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**HALT U.S. THREATS
AGAINST CUBA
AND NICARAGUA!**

**Havana Conference
Deals Stinging
Setback to
Washington**



Heroes Welcome for Puerto Rican Nationalists

Halt U.S. Threats Against Cuba and Nicaragua!

By Larry Seigle and Mary-Alice Waters

Behind Washington's belated "discovery" of a Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba is the danger of new U.S. aggression against the island and against the advancing revolution in Nicaragua. The chorus of threats by both Democratic and Republican party politicians is aimed at preparing the American people and world public opinion for the use of U.S. military might in Central America and the Caribbean.

The timing of Washington's new propaganda barrage was determined by its growing concern over the triumphant Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. In his speech at the July 26 celebration in Holguin two months ago, Fidel Castro called on the United States and "our sister socialist nations" to take part in an "emulation campaign to see who can do the most for Nicaragua."

The imperialists have a different message for the Soviet Union: *No aid to Nicaragua!* In their daily secret negotiations in Washington, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance is undoubtedly warning Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that the U.S. government will not tolerate a positive response by Moscow to Castro's challenge.

Washington's anti-Cuban blasts were also timed to coincide with the Nonaligned Conference in Havana, where Castro took the lead in delivering a stinging rebuke to U.S. imperialism.

Cuba's Anti-Imperialist Role

These events come after nearly half a decade in which Cuba has played an increasingly prominent role in anti-imperialist struggles around the world. Cuban troops in Angola beat back the South African invasion of that country in 1975. Cubans were decisive in defeating the imperialist-inspired invasion of Ethiopia by Somalia in 1978. Earlier this year, the Cubans offered to "shed our own blood" to defend Vietnam against the invasion by Peking in collusion with Washington. They stood up to Carter's threats to intervene against South Yemen.

The imperialists have other complaints against the Castro leadership, as well.

At the Nonaligned Conference, Castro outraged Washington by telling the truth about the real threat to peace in the world—the U.S. war drive—and the real cause of poverty in the "underdeveloped" countries—capitalist domination.

Cuba has exposed Carter's "human rights" pretensions by throwing open its prison doors and releasing every political prisoner in the country. Castro's related

campaign to defend the human rights of the Puerto Rican Nationalists in U.S. prisons played a decisive role in winning their release after twenty-five years behind bars.

The Castro government has encouraged tens of thousands of Cubans living in exile to visit their native country and see what the revolution is like. In late August Washington responded to this intolerable breach of its blockade by canceling the license of the travel agency that organized the family reunification tours.

Liberals Lead Pack

The liberal Democrats are leading the war whoops in Congress against the alleged Soviet threat. The lead has been assigned to Sen. Frank Church, a Democrat from Idaho, who was a prominent "dove" toward the end of the Vietnam War. This is a "test of U.S. firmness or lack of it," Church warned.

Carter chimed in by denouncing Cuba as "a country which acts as a Soviet proxy in military adventures in other areas of the world like Africa."

Sen. Henry Jackson, a Democrat from the state of Washington, upped the ante by demanding not only the withdrawal of the "combat units" but the removal of advanced Soviet-built aircraft and submarines. Jackson said that "even a small number" of submarines in Cuba are a threat to the U.S. because they "are especially well-suited for covert insertion of personnel and small arms throughout the Caribbean and Central America."

As members of Congress worked themselves up into an orgy of jingoism, the original pretext for the war drive was left in tatters.

On August 31, the State Department, in its initial statement on the affair, claimed that "this is the first time we have been able to confirm the presence of a Soviet ground forces unit" in Cuba.

On September 10 the *New York Times* conceded, "Intelligence officials have said that there was reason to believe that a Soviet combat force had served quietly in Cuba for years, perhaps as far back as 1962. . . ."

And by September 14, the *Times* was reporting: "Not the least source of potential embarrassment to the Administration is that a reassessment of the intelligence information involved may show that Moscow could have been partly correct when it insisted in Pravda this week that the unit had only a training function and had been in Cuba since the early 1960s."

Why, then, has Washington suddenly decided to "draw the line?"

David Binder, writing in the September 6 *New York Times*, provided part of the answer. Binder quoted one "high-ranking Administration official" as saying, "Recently we've gone back to look more carefully at Cuba in the light of Central America." The official, Binder explains, was "alluding to the revolution in Nicaragua and the insurgency in El Salvador. In both cases, Cuba has been charged with contributing logistical support and training."

The September 7 *Los Angeles Times* summed up the chain of events this way:

"In March, a coup against the government of Grenada, a small eastern Caribbean island, led to a Cuban-oriented government and the arrival of Cuban civilian and military advisers over the next few months.

"By early June, White House and Pentagon officials watching Soviet-made arms funneling into Nicaragua, apparently through Cuba, began asking each other: 'What the hell are the Cubans up to in Central America?'"

"The intelligence community . . . was ordered to take a new in-depth look at Cuban activities."

The results of the "in-depth look" were turned over to Senator Church just in time for him to make them public on the very eve of the opening of the Havana Conference of Nonaligned Nations.

Time magazine quoted an anonymous guest at a White House breakfast as reporting that "'The President felt that it was advantageous to us to expose [the brigade] at this time to embarrass Castro.' This was a reference to the meeting of the non-aligned nations."

Fundamental Challenge

Richard Burt, writing from Washington in the September 11 *New York Times*, gave away Washington's real concern:

"A senior Administration official said today that an evaluation of Soviet military aid to Cuba over the last several years has shown a general increase in Havana's military capacity that is a more important strategic problem for the United States than the presence of a few thousand Soviet troops. . . ."

"Officials said that national security aides had expressed concern, in private, about the growth of Cuban military potential before the presence of the Soviet combat brigade became apparent. . . ."

What has Washington upset is Cuba's

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"more assertive military role in Africa and elsewhere. The officials traced the buildup to the civil war in Angola in late 1975. . . ."

By throwing its weight on the side of anti-imperialist struggles and refusing to knuckle under to pressure from Washington, Cuba has acquired influence and a strategic weight far beyond its small size.

Arm-Twisting From Moscow

Cuba's foreign policy is the opposite of Moscow's "détente" policy. Moscow uses its influence and power to sabotage revolutions in return for trade and diplomatic concessions from U.S. imperialism. That is where the threats in Washington about delaying or even scuttling ratification of the SALT II pact come in. The imperialists are squeezing Moscow to put pressure on the Cubans to pull back from their internationalist activities.

The Cubans, however, have shown no signs of backing down.

"Cuba," Fidel told the Nonaligned Conference, "has never ceased to practice a policy of close solidarity with the national liberation movements and all other just causes of our times. Cuba has never hesitated to defend its political principles with determination, energy, dignity, honesty and courage, nor, in over twenty years, has it ever stopped fighting against the aggression and the blockade imposed by the most powerful imperialist country in the world simply because Cuba carried out a genuine political and social revolution just ninety miles from that country's coast."

The Real Threat

Carter knows that American workers want no part of any new Vietnams in Latin America. That's why the U.S. rulers are going all-out to portray their latest war moves as "defense" against Soviet troops.

But Cuba has never invaded the United States, bombed it, or tried to assassinate its government figures. *Washington has committed all these crimes against Cuba.* In the face of this proven U.S. aggression, Cuba has every right to organize the strongest possible defense, including obtaining all the military aid it can get from the Soviet Union.

Carter's stepped-up military pressure against Cuba, however, poses a real threat. President John Kennedy's "missile crisis" in October 1962 is a grim reminder that the danger of a "miscalculation" that could wipe out humanity is built into imperialism's anti-Cuba drive. Nuclear blackmail has always been part of the efforts by the U.S. rulers to destroy the Cuban revolution and prevent its spread.

Working people around the world have a life-or-death stake in demanding that Washington put a stop to its threats against Cuba and lift the economic and diplomatic blockade. The U.S. base at Guantánamo must be immediately closed down.

Hands off Cuba!

Hands off Nicaragua!

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Havana Conference Deals Stinging Setback to Washington

By Fred Feldman

"At this conference, the spirit of solidarity has shined brighter than ever, the most important and pressing problems of our times have been analyzed at this conference."

That was the assessment by Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro in his speech to the closing session of the Sixth Summit Meeting of Nonaligned Countries, September 9. Castro chaired the conference, which opened in Havana September 3.

Official delegates came from nearly a hundred countries and three liberation movements and included some sixty heads of state. Observers from other countries and liberation movements were also present. The overwhelming majority of representatives were from capitalist governments in semicolonial countries.

The results of the conference marked the most sweeping indictment of imperialism ever to come out of such a gathering of top government figures. According to Prensa Latina, the Cuban press service, the conference adopted the following stands:

- It called for withdrawal of all U.S. troops and bases from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Korea.
- It denounced the Camp David accords between the Sadat government in Egypt and the Zionist rulers in Israel; reaffirmed its recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of the Palestinian people and a full member in the Movement of the Non-aligned Countries; and called for the creation of a Palestinian state.
- It opposed U.S. military threats against Arab countries, particularly the oil-producing states.
- It denounced the racist character of Zionism.
- It blasted U.S. and British maneuvers aimed at propping up the white-dominated regime in Zimbabwe.
- It accorded official recognition to the Patriotic Front as the representative of Zimbabwe and to the Southwest African People's Organisation (SWAPO) as representing the people of Namibia, now under the rule of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Granting full membership to the Patriotic Front, SWAPO, and the PLO gave these liberation organizations the virtual status of governments.
- It called for "support and assistance" to the "front line states" (such as Mozambique, Angola, and Zambia), which are under attack from the South African and the white-dominated Rhodesian governments. (Cuba has already committed

20,000 troops in Angola for this purpose.)

- It denounced U.S. and British economic and military ties with South Africa.
- It withdrew recognition from the blood-drenched Pol Pot forces as representatives of Kampuchea.
- It called for the independence of East Timor, now occupied by Indonesian forces.
- It endorsed the struggle of the Polisario Front against Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara.
- It hailed the overturn of Somoza in Nicaragua, describing his brutal dictatorship as "the result of imperialist domination and imposition." The Sandinista-led government was voted in as a member.
- It blasted the Israeli regime's military aid to Central American dictatorships and warned against "the interventionist maneuvers of imperialism and its neocolonial agents in the zone."
- It expressed "satisfaction" with the rise of struggle against the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile.
- It condemned the military pacts used by the U.S. rulers to restrict the independence of the peoples of Latin America.
- It endorsed Fidel Castro's opening speech to the conference as "an historic contribution to the definition of the objectives of the movement" and affirmed Cuba's presidency of the Coordinating Bureau for the next three years.

U.S. Sabotage Falls

The outcome marked the failure of a campaign organized by Washington to block the adoption of a strongly anti-imperialist stance or, if that proved impossible, to disrupt and possibly split the conference.

The U.S. imperialists know that the toiling masses of the semicolonial countries whose governments were represented at the gathering are increasingly demanding such an anti-imperialist course, as the tightening squeeze of the world capitalist crisis worsens their already wretched living conditions. The U.S. rulers also know that the Castro leadership in Cuba will implement conference decisions by extending its policy of using the resources of state power to aid and defend anti-imperialist struggles.

That's why the imperialists have responded with such hostility. "Havana shriekers," the *Washington Post* called the delegates, while the *New York Times* sneered at the final declaration as "wooly silliness." *New York Times* diplomatic correspondent Flora Lewis gloomily con-

cluded September 12 that the Havana conference "left the West, and particularly the United States, a harder, stonier field in which to operate."

Particularly galling to the imperialists was attendance by twenty-two Latin American governments. The presence of these delegates and observers, wrote Alan Riding in the September 9 *New York Times*, "marked the de facto end of Cuba's isolation in the area and the growing desire of Latin American governments to assert independence from the United States in international affairs."

This setback for imperialism reflected a further significant shift in the relationship of class forces over the past half decade to the detriment of world capitalism. The defeat of the U.S. aggressors in Indochina inspired anti-imperialist fighters among the oppressed workers and peasants everywhere—from Ethiopia, the former Portuguese colonies, and the white-dominated regimes in Africa; to Iran, Afghanistan, Grenada, and Nicaragua; to Indochina itself.

The inability of U.S. imperialism to crush such struggles, and the deep antiwar attitudes that have developed among American workers, have deepened the self-confidence and will to struggle of the masses throughout the semicolonial world. Fidel Castro cited this vitally important factor in world politics during his opening address:

"The important role that the people of the United States . . . played in ending the criminal imperialist war against Vietnam should not be forgotten."

This reflects the growing tendency of the Cuban leadership for the first time to include an assessment of important developments among American workers in their strategic evaluation of world politics—a factor also signalled by their initiative toward a dialogue with Cubans living in the United States.

Cuba's Anti-Imperialist Role

The Castro leadership itself has been a key factor in strengthening anti-imperialist currents. The Cubans have earned the right to lead the anti-imperialist movement in the eyes of tens of millions by not restricting themselves to talk. They sent troops to defeat the South African invasion of Angola and to defeat the Somali regime's drive against the Ethiopian revolution. Their forces helped defend South Yemen against the threat of imperialist attack earlier this year. They gave full

solidarity to the struggle in Nicaragua. They have provided massive aid to the new government of Grenada.

And they have won friends all over the world by providing doctors and teachers—with no political strings attached—to many countries in the semicolonial world.

The Cubans' readiness to risk their lives in the fight against imperialism has multiplied the inspiration provided by their own dramatic material and cultural progress on the home front—the elimination of hunger, illiteracy, and racism. It added to the impact of the Cubans' success in defending their revolution for twenty years against Washington and Wall Street.

The Cuban revolution now stands higher in the esteem of the toilers in the semicolonial countries than ever before in its history—a fact registered by the stance that growing numbers of capitalist political figures in these nations feel compelled to adopt toward the Castro government.

This, for example, helps explain why Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia—hardly the most radical of Africa's leaders—poured praise on the Cuban revolution in his address to the delegates. According to the September 4 *New York Times*, Kaunda declared that “we admire Cuba” for its steadfast 20-year struggle against “the biggest, best-armed power in the world.”

“He addressed himself repeatedly to ‘Comrade Castro.’ . . .”

As Castro stated in his closing remarks, the conference was a gathering of “state leaders” that “constitute a movement of heterogeneous countries.”

“How can one describe a group which includes Saudi Arabia and the PLO, Argentina and Cuba, Singapore and North (but not South) Korea?” disparagingly commented former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Charles Yost in the September 14 *Christian Science Monitor*. “It clearly is based on no principle either of exclusivity or of universality.”

But these countries *do* confront something “universal.” All are semicolonies or former colonies of imperialism. All are still kept in poverty and superexploitation by imperialist plunder or—in the case of Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and Yugoslavia—still victimized by imperialist domination of the world market. They are compelled to sell cheap and buy dear in that market. They are threatened by imperialist military power.

The coming together of these countries reflects the realities of the laws of the world capitalist market and the resulting economic and political conflicts with imperialism, even among the most overtly proimperialist member governments. It is these realities, rather than alignment or nonalignment, that defines this grouping of nations.

Based on this common oppression, the Cuban leaders participate in the Non-aligned movement in order to advance

anti-imperialist struggles. They have rejected the sectarian course of simply boycotting and denouncing bourgeois governments in the underdeveloped countries. They see participation as an aspect of their revolutionary internationalist duties.

The Castro leadership's class-struggle stance is in striking contrast to the class-collaborationist approach of the bureaucratic castes in Moscow, Peking, and Belgrade. Stalinist regimes view these gatherings as possible points of support for attaining economic and diplomatic deals with the imperialists on the basis of the international status quo. The Cubans have the opposite aims.

Washington recognizes Cuba's role in the Nonaligned movement as a threat—and its succession to the official leadership of the movement for the next three years as a serious obstacle to imperialism's goals.

U.S. officials gave enthusiastic support last year to the foreign ministers of Somalia and Yugoslavia, who opposed the choice of Havana as the site of the conference, and to President Sadat of Egypt, who announced plans to boycott the meeting.

When this failed, the U.S. press launched a campaign of lies about the Cuban proposals for the conference, depicting Cuba as a “Soviet puppet.” One U.S. official was even quoted in the September 10 *Newsweek* as predicting that the Cuban proposals would turn the movement into “an adjunct of the Warsaw Pact.”

This theme was picked up by those regimes that were supporting proimperialist stands. While the capitalist press depicted Yugoslavia's Tito as the leader of this group, those who sharply opposed Cuba's stands were the most servile underlings of U.S. imperialism. In the U.S. press, however, these regimes were invariably described as “genuinely nonaligned.”

Soviet Troop Scare

The timing of the U.S. scare campaign over an alleged Soviet “combat brigade” in Cuba was partly determined by the needs of this propaganda effort. This was to be proof positive of Cuba's “puppet” status, while the illegal presence of 2,800 U.S. troops at the Guantánamo Naval Base against the will of the Cuban people was to be forgotten in the excitement.

Some imperialist mouthpieces openly expressed hope for a split at the gathering. The August 25, 1979, London *Economist* asked rhetorically, “Should they [the ‘movement's truly non-aligned members’] let Mr. Castro lead the whole group some way along the Soviet path, rather than let him split it in two?” It suggested that Tito's decision to oppose a split was a “tactical” error.

In his September 3 speech opening the conference, Castro made no concessions to proimperialist pressures in laying bare the real issues in dispute. While the Stalinists portray the SALT II treaty as the key to

world peace, Castro—although endorsing the treaty in passing—made it clear that his conception of peaceful coexistence has nothing whatsoever to do with tolerance for imperialist domination:

“Peace is possible, but world peace can only be assured to the extent that all countries are consciously determined to fight for it—peace not just for a part of the world, but for all peoples. Peace, also, for Vietnam, the Palestinians, the patriots of Zimbabwe and Namibia, the oppressed majorities in South Africa, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Ethiopia, Syria, Lebanon, and the Saharan people. Peace with justice. Peace with independence. Peace with freedom. Peace for the powerful countries and the small countries. Peace for all continents and all peoples.”

Castro stressed that imperialism is the cause of war and that socialism is the only definitive guarantee of peace. “Halt the philosophy of plunder and the philosophy of war will be halted,” Castro stated, quoting an earlier speech he gave to the United Nations.

While unconditionally endorsing every step the semicolonial countries take toward economic independence and progress, Castro also explained that only socialism can really end underdevelopment:

“I'm not going to tell you half-truths, nor am I going to hide the fact that social difficulties are much greater when, in any of our countries, a small minority controls the basic wealth and the majority of the people are completely dispossessed. In short, if the system is socially just, the possibilities of survival and economic and social development are incomparably greater.”

The question of the Soviet Union held a subordinate place in Castro's talk, as in the conference as a whole. He correctly explained that the October revolution has made possible the liberation of the colonial world. He noted that the Soviet Union, unlike the imperialist powers, had provided material and public support to an array of liberation struggles. And he noted that Cuba obtains terms of trade for its sugar from the Soviet Union that other underdeveloped countries could never obtain from the imperialists.

Citing these facts was not calculated to win recruits to the Kremlin's policy of class collaboration with imperialism. On the contrary, Castro's description could only have the effect of encouraging liberation movements and underdeveloped countries to seek increased support from the Soviet Union—support that would run counter to Brezhnev's search for international stability and deals with Washington.

Castro Sets Tone

Castro's opening speech, which won enthusiastic applause, set the tone for the conference. It punctured the imperialist

claims that Castro was plotting to bring the semicolonial countries under Kremlin domination.

Deprived of this red herring, each of the delegates at the conference was compelled to take a public stand on the real issue: for or against imperialism.

Under this pressure, the speech given by Marshal Tito the following day—billed in the capitalist media as a reply to Castro—avoided any head-on clashes with the Cuban leader.

In the course of long sessions, many speakers, procedural wrangles, and all-night steering committee meetings, most of the disparate forces at the conference were gradually won to support the basic outlines of Cuba's proposals. As a result, the Cubans and their allies were able to isolate the most abjectly proimperialist regimes.

Once it was clear that the Cuban position was going to carry, the capitalist media adopted yet another tack to smear the conference. Castro was accused of railroading, packing the speakers list, and intimidating the participants. As the *New York Times* declared editorially, "The Havana Declaration was composed under the bullying tutelage of Fidel Castro by weary delegates. . . ."

The image of the delegates being tortured into submission by a brutal Cuban dictator, however, was even belied by many reports of journalists covering the conference.

"Communist or capitalist, president, prime minister or king, few of the leaders meeting here for the sixth nonaligned summit have abstained from liberal use of the code words for what has emerged as the No. 1 nonaligned enemy—the United States," reported Karen DeYoung in the September 8 *Washington Post*.

Kampuchea and Camp David

Two issues in particular provided a test of strength for those favoring accommodation to U.S. imperialism at the conference: representation by remnants of the Pol Pot regime for Kampuchea, and the Camp David accords.

Representatives of the governments of Singapore and Malaysia—whose credentials of "genuine nonalignment" include full support to Washington during the Vietnam War—led the effort to maintain the reactionary Pol Pot regime as Kampuchea's representative. The *New York Times* signalled U.S. imperialism's backing for Pol Pot by designating this as one of the issues that would determine whether or not the movement would "reaffirm the founding principles of nonalignment."

Opposition to this move was led by the Cuban and Vietnamese governments.

According to a September 1 article by *New York Times* correspondent Flora Lewis, acting Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach "compared the situation [surrounding the war in Kampuchea] to that in the Middle East and southern

Africa, saying it could be understood only by analyzing the underlying aims of the United States and other imperialists." Blasting Peking's "marriage" with U.S. imperialism, Thach also criticized "reactionary Southeast Asian regimes" for their support to Pol Pot.

At a late-night session September 6, Castro tagged defenders of Pol Pot—notably Singapore's Foreign Minister Sinathambay Rajaratnan—as "imperialist stooges."

In the end, the conference withdrew the recognition granted at an earlier gathering to the Pol Pot gang and left Kampuchea's seat open until the 1981 foreign ministers' meeting. This was a blow to the attempt by Washington and the Chinese Stalinists to pass off the Pol Pot forces as the legitimate government and adds to the pressure on them to forego any repetition of Peking's February attack on Vietnam.

In response to the Camp David accords, a group of Arab governments pressed for Egypt's exclusion from the Nonaligned movement. Sadat showed his allegiance by demonstratively meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Begin as the Havana conference was opening.

Opposition to Cuba's proposal for "moral censure, at least" of Sadat was led by several neocolonial African regimes, including the representatives of Senegal, Malawi, and Gabon. Other African delegates, notably President Samora Machel of Mozambique and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, defended Cuba's stand.

The efforts to soft-pedal the Camp David betrayal by letting Sadat off the hook were unsuccessful. A motion was passed condemning Sadat and proposing that a committee submit a further recommendation on Egypt's membership to the 1981 meeting.

Senegal's foreign minister, Moustaphe Niassé, denounced the compromise, charging Cuba with taking a militant stance on the Middle East "from the safe distance of 30,000 kilometers."

Dismissing the Senegalese minister as "a rat," Cuban Vice-premier Carlos Rafael Rodríguez reminded the delegates that Cuba had 700 combat troops at the Syrian front during the 1973 war with Israel.

The conference declaration unfortunately did not include support for the Eritrean people's just struggle for their right to self-determination. However, the Cuban government reportedly distributed to the delegates the text of the 1975 speech by Castro to a meeting of the Nonaligned foreign ministers. In that speech—printed up before the conference and on sale all over Cuba—Castro stated:

"From a progressive and revolutionary point of view the events in Ethiopia, which also took place last year, are both of great interest and historic importance. . . . Unfortunately, a fratricidal struggle between the new government that destroyed the old structures and a national liberation move-

ment is now being waged within that very state. This situation in which two causes of progressive trends are confronting each other is indeed complex.

"Therefore, what is the duty of the nonaligned? Is it perhaps to stand idly by or to support one side to the detriment of the other? To urge the war on? Decidedly not. The least that should be done is to make a serious effort and seek a peaceful and just solution that is acceptable to the parties in the conflict which is separating and pitting against each other the Ethiopian revolutionary process and the Liberation Movement of Eritrea."

This position, which stops short of supporting Eritrean self-determination, essentially remains the public position of the Cuban government today. The possibility of a peaceful solution continues to be blocked by the determination of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia to subjugate the Eritrean people.

A Clear Success

"Castro has clearly succeeded in his main objectives," *Time* magazine's diplomatic correspondent Strobe Talbott noted glumly in the September 17 issue.

"At the very least, Cuba has won the appearance of a ringing endorsement from the Third World of its military intervention in Africa. Though there have been dissenting and cautionary voices, the vocal majority have applauded Cuba's championship of liberation movements. In the future, Cuba and those countries and guerrilla groups seeking its aid will be able to point back to this summit and what will probably be called the 'Havana Declaration' as justification for further intervention."

"Castro has also succeeded in marshaling a consensus against the American peace initiatives in the Middle East and southern Africa. This is precisely what U.S. diplomats sought to avoid, through two months of feverish lobbying with nonaligned foreign ministers throughout the world. . . ."

"To make matters worse, Castro may well ride the swell of his enhanced prestige straight into the Security Council, if the Cubans succeed in obtaining the rotating Latin American seat. . . . If Castro should go to the U.N. this fall, he will appear as the foremost leader of the Third World—and the firebrand spokesman for a kind of global anti-Americanism."

Flora Lewis, in the September 12 *New York Times*, noted another setback for U.S. imperialism. The conference "seemed to cut China off from the sympathy it once enjoyed in the Third World."

But it was the criminal alliance of the bureaucratic caste in Peking with U.S. imperialism, not the Chinese revolution, that was isolated at the conference. (This counterrevolutionary alliance was symbolized when the Chinese and U.S. observers at the conference walked out within min-

utes of each other during Castro's anti-imperialist speech.)

The outcome at Havana will make it more difficult for U.S. imperialism to use Peking's support as left cover for attacks on the colonial revolution, including the Vietnamese revolution.

The isolation of the Peking rulers signified a change of still broader significance—a further advance in the decay of world Stalinism, a massive obstacle to the advance of revolutionary struggles.

For nearly three decades, throughout most of the colonial world, Peking's brand of Stalinism was falsely but widely seen as a revolutionary alternative to the Moscow variety.

Following the victory of the Cuban revolution, a non-Stalinist alternative began to attract anti-imperialist fighters. Today, the Cubans—a revolutionary current—have clearly pushed aside the Maoists as the prime model and inspiration for revolutionists in the semicolonial world.

The glaring contrast between Cuba's revolutionary action in the struggle against imperialism and Peking's more and more flagrant groveling before imperialism has been the key to this shift.

The Kremlin Stalinists, on the other hand, may try for the moment to bask a little in the reflected glory of Cuba's victory at the Havana conference. But Brezhnev views the Cubans' aggressive anti-imperialist course with grave misgivings. This is no way to pave the road for class-collaborationist deals—the be-all and end-all of Kremlin foreign policy.

The new prestige won by the Cubans gives them new leverage in pressuring Moscow for assistance to the Nicaraguan revolution and to other anti-imperialist struggles.

The increased legitimacy attained by the new Sandinista government in Nicaragua will strengthen its hand in demanding massive humanitarian aid and in buying time to prepare its defenses against military intervention by the imperialists or their cronies in Central America. It brightens the prospects for the intensifying struggles in El Salvador and Guatemala.

The Havana conference marks a mighty triumph for the Cuban revolution and greatly increases the difficulties imperialism faces in preparing new counterrevolutionary threats against struggles anywhere in the world.

As Fidel Castro stated in his closing remarks:

"This conference has given our country great prestige, great authority, but that prestige and authority will never be used to the benefit of our country, we will use it to fight and work for others. . . .

"One thing we can say: Cuba will sacrifice more, Cuba will work more for others."

Save the Lives of the Socialists!

Worldwide Protests Make Impact in Iran

By Janice Lynn

The powerful international defense efforts on behalf of the fourteen imprisoned members of the Iranian Socialist Workers Party (HKS) has already had a big impact within Iran. This campaign continues to be vital to winning their release and blocking moves by the Iranian government to execute them.

Twelve of the HKS members were sentenced to death in a secret trial August 26.

Last week, six of these prisoners were returned to Karoun Prison in Ahwaz. They are: Hadi Adib, Firooz Farzinpour, Ali Hashemi, Mahmoud Kafaie, Kambiz Lajevardi, and Kia Mahdevi. All six had been arrested in Ahwaz on June 23 as they were circulating petitions in defense of other HKS members arrested earlier.

For the first time in a month, these six should now be able to receive visitors.

However, six of the HKS members are still imprisoned in the jails of the Special Court building. They are: Hormoz Fallahi, Morteza Gorgzadeh, Mustafa Gorgzadeh, Mohammed Poorkahvaz, Mustafa Seifabadi, and Hamid Shahrabi. Their lives remain in the greatest danger.

The two women members of the HKS, Mahsa Hashemi and Fatima Fallahi, who were sentenced to life imprisonment, are in Dezful Prison, fifty miles outside Ahwaz.

A letter from the HKS answering recent frame-up charges of "sabotage" leveled against the prisoners by Vice-premier Sadeq Tabatabai appeared in all major Tehran dailies. The HKS letter was reported on the front page of *Baamdad* and in *Ettela'at*, *Kayhan*, and *Islamic Revolution*.

These papers have also been printing copies of protest telegrams sent to the government by trade unionists and others demanding a halt to the executions.

The international support campaign continues to win broad support. The following telegram was sent by numerous individuals and groups in Israel and the Occupied Territories.

"We, the undersigned, as consistent supporters of the struggle of the people of Iran against the shah's dictatorship, call upon your government to cancel the death penalty verdict issued on August 26 against twelve members of the Socialist Workers Party of Iran in Ahwaz. We strongly protest against the use of the death penalty against known antishah fighters."

Among those signing the telegram were twenty Palestinian activists, eleven of whom are former political prisoners; the Painters Union in Ramallah; the Writers

Union in the Occupied Territories; the Beit-ur Workers Club; the Building Workers Union in Beit-ur; the Union of Workers in Abud; and the Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Ramallah.

Also: four members of the Abne al-Balad (Sons of the Village) in Um-al-fahm, one of the largest Arab towns; former presidents of Arab Student Unions from Jerusalem, Arabe, Nahaf, and Bir Zeit; lawyers Lea Tsemel, Muhammad Keiwan, and Ali Rafa; Mansur Kardosh of Nazareth, a former leader of Al-Ard (The Land, a Palestinian nationalist group banned by Israeli authorities); and the Revolutionary Communist League (Israeli section of the Fourth International), the Workers League, and the Progressive National Movement of the Arab Students in Jerusalem.

In Mexico City, a September 6 demonstration in front of the Iranian embassy drew 400 participants. It was organized by the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), Mexican section of the Fourth International; and the Marxist Workers League (LOM).

At the embassy, PRT representative Jaime González spoke with the Iranian ambassador who told him it was not true that the HKS members had been sentenced to be executed and that they should not worry about any possible injustice.

González responded by explaining that they *were* worried and that they demanded the immediate release of all fourteen HKS members.

The demonstration was reported in the Mexican daily *Uno más Uno*. Another major daily, *Excelsior*, has carried a report on the HKS prisoners.

In Canada, the British Columbia Federation of Labor, representing a quarter of a million workers, sent a telegram protesting the death sentences.

In Vancouver, Farhad Hour, a leader of the HKS and a staff writer for the banned HKS newspaper *Kargar* (Worker), was interviewed by the Canadian Broadcasting Company, reaching millions throughout Canada. As a result the Vancouver newspapers and televisions also requested interviews.

In Seattle, Nouri spoke before 130 people including a number of Iranian students who are actively working in defense of the imprisoned HKS members. Close relatives of two of the prisoners, Hormoz and Fatima Fallahi, are also working in the Seattle defense efforts. □

Sandinistas Spur Worker and Peasant Organizing

By Fred Murphy

MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Sept. 11—There has been an explosion of organization among the worker and peasant masses here since the triumph of the Sandinista-led popular insurrection on July 19.

Sandinista Defense Committees have arisen in the cities on a block-by-block basis. These bodies, usually centralized by neighborhood and zone, oversee the distribution of emergency food aid and organize special campaigns, such as the mass immunization of children against polio last week.

They also collaborate with the militia units and the newly formed Sandinista police force in guarding residential areas against counterrevolutionary bands of Somoistas that are still active.

Trade unions are being organized for the first time in many workplaces, while other unions that were forced to function underground during the dictatorship are now organizing publicly.

Most of the new unions are affiliating immediately to the Sandinista Workers Federation (CST). The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) is urging the other union organizations here—the CGT, CGTI, CAUS, and CNT*—to join with the CST in a single federation. Discussions are under way to achieve this.

In the countryside, the Sandinista-led Field Workers Association (ATC) is organizing peasants and agricultural laborers.

A further step toward organizing the oppressed in the countryside was announced by Agrarian Reform Minister Jaime Wheelock in Matagalpa on September 7.

Speaking to a meeting of several hundred coffee cultivators, Wheelock called for the organization of a National Association of Small and Medium Sized Coffee Producers. It was these, he said, who had suffered "the heaviest blows and the most extortion at the hands of the Somoza regime."

Wheelock emphasized that the lands of the small producers would no longer be mortgaged to any institution and that a price stabilization fund would be created to assure them of an adequate income.

Some big landholders at the Matagalpa meeting accused the Sandinistas of trying to "divide" the coffee producers with such measures. Wheelock responded:

"What is involved is that the interests of the small producers are different from

those who have all kinds of facilities at hand. How can there be equality between the barefoot son of a peasant and the son of a big producer who is studying in the United States?

"It's the barefoot ones we have to think about. That is why the government is going to provide incentives to the small producers."

Capitalist Disquiet

These and other such progressive measures taken by the new government, along with the rapid spread of organization among the masses, which is being encouraged and led by the FSLN, have given rise to increasing disquiet on the part of the anti-Somoza capitalists and their political representatives.

At a news conference held by Sandinista leaders attending the Conference of Non-aligned Nations in Havana, a Mexican journalist asked Comandante Daniel Ortega to comment on a statement signed by a number of Nicaraguan businessmen that is reportedly circulating in Venezuela.

"The people's revolution and the Sandinista National Liberation Front have not signed an agreement of any kind with businessmen or sectors of private enterprise in our country, so that today they might demand of us the fulfillment of such accords," Ortega replied.

The account of the Havana news conference in the September 8 issue of the FSLN daily *Barricada* continued, "[Ortega]

added that the Sandinista National Liberation Front launched a call for all sectors to unite as one people in the struggle, but that at no time did this mean the establishment of any particular pacts or agreements.

"We cannot deny the participation of some sectors of private enterprise that joined the struggle and showed themselves to be on the side of the people, but they never played a firm role in the liberation process," Comandante Ortega added.

"What is more," he continued, "they always were looking for negotiated solutions to the Nicaraguan problem. They proposed the retirement of the dictator, which was the solution the imperialists proposed to these reactionary groups."

Attacks by Social Democrats

On September 7 a news conference was held here in Managua to announce the formation of the "Sandinista Social Democratic Party" (PSDS).

Despite the name, this new formation has no relation to the Sandinista National Liberation Front, nor does it have the mass working-class following of European Social Democratic parties.

In fact, a number of the leaders of the new PSDS played important roles in the old Democratic Conservative Party—one of the main political formations of the anti-Somoza capitalists.

The PSDS presents a program calling for free elections and a series of social



Sandinistas parade in Managua, August 31.

Fred Halstead/Militant

*General Confederation of Labor, Independent General Confederation of Labor, Center for Trade Union Action and Unity, National Labor Federation.

reforms, and they claim to support "the Government of National Reconstruction and the Joint Directorate of the FSLN in their efforts to reconstruct the country and guide the Nicaraguan people toward an authentic democracy with equal opportunities for all."

However, the PSDS has also launched a veiled attack on the Sandinista Front, seeking to portray it as "totalitarian":

"In view of our Social Democratic principles, we reject all totalitarian ideas that tend toward the creation of a single party, a single workers federation, or the orientation of the army toward the service of a single political institution, however important its contributions to national liberation."

After reading the PSDS program to the news conference, party General Secretary Wilfredo Montalván concluded with the slogan, "Sandinism yes, Communism no!" He was applauded loudly by the PSDS members present.

This McCarthyite display outraged many of the Nicaraguan journalists present. Several of them took the floor to point out how the Somozas had used anticommunism to justify their brutal rule.

Eventually, PSDS Political Secretary Luis Rivas Leiva was forced to say that the party would withdraw the slogan.

In subsequent days, leaders of the Sandinista Front challenged the PSDS's use of the name "Sandinista" to describe their party.

At a September 11 news conference at army headquarters here, Comandante Luis Carrión was asked his opinion of the new party. "I think the Sandinista Social Democratic Party, in a rather abusive way, is trying to grab for itself a name that was duly won by the Sandinista fighters in a long and bloody struggle."

The PSDS forgets, Carrión said, that "for many, many years Sandinism has meant a revolutionary attitude and a revolutionary way of action—a revolutionary commitment to our people that has been assumed in the first place by the Sandinista National Liberation Front. So there is really only one Sandinism—the revolutionary Sandinism that the Sandinista Front represents."

Role of Militias

Carrión also took the opportunity of the news conference to clarify a question the Sandinista leaders have been grappling with—the relationship between the new Sandinista People's Army (EPS) and the militias that arose out of the fight against Somoza in the cities.

"The EPS is a regular, permanent force," Carrión explained, "while the people's militias are a force that is not mobilized constantly. Many of the militia compañeros are now being incorporated into the regular army, while the rest—who will make up the militias as such—are going to remain organized on the basis of neighbor-

hood, factory, agricultural unit, and so on.

"They will receive training, but will not be permanently under arms. Instead they will be incorporated into useful activities—

into production or school. Our main concern is that all the militia personnel be involved in the process of national reconstruction." □

'It Is Dangerous Not to Heed a Workers Assembly'

[The following editorial appeared under the headline "Our 'What Is to Be Done?'" in the August 14 issue of *Barricada*, daily newspaper of the Sandinista National Liberation Front. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

* * *

Revolution means construction. There should be clarity and consciousness on the part of all Nicaraguans that this is the case today when we talk about the Nicaraguan revolution, the Sandinista revolution.

However, no one should misunderstand the process of national reconstruction that characterizes the Sandinista revolution today, especially in regard to the effort that all Nicaraguans have to carry out in a fraternal manner.

Our people—our workers, peasants, and other toilers—are conscious of the great effort needed to bring about the necessary climate to enable us to build a new Nicaragua. But their attitude of harmony and self-sacrifice in the process of reconstruction should not be misunderstood by business sectors or reactionary groups—including camouflaged *Somocistas*—who mistakenly think that in this situation they can go on abusing our people and continue their past practices of laughing at the people's aspirations, denying them their rights, cheating them of their social benefits, or saddling them with foremen or bosses used to indulging in mistreatment or repressive acts.

This revolution belongs to Sandino's people. It is true that nearly all sectors of the nation participated in the overthrow of the dictatorship, but it was the workers and peasants—the sons of Sandino—who bore the brunt of the conflict. They therefore feel—and quite rightly so—that this is their revolution.

The Sandinista National Liberation Front reaffirms: This revolution belongs to the people.

But it would seem that more than a few have not wanted to see things this way. There have already been several cases in which the workers of certain companies or institutions—including state institutions—workers with traditions of combativity, have called for such measures as the purging of personnel, expelling the stooges, stool-pigeons, and paramilitary elements that used to attack them, but bosses or new administrators have tried hard to keep such personnel.

It is dangerous not to heed a workers assembly. It shows a lack of comprehension of the necessary interplay of harmony, work, and justice at this stage of the revolution.

Businessmen and administrators—especially those who administer state property, which belongs to the people—must keep in mind the people, the workers, those who endured Somoza's terror and shed their blood for a better Nicaragua.

It's not as if the workers today have carte blanche to do anything they want. It's a matter of basing oneself on the fact that while the revolution belongs to us all, the majority—and those who produce the wealth—are the working people.

Our workers and peasants are Sandinistas. And we Sandinistas are mature, disciplined, and conscious. We know what an immense effort reconstruction demands. We know that this process requires a climate of harmony. We know what our attitude should be.

The country is bankrupt. Somoza's destruction left hardly a company or productive facility intact.

The workers realize that many of the demands we raised against the Somoza regime and against the owners of the means of production then are difficult to pose today, in the new situation we face at the moment. They know that many companies which used to treat them unjustly are now theirs, through the medium of state administration, and that these companies face a crisis as a result of Somoza's looting.

The workers will not be tricked by persons who managed to keep themselves out of the war of liberation, but now run around workplaces claiming to lead our workers and peasants, with schemes that are divorced from what can justly be demanded under these circumstances.

The situation in Nicaragua today is difficult. The people of Sandino will first have to overcome our present difficulties in order to rebuild Sandino's homeland.

It's not that we are going to conciliate irreconcilable interests. It's just that we must all keep in mind that the Sandinista revolution belongs to us all but above all to the people, and that we must all seek harmony in work and justice in order to consolidate and deepen the revolution.

Everyone should bear in mind that for the time being, revolution means reconstruction. □

Nicaraguan Consul Urges Humanitarian Aid

[The following interview with Franklin Chávez, Nicaraguan consul general in Miami, was obtained August 23 by John Ratliff. It is taken from the September 21 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

* * *

Question. What are conditions like in Nicaragua today?

Answer. People are 100 percent better off than before the fall of Somoza, of course.

Before he fell, however, Somoza unleashed a war of terror against the people. Somoza's air force bombed all the cities of the country.

Food is in very short supply. The people are hungry. We need 300-400 tons a day to meet our needs. But we have been able to obtain only a small part of that—80 tons or so of grain a day.

Q. Where is the food coming from now?

A. From other Latin American countries; some from the United States.

Q. Has the United States been sending the aid it has promised?

A. For some reason which we do not understand, the U.S. has been very slow in sending the assistance it has promised. Because of this a very critical situation has developed. Over 250,000 children are seriously endangered for lack of food.

It is hard to say why the food has not started flowing in all this time. Perhaps it is bureaucracy, perhaps something more is involved.

Hopefully no one thinks that even in the conditions of extreme need now facing the Nicaraguan people, the masses will sell the fruits of their revolution for a few dollars.

Q. What does the revolution mean to the Nicaraguan people?

A. Too few understand how much the Nicaraguan revolution means to our people.



FRANKLIN CHAVEZ

It began forty-eight years ago when Sandino took up his struggle against foreign rule. For the past forty-six years the people have struggled against the Somoza dynasty.

During this struggle the people became

class conscious. The Nicaraguan revolution has to be, will be, and is a revolution for and by the Nicaraguan people. By this I mean the major class of the people, the workers, peasants, and poor; those who were robbed, those who starved under Somoza; those whose children were denied hope for a better life.

You can't compare the Nicaraguan revolution to any other—the Cuban revolution, the Bolshevik revolution, or even the American revolution. It is the Nicaraguan revolution, and just that. However, the Nicaraguan people naturally feel solidarity with all movements which aim to better the lives of the people.

Q. Are efforts under way to overturn the revolution by supporters of the dictatorship?

A. The counterrevolutionary movement has already begun. It is led directly by Somoza and his henchmen, who stole millions from our poor country. The counterrevolutionaries are moving very quickly and have unfortunately succeeded in getting support from some quarters.

American companies refuse to return to Nicaragua items of property owned by the Nicaraguan government. Dozens of reasons are given, but somehow these companies cannot organize themselves to perform simple tasks and return to our government things that clearly belong to it.

We have had to be very concerned about security as well. Our consulate has been threatened. Personally, my life has been threatened and I have been fired at twice. Of course, such violence will not deter me from my work.

They cannot destroy our revolution with such violence. They would have to kill two and a half million Nicaraguans to kill the revolution.

Some leaders of the Cuban exile community in Miami have been hostile to the Sandinista movement and to the Nicaraguan revolution. Some have even tried to make a hero of the dictator and butcher Somoza. I invite the leaders of the Cuban community in the United States to come to Nicaragua and see for themselves how this revolution of ours works.

The Sandinista movement is unique to Nicaragua. It is not communist, it is not capitalist, it is Sandinista. Every country has its own issues and will find its own road.

Nobody can stop the revolution of the masses, of the workers. Nobody here or anywhere. After we have tasted freedom, money will certainly not tell my people what to do.

Aid Campaign Under Way in U.S.

One of the organizations in the United States that is coordinating helping meet the desperate need for food, medicine, and other supplies for Nicaragua is Humanitarian Aid for Nicaraguan Democracy (HAND). HAND was established in March 1979 as the fundraising wing of the National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People.

At the current time nearly half the Nicaraguan population—some one million people—is dependent on food aid.

From April to August HAND raised more than \$60,000 toward this effort. HAND primarily focuses on money

contributions because of the difficulties in shipping food.

"During the war in Nicaragua," Network coordinator David Funkhouser explained, "funds were channeled through Mexico. Had they gone to a Nicaraguan bank, they would have ended up in Somoza's hands."

"Now we channel funds directly to the Ministry of Social Welfare in the Nicaraguan government."

The group also has a medical aid campaign.

The national office of Humanitarian Aid for Nicaraguan Democracy is located at 1322 Eighteenth Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Q. How can the American people help?

A. We need a lot of help. We need the help of the American people and others. The Nicaraguan people know that the American people are generous. Solidarity of the Nicaraguan and American peoples

is important to both. We are brothers, all human beings.

We have acted in good faith and will continue to act in good faith. Hopefully the United States government will do the same.

The Nicaraguan people will fight to the

utmost against any intervention, however. We insist that all aid, from any source, be free of strings, military or ideological.

We also demand that the rightful property of the people of Nicaragua, such as the planes in the national airline and the ships of the merchant marine, be returned to the people. □

Statement by United Secretariat Delegation

[The following statement was given to the leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Managua September 3 by a delegation from the United Secretariat of the Fourth International consisting of Manuel Aguilar, Jean-Pierre Beauvais, Hugo Blanco, Pedro Camejo, Barry Shepard, and Charles-André Udry.]

* * *

Through a heroic popular insurrection under the revolutionary leadership of the FSLN, the Nicaraguan people have overthrown the bloody Somoza dictatorship, which had the direct backing of the United States.

The Nicaraguan working masses, women, youth, and FSLN fighters have thus provided an irreplaceable example to the peoples around the world who are fighting the oppression and exploitation of imperialist rule.

Under the banner of the Sandinista movement, the people of Nicaragua today are continuing their struggle to safeguard the independence of their homeland and to establish a society where social and economic justice will reign, in which there will be no place for exploiters and oppressors.

Faced with their inevitable defeat, the imperialists and Somoza did not hesitate to resort to genocide and massive destruction of the country. Confronted with the gigantic tasks of the revolution, the Nicaraguan people, under the leadership of the FSLN, are showing the same courage and determination they did in the struggle against the dictatorship.

It is the duty of all revolutionary and democratic forces in the world to solidarize with the struggle of the people of Sandino and the FSLN. They should mobilize to carry out a vast international campaign with the goal of defeating any attempt at counterrevolutionary intervention, and to see that Nicaragua receives massive material aid immediately and unconditionally. The Fourth International and all its members pledge to devote their full energies to this necessary campaign of solidarity with the Nicaraguan revolution.

To defend this revolution means to support the struggle whose vanguard is the FSLN. All activities which seek today to

create divisions between the mobilized masses and the FSLN are contrary to the interests of the revolution.

This was the case, specifically, with the activities of the "Simón Bolívar Brigade." This group actually had a dual policy: to capitalize on the prestige of the FSLN, it cloaked itself with the Sandinista banner; but at the same time, in the mass organizations its sectarian policy tried to separate the workers from their vanguard.

According to certain assertions that have appeared in the press, the activities

of this group represented the attitude of our organization toward the revolution and its leadership. This is totally false. This group acted on its own.

In a political and economic situation that required the greatest possible unity in struggle, the FSLN was right to demand that the non-Nicaraguan members of this group—which defined itself above all as a military organization—leave the country.

Charles-André Udry
Pedro Camejo

'Barricada' Prints SWP Solidarity Message

MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Sept. 11—Today the newspaper of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), *Barricada*, printed in full a message from Andrew Pulley and Matilde Zimmermann, the Socialist Workers Party candidates for president and vice president in 1980.

Under the four-column headline, "Socialist Party in the United States Pledges Solidarity and Support," *Barricada* wrote:

"We have received a letter from the Socialist Workers Party of the United States in which this organization, in the name of the U.S. working people, salutes our revolutionary process and pledges absolute solidarity to help educate, organize, and mobilize the North American people with the aim of neutralizing any counterrevolutionary imperialist adventure that might be promoted against our country."

The full text of the letter followed:

Sandinista National Liberation
Front,
c/o *Barricada*
Compañeros,

Fifteen hundred of us, gathered at the Socialist Workers Party Thirtieth National Convention in Ohio, salute your historic victory over the bloody Somoza

tyranny which was installed and maintained in power by U.S. imperialism.

The blood of your martyrs has not been spilled in vain. Nicaragua is at long last free of the imperialist yoke and must remain so. We pledge our full solidarity to help educate, organize, and mobilize the North American people against any imperialist counterrevolutionary venture.

We are demanding that the U.S. government immediately provide food, medicine, and other material aid needed by you to reconstruct Nicaragua after the imperialist organized devastation you have suffered. We are convinced that the North American working people will respond with internationalist solidarity, in behalf of Nicaragua.

Working people in the U.S. will oppose any moves toward U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua.

U.S. Hands off Nicaragua! No more Vietnams!

Long Live the Nicaraguan Revolution!

Long Live the FSLN!

Andrew Pulley, Socialist Workers Party candidate for president

Matilde Zimmermann, Socialist Workers Party candidate for vice-president

Nationalists Receive Heroes Welcome in Puerto Rico

By Dan Dickeson

SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico—Chants of "Puerto Rico libre! Cuba sí, Yanqui no!" greeted Rafael Cancel Miranda as he stepped out onto the airplane ramp here, saluting the cheering crowd of 7,000 with a clenched fist.

Cancel Miranda and three other Puerto Rican Nationalists, freed from U.S. prisons after more than twenty-five years, were received as national heroes upon their return here September 12. An intensely emotional rally at San Juan's international airport was followed by a militant and spirited car caravan through the city.

The four—Oscar Collazo, Irving Flores, Lolita Lebrón, and Rafael Cancel Miranda—had been imprisoned in the early 1950s for armed actions in support of Puerto Rican independence (see box). They were the longest-held political prisoners in the Western Hemisphere.

When the news of their impending release reached here, the National Committee to Free the Nationalist Prisoners started organizing a welcoming rally. Hours before the plane carrying the four reached San Juan, thousands of people had already crowded around a hastily erected speakers' platform at the airport. The crowd grew, and excitement mounted as their scheduled arrival time approached.

When the plane landed, and rolled up to the end of the terminal near the crowd, a tremendous cheer went up. After a reunion with close friends and relatives and a quick press conference inside the airport, the four climbed onto the speakers' platform. For several minutes they stood waving, with tears in their eyes, as they looked out over the sea of Puerto Rican flags and raised fists.

Lolita Lebrón took the microphone. Her voice breaking with emotion, she described her joy at seeing her country and her people again, and urged everyone to keep up the fight for independence. The crowd responded with rhythmic chants of "Lolita Lebrón, example of courage!"

Oscar Collazo spoke next. He too vowed to continue fighting, and drew an especially enthusiastic response when he called for unity in the struggle for independence.

Irving Flores and Rafael Cancel Miranda also spoke, stressing the need for unity. The rally concluded with singing of the revolutionary Puerto Rican anthem, *La Borinqueña*.

The speakers' platform was flanked by portraits of Andrés Figueroa Cordero, a fifth Nationalist prisoner who had been released in 1977 shortly before he died of



Dan Dickeson/IP-1
Cancel Miranda, Collazo in San Juan.

cancer, and Pedro Albizu Campos, the leader of the Nationalist Party at the time of the 1950 uprising. Albizu Campos died in 1965 after long years in prison.

Following the airport rally, the Nationalists and their supporters drove in a car caravan across San Juan to a memorial service at the grave of Albizu Campos.

The five Nationalists had been kept in U.S. prisons long after the thousands of others jailed during the 1950 uprising had been released. Their prolonged imprisonment was widely seen here as a humiliating affront to the entire Puerto Rican people.

The U.S. government—even while denying that the five were political prisoners—offered to release them on parole if they would promise to no longer participate in the Puerto Rican independence struggle. But the Nationalists steadfastly refused to accept any such conditions. Their defiant stance was a source of pride for Puerto Ricans, an affirmation of their dignity as a people. As Irving Flores told the cheering crowd here, "All the power of the empire could not bring us to our knees!"

After walking out of federal prisons September 10, the four had spoken at rallies in the Puerto Rican communities of Chicago and New York before flying on to San Juan.

The release of the four was the result of a prolonged international campaign to free them. At the press conference here, Flores scoffed at talk about Jimmy Carter's supposed "humanitarian motives" for granting them clemency. He stated that they had been freed "thanks to the efforts of the

militant people of Puerto Rico and the United States, and of the honest and sincere people of Cuba."

The Cuban government played a leading role in promoting the cause of Puerto Rican independence and freedom for the Nationalist prisoners. On August 15 the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization passed a Cuban-sponsored resolution calling for their release. Carter's announcement of clemency was timed to coincide with the Summit Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Havana, where the imprisonment of the Nationalists would once again have become a scandal.

One of the banners at the airport rally here was from the Antonio Maceo Brigade, an organization of young Cubans in Puerto Rico, the United States, and other countries who support the Cuban leadership's dialogue with the Cuban community abroad.

Also present at the rally was Juan Mari Bras, the secretary general of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, who had just returned from the Nonaligned Summit. The Puerto Rican Independence Party was also represented.

Freedom for the nationalist prisoners had been the demand of nearly all political forces here, including even Puerto Rican capitalist parties that are firmly committed to continued U.S. domination. The municipal assembly in the city of Mayaguez passed a resolution "congratulating" Jimmy Carter on his decision to release the four. Public employees in the towns of Cabo Rojo, Lajas, and Guayanilla were given time off to attend the welcoming rally here.

Governor Carlos Romero Barceló is one of the few Puerto Rican politicians to openly oppose the unconditional release of the nationalists. He ordered members of his party not to speak to the press on the day the four returned.

The Puerto Rican Trotskyists of the Liga Internacionalista de los Trabajadores (LIT—Internationalist Workers League) have played a prominent role in the National Committee to Free the Nationalist Prisoners. Leaders of the LIT said that the campaign to free the Nationalists has been a rallying point for all supporters of independence in Puerto Rico. The return of the Nationalists, who have pledged to press for united actions, could contribute greatly to strengthening the independence movement. A major proindependence demonstration is scheduled for September 22, the anniversary of *El Grito de Lares*, the 1868 uprising against Spanish colonial rule. □

Repression and Rebellion in Puerto Rico

In April 1950, U.S. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson met with Puerto Rican Governor Muñoz Marín to plan a campaign to destroy the influence of the Nationalist Party, then a major force on the island. This campaign began in October 1950 with the arrest of numerous *independentistas*.

Responding to this attempt to wipe it out, the Nationalist Party launched a revolt on October 30, under the leadership of Pedro Albizu Campos. Fighting spread rapidly to all major cities in Puerto Rico. For five days U.S. tanks, planes, and troops fought the rebels. Hundreds of Nationalists were killed and thousands arrested during and after the uprising. Some received prison terms of up to 400 years.

While U.S. forces were brutally putting down the rebellion on the island,

two Puerto Ricans living in New York, Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola, carried out an armed attack on Blair House, the temporary residence of President Truman. Torresola was killed in the attack and Collazo severely wounded. Collazo was later sentenced to death, although the sentence was eventually commuted to life imprisonment.

In 1954, after legislation was passed proclaiming Puerto Rico a "free associated state," Lolita Lebrón, Rafael Cancel Miranda, Irving Flores, and Andrés Figueroa Cordero protested the imposition of colonial status on their country by shooting up the U.S. House of Representatives, wounding five members of Congress. The four Nationalists were sentenced to prison terms ranging up to 50 years.

As a "free associated state" or "com-

monwealth," Puerto Rico remains politically and economically tied to the United States, with the majority of its 3.2 million people condemned to poverty. Wage scales are much lower than in the United States, the official unemployment rate stands at 35 percent, and more than half the population of the island depends on food stamps (the American food dole) for survival.

While their homeland has become a haven for U.S. tourists and investors, a third of all Puerto Ricans have been forced to emigrate to the United States in search of work. Puerto Ricans in the United States suffer racist discrimination and are among the most heavily exploited workers. Like Blacks and Chicanos, they suffer from a lack of educational opportunities, inadequate health care, and overcrowded and deteriorating housing.

U.S. Imperialism Blames Vietnam

Washington's Famine in Kampuchea

By Fred Feldman

Ten years of U.S. imperialist crimes against the people of Kampuchea, beginning with secret bombing raids during the Nixon administration in 1969, are being compounded by a new one—perhaps the most brutal of all. This time the very survival of the Kampuchean people is threatened.

The Carter administration is holding up massive food supplies needed to overcome famine in the war-torn land. The U.S. rulers are willing to see millions of Kampuchians die in order to retain a foothold in Indochina.

Officials of the Heng Samrin government, brought to power when Vietnamese troops and Kampuchean rebels toppled Pol Pot in January, state that 2.5 million Kampuchians face starvation.

In a report in the August 8 *New York Times*, correspondent Seymour Hersh reported information from officials of the International Red Cross and UNICEF who had recently visited Kampuchea. According to these reports, the new government has had to "set the daily intake of rice per person at 130 grams, roughly 4.5 ounces. That is less than one-third the average quota for other Southeast Asian nations. . . ."

One factor in the famine, Hersh reported, "is the apparent absence of any significant population in the fertile rice-growing areas east of the Mekong River,



the area between Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese border. 'My first impression after passing the border is that at present no more than 5 percent of the fields are

cultivated,' one relief official explained. 'The eastern half of the country is a desert—no boats, no one on the roads,' he said.

"The people who had lived in that area, the official said, were viewed with special suspicion by troops of the Pol Pot regime because of its proximity to Vietnam, and thus they were forced to move out." (This mass deportation, which began at the end of 1975, was reported in *Intercontinental Press* March 8, 1976, p. 342.)

Another cause of hunger was cited by Nayan Chanda in the August 17 *Far Eastern Economic Review*. In Kandal Province, south of Phnom Penh, he stated, "the rivers and lakes . . . are teeming with fish and could have staved off famine, but there are few fishing nets left. Many were lost during the massive transfer of population undertaken by Pol Pot in 1975, or destroyed by the Khmer Rouge to deprive individuals of any means of subsistence other than collective work on farms."

Due to inadequate nutrition, resistance to illness is low. The hospitals set up since the fall of Pol Pot—who abolished most medical care—are packed with the sick and dying.

"In 1975," wrote Nayan Chanda in the August 17 *Far Eastern Economic Review*,

"the population of Kampuchea was 7 million; now, the government estimates that it is around 4 million. Of the adult population only about 20-30% are men, and most of the women are widows. According to Sauoeun, who is one of only 40 doctors in the country (in 1975 there were 500), there is now only one birth for every 10 deaths."

U.S. Blames Vietnam

The U.S. imperialists have a ready answer to the problems facing the Kampuchean people: Blame Vietnam! The famine resulted from "the invasion and occupation of that country and from prior years of despotic rule," the State Department proclaimed August 9.

This won't feed the hungry, of course. But it certainly helps stoke the anti-Vietnam propaganda campaign. And it helps cover up for Washington's policy of maintaining a tight aid and trade boycott against Kampuchea.

The Carter administration is using the famine to maximize pressure on Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Kampuchea. This would make it possible to impose a government more to the liking of the U.S. imperialists than that of Heng Samrin.

But it is U.S. imperialism, not Vietnam, that has inflicted years of starvation and near-starvation on the Kampuchean people. Between 1970 and 1973, Washington dropped 442,738 tons of bombs on the Kampuchean countryside—more than 100 pounds for every man, woman, and child in the country. Dikes and waterworks were destroyed and draft animals slain by the hundreds of thousands. Full-fledged famine conditions already existed when the U.S.-supported Lon Nol regime fell in 1975. With typical cruelty, the U.S. government reacted by cutting off its food aid program.

All these problems were then compounded by the mass deportations, forced labor camps, and other repressive measures instituted by the Pol Pot wing of the Khmer Rouge.

When that regime was toppled last January, Khmer insurgents and the massive

number of Vietnamese troops that accompanied them were greeted as liberators. But U.S. imperialism—with total support from the Peking bureaucrats—began to funnel support to Pol Pot's remaining forces through the U.S.-dominated military dictatorship in Thailand. The U.S. rulers feared that advances for the Kampuchean masses would strengthen the workers and peasants struggling against the Thai regime.

Pol Pot's forces were given sanctuary and rearmed in Thailand, and then trucked back into Kampuchea at less-defended points by Thai Army convoys.

Rightists Assure Famine

With this imperialist backing, Pol Pot's forces were joined by units of the CIA-organized Khmer Serei—backers of the former Lon Nol regime. Together they set out to assure a devastating famine, while counting on the Thai regime to keep their troops supplied with food. Rice paddies were mined. Storehouses of grain were burned. Irrigation projects and dikes were wrecked. Tens of thousands of peasants were kidnapped or killed. While the Pol Pot forces scored no significant military gains, they did succeed in assuring famine.

Now Washington is seeking ways to give support to the Pol Pot forces more openly, while fending off international pressure to provide aid to the great majority of Kampuchean who live under the Heng Samrin government.

According to a report by Elizabeth Becker in the July 20 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "The only way we can help in Kampuchea is by giving support to aid for both sides," an American official said. "If we can't find a way to help the people on Pol Pot's side it's unlikely that we'll be in a position to do anything even indirectly for those under Heng Samrin."

Yet, an editorial in the September 21 *New York Times* tried to shift the blame for Washington's inaction onto the Heng Samrin government. "Forceful American and international efforts are needed to get

the Cambodian authorities, such as they are, to permit the world to help fight their spreading famine," the editorial piously stated.

To Washington, the starving people of Kampuchea are a pawn in its efforts to isolate and deny legitimacy to the new government of that country.

As a condition for any aid program, Japanese officials have demanded that the Kampuchean government cease fighting the Pol Pot terrorists.

Nor has the United Nations deviated from the line set by U.S. imperialism. "Diplomats here following the situation," wrote *New York Times* correspondent Henry Kamm from Bangkok, Thailand, ". . . are discouraged by the general inaction of potential donors and such international figures as Secretary General Kurt Waldheim of the United Nations on a broad relief program for all Cambodians."

The UN continues to recognize the Pol Pot forces as the government of Kampuchea, even though they control almost no territory and a small percentage of the population.

Sihanouk's Angle

Prince Norodom Sihanouk is also among those who have been counting on famine to bring the Kampuchean people to their knees and force the Vietnamese to accede to imperialist demands. This "great patriot" has been prominently mentioned as a candidate to head a coalition government acceptable to Washington.

Sihanouk told Nayan Chanda:

"The Soviets can give weapons to them but not rice. . . . With Kampuchea in ruins, with Laos without an economy, having to feed the Kampuchean, to feed the Laotians, to feed the Vietnamese themselves, Mr. Pham Van Dong, Mr. Le Duan [leaders of the Hanoi government] cannot go further. In a few years under the pressure of the whole world they will have to let Sihanouk go back to Kampuchea to solve the problems." (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 27).

Vietnam's Aid

Vietnam, itself hard-hit by food shortages and hunger, appears to be meeting its responsibility to help the Kampuchean fight off famine. "Vietnam so far has supplied 10,000 tons of rice seed, 20,000 tons of rice, 9,000 tons of fuel oil and 5,000 tons of consumer goods such as condensed milk, cloth and household utensils," Chanda reported. "Now each province in southern Vietnam is being asked to provide some assistance. In Mekong delta provinces like Cuu Long, Ben Tre and others, each Vietnamese family is being asked to contribute 3 kg of rice for the sister province in Kampuchea."

Nonetheless, some radical groups have fallen into the imperialist trap of blaming Vietnam for the famine in Kampuchea. For example, in the September 5 issue of the *New York "radical" weekly Guardian*,

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William Ryan writes:

"Prior to the massive Vietnamese invasion . . . there were no reports of starvation.

"According to a recent statement from the Pol Pot government," Ryan continues, "adequate irrigation ditches and reservoirs were built after the defeat of U.S. imperialism in 1975, with resulting large harvests in rice. These systems—which helped Kampuchea become an inchoate rice exporting country—have been destroyed in the fighting."

The agricultural utopia described by the *Guardian* bears no resemblance to real life

under the Pol Pot regime. The export of small amounts of rice proved nothing about whether or not the population was adequately fed, especially since the Pol Pot regime attempted to force consumption below subsistence levels precisely in order to increase rice exports.

Life Under Pol Pot

A more accurate picture of life in Pol Pot's agricultural labor camps was given to correspondent Chanda by Suos Kim Mong, an unemployed worker now living in Phnompenh.

"Along with 275 families, Mong had

spent nearly three years in a cooperative in Battambang province. At the end, he believed, only some 80 families survived. The rest were either executed . . . or had died of disease and exhaustion. For months, he said, the meals consisted of rice soup with salt and *prahok* (fish sauce). Children under eight and men over 40 could not stand this diet very long. They ate leaves, roots and rats whenever they had a chance. This plus 12 hours of rigorous work and malaria and other diseases took a heavy toll. 'If the Vietnamese had come a few months later,' Mong said, 'we would all have been dead.' □

James T. Farrell: 1904-1979

By Alan Wald

[The following article appeared in the September 14 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

* * *

James Thomas Farrell, the internationally-known author of the *Studs Lonigan* trilogy who defended Leon Trotsky at the time of the Moscow Purge Trials, died of a heart attack in New York City on August 25. He was seventy-five years old and his survivors include Cleo Paturis, his companion of the past fifteen years, and Dr. Kevin Farrell, a son.

Crowds of people attended an August 25 memorial meeting in Manhattan that was addressed by the novelist Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. The next day a grave-side ceremony was held at Calvary Cemetery near his home-town of Chicago. His death was reported on national television news programs and the *New York Times* featured a three-column obituary.

Such fame was not augured by the circumstances of Farrell's birth and upbringing. He was born on February 27, 1904, into a working-class Irish-American family. His father was a teamster and his mother worked as a domestic servant. The Farrells were so poor that the three-year-old son had to be turned over to the care of middle-class relatives.

He worked his way through the University of Chicago as a gas station attendant and in other assorted jobs but quit before graduating because he decided to become a writer. In 1931 he eloped to Paris with his first wife, Dorothy Butler, and wrote industriously while living in dire poverty.

The next year he settled permanently in New York City, witnessing a change in fortune when his first novel, *Young Lonigan*, was published by Vanguard Press.

This was followed by *Gas-House McGinty* in 1933, and *The Young Manhood of Studs Lonigan* and *Calico Shoes and Other Stories* in 1934. In 1935 the appearance of *Judgment Day* completed the *Studs Lonigan* trilogy and Farrell was established as a major figure in American letters.

During his remarkably productive career, Farrell published fifty-two books. Twenty-four of them are novels, seventeen are collections of short stories, five are anthologies of criticism, and the rest consist of journalism, satire, poetry, and a short play composed with his second wife, the actress Hortense Alden.

Farrell's precise stature in world literature has yet to be determined. At the least, he will be recognized as one of the dozen most influential writers of his time in the realist-naturalist genre.

His importance to the sub-category of American literary radicalism can be more exactly stated. Along with Max Eastman and John Dos Passos, he was one of the decisive figures in forging a fecund and inspiring tradition in the United States of literary intellectuals who combined left-wing politics with creative writing.

Revolutionary Socialist

Eastman pioneered the association of radical politics and rebel art through his editorship of the *Masses* magazine after 1912. Dos Passos wrote the most influential work of political fiction in the 1930s, the *U.S.A.* trilogy (1936). Farrell's distinctive contribution was that he defended the principles of genuine Marxism in letters, while advancing the working-class struggle through his collaboration for a period with the revolutionary socialist movement.

A supporter of the Communist Party from 1932 to 1935, Farrell was one of the first intellectuals of the Great Depression era to break with Stalinism through the recognition of its counterrevolutionary pol-

itical character. He concluded this after studying the Marxist classics and observing the Communist Party's fatally sectarian German policy in 1933 and its Popular Front turn in 1935.

In the spring of 1936 he published *A Note on Literary Criticism*, which is a Marxist polemic against the political manipulation of literature practiced by the Communist Party. The theoretical underpinnings of the book are consistent with Leon Trotsky's views in *Literature and Revolution*. Farrell discussed a draft of his work with George Novack, a Trotskyist he had befriended at Yaddo, an institute for writers and artists in Saratoga Springs, New York.

Later that year Farrell helped organize the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky. The purpose of this body was to permit Trotsky to have a hearing in order to answer the charges levelled against him by Stalin's frame-up trials in Moscow.

In 1937 Farrell traveled to Mexico to observe the John Dewey Commission, which took Trotsky's testimony. On his return to New York, Farrell encouraged the transformation of *Partisan Review* magazine into an organ of the anti-Stalinist literary left and contributed regularly to it for several years. In 1938 he was a sponsor of the League for Cultural Freedom and Socialism, inspired by a manifesto written by Trotsky, the French surrealist André Breton, and the Mexican muralist Diego Rivera.

Until 1945 Farrell was a dependable ally of the Socialist Workers Party. Along with Columbia art historian Meyer Schapiro and the journalist Dwight McDonald, he was one of the few prominent intellectuals to oppose United States imperialist aims in the Second World War. From 1941 to 1945 he served as chairman of the Civil Rights Defense Committee, formed to defend the

trade union militants in Minneapolis Teamsters Local 544 and leaders of the Socialist Workers Party prosecuted as the first victims of the Smith "Gag" Act.

Marxism Versus Pragmatism

Farrell's primary concern in his revolutionary socialist years was the same as it was during the rest of his life: literature came first and foremost. He was an outstanding example of the artist who recognizes the interdependency of the advancement of culture and the struggle for human liberation. He believed it was necessary to construct a revolutionary party rooted in the working class to lead the fight for socialism, and he sought to assist in the capacities for which he was best suited.

Farrell's fiction differed from that of Dos Passos, who wrote explicitly political novels. Although some of Farrell's work, such as his anti-fascist novelette *Tommy Gallagher's Crusade* (1939), dramatized important political issues, he was primarily a novelist of human character. Acutely sensitive to the psychological costs of living in bourgeois society, his conceptions of individual consciousness and social destiny were infused with a materialist outlook.

However, prior to his study of Marxism, Farrell had nurtured his literary ideas by immersing himself in the pragmatism of John Dewey's instrumental philosophy and George Herbert Mead's social psychology. In the 1930s and 1940s Farrell aspired to reconcile Marxism with these thinkers.

Although he achieved some degree of successful integration in his fiction and aesthetics, he rejected dialectical materialist philosophy. Thus he remained susceptible to the influence of non-Marxist pressures and ideology and eventually reverted totally to liberal pragmatism.

In 1939-1940 Max Schachtman led a faction in the Socialist Workers Party which opposed the view, supported by James P. Cannon and Trotsky, that the Soviet Union should be defended against imperialism. When Schachtman split and founded the Workers Party, Farrell remained sympathetic to the SWP, despite his doubts about the class character of the Soviet Union.

But in 1945-1946, Farrell grew dissatisfied with the Socialist Workers Party. He followed a course paralleling the tendency led by Albert Goldman and Felix Morrow which followed in the footsteps of Schachtman.

Farrell remained a supporter of the Workers Party until the spring of 1948, when he wrote Goldman that "Trotskyism has failed. It has not organized a sufficient fighting force with which to meet Stalinism." He came to the view that it was necessary to ally with United States capitalism against the menace of Stalinism.

This led Farrell to associate with the anti-communist Cold Warriors of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom during the early 1950s. For his role in this

CIA-funded organization, he was called "reactionary" by the cultural historian Christopher Lasch in his book *The Agony of the American Left*. Farrell denied this charge, insisting that he never took money from the CIA and that he resigned from



Anne Teesdale/Militant
James T. Farrell speaking at memorial meeting for SWP leader Evelyn Reed.

the committee partly because he learned of the existence of such funds.

Nevertheless, Farrell's political life never recovered from the disorientation he suffered in the late 1940s. The man who once admired the Bolsheviks and American working-class militants such as V.R. Dunne now endorsed the capitalist politicians Adlai Stevenson and Hubert Humphrey. In 1978 he joined Social Democrats USA, the right wing of the American social democracy.

Farrell was an internationalist in culture and sensitive to the literature of many peoples, with special affection for the Irish. He was also vehemently anti-elitist. But he had little understanding of the dynamic of the contemporary struggles of oppressed minorities and women. On issues such as affirmative action and Israel, his views were hardly distinguishable from the group now called the "neo-conservatives," identified with *Commentary* and *The Public Interest* magazines.

Honesty and Integrity

Farrell was thoroughly unlike Studs Lonigan and his other tough-guy anti-intellectual characters. He was unusually well-read in Western European history and philosophy. The motivation for the stark and brutal scenes in his literature—for which he was hauled before the courts on charges of "obscenity"—was his irrepressible desire to recreate the Chicago world he had known—and "never made"—with the utmost fidelity.

The artistic qualities of his writing have

been misunderstood or ignored. Although he is often compared with Theodore Dreiser and Sherwood Anderson, he conceived of his literary projects under the inspiration of Honoré de Balzac and Marcel Proust.

Farrell was also remarkably generous to young writers and scholars. He willingly offered his friendship, guidance, and personal assistance. Although some of his literary feuds have been widely publicized, he was a loyal friend who was admired for his honesty and personal integrity even by those with whom he had sharp political disagreements.

Moreover, he was animated by an extraordinary empathy with and compassion for the oppressed of capitalist society. This was true even in his later years, when his response to suffering was stoical acceptance rather than revolutionary social action.

Unlike those intellectuals who made political accommodations in the hope of receiving security and financial benefits, Farrell never wrote for money. In the 1950s and 1960s many ex-radicals prospered as they adapted to the fashionable cultural trends. But Farrell persisted in a curmudgeonly sort of rebellion and drifted into near obscurity.

Hounded by censors, sneered at by a hoard of literary detractors, and harassed by publishers who didn't find his books sufficiently marketable, Farrell persisted in using his art to tell the truth as he saw it and refused to take orders from anyone.

At one point he was evicted from his apartment for nonpayment of rent, and on another occasion financial desperation forced him to sell the movie rights to *Studs Lonigan* for a pittance. But he only became stronger in his belief that artists must resist commercial forces. In 1961 he made the public declaration that "I began writing in my own way and I shall go on doing it. This is my first and last word on the subject."

Only in the last two years of his life was his reputation revived and he began to receive some long overdue recognition. *Studs Lonigan* was broadcast on NBC television in March 1979, and shortly afterwards he received the Emerson-Thoreau award from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

However, Farrell's most significant honor may be the respect accorded him by the present generation of radicalizing young workers and by future readers who recognize his artistic truth. They will study his fiction for its vivid depiction of the socio-psychological malaise perpetrated by capitalist institutions.

Marxists can also benefit from the study of Farrell's literary criticism. *A Note on Literary Criticism* (1936), *The League of Frightened Philistines* (1945), and *Literature and Morality* (1947) are exemplary in their understanding of the social matrix of culture. □

Selections From the Left

[The entire column this week is devoted to initial assessments of the revolution in Nicaragua.]

rouge

"Red," weekly newspaper of the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), French section of the Fourth International. Published in Paris.

Four recent issues of the French Trotskyist weekly have featured extensive coverage of developments in Nicaragua since the overthrow of Somoza.

I.

In the August 10-17 issue an unsigned article headlined "Between Imperialism and Revolution" expresses concern about how the FSLN leadership will respond to two major questions facing the revolution:

"The first is defense. Will the armed population itself assure the defense of the revolution, with mobilization of the masses remaining the main bulwark against intrigue and aggression? Or will the new government seek to normalize the armed forces and rebuild a regular police force? . . . What should be the order of the day is extension and centralization of self-defense and the militias.

"The second question is national reconstruction. Does it mean handing rebuilding of the cities and transport over to the speculation of capitalist entrepreneurs, both Nicaraguan and foreign, along with the reorganization of the networks of commercial distribution? Or does it mean that these things will be organized under the control of the peasants and workers of Nicaragua, in accordance with their needs, without giving a cent to the exploiters?"

"To gain the means to rebuild the economy in accordance with the needs of the workers and the poor, the government would have to publicly repudiate the \$1.2 billion foreign debt left by Somoza. It would have to take over the land—not simply the 25 percent held by the Somoza family—so as to organize the agrarian reform on a large scale. It would have to expropriate the means of transportation and production, both locally and foreign owned, and not simply remain content with the nationalization of two banks.

"But tasks of such magnitude and scope cannot be entrusted to a government and a junta of reconstruction dominated by an overwhelming majority of capitalist ministers, connected by a thousand links to American imperialism.

"Only a workers and peasants government that breaks totally with the bourgeois-

ie, immediately convokes a democratic constituent assembly, and bases itself on popular self-defense and neighborhood committees will be strong and bold enough to take up these tasks.

"This is the still-living lesson of the Cuban revolution. . . ."

II.

The August 24-30 issue prints major excerpts from the following: an eyewitness report from Managua by Pedro Camejo, Sergio Rodríguez, and Fred Murphy (published in the September 3 *IP/D*); an interview with Jaime Wheelock, FSLN minister of agrarian reform (also published in the September 3 *IP/D*); and Fidel Castro's July 26 speech hailing the victory over Somoza.

III.

The August 31-September 6 issue features a four-page report by LCR leader François Ollivier, who visited Nicaragua as part of a delegation from the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. After reporting on the terrible destruction left by Somoza's bombings and the political, social, and economic measures initiated by the FSLN to confront the country's most pressing needs, Ollivier offers this assessment of the FSLN leadership:

"The revolution has only begun. Many difficulties and obstacles remain.

"But one thing is clear—this leadership has begun a revolution. That is a fundamental historical fact. Unlike centrists who oscillate between reform and revolution, the FSLN mobilized the masses and formed a revolutionary army to overthrow Somoza. Today, following the overthrow of the dictatorship, it is seeking to deepen the process. In this sense, it is a revolutionary leadership.

"So if we, as Trotskyist militants, happen to have the chance to discuss this or that question about the revolutionary process under way in Nicaragua, it should be with this approach, in the spirit of one revolutionary talking with another, that we hold discussions with our comrades of the FSLN."

On the question of reconstruction in Nicaragua, Ollivier makes the following point:

"While we should state very clearly that reconstruction of the country must serve the workers and poor peasants, we cannot and must not in any way take the same approach Trotskyists did, quite correctly, after 1945 in capitalist countries such as France or Italy. There, for the Stalinists and Social Democrats, 'reconstruction' meant reconstructing the bourgeois state and the capitalist economy while disarming and demobilizing the working class, with the aim of reestablishing the conti-

nunity of capitalist domination.

"We fought such a policy. But today in Nicaragua not only has all continuity of the old state and institutions been broken by the revolutionary overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship, but the reconstruction envisaged by the FSLN is linked with the mobilization and advancement of the masses. That is a qualitative and fundamental difference."

This issue also reprints excerpts from an article in the August 31 issue of the U.S. *Militant* reporting on the expulsion of the Simón Bolívar Brigade from Nicaragua. In their introduction to the article, the editors of *Rouge* state that they view the way the expulsion was handled as a "disturbing precedent."

IV.

The September 7-13 issue contains four items on Nicaragua. The first is a brief article hailing the currency reform as a "heavy blow to the Somocista profiteers."

The second consists of major excerpts from an article by Ricardo Ramírez of the Colombian Socialist Workers Party (PST), the organizer of the Simón Bolívar Brigade, on the expulsion of the brigade. (A translation of the full text of Ramírez's article appears in last week's *IP/I*.)

The third item is a statement issued by the LCR Central Committee calling for a massive campaign of support to the workers and peasants of Nicaragua. "The Fourth International has placed defense of the Nicaraguan revolution at the center of its activities," the statement says. The LCR "will give this campaign priority in its international activities," demanding "along with all the unions and workers parties that the French government send massive aid to Nicaragua, with no strings attached."

The fourth item is a statement on the expulsion of the Simón Bolívar Brigade, which reads as follows:

"The Central Committee of the LCR, at its meeting September 1, 1979, declares:

"1. That the orientation and initiatives of the Simón Bolívar Brigade in Nicaragua, which were developed outside the control of the Fourth International and independently of its positions, are in no way the responsibility of the Fourth International.

"2. That the expulsion by the Nicaraguan government of 'foreign' militants constitutes an unacceptable precedent; also inadmissible are the public attacks against Trotskyists, launched by a leader of the FSLN to justify a campaign against extremism in general.

"The Central Committee of the LCR requests from the United Secretariat a detailed report on the events in Nicaragua,

so that it can take a position on the substance of this question."

Socialist Challenge

Newspaper sponsored by the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International. Published weekly in London.

"Reconstruct Nicaragua—but for whom?" asks an article by Dave Kellaway in the August 9 issue.

"Government measures have flowed thick and fast. The banks have been nationalised. . . . All of Somoza's land—30 per cent of Nicaragua's best—has been nationalised, but will remain in the hands of state administrators. Only fallow land will be given to the 60,000 landless peasants. . . .

"... further nationalisations of imperialist and capitalist interests have been ruled out. A mixed economy has been proclaimed in which the state will 'regulate foreign investment to maintain national independence'. . . .

"... U.S. officials are said to be pleased with the moderate tenor of the new government. Their aim now is to try to keep it that way by using aid as blackmail."

The August 30 issue features interviews with a government minister, a worker in a match factory, and a leader of a neighborhood committee. In an introduction to them, the editors state:

"Several weeks after the insurrection which overthrew Somoza, the country is in the throes of a revolutionary upheaval. A state of dual power exists, but with this difference: the bourgeoisie has no repressive state apparatus at its disposal. The masses remain armed and in a state of permanent mobilisation.

"The future of the Nicaraguan revolution depends on the political evolution of the left wing of the Sandinistas and their ability to defeat imperialism and the native bourgeoisie."

This issue also contains a statement by the IMG on the expulsion of the Simón Bolívar Brigade. It says in part:

"The decision to despatch the Simón Bolívar Brigade to Nicaragua was not discussed by any elected body of the Fourth International. It was an initiative of the Colombian PST, a sympathising organisation of the FI.

"We shall have to discuss publicly and with the comrades concerned on the basis of more detailed information the balance-sheet of this initiative. At the same time we will be equally ready to discuss publicly and fraternally with the Sandinista comrades on the tasks and perspectives of the Nicaraguan revolution.

"However we have no hesitation in condemning the statement made last week by Jaime Wheelock, the Minister for Agrarian Reform, who denounced 'the

Trotskyists and all those who seek to accelerate the evolution of the Nicaraguan regime'. . . .

"It is not very convincing, despite the political differences, to believe that 60 foreign volunteers posed a serious problem for a revolutionary leadership that enjoys mass support. We cannot support the deportation of these comrades, whatever political errors they have made. Differences in the workers movement cannot be solved in this way.

"In any event, we refuse to accept the ritual denunciation of 'Trotskyists,' which has served in the past as a pretext and alibi for extremely dubious enterprises."

In the September 6 issue, Clive Turnbull focuses on the pressure being exerted by imperialism:

"The main imperialist intervention at present is economic and diplomatic. It is attempting to bully and cajole the FSLN leadership, or a section of it, into halting the revolutionary process and then to roll back the gains of the masses. This is what lies behind the withholding of aid, the manoeuvres over a loan from the International Monetary Fund, and the offer of training for the Sandinista army and police from Omar Torrijos, the 'strong man' of Panama. . . .

"Since coming to power the Sandinistas have set up a Government of National Reconstruction, which includes a number of bourgeois figures. FSLN leaders argue that they would be isolated if they set up a workers and peasants government today—'Everyone, the US imperialists, other Latin American regimes, the social democracy, would attack us.'

"But the bourgeois ministers, while individually powerless, represent a compromise with imperialist pressure. It means that the bourgeoisie gains credibility in the eyes of the masses out of all proportion to its negligible social weight.

"So far, where the masses have gone beyond the programme of the Reconstruction Government, the Sandinista leadership has backed them and not the bourgeoisie. This choice will confront them more and more sharply as time goes on: to rely on the mass self-organisation of the workers and peasants to reconstruct Nicaragua, or on the aid which imperialism will try to turn into a noose with which to choke the revolution?"

la brèche

French-language organ of the Revolutionary Marxist League (LMR), Swiss section of the Fourth International. Published twice a month in Lausanne.

"Nicaragua: Total Support!" is the headline on the front page of the September 1 issue, which features three articles on the revolution that overthrew Somoza.

The first is a statement by the LMR

Political Bureau, which calls for "Immediate and unconditional aid for Nicaragua from the Swiss government"; "Imperialists Hands off Nicaragua"; and "No threats against Cuba."

The second is an article on the expulsion of the Simón Bolívar Brigade, reprinted from the August 31 issue of the U.S. *Militant*. In their introduction to the article the editors state: "The necessity for a public debate on the results of the activities of this brigade, organized under the sponsorship of the Colombian PST independently of any discussion with the elected leadership of the Fourth International, does not however prevent us from deploring the statements by the minister of agrarian reform, Jaime Wheelock, who is said to have violently denounced 'the Trotskyists and all those who seek to accelerate the evolution of the regime in Nicaragua.'"

The third is an article by Charles-André Udry, urging a "powerful movement of solidarity" with the "deepgoing process of permanent revolution now under way in Nicaragua, twenty years after the beginning of the socialist revolution in Cuba."

After describing the enormous destruction inflicted by Somoza's bombings, the efforts by the imperialists to use promises of aid as blackmail, and the massive aid sent immediately by Cuba, Udry cites some of the measures initiated by the FSLN to solve immediate problems:

"On July 20 the Junta published a decree announcing the confiscation of 'everything that has been stolen from the people,' that is, all of Somoza's holdings. . . .

"The peasants, under the cry 'land of the murderers of the peasants,' immediately occupied the big estates. . . .

"The factories and business establishments controlled by Somoza and his associates were also nationalized. . . . Stocks of the main export products—coffee, sugar, cotton, and fish—were placed under government control.

"The many mansions belonging to supporters of the old regime were confiscated" and are to be "turned into schools, child-care centers, cultural centers, museums. . . .

"The Ministry of Social Affairs . . . has taken radical measures, characterized by a profound egalitarian spirit, in the fields of health, education, and distribution of food. Salaries paid to functionaries of the new regime are strictly limited.

"A call has been issued for the formation of a Sandinista Trade-Union Federation that will unite all working people, including in the agricultural sector, so that they may 'demand their rights and resolve their problems.'

"The number and scope of the measures taken *immediately* by the leadership of the revolution, the FSLN, reflect the dynamic of the process of permanent revolution under way in Nicaragua."

Cubans in the United States and the Cuban Revolution

By José G. Pérez

[The following article appeared in the August issue of the *International Socialist Review*, monthly magazine supplement to the *Militant*.

[José G. Pérez was born in Cuba and came to the United States with his parents at the end of 1960. Pérez is editor of *Perspectiva Mundial*, a Spanish-language revolutionary-socialist news magazine published in New York. He recently traveled in Cuba with the Antonio Maceo Brigade.]

* * *

I believe—sincerely—that what we have done and are doing is revolutionary. If we'd let ourselves be carried along by routine, by what's easiest to do, we wouldn't have taken on what we have. I firmly believe we wouldn't be doing it if we weren't revolutionaries. I believe we're doing it because we are revolutionaries.

To our way of thinking, being a revolutionary means defying routine, turning off the easy road, and many times it means taking the difficult road. But we don't doubt for a moment that what we're doing is highly positive, highly constructive, highly moral, and that it will benefit all Cubans: the Cuban community at home and the Cuban community abroad.

... men must not act in order to write pages in history. There's no point to that. But always history will record the things that have some human, social, political value; and we believe that this has value, a high human, social and political value.

* * *

We must bear in mind that if this emigration reached such a height and the counterrevolution achieved a certain strength in Cuba, if that division took place, it was largely due to the power and influence of the United States.

I believe that above all this means defeat for the enemies of our people.

—Fidel Castro on the Dialogue

December 9, 1978

Granma, December 17, 1978¹

Almost a year ago, the revolutionary government of Cuba ditched its twenty-year policy of undifferentiated hostility to

1. This and all other references to *Granma* are to the English-language weekly review, which is different from the daily. I have used *Granma's* translations. Simultaneous weekly review editions of *Granma* are also published in Spanish and French, and their contents are identical to the English edition.

the Cuban emigrés and initiated a rapprochement—known as “the dialogue”—with the Cuban communities abroad. As part of this change, tens of thousands of Cubans living in the United States have visited Cuba since the beginning of the year; mechanisms have been set up for reunifying divided families; and, as a gesture to the community abroad, the overwhelming majority of people who were imprisoned in Cuba for crimes against the security of the workers state are being released.

Whereas in the past the Castro leadership had not paid attention to the political life of the advanced capitalist countries, this initiative represents a ground-breaking policy shift that could transform the impact of the Cuban revolution on American politics. It has brought to the surface the growing political differentiation and polarization among the 700,000 Cubans in the United States.

Myths About Cubans in the U.S.

The image that most people have about the Cubans in the United States is composed of three interrelated myths.

The first myth concerns “la anorada Cuba de ayer” (the longed-for Cuba of yesteryear). This supposes that the exiles were all capitalists and other very well-off people, as well as the politicians and assassins associated with the old Batista dictatorship.

It is true that the overwhelming majority of those people left the country after the revolution. But many of the people who left were urban middle class or relatively privileged workers who had not necessarily lost much economically. Many of these people came for economic reasons—not that things were so bad in Cuba, but simply because they had the opportunity and sought to obtain the standard of living they thought was possible in the most advanced capitalist country in the world.

The second myth is that Cubans here have done exceptionally well in “el exilio de oro” (the golden exile). In fact, Cubans do not do as well as the average Anglo. Many former businessmen and professionals are washing dishes. Many formerly well-off women now work in sweatshops. Cubans suffer higher unemployment than Anglos. The average wages of Cuban workers are substantially lower than those of their Anglo counterparts. The rate of participation of Cuban women in the work force is the highest of any sector of the American population, showing the degree to which Cuban working-class families

find it impossible to meet their expectations with only one income. This is especially significant given the qualitatively lower rate of participation by women in the labor force in pre-revolutionary Cuba, and the continuing strong influence among many Cubans of the backward idea that a woman's place is in the home.

All the socio-economic indexes show Cubans to be worse off than Anglos in areas such as wages, family income, unemployment, and percentage of persons employed as professional, technical, or managerial personnel.

Cubans suffer from the same racist and language discrimination as all Latinos. Most Anglo bosses who discriminate against Latinos don't care whether you're Puerto Rican, Chicano, or Cuban: to them, a “spic” is a “spic.” Like Blacks, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans, Cubans are vastly underrepresented in all levels of government, elected or appointed.

The third myth is that virtually all Cubans are hostile to the Cuban revolution. This myth is promoted by the U.S. capitalist media and was accepted, for a time by the Castro leadership and by radicals in the United States, who labeled them all as *gusanos* (worms), the term used to describe active counterrevolutionaries.

A Changing Mood

The truth is that most Cubans in the United States were never active supporters of the militant right-wing groups, and of those who were, the vast majority have by now given up hopes of overthrowing the revolution. If the right-wingers still seem stronger today than they really are, that is mainly due to the image projected in the media by the American ruling class. The handful of ultra-right terrorists enjoy complete immunity from the cops and FBI, and probably count with their active cooperation on some projects.

Most Cubans who were initially hostile to the revolution have changed their minds. The majority of Cubans in the United States favor lifting the U.S. economic blockade of the island, and they support the normalization of diplomatic relations. Even many deeply held anticommunist prejudices are breaking down, and this process has been accelerating as thousands of Cubans visit the island every month and come back telling their friends of their favorable impressions.

A growing differentiation among the Cubans has been developing since the late 1960s, beginning with the campuses and

spreading throughout the communities. One of the most prominent groups is the Christian Evangelical Reformed Church in Miami, headed by Rev. Manuel Espinosa, which has several thousand members. The Cuban-American Committee for Normalization of Relations is composed primarily of college professors, and the Antonio Maceo Brigade is a group of young Cubans who had been brought out of the country by their parents after the revolution. The left-wing magazine *Areíto*, which is generally favorable to the revolution, has a circulation of several thousand.

The political differentiation in the Cuban communities is rooted in several interrelated factors, most of all the class differentiation within the communities and the national oppression suffered by Cubans in the United States. These interact with the fact of the revolution, which is by far the most important event that ever happened to the overwhelming majority of Cubans, totally transforming their lives.

The majority of U.S. Cubans want an end to the blockade . . .

The political move by the revolutionary government in initiating the dialogue is more complicated and far-reaching than it might seem at first.

Beginning in the mid-1970s a few selected Cubans, most of them friendly to the revolution, started to visit the island, usually with no publicity. These visits led to a proposal to the Cuban government that young Cubans who had been taken out by their parents before the age of eighteen be allowed to visit openly, in a group similar to the Venceremos Brigade.

The first such group, called the Antonio Maceo Brigade, visited the island at the end of 1977 and early 1978. Their trip coincided with the publication in Cuba of the book *Contra Viento y Marea* (Against the Wind and the Tide), which depicts the experiences of this layer of younger exiles, describing how they had eventually come to reconcile themselves to the Cuban revolution and then in many cases to become enthusiastic supporters of it. This book was awarded a prize by the Cuban literary institution, Casa de las Americas, in the special category (created for the occasion) of "Testimony: Youth in Our America."

The book is basically a collection of interviews with fifty young exiles and includes a section devoted to critical evaluation of some weaknesses in Cuba today, including the attitude toward homosexuals, the poor quality of *Granma* and other printed media, the treatment of artists and intellectuals, bureaucratism and privilege, and the strides still to be made in advancing equality of women. This is another piece of evidence to show that the image of Cuba as a totalitarian society painted by the imperialist press is a slander.

In his initial press conference on the dialogue last September, Fidel Castro explained the impact of the brigade's visit:

"For example, I'd say that something that helped make us conscious of this, and which made a great impact on Cuban public opinion, was the visit of the Antonio Maceo Brigade. Those young people, who had nothing to do with these problems and who are not to be blamed for these problems, who visited Cuba with an attitude of peace, with friendly attitude, made a great impact in our country. That is one example."

A Stirring Visit

Later on at the September news conference, Fidel Castro returned to the visit of the first contingent of the brigade, explaining that it had provoked quite a discussion in the Cuban leadership:

"How and when the idea first came up, I couldn't tell you because I don't remember. I recall that one day some comrades told us that there was the possibility that a brigade of children of emigrés might come. We might say it was a strange thing. And we even wondered whether such a thing would be understood—that was the first thing we asked ourselves. Some comrades felt they should come. But, would the people understand? How would the people react? . . .

"Well, it proved to be a test. We might say it was a test. Later, they went everywhere and met with everyone from the very first moment they arrived. And they met with many leaders as well. I also met with them near the end of their visit. But I had noticed that all the people, the political cadres and leaders who had met with them, were all very favorably impressed and deeply touched. The meetings were very moving. . . .

"They also helped us become aware of the problems of the community. Because there is something which we have started to realize, the fact that, as I see it, the Cuban community, like all other communities in another environment, in another country, tries to maintain its national identity. . . . Actually, we view this sympathetically. Regardless of what they might be, whether a Cuban millionaire or a worker in the emigré community. Because there are many workers who have emigrated; many Cubans abroad work hard at earning a living in factories. . . .

"This, logically, arouses our solidarity. I mean just that: it arouses our solidarity and appreciation. . . . I repeat, this arouses our solidarity and appreciation, even if they don't support the Revolution.

"Because we support all communities which try to maintain their identity. We support the Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Latin Americans, blacks and Indians as well—in short, all the minorities who struggle for their interests. We support them. Why not view the Cubans in the same light? . . .

"In our contacts we were able to note this angle of the problem. But our contacts have been made primarily with these young people, because it had a great impact on us. There is even a documentary film about the Brigade, and I know that many people cry when they see it. There is no doubt that national feeling is very strong. . . .

"We had thought there might be criticism of the government and the Party as a result of the Brigade's visit, but there was no criticism. The reaction was just the opposite. . . .

"You shouldn't think this is easy. We need the understanding of the people, because we don't do anything behind the backs of the people nor contrary to their feelings. Everything we do must always be in accordance with this. If it is not understood it can't be done." (*Granma*, September 17, 1978).

In his news conference Fidel explained a series of problems that concerned both Cubans abroad and in Cuba. These included reunification of divided families, return trips to Cuba by exiles to visit, and the freeing of political prisoners. There was also the broader question of ongoing relations between Cuba and the community abroad; the possibility was raised of forming a special government agency to handle this question and of publishing a magazine, and so forth.

Fidel said these questions should be discussed between the Cuban government and representative individuals from the community abroad. Only active counterrevolutionaries would be excluded.

Release of Prisoners

A group of Cubans (the "Commission of 75") went to Havana and met with top leaders of the Cuban government in late November. A few weeks later the commission returned, having by this time almost doubled in size. Further discussions were held, and a joint declaration was signed by all parties to the talks.

The Cuban government agreed to release some 3,000 political prisoners, that is, the overwhelming majority of the people still imprisoned for counterrevolutionary acts, as well as all 600 people imprisoned for trying to leave Cuba illegally. Return visits by the emigrés would be permitted and organized, and a mechanism was set up to facilitate the reunification of divided families.

For its part, the Commission of 75 promised to do the necessary paperwork and take other steps to encourage the U.S. government to permit those prisoners and ex-prisoners who wanted to do so to emigrate to the United States. The joint declaration also included further ideas for strengthening the links between Cuba and the Cuban community abroad, presenting these as items for further study and discussion.

The document also reported that it had

been decided to "maintain the contacts and communication channels that have been established."

U.S. Campaign Against Cuba

The Cuban government made the proposal for the dialogue at a time when, from its point of view, relations with the U.S. government were—as Castro put it recently—"perfectly bad."

For the past four or five years, the U.S. government has been on a stepped-up anti-Cuban campaign in response to the aid Cuba has given national liberation struggles against imperialism in Africa. President Ford branded the Cubans "international outlaws" for daring to drive back the South African invasion of Angola.

At the beginning of his administration, Carter made some gestures that appeared to be conciliatory toward Cuba, such as lifting the travel ban (long ago declared constitutionally unenforceable by the Supreme Court). But these were followed by renewed imperialist propaganda and military threats against Cuba in response to Cuba's aid to Ethiopia against the imperialist-inspired Somali invasion. Following these, Carter publicly accused Cuba of backing the Katangese rebellion in Zaïre; the charge was hotly denied by Cuba, and the United States was eventually forced to withdraw it. The CIA mounted a "disinformation" campaign trying to link Cuba to the Ethiopian junta's military drive against the Eritrean rebels, despite Cuba's publicly stated differences with the junta on this question.

In a report to Congress drafted in December 1978, Carter told his fellow ruling-class politicians: "We will continue to express our concern to the Cubans over their military activities in Africa and emphasize that these will condition the pace at which normalization [of relations] moves forward, or, indeed, whether it moves forward at all. . . ."

"While we cannot reimpose the multilateral sanctions [i.e. the Organization of American States economic blockade], we will continue to indicate to the Cubans that we cannot consider a total lifting of the US embargo on direct trade until 1) there is some dramatic improvement in their African posture and 2) we reach agreement on a formula for payment of compensation for expropriated US properties. We should also continue to make it clear to them that we cannot consider reestablishing diplomatic relations until these major problems are resolved."

Reactions to the Dialogue: Carter

The reaction of the U.S. government and capitalist news media to the dialogue was one of feigned indifference, but in reality of hostility.

Shortly before the first session of the dialogue, the U.S. government leaked to the news media the "news" that Cuba had obtained MIG-23 jet fighters from the



José G. Pérez/Perspectiva Mundial

Soviet Union, and suggested that they might be carrying nuclear weapons. At the same time, a flotilla of thirty-six U.S. warships, an aircraft carrier, and nuclear submarines moved toward Cuba, in what was later officially described as training "maneuvers." Carter ordered the resumption of U.S. spy flights over Cuba, a transparent provocation and outrageous violation of Cuba's national territory.

This warmed-over "Cuban missile crisis" was soon shown to be a hoax. The planes had, in fact, been in Cuba for months; the U.S. government was forced to admit they were defensive tactical fighters and were not nuclear-armed.

Another indication of the Carter administration's real posture was its attitude on admitting the counterrevolutionary prisoners to the United States. Attorney General Griffin Bell said the United States would have to check every single one to screen out "spies, terrorists, and common criminals." Although shortly after Bell's statement the United States government claimed it would be willing to admit up to 400 ex-prisoners a month, it didn't do so. In fact, it tried to sabotage the release program by imposing interminable delays in processing visa applications. That policy continues.

Washington was clearly trying to delay the amnesty program. But in May the Cuban government decided to continue releasing prisoners independently of whether the U.S. government granted visas, and to increase the number released so that all would be freed by September. As of the end of May, some 1,900 prisoners had been freed.²

2. The day I was putting finishing touches on this article, the *New York Times* reported a decision by the revolutionary government to free the remaining 610 political prisoners not covered by the dialogue accord. This group is composed mostly of former members of Batista's armed forces convicted of war crimes. The decision was announced July 9 by members of the Cuban community abroad who had traveled to LaHavana to discuss the release of these prisoners with the government.

The reaction to the dialogue by the Cuban communities was very different from Washington's. Members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade, Rev. Espinosa's church, and others set up travel agencies to organize tours to Cuba by Cubans in the United States. Despite the high cost—about \$800 for one week—the special tourist offices have been swamped since the day they opened their doors. For example, Cubatravel in New York has itself been organizing trips by nearly 3,000 people a month, and is constantly turning people away because flights are booked far in advance. Overall, of the roughly 1 million Cubans living abroad, some 100,000 will visit the island this year, with the overwhelming majority coming from the United States.

The trips are having a tremendous impact. Some people have gone to Cuba two or three times in the past few months and are saving money to go back again. For many, it is simply an opportunity to visit their loved ones or see their hometown. But seeing revolutionary Cuba today, and comparing it with what it was twenty years ago, is an experience that leaves few unchanged.

According to tour organizers, the overwhelming number of visitors are working class, primarily emigrés from lower social-economic strata in Cuba who still have many or most of their relatives and friends there.

The dialogue shows the continuing capacity of the Cuban leadership to see an opportunity and figure out how to take advantage of it.

- Fidel Castro took Jimmy Carter's human rights rhetoric and crammed it down his throat. All of a sudden, in the eyes of masses of Cubans in the United States, it is the U.S. government that is the obstacle to freeing the prisoners.

- Washington has lost what it thought was a stable base of support and a demagogic debating point for its anti-Cuba policy. It is clear the majority of U.S. Cubans want the U.S. economic blockade

lifted and diplomatic relations normalized.

• By affirming the Cuban national identity of Cubans abroad, Havana has stimulated the awareness of Cubans in the United States that as a group they suffer national oppression, and that in fighting it they have the complete support of Cuba. This was succinctly expressed in Fidel's parting statement to the first contingent of the brigade: "*La patria ha crecido*" (The homeland has grown). In a country where "*Patria o Muerte! Venceremos!*" (Land or Death! We will win!) has been the battle cry of the revolution for twenty years, such a statement implies a far-reaching political commitment.

Advance for Cuban Revolution

• The Cuban government is for the first time trying to directly influence U.S. politics, seeking to find support among a mostly working-class layer of the population for lifting the blockade and normalization of relations. If only by exposing Cubans in the United States to the reality of revolutionary Cuba, the dialogue means a tremendous step forward.

The dialogue has polarized the Cuban exile communities . . .

• The dialogue has strengthened the prestige and popularity of the revolutionary government among the masses in Cuba. Like the Cubans in the United States, many in Cuba have also suffered from being cut off from family members and friends for close to twenty years.

• At a time when the world market price of sugar is less than what it costs Cuba to produce it, the income generated from the visits by Cubans abroad are a welcome source of sorely needed foreign exchange with which to advance Cuba's economic development.

• The dialogue is helping to break down the imperialist information blockade and slander campaign against revolutionary Cuba. Tens of thousands of U.S. workers are seeing with their own eyes and hearing from their own relatives and friends that Cuba is not a totalitarian police state and that the Cuban people are not starving to death.

• The dialogue has helped to shift the relationship of forces within the Cuban communities in the United States. The ultra-rightists are becoming increasingly isolated. For example, in Miami recently they were only able to mobilize a few hundred (as opposed to many thousands a few years ago) in an all-out effort to show opposition to the revolution. In other areas, their situation is worse. On the other side, groups such as the Committee for Normalization of Relations, Rev. Espinosa's church, and the Antonio Maceo Brigade are growing rapidly. The brigade's

second contingent will consist of 250 people, compared to 55 on the first one, and there were more applications than available slots.

• The dialogue and everything associated with it has tremendously raised the prestige of the revolution and its central leaders among the Cubans in the U.S., even among those who remain ideologically opposed to the revolution.

• Finally, it is useful to single out what the dialogue is not, since it has been misrepresented in the U.S. capitalist press. It is not an approach by the Cuban government to the U.S. government through exile intermediaries. In his first news conference on the dialogue, Castro stressed that:

"None of these problems has been discussed with the Government of the United States. The U.S. Government has absolutely nothing to do with this, absolutely nothing! . . .

"These problems are internal problems which we are not willing to discuss with the Government of the United States, because they are internal to Cuba, and we do not discuss nor will we ever discuss with the Government of the United States questions referring to Cuba's internal affairs or to Cuba's sovereignty.

"However, we're willing to discuss these particular problems with the Cubans abroad. In other words, we're willing to discuss, to talk over these questions that concern the Cuban community—but not with the Government of the United States." (*Granma*, September 17, 1978).

Fidel went to great lengths to communicate to the Cubans abroad that they should look to Havana, not to Washington, for real solutions to questions such as the release of prisoners and restoration of the right to visit relatives in Cuba. It was a political move to take away from Washington several issues it had used to keep many U.S. Cubans tied to its counterrevolutionary line.

Role of Antonio Maceo Brigade

As can be noted from Castro's news conference, the Antonio Maceo Brigade has played a special role in the dialogue.

The brigade's central core consists of several circles of longtime friends and political associates that emerged from student movement milieus in the United States and Puerto Rico. Some came out of the left wing (the so-called *tercerista* faction) of the Puerto Rican Independence Party. Others were associated with a group known as Cuban Socialist Youth that functioned on a few Florida campuses in 1970 and 1971. Still others had been active in struggles by Latino communities, including the District 1 struggle for community control of the schools in New York City. Over time, they tended to group around the magazine *Areíto*, whose editorial board made the original proposal for the brigade to the Cuban government and put together the book *Contra Viento y Marea*.

To be in the brigade, it is not necessary to be a supporter of the revolution or a *fidelist*. The requirements are that a person be of Cuban birth or parentage, be between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, have left Cuba due to parental decision before the age of eighteen (in the case of those who are Cuban-born), not be a member of a counterrevolutionary organization, and support lifting the blockade and normalizing relations. However, many members of the brigade are sympathetic to the revolution, and many of the leaders identify politically with the Cuban leadership, although not uncritically. They consider themselves revolutionaries and, more specifically, Cuban revolutionaries.

In April, Carlos Muñiz, a central leader of the brigade in Puerto Rico and a member of its U.S.-Puerto Rico National Committee, was assassinated by right-wing terrorists. A eulogy published in *Granma* explains how the Cuban government views this layer:

"Carlos Muñiz was 26 years old when he died, and he had reached what Che called 'the highest condition of the human species': the condition of being a revolutionary. . . .

"You had to have seen his eyes that night when Fidel told them: 'Let there be no doubt in your minds that we consider you part of our family.' He was one of the first—always one of the first—to understand when Fidel said that their duty did not necessarily lie in Cuba but there, where they were most useful. . . .

"He died in battle, as teacher Conrado Benítez did, as literacy campaigner Manuel Ascunce did, as young Puerto Ricans Soto and Rosado did, as the internationalist soldier that he was. Over his body we'll say the words of José Martí: 'Death gives us leaders, death teaches us lessons and leaves us examples. Thus, these invisible threads are woven steadily together to form the soul of the homeland.' With his leadership, his lesson and his example, ever present in our people's memories, we say with Carlos Muñiz the irrevocable watchword of *Patria o Muerte, Venceremos.*" (*Granma*, May 13, 1979).

A Permanent Dialogue

An editorial in the first issue of the brigade's paper, *Baraguá*, explains the position of the brigade leadership on the dialogue:

"We are concerned with the freedom of the prisoners and the reunification of the family. But we—at least those of us in the Antonio Maceo Brigade—are also concerned with developing a permanent Dialogue with Cuba. This is why we have raised in both sessions of the Dialogue, the possibility that the Cuban government give those of us abroad our constitutional rights. Those rights might include voting in elections to the Assembly of People's Power, joining Cuban mass organizations, studying in Cuban universities and send-

ing our children to Cuban camps and schools.

"The Antonio Maceo Brigade is, therefore, not a travel agency. We went to Cuba not only moved by nostalgia for the past, but moved, above all, by the revolutionary course of the Cuban people begun on October 10, 1868, continued by José Martí and the Cuban Revolutionary Party and culminated on January 1, 1959.

"In 1977, we were opposed to the blockade and defended our right to experience the achievements and shortcomings of the revolutionary process. Today we also want to insure an ongoing Dialogue with Cuba. The second contingent of the Brigade and all those that follow will be made up of young people who, while not necessarily socialist in orientation, want to experience Cuba more deeply than they might in a tourist trip. It is important to emphasize, however, that many young people will first travel to Cuba as tourists and then become interested in a different experience of Cuban society. That different experience is what the Brigade has to offer.

"The current situation allows us to think that the process of losing our nationality, a process that in one or two generations would have prostituted the Cuban national identity, has largely been stopped. Although many young people speak Spanish haltingly and do not know Cuban history, the doors are now open for them to know their roots. Although many Cubans of our parents' generation may retain their conservative positions, knowing the Revolution's reality will weaken these positions, at any rate with respect to the normalization of relations between Cuba and the U.S. The fact that contact with Cuba slows down the loss of nationality may well result in changes in political attitude among Cubans abroad. After all, in today's Cuba, national identity is much more than a cultural definition; being a Cuban also involves a world view formed by the revolution."

The favorable reaction of the Cuban government to the idea of a "permanent dialogue" is reflected in the joint declaration on the dialogue signed by the Cuban government and the Cubans from the United States who participated in it.

"There were a number of issues brought up during the talks by representatives of the Cuban community abroad, among them:

"—The setting up of a Cuban state institute to attend to matters concerning the community abroad; the right to repatriation; the possibility of scholarships for young Cubans and participation by children living abroad in the Pioneer vacation camp program; and exchanges between Cuban artists, intellectuals and professionals. These ideas were listened to with interest by the Cuban government.

"—Also raised by a number of persons representing the community were issues of Cuban citizenship and the legal status of

emigrants; possible connections between persons residing abroad and national social and mass organizations; the suitability of putting out a publication for the Cuban community abroad; and other matters related to facilitating visits to Cuba.

"The Government of the Republic of Cuba will study all these matters very carefully in order to find the most just and reasonable solutions to them." (*Granma*, December 17, 1978).

One of the ideas raised in the brigade's platform for the dialogue and in the "Final Act" has already been adopted, that of sending Cuban children abroad to summer camps in Cuba where they will stay for several weeks with the *pioneros*. Several dozen *maceitos* (little Maceos) will go on the first such trip this summer, under the auspices of the Antonio Maceo Brigade and the Cuban government.

A New Cuban Nationalism in the U.S.

Nationalist sentiment is evident in the Antonio Maceo Brigade editorial and in other writings on the younger pro-revolution exiles (such as the book *Contra Viento y Marea*).

This nationalism has nothing to do with—or rather, is precisely the opposite of—the phony, proimperialist prattle of the right-wing exiles about how much they love (the old) Cuba.

At root, the nationalism of these younger, pro-Cuba Cubans is no different from the nationalism of Chicanos, Blacks, or Puerto Ricans. It reflects their perception that Cubans in the United States aren't getting a fair shake, face common problems, and are predominantly working class in composition. It is a nationalism that is directed against a real national oppression; as such, it is progressive. Moreover, this nationalist sentiment is also directed against the imperialist attacks on Cuba. It is directed against the right-wing puppets with their huge Cuban flags—which they used to try to hide the strings through which the U.S. government manipulates them. The radicalizing young Cubans tend to be anti-imperialist from the outset.

Twenty years of living in the United States has changed the Cuban exiles. But the greatest effect has been on those who were brought out as children. The U.S.-born or -raised Cuban is very different from those in Cuba or even their parents who came here as adults. Nevertheless, the national identity that the younger radicals identify with is Cuban, not Cuban-American, although that term is occasionally used. And the Cuban government considers them Cuban too. In fact, all Cubans who travel to Cuba have to get Cuban passports and are considered to be Cuban citizens, even if they are also naturalized U.S. citizens. Those of Cuban parentage born abroad are encouraged to register as Cuban citizens if they wish, since Cuba recognizes dual citizenship.

As a result of the dialogue, the polarization within the Cuban communities has sharpened. The ultra-rightists oppose the dialogue, and as they became progressively more isolated, they have resorted to increasingly desperate action. In addition to murdering Muñiz there have been many bombings (sometimes not publicized even in the local capitalist press or the radical press). There has also been a systematic campaign to silence Cuban journalists who report favorably on the dialogue and to intimidate those who took part in the Commission of 75, including assassination threats and attempts against the Rev. Manuel Espinosa, one of the best-known figures among them.

The U.S. government is in complicity with these attacks. Police have been totally uncooperative in responding to threats made against prodialogue Cubans.

The Antonio Maceo Brigade has had an increasingly difficult time finding places to hold public forums or film showings in New York. Even before any publicity is given to an event, the right-wing terrorists seem to know who has agreed to rent them a meeting hall, and pressure is mounted on the owners to cancel the event.

Employees of Cubatravel agency, who are mostly members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade, have faced extraordinary delays in obtaining the necessary U.S. papers to travel outside the United States, although the U.S. government now claims it does not restrict travel to Cuba.

There have been repeated public charges that the main terrorist group is the Cuban Nationalist Movement, with public headquarters in Union City, New Jersey. Its central leader is currently imprisoned for the assassination of Chilean Orlando Letelier. In addition to functioning in its own name, it also acts in concert with other right-wing Cuban groups, such as Abdala, Alpha 66, and the 2506 Brigade, through a front group known as the Bloc of Revolutionary Organizations.

When carrying out their actions, the terrorists use several different names. Domestic Cuba-related assassinations are signed by "Comando O." The name "Omega 7" is used to take credit for bombings. In international operations against the Cuban revolution, their actions are signed "CORU." The acknowledged head of CORU, Orlando Bosch, is in prison in Venezuela for having blown up in midair a plane of Cubana de Aviacion with more than seventy people on board. Fidel Castro—whose track record in surviving countless assassination attempts indicates he has substantial sources of information—publicly accused the American CIA of having engineered the airplane bombing.

U.S. Government Backs Rightists

Communiques from the terrorists and interviews with their "military chief," one "Commander Z," are published in the

right-wing *periodiquitos*, weeklies distributed free in the exile communities. These kinds of papers have been publicly accused of extorting advertising revenue from local Cuban businessmen. Similar fund-raising techniques are used to get money to defend arrested terrorists, etc.

The American government claims it stopped supporting the right-wing terrorists at the end of the 1960s. Fidel Castro has stated several times that the policy of direct U.S. government backing of the terrorist groups ended only in 1977. Nevertheless, U.S. government complicity with the terrorists continues. As Fidel pointed out in one of his news conferences on the dialogue, "If it [the U.S. government] wanted to it could eliminate the terrorists immediately. The U.S. Government knows who they are, what weapons they have, where they live and what they do." Castro added that one explanation of why the government doesn't eliminate the terrorists "is because it doesn't want to." (*Granma*, December 17, 1978).

In addition to attacking prodialogue forces, the terrorists continue their attacks against Cuban diplomatic missions, cultural and sporting events that involve participants from Cuba, and similar targets. Anti-Cuban statements by Carter, whether pegged around Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, or Africa, reinspire the terrorists and encourage the cops to wink at their crimes. The way the terrorists see it, they are only carrying out U.S. foreign policy through other means.

The Antonio Maceo Brigade and other prodialogue groups launched a campaign in response to the terrorist attacks, and especially the assassination of Carlos Muñiz. They held simultaneous news conferences in half a dozen cities demanding that the government crack down on the terrorists, and calling on all Cubans and all supporters of democratic rights to send messages to President Carter and Attorney Griffin Bell along this line. They also held highly visible, public events in the Cuban communities—including those where the terrorists are strongest—to show them that the supporters of the dialogue would not be driven underground. These usually took the form of religious memorials for Muñiz followed by car caravans. Several hundred cars participated in Miami, about 150 people participated in Union City, New Jersey, and similar numbers in other cities.

Defending the Cuban Revolution

In carrying out the dialogue, American revolutionists can do well to follow the example of the Cuban leaders in spotting an opening to advance the revolution and moving to take advantage of it.

Cuba's demand that the U.S. government lift the economic blockade and normalize diplomatic relations deserves support. "The economic blockade," as Fidel Castro has explained, "is like a knife at

Cuba's throat." (*Granma*, December 3, 1978). The blockade prevents Cuba from buying anything from the United States or exporting to the United States. This is a great burden on the small, underdeveloped country. The Cubans are forced to deal through expensive third-party intermediaries for essential parts for U.S.-made machinery. They must do without many common items, or order them from as far away as the Soviet Union. And Washington then has the hypocrisy to attack the Castro government for inflicting privations on the Cuban people, and for turning Cuba into a "Soviet satellite."

The U.S. government could stop terrorist attacks if it wanted to . . .

At the same time, Washington hopes to use its détente relationship on the Cubans to moderate or abandon their internationalist foreign policy. In his June 18 speech to Congress reporting on his summit meeting with Brezhnev, Carter said, "I made it clear to President Brezhnev that Cuban military activities in Africa . . . and also the growing Cuban involvement in the problems of Central America and the Caribbean, can only have a negative impact on U.S.-Soviet relations." (*New York Times*, June 19, 1979).

Fortunately, the Cuban revolutionists have stood up to this kind of pressure; and in this too, they deserve our support and that of working people throughout the world.

We should also vigorously campaign against every U.S. military threat or hint of military threat against Cuba. The revolutionary upsurge in Nicaragua, coming on the heels of the Angolan and Ethiopian events, demonstrates again that defense of struggles in semicolonial countries is inseparable from defense of the Cuban revolution.

The example of what the Cuban workers and peasants have accomplished in the past twenty years can help show workers and farmers in the United States how well we could do here without bosses, especially because we could begin with greater material advantages. Socialists should publicize the revolution and its accomplishments, and should become known as those who favor American workers and farmers solving their problems by taking the Cuban road.

American socialists should work with prodialogue Cuban groups as the Cuban-American Committee for Normalization of Relations, around projects such as the petition campaign that group is sponsoring demanding that Carter lift the blockade and normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba.

One of the most successful activities sponsored by brigade units in various

areas are showings of documentaries and other films from Cuba, especially highly political films that don't usually make it into any theaters in the United States. We socialists can publicize and attend brigade film showings, or do the same thing ourselves.

The second contingent of the Antonio Maceo Brigade—named "Contingente Carlos Muñiz Varela" in memory of the murdered brigade leader—will return in mid-August from a month-long visit to Cuba. The firsthand account of the *brigadistas* on what they did and what they saw should make exceptionally interesting public meetings.

Support the Dialogue

Supporting the dialogue is part of defending and extending the Cuban revolution. By releasing the prisoners, for example, the Cuban leadership has dealt a powerful blow to the anti-Cuban propaganda and shown that it understands that defense of the revolution is above all political. The Cuban government is correct in saying that the U.S. government has a moral responsibility to admit to the United States those prisoners who wish to come here. And the Carter administration deserves denunciation for preaching about human rights while trying to sabotage the humanitarian gesture of the Cuban government.

Supporters of the dialogue must punch through the blackout of news on this development by the imperialist news media.

Socialists should also support the idea of the "permanent dialogue," the idea that Cubans in the U.S. should maintain an ongoing relationship with the revolution. The relationship with the revolution—not simply support for one or another measure—is what's really at the heart of the dialogue. That's why it has become the dividing line within the Cuban communities, and why the terrorists and the U.S. government are making their target all those who support the dialogue or are associated with it.

The dialogue is more than the two meetings held in Havana last fall; it is an ongoing process. It will not only affect the Cuban layer of the U.S. working class, but will tend to have a growing impact on all working people. It won't just mean increased attention by the Castro leadership to the politics and problems of the Cuban communities in the United States, but also to U.S. politics as a whole. The dialogue shows that far from being weighed down with an entrenched bureaucratic caste, the Cuban revolution still counts with a leadership capable of seeing a possibility for advancing the revolution and making good use of it—in short, that Cuba still has a revolutionary leadership. The dialogue means a new stage in the interrelationship between the Cuban revolution and the coming American revolution. □