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NICARAGUAN MASSES CELEBRATE VICTORY

**IRAN DEMONSTRATORS SAY 'FREE
JAILED ARABS AND SOCIALISTS'**

NEWS ANALYSIS

Carter Laments 'Loss of Faith' in U.S. Rulers

By Will Reissner

When President Carter took to the airwaves on July 15 to deliver his speech on energy matters, he had already done all he could to ensure a large audience.

The original date had been abruptly cancelled. Streams of visitors were reported going to Camp David to confer with him. Rumors about the contents of the speech filled the newspapers.

The orchestrated publicity campaign achieved its goal: about 100 million people tuned in to Carter on July 15, compared to 30 million the last time he spoke on energy.

Carter's thirty-three-minute speech was an attempt to deal head-on with the most serious problem facing the American ruling class: the growing radicalization of American workers, their alienation from the institutions of capitalist rule.

This radicalization, this growing willingness to fight back against the escalating attacks on their standard of living, which Carter repeatedly described in his speech as a "crisis of confidence," is the major stumbling block to any attempt to get working people to acquiesce to a policy of increased austerity and exploitation.

And the crisis runs deep. On the eve of Carter's speech, polls indicated that only 25% of the population gave the president a "positive" rating. This is even lower than Richard Nixon's standing when he was forced to resign in disgrace.

In addition, despite the mammoth propaganda barrages and recurring long gasoline lines, barely 26% of the population believed the administration's and oil companies' phony claims that there really was a gas shortage.

But the crisis goes far deeper than opposition to an individual president and disbelief in the oil "shortage." A poll taken shortly before Carter's speech indicated, according to a report in the July 23 *Newsweek*, that "a majority of Americans believe for the first time ever that their children's lives will be worse than their own. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Members of Congress returning to their districts for the July 4 holiday weekend

reported deep malaise among their constituents. "I've never seen people so angry—or so ugly," Representative Peter H. Kostmayer of Pennsylvania noted. "It's almost as if they've given up on the country. . . ."

But when the *Washington Post* queried returning members of Congress about the targets of people's anger, it found "less hostility toward oil-exporting nations than might be expected." A New York representative confirmed this, saying, "They suspect the oil companies and the government, but they don't tend to focus their criticism on the Arabs that much."

Carter's own adviser on domestic affairs, Stuart Eizenstat, sent the president a memorandum on June 28 outlining the problem. The memorandum noted the deep anger caused by the gasoline shortage and the 55% rise in gasoline prices since January.

Eizenstat reported that "members [of Congress] are literally afraid to go home over the [July 4] recess, for fear of having to deal with very angry constituents." He added that people were comparing the present mood to the opposition that developed to the Vietnam war.

"While the Vietnam analogy is a strained one," said Eizenstat, the "similarities between problems of credibility and political opposition from the left are real, though clearly undeserved."

Carter's adviser felt there was a way out, however: Blame the problems on the Arabs! "We have a better opportunity than ever before to assert leadership over an apparently insolvable problem, to shift the cause for inflation and energy problems to OPEC," the memorandum stated. It added, "We should seize this opportunity now and with all our skill." [Emphasis added.]

Eizenstat concluded by telling Carter: "With strong steps we can mobilize the nation around a real crisis and with a clear enemy—OPEC."

This was the strategy Carter attempted to implement in his speech. To justify the longterm imposition of higher gasoline prices, to force acceptance of austerity measures, to lay the groundwork for salvaging the nuclear program, to justify deregulation of domestic oil prices and the vast windfall profits of the oil trusts, and to shore up dwindling confidence in U.S. institutions Carter attempted to shift the blame for the country's problems to the OPEC nations.

Carter began by acknowledging the depth of alienation from capitalist institutions.

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He told his audience that there is "a fundamental threat to American democracy. . . ."

"It is a crisis of confidence. . . ."

"We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our nation. . . ."

"Confidence in the future has supported everything else—public institutions and private enterprise. . . ."

"We've always believed in something called progress. We've always had a faith that the days of our children would be better than our own."

"Our people are losing that faith. Not only in Government itself, but in their ability as citizens to serve as the ultimate rulers and shapers of our democracy. . . ."

"For the first time in the history of our country a majority of our people believe that the next five years will be worse than the past five years. Two-thirds of our people do not even vote."

"As you know," Carter went on, "there is a growing disrespect for Government and for churches and for schools, the news media and other institutions."

Carter noted that this crisis had been brewing for more than a decade. He added that Americans "were taught that our armies were always invincible and our causes were always just, only to suffer the agony of Vietnam. We respected the Presidency as a place of honor until the shock of Watergate. We remember when the phrase 'sound as a dollar' was an expression of absolute dependability until 10 years of inflation began to shrink our dollar and our savings."

Acknowledging that the gap between "our citizens" and "our Government" has never been so wide, Carter then went on to widen it still more by following the advice of the Eizenstat memo and placing all the

Summer Schedule

Next week's issue will be the last before our summer break. We will resume our regular schedule with the issue dated September 3.

blame for the gas shortage on OPEC.

"Our excessive dependence on OPEC," Carter declared, "has already taken a tremendous toll on our economy and our people. *This is the direct cause of the long lines that have made millions of you spend aggravating hours waiting for gasoline. It's a cause of the increased inflation and unemployment that we now face.* [Emphasis added.]

"This intolerable dependence on foreign oil threatens our economic independence and the very security of our nation."

Carter then outlined a six-point "plan" that will result in higher prices and a huge profits rise for the energy trusts, under the guise of a battle to free the United States from dependence on OPEC oil.

Only working people were called upon to sacrifice—by driving less and lowering their thermostats. Carter told his listeners: "Every act of energy conservation like this is more than just common sense. I tell you it is an act of patriotism."

Following the speech, polls reported that a large majority still disapproved of Carter's handling of the presidency, and a majority remained convinced that the oil shortage is rigged.

Significantly, 77% of the American people agreed that there is "a crisis of confidence, in the country today," while only 13% disagreed.

Powerful objective factors are at work that will still further undermine the "confidence" of American workers in the institutions of capitalism. Inflation has now reached a 14% annual rate and the economy has already begun its slide into a new recession.

Given the still overwhelming disbelief in the oil shortages, there is little reason to believe that Carter will be able to convince the American people that OPEC is to blame for their declining standard of living. American workers cannot be sold a bill of goods solely on the basis of trust in the presidency.

Carter's speech did not accomplish its fundamental purpose—to slow the decline in faith of American workers in the institutions of capitalist rule. This poses a genuine problem for the ruling class. As the United States begins a recession with 77% of the population already feeling a "crisis in confidence" in the country, that very fact severely restricts the maneuvering room of the ruling class.

The rulers must go to American workers and demand they make sacrifices, that they bear the costs of the austerity policies that are to come, at a time when the workers simply do not believe what the government and big business tell them.

While causing giant problems for the ruling class, this sentiment provides tremendous opportunities for revolutionary socialists to put forward their alternative to the capitalist crisis and the attempt to launch a chauvinist campaign against OPEC. □

In This Issue

Closing News Date: July 21, 1979

NICARAGUA	748	Masses Celebrate Victory —by Fred Murphy
IRAN	749	Demonstrations Demand Release of Antishah Fighters
	749	Rise in Strikes, Demonstrations, Land Takeovers—by Gerry Foley
USA	750	Marroquín Wins Concessions in Asylum Case
CUBA	751	Castro Throws Prisoner Issue Back in Carter's Face—by Fred Murphy
	752	Why the Imperialists Fear Impact of Cuban Example
	754	The Flowering of Cuban Literature
ITALY	760	Meaning of CP Setback in Elections —by Livio Maitan
FRANCE	763	Communist Party Holds Twenty-Third Congress—by Jacques Lahire
	766	CFDT Leadership Under Fire From Ranks
GHANA	768	The Imperialist Campaign Against Ghana—by Ernest Harsch
NEWS ANALYSIS	746	Carter Laments "Loss of Faith" in U.S. Rulers—by Will Reissner
SELECTIONS FROM THE LEFT	755	"Boat People"

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Nicaraguan Masses Celebrate Victory

By Fred Murphy

Hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans filled the streets of Managua on July 20, celebrating their hard-fought victory over the forty-year dictatorship of the Somoza family.

The huge crowd welcomed the triumphant entry into the capital of the leaders of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the Sandinista-appointed Government of National Reconstruction.

Some 250,000 persons gathered for a rally at the newly renamed Plaza de la Revolución. "The crowd, bristling with rifle barrels and the red and black banners of the Sandinist guerrillas, stretched across the square, piled pyramid style on top of tanks, trucks and buses, and ringed the pediments of the National Cathedral. Someone had placed a guerrilla flag in St. Peter's granite grasp atop the edifice." (*New York Times*, July 21.)

The new government's first acts were to formally dissolve the hated National Guard and Somoza's rubber-stamp Congress and to decree the seizure of the vast property holdings of Somoza and his supporters.

Announcing the expropriations at the rally, junta member Sergio Ramírez declared that "the land of Somoza will now be under the feet of the peasants of Nicaragua."

The offensive that toppled the dictatorship began in late May. As the FSLN and the militias it organized among workers, peasants, and youth routed the National Guard from city after city, Washington sought frantically to stave off Somoza's collapse. On June 21 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance called on the Organization of American States (OAS) to send a "peace-keeping force" to Nicaragua. The role of such troops would have been to prevent a Sandinista victory.

But so deep was the mass opposition to U.S. intervention and the mass support for the Sandinistas throughout the continent that no Latin American regime would dare offer cover for such an invasion. Washington's hand was also stayed by antiwar sentiment among American working people and by the Cuban government's warning that an intervention in Nicaragua "would create a Vietnam in the very heart of Latin America."

After the setback at the OAS meeting, Washington turned to diplomatic moves aimed at prying concessions from the Sandinista leaders and the junta they had appointed. While publicly calling on Som-

oza to resign, U.S. envoys were actually urging him to hang on and put maximum pressure on the rebels.

What Washington wanted above all was to preserve Somoza's National Guard. It feared the growing numbers of armed workers and peasants and had a deep distrust of the radical-minded Sandinistas.

But few concessions were forthcoming from the rebels. As the morale of the Guard swiftly deteriorated, Somoza was allowed to resign on July 17 and flee for Miami.

In his place, Somoza left Francisco Urcuyo Maliaños, president of the Chamber of Deputies. Still hoping for a last-minute rescue by the U.S. marines, Urcuyo vowed to stay until 1981 and demanded that the rebels lay down their arms. Guard commander Gen. Federico Mejía ordered his troops to redouble their fight and declared that "the National Guard must be recognized as the only constitutional armed force of the Republic."

But it was too late. As news of Somoza's departure spread, Guard garrisons surrendered to the Sandinistas in Granada and in several other of the few towns they still controlled. Within thirty-six hours Urcuyo, Mejía, and the entire remaining general staff of the Guard fled the country.

What was left of Somoza's army then disintegrated. Soldiers tore off their uniforms and sought refuge in Red Cross centers and churches. Hundreds clambered aboard air force planes and flew to Honduras. Some even commandeered a Red Cross supply jet and forced the pilot to fly them to Miami.

At dawn on July 19, a column of FSLN troops entered Managua without resistance and occupied Somoza's deserted "bunker." The most senior Guard officer they could locate was Col. Fulgencio Largaespada, chief of the traffic police. Largaespada had no choice but to broadcast orders for all Guard units to surrender unconditionally. "The Sandinista National Liberation Front now controls all the national territory and has overthrown the Nicaraguan National Guard and ended the war," Largaespada said.

With the overthrow of the U.S.-backed Somoza dynasty, the Nicaraguan masses are in a position to gain the democratic rights so long denied them—freedom of the press, speech, and political and trade-union organization. They are in a position to wage the new war that FSLN leader Tomás Borge spoke of at the July 20 rally—"a war against backwardness,

against poverty, against ignorance, against immorality, against destruction." They are in a position to fight for thoroughgoing land reform, public works to provide jobs, and decent housing, hospitals, and schools.

What the imperialists fear now is that the Nicaraguan workers, peasants, and urban poor will seek to achieve these goals by taking the road of the Cuban revolution; that to overcome the heritage of the dictatorship and imperialist domination they will establish their own government, a workers and peasants government.

Washington intends to exert its economic pressure to prevent such a development. The editors of the *Christian Science Monitor* explained this blackmail operation on July 18:

"The leaders of the Sandinista rebels . . . ought to know that the United States and the democracies of Latin America stand ready to help the Nicaraguan people rebuild their shattered country and to lay the foundation for a true democracy. They should also know that they can expect no such help if they impose another dictatorship, this time a leftist one, on the long-oppressed Nicaraguans. The choice is theirs."

The Nicaraguan people have had long and bitter experience with U.S. attempts to impose "true democracy" on them; the Somoza dynasty resulted from the last such attempt.

To make it clear that Washington can bring more than economic pressure to bear if necessary, President Carter ordered the amphibious assault ship *Saipan* and the frigate *Miller* to take up positions off the Nicaraguan coast on July 17.

Tomás Borge called attention to Washington's threats at the July 20 rally, noting that U.S. intervention had so far been avoided. But "if it comes," he warned, "the people of Sandino will again take up arms and fight." □

General Strike in Peru

Workers throughout Peru struck for twenty-four hours on July 19 to protest a new round of government-decreed price increases on essential items and to show solidarity with a nationwide teachers strike that began June 4.

The general strike occurred on the second anniversary of a similar work stoppage in 1977; that one marked the opening of a wave of struggles that is still continuing against the military government's austerity measures.

Four persons were killed when troops attacked strikers in Iquitos and Lima. Among several hundred arrested when police broke up a strike rally in downtown Lima was Trotskyist leader and former Constituent Assembly deputy Enrique Fernández of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers Party).

Demonstrations Demand Release of Antishah Fighters

In mid-July, guards at Karoun prison transferred five of the fifteen jailed members of the Ahwaz branch of the Socialist Workers Party (HKS) to cells that were used as torture chambers under the shah.

Other imprisoned Socialist Workers Party members began a sit-down strike in the prison yard to demand the release of their comrades from the special cells. They were attacked and beaten by the guards. One of the Trotskyists, Fatima Fallahi, was badly hurt.

Following the attack on the Socialist Workers Party members, all the political prisoners in Karoun, some 300 people, mostly Arabs, carried out a strike in solidarity with the Trotskyists.

In the past weeks, there have been constant demonstrations of thousands and tens of thousands of Arabs in the cities of Khuzestan Province demanding the release of those arrested in the Khomeini-Bazargan government's attacks against leaders of the oil workers and the Arab community.

Release of these prisoners was promised in an agreement between the government and the Arab leader, Sheikh Mohammed Ash-Shobeir Khaghani. But this promise has not been kept.

In the most recent mass protests, the

Arab demonstrators have raised the demand for the release of the imprisoned Trotskyists alongside their demand for the release of those arrested in the attacks on the Arab communities.

In Isfahan, an important industrial center in southeast Iran, a brutal attack on a Trotskyist who was selling the Socialist Workers Party paper *Kargar* occurred in mid-July. HKS paper sellers have in the past been subjected to considerable harassment by rightists inside and outside of the Imam's Committee, but this incident was graver than any previous attack.

The HKS member was grabbed by a group of men and taken away in a car. He was systematically beaten with chains and burned with lighted cigarettes. Then the car was driven over his fingers.

Some of the kidnappers were recognized as members of the local Imam's Committee. But the methods used against this Trotskyist paper seller were those of SAVAK.

It is well known in Iran that local Imam's Committee leaders have allowed former SAVAK agents to continue their terror against socialists, militant workers, and oppressed groups under the cover of these committees. There is rising indignation among the Iranian masses over this.

In recent weeks, the government has

revealed its increasing political embarrassment over the case of the imprisoned Trotskyists by offering to release them if they recanted their political views.

The government's problem is that widening sections of the population are asking more and more questions about how the government intends to respond to the demands of the workers, peasants, and semiproletarian masses that overthrew the shah. And its repression of consistent fighters against the dictatorship is being seen by larger and larger sections of the population as an attack on them.

That is why, for example, the oppressed nationalities and their leaders, including the Kurdish leader Sheik Ezzedin Hosseini, are calling for the release of the Trotskyists, along with the other left political prisoners.

The Iranian press continues to report the statements of the Trotskyists and those who oppose this repression against them.

Thousands of supporters of the Iranian revolution around the world have already come to the defense of the HKS fighters. More protests are urgently needed. They should be sent to Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, office of the Prime Minister, Tehran, Iran; and the Islamic Revolutionary Council, Tehran.

Copies of all messages should be sent to *Kargar*, Post Office Box 41/3586, Tehran.

Arab Militants Executed in Khuzestan

Iran—Rise in Strikes, Demonstrations, Land Takeovers

By Gerry Foley

In the past month, the Bazargan-Khomeini government has been rocked by rising mass pressure. Under the impact of this, new splits have opened up in the ruling forces and those that had previously appeared have deepened.

There has been a virtual fragmentation of authority. Even decisions backed by both Bazargan and Khomeini more and more often go unheeded by local authorities.

Struggles by workers, while remaining local and scattered, have multiplied and become more militant. Even though the government does not yet face mass workers organizations, this vast elemental pressure has already thrown the new would-be administrators of capitalism in Iran off balance.

On July 5, the government was forced to

nationalize most of industry in the country. In its July 23 issue, *Newsweek* offered an indication of the context in which this move was made. Many of the Imam's Committees, which Khomeini tried to make into means for holding the workers back, were forced by the direct pressure they were under to carry out the workers' demands.

"One foreign investor," *Newsweek* reported, "returned to his industrial concern in Iran to find himself confronted with komiteh [Iman's Committee]-approved demands from a group of workers who had been laid off in 1978. The workers took him at gunpoint to Tehran's komiteh headquarters, where he was told that his life was at stake. He agreed to pay the former employees more than a year's back pay."

In its July 14 issue, the *Economist*, one

of the most authoritative British business magazines, considered that Khomeini's declaration of an amnesty for most of the jailed servants of the dictatorship might offer some hope for "better times" in Iran. Its hopes were quickly deceived.

On July 12, in the province of Khuzestan, a crowd stormed the Behbahan prison and seized Assadollah Masavi, a former governor of the province under the shah, who was to be included in the amnesty. He was taken out and shot.

In the July 14 *Le Monde*, correspondent Eric Rouleau reported:

"Strikes, demonstrations, and terrorist acts are multiplying in several provinces of the former empire of the Pahlavis—in Baluchistan, Kurdistan, and Khuzestan."

In subsequent issues of *Le Monde*, reports developed a picture of spreading

confrontation between the masses and government-backed rightist forces trying to stop the deepening of the revolution.

The July 17 issue reported, for example: "In Marivan, in Iranian Kurdistan, clashes occurred between the population and Imam's Committee guards on Saturday [July 14]. Twenty-four persons were killed and about forty were wounded. The demonstrators were protesting against the presence of the committee guards in Kurdistan, who they say include 'former SAVAK agents and hired men of the local feudal landlords.'"

Another clash of the same scope was reported in the July 16 *Christian Science Monitor*. A pitched battle took place July 14 between Imam's Committee guards and Kurdish peasants in the town of Dezh Shahpur, which is on the Iraqi border. At least twenty-two persons were said to have been killed. The guards were defeated.

In fact, the revolutionary process in Iranian Kurdistan has deepened considerably in the last two months. Throughout the Kurdish area, peasants have taken over land from the landlords and organized their own councils. The most widely recognized leader of the Kurdish people, Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini, has called for the extension and arming of these councils, declaring that Kurdish self-government must be based on the organization of the toilers.

In the province of Pars, also, in southeastern Iran, there have been extensive land seizures by the peasants, who have organized councils as well.

But the most violent and continuous conflicts have been in Khuzestan, where the oil fields lie. This area is decisive for the Iranian economy. A majority of the population are Arabs, who were subjected to systematic discrimination by the Pahlavis. The Arabs have the greatest potential power and the most deepgoing aspirations of all the oppressed nationalities in Iran, since they are also a superexploited layer of the working class. When they began to organize and demand an end to their oppression after the fall of the dictatorship, they started to shake the entire capitalist structure in Iran.

At the end of May, the Bazargan-Khomeini government opened up a large-scale attack on the Arab people, going so far as to send gunboats to shell poor neighborhoods. Hundreds of Arabs were arrested, and many were shot out of hand after being taken prisoner.

The government crackdown, however, failed to break the movement of the Arab people. Reports in the international press since these attacks indicate an increasingly explosive situation.

In the July 13 *Christian Science Monitor*, Tony Allaway reported that in Ahwaz, one of the main cities of Khuzestan, "The Iranian Arabs are staging demonstrations . . . almost daily to rail against the government. . . ."

On July 11, thirty thousand Arabs demonstrated in memory of those killed during the government attacks.

In Abadan, according to the July 14-16 *Le Monde*, Imam's Committee guards opened fire from rooftops on an Arab demonstration, wounding three participants. The slogans raised by the protesters had been "We don't want secession, but we do want autonomy for the Arabs, Kurds, Baluchis, and Turkmenis," and "Giving autonomy to the national minorities is the best way to guarantee the survival of the Islamic republic."

There are numerous reports of violence in Khuzestan, bombings, attacks by Arabs on police stations, grenade attacks on Imam's Committee patrols, and arrests of alleged arms smugglers. For example, on July 12, an Islamic tribunal in Dezful ordered the execution of an Arab for "contraband in arms" and "plotting against the Islamic republic."

The local authorities seem to have begun to try to make summary execution a regular institution. Such decisions by local Islamic tribunals are increasing.

On July 15, six persons were killed when a grenade exploded in a mosque in Khorramshahr. Arab leaders, including the most widely recognized one, Sheikh Ash-Shobeir, report that the grenade exploded accidentally in the hands of an Imam's Committee Guard. But on the very same day, the local authorities executed three Arabs who they claimed were responsible for the explosion.

The authorities attempt to justify such actions by claiming that there is a growing problem of terrorism in Khuzestan. But much of the terrorism is directed against the Arabs, and no one has been executed for this. For example, on July 15 Sheikh Ash-Shobeir's home was machine-gunned and four of his bodyguards were killed.

The fact is that in attacking the masses, the Bazargan-Khomeini government is forced increasingly to rely on the most reactionary forces whose aspirations are to restore a more stable repressive regime. But in general, the position of all those forces that want to restore a stable capitalist regime in Iran has greatly weakened in the past several weeks. □

Travel, Employment Restrictions Lifted

Marroquín Wins Concessions in Asylum Case

In an important victory in Héctor Marroquín's fight for political asylum in the United States, a judge of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) dropped all travel and employment restrictions against him July 13. This move comes on the heels of a June 21 INS decision lowering his cash bond from \$10,000 to \$5,000.

Marroquín, a trade unionist and member of the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance, is fighting U.S. government efforts to deport him to Mexico. A victim of a political frame-up by the Mexican regime, Marroquín would face persecution, imprisonment, torture, and possibly murder if he were returned to that country.

"This is a real step forward," Marroquín said of the INS concessions, "but not only for my case. It's a victory for democratic rights, and as such it's a victory for all the American people, every political activist, every trade unionist."

The restrictions on Marroquín's travel and employment rights, together with the \$10,000 cash bond, had been imposed as conditions for Marroquín's release from prison in December 1977.

The travel restriction meant that Marroquín had to request permission of the INS before leaving New York. "These restric-

tions were an outrage," said Marroquín's lawyer Margaret Winter. "They were only imposed because Marroquín was a political activist. They aimed to keep him from building his case and reaching out to the American people."

At the time of Marroquín's deportation hearing in April, Winter asked that all these restrictions be dropped and that he be released into the custody of the Héctor Marroquín Defense Committee or the Socialist Workers Party.

INS judge James Smith refused. But after a special appeal to the INS Board of Appeals in Washington challenging the bond, the Board halved it and ordered the judge to rule on the other conditions. This time Smith was forced to rule favorably.

"Clearly the INS and the Carter Administration are under pressure," a statement by the Héctor Marroquín Defense Committee said. "We've won a round, but we can't stop now. This decision should encourage us all to redouble our efforts. We will keep fighting till we win our main goal—political asylum for Héctor Marroquín."

In several months, Marroquín will make a tour of twenty American cities to speak out in his defense and to explain his socialist ideas. □

Castro Throws Prisoner Issue Back in Carter's Face

By Fred Murphy

When the Soviet government released five imprisoned dissidents and deported them to the United States in April of this year, the U.S. capitalist press featured the story for several days running and used it to launch a barrage of anticommunist propaganda. President Carter was photographed attending church with one dissident, and several U.S. senators and a cabinet secretary joined others on the platform at a special rally in New York City.

The ability of the U.S. rulers to turn the release of the Soviet prisoners into an anticommunist crusade stands in stark contrast to their silence on the large-scale amnesty program currently being implemented by the Cuban government.

On July 9, plans were announced in Havana for the release of 610 counterrevolutionary prisoners, most of whom had been held since the revolution for crimes committed while defending the Batista dictatorship. But this news merited only three brief paragraphs in the July 10 *New York Times*.

The Carter administration, which once continually cited Cuban "political prisoners" as a key justification for maintaining the U.S. economic blockade against the island, this time had nothing to say. Washington's silence demonstrated the degree to which its concern over "human rights" has only been a pretext for attacking the Cuban revolution.

The Castro government's initiative in freeing the counterrevolutionaries has effectively exposed Carter's hypocrisy. At the same time, it offers testimony to the strength of the Cuban revolution and the self-confidence of the Cuban people.

The prisoners whose impending release was announced July 9 are only a hard-core minority (known in Cuba as the *plantados*, or unyielding ones) among a total of more than 4,000 prisoners who are being set free. Between December 1978 and June 1979, some 1,900 persons convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes were released; by the beginning of September, the Cuban authorities plan to free 1,700 others in addition to the 610 *plantados*.

Unlike the dissidents who suffer persecution in the Soviet Union, these Cuban prisoners have all been held for specific acts against the revolution—sabotage, terrorism, participation in armed invasions—or for membership in armed counterrevolutionary organizations. In fact, an Amnesty International delegation that visited Cuba

in 1978 recognized this and declined to categorize any of the prisoners as "prisoners of conscience."

Cuba's amnesty program began as a result of the "dialogue" opened up during late 1978 between Havana and the Cuban community abroad, chiefly in the United States. The Cuban government recognized that the exile population had never been monolithically opposed to the revolution, and that the openly counterrevolutionary groups based among it had been losing influence for some time.

Last November, a delegation of prominent Cuban exiles traveled to Havana to begin the "dialogue." Discussions on how to improve relations between the regime and Cubans abroad centered first on the prisoners, many of whose relatives live in exile. The counterrevolutionary groups have always used the prisoner issue to stir distrust of the revolution.

The result of the first "dialogue" session was a pledge by Havana to release some 3,000 persons jailed for counterrevolutionary acts and about 600 others held for attempting to leave Cuba illegally, provided that the United States would accept all those who wished to go there. This amounted to all of Cuba's political prisoners, with the exception of the 610 *plantados*.

In calling for U.S. acceptance of the prisoners, Castro explained that Washington has a "moral responsibility" to take them since it was the CIA and the Pentagon that had encouraged, recruited, trained, and armed the counterrevolutionaries for their attacks on Cuba.

At the same time, Castro made it clear that the "dialogue" had nothing to do with any effort to make a deal with Washington. He explained at the first news conference on the "dialogue" on September 6, 1978:

None of these problems has been discussed with the Government of the United States. The U.S. Government has absolutely nothing to do with this, absolutely nothing! . . .

These problems are internal problems which we are not willing to discuss with the Government of the United States, because they are matters internal to Cuba, and we do not discuss nor will we ever discuss with the Government of the United States questions referring to Cuba's internal affairs or to Cuba's sovereignty.

However, we're willing to discuss these particular problems with the Cubans abroad. In other words, we're willing to discuss, to talk over these questions that concern the Cuban community—

but not with the Government of the United States.*

The Carter administration reacted to the "dialogue" by seeking new pretexts for attacking Cuba. Spy flights over the island were resumed, with phony allegations that nuclear-armed Soviet jets had been sent to Cuba. U.S. and British naval "maneuvers" were held just fifty miles from Cuban shores.

As for the counterrevolutionary prisoners, U.S. Attorney General Griffin Bell declared he would have to check every prospective immigrant to screen out "spies, terrorists, and common criminals." Another Justice Department official explained: "We just don't want a bunch of pimps and whores coming in."

Washington's foot-dragging brought an outraged reaction from the U.S. Cuban community. The U.S. authorities were forced to promise to accept 400 Cubans a month.

But Washington failed to deliver on this pledge. By early April only 190 prisoners had been allowed into the United States. The Cuban government's initial reaction was to slow down the release of prisoners. But when counterrevolutionary groups seized on this to mount new slanders inside the Cuban community, Havana announced that it was accelerating the release program despite Washington's stalling.

The last hope of the counterrevolutionaries who wanted to disrupt the "dialogue" over the prisoner issue was the 610 *plantados*—the criminals who did Batista's dirty work. But this ploy collapsed on July 9 with the announcement that they too would be released.

An important role has been played throughout this process by the representatives of the Cuban community abroad who support the "dialogue"; they have helped Havana to understand the extent of Washington's stalling and the cynical tactics of the counterrevolutionary groups. But the key has been the Cuban government itself, which has applied a revolutionary policy genuinely based on defending human rights. In so doing, it has demolished one of the imperialists' favorite forms of anti-communist and anti-Cuban propaganda.

By September there will be no more political prisoners in Cuba. □

**Granma*, weekly English edition, September 17, 1978. For more extensive excerpts from this news conference, see *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, October 9, 1978, p. 1107.

Why the Imperialists Fear Impact of Cuban Example

[The following has been excerpted from an interview with Humberto Pérez, vice-president of the Cuban Council of Ministers and president of the Central Planning Board. The interview appeared in the February 16, 1979, issue of the Cuban magazine *Bohemia* under the title "What the People Should Know"; it was conducted by Marta Harnecker. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

No More Unemployed

Prior to the victory of the revolution, the country's work force stood at some 2.2 million workers, and of those 33% were unemployed. Unemployed or underemployed, that is, working only certain days during the year. Thirty-three percent—about 700,000 persons—were in that situation. Today all workers have jobs. The total number of persons employed in the economy has now reached approximately 3.1 million.

This means that the revolution has created 1.5 million new jobs in the past twenty years. Jobs have been assured to all who are able to work, and the female population has increasingly been incorporated into the work force. In 1958 there were only about 190,000 women workers—about one-eighth of all employed workers. Today the number of women who work has risen to about 800,000—more than one-fourth of all workers.

Another related factor is the length of the working day. Before the revolution, the legal working day was also eight hours, but in reality—as is quite well known—for most workers the working day was far longer than eight hours. For agricultural workers, the working day ran from sunrise to sunset—twelve or more hours a day. In commerce as well—especially in the food industry and in certain industries located mainly in the interior of the country—the working day far exceeded eight hours.

Today the working day—legally and in fact—is eight hours for everyone, with the exception of construction workers. They work a ten-hour day, but they get paid for all ten hours, not just eight.

Social Security

Another gain of the revolution, reflected for each individual person, is in the area of benefits or insurance for workers who become sick. Prior to the victory of the revolution, workers received only nine days of paid sick leave a year; those who were ill for more than nine days were not covered after the ninth day. Today, a worker who falls ill can be covered even for an entire year's absence from work.

For sick workers who remain at home, 50% of their wages are covered. Those admitted to hospitals—where they receive medical care, medicine, and meals free—continue to receive 40% of their wages. Those who suffer accidents on the job or occupational ailments related to their work receive 70% of their wages if they are at home or 60% if they are hospitalized.

Another question which is of extraordinary importance for the security and peace of mind of the individual is that of old-age retirement. Before the victory of the revolution only a very few categories of workers received old-age pensions. In some cases these pensions were never even paid, or if they were paid at all they were ridiculously small. There were pensions of 1.5 and 2 pesos a month [US\$1.50 and \$2 at the time].

In 1958 the total of all expenditures for social security was 105 million pesos, which means that the government and pension funds were paying out 16 pesos for each person in the country for social security. But in 1978, 600 million pesos were spent on social security—62 pesos per person. In 1950 there were only 154,000 pensioners, while today there are more than 650,000. All workers today know that when they reach the established age a pension will be guaranteed.

Free Medical Care

We have about one doctor for every 680 persons in the country, the highest level in Latin America. Moreover, there is more adequate distribution of medical services. In 1958, 65% of the doctors in Cuba were in

Havana, with only 35% in all the rest of the country. But today, on the contrary, only 36% live in Havana while the other 64% are in other areas. In addition, whereas in 1958, 62% of the hospital beds were in Havana, today—again conversely—39% of them are in Havana and 61% in the rest of the country.

Prior to the revolution, for every 1,000 children born, 60 died during their first year. Today the figure is down to 23 per 1,000. Diseases such as diphtheria, malaria, and polio have disappeared, and others have been greatly reduced. The life expectancy at birth was calculated at 59 years in 1958; today it is 72 years.

According to United Nations statistics, this figure places us alongside the United States and Canada in this very important index of public health, far ahead of the rest of the countries of Latin America.

The budget for public health in 1958 amounted to only 3.3 pesos for each person in the country. In 1978 the public health budget is 40 pesos per capita—twelve times as much.

And most importantly, all these services are provided free of charge.

No Illiteracy, No Children Without Schools

In 1958, 22% of those old enough to read and write were illiterate—more than 1 million illiterates. Among the rural population, the illiteracy rate stood at more than 40%. As for primary education, only 70% of school-age children attended schools, and there were only 17,000 primary-school teachers in the country.

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Today there are no illiterates, all children of primary age go to school, and there are more than 90,000 teachers for those grade levels. Of the primary-school students, 54,000 are in full-time boarding schools and more than 280,000 are in part-time boarding schools.

In the secondary schools, where there were only 88,000 students in 1958, today there are more than 1 million. Of these, more than half attended boarding schools. And the number of secondary-school teachers has gone from 4,500 in 1958 to almost 70,000 today.

As for higher education, there used to be 15,000 students and 900 professors. But we now have almost 140,000 students, of whom more than 55,000 attend part- or full-time boarding schools. We have about 8,800 professors.

The education budget in 1958 was 74 million pesos—11 pesos per capita. In 1978 that budget was more than 1 billion pesos, meaning that the government spent 110 pesos for each Cuban to be educated—10 times as much.

Higher Wages Without Inflation

According to available statistics, the per capita personal income in Cuba in 1958 was less than 400 pesos a year. Out of this, people presumably had to pay—if they could—for services that the revolution today provides free of charge: medical and hospital care, education for their children, and so on. The per capita income we speak of here included the income received by workers, but it also averaged in the income of the capitalists. As a result the per capita figure was mere arithmetic rather than real; the "average" was quite inaccurate, considerably higher than the real income of the workers.

In 1978, per capita income—which is now much more even and better distributed since there are no longer any capitalists nor any unemployed in the country—was 650 pesos per year. And people no longer have to pay out of their own earnings for medical or hospital care when they get sick, nor for the education of their children, since these are free.

In 1958, the average wage was about 73 pesos a month. But the average for agricultural workers was less than 50 pesos, and in most cases wages were less than 30 pesos a month. Agricultural workers in 1958 numbered nearly 400,000 in all; including their families, they were responsible for approximately 2 million persons—34% of the entire Cuban population. In the overwhelming majority of cases, according to a survey carried out by a Catholic group at the time, these workers received wages of less than 42 pesos a month.

Today, the average wage of agricultural workers is about 115 pesos—three times as much—and the average wage for the country as a whole is about 140 pesos a month.

In addition to these personal incomes—which as we have seen are much higher



Planned economy, mechanization of agriculture, and rationing to assure equitable distribution give Cubans one of best diets in Latin America.

now than they were before—basic services are free, so that the people do not have to spend a cent to receive them. Other services and products are sold at prices that have been virtually frozen since the early years of the revolution, while throughout the world prices have risen astronomically. This is especially true for food prices.

For example, to produce one pound of beef costs the country between 45 and 50 centavos—just for capital equipment costs, raw materials, feed, and other items. When you add in all the other national expenditures on ranches, transportation, meat packing, distribution, and so on, the cost of production rises to 80 centavos or more. But beef is still sold to the people at 55 centavos a pound for Grade A and 44 centavos a pound for Grade B.

The fees for use of child-care centers—which vary from 3 pesos a child for families with the lowest income to 40 pesos for families with higher incomes—only cover on the average one-third of what it costs to care for a child in one of the centers.

Before the revolution, rent payments absorbed an average of 30% of all personal income; that is still how it is in most capitalist countries. But in Cuba today, rents take up 10% or less of personal income.

Food and Manufactured Goods

If we talk about per capita consumption of the main foods and principal industrial products, the rates of consumption have risen extraordinarily between 1958 and today. In fact, in most cases they are higher than for the majority of countries of Latin America. And besides, we are talking about real per capita consumption, not just arithmetical averages.

For example, prior to the victory of the revolution, according to the survey by the Catholic group I mentioned before, among rural families 11 out of every 100 persons

drank milk, 4 out of 100 ate meat, 2 out of 100 ate eggs, and only 3 out of 100 ate bread.

The per capita consumption of food grains in Cuba in 1973 was 97 kilograms, while in Spain it was 84 kilos, in Bolivia 81, in Brazil 91, in Ecuador 67, in Venezuela 88, and in Colombia 68.

The per capita production of vegetables in Cuba in 1973 was 48 kilograms. In Italy it was 39 kilos, in El Salvador 8, in Guatemala 3, in Honduras 17, in Mexico 10, in Nicaragua 11, in Venezuela 38.

The amount of protein consumed per capita in 1973 in Cuba was 65 grams a day. In Bolivia it was 48 grams, in Ecuador 47, in Brazil 63, in El Salvador 50, in Guatemala 53, in Honduras 52, in Mexico 65, in Peru 60, in Venezuela 62, and in Colombia 47.

These figures, provided by international organizations such as the FAO [United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization], demonstrate that our rationing system and the earning power of our people assure everyone a standard of living far superior to that existing in other countries that do not even have rationing.

When it comes to industrial products, there have also been advances and increases in the per capita distribution of some items such as cloth and inner and outer garments—although we are still very far from satisfying the needs of the entire population. . . . But there has been a significant increase in the distribution and sale of televisions, refrigerators, radios, washing machines, electric irons, pressure cookers, and so on. Last year, in 1978, 196,500 televisions were distributed to the population, 36,000 more than in 1977; as were 93,200 refrigerators, 18,000 more than the year before; 93,300 washing machines, 19,000 more than in 1977; 80,000 fans, 79,000 more than in 1977 when virtually none were distributed. The same was true of many other manufactured goods. □

The Flowering of Cuban Literature

In the two decades since the beginning of the Cuban revolution, Cuban art and literature has flourished to an unprecedented extent. In a country where a large section of the population was unable to read or write twenty years ago, the virtual abolition of illiteracy has led to enormous advances in the country's cultural level.

A brief survey of this development and of the state of Cuban literature today was provided in the June 10 *New York Times Book Review* by Peter Winn, an American professor of Latin American history who spent three weeks in Cuba talking with writers and editors.

On the growth of the Cuban publishing industry since the revolution, Winn wrote:

In 1958 the Cuban publishing industry consisted of two textbook houses, most of whose production was exported to Central America. There was little in the way of trade books, except for small, privately printed editions of poetry or fiction. . . .

The Cuban revolution brought with it a revolution in publishing. Only a million textbooks were produced in 1958, but more than 24 million books were published in 1977. Although most of these were texts for the greatly expanded Cuban school system, a sizable number were trade books.

The revolution's subsidized book prices—most Cuban books are paperbacks that sell for less than \$1—and its emphasis on literacy and education have enlarged the book-buying public, while nationalism and ideology have created a new audience for a growing number of Cuban authors. As a result, instead of the 1,000 to 2,000-copy printings of the pre-revolutionary period, a successful novel now sells out printings of 40,000 to 80,000 and first novels are published in handsome editions of 5,000 to 10,000 copies. The best-selling novel in Cuba since the revolution, Gabriel García Márquez's "One Hundred Years of Solitude," has sold more than 125,000 copies—in a country with a population the size of New York City's.

The June 3 issue of *Granma* provided additional details on the growth in publishing. In the twenty years since the revolution, more than 12,000 different titles have been published in Cuba. The vast bulk of these titles, some 11,000, have been published since 1967. The 400 million copies of books and pamphlets published since 1959 average out to forty-four for every inhabitant of the island.

According to Winn, the trade books in Cuba are published by the recently established Ministry of Culture "through a network of presses that operate within general ministerial guidelines but retain a high degree of editorial autonomy." Writers can submit manuscripts directly to these presses.

The expansion of publishing and of education in general has provided an

impetus to the emergence of many new, young writers. Amateur "writers' workshops" have been set up in factories, schools, and towns throughout the island. Literary contests are frequent, with winners assured of publication.

Histories and novels are the most popular works. Among the best selling books over the past year was Raúl Valdés Vivó's *Ethiopia: The Unknown Revolution*, an account of the social forces that led to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and the progressive social programs that have been implemented in Ethiopia since then. The popularity of the book—and the fact that thousands of Cuban youths volunteered to fight in defense of the Ethiopian revolution—is a reflection of the high degree of internationalism among Cuba's people.

According to Winn, the flowering of revolutionary literature in Cuba has "produced several promising young novelists who have begun to transform their generation's experiences into literature. . . ."

A new genre that has developed in Cuba is the *testimonio*, or testimonial literature, ranging from oral history to written memoirs. According to Winn, "*testimonios* are among the most original and widely read publications in Cuba—as are the didactic 'oral essays' of Fidel Castro, the last of the charismatic orators."

Another new genre that has developed in Cuba since the revolution is the political mystery. Promising young writers like Luis Rogelio Noguerras use it as a medium through which they can reach broader audiences with their social commentary.

Winn commented:

The bookstores of Havana, however, are not the place to find out what Cubans are reading, which I discovered only after a survey of Eastern European titles in translation (from Bebel to Brezhnev) that filled half the shelves of a Havana bookstore. "What you see on the shelves of our bookstores is what Cubans are *not* reading," one Cuban writer explained. "What they *are* reading is sold out." What are Cubans reading? "The latest thing," he replied, generally Cuban or Latin American.

From Winn's description of the literary scene in Cuba today, there appear to be few constraints on content or style, unlike the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where harassment, repression, strict censorship, and official favoritism toward certain literary "styles" tend to stifle creativity.

One indication of this is the influential place in Cuban literature that José Lezama Lima, who died three years ago at the age of sixty-five, has held. According to Winn, Lezama's work was marked by

"apolitical pedantry and esoteric Catholicism, Baroque poetics and homosexual politics. . . . Lezama may not have been a government favorite, but the power of his poetry won him respect and admiration that assured the publication of his works."

The most serious case of literary persecution in Cuba—the detention in 1971 of the poet Heberto Padilla—has not been repeated in the eight years since then. Writers close to Padilla, Winn pointed out, stress that the case "belongs to 'a moment' in the Cuban revolution that is now past.

"These writers are now 'back in circulation,' and Cuban authors speak of significant artistic autonomy. The cultural ambience is not Paris, but neither is it Prague. Padilla himself keeps out of the limelight, but has just published a volume of what other Cuban poets are calling 'the finest Spanish translations ever' of the English romantics, including the virtually untranslatable William Blake."

In a clear indication of the government's attitude toward critical writings, Casa de las Americas, one of the leading presses in Cuba, published in 1978 *Contra Viento y Marea* (Against the Wind and the Tide). This is a *testimonio* written by a group of young Cubans who had grown up in the United States. It explains how they followed the development of the Cuban revolution, realized the gains that it had brought to Cuba, and increasingly came to identify with it.

Within that framework, some of them dealt frankly with the problems that the Cuban revolution faced. They referred to the dangers of bureaucratism and the "need for greater participation by the masses in decisions making." They note that women are still underrepresented in positions of authority. Summarizing some of the interviews that partly make up the book, the authors state, "The problem of the very negative policy followed toward homosexuals at an earlier stage of the revolution, one that has now seemingly been overcome, also comes up in these accounts, usually linked to discussions of cultural policy." There is likewise some criticism of the 1971 detention of Padilla.

Not only did Casa de las Americas publish the book, but it was considered so significant that it was awarded a special prize. □

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Selections From the Left

[The entire column this week is devoted to assessments of the flight of the "boat people" from Vietnam.]

* * *

rouge

"Red," Revolutionary communist weekly published in Paris.

Under the headline "Vietnam Loses the Peace," the editorial in the July 13-20 issue states:

"The hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese and Cambodians fleeing Indochina are the supporting cast for an anti-Communist campaign that is having destructive effects around the world. The imperialist West is draping itself in the banner of 'human rights.' It is breezily forgetting about Johnson, Nixon, and all those who dumped more bombs on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia than were used in the second world war.

"The material and human destruction caused by thirty years of imperialist war in Vietnam, war conducted first by the French and then by the Americans, are the primary and underlying cause of the present exodus into the China Sea. This is what the imperialist bourgeoisies want to make people forget in order to discredit socialism in the eyes of the peoples and create the political conditions for new military interventions. . . .

"Those responsible for the destruction of the war and its terrible consequences, the imperialist states, and first of all the U.S., have the means to stop the flood of boat people by sending their fleets to the China Sea to pick up the refugees, by organizing airlifts. But nothing of the sort has been done. . . . Another means would be to provide the promised war reparations to Vietnam and to lift the economic blockade of this country.

"But while the imperialists are exploiting the tragedy of the 'boat people' . . . the fact is that the Vietnamese workers state is giving them this opportunity. The prestige of the Vietnamese revolution, which was considerable throughout the world, has been badly eroded in a few short years.

"Terribly isolated in face of the combined hostility of China and imperialism, the Vietnamese leadership has not based itself, as it did during the war, on this international prestige. It has chosen alliance with the USSR for economic reasons, going as far as joining Comecon. That is a major reason for the Chinese aggression against Vietnam.

"The North has reunited the country but at the same time eliminated or neutralized

the southern political cadres, which were trained by the National Liberation Front. The bureaucratic apparatus of North Vietnam has extended its control over the populations of the South, in a probing, stupid, and often brutal way. If the support of the people is lost in a context of grave food shortages, there soon becomes no way to rule except through the police and army. Is that what is happening today in Vietnam?

"The Vietnamese revolutionists, trained in the Stalinist school, have won the war against imperialism. But they have lost the peace. The flood of refugees testifies to this. No one can accept the explanation that these are only bourgeois and counter-revolutionaries. Such people were certainly going to leave and are leaving. But isn't it a whole Westernized population of the big cities that could have been won, if only partially, to socialism, that is now leaving and setting in motion a process of emigration throughout the South? The leaders in Hanoi have offered no proof that this is not what in fact is taking place.

"To the contrary, no evidence has been offered to refute the report that the Vietnamese state treasury is filling as the boats leave packed with refugees. No evidence has been offered to refute the accusation that Hanoi is permitting this emigration, or even organizing it, in order to create problems for those countries that have to offer the first refuge for these people, that is, its immediate neighbors, and that it is doing this in order to obtain diplomatic concessions.

"The material and human problems facing the countries of Indochina in the wake of the war are very grave. These have been considerably increased by the arrogance and cynicism displayed by the bureaucratic layer that holds power in Vietnam.

"For all these reasons, at a time when the new tragedy in Indochina is disorienting many who participated in the past in the anti-imperialist struggle, it is necessary to reaffirm the following positions.

"• We must oppose the anti-Communist and anti-Vietnamese operation everywhere. It is necessary to remind people that the wars waged by the French and Americans are responsible for the present situation.

"• We must oppose all reprisals taken against the Vietnamese workers state, such as the stopping of food shipments that is being considered by the Common Market.

"• The events in Southeast Asia raise with greater acuteness than ever the question of socialist democracy, of workers democracy, in Indochina as well as in all the workers states. For our part we have

never stopped publicly raising this question even when we were most involved in support for the Vietnamese resistance, an activity into which the Trotskyists of the Fourth International threw all their forces.

"• No one can remain indifferent to the tragedy of the 'boat people,' who risk starvation, rape, and death in the China Sea. The imperialist bourgeoisies must pay for the damage they have caused. They must take responsibility for the 'boat people,' and take them in, without any discrimination on the basis of language, cultural level, health, or class."

DIRECT ACTION

A socialist weekly published in Sydney, Australia. Presents the views of the Socialist Workers Party.

Renfrey Clarke writes in the June 28 issue:

"Imperialism and its puppet governments in South East Asia are reacting to the refugee problem, as to all aspects of the continuing difficulties of Vietnam, with their usual contemptuous inhumanity.

"For 30 years, there was almost no price the US and its allies would not pay in order to 'save the Vietnamese from communism.' Now that imperialism has been defeated in Vietnam, even right-wing Vietnamese refugees are being left to rot or drown. . . .

"In Australia, the *Sydney Morning Herald* on June 15 spoke of Hanoi's 'current policy of wholesale expulsion of its hapless Chinese population.'

"The assertion, or strong implication, that people are being forced from Vietnam against their will is found in almost all the reports on the situation appearing in the capitalist press. But one thing that is clear from the published testimonies of the refugees is that those who have left Vietnam have deliberately chosen to do so. . . .

"Almost without exception, the reasons given by the refugees for leaving Vietnam include hunger. Agricultural production in the country, ravaged by imperialist aggression, has since been disrupted by severe flooding. Some accounts hold that the Chinese, as members of a former commercial elite, are discriminated against in food rationing.

"But for many refugees, the decision to leave has been precipitated by the threat of being sent to develop 'new economic zones' in the countryside; members of the urban middle class, and particularly the Chinese, are said to have been singled out for this work.

"Conditions in the pioneer areas are known to be harsh, and many settlers are believed to perish, but this policy of the Vietnamese government is hardly to be compared with the barbarity of imperial-

ism's 'free fire zones' and saturation bombing. . . .

"Those who want an end to the misery of the 'boat people' should be demanding that the US, France, Japan, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, the imperialist powers that over the years have occupied and plundered Indochina, should institute massive programs of reconstruction aid to the region, with no strings attached.

"In the case of refugees who do not wish to return to their homelands, it is the responsibility of these same imperialist governments to accept all these people, immediately, as immigrants."

Socialist Challenge

Newspaper sponsored by the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International. Published weekly in London.

The June 14 issue features an article by Geoffrey Sheridan entitled "Behind the flight of the boat-people: Red sails in the sunset?"

Sheridan notes the hypocrisy of the British government's "humanitarian" concern for the boat people, pointing out that London's immigration policy is politically discriminatory, and that the imperialist powers are responsible for much of the material hardship of Vietnam "which is a major factor behind the exodus. . . ."

He then goes on to write:

"It would be satisfying if the blame for the 'boat people' could be laid entirely at the door of imperialism, but that unfortunately is not the case. The other culprit is, in a phrase, the heritage of comrade Stalin. . . ."

"... the Chinese bureaucracy sees its hegemony in Indo-China threatened by the revolution in Vietnam and cut off its aid to Vietnam last July, cancelling 80 projects. There followed, of course, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam earlier this year.

"The trail of socialism in one country and bureaucratic rule does not stop there. The continuing Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia is in pursuit of the Vietnamese leadership's aim of bringing about by military means an enforced alliance between Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

"For the Vietnamese people, these wars between the workers' states are exacting a heavy toll. . . ."

"To what extent this migration is due to subversion stemming from the Chinese leadership, as the Vietnamese authorities claim, or to racist-inspired policies by the Vietnamese leadership, as the Chinese authorities argue, it is impossible to say.

"What is certain, however, is that Stalinism fosters national chauvinism, and that the bureaucratic interests of the Vietnamese leadership prevent it from encouraging the Vietnamese people of Chinese origin to appeal to the Chinese masses.

"A bureaucracy is limited in the steps it

can take against another bureaucracy; all of which argues that socialist democracy and proletarian internationalism are the only measures which can halt the flow of refugees.

"The West's tears for the 'boat people' fall from dry eyes, just as they would if the Vietnamese authorities forcibly closed their borders and put a stop to the exodus.

"This is not to say that we should oppose the entry of the Vietnamese refugees to Britain. It is the National Front which has promised pickets, and the left should mobilise against these.

"As with white Rhodesians, supporting immigration restrictions would mean, in effect, telling the masses of some other country that they should put up with them. The British labour movement has to accept its responsibility for failing to oppose imperialism."

la gauche

"The Left," French-language paper of the Revolutionary Workers League, Belgian section of the Fourth International. Published weekly in Brussels.

François Massion writes in the June 28 issue:

"A sudden and suspicious love for 'survivors of the Vietnamese gulag' has been expressed in the past few months in Western countries. The capitalist press, which pours out an endless stream of lies on everything from Iran to the oil crisis, has now taken the 'boat people' under its wing. Thanks to the mass media, the humanitarian sentiments of thousands of people are being abused for this reactionary campaign."

Noting that the bulk of the refugees consist of the "remnants of the old repressive apparatus of the puppet state or the expropriated possessing classes," Massion continues: "It was only in March 1978 that capitalism was overturned in South Vietnam, notably with the expropriation of the ethnic Chinese bourgeoisie which controlled commerce in part of the economy. It's no accident that only since then has the flow of émigrés from Vietnam risen considerably. The fees demanded of them by the Vietnamese government is nothing other than a way of recovering some of the immense profits that they have made at the expense of less privileged people. Among the refugees can also be found a minority who have fled to escape Stalinist repression. . . ."

"The Indochina war is not over. The United States suffered a military defeat in 1975. But this does not mean that they have been transformed into pacifists and defenders of the right of peoples to self-determination. Following their setback they have gone on a campaign to step up their aid to reactionary regimes in that part of the world. . . ."

"The 'revelations' about atrocities, fam-

ine, and suffering are an attempt to discredit the social gains made in Vietnam, and dissuade the peoples of Malaysia, Thailand, and other countries from following the example of the Vietnamese. Look, they say, at what will happen to you if you fight against your own governments, and against the United States!

"But the capitalist press (and that of the reformists) neglects to mention the heritage left behind by the former occupiers. The tons of bombs still buried in the rivers, the factories destroyed by the bombings, the hundreds of thousands of victims of the war, the economic blockade by the U.S. and its refusal to pay war reparations—these are the little 'details' that are absent from all the various appeals and open letters. Not a trace of the progress for the Vietnamese people resulting from the measures that put an end to capitalist exploitation.

"But while we continue to unconditionally defend the gains of the Vietnamese revolution against the imperialist attacks, we do not hide our criticisms of the present regime. By preventing the Vietnamese working masses from organizing independently, by launching a bureaucratic war against the repressive Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, and by dropping its support to the guerrillas in Thailand, the Vietnamese Communist Party of Stalinist origin has made the reactionaries' job easier. For us the defense of the Vietnamese workers state thus involves exposing the counterrevolutionary role of the bureaucracy currently in power.

"We can only regret that certain militants of the antiwar movement, such as Joan Baez, Yves Montand, and Jean-Paul Sartre, have made the reactionaries' job easier by falling into their trap of 'humanitarian sentiments.' In the struggle that is unfolding, the workers movement cannot remain neutral or on the defensive. Above all, it is necessary to stop and to denounce the imperialist propaganda and maneuvers which are concealed behind this campaign. The Indochina war is not over."

Socialist Action

Published twice monthly in Auckland, New Zealand.

The June 29 issue features an editorial entitled "Refugees: who is responsible?"

"The decision of the Malaysian government to ship 73,000 Vietnamese 'boat people' back out to sea, and to repel any who try to land, has made these refugees front-page news again. [Prime Minister] Muldoon and the establishment news media have taken advantage of the Malaysian government decision to renew their attacks on Vietnam.

"The June 18 NZ Herald reported that Muldoon 'told the Herald that Vietnam must be made to halt the flow of refugees. . . . The shedding of up to one mil-

lion people, and coercion which made them pay to leave the country, was an offence against humanity, he said.'

"This is the voice of the same person who supported the United States war in Vietnam. . . .

"Vietnam has not been able to recover from this legacy of destruction and poverty wrought by the United States and its allies, which include the New Zealand government. And this is no doubt one factor contributing to the refugee situation.

"But the principal factor is the social revolution which has taken place in Vietnam, including the nationalisations of all hundreds of capitalist businesses which flourished under the pro-US dictatorship. The vast bulk of the refugees are people who lost their relatively privileged position through the popularly-supported nationalisations, which were a huge step towards ending the poverty inflicted on Vietnam by decades of war and imperialist domination. . . .

"The real responsibility for the 'boat people' lies with those governments which, for thirty years, waged a merciless war against the Vietnamese. The United States, French, Australian and New Zealand governments are the main culprits. Yet New Zealand restricts the entry of all but a handful of these refugees, in line with its overall racist immigration policy.

"This government has a duty not only to open the doors to refugees from Indochina, but to contribute massively towards helping rebuild Vietnam."

rood

"Red," Flemish weekly paper of the Revolutionary Workers League, Belgian section of the Fourth International.

In the June 29 issue, Harry Mol writes: "The hundreds of thousands of refugees from the three Indochinese countries—Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea—could, it seemed, at least take comfort in one thing. Interest was expressed in their fate. But this great interest has not led to any significant action to help them. Thus, obviously, this interest was motivated by something other than humanitarian concern. . . .

The U.S.'s concern about the sad fate of the 'boat people' is motivated by political considerations and nothing more. It wants to put Vietnam in a bad light. Last year, Vietnam was pilloried by the U.S. rulers and their echoers around the world for not letting people leave. Now Vietnam has opened its border, and the same chorus is protesting because it is letting people go. . . . If that is their attitude, why aren't they asking the Soviet Union not to let Jews leave? . . .

"The reason the U.S. imperialists are not lifting a finger to help the 'boat people' is that they bear the main responsibility for their fate. . . .



Emigrants from Vietnam during temporary stop in Hong Kong.

"The U.S. and French imperialists ravaged the country for thirty years and distorted its life. Prostitution almost became a more important part of the economy than agriculture. This was the context in which the country had to start rebuilding in 1975.

"The Vietnamese were immediately faced with active economic sabotage on two levels. The U.S. went back on its promise to provide aid for rebuilding the country, and China drastically cut its aid. Vietnam had to rely more and more on the Soviet Union and Comecon (which it joined). The Vietnamese bureaucracy had to lean more and more on Moscow, which was certainly not going to exercise a positive influence on the Vietnamese revolution (as we have seen in the Cuban case).

"The second form of sabotage was in Vietnam itself. In the south, three quarters of trade and finance were in the hands of the ethnic Chinese. That is the case also in most of the Southeast Asian countries, where they are called the 'Asian Jews.' In fact, they have suffered repeated pogroms.

"When the Kuomintang ruled China, it viewed all the overseas Chinese as citizens of China. This fanned the flames of anti-Chinese racism. . . . In 1955, Zhou Enlai called on the overseas Chinese to become full citizens of the countries in which they lived. But this did not happen. They continued to live in their ghettos and to remain essentially unintegrated in their adopted countries.

"That was also true in South Vietnam, where after the National Liberation

Front's Tet offensive of 1968, the Chinese sister city of Saigon—Cholon, the center of trade—became the target of a pogrom.

"In 1975, the bulk of trade and industry in South Vietnam was in the hands of the Chinese capitalists, big and small. This group profited from the economic difficulties resulting from the war. They made the famine worse by hoarding rice so that they could sell it at black market prices. The situation became so dramatic that in March 1978, the government had to bring trade completely under state control. . . .

"Then the government advanced its program for 'reducing congestion' in the cities. During the war, millions of people had been uprooted and millions of peasants had fled to the cities. An enormous parasitic layer developed. At the same time, people were needed in the countryside to rebuild agriculture.

"New Economic Zones were set up in which those who had come to the cities during the war were to be resettled. . . . But many of those who lived off the war economy—prostitution, the black market, the enormous military and administrative apparatus—remained in the cities.

"Within the Communist Party, those who favored a policy of persuasion toward these elements won the majority. But apparently they lost it after the Fourth Congress in December 1976, because more and more force has been used since, especially during the past year.

"The policy of reducing the city population, coupled with the nationalization of trade, had the severest consequences for

the Chinese. To make matters even worse for them, the conflict between Vietnam and China (and Kampuchea) sharpened more and more. Once again, the country was the scene of great military tensions and mobilizations. But young Chinese were mistrusted when it came time to take them into the army. . . .

"The situation in Vietnam was aggravated by the severe floods of September 1978, the worst in a century.

"The stream of refugees is a result of all these factors, plus Hanoi's policy of opening its borders and China's policy of inciting the ethnic Chinese to leave North Vietnam . . . in order to paralyze important sectors of the economy such as mining, where the ethnic Chinese constitute a majority of the technicians. . . .

"And then the Chinese incited the Pol Pot regime to attack Vietnam. . . . Today, China proclaims its concern about the Chinese refugees from Vietnam. But it never showed any concern about the victims of Pol Pot or said anything when that regime banned the use of the Chinese language.

"Does this mean that the Vietnamese government and the CP should be absolved of all responsibility? Quite the contrary. There are too many indications that there was an aspect of racism in the policy followed toward the ethnic Chinese.

"But . . . it's too much when somebody like Begin attacks the Vietnamese, since he helped drive millions of Palestinians from their homes. It's too much when accusations against the Vietnamese come from figures who said nothing in 1965 when the Indonesian generals slaughtered a million people, including 300,000 ethnic Chinese."

THE MILITANT

A socialist newsweekly published in the interests of the working people. Published in New York City.

An editorial in the July 13 issue takes up the propaganda campaign in the American news media comparing the departure of the boat people from Vietnam to the flight of Jews from Hitlerism during the 1930s:

"•The capitalist news media claim the boat people are being expelled from Vietnam. They are not being expelled. They are leaving by their own choice. Imagine the hue and cry if the Vietnamese tried to prevent those who want to leave from going!

"•The media claim that the refugees are the victims of racial persecution. But most of them were privileged under the old regime and object to the loss of their old position. There is no evidence whatsoever of a pattern of racial persecution.

"•The media claim Vietnam is responsible for the plight of the refugees and the purported deaths of thousands on the high seas. But the Vietnamese proposed an

airlift of those who wish to leave. Their humanitarian offer was rejected. It is the refusal of Washington and the U.S.-backed regimes to take the refugees in that is responsible for their hardship.

"There is only one reason for the smear campaign against Vietnam. There is a social revolution going on there. The workers and peasants are beginning to take their destiny in their own hands. . . .

"As for those refugees who choose not to live in Vietnam, they should be allowed into the United States.

"The humanitarian problem would be solved tomorrow if Carter was willing to drop racist U.S. immigration restrictions.

"But he refuses to do that. The hysteria over refugees from Vietnam has nothing to do with humanitarian concern. It is a political campaign. It is part of imperialism's drive to prepare the American people for new counterrevolutionary wars, and in particular for stepped up U.S. support to reactionary forces in Southeast Asia."

The editorial also points out, "Every great revolution has led to the emigration of a minority that is unwilling or unable to accept the new society." The following issue, dated July 20, gives one example of this, the departure of the Tories during the American revolution.

An excerpt from *Sam Adams and the American Revolution* by Harry Frankel states:

"Let us begin with the startling facts of the Tory emigration during the war. It is not very well known that somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 emigres fled the colonies during this period. . . .

". . . who were the American emigres? An authoritative historian has written: 'If we should investigate the Tory party in the several colonies in detail, we should be forced to the conviction that, in New England, it comprised in 1775 a very great share, probably more than half, of the most educated, wealthy and hitherto respected classes.'"

bresche

Twice-monthly German-language organ of the Revolutionary Marxist League, published in Zurich, Switzerland.

Featured on the back page of the July 9 issue is an article entitled "Indochina Refugees—Those Who Are Guilty Are Making the Loudest Accusations." It states, in part:

"Some 300,000 refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are sitting in camps in Southeast Asia waiting for permission to stay or to go somewhere else. Tens of thousands more are leaving these countries.

"Four years ago, Vietnam was the subject we stressed, it was the symbol of the power of the liberation struggle and international solidarity, the proof of the vulnerability of the best equipped imperialist war

machine. Vietnam, our great hope, has now again become the focus of anti-Communist propaganda by the bourgeois media and the capitalist politicians.

"At the same time, the left, with a feeling of guilt and resignation, remains silent. But we must not remain silent, because that would leave the field open for the international bourgeoisie, which bears the main responsibility for the sad fate of these refugees, to pose as defenders of human rights.

"In reality, this pretense of humanism is nothing but preparation for war. It is no accident that it is exactly in these recent weeks that the U.S. has revealed the creation of an international intervention force of 110,000 troops.

"We must not remain silent, because mistakes and crimes are no less wrong when they are committed by regimes that have emerged from a liberation struggle, and which rightfully had our solidarity and support. And unfortunately, such crimes have been committed by the Indochinese Communist leaderships.

"Why are these refugees leaving? In the case of those coming out of Cambodia, the reason is obvious. They fled the terror of the Pol Pot regime, and today they are trying to escape from the civil war that has deprived them of their means of existence and which directly threatens their lives.

"In the case of the refugees from Vietnam, the reasons are less clear. Essentially, there have been two waves of emigration. . . . The first, which came directly after the victory of the National Liberation Front, included 200,000 persons, most of which were collaborators—officers and officials of the overthrown puppet regime and their families. . . .

"The second wave began in 1978 and has not yet ended. It was ushered in by the nationalization of large and small trading operations in southern Vietnam, which had been mainly in the hands of the Chinese minority. . . . This was the occasion for open conflicts between Vietnam and China, accompanied by nationalist and racist propaganda on both sides. In fact, about 70 percent of the present wave of refugees from Vietnam are of Chinese origin.

"The nationalization of trade became unavoidable after the drought and severe winter of 1976 and 1977 sharpened the problem of food supply, which was already precarious in the ruined country. Food was sold at extortion-level black market prices. After the nationalization of trade, 230,000 Vietnamese Chinese went to China, with Peking's encouragement. Today, China does not want to accept any more refugees. It is interested in carrying out an anti-Vietnamese campaign, for which the present wave of refugees provides a pretext.

"It is true that the refugees waiting in the camps today come mainly from the middle classes. . . . However, it is incon-

ceivable that these people would accept the dangers of flight (many drown on the way) or the difficulties of being without a country only for the sake of a more comfortable life in the future. On the other side, despite the big propaganda campaign in the bourgeois media, there has not been any evidence that these people face physical extermination (as is practiced on a large scale by friends of the U.S. such as Somoza, Pinochet, and Videla). . . .

"The Vietnamese and Cambodian but also the Chinese leaderships bear a major responsibility for the sad fate of the refugees, which unfortunately is no imperialist atrocity story. But it is hard to imagine anything more hypocritical and cynical than the outcry of the international bourgeoisie against Vietnam. With all the mistakes of the Indochinese bureaucrats, it is first of all France and the U.S. . . . that prepared the way for the material problems in Indochina. . . .

"It was the U.S. intervention that destroyed the whole social structure of South Vietnam and left a gigantic parasitic layer. . . .

"The interest of these circles is not humanitarian but political. They want to make capital out of the sad fate of the refugees. . . .

"We deny the bourgeois politicians any right to sit in judgment over Vietnam. . . . There is nothing more outrageous than the fact that these people who in reality almost bombed Vietnam back into the stone age are today deriding this country for its 'stone-age communism.' . . . It is no badge of honor for the Maoists that they are howling together with these wolves.

"We demand that the Indochinese refugees (and first of all the Cambodians facing death) be allowed to go to the countries of their choice and that they get help there and not simply be exploited as unskilled workers.

"We also demand that at least an amount of aid equal to that given to the refugees be given to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for the reconstruction of their economies, because only in this way can the problems at the root of this emigration be dealt with.

"From the Vietnamese leadership we demand that they immediately end their racist campaign against the Chinese and abandon all discrimination and political oppression. Because by these practices they are not only doing harm to international solidarity but providing ammunition for the capitalists' anti-Communist campaign.

Socialist Voice

Revolutionary socialist fortnightly published in Toronto, Canada.

In the July-August issue, the editors state:

"Canada's new Conservative govern-

ment has lost little time in joining the current anti-Vietnam propaganda offensive centered on the plight of the 'boat people.' This U.S.-inspired campaign is aimed at isolating the Vietnamese revolution and preparing the ground for new imperialist intervention in Southeast Asia.

"One of the first acts of the Clark government was to cut Canadian aid to Vietnam. The ban applies to direct and indirect aid through non-governmental organizations.

"The banning of aid has been cloaked in sanctimonious statements about the hardships of Vietnamese refugees by politicians who failed to oppose Canada's one-million-dollar-a-day arms trade with the United States during its genocidal war against the Vietnamese people. . . .

"The Conservative government's actions are part of the international campaign presently being waged by imperialism against the Vietnamese revolution. Imperialism hopes to pin responsibility for the wave of refugees on the Vietnamese regime, and in so doing to isolate Vietnam in the eyes of world public opinion. . . .

"Canadian working people, their trade union organizations and the NDP [New Democratic Party, the Canadian labor party] should take a stand against the hypocritical policy of the Clark government on the refugee question and should oppose the imperialist campaign that seeks to make Vietnam take the rap for the continuing crimes of imperialism. It is imperialism that is responsible for the plight of the 'boat people,' not Vietnam."

世界革命

"*Sekai Kakumei*" (World Revolution), central organ of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Japanese section of the Fourth International. Published weekly in Tokyo.

Hisao Oyama writes in the July 2 issue:

"Wars and revolutions always produce many exiles and refugees. The victorious revolutions in Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos in 1975 were no exception. Government and military officials who had served the imperialist aggressors under the old regimes, as well as comprador capitalists with their families and relatives, emigrated in large numbers, most going to the United States or Europe. . . .

"The peculiar thing about the refugee exodus from Indochina, however, is that in contrast to many revolutions in the past, the number of exiles and refugees has not tapered off with time. On the contrary, the number of people fleeing Indochina increased abruptly in 1978-79, three years after the revolutionary victories. . . .

"The decisive factors in spurring on the exodus have been economic transformations within Vietnam since the spring of 1978, intensification of the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict, Peking's campaign to

disrupt Vietnam using the ethnic Chinese living there, and most of all China's aggression against Vietnam in the first part of 1979. . . .

"Faced with all these people wanting to emigrate, the Vietnamese government has refused to take the kind of measures Pol Pot did, turning the whole country into a concentration camp and killing those who try to escape. . . .

"What's wrong with Hanoi's stance? What is so 'inhuman' about it?

"The problem is not 'inhumanity' on Hanoi's part. On the contrary, the real problem is precisely that while the Vietnamese government is allowing those who want political asylum to emigrate, the imperialist powers—despite their own responsibility for the Vietnam war—are refusing to accept the emigrés. This has led to the tragedy of the refugees stranded at sea, the so-called 'boat people.' . . .

"The attitude working people should take toward the issue of the Indochinese refugees is first of all that the United States and Japan must pay reparations and provide unconditional, unrestricted aid to the countries of Indochina. . . .

"Secondly, all responsibility for the mass exodus of refugees must be laid at the feet of the U.S. imperialists, of their Japanese counterparts who raked in superprofits as "merchants of death" producing weapons for the American war of aggression, and of Peking. Japan and the other imperialist powers must admit all the refugees, guaranteeing them full rights of citizenship and unconditionally respecting their right to return to their homeland if and when they choose to.

"Peking must also be held responsible for its agitation around the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.

"The Japanese government has carried out the worst policies toward immigrants of all the imperialist powers. Koreans living in this country have been denied citizenship and even such rights as coverage under the national health insurance plan. Not only should full citizenship rights be granted to the Vietnamese refugees, but all discriminatory policies toward Koreans in Japan must be abolished as well."

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Meaning of CP Setback in Italian Elections

By Livio Maitan

The assessment that most commentators made of the results of the June 3 Italian elections was fundamentally correct. That is, the situation has not changed radically. The instability has not been overcome. And achieving a political equilibrium in the government as well as in parliament remains quite difficult.

Nonetheless, we cannot fail to take note of a series of shifts on the electoral level that reflect rather significant developments over the last two years.

First, let us look at some general facts:

1. The vote for the parties and formations claiming to represent the workers movement dropped by 3.1% in the elections for the lower house and 2.1% for the Senate.¹ (The Communist Party vote was down by 4% in the lower house elections and 2% for the Senate. The Socialist Party vote increased by 0.2% for both houses. The far left gained 0.7%, getting a total of almost 800,000 votes.)

2. The Christian Democrats' vote dropped by 0.4% for the lower house and 0.6% for the Senate. The small center and center-right parties gained 0.9% in the lower house elections and 2.6% for the Senate.

3. The vote for the fascist right, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), dropped by 0.8% for the lower house and by 0.9% for the Senate.

4. The Radical Party scored a major advance, increasing its vote by 2.3% for the lower house and 0.5% for the Senate. The success of some of its local slates should also be noted. The most spectacular was in Trieste, where the Radicals got 30% of the vote.

5. The number of abstentions was up by nearly a million and a half. A total of four million voters abstained in the elections for the lower house, bringing the abstention rate up to almost 10%, which is high for Italy. Along with this, the number of blank or invalid ballots rose by almost 40%, totalling more than 1.4 million in the elections for the lower house.

Some other facts should be noted to shed more light on these results.

The difference in the vote for the lower house and the Senate is an indicator of the orientation of the younger voters, since only those over twenty-five can vote for senators. This difference worked mainly against the CP, partly because the far-left groups have generally gained representation in the lower house but not in the

1. I base myself on the figures given by the Italian press up to June 6; the final results may differ slightly.

Senate, and partly because the CP's influence is more limited among the newer generations.

The CP press itself has estimated that in 1976 about 40% of the young voters cast their ballots for the party and that this fell to about 28% in the June 3 election. The Radicals seem to have been the main gainers from the orientations of certain layers of youth.

The nationwide trends are more marked, sometimes strikingly so, in the big cities, which are the main centers of the political struggle and reflect changes or new phenomena more rapidly. Thus, the losses for the CP in the lower house vote exceeded the nationwide average in Rome, Naples, Turin, Genoa, Palermo, Cagliari, and Bari. In Milan the CP losses were the same as the nationwide drop. In Bologna, Florence, Venice, and Trieste, they were less.

Still more significantly, the CP vote dropped sharply, by more than the national average of 4%, in the key working-class suburbs of Turin. In these same areas, there was a high abstention rate in places. Moreover, the Radicals scored some successes. The same trends could be seen in the working-class suburbs of Milan and in the poor neighborhoods in Rome.

The Christian Democrat vote dropped by 4.2% in Milan, 3% in Turin, 2.6% in Genoa, 2.4% in Bologna, 2.3% in Florence, 4% in Cagliari, and 13% in Trieste. It remained stable or advanced slightly in other cities such as Rome and Naples.

As for the Radical Party, it was precisely in the cities where it emerged as a considerable force (in general reaching the position of the fourth largest party). It got 7.1% of the vote in Rome, 5.9% in Naples, 6.6% in Turin, 5.9% in Genoa, 4.7% in Bologna, 6.6% in Palermo, and 6.5% in Venice.

The setback for the CP was sharpest in the south, notably in the big cities and significant centers. Its vote was down by 10.3% in Naples, 8% in Palermo, 5.9% in Cagliari, 6.5% in Bari, 5.5% in the province of Taranto, 8.1% in the province of Catania, 6.5% in the province of Reggio di Calabria, and 8.9% in Caltanissetta.

The first observation that has to be made is that this is the first time since 1946 that the CP vote has fallen in an election.² And, considering the Italian

2. It is difficult to assess the results of the 1948 elections, since the CP was combined with the SP in the Front for People's Democracy. The vote of the workers movement as a whole fell from its 1946 level, but this was probably a result of SP voters deserting to the Social Democrats [a right-wing splitoff] and the Christian Democracy.

voting patterns, this drop was unquestionably a major one. The setback was all the more important since the main aim of the Christian Democrats and the bourgeois formations was to weaken the CP. This objective was achieved.

Of the two main workers parties, it was the Socialist Party that managed to maintain its positions. And this is a party that in the recent period has assumed the most ambiguous attitudes, launching violent attacks on the CP and seizing on every available issue for this purpose.

The second observation that has to be made is that the Christian Democrats did not improve their positions and even suffered losses in some important cities. This means that this party failed to achieve its No. 2 objective, that is to increase its percentage of the vote to 40%.

The extremely modest gains of the other center parties in the lower house of parliament do not compensate for the stagnation of the Christian Democrats, even though the center (and the center-left) gained some seats.

As for the fascist party, it failed to regain all the ground it lost as a result of the departure of the deputies and senators who formed the National Democratic Party (which won no seats and got no more than 0.6% of the vote). But it is more homogeneous than in 1976 and more radicalized in a rightist way.

The far left scored gains both in its numerical vote and in its percentage (which rose by 0.7%). It got six seats in the lower house (the same number as in 1976). It should be said in passing that this confirms the fact that in a highly politicalized country where all the political sectors are highly differentiated and where there is a system of proportional representation, similar, or relatively similar forces, get a bigger combined vote if they present separate slates.

This is a kind of political "law." We saw it operate in 1948, when the CP and SP ran a joint campaign as the Front for People's Democracy. There was another example in 1968, at the time of the ephemeral reunification of the SP and the Social Democrats. The same law operated in 1976 when the far left ran a joint campaign for the Proletarian Democracy slate.

It should be noted, moreover, that the far left today is still less able than it was in 1976 to present a general alternative. The wing represented by the United New Left was unable or unwilling to differentiate itself from the Radical Party or from the ultraleftist and "movementist" forces that

are still on the scene.

The strongest far-left group in the electoral arena, on the other hand, is the Party of Proletarian Unity (PdUP). While this group criticized the historic compromise and enjoys important support in the "trade-union left," it was unable to offer a strategy qualitatively different from that of the reformists and maintains clearly gradualist conceptions of the transition to socialism (or the "way out" of capitalism, to use its terminology).³

It should be pointed out that the PdUP made an agreement with the Workers Movement for Socialism (MLS), a formation that remains fundamentally Maoist, has a still more right-wing orientation, and is partially integrated into the trade-union bureaucracy (especially in the Italian Federation of Trade Unions [UIL], the confederation influenced by the SP and the Social Democrats).⁴

As I have indicated, the setback for the CP, coming together with the success for the Radicals, is the salient fact about the June 3 elections. It should be pointed out that this advance for the Radicals comes at a time when a tendency only incipient in this party in 1976 has become notably stronger.

During a whole period, the Radical Party appeared to be a means for waging struggles for democratic rights, struggles in which the big workers parties, especially the CP, were late in getting involved. (One example is the fight for the right of divorce.) Then this party started to become a magnet for all sorts of malcontents, and it directed its fire mainly against the CP.

Already in 1976, the Radicals succeeded in capturing part of the potential electoral base of the far left. Now this phenomenon has assumed far greater dimensions. On the Radical slates, along with the "historic" leaders of the party, we find former leaders of Lotta Continua (including a member of the last Chamber of Deputies, Pinto, who was a leader of the unemployed movement in Naples in 1975); former CP deputies; former SP members; intellectuals like Sciascia, who was elected on the CP slate in Palermo in the 1975 municipal elections; and others such as Macciochi. (Sections of the "Autonomi" [anarchists], also called for a vote for the Radicals.)

What may come out of such a mishmash in the future is pure speculation. Let us say for the moment that the Radical phenomenon is a new manifestation of the crisis of the petty bourgeoisie. This stratum underwent radicalization, beginning in 1968-69. A section of it has come to adopt very ambiguous "anti-establishment" atti-

3. *l'Unità* of June 6 openly expressed satisfaction that the PdUP-MLS scored a relative success vis-à-vis the United New Left in Milan and Bergamo.

4. On the basis of agreements made before the vote, the PdUP will get four deputies (it got three of the six Proletarian Democracy seats in 1976) and the MLS, two.

tudes and is developing a bizarre ideology combining a socialist-oriented libertarianism, an outlook like that of the "new philosophers," and a peculiar kind of left Poujadism.⁵ It exercises an influence even over fringes of the newer generations of workers.

The question arises whether the Radical Party was the main gainer from the decline of the CP. It is not an easy one to answer. This can be done accurately only later on, based on a very detailed analysis of the vote. As on other occasions, there were probably compensating shifts, and it would be simplistic, if not outright wrong, to base a judgment solely on the raw percentages of gains and losses.

For example, it is possible, even probable, that a not inconsiderable part of those who voted for the Proletarian Democracy in 1976 cast their ballots in 1979 for the Radicals (let us remember that a whole wing of what remains of Lotta Continua supported the Radicals, while others supported the United New Left). Likewise, the far-left slates in 1979 may very well have taken more votes from the CP than would appear to be the case on the basis of oversimplified calculations.

Nonetheless, it is indisputable that a section of those who voted previously for the CP, including in the working-class suburbs, cast their ballots for the Radicals. The CP itself has said this in its initial analyses. (*l'Unità*, the CP daily, wrote: "There is a very close relationship between our losses and the gains of the Radicals in areas and cities such as Rome, Turin, Trieste, Cuneo. This phenomenon is less marked, apparently, in the south.")

The Socialist Party does not seem to have profited from the CP's losses except very modestly in a few cases (notably in the south). In passing, it should be noted that the SP made some real gains in the south, lesser ones in the center, and it suffered losses in the north.

Such calculations are still more difficult for the center parties. In any case, these are negligible quantities.

On the other hand, the CP seems to have been hard hit by the phenomenon of abstentionism and the increase in the number of blank and invalid ballots. There is agreement among the commentators on this point. From the standpoint of the social forces involved, this is what *l'Unità* said:

There are strong grounds for saying that the greatest losses suffered by the CP came in those neighborhoods in the suburbs that are losing their social cohesiveness and in depressed areas. Notable losses also occurred in middle-class areas. The vote for the party in working-class areas remained substantially solid, although subject to some shifts. The peasant vote was consolidated.

The charm of the euphemism used to

5. P.-M. Poujade, a right-wing demagogue who appealed to small shopkeepers, led an antitax movement in France in the 1950s.—*IP/I*

minimize the loss of working-class votes will not go unappreciated. But in general this analysis seems to correspond to the reality.

There is no need to dwell on the fact that the CP is paying the price for the policy it has been conducting since 1976 in the framework of its broader strategy of historic compromise. Now the CP leaders have to admit openly what we have pointed out on several occasions.

That is, it is easier to write in resolutions that the party is simultaneously a government party and a fighting party than it is to put this across in day-to-day activity. (See, for example, the interview with Occhetto in the June 7 issue of *La Repubblica*.) This is all the more true when you are working in a context of persistent economic problems and when the government you are supporting is applying a line of austerity, not as it is represented in the sophisticated and nebulous formulations developed by Berlinguer, but a very prosaic austerity that involves reducing the standard of living of the masses, both directly and indirectly, through inflation and increased unemployment.

In 1975-76, the CP was advancing in all areas. The working class was placing more confidence in it than ever before. Its influence was growing among the middle classes. Sections of the bourgeoisie itself thought that the CP could play a key role in putting their house in order by forcing the Christian Democrats to take a smaller share of the spoils. All of the manifold liberalizations in the CP's policies, of its theoretical elaborations and its "pluralistic" declarations, were designed precisely to achieve such results.

But as the policy of the CP was subjected to the test of practice, a boomerang effect started to be felt. Three years after 1976, the CP is running out of steam in all those areas where it had been on the advance. The results of the June 3 election reflected a threefold phenomenon:

1. A crisis of confidence in sections of the working class, even in the CP's bastions in the north. In this area the CP is also paying most of the price for the opportunist orientations of the union leaderships (even though it does not bear the sole responsibility for them), in particular for the way the present round of new-contract negotiations has been carried on.

2. A still deeper and more marked crisis of confidence among sections of the petty bourgeoisie, of the intelligentsia, and—in often still more spectacular forms—among the poor masses of the south (for example, in the chronically crisis-ridden cities such as Naples and Palermo).

3. A loss of influence and prestige among those sections of the middle bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs who flirted with the CP after the 1975 local elections in the hope that it would pull their chestnuts out of the fire.

As I have already said, this crisis has

assumed much greater proportions among the newer generations. The election results only confirmed a trend that had already been shown in the inability of the CP to win and consolidate a broad influence in the student movement and in the failure of the Young Communist Federation as a mass organization, which had to be openly admitted at the last party congress.

There has also been a change in the mood of those who continue to vote for the CP (and who, it must not be forgotten, still represent a very considerable force). In 1975-76, the CP seemed to them to offer a new perspective and the notable increase in the strength of the party reflected a radicalization that was not only continuing but broadening and deepening. The same cannot be said today.

The CP's policy of national unity has revealed the actual content of its strategy of historic compromise. The CP activists and voters have suffered profound disillusionment. The way they vote represents a class choice, which many of them consider inescapable, so long as there is no credible alternative. But it does not have the same significance and the same potential as it did three years ago.

The Christian Democrats, I repeat, got only half what they wanted, inasmuch as the CP's losses were not matched by gains for them. Nonetheless, they can take legitimate satisfaction from the progress that has been made in the last four years.

In 1975, the Christian Democrats had reason to fear that they would lose their lead in the percentage of the vote to the CP, a possibility that has been frequently discussed by the Italian press, even in the campaign that has just ended. But it was not only this. The Christian Democratic Party was being challenged more openly by very broad and very influential sections of the ruling class, which were thinking about finding a new political instrument.

Today, despite all the criticism, even virulent criticism, that the big press continues to direct against the ruling party and its governments, the indispensable role of the Christian Democracy is no longer put in question. Only a tiny fringe of voters decided to switch to the Liberal Party or other center parties on June 3.

The results of these latest elections offer the Christian Democrats more favorable conditions for confronting the CP. They can say that the voters have endorsed their decision to offer the CP a chance to collaborate in the framework of national unity but not to give the CP itself a role in the government. In the medium term, perhaps after their congress scheduled for the fall, they can try to develop a government based on special collaboration with the Socialist Party, with or without the contribution of the small parties of the old center-left, and with or without the direct or indirect support of the CP.

In fact, the Christian Democrats have already opened their offensive to achieve

this type of political solution. This was done in statements and interviews by the party leaders immediately after the elections.

The Socialist Party, on the other hand, finds itself in an uncomfortable position. It failed to gain any more bargaining power. But, nonetheless, the choice it makes can be decisive. It can make overtures to the Christian Democrats and go back to the governmental formula of the 1960s. Or it can line up alongside the CP in the opposition. Either choice would cause the SP serious problems from the standpoint of its general orientation and international situation.

It is also inevitable that serious conflicts will develop in the SP and that it will go through another one of the turbulent periods that it has experienced several times since the party was rebuilt in 1944-45.

The CP is also going to have to face difficult situations. For the first time since the end of the war, the leading group can no longer defend its line with the seemingly unchallengeable argument that the party's influence is steadily growing. A debate is inevitable, and it will also cut across the highest levels.

In recent months, the decision to stop supporting the Andreotti government has already been subjected to criticism, from two different points of view. Some considered that it should have been made earlier. Others emphasized the danger of precipitating a governmental crisis that could only lead to earlier elections.

Today, in the phase that is opening up, we will probably see one tendency favoring a resumption of the process of political and ideological revision so as to improve the conditions for carrying out a policy of national unity or long-term compromise. There will probably also be a tendency favoring a tougher line, a reaffirmation of the identity of the party, and hence an accentuation of the shift begun in the middle of 1978, which was concretized in the party's leaving the governmental majority.

The elections have dealt the CP a lesson that it cannot take lightly. But that does not mean that a decision to return to the opposition for an entire period is an easy one for it to make. It cannot be unaware that if it sticks by the position it maintained during the elections and even after, that either both workers parties should go into the government or they should both go into opposition, and the SP goes along with this, it is going to lead to an extremely grave political crisis, or even a major confrontation.

Are the theoreticians of the historic compromise, which was designed precisely to avoid such a confrontation, ready to face it today, when the relationship of forces has shifted to their disadvantage, even though only partially? What, in particular, would they do if they have to face a Christian Democrat-SP government that

makes some programmatic concessions on paper and calls on them to support the government from the outside?

It is not the objective of this article to draw a general balance sheet of the dynamic of the Italian situation over the past three years. I would only caution against two evaluations, both equally wrong. The first involves what might be called a pessimistic view. That is, the elections confirm that there is an ebb, that the working class is seriously weakened, that the ruling class is succeeding in its offensive and that the relationship of forces is being reversed (this is a rather widespread opinion in far-left circles).

This view is basically an impressionistic assessment that fizzes over the fundamental facts. It obscures the fact that the relationship of forces, even as reflected in the distorted mirror of elections, has not qualitatively changed. It diverts attention from the fact that the Christian Democratic Party has suffered further attrition and that in the present context any government is going to be weak and insecure. That is, regardless of whether there is any programmatic agreement between the Christian Democrats and the SP (or between the CP and SP), any government is going to have to try to impose an austerity policy, in either a direct or camouflaged way. No government is going to be able to reduce unemployment or choke off inflation. As shown by the struggles in recent months, the working class has not lost its combativity and is not ready to passively accept the blows it is suffering. And the new forms of the crisis hitting layers of the petty bourgeoisie do not at all mean political stability for the system.

It would be an equal and opposite error, however, to disregard or minimize certain changes and tendencies that have been reflected on the electoral level and which I have indicated, if only schematically, in my analysis of the vote. These are the disarray and loss of confidence on the part of sections of the working class; the partial reduction of the power of attraction of the working class and its organizations for other exploited layers—that is, strata of the radicalized petty bourgeoisie and the student movement; and a political identity crisis afflicting a considerable part of the youth.

An awareness of the difficulties that

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flow, and are inevitably going to continue to flow, from such tendencies must inspire the revolutionary Marxists to fight in the unions and mass movements to see that the battles that are on the agenda are fought without any concessions to the "spirit" of national unity that sacrifices the interests of the working class and the other exploited layers to the needs of restructuring the capitalist economy and achieving bourgeois "normalization." An awareness of these difficulties must inspire revolutionary Marxists to strive to assure that an overall alternative emerges from these partial struggles, which otherwise would very largely lose their meaning.

The Italian section of the Fourth International, the GCR, unable to run a slate of

its own in the elections, called for a vote for any of the working-class slates. In its statement, it said:

Conflicting with the demand for the resumption of the policy of national unity are the real needs of the working masses—the need for a victory of the steelworkers and workers in other industries in the new contract negotiations; the need to fight for a thirty-five-hour week and for a real general strike that would combat the arrogance of the bosses. What is needed is a general strike that would not just reconfirm the relationship of forces that has emerged from the last ten years of struggle but would try to transform them on the level of the government and the state. . . .

We must work to assure that the diplomatic debate over parliamentary formulas does not undermine the strength and unity of the workers

movement. We must strive rather to see that the independence of the trade-union movement from the bourgeoisie and from the diplomatic maneuvers between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic working-class leaderships is reaffirmed.

"We must strive," the statement concluded, "to help the activists of the reformist parties learn the lessons of the election results and think about a different perspective that would break from the illusions about the possibility of a historic compromise and the reformability of capitalism. Today it is necessary to back up those forces that have fought in a conscious way for the unity of the working-class movement, for its independence, and for mobilizing its power against the bosses and against the bourgeois solutions. . . ."

Pledge Defense of 'National Interest' Against 'German-Dominated Europe'

French Communist Party Holds Twenty-Third Congress

By Jacques Lahire

The Twenty-Third Congress of the French Communist Party ended May 13 with a coup de théâtre. Roland Leroy, the managing editor of the CP daily *l'Humanité*, was edged out of the Secretariat, the real leadership of the party. Plissonnier, who is generally considered "Moscow's man," announced it to the congress, and probably to Leroy at the same time.

This semidismisal—for Leroy remains a Political Bureau member and managing editor of *l'Humanité*—was all the more surprising to observers in that Leroy was considered to have been the initiator, in opposition to Marchais, of the French CP's new policy toward the SP. But for those who are familiar with the norms of the CP apparatus, Leroy's ouster merely confirmed the fact that the essence of the line he advocated had been adopted by General Secretary Georges Marchais. For Marchais, ousting Leroy meant preventing him from using this success to challenge the general secretary.

A Critical Reassessment of the Union of the Left

In 1974, Paul Laurent, a leading member of the Secretariat in charge of the Paris region, thought that the SP had "broken in practice with class collaboration." That was the period when the CP was singing the praises of the Common Program signed with the Socialists in 1972, and subsequently adopted by the Left Radicals.

But according to the political resolution unanimously adopted at the Twenty-Third Congress, the SP is "actively involved in

the capitalist forces' strategy of counteroffensive," and a recent document by the CP leadership on its work in the trade unions condemns the SP as "a right-wing, non-working-class organization."

These shifts in analysis are in fact designed to justify the changes in the CP's policy toward the SP and the Union of the Left. A balance sheet on the latter was drawn by the CP leadership in a column by Political Bureau member Lajoinie published in *l'Humanité*:

This governmental pact (the Common Program) gave the SP a kind of good-conduct certificate among the left, fostering illusions about an alleged change in its Social Democratic nature. . . .

No agreement at the top can replace the mass movement for unity. It can, in fact, as the Common Program showed, put a brake on it. . . . For the first time in history, unity around a program did not facilitate the growth of the CP—in fact, it was only the SP that profited from this experience.

Georges Marchais publicly confirmed this analysis on television, declaring that "restabilization in favor of the SP has been bad for the workers."

Breakup of the Union of the Left and the CP's New Policy

In September 1977, six months before the legislative elections, the CP leadership decided to blow up the Union of the Left. It then launched a polemic against the SP, dealing not with the content of the program, but rather with the steps being

taken to "bring it up to date."¹ The number of nationalizations—which the SP wanted to reduce as much as possible—provided the main excuse for initiating the division of the left.

The CP leadership did not want to pursue a policy that mainly profited the SP (from 1972 to 1978, the SP's electoral following doubled, while that of the CP stagnated) at a time when the development of the political and social movement of the working class, in the context of the capitalist crisis, could have made a left victory in the elections explosive.

For the CP this would have meant taking the risk of serving as a stepping-stone to the SP's electoral victory, while having to mount the front lines, as the party most implanted in the working class, to apply a policy of managing the crisis for the capitalists, and thus paying the highest price for it within the working class.

To justify this sudden turnaround to its members, while again whipping up party patriotism, the CP leadership stressed the SP leadership's refusal to give Communist ministers in a future government of the Left the role that they deserved.

At that time, as today, the CP in no case offered a different strategy to the working class. Its line was and still is an anti-SP policy, not a prosocialist one.

This new line was ratified by the Twenty-Third Congress. The congress,

1. The Common Program, signed in 1972, envisioned continuing economic growth at an annual rate of 6 percent. This was before the economic crisis. Beginning in June 1977 the CP and SP discussed "bringing the program up to date."

held more than a year after the March 1978 defeat, and more than eighteen months after the change in policy toward the Union of the Left, officially marked the turning point, and was aimed at putting a full stop to the questions that CP members and sympathizers have asked since. The framework for this new policy is provided by analyzing the crisis of capitalism as "primarily national," even if it has a "specific international aspect."

The purpose of this odd theory (which nevertheless finds it difficult to explain why the crisis is *simultaneously* hitting all the big imperialist countries, France included!) is to define the CP as a party that does not conceal the responsibilities of the government and of Giscard for the crisis (whereas the SP is ridden with "Giscardism" and has become the harbinger of the "Europe of Giscard and Schmidt"). It also seeks to present the CP as a "national" party, one which defends the interests of the national economy against foreign capitalists and Social Democratic governments.

The Common Program policy failed to bear all the fruits hoped for, but merely strengthened the SP. In contrast to that the new policy rules out an agreement with the SP, at least for the immediate future. It even proscribes agreements, as Lajoinie wrote, "with SP organizations"—that is, with local and rank-and-file bodies of the Socialist Party. To the Union of the Left, the Twenty-Third Congress strictly counterposes "unity at the bottom," "while not precluding unity at the top," as Political Bureau member Guy Hermier declared in his closing speech to the congress.

It is not a matter of the CP taking an ultraleft course after having followed an opportunist one toward the SP, as has happened so often in the past. The principal reason for this turn is the political, social, and economic situation.

After the elections, the bourgeoisie launched a new version of the Barre plan, much more aggressive than the preceding ones, to try to weaken the working class before the new international wave of recession that is on the horizon. The working class has not remained inert in the face of this bourgeois offensive. Despite all the difficulties—which are chiefly due to the diversionary policy of the CP and SP since the elections—it launched a counteroffensive, as shown by the mobilizations in Lorraine and the Nord.

In this context, the CP could not afford the luxury of an ultraleft sectarian, adventurist course, for this would have threatened to put a match to the powder keg and to be seen by the workers, willy-nilly, as the signal for a general strike.

After an electoral setback, the working masses instinctively move to launch a fightback against the bourgeoisie, using typically working-class means. They seek to win through direct action what they have not obtained through the ballot box.

This is why the CP has had to embark on a sectarian course toward the SP to reaffirm its own standing as "the number-one party of the working class," while at the same time failing to offer any overall political solution. Leaders of the CP have advanced the idea that the overall solution offered by the Common Program downplayed the day-to-day struggles of the workers. Georges Ségué, a member of the Political Bureau and general secretary of the CGT,² recently told the federation's national committee that national actions involving workers in different industries could only come about "through a proliferation of initiatives in action at all levels." And to make sure he got the point across he added that the level of struggles had not yet reached that point "because we are still seeing a tendency to wait for something to come down from above, to wait for a national call that would serve as a spark!"

This policy will be carried out up to the 1981 presidential elections, in which, as Marchais has already stated, there will be a CP candidate. While declaring its "loyalty to the Union [of the Left] against the betrayal of the Socialists," and its eagerness to seek "rank-and-file unity," the CP will continue this policy of splitting the workers ranks for many months if not years. In no way will it point toward an overall working-class response.

The CP will do all it can to prevent the outbreak of a general strike, in face of which it would be totally disarmed. Lacking a class-collaborationist governmental solution of its own it would have to submit to the humiliating terms of the SP.

In order to continue presenting itself as a "national" party, as a "governmental party"—that is, as a party in which the bourgeoisie can place confidence when the time comes—the CP will step up its ultrachauvinist policy of defending "national interests" against the multinational corporations and the "German-dominated Europe" (or sometimes the "German-American-dominated Europe").

A Turn, Not a Return to Stalinism à la Thorez and Jeannette Vermeersch

The Twenty-Third Congress represents a continuation of the Twenty-Second. While the Twenty-Second Congress officially took its distance from Leninism and the communist tradition, the Twenty-Third Congress continued this process.

The CP is sinking ever deeper into the road of class collaboration and the so-called "democratic transition to socialism." From now on the references to Lenin-

ism (absent, even as a ritual, from the political resolution) will vanish. Proletarian internationalism is replaced by "internationalist solidarity," and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is banished from its vocabulary.

As one contribution to the discussion column of *l'Humanité* put it, it is no longer a question of setting up "people's committees" or "committees of dual power." In the CP's strategy the key is "mass control over all the democratic openings that have been won step by step."

Moreover, to make clear that the CP does not intend to change its strategy, but will stick within the framework of "Eurocommunism," Marchais hastened to have two meetings with [Italian CP leader] Enrico Berlinguer after the Congress, one in Marseille and the other in Turin. There he reaffirmed the agreement of the French and Italian CPs on the essential questions.

Within this framework, the Twenty-Third Congress has nevertheless forcefully reaffirmed the "generally positive record of the socialist countries." It even went so far as to assert that "the situation of women in the socialist countries is unequaled anywhere else in the world."

The CP leadership has thus shown the limits of "Eurocommunism." They formally reject that which is an obstacle to the growth of the CP—the repulsion felt by the overwhelming majority of the workers toward Brezhnev's bloody caricature of socialism—and they therefore denounce the most blatant aspects of the bureaucratic dictatorship in the USSR and the "people's democracies." But they are very careful not to go so far as to break politically with the Kremlin, and they make their criticisms in extremely measured terms.

Thus the congress, turning a deaf ear, refused to come out in solidarity with the Czechoslovak dissidents of Charter 77 and with Sabata, who came to trial the same week the congress was held.

At the same time, to obtain sufficient latitude vis-à-vis the Kremlin, the French CP leadership maintains special ties with the Western CPs, and is even talking now about the need to reestablish fraternal ties with the People's Republic of China.

Marchais set the tone when he stated that "there's no lack of prophets predicting the death of Eurocommunism. Either they are deceiving themselves, or they're just lying."

Thus, it is in no way a question for the CP leadership of taking up the position of those few who are nostalgic for the good old days of Stalinism—a position expressed last year on television by Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch.³

There has not been any division within the CP leadership on this score.

2. Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor, one of France's two main trade-union federations).

3. Widow of former French CP General Secretary Maurice Thorez and known as a hard-line Stalinist.—*IP/I*

At the close of the pre-congress discussion, the party leadership congratulated itself on the numerical weakness of the vote against its line.

Out of 20,446 delegates to 98 local conferences, 63 reportedly voted against the draft resolution, while 151 abstained.

Out of 28,000 cells, 824 rejected the resolution.⁴

The first remarkable fact, however, is that opposition votes were expressed to such an extent—that they managed to get past the initial bureaucratic roadblocks.⁵ Nothing like this has happened in the French CP in fifty years.

Nevertheless these oppositions, whose ranks were swelled by the divisive policy pursued by the leadership and by the setback of March 1978, are still weak and heterogeneous.

Elleinstein,⁶ as it turned out, remained an outsider at this Congress. His efforts to pose as the champion of “de-Stalinization” have found definite echo within the party, but he is incapable of offering a real strategic and tactical alternative to the leadership. His fundamental anti-Leninism does not lead to a concrete policy that could mobilize party members “to the right.”

Of course his efforts to combat sectarianism toward the Social Democracy have coincided with the aspirations of many members. But they run up against what these same members instinctively see as the purpose of seeking unity with the Socialists: the beginning of a dogged fight, of a united front against the regime and the Barre plan. On this level the CP leadership is quick to reply that the party's edge must be preserved, and that a policy like Elleinstein's would only lead to lining up with the Social Democracy.

As far as the “Althusserians”⁷ and intellectuals are concerned, their main weakness is political.

They reject the deepening course toward dropping all ties with Leninism and whatever formally remains of it within the CP. But they have practically nothing to say about the tactics of the party, except, as is the case with many, to advocate a return to the Union of the Left, to a policy of union, without being capable of saying what this means in the *present* situation,

4. According to the criteria for representation used by the leadership, 824 cells would represent slightly more than 20,000 members. In fact one is dealing with a few thousand militants.

5. Only the majority is represented in the upper echelons of the party apparatus.

6. Jean Elleinstein, a prominent CP historian who has pressed the leadership to speed up the process of “Eurocommunism.”—*IP/I*

7. Philosopher Louis Althusser presents himself as a “left critic” of the CP leadership.—*IP/I*

after the March 1978 setback and the new political and social situation that ensued.

Nevertheless these critics have been acerbic and have courageously taken a position in favor of solidarity with the victims of repression in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and other countries of Eastern Europe, as Hélène Parmelin did, for example.

Politically the most vigorous opposition has been expressed in the bulletin *Luttes et Débats* (Struggles and Debates), which is edited by some worker militants of the CP. This bulletin, which is open to contributions by all CP members, tries to compensate for the lack of democratic discussion, which the handpicked discussion columns of *L'Humanité* or *France Nouvelle* [the CP weekly] hardly make up for.

A Manifesto of Fifteen Worker Militants has been published by its authors. The *Manifesto* constitutes a class-struggle alternative to the leadership's strategy. It counterposes the line of a workers united front to the policies of division and class collaboration. It proclaims that:

Reformism can never be fought by sectarianism, but only through action and unity, based on unifying demands that tie every economic struggle to the political struggle. We should press for coordination of struggles, those in progress and those to come. We need to build workers solidarity around these same struggles. . . .

We should propose to the workers that they organize themselves in these struggles (through rank-and-file strike committees) because action is not decreed from above, but motivated and impelled by the ranks. We need to agitate for unity of the workers parties and trade unions on the basis of unifying demands. . . .

A general strike will only be prepared within this framework, not by hoping for some great hypothetical upheaval. . . .

Our party must concretize the political openings for the establishment of a government of the workers parties, the CP and SP, which would have as its program the satisfaction of the demands raised by the workers, and would maintain participatory structures of workers democracy for the toiling masses (rank-and-file committees, factory committees, neighborhood committees). On the basis of a common front of the workers parties and trade unions, we will be able to pose the question of satisfaction of our demands and of political change by means of an indefinite general strike. . . .

We have no use for a program proposing the democratization of bourgeois democracy, or the maintenance of a market economy, despite nationalizations. How can we claim to follow the logic of planning for human needs, while staying within the laws of the capitalist system based on profits? . . .

It is as Communists, as militants involved in struggles, that we make this contribution to a debate which is indispensable in the party today.

This orientation unquestionably marks the appearance of an opposition to the left of the CP leadership—something all the more notable in that it has been put forward by workers. But despite its good press, it must be kept in mind that this opposition remains extremely small, and that it does not yet have the forces to take

on the leadership, notably through representation at the party congress.

The Coming Crisis

The contradictions with which the CP is riddled were not immediately apparent at the party congress, but that does not mean they have disappeared. This is particularly true as concerns the CGT and its relationship to the CP.

The leadership has been aware of this problem, and published a special feature in *L'Humanité* on the CP's trade-union work—a rare event. The chief aim was to reaffirm the primacy of the party over the unions, and of party activity in the workplace over trade-union activity. It sought in this way to show Socialists in the CGT that the CP was keeping an eye on them, and would not allow them to go too far.

The absence of a political perspective is bitterly felt by trade-union militants, who are the most directly faced with the Barre plan's attacks and the workers' desire to fight back.

Isolated on the trade-union level, the CGT in fact has no alternative with which to oppose the “recentering” of the CFDT,⁸ and its proclamations about the necessity of struggle inevitably run up against the policy of the CP.

The differences within the bureaucracy were made clear at the most recent National Committee meeting of the CGT. There were some CP militants who favored splitting from the FEN,⁹ at least on the local level, and setting up a union tied directly to the CGT. There were expressions of regret over the failure of struggles to lead to significant results. There were problems with carrying out the positions on trade-union unity adopted at the CGT's Fortieth Congress (positions which the most sectarian CPers viewed as a resurrection of the Common Program with the Socialists!). There were Séguy's statements about the nonimplementation of the Fortieth Congress decisions.

These tensions are a distorted reflection of the contradictions being felt in the ranks of the trade-union federation.

It is through the CGT that the CP's divisive, chauvinist, class-collaborationist policies collide most directly with the desires and the struggles of the working class. This is why the crisis of the French CP will have repercussions, especially in the CGT and in the latter's relationship with the CP fraction. □

8. Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (French Democratic Federation of Labor, the country's other major trade-union federation). “Recentering” is the term the CFDT leadership has given to its present policy of focusing on “trade-union” as opposed to “political” questions.—*IP/I*

9. Fédération de l'Éducation Nationale (National Education Federation, the country's largest teachers union, organized as an independent federation).—*IP/I*

France—CFDT Leadership Under Fire From Ranks

In face of an ongoing economic crisis the European trade-union bureaucracies can no longer continue with the traditional tactics they developed for times of expansion. The recent convention of the European Federation of Trade Unions (CES) stressed that "new" solutions have to be found.

Among the organizations in the CES, the French Democratic Federation of Labor (CFDT) sees itself in the forefront of the search for "new" responses to the crisis.

The CFDT's Thirty-Eighth Convention, which took place in Brest at the beginning of May, was supposed to endorse a policy known in France as "recentering." They have been applying this policy since the defeat of the Union of the Left in the March 1978 legislative elections.

But the Brest Convention did not go well for the union leadership. Massive opposition to the recentering policy emerged, testifying to the workers' firm refusal to go along with a policy that amounts to administering the capitalist austerity.

Coming just a short time after the defeat of Michel Rocard's bid for leadership of the French Socialist Party, the CFDT convention gives an indication of the dominant tendencies in the French working class. Despite the bureaucratic leaderships in the workers organizations, the dominant tendency is not toward retreat and demoralization.

The CFDT is the second-largest union federation in France, after the General Federation of Labor (CGT). From 1966 to 1976 it doubled in size and today has one million members.

In contrast to Force Ouvrière, the third French union federation, the CFDT has developed in the most combative sectors of waged workers. It remains, however, proportionally less blue-collar and more white-collar than the CGT.

But the CFDT's distinctiveness is due to its roots, which are in the French Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC)—the class-collaborationist Christian union founded in the 1920s.

After the end of the Nazi occupation, the CFTC developed federations in basic industry and underwent an internal evolution. A nonreligious tendency gained ground, and succeeded in taking it over in 1964, the year the CFDT was born.

The birth of the CFDT was accompanied by a split, with the minority maintaining the CFTC. Since then the CFTC has not had any real growth.

The CFDT also went through a parallel political evolution. Although it was linked to the Christian Democracy at the end of

the Nazi occupation, it progressively broke its ties to Christian Democracy and then turned toward the socialist parties. This evolution was part of the evolution of the Christian workers movement toward socialist ideas and the socialist movement.

The Brest convention has sealed this evolution by deciding to totally pull out of the World Federation of Labor, a Christian group, in favor of the European Federation of Trade Unions.

The CFDT leadership openly stated that this decision to change its international affiliation meant a complete break with the "Christian Democratic ghetto," that it meant deepening the CFDT's entry into the socialist workers movement on the international plane.

The CFDT's deepgoing political evolution over the past twenty years makes its relationship to the Socialist Party very different from the type of relationship that exists between the West German Trade Union Federation (DGB) and the West German SP.

The French SP has hardly any presence in the workplaces and union organizations. In line with the theoretical schema of workerism, the CFDT leadership would like the SP to become an extension for carrying out working-class activity (meaning, to the CFDT, trade-union activity) on the parliamentary and governmental level. The CFDT views itself as being simultaneously a trade union and the carrier of a specific strategy.

This conception of the CFDT as a union-party is used to justify the continuing organizational division of the union movement. At the same time, it is invoked to exclude the free confrontation of different orientations inside the CFDT.

After the defeat of the left in the March 1978 elections, the CFDT leaders launched with great fanfare their policy of "recentering." Using "leftist" verbiage (according to them, what was lacking in order to win was the "social dynamic"), they threw themselves totally into a policy of calculated negotiations with the government and the bosses, in which the CFDT negotiators develop the "acceptable" proposals for the other side.

They did this, for example, in relation to grants for the unemployed and the duration and arrangement of the workweek. The employers and the government had instituted a system of paying those laid off due to economic conditions 90% of their old wage. This measure was adopted to make it possible to carry out the first massive layoffs in industry without too much resistance.

For some months the bosses have been

relentlessly calling for lowering the benefits, in return for higher payments for those unemployed who were not laid off for economic reasons. This resulted in an agreement, to which the CGT came around, that did away with the 90 percent that had been won. The agreement was hailed by the employers as an example to follow and as a model of trade-union comportment in face of economic difficulties.

Along the same lines, the CFDT itself is proposing to the employers a plan for a (modest) reduction in work-time, tied to a system of variable hours over the year. This was its response to the National Council of French Employers, which linked discussion on reducing work-time to discussion on apportioning work (the employers hope to be able to establish a degree of "flexibility" that will allow them to adapt the number of hours worked to the needs of production).

Regarding the famous thirty-five-hour week, the CFDT leadership has made it part of its trademark. In fact, however, the CFDT leadership does not view this as a current demand, as something to fight for now, but rather as a "perspective." Moreover, the CFDT leadership is even saying that it might be accompanied on a case-by-case basis by a reduction in wages.

The central theme of the federation leadership is to turn the focus of activity back into the trade-union arena rather than the political arena (i.e., where activity is determined by the needs of the parties and their electoralism). In the name of this concept, in recent months the CFDT has launched extremely heated attacks against the CGT, has rejected united actions on a national level in defense of Social Security benefits and the steelworkers' jobs, and has contributed heavily to introducing the same climate of division that now reigns between the CP and the SP into the relations between trade-union federations.

The CFDT leadership imparts an almost historic dimension to this recentering policy. The argument is that since the "political" road (the road of the parties) has run aground, it is necessary to put action (by the unions) back on center-stage.

This policy is dressed up under the formula that "social struggles are the motor force of change." It is accompanied by a self-criticism regarding recent years. CFDT General-Secretary Edmond Maire explains that the CFDT was off the track from 1974 to 1978, when the electoral victory of the left seemed sure.

Thus the recentering policy rests on the existing CP-SP division: there is no political solution, the CFDT leaders repeat.

They clearly indicate that they think that recentering provides a perspective, the only one possible, for the whole workers movement, not just for the CFDT.

Their justification of this policy is based on their analysis that it is possible to gradually impose a new type of development, in a time of economic crisis.

The CFDT is putting its emphasis on reducing existing inequalities (by dividing the same total of wages more evenly), making counterproposals on industrial questions (which leads it to accept the basis premise of restructuring and layoffs, especially in the steel industry), and, finally, putting forward what it calls "qualitative" demands. "Qualitative" demands address the context of life, aiming for an amelioration of the present conditions of exploitation.

The CFDT leadership acknowledges that it has taken its inspiration from two European experiences. The first is Scandinavian trade unionism, which is well situated within a dense contractual network.

The other inspiration is Italian trade unionism, which is oriented toward negotiations on industrial policies. The CFDT is trying to rehabilitate the now not very attractive image of the West German trade-union federation, the DGB, in the consciousness of militants.

For a year now, in negotiations after negotiations, the CFDT leadership has been running after what it calls "significant results." All in vain. The government and the bosses have been fully playing the CFDT card, without so far giving it anything it asked for in return.

The CGT, which is nervous about the breakdown in united activity with the CFDT (which had been traditional since 1966), blames its partner for its own inactivity and its own capitulations. And finally, the SP leadership has come into conflict with the leadership of the CFDT.

In fact the Maire leadership has not been sparing in its support, including public support, to Michel Rocard in the internal struggle going on in the SP. The CFDT leadership denounced Mitterrand's "unity" orientation, his desire not to lend the slightest credence to the CP's charges of a "turn to the right" by the SP, as more concessions to the CP, as the pursuit of the "strategy of defeat," as an attempt to change society "from above."

An important, though not recent, element in the CFDT's policy is its commitment to "Europe." Edmond Maire calls for the development of a European class consciousness. In reality what he means is total support for the establishment of Common Market institutions and for the emergence of a European imperialism that can take on its American and Japanese competition.

The CFDT leadership maintains that the struggle over big demands, such as the thirty-five-hour workweek, can only won

through negotiations on a Europe-wide scale.

The period leading up to the CFDT convention was handled very bureaucratically. There was no discussion column in the union press. The draft resolutions were abstract in the extreme and the upcoming convention was hardly a passionate topic in the CFDT during the preconvention discussion.

But it was quite different at the Brest convention itself, to which the unions sent delegates. (In the CFDT, the union, which is the basic unit of the organization, is a territorial structure that encompasses all the members in a single economic branch in a given region. The factory sections, while important, do not constitute a union.)

Edmond Maire's activities report was received coolly, and the general-secretary was applauded only when he made a ritual profession of faith in unity. In contrast to what certain press organs would have us believe, the report was not followed by a volley of recriminations. Rather it was met with a real assault on the recentering policy.

The fight was launched by two groupings of Parisian unions. One of these groupings viewed the recentering policy as a real revision of strategy from the previous course. These unions maintained the need to break with capitalism. The theme of the need for a "break" had been placed at the center of the Socialist Party convention in Metz, held shortly before the CFDT convention at Brest, by members of the CERES* and supporters of Mitterrand, against those of Michel Rocard.

This first grouping also denounced the CFDT's adaptation to the capitalist plans for restructuring industry and its abandonment of any perspective for political change. They posed the need for "all-inclusive," "everyone together" activities in opposition to the bosses' anti-working-class measures.

The second group, on the other hand, felt that the recentering policy was a continuation of the wait-and-see policy the CFDT pursued in the pre-election period.

This second grouping of unions denounced the policy of managing the crisis, the downward revision of demands. It called for the systematic development of interunion unity in action. It proposed action in the perspective of a movement of everyone—of the June 1936 or May 1968 type that forces the CP and SP to provide a political solution.

This grouping also denounced the exclusion of CFDT oppositionists, including several trade-union sections. One of these, the CFDT section at the Usinor steelworks in Dunkirk, had been "suspended" on the pretext of "financial irregularities," before

*Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches, et d'Education Socialistes (Center for Socialist Studies, Research, and Education), the SP "left wing."—*IP/I*

the convention—at a time when it was in the midst of the struggle against the restructuring of the steel industry.

In fact, the Dunkirk Usinor CFDT had opposed the policy of negotiating layoffs that the Metalworking Federation of the CFDT was following. It had participated, along with the Longwy Usinor CFDT branch, in the steelworkers march on Paris last March 23, which had been organized by the CGT alone and denounced by the CFDT leadership as a politicians' operation.

Most of the unions that took part in the general debate echoed these criticisms in one form or another. Some called for a "left recentering." Many others reported on the wretched results of the recentering policy in the plants.

In this vein, a grouping of metal unions in the Nantes region said:

There has been a lot of talk about joint actions, of coordination. . . . In fact, we return to the theme of negotiation-demand, plant by plant. We have done it and the results are rather meager. Our policy increased the disparity between plants.

Many contracts are becoming dead letters. This strategy has broken down our class solidarity.

In closing the two-day debate, Edmond Maire was obliged to acknowledge the existence of a strong opposition at the convention, an important nucleus basing itself on a totally different orientation from the one put forward by the federation leadership.

Despite the efforts of the general-secretary to mobilize his supporters, the vote on the activities report, which was presented as the decisive vote at the convention, yielded only 57 percent in favor of the outgoing leadership.

In the CFDT there has never been an activities report that got so few votes. Thirty-one percent of the delegates voted against the report, compared with 20 percent at the previous convention in Annecy, three years earlier.

While the resolutions were adopted by larger majorities, they were the subject of big fights over the amendments (these had been sorted and chosen, meaning modified, in advance by the leadership).

The main fight, which involved all the oppositionists and many others as well, was on the question of the thirty-five-hour workweek with no reduction in wages. An amendment that the leadership incorporated and defended raised the possibility of discussing a reduction in wages linked to a reduction in the workweek on a case-by-case, plant by plant, basis.

This amendment was rejected by 57 percent of the votes. In the context of the convention the meaning is completely clear. It is a rejection of the idea of watering down demands, of a policy of austerity for the workers.

An amendment on breaking with capitalism, uniting the two opposition group-

ings from the Parisian unions mentioned above, received 41 percent of the votes. Various amendments to the resolution on functioning, which opposed the most bureaucratic aspects of the CFDT's day-to-day practices, got nearly 30 percent of the votes.

Several lessons can now be drawn from the Thirty-eighth Convention of the CFDT. First off, we can conclude that only a minority of the members of the plant units support the recentering line, because a convention overrepresents the bureaucratic apparatus in various ways. Thus the recentering policy has not gone over well in the CFDT, even though there are calls to apply it in concrete situations.

The federation leadership, which is based on an apparatus that has been able to consolidate and homogenize itself in past years, will apply its line come what may. But it has lost a first and very important battle: its plan was to actively mobilize the CFDT around its line, in order to make the CFDT a political agent exerting weight on the CGT and the SP.

The other lesson is the appearance of a trade-union opposition that puts forward the broad outlines of an alternative class-struggle orientation. The CFDT bureaucracy will surely be extremely attentive to this opposition and will not hesitate to fight it with all the means at its disposal.

The leadership's present strength rests on the fact that the opposition is made up only of unions. These can be brought together to apply pressure at a convention, but in daily union life they are not a framework that can centralize struggles and experiences.

Although several federations of industry and several regions made clear at the convention that they had disagreements, sometimes major ones, with the recentering policy, none of them took part in the fight, much less produced a counterresolution that could have brought together the union opposition nationally.

The Maire leadership obviously gains all the advantages from such a situation since at this point there is no alternative leadership counterposed to it. □

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Students Demand 'U.S. Stop Interference'

The Imperialist Campaign Against Ghana

By Ernest Harsch

The June 4 seizure of power in Ghana by a group of junior officers and rank-and-file soldiers has raised concern in a number of imperialist capitals.

The measures taken by the new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)—a purge of the military hierarchy; the execution of eight senior officers (including three former heads of state); the arrest of corrupt businessmen, traders, and officials; steps to control prices and combat hoarding—have been greeted with considerable enthusiasm by many Ghanaians. The imperialists are worried that this popular response could lead to mass struggles that challenge their vital interests.

Following the executions of former military dictators Afrifa, Acheampong, and Akuffo, the imperialists began to exert pressure on Ghana. Under the guise of defending "human rights," the American, British, and West German governments demanded a halt in executions.

Several of the neocolonial regimes in West Africa, including those in Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Upper Volta, and Ivory Coast, followed this imperialist lead. The military rulers of Nigeria cut off all oil shipments to Ghana, which is dependent on Nigeria for 80 percent of its oil supplies. The military juntas in Upper Volta and Benin likewise halted shipments of meat, corn, and oil.

In an interview in the July 9 issue of the London weekly *West Africa*, Flight-Lt. Jerry Rawlings, the chairman of the AFRC, denounced these moves as a politically motivated "blockade" against Ghana, designed to sabotage the AFRC's reform program.

Ghana had already been suffering from shortages of key commodities before June 4. The blockade has seriously worsened the situation.

Under the pressure of this imperialist-inspired campaign, Rawling announced June 30 that the AFRC would carry out no more executions, although it would continue to try corrupt officials and sentence those found guilty to forced labor.

The AFRC, however, is also under considerable mass pressure to push forward with the "housecleaning exercise" it initiated. This was evident in the popular reaction to the executions. A dispatch from Accra in the July 2 *West Africa* reported that the June 26 executions of Afrifa, Akuffo, and four other officers were watched by more than 5,000 persons. The report continued:

There was cheering, booing, and hooting when the condemned men were brought, already blindfolded. Ghana News Agency reported that people were shouting "Action! Action!" and "Finish them all." . . .

Public reaction in Accra seems much in favour of the executions. One example of this came at the University of Ghana, Legon, when the first National announcement came on the radio's one o'clock news. There was a huge roar and cheering which could be heard all over the campus, and one group of students were discussing which officers should be shot next and which should have already been shot.

On July 3, the Student Council at the University of Ghana passed a resolution calling for more executions. The same day, thousands of students in the capital demonstrated in support of the AFRC and to protest the American, British, and Nigerian pressure against Ghana. The protesters carried placards reading "Go Home Yankees" and "U.S. Stop Unwarranted Interference in Our Affairs." Some of them stormed the American embassy and tore down the U.S. flag.

To an extent, the AFRC has sought to identify itself with the popular anger against the corruption, graft, tax evasion, and hoarding that flourished under the previous military regimes. The council is dominated by the lower ranks; of its fourteen members, there are two commanders, three captains, two sergeants, six corporals, and one private.

In an interview in the June 24 *Washington Post*, Rawlings, referring to Franz Fanon's book *The Wretched of the Earth*, emphasized that "that is what we are all about. It's not a black-white thing here but the rich suppressing the poor, exploiting us, oppressing us." He added, "I've always wanted to do something to correct injustice."

But at the same time, the AFRC has sought to keep the masses from mobilizing independently. It has told workers to postpone their demands for higher pay and has reappointed some officials from previous regimes to positions of authority.

As the July 3 student demonstrations showed, however, the AFRC's control is limited. Rawlings has noted that some troops were "over-enthusiastic" in arresting officers. The July 2 *West Africa*, citing a Ghana News Agency dispatch, reported that "every senior police officer in Tamale has been arrested by non-commissioned officers in an apparent uprising." □