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NEWS ANALYSIS

Growing Fissures in Shah's Regime

By Parvin Najafi

In response to twenty-five years of dictatorship, a powerful movement for democratic rights and against all aspects of tyranny has emerged in Iran. This growing movement is reaching out to fresh layers of Iranian society, while at the same time expanding to the remotest parts of this vast country.

Professors, lawyers, writers, journalists, students, small shopowners, and the urban unemployed have all joined this movement in great numbers, each of them voicing their own grievances.

Throughout the last year this movement has demonstrated its ability to mobilize thousands in the streets, time and again, despite savage reprisals by the government.

A closer look at the events of the last few months gives a gauge of the power of this movement, which has opened up a front on almost every arena of political life.

Turbulent Universities

Students have played a vanguard role in the fight against the shah's regime. They have mobilized in mass in support of their own demands and those of others for political and civil rights.

Today, the fight in the universities centers around the demand for the removal of guards from the campuses. These guards, hired by and under the command of the central government, have been stationed on the campuses since 1972. Since then they have terrorized students and professors across the country.

Beginning in January of this year there have been waves of student strikes demanding removal of the guards. Mass rallies of several thousand in support of this demand have become a common occurrence.

Professors have joined forces with the students, issuing statements and resolutions placing responsibility for campus violence exactly where it belongs—on the shoulders of the regime.

A significant development in this fight was the recent protest at Tehran University. On June 2, several hundred women

students demonstrated for removal of the guards from their dormitories and for an end to the special restrictions that limit women's freedom to enter or leave the dormitories after certain hours.

Another important issue has been the government's plan to close down Aryamehr University in Tehran.

Aryamehr University has been in the forefront of the struggle against autocracy for several years. In an effort to quiet the campus, the authorities decided to simply close it, under the guise of transferring it to Isfahan.

To protest this action the university's faculty went out on strike in April, announcing that they would not go back to work until the government changes its decision.

The students of Aryamehr have joined the professors in the strike, which has won the support of virtually every university and institution of higher learning in the country, as well as that of the Writers Association of Iran, alumni of the university, groups of merchants and small shopowners, and many prominent individuals.

The depth of the sentiment on this issue can be gauged from the fact that even *Rastakhiz*, the regime's official organ, which is not in the habit of printing news about the activities of oppositionists, has acknowledged that the prime minister has received numerous protest letters, including from the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization.

E'telaat, the semiofficial daily in Tehran, published a column in support of the strike, and Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, a member of the Majles (Iranian parliament) who has recently opposed some aspects of government policies, spoke in support of it from the floor of the assembly.

The Fight to Lift Government Censorship

The demand for an end to censorship has been one of the central focuses of the movement against autocracy. In June of last year, in one of the first acts of open protest against government repression, forty Iranian writers sent an open letter to the prime minister, condemning censorship and announcing the formation of the Writers Association. Very quickly the adherents of the Writers Association grew to more than 120.

In October, the Writers Association took the initiative of organizing ten "Evenings of Writers and Poets," which were in

actuality rallies against censorship. More than 10,000 persons attended each session, many gaining for the first time a feeling for the power that lies in their massive numbers.

Despite severe harassment by the government, by the end of May of this year the Writers Association was finally able to hold a general membership meeting and elect an Executive Committee. This in itself was a victory in the fight against censorship.

Meanwhile, a new group has entered the battle. One hundred eighty journalists, most of them currently working for major newspapers and magazines, recently sent an open letter to the prime minister demanding an immediate end to censorship.

Political Prisoners Speak Out

The fight for the freedom of political prisoners was initially organized by Iranian students outside the country. After winning wide international support and increasingly isolating the regime in world public opinion, the campaign is now beginning to involve thousands of political activists in Iran.

A good example of this is the press conference that was held in Tehran July 11, with foreign reporters, protesting the imprisonment and torture of the thousands of prisoners of conscience in the shah's jails.

The details of this conference were reported in the July 15 issue of *Iran Times*, a weekly newspaper published in Washington that is close to the Iranian embassy.

Participants in the press conference included thirty-five dissident lawyers; several prominent writers; Mehdi Bazargan, the spokesman for the Iranian Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedom; Khalil-alah Razaei, the father of seven children, all of whom have either been killed or imprisoned by the regime; and eleven women representing the families of seventy-three women political prisoners.

The press conference effectively refuted the recent propaganda of the shah's regime and its international supporters about "liberalization" and an end to the torture of political prisoners.

This growing support has encouraged the prisoners themselves to speak out for their rights. It was instrumental, for example, in inspiring the victorious month-long hunger strike by political prisoners in Qasr, the largest political prison in Iran.

To support their demands for uncensored reading material, better conditions, and review of their cases by civilian courts, the prisoners in Qasr began their protest March 13.

Immediately, thousands in and outside Iran rushed to their support. Students in several of the major universities went out in solidarity strikes, hunger strikes began in other prisons, petitions were circulated,

Summer Schedule

This week's issue is the last before our summer break. We will resume our regular schedule with the issue dated August 28.

and the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Political Prisoners was formed. During the course of the strike, the committee published nine bulletins reporting the demands of the prisoners, news of the strike, and details of the international backing the prisoners had received.

After the government granted all the demands of the prisoners except retrial by civilian courts, the hunger strike ended April 10. Since then, the Qasr prisoners have resumed their fight for review of their cases by civilian courts, and similar struggles have begun in other prisons.

This ferment, reaching into the depths of the shah's dungeons, is another telling indicator of the scope of unrest in the country.

Street Demonstrations Continue

Since the beginning of the year, massive antigovernment demonstrations have erupted throughout the country every forty days. This wave of demonstrations began January 9 in Qum, in protest of an article in the government-controlled press insulting Ayatollah Khomeini, one of the most authoritative leaders of the Shi'ite Muslim sect. The government opened fire on the demonstrators, killing several and wounding hundreds.

To protest this atrocity, a day of mourning was called for February 18. Ceremonies in the mosques turned into street demonstrations that continued for two days in several major cities, the largest action occurring in Tabriz. More demonstrators were gunned down, and a day of mourning to protest their deaths was called for April 2. This time demonstrations took place in more than fifty-five cities. More demonstrators were killed.

Again, forty days later, a day of national protest was held to commemorate these victims.

These nationwide demonstrations, bigger each time, shook the Pahlavi dynasty to its foundations. They took place despite and to the dislike of the religious leaders.

The most recent day of mourning, for those killed in the May protests, was held June 17. Well in advance, the religious leaders began actively to seek to prevent the occurrence of similar mass actions. Several important religious leaders, including Ayatollah Shariatmadari, issued statements advocating Gandhi-style passive resistance and calling upon their followers to remain home on that day as their form of protest. They repeatedly asked their followers "not to let their gatherings get out of control"—that is, go into the streets.

On June 17, the shops and bazaars in several major cities, including Tehran, Tabriz, Qum, Isfahan, Ahwaz, Kerman, and Khorramshahr, were closed down.

Despite the efforts of religious leaders to prevent further mass mobilizations, the population has continued to pour out into

the streets on different occasions. But at present the demonstrations are sporadic and take place on a local basis. The latest examples of this were the demonstrations of several thousands in Shiraz and Kermanshah (the main cities in the Kurdish area of Iran), and the demonstration of several thousand in Meshed on July 23 and 24, during which more than twenty-four persons were wounded.

Ebbs and flows in such a movement are inevitable, and there have not been any

further nationwide demonstrations since May 9. Furthermore, it appears that the religious leaders are going to actively oppose any further such actions. But the previous nationwide mobilizations have had a lasting and deep effect on the political consciousness of the masses. In a context in which it is impossible for the shah to grant any meaningful concessions, the potential exists for much broader and more massive actions, leading to the eventual downfall of the hated regime. □

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Editor: Joseph Hansen.

Contributing Editors: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

Managing Editor: Michael Baumann.

Editorial Staff: Jon Britton, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Fred Murphy, Susan Wald, Matilde Zimmermann.

Business Manager: Harvey McArthur.

Copy Editor: David Martin.

Technical Staff: Paul Deveze, Larry Ingram, Arthur Lobman, Kevin McGuire, James M. Morgan, Sally Rhett.

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'The Task Today Is to Organize FOCEP Throughout Peru'

[The following speech by Hugo Blanco was given to a rally of 5,000 held July 16, the day he returned to Peru from exile in Europe. At this rally representatives of a number of Trotskyist groups spoke, including the Partido Obrero Marxista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Marxist Workers Party, a group that shares the views of the Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International.)

[There was a broad spectrum of speakers, including the president of the teachers union, SUTEP; and Andrés Luna Vargas, a leader of the Peruvian Peasant Federation. Alfonso Barrantas Lingán, president of the Democratic People's Union, one of the two slates to the left of the CP, also spoke and called for unity of the left.

[The translation of Blanco's speech is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor.*]

* * *

[*Applause, shouts, chanting of slogans "Land or death, we will win!" "Hugo, Hugo, Hugo!" "Down with Bedoya!"*]

Compañeros, I'm going to begin by reading a message from [deportees still in exile in] Paris. It's a joint statement by the FOCEP² and the UDP.³

"Through Compañero Hugo Blanco we send joyful greetings to the Peruvian working people, and we hail their great struggles in which we are participants. We announce that we are demanding that the Peruvian military government pay the fares of returning deportees. Since it deported us, it has the obligation to give us the material means to return. [*Applause, shouts of "Bravo!"*] As you know, the government bought only one-way tickets!"

I remind you all that we have to fight to get the government to pay the fares for these compañeros. The government deported candidates, and now that these candidates have been elected, it doesn't want to pay their way back. So, we've got to fight to make sure that they don't get

1. A leader of the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC—Christian People's Party, the Peruvian Christian Democrats), a rightist formation that claimed to oppose the military government. It got 27% of the vote in the June elections.

2. Frente Obrero, Campesino, Estudiantil, y Popular (Workers, Peasants, Students, and People's Front, the electoral slate for which Blanco was a candidate).

3. Unión Democrática Popular (Democratic People's Union, an electoral front that includes the majority of the miners federation leadership, Maoists, and some Trotskyists. Maoists were the dominant force.

into the habit of doing such things. [*Laughter, applause.*]

During the campaign itself, we said that the elections were a farce. That's what we said, and we still say it. We have said that we were using the elections to give impetus to the struggles of the masses, which are the only thing that can lead to the liberation of our people. We said this during the campaign and it is what we say today. [*Applause.*]

There would be no justification for our being in the Constituent Assembly if we didn't use our presence there to support the struggles being waged day after day by the workers in the factories, in the shantytowns, in the countryside, and in the streets. If we can use our position in the Constituent Assembly for this purpose, then we are doing something. If not, then being in the Constituent Assembly accomplishes nothing. [*Shouts of "Bravo!" Applause.*] Because we are not going to convince Señor Bedoya Reyes and Señor Haya de la Torre.⁴ [*Shouts of "Down with them."*] If he doesn't learn now, he never will. There's no point in trying to argue with corpses. What's important is that we use our position there to promote the struggles of the masses.

We are not interested in what they say up there. What interests us is what the people are interested in, what they are struggling for. Let all these gentlemen keep on cooking up their deals, keep on with their card tricks, keep on plotting. What we should do is concentrate on organizing the struggles of the masses and on working openly among the masses to achieve the unity of the left. We shouldn't work behind closed doors as the others do. [*Shouts of "Bravo!" Prolonged applause, chants of "The people united will never be defeated."*]

We are not going to unite so that we can divide up posts, or offices, or that sort of thing. We are going to unite to give impetus to the struggles of the masses. That should be very clear.

There have been some discussions among the deported compañeros. We could begin by proposing a presiding committee. (I don't know what they call that damned thing, the arrangement they have, a preliminary slate.) What's happening is that

4. Leader of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA—American People's Revolutionary Alliance.) This is an old anti-imperialist formation that has turned right-wing and proimperialist. It has connections with the Social Democracy internationally.

they are going to propose a presiding committee for the Constituent Assembly. [*Laughter.*]

Of course, Haya de la Torre's going to preside over it. [*Laughter. Shouts of "That creep should drop dead!"*] He's going to run for chairman (let Bedoya take note). We were talking it over with the compañeros and we thought that it would be a good idea to run an opposition slate. Of course, it would lose. But this would show that we have nothing to do with them and that we are completely opposed to them. It would be an opposition slate made up of compañeros on the left.

We had only one little problem here. It was over the PSR.⁵ As you probably know, the compañeros of the UDP were in favor of including them in the left. We were opposed to this. But now there is no problem any more, since "Chango" had a fight with his generals.⁶ [*Loud laughter, applause.*] So, now the argument about whether the PSR was left or right is over. We found out that the PSR was left and right. The right has gone off in one direction, and the left in the other.

So, such a left opposition slate gives us a way to begin to demonstrate to those gentlemen and to the people that we are a completely different thing, that we aren't going to get involved in any wheeling and dealing, any fancy card tricks, or any damned thing like that. Putting up an opposition slate doesn't have any importance in itself, but it is important to show the people that they shouldn't have any illusions in this Constituent Assembly circus. [*Laughter.*]

You know what a farce this whole thing has been. The crowning touch was when they arrested Leonidas Rodríguez⁷ as he was going to vote. (He is not a man of the

5. Partido Socialista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Socialist Party, a formation that represented the left wing of the military government). When it was formed it included a number of generals and others who held high positions in the government of General Velasco Alvarado. It also included a number of leftists who went into the mass organizations of the military regime, which were supposed to mobilize the masses to carry through the government's reform program.

6. Antonio "Chango" Aragón was a leader of the Peruvian Trotskyist movement during the 1962-63 peasant struggles. He headed the wing of the PSR that split July 5 from the party of the so-called progressive ex-military officers. Aragón's PSR includes the bulk of the party's trade-union and peasant leaders.

7. The chairman of the PSR.



Fred Murphy/Intercontinental Press-Inprecor

Thousands line streets of Lima July 16 to greet return of Hugo Blanco (atop truck at right).

left, but I respect him and I respect his democratic rights.) That's already enough to make a joke of this Constituent Assembly. This is the way the government has made a mockery of the Constituent Assembly, the way it has trampled on it.

The government trampled on it by deporting candidates and sending them off like prisoners of war to a foreign army. The government trampled on it by canceling UDP and FOCEP broadcasts whenever it felt like it, when the other gentlemen were allowed to campaign even at football games, in news broadcasts, and all the rest. What is more, they let these gentlemen hold a rally to conclude the campaign and didn't let us do it.

So, this Constituent Assembly is a farce through and through. And despite all this, we saw what kind of vote the left got. Do you remember, *compañeros*, those cartoons that were run in all the magazines, and the rest, portraying me as the odd man out because I rejected deals with any section of the bourgeoisie.

I was crazy because I called for a workers government. I was crazy because I called for disavowing Peru's foreign debt, its debts to the International Monetary Fund, to the banks, and other imperialist agencies like these. Total disavowal of debts, nationalization without compensation, workers management—these proposals aroused laughter on the right, but they

won us the support of the masses.

So, you will understand that we have to keep our promises to the *compañeros* who voted for the program of a workers government and socialism. That is why we have to wage a consistent struggle for a workers government and for socialism. If we were not consistent in this, we would be betraying the half million people who voted for us. [Applause.]

On these points, we have some differences with the *compañeros* of the UDP. I don't know about the *compañeros* in the PSR who remain. We will have to have some new discussions with "El Chango" about this. But in any case, we know that although there are differences on this point, although they are not for a workers government today, although today they are not for socialism here and now, there are still many things that unite us.

For example, we can come together in this rally. We all fight for a general strike. We all support the fight for the reinstatement of those who have been fired. We oppose the law on instability in employment. We are all for the rescinding of the sentences and the release of all the prisoners. We are all for the success of the SUTEP strike,⁸ which is the most impor-

tant thing at the moment. There are many other examples.

On all these points, there is no question, no doubt whatever that we are going to stand together with the *compañeros* of the UDP and with the *compañeros* of the PSR. That goes without saying. What is more, we are already doing so. And this shows that such unity already exists.

There can be unity on many other points. It already exists, for example, because *Compañero* Luna Vargas is part of the executive committee of the CCP.⁹ This unity already existed between the forces in FOCEP and the UDP before these formations existed. So, *compañeros*, we don't have to say that we are for unity with the UDP. We have united, we are uniting, we are working together in practice. We are for unity with the PSR, now that the problem has been cleared up.

We also appeal to the *compañeros* of the Communist Party to unite with us, because we aren't sectarians. The fact that their leaders are more interested in unity with Morales Bermúdez, well, that's another problem. But if they won't unite with us, it's not because we aren't calling for it.

strike, demanding a 100 percent wage hike, better working conditions, and recognition of their union, SUTEP, as their bargaining agent. The union leadership is predominantly Maoist.

8. Since May 8, the vast majority of Peru's 140,000 public high-school teachers have been on

What's happening is that on the other side Morales Bermúdez is also beckoning to them, and they prefer unity with him. [Laughter.] In any case we appeal to the *compañeros* of the Communist Party, we remind them that they are a left party and that their place is with the workers and not with the military government. [Applause, shouts of "Bravo!"]

But these are not all the forces you have to unite with. We can't be electoralists. We can't think that the left is only those who chose to participate in the elections. There are some *compañeros* who thought that it was a mistake to participate in the elections. And these *compañeros* were not represented on the slates or anything like that. But they are *compañeros* who are with us in the struggle. And so, unity has to include them too. Whether it was correct to take part in the elections is now a matter for historical debate. We can continue the discussions as historians.

But in the meantime, in the struggles we face here and now, what we have to do to move forward is to close ranks. The SUTEP struggle is an example. Those *compañeros* are for the SUTEP struggle. We are for the SUTEP struggle. We are all for support to the teachers. And we are all for a general strike to solve the problems of the teachers—and that is the only thing that can solve them, not the Constituent Assembly, or anything like it. [Applause, shouts of "Bravo!"]

And since we are talking about unity, there is another little problem that has to do with unity. [Chants of "Hugo Blanco supports the SUTEP strike!"] Well, even if he didn't support it, the Peruvian people support it. [Laughter.] OK, *compañeros*, since we are talking about unity, there is another little problem here, a more internal problem.

The *compañeros* of FIR-POC,⁹ one of whom just spoke, were one of the groups that fought shoulder to shoulder with the PST¹¹ and the other *compañeros* in the Fourth International. If we want to talk about unity, if we Trotskyists want to talk about unity of the left, the first thing we are going to have to do is unite ourselves. If we don't do that, we won't have any authority to talk about unity of the left. [Shouts, applause, cries of "Long live the socialist revolution!"]

Besides, we Trotskyists who were in the FOCEP and the Trotskyists who were in the UDP have been taught a lesson by the

Peruvian people. When we proposed an election program calling for a workers government and for socialism, we thought that the people were not ready to support this. We thought that the people were going to be for intermediate, halfway solutions. We thought that they were not going to vote for us but for other kinds of candidates. We thought that we were going to get a minimal vote, but that we had to run the kind of campaign we did to educate the masses.

We started educating the masses, but it was the masses who completed our education. They showed us that they were in favor of our program. Because that's what was shown by the vote we got, that the masses agreed with our program, and that they did not see a workers government as something fantastic, something out of science fiction.

This is what we Peruvian Trotskyists learned in this last period from the Peruvian masses. And so we know that there are hundreds of thousands of workers who are ready to struggle for a workers government and for socialism. And so, the immediate task of those of us who said we were fighting for that is to begin to organize these masses. That must be the immediate basis of a unification of the Trotskyists. [Applause, shouts of "Trotskyists united to build the party!"]

I repeat, these are internal problems among Trotskyists. The fact that I am talking about them here in front of you shows the honesty with which we confront these problems. This is a commitment made before you to unify the Trotskyist movement so that we can speak with authority about the need to unite the left.

I have also learned that the comrades of the PSR, Vanguardia Revolucionaria, and other currents are involved in processes of unification. I think that's wonderful.

There is another little problem we have to take up. The respectable gentlemen in the Constituent Assembly, not us, but the respectable ones, are discussing together with all of the right, including the section that is not in the Constituent Assembly, like Belaúnde,¹² for instance. They are plotting among themselves to see how they can set up a *Ménage à trois* [laughter] between the APRA, the PPC, and the government. What is Señor Bedoya going to tell the masses who voted for him. They voted for him because he said all sorts of bad things about the military.

So, *compañeros*, he is going to have to do a lot of wiggling to explain to the masses who voted for him why he is going into a coalition government now—because that is what he is going to do. You don't need a crystal ball to see that; you don't even

have to be particularly clever. There is going to be a coalition government including the APRA, the PPC, and Morales Bermúdez.

Of course, Bedoya could say anything he liked against the military, and be very bold about it too, because he owns them. So, how could they deport him. [Laughter.] But now the people can see that they were cheated when they thought they were voting for the APRA and for the PPC as a way of voting against the military government. These parties are going to form a single government together with the military dictators that they attacked.

When the people see that this marriage is being consummated in order to continue the policy of the IMF, which is the most hated enemy of the Peruvian people, then we will see where the masses who voted for the PPC and for APRA go. They are going to swell our ranks. [Applause, shouts of "Bravo!"]

Among the matters that these gentlemen are discussing is the "Hugo Blanco phenomenon." [Laughter.] That is, they can't put him in prison for very long, because the masses protest; and if they deport him, he comes back like a yoyo. [Laughter.] So, what can be done about him? Maybe the solution is to kill him. They eliminate him, and then the left is done for.

Well, *compañeros*, we have to talk about this question. But we should do so in a political way and not an emotional one. Specifically, what we have to do is to take steps so that even if they eliminate me, the unity of the left will not be wrecked. I am absolutely confident that this can be done, because out of the last sixteen years, I have spent only twenty months free and in Peru. And despite this the Peruvian people keep fighting. So, it's not Hugo Blanco that's doing the fighting, it's the Peruvian masses. [Applause.]

So, let's look at the little problem they have here in this farce that they staged to fool us, and which ended up fooling them. If they keep me out of the Constituent Assembly by doing me in, then they are going to show the masses what their democracy is like. They are going to convince the masses that parliamentarism leads nowhere—that they are the ones who cannot live with democracy and not we. And in doing this they are going to show the masses the real road to their liberation. If my blood is spilled, the people should see the color of the road that leads to their liberation. [Applause, shouts of "Bravo!"]

As the members of FOCEP who are here know, I have gotten a mandate from the chairman of the front. This has to do with a general problem. It is a tragedy that there are only a few hundred organized members of the FOCEP, and a half million who voted for the slate. This cannot be. A few hundred persons cannot make decisions for a half a million. It is this half million people who must decide on the future steps to be taken by the FOCEP,

9. Confederación Campesina del Perú (Peruvian Peasant Federation).

10. Frente de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—Partido de Obreros y Campesinos (Front of the Revolutionary Left—Workers and Peasants Party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International).

11. Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, Socialist Workers Party, the Trotskyist organization of which Hugo Blanco is a member.

12. A former president, deposed by the military coup that installed the Velasco Alvarado government. He opposed calling elections for a Constituent Assembly.



Fred Murphy/Intercontinental Press-Inprecor

Part of crowd of 2,500 at airport July 16 to welcome Blanco.

and not the 500 persons in the FOCEP organization now.

Here is a letter of authorization that I would like a FOCEP member to read.

FOCEP member: "In view of the need to begin immediately to organize the masses who voted for the FOCEP in the June 18 elections and in view of his excellent qualifications as an organizer, Compañero Hugo Blanco Galdos is designated organizational secretary for the national leadership of the FOCEP and has the responsibility to report to this body. [Applause.] Signed by the national chairman, Genaro Ledesma, July 14, 1978." [Applause.]

OK, compañeros, this has an importance for the question of the unity, or division of FOCEP. The right is chortling, saying, "The chairman of the slate is Genaro Ledesma, and the one who got the most votes is Hugo Blanco. So, a power struggle is already on." [Laughter.] This is all lies. Genaro Ledesma remains the head, and I am an activist who holds the post of organizational secretary. [Applause.] Genaro Ledesma will continue, of course, to be chairman of FOCEP.

The right has also thought that there was going to be a power struggle in the CCP, as a result of the vote, between Vargas, who is the chairman of the organization and me, who is a lower-ranking

member. This other so-called power struggle is not going to take place either. Because I am a trade-union activist, and I will continue carrying out my duties there when I don't have to be occupied with the foolishness in the Constituent Assembly. I will continue carrying out my duties in the leadership of the CCP, since it is the organization that is going to solve the problems of Peru and not the Constituent Assembly. [Shouts of "Bravo!" Applause.]

So, compañeros, to come back to the tragedy that is constituted by the fact that only a few hundred organized persons are representing a half million people, this means that we have to organize this half million people as soon as possible. The task of FOCEP members today is to go out immediately to every neighborhood to every factory, to every peasant union, and organize a local committee of the front. [Shouts of "Bravo!" Applause.]

Since we aren't bureaucrats, no signature or stamp from the organizational secretary is needed to organize these committees. The only thing that is needed is for the people in the local areas to want to form a FOCEP committee. [Applause. Shouts of "Bravo!"] And then they will be the ones who in their meetings and congresses will decide how the line of the FOCEP will be carried forward, how

FOCEP will fight for a workers government and socialism.

Therefore, compañeros, the task is not mine alone. It is the duty of all of us, all members of the FOCEP, to begin to build local committees of the front. Compañeros, don't worry about the form in which these committees should be organized. Organize them any way you like. No committee can function unless it is set up, and these questions can't be decided in advance. The organizational task today, compañeros, is to organize supporters of the FOCEP throughout Lima and throughout Peru! [Applause, shouts of "Land or death!"]

The Chair: "Compañeros, we said in the beginning that we should greet Compañero Hugo Blanco with shouts of 'Land or death!' Today, the revolutionary slogan can only be 'Socialism or death!' [The audience takes up the chant.]

"Compañeros, all out to the Plaza de Mayo on July 19 to commemorate the heroic national strike of July 19, 1977."¹³

13. In this strike, which was touched off by a 50% increase in the prices of basic necessities, at least six persons were reported killed. Some 300 union leaders were arrested, and more than 5,000 union activists were fired from their jobs.

The German Trade-Union Federation Congress

By Winfried Wolf

The Eleventh Ordinary Congress of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB—German Trade-Union Federation) was held in Hamburg at the end of May. If we are to judge this congress by the consequences it will have for the class struggle, we may as well get on with the agenda. The results will be practically nil in terms of the day-to-day skirmishes between wage labor and capital, the struggles around the collective contract talks over real wages and working conditions, or the question of the unions' taking a political stand.

Even the composition of the congress delegates—in their vast majority full-time trade-union officials—guaranteed that it would be staged in what has become the West German tradition. Under the emblem of the slogan, "The trade unions—a bulwark of democracy within society," a string of public figures filed up to the podium, from the president of the republic to the federal chancellor, from party chairmen to Schmidt's cabinet members.

Finally, a careful screening process applied to all motions submitted for discussion—to say nothing of the vote—both before and during the congress, was meant to see to it that everything went off according to the trade-union bureaucracy's wishes.

However, if we look at what happened at the congress, taking into account the whole way it was staged and all of the bureaucracy's mechanisms of control, as well as our own expectations of what would happen based on the experience of past congresses, then we have to conclude that it contained a few surprises. This reflects the fact that the change in consciousness taking place among the rank-and-file activists is finally beginning to make some impact, even within the bureaucracy (and this congress was 85 percent to 90 percent made up of bureaucrats).

These changes can be summed up in two points: 1. greater militancy in face of the bosses' attacks, and 2. a distinctly cooler attitude toward the coalition government of the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—Social Democratic Party of Germany) and FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei—Free Democratic Party). Added to this are the deeper cracks within the trade-union bureaucracy itself, which nevertheless managed to keep up a monolithic appearance at the Tenth Congress of the DGB.

The change in attitude toward the government was the most distinctive feature

of the congress. The old cozy relationship is no more. Even Helmut Schmidt was realistic enough to see that such an atmosphere could not be restored with the help of a few phrases.

Before the congress, he had warned the trade unionists—in very mealy-mouthed terms—of the "danger of the unions falling into self-imposed isolation." He had even publicly expressed the hope that the congress would take back the qualified "no" that the trade-union leadership had uttered with respect to "concerted action" with the employers, or at least that it would not make it worse. But during the congress itself, Schmidt was satisfied with the role of the "honest broker" and the "realistic and sober politician." His speech was not well received by the congress participants.

Schmidt gave no support to the unions' demand for outlawing lockouts by the employers, a demand raised after the experience of this spring's strikes and supported by the SPD leadership. Instead, he started expressing the "hope" that the bosses would not use the lockout weapon "indiscriminately."

He asked the unions to maintain a "sense of proportion" in wage demands, while demagogically adding that the same "sense of proportion" should also be applied to the salaries of parliament (these were increased by more than 50%, whereas the bosses and government consider 5% wage increases "excessive").

He said that the connection between rationalization in the factories and unemployment should not be "exaggerated." He warned the congress participants against a return to "Luddism" (a movement to destroy machines at the dawn of the workers movement), and condemned the use of sensationalist headlines in the union press, such as "Job-eater On the Way."

He reiterated his "creed" concerning "a priority on ending unemployment," but at the same time demanded "greater mobility and flexibility," which brought an outburst from the floor: "Society of camper-trailers." Labor Minister Ehrenberg repeated the worn-out rhetoric about "West German wages being the highest in the world," and said that "our unemployment rate is one of the lowest of any country."

It was Ehrenberg who launched into a no-holds-barred slanderous attack on unemployed women, which is becoming more and more fashionable in the imperialist countries: "We no longer see them only in

the Frisian Islands and other beach resorts. We see them in other places also. Wives of café owners and shopkeepers, who are declared as employees by their husbands, register as unemployed at the end of the season so they can get unemployment benefits."

Schmidt could muster some applause only by resorting to well-known rhetorical devices tailored to a gathering of trade-union bureaucrats. He called on the "youth" to show respect for the "hard work of building the organization" accomplished by the older generation of trade unionists, and cautioned against illusions in "magical solutions."

But his attempt to appear as a "humanist," concerned by the fact that "men and women are no longer capable of holding real conversations with one another," and his plea for "one evening a week without television," went over like a lead balloon.

This negative response by the congress participants to the Schmidt cabinet embarrassed the DGB leadership. Its head, Vetter, strove to maintain a cordial attitude toward the chancellor. But he could not avoid discussing the subject of rationalizations and unemployment in terms that were explicitly opposed to Schmidt.

Vetter stressed what the trade-union leaderships had in fact denied for years—that the new technologies were eliminating jobs on a massive scale, and that this was not being offset by the creation of new jobs in the factories producing the new technological installations, because these industrial branches were themselves among the most highly automated. The conclusion he drew was that there was no other solution except to cut working hours in a number of ways, "up to and including the thirty-five-hour week."

As for lockouts, Vetter strove to make a distinction between Schmidt as the head of government and as part of the SPD leadership (he is the vice-president). He thanked the party leadership for its support to the DGB. But the SPD chairman, Willy Brandt, threw cold water on this enthusiasm. He explained to the congress participants that his party had not come out for outlawing lockouts, but had only challenged the bosses' "moral right" to use them. As though there could be such a thing as "moral victors" in the class struggle.

On at least three questions submitted to the congress, the bureaucracy's "faultless preparations" turned out to be too hasty.

The most dramatic case had to do with nationalizations. For eighteen hours, the DGB was bound by a vote of its highest body, the congress, to support "nationalization of basic industry, banks, and insurance companies." This provoked indignation in the bourgeois media, leading the congress to revise its position.

It all began with a proposed resolution by the Federal Commission of Trade-Union Youth (Bundesjugendsausschuss). This resolution was adopted by a majority of congress participants, over the opposition of the national leaders and despite their call for a vote against the draft resolution. This vote indicated that even within the trade-union bureaucracy, or at least within a wing of the bureaucracy that is sensitive to fluctuations of opinion among the ranks, such demands are becoming ever more popular as a result of the depression in the capitalist economy.

After the sharp reactions in the newspapers and on television the next day, the session was adjourned and private meetings were held with the delegates to bring them into line. Then the congress was reopened, and by an "overwhelming majority," a motion was passed overruling the previous one. The argument used to accomplish this was particularly noteworthy and treacherous: the motion in favor of nationalization allegedly "went beyond the scope of the DGB's program," and could not be submitted for a vote until the next congress in 1980.

As it happens, however, the DGB program explicitly calls for "turning the key industries, and other enterprises holding a preponderant place in the market, over to public ownership." Without a doubt, the banks and insurance companies hold such a "preponderant place." It is the DGB leadership, in fact, that is trying to revise this point in the program, or at least to reformulate it into something more cautious and vague.

Furthermore, the leadership had originally intended to make this change at the Hamburg congress, but prudently held back in view of the changed climate within the trade unions.* The leadership had thus decided to postpone the operation until 1980—only to find itself confronted by an initiative from the trade-union youth aimed at reinforcing the current program, an initiative which the leadership, with stunning hypocrisy, criticized for trying to go beyond the scope of the program!

But while the leadership was able to recapture the ball on this question—which was largely academic anyway—it was quite a different story with regard to two other votes.

The more important of these was a motion for a thirty-five-hour week, also put forward by the Federal Commission of

Trade-Union Youth. This motion was passed against the recommendation of the national leadership, and against the recommendation of the resolutions committee. This vote upheld the motion passed at the metalworkers congress in Düsseldorf, where a similar incident occurred. It confirms the very great sentiment on the part of West German workers for a reduction in the length of the legal work day, a sentiment which is increasingly echoed within the "left" wing of the trade-union bureaucracy itself.

The passage of this motion is important, first and foremost, because it derailed a co-opting maneuver by the bureaucracy that consisted of arguing for an overall reduction of work hours (on an annual basis), and then expressing this demand in the form of extra vacation days, lowering the retirement age for partially handicapped workers, and other, similar distractions. Thanks to the vote at the congress, it will now be easier for union militants to fight to get the demand for a thirty-five-hour week—a key unifying measure against unemployment—introduced into all ongoing contract negotiations, and make it the target of immediate, concrete struggles.

Furthermore, it will be harder for the bureaucracy to override the vote at the metalworkers congress—which is what one of the central IG-Metall leaders did. He had "his" delegates vote against a thirty-five-hour week at the Hamburg congress, in spite of the motion passed at Düsseldorf! There have already been all kinds of maneuvers to try to say that this vote does not mean that a thirty-five-hour week should be introduced "immediately," but only that it should be introduced "by stages"; otherwise, "the financial burdens on the companies would become intolerable," and so on. So union militants will have to be on the lookout.

A third important motion was unexpectedly passed at the Hamburg congress, against the wishes of the national leadership. This was the motion upholding the rejection of "concerted action." The vote for this motion stemmed from a public controversy between two wings of the trade-union bureaucracy, the first represented by the chemical workers' leader, Hauenschildt, and the second by the leader of the transportation and civil service workers union, Kluncker.

Hauenschildt had made the slip of catching on the rebound the ball thrown by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in favor of a return by the unions to concerted action with the bosses. He paid for it, because his plea elicited a massive rebuke from the congress participants, for which Kluncker became the main spokesman. The latter even went to the point of proposing that "concerted action" be rejected "in all its forms." Despite opposition from the national leadership, this radical motion was passed.

However, the DGB leaders are cynically

preparing to flout their own rules in this area too, that is, by publicly proclaiming that they are not going to obey the decisions of their congress.

The head of the DGB, Vetter, stated the day after the congress, in an interview with *Bild am Sonntag*: "If full employment is at issue, we are ready to renew the dialogue at any time," and return to "continual joint conversations with the employers," as long as "something reasonable comes out of it." The head of IG-Metall, Eugen Loderer, declared: "We have not broken off concerted action on principle. What is decisive is the composition of the meetings." Here too, vigilance is necessary.

So Vetter is still Vetter, and Loderer is still Loderer. The bureaucracy has not changed in any respect in light of the Hamburg congress. Vetter even said that in the last three years there have not been any important changes in West Germany. He did, however, prudently refer to a "contradiction" between capital and labor. Mahlein, leader of the printing and paper workers union, which is locked in a tough fight with the bosses, curtly amended this statement: "The contradiction between capital and labor is the fundamental contradiction in West Germany." Indeed it is.

Outside of the congress sessions, the Trade-Union Action Group Against the Nuclear Threat had organized a meeting and press conference to draw the attention of congress participants and the public to its activities.

In the last few months, this action group has succeeded in gathering support (in the form of signatures) from thousands of DGB members, and more than 1,000 trade unionists carrying out functions at the level of factories or of local and regional organizations. It has set up local affiliates in about twenty cities. Among the groupings that have given organizational support to the action group are the Frankfurt postal workers union, the Berlin teachers union, and the Socialist Youth of Hesse in the southern district.

It is important to recall that barely one year ago, Heinz Brandt, former editor of the IG-Metall paper *Metall*, was expelled from the metalworkers union because he had condemned the collaboration of shop stewards with the private owners of the nuclear power industry in irresponsibly defending the building of all nuclear power plants then under way. This expulsion was later overturned, under pressure from rank-and-file protests.

At the Hamburg congress, Vetter himself was compelled to denounce the "syndicalist deviation" ("corporatist" would have been better) involved in having measures in the interests of the bosses approved by the shop stewards. There, too, pressure from the ranks, and the growth of class consciousness—slow but sure—is beginning to reverberate within the trade-union bureaucracy itself. □

*See "The 'German Model' Loses Its Attractiveness," by Werner Hülsberg, in *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, June 12, 1978, p. 708.

Angola Three Years After Independence

By José Maia

[The following article was written in November 1977, before the First Congress of the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola). Some points on the congress were added before it was published in issue No. 4, Second Series, of *Acção Comunista*, the theoretical journal of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista, Portuguese section of the Fourth International. The translation from the Portuguese is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

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"1977—Year of the First Congress of the MPLA, of the Founding of the Party, and of Production for Socialism"—that was the endlessly repeated slogan. It became a standard phrase in the radio news broadcasts, in the editorials of the *Jornal de Angola*, in reports, in official letters, and even in the everyday language of the more zealous officials. This pompous slogan of a case-hardened bureaucratic leadership concealed a shameful lie behind two formal truths.

The true statement about the holding of the "First Congress" of the MPLA¹ in fact

1. In 1971, the old Steering Committee called the First Congress of the MPLA. The official reasons given why it was not held were "lack of an opportunity and of financial resources" (see the pamphlet *O que é o Congresso* published by the First National Seminar on Organization, Luanda, July 1977). In reality, what prevented it from being held was the first signs of conflicts with Chipenda. In place of a congress, a "Readjustment Movement" was begun in 1972. Its main result was to put the Steering Committee "on ice" and form another leadership, which was just like the preceding one, except that it did not include Chipenda.

In 1974, after April 25, the First Congress was called again in Lusaka. This occurred under pressure from two sources. *Revolta Activa* [Active Revolt], a faction led by J. Pinto de Andrade and Gentile Viana, which had strong influence in intellectual circles, criticized the lack of internal democracy and the rule of an "all powerful president." The guerrilla faction in the east headed by Chipenda, *Revolta do Leste* [Eastern Revolt], also pressed for the holding of this congress. Although it was present at this assembly, the MPLA leadership (Neto) did not recognize its validity.

Finally, the Third Plenum of the Central Committee held in October 1976 called for holding the congress in 1977. The premier of the

concealed the travesty of democracy that was being rigged up. This ran the gamut from pushing into the background those who belonged to currents opposing the traditional apparatus (whose crimes will be taken up later) to imprisoning and shooting them.

It included the co-opting of functionaries, who had not participated in the rank-and-file bodies (the Grupos de Acção) and were chosen for their docility, to supervise the various organs of the movement. It involved dividing up the places on the incoming Central Committee and the presentation of these worked out in corridor "struggles" among the various factions.

Among the contending groups were the traditional apparatus (Lúcio Lara, Carlos Rocha Dilolwa), the right-wing nationalist old guard (Mendes de Carvalho, Manuel Pacavira), and the petty-bourgeois technocrats (Lopo do Nascimento, the ministers of foreign trade and fisheries). There were also groups with much more well-defined interests, such as that headed by Secretary of State for Communications Bento Ribeiro, the advance scout for Italian capitalism, the most enterprising in Angola.

There were manifold factions with confused political and economic programs, varying from an Argentine-style state capitalism (Lara) to more familiar forms of neocolonialism with less of a progressive façade.

The "First Congress of the MPLA" will give formal expression to the relationship of forces resulting from the backroom alliances and wheeling and dealing among the bureaucrats. *It will not be the fruit of democratic debate nor will it plant the seed of socialism.*

The statement about the "founding of the party" is also formally true. A party will be founded, but it will not be a party of the workers and peasants, as is claimed; nor will it be Marxist-Leninist, despite the invocation of this term. Of the Leninist norms of democratic centralism, the demo-

Angolan People's Republic, Lopo do Nascimento, set the date for the beginning of the congress as December 4, the twenty-first anniversary of the founding of the organization.

The congress was held December 4-10, 1977, and approved the organization's new name—"MPLA, Party of Labor." It also approved the new statutes and theses, as well as confirming the forty-five new members of the Central Committee.

cracy is being swept under the rug and the centralism made authoritarian.²

On this point at least there is total agreement among the various factions and even among the most reactionary chauvinists (Mendes de Carvalho, for example). In this respect, the lessons imparted by East German and Soviet advisers have been accepted without resistance.

The shameful lie is the slogan "production for socialism," because what this would mean, if the term were being used properly, is production for the workers, *under their control and with their participation* in making the basic economic-policy decisions. I will come back to this question further on. In particular, I will take up the caricature of socialist planning outlined at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1976.

Along with this, I will show that while the MPLA's "progressive" verbiage may easily turn the heads of centrists, since they are not screwed on very tightly anyway, it does not hold up under Marxist analysis.

So, the year 1977 will not go down in the history of the Angolan workers movement for any of the things touted in the official

2. In the pamphlet *O MPLA e o Partido* [The MPLA and the Party], which was published in October 1977 and contains the Documentos de Estudo para o Partido [DEP—Study Documents on the Party], there is a tendency to dwell on the "subordination of the lower bodies to the higher ones, of the action groups to the Steering Committee," "of the minority to the majority," etc. And the democracy that would make this centralism a conscious instrument is reduced to vague banalities. But it is noted that in no case should "internal democracy endanger the discipline and unity of the party." Democracy is reduced finally to "defending individual points of view" in the rank-and-file bodies.

What sort of guarantee will this be for the right to maintain "individual points of view" in an organization that is going through a terrible witch-hunt, in which "being seen with a factionalist" or "a conversation that he had with 'x' in March of last year" is liable to be punished by imprisonment, expulsion from the party, or loss of your job.

What sort of guarantee is this when you consider the circular issued by the Comissão Política Provisória de Luanda on July 21, 1977, and signed by Mendes de Carvalho. It said: "We recommend the removal from the Action Groups and Action Committees of all the factionalists and those who speak on their behalf, support them, or identify with them."

slogan. What marks the year is the major defeat suffered by the working-class movement as a result of the May 27 events [the attempted coup by the Nito Alves wing of the MPLA].

May 27 was the point at which the revolutionary process began to be reversed. It was the culmination of setbacks that will be reviewed further on. What it represented was the laying of the foundations of the bourgeois state that is now being built. This defeat is all the more grave inasmuch as the revolutionary crisis opened up in Angola by the decolonization seemed likely to offer a better perspective for moving forward to socialism than anywhere else on the continent.

The MPLA in the Anticolonial Struggle

The MPLA was the only liberation movement in Angola that did not let itself get entangled from the start in the web of tribalism. It also benefited in the last analysis from the inability of Portuguese capitalism to shift over to neocolonial solutions. The Portuguese capitalists could not do that without running the risk of losing out in competition with other imperialist forces.

The long and hard struggle that the MPLA waged over a fourteen-year period for the minimum aim of ending colonial rule created the objective conditions for a qualitative break (even if only a pragmatic one) with the process of neocolonialization that developed in the African countries gaining their independence in the 1960s.

A number of factors came together that led to a break with the traditional nationalist orientation and brought the MPLA into a complex historical process of radical, revolutionary nationalism. It was obliged by the intransigence of the colonial power to arm the masses. It went through the experience of training cadres and organizing and mobilizing the peasants in the vast areas of Moxico, Kuando-Kubango, Uíge, and Cabinda.

The MPLA was a pole of attraction for the African student youth, some of whom had spent time in Portugal and gotten their first experience in party work in the Portuguese CP. In a number of cases after 1965 these youth went through a political apprenticeship in the semi-Maoist anti-reformist splits that were influential in the Portuguese student milieu at that time.

Another factor was the MPLA's policy of alliances. It was fraught with ambiguities and limitations, to be sure. But in opposing the imperialist bloc allied with Portugal, it moved toward the Soviet bloc. The MPLA also went through an initial experience of organizing a political struggle on a continent-wide basis in the CONCP.³

3. The Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of Nationalist Organizations in the Portuguese

However, at no point did the MPLA take the basic steps that would have assured a de facto choice of an anticapitalist road. In any case, the whole process during the period of the anticolonial struggle had an *empirical character and did not lead to any programmatic conclusions*. In fact, the MPLA's program (divided into a maximum and a minimum like all stagist programs) in nowise differed from those of the traditional nationalist forces.

This program stressed the character of the organization as a national front. On that basis, it called for "broad unity of all political parties" and "every stratum of Angolan society, all Angolans without distinction as to political tendencies." This was the minimum part of the program.

The purpose of the front was to accomplish the tasks of "national liberation" and "establishing a republican and democratic system based on total independence." That was the maximum program.

All this was supposed to lead (without any explanation of how) to "the sovereignty of the people over the state" and the transformation "of Angola into an economically independent country."

During the entire period of the anticolonial struggle, the MPLA leaders in their statements never departed from this reformist program, which was reiterated subsequent to April 25. (See, for example, the well-known interview with Lúcio Lara in Brazzaville and published in the colonialist Luanda weekly *Notícia*.) The objective of their opportunist line was to make sure that no social layer got "detached" from the tasks of "national liberation."

The conferences and accords of Nakuru, Alvor, and Mombasa with the proimperialist movements UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and the FNLA [Angolan National Liberation Front] showed that the reference in the MPLA's program to "broad unity of all political parties" was not just rhetoric.

On the other hand, the movement's essentially pragmatic evolution itself set limits on its development. Its activity and experience in struggle were confined to organizing masses of peasants, with whom it maintained a relationship of paternalism and giving orders. This did not equip it to take up on a theoretical and organizational level the problems arising from the complexity of the social formation represented by the urban masses (who came definitively to the forefront of the political and social struggle after April 25). Nor did it prepare the MPLA to deal with the problem of freeing the Angolan economy from the domination of the capitalist world

Colonies) included the PAIGC [African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde], Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front], and the MPLA, and was established to develop a common strategy for the struggle against Portuguese colonialism.

market, since this could only be done by anticapitalist means.

Throughout the history of the MPLA, tendencies arose that challenged the limitations of its program and activity, the multiclass character of its political line, and its exclusive concentration on the tactic of guerrilla warfare in the "bush."

Such tendencies wanted to provide an alternative giving a socialist content to the movement's program. They stressed the need for working with the proletarian masses whose strength was steadily growing in the industrial suburbs of Luanda, Nova Lisboa (now Huambo), and Lobito. But these tendencies were viewed with the greatest distrust by the central apparatus.

One example of such a tendency was the few dozen youths who tried in 1968-69, against the directives of the leadership in Brazzaville, to organize nuclei of MPLA sympathizers in Luanda. These groups were broken up by the PIDE [the Portuguese political police]⁴ in 1970, and their members were sent to the concentration camps of São Nicolau, in the south of Angola, and Tarrafal. Out of this layer came the "ideological nucleus" of the "Nitistas" [supporters of Nito Alves], that is, Nado, Juca Valentim, and Zé Van Dúnem, who were later shot on the orders of the MPLA leadership.

The organization was already highly centralized. At the top, Agostinho Neto seemed to hold full personal power. But the real leader was Lúcio Lara, the organizer of the movement.

Whenever differences arose, they resulted in expulsions and anathematization of those involved as "counterrevolutionaries" (e.g., Viriato da Cruz, the Active Revolt group, Eastern Revolt). This is the least of what happened. There were also shootings, for example, the execution of Comandante Paganini in the west in 1973. He was accused of being an accomplice of Chipenda.

All of this hardly prepared the MPLA,

4. Costa Andrade, a loyal retainer of Lara, a poet and editor of the only Angolan daily, *Jornal de Angola*, in a slander suited to the hysterical tone of this paper, accused the Luanda group after Nito Alves's putsch of belonging to the PIDE. The only evidence he offered was "the strange coincidence that its appearance coincided with the new Caetano policy of 'using the methods of social psychology and infiltrating the liberation groups,'" which was tried in 1968-9.

I would note that more than half the Angolan government (to speak only of the government) cannot be accused of being linked to this "infiltration" in the 1960s. The present ministers of Finance (Ismael Martins), Fisheries (Vitor de Carvalho), Foreign Trade (Benvindo Pitra), Social Affairs (Conceição Vahekeni), Public Works (Resende de Oliveira), Health (Coelho da Cruz), Justice (Diógenes Boavida), the Deputy Minister of Internal Commerce (Maria Mambu Café) and others waited until 1974 to join the MPLA and become anticolonialists when colonialism was already breathing its last.

bureaucratized as it was from the outset, to serve as a testing ground in which the unavoidable differences over revolutionary alternatives in the postcolonial period could be discussed out and resolved in democratic debate.

One of the reasons that the apparatus was reticent about extending the struggle beyond those areas close to the command centers in Zambia (the east) and Congo-Brazzaville (Cabinda) was the difficulty of keeping the activity of the local units under the control of the central leadership.

It is no accident that, besides the Luanda group mentioned earlier, virtually all the military chiefs of the only guerrilla pocket not in direct contact with the Steering Committee, that is, the First Military Region (Dembos and Uíge) came historically to form factions.⁵ This includes Van Troi, Sihanouk, Bakaloff, Nito Alves, Monstro Imortal, and Ho Chi-Minh,⁶ along with others. *All were arrested and shot following May 27.*

Angola—An Economically Deformed and Dependent Country

Such limitations on the internal life of the MPLA blocked a dialectical resolution of the differences that had historically arisen within it. The leadership preferred to settle the differences by expeditious administrative methods. This indicated that the MPLA would not be able to emerge as a coherent revolutionary leading force in solving the coming socialist tasks.

Programmatically disarmed and with its military experience confined to areas of small agricultural production, the MPLA did not seem to be the revolutionary driving force that could give impetus to a process of the struggle growing over into a struggle for socialism. However, *only such a qualitative leap in accomplishing the tasks of the revolution would have made it possible to free Angola from its economic subordination to the capitalist world market.*

Deformed by colonial and imperialist exploitation, the Angolan economic structure before independence was oriented exclusively toward the production of raw materials to meet the needs of the imperialist market and the ruling colonial power. (More than 90% of Angolan exports were unrefined raw materials.)

Angola's oil, diamonds, and iron were controlled by non-Portuguese imperialist capital. Cabinda Gulf Oil, dominated by

American capital, pumped the oil from the continental shelf off Cabinda. Diamang, representing English capitalists and South African capitalists such as Oppenheimer, mined the diamonds in Lunda. The iron ore in Cassinga was exploited by the German capitalists of the Krupp combine. The bulk of Angola's foreign currency came from these operations.

Coffee, sisal, cotton, and other export crops were under the control of Portuguese capital, sometimes in association with that of other countries. (Cotonang, a cotton export combine, was owned by Portuguese and Belgian capital; the French bank Mallot et Cie had a share in CADA, which controlled 80% of the coffee crop.)

On the other hand, after the first surge of nationalist guerrilla activity in the mid-1960s, Angola became a field for massive investments of imperialist capital, which came in to establish processing industries (textiles, petroleum refining, fish products, beverages, cement, and so on).⁷ These industries were based on a transfer of capitalist technology and an unrestrained exploitation of cheap labor.

This push to exploit cheap labor had a crucial political and social impact in that it led to the growth of the rural proletariat on the coffee and cotton plantations (in Uíge, Kwanza Sul, and Malange) and on the sugar plantations (Tentativa-Caxito and Cassequel-Catumbela). Masses of people swarmed into the *muçeques* [shantytowns] of Luanda, Lobito, and Nova Lisboa. They became proletarianized in the emerging industrial belts of these cities.

The transportation network is also an important example of an economy shaped by imperialist domination.

The three main rail lines and the three main ports are essentially conduits for taking out imperialist plunder.

The Benguela railroad carries copper from Zambia and Katanga to be exported out of the port of Lobito. This line is owned by Tanganyika Concessions, in which most of the stock is held by the South African Oppenheimer group.

The Moçamedes railroad carries iron and manganese from Cassinga to be exported out of the port of Saco (Moçamedes).

The Malange railroad carries export crops (cotton, sisal), which are shipped out through the port of Luanda.

In a hot, tropical country, there is virtually no refrigeration network on the national level for distributing and storing perishables (fish, fruit, vegetables). The main center of the fishing industry, Moçamedes, has one of the biggest refrigeration

complexes on the continent (ARAN), but it is exclusively for the export trade.

As a final indication of the nature of this economy, let us look at the Cunene project in the far south of Angola. Work on this hydroelectric complex (twenty-seven dams and electricity generating plants) began in the last years of colonial rule. The total South African and Portuguese investment in this project was 17.5 billion escudos [approximately US\$700 million at the time], higher than the investment in the Cabora-Bassa dam in Mozambique. The electricity to be produced was intended for the industries in South Africa and Namibia.

These structural conditions of a dependent economy are compounded by the objective weight of Angola's underdevelopment. The country has a backward social structure and virtually no professionals or technicians.⁸ Thus, the departure of the Portuguese technicians and the sabotage of the economy by the colonial bourgeoisie beginning in the period immediately prior to independence had catastrophic consequences for the organization of industrial and agricultural production and the flow of supplies of raw materials and consumer goods.

The MPLA's Limited Economic Solutions

In face of this pernicious colonial legacy, the MPLA's economic plan, it soon became clear, was to give priority to building a strong state sector. It did not involve a determined attack on the ties binding the country to the imperialist market.

Law No. 3/76 (March 1976) regulating nationalizations and confiscations specified that, besides "abandoned businesses," the concerns subject to nationalization would be those "whose remaining in the private sector is contrary to the national interest." As the second deputy premier and director of planning, Dilolwa, explained to the weekly *Planificação* in January 1977 in Luanda, the extension of nationalizations of, and state interventions in, agricultural and industrial enterprises was "owing fundamentally to their abandonment by their owners."

Once again, things were decided on an empirical basis.

The sectors of the economy bound up with the colonial bourgeoisie, specifically the export crops (coffee, sisal, and cotton),

5. With the exception of Kiluange, a member of the Central Committee and secretary of state for veterans, who is today the only commander from the First Military Region who has not been shot.

6. The last four were members of the Central Committee of the MPLA. Monstro Imortal and Nito Alves were also members of the Political Bureau.

7. In 1965, the Salazar government adopted a law permitting the formation of companies in which the majority of the stock was held by foreigners (non-Portuguese). The interests, dividends, and profits deriving from such investments were to be freely transferrable outside the country.

8. Taking into consideration the demographic structure of the work force in traditional agriculture and the prevailing wage levels, we can estimate, on the basis of the Gross National Product, which was 32.7 billion escudos in 1972, that 90% of the population (all but a tiny part of the Black population) had a per capita income of 2,200 escudos per year [about US\$81 at the time]. The remaining 10% (including virtually all the white population) had a per capita income of 35,200 escudos [about US\$1,300], or sixteen times what the others had.

were put under state administrative supervision as a result of the plantations being abandoned.⁹

The nationalization of or intervention in the processing industries, most of which were also linked to Portuguese capitalism, took place under a combination of pressures.

One factor was the economic objectives of the government. Control of the sector oriented to the internal market is the key to building state capitalism, through which the MPLA wants to establish its economic credibility. Another factor was the abandonment of these installations by their owners. Finally, the express will of the workers played a role.

Those sectors of the economy linked to non-Portuguese imperialist capital, which, as we have seen, are the main sources of foreign currency, remain in private hands, although the terms of the contracts are subject to revision. This goes for Cabinda Gulf Oil, the Benguela railroad,¹⁰ and the Cassinga mines. The mines are either paralyzed or the state has assumed the predominant voice in supervising them, as it did recently in the case of the Diamang holdings (where it assumed a 61% interest).

The government has decided to nationalize the industrial sector of processing (which although it was expanding in the final years of colonial rule remains tiny in the context of an underdeveloped economy). Also to be nationalized are the export crops.

A project has been undertaken to organize the peasants in cooperatives to produce consumer goods for the internal market (with extremely inadequate results up to now). For example, vegetables and fresh foods continue to be supplied to Luanda, badly, by small private concerns.

Another government aim is to establish control over foreign trade. In this respect, it wants to centralize the export business under state control. A state company, IMPORTANG, is to control imports. "Maximum" levels of imports are to be set for private concerns.

The government also wants to establish control over internal trade. This involves setting up state companies for wholesale trade on the national and provincial levels.

9. However, petty-bourgeois hesitation is proverbial. It is symptomatic that in an almost entirely nationalized branch such as fisheries, the major processing company, the Mampeza cannery in Benguela, is American owned and has not been nationalized. This goes for the only company in the second biggest processing industry (after breweries, which are the biggest), the cement company SECIL, which is Danish owned and is still in the private sector, although this factory's operations are certainly important to the "national interest."

10. However, Tanganyika Concessions, the main stockholder in the Benguela railroad, owes the Angolan government 1.5 billion kwanzas [approximately US\$38 million].

A state company, EDINBA, is to handle interprovince distribution of food products. Another state company, EDINBI, is to handle interprovince distribution of industrial products.

Transport is also to come under government control. This involves setting up a national airline, TAAG; a merchant marine fleet; a national rail company, ETP; and a maintenance system, MANAUTOS. State concerns are also to be set up to provide essential services, such as hospitals, general medical care, education, and so on.

These measures are not sufficient to create the objective conditions for a socialist transformation of the society when, as in the case of Angola, the imperialists remain ensconced in the basic sectors of the economy.

Furthermore, similar, and in some instances more drastic, measures have already been carried out in other countries, such as Algeria and Libya. And they have not freed those countries from imperialist economic domination.

However, the fundamental reason that these nationalization measures amounted to no more than "quantitative advances" was that the working masses played no role in controlling the productive process. The role of the masses has to be analyzed in its development subsequent to April 25.

The Angolan Masses in the Anticapitalist Struggle

The analysis of the MPLA in the period of the anticolonial struggle that has been made above essentially also fits Frelimo and the PAIGC.

However, the development of the situation in Angola after April 25 was markedly different than in the other main Portuguese colonies. This meant that the pragmatic petty-bourgeois leaderships had to strive in different ways to achieve the same objective, one that was accomplished belatedly in Angola—the building of a bourgeois state.

After April 25, the PAIGC and Frelimo geared themselves up to take over the state apparatus they inherited from the colonial regime. They took advantage of the centralized system and accentuated it by establishing a one-party state. Since they monopolized the nationalist field (their only competitors being discredited elements such as Joanna Simeão or FLING [Struggle Front for the National Independence of Guinea-Bissau]) and the imperialists were relatively resigned to their taking power,¹¹ they did not need to resort to

11. The September 7, 1974, putsch, with the occupation of Rádio Clube de Moçambique, was a last desperate act by the ultracolonialists and could only be abortive.

It should be noted that Frelimo appealed not to the African masses to crush the colonialist

mobilizing the masses. They were able from the start to adopt the language of "statesmen," calling for "order and productivity."¹²

The MPLA was in a different situation. April 25 found it in a full-blown internal crisis that affected both its political and military structures. Two dissident groups, Active Revolt and Eastern Revolt, were challenging Neto and Lara for power. They had paralyzed an apparatus that was used to functioning in monolithic way.

Only the support of the numerous Luanda group at the Interregional Conference¹³ enabled the Neto leadership to survive. It had already been prepared to accept a triumvirate with Chipenda and J. Pinto de Andrade.

The decisive speech was given by the leader of the Luanda group, Nito Alves, a guerrilla fighter in the First Military-Political Region, an unknown figure to the apparatus.¹⁴ His followers represented a capital city convulsed by agitation and mobilizations unequalled anywhere else in the country.

In return for this support, the Neto-Lara group was obliged to accept seven members on the Central Committee from the First Region and Luanda. At the same time, it had to bring Monstro Imortal and Nito Alves (who was co-opted shortly after the conference) into the Political Bureau.

But it was only because of these internal difficulties that the MPLA leadership made such concessions to a faction that, according to the "Report of the Political Committee on the May 27 Attempted Coup d'Etat," had already shown signs of "strange affinities . . . which were characterized by factional political activity that was in fact outside the structure of the MPLA, although they maintained the cover of the organization."

The first signs of crisis in the colonial repressive apparatus (appearing most not-

putsch but to the Portuguese armed forces, based on the Portuguese-Mozambican accords signed in Lusaka.

12. They did more than make appeals. The first armed units of Frelimo that entered Maputo went in expressly to control any outbreaks by the African masses as the colonialist repressive mechanisms were breaking down. This was before the first transitional government headed by Chissano.

13. Held in September 1974 at the call of the leading apparatus. It coordinated MPLA activists coming from the "underground" inside the country and outside (mainly Portugal). It was held in Lundoje (Moxico) on the western front.

14. Pepetela, deputy minister of education and a member of the Lara faction, wrote in his short story "A víbora de cabeça ao contrário," written in the form of a fable, that Nito's "confused and ultraleftist" speech made him a dangerous alternative to the leadership. But he adds cynically that Nito was a necessary evil at that time and for a while longer. Nito was to be gotten rid of as soon as possible.

ably in the DGS [the military political police] and the Portuguese armed forces) following the fall of Caetano were to lead to a breakdown of the status quo that had been maintained by terror in the cities. We saw this process in particular in Luanda. A breach was opened up through which the masses could emerge forcefully on the political scene.

The first mobilizations were for self-defense, and were carried out in the muçeques in response to the attacks of racist settlers and ultrarightists. The massacres conducted by these elements, especially in July and August 1974, led in Luanda to the appearance of embryonic forms of self-organization in the hardest-hit muçeques (Cazenga, Prenda, Golfe). This process later spread to the entire belt around the white city.

With the encouragement of an active semiclandestine press—*Revolução Popular*, organ of the Comitês Amílcar Cabral (CACs);¹⁵ and *Luta do Povo*, organ of the Comitês Henda¹⁶—the first Neighborhood

15. These were formed by Angolan students with experience in the "Marxist-Leninist" groups that gave origin to the Portuguese UDP [União Democrático do Povo—People's Democratic Union, an eclectic Maoist organization]. In the beginning, they claimed to adhere to the MPLA, but in 1975 they followed the official Chinese line closely, demanding that the accords between the "three liberation movements, the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA" be respected.

Very influential in the Neighborhood People's Committees in Luanda, the CACs argued that these bodies should be "nonparty," a line that came into conflict with the MPLA's policy of controlling these mass organizations. They published *Revolução Popular* and a supplement for workers called *Libertação Nacional* (which was a factory paper). They had an influence over the Coordinating Committee of the Neighborhood People's Committees and its paper *Popper Popular*.

The CACs were suppressed by the MPLA shortly before independence. The MPLA took advantage of their criminal campaign against "social imperialist" military aid to Angola, at a time when the county was being invaded by South Africa and regular troops of the Mobutu regime. Their leading activists were jailed in São Paulo prison in Luanda and their organization was broken up. Some of their activists formed the Organização Comunista Angolana (OCA—Angolan Communist Organization) in Portugal, where they have the backing of the UDP.

16. The Comitês Henda are semi-Maoist in origin. Some of their leaders were activists in the MRPP [Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party, an ultraleft sectarian Maoist group in Portugal]. They were so-called "passives" because being foreigners in Portugal supposedly prevented them from interfering in the "internal life of another country." This group always claimed adherence to the MPLA, and its tactic for intervening was based on attempts to influence factions in the apparatus of the movement. Initially, they gained influence over Nitista leaders (Bakaloff, Nito Alves, Zé Van Dúnem, Nado). But they lost all this influence to the

People's Commissions began to form. Beginning in late 1974, they started pushing the theme of "people's power." They called for the following:

Formation of armed militias to resist the racist violence, supervision of the prices of merchants, organization of consumer cooperatives and teams to take care of sanitation, hygiene, and health. [Interview with the Prenda Neighborhood People's Commission, in the January 1, 1975, issue of the magazine *Angola*, published by the Liga Nacional Africana.¹⁷]

On October 16, 1974, the city hall of Luanda was occupied by demonstrators from the muçeques led by the Golfe neighborhood militia. On February 1, 1975, the First People's Assembly of Luanda met. This was the culmination of the "week of people's power," which was denounced by UNITA and the FNLA and supported, after some hesitation, by the MPLA leadership. The following motion was adopted:

The People's Assembly of Luanda is the highest decision-making body of the Angolan people. The coordinating body of the Neighborhood Commissions is entrusted with implementing the decisions of the assembly and the representatives of the people of Luanda. The members of the coordinating body of the Neighborhood People's Commissions will be elected by the people in Neighborhood People's Assemblies, and only the people can remove them from office.

Along with this, hundreds of strikes developed in the two most important industrial areas (Cacuaco-Luanda-Viana and Lobito-Benguela). There were strikes by the dock workers in Luanda and Lobito, by the railway workers in Benguela, by the steelworkers in Luanda, by the Shell Oil workers, in the sugar mills in Tentativa and Cassequel, by the Textang (textiles) workers, by the fishermen in Luanda and Benguela, and by other groups of workers.

The first attempts were made to get work going again in the factories that had been abandoned by their owners.

The colonial structure, ridden with sharp contradictions, could not hold up under the pressure exerted by a working class that was learning that it could make demands.

Portuguese Communist Party group (Cita Vales, Rui Coelho).

The "Hendas" (as they are known) have gained positions on the intermediary rungs of the state apparatus and are today close to the Lopo do Nascimento faction, for which they provide an "anti-Cuban" ideological cover.

17. This is an Angolan cultural association, a traditional meeting ground for nationalist intellectuals. Among those who were active in it were the intellectuals of the "Vamos Conhecer Angola" [Let's Learn to Know Angola] movement (1949), which was a school for national leaders such as Viriato da Cruz, Mário de Andrade, Agostinho Neto, and others. During the last colonial war (1961-74), its activities were kept under strict surveillance by the PIDE. After April 25, its leaders were pro-MPLA.

Against the background of this social agitation, the political situation was sharpening.

In the initial period after April 25, the Portuguese followed an openly neocolonialist policy. This phase was marked by the meetings between Spínola and Mobutu on the island of Sal in September 1974 and between Mário Soares, Mobutu, Chipenda, and [FNLA leader] Holden Roberto in Kinshasa. At the time, Soares, then Portuguese minister for foreign affairs, declared: "We all speak the same language."

This phase was followed by the slippery policy of the Vasco Gonçalves government, which said that it regarded the decolonization process in Angola as "special and different," different that is from what was planned for Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. It stated its position in a communiqué dated August 8, 1974, and this position was reiterated by the Portuguese government after the ouster of General Spínola. The communiqué said:

Once a cease-fire agreement is achieved, the Portuguese government will immediately establish a provisional government in which representatives of all the liberation groups will be included, along with representatives of the most important ethnic groups in the Angolan state, which will obviously include the white ethnic group.

Parallel to these last maneuvers by the Portuguese neocolonialists, the American imperialists reactivated the FNLA and UNITA puppet groups. Thus, in the post-April 25 period, the MPLA, unlike the PAIGC and Frelimo, would have to fight in the arena of mass struggle in order to win political power.

At this time, any observer following the Angolan situation with any degree of attentiveness would have noticed that the axis of the struggle was in Luanda.

The decision by Neto and Lara to allow the group led by Nito Alves and Zé Van Dúnem to participate in the leadership was an attempt to reestablish ties between the MPLA and the urban masses, links that had been neglected for many years as a result of a shortsighted policy.

In fact, the first MPLA activists to enter the capital came from the First Political-Military Region (Nito Alves began working clandestinely there in January 1974) and from among the Luandan political prisoners released from the São Nicolau prison camp (the Zé Van Dúnem group).¹⁸

It was these elements, along with the semi-Maoist Comitês Amílcar Cabral and the Comitês Henda (with which they worked closely), that led the mobilizations

18. The first official delegation of the MPLA, led by Political Bureau members Lúcio Lara and Onambwe, reached Luanda only on November 8, 1974.

of the Luandan workers in the factories, in the muçeques, and even in the colonial army. In July they directed an uprising of Angolan soldiers in the Portuguese armed forces, who demanded the right to defend the muçeques from the racist attacks.

One of the factors that helped to radicalize the process was the presence in Luanda of armed delegations from the UNITA and FNLA, and their collusion respectively with the most reactionary colonial forces and with Mobutu. This provided a clear example of neocolonialism for the Angolan masses.

Unfortunately, in the name of "national unity," the CACs and the Comités Henda held back from attacking the neocolonialist organizations. This kept the MPLA from being pressed to give a political character to its differences with the puppet organizations. It made it possible for the MPLA to become entangled in a policy of maneuvering to achieve a favorable balance of forces.

Beginning in January 1975, the MPLA sat in the Provisional Government alongside the puppets, *without anyone demanding an accounting*. At the same time, through the Nitista faction, it was able if not to control the mass movement, at least to exercise an influence in it.

While the MPLA was officially signing joint communiqués with the FNLA and UNITA, its governmental partners, it was obliged in its press to adapt to the mass radicalization.

Thus, in August 1975, the magazine *Angola*, published by the pro-MPLA Liga Nacional Africana, could run long articles opposing the "national reconstruction" policy of the "reactionary majority" government (in which the MPLA participated).

UNTA,¹⁹ the pro-MPLA union confederation, waged a campaign against the "placing of the dock workers under military discipline," a measure decreed by the Provisional Government in which the MPLA sat. It demanded "the immediate recognition of the Neighborhood Committees and all the organs of People's Power."

It called on the people to demonstrate outside the government palace to demand "recognition of the resolutions of the First People's Assembly of Luanda." Its Executive Committee raised "a strong protest against the transitional government's call for a suspension of strikes" (*A Voz dos Trabalhadores*, central organ of the UNTA, March 1975).

The very official organ of the MPLA, *Vitória é Certa*, ran a big headline in its May 24, 1975, issue proclaiming an "ultra-left" nostrum: "Production Cannot Be Increased Until Exploitation Is Ended." The article supported the strike at Têxtang.

The positions expressed by the MPLA press were symptomatic of two important factors operating in the Angolan situation at the time—the radicalization of the workers and the sensitivity of the apparatus to its pressures.

It was this sensitivity, reinforced by the organic link it had with the masses through the Nitistas, that made it possible for the MPLA to achieve its objective of controlling the mass movement.

Moreover, the concessions made at the Interregional Conference, the sharing of the leadership with the Nitista group, began to bear fruit. The "Political Bureau Report on the May 27 Attempted Coup d'Etat" explains explicitly:

At first the Nito Alves and Zé Van Dúnem group mingled in with other factionalist groups (such as the Comités Amílcar Cabral, the Comités Henda, and others), using these groups as a springboard. Then, after they had helped the MPLA leadership to neutralize their rival factionalists, the Nito Alves and Zé Van Dúnem group emerged with a greater predominance.

Thus, using the Nitista faction, which at this point was already under the influence of the Cita Vales-Rui Coelho group linked to the Portuguese CP,²⁰ the MPLA sup-

20. After May 27, the Portuguese CP made various attempts to wriggle out of such compromising ties.

Rui Coelho, a member of Nito Alves's staff when Alves was minister of the interior, said in the "public confession" he was forced to make over Angolan TV that when he was in Portugal he was a member of the CP. In its transcription of this confession, *O Diário* [an unofficial CP paper] made a typographical error. It wrote that he said he was a member of the Portuguese CP (M-L). Obviously this "typo" fooled neither the Angolans who read *O Diário* (the only Portuguese paper sold in Angola) nor the students at the law school of the University of Lisbon, who remember him as one of the most active members of the Union of Communist Students [the CP student organization].

The book *A crise do apartheid em Africa* by Edgar Vales, which was published by Seara Nova before May 27 was taken off the market after May 27 because the author made the "grave political error" of being Cita Vales's brother. Our local Stalinist censors thus went back to the old tradition of their current, directing repression against people just because of their family connections.

Covering up its relationship with a person who was the best-known leader of the Union of Communist Students, Cita Vales, was more difficult for the CP, but a lack of persistence is not a fault that we can attribute to the leadership of this party. This persistence, along with a lack of any shame, was shown in the circulating of a version that Cita had left the CP earlier. If she had left, it would have involved a split (although no one has heard of any such thing), since she had dozens of associates who were known to be CP members and were expelled, imprisoned, or shot after May 27 (e.g., Rui Coelho, Nuno Simões, Edgar Vales, Manuel Vidigal, to mention just a few). If Cita Vales had left, it would not have been because of any grave fault or betrayal on her part (because if that were so, the CP

pressed the "ultraleftist" organizations in an attempt to gain complete control of the mass movement.

The main target of this repression was the Comités Amílcar Cabral. This was for two reasons. One was the problem represented by their strength in the Neighborhood People's Commissions. The other was that their own irresponsible policy gave their repressors a pretext for going after them.

Since the Comités Amílcar Cabral were more right-wing than the MPLA leadership as regards the concessions they wanted to make to the puppet groups, it was easy to slander them as allies of the FNLA and UNITA.

Moreover, the hue and cry these groups raised about "social imperialist" arms being sent to the MPLA could scarcely be understood by a population that recognized the need to drive out the heavily armed forces of the ELNA, the FNLA's army; and the FALA, the UNITA's army; as well as their Zairian and South African allies.

It was by taking advantage of such errors that the Nitista group was able, following the Second Week of Propaganda for People's Power in Luanda in August 1975, to win the predominant influence in the Neighborhood People's Commissions away from the CACs. And as a result it was able to use these commissions as transmission belts for the slogans and directives of the MPLA.

The transformation of the civil war into a war of resistance to the invasion by the regular troops of the Mobutu regime and of South Africa enabled the MPLA to speed up the process of converting the Neighborhood People's Commissions into its instruments.

In October 1975, the delegates to the First Conference of UNTA learned to their indignation, from an addendum printed by mistake, that the statutes they had just adopted and the National Secretariat they had just put in office had been decided on previously by the Political Bureau of the MPLA. Later the bureaucratic hacks explained that this had been done because of the "imperative national needs" created by the South African invasion.

Following independence (which came on November 11), the MPLA leadership and the government of the new People's Republic raised the slogan: "The Way to Fight Back Is to Produce." And they tried to put this slogan across in the factories and in all places of production.

On December 15, Law No. 11/75 on "Discipline in the Productive Process" was

should have denounced her then). This means that whatever the relationship is between the CP and Cita Vales, the party should not have abandoned her to a repression that accorded her no legal or human rights.

19. União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola (National Union of Angolan Workers).

approved. Taking the pretext of "the war that has been forced on us by the enemies of the Angolan people," this act established penalties for a series of "crimes against production." These included "lack of punctuality and diligence," "strikes unauthorized by the unions," and so forth.

Article No. 18 (Part III) of the new law made the union shop committees into repressive instruments:

Members of union committees and union locals . . . that fail to report to the Ministry of Labor such crimes against production will be tried and sentenced as accomplices.

In the same way, the MPLA sought to take control of the Neighborhood People's Commissions. On February 5, 1976, the government adopted the ironically named "People's Power Law." In Section 3, Article 44, this act states:

Nominations for membership in the grassroots people's commissions can be made only by (a) the MPLA Action Committees, (b) UNTA, (c) the MPLA Youth, (d) the Angolan Women's Organization.

Its prestige shored up by the expulsion of the South Africans and the Zaïrians from the country, the MPLA leadership moved to channel all the administrative life of the country through its structures. The main role was played specifically by the following institutions:

1. The steering committees and political commissariats, which are the highest party and state bodies on the provincial level.

2. The FAPLA. The armed forces went through a long process of reorganization in which a hierarchy was built up. This was not easy, since there was resistance from the young political-military commissars in particular.

3. The DISA, the political police.

Arming of the masses was dropped. The distribution of arms outside the regular armed forces was turned over to paramilitary structures of the party, the Organização da Defesa Popular (ODP—People's Defense Organization). These units play an important role only in those rural areas not yet under government control. For example, it is the ODP that organizes the *quimbos*, or villages, in Bié and Huambo where UNITA has lost its influence or not yet gained any.

In addition to launching the campaign around the slogan "The Way to Fight Back Is to Produce" and adopting the law on "Discipline in the Productive Process," the government has appointed state/party administrative commissions with full executive powers to run the state enterprises and those companies that have been put under state supervision.

It is the central bodies that set the short-term norms of emulation and annual production quotas. This is done through the ministry planning boards, under the coordination of the National Planning Commission. They are assisted by the section

leaderships and the UNTA, which plays a role in emulation plans. All of this is done in a bureaucratic way. Those who actually do the work of production, the workers, are not called upon to participate in deciding what is to be done or in supervising the execution of the tasks.

The final thing that the MPLA had to do to accomplish its "normalization" operation was to "clean out its own house."

A number of factors had prepared the way for the Neto-Lara leadership to undertake this job. Its prestige had been given a boost by the expulsion of the invaders. It had already taken the basic steps to take control of the mass movement, which was now channelled through its transmission-belt structures—the UNTA, ODP, MPLA Youth, the Angolan Women's Organization, and others. Moreover, it had the political, military, and ideological support of the Cubans. The Neto-Lara leadership knew that they had to get rid of the "thorn in their flesh" represented by the Nitistas.

In the first place, the Nitistas had political ambitions of their own. They were trying to become an alternative to the leading faction, and to this end they had occupied powerful positions in the party and state apparatus (especially in the FAPLA and DISA).

Secondly, the Nitistas' strategy involved mobilization and opposition, and it was attracting the more radical elements. These included the Luanda dock workers; the people in certain *muçeques* with a tradition of struggle, such as Sambizanga and Rangel; and in particular the most combative elements in the FAPLA, specifically the political commissars.

These more radical elements were struck by the contrast between the beginning signs of corruption and careerism among the "political personal" and the day-to-day difficulties in the neighborhoods and on the battlefronts.

While the news media that the Nitistas controlled—the daily *Diário de Luanda* and the radio programs "Kudibanguela" and "People in Arms"—hailed Nito Alves as an "outstanding political figure, philosopher, fighter, and poet," they also made just criticisms of the social situation. At this time, people could see disorganization, scarcity, and hunger (no mere literary expression in 1976 and 1977) going hand in hand with the appearance of a succession of Alfa Romeos, Volvos, and Mercedes at the homes of the new ministers and their respective consorts.

Following the Third Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1976, the Nitistas began to be removed officially from their ministerial and party posts.²¹ This

21. David Aires Machado, who used the pseudonym Minerva, minister of internal commerce, and therefore responsible for organizing the supply of consumer goods, is the only well-known Nitista in a high governmental position who escaped the October 1976 purge. I do not

culminated on May 20, 1977, with the expulsion of Nito Alves and Zé Van Dú-nem from the Central Committee in a maneuver whose most immediate aim was to prevent them from taking part in the congress.

The Nitistas were forced into clandestine activity. And they proved unable to respond to these conditions in any other way than by adopting a putschist course. This is despite the fact that throughout May they were gaining support in a number of neighborhoods (Sambizanga, Rangel, Prenda, Nelito Soares) and in units of the FAPLA (the Ninth Armored Brigade, the Military Police, and the Women's Detachment).

Although it originated in an intra-bureaucratic faction fight, May 27 had tragic consequences in that it provided a pretext for unleashing repression against the most radical sections of the working people and the activists in the neighborhoods, the factories, and in the FAPLA. A particularly disastrous consequence of the May 27 events was that an atmosphere of terror²² was created that discouraged the masses from trying to engage in any activity outside the channels established by the MPLA.

The MPLA did not miss its chance to inflict a defeat on the workers that could serve as an effective warning. As a result, strike attempts since May 27 have been easily demobilized. An example of this is what happened at the Siga bag factory in Luanda. Third Deputy Premier Loy intervened right in the middle of a workers assembly. All he had to do was allude to connections between the strike and "factional activities." An implicit threat was left hanging.

The wave of repression also struck the UNTA. Its former general secretary, Aristides Van Dú-nem, was reportedly likely to be condemned to death. On the pretext that they had been "infiltrated by the Nitistas," all the union commissions were suspended, awaiting the outcome of an inquiry.

Only by relearning clandestine methods of organization, opposition, and struggle; only by regaining their confidence through small victories; only if the coming van-

want to speculate about conspiracies, but this omission in the purge was a boon to the campaign against "Nitista sabotage" that aided in the repressive crackdown after May 27.

22. These are just a few cases of the hundreds of assassinations carried out by the MPLA leadership.

In Ngunza, the capital of Kwanza Sul, where the provincial commissar was a Nitista, on the night of August 6 some 204 alleged "factionalists" were shot down.

In Luena, the capital of Moxico, in the days immediately following the putsch in Luanda, all the political commissars of the FAPLA were assassinated on the orders of Central Committee member Sapilinia.

guards learn the political lessons of this setback, will the Angolan working masses be able to shake off the feeling of defeat.

The Role of the Cubans

In the construction of a state apparatus and in "normalizing" administrative life and the functioning of various social and economic structures, the support of the Cubans has played an essential role throughout the Angolan process.

The Cuban intervention on the side of the MPLA after the South African and Zaïrian invasions was ambiguous and contradictory.

We should consider important by itself such a decision by a deformed workers state, by its voluntary and conscious disruption of the international status quo, without its borders or national interest being in danger. We know that this could only be done by a leadership such as the Castroist one.

In the most important stages of its historical development, the Castro leadership was built despite the Soviet aims or even in direct contradiction to them. Its links with the masses, like those of the Vietnamese, cannot be compared to the situation in other workers states.

However, we think that the well-known analysis, which was made explicitly by the Colombian writer Gabriel García Márquez in his article "Operation Carlota" (published in the *Jornal do Angola*) is not correct in stating that the Cuban decision was made in a sovereign way and that the Soviets were presented with an accomplished fact.²³

The Cuban intervention did break the limiting and ideologically dangerous framework of "African solidarity" and "pan-Africanism" so much in vogue in the MPLA's propaganda. It forced the MPLA to recognize a higher and clearer form of anti-imperialism. However, the role that the Cubans played subsequently demonstrated that their involvement was essentially within the context of the general Soviet strategy.

The Cubans were more perceptive and subtle in their understanding of the geopolitical phenomena of the so-called Third World. Thus, they could provide effective logistic support and political counseling. The Soviets (and other East European countries) have already demonstrated on several occasions (as in Egypt and Somalia) that they cannot do this.

The Soviets are hindered by their great-power attitudes, their commercial ambi-

tions, and their political and economic arrogance (e.g., the shameless plundering of Angolan territorial waters between Porto Alexandre and Benguela by Soviet trawlers). Thus, the Soviets cannot have the flexibility that the Cubans do, a flexibility that in the last analysis is necessary to carry out the Soviet strategy—to build a "progressive" state.

Whatever tactical differences the Soviets and Cubans may have, their actions do not serve the interests of the workers.

As a result of the actions of the Cubans

and the Soviets, the essential foundations have been laid for the emergence of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie based on the state capitalist sector. There are no organs of mass control. The state enterprises function in a bureaucratic way. There is a strong economic sector linked to imperialism.

History will reveal how the Angolan people will eliminate these obstacles. The present has already shown that when they do this they will not be organized in the MPLA but in opposition to it. □

Lev Lukyanenko Sentenced to 15 Years

By Marilyn Vogt

Lev Lukyanenko, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group, was sentenced to a fifteen-year term on July 20. The sentence—ten years' strict-regime labor camp and five years' internal exile—came after a four-day closed trial in Gorodnya, about 100 miles northeast of Kiev.

Lukyanenko is the fifth member of the Ukrainian group to be sentenced to a long term since the Stalinist rulers began their police crackdown on the group in February 1977. Oleksiy Tykhy also received a fifteen-year term and Mykola Rudenko received a twelve-year term in July 1977; and Myroslav Marynovych and Mykola Matusevych, tried in March 1978, both received twelve-year terms. All five were sentenced on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Lukyanenko was born August 24, 1927, in a Ukrainian village not far from where his trial was held. He served in the Soviet army from 1944 to 1953. Following his discharge, he joined the Communist party and enrolled in the law school of Lomonosov State University of Moscow. He graduated in 1957 and then served as a staff propagandist for party district committees in the Ukrainian republic and as a defense attorney in the Lviv Region.

Over the past seventeen years, Lukyanenko's name has figured prominently in the Ukrainian movement opposing the Stalinist policy of Russification. He became an active opponent of Russification in the late 1950s. In January 1961, he was one of seven persons arrested for trying to organize a Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Union to put forth for discussion the demand for an independent socialist Ukraine.

For his role in trying to organize the group, Lukyanenko was sentenced to death on "treason" charges. While the right for any Soviet republic to secede from the USSR is guaranteed by the Soviet constitution, agitating for such secession qualifies as treason under the Stalinists' criminal code.

Lukyanenko's death sentence was com-

muted to a term of fifteen years' hard labor. While he was serving this term, prison authorities continually intensified the severity of his terms of confinement. In February 1974 he was moved to the notorious Vladimir prison, and in December 1974 he was transferred to a psychiatric hospital prison. The aim was to try to force him to renounce his views. They did not succeed.

Lukyanenko was released in January 1976 when his term ended. The persecution did not stop.

He was settled in the city of Chernigov and kept under continuous police surveillance. He was constantly followed, his phone calls were intercepted by the police, his mail was opened, he had to report regularly to the police, and he could not leave the city without police permission.

Despite these attempts to keep him silent, Lukyanenko helped establish the Ukrainian Helsinki group in November 1976. The group, in its documents, condemns the persecution by the ruling "fanatical Great-Russian chauvinists" of Ukrainian nationalists whom, the group asserts, Lenin would have defended.

As the police pressure on him escalated, in August 1977 Lukyanenko requested that the Soviet government allow him to emigrate. For although he loves the Ukraine more than himself, he said, he would never renounce his views and was destined to be forever a prisoner of the Kremlin's police, even in his present conditions "in freedom."

His new arrest came in December 1977.

The second fifteen-year term for Lukyanenko, whose name has become synonymous with the demand for an independent socialist Ukraine, is meant by the Stalinist rulers to be a serious blow to the masses of Ukrainians whose national and democratic rights he has championed.

But the fact that the Kremlin rulers have had to resort to imposing such a long term shows that even when he was kept under virtual house arrest, Lukyanenko and his ideas posed a mortal threat to their power.

23. García Márquez wrote: "The Cuban CP leadership had only twenty-four hours to decide. It did so unhesitatingly in a long and calm meeting on November 5. Contrary to what has been said on several occasions, this was an independent and sovereign decision by Cuba. Only after the decision was made, and not before, was the Soviet Union informed."

Philosophy in Yugoslavia: What Happened to 'Praxis'?

Reviewed by George Novack



Until recently Serbo-Croat philosophy made little impact upon the rest of world thought. This is no longer the case. Over the past fifteen years the dissident Yugoslav Marxist scholars gathered around the journal *Praxis*, the most unfettered intellectual force in East Europe, have become the focal point of political controversy and attracted international attention to their ideas.

It is understandable why the most defiant school of anti-Stalinist philosophers adhering to Marxism came forth in Yugoslavia before any of the other postcapitalist countries. Their development has been bound up with the zigzag course of the Yugoslav revolution, the ideological and political openings issuing from the break between Moscow and Belgrade in 1948, and the incapacity of the Titoist regime, for all its innovations, to shake off its bureaucratic practices and permit unhampered criticism of its defaults, even from the standpoint of strengthening socialist tendencies.

Gerson S. Sher, now connected with the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C., has written a full-scale study of the views and vicissitudes of the *Praxis* group in its shifting relations with the government and party authorities. The frictions between them led to the expulsion of eight professors from the Belgrade University philosophical faculty in January 1975 and the shutting down of *Praxis* itself a month later. His admirably informed account is indispensable for understanding the evolution of the *Praxis* collective and its significance for contemporary socialist thought.

The Yugoslav thinkers of Marxist persuasion confronted the same tasks after 1948 as the leaders of the Yugoslav CP: How to understand the nature of Stalinism in which they had been enmeshed, eradicate its baneful effects in all fields, and henceforth think and act in accord with the genuine methods of scientific socialism.

The Tito leadership, intent on bureaucratic self-preservation, proved incapable of developing a revolutionary course at home or abroad or grasping the essence of Stalinism as the policies of an uncontrolled bureaucratic caste in a degenerated workers' state born of an anticapitalist

revolution. For fear of forfeiting their monopoly of power and privileges, they refused to hand over the ultimate decision-making powers to the popular masses in whose name they ruled.

At first Belgrade characterized the So-

Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia, by Gerson S. Sher. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. 360 pp. \$15.

viet Union as a monopoly-capitalist imperialist state, while Moscow branded Yugoslavia as a fascist capitalist pawn of Western imperialism. The equally opportunistic contestants substituted polemical epithets for serious sociological analysis. This theoretical light-mindedness was exposed after their reconciliation in 1955 when each readmitted the other to the category of "socialist" countries.

Despite its shortcomings, Tito's regime has instituted more progressive reforms than any other in East Europe. In the economy it established a system of workers self-management, though limited to the factory level. It relaxed controls over intellectual and cultural life, allowed more latitude in the expression of opinion, and freer intercourse with the West. At the same time it maintained a strict one-party monopoly of political life. Instead of following a policy of international class solidarity designed to extend the world revolution, Belgrade sought to maneuver between the imperialist powers and other workers states under cover of "nonalignment."

The *Praxis* group, made up of former partisan fighters and CP members, welcomed the domestic reforms as a pledge of the leadership's intention to jettison the rest of the heritage of Stalinism. Under the impetus of the fast-moving developments within Yugoslavia during the 1950s they set about to accelerate the progressive changes by revitalizing Marxism along the lines of a "socialist humanism." Individually and collectively, they aspired to work out an anti-Stalinist mode of thought that could steer the party and the regime toward a socialist democracy. They believed

this was possible within the precincts of the party or at least was well worth the effort.

In the endeavor to pull the regime forward they began to outpace official thought and move beyond it to the point where they were obliged to constitute themselves as a loose collective organized around their periodical.

The central leadership, troubled by critics to the right and to the left, came to regard the group as more of a threat to its authority than the initiators expected. In addition to nationalist ferment in Croatia and Montenegro, the Titoists had to contend with Stalinist diehards looking to Moscow, as well as with Social-Democratic and bourgeois-democratic dissidents such as Djilas and Mihajlov. They disposed of these sources of opposition by suppression and imprisonment.

The *Praxis* gadflies on their left flank were not so easy to handle. They not only agreed with workers self-management and the "Yugoslav road to socialism" but included the most able and eminent scholars, teachers, and writers in the fields of philosophy and sociology. Punitive measures against them for their opinions would damage Yugoslavia's reputation in the West as the most destalinized of the post-capitalist states. Moreover, the ideas and proposals of the *Praxis* people met with widespread sympathy and support among the youth and even among elements in the upper party circles.

Thanks to these circumstances, the group enjoyed exceptional freedom for a time during the first half of the 1960s. They were able to maintain their free-thinking journal and summer school at Korcula for ten years from 1964 to 1975, a record of longevity unmatched anywhere in East Europe. The open publication of *Praxis* stood in contrast with the enforced underground circulation of samizdat in the Soviet bloc.

Whatever self-restraint they exercised, the *Praxis* conception that Marxism enjoined "the critique of all existing conditions," expressed in the early issues, was bound to bring them into conflict with the party tops who could hardly be expected to tolerate the criticisms of their own "New Left" without retribution against them.

The first public attacks came in

February-March 1965 when the secretary of the Zagreb City Committee and the chairman of the League of Communists of Croatia Ideological Commission censured *Praxis* for its "destructive" attitude toward the task of social criticism. This campaign culminated in a polemic in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia Central Committee's official organ *Socijalizam* by no less a figure than Edvard Kardelj, the committee's principal spokesman.

Kardelj dismissed their theories as an "alchemistic mixture of abstract eternal truths about humanity and freedom" and the "destructive criticism" of irresponsible individuals "who are not in a position to understand the essence of social relations, egoists, demagogues ambitious for power, the disoriented man who wants to be original at all costs." (pp. 199-202). The core of his concern was whether the radical criticism of *Praxis* "will introduce . . . methods . . . of political struggle between political cliques." Since tendencies and factions were prohibited in the Yugoslav CP as in all Stalinized parties, he feared that the *Praxis* theorists might precipitate a formation that could challenge the omniscience of the party leadership and undermine its prestige.

In defense against these accusations of being an antiparty tendency, *Praxis* wrote an editorial denying that its criticism was connected with current political issues or action. "For—we are not, and do not want to be, political!" This disavowal was unconvincing and contradictory for a publication named *Praxis*. It not only flew in the face of the actual contention of forces but ran counter to the Marxist maxim that it was insufficient to interpret events in the manner of "speculative philosophers"; it was necessary to affect their development. And indeed, far from swimming "in the peaceful waters of scholasticism," *Praxis* had willy-nilly embarked on a stormy course of confrontation with the party authorities. Much as they hoped to remain aloof from Yugoslav politics, it would not leave them unmolested in academia.

In 1966 *Praxis* was harried by financial pressures, the resignation of its editor-in-chief, Danilo Pejovic, president of the Croatian Philosophical Society; the repercussions of the Rankovic* affair; and the arrest of the writer Mihajlo Mihajlov. The magazine was blamed for encouraging the

latter's heresies and seeking to found a current based on "Djilasism." With some difficulty the editorial board was able to surmount these and related obstructions, hold firm, and keep alive.

The showdown with the powers-that-be came with the student revolts in the universities lasting a week in June 1968. These erupted out of the youth radicalization which exploded in late December 1966 with a demonstration against the U.S. bombing of Hanoi that led to a fracas with the police. This had its sequel in a bloodier clash with the police on the evening of June 2, 1968, and the occupation of the University of Belgrade building housing the faculty of philosophy. The philosophical faculties of Belgrade and Zagreb were the focal points of the countrywide protest.

In this birthplace of "the red university" the rebellious students drew up a list of demands calling for major changes in Yugoslav life. Their Action-Political Program dealt with all the abscesses of the society—social differentiation and privilege, unemployment and political sinecures, real as opposed to merely formal self-management, the demoralization of official organizations, especially of the League of Communists, land speculation, the commercialization of culture and the quality of university life.

The philosophy professors were blamed for fomenting the demonstrations. They were a source of inspiration for the demands but they did not incite them and indeed in several instances tried successfully to dissuade the students from physical confrontations. Nonetheless, Yugoslav officials held them accountable for the student actions.

Actually, as Sher says, the June 1968 events represented "the political coming of age of a new generation—one which had not passed through the purifying flames of the Partisan War—and its affirmation of the revolution's goals, an affirmation as intense and spontaneous as it was short-lived."

The insurgent students were as much in tune with the *Praxis* views as they were at odds with the party hierarchy. Their June movement did succeed in quashing the project to introduce stock certificates within economic enterprises, a step intended to cement the workers' interest in the prosperity of a given production unit as well as to establish a limited stock market for foreign investors. This scheme was an entering wedge for capitalist relations.

On June 9 Tito himself went on the air and made a speech conceding the justness of the student demands and promising to rectify their grievances. (This he failed to do.) In a follow-up speech two weeks later, after a press campaign against "hostile" elements, he inveighed against a group of "individual professors, some philosophers, various *praxisovci* and others, various dogmatists" who wanted to "create chaos

and to fish in troubled waters." He stated that such people had no place in the schools and universities and, if necessary, administrative measures should be invoked against them.

Although Gajo Petrovic and Mladen Caldarcic were immediately expelled from the party in Zagreb, it took four years before Tito's threats were carried out. Meantime the government kept harassing *Praxis*; the first issue to be confiscated was in 1971.

Individual members of the board became more radicalized and outspoken and the magazine published controversial articles on such sensitive issues as the worker and student strikes, Stojanovic's analysis of the student movement, and went so far as to print an essay advocating a multiparty political system, the height of heresy.

Praxis came more in harmony with the regime when the publication opposed as "petty-bourgeois" the Croatian national movement, which resulted in the purge of the leaders of the League of Communists of Croatia in 1972. It won support from the new president of the LCC Ideological Commission, Stipe Suvar, and one of its best-known members, Predrag Vranicki, was elected rector of Zagreb University.

The *Praxis* theorists regarded themselves not as political activists but as a sort of Marxist "think-tank," preoccupied, as Rudi Supek emphasized, with "problems of social consciousness in a socialist direction, for which we as intellectuals . . . are directly responsible." They hoped to accelerate the processes of democratization by conducting a constant dialogue with the liberal forces in the ruling party. They believed they had made some impression on the decision-makers as evidenced in the provisions of the new 1974 constitution and the strengthening of the system of workers self-management, which is for them the touchstone of a democratic socialism.

As a group, they deliberately refrained from proposing a multiparty system for fear of crystallizing nationalist hostilities in the federated republic and legalizing both pro-Stalinist and probourgeois parties. Such an "interparty struggle for power," Stojanovic cautioned, "would in turn imperil further democratization." Much like the noted Soviet dissident Roy Medvedev, they favored gradual liberalization of the existing regime and its practices. As a 1968 editorial declared: "We consider that outside of or alongside of a Marxist-Communist ideological basis and perspective, outside of or alongside of the program of the LCY, there exists today no ideological-political force capable of safeguarding the integrity of this country."

Sher remarks that the government's repressive measures should by now have disabused them of that illusion. "By 1975, only Vranicki and the young Zarko Puhovski retained their party membership, others having renounced it or having been

*In July 1966 Tito conducted a purge of highly placed officials, amid charges that a large-scale secret-police bugging of the homes of the party leadership had been discovered. Chief among those dismissed was Aleksandar Rankovic, head of the political police. This blow against the "dogmatic" elements was accompanied by efforts to implement the other side of Tito's policy—curbing his "liberal" critics. Attacks against *Praxis* were stepped up, including an attempt to engineer the "resignation" of its editorial board.

deprived of it in the preceding years."

The ax began to fall after Tito once again called in January 1972 for ousting "those who are corrupting our youth." The ensuing escalation of attacks upon the editorial board culminated in the expulsion of eight of the Belgrade University philosophers and sociologists from their posts at the end of January 1975, followed by the closing down of *Praxis*.

This punitive operation met with prolonged resistance in the university as a clear violation of academic self-management. Since then the persecution of the "Belgrade Eight" has become a cause célèbre not only in Yugoslavia but in scholarly circles around the world. (See my account in "Freedom for Philosophy," in *Intercontinental Press*, March 29, 1976, p. 596.)

After the victimized professors appealed to Serbia's highest court, the measure was judged constitutional. In January 1978 they addressed an open letter to Tito protesting the acts of political repression in regard to employment in Yugoslavia.

(See "The New System of Self-Management in Yugoslavia" by Catherine Verla, *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, May 8, 1978, p. 557.)

The affair is far from ended. Like many other issues in Yugoslavia today, it will be subjected to review in the period ahead. The Yugoslav CP concluded its Congress on June 23. This was probably the last Congress where the eighty-six-year-old Tito, president of both the party and the government, would be present. The question on the mind of everyone interested in that country's destiny is: What will happen when that towering figure dies?

Sher is pessimistic. "The clumsy actions against the 'Eight' in Belgrade and the closing of *Praxis* itself, taken in the broader context of the politics of the 1970's, appear to confirm that the Yugoslav revolution is entering decisively on a conservative phase." In post-Tito Yugoslavia honest social debate and critical thinking of the *Praxis* type "will become mere memories of a past age," he opines.

On the other hand, Mihajlo Mihajlov envisages the emergence of a multiparty democracy. "After a short crisis we'll see for the first time the liberalization of an authoritarian state," he told the *New York Times* June 11, 1978.

In fact, no one can foretell what the immediate consequences of Tito's departure might be. That will be decided by the struggle of the forces within the country. We know that the deaths of Stalin and Mao released long-pent-up divisions at the top and aspirations and demands from below that ushered in quite unanticipated and startling changes.

Tito has been an equally commanding source of stability in the Yugoslav postrevolutionary political setup and his passing should very likely detonate developments that will surprise even their participants. In any event, because of their persecution and popularity the *Praxis* intellectuals and their followers should have a significant contribution to make in the critical times ahead.

July 2, 1978

Interview With Michael Farrell

Ireland—A New Awakening of Anti-Imperialist Sentiment

[Michael Farrell was one of the most prominent leaders of the mass civil-rights movement in Northern Ireland. He was in the forefront in particular in the 1968-69 demonstrations. He is the author of a history of the imperialist enclave of Northern Ireland, *The Orange State*.

[Farrell was also a founder of the People's Democracy group, which is now engaged in a process of fusion with the Movement for a Socialist Republic, the Irish section of the Fourth International. He gave the following interview to Gerry Foley in Belfast in mid-April.]

* * *

Question. Has there been any major change in the situation in Northern Ireland in the past year?

Answer. The conference on repression held in Coalisland this February represented a new awakening of the spirit of resistance. This spirit had fallen to a very low level, beginning particularly in 1974, with the fall of the power-sharing executive¹ and victories by Unionists in two successive Westminster elections.

1. "Power sharing" is a scheme for giving some posts in the executive branch of government in Northern Ireland to Catholics, so that the parties of the Catholic minority will not perpetually be

in opposition. This scheme was briefly put into effect in Northern Ireland but was abandoned in the face of right-wing Protestant opposition.—*IP/I*

Q. What forces were represented at this conference?

A. It was broadly representative. It included a number of important layers besides the groups already involved in the protests such as Provisional Sinn Féin and the Marxist groups.

One layer was people who had been involved in earlier civil-rights struggles and had been apathetic for years. They had either been demoralized by the decline in the struggle or by the sectarian infighting among the anti-imperialist groups. This layer exists throughout the six counties of Northern Ireland.

There were a lot of SDLP [Social Democratic and Labour Party, the main Catholic electoral party] members. There

were two SDLP leaders, Paddy Duffy and Austin Curry. Neither spoke. And it was quite clear that Curry in particular was not in support of the initiative. But it is indicative of the strength of this mobilization that they felt it necessary to be there.

Their presence was quite striking. They stood at the back of the hall. They did not say anything. But they made sure that people saw that they were there. They were hedging their bets. So, if anything came out of the conference, they could say that they had been there and weren't hostile to the initiative. They also wanted to see who else was there and how much strength the movement had in the population.

There was a very large representation from the Irish Independence Party [which emerged as a bourgeois-nationalist alternative to the SDLP when the latter became too entangled in collaboration with the imperialists]. Two of their main leaders were there—Frank McManus, the former member of parliament from Fermanagh-South, and John Turnley, a former SDLP member of the constitutional convention set up in 1974.

There were also some representatives of the Republican Clubs [the "Official" republican organizations in the North].

Q. The presence of the "Officials" was

rather a new development, was it not? Since 1974 in particular, they have avoided all united-front activity, claiming that association with nationalist organizations would compromise them in the eyes of the Protestant working class.

A. A representative of a local Republican Club spoke and said that his organization would cooperate in a united front of resistance. He seemed to be speaking for his local club and not for the national leadership of "Official" Sinn Féin. Nonetheless, it indicated that in the ranks of "Official" Sinn Féin locally there are elements willing to cooperate in a united front.

Q. How was the "Official" republican speaker received by the largely Provisional audience at the conference?

A. There were two things striking about the intervention of this man, a former county councillor named Eugene O'Duill. One was its positive tone. He spoke in a nonsectarian way. He didn't make any of the customary attacks on the Provisionals. The other thing was that he was listened to with attention and respect by the audience.

In my experience, in the recent years of internecine feuds between the "Officials" and Provisionals, it would not have been possible for an "Official" spokesman to appear at a conference where there was a large number of Provisionals and get a hearing.

That indicated to me that even among the supporters of Provisional Sinn Féin there was a willingness to listen to what the "Officials" had to say, and to cooperate with them to some extent, if they themselves were prepared to do that. It showed me that there was a possibility of cooperation at least on a local level.

Q. How would you compare the Coalisland conference to the conferences held by the civil-rights movement when it still had active mass support?

A. The Coalisland conference was the largest and most representative conference in Northern Ireland since 1971-72. Actually, it was very similar to the conferences that launched the Northern Resistance Movement in that period. In fact, a lot of the same people were involved. That was very important.

In terms of the politics of the Coalisland conference, its political level was considerably higher than that of the conferences held before. I think this was a result of the experiences of the struggle in the last ten years. A lot of political lessons had been learned. A lot of political concepts were clearer.

The demands that came out of the conference were on a higher level than in the past.

In my intervention I outlined what I

thought the demands of a united front should be now. I made the point that it was necessary to demand British withdrawal. This was because the level of consciousness in the anti-imperialist population had moved upwards.

In 1968-69, the slogans around which a movement could be built were simply demands for civil rights within the framework of the six-county state. In the period of the Northern Resistance Movement in 1971-72, the slogans were for an end to internment and for smashing the Stormont government [the Belfast parliament].

The demands for British withdrawal and an end to the six-county state were not raised explicitly. They might have been implicit in the other demands. But they were not made explicit because this was not called for by the consciousness of the people at the time.

At Coalisland, I said that the demand for British withdrawal should be a basic demand of the united front and that it would be acceptable to all the people in the room. In fact, there was only one dissenting speaker. I think the "Official" Sinn Féin speaker also said he would agree to that demand. That indicated how much the consciousness had moved upwards. The demands today are aimed directly against imperialism.

Q. What role did the revolutionary Marxists play in building the Coalisland conference and in the discussion at it?

A. The initiative came from Bernadette [Devlin] McAliskey of the Independent Socialist Party. And outside of her local area, it received its main support from ourselves in the PD and MSR. So, we played a major role in bringing about the conference in face of some opposition from Provisional Sinn Féin.

But the Marxists played much the same role with respect to building the Resistance Movement in 1971-72. It was Bernadette McAliskey, as an individual, and PD that played the main role in convening the conferences that set up the Resistance Movement.

The main difference that I would see today is that the groups involved are actually Marxist. In those days they were left-centrist groups. Today their level of political understanding is a great deal higher. The leadership that we would give to a united-front movement would be correspondingly higher.

Q. Do you think that the organizational level of the Marxist groups is also higher? In the early days of the civil-rights movement, the republicans were not much more numerous than the socialist groups. But the fact that the socialists were organized in a loose and amateurish way made it easy for the republicans to bypass them.

A. As far as the relationship of forces

goes, the position of the Marxist groups vis-à-vis the republicans is much weaker today than it was at the time of the Northern Resistance Movement. At that time, our organization, the PD, was much larger than it is now. And the Provisional republican movement, who were our main allies in the civil-resistance movement, were much weaker than they are today. Their political organization, Sinn Féin, was still fairly disorganized at that stage.

So, in that sense, today we are weaker. The Provisional Sinn Féin is fairly strong. We are a great deal smaller. On the other hand, our organizations, the PD and the MSR, are more internally cohesive and disciplined and capable of making a much more effective intervention within a united front if one develops.

Q. What has been the impact on the oppressed people of the North of the defeat of the National Coalition Government in the South, which openly collaborated with British imperialism?

A. The defeat of the Coalition, more than the actual victory of the Fianna Fáil party, has given a big boost to the morale of the anti-imperialist population. The statements by the new Fianna Fáil government about British withdrawal have reinforced this.

The fact is that the anti-imperialist population in the North, after suffering a series of defeats, had become very isolated. The Southern government, and, as far as they could see, Southern public opinion, were against them. In particular, they were being harangued and denounced by Southern politicians.

Then, when the anti-imperialist population in the North saw the main agents of British imperialism in the twenty-six-county state, Conor Cruise O'Brien and Patrick Cooney [Minister for Justice], go down to defeat in the elections, that was a tremendous morale booster.

Q. You have seen the consciousness of the Provisional republican membership develop from pure nationalism to an almost universal identification with socialism, at least in words. What are the causes of this and how far is the process likely to go?

A. One reason for this process is that, as the struggle has continued, all the bourgeois political forces have not only failed to support the struggle but have denounced and opposed it. They have fairly clearly taken the side of British imperialism.

This has compelled many republicans who were not initially socialist-oriented to reconsider the class forces involved in the struggle. It has compelled them to recognize that bourgeois political forces will not support the anti-imperialist struggle and that victory cannot be achieved with the assistance of bourgeois forces.

For example, when the Provisionals

were first formed, it is well known that they were given some assistance by a section of the Fianna Fáil party led by Blaney and Boland, who are the spokesmen for a section of the Southern bourgeoisie. The Provisionals have long since ceased to get any support from that element.

They have lost faith in the Southern bourgeoisie coming to their rescue. They have also seen the spokesmen for the Catholic bourgeoisie in the North, the SDLP, betray them. Finally, they have been forced to fall back on "the men of no property," as Wolfe Tone² called them.

The same has been true on the international level. Many of those who came to the republican movement simply out of nationalist consciousness tended to look to the United States for political support. Having found that the United States government fully supports the British and will give them no assistance whatsoever has forced them to reconsider the nature of a country like the United States and of its government. They now no longer see the United States as the "land of the free" but as standing on the side of the oppressors.

In looking for support abroad, the Provisionals have found that it has come almost entirely from the organizations of the Marxist left. Their staunchest and most reliable friends internationally are the Marxist left. And that has forced a lot of republicans to take a sympathetic attitude to socialism. It has also discredited the elements in the republican movement who were antisocialist.

Q. Do you see any obstacles, then, to socialist consciousness continuing to develop in the Provisional republican movement?

A. I think that within the republican movement it is not possible for militants to reach a fully Marxist consciousness. By its tradition this is a petty-bourgeois military movement. Its political structure is underdeveloped and is basically an adjunct to the military organization.

There is really no provision within the republican movement for democratic discussion of strategy and tactics. Since it is a guerrilla organization, a secret and conspiratorial one, I think that it is impossible for an open debate to take place that will lead to a clear counterposing of Marxist and non-Marxist positions and victory for one or the other. So, I don't think that the republican movement can advance beyond a general sympathy with socialism and Marxism.

However, I also think that as the struggle continues it will become increasingly clear that while traditional republican militarism can prove an irritant to impe-

rialism it cannot defeat imperialism. A traditional republican military organization simply cannot mobilize forces strong enough to defeat imperialism.

In particular, republicanism has no way of bringing the mass of the population in the South from a passive sympathy with the struggle to an active involvement in it. The republicans do not concern themselves with the questions around which these people can be mobilized—the questions of class and of the economy. The republican movement cannot solve this problem; it cannot defeat imperialism.

Hopefully, it will be seen that the only organizations that can pose a strategy capable of defeating imperialism and achieving socialism in Ireland are the Marxist organizations, and therefore militants in the republican movement will be drawn toward Marxism. But in order to become Marxists, I think, they will have to leave the republican movement.

Q. What is the attitude now in the Catholic ghettos to the armed struggle?

A. There has definitely been a decline in active support for it. At the peak of the struggle in early 1972, after the introduction of internment and before the fall of Stormont, 70 percent or more of the Catholic population would actively have supported the armed struggle. The percentage now is probably rather small, about 20 percent.

Q. Does that percentage hold throughout the Catholic areas of the Six Counties?

A. The strongest support is in the Belfast Catholic ghettos. In the rural areas, the percentage would be lower. There are some areas that once were IRA strongholds but are now fairly quiet.

On the other hand, active opposition to the armed struggle is not a majority position within the Catholic population. The Peace Movement reached its peak around the end of 1976 and the beginning of 1977. It is now fairly well discredited.

The mass of the Catholic population have a position of sympathy toward the IRA and vehement opposition to British army repression. They accept the need for the use of armed force in defense of the ghettos; they regard armed force as a legitimate weapon against imperialism.

But I think tactically the mass of the Catholic population no longer actively supports the armed struggle, primarily because they no longer believe that it is succeeding or likely to succeed.

Most Catholics appear convinced that the Six Counties will never be other than sectarian [i.e., Protestant supremacist]. They are opposed to the torture and repression being carried on by the imperialist forces. I think that they can be mobilized now in a political movement around these issues. I don't think that they can be mobilized in support of the armed struggle.

Q. Is the mass of the Catholic population concerned about the conditions faced by the Provisional IRA prisoners?

A. I think that there is strong feeling about this among the masses of the population. It has taken a long time for the conditions in H-Block [where the republican prisoners who refuse to accept criminal status are held] to come home to the mass of the people. Many republican militants tend to be impatient about this. It's happening to their relatives and friends. They know about it directly.

Those who visit their relatives in prison know the full horrors of the treatment of political prisoners. They feel this with a tremendous urgency. And so they get very frustrated at the failure of the masses of the population to take up these issues.

But I think it has to be borne in mind that the H-Block prisoners are isolated. There's not much publicity coming out. It has been difficult to get publicity in the bourgeois press, and the circulation of the republican papers is limited. So, it has taken a while for this information to get home to the mass of the population. But that is happening now, and the anger is considerable.

Q. Is there any resentment of the Provisionals in the Catholic ghettos because of their arbitrary actions, the commandeering of automobiles, and so forth?

A. We in the PD and the MSR have a general criticism of the Provisionals. We think that their militarist strategy is wrong. They put military struggle before political struggle, more emphasis on military success than on winning support. As a result, we think, the Provisionals often act in an arbitrary and arrogant way that takes no account of the need of retaining the support of people in the area.

The kneecappings and arbitrary punishments meted out by the Provisionals, the decisions of arbitrary tribunals with no moral authority to punish people in a barbarous way, were often very much resented by the population. I think that the republican movement has felt the effect of this resentment, because this sort of thing has declined.

The problem of Provisional actions drawing British army reprisals against the people is different. All armed activity may very well result in reprisals against the civilian population. But I think that the people understand that if the imperialists were not here, there would not be the necessity for such armed action. So, I don't think that reprisals create much resentment against the Provisionals.

However, the people do resent arbitrary actions such as bombings that endanger innocent people, for instance the La Mon bombing.³ This incident was undoubtedly

3. On February 17, Provisional IRA operatives planted an incendiary bomb in the La Mon

2. Tone is considered by Irish republicans to be the founder of their movement. He was one of the leaders of the 1798 rebellion.—*IP/1*

accidental, in the sense that the republicans have no desire to kill civilians.

Nonetheless, the bombing carried with it the risk of civilian casualties. It was a risk that I think was unjustifiable. It was an action in the framework of a strategy that puts military victory of one army over another above the need of retaining mass support and not doing anything to alienate it.

Q. As a teacher you are in a position to watch the changes in the attitudes of teenage youth. Do you think that the Provisionals have as much attraction for the youth coming up now as they had in the early 1970s?

A. No, I don't think so. This is because the national question does not seem so immediate now as it did a few years ago. There is a consciousness among the Catholic population that we live in a society dominated by imperialism and in a state that can never be anything but sectarian. But in 1972-73, say, there was a widespread feeling among the population that the struggle could be won, that we were close to defeating imperialism.

That feeling lent an urgency to getting involved in the national struggle. But now that it seems that we are not close to victory, the national issue does not seem so urgent. And so other issues, such as social and economic ones, that tended to be shelved during the high point of the national struggle are now assuming more significance.

Among young people there is still a lot of support for militant resistance to imperialism. But I think that there is also a demand for political activity on other issues as well. There's more consciousness of unemployment, bad housing, and so on. And young people demand that any political movement, anti-imperialist movement, take a stand on these issues as well and do something about them.

Q. How has the attitude of the anti-imperialist forces evolved on the question of trying to achieve class unity with the Protestant workers on economic issues?

A. In the early days of the civil-rights movement, there was great confusion about the Protestant section of the population. There was a great reluctance to face hard but powerful facts.

We, in common with other left elements, were unwilling to face the fact of Protestant privilege, the fact that it created a division in the working class and that working-class unity could not be achieved as long as Protestant privilege remained.

We thought that by making utopian appeals to class unity, appeals that went around the question of Protestant privi-

lege, high Catholic unemployment, of Protestants monopolizing most of the jobs, we could achieve class unity.

The fallacy of that theory was demonstrated, not just in theory but in practice. PD tried to carry the proposal of united class activity on economic issues into the Protestant areas. We were prevented from doing so by Loyalist thugs. It was driven home to us quite concretely that it was impossible to build class unity until the national question was resolved.

This understanding was reinforced by the rise of the Protestant paramilitaries, who got substantial support among the Protestant working class. This finally exploded the theory that the Protestant working class would easily see their class identity with the Catholic workers, and that all that was needed was to point this out to them, or for the Catholic working class to make some symbolic gesture, such as opposing the Catholic church and their own bourgeoisie, and then the Protestants would do the same.

We in PD came to an understanding of this in 1971-72. The illusions lasted longer in the "Official" republican movement and in the groups on the left that oriented to the "Official" republican movement. The "Official" organization as such, of course, still maintains all the old illusions. But large sections of their movement saw the fallacy of them and became disillusioned.

The "Officials" learned the same lesson that we did, but they drew the opposite conclusion. They learned that you could not appeal to the Protestant workers on economic issues while a struggle was going on around the demand for equal rights and the national question. But their solution to the problem was to abandon the national question.

Q. What has happened to all those who have left the "Officials," since they appear to have lost the overwhelming majority of the members that they had in 1970-72?

A. I think that a substantial number had dropped out even before the formation of the Irish Republican Socialist Party [at the end of 1974]. And then, with the formation of the IRSP, very large sections of the "Officials" broke away. Most of these have since dropped out of politics.

Contradictions within the IRSP, its failure to build any sort of credible political structure, or resolve within itself the problem of the relation between the national question and socialism, led to the disillusionment of quite a lot of "Officials" who had left to join the IRSP.

I don't think these people are lost to socialist and anti-imperialist politics. Many of them still have incorrect ideas left over from their experience in the "Officials." But a lot of these people are still interested in political debate. In fact, we recently have managed to attract some of them to the discussions organized by the

Connolly Society here in Belfast.

We think that creating a viable united front on the question of repression will bring a lot of these people back into activity. The building of a strong, coherent Marxist organization will also attract quite a few of them.

Q. How did People's Democracy develop?

A. It was born out of the mass reaction of students at Queens University in Belfast to being attacked by the police on a civil-rights demonstration in Derry in 1968. The students were encouraged to react the way they did by the general current of student unrest and militancy generated in 1968 by the Paris uprising, the mass demonstration against the Vietnam war held in England, and the student agitation in the United States.

In Belfast this general trend coincided with the development of a small group of socialists who were in touch with British Trotskyist organizations, such as the International Socialists. This small group, of which I was one, were not in any meaningful sense Trotskyists or even Marxists. They were centrists with a small smattering of Marxist politics. At that stage, there was no living tradition of Marxism in Ireland.

This group became involved in the student reaction to the attack on the civil-rights demonstration. With even their very rudimentary political experience, even though it came from dealing with British left groups, they were able to exercise a very substantial influence on the development of the mass student movement and also on the development of the civil-rights movement as a whole.

This political experience was reinforced by continuing contact with the British left groups. On the other hand, I would make many criticisms of the British left groups' intervention in Ireland. It was very superficial and impressionistic. They made very little attempt at a serious analysis of the situation in Ireland. Nor did they make much of an effort to give thorough political training in Marxist principles to the socialist elements in the Irish struggle, who were politically extremely naive.

Q. What was it that led PD to develop into a genuinely Marxist organization?

A. We were forced in the direction of Marxism by ongoing development in the struggle. Time and time again we met with political problems to which we found that the only solution was offered by Marxism. We were either made aware of this by comrades from fraternal organizations who pointed out the answers to us or we realized it from our own halting reading of the Marxist literature.

Having confronted a political problem, wrestled with it, and made a lot of mistakes because of our inexperience, we

House restaurant. Before the building was clear, the bomb went off and a number of civilians were killed in the resulting fire.—IP/I

found that the answer was there in the Marxist classics. Our development toward Marxism was forced upon us by the problems we met in the struggle, until eventually we became convinced that Marxism was the only political approach that would actually answer the problems. Then we began to study Marxism systematically and found it more and more relevant.

Q. When you say Marxism, do you mean specifically Trotskyism and the experience of the Fourth International?

A. No. We came first to an understanding of Marxism and Leninism. But we found that we could not stop with Lenin's theories. We were further attracted to Trotskyism by two factors. One was that some of us, like myself, had acquired what little political training we had through contact with the Trotskyist movement.

The other factor was that we found that the groups that took a principled position toward the struggle in Ireland and the one here with which we found ourselves in principled agreement on most occasions were Trotskyist groups. And so we were attracted to studying Trotskyism more thoroughly.

Also, as the fight here went forward, we found that the international character of the struggle for socialism and the need for internationalism were not mere slogans. We found that they were real factors in the struggle. The necessity of an international organization was impressed upon us.

Q. How did you come to begin a process of fusion with the MSR?

A. I described how we moved toward the strategic orientations of the Trotskyist movement in particular. That inevitably brought us closer and closer to the MSR, which was trying to apply the positions of the Trotskyist movement in Ireland. It would be wrong to say that they came to Ireland with a fully developed Trotskyist ideology. They were active in the struggle for many years. But they were trying to marry their practical experience to a more developed political theory than we were.

We had a much higher level of practical experience and a lower level of political theory. But both lines of development eventually coincided. That is one reason for the fusion.

However, the fusion was lent more urgency because we felt that it was particularly vital at this very crucial moment in the development of the Irish struggle that the forces of revolutionary Marxism be as strong as possible. It was the duty of revolutionary Marxists to try to build as strong an organization as possible, to try to bring together on a principled basis as broad a group of comrades as possible. The obvious way to begin that process was for our two organizations, which have already reached a very substantial measure of programmatic agreement, to fuse.

Q. Has the fusion had an impact on people who are in the orbit of revolutionary Marxism but have been hesitant to join the existing organizations?

A. For various practical reasons, including long involvement in the struggle, both organizations have been suffering from a bit of fatigue, which has slowed down the fusion. This has impaired our ability at this moment to get the maximum value out of it.

But even given that, I think that there has been a considerable awakening of interest in people who were perhaps broadly sympathetic to the Marxist organizations. It has created a lot of interest among others. When the fusion is actually carried out, and the organization is able to move forward on the basis of a solid program, and to intervene confidently, I think it will attract quite a number of people.

There is a rather broad periphery of people who are politically sympathetic but have been unable to take the step of joining what they see as miniscule organizations. This is particularly true when there are at least two groups that have practically the same views.

There is also a large group of people in Ireland at the moment who have become politicalized by the struggle, who have been members of other anti-imperialist organizations. Some have not been members of these organizations but have been on the fringes. They are interested in political discussion. They see serious inadequacies in republicanism. But they have not yet had an opportunity to hear a strong, coherent presentation of the Marxist position, the Marxist analysis, the Marxist strategy. I think that the fused organization, which will be immeasurably stronger, will provide a very strong pole of attraction for them.

Q. How much of an obstacle to debate with republicans do you think the new turn of the Provisionals will be? They seem now to be tending to try to develop an ideological defense of the primacy of armed struggle. This seems to be leading them toward an ideological sectarianism similar to that of the ultraleft groups.

A. As I said, there is a development within substantial sections of the republican movement toward some sort of socialist consciousness as a result of their disillusion with bourgeois forces. I also said that the republican movement itself would not be able to develop towards Marxism.

In fact, there is a dangerous trend developing now. That is, the building up of a left-sounding defense of traditional republican militarism. There is a tendency to use left-wing phrases and phrases culled from the socialist movement to present the traditional militarism as the highest form of struggle. This tendency is fairly similar to and perhaps influenced by the development of groups using leftist rhetoric but in fact operating in a terrorist rather than a Marxist way.

Of course, this tendency is also largely a product of confusion—confusion that is understandable in view particularly of the slow development of what is now the Marxist left in Ireland. A lot of it is just a question of political confusion.

Therefore, it is necessary that there be a very rigorous discussion in the Marxist movement on these questions. And there must also be a discussion on them in the broad anti-imperialist movement. The PD and MSR have already tried to initiate this debate within the anti-imperialist movement.

This has provoked a very hostile reaction from the Provisionals. But it is a debate that we feel must be opened if the anti-imperialist movement is to advance toward effective mass action. □

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