

Colombia—Hundreds Jailed, Tortured in Raids

By Fred Murphy

More than 2,400 persons have been jailed by the Turbay Ayala regime in Colombia in the course of an "antiterrorist" dragnet that began January 16. Five hundred of these prisoners are being held without charge in military barracks; many have been tortured.

Intercontinental Press/Inprecor correspondent Eduardo Medrano reports from Bogotá that "besides detentions, massive raids on residences in the poor neighborhoods of the capital, and torture, the government has gone still further, curtailing freedoms and constitutional guarantees for the entire population.

"On January 9 the cabinet authorized use of the draconian Article 28 of the Constitution, which permits detention without trial and suspends the right of habeas corpus. The regime has even revoked the credentials of the Associated Press, apparently in reprisal for its having reported the suspension of liberties."

On January 11 Turbay decreed that persons sentenced for "political" offenses would be taken to the sinister island-prison of Gorgona off the Pacific coast.

The pretext for the wave of repression is the December 31 theft of some 4,300 weapons from an army barracks in the Usaquén district of Bogotá. The urban guerrilla group known as the April 19 Movement (M-19) claimed credit for this elaborate operation, which involved the digging of an eighty-meter-long tunnel into the arms depot.

Most of the weapons were recovered January 16 in army raids on M-19 "people's jails" in Cali and Bogotá. The next day the army launched its campaign, described by Medrano as follows:

The raids are carried out mostly in the early hours of the morning, without any genuine judicial order. Instead, the officer in charge fills in an address on a warrant a few minutes before the raid. After searching and nearly wrecking the house, the officer arrests at random whichever resident he considers the most "suspicious." The prisoners are taken secretly to the stables at the Usaquén Barracks, where they are submitted to constant "interrogations" for four or five days. They are held blindfolded in the open air and forced to remain standing, without food and without being able to sleep or rest.

Among those being held are the former dean of the National University, sociologist Orlando Fals Borda; his wife, also a sociologist, Maria Salazar de Fals; film and theater director Carlos Duplat; and attorneys Carlos Rodríguez, Rafael Ardila, and Abel Otero. On January 24 fifteen persons, including a Catholic priest and three Uruguayan citizens, were brought before a military court and charged with "aiding" the M-19. The Uruguayans have been deprived of legal counsel.

The most notorious case of torture that has come to light is that of the twenty-sixyear-old physician, Dr. Olga López de Roldán. Medrano reports:

She and her four-year-old daughter were detained January 6. López was blindfolded, and made to believe that her daughter was being held in the same conditions. The child had actually been left at the home of Dr. López's father, but military intelligence agents had taped the voice of the child crying and calling for her mother. They tricked López with this tape, and even threatened to rape the child if López did not "confess" about where the stolen arms were hidden. At this point López attempted suicide by slashing her wrists.

When López's father, ex-Senator Ivan López Botero, tried to secure her release, the minister of the interior told him he could do nothing because "the military doesn't like anyone interfering in their affairs." (The Colombian government prides itself on being one of Latin America's few "democracies.")

Twelve attorneys involved in defending the hundreds of prisoners have sent a letter to President Turbay denouncing the "physical and psychological torture" being utilized by the military authorities, and demanding that Turbay "order whoever is responsible . . . to suspend the torture completely and absolutely. . . . "

The lawyers also complain of numerous restrictions on their defense efforts, saying that the military "has denied us access to the judges' offices and submitted us to curtailed appointment schedules, along with numerous other obstacles and forms of harrassment."

Letters and telegrams demanding an immediate halt to the torture, due process of law, and the release of all the prisoners should be sent to Colombian embassies or to Julio César Turbay Ayala, Presidente de la República, Bogotá, Colombia.

British Truckers Bury Social Contract

By G. K. Newey

The truck drivers' strike that has paralyzed much of British transportation since early January is nearing an end on terms that spell a big victory for the drivers and a big defeat for the Callaghan govern-



JAMES CALLAGHAN

ment's attempts to impose a 5% wage ceiling.

Drivers in southwestern England agreed on January 29 to a settlement that would give them a 20.75% raise. They had been demanding a raise of 22.5%.

Prior to the settlement the employers

had argued they could not afford to grant more than 15%. The drivers' victory gives them a base pay of \$128 for a forty-hour week.

Drivers in northwestern England, however, are still holding out for the full 22.5% their union has been demanding.

Prior to the victory of the truckers, the most serious blow to the government's austerity policy had come in November, when striking Ford workers were able to win raises of 16.85% after a two-month strike.

Unions representing more than one million low-paid public workers have been staging sporadic walk-outs for several weeks, affecting hospitals, garbage collection, street cleaning, and the like. They are demanding wage increases of up to 40%. Although there had been talk of accepting raises of 15%, the truckers settlement has given rise to a new determination to hold out for more.

Prime Minister Callaghan, in the meantime, has suggested raising the government's wage guidelines to 8%. But this figure has little chance of gaining acceptance in the wake of the results the truckers won through their militant activity, which relied heavily on flying picket squads to close down facilities that were not being struck. \Box

Pope Hails 'Simple Joys' of Poverty

By Will Reissner

When Pope John Paul II's chartered jet touched down January 26 in Mexico, where the pope was to attend the Third Latin American Conference of Bishops, he was warmly greeted by President José López Portillo.

Although President López describes himself as a "Hegelian," and although the Mexican constitution prohibits the wearing of clerical garb in public, the president was anxious to cash in on the excitement surrounding the pope's visit. He wished John Paul II success in his work in Mexico.

The pope has shown that he is a master of public relations. He was endlessly photographed kissing babies, wearing cowboy hats, donning Indian head garb, and doing all the things one expects from a slick politician.

But there was another side to his trip. John Paul II's mission in Mexico was intended to remove any doubt about Vatican disapproval of social activism among Latin American priests.

The last bishops' conference was held in Colombia in 1968. It produced a document calling for the clergy to oppose "the tremendous social injustices that exist in Latin America." The conference opened the way for what came to be known as the "theology of liberation," which has encouraged a layer of Latin American priests and nuns to oppose the ruling classes of their countries.

In 1972 a conservative bishop, Alfonso López Trujillo, became head of the bishops' group and began to reassert the church's traditional role of defending the status quo.

During his week-long stay in Mexico, the pope came down squarely on the side of the traditionalists. He gave the conference clear instructions that the clergy were to stay away from politics and social activism.

John Paul II told the gathering that following the 1968 meeting "interpretations have been given that have been at times contradictory, not always correct, not always beneficial for the church." Participation in political movements, he said, was "inopportune and counterproductive.'

"You are not," the pope told the assembly, "social workers, political leaders, or functionaries of a temporal power." He warned them that they "should not have illusions of serving religion if we take an exaggerated interest in the broad field of temporal problems."

At a mass performed before 200,000 in a Mexico City soccer stadium the pope went a bit too far. When he referred to the

"simple joys of the poor," he was soundly hissed by many in the crowd.

The supporter of "simple joys of the poor" then went to the Basilica of Guadalupe, recently completed at a cost of \$24 million, where he prayed at the site of a holy relic that is protected by a 27-ton railing of silver.

			_
In TI	his Is	Closing News Date: February 3, 1979	
FEATURES	118	Gloomy Economic Outlook for the Semicolonial World —by Charles-André Udry	
USA	100	550 Attend New York Memorial Meeting for Joseph Hansen—by Susan Wald	
	101	\$8,000 Raised for Hansen Publishing Fund	
IRAN	102	Millions Greet Return of Khomeini —by Fred Murphy	
	103	Tehran on Eve of Khomeini's Return —by Cindy Jaquith	
	104	One Million March Against Bakhtiar —by Cindy Jaquith	
	105	Death Agony of Monarchy and Tasks of Revolutionary Socialists	
	106	"The Revolution Has Made It Possible for Us to Return"-by Reza Baraheni	
CHINA	108	Dissidents, Peasantry Voice Grievances —by Leslie Evans	
	110	Teng's Visit to Washington —by Dan Dickeson	
	110	Visit Sends Maoists Into a Frenzy —by David Frankel	
INDIA	111	Unionists Defend Right to Strike —by Sharad Jhaveri	
PERU	112	Interview With Hugo Blanco	
	113	Junta Whipping Up War Fever —by C.D. Castano	
	114	Say No to the War Drive!-by Hugo Blanco	
SOUTH AFRICA	115	Crossroads—A Black Community's Fight for Survival—by Ernest Harsch	
NEWS ANALYSIS	98	Colombia—Hundreds Jailed, Tortured in Police Raids—by Fred Murphy	
	98	British Truckers Bury Social Contract —by G.K. Newey	
	99	Pope Hails "Simple Joys" of Poverty —by Will Reissner	
AROUND THE WORLD	107	Students Shake Emperor Bokassa's Throne	
SELECTIONS	12.1		
FROM THE LEFT DRAWINGS	124 98	James Callaghan; 107, Ian Smith; 110,	
Diamindo	50	Teng Hsiao-p'ing; 114, Hugo Blanco —by Copain	
COVER PHOTO	97	Crossroads, South Africa —by Ernest Harsch	

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Published in New York each Monday except the first in January and third and fourth in August.

Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. Editor: Mary-Alice Waters

Contributing Editors: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack. Managing Editor: Michael Baumann,

Editorial Staff: Jon Britton, Dan Dickeson, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Fred Murphy, Susan Wald, Will Reissner.

Business Manager: Harvey McArthur.

Copy Editor: David Martin.

Technical Staff: Paul Deveze, Larry Ingram, Arthur Lobman, Kevin McGuire, James M. Morgan, Sally Rhett

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material stands on the program of the Fourth International.

To Subscribe: For one year send \$24 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail.

In Europe: For air-speeded subscriptions, write to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 50, London N1 2XP. England. In Australia: Write to Pathfinder Press, P.O. Box K208, Haymarket 2000. In New Zealand: Write to Socialist Books. P.O. Box 1663, Wellington.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Intercontinental Press is published by the 408 Printing and Publishing Corporation, 408 West Street, New York, N.Y. 10014. Offices at 408 West Street, New York, N.Y.

Copyright © 1979 by Intercontinental Press.

550 Attend New York Memorial Meeting for Joseph Hansen

By Susan Wald

NEW YORK—More than 550 persons gathered here January 28 to pay tribute to Joseph Hansen.

Hansen, a longtime leader of the Socialist Workers Party and Fourth International, died January 18 at age sixty-eight. He was editor of *Intercontinental Press/ Inprecor* since its inception in 1963 and a former editor of the *Militant*. From 1937 to 1940 he served in Mexico as a secretary to Leon Trotsky.

The meeting launched a special \$20,000 fund to begin publication of Hansen's most important political and theoretical writings.

Mary-Alice Waters, a member of the SWP Political Committee, chaired the meeting. In opening remarks she commented, "The appropriate word to describe this afternoon's gathering is a rally—a rally to build the revolutionary Marxist movement that Joe Hansen spent his entire life advancing."

Comrades, friends, and co-workers of Hansen came from all over the eastern United States to attend. The Revolutionary Workers League/Ligue Ouvrière Révolutionnaire sent a delegation from Toronto and Montréal.

More than 75 messages poured in from around the world from longtime friends and colleagues, from sections and sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International, from branches of the Socialist Workers Party, chapters of the Young Socialist Alliance, and from other political organizations.

One message that was received with special enthusiasm was from the Political Committee of the newly formed Socialist Workers Party of Iran.

"Comrade Hansen . . . played a central role in educating our leadership and developing our party," the Iranian Trotskyists wrote:

Comrade Hansen taught us to concentrate on the problems of our own country and be *Iranian* Trotskyists...

Now in the midst of the third Iranian revolution, we are struggling to build the proletarian party.... This is the best tribute that Comrade Hansen would have wanted us to pay to his memory.

During the course of the meeting, numerous messages were read from comrades with whom Hansen had collaborated over the years in building the Fourth International, including Hugo Blanco, Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, Nahuel Moreno, Peng Shu-tse and Chen Pilan, and Charles-André Udry. With the death of Joseph Hansen, wrote Mandel and Udry:

... the Socialist Workers Party, the Fourth International, and the international labor movement have suffered an irreparable loss.

Having had the opportunity to be a close personal collaborator of Leon Trotsky and of Jim Cannon, Joe tried all his life to apply the political and organizational principles he learned from these great revolutionists....

One of [his] most important contributions ... was the decisive role he played in the early sixties in preparing and making possible the reunification of the Fourth International. His contribution to the struggle to maintain the unity of the movement, in spite of the serious differences which divided us in the 1969-1976 period, was of equal importance.

Working together with Joe during various periods of this whole stage in the history of the Fourth International, we had more than one occasion to appreciate the maturity of his judgement, his leadership qualities, and his complete personal integrity.

Speakers at the gathering spanned several generations, ranging from those who had known Hansen throughout his long years in the revolutionary movement, to younger leaders who had collaborated closely with him toward the end of his life.

Art Sharon, a member of the American Trotskyist movement since 1933 and longtime leader of the Socialist Workers Party who had worked with Hansen for several decades in the SWP and the leadership of the Fourth International, talked about Hansen's early years in the Trotskyist movement.

Joe first took up the tasks and challenges of the revolutionary movement forty-five years ago. I can't think of any other country where revolutionists span such a long period of history—not just Joe, but a whole generation of leaders....

And as a result of the very conscious work done by Joe and others over the past two decades, a new generation has now stepped in to take over those tasks and those challenges.

Cristina Rivas, a member of the Political Bureau of the Mexican Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT—Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores), told of how Hansen had convinced her to come to New York in 1974, to begin including a few pages in Spanish in each issue of *Intercontimental Press*. That experience helped pave the way for launching the fortnightly magazine *Perspectiva Mundial*.

This collaboration with Hansen was "the richest and most educational experience of my life," Rivas said. "There were many things to learn from the way he worked, and how he collaborated with young comrades."

Rivas spoke of Hansen's particular interest in and knowledge of Latin America, "a continent he knew even better than many Latin American Trotskyists."

He was especially fond of Mexico, a country he understood well.

I must say that for an American comrade, it's always hard to gain the full confidence of revolutionists in Latin America. This is a reaction caused by the imperialist oppression of our countries. But Joe had won the respect and confidence of the vast majority of us in Latin America. This was due to the fact that he was a true internationalist, who had deep respect for our traditions. He always taught us to build a party that could stand on its own feet.

Rivas pledged the support of Mexican Trotskyists in the efforts to publish Hansen's writings in Spanish, particularly those on Latin America.

Michael Baumann, managing editor of Intercontinental Press/Inprecor, spoke of how Hansen had passed on the high standards and painstaking methods of revolutionary journalism during their five years of collaboration.

Joe insisted that every staff member meet the highest standard of accuracy and attention to detail in their writing, editing, and translating. In his view, any job that needed to be done needed to be done right.

At the same time he was careful not to misuse his authority as an editor. He worked with those around him in such a way as to build up their confidence in their own abilities.

Manuel Aguilar Mora, national secretary of the Mexican PRT, spoke on behalf of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International:

Hansen's decisive contribution to the formation of the present-day Fourth International in Latin America was fundamental in the long and hard debate on revolutionary perspectives which took place in our ranks from 1969 to 1976.

On the basic issues, his evaluation proved to be the correct one.

In this way, Joe Hansen was a living link in the collaboration between revolutionary Marxists in the Americas.

Aguilar noted that Hansen's participation in continuing political discussions on issues such as Stalinism and the problems of the political revolution in China would be missed.

Messages to the meeting from other political tendencies indicated the high esteem in which Hansen was held even by those with whom he had many political differences over the years. Tributes from the International Secretariat of the International Revolutionary Marxist Tendency led by Michel Raptis, and from Pierre Lambert on behalf of the Internationalist Communist Organization (OCI) of France, both noted Hansen's life-long dedication to the international socialist movement. Messages were also received from Ross Dowson of the Forward group in Canada, and from the Spark grouping in the United States.

One of the most penetrating messages came from Marvel Scholl and Farrel Dobbs, veteran leaders of the Socialist Workers Party. Together with Dobbs, Hansen shared central responsibility for leading the SWP over several decades. They wrote:

As part of the leadership team, [Hansen] played an especially strong role in helping to keep Marxist theory abreast of the latest objective trends... He wrote prolifically on these and other subjects in a precise, lucid manner....

Comparable qualities of revolutionary devotion were manifested by Joe on the organizational side. He functioned consistently as a loyal and disciplined comrade, accepting in good spirit whatever assignments he received and putting the party's needs above personal considerations. . . In every respect he was a good soldier who had enlisted for the duration in the revolutionary struggle for humanity's socialist future.

The final speaker was SWP National Secretary Jack Barnes, who had worked closely with Hansen over the last 15 years.

Barnes described Hansen's early years as the oldest of fifteen children in a poor working-class family, in southern Utah and Nevada and later in Salt Lake City.

It was reading about the Bolsheviks on the front pages of the newspapers that first got Joe interested in the broader world and gave him his first political sympathies. He began digging around in libraries, listening, arguing. He began devouring books. He quickly became known as the socialist and the Bolshevik. And of course in those days, everyone thought Bolsheviks were just wild-eyed bomb throwers.

Joe soon became known as the atheist, too, which was probably considered even worse.

The brutal depression, the struggles of the workers and farmers, these are the things that marked Joe as a young man. These are the things that prepared him to be won to Trotskyism, to a world view that was the least provincial, least narrowly American of any possible world view.

The internationalist perspective stuck with him to the end. To Joe, the Socialist Workers Party and the Fourth International were basically one and the same. To join one, you also joined the other. Every revolutionist is a party member in their own country, fights to make the revolution there first and foremost, and in doing so is an integral and invaluable part of the world party of socialist revolution.

Barnes went on to explain that Hansen's political life could be divided into three periods.

The first encompassed his recruitment at the University of Utah [1934]; the period of his

February 12, 1979

\$8,000 Raised for Hansen Publishing Fund

More than \$8,000 was raised for the Joseph Hansen Publishing Fund at the New York meeting. The aim of the fund is to collect \$20,000 by March 31 to publish some of the most important writings by Joseph Hansen.

"Many comrades have been inspired and impressed since last August by the publication of the first such collection of Joe's works on the Cuban revolution, which was one of Joe's finest contributions to Marxism," chairperson Mary-Alice Waters told the New York meeting.

"Today that book is serving to reeducate an entire generation of revolutionists on the understanding and appreciation of how to approach and analyze the great events of the class struggle as they are unfolding."

Waters said that plans are under way to publish the book in French, German, and Spanish.

The success of the publishing fund, Waters explained, will ensure the quickest possible publication of books by

experiences working with Jim Cannon on the West Coast; his years in Mexico learning politics and discipline alongside Trotsky—the single thing that most transformed Joe's life and marked him from that time forward.

The second period began after Trotsky's assassination, when Hansen returned to the United States and came to New York. During this period of the 1940s and 1950s, he took a variety of assignments and contributed as a party journalist.

The third period began with the victory of the Cuban revolution:

This historic event proved to Joe that a new period of the world revolution had opened. . . . The SWP's approach to Cuba was simple, and

Joe wrote more about it than anyone else.

Defend the revolution. And in doing that, exert every effort to help its leaders extend it.

Fight for and explain the need for a Leninist party in Cuba and on a world scale, and the need for socialist democracy. . . .

As the Cuban revolution unfolded, Joe reviewed and enriched the most fundamental conquests of Marxism: our understanding of the state and the government; the role of our class in the revolutionary epoch; and the role of the revolutionary party.

Barnes went on to explain that the second most important contribution Hansen made in the last period of his life was helping to lead the fight within the Fourth International for a correct revolutionary strategy in Latin America:

Beginning in late 1967, the leaders of the SWP realized that a growing section of the leadership of the Fourth International was moving toward elevating guerrilla warfare from a tactic to a strategy....

We were convinced that if a decisive turn was

Hansen on revolutionary strategy in Latin America, the workers and farmers government, and many other topics.

The fund was initiated following Hansen's death by Reba Hansen and by the contributing editors of *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*—George Novack, Ernest Mandel, Pierre Frank, and Livio Maitan.

The project has won wide international support. Among the most recent sponsors are Timothy Harding, Dave Holmes, Bohdan Krawchenko, Manuel Aguilar Mora, François Moreau, Joyce Meissenheimer, Evelyn Reed, Christina Rivas, Cathy Sedwick, and Art Sharon.

Twenty-nine initial sponsors of the fund were listed in last week's *IP/I*.

In addition to the New York gathering, Joseph Hansen Publishing Fund meetings will be held in numerous cities in the U.S. and other countries.

Contributions to the fund may be sent to Joseph Hansen Publishing Fund, 14 Charles Lane, New York, N.Y. 10014.

not taken away from this guerrillaist orientation, the entire Fourth International would be in grave danger....

Joe considered helping lead the fight to reverse this erroneous course the most important single political obligation of his life. He believed that the work he did and the articles he wrote explaining our positions in that struggle were his greatest single contribution to our world movement.

Barnes also discussed Hansen's views on building the Fourth International and developing revolutionary leadership on a world scale:

Joe was convinced that objectivity, kindness, and encouragement in your relationship with every revolutionist you work with are the mark of a revolutionary leader. I don't think you can find anyone whom Joe worked with over the past fifteen years who would deny that those are fair words to describe Joe.

In concluding his talk, Barnes said:

We in the United States have a special responsibility. And that is that we've had a unique advantage. Because of a peculiar combination of historical factors . . . we've had a large number of older leaders who worked with us and taught us everything they learned over decades. That gives us a greater responsibility than those who were not fortunate enough to have that continuity of revolutionary experience.

We can't exactly continue Joe's work. Joe's work is done. He did it. We have to continue ours. . . .

So we can give the last word to Joe.

"For the Young Socialist Alliance.

"For the Socialist Workers Party.

"For the Fourth International."

The meeting closed with the singing of the *Internationale*. \Box

Millions Welcome Khomeini

By Fred Murphy

Millions of joyous Iranians filled the streets and squares of Tehran February 1 to welcome the long-awaited return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—the symbol of their struggle to put an end to the Pahlevi monarchy and foreign domination. Many soldiers openly participated in the celebration, and a group of noncommissioned air force officers served as Khomeini's bodyguards.

"By all appearances, it was larger than any of the massive antigovernment demonstrations of the past six weeks," a *Washington Post* correspondent wrote. Thus the crowd surpassed even the January 19 mobilization of 4 million in Tehran that celebrated the shah's flight.

After a tumultuous procession from Mehrabad Airport through the center of the capital, passing by the scenes of recent slaughters of demonstrators by the shah's army, Khomeini went to the Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery south of the city to pay tribute to the revolution's thousands of martyrs.

"Is it human rights to say that when we want to name a government we get a cemetery full of people?" Khomeini asked bitterly of the Carter administration in his address amid the graves.

"We will not let the United States bring the shah back," he declared.

"As long as we are alive we won't let them do that, and I tell you it is up to all of us to keep this revolution alive until we choose a government."

As for the American-supported regime the shah left in his place, Khomeini said: "This is an illegal parliament, and the members stole money from the people and will have to pay for it. The government is illegal, the king is illegal, his father was illegal...."

The religious leader's arrival after fifteen years of exile followed two weeks of maneuvers by the Bakhtiar government to forestall or delay it. Bakhtiar and the shah's generals closed down the country's major airports for several days and murdered dozens of demonstrators who were demanding Khomeini's return (see accompanying article).

Bakhtiar even tried to go to Paris to talk Khomeini into staying in exile for several more weeks, but he was sharply rebuffed.

The anger and impatience of the masses mounted. On January 29 demonstrators near Tehran University pulled top police commander Gen. Taghi Latifi from his car and gave him a beating. They were about to bring Latifi before an impromptu "people's tribunal" for ordering the January 28 massacre at 24th of Esfand Square, but some religious leaders rescued the hated cop.

Incidents such as this, along with a march of one million on January 27, an uprising in the poor neighborhoods of southern Tehran, growing insubordination in the ranks of the military, and rising

Bakhtiar's support comes from the wealthy . . .

calls for armed struggle on the part of demonstrators finally forced Bakhtiar to clear the way for Khomeini's return without conditions.

But the regime made a final attempt at intimidation just before the ayatollah's arrival. On January 31 the generals put their hardware on display in big parades throughout the streets of the capital:

One of the columns of military vehicles was more than two miles long. A reporter watching it pass through Vanak Square counted 53 trucks loaded with soldiers with bayonets fixed, 78 jeeps, most of them with heavy machine guns or recoilless rifles, 12 Chieftain heavy tanks, 6 Scorpion light tanks and several ambulances and utility vehicles. Before all the vehicles had passed he was forced to take cover by bursts of rifle fire. [*New York Times*, February 1.]

The troops, many of which were from the shah's elite Imperial Guard, opened fire on demonstrators or passersby at a number of points. However, the *Times* reported, "not all the participants in the military 'parades' seemed hostile to Ayatollah Khomeini. . . . Some soldiers had stuck carnations in the muzzles of their rifles as a symbol of nonbelligerency, and a truckload of air force men waved pictures of the Ayatollah."

In his address at the cemetery, Khomeini said he would soon appoint a provisional government. He called on Bakhtiar and his cabinet and the shah's parliament to all resign, and said "if they continue we will arrest them and I will shut their mouths."

Bakhtiar, however, has vowed time and again to remain in office and has declared that he will order the arrest of anyone accepting a post under Khomeini. "I will not allow the country to be governed by any force other than the central government," he said January 31.

Thus the lines are drawn for a show-

down. Behind Khomeini stand the revolutionary millions of Iran—including growing numbers of soldiers, sailors and airmen—who desire above all the total abolition of the monarchy that Bakhtiar seeks to defend.

What little support Bakhtiar has comes from those wealthy residents of North Tehran who have not yet fled the country, from the shah's top military officers, and from the U.S. embassy.

But the American imperialists did not hesitate to dump the shah once they decided he had become an absolute liability. The same fate could be in store for Bakhtiar. And the generals might abandon the prime minister without even waiting for word from Washington, if only to keep from ending up like General Latifi.

There have been persistent reports in the Western press of negotiations between figures in the religious opposition, such as Mehdi Bazargan, and top generals, including Chief of Staff Gharabaghi.

Khomeini has denied having anything to do with these talks, but he did appeal directly to the officer corps in his cemetery speech: "We want you to be independent. You, generals, don't you want that? I advise you to come and be with the people and say the same things as the people. They say our army should not be under the orders of foreign advisers."

The generals might see throwing their support to Khomeini now as their last chance to buy time, restore discipline in the ranks, and await a more propitious moment for a counterrevolutionary blow. But they will have to move quickly, because the ayatollah also addressed himself to the troops who have deserted or mutinied: "We thank them all, and those that did not join we tell them they should join."

The Carter administration's declining confidence in the army's ability to keep the situation under control was shown by its January 30 order for all dependents of U.S. government personnel to evacuate. American companies were urged to take the same step.

According to businessmen briefed earlier by Ambassador William Sullivan, this move was the "third phase" of U.S. plans. The fourth, they said, "would be full-scale evacuation supported by U.S. military forces" (Newark *Star-Ledger*, January 31).

The embassy's evaluation order came the day after sixty Iranian soldiers assigned to guard the U.S. compound began chanting "Yankee go home!" as they went off duty. $\hfill \Box$

airmen had held demonstrations against the shah, others had reportedly gone on strike.

Tehran on Eve of Khomeini's Return

By Cindy Jaquith

[The following article appeared in the February 9 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

* *

TEHRAN, Jan. 29—Determined to block the arrival of the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the revolutionary explosion his arrival could bring, Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar has launched a bloody crackdown against the movement here.

Yesterday the sickening crackle of machine-gun fire echoed throughout the city all afternoon, along with the screams of the wounded, as the army opened fire mercilessly on demonstrators in Esfan Square near Tehran University.

The government claims people had attacked a cop station. This is untrue. The assault by the army was unprovoked.

As the army opened fire, the drivers of ambulances and buses tried in vain to form barricades that could protect the hundreds fleeing from the bullets that filled the air.

No one knows how many hundreds are dead. The hospitals are filled to overflowing.

The renewed repression began the night of January 25, after Khomeini announced he was flying to Tehran the next day. Iran Air employees had declared they would end their strike for one day to fly Khomeini here on a special "revolution flight." The army then surrounded the airport with tanks and closed it down.

Angry students demonstrated the next day at Tehran University. They were met with army machine guns that killed more than 100.

Meanwhile, martial law authorities began a roundup of newspaper reporters, professors, and other activists. Seized at midnight, January 26, were five officers of the Writers Syndicate. [They were released January 30.]

In the morning of January 27, 160 airmen were executed at Jamshidieh garrison here for anti-shah activities. Some of the In Isfahan, a hunger strike has been going on by air force pilots who refused orders to bomb Iran's major cities the day the shah was forced to leave the country. The planned bombings were to initiate an attempt at a military coup.

Bakhtiar has been using the threat of such a coup to try to intimidate the masses. But growing divisions within the armed forces and the masses' universal hatred for his regime have forestalled any coup up to now.

A resounding answer to the threat of a coup took place January 27, when 1 million people marched here to condemn the murder of the Tehran University students and to demand that Khomeini be allowed to enter the country.

Outrage at the slaughter of the students the day before was so great that Bakhtiar was forced to declare the march legal. The army was not present, and the demonstration proceeded peacefully.

This demonstration dwarfed attempts in recent days by the right-wing, pro-shah forces to carry out their own actions.

On January 23, the Immortal Guards, an elite military corps, carried out an exhibition in which they shouted, "Long live the shah!" Even within this regiment, however, there have been shoot-outs between pro- and anti-shah elements.

On January 25, a pro-shah dem-



One million Iranians demanded return of Khomeini and ouster of Bakhtiar on January 27.

February 12, 1979

onstration—thinly disguised as a pro-Bakhtiar, pro-constitution march—took place. Thirty to forty thousand participated, including many cops and soldiers ordered to attend and carefully instructed on slogans they should chant.

Organizers of the action insisted that no one mention the shah by name, but the purpose was clearly to create the impression that large numbers want the hated despot to return.

It is in the context of this deepening polarization that the shah's loyal followers fear a return by Khomeini will irreversibly tip the balance.

The entire country is at an intense revolutionary pitch.

In the north, peasants have carried out massive land seizures.

The oppressed nationalities—the Azerbaijanis in the Tabriz area and the Kurds—are mobilizing both against the shah and for their national rights.

Appeals to striking workers by Bakhtiar, and in some cases by the strike coordinating committees set up by Khomeini, for an end to walkouts have not been successful. The oil workers in particular—whose strike is at the heart of the struggle here—have rejected all appeals to return to work.

Every day there are also new reports of anti-shah activities by soldiers and airmen, not only in Tehran but throughout the country.

The chief of the Supreme Commanders Staff, Gen. Abbas Qarabaghi, has announced a "state of emergency" within the armed forces. "Punishments will be more severe" against rebellious soldiers, he threatened.

In this situation the masses feel the confidence to take power and abolish the monarchy. Many are convinced that they should wait for Khomeini's return to do so, however. But frustration is growing as Khomeini delays his return.

Religious leader Ayatollah Yahya Noori, according to the January 29 *Tehran Journal*, "warned last night a time may soon come when people might ignore the appeals from religious leaders to be calm and resist the get-tough moves now being used by the government.

"I do not know when the clenched fists

Copies Missing?

Keep your files of Intercontinental Press complete and up-to-date. Missing issues for the current year may be ordered by sending 75¢ per copy. Write for information about previous years.

> Intercontinental Press/Inprecor P.O. Box 116 Varick Street Station New York, N.Y. 10014

of our people will turn into guns," Noori said.

This is why Bakhtiar has refused until now to allow Khomeini to return. His arrival would signal to the masses that the time was right to overthrow the current regime and the Pahlavi dynasty.

This would pose the question of what government would best serve the workers and peasants—and would raise the question of a democratically elected constituent assembly.

The pro-shah forces and their backers in the White House want to prevent events from ever reaching this stage. Bakhtiar claims he is for opening negotiations with Khomeini. He says he doesn't oppose the opposition leader's return, but must first "prepare" the situation because there are "agents and enemies," "irresponsible elements," who might harm Khomeini.

By this Bakhtiar does not mean his own

generals, who openly threatened several days ago to shoot down Khomeini's plane. Bakhtiar's reference is a slanderous attempt to portray groups on the left as opponents of Khomeini's democratic right to return.

The left here—such as the Tudeh (Communist) Party and the Hezeb Karegaran Socialiste (Socialist Workers Party)—has supported this right. Bakhtiar's threats are aimed at dividing the movement against the dictatorship and setting up such groups for arrest or worse. Khomeini himself has stated that the only people threatening him are the shah's officer corps.

The Iranian masses have charted a course. To win their freedom, they are determined to brave all the bullets the government can fire. They are an inspiration to the workers and peasants around the world. $\hfill \Box$

One Million March Against Bakhtiar

By Cindy Jaquith

[The following article appeared in the February 9 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

* *

TEHRAN, Jan. 27—The blood of slain students was still on the streets when 1 million people poured out here today to vent their anger at the Bakhtiar regime.

More than 100 young people had died in machine-gun fire the day before at Tehran University.

As I join the march, demonstrators are chanting, "My brother, you are gone, but we will continue." Along with other journalists I am swept along in a sea of humanity down the street where the students died.

To our left is a contingent of 1,000 women, all in black veils, with raised fists. Women are nearly half the demonstration. These sisters chant: "It is good the students and workers are getting together."

Behind them are signs denouncing Jimmy Carter and Shahpur Bakhtiar.

"Death to Carter, the shah, and Shahpur" is a popular slogan.

"If Khomeini comes late, we will kill you Bakhtiar," is another.

Word passes quickly through the crowd that 160 airmen were executed this morning for mutiny. "Oh you airmen; you are the light of our eyes," the demonstrators shout.

This demonstration has been organized overnight by supporters of Khomeini. It coincides with the traditionally observed anniversary of the death of the prophet Mohammed. Many of the slogans combine religious and political messages. The focus is on the massacre of the students, the call for an Islamic republic, and the demand that Khomeini be allowed to return.

Hundreds of thousands—perhaps a million—people have come into Tehran from other cities to greet Khomeini. Many of them are on the demonstration.

Also marching is a contingent of Azerbaijanis, chanting in Turkish, "Koran is our aim; our capital is our integrity; Shahpur Bakhtiar is more dishonest than the shah."

Islamic members of the guerrilla group Mujaheed Khalg, which is now split into Muslim and Marxist-oriented wings, are here. Their slogans hail the workers, peasants, and Palestinians.

We stop to rest at Esfan Square. There used to be a statue here of the shah's father. That has been pulled down and replaced with pictures of Khomeini.

People start to gather around us, realizing we are journalists. They are anxious for the truth to reach the rest of the world.

A young boy shows me color photos of the dead and wounded from Black Friday, September 8. Another shows us caricatures of the shah.

An engineer tells us he believes the CIA has masterminded the killings here. He denounces Ardeshir Zahedi, Iran's ambassador to the United States, as a CIA agent.

Many demonstrators say that armed resistance by the masses must come soon. "We cannot go in front of the tanks barehanded," explains one student, who narrowly escaped death the day before.

Others have a message for Carter: "Jimmy boy, Jimmy boy, run run run; the people of Iran are picking up their guns."

Iran—Death Agony of Monarchy and Tasks of Revolutionary Socialists

[The first issue of the revolutionarysocialist newspaper *Che Bayad Kard* (What Is To Be Done) appeared on the streets of Tehran January 20 in an edition of 10,000. Items in the initial issue included a statement "The Shah Has Gone! Down With the Monarchy!" an appeal to soldiers by revolutionary socialists, and the text of the November 21 statement on Iran by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.*

[We are printing below the editorial from the first issue of *Che Bayad Kard*. We have taken the translation from the January 25 issue of *Socialist Challenge*, the London weekly sponsored by the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International.]

The Pahlavi Monarchy, the central bastion of all internal and foreign reactionary forces in Iran, is passing through the final stages of its death agony.

The extensive institutions of the Shah's empire of terror and repression have been smashed one after another by the impact of the relentless struggle of the masses.

Mohammad Reza Shah, the central cog in these ruling institutions, has been put to flight and has taken refuge in the arms of his masters.

The hour of Iran's new revolution is approaching. The powerful waves of this revolution are surging forward one after another, each one more powerful than the last.

The new wave, characterised by the presence of the working class, has turned imperialism's "island of stability" into the centre of the earthquake of world revolution.

The cities of Iran are once again speaking in the language of the Constitutional Revolution and the period following the flight and exile of Reza Shah.

Every time the dictatorship has tried to provide the ruling class with the opportunity for a breathing space and preparations for a counter-revolution it has soon found itself confronted by a more militant movement.

After every brief lull the movement has reappeared with renewed vigour and the oppressed masses have once again taken their historic path, adding new dimensions to their struggle and deepening their demands.

The ruling class has finally realised that its forces of repression are no longer effective. With guidance from imperialism it is now therefore preparing a trick.

The formation of the Bakhtiar govern-

ment and the Shah's flight are signs of a plan intended to block two fundamental tendencies within the anti-dictatorial struggle and to divert the mass struggle from its revolutionary path.

On the one hand the inseparable link



Tehran demonstrators flee as soldiers open fire.

between dictatorship and monarchy in the Iranian state has fused the struggle for democracy with the struggle against the monarchy itself.

"Death to the Shah," the slogan under which many of the anti-dictatorship mobilisations have taken place, is the first sign of this fusion.

On the other hand the strong bond between Iranian capitalism and the monarchy has given the anti-dictatorship struggle an anti-capitalist character.

The entry of the working class onto the scene of political struggle has made the possessing classes of Iran and their imperialist supporters aware of this tendency.

The regime is trying to harness democratic aspirations through the Bakhtiar government by giving some concessions (limited abolition of censorship, curbing the SAVAK's powers, legalising some political parties, etc.) and promising other reforms (such as free elections etc.).

In this way it aims to take the edge off the anti-dictatorship movement and save the monarchy, the basic foundation of the strength of the state, and hence save capitalism.

Promises of a return to "Constitutional Monarchy" were ineffective. The Shah has therefore been sent on "holiday" to prevent the further progress of the mass movement along the path of a revolutionary overthrow of the monarchy and the power of the ruling class.

In order to ensure the success of this plan they even threaten the mass movement with a bloody coup: either the Bakhtiar government or military rule! This is the ruling classes' answer.

But the oppressed masses will not be fooled by such threats. They haven't given thousands of lives to keep the same regime throw of the Pahlavi dictatorship is linked to an attack on the capitalist system and the bourgeois state.

in power, to have the same imperial army

"maintaining law and order," to leave the

peasants and other toilers. This is the only

solution to Iran's present political and

ary socialists is to help bring about such a

solution. We must ensure that the over-

The most important task of revolution-

They will continue until the complete overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a government of workers,

possessing classes in their place.

social crisis.

Our most immediate task in this direction is to fight for the complete overthrow of the monarchy and all the social and political foundations on which its power is based.

We—a number of different revolutionary socialist groups formed inside and outside Iran and now in the process of fusion have come together to give a response to this important need. This publication is the result of our cooperation.

Our aim is to link up the different sectors of the movement by publishing this national revolutionary paper and to make our contribution to organising the revolutionary mass struggle by arming the vanguard layers of the mass movement with the revolutionary programme of action.

Our success depends on the cooperation of all Iranian revolutionary socialists. We will make every attempt that they should see this paper as their own.

There are some who see the tasks of the socialist movement limited to scattered activities simply serving the spontaneous movement.

Our understanding of a revolutionary socialist struggle is different. The basic task of the socialist movement is the building of a revolutionary party fused with the mass movement.

Without a struggle for building a national revolutionary paper this task is impossible.

The crucial moments of the Iranian revolution have arrived and it is time for revolutionary socialists to take up these tasks in a unified manner. The columns of this paper are open to all those who agree with these aims. $\hfill \Box$

^{*}Printed in our December 11 issue, p. 1354.-IP/I

'The Revolution Has Made It Possible for Us to Return'

[The following statement was released at a news conference in Tehran January 22 by poet Reza Baraheni. Baraheni, an outspoken opponent of the shah, was imprisoned and tortured for 102 days in 1973, before being forced into exile. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor.*]

As a former political prisoner of the shah, as an Iranian citizen who has suffered at the hands of the shah's torturers, as a writer who has had two-thirds of his writings either suppressed by the monarchy's censorship or distorted by the agents

The Iranian Revolution has made us invulnerable . . .

of the dictatorial apparatus, as a poet forced to spend four years in exile because of efforts to expose the bloody hands of SAVAK and the monarchy, and finally as an individual who even in exile has had to face slander and threats on his life by the agents of the monarchy and the imperialist spy agencies, I am returning to Iran to be among the aroused masses of my people.

I am returning so that I can link my arm with the powerful arm of the revolution, so that in all humility I can pay tribute to this great revolution. I am returning to salute the martyrs of freedom, to hail the peasants, women, students, teachers, writers, lawyers, and all the deprived and oppressed, as well as all those political prisoners who have fed the Iranian revolution with their blood.

If I am able to return today, if the exiles are returning today, and if tomorrow thousands more will return, it is because the Iranian revolution has made us invulnerable. If we are returning, it is because of the February uprising in Tabriz and the forty days of mourning that followed. It is because of the marches on Fetr [September 4, when millions of persons demonstrated throughout Iran]. It is because of those whose blood was spilled by the dictatorship on Black Friday [September 8, when more than 4,000 demonstrators were killed].

We are able to come back because of the millions who brought the message of democracy and revolution on Taasoua and Ashura [the huge anti-shah marches on December 10 and 11]. It is also because of the courageous strike by the oil workers. We are returning because of the efforts of the thousands of men and women who have taken control of the Iranian cities in their own hands and because of the youth who have stood up against bayonets.

We are able to return because of the fervor of the risen masses and because of the roaring of their voices, in a word because of the revolution that is a magnet attracting everyone toward it.

We are returning because it is impossible for us not to. The revolution is our fate and the fate of our people. The plunderers who used to call us traitors to the country are now fleeing this country because of the revolution—the same revolution that is calling us home. We have returned to eradicate the word "political exile" forever from the language of our people. We have returned to stay.

On returning to Iran, as an independent writer not belonging to any party, I propose the following demands.

1. SAVAK, this organization of spies, executioners, and torturers, must be abolished once and for all and its agents handed over to genuine people's tribunals.

2. All SAVAK's files must be open for the people to review, in order to reveal the identity of those who, both inside and outside Iran, have slandered the freedom fighters or have been responsible for torturing and murdering them.

3. Bring before the people of Iran all the slanderers and provocateurs who, on orders from SAVAK, the CIA, and the FBI, set the opposition groups against each other.

4. Unconditional release of all political prisoners.



REZA BARAHENI

5. Open all the files showing the details of SAVAK's relationship with the CIA, the Israeli secret police, and other secret police organizations so that the people of Iran can study them and make decisions about

The shah must be put on trial for his crimes . . .

them. The people of Iran must have access to all correspondence and cables indicating the relationship of these organizations. All agents who had any part in these plots, both inside and outside of Iran, must be exposed before the people.

6. Since the shah is the main person responsible for all these crimes, he along with his brothers and sisters and all his criminal agents must be put on trial.

7. Full freedom of speech and expression must be restored in the press and in culture and literature. All associations and political parties must be given freedom to operate.

8. Since imposing any kind of government from above would be, as the previous government was, counter to the principles of freedom, democracy, and the revolution for which the Iranian people have shed their blood, general elections must be held as soon as possible for a constituent assembly so that the representatives of our oppressed people can draft a constitution for Iran. $\hfill \Box$

Still Available Complete Back Files (Unbound) Intercontinental Press

1967	42 issues (1.072 pages)	\$25
1968	44 issues (1,176 pages)	\$25
1969	43 issues (1.152 pages)	\$25
1970	43 issues (1,120 pages)	\$25
1971	45 issues (1,128 pages)	\$25
1972	47 issues (1,448 pages)	\$25
1973	46 issues (1.520 pages)	\$25
1974	47 issues (1.888 pages)	\$25
1975	47 issues (1.888 pages)	\$35
1976	49 issues (1,888 pages)	\$35
1977	48 issues (1,456 pages)	\$35
	P.O. Box 116	
	Variak Street Station	

Varick Street Station New York, N.Y 10014

Intercontinental Press

AROUND THE WORLD

Students Shake Emperor Bokassa's Throne

Bangui, the capital of the Central African Empire, was the scene of three days of antigovernment demonstrations in January. The protests were put down only after Emperor Bokassa called in troops from neighboring Zaïre, who killed dozens of protesters.

The unrest began on January 20, when students marched from the outskirts of Bangui to the center of the city to protest a new ruling requiring them to wear school uniforms bearing Bokassa's name. Bokassa had himself crowned as "emperor" in December 1977 during a lavish ceremony costing \$27 million.

According to news reports, the ranks of the students were soon swelled by other inhabitants of Bangui, which has a population of 350,000 (in a country of two million). Some protesters chanted slogans indicating that they favored a restoration of the republic. Referring to Bokassa's residence in Berengo, they shouted, "The court is in Berengo, but the republic is in Bangui."

Georges Bokassa, a son of the emperor who is now living in exile in Paris after a dispute with his father, said he believed "the students in particular, who follow international events very closely, have certainly been motivated by the developments in Iran that led to the departure of the shah."

Bokassa responded to the protests by clamping a curfew on Bangui and appealing to President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre for assistance. Although Mobutu has denied sending troops, French government sources said that between 200 and 300 were sent to Bangui. Travelers passing through Bangui confirmed this.

News reports place the number killed during the crackdown at between a dozen and 100. A French doctor who visited the Bangui hospital estimated that 400 persons had been killed or wounded.

By January 23, the protests had been crushed, and the curfew was lifted. Zaïrian troops were still reported to be patroling the streets, however.

In Paris, the Executive Committee of the National Union of Central African Students issued a statement condemning "the bloody, antisocial, and basically proimperialist" regime of Bokassa and calling for a struggle to overthrow the monarchy.

Saudi Arms for Afghan Rebels?

Right-wing rebels in Afghanistan are seeking arms from Saudi Arabia and other Arab regimes in their fight against the government of President Noor Mohammad Taraki. According to a January 28 Reuters dispatch from Pakistan, a leader of one of the rightist groups recently left for Saudi Arabia and may later visit Kuwait and Egypt as well.

Rhodesian Whites Try to Buy Time

Some 67,000 Rhodesian whites went to the polls January 30 to vote on a new constitutional proposal ostensibly de-



IAN SMITH

signed to lead to "majority rule." The plan put forward by Prime Minister Ian Smith and his Black collaborators in the government was approved, with 85 percent of the votes in favor.

The most important statistic, however, was of those who did not vote—the more than six million Black Zimbabweans. They were not allowed to.

The constitution itself seeks to entrench white privilege for at least ten more years. Twenty-eight seats out of a 100-seat parliament are to be reserved for whites for a decade, as are 28 percent of the cabinet posts for five years. Other clauses seek to block any significant Africanization of the civil service, military, police, or judiciary, or nationalization of white-owned land, which accounts for half of the country.

Smith has promised "free" elections on April 20 to fill the seats in the new parliament, extending the vote to 2.5 million eligible Black voters. In the meantime,



however, he has made it clear that his troops will continue the war against the Zimbabwean liberation forces. (There are about 12,000 guerrillas of the Patriotic Front now operating within the country.)

Despite the racist character of the new constitution, there was little jubilation among whites over its adoption. Many fear that it will simply not work. One automobile mechanic, who was quoted in the January 31 *New York Times*, summed up the feeling of many whites when he said, "The way I look at it, the situation is hopeless if we reject the agreement, and only slightly less hopeless if we accept it."

Brazil Unions Call for Workers Party

"An initial step has been taken toward the formation of a workers party in Brazil," *Le Monde* correspondent Thierry Maliniak reported from Rio de Janeiro January 27.

"Gathered in a congress, the thirty-seven metalworkers unions of the state of São Paulo (the most important group of independent unions in the country) decided on January 24 to set up a preparatory commission. They cited 'the increasing importance of workers in the life of Brazilian society, and their political marginalization.' A number of unions in the state of Minas Gerais have already announced their agreement with this move."

Some union activists argued that the time was not yet right for a workers party and that it would be better to work through the bourgeois Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the only legal opposition party.

"This is not the position of the majority of the independent union leaders. They feel that the specific demands of the workers are minimized by the legal opposition, and emphasize that for more than ten years the MDB has called for political and institutional reforms while leaving union and workers problems in second place."

Other delegates questioned whether the level of consciousness of most workers was high enough to sustain a workers party. "But time is growing short, and a kind of race is under way. The leaders of the old [bourgeois-nationalist] Brazilian Labor Party of ex-Presidents Vargas and Goulart are themselves getting ready to reorganize their party. For the majority of the new independent unionists at the metalworkers congress in São Paulo, 'historical' Laborism, as well as the MDB, has tried to speak in the name of the workers without truly giving them a voice."

Chinese Dissidents, Peasants, Voice Grievances

By Leslie Evans

The third anniversary of the death of Premier Chou En-lai on January 8 was taken as an opportunity by a number of China's newly formed dissident groups to direct some sharp demands at the party leaders in Peking.

Highlights of the week included the formation of a group called the Human Rights Alliance, which pasted up a nineteen-point program at Peking's Democracy Wall challenging a wide range of bureaucratic abuses; and marches and sitins by groups of peasants demanding democratic rights and more food.

Small demonstrations for civil liberties or to correct particular abuses have become fairly common in some of China's major cities since the government announced in November that it would permit the public airing of grievances. Peking's Tien An Men Square and the nearby Democracy Wall have become the national center for such protests, but they have appeared elsewhere. The January 2 Le Monde, for example, reported that a woman worker in a Shanghai silk factory was wounded by police gunfire on December 29 in a clash between workers and police during a workers demonstration protesting the pace of work and calling for higher pay.

Before dawn on Saturday, January 6, the first poster of the Human Rights Alliance was put up at the Democracy Wall in Peking. This was the first of the political wall posters that has been signed with real names—the seven authors boldly announced their names and promised to appear on January 8 for a public meeting to debate the content of their program. Some of the nineteen points, as summarized by Western correspondents in Peking, included:

• For the release of all political prisoners.

• For the right of dissent for Communist Party members.

• For the removal of Mao's body from its mausoleum, where it stands as an example of "feudal idolatry."

• For the right to elect all state and party leaders.

• For the right of opposition parties to have voice and to be elected to the National People's Congress.

• For provisions of the constitution to be enforced.

• For publication of the state budget and of statistics for all areas of Chinese economic and social life.

For an end to secret government meet-

ings and for the right of citizens to attend sessions of the National People's Congress.

For an end to duplicitous propaganda.

• For a study of Western democracy and culture as well as science and technology.

• For the right to enter foreign embassies; meet foreign correspondents; receive foreign books and magazines; and to publish abroad.

• For the abolition of the system of lifetime assignment to work units.

• For freedom of travel, employment, dress, and personal decisions in family planning.

• For unemployment insurance, a guaranteed minimum grain ration for all peasants, and an end to the forcible sending of urban youth to the countryside.

• For immediate abolition of the secret police.

• For an end to the "terrible hovels some poor people live in with three generations in one room . . . grown boys and girls should not have to live in the same room."

• For a reconciliation with the Soviet Union. "The Sino-Soviet split in ideology has already lost its objective base. The citizens demand a relaxation in the attacks on revisionism. The Soviet Union is a socialist country and the Soviet people are a great people. China and the United States are now friends. China and Japan are now friends. The people of China would like to be friends with the Soviet Union. We demand a beginning of talks with the Soviet government." (Toronto Globe & Mail, January 6; Los Angeles Times, January 7; Christian Science Monitor, January 8.)

John Fraser of the Toronto *Globe & Mail* met with two of the authors of this remarkable document following their appearance at the Democracy Wall on January 8:

The two were both workers. They had spent the morning at Hsi Tan [the street where the Democracy Wall is located] debating their poster with Chinese and had had a warm, enthusiastic reception. There were some criticisms of certain points in the poster, but its over-all objectives received wide support from several hundred people. [Globe & Mail, January 8.]

According to another Chinese who was present and later interviewed by Fraser, the criticisms did not focus on the Human Rights Alliance's antibureaucratic positions but on their proposal to defuse tensions with the USSR. The dissidents replied that they did not advocate imitating the Russian system in China.

The Human Rights Alliance was only one of several groups at the Democracy Wall and in Tien An Men Square on January 8. The more or less official celebrations for Chou En-lai had brought tens of thousands of people to Tien An Men. One unofficial group called the Enlightenment Society, which had appealed to President Carter to make a statement on behalf of human rights in China, circulated in the crowd selling printed pamphlets of its statements for 30 cents each.

The most dramatic incident at the square was a march by some 200 peasants from provinces all over China, joined by more than a thousand Peking citizens, behind banners reading "We don't want hunger. We don't want to suffer any more. We want human rights and democracy" (New York Times, January 9).

No one knows exactly how many of these refugees from the countryside are now in Peking. They have been arriving in Peking singly and in small groups from all parts of China since late last year, with larger numbers coming for the Chou En-lai anniversary. One of the demonstrators told Western reporters that there are 20,000 such displaced peasants in Peking (Reuters, January 14), although Agence France-Presse gave its estimate of 1,000 (January 14).

On January 11, Fox Butterfield wrote from Peking:

This week in Peking . . . 400 to 500 people dressed in the patched, faded garb of peasants marched for three days around Tien An Men Square to protest shortages of food and demand human rights in China. The people, who appeared to come from virtually all of China's 29 province-level units, including Tibet, said they did not want to overthrow the Government but simply to obtain redress against insensitive local officials.

The marchers slept at night in the Peking railroad station or other public buildings with no official interference. They said they had come to Peking by hitching rides on trucks or walking since they did not have travel permits to take trains. [New York Times, January 14.]

On January 14, some 200 of these peasant demonstrators staged a protest outside the leadership compound at Chungnanhai, where Hua Kuo-feng and the rest of the top party officials live. The protesters demanded a brief interview with either Hua or Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The scene was described by the correspondents of the Toronto *Globe & Mail*:

Their ranks were joined yesterday by other

disaffected people from Peking itself, as well as a large group of interested onlookers. By the time everyone reached Chung Nan Hai, the crowd consisted of more than 2,000 people and it took at least 100 soldiers from the People's Liberation Army to keep firm but friendly order...

The sight of the peasants visibly affected many Chinese and foreigners. They were among the poorest-looking people anyone had ever seen in China. One man carried his handicapped wife on his back throughout the entire hour-long march on the coldest day so far this winter. Another peasant who had spent 15 days travelling from his home town near Shanghai (1,000 miles away), talked to Western journalists. He said his name was Hsu Yu-shan of Chingchiang in Jiangsu Province.

Hsu said he was 62 and he and his wife have three children. Fifteen years ago, his family was forced to return to the countryside when widespread famine brought chaos to many Chinese cities. He said that their lives had been miserable eyer since. In his town, people have to subsist on one jin of rice (about one pound) a day or one jin of mantou (Chinese bread). In addition to this basic food allotment, Hsu added, peasants could get a few poor-quality vegetables and on a lucky day a few scraps of pork. The most cash he had ever earned in a month was six Mao (about forty cents). [January 15.]

The party leaders refused to meet with the demonstrators, and for the time being the peasant demonstrations came to an end, with some of the protesters beginning the long trip home.

The local advocates of democracy, how-

ever, have continued their campaign. One of their tactics has been to make contact with foreign newspaper reporters, as a means of circulating their message and putting pressure on their own government. Fox Butterfield, long-time *New York Times* Hong Kong correspondent, commented on his two weeks in Peking at the beginning of the year on the occasion of the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S.:

Before, no foreigner had met a Chinese dissident. Now practically everyone has, and some Chinese students have begun calling newsmen up at all hours of the night with tips on the latest poster. [*New York Times*, January 21.]

On January 23, the Human Rights Alliance put up a ten-page poster warning the citizens of Peking that they expected a crackdown from Peking's new mayor, Lin Hu-chia, who had made a speech claiming that "some enemies have smuggled themselves into the good forces," and disparaging "underground" groups and periodicals. The Human Rights Alliance countered by denying that the various human-rights groups or their publications have been underground, saying that all the various publications had been posted on walls and that members of the alliance had appeared in public to defend their views.

According to Reuters, on January 29 several hundred people held a rally at

Peking's Democracy Wall in defense of the leaders of six different civil-liberties groups that have declared their intention to fight for free speech.

Thus far the government has made no move against the dissidents. One consideration is certainly Teng Hsiao-p'ing's visit to the United States—a wave of arrests in China at this moment would provide grist for the right-wing American press. But another, possibly more weighty, consideration is the mood of the people of China.

In an unusual move, the Chinese authorities permitted *Teng Hsiang* (Trends), a Hong Kong pro-Peking magazine, to take an official public opinion poll of Peking citizens. *Teng Hsiang*'s reporters claim to have interviewed members of an agricultural people's commune, a military unit, and hospital workers. They report that 76 percent of those questioned felt that constitutional rights have not been respected in China. In addition, 88 percent said they are "dissatisfied" with the present cultural life. Complaints were particularly strong over restrictions on the right to travel abroad and the prohibition on emigration.

Teng and Hua may have decided that for the moment it is less risky to tolerate the open organization by the dissidents than to provoke a reaction from China's "silent majority."



Chanting peasants appeal to Teng Hsiao-p'ing for food and democracy.

February 12, 1979

Teng's Visit to Washington

By Dan Dickeson

Vice-premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing arrived in Washington January 28 for the first U.S. visit by a Chinese leader since the 1949 revolution. The trip follows the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries last month.

The delegation headed by Teng met with a series of American government officials and corporate leaders. A major aim on both sides is to open expanded trade. The Chinese government wants U.S. equipment and technology to help in modernizing China's economy.

American businessmen, for their part, are eager to sign export contracts with China, especially since they know a recession in this country is on the way.

One reason U.S. rulers speeded up normalization with China in December was that Japanese and European capitalists had already taken the lead in making trade deals. Continuing refusal to recognize the Chinese government might widen the gap even further, they feared.

Carter has more reasons than this to be pleased with Teng's visit. Just last week the White House announced a tight-fisted austerity budget, while pushing up war spending to a record \$135 billion. So Teng's call for an even bigger U.S. military buildup against the Soviet Union is music to Carter's ears.

In an interview for the February 5 issue of *Time* magazine, Teng claimed that "the true hotbed of war is the Soviet Union, not the U.S."

The truth is that the American capitalists and their government are entirely to blame for the escalating arms race. But Teng is glad to help Carter cover up that fact.

The strategy of the Chinese bureaucrats is one of seeking to cooperate with capitalist governments around the world. Teng's trip is the culmination of a process that began with Nixon's 1972 visit with Mao Tsetung in Peking.

This policy by the Chinese Stalinists parallels that of the Kremlin bureaucrats, who also hosted Nixon in 1972. Both of these Stalinized regimes have eagerly betrayed revolutionary fighters around the world in return for favors from Washington.

Carter comes out the winner in the dispute between the Moscow and Peking

Intercontinental Press/Inprecor

will give you a week by week analysis of the most important world events.

Subscribe now!

bureaucrats. He has even exploited Teng's anti-Soviet diatribes to cynically pose before the press as a "moderate" on the question of military spending.

At the welcoming ceremony for Teng, Carter had the gall to remark, "For too long, the Chinese and the American peoples have not been able to see each other for themselves. We are glad that time is past."

As if it were all some unfortunate mis-

take? As if Carter and the wealthy handful he represents were not responsible for the thirty-year campaign to isolate China? As if the rulers of America did not militarily encircle China in hopes of rolling back the Chinese revolution?

Teng, of course, avoided asking Carter these embarrassing questions.

The significance of Teng's visit was perhaps best symbolized by the invitation to Richard Nixon to attend the January 29 state dinner at the White House. This should serve as a reminder that above all, Teng's trip marked another stage in a rotten deal worked out between Mao and Nixon while U.S. bombers pulverized Vietnam.

Visit Sends Maoists Into a Frenzy

By David Frankel

One byproduct of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's visit to the United States has been nationwide media coverage of the Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party.

Two RCP members on the press platform shouted out slogans against Teng during the welcoming ceremonies on the White House lawn. Police dragged them off and brutally beat them.

Later that day, forty other RCP members were arrested during a protest outside the White House. The police violence against these demonstrators should be condemned by all socialists and supporters of civil liberties.

The RCP, formerly abject supporters of the Peking regime, decided after Mao's death to cast their lot with the deposed "Gang of Four." Teng's ascent to power transformed China into a "fascist" country, the RCP claims.

To protest Teng's visit as a betrayal of Mao's heritage, however, flies in the face of historical fact.

It was Mao himself, after all, who welcomed Richard Nixon to Peking in February 1972, even as U.S. bombs were raining down on the people of Vietnam. In flights over Hanoi and other North Vietnamese cities, U.S. warplanes dropped, along with their bombs, thousands of photos of Mao and Nixon shaking hands.

The RCP hailed Mao when he stabbed the Vietnamese revolution in the back. Despite the RCP's outraged protests today, Teng's foreign policy truly follows the lead of the late Great Helmsman.

In its frenzy against the post-Mao regime in Peking, the RCP went so far as to carry out an attack on the Chinese liaison office in Washington, D.C. Five RCP members broke windows at the office on January 24 and threw white paint on its walls. RCP Chairman Bob Avakian told reporters: "The kind of thing that happened at the embassy yesterday is an example of a 'fitting welcome'. . . . A warning has been issued, and a call has been made."

Such actions are virtually indistinguishable from those carried out by racist and ultraright forces. The United States, we should remember, has a long and sordid



TENG HSIAO-P'ING

history as an imperialist exploiter of China, as an aggressor on Chinese territory, and as a center of anti-Chinese racism.

Political opposition to the Chinese regime is one thing. Physical attacks or threats by citizens of an imperialist power against representatives of an historically oppressed country are something else. \Box

Indian Unionists Defend Right to Strike

By Sharad Jhaveri

JAMNAGAR—On several occasions over the past two months, the Indian working class has again displayed its strength and its capacity to unify.

On November 20, 1978, a mass of 100,000 workers marched on Parliament in New Delhi to protest the Janata Party regime's new Industrial Relations Bill, which threatens basic trade-union rights, particularly the right to strike.¹ The workers assembled at noon to hear trade-union leaders denounce the bill. The workers, belonging to various unions and political parties, had come from all parts of India to participate in the rally.

The day before, a union conference called by all the central trade-union organizations was held in New Delhi. It unanimously adopted a resolution demanding the withdrawal of the proposed Industrial Relations Bill. The conference called on workers to carry out a massive, coordinated campaign against the bill. A national campaign committee was to be set up for that purpose.

The conference drew the active support of more than forty confederations, unions, and associations representing railway, engineering, steel, fertilizer, dock, defense industry, electricity, press, plantation, bank and insurance, university, and central and state government workers. Even

Should Ireland Go Nuclear?

The government says "yes," arguing that because Ireland is an "energy deficient" country, importing 80 percent of the energy it uses, rapid development of nuclear power is the only answer. As a first step, plans have been announced for the construction of the country's first nuclear power plant at Carnsore Point in County Wexford, on Ireland's southern coast.

Antinuclear activists Matthew Hussey and Carole Craig say "no" and cite the safety, environmental, and economic reasons why in the sixty-four-page pamphlet *Nuclear Ireland?* Available for £1 (US\$2) from Co-op Books/Focus Ireland, Irish Writers Cooperative, 50 Merrion Square, Dublin 2, Ireland. the HMS, HMP, and BMS,² which owe political allegiance to the ruling Janata Party, were among the organizers of the conference. About 7,000 delegates took part in all.

The conference and the demonstration were unprecedented. For the first time in

The merchants and industrialists have sought to counter this struggle by calling for closures of entire industrial and commercial centers like Bombay and Ahmedabad. The regime has warned that it would deal with the bank workers' actions "firmly."



New construction towers over Bombay slums.

recent history, all the major unions in the country have buried their differences and come together to oppose a measure that threatens the very structure and function of the union movement.

Initially, there were differences on how best to fight the bill. Some thought in terms of trying to modify it. Now at least there is unanimity in asking for the total scrapping of the bill.

Another show of working-class strength came on December 28-29, when 600,000 bank workers throughout the country struck in support of their demands, which include calls for a wage agreement, protection of cost-of-living benefits, and restoration of bonus payments.

The strike was called by the All-India Bank Employees Association, but it was supported by other unions as well. Since then, the workers have been conducting slowdown actions, seriously affecting trade and business. On the other hand, six major trade-union organizations, meeting in Calcutta January 13, extended their full support to the struggle by the bank workers. The organizations were the Hind Mazdoor Sabha, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh, the Indian National Trade Union Congress, the All-India Trade Union Congress, and the United Trade Union Congress.

In West Bengal, which is ruled by a popular-front government led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), jute workers have been on strike since January 5 for revision of their wage agreement. The last wage agreement expired three years ago.

According to a recent statement in Parliament, there were 194 strikes in West Bengal between March and August 1978, the highest number in the country. The January 2 *Economic Times* reported that in recent months some 200,000 workers have been on strike in the state for long periods, including hosiery workers, printing press operators, and bargemen. The report also noted that the state government and the CPI(M) are extremely anxious to prevent any further large-scale labor unrest.

January 14

^{1.} The bill seeks to make all strikes in "essential services" illegal. The regime would have the right to include any industry in this category. In those industries not considered essential, the right to strike is still to be curtailed to an extent. Picketing, plant occupations, "work to rule," and other forms of labor action will be prohibited as "unfair practices." The bill also seeks to bypass the unions themselves as direct bargaining agents on behalf of their workers.—IP/I

^{2.} Hind Mazdoor Sangh, affiliated to the former Socialist Party component of the Janata Party; Hind Mazdoor Panchayat, led by George Fernandes, a former leader of the Socialist Party who is now industries minister in the government; Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh, affiliated to the former Jan Sangh.

Peru—Why the General Strike Failed

[The following interview with Peruvian Trotskyist leader Hugo Blanco of the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT) was obtained by telephone January 15. For further information on the January 9-11 general strike and the Peruvian government's repressive measures, see Intercontinental Press/Inprecor, January 15, p. 12 and January 22, p. 26.]

* *

Question. Can you describe the situation in Peru during and after the general strike, and give us your opinion on the results of the strike?

Answer. The strike was weak from the outset. Only 30 to 40 percent of the workers struck on the first day, and participation fell off even more on the second day. The CGTP¹ then decided to suspend the strike.

There are a number of conjunctural reasons for the insufficient development of the strike. The government was very well prepared to confront it, both politically and with repression.

The strike was called against a series of

1. Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (General Confederation of Peruvian Workers), the main union federation in Peru. economic measures decreed by the government. But the regime partially withdrew the measures. It ordered a wage increase, and although this did not meet the needs of the workers it did demobilize them, because it appeared as if the demands of the strike were being granted. It was a different thing from previous situations to prepare and carry out a strike under these conditions.

The political preparation of the action also left much to be desired, owing to the year-end holidays. January is a bad month in this respect.

An internal factor should be mentioned that greatly affected the organization of the strike from the beginning-the sectarianism of the Stalinists who control the leadership of the CGTP. In fact, in contrast to the July 1977 general strike, no joint leadership was formed among all those supporting the strike. This time the Communist Party refused to coordinate activity with anyone who was not in total agreement with its positions. So the classstruggle unions of Lima and the tendencies linked to forces to the CP's left were excluded from the outset. No factory assemblies or other kinds of actions were carried out to prepare for the strike.

Q. What about the repression?

A. The government, on the other hand, was very well prepared. Long before the announced date of the strike, it launched a big campaign of intimidation, unprecedented in earlier strikes. Lima and other cities were totally militarized. Tanks, armored vehicles, and soldiers appeared, while at the same time a propaganda offensive was conducted on radio and television and in the press, warning that the repressive forces had "license to kill." The people are not suicidal, so they were intimidated.

Small mobilizations did take place on the first day; for example, in Comas on the north side of Lima and elsewhere. But on the second day there was little activity in support of the strike. Also, hundreds of persons were jailed before the strike. The majority of them have now been released, but forty-four are still being held by State Security.

Q. How did this repression affect the movement?

A. On this occasion we have really seen the enormous pressure that the economic recession is putting on the working class, with a whole series of consequences. The firings of tens of hundreds of leaders in the factories and the workers movement has had a big impact. The workers fear unemployment, and they feel that the stockpiles the bosses maintain enable them to withstand the effects of a strike. That is why many workers did not strike.



Lima and other cities were totally militarized before the strike began.

Militant/Diane Wang

Intercontinental Press

Q. What attitude did the Constituent Assembly take toward the strike?

A. The left deputies supported it, of course. They rejected the repressive measures launched by the government.

But the APRA² behaved worse than ever, and supported the military's measures to the hilt. The APRA voted down the motion presented against the suspension of constitutional guarantees and in support of the general strike. The left deputies walked out of that session of the assembly—the UDP, FOCEP, CP, both factions of the PSR,³ and the Christian

3. UDP-Unidad Democrático-Popular (Democratic People's Unity), a bloc of Maoist and centrist parties; FOCEP-Frente Obrero, Campesino, Estudiantil, y Popular (Workers, Peasants,

Democrats. The APRA proposed "secret sessions" of the assembly, but all that was discussed in those was the measures the government was preparing against the strike, and these were known to all. Also, the "danger of war between Chile and Peru"—a typical diversionary tactic [see accompanying article].

Q. What is the present situation?

A. The APRA says elections for a new government will be held in October. The dictatorship also says this—it wants to go through with the transfer of government it has agreed upon with the bourgeoisie. The regime will try to maintain its "image" by holding the elections, but it will continue

Students, and People's Front), bloc of Trotskyist parties and independent socialists to which the PRT belongs); PSR—Partido Socialista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Socialist Party). One of the PSR's public factions is led by bourgeoisnationalist ex-military officers; the other is a centrist grouping.

Peru Junta Whipping Up War Fever

By C.D. Castano


LIMA—There have been many signs here that the ruling military junta is preparing for war. Nineteen seventy-nine is the 100th anniversary of the War of the Pacific—an armed conflict between Chile, Bolivia, and Peru in which Bolivia lost its access to the sea and Peru lost the provinces of Arica and Tarapacá.

There is no reason to believe that Peru would take on Chile by itself, but in a situation in which its southern neighbor is already involved in another conflict it is possible that the junta would take advantage of the opportunity.

There is a real possibility of war between Chile and Argentina. The conflict is over the Beagle Channel and the three islands located in it.* Both the economic interests involved—large oil reserves and important fishing resources—and the military and strategic stakes are too high for either of these countries to give up the area without a struggle.

The military governments of both Chile and Argentina are also using war threats to reinforce their positions within their respective countries. The Videla regime, for example, has gotten support for its military moves from the labor unions and the reformist parties. War would also offer an extraordinary opportunity to crush the opposition.

What indications are there then that Peru would get involved in such a war? In recent years, Peru has built up its armament to an extent that can hardly be considered necessary for defense. A considerable portion of foreign credits have been devoted to the arms race. Most of the weapons have been purchased from the Soviet Union.



to harass all activity by the left. That is why they have decreed a "state of emergency"—an excuse for detentions and attacks on the workers.

Q. What is the PRT's situation?

A. Our party took part in the strike, and made its presence felt. Where we could, we worked jointly with the POMR,⁴ another Trotskyist group, to organize and support the general strike.

We have struggled to make the FOCEP function in an organized way, and this is now being done. There is an executive committee that has begun to hold discussions and set some tasks. But the election campaign must still be discussed and planned. This will be an important opportunity to confront the bourgeoisie's maneuvers to demobilize the workers movement. $\hfill \Box$

4. Partido Obrero Marxista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Marxist Workers Party).

Sources close to the Foreign Ministry have said that Peru has sent large numbers of troops to the Chilean border.

Furthermore, it has leaked out from military circles that there have been divisions in the government over how to proceed with regard to the Chile question. A tendency favoring war to win back the areas lost in 1879 is said to have won. This is supposedly reflected in the cabinet shuffle that took place on January 2, when Gen. Pedro Richter Prada replaced Gen. Oscar Molina, becoming the new premier and minister of war; and García Bedoya replaced José de la Puente as foreign minister.

In early January the front pages of the Peruvian daily press featured stories about three Chilean spies being expelled from Peru. In fact, the events had occurred three weeks earlier, but nothing was said about it until the headlines appeared, interestingly enough, shortly after the CGTP issued its call for the January 9-11 general strike.

A "traitorous" air force sergeant, Julio Alfonso Vargas Garayar, who allegedly worked with the Chilean spies, was sentenced to death by the Naval-Air Military Court, under a law that is applicable only in wartime. The sentence was upheld by the High Court of Military Justice, and Vargas Garayar was executed by firing squad January 20.

A day later, the Chilean ambassador departed from Peru, having been declared *persona non grata* by the government.

One other indication of the way the military is trying to whip up war fever is the fact that 1979 has been renamed the "Year of the Heroes of the War of the Pacific." It had originally been declared "Year of the Child."

^{2.} Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American People's Revolutionary Alliance), Peru's main bourgeois party. The APRA holds the largest number of votes in the Constituent Assembly.

^{*}See "The Dispute Between Videla and Pinochet on Beagle Channel" in *Intercontinental Press/ Inprecor.* December 18, 1978, p. 1393.

Say No to the War Drive!

By Hugo Blanco

For a long time there have been rumors about the possibility of war between Peru and Chile. This is especially the case now, because 1979 is the centennial of the War of the Pacific between these two countries, which Peru lost.

The war in 1879 broke out because of the imperialist interests in the nitrate deposits in the area where the Peruvian, Bolivian, and Chilean frontiers met. At that time, Peru did not border on Chile but on Bolivia, which had a coastal strip.

The Chilean government was the one that best served the foreign interests, in this case English. It was for this reason that the imperialists engineered the war between Peru, Chile, and Bolivia, in which Chile conquered parts of Bolivia and Peru along the barren but nitrate-rich coast.

We know that this was no victory for the Chilean people, since they were only exploited in those mines. The only ones who got rich from this were the English and other foreign companies. And the Chilean workers were not only exploited but even massacred when they fought for better working conditions. All this is described in Chilean folk music, such as the Cantata Santo María de Iquique.

At the time of the War of the Pacific, just as now, it was the imperialist interests that dominated. Neither the people of Peru, nor Chile, nor Bolivia got anything from the war. The people were the losers, and the winners were the big multinational companies.

Right now, there is no dispute over nitrate deposits, but there may be another question having to do with the political balance of power in the southern hemisphere. Peru would look on a strong Chile with a certain fear.

I do not know in detail what interests would be served by a war, but one of them is, crystal clear. Both the Peruvian and Chilean governments are threatened by the working class and broad masses in their countries. This is a result of the fear and hunger with which the Chilean people have to live, and the hunger that is increasing in Peru as well. It is obvious that the military is using rumors of war and war propaganda to keep the masses quiet, to hold them back, and to try to unite the oppressed and oppressors in Peru against a common enemy—the oppressed and oppressors in Chile.

This is an attempt by the governments of both countries to gain support from their people. We cannot support this conspiracy in any way. They also want to use their propaganda to creat the atmosphere for repressing the most militant layers, such as the trade-union and political leaders. They are calling for "social peace,"

114

saying that the workers should no longer fight the bosses because in wartime that amounts to treason.

So it is quite clear that the war propaganda, and the war itself, if it comes to



HUGO BLANCO

that, will be used to repress the masses and their representatives, who will be called traitors.

Finally, we should declare that we are completely opposed to a war, since it is the working people, the exploited, who will have to pay the price. Those who are killed in wars, or who die as a result of their ravages, are the poor. And the only ones who win are the rulers and the big multinational companies, including the war industries.

We are opposed to a war. We revolutionists in Peru and the revolutionists in Chile. We know that it is imperialism that we must fight, especially U.S. imperialism, which oppresses us. The way to defend our nation, to defend our sovereignty, is by fighting against this imperialism that has made us its semicolonies. There is no other way to defend our countries except to defend them against the imperialists, who take away our national resources and in a way also occupy our country.

The most important representatives of these imperialists are undoubtedly the respective governments in Peru and Chile. And I think that we Peruvians have to fight against the military government, which is the representative of imperialism and the real betrayer of our national sovereignty. The Chilean revolutionists must fight against the Pinochet dictatorship, which also serves U.S. imperialism, selling out Chilean sovereignty to U.S. imperialism. That is the way we see this issue.

I do not have a lot of details about the war danger, but regardless of the details, we are against such a war *in principle*, because we are for fraternal relations between the Peruvian and Chilean peoples in the struggle against imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism, and for the sovereignty of our people. And this way of looking at things would not change even if we learned more details about the question. \Box

Eyewitness Coverage of the Iranian Revolution

Don't miss a single issue of Intercontinental Press/Inprecor! Send for your subscription now!

□ Enclosed is \$24 for a one-year subscription.

Enclosed is \$12 for a six-month subscription.

Please send information about first-class and airmail rates.

Name _

Address _

I

City/State/Zip __

Country _

Make checks payable to

Intercontinental Press P.O. Box 116, Village Station New York, N.Y. 10014 U.S.A.

Intercontinental Press



Ernest Harsch-IP/I

Crossroads—A Black Community's Fight for Survival

By Ernest Harsch

CAPE TOWN—Almost anywhere else in the world, Crossroads would be the sort of place one would want to move out of. But not in South Africa.

The 20,000 African residents of the impoverished shantytown ten miles east of here are fighting for the survival of their community; they are struggling to save their meager homes from demolition by the bulldozers of white supremacy. As crowded and flimsy as Crossroads is, its inhabitants are determined to stay there, because the alternatives—eviction to the barren rural reserves or the breaking up of their families—are simply unacceptable.

At a time when most open political activities against the regime have been suppressed, the fight being waged by the people of Crossroads has become a symbol of resistance for the entire Black population. A victory there would not only strike a blow at Pretoria's policy of forcible population removals, but could also inspire Blacks elsewhere to once more press forward with their own struggles for political, social, and economic rights.

The regime realizes this, and is determined that Crossroads be stamped out, despite recent conciliatory statements by some government officials.

The very existence of Crossroads stands in defiance of the regime's racial and labor policies. Yet, ironically, it is a direct product of those same policies.

In the South African scheme of things, Blacks are supposed to be rightless, underpaid laborers for the white-owned industries and farms. Nothing more. From the time of the first white settlement here more than three hundred years ago, Blacks have been dispossessed of the vast bulk of their land. In their millions, they have been driven, by law and economic necessity, to seek work with white employers. At the same time, Blacks are denied virtually all political rights. This enables the ruling class to keep Black wages extremely low and to hamper Blacks from using their substantial social and economic weight to advance their political position, to challenge the dominance of the white settler community.

A central aspect of this set-up is the migratory labor system, under which Africans in the Bantustans (rural reserves) are allowed to work in the "white" cities, like Cape Town, on a contract basis only—with no rights of permanent residency and without their families. Roughly half of all African workers in the country fall into this category.

Conditions in the poverty-stricken Bantustans being what they are, however, many Black migrant workers have chosen to defy the law by bringing their families with them, or have refused to return to the Bantustans once their labor contracts expire. Since they cannot then get legal housing in the established Black townships, they have little choice but to erect whatever shelter they can, wherever there is an available patch of vacant land. The result: rambling shantytowns, or "squatters' camps" as they are usually called.

Some Blacks who might be legally eligible for township housing end up in squatters' camps as well, either because the rents are too high in the townships or because there is simply no housing available.

Although for many Blacks squatting is the only acceptable alternative open to them, it has been decreed a "crime" in South Africa, punishable under the Illegal Squatting Act of 1951.

The phenomenon of squatting is particularly acute here in the Western Cape. In this region, the government has a strict policy of keeping out virtually all Africans, except for migrant workers. As a consequence, no family housing for Africans has been built in Cape Town since 1968, and the migrant workers must live in barracks in the three recognized African townships around the city: Guguletu, Nyanga, and Langa.

In reality, of course, African families do come here—and end up in the shantytowns. A number of settlements have sprung up over the past few years, including Modderdam, Unibel, Werkgenot, Elsies River, Lourde's Farm, and Crossroads.

There are also many squatters' camps inhabited by those Blacks who are classified as Coloured (of mixed ancestry). In fact, the majority of the more than 200,000 squatters in this area are Coloured. Although they are legally entitled to live here, the housing situation is so bad that they too have little choice but to crowd into shantytowns. Many had previously been kicked out of their homes in Cape Town to make way for white residential areas.

The conditions in one of the Coloured squatters' camps that I visited were little better than those in Crossroads.

Crossroads itself was first established in February 1975, many of its early residents having been evicted from smaller settlements in the area. Ironically, it was officials of the local Divisional Council who actually told them to go to Crossroads, a stretch of land near the intersection of two main roads not far from D.F. Malan Airport. At that time, the authorities viewed it as a temporary "transit camp," from which those workers who were authorized to be in Cape Town would eventually be rehoused in the townships—and everyone else shipped off to the Transkei and Ciskei reserves.

The entire area in which Crossroads is

located, between Cape Town and False Bay to the southeast, is known as the Cape Flats. It is made up of sandy, low-lying terrain and offers little protection from the fierce winds that sweep across the Cape Peninsula. In winter, a heavy mist hangs over the flats, accounting for a high incidence of bronchial ailments among the largely Black population of the area.

Crossroads now houses some 3,000 African families, or about 20,000 persons in all.

A majority of the adult men are employed in Cape Town, to which they must commute daily. Some men and women are self-employed within the settlement, as mechanics, dressmakers, small-scale traders, or operators of shebeens (illegal drinking establishments). The average income for family heads in Crossroads is R35 (US\$40.25) a week.

About half of the men are in the Cape Town area legally. The vast majority of the women and children are not. They have come for two main reasons: to be with their husbands and fathers and to escape the harsh conditions in the Transkei and Ciskei.

There are many women in Crossroads from Cala, in the Transkei. According to one of them, they left "because there it is dry, and we go hungry. The doctors are scarce, and there is nothing to keep us there. Also our husbands are in Cape Town. That is why we are making our homes here in Crossroads."

Many of the inhabitants of Crossroads, including those who are here "illegally," have actually resided in the Cape Town area for many years, averaging about eighteen years for the men and twelve years for the women. Contrary to government claims, they do not regard the Bantustans as their "homelands."

Crossroads was built by the residents themselves, out of materials that they either bought or salvaged. On a visit to the shantytown one morning, I was able to walk through extensive sections of it. All the housing is pretty much the same.

The shacks, called *pondoks*, are generally very small, composed of one or two rooms. With the exception of a rare brick structure, they are made of wood, corrugated iron sheeting, pieces of zinc or tin, cardboard, plastic, tarpaulin, or any other materials that offer a small measure of shelter.

Most of the pondoks have no glass windows, just square holes in the walls to let some light in. Some have wooden floors, and many have their walls covered with old newspapers, advertising posters, and other kinds of "wallpaper" to help keep the wind and rain from blowing through the cracks. Most roofs are of metal sheeting or tarpaulin, weighted down with stones and bricks to keep the wind from lifting them off.

Cape Town winters can be bitterly cold, and the only heating available in the pondoks is from coal or wood stoves.

Crossroads, not surprisingly, has few facilities. No one has running water or electricity. The only toilets are enclosed in pits in the back. After the residents won a court ruling in 1976 declaring Crossroads an "emergency camp," the local authorities grudgingly provided eight water taps on the outskirts of the camp, twice-weekly garbage collection services, and a medical clinic—for which each household must pay R7 (US\$8.05) a month (an amount that in some cases is even higher than in the official townships).

The conditions in Crossroads are not the worst of South Africa's shantytowns. Many are flimsier and even more impoverished. In some respects, in fact, life in Crossroads is more bearable than in the officially authorized African townships here.

What is immediately striking about Crossroads is a strong sense of community solidarity. In the words of Johnson Ndayi, a former unofficial "mayor" of Crossroads, "There is a strong community spirit amongst the people at Crossroads, who tend to help one another in many different ways."

This results partly from the residents' common struggle to save their homes, and partly from the fact that they have some influence over at least certain aspects of their lives, unlike in the strictly-regulated townships, where the police are everpresent.

The development of a closely-knit community in Crossroads is reflected in many



For many life is more bearable here than in official townships.

different things. On their own initiative, the residents have set up a thirty-member elected committee to oversee the affairs of the settlement. The area is subdivided into wards, each with its own small committee. A neighborhood force, called the "home guards," has also been established to patrol the shantytown against crime and to warn residents of raids by the authorities. The camp is kept relatively clean of litter.

Since most of the men are away at work during the day, women play a leading role in running the camp. They have also organized the Crossroads Women's Movement to help fight the regime's demolition plans.

The people of Crossroads have built two schools, the Sisamiele lower primary school and the Noxolo lower and primary school, which teach about 500 students. Teachers' salaries are paid by school fees raised within the shantytown and by donations from sympathetic groups in Cape Town and elsewhere. Adult literacy classes have also been established.

In addition, Crossroads has more than three dozen shops, seven churches, a number of cooperative self-help schemes,

A neighborhood force protects the shantytown . . .

karate clubs, and soccer teams. During the day, it is bustling with activity.

The ability of the people of Crossroads to accomplish all this *in opposition* to official policy could set an example to Blacks elsewhere. If Crossroads survives, the entire system of "influx control" (the regulation of population movement from rural areas to the cities) could be undermined, and with it the white ruling class's firm grip over the Black majority.

In the words of one official of the Divisional Council, it is difficult in shantytowns like Crossroads "to control the influx of persons and these unstable conditions could be a serious hazard in times of unrest."

As the regime sees it, it is imperative that the threat of Crossroads be blotted out.

Although the local authorities initially directed some squatters to move to Crossroads, they soon realized their mistake as the shantytown rapidly blossomed out of control. The first demolition moves against individual shacks began just a few months after the camp's establishment.

What followed was a long period of harassment and intimidation designed to force residents out. Police conducted raids and searches to pick up people whose passes did not contain the proper authorization allowing them to be in Cape Town. Some workers were arrested for "illegally" harboring their wives and children. Residents who fell behind in the payment of their service fees were threatened with eviction. Some pondoks were demolished.

One woman, in a letter to a friend, described the constant harassment: "The police are waking us up at night, and they are waiting for us at the [water] taps and even at the office when we go and pay our rents [service fees]. So it is difficult to fetch water and pay rent."

On several occasions, women were seized during the day, while their husbands were away at work, and unceremoniously dumped with their children onto trains headed toward the Bantustans. Some managed to make their way back to Crossroads.

Utilizing a loophole in the Illegal Squatting Act, the residents of Crossroads won a partial victory in court in June 1976 when they had the settlement declared an "emergency camp," thus staving off the immediate threat of demolition.

However, the authorities at the same time declared a freeze on the building of any new shacks at Crossroads. The shacks were numbered to enable the inspectors to enforce the ruling, and a "squatter control unit" would swoop in to knock down any new ones that were discovered.

The people of Crossroads having forced a temporary stalemate, the authorities eased up on the harassment for most of 1977.

In the meantime, however, they moved to close the legal loopholes allowing squatters to challenge demolition orders through the courts. They also turned their attention to other squatters' camps in the area: Modderdam, Unibel, and Werkgenot were flattened by bulldozers and their 30,000 inhabitants rendered homeless (some eventually ended up in Crossroads).

That left Crossroads as the largest surviving African shantytown here. The authorities decided it was time to zero in on it once more.

New eviction orders were issued in early 1978, and the police raids and intimidation rose sharply. So did the squatters' determination to stand fast.

Regina Ntongana, the head of the Crossroads Women's Movement, affirmed, "In 1976 we had trouble. When they came into Crossroads, we ran. We had to stay like baboons in the field and then come back.

"This time we're not running. It's our aim to stay. We'll stand in our houses."

In June, after a series of raids in which police shot at crowds and arrested fifty persons, about 200 women of Crossroads marched to the Bantu Affairs Administration Board offices to protest. When told that their presence in Crossroads was illegal, they responded, "If we are told we are illegally here, that is bad. We did not make those laws; we will stay here."

The following month, on July 30, protest actions were held in several cities in South Africa, and in other countries as well, to express support for the struggle in Cross-



Ernest Harsch-IP/I

Workers are arrested for "harboring wives and children."

roads. Some 4,000 persons rallied in Crossroads itself.

The regime's stance hardened even further. In August, Defence Minister P.W. Botha (soon to become the prime minister) announced that Crossroads would have to go. Brig. J.H. van der Westhuizen, chairman of the Cape Peninsula Administration Board, proclaimed that if Crossroads were not demolished, other squatters' camps would grow and spread.

During the early morning hours of September 6, about 600 police, some of them dressed in camouflage uniforms, descended on Crossroads in what van der Westhuizen called a "police exercise." They kicked down doors, assaulted residents, tore up identity documents, and arrested about 450 persons. Many were subsequently fined.

A little more than a week later, on September 14, came a second, even more vicious attack.

Some 600 police and board officials had attempted to catch the people of Crossroads by surprise, but they had been expected and the shantytown's home guards were posted around the perimeter of the camp to sound the alarm.

The authorities withdrew, but returned a few hours later in force. They were armed with clubs, guns, and police dogs. Residents of shacks were dragged out and beaten. Tear gas was fired when crowds gathered in self-defense. Johnson Ngxobongwana, the chairman of the Crossroads residents' committee and commander of the home guards, was beaten unconscious when he protested the attack. Amid the panic, another 350 inhabitants were arrested and carted off.

One resident of Crossroads, thirty-threeyear-old Sindile Ndlela, was shot to death by the police. He had just returned from the Transkei, where he had taken his wife for safety after the first mass raid a week earlier. Another resident, Evelyn Tshaba, was wounded by gunfire.

Brigadier van der Westhuizen tried to blame the violence on the people of Crossroads themselves. "There is no doubt," he claimed, "that the squatters' committee, the home guards and the spirit of resistance against laws and officials have led The Crossroads committee responded to a similar declaration by the Western Cape divisional commissioner, Brig. J.F. Rossouw, who claimed that only "necessary" force had been used to "restore order." The committee pointed out in a statement, "The police never restored order. There was perfect order before they came. After they came there was no more peace." It charged the police with acting like "terrorists."

to confrontation and violence and the

tragic loss of life.'

A member of the committee also reaffirmed the residents' determination to continue their struggle: "We will not move, no matter what happens."

The resistance of the people of Crossroads, and the widespread publicity and support they have won, forced the government to back down somewhat from its immediate demolition plans.

On November 30, Minister of Plural Relations Pieter G. Koornhof, who is in charge of overseeing policy toward Africans, said that the demolition plans had been set aside indefinitely. Koornhof refused, however, to discount demolition entirely. He emphasized instead that the residents of Crossroads would be "persuaded" on a "case-by-case" basis to move out "voluntarily."

I visited Crossroads just a few days after Koornhof's announcement. There was little rejoicing. The general consensus was that Crossroads had won a temporary reprieve, but that the regime still aimed to eliminate the settlement, reverting for the moment to the old tactic of applying pressure on individual families to get out, a process of piecemeal demolition.

Nor has the threat of outright destruction of the entire camp receded very far. Given more politically favorable circumstances, the authorities would certainly try to rush in with their bulldozers to finish off Crossroads once and for all.

The struggle of the people of Crossroads themselves will obviously be key to the settlement's survival. But international solidarity can do much to aid them. It already has. What is needed now are stepped-up efforts internationally to halt this latest attack of the apartheid regime on Black rights. Crossroads must be saved.

Gloomy Economic Outlook for the Semicolonial World

By Charles-André Udry

The World Bank's latest report on worldwide economic development was published in August 1978. It states: ". . . some 800 million souls [!] still live in a state of absolute poverty. These masses of marginally employed are deprived of food, shelter, education, and decent medical care." That is a rough definition of what is known as underdevelopment.

During the last period, which was one of growth and relative industrialization for many semicolonial countries, inequalities of income and consumption deepened. The standard of living and relative share of the national income accruing to 40% of the poor layers of the population in Brazil and Mexico declined. Ten to twenty percent of the population, representing the poorest layers, experienced an absolute drop in income.¹

A recent study focusing on Thailand and its artificial boom of the past few years shows that "the number of those living below officially-defined poverty lines has increased; the rural-urban income differential is increasing; and rural incomes are becoming more unequal." (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 1, 1978.)

In truth, the pattern of accumulation in these countries has meant a concentration of incomes, superexploitation of the working class, and pauperization of the peasant masses.

The semicolonial countries whose populations are still largely, if not in their majority, rural, are nonetheless becoming increasingly dependent on imports of food.

The shortfall in grain production in these countries continues to grow. In 1969 and 1972, it was 30 million tons; in 1974, it exceeded 50 million, and in 1975, 57 million.² Mexico, for example, whose corn imports had already increased in value by 67% in 1977 over the previous year, further increased its volume of imports in 1978. In 1977, Mexico spent \$857 million on imports of food; in 1978, it greatly surpassed this amount. (*Financial Times*, November 2, 1978.)

According to a study commissioned by the U.S. authorities, the "third world" countries will have to import 120 to 125 million tons of food from the imperialist countries by the end of the 1980s.³ These prospects led an analyst of international trade to write that "[hunger] constitutes a steady market for the major powers. In a word, hunger is 'good business' for some and a serious business for others."⁴

Several factors explain the obstacles to expanding the production of food for the internal market and increasing agricultural productivity worldwide. These include:

1. The alliance of the bourgeoisie with the landowning class in the semicolonial and dependent countries; this is necessary if the bourgeoisie is to maintain its control of the state.

2. Capitalist penetration of the rural areas, resulting in greater social differentiation.

3. The structure of agrarian ownership.

4. Industrialization based on the superexploitation of the peasant masses—who provide a source of cheap labor power and are crushed by the burden of taxes and the totally unfavorable terms of exchange on the internal market—while providing no stimulus to agriculture.

It is thus possible to clarify two facets of the debates on the "new economic order" relating to agriculture. First, the demand raised by the bourgeoisies in the semicolonial countries for stabilizing the prices of agricultural products in no way addresses the real problems that are at the root of the agrarian crisis. In fact, the concern of these bourgeoisies is rather to make sure they have money coming in to pay for imports of the heavy machinery and manufactured goods needed for industrialization. (Fifty-six "developing" countries draw more than 50% of their outside income from the sale of agricultural products.)

Second, the program of aid to the "poor peasants of the third world" put forward by the World Bank in 1976 itself largely corresponds to the profit needs of the imperialist agribusiness companies. During the 1970s, these concerns stepped up their penetration of the semicolonial countries, where they built true agricultural enclaves oriented toward exports for the world market.

The agribusiness companies to some extent took over the various "green revolu-

tions." They heavily dominate production for export (either directly or through their control of distribution), as well as the sale of agricultural machinery.

The projects of international public institutions, helped along by state subsidies, either go to prop up the power of the big landowners or are aimed at organizing the "small producers" and channeling their crops toward agribusiness. These multinational corporations now determine a good part of the "third world's" agricultural development. In a remarkable study, Ernest Feder writes:

"Though it is difficult to prove with figures, based on documentation provided by the World Bank we can state that the bulk of agricultural loans, including research projects—probably 90% or even more—go back into the coffers of the agribusiness companies. That is the implicit purpose of these loans. Given the penetration of the third world by foreign capital and technology, any loan made by the World Bank is assured of being placed in a sector where foreign concerns control investments and production."⁵

The Transformation of Exports

One of the distinguishing features of the evolution of international trade in recent years is the growth in exports of manufactured goods from the underdeveloped capitalist countries. This growth reflects the relative (and distorted) industrialization some of these countries have undergone. It is itself tied to the combination of industrial "delocalization" carried out by the multinationals and initiatives on the part of the bourgeoisies and regimes of the "third world."

However, it is necessary to remind ourselves that the very great majority of these countries still specialize mainly in supplying raw materials to the developed capitalist countries.

Thus, the respective share of manufactured products and primary products in the total exports of "non-oil-exporting developing countries"⁶ to all of the imperialist

^{1. &}quot;The United States and World Development: Agenda 1977," p. 61. Praeger and S. Jain, "Size Distribution of Income—A Compilation of Data," World Bank report, November 1974.

^{2.} Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "Coopération Pour le Développement," 1976 examination (November 1976).

^{3.} Research Report No. 3, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. (Quoted in *The Economist*, September 16, 1978.)

^{4.} Gérard Viguié, "La Faim, le Marché du Siècle?" (Hunger-The Market of the Century?), *Politique Etrangère*, No. 4. 1978.

^{5.} Ernest Feder, "Capitalism's Last-Ditch Effort to Save Underdeveloped Agricultures: International Agribusiness, the World Bank, and the Rural Poor," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1977.

^{6.} For the purposes of this article, the phrase "non-oil-exporting developing countries" is understood to signify those underdeveloped countries not belonging to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

countries combined works out as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Exports from 'Third-World' Countries, Not Including OPEC Members

	Raw	Manufactured
	Materials	Goods
1974	63.5%	35.5%
1975	65.0	34.7
1976	60.5	36.7
1977	61.6	38.1

Source: GATT, International Trade in 1977-78, Geneva,

More generally, the non-oil-exporting developing countries, which represent about two-thirds of the world's population, continue to play a very small role in total exports worldwide (11.8% in 1973, 11.3% in 1975, 12.0% in 1976, and 12.2% in 1977).

However, the rate of increase in their exports of manufactured goods in the 1973-77 period was faster than that of the imperialist countries (99.6% compared with 83.9%). At the same time, the proportion of manufactured goods from the "non-oilexporting developing countries" on the world market is slowly increasing, even if it is still very small:

1973	7.5%
1974	8.0%
1975	7.1%
1976	8.3%
1977	8.4%

While these general figures make it possible to grasp the limitations of the transformations taking place, they nevertheless tend to obscure the real changes going on in a few countries in terms of certain products (textiles, clothing, light electronics, etc.).

It should also be noted how hard the 1974-75 recession in the imperialist economies hit the exports of the "third world." Finally, it should be recalled that India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and twenty-four other "low-income" countries (according to the World Bank's classification) account for only 1% of world trade. However, they add up to 50% of the population of the "third world."

Stabilizing the Prices of Raw Materials

In 1974-75, the ruling classes in the underdeveloped countries sought a real rise in the prices of primary products. They aimed to get the resources that, along with a transfer of technology, were supposed to finance a new phase of industrialization anchored in the export of manufactured goods to the imperialist "centers." Here, too, another aspect of the "new economic order" is revealed.

In fact, it is plain that any attempt to place manufactured goods on the imperialist market necessitates keeping prices low. This in turn exerts strong pressure on direct and indirect wages, resulting in constriction of the internal market and barring large quantities of consumer goods. The effect of this is to block rounded industrial development.

The plans for raising prices have now fallen flat. The slowing of industrial growth in the imperialist countries in 1977 and 1978 has caused the demand for primary goods used in industry to slack off, which has led to a relative drop in the prices of many raw materials. The new recession that is on the horizon will not help matters.

Moreover, what counts for the underdeveloped countries is not only the absolute price level, but its relationship to the prices of other types of merchandise (above all finished goods). However, as can be seen from Table 2, this relationship is changing to the detriment of primary products.

The trend is clear, even if the comparison between the two sets of figures must be taken with caution (because of their different statistical bases).

	Table Prices of Manufact	Raw Ma		
	(1970 =	100)		
	1976	1977	19	78
Agricultural Raw Materials			1st Quarter	2nd Quarte
(Cotton, rubber, etc.)	227	237	233	240
Minerals and Nonferrous				
Metals (except fuels)	173	180	180	176
Manufactured Goods	186	203	222	225
Source: United Nations Statistical	Bulletin.			



U.S.-owned plant in Taiwan.

In the present context, no further consideration is being given to an index tying the prices of the seventeen principal raw materials to a "basket" of eighty-nine manufactured goods, as was discussed in Nairobi in 1976. Discussions on a mere "stabilization" of prices ended recently in Geneva with no results (*International Herald Tribune*, December 1, 1978). And what is worse, it is now only a question of "stabilizing" the prices of eighteen primary products, without manufactured goods getting the same treatment!

Even in this realm, the imperialist powers are not about to make concessions. The debate revolves around three questions. First, fixing the price floor at a stable level.⁷ When the price of a material approaches the price floor, the controller of the "regulatory stockpile" (composed of surpluses) must buy on the market. However, the fixing of this price floor is largely determined by estimating the capacity of the fund (that is, of a country's financial resources) in order to defend it against market fluctuations and speculation. It is a well-known fact that the imperialist powers refuse to build up these funds.

Secondly, the imperialist powers are pushing to reduce the financial volume of a projected common fund. If agreement is reached, the fund will contain six to twelve times less resources than anticipated by the proposal of the "Group of 77" in Nairobi (*The Economist*, November 11, 1978). However, with its original \$3 billion dollars, later to be increased to \$6 billion, it will be used up by the simultaneous stockpiling (corresponding to two months' worth of consumption) of cotton, sugar, and coffee.

Thirdly, these funds are the "joint responsibility" of the (debt-ridden) producers and the consumers. *Business Week* draws the logical conclusion: "The participation

^{7.} For a critique of stabilization mechanisms, see *Revue Tiers-Monde*, No. 4-6, 1976. See also the cynically frank article in *The Economist*, September 23, 1978, on the "model" Lomé pact and the Stabex system.

of powerful consumer countries on the administrative boards of these agreements on raw materials should prevent any deliberate attempt to raise the price above longterm market trends" (May 9, 1977).

Erosion of the Cartels

In the crisis atmosphere of the imperialist economies, the producer cartels, which some depicted as so powerful in 1974-75, are rapidly eroding. This has been true for CIPEC (the copper cartel). Faced with an overabundance of accumulated stocks, the only solution would be a drastic cut in production. But Chile, whose production costs are lower than in other producer countries in CIPEC, is not interested in such a step. "Even if a sharp cut in production were implemented by countries like Peru, Zambia, or Zaïre, Chile, with its vast reserves, would quickly fill the gap" (African Business, September 1978).

OPEC is going through basically the same first stages of disintegration. The market is declining or stagnating (in the first semester of 1978, OPEC's production of crude oil fell by 9% compared with the same period in 1977). A growing number of oil producers not belonging to OPEC are entering the market (Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia), not to mention the competition from Alaskan and North Sea oil.


Thus, a miniature war of prices, discounts, and reductions for "favored customers" has begun (*Il Mondo*, November 29, 1978). The trend may be momentarily reversed owing to the mass upsurge in Iran and its effects on oil production, but it seems inconceivable that this could strengthen OPEC.

The imperialist powers, taking advantage of the crisis, have opened a new front in the "battle" over raw materials—the mining sector.

According to an EEC commission, mining companies in 1960 devoted 57% of their revenues to investments in the "third world." By 1977, this share had fallen to 13.5%. West Germany's minister of the economy did not neglect to announce that this reduction was essentially rooted in the threat of nationalization by these countries of the extraction sector and the first steps in the process of refining raw materials (*Financial Times*, November 30, 1978).

A report by the same commission, dealing with five key raw materials (cobalt, tin, phosphates, tungsten, and copper) notes that "the mining companies do not want to put in 90% of the money for only 40% of the net profits. The greater the (political) uncertainty, the less likely it is that a firm would be willing to invest £100 million or £500 million. And it is projects of that scope that we are talking about." (African Business, September 1978.)

The EEC is putting increasing pressure on the governments of semicolonial countries to provide guarantees against "noncommercial risks," i.e., nationalizations. In



Pakistani peasant behind his plow.

Agence France-Presse

addition, a system of aid to mining enterprises is going to be set up. It will undoubtedly be presented as "assistance to the third world"!

This new interest in mining projects in the underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa, is explained by the exigencies of the keen rivalry between European, Japanese, and U.S. imperialism. Control of raw materials is a significant asset in this war over the world market. Some readjustments will be necessary, as a result of the disproportions created by the dynamic of investments during the period preceding the crisis of 1974. Finally, although prices are stagnating, they are quite a bit higher than before 1973, and this makes new investments more attractive.

Thus, from the beginning of the crisis in the international capitalist economy, a dominant feature has emerged—the shrinking of revenues from the export of raw materials. This might well contribute to a fairly rapid reversal of the tendencies to development that have been shown by some of the most successful exporters of raw materials. The loss of resources stemming from exports may, in turn, limit these countries' access to international loans, a factor that also contributed to their relative growth spurt in the last three years.

Sharper Differentiations

Under the impact of the crisis, differentiations among the semicolonial countries have sharpened in relation to their role in world trade and in the process of reproduction of capital within the imperialist countries (that is, their role in the division of labor on a world scale). For the sake of convenience, the following breakdown can be made, even if the homogeneity of these groups is limited:

1. The oil-exporting countries have been able to shore up their financial position. This position is not as powerful as might have been expected based on the projections made by the IMF four years ago. In fact, in the second quarter of 1978, the sum total of loans and withdrawals made by the OPEC countries on the capital market exceeded their deposits (*Le Monde*, December 11, 1978).

Nevertheless, the volume (in absolute figures) of capital accumulation in these countries has made for a rapid process of industrial expansion, despite the sharp inequalities that are apparent among the thirteen OPEC members (from Iran to Ecuador; from Nigeria or Algeria to Saudi Arabia). They form part of the international gamut of industries producing intermediate materials (steel, cement, petrochemicals).

But several bottlenecks have appeared: a general lack of skilled labor power; the limited growth of the internal market; a tendency to overaccumulation and inflation; very uneven development from one sector to another; and a large balance-oftrade deficit, which has had quite visible effects in some countries (Algeria, for example).

Furthermore, investments made in steel or petrochemicals may well suffer as a result of the big excess in productive capacity on a world scale. This makes it questionable whether a portion of these investments will ever be realized. For example, Mitsui Petrochemical and Mitsubishi Petrochemical, together with Iranian stateowned companies, are building two big petrochemical complexes slated to go into production in 1981 and 1984. The two Japanese companies fear for their ability to carry out these plans, not only because of the social and political situation in Iran, but also because of the strong competition in this sector. Huge investments are also being made in Southeast Asia (Sumitomo Chemical is participating in an imposing project in Singapore) and elsewhere, despite the existing excess capacity (Far Eastern Economic Review, November 24 and December 8, 1978).

The process of industrialization that is unquestionably taking place in these countries and upsetting the old equilibrium of their social structure (as shown by the upsurge of the masses and the working class in Iran) will be much more jarring than the most optimistic imperialist exporters of heavy machinery imagined at the start of the "oil miracle" period.

To this first group may be added countries that export strategic or scarce raw materials, such as uranium, bauxite, phosphates, or tin. But their position is much shakier than that of the countries mentioned earlier.

2. A second group is made up of:

a) A small number of countries or territories where one industry, with the help of subsidiaries of multinational corporations or of national firms, is experiencing a very fast rate of growth based on the export of manufactured goods (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong). Singapore is trying to join this club, and it has other imitators in Asia—Malaysia and Thailand. Nevertheless, deep dissimilarities exist between the first three countries and the last three.

Within this group, South Korea stands out strongly. In 1962, 80% of industrial investments there were made by foreign companies; by 1975, their share had declined to 41% (*Le Matin*, September 23, 1978). The share of manufactured goods in total exports grew from 88.3% in 1975 to 89.7% in 1977 (*Asia Yearbook*, 1978). The growth of foreign trade is staggering: exports went from \$3.3 billion in 1974 to \$10.2 billion in 1977, and the boom continued in 1978 (*Ibid.*).

South Korea has joined the ranks of the world's biggest exporters in the fields of textiles, clothing, shoes, household appliances, cement, and plywood. Its construction companies, which made a bundle in Vietnam working for the U.S. armed forces, have obtained building contracts in the Mideast (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, May 24, 1978). Under an arrangement with international banks or multinationals that use South Korea as a relayer of exports to Asia, South Korean companies are beginning to step up their penetration of heavy industry. As a result of unemployment and Park's police state, wages average about one-third what they are in Japan (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, May 24, 1978).

b) Countries where the process of industrialization began during the crisis of the 1930s and World War II, which have also emphasized exports in the last period (Brazil; Mexico, which can also be placed in the first group; and Argentina). They

Price Increases in Hungary

Hungary's official press agency announced January 7 that, starting immediately, the price of gasoline will rise 25%, tobacco products 30%, beer 20%, and newspapers 40%. The price of rice will double.

According to a Reuters dispatch from Budapest, officials said the increases are necessary to make the economy more "competitive" internationally.

February 12, 1979

are also among the countries producing intermediate materials (chiefly steel and cement), as well as standard machine tools (Brazil).

3. A third group, within which big differences exist—particularly in the degree of industrialization—could encompass all the other underdeveloped countries, which have been and are the hardest hit by the crisis of the international capitalist economy.

In terms of the world market, the newest feature is the emergence of a number of semi-industrialized underdeveloped countries that export manufactured goods. This group is still small, although it is true that its numbers are tending to grow. These exporting countries are for the most part located in East Asia. In 1977, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines together exported more than \$61 billion worth of manufactured goods—as much as France. This represented 5.6 times more than in 1970 (*Paribas, Conjoncture,* November 1978).

The regional distribution for the "third world" of exports of manufactured goods looked like this in 1975:

Exports of Manufactured Goods by Region

Southeast Asia	9.81%
East Asia	60.13
Latin America	21.95
Middle East and	
North Africa	5.06
Subsaharan Africa	3.04

Source: "L'Evolution des Economies du Tiers-Monde et l'Appareil Productif Français," Commissariat au Plan, April 1978.

The export drive is focusing for the time being on a small number of products. While greater diversification of exports is being planned in South Korea or Taiwan, textiles still represented 32.3% of South Korean exports in 1977.

In 1976, textile exports from the non-oilexporting developing countries represented 19.24% of world exports; in exports of clothing, the figures rose to 38.8%. Within the Common Market countries, imports of textiles and clothing from the non-oilexporting developing countries came to 10.2% and 27.3% respectively in 1976, and 11% and 26.7% respectively in 1977 (GATT).

Since the beginning of the 1970s, items made of synthetic and artificial fibers have acquired the leading role in exports. It follows from this that the exporting countries are big importers—both of the raw materials and intermediate products used in the chemical processes of textile production, and of heavy machinery, licenses, and technology.

However, as can be seen in Taiwan and South Korea, once these countries have run through the "downstream" stages of textile production (assembly), they begin to take on as well the "upstream" stages (production of threads, chemical fibers, and textile machinery). This is being done in joint ventures with imperialist companies, mainly Japanese. It is part of the "redeployment" of the textile industry on an international scale (*Le Monde*, November 21, 1978). Only Taiwan can come anywhere near South Korea in the coming years. The chances are slim that other countries will be able to gain control of the "upstream" stages of textile production.

A second group of products is made up of articles such as television sets, radio receivers, cameras, office machines, household appliances, simple electronic equipment, and wristwatches. The entry of these products onto the world market, in terms of their absolute value, is changing the face of world trade.

Production of such goods was extended internationally under the auspices of the American and Japanese, and later the European, multinationals (West Germany and Switzerland for watchmaking). The first electronics assembly plant in Mexico was built in 1961. In 1964, General Instruments set up shop in Taiwan, and in 1968, National Semiconductor came to Singapore.⁸

In the last six years, the geographic spread of production of electronics goods, propelled by the search for a way to combine low wages and advanced technology, has been given a boost under the pressure of the Japanese, who needed to retaliate for the rise in the value of the yen in 1971. The industry now involves Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Central America (El Salvador, Haiti, the Dominican Republic). The Japanese capitalists, who were (and are) so closely associated with the rise of the four leading Asian exporters on the world market (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore), must readjust their strategy in the face of these new competitors. The latter are exerting pressure, for example, on the U.S. market, in the fields of clothing, shoes, black-and-white television sets, radios, sewing machines, and plywood (Far Eastern Economic Review, February 24, 1978).

Of course, a fraction of these exports represents camouflaged "Japanese" products, for in order to deal with the rise in value of the yen, Japanese concerns employing a large proportion of labor stepped up their implantation in the region—not with the aim of controlling the internal market in these countries, as was previously the case, but of exporting from them. But this type of exports by no means encompasses total exports in the region. The penetration of East Asian goods into the Japanese internal market, which is controlled by the Japanese distribution giants, is widening. The biggest Japanese

8. "Electronics, the Global Industry," NACLA Report on the Americas, April 1977. producer of plywood, Eida Ltd., plunged into bankruptcy in 1978 as a result of this competition (Société de Banque Suisse, *Le Mois*, December 11, 1978).

In the long run, this is forcing Japanese capitalism, which has huge markets in these countries for its heavy machinery, technology, and so on, to redeploy its industry in the direction of heavy electronics (Fujitsu and Hitachi are ready to take on IBM in this sector), data processing, export of technology, etc. For example, Japanese exports of computers went from 275 billion ven in 1973 to 720 billion in 1977 (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 25, 1978). During the trade discussions between South Korea and Japanese imperialism, plans were made for a horizontal division of production in the framework of Southeast Asia (Far Eastern Economic Review, October 13, 1978).

Dark Clouds on the Horizon

These statistics on textiles, clothing, and electronic technology reveal the transformation that has taken place in the structure of the world market. This transformation began in the 1960s, but was stepped up as a result of the restructuring made necessary by the crisis. It reflects the new distribution of economic activities on an international scale (the international division of labor).

However, it should not be forgotten that "for all the fuss about the emergence of the poor as competitors, they remain overwhelmingly more important as buyers" (The Economist, September 9, 1978). Since 1974, exports to the underdeveloped countries-above all to those undergoing a process of semi-industrialization-have represented a growing proportion of manufactured goods exported by the United States, Japan and the EEC-EFTA (European Economic Community-European Free Trade Association).9 In 1977, Japan exported ten times more to these countries than it imported from them, and for the EEC-EFTA, the relationship was five to one.

The very nature of these exchanges indicates that the relative industrialization of many "third world" countries is inextricably tied to their deeper integration into the world capitalist economy. Their dependence on imperialism may take different forms—such as imperialist control of technology, financial control (witness the greater role played by the big imperialist banks in investment in these countries), or control of the circulation of goods on the world market—but the basic relationship remains.

Three immediate conclusions can be drawn from this:

a) These countries, which have joined the ranks of exporters of manufactured goods, are easily affected by fluctuations in demand from the imperialist countries. Their small internal markets cannot absorb the existing supply. Therefore, protectionist measures taken by the imperialist powers have immediate effects on the growth of their exports, especially since their diversification is limited owing to the rudimentary stage of industrialization that exists in these countries (Colombia, Morocco. Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, for example).

A country like Brazil finances its exports through a lavish system of subsidies. This in turn causes it to become indebted to the imperialist banks, while at the same time provoking protectionist reprisals that highlight the weakness of the Brazilian thrust toward external markets (*Financial Times*, December 7, 1978).

Furthermore, protectionist measures in the advanced countries have cumulative effects. For example, measures that limit imports of Japanese goods (television sets) to the United States force South Korea and Taiwan to slow the rate at which they are reducing exports of textiles and clothing, because they cannot easily branch out into new fields (television sets). This in turn has repercussions on countries that are initiating production of manufactured goods (entry into textile and clothing).

b) The processing industries that are being transferred to the underdeveloped countries are by and large those for which the medium- and long-term rates of growth of worldwide markets are relatively the slowest. For example, since 1974 in nearly all the imperialist countries, the final demand for textile goods has been stagnating (*L'Expansion*, November 1978).

More than one of the underdeveloped countries that are building petrochemical complexes as a joint venture with Japanese, American, or European companies will also have trouble finding profitable outlets on a world market plagued by a 30% excess in productive capacity. Even if there has been less scaling-down of plans for investment in steel production in the Latin American countries (Mexico, Brazil) than in the imperialist "centers," there has still been a significant reduction (the Las Truchas project in Mexico has been cut back by 18% since the onset of the crisis).

c) Finally, in a number of countries, including in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina), export industries modeled on those in Hong Kong or Taiwan do not seem likely to develop much in the future (outside of a few free trade zones). This is owing to protectionist barriers, the strength of competition on the world market, wage levels (which depend on the degree of development and level of activity of the working class), the wageproductivity ratio, and the strategy of multinational enterprises, whose direct investments are declining. In addition, in Latin America, the multinationals are still by and large focusing on the internal market. 10

Moreover, as a byproduct of industrialization itself, the strengthening of the working class and its struggles may upset more than a few plans made by the technocrats of development and the national bourgeoisies of the "third world." This is true not only for Iran and Brazil, but even in an embryonic way for South Korea (see *Business Week*, December 18, 1978, "Why Korea's Economic Success Threatens Park").

The Debt Trap

"We foresee, even if the growth of world trade slows, a steady improvement in the balance of payments for the developed countries, at the expense of the oil producers as well as other developing countries" (*Financial Times*, November 29, 1978).

This prognosis may well be confirmed. A number of factors are contributing to heavier balance-of-payments deficits. These include: the changes in the respective prices of primary goods and raw materials (some underdeveloped countries are suffering on account of both); the ratio of imports to exports (in case of recession, the demand for imports among the non-oilexporting developing countries is much less elastic than in the imperialist countries, hence a decline in exports among the underdeveloped countries is much more serious than in the imperialist centers); and the effects of the rate of inflation on interest rates (with the repercussions this has on debt service paid by the underdeveloped countries).

Finally, the multinationals' model of accumulation itself leads to a deficit; their balances of goods (imports of heavy machinery) and services (dividends, royalties, freight, insurances, and so on) are in deficit. Thus, to take Brazil as an example, five big multinationals (Geigy, Bayer, Hoechst, du Pont, and Monsanto) together imported \$177.9 million worth in the first nine months of 1978 while exporting \$4.43 million. In 1977, this ratio was \$106.7 million to \$3.06 million (*Financial Times*, December 5, 1978).

Disequilibrium in the balance of payments has become chronic in the semicolonial countries. To cover such a deficit, the non-oil-exporting developing countries (and OPEC members too, for that matter) are compelled to resort to "external" sources. However development aid has been stagnating since 1963-64, and has even declined (in real terms) since the beginning of the 1970s.¹¹ Thus, the underdeveloped countries must turn to private international money markets, with their usual rates of interest.

^{9.} Report on International Trade, 1977-78, GATT, Geneva, 1978.

^{10.} See the articles by P. Salama and the summary of a report by C. Furtado in *Revue Tiers*-

Monde, No. 4-6, 1978, and the study by J.P. Agarwal in *Die Weltwirtschaft*, Vol. 1, 1978, pp. 114-132.

^{11.} M. Schiray, Tiers-Monde et Monde Industrialisé (Third World and Industrialized World), Paris, 1978, p. 64.



Singapore is trying to become a big exporter of manufactured goods.

To make this possible, it is necessary on the one hand for petrodollars to be circulating on these markets (recycling), and on the other hand for declining investments in the imperialist economies to release a mass of capital for loans and speculation. The imperialist countries are also aware of the importance to them of keeping the markets of the "third world" going. A decline in the growth of the "developing countries" by even a percentage point means a market loss of \$1.5 billion for the imperialist economies (*Euromoney*, June 1977, p. 99).

Increased participation by banks in direct investments in the "third world" is part of the same process. It also reflects a burgeoning of economic initiatives on the part of the ruling classes and governments in the semi-industrialized underdeveloped countries (quite often through joint ventures with imperialist firms), as well as the reluctance of the multinationals to make direct investments because of the "political climate."

Thus, the "third world's" debt burden has grown. The debt structure has changed to favor loans backed by big imperialist banks (which make about 50% of their profits this way [Bulletin Financier Suisse, April 21, 1977]):

Foreign Debt of Underdeveloped Countries (Non-OPEC Members) (in billions of dollars)

1970	74.23
1975	151.40
1976	206.80
1977 (est.)	250-260

Source: Société de Banque Suisse, Le Mois, No. 1, 1978; Africa, December 1978.

According to the World Bank, the debt burden of "medium-income countries" (Mexico, Brazil, Morocco, Peru, South Korea) increased by 438% between 1970 and 1977, or by 189% in real terms (*Africa*, December 1978).

In 1976, 40% of the debt of the entire "third world" was financed by private loans. The major portion of these loans were granted to a dozen countries (the "richest" of the poor countries, those that possess either potentially vast resources or more secure revenues stemming from exports of manufactured goods or key raw materials).¹² In Africa, four countries alone accounted for 69% of private loans (*Africa*, December 1978).

Another tendency is also emerging in the debt structure. After having pounced on Eurocurrency, a small number of "privileged" underdeveloped countries are entering the Eurobond market (Brazil, the Philippines, Mexico, South Korea). According to Morgan Guaranty Trust, recourse to the bond market went from \$67 million in 1975 to \$993 million in the first three quarters of 1978 (*International Herald Tribune*, Special Report No. 2, November 1978, "The Euromarket").

Debt service can only increase, given the growing proportion of private loans. These are frequently short-term loans, or loans tied to short-term interest rates (rollover credit). The ratio of debt service to export revenues will grow inexorably. According to forecasts, Brazil's debt service of \$8 billion will soon correspond to 66% of export income (*Le Monde*, October 8-9, 1978).

The debt burden of the underdeveloped

12. World Bank, Report on Development, p. 27.

countries translates into deepening oppression of the worker and peasant masses, both directly and indirectly: directly, because in order to insure cheap exports, it is necessary to step up superexploitation; indirectly, through the bourgeois state's fixing the prices of consumer staples, raising taxes, and so on. The IMF's job is to point the way in this area, as it has done in Peru and Chile and in Egypt, Zaïre, and elsewhere in Africa. It does this to protect the imperialist banks against a cessation of payments.

In the present situation, the storm clouds are gathering:

a) Big debtors, which have accumulated huge short-term loans in the last four years, resulting in a fantastic increase in the amount of their obligations, may well experience serious difficulties. If two or three of them experience the same fate as Zaïre in 1976, the banks will show some hesitation about financing additional loans to other underdeveloped countries (even in the best of cases—for a banking crash would not be far off if that happened). Furthermore, given their debt burden, some countries are being forced to take measures that set off a recessionary spiral. That is what Brazil is now doing.

b) Credit-tightening in the United States, as announced by Carter, will increase the debt service of the underdeveloped countries by driving up the interest rates on short-term loans. The importance of these for the "third world" has been demonstrated. Moreover, a recession in the United States means a reduction of exports to this market. Interest rates will not go down at the start of the recession. Thus, for a period, these two negative effects will be combined for exporters and debtors on the "periphery."

c) The rise in the price of oil will upset the balance of payments for many non-oilexporting developing countries. If this is added to protectionist measures prompted by a recession in the imperialist economies, it will have severe repercussions for the underdeveloped countries. Finally, the holding back of industrial development projects, either because of the political situation (Iran), or because of excess productive capacity in many sectors, is intensifying the financial difficulties of the underdeveloped countries.

The evolution of raw materials prices, the dynamic of exports of manufactured items, the financial outlook—none of these point to a long-term continuation of the relative development that these countries underwent in the later years of the first phase of the present crisis of the international imperialist economy. Differentiations will increase. Some countries will still be able to maintain their growth (in East Asia, for instance). But the deepgoing integration of these countries into the international capitalist economy, which has entered a crisis, will bear its fruits.

December 17, 1978

Selections From the Left

[The entire column this week is devoted to reactions in the left press to the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia and the fall of the Pol Pot regime.]

* * *

Internationalen 🖗

"The International," central organ of the Communist Workers League (Swedish section of the Fourth International). Published weekly in Stockholm.

The editorial in the January 12 issue says:

"The war between Vietnam and Cambodia reflected the character of both regimes, their continuing bureaucratization and attachment respectively to Moscow and Peking and their opposition to the masses taking the power directly into their own hands. The recent developments showed that the Pol Pot regime lacked broad popular support.

"Vietnam's military intervention was carried out by means of a full-scale invasion, but it is clear that Pol Pot failed to mobilize the population in defense of his regime. What is not clear is whether the new regime has broad support. But it is seeking such support, obviously, by making extensive promises of democratization and liberation from the oppression of the old regime. In this situation, we must give full support to moves in this direction among the Cambodian masses.

"But no one should have illusions about the new regime's intentions or Vietnam's support for it. The government in Hanoi is acting in accordance primarily with its own state interests. . . . A regime in Pnompenh that accepts a Vietnamese military presence in the country will come into direct opposition to the Cambodian masses taking power by organizing and arming themselves. . . .

"The Indochinese regimes have undermined defense of the revolution by opening the way for armed confrontations among sister nations. . . .

"Regardless of the character of the various Indochinese leaders, we must mobilize against international reaction in defense of the Indochinese revolution. Every attempt to send imperialist troops to Cambodia under UN cover must be rejected. In answer to calls for stopping aid to Vietnam, the demand for aid to repair the damage caused by the imperialists must be raised more forcefully.

"Only in this way can we help the only ones who can ultimately defend the revolution, the Indochinese masses, organize themselves and make their own decisions about how to build the new society."

rotfront

"Red Front," the monthly newspaper of the Revolutionary Marxist Group, Austrian section of the Fourth International.

"For a whole generation of young leftists," the January issue states, "this war is the source of the gravest political disorientation.

"In fact, it mocks all the principles of socialism and proletarian internationalism. It can be understood, however, when you consider that the liberation movements that emerged victorious in Indochina came straight out of the school of Stalinism . . . and as a result established bureaucratic regimes.

"It was only as a result of aggravating factors, however, that this nationalism typical of such regimes . . . could lead to a full scale war—the way in which the Cambodian regime sealed off the country, which went hand in hand with its crazy projects and the whipping up of an ultranationalist chauvinist climate, the ever more pressing needs for economic cooperation that Vietnam sought by not always irreproachable means. . . The fanatically anti-Soviet policy of the People's Republic of China also played a role, severely sharpening the isolation of Vietnam."

was tun

"What Is To Be Done," weekly paper of the International Marxist Group. Published in Frankfurt, West Germany.

"In the history of this century, there is hardly a more painful experience," the editors state in the January 25 issue.

"The events in Indochina mean a new stage in the conflict between noncapitalist states in general and between the former allies, China and the USSR, in particular. This development can only deepen the division and confusion in the international workers movement."

In an accompanying article Hermann Dirkes writes: "The sudden collapse of the Pol Pot regime proves that it no longer had any political or social basis in the country." He points out that there were indications of growing opposition to the regime before the Vietnamese intervention. However:

"The Vietnamese claim that they have only aided an opposition people's movement politically and materially is unacceptable. A force supported by important concentrations of armor and artillery that rapidly occupies the main highways in the center of the country . . . is no guerrilla army slowly spreading as it wins support." Dirkes concludes:

"Our position must be clear regarding the grave development in Indochina:

"• We support the opposition movement of the Cambodian workers and farmers against the tyranny of the Pol Pot regime.

"• We oppose the military intervention of the Vietnamese workers state in Cambodia....

"• We regard the direct military intervention in Cambodian internal affairs as a grave obstacle on the road to a proletarian and internationalist solution of the Indochina question."

rood

"Red," Flemish weekly paper of the Revolutionary Workers League, Belgian section of the Fourth International.

In the January 19 issue, Tony Kowalski comments that the action of the Vietnamese government resulted in "a defeat for proletarian internationalism, which in the age of imperialism is one of the cornerstones of socialist revolution." He concludes:

"• The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia is unquestionably grist to the mills of the bourgeois forces that want to launch a new anti-Communist campaign and back a counterrevolutionary army in the name of Cambodian independence.

"• These events mark a new step in conflict between Moscow and Peking that can only increase divisiveness and confusion in the international workers movement.

"• Vietnam must immediately withdraw its troops from Cambodia.

"• For Vietnam itself, this invasion means a prolonged military mobilization that is not only an obstacle to solving the country's pressing economic problems but also reinforces nationalist ideology."

In describing the origins of the conflict, Kowalski stresses the development of narrow nationalist attitudes, particularly on the part of the Cambodians.

"The country [Cambodia] was hermetically sealed off and brutal social measures were taken, coupled with severe political repression and extreme anti-Vietnamese nationalism." As the conflict sharpened, "given their difficult internal situation and the border tensions with the Chinese People's Republic and the impossibility of solving the conflict with Cambodia peacefully, the Vietnamese leadership decided to resort to crude methods."

Socialist Challenge

Newspaper sponsored by the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International. Published weekly in London.

"The fall of the Pol Pot government in Cambodia had been expected for some time," Tariq Ali writes in the January 11 issue.

"Despite the crocodile tears of some Western analysts (obsessed with cold war hatred of the Soviet Union), a few leftliberals and Peking, the departure of the Pol Pot government was mourned by no one.

"While the Vietnamese were clearly involved in removing this regime, there is no doubt that the Cambodian United Front for National Salvation does have local support...

"Why did the Vietnamese intervene at this particular time? The most important reason is the continuing destabilising impact of Cambodia on Indochina as a whole."

The Pol Pot regime took the "Stalinist theory of 'building socialism in one country'" to its "most barbaric logic." They declared "self-sufficiency' to be the driving force of the Cambodian revolution. They herded the population into camps in the countryside.

"Through naked coercion they transformed them into virtual slaves. . . . This has all now blown up in their faces."

As for the reaction of the imperialists, "we can only state our amazement at the cheek of General Haig, the boss of NATO and a possible presidential candidate in the United States, when he expresses sympathy with the plight of Cambodia.

"For we have not forgotten who invaded Cambodia, bombed it and imposed a vicious and tyrannical regime in the early Seventies."

klasse∙ kampen

"Class Struggle," published weekly in Copenhagen by the Revolutionary Socialist League, Danish section of the Fourth International.

In the January 18 issue, Torben Hansen raises the question: "Is Vietnam's intervention a repeat of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia?" He describes the policies of the Pol Pot regime and concludes, "such a bureaucratic and reactionary government cannot be defended in any way."

Hansen continues: "But what about the right of national self-determination? Are our local Peking Stalinists right when they say that Vietnam's intervention must, in any case, be condemned?

"From an internationalist revolutionist standpoint the violation of frontiers and

the right of national self-determination is not always necessarily unjustifiable.

"If the massive Vietnamese military intervention can result in the creation of a workers state, even under the leadership of a new Stalinist bureaucracy, that must be considered progressive. The problem is what direction things will take in Cambodia.

"The Vietnamese CP is not a revolutionary party. . . Therefore, it is uncertain whether the course adopted there will be the same as in South Vietnam [the creation of a workers state]."

gauche

"The Left," French-language paper of the Revolutionary Workers League, Belgian section of the Fourth International. Published weekly in Brussels.

"The prevailing mood among a whole generation of militants won to socialism through the solidarity campaign with the Indochinese fighters is certainly one of incomprehension and disillusionment," the editors state in a front-page article January 11.

"How is it possible," they ask, "that those who fought side-by-side against the American war machine could now be involved in a fratricidal war?"

While the Sino-Soviet conflict has played a role, it is not sufficient to explain the war. Rather, "the causes should be sought in the narrowly nationalist outlooks of both the present leaderships."

Noting that the imperialists are trying to exploit the situation through Prince Sihanouk's calls for United Nations intervention, the editors explain that "defense of the revolutionary gains is made even more difficult by the fact that the masses have been silent throughout the conflict. Oneparty rule prevails both in Cambodia and in Vietnam, and any independent forms of self-organization among the workers and poor peasants are absent.

"If such forms had existed, we can be certain that economic and political cooperation between Cambodia and Vietnam would have developed in an internationalist and revolutionary spirit, without the use of violence. It is not the toiling masses of the two countries that oppose each other; it is the bureaucratic leaderships in power."

The editors conclude that no support can be given to "the bureaucratic methods employed as much by the Kampuchean Communist Party as by the Vietnamese Communist Party. . . ."

DIRECT ACTION

Socialist weekly published in Sydney, Australia. Presents the views of the Socialist Workers Party. "The sudden escalation of the Kampuchea-Vietnam border war is a major setback for the peoples of both countries and for the cause of socialism on a world scale," Allen Myers writes in the January 25 issue.

"There are conflicting claims concerning the degree of popular support for the new regime. But the Vietnamese involvement in its establishing will make it appear to many Kampucheans as a creature of Hanoi—especially if, as many observers are predicting, the Vietnamese find it necessary to maintain garrisons in the country to counter guerrilla assaults from the Khmer Rouge."

In the long run, "the attempt by the Vietnamese leaders to impose their will by force of arms can only hamper real cooperation, create new sources of conflict, and provide openings for imperialist intervention."

一計世界革命

"World Revolution," newspaper of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Japanese section of the Fourth International. Published weekly in Tokyo.

A statement by the Central Political Bureau of the JRCL, published in the January 15 issue, hails the victory of the Kampuchean rebels and Vietnamese armed forces as a "new advance of the Indochinese Revolution."

The new leadership in Cambodia, in the JRCL's view, seeks "to press ahead with the construction of socialism based on the fraternal solidarity of the peoples of the three countries of Indochina."

Imperialism was attempting to use the Pol Pot regime and China as "a way of restraining Vietnam" and "splitting the revolutionary forces in Indochina" in order to defend the imperialist system in the rest of Southeast Asia.

While calling the outbreak of the fighting between Cambodia and Vietnam "a major political blow to liberation struggles around the world," *Sekai Kakumei* concludes that the resolution of the fighting and the emergence of a fraternal, unified force in the three countries of Indochina will advance liberation struggles in East Asia.

The Japanese Trotskyists demand that the Japanese government "immediately recognize the People's Revolutionary Council of Cambodia" and lift its freeze on economic aid to Vietnam.

Sekai Kakumei states that "these three countries must now jointly grapple with the challenge of setting up a Socialist Federation of Indochina, which includes the perspective of winning a revolutionary victory in Thailand." In such a policy, the JRCL notes, "they will inevitably come into conflict with the policy of the Soviet leadership, which today supports Vietnam and the new Cambodian government."

COMBATE

"Combat," weekly organ of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Communist League, section of the Fourth International in the Spanish state.

"This is the first time since the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR in 1968 that two workers states have confronted each other militarily in a war of occupation," A. Maraver writes in the January 18-24 issue. "The Khmer Rouge's attacks on socialist democracy and their massacres and deportations deserve only rejection by all those claiming to speak for the working class who do not want to convert themselves into the accomplices of these criminals...."

After discussing at some length the history of the conflict between the two countries, Maraver concludes:

"Vietnam is a degenerated workers state in which national oppression is maintained and socialist democracy does not exist. But it is objectively playing a revolutionary role in proposing an Indochinese Federation. . . The alternative today is either the ghostly Sihanouk—whose criticisms of the Khmer Rouge serve only to hide a return to neocolonial capitalism in Cambodia—or else defense of the socialist achievements in Indochina, which Vietnam and the FUNSK are today assuring.

"We thus demand the immediate recognition of the FUNSK as the sole representative of Cambodia and the end of all economic restrictions and political condemnations against Hanoi in the United Nations...."

Bandera Socialista

"Socialist Flag," newspaper of the Revolutionary Workers Party. Published weekly in Mexico City.

"This conflict marks a grim reality for the worldwide workers movement," José Ayala writes in the January 15 issue. "For the first time in history, an armed movement (the FUNSK), supported by a workers state (Vietnam), has overthrown a government of a country where capitalism was being swept away. . . ."

In Ayala's view, the conflict between the two countries over the past year was exacerbated by the Chinese government's denunciations of the expropriation of private traders (mostly ethnic Chinese) in southern Vietnam in April 1978, and by the Cambodian regime's refusal to negotiate with Hanoi.

He concludes by responding to the view that the Pnom Penh regime "fell because of the presence of Vietnamese troops on its territory and not through the insurrection of the Kampuchean masses."

"These accusations [of a Vietnamese invasion] in reality serve to cover up a whole new offensive that the imperialists are launching to isolate, discredit, and totally boycott that country for having overturned capitalism, just as the United States has done with Cuba. . . .

"The victory of the FUNSK in Kampuchea... will be an impulse to the Indochinese revolution. Thus the launching of a broad campaign to defend Vietnam is called for."

labrèche

French-language organ of the Revolutionary Marxist League, Swiss section of the Fourth International. Published twice a month in Lausanne.

Under the headline "Vietnamese troops out of Cambodia!" F.G. writes in the January 20 issue:

"There can be no doubt that the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot) regime . . . is the result of an armed Vietnamese intervention, supported by insurgent Cambodian troops to a degree that is impossible to determine at present.

"The bloody repression carried out by the Khmer Rouge regime since it took power in 1975—imposed as much through an aberrant form of economic autarky as through political repression characteristic of the blackest years of Stalinism in the USSR—facilitated the lightning operation by the Vietnamese. Facilitated but did not justify....

"If the Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot-Ieng Sary bears the primary responsibility in refusing Vietnamese offers to settle the 'border conflict' peacefully, the military occupation of the major part of Cambodian territory by Vietnamese troops only postpones still more tragically the perspective of a voluntary federation of the Indochinese peoples....

"Of course, we are not defending what the Khmer Rouge regime was before its overthrow. Certainly, we refuse to join in the crocodile tears shed by the representatives of U.S. and French imperialism. . . .

"But we nevertheless denounce the Vietnamese military occupation of Cambodia and we demand the immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops (while not opposing their distributing some of their arms and ammunition to the insurgents fighting against the return of the Pol Pot regime)."



"Red," revolutionary communist daily, published in Paris.

The escalation of a "fratricidal war" between "two countries claiming to be socialist" is a "crime not only against the peoples of Indochina but also against all those who throughout the world are fighting for socialism," Anna Libera writes in the January 5-7 issue.

"There is a great danger that this conflict will strengthen the operations of imperialism aimed at undermining the revolutionary conquests of the people of Indochina. There is an equally great danger that it will leave an entire generation of activists, won to socialism alongside the Vietnamese freedom fighters, utterly demoralized and in despair. . . .

"In speaking out about the horror such a conflict inspires in us, we cannot at the same time allow its fundamental origins to be covered up." These lie, she notes, in the destruction wrought by decades of colonial rule and thirty years of imperialist military aggression, followed by a reversion to narrow nationalism under the Stalinist theory of "building socialism in one country."

After losing the war, Washington sought to encircle Vietnam diplomatically, enlisting the aid of Tokyo and Peking. This "joint policy of the imperialists and the Peking bureaucrats placed Vietnam in a vise, with the result that the Hanoi leadership was prepared to support the overthrow of the Pnompenh regime."

Nonetheless, "the situation of isolation and the difficulties in which Vietnam finds itself in no way justifies the means the Hanoi leadership has used to confront them."

In the January 12-14 issue, under the headline "Vietnamese Troops Must Leave Cambodia," Daniel Bensaïd writes: "Today, without extending the slightest support to the bureaucratic Pol Pot dictatorship, whose rapid fall attests to its social isolation, we denounce Hanoi's military intervention (despite its denials) and demand the immediate withdrawal of its troops."



"Workers Struggle," presents the views of the Revolutionary Workers League. Published fortnightly in Québec.

The January 23 issue reprints major excerpts from the *Rouge* article by Anna Libera cited above, with an introductory note stating that the "article reflects the fundamental principles underlying the position of the Fourth International."



The Marxist paper for labour and youth. Published weekly in London.

A "tragedy" has occurred in Indochina, Jim Chrystie writes in the January 12 issue. "In an extraordinary and almost unique way a non-capitalist state has been overthrown by forces from a similar regime."

After abolishing "capitalism and landlordism" in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge "introduced a bureaucratic, repressive regime" that sought to develop the country "through a ruthless direction of labour." Now, "that regime has gone, to be replaced by a government favourable to Vietnam."

The conflict simply illustrates "how far either side is from Marxist internationalism," both states having been "distorted at birth by their bureaucratic and nationalist orientation."

Moreover, it is far from over: "It is likely that the Khmer Rouge, supported by China, will now undertake a guerrilla war against the new regime.

"Sabre-rattling by the Chinese government on its border with Vietnam will be repeated by the USSR on its border with China. Whilst this is unlikely to escalate into a USSR-Chinese war, both powers will continue to keep the conflict alive for their own narrow interests. This chauvinist rivalry is light years away from Marxism."

ouvriere

"Workers Struggle," Paris weekly supported by a grouping of militants who view themselves as Trotskyist in orientation.

R.G. writes in the January 13 issue: "The arrival of the Vietnamese forces in Pnompenh seems not only to have brought down Pol Pot's regime but also to have dashed any support it had in the world, since no one seems willing to defend it any more. Pol Pot's envoy, the former Prince Sihanouk, is careful to dissociate himself from the regime. Even the Chinese leadership has hinted that it defends Cambodia's independence more than Pol Pot's regime.

"It seems that if the Vietnamese forces had been able to overthrow the regime without invading Cambodia, everyone would have applauded.

"As a matter of fact, Pol Pot's regime hardly seems to have carried much popular support within Cambodia itself. There is not the slightest evidence that the people rose up against the Vietnamese forces in order to defend Cambodia's regime. . . .

"It is impossible to assess the intervention of the Vietnamese troops in Cambodia without taking into account the attitude of the Cambodian people toward it. In this respect, everything will depend on how the new government represents and establishes links with the population.

"If the new regime cannot gain popular support and has to go on relying on the Vietnamese troops for power, Vietnam itself will be affected. But if the new regime does muster popular support, which the Pol Pot government never achieved, the Vietnamese intervention will have been justified even if Vietnam is condemned for it internationally."

INFORMATIONS OUVRIERES

"Workers News," open forum for the class struggle. Published weekly in Paris.

In the January 17-24 issue, the editors describe the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia as "a looting operation worthy of Stalin":

"The Cambodian state is not 'simply' a workers state. It is a bureaucratic workers state. Neither in Vietnam nor in Cambodia nor in Laos do the masses exercise power. In Vietnam, power is concentrated in the hands of the CP's bureaucratic apparatus. From this point of view, the Vietnamese bureaucracy's military intervention in Cambodia must be called what it is—an unprincipled pillage aimed at taking control of the Mekong Valley, the key zone for feeding the entire peninsula, the rice basket of the whole region. . . .

"At bottom what was the "disagreement" about between the bureaucratic Pol Pot regime, which looked to the Chinese bureaucracy, and the Vietnamese bureaucracy? It was, on the one hand, over possession of the islands in the Gulf of Siam, reported to have oil, and on the other, over the refusal of Cambodia's leaders to sign a 'friendship treaty,' in point of fact a treaty of subordination to the needs of the Vietnamese bureaucracy, like the one signed with Laos."



Weekly paper of the Workers Socialist League. Published in London.

In the January 17 issue, the editors blame "the nationalist rivalries of the bureaucratic parasites who rule all the workers' states" for the recent events in Indochina.

To counter these "bureaucratic obstacles to socialism," the masses of workers and peasants in Cambodia and Vietnam are advised to demand the "unconditional and immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea" and to begin "building in each area independent workers and peasants' soviets."

TORCH

Newspaper of the Revolutionary Socialist League, published monthly in New York.

The editors urge their readers to "defend Kampuchean independence!" against an "expansionist," "imperialist" invasion launched by Hanoi.

"Many revolutionaries," they state in

their January 15-February 14 issue, have unfortunately been "confused and demoralized" by the apparent "sight of one 'socialist' state waging a war of conquest against another."

To clear the confusion, new eyeglasses with a state-capitalist prescription are suggested:

"Both Vietnam and Kampuchea claim to be socialist states. In reality the governments of these countries represent a new capitalist class, based on state-owned industry and land. . . .

"Like all capitalists, the Vietnamese rulers try to increase the resources under their command by expanding at the expense of weaker neighbors. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea... is the action of a capitalist ruling class driven by the need to accumulate wealth not only by exploiting the working masses within its borders, but also by imperialist aggression against less powerful rivals."

Socialist Worker

Newspaper of the Socialist Workers Party. Published weekly in London.

The crystal ball seems to have shortcircuited at the *Socialist Worker*, whose January 13 issue predicted:

"It is unlikely Vietnam will advance far beyond the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh which they took at the weekend.

"To do so would be to throw the whole of Indo-China into the melting pot again and to risk the intervention of Thailand, backed by the Association of South East Asian Nations and the United States. It would also push China into a direct attack on Vietnam's northern border (already China has been busy manufacturing a host of pretexts for such an attack)."

After stating "there can be little doubt that the new regime [in Cambodia] will be an improvement" the article concluded: "There is nothing in this war for the mass of Cambodians, Vietnamese or Chinese."

Having clarified matters to their own satisfaction, the next two issues of *Social ist Worker* took no further notice of developments in Cambodia.

Gramma

Official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. Published in Havana.

Prominent on the front page of the January 21 issue of the weekly Englishlanguage edition is the following message from Fidel Castro to Heng Samrin, president of the new regime in Cambodia:

"On behalf of the Party, Government and people of Cuba, we congratulate you on the great revolutionary victory of the sister people of Kampuchea who, under the leadership of the National Unity Front of Kampuchea for National Salvation, did away with a barbaric, tyrannical and traitorous regime and paved the way for democracy, peace, true independence, freedom and the advance toward socialism. We salute the establishment of the People's Revolutionary Council and are sure that the new Government of Kampuchea will strengthen the ties of friendship and cooperation between our two countries in the common struggle for the revolutionary ideals that unite us."



An independent socialist newspaper published weekly in Chicago.

For the Social Democratic editors of this newspaper, the issues in the Indochina war were "still largely obscure" at press time for their January 17-23 issue.

Nonetheless, the following conclusions were drawn:

"The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in alliance with an indigenous opposition movement, is not the first effort of one Communist regime to overthrow another." Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 being cited as examples.

This marks the entry into a "new era" in which "the most salient conflicts in world politics involve those among communists and socialists."

Socialists, then, must begin "adjusting their understanding" to the realities of this new era "at the cost of cynicism, disillusionment, and just plain loss of credibility, if we don't."

Although "Vietnam is without justification in its invasion of Kampuchea," American socialists "should not take the side of one against the other. . . . We should exert whatever influence we may have toward stopping the war, toward Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea."

DAILY WORLD

Newspaper of the American Communist Party. Published in New York.

In the view of the American Communist Party, the flight of Pol Pot from Pnompenh meant that "the roadblock to social progress and to socialism has been dramatically removed in Kampuchea (Cambodia)."

In the January 10 issue, Gus Hall, general secretary of the CP, describes the Pol Pot regime as a militarist clique masquerading as Marxists. "They turned all of Kampuchea into a Maoist-like camp and called it a commune."

"Under the guidance and support of Mao Tse Tung," Hall states, "they continued a policy of military aggression against Vietnam." In addition they were guilty of "racist genocide against a number of smaller minorities."

The American CP has consistently denied that there was any Vietnamese involvement in the fighting in Cambodia, claiming that such reports are simply CIA misinformation emanating out of Bangkok.

Erik Bert, in a "News Analysis," states that reports of Vietnamese participation in the fighting are "a lie."

Guardian

An independent radical newsweekly, published in New York.

A January 17 editorial states that "The Guardian is reserving its judgment for the time being on the recent developments in Kampuchea." The *Guardian* simultaneously disagrees with the "triumphant glee" expressed by the Soviet Union over the fall of the Pol Pot government and with the Chinese view "that the situation was brought about solely through Vietnamese aggression at the behest of the USSR."

In addition, the editors take their distance from both Pnompenh and Hanoi. They argue that the Cambodian regime was "characterized to a large degree by ultra-'leftism' in its internal affairs and by an incorrect policy in handling contradictions among the people."

Vietnam, they say, "followed an incorrect policy in handling contradictions between socialist countries—or any countries—in apparently launching a large-scale invasion force..."

They conclude by stating that "the facts are not all clear and the struggle is not over. Time will cast a positive or negative judgment."

In its January 24 issue the *Guardian* continued to withhold judgment, while reporting on a wide range of reactions from the U.S. left.

The January 31 issue contains a lengthy criticism of the *Guardian*'s position by a member of the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters. In its introduction, the *Guardian* states that, while disagreeing with some of "the tone and substance" of the article, it is being printed in "an effort to stimulate discussion and present varying points of view on the current events in Indochina."

The statement by the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters member argues that "the invasion of Kampuchea vividly illuminates the fact that the practice of the Soviet Union and its allies like Vietnam is not the practice of Marxism-Leninism in the world arena." Rather, the writer states, it is a warm-up battle "for a worldwide struggle between the two superpowers [the U.S. and USSR] to redivide the world." The article concludes that "The Guardian should get the hell off the fence."

Arbeiterkampf

"Workers Struggle," workers newspaper of the Communist League. Published fortnightly in Hamburg, West Germany.

The Communist League is an eclectic Maoist group that supports the "gang of four."

Its January 22 issue devotes a full page to the Cambodian events, under the headline "People's Republic of Cambodia Founded." The article states:

"While the three Indochinese peoples wholeheartedly hail the development in Cambodia, their foes cannot reconcile themselves to their defeat and are openly whipping up a war fever. In this, the People's Republic of China is playing the main role. Its best pawn is the comic opera prince Sihanouk. The old Cambodian leadership has been reduced to what it always was, an auxiliary of the People's Republic of China.

"In general, the People's Republic of China denies any independent development in Cambodia and classifies the new government as a 'Vietnamese puppet.'... Of course, the Soviet Union is supposed to be behind it all."

A box along with the article denounces the Soviet government's claim that the fall of Pol Pot represents a defeat for Maoism. "Maoism has no more failed in Cambodia than the Soviet leaders are true friends of the Cambodian people."



Organ of the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist). Published weekly in Chicago.

These American supporters of the present regime in China describe the situation in Cambodia as a Vietnamese invasion instigated by Soviet social-imperialism.

"Basing itself on an exploitative statecontrolled, monopoly capitalist economy, the Soviet Union is motivated by the same laws and forces that pushed the U.S. into Indochina" the January 29 issue states. The Soviet Union today "has stepped into Hitler Germany's shoes as an aggressor and instigator of war."

Vietnam "is utilized by Moscow as a 'regional hegemonist." But the war is not, according to the CP(ML), a proxy war. "China, as a truly socialist country, is duty-bound to give assistance to the Kampucheans, and is doing everything in its power to awaken world opinion to the aggressive Soviet drive."

The Call also reports or reprints statements in support of the Pol Pot regime from the Iranian Student Association, the Dominican Linea Roja MRJ 14 and Bandera Proletaria, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, the U.S.-Kampuchea Friendship delegation, and the North Korean CP newspaper Rodong Sinmum.