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HUGO BLANCO WINS SEAT IN PERUVIAN ASSEMBLY

***Hanoi Does Away With
Capitalism in South***

***Carter Caught Lying on
Cuban Role in Zaire***

***Peking in Orbit Over
Neutron Bomb***

***For Immediate Pullout of
French Troops in Chad!***



HUGO BLANCO: Though in exile, Trotskyist leader was elected to Peru's constituent assembly June 18, as were eleven other candidates of the Workers, Peasants, Students, and Poor People's Front (FOCEP). The FOCEP ran third in the country and outpolled all other working-class slates. See page 788.

Pierre Frank: The Crisis in French CP

NEWS ANALYSIS

Peking in Orbit Over Neutron Bomb

By Matilde Zimmermann

It has been called "the perfect capitalist weapon" because it kills people without damaging property. Peking would rather think of it as "the perfect anti-social-imperialist weapon" and bemoans the fact that the Pentagon is not moving full steam ahead with production of the neutron bomb.

When Carter announced April 7 that he was deferring production of the deadly bomb, the New China News Agency said he was capitulating to "Soviet threats and blackmail." Peking insists that the West needs the bomb because of the Soviet Union's "unprecedented" arms expansion and "overwhelming advantage" in some military areas.

To prove its case, Hsinhua depicts a groundswell of pro-neutron-bomb sentiment, citing, among others, Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, NATO officials in Brussels, *Newsweek*, West German parliamentary leaders, Ronald Reagan, and "public opinion in the West."

Like anyone else arguing for fattening the Pentagon's war budget, Peking raises the specter of Soviet military superiority. An article in the May 12 issue of *Peking Review* expresses concern about the threat to western security posed by the Soviet drive for "unilateral supremacy."

With this military threat facing them, West European countries feel ever more anxious. They have in recent years been discussing measures to fill this dangerous discrepancy in military strength. Since the United States' successful trial production of the neutron bomb many consultations between West European countries and the United States have taken place. Many in the West hold that the neutron bomb is an effective means of defence against Soviet military superiority. . . .

At least a few in the East agree—for example, the editors of *Peking Review*.

The article has to admit that there is widespread opposition to the neutron bomb but insists that opponents of the bomb have simply had the wool pulled over their eyes by the Kremlin's "powerful propaganda offensive":

But under pressure from the Soviet Union, there are others who want to make concessions over the neutron bomb in exchange for a Soviet "restraint" in conventional and nuclear weapons programmes and troop deployment. This, in fact, is only wishful thinking.

It might even be something worse than "wishful thinking." It might be "appeasement." Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua emphasized the danger of "appeasement" in his speech to the UN special

session on disarmament May 29:

In order to put off the outbreak of war, it is also necessary to oppose a policy of appeasement. The Soviet Union is increasing its military threat to Western Europe, striving to expand its influence in the Middle East and carrying out a series of military adventures in Africa. . . . It is the most dangerous source of a new world war and is sure to be its chief instigator.

It is a mistake, Huang insisted, to think that "concessions"—like deferring production of the neutron bomb—can stem the Soviet war drive. ". . . to pursue such policies of appeasement will only serve to camouflage and abet social-imperialism's war preparations and bring the war closer."

The Call, newspaper of the pro-Peking Maoists in the U.S., has divided American military and political personalities into "appeasers" and "anti-appeasers." Cyrus Vance is an "appeaser." *The Call's* editors do not name any "anti-appeasers," which is probably a judicious decision on their part.

Carter Caught Lying on Cuban Role in Zaïre

By Ernest Harsch

The Carter administration, recognizing that its fabricated charges about Cuban involvement in the recent uprising in Zaïre have met with skepticism from broad segments of the American public, is now trying to play down its previous claims.

On June 19, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance backtracked considerably, stating that the question of Cuban involvement in Zaïre had been "blown out of all proportion."

This shift in emphasis does not mark any lessening of the American imperialists' concern over Cuban involvement in Africa, and especially over Havana's assistance to various anti-imperialist struggles. Rather, it stems from Carter's realization that he has been caught in his own lie on the specific question of Zaïre and that the most prudent course is to beat a quiet retreat before credibility in the White House is further eroded.

The widespread disbelief in Carter's claims was spurred by his refusal to make public the alleged "evidence" of Cuban aid to the Zaïrian rebel forces based in northern Angola, and by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's detailed accounts of how Havana had actually opposed the activities of the

The New York Times published a letter July 19, 1977, that explains why the neutron bomb is considered more "efficient" than other nuclear weapons: "the overall amount of death, disease, and genetic damage to future generations per kiloton will actually have been greatly multiplied." But *Peking Review* discounts as just another Kremlin hoax the idea that production of such a bomb will step up the arms race:

The Soviet leaders and their media went all out to play up the neutron bomb as an inhumane, more savage, more dangerous and more destructive weapon which would raise the arms race to a more dangerous level. . . . The Soviet Union has nuclear weapons of greater destructivity than the neutron bomb. They are not a bit more 'humane' than the bomb.

One of the things that has fueled the growing peace movement in the United States and elsewhere is fear and outrage about superweapons like the neutron bomb. When 20,000 persons demonstrated outside the United Nations disarmament meeting in New York May 27, many carried signs against war and against the neutron bomb. Those truly faithful to the Peking line should show at the next such demonstration with signs against war and for the neutron bomb. Perhaps they would be wiser to simply stay home. □

Front National de Libération du Congo (FNLC—National Liberation Front of the Congo).

Nor did Carter find a more receptive audience abroad. For instance, Colin Legum, an associate editor of the London *Observer* and editor of the authoritative *Africa Contemporary Record*, who has expressed frequent concern over Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa, stated in a column in the June 24 issue of the American weekly *New Republic* that he believed Castro's account.

Legum also provided additional details on the Cuban attitude toward the FNLC. While noting that the FNLC probably received some Cuban training and equipment during the Angolan civil war (when they were allied with the Cuban-supported People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), Legum continued:

More recently, however, the FNLC has indulged in large-scale diamond smuggling as a means of raising funds for its struggle. . . . President Neto of Angola apparently decided that the situation along that part of his border had to be brought under control and the diamond-smuggling stopped. He entrusted the Cubans with the role of policing the area and maintaining security. The Cubans (according to

Western diplomatic sources in Angola) have expressed strong political and military criticisms of the FNLC, and are unlikely to have assisted them in crossing the border into [Zaire's] Shaba province.

Carter has not even been able to elicit the desired volume of public denunciations of Cuba from his allies in Latin America. The various pro-American regimes there are concerned that Havana's anti-imperialist drive in Africa could eventually spill over in their vicinity. But their concern has been tempered, according to a report in the June 20 *Christian Science Monitor* by James Nelson Goodsell, by a "begrudging admiration for the Cuban role in Africa."

More practical considerations were also involved. Goodsell noted that "some Latin American commentators find benefit in the Cuban role in Africa: After all, it keeps those thousands of Cuban soldiers and paramilitary civilians occupied a continent away and therefore unavailable for any possible Latin American activities."

Despite the White House's retreat on the question of Cuban involvement in Zaire, Vance himself reaffirmed the administration's worries about the Cuban role in Africa in general. In a June 20 speech on Washington's African policy, he stressed, "The continued presence of large quantities of Soviet arms and thousands of Cuban troops in certain parts of Africa raises serious concerns."

Vance added that "the continued presence of large numbers of Cuban troops" had "complicated" the situation in Ethiopia. He tried to imply that the Cuban troops were involved in the Ethiopian regime's war against the Eritrean independence struggle, although all the Eritrean liberation organizations have declared recently that the Cubans were not involved.

Turning to Angola, Vance displayed the other half of the White House's carrot-and-stick approach toward the Neto regime. Earlier, Carter had blasted the Angolans for bearing a "heavy responsibility," along with the Cubans, for the uprising in Zaire and had hinted at renewed aid to antigovernment guerrilla forces in Angola. But in his speech, Vance stated that "it could be helpful to increase our consultations with the Angolan Government. . . ."

After the words had barely been spoken, a State Department representative was on his way to Luanda for discussions with Neto, with the ostensible aim of getting Neto to restrain the Zairian rebels and use his influence with Namibian independence fighters based in Angola to achieve a "peaceful settlement" of the Namibia conflict.

Vance emphasized in his June 20 speech that the continued unrest in southern Africa could provide an "excuse" for "outside interference" (meaning Cuban aid to the liberation struggles) and could do "damage to economic progress and our own economic interests." □

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Hugo Blanco Elected to Peru Constituent Assembly

By Fred Murphy

Trotskyist leader Hugo Blanco and eleven other candidates of the Workers, Peasants, Students, and Poor People's Front (FOCEP)¹ were elected as deputies to the Peruvian constituent assembly in a countrywide vote June 18.

The constituent assembly is to write a new constitution as part of the military government's plan to turn power over to a civilian regime by 1980.

Of the three slates of candidates put forward by working-class currents, the FOCEP received the largest vote. With 98% of the almost 5 million ballots counted, unofficial returns showed the FOCEP with 11.5%, the Communist Party (*Unidad*)² with 5.7%, and the Democratic People's Union (UDP)—a bloc of centrist and Maoist parties and the dissident Communist Party (*Mayoría*)—with 4.2%. Deputies to the 100-member constituent assembly were to be chosen on the basis of proportional representation; thus FOCEP will be represented by twelve deputies, the CP(U) by six, and the UDP by four.

The Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR), a bourgeois-nationalist group led by former members of the military government, received 5.9% of the vote and will have six deputies in the assembly. Socialist Revolutionary Action (ARS), a small radical split-off from the bourgeois People's Action Party, received 0.65% of the votes. Thus the total vote for parties claiming to be socialist was more than 27%.

In addition to voting for a slate, Peruvian voters also cast a "preferential vote" for one member of the slate chosen. This was to determine which individuals among the 100 candidates on each slate would be elected as deputies. The tabulation of the preferential vote has not yet been completed, but initial reports show that Hugo Blanco was preferred by about 80% of those voting for the FOCEP. Thus Blanco's election is assured.

The FOCEP outpolled all other slates in three of Peru's fourteen departments (provinces). Sixty-two percent of the voters in

the department of Pasco cast ballots for the FOCEP, and in the southern departments of Moquegua and Tacna the FOCEP polled 40%. Pasco and Moquegua are copper-mining centers. Tacna was the site of Hugo Blanco's 1966 trial by a military court martial for his leading role in the 1952-63 peasant struggles in the department of Cuzco.

Combined vote totals for the departments of Junín, Ayacucho, and Huancaavelica showed the FOCEP in second place with 21% of the vote. Junín is also a mining region.

In metropolitan Lima, with twenty-five election districts, the FOCEP came in first in four districts and second in two districts, with votes ranging from 15% to 36%.

Bourgeois Parties Gain Majority

In the countrywide vote totals, two big bourgeois parties came out on top. The Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP) received a little more than 35% of the vote and the Christian People's Party (PPC) was second with 26%. (No other bourgeois slate received more than 3%.)

The PAP, which is also known as the People's Revolutionary American Alliance (APRA), has long been Peru's largest party. It was founded as a revolutionary-nationalist organization in 1930 by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Now more than eighty years old, Haya remains the APRA's "supreme head," but he and his party have long since given up their radical program. The APRA nevertheless retains a large bureaucratic apparatus and the loyalty of many voters, particularly in areas of northern Peru that have been APRA strongholds since the 1930s.

The Christian People's Party originated out of a 1967 split in the Christian Democracy. Its central figure, former Lima Mayor Luis Bedoya Reyes, campaigned as a defender of "free enterprise" and on occasion expressed admiration for the Pinochet regime in Chile. He had the support of most of Peru's big private capitalists.

The PPC directed much of its fire against the military government, reflecting the bourgeoisie's desire to regain the direct control over the state apparatus that it lost after the 1968 military coup.

Bedoya's party probably received many of the votes that would otherwise have gone to the People's Action Party of ex-President Fernando Belaúnde Terry. Belaúnde and his party dropped out of the

race in March, demanding immediate general elections.

As the election results became known, rumors began to circulate in Lima that the military would accelerate its timetable for restoring civilian rule and yield to a new cabinet made up primarily of APRA and PPC leaders. In return, the armed forces would retain some cabinet posts and much of the state bureaucracy.

Whatever new arrangements are made, Peru's deep economic crisis will remain. Before the elections some bourgeois politicians were advocating a "social pact" between the government and the workers movement to enforce austerity measures. But with the large vote for the FOCEP, which categorically rejected any such agreement, and with the relatively lower total for the CP(U), which would have been most amenable to a pact, the prospects for this kind of outcome look dim.

FOCEP: Working-Class Independence

The FOCEP's militant opposition to the military government and its identification with the May 22-23 general strike and the other massive struggles that have swept Peru in the past year were no doubt instrumental in its success. Among its candidates Hugo Blanco in particular enjoys a long-standing reputation as an uncompromising defender of the rights and demands of the Peruvian workers and peasants—despite the fact that he has been in prison or in exile for most of the past fifteen years.

Blanco returned from his second exile April 12. From then until he was again deported May 25 he was the FOCEP's principal spokesman. He appeared on television on a number of occasions and spoke at election rallies and meetings throughout the country. Blanco popularized the socialist program with a proposed draft constitution calling for expropriation of all the capitalists and landlords, a government based on elected committees of workers and peasants, and renunciation of Peru's massive foreign debt. (For the full text of this constitution, see "A Revolutionary Program for Peru," *Intercontinental Press/ Inprecor*, June 19, p. 748.)

The FOCEP itself is an electoral coalition based on a four-point platform:

"1. Support for the struggles of the working people for their class, national, and democratic demands.

"2. No submission to the government's

1. Frente Obrero, Campesino, Estudiantil, y Popular.

2. The Peruvian Communist Party split in January into two public factions, which take their names from their newspapers. The old-line Stalinist faction publishes *Unidad* (Unity). The oppositionists, who have taken a more militant stance against the government, publish *Mayoría* (Majority).

plans nor to its regimented and antidemocratic constituent assembly.

"3. Struggle against the traditional bourgeois parties—the APRA, AP, MDP, UNO, PPC, and so on; no electoral alliance with parties such as the Christian Democrats, the PSR, ARS, and others.

"4. Struggle against continuation of the military government; struggle for the sovereignty of the working people."

Within this common framework, each party or organization within the FOCEP is free to raise its own program and demands.

The main political forces within the FOCEP are Trotskyist parties: the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers Party), of which Hugo Blanco is a central leader; the Partido Obrero Marxista Revolucionario (POMR—Revolutionary Marxist Workers Party), whose best-known figure is Hernán Cuentas, general secretary of the miners union at the huge Cuajone copper complex; and the Frente de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—Partido de Obreros y Campesinos (FIR-POC—Front of the Revolutionary Left/Party of Workers and Peasants). The PST and the FIR-POC are sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International; the POMR is affiliated to the Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International.

One other political party belongs to the FOCEP: the Communist Party (*Bandera Roja*), a Maoist group led by Saturnino Paredes.

In addition to the four workers parties, the FOCEP includes the Miners and Metallurgical Workers union at the Centromín mining complex in the department of Pasco; the Peasant Communities of Yanahuanca and Pasco; the Piura Departmental Workers Federation; the steelworkers union at the state-owned SIDERPERU works in Chimbote; two locals of the Bank Employees Federation; the National Federation of Pueblos Jóvenes, an organization of shantytown dwellers; three socialist youth groups; and several other trade-union organizations.

A number of well-known independent socialists also participate in the FOCEP. These include attorney Laura Caller, the representative of Amnesty International in Peru; the poet and writer Manuel Scorza; and labor attorney Genaro Ledesma, who was deported along with Blanco on May 25. Ledesma was elected to the Peruvian Congress in the early 1960s by the copper miners of the department of Pasco, despite his being a political prisoner at the time.

Millions Prevented from Voting

The substantial vote for the FOCEP and the other leftist parties and slates came despite the undemocratic nature of the elections and the repression suffered by the left in the weeks leading up to the June 18 vote.

Only those persons able to read and write in Spanish were allowed to vote. This disqualified at the outset about 3 million Peruvians—mostly Indian peasants whose principal languages are Quechua and Aymará. (The vote for FOCEP would no doubt have been higher had this restriction not been in force—it was among the Quechua-speaking peasants of the Cuzco region that Hugo Blanco led land occupations and other struggles against the landlords in the early 1960s.)

To achieve ballot status required the submission of 40,000 signatures and the establishing of committees in at least twelve departments.

The statements of the left were often censored in the meager allotments of free radio and television time and newspaper advertising. At one point, the broadcasts of the FOCEP and the UDP were suspended altogether. The daily newspapers, owned and controlled by the military regime, gave grossly disproportionate coverage to the bourgeois parties and candidates, who also spent millions on lavish television campaigns.

The situation became considerably worse in mid-May. When a massive wave of strikes and protests broke out against a series of harsh new economic austerity measures, the regime declared a state of emergency, suspended publication of the independent weekly periodicals that had been providing the bulk of the information on the leftist parties' campaigns, and ordered a halt to television and radio broadcasts and newspaper advertising by all candidates. Dozens of leftist candidates were arrested.

On May 25, nine candidates were deported to Argentina along with two journalists and two union leaders. The deported candidates included Hugo Blanco,

Genaro Ledesma, and Ricardo Napurí of the FOCEP; Ricardo Letts, Javier Diez Canseco, and Ricardo Díaz Chávez of the UDP; and José Luis Alvarado, Adm. Guillermo Faura Gaig, and Adm. José Arce Larco of the PSR.

The state of emergency was lifted ten days before the election and the weeklies were allowed to resume publication. But broadcasts by leftist candidates were again subjected to censorship.

On June 16, a joint rally in Lima by 5,000 supporters of the FOCEP and the UDP was broken up by police wielding clubs and firing tear gas. Two days earlier a rally of 2,000 held by the bourgeois PPC had been allowed to proceed without police intervention.

On election day, PSR president Gen. Leónidas Rodríguez was arrested and beaten when he went to vote. He was later deported to Argentina.

The military rulers have so far given no indication that they will allow any of the deportees to return—elected or not. Ulises Montoya, president of the National Elections Court (JNE) said June 13 the fact that some candidates were out of the country was not a matter of concern to the JNE, and that if any of the deportees were elected they would be granted credentials as constituent assembly delegates. The JNE was appointed by the military to oversee the elections; it has no real power.

The independent periodicals in Peru have already begun to demand that Hugo Blanco and the other exiles be let back into the country. If the military expects its constituent assembly to have any credibility, it will at least have to allow all 100 of the assembly's deputies to be present and not in exile or in jail when the opening session convenes July 28. □

Blanco: International Campaign Stayed the Hand of Argentine Junta

[The following interview with the Peruvian Trotskyist leader Hugo Blanco was published in the June 16 issue of *Internationalen*, the weekly newspaper of the Communist Workers League, Swedish section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

* * *

Question. Is it true that you were arrested by the police only a few hours after you appeared on TV?

Answer. Yes. The promises about the election to the constituent assembly included giving all parties an opportunity to present their policies in the mass media. I am on the slate of the FOCEP electoral

front, and when I spoke on TV I called on people to support the planned strike against the regime's price increases. That was on May 18.

In the evening, a few hours later, I was arrested by police in my home. That night a state of emergency began to be imposed. But it was not announced officially until two days later. Along with me, other leaders of the left were picked up. A number of them were taken in the day following my arrest.

After spending a few days in jail, on the evening of May 24, I and a group of other prisoners were told that we had ten minutes to get ourselves together before being taken away. We were put in a car without being told where we were going.

We were driven off in the company of

two imprisoned admirals, who had been naval ministers under the Velasco regime. The police told us that we were going to be flown to Argentina.

We didn't believe it at first. When a police chief repeated it, I told him that it was a form of psychological torture to fool us about that.

When we got to the airport and found that it was true, we refused to go onto the plane. The police called for reinforcements and handcuffed us so that they could drag us onto the plane. They were secret police, not the ordinary kind.

The airport personnel knew nothing about the deportations. We took every opportunity to protest against the way we were being treated. Finally, the police had to drag us into the plane.

Q. Weren't you taking a big risk by resisting?

A. It was a good thing that we did what we did. It was because of it that the deportations became known. The next day a picture of the scene at the airport appeared in the newspapers along with news about our being exiled. The international campaign got under way, and then it was hard for the Argentine government to do anything to us.

Q. What happened when you got to Argentina?

A. We were turned over to the Argentine army in Jujuy, near the Bolivian border. The army could have killed us there and said that we were a group of Bolivian guerrillas who had crossed over the frontier.

We were transferred into a truck. The soldiers pointed their rifles at us. We were taken to a military barracks, where we were kept under armed guard. The guards often pointed their weapons at us.

But when the news got out, things got better. Officials came from Buenos Aires and said that we would be granted asylum in Argentina.

We said no. We wanted to go to another country and asked to be put in contact with some embassy. That was refused. We were not being persecuted in Argentina, the officials claimed, and so the only possibility was to accept asylum in Argentina and then go to some other country.

I said that I had a Swedish residency permit. Another one of us, the union lawyer Ricardo Díaz Chávez, had a Mexican residency permit, since he had a job there as a university lecturer.

Q. Why did they want to give you "asylum" in Argentina?

A. It was important for the regime's propaganda. There is a lot of talk about human rights.

Two union leaders who were forced to accept the offer of "asylum" were taken to

the town of General Pico in the province of La Pampa. They are to be forced to stay there.

After we were flown to Buenos Aires, we were put in cells at the federal police headquarters. We got nothing to eat for twenty-four hours, and when we did get food, it was so bad that not even Peruvian dogs would eat it.

But it was never said that we were under arrest. They claimed that we were only being kept in jail for technical reasons. Finally, I was allowed to talk to the Swedish consul and Swedish journalists.

It got harder and harder for the police to keep us isolated from the outside world, and my comrades got permission to make some telephone calls. Then I came here. I

don't know exactly what happened to the others.

Q. You said that you suspect the CIA of being behind this operation.

A. We had not done anything directed against the Argentine government. There are grounds for suspecting an international conspiracy with CIA involvement. One reason is that Admiral Guillermo Faura, a naval minister under Velasco, was among those deported.

In his term in office, he moved against the CIA offices that had been set up in government buildings. He threatened the CIA with more sweeping measures if they did not immediately clear out of the offices they were using in the Ministry of the Navy buildings in the Centro Civico in Lima. □

Showdown Nears in SWP Suit Against FBI

The possibility that Attorney General Griffin Bell might be jailed for refusing to obey a court order in the Socialist Workers Party case has alarmed the editors of several of the country's major daily newspapers. In lead editorials the *Washington Post* of June 17 and the *New York Times* of June 20 urged Federal Judge Thomas Griesa not to force Bell to obey an order to turn over FBI files on eighteen informers in the SWP and Young Socialist Alliance.

The *Washington Post* admits that "at first glance, the position of Attorney General Griffin Bell in the Socialist Workers Party case seems outrageous." Actually, Bell's stance does not look so good upon closer examination either. But the *Post* and *Times* both claim that Bell's defense of "informer privilege" has merit.

A year ago, Judge Griesa ordered the government to turn over some twenty-five file drawers of uncensored records to attorneys arguing the socialists' \$40 million lawsuit. His directive has been upheld twice by the Court of Appeals and once by the U.S. Supreme Court. Bell still refuses to comply, and attorneys for the socialists have asked that he be cited for contempt of court and put in jail until he obeys the order.

The judge has read the files and declared that they "are an absolutely indispensable source of evidence in this case." In a February 1978 hearing, Griesa said that "[there] simply is no substitute for what is seen in these files." Attorneys for the SWP and YSA have explained that the files are necessary to assess the full damage done to the organizations by government spies planted in their ranks. The *Times* editorial, however, questions "whether the party has substantial need for the informer files."

The editors of the *Times* and *Post* are not really worried about whether the socialists honestly need the files to press

forward their case. Rather, they are concerned because turning over the files would strike a serious blow to the whole use of undercover informers against dissident groups. Bell's argument is true in a certain sense: Informers will be less willing to do the government's dirty work if they think they might eventually be identified and become liable to prosecution by a criminal or civil court for their activities.

In the past the *Times* and the *Post* have complained about the FBI's illegal harassment of the SWP and YSA. Now they counsel the attorney general to compound this illegal activity by defying a valid court order. Both newspapers think that the socialists have gone too far, even though they clearly have the law on their side.

The sections of the U.S. ruling class represented by the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* are convinced that the FBI needs to polish up its image by minimizing "abuses" like burglaries and illegal wiretaps. But they do not think that planting secret agents inside a legal political organization is itself an abuse. "Informers are often essential," says the *Times*. The *Post* politely calls the snitches "sources of information" and says it is logical to believe "the government has a legal right to protect the confidentiality of its sources."

The June 24 issue of the liberal *New York weekly The Nation* carried quite a different editorial on Bell's conflict with the court. It accused the Attorney General of seeking "to preserve the dishonorable profession of political informer, one that is so useful to police prying into the lives of citizens," and suggested Bell pay more attention to "the strict observance of the law at all levels of police activity," and less to "the protection of a few miserable informers and their like in the future." □

Mobutu Offers Zaïre to Highest Bidder

By Ernest Harsch

Fresh from their military intervention in Shaba, the major imperialist powers have moved to tighten even further their stranglehold over Zaïre's economy.

Representatives of the Mobutu regime, ten creditor governments, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the executive body of the Common Market met in Brussels June 13-14 to discuss Zaïre's grave economic problems and the terms for an international "rescue" operation designed to bail out Mobutu.

The price Mobutu was required to pay for more financial assistance from his Western backers was revealed on the first day of the summit meeting when the Zaïrian representative, Bokana W'ondangela, agreed to greater imperialist dominance over Zaïre, both in the economy and in the actual administration of economic and financial affairs.

By August, the International Monetary Fund is to designate a "principal director" to take direct control of the Bank of Zaïre, the central bank in the country. "Although the official would technically be outranked by the Zaïrian governor of the bank," a dispatch in the June 14 *Wall Street Journal* reported, "conference sources left little doubt that the IMF representative would in effect control the bank's operations, particularly international money transfers. He would be assisted by a staff appointed from abroad."

Another foreign official is to take over the Ministry of Finance and supervise all government expenditures.

Other aspects of the economic scheme—known as the "Mobutu Plan"—include efforts to get the mining industry back into production following the disruption caused by the rebellion in Shaba in May and incentives to attract more foreign investors.

These measures are just part of a broader scheme aimed at strengthening the American and West European presence in the country and at safeguarding their substantial investments. Besides increased American, Belgian, and French military involvement, the Western powers have also been pressing for alterations in Mobutu's corrupt and unstable regime.

According to a report by correspondent Jim Browning in the June 12 *Christian Science Monitor*, a two-fold strategy toward the Mobutu regime emerged from a June 5-6 meeting in Paris of top foreign policy officials from the United States,

France, Britain, West Germany, and Belgium.

One goal was to "force Mr. Mobutu to share power internally with other Zaïrian political forces and with Western experts." By broadening out the regime, the imperialists hope to lend it greater stability and possibly prepare an eventual replacement for Mobutu, an option that has been under consideration in imperialist circles for several years. The second goal would be to improve relations between Mobutu and the Angolan regime, which has thus far provided sanctuary in northern Angola for anti-Mobutu rebel forces.

"In the domestic policy area," Browning continued, "the Western nations want Mr. Mobutu to share power by naming a prime minister and cabinet. Key decisions, however, would be made by Western 'counselors,' distributed through such important sectors as the national bank, the mining industry (which is nationalized), transport, communications, and defense."

The Mobutu regime is aware of the opposition that the arrival of the foreign officials could arouse among the Zaïrian population. On June 13, Bokana W'ondangela tried to gloss over the substantial concessions the regime has already made to foreign domination, claiming that the capitulation "doesn't mean we are coming back to colonialism." He tried to portray it as "international cooperation."

The imperialists are likewise trying to cover up the real nature of the agreements. "The plans are being carefully presented as a response to Zaïre's requests," Jonathan Spivak reported in the June 15 *Wall Street Journal*, "because the conferees here want to avoid seeming to impose a white western solution on this black African nation, whose resources include rich deposits of copper, cobalt, industrial diamonds and uranium."

The "Mobutu Plan," however, was actually drafted by Belgian personnel working in Zaïre.

In return for the Zaïrian concessions, the IMF and the imperialist governments have offered Mobutu increased financial assistance. Although little has yet been finalized, a two-year, \$1 billion aid package was discussed at the Brussels meeting. All that was concretely agreed on, however, was provision of \$116 million in emergency aid, mostly in the form of food, fuel, and spare parts, over a three-month period. The rest, the imperialist representatives made clear,

would be dependent on Mobutu's "performance."

Much of this longer-term assistance, moreover, would be geared toward helping Mobutu repay his more than \$2 billion in debts that have accumulated over the past few years as a result of a severe economic crisis.

The Zaïrian economy, dependent largely on the export of copper and a few other minerals, was badly hit by a sharp drop in the world copper price in 1975, forcing Mobutu to borrow heavily to cover a mounting balance-of-payments deficit. The worsening crisis, compounded by severe transport difficulties and the impact of the world recession, pushed the country to the brink of international bankruptcy.

The effects of the crisis have hit the Zaïrian masses especially hard. Unemployment is rising, inflation now ranges between 50 percent and 70 percent a year, and the decline in agricultural production has resulted in shortages of basic food items. According to a report by Lewis LeDroit in the June 10 issue of the American weekly *New Republic*:

The average Kinshasa family of five can barely care for or feed itself on its monthly income. A sack of cassava, the basic diet staple, costs twice the minimum legal monthly wage of 20 Zaires (\$23). Yet the average family requires two bags a month. Prices for essential foodstuffs and goods are exorbitant throughout the country. There are reports from eastern Zaïre that schoolchildren have collapsed in their classroom because they cannot get enough to eat.

Such conditions have spurred widespread discontent against the Mobutu regime, shown most strikingly by the rebellions in Shaba, Bandundu, and other provinces.

While the "Mobutu Plan" may spur the flow of repayments to foreign banks and lending institutions and will give the imperialists a better footing from which to increase their exploitation of Zaïre, it will do little to alleviate the grinding poverty—or the discontent—of the Zaïrian workers and peasants.

It is against this background that the Western powers have coupled their economic moves with stepped-up military intervention. They have thrown together an imperialist-backed expeditionary force of Moroccan, Senegalese, and other African troops to bolster Mobutu's disorganized and ineffective army. Several hundred Belgian paratroopers remain in the country to patrol Shaba Province. Belgian and French advisers are to train a new 12,000-man infantry division and a 3,000-man airborne brigade.

And as the joint Belgian, French, and American military intervention in Shaba revealed, the imperialists are fully prepared to act even more directly should their dominance in Zaïre become endangered once again. □

Hanoi Does Away With Capitalism in South Vietnam

By Fred Feldman

The Vietnamese revolution has taken a big step forward in recent months. Measures promulgated by the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and backed up by mass actions, have abolished the last strongholds of the capitalist class in the South. The two zones of Vietnam, which were united politically in July 1976, have now been fused economically into a single planned and nationalized economy.

The new stage opened with a March 23 decree abolishing 30,000 commercial and business enterprises in South Vietnam. The main target of these measures was businessmen in the Cholon district of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) who have long dominated trade in the South. Nayan Chanda, a journalist who has closely followed developments in Indochina since the end of the war, described the Cholon district as "a capitalist heart beating within the socialist body of Vietnam."

Writing in the May 26, 1978, issue of the Hong Kong weekly *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Chanda described how this decree was carried out:

"Tens of thousands of youth volunteers, communist cadres and security force members were mobilised to close all businesses and make a thorough search to prepare inventories of goods held in shops or businessmen's residences. After the inventory was made, guards were posted in front of every shop to prevent dispersal of goods pending takeover by the government."

On April 16 the regime once again mobilized its supporters to close down illegal operations in Ho Chi Minh City's open-air markets, centers of black market operations.

Although many small shops continue to operate, these measures effectively placed the government in control of large-scale wholesale and retail trading operations. "Like their compatriots in the north, Vietnamese in the south have now started queuing to buy supplies from State and cooperative shops," reported Chanda.

The regime is evidently taking steps to block any comeback by the expropriated capitalists. According to Chanda, thousands of businessmen and their families "have been asked to prepare to leave Ho Chi Minh City to go either to their native villages or to New Economic Zones—resettlement areas on virgin land." Some have been offered the chance to remain in the city if they invest their remaining capital in government projects.

On May 3 a single currency was estab-

lished for the whole country. Previously the two zones had different currencies, a reflection of the different economic structures that existed. Strict measures were taken to block hoarding and other forms of currency manipulation.

The measures taken in the South spilled over into the North, where new tight controls have been placed on private trade.

(About 90 percent of the expropriated merchants were ethnic Chinese. The Peking regime has utilized this fact as a pretext for a propaganda offensive against Vietnam, based on unsupported allegations of discrimination against the Chinese minority.)

The measures carried out in March, April, and May constitute the extension to the South of the planned economy that has existed in the North for two decades. It marks the completion of a process of social revolution that began with the entry of the liberation forces into Saigon on April 30, 1975. These moves contrast sharply with the policies which the Vietnamese Communist Party regime sought to pursue after the victory.

The victory of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (former name of North Vietnam) and the National Liberation Front in April 1975 destroyed the military and administrative apparatus of the old regime. As the liberation forces approached Saigon, most of Vietnam's top capitalists scrambled into the departing planes of their imperialist masters. In many cases workers, usually led by NLF or DRV cadres, took over factories, protecting them from theft or destruction until the rebel forces completed their conquest of the city, and trying to keep them in operation while a new administration was being established.

The fall of the corrupt capitalist regime was greeted with enthusiasm by workers and young people throughout Vietnam's cities, as well as by most peasants in the countryside. They wanted the reunification of their long-divided country and the complete abolition of landlordism and capitalism. With as much as 70 percent of industry already in government hands owing to the flight of the owners, it was within the power of the DRV-NLF leaders to carry out a socialist revolution and reunify Vietnam.

They chose to follow a different course. Instead of reunifying Vietnam, a "Provisional Revolutionary Government" was installed as the government of a formally independent state in the South, although the party and military apparatuses of the

two zones were fused. Vietnamese Communist Party leaders indicated that reunification was at least five years off. The new regime promised to preserve capitalist property relations in the South. This was in line with the class-collaborationist program put forward by the rebel leaders in the years preceding their victory.

Communist Party Secretary Le Duan predicted on May 15, 1975, that this course would lead to the creation of "a fine national democratic regime, a prosperous national-democratic economy" in the South.

Le Duan's statement expressed the VCP's adherence to the Stalinist two-stage theory of revolution. According to this concept South Vietnam had to go through a period of development under capitalist auspices before moving on to a socialist revolution.

The VCP leaders hoped that maintaining capitalism in the South would attract imperialist aid and investment to Vietnam, particularly the \$2.2 billion in reconstruction assistance promised by the Nixon administration in the 1973 Paris accords. The need for such assistance was real and desperate.

For a decade the rural areas of South Vietnam were pounded by U.S. bombs and sprayed with defoliants, bringing ruin to South Vietnam's agriculture. Once an exporter of rice, South Vietnam eventually required massive imports. Millions of peasants were driven into overcrowded cities as refugees. The entire economy became dependent on outside aid, and hundreds of thousands of people made their living by providing services for the American occupiers.

When the U.S. forces finally pulled out in April 1975, the devastation inflicted by the Pentagon remained. Unemployment soared to 3.5 million. Hundreds of thousands of homeless children needed to be cared for. The cities were plagued by prostitution, drug addiction, and disease.

The hoped-for assistance from capitalist governments and corporations failed to materialize, although modest investments were initiated by Japan, France, and Sweden. Despite considerable interest in Vietnam's oil resources, most capitalist investors shied away from the regime because of its roots in a revolutionary upsurge and its close ties to the workers state in the North.

The U.S. imperialists followed this up with further crimes against the Vietnamese people. All assistance was cut off. The White House reneged on the treaty promise to help reconstruct Vietnam. Trade with Vietnam was barred. (This was particularly damaging because most South Vietnamese factories were dependent on raw materials from the United States.)

The State Department has refused to accord diplomatic recognition to the government and has sought to disrupt its United Nations delegation with phony spy

charges. And the White House has continued to surround Vietnam with client regimes like Thailand, U.S. military bases, and the Seventh Fleet.

The goal was to punish the Vietnamese for defeating the imperialist invasion and discredit the new regime by forcing it to confront grave economic problems in isolation. Thus the U.S. capitalist press has published numerous articles depicting the difficulties of life in Vietnam today, while delicately omitting to mention the miserable conditions of the great majority of people under the old regime, or the heavy responsibility borne by Washington's invasion and subsequent economic blockade.

The VCP leaders have also been disappointed in their hopes for massive aid from the USSR and China. The bureaucrats who rule these workers states viewed the end of the war as a good excuse for reducing their assistance to the Vietnamese people and imposing more stringent terms. Thus Moscow has replaced grants to Vietnam with interest-bearing loans, while Peking has demanded payment for shipments of rice to the hard-pressed Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese experience once again demonstrates the fallacy of the two-stage theory of revolution. It proved impossible to construct "a fine national democratic regime, a fine national democratic economy" in the South. Despite their promises, the VCP leaders have been compelled, step by step, to do away with capitalism in the South, extending to that region the economic and political structures of the workers state in the north.

The regime was pushed in this direction not only by objective necessity, but also by the mass pressure for decisive measures to organize the economy. Although the bureaucratic structure of the regime denied the populace any political voice, the leaders could not ignore the basic economic needs of the workers and youth who provided its popular base in the cities.

The major sector of the capitalist class that survived the fall of the puppet regime was the merchants. They controlled the distribution of most goods—even the products of many nationalized factories. The regime's class-collaborationist perspective was based on the assumption that they could be cajoled and pressured into participating cooperatively in the new order. Nothing of the kind happened.

In August 1975 shortages and price inflation, coupled with continuing unemployment, sparked a crisis. Banking was nationalized, a new currency introduced for the South, and a few key traders had their property confiscated as an example to the rest.

Explaining the reasons for this action, Prime Minister Huynh Tan Phat said: "Everything was in their [the compradors'] hands. They disrupted the markets, arti-

cially created shortages, and sent prices spiralling upwards and there was little we could do about it. They controlled everything from the purchase, transport, and distribution of virtually all commodities. . . ." The initial anticapitalist moves were supported by demonstrations of thousands in the streets of Ho Chi Minh City.

The combination of economic difficulties, the hostility of the merchant capitalists, and popular discontent persuaded the VCP leaders to speed up the timetable for reunification. A National Assembly was elected in April 1976. On July 2, 1976, this body proclaimed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and selected a government headed by the leading figures of the former Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Le Duan promised:

"In the south we must immediately abolish the comprador bourgeoisie and the remnants of the feudal landlord classes, undertake the socialist transformation of private capitalist industry and commerce, agriculture, handicraft and small trade through appropriate measures and steps, combine transformation with building in order actively to steer the economy of the south into the orbit of socialism, and integrate the economies of both zones in a single system of large-scale socialist production."

An article, "New Advances in Vietnam's Course Against Capitalism," in the October 18, 1976, issue of *Intercontinental Press* summarized the significance of the reunification and the perspectives it posed:

"Through these measures the deformed workers state that was established in North Vietnam in the years after 1954 formalized the extension of its political apparatus and control to the South. In doing so it has come face to face with a major contradiction.

"In contrast to the North, the economy of the South remains capitalist in nature although it is a weak and battered capitalism. The Vietnamese rulers are thus confronted with the choice of coexisting with capitalist forces in the South or completing the social revolution in the South through the overturn of capitalist property relations and the creation of a planned economy.

"Should the Vietnamese leaders decide to coexist with a capitalist economy in the South, the recovery and growth of capitalist forces would be encouraged. Their penetration into the government and into the economy of the North would be facilitated. The ground could thus be prepared for the reactionary overthrow at some future time of all the progressive gains of the Vietnamese revolution, including the planned economy in the North.

"In reality, however, Vietnam is moving toward a progressive resolution of this contradiction, despite the hesitations and class-collaborationist practices of the Stalinist leadership."

Some anticapitalist measures followed the meeting of the National Assembly. The destruction of landlordism was pressed through the nationalization without compensation in mid-1977 of imperialist-owned rubber plantations like those of the Michelin firm.

Despite its proclamations, however, the regime continued its efforts to collaborate with the industrialists and merchants who dominated a section of industry and the bulk of commerce. The measures taken against a few merchants in August 1975 were not followed up. On April 30, 1976, Nayan Chanda wrote in the *Washington Post*:

"Despite some tough measures against big-business operators of Cholon . . . many of the business community have apparently survived the currency reform last September by quickly dispersing their holdings. Nor has it been possible to unearth their hidden stocks of goods.

"After an initial lull of a few months, Cholon is again doing a brisk business. Hoarding and blackmarketing, combined with a general shortage of goods this country has imported in the past, have caused prices to rise. . . ."

A dispatch by Richard Ward from Hanoi in the June 21, 1978, issue of the New York weekly *Guardian* quotes Father Tran Tam Tinh, a professor living in Québec who has visited Vietnam several times since liberation, as saying that the Saigon merchants "formerly controlled almost the entire import-export network, almost all road transportation and they had monopolized commerce in rice, meat, fabrics and other basic necessities."

Although the National Assembly had proclaimed an economic plan for the whole country in July 1976, the scope of capitalist economic power blocked the integration of the Southern economy into the plan.

Furthermore the economic power and wealth of the capitalists and merchants enabled them to forge close ties with the state administration in the South. Cadres sent from the North to organize the bureaucratic apparatus often developed cozy and profitable ties with the business community.

Corruption became a threat to the government's control of the new administration in the South, and alienated popular support. In the North, too, complaints against bureaucratic corruption became rife.

In a 1976 article in *Hoc Tap*, a VCP journal, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh said that corruption and tyrannical behavior by some cadres have "more than slightly tarnished the prestige of the Party, State and Army in the eyes of the people" and warned that "if not promptly rectified they will lead to degeneration and deterioration."

According to Nayan Chanda, writing in the March 3, 1978, *Far Eastern Economic*

Review, an anti-corruption campaign was "launched with added urgency in the south, particularly in Ho Chi Minh City, where the danger of moral degeneration of the cadres is greater—as is the need to keep the party's image untarnished.

"Since last July when the Ho Chi Minh City party committee adopted resolutions to combat corruption (according to an official, during the congress the party received 10,000 letters from the local population making complaints and suggestions), a sizable number of veteran party cadres and officials have been jailed, including directors of a nationalized company and of Saigon's port and the chairman of a people's committee in the city."

The anticorruption campaign gained steam as the necessity for moves against the capitalists became more apparent. A Southern leader, VCP Politburo member Nguyen Van Linh, was removed from his post as chairman of the committee for the transformation of private industry in trade. "He, in fact, has been held responsible for not being able to reform the capitalists faster," asserts Chanda. "A few months before the reshuffle several thousand cadres from the north were sent south to take over administrative and managerial jobs from incumbents believed to be incompetent and corrupt."

The steady drumfire of popular demands both in the North and the South for more consumer goods led the regime to reorient its economic planning toward consumer goods and agriculture rather than heavy industry, and placed it under pressure to rationalize distribution. This was necessary to meet the needs of city dwellers, provide inducements for moving to New Economic Zones, and provide goods which could be supplied to the peasants in exchange for rice.

Matters were brought to a head when drought and flooding reduced crops in 1976 and 1977. Shortages of food resulted in reduced rice rations, and required a further de-emphasis of industry in favor of agriculture in economic planning.

The impact of these and other shortages was exacerbated by hoarding, currency manipulation, and other practices indulged in by the merchants. This contributed to an inflation rate in the South of about 80 percent.

Military considerations also pressed the leadership toward decisive action. In addition to the border conflict with Cambodia, the regime has been under increasing pressure from Peking on its northern border. Vietnamese troops are at present combating rightist and royalist guerrillas in Laos.

In the face of rising discontent and economic disruption, the government decided to break capitalist economic power. In the May 26 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, correspondent Chanda quotes an April 13 editorial in the party daily *Nhan*

Dan, which conceded that "the experience of the past three years showed that despite restrictions 'the capitalist economy continued to rule the roost.'" The editorial ridiculed the idea that "the good points of the capitalist and private economic systems can be of use." Such claims about the value of capitalism for the economic development of the South had been part of the standard rhetoric of the VCP leaders.

The editorial concluded that "so long as [the private sector] exists, the reorganization of agriculture and handicrafts along the socialist line will be very difficult. Similarly, as long as capitalist trade survives, it will be impossible to build a strong socialist trade."

The elimination of large-scale private trade does not mean that Vietnam has eliminated all capitalist enterprise. On the contrary, a sector of industry still operates on a capitalist or mixed state-private basis (this accounts for perhaps as much as 30 percent of industrial production in the South). This sector is closely supervised by the government, and control will now be enhanced by the fact that industrialists no longer have the option of marketing their goods through private traders.

The remaining capitalists lack internal cohesion and strong organization, such as the Cholon traders possessed. Above all they hold no decisive levers of economic power. The last capitalist strongholds in South Vietnam have been crushed.

The new measures further place the government in a strong position to assure food supplies to the cities and to guide the development of agriculture, since merchants can no longer outbid the state for the peasant's production. The potential danger of a merchant-peasant alliance against the regime has been forestalled.

Taken as a whole, the measures constitute a positive resolution of the contradiction between the regime that arose out of Vietnam's long revolutionary struggle (beginning in 1945) and the surviving capitalist property relations. Capitalist property relations no longer predominate in South Vietnam.

Despite the difficulties that have plagued Vietnam as a result of imperialist exploitation, war, and economic blockade, compounded by the activities of native capitalists, some major advances have been scored. Abolition of capitalism and independence from imperialism are the most important. Unemployment has been reduced to 1.5 million. Hundreds of thousands of people have been induced to leave the cities for their native villages or New Economic Zones, where progress is being made under difficult conditions in restoring and expanding Vietnam's agriculture. Despite crop failures, the regime has been able to feed the entire population—something that its predecessor, despite vast amounts of aid from the United

States, could never accomplish.

"Thanks to a campaign for adult education and community schooling for children," writes Nayan Chanda, "the literacy rate has risen appreciably. Notwithstanding shortages of equipment and medicine, a cleanliness and vaccination drive has prevented major epidemics [a regular occurrence under the U.S. puppet regime—FF]. International agency officials say they are impressed by the purposefulness and devotion with which a rudimentary health service has been set up in the south."

Such measures—which are regularly omitted in news stories about Vietnam that appear in the U.S. capitalist press—help explain the continuing deep loyalty of the Vietnamese people to their revolution despite the great difficulties that they have had to endure. The establishment of a planned economy for the whole country lays the basis for further conquests.

More than this is required, however, to truly eliminate want and inequality in Vietnam. Workers democracy and freedom of thought must be instituted, so that the masses can direct and control the regime. This is the only way to eradicate corruption, which is endemic to a regime based on bureaucratic command and a hierarchy of privilege.

The attainment of socialism requires that the policy of "peaceful coexistence" with imperialism advocated by the VCP leaders be replaced by a policy aimed at fostering anti-imperialist and socialist victories all over the world. The effort to get aid, trade, and investment from imperialist countries and other sources is absolutely necessary for Vietnam's development at the present time, but it is fatal for the Vietnamese leaders to subordinate revolutionary struggles elsewhere to this effort. Socialist and anti-imperialist victories are the surest defense of the Vietnamese revolution and create the basis for international socialist planning which can decisively overcome Vietnam's poverty.

The VCP leadership, trained in the Stalinist school and committed to bureaucratic tutelage over the masses, cannot institute the program that is needed. For that the Vietnamese workers and peasants will have to carry out an antibureaucratic revolution to cleanse their workers state of privilege and corruption, and set it on the road of working-class internationalism.

New advances in the Vietnamese revolution make it all the more imperative that socialists step up their demands on the White House to meet its obligation to assist Vietnam, to establish diplomatic relations with the regime, and to drop the economic blockade raised against this heroic people. Washington must end its efforts to encircle the Vietnamese revolution with military bases and reactionary client regimes. □

The Crisis in the French Communist Party

By Pierre Frank

The defeat of the Union of the Left in the March legislative elections touched off a crisis in both of the big workers parties that belonged to this alliance. In the SP, it has not yet taken an acute form. On the other hand, the crisis in the CP has assumed unprecedented proportions.

This is not the first crisis that the Communist Party has experienced since the end of the Second World War, that is, since it became the dominant party in the working class. It went through crises at the time of Stalin's break with Yugoslavia, at the time of Khrushchev's report to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and during the mobilizations in Poland and Hungary that also came in 1956, at the time of the Algerian war, during the war in Vietnam, and in May 1968.

However, all these crises were relatively minor in scope. They affected intellectuals, youth, veterans of the Resistance—in short, small and rather peripheral layers of the party. The CP's working-class base, in particular the rank-and-file activists in the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor], who upheld the party's influence in the working class, were hardly touched by them. At most, the problems that gave rise to these crises created a malaise among the CP's working-class activists. The present crisis is both broader and deeper.

The politicalization that developed after May 1968 both in the factories and in the new areas of ferment in society did not fail to have repercussions in the CP. In a slow-moving and bureaucratic way, the leadership gave ground on some points, but it was able largely to maintain its credibility as a result of the signing of the Union of the Left pact and the Common Program. The great majority of the workers saw this as a realistic political perspective for change in a relatively short time. The criticisms of the far left were still listened to, but they had less punch.

An Unanticipated Problem

Shortly after signing the Union of the Left pact, the CP leadership found itself facing a problem that got in the way of its perspectives. The CP and the SP were now allies for the third time. The first alliance was in 1935 in the Popular Front (which included the Radical Party). The second was in the immediate postwar period in the three-party government, along with the

Republican People's Movement [a left Catholic party]. In the third case, the Union of the Left, the combination included the Left Radicals.

The first two experiences ended badly for the workers. However, in each case the CP had grown at the expense of the SP. But the Union of the Left was not to produce the same result.

When the agreement was signed in 1972, the SP's electoral strength was relatively small in comparison to that of the CP. After the 1973 legislative elections, it was clear that the SP was growing while the progress of the CP remained more than slow. At the May 1973 Central Committee meeting, Marchais pointed to this fact, and expressed a certain concern.

The same tendency was confirmed at the time of the legislative by-elections in the fall of 1974, and the CP leadership responded by directing violent attacks against the SP leadership over a period of weeks. The CP was and remains dominant in the factories. But for those who looked forward to achieving socialism by the parliamentary road, the fact that the SP was making gains while the CP stagnated was not a secondary problem.

The municipal elections in March 1977—a year before the legislative elections—were more than an alarm signal for the CP leaders. To be sure, the party had won control of some important municipal governments, and it made a public show of gratification over these gains. But its percentage of the vote was down even in the old bastions. On the other hand, the SP had won control of many more municipal governments, and in the number of votes had become the biggest party in France.

Moreover, for the first time, the far left had won a considerable vote in the big city working-class neighborhoods. So, the CP was losing both on its left and on its right. The party leadership steered clear of drawing any *public* balance sheet on these elections.

The Union of the Left Breaks Up

Shortly after the municipal elections, relations between the CP and SP began to deteriorate. Thinking that victory in the 1978 elections was even more of a sure thing because of the public wrangling between the Giscard and Chirac groups, the SP leaders were interested only in attracting more petty-bourgeois layers. And they tried to do this by watering their already very thin wine.

The CP leadership, seeking both to limit the SP's gains and drive back the far left, put a "left" face on its policy. It criticized the SP for the advances it was making to petty-bourgeois layers, forgetting all about its own previous approach of trying to attract technicians and professionals. At the same time, it started to do some poor-mouthing in its propaganda, talking in terms of the poor against the rich.

Beginning in September 1977, six months before the elections, the CP's propaganda came to be focused essentially against its "ally." This was done in a way and in terms that could not help but repel SP members, even those critical of their leadership. The CP leaders even left hanging the threat that they might not withdraw their own candidates in the second round in favor of the SP in those districts where SP candidates got the bigger vote. In the days following the first-round elections, the leaders of both parties staged a farce ending in an "agreement" that fooled no one.

We know what the results were in March 1978. The CP did not make any inroads into the vote of the far left. Its percentage of the total declined slightly, even though the voting age had been reduced from twenty-one to eighteen years of age. The CP's only "success" was in holding back the electoral advance of the SP.

It has been said that the CP leadership wanted a defeat, either on Moscow's orders or because it preferred to stay in the opposition during the present economic crisis. These explanations do not hold water.

There are, of course, ties between the CP and the Kremlin. But they are far from involving the kind of subordination that existed in the past. In some areas, the relations between the CP and Moscow are even fraught with conflict.

To say that the CP leadership did not want to win the elections amounts to saying that its whole fifteen-year campaign for the Union of the Left was a sham, and that even now, when the elections are over, it is continuing to support a policy that it does not want to see come to fruition.

The reality is that the CP leadership wanted a Union of the Left victory in the elections. But it was not indifferent as to the conditions in which this took place. Two factors that should not be overlooked weighed heavily in its considerations.

First, for about fifteen years, the CP has

been recognized as the dominant party by far in the working class, and it is not reconciled to being outstripped by the SP. That would put in question its entire perspective. The CP's idea is that, as the only party of the working class, it will serve as the keystone of so-called class alliances such as the Union of the Left and the Union of the French People. Then, through electoral victories, it will be able to achieve deepgoing changes that will lead toward socialism.

Continued growth by the SP would put this perspective in question, since the experience of 1947 is well remembered by the CP leaders. At that time, it was an SP premier, Ramadier, who kicked the CP out of the government. They were afraid of the same thing happening again with Giscard's blessing. So, the CP leaders wanted to reestablish a favorable relationship of forces vis-à-vis the SP. That was their primary objective, for which they were willing to risk losing the elections.

The Crisis Explodes and Continues

As soon as the CP leadership started up its furious attacks on the SP in September 1977, voices began to be raised in the party which, while not defending the Social Democrats, expressed disapproval of the way the campaign was being conducted. In the aftermath of the elections, the crisis broke out.

This time, unlike in the past, what was involved was not just peripheral layers feeling the impact of some question that did directly concern the great majority of party members. For years the entire party had participated in the struggle for the Union of the Left, and the ranks could see that the anti-SP campaign was not understood by the masses. For five years at least they had had an almost palpably clear perspective, and then suddenly it vanished, without anything to take its place.

It should be added that there had been some leaks indicating that the Political Bureau was not unanimous on the policy to be taken toward the SP. A discussion in the party was inevitable.

However, the leadership handled this discussion in a way that could only exasperate all those who had criticisms to make. It postponed the Central Committee meeting for about five weeks. At the same time, it said that everyone could speak their mind in the party bodies to which they belonged (cells and branches), and that no sanctions would be taken.

However, the party leadership refused to open "discussion columns" in the party press and stopped the publication of issues in which criticisms were expressed. Those who wanted to address themselves to the members of their party did not hesitate, then, to turn toward the nonparty press. They were prompted to do so all the more because on March 20 the Political Bureau had declared from the outset: "The PCF

[Parti Communiste Français—French Communist Party] bears no responsibility in this situation [the defeat of the Union of the Left]." On March 29, Fiterman [one of the top leaders] dumped the full responsibility on the SP leaders.

In the April 26-27 Central Committee meeting, Marchais presented a report that contained no analysis of the situation, said nothing about the defeat in the elections, and sounded like a diplomatic white paper formally putting blame on an opposing party. In addition, the report distorted the criticisms that had arisen among party members and, without naming them, took a crude swipe at the intellectuals who had voiced these criticisms.

What is more, *l'Humanité* published Marchais's report and the Central Committee resolution of approval, which was presented as having been adopted by unanimous vote. But the party paper failed to report the remarks made in the discussion. It is now believed that the Central Committee passed the motion of approval by a majority vote and that the motion itself contained the proviso that it would be said publicly that the Central Committee was unanimous.

Before the Central Committee meeting was held, articles had appeared in various papers and magazines, including three articles by Elleinstein and four by Althusser. Far from bringing the crisis to a close, Marchais's report and the refusal of the Central Committee to permit discussion columns touched off an outcry.

Other articles were sent to *Le Monde*, *Le Matin*, *Politique-Hebdo*, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, and *Rouge*. Petitions were circulated, signed by many party members. The most important one originated in the party cell at the University of Aix-en-Provence, and got 300 signatures before being published.¹

On April 3, Marchais declared publicly that he had received only thirty-one critical letters from party members. On May 29, he said on television that "only five branches and sixty-five cells," representing "at most a thousand members," had taken a position challenging the leadership's policy. The leadership has continued to say that it will not expel anyone, even though the statutes give them the right to do so, and that it will conduct a hard political fight against the oppositionists.

In fact, for some time, *l'Humanité* has been publishing daily articles of half a page to a page, and sometimes more, to combat the views of people who are not named. In accordance with the worst practices of the Stalin school, these articles try to attribute more or less made-up positions to those challenging the leadership and to present them as more or less conscious

1. A translation of this statement appears in last week's issue, p. 781.—IP/I

instruments of the bourgeoisie and the Social Democracy.

Once again the leadership is taking the tack that could be summarized as follows: the party is right today, and since it will continue to follow the same line, it will be right again tomorrow.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the 'Questioners'

The questioners² are sometimes said to comprise two oppositions, a right-wing around Elleinstein and a left-wing around Althusser. It is true that they are the most representative personalities who have spoken out publicly. It is also true that Elleinstein has a well-defined right-wing line that puts him close to the positions of Santiago Carrillo. This is true not only of his views regarding the Union of the Left but also regarding the splits in the 1920s that led to the formation of the Communist International.

As for Althusser, it can be said in the present crisis that he has taken a step forward. He has moved from the realm of theory, in which he kept himself ensconced up to now and isolated from the bulk of the party membership, onto a more political plane, where his views can be more generally understood.

Althusser's articles, which have been collected in the pamphlet entitled *Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans le Parti communiste* [What Cannot Go On Any Longer in the Communist Party],³ constitute one of the most vigorous critiques yet made of the party regime and of a number of the party's positions, such as the abandonment of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Althusser denounces the Stalinism persisting in the party. He condemns the "theory" of state monopoly capitalism, and so on. This is a critique that could serve to orient a questioning left current.⁴

However, in my opinion, it would be wrong to try to classify the oppositionists here and now and talk about currents. More than opposition currents, what we are seeing now is the expression of all sorts of criticisms, which may lead those voicing them to different positions.

What is most important to point up in the present stage of the crisis, I think, is the whole wide gamut of criticisms being voiced by members of a party that has never permitted, and in an organizational sense still does not, the expression of the

2. I use the term "questioners" for lack of anything more precise to designate the CP members who are raising questions and criticisms, since I do not want to lump them together.

3. Editions Maspéro.

4. See the critique of Althusser's pamphlet by Ernest Mandel that appeared in the June 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 issues of *Rouge*.

thinking going on within it and the formulation of political positions based on this.

The common denominator for all these questioners is the theme of what they call the lack of democracy in the party. This is the focal point, for example, of the statement of the three hundred, which was signed by Elleinstein and Althusser, among others. It was this statement that at least temporarily blocked the attempt to isolate Althusser from the bulk of the critical elements.

The leadership itself has done its best to impress the lack of democracy in the party on the membership. It was through Marchais's statements over television that the CP membership first learned, for instance, that the party was giving up the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that it would not fight against the independent nuclear striking force but would support a policy of national defense relying on nuclear threats aimed in all directions.

This was before any news of these positions had appeared in the party press and before any discussion in the Central Committee that the members knew about. The membership was told, after the fact, that military questions had long been discussed with "specialists."⁵

All the questioners, likewise, recognized that the decision to turn the party's fire on the SP had been made and implemented in an unclear way without the real reasons for it and the real objectives being frankly stated.

Now all the questioners feel this same lack of democracy in the way they are being bottled up in the bodies to which they belong. They are not permitted to make their positions known to other party members except through vertical channels, which are blocked at the top. Exchanging views with party members other than those in their cell or branch is denounced as "factionalism," violation of the party statutes—in a word, as an "antiparty" attitude.

However, while expressing their aspiration for a democratic regime in their party, all the questioners declare themselves opposed to forming tendencies or factions. They do not understand that there can be no democracy where members are not allowed to form tendencies, that is, temporary groupings to defend a point of view on a specific question within the party. The ban on tendencies is simply the starting point on the road to a monolithic party.

With a wave of the hand, the CP leadership dumped the dictatorship of the proletariat, although this is a question of principle on which Lenin wrote articles and whole books and on which he got the Communist International to adopt these.

On the other hand, the Tenth Congress resolution [banning factions] that was used by Stalin to crush all tendencies that formed in the Soviet party had a purely



MARCHAIS: Faces mounting dissent.

temporary character. The only justification Lenin gave for it was the gravity of the situation at the moment. At the same time, he said that this rule could not be followed subsequently in electing the Central Committee.

This resolution was never submitted to vote in the Communist International in Lenin's time. And he presented no reason of principle for adopting it. But it has been made into a dogma by the bureaucratic Stalinist and post-Stalinist leaderships.

The questioners have already produced a voluminous body of writing. Three books have appeared. The one by Althusser has already been cited. There is also *Dialogue à l'intérieur du Parti communiste français* by Molina and Vargas and *Trente ans de parti: un communiste s'interroge* [Thirty Years in the Party—A Communist Wonders] by Rony.⁶

There have been numerous joint statements. One, originally signed by 300 members, has already been signed by 900 more. Another was signed by a hundred members. The most recent was one signed by five party members challenging the CP's position on the "question of women." There have also been many letters, interviews, and so on.

In this material, you do not find a political line or lines, and this is not

surprising. Rather, you find a lot of very pertinent remarks and observations. One general thing sets off these documents from those published in previous crises by minorities that soon disappeared: They all declare a determination to stay in the party. At the same time, they attack a whole series of myths that for many represented the fundamental ideology of the party, to use this term in the Marxist sense, that is, meaning false consciousness.

In these documents, we see being challenged the view that the CP is the only workers party, that the party regime is genuine democratic centralism, that the spontaneous action of the working class is dangerous, that the party is always right, and so on. All this obviously did not come out of the blue.

It is the culmination of a long internal process, as can be seen in reading the books by Molina and Vargas and by Rony. And this process is not confined to those who are openly raising questions today but is very widespread in the party, affecting even those sections that today are lined up behind the leadership.

I am not going to make a detailed examination here of what the questioners have already said. Perhaps this should be done at a later stage in the crisis, when things have gone beyond immediate reactions. Instead I want to point up what in all this material seems to me to be a considerable omission and what represents a promising step forward.

What omission do I have in mind? Several of the questioners note that their party's influence is stagnating or even declining among the workers. They refer to this in general terms, basing themselves only on the results of the legislative or municipal elections. None has dared raise the problem of the orientation given to the CGT by the CP activists, or to bring up the question of the situation in which the CGT finds itself.

However, all the statistics on plant elections indicate that for years the CGT has been suffering serious erosion. What is involved here is not the incompetence or mistakes of some shop delegates but a tendency affecting many industries and regions.

After June 1936 and in the aftermath of the liberation, the CGT grew enormously and with it the influence of the CP in the working class. May 1968 did not produce a similar result. Since then the CGT has been tending rather to lose ground. This cannot be attributed either to unemployment or a lack of combativity on the part of the workers. The CGT has been losing to the CFDT⁷ and even to Force Ouvrière.⁸

5. These "specialists" include generals in the French army.

6. The Molina and Vargas book was published by Maspéro; Rony's book by Christian Bourgeois.

7. Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail, French Democratic Confederation of Labor, an originally Catholic federation that evolved in the direction of independent leftism

One thing is certain. The CP members in the CGT, especially those at the top, bear the major responsibility for leading the confederation, its component unions, and their locals. In this case, they cannot blame any "right turn" by the SP. They drew the CGT behind the CP in its recent electoral campaign against the SP.

The erosion of the CGT reflects the decline in the influence of the CP among broad layers of workers on the trade-union level and not just on this level. The CP leadership steers clear of raising this question because, they say, this would be violating the "independence" of the unions.⁹

The CGT leadership recently had an article published in *l'Humanité* responding to the statistics that appeared in *Le Monde*. It tried to minimize the loss of influence in the factories. But it cannot be unaware of the fact and also of the mistake it made in the election campaign. Without admitting it, the CGT leadership is carrying out a retreat. It has swerved from tailending the CP to a narrowly economist approach reminiscent of Force Ouvrière. Thus, it has done nothing to oppose the recent interventions of the French imperialists in Chad and Zaïre.

It is essential to make a critical examination of the CP's trade-union policy from May 1968 to the present, because the whole line followed in the Union of the Left flows from this policy. The CP's policy in the labor movement has gone from scuttling the general strike to concentrating on a parliamentary combination with the SP. It is also essential to make such an assessment, as we will see further on, in order to project a perspective for the future.

However, along with this omission, which will weaken the impact of the oppo-

sitionists on the CP's working-class activists, some of the questioners have taken a step forward that can have the greatest importance for the coming battles of the French proletariat. Some of them have not limited themselves to criticizing the CP's internal regime and the lack of democracy in the party. They have understood and shown that this internal regime had a no less bureaucratic carry-over into the CP's relations with the working class as a whole. In substance, they say that the party leadership runs, or tries to run, the working class movement in the same way the bourgeois government runs the society.

"By combining the model of compartmentalizing with the model of parliamentary democracy, the party cannot help but reproduce in a still stronger way the bourgeois mode of political functioning" (Althusser, op. cit., p. 77).

". . . It is well known that from 1972 to 1977, nothing was done to stimulate or promote rank-and-file initiatives and forms of unity between manual and intellectual workers. What is more, any suggestion that people's committees would be a good thing was rejected on the grounds that there was a danger that they would be 'manipulated'" (Althusser, op. cit., p. 115).

Without saying it in so many words, other questioners have accused the party leadership of conducting the fight against the SP for a so-called "updated" Common Program as if it were a wrangle between head-office staffs and in such a way that it seemed alien to the ranks of both parties and to the working class.

Here a really fundamental criticism has been raised. The lack of rank-and-file bodies, of democratically elected committees, was the French workers movement's greatest weakness in the three great national struggles it waged, first in June 1936; second, at the end of World War II; and, third, in May 1968. In all three cases, the mobilizations were channelled throughout by the party and union leaderships, who did everything to smother the initiative of the workers rather than stimulate it. Even today, despite the example of Lip, the idea of rank-and-file committees is still not widespread.

But regardless of the initial demands they are formed around, no matter what names they might take (even if they were to be called Union of the Left committees), as long as they are genuine mass committees functioning democratically and allowing all the workers and all the currents within them to express their views, such rank-and-file committees offer a real road that can lead to workers power.

In this respect, it might be pointed out that in a Central Committee meeting in October 1974 Thorez made a "self-criticism," saying that it was a mistake that the party had not created rank-and-file committees at the time of the Popular Front and of the liberation. But this was a statement that would lead to nothing. It is

the sort of thing said after battles are lost and always forgotten during mass upsurges.

The idea of rank-and-file committees is obviously equally valid on the trade-union level. But both Séguy and Maire [leaders respectively of the CGT and the CFDT] share a hostile attitude toward them. This view was also repeated recently by Bergeron [leader of Force Ouvrière]:

"The stance of the CGT/FO must never be subordinated to decisions made by hand vote in factory courtyards. We know where this leads. I would rather say this now than see Force Ouvrière activists get involved tomorrow in adventures that they will not be able to keep under control" (speech at the congress of FO functionaries; quoted in *Le Monde*, June 8, 1978).

The idea of rank-and-file committees must be applied initially by electing strike committees in the course of economic struggles. These should be committees to which the unions and parties will bring their advice and propositions but where the representatives elected by the workers in struggle will make the ultimate decision.

A New Political Perspective

It was inevitable that the activists would begin by making a critique of their party's past policy. It was also inevitable that the developing crisis would be focused first mainly on the internal problems. In fact, this was essential. But the situation cannot remain at this stage.

The leadership is making some sharp denunciations of the questioners, but it assures that it will not take organizational measures against them. It is probably hoping that time will work in favor of those who hold the apparatus.

Moreover, the leadership has already begun to use an argument that while threadbare still has an effect on the less political elements. It says that the government and the bosses are on the offensive now and this is the time to stand up to it and counterattack, but instead of this a handful of people are getting off track and attacking the party, and so forth.

In fact, the government and the bosses, emboldened by an electoral victory that seemed out of their grasp for months, are taking advantage of the disillusion of the working class to conduct a policy that promotes inflation and unemployment.

However, now, less than three months after the elections, there are more and more signs of resistance by the workers. This has reached the point that even Bergeron went to tell Premier Barre that he was tightening the screws too hard.

In any case, the election defeat created a new situation in which the questioners should not let themselves be caught by the CP's game of burying internal criticisms under the day-to-day tasks of the class struggle.

The electoral defeat eliminated the politi-

and recently has been attracted to the renovated SP.

8. This group originated in a split led by right-wing Social Democrats at the beginning of the cold war. It claims to defend the independence of unions from political parties and has attracted syndicalists and others alienated by the CP's heavy-handed control of the CGT.—IP/1

9. An interview given to *Rouge* by Garaudy has become an issue in the present crisis of the CP. It provoked furious statements from the CP leadership and Séguy. Garaudy presumed to reveal the content of some discussions in the CP Political Bureau in May 1968. Slanders, said his opponents, without specifying what statements they considered slanderous. Séguy added that the Political Bureau had not violated the "independence" of the CGT. Who are they going to get to believe that the Political Bureau did not discuss the events of May-June, that it did not want to "end the strike," as Thorez did in 1936, and that Séguy did not tell Marchais that that was a hard thing to do and could cost the CGT dearly? In his book, Rony alludes to this question when he says: "The Common Program was both the child of May-June 1968 and revenge for the humiliation that this mobilization represented for the left parties" (p. 167).

cal perspective of a Union of the Left government. If they do not want to let the CP leadership maneuver them into a corner, the questioners must move ahead from a critique of what happened in the past and of the internal regime. They must offer a new political perspective that is not based on combinations at the top and the parliamentary illusions of the past.

The questioners have to offer a perspective pointing toward a generalization of the struggles, not one that limits the struggles of the working class to the sum total of industrial disputes. They have to offer a perspective favoring the development of the movement of "unprecedented breadth" that they talk about, that is, the general strike that the CP and CGT leaders did not want when it came in May 1968 and which they sold out for a mess of potage represented by legislative elections.

The experience of the Union of the Left as it unfolded from 1972 to 1978 is now a closed chapter. The uncritical enthusiasm it aroused has vanished. Distrust has developed between the two parties, and in each party between the ranks and the leadership.

400 March in Guam

Protest Suppression of Chamorro Language Rights

[The following article appeared in the June 15-30 issue of *Ang Katipunan*, national newspaper of the Union of Democratic Filipinos. Published fortnightly in Oakland, California.]

* * *

AGANA, Guam—A march and demonstration of 400 Chamorro language supporters against Guam's sole daily newspaper, the Pacific Daily News (PDN), rocked this tiny U.S. colony and military outpost in the Pacific.

The March 25th rally was the result of the local people's angry response to the racist "English only" policy of the PDN, which discriminates against the use of the island's native language, a Malayo-Polynesian language called Chamorro, in the paper's public service announcements and advertisements. The demonstration, the first of its kind on the island, was organized by the People's Alliance for Responsive Alternatives (PARA), which felt such action was necessary in order to reverse PDN's "violation of the Chamorro people's rights to express themselves in their own native language."

The two-hour protest, held at the downtown PDN office located in the Chase Manhattan Bank Building, drew senior

The CP and SP leaderships find themselves in an awkward situation. They can trade accusations, which are not without a basis in fact. But the CP leadership has no alternative policy to the alliance, and the SP leadership cannot at present consider a combination with any part of the ruling bourgeois majority without risking the loss of the electoral influence it has gained, and suffering a split.

Both leaderships will have to face a more critical membership and increasing demands for democracy in the workers movement. Therefore, the objective conditions favor a continuation and deepening of the crisis in the CP. It is not clear whether this crisis can lead to anything concrete in the near future, in view of the heterogeneity and political confusion of the questioning elements today.

But in any case, something has changed in the workers movement, particularly in the relationship between the masses and the ranks of the CP and the party leadership. And this is a thoroughly positive change.

June 12, 1978

citizens, youth and students, government workers, Chamorro language educators, and other sectors of the community and was highlighted by 163 subscription cancellations from rally participants and the symbolic burning of a copy of the newspaper.

A month prior to the rally, the PDN, a subsidiary of the Gannett Co., a giant New York-based media conglomerate, refused to print a public service announcement written in Chamorro. The notice, intended for reaching Chamorro parents with exceptional children, was personally rejected by the PDN publisher on Guam, who said that written Chamorro had "not yet matured into an effective, organized communicator."

Although the paper was forced to concede to the demands of PARA, the institutional racist attitudes still prevail, creating the need for PARA to continue the struggle to address the deeper problem of language oppression that exists in the media and elsewhere.

The issue of Chamorro language suppression is reflective of the overall colonial oppression the Chamorro people have historically endured and is nothing new to Guam's colonial experience. In 1521, Magellan paved the way for the Spanish conquistadors and priests who brutally

suppressed the Chamorros and waged a genocidal campaign, practically decimating the once-proud Chamorro race.

As a result of the Spanish-American War, Spain ceded the island to the U.S. together with Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines which is 1,500 miles to the west of Guam. The cruelties of the Spanish colonial system were thus replaced by the more subtle repression of the U.S. colonizers.

The outlawing of the native tongue and the strict enforcement of the English language in colonial education and government administration sought to accelerate the process of Americanization. Where the Spanish conquistador had used the sword, the U.S. Naval Government employed the American textbook which taught Chamorros to look up to American heroes, to regard American culture as far superior to their own, and American society, with its myths of equal opportunity and fair play, as the ideal model for Guam's colonial society.

In terms of language policy, naval authorities prevented the flowering of Chamorro arts and literature by making the speaking of the local language in schools punishable by fines and corporal punishment. Research by a Chamorro priest, high in the local Catholic hierarchy, has uncovered evidence that authorities even resorted to the burning of Chamorro textbooks during an earlier period.

Today, of the current population of 100,000, the Chamorros constitute over half while the rest consist mainly of Micronesians, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, and U.S. statesiders. In addition there are 30,000 U.S. military personnel and dependents situated on U.S. bases that account for one-third of the island's land mass of 212 square miles including its only harbor and some of its best beach and agricultural land.

Despite the overwhelming hardships of the past, the Chamorro people, as well as their language and parts of their culture, have survived. The local legislature composed of mostly Chamorros has increasingly taken nationalist stands and in 1974 passed a law giving the Chamorro language for the first time official standing along with English. □

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The Second War in Shaba

By Claude Gabriel

With a cry of alarm addressed to the capitalist West, President Mobutu revealed to the world the new threat of disintegration looming over his regime. "The African continent is the object of a genuine ideological aggression," he declared in the May 16 *Le Monde*. This harping on the threat of destabilization by the Soviets and Cubans is the common theme song nowadays of all crisis-ridden regimes. It was the excuse used by the South Africans for their intervention in Angola in 1975, and it's the same story with the Senegalese Socialist Party, a section of the Second International.

Just over a year ago, in March 1977, the Congo National Liberation Front (Front National de Libération du Congo—FNLC) attacked Zaïrian troops in the Kolwezi area, and threatened the mining centers and the stability of the Kinshasa regime, which had been brought to the edge of bankruptcy by an unprecedented economic crisis. It took the intervention of Moroccan troops, backed up logistically by the French army, to make the FNLC decide on a temporary pullback. What has happened since?

For one thing, the economic crisis has only grown worse. Despite the tendency of the International Monetary Fund and the big Western banks to assume more control, the government has been unable to make order out of the bureaucratic and economic chaos. The foreign debt has reportedly risen to more than \$2 billion. Inflation seems to have surpassed 80 percent, and corruption retains its primary role in the workings of the administration and the business world.

On the other hand, in the political realm, Mobutu broke with his heir apparent Karl I Bond, as a result of some murky dealings that reportedly convinced the Western capitals that he could be used to replace his mentor. Sentenced to death and later pardoned, Karl I Bond does not seem to have been able to influence a section of the Zaïrian army in a lasting way.

Nevertheless, Mobutu is continuing to create a vacuum around himself. On March 8, Kinshasa announced the execution of fourteen persons accused of a "military plot." Around the same time, it was learned that the Zaïrian army had entered Bandundu province, massacring hundreds of "rebels," probably villagers. In Shaba, the retaking of the terrain by government troops was accompanied by reprisals against the Lunda population, which was accused of "complicity." Mobu-

tu's soldiers behaved like an occupation force, extracting ransom from people, looting villages, and running a black market for their own benefit.

For several months Shaba had been in an uproar. The Zaïrian army had moved part of its troops from Kolwezi to Dilolo and Kasaji, and the Europeans report that their servants had warned them of the likelihood of a new military raid by the FNLC.

The decomposition of the Zaïrian army may have had even graver consequences. It is possible, in fact, that a section of the army, or at least of the officers stripped of their rank following the events of last year, may have gone over to the camp of the FNLC. The latter has been considerably strengthened as a result of the flight of refugees during the last war; it has found many collaborators in the cities and deepened its implantation among the tribal groups. Finally, it has sanctuaries in all the areas bordering on Angola and Zambia.

Its raid on Kolwezi appears to have been child's play. The government troops put up only minimal resistance, and the majority of the population sided with the FNLC.

Imperialist Intervention and the French 'Gendarmes'

In March 1977, the imperialist powers decided to pull the Mobutu regime out of its rut. On the one hand, they made conditional pledges of economic aid to Zaïre, and on the other they supported the French-Moroccan intervention all but unanimously. Only a few voices publicly expressed doubts about the operation. Some American politicians and sectors of the European bourgeoisie were uncertain as to the possible advantages that this regime in chaos could ultimately bring the West. Incidentally, there was agreement on that occasion that the Soviet Union and Cuba had nothing to do with the FNLC attack.

This time, proof of Mobutu's incompetence is no longer in doubt. Kinshasa has not succeeded either in establishing its power over the entire territory, or in controlling the economy as a whole. The imperialist plundering of this country is taking place in a surreal atmosphere of structural and individual decay.

For the imperialist rulers, Zaïre has become an undecipherable riddle. On the one hand, the country cannot, even for the time being, be abandoned to a petty-

bourgeois nationalist leadership, which would rush to take over the mines and industries of Gecamines,¹ and which would severely limit the power of foreign investors. On the other hand, maintaining a minimum of imperialist control over the situation in southern Africa, and the chances of catching the Zimbabwean and Namibian nationalists in a vise requires maintaining a government in Zaïre that is firmly tied to the West.

But this fine plan has run up against the impossibility of finding political leaderships that can succeed one another while giving the illusion of a change in the regime. The first Congolese civil war ended by physically and politically crushing the different nationalist parties, and by Mobutu taking power. Since then, the political vacuum around the dictator has grown owing to the permanent repression he has built into a system. The Mobutu regime is on its last legs, but no one is really ready to replace it or capable of neutralizing the opposition forces for long.

Confronted by this dilemma, the different imperialist factions have not all taken the same stance. This is how Western governments are able to take varying positions according to the predominant interests of their ruling classes, and how, within the same country, various capitalist groups are divided on what solution to adopt, as in the United States and Belgium.

In Belgium, the investors who hold the most interests in Zaïrian mines are frantically seeking an alternative to Mobutu.

In the current conflict, French imperialism, which poses as the "ambitious young man" with respect to its two big rivals, American and Belgian, has come up with nothing better than to stake their game on Mobutu, for the time being.² As a result, when the first distress signal went up from the dictator of Kinshasa, Paris hastened to respond to it. The defense of future French investments in Zaïre seems tied to maintaining the present government. Unlike Belgium, France is the godfather of many neocolonial bourgeois states on the African continent. Its ability to defend a regime threatened by "subversion," given the current situation in Africa, is an important factor in negotiations between imperialist rulers and native rulers.

For the farsighted wing of the Belgian bourgeoisie, Mobutu's advantages fade

1. Société Générale Congolaise des Minerais, a Zaïrian state corporation managed by Belgian interests which exploits vast copper and other mineral resources.—*IP/I*

2. The French government is one of the few Western governments that can initiate direct military intervention in Africa without a parliamentary crisis or a moralizing outcry from the media. This margin of maneuver helps strengthen the special role French imperialism plays in Africa.

away once he becomes incapable of making the wheels of the economy turn, since these are what Gecamines depends on. With \$800 million worth of investments, Belgium's are forty times those of France. This economic penetration is accompanied by an "infrastructure" of 25,000 Belgians, 2,000 of them in Kolwezi.

The policies of the two countries in the recent period could only diverge with respect to tactics. For such people, defending the interests of the system is intimately tied to the way in which they must defend their respective interests. There lies an old contradiction of inter-imperialist rivalry. This explains why last year, during the first Shaba war, the Belgian minister of foreign affairs declared: "France is particularly interested in the wealth of Zaïre, and Belgium perceives this as international rivalry." And with the sanctimoniousness typical of this kind of shark, he added that France ought to leave Belgium "in peace in those areas that have historically been its home."³

In the heat of recent events, this difference between Paris and Brussels has taken a more pronounced turn. Among the many attacks by the Belgian government coalition on the French government, the current minister of foreign affairs, Simonet, has been the most vehement. He declared, "The French government has an African policy that is not ours. France is seeking to maintain some leverage on the black continent, while Belgium is seeking cooperation with a country rather than with a regime."⁴

That's a fine piece of hypocrisy, since Belgium (together with the United States) has been the principal mainstay of this regime for more than ten years. But Simonet is no more honest than his French friends. He translates into discreet terms that satisfy the moralistic anxieties of Belgian Social Democracy what might more bluntly be called the "rackets" of the Belgian employers.

For their part, the Americans have behaved impeccably toward their allies. Rather than openly choose one of the two solutions, they have offered their logistical services, supplying fuel and air shipments. To make himself look good, Carter announced May 18 a grant of \$17.5 million to Zaïre in the form of spare parts, fuel, and pharmaceutical products. The U.S. president found it necessary to justify this as "in the U.S. national interest." Surprise!

Thus, the aim of the 1,800 paratroopers who left for Shaba, according to official sources, was to repatriate all of the Belgian technicians. For their part, the French paratroopers, intervening directly in Kolwezi as assault troops, were trying to take the city back from the FNLC and

restore the central government to its prerogatives. For Paris, it was not basically a question of repatriating the Europeans, but rather of putting them back to work.

Brussels seems to have quietly drawn



MOBUTU: A shaky future.

the lessons of national liberation struggles in Africa. As a matter of fact, repatriating the 2,000 Belgians in Kolwezi constitutes, beyond any doubt, their best bargaining card with the FNLC. For that matter, the FNLC did not hide the fact that, in addition to its offers to evacuate the Europeans from Kolwezi, it had had contacts with the management of Gecamines.

According to Mbumba, leader of the FNLC, "a meeting took place between my organization and the representative of the foreign personnel at Gecamines, Mr. Renard, in front of other foreign nationals, with the aim of cooperating in running the city." He says that "they agreed, and promised to give active support in this area."⁵ Moreover, the FNLC seems to have wanted to set up a "revolutionary committee" for Kolwezi that would include Europeans. The FNLC does not hide its desire to negotiate with Belgium and its refusal to alienate the first favorable attitudes that have appeared in the Brussels business community.

March 1977 and May 1978: Acts One and Two

Still, with the arrival of the French

paratroopers, the FNLC decided to pull back, the better to capitalize on its unquestionable political success. France enabled Mobutu to save face for a while. The Belgian government was bitterly attacked by its Liberal opposition, and suddenly began to redouble its proclamations of friendship for the Zaïrian general. Even better than anything it could say, the Tindemans government decided to ban meetings of Zaïrian oppositionists in Brussels. What did Simonet, who claims to have so little interest in the "regimes" of friendly countries, think of this? France emerged from the test enhanced in the eyes of the one man clinging to power in Kinshasa.

This shows how little meaning this victory has in the race for investments, especially since the Common Market will eventually have to adopt a unanimous position on the question. The big industrial projects, like the hydroelectric and industrial compound at Inga, the high-voltage cable from Inga to Shaba, or the secret base for German OTRAG rockets in the northwest of the same region, necessarily make the principal sources of financing interdependent (private banks, the European Development Fund, and so on). The good old days when Brussels could toy with the secession of Katanga to protect its mining interests are over. The integration of capital and the scope of economic projects in this region have done away with old-school neocolonialism.

The FNLC, then, is going to prepare for its third offensive, in the context of a slightly weaker government, an even more ossified army, and a population willing to get it over with by whatever means are necessary. The nationalist illusions in the Mbumba leadership should initially contribute to Mobutu's isolation, inasmuch as the FNLC could become a hodge-podge in which every oppositionist can find a niche.

In an interview with *Rouge* published in the May 29 issue, the FNLC representative in Belgium stated that "there is no other possibility except to resume the struggle. With the paratroopers gone, it is clear that we will be in a position to retake the city."

If this should happen, two factors would determine Mobutu's future: first, the FNLC's military capacity to march on Lubumbashi and take control of it; second, the ability of the worldwide anti-imperialist movement to make prompt military aid by the Western powers to the Kinshasa regime difficult, if not impossible.

If these two conditions were met, Shaba province, completely under the control of the opposition, would bring down all of Zaïre in a civil war. In that case, the post-Mobutu era might resemble the pre-Mobutu era, that is, a new entanglement between the mass movement, its nationalist leaderships, and the factions of imperialism. □

3. See *Le Monde*, May 21, 1978.

4. See *Le Monde*, May 23, 1978.

5. *Afrique-Asie*, May 28, 1978.

How the CP, SP, and 'Far Left' Responded

By Jean-François Godchau

Today, as in the past, the French bourgeoisie and its kept press are serving up a warmed-over dish—"protecting French nationals"—to justify intervention by "our" brave warriors. This is hardly a new tactic; it has been used from the dawn of the colonial "epic"—here a dead missionary; there a group of soldiers "slain in an ambush"; somewhere else a sunken ship—these are among the pretexts for "civilizing" intervention by the Western powers.

From this standpoint, we see that "decolonization" has not greatly replenished the repertory of the former colonial powers. It is sufficient to wave real or imagined "cooperation pacts"—as the case may be—and "France" goes off to defend, by military force, its quite material interests in the name of its civilizing past and African independence!

Nevertheless, the impact of the colonial revolution, the working-class radicalization in the advanced capitalist countries, and the absolute minimum of solidarity that the organized workers movement in these former colonial powers must display toward national liberation struggles have combined to make it impossible, among the "left," to swallow the unappetizing ideology spewed forth by the mass media. The "humanitarian mission" pretext—or even that of neutrality and strict adherence to cooperation pacts—no longer works except with those who are predisposed to believe it.

It is significant, moreover, that the entire working-class press emphasizes the economic aspects of the matter, that is, the fabulous wealth of Zaïre, to explain the reinvigorated interventionist policy of the various imperialists in Africa, and most particularly in the recent period of French imperialism.

However, it is not enough to discover that imperialism survives. What is necessary is to fight it, as strenuously as it deserves to be fought! However, from this standpoint, the response of the mass parties of the working class and the trade unions has been much the same as their policy toward defeating austerity—disgraceful!

The fact is that two elements necessarily place their record in a negative context. Despite the keenness of their analysis of the reasons for the intervention in Africa, not one of them has unhesitatingly and without reluctance gone beyond the stage of verbal (or written!) protest in the factories and in the streets.



MITTERRAND: Blank check for Giscard.

Furthermore, far from rejecting the French government's international policy wholesale, they have, for example, endorsed Giscard's act at the United Nations—the SP by participating outright in the French delegation, the CP by refusing to make clear the exact reason for its last-minute refusal to participate.

True, it is hard to see how parties that accept the UN's official purpose at face value—organizing and maintaining world "peace"—and that go out of their way to talk with their recent electoral opponent (for the second time in two months) about the best tactic for representing the "French nation" before this "distinguished assembly," could take the initiative in combatting, through effective, extraparliamentary methods, the subject of such genteel discussions.

The Social Democrats: Silence and Questioning

To begin with, we should recall an exploit in the best tradition of Social Democracy, which *Rouge* called attention to in its May 13-14 issue. While meeting in Dakar May 12 and 13—i.e., a few days after the French Jaguar jet fighters intervened in Chad—the Second International breathed not a word about it! To be sure, side by side with Schmidt, Soares, and Brandt sat that other outstanding "social-

ist," the poet-statesman" Léopold Senghor. And how could French policy be criticized—if indeed anyone had such inclinations—without implicating the Senegalese regime that is so beholden to it?

But that's not all! If we can believe *Le Monde* (May 13), recounting Mitterrand's conduct in relation to the Chad affair: "Mr. Mitterrand (SP) was concerned about possible threats to the sovereignty and national independence of Mauritania and Chad. He asked the minister to explain the nature of these threats and the reasons for French intervention in these two countries."

To dissipate all doubts about the spotless anti-imperialism of the first secretary of the Socialist Party, let us refer to his own comments. During a May 22 press conference (reported in the May 24 *Le Monde*), in the midst of the Zaïre operation, Mitterrand declared: "We have just come through some difficult hours. When we learned of the threats to the lives of a number of our fellow citizens in Zaïre, I confined myself to asking that the National Assembly be convened and informed."

There, in a nutshell, we have the primary "battle slogan" of the French Socialists. Act of war or "humanitarian mission"—that's not what really counts when "our" paratroopers cross the ocean, but by all means, make sure to inform parliament!

And what will the second round of this mighty contest that must have caused such tremors in the imperialist centers consist of? It comes, naturally, when François Mitterrand, fearlessly reminds the government, in front of all the deputies, that, given that no formal military engagements exist between Zaïre and France—or rather, between the governments of these two countries—sending troops under such conditions might constitute an act of war and lend itself to an "amalgam" between a humanitarian mission and intervention in Zaïre's domestic affairs!

True, Mitterrand hastened to admit that the government had an "obligation to defend French nationals," and to state loud and clear that "the SP, here as elsewhere, is in total solidarity with the French lives in peril," and thus also with the pretext, which it even furnished, for neocolonial intervention.

Things become even clearer when we read the first secretary's weekly message, entitled—like one of his books—"My Share of Truth," in the May 26 issue of *l'Unité*,

the SP paper. Let's leave aside the somewhat megalomaniacal side of this character: "I wait until the speaker at the podium has finished his presentation, and I raise my hand. Thus begins the public debate on the events in Zaïre" (in the National Assembly).

We learn that "last year, those referred to as Katangan gendarmes tried in a similar fashion to overturn the Mobutu regime. A combined military operation by France and Morocco barely prevented them from doing so." All we are told is that "the difference between these two actions [in 1977 and in 1978] was that this time France was alone."

Once again, what sincerely angers François Mitterrand is that "France has sent an expeditionary corps into Shaba on the strength of a nonexistent treaty and . . . on the request of the government of Zaïre. . . . It has not acted of its own volition to save lives in peril. . . ."

And so, Mitterrand explains, "reduced to making assumptions, I recall, on behalf of the SP:

"1. That no *valid* (my emphasis—J.-F.G.) military technical assistance treaty commits France to Zaïre.

"2. That if such a treaty had been ratified by our parliament, it would not, on the model of other agreements of this type, have authorized France to enter into the internal affairs of that country.

"3. That the duty to guarantee the safety of our citizens abroad is self-evident.

"4. That it would be wise to obtain the cooperation of international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity to that effect.

"5. That a discussion is incumbent on the National Assembly."

This at least has the merit of frankness. But wait, that's not all. Mitterrand asks (himself) other questions, quite innocently, which, by the way, he does not answer: ". . . other uncertainties arise. For example, do the Cubans have a hand in it? In Paris, it is hinted that they do. No one has given proof of their participation in the Shaba attack."

In short, what is the verdict on this latest commando raid, illustrating to perfection what neocolonialism and (French) imperialism are all about? In one fell swoop, the "uncertainties" have given way, in Mitterrand's mind, to a deep conviction, engendered and fortified by the final outcome of the raid in question:

"Now that, on the ground, the paratroopers of the Second Foreign Legion Regiment have saved what could be saved, and that in the midst of so much misfortune, the success of their action has brought so much joy, no one will be able to challenge the president of the republic on the good judgment of his decision."

A single reservation is attached to the blank check given Giscard, who couldn't have asked for more. Mitterrand noted

" . . . the advantage there would be to taking a more responsible approach to information in the area of foreign policy, and, in that connection, what the head of state himself has called a little more openness. . . ."

In effect, Mitterrand is telling Giscard: "Don't be so crude, when you send paratroopers, stop saying that it's the Red Cross, and above all, start by informing us and involving us in that aspect of your policy. In that way, we can help you to serve the country better"

What was still lacking was for the SP to translate its words into action. This was done, if only in a symbolic way, by Charles Hernu, who, as the May 25 *Le Monde* reminded us, is the "deputy from the département of Rhône and in charge of defense issues for the Socialist Party."

And so we learn that this worthy official "attended the luncheon on Tuesday, May 23, at the Château de Versailles, held for those who had participated in the fifth Franco-African conference." And it was in front of this select open-air gathering that Hernu declared "the idea of an all-African military force is attractive, as long as we realize that it has the African heads of state themselves worried, and that, if it came into existence, France would provide its training and logistics. . . . However, France is not Belgium [!], and if France wishes to remain the greatest of the medium-sized powers [!!], it is necessary to have an African policy and to shoulder some of its consequences."

CP: A Neocolonialist War

Beyond any doubt, the tone—and partly the content—of the articles published in the CP journals (*l'Humanité* and *France-Nouvelle*) are somewhat different from those of the Social Democrats.

To be sure, Robert Ballanger and the CP delegation in the National Assembly that he heads lodged one "energetic" protest after another against the government's decision to send troops to Zaïre, in connection with the opening of a debate and the "democratic" preparations for a vote in the chamber. But apart from calling attention to the economic side of the French intervention in Africa—that is, the organized plundering of Zaïrian resources by French companies—it is possible to single out the following elements in the CP's criticisms:

1. The protection of French nationals in no case constitutes a convincing justification for the combat operation carried out by the paratroopers.

2. Such an operation is part of a broader policy in which the French SDECE (Department of Documentation, Studies, and Counterespionage) plays a major role. It can hardly be termed a "humanitarian action," but on the contrary, is an integral part of an overall strategy to encourage conservative regimes and "destabilize" progressive regimes in Africa. In this case,

it was indeed aimed at reconsolidating the Mobutu regime while waiting for something better.

3. The Franco-African summit conference clearly represents a stitch in the neocolonial fabric woven by France under Giscard to best preserve its interests. And the CP is careful not to omit a slap on the wrist to Hernu for his "attraction" to the idea of an all-African military force.

4. Hernu and Mitterrand anxiously wonder what would happen if the "rebels" encircled "our paratroopers!" On several occasions, *l'Humanité* opens its columns to the Congolese National Liberation Front.

5. On the heels of René Andrieu in the May 23 *Dossiers de l'Ecran*, *l'Humanité*—followed by *Rouge* and *Libération*—waged a campaign against Colonel Erulin, commander of the paratroopers sent to Zaïre, and torturer of Maurice Audin and Henri Alleg during the Algerian war.

6. The May 27 issue of *l'Humanité* publishes an entire page of photographs, headed "A simple humanitarian operation," and clearly showing "scenes of foreign occupation."

In a word, for the French CP, what is involved is nothing less than a neocolonial war launched by French imperialism for its own benefit and with the complicity of other imperialists. Furthermore, the CP thinks, such a war is harmful both to the African peoples and to the French workers. The CGT's opinion is the same. In a May 29 communiqué, the CGT deplored the fact that the government had made a decision that showed "disregard for the French parliament's prerogatives."

Why Such Inertia?

That the SP did not publicly demonstrate against an intervention that, in the final analysis, it felt to be in France's interest, is understandable. But what explains the fact that up to now, the CP has not organized any mobilizations against what it calls a "dirty war"? Of course, in a speech he gave at a CP festival in the Vendée, Maxime Gremetz, a member of the Political Bureau, did demand "an immediate halt to these armed interventions on the African continent" (*l'Humanité*, May 22).

And, of course, Robert Ballanger did turn down Raymond Barre's invitation to lunch at the Quai d'Orsay with the participants in the fifth Franco-African conference. He wrote: "You will understand that I find it impossible to endorse by my presence the interventionist policy that your government is carrying out in Africa." But, once again, what exactly do these commendable statements lead to? Only to the repeated demand for a "genuine democratic debate in the Assembly!"

It should be noted, moreover, that among the consequences of the French military expedition to Zaïre most deplored by the CP is the fact that it strongly

threatens to place in jeopardy not only the traditional "bonds of friendship" between France and the African countries, but also the lives of French nationals who are supposed to have been saved by this expedition, and, above all, "the future of the necessary cooperation between France and Africa—necessary for the African peoples, but also for the French people" (*France-Nouvelle*, May 29).

And that's exactly where the shoe pinches. It was all well and good for the Common Program to stipulate that "the (Union of the Left) government will establish new cooperative relations with all the developing states, freely negotiated, and exclusive of any neocolonialist intent," and to provide that "the institutions responsible for putting the cooperation policy into effect will be democratized." But it is hard to see how private enterprise based on profit—which remains a cornerstone of the society envisioned by the Union of the Left—could be reconciled to the outright loss of the superprofits "pumped" out of the "Third World" by imperialism, a mainstay of which is the French cooperation policy. Anything less than a fundamental questioning of the cooperation policy, as capitalism has created it, means paving the road to hell for the "developing countries" with good intentions, which we can be sure will remain ineffective.

Beyond a doubt, the French CP's real positions on imperialism have a long history, and even longer implications.

In a 1977 book devoted to French imperialism,¹ the CP basically sets forth the following propositions: Big business and the bourgeoisie are increasingly coordinating their activities on an international scale; therefore, it falls to the left, and most particularly to the CPs, to pick up the torch of revolutionary nationalism betrayed by the crisis-ridden bourgeoisie.

The imperialists are trying to get around the rise of nationalist movements by inventing new forms of domination and creating regional networks or "subimperialisms." And, in this world context, what characterizes Giscardist policy—according to the CP's "experts" on imperialism—is the systematic determination to "sell out the national potential"—which it thus falls on genuine patriots to defend!

How, then, can one criticize the belligerent moves of French imperialism while at the same time defending "France" and its "national heritage"? Why become the best advocate of "national defense" while hoping that the means at the disposal of the chiefs of staff will remain on the shelf forever? How can one express regret that "the role of French companies has been diminished . . . and frequently reduced to

a subcontracting status" relative to their West German and Japanese competitors, while barring these poor companies from boosting their rates of profit overseas?

These are some of the contradictions that we can bet will find no easier solutions than those generated by the "Euro-communist" project of a smooth change-over from capitalism to socialism—a more and more distant socialism, besides.

It was thus only belatedly that the CP called a street demonstration against French intervention. Apart from the "gimmicky" sectarian aspect of this initiative—neither the SP nor the trade unions were invited—the CP took the necessary precautions:

- No to the *Giscardist* intervention in Africa;
- No military *adventures*;
- Friendship and cooperation with the African peoples;
- Freedom for the African peoples.

The absence of any slogans calling for the immediate withdrawal of all French troops should be noted. The intervention is only "Giscardist" and is described as an "adventure." The CP shapes its propaganda according to an idealist conception of the relations between "France" and the "African peoples," without naming the objective causes of the present situation. It avoids becoming involved in a genuine anti-imperialist campaign, while at the same time trying to brand the SP as the sole accomplice of French neocolonialism.

But the mobilization that such a campaign could generate among the Young Communists, combined with actions by the far left, could quickly put the CP leadership in a situation similar to that faced by the American CP with respect to the war in Vietnam in the early 1960s—becoming cut off from the living forces of youth, anti-imperialism, and anticapitalism.

Kudos to the Revolutionists?

Only some revolutionary organizations demonstrated, within the limit of their forces, against the intervention in Zaïre by French troops.

This deserves to be mentioned, especially in view of the fact that Giscard's "advanced liberalism" had banned all demonstrations against its militarist policy; that the mass workers parties, despite their deep sense of "democracy," did not protest any more loudly against this attack on basic liberties than against the topic of the demonstrations; and that, for the first time in a long while, a moderate renewal of the process of unity could be observed around an issue that, to be sure, would not have posed any problem before and just after May 1968.

Of course, the entire revolutionary left was not represented at the outlawed demonstration on Monday, May 22. The OCI justified its refusal to participate by saying

that the fact that the major forces in the workers movement were boycotting this demonstration made any action of this kind "symbolic."

As for the PSU, its traditional pendulum swings between the revolutionary organizations and the reformist parties seem to be bringing it ever closer to the latter, reducing it to de facto abstentionism when it comes to taking action before they do. Thus, the responsibility of calling the May 22 demonstration in Paris fell to the CCA, LCR, LO, UTCL, UCF(M-L), and CEDET-TIM.² Despite the huge police apparatus that honeycombed the city and even the subways, resulting in the arrest and beating of a number of demonstrators, several thousand persons turned out for the action.

But it cannot be denied that May 22 may have been the signal for a renewal of militant anti-imperialism in France. This is further confirmed by the fact that many similar demonstrations, or various kinds of rallies, took place in cities outside Paris: Montpellier, Orléans, Pau, Grenoble, Rouen, Angers, Bourges, Amiens, Clermont-Ferrand, and others. Union locals and high-school assemblies are meeting to plan a protracted fight against the operations carried out by the government. All of these actions resulted in broadening the solidarity movement.

On June 2, a rally at the Mutualité auditorium in Paris, organized this time by the CCA, LCR, OCI, OCT, and PSU—and endorsed by the CEDET-TIM—called for a mobilization to get French troops to withdraw from Zaïre and from Africa.

It is unfortunate, of course, that LO decided at the last minute not to cosign the call for the rally; without this sectarian gesture, it would have been the broadest united action on the part of the French revolutionary left since 1968.

In spite of this, the May 22 demonstration, the June 2 rally, and the June 5 demonstration called by the CP and Young Communists, which the LCT and other revolutionary organizations have also decided to support, represent milestones on the way to a new upsurge of anti-imperialist struggles in France. □

2. LO—Lutte Ouvrière (Workers Struggle); UTCL—Union des Travailleurs Communistes Léninistes (Union of Leninist Communist Workers); UCF(M-L)—Union Communiste de France (Marxiste-Léniniste) (Communist Union of France [Marxist-Leninist]); CEDET-TIM—Centre d'Etudes Anti-impérialistes (Center for Anti-imperialist Studies); OCI—Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (Internationalist Communist Organization); OCT—Organisation Communiste de Travailleurs (Communist Workers Organization); PSU—Parti Socialiste Unifié (United Socialist Party); CCA—Comités Communistes pour l'Autogestion (Communist Committees for Self-Management); LCR—Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist League), French section of the Fourth International.

1. *L'Impérialisme Français Aujourd'hui* (French Imperialism Today), an anthology published by Editions Sociales, reviewed by *Rouge* in its August 12-16, 1977, issues.

For Immediate Withdrawal of French Troops From Chad!

By Frank Tenaille

Will the French government get bogged down in Chad once again? Has it forgotten the unfortunate experience of 1968-72, when its expeditionary force of 4,000 troops suffered a stinging setback?

These are questions we began raising several months ago, when we learned through "leaks" that the Elysée palace had considerably reinforced the number of its "technical advisers," officially estimated at 310 military personnel, in the Chadian capital of Ndjamená. And now, after a number of weeks, it has become necessary to answer in the affirmative.

The guerrilla offensive launched at the beginning of March in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region overran the positions of the Chadian national army. The garrisons at Fada and Faya-Largeau were surrounded by the fighters of Goukouni Oueddei. Convoys of reinforcements sent from the capital suffered severe losses in skirmishes that at the same time demonstrated the low morale of the Chadian troops.

The critical condition of the regime of Gen. Félix Malloum worsened rapidly in mid-April.

In Paris, the "Standing Group for the Analysis of Situations," a body responsible directly to the General Secretariat for National Defense and headed by Gen. Roger Rhenter, had already been obliged to consider seriously bolstering the Ndjamená army after two planes, a DC-3 and a DC-4, were shot down February 3 by forces of the Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (Frolinat—Chad National Liberation Front). In the interim, the fall of the main government positions in the BET, those at Bardaï, Zouar, Fada, and Faya-Largeau, had put the whole region under Frolinat's de facto control.

With supplies of fuel and ammunition seized, thousands of troops taken prisoner, and many arms captured, the picture looked dismal for France's protégé. Two solutions were then discussed in both Paris and the Chadian capital: that Paris intervene massively, at great cost, to defend the regime, or that Ndjamená temporize and try to negotiate for "national reconciliation." The choice was to be the latter. Under the auspices of neighboring countries (Niger, Sudan, and especially Libya), a confused meeting was held March 21 at Sebha-Benghazi, in Libya, between Frolinat and the Chadian regime.

An accord was ratified at the end of the



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meeting. Its main clauses were the following: recognition of Frolinat by the Chadian junta, the Supreme Military Council; "freedom of movement" throughout the country for both parties; and most importantly, supervision of a cease-fire by a committee of representatives from Niger and Libya.

Considered as part of the last point was agreement by both sides to cooperate with a control commission established to investigate whether "foreign troops or military bases were present or not in Chad." Of course, interpretation of the text became a subject of dispute, especially since it was the French military presence that was being questioned through this paragraph.

Several days later the Chadian regime ended its equivocation by declaring, "Yes to national reconciliation, no to capitulation." In those terms, it made it clear that it was not ready to respect the provisions of the accord. Nor was Paris any more disposed to carrying it out and seeing its aid to Ndjamená reduced to a bare minimum.

French policy became clearer. It was of course necessary to maintain friendly relations with Libya, Frolinat's rear base, but Paris could in no way allow the ousting of its local outpost, represented by Malloum. Giscard made it clear that Paris would follow its interventionist policy while expanding efforts to conclude a "national reconciliation" in Chad. There was cer-

tainly no intention of aiming for an impossible military victory, but rather of preserving Malloum's bargaining position for the negotiations scheduled for June 7 in Libya.¹

It was a delicate operation, since the conflict could suddenly escalate at any time, despite the pressures from the other states in the region (Niger, Sudan, Cameroon, and Libya), which would like to avoid a broader conflict.

The 'True Interests of France'

Meanwhile, the French authorities recognized that they would have to "pull out the stops" to reverse the situation. French military reinforcements began to arrive in Chad from the beginning of April, under the guise of "technical advisers." Their task was to prevent a collapse of Malloum's army.

The fragility of the Chadian army, its internal breakdown, and the obvious lack of commitment among its troops obliged the French strategists to begin with the most immediate problems. Their first objectives were to establish order within the barely operational Chadian armed forces (5,000 ground troops and 6,000 gendarmes and national guardsmen) and set up a line of defense around Ndjamená by bolstering the forces in Rig-Rig, Moussoro, Mongo, and Abéché.

However, advocates of even greater intervention soon appeared in both Ndjamená and among the French high command. The precedent of Mauritania was evidently raised.² Through "emergency procedures," that is, without first consulting Louis Dallier, the French ambassador in Ndjamená, Chadian Foreign Minister Abdelkader Kamougue arrived in Paris April 20 to request such intervention.

The Chadian regime was apparently convinced that it would find a receptive ear from Giscard himself. Although the

1. The talks in Libya failed to materialize. Following an attack by hundreds of French troops against Frolinat units in late May and early June, a Frolinat representative announced that the group would not participate in the negotiations.—IP/I

2. In December 1977, French jets began flying bombing missions on behalf of the Mauritanian regime against guerrillas fighting for the independence of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony that was partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania in November 1975.—IP/I

secrecy around the discussions at the Elysée palace has not been broken, the departure of French troops and matériel to Chad was nevertheless rapidly stepped up.

It is still difficult to give a precise estimate of the number of French forces in Chad because of the French government's official "blackout" and the impossibility of journalists getting into Chad (*Figaro's* special correspondent was expelled twice). But as far as can be told the French military forces now in Chad are the following: almost the entire First Cavalry Regiment of the Foreign Legion based in Orange (about 800 men); the First Battery of the Thirty-fifth RAP in Tarpes (sixty men); 50 troops of the Second Paratroop Regiment of the Foreign Legion in Calvi; 60 paratroopers of the Fifth RCP in Pau; a squadron of the First RICM in Vannes (300 men); units of the Ninth Marine Infantry Division in Saint-Malo (200 men); and the Fourth Company of the Third RIMA in Vannes (100 men).

These troops are in addition to 310 "technical advisers" provided for by the 1976 cooperation accords with Ndjama, who are under the command of the notorious Camille le Gouvernec. Le Gouvernec, an officer of the Second Bureau [political police] and director of the Intelligence Coordination and Collection Council, is also the power behind Malloum.

They do not include the "paramilitary" civilians under Chadian contract—similar to mercenaries—who fly AD-4 Skyraiders and Puma aircraft during air-support missions for ground troops. Nor do they include the pilots and flight personnel for the Jaguar jets, Transall and Noratlas transports, two KC-135 supply planes, and a Bréguet-Atlantic patrol plane recently sent to the base in Ndjama. Also excluded are the "individuals" recruited (with triple pay) in various units, and the artillery specialists who have been discreetly incorporated into the regiments.

Such a tally, despite its gaps, is nevertheless clear enough to show the French government's intentions and the reality of French intervention in Chad. It makes mincemeat of the "explanations" of the Foreign Ministry, which has once again not hesitated to issue lies, hypocritical statements, and dubious rectifications. It must be said that during the past months French diplomacy has shown the importance that Paris accords to the press, Parliament, and public opinion in general.

The only things that Giscard and Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud have confirmed are French ambitions with respect to political and military normalization. "One cannot play a role without taking some risks. . . . If France were to take no interest in Lebanon or the African states with which we have signed cooperative accords, could we not be accused of forgetting the past, our historic mission?" This statement by de Guiringaud to the French radio station Europe I several

weeks before the "Franco-African" summit in Paris simply dotted the "i's."

Since the intervention in Zaïre, it is clear that the French government is playing the role of imperialism's gendarme. By approving its open military intervention in Chad, Washington aims to give Paris a certain legitimacy in this realm.

It would be wrong, however, to believe that the actions carried out by the Centre Opérationnel des Armées (Army Operational Center) are just the result of the Giscard regime's whims. As we have emphasized since the first French airlift into Zaïre, it is, on the contrary, a deliberate, planned policy flowing from the necessary adjustments in the French neocolonial system. Besides, de Guiringaud has insisted that "France does not act haphazardly."

This underscores (if it were necessary) the responsibilities of the French workers movement and the importance of its future tasks. The struggles to break the military treaties with the African states and to force the immediate withdrawal of French troops from Chad must by necessity go beyond the protests so far. The long-term nature of these aims, in view of French imperialist strategy, requires the organization of a movement of ongoing mobilizations, one that can link up the uncoordinated and isolated actions of political and trade-union organizations, local anti-imperialist groups, and workers in uniform.

Frolinat's Course

Within this context, however, it is necessary to be aware of the handicap resulting from Frolinat's policies from the time of its formation. While action against the imperialist intervention in Chad must develop independently of one's assessment of Frolinat, it is nevertheless important to emphasize the confusion that Frolinat has sown for several years, especially among a number of African militants who have illusions in it.

What is Frolinat today? Without going into all the details of its internal conflicts, it is essential to briefly recount its history so as to clearly identify the line-up of forces.

Frolinat was established in June 1966 in the wake of a peasant revolt. Its founder, Ibrahim Abatcha, was killed in February 1968 during an "encounter" with the neocolonial forces.

After Abatcha's death, Frolinat came under the leadership of a triumvirate composed of Aboubakar Djalabo Othman, the representative of the foreign delegation; Mohammed el-Baghlani, the front's representative in the Sudan; and Dr. Abba Siddick, a former minister of education in Chad from 1957 to 1959, shortly before independence.

Differences soon arose among the three leaders. They were "ironed out" by the

disappearance of Aboubakar Othman during a tour of the guerrilla units and by the expulsion of Baghlani, who was accused of embezzling funds from Kuwait.

Those were the "official" explanations provided by Siddick's Frolinat. They were unable to fully conceal the internal clashes and the ethnic and personal rivalries within the organization. They could also not compensate for the weaknesses in Frolinat's program.

The struggle between the two factions—Siddick's First Army and Baghlani's "Vulcan" army—sharpened by the end of 1970. (Baghlani died in 1977 during an automobile accident in Libya.)

In October 1972, yet another faction emerged. Under the leadership of Hissene Habré, it carried out military actions on its own in the Borkou and Tibesti regions and called itself the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North, also known as the Second Army. Meanwhile, the First Army conducted guerrilla operations in central Chad and in the Ennedi region.

During the subsequent "Claustre affair,"³ differences arose between Hissene Habré and Goukouni Oueddei over what course to follow. Behind these differences lay the question of what attitude to adopt toward Libya, which had begun to provide considerable logistical support to the Second Army, while ending its assistance to Siddick's forces.

During Libya's 1976 occupation of the Aouzou strip in northern Chad, which Qaddafi considers part of Libya, Habré condemned the action. The dispute within the Second Army was concluded by the departure (or expulsion) of Habré, who went with his followers to set up a new base in the Biltine region.

A little later, under the prodding of Libya, the "Vulcan" army and Goukouni's Second Army formed the Comité Militaire Interarmées Provisoire (CMIAP—Provisional Interarmy Military Committee).

In August 1977, the First Army, also called the Forces Populaires de Libération-Frolinat (FPL—People's Liberation Forces) held its Fifth Congress in Karanga, at the end of which the ranks decided to dismiss the old leaders, most notably Abba Siddick.

The new Provisional Council of the Revolution, which held both political and military responsibilities, decided to henceforth work toward "unity of all the tendencies in Frolinat." It declared, "For this congress, the main task is to realize the unity of all the fighting forces."

However, this reorientation has not involved a discussion of the programmatic ambiguities of the various Frolinat factions. A class analysis of Chadian society is still lacking. Frolinat has not broken

3. Françoise Claustre, a French archeologist, was captured by Habré's forces in April 1974 and held hostage for nearly three years.—*IP/I*

with nationalism and its related interclass conceptions, which have led to incorrect alliances and have prevented posing the question of what kind of organization to build. Self-organization in the liberated zones remains hypothetical, despite what the new leaders say.

Frolinat's errors with respect to its attitude toward the traditional chiefs and the neocolonial state remain quite serious. As a result of Libyan arm-twisting, they could go even further within the context of the "national reconciliation" project, the fruit of a deal among the various regimes involved in Chad.

On one side is the Chadian regime. Its "national reconciliation" scheme has now been bolstered by Hissene Habré and Abba Siddick, who have rallied to the government. This policy reflects the interests of French imperialism, as well as of other imperialist powers, especially the United States (working through the intermediary of Nigeria).

On the other side are the FPL and CMIAP. Their aim is to achieve a relationship of military forces favorable to negotiations with Malloum's Supreme Military Council. They maintain close ties with the Libyan regime and, through it, with Moscow.

In fact, whatever the degree of autonomy of Frolinat in its relations with Libya, it has to an extent now been pulled into Libya's orbit. The character of the war has changed. From a national liberation struggle, it has been transformed into a factional competition to establish a new regime in Ndjamená, in which the various forces are now trying to assure their dominance. This reality, confounding to some, was predictable a long time ago.

From its origins under Tombalbaye,⁴ Frolinat's program has reflected the demands of the petty-bourgeoisie, within the framework of an indigenous capitalist society. The vague references to socialism or to a "people's national democratic revolution" are designed to screen its true aims. Especially since, according to Abba Siddick, "the revolutionary nationalist movement" is "open to all Chadians who realize the urgency of restoring national unity, without any kind of discrimination."

Over time, this orientation of Frolinat's has found some roots. After the setback of French imperialism's military intervention in 1968-72, Paris understands the necessity of altering its backward policy and of conceding to political and administrative reorganization.

Was Malloum's April 13, 1975, coup part of this plan? Certainly, an appeal was issued to the opposition after the putsch promising "national reconciliation." Froli-

nat did not reject it. On November 6, 1975, it declared that it "does not exclude a political solution to the present crisis." The demands of the Second Army, which a year ago called for "autonomy for the BET in its relations with the central government," were also within this context.

The March 1978 accord between Malloum and Habré to begin the establishment of a government of national union, the restoration of some democratic freedoms, the release of political prisoners, even the visits to Ndjamená by Cuban, Libyan, and Sudanese delegations, all

have the objective of preparing for Goukouni's participation in the "national reconciliation" on the most favorable terms.

The moves toward replacing the Malloum team will take some time to arrive at a reconciliation acceptable to all the interests involved. But how viable will it then be? Political and social instability will continue in any event. The very existence of Chad itself is a legacy of colonialism. If there is one African country with a completely artificial character, it is Chad, on the frontier of the Sahara and Black Africa. □

Let a Few Flowers Bloom

An editorial entitled "For a Thriving Literature and Art" appeared in the May 23 *People's Daily*, published in Peking. According to the China News Service, the editorial urges "writers to use the writing method advocated by Chairman Mao, that is, integrating revolutionary realism with revolutionary romanticism."

"We should not demand perfection of works of literature and art or scold them for lacking it," the summary of the editorial continues. "Any creation that is in line with the six criteria put forward by Chairman Mao—mainly, benefiting the socialist road and consolidating the leading role of the party—and that is fairly good artistically may be published or produced."

Unless, of course, it is part of the "corrupt and decadent culture" of the "gang of

four." The editorial rails against the gang's "fascist cultural despotism and straitjacket policy towards culture, against their idealistic 'Principle of the Three Prominences'—giving prominence to the positive characters, to the heroic characters among them and the principal hero—and against their fostering a literature and art given over to political intrigue."

How does *People's Daily* propose that artists break out of this straitjacket? "Writer and artists should stick to their orientation of serving the workers, peasants, and soldiers, go to factories, rural areas and army camps, to the front line in the fight for the four modernizations, share weal and woe with the masses, use the stand, viewpoint and methods of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought. . . ."

Babu Freed in Tanzania

On April 26, Abdulrahman Mohammed Babu was released from prison in Tanzania, along with a number of other persons who had been jailed for political activities.

The country's best-known political prisoner, Babu had been in jail since 1972 on frame-up charges of having been involved in the assassination of Sheikh Abeid Karume, the president of Zanzibar, a group of islands just off mainland Tanzania.

The "evidence" presented against Babu in the Zanzibar trial consisted largely of testimony by condemned prisoners and "confessions" extracted under torture. Babu and thirteen others, who were being held in detention on the mainland, were sentenced to death in absentia.

Babu, an avowed communist, had previously been the central leader of the 1964 revolution in Zanzibar that overthrew the British-backed sultanate. He also held a

number of cabinet posts in the Tanzanian regime after Zanzibar and mainland Tanganyika were joined into a union.

A number of other defendants in the Zanzibar trial were released with Babu, and some had their sentences cut.

According to a report in the May 13 issue of the London *Economist*, nearly two dozen members of southern African liberation movements who have been in jail in Tanzania are also to be released. They include members of the Zimbabwe African National Union, the South West Africa People's Organisation, and two South African groups, the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress.

Despite the recent releases, it is estimated that hundreds of other persons, many of them political activists, are still being held in President Nyerere's jails without trials.

4. François (later Ngarta) Tombalbaye ruled Chad from the time of its independence from France in 1960 until he was deposed and killed in a military coup in April 1975.—IP/I

The First Voices of the Feminist Movement

By Jacqueline Heinen

The student revolt, as is well known, played a detonating role in unleashing the May 1968 general strike in France. To be sure, there was not enough time for this revolt to be transformed into a social movement on the scale of the German or American student movements during the same period.

Nevertheless, the French student rebellion adopted the key antiauthoritarian slogans that had been raised on the Berlin and Berkeley campuses at the height of the mobilizations against the war in Vietnam. The streamlining of education to meet the needs of capitalism, the brainwashing role of the mass media, the consumer culture, waste, the hierarchical structure of society, and anti-imperialism were among the intersecting themes and jumping-off points of the student revolt in all of the countries where it developed at the end of the 1960s.

May 1968 saw the unfolding of a social crisis that challenged traditional values and bourgeois order, a crisis in which all the social movements that have developed since then are rooted. The goals of these movements, and their emphasis on the "quality of life," are a challenge to the class collaboration of the traditional organizations of the working class.

All of these movements—from those that attack the repressive function of bourgeois institutions such as the family, schools, or prisons, to the environmental and ecology movements, and including the movement of national and regional minorities—offer proof that "social integration" is a hoax in a society shaken by an unprecedented social crisis.

Of all these movements, the women's liberation movement is probably one of the most significant, owing to its function, which is not only to lift one-half of humanity out of silence and oppression, to enable women to express their special needs and demands, but also to bring out the full meaning of the objective of working-class unity that revolutionists fight for.

In France, however, the question of the special oppression of women did not arise. Even though a few mass meetings on this subject were held at the Sorbonne, and even if a few women's groups arose out of the ferment of May 1968, under the impact of the radicalization of American feminists, it is nevertheless apparent that such concerns remained limited to very small groups with little influence (just as small consciousness-raising groups began to emerge in Italy, Switzerland, and even Spain around that time).

But this was not on the same scale as the powerful rise in feminist consciousness as it was expressed in the English-speaking countries—the United States, Canada, and Great Britain—or in one of the largest student movements in Europe, the West German SDS [Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund—German Socialist Students Federation].

The Revolt of SDS Women

"We cannot individually solve the social oppression of women. Nor can we wait until the revolution has taken place, for a purely economic and political revolution does not eliminate personal kinds of repression. The socialist countries have given abundant proof of this." (Declaration of the Action Council for Women's Liberation during the conference of SDS delegates in the summer of 1968.)

This was the first sign of rebellion. The women students of Berlin had reached a conclusion that many other women would subsequently reach. That is, despite the objectives put forward (rejection of authority, discipline, and the individualistic values preached by bourgeois education), and despite the determination with which the student movement initiated actions against imperialism and bourgeois order, the traditional relationships between men and women within the movement itself had not really changed.

"The separation between private and public life always relegates women to isolation, and forces them to take sole responsibility for the conflict that ensues. Society has conditioned women from an early age to build their lives around the family, and the family, in turn, depends on relations of production that we combat."

This is what women who had begun to meet "among themselves" in the winter and spring of 1968 to think about their own situation were saying. Pointing out that their decision to concentrate by themselves on problems that were not taken seriously had, at first, elicited only gibes from their male comrades, they added:

"Now they resent us for having separated ourselves; they try to make us say that we think women do not need men in order to be liberated. This is all nonsense which we have never uttered. . . . It is precisely because we think that emancipation can only occur at the level of the whole society that we are here."

Despite snubs and discouragements,

their presence at this congress indicated their determination to establish the basis for a common battle, whatever the specific features of the struggle they thought they would have to carry out against the sexist reflexes characterizing relationships in the student movement.

"Only women are sufficiently motivated to open fire on patriarchal society; only they can guarantee a radical change in the organization. To accomplish this, temporary isolation is necessary."

Thus, they were cautious on the question of separation (in a document written two months later, they explained: "Our withdrawal is only temporary and is aimed at giving us the capacity to define ourselves at last, without other considerations or compromises"), but no less determined.

Their report, for example, ended with the following threat: "Comrades, if you are not ready for this discussion, which must be thoroughgoing, we will then have to conclude that SDS is nothing but counterrevolutionary slime." And the reporter added: "The comrades I represent will know what action to take."

These lines already put the emphasis on the key elements underlying our conviction today that an independent movement is of strategic importance: the need for women to gain confidence in their ability to express themselves and to take the floor; the role of the family and the struggle that has to be carried out against the traditional separation between private and "public" life; the uncompromising battle that has to be fought—including within the left organizations—against resistance to the desire for emancipation that women are beginning to show.

What also emerges from these lines is the Marxist approach underpinning this analysis. And this is not an accident: the discussions that took place at the "Free University of Berlin"—an SDS stronghold—confused as they were, nevertheless reflected the desire of a good many activists to reavail themselves of the foundations of Marxism and Leninism.

This was true for the SDS women as well. Their concern with meeting the needs of working mothers, first and foremost, as well as their fruitless attempt to extend to the working class the experience of community-organized child-care centers set up by a wing of the Berlin student movement, stemmed from a class viewpoint in analyzing the situation of the most oppressed women. The subsequent



Göskin Sipahiöglu/L'Express

Women's contingent in 1973 May Day demonstration in Paris.

abandonment of all Marxist positions by a large part of the movement can be explained only by a series of combined factors.

In a country whose traditional organizations are dominated by the overriding influence of a fairly right-wing Social Democracy, and where the protest movement at the end of the 1960s did not succeed in establishing a credible revolutionary pole for the working masses, it is hardly surprising that a growing number of women's groups formed during these past few years should have cut themselves off from the working class, refusing to take initiatives that could have widened their field of activity and impact on large sections of proletarian women.

The influence of separatist theories, and the strength of the radical-feminist current in Germany, must be seen in direct relationship to the resistance with which the bureaucratic leaderships of the workers movement met feminist demands, and to the effects of social peace in Germany. But to this must also be added the indifference, not to mention the hostility, that feminists encountered within the student movement and all of the far-left organizations, both with respect to the questions they raised on the theoretical plane (concerning an analysis of the special oppression of women in the capitalist system, for instance) and to their determination to take their struggles into their own hands.

Aggressiveness of the First American Feminist Groups

At the very moment that German women students were beginning to come to grips with their oppression—whether in

theoretical study circles or through concrete actions such as the child-care movement—small feminist groups were beginning to emerge all over the United States. Some of them employed dramatic methods of action to proclaim their rebellion against society (such as the “burial of femininity” in Washington during an antiwar demonstration in the autumn of 1967, or the attempt to prevent the holding of the Miss America contest the following year).

But for the most part, the American movement functioned and developed in a semi-underground way, through small “consciousness-raising” groups in which women gained confidence in themselves, discussing the new and controversial ideas that were beginning to emerge. This all but invisible movement revealed its following two years later, with the August 26, 1970, women's strike. After a week of activities in most cities, marked by demonstrations, occupations of municipal offices to demand funds for child care, and collective actions in which women smashed cups on the street as a sign of rebellion against employers who treat their secretaries like maids-of-all-work, 35,000 persons marched down Fifth Avenue in New York to shouts of “Free abortion! Twenty-four-hour child-care centers! Equal educational and job opportunities!”

This was the height of the dramatic phase of the American women's liberation movement. For their part, the movement's initial documents, and the feminist press that was growing at a dizzying rate, displayed a different approach than that of the German students, most of whom had come under the influence of Marxism.

Nevertheless, the themes that had caused the first outbreaks of revolt among the women in the American student movement were identical to those of their European sisters—a refusal to continue being “second-class citizens,” suited for typing leaflets and distributing them, a desire to finally speak in their own name, and so on.

As in Germany, the movement at the outset was peripheral to the working class, and mere numerical growth on its part could not suffice to break the sexist strait-jacket in which the organizations of the workers movement were confined. But the ideas of the women's movement soon penetrated into every pore of society, giving rise to women's groups in the trade unions, offices, and plants, as well as the first organizations of Black, Chicana, and Puerto Rican women. It was after the economic recession of 1974-75, in particular, that the most exploited and oppressed women began to radicalize and organize among themselves on such a scale that their weight began to be felt in the workers movement.

The Fight for Equal Pay in Britain

One of the first women's groups in England was formed in the spring of 1968 to support the struggle of the wives of the Hull fishermen. After several boats had disappeared a few months earlier, these women were fighting to improve working and safety conditions for the men who went to sea. In face of the hostility and contempt with which the press treated these angry women, the group decided to

carry out a long-term battle to win respect for equal rights.

In May 1968, women workers at Ford struck for equal wages with those of men. In this strike—out of which grew a trade-union organization for equal rights and pay—the National Joint Action Campaign for Women's Equal Rights was to play a decisive role in raising the consciousness of many British feminists. The Joint Action Campaign made it possible to raise the question of sex discrimination publicly for the first time.

To be sure, the campaign groups had only a limited impact in their effort to mobilize student women, as well as women of privileged strata who were beginning to question their place in society, to the side of working women. The desire for control expressed by the trade-union bureaucracy soon limited the activity of these groups and their capacity for initiative.

As a result, feminists developed a strong distrust of the bureaucrats' authoritarianism. But their concern not to place themselves outside the needs of the masses of women—expressed, for instance, in the demand for equal pay raised by the women workers at Ford—was to determine the character of the burgeoning women's movement in Great Britain.

Nevertheless, this movement—made up for the most part of women of privileged social origins, students, intellectuals, and, to a lesser degree, white-collar workers—succeeded more rapidly than others in initiating campaigns relevant to working-class women (equal pay, equal rights, beaten women) that often found real support within the workers movement.

The peculiarities of the workers movement from an organizational standpoint—the relative independence of the unions organized by branch of industry or workplace, the proliferation of union structures—are no minor aspect of the fact that the women's movement has succeeded in winning the support of one or another branch during the holding of congresses.

The political situation and the rise of struggles in Britain after 1968 also explains the greater centrality of the women's movement with respect to the working class. But the role that strikes by working women played at the outset, and the capacity of revolutionists to become involved in the initial discussions of the movement and an integral part of its first campaigns, also determined the development of the women's movement in Britain.

A Movement in the Process of Becoming

These three examples make it easier to understand why the women's liberation movement in France took more than two years after May 1968 to begin to get organized.

The fact that the social crisis is becoming generalized on a world scale tends to give a universal character to the objective

factors on which the radicalization of women in the era of late capitalism is based. The growing percentage of working women, the raising of the educational level, the development of contraceptive and abortion techniques, the ever-increasing automation in the area of household work, are among the factors that to one degree or another make women aware of the contradictions inherent in the profit system, of the gap that exists between the potential for social development and the daily reality in which they are trapped.

But while in terms of figures and statistics the objective situation appeared quite similar in most of the advanced capitalist countries at the end of the 1960s, the rise in consciousness among women in those countries nevertheless proceeded at a different rate.

In France, the elements that acted as a brake on the emergence of the feminist movement are to be sought both in the brevity of the student upsurge referred to earlier, and in the influence of the Catholic Church in the area of mores, personal relationships (with women seen first and foremost in their roles of wives and mothers), the existence of laws limiting access to contraception, and in the control of the working class by a Stalinist bureaucracy repeating word for word the ruling ideology with respect to the family and the role of women in society.

These different factors, although in varying ways, are equally valid for explaining the analogous discrepancies—even greater ones—that have been observed in Italy and Spain (in Portugal and in Greece, the radicalization is just beginning to make itself felt).

Even if we leave out of account for the moment the smaller proportion of working women and those who have access to higher education, relative to the other advanced capitalist countries, women students in the countries of Southern Europe face two major obstacles in becoming conscious of their oppression. First, the omnipotence of the Catholic church in civil matters, based on the decades of Francoist or Salazarist dictatorship or the particularly backward doctrines of the Orthodox church. And second, the total lack of questioning of the concept of women's "inferiority" by working women's organizations.

This is in spite of the fact that—as in Germany or the U.S.—their privileged situation made a number of contradictions related to the gap between their level of education and their professional future more evident.

Ten years after May 1968, the ideological impact of the first liberation movements, magnified by the acceleration of the economic and social crisis, has had its effect—the radicalization of women has ceased to be a phenomenon external to the working class. From the first small groups of stu-

dents and intellectual women, genuine movements have emerged whose strength and impact on the workers movement derive directly from the sharpness of the class struggle.

More and more often, women are taking the step of meeting among themselves in the mixed organizations of the workers movement in which they are active, in order to discuss their special problems and establish a relationship of forces enabling them to get their point of view across. More and more frequently, they are sending delegates to local or national coordinating bodies where discussions take place around the central campaigns to be carried out.

Of course, the women's movement is still far from homogeneous, and those currents that defend a class point of view within it are still far from seeing their ideas win out. The policy of the trade-union bureaucracy, alternating between demagogic statements and steps aimed at limiting women's freedom of expression, has managed to discourage more than a few activists, and the ideas of the radical-feminist current, which give greater priority to the battle of the sexes than to the class struggle, have won adherents, even among a few fringes of working women.

But the women's movement is a fact. It is a movement in the process of becoming. And one of the key factors in its development will be the capacity of revolutionists to influence it, to see to it that an uncompromising struggle to defend the special needs of the masses of women is intrinsically tied to the class line that strengthens the unity and independence of the working class. □

Hunger Strikers Protest Death Sentences for Kurds

In an attempt to save the lives of 165 Kurdish nationalists sentenced to death in Iraq, a group of Kurds are conducting a hunger strike in Sergelstorg, the central square of Stockholm.

In its May 31 issue, the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter* reported:

"There are now at least 2,000 political prisoners in various jails in Iraq. According to many reports, these prisoners are being subjected to barbarous forms of torture. Last fall, 1,500 families of partisans—women, children, and old people—were arrested and sent to prisons in southern Iraq."

In addition to calling for the lifting of the death sentences, the hunger strikers are demanding that the Iraqi regime cease its aggressive war against the Kurdish people, release the Kurdish political prisoners, and permit an international commission of inquiry to investigate the treatment of the Kurds.

'Socialist Challenge' Supporters Meet in London

By Dodie Wepler

LONDON—The first national conference of *Socialist Challenge* supporters on May 27 in London was a modest but important step forward for the newspaper. Since *Socialist Challenge* was launched by the International Marxist Group (British section of the Fourth International) one year ago, it has sparked intensive debates amongst the left; and the idea of holding a conference to elect the paper's policy committee was itself an innovation.

Socialist Challenge holds that a united revolutionary party is vitally needed in Britain at a time when thousands of militants are looking for a real socialist alternative in face of both attacks by the Labour government and the abject failure of the Communist Party to provide any clear lead.

There are more than twenty groups claiming to be Trotskyist in Britain, and *Socialist Challenge* has insisted that divisions among revolutionaries have often persisted on the basis of secondary questions—even on nebulous grounds like the political "style" of work.

The paper has argued for a principled unity among the splintered forces of revolutionary socialism. The Editorial Board thus put to the conference a set of theses—"Our Common Ground"—which the IMG believes draw a dividing line between revolutionists and reformists.

This document outlines the "big" political questions of today, agreement around which can provide a principled basis for discussing and sorting out differences that still exist on a number of other important questions. Of course the paper will continue to take positions on questions in dispute, but it will not make the differences a barrier to participation.

The conference overwhelmingly endorsed "Our Common Ground" and on that basis elected a twenty-person National Policy Committee. This body includes not only members of the International Marxist Group, which holds the majority of positions and continues to be the major group behind the paper, but also six comrades from the International Socialist Alliance.

The ISA is a newly formed group of about 150 former members of the International Socialists (now the Socialist Workers Party). It will be holding its own first national conference on June 18-19.

Big Flame, another far-left organisation, with about 100 members, asked for an observer on the NPC, and this was granted



G.M. Cookson/*Socialist Challenge*
Soweto student leader Barney Mokgatle speaking at London conference.

by the conference. The NPC will meet at least every three months, and the first meeting will elect an Editorial Board to oversee the day-to-day concerns of the paper.

Tariq Ali, editor of *Socialist Challenge*, explained that the involvement of these comrades in the paper "will hopefully provide a further testing ground, in addition to the joint work in which our organisations are already involved both locally and nationally, for a new democratic centralist organisation. This is important, because we have a whole tradition of sectarianism on the British left to overcome."

The conference encouraged supporters to get involved in local *Socialist Challenge* groups. Seventy such groups exist with plans for four more in the near future. At least eight have been set up by non-IMG supporters of the paper.

"Some of these groups have run into problems," explained Dodie Wepler in opening the conference on behalf of the Editorial Board, "and this is partly because they have limited themselves to debate and discussion. This is important, but the biggest test for unity will come if supporters begin to organise together."

To this end, the conference agreed to

make top priorities of antiracist activity, the Tribunal on British Presence in Northern Ireland, a campaign initiated recently by *Socialist Challenge* for the release of East German dissident Rudolph Bahro, organising against the cuts in social services, and supporting activities of the women's movement.

Furthermore, the need for democratic independent groupings within the unions was endorsed, and supporters committed themselves to building the Socialist Challenge Trade Union conference scheduled for July 1.

According to reports, the most stimulating part of the conference for many supporters were the workshops on racism, sexual politics, Ireland, and on trade-union and international coverage.

The measures taken by the conference were designed to improve further upon the modest successes already achieved by *Socialist Challenge* in its impact and its sales. In a report on the promotion of the paper, Ric Sissons explained that it was realistic to aim to expand the paper from the present sixteen pages to twenty by 1979, and to increase subscribers by 300 to a total of 1,000.

Sissons emphasized the importance of the overall development of the paper of the decision of the two major capitalist distribution chains to stock the paper in limited outlets. "This decision is a significant breakthrough for a revolutionary paper. These avenues to new readers have been closed to the left press for too long, and now we have to make full use of them."

In addition to subscriptions and shop sales, Sissons also urged local supporter groups to increase paid weekly sales beyond the present level of 6,000. All these steps could take the press run above its current level of 10,000.

The need for an internationalist perspective was a theme of the entire conference. Supporters welcomed a proposal by Richard Carver, the international editor of the paper, that a telegram be sent to the Peruvian government protesting the state of emergency in that country and the deportation of Hugo Blanco and other militants to Argentina. The conference agreed to support a picket line at the Peruvian Embassy on June 3, the day of Peru's game at the World Cup. Barney Mokgatle was also warmly received when he gave greetings from Soweto students, and urged a big turnout for the South African demonstration June 17 in London.

Twelve-Year Struggle Against an Environmental Disaster

Solidarity With the Opponents of Narita Airport!

By Fritz Trier

In face of widespread opposition, the Japanese government opened the new Tokyo international airport at Sanrizuka, Narita City, on May 20.

The airport opening had been scheduled for March 26, but was postponed in the wake of a 20,000-strong demonstration by opponents of the airport on that day. In preparation for the May 20 opening, the government of Liberal Democratic Premier Takeo Fukuda made numerous arrests and pushed new repressive laws through the Diet (parliament). One billion yen (more than US\$450,000) was spent on special security precautions, and a force of 13,000 riot police were mobilized for the opening.

Nearly 200 opponents of the airport have been arrested since February, with some 150 of these members and supporters of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League (JRCL), Japanese section of the Fourth International. Also arrested were three leaders of the Opposition League, an umbrella group based on farmers whose lands have been taken away or are threatened by the new airport, but which includes other opposition forces. The three leaders are Kitahara Koji, Ishii Takeshi, and Akiba Tetsu.

Charges against those arrested are serious, and in many cases the defendants face multiple charges and long prison terms if convicted. In spite of the fact that there were no serious injuries to police in clashes with the demonstrators, some demonstrators face charges of attempted murder, which could bring life sentences. Others, including members of the JRCL, are charged with "endangering airport safety," a law originally intended for hijacking cases and which carries a maximum penalty of thirteen years.

Leading up to the May 20 opening, police staged thirty-five raids against the headquarters, printshop, and apartments of JRCL members alone. On May 12, the Diet passed a special law that allows the Transport Ministry to remove any buildings within a three-kilometer radius of the airport and to arrest without warrant anyone within the same jurisdiction.

The law can be used to attack the "unity huts" opposition farmers have built over the long years of their struggle against the airport, and which are used by oppositionists as demonstration staging areas.

The three-kilometer limit of application of this repressive law is ambiguous. It can apply to any area within three kilometers around any facilities related to the airport, which spread out all over the country from

jet fuel transportation routes to small aviation signal posts.

Opposition to the airport goes back to 1966, when the government first decided to build it. The decision was made in an arbitrary fashion, without consulting the farmers whose lands would be taken away to construct the airport or whose lands would be adjacent to it.

In 1967, riot police brutally attacked farmers, evicting them from their land. The farmers became the core of opposition to the airport's construction, but were joined by students, environmentalists, and others over the years. This movement delayed the opening of the airport time and again.

Opposition to the airport is not limited to the farmers and their radical supporters, however. An opinion poll published early in May found that only 17 percent of those questioned supported the government's decision to push ahead with the planned opening. Most favored postponing the opening and holding talks with the farmers.

The airport itself is unsafe and an environmental disaster. Only one of its projected three runways is completed. Owing to opposition from farmers now holding the land on which the other two have to be built, the government doesn't envisage completing them for years. This means that there is no runway for cross winds, which are sometimes strong in that area.

The airport is near enough to the Japanese jet fighter base of Hyakuri that planes coming or going from Narita must share airspace with Hyakuri, as well as with U.S. bases. This has resulted in a complicated system of rules of flight, with passenger planes supposedly confined to zones above the flight patterns of the jet fighters.

Air safety experts point out that it is not always possible for planes to stick to precise air patterns, especially in inclement weather. The flight patterns also mean that passenger planes must land and take off at steeper angles than safety norms call for.

Another complication is that the jet fighters from Hyakuri and the passenger planes will be utilizing different radio frequencies and codes, and the two control towers cannot communicate directly by radio. A telephone "hot line" between the two hardly compensates.

The March 25 *Mainichi Daily News* pointed to some of the problems:

Take, for example, the case of a passenger jet. . . . Shortly after takeoff at a point seven nautical miles (about 12.6 kilometers) north of the airport, the jet is required to climb sharply to an altitude of 2,800 feet while circling to the right.

This is to be followed immediately with an ascent to 3,500 feet at a second point and then to 4,500 feet at a third point where the plane is again required to circle to the right.

During the several minutes involved in this stage of the flight, the pilot has to confirm the exact position of his plane by radio beacon while adjusting the altitude five or six times. Added to this are other requirements, such as that a departing plane is supposed to ascend very sharply after takeoff, and that a flight over residential areas of Choshi City must be avoided.

In the meantime, ASDF [Air Self-Defense Force] jetfighters approaching the Hyakuri base guided by the radio beacon may come within a range of about three nautical miles (about 4.5 kilometers) from an ascending passenger jet.

An official of the Transport Ministry says there will be no near misses between passenger jets and ASDF jetfighters because a 1,000-foot buffer zone exists between the Narita airspace and the Hyakuri air space. . . .

But does this step assure 100 percent safety? One cannot help but remember the air collision that took place in 1971 over Iwate Prefecture, involving a passenger jet of All Nippon Airways and an ASDF jetfighter. The accident occurred in clear skies at an altitude of 7,000 meters.

Before the May 20 opening, the International Air Aviation Association sent a telegram to the Japanese Transport Ministry, expressing concern over the safety of the airport and asking the government to postpone its opening indefinitely.

The International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association sent a similar telegram from its general assembly, held in Frankfurt in April. The Opposition League farmers and the United Church of Christ in Japan sent letters to pilots in sixty-six countries, urging them to come for a first-hand look at the dangerous airport.

Another problem is noise pollution. Several citizens' groups have been formed in Narita City and other cities in the vicinity, in protest of the noise pollution the airport will cause. Tests show very high levels of noise pollution in many towns around the airport. The government has responded by soundproofing homes in certain areas but local residents obviously are not content with that step alone. Their opposition could result in restrictions on night flights at least, crippling the functioning of the facility as an international airport.

The transportation of jet fuel to the airport presents another danger. The Airport Corporation had installed a fuel pipeline under Chiba City. In face of strong resistance of the residents of this city, upset over the prospects of an accident that could be disastrous, this project had to be given up.

The alternative was to transport the fuel by train. But the National Railway Motive Power Union, one of the strongest and most militant in Japan, has pointed out

that the route itself is dangerous. The tracks are laid over soft earth, partly humus, which is an invitation to accidents. Consequently, the railway workers who are to transport the fuel, in addition to expressing sympathy with the farmers, are opposed to the airport for reasons of their own safety and of the environment surrounding the route.

Fishermen, who fear the results of the air traffic and pollution on their livelihood have also voiced opposition.

To top it off, the airport itself is situated sixty-six kilometers from Tokyo, making it one of the most inconvenient airports to get to in the world. Plans to build fast trains that were to connect Tokyo with the airport have been set aside, again due to opposition from residents along the trains' proposed route.

Given traffic conditions, the trip often takes three hours. Since the airport opening, there are reports of passengers arriving at night being unable to make the trip at all, and, unwilling to pay the \$50 for the airport hotel, sleeping in the airport lobby.

Employees of the Foreign Ministry have opposed the airport on this ground. The *Tokyo Shimbun* of August 23, 1977, reported that "The union [of Foreign Ministry Employees] complained that six hours round trip to receive foreign guests would be too excessive. . . . The government should be blamed for irresponsibility when it recklessly and hastily tries to open the airport."

On April 6, representatives of national trade unions, including the largest federation, SOHYO, met with the transportation minister and demanded that a "dialogue" be opened with the farmers. Even the secretary general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party took a "softer" tone than Fukuda, stating that the government should review its position and talk with the farmers.

The leadership of the Socialist and Communist parties originally supported the farmers' struggle, but pulled away from this support in the early 1970s, on the grounds of not wanting to be identified with "extremists." Recently there has been a change in the SP position. On April 20, the SP issued a statement putting the blame solely on the government for the turmoil around the airport and calling for postponement of its opening.

The Communist Party leadership, on the other hand, has called for more government repression against "extremists," writing in the March 28 issue of their paper *Red Flag*, "The Fourth International, which played a leading role in the recent Sanrizuka incidents, is an international counter-revolutionary organization founded by Trotsky . . . with the main aim of destroying the socialist countries and communist parties in the world." Nevertheless, the CP joined the SP and SOHYO in organizing a demonstration of 7,000 the

night the Diet passed the special security law concerning the airport, in protest against this attack on civil liberties.

The breadth of opposition to the Narita airport and to the repressive actions of the government show that it is possible to build a large united movement to protest the arrests and the repressive laws.

Defense of those arrested is now a top priority for the movement. This defense

May Day in Chile

By Lars Palmgren

SANTIAGO-DE-CHILE—It is May Day, for the fifth time since the military dictatorship took power. But by morning you can already tell that this fifth May Day will be different from the four previous ones.

The streets are crowded, and excitement is in the air. On Avenue Bulnes, near the Moneda presidential palace that was bombed, many people have gathered. It seems a little strange, for they are not out for a stroll. They are people who from time to time shout, "Chile, yes, junta, no!" "The people united will never be defeated," and "Trade-union freedom for the final victory." And many people raise their fists.

It is a demonstration, the first big, independent demonstration since the September 11, 1973 coup. It seems a little strange, but wonderful. It's not a tight demonstration; people march in small groups, moving from one side or another. But it is a demonstration, and we are numerous. There may be 4,000 or 5,000 of us; it is hard to make an accurate guess. But there are definitely several thousand of us. And it's May 1! A day of struggle for the workers—and we are in Santiago.

Suddenly, at around eleven o'clock, we hear police sirens. Just then, the first green buses loaded with cops pull up to Avenue Bulnes from adjacent streets. When the police come out, clubs in hand, people begin to run. Some run up the avenue, toward La Moneda, while others run down Avenue Bulnes, but most of the people disperse into nearby streets. That is where we stop to try and catch our breath, and we smile, looking at each other. "Name of God, it's like the old days," someone cries, and we start to laugh.

Then some go back to Avenue Bulnes to try and regroup the demonstrators. But before long we hear the sirens again, and new busloads of cops arrive to chase us away. The cops are scared, they don't know what to do, and so they become hysterically violent. Blows from their clubs rain down on those within their reach, including women and a few children.

Now the first bus is full of arrested people. It takes off for the nearest police station. Soon a second bus is full, and then a third. The cops arrest everyone they can

can be aided by international protests and statements demanding the dropping of charges against the opponents of this dangerous and destructive airport.

Such statements should be sent to the Japanese embassy in each country, with copies to the United League of Sanrizuka and Shibayama Farmers Against the New Tokyo International Airport, Narita City, Japan. □

lay their hands on. But the demonstration goes on as best it can. For several hours, it fills the streets lying between Avenue Bulnes and San Francisco church, located further up on Avenue Alameda. A dozen women seek refuge in a church, but the cops come in behind them and arrest them.

New buses full of cops arrive constantly. They succeed in cutting off contact between different groups. We can't find each other. We remain divided into small groups, an easy prey for the cops. And yet, people don't seem to care whether or not they are arrested. It would have been easy to leave the demonstration and melt into the anonymity of the downtown streets, but few did it. People seemed not to worry about cops that day. After a few hours, everything stopped, but only for a short while.

Several thousand persons head for San Francisco church and take refuge inside. The cops park their green buses outside and wait. Inside, a few speeches are made. We hold each other's hands and sing. Even though it's not the *Internationale* but a different song, it's a song that inspires us to struggle. And outside, the police are waiting.

They have promised not to arrest anyone if we leave the church peacefully. But we decide to exit as a group onto Bulnes Square and not to break up the demonstration until we get there. And that's what happens. Two thousand persons slowly emerge from San Francisco church, descend Avenue Alameda—the main street in Santiago—and gather on Bulnes Square. Nothing happens. On the sidewalks the large crowd watches. So do the cops, without interfering.

Around two o'clock or two-thirty, we reach Bulnes Square, and that's where the demonstration is dispersed. But the whole afternoon, whole evening, and all next day too, there is something different in the atmosphere in Santiago. Something has happened. A new tension is in the air. People murmur to each other: "Did you see what happened yesterday?" Someone answers: "Name of God, it feels so good to run from the cops!" □

Selections From the Left

Internationalen

"The International," central organ of the Communist Workers League (Swedish section of the Fourth International). Published weekly in Stockholm.

The June 9 issue reports:

"The People's Campaign Against Nuclear Energy demonstration in Stockholm drew about 3,000 persons, which is very good when you consider that it was a hot summer day."

Representatives of the various organizations participating in the campaign spoke. *Internationalen* printed the speech given by Göte Kildén, a leader of the Communist Workers League. He said, among other things:

"When a few provocateurs in Göteborg set off a bomb, with the obvious aim of damaging our conference and this demonstration, there is no end of publicity about it. But when about twenty national organizations formed the People's Campaign and managed to publish a mass paper with a circulation of 300,000, there is total silence about that.

"The most scandalous was the attitude of the workers movement paper *Aftonbladet*, which did not say one word or give one millimeter of space to our conference and demonstration.

"By such grotesque distortion of research and the news in the mass media, the nuclear power industry and its political hangers-on want to turn the balance of public opinion in their favor so that they will be able to press ahead with the loading of the Ringhals III plant. . . .

"The worst enemy of the nuclear power industry is full reporting and informed debate. For that reason, it fears a democratic confrontation of arguments and democratic decision-making like the plague.

"And that is also why we must have a popular referendum on nuclear energy, under a truly democratic system. We need a referendum in which the arguments for and against will be fully presented in the workplaces, union organizations and other mass organizations, and in the mass media.

"We are the ones who are going to have to live with the dangers of nuclear energy and we should be the ones to decide whether we are going to have it or not. . . .

"The march out of the nuclear-power society is long and difficult. But the building of the People's Campaign is a big step forward. In this campaign, opponents of nuclear energy and defenders of the environment have united around several important demands, even though participating organizations are extremely diverse. For

us in the Communist Workers League, for instance, a resource-conserving society is possible only through a planned economy under a workers government.

"But despite the differences among the participating organizations, it has been possible to work together around several important issues.

"The People's Campaign Against Nuclear Power has taken its first wobbly step. . . .

"But one thing is clear. Our long march has begun. A new mass movement has been born. Long live the People's Campaign Against Nuclear Power!"

An Phoblacht

"The Republic," weekly newspaper reflecting the views of the Provisional republican movement. Published in Dublin.

Anti-imperialist sentiment has been very high among the Catholic youth in Derry City since the beginning of the present conflict. The May 20 issue of *An Phoblacht* gives a number of examples of the way the British army has been dealing with the problem:

"Young Gary Page, Bluebellhill Gardens, Brandywell, Derry, was arrested recently and during interrogation beaten to the point of massive internal bleeding from the stomach area, requiring his immediate emergency hospitalisation.

"Result was a forced 'confession,' shown to him on his arrival in Strand Row RUC Barracks, typed and awaiting his signature. In this he admitted involvement in shooting a soldier in 1972 when aged 13!

"At his hospital bed, after being charged with murder, he was barely able to tell his father what had happened and scarcely knew the significance of his signature.

"His father had difficulty understanding him in the short time allotted, due to the fact he was constantly vomiting blood into a small basin by his bedside. . . .

"Recently the homes of neighbours across the street from each other in Rathkeele Way, Creggan, were raided and three children lifted [arrested]: Patrick Nelis (16), his brother John (17), and Brian Fahy (17). . . .

"The Nelis family was subjected to virtual 'house arrest' throughout Monday. Two pigs [troop carriers] effectively sealed off the top and bottom of Rathkeele Way, stopping everyone going through on foot.

"The RUC made it clear that Mrs. Nelis, who is active in the Derry Relatives Action Committee, was under no circumstances to be allowed to see her son in Strand Road Barracks. If there were to be visits, only Mr. Nelis was to be allowed in.

"Both sets of parents were allowed to see

their sons after both boys [that is, Brian Fahy and John Nelis; Patrick Nelis was released] had signed statements.

"Both boys looked dazed but their parents couldn't speak to them because of two RUC men present.

"John Fahy was able to learn one disturbing fact: Brian wasn't even sure what he had signed for.

"Brian Fahy is under a doctor's care for a stomach ulcer. His parents got their doctor to agree to examine their son in the RUC barracks. On all three occasions when Dr. Cosgrove tried to visit him, the RUC refused him admittance contrary to law.

"Both youths are charged with membership of the Fianna [a nationalist Boy Scout organization] and 'scouting' during the shooting of a soldier in 1976, when they were only 15 years old. . . .

"On Monday night [May 15], young Sean Tracy (15) was rushed from RUC HQ to Altnagelvin Hospital for an emergency appendectomy—the result of the vicious kicking he had received while being interrogated."

was fun

"What Is To Be Done," weekly paper of the International Marxist Group. Published in Frankfurt, West Germany.

The June 8 issue reports on the results of important local elections held June 4. The Social Democrats' [SPD's] bourgeois coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party [FDP] fell below the minimum percentage required for representation in parliament.

On the other hand, there was a flood of votes for protest slates concentrating on environmental issues. The percentage for these slates came to roughly equal that for the FDP.

In Lower Saxony . . . what happened was not just that the FDP lost out to the "Greens" and the "Bright Colors" [a populist slate dominated by Maoists]. The Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats were less successful than claimed in areas where they run one-party governments. The picture is quite clear in Lower Saxony. The absolute figures show this better than the percentages.

While the number of qualified voters rose by about 110,000 since the time of the last state elections . . . the number who actually voted dropped by 183,000.

All the "established parties" lost votes. The FDP total dropped from about 300,000 to 170,000 for a loss of 130,000 votes. The SPD also lost 130,000 votes (going from 1,850,000 to 1,720,000) and the so-called winners, the Christian Democrats, lost 110,000 votes (falling from 2,098,000 to 1,989,000). The NPD [ultrarightists] lost 10,000 votes, falling back to a total of 17,600. The Communist Party lost 4,000 votes, ending up with 12,700.

The winners in Lower Saxony were the "Greens," who got 177,666 votes. The fact that they did not win votes just from the FDP can be seen most clearly in the Lüchow-Dannenberg district, where Gorleben is located, which has been the site of many demonstrations against the establishment of a nuclear-waste dumping ground.

The Christian Democrats' share of the vote fell from 61.6% to 52.8%, the Social Democrats' from 30.3% to 25.9%, the FDP's from 6.3% to 2.3%. The 'Green Slate for Defending the Environment' got 17.8%.

In Hamburg, the FDP is in a coalition with the Social Democrats, and its losses were out of proportion to the gains of the "Greens" and "Bright Colors." The FDP suffered a disaster because people no longer knew what it represented.

Was it a nationalistic-conservative party thundering against the environmentalists, like the FDP in Hannover? Or was it a liberal party, like the FDP in Hamburg? Was it represented by Minister of the Interior Maihofer, who went over from liberalism to archconservatism, or by Bundestag deputy Helga Schuchardt, who voted against the antiradical decrees and nuclear power plants?

This two-faced, Dr.-Jekyll-and-Mr.-Hyde image confused the voters. So, the more conservative supporters of the FDP voted this time for the Christian Democrats, the "new middle class" elements turned to the Social Democrats, and those interested in defending the environment voted for the "Greens" and the "Bright Colors."

In Hamburg, the number of those casting ballots fell from 1,056,000 in the municipal elections in 1974 to 968,000, a drop of 88,000.

The Christian Democrats lost 63,000 votes (dropping from 423,000 to 360,000).

The FDP lost 68,000 votes (dropping from 113,000 to 45,000).

The Communist Party lost roughly 14,000 votes (dropping from 23,000 to 9,000).

Despite the low turnout, the SPD gained 23,000 votes (going from 469,000 to 493,000). That obviously contrasts sharply with the general trend in which all "established parties" lost votes. But there were some factors favoring the Social Democrats locally. One of these was the fact that the Social Democratic mayor, Heinz Ulrich Klose, who got a reprimand from the Bonn government, interceded actively on behalf of the striking dock workers. The decisive thing, however, was that in 1974 the Social Democrats lost 10% of their vote, and this time they failed to persuade 120,000 of those who voted for them in the 1976 national elections to cast their ballots for them again. . . .

It would thus be quite wrong to see the small gain in the Social Democratic vote as representing any turn or any revival of confidence in the Social Democrats on the part of the workers.

The big surprise in Hamburg was the large vote for the "Bright-Colors" slate. It got 33,000 votes, or 3.5% of the total. The "Green" slate got only 1%. It can be surmised that almost all the 14,000 votes the Communist Party lost went to the "Bright Colors." It certainly got thousands of votes from women who have mobilized in struggle for their emancipation and consider themselves to be in the socialist camp.

Members of the Socialist Bureau [a centrist grouping] and even spontanéists were driven by their consciences to vote for the "Bright Colors" slate in the end. Naturally the comrades of the International Marxist Group also voted for this slate.

Was Tun commented that the bulk of those who voted for the "Bright Colors" list were looking for a socialist alternative.

LA NOVA FALC

"The New Sickle," publication of the Socialist Organization for National Liberation, appears monthly in Perpinya (Perpignan), the center of the Catalan Lands incorporated into the French state.

The May issue takes up the situation following the defeat of the left in the French elections.

"Now that the electoral agitation that mobilized all the political parties has passed and all the glittering promises they made have faded, people have had to confront the harsh reality, especially here in North Catalonia. After the euphoria of the most demagogic campaign in history, and the hopes inspired by the reformist left (the CP and SP), and after the results that we are all familiar with, there has been a discouragement, a great disillusion, a general defeatism.

"Left high and dry by a defeat that they more or less wanted, the would-be government parties are running to the Elysée Palace to pay homage to Giscard. The unions are giving up any combativity to negotiate with a third Barre government that promises the same austerity policy. . . . The workers are being betrayed both by the parties and by the unions that accept a 'social contract.'

"In North Catalonia, this defeatist policy has had the immediate result that there has been little fight put up against a series of factory closings and layoffs . . . which have just happened to come after the elections. . . .

"The workers who have been the victims of these 'economic' measures have put their confidence in the reformist unions . . . and the reformist parties and continue to do so. . . . These organizations have a very great responsibility because they have the capacity, if they wanted to, to mobilize the majority of the workers in a struggle against those who have created a catastrophic economic situation. Instead of doing this, these parties and unions are putting blinders on the workers and limiting their actions to the most sterile discussions with prefects, press communiqués, or 'peaceful' mini-demonstrations. They will not hear of determined powerful actions because that would go against the 'order' that they defend. . . .

"The will of the workers cannot continue to be mocked by their representatives. . . .

"The experience of the recent elections provides a lesson that must be learned. The reformist parties and the unions (which follow them) put the interests of cliques above those of the workers or the people. In North Catalonia, it is not these organizations, which are linked to Paris and centralist by definition, that will pro-

vide the necessary solutions. Only if our people collectively develop political consciousness and a unity of purpose will it be possible to fight back against those who are clearly aiming to destroy our nationality."

THE BOTTOM DOG

The working-class paper of North Munster. Published in Limerick, Ireland.

"The proposed nuclear plant in Wexford is likely to run into determined opposition," an article in the April 24 issue begins. The author notes that massive demonstrations against nuclear power have taken place in the United States and Europe, and asks, "What attitude should working people take to the question?"

"Unlike other sources of energy, nuclear power is inherently unsafe. An oil spillage, no matter how bad, can eventually be cleaned up. Technology has not advanced to the stage where a nuclear 'spillage' could be adequately dealt with. Technology has not even come up with a foolproof method of disposing of nuclear waste!"

Therefore, the author says, the trade-union movement has two tasks:

"1. To organise all-out opposition to the building of these plants anywhere in Ireland. Such plants are an attack on the living conditions of working people. The capitalists have tried to make the working class pay for the economic crisis by attacking our standard of living. Now they are trying to make us pay (with our lives?) for the energy crisis. It is not at all clear that there is an energy crisis. Oil, our most important source of energy, is in the hands of mighty multinational companies. They are the only ones who really know the extent of our oil reserves in the ground. It wouldn't be the first time private enterprise created an artificial shortage so as to shove up prices—and profits. Which brings us to the second task of the Labour Movement.

"2. To force these giant companies to open their books and information to the trade unions. They must be made to let us know what the real extent of our energy reserves are. . . .

"If there really is an energy crisis then working people are certainly not to blame, and should not have to pay by having a killer industry in their midst. . . .

"As elsewhere, the people of this country are not likely to be blackmailed by politicians like Des O'Malley who said, at the Fianna Fail Ard-Feis, that if Wexford refused the nuclear plant then there were plenty of other places in Ireland that would only be too delighted to get the (few) jobs it would involve. We must let O'Malley know that we are not going to put our lives and environment at risk just to ensure that Fianna Fail's promised job target is met."



Lou Howort/Militant

Thousands Commemorate Execution of Rosenbergs

By Susan Wald

NEW YORK—Thousands gathered here in Union Square June 19 for a four-hour tribute marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the U.S. government's legal murder of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

As the rally got under way there were about 1,500 persons present. But within an hour, the crowd had swelled to more than 3,000. Many were older persons who said they had been among the demonstrators who had thronged Union Square on that same night in 1953 to express their revulsion and outrage as the monstrous political frame-up claimed its victims.

Michael and Robert Meeropol, the Rosenbergs' sons, introduced the speakers and read messages from those who could not attend. Also cochairing the rally were Helen Sobell and Morton Sobell. Morton Sobell, convicted, like the Rosenbergs, of "conspiracy" to pass the "secret" of the atomic bomb to the Soviet Union, served nineteen years in prison.

Many groups and political organizations set up literature tables at the rally, including the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, supporters of the *Guardian* newspaper, National Lawyers Guild, Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran, and Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights.

Ron Kovic, a disabled Vietnam veteran, spoke of how the mass movement against the Vietnam war and the Watergate revelations had swept away the last vestiges of a political climate in which the Rosenbergs' Communist sympathies could send them to the electric chair.

"They called it 'the crime of the century.' You know as well as I do that the biggest criminals of this century live in Washington, D.C.," Kovic said.

Denouncing U.S. military moves in Africa, Kovic declared, "We send a message to Washington that if they try to do it one more time, we're going to fill the

streets of this country." He received loud applause.

A theme of the rally was "Unite Against Today's Repression," and many of the nineteen or more speakers addressed the need to defend current victims of government witch-hunting.

David Dellinger, a longtime antiwar activist, spoke of the recent conviction of David Truong and Ronald Humphrey on charges of spying for the government of Vietnam (see *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, May 22, 1978, p. 605.)

"Truong was singled out to create the same atmosphere of cold war and hysteria," Dellinger said.

Truong sent a message to the rally from the Alexandria, Virginia, jail where he is being held pending appeal of his and Humphrey's conviction.

A message was also read from the Reverend Ben Chavis, one of the Wilmington Ten defendants. Chavis called for a "fight to abolish the death penalty and save its intended victim, my brother Imani, Johnny Harris, in Alabama."

Dianne Feeley, candidate of the Socialist Workers Party for governor of New York, spoke of the SWP's fight to force the government to comply with a court order and turn over the files of eighteen informers it has used against the SWP and Young Socialist Alliance. She was greeted by applause when she said, "Our attorneys are filing a motion that Attorney General Bell be cited for contempt of court and held in jail" until he agrees to deliver the files.

Other speakers included Irwin Silber, executive editor of the *Guardian*, Milton Reverby, representing District 65, Distributive Workers of America; Henry Winston, national chairman of the Communist Party; Miriam Schneir, co-author of *Invitation to an Inquest*, an exposé of the Rosenberg frameup; the American Indian Move-

ment leader Russell Means; and actor Ossie Davis.

Marshall Perlin, an attorney involved in efforts to reopen the case, described how documents recently obtained under the Freedom of Information Act show how the judge and prosecutor collaborated with the FBI in concocting the frame-up that sent the Rosenbergs to their deaths.

"It is time we demand that Judge Irving Kaufman, the prosecutor, and the forces in the government that committed this heinous crime be brought to account, so that Julius and Ethel will be vindicated, and it will never happen again." □

Zia Claims Victory

Maj. Gen. Ziaur Rahman, the military dictator of Bangladesh, claimed a victory in the June 3 presidential elections. According to the official figures, Zia won 77 percent of the votes, against 20 percent for his principal rival, Gen. M.A.G. Osmani.

Osmani's supporters claimed widespread vote fraud. "There were very, very extensive irregularities around the country," Osmani said. "They have thrown our people out of the polling places, and they have cast all the votes for themselves." Journalists confirmed some instances of rigging, but were unable to establish an overall pattern of fraud.

In any case, the elections were far from democratic. The country is still under martial law, thousands of political prisoners are in jail, and there are a number of restrictions on leftist political parties.

Zia himself came to power in November 1975 during an uprising within the military. He has approved the execution of scores of dissidents. He proclaimed himself president in April 1977 and called the elections to legitimize his position. He has called elections for December to establish a parliament, although as president he will continue to wield dominant influence.