

# Intercontinental Press

combined with **Imprecor**

Vol. 16, No. 37

© 1978 by Intercontinental Press

October 2, 1978

USA 75¢

UK 30p

# WHAT SADAT GAVE AWAY

**Somoza Kills Thousands  
in Nicaraguan Upsurge**

**Moreno and Strasberg  
Freed in Brazil**

**Shah Turns Deaf Ear on  
Victims of Earthquake**



## Moreno, Strasberg Freed in Brazil

By Russell Morse

An international campaign has succeeded in winning the release of Argentine socialist leaders Hugo Bressano and Rita Strasberg from jail in Brazil.

Bressano, best known under his pen-name Nahuel Moreno, and Strasberg were released in São Paulo on September 18 and allowed to return to Colombia, where they have been living in exile.

The two leaders of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers Party) were among twenty-two persons arrested in São Paulo on August 22. They were taken into custody by the political police after having attended a public rally sponsored by Socialist Convergence, a group that has been functioning openly in Brazil since January with the aim of organizing a new socialist party.

In addition to a number of student demonstrations and other protests in Brazil, there has been a broad outcry against these arrests internationally.

Six members of the Colombian parliament—including the president of the Chamber of Representatives—have sent protests to the Brazilian government, as has the national executive committee of Mexico's ruling party, the Partido Revolu-

cionario Institucional (PRI). The Geisel dictatorship has also heard from Bolivian trade unionists, ten members of the Peruvian Constituent Assembly, and leaders of the French and Spanish Socialist parties.

The United Nations High Commission on Refugees played an important role in freeing Bressano and Strasberg and preventing their deportation into the hands of the Videla dictatorship in Argentina.

Earlier, the Portuguese parliament passed a resolution denouncing the arrests of Bressano, Strasberg, and Portuguese socialist leader Antônio Sá Leal. This helped in winning Sá Leal's release on September 6.

Further protests are needed to demand the release of eight of the Socialist Convergence activists arrested August 22 who are still being held, as well as of six other members of the group jailed and tortured in Brasília in July.

Send telegrams and letters to Brazilian embassies or to President Ernesto Geisel, Palacio Presidencial, Brasília, Brazil. Copies should be sent to the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners, 853 Broadway, Suite 414, New York, N.Y. 10003. □



SHAH: 700,000 troops to crush demonstrations, 700 to aid earthquake victims.

car, crying "Don't go sight-seeing. Go pull out bodies of my family!"

The reason almost all the residents of Tabas were killed was because their mud brick houses collapsed on them. The only things left standing were the city's two or three buildings with steel frame construction.

There are few places on the planet where the danger of earthquakes is greater than in the region where Tabas is located. Twelve thousand died when an earthquake struck the area in 1968. A quake in a neighboring province killed almost 600 only nine months ago. Yet the entire population of Tabas was living in mud death-traps—under the leadership of Iran's great "modernizer."

Some correspondents have speculated that the shah may derive some political benefit from the tragedy of Tabas. The shah can hardly be blamed for the earthquake—the reasoning goes—and the magnitude of the disaster will draw attention away from the antigovernment rebellion that rocked the country in early September.

The approach of these commentators seems rather short-sighted. The 1972 earthquake in Nicaragua and the 1973-74 famine in Ethiopia were "natural disasters" too. But the Nicaraguan and Ethiopian masses correctly blamed many of the deaths on their corrupt rulers who withheld or siphoned off the emergency aid so desperately needed. This anger fueled the revolutionary movements in both Ethiopia and Nicaragua.

There is little reason to think the people of Iran will react differently, particularly since they have already mobilized in massive numbers against the shah. □

## Earthquake—Shah Turns Deaf Ear on Plea for Help

By Matilde Zimmermann

The city of Tabas in eastern Iran was hit September 16 with perhaps the worst earthquake in the nation's history. In ninety seconds the entire city was reduced to rubble.

Initial government reports put the death toll at 11,000, but survivors claim that 30,000 have died, and an Agence France-Press dispatch from Tabas predicts the final count may reach 40,000. Of Tabas' 13,000 residents, less than 2,000 survived, most of them seriously injured. Forty nearby towns were completely demolished, and another sixty suffered severe damage. Water was splashed out of swimming pools in Tehran 480 miles away, according to UPI reporter Sajid Rizvi.

The exact number killed will never be known; no one is keeping count as the victims are hastily buried in mass graves to avoid the spread of disease.

Many who were not killed immediately died later of their injuries and of exposure to the hot sun and cold nights of the

desert. Some of these people would have lived if adequate help had been rushed to the area. But the shah, who has mobilized his 700,000-man army against massive demonstrations for nine months, could spare only 700 troops to help dig out Tabas.

"We need people to help," pleaded Abbas Safaie, a former mayor of Tabas. "We could use 2,000 to 3,000 more." The Iranian people were more responsive than their government; thousands lined up in Tehran to volunteer to help with the rescue operations. Leaders of the anti-shah opposition movement sent dozens of truckloads of food, blankets, and medicine into the area.

The shah sent Empress Farah, on a trip reminiscent of Pat Nixon's 1970 "mercy mission" to Peru following the disastrous earthquake there. She got an angry reception. Survivors screamed "Dig out the dead! Dig out the dead!" at the shah's wife, until security men whisked her away. One young man threw himself at the empress's

# Exit Vorster

By R.D. Willis

At a September 20 news conference in Pretoria, South African Prime Minister John Vorster announced two major decisions. First, that he would resign from office as soon as a successor was chosen, thus ending twelve years as prime minister of the white supremacist state. Second, that Pretoria was rejecting a United Nations-sponsored plan for the independence of Namibia, a South African colony.

Vorster gave no reason for his resignation, but he is known to be ill. There was no apparent pressure on him from the white population, the regime's only real social base.

Vorster's successor, who will be selected by the National Party leadership, will most certainly continue—and even extend—the same racist policies that have been followed by the South African regime for decades. Vorster, moreover, may himself continue to lend a hand, since he declared that he would be “available” for the largely ceremonial post of state president.

Vorster's declaration on Pretoria's Namibia policy may have a more decisive impact on developments throughout southern Africa. In rejecting the UN proposal (which some South African officials had earlier indicated they might agree to), Vorster said that Pretoria would go ahead with its own formula for Namibian “independence.”

In fact, however, the South African plan aims at the installation in Namibia of a quisling regime willing to safeguard Pretoria's substantial economic and political interests in the territory. Since the plan is opposed by the main Namibian nationalist forces, Vorster's announcement also signals a commitment by Pretoria to maintain, and even increase, its large military presence in Namibia.

The American State Department reacted with concern to the announcement, no doubt fearing that Pretoria's intransigence could provoke an even sharper struggle by Namibia's masses for independence. Washington also fears that an escalating conflict could lead to stepped-up assistance to the Namibian freedom fighters from Cuba.

Speaking in Lusaka, Zambia, September 22, Mishake Muyongo, an official representative of the South West Africa People's Organisation, the main Namibian nationalist group, said that SWAPO would never participate in South African-organized elections in Namibia. “Instead,” he declared, “we will intensify the armed struggle. . . .” Muyongo also said that SWAPO might call upon “socialist countries” to provide it with “all-out military assistance.” Behind him hung a portrait of Fidel Castro. □

## In This Issue

Closing News date: September 23, 1978

MIDEAST	1076	Why Sadat's Giveaway Won't Lead to Peace —by David Frankel
NICARAGUA	1078	Somoza Butchers Thousands —by Fred Murphy
COSTA RICA	1079	Rally Says “No” to Aid for Somoza —by Mike Kelly
	1080	Trotskyists Demand “Hands Off Nicaragua!”
CHILE	1080	Miners Demand Wage Hike
PERU	1081	Repression Forces Miners to Suspend Strike—by Fred Murphy
JAPAN	1082	Anger in Ranks Sharpens Divisions in Japan's Biggest Union —by Dan Dickeson
CAMBODIA	1083	Tokyo Establishes Diplomatic Ties With Pnompenh
COLOMBIA	1084	Assassination Is Pretext for Crackdown —by Eduardo Medrano
	1084	Colombian Workers—the Real Target of “Statute of Security” —by Eduardo Medrano
SOUTH AFRICA	1086	Police Drive Blacks From “Illegal” Homes —by Ernest Harsch
IRAN	1087	Save the Life of Seyyed-Javadi! —by Peter Seidman
MAURITANIA	1088	Behind the Coup—by Jim Atkinson
ETHIOPIA	1092	Meaning of the Somalian Military Attack —by Ernest Harsch
NEWS ANALYSIS	1074	Moreno, Strasberg Freed in Brazil —by Russell Morse
	1074	Earthquake—Shah Turns Deaf Ear on Plea for Help—by Matilde Zimmermann
	1075	Exit Vorster—by R.D. Willis
DRAWINGS	1074	Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi—by Copain

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Varick Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Published in New York each Monday except the first in January and third and fourth in August.

**Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y.**

**Editor:** Joseph Hansen.

**Contributing Editors:** Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

**Managing Editor:** Michael Baumann.

**Editorial Staff:** Jon Britton, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Fred Murphy, Susan Wald, Matilde Zimmermann.

**Business Manager:** Harvey McArthur.

**Copy Editor:** David Martin.

**Technical Staff:** Paul Deveze, Larry Ingram, Arthur Lobman, Kevin McGuire, James M. Morgan, Sally Rhett.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it re-

flects editorial opinion, unsigned material stands on the program of the Fourth International.

**To Subscribe:** For one year send \$24 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Varick Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail.

In Europe: For air-speeded subscriptions, write to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 50, London N1 2XP, England. In Australia: Write to Pathfinder Press, P.O. Box 151, Glebe 2037. In New Zealand: Write to Socialist Books, P.O. Box 1663, Wellington.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Varick Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Intercontinental Press is published by the 408 Printing and Publishing Corporation, 408 West Street, New York, N.Y. 10014. Offices at 408 West Street, New York, N.Y.

Copyright © 1978 by Intercontinental Press.



## Why Sadat's Giveaway Won't Lead to Peace

By David Frankel

[The following article appeared in the September 29 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

Flanked by Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, a smiling President Carter appeared on nationwide television September 17 to announce that "prayers [for peace in the Middle East] have been answered far beyond any expectations."

Carter's claim of success raised the hopes of millions all over the world. Once again, as after Sadat's trip to Jerusalem last November, people are asking if a solution to the Middle East conflict is really in the offing.

Certainly, the governments involved in the Camp David Summit have done their best to give this impression. A typical response from capitalist politicians in the United States came from Sen. Jacob Javits. He declared that "all mankind must breathe a sigh of relief that the road to peace has been opened. . . ."

A resolution was introduced in the Senate September 18 recommending Carter, Begin, and Sadat for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Reaction among Israeli officials was equally favorable. Begin set the tone with his claim that "peace now celebrates a great victory."

Sadat has also tried to portray the results of the summit as a giant step toward peace.

But elsewhere in the Arab world, the Camp David agreements are correctly viewed as merely a cover for a separate Egyptian deal with Israel.

Such a deal is hardly a step toward resolving the Mideast conflict. Rather, it gives the Egyptian regime's seal of approval to the oppression of the Palestinian people and frees the hands of the Zionist military machine for further aggression against Lebanon, Syria, and perhaps Jordan.

One has only to look at the actual provisions of the accords to see that they mark no progress toward peace.

### No End to Occupation

• There is not a single word in the accords on the Israeli occupation of Syria's Golan Heights. Thus, the "framework for peace" leaves out even the pretense that there will be a reversal of Israel's de facto

annexation of Syrian land.

• Similarly, no mention is made of Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem. Sadat has registered his disapproval of this annexation in a letter of protest. But he also has made clear that it will not stand in the way of signing a treaty with the Zionist regime.

Begin explained his position in a September 18 television interview. He stated that Jerusalem is Israel's "eternal capital" and that Egyptian differences with this are "their problem."

• In regard to the West Bank and Gaza—the occupied territories populated by 1.1 million Palestinians—the Camp David accords offer a warmed-over version of the "civil autonomy" plan proposed by Begin and indignantly rejected by Sadat last December.

Cosmetic changes in the military occupation would include the establishment of a "self-governing authority" elected by the Palestinian population. But all powers of this body would be set with the agreement of the Israeli regime. While the Palestinians are given a say in this glorified board of education and sanitation department, the Israeli army will continue to hold the real power.

Within three years after the establishment of the "self-governing authority," negotiations are to begin over the final status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli regime's plans in this regard were spelled out with brutal frankness by Begin. Appearing September 19 on NBC television, he said that Israeli military forces would stay on the West Bank for five years, ten years, or perhaps forever. He also insisted that his regime would assert its claim to full sovereignty over the West Bank in the negotiations.

Speaking to a meeting of Jewish leaders in New York the following day, Begin declared, "If some unknown spokesman in the State Department said the Israel Defense Forces would stay in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] only for five years, I hereby declare they will stay beyond five years!"

*Washington Post* correspondent Jim Hoagland pointed out, "While it had appeared earlier that Begin would commit Israel to suspending establishment of civilian Jewish settlements on the West Bank throughout the five-year negotiations," it later became clear that a much shorter moratorium on new settlements was involved. "U.S. officials estimated this pe-

riod as perhaps as short as three months."

This is the "just, comprehensive, and durable settlement" promised for the West Bank and Gaza!

What about Begin's promises in regard to the Sinai Peninsula? The Camp David accords call for formal recognition of Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai and the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces within three years after a treaty is signed. Moreover, Begin has said the Israeli Knesset (parliament) will vote within two weeks on the dismantling of Israeli settlements in the Sinai.

Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai—or any other piece of occupied Arab territory—would be welcome indeed, if it were not for the fact that the price tag for Sadat is his agreement to stab the Palestinian people in the back.

Moreover, the measures promised by Begin are hedged with conditions that represent a violation of Egyptian sovereignty. These include the stationing of United Nations troops in the Sinai.

These UN forces cannot be withdrawn at Egyptian request, but only by the unanimous consent of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—France, Britain, China, the USSR, and the United States.

Summing up the results of the accords in a September 19 article, *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Daniel Southerland commented:

"Analysts seem to agree that for Israel, the Camp David agreements amount to an almost unalloyed victory. The Israelis are now well on their way to neutralizing any potential hostility from their biggest and most powerful Arab neighbor, Egypt. Without Egypt and its armed forces, the other Arabs are not in a position to launch another war against Israel."

From the point of view of the Israeli regime, the political advantages in a deal with Sadat will be at least as important as the military advantages.

Israel was established at the expense of another people. During the war of 1948-49, some 700,000 Palestinians were driven out of their homeland. These refugees were not allowed to return after the fighting. Instead, their land and their property was confiscated and their villages—385 in all—destroyed.

In order to defend and maintain a state built on the oppression of a whole people, the Zionist regime has perpetrated one crime after another. Just six months ago it ordered its army into action against the

people of Lebanon, destroying dozens of towns and villages, murdering and maiming thousands, and creating some 250,000 new refugees.

Begin hopes that a formal treaty with Sadat will finally break the refusal of the Arab masses to accept the dispossession of the Palestinian people. As former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin put it, "If we come to peace with Egypt, as agreed at Camp David, we would have peace with 50 percent of the Arab world."

Of course, there are those who say that even a peace based on injustice is better than no peace at all. But the whole point is that there can be no peace in the Middle East so long as the Palestinian people are not allowed to return to their homeland and to live there on an equal basis with the Jewish population.

As long as the Palestinians live as second-class citizens in Israel, under military occupation in Gaza and the West Bank, and as homeless and destitute refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, they will continue to fight against their oppression. And their struggles will continue to provoke new Israeli aggressions, such as the invasion of Lebanon, and new Mideast wars.

In this context, the Carter administration is attempting to lay a basis for deepening U.S. military involvement in the Middle East—and all in the name of peace.

Carter himself, in late August, raised the possibility of stationing U.S. troops in the Middle East as part of a negotiated settlement there. Begin also raised this idea in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September 19.

Moreover, part of the summit agreement is that Washington will build two new airbases to replace those in the Sinai that the Zionist state is supposed to give up. These bases are expected to cost about \$500 million each—another U.S. subsidy to the Israeli war machine made in the name of "peace."

#### Vance Twists Arms

Now that Sadat has established the overall terms of a separate treaty with Israel, Carter has sent Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to the Middle East in order to twist some arms. Vance will no doubt talk to Jordan's King Hussein about the explosive situation in Lebanon and the possibility of a war between Israel and Syria being sparked there.

Since Hussein is in a military alliance with Syria, he also faces attack by Israel. Unless, of course, he agrees to join in the Camp David framework. . . .

Although the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian regimes are holding the door open to endorsing the accords, Vance's success with such blackmail is far from assured.

For Hussein especially, entry into the negotiations over the West Bank would entail grave risks. Such negotiations would certainly drag on for years.

## Arabs Denounce 'Dirty Deal'

Response to the Camp David accords in the Arab world was not long in coming. Yassir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, denounced the "dirty deal" arranged by Carter. The PLO called on all Palestinians to express their "firm opposition" to the agreement by joining in a one-day general strike and organizing mass marches and demonstrations September 20.

"I challenge Carter, Begin and Sadat in the name of these fighters here to try to impose their will on the Palestinians," Arafat said in a speech at a commando camp south of Beirut.

"Camp David is a dirty deal which the Egyptian people will reject and which does not decide our destiny."

Thousands throughout Lebanon answered the call for protests, shutting down much of Beirut September 20 and burning effigies of Carter, Begin, and Sadat in refugee camps up and down the country.

The Lebanese government issued a statement denouncing the summit for ignoring "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as well and their future and right to a homeland."

Bassam Shaqa, the mayor of the

West Bank city of Nablus, and Karim Khalaf, the mayor of Ramallah, also condemned the accords. Khalaf said, "We only deceive ourselves if we believe peace is near." Shaqa insisted that Sadat's deal "will intensify the conflict."

The Syrian regime denounced the summit agreements as a "unilateral peace treaty" between Sadat and Israel, and as "a denial of Palestinian rights."

It is "the biggest victory that the enemies of the Arab nation could have achieved," Syrian President Hafez al-Assad said. Sadat, he added, had "turned his back on the Arabs."

Even the most pro-imperialist regimes in the Arab world have expressed reservations. A Jordanian statement said King Hussein's government "condemns separate peace agreements and also declares that the Palestinian people are the first and most important party in a peace settlement."

Abu Dhabi's semi-official newspaper called the summit results "negative," and the governments of Kuwait and Qatar criticized it for failing to demand Israeli withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied in 1967.

Meanwhile, Hussein would be out on a limb. He would face widespread resentment from his own people, who are mostly Palestinians, and strong hostility from the neighboring Syrian regime. And, as Begin has repeatedly stressed, there would be virtually no chance of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.

Another problem for Washington is the shakiness of Sadat's regime. It was precisely his weakness in the face of Israeli military threats, and the pressure of the world economic crisis, that forced Sadat to opt for a separate deal in the first place. But now, it remains to be seen if Sadat can manage to last long enough to complete the bargain.

*Washington Post* correspondent Mary Anne Weaver described the reaction in Egypt to the Camp David summit in a September 19 article. "The man-on-the-street reaction here . . . is so downbeat it almost doesn't exist.

"There is no jubilation, no dancing in the streets," Weaver reported.

Disaffection with Sadat's policies surfaced even in the highest levels of his government. Foreign Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel—who got his job after his predecessor resigned to protest Sadat's trip to Jerusalem last year—resigned himself September 15 over the Camp David agreements.

A final factor that may yet blow up a separate Israeli-Egyptian deal is Begin's arrogant insistence on spelling out his intention of never withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza.

Sadat wants to be able to appear before the Egyptian people as a leader of the Arab world, not as a traitor to it. If Begin continues to expose the reality behind the accords' phrases about "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people," he may end up making it politically impossible for Sadat to go through with the agreement.

In any event, as this writer explained in the December 23, 1977, issue of the *Militant*\*—just one month after Sadat's trip to Jerusalem:

"If Sadat were to go through with his thinly veiled threat of a separate agreement, the result would hardly lead to peace. On the contrary, a deal with Sadat would greatly strengthen Israel's already dominant military position, and encourage the Zionist rulers to engage in adventures in Lebanon and against Syria. In the long run, it would make war more likely."

Unfortunately, there is no reason to change that conclusion today. □

\*See "Why Sadat's Trip Won't Bring Peace," by David Frankel, in *Intercontinental Press*, December 19, 1977, p. 1388.



## Somoza Butchers Thousands in Nicaraguan Upsurge

By Fred Murphy

Using weapons supplied by Washington, the U.S.-trained troops of the Nicaraguan National Guard have succeeded in regaining control over the cities where popular uprisings occurred during the second week of September.

Terror and mass destruction have been the principal methods of the National Guard. As *Newsweek* magazine put it, "President Anastasio Somoza . . . seemed ready to destroy his country in order to save it—for himself."

Estelí, a town of 25,000 some eighty miles north of Managua, was the last to fall and the hardest hit. "The whole town is a cemetery," a Red Cross worker said after the National Guard fought their way into Estelí on September 21. "The guardsmen are killing like dogs," said another.

A UPI dispatch described the conditions in Estelí as the National Guard established its occupation:

The market and several other areas were still smoking. Not a single house was left intact. . . .

Much of Estelí was in ashes and many homes had their roofs blown off by rockets, artillery and tank barrages. The city has been almost deserted by its 25,000 residents and 6,000 refugees were holed up in a high school on the edge of town, many of them sick with malaria.

"Execute all the subversives" was the order given over radio September 18 from the National Guard's headquarters in Managua. The order was enthusiastically carried out. *Washington Post* correspondent Karen DeYoung reported from León on September 20:

At least 14 young men were killed last Friday afternoon [September 15—five days after León fell] on a two-block stretch of Santiago Arguello Avenue here. All of them, according to family members and neighbors, were executed by sub-machine guns at point-blank range by the Nicaraguan National Guard and all of them begged for mercy, some on their knees. . . .

For the National Guard, which ostensibly believes it is saving the country from an imminent guerrilla-led communist threat, every Nicaraguan youth has become a potential terrorist, and every closed door a potential hideout. . . .

On Thursday afternoon [September 14] the National Guard entered a barricaded slum on the northern edge of the city where, according to Red Cross officials and residents, they ordered the residents of a block to come out into the streets. Women and children were reportedly marched north, on a nearby highway, toward Chinandega. Husbands and sons over the age of 15 were marched south, toward Managua.

After walking a mile, the 21 men reportedly were stopped beside the highway, ordered to

scratch out a shallow grave in the road shoulder, and shot. . . .

Similar atrocities were repeated in Masaya, Chinandega, Estelí, Diriamba, and other cities and towns as the National Guard proceeded with its "clean-up" operations. Estimates of the dead from the guard's aerial bombing and strafing, shelling by heavy artillery, and cold-blooded murder range from 1,500 to 5,000, according to the Red Cross and opposition sources. Thousands more have been wounded.

In each city the National Guard has retaken, large numbers of buildings and homes have been destroyed or burned. Thousands of refugees have fled into Honduras or Costa Rica.

The capital city, Managua, has been affected in a different way. Somoza declared martial law and a tight curfew there as soon as the uprisings began, and the National Guard established control immediately. Correspondent Wladir Dupont reported from Managua in the Brazilian weekly *Veja* September 20:

The city seems like a war zone, occupied almost solely by troops and military trucks. The circulation of vehicles has diminished greatly. . . . There are endless lines of poor people trying to buy rice and beans at the few food stores open to the public under government control. At La Mercedes airport, another pathetic scene: a multitude that sleeps in the lobbies and corridors, awaiting an improbable vacancy on a flight out of the country. There is much suffering in the city. A foreign colleague tells me: "It seems like Saigon, in the last days."

If dictator Somoza has managed to regain military control of Nicaragua through brute force and terror, the situation his National Guard has created can only bring further hatred for his rule among the masses. In addition to the death, destruction, and social dislocation, Nicaragua is now on the brink of mass starvation and economic disaster.

Food and export crops that provide more than half of Nicaragua's income are being neglected as agricultural workers are either on strike or else terrorized or driven out of their homes in the slum areas of the northern cities by the National Guard.

There has been a "massive flight" of capital, according to central bank president Roberto Incer. Wealthy Nicaraguans have sent \$40 million out of the country in the past three months, and \$235 million in dollar deposits was withdrawn from banks prior to the imposition of exchange controls. This amounts to the virtual entirety

of private dollar holdings in the country.

The government faces a grave liquidity crisis, as massive numbers of people are refusing to pay their taxes—due in September—and as the vast expense of military operations mounts. Teachers went unpaid for several months, only to have their August checks from the government bounce. A similar prospect faces other public employees.

Meanwhile, the general strike and business shutdown initiated by opposition forces August 24 continues with no end in sight.

While large numbers of the youth who joined with the Sandinistas to fight the National Guard in the cities have been massacred, thousands more have fled to the countryside to swell the ranks of the guerrillas. In addition, the guard's brutality has created still more sympathy for the Sandinistas among the populace. "There is no decent person in this town who is not against Somoza," a León lawyer was quoted as saying by *Newsweek*. "Everyone is cooperating with the guerrillas."

The potential remains for further spontaneous uprisings, such as the one that occurred September 16 in Corinto, Nicaragua's principal Pacific port. Three thousand persons, unarmed, dispersed a small contingent of guardsmen and forced open the doors to six big food warehouses and emptied them of their contents. Somoza sent naval forces under the command of his half-brother, José, to restore order and guard the many merchant ships standing in the port.

Washington has grown increasingly concerned about the situation in Nicaragua, despite Somoza's "victories" on the military level. The most ominous sign of this was the appearance of one or more U.S. warships off Nicaragua's Pacific coast on September 22. A Pentagon spokesman acknowledged they were there—"to monitor radio communications."

The sending of the naval vessels coincided with a meeting of the Organization of American States in Washington September 21-23. The OAS provided the cover for the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965; a similar role for it at this time should not be ruled out.

But the U.S. imperialists and their Latin American allies seem to be split rather sharply over how best to stave off a popular revolution in Nicaragua: keep Somoza in power at all costs, or force him to resign. This was reflected in the failure

of the OAS gathering to arrive at any clear position.

Publicly, the State Department has limited itself to calling for a cease-fire and "concessions and sacrifices" by both sides—considered by some commentators to be a veiled way of asking Somoza to step down. Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador to Panama William Jordan has been sent on a tour to meet with the presidents of Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Panama. Queried by reporters in Caracas, Jordan said that he was "trying to achieve a consensus," but refused to elaborate.

Divisions over how best to contain the upsurge in Nicaragua are also evident in the U.S. Congress. On September 22 the Senate voted to cut off all remaining economic aid to Nicaragua, at the urging of Senator Frank Church of Idaho and other liberal Democrats. Church called on the administration to disavow Somoza and press for "a moderate government which respects human rights and free enterprise."

"The longer we delay, the greater the chance that the revolution will fall into the hands of the extremists," Church said.

Meanwhile, Somoza announced September 23 that seventy-eight members of the U.S. House of Representatives had sent a letter to President Carter expressing full support for the Nicaraguan dictator's fight against "communist terrorists trained in Moscow and Havana."

Crude appeals of this nature notwithstanding, the political costs to the Carter administration of continuing to equivocate on Nicaragua are becoming quite high. The brutality of the National Guard and Somoza's total lack of popular backing has been exposed to the entire world in recent weeks—in particular, to the people of the United States. It will be increasingly difficult for Washington to continue a policy that is viewed as supporting Somoza's remaining in power.

Given the degree to which Somoza has been exposed as a brutal dictator whose continued rule is based only on naked terror, any outside military intervention aimed at rolling back the mass upsurge would have to be organized on the pretext of throwing out Somoza and restoring "democracy" to the country. The bourgeois-democratic regimes of Venezuela and Costa Rica have already put out feelers in this direction. But gaining the assent of the dictatorships in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala could prove difficult. These regimes have close ties to Somoza and can probably glimpse their own future in Nicaragua today. The idea of dumping dictators who have outlived their usefulness does not appeal to them.

The protests that have already taken place in Costa Rica point the way toward the kind of solidarity with the Nicaraguan workers and peasants that is required (see accompanying article).

There have even been actions in some of the Latin American dictatorships. On September 5 and 6 law students in Santiago boycotted classes to protest the refusal of university authorities to allow an assembly in solidarity with the anti-Somoza struggle. On September 20, hundreds of students and workers marched in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, to demand that the Paz García government stay out of the Nicaraguan conflict.

Ten thousand persons marched in Mexico City in early September to express solidarity with Nicaragua.

In a statement printed in the September 17 edition of *Granma*, the Cuban government called on "world public opinion" to "be alert to the struggle of [the Nicaraguan] people, whose final victory the Yankee imperialists are trying to snatch away, in collusion with all their agents in the area." □

## 500 Voice Solidarity With Freedom Fighters

### Costa Rican Rally Says 'No' to Aid for Somoza

By Mike Kelly

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica—Moves by Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo to organize an intervention against the Nicaraguan masses have been met by growing protests here.

Support for the popular rebellion against the Somoza dictatorship is widespread among the people of Costa Rica—a fact that has the country's rulers plainly worried.

President Carazo went on nationwide television September 5. He linked the movement against Somoza in Nicaragua to a ten-day strike by hospital workers and other labor protests here. Carazo declared that "part of what our country has experienced with the illegal strikes and the internal struggle in Nicaragua has raised fears in many centers and among Costa Rican businessmen of the proliferation of Sandinism."

Carazo has sent his foreign minister, Rafael Calderón, to seek support from the dictators in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador for a Central American "mediation" effort in Nicaragua.

Foreign Minister Calderón was quoted in the September 8 edition of the San José daily *La Nación* as saying that "there is concern in the Costa Rican government about what might happen in Costa Rica and the rest of Central America if power in Nicaragua should fall to the communist guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front [FSLN]."

While the Costa Rican rulers' public stance is one of seeking to "mediate" the conflict in Nicaragua, their goal is to blunt the mobilizations of the Nicaraguan masses. The kind of operation that may really be in the works has been indicated by ex-Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio.

Facio condemned the Somoza dictatorship in a statement in the September 7 *La Nación*, but went on to express fear that the "totalitarian" FSLN would "establish

a regime similar to that of Cuba on our northern frontier, with all the dangers that would mean for our peace."

What was needed, Facio said, was the kind of "pacification action carried out in the Dominican Republic in the 1960s."

While Facio thought the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic by 30,000 U.S. Marines was "badly begun," he said it was nonetheless "later transformed into an action with collective legality."

The Costa Rican government's moves were denounced at a rally of 500 people in San José's Central Park on September 10, sponsored by the Costa Rican Committee in Solidarity With the Nicaraguan People. The rally was preceded by an all-day cultural event, which drew 4,000 to 5,000 persons.

Hundreds of people stopped to read large display boards, or *burras*, covered with slogans and articles on the anti-Somoza struggle.

On September 11, activists from the Socialist Workers Organization (OST), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Costa Rica, mounted an informational picket line and set up *burras* outside the San José post office. Interest among passersby ran high, and many stopped to give donations. A newsboy, about nine years old, stopped in front of my camera, raised his fist, and shouted, "¡Viva las Sandinistas!" □

#### Perspective on the News

"The worst was when the Pope died. We had 2 million copies of a cover on black holes printed, and we had to dump them. We had another cover printed and then the new Pope was elected and we had to dump that cover. Those two cost us several hundred thousand dollars."—*Time* associate publisher Reginald Brack, quoted in the September 19 *Washington Post*.

## Trotskyists Demand 'Hands Off Nicaragua!'

[The following statement was issued in San José, Costa Rica, September 10 by the Organización Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers Organization), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

\* \* \*

The Nicaraguan people are ready to fight to the finish to bring down the Somoza dictatorship. Saturday night [September 9] nearly a dozen of the most important cities in the country rose up in arms. The entire population of these cities has confronted the Nicaraguan National Guard, which has been unable to keep the situation under control despite the fact that they have tanks and bombs. "Down with Somoza!" is heard in all corners of the country. The heroic struggle of the Nicaraguan people has the Somoza government hanging by a thread.

The people of Costa Rica are also opposed to Somoza. The movement in this country has denounced the crimes of that dictatorship. We have come out in solidarity with the struggle to overthrow that murderous dictatorship. But the people of Nicaragua need more than just moral support. We have to mobilize to prevent the bosses' government of Carazo from meddling in the Nicaraguan conflict.

The Minister of Foreign Relations, Junior Calderón, visited the Central American presidents in order to "seek a solution to the Nicaraguan problem." The Costa Rican government has the nerve to seek help from none other than the *gorila* dictators of Central America! Carazo talks about "impartiality," but look who his cohorts are.

The Carazo government is Somoza's accomplice. There has been constant perse-

cution of the Sandinistas in this country. The imprisonment of Plutarco Hernández, a leader of the FSLN, was one more proof of the government's aid to Somoza. The Costa Rican government, which spends its time violating the rights of Costa Rican workers, couldn't be expected to do anything other than to defend capitalists like Somoza. Between the Nicaraguan people and the Somoza government, Carazo is *not impartial*. Only our mobilization can stop the Carazo government from helping Somoza. Our struggle to win the release of Plutarco Hernández showed how to do it—*put pressure on the government!*

Right now imperialism and all the capitalist governments—whether they be Carazo-style regimes or military dictatorships—are looking for some way to

stop the Nicaraguan people.

The Organization of American States is also preparing to intervene. Whenever the OAS has gotten involved it has always been to safeguard and maintain the bosses' control. *OAS Out of Nicaragua!*

The aspirations of the Nicaraguan people cannot be fulfilled by some other group of bosses that might replace Somoza and "soften" the exploitation of the people. Only a workers government without any bosses can provide a real solution to the problems of the Nicaraguan people. Down with Somoza and with any capitalist government that they try to set up in his place! Dissolve the National Guard! For a workers government!

*Imperialists and OAS, hands off Nicaragua!*

*Central American dictators, Carazo, hands off Nicaragua!*

*Mobilize and support the Nicaraguan people's struggle!*

*Mobilize against the Carazo government's aid to Somoza!*

*Down with the dictatorship! For a worker's government in Nicaragua!* □

## Progovernment Union Tops Feeling the Heat

## Chilean Miners Demand Wage Hike

The Chilean military dictatorship declared a state of siege in part of Antofagasta Province September 1, in an effort to break a struggle by 10,000 miners at Chuquicamata—the world's largest open-pit copper mine. More than fifty miners were arrested.

The miners at Chuquicamata began a boycott of company lunchrooms on July 31 as a means of pressing their demand for a 50-percent wage increase. On August 8, an assembly of 4,000 miners reaffirmed the boycott.

Six miners who spoke at the assembly were fired shortly thereafter, on grounds of having violated their contracts by inciting strikes. The miners then added the demand for reinstatement of the six as a condition for ending the boycott.

Gen. Orlando Urbina, head of the government-owned mining concern Codelco, tried at first to break the movement at Chuquicamata by appealing to the miners' wives to urge their husbands to give up the lunchroom boycott. The women responded with a "march of empty pots" on August 9 in support of the miners' struggle.

Interior Minister Sergio Fernández then ordered direct negotiations between pro-

government mine-union officials and the management of Codelco. The firing of the six workers was suspended.

In the midst of the talks the regime declared the state of siege at Chuquicamata. The talks broke down September 11 as the union officials walked out, declaring that they were "frustrated and disenchanted" with the government's attitude.

Chile's progovernment union officials are under great pressure from the ranks of the workers. President Bernardino Castillo of the Copper Workers Federation was shouted down by the Chuquicamata miners at the August 8 assembly, and he and other officials were forced to leave the meeting.

After General Pinochet blamed the Chuquicamata struggle on "a group of persons directly linked with the clandestine activity of the Communist Party," a number of top union officials held a news conference in Santiago and declared: "The government can say we're Communists. The government can say we're Christian Democrats. But we will continue defending the rights of the workers. . . ."

Among those at the news conference was Leon Vilarin, president of the independent truck-drivers union that played a key role

### Copies Missing?

Keep your files complete and up-to-date. Missing issues for the current year may be ordered by sending 75¢ per copy. Write for information about previous years.

Intercontinental Press/Inprecor  
P.O. Box 116  
Varick Street Station  
New York, N.Y. 10014



in the capitalist offensive against the Allende government in 1973. Vilarin said Pinochet's economic policies are ruining the independent truckers.

The copper-union officials declared before their talks with Codelco broke off that

they would not be responsible for "what might happen" if the miners' demands were not met. Union President Castillo warned the government that there is "general unrest" among copper miners, not only at Chuquicamata but also at El

Teniente (the world's largest underground copper mine), El Salvador, Andina, and other mines. Meanwhile, another lunch-room boycott, also demanding higher wages, has been started by steelworkers in Concepción. □

## Stalinists Block Solidarity Efforts

# Peru—Repression Forces Miners to Suspend Strike

By Fred Murphy

The Peruvian miners union FNTMMP\* announced September 8 that it was suspending for thirty days the nationwide strike that began August 4 and had closed virtually all of Peru's mines.

Many miners had already been forced back to work, under threat of firing and heavy military repression.

The work stoppage had been called to demand that the government order a "labor amnesty"; that is, the reinstatement of 320 FNTMMP leaders and almost 5,000 other union militants fired on government authorization after the July 19, 1977, general strike.

Another key demand on the government was the abrogation of two antilabor laws: the 1976 emergency mining decree, which denied miners the right to strike and greatly restricted union activity in the mines; and the March 1978 "labor stability" decree, which gave employers a blank check to carry out mass layoffs and extended the probation period for newly hired workers from three months to three years.

The miners were also seeking a wage increase and the settlement of a number of local disputes with the mining companies.

While none of these demands were definitely met, the regime has promised to abolish the emergency mining decree, as well as to amend the three-year probation clause and reconsider other aspects of the "labor stability" decree.

The government remained intransigent on the key question of the fired union activists. It was reported that the Southern Peru Copper Corporation—a U.S.-owned outfit that operates the big mines at Cerro Verde, Toquepala, and Cuajone—had threatened to close down its operations entirely rather than reinstate any of the FNTMMP leaders it has fired (among them union president Víctor Cuadros).

The SPCC did offer compensation pay-

ments of 30,000 soles (US\$175 at current exchange rates) a month over a four-year period to fired workers. Many accepted this as the government's efforts to break the strike intensified.

Martial law was declared in five mining districts on August 22 and extended to five departments (provinces) in central Peru on August 29. Heavily armed troops were sent into the mining districts. Union offices were ransacked by agents of the political police. Dozens of union leaders were arrested, and all public meetings and assemblies were banned in the areas under martial law.

In the iron-mining center of Marcona, an 8 p.m.-to-7 a.m. curfew was imposed on September 4.

At the SPCC's Toquepala complex, the miners' housing area was totally surrounded by troops and tanks. Food supplies were stopped from being brought in, and only those persons bearing an SPCC company pass were allowed to leave. The military even threatened to cut off the community's water supply. In face of this, the Toquepala miners decided to lift their strike on September 4.

Among the most militant strikers were those from the government-owned Centromín mines and refineries in the mountains of central Peru. Thousands of miners and their families from La Oroya, Morococha, and other Centromín installations carried out a "march of sacrifice" into Lima in mid-August. They remained there, holding marches and rallies on an almost daily basis to build support for the strike among the workers of Lima. The miners set up makeshift housing on the grounds of the San Marcos University medical school.

When the FNTMMP's executive committee proposed a fifteen-day suspension of the strike to a national delegates' assembly of the union on September 5, the Centromín miners argued strongly against it, and the assembly voted to continue the strike.

Early in the morning of September 6,

government troops and police attacked the encampment at the medical school with tear gas, fire hoses, and incendiary bombs. They routed the miners and their wives and children, forcing many of them aboard trains that took them—under police guard—back to the mining districts. Many children were reportedly lost in confusion.

When the trains arrived in La Oroya, the miners tried to hold an assembly and reestablish a protest encampment. But they were again dispersed with tear gas and forced back into their houses by a platoon of Assault Guards.

The September 6 attack was the final blow to the miners strike. Most of the Centromín workers went back to their jobs on September 7, and the next day the national FNTMMP leadership formally suspended the strike.

The miners enjoy great support and sympathy for their struggle among the rest of the Peruvian working class. What was lacking—and what might have turned the tide—was the mobilization of this support by the other union federations, especially the Communist Party-controlled General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP).

According to FNTMMP President Víctor Cuadros, the CGTP leaders claimed that calling a general strike to back up the miners' demands and defend them from the military's attacks "could have caused the overthrow of the government and its replacement by a Chile-type fascist regime" (*Marka*, September 14).

The Stalinist bureaucrats even refused to allow Cuadros to speak at a CGTP rally in Lima on September 2. Most of the crowd then marched away to another plaza, where they were addressed by Cuadros and other left-wing workers leaders.

The Peruvian miners have suffered a setback. But their union remains intact with an important experience of struggle behind it. If substantial concessions from the government and the mining companies are not forthcoming, the strike could resume in the weeks ahead. □

\*Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos del Perú (National Federation of Miners and Metalworkers of Peru).

# Anger in Ranks Sharpens Divisions in Japan's Biggest Union

By Dan Dickeson

The national congress of the Japanese trade-union federation Sohyo,<sup>1</sup> held in Tokyo July 15-18, was the scene of a sharp debate, as the deepening discontent of broad layers of workers led to sharp divisions within the reformist union leadership.

Sohyo is by far the largest labor federation in Japan, representing a total of 4.5 million workers. Its membership is concentrated in the public sector, which includes employees of national and local government agencies, as well as those in nationalized industries such as Japan National Railways, the International Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation, the postal service, and others.

Sohyo has generally been the most militant and democratic wing of the labor movement in Japan. Although its leadership politically supports the Socialist Party, activists in the Communist Party and other minority tendencies have been able to function fairly freely within most Sohyo-affiliated unions.

One of the focal points of debate at the July convention was the relationship between Sohyo and the other Japanese labor unions. There are three other trade-union federations in Japan, the most important of which is Domei,<sup>2</sup> representing some 2.2 million workers, mostly in the key sectors of private industry. The Domei officialdom consists of openly anticommunist business unionists who point to the American AFL-CIO<sup>3</sup> as their model. They have been in contention with the left-Social Democratic leaders of Sohyo for leadership of the Japanese labor movement ever since Domei was formed in 1964.

The debate within Sohyo began in response to the growing problems of Japanese capitalism. The recovery of the Japanese economy from the 1974-75 recession was fueled mainly by the expanding export trade, rather than by a growth of consumer spending within Japan. In fact, while the profits of major corporations have soared, the wages of most Japanese workers have fallen steadily behind rising prices since 1975. The labor movement has

suffered defeats during the annual *shunto* ("spring struggle") round of contract negotiations in each of the past three years.

Last year, at the 1977 national convention of Sohyo, the leadership proposed a shift in strategy which it claimed would break labor's losing streak. General Secretary Mitsuo Tomizuka proclaimed that with the end of the economic boom and the political crisis of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Japanese labor movement was facing "an era of coalitions."

According to Tomizuka, Sohyo unions would have to moderate their demands and forms of struggle so that they could enter into coalitions with more conservative union federations, especially Domei, in order to win concessions from the capitalists. Union activists were advised to concentrate less on winning wage increases and more on obtaining "policy" concessions from the government in areas such as employment security.

The big-business press applauded Tomizuka's strategy as a "responsible," "realistic" course for labor, which would help assure stable growth of both wages and profits.

In fact, however, the result was a further decline in the standard of living for most workers. The 1978 *shunto* was a demoralizing defeat for the entire labor movement. Rank-and-file discontent within Sohyo continued to deepen.

A section of the Sohyo leadership around Akira Iwai began to call for a reversal of the 1977 turn. It soon became clear that the Tomizuka leadership would have to back down somewhat to avoid an open rebellion by delegates at the July national convention.

The draft resolutions presented to the convention included substantial concessions to the Iwai wing, but even so a heated debate broke out on the convention floor.

At one point Tomizuka was forced to lamely admit that "the wage raises won in the 1978 *shunto* were terribly inadequate. In the area of policy demands as well . . . we failed to accomplish all that we should have. In retrospect, I must say frankly that there have also been some problems in the organization and leadership of our movement."

A minority of delegates, led by officials of the telegraph and telephone workers union, Zentsu, argued for sticking to the strategy of working with Domei, but

they became increasingly isolated as the debate went on.

By the end of the convention, the national leadership had retreated even further. Tomizuka declared that Sohyo unions may resort to strikes or other forms of direct action to win the passage of SP-sponsored legislation in the upcoming special session of the Diet (parliament). This will include bills to guarantee employment security, a proposal for a one trillion yen [about US\$5.3 billion] tax cut, and opposition to an LDP-sponsored bill to introduce a sales tax.

The Sohyo leadership also pledged to take more aggressive, independent action to win wage increases when the current contracts expire in April 1979, rather than relying entirely on joint actions with Domei unions.

The bourgeois press denounced Sohyo's turn away from the "responsible" policies adopted at its 1977 convention, and predicted dire consequences under the new "radical," "strike-happy" line. But in fact, the strategy advanced by Sohyo "left wingers" such as Iwai represents no more than a return to the organization's pre-1977 posture of "militant" reformist unionism.

The outcome of the 1978 national convention reflects in a limited and distorted way the pent-up frustration and readiness to struggle of the Sohyo ranks. What the capitalists fear is not that bureaucrats like Tomizuka and Iwai have suddenly become militant fighters, but rather that the union membership, having forced their leaders to back off from an openly conservative course, will now take seriously and act upon their promises of more determined actions in the coming months.

Following their defeat at the Sohyo convention, the conservative leadership of Zentsu went into their own national convention determined to force through their policies. They even raised the possibility of the telegraph and telephone workers joining a new industrial federation of unions in the "information sector" (data processing, communications, and related industries). This amounts to a threat to take Zentsu out of Sohyo, since the major unions in the electronics industry are affiliated to other federations.

During the past several years Zentsu has come to be one of the least democratic unions within Sohyo. Since their setback at the Sohyo national convention, Zen-

1. Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai, (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan).

2. Zen Nihon Rodo Sodomei Kumiai Kaigi (Confederation of Japan Labor Unions).

3. American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, the principal trade-union federation in the United States.



dentsu bureaucrats have taken further steps to silence any opposition to their conservative policies by cracking down on the few remaining strongholds of dissident currents within the union.

One of the prefectural (provincial) councils of Zedentsu in which opposition currents have managed to retain a certain freedom of operation is in the northeastern prefecture of Miyagi, where the Trotskyists of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League have played a prominent role.

In Miyagi, the Zedentsu leadership has openly collaborated with management to victimize a number of militant activists.

Four telephone workers who were arrested during demonstrations against Nar-

ita Airport were fired by the telegraph and telephone public corporation, allegedly because their participation in "antisocial" actions violated the "high moral standards required of public servants."

Rather than fighting against this unprecedented attack on the rights of public employees, the Miyagi headquarters of Zedentsu echoed the government's propaganda, stating that "this union and its members will have nothing to do with the antisocial Narita struggle." When co-workers formed a defense committee to demand rehiring of the four, the leadership expelled three defense committee activists from the union, and suspended fifteen others. □

## Delegation Reports on Visit to Cambodian Capital

### Tokyo Establishes Diplomatic Ties With Pnompenh

Three weeks after the signing of the Japan-China "peace and friendship" treaty, Japan has become the first imperialist power to establish diplomatic relations with the new regime in Cambodia.

A six-member delegation of Japanese diplomats flew to Pnompenh via Peking September 2 for a week of talks with Cambodian officials. The delegation was headed by Shoji Sato, the Japanese ambassador to Peking, who will now also serve as Tokyo's envoy to Pnompenh.

After talks with Premier Pol Pot, Deputy Premier Ieng Sary, and other Cambodian officials, Sato announced that the two governments will soon begin formal negotiations on trade and economic aid agreements. Cambodian officials were also said to be considering the possibility of allowing Japanese journalists to be stationed in Pnompenh.

The Japanese diplomats left Cambodia for Peking September 9. One of them, a deputy director of the Japanese foreign ministry's Asia bureau, returned to Tokyo September 12, and described his impressions of Cambodia at a news conference.

#### Economic Reconstruction

As reported in the September 13 issue of the Tokyo daily *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Japanese diplomats were told that Cambodia achieved self-sufficiency in basic food production in 1977, and even exported 150,000 tons of agricultural products.

Cambodian officials said that after overcoming the critical food shortages that gripped the country following the fall of the Lon Nol regime in April 1975, the new government is beginning to build up light industry, much of it in the suburbs of Pnompenh.

The Japanese visitors were told that

after the evacuation of the capital city in 1975, Pnompenh is now gradually being repopulated. Cambodian officials estimated that there are some 200,000 people in the city and its suburbs, and that with further development of industry the population will eventually rise to around 400,000.

This compares with a prewar figure of 600,000, and a peak wartime population estimated at 3 million. On the other hand, Yugoslav journalists who visited Pnompenh in March 1978 were told that only 20,000 people were living in the capital then. If these figures are accurate, they indicate a very rapid process of resettlement.

#### Life in Pnompenh

Japanese diplomats were astonished by what they actually saw in Pnompenh. They reported that in the center of the city at midday, the streets are almost totally deserted. Residents of the inner city leave each morning for the industrial belt surrounding the capital, and return to their homes late in the afternoon. Then the street lights are turned on and the city comes alive.

Shops in Pnompenh remain closed. There is no money in use. Workers are paid in commodities. The only telephones are those in government offices.

The region surrounding the capital is one of rich rice paddies, which officials claim now yield three crops a year. The Japanese visitors reported seeing many workers and peasants in their black work-clothes, but said that all of them appeared to be young men and women in their twenties. Persons older than that do not appear to have been resettled in the Pnompenh region.

The peasants are organized in communities said to resemble the "people's communes" in rural China. A typical commune has about 5,000 members. Each commune has its own clinics, schools, and child-care facilities. The communes are divided into 100-member sections, consisting of people who work at the same jobs.

Ambassador Sato was told that this type of commune is the basic unit of local government throughout Cambodia.

#### A Push From Peking?

If the opening up of diplomatic relations with Japan is followed by the anticipated economic aid agreements and the stationing of Japanese journalists in Pnompenh, it will mark a turning point for Cambodia. Since 1975 the Pol Pot leadership has carried out a policy of extreme isolation, not seeking aid from abroad but proclaiming that Cambodia would pull itself up by its own bootstraps, whatever the human cost.

There are indications that this new turn by Pnompenh may have been carried out at the urging of Peking.

Up to now, China has been the sole source of economic and military aid to the Cambodian regime, and Peking is one of very few governments in the world to politically support the Pol Pot leadership. Aid to Cambodia has been a steady drain on the Chinese economy.

In addition, Peking may have doubts about the stability of the Pol Pot regime. Since the outbreak of large-scale military clashes with Vietnam there have been persistent rumors of rebellions among the regime's own troops.

For these and other reasons, Peking may have opted for a policy of trying to "open up" Cambodia to other sources of aid.

Tokyo's move to establish diplomatic ties and provide economic aid to Pnompenh was undoubtedly one of the unpublicized topics of discussion during negotiations leading up to the Japan-China treaty signed in August. □

#### Smith's Jets Bomb Mozambique

In yet another terrorist assault against the Black masses of both Zimbabwe and neighboring countries, Rhodesian military forces struck in Mozambique September 20.

According to Rhodesian military communiqués, troops and air force jets were sent 125 miles into Mozambique to attack "guerrilla bases" of the Zimbabwe African National Union, one of the two nationalist groups allied within the Patriotic Front. At least five ZANU bases were said to have been hit.

The assault is only the latest in a string of similar attacks against Zimbabwean refugees and freedom fighters in both Mozambique and Zambia, in which hundreds of Zimbabweans have been killed.



# Assassination Is Pretext for Crackdown

By Eduardo Medrano

BOGOTÁ—At 8:30 a.m. September 12, two men wearing uniforms of the Colombian Military Police entered the home of former cabinet official Rafael Pardo Buelvas and killed him.

Pardo Buelvas was minister of agriculture and minister of interior under the administration of Alfonso López Michelsen, as well as a leading member of the Conservative Party.

In his capacity as minister of interior, Pardo Buelvas was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the repressive measures taken by López Michelsen during the citizens' national general strike of September 14-15, 1977. At that time, the police and army killed twenty-three persons in Bogotá.

According to the daily *El Espectador*, a new terrorist group calling itself the "Movimiento de Autodefensa Obrera" (MAO—Movement for Workers Self-Defense) issued a communiqué claiming responsibility for the assassination.

The Turbay Ayala government immediately sent troops into the city, began

carrying out massive stop-and-search operations in the streets, and held thousands of persons for not having identity papers. In addition, all demonstrations were banned throughout the country, particularly in Bogotá. (A few days earlier, the government had granted permission to the trade-union federations to hold peaceful marches in commemoration of the citizens' national general strike.)

Upon learning of Pardo's death, Defense Minister Luis Carlos Camacho Leyva issued the following statement: "Those persons who have the means to do so should immediately take measures for their own safety. Business enterprises, whatever kind they are, should immediately set up a security system in their plants [with] the people who work in them."

He also gave the following warning: "The government will not spare the slightest effort to hunt down the perpetrators of the crime and bring down on them the full force of the law. And if this cannot be done by force of law, we will have to use the same weapons that they are using to

victimize the citizenry."

The repressive hysteria unleashed by the regime only five days before, with its declaration of a "statute of security," has increased sharply since the assassination. The government used the MAO's action as a pretext to justify implementing the measure with utmost rigor.

Of the four trade-union federations, the only one that has condemned the assassination up to now is the Union of Colombian Workers. The others "would prefer to give themselves a little time before making statements to that effect to 'avoid problems,'" according to a report in the September 13 issue of the Bogotá daily *El Tiempo*.

At the same time, it was reported that the four federations were going ahead with preparations for peaceful mobilizations throughout the country to commemorate September 14, despite the government ban. The aim of the actions is to repudiate the "statute of security" and insist that the government agree to negotiations around a fourteen-point platform, which includes the following demands: across-the-board wage increases, trade-union rights, defense of earlier gains won by the workers movement, and reform of the social security administration.

The chief of the National Police, General Rosas Guarín, replied to this announcement by saying that "massive roundups of extremist elements" might be carried out on September 14. □

## Decree Paves Way for New Austerity Measures

# Colombian Workers—the Real Target of 'Statute of Security'

By Eduardo Medrano

BOGOTÁ—Less than one month after taking office, Colombian President Julio César Turbay Ayala, who was elected by only 15 percent of the voting population (he received 2.5 million votes), dealt his first blow to the democratic freedoms and human rights of 25 million Colombians.

Claiming that there had been a "declaration of war" against his administration (a few days earlier, a clandestine group had distributed a leaflet calling for another citizens' national general strike<sup>1</sup>), the newly installed president issued a repressive decree to the nation, No. 1923, which

he called a "statute of security."

The television networks and bourgeois dailies immediately assumed their role. They hastened to give assurances that the "entire country" had welcomed this measure "with relief." Their job was to present this reactionary scheme to public opinion as simply a number of measures designed to combat ordinary crime.

In reality, the causes of unsafe conditions in Colombia's urban and rural areas have increased owing to the economic, political, and social crisis in which successive Liberal-Conservative governments have plunged the country in the last few years.

The muggings, kidnappings, and murders committed in broad daylight by well organized gangs, the robberies on the highways, the smuggling and cattle-stealing in the countryside, the "rip-offs"

in the streets, the proliferation and impunity with which foreign and local drug dealers operate, the dishonest manipulation of the national economy by some of the "hawks" of finance capital, as well as the regime's police brutality, keep the population terrorized.

By playing on the popular sentiment against crime, and making an amalgam between it and "subversion," Turbay and his ministers have presented this decree as something beneficial to the country.

However, this particular "statute of security" does not say a word about muggers—whether the street or white-collar variety—nor about drug dealers, smugglers, or highway bandits. What it does is institute a series of provisions designed to repress working-class and popular protests with extreme harshness, and establish censorship of the mass me-

1. See "Twenty-Four-Hour General Strike Shakes Colombia," and "Aftermath of the General Strike," by Eduardo Medrano, in *Intercontinental Press*, September 26, 1977, p. 1036, and October 3, 1977, p. 1068.

dia such as has not been seen in Colombia for years.

The "security statute" increases the penalties for kidnapping and triples the penalties for "rebellion," a political crime if there ever was one. But it doesn't stop there. It also punishes any kind of "disturbance of public order" with one to five years in prison, as well as any "interference with the peaceful development of social activities."

For those who "temporarily occupy public or open areas with the aim of pressuring the authorities to make a decision," or of "distributing subversive propaganda," the statute prescribes a mandatory year in prison. This is also the penalty for anyone who puts "offensive or subversive writings or drawings" on the walls, or who "prints, stocks, carries, distributes, or transports subversive propaganda."

To be noted is the fact that the officials responsible for deciding what is "subversive propaganda" or "offensive or subversive writings or drawings" will be "commanders of a regiment, naval force, or air base," as well as "commanders of police garrisons whose rank is not lower than that of captain."

What this measure is obviously intended to do is to stifle all popular protests and terrorize all political and trade-union activists. It is also intended to destroy any movement toward a strike, even though the right to strike is protected by the constitution and has been defended by the workers at the cost of many sacrifices.

It also aims to jail anyone who participates in a citizens' general strike or in a student strike, since the statute makes it easier to detain people by stipulating that anyone who "incites lawbreaking" or "disobeys authority" or "disregards a legitimate order from a competent authority" may be liable to "imprisonment up to one year without bail."

Thus, the full force of this measure is going to be aimed first and foremost at the urban and rural shantytown dwellers who occupy a piece of land in order to put up a makeshift structure, or those who block a public thoroughfare to make a local citizens' strike effective, or those who distribute a trade-union leaflet or sell a working-class publication.

In addition, the statute broadens the scope of "military jurisprudence" at the expense of civil jurisprudence, while eliminating recourse to appeal.

In terms of press censorship, the statute says that "while a disturbance of public order is going on, the radio and television stations may not transmit news, statements, communiqués, or commentaries relative to public order, the cessation of activities, or illegal strikes or work stoppages, or news that constitutes an incitement to crime or an apology for it."

To this the minister of communications added: "Only the governors, deputy assist-

ants, and sheriffs may give out written information on events that interfere with national tranquility."

Most capitalist sectors—such as ANDI, SAC, ANIF, FEDEMÉTAL, and FEDER-ALGODÓN,<sup>2</sup> the Chambers of Commerce, and the liberal daily *El Tiempo*, together with the conservative dailies *El Siglo* and *La República*—have supported the measure without reservations.

Others, however, have repudiated it. The Liberal parliamentary deputy Luis Villar Borda characterized the measure as a "severe blow to the liberal-democratic order," and pointed out that what was involved was "basically a statute of political repression" that appeared to have "taken its inspiration from the Uruguayan political model."

The president of the College of Attorneys in Bogotá, José Antonio Cancino, stated that he would ask the Supreme Court of Justice to review the statute, "because to remain callous and indifferent would be tantamount to looking favorably upon a statute that can never expect to receive our endorsement."

Even the daily *El Espectador*, in a September 8 editorial, characterized the measure as an "abuse of authority" and ridiculed it: "When nonconformity and protest exist in reality, the solution is not for the radio stations to concentrate on broadcasting popular music while the trade unions and marginally employed are howling in the streets." It added that the statute "came down hardest on collective nonconformity while being helpless to control the corrupt and the corrupters."

The trade-union federations have also begun to make protests. Faustino Galindo of the CSTC<sup>3</sup> stated: "This is a dangerous decree, but through the actions of the workers we are going to struggle to have it abrogated, filling the jails with students, workers, housewives. . . ."

The CTC<sup>4</sup> issued a document condemning the statute for repressing "the free expression of the trade-union, civic, and popular movements."

Representatives of the CGT and FE-TRACUN<sup>5</sup> also made similar statements.

2. ANDI—Asociación Nacional de Industriales (National Association of Manufacturers); SAC—Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (Colombian Growers Society); ANIF—Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras (National Association of Financial Institutions); FEDEMÉTAL—Federación Metalúrgica Nacional (National Metals Federation); FEDERALGODON—Federación Nacional de Algodoneros (National Federation of Cotton Growers).

3. CSTC—Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia (Trade Union Confederation of Colombian Workers).

4. CTC—Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia (Confederation of Colombian Workers).

5. CGT—Confederación General del Trabajo

The independent magazine *Alternativa* and several left publications have also criticized the "statute of security."

The Communist Party, which has been the favorite target of attacks by Defense Minister Camacho Leyva, explained in its paper *Voz Proletaria* of September 7-13 that the decree stemmed from the fact that "reactionaries" have established "preeminence" in the Turbay government.

The Trotskyists of the Partido Socialista Revolucionario,<sup>6</sup> in a resolution passed September 9, condemned the statute, blamed it on the government as a whole, and called for forming a united front against the odious measure.

In nearly all the vanguard sectors, the well-founded belief prevails that with the "statute of security," the regime is trying, one year after the citizens' national general strike, to prevent another militant and unified response by the workers and popular movement to the austerity plans of Turbay and the bosses.

The bosses' objectives are known to everyone. At its recent convention held in Cartagena, the ANDI demanded a "thoroughgoing revision of current labor legislation" since the latter is "detrimental to production." They also complained about the "growing politization of the Colombian trade-union movement," and called for private enterprise to intervene even more in the life of the trade unions "so that they do not turn into a key instrument in the struggle against democratic institutions and the free-enterprise system."

As though that weren't enough, they also asked the government to reduce pensions and jobless benefits to make them "cost-effective and quantifiable"; and to establish an "integral" wage, that is, do away with the social benefits won through trade-union struggles; and to open the doors to international capital, "which today is attacked without reason."

September 11, 1978

(General Confederation of Labor); FETRACUN—Federación de Trabajadores de Cundinamarca (Federation of Cundinamarca Workers).

6. Revolutionary Socialist Party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

### Blind Justice

A military tribunal in Italy has ordered Fernando Castronuovo to pay 39,515 lire (US\$47.30) because he fled his naval unit rather than be captured by German forces when Italy surrendered in World War II.

The tribunal said that Castronuovo had been convicted in absentia in 1952 of desertion and stealing military property—the uniform he wore when he fled.

Although Castronuovo was later amnestied, the tribunal ruled that he still had to pay 39,515 lire in court costs.





Residents of Crossroads flee police assault on "unauthorized" township. Three Blacks were reported killed in raid.

## South African Police Drive Blacks From 'Illegal' Homes

By Ernest Harsch

Before daylight, armed South African riot police swept into Crossroads, a shantytown near Cape Town, September 14, terrorizing the encampment's 22,000 African inhabitants.

They kicked down the doors of some of the shacks, beat residents with clubs, and unleashed clouds of tear gas. The police admitted that one person was shot dead, while witnesses said that a second had also been murdered. In addition, an infant was reported to have been trampled to death by the fleeing crowds after slipping out of a sling on its mother's back.

Hundreds of African residents were arrested for violating the Group Areas Act, which stipulates where Africans may or may not live. According to the apartheid authorities, they may not live at Crossroads.

Brig. J.F. Rossouw, the police commander in the Cape Town area, termed the action a "crime-preventive" raid.

In South Africa, it is a crime for Africans to live outside of certain designated areas, such as the rural African reserves, known as Bantustans, or the segregated African townships around the major "white" cities.

It is a crime for most African workers in the Western Cape to live there permanently with their families, and it is a crime for wives and children not employed by a white boss to even reside in the area. It is a crime for any adult African to be out of doors without a pass.

Crossroads itself is an illegal "squatters' camp," a blot on the apartheid regime's blueprint of what South Africa should look like. And like other similar shantytowns, it

has been slated for demolition by bulldozers—perhaps within the next few weeks. According to social workers involved in Crossroads, the police raid was a prelude to the destruction of the settlement and was designed to intimidate the inhabitants into vacating their homes.

It makes little difference to the handful of racist administrators who govern the lives of South Africa's Black majority that Crossroads is seen by its inhabitants as a viable, stable community, on a level with many of the officially sanctioned African townships. It has two schools, and each family chips in fifty cents a month for teachers' salaries. It has two clinics, two churches, a community center, soccer teams, karate clubs, and an informal local government. All the shacks have been built by the inhabitants themselves, out of



whatever materials were available. Since most men spend long hours during the day working in Cape Town, women play a prominent role in running the settlement.

Nevertheless, Crossroads has no electricity and no running water of its own (there are only eight water outlets on its outskirts), and it offers little protection from the harsh Cape Town winters. Its inhabitants have been forced to live under such conditions—and under the constant risk of eviction—because they have no alternative. Virtually no houses have been built for African families in Cape Town since 1966.

Ironically, it is the apartheid system itself, and the need of South Africa's capitalist economy for a ready supply of cheap Black labor, that bring shantytowns like Crossroads into existence. Since the end of the last century, millions of Africans have been driven off the land to work in the white-owned mines and factories. They are denied virtually all political rights, both to keep their wages low and to prevent them from translating their substantial economic and social weight into political power that could challenge the survival of white supremacy.

The migratory labor system is a centerpiece of this whole set-up. Under it, many African workers are allowed to live in the "white" areas only temporarily, without their families. In most of the country, migrants make up about half of the African work force, the rest being permitted to live with their families—at least for the moment. The Western Cape, however, has been declared off-bounds to all Africans except migrant workers.

Naturally, many Africans in the Cape Town area simply ignore these regulations. But since African families cannot get legal accommodations in the recognized townships of Langa, Guguletu, and Nyanga, they are forced to live in the makeshift shantytowns, despite the insecurity involved. Other shantytown residents are unemployed workers who refuse to go to the Bantustans while they wait for another job.

An editorial in the November 1976 issue of *Forward/Voorwaarts/Phambili*, a squatters' newspaper, pointed out, "The reason why people are squatting is not only a result of the government's apartheid laws. It is also because the bosses are only interested in their profits and because the authorities act in the interests of the rich and do not answer to the people."

While the economy was booming and Cape Town's industry was starving for more African labor, the illegal shantytowns were tolerated. But now that recession has set in (and unemployed Africans in the urban areas could add to the political turmoil), the regime has decreed that they must go.

Since mid-1977, three African shantytowns in the Cape Town area have already been bulldozed into oblivion: Modderdam,

Werkgenot, and Unibell, throwing more than 30,000 Africans out of their homes. (Many simply moved into other overcrowded squatters' camps.)

That Crossroads would be the next target was confirmed during the Cape provincial congress of the ruling National Party in August. The debate centered around the need to stiffen the laws governing African movement and residency in the Western Cape. Connie Mulder, the official in charge of administering Pretoria's apartheid laws, declared that "we will have to act more strictly. . . ." Defence Minister P.W. Botha, who is also leader of the National Party in the Cape, announced that he had visited Crossroads. He reaf-

firmed that it would have to be demolished. Both Mulder and Botha are front-runners to succeed John Vorster as prime minister.

The residents of Crossroads and their supporters have not taken the threatened destruction of the shantytown lying down. On July 30, between 4,000 and 5,000 persons rallied in Crossroads for a two-and-half-hour prayer service against the demolition plans. After the September 14 police raid, protest rallies were held in a number of cities.

The people of Crossroads have also appealed for international actions in solidarity with their struggle. They deserve full support. □

## Save the Life of Seyyed-Javadi!

By Peter Seidman

[The following article appeared in the September 29 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

One of the most prominent targets of the shah's martial law crackdown against dissidents is Dr. Ali-Asghar Hadj Seyyed-Javadi.

The Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran (CAIFI) has launched an emergency appeal to ensure the safety of Seyyed-Javadi and force the Iranian government to lift its travel ban on him.

Seyyed-Javadi was forced into hiding, along with his wife and two young children, immediately after the September 8 massacre in Tehran. Within twenty-four hours, agents of the SAVAK, the shah's secret police, raided his house five times in an effort to arrest him.

From hiding, Seyyed-Javadi was able to get CAIFI a copy of an open letter he has sent to the Prime Minister of Iran. In the letter, Seyyed-Javadi says that he fears the government will torture and murder him if he is captured. However, he offers to stand trial on any charges brought against him if genuine guarantees of safety are offered.

Seyyed-Javadi's fears are well-founded. He reports that several other prominent dissidents in Iran have already been victimized since martial law was declared:

"I am informed that your armed agents, after nearly beating to death Ayatollah Ghomi, put him under arrest. This respected old man, having been forced to spend the past fifteen years of his life in exile, was simply returning to his home in the city of Meshed. Your armed agents, having beaten and injured Dr. Mofatteh, the great Islamic orator, put him under arrest. And, it has been reported that after

having severely beaten Ayatollah Nouri inside his own house, they murdered him. There is no information on the fate of the arrested individuals such as Mr. [Mehdi] Bazargan, that symbol of piety of Islamic faith."

In a statement supporting CAIFI's campaign, prominent Iranian playwright and novelist Dr. Gholam-Hossein Sa'edi explains why the shah has targeted Seyyed-Javadi for victimization:

"Hadj Seyyed-Javadi was one of the first people to seriously take up the issue of human rights. . . . His unique boldness in exposing dictatorship and repression, the dominant reign of executive power, the bankruptcy of the economy, social ills, and the lack of human and civil rights, as well as exposing censorship, is unparalleled."

Former Iranian political prisoner and prominent poet Reza Baraheni has also appealed for Seyyed-Javadi's safety. Baraheni, CAIFI's honorary chairperson, explained that since 1975 this prestigious social and literary critic has issued a series of more than a hundred open letters and pamphlets "laying the blame for the entire devastation of the economic and cultural resources of the country at the threshold of the Shah's court itself. . . ."

Now, says Baraheni, there is no doubt in the minds of many Iranians both at home and abroad that the Shah's agents will kill [Seyyed-Javadi] if they find him."

CAIFI is urging that letters demanding Seyyed-Javadi's safety be sent to Ardeshir Zahedi, Ambassador of Iran, 3005 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20008, or to other Iranian embassies. In addition, CAIFI has issued an emergency brochure to help gather support for Seyyed-Javadi. It asks that copies of all protests, as well as donations and orders for the new brochure, be sent to CAIFI, 853 Broadway, Suite 414, New York, New York 10003. □

# Behind the Coup in Mauritania

By Jim Atkinson

NOUAKCHOTT—The seizure of power here on July 10 by a group of senior army officers styling themselves the Comité Militaire de Redressement National (CMRN—Military Committee for National Recovery) marks a major turning-point in the nearly three-year-old Western Saharan war.<sup>1</sup>

The coup-makers, led by the armed forces chief-of-staff, Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Mohamed Salek, who is now the CMRN's president, promised the Mauritanian people that they would work out a timetable to restore peace.

The top army brass decided to overthrow Moktar Ould Daddah, the dictator who ruled here for eighteen years, because his war against the Western Saharan nationalist forces of Polisario was, they feared, leading the capitalist system in Mauritania towards military, economic, and political disaster.

This does not mean that these senior bourgeois army officers immediately recognized the right of the Western Saharan people to self-determination. They have

not withdrawn their troops from Tiris El-Gharbia, the Mauritanian-occupied sector of Western Sahara, and the Mauritanian flag still flies in Dakhla, its largest city.

Since taking power, however, CMRN leaders have met with Morocco's King Hassan, Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, French President Giscard d'Estaing and the Libyan head of state, Col. Qaddafi, in a flurry of diplomatic activity aimed at extricating this war-battered country from the conflict. Well-informed sources here say that the CMRN has also held direct, though secret, talks with Polisario, which are thought to have taken place in Libya.

Two days after the coup, the guerrilla movement unilaterally declared a "temporary halt in military operations in Mauritanian territory."

The cease-fire has now held for two months, but no long-term agreement between the CMRN and Polisario has yet emerged, mainly because the Moroccan government, which has not had to face the same scale of difficulties from the war as the ruling circles in Nouakchott, opposes giving an inch of territory to the Sahraoui nationalists.<sup>2</sup>

Morocco has more than 9,000 troops stationed in Mauritania and is likely to try to seize Tiris El-Gharbia if the CMRN renounces its sovereignty there.

### Massive Desire for Peace

No visitor here can avoid being struck, however, by the overwhelming pressures building up on the new military government to come to terms with the Sahraoui nationalists.

The antiwar sentiment is practically

1. Ex-President Moktar Ould Daddah plunged Mauritania into war when his regime signed an agreement in Madrid on November 15, 1975, with Spain and Morocco, under which the Spanish colony of Western Sahara was handed over to its two northern and southern neighbours.

Five months later, in April 1976, Daddah and Morocco's King Hassan signed a second treaty, in Rabat, formally partitioning the ex-Spanish colony, with Morocco taking the phosphate-rich north and Mauritania a poorer and smaller share of territory to the south, now known as Tiris El-Gharbia.

All of this happened over the heads of the 74,000 inhabitants of Western Sahara and in violation of a score of United Nations resolutions urging a referendum. In May 1975, a United Nations mission that visited the country reported that the overwhelming majority wanted independence. The main independence movement is the People's Front for the Liberation of Saguiet El-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario), which was founded in May 1973 and carried out sporadic guerrilla warfare against the Spanish colonial regime. When Western Sahara was occupied and partitioned by Morocco and Mauritania, Polisario decided to turn the tables on its new enemies by spreading the guerrilla war beyond the frontiers of Western Sahara into the vast desert expanses of Mauritania and southern Morocco.

The movement, which was shunned by Algeria during its struggle against the Spanish, has received arms and bases since the end of 1975 from the Boumedienne regime, which is seeking to curb Moroccan power in the Maghreb.

2. Though the war has had an increasing toll on the Moroccan economy, King Hassan has so far been able to successfully rally the Moroccan population in a chauvinist national crusade behind his Saharan policy—with the support of all the major political parties, including the two main workers parties, the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP—Socialist Union of People's Forces) and the Stalinist Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (PPS—Party of Progress and Socialism). The latter parties habitually attempt to give the Saharan campaign a fake "anti-imperialist" gloss: "The Moroccan people cannot accept any process whatever that challenges its territorial integrity," Abderahman Bouabid, the USFP's secretary-general, said on July 30. "Morocco gained the Sahara after twenty years of struggle against the Francoist regime."

universal. Only a tiny minority attempt to justify the war. And they are mainly discredited, isolated ex-functionaries of the Parti du Peuple Mauritanien (PPM—Mauritanian People's Party), the sole legal party under the Daddah regime, which has now been dissolved by the CMRN.

The antiwar mood was accurately summed up by Assane Y. Diallo, a feature writer for *Chaab*, the Nouakchott daily paper. In its July 22-23 issue, he wrote: "Our people, it is evident, never accepted this war. They did not understand the real objectives and did not accept the declared motives. The disengagement of our country is urgent. The sacrifice of some of our bravest sons and courageous youth will be heavy to bear before history."

Many Mauritians accuse Daddah of having violated his own, now abrogated, constitution, by annexing Tiris El-Gharbia without holding a referendum.

Above all, Mauritians are saying that Daddah's war was "fratricidal," an unjust attempt to deny fellow Arabs and Africans their elementary right to determine their own future. In fact, many Mauritians, especially youth, openly say that they sympathize with the Sahraoui guerrillas (the more relaxed atmosphere since the coup is encouraging people to be more open in speaking their mind).

### Roots of Polisario's Success

The guerrillas' military gains here have, of course, depended partly on the sympathy of wide sectors of the population. And it is known that many hundreds of Mauritians, including small groups of soldiers, have enrolled in the guerrilla movement's ranks.

This solidarity is partly due to the close ethnic ties between the tribes of Western Sahara and those in Mauritania. All of the tribes in this region, except the Black Africans in the extreme south of Mauritania, share a common language, Hassaniya; and several, notably the Reguibat, who account for over 75 percent of the Western Saharan population, live on both sides of the border.<sup>3</sup>

But, above all, many Mauritians share the Sahraoui nationalists' hostility to Morocco. Until 1969, the Rabat regime

3. It is estimated that 76 percent of the country's 1.42 million inhabitants are Hassaniya-speaking Moors. The Moors, who are divided into a number of tribes and sub-tribal fractions, are the Arabised mixed descendants of Berbers, Arabs, and Black Africans. The Hassaniya language is close to classical Arabic. Traditionally, the great majority of Moors were livestock-raising nomads; but the great Sahelian drought has made nomadism increasingly precarious. In 1977, a census found that only 36.2 percent of the population was still nomadic, compared to 78 percent in 1959. About 24 percent of the population are non-Arabic-speaking Africans, from four main ethnic groups, each with their own language: Pulaar (17 percent), Soninké (5 percent), Wolof (1 percent) and Peul (1 percent).



claimed not only then-Spanish Western Sahara, but also all of Mauritania and parts of the Algerian and Malian Sahara. This chauvinist policy was based on the claim that, prior to the European powers' division of Africa at the turn of the century, the tribes of this entire region had ties of allegiance to the Alawite kings of Marrakesh and Fez. For the first nine years of its existence as a formally independent state, 1960-69, Mauritania was not recognised by Morocco, which maintained a "Ministry of Saharan and Mauritanian Affairs" in Rabat.

It is thus little wonder that Mauritians expressed solidarity with the Saharoui nationalists when King Hassan sent 30,000 troops into Western Sahara. To many Mauritians, Daddah, who really got only the crumbs in the carve-up of the Western Sahara in 1975-76, acted as a kind of petty accomplice to the Moroccan monarch's crime. Even worse, in their mind, was that Daddah, when he could no longer cope alone against the guerrilla offensives, signed a joint defense pact with Morocco in 1977, under which the Rabat regime has since been authorized to station more than 9,000 of its troops directly on Mauritanian soil. They have been based at points throughout the country, except in the capital and the extreme south.

#### A Hopeless War

The new military rulers here are not only deeply aware of the hostility to the war; they have also learned, through their own bitter experience, that they cannot win it.

Mauritania is a large country, a little over a million square kilometers, or twice the size of France. Most of it is practically uninhabited desert—a succession of massive dune zones alternating with rocky plains, broken by small mountainous escarpments.

It is virtually impossible to police such a vast area. Polisario's motorized guerrilla units, moreover, are highly mobile and know the desert well. Their ability to outwit the Mauritanian army was first dramatically shown in June 1976 when a group of thirty-five Polisario landrovers travelled undetected for 1,000 miles to the outskirts of Nouakchott and shelled the presidential palace.<sup>4</sup>

Then, on May 1, 1977, guerrillas managed to burst briefly into the country's most important economic center, the iron-mining city of Zouérate. The guerrillas tried, with increasing success, to disrupt the iron industry, on which Mauritania last year depended for 82 percent of its exports, by raiding repeatedly against the 650 km railway from the Zouérate mines to the port of Nouadhibou.

4. The guerrilla group was surrounded after the raid, however, and practically wiped out. Among those killed was Moustapha El-Ouali Sayed, one of Polisario's founders and its secretary general.

Last year, according to officials of the Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière (SNIM), which owns the mines, guerrilla attacks forced the cancellation of 150 iron-ore trains, the equivalent of 1.6 million tons of ore worth \$22 million, or 18 percent of last year's total iron ore exports.

When the war started, Mauritania had an army of fewer than 2,000 soldiers. Ould Daddah was forced to rapidly expand his



armed forces to their present strength of between 15,000 and 20,000. But these new recruits have been drawn mainly from the impoverished Black population of the south, whose agriculture has been ravaged by the Sahelian drought. They have been of little military value, having signed up to earn a living rather than risk their lives for a cause in which they have no interest.

It was to supplement this small, morale-lacking force that Daddah invited in Moroccan troops and French military specialists and air power. The Daddah regime signed a military aid agreement with Paris in October 1976 under which French officers arrived to train Mauritanian troops at a school at Atar. Then, in January 1977, the terms of the agreement were broadened and Paris started sending specialized military personnel to help run telecommunications equipment and direct strategy at the Mauritanian army headquarters. Finally, and most seriously, last December, French Jaguar jets, based in Dakar, the capital of neighboring Senegal, were ordered into action here to bomb and strafe Polisario guerrilla units.

But Daddah still could not beat the guerrillas. Their mobility and the sheer size of the country gave the Jaguar pilots and the Moroccan troops an almost impossible task.

#### Disastrous Economic Consequences

Besides, the war was becoming more and more expensive. To pay for it and simultaneously try to keep Mauritania's recession-hit economy afloat, the Daddah regime had no alternative but to borrow from abroad. By the end of last year, according to the Central Bank of Mauritania, external public debt had soared to

\$467 million, 92 percent of the country's gross domestic product.

By April, the Daddah regime was having difficulty finding the cash to pay soldiers and state employees their wages. And, right after the coup, the CMRN had to negotiate a further \$35 million emergency aid from France, Morocco, and Libya.

"Our country has arrived at catastrophe," Lt.-Col. Salek said on August 17. "I won't even say to the edge of catastrophe. It has reached catastrophe. Its reserves are empty. Its entire economy has nearly been destroyed."

The war could not have come at a worse time for Mauritania's ruling class. While it was being forced to boost military spending, the government saw its revenues from the crucial iron industry dry up because of the recession in the world steel industry and the attacks on the Zouérate-Nouadhibou railway.

Exports of iron ore have been falling almost steadily since 1974, when they totaled 11.7 million tons. Last year, they were down to 8.4 million tons; and this year exports are unlikely to surpass 6.5 million tons, judging by sales to July.

Last year, SNIM went into deficit for the first time in its history, reportedly to the tune of \$41 million. The country's second main industry, the copper mines at Akjoujt, meanwhile, were closed down indefinitely in June because of the low price of copper since the onset of the world recession in 1974. The state-owned copper company, SOMIMA, which has now laid off its work force, was losing \$11 million a year.

A measure of the desperate straits of the Mauritanian economy is the balance of trade statistics. Until 1973, the economy had a slight trade surplus. But since then, imports have doubled (from 6.22 billion ougiya in 1973 to 13.9 billion ougiya in 1977) because of world inflation.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, because of low world demand for iron and copper during the recession, exports have stagnated in money terms (7.16 billion ougiya in 1977 compared to 6.99 billion ougiya in 1973) and fallen considerably in real terms. As a result, exports last year barely covered half the import bill, a graphic illustration of how a semicolonial country like Mauritania can be battered by the anarchic business cycles of the world capitalist system.

At the same time, Mauritania has been one of the West African countries hit hardest by the Sahelian drought, which began in 1970. Investment here over the years has been geared towards extracting as cheaply as possible the country's mineral wealth and shipping it to Europe, Japan, and North America, while almost no funds have gone into irrigation schemes that could protect peasant

5. One U.S. dollar is equivalent to roughly 46 ougiya.



farmers from the hazards of drought. In the last harvest, which followed a year of appallingly low rainfall, production of the two main food crops, sorghum and millet, plummeted to 14,000 tons, only one-tenth of domestic needs.

Meanwhile, the prolonged drought has swollen the cities with impoverished refugees from the countryside. A census taken in January 1977 showed that 26 percent of the total population lived in urban areas, compared to only 7 percent in 1965.

Nouakchott is surrounded by acres of shantytowns and tent encampments and today has a population of over 150,000 compared to 15,000 in the early 1960s. The vast majority are jobless.

### Why Daddah Had to Go

It was against this background that the army brass decided to depose Daddah. The reasons for the coup were frankly spelled out by Salek on July 11, in his first press conference after the events. He said that the Daddah regime had led the country to a state of "bankruptcy," "economic marasmus," and "financial decadence," and that there had been a "daily danger of revolt and popular uprising." "This situation," he said, "in the absence of any attempt at solution, made the armed forces decide to put an end to the political and economic disorder and anarchy."

Salek and his senior army colleagues had concluded that a coup was the only way to stop Daddah's unpopular, unwinnable, and increasingly expensive war that was leading to both economic ruin and a political explosion by the poverty-stricken masses.

The Mauritanian ruling class applauded the coup-makers because, under Daddah's dictatorship, a military putsch was the only way to get rid of him and reorient policy. Since 1965, the PPM, which Daddah personally controlled under a tight rein as its secretary general, had been the only legal party—and was enshrined in the constitution as "state party" to boot. Elections, naturally, were a farce. At the last presidential elections, in August 1976, Daddah—the only candidate—supposedly won 99.4 percent of the votes.

After the coup, in an interview with Radio France Internationale, Ismael Ould Amar, the director general of SNIM, enthusiastically noted that the orientation taken by the CMRN "will allow economic liberalism and free enterprise to be encouraged," adding that "the perspectives for the economic development of our country will be glowing once peace has been restored."

The Confédération des Employeurs et des Artisans de Mauritanie (CEAM—Confederation of Employers and Artisans of Mauritania), in a declaration published July 12, two days after the coup, said that it "supports with all its force the destruction of the system which has ruined our businesses and assaulted the respect of the human person and private property." The

CEAM urged "the immediate liberalization of our economy and our international commercial and financial relations." On July 17, the employers federation organized a motorcade through Nouakchott to demonstrate its "total adherence" to the new military government.

The CEAM's president, Cheikna Ould Laghdaf, was named foreign minister when Salek announced his first cabinet on July 11.

Salek himself, in a broadcast to the nation on July 14, promised that the CMRN would "encourage private initiative in the context of a liberal economy."

In the early 1970s, Daddah had taken a number of nationalist measures to reduce direct imperialist control over the economy. In 1973, Mauritania quit the franc zone and launched its national currency, the ougiya. In 1974, the Daddah regime nationalized MIFERMA, a foreign trust that owned the iron industry, and handed its assets over to the newly created state company SNIM.

However, these measures were limited. In January 1976, the Daddah regime agreed to pay \$90 million compensation to MIFERMA's shareholders, thereby adding to the foreign debt. The move was partly prompted by Daddah's desire to attract imperialist support as the Saharan war gathered pace.

Then, in October 1976, his regime adopted a new investment code that guaranteed transfers of profits and capital.

Last January, an extraordinary congress of the PPM approved government plans to open up state companies to foreign and private capital. And, in April, a law was duly adopted by the National Assembly denationalizing SNIM, by far the largest of these companies, and turning it into a mixed company, with 49 percent private participation.

So, in declaring its support for "economic liberalism," the new military government has been indicating that it will continue and deepen the economic orientation followed by the Daddah regime over the past three years.

### What the Masses Expect

However, while the CMRN has won the backing of almost the entire ruling class, it has also aroused tremendous hopes in the masses. Above all, they believe it will restore peace. After eighteen years of the Daddah regime and nearly three years of war, the overwhelming majority of Mauritians look to their new military rulers as "saviors."

Two days after the coup, thousands marched through the streets of Nouakchott to celebrate the downfall of the Daddah dictatorship and welcome the new military government. Over the following week, demonstrations of support for the CMRN were held throughout the country; and messages of support arrived at the presidential palace from trade unions, groups

representing the oppressed Black African minorities, cultural associations, and students.

The demands of the masses, however, were also to the fore in all these demonstrations and messages—the desire for peace, the restoration of democratic rights, an improvement in economic conditions, and measures to end discrimination against the Black African minorities.

Two Black groups, for example, the Association pour la Renaissance du Pulaar en République Islamique de Mauritanie and the Association pour la Promotion de la Langue et de la Culture Soninké,<sup>6</sup> have taken advantage of the new atmosphere created by the coup to issue a declaration denouncing the "national and cultural oppression of the Black African masses."

While promoting Arabic and French, the Daddah regime discriminated against the Black African languages. In 1968, Arabic became an official language, along with French, and was designated the sole "national" language. The Soninké, Pulaar, Wolof, and Peul languages enjoyed neither official nor "national" status. Moreover, in 1973, under an educational reform program, the Daddah regime completely Arabicized the first two years of primary school—with all teaching in Arabic, even in non-Arabic-speaking areas of the Black-populated south. The Daddah regime did not even bother to officially transcribe these languages.

Thus, the Soninké and Pulaar associations, in their joint declaration, urged "a just solution to the problem of transcribing and teaching the Pulaar, Soninké, and Wolof national languages."

### Workers Demand Right to Organize

The coup has also encouraged workers to take the first steps toward trying to throw off state control over the trade unions.

In 1972-73, after four years of bitter class battles between workers and the government, Daddah managed to curb the trade-union movement by firing militant workers from their jobs, refusing to recognize dissident unions, and, finally, in April 1973, holding a government-controlled congress of the Union des Travailleurs Mauritanians (UTM) at which the labor federation affiliated to Daddah's "state party."<sup>7</sup>

6. The Association for the Renaissance of Pulaar in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Association for the Promotion of the Soninké Language and Culture.

7. A labor radicalization began in 1968, when workers went on strike at MIFERMA's iron mines in Zouérate. The army was sent by Daddah to break the strike and in the ensuing clashes seven workers were shot dead. In February 1969, the trade-union movement split, with unions opposed to the government forming the Union des Travailleurs Mauritanians (Renovée), the Union of Mauritanian Workers (Renovated). This federation's affiliates were crushed in the Daddah regime's crackdown on the unions in 1972-73.

Now, with the dissolution of the PPM, the UTM is once again formally free from state control. And, though the old PPM trade-union bureaucrats still remain in their posts, there is growing pressure from the ranks to hold an extraordinary UTM congress at which new leaders could be democratically elected.

In all the demonstrations since the coup, the demand for an end to the war has been central. A rally held by the Nouakchott district trade unions shortly after the military takeover approved a resolution, for example, that demanded a "halt to the fratricidal war by rapid negotiations for a just negotiated peace safeguarding the independence and dignity of all the peoples of the sub-region." At the same time, the Nouakchott unions called for the "institution of democratic rights, and particularly trade-union rights, including the sacred right for the workers to organize themselves freely."

The Pulaar and Soninké organizations, while urging an end to linguistic discrimination, called also for "the establishment of peace and concord in our sub-region."

The popular pressure for peace and the state of the economy are such that the CMRN may end up having no option but to negotiate a long-term agreement with the Sahraoui nationalists, even if this entails an eventual break in the Mauritanian-Moroccan alliance, which the CMRN has so far been keen to uphold.

The restoration of peace was, as the masses see it, the CMRN's principal pledge on taking power. If the pledge is not implemented in practice, the CMRN will rapidly lose its present popular support and end up as isolated and discredited as the Daddah regime.

"With Morocco," Salek said two days after the coup, "we are certainly going to set out a calendar of work to start a process which will have to, incontestably, lead us to peace. The people want peace, and the military council will do everything so that it has this peace."

Salek added that the "recovery of the country is probably dependent on the evolution of the conflict."

#### Hassan Lays Down the Law

But, on August 20, King Hassan warned the CMRN that Morocco would never accept a Mauritanian decision to cede Tiris El-Gharbia to Polisario. He said that Morocco would only support a "peace settlement" on two conditions: "First of all," he said, "this solution must not involve any threat to our territorial integrity. Secondly, it must not lead to inserting a foreign frontier between Morocco and Mauritania."

Two days later, Reda Guedira, a Moroccan Royal Councillor, arrived in Nouakchott to hold talks with the CMRN. In a statement at the airport, he said that Morocco's "two conditions" are "the respect of the territorial integrity of Maurita-

nia and Morocco and the rejection of a microstate on the frontiers between the two countries."

The CMRN knows, however, that it has no hope of convincing Polisario to turn its temporary cease-fire into a long-term agreement if it does not, at a very minimum, allow the Sahraoui nationalists to take part in a free referendum in Tiris El-Gharbia. It may well decide to move in this direction, even if this means violating Hassan's "two conditions," simply because the Mauritanian ruling class cannot afford to run the political and economic risks of a resumption of the guerrilla war.

There is a very real danger, however, that, in this eventuality, Hassan will then order his troops to take direct control of Tiris El-Gharbia. Some 3,000 of the 9,000 Moroccan troops in Mauritanian territory are stationed there.

#### The Junta Defines 'Democracy'

While it grapples with these problems, the CMRN is hoping to keep the masses off the political stage as much as possible. It is aware that, in overthrowing the Daddah regime and promising peace, it has aroused the masses' hopes—and that this could lead, if these hopes are not rapidly satisfied, to independent mass mobilizations and political action. The CMRN is therefore reluctant to put into practice certain "democratic" pledges it made right after the coup.

At that time, the CMRN said that it would return to barracks as soon as democratic institutions had been set up. "We will respect the popular will," Salek claimed at a news conference on July 12. "Our enterprise responds to the profound will of the people to see the creation of new democratic institutions, freely chosen by the people." The CMRN said that it would favor a multiparty system.

But no concrete moves have yet been made to institutionalize basic democratic liberties. There are no plans to hold elections to a constituent assembly; indeed, the new constitution is supposed to be drafted by an appointed "consultative commission," though its members have still not been named. All political parties remain illegal, though talk of future "multipartyism" continues.

At a July 19 press conference, Salek made it clear that there are limits to the kind of "democracy" the CMRN has in mind. "It is necessary, first of all, to distinguish two periods," he said. First, "the period during which the Comité Militaire de Redressement National will have to assure the responsibility and leadership of the state. During this period, naturally, every party and all clanism are excluded and cannot be manifested in any way. There is then only one party which exists, that of the nation, the state."

He went on, "During this period, I tell you that parties do not exist. The second phase, that's when new institutions are

prepared, and, naturally, the first phase is a test for the second."

Nonetheless, the masses expect to enjoy greater democratic freedoms than they did under the PPM regime. Democratic demands have, along with slogans for peace, been at the fore in all the demonstrations since the coup.

A number of political groupings have started to take advantage of the new post-coup climate, albeit in semiclandestinity, to reach the masses with their ideas and policies.

One leaflet that has been circulating here is of special note. Written by a group of *kadihines* ("proletarians"),<sup>8</sup> it urges a "halt to the war of aggression and the search for a peaceful solution respecting the right of the Sahraoui people to self-determination." The authors say they will support every measure taken by the CMRN to end the war, but add: "We will combat it with the same vigor if it carries on the war, a road that will inevitably lead the CMRN to where it led the Daddah regime."

"To surmount the crisis," these *kadihines* write, "it is necessary to mobilize the masses to stop the war; expel the foreign troops stationed in our territory; defeat Moroccan expansionism, which more than ever constitutes the principal danger to the existence of our country; bring about a radical change of the political and economic structures by setting up an independent national economy based on the rural sector; and find a democratic solution to the national problem."

"We do not think," they continue, "that a military regime basing itself on layers of the dominant classes and the petty bourgeoisie and maintaining the apparatus of the neocolonial state has the ability to carry out such a program." □

8. The Parti des Kadihines de Mauritanie (PKM—Mauritanian Proletarian Party) was founded in 1973. A product of the student and labor radicalization of the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was under Maoist influence. In 1975, the PKM split. A right wing decided to enter the PPM and dissolve the PKM after concluding that the limited anti-imperialist measures taken by the Daddah regime in 1973-74 showed its "progressive" and "national" character. Several members of this wing subsequently rose to high office in the PPM regime and became fanatical advocates of the war against the Sahraoui nationalists. A left-wing Kadihine group denounced those who entered the PPM as "liquidators" and set up the "Groupe de Reconstruction du PKM" (Group to Reconstruct the PKM). It opposed the war and supported the Sahraoui people's right to self-determination. It has opposed giving political support to the CMRN, but remains tied to the Maoist notion of the bloc of four classes. It seems to be in some difficulty finding a "national bourgeoisie" with which to forge an alliance to carry out the "national democratic revolution" and it has been thrown into considerable ideological confusion by the overthrow of the "gang of four" in China.



# Meaning of the Somalian Military Attack

By Ernest Harsch

*[Second of a series of two articles]*

The revolutions in Ethiopia and Eritrea pose a deadly threat to imperialist interests—in the Horn of Africa itself, throughout the continent, in the Middle East, and in fact on a world scale. The imperialists understand the dynamic of the permanent revolution quite well.

For more than two and a half decades, American policy toward the Horn had been based on essentially one thing: maintaining the Selassie regime as an imperialist prop, as a “stabilizing influence” in the area. Selassie’s overthrow left Washington with very little room to maneuver and with an extremely unstable situation in the area. The imperialists’ biggest headache was—and still is—how to reduce this instability, how to stop the revolution from going further, and ultimately, how to crush it and overturn many of its gains. So they went on an offensive against the Ethiopian revolution, an offensive that had various aspects to it.

But Washington faced a number of problems in trying to achieve these goals. First of all, it would have been extremely difficult and politically costly to send in U.S. troops, as in Vietnam. The massive antiwar sentiment in the U.S. made all the difference in the world. It forced the imperialists to stop and consider the risks very carefully before trying even a minimal military intervention abroad. They knew that if they did, they would have very likely been confronted with big antiwar demonstrations, with all the radicalizing impact that would have had on U.S. politics. It would also have provoked a strong response from the Black community in the United States. And the fact that about one quarter of the army ranks are Black could also not be ignored.

However, the imperialists obviously do not rule out direct military aggression—if they can get away with it. They are constantly looking for openings, testing the ground, trying to see if there is some way they can pull the wool over everyone’s eyes.

The second problem Washington faced was the paucity of any reliable local allies at the time, allies with enough strength of their own to confront the power of the Ethiopian revolution. The entire Ethiopian aristocracy and landlord class, which the imperialists had counted on, was destroyed. Even the top officers of the

military, who had been trained by the Americans, were either forced from office, driven out of the country, imprisoned, or killed. Washington had few pawns left to play with.

Nevertheless, the stakes were too great to ignore. And despite the political limitations on its room to act, American imperialism still functions as a world cop on behalf of the capitalist system. So it was compelled to go in, to use whatever allies were available, to slow down the revolutionary process, to stall for time, to look for some opening to build up local reactionary forces or to intervene more directly itself.

The imperialists did not care for the Dergue too much or for the measures it carried out. In fact, they would like to see it overthrown and replaced with something more to their liking. But they also realized the contradictory nature of the Dergue, and hoped that it, or a section of it, could be transformed into a more openly counterrevolutionary instrument, or at least into one that could obstruct the revolution enough to give other imperialist-backed forces a chance to move in. After some initial hesitation, Washington continued to provide military aid to the Ethiopian regime, backing the Dergue’s efforts to demobilize the masses, crush the radical left and trade union leadership, and defeat the Eritrean independence struggle. In 1976, it allocated \$22 million in military aid to the Dergue, almost double the amount for the year before. Beginning in September 1974, the U.S. began to sell the Dergue more than \$150 million worth of arms, including tanks and jet fighters. But only part of that had been delivered by the time it was decided to cut off aid.

Meanwhile, the imperialists scrambled around looking for other options. There are indications that money was funneled to the Ethiopian Democratic Union, a rightist army led by dispossessed landlords and aristocrats. Washington also tried to get a grip on the various factional conflicts within the Dergue, in a bid to push forward the more conservative sections of it. Also about this time, Washington started to look for potential allies in neighboring countries. The Saudi Arabian regime, one of the closest American allies in the Middle East, began to offer large amounts of money to the Somalian regime if it moved closer to imperialism.

But the main obstacle Washington still faced was the mobilization of the Ethiopian and Eritrean masses. Without much support



Camerapix/New African Development

Somali tanks invade Ethiopia, rolling toward battle front.



from the peasantry, the Ethiopian Democratic Union proved ineffective and was easily defeated by the Dergue's forces, although some remnants still exist. And under mass pressure, the purges and factional conflicts within the Dergue gradually resulted in the elimination, not only of the more radical elements, but also of those who were willing to move closer to imperialism. The Dergue itself proved incapable of bringing either the Ethiopian revolution or the Eritrean independence struggle under control.

Washington therefore decided that if this policy was not going to work anyway, it would be just as well to pull back from providing open and direct aid to the Dergue and start looking seriously for other possibilities. Mengistu retaliated in April 1977 by closing down a number of U.S. offices and installations in the country.

\* \* \*

Deprived of American arms, Mengistu went to Moscow the following month to look for a sympathetic ear and a new arms source. He got both. The Dergue was touted as "progressive" and "revolutionary" in the Soviet press and was given all the credit for the gains of the Ethiopian revolution. It also began to receive large-scale arms shipments.

For the Stalinist rulers in Moscow, such a policy is quite common. They often try to cultivate influence with capitalist regimes in the semicolonial world, to give them a little extra edge in their class-collaborationist dealings with American imperialism and to try to acquire a handle that they can use to control revolutionary developments. Basically, they just want more diplomatic elbow room.

By portraying the Dergue as "socialist" and "Marxist-Leninist," the Kremlin helps bolster Mengistu's phony claims and covers up his attempts to derail and limit the Ethiopian revolution. The massive Soviet arms aid to the Dergue falls within the context of Moscow's support for the Dergue's repressive policies against the Ethiopian and Eritrean masses. In addition, Moscow's policy is highly opportunist, and has nothing to do with aiding the Ethiopian revolution. This can be seen by just noting the massive Soviet backing that was earlier given to the repressive military junta in neighboring Somalia. Moscow did not offer similar aid to Ethiopia in the early days of the revolution, but only after Washington began to pull back and the Kremlin saw a chance of picking up some extra influence. In their eyes, Ethiopia, with its thirty million people, seemed more attractive as a diplomatic bargaining chip than did Somalia, with a population of only three million.

\* \* \*

Despite Moscow's counterrevolutionary approach, the American imperialists are quite dubious about its ability to contain the Ethiopian and Eritrean revolutions. Moscow's influence appears limited to the Dergue itself, since there is no mass Communist Party in the country that could rally support for the regime or sidetrack mass struggles at decisive points. Even if there were, the imperialists would still prefer to crush the revolution themselves. They always do.

Although Washington pulled back from its efforts to use the Dergue against the revolution, it continued to retain some indirect ties with it. The Israelis, because of their opposition to the Eritrean struggle and because of American encouragement, renewed their minimal military aid to the Dergue and sent in some advisers. This gave Washington a way to continue receiving accurate information about what was going on in Ethiopia, since some of those advisers were actually agents of Mossad, the Israeli secret police. Washington also supplied some economic assistance to the Dergue to keep the doors open and retained some ties to a few of the Dergue members who were considered possible allies. At that point talk of a planned coup against Mengistu was rife, possibly involving Mengistu's number two, Atnafu Abate, who was executed in November 1977.



Throughout much of 1977 and into early 1978, Washington's most important attempt to strike out at the Ethiopian revolution focused around the Somali invasion of the Ogaden desert and other regions in the eastern part of the Ethiopian state. At the time, we overestimated the scope of the Somali national struggle in the Ogaden, presenting it as the major element in the conflict and minimizing the other questions involved. Our assessment has since changed. In reviewing the facts, it is fairly clear that the imperialist-backed Somali invasion was the overriding aspect of the war, both in its actual extent and in its political thrust.

The Somali regime of Gen. Mohammed Siad Barre tried to hide its involvement in the war, presenting the conflict as an upsurge of the Somali masses in Ethiopia fighting for their self-determination and for national unity. It is quite common for capitalist regimes to use such justifications in wartime. But because there is a Somali national question in the Ogaden, it is important to examine these claims in the context of this specific war, before actually taking up the war itself.

The Somali people have a common language, religion, and culture. They saw their territory divided up around the turn of the century by the imperialists and the Ethiopian feudalists. In opposition to this partition and national oppression, there developed a nationalist movement among the Somalis that aimed to

achieve independence and to reunite the Somali peoples within a single state.

Eventually, in 1960, the British- and Italian-ruled colonies gained their formal political independence, and merged to form what is now the state of Somalia. Djibouti, where Somalis are a majority of the population, gained its independence last year, but there are still some 4,000 to 5,000 French troops stationed there to make sure French dominance is maintained. The Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya remain oppressed nationalities within those states, and have from time to time struggled against their oppression. Leninists support those struggles and support their right to self-determination; that is, their right to decide for themselves what kind of state form they want to live under. But that is their decision to make, not the Somali regime's.

In recent years, however, the struggle in the Ogaden has never reached anything like the level of the Eritrean mobilizations. That is not to denigrate it; it is just a fact that needs to be noted. And the leadership, the Western Somali Liberation Front, has been traditionally dependent on the backing of the Somali regime.

In the late 1960s, the Somali regimes of Abdi Rashid Ali Shumarke and, after the 1969 coup, of Siad Barre consciously followed a policy of dampening the Somali national struggles in Ethiopia and Kenya, in pursuit of better relations with the neighboring regimes. There was little nationalist activity in the Ogaden, even throughout most of the Ethiopian revolution. In fact, there were few signs of struggles by the Somalis in the Ogaden until the Somali regime itself decided to send in its army. Thus the Somali military thrust was clearly not in response to any upsurge of the Somali masses.

But why then did General Siad choose to go in, and why at that particular time? He claims that he wanted only to aid the liberation of the oppressed Somalis. But the regime's real attitude on this score became clear after the war, when one of its officials actually tried to cover up for the oppression of the Somalis living in Kenya. He was quoted in the June 3, 1978, issue of the London *Economist* as stating: "We know that the Somalis there have a good life—even that they receive priority from the Kenyan government in development projects. Their situation is quite different from that of the Somalis in the Ogaden." His portrayal of Somali life in Kenya has little to do with the actual reality. The Somalis in Kenya are faced with just as much national oppression as those in the Ogaden. They have faced severe repression over the years. What is different between Kenya and Ethiopia is that in Kenya there is no revolution going on, and the regime is a close American ally. And why, in the Ogaden itself, did Siad not give the Somalis aid, as he calls it, before 1977? Was it maybe because the U.S. was not that interested before then in encouraging the Somali invasion and was still trying to work through the Dergue? Moreover, since the end of the war, Siad has said relatively little about the oppression of the Somalis in Ethiopia, concentrating more on condemning the presence of Cuban troops and appealing to Washington to halt the spread of "communism." The real impetus behind the invasion—and its objective aims—becomes clear in the light of the facts of the war and how the U.S. involvement developed.

Until early 1977, Moscow was the biggest backer of the Somali regime. When Washington decided to pull back from aiding the Dergue, however, Moscow began to shift its assistance from Somalia to Ethiopia. This put Siad Barre in the predicament of looking for a new international backer.

The situation was ideal for American imperialism to jump in. As early as February 14, 1977, Andrew Young, the American representative to the United Nations, declared that Washington should seek more influence in Somalia. One week later, an initial force of 1,500 Somali troops made a brief raid into the Ogaden. In early April, Carter ordered his close aides to "get Somalia to be our friend." Siad welcomed that. Kevin Cahill, an American doctor with State Department connections, said after talking with Siad that the general had a "sincere desire for a greater American

presence." Behind the scenes, the Saudi Arabian regime began quietly offering Siad hundreds of millions of dollars. In mid-June, Cahill flew to Mogadishu, the Somali capital, to meet with Siad. He told the general that he had a message from "the very top," apparently meaning Carter, to the effect that Washington was "not adverse to further guerrilla pressure in the Ogaden." He also told Siad that Washington was prepared to supply Somalia with military equipment. The Somali ambassador in Washington then met with Carter twice to confirm the accuracy of the message.

Mid-June was the same time that the first significant Somali guerrilla actions were reported in the Ogaden, supposedly carried out by the WSLF, but perhaps already with the direct participation of regular Somali troops. The Somali regime has admitted that its troops are given long "leaves" to fight with the WSLF.

In any case, by mid-July, the regular Somali army had begun its invasion in force, including the deployment of tanks, armored cars, MIG jet fighters, and thousands of troops. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had given Siad another go-ahead for his invasion during a July 4 speech, when he hinted broadly that American aid would be forthcoming. And on July 26, when the invasion was well under way, he announced specifically that Washington was willing to sell arms to Siad. According to a report in the July 30, 1977, London *Economist*, "The United States will not be the only country offering military aid to Somalia. Britain, France, Germany, Iran and Pakistan are also involved, and Saudi Arabia will be paying most of the bills." Siad made a little-publicized trip to Saudi Arabia, where government officials told him they were in contact with Washington and were ready to ship French and British arms immediately. The public American offer was later withdrawn, but the efforts to encourage Siad from behind the scenes continued.

With this imperialist backing, the Somali army made some rapid military gains, taking most of the Ogaden within a few weeks, including the major Ethiopian military post at Jijiga. But the Somali troops also struck far beyond the Ogaden itself. They invaded much of Bale and Sidamo provinces, which are inhabited largely by Oromos and Sidamos, forcing many of the peasants in those non-Somali areas to flee their homes before the advance of the Somali army. Although Diredawa and Harar, the second and third largest cities in Ethiopia, are largely non-Somali cities, they too were attacked by the Somali troops, who shelled them from the surrounding hills. Much of the population of Harar (who are known as Aderes) was compelled to flee, as was the population of Diredawa. Diredawa has one of the larger industrial bases in Ethiopia, with a working class of about 20,000, composed half of Oromos and half of Somalis. Both the Oromos and the Somalis had to flee from the Somali invasion. If the Somalis had been successful in capturing those cities, they made it clear that they would push further. According to Abdullahi Hassan Mohammed, the ostensible leader of the WSLF, "We are going all the way to the Awash [a river that runs as close as fifty miles to Addis Ababa] and we don't intend to stop until we get there." In fact, the Somalis claimed all of the provinces of Hararge, Bale, Sidamo, and Arussi, which have a total population of about 7.4 million people, the bulk of them Oromos and Sidamos. The Somalis in the Ogaden itself are estimated to number about 1.4 million. These facts alone show that the Somali army was not waging a "national liberation struggle."

Despite its advances, the Somali army was unable to take Harar and Diredawa, and the situation on the ground remained stalemated for awhile.

The Somali invasion fell into the framework of the broader imperialist drive to stop and eventually turn back the Ethiopian revolution. In fact, at that point, it was the most important aspect of that drive. This can be seen both by looking at the direct American involvement in it and by viewing it in the context of the general imperialist offensive against the African revolution as a whole.



If the Somalian troops had been successful in consolidating their position in Ethiopia, or at least in hanging on longer than they did, it would have provided an ideal opening for Washington and its allies to move in in much greater force. In fact, given the overall Somalian weakness in relation to the military might of the more powerful Ethiopian state, further Somalian advances would have been possible only with considerable outside backing. Siad Barre may have miscalculated, but he is not a total fool. He obviously believed, and with reason, that the backing would be available.

From the imperialist viewpoint, the actual invasion may have been more of a probe against the Ethiopian revolution than an outright attempt to decisively defeat the Ethiopians then and there. If the invasion had been more successful on the ground, and if the general political situation in the United States and abroad had been more favorable to Washington, it would certainly have provided an opening wedge for a much more substantial and broader attack. As it was, the imperialists were trying to see what they could get away with. They were testing out a number of options. Would the Somalian invasion itself be sufficient to cripple the Ethiopian revolution, or could the occupation serve as a beachhead for further attacks? How useful and compliant was the Siad Barre regime? What kind of role could the Saudis or Iranians play? How directly could Washington go in, or Paris, or Bonn? How much would the invasion encourage the rightist guerrilla bands in Ethiopia? Could it increase the opportunities for a rightist coup in Addis Ababa? While the imperialists may not yet have had a completely thought-out plan, their target was clear: the Ethiopian revolution.

There were some reports that the Somali population in the Ogaden generally favored the Somalian military actions, especially since they were viewed as being directed against the Somalis' traditional oppressors. But that does not change the fundamental nature of the war itself. Moreover, the response of the Somali workers in Direedawa indicates that support for the Somalian invasion among Somalis was at least not universal. Nevertheless, insofar as the Somalis in the Ogaden *do* struggle against their national oppression, revolutionists generally support those struggles and champion their right to self-determination as a way of advancing the broader class struggle. But the invasion by the regular troops of the Somalian army was not directed at liberating the Somalis in the Ogaden. It was carried out in the interests of American imperialism, with imperialist backing, and was directed at striking a serious blow against the Ethiopian revolution.

In fact, had the invasion been successful in opening the way for an overturn of the Ethiopian revolution, it would have been a major setback for the Somali people themselves, both in the Ogaden and in Somalia. It is precisely the deepening of the Ethiopian revolution into a socialist one that offers the best hope for all the peoples of the Horn for an end to national oppression, class exploitation, and imperialist domination. Its defeat would mean a further entrenchment of the imperialist stranglehold over everyone, including the Somalis. In this light, Siad's willingness to go along with Washington's schemes is a betrayal of the Somali masses. The WSLF's willingness to serve as a cover for the invasion was likewise a betrayal.

Given the nature of the Somalian invasion, and the key importance of defending the Ethiopian revolution from imperialist attack, revolutionists would support an Ethiopian victory in the war against the Somalian invaders. Just that. Not political support to the counterrevolutionary Dergue, nor support to its efforts to crush the Somali national struggle, even though it attempted to do that in the process of driving out the Somalian troops. Revolutionists continue to back the right to self-determination of the Somalis, Eritreans, and other oppressed peoples in Ethiopia, and point out that the granting of those rights would be the best way of defending and advancing the revolution. They would make it clear that all they supported was a military victory of the Ethiopian side of that specific war, because



Camerapix/Africa

Contingent of Ethiopian People's Army parading in Addis Ababa before leaving for battlefield in Ogaden.

that was what was necessary to defend the Ethiopian revolution and hold back the imperialist attack.

\* \* \*

The failure of the Somalian army to take Harar and Direedawa meant that it was unable to consolidate its position in the rest of the territory that it occupied, and that it was quite vulnerable to an Ethiopian counteroffensive. This presented the imperialists with a big problem. To either help the Somalis take those cities or to withstand a counteroffensive would have meant massive and direct imperialist military aid, possibly including the dispatch of advisers or surrogate troops from other countries in the area. As a result of the big antiwar sentiment in the United States, that would have been difficult. It was that sentiment that basically stayed Washington's hand. The situation was somewhat similar to Washington's predicament in the Angolan civil war. It had encouraged the South Africans and Zaïrians to invade Angola, and had tried to follow through with military backing. But it was stopped by opposition within the United States.

This antiwar sentiment forced the imperialists to continue to operate indirectly, with all the limitations that implied. Nevertheless, that indirect involvement was significant. Aid was funneled to Siad Barre, especially through the Saudi Arabian regime. According to a report in the December 3, 1977, *Economist*, the Somalian regime was estimated to have received \$300 million up to that time from the Saudis alone—no small sum. The imperialists probably hoped that such aid would be sufficient to turn the tide decisively against the Ethiopians, or at least to drag the conflict out longer in the hope that an opportunity would open up to strike further blows against the revolution.

In December, a new element entered the picture. Large numbers of Cuban troops started to arrive in Ethiopia. Earlier that year, Fidel Castro had initiated negotiations with Siad and Mengistu in a bid to head off a war. He was unsuccessful. As it turned out, Washington had the greater influence with Siad. Castro later explained that the Cuban troops were sent to Ethiopia precisely to drive out the imperialist-backed Somalian invaders.

For imperialism, this Cuban involvement raised the stakes—and the risks—of the war even higher. On the one hand, it would have required even greater imperialist aid to the Somalis to



bring the invasion off, and the political sentiment in the United States was against that. So at a January 21, 1978, meeting, the major Western powers—the U.S., France, West Germany, and Italy—decided to gradually pull back their support for the invasion itself.

At the same time, the imperialists were infuriated by the Cuban challenge. The Cubans had stopped them once in Angola, now here they were again! These people from this small island ninety miles from the United States, running around all over the place, upsetting the military schemes of the biggest imperialist power in the world. This just couldn't go on! It had to be stopped.

So in addition to its opposition to the Ethiopian revolution, Washington stepped up its campaign to get the Cubans out of Africa. Carter initiated a big propaganda drive. It was intended as a smokescreen to cover Washington's own intervention in the Horn, but Carter also was trying to prepare public opinion for more concrete attacks against Cuba itself. This was not all just hot air. During the Angolan civil war, Washington actually considered a military attack against Cuba. For revolutionists, this imperialist campaign means an additional responsibility. It means they must intensify their defense of the Cuban revolution and act to stop any moves by Washington against it.

As the Cuban-backed Ethiopian counteroffensive got under way in the Ogaden, the imperialists tried to manufacture a justification for direct intervention. Carter warned the Cubans and Ethiopians that if they so much as set a foot across the border with Somalia, all hell would break loose, that it would endanger "worldwide peace." And this from the very person who whispered into Siad's ear that he should invade Ethiopia!

But that wasn't all. The imperialists had not given up entirely on the prospect of using the Somalian invasion as part of a broader attack. Some sixty French tanks arrived in Somalia via Saudi Arabia. West Germany gave Siad \$25 million. Saudi Arabia had already provided money for Somalian arms purchases, which included an order for 43 Cobra helicopter gunships from Italy. Sadat sent some \$30 million worth of arms to the Somalians.

In addition, offers were made to recruit American mercenaries with experience from the Vietnam War. The shah of Iran, that archreactionary friend of the White House, warned that if any Ethiopians or Cubans crossed the border into Somalia, he would not "stand by idly." A think-tank study produced in Washington by the Center for Strategic and International Studies openly discussed the logistical feasibility of Iranian air strikes into Ethiopia, flying from air bases in either Saudi Arabia or Somalia. The French warned that their military forces in Djibouti would intervene. And to top it all off, in early February 1978 Washington sent two warships to the Red Sea as a show of force. This old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy was the most direct warning yet of American imperialism's desire to move in against the Ethiopian revolution and against the Cuban presence in Africa.

But before the imperialists could blink again, it was all over. The Ethiopians, with Cuban help, managed to rout the Somalian forces within several weeks, pushing them out of Ethiopia by mid-March. The most immediate threat to the Ethiopian revolution had been driven back for the moment, and imperialism suffered another setback.

The main character of the Cuban involvement in Ethiopia was therefore progressive. By halting the imperialist attack, the Cubans were helping to defend the Ethiopian revolution from its most serious enemy, imperialism. It is an internationalist policy, a policy that aids the African revolution, and by extension the world socialist revolution.

That is not to say that revolutionists support everything that Castro says or does in Ethiopia, or in the rest of Africa for that matter. Castro calls Mengistu a "true revolutionary" and gives the Dergue too much credit for the achievements of the Ethiopian revolution; he says that the Dergue is working for "socialism." Castro is right when he points to the socialist dynamic of the Ethiopian revolution, but he confuses the Dergue itself with that

process. This political position could lead to some serious errors, especially in a situation as complicated as that in Ethiopia.

One example is the difficulty facing the Cubans on the question of Eritrea. They had previously aided the Eritrean fighters and were now giving political support to the Dergue, so what should they do in the specific case of the Dergue's war against the Eritreans? So far, the Cubans have steered away from getting directly involved in the war, as Mengistu has tried to get them to do. The struggle going on in Eritrea today is a real national liberation struggle. Its victory would be a big advance for the Ethiopian revolution as a whole. Were the Cubans to get sucked into trying to crush the Eritrean struggle, it could seriously damage the Ethiopian revolution, and even the Cuban revolution itself. Castro at this point says that he supports the right of self-determination for the Eritreans and has pressed the Dergue to abandon its military approach for a policy of negotiation. But at the same time he has been forced into contortions on this question as a result of his political support to Mengistu.

Despite the negative aspects of the Cuban role in Ethiopia, the dominant side by far has been the progressive one. In a war situation—where the question is posed of "which side are you on?"—the Cubans came out decisively against the imperialist machinations. In the overall picture, that's no small thing.

\* \* \*

The imperialists suffered a setback in the Ogaden, but they have not given up. Carter has once again raised the idea of supplying arms directly to the Somalian regime and he has been trying to strengthen a number of his allies in the region, such as the Egyptian, Saudi, Somalian, and Kenyan regimes. Washington is undoubtedly trying to establish some influence over the Eritrean movement through some of the Arab states that are supplying the Eritreans with aid. So far, it has had no real success.

In the overall context of the advancing African revolution, with the Horn as one of its focal points, the imperialists are impelled to keep on going in. Since their long-term and vital interests are threatened, they cannot afford to ignore developments there. The example of the imperialist intervention in Zaïre in May 1978 shows what they would like to do.

\* \* \*

What is needed to defend the Ethiopian revolution? For revolutionists in the United States and other imperialist countries, the tasks are clear: exposure of the imperialist role and education about the revolutionary developments in the Horn. That will make it easier to move quickly into action if necessary to oppose any new American or other imperialist intervention, direct or indirect.

Within Ethiopia itself, the best way to defend the revolution would obviously be to arm and mobilize the masses to repel any imperialist attack. By refusing to do so, or by doing so in a limited and bureaucratically controlled way, the Dergue has shown that it is incapable of really defending the revolution's gains. Ultimately, the only real defense is to extend and deepen the revolutionary process, leading to the overthrow of the Dergue by the Ethiopian workers and peasants. That task will require a mass revolutionary combat party capable of leading the various class and national struggles to a victorious conclusion, that is, a socialist revolution. By necessity, a revolutionary upheaval—to be successful—would have to lead to the recognition of the right to self-determination of all of Ethiopia's oppressed nationalities, the only policy that can forge the broadest unity among the peoples of the Horn and undercut imperialism's efforts to use the national conflicts for its own ends.

A socialist revolution in Ethiopia, moreover, would provide an important impetus to the African revolution as a whole—and indeed, to the entire world revolution. □