

# Intercontinental Press

combined with **IMPREGOR**

Vol. 16, No. 28

© 1978 by Intercontinental Press

July 17, 1978

USA 75¢

UK 30p



Angel Rodríguez/El Bravo

**Mexican Students Condemn Police Terror**  
June 26 protest of 7,000 in Matamoros confronts mayor (older man with white shirt and glasses in foreground). Two days of angry protests following police murder of

high-school student forced resignation of top police officials, firing of twelve cops, arrest of three others on charges of murder, and release of all students arrested during upheaval. See page 856 for news report.

**CUBAN ROLE  
IN AFRICA**

**Peru: Let the  
Exiles Return!**

**Afghanistan—New Powder Keg in Middle East**

## Let all the Exiles Return!

By Fred Murphy

Gen. Francisco Morales Bermúdez, president of Peru, held a news conference June 23. A reporter asked if the candidates that had been deported three weeks before the June 18 constituent assembly elections would be allowed to return to the country.

"The government will respect the will of the people," Morales answered. This was taken by the Peruvian press to indicate that the government would not prevent elected deputies from returning to Peru for the July 28 convening of the assembly.

The final, official results of the elections have not yet been released, so it is not known for certain which of the ten prospective assembly deputies now in exile will benefit from Morales's generosity. Those almost surely elected, according to unofficial returns, include Trotskyist leader Hugo Blanco and socialist attorney Genaro Ledesma of the Workers, Peasants, Students, and People's Front (FOCEP); Gen. Leonidas Rodríguez of the bourgeois-nationalist Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR); and Javier Diez Canseco of the Democratic People's Union (UDP).

The other exiles who were candidates in

the June 18 elections are Ricardo Napurí of the FOCEP, Ricardo Díaz Chávez and Ricardo Letts of the UDP, and Adm. José Arce Larco, Adm. Guillermo Faura, and José Alvarado of the PSR. Several of these may also have been elected. Also in exile at present are Arequipa trade-union leaders Valentín Pachó and Justiniano Apaza and journalists Humberto Damonte and Alfonso Baella.

If Morales Bermúdez's government is to really "respect the will of the people," it must allow all fourteen of the exiles to return to Peru, whether they are assembly deputies or not. Beyond that, the military regime must release the hundreds of trade-union and political activists arrested during the May 22-23 general strike and still being held, and also must lift the orders for arrest and deportation still hanging over the heads of a number of other leftist leaders.

Letters and telegrams demanding the return of all the exiles and the release of the political prisoners should be sent to Gen. Francisco Morales Bermúdez, Presidente de la República del Perú, Palacio Presidencial, Lima, Peru. □

## The Shift to the Left in Peru

[The following appeared as an editorial in the June 26 issue of *Palabra Socialista*, the newspaper of the Peruvian Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers Party), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

\* \* \*

The results of the July 18 elections show a sweeping advance for the left. Based on the number of votes, the left is now the second big political force in the country.

This victorious achievement also means an important defeat for the Peruvian right. This is shown by the reverse that the PPC [Christian People's Party] suffered. The PPC received little more than 27 percent of the vote—a rather low figure, considering the PPC's impressive campaign and the help it picked up from the Belaúndistas. [Ex-President Belaúnde's People's Action Party pulled out of the campaign in March; many of its votes probably went to the PPC.]

expression of some psychological attitude, and not as a definite political statement. The commentators have sought in this way to empty our victory of its content, presenting it as the result of the masses' political ignorance.

It is beyond question that we received such a high vote because of what the FOCEP—and Hugo Blanco and his party, the PST—have represented. We have been the ones to most clearly express the program and policy that all the exploited sectors of the nation aspire to.

It was the FOCEP that best reflected the shift to the left and the combativity of the workers, which was expressed most recently in the May 22-23 general strike. It was the FOCEP that had the clearest policy of independence from the military government and the ruling-class parties. And it was the FOCEP that most clearly put forward a socialist solution to the crisis that the country is going through.

The conscious political course of the forces that make up the FOCEP definitely gained the attention of the masses and became a part of their thinking. Hugo Blanco is not some "myth" or "new religion," as certain "political analysts" would have it. He is the representative of a tradition of struggle among our people. At a time when the working people are seeking solutions to their intolerable condition, Hugo Blanco means the refusal to sell out or compromise with the exploiters. He thus represents the real possibility of a solution to the present situation.

The more than a million votes received by the left parties reflects the tremendous working-class and popular upsurge, and the search for an authentic socialist solution for our country. The FOCEP campaign mobilized thousands of activists. While not fully organized, this expresses the strong support that exists for building an alternative. The basis has been laid for forming a big working-class and socialist party that can give political expression to this underlying need.

As part of the FOCEP, the PST believes that this is the task of all the working-class and socialist currents that participated in the elections. It must be recognized that the workers voted in massive numbers for class independence. They voted against any conciliation with bourgeois figures—civilian or military—and they voted for socialism against capitalist exploitation. If we unite around a program that expresses these aspirations of the mass movement, we can build a big party or movement that puts together in one organization all the thousands of activists and workers in the cities and the countryside who have rejected ruling-class and conciliatory solutions.

We therefore join in Comrade Hugo Blanco's call to lay the foundations for building that big socialist party, starting from the influence that the FOCEP and the UDP have gained in the mass move-

ment. We also call on the currents inside the PSR\* that are for working-class independence and socialism, as well as on the Communist Party and all the workers' political organizations, to take advantage of this new opportunity to build such an alternative. □

\*Partido Socialista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Socialist Party), a bourgeois-nationalist formation led by ex-military officers. Its leaders and candidates have used much radical and socialist rhetoric, and it has influence in a number of trade unions and peasant organizations.—*IP/I*

### Leo Sihlali Arrested in South Africa

Leo Linda Sihlali, a veteran political activist, has been arrested in the Transkei under the Matanzima administration's repressive security legislation. The Transkei is one of South Africa's ten Bantustans, or African reserves, and was declared "independent" in October 1976 by the Vorster regime. It remains, in fact, part of the South African economy and political system and is totally dominated by the apartheid regime.

Sihlali has been an executive member of the Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA) for many years and was its president from 1962 to 1964. Previously he was active in the struggle against segregated education and was dismissed from his teaching post in 1955 along with other leaders of the Cape African Teachers Association (CATA). He was president of CATA until the organization was outlawed.

Sihlali himself was "banned," a form of house arrest, in 1963, and two years later was arrested on charges of breaking his banning restrictions and sentenced to Robben Island, Pretoria's notorious detention center for Black political prisoners. He was released in 1969 but was again detained for a while during a crackdown on UMSA members in 1970-71.

That crackdown resulted in thirteen other UMSA members being sentenced to prison terms on Robben Island after a trial under the Terrorism Act in Pietermaritzburg in 1972. Three of the defendants in the latter case, Frank Anthony, Surinayan Venkatrathnam, and Robert Cedric Wilcox were released in April after serving their sentences. All were immediately issued banning orders restricting their movements and other activities for a period of five years.

### Copies Missing?

Keep your files complete and up-to-date. Missing issues for the current year may be ordered by sending 75¢ per copy. Write for information about previous years.

Intercontinental Press/Inprecor  
P.O. Box 116  
Varick Street Station  
New York, N.Y. 10014

## In This Issue

Closing News Date: July 8, 1978

FEATURES	854	International Campaign Launched for Right to Abortion—by Jacqueline Heinen
AFGHANISTAN	852	Will Ferment Spread to Iran and Pakistan? —by Javad Sadeeg
MEXICO	856	Students Mobilize Against Police Terror —by Miguel Pendás
	857	Marroquín Hails Matamoros Students
USA	858	Attorney General Cited for Contempt of Court
	858	Landmark Suit Against FBI Spying Enters Fifth Year—by George Novack
	867	Public Outcry Over Austerity Measures in California—by Jon Britton
	870	Bakke Ruling Spurs Attacks on Affirmative-Action Gains —by Fred Murphy
AFRICA	860	Behind Carter's Threats Against Africa and Cuba—by David Frankel
ARGENTINA	863	Dictatorship and Resistance —by Marcelo Zugadi
YEMEN	869	U.S. Alarm Over South Yemen Coup
NEWS ANALYSIS	850	Let All the Peruvian Exiles Return! —by Fred Murphy
	850	The Shift to the Left in Peru
CAPITALISM		
FOULS THINGS UP	880	Seabrook Construction Halted
DOCUMENTS	871	Castro Answers Carter on Cuban Role in Africa
	876	Court Ruling Upholding SWP's Right to Informer Files
DRAWINGS	865	Jorge Rafael Videla—by Copain

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Varick Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Published in New York each Monday except the first in January and third and fourth in August.

**Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y.**

**Editor:** Joseph Hansen.

**Contributing Editors:** Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

**Managing Editor:** Michael Baumann.

**Editorial Staff:** Jon Britton, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Fred Murphy, Susan Wald, Matilde Zimmermann.

**Business Manager:** Harvey McArthur.

**Copy Editor:** David Martin.

**Technical Staff:** Paul Deveze, Larry Ingram, Arthur Lobman, Kevin McGuire, James M. Morgan, Sally Rhett.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it re-

flects editorial opinion, unsigned material stands on the program of the Fourth International.

**To Subscribe:** For one year send \$24 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Varick Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail.

In Europe: For air-speeded subscriptions, write to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 50, London N1 2XP, England. In Australia: Write to Pathfinder Press, P.O. Box 151, Glebe 2037. In New Zealand: Write to Socialist Books, P.O. Box 1663, Wellington.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Varick Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Intercontinental Press is published by the 408 Printing and Publishing Corporation, 408 West Street, New York, N.Y. 10014. Offices at 408 West Street, New York, N.Y.

Copyright © 1978 by Intercontinental Press.

## Will Ferment in Afghanistan Spread to Iran and Pakistan?

By Javad Sadeeg

When more than 270 senior generals, admirals, diplomats, scholars, officials, and (undoubtedly) spies gathered for a three-day "high level symposium" of the NATO Atlantic Command at Annapolis, Maryland, in late June, they concluded that things were not going well for imperialism in Afghanistan since the recent revolutionary upheaval.

"The establishment of a powerful Soviet military and political influence in Afghanistan is regarded by experienced analysts as more valuable strategically to Moscow than any of the Kremlin's gains in Africa," *New York Times* military affairs correspondent Drew Middleton reported June 24.

The assembled imperialist strategists expressed particular concern about their main lackey, the shah, who "now faces the possibility of an Eastern neighbor that is not only armed with Soviet weapons—as Afghanistan has been for years—but that is also advised by Soviet officers."

However, Soviet influence cannot be what now upsets the imperialists so much. Afghanistan has been under heavy Soviet economic and political influence for decades, and Moscow has for years trained the Afghani army and air force and supplied its equipment.

What the imperialists really fear are the far-reaching implications of the upheaval for both Afghanistan and the countries beyond its borders. They see in this development a challenge to their rule and to the existence of the crisis-ridden capitalist states in the region.

In particular, they are worried about the ferment in Afghanistan giving encouragement to the national liberation struggles of the Baluchis (who are divided between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) and the Pushtus (or Pathans, who are divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan).

Consequently, they are worried about Pakistan falling apart—a process that started with the secessions of Bangladesh in 1971. One general commented that "if Pakistan should fall apart the Russians would have a clear road to the Arabian Sea and capability to build bases near the exit from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz," an important oil route.

The imperialists' obvious alarm about the recent developments in the region and their constant references to "Soviet expansionism" betray their own intentions of possible military intervention in Afghanistan.

The shah has been more open in his

threats and actions. When the new regime came to power in Kabul at the end of April, he reportedly sent troops to the Afghan and Pakistani borders and considered military intervention.

He has continued his threats. The *New York Times* of May 20, summarizing the remarks of an unnamed high Iranian official, reported that "Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's Government considers the new revolutionary Government in Afghanistan to be completely under Communist control . . . and Iran will use 'all means' to keep the Afghans from expanding influence into the Persian Gulf, the main route for shipping oil from the Middle East."

The official stressed the shah's opposition to the rise of the "old separatist movements in two Pakistani provinces, Baluchistan and Pushtunistan," and recalled that the shah had stated publicly that "Iran would not stand by and permit further dismemberment of Pakistan."

He also said that "if Kabul tried to weaken Pakistan by instigating the Baluchis and Pushtus to revolt, Iran would call on all concerned countries to use 'all means,' including military intervention." The "concerned countries" would range from the U.S. imperialists to their allies in Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran (the CENTO Pact countries).

More recently it has been reported that the governments of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are secretly negotiating a "security arrangement" that, according to a report in the June 18 *New York Times*, "could create a major shift in the strategic balance of the oil producing area."

It is not known to the Iranian people what other secret negotiations or preparations have taken place during the recent comings and goings of the heads of states and police agents. In this connection, the recent dispatch of General Nasiri to Islamabad as the ambassador to Pakistan is not accidental. Nasiri, the former head of the shah's secret police, the SAVAK, was a central figure in the 1953 CIA-engineered coup in Iran.

In the tradition of Cold War propaganda, the imperialists are trying to portray the upheaval in Afghanistan as yet another case of "Soviet expansionism." The truth is, however, that the upheaval in Afghanistan was brought about by the deteriorating conditions of the masses and the incapability of the former Daud regime to take steps to solve this crisis.

Since the 1973 coup that brought Daud to power his regime became more and more

repressive. He refused to carry out the reforms that he had promised, including a democratic constitution and land reform.

Amir Taheri wrote in the Tehran daily *Kayhan* April 29: "Two years after the coup I asked Daud: 'Finally, when will Afghanistan get a new constitution?' He answered: 'Whenever I deem it necessary.'"

Daud never deemed it necessary. Agriculture went into a crisis and as in Iran, millions of poor peasants and tribal people (Afghanistan has a tribal population of about 2.5 million) were driven into cities that could not absorb them productively and many were forced to emigrate in search of jobs.

Taheri reports that 1.5 million Afghani workers have had to leave the country for Pakistan, India, the Persian Gulf states, and Iran in search of jobs. The plight of the nearly half million Afghani workers who have come to Iran is well known. They face constant discrimination, humiliation, degradation, imprisonment, and in some cases even execution, such as those carried out by the shah's regime last year.

As mass sentiment turned against the Daud regime he intensified the repression and started to get some help from the shah and the SAVAK in this direction.

On April 17 Amir Akbar Khaybar, a popular labor leader and a leader of the People's Democratic Party (PDP), was assassinated. His funeral procession in Kabul attracted tens of thousands of angry young demonstrators, many of whom carried red flags, as well as a large number of women. A prominent figure in the demonstration was Noor Mohammed Taraki, who is now president of the country.

A report in the May 26 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* described the protest as "a move unprecedented in Kabul," in which "a 100,000 crowd joined the funeral procession led by Taraki in a demonstration in front of the American Embassy, accusing the Central Intelligence Agency and its Iranian counterpart, Savak, of Khyber's murder."

In the following days demonstrations continued. Daud responded by arresting many of the leaders of the PDP, including its main leader, Taraki. Daud also arrested some of the air force officers, but Colonel Abdul Khadir, who later led the coup, escaped detention.

According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, following a week of demonstrations "a large crowd gathered in Kabul's central park, which, on Daud's instruc-

tions, was surrounded by soldiers. When ordered to fire, sections of the soldiery turned their weapons against the nearby presidential palace, which was strongly guarded by the Gendarmerie, some army men and anti-aircraft batteries.

"About 50 tanks came rolling in and began pounding the palace. The air force also sent in MiG-21s that first used rockets, lost two aircraft to ground fire and finally finished off the defenders with a 500-pound bomb."

The June 4 issue of *Granma*, newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, carried the transcript of a televised interview with Afghanistan's new foreign minister, Hafizullah Amin. Amin said that his party (PDP) had been building a base among the workers, peasants, intellectuals, and army since 1965.

All published reports indicate that in the context of a rising mass movement and Daud's attack on the PDP, the leadership of the party decided to use its base in the army and air force to take power in self-defense.

It also appears that the PDP had to make a rapid decision on the insurrection, and that despite its pro-Soviet stance it may not have had time to consult with or get the approval of Moscow. In this regard, the report in the May 26 *Far Eastern Economic Review* noted that "diplomats in Islamabad . . . assert that the coup was as much a surprise to Moscow as to the rest of the world."

The uprising was announced April 27 by Radio Kabul: "For the first time in the history of Afghanistan the last remnants of monarchy, tyranny, despotism and the power of the dynasty of the tyrant Nader Khan has ended, and all powers of the state are in the hands of the people of Afghanistan. The power of the state fully rests with the Revolutionary Council of the armed forces."

Amin told the Cubans in his televised interview than when this communiqué was heard "our officers arrested all the generals in various regiments and put them in prison. With the exception of one province, where the general and governor died, the members of our party assumed leadership of all the regiments without running into any resistance."

Two days later the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces issued a decree that "transferred all high State powers to the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and merged itself with the latter council." On April 30, this council issued Decree No. 1, which stated that Noor Mohammed Taraki was elected chairman of the Revolutionary Council and head of the government (prime minister), and proclaimed the state to be the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

On May 9 Taraki delivered a policy speech in which he defined the armed uprising of April 27 as the starting point of



a "democratic and national revolution" led by the PDP. He presented a thirty-point program that included "democratic land reforms" and abolition of the old feudal and pre-feudal property relations, as well as a democratic solution of the national question.

It was further specified that resolution of the Pushtu and Baluchi national issue would be based on their own will and on the "historical background," and would include "peaceful political talks between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Pakistan." In addition, nationalities resident in Afghanistan are to have the right of education and publications in their native languages.

Taraki also stated that it was the intention of his government to ensure friendly relations with neighboring Iran, Pakistan, and China, as well as to consolidate and widen its relations with the Soviet Union.

The declaration of the thirty-point program signified an end to a five-year split in the PDP. The split came about after the 1973 coup that put Daud in power, and focused mainly on the question of what attitude to take toward the new regime. Taraki opposed giving support to Daud on the grounds that his regime did not represent a real change from the government of Daud's cousin King Mohammed Zahir Shah, despite the formal change from a monarchy to a republic.

The PDP split into two public factions over the question—Parcham (Banner) led by Badrak Karmal, who is now a deputy prime minister, and Khalq (Masses) led by Taraki. It is reported that Moscow tried unsuccessfully to pressure Taraki to support the Daud regime.

A concrete step the new regime has taken is to allow the formation of trade unions, which have been made legal for the first time in the history of the country. So far no reports of implementation of the promised agrarian reform have been published.

In answer to a question by Cuban reporters as to possible dangers to the revolution, Foreign Minister Amin replied: "Within the country itself, I see no danger on the part of the people, because the masses have strongly supported the revolution. However, as you know, wherever there is a real revolution, a revolution that heralds a socialist revolution, there begins resistance on the part of the agents of imperialism and reaction.

"Thus it is likely that the imperialist circles and their lackeys will want to encourage the fanatic religious leaders with the help of the feudal lords who feel they are in danger and, in that sense, there might be problems."

The new regime, seeking to gain popular support on the basis of such slogans, will surely arouse greater expectations on the part of the masses. This is particularly true of the hundreds of thousands of Afghani workers who are returning home from neighboring countries in hope of major changes.

It remains to be seen to what extent the working class and its allies—the poor peasants, women, oppressed nationalities, and youth—will be able to mobilize in defense of their own interests. It is clear, however, that this is what the imperialists and their puppets are deadly afraid of. They fear both the deepening of the revolutionary movement inside Afghanistan and its extension beyond the borders of the country.

The editors of the *New York Times* noted the latter possibility, sounding a danger signal one week after the Kabul insurrection. In an editorial May 5 entitled "A Communist Coup in Afghanistan," they said: ". . . a revolutionary Afghanistan will make its neighbors nervous. Its very existence will intensify separatist sentiment among the Baluchi tribesmen in Pakistan and Iran. . . ."

Those whom the editors of the *Times* call Baluchi "tribesmen" number as many as ten million, according to some estimates, and fought the Pakistani army from 1973 to 1977. Although the Pakistani government committed as many as 100,000 troops to the war and suffered as many casualties as in the 1971 war with Bangladesh, it failed to subdue the insurgents.

The architect of this miserable operation was the shah himself, in collaboration with then-Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

So it is clear why the shah and General Zia, the current leader of Pakistan, are nervous. But so are the imperialist planners who took part in the NATO "high level" symposium.

The Baluchi and Pushtu national liberation struggles are only the tip of the iceberg. The entire region is beginning to enter a period of revolutionary upheaval and cracks are appearing along the boundaries of the awakening oppressed nationalities. Mobilization for deepgoing social

reforms in Afghanistan would be a tremendous source of inspiration for the present movement in Iran against the shah. This emerging movement has its roots in the crisis of the shah's regime and of Iranian capitalism, and is bringing the working class and poor peasantry into political motion.

The mass movement against the shah is combined with an awakening of the oppressed nationalities in that prison house of nations. Ever since the February 18-19 uprising in Tabriz (the center of the Azerbaijani nationality in Iran) the shah in his speeches keeps bringing up the 1945 uprising in which the Azerbaijani and Kurdish nationalities rose up, threw out his armies, and established their own autonomous governments. This inaugurated the Second Iranian Revolution, in which only Stalinist betrayals prevented the working class from coming to power.

By invoking that specter the shah is trying to unify his class. But he is also nervous about the recovery of the Azerbaijani revolution, as well as of the Kurdish revolution, which, despite the major setback in 1975, is showing signs of renewed life in Iran and Iraq.

The February 18-19 uprising in Tabriz was the first of such scope and combativity in more than twenty-five years, encompassing the youth, workers, poor peasants from the areas around the city, and women. The massive size of the mobilization caused hesitation inside the Tabriz garrison, enabling the people to take over the city for almost a day until troops from other cities were brought in. That uprising is viewed as a victory in the entire country, adding momentum to the movement for

the shah's overthrow.

The rising revolutionary movement in the region also has implications for the political revolution in the Soviet Union. Many of the oppressed nationalities in the area are divided by the Soviet borders, and their national struggles affect those of their Soviet counterparts.

The imperialists are undoubtedly counting on this to persuade the Soviet bureaucracy to try to apply the brakes to the spread of ferment in Afghanistan. The London *Economist* has already warned that encouraging Pushtu and Baluchi self-determination may set up a "chain reaction of tribal troubles that could even spill over into the Soviet Union itself by way of the Uzbeks and Tajiks in Afghanistan. . . ." (May 6).

This warning could fall on receptive ears in the Kremlin, in light of the existing support for the national movements in the Soviet republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as evidenced by the demonstrations that forced the bureaucracy to reverse itself and restore the indigenous language as the official language of each republic. (Georgia, Armenia, and Northern Azerbaijan were part of Iran before tsarist Russia militarily annexed them in the nineteenth century.)

The Tadzhik, Uzbek, and Turkmen Soviet republics—whose nationalities extend beyond the Soviet border into Afghanistan—do not have the right to use their indigenous languages as the official language of their republics. Revolutionary developments in Afghanistan could thus have a positive influence on the struggles of these oppressed nationalities in the Soviet Union.

To slow down, reverse, and halt the possibility of a spreading upsurge in Afghanistan, the imperialists will do everything in their power. Among their options, military intervention is a distinct possibility. In this eventuality, the shah of Iran, ever eager to be of use and to save his crown, will be the primary candidate to spearhead a military invasion. With 700,000 troops in uniform, he already has the credentials to show that, next to Israel, he is the most reliable counterrevolutionary force in the region.

He has shown no hesitation in gunning down the people of Iran; suppressing the movements of the oppressed nationalities; or using his military in ventures outside the country. He has troops in Lebanon under the United Nations command, deployed against the Palestinian resistance movement. He has sent troops to Oman to crush the rebellion in Dhofar.

In an interview published in the June 26 issue of *U.S. News & World Report*, he was asked: "Do you want Iran . . . to play a more active Mideast role without relying so much on the U.S.?"

He proudly answered: "We have already done so in Oman, where we helped the Sultan defeat the Communist rebellion, and a limited number of Iranian troops are still there. Incidentally, the trouble is starting again, and five British officers were massacred there recently."

The extraordinary nervousness that the imperialists are exhibiting in connection with the recent upheaval in Afghanistan indicates that the shah's threats against the upsurge in Afghanistan must be taken seriously. □

## International Campaign Launched for Right to Abortion

By Jacqueline Heinen

Massive mobilizations for the right to abortion in New Zealand have been organized in the recent period by a united front of women's organizations. In spite of this, at the beginning of April, the government passed a law worded in accordance with a report of the Royal Commission assigned to study the "problem" of abortion.

Apart from the laws passed under fascism, this law is clearly one of the most repressive and inhumane in the world. Even a woman who has been raped does not have the right to abortion. Only cases of incest and mental deficiency are considered "valid" justifications for abortion.

The Auckland Medical Aid Centre, which was responsible for nearly 83 percent of abortions performed in New Zealand, will probably have to close for lack of

patients. Only fifteen women have obtained permission to have abortions since the law was passed. We can imagine the despair felt by all the rest.

To be sure, this is an extreme example, and a particularly cruel step backward from a situation that in fact enabled a good number of women to obtain abortions under relatively decent conditions. But it would be a mistake to see this as a "slipup" on the part of the ruling class in a given country.

In most countries in the world, women still do not have the right to abortion. They still do not have the right to freely decide whether or not to have children. And this goes not only for the colonial or semicolonial countries, but also for a country like Spain, where the "democratiza-

tion" of political life has not yet done away with forty years of Francoism and the omnipotence of the Catholic church where women's social position is concerned. It appears that nearly 80 percent of the women now in prison in these countries were put there for so-called "feminine crimes," primarily abortion.

In the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and West Germany—to cite only a few examples of capitalist countries where women have been fighting for this right for years—abortion is still punishable, except under very unusual circumstances.

The extent to which the law is carried out appears to vary according to the country and area, but one thing is certain—the ruling class is doing everything in its power to forestall having to recognize

women as individuals in their own right, free to control their bodies and plan their lives. And when it is finally pushed to the wall by a mass movement demanding liberalization of the law, and forced to surrender, it generally manages to do so at the least possible expense, as shown by the Veil law in France. In addition to all the restrictions this law imposes, it does not provide for reimbursing the cost of abortion through Social Security.

But what comes through most clearly today, in this period of economic and social crisis, is that even in those countries where the law has been liberalized, the governments in office are the first to support the most reactionary wing of the bourgeoisie, which constantly demands the elimination of the meager rights won. They may do this in an indirect way, through heavy cuts in public spending (which always results, as if by accident, in reducing the funds allotted for abortion in hospitals). Or they may do it openly, by inserting restrictive clauses in the law on the strength of parliamentary debates, often on the pretext of being able to better "protect women against abuses."

In Great Britain, for example, for three years there has been one amendment after another, all alike—whether proposed by Labour Party or Conservative Party members—all equally reactionary, and all with one aim: to prevent women from taking advantage of a law that is already quite hedged with restrictions, and to place the decision back in the hands of doctors, husbands, government, and the courts—everyone, that is, except those who have the most at stake.

We have just seen the appeals by the pope to try to prevent any application of the law recently passed in Italy, a restrictive law that makes abortion dependent on the husband's consent, and puts it practically out of the reach of minors. A law that, according to the latest polls, stands very little chance of being implemented in a country where the majority of hospitals are still run by the church (many of them are owned by religious orders).

The pope's appeals to doctors and hospital staff, issued the very day the law took effect, calling on them, as good Christians, to make use of the conscience clause and the right afforded them by law to refuse to perform abortions, do seem to have been widely heeded. The first survey carried out in the capital shows that 90 to 95 percent of hospital workers—nuns made up a large part of the nurses—refuse to perform legal abortions.

The attempt to divide women—minors and those of age, native-born and immigrants, white and black, rich and poor—appears to be paying off. Witness the American bourgeoisie's support for the Hyde amendment, which eliminated federal funds designed to help the poorest women obtain abortions in facilities with

very high costs (almost 40 percent of Black women are in this situation). This measure had a domino effect, since a number of state governments rushed to follow the example it set by cutting off funds. In several states, this was followed by attempts by district courts to reintroduce provisions in the law requiring the consent of the husband, or parents in the case of minors.

A further amendment has been proposed that would enable employers to refuse to pay wages to women who have taken time off for an abortion. We should not forget to mention the outlandish requirements for abortion clinics in terms of equipment which are aimed at keeping as many of them as possible from opening, and making them impossible to run because of the staggering financial burden involved.

This amendment was clearly an open invitation to the right wing. In the recent period, this resulted in the use of physical violence by extreme right-wing forces against all those who tried to implement the law. There have been countless attacks on abortion clinics. The arson attack on an abortion clinic in Cleveland, Ohio, is only one example in a long series of crimes committed by groups who make no secret of their racist views.

They are the same ones who, in Puerto Rico and elsewhere, support the population-control policies imposed by the imperialists on ethnic minorities or colonized peoples. Nearly half the female population on the island of Puerto Rico, and almost a third of Indian women in the United States have been forcibly sterilized. There has been talk of a plan by the Agency for International Development, which has CIA ties, to forcibly sterilize no less than 100 million women.

There is no need to explain that such measures are aimed above all at women in the Third World countries. But we should note that in Europe as well, forced sterilization is often imposed on immigrant women who enter hospitals after a self-induced miscarriage owing to the absence of legal abortion. Numerous examples of this can be seen in France particularly.

Therefore, there is an urgent need for a campaign for legal abortion and contraception, and against forced sterilization. This is what was discussed by the women who attended the meeting in London on June 10 and 11 called by the National Abortion Campaign (NAC) in Britain.

Although this first international meeting on abortion was not representative enough, nevertheless, it enabled the delegates and observers present to lay the groundwork for a campaign that aims to be massive and open to all forces in the women's movement and labor movement who can be expected to support such an initiative.

Present were representatives of the National Abortion Campaign, the national abortion coordinating committees in the

Netherlands and Belgium, CISAI (Campaign for Information on Abortion) from Bologna, women's abortion and contraception centers from Barcelona and Madrid, groups from the women's movement in Switzerland, Paris-based groups trying to launch a campaign to enforce the Veil law, the Labour Party, and the Fourth International.

A date was set for an international day of action next April, with the understanding that regular meetings would be held between now and then. (The NAC delegates agreed in principle to be responsible for the main coordinating tasks.) Right from the start there was a general desire not to restrict such a campaign to a European framework, but to do whatever was necessary to see that it assumed truly international proportions. Hence the importance of paying attention to the special problems faced by women in the colonial countries, and not focusing the entire campaign on the demands of women in the imperialist capitalist countries alone.

Thus the following central slogan was adopted: "For abortion, contraception, and women's rights. No to forced sterilization."

Other demands relative to implementing the law, securing funding, establishing clinics, insuring the availability of sex education and contraceptives, and so on, can be discussed in each country depending on the specific situation, and be included in posters taking the special features more into account. But it was proposed at the meeting that an international poster, translated into several languages, be the overall symbol of the campaign, and that a preliminary version be voted on at the next coordinating meeting, to be held in Brussels September 23-24.

Among the topics to be discussed are the text of a call for the day of action, methods of building the campaign and coming up with the necessary funds, and the type of propaganda to use to see that it gets the widest possible response.

The newsletter *Donna* published by the CISAI group has offered to serve as the liaison for this campaign,\* and the written contributions that have been requested for the September meeting will be the basis for articles that will be submitted for publication in the feminist press in various countries, or perhaps for an information bulletin inside a given country.

The fundamental goal, of course, is to arrive at unitary committees in each country, uniting the largest number of feminist groups, political organizations, and trade unions, ready to launch a vigorous battle for women's inalienable right to control their bodies and decide their own fate. □

\*All correspondence should be sent to National Abortion Campaign, 30 Camden Road, London NW1, Britain. All discussion articles should be sent to *Donna*/CISAI, via Massarenti 190, Bologna, Italy.

## Mexican Students Mobilize Against Police Terror

By Miguel Pendás

[The following article appeared in the July 14 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

MATAMOROS, Mexico—A rebellion sparked by the police murder of a high school youth has ended in a victory for the students of this border city of 300,000 people.

Following two days of massive, angry demonstrations, top police officials have resigned, all students arrested during the rebellion have been freed, and twelve cops have been fired and three others arrested for murder.

In an attempt to suppress the rebellion, the cops had murdered three people.

The events that led to the mass explosion began June 19, when Matamoros cops arrested fifteen-year-old Salvador Barrios Barba while he was sitting on a park bench on the pretext that he "looked suspicious."

Later, at a holding cell, three cops savagely beat Barrios Barba until he began vomiting blood.

When his family arrived and tried to get the cops to send him to a hospital, they refused. They said he was faking. The family offered the cops 4,000 pesos (U.S. \$200), but still they refused.

The cops finally relented the following morning, took the money, and sent Barrios Barba to a hospital. But it was too late.

News of the murder outraged the people of Matamoros. There is a long history of police brutality and corruption in northern Mexico, and the issue has received much media attention.

High school and college student leaders demanded the cops responsible for the killing be prosecuted and that Police Chief Emiliano del Toro be fired.

For a week, Mayor Antonio Cavazos Garza steadfastly refused the demands and stood by his political crony del Toro.

Finally on June 26 the Union of Students of Matamoros, a coalition of students from eleven schools, sponsored a rally of 7,000 at Plaza Hidalgo, across the street from city hall.

Mayor Cavazos Garza was forced to come out to speak to the crowd. He said three cops had been arrested, but again refused to fire the police chief, offering to "restructure" the department instead.

The crowd answered with boos, hisses, and chants of "Lies! Lies! Lies!"



Angel Rodríguez/El Bravo

June 26 rally. City hall and jail (in background), hated symbols of repression, were later razed in confrontation with cops.

The slain student's teacher took the microphone. He pointed out that a similar incident in the previous administration had led to the firing of the police chief. The teacher added that in Reynosa (another border town nearby) the police chief had recently been fired after a scandal. The people of Matamoros, he said, had a right to expect the same.

Angered by the mayor's refusal to fire the chief cop, the crowd chased the mayor and his bodyguards down the street, pelting them with stones and tomatoes.

The mayor tried to hide in a bar, but it was ransacked. He then fled to the offices of his party, the PRI (Spanish initials for Institutional Revolutionary Party, which has ruled Mexico for decades). The PRI offices were also destroyed.

Then the thousands of angry protesters turned their wrath on the city hall and jail, which are housed in the same building. The crowd freed prisoners, destroyed the police radio, and torched police records.

The building was largely gutted in the ensuing blaze.

Five banks and many other businesses had their windows smashed, and many stores were emptied of their contents.

The angry crowd overturned and burned police vehicles and drove the cops from the streets. Many cops took off their uniforms and went into hiding. One contingent took refuge in a nearby hospital, where they exchanged their police uniforms for hospital workers' clothing to avoid detection.

At one point the chief of police of the state of Tamaulipas, where Matamoros is located, was apprehended by the protesters. He was released after convincing the crowd that it was the city cops, not his state force, who were responsible for the student's murder.

When the fire department of the Texas city of Brownsville (which is across the border from Matamoros) tried to come to the aid of Mexican authorities, the crowd turned back the trucks.

Within hours of the first incident, Mexi-



co's Secretary of Defense ordered the army to occupy the city. Hundreds of heavily armed troops imposed martial law.

During the rebellion, police killed three people. Thirty-five-year-old prisoner Juan Mares Castro was shot while he was trying to flee from the jail. Cops also shot fifteen-year-old Ricardo Rangel Niño in the head.

And the day after the rebellion, another fifteen-year-old, Antonio Lungía Lambarri, was found in the burnt-out ruins of city hall. The autopsy showed police had shot him in the back four times before throwing his body into the burning building in an attempt to make it look as if he had been a victim of the protesters.

In addition, authorities wounded fifteen other persons. There were no reports that any cops or troops had suffered injuries.

The following day, Tamaulipas Gov. Enrique Cardenas Gonzales, also of the PRI, came to Matamoros to personally oversee operations. Army sweeps netted forty-three persons, almost all between fifteen and eighteen years of age. Authorities said the forty-three had been "detained" on suspicion of being "activists." They were held for more than a day, lying on the floor with their hands behind their backs.

A local paper reported, "Youth can't stand around on the street without being abused" by the troops.

The bureaucrats of the government-controlled CTM (Federation of Mexican Workers) also came to the aid of the mayor. Agapito Gonzales Cavazos, a PRI member of the Mexican legislature and head of the CTM's regional affiliate, ordered a progovernment work stoppage June 27 on the pretext that the rebellion made it unsafe to go to work.

Workers did stay off the job, but unwillingly. Interviewing idled workers who gathered in the Plaza Hidalgo in the afternoon, reporters found that everyone spoke out against the authorities and in support of the student rebels.

"We are sick and tired of all the abuses, injustices, and atrocities committed by the police," said one worker.

This mass sentiment was reflected in the local press, which pointed out that the mayor could have avoided the rebellion simply by firing the police chief at the outset.

Even Mexican President José López Portillo, also of the PRI, felt forced to make a statement criticizing the brutality of the Matamoros cops.

Under this public pressure, the police chief resigned June 27. Resignations of two police commanders, the head of the city jail, and his assistant, followed.

In addition to the three cops arrested for murdering Barrios Barba, twelve other cops were fired. On June 29 all forty-three demonstrators arrested by the army were released without charges.

Gov. Cardenas Gonzales, who has blamed unidentified "professional outside agitators" for the incident, nevertheless, promised there would be "no reprisals."

But the Tamaulipas attorney general and the Matamoros district attorney insist they will carry out a "full investigation" to find those responsible for "vandalism."

Student leaders from the Matamoros Regional Technological Institute, a junior college, told the *Militant* that while there appears to be a settlement of the issue, they have no confidence in the new police chief "because the interests they serve are

the same as the others. Cops are part of the system."

At a news conference, student leaders Andrés Pérez, Antonio Carvajal, José Luis García, and others said that not only police brutality but also living conditions in this impoverished city were responsible for the rebellion.

They pointed to the lack of drinking water, paved streets, and drainage in the workers' neighborhoods as examples of the pervasive poverty.

"The people fear police more than they fear criminals," the student leaders said. □

## Marroquín Hails Matamoros Students

[The following statement was released by Héctor Marroquín July 5. Marroquín is a member of the Young Socialist Alliance National Committee and of the Socialist Workers Party. He was a student leader in Mexico until forced to flee his homeland to escape political repression. Although in Mexico he faces imprisonment, torture, and possible death, the U.S. government has so far refused to give him political asylum.]

\* \* \*

The barbaric police murder of Salvador Barrios Barba, a fifteen-year-old Matamoros student, is nothing out of the ordinary in that city or anywhere else in Mexico.

I was born and grew up in Matamoros. All my life I have known of the brutality of the cops there. When I was eight years old, my uncle—who was a Matamoros police officer—beat a seven-year-old child to death. The authorities did nothing except transfer him to a police job in a different city—and that only because the child's father was a reporter and the case became a scandal.

I have had more than my share of direct experience with Mexican cops. In 1972, I saw police murder my friend Jesus Rivera in cold blood. To cover up their crime, the police posthumously accused him of being a terrorist, but this was a lie.

When police falsely accused me of being a terrorist two years later, I had to flee my homeland and come to the United States to escape a fate similar to my friend's.

In the United States cop terror is a grim fact of life for Blacks, Chicanos, and other oppressed nationalities.

In Brooklyn, New York, cops recently strangled to death Black civic leader Arthur Miller. Although there were scores of witnesses to the crime, no cops have been charged for Miller's murder.

In Houston, police beat Chicano army veteran Joe Campos Torres and then

drowned him in a canal. At the state trial, the cops got a one-dollar fine. At the federal trial, they received a token one-year sentence. When Houston Chicanos rebelled against this outrage, hundreds of cops were brought in to terrorize the community.

So the victory won by the students of Matamoros is an inspiration to everyone fighting police brutality.

But now, Mexican authorities are threatening a "full investigation" to find those responsible for "vandalism."

I have seen what similar "investigations" have meant for many student activists in Mexico. They have been sentenced to long prison terms after being tortured into signing false confessions. They have been killed in alleged gun battles, or shot "while trying to escape." They have been kidnapped by police and never heard from again.

We must not let that happen to the Matamoros students. I appeal to the student movement in the United States, to Blacks and Chicanos who are fighting police terror, and to all supporters of human rights to remain vigilant against any attempt by the Mexican government to victimize the Matamoros students.

An important part of exposing political repression in Mexico is my own fight for political asylum in the United States and that of José Jacques Medina, another compañero forced to flee Mexico to escape repression.

What is involved in our cases is not only repression in Mexico, but the U.S. government's complicity with that repression. Despite President Carter's human rights rhetoric, he has so far refused to grant either Medina or me asylum in the United States. Carter's immigration cops are still trying to deport us—to hand us over to the torturers and assassins of Mexican students.

A victory in our cases would not only be a victory for us, but a victory for the struggle against political repression in Mexico.

## U.S. Attorney General Cited for Contempt of Court

Federal Judge Thomas P. Griesa made history June 6 when he held the attorney general of the United States in contempt of court. The ruling came after Attorney General Griffin Bell had again refused to turn over files on eighteen informers to attorneys for the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance.

On June 30, Griesa had given Bell one week to comply with his order, which was in response to a motion by the socialists in their \$40 million lawsuit against government spying. (See page 876 for excerpts from Griesa's ruling.)

Bell, who hails from Georgia and is a longtime associate of Jimmy Carter, is the first attorney general to be held in contempt for refusing to obey a court order to release government files.

SWP National Secretary Jack Barnes hailed the original contempt ruling as "a milestone in the fight to uncover the truth about FBI political spying."

Attorney Mary Pike said, "This decision

has far-reaching implications for everyone involved in political activity. It will be drawn on for years to come—if it is upheld on appeal."

The *Christian Science Monitor*, in its July 7 issue, said Griesa's ruling was "reminiscent of federal Judge John J. Sirica's Aug. 29, 1973, order to President Nixon that he surrender the White House tapes. . . ."

The Carter administration realizes that it is in a tight spot but continues to stonewall. The *New York Daily News* disclosed July 7 that Bell had gone to Camp David two days earlier to review the case with Carter.

"It's fair to assume that the attorney general and the President see eye to eye on this," Justice Department spokesman Terrence Adamson was quoted as saying of Bell's defiance.

The arguments of the Carter administration in refusing to turn over the files also bear a striking resemblance to Nixon's claim to be upholding "national security."

In an affidavit submitted July 6, Bell said that the decision to compel disclosure was "both unprecedented and damaging to the Government's ability to obtain information through informants for law enforcement and foreign counter-intelligence purposes."

Judge Griesa's order that the government turn over the informer files was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court allowed that decision to stand. Now that he has been cited for contempt, Bell has appealed once again.

On July 7, Judge Murray Gurfein of the U.S. Court of Appeals agreed to stay the contempt citation (hold it in abeyance) until the federal appeals court panel meets to consider the new appeal.

If this appeal also is turned down, Judge Griesa has said he will entertain a motion for more drastic sanctions. In that eventuality, attorneys for the socialists will re-submit an earlier motion that Bell be sent to jail. □

## Landmark Suit Against FBI Spying Enters Fifth Year

By George Novack

[The following article appeared in the July 14 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

The Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance initiated a landmark suit against the surveillance and harassment activities of the government on July 18, 1973. We did not then anticipate that five years would be consumed in discovery proceedings even before the case would go to trial.

Why this crawling pace? On one side the federal authorities have "stonewalled" all along the way, raising obstacles and causing delays aimed at exhausting the plaintiffs or derailing the suit. On the other side the prolonged discovery efforts have pried more than 100,000 pages of documents out of the FBI and other agencies. As the *New York Times* noted, "Most of what is now known about the 15-year Cointelpro program has been made public as a result of the SWP suit."

The suit has uncovered authenticated

proofs of FBI burglaries; spying on the plaintiffs as well as on Black, antiwar, women's, and Chicano movements' activities; poison-pen letters; agent "visits" to landlords, employers, and relatives, leading to loss of jobs and housing; conniving with administrators to get college and school teachers fired; agency attempts to foment dissension within and among their target groups; the use of hundreds of informers to spy on people, steal records, and instigate provocations. It has brought to light CIA break-ins against Americans overseas, and much, much more.

### Foremost Civil Liberties Case

That is why this ongoing \$40 million litigation has taken center stage as the foremost civil liberties case of the post-Watergate era and won so much publicity and endorsement. The constitutional issues involved in its unprecedented revelations make it the legal trailblazer in testing the transgressions committed by the entire federal "intelligence community." Two appeals have already been taken to the U.S. Supreme Court.

For the past year, the lawyers have been battling to secure the files of a cross-section of the informers who have infested the two organizations over the decades. This contest has now reached the point where U.S. Attorney General Bell, one of John Mitchell's successors, is risking punishment for contempt of court by refusing to obey the federal judge's order to hand over eighteen of the informer files to the SWP's attorneys. This is an unheard-of defiance of the law by the nation's top law enforcement official.

The political significance of this showdown between the judicial and executive branches of the government and between the plaintiffs and the powers-that-be can be gauged by contrasting the circumstances in 1948, when the cold war witch-hunt took off, with the present situation. Back then the SWP was placed without a hearing on the attorney general's "subversive list" together with scores of other groups. The FBI was sacrosanct and its head, J. Edgar Hoover, a national hero.

Today the subversive list has been scrapped, at least formally, and can no

longer be invoked as a punitive instrument for hounding dissenters. The attorney general has been forced publicly to issue an order that the FBI should cease investigating the plaintiffs after admittedly spending \$1.6 million and employing 1,300 informers without yielding the slightest shred of any wrongdoing. "You've been looking at this group for thirty-five years and you haven't produced one single solitary crime or incitement to violence in the U.S. by anyone in this organization," Judge Thomas Griesa observed in a bench opinion.

On the other hand FBI agents are under indictment for illegal break-ins; Hoover's memory is in disgrace as added evidence of his vendetta against Martin Luther King, Jr. has been disclosed. There is less and less trust in the credibility of the White House. And Carter's Georgia friend, the attorney general, is openly censured in federal court for "a naked exercise of power beyond the rule of law."

#### What a Turnabout!

As the June 18 *New York Times* commented: "It seemed incongruous, but the tiny Socialist Workers Party had the chief law enforcement official in the United States boxed into a corner last week."

"What a turnabout is there, my countrymen!" an orator of the old school might well proclaim.

And what light this act of defiance throws upon the hollowness of the boast that President Carter is the sturdy champion of human rights and has put behind him the criminal deeds of the Nixon years. In fact, the administration keeps chipping away at civil liberties in its striving to recover the unrestrained exercise of executive privilege that was crippled after Watergate.

In the Humphrey-Truong espionage conviction last May, the Justice Department sought "to impose an Official Secrets Act on the country by stealth," protested *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis on June 19. "This is only the latest of many disturbing positions taken by the Carter Justice Department—disturbing for freedom of expression and information. The department has pushed gag orders to new extremes, and this week it brings Frank Snapp to trial for publishing unclassified information about the C.I.A."

The latest dramatic episode in the SWP suit exposes to full view how little consideration the executive branch gives to constitutional rights and legal procedures when these threaten its spy system.

It is important to understand why the government has stalled for over a year and is so adamant on shielding its informers at all costs. Informers are as essential to the operation of the repressive agencies of a capitalist regime as the police or armed forces. As the new FBI Director William Webster says, informers are "the most

effective tool of law-enforcement today." However, in respect to political dissidents these snoopers do not simply supply information; they concoct it for their employers to earn their pay. Lies are their stock-in-



David Frankel/Militant

#### BELL: Defies court order.

trade. I can vouch for that after reading the manufactured materials in the FBI and IRS reports about myself.

#### Undercover Mercenaries

Informers likewise work to frame up opponents of government policy and disrupt their organization. They are mercenaries in an undercover army of spies that do the "dirty tricks" forbidden under the law. These embrace burglarizing homes and offices, planting illegal wiretaps, sending poison-pen letters, physically assaulting demonstrators and leading them into police traps. Ample hard proofs of such skullduggeries have already turned up in the course of the five-year litigation—and the judge has intimated that further damaging evidence is to be found in the eight-teen disputed informer files.

The government is afraid that its entire informer network will be endangered if these files are made available even to a few lawyers. The attorney general asserted as much in his affidavit opposing the court order. Such action would indicate that informers could no longer count on anonymity to conceal their crimes and absolve them from being brought to account. Release of the files, it is claimed, would set a precedent that could blow the cover in other pending cases.

Two other major issues are at stake in the development. Is the national administration above the law? This is what Carter's officials contend, just as Nixon's did before them. And are dissidents to be spied

upon and harassed by a legion of informers who are granted immunity from their misdeeds under governmental protection?

What an irony this confrontation presents! Democratic and Republican administrations from Roosevelt to Ford sought to squelch opposition to their policies by spying on and trying to disrupt the legitimate political activities of the SWP and YSA. Their extensive and expensive efforts failed to uncover any illegality.

On the other hand, the suit has succeeded in exposing a long train of gross violations of the constitutional and civil rights of our members. We were not the only victims. Others included the NAACP, the Urban League, Black Panthers, and other Black organizations, National Organization for Women, the United Church of Christ, the Communist Party, trade unions, the women's movement, antiwar activists, and many more.

At this climactic point we see the principal law enforcement officer of the United States, sworn to uphold and protect the law, declaring himself above the law and being held in contempt of a federal court order!

#### Bold Move

This turn of events lends added importance to this already historic court action. We took a bold move five years ago in challenging the imperial power at Washington on such grounds. The litigants were unequally matched. For a political party such as ours to sue the federal colossus that has unlimited resources at its command appeared as foolhardy as for a small business to sue IBM or General Electric for patent infringement. Such a step could not have been contemplated before Watergate.

It has taken considerable tenacity and unremitting money raising and publicity work by the Political Rights Defense Fund, which is organizing support for the suit, to arrive at this critical juncture. In a press conference at the start of the case, the noted constitutional attorney Leonard Boudin, fresh from his victory in the Ellsberg defense, told reporters it could be "a major step in reversing the erosion of political and civil liberties." And he added: "This case is winnable."

That is the persevering spirit in which, after five years, all of us who are connected with this fight—the plaintiffs, the attorneys, the SWP and YSA members, and our many loyal supporters from coast to coast—are resolved to carry it through to a victorious conclusion.

**Intercontinental Press/Inprecor** will give you a week by week analysis of the most important world events.

Subscribe now!

# 1. Washington Confronts New Rise in Liberation Struggles

By David Frankel

[The following article appeared in the July 7 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York. We are printing it in two parts, of which this is the first.]

\* \* \*

A new charged international atmosphere has been created by the Carter administration's repeated attacks on Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa.

Carter's anticommunist campaign reached a peak following the rebellion in Zaïre's Shaba province in mid-May. At the same time, lurid stories of atrocities against whites were splashed across the capitalist press.

Under cover of this racist and anticommunist propaganda, French and Belgian paratroopers intervened in Zaïre. U.S. transport planes and some U.S. military personnel participated in the intervention.

Billed as a "rescue mission," this imperialist adventure was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people. Of course, it had nothing to do with saving human life. Its immediate aim was to prop up the corrupt dictatorship of Zaïrian President Mobutu Sese Seko.

As the editors of the *New York Times* admitted June 15: "With or without Cuban involvement, Mr. Carter seemed determined to lend a hand in rescuing the Mobutu Government, and giving its bankrupt treasury yet another infusion. Zaïre is a mess and seems destined to remain a mess for a long time while Western interests—as foreign to Africa as the Cubans—seek to salvage their investments in Katangan ores and Mobutu bonds."

This was a sharp shift for the *Times*, which had previously hailed the intervention in Zaïre as a response to "the Soviet-Cuban legions in Africa."

Prompting the shift was Carter's June 14 news conference. After weeks of repeated attacks on the Cuban government for being behind the Zaïre rebellion, Carter virtually admitted that he did not have a shred of proof for his charges. He lamely suggested that if the Cuban government really opposed the insurgents, it could have done more to stop them—even using its own troops against them.

Not surprisingly, the *Times* editors thought it prudent to back up a bit. "President Carter's vigorous charges that Cuba bore responsibility for last month's invasion of Zaïre were unworthy of American diplomacy to begin with. They turned out to be unprovable except by a kind of guilt-

by-association," said the *Times*.

It was a diplomatic way of noting that Carter had been caught in his lie.

Similarly, *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent James Nelson Goodsell reported June 16: "President Carter's apparent shift away from confrontation with Cuba over whatever role it played in the Katangan invasion of Shaba Province in Zaïre has come none too soon for many in the Washington intelligence community.

"The evidence of Cuban involvement in the recent Zaïrian fighting was, in the view of these intelligence sources, simply 'too flimsy' to stand up under close scrutiny."

But the crisis in Zaïre was not an isolated incident. Carter's intervention there, and his threats against Cuba, come in the context of an ongoing upsurge in the African liberation struggle.

How to halt this upsurge, and how to stop the Cuban government from extending aid and solidarity to the Black masses fighting for their liberation, has become the central concern of imperialist policy in Africa. From this point of view, the threats against Cuba and the groundwork being laid for further U.S. military intervention in Africa pose serious dangers.

Carter, of course, has moved with great caution. As one administration official recently acknowledged, "It's our general assessment that the mood of the U.S. as a whole is one of reservation about . . . military involvements overseas, and that anything that raises that possibility has to be very clearly justified. . . ."

Carter has attempted to justify such moves by attacks on the "red menace." Thus, his red-scare campaign around the Shaba rebellion ties in directly to broader U.S. policy in Africa. This becomes clearer if we recall the events of the past few years.

## Imperialist Strongholds Crumble

Since the spring of 1974, two pillars of the imperialist status quo in Black Africa—the Portuguese empire and the Ethiopian monarchy—have crumbled. At the same time, a third pillar—the racist, white minority regimes in southern Africa—is under increasing pressure from the Black majority.

The April 1974 revolt of the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal came about largely as a reaction against the devastating impact on Portuguese capitalism of the brutal, thirteen-year-long colonial war

waged by the totalitarian Salazar regime against the Black population of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. The first declaration of the new military government in Portugal was a promise to negotiate peace in their colonies.

Naturally, this was a tremendous inspiration to the African masses. Strikes and demonstrations in the cities reflected their increased combativity. The armed struggle also stepped up. In Mozambique, for example, whole Black units of the Portuguese army deserted to the liberation forces, taking their equipment with them.

Although the new Portuguese regime tried to stall in hopes of finding some way to retain influence over its African colonies, it was finally forced to concede to the demands for independence. Angola, the last of the Portuguese colonies to gain its independence, celebrated the end of 500 years of Portuguese rule on November 11, 1975.

How did Washington react to these advances by the African liberation movement?

It was *dismayed*.

While giving lip-service to the struggle against colonial rule, and while claiming to abhor the racist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, Washington's real policy all along had been to support the Portuguese empire and the white minority regimes.

In April 1969, shortly after his inauguration, Richard Nixon ordered his National Security Council to review U.S. policy toward southern Africa. Carried out under the direction of Henry Kissinger, the study advised that "whites are here [in Africa] to stay and that the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists."

Nicknamed "Tar Baby" by White House advisers, the policy adopted by Nixon was to "maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political and economic restrictions on the white states. . . ."

Of course, for many decades prior to this the colonial regimes in southern Africa had depended on U.S. and other imperialist support in order to survive. But the "Tar Baby" policy represented a more open tilt in their direction. Washington backed Lisbon's colonial wars in Africa with extensive military aid and financial assistance, while stepping up loans, trade,

and investment designed to strengthen the South African and Rhodesian regimes.

John Stockwell, the former chief of the CIA's Angola task force, comments on the result of the "Tar Baby" policy in his book, *In Search of Enemies*. Stockwell notes that during the colonial war, "American bombs and napalm fell on the Angolan nationalists," and that, not surprisingly, the collapse of the Portuguese empire "caught the United States by surprise, without graceful policy alternatives and out of contact with the African revolutionaries."

At first, Washington intervened in Angola to stoke the fires of civil war among the three competing nationalist organizations.\* By preventing what Stockwell calls a "cheap" MPLA victory, the U.S. rulers hoped to exhaust the Angolan masses and weaken the ability of an independent Angola to stand up to imperialist demands.

Helped by Soviet aid, however, the MPLA began to get the upper hand. Washington responded by encouraging the South African regime to invade Angola. By October 1975 there were 3,000 South African troops deep inside Angola.

This imperialist invasion of Angola altered the character of the conflict. It was no longer primarily a civil war. It posed a deadly threat to the anti-imperialist struggle of the people of Angola and their right to self-determination.

For about two months, the capitalist news media around the world almost completely blanked out news of the South African invasion. Meanwhile, Kissinger kept up a barrage of threats and denunciations against the Cuban government, which sent troops and aid to help the MPLA resist the imperialist invasion.

As news of the South African invasion did come out, the U.S. imperialists lied through their teeth, vehemently denying that they had encouraged it. (Later, during the Somali invasion of Ethiopia, similar denials came from Washington. It's hardly surprising that the imperialists lie about their role in such adventures. Imagine what the reaction of the American people would have been back in 1965 if Lyndon Johnson had told the truth about what he was doing in Vietnam.)

Looking back at Kissinger's statements on Angola, one is struck by how similar they are to those of the Carter administration today. On November 10, 1975, Kissinger warned that Soviet policy in Angola "was not compatible with the spirit of détente"—a formula that was echoed by Carter aide Zbigniew Brzezinski May 28 when he said Moscow's behavior was not "compatible with what was once called the code of détente."

\*MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola); UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola); FNLA (Angolan National Liberation Front).

On November 24, 1975—at a time when *South African troops had driven more than 600 miles into Angola!*—Kissinger declared that "the United States cannot remain indifferent" to Soviet and Cuban support for the Angolan government.

Once again, Kissinger's words recall Carter's May 30 speech in which he insisted that NATO "cannot be indifferent" to Soviet and Cuban policies in Africa.

The collaboration between Washington and South Africa became so apparent that former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Patrick Moynihan tried to minimize it by stating December 14, 1975, that there was only a "convergence of policy" between the two governments. "We are doing the same thing, sort of," added the former Harvard professor.

The full measure of Washington's hypocrisy in this matter was exposed when South African Defense Minister Pieter Botha indicated that top U.S. officials had urged the South Africans to go into Angola. An anonymous South African "high official" also told *New York Times* correspondent Henry Kamm, according to a February 6, 1976, article, that "we accepted the utterances of Mr. Kissinger and others. We felt surely he had the necessary pull to come forward with the goods."

According to Stockwell, the CIA collaborated closely with the South African secret police, and at one point Washington was even considering the direct shipment of U.S. arms to the South Africans in Namibia.

But despite his best efforts, Kissinger was unable "to come forward with the goods." The majority of the American ruling class did not think it could get away with large-scale involvement in Kissinger's dirty war in Angola. They knew the American people would not tolerate another Vietnam.

#### 'An International Outlaw'?

Ford and Kissinger were joined in their propaganda campaign by an obedient big-business press. For example, the *New York Times* editorialized against "Soviet imperialism" in Africa in its November 26, 1975, issue, saying:

"Since October the MPLA has been reinforced by a 3,000-man force of Cuban personnel. Whatever military supplies have reached other factions in Angola from American sources are paltry and tardy by contrast."

The *Times* editorial tried to blame the Soviets and Cubans for the escalation of the Angolan war—a lie that is so outrageous in light of the initial U.S.-South African intervention that it deserves equal place with Ford's claim that he was only trying to give the Angolans "an opportunity to make the decision for themselves" on who should run their country.

Unlike Kissinger, however, the *Times* editors realized that a U.S. show of force in

Angola was "something that the American people would never countenance now."

Despite such warnings, Ford and Kissinger seriously considered a direct attack on Cuba. Ford himself assailed the Cuban government as "an international outlaw" and "a regime of aggression" for its role in countering the South African invasion. He threatened to take "appropriate measures" against the Cuban revolution.

Among the measures considered, says Stockwell, was "the feasibility of making an overt military feint at Cuba itself to force Castro to recall his troops and defend the home island."

According to the account of the Cuban role in Angola by Colombian author Gabriel García Márquez (an account published by the official Cuban news agency, *Prensa Latina*) there were other threats too. García Márquez says that Cuban planes going to Angola were stopped from refueling in Guyana when "the ambassador of the United States personally threatened it with the bombardment and destruction of the airport at Georgetown."

In light of such threats, one might well ask, who was the real "international outlaw"?

Of course, the Cubans carefully weighed the threat of U.S. action. "The possibility that the United States might intervene openly, rather than through the mercenaries and South Africa as it had been doing for some time, was obviously one of the most disturbing unknowns," García Márquez noted. "But a rapid analysis suggested that at least Washington would think twice about doing so:

"It had just freed itself from the morass of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. It had a President no one had elected. The CIA was under fire in Congress and low-rated by public opinion. The United States needed to avoid seeming—not only in the eyes of African countries, but especially in the eyes of American blacks—to ally itself with racist South Africa. Beyond all this it was in the midst of an election campaign in its Bicentennial year."

Certainly the decision of the Cuban government to stand up to Washington and its South African allies in Angola was a move of extraordinary courage. A small country of 10 million people successfully defied the mightiest imperialist power in the world. The South African army was forced to withdraw, and that threat to the Angolan independence struggle was beaten back.

What an inspiration this was to the Black freedom fighters in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa itself!

In fact, the defeat of the imperialist intervention in Angola was accompanied by the intensification of the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe. The regime in Mozambique felt strong enough as a result of the victory in Angola to close its borders to Rhodesian trade.

And only three months after the South

African withdrawal, the Black township of Soweto exploded. The ensuing strikes and demonstrations among Black workers and students throughout South Africa revealed to the whole world the explosive potential building up in the main bastion of imperialist rule in Africa.

No wonder Ford and Kissinger considered going to such lengths against the Cuban revolution. Just as the Cuban leadership was among the first to call for international solidarity with the liberation fighters in Vietnam, and just as they sought to extend the socialist revolution to Latin America by aiding anti-imperialist guerrilla movements there, they are now aiding the African liberation struggle.

The Socialist Workers Party disagrees, however, with Cuban President Fidel Castro's portrayal of the Angolan regime as a revolutionary or a socialist government. In reality Angola, like Egypt under Nasser, has a bourgeois government administered by a petty-bourgeois nationalist apparatus that defends capitalist property relations and that suppresses the democratic rights of the masses and the independent organization of the working class.

Of course, revolutionists fight together with such regimes against any assault by imperialism. Chinese Trotskyists in the 1930s even fought in the same camp as the reactionary bourgeois regime of Chiang Kai-shek when that was necessary to oppose the invasion of semicolonial China by Japanese imperialism.

But it is one thing to support a military struggle against an imperialist invasion and another to give political support to a bourgeois government that carries out repressive actions against the working class.

Despite this Cuban political support to the Angolan regime, however, the Cubans played a progressive, anti-imperialist role in helping to beat back the South African aggression. Certainly the American imperialists have not lost sight of this fact.

At the same time, to the extent that the Cubans fail to distinguish between working-class and procapitalist currents within any particular anti-imperialist struggle, they are unable to help propel the socialist revolution forward. The Cuban revolution itself would never have triumphed if Castro had taken this attitude in regard to Cuba. In order to carry the anti-imperialist tasks of the Cuban revolution through to the end, Castro had to split from those forces in the July 26 Movement who insisted on subordinating the tasks of the revolution to the maintenance of capitalist property relations.

The presence of thousands of Cuban troops in Angola has introduced a new factor in southern Africa. It creates a powerful obstacle to imperialism's ability to intervene there at will.

In the case of Angola, the South Africans were faced with the choice of either getting out of the country or substantially

escalating their military aggression.

The role that Cuban troops could play was also raised in regard to Zaïre.

After the first rebellion there, in 1977, Castro ridiculed charges that Cuban troops had been involved. Had that been the case, Castro said in an interview in the May 22, 1977, issue of *Granma*, the newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, "there wouldn't be a single soldier of Mobutu's or of King Hassan's [of Morocco] left in that province."

If the French and Belgian regimes had really thought there were Cubans in Shaba during the uprising there this May, they would have thought several times before sending their paratroopers in.

Carter and Brzezinski, just as Ford and Kissinger before them, are deathly afraid that the Cubans will begin to take an active part in the struggle in Zimbabwe. The June 6 announcement by Joshua Nkomo, one of the major Zimbabwean nationalist leaders, acknowledging that Zimbabwean freedom fighters were being trained by Cuban troops, underscored this danger to imperialism in southern Africa.

Certainly Castro has made no secret of his intentions. Calling Africa "the weakest link in the imperialist chain today," he said in the interview quoted above:

"Only the continuation of the armed struggle of the people of Zimbabwe can develop the required strength and mobilization to overcome the Rhodesian racists and guarantee true national independence. I don't think that peaceful or diplomatic solutions will convince the Rhodesian racists and their allies to give up their regime. . . .

"Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia will never be freed without the most energetic struggle ever, weapon in hand, so these peoples oppressed by colonialism and racism may achieve freedom and dignity. We must keep in mind that the tiny racist minority that oppresses those peoples will never resign itself to their freedom—which will never be obtained by any diplomatic or peaceful means."

One can look in vain for such statements from the Stalinist leaders in Moscow. This is not the language of "peaceful coexistence" and "détente."

Of course, the imperialists have tried to discredit the Cubans by calling them pawns of the Soviet regime—even mercenaries. This latter charge sounds strange, coming from governments whose only mission in life is to protect the investments and markets of a tiny minority of super-rich capitalists. Unlike them, the Cubans have no economic interests in Africa at all.

The Cubans themselves insist that they took the initiative in Africa on their own, without first consulting Moscow. According to García Márquez's account of the Cuban move in Angola: "Far from what has so often been said, it was an independent and sovereign act of Cuba. Only after

the decision was made, not before, was the Soviet Union informed."

Stockwell, the CIA's former chief in Angola, agrees. "After the war," he says, "we learned that Cuba had not been ordered into action by the Soviet Union. To the contrary, the Cuban leaders felt compelled to intervene for their own ideological reasons."

The impact that the Cubans have made in Africa—so out of proportion to the size of their country—is testimony to the power of the Cuban revolution. Moscow has never been able to make such an impact, not because of lack of resources, but because it has insisted on subordinating any support for the African liberation struggle—most of which is purely verbal anyway—to its diplomatic relations with Washington.

If the Cubans held that perspective, they would never have sent their troops to counter the South African invasion of Angola, and they would not today be trying to aid the struggle in Zimbabwe.

In fact, Washington has insisted that any improvement in its diplomatic relations with Cuba can come only on condition that Cuban troops are withdrawn from Africa.

But Castro has steadfastly refused to use the African liberation struggle as a bargaining chip in return for a few favors from Washington. In answer to newscaster Barbara Walters's question last fall, "Will you remove your troops from Angola?" Castro said:

"... we can discuss this problem only with the Angolans and the government of Angola. We cannot and are never going to discuss this problem with the United States."

From the Kremlin's point of view, Cuban aid to the African liberation struggle is quite useful. Havana runs the risks, while the threat of further anti-imperialist successes gives Moscow greater leverage in bargaining with Washington.

In analyzing Cuba's foreign policy, two negative pressures must be kept in mind. One is the constant attempts by the Kremlin bureaucracy, backed by the leverage of Soviet economic aid to Havana, to mold Cuba's policy to fit Moscow's counter-revolutionary line of "détente."

The second negative pressure is the contradiction contained within the Cuban line itself. Cuba's unhesitating military backing for anti-imperialist struggles is combined with political support to selected bourgeois nationalist governments. This was true of Cuban policy in Latin America since the coming to power of the Castro regime, and it remains true in Africa today.

This policy elevates the role of armed forces—whether guerrilla movements, or Cuba's well-trained troops—above the question of a correct revolutionary socialist political course.

[To be continued]

## Dictatorship and Resistance in Argentina

By Marcelo Zugadi

At long last, the Argentine dictatorship has chosen a president for the "Second Period of the Process of National Reorganization." Videla is to assume his new title at the beginning of August—but his three-year term began last March 24. With unmistakable sarcasm the editors of the Buenos Aires daily *La Nación* said May 7: "This is the first time a president has been chosen retroactively."

Nonetheless, this irony could not cover over the fact that the new president was "elected" by three persons, and that his long-discussed and oft-postponed designation brought to light the deep rifts inside the armed forces. The leading voice of the Argentine exploiters rejoiced once the decision had been reached, noting that it had become an imperative need since "at the end of last week the military's deliberations took on dimensions that the political eyes of the country are not accustomed to seeing" (*La Nación*, May 7).

So there is agreement on the presidential figure for the "Second Phase." But the powers of this president remain to be discussed. The resolution adopted thus takes on mere symbolic value, designed simply to limit the public argument among the military commanders, which has revealed to all the political crisis that the dictatorship is now going through.

In the same communiqué in which it announced Videla's selection, the military junta reported that it had decided "to direct the appropriate bodies to study the specific aspects of the functioning of the governmental system and to make recommendations before July 15, 1978." This involves deciding who is to appoint the cabinet ministers and the provincial governors, and whether or not the president will also be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces—as has been the case since 1853. In other words, what is to be decided is who will actually run the government. After two years without reaching agreement, the junta has decided to set a deadline.

The situation can be summed up in a single sentence: Videla is governing as president in his second term, which began March 24 of this year, but only by July 15 will his powers have been decided upon . . . and he assumes his new post on August 1.

Whatever the immediate outcome of this crisis, it is clear that in one way or another the dictatorship is entering a new phase. To foresee what its character will be requires above all understanding what the

military junta set out to do and what it has achieved in the past two years.

### The Causes of the Coup

The armed forces explained that the coup was unavoidable for two reasons—the activity of the guerrilla organizations and the existence of a "power vacuum." While more than a few revolutionists let themselves be taken in by such arguments, it cannot stand the least comparison with the facts.

In the first place, in order to talk about a "power vacuum," you have to ignore the fact that long before March 24, 1976, the armed forces had taken over all the key positions in the state. They did this with the complicity of all the bourgeois and reformist parties and even the government of Isabel Perón. (It might be noted in passing that for revolutionists to think in terms of a "power vacuum" implies a curious conception of the bourgeois state and the factors that lead to a breakdown of its power.)

A vast amount of special repressive legislation, the state of siege, and the voluntary paralysis of the Congress gave the military a blank check to carry out their repressive tasks throughout the country. Tucumán Province was put under direct military control; a member of the armed forces general staff became chief of the federal police (General Harguindeguy, now minister of the interior).

It is a big mistake to confuse the paralysis of a camarilla of adventurers in the government with a "power vacuum."

At the same time, the ERP<sup>1</sup> and the Montoneros not only did not pose a threat to this government—nothing could be further from the truth!—but rather were clearly on the wane. The total failure of the ERP's attack on the Monte Chingolo regiment in December 1975, the destruction of the guerrillas operating in the mountains of Tucumán, and the disaster that resulted from the Montoneros' attack on the Formosa regiment demonstrated unmistakably that the guerrilla organizations were approaching the culmination of an irreversible decline that had begun long before. The military coup—or more precisely, the transfer of the government to the military—resulted neither from any fanciful "power vacuum" nor from any imagi-

nary guerrilla threat.

Rather the coup must be explained on the basis of the bourgeoisie's need to come up with a tactical and strategic response to the challenge of the workers movement. The breakup of the Peronist movement deprived the ruling class of the only instrument it had to control and deflect the activity of the workers on the trade-union and political levels. It became necessary to purge the union bureaucracy—by then incapable of fulfilling its function—and put together a new political force that could replace the irretrievably defunct Peronist movement.

The powerful workers mobilization that culminated in the general strike of June 1975 had shown that the proletariat was moving ahead toward achieving class independence and that even in the government the Peronists were incapable of containing that advance. Replacing the Peronists thus became a pressing task in order to guarantee the long-term survival of the capitalist regime. And so the bourgeoisie set its sights on that.

(It should be noted in passing that moving up the elections, a necessary part of the plan given the total paralysis of the governing camarilla, had already led to considerable success in achieving a political alternative for the bourgeoisie. The reformists, populists, and centrists, with the guerrilla organizations in the forefront, had thrown themselves enthusiastically into building a popular front and were getting ready to run Cámpora<sup>2</sup> in the elections they naively believed would be held.)

But neither the bourgeoisie's political maneuvers—in which the AAA<sup>3</sup> played an important role—nor the reformist-populist-centrist betrayal, nor the blindness of those who refused to see the deepening of the class struggle, could hold back the force against which the entire political plan was aimed—the proletariat. Achieving again the level reached in the mid-1975 struggles, the workers returned to the streets. They extended their mobilizations throughout the country, once again got out of the control of the bureaucracy, and

2. Héctor Cámpora, a Peronist leader elected president in March 1973. He resigned three months later and was succeeded by Perón himself.

3. Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (Argentine Anticommunist Alliance), armed parapolic units.

reconstituted their *coordinadoras*. With the Coordinating Board of the Córdoba Unions<sup>4</sup> in the vanguard, the proletariat began to seek national leadership and political direction for its struggle.

On the horizon loomed a new general strike, but at an incomparably higher level than the one six months before. The bureaucracy could not repeat its maneuver of calling a general strike in order to regain control of the movement. But it could not avoid one either. Not only would a general strike have aborted—or made extremely difficult—the political plans of the bourgeoisie, but it would also have blocked the military coup.

Despite the total absence of a revolutionary leadership, the accelerating advance of the workers movement cast a shadow over all the plans of the counterrevolutionaries. Unless drastic measures were taken their immediate perspectives would be jeopardized. The decision was made—a military coup was unavoidable. The national radio network was made available to all the bourgeois leaders, who explained without mincing any words that a military coup was the only solution.

The top bureaucrats assured the workers again and again that “everything has been worked out,” while they collaborated effectively to prevent the development of any national leadership for the mobilization. The reformist-populist-centrist bloc cheerfully continued to prepare its popular-front presidential formula. Revolutionary leadership was conspicuously absent. Around mid-February the military gangs began jailing and kidnapping class-struggle workers leaders. On March 24, Isabel Perón was transferred to a fortress in the south and the three military commanders installed themselves in the Casa Rosada.

In such conditions, could one expect anything but a setback for the working class?

### The ‘Reorganization’ Begins

On March 25 the Communist Party issued a long statement supporting the “process of reorganization,” pointing out that it was necessary to avert a “rightist coup,” and calling for formation of “a broad democratic coalition cabinet” to carry out the “reorganization.”

All indications being that there would be no elections, the guerrilla sector of the popular-front bloc called for a “people’s war against the military junta.” Others, proclaiming that the working class had suffered a historic defeat, went into hibernation.

To be sure, a number of revolutionary-Marxist organizations did not fail to raise their voices in a courageous way. Through-

out the process these groups had sought to provide an answer. But for historical reasons that I am not going to go into here (their smallness, their divisions, and all the political weaknesses that spring from this), they were unable, both before and after the coup, to put forward a credible political alternative, a concrete proposal for overcoming the lack of a workers leadership.

In this context, once the military junta was installed in power, with the backing of a solid bourgeois front, what could be expected but that the workers movement would suffer further, still graver, setbacks?

But is it permissible to say, as some have, that this situation is the result of some “intrinsic weakness” on the part of the proletariat? Certainly not! Still less acceptable are the conclusions drawn by those who, while they correctly understand the causes of the coup, think that the workers movement amounts to no more than the sum total of exiles, dead, prisoners, and kidnapping victims. On this basis, they come up with the idea that there is no organized vanguard in Argentina today, that the class is atomized and lacks even so much as trade-union organization, and that we must start from less than zero to organize the resistance.

The facts demonstrate quite the contrary. These are highlighted, for example, in a statement of “support for the government” published May 7 by the Rural Association—which represents the cattle-raising oligarchy whose interests are tightly linked to big monopoly capital and imperialism. The Rural Association says: “The situation in the labor field has still not been clarified, nor has the system been brought into harmony with the guiding principles of the process.”

Semantic discussion about words that are more or less arbitrarily interpreted is not very important. Only a totally irresponsible person could fail to recognize the hard, extremely hard, blows that the workers movement has suffered in Argentina. What is important, however, is for it to be clearly understood that (in the words of the club of the Argentine counterrevolutionists) “the system has not yet been brought into harmony with the guiding principles” of the dictatorship. In our own words—the working class has not yet been smashed. Its trade-union structures have not yet been dismantled. And the bourgeoisie has not yet been able to inflict on it a defeat that could demoralize it and break the inexorable and uninterrupted line of its development toward class independence.

Why is it especially important for us to make this clear, as the decisive question? Because the “not yet” in the statement by the Rural Association means two things. In the first place it means that despite the indescribable repression that we must confront, we Argentine revolutionists do not have to work in a wasteland or preach in a wilderness.

Quite to the contrary. We sow on fertile soil. We are swimming with the tide, not against it. The harvest we seek to gather has not been felled by the murderous hand of the bourgeoisie. We speak our words to eager ears that have already learned to pay no heed to the false voices of the enemies of the revolution! Is this what is pointed up by those who tell us of a deepgoing defeat, a terrible defeat, an historic defeat? Obviously not.

In the second place, this “not yet” means that the most economically powerful sector of our class enemy believes the job has not been done . . . and is calling for finishing it. Now that the heroic resistance of the workers, the economic disaster, the disintegration of the bourgeois front, and the divisions inside the armed forces are all coming together in a crisis, big capital says in its document: “What is to be called for from citizens is reflection and sober judgment, and from the government, energy, so as to keep outdated solutions from being tried again.”

Whatever disagreements we might have, we revolutionists must respond with one voice to this declaration by the class enemy: that the government must be energetic—because it has not yet smashed the workers movement!

### What Is the ‘Second Period’?

The conflicts that arose in choosing a president for the “second period” of the dictatorship are only the reflection on the institutional level of the following crucial problem: The dictatorship is supposed to represent the bourgeoisie’s strategic answer to the workers movement, but after two years in power and despite its blood-thirsty rampage it has not fully carried through the first tactical step to enable such a long-term solution to begin to take shape.

At the same time, the dictatorship has been losing its base of support. The divisions among the bourgeoisie are being carried over into the ranks of the military. And the climate of passivity and confusion that made it possible for the regime to accomplish what it did in its first months has dissipated. The first period is thus obviously over, but the dictatorship has not yet been able to get into a position where it could open a second stage. Since there is neither agreement nor predominant support inside the armed forces—either for “acting energetically” or for “trying outdated solutions again”—an open crisis looms.

To provide a solution at this critical turning point, a “political plan” was presented, at the very moment the military junta announced that Videla had been named president for the next stage. The plan illustrates the kind of room for maneuver that the bourgeoisie has today; it is all the more revealing since it was drawn up by the Asociación de Bancos Argentini-

4. The coordinating committee of class-struggle oppositions from all factories and branches of industry in Córdoba.



nos (ADEBA—Association of Argentine Banks). In 359 pages it analyzes political and economic developments since 1930 and projects the study to the year 2000.

The bankers' plan proposes a constitutional reform to assure that political parties ("the central axis of the state and government in democratic societies") will be governed by new principles. These principles would include:

a. A stipulation that the role of political parties is to further the fundamental values of the constitution and that they are not above those values.

b. A constitutional obligation to deny the opportunity to function as a political party to those who in their platform do not explicitly subscribe to the basic values of Argentine society.

c. A provision for stripping political parties of all their rights if, in exercising governmental power, they violate the fundamental rights and liberties of society and citizens, or if they fail to openly, repeatedly, and clearly meet their obligations to society and individuals.

d. A provision that no party be allowed monopoly control of the representative bodies, and that candidates in municipal elections run as individuals.

ADEBA, not wanting to leave any room for improvisation, proposed further conditions beyond the above "principles": (1) the abolition of compulsory voting; (2) no voting rights for illiterates, i.e., all those who have not completed their primary schooling (the dropout rate from primary schools reached 50 percent in the last decade); and (3) raising the voting age from eighteen to twenty-one years.

ADEBA also states that the executive branch is to predominate over parliament, although at the same time, in another respect, the office of the president is to have its powers cut. The president would not be commander-in-chief of the armed forces and could not designate military commanders, directors of the Central Bank and state enterprises, or supreme court judges. The president would have a role to play nonetheless, since ADEBA's draft accords the chief executive: "a. the sole power to initiate laws; b. the power of veto, which cannot be overridden by the congress."

Still more guarantees were apparently thought necessary, and so the moneybags proposed that the new constitution establish that "the armed forces shall have constitutional responsibility for preserving the liberties and fundamental rights of individuals and society against attacks by the state or by social groups." Also proposed is a "constitutional security clause, which would become operative like a red light whenever the government openly and systematically violated rights and fundamental liberties, created social chaos, or gravely neglected its responsibilities for maintaining security."

Another innovation is that all provinces would have an equal number of representa-

tives in the congress, regardless of their population.

There are, of course, some preconditions that must be achieved before this ambi-



"PRESIDENT" VIDELA

tious plan can be put into practice to open "a historic stage of renovated institutions." ADEBA notes three:

1. Effective public peace and security, that is, total monopoly of force on the part of the state.

2. Economic improvement, of such scope and continuity that the society will be able to see tangible benefits.

3. Development by the armed forces of a political action program with three essential goals: (a) acceptance by the citizenry of a set of principles that can act as the cement of renovated institutions, (b) the embodiment by stages of the principles into institutions, and (c) the achievement of an orderly, controlled process of succession in government, the basic premise of which would be continuity of the established political order and program.

This is only one of the many projects under discussion today. Basing themselves on Pinochet's concept of "authoritarian democracy," some are putting the stress on "democracy" and others on "authority." All, however, agree that the above preconditions must be achieved before the "new historic stage" can begin. The "second period" would then be marked by the achievement of "social peace" and "substantial and ongoing economic development," along with the implementation of a "program of political action."

As we have seen, this process is not starting off too well for the bourgeoisie. But this does represent an attempt to tackle the decisive problem of the coming years: to achieve "acceptance by the citi-

zenry of a set of principles that can act as the cement of the institutions." Put bluntly, this involves replacing the Peronist movement with one or more political formations capable of binding and gagging the proletariat. Leaving aside for the moment the fact that this third prerequisite is intimately bound up with the other two, let us see what steps have been taken toward achieving it.

#### A United Front Against the Workers Movement

It must be noted first of all that varied forces have converged at the international level to carry out this task. Imperialism, taking a lively interest, has advanced its pawns—Social Democracy, the church, the bureaucratic union federations—in an open offensive against the independence of the Argentine workers movement. The most striking example of this has been the 1977 turn of the bulk of the Commission of the Twenty-five<sup>5</sup> toward Social Democratic positions. This has involved link-up with the ICFTU<sup>6</sup>, as well as abandoning all references to the "third position" and other folkloric formulas of Peronism.

There have been repeated visits from ICFTU and AFL-CIO bureaucrats. The top bureaucrats of all currents have had meetings with Cyrus Vance, Terence Todman, and Franz-Josef Strauss. These comings and goings formed the prologue to an impressive political campaign. Among other things, they have set up a weekly periodical aimed at "working people" (*Tribuna de la República*), another weekly aimed at the small and middle bourgeoisie (*Tribuna Económica*), and a monthly exclusively for pensioners (*Tribuna del Jubilado*).

The AFL-CIO organized a cadre school in Washington for apprentice bureaucrats. Another school lasting more than a month was held in Bariloche, an exclusive tourist center in the southern part of the country. The Jesuits as well organized various short courses with the same objectives. These were conducted by Msgr. Quarracino, the bishop of Avellaneda; union bureaucrat Miguel Gazzera; and Jorge Gualco, the leader of the People's Christian Party.

At a meeting last November the Latin American Workers Federation (CLAT), a regional Christian body funded by the Adenauer Foundation, ousted Raimundo Ongaro from his post and put Miguel Gazzera in his stead. In his new capacity, Gazzera opened an "office of CLAT af-

5. A coordinating committee of the leaders of unions not under government intervention.

6. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Founded at the end of World War II as an alliance between the European Social Democratic union bureaucracy and the U.S. AFL-CIO. The latter has since pulled out.

fairs" in Buenos Aires.

For its part, the ORIT (Inter-American Regional Workers Organization)—the discredited Latin American section of the ICFTU—has seriously set about changing its name and founding a new continental federation based in Buenos Aires.

The offensive is not taking place only on the trade-union level, however; it is also—and fundamentally—political. It should be remembered that the Communist Party has not been declared illegal by the dictatorship. Many of the CP's publications, which invariably support the "process of national reorganization," circulate freely in the country. The Democratic Socialist Party (in addition to the fact that its president, Américo Ghioldi, represents the military junta as ambassador to Portugal) has received obvious support in the trade-union field. The Radical Civic Union, the only bourgeois party organized at the national level, is seeking membership in the Second International. The so-called "antiverticalist"<sup>7</sup> sector of the Peronist party, headed by Luder and Robledo, is also involved in this overall plan. The Intransigent Party (whose principal figure, Oscar Alende, headed the presidential ticket supported by the CP in 1973) is also willing to collaborate in this task and is fighting for a slice of the pie, as are various factions of the Christian Democracy.

Nonetheless, it is obviously a simpler thing to say, "It is necessary to build a big reformist party to replace Peronism," than it is to get concrete agreement on how to go about it. The problem is the more difficult inasmuch as there are no workers parties with even limited support among the workers. The plan has to center around the union bureaucracy—which in turn, in order to exist as such, must respond to the pressing demands of the exploited masses. The economic situation offers no perspective for making real concessions to back up a policy of winning political support among the working class. And the ongoing resistance of the class is driving an inexorably widening wedge into the plans of the dictatorship and the bourgeois parties.

We are now involved in a full-scale battle. Two forces are disputing for the leadership of the workers movement: reformists and revolutionary Marxists. The former are relying on the antiworker united front that we have briefly described. The latter lack a clearly defined plan and a solid revolutionary organization capable of uniting their dispersed forces. The reformists have all the economic resources and the support of the dictatorship. The revolutionary Marxists have no economic resources and very limited organizational means;

they are obliged to work in the strictest clandestinity. Between the two stand the populists and centrists. They are still clearly willing to play the reformists' game. But in certain circumstances they can be drawn in as allies behind an independent working-class policy.

This apparently negative relationship of forces changes its sign, however, when one decisive factor is brought into the equation—the living workers movement. The continual resistance and the vitality of the workers movement have thrown all the dictatorship's plans into turmoil. This crisis is expressed in the struggles within the military command, the political paralysis of the dictatorship, the inability of the bourgeois parties to reach a concrete agreement, an economic situation that is out of control, and—a development that is bound to have big repercussions in the future—the divisions in the bureaucracy.

#### For Unconditional Unity of the Workers Movement

In early April the "verticalist" sector of the Peronist bureaucracy formed what it calls the Comisión de Gestión y Trabajo<sup>8</sup> (whose initials happen to be CGT). These forces took on the Commission of the Twenty-five in a sharp public confrontation, fighting for the labor franchise from the dictatorship. The "verticalist" wing is mostly, though not exclusively, made up of the leaders of unions that are under military intervention. (Notably, however, José Rodríguez, general secretary of the Machinists Union, which is under government intervention, is in the opposing gang; he is a stalwart agent of the ICFTU.)

This split in the bureaucracy is still not well defined and at present separates only the bureaucratic tops. While it reflects the objective pressure of the workers coming to bear against the plans of the dictatorship and the bourgeois and reformist parties, it also poses a serious danger that must be dealt with immediately. It threatens to split the workers movement. The struggle to defend trade-union unity can be waged effectively only if a correct response is made to the *political* maneuver that our enemy is trying to carry out.

There are, broadly speaking, three different projects aimed at constructing a political force capable of "acting as the cement of renovated institutions": On one side we have the dominant sector of the Commission of the Twenty-five, supported by the ICFTU. Their approach is to build a Social Democratic party on the German model. On the other, we have the Comisión de Gestión y Trabajo, which is seeking to refurbish the "national movement" and

restore the continuity of Peronism. In between these are the UCR and some minor bourgeois parties trying to pull the other two forces around their own apparatus.

The overall picture is still quite confused and ill defined. It is nonetheless clear that the minister of labor, along with ex-President Arturo Frondizi's Movement for Integration and Development and the "nationalist" sector of the army, is on the side of the Comisión de Gestión y Trabajo. The "liberal" sectors of the armed forces are divided among the other two variants. A recent meeting presided over by UCR leader Ricardo Balbín brought together the former components of the Hora del Pueblo,<sup>9</sup> plus the CP and several factions of the old Socialist Party, around Balbín's slogan "Videla, a general for democracy." This indicated the basis of support for the UCR's project.

The revolutionary-Marxist program expressly stipulates that, under certain circumstances, the formation of a labor party can be a positive step in the struggle for political independence of the workers movement and in the process of building a revolutionary workers party. But there are specific prerequisites for supporting such a development, the primary one being that the party in question be based on genuinely proletarian organizations. The operation being attempted by the UCR, which has supporters in the Commission of the Twenty-five as well as in the Comisión de Gestión y Trabajo, runs directly counter to this. It must therefore be exposed as a project that is contrary to the immediate and historical interests of the workers movement.

As for the other two variants, since they were given their push by the support of the Social Democracy or the current represented by the minister of labor and are aimed primarily at dividing the workers movement, they constitute a danger that must be immediately averted by revolutionary Marxists. In the present situation this task can be accomplished only with a perspective that combines defending the unity of the workers movement and fighting for its political independence from the parties of the bourgeoisie. And that perspective takes concrete form in the battle for an *independent workers party*.

#### Democratic Rights—A Key Struggle

While the fight to roll back the wage cuts is the main concern of the workers at the moment, this struggle links up directly with the problem of democratic rights. The slogan of "free collective bargaining" combines these two aspects of the struggle in a concentrated form. To discuss wages freely

7. The wing of the Peronist leadership that sought more room for dissent within the centralized, "vertical" command structure of the movement.

8. Labor Action Commission. Its initials, CGT, also stand for Confederación General del Trabajo (General Confederation of Labor). The CGT was the main Peronist union federation; it has been dissolved by the military junta.

9. The Hour of the People—a front of bourgeois parties and a faction of the Socialist Party formed in 1970 to press for a greater role for political parties under the Onganía dictatorship.

presupposes the military getting out of the unions, full restoration of trade-union life, and repeal of the laws that have abolished the right to strike, to hold meetings, and to organize, as well as freedom of expression and other rights.

In addition to all that, thousands of jailings and kidnappings and the total lack of personal security under the conditions of the repression have given rise to a de facto antidictatorial front embracing the immense majority of the population. The bourgeois parties have had to respond to this in spite of themselves.

While the workers movement must unconditionally defend its independence, it also needs allies in the fight for democratic rights. It must expose the reactionary character of the parties that try to present themselves as democrats, and lead a struggle of the workers and popular masses against the dictatorship. To this end, it should raise demands that those persons kidnapped be produced and that the hu-

man rights recognized by the constitution be fully observed. This program leads logically and unavoidably to calling for the overthrow of the dictatorship and for the convoking of a national constituent assembly.

Propagandistically, the formulation of this demand should call for the constituent assembly to be convoked by a provisional government of the CGT and the parties and organizations of the workers and popular masses. However, the slogan will have to be adjusted as events unfold, so as not to impede the revolutionary Marxists in struggling for their program in the concrete situation.

But at the same time that we confront the dictatorship, we also have a big battle to carry out against the enemies of the social revolution inside the workers movement. This battle begins with the organization, factory by factory, of the clandestine resistance, and culminates in the political

struggle against the dictatorship. It demands that the revolutionary Marxists unify their forces and lay the basis for a big party—the Argentine section of the Fourth International—which can offer an alternative adequate to meet the historic challenge that we face.

The dictatorship is in crisis. It must begin its second stage without having achieved the objectives of the first. The world economic situation holds nothing in store for it but new and still greater difficulties. The present state of affairs can lead either to a redoubled offensive by the bourgeoisie aimed at finally breaking the back of the proletariat, or to a complete collapse of the dictatorship, the failure of all the plans of the bourgeoisie, and the opening of a new chapter in the history of the Argentine proletariat. On this point, what the Trotskyists and the Fourth International do will be decisive.

May 23, 1978

## 'That's Not What I Voted For'

# Public Outcry Over Austerity Measures in California

By Jon Britton

Governor Jerry Brown and other Democratic and Republican politicians in California are continuing their efforts to impose severe cutbacks in government social spending in the aftermath of the landslide vote June 6 in favor of Proposition 13. The ballot initiative, which went into effect July 1, mandates a 57% across-the-board cut in property taxes.\*

But an outcry by thousands of irate citizens, initial protest actions, steps towards organizing much larger protests, and the consequent threat to Brown's presidential ambitions have caused the state government and local governments to back off temporarily from some of the more drastic measures they were threatening—and in some cases had begun implementing—after Proposition 13 was passed.

(Even bigger cuts and more massive layoffs had been threatened prior to the vote as part of a scare campaign by the Democrats and mainstream Republicans to get hard-pressed taxpayers to reject Proposition 13 in favor of a watered-down version that was listed on the ballot as Proposition 8.)

The austerity measures that remain in effect, however, still represent a bigger bite out of many Californians' living standards

than the ruling class dreamed of taking prior to June 6. And the respite from ruling-class efforts to impose much harsher cuts will not last long if an effective fightback on the part of labor and its allies is not organized.

As soon as Proposition 13 was passed, in some cases on the same day as the voting, state and local officials moved to freeze wages of public workers; lay off thousands of them; cancel a scheduled 7% cost-of-living increase for blind, aged, and disabled persons, dependent children, and others on welfare; close down special programs for the indigent elderly and mentally retarded; eliminate free ride service for the elderly and disabled; cancel summer school sessions; close down libraries and art museums; and take other similar measures—all in the name of "carrying out the will of the voters."

Soon, however, meetings of local government bodies held to discuss and decide details of the cuts were besieged by angry citizens determined to speak out against the inhuman and brutal actions being proposed. The turnout included many who had pulled the lever for Proposition 13 and who wanted to let the capitalist politicians know that such cuts were "not what I voted for."

In Berkeley, on the night of June 21, for example, new and increased taxes and fees were discussed by the City Council while a

crowd of 150 filled the council chamber. Police prevented another 200 persons on the city hall steps from entering.

The *Oakland Tribune* reported:

A group of marchers paraded from the offices of the Berkeley Unified School District to City Hall to protest cuts in services. They carried signs which said "People Before Profits," "Cut the Top, Not the Bottom," and "Don't Let Jarvis Starve Us."

Similar confrontations, usually on a smaller scale, took place at hundreds of such meetings in cities and towns across the state in the days following passage of Proposition 13.

Newspapers were flooded with letters to the editor protesting cuts in needed services.

Efforts to get more organized protest under way were launched at the same time. Relatively small, uncoordinated actions began to occur around the state. And there were indications of much bigger things to come.

In Los Angeles, Local 660 of the Service Employees International Union took the initiative to call together a meeting at which representatives of trade unions, Black and Chicano organizations, women's groups, student groups, and other forces could discuss and decide on emergency protest action. The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, a central labor council representing the trade unions

\*See *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, June 26, p. 758.

of that area, agreed to officially host the meeting.

Some 150 participants from a wide range of organizations heard initial plans for a mass protest demonstration. They also discussed circulation of a petition calling upon the state legislature to put a new referendum on the November ballot that, if approved, would eliminate the multi-billion-dollar tax windfall reaped by corporations and landlords as a result of Proposition 13's passage.

Similar efforts for joint labor-community action, on a more modest scale, got under way in northern California.

At the same time, Governor Brown and the state legislature in Sacramento were mobbed by an army of union officials, local politicians, and other lobbyists and protesters. A major demand was for the state government to allocate its \$5 billion to \$6 billion budget surplus to the schools and to local governments to make up for a major part of the loss in property-tax revenues. (Brown had insisted prior to June 6 that he would oppose such a measure, and his estimate of the surplus at that time was only \$3.4 billion.)

Meanwhile, the ultraright and Reaganite Republican sponsors of Proposition 13 continued to make hay, demagogically proclaiming that by making such cuts the "politicians" were simply trying to punish the majority who had voted for the measure. Opponents of school desegregation, who are led by the same right-wing forces, began to try to take advantage of the cutbacks to defeat busing plans.

Thus, the potential for a destabilizing polarization of California politics was shaping up, a development that could cost Brown and the Democrats and mainstream Republicans dearly and lead to social turmoil.

At this time, however, the American ruling class is not in such desperate straits economically that it must forge ahead with a particular attack in the overall offensive against working people whatever the cost. Intensified competition in the world market, declining profitability of investment, and the falling dollar are among the pressures forcing the U.S. capitalists to keep up their efforts to slash living standards.

But the rulers still have some flexibility and room for maneuver. When they meet stout resistance, such as the mine workers put up last year and early this year, or seriously risk provoking social and political instability, they will retreat temporarily and launch new attacks on other fronts.

Moreover, the California capitalists have in Brown a possible winning entry in the 1980 presidential sweepstakes. If Carter's popularity keeps plummeting and he ends up as a one-term president, a Brown victory would bring California big business added billions in new military contracts and other federal largess.

Brown also realizes that his presidential ambitions are on the line. He has to get reelected in November and avoid a big political and social blowup in California if he is to stand a chance in 1980. On the other hand, he knows that if he can put across significant cuts and get away with it, his stock with the ruling class nationally will rise considerably.

Thus, while quickly moving to freeze wages of state employees and to carve hundreds of millions of dollars out of the state budget for the fiscal year beginning July 1, Brown also proposed to the legislature that the budget surplus, accumulated over several years, be allocated to local governments and school districts to cushion the impact of Proposition 13.

On June 23, the legislature passed a bill distributing \$4.1 billion in direct aid and establishing a repayable \$900 million loan fund to help in short-term emergencies. As part of the plan, the state will assume local welfare costs for at least the next year.

Other provisions of the bill were less "beneficent." Grants to welfare recipients were effectively frozen by barring any increases that state employees did not also receive. And cost-of-living provisions in all state and local contracts were declared "null and void."

In the days that followed, local governments and school districts canceled or put off some of the more drastic cutbacks, layoffs, and other austerity measures they had been threatening to impose.

In San Francisco, where Mayor George Moscone had proclaimed a state of emergency, threatened layoffs of 5,000 city workers, and increased transit fares, it was announced that now no layoffs would be necessary although about 200 jobs would be eliminated through attrition.

The Los Angeles City Council voted not to lay off any employees this year after learning that the city would receive \$72 million from the state. Earlier, city officials had estimated that about 6,000 city workers would be laid off. Some jobs will be eliminated through attrition, however, and a plan to phase out all the city's day-care centers was approved on June 27.

Despite the distribution of more than \$5 billion in state funds, the educational system faces an average 10.5% loss in the revenue that had been expected in 1978-79, which officials will no doubt make up by firing large numbers of teachers. Most summer-school sessions remain canceled, and many of the other austerity measures imposed following the June 6 vote remain in effect. Thus, for example, more than 25% of California's cities have increased fees in order to recoup fiscal losses, according to Don Benninghoven, executive director of the League of California Cities. The city of Downey has even begun charging residents for sewer service.

Brown has also proposed an amendment to the state constitution that would put a

ceiling on state spending, dealing yet another blow to public employees and to vital social services affecting all California working people.

Still, there was a collective sigh of relief throughout California when it became clear that the cutbacks and lay-offs would be less far-reaching than first thought—at least for now.

As a wait-and-see attitude became prevalent and the earlier sense of urgency ebbed, the labor bureaucracy moved to take complete control of the budding union-led protest movement and subordinate it to the reelection of Jerry Brown.

In Los Angeles, the mass protest demonstration that was to have been called was put off and the wording on the petitions demanding a new referendum was unilaterally changed. Now, under the proposed law, landlords would retain their Proposition 13 tax cut along with homeowners. Moreover, officials made no effort to organize a serious campaign to circulate the petitions.

In northern California different unions circulated different petitions with different wording.

However, there is still much anger at the cutbacks, wage freezes, and other austerity measures that remain in effect and potential for an organized fightback remains.

This helps to explain why on June 26, after the uproar over the threatened cutbacks had partially died down, the editors of the *Los Angeles Times*, California's most authoritative capitalist daily, endorsed the proposed compromise referendum, now known as the Dills Amendment, and urged that it be placed on the November ballot. The editorial concluded as follows:

Sacramento, it should not be forgotten, for years misread the popular mood and did nothing to bring about responsible property-tax reform, thus setting the stage for the initiative that became Proposition 13. That mistake shouldn't be repeated. The Legislature should let the public decide in November on a constitutional amendment that affects the people's future well-being, and the quality and adequacy of services in their state.

The *Times* editors are obviously worried that if such a referendum is not put on the ballot in November a campaign could get under way later on, this time led by sections of the labor movement, for a much more radical alternative.

Brown, however, has said that such a referendum is "premature." Instead, he has called upon landlords to voluntarily rebate their tax savings to tenants and for corporations to create new jobs with their billions in tax windfalls—not a likely prospect, to say the least.

Another indication of the anger and readiness among working people to fight back was a protest demonstration in Sacramento of more than 5,000 public workers June 29. The action was organized

by the Civil Service Employees Association, the most conservative public employees union in the state.

The union officials invited Brown to address the protest rally and as he began to speak he was booed so loudly that, according to one press account, "the trees shook." Many in the audience carried hand-lettered signs, one of which said "You Aren't Producing."

Brown's announcement on July 6 that he was vetoing a measly 2.5% increase in wages for state employees (in place of the 5% they were originally supposed to get), passed by the state legislature the previous day, will arouse even more indignation.

In this situation, the American Trotskyists of the Socialist Workers Party, while participating in and urging further protest actions, have stepped up their educational efforts through the party's press and California election campaign.

One focus is the need for the unions to break with Brown and the Democratic Party, which are leading the austerity offensive in California, and to run their own candidates for public office. Fred Halstead, candidate for governor, and the other SWP candidates are also speaking out on the class nature of the tax system and are presenting concrete proposals for a complete overhaul that would take the burden of taxation off working people and small property owners entirely and place it on the wealthy.

Meanwhile, the Democrats and Republicans across the country are moving swiftly to take leadership of the growing sentiment against high taxes and inflation and divert it into support for reductions in government social spending at all levels.

One sign of this was the royal reception given Howard Jarvis, the main sponsor and leading campaigner for Proposition 13, when he visited Washington, D.C., on June 19.

The retired industrialist, who believes public education should be abolished altogether, began with breakfast in a chandelied Senate meeting room with ten Republican senators brought together by S.I. Hayakawa of California and Robert Dole of Kansas.

Then Alan Cranston, the liberal Democratic senator from California, met with Jarvis. Afterwards, Cranston vowed to "do everything we can" to implement the massive tax cut in California, "because that's what the people voted for" (*Los Angeles Times*, June 20).

Cranston then shepherded Jarvis through the Capitol for five hours, during which time he met with House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, and other influential Democrats.

One Democrat who didn't invite Jarvis in for a chat was Jimmy Carter. It was later reported that the White House staff was divided on the propriety of Carter meeting with the right-wing demagogue,

even though the capitalist press has been painting him up as a new American folk hero.

Greatly encouraged by his national recognition (*Time* magazine even featured him on the cover of its June 19 issue), Jarvis stepped up his efforts to spread Proposition 13 to other areas of the country. "We are considering several plans on the national basis," Jarvis told the *Christian Science Monitor*. "I haven't decided yet whether we should have two organizations, one a tax group and the other a political group" (June 29).

A survey by the *Christian Science Monitor*, reported in its June 23 issue, showed

that proposals for property-tax cuts or spending limitations in twenty-seven states either had been initiated or picked up steam in the wake of Proposition 13.

Thus, as in California, the ruling class nationally sees an opportunity to speed up its offensive against working people by diverting the rising sentiment against high taxes into cutbacks of social services and layoffs and wage freezes for public employees. At the same time, the rulers are watching California closely to see how far they can go without provoking a massive response. That makes all the more important the organizing of an effective fight-back movement in the "sunshine state." □

## U.S. Alarm Over South Yemen Coup



Washington Post

Aden radio announced June 26 that South Yemeni President Salem Robaye Ali had been deposed and executed for attempting to seize complete control of the government. Unconfirmed news reports said that Robaye Ali's ouster followed several hours of heavy fighting in the capital.

The new regime is reportedly dominated by Abdel Fattah Ismail, the general secretary of the ruling National Liberation Front and head of the "People's Militia"; Prime Minister Ali Nasser Mohammed Hasani, who also assumed the presidency after Robaye Ali's death; and Defense Minister Lieut. Col. Ali Antar.

On June 28, Ismail announced that three members of the nine-member Political Bureau of the National Liberation Front had been purged and that the three constituent parties of the front will soon merge into a new formation called the Vanguard Party.

The immediate causes of the power struggle in South Yemen remain obscure. But the imperialists and their allies in the

region have expressed displeasure at Robaye Ali's ouster.

Citing Egyptian and Western analysts in Cairo, *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent John K. Cooley reported in the June 28 issue that the change in government in South Yemen was viewed "as a serious setback for the West."

Officials in Washington concurred. According to a report in the June 27 *New York Times*, "Mr. Robaye Ali had indicated through diplomatic channels that he was eager to improve relations with the United States—Southern Yemen broke ties in 1969—and had recently shown unhappiness with his country's growing image as a Soviet satellite in the Middle East." (South Yemen receives military and economic assistance from the Soviet and Cuban governments.)

Correspondent Richard L. Homan reported in the June 27 *Washington Post* that, according to U.S. analysts in the capital, Ismail was considered "very difficult to deal with."

Following this cue from Washington, fifteen member states of the Arab League agreed July 2 to impose a political, economic, and cultural blockade on the South Yemeni regime. The ostensible justification for the action was the claim of the North Yemeni authorities that Aden was responsible for the June 24 assassination of North Yemeni President Ahmed Hussein al-Ghashmi. Aden has denied the charges.

At a July 3 news conference in Beirut, South Yemeni Minister of Communications Mahmoud Osheish charged that the regime in North Yemen, which is backed by the reactionary Saudi Arabian government, had sent some troops across the border into South Yemen and occupied two villages. Osheish warned that if such actions continued it could lead to renewed conflict between the two regimes, which had fought a border war six years ago. □

## Bakke Ruling Spurs Attacks on Affirmative-Action Gains

By Fred Murphy

"Only 3 percent of the physicians currently practicing in the United States are Black," Simon Anekwe wrote in the July 8 issue of the New York *Amsterdam News*, the largest Black weekly in the United States.

"Only 6.7 percent of the first-year medical school students in the country are Black; the percentage of Blacks in medical schools has increased only six-tenths of one percent since 1970; and two Black medical schools . . . currently train 66 percent of [Black] doctors. The remaining 118 white medical schools train only about 40 percent of all Black physicians."

The statistics cited by Anekwe demonstrate clearly that further steps are necessary to break down the continuing barriers to Blacks in the medical and other professions. But the U.S. Supreme Court's June 28 decision in the *Bakke* affirmative-action case is intended to have precisely the opposite effect.

The court ruled that Allan Bakke, a thirty-eight-year-old white, male engineer, had been the victim of "reverse discrimination" when he was denied admission to the medical school of the University of California at Davis. The Davis school had set aside 16 out of 100 places for "disadvantaged students." Until this program was begun, no Blacks or Chicanos had ever been admitted to the school—a publicly financed institution in a state where more than one-third of the population are members of oppressed nationalities.

Bakke sued Davis, claiming that Blacks and Chicanos with lower test scores than his had been admitted to the sixteen special slots. The California Supreme Court agreed that this constituted "reverse discrimination," and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld that ruling.

"It boggles the mind to think that someone could seriously advance Allan Bakke's arguments that he deserves consideration because he was discriminated against because he is white," wrote Wallace L. Ford II, president of the Harlem Lawyers Association, in the July 8 *Amsterdam News*. But the courts have now done just that, and thus have given a big boost to the drive by the U.S. capitalists to dismantle the gains that Blacks, women, and other oppressed layers have won in struggle over the last two decades. The *Bakke* decision marks a qualitative new step in the rulers' campaign to do away with the concept that the most oppressed sectors of the working class deserve preferential

treatment to make up for generations of discrimination.

Knowing full well that there is very broad support among working people—including whites—for equality and against racist discrimination, the U.S. rulers have moved cautiously in their efforts to roll back the gains of the civil-rights movement. Thus the Supreme Court declared that "voluntary" affirmative-action programs could continue to be used.

In addition, in a decision released June 3 that involved an affirmative-action program set up under government pressure by the American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T), the court even seemed to uphold the legality of quotas in situations where a "past history of discrimination" on the part of specific companies or institutions could be demonstrated by the victims.

But in *Bakke* the court clearly struck down quota systems designed to remedy the effects of "societal discrimination."

The capitalist news media were quick to erect a smokescreen around the main thrust of the *Bakke* ruling. "The movement to expand opportunity for blacks and other minorities has been ruled legal," the editors of the *New York Times* announced. "Everybody won," the editors of the *Washington Post* said, adding with relief that "perhaps the most useful aspect" of the court's ruling was its "soothing effect."

The point being covered up is this: Quotas based on race and sex are absolutely necessary if affirmative action in employment, school admissions policies, and other areas is to have any real meaning. Without such quotas, imposed and enforced by law, employers and institutions will return to the old discriminatory policies that have long been used to keep women and Blacks and other minorities in the worst jobs and at the lowest pay.

This process has already begun under the impact of the *Bakke* case.

Referring to the bureaucratized craft unions that have long been whites-only job trusts, a lawyer for a construction company told columnist Jimmy Breslin that "it'll all turn around. The father and son unions, the iron workers, the electricians, sheet metal workers union, they'll look to buy off or push out any of the blacks they have now. You say put blacks to work in the future? Not after this" (New York *Daily News*, July 4).

AT&T officials are now reviewing their quota-based affirmative-action program, under which tens of thousands of women

and Blacks and members of other oppressed minorities have scored big gains in hiring, training, and promotion with AT&T during the past five years. A key part of the program has been "overriding" or downplaying seniority as a factor in promotions, in favor of other, "basically qualified," applicants. "We would not expect to continue the override after the [program] expires in January," an AT&T official told the *Washington Post*.

"A full blast of lawsuits" like Allan Bakke's will now be filed "by those who would use the Bakke case as a means of rolling back the top on minority progress," said Benjamin Hooks, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).

Although Hooks initially greeted the *Bakke* ruling as "a clear-cut victory for voluntary affirmative action," he sounded the alarm at the NAACP's national convention in Portland, Oregon, July 3-7. Hooks announced that an emergency conference "to deal with the problems raised by the Bakke decision" would be held in Detroit July 22-23.

The NAACP closed its convention by passing a formal resolution urging President Carter to go on national television to dispel "the perceived public mood that the wrongs which have been inflicted upon black Americans over the past 300 years have been corrected."

But it is Carter's government itself that is actually implementing the present attacks on Black rights. Attorney General Griffin Bell's brief to the Supreme Court in the *Bakke* case totally avoided the question of quotas. When the brief was filed, Bell explained that "there is a line between goals and quotas and when you cross the line we would oppose quotas." Bell hailed the *Bakke* ruling as "a very helpful opinion" that "confirms our position."

Rather than call on Carter for an abstract speech about his purported commitment to Black rights, the NAACP and other civil-rights organizations would be far better advised to map out a campaign to defend affirmative-action quotas and all the other gains of the past two decades with the same tactics that were the key to winning them in the first place.

They could begin by putting into practice something Benjamin Hooks said at the NAACP convention: "We didn't march in the sixties to just march and we will not in the seventies abandon marches, boycotts and any other means necessary to achieve our goals." □

## Fidel Castro Answers Carter on Cuban Role in Africa

[The following is the full text of an interview with Fidel Castro, conducted in Havana June 16 by correspondents of the three major American television networks—Edward Rabel (CBS), Richard Valeriani (NBC), and Barbara Walters (ABC). The translation, which is “unofficial,” has been provided by the Cuban Mission to the United Nations. In an introduction, the Cuban Mission noted that the interviewers’ questions had been retranslated from the Spanish-language version issued by the Cuban press service Prensa Latina.]

\* \* \*

*Barbara Walters (ABC):* President Carter claims that you could have done a great deal more to prevent the Katangese invasion of Zaire, including the use of Cuban troops to prevent the attack, and by giving prior notice to the world, through various means, that you wanted to halt the invasion. He said, for example, that there were two thousand troops along the Angolan border and that you could have used those men to stop the Katangese. Why didn’t you, and the President of Angola, Agostinho Neto, stop the invasion?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* In this statement by Carter, in this latest statement, a certain change already can be observed. No longer is he stressing the earlier accusations trying to blame us directly for what happened in Shaba. Before answering, I’d like to make a point on this matter. We are not dealing here with a moral issue, or a legal issue. Angola, and Cuba as Angola’s ally, would have had every moral and legal right to aid the Katangese—to organize, train and supply them—given that Angola was invaded from Zaire, and from Zaire, following the war and over two and a half years, groups of the FLEC (Liberation Front of the Cabinda Enclave—translator’s note) have been trained to attack Cabinda; groups of the FLNA (National Liberation Front of Angola—translator’s note) have been trained to attack Angola from the north, from Zaire; groups of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola—translator’s note) have been organized, with the cooperation of South Africa, to attack Angola. That is why, from a moral point of view, as an act of legitimate defense, we would have had the right to do the same with the Katangese. But neither moral nor legal issues are involved—we are dealing with a political problem.

We have solid political reasons for not having supported the Katangese. This is the reality. If you wish, I can explain these reasons for you later on. But the fact is—and the United States must know this—that we are simply opposed to these kinds of operations by the Katangese. Last year the Katangese actions created a complicated situation, forcing us to halt the reduction of our military personnel in Angola, which we had been carrying out in agreement with the Angolan government. And we were forced to propose to the Angolan government a reinforcement of troops. So this is not a new position. It is the position which Cuba has maintained from the very moment the war in Angola ended. And the Angolan government knows this position of ours, the progressive countries of Africa know this position, and the socialist countries know Cuba’s position.

Now, we had no certainty that the Katangese were going to carry out this incursion: we had no exact information on this matter. We simply had received rumors and were afraid that they would carry out another incursion of this kind. There are 200,000 refugees from Zaire in Angola—that is, 200,000 Katangese. They live in an enormous territory, extending along thousands of kilometers of the border. And, concerned that another action of this kind could take place, we communicated with President Neto

toward the end of February. The main representative of our party and government in Angola, comrade Risquet, was vacationing in Cuba, and we asked him to interrupt his vacation, to travel to Angola with an important message to President Neto on this matter: the rumors we had heard, the concern we felt, and the necessity of preventing a provocation of this kind. President Neto was absolutely in agreement with our point of view, and President Neto is, moreover, a serious and honorable man. We know that President Neto spoke with the Katangese and also gave instructions to prevent an incursion of this type from taking place. This is rigorously accurate, rigorously historical.

I have explained that President Neto had to leave the country a few weeks after this. I believe that he was unable to personally supervise the carrying out of these instructions. Now, how could we be asked to employ our troops on our own to block an action by the Katangese? Even if we had known about it with certainty—and we did not, having heard only rumors—we do not govern Angola—Angola is governed by the MPLA and President Neto. We have no right to use the troops in Angola on our own. Undoubtedly, if President Neto were to ask for our help in resolving a problem of this kind, we surely would give him our cooperation. But how can anyone now blame us for not having employed Cuban military personnel, or for not having warned Mobutu? Mobutu’s government is one of the most corrupt and bloody governments in Africa; it is a government completely lacking in seriousness. We are under no obligation to inform Mobutu of these problems.

We did the only thing we could do, in the way we did, on the level we did, and we really did the maximum that we could and should have done to prevent this provocation from taking place. Because I cannot see what happened in Shaba as anything but a provocation. What needs to be seen is what strings were being pulled behind the scenes of all this. But we stand behind our policy—the policy we have been following for two and a half years—of simply not establishing any kind of collaboration or commitment with the Katangese movement.

Now, do you know why? It is very simple. First of all, we have always been in favor of Angola having peace, because Angola needs peace to rebuild the country. Second, we are categorically opposed to the development of conflicts between the peoples of Black Africa. Third, we believe that the fundamental problems of Africa are in southern Africa, the problems of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. This is the fundamental problem in Africa, the problem that unites all of Africa; and I believe it is the problem on which the Africans must concentrate their efforts. And for this reason, for political reasons, we have been absolutely opposed to this kind of action by the Katangese. This has been our policy and we have defended it consistently. Any attempt to deny this policy, to falsify this policy, is simply a lie, a big lie.

*E. Rabel (CBS):* Mr. President, do you plan to condemn the Katangese aggression against Shaba province?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* I saw that this was one of the things Carter proposed in his speech. We issued a statement categorically saying we had nothing to do with this problem. Now, why should we issue a statement of condemnation? What for? To help Mobutu? To help interventionist plans in Africa? To legitimize and justify the criminal intervention of NATO forces in Africa? To justify the United States’ interventionist policy in Africa?

We are under no obligation whatsoever to get involved in this problem or politically condemn anybody. We’re not going to play

into the hands of interventionism in Africa. However, if you ask me about acts such as committing a crime or killing someone, or massacring people, we will always be against any crime or massacre, for moral reasons and based on profound convictions. I am deeply sad that some whites may have been killed in Shaba; but I understand, according to statements by many European witnesses, that Mobutu's forces participated in those massacres.

Now, Carter is asking me if we have condemned the conduct of the Katangese, or the Katangese incursion into Zaire. I could ask Carter if he condemned the massacre of close to 800 Black men, women and children perpetrated in Cassinga on May 4th by the South Africans. I ask Carter if he has condemned, and if he has made known to the world, this criminal, barbaric, brutal, fascistic slaughter of hundreds of children, women, young and old people. And I have the photographs right here, and I can have them sent to the journalists.

The death of any person is painful to me; any crime hurts me, and I condemn it, no matter who commits it. Of course the death of any whites who may have died in Shaba is painful to me—but it also hurts, very deeply, to see the death of the thousands of Africans who are dying at the hands of the South African racists, at the hands of the occupiers of Namibia, at the hands of the racists of Zimbabwe.

*R. Valeriani (NBC):* Mr. President, before asking my question I would like to point out that the U.S. government officially condemned that. Now, the question I would like to ask is that President Carter also said that if you really wanted to stop the invasion of Shaba, you could have advised the Organization of African Unity about the information you had, you could have advised the world as a whole.

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* What are they asking us? To become some kind of universal advisers? That we become gendarmes of the world? First of all, we aren't gendarmes. Secondly, Angola is an absolutely independent country. We don't have to discuss the problems of Angola with anybody except the Angolans. What would the government of Angola think of us if, in face of a problem of this kind, we address ourselves to other governments, ignoring the Angolan government? Moreover, I already said that our position is based on political reasons—it's not that we have moral or legal reservations, I repeat.

*Barbara Walters (ABC):* President Castro. President Carter called on Cuba and Angola to pledge to prevent any kind of Katangese incursion against Zaire. Are you prepared to do this?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* In Angola we will do exclusively what the government of Angola orders us to do. Very well, I could also ask President Carter to use his good offices with his friend Mobutu to stop training, supplying, organizing and authorizing the aggressions by the FLEC, the FLNA, and UNITA from Zaire, because this has been going on constantly for two and a half years. But I am going to make a revelation.

We have learned, from a very reliable source, that the CIA recently made contact with UNITA and promised U.S. government support. Therefore, I would like to ask the government of the United States if it is true or false that it made such a contact and commitment, which constitute an extremely grave interference in Angola's internal affairs.

We are willing to cooperate in anything that will help secure peace between Zaire and Angola. We are not concerned about who is governing Zaire. Our collaboration in Africa is with absolutely sovereign countries and governments. We do not interfere in the internal affairs of any African country, no matter what kind of government it may have. Of course, this is apart from our support for the liberation movements of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Our policy of principle establishes our obligation and duty to support these revolutionary movements, and we don't deny it. What we do deny is that we are supporting this political movement of the Katangese—this is what we deny. And since this is

our policy, we defend our truth and categorically reject all false accusations and lies aimed at linking Cuba politically with the Katangese movement.

*Barbara Walters (ABC):* To continue with this question . . . You cannot speak for Angola, but would you say that Cuba would pledge to try to prevent future incursions against Zaire?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* We can make absolutely no pledges, absolutely none. The most we can do is, if we have some information in this respect, communicate it to the government of Angola, explaining our opinions. But we cannot make any pledges all by ourselves. This is simply the policy which we have followed.

*E. Rabel (CBS):* Mr. President, you have often said that the greatest obstacle to the normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba is the U.S. blockade of Cuba. Doesn't Cuba's intervention in Africa represent an impediment to the normalization of relations?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* What kind of Cuban intervention in Africa? There is no intervention whatsoever; it is simply the collaboration which we have established with legitimately constituted governments that have requested our collaboration, which is not the same thing as intervention.

Doesn't the United States collaborate militarily with dozens of countries throughout the world? Aren't there American troops in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, Taiwan? Aren't there American bases in Turkey, Greece, all over Europe? Aren't there U.S. soldiers in Panama, and aren't there U.S. soldiers right here in Guantanamo against our people's will? I know that the U.S. soldiers are in Panama against the Panamanian people's will, and they are in Cuba against the will of the Cuban people.

We aren't anywhere against the will of any government, or against the will of any people. This cannot be termed intervention. These are mere pretexts by the United States government to maintain such an inhuman and unjust measure as the economic blockade. I do not understand how the attempt to starve a people to death can be reconciled with the principles of human rights.

*E. Rabel (CBS):* To continue this question with respect to the normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba . . . do you have any plans to withdraw the Cuban diplomatic mission in Washington, or to ask the United States to withdraw its diplomatic mission from Havana, as a result of the dispute between the United States and Cuba over the Cuban presence in Africa?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* No. The interests section was established at the request of the United States, and we accepted it. This seems to us to have been a positive and constructive step. It would be baseless for us to sever this minimal relationship that exists. Therefore, we have no intention of breaking this little diplomatic link that exists between the United States and Cuba. Moreover, it can be very useful, and this problem demonstrated as much, because we used the interests section as the channel to transmit a very important confidential message to the government of the United States. It is not our fault if this message was leaked. I think the United States could have used this channel, this same channel, if it had any doubts or confusion on this matter; surely we would have helped to clear up this problem. But I think it was a positive step on the part of the United States and on the part of Cuba to establish these interests sections.

*R. Valeriani (NBC):* Mr. President, the United States government claims to have solid evidence that the Cubans were involved in the recruitment of the Katangese in 1977—5,000 recruits, on top of 1,500 veterans of the first invasion—who were taken to five bases in Angola (they have their names), and that they were trained there by Cuban advisors, and that the Cuban advisors



took them to the Zambian border, from Angola to Zaire. And now there is a report, which has been published, that Cubans have been seen in Kolwezi, in Shaba province.

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* Look, all of these reports come from a summary the CIA has disseminated to journalists in these days. This summary says that "Cuba could have equipped and reorganized the Katangese force in Angola as early as 1975." There is some truth in this, because during the Angola war the Katangese fought alongside the MPLA, because, logically speaking, the Katangese refugees would have been exterminated if South Africa and Zaire had taken control over Angola. For their own survival they supported the MPLA, and on several fronts, they were with us. They took part, it's true. Now, this was towards the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976. What this summary says, that "Cuba provided planning and training for the invasion of Shaba by 2,000 Katangese in March 1977, and after the failure of this action continued helping the rebels until a short time before their latest attempted invasion last month" is an absolute lie.

Secondly, this summary accuses Soviet and Cuban advisors of "having asked the Angolan government in 1976 to permit incursions into Zaire, and that Cuban and East German personnel trained the rebels at the Saurimo airbase in the Angolan province of Luanda." This is absolutely false. There is something else. When we spoke to Lane in Havana,<sup>1</sup> we explained that the Soviets held exactly the same position as ours with respect to the Shaba problem, and that the Soviets had absolutely nothing to do with this problem. Nothing has been said about this, but we informed the government of the United States to this effect.

Another point in the summary says: "Following the 1977 invasion, Cuban instructors trained the rebels at five bases in northeastern Angola: Cazombo, Nova Chaves, Chicapo, Seremo and Kamisfomo." This is an absolute lie.

Fourth: "At the beginning of this year the Katangese leader Nathaniel M'bumba proclaimed his intention to eliminate the government of Zaire, and assured that he had the support of Angola." This I don't know; I don't know what this Mr. M'bumba has said or to whom he has said it. But what I can assure you is that we have never told him that we were going to collaborate with his movement. This is very clear: we have received Sam Nujoma, leader of SWAPO, in Havana; we have received Nkomo, leader of the Patriotic Front; we have received Oliver Tambo, leader of the South African patriotic movement; we have received them with all honors, publicly; if we had considered it politically correct from our point of view to support Mr. M'bumba and his movement, we would have received him and we would have supported him. We have never denied any kind of collaboration with any revolutionary movement from the outset of the Revolution, and that is why we categorically refuse to admit to political support that we are simply not giving. That is what it is all about.

Point five . . . the CIA summary says: "During all this time the Cubans were involved in the logistical organization of the rebel movement toward the Zambian border, accompanying them to the point at which they left Angolan territory." And I say this is an absolute lie. We have not supplied a single weapon, we have not provided any supplies, we have not transported a single Katangese and there wasn't a single Cuban accompanying the Katangese to the Zambian border.

When we do things, we do them and take responsibility for them. When we don't do them we simply deny them—we don't go around telling lies.

*R. Valeriani (NBC):* Mr. President. President Carter has risked his prestige and his credibility by making these statements and you are sitting here denying this. Why do you think the American people should believe you and not President Carter? Why should the world believe you instead of President Carter?

1. Lyle Franklin Lane is the head of the United States "interest office" in Havana.—*IP/I*

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* Counterposing the credibility of one or another isn't involved, but truth and falsehood. Why is this accusation against Cuba being made? Why is the lie invented that we back this political movement of Katanga, of Zaire? Why? When we have done precisely the opposite and when we have opposed these actions, why have they invented the lie of blaming Cuba?

Now I am not questioning the prestige of President Carter; I am not questioning President Carter's honesty. I've said this publicly on other occasions that I believe Carter to be a personally honest man, whose ethics are based on his religious convictions. I've said this publicly and I don't mind saying it, because there's no cowardice in being polite; but this doesn't rule out the possibility that Carter may be confused and deceived. In my opinion, President Carter has been confused and deceived when he was falsely informed that Cuba is responsible for these Katangese actions, and this is what we categorically reject. In all sincerity I do not think Carter is telling a deliberate lie. Carter has simply believed the information they have given him.

*Barbara Walters (ABC):* President Castro, you asked why, why is the United States doing this. I would like to hear your answer. Why have the President and Secretary of State, as well as Mr. Brzezinski, all said you are lying? Why do you think the United States is doing this?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* I am not saying that everyone has said I have been lying. It seems logical to me that if the President is given a piece of information and he announces it, the members of his team are going to support him.

But I'm going to tell you something. This is a little strange, because it was the first time we made the gesture of communicating with the U.S. government to explain our position on a given matter. Now, why did we do it? Between May 12 and 15 the government issued two statements saying that it had no evidence of Cuban participation. This was public—here are the cables on this. On May 15 we received a message from highly placed officials of the U.S. government—a message which in our judgment was constructive and positive—about Africa. In response to this, to this message—which they transmitted to our interests section on the 15th and which we received the 16th—on the 17th I decided to meet with the head of the U.S. interests section in Cuba. I proceeded to explain to him, in essence and in detail, our position concerning the following problems. First: there was collaboration between the Katangese, the MPLA and the Cubans during the war in Angola. After the war, we refused and avoided all forms of involvement and collaboration with the Katangese, for the aforementioned reasons. We did not want the Katangese to become the cause of a conflict between Zaire and Angola. Foreseeing these problems (because this is an old problem, this problem of the Katangese), we refused and avoided any kind of collaboration with them. We explained to the United States government that we had neither direct nor indirect responsibility, that we hadn't been organizing or supplying the Katangese. We explained, moreover, that we didn't even have physicians among the Katangese; that we had even avoided carrying out intelligence activities among the Katangese. But we said more: we said that we were against such actions. We said this quite frankly.

We gave the reasons for our position, we explained the Angolan government's agreement with our position, the agreement of the Soviet position with the Cuban position on this matter. We explained these things in detail. We also explained the efforts we had made with the government of Angola to prevent all this. In two words: we said to the United States government that there wasn't any plan to create a conflict there, to create a problem there. And I gave all this information.

At the same time we requested the U.S. government to use its good offices to prevent any type of intervention in Zaire. We communicated this to the U.S. government on the 17th. On the 18th the government received this message and transmitted a response which, in my opinion, was friendly, expressing satisfac-

tion with our message. We received this message the morning of the 19th. Mid-day on the 19th, news of my message to the United States was leaked, and in the afternoon of the same day Reston issued a statement which, in my opinion, consisted of a brutal and inconsiderate response to the gesture we had made to the United States.<sup>2</sup>

Why did they do this? In my judgement, because the whole intervention in Zaire was already under way. Second, because there are people in the Carter administration trying to fabricate their own "Tonkin incident" to justify intervention in Africa. This is the only explanation I can find.

*Barbara Walters (ABC):* To continue along these lines . . . Could you tell me who you think these persons are specifically? And why you think the United States or these persons want to do this? What is their final objective?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* Since you ask me I am going to tell you the truth; I think that the one who is to blame for this policy is Brzezinski. And there are precedents to this. Everyone knows that when relations between the United States and Cuba were improving, from Brzezinski's office came that map indicating all the places in Africa where there were Cuban military personnel—with many false figures, sometimes exaggerated, sometimes placing military personnel where there were none—with the aim of creating a huge scandal and turning the question of Africa into the "apple of discord" and the prime difficulty in the way of any improvement in Cuba-U.S. relations.

Later on, recently, when the question of F-15 jet sales to Saudi Arabia was being discussed in the Senate, he dragged out our collaboration with Southern Yemen, our military collaboration, the small and modest military collaboration with Southern Yemen which we have been giving for some six years. But it was dragged out precisely to pressure the Senate, to get the sale of planes to Saudi Arabia approved.

And third, this problem arises. The Shaba incident took place and the opportunity was used to try to blame us for this incident.

Brzezinski has a policy of cold war, a policy of international tensions: the policy of utilizing China against the Soviet Union, the policy of mixing the SALT negotiations with the problems of Africa, etc., etc. And you, the Americans, know this perfectly well.

*Barbara Walters (ABC):* May I interrupt you at this point? Do you believe that a single man, Brzezinski, can establish policy for the whole government, confuse the President, the Secretary of State, members of Congress? This single man, Brzezinski?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* Barbara, you know as well as I do that a big division exists in the U.S. government, in the Carter administration, and that there are two lines: the line followed by Brzezinski, on the one hand, and the line followed by others. I would not say that Vance's position is the same as Brzezinski's. It seems to me that Vance has a constructive, realistic position on the problems of the world, on the realities of today's world . . . on the question of disarmament, the question of peace, on the necessity of avoiding a cold war, on the necessity of avoiding an arms race, on the necessity of avoiding international conflicts. It seems to me that Young's position is also different from Brzezinski's. It can be seen clearly that there are two positions.

Now, we explained our position on this matter to Vance; we explained it to Young also; we explained it to (Senator) McGovern, and we have explained it to many Americans. We are being sincere about this. I have no friendship with Vance, I don't know Young personally. But I have observed throughout the Carter

administration what positions they have held. This is nothing new; everyone knows this. A single man isn't involved—different currents are. I am talking about this because you asked me to. I think that Brzezinski has an adventurist, irresponsible position, one that is, moreover, dangerous for peace.

*E. Rabel (CBS):* President Castro, supposing that you have studied the lessons of the Americans in Viet-Nam . . . couldn't the Cuban participation in Africa turn into something similar for Cuba?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* I don't see risks of this kind anywhere. The United States was supporting a corrupt, unpopular, reactionary, neo-colonialist government in Viet-Nam, whereas we are collaborating with really progressive governments, popular governments which have the support of the masses . . . and we have not supported them in terms of their internal problems but collaborate in their defense against outside aggression. We do not interfere in the internal affairs of any African country.

*E. Rabel (CBS):* To continue this question . . . Today the anti-government guerrillas in Angola reported that 50 Cuban soldiers died and 61 were wounded in Angola last week. How long can Cuba withstand these costs?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* And how long are you going to continue to believe in this fantasy and in these lies? They are absolutely fantastic lies not worthy of any credit. It is not so easy to kill a Cuban soldier, nor is it so easy to wound or catch a Cuban soldier. This is pure fantasy.

*R. Valeriani (NBC):* If we could add along these same lines . . . There is obviously a great deal you would like to continue doing in Cuba. There is still rationing of food and clothing. Why do you have so many Cuban soldiers in Africa, given the high cost this represents, the great burden that falls on Cuban society.

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* Well, I believe that we are fulfilling an elementary duty. In the two cases we prevented two enormous historical crimes. In the case of Angola we prevented South Africa from taking over Angola. In the case of Ethiopia we helped prevent the Ethiopian revolution and a nation of 30 million inhabitants from being torn apart by outside aggression.

This doesn't demonstrate that we are a big country—we are a small country. It doesn't demonstrate that we are a military power—it shows that we are a moral power, a spiritual power, and that we have a generous, revolutionary, altruistic people. In order to understand this, you have to know what's happening in Cuba, what are the feelings of the Cubans. Here, when volunteers are requested for any internationalist mission, hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people come forward. This demonstrates that we have a people with a revolutionary awareness. It is not so costly from an economic point of view simply because our people live selflessly and austere. They know that their families, their children, are absolutely taken care of, and they feel calm about this.

Now we are devoting the bulk of our energies to work in our country, to the development of our economy. And I'm going to give you another piece of news, taking advantage of the occasion: this year we are going to have the second-largest sugar harvest in Cuban history. Already we are approaching a production of almost 7,300,000 tons of 96-base sugar, and we believe that we will surpass that amount in upcoming days. We have made the decision to put an end to our policy of discretion with respect to sugar output, and announce production levels yearly. As you can see, we're going to have a great economic success this year in this respect, and moreover, we are already prepared to receive almost 20,000 young people from around the world for the World Festival of Youth and Students. Don't think that international problems are robbing all of our energies. Most of our energies and efforts are concentrated in this country.

2. State Department spokesman Tom Reston told reporters at a news briefing May 19 that the Shaba insurgents were using Soviet and East European weapons supplied to them by Cubans in Angola. He would not say how the United States came upon the information or explain the timing of the disclosure.—*IP/I*

So I've given you two new pieces of information: the sugar output and the contacts of the CIA with UNITA.

*R. Valeriani (NBC):* If I could ask you a question concerning national affairs . . . You talk about moral power. Would you be willing to free some political prisoners, for example Hubert Matos, who has been imprisoned for 17 years, in exchange for others imprisoned in other places?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* We have released many prisoners, the immense majority of those who were imprisoned in this country. Some have been in a longer time, it is true. Now, we will never release any counterrevolutionary prisoner under pressure from anyone. They've pressured us many times.

Now, you mention one case, but I'm going to ask a question which you could put to Carter: why haven't they released Lolita Lebron and the Puerto Rican patriots who have been imprisoned for a quarter of a century? In reality, they haven't given the example in this. You have the Wilmington 10 over there. Public opinion around the world is demanding the release of these prisoners and you do not release them. In the United States there are tens of thousands of prisoners who because of unemployment, hunger, had to rob or commit some crime, and you do not release them. I think you could give us the example in this respect.

Anyway, I will tell you that the vast majority of those who went to jail because of counter-revolutionary activities are now free. In addition, we have been following a more and more flexible and generous policy in this respect, and the day the hostility of the United States ends, the day aggressions against our country cease, we will have better conditions to be even more generous with respect to the persons you are referring to.

*R. Valeriani (NBC):* I would like to get something clear: you claimed that Cubans were not involved in the first invasion of Shaba.

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* Neither in the first nor the second. This is our policy, it is the policy we have consistently followed. There is a policy—for political, not moral or legal, reasons.

*R. Valeriani (NBC):* With respect to the Puerto Rican prisoners,

I understand that there are negotiations under way to exchange Lunt for Lolita. Are you willing to do this?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* We cannot speak of negotiations at this point. I have received, through indirect channels, certain questions about our stand on this matter. With pleasure we would release Lunt if the Puerto Rican patriots were released. But what is happening? As I understand it, they are speaking of Lolita Lebron and two others' freedom—but I believe Lolita Lebron refuses to be released by herself. I have heard that she would agree if they also release the rest of her comrades. I think they are four. Therefore on our part, we are willing to accept this arrangement, we are willing to release Lunt. The Puerto Rican prisoners and Lolita Lebron must decide on this matter themselves. We have been asked what our opinion was and we said yes, we were in agreement—through indirect channels.

*Barbara Walters (ABC):* If Lolita Lebron were to be released along with her comrades or friends—the four you refer to—would you release four prisoners?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* Well, we would have to think about it. Are you referring to Americans? I think there are only four left, because the majority of Americans who were imprisoned have been released in the past few months. Very few are left—but the main one is Lunt. Now, with respect to the others, if the problem arose, I would be in favor of freeing the prisoners. I cannot make any commitment, as I already explained, because I do not take single-handed decisions . . . but I would be in favor, I would be thrilled, I would have no objection, because the most important one is Lunt. Then we'd have no Americans in jail and you wouldn't have those Puerto Rican patriots in prison.

(Following this televised interview, the following questions were asked:)

*R. Valeriani (NBC):* Why don't you meet with President Carter and discuss the matter?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* I would like to clarify something in this respect, something that has not come out. It was published that I had suggested a meeting with Carter, or that I had proposed it. That is not true, not true at all. I want to clarify

# 定期購読で

# インターコンティネンタル・プレスを!

"Regularly buy and read the periodical INTERCONTINENTAL PRESS!"

That's the handwritten advice from one of our supporters in Tokyo.

Right on!

We can only add that the easiest way to "regularly buy and read" is to subscribe.

So fill out the blank and mail it in.

Intercontinental Press/Inprecor  
P.O. Box 116  
Varick Street Station  
New York, New York 10014

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Street \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_

( ) Enclosed is \$12 for six months.

( ) Enclosed is \$24 for one year.

this, and you may publish this. Representatives Solarz and Beilinson asked me; they said it would be a good thing if we met (Why? I ask myself) and they asked my opinion. I told them I had nothing against it. The journalists asked me and I told them the same thing. This is not the same thing as saying I propose, I suggest a meeting with Carter, because it seems to me it would be a little stupid of me to do so.

*Barbara Walters (ABC):* But if Carter said—I'd go and meet you somewhere . . . would you accept?

*Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro:* I repeat the same answer—I wouldn't have any objection to this, I have no prejudice. And I repeat that personally I have a good impression of Carter, and I believe that Carter is the only U.S. President, in recent years, who has made positive gestures towards us. Apart from this incident, I cannot deny this fact and I acknowledge it, and it seems only fair to recognize it. My opinion of Carter is that he is a decent man, a man who is personally honest.

June 22, 1978

## Court Ruling Upholding SWP's Right to FBI Informer Files

[On July 6, for the first time in American history, the nation's highest law-enforcement official was declared in contempt of court for refusing to obey a federal court order to release government files. This occurred when U.S. Attorney General Griffin Bell refused to turn over to attorneys for the Socialist Workers Party the files on 18 of the 1,300 paid informants used by the government in its decades-long campaign to disrupt the SWP.

[The following are excerpts from the court ruling, issued June 30 by Federal District Court Judge Thomas P. Griesa, that brought about this dramatic confrontation between the judicial and executive branches of the American government. A copy of the full text of the decision may be obtained by sending \$1 to the Political Rights Defense Fund, Box 649, Cooper Station, New York, New York 10003.]

\* \* \*

This is an action brought by two related political organizations, the Socialist Workers Party ("SWP") and the Young Socialist Alliance ("YSA"), and members of these organizations, claiming that various agencies and officials of the federal government have violated plaintiffs' constitutional and other legal rights.

Plaintiffs have moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D) to adjudge the Attorney General of the United States in contempt for failure to obey an order of this Court of May 31, 1977. The latter order directed defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation to produce to plaintiffs' counsel the files of eighteen FBI informants, with the express direction that plaintiffs' counsel were prohibited from revealing the identities of the informants or any other information contained in the files to anyone other than the attorneys specified in the order.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion dated October 11, 1977 held that the May 31, 1977 order was issued within the District Court's lawful discretion. *In re United States*, 565 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1977). A petition for rehearing to the Court of Appeals, with a suggestion for rehearing *en banc*, was denied on March 9, 1978, no active judge, or judge who was a member of the panel, voting for rehearing. On June 12, 1978 the Supreme Court denied the Government's certiorari peti-

tion, Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Powell announcing they would grant the petition.

In an affidavit dated June 13, 1978, confirmed by subsequent submissions made to the Court by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, the Attorney General has stated that he will not comply with the order of May 31, 1977, and that neither the Department of Justice nor the FBI will produce the informant files specified in that order.

This Court cannot accept the Attorney General's position. No one can deny that it is a grave step to enforce a court order to the extent of holding the Attorney General of the United States in contempt. However, the issues in this case are grave in the extreme, involving charges of abuse of political power of the most serious nature. Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that the FBI used its very considerable power to conduct a systematic covert campaign to manipulate and disrupt the plaintiff organizations and interfere with their lawful activities. Plaintiffs allege that a prime device used in this campaign was to infiltrate the plaintiff organizations with paid, undercover informants, who were instructed to take various actions designed to harm the organizations, and to furnish the FBI information so that the FBI could take additional steps to harass and hamper the organizations and their members. Plaintiffs also allege that, aside from this campaign to manipulate and disrupt, there was a serious invasion of constitutional rights in the very fact of the pervasive intrusion and surveillance carried out by the undercover informants with respect to the peaceful political activities of the organizations and the personal lives of members, accompanied by the use of these informants to obtain all manner of confidential documents, including membership lists and financial records.

Plaintiffs urge that the activities of the FBI informants were of a radically different character than legitimate use of informants for valid law enforcement purposes. Plaintiffs contend that there was no valid law enforcement or crime-detection purpose involved in the FBI surveillance and the other activities carried out by the FBI against the SWP, the YSA and their members. In this connection, it should be noted that in September 1976, some three

years after this action had been commenced, and after a Senate subcommittee had severely criticized the FBI with respect to its activities against the SWP and the YSA, Attorney General Levi terminated the investigation of the SWP.

It is not only in plaintiffs' interest, but in the broad public interest, that plaintiffs be afforded a fair opportunity to obtain and present the essential evidence about this alleged wrongdoing. The issues in this case relate to the most fundamental constitutional rights, which lie at the very foundation of our system of government—the right to engage in political organization and to speak freely on political subjects, without interference and harassment from governmental organs. Since the allegations relate to the highest levels of government, it is entirely appropriate for a court to enter an order against a cabinet officer, if necessary, for the production of the essential evidence, and to adjudge that cabinet officer in contempt if he refuses to obey the order.

For reasons to be explained hereafter, this Court concludes that the FBI informant files constitute a unique and essential body of evidence regarding the allegations of wrongdoing in this case. The Court further concludes that, although it is neither necessary nor practical to have all such files (numbering over 1300) produced or used as evidence, it must be established as a principle in the conduct of this case that plaintiffs' counsel are entitled to production of a representative selection of these informant files, without deletions or expurgations—such production to be decided upon *by the Court*, and not to depend upon the unilateral terms and conditions set by the FBI or the Attorney General.

The Attorney General's assertion that the public interest requires ensuring the confidentiality of informants is a reiteration of the position taken by the FBI throughout these proceedings. This Court has consistently recognized the need to give the matter of confidentiality of the informants the most careful consideration. It has been the purpose of the Court, often expressed, to handle the case in such a way as to keep any public exposure of the identities of FBI informants to an absolute minimum. However, the informant privilege is not absolute. *Roviero v. United States*, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957). The Gov-

ernment's interest must be weighed against other factors. One factor here is that there is no ongoing investigation of the SWP or the YSA which will be compromised by the production of informant files. Thus, the Government is asserting a "generalized interest in confidentiality" (see *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974))—that is, the concern that informants in other situations may be deterred if confidentiality is not maintained in the present case. Of greater significance is the fact that this is *not* the normal situation where the problem is the disclosure of information relating to informants who have unquestionably been used in legitimate efforts to detect crime. The present case involves the serious allegation that the FBI informants were used for *unlawful* purposes—that is, to monitor and interfere with legitimate political and private activities. Thus the questions about production of informant files in the present case cannot be resolved by looking solely at the interest in informant confidentiality, as the Government would have us do. There are countervailing considerations which deeply affect the public good. These considerations relate to the interest of the citizens of this country in being protected against the illegal and unconstitutional use of informants to interfere with the exercise of basic political rights and to invade the privacy of persons and organizations. One obvious way to protect against such abuses is to allow private plaintiffs fair opportunity to recover for such abuses to the extent legally allowed, with the attendant exposure of any misuse of Government power to public view. These considerations reinforce the conclusion that there is ample justification for the enforcement of an order against the Attorney General which is designed to provide essential evidence in this case to plaintiffs' attorneys.

A principal justification asserted by the Attorney General for his refusing compliance with the May 31, 1977 order is that such refusal is necessary in order to preserve the right to "full appellate review." The Attorney General contends that the Government has been unable to obtain "review on the merits with respect to the Court's order" in the appellate proceedings which have taken place.

The theory that full appellate review has thus far been denied, and that there is some other procedure which will provide an additional quantum of review is repeated over and over again in the Attorney General's affidavit and in the brief filed on his behalf. However, this proposition is simply invalid.

At no point in the Attorney General's affidavit or in his brief is there any attempt to articulate or explain what additional measure of review would be available through some other appellate proceeding. Not one judicial authority is cited to illustrate or define what further

appellate review would add or accomplish.

As will be described more fully hereafter, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, *but* entertained and ruled upon the mandamus petition. This ruling expressly resolved each relevant question of law—that is, that the informant privilege applies; that it is qualified privilege, which can be overcome by a showing that the need for disclosure outweighs the claim of privilege; and that a district judge, in the exercise of his discretion, may permit opposing counsel to participate in and assist him in the conduct of *in camera* proceedings under a pledge of secrecy. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the May 31, 1977 order was a valid exercise of discretion under these rules. *In re United States*, 565 F.2d 19, 22-23.

The problem, from the Government's standpoint was not that the Court of Appeals failed to rule on the issues, but that the Court ruled adversely to the Government.

The authorities are absolutely clear that, in connection with a discovery problem such as the one involved in the present case, the issue on appellate review, regardless of the form such review takes, is the question of whether the district court abused its discretion. Thus, no additional measure of review would be available to the Government in this case in any further proceedings in the appellate courts.

The Attorney General goes so far as to contend that he would be justified in disobeying the May 31, 1977 order even if it meant his being held in civil contempt, because this would be a legitimate device for obtaining "full appellate review." The argument about the availability of fuller review has been dealt with. Moreover, it is the settled rule that a party to a civil case does not have a right of appeal from a civil contempt citation until final judgment.

The Attorney General argues that he has a kind of option to accept sanctions under Rule 37 short of compliance with the order. The sanctions suggested by the Attorney General, which will be analyzed hereafter, are nothing but attempts to avoid or drastically reduce the effect of the May 31, 1977 order. In other words, the Government seeks to use the weapon of defiance of the order to dictate its own terms as to what it will or will not do in connection with providing evidence in this case.

This position cannot be justified. The Attorney General has no "right" to defy a court order for discovery, and accept sanctions of his selection. *United States v. Costello*, 222 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir. 1955), *rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matles v. United States*, 356 U.S. 256 (1958); *Edgar v. Slaughter*, 548 F.2d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 1977). On the contrary, his duty is to obey the order. The Court possesses, and must possess under our system of law, the authority to enforce an order for the production of evidence, with a view to the interests of all parties in a litigation, and

with a balanced view of the public interests involved. The Court must not fashion its orders and remedies solely at the behest of any one party, even if he is the Attorney General of the United States.

The Government asserts that the Attorney General's refusal to comply with the May 31, 1977 order is made in the utmost good faith. While this Court does not doubt for a minute the Attorney General's sincere interest in protecting legitimate informant confidentiality, the effect of the Government's position at this juncture in the present proceedings is to create unjustified delay and obstruction to the production of evidence in a case involving serious charges of illegal use of informants. In any event, the good faith motive of a party does not justify disobedience of a court order. *McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.*, 336 U.S. 107, 191 (1949); *Sawyer v. Dollar*, 190 F.2d 623, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1951), *vacated as moot*, 344 U.S. 806 (1952). For instance, in a case recently tried by this Court, the Department of Justice obtained a civil contempt citation and then a conviction for criminal contempt of a young woman who refused to give testimony when ordered to do so by the court, despite the fact that the refusal resulted from the woman's honest and reasonable belief that she would be killed if she testified. *United States v. Alpert*, 76 Cr. 497 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1977).

The Supreme Court has emphatically affirmed the power and the duty of the Judiciary to declare the law in connection with claims of governmental privilege asserted by the highest officials in the country. The Supreme Court has affirmed the power of the Judiciary to enter an order for the production of evidence even against the President of the United States. *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 704-5 (1974). Surely these rules apply to a cabinet officer.

The power to enter an order against an official necessarily implies the power to enforce that order by appropriate means, including holding the official in contempt of court.

In view of the factual record, and in light of the applicable authorities, the Court rules:

(a) The order of May 31, 1977 remains in force, and the Attorney General and the FBI are hereby given notice that they are to comply with that order, and to produce the files as directed, forthwith. In order for the Attorney General and his advisors to have an opportunity to review this opinion, it will be deemed to be compliance with the order if the files are produced to plaintiffs' counsel by 5:00 p.m. July 7, 1978. If such production is made at or before that time, the Attorney General will not be in contempt.

(b) If the production of the files is not made at or before the time speci-

fied, the Attorney General will be in civil contempt of court thereafter, until he purges himself of contempt by directing the production of the files.

At this time the Court declines plaintiffs' request for an order of imprisonment. The authorities hold that, in connection with civil contempt, the minimum sanction necessary to obtain compliance is to be imposed. *Shillitani v. United States*, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966); *Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.*, 221 U.S. 418, 450-51 (1911). The announcement by the Attorney General that he will not comply with the court order justifies, and indeed necessitates, specific notice to the Attorney General that he will be in civil contempt of court if he continues in this non-compliance. It is obvious that the status of civil contempt would, in and of itself, be a severe sanction against the highest law enforcement officer in the United States. The Court earnestly hopes that the Attorney General will now carry out the order, and that contempt will be entirely avoided. If this does not occur, and if the Attorney General is in civil contempt and makes no effort to purge himself, the Court will entertain a motion for more drastic sanctions.

The discovery process has been unusually complex for a variety of reasons. The Government has admitted that it possesses about 8,000,000 documents relating to the SWP, the YSA, and their members. All parties have endeavored to be as selective as possible regarding document discovery, so as to avoid involving millions of documents in discovery and evidence at trial. So far about 65,000 pages of documents have been produced by the Government—less than one percent of the total.

In general, the various Government agencies have been cooperative, and appear to have been candid, in responding to discovery requests. The United States Attorney's staff is entitled to special commendation for their efforts in connection with the discovery in this case.

However, certain instances of misrepresentations by the FBI in connection with discovery have occurred. These unfortunate instances furnish some plausibility for plaintiffs' assertion, in connection with their request for informant files, that they need at least a representative sample of actual, complete files, and that they should not be relegated to summary information or expurgated documents prepared for them by the Government.

One critical instance where the FBI was less than candid occurred in connection with plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories directed to the FBI. These interrogatories were served in December 1973. By the time of these interrogatories plaintiffs had obtained, among other things, a copy of a memorandum dated April 28, 1971 from the Director of the FBI announcing the discontinuance of certain "counterintelli-

gence programs"—including programs entitled "COINTELPRO—New Left" and "Socialist Workers Party—Disruption Program." The FBI furnished sworn answers to the interrogatories February 5, 1974. These answers stated, among other things, that COINTELPRO—New Left was not applicable to either the SWP or the YSA; and that the purpose of the Socialist Workers Party—Disruption Program "was to alert the public to the nature and activities of the Socialist Workers Party and thus to neutralize the Socialist Workers Party." The answers further described the tactics employed in the Socialist Workers Party—Disruption Program as consisting of the furnishing of information to law enforcement agencies regarding violations of the law by SWP and YSA members; furnishing the news media pertinent information regarding the objectives and activities of these organizations, and furnishing "information concerning the nature and activities of SWP and YSA to organizations and individuals associated with SWP, YSA or their members."

In March 1975 the FBI produced documents which showed that COINTELPRO—New Left was in part directed to the SWP and YSA. The documents showed FBI plans and activities of both COINTELPRO—New Left and Socialist Workers Party—Disruption Program which were far different from the bland descriptions in the answers to interrogatories. The documents indicate that the purpose of the FBI in these programs was to destroy or cripple the SWP and YSA by a host of covert means—to isolate the SWP and YSA from sympathetic organizations, to turn members against one another, and to impose burdens and barriers to the functioning of the SWP, the YSA and their members. These are activities which are not countenanced in the prosecution and punishment of actual criminals, under our system of government.

The documents show FBI plans to place informants within the SWP and YSA to split the organization structure and foment dissent. According to the documents, the FBI interfered with travel reservations of members, took steps to cause speaker hall rentals to be canceled, and circulated false information about the times and places of meetings. The documents show that the FBI caused local law enforcement officers to make arrests and break up functions, not for the purpose of assisting in the enforcement of local laws, but for the purpose of disrupting the SWP and YSA. In one instance, the FBI arranged for a raid of a SWP summer camp for alleged state law violations, and considered it a success when the SWP was forced to sell the camp property. According to the documents, the FBI attempted to secure the eviction of the Philadelphia SWP office from a public building. The documents show that the FBI sent fraudulent letters, purporting to be from "distracted par-

ents," to school administrators, in order to induce these administrators to discharge SWP or YSA members from teaching positions. According to the documents, the FBI sent and circulated a wide variety of communications and leaflets, purporting to be in the name of various individuals and organizations, and designed to create hostility and dissension within the SWP and YSA, and isolate these organizations from other allied organizations. It appears that in some cases informants directly participated in the carrying out of the disruption activities. In other instances the informants furnished the FBI with information which enabled regular agents of the FBI to conduct the disruption activities. The observations of the informants assisted the FBI in assessing the success or failure of disruption activities.

It is now necessary to return to the summer of 1976, and to the immediate background of plaintiffs' motion for the production of nineteen informant files, the issue on this motion later being reduced to eighteen files because of the voluntary production of one file.

In the summer of 1976 one Timothy Redfearn was arrested by the Denver police. It was quickly revealed that he was an FBI informant against the YSA, and that, among other things, he had committed burglaries of YSA premises. It was apparent that the FBI had full knowledge of these burglaries. Finally, it was clear that the FBI had intentionally falsified the answers to interrogatories to conceal the fact of the burglaries.

Shortly thereafter plaintiffs moved for the production of the informant file on Redfearn and the files on six other informants whose identities had, in one way or another, been revealed to plaintiffs. Following an examination of these files, in August 1976, plaintiffs moved for production of nineteen other informant files. These related to informants whose identities were not known, but who were indicated in the interrogatory answers by number, accompanied by a limited description which was used by plaintiffs as a basis for their selection. Plaintiffs asserted, as reasons for this motion, (1) that the interrogatory answers, particularly in view of the indication of falsification, were inadequate to provide sufficient discovery and evidence on the FBI informant issue; (2) that the seven files of informants whose identities had become known were not sufficiently representative and were inadequate to provide discovery and evidence on the issue; (3) that, without waiving the right to request additional informant files, plaintiffs had made what they hoped was a representative selection of present and former member informants, informants who had engaged in significant activities, and certain non-member informants.

To return to the subject of the interrogatory answers—following the revelation of false answers in connection with the infor-

mant Redfearn, the FBI undertook a review of the answers as a whole. On October 8, 1976, the FBI filed amendments to the answers relating to 22 of the informants. A special review at FBI headquarters in Washington was made with respect to the answers to interrogatories filed with respect to the eighteen informants whose files were the subject of plaintiffs' motion. This review resulted in amendments to the interrogatory answers in ten instances, filed October 15, 1976. Under the circumstances, there inevitably remains some question as to the accuracy and completeness of the interrogatory answers as to the FBI informants.

It should be noted that the 1331 informants used by the FBI against the SWP and YSA during the period 1960-1976 included about 300 member informants and about 1000 non-member informants. According to an affidavit submitted by plaintiffs, there was a total of 73 branches of the SWP and YSA in 1976. The FBI has represented that it had 60 member informants in place in the SWP and YSA in 1976; 85 in 1975; 99 in 1974; 105 in 1973; 116 in 1972; and 109 in 1971. The FBI has given the figures going back to 1960. Somewhat fewer informants had been used in years prior to an apparent step-up of the program in about 1971.

In the Court's ruling of May 31, 1977, dealing with the question of the eighteen files, the Court stated that the evidence contained in the FBI informant files undoubtedly constitutes the most important body of evidence in this case, recording in immense detail the activities of the informants, the instructions by the FBI to the informants, and the FBI's evaluations of informant activity. The Court stated that the extensive infiltration of the SWP and YSA by the member informants raises serious questions under the federal Constitution and under various other theories of federal and state law. The Court further noted that the documents in the files indicate that the FBI may have used informants in certain instances to destroy or weaken chapters of the SWP and YSA, to remove private documents for production to the FBI, and to perform other types of activities whose legality was highly questionable.

The solution reached by the Court was to order at that time production of the eighteen files to specified attorneys representing plaintiffs, with direction that they should not reveal the identities of the informants or any information in the files to anyone else without specific authorization of the Court.

In order to keep publicity to an absolute minimum, the Court directed the attorneys not to reveal even the fact that this order had been entered and this procedure was taking place. The opinion of May 31, 1977 was sealed. It was unsealed only at the direction of the Court of Appeals in the course of proceedings there.

The Court wishes to state that, in five years of experience with plaintiffs' attorneys in this case, these attorneys have demonstrated beyond any question their total reliability. They have proved that, while they may strongly object to certain directions of the Court, they will obey those directions to the letter, including orders of confidentiality.

This Court has studied the eighteen informant files themselves to a substantial extent, and has exhaustively reviewed detailed summaries of these files prepared by the Government. This Court has studied the seven informant files voluntarily produced in the summer of 1976 and the two other quite insignificant informant files voluntarily produced at subsequent times. The Court has analyzed these materials as they relate to certain other documents produced by the FBI—particularly the COINTELPRO and Disruption Program documents, and, of course, as they relate to the various legal and factual issues in this case. After careful consideration, it was and is the firm conclusion of the Court that the eighteen FBI informant files contain evidence which is indispensable to plaintiffs' counsel in order for them to proceed with this action on any fair basis. It was and is the Court's further conclusion that this evidence is so basic and essential that no major issue in the case—whether relating to injunctive relief, claims for damages, or jurisdictional defenses—can be resolved without developing a factual record with evidence from these files.

At one point, in a discussion with counsel after the Court of Appeals ruling, this Court voiced the view, in "thinking out loud," that if the damage issue were somehow out of the case, the FBI discovery of the informant files would not be necessary (Minutes October 21, 1977 p. 26). Of course, this was a purely hypothetical statement, because the damage claims were not, and are not, out of the case. However, lest there be any misunderstanding about the Court's position, the Court wishes to make it clear that, upon thorough consideration, it views the informant files as relevant to both the damage *and* injunction questions in the case. This becomes more apparent as the case progresses.

As to the injunction issue, there is a very live controversy, despite the termination of the investigation of the SWP and YSA in September 1976. The Government has suggested on occasion that the claim might be moot, but this subject has not been followed up seriously; and plaintiffs clearly do not concede mootness. The announcement of the termination of the investigation came three years after the litigation had been in progress. The injunction claim is not rendered moot unless it is demonstrated that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated. *United States v. W. T. Grant Co.*, 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1952).

The Government has made it clear that it would oppose any injunction in general terms against the FBI prohibiting the investigation of the SWP or YSA, and that the only possible injunction which could be entered would need to be directed against specific activities (Memorandum October 21, 1976 pp. 13-15). Under all the circumstances it is clear that a thorough development of the facts regarding methods and activities of FBI informants will need to be developed in connection with plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief. In this regard, it is important to note that the Government has consistently urged, as justification for some or all of the FBI activities, that the SWP and YSA are affiliated with a worldwide federation known as the Fourth International; and that there is in the Fourth International a strong faction, called the Internationalist Tendency, which espouses violence. See *Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General*, 510 F.2d 253, 254 (2d Cir. 1974). One essential aspect of the eighteen informant files is that a number of them contain evidence bearing upon the question of whether the Fourth International affiliation led to any criminal or violent actions or plans by SWP and YSA members in the United States.

As to the damage claims, it should be reiterated that plaintiffs are asserting the most serious claim of a plan by the highest officials in the FBI to destroy or cripple the SWP and the YSA and their branches throughout the country.

Plaintiffs must be permitted to develop a full factual record about these matters in order for them to litigate fairly their damage claims against the Government, both as to the alleged overall plans to destroy and cripple, and the individual instances of alleged wrongdoing in various locations. The Government's repeated assertions that all these damage claims can be dismissed as a matter of law are totally unrealistic.

#### Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion to cite the Attorney General of the United States for civil contempt of court for failure to comply with the order of the Court dated May 31, 1977 is granted to the extent that the Attorney General is given notice that he must comply with the order forthwith, and that if he does not comply by 5:00 p.m. July 7, 1978, he will automatically be in civil contempt of court thereafter until he complies with the order. To the extent that plaintiffs apply for an order directing the imprisonment of the Attorney General, that application is denied, without prejudice to the making of a renewed motion for that or other specific sanctions.

So ordered.

Dated: New York, New York  
June 30, 1978

THOMAS P. GRIESA  
U.S.D.J.

# Capitalism Fouls Things Up



## Construction Halted at Seabrook After Protest of 20,000

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announced June 30 that it was suspending the construction permit for the Seabrook, New Hampshire, nuclear power plant. The NRC ordered all work to halt by July 21.

The ruling came amid a series of protest actions against the Seabrook plant. During the weekend of June 23-26, thousands of opponents of nuclear power gathered at the construction site in Seabrook. The high point of this protest was a rally of 20,000 persons on June 25—the largest antinuclear action yet held in the United States.

Two thousand persons marched in Manchester, New Hampshire, on June 26, while the NRC and the Environmental Protection Agency were holding hearings there on the Seabrook plant.

On June 28, several hundred persons, many of whom had traveled from Seabrook, held an antinuclear rally near the White House. A sit-in at the NRC's Washington headquarters began the same day and was still in progress when the agency's ruling was announced.

One spokesman for the opponents of the Seabrook plant hailed the stop-work order as "a historic breakthrough for the entire antinuclear movement in this country."

A more sober assessment was given to the socialist weekly the *Militant* on July 4 by a representative of the Clamshell Alliance, the New England coalition that has led the Seabrook protests: "We're happy that the NRC has taken a step in the right direction, but it has happened before. We have to hold off any real enthusiasm until the NRC irrevocably halts construction."

The NRC's ruling came in response to petitions by the Audubon Society of New Hampshire, the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, and the state of Massachusetts. The ruling suspends the construction permit until the Environmental Protection Agency has come to a final decision on the plant's cooling system, and until the NRC has considered alternative sites in light of the EPA's eventual findings.

The cooling system has been a special target for opponents of the 2,300-megawatt, twin-reactor installation that the Public Service Company (PSC) is building at Seabrook. As currently designed, the

plant will be cooled by a constant flow of sea water through tunnels extending several thousand feet into the Atlantic Ocean. Water pumped through at the rate of 1.2 billion gallons a day will return to the sea as much as 40 degrees Fahrenheit (22° C) hotter than the coastal waters.

Environmentalists have expressed concern that this thermal pollution will damage marine ecology on the rich fishing banks near Seabrook. A regional EPA administrator concurred in November 1976, ruling the system inadequate to "assure the protection and propagation of . . . shellfish, fish, and wildlife." The NRC suspended the construction permit at that time also, while allowing "limited" work to proceed.

In June 1977 EPA head Douglas Costle—acting at the behest of President Carter—overturned the regional ruling. Costle was in turn reversed in February of this year by a federal court of appeals, owing to procedural improprieties.

At present, the EPA is still reviewing complaints against the cooling system. The agency could decide that the "once-through" sea water system should be replaced by cooling towers. EPA officials have noted, however, that cooling towers would create a constant salt-laden fog harmful to plant life and dangerous to motorists on an expressway near the plant. Thus an adverse decision could necessitate relocating the power station, which is now about 15 percent complete.

The Public Service Company stands to lose \$15 million for each month that construction is halted. The PSC has already declared its intent to raise electric rates for New Hampshire consumers by 17 to 29 percent to meet the Seabrook construction costs, with further 20 percent boosts to follow on a yearly basis. This has led to a rate-withholding campaign organized by the Clamshell Alliance and other groups. Four New Hampshire towns have voted not to pay the additional electric charges.

