and Grenada?" he asked the massive crowd.

"The fact that these are people's revolutions, revolutions with deep roots, with great popular support."

Castro reported that 100,000 Cubans had already served as volunteers in internationalist missions, such as their aid to Angola in defeating South African invaders. Thousands more are serving as doctors in Africa and the Mideast, technicians in Grenada, teachers in Nicaragua.

These are the true representatives of the

Cuban people, Castro said, not the emigrants who are being played up by the big-business press.

Castro also took a jab at those his brother Raúl has publicly labelled the "fainthearted"—those, especially in the government or managerial positions, who have developed the habits of bureaucrats, pursue only their own personal comfort, value "buddyism" over discipline, and believe that Cuba should trade in its internationalism for economic and diplomatic deals with Washington.

Castro pointed out that some of these "softies," some "shameless types who had hidden their feelings," were among those leaving Cuba. And he remarked that "these pretenders were the ones who produced the most irritation" among the majority of Cuban working people.

Cuba does have "the duty to struggle to develop peace and collaboration between peoples," Castro said. "But we will never do it by getting on our knees at imperialism's feet to beg for peace."

And neither should the government of any other oppressed nation, he indicated. He challenged the leaders of the OPEC nations to refuse to sell a drop of oil to any country whose government joins in Carter's sanctions against Iran.

Castro condemned the attempted U.S. raid on Tehran, tying it in with Washington's threats in the Caribbean. The Cuban leaders are clearly aware that the revolution in Iran is a powerful ally of struggles in the Western Hemisphere, and that the failure of the U.S. attack on Iran was a factor in convincing Washington to scale down its planned maneuvers in the Caribbean.

As an article in the Cuban Communist Party daily *Granma* put it a few days before Castro's May Day speech:

"In Iran they lost five helicopters, a plane, eight men and the little prestige they had left. Has Carter considered what the United States might lose if it attacks Cuba? Maybe he is thinking about it now." □

Behind Bloody Storming of the London Embassy

By Gus Horowitz

British government representatives could not restrain their glee as they announced that a squad of elite troops had successfully stormed the Iranian Embassy in London May 5, putting an end to a six-day takeover by men who said they were fighting for justice for the Arab inhabitants of Iran.

When it was all over, five of the six Arabs and two of their twenty-one hostages were dead. Two more hostages were in serious conditions.

It "made us all proud to be British," said Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

"I think we had best consider how we can turn this superb operation to the best advantage of the American hostages."

For the British ruling class, and especially for its ally in Washington, the outcome could hardly have been better. They reaffirmed that their policy is to resort to force to resolve such crises on their own terms—whatever the cost.

When the Iranian Embassy was first seized, London told the occupiers it could do nothing to meet their stated demands: the release of ninety-one Arabs imprisoned in Iran and the granting of autonomy for

the largely Arab region of Khuzestan.

But British authorities insisted that they wanted "to resolve the situation without the loss of life."

Facts reveal that this was deliberate deception.

London police official John A. Dellow, who was in charge of negotiations, told a news conference May 6 that the occupiers had dropped their original demands. "I think that after making a certain amount of publicity for their cause, they just wanted to leave safely," he acknowledged.

But the British government had "given no consideration at all" to this offer, Dellow said. Instead, it kept the embassy surrounded by police and commandos, just waiting for a pretext to move in. They soon got their chance.

On May 5, at 7:00 p.m. according to police, the body of a dead hostage was pushed out the door of the building.

At 7:30 p.m. the British commandos launched their assault. It was after this that all remaining deaths and injuries occurred.

"This operation, an outstanding success, will show the world that we in Britain will not tolerate terrorism," crowed British Home Secretary William Whitelaw right afterwards.

Whitelaw—who had been London's appointed ruler over Northern Ireland in the early 1970s—clearly had in mind reaffirming the policy of brutal suppression against the Irish freedom struggle.

London's assertion of the value of strong-arm methods was also an announcement to the world that it backed Carter's stand towards the embassy crisis in Iran. A clear aim was to help cushion the impact of the U.S. debacle in the Iranian desert a couple of weeks before.

In addition, the capitalist media all over the world seized on the incident to berate the Iranian government for not seeing the supposed irony in the situation. They insisted that the lesson to be learned was that everyone must play by the same rules.

These rules, which are, of course, drawn up by the capitalists, decree that aggrieved parties must petition meekly to redress their grievances; they must never resort to force or direct action, which are prerogatives of the powerful alone.

In other words, the Iranians should not have seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, mobilized millions, and put their demand for justice at the center of the world's attention. They should instead have gone through diplomatic channels, where their request for the return of the shah could have been stalled forever.

For those who support the struggle of the oppressed, there are different rules. Actions are judged on the basis of how well they advance the cause of justice and freedom.

How does the incident in London measure up against this yardstick?

Little is known about the Arabs who

seized the Iranian embassy. Whether they are a group that arose out of struggles by the people in the Arab province of Iran; whether they are agents of Iraq, as Tehran has charged; whether they are a group of any significance at all—these still remain unanswered questions.

What is indisputable is that the Arab people living in Iran are an oppressed minority. Their fight for their rights is just. The Arab protesters in Iran's jails should be released.

Moreover, the Iranian government's denial of Arab rights weakens the Iranian revolution and the fight of all the peoples who live in Iran against imperialist domination.

The seizure of the Iranian Embassy in

London, however, in no way advanced the struggle of the Arab people of Iran.

The action came only six days after an aborted U.S. raid against Iran. It came in the midst of a months-long imperialist propaganda drive—hypocritically focused on the hostage issue—that aims to justify such aggression.

In this context, and regardless of intent, how could the political result of the London takeover have been anything but to give ammunition to Washington? How could it have helped the Arab masses win support from other Iranian working people for their demands?

Instead, the issue of Arab rights ended up buried in an avalanche of imperialist invective against Iran. □

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Sweden Faces Its Biggest Labor Conflict Ever

By Thom Gustaffson

STOCKHOLM—The biggest labor conflict ever to take place in Sweden broke out on May 2. Nine hundred thousand Swedish workers are currently not at their jobs—100,000 of them on strike and 800,000 locked out by their employers.

Not since the big strike of 1909, when close to 300,000 workers were out, has Sweden experienced anything like this. In comparison, during the metal workers strike in 1945, the other main labor struggle in this century, 112,000 workers took part. The number of participants in wild-cat strikes in recent years has been much lower, although these strikes played a big role in paving the way for the current struggle.

Most of the workers in the current conflict are in the industrial and trade sectors and are members of the Landsorganisation (LO—National Federation of Trade Unions), the main labor federation. Twelve thousand public workers are also on strike, while 14,000 of them are locked out by the state and municipal authorities. These groups are either members of the LO or of a white-collar federation in the public sector that is cooperating closely with the LO. In addition to these workers, more than one million wage earners are refusing to work overtime.

Most white-collar workers, however, are not engaged in the strike and lockout right now. Their union federations have taken a wait-and-see attitude.

Only on April 30 did it become clear that this conflict would really break out. This gave a new impetus to the May Day demonstrations.

It is a ninety-year-old tradition in the Swedish workers movement to demonstrate massively on the first of May. This year, the participation at the demonstrations and at the meetings that followed them was extraordinarily high. The labor leadership claimed up to 900,000 people turned out in 350 places all over the country, that is, slightly more than one-tenth of the whole Swedish population.

The main theme in these demonstrations was: "Enough. Enough of wage decrees. Enough of bourgeois arbitrariness. Enough of bourgeois governments."

Employers Say 'No'

Negotiations in this year's round of collective bargaining started more than six months ago, but so far there have been no clear gains for the workers. The employers have taken an extremely hard line. The Swedish Employers Association (SAF), which includes the overwhelming majority

of the big industrial and trade companies, has continually fought for a wage freeze, although price increases for basic commodities have been more than 8 percent over the last six months.

This hard-line attitude by the SAF is not due to any acute crisis in Swedish exports right now. On the contrary, many big Swedish companies are doing well in the export markets, and show increasing profits and growing dividends for their shareholders. But the employers and bankers know full well that a new international recession is on the way, and that such a recession will greatly affect them.

Swedish industry is highly dependent on exports, especially in iron ore, steel, paper, and paper pulp. Special steel, cars, and electronic products will also have to face sharp international competition in a stagnating or shrinking international market.

This is why the leaders of the SAF, Olof Ljungren and Curt Nicolin, now talk about the great lockout as a "good investment for the future."

Most of the workers in the conflict—800,000—have been hit by the employers' lockout. Swedish law gives the employers great leeway for carrying out lockouts. In the labor laws introduced by the Social Democrats, a lockout is considered a normal response to a strike or a ban by employees on working overtime.

The same regulations place great restrictions on the right to strike. The LO leadership can veto any substantial strike, and the law requires advance warning before a strike can take place. Strikes are banned while a contract is in force, and there is a system of compulsory mediation and labor courts.

Discontent Among Workers

The Swedish trade-union movement is not famous for its militancy. The big conflict this time is the result of the employers' hard line on the one hand, and on the other of the discontent among large layers of workers due to decreasing real wages and the anti-working-class economic policies of the government.

The LO leadership and the leadership of its member organizations have been subjected to such strong pressure from below that they find it impossible to sign contracts as bad as the last two. Swedish workers know full well that they have lost more than two months' wages in the last two years. They are not prepared to accept this a third time, especially not in the context of continuously rising prices, rising rent, and so on.

During this winter and spring, trade union after trade union on the local level demanded substantial wage increases. There has also been strong support, especially among metalworkers, for the campaign for the right to ratify contracts, which was started last autumn by the influential trade union at the Volvo plant in Göteborg, the biggest union local in all Scandinavia.

The national trade-union leaderships made many efforts to reach an agreement, after finally, with much delay, presenting their wage demands a couple of months ago. The demand was for an 11.3 percent wage increase.

The LO leadership withdrew its ban on overtime a couple of weeks ago "to give the state mediators room for new negotiation." But it was forced to reimpose the ban on overtime after the mediators, pressured by the bourgeois government, had presented the ridiculous offer of 1.5 percent, thereby slamming the door in the face of the LO negotiators, who were hoping for a compromise.

Social Democrats Hesitate to Take Over

The current conflict has strong political overtones. The employers know that they have a government that is very sensitive to their demands. The trade union leadership, on the other hand, had been accustomed to cooperating with a Social Democratic government for forty-four years—up until 1976, when it was voted out of office. Now they are fearful, especially in an economic situation which is getting worse and worse.

Both the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party refuse to mobilize against the government, although recent opinion polls say the Social Democrats represent 44 percent of the voting population, and would have a majority together with the VPK (the pro-Moscow Left Party of Communists).

The trade-union leadership says it does not want to politicize the conflict. The Social Democratic leadership says that it does not want to unleash a parliamentary crisis in addition to the labor conflict—something that would be quite easy to do, in light of the single vote majority of the bourgeois government in parliament.

Both Olof Palme, the Social Democratic chairman, and Gunnar Nilsson, the chairman of the LO and a Social Democratic member of parliament, have criticized the government but have refused to ask a vote of confidence in parliament.

Meanwhile, the industrial workers, as

well as hospital workers and subway engineers involved in the conflict, have been holding special strike meetings all over Sweden, generally with a high level of participation.

Demonstrations to protest the lockout and the increase in shareholder's dividends have been carried out in a number of places.

Tens of thousands of Swedish workers are now experiencing for the first time in their lives what it means to be a picket captain, and now and then what scabs look like.

Sweden Almost at a Standstill

Swedish trade unions have traditionally been heavily bureaucratized, but when they move, they have considerable organizational strength. For example, more than 97 percent of Swedish metalworkers are organized. The figure is substantially lower, however, in some other sectors, such as restaurant trades.

In general, the employers have not attempted large-scale strikebreaking activities. The strikebreaking efforts that have been made have usually been answered forcefully. In some towns, teachers have been called out on strike in retaliation for attempts by authorities to get white-collar workers to do work that the teachers were refusing. (In this case, the white-collar workers were members of the same federation as the teachers.)

Today, Sweden is nearly paralyzed. Most industrial production has come to a standstill, except in the case of cooperative-run companies. Industrial white-collar workers are at their jobs, but are refusing many tasks.

In Stockholm, the subway is closed, but the buses are still running. In Göteborg, the trams have almost completely stopped. In Uppsala, the buses have stopped. The rail system is still working, but there is only one port (near Denmark) where ferry and shipping activities are still functioning. The customs service is very restricted. All airports are completely closed. Radio broadcasts have been sharply curtailed, and on television only news comes through.

Some cinema and other entertainment centers will be hit by strikes in the coming weeks, and most restaurants will be on lockout.

Moreover, in the coming days, three out of four Swedish oil refineries will be closed down by strikes. The transport of oil and gas will be severely restricted as transport workers respond to the employers' decision to extend the lockout one more week, to May 18.

Negotiations are continuing, but the state mediators don't have much room for maneuver due to the government guidelines. The government has caused increased irritation among working people through a new austerity program, which will be decided on in parliament on June

Mobilize the Union Membership!

The Communist Workers League (KAF), Swedish section of the Fourth International, put out a special strike issue of its weekly newspaper *Internationalen*.

A front-page editorial urged that the lockout be turned into "a general strike against the employers and their representatives in government, against their efforts to force workers to bear the burden of the capitalist crisis."

The bosses "want to see the lockout turned into an extra vacation," *Internationalen* said, in order to keep "the workers atomized during the fight."

The battle will "never be won in closed negotiating rooms," the socialists explained, but only by "the membership in the streets, through union meetings, and outside the factory gates." To mobilize that kind of mass

power and participation, the editorial said, "The members of the trade unions must have the right to say what they think. They should have the right to ratify all proposed contracts."

The key to winning is the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of workers throughout Sweden, said the editorial.

"Organize efficient picket captains. Make sure all trade union members are continually informed about the strike and that the information is translated into the languages of the immigrant workers. Extra trade-union meetings; strike meetings and rallies organized jointly by private and public workers; united demonstrations. . . .

"If the strike is organized in this way . . . we will be able to win the fight against capital and its government."

11. This program calls for cutbacks in social expenditures, including in hospitals and childcare and in the system of retirement benefits.

The government denies that it is active in the negotiations, but everybody knows that it is there behind the scenes.

Premier Thorbjörn Fälldin already burned his fingers once through a "to rapid" intervention, as it is now called in the bourgeois press, when he held secret negotiations on a wage and price freeze. The main trade unions resisted, although some white-collar workers and teachers federations accepted it. The Social Democratic Party refused to go along—not for principled reasons, but because of the specific circumstances.

Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the government will come back with a new attempt to enforce a program of wage controls.

There is no significant sign of demoralization among industrial workers, although the fighting spirit is uneven. It will also take some time before broad layers of strikers begin to suffer economically. The strike funds are not depleted, and as a rule they could furnish workers with US\$20 to US\$25 a day for several months. But it is clear that international aid could eventually become very important.

The resistance among workers is more remarkable in light of the flood of propaganda against the trade unions in the press, radio, and television. Eighty percent of the press is in capitalist hands, which is strongly felt, especially since the Social Democratic press does not offer an adequate counterweight.

Radio and television are run by a state monopoly, but this does not stop them from crying out against the so-called countrywide misery. Well-paid commentators are given plenty of time to present their anti-working class analyses, and fake

opinion polls are presented as scientific truth.

Recently the trade unions have succeeded in establishing some local radio programs and in publishing some of their own strike papers.

Of course, there is a constant risk that the trade-union leadership will accept a somewhat improved, but still extremely inadequate proposal from the government mediators or passively accept some form of direct governmental intervention. The risk of a really bad settlement will increase if the struggle goes on for a long time and the level of activity decreases.

Such a settlement would certainly meet strong reaction in many factories and encourage campaigns for the right to ratify contracts. The problem, however, is how such sentiments could be translated into active national initiatives. Today there is no national force that could act as an alternative in such a situation, although there are a growing number of radical trade unionists and socialists.

Finally, one thing is clear. The present conflict has drawn Sweden, with its famous stable labor market, closer to continental Europe. The so-called Swedish model, with its reciprocal understanding and broad institutionalized cooperation between trade unions and employers, has been dealt a severe blow. The economic crisis, which affects Sweden more and more, has placed a big question mark over the traditional trade-union and reformist policies.

Dagens Nyheter, the biggest liberal morning paper, wrote in an editorial, "In a couple of days, our own and the international picture of Sweden were destroyed. The Swedish model broke to pieces."

One is tempted to add that it was high time, dear editors.

May 8, 1980

Council of State Opens in Nicaragua

By Pedro Camejo and Fred Murphy

MANAGUA—Nicaragua's Council of State held its first session here on May 4, "Day of National Dignity." The date marks the fifty-third anniversary of the opening of Gen. Augusto César Sandino's war to oust the U.S. Marines from Nicaragua.

The Council of State will function as a consultative and legislative body subordinate to the FSLN-led Junta of National Reconstruction; it may not override the junta's decisions. The council is made up of forty-seven delegates, the substantial majority of which represent working-class and peasant organizations.

Members of the council were sworn in at the morning organizational session presided over by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. They then elected Commander of the Revolution Bayardo Arce as president of the Council of State and chose a directing board.

The formal installation of the council took place in the evening at the Rubén Darío People's Theater and was broadcast live on nationwide television. It was attended by the National Directorate of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, the Junta of National Reconstruction, the Supreme Court, leaders of the mass organizations, the general staff of the Sandinista People's Army, cabinet ministers, and the foreign diplomatic corps.

Junta member Sergio Ramírez presented an extensive report on the measures taken and difficulties faced by the revolutionary government during the nine months since the victory of the anti-Somoza insurrection last July 19.

The ceremonial high point of the evening came when Commander Edén Pastora, chief of the Sandinista People's Militias, presented to the Council of State the Nicaraguan flag his commando unit recovered from Somoza's Congress in the daring August 1978 takeover of the Nicaraguan National Palace. Pastora, who gained fame as "Commander Zero" of that action, was embraced on the stage by Commanders "One" and "Two"—Hugo Torres and Dora María Téllez—who are now FSLN delegates to the Council of State.

Failure of Bourgeois Maneuvers

After the governing junta announced the decrees setting the council's composition on April 21, each organization was free to decide for itself how to choose its representative.

The mass organizations led by the FSLN—the Sandinista Workers Federation (CST), Rural Workers Association

(ATC), Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS), Association of Nicaraguan Women (AMN), and July 19 Sandinista Youth (JS-19)—chose their delegates through provincial, regional, and national assemblies. The candidacies of various activists and leaders were democratically discussed and voted on.

Most other organizations' representatives were selected by their respective executive bodies.

Three bourgeois parties were allotted one seat each in the Council of State. However, the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN)—led by ex-junta member Alfonso Robelo—and the Democratic Conservative Party are boycotting the council. They charge that it is "totalitarian" because the FSLN and mass organizations have a majority. The Social Christian Party has chosen its delegate but refused to participate in the initial session.

The six organizations of the industrialists, merchants, landlords, professionals, and big farmers that make up the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) joined Robelo in protesting the council's composition. But the COSEP organizations decided at the last minute to send their one delegate each.

All the bourgeois forces had complained



Poder Sandinista
Council President Bayardo Arce

bitterly when the makeup of the Council of State was made known on April 21. In democratizing the council by providing majority representation to the workers and peasants, the FSLN had altered the origi-

nal Program of Government adopted by the Junta of National Reconstruction before the anti-Somoza victory last July. That program called for a thirty-three member Council of State, with representation disproportionately weighted toward the bourgeois sectors of the anti-Somoza front.

Alleging that a supposed "pact" had been broken by the Sandinistas, the COSEP and bourgeois parties held meetings and issued statements calling for maintenance of the old formula. On April 22, Alfonso Robelo resigned from the governing junta, and his party, the MDN, declared that it was boycotting the Council of State.

Robelo had hoped to present the Sandinistas with a governmental crisis and discredit the Council of State, while rallying all the bourgeois forces around himself and the MDN. By shouting about the FSLN's alleged "totalitarianism," the MDN has sought to broaden its popular base, especially among the petty bourgeoisie.

Contrary to Robelo's hopes, however, the revolutionary regime weathered his withdrawal from the junta, as well as that of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (who resigned April 19 citing failing health). Instead of following Robelo, the vast majority of middle-class professionals and technicians employed by the government remained in their posts; some even publicly announced their resignation from the MDN.

Moreover, the fact that the bourgeoisie remains divided and on the defensive was shown by the COSEP's last-minute decision to send its delegates to the Council of State.

On the other hand, the FSLN continues to enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the workers and peasants and of decisive sectors of the petty bourgeoisie as well. This was obvious from the huge May Day turnout in Managua: more than 200,000 people participated, the vast majority in organized contingents from the trade unions, the ATC, and other mass organizations.

The FSLN's decision to expand the Council of State and give key dominance to the mass organizations is widely recognized as the profoundly democratic measure that it is, and hardly as the "totalitarian" move Robelo claims. On May Day, one of the most popular chants was, "In the Council of State—the Organized People!"

Until less than a year ago, Nicaragua

was ruled by one of Latin America's oldest and bloodiest U.S.-imposed dictatorships—the Somoza dynasty. Today, under the leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, the working people of this small Central American nation are taking historic steps toward democratic participation in shaping the political direction of their country.

The newly installed Council of State formally introduces the mass organizations of the workers and peasants into the governmental structure at the national level. It marks a further step toward the consolidation of a state that safeguards the interests of the working masses.

The development of democratic mass participation and organization in Nicaragua can be traced to the Civil Defense Committees (CDC) that both arose spontaneously and were initiated by the FSLN during the June-July 1979 insurrection. After the victory, these became the Sandinista Defense Committees coordinated at the city, regional and national levels. Now, the CDS and other mass organizations with similar origins in the class struggle (the CST, AMN, ATC, and JS-19) have been officially integrated into the government.

In addition to the Council of State, with its worker-peasant majority, there are other important examples on the local level of growing democratic political participation by the mass organizations.

In Masaya, the country's third largest city, a new municipal junta was recently chosen through the election of delegates from the Sandinista Defense Committees, the CST, and the ATC.


In Jalapa, a town in the northern province of Nueva Segovia, dissatisfaction with the local junta initially appointed from Managua led the mass organizations there to convene a "people's council." They forced the local junta to resign and elected a new junta that is now governing in coordination with the "people's council."

The composition of the Council of State also recognizes the right of non-FSLN currents in the Nicaraguan workers movement to express themselves and participate in the revolution—what the Sandinistas have called "political pluralism."

For example, despite the FSLN's overwhelming support among the workers and the continuing rapid growth of the Sandinista Workers Federation, five of the eight positions in the Council of State reserved for trade unions were given to non-FSLN-led unions. Two representatives were allotted to the Independent General Workers Federation (CGT-i), led by the pro-Moscow Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) and based primarily among construction workers; one representative to the Confederation of Trade Union Action and Unification (CAUS), led by the ultraleft Stalinist Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCN) and based mainly among Managua textile workers; one to the Confederation of Trade Union Unification (CUS), whose leaders

are tied to the AFL-CIO officialdom in the United States; and one to the Confederation of Nicaraguan Workers (CTN), which is controlled by an anticommunist Christian Democratic current.

In addition, a seat on the council was allotted to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party,



Fred Murphy/IP-I

Robelo: Resignation fails to provoke governmental crisis.

as well as one each to the small petty-bourgeois Independent Liberal and People's Social Christian parties, which have collaborated closely with the FSLN.

The nine seats set aside for three bourgeois parties and the COSEP reflect the decision by the Sandinista-led workers and peasants government to solicit the cooperation of sectors of the capitalist class in restarting production in order to prevent a severe economic crisis in Nicaragua. Granting such representation in the council is seen as one means of dealing politically with the problems and frictions that arise from the continued existence of a capitalist sector under a rapidly advancing workers and peasants revolution. The small minority offered the capitalists gives them no possibility to alter the overall decisions of the council.

Some capitalists have cooperated in economic reactivation, in order to continue taking in revenues while they seek ways to slow down and reverse the revolution. But there has also been a trend toward decapitalization and flight to more profitable climes. The Sandinistas have responded by encouraging workers' control and vigilance in the plants and enacting tough laws against the decapitalizers.

Since the revolutionary victory last year, the FSLN has fostered a continual strengthening of the workers and peasants movement, while blocking the political

consolidation of the forces of the bourgeois counterrevolution. That this continues to be the case is shown on the one hand by the mass organizations' hegemony in the Council of State, and on the other, by the disarray in the bourgeoisie's ranks over what policy to adopt toward the council and economic cooperation.

Election Pledged

In concluding the junta's report to the Council of State and to the nation on May 4, Sergio Ramírez reaffirmed a pledge by the government to hold elections "by means of which we will be able to choose our municipal representatives, the representatives to a national assembly, and the authorities of the executive power."

At a news conference the following day, a North American television reporter asked junta member Commander Daniel Ortega if this didn't contradict a slogan on a huge CST billboard in the Plaza of the Revolution—"The people already had their election: the insurrection."

Ortega replied:

"When we say the people already had their election, we are saying something that is certain in this country. Here the people voted in the first instance for armed insurrection led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front. And the people shed their blood, giving their votes for the freedom of Nicaragua. . . .

"I would like to know what proportion of Americans vote when they elect their president? What proportion vote? Let's see if we can really speak of a government elected by a majority of the American people. If in the United States, 70 percent, 80 percent, or 90 percent voted, we might be able to say that there was a government elected by a majority of the population. But we understand that less than 50 percent of the population votes in the United States. Can that be democracy?

"We understand democracy in another sense. We understand it as the participation of the entire people, not a minority. And when we talk about elections, we don't mean elections with artificially mounted propaganda, but popular elections, elections by a conscious people who vote in a conscious and not in a manipulated way. And to have conscious people, they must be educated, taught to read and write, taught the history of their country, taught to think freely—that is the great task facing our revolution at this moment.

"Those who have been thinking that there are going to be elections like those Somoza had or like the ones [dictator Alfredo] Stroessner might have down in Paraguay can forget it. Here there will be elections with a different content, with a different aim—popular elections.

"And that doesn't deny the truth of that billboard in the Plaza of the Revolution—the people already voted, voted for their liberation, a liberation that the people are carrying out at this moment." □

Quebec Unions Denounce Reactionary Coalition

A deep-going discussion on the national oppression of the Québécois people and on the measures necessary to overcome it is unfolding in the Quebec trade-union movement. The discussion has been sparked by the upcoming referendum in which the people of Quebec will be asked to give the Parti Québécois (PQ) government a mandate to negotiate a "new agreement" on relations with the rest of Canada. (See *IP/I*, April 21, p. 396.)

The "new agreement" proposed by the PQ would link a politically sovereign Quebec to the rest of Canada in an economic association. Leaders of the capitalist PQ have assured businessmen and property owners that their "sovereignty-association" proposal will not result in full independence or radical economic changes in Quebec. But the Canadian ruling class has not been convinced. It fears that the PQ might not be able to hold the Québécois workers in check in the event of a "yes" vote on the referendum.

Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau has taken the position that he would not negotiate with PQ leaders even if the referendum wins on May 20. Meanwhile, the employers have gone on an all-out drive to defeat the sovereignty-association referendum and to drive back the national liberation struggle in Quebec.

Louis Laberge, president of the 340,000-member Quebec Federation of Labor (FTQ), declared at a special FTQ convention April 19:

"... what we are seeing is a line-up of individuals and organizations according to their desire for change or their resistance to change.

"You have only to look at the no camp to see what is an unprecedented regroupment of reactionary forces. . . .

"Side by side we have the Quebec Liberal Party, the Liberal Party of Canada, the Conservative Party, the Quebec Employers Council, the principal spokespersons for the financial institutions, representatives of Power Corporation, Bell Canada, ITT, Alcan, Iron Ore. . . . It is obvious that the principal aim of these reactionary forces is to maintain Quebec in a dependent state, which has generally been to their advantage, and to snuff out any moves at all in the direction of change."

More than 90 percent of the FTQ delegates at the special convention voted in favor of a yes vote on the referendum. Their position reflected a massive rejection of the denial of Quebec's national rights within the Canadian state.

Eighty-one percent of the Quebec people speak French as their first language. Yet studies in the early 1970s showed that two-thirds of the jobs in Montreal required



TRUDEAU: Canadian prime minister has vowed not to negotiate with Québécois.

knowledge of English. Some 600,000 French-speaking Québécois had to speak a foreign language in order to get a job.

Behind this discrimination against the French language is the fact that the key sectors of Quebec's economy are controlled by an English-speaking ruling class. Quebec's immense natural resource industries are almost entirely foreign owned, and 78 percent of workers in manufacturing are employed by foreign-owned or English-Canadian companies.

National oppression in Quebec means that the French-speaking population there suffers from greater unemployment, lower wages, and less education than English Canadians.

FTQ leader Laberge called on the trade unions to campaign against the reactionary forces lined up against the referendum. But he insisted that in supporting the referendum, the FTQ was saying "yes for the negotiation of a major political change . . . not a yes for the Parti Québécois."

He criticized the PQ for its antistrike legislation. Quebec's two other main union federations—the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CSN) and the Quebec Teachers Federation (CEQ)—have been even more critical of the PQ.

Many members of these federations are public workers who have been directly effected by the PQ's harsh cutbacks in social services and strike-breaking legislation.

At its April 11-12 convention, the CSN came out for a yes vote on the referendum, but was sharply critical of the PQ's proposal. Gérard Larose, president of the CSN's Montreal Central Council, said:

"The pro-Canadian and procapitalist nature of sovereignty-association is not reassuring to any worker who is fighting for an independent and socialist Quebec.

"However, in the context of the referendum, we are witnessing the construction of the most formidable reactionary coalition of investors, employers, and federalists. . . . it has only one goal: to deal a crushing blow to the long-standing desire of the majority of the Quebec people to fight national oppression."

Delegates at the FTQ convention also saw beyond the narrow "constitutional options" set by the referendum. They came out loud and clear for national liberation: for wage parity with English-Canadian workers, for French as the sole official language of Quebec, against the reactionary employers' front, and in strong opposition to federal government intervention into Quebec's affairs.

Revolutionary socialists in Canada, organized in the Revolutionary Workers League, the Canadian section of the Fourth International, stand with those defending the rights of the Québécois people and against the reactionary coalition calling for a no vote on the referendum.

Because of the content of the referendum itself, however, a yes vote would signify only a vote of confidence in the PQ and its attempts to reach a new deal with Canadian capitalism—not a step toward self-determination. Therefore, the RWL advocates spoiling the ballot in the referendum.

Although the discussion on the referendum has been slower in getting started among English-Canadian trade unionists, it is beginning. Members of the United Steelworkers at the Steel Company of Canada (Stelco), in Hamilton, Ontario, adopted a motion April 9 calling on the New Democratic Party, Canada's labor party, to "support Quebec's right to freely decide its own future . . . without any restrictions or conditions from anyone. . . ."

The resolution also urged the Ontario NDP to carry out "campaigns in support of Quebec's national rights," and to "refuse to participate [in] or support so-called 'pro-Canada' committees . . . that work against Quebec's right to decide. . . ."

About 250 trade unionists from British Columbia, including a number of prominent officials, raised money for a May Day advertisement in the Montreal daily *La Presse* expressing the support of "working people in English Canada" for "the right of the people of Quebec to determine their own political future."

Finally, the Canadian Union of Postal Workers has voted overwhelmingly to support Quebec's right to self-determination, and for the right of the people of Quebec to have French as their language of work. Only 16 percent of the Postal union membership is Québécois.

The "sovereignty-association" referendum has led to the broadest debate in the Quebec trade union movement in history, and to a new stage in the struggle of the Québécois people for their national liberation. □

Workers' Strikes Shake South Korean Regime

Since the beginning of this year, a wave of militant working class actions has been sweeping South Korea. Sit-down strikes, slowdowns, and other labor actions have risen from 105 in all of 1979 to 719 in the first four months of 1980 alone.

"Workers in several industries have sat down on shop floors, occupied managers' offices, smashed furniture, and on two occasions fought violently with police," reported William Chapman in the May 1 *Washington Post*.

According to Chapman, "In the southern port city of Pusan, about 1,000 steel workers clashed [April 29] with local police during a protest demanding a 40 percent wage increase. Eleven policemen and one steelworker were injured."

Inflation in South Korea is running at a rate of more than 40 percent a year.

Since the assassination of former dictator Park Chung Hee last year, the regime has been reluctant to test its strength against the workers, although the strikes are illegal.

"Business leaders are shocked and angered by the unrest," reported Chapman, "but agree employers will [be forced] to meet most demands unless the government intervenes."

"The labor movement is spreading rapidly and won't reach its peak for months," said one executive who asked not to be identified in print. "It is just the beginning."

According to the head of the Korean Employers Association, wage increases have been averaging about 25 percent, despite a government guideline seeking to limit them to about 15 percent.

Another big aspect of the labor upsurge has been the demand for the ouster of union officials installed under pressure from the bosses and the Park regime, and the election of genuine workers leaders.

"In the most serious confrontation," reported Chapman, "coal miners last week took over the central city of Sabuk, attacked a police station, killed a policeman, and demolished several houses. They were trying to oust their union president who had accepted a 20 percent company wage increase instead of a figure twice that much being sought by the rank and file."

"Other plant rebellions have been settled without serious violence, largely because employers have granted big wage increases to avoid more trouble."

"Here in Seoul, for example, 980 workers at the Il-Shin Steel Co. sat on the shop floor for two days last weekend chanting slogans and shouting their demands."

"Management surrendered and by Monday afternoon workers had posted at the plant gate a list of their victories [includ-

ing] doubled bonuses, an average wage increase of 25 percent and the ousting of the union president deemed subservient to the management."

Christian Science Monitor correspondent Takashi Oka reported May 8 that the 2,700 workers at the Lotte Confectionary Company were holding a special meeting to elect a new union head. Kim Sun-ok, one of the women workers, told Oka she would run because: "She wants a union that will genuinely represent the workers—not one that is in management's pocket."

South Korea has some 8.8 million non-agricultural workers—75 percent of them under the age of twenty-nine. Forty-four percent of all Korean women now work. These workers have clearly had enough of the conditions maintained by the dictatorship.

Meanwhile, the struggles of the workers have inspired students to renew their demands for an end to martial law and for democratic rights. Several thousand students rallied in Seoul May 2 to demand the dismissal of Lieut. Gen. Chon Too Hwan, the head of the Army Security Command and of the Korean CIA. Chon had held a news conference April 29 to say that martial law would remain in force.

Brazilian Metalworkers Win Broad Support

Despite new arrests of union leaders, the strike by metalworkers in the industrial suburbs of São Paulo remains solid, with the union estimating that 70 percent of the workers are still out in the São Bernardo suburb.

"The strike has been better prepared than in the past, with alternative leaders ready to take the place of those arrested," reported the May 2 issue of the London *Latin America Weekly Report*.

The report continued: "Regardless of how the strike ends, the government has been dismayed, not only by the extent of support for the strikers among non-working class sectors, but also by the militancy displayed by groups which normally confine their dissatisfaction to verbal protests."

President João Baptista Figueiredo has accused the archbishop of São Paulo, Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns, of "inciting the strike" because of his statements backing the workers. Church activists have taken responsibility for providing food to the strikers and their families and churches have been made available for strike meetings.



GENERAL CHON: Student protesters are demanding that he lift martial law.

Students at Seoul National University, the largest and most prestigious school in the country, said that if martial law was not lifted by May 14, they would launch a larger campaign against it. Protests also took place at Sungkyunkwan University and Korea University in Seoul, and in the cities of Taejon and Chonju, south of Seoul. □

Replying to Figueiredo's charge, Cardinal Arns said the church was "simply offering spiritual and material support to enable the workers to take their own decisions as free men, in the absence of repression and free of the pressure of hunger on their families."

Support also came from the four main opposition parties, which issued a joint manifesto denouncing the labor laws for the "perpetuation of an unjust and wicked social order concentrating power in the hands of a privileged minority," and blaming the "intransigence of the regime" for the long strike.

"Nor has militancy been confined to the working class," the *Latin America Weekly Report* explained. "Over half a million farmers and rural workers recently took to the streets in an unprecedented protest against the soya export taxes, which were duly dropped. . . ."

"On the one hand, the government is under pressure from military hardliners to toughen up; on the other, the numbers of people who are prepared to stand up and resist are growing daily." □

Palestinians Refuse to Bow to Israeli Terror

By David Frankel

Using the pretext of a Palestinian guerrilla ambush in the city of Hebron, Israeli authorities are lashing out at the Palestinian people on the occupied West Bank, trying to crush their will and beat down their struggle.

Immediately following the May 2 action, in which six Israeli occupiers died, the entire city of Hebron was placed under a twenty-four-hour curfew, with nobody allowed out of their homes.

Army demolition teams blew up a half-block row of Arab shops in the vicinity of the ambush, and residents of the area were evicted from their homes.

House-by-house searches—along with the beatings and terrorism that are a standard part of the process—were begun.

Mayor Fahad Kawasmeh of Hebron and Mayor Mohammed Milhem of Halhul, along with Sheikh Raja Bayud Tamimi, the Muslim judge of Hebron, were routed out of their beds and forced across the border into Lebanon.

None of the three were given any hearing or chance to appeal. Occupation authorities didn't claim that the three had played any role in the guerrilla attack; they merely charged them with encouraging resistance to the occupation.

Kawasmeh, Milhem, and Tamimi were welcomed as heroes by thousands of Palestinian and Lebanese demonstrators in Beirut. Crowds in the street chanted "Our heroes!" and "Death to Israel! Death to America!"

Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yassir Arafat declared May 5: "Hebron was a legitimate act of resistance against foreign occupiers who have seized the land, driven away its inhabitants and trampled on the religious and cultural values of our people."

Vowing to return to the West Bank, Kawasmeh said in an interview May 6, "Why not? I'm a Palestinian. I live in Hebron. What mistake have I made? If I did something wrong, why not take me to a court?"

"All right, I say no to Israeli settlements in the West Bank. All the world says no. Some Israelis say no. Does that mean they must be deported?"

Other West Bank leaders have also been threatened with deportation if they speak out against the injustices the Palestinian people are subjected to. Expressing his racist view of the Palestinians, occupation chief Maj. Gen. Danny Matt said to reporters, "Before sending a schoolchild home, of course, a teacher first has to warn him and hope he will change his ways."

The Israeli regime and its defenders in

the capitalist media brand the Palestinian liberation fighters as "terrorists," just as they branded the liberation fighters in Vietnam and southern Africa. But the real terrorists—several thousand armed Zionist demonstrators—marched through Hebron May 5.

"Young Jews wearing skullcaps and jeans hurled stones through the windows of Arab houses while Israeli soldiers for the most part watched impassively, sometimes talking over their radios," *New York Times* correspondent David K. Shieler reported. "A few of the mourners, eager to impress the Arabs with the Jewish presence, fired into the air."

But the repression has only spurred new protests throughout the West Bank. Through their courageous struggle, the Palestinians have kept their plight in the center of world attention. And they have prevented the Camp David treaty, which would deny them their rights, from gaining support in the Arab world.

"Above all, we are in the midst of a battle for the land of Israel," declared Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman May 3.

Weizman's statement goes to the heart of what is behind the mounting struggle in the Israeli-occupied West Bank—"a battle for the land."

The 2,200-square-mile West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is the home of some 950,000 Palestinian Arabs. Since the area was taken over by Israel in the June 1967 war, however, Zionist colonists have begun to settle there. Perhaps 15,000 are now in the West Bank, in addition to the tens of thousands in East Jerusalem.

Backed up by the Israeli regime, these settlers hope to do in the West Bank exactly what was done within the pre-1967 borders of Israel. They want to take Arab land away from the original inhabitants.

Already, 30 percent of the West Bank has been expropriated by Israeli authorities. On May 2, the Israeli government announced that it would expropriate another 30,000 acres of West Bank land—more than 2 percent of the area's 1.4 million acres.

Along with the land expropriations go the policies required to terrorize the Palestinian workers and peasants and hold down their opposition—demolition of houses, collective fines, deportations, administrative detention, torture, murder.

Among the most enthusiastic participants in this policy of terrorism are the hardened Zionist racists who volunteer to settle on the newly expropriated Arab land. In April 1979, settlers from Kiryat

Arba, outside of Hebron, gunned down two Palestinian high school students who were demonstrating against the Israeli occupation. On May 2, 1979, another Kiryat Arba settler shot a student at Bir Zeit University. *Newsweek* magazine said in its May 14, 1979, issue that "the peaceful rally at Bir Zeit [against Zionist colonization] so incensed nearby Israeli settlers that one of them shot and wounded a 20-year-old Arab student in the chest. . . ."

Typical of the Zionist "pioneers" at Kiryat Arba was Eli Hazeev, who, according to the May 6, 1980, *New York Times*, "used to tell friends that the 'only good Arab is a dead one.'"

A follower of Rabbi Meir Kahane, who founded the ultrarightist Jewish Defense League in the United States and the Kach movement in Israel, Hazeev left Virginia to settle in the West Bank.

Last year he was convicted of breaking into Arab houses in the city of Hebron, shouting that they were "Jewish houses," smashing furniture, beating residents, and ordering them to leave their homeland.

Recently Hazeev was arrested again after a window-smashing rampage by Zionist thugs in the Palestinian village of Halhul.

Hazeev was one of those killed in the May 2 ambush. Of the six dead, two were from the United States and one was from Canada.

Yet General Matt cannot understand why the Palestinians resist foreign settlers who try to steal their land and drive them out of their homes. Attributing the Hebron ambush to Arab irrationality, the racist in charge of governing more than a million Palestinians said, "Here in the Middle East, unfortunately, it's very easy to incite people and move them into such an attack. . . ."

Other Israelis, however, are beginning to have their doubts about just who is being irrational. One Israeli woman told *New York Times* correspondent Shieler May 4 that "my friends feel some ambivalence about this. It is as if they are saying, but don't quite use the words, that these people were asking for it." □

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Amnesty International Report Ignites Debate in Colombia

By Luís Rodríguez

BOGOTÁ—The release of a devastating report by Amnesty International (AI) on human rights violations by Colombian authorities has provoked a sharp reaction in official circles and sparked a nationwide debate.

Even before the Amnesty International report was made public, Justice Minister Hugo Escobar Sierra and Government Minister Germán Zea Hernández both denounced it as a violation of Colombia's "national sovereignty."

The government's concern with the findings of the report could be seen in the fact that on April 19 President Julio César Turbay Ayala took to the airwaves during prime time to deliver an hour-long television speech against the exposé. This was only his third such appearance in the past year.

Amnesty's forty-four page report indicted the government for numerous violations of elementary human rights. Specifically, government officials were accused of condoning the widespread use of torture to obtain information and confessions, of "disappearing" opponents of the regime, murdering prisoners, denying habeas corpus, denying legal defense for persons appearing before military tribunals, violating trade-union rights, and abusive military occupation of indigenous (Indian) and peasant zones of the country.

The report identified thirty-three torture centers by name, where the most varied and barbaric tortures were practiced.

Among the recommendations that the London-based rights group made were that the thirty-year-old "state of siege" be lifted and the draconian "Security Statute" be abolished. The Security Statute includes vague crimes like "disturbing public order," and provides for the denial of rights of habeas corpus and transfer of cases from ordinary courts to military tribunals.

Amnesty recommended that defendants appearing before military tribunals have the right to effective legal defense. It also called for the formation of independent public commissions of doctors and lawyers to investigate all charges of torture, and asked that the authorities allow defendants to be visited within twenty-four hours by lawyers and relatives and to be examined regularly by doctors.

The report was the result of a visit to Colombia by a high level commission that included AI Secretariat member Edmundo García. The commission was in Colombia from January 15 to January 31.

President Turbay's hour-long appear-

ance on television was largely an attack against Amnesty International itself. In his opening remarks, the Colombian chief executive tried to slander the character of AI commission members.

Turbay also bemoaned the fact that commission members had spent more time talking to prisoners, torture victims, their families, and doctors who had examined torture victims and assassinated oppositionists than with government officials.

In addition to trying to besmirch Amnesty's reputation, Turbay spent much of his time in a shrill defense of the military, the Security Statute, and the state of siege. In one of the few instances where he tried to directly refute an Amnesty charge, Turbay quoted a letter signed by bureaucrats of the Union of Colombian Workers (UTC) and the Federation of Colombian Workers (CTC), unions dominated by the Liberal and Conservative parties. In their letter, these labor misleaders claimed that union members have *not* been jailed for their union activities.

But on April 23, Bogotá daily newspapers carried a statement by the executive board of the CTC denouncing the assertions of its president, Hurtado, as being unauthorized and untrue!

Toward the end of his television speech, Turbay admitted for the first time that torture and other rights violations might have occurred. The government, Turbay stated, "does not deny that lower-level functionaries might have exceeded these legal bounds. But this is in no way a generalized practice."

In the debate unleashed by the release of the Amnesty International report, other top officials have also had to acknowledge rights violations in the course of their defense of the government and military. For example, the former president of the Supreme Court, José María Esguerra Samper, while complaining that the Amnesty commission spent very little time talking to him, did acknowledge that "without proof I cannot deny that tortures have taken place—perhaps there have been some—and I would hope that there have been very few."

Government Minister Germán Zea qualified his self-righteous defense of the government by noting that it "has not denied that excesses may have occurred in this area," and he admitted that "in some cases sanctions have been applied" against those who committed the excesses.

This was the first time that any official had acknowledged that there have been "excesses," even though Zea refused to

provide details about who was sanctioned, when, and why.

Both major Bogotá dailies entered the debate on the report. *El Tiempo*, which is noted for its complete subservience to the ruling Liberal Party, defended the president, attacked Amnesty International for violating Colombia's national sovereignty, and generally cast aspersions against Amnesty International as a group.

The paper called attention to the fact that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States would soon visit Colombia at the invitation of the government and predicted that the results of that commission's investigations would be different.

El Espectador, the other major daily, maintained its usual opposition stance toward the government. In an editorial on April 19, the editors hit back at those government representatives who were attacking Amnesty International for intervening in Colombia's affairs.

The newspaper commented that the report "contained nothing new or original," and pointed out that its conclusions were already known by Colombians.

Support for Amnesty's report and opposition to the government's violations of human rights are being heard with increasing frequency. Newspapers have had numerous letters about the conclusions of the report. One trade unionist wrote a letter describing how he was submitted to the "ant hill torture," which led to the only known conviction of a government official for torture. A widow wrote to denounce the government's murder of her husband in a case of mistaken identity. The next day a union federation executive board repudiated its president's support for the government position.

The Amnesty International report is also a hot topic of conversation in the streets, factories, offices, and schools. The report is seen as confirmation of what the average person in the street already knew: that any student protester, any striking worker, and peasant agitating for land can be arbitrarily jailed, tortured, and even killed.

The debate over the Amnesty report will undoubtedly spur the building of the National Forum on Human Rights. The first Human Rights Forum, organized in April 1979, successfully brought together all the country's major union federations, most left groups, liberal oppositionists, women's groups, professional groups, students, and others in a broad coalition to defend human rights in Colombia. □

Bourgeois Government in Portugal in Rough Seas

By Heitor Souza

It is only a few months since the bourgeois Democratic Alliance (AD) government¹ came into office, having won a parliamentary majority in the December 2 elections. But it already faces the opposition of important sections of the mass movement, which are challenging its policy and every one of its moves.

There have not been such broad and determined mobilizations against the government in Portugal, since 1978. It is clear that the gauntlet has been thrown down. The survival of the government of Premier Francisco Sá Carneiro is at stake.

The trade-union mobilizations against the government reached their culmination in the three days of struggle in defense of the Agrarian Reform on March 25-27. The entire Alentejo region² was paralyzed by the general strike there.

At the same time, 300,000 metalworkers downed tools in order to win their demands. Moreover, for several weeks, transport workers have been struggling for their contract and to prevent the return of some enterprises to the private sector. Overall, these mobilizations have involved several hundreds of thousands of workers.

Collective Production Units

The central theme in all these conflicts is the government's offensive against the Collective Production Units (UCPs)³ and cooperative farms in Alentejo and Ribatejo. In the last two months, the government has given the old big landlords back 40,000 hectares [1 hectare = 2.47 acres] of land that had been occupied by the peasants or turned over to the UCPs. About 50 out of the 500 UCPs have been dismantled, and many others are threatened with the same fate.

The social consequences of such a policy are very pronounced. In a few months' time, 25,000 agricultural workers have been fired. This growing unemployment reminds the workers in Alentejo that it was not so long ago that the specter of

hunger haunted all the villages in these provinces.

The bourgeoisie itself realizes that Alentejo is becoming a powder keg and that the least spark could explode it. In its March 27 issue, the London *Financial Times* wrote:

"The future stability of Alentejo depends on the government's ability to offer a coherent policy for compensating the agricultural workers who are threatened with the loss of their jobs. The few cards that Premier Francisco Sá Carneiro can play



PREMIER SA CARNEIRO

include distributing small plots of land to individual peasants, an ambitious plan of public works, and aid to the fragile national industrial sector."

The article concludes on a prudent note: "His task will not be an easy one."

In fact, Sá Carneiro's task is very difficult. The overwhelming majority of the population of Alentejo consists of agricultural workers who have a long experience of struggle and a high level of class consciousness. The delay in the application of the Barreto Law for restoring reserve lands to their former owners reflects clearly the intensity of the confrontations we are seeing today. It was passed by the votes of the PSD and the Socialist Party in July 1978, but it has yet to be put into effect.

In order to implement this legislation, the government is not going to spare any effort. The 5,000 man force of the Republican National Guard (GNR) has been beefed up with 1,400 police from the anti-riot units and 300 other policemen. In two attempts to clear the occupiers off tracts of land, two persons have been killed and more than 1,000 wounded.

This climate of confrontation is going to sharpen. The government has announced

that it intends to return all the "reserve" lands to their former owners before this coming October, when the legislative elections are likely to be held.

But after every one of the evictions of "occupiers," accomplished by a great array of military forces, the agricultural workers have been recovering part of the land. The GNR cannot mount a permanent guard over all the "cleared" land. So, the workers have taken advantage of the wide open spaces in Alentejo to regain control of a lot of the land. This took place for example in Mortemor o Novo, where eleven tracts of land were reoccupied by the agricultural workers.

In the communiqué they published to explain their action, the workers said:

"We have gone back onto these tracts to reoccupy the land and take back the crops that were stolen from us by the government of Sá Carneiro and Freitas do Amaral. We hope that this action will make it very clear that the stolen lands are coming back into the hands of the workers and that the agrarian reform will not be destroyed."

The situation became still more explosive after the outbreak of gigantic scandals over corruption in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. It was discovered, for example, that more than 60 percent of all the national agricultural loans—cheap loans for the creation of new farms—were given to three families, one of them being the family of the president of the Portuguese Farmers Confederation (CAP)⁴ and another being the family of the chairman of the Investment Planning Board in Alentejo.

João Goulão, the secretary of state responsible for these operations, capsulized the situation in a slip of the tongue as he began to speak in parliament. "We want to give the land back to those who have always held it."

Spurs Other Workers Struggles

Another effect of these confrontations is the stimulus that they give to the rest of the Portuguese workers movement. In the context of the deepening social crisis, the resistance to these clearances is putting on the agenda a general strike against the Sá Carneiro government.

Some union leaderships with links to the opposition in the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP)⁵, such as the shoemakers' unions in Aveiro and Coim-

4. Confederação dos Agricultores Portugueses, a conservative organization dominated by big farmers.—IP/I

1. Aliança Democrática (AD), includes the Partido Social Democrata (PSD—Social Democratic Party, formerly the Partido Popular Democrático—PPD), a bourgeois center party moving right; the Centro Democrático Social (CDS—Social Democratic Center), a smaller bourgeois conservative party; and the Partido Popular Monárquico (PPM—People's Monarchist Party), a tiny "monarcho-populist" group.—IP/I

2. The main wheat growing area, formerly a region of large estates. It is a thinly populated dry area dependent on irrigation.

3. Unidades Colectivos da Produção, collective farms formed in 1974-75.

bra, or the one in Guimarães, where the revolutionary socialists have a decisive influence, proposed that the day of struggle in defense of the agrarian reform on March 27 be transformed into a [national] general strike. Such a strike was possible.

Despite the refusal of the CGTP leadership to extend the mobilization, there is already considerable pressure for this. The development of such pressure is the most important effect of the resistance to the dismantling of the agrarian reform, and it is a step toward achieving what is needed to assure the victory of this fight—the reorganization of the struggle of the urban workers to take on the government and its policy.

Politically, the continual mobilization of the agricultural workers in Alentejo and Ribatejo is a factor favoring the struggles to defend the buying power of the urban masses. The trade-union forces are regrouping around the combination of these two issues.

For its part, the government does not have sufficient margin for maneuver to carry out a policy of partial concessions or of co-optation. A few months ago, a major change took place in the economic and financial situation. In 1979, for the first time in a long while, the balance of payments showed a surplus. Exports grew by 61.6 percent, while imports grew by only 25.5 percent. Thus, the export cover for imports went past the point of equilibrium to 54.6 percent.

These data for the first half of 1979 reflect a real economic recovery. The utilization rate reached 74 percent of productive capacity in manufacturing, while the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product exceeded the average for the European Common Market countries. These are the results of an aggressive austerity policy undertaken by the government of Socialist Party leader Mário Soares on the basis of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund.

A considerable relaxation of the financial pressures, increased liquidity, and export growth have gone hand in hand with a major concentration of capital in the domestic market. These results, however, do not seem sufficient to prevent the resurgence of more serious disequilibria with the approach of a new recession.

In the third quarter of 1979, the economic conjuncture shifted again. Investments in manufacturing dropped by 46 percent, and by 13 percent in the industrial sector as a whole. External demand decreased. Agricultural production experienced a major decline (which will continue as a result of the confrontations described previously, which are taking place in the country's main grain producing regions).

The improvement in the business situa-

5. Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses, the union federation led by the Communist Party.

tion—including the little whiff of oxygen that the Portuguese economy has enjoyed—has been possible only through a tightening of the austerity policy and the wage freeze, which has led to a steady decline in real wages for the Portuguese workers since 1975.

At the same time, this decline in real wages testifies to the enormous limitations that have been imposed on the defensive struggles of the Portuguese workers. A World Bank report, *Unemployment in Portugal—Prospects and Policy*, gives an idea of this situation, showing the trend in workdays lost due to strikes.

Workdays Lost Due to Strikes

| | |
|------------|-----------|
| 1975 | 2,174,067 |
| 1976 | 1,503,093 |
| 1977 | 524,654 |

Everything indicates that the figures for 1978 and 1979 will not show a shift in the trend. This does not mean, however, that the Portuguese working class has suffered a decisive defeat. In 1976, and even in the last election, the workers parties got an electoral majority (in 1979, the bourgeois coalition got a parliamentary majority thanks to the distortions created by the system of proportional representation that was used). And the most recent events have demonstrated the fighting capacity of the workers movement, if any proof of this were needed.

It is true that the Soares government's austerity policy and its initiatives succeeded in paralyzing the workers' fightback for a certain time. The trade-union bureaucracies collaborated directly with this offensive by trying to negotiate a social pact with the government. But now the installation of the Sá Carneiro government is generating pressure for working-class unity and making for a much more direct political confrontation.

Today the government faces a much better organized and much more determined workers movement. It confronts the powerful aspiration of the masses for unity and for a general mobilization to regain their lost buying power, as well as to stop the offensive of the right wing. The general social crisis, and the directly political impact of the confrontations going on in Alentejo, are setting the working masses in motion.

Sá Carneiro has already been forced to back off from his decision in the first days of his government to freeze forty union contracts. Moreover, this counteroffensive by the people is creating additional difficulties for a fragile coalition, which is hesitating over what policy to follow.

In fact, Sá Carneiro thought that he was going to be able to implement his measures smoothly. He believed that he could bring into play the body of laws and institutions set up under Soares—it was the SP that introduced the law now being used to dismantle the agrarian reform in Alentejo—without creating any serious

social upsets. He hoped to accomplish this before the elections that are to be held in September or October, and thus win a solid majority that could sustain his government for the four-year life of the new parliament.

In the face of the current situation, the government has gone into crisis.

At the end of February, the weekly *Tempo*, which supports the government and is one of its main mouthpieces, ran a six-column headline on its front page, "Portugal Heads for An Insurrectionary Period." The editorial, written by the editor of the publication, explained, "If the government is not energetic, the country may at some point enter into an insurrectionary situation."

Another rightist journal evoked the possibility of a "military coup" against the government.

And *Tempo*, in turn, wrote: "Faced with such an attempted coup by political forces seeking primarily to get Portugal out of NATO and line it up with 'anti-Western' forces, there is no doubt among political observers that the present chief of the executive branch and of the armed forces would not allow Portugal to become the victim once again of a foreign intervention."

It is clear that it is not the 30,000 striking transport workers who are threatening to plunge the country into an "insurrectionary phase."

But, if the mass resistance to the government's measures increases, or even if the crisis in the cabinet sharpens, Sá Carneiro might be tempted to make a dramatic move in order to rally the forces of the Democratic Alliance behind the government and force the unions to retreat.

Conflict Between Eanes and Carneiro

However, the government's growing difficulties have led the president of the republic, General António Ramalho Eanes—the main designer of the November 25, 1975⁶ operation and a partisan of a governmental accord between the SP and the PSD—to take more distance from the government and sharpen his criticisms of it.

With the powers he holds under the constitution, Eanes is an important element of pressure on the government and can place obstacles in its way. It is already certain that the president will oppose the implementation of the new electoral law proposed by the government. It is a certainty also that he will oppose the "referendum law" that would make it possible to change the constitution without a two thirds majority vote in parliament.

So, the "boato"—the rumor about a

6. On November 25, 1975, the military-led government provoked a coup attempt from the left in order to provide itself cover for taking repressive measures to roll back the gains won by the Portuguese masses after the overthrow of the Salazarist dictatorship in April 1974.—IP/I

military coup—indirectly challenged the Council of the Revolution and Eanes himself, suggesting that they were making preparations, or letting preparations be made, for a coup against the government. In this way, Sá Carneiro wanted to regain the initiative, sharpen the conflict between the government and the president of the republic, and begin preparations for running a candidate against Eanes in the presidential elections. It cannot even be ruled out that the government may resign so that the Democratic Alliance can run a candidate in these elections as an opposition party.

But all these maneuvers first of all reflect the failure of the government. Sá Carneiro himself was forced to admit that there were no preparations under way for a military coup. But he achieved at least one thing. He gave the starting signal for the presidential race and for the presentation of the first candidates.

However, very little was gained by this; in fact, the outcome seems to be another defeat. Eanes announced his candidacy without encountering any opposition from any section of the military hierarchy. And for the time being, the Democratic Alliance has no alternative to propose. Graver still, the AD is divided over this question.

Some of the AD leaders argue that it is necessary to back Eanes in order to achieve an "institutional compromise" with the SP in order to change the constitution in the next parliament. Their caution is quite rational. "We are among those who think that the country is still leaning to the left and is not ready to trust the right," wrote the editor of *Tempo*.

This means, in other words, that if a candidate supported by the AD lost to Eanes and the president had SP support, Soares and his party would get another chance to play the pivotal role in all the governmental negotiations.

However, another section of the AD, which represents a large majority, wants to field an alternative candidate.⁷

The deep division in the AD reflects the difficulties the AD is encountering as it tries to decide how and when to take on the workers movement. It illustrates very well the government's contradictions and the crisis in which it finds itself.

The government's failure and the division in the AD led Sá Carneiro to float the rumors of a military coup in order to assure that the elections will be held as soon as possible.

After failing in its attempt to move up the date of the presidential elections, the government is now trying to get the legisla-

7. Since this article was written, according to the *New York Times*, the Democratic Alliance has nominated Gen. António Soares Carneiro, as its presidential candidate. Soares Carneiro is president of the Association of Commandos, an organization of veterans of an elite unit in the Portuguese imperialist army.—IP/I

tive elections held some time in the next two months, that is, before the end of June. The fact is that time is working against the AD.

The pressures on the AD are growing, along with the dissatisfaction of its supporters, because of its inability to effectively break the resistance of the agricultural workers or to take on the union movement.

All the sectors of the opposition are actively preparing for the elections.

Left in the Elections

The Socialist Party has formed the "Front for Progress." This is an alliance with two bourgeois parties, the Social Democratic Movement, a split from the PSD, and the Independent Social Democratic Association, another split from the PSD that took place in 1979. The latter group includes the majority of the PSD parliamentary fraction at the time. This alliance also embraces the Union of the Left for Socialist Democracy (UEDS)⁸, led by the former minister of agriculture Lopes Cardoso.

This is the tack the SP is taking to try to reverse its electoral decline and get back into the government. For its electoral partners—especially the UEDS, which suffered a crushing defeat in December 1979, failing to elect a single deputy—the Front for Progress is a passport to São Bento (the parliament building).

The Front for Progress will support the candidacy of General Eanes. It includes personalities such as former Premier Maria de Lourdes Pintassilgo, who is directly linked to the president of the republic.

The Communist Party is maintaining its electoral formation, the Alliance of the People United, which is a partnership with the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP). It can expect to get the same vote as in the last elections, 17 percent of the poll, a million votes. But it is unlikely that it will be able to improve its vote, because the appearance of unity achieved by the formation of the Front for Progress is going to channel those who want to "make their votes count" toward the SP.

For the presidential elections, many CP leaders, such as Dias Lourenço, have already expressed a desire to come to an agreement with Eanes. However, the CP may be forced—mainly by pressures brought to bear from the left—to run its own candidate in the first round and call for a vote for Eanes in the second (unlike the legislative elections, the presidential vote has two rounds, on the French model).

Former General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is heading up the People's Unity Force (FUP), which includes far-left organizations such as the two factions of the MES⁹, the PRP¹⁰, and the UDP¹¹ along with one of its split-off groups. The plan of

8. União da Esquerda Democrática Socialista.

9. Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left), a centrist forma-

tion that has careened between ultraleftism and Social Democracy.—IP/I

this coalition is to run slates of candidates headed by "officers who participated in the April 1974 coup." The program they will run on has not been very well defined, but the axis will be defense of the constitution, which the alliance considers the indispensable banner for rallying forces to fight the offensive of the right.

Otelo was naturally the candidate chosen by this coalition. But many of its components are showing signs of pressure to withdraw in favor of the SP in certain areas of the country. There are also strong pressures on them to support the candidacy of Eanes, "the defender of the constitution."

The Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR), the Portuguese section of the Fourth International, will run candidates of its own throughout the country. They will stand on a platform of emergency demands centering around the call for working-class unity and a single presidential candidate of the workers movement to run against Eanes.

Facing a massive counterattack by the masses against his government and the reorganization of the union movement for struggle, Sá Carneiro can depend only on a fragile coalition.¹² He has every interest in speeding up the elections.

Some people call this tactic "Italianizing" Portugal. The aim is to achieve a polarization between a right-wing bloc and a strong CP, which is to be kept out of the government, while the SP is to be prevented from playing the role of intermediary. But for the moment, there is no indication that this dream can become a reality. The SP is far from having been cut down to the size of the Italian SP. And the unstable rightist coalition in Portugal is a far cry from the Italian Christian Democracy, which is well ensconced in all the Italian power structures.

The mass struggles in March, which posed the objective possibility for an immediate national general strike, had the effect of accelerating the governmental crisis and advancing the date of the elections.

But these struggles are far from over, and they have not been defeated. Every day they are stamping a deeper imprint on the evolution of politics in Portugal. □

10. Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado (PRP—Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat), a group with origins in a guerrilla movement against the pre-1975 regime.

11. União Democrática do Povo (UDP—People's Democratic Union), a federation of Maoist groups that have moved toward positions independent of Peking policies.—IP/I

12. This would not be the first time an alliance between the two major parties in the AD broke up. In 1978, Sá Carneiro formed a coalition called *Convergência Democrática* with Freitas do Amaral of the CDS. It only lasted a month. The CDS decided to form a government together with Mário Soares.

Workers Self-Management in Yugoslavia Today

By Catherine Verla

The beginning of 1980 was marked in Yugoslavia by the government's imposing an austerity plan through special procedures that allowed it to bypass the stubborn opposition in the Federal Assembly. One of the reasons for this plan was the contradiction between the recession hitting Yugoslavia's capitalist trading partners—leading them, for example, to reduce their purchases of Yugoslav products—and the very high growth rate of the Yugoslav economy in recent years. Yugoslavia has not suffered from "stagflation."

Because Yugoslavia's raw materials are still insufficiently exploited, the country's high growth rate led to a large increase in imports. This, in turn, increased the foreign debt and generated new inflationary pressures. Such problems will have to be taken into account in the discussions on the integration of the country into the "new world economic order."

Uncertainty After Tito

In the meantime, there is serious doubt about the effectiveness of the austerity measures adopted. The price freeze introduced last August resulted in hoarding of goods (coffee among other things) because of speculation on future price increases. This development caused a real crisis of supply in Belgrade in December. (Some local officials threatened to resign as a political gesture.) But this was only the tip of the iceberg.

After the widespread purges of the early 1970s, which hit at all those of both the "right" and "left" who could have threatened the unity of the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC, as the Communist Party calls itself) and its monopoly of political power, self-censorship is again the rule as people wait to see what will follow Tito's passing.

Some people expect the ruling political team to offer a new phase of political liberalization, since it will no longer be able to appeal to an arbitrator and would not have sufficient popularity itself to contain the tensions. A political liberalization would be a way to widen its popular base.

In support of this argument, there have been some recent declarations about the need for "reconciliation" with those who had been thrown out of, or resigned from, the LYC. There is talk about reconsidering the status of the banned magazine *Praxis*, whose left-wing Marxist editors were forbidden in 1975 to teach at the university.

But even those who look forward to a political liberalization openly acknowledge their fears that this could take place in a

context that would favor the centrifugal forces in Yugoslavia. They worry that under such circumstances, the exacerbated nationalistic feelings of the various peoples who make up the federation could lead to the breakup of the state itself.

In the present situation, the breakup of Yugoslavia would weaken the capacity of the Yugoslav peoples to resist both the pressures of the capitalist environment and Soviet intervention. In the event of the collapse of the federation, the different republics would suffer different fates.

Fear of the "Russians" exists everywhere, and is fed by the authorities. They understand very well that this apprehension strengthens the cohesiveness of the population, and is a factor inhibiting the population from openly expressing its discontent.

Many army leaves have been cancelled and citizens are doing night guard duty at their workplaces. While direct Soviet military intervention is quite unlikely, it is clear that in recent years the Kremlin has been trying to step up its direct bilateral exchanges with the different Yugoslav republics. As in the past, it would not hesitate to exploit national dissensions to strengthen its own positions.

For the present, the main uncertainty is about the relationship of forces within the country between the different classes and social layers and between the different tendencies that could take the leadership of the CP and the Yugoslav system.

What have been the deep-going effects of the measures taken since 1971, which were given legal sanction in the 1974 constitution and especially in the "Law on Associated Labor" adopted in late 1976?

Ever since these measures were enacted we have stressed that they would lead to a blind alley.¹

To really determine what effect these reforms have had on the consciousness of the workers and to what extent they changed the social relationship of forces, we will have to wait for the surfacing of the social tensions that were contained during the final period of Tito's reign. To say that self-management is largely a formality in Yugoslavia is an overly glib generality. The ways in which it has been reduced to a formality have varied considerably in each of the major phases through which Yugoslavia has passed.

1. See "The New System of Self-Management in Yugoslavia" in *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, May 8, 1978, p. 557; and "Mounting Economic Difficulties in Yugoslavia" in *IP/I*, March 12, 1979, p. 251.

If we were simply to dismiss the Yugoslav experience without taking time to study its contradictions, which have been infinitely more complex than those of its neighbors in the rest of Eastern Europe, we would be ignoring one of the richest laboratory experiments from the point of view of the workers movement and the construction of a genuinely self-managing socialist society. We would also be totally disarming ourselves in Yugoslavia, even in the face of the big events to come.

Tendencies Toward Capitalist Restoration in the 1968-71 Period

For a long time in Yugoslavia centralized planning was identified with bureaucracy. The main instrument of planning prior to 1965—the Central Investment Fund—was dismantled by the economic reform of that year on the grounds that this would result in greater effectiveness of the self-management bodies at the factory level. The market forces ("socialist" market forces as well as the world market once the borders were opened) were seen as the inevitable accompaniment of the "freedom" of self-management, as opposed to the bureaucratic shackles of the previous period.

In a short time—this became obvious by 1968—it was noticed that the extension of the rule of market laws was accompanied by three phenomena—planning became ineffective, the weight of the workers in society declined relative to that of "management specialists," and unemployment grew.² Those forces in society that benefited from the growth of the market economy, notably managers of the import-export companies enjoyed a meteoric rise.

The fastest climbers, however, were the managers of banks and other financial intermediaries. In that period these institutions acquired accumulations of stock in an uncontrolled way, as a result of large debts piled up by the enterprises (for which the banks provided virtually the sole source of investment funds).

A veritable program for capitalist resto-

2. In theory, workers cannot be laid off to bolster an enterprise's profitability. In practice, during the period from 1965 to 1971, competition between enterprises and the determination of income according to the results of the market led the workers to accept lay-offs as "inevitable." They generally chose to begin by laying off married women whose husbands were working.

At present the figures on unemployed people include youth looking for their first job, peasants who cannot make a decent living off their little plots of land, and people who have found temporary part-time jobs.

ration was, in fact, inscribed in the logic of the reform. Didn't "rationality," which was bound up with the ability to compete in the market, didn't the "spirit of loyalty to the enterprise," which the workers found so uninfected in this context, require the elimination of self-management rights? Didn't this logic require that the management have the legal right to fire workers? Wasn't it necessary to give the managers a stake in the company? Didn't you have to restore a stockmarket or its equivalent to assure the "effective" utilization of funds? And, therefore, wasn't it finally necessary to extend the sphere of private ownership?

The LYC leadership itself played the role of the sorcerer's apprentice. The reform program found its most ardent defenders within the ranks of the leadership (whatever their consciousness of the restorationist consequences of its application).

The logic of competition also contradicted solidarity with the less developed sectors and regions. Inequality could only grow, regional chauvinism could not help but assert itself and take the form of conflicts between the republics—that is, between the nationalities.

In 1971 a huge movement developed in Croatia calling for an end to attempts to centralize resources, which it was claimed led to "colonization" of rich regions by the poorer ones. In particular, Croatia—which thanks to Dalmatian coast tourism, brings in a large part of Yugoslavia's foreign currency earnings—demanded the right to retain control over all this foreign-currency income.

This movement, which was partially encouraged by the local Croatian leaders of the LYC, assumed a separatist and rightist direction. It was dominated by petty-bourgeois layers oriented toward international trade, and ideologically exploited by the church and the Croatian Usta-shi. It does not seem to have gained much of a foothold among the workers. At the same time, because of the way planning was handled, the demands that were raised did reflect well-founded antibureaucratic feeling.

Faced with clear evidence not only of a breakdown of planning, but also of the LYC and the Yugoslav federation itself, the leadership made a sharp turn in 1971.

A Bureaucratic Centrist Turn

The new course adopted at that time has had the following general features:

- On the political level, there has been repression of all opposition currents. The regime's main theoretician, Edvard Kardelj, who died last year, made a public criticism of the "premature withering way of the dictatorship of the proletariat," meaning the "leading role of the party." The weight of the army in the LYC and the state apparatus has been increased. The unions, which had freed themselves some-

what from their role as transmission belts, were brought back to heel.

- On the social level, a new equilibrium was established, using the workers as a counterweight to the technocrats. At the

the enterprises were annulled. The local banks were transformed into a sort of financial servicer of the enterprises that fund them and/or deposit their funds there. In other words, the associated enter-



same time, once the apparatus had consolidated its hold and the movements of revolt had been suppressed, the main demands of the decentralizers were granted. To counter the power of the technocrats in the enterprises and banks, the banking system was reformed and the old enterprises were dismantled. They were replaced by smaller units (which supposedly could be more easily controlled by the workers).

Moreover, the Rank-and-File Organizations of Associated Labor were given full right to manage their own "income" (that is, the portion that remains after deducting the cost of the raw materials and amortization of fixed capital).

In other words, there was an enlargement of the scope of self-management. It now applied not only to immediate "personal income" (wages). It also extended to collective consumption (childcare, hospitals, education, housing, etc.), facilities administered by Self-Managing Communities of Interest, which directly brought together workers and users of collective services. And finally self-management was extended to "expanded reproduction" (investments).

In this framework, the stock holdings of the banks were eliminated and the debts of

prizes demand credit from the banks and at the same time, through the intermediary of their representatives, determine the banks' policy.

Along with this, the Central Bank of Yugoslavia was broken up into a number of central banks and banks of the republics. These banks are the only ones that have sufficient means to finance the big priority investments. And, since January 1968, each republic retains its foreign currency receipts and has a considerable degree of budgetary and economic autonomy.

It is first and foremost the LYC that provides the underpinning and the backbone of the leaderships in the enterprises and the banks. It is the party that is to unify the system by demanding strict discipline from its members. The plan sets the overall targets and priorities. But it does not specify penalties for failure to carry out its decisions.

The planners' decisions are the product of a long process of balancing out the manifold conflicting interests expressed by the individual plans of each Rank-and-File Organization of Associated Labor, each commune, and each republic, up to the federal level. There has been an attempt to

substitute a system of self-management agreements and binding contracts for the dictates of a plan.

In addition to the broad management powers given to the workers, they have been granted as a basic right—the right of *workers control* within self-management. This is designed to counterbalance the de facto powers the technocrats hold in this system of management.

Time for an Assessment

While remaining fundamentally based on the market, the new system was supposed to make it possible to control the worst effects of the market—"unjustified" inequalities and powerful technocratic forces. It also was supposed to allow the workers to have more say over management decisions.

In practice, the gulf has continued to widen between the richest and poorest regions. The decentralized method of determining income means that in practice the highest incomes accrue to those sectors that derive a privileged position from their place in the market. This may be for "natural" reasons (attractive tourist sites, abundant raw materials), or because they have an infrastructure that provides the basis for high labor productivity.

While theoretically the portion of income that flows from these "dividends" should be redistributed in the form of the collective funds and accumulation funds, any attempt to do this runs up against quite strong resistance. In practice, "to each according to their work" continues to mean "to each according to both their role and the result of their work on the market."

This means that there is a transfer of value from the less developed regions and sectors toward the other sectors, and from the productive sectors toward the "tertiary" sector.

To this must be added the differences in income arising from variations in pricing policies. For example, since the prices of the principal raw materials are kept low, the workers in these sectors, in fact, have lower wages, since the means of compensation are largely insufficient. On the other hand, it seems that *within* a single workplace the wage gap is rather limited (reflecting more direct workers control). This appears to be true as well in branches where agreements between enterprises have led to comparing incomes.

In view of the powers assumed by "experts" in the larger-scale forms of labor organization, the workers tended to confine themselves to the sphere of concrete decisions that have direct and immediately palpable implications. This tendency can only be strengthened by the framework for decision-making that exists.

The basis for making these decisions is presented in the form of a heap of unreadable documents (unreadable because of their language and their volume). No one who

works more than forty hours can take the time to plow through them. And even if a worker did finally succeed in understanding the decision that has to be made, he or she is presented with only a single proposal, without any practical—that is, political—possibility of working out an alternative.

This is one of the reasons why giving the workers rights to a say in a considerable number of decisions has meant, in practice, a growing gap between the law and the reality. Thus it has provided new reasons for emptying self-management of its potential content.

The example of the Self-Managing Communities of Interest is quite typical. These bodies were supposedly to promote the withering away of the state by enabling the workers and users of collective services (health, education, etc.) to assume direct control over them. But in practice they became rapidly bureaucratized. Since the workers did not have the means to oversee the decisions made in their name by the "delegates," these delegates rapidly became in fact functionaries. They at times managed considerable sums and built up a new administrative apparatus to the detriment of the collective service itself.

I have been shown pay stubs noting many deductions. It was not even specified what these quasi-automatic deductions were for, although they were supposed to have been the result of self-management decisions.

As far as the banking system is concerned, the relationship of forces there is now different than it was in the 1965-71 period. Bank policy is not decided by an autonomous management motivated by the pursuit of immediate profits to be made from the indebtedness of enterprises. The interest rates have, on the contrary, been very low (since the enterprises that seek loans are at the same time the ones that decide the bank's policies). In fact, the rates are so low that, when inflation is taken into account, they are actually negative interest rates. And so they have stimulated an enormous investment demand in the recent period.

By comparison with the previous situation, local potentates have acquired a very marked influence in real decision-making. In a system where privileges flow primarily from one's role (and, first of all, from one's position in the party and state apparatus), the decisions that are made are directly determined by the search for good relations with one or another local leader.

The policies of these local leaders are marked by a desire to avoid tensions in their areas, to consolidate their political power, and to enjoy a certain degree of prestige. In a context of extreme economic decentralization, this leads each locality to seek a kind of quasi-autarchic development (with each area having its "own" sugar mill, its "own" energy, etc.). The result is palpable waste of productive capability

through the proliferation of redundant facilities, the absence of real coordination, and the failure to integrate self-management and labor at the level of the society as a whole.

Self-Managing Workers Control: A Positive Balance

On the basis of an analysis of conflicts and strikes that had taken place within the enterprises (see accompanying article), the unions discussed and then adopted workers control measures in 1972-74. These measures were then institutionalized in the "Law on Associated Labor" passed in late 1976.

The law recognizes that the workers should be able to exercise their *control*. It gives them the right to publicly demand, either orally or in writing, an accounting of any aspect of the management of an enterprise at any time. This right can be exercised directly through the Workers Council or through the establishment of a special body, the Self-Management Workers Control Committee.

An inquiry carried out in 1976 on these committees shows how important the workers consider them.³ In principle, the union organization is supposed to nominate the candidates for these control committees. But the study shows that in 67% of the cases the list of candidates was determined directly by a meeting of the workers.

In 80% of the cases, these committees carried out all phases of their work in public, and all the workers had access to their sessions (as against 20% nonpublic work in the phase of researching the facts and documentation). In 75% of the cases, the reports were presented to the Workers Assembly or to the Workers Council (against 15% of the cases where the report was presented to the leaderships of the LYC and unions).

Out of the 1602 committees studied, 81% of their members were production workers, a figure that is much higher than in the Workers Councils and Management Councils (see accompanying article). Some 44% of their members belonged to the LYC.

When we look at who initiated the activities undertaken by the Self-Management Workers Control Committees, we find that in 73% of the cases it was workers and members of the control committees who initiated the activities. Only 9% of the proposals came from the Workers Council and only 2% were suggested by the LYC or the unions. In 46% of the cases, the subject of the investigations was the operations of business bodies of the enterprise or its specialized services; and in 17%, the Workers Council was investigated.

The control committee is not empowered to make decisions regarding the irregulari-

3. The following statistics are taken from the study by Neca Jovanov, which involved responses from 1756 work organizations.

ties it uncovers. But it informs the workers and the bodies that have the power to make decisions. In 72% of the cases either the Workers Assemblies or the Workers Councils have directly made the decisions to eliminate the irregularities uncovered. In 10% of the cases, no decision was reached, despite a report (which does not however mean that no decision will be made, but rather that the conclusion had not yet been made at the time of the inquiry).

In those instances when proposals of the control committees were not acted upon, in 64% of the cases these committees appealed to the LYC and to the trade unions, and in 25% of the cases they called a meeting of the Workers Assembly and asked for an immediate decision.

Let us look at the problems that prompted the inquiries. The committees dealt with the following sorts of cases:

- Misuse of positions (8%).
- Use of bureaucratic methods by directors in dealing with workers (6%).
- Irregularities in payment of wages (10%).
- False reporting of business dealings (6%).
- Unjustifiable entertainment expenses (5%).
- Problems in applying decisions of the workers meetings (10%).
- Nonrespect for clauses in the self-management documents (21%).

A Broadening of the Issues

The growing gap between the acknowledged rights of the workers and their real power has been pointed out. But that does not mean that these rights are simply formal rights. The impressive effectiveness of strikes, or workers control actions, reflect social relations where the rights of self-management have a very real weight. The managers of an enterprise are approved by the workers, and can be removed by them.

The leaders of the LYC and the unions are quite aware that they need social calm in order to enjoy security in their positions. This explains why they try so diligently to resolve the conflicts when strikes break out. These political leaders and technocrats do not have roots in private property. They no longer have even the relative political security enjoyed by bureaucrats appointed from above, as they are in the Soviet bloc.

So, in 1971 when the Titoist leadership launched a big campaign (which of course was largely demagogic) against all those who had enriched themselves by fraud—a campaign that coincided with the purges that were then taking place—many enterprises in Croatia could no longer find enough people willing to volunteer to take managerial jobs.

Moreover, self-management is also an “ideological reality,” as they say in Yugoslavia. That is, it has been largely reduced

to a paper right today as a result of all the mechanisms previously described; but the workers would rebel if it were eliminated. What is more, the extension of this right to new spheres cannot fail to have an importance for the future in the working-class consciousness.

In defense of such optimism, we will say that it is no coincidence that in the recent period there has been a growth in the scope of issues involved in conflicts. For example, people have told me of cases of rent strikes (rents are an example of charges that are supposed to be decided on by the Self-Managing Communities of Interest, but which in fact are handed down without the interested parties being consulted). I have also heard of very strong discontent over the question of access to university education.

It should be pointed out that one of the reasons for unemployment in Yugoslavia is the lack of coordination between the education that young people get and the jobs available. In general terms there are lots of job offers in the material production sector (the lowest paid) while there are too many sociologists, and so on.

In Croatia an educational reform has just been introduced that was intended to be extended later to the rest of the country. It instituted a sort of workers control over education and established a connection between education in the various fields and society's needs. (In this case, these needs were expressed by the guarantee to students of jobs by particular enterprises.) The failure of the reform is already obvious, but it raised quite a few reverberations. What happened was that the benefits went to the well-connected and extended bureaucratic privileges.

The Alternative

In response to such conflicts and also to a proliferation of questions that the workers are supposed to decide, but which others actually decide for them, one hears very elitist, if not openly technocratic, points of view being expressed today in Yugoslavia:

“Some jobs are thankless, others are of a higher nature. Those who are the most competent and the most highly qualified should be the best paid. And since the workers cannot decide everything, they should delegate their power to specialists.” An eminent professor told me: “The workers do not understand this! They say ‘I pay a director to direct, and then he turns around and asks my advice on everything, and I have to think about this besides putting in a day's work!’”

On the other hand, people also pointed to an “island of socialism” in a town where a former partisan had become the factory director. He was able to create a totally different conception of the micro-society that he guided in collaboration with his workmates. There, the engineers and functionaries earn quite a bit less than in the

rest of the country, but they do not want to leave. The whole organization of work was subjected to a creative rethinking. The former compartmentalization and divisions began to be broken down. Productivity was increased tenfold. Resources were collectively managed in a way to create a framework of social life in which services could develop and assume a high quality.

There are alternatives already in existence to the technocratic answers to the problems described. Such alternatives are gaining ground, although it is still impossible to say to what extent and at what pace. The mechanisms that obstruct the achievement of self-management also show how demands could be formulated more clearly to get self-management implemented in practice.

Workers democracy on the political level is the decisive precondition for the deepgoing transformation of all social relations:

- There can be no real choice and no real right to vote unless alternative plans can be presented.

- The influence of the technocrats cannot be countered unless the workers form a collective power, conscious of the various alternatives and their implications. The conditions must be created for holding the broadest political discussions on the general options available. The major opposing points of view must be publicly contrasted, using audiovisual resources of mass media at all levels. Delegates should then be elected on the basis of the programs put forward in these public debates.

All those who share a common point of view on the major options should be able to meet to discuss even short term questions in order to develop their arguments in the clearest and most convincing way.

In this context the public debates should also take place in the unions and parties. The positions of minorities should be made known and they should have access to means of expressing their views publicly. No one should get any special say in the decisions that are the prerogative of the self-management bodies just because of membership in any political organization.

- People cannot make genuine choices unless they are given the time and training necessary to make informed decisions. Time should be set aside for this during working hours.

- There can be no real choice if one has to abide by the dictates of the market and competition. In discussing the general options of development, consideration must be given to the need to eliminate the inequalities and old divisions between town and country, manual and intellectual labor. Attention must be paid to eliminating the inequalities in the sexual division of labor. The persistence of such inequalities would preserve social privileges and make it impossible to extend the right to unalienated work to each person, male and female. □

How Policies of Yugoslav Bureaucracy Spur Strikes

By Catherine Verla

Neca Jovanov, fifty-two years old, has worked during the last eleven years at the Central Council of the Yugoslav Trade Union Confederation as part of a commission to study the situation of workers in Yugoslavia. There he directed several studies of strikes in the country. For a long time, Yugoslav authorities have viewed strikes, if not as illegal, at least "negative" factors.

Based on the results of his studies, Jovanov has publicly defended the view that strikes should be legalized, because, far from being hostile to workers' self-management, these strikes basically demand that it be implemented.

In numerous articles and interviews published in the Yugoslav press, Jovanov explains that during the discussions on the new constitution that was adopted in 1974, and the "Law on Associated Labor" adopted in 1976, the question of legalizing strikes was discussed by the Titoist leaders. But since they were divided on the question, they left it blank in the final texts. This means that in reality, strikes are tolerated, but not legal.

Neca Jovanov was able to do a statistical study of strikes in the period 1953-1969. But he believes, as do other commentators in the Yugoslav press, that at the beginning of the 1970's the tempo of strikes has again accelerated. As a matter of fact, it appears that the largest number of strikes took place after 1965—during the period when the economic reforms were being instituted. There was, however, a slight decline in the number of strikes in 1966-67, when the central investment fund was dismantled and distributed to the enterprises, which used these funds to increase wages. But this capital was very quickly used up, increasing the enterprises' dependence on the banks.

During the entire last period, the end of the 1970s, several accounts seem to indicate that other forms of discontent besides visible strikes have developed. In the previous period strikes were usually accompanied by mass meetings, discussions, and even strike committees. Now, we are also seeing silent strikes, which in several cases appear to be carried out in response to a witch-hunt against "agitators."

Take the following example in Croatia: Imagine the scene. The workers' pay has been lowered. It doesn't correspond to what they promised. Without a word, without expressing a single demand, the workers assemble without picking up their pay checks. They wait. Then they break into the "Song of the Partisans." The political and union leaders become very nervous.

Several become nearly hysterical. Within a few hours the workers' paychecks are changed, conforming to what they had been promised, and the workers return home peacefully.

But there are also forms of passive resistance, which could signify a certain demoralization in the face of the mass of broken verbal promises (in particular over the fact that the workers should in some measure control the investment policy). There are reports of a very big decline in labor productivity due to the development of massive absenteeism, and other factors.

People have also told me that the grounds for discontent have grown.

In the introduction to his study, Neca Jovanov states: "I do not hide the fact that my consciousness is 'biased' in favor of the strikers." Jovanov comes from a poor peasant family, and at the age of sixteen, as the revolutionary struggle against the German occupation was coming to a close, he joined the Yugoslav Communist Party—he is still a member of the League of Yugoslav Communists. When he joined, he was a metalworker in a factory that manufactured railroad cars, which is where he lost a finger.

He is the director of the Department of Social Sciences at the Faculty of Technical Sciences at Novi Sad where he has been teaching for three years.

In Yugoslavia Jovanov has come to be known as the "Doctor of Strikes" because, after taking up the study of law at age thirty-two, he has just obtained his doctorate for his study of strikes in Yugoslavia. (Can you imagine anything like this in Poland?) His thesis, *Strikes in Yugoslavia*, was published in early 1980 in Belgrade.

Jovanov writes: "With relatively few bones, we can reconstruct a mammoth's skeleton. Obviously, this text on strikes is not intended to reconstruct the overall social system; nevertheless, I do not hide the fact that in my work I have tried to analyze the strikes as part of the social system. . . . According to Jovanov, the main factors responsible for the rise in strikes were:

1. The growth and greater concentration of the working class. Strikes have been the most intense in the more industrially developed areas of Yugoslavia.

2. The rising consciousness that rights of self-management have not been implemented (the higher educational level of the industrially developed regions also promotes this).

3. The democratization of social relations. In Yugoslavia strikes have taken place during periods of an enlargement of

workers' rights, while in the totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe strikes are usually repressed (which means that they are even more explosive when they finally break out, as we have seen in Poland).

4. The atomized character of self-management, with workers only having a say over the running of their own particular plants. This facilitates the domination of the workers by the state bureaucracy, as well as by the banking, technological, and commercial apparatuses.

5. "The decline in the representation and influence of workers in the institutions of social power." The total membership in the Workers Councils went from 156,300 in 1960, to 149,404 in 1965 to 135,204 in 1970.

The percentage of workers on the Workers Councils decreased from 76.2 percent in 1960, to 73.8 percent in 1965, to 67.6 percent in 1970.

If you look at production workers alone, the percentage in 1970 was 54.9 percent. But this statistic is misleading because it counts those who are workers by trade, although they may not be working at their trade. Thus, this statistic also includes an unknown proportion of former workers who have become full-time officials.

If you look at the representation at the level of municipalities, the republics, and the federal state,* the proportion of workers declines even more. In 1971 workers made up:

- 54.9 percent of the Workers Councils;
- 32 percent of the Management Committees;
- 13 percent of the Municipal Assemblies;
- 1 percent of the assemblies of the individual republics; and
- 1 percent of the Federal Assembly.

At the 1957 congress of Workers Councils, 61 percent of the delegates were actually workers, while at the second congress in 1972, the large majority of delegates were full-time staff members and highly skilled workers.

As Jovanov points out, the workers' declining representation and influence in the institutions of social power also coincides with:

- the growth in the relative representation and influence of experts and political

*The highest organ of government is the Federal Assembly, which nominates the highest executive bodies in Yugoslavia. The federal constitutional structure is, in essence, repeated in each of the six constituent republics. These are: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia. Serbia contains the two autonomous regions of Voivodina and Kosovo.

and economic leaders and production foremen at all levels of these institutions of social power; and

- a process of social differentiation and greater social inequalities, at the expense of production workers.

6. The existence of autonomous centers of social power that are "alienated from the workers."

7. The market economy that aggravates the "unjustified" social inequalities.

8. The heterogeneous character of the working class and its insufficient political organization on the level of overall society. This leads to the "appearance of short-term, partial interests" that may be "in contradiction to the class interests and historic mission of the working class as a whole." "Consequently, the weak class

consciousness of one segment of the working class is one of the negative factors that causes strikes."

9. "The day-to-day activity (actually inactivity) of the League of Yugoslav Communists and the trade unions."

10. Jovanov shows that "agitation by the enemy" (the former members of the bourgeoisie and foreign political adversaries) is not the cause of strikes. At most, in certain cases, these forces can take advantage of the deep causes for the strikes in order to exacerbate the conflicts.

11. The strike traditions. This is a real factor in the industrial centers and economic sectors where strikes occurred before the revolution.

12. The contradiction between the promises for the future and present reality. □

Municipal Assemblies in Yugoslavia.

Of the 478 union councils that exist, 405 responded to the questionnaire. Of the 405 communes, 258 answered that there had been no strikes in their area; 147 reported there were strikes and filled out the information requested.

Of the 512 strikes, 458 (or 90%) took place between January 1, 1966 and August 30, 1969, and involved a total of 62,504 strikers, (or 93.5% of the total). In the case of 40 strikes, we have no data. Leaving these out, there was an average of 141 workers per strike.

The largest number of strikes took place in industry. These amounted to 71.2% of all strikes. Construction followed with 7.3%, and then mining, with 5.5%. Strikes in these three sectors of the economy represented 84% of the total number of strikes. In 1970 these three sectors comprised 47.9% of the socialized sector in Yugoslavia—industry and mining comprising 38.7% and construction 9.2%.

Within industry, the largest number of strikes (24.2%) occurred in the metallurgical sector; followed by the wood industry (12.2%), and textiles (10.8%). The largest number of strikers (50%) were also in these three sectors.

These three sectors are at the bottom of a chart of personal income. This has a direct relation to the causes of strikes.

As we will see further on, the low value placed on human labor—both material and moral—in direct production is in the majority of cases not only the immediate motivation for strikes, but also the underlying cause.

This is a result of the relative impoverishment of the country, as well as the strengthening of finance capital which is becoming more and more autonomous and is increasing its hold on the productive enterprises.

From the standpoint of the economic strength of certain sectors and the social status of those who work in them, it is important to note that there have not been any strikes in banks, import-export companies, government offices or other institutions of this type (social security offices, insurance companies, etc.). The one exception is a strike that took place among judges and court officials at the municipal court in Lazarevac.

The reason there have not been strikes in these different sectors is not because self-management is more advanced here than in the enterprises engaged in production, but because the general social conditions of the employees are far better than that of workers in industry.

You could even say that these bank employees, import-export employees, and government workers are satisfied with their conditions. Although they have very little self-management, they enjoy a higher living standard. By going on strike they would risk losing this and risk being relegated to the level of workers who do

Extracts from Jovanov's Study of Yugoslav Strikes

[The following is based on extracts from the study by Neca Jovanov on strikes in Yugoslavia.

* * *

The first known strike in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia took place January 13-15, 1958. Close to 4,000 miners in the Trbovlje and Hrastnik coal mine stopped work. The strike involved 3,726 miners, 157 technicians and foremen, 17 engineers, and 141 office workers, and even some managerial personnel. All the members of the Workers Council, Management Council, the League of Communists, and the leaders and members of the miners union participated in the strike.

The cause of the strike was low wages resulting from the place assigned to the mine in the general system of allocation. The prices of equipment and intermediary products were relatively high, while the price of coal was relatively low. The wages of the mine workers were much lower than the wages paid to workers in other sectors of the economy.

The position of the mines in the general system of allocation was determined exclusively by the federal authorities and the prices for equipment and coal were set by them. So, in striking, the miners came into direct conflict with the authorities.

The strike was the miners' last recourse. Their representatives had turned for help to the trade unions and League of Communists and to the authorities in their town, their district, the Republic of Slovenia, and the Federation. But all in vain.

The only way they were able to get the increase in personal income they were demanding was by striking. This proved more effective than all the efforts of the delegations. But the underlying causes of the strike were not eliminated. The low value placed on productive labor in the coal mines would continue for a long time to provoke strikes in other mines.

The press, radio, and television did not

carry any information or news of the strike. It was a taboo subject. But, the news was circulated rather systematically through the semi-official channels.

About 1,200 coal miners at Zagorje ob Savi conducted a 24-hour solidarity strike on January 16

So, the first strike broke out in the most economically developed region in Yugoslavia—Slovenia—in a coal mine where there was considerable working-class tradition and a relatively skilled labor force.

The Dynamic of Strikes Through the Years

After Slovenia, strikes broke out in Croatia, and Serbia, then in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finally in Macedonia, and Montenegro. It wasn't until 1968, a full decade later, that strikes broke out in Kosovo, the least economically developed province in Yugoslavia.

The greatest number of strikes and strikers have been recorded in the most economically developed republics and in the province of Voivodina. The least number were in the underdeveloped republics and in the province of Kosovo. This fact points up still more the importance of examining the preconditions for these strikes.

We did not have exact annual data on strikes. But the data that is available are useful because they indicate fairly accurately what the real situation was.

From 1964 through the first eight months of 1968, 77,597 strikers participated in 869 different work stoppages. That comes out to 90 workers participating in each strike. The figures for the years 1958 through 1961 are not complete. Therefore, there were more strikes than those indicated.

The results presented here are based on the study done in 1969. A questionnaire was used that contained mostly twenty-five open-ended questions. So, not all the answers could be presented here. The questionnaire was sent to all the union councils in the communes and all the

not have a lot to lose by going on strike.

In contrast, workers in production have a greater sense of democracy and much more courage. This enables them to strike without this affecting their social and political position. Their general social condition is such that they have almost nothing to lose. By way of example, the total income of a textile worker is one-fourth that of an employee in an import-export company dealing in nonagricultural products and one-sixth that of a worker in a hydroelectric plant.

The extent of teachers' strikes in primary and secondary schools and medical workers' strikes can be explained by the moderate value placed on their labor and the generally bad social conditions of teachers. They are reduced to the status of employees of those who pay them. These two factors seriously threaten the high ethical and professional standards of teachers and medical employees. The effect of strikes on professional morale merits a separate study.

Of the total number of strikes, 78.5% lasted one workday or less; 21.5% lasted more than one day; while 3.8% (19 strikes) lasted three days and involved 11.9% of the total number of strikers.

The figures show that in almost 80% of the cases, production workers struck on their own. In the other cases, office workers and technical staff only went on strike when the employees in the entire enterprise went out or at least part of the enterprise stopped working. In other words, the office workers and technical staff went on strike only when it was impossible to do otherwise, either because the industrial workers' strike prevented them from working, or because they had no other option but to solidarize with these workers.

It is important to note that in 85% of the strikes, members of the Workers Councils, Management Committees, and other bodies took part in the strikes. This fact is in direct relation to the declining influence industrial workers have on decisions made by these bodies of workers' self-management, and the decline in the representation of production workers on the Workers Councils and Self-management Committees relative to other categories. When they cannot get suitable solutions approved by the institutional centers of self-management, workers, and members of Workers Councils and Management Committees go on strike, just like the production workers who do not formally belong to these bodies of workers' self-management.

Causes of Strikes

We asked the question: What were the real causes of strikes, causes outside of the workplace? In 90.6% of the strikes, the causes were said to be bad market conditions and the unfavorable position on the market.

We asked the question: What were the

immediate causes of the work stoppage? The responses are given in Table 1.

In more than 90% of the cases, the position of the workplace in the economic system is given as the answer to the first question about causes of strikes outside the enterprise. The economic and political system has a strong influence on strikes. Although strikes essentially take place within a microcosm, they are not only a result of relations within the workplace, but also result from relations within society in general.

As far as the immediate causes within the workplace itself, there is a convergence between the immediate causes and the deeper reasons. In 83.3% of the cases, what is cited as the immediate cause of strikes is personal income. This is also the reason given for 63.2% of the real, underlying causes. We can conclude that these conflicts have a social character.

In 14.9% of the cases the underdevelopment of self-management in the various workplaces is indicated as the deeper reason for strikes. This figure is certainly interesting and merits a deeper study. It could help establish to what degree self-management is consciously chosen as the only way to ensure the true liberation of workers. It would help establish how it is seen as a way to overcome the polarization

where we have, on one side the production workers asking for higher personal income, housing, etc.; and on the other side, those who run things, to whom the demands for higher personal income and improvements in general social conditions are directed.

We should also note that agitation of enemies is not mentioned a single time as an immediate cause or deeper reason for strikes.

In answer to the question of whether before going on strike the workers took advantage of all other channels to resolve their problems, in 72.3% of the strikes the answer was no, and in 27.7% of the strikes, yes.

In answer to the question: Against whom did the strikers express their discontent? 77.3% of the strikers were said to be in conflict only with the authorities in their enterprise, 14.5% only against authorities outside their enterprise, and 8.2% against both.

Within their workplace, 68.4% answered they were in conflict only with the directors in their enterprise; 16.3% said with both the directors and the self-management bodies; 12.9% said only with the self-management bodies; and 2.4% said with another department in the enterprise.

In answer to the question of whether the

Table 1
Immediate Causes of Strikes

| Cause of Strike | Number of strikes | % | Number of strikers | % |
|---|-------------------|-------|--------------------|-------|
| Low wages | 134 | 26.6 | 19,049 | 28.6 |
| Level of minimum wage | 14 | 2.8 | 1,245 | 1.8 |
| Total wages and distribution of wages | 133 | 26.4 | 16,228 | 24.3 |
| Wages distributed late | 75 | 14.9 | 8,223 | 12.3 |
| Reduction in base wages | 39 | 7.8 | 6,571 | 9.9 |
| Raising of production norms | 24 | 4.8 | 1,975 | 3.0 |
| Managers treating workers bureaucratically | 37 | 7.4 | 6,831 | 10.2 |
| Decision of self-management body | 7 | 1.4 | 1,466 | 2.2 |
| Lack of information or false information | 24 | 4.8 | 3,661 | 5.5 |
| Dismissals or transfers to worse jobs | 13 | 2.6 | 1,303 | 2.0 |
| Agitation by enemy agents | — | — | — | — |
| Authorities outside enterprise break promise or agreement | 3 | 0.5 | 107 | 0.2 |
| Total | 503 | 100.0 | 66,659 | 100.0 |
| Cause unknown | 9 | — | 186 | — |
| Total | 512 | — | 66,845* | — |

*In the case of forty strikes, the number of strikers was not given.

demands of the workers were satisfied after the strike, in 58.7% of the strikes the demands were said to be totally satisfied. In 23.4% they were said not to have been satisfied. And in 17.9% of the strikes they were said to have been partially satisfied.

In answer to the question: Did the unions take a position on the strike? In 44.5% of the strikes, the unions were said to have supported the workers' demands, but disapproved of using the strike as a method. In 22.6% of the strikes the unions did not have a position. In 21.6% of the strikes the unions did not support either the demands or the strike. And in only 11.3% of the strikes did the union support both the workers' demands and the strike as a way of winning demands.

In response to the question of what should the union's role be, 56.9% of the strikers said it should be to take preventive measures which could eliminate the causes of strikes. Another 27.9% said it should support legitimate strikes when the workers have to use this method as a last resort. Some 11.2% said it should be against all strikes. Two percent said the union should support all strikes, and another 2% said it should demand an accounting from those who cause strikes by their negligence.

Strikes are a socially contradictory phenomenon. This can be seen by looking at

the places where strikes have occurred, their immediate causes and deeper causes, the strikers and those they are striking against, the effectiveness of strikes, and their other characteristics.

Conclusion

From the standpoint of the interests of the working class, strikes are neither totally positive, nor solely negative. As a matter of fact, strikes have both these characteristics, both as a general phenomenon and in specific instances. This is why it is impossible to take an a priori position for or against a strike.

Strikes develop and are conducted outside the political structures and institutional self-management bodies that exist both in workplace and in the larger context. That is to say, the institutionalized decision-making bodies are not broad enough (i.e. democratic enough) to allow divergent and opposing interests to surface within these bodies and be resolved in the best and most effective way—by democratic methods. The institutionalized decision-making bodies have a decisive influence on the structures against which the workers are striking.

Strikes are organized and take place outside of, and behind the back of, the self-management bodies, the League of Com-

munists, the unions, and the youth organization.

From this viewpoint, they could be called "wildcat strikes" since they are not organized by any institutionalized structure. So, we have at opposite sides of the conflict, men who belong to the same institutions of political and self-management structures. Among the strikers and among those against whom the strikes are directed there are people who belong to the same organization within the League of Communists, the same union, the same self-management body, and the same youth organization.

Membership in the same institutionalized structures of politics and self-management has no effect on workers' participation in strikes nor their attitude about strikes as an expression of conflict.

The following are the factors that determine the positions of the strikers and those against whom the strikes are directed when they face this problem.

1. The various possibilities to affect the decisions that bear on those questions that are crucial for the general condition of such social groups. On one hand there are those who exercise a preponderant weight in decision-making (above all those who hold leadership posts). And on the other hand there are the production workers who have very little chance to influence decisions.

2. The bases (or criteria) for participating in the distribution of income. Those who strike earn their personal income in accordance with the results of their labor. But these results are measured and evaluated by others. Those against whom the strikes are directed make their personal income and their general social condition is determined on the basis of their function in the labor process, and in particular according to the importance of the leadership post they occupy.

3. The percentage of income allocated to everyone in dividing up the national income (volume of appropriation) does not depend on the results of labor of the recipients but on the social power to influence not only distribution of individual income, but also the decisions concerning the condition of society as a whole. Since income is distributed not according to the products of labor but according to social power, the big differences (which are not socialist in nature) between social groups in the holding of social power and in the general social status generate violent conflicts (strikes).

The conflicts between these groups arise independently of their formal membership in the same institutional structures.

In the real relations among the people who formally belong to the same institutionalized structures and organizations (League of Communists, unions, self-management bodies, etc.) these social inequalities lead to confrontation much more than to unity. □

Underlying Causes of Strikes in Yugoslavia

| Cause of Strike | Number of strikes | % | Number of strikers | % |
|--|-------------------|-------|--------------------|-------|
| Weakly developed self-management, little influence by workers in decisions | 67 | 14.9 | 10,423 | 17.0 |
| How wages are divided, wage division that does not correspond to work done, arbitrary application of wage policies, unjustified and brazen differences between personal wages | 164 | 36.4 | 20,472 | 33.2 |
| Low wages, minimum wages, norms too high, wage base too low | 121 | 26.8 | 15,657 | 25.4 |
| On-going conflict between part of the work organization and the organization as a whole, concentration of decision-making power at the enterprise level and weakly developed self-management in its various subdivisions | 37 | 8.2 | 7,045 | 11.4 |
| Continuous bureaucratic attitude toward workers, rejection of their legitimate demands | 15 | 3.3 | 1,285 | 2.1 |
| Lack of information or false information | 47 | 10.4 | 6,694 | 10.9 |
| Total | 451 | 100.0 | 61,576 | 100.0 |
| Cause unknown | 61 | — | 5,269 | — |
| Total | 512 | — | 66,845* | — |

*In the case of forty strikes, the number of strikers was not given.

DOCUMENTS

May Day Speech by Fidel Castro to 1.5 Million Cubans

Building Socialism is the Task of Free Men and Women

[The following is the text of President Fidel Castro's May Day speech in Havana. The translation and footnotes are by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

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Compatriots:

We know how many hours you have already been standing in this plaza (SHOUTS OF "No!"). We ask only one more effort of you (APPLAUSE AND SHOUTS OF "Fidel, friend, the people are with you!").

Well, we are now going to give another proof of discipline. We are going to remain silent.

I was saying, or I was trying to say, that this afternoon when we were coming to this meeting we could again see the incredible spectacle of absolutely empty streets. Could we imagine the size of this meeting? We figured it would be a big meeting, we figured it would be the biggest meeting in all twenty-one years of the revolution, but it was really impossible to imagine its size. Perhaps the only way we could manage to see how big this meeting is would be from the top of the tower, perhaps from the air, perhaps only graphically, through movies or television or photographs (SHOUTS OF "It is the people who love you!" AND APPLAUSE).

I don't say it or I don't appreciate it in terms of what it means as support for us. I say it and I appreciate it in terms of what it means as support for our noble and just revolutionary ideas, what it means as support for our revolutionary cause (APPLAUSE).

What was involved was a show of strength, but not simply to show it. In recent days a mass battle has been carried out, the likes of which has never before been fought in the history of the revolution, both in terms of its breadth and in terms of its depth. The events that motivated it are known. It was necessary to do this! (APPLAUSE AND SHOUTS OF "Let them go, let them go!" AND "Hey, hey, what do you say, all the worms should leave today!"). We had to show the enemy and teach the enemy that you can't play games with the people (APPLAUSE AND SHOUTS OF "You can't play games."). We had to show the enemy that you can't play games with the revolution (APPLAUSE AND SHOUTS). We had to show the enemy that you cannot insult a people with impunity (APPLAUSE AND



Left to right: Daniel Ortega of Nicaraguan FSLN, Grenada's Maurice Bishop, and Fidel Castro all spoke at rally.

SHOUTS OF "No!"), that you cannot threaten a people with impunity (SHOUTS OF "No!"). And this image that we see here before us is the one they dreamed of destroying: the image of what the people are, the real revolutionary people, the proletarian people, the working people, the peasant people, the fighting people, the student people! (APPLAUSE AND SHOUTS OF "The people united will never be defeated!").

They probably believed that the revolution had been weakened (SHOUTS OF "No!"), and you can see what a "weak" revolution they have discovered (SHOUTS OF "No!" AND "They should go, they should go!"), see what kind of revolution they have found. That is why it was necessary to fight this battle.

As you know, in recent months our party, our people have been carrying out a stubborn and self-sacrificing struggle to be demanding, to overcome inefficiency, to defeat the difficulties; calmly, steadfastly we have been carrying out this important work for some months. It could be said that our revolution, our people, our party had dedicated themselves to this task, and to the tasks of production, in the first place to the sugar harvest, and to the planting;

confronting the problems of the tobacco mold, of the cane rust, of swine fever which have mysteriously—mysteriously!—appeared almost simultaneously in our country¹; confronting the various problems of our revolutionary process, struggling for development, struggling to improve it all within our material possibilities, preparing for the congress of our party. We were involved in this task.

But why did this situation arise? This is not a coincidence, but it turns out that, as

1. Blue mold devastated Cuba's tobacco plantations in 1978-79, from which they still have not recovered. Sugarcane rust or smut is having a major impact on the sugar yields in this year's harvest. African swine fever was detected in Guantánamo province late last year and has led to the preventive slaughter of large numbers of pigs.

The CIA has had a history of introducing agricultural diseases into Cuba. In 1968 a specialist working for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations was arrested for introducing coffee blight into Cuba. Much of the coffee crop was lost to the blight. In 1969 and 1970 the U.S. treated clouds with chemicals to try to ruin the Cuban sugar harvest. And in 1971 the CIA introduced swine fever into Cuba, causing a major outbreak of the disease.

in all the previous circumstances, each time they have messed with us they have ended up in worse shape, each time they provoked us they have ended up losing.

You know the facts, and if it were not for the foreign journalists who are present, it would not be necessary to speak very much about the earlier events. But the issue broke out following the provocations at the embassies of Peru and Venezuela.

The whole world knows that imperialism would like to affect the relations between Cuba and Venezuela, and between Cuba and Peru, that for a long time it has been manipulating things with this in mind.

We cannot forget that it was precisely in Venezuela, and with the participation of Venezuelans, that the monstrous crime of Barbados was planned, organized, and carried out—one of the most unspeakable acts that has occurred in the entire revolutionary period.² Everyone knows that these people have not even been tried, and that frequently there is even talk of their being freed, because some of them have long ties with the ruling party in Venezuela.

We cannot forget that in Peru it was the navy of that country—the navy of that country, and we know it, I think they would not dare to dispute it—the navy of that country!, agents at its orders, who sank our two fishing boats, the *Río Jobado* and *Río Damji*. An incredible provocation. But, in addition, we also cannot forget how the fishing agreement that existed between Cuba and Peru, which lasted a long time, which was working perfectly well, which was useful, very useful for the Peruvians since it helped to produce food for the Peruvians and also helped to produce food for us, was unilaterally cancelled, also on the orders of the navy, cancelled so they could sign private contracts which would make an individual, without doing anything, without doing anything but signing his name, into a millionaire. We cannot forget how the government of Peru failed to fulfill the contract for construction of twenty tuna boats that we signed with them, in line with which our country also spent tens of millions of dollars on a fish processing plant; and despite that the contract was not fulfilled, the tuna boats were not built, and we are left with a processing plant and no tuna boats.

This whole affair has its history and its antecedents. Logically these things were placing a chill on the relations that at one time were warm and close with the revolutionary government of Velasco Alvarado (APPLAUSE), relations that were opened in those difficult days for Peru, caused by

the earthquake, when our people responded to an appeal by the revolution, despite the fact that there were no diplomatic relations, and made 100,000 donations of blood in ten days, and our doctors and our nurses volunteered, and our construction workers volunteered, and our people volunteered to aid the sister people of Peru (APPLAUSE). Yes, the sister people of Peru, because we call and will always continue to call the people of Peru, like the people of Venezuela, our sister peoples (APPLAUSE).

We gave the people our blood with pleasure, because in general it is the people who die in these catastrophes, their houses are the ones that fall down; the houses of the rich, of the bourgeois, are earthquake-resistant. If we have to do the same thing again for the people of Peru, we would do it; just as we would again do it for the people of Chile if there was a repeat of the circumstances that led to the donation of part of our rationed sugar, as Laura Alende recalled yesterday in her beautiful letter.

This is our people! This people who are here, this people of workers, of soldiers (APPLAUSE); the internationalist people, the people of the glorious fighters in Angola and Ethiopia, the people, more than 100,000 of whose soldiers and reservists of their armed forces have already fulfilled internationalist missions (APPLAUSE); the people who when asked for teachers for Nicaragua, offers 29,500. That, that is this people, not the lumpen they want to put forward as a picture of the people, not the scum that went to the embassy of Peru! (APPLAUSE AND SHOUTS OF "They should go!", "Down with the scum!", "All those who don't want to work should go!" "Hey, hey, what do you say, all the worms should leave today!"). That was what insulted our people the most.

That dust—and other dust—caused this mud, and that breeze brought these storms. And it is a strange thing, something that did not happen in any other embassy. When corrupt elements, delinquents, lumpen would go to the Peruvian embassy to ask for a visa, they wouldn't give it to them. They didn't give them visas. But when they entered by violence, crashing a truck or crashing a bus through the fence, ah, then they received them with full honors, they sheltered them, they gave them asylum, they paid for their passage, and they received them as heroes. This could have no other consequence than encouraging the lumpen to carry out these activities, there could be no other result.

And the patience that we showed for practically years did no good. We explained to them that this was wrong, that this would bring bad consequences, that this was going to stimulate violence against diplomatic missions, that they should not continue this policy. On repeated occasions we solved the problem for them, because they said that they did not want to live with those types inside there.

Well, we could have said, let them stay there the rest of their lives. "But, please," they told us, "we do not want to live with these people." And so we authorized the departure of the individuals. We did it repeatedly and what we warned always happened: as soon as one group left, another entered. That's how it was.

But why only in the embassies of Venezuela and Peru? Why didn't this happen in the Mexican embassy, for example? Why didn't it happen in the embassy of Guyana, or in the embassy of Panama, or in the embassy of Jamaica? Not to speak of Nicaragua and Grenada, which not even a crazy person would consider entering whether with a tank or a truck. It did not occur to them, it did not occur to them because the lumpen know and understand governments almost as well as we do, and they know that Mexico had a friendly attitude toward Cuba, that it would not permit this despicable act, these irregularities, nor would Panama permit it, nor would Guyana permit it, nor would Jamaica permit it. Why did these things take place specifically at the embassies of Venezuela and Peru?

It is clear that behind all of this, behind the monstrous crime of Barbados, behind the boats that were sunk in Peru, behind the cancellations of the fishing agreements, behind the nonfulfillment of the contract to build the twenty tuna boats, behind all that and behind all these provocations is the CIA.

Our patience continued until the death of soldier Ortiz Cabrera (APPLAUSE) took place, up to that point, up to that point.³ The point had been reached when we could not tolerate any more and we said: whatever the price—and understand this clearly—whatever the price there must be an end to the provocations. And when the revolution says: it is ready to put a stop to something whatever the price, the world can be sure that it will put a stop to it, whatever the price (APPLAUSE AND SHOUTS OF: "For Sure!").

We simply withdrew the guards at the embassy, and we knew what was going to happen. Because you cannot have imperialism and the lackeys of imperialism going around for so long enticing the lumpen by offering them villas and castles, offering them paradise, offering them everything, filling them with illusions on the one hand, while on the other hand they close off entry into those countries. It's a curious thing: they encourage them to enter illegally by force, they encourage them to leave illegally; but they won't allow them to enter if they ask normally and peacefully.

2. On October 6, 1976, a Cuban airliner bound from Venezuela to Cuba, carrying young Cuban athletes, was blown up in mid-air over Barbados. All seventy-three people on board were killed. In an October 1976 speech Fidel Castro charged that "the CIA directly participated in the destruction of the Cuban plane in Barbados" acting through counterrevolutionary Cuban terrorists.

3. Pedro Ortiz Cabrera, a twenty-seven-year-old Cuban policeman was killed on April 1, 1980, while doing guard duty at the Peruvian embassy in Havana. Ortiz, from a poor peasant family in Oriente, left a five-month-old daughter and a twenty-four-year-old wife. He had been a member of the Young Communist League since 1973.



Part of the crowd at the May Day rally.

We knew that when the guard was withdrawn, as soon as the lumpen knew that there was no guard, the embassy would fill up with lumpen. And that is exactly what happened. It could be said that the lumpen did exactly what was expected.

Well, it was necessary to reestablish a provisional guard, because the guard at that embassy is provisional. I want them to take note of this, since the problem of what to do with those who penetrate an embassy by force remains to be solved. (SOMEONE SHOUTS: "Withdraw the guard!"). Withdrawing it now does not have much importance because we have withdrawn the guard from the Florida peninsula, which is much larger (APPLAUSE). We have had to withdraw the guard from the peninsula of Florida; they have a much easier way for going to the United States (APPLAUSE).

Imperialism immediately began using this problem, the whole bourgeois and rightist press in this hemisphere and in the world began using it, to launch a deluge of slanders and propaganda against Cuba. We expected it. But in this battle we win, we are winning, we will win completely, because we not only defied Yankee military threats; we defied the imperialist information monopolies; we defied the barrage, we defied the campaign with total calmness.

If one is not ready to defy dangers of all types, dangers of military aggression as well as dangers of their propaganda, one cannot respond adequately to the enemy; to be intimidated in the face of the propaganda is like being intimidated in the face of enemy rifles. There is no reason to be afraid of anything; we have learned this perfectly well during twenty-one years.

But they unleashed the international campaign around the idea that the people wanted to leave, that there were many dissidents, especially around this idea: dissidents. There are lumpen there, in that embassy—as you were able to see for yourself in the documentary—who don't

even know what the word dissidence means (LAUGHTER).

Then they orchestrated their campaign around this and, of course, in the front ranks was the imperialist press, and as you can imagine the reactionary and rightist press of the hemisphere and the world, a campaign aimed against socialism, against communism, against the Cuban Revolution.

Parallel with this, the Yankees were doing exactly the same thing as had happened at the embassies of Venezuela and Peru. In recent months, in recent months there has been an increase in illegal departures. The individuals hijacked boats, often taking the crew hostage, and then they were received in Florida as heroes, as dissidents, as patriots, etc. And we warned them, we warned them repeatedly through diplomatic channels. We also warned them publicly, because we spoke specifically of this on March 8, International Women's Day, at the closing session of the congress [of the Federation of Cuban Women].⁴ We warned them in every way of the consequences it might have, and that we might open up Camarioca again.

That day we pointed out what the policy of the revolution is and will be, a basic idea of ours, and that is that the work of a revolution and the building of socialism is a task for absolutely free men and women and is absolutely voluntary (APPLAUSE). Those who do not have revolutionary genes, who do not have revolutionary blood, who do not have a mind that adapts itself to the idea of a revolution, who do not have a heart that adapts itself to the effort and the heroism of a revolution, we don't need them in our country. (SHOUTS OF "They should go!"). And, in short, they are an insignificant part of the people; because the imperialists want to hide, it hurts them to recognize some truths; for example, no other revolution has the

4. See *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, April 14, 1980, p. 382, for that portion of Castro's March 8 speech.

strength of militant masses that the Cuban Revolution has (APPLAUSE).

That is, our revolution . . . it's not good to make comparisons with anyone, it is never pleasant, but certainly the mass strength, the moral strength, the political strength, the ideological strength that the revolution has is tremendous, and when it is put to the test, look at the results, look at the April 19 march, look at this meeting today; but not only in terms of numbers, but rather fundamentally the quality and spirit of the people (APPLAUSE, SHOUTS OF: "Fidel, the scum should leave").

This is the picture that imperialism wants to hide, because that picture does not suit it, it wants the peoples to lose faith in Cuba, it wants peoples to get discouraged about the example of Cuba.

Moreover, in this whole hemisphere—we will leave out Nicaragua and Grenada, but perhaps they would be in agreement with us—despite everything, despite there still being lumpen here unfortunately, despite there still being declassed elements here, despite there being antisocial elements, we have the fewest antisocial and lumpen elements in the whole hemisphere, we are the country in the Americas that has the lowest robbery rate—in spite of the fact that there are thieves—the lowest crime rate, the tiniest drug rate, there is no prostitution, and gambling is not tolerated and its totally prohibited. The Grenadians and the Nicaraguans still have not been able to overcome this situation and it will take them time to overcome it, because we too were not able to overcome it in the first or second year of the revolution.

But no society in the entire hemisphere has a more healthy moral atmosphere than our society (APPLAUSE); no society has greater moral values than those that this society of ours has reached after twenty-one years of revolution, with a sense of justice, with a sense of honor, with a sense of dignity, with an appreciation and an admiration for merit, for work, for sacrifice. And it is shown every time it is put to the test. As we have said other

times, when the wars in Ethiopia and Angola broke out, hundreds of thousands of Cubans came forward to volunteer to participate in those struggles. It is shown by the fact that there are 50,000 of our compatriots, between military and civilian personnel, who are working abroad; it is shown by the fact that Cuban technicians are working in thirty-five countries (APPLAUSE).

And imperialism no longer had allies here. In the beginning it had the bourgeois elements, the landlords; it had vacillating elements of the middle class, including the petty bourgeoisie; but now, where is it going to find allies? Among the workers? (SHOUTS OF: "No!"). Among the peasants? (SHOUTS OF: "No!"). Among the students? (SHOUTS OF: "No!"). Will it find allies among our honest manual and intellectual workers? (SHOUTS OF "No!"). No! In the beginning imperialism sought out some classes because they existed as exploiting classes in our country and they were its allies. Now all that is left to imperialism is the lumpen, that is imperialism's only potential ally; and some people who have a lumpen mentality or are mixed up with the lumpen, that's all; but that is the only potential ally left to imperialism, and starting from that it has to invent its refugees, its asylum seekers, its dissidents.

And I was saying, that parallels with this business at the embassy, the United States was encouraging illegal departures from the country, and this is fundamentally what led to the opening of the port of Mariel.

Mariel, which has already far surpassed Camarioca;⁵ Camarioca was child's play next to Mariel (FROM THE CROWD PEOPLE SHOUT: "Mariel, Florida, we have now opened a wound" [a rhyming chant in Spanish]). They say: Mariel, Florida, we have now opened a wound (LAUGHTER). But look, it was more of a self-inflicted wound. I'll explain.

Because the interesting thing is that this time we were not the ones who took the initiative to open up Mariel, no, they took the initiative over there. In the heat of the situation and of the campaign created in the United States itself around the events at the embassy of Peru, the idea of sending boats to pick up these lumpen arose spontaneously in Florida, and then we simply limited ourselves to saying that the boats would not be met with cannon fire because they were not coming on a war footing, and that they would be met with full

5. In October 1965 Cuba turned the small port of Camarioca into an emigration port for those Cubans who wanted to leave the country and invited Cuban exiles in the U.S. to pick up their relatives and friends. At the same time Cuba called on the U.S. to negotiate on setting up regular flights between Varadero Beach and Miami to take out the bulk of those wishing to leave. As a result of Cuban pressure, flights between Cuba and Miami were reestablished in December 1965 and continued for seven years.

courtesy, and this thing was opened up. I don't know if it is a self-inflicted wound, an act of hara-kiri or something like that, but it was opened. Now let's see how it will be closed, how they can close this (LAUGHTER), now we will have to see, we will have to see. They are performing a wonderful sanitary service (LAUGHTER), wonderful. Now they are complaining.

They say that there are delinquents, as if this were really a discovery, as if they were surprised to find some delinquents. But who do they think entered and remained in the embassy of Peru? Did they think they were intellectuals, artists, or technicians, engineers? What did they think, what did they think was in there? They thought that it was propaganda on our part, they thought that we were unjust, and that we were calling these "poor little dissidents" lumpen. And this was the type of element that made up the immense majority of those who were in the Peruvian embassy. Of course some of them brought family, and we are not going to say that a child is a lumpen; it is a sad thing for a child to be the son of a lumpen, it is a terribly sad thing. But the immense majority of the people who were there were of this type: lumpen.

Some softies, as someone said (LAUGHTER), some shameless types who had hidden their feelings. You know them, the committees know this well, better than anyone, they know that some of these people also snuck in, that, by the way, these pretenders were the ones who produce the most irritation.

Now, well, Mariel was opened, and we are strictly, rigorously following our slogan: that anyone who wants to go to any other country that will receive them, should go (SHOUTS OF "They should

go!"); and that the building of socialism, the revolutionary work, is the task of free men and women. Don't forget this principle, don't forget this principle, which has immense moral value (APPLAUSE).

Now, we did not just give safe-conduct passes and passports only to those who were in the embassy, no. We gave them to every lumpen who asked for one, to everyone who asked for one. But, of course, the lumpen said: "This is International Lumpen Day!" (LAUGHTER.) When they heard us say this, well many lumpen wanted their passports and their safe-conduct passes. And what are we going to do? Why should we deny this to them? As *Granma* said, "it would be unfair and unconstitutional."

So, what do they think they are going to receive over there? Of course, at the beginning, ah!, they got the oh-so-refined bourgeois, the oh-so-well-dressed landlord, and they got the doctor, the professional. . . . And doctors, remember they took half the doctors there were in this country; we had 6,000 and they took 3,000. Now it is very difficult for them to get a doctor, very difficult indeed, because we now have a different kind of doctor. First, there are those who stayed here, the best; then there are the doctors trained in a different spirit of solidarity, in a different spirit of humanity, doctors who are not merchants. And we have plenty. This is proven by the fact that there are about 1,500 doctors serving in internationalist missions. It is no longer the same kind of engineer, of architect, of professor as in the first days of the revolution, no (APPLAUSE).

Because it must be said that many interesting things have been revealed in this battle. We should begin by noting the incredible participation of the youth, the



The Cuban government has stationed naval ships every eight miles between Mariel and U.S. territorial waters to insure that boats make the trip safely. Sign says: "There will be no safer transportation in the world than the 'Mariel-Florida' route."

combativity and fervor of our youth, because this has been the first great battle of an entire generation of young people (APPLAUSE). The massive participation of women, a notable thing; but, in addition, the attitude of the intellectuals, the intellectual workers, the journalists, the writers, the artists, the technicians, the professionals, the doctors, a magnificent attitude! It must be said that the intellectual workers have also been in the first ranks of this battle—not to mention the students!

Of course, imperialism used to pick and choose. Well, how is it going to select now? As Nuez says, the only thing they can do is swallow the whole sword, right to the hilt (SHOUTS).⁶ That is the situation.

But this was not the whole problem; this was only part of the problem. While this was going on, and the big propaganda campaign, they announced military maneuvers in the Caribbean—now this is much more serious—with air and naval landings at the Guantánamo Base. This was more serious, more serious, it was especially more serious taking into account the world situation; more serious if we analyze imperialism's increasingly aggressive policy toward us.

Because while in the early days of this administration there were some gestures that could be considered positive, later the most reactionary elements, the so-called hawks inside the United States government have been increasingly imposing their line, and this line was increasingly aggressive against Cuba.

This did not just begin now. It began at the time of the Sixth Summit Meeting of the Nonaligned Countries. They were angered by Cuba's strength, by Cuba's prestige, by Cuba's positions, and Cuba's victories in the Nonaligned Movement. In the middle of the Summit Conference they launched that huge and hypocritical campaign around the Soviet personnel that were in Cuba;⁷ personnel, a quantity of Soviet military personnel that has been in Cuba in similar numbers since seventeen years ago, since the October [Missile] Crisis, something that didn't have anything to do with the agreement of the October Crisis, Soviet military personnel.⁸ The Yankees knew this; they knew it; they have known about it since that time, and all of their presidents have known it.

And suddenly they "discovered" a Soviet military unit. They said it was a brigade, for our part we did not feel like calling it a brigade, and we called it something else, I

6. Nuez is a well-known Cuban political cartoonist.

7. In August 1979, the U.S. administration claimed that it had recently discovered a Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba. On August 31, the State Department claimed "this is the first time we have been able to confirm the presence of a Soviet ground forces unit" in Cuba. Later U.S. sources admitted it had been there since at least 1962.



A Nuez cartoon from the Cuban daily, *Granma*.

think it was Training Center Number Twelve. It's all the same, the name is of no great importance. But yes, we do not deny that there were these personnel, that they are there, and we are very happy that these personnel have been there for seventeen years. We're only sorry that there have not been more training centers, that this was not number thirteen, number fourteen, number fifteen! (APPLAUSE.) Because we would be much happier still if we had several more such training centers, because they are magnificent training centers, let me tell you.

But they knew all about it. That's imperialism's hypocrisy and duplicity. In the middle of the Nonaligned Conference they launched a huge scandal around this, they began a big campaign, which later would end up affecting even the prestige of the United States government. Because, why did they discover it at that time . . . And [Carter] had to take certain measures.

But coupled with this propaganda campaign, coupled with it, and using it as a pretext, they organized a Caribbean Task Force and they installed it over there in Florida, at Key West. They established a multiforce operational command.

Their basic concern was caused by the revolutionary victory in Nicaragua and the growing upsurge of the revolutionary movement in Central America. They began to make their preparations to estab-

8. On October 22, 1962, President John Kennedy ordered a complete naval and economic blockade against Cuba, demanding that the Soviet Union withdraw missiles it had placed on the island. On October 28, the Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles in return for a pledge that the United States would not attempt an invasion of Cuba.

lish a capability to intervene. And, of course, they used the pretext of the Soviet military personnel in Cuba. And they also used it to begin exerting pressure against us and to make threats against Cuba, and at the end of last year they carried out a little maneuver at Guantánamo. But now this maneuver was to be much bigger, more massive, with more resources, more soldiers, of a stranger character. And we said: No, no, no, this cannot be. We are not going to sit still to the idea that they are going to organize this maneuver just like that.

This maneuver, as has been said, is clearly a practice invasion of our country, a masked practice invasion on our own territory. This is what is really intolerable, what is unacceptable: a maneuver on how to invade Cuba carried out on our own territory.

The maneuvers became a serious problem, and we were not going to stand around with our arms folded. Of course, measures were immediately taken to mobilize the Oriente Army, and with reinforcements from other provinces to organize a Cuban armed forces maneuver in the face of the Yankee maneuver (APPLAUSE).

(APPLAUSE AND SHOUTS OF "Fidel, for sure, hit the Yankees hard!")

It was natural that the hurricane would turn back toward the United States, and the hurricane did turn back toward the United States.

Well, the United States has imposed a blockade on Cuba for more than twenty years, a harsh economic blockade, that even prohibits the sale of food and medicines, even medicines! It is a brutal thing, put in effect twenty-one years ago.

The United States occupies a piece of our

territory by force and against the will of our people. On what doctrine, on what principles, on what law, on what legality can you base the act of maintaining a naval base on the territory of another country against the will of the people? This has no legal basis, no juridical basis, no moral basis, no basis in any principles; it is simply an act of force.

The United States sends the ultramodern SR-71 planes over the territory of Cuba, planes that fly at an altitude of between 25,000 and 30,000 meters, at a very high speed. And every so often throughout the country we hear these booms, because as they break the sound barrier they cause sonic booms the length of the country, and walls shake, and glass shakes, and windows shake every time the SR-71 passes (SOMEONE SHOUTS: "Let's knock them down!"). It's not so easy to knock them down, not so easy, technically it is not easy.

Now, is it legal to do this? Is it legal to blockade our country? Is it legal to have a naval base on our territory? Is it legal to violate our air space? (SHOUTS OF "No!"). And they are doing these things. And in addition, there is the maneuver.

But this is not the only thing imperialism did in all these years. Many of the comrades who have spoken here have mentioned and recalled the *La Coubre*, they recalled Girón, they recalled Escambray, they recalled the sabotage, they recalled the plans for subversion, they recalled the attempts and the introduction of diseases to our agriculture, they recalled the plans to assassinate leaders of the revolution, they recalled Barbados, they recalled many things, because there are many deeds that the United States can be reminded of.⁹

So, it wasn't that we capriciously diverted the hurricane that began in the Peruvian embassy back toward the United States, but rather that the natural course of the hurricane was toward the United States, and the natural course of the struggle against those violations and that blackmail was for us to eliminate the restrictions on departure by sea, withdrawing the guard from Florida. It was the natural course and it should not have been

9. *La Coubre* was a French merchant ship that was blown up in Havana harbor on March 4, 1960. It was proven that U.S. agents had a part in planning the sabotage, in which nearly 100 people died and over 200 were seriously wounded.

Playa Girón on the Bay of Pigs was the landing point for more than 1,500 U.S.-organized Cuban counterrevolutionaries who invaded Cuba on April 17, 1961. The invasion was wiped out within seventy-two hours.

In 1961 U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary groups carried out armed struggle in the Escambray mountains.

For a list of sabotage attacks against Cuba and attempts on the lives of Cuban leaders, see *IP/I*, April 7, 1980, pp. 339-340.

so surprising to them, because they knew it was going to happen.

And as I said, formally we were not the ones to open Mariel, it was opened from over there, and we do not have any police over there. This is their problem, something they have to do; because if no one wants to obey their orders, that's their problem. But we have the right, and what we are doing within our territory is legal, we have the right to authorize the departure of the antisocial elements that want to go. We force no one—absolutely no one!—let that be understood. We have never deported a single person! Ah, but we are absolutely within our rights to authorize the departure of the antisocials, and that is what we are doing. Well, this battle is getting interesting.

Today, beginning early this morning, cables and news began arriving saying that the Yankees have suspended the naval landing at Guantánamo. Listen to this. Even a U.S. radio station, in the early hours of the morning, said that the naval exercise but not the air exercise had been suspended. But later this afternoon we received official information, and we were able to confirm it with the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, as well as the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, which sent this open cable. It says: "We have just spoken with Mr. Myles Frechette, head of the Bureau of Cuban Affairs of the State Department, who confirmed that the military maneuvers projected for Guantánamo have been totally cancelled" (APPLAUSE AND SHOUTS OF: "Fidel, be tough, Cuba must be respected!"). "Frechette commented that there had been communications with the 'Voice of America' radio to point out its error regarding its transmission reporting that parachutists would take part in that maneuver."

It appears and they say that they will now carry out the maneuvers over there, on the Florida coast and on the east coast of the United States. While we know that these maneuvers are still definitely aimed against us and against Central America and the Caribbean from there, we are not going to dispute their right to have maneuvers over there on U.S. territory. What we were disputing was the right to hold maneuvers on Cuban territory.

If this is the case, there is no doubt that it means a great success for our people's struggle and for international solidarity (APPLAUSE). Therefore the Cuban government will suspend the special maneuvers that the Oriente Army was going to carry out under the name Girón-XIX, which were to begin on May 7 (APPLAUSE).

But the March of the Fighting People will still take place, the March of the Fighting People will still take place! (APPLAUSE) because the march was not simply against the maneuvers, but also against the blockade, against the base at Guantánamo, and against the SR-71 spy flights (APPLAUSE), and we must prevent

the Yankees from trying to gain the advantage of the people demobilizing in the middle of the battle (SHOUTS OF "Never!"). The March of the Fighting People must take place, and it must take place with even greater force than the April 19 march (APPLAUSE). It is a mobilization of the people against the blockade, against the base at Guantánamo, and against the violation of our air space. We must not remain quiet, and we must show world public opinion that we reject and that we are willing to struggle against these things.

Of course if the United States government were to announce that it has suspended the blockade against Cuba, that it is going to return our occupied territory at Guantánamo, and that it is going to suspend the SR-71 flights, then, very good, we would, with pleasure, suspend the March of the Fighting People (APPLAUSE). They are not going to do that, they are not going to do that. But they are going to respect us a little more, they are going to learn a little more about Cuba, they are going to learn to respect Cuba more (APPLAUSE AND SHOUTS OF: "Fidel, be tough, Cuba must be respected!"). They have suspended the maneuver, but they have not renounced the right they have claimed for themselves of turning around and holding it in three months, in four or five months, or whenever they feel the international or other circumstances are more favorable. Therefore, what they must do is relinquish their presence on this piece of our national territory.

Therefore, we will continue to uphold these three banners, and we will organize the march. They say that I am organizing it. They say: "This is organized by Castro." Clearly the mass organizations did it. Of course the masses have their political leaders, and the masses have their party; we don't go along with hypocrisy of any kind, because here we are, and we've got it all together (APPLAUSE); we don't go around creating fictions, we don't go around creating fictions! We are united, and we have a party, we have a leadership; but, of course, the party cannot organize the march, it can't. The march can only be organized through the mass organizations, this meeting could only be organized through the mass organizations, and only through the miracle of a revolution can you create the enthusiasm of a meeting like this. These are facts.

All right now, the whole people has participated in this, the whole people has participated, as we are participating in this meeting.

Therefore, the March will take place on Saturday May 17, not on the eighth; because the maneuvers were to begin on May 8, but that is not the specific date when they were going to carry out the amphibious landing. So the March of the Fighting People will take place on Saturday, May 17, throughout the country. This time it won't be a million, I estimate that around

five million people will march that day throughout the length and breadth of our homeland (APPLAUSE).

But, of course, that is why I say that we must not let our success make us overconfident; this is not the time to be overconfident. The enemy still exists, it is still strong; it harasses us, it blockades us, it threatens us, all the more so in the heat of a new world situation, where we are at the threshold, or already in the midst of a situation of an arms race and of cold war. Therefore we cannot drop our guard and we must remain alert.

For that reason the party has instructed the Armed Forces to form Militias of Territorial Troops, as one more force (APPLAUSE), that will be made up of men and women, workers, peasants, students, all those who are able to fight, and will organize them and structure them so they will be able to defend every piece of the national territory (APPLAUSE). All those who are able to fight and are not part of the reserves of the regular troops will be able to be part of the Militias of Territorial Troops.

We should be clearly aware that in Cuba—just as in Nicaragua, even though Cuba has a much stronger army than Nicaragua, as would be expected, since there has been more time and Cuba has a much larger population—aggression against us will be confronted not just through a regular war; it will also be necessary to confront the enemy through people's war. Both things: resistance by the regular units and resistance by the whole people.

Do you know what really makes us strong—us, and Nicaragua, and Grenada? The fact that these are people's revolutions, revolutions with deep roots, with great popular support; and any enemy would have to think that it would be madness to invade a country like this, it would be madness because the same thing could happen as happened to Napoleon's troops in Spain, which entered and then could not figure out how to leave, or his troops in the old Russia, who entered and then also could not figure out how to leave. Yes, they can enter; but if they are going to tangle with a people like this, if they tangle with a people like this, it is much harder to then leave. This is the problem (APPLAUSE).

That is, we must prepare ourselves for the two kinds of war: conventional war and people's war—the two wars, both types of war. This will force the imperialists to think long and hard before they commit the blunder of invading our country.

But there are dangers for us, because some of those people have already begun to speak in more aggressive terms, some have called for ignoring the 1962 agreements, that is, they are again beginning to put forward the thesis that they have a right to invade us. Others have very cynically said that if a conflict should develop



Sandinista flag at Havana May Day rally.

in another part of the world, they would take the liberty of carrying out action wherever it best suits them; in a word, they were referring to Cuba, given the fact that Cuba is extremely far from the Soviet Union and the socialist camp.

So we must be realists, we must be realists, because these dangers arise from the growing aggressiveness of imperialism, and from the theories and things that they are putting forward. But they should know what they will find here. That is why we said that this mass meeting was so important, because this shows imperialism that there is a people here—and what a people!

I would say that this is a battle that has been launched today in defense of the integrity of our homeland (APPLAUSE). Your very presence, your very presence in this Plaza is a battle, and an important battle, in defense of the integrity and security of Cuba. Because the most dangerous thing is that the enemy might misread things, that the enemy might delude itself.

But we are also going to do something else. We have already begun work on drawing up plans of how the country could survive and resist in the event of a total blockade; in the event of a total blockade what each one of us would have to do. And beginning with the premise that no food entered the country, that no fuel entered the country, what we would have to do to survive and resist.

Because they are also talking about this thesis. They say: okay, let's not carry out military activity on the ground, instead let's mine the ports. One of the objectives of the planned maneuvers was to study how they would do this. They speak of

naval blockades, reckoning how difficult it would be for a country without oil to survive a naval blockade. And we have to draw up plans for what we would do in such a situation.

By the way, Regan, or Reagan, or Rigan, I don't know how it's pronounced, who is certain to be the candidate of the Republican Party, has come out in favor of carrying out a naval blockade of Cuba. Of course none of this will be easy, we must let them know that. But we have the duty as revolutionaries, as a realistic people, to have a response ready for each and every one of these problems.

But what they cannot count on is that Cuba would ever surrender, because we will never surrender, we will never surrender! (PROLONGED APPLAUSE).

If a climate of peace does not exist in the Caribbean, the blame for that is not ours, it is theirs. They should end their blockade, they should give up their base at Guantánamo, they should stop their flights over Cuba, they should respect Nicaragua, they should respect Grenada. And if to this we add the point of noninterference in the internal affairs of other peoples in Latin America, then a climate of peace, of détente could be created. We have the duty to struggle to develop peace and collaboration between peoples. But we will never do it by getting on our knees at imperialism's feet to beg for peace (SHOUTS OF "No!" AND OF "Carter, CIA, the same crap!").

The international situation tends to become more complicated. I want to call attention to, and take this opportunity to speak about, the situation in Iran.

All of us are interested in these prob-

lems, because a conflict there or anywhere else could lead to decisive actions by them anywhere else, as they have so cynically stated. That is, what happens in all parts of the world is of interest to us; it is of interest to us as revolutionaries, it is of interest to us as conscious people, and in addition it is of interest to us for ourselves. What happens in the world is of interest to us.

You all know that in Iran the shah's dynasty lasted more than thirty years. Those people lived under a fierce tyranny for decades. The people had overthrown the shah once, and the CIA put him back into power, just as it did in Guatemala, exactly the same. This is common knowledge, it is part of history, all the documents and all the proof exist. He murdered hundreds of thousands of Iranians. He jailed, tortured, committed all kinds of horrors. The Iranian people, with great courage, with great patriotism, almost without arms, and despite the fact that the shah possessed the most powerful army in the region, overthrew the shah. And naturally this led to anger against and a powerful rejection of the policy of the United States. When the United States then committed the error of bringing the shah into their country, this provoked a popular explosion, an explosion of indignation among the Iranian people, which led to the events at the United States embassy in Iran, the taking of the embassy, and the capture of a group of embassy staff.

The arrogant United States response to events of this kind is force. It was the CIA's action in installing the shah there that produced this hatred among the masses. It was the support the United States provided to the shah that produced

this hatred of the United States. It was the arrival of the shah in the United States that produced the explosion of the masses.

And we have always held the position that this problem must be solved through political and diplomatic means and not by force; this problem of the embassy and of the so-called hostages.

But the United States has committed a series of errors. Their first error was to practically confiscate, to seize control of billions of dollars that the Iranian state had on deposit in U.S. banks. This measure of force, of arrogance, this illegal measure, could not help but increase the anger of the Iranians. And each thing the Americans have done has irritated the Iranians more. The U.S. mobilized big forces, aircraft carriers, dozens of naval units, and sent them near Iran. They threatened Iran, and this naturally angered the Iranians more. Moreover, they were talking about carrying out military actions before July. And, in fact, they carried some out, like the attempted commando attack in Iran that tried to solve the problem through force and surprise.

They have further complicated the situation. The students have now dispersed the so-called hostages. In short, any act of force against the people of Iran would be very dangerous.

Moreover, the United States has now prohibited trade with Iran and has established a type of blockade against Iran, and it is threatening to take new measures, and is trying to get Western Europe and Japan behind the economic blockade against Iran, that is, an attempt to make Iran surrender through starvation, something similar to the things they have done to us.

In Iran a real people's revolution has

taken place—there is no question of that—which has extraordinary force. And it is our duty to support Iran, to solidarize ourselves with Iran, because everything that is taking place in Iran reminds us of what happened in our own country (APPLAUSE).

At the same time, we must work to try to get the conflicts between our Iraqi brothers and the Iranian brothers to cease. We must work to see they resolve their problems through diplomatic means, because these conflicts are only grist for the imperialist mill.

Well, now, what will happen if the United States succeeds in establishing this blockade against Iran? Will they try to conquer it through starvation? But Iran is a country that belongs to the Third World, that belongs to the Nonaligned Movement and to OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

OPEC has the power to stop an economic blockade of Iran; it has that power in its hands if it warns that oil shipments will be suspended to countries that join the blockade against Iran (APPLAUSE). Because the West cannot apply an economic blockade against Iran if OPEC is against it, if OPEC resists it, if OPEC, totally correctly, warns of the consequences.

OPEC could say: well, if you want to starve 35 million human beings to death, we won't send you oil so you can ride around in your cars. This is OPEC's hour, the moment of truth for OPEC, when it can show that it is good for something besides raising prices and accumulating big fortunes. It is the moment of truth for OPEC, it is the moment of truth for the nonaligned countries, and it is the moment of truth for the countries of the Third World.

Therefore it will be very interesting to see what OPEC does. And we hope that OPEC will not act like the OAS [Organization of American States], that it won't do what the OAS did when the imperialists established their blockades and their aggressive plans against Cuba.¹⁰ This is a problem we must follow closely, we must mobilize our relations, our friends internationally to give support to Iran.

Of course, Iran is far away. But right here, near us, we have the case of El Salvador, where they are committing real genocide, where they are murdering thousands of patriots.

To understand how inconsistent the politics of some states are, we have the example of what the Andean Pact¹¹ did

10. On February 14, 1962, Cuba was expelled from the Organization of American States. The expulsion of Cuba was soon followed by a total trade embargo by the remaining twenty members of the OAS, with the sole exception of Mexico, which continued to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with Havana.

11. The Andean Pact is made up of the governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Peru.

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around this and other problems. We are not opposed to the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean. On the contrary, we favor it. And, with Mexico, we were founders of SELA, the Latin American Economic System. But we are opposed to the political Mafias in this hemisphere, because they don't lead to anything. We would have welcomed a progressive Andean Pact, or better yet a revolutionary Pact. As one of the signs on the March of the Fighting People said, the Andean Pact should become the real pact of Bolívar and of Sandino.

But what did it do? What has it done, for example, with regard to the provocative and threatening maneuvers that the Yankees were organizing? It didn't even issue a statement. What have they done with regard to the blockade of Cuba, which is a crime? They have not even issued a statement condemning the blockade. What have they done with regard to the base at Guantánamo? They have not issued a single statement demanding that this territory be returned to us. What have they done with regard to the spy flights over Cuba, which are a shameless violation of our sovereignty? They have not issued a single condemning statement.

What have they done about Puerto Rico, a brother people, which imperialism wants to gobble up, which the United States wants to annex? They have not said a word. What have they said about Iran and the blockade against Iran? As far as is known up to now, they have not said even one word. What have they said about the genocide being carried out in El Salvador? Not a word. And in recent months thousands of people are dying and have died there.

They did issue a deluge of propaganda against us around the Peru events, and there there wasn't even a single injury.

Let's just say that over there, where thousands of patriots are dying, the Andean Pact does not say a word. And there is a reason for that. Because, specifically, the ruling party in Venezuela, which is one of the members of the Andean Pact, supports the genocidal government of El Salvador, just as in Panama it supports the so-called Christian Democracy, which is a reactionary right-wing group that is conspiring against the progressive government of Panama.

These are the facts. And in relation to this problem, they adopted a demagogic policy against Cuba; they acted like a Mafia. I won't say that the conduct of each of them has been the same. There were some differences between them, but this was all that the Andean Pact was good for.

There is, I repeat, this situation in El Salvador, which requires the broadest international support in order to stay the hands of the imperialists.

These demonstrations of ours are part of the struggle not only in defense of our own integrity, but also in defense of the integ-



city of Grenada, of Nicaragua, in defense of the sovereignty of the countries of the Caribbean and Central America. It is part of our struggle.

Therefore this meeting has had a unique character. It has really been an international meeting of the workers. For us it has been an occasion of great honor, great satisfaction; we have felt very encouraged, very strengthened by the presence of Comrade Bishop at this meeting. He took part in a meeting in Grenada this morning, and then this meeting in Havana in the afternoon (APPLAUSE). The presence of Comrade Daniel Ortega (APPLAUSE). You have met both these leaders before, at the Sixth Summit. The presence of the president of the World Peace Council, Comrade Chandra, who is among us (APPLAUSE). The presence of the leader of the World Federation of Trade Unions, Comrade Pastorino (APPLAUSE). We have been honored by the valued presence of representatives we could call them, of the best of the Latin American intellectuals, Comrade Juan Bosch (APPLAUSE) and Comrade Gabriel García Márquez (APPLAUSE).

All this has meant a great deal to us, providing a really historic character to what has been the greatest meeting of the revolution.

In addition to maintaining our mobilization and preparing ourselves for the May 17 march, we have to turn this energy not only into political strength, not only into military strength, but also into productive strength. As Veiga explained, the next

weeks will be decisive both for the end of the sugar harvest and for the great quantity of cane that must be planted and weeded. We must turn this energy into productive strength.

We must also convert this tremendous strength that has emerged from this colossal mass battle, that has emerged from this revolutionary rededication of the people, that has emerged from the anger expressed against the bums, parasites, lumpen, against the antisocials, into a strength of consciousness, into a weapon in the struggle to be more demanding, the struggle to overcome shortcomings, and the struggle to defeat the difficulties. This is very important: we must be capable of turning this incredible, gigantic strength into a weapon in the struggle against our own shortcomings, in the struggle against our own weaknesses.

Many emotion-filled things have taken place today, many stirring things. The most basic, the most fundamental, has been the people. I believe that for all of us, this afternoon will remain an unforgettable experience, an indelible experience.

Without being demagogic, without trying to flatter, but rather expressing the deepest, most sincere, and most heartfelt spirit of justice, I would venture to say that a people like this deserves a place in history, a place in glory. A people like this deserves victory!

Patria o muerte! [Our Country or Death!] *Venceremos!* [We will win!] (SHOUTS OF "We will win!") (OVATION)

WORLDWIDE CAMPAIGN FOR AID TO NICARAGUA



**POR
NICARAGUA**

**1° Jornada
Latinoamericana
del 20 al 23 de Marzo
U.C.V.**

Organizan: F.C.U. y C.E.S.

From March 21-23, three days of Latin American Solidarity With the Nicaraguan Revolution were held at the Central University of Venezuela, in Caracas. Organized by a coalition of left-wing groups in the Center of Social Studies and by the Federation of Venezuelan University Students, the days of solidarity culminated with forums on the struggle in El Salvador and on the Nicaraguan revolution.

Chilean Trotskyist, Luis Vitale, opened the forum on Nicaragua. Miguel Angel, representing the Sandinista National Liberation Front, answered questions on the situation in Nicaragua and on the perspectives of the revolution. Also taking part in the program was the Nicaraguan ambassador to Venezuela. Speakers from the Chilean Socialist Party and the Venezuelan Student Federation closed the meeting.

Nicaraguan Health Plan Wins Support in Britain

[The following is from an article in the March 27 issue of *Socialist Challenge*, the weekly newspaper sponsored by the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

Since coming to power in July last year, the Government of National Reconstruction (GRN) has implemented a radical programme of health care.

The new Ministry of Health has:

- Vaccinated two thirds of the entire population against polio, tetanus, diphtheria, measles and other illnesses;
- Fumigated some 24,548 houses against the everpresent danger of malaria;
- Dispatched 25 medical brigades to attend to sugar cane and coffee plantation workers;
- Created a special education programme of nine courses for training auxiliaries in nursing, dietetics, laboratory examinations, anaesthesia and basic sanitation;
- Installed 4,200 new latrines, twice the number for the whole of 1978;
- Made free all medical prescriptions.

Moreover, plans are already underway to reconstruct the hospitals destroyed by Somoza during the civil war. Work has also begun on the building of a National Childrens' Hospital and five clinics, with plans to build a further 150 clinics in the near future.

These are only a small sample of the ambitious preventive health measures taken by the GRN. Free health care for its people will require approximately £10 million. New hospitals must be built, new doctors trained to replace those who have died or fled the country, and vast quantities of medical supplies and equipment found.

The Nicaraguan Solidarity Campaign in Britain is already organising medical aid to Nicaragua, with regional committees in the North and South of England responsible for raising materials or money for the reconstruction of the medical service in Esteli and Rivas respectively.

In addition, both the National Union of Public Employees and Confederation of Health Service Employees have promised to support the campaign nationally. This will be followed up shortly by the publication of a comprehensive pamphlet entitled *Health In Nicaragua: Past, Present and Future*. □