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Peru Unionists on Hunger Strike



Marka

Hundreds join hunger strike to demand rehiring of activists fired after July general strike. See p. 230.

Gerry Foley:

Ireland—The Pendulum Begins to Swing to Left

Statement of the Fourth International

Solidarity With the Tunisian Workers!

[The following statement was issued February 3 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. We have taken the text from the February 4-5 issue of the French Trotskyist daily *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press /Inprecor*.]

* * *

The general strike of January 26 and the repression unleashed by the Nouira government signals a major crisis for a regime that for twenty years has been presented as a model of stability and progress by all advocates of imperialism and neocolonialism.

Under the lash of the economic crisis, unemployment, neglect, and growing impoverishment, the exploited masses, led by the working class, have turned out in more and more powerful upsurges that began with economic demands and led to a political confrontation with the regime. The trade-union federation UGTT (General Union of Tunisian Workers), although controlled since its inception by leading figures in the ruling Destour Socialist Party, has had to gradually take its distance from the government and act as a vehicle for mass discontent, to the point of declaring a general strike.

Faced with the working-class upsurge, the regime led by the "Supreme Combatant" has had to shed its mask. So much for paternalism, "liberalism," and astute maneuvers. The strikers and demonstrators in Tunis and other cities were answered with repression, with the weapons of the police and army, with the ruling party's shock troops, with provocateurs on the government payroll. A massacre unprecedented in North Africa in the postcolonial era has taken place.

It is urgent to counter the reactionary wave of repression sweeping over the country. We must demand immediate repeal of the state of emergency, the release of all prisoners, respect for all democratic freedoms, and independence and freedom of action for the UGTT. The government and bosses must be compelled to meet the demands that gave rise to the working-class upsurge and the general strike.

The international workers movement has expressed solidarity with the Tunisian workers movement. Many trade-union federations have condemned the repression against the UGTT, its leaders and activists. They should continue their campaign and refuse to have any relations

with the puppets that the government wants to install in place of the jailed leaders.

Actions and campaigns should be undertaken, especially in the countries where immigrant workers and Tunisian students have already taken part in demonstrations

against the murderous Nouira-Bourguiba regime.

For the immediate release of all the prisoners!

For independence of the UGTT!

Down with the repressive Nouira-Bourguiba regime!

NEWS ANALYSIS

Israeli Settlements 'There To Stay'

By Matilde Zimmermann

Jimmy Carter's much publicized criticism of Israel for building new settlements in occupied Arab territory was presented in most U.S. newspapers as "lining up with the Arabs" on a key question in the current round of Middle East negotiations.

It should have been obvious—even before Carter proposed the sale of almost \$2 billion worth of the most advanced fighter planes to Israel—that no such "tilt toward the Arabs" was under way.

The Israelis have been going full steam ahead with settlements in the Sinai and West Bank—which now number more than 100—ever since the current "peace offensive" began. The first week of January, the government settlement committee announced plans to spend \$24.5 million for Sinai settlements.

Israeli television reported January 5 that 100 settlements were planned for the Rafah area of the Sinai alone. On January 10, four new settlements in the West Bank were approved, and Israeli newspapers revealed that the 1978 budget included a large increase in expenditures for absorbing new settlers.

The new settlement at Shiloh in the heart of the West Bank was passed off as an "archaeological expedition," despite the fact that there was not a single archaeologist among the ten families and forty students who moved there.

The Shiloh settlers, members of the extreme Zionist group Gush Emunim, held a cornerstone ceremony for their new town and openly boasted to reporters that the archaeology dig was just a cover for permanent settlement.

Even some Israeli newspapers have ridiculed the transparency of the archaeology fiction.

It was the Shiloh incident that prompted

Carter to send a note to the Israeli government January 28 expressing his confidence that Premier Menahem Begin would "honor the commitment made personally to me and thus will not permit this settlement to go forward."

Carter, who has characterized settlements as "illegal" and "an obstacle to peace," claimed January 30 that Moshe Dayan had "promised" him, in September, that Israel would hold off on starting new settlements "for a year." Both Begin and Dayan deny this.

"In my talks with President Carter in Washington in September 1977," Dayan told the Israeli parliament February 1, "I told him that all [Israeli] governments in the future, just as in the past, will continue settlements in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank]." Dayan said that the only "restriction" he agreed to was that for the few remaining months of 1977, new settlements would be "installed in military camps."

Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat arrived in the United States February 3 prepared to press the advantage of a supposed Washington-Tel Aviv rift on the settlement question and convince the Carter administration to step up the pressure on its Zionist ally.

But it was Sadat who got pressured—whisked off to two days in seclusion at Camp David, Maryland, where Carter told him to "moderate" his demands. In particular, Carter said that the U.S. could not endorse the Arab demand that Israel give up all the territory acquired in the 1967 war.

Carter's position on Israeli settlements is the same as that of his predecessors. While officially suggesting that Israel refrain from setting up permanent civilian settle-



DAYAN: Says he has Carter's OK.

ments in the Arab lands conquered in 1967, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter have poured economic and military support behind the expansionist state.

The latest round was no exception. Three weeks after Carter scolded Begin and only a few days after Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said that Israeli settlements in the Sinai violate international law and "therefore should not exist," Carter proposed to sell eighty of the most advanced war planes to Israel at a cost of \$1.9 billion. This was combined with a proposal to sell smaller planes to Egypt (which, Carter emphasized, Sadat had promised would not be used against Israel).

There were some predictions that Congress would veto the sale of fighter planes to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, one defense expert has shown that even if the whole package is approved, Israel will benefit more than the two Arab countries.

According to Dale Tahtinen of the American Enterprise Institute, the planes Israel will get are superior to anything else in the Middle East, while the planes for Egypt are smaller, have a shorter range, and are less modern. The February 17 *New York Trib* reports Tahtinen as saying that the chief advantage of the F 5Es to Egypt is that they will help President Anwar el-Sadat stay in political power.

And, just in case there was still any illusion that Carter was seriously trying to get the Zionists to pull back, Moshe Dayan emerged smiling from a "courtesy call" on Carter February 16 and told reporters, "The settlements are there to stay." □

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Editor: Joseph Hansen.

Contributing Editors: Pierre Frank, Livio Mai-tan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

Editorial Staff: Michael Baumann, Jon Britton, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Fred Murphy, Susan Wald, Matilde Zimmermann.

Business Manager: Harvey McArthur.

Copy Editor: David Martin.

Technical Staff: Paul Deveze, Ellen Fischer, Larry Ingram, Arthur Lobman, James M. Morgan, Sally Rhett.

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Carter Drops 'Hands Off' Pretense in Ethiopian War

By Ernest Harsch

The war in the Ogaden desert region of Ethiopia has escalated sharply since late January, when Ethiopian forces launched a counteroffensive aimed at putting down local Somali insurgents and at driving out Somali army forces that advanced into the area in July 1977.

With the stepped-up war has come a significant increase in international involvement, as Washington, Moscow, and more than a dozen other governments vie to protect and advance their particular interests.

The Ogaden region itself is largely desert and has a population of only about a million and a half Somali nomads. But this population is struggling for freedom from Ethiopian control. The outcome of this struggle could have far-reaching repercussions, not only for the Ethiopian and Somali regimes and for the other oppressed nationalities living under Ethiopian domination, but for much of Africa and the Middle East as well. The Horn of Africa's strategic location on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean adds importance to the conflicts now unfolding there.

Carter Sends Gunboats

The American imperialists have signaled their concern over the mounting unrest in the Horn by sending two U.S. warships to the Red Sea, off the coast of Eritrea. According to a report in the February 8 *Christian Science Monitor*, Pentagon sources disclosed that "the destroyer USS Davis and the frigate USS Truett were dispatched to the Red Sea as a possible show of American force in the region."

Though the Carter administration claims that it is following a "hands off" policy toward the Horn, such gunboat diplomacy confirms the danger of direct imperialist military intervention. It is designed to remind the contending forces that U.S. interests are at stake and that Washington is ready to defend them with armed intervention if necessary. Carter is no doubt also using the deployment of the warships to test domestic and international reaction to stepped-up U.S. involvement.

To create a domestic climate more favorable to Pentagon ventures in the area, Carter and other White House officials have made frequent denunciations of Soviet and Cuban "interference" on the side of the Ethiopian regime.

On February 4, for instance, the White House suggested that Cuban pilots were flying bombing raids into Somalia. Five

days later Secretary of State Cyrus Vance claimed that 2,000 Cuban troops were fighting Somali forces in the Ogaden and that more were "probably on the way." By February 17, the State Department had raised the number of Cubans to 5,000.

Although both Moscow and Addis Ababa have publicly assured Washington that the current Ethiopian offensive would not spill over the border into Somalia proper, Vance warned February 10 that Washington might reconsider its "hands off" policy if it did.

Cuban 'Mercenaries' Denounced

The *New York Times* chimed in on cue February 15, denouncing the Cubans editorially as "tools of Soviet imperial purposes" and "the world's foremost intercontinental force of mercenaries."

In all their condemnations of Moscow and Havana, however, the White House officials conveniently ignored the fact that Washington itself had armed and trained the Ethiopian military for more than two decades, under both Selassie and the current military junta, known as the Dergue. From 1954 to 1977, about \$350 million in American arms were provided and at times up to 6,000 U.S. "advisers" were stationed there.

Moscow, for its part, has made no secret of its support for the repressive and pro-capitalist junta. It calls the Dergue and its chairman, Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, "progressive" and has condemned the Eritreans, Somalis, and other oppressed nationalities struggling for their freedom.

On January 19, the Soviet Communist Party daily *Pravda* said that Moscow was supplying the Dergue with "appropriate material and technical assistance for repulsing aggression." Though the Kremlin rulers have provided few details of the scope of their aid to the junta, reporters have described seeing Soviet automatic weapons, artillery, tanks, and MIG jet fighters. The Eritrean freedom fighters have captured and displayed some Soviet tanks.

On February 12, Ethiopian commanders in Harar told foreign journalists for the first time that Soviet and Cuban "advisers and technicians" were aiding the regime, though they were said not to be involved in the actual fighting. Mengistu confirmed this two days later, stating that the Soviet and Cuban personnel were "acquainting" Ethiopians in the use of the new and unfamiliar Soviet equipment.

Moscow has justified its support to the Dergue on the grounds that the junta is resisting foreign "aggression," a reference to the drive of Somali troops mounted by the Siad Barre regime from neighboring Somalia to help the Somali guerrillas in the Ogaden. In a similar manner Moscow suggests that the Eritrean freedom fighters are tools of reactionary Arab regimes.

The Soviet military aid has been used not only against the Eritrean and Somali nationalists, however. It is also directed against leftist opponents of the regime in Addis Ababa and other major cities. According to numerous reports from Addis Ababa, hundreds of alleged supporters of the underground Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party have been killed over the past few months in what the Dergue calls its "red terror."

Bargaining Chips

The Kremlin's basic aim in arming the Dergue is to gain additional political influence in the region so as to strengthen its bargaining hand in behind-the-scenes dealings with imperialism. For the same reason, it also armed and helped train the troops of the Somali regime until its advisers were expelled in November.

In opposing the Eritrean and Somali struggles, Moscow is echoing the position of most of the African capitalist regimes, which fear that any successful secessionist struggle or change in the existing borders could encourage the oppressed nationalities in their own countries.

The Carter administration would like to check increasing Soviet and Cuban influence in Ethiopia. It would also like to take advantage of the rift between Moscow and the Somali regime by drawing the latter closer to U.S. imperialism. Nonetheless, the White House has so far turned down Somali President Mohammed Siad Barre's repeated appeals for American arms.

Like Moscow and most of the African states, Washington fears a successful struggle by the Somalis in the Ogaden for independence from Ethiopia and unification with Somalia. Besides the long-term impact that it could have throughout Africa, the unification of the Ogaden with Somalia would inspire the Somalis in Kenya and Djibouti to advance their own struggles.

Secretary of State Vance expressed concern over such a prospect February 10 when he demanded, in stronger terms than

any White House official had used previously, that the Somali troops in the Ogaden be withdrawn. "We believe it is fundamental," he said, "that there be a recognition and a respect by all parties of the internationally recognized borders."

Coupled with his statement that Washington would not give arms to the Siad Barre regime as long as Ethiopian troops did not invade Somalia itself, Vance's pronouncements amount to tacit approval for the Ethiopian campaign to crush the Somali upsurge in the Ogaden.

Despite its anti-Washington rhetoric, the Ethiopian regime itself has noted the Carter administration's support on the question of the Ogaden. In an interview in the February issue of the London monthly *New African Development*, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Feleke Gedle-Giorgis concluded by noting that "the USA has recognized our territorial integrity and condemned Somali aggression on a number of occasions."

In a more overt gesture toward the Dergue, Carter dispatched a personal envoy, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security David L. Aaron, to Ethiopia February 17 to seek improved ties with the regime. A few months earlier, Congress approved the allocation of \$10 million in relief aid to the Ethiopian junta.

The Israeli Connection

Washington's strongest ally in the region—Israel—has provided direct military aid to the Dergue.

Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan publicly admitted this for the first time February 6, stating, "We are selling some arms to Ethiopia. We have had cooperation with Ethiopia for years, never with Somalia. We want to retain the good relationship with Ethiopia. The fact that we are on the same side as the Soviets in this matter, well, that's another question."

Since Israel gets about four-fifths of its oil supplies via the Red Sea, it has long opposed the Eritrean independence struggle, which it sees as a threat. The fact that the Eritreans and Somalis have received some backing from some Arab regimes, as well as from the Palestine Liberation Organization, has been an added inducement for Israel's support for the Dergue.

According to a report in the January issue of the New York monthly *African Mirror*, in 1976 "Israel and Ethiopia signed a secret contract for about 40 Israeli experts to train a new Ethiopian army task force of approximately 15,000 men in the techniques of guerrilla warfare. Further, the agreement includes a shipment of 650 tons of arms and ammunition to assist Ethiopia in its struggle in the Horn of Africa."

The Israeli arms aid has included communications equipment, ammunition, missiles, cluster bombs, and napalm. Much of it was of Soviet manufacture, captured by



Washington Post

the Israelis from Egyptian and Syrian forces during the 1973 Middle East war. In return, Israel was allowed to use facilities on two islands off the coast of Eritrea.

There have been a number of reports that this Israeli aid was given with American encouragement. According to the November 12, 1977, London *Economist*, the Israelis had wanted to reduce their assistance in early 1977, but were persuaded by Washington to maintain it.

In mid-1977, when Somali forces in the Ogaden started to make significant gains, the Carter administration again urged greater Israeli aid. The Americans argued, according to the *Economist*, "that though it was important for the west to keep a foothold in Ethiopia, they themselves could not directly help the Mengistu regime because (a) it was so closely tied to the Soviet Union and (b) Saudi Arabia and Egypt openly supported the Somali side. Reluctant or not, Israel responded. . . . America footed the bill."

In a dispatch from Jerusalem in the February 8 *Christian Science Monitor*, correspondent Francis Ofner reported, "The whole issue was discussed when Moshe Dayan stopped over in Brussels in September last year and conferred with NATO commander Alexander Haig."

The regime in Kenya, which also receives substantial American economic and military aid, has extended its open diplomatic support to the Dergue as well. There are several hundred thousand Somalis in Kenya's Northeastern District, and the regime obviously fears that a Somali victory in the Ogaden would inspire them to step up their resistance to Kenyan rule. In September 1977, a joint Ethiopian-Kenyan

declaration condemned "the brazen and naked aggression on Ethiopia by the Democratic Republic of Somalia. . . ."

The pro-Washington regime of Gen. Gaafar al-Nimeiry in the Sudan, although it has given some backing to the Eritreans and Somalis in the past, is now moving toward closer ties with the Dergue.

Sadiq al-Mahdi, now a close adviser to Nimeiry, was quoted in the January 25 *Christian Science Monitor* as saying that a fragmentation of Ethiopia would be "disastrous for Sudan in particular and the Arabs in general." (The Arab-dominated regime in Khartoum itself spent many years fighting a Black nationalist rebellion in the southern part of the country.)

Since the Eritrean independence fighters have used the Sudan as a refuge and as a transit route for their outside assistance, a rapprochement between Nimeiry and Mengistu could hamper the Eritrean struggle against Ethiopian rule.

An Unusual Lineup of Forces

The Dergue also has a broad range of other foreign supporters. In a dispatch from Addis Ababa, David B. Ottaway reported in the October 8, 1977, *Washington Post* that the Ethiopian regime's backers "included Libya, Israel, South Korea, and West Germany together with Cuba, East Germany, North Korea and the Soviet Union."

East German economic aid has been promised for expansion of the port of Assab, in Ethiopian-occupied Eritrea. The West German government has provided advisers and materiel for the Ethiopian police force. Uniforms for the Dergue's army and "People's Militia" have come from South Korea, and the Libyan regime has given money, arms, and diplomatic support.

The regime in South Yemen, a former supporter of the Eritreans, is now also aiding the Dergue. And according to a report in the February 10 issue of the Swedish Trotskyist weekly *Internationalen*, the Swedish aircraft corporation SAAB has sold planes to the Ethiopian regime.

Meanwhile, Washington and its allies have sought to keep their options open toward the Somali regime in Mogadishu as well, giving a limited amount of direct and indirect assistance.

In November 1977, the shah of Iran revealed that he would send light arms and medical supplies to Somalia. And during Siad Barre's visit to Tehran the following month, the shah declared, "We must say that if Ethiopia violates Somalia's recognized borders, Iran will not stand by idly."

King Khalid in Saudi Arabia has reportedly supplied about sixty French AMX tanks to Mogadishu and is financing Somali arms purchases on the world market. *Newsweek* correspondent Arnaud de

Borchgrave reported from Somalia in the February 20 issue that the Siad Barre regime had ordered through a Spanish company forty-three Cobra helicopter gunships from Italy, as well as other military equipment.

\$500 a Week for Vietnam Veterans?

"I was also told," de Borchgrave said, "that a British firm named Secrun, Ltd.—which has links with Samm, a Paris-based arms company—was approached to supply 183 Americans with Vietnam experience to fly and maintain the helicopters at salaries of \$500 to \$1,000 a week." He added that the deal had not yet been consummated.

Secretary of State Vance has denied that Washington okayed the transfer of *American* arms to Somalia by the Iranian and Saudi Arabian regimes. But State Department representative John Trattner noted February 13, "It's no secret that the Iranians and the Saudis are very concerned about the extent of Soviet involvement in Ethiopia, as we are."

The *Washington Post* reported the next day, "U.S. officials acknowledged privately that Iran and Saudi Arabia are financing or otherwise helping to supply non-American arms to Somalia, purchased on the world market or obtained from other Middle Eastern nations."

Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat has publicly admitted that he is supplying about \$30 million worth of military aid, mostly light weapons and ammunition, to Mogadishu. On February 15, an Egyptian plane was forced down at the Nairobi airport by Kenyan jets while it was on its way to Somalia with artillery shells and explosives.

Egyptian military representatives in Cairo have acknowledged that Sadat discussed the question of aiding the Somali regime during his talks with Carter in Washington February 3-4.

In addition, the Iraqi regime, which receives much of its military equipment from Moscow, has shipped some arms to Somalia. Syrian air force technicians and instructors are aiding the Somali air force, while the Pakistani regime has promised some light weapons.

Although West German police advisers are aiding the Dergue, the West German government has at the same time pledged to give \$25 million in financial and technical assistance to Mogadishu. The British government turned down Siad Barre's appeals for arms, but promised some economic assistance.

The February 1 issue of the Paris weekly *Jeune Afrique* reported that Peking has shipped some military assistance to Somalia as well.

So far, however, the amount of aid Siad Barre has gotten has been limited in comparison to the Ethiopian regime's huge arsenal and has been restricted largely to light weapons. Even without the massive Soviet arms shipments, the Dergue has greater resources for a long war than Mogadishu does; Ethiopia's total population is about thirty million, while Somalia's is only a little more than three million.

Most of the Somali regime's heavy arms were either lost or badly damaged during the fighting in the Ogaden last year. Only 30 of its 300 tanks are still in operation, all of its helicopters have been grounded, and only 9 out of 52 Mig fighters can still fly.

David B. Ottaway commented in the February 8 *Washington Post* that "if western nations begin providing Somalia with heavy arms too soon, they could simply be used to ward off the Ethiopian counteroffensive and to tighten the Somali grip on the Ogaden."

There are also indications that the imperialists and their allies may be using a *promise* of greater arms aid as an inducement to get the Somali regime to abandon its support for the Somali guerrillas in the Ogaden.

Though no reporters have visited the battle lines since the Ethiopian offensive began, there are indications that the Ethiopian military superiority has begun to have an impact. The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) has admitted making "tactical withdrawals" and the Ethiopian forces are reportedly advancing toward the Somali-held city of Jijiga and along the railway line to Djibouti, which has been cut by Somali guerrillas since last June.

On February 11, Siad Barre ordered a full-scale military mobilization and declared a state of emergency "for the defense of the unity and existence of the Somali nation." For the first time, he admitted that regular Somali troops were fighting in the Ogaden alongside the forces of the WSLF.

Even if the Dergue is successful in reoccupying the Ogaden's towns and cities, however, it will have much greater difficulty in bringing the region itself under firm control. The Somali nomads have clearly expressed their hatred for Ethiopian domination and have a long history of struggle against the central government in Addis Ababa. □

After Stalinists Cancel General Work Stoppage

Peruvian Union Militants Go on Hunger Strike

By Fred Murphy

The Peruvian military government brought charges against fifty-four trade unionists February 10, in an effort to halt a hunger-strike movement that began January 28.

The hunger strike was initiated at a Catholic convent in Lima by eight workers—union militants who have been without work or unemployment benefits since being dismissed from their jobs for their role in the July 19, 1977, general strike.

The strikers asked for reinstatement at their old jobs, and also demanded that 5,000 others dismissed after the July work

stoppage also be rehired. In addition, they demanded speedy public trials for the union leaders charged with responsibility for the July strike, amnesty for political prisoners, and the return of the trade unionists and political figures currently exiled from Peru.

The government first responded by offering on January 30 to restore the jobs of the eight workers alone. This was rejected out of hand: ". . . we are struggling for *every one*. . . and we would not be capable of such an act of disloyalty to our working-class compañeros," the strikers said.

The regime imposed censorship on the

daily press and radio and television to keep reports of the hunger strike from reaching the public. Police units and PIP¹ agents surrounded the convent, intimidating journalists and forcing the cancellation of one news conference the strikers tried to hold.

But the movement nevertheless gained support. By February 2, more than 200 persons had joined the hunger strike at several other churches in Lima and in

1. Policía de Investigaciones del Perú (Peru Investigations Police), the regime's political police.

other cities such as Cuzco, Puno, Trujillo, Chimbote, and Cajamarca. Political prisoners in jails in Callao and Lurigancho also declared hunger strikes.

Most of the strikers were fired trade-unionists like the initial eight, but lawyers, relatives of fired activists, and other workers also joined in solidarity.

At 4 a.m. on February 7, eighteen PIP agents invaded the convent where the hunger strike began and removed seven of the original eight strikers to a government hospital. (The eighth had been hospitalized shortly after the strike began.) But they still refused to eat, and issued a statement saying "we will continue to the end."

The hunger strikers modeled their struggle on the movement in Bolivia in January that won a broad political amnesty and restoration of trade-union freedoms. But the immediate cause of the hunger strike was the betrayal of what could have been a far more powerful show of working-class strength.

In December, a national assembly of the CGTP,² the main trade-union federation in Peru, issued a call for a forty-eight-hour general strike on January 23-24, around the same demands later raised in the hunger strike.

The countrywide work stoppage was also to demand an across-the-board wage increase to offset a series of big price increases—a key part of the austerity policy the International Monetary Fund has forced the military government to impose.

By mid-January the CGTP's call had received broad support from all the key independent union federations, as well as the two main peasant organizations and most of the working-class political parties. The Comando Unitario de Lucha (CUL—United Struggle Command), which organized the July 1977 actions, was reconstituted to involve all these forces. A CGTP delegates' assembly held January 15 reaffirmed the strike call and empowered the CUL to make all further decisions about the work stoppage.

Interior Minister Luis Cisneros Vizcarra threatened on January 9 and again on January 13 to "do everything in my power to cause the strike to fail."

Then on January 19, the government suddenly accused Ecuadorean troops of attacking a Peruvian garrison across the border between the two countries. Foreign Minister José de la Puente warned that such violations "could affect peace."

At the same time, President Francisco Morales Bermúdez sent a letter to the CGTP leadership expressing "hope that we might all collaborate to the best of our abilities in these crucial moments for the fatherland. . . ."

The CGTP is dominated by the Communist Party, whose policy in recent months has been to give lukewarm support to the struggle against the austerity policy while seeking a "dialogue" with the junta. Deep discontent with this line—and with the CP's earlier uncritical support of the Velasco Alvarado government—erupted in early January in an open split that reached into the upper layers of the CGTP. But the top union bureaucrats who line up with the leadership faction of the CP were ready to respond to the president's bid for "collaboration."

In a meeting with the minister of labor the morning of January 19, Eduardo Castillo of the CGTP National Executive Council (CEN) unilaterally agreed to call off the strike. He drafted a public communiqué to that effect, citing the "request of the president of the republic" and the danger of "war with Ecuador."

Castillo then called a CEN meeting for five p.m. the same day. He was unable to get a quorum for a formal vote, and was supported only by a narrow majority of the members who did arrive on such short notice. Only the CUL actually had the authority to cancel the strike, but it was never consulted at all.

By the time of the rump CEN meeting, Castillo's communiqué was already on the front pages of the government's daily newspapers and in the hands of the radio and television stations. The regime insured that it received the widest possible publicity.

Héctor García Neyra explained how he and the other seven who initiated the hunger strike were affected by this development:

We had put all our hopes in the general strike. It had awakened great expectations among us. We saw in the strike a good possibility of being reinstated. Thus its suspension hit us like a knife in the back.

We thought: if some of our leaders have abandoned us, if they have turned their backs on us, then we will have to defend ourselves alone. So we decided to launch a hunger strike. [Quoted in the Lima weekly *Marka*, February 9.]

Having been presented with a fait accompli by a handful of Stalinist bureaucrats, the other unions and organizations that had been building the general strike acceded, under strong protest, to its cancellation. The CUL issued a statement January 21 that outlined the facts of Castillo's maneuvers and then said:

All this raises the problem of the leadership of the union movement. The CUL, consistent with its defense of the interests of the populace, . . . agrees:

1. To reject and condemn the communiqué that, in the name of the "National Council" of the CGTP, agreed to suspend the January 23-24 general strike.

2. To declare the group of leaders headed by Eduardo Castillo . . . traitors to the working class and the people of Peru. . . .

3. The CUL calls on the militant working-class ranks of the CGTP to uphold the unity of their

federation . . . energetically cleansing it of all traitorous elements. . . .

4. To support resolutely the struggles that the workers and peasants are carrying out independently of this sellout, such as the heroic struggle of the SIDERPERU workers and the strike by all the people of Chimbote that is to begin January 23. . . .

The statement ended by calling for a mass rally in Lima February 9 to reaffirm the demands of the aborted general strike. A number of CGTP unions later declared their support for that action, as did the dissident faction of the CP.

Despite being denied the valuable national solidarity that the general strike could have brought, the 5,200 workers at the state-owned steel works SIDERPERU in Chimbote won a victory in their fifty-two-day strike January 26.

Their main demands had been for restoration of automatic cost-of-living wage increases that the regime had refused to pay since October 1975, and an end to wage cuts brought about by arbitrary transfers within the plant.

The SIDERPERU unions won the latter demand, and were granted across-the-board wage hikes and a percentage increase that in effect restored the cost-of-living raises they had failed to get earlier. The government also agreed to cancel the dismissals of 240 workers who had been ordered fired for their role in the strike.

Mobilizations by the people of Chimbote and Ancash Province were instrumental in the steelworkers' victory. Three province-wide general strikes were held on January 5, January 12-13, and January 23-25. These were preceded and accompanied by popular assemblies and mass meetings involving up to 20,000 persons.

The mobilizations occurred in the face of harsh repression. Government troops killed three persons and wounded dozens of others January 13. A state of emergency and dusk-to-dawn curfew were imposed in Chimbote January 24.

The regime's actions did not stop the movement. In the course of the solidarity mobilizations with the steelworkers, the people of Chimbote and Ancash Province raised their own demands—for electrification, clean water, adequate sanitation, and so on. Dozens of neighborhood committees were organized in Chimbote, and a province-wide coordinating committee of unions and popular organizations emerged. This body, the CCOSPA, has remained in existence and is continuing to press the region's demands. □

Chile Denationalizes Tire Industry

Corfo-Insa, Chile's largest tire manufacturer, has been sold by the Pinochet government to Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company for \$34 million.

Goodyear de Chile, a subsidiary of the giant U.S. rubber corporation, will operate the facility, which employs about 2,000 persons.

2. Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos (General Confederation of Peruvian Workers).

General Strike Fails to Budge Somoza

By Eduardo Medrano

Business sectors in Nicaragua formally ended a two-week general strike against the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle on February 5. But many workers refused to return to their jobs for several more days.

The country-wide work stoppage began January 23 as a protest against the January 10 murder of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, publisher of the Mangua daily *La Prensa* and the best-known opponent of the Somoza family's decades-long dictatorship.

The strike was called by the opposition coalition known as UDEL* and supported by most of the business groups in the country not directly tied to the Somozas' own commercial empire. These sectors hoped to force Somoza to resign through a show of the mass opposition to his rule.

The strike call was enthusiastically welcomed by the Nicaraguan masses. Workers, shopkeepers, doctors, nurses, government employees, students, and housewives throughout the country joined the movement. At its height, 90 percent of commerce and industry was reported paralyzed.

But Somoza refused to budge, and his bourgeois opponents, fearful of the consequences that further mass mobilizations could have for their own positions, decided to call a halt to the strike. By February 8, most of the country's economy was again functioning.

The movement nevertheless demonstrated the depth of the masses' hatred for Somoza. This was further shown in municipal elections held February 5 in all cities and towns except Managua, the capital. Fifty-two out of 132 candidates of the Conservative Party (the only legal opposition) withdrew voluntarily, and there was a massive boycott of the polls. The regime admitted February 6 that only 143,000 out of 700,000 eligible voters—just over 20 percent—had turned out. Of these, it claimed all but 7,000 had voted for Somoza's Nationalist Liberal Party.

Discontent is bound to deepen further as the dictatorship's cover-up of the facts in the Chamorro murder unravels. "The glaring deficiencies in the Government's performance so far have cast serious doubts on its impartiality in the case," Alan



La Prensa

MATEARE, Nicaragua, January 30. Workers and peasants march to public assembly as general strike spread throughout the country.

Riding reported from Managua in the February 14 *New York Times*.

Chamorro family attorney Roberto Argüello Hurtado told Riding: "It's quite obvious there's a cover-up. There are many people involved and there must be big shots in this or else a cover-up wouldn't be necessary."

"The investigating judge also seems to be on strike," Xavier Chamorro, brother of the slain journalist, told Riding. "The judge is doing nothing. He isn't calling witnesses that should be called, he isn't asking questions that should be asked, he is showing no interest in getting to the bottom of things. There's a cover-up in all areas."

Chamorro's widow, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, said "the government claims the case has been solved, but I hold Somoza responsible because no one does anything without permission from above."

A few days earlier Col. Aquiles Aranda Escobar of Somoza's National Guard had announced there was nothing more to investigate because "the case has already been cleared up."

Some facts have come to light that bear out the skepticism voiced by Chamorro's relatives and associates, however. The judge assigned to the case, Guillermo Anastasio Rivas Cuadra, is not only a member of the party controlled by Somoza but also belongs to a family that has long been associated with the tyrant.

Rivas Cuadra ignored evidence that could have been provided by five Cuban-Americans who worked at Plasmaferesis, the blood-plasma export company managed by Pedro Ramos. Ramos, also a Cuban-American, has been accused of paying Chamorro's assassins. His five ex-employees left Nicaragua under the protection of the U.S. embassy. According to "diplomatic sources" cited by Riding, the embassy had indicated that the five were ready to testify in the case but that the offer was ignored by the Nicaraguan authorities.

Rolando Santa María, deputy manager of Plasmaferesis, is a Nicaraguan citizen and is still in the country, but he has not been called to testify either.

There is also a rumor that documentary

*Unión Democrática de Liberación (Democratic Liberation Union), a front composed of the Conservative Party, several other bourgeois parties, two labor federations, and the Nicaraguan CP.

evidence in the case was destroyed when the Plasmaferesis building burned down the day after Chamorro's murder. According to Riding, "the Government blamed 'Communist gangs' for the fire, although witnesses said that it appeared to start inside the plant and not as a result of gasoline bombs thrown by demonstrators."

Silvio Peña Rivas is the alleged leader of the group of eight men accused of murdering Chamorro. His brother Ronaldo, who is also his attorney, claims that Peña Rivas's confession was extracted under torture. Ronaldo Peña Rivas has also said that the eight are being held totally incommunicado, and except for his brother, are being deprived of legal counsel. Witnesses able to prove Silvio Peña Rivas's innocence have been silenced through death threats, his brother says.

But according to Chamorro family attorney Argüello, Peña Rivas is guilty: "Clearly Silvio Peña Rivas used his car [in the attack] because he felt he had full protection from someone high up."

Another contradiction, concerning the type of weapon used, has yet to be clarified. One of the accused claims to have fired a 12-gauge shotgun, whereas the police say they have a 16-gauge shotgun that is the murder weapon. Argüello says no effort has been made to trace the origin of the other weapons found on the suspects.

In his confession, Silvio Peña Rivas claimed Ramos had mentioned the names of four prominent Nicaraguans that were in some way involved or acquainted with the plot. Of the four, Fausto Zelaya, former head of the National Housing Bank, is out of the country; and Cornelio Hueck, president of the Congress, has parliamentary immunity. The other two—ex-Economy Minister Juan José Martínez and Finance Ministry official Carlos Dubón Alvarado—have not been called to testify.

"Legal sources" told Riding that the government was planning to seek extradition of Pedro Ramos, who is now in Miami, "although with little evidence, in order to blame the United States for blocking the investigation and preventing his trial in the likely event that the request is turned down."

A series of attacks on National Guard installations by guerrillas of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN—Sandinista National Liberation Front) were reported during the first week of February. According to an Agence France-Presse dispatch from Managua February 4, police units provided by the neighboring governments of El Salvador and Honduras may have aided the Nicaraguan forces in repulsing these attacks.

On the other hand, after learning that five Sandinistas had been captured on Costa Rican territory February 3, Somoza warned the Oduber regime, "I think the

government of Costa Rica should increase its vigilance over these individuals; otherwise, it could put itself in jeopardy."

Four Sandinistas reportedly sought asylum in the Venezuelan embassy in Managua February 11.

Francisco Salinas of the Mexico City daily *Excelsior* reported from Managua February 5 that Somoza was planning to dispatch an emissary to Washington to complain about "the supposed intervention of that country in providing arms to the guerrillas." The Nicaraguan government claims that "arms of U.S. manufacture" have "entered the country surreptitiously." Thus "it is thought that there are U.S. interests in the destabilization of the Somoza regime."

Washington, of course, has long been the

biggest supplier of weapons to Somoza himself. Thus it is far more likely that the FSLN has been able to capture a few "arms of U.S. manufacture" for its own use.

Salinas also reported that UDEL President Rafael Córdoba Rivas had said "he would ask Washington not to involve itself in Nicaraguan affairs . . . , even in our [the opposition's] favor."

For its part, the U.S. State Department reported to a Congressional hearing February 16 that it thought the human-rights situation in Nicaragua was improving: "Although the problems remain, it is our opinion that marked progress has been manifested since early 1977." That is, since a year before Chamorro was gunned down. □

Tokyo and New York City

Neck and Neck in Race to Bankruptcy

By Jon Britton

The government of Tokyo, the world's largest city, announced in late January that drastic measures had to be taken to ward off impending bankruptcy.

The actions taken by city Governor Ryokichi Minobe, as well as the financial stringency that prompted them, are reminiscent of the "budget crisis" that hit New York City during the 1974-75 slump and that continues unabated today.

The austerity measures include a pay freeze for city workers, supposedly to last one year; a cutback in hiring; a sharp rise in some school tuitions; a 20% cut in allowances for managerial personnel, including an end to chauffeured limousine service for some city officials; and the sale of \$221 million worth of city-owned land.

These measures were imposed by Governor Minobe under pressure from the central government of Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, whose approval is needed for sales of additional bonds to finance the city's \$1 billion deficit.

The bonds would push Tokyo's debt past a \$416 million ceiling, which if exceeded at the end of the fiscal year (March 31) normally would necessitate a formal declaration of bankruptcy and a takeover by the Home Affairs Ministry of the city's finances.

According to a February 3 dispatch written from Tokyo by *New York Times* correspondent Andrew H. Malcolm, Fukuda was holding out for still more cutbacks and a redirection of other expenditures.

"Traditionally," Malcolm says, "the central Government has favored heavy public spending on such large-scale projects as expressways, railroads, bridges, and airports." This type of spending provides important markets for the steel companies and other major industries now experiencing severe stagnation. Such stimulus would be especially welcome this year in light of Fukuda's pledge in a recent trade agreement with Washington to spur the domestic economy to a 7 percent growth rate.

On the other hand, Malcolm writes, "Minobe's administration, which has been supported by the Buddhist Komeito, or Clean Government Party, and the Communists, favors more people-oriented bond projects concerned with welfare, schools and hospitals."

At least one mouthpiece of the capitalist class has expressed concern that the rift could get out of hand. The editors of the *Mainichi Daily News*, an English-language paper published in Tokyo, advised the central government on January 20 to "cease to take a hostile attitude toward the 'reformist' government in Tokyo."

At the same time, they suggested that Minobe take more stringent action to shore up the city's finances: "It may . . . be difficult to totally deny the contention in conservative circles that Minobe has promised welfare measures too liberally just to

maintain his own popularity."

That this was a not-too-subtle call for further "belt-tightening" is confirmed by the editors' references to the New York City budget crisis. This crisis, they claimed, was partially caused by "sharp increases in personnel costs and excessive relief for low income earners. . . ." They pointed out that "there are lessons that can be learned from New York City."

The lessons the editors of this capitalist daily have in mind undoubtedly relate to the signal success achieved by Democrat Abe Beame, mayor of New York City when the budget crisis hit, in imposing a wage freeze, cutting back sharply on social services, instituting tuition for the first time in the city university system, and laying off tens of thousands of city workers—all without any serious opposition from the unions ostensibly representing the interests of municipal employees.

The New York union bureaucrats—themselves closely tied to the Democratic Party—not only did not lead a fight to defeat these austerity moves; they agreed to "invest" billions of dollars of union pension funds in city bonds, which when they come due may not be worth the paper they are printed on.

This arrangement created a conflict of interest for the unions—between defending the needs of the rank and file by mobilizing to fight for higher wages and job security, on the one hand, and protecting their new "investments" by not doing anything to jeopardize the finances of the city government, on the other.

Another lesson the *Mainichi Daily News* editors may consider valuable is the clever way in which control over the finances of New York City was turned over to the banks by setting up an "Emergency Financial Control Board."

Through this unelected board, the banks have effective veto power over virtually any action taken by the city that costs money, including the signing of union contracts. At the same time, this arrangement takes some of the heat off the city administration, because the mayor can shift responsibility for new "sacrifices" to the banks.

Even before the banks precipitated the budget crisis by suddenly withholding credit from the city government in 1975, Beame and his predecessors had been disguising the increasing shakiness of city finances by shifting all kinds of current expenditures to that portion of the budget reserved for "capital projects," such as bridges, roads, sewers, schools, and the like. Meanwhile, actual expenditures for new construction were gradually reduced. Maintenance and repair work on the city's physical plant was sharply cut back.

The baneful results are being felt by New York residents:

Several years ago a portion of the elevated West Side Highway collapsed, forcing the city to permanently close a large

section of it to vehicular traffic. Now only joggers and cyclists dare trust the rusty superstructure.

The city's streets are full of potholes, estimated to number a million, which cause damage to moving vehicles and injuries to passengers.

At the time of the recent snow storms, 40% of the sanitation department's vehicles, some of which are more than forty years old, were broken down. Many streets were not cleared for days, and large mounds of uncollected garbage piled up on the sidewalks.

School buildings have been going without needed repair. At some schools, every time it rains or snows, large amounts of water leak through the roofs into the interiors of the buildings, damaging equipment and rendering classrooms and gymnasiums unusable.

City water mains repeatedly break, flooding highways and halting subway trains. There have been continued warnings about the condition of the Fifty-Ninth Street Bridge.

A thousand miles of sewers are so badly decayed that they should be replaced immediately.

As the *New York Times* put it January 29, "neglect threatens the basic systems that make the city inhabitable as a complex urban society."

Despite the cutbacks, the layoffs, the wage freeze, and the human misery, New York City is not out of the financial woods. According to the latest budget projections, the city's operating expenses will exceed

its income by more than \$1 billion in the fiscal year beginning July 1.

The new mayor, Democrat Ed Koch, on January 20 unveiled a four-year financial plan to cut services further, eliminate 20,000 city jobs, and drive people off welfare. The plan allows for no wage increases of any kind for city employees.

"If further sacrifices are necessary, New Yorkers are prepared to tighten their belts another notch," Koch said as he announced the plan.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported February 3 that New York City's unemployment rate in January was over 10%. This meant that 322,000 persons actively seeking jobs were without work. Many thousands of others who want jobs have given up looking for work and are no longer counted by the government as unemployed.

Thus, while the city decays, perhaps half a million able-bodied residents are involuntarily idle.

This striking contrast between unmet social needs and idle workers proves that New York City's budget crisis is not something unavoidable like a natural disaster but is "man-made," a product of the declining capitalist system.

This, of course, holds true for Tokyo's financial problems as well. As in New York, bankruptcy and a central government takeover have been averted for the time being, at the expense of working people. On February 15 Fukuda's Ministry of Home Affairs approved the issuance of \$229 million more in municipal bonds to cover the city's deficit. □

Singapore—Fifteenth Year of 'Operation Cold Store'

On February 2, the fifteenth anniversary of an extensive crackdown against political dissidents in Singapore, Amnesty International renewed its call for the immediate release of four prominent political prisoners who are still being held without trial.

The four include Said Zahari, Lim Hock Siew, and Ho Toon Chin, former leaders of the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) who were arrested on February 2, 1963, at the beginning of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's "Operation Cold Store," in which more than 100 political activists were detained. The fourth prisoner, Lee Tse Tong, was a Barisan Sosialis member of Parliament who was arrested in October of the same year.

Since Amnesty International published its first briefing on Singapore in February 1976, a press release pointed out, "human rights violations in Singapore have increased with new arrests, serious and consistent allegations of ill-treatment during interrogation and the continued deten-

tion of not less than 70 prisoners without trial. The length of time that many of them have now spent in detention gives cause for grave concern. No formal charges are ever brought against political prisoners and there is no opportunity for the government's allegations concerning prisoners to be tested in a court of law."

To mark the fifteenth anniversary of "Operation Cold Store," the human rights group has published an updated edition of its 1976 report.

It drew attention to several recent cases of political repression. Shamsuddin Tung, an opposition candidate, was arrested under the Internal Security Act on the eve of national elections in December 1976. Poh Soo Kai, who was detained from 1963 to 1973 and who criticized the curtailing of civil liberties in Singapore upon his release, was returned to prison under the Internal Security Act in 1976. G. Rahman, an outspoken critic of the regime and a lawyer who defended political prisoners, was arrested in February 1977.

Zimbabwe to Get Black Majority Government?

By Ernest Harsch

After ten weeks of talks with three prominent Zimbabwean figures, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith announced February 15 that broad agreement had been reached on the outlines for a future Black regime. He hailed the so-called internal settlement as "a victory for moderation."

With him at the news conference were Abel Muzorewa, the leader of the United African National Council; Elliot Gabellah, a representative of the African National Council (Sithole); and Jeremiah Chirau, a government-backed tribal chief. Although the ANC(S) leader Ndabaningi Sithole was not at the news conference itself, he was directly involved in the negotiations.

Both Muzorewa and Sithole are prominent Black nationalist figures and have led significant struggles against the white minority regime in the past.

Although the actual text of the agreement was not immediately released to the public, some of its major points were thought to include provisions for the establishment of a 100-seat national assembly, in which the white minority of 250,000 would be "guaranteed" 28 seats for at least ten years, compared to only 72 for the country's Black majority of more than 6 million. Other concessions to the privileged whites are said to include guaranteed pensions payable abroad and "fair" compensation for any property that is expropriated.

Since the so-called entrenched clauses of the proposed constitution would require approval by 78 of the 100 members of the assembly, the white representatives would have blocking powers.

The following day, "informed sources" in Salisbury told reporters that agreement had also been reached on the structure of the armed forces under such a regime. The existing army would be retained, they said, but Black guerrillas who ended their resistance to the regime would be allowed to join it. Discussions were still continuing on the structure of a so-called interim administration to precede the establishment of the proposed regime.

If the plan is actually put into effect—a big if—the white majority would obviously continue to wield considerable influence and retain many of their racist privileges.

The announcement of the accord brought an immediate denunciation from the Patriotic Front, a Black nationalist alliance that was not included in the talks and that is engaged in a guerrilla campaign against the Smith regime. Joshua

Nkomo, one of the two main leaders of the front, said that it "changes nothing." Another representative, Josiah Chinamano, condemned Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau as "puppets and stooges" and said that the agreement "will not end the war but prolong it."

The Case of Denis Goldberg

Serving a Life Sentence in Pretoria Jail



Times of London
DENIS GOLDBERG

Denis Goldberg, a white South African political prisoner who has already served fourteen years of a life sentence, is facing greater harassment by his jailers, according to a report in the January 24 London *Times*.

Political prisoners are denied most contact with the outside world and are allowed only very limited opportunities to read or write. One of the few intellectual activities open to them has been studying through correspondence courses. This "privilege" has allowed prisoners (both Black and white) greater access to books and writing materials.

But now, according to a letter Goldberg sent to friends in London, "Studies will not be allowed in future, except that those enrolled for further (ie degree) studies will be allowed to complete them in a period decided by the Commissioner (of Prisons), and he may allow those with little or no

The American government, which has been pressing for the Patriotic Front's participation in any settlement, also expressed reservations. Andrew Young, the American representative to the United Nations, said that if the Patriotic Front were excluded, he "could see another Angola-type situation."

London, which has been involved in a series of negotiations with Washington and the Patriotic Front, also indicated that it would continue to press for the front's inclusion. However, British Foreign Minister David Owen at the same time termed the Salisbury agreement "a significant step toward majority rule." □

schooling to complete school education."

These new restrictions may mean that Goldberg will be unable to undertake any additional studies once he has completed the degree program he has already enrolled in. Goldberg's daughter commented, "He's a great optimist but if they stop the studying they'll cut off his lifeline."

In addition, the South African authorities have refused to permit his wife, who now lives in Britain, to return to South Africa to visit him.

In the early 1960s, Goldberg was a leader of the Congress of Democrats, a white political group strongly influenced by the South African Communist Party and closely allied with the African National Congress (ANC). He was arrested in 1963 along with a number of ANC leaders and charged with leading a sabotage campaign against the white minority regime. At the subsequent "Rivonia Trial," Goldberg, Nelson Mandela, and six others were sentenced to life in prison.

While the Black prisoners were taken to Robben Island, Goldberg was confined to a specially built prison in Pretoria that now holds nine white political prisoners. He is the only one of them serving a life sentence.

In South Africa, life imprisonment means just that. There is no parole or reduction of sentence. In 1975 Goldberg's compatriot, South African Communist Party leader Abram Fischer, was released only when he was near death from cancer. After Fischer died, the authorities demanded that his ashes be returned to their custody inside the Pretoria prison.

Goldberg is now forty-four years old. Short of an overthrow of the apartheid regime, he faces the prospect of many more years of isolation and harassment, as do the scores of other long-term political prisoners in South Africa. □

The Murders of Said Hammami and David Holden

By Colin Talbot

LONDON—The brutal murder of Said Hammami, London representative of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, January 4 caused a wave of speculation as to who his killers might be. His death followed closely on the murder of London *Sunday Times* journalist David Holden in Egypt December 7 and the deaths of two Syrian embassy officials in a car-bomb explosion in London.

Press speculation in all three cases followed a predictable pattern. Hammami was "murdered by militant Palestinians" and the two Syrians "blew themselves up" on the way to bomb Egyptian property in protest against Sadat's sell-out.

David Holden, however, was almost certainly killed by the Israeli security police, Mossad. Whether Mossad was responsible for the other deaths is not yet clear. What is certain is that for thirty years Israeli terrorists have carried out a ruthless campaign of assassination against individuals considered to stand in the way of the Zionist dream. It was David Holden's newspaper, the *Sunday Times*, that has probably done more to expose these activities than any other.

It was the *Sunday Times* that revealed the history of the letter bomb in Mideast politics. The letter bomb, widely regarded as a terrorist weapon reserved for the Irish Republican Army or the Palestinians, was in fact first used by the Zionists.

The *Sunday Times* of September 24, 1972, revealed that a letter-bomb campaign had been used for the first time in 1947-48 by the Zionist "Stern Gang" against British targets. The technique was then taken over by Mossad, after Israel was established, and used in 1963 in Egypt, in 1967 in Egypt and Jordan, and in 1972 in Lebanon.

Writing of the 1963 attacks the *Sunday Times* said: "Israel's complicity was accepted when the then head of Israeli security, Iser Halprin, resigned after [Prime Minister] Ben Gurion publicly reprimanded the security forces for the campaign and announced that he was halting it."

In 1972 Mossad began a new campaign. A special "Hit Team" was established to hunt down and kill a list of "known Palestinian terrorists." The first victims died in July 1972, when Palestinian poet Ghassan Kanafani and his young niece Lamees were killed in Beirut as their car was blown to pieces by a Mossad bomb. Within twelve months Mossad had killed eleven more "targets" and numerous by-

standers like Lamees. The assassinations took place in Beirut, Rome, Paris, and Nicosia. Some were shot and others bombed.

In July 1973 the luck of the "Hit Team" ran out when six of them were arrested in Norway. They had just shot their thirteenth "target," Ali Hassan Saleme, in the small town of Lillehammer. The man who was riddled with fourteen bullets, however, was not Salameh, but a local Arab waiter, Ahmed Bouchiki. Despite the cold-blooded murder of Bouchiki, in broad daylight in front of his wife, none of the "team" spent more than twenty-two months in prison.

The Norwegian debacle was unfortunately not the end of Mossad's "Hit Team." In January 1977 a Palestinian who had once served as the PLO representative in Paris was gunned down. Mahmoud Ould Saleh was shot as he left the bookshop he ran in Paris, and the killing had all the hallmarks of another "Hit Team" operation.

The reason became clear a few days later. Abu Daoud, a high-ranking PLO official, arrived in Paris shortly after Saleh's death, at the head of a PLO delegation sent to Saleh's funeral. Daoud was promptly arrested by French secret police and Bonn and Tel Aviv made applications for his extradition as the alleged "mastermind" of the attack on the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972.

Apparently no one in the hierarchy of the French police or government had been consulted about the arrest and Daoud was promptly released. "So who had Abu Daoud arrested and why?" *Time* magazine asked January 24, 1977.

"The most plausible answer," *Time* speculated, "was Israel, whose intelligence agents keep close watch on P.L.O. terrorists. By alerting friends in the DST [the French counterintelligence agency] to Abu Daoud's presence in France they could both embarrass Giscard for his pro-Arab policy and score another round against the Palestinians."

After his release, Daoud offered to stand trial in Germany if the authorities would guarantee his safety. They declined.

The indications pointing towards Mossad involvement in Holden's death are quite clear. In the *Sunday Times* of January 1, 1978, the paper's Insight Team wrote: "David Holden was killed by an intelligence organisation. That is now the view of the Egyptian authorities investigating the case. They believe that his

murder was planned, elaborately, at least twenty-four hours ahead—and conceivably more than two weeks in advance."

Three cars were stolen for use in the killing, one two weeks before the event and the other two twenty-four hours before Holden arrived in Cairo. The shot that killed him was fired from behind with great accuracy into the heart, using a specially made low-power shell that would not exit from his body. Such a killing obviously involved training, numbers, careful planning, and detailed knowledge of Holden's movements.

The first car to be found, containing Holden's belongings, had been stolen from a young Palestinian whose brother had just been deported for political activities. This clear frame-up attempt failed, but the fact that three Palestinians were initially arrested was sufficient to bolster allegations from the press that Holden's death was the work of "Palestinian extremists out to disrupt the peace initiative of Sadat."

David Holden was not popular with the Israeli government. The *Sunday Times* of December 18, 1977, reported: "A symposium broadcast two years ago, in which he forcefully stated the nature of Arab grievances, drew threatening telephone calls. . . he was blamed in certain quarters for masterminding a Sunday Times inquiry into allegations of Israeli torture. . . ."

What better than to "kill two birds with one stone"—eliminating an irritant and blaming the Palestinians for it? □

*See "Palestinians Face Torture in Israeli Jails," *Intercontinental Press*, July 4, 1977, p. 762; and "Charges of Torture in Israeli Jails Confirmed," in *Intercontinental Press*, August 8, 1977, p. 901.—IP/I

Students Strike in Bandung

University students in Bandung, Indonesia, have launched a boycott of classes to protest the arrest of many of their compatriots in January.

Following several weeks of student demonstrations in Jakarta and other cities, the Suharto regime had cracked down January 21, detaining about 150 student activists, banning all student councils, and shutting down seven newspapers.

The military authorities in Bandung warned the striking students February 2 to return to their classes.

Capitalism Fouls Things Up

Marcos to Conduct Experiment—Do Volcanoes and Nuclear Plants Make Good Neighbors?

Five volcanoes—four of them described as “active”—lie within 100 miles of the construction site of the Philippines’ first nuclear power plant. Four reactors are to be installed there eventually.

The nearest active volcano, Mt. Natib, is less than ten miles away. The outer edge of a huge mudflow from Mt. Natib’s last eruption is less than two miles from the site near the villages of Bagac and Morong on the Bataan Peninsula where the first reactor is now under construction.

The other three active volcanoes are between sixty and ninety miles away.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) made a study of the site for the Philippines Atomic Energy Commission and concluded that “all volcanic hazards should be considered possible”—ranging from “ash fall and lava flow to volcanic earthquake.”

In the February 8 *Washington Post*, Thomas O’Toole summarized the NRC’s internal documents on the problem: “Hazards from the closest volcanoes include lava and mud slides that could cover the power plant. Ash falls from all five nearby volcanoes could cover the site like heavy snowfalls, clogging filters and cooling ponds [for nuclear wastes] and raising havoc with the nuclear plant’s complex machinery.”

Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos has reportedly been considering cancelling the Westinghouse Electric Corporation’s \$1.1 billion contract for the first reactor. Marcos’s second thoughts result from revelations in the U.S. press that Westinghouse may have made “improper payments” of up to \$35 million to Herminio Disini, a close relative of Marcos’s wife, for his help in swinging the deal.

Companies owned by Disini are involved in construction, communications, and other work on the nuclear plant, and another Disini outfit provided a \$688 million insurance policy for the project.

The plant is already 20 percent complete, so Marcos will have difficulty in backing out of the Westinghouse contract. But if he should do so, another eager nuclear exporter is ready to strike a deal.

Marcos’s wife Imelda said February 14 that the Soviet ambassador to the Philippines had offered “a complete plant, even a

reactor, to replace the Westinghouse one. He even offered to help us develop our uranium resources.”

Overexposure in Britain

All British nuclear workers exposed to radiation in 1976 beyond the internationally-agreed-upon limit of five rems* a year were employed at the Windscale works of British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.

The British government’s Nuclear Installations Inspectorate said in its annual report for 1976 (issued in late January of this year) that 6 Windscale workers were overexposed in 1976, as against 36 in 1975 and more than 100 in some previous years.

The Windscale plant also topped the inspectorate’s most recent quarterly list of nuclear “incidents” in Britain. Of the fourteen reported, seven occurred at Windscale.

The annual report found more persons overexposed to radiation in general industry in 1976 than in nuclear plants. Thirty-seven non-nuclear workers received more than the general industry limit of three rems a quarter; of these, one person received more than fifty rems in one quarter.

“Management error was a contributory or principal cause of many of the overexposed incidents in 1975 and 1976,” chief inspector Ron Gausden said in the report.

Radiation Limit 10 Times Too High?

Five rems of radiation exposure in a year’s time is considered “safe” for workers in the nuclear industry internationally. But this standard has repeatedly come under attack from scientists.

On February 8, Dr. Edward Radford of the University of Pittsburgh told a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee that if a worker received five rems a year over a forty-year period, that would make his or her “subsequent cancer risk . . . more than 100 percent greater than ex-

*The rem (roentgen equivalent man) is a measure of radiation exposure that takes into account the differing biological effects of various kinds of radiation. A single dose of 500 rems will cause death in about 50 percent of those exposed.



pected” for the normal population.

Radford called this risk “unacceptable” and said occupational exposure “should be reduced at least to 500 milirem (.5 rem) per year. . . .”

‘No Smoking’ Signs Go Up in Asbestos Plants

The Johns-Manville Corporation has banned smoking in all fourteen of its asbestos mines and plants in the United States and Canada. The company has also announced that persons who smoke will no longer be hired at its other plants where asbestos is used in manufacturing processes.

Johns-Manville said the decisions were based primarily on a study conducted at Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York. Researchers found that smokers exposed to asbestos on the job have a *ninety-two times* greater susceptibility to lung cancer than the general nonsmoking population.

About 8,000 workers are employed at the fourteen asbestos facilities. Physician and Johns-Manville Vice-President Paul Kotin claims the new policy will give asbestos workers about the same chance of contracting lung cancer as the nonsmoking public in general.



“Our PR man suggested it”

Austin/New Scientist

Selections From the Left

rood

"Red," Flemish weekly paper of the Revolutionary Workers League, Belgian section of the Fourth International.

The February 10 issue carries an interview with some workers at the Tihange nuclear power plant, where an accident recently occurred. Rood asked:

"Van den Damme and Spitaels say that 'nothing terrible' happened at Tihange. What is the truth of the matter?"

The workers replied:

"On Saturday January 14, eighty workers were to go into the reactor building to prepare for a test (a loading and unloading of the reactor). Because of that a security official took a survey of the air at about 11:00 p.m. on the night of January 13. The analysis showed that contamination by iodine 131 had gone 150 times over the danger limit.

"There was an apparatus in place that was supposed to monitor radiation but it had not functioned.

"On Saturday, eighty workers waited at the entrance for permission to go in. A new survey of the air was carried out. Once again it showed that the legal limit of radiation had been exceeded. But the monitoring device still registered normal. A security official, a member of the plant technical staff, gave permission to go in.

"About eighty persons worked there all day. Only in the late afternoon did the technician inform his superiors of the situation. They then cleared the building. Tests showed that the workers had been contaminated both externally and internally. Some workers were so badly affected that they could not be entirely decontaminated."

Rood asked:

"Isn't it dangerous that a company technician is given responsibility for safety. . . ?"

The workers replied:

"It makes no sense whatsoever to give the responsibility for safety to a company officer, because such officers always have to choose between safety and profits. For example, if the technical officer in charge in Tihange had decided to keep the workers out of the reactor building, that would have meant a day's delay in testing the reactor, that is millions of francs."

REPUBLICAN NEWS

Reflects the views of the Provisional republican movement. Published weekly in Belfast.

The February 11 issue comments on the

attempted assassination February 1 of Kevin Hannaway, a leading Belfast republican:

"The gunman, wearing a khaki-coloured anorak and balaclava helmet coolly fired about ten shots into the Hannaway's Benares Street home. He shot with a semi-automatic weapon using a two-handed outstretched hold from a semi-crouching position.

"Such a military-style 'operation' bears strong hall-marks of a 'professional' job where the assassins failed for reasons not of their making.

"Firstly, because of the 'chance' position of their intended victim who was standing in the kitchen door-way holding his baby son. And secondly, because he instantly sized up the situation and reacted instinctively.

"As the man opened fire from just inside the living room Kevin flung the baby away behind him into the working-kitchen, and threw the fridge across the kitchen door-way smashing the glass door to smithereens. ('Speedy,' the Hannaway's goldfish, whose home is a bowl on top of the fridge, was hurled across the kitchen and finished up swimming about in a glass-splintered pool of water and the baby's blood.)

"The sharpness of Kevin's response together with the crash of the glass kitchen door smashing, deterred the gunman (who seemed prepared to reload) from pursuing the family into the working-kitchen. . . .

"But the baby had been shot three times. Once in the thigh, once in the arm, and one bullet entered his mouth and came out through the side of his neck. . . .

"The immediate response from some people might have been to think that this was a Stickie ["Official" republican] shooting. But this was definitely not the case. And even if the shooting had been set-up to look like the Sticks, in no way would the Republican Movement have got drawn into any demoralising feud; for the 'mediation mechanism' is now efficient so as to clarify any given situation.

"The morning after the shooting some typical black propaganda was directed through 'The Sun,' which blamed the attack on 'inter-factional feuding within the Provisional IRA.'

"But full marks for real originality must be given to 'The Belfast Telegraph,' which ambiguously portrayed the attack as the berserk actions of a baby-battering father who had shot his son and then 'disappeared.' [Hannaway went to Dublin for treatment of his wounds; republicans have been assassinated in Belfast hospitals.]

". . . the shooting was portrayed by its master-minds to be an Orange job.

"The car used by the three-man 'hit squad' was taken from the loyalist side of

the 'peace line' in Conway Street. And after the shooting the three men abandoned their car with blazing lights and open doors at the 'peace line' where Lucknow Street joins Cupar Street. They then ran off down Lawnbook Avenue, a Loyalist street. . . .

"However, reliable (journalistic) sources in the Shankill Road indicate that the Loyalists have no knowledge of the attack. . . .

"During last November an attempt was made on the life of a well-known Belfast Republican as he sat in his taxi at Lenadon. Men in a car drew up alongside and fired several shots.

"In another attempted murder on a different Republican he awoke and disturbed would-be bombers attempting to sabotage his car during the night.

"Then at the beginning of this year we printed a warning from the Belfast Brigade of the IRA. The contents . . . revealed the extent to which the Brit war-machine in its despairing search for a military 'solution' is now officially seeking to use the weapon of political assassination. . . .

". . . there can be little doubt in the case of Kevin Hannaway of direct Brit involvement in his attempted assassination.

"And although the main fire was directed towards Kevin the gunman fired 'all around' without regard to killing members of the family.

"Such a family 'wipeout' would be a much more severe form of intimidation to other Republicans than the 'restricted' selection of individual targets.

"Through committing such horrific acts the Brits would seek to utilise family pressure on men to under-cut republican resistance."

It is clear from this report that the Provisionals, and apparently even the "Officials," who have followed an extremely sectarian course since 1975, have recognized how armed conflicts among the anti-imperialist forces can help British assassination squads.

Republican News says that a mechanism has been set up to forestall any provocations. It was obviously badly needed. Such armed conflicts have been extremely costly, both to the republican organizations and the anti-imperialist movement as a whole.

Bandera Socialista

"Socialist Flag," the weekly newspaper of the Revolutionary Workers Party. Published in Mexico City.

The January 21 issue reports:

"Once again the question of the hundreds (or thousands?) of comrades who

have disappeared or have been imprisoned for political reasons has been put on the agenda. On January 10, the attorney general of the republic placed an expensive ad in all the newspapers, stressing that there are no political prisoners in our country. This two-page ad is the official response to the ongoing campaign of the National Committee for the Defense of Persons Imprisoned, Missing, Standing Trial, or Exiled for Political Reasons. . . . We have done what we could to help this campaign in these pages.

"This response by the attorney general, however, was not an answer to the protests that have been raised in a thousand different ways about the fate of the comrades missing or imprisoned for political reasons. The fact is that our country is being visited by the general secretary of Amnesty International, M. Ennals, who recently exposed the fact that there are more than a hundred political prisoners in concealed jails in Mexico and that torture is being used against prisoners.

"This is the government's response to Amnesty International, even though when the report of this organization—which last year was given the Nobel Peace Prize—was made public, the attorney general simply said that the facts were falsified, without making any more extensive reply.

"On several occasions, the attorney general has been called on to allow a delegation from Amnesty International to visit the Mexican jails and detention camps. But this proposal has been peremptorily rejected as an 'intolerable' interference by an international organization in the 'internal affairs' of this country. But the government takes quite a different attitude toward the FBI and CIA, whose illegal activities and interference here seem by no means 'intolerable' for the government. . . .

"There is a more and more crying need for a general amnesty. The democratic and revolutionary forces have been fighting for this for a long time."

DIRECT ACTION

Socialist weekly published in Sydney, Australia. Presents the views of the Socialist Workers Party (Australian section of the Fourth International).

The January 26 issue contains a response by Mary Rabbone to a recent barrage of media attacks on the right of married women to work in Australia. It quotes from a vicious article in the January 14-15 *Australian* entitled, "If mum quit work, there'd be jobs for the boys (and girls)."

The *Australian* blames youth unemployment on teachers, mothers, and ultimately the women's liberation movement: "The first reason why the school-leaver is unable to get a job is his teacher. The second

is his mother—she has already taken the job." Young people are turning to crime and violence, according to the *Australian*, while "their mothers are at work, depriving the young ones of a job. They have fallen for the pressure of their peers, who say that being tied to a kitchen sink is tantamount to bludging."

Rabbone points out that there is a relationship between youth unemployment and female unemployment, but it is not what the *Australian* claims:

"Young people currently make up 40 per cent of Australia's unemployed. . . ." Rabbone says. "Together with women they are the biggest victims of the emergence of structural unemployment."

Rabbone explains how women are the victims not the cause of unemployment: "Women are the last hired and the first fired and are employed in the first place only because they are cheaper (despite the equal pay decision in 1972, women's wages on the average are still 60 per cent those of men) and more exploitable.

"Women are more vulnerable to attacks because they aren't organised. Currently only 18.5 per cent of job vacancies are for women, contrasted to 33.7 per cent for men. A Bureau of Statistics survey of unemployed people of all ages, published in the *Australian* in October last year, reported that of the more than 65,000 people who had given up hope of finding a job and had stopped looking, 88 per cent were women!"

"Married women," concludes Rabbone, "can no more afford to be out of work, or wish to be out of work, than any other sector of the working class. Yet they are pointed to as expendable by the bosses and the government, a view which is also rampant in the labor movement, which to date has refused to take up the struggles of working women or defend the right of women to work."

Internationalen

"The International," central organ of the Communist Workers League (Swedish section of the Fourth International). Published weekly in Stockholm.

In the February 10 issue, Anders, a member of the Communist Workers League, reports his impressions from a recent trip to Turkey.

"That Turkey is a country in crisis can be seen as soon as you come into Istanbul from the airport. Large sections of the city are sunk in darkness. These are areas where electricity and water have been shut off. This happens for several hours every day, at varying intervals. Such 'conservation measures' have been imposed on the population of the big cities since the early 1970s.

"The energy and environmental crisis is manifested in other forms as well in the

big cities. Such a necessity as gas for cooking and heating is not always available. Air pollution in the big cities is extreme. Ankara is the worst. Pollution there is six times what is internationally considered the maximum safe level!

"Everything is greatly more expensive than it was when I was in Turkey two years ago. For example, we paid 100 lira [US\$5.88] for a kilogram of chopped meat. . . . It is obvious that this was a special treat and that meat seldom appears on tables. The family I lived with for some days in the Oaraköy section of the city pays 300 Swedish krona [US\$63.69] a month for its small three-room apartment. That is considered a low rent, and it costs another 250 krona [US\$53] a month for wood to heat it during the six cold months of the year.

"For most items of clothing, the price is almost as high as in Sweden [where prices are among the highest in Europe]. . . .

"In the last two years, prices have increased by 150%.

"Even as a tourist, I could see that the mood of the people has also changed, becoming much more tense. This impression was confirmed by my talks with comrades on the left. They all seemed much more cautious about expressing points of view, or discussing openly."

Anders also comments on the reaction to the fall of the Demirel cabinet on December 31 and the formation of the new government headed by Bulent Ecevit:

"It is important to note that Ecevit's coming to office is not the result of any struggle by the people but rather is the outcome of a decision at the top levels by those who realized that Demirel's role was exhausted. Ecevit came to office with the help of deputies breaking from Demirel's Justice Party, as well as from two smaller bourgeois parties. These bourgeois groups also have a disproportionately large share of the ministerial posts. . . .

"Ecevit is often called a Social Democrat in the Swedish press. It is true that Ecevit is trying to present himself as a Social Democrat. . . .

"It is questionable if Ecevit's Republican People's Party can be called Social Democratic. When it was founded in 1924 by Ataturk, it was not a workers party, either in the historical, social, or ideological sense. The workers movement, like the class itself, is very young in Turkey. It only really began to develop in the 1950s, during Menderes's industrialization program. The union movement remains very weak. . . .

"The first thing Ecevit promised, and perhaps can deliver, is 'ridding the country of fascists,' restoration of legality in the high schools and universities in particular. The police may become more independent from the fascists. 'There may be fewer deaths, but people are going to continue to be killed,' one comrade said."

Origins of the Conflict Between Hanoi and Pnompenh

By Pierre Rousset

The armed confrontations between Vietnam and Cambodia are a monstrous development. They also constitute a paradox. This is true because Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (Kampuchea) were caught up in an unparalleled region-wide revolutionary process, and in no other such struggle did objective solidarity play a more direct and essential role in the fight against imperialism and the bourgeoisie.

Moreover, this objective collaboration occurred twice. In each of the two Indochina conflicts, the unity in struggle of the various battlefronts of the liberation war was solemnly proclaimed.

Furthermore, the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian communist movements all have the same origin—the Indochinese Communist Party. It was only dissolved, to make way for the emergence of separate national Communist Parties, in 1951. But all this common experience has not prevented new flare-ups along the border between Kampuchea and Vietnam.

Why such a conflict was possible cannot be understood without looking back into the history of the international workers movement over the past fifty years. Were it not for the victory of Stalinism in the USSR and the degeneration of the Third International, were it not for the abandonment of internationalist traditions and the rise of national chauvinism in the world Communist movement, were it not for the sharpness of the Sino-Soviet conflict and its transformation into an interbureaucratic struggle conducted in the spirit of the triumphant ideology of "socialism in one country," a minor border conflict between two regimes adhering to Marxism-Leninism could never have degenerated into a very grave political and military confrontation.

A Political Conflict

The border dispute is a minor one, at least if we are to believe the official statements of the Vietnamese and Cambodian governments. Both Pnompenh and Hanoi claim to recognize the boundary lines drawn during the colonial period and those laid down by the accords signed in 1967 by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the government of Prince Sihanouk. The maps published by both sides, insofar as these are an indication, are generally the same.

The only important dispute concerns the off-shore limit. Vietnam, for example, would like to have Khmer territorial wa-



New York Times

ters, which closely surround the island of Phu Quoc, moved back from its coasts. Pnompenh seems opposed to this. But in any case, the problem of the off-shore limit could not by itself explain such a violent clash between the Vietnamese and Cambodian states. In order to understand it, you have to look for deeper causes.

In fact, it is not sufficient to explain that such a conflict was made possible by the general evolution of the international workers movement and the Indochinese regimes. It is also necessary to try to explain why this clash actually came about in such an extreme form and so quickly after the combined victories of 1975. This task obviously is made difficult by the total monopoly of information exercised by the leaderships of the Communist parties in power in Vietnam and Cambodia and by the use of secret diplomacy by Hanoi and Pnompenh.

Attempts to explain this conflict therefore tend to rely on supposition and remains open to discussion. Nonetheless, it is possible to pursue such an investigation by considering the chronology of the conflict as it emerges from a comparison of Pnompenh's and Hanoi's statements, the orientations being followed in Vietnam and Kampuchea, the origin of the political dispute between the leaders of the Vietnamese and Cambodian CPs, and the present impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the Indochinese peninsula.

The dispute between the Vietnamese and Cambodian regimes is political rather than territorial. The statements of both sides leave no doubt about this. In essence, Pnompenh accuses Hanoi of wanting to impose by force an "Indochinese Federa-

tion" that would be under its tutelage. The Vietnamese Communist Party denies that it has such a plan. The federation perspective was officially abandoned in the 1930s.

But, on the other hand, the Vietnamese CP says that it is in the interests of the Indochinese peoples that "special relations" be maintained between Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. It denounces the role played by the leadership of the Cambodian CP, which it claims is fanning "national hatreds" and destroying the tradition of solidarity forged during the common struggle against imperialism.¹

The political dispute does not involve only the nature of the relationships that should be established in the region following the victories of 1975. It is much more general. Pnompenh and Hanoi often made opposite political choices in domestic policy. For the Vietnamese, the line of the Khmer CP exhibits an "infantile communism," "ultrachauvinism," a "brutal peasant egalitarianism."² For the Cambodian militants, on the other hand, the line of the Vietnamese CP amounts to "begging rice from the imperialists," or even selling the labor power of its workers to the foreign capitalists, that is, to an abandonment of "a policy of independence and national dignity." In their international alliances, these two states have chosen no less opposing lines. Pnompenh relies almost exclusively on Peking, with which Hanoi's relations are growing steadily chillier.

In September 1977, the Cambodian leadership equated the Vietnamese regime, which it accused of having annexationist inclinations, with the Hitler government.³ When the conflict between the two countries became public on December 31, 1977, the Vietnamese leadership began slowly to drop its official reserve, and by January 20 went so far as to characterize the Khmer "authorities" as "reactionaries," in an editorial in the party daily *Nhan Dan*.

To understand the violence of the

1. Unless specifically indicated, the quotations are from the documents disseminated by the Vietnamese and Cambodian press services.

2. See the article by Nayan Chanda in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of January 13, 1978.

3. In the speech delivered by Pol Pot September 30, on the occasion of the seventeenth anniversary of the founding of the Khmer CP (p. 61 in the French text). This accusation was reaffirmed—explicitly this time, in the December 31 statement by the government.

Vietnamese-Cambodian split, it is necessary to go back to the origin of the present Khmer leadership. The dissolution of the old Indochinese Communist Party, and later the breakup of what was known as the "Indochinese Revolutionary Front," have underlying causes that we will have to come back to. But the head-on confrontation between the Vietnamese and Cambodian leaderships was not inevitable, as is attested by the example of the quite different relations between the Vietnamese and Laotians.

Pol Pot, the premier of Kampuchea and general secretary of the Khmer CP, does not hide the fact that the political conflict between the two parties goes far back. In fact, he dates the first important dispute with the Vietnamese from 1965, that is, well before any territorial questions were immediately on the agenda.⁴

Origins of the Dispute

The political split began with the balance sheets that both sides drew from the 1954 Geneva Accords. In Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the price that the liberation movements had to pay as a result of the Soviet and Chinese policy of peaceful coexistence was very high. The period between the Geneva Accords and the resumption of the armed struggle in South Vietnam (in 1959-60) was marked by severe political tensions and obvious hesitation on the part of the various CPs as to the line to follow.

In Vietnam and Laos, the continuity of the leaderships and the organizations was maintained. In Cambodia, however, the history of the Khmer CP is distinguished by both a political and organizational break. This seems to be at the root of the nationalist regression of the Khmer Communists, which has no equivalent in the other two Indochinese countries.

All three Communist parties in the region combine in their line important elements inherited from their Stalinist education and the lessons they drew from their struggle. In so doing, they adapted programmatically to the specific conditions in which they had to operate for thirty years. These conditions derived from the dilemma of national liberation movements having to wage prolonged resistance to imperialist intervention without any direct support from a revolutionary workers movement in the developed capitalist countries.

The failure of the revolutionary upsurge in Europe between the two wars and the degeneration of the Third International had profound consequences for the Indochinese colony. For example, a certain internationalist spirit had prevailed in the united-front collaboration between independent Marxists, Trotskyists, and CP

members on the Saigon journal *La Lutte*. It was wiped out, not to rise again.

It is quite significant from this point of view that one of the few questions on which the Vietnamese Communist Party has been ready to break openly with its own orthodox canon is on the national question. The politically dominant view today in the Vietnamese CP is that the Vietnamese nation is the product of a long process of development, which goes back 4,000 years, that is, into prehistory.

Similarly significant is the way in which the Vietnamese past, including the period of the legendary kings, has been consistently referred to in order to inspire nationalist feelings. The reaffirmation of a cultural and historic Vietnamese identity was obviously indispensable and inevitable in the advance of anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggle. The Vietnamese CP leadership, moreover, showed that it was capable of utilizing even the cultural heritage of the Montagnard minority peoples.

The difficulty was an objective one. It was necessary both to support the revival of the Vietnamese national identity, which had been denied by the colonialists, and to fight against nationalist ideology. But history as it is presented today in Vietnam has a deep nationalist imprint, and in the present context this can have grave consequences.

However, as regards nationalism the evolution of the Vietnamese and Cambodian CPs has been profoundly different. In view of the weight of the imperialist intervention it faced, the Vietnamese leadership had to continually expand the range of its political activity internationally in order to meet the needs of the national liberation struggle. This largely explains its special position in the world Communist movement and its orientation combining a predominant "national point of view" with a genuine international concern.

In contrast, after its break with the tradition of the Indochinese Communist movement was consummated, the Cambodian leadership has retreated further and further into narrow nationalism. This is what emerges clearly from the history of the Khmer CP as recounted by Pol Pot in his anniversary speech on September 30, 1977.

In the early 1950s, most of the Khmer CP leaders who became known in the 1960s and 1970s were in France, either in contact with the French Communist Party or members in it. To them it seemed that the setback in Geneva, which resulted in "the evaporation" of the "revolutionary gains" made in the struggle against the French was related to the lack of a "correct line" in the Khmer CP. The old leadership had followed "a line copied from that of others" (i.e., the Vietnamese). Henceforth it would be necessary to adopt "a position of independence and sovereignty"; it would

be necessary to "rely on our own strength."

This maxim has acquired a very particular meaning in Cambodia. In 1960, the team trained in Paris returned to the country and took over the leadership of the Khmer CP. In 1965, frictions between the Khmer party and its Vietnamese counterpart seem to have ensued. It is impossible to assess today the positions defended at the time by one side or the other. But it is clear what was at stake. It was whether or not a common strategy should be adopted. This year was marked by the beginning of the escalation of American imperialist aggression against Laos and Vietnam.

If there was a conflict at this time between the Vietnamese and Khmer CPs, it must have concerned the establishment of a new unity in Indochina. In 1967, the Khmer CP considered that the situation in the country was ripe for generalized armed struggle. It is possible that at that time a dispute arose over the advisability of opening a new front in Indochina, in view of the special position of the Sihanouk regime.

Finally, in 1972-73, the Khmers Rouges refused to bring their policy into line with that of the Laotians and the Vietnamese, who were preparing to sign the Paris and Vientiane accords. At that time they accused the Vietnamese of compromising with the enemy instead of carrying the struggle through uncompromisingly to its conclusion. In these conditions, the "Indochinese Revolutionary Front," seems, at least as far as Cambodia and Vietnam are concerned, to have been reduced to a temporary military alliance. The rejection of the tradition of the Indochinese Communist Party went very far. The official history, which was set down by Pol Pot's speech on the seventeenth anniversary of the Khmer CP, said nothing about the role played by the Vietnamese and Laotian liberation forces in the victory of the resistance in Cambodia (and vice-versa).

Likewise, it passed over in silence—with the exception of some allusions—the very existence of the Khmer CP before 1960 and the role of the Indochinese Communist Party in introducing Marxism in Cambodia. This stands in complete contrast to the kind of statements being made in Hanoi and Vientiane, which never fail to recall the past solidarity in struggle and the common history of the Communist movements in the region.

Cambodia and Laos Take Different Roads

In the absence of any solid information on the subject, we cannot make any judgment about the disputes that arose between the Vietnamese and Khmer CPs in 1965, 1967, and 1972-73. However, we cannot underestimate either the importance of the far-reaching retreat into nationalism carried out by the Cambodian leadership.

Kampuchea and Laos are in fact both

4. In his September 30 speech.

distinguished by the backwardness of their economic and social development. The working class is very weak. The agricultural proletariat is generally of Vietnamese origin. The crisis of agriculture was late in developing and was more limited than in Vietnam. The chances for a process of permanent revolution developing in these two countries thus depend largely on their being integrated into an Indochina-wide revolutionary process.

In such conditions, Cambodia's shutting itself in on itself after the victory could only have grave consequences. In the name of national independence, in fact, the leadership put itself in a position where it could not appeal for international aid and turn to Vietnam and its network of alliances. It then had to try to make up for the weakness of its base by an adventurist policy at home.

In fact, in 1973, a new course seems to have been adopted, contrasting with the prudent policy that had prevailed heretofore in the FUNK [Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—National United Front of Cambodia]. The "Sihanoukites" were isolated, and a vast cooperative movement was launched in the countryside.

Two months before the taking of power, a decision was made to empty Pnompenh of all its population once victory was won. One of the principal arguments that weighed in the balance was the fear of not being able to control the Cambodian capital. In April 1975, a kind of peasant "war communism" was decreed.

Money was to be abolished outright. Commerce was banned, to be replaced by barter and an administrative distribution of goods. All energies were to be concentrated in agriculture and in the production of necessities in plants and small shops. Giant mobile work teams were established to carry out big tasks such as irrigation and forced collectivization.

It has to be taken into consideration that a big international hysteria campaign was whipped up against Cambodia in 1975. But the human and political cost of the Khmer CP's orientation could not but be very high. It was particularly onerous for the urban population, which was sent to work in the countryside in conditions that were often very unhealthy and where there was not medicine or medical care. Unlike Vietnam, the repressive measures taken were certainly very severe and very grave.

This orientation seems to have put severe pressure on the unity of the Khmer leadership. Pnompenh recognized today that there were several grave crises, which it claims were the result of "plots" hatched by the "agents" of the Vietnamese CP. Nothing has been heard of the majority of the leaders who were known at the time of the FUNK. It is impossible to know what has become of them.

The orientation adopted in Pnompenh following the victory contrasted not only with the one applied in Vietnam but also

with that in Laos. In the latter country, notably, choosing a "Cambodian road" was inconceivable. It is far from enjoying the agricultural wealth of Kampuchea, which has the benefit of good land and an extraordinary natural regulator of the flow of water, Lake Tonle Sap.

Unlike Cambodia, also, Laos has no access to the sea, and so long as the Laos-Vietnam highway is not ready for traffic it remains largely dependent on the good will of Thailand for its supplies. The new government had, moreover, to face dangerous opposition by a section of the Meo tribes, which were armed by the CIA and backed by Bangkok.

The Laotian leadership saw the path to developing its country as involving association with Vietnam. This option seems to have been reinforced after the discovery in December 1976 of a rightist plot to overthrow the new regime.

In an interview, Laotian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Khamphay Boupha stressed the renewed importance of cooperation among the Indochinese countries, saying that it was "even more necessary" now that victory has been won than it was during the liberation struggle.⁵

On July 18, 1977, a twenty-five-year renewable treaty was signed between Vietnam and Laos. It stated the need for "developing socialist cooperation in all fields."⁶ An agreement in principle was also signed drawing the frontier between the two countries, after two years of apparently difficult negotiations. Vietnamese forces have participated in joint operations with the Laotian forces against the rightist guerrillas and against the incursions of commandos coming in from Thailand.

Vietnam has granted Laos aid in rice and other commodities, as well as financial aid totaling 400 million dong (about US \$155 million). Half of this financial assistance is to go to pay the many Vietnamese soldiers and workers sent to Laos to take part in road and bridge construction, according to the journalist Nayan Chanda.⁷

The Question of a Federation

Does this mean that Vietnamese-Laotian cooperation is exemplary? No! The twenty-five-year treaty is important in that it stresses the vital need of the Indochinese peoples to step up their solidarity and regional cooperation. But it also points up the programmatic limitations that the Vietnamese and Laotian leaderships are apparently unable to overcome as a result

5. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 26, 1977.

6. The texts of the Vietnam-Laos statement and the treaty were published in the September 1977 issue of *Bulletin du Vietnam*.

7. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 23, 1977.

of their historic origins and bureaucratic deformations that weigh them down.

There is no perspective of federation in the "treaty" or in the Vietnamese-Laotian "joint declaration," even though these documents deal with long-term relations between the two countries. They do not go beyond stressing the need for increasing cooperation between sovereign national states, never calling for the establishment of a federative political superstructure.

However, a federation, which obviously can only come when the peoples concerned want it, is essential for three reasons. Only such a union would make it possible to develop a real common economic plan giving priority to the more socially and economically backward country and marshaling the necessary resources to achieve this objective.

Only a federation would provide a political framework in which the peoples of the two big countries could decide jointly on the main lines of economic development and foreign policy. Only this would make it possible to wage a continuing struggle against any resurgence of nationalist feelings by offering a real perspective for superseding the national frontiers, which, moreover, were often drawn in an arbitrary way.

Mere cooperation between states that are in fact independent cannot accomplish such tasks, and in the long run could only favor the more powerful state. On the other hand, establishing the practice of making supranational decisions without forming a federation could only increase the role of the ruling parties in substituting for the masses; it could only reinforce the power of the bureaucracy against the masses.

In this connection, it can be said that real respect for the national rights of the minority peoples requires the withering away of nation states, and the fight for genuine internationalism must go hand in hand with the fight for socialist democracy.

However, in view of their programs, their international position, and the bureaucratic character of the regimes whose birth they have presided over, neither the Vietnamese leadership nor the Laotian one can advance this dual perspective of internationalism and socialist democracy.

The Facts About the Conflict

The Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict is thus revealing of the problems the Indochinese revolution faces today, less than three years after the combined victories of 1975. The problems are on different levels. The orientation and the programs of the Vietnamese CP and the Laotian party, as well as the bureaucratic character of the Vietnamese and Laotian regimes, make it impossible to set up a genuine democratic federation in Indochina. The course followed by the Cambodian leadership explains why the Vietnamese-Khmer ten-

sions rapidly degenerated into a series of armed confrontations, contrasting violently with the evolution of Vietnamese-Laotian relations (although it should not be thought that the course of these relations was always smooth either).

A comparison of the Vietnamese and Cambodian statements and an analysis of the events that transpired between April and the beginning of 1978 make it possible to draw three conclusions, at least tentatively.

First, the initiative in the military and polemical escalation of the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea seems to have come in most cases from Pnompenh. This is particularly clear in May-June 1975 and at the end of 1977.

We can try to understand why. As a result of the adventurist policy represented by the "radical measures" taken in the wake of the seizure of power, the leadership is obliged to whip up nationalism as the indispensable ideological cement of the regime. In this context, friction on the frontier could only increase and heat up. A flood of Cambodian refugees into Vietnam alone could cause this.

The Vietnamese-Khmer border is a still more sensitive region because the presence of an important pocket of opposition has been noted in the Vietnamese highlands. In this area, forces from the old puppet army are reportedly carrying on guerrilla warfare. It is possible that elements of the Khmer Krom (Khmers from Cochin China [the southern part of Vietnam]) are involved.

Between 1975 and 1977, the Khmer CP went through several grave crises. It is probable that bulwarks of opposition developed in certain frontier areas, where Vietnamese troops were present during the war. In view of the measures of social repression taken by the Khmer CP, it is reasonable to think that an appeal for a national mobilization against the "foreign enemy" could have been useful from its point of view. Finally, in reviving the historical national hatreds that have so long torn Indochina apart, the Vietnamese-Khmer conflict could only tend to become more and more envenomed.

As for Hanoi, on the other hand, it is hard to see why an increase in tensions on the frontier would have been desirable from its point of view. It is clear that the Vietnamese CP would like to see a change in leadership in Kampuchea. It is also true that Hanoi's support for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, based on arguments similar to those of the Cubans, constitutes a very grave political precedent.

The attitude the Vietnamese leadership took at that time shows that in fact it might one day consider that the only possible "solution" left was a military one. This is why it must be reaffirmed that there is no acceptable military solution, either for the frontier dispute or for the

political conflict between the Hanoi and Pnompenh regimes.

However, an analysis of the orientation adopted by Vietnam in the aftermath of victory makes it quite unlikely that Hanoi took the initiative in escalating the conflict. The present state of semiwar in fact endangers the accomplishment of vital objectives in a whole number of areas. From the economic standpoint, it is an obstacle to opening up the virgin lands in western Cochin China. From the financial standpoint, it is an obstacle to getting international loans and investments. Politically, it is an obstacle to Hanoi's attempt to prevent a breakdown in its relations with Peking. From a diplomatic angle, it obstructs, in particular, the Vietnamese regime's effort to normalize its relations with the countries of Southeast Asia.

The Vietnamese regime probably intended to wait until the ripening of conditions in Cambodia forced a change in orientation, or of leadership, in Pnompenh.

It is hard to see, therefore, why Hanoi should have opened up a policy of military provocations against Kampuchea in 1975. On the other hand, what is certain is that, confronted with a deteriorating border conflict and sharpening political tension with the Cambodian regime, the Vietnamese leadership has responded with a combination of retaliatory measures, appeals for secret negotiations, and pressures through "friendly governments."

That is, the Vietnamese leadership operated in the framework of secret diplomacy and a strict monopoly of information in the hands of the CP Politburo. This once again points up the tragic consequences of the lack of a genuinely internationalist program and of a system of workers democracy in Vietnam. The use of secret diplomacy certainly helped to bring about a festering of the dispute with Kampuchea.

The role of China has emerged particularly clearly. In Peking's eyes, some years ago, Southeast Asia became one of the main areas of confrontation with "Soviet social imperialism." At the time of the military occupation of the Paracel Islands in 1975, it could be seen that the Chinese leadership does not use kid gloves in dealing with its Vietnamese "sister party."

The Vietnamese CP must have come to seem particularly dangerous in the eyes of Peking. Not only has the Vietnamese leadership refused to condemn Moscow, but the USSR proudly presents itself as Hanoi's main ally in the international arena. That Peking wants to weaken the Vietnamese regime as much as possible is no mystery to anyone. It is understandable, therefore, why the Chinese leadership has accorded the indispensable political cover to Pnompenh, even though the Cambodian leadership's domestic policy differs from the present line of the Chinese CP.

Such Chinese support was ostentatiously demonstrated in September 1977, on the occasion of Pol Pot's triumphant visit to

Peking. It was at that time, moreover, when the Vietnamese-Khmer border dispute took an acute form, and the Cambodian leadership began clearly to compare the Hanoi regime with that of Hitler. Chinese support was extended again in early January 1978, when the conflict began to become definitely envenomed. Later in January, this backing was made spectacularly evident at the time of the visit to Pnompenh of Madame Teng Ying-ch'ao, Chou En-lai's widow.

The victory of the liberation struggles in April 1975 thus precipitated an explosion of the contradictions that undermined the defunct Indochinese Revolutionary Front. The consequences of the festering of the Khmer-Vietnamese conflict are grave.

In raising a hue and cry against a Vietnamese "invasion" on December 31, Pnompenh seems to have wanted to definitively bar the way to any internal opposition, since any that developed would immediately be branded as pro-Hanoi. Likewise, it seems to have wanted to make a spectacular display of its Chinese support and create a situation that would prevent any turning back and adopting a "moderate" line in Kampuchea.

In Hanoi, they seem more and more convinced that no solution can be found for the border dispute except in the framework of general political negotiations resulting in a change of orientation in Pnompenh. The Sino-Vietnamese conflict has just taken a sharp turn for the worse. There is a real danger that the Vietnamese-Khmer conflict will flare up again and take a still graver form.

Everything possible must be done to achieve a negotiated solution—in open and public negotiations—to the border dispute, and the use of arms must be excluded. More generally, it is important to reaffirm that the interest of the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian peoples demands the formation of a democratic federation linking these three countries. But such a federation can only come about as a result of the free choice of the peoples concerned, a free choice that requires the abandonment of the total political monopoly exercised by each Indochinese CP leadership in its own country.

The underlying political differences that divide the Vietnamese and Cambodian leaderships today must be publicly aired and freely debated. □

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'Punitive Medicine'—Moscow's Abuse of Psychiatry

[We print below an interview with Marina Voikhanskaya, a psychiatrist who worked for thirteen years in Leningrad psychiatric hospitals. In 1973, she encountered in a section of her hospital a poet who, although he was totally sane, was undergoing forced psychiatric treatment. She subsequently encountered three more such people who had been imprisoned in her psychiatric hospital by the KGB for, she stated, "a single reason—their political or religious beliefs did not coincide with official Soviet ideology."]

[After Voikhanskaya protested in defense of these prisoners to hospital authorities, she was harassed by the KGB, demoted, threatened with a possible "psychiatric" examination herself, and finally forced to emigrate in 1975.]

[Since then she has lived in England and has campaigned throughout Europe and North America defending the victims of Soviet psychiatric abuse. In August 1977, she testified before the World Psychiatric Association convention in Honolulu, which subsequently passed a resolution condemning the "systematic abuse of psychiatry for political purposes in the U.S.S.R."]

[The interview was conducted by Marilyn Vogt in New York in January 1978.]

* * *

Question. What is the purpose of your current trip to the United States?

Answer. I came to this country to talk about psychiatric abuse in Russia—lectures have been arranged for me in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston—and to get some support for my son [see accompanying box].

Q. Recently we have learned about the coal miner Vladimir Klebanov,¹ who was sent to a psychiatric hospital for four years because he protested the poor working conditions in the mine where he was a foreman. Is this an exceptional case for workers to be sent to a psychiatric hospital for defending workers' rights?

A. There are a lot of workers in mental hospitals. Vladimir Borisov, a friend of mine, is a metalworker. He is now thirty-three years old and has spent altogether nine years in mental hospitals. He organized a group to study Marx and he was put in a mental hospital. He is a Marxist

1. See "Worker Dissidents Hold Press Conference in Moscow," in *Intercontinental Press/Interprec*, January 30, 1978, p. 124.

The Case of Misha Voikhansky



Marina and Misha Voikhansky

Because Marina Voikhanskaya has exposed internationally the Kremlin rulers' use of psychiatry to punish dissenters, they are in effect holding

her eleven-year-old son Misha as a hostage.

When Voikhanskaya emigrated in 1975, her son was to follow as soon as she had a job and a place to live. However, after she left, the authorities forced her former husband—Misha's father—to revoke his previous permission for Misha to emigrate.

Subsequent attempts to deprive Voikhanskaya of her maternal rights through a court action were averted only because of international protests.

Misha now lives in Leningrad with Voikhanskaya's mother, who has also been denied permission to join Voikhanskaya. The authorities refuse to let Misha emigrate, on the grounds that Voikhanskaya is an "anti-Soviet element and must be punished."

Voikhanskaya urges that international protests be raised against her continued persecution, and that her son and mother be allowed to join her.

himself. Now he is not allowed to work. He is called a schizophrenic and he has a very small pension, thirty-two rubles a month. The last time they put him in a mental hospital was in December 1976. We gained a lot of publicity for his case in England and France. He happened to be put in my old hospital. I telephoned the head of my hospital many, many times. He was released two months later.

I was the doctor for another worker, Vasily. He was a highly qualified worker in Leningrad who became a very religious man. He began to believe in God. He tried to tell other workers in his factory about his beliefs and even though he was very highly qualified and the only one in his factory who could do his job, he was thrown out of the job.

He had a very small room to live in. His neighbor was a retired colonel and a drunkard. He tried to invite Vasily to drink and Vasily didn't drink. The colonel became suspicious. "A real Russian worker who doesn't drink! It is almost impossible." So the colonel telephoned the psychiatric outpatient department and Vasily was put in my ward.

This was not a political case but it was incredible. For two years Vasily had had no money. He was thrown from his job and

that was all. He didn't have one kopeck. For two years he picked up food from the streets. "Look, I could find a potato or a leaf of cabbage and you know once I found a piece of cheese," he told me. It was horrible.

For two years, he lived in the gutter in Leningrad. In Russia you cannot find much food in the gutter because we are very short of food and nobody throws away good food. And when he was put in my department I discovered he was not mentally ill at all and I wanted to discharge him as soon as possible. But we had an agreement because even that food in the hospital—very bad, very low in calories—for him was a luxury. He was very skinny.

We decided together that he would stay in the hospital as long as he wanted so he could eat. He stayed about two months and after that for more than a year he used to visit me every other Sunday when I was the doctor on duty. He knew when I was there and he used to come and they would bring a big lunch.

After a while, he disappeared. I don't know where or what happened to him. By that time, I was already involved in the dissident movement. The KGB followed me

and I didn't want to bring him more trouble by looking for him.

Victor Fainberg was a worker too. He spent five years in a mental hospital because he took part in the demonstration in Red Square against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Fainberg spent only five minutes in Red Square before he was arrested and for every minute he demonstrated he got a year in a mental hospital.

Q. After the press conference in December, Klebanov was seized again by the police and put in a psychiatric hospital a second time. This time, he was released after a few weeks.

A. Yes, this was a great victory for the Moscow [Helsinki Monitoring] Group. The Moscow Group has a Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes. They knew about Klebanov and they publicized his case widely. Because of this, he was released very quickly.

Q. Borisov was also released very quickly. Do you think that the fact that Borisov and Klebanov were freed so soon indicates that the Kremlin rulers are under more pressure not to keep people incarcerated in mental hospitals?

A. It is a very strange thing with psychiatric hospitals now. People who are well known either are not put in them or are released quickly, because of all the publicity. But people who are not well known, simple workers, people who work on the collective farms, people who live very far away in the country, on these people they use it very, very widely.

Do you know the case of Voloshuk? He was a Baptist. He was not a dissident at all. But because he was a Baptist, last winter he lost his apartment. He had a family with two or three children. They had no place to live. He went to Moscow to the Supreme Soviet to win his rights. And he was put in a mental hospital. But he had first gone to the Moscow [Helsinki Monitoring] Group with his complaint. So they knew about him and when he disappeared, they knew where to find him. And he was released in two weeks time.

The Moscow Group's Psychiatric Commission has statistics now. Every day, from the reception room of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, an average of thirteen people are taken straight away to mental hospitals. They are not dissidents but simply people who are pressing complaints. They are sent to psychiatric hospitals for a month or so for punishment. There is a room No. 10 in the Supreme Soviet. That room has two exits. If someone who came to complain about a simple problem annoys a bureaucrat, the bureaucrat says, "OK, you are all right. Please go to room No. 10. Then everything will be OK after that."

You go in one door of Room No. 10 and disappear through the other to a mental

hospital. An ambulance waits outside. The head of the Moscow Group's Psychiatric Commission, Aleksandr Podrabinek, has collected information about this situation in a book called *Punitive Medicine*.²

Q. Do you think the workers who have come forward to protest their conditions have been influenced by the dissidents?

A. Yes, and I am very proud they have now formed a union. I think the Helsinki Monitoring Groups had a great influence because they have established extensive connections within the Soviet Union. In general, people don't have a place to voice their complaints; there is no one who will listen to them. People come from faraway parts of the Soviet Union, having heard about this Moscow Group, to tell their problems.

Before that, even though some workers were involved in the public protests, they were also intellectuals. Our movement was not mixed with workers because they did not trust us intellectuals, and we had different problems. But now we and they realize that we have a lot of things in common. At first when Klebanov came to Sakharov for help, Sakharov hesitated. He was not paranoid, but he knew the real situation. He knew that people who came to him for help who were not well known were sometimes killed. We know of three cases of people who were killed right after they went to see Sakharov. Three were killed in 1976 and 1977. They left Sakharov's home and they were killed.³

2. A Summary of *Punitive Medicine* is available from Amnesty International, 10 Southampton Street, London WC2E 7HF, England.

3. For a report of one such incident, see the Russian-language samizdat journal *A Chronicle of Current Events*, no. 44, p. 106. The journal is available from *Khronika Press*, 505 Eighth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10018.

Q. Has the development in Europe of a left-wing defense of the dissidents had an impact on the thinking of the dissidents in terms of who they look to for help?

A. Inside Russia, for us it really doesn't matter who helps. We are really in trouble. The reason workers, for example, appeal to Meany⁴ is because they really don't know who is who. They think he can help. Of course, they wouldn't accept help from the CIA but they look for help from ordinary people.

Q. What do you consider to be the most important case to focus on right now?

A. To me the most crucial case is that of Podrabinek. He has not been arrested yet. The government has not yet decided what to do with him. But now is the most important time to help him. He does not want to emigrate. He is only twenty-four years old. He has already done a lot. He goes to Siberia, the Ukraine, etc. to help people who are being persecuted. He has collected information on more than 200 cases of people who are in mental hospitals or were in mental hospitals. The KGB tried to confiscate all his materials but he managed to retain them and has written this book about these cases.

Because Podrabinek will not emigrate, his brother has been arrested. Bullets were planted in his brother's coat pocket. Then the KGB came and searched his flat, went straight to his coat, and found these bullets. He was arrested and is still in prison. The KGB has called Podrabinek in and told him that if he would emigrate, they would release his brother. But he refuses to leave the Soviet Union. □

4. George Meany, head of the AFL-CIO, the American trade-union federation.

Torture 'Routine' in Paraguay

Amnesty International has issued a report on human-rights violations in Paraguay charging that "deaths under torture and detentions that are not officially recognized constitute routine practices" in that country.

While noting that "three persons jailed for more than eighteen years were freed in early 1977," the international organization points out that "there remain political prisoners who have been held under similar conditions for five to eighteen years. At the same time there is growing evidence of deaths under torture and disappearances after arrests."

According to a list released by Amnesty International, the following persons are known to have been tortured to death under the Stroessner regime: Mario Arza-

mendia Flores, Evasio Benítez, Armoa, Arturo Bernal, Juan Manuel Cabral, Juan Carlos Da Costa, Juan José Farías, Joel Filártiga Sperati, Silvano Flores, Sixto Melgarejo, Cándido Oviedo, Juan de Dios Salinas, Mario Raúl Schaerer Prono, and Albino Vera.

Almost 3,500 Held in Argentina

The Argentine government admits holding 3,472 political prisoners.

Interior Minister Albano Harguindeguy gave that figure to a delegation sent to Buenos Aires in late January by the International Federation for the Rights of Man. Harguindeguy also said that his government will publish an official list of these prisoners. (*Le Monde*, January 28.)

The Long March of the Argentine Working Class—II

By Héctor Lucero

[This is the second and concluding installment of "The Long March of the Argentine Working Class."]

V

From afar it is difficult to assess the significance of the recent strikes by the electrical workers, the dock workers, and other sectors. What is certain is that they lasted for weeks in the midst of a fierce repression and that many of the leaders had been local Peronist union officials. Thus, the leadership came in large part from the old trade-union leading bodies that were broken up by the coup. The strike leaderships also included new and unknown people.

However, it is obvious to anyone who has the slightest notion of the way the real workers movement is organized at the factory level that it is impossible—indeed, inconceivable—that the cadres who have developed within this movement could be replaced overnight. Peronist or not, these cadres are the product of a process of selection that does not go on simply in the bureaucratic apparatuses but in struggles and in day-to-day life. Since the consciousness of the working class is Peronist, it is natural that the local leaders it throws up, or at least most of them, are also Peronist.

Only someone who imagined that a social class chooses its leaders in abstract debate over doctrines and ideas and not in the material process of the class struggle could be surprised that even now, after the political defeat of Peronism, the leadership of the first strikes in the new resistance is still made up largely, although not exclusively, of Peronists.

The presence of Peronists in the strike leaderships is no accident; it could not be otherwise. The emergence of a new leadership requires a new stage of struggles, which could only grow out of the previous one. The decisiveness of the transition would depend on the clarity and tactical adeptness of the political vanguard that tried to organize not merely propaganda work but a whole process of raising the consciousness of the workers movement from nationalism to socialism.³

3. Those who have belittled the nationalist consciousness of the working class and have pronounced Peronism dead and buried whenever it suffered a historic reverse (downfall of Perón in 1955, the military coup of 1976), have condemned themselves to isolation and sterility.

The resistance strikes are undoubtedly defensive battles. The cost is extremely high, and they are almost certainly destined to defeat. The working class is falling back in a long retreat. It has no other alternative. But it is trying to preserve the most elementary forms of its organization and to defend its right to exist, since the military coup swept away the workers' democratic and trade-union rights and the social gains of the last thirty years.

However, while it is hard to gauge the extent of these mobilizations, their importance should not be underestimated. They indicate a notable difference from the situation that followed the 1973 coup in Chile.

In Argentina, the defeat suffered by the movement of the workers and poor masses has been both graver and more limited than in Chile. It was graver because the working class has no party of its own. Moreover, this defeat came after the one in Chile, and therefore has a cumulative impact. In a certain sense, it represents the culmination of the reactionary offensive in the Southern Cone of Latin America.

The Argentine defeat was more limited than the one in Chile because the real organizational structures of the class are more deeply rooted in social life, in the factories and in the experience of millions of men and women in their daily lives; they do not depend solely on the political superstructures such as the political parties and the state. The Argentine proletariat has Peronist, but not parliamentary, illusions.

In Chile, when the parties were destroyed and the state was seized by the counterrevolutionists, the working class was left without organization. The forms of organization of the Chilean workers had been based primarily, although not exclusively, on a degree of *political democracy*.

On the other hand, those who have underestimated the level of organization of the proletariat as a class in the factories and neighborhoods have also been caught in a dilemma. At times, they have tail-ended the Peronist prejudices of the majority of the working class and idealized Peronism. Thus, they failed to understand the real social forces through which Peronism could be superseded in the historical consciousness of the masses. At other times, they have tried to replace the existing working-class organization, which they consider bureaucratic, deleterious, and backward, by ultraleftist operations in which the radicalized sectors of the petty-bourgeoisie have isolated themselves and been led into terrible defeats.

In Argentina, facing a similar military takeover, the working class has taken refuge in its capillary *social* organization, and from this it is organizing its defensive battles, its elementary resistance. This struggle is all the more diffuse and persistent in consonance with the immediate and elementary nature of the workers' needs.

This capillary organization of the Argentine working class, which represents the accumulation of thirty years experience, is what enabled a Montonero leader to tell the Madrid magazine *Opinión*: "We have no home base in any of the neighboring countries. Our only home base is the Argentine working class, this working class that is carrying out strikes today in conditions that would seem incredible to a European."⁴

It is clear that the Argentine strikes are not the product of a socialist class consciousness, what Marx called the consciousness of a class for itself. This is what has made it possible for the state to consistently tolerate them, even when as in 1964 such actions led to a general strike with factory occupations throughout the country. Since these strikes have remained within the limits of the system, they have not threatened the state's existence. However, they have made possible a constant

4. An essential difference between the Montoneros and the ERP is that the Montoneros move much more within this social framework. Both movements come from sections of the radicalized petty-bourgeoisie that have sought to unite with the workers. Such a union would be an *explosive mixture*, one that Perón always sought to avoid and which no state or army in Latin America would tolerate for very long. It was against such a united movement that the massacre of Tlatelolco was directed in Mexico in 1968, as well as the massacre of Ezeiza in Argentina in 1973.

However, while the Maoist-Guevarist ERP has tended to consider Peronism as eliminated from the consciousness of the masses, and as a result isolated itself from these masses and exposed itself much more to the blows of the repression; the socialist-Peronist Montoneros have tended to overestimate the classical Peronist forms of this mass consciousness and brought their political activity down to the level of the most backward sections of the Peronist masses.

But it is obvious that in a period of deepgoing retreat and purely defensive actions by the working class, the Montoneros' attitude offers activists better chances for finding protection and for blending into the society. I would just point this out, without going into the significance and implications of the tactic of armed struggle being applied by both organizations.

accumulation of experience embodied in the capillary network drawing together the proletariat and all wage workers at an even deeper level than the official union structures, at the level of the factory and the neighborhood.

The bourgeoisie and its ideologues have overlooked the extent and depth of this accumulated experience because it has developed *within* the framework of a bourgeois ideology still accepted by the working class—Peronist nationalism. And the continual accumulation of experience by itself could not break out of this framework. This bourgeois form has constituted both a cover and a weakness for the developing experience of the Argentine working class.

The central problem for the Marxist vanguard is to grasp the specific combination between this limited *level of consciousness* and this advanced *level of organization*. It must be able to do this in order to raise the level of consciousness to accord with the level of organization. This means understanding how much and to what extent the nationalist form of consciousness has already been *penetrated* and raised from within by the *proletarian* content of the level of organization achieved. The Marxist vanguard must not limit itself to noting the obvious limitations that this form imposes on this content.

VI

The specific form of the organization of the Argentine workers is difficult to understand in European terms because it does not have well-defined class contours. The organization of the working class is still tied to the bourgeoisie by the *nationalist* ideology of the union leadership, which in turn derives from the *nationalist* and not socialist consciousness of the workers themselves.

This *nationalist consciousness* on the part of a *working-class organization* greatly obscures the terms of comparison with what exists outside the country. In fact, the Argentine movement is not one led by Communists or Socialists that has assumed the tasks of national liberation along with working-class ones. Nor is it an all-embracing nationalist populist movement in which class distinctions have been dissolved. It is a mass movement led by *nationalists* that has within it a *proletarian* organization given definite form by the unions from which it derives its essential social power.

The reason for this peculiar combination lies in the fact that the thinking of the Argentine proletariat, the working class of a capitalist country with substantial industrial development, is of a universal type that takes form in the factories and thus is open to the influence of socialism and the world workers movement. However, this thinking, which on the level of trade-union

and factory struggle is as mature as that of the Italian or French proletariat is not associated with a mass working-class party as it is in these other cases, a working-class party built up over long decades. In the past of the Argentine proletariat, there is no Paris Commune or *Ordine Nuovo* [the journal of the nucleus of the Italian CP leadership, edited by Gramsci]. The Argentine workers are, therefore, obliged to express this universal content in the forms and instruments provided by the national cultural tradition. This culture is bourgeois. The struggle of the working class has thus given a revolutionary content and a working-class base to a nationalist ideology, but it has not superseded this ideology.

The Argentine workers have thus not produced a socialist movement in the programmatic sense but rather a movement that is both *nationalist* and *proletarian*. It is nationalist in its ideology, proletarian in its organization.

Of course, there is a contradiction in terms here. But this contradiction exists also in reality. Peronism is a bourgeois-nationalist movement that clashed with imperialism, even though in a very limited way and in bourgeois terms. In this conflict, it based itself on the trade-union organizations of the working class, over which it exercised control through the union leadership, which was closely bound to the state by its ideology, its privileges, and by the political patronage it received.

But this trade-union organization was never a "vertical" or "corporate" one. It was and is real; it lived and continues to live through its myriad links with the working class. It is the political frame of reference for the working class, its center of social cohesion. It is the organization that socially differentiates the working class from the bourgeoisie, while it remains ideologically subordinated to the bourgeoisie within the national movement.

With the unions and their innumerable ramifications, the Argentine proletariat does not have a simple *populist* consciousness, the consciousness fostered by a movement of the poor masses led by bourgeois or petty-bourgeois intellectuals by means of a demagogic, paternalistic ideology. Although Perón always spoke in the name of the "people" (his slogan was "the people are the best thing we have"), the working class is differentiated from the "people" through its trade-union organization and experience, which is rooted in the factories, that is in the basic cells of capitalist production. It is the factories that invariably form the framework for its mobilizations and for its collective life, including its political life. The working class does not consider itself just part of some all-embracing "people." It has an awareness of being a distinct class, just as the Italian, French, English, or Spanish workers have.

The working class thus has a *nationalist*

political consciousness (not a proletarian one) which is embodied in a *proletarian* social organization (not a merely nationalist or populist one). Within this nationalist movement, the proletariat differentiates itself and identifies itself socially as a class.⁵

It was this conflict within the Peronist movement that exploded following the disappearance of the economic conditions that had made it possible to hold together the two poles of the contradiction.

This does not mean that now that the preconditions for Peronist nationalism have been exhausted the working class will automatically rise to a socialist level of consciousness. There is a connection and a contradiction between the level of consciousness and the level of organization. I have pointed out the contradiction. The connection lies in the fact that since this organization is trade-unionist in nature and not political, however extensive it may be, it cannot by itself lead to socialist consciousness. Lenin already explained this in the analysis he made at the beginning of the century.⁶

A higher level of consciousness than the nationalist can only come from outside the unions. It can only come from a Marxist vanguard. Such a vanguard must be organized in a party that upholds the socialist program and fights to get this program embodied in a mass party.

However, a vanguard party can make the socialist program into a real force in society only if it understands and takes into consideration the real level of the organization of the working class. It must not underestimate this organization, confusing it with the nationalist consciousness with which it is still associated. Conversely, it must not subordinate itself to this nationalist consciousness, putting on a Peronist or nationalist mask for fear

5. This is the reason—and not the protection of the state or Perón's trade-union laws—for the astonishing durability of the Confederación General del Trabajo [CGT—General Confederation of Labor], despite the betrayal or flight of so many of its leaders and the successive waves of repression. Since it was organized in 1945, the CGT has had its offices occupied, it has been banned, deprived of its legal status, and split many times. But every time, the workers movement has had to reorganize itself within this framework of a single national federation of labor. The reason is that this framework represents the level of experience that has been achieved, and the workers are not willing to fall below this level.

6. On the other hand, the greater the separation between the level of consciousness (which is limited) and the level of organization (relatively high), the larger the opening is for the consolidation of a bureaucracy based on the working class in the unions, parties, and the state. Such a gap is precisely the *living space* for the bureaucracy, whose existence in turn conspires by its nature against any raising of the consciousness of the workers.

of being cut off from the present form of organization.

That is, the working class can only rise above the nationalist ideology, can only make a bridge between this ideology and the socialist program, through the real, living experience embodied in its struggles, even those of a defensive character. It has to start off from its present level of organization as a class.

The organizational level achieved by the workers constitutes their most essential gain. And it is within this framework that the Marxist vanguard must work to lay the foundations of a mass workers party growing out of the experience of the working class, and not one that merely defends the socialist program as a minority and from outside the class.

It is against this great organizational achievement of the workers that the offensive of the repressive forces is being concentrated. In the ranks of these forces are men who have prepared themselves for long years for this job, gaining experience in confrontations of varying scope under previous, more or less "democratic" governments. Of course, in the same years, a broad vanguard of workers also gained experience under fire, learned to know their enemies, and got used to fighting them.

The present confrontation has all the signs of being an extremely prolonged and arduous process. It has begun with a severe setback for the working class and the poor masses, who were left without leadership and without any political solution corresponding to their current level of consciousness. There is no nationalist solution; there is no "return of Perón"—in the immediate future, there are only defensive battles for minimum demands.

Nonetheless, it is in this process, whose forms it would be pretentious and useless to try to predict, that a new and qualitatively higher phase of the struggle of the Argentine proletariat will take shape. This coming phase will be one of fighting for working-class hegemony—that is, for the socialist program and the kind of mass party that will give it expression—in the most important anti-imperialist movement in Latin America.

Those who think that this means that Argentina is going to go from military dictatorship to socialist revolution have not learned anything and have not tried to learn anything—except schemas—from the Vietnamese revolution, the Cuban revolution, from Portugal, from Spain, or even from the defeat of fascism in Italy. Today the basic struggle in Argentina is the fight for democratic rights. And the fundamental, decisive form of this struggle is the fight to defend the organization of the working class against destruction and massacre.

However, the struggle for democracy and the fight for working-class leadership, after the tragic and grotesque collapse of

bourgeois Peronism, are interlocking and complementary processes. They cannot be separated. Regaining democratic rights involves restoring and developing the instruments of working-class leadership, not merely the reestablishment of parliamentary institutions. The most important of the instruments to be developed is the party that the working class still lacks, a party rooted in the masses and recognized by them as their organization, one that would defend the program and goal of socialism, while making whatever alliances are possible in the struggle against the dictatorship.

It is the United States and its local allies that are creating "one, two, three . . . many Vietnams" in Latin America. In these cases, as in Vietnam, the party of the working class will develop and be tempered in a prolonged struggle, in extremely arduous conditions. In this struggle, new forms of democracy will be built in Argentina, as, for example, were built up in Vietnam itself. But what will assure the advance of this process, as in Vietnam, are not deals with "democratic" civilian and military elements (although such agreements are not excluded a priori). What is necessary is the consolidation of working-class leadership, replacing the old bourgeois leadership of the Peronist movement, in a national front against the military dictatorship and against imperialism.

VII

Cambodia borders on Vietnam, Vietnam on China, China on the Soviet Union. Argentina is surrounded by five military dictatorships—Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and Uruguay. The Argentine working class has no neighbors; it can rely only on itself. It has no base behind the lines. But, on the other hand, it has something that goes beyond any kind of a relationship one nation could have with another—a common class *identity* with the organized workers movement in the other countries of the world. This common identity today can be the best source of solidarity, especially in those countries where the workers movement is strongest.

The Argentine people need the support of democratic public opinion in their fight against repression. However, what is especially needed is working-class solidarity with the Argentine proletariat, unconditional support for the organizational level of the Argentine working class as it is, for its underground coordinating committees and factory committees, for its jailed union leaders, for its persecuted shop delegates. What is needed is class solidarity from workers who will not ask that the Argentine proletariat stop being Peronist or try to offer "excuses" or "justifications" for the fact that it still is. The Argentine workers are working organizational miracles in conditions comparable to those of

the March 1943 strike in Turin, Milan, and Genoa under the German occupation. They should be supported without any conditions or mental reservations.

Since the working class does not have a party of its own, it has no way to make its voice heard abroad. It expresses itself through social actions. But just as communication with the outside world occurs through political channels, those who voice them are the Argentine political organizations that advocate either a fight for representative democracy or the guerrilla struggle road. The supporters of both positions obviously have the right to defend their points of view. But this leaves in obscurity, without any voice of its own, the social alternative to both, an alternative that does not exclude either one of these struggles but would subordinate them to the needs of the organization of the working class as the central social force.

This social alternative is organizing in the factories, forming clandestine shop committees, strike committees, coordinating committees, building the CGT of the Resistance. It is hard to see from afar what strength these bodies have today. But the strikes in the automobile plants, the electrical industry, and on the docks are indications that this historical experience of the working class will be resumed in the complex phase opened by the military coup.

In these struggles, in which the conscious initiative of the revolutionary vanguard is coming to play a decisive role, the working class as a whole is going through an experience of independent organization qualitatively more advanced than in all the previous struggles. This is a result of the terrible conditions under which this is taking place and of an already developed critical attitude toward the old bourgeois leadership.

This experience will enable the workers to assemble the conditions for overcoming the limitations of Peronist consciousness, for consolidating their class consciousness, and for winning the fight for class independence and a socialist program, which are the prerequisites for building a party of their own.

November 1976

Banzer Lifts Trade-Union Ban

A four-year ban on trade-union activity has been rescinded, the Bolivian government announced January 25. In particular, the regime said that the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB—Bolivian Workers Federation) will be allowed to resume legal functioning.

The COB was banned in 1974 for "extremist political activity." After that, the Banzer dictatorship appointed union "leaders" from above.

Ireland—The Pendulum Begins to Swing to the Left

By Gerry Foley

After four years of decline, anti-imperialist feeling is beginning to rise again in Ireland. This shift has already had a powerful impact on the major political parties that seek the support of the oppressed Irish people in both parts of the island.

In June 1977, the openly proimperialist National Coalition of the Labour Party and Fine Gael suffered a resounding defeat at the polls. The results upset the predictions of virtually all the bourgeois press, which had expected the coalition to retain control of the Dublin parliament.

The ministers most directly identified with the escalating repression against militant anti-imperialists received sharp rebuffs at the polls.

Conor Cruise O'Brien, minister for posts and telegraphs; and Patrick Cooney, minister for justice, failed even to retain their seats in the popularly elected house of the legislature. O'Brien barely retains a foothold in parliament as a university representative in the Senate, a deliberative body designed to represent the "professions and trades."

The bourgeois party with the most nationalistic image, Fianna Fáil, swept to one of the biggest victories in its history.

This triumph came after seven years in which the leaders of the coalition have made special exertions to portray Fianna Fáil as representing the tradition of "reactionary nationalism," and "violence" in Irish politics.

In this election campaign as well, it was argued, especially by Conor Cruise O'Brien, that a victory for Fianna Fáil would encourage the "gunmen" and alienate the proimperialist Protestants in Northern Ireland.

In fact, the step-up of repression against the anti-imperialist movement was started by the last Fianna Fáil government in 1971-72. And until September 1977, there was agreement on this policy between Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil. The division that opened up in September reflected the growing opposition to repression among the population.

There is no difference between the basic aims of Fianna Fáil and those of Fine Gael. However, for historical reasons and because of differences in their traditional bases of support, Fianna Fáil is more vulnerable to nationalist pressures.

Although he campaigned against Fianna Fáil as a party tainted by association with "violent nationalism," Conor



Time

O'BRIEN: Dismissed by voters.

Cruise O'Brien claimed after the elections that the results did not indicate any desire for a change in stance toward the British government.

However, in the past six months it has become absolutely clear what practical conclusions the Dublin politicians have drawn from the vote. They are taking a sharper tone toward London. And this holds true for others besides Fianna Fáil.

In fact, one of the most acerbic of the recent statements was made in mid-November by John Kelly, who was attorney general in the ousted government and who became known for his tirades against the IRA.

Kelly's remarks were prompted by a statement by a second-rate British Conservative Party figure, William Van Straubenzee, that the coalition government had been "craven" in refusing to sign the European convention on extraditing alleged terrorists.

The former Irish attorney general said that Van Straubenzee showed contempt for the Irish constitution and that he wanted Dublin to establish a police state for the convenience of the British government. Kelly evidently got so carried away that he raised questions whose implications were anything but flattering about the policies of the coalition government. He queried whether the British government was willing, as the recent Irish governments have been, to abolish trial by jury in political cases or sentence persons to prison on the uncorroborated word of police officers.

Kelly even pointed out that the Irish special courts could "without changing a line of the law" be made up of army officers instead of judges.

While for the last four years it has been the fashion in top Irish political circles to put the blame for the situation in the North on "men of violence" in general, Kelly put the responsibility squarely on London:

When during the years before 1968—when timely reform might have averted the Northern confusion—did Mr van Straubenzee or his colleagues ever concern themselves with what was going on in Northern Ireland? Most certainly, we will take no lectures on neglected duty from that quarter.

In its December 9 issue, *Inniu*, an Irish-language weekly that normally follows a line close to that of Fianna Fáil, published an editorial entitled "Pax Britannica" that stated:

It is becoming clear with the passage of time that the government of Britain has no intention of granting fair play to the minority in the North of Ireland nor to the majority of the people of Ireland.

The real British policy, *Inniu* said, was to integrate Northern Ireland totally into the United Kingdom.

On January 8, Dublin Prime Minister Jack Lynch said in an interview on Irish radio that the British government should declare its intention of eventually withdrawing politically and militarily from Northern Ireland. His remarks were seized on by the proimperialist Unionists to raise a hue and cry about the Irish government "meddling" in the North.

Lynch did not more than reiterate his party's traditional policy. But the trend in bourgeois politics in the formally independent part of Ireland had been to renounce interest in the North. And if mounting public pressure had not forced a reversal of this shift, Fianna Fáil would certainly have gone along with it. In fact, it had made some moves in that direction.

Lynch's statements were supported in an editorial in the January 9 issue of the *Irish Times*, the most serious of the Dublin dailies and one that does not have a nationalist tradition. The paper said: "There is no such thing as 26-county patriotism. The patria is the whole island."

Long before the elections, Conor Cruise O'Brien had begun campaigning for repeal of the article of the Irish constitution claiming sovereignty over the entire island for the Dublin government. He tried to



G.M. Cookson/Socialist Challenge

British troops on patrol in central Belfast, May 1977.

continue this even after his defeat. In an Oxford debate September 17 he produced survey results showing, he said, that a majority of the population of the formally independent part of the country were opposed to unity with the North.

O'Brien distorted the survey findings in such an obvious way that it became an embarrassment to the already demoralized Labour Party. On September 20, he resigned from the Labour parliamentary group. His disassociation from the party leadership was gratefully accepted by the chairman, Frank Cluskey.

On October 25, O'Brien told the London Institute of International Affairs that direct British rule of Northern Ireland "is the nearest thing to a satisfactory solution which is available in our time." He has thus come to identify himself totally with the defense of British policy in Ireland.

But it is clear that from now on O'Brien's role will be confined to that of a mandarin ensconced behind the protecting walls of bourgeois "intellectual" institutions. He can no longer play an active political role.

Impact in Northern Ireland

The rising anti-imperialist feeling has naturally had a still greater impact on politics in Northern Ireland. Since approximately the time of the British queen's visit to her "Irish dominions" in mid-August

1977, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, the biggest electoral party relying on the votes of the Catholic ghetto dwellers, has been making obvious efforts to refurbish its anti-imperialist image.

The SDLP's turn was particularly noticeable not only because of the howls it provoked from the imperialist and proimperialist forces; but because the party's accommodationist policy toward imperialism in the past period had been so abject.

Just two years ago, in February 1976, the SDLP took out a full-page ad in the Belfast *News-Letter*, the main Catholic daily, pledging full support to the Royal Ulster Constabulary "in impartially upholding the rule of law and in seeking out any criminal." The RUC is hated by the Catholic population as the police of the Protestant ascendancy. This force led the 1969 pogroms against the Catholic ghettos.

The SDLP leaders had been hoping that the British government and the Unionists would make enough concessions to the Catholic community to win its support for "law and order." However, the anticipated "phasing out" of the Protestant ascendancy did not occur. In fact, when the mass civil-rights movement declined, the military and police stepped up their campaign of intimidation against the Catholic population.

Moreover, the increasing isolation of the

Provisional IRA and the fading of its guerrilla campaign did not bring any letup in the pressure of the army and police on Catholic neighborhoods. Instead, these forces launched a campaign to smash the Catholic people into the ground.

The queen's visit was a culmination of the campaign to break the spirit of the Catholic population once and for all. She was paraded around Northern Ireland behind a massive screen of repressive forces as the symbol of triumphant Unionism, the restoration of "law and order" under the crown of the "Three Kingdoms" (England, Scotland, and Ireland) and of the empire.

The "royal tour" said the same thing to the Catholics as the Orange marches: "Croppies [Catholics], lie down." Of course, the message was presented in more elegant language than that normally used in the Orange anthems, which is exemplified by the following verse: "We are the Billy Boys, we're up to our knees in Fenian [Catholic] blood, surrender or you'll die." But it was no less clearly understood by the Catholic population.

Thus, the queen's visit placed the SDLP in a dilemma. It had been pressing fundamentally for "power sharing," that is, for joint SDLP-Unionist rule in Northern Ireland. Consequently, it accepted the "constitution," the sovereignty of the British state formally headed by the queen. How-

ever, it could hardly participate very enthusiastically in a celebration of the Protestant ascendancy. And so, the "cool" reception SDLP leaders gave the queen came to be commented on widely in the press.

The Unionists raised the cry that the SDLP had proven that it was still a fundamentally "disloyal" party. This continued the tradition of Orange orators, who like to refer to Catholics as "dastardly rebels seeking to detach this fair province from Her Majesty's dominions."

Paddy Devlin Thrown Out

While the SDLP was under fire from the Unionists, inspired to new transports of "loyalty" by the presence of "Her Majesty," a split appeared in its ranks. In late August, one of the founders and main leaders of the SDLP, Paddy Devlin, former member of the Belfast parliament for the Lower Falls ghetto area, opened up a public attack on the majority of the party executive, accusing them of backsliding toward nationalism.

Devlin claimed later that his statements were motivated by leaks to the press about a coming policy change.

On a BBC program September 5, Devlin said that the SDLP leaders had moved away from their original objective of winning over "moderate Unionist" voters by a program of social and economic reform. They were now moving back to a position of nationalists versus Unionists.

When the SDLP was founded in 1970, it represented an amalgamation of the old bourgeois Nationalist Party, moderate civil-rights leaders such as John Hume, and a few politicians who claimed to represent labor.

The present chairman of the SDLP, Gerry Fitt, was the leader of the antipartisan wing of the old Labour Party in Northern Ireland. By the time of the founding of the SDLP, this grouping had become nothing more than his personal constituency machine.

Devlin, a former IRA man, came from the Northern Ireland Labour Party, which accepted partition. In the period before the rise of the civil-rights movement, the NILP had exercised a certain appeal to both Catholics and Protestants on a purely economic basis. Any hopes that it could unite Catholic and Protestant workers, however, were shattered by the polarization that developed between the two communities when the Catholics began to struggle against their oppression.

The old Nationalist Party was the northern section of the old Home Rule Party, supplanted almost everywhere else in Ireland in 1918 by separatists. Because of the pressure of the Protestant settler community, no clear differentiation occurred between home rulers and separatists in the North. The overwhelming majority of the Catholic community continued to look to

the nationalists to represent their interests in the parliamentary framework.

However, the Nationalist Party was extremely passive, and was bypassed by the rise of the civil-rights movement. It suffered a series of electoral defeats at the hands of civil-rights leaders, including such an outspoken revolutionary socialist as Bernadette Devlin. This made necessary the formation of a new, revamped party. But the SDLP was not, and could not be, fundamentally different from the Nationalist Party.

There never was any possibility that the SDLP could appeal to "moderate Unionists." What Protestant members it has have in fact come over to nationalism and broken, willingly or unwillingly, with the settler community. These "renegade" Protestants often take stronger positions on the national question than the Catholic politicians themselves.

What orienting to the "moderate unionists" represented in reality was the hope that the Catholic bourgeois forces could make some gains by cooperating with British imperialism and the Unionists.

If such an accommodation could be reached, then "social and economic" reforms could be expected to bring conditions in Northern Ireland more into line with those elsewhere in the United Kingdom. But these reforms would only be the sweetener for surrender to imperialism. The turn the SDLP has now made shows that this was exactly the way the more astute politicians in the party saw it.

Paddy Devlin was left behind in the shift. Somewhat like Conor Cruise O'Brien, but in a much more acute way, he became an embarrassment to his party. On the weekend of September 10-11, 1977, he was dropped from the leadership, and on the following weekend, expelled from the party.

Congratulated by NILP

The Northern Ireland Labour Party leadership, now appealing for affiliation to the British Labour Party, declared its willingness to welcome Devlin under its wing. The September 12 *Irish Times* reported:

The NILP's vice-chairman, Mr. Alan Carr, had said that a new pressure group could include the NILP, Mr. Devlin and others willing to unite in a struggle for complete parity with Britain and the implementation of socialist policies throughout the UK.

Congratulating Mr. Devlin on his opposition to SDLP policy, Mr. Carr had said: "Paddy has come to his senses and denounced his erstwhile colleagues as reactionary nationalists. Socialists will be pleased by his recognition that the SDLP's pursuit of dreary nationalist aspirations can serve only to perpetuate sectarian divisions [i.e., antagonism between Catholics and Protestants]."

Devlin's stand was hailed in similar terms by the *Tribune*, the weekly paper of the British Labour Party left.

The ousted SDLP leader's criticisms had

come to the center on the policy document adopted by the leadership at the same time it expelled him. The document was entitled "Facing Reality." Here are some excerpts:

On the constitutional front—in spite of our efforts and our clear willingness to negotiate, there has been nothing but complete intransigence from the Loyalist block. Their behaviour in the new local councils has confirmed that not only have the terrible events of the past eight years taught them nothing about the need for genuine reconciliation and justice in this community, but it would appear that they have actually gone backwards. In the light of this intransigence, which represents a clear rejection of policies overwhelmingly passed by the British Parliament, we have addressed a series of questions to the British Government.

These questions amounted to requests to the British Government to state whether they were willing or capable of implementing the democratic will of the British Parliament in relation to Northern Ireland and to consider the consequences of their failure to implement that will.

We have received no answers. Instead, we have the shameful reality of a British Labour Government entering into pacts and undertakings with Unionists at Westminster which amount to an abandonment of those politics. . . .

There is a clear need for the British Government to spell out its long-term strategy for the future of Northern Ireland and its relationship with the rest of Ireland. While it continues to refuse to do so, and while it leaves as its only basic long-term statement, its continually renewed Unionist pledge, it will find no willingness among the Unionists to budge one inch from their present intransigent stance.

Why should they, when they know that failure to achieve their first objective—a restored Stormont [Belfast parliament]—simply leaves them with a highly acceptable—to them—alternative, closer integration with Britain?

The 'Realities'

The first "reality" the new SDLP document faced was that the British and the Protestant ascendancy politicians have not made any concessions, and in fact have been moving toward a harder line toward the Catholic community.

The second "reality" flows from the first. The abolition of the Protestant-dominated Northern Ireland parliament was not a victory for reform as was generally thought at the time. It was not the prelude to a phasing-out of the Protestant ascendancy by the British. Instead the imperialists have both maintained the settler caste as an essential instrument of their policy and gained greater maneuverability for reconsolidating their hold on their enclave in Ireland.

In his keynote address to the SDLP convention November 5-6, 1977, Gerry Fitt explained the political dilemma his party had found itself in:

We can't find the accommodation and trust if it means that we have to ignore or stay silent about what is happening in the interrogation centres, particularly Castlereagh [where "confessions" are extorted from political suspects by

torture] and throughout Northern Ireland. We believe there are things happening in Castle-reagh which offend every concept of human dignity and human rights. If the Unionists say—"You must remain silent, otherwise we are not going to have anything to do with you," then we are not going to stay silent.

If, to reach an agreement, we are told we must wave Union Jacks and pay homage to every member of the Royal Family, then there's no accommodation going to be reached. We also have our traditions, our customs and our cherished ideals of eventual reunification of this country by peaceful means, and we will not give them up.

Fitt twisted himself into a knot trying to both recognize the British "constitutional" framework and object to the actual role of the monarchy in Northern Irish politics:

It was quite right that the Queen should open Parliament at Westminster last week, when she wasn't doing it to assert that she was the head of a political tribe.

The conference unanimously adopted a motion saying it "deplores the continued ill-treatment of suspects and prisoners by the security forces and calls for the immediate removal and prosecution of those responsible and holds the Westminster Government fully responsible for it."

The Irish Independence Party

Unable to offer the Catholic population any prospects for gains, the SDLP found that it had gone too far out on a limb in seeking accommodation with the British authorities and the Unionists. One sign of this was the appearance of another bourgeois nationalist party, the Irish Independence Party (IIP), which sought to capitalize on the demand for British withdrawal.

The *Irish Times's* main Northern correspondent David McKittrick made the following comment in the November 5, 1977, issue of the Dublin daily:

... the IIP is a sign of an apparently inexorable shift of opinion within the minority and within the SDLP—that is, away from the idea that it is possible to work within the present Northern Ireland State to achieve their long-term objective of Irish unity. . . .

Last year John Hume, Gerry Fitt and company managed to hold back the tide. This year they have been forced to make significant concessions to avoid being overrun. Unless something turns up in the meantime, next year could be the occasion for the party to take the crucial step—backward or forward, according to your point of view—of going for withdrawal.

Certainly there was a big difference in the sort of thing that was said about the British presence in Northern Ireland in this year's SDLP convention as compared with the previous one.

For example, in the last convention, SDLP executive member Seán Farren said, according to the summary of his remarks in the December 6, 1976, *Irish Times*:

The British involvement in Northern Ireland was not the problem. A British declaration of



Der Spiegel

Demonstration in Dublin, April 1977. More than 5,000 marched to demand freedom for 18 political prisoners in second month of hunger strike.

withdrawal would only be seen as a victory for traditional Irish nationalism, and a victory of one side over another was something which people in Northern Ireland had had enough of.

These words must have an ironic ring in the ears of the SDLP notables now, if they remember them. The last year has forcefully reminded them that only one side has won victory over the other in Northern Ireland for 400 years, the Protestant settlers over the descendants of the population vanquished by the English conquest, and they show no signs of having "had enough" of this victory.

In 1976, Austin Curry, one of the leaders of the SDLP who came from the Nationalist Party, said that he was in favor of eventual British withdrawal but that he agreed with the sentiment in a phrase of St. Augustine: "Let me be good, Lord, but not now." His attitude was: "Let the British get out, Lord, but not now." He claimed that only the British troops stood in the way of a disastrous civil war.

At the 1977 convention, the party leadership clearly felt that it could no longer give open support—with criticisms—to the British army as the guarantor of the best of all possible worlds.

Actually, it is not very likely that the SDLP will "go for withdrawal" in any real sense. The Catholic bourgeoisie in Ireland has never gone for withdrawal in its entire history.

The bourgeois elements that opposed the British in the 1918-21 war of independence were catapulted into this conflict by the buildup of pressures from below, and they retreated from it as rapidly as they could, that is, as soon as the British offered concessions that could provide some support for a perspective of "progress through negotiation."

The SDLP is not very likely to "face reality" fully either. As the party of a weak and vacillating Catholic middle class, its existence depends fundamentally on preventing the oppressed population from

recognizing that only a mass revolutionary struggle against the imperialist system as a whole can end its oppression.

The fact is that the SDLP has simply been left by the British and the Unionists without anything to offer its mass base, and it has, therefore, taken the only option it has—bluff. The turn by the Dublin government represents exactly the same thing. The only difference is that the pressures of the conflict do not bear so immediately on the Southern regime as on the SDLP, and so normally its turns are not so sharp.

The problem both for the imperialists and their supporters and for the Irish bourgeois forces is that confrontations tend to escalate rapidly and go out of the control of the bourgeois nationalist leaderships.

Honeymoons and Quarrels

The now decade-long conflict in Northern Ireland has been marked by a succession of honeymoons and quarrels between the British imperialists and the Catholic bourgeois forces, going hand in hand with periods of reformist illusions among the masses of the oppressed population at certain times and revolutionary explosions at others.

In the late 1960s, the prevailing illusion was that the Belfast government was going to carry out democratic reforms. That illusion was shattered by the August 1969 pogroms. Then, there was an uprising in the Catholic ghettos that effectively drove out the police. A mass upsurge erupted in the South, threatening the stability of the Dublin government.

This crisis once again revealed the interdependence of the neocolonial regime and the bourgeois and moderate forces in the Northern Catholic communities. It is vital to Dublin's interest to keep a rein on the political situation in the Northern ghettos. On the other hand, the weak

Catholic bourgeoisie and probourgeois elements in the North need the backup of Dublin in order to bargain with British imperialism and the Unionists and to have any credibility for the Catholic masses as "negotiators."

Thus, in 1969 and 1970, the Dublin government was forced to resort to a dangerous bluff. It promised to supply weapons and military equipment to moderate leaders in the Catholic ghettos. The purpose of this operation was to head off the emergence of more radical leadership. But even so the British government could not tolerate it.

Fine Gael, then in the opposition, was informed of the Irish army undercover operation, probably by British agents in the Dublin government apparatus. The party leader, Liam Cosgrave, raised a hue and cry about the attempt to import weapons for the Northern defense groups. The premier, Jack Lynch, then dissociated himself and his government from the project, putting the blame on some cabinet members and a middle-ranking Irish intelligence officer.

The illusions that the British army had come to defend the Catholics were exploded in July 1970, when the troops raided the Lower Falls Catholic ghetto to search for weapons. No such operation had, or yet has, been carried out in a Protestant neighborhood, although the Protestant paramilitary forces are well known to be much more heavily armed than any Catholic defense force.

Also in July 1970, following the "Battle of the Falls," the British troops began to shoot randomly with intent to kill when clashes developed between them and Catholic crowds. The SDLP was forced to withdraw from the Belfast parliament and threatened to set up an alternative assembly. On August 18, the British showed that they had no intention of dealing with the Catholic representatives—they roughed up some of the main moderate leaders during a demonstration in Derry.

Confrontation with the Northern Catholic bourgeois nationalists quickly led to a confrontation with Dublin. The Lynch government declared its support for a campaign of "passive resistance" to bring down the Protestant parliament in Belfast. It began to issue stronger and more public protests against British army incursions over the border. The possibility loomed of frontier clashes between the British and Irish armies.

This confrontation course culminated in the Bloody Sunday massacre in Derry at the end of January 1972, which touched off mass mobilizations in both parts of the country. A spontaneous general strike swept the South. The political situation went out of the control of all the forces interested in maintaining the essential status quo.

The explosion was dissipated because there was no leadership present that could

lead the masses forward. But the situation did not begin to become defused until the British government suspended the Belfast parliament, creating illusions among the Catholics that it was going to impose reforms over the heads of the Protestant settler caste.



LYNCH: Surprised pollsters.

In this situation, the Provisional terrorist campaign accelerated the decline of mass opposition to the imperialist system, but it was not the fundamental cause of the downturn.

The fundamental cause was the revival of illusions that it would be possible through negotiations to achieve improvements in the conditions facing the Catholic population. With various ups and downs, this climate of false hopes has continued since mid-1972. It is only in the last year and a half that it seems to have begun to break down.

Unable to Grant Concessions

It was inevitable that the hopes raised by the introduction of direct British rule and the floating of various schemes for democratic reform would be disappointed. In fact, this has happened with extreme rapidity.

In the context of a new world economic crisis, British imperialism has been unable to offer even the most modest perspective for higher living standards among the Catholic population. Instead conditions have gotten worse.

In the South, as well, greater subordination to imperialism has not brought the economic benefits expected. The growing imperialist investment in the last two decades did stimulate some development. But over the past two years it has become clear that the country is not making any

real progress toward escaping from its chronic stagnation.

The number of registered unemployed still stands at well over 100,000 in a total population of barely over 3 million. The official jobless figure will probably go down with the upturn in the international business cycle. But it is certain that it will remain high. The creation of jobs has been and remains slower than the flow of youth into the employment market, and there is no perspective for changing this.

Now, in contrast to the historical pattern, the cost of maintaining these jobless falls on Irish society itself. The traditional outlets for emigration—Britain, North America, Australia, and New Zealand—are no longer capable of draining off the pool of unemployed.

Thus, the main change seems to be not so much that the Free State economy has become stronger, but that the imperialist ones have become weaker. This makes the social situation in Ireland more explosive. The contradictions of blocked development in a country so closely integrated with the imperialist center have always been resolved by emigration.

The edging of the main bourgeois nationalist parties toward a more anti-imperialist position reflects the rise of strong pressures. The Irish masses as yet show no sign of any conscious determination to renew the struggle for national liberation. But such a fight follows inevitably from rejecting imperialist and proimperialist repression.

Every mass upsurge against the imperialist system in Ireland in the past ten years has come in response to acts of repression that have made it clear to the Irish people that they are still oppressed and can expect nothing better from their masters.

The past ten years have also shown once again that the anti-imperialist struggle in Ireland is particularly subject to sharp ups and downs. This is the result of two factors, which are really opposite sides of the same coin. The first is the weakness of the oppressed nationality relative to the forces that hold it in subjection. The second is the fact that since Ireland has been so totally dominated by Britain for so long, a certain integration has taken place.

While the development of Ireland overall is blocked by British domination, Irish working people have been able to look forward to a "western" standard of living through temporary or permanent emigration. Irish business has been able to look forward to modest profits from ties with the British economy and the inflow of money from emigrants.

The result of both factors is very sharp contradictions in the attitudes of the Irish people. These contradictions are sharpened still more by a constantly renewed experience of struggles that have resulted in considerable suffering but have failed to

achieve any fundamental breakthrough toward achieving Irish national aspirations.

In fact, the pressures imperialism exerts on the Irish people coupled with the weakness of the Irish bourgeoisie have essentially frozen the situation in the country for fifty years. There was a complete deadlock from the time of the bourgeois betrayal of the independence struggle that resulted in the 1921-22 civil war to the rise of the civil-rights movement in the North in 1968. Then the decline of the civil-rights struggle seemed to restore the deep freeze.

Under these conditions, plausibility is given to the view that limited gains can be achieved by avoiding the national question. As a result, there have been strong tendencies to think that no progress is possible in the national struggle until a higher level of social and economic development has been achieved.

Conversely, there is a strong tendency to believe that since no progress has been made in the national struggle for so long, the national question must in fact essentially have been resolved by history, leaving only a small loose end in the North to be tied up.

As a consequence, the connection between immediate, partial struggles and the general question of national liberation has tended to become particularly obscured in Ireland. This is reflected on the political level by a division between those dedicated above all to keeping the flame of national resistance alive and those interested above all in fighting for concrete improvements in the lot of the masses.

Both may or may not be revolutionary minded. The first are suspicious that all partial struggles are a diversion from the fundamental issues, and thus useless or even a betrayal. The second, in turn, are suspicious of those who put national demands first, considering them to be sterile nationalists, uninterested in the needs of the working people, or actually opposed to them. This division has been deepened by the fact that up until now in Irish history, the worst suspicions of both have been confirmed by the events.

The Civil Rights Breakthrough

The civil-rights struggle in the North achieved a breakthrough because for a time it transcended this dilemma. It succeeded in mobilizing the masses of the most oppressed sector of the Irish people, beginning with immediate demands that were understood and supported by all. Furthermore, these demands could win the support of the rest of the national majority and of public opinion in the imperialist countries themselves.

This broad appeal of the civil-rights demands was particularly important. In the first place, the contradictions in the attitude of the Irish people toward the anti-imperialist struggle divide different layers

of the population. For the unemployed youth in Northern Catholic ghettos, there is little hope except in a national revolution. Once aroused to struggle, this layer



Tribune

PADDY DEVLIN: Booted from SDLP

has continued to fight despite deepening isolation, impossible odds, and catastrophic losses.

However, for most other sections of the Irish people, and even of the Catholic minority in the North, the perspective of national struggle has normally been more threatening than promising. This is true to such an extent that the head of the National Coalition government, Liam Cosgrave, could publicly denounce the section of the oppressed Irish people in the North as a dangerous breed alien to the rest of the national majority. On June 13, 1974, he said:

They [the people of the South] are expressing more and more the idea that unity or close association with a people so deeply imbued with violence and its effects is not what they want.

Furthermore, international support is particularly important to the Irish struggle. Located in the very center of the Western imperialist alliance, the Irish people have no realistic hope of support from any foreign power. Their only potential allies are in the populace of the imperialist countries themselves. It is notable that major struggles in Ireland have generally occurred when social unrest was rising in Western Europe.

In the Irish struggle over the last ten years, the traditional dichotomy between those interested primarily in struggle against specific social evils and those interested primarily in fighting the imperialists was expressed in the conflict be-

tween the "Official" and Provisional republicans. In opposite ways, they misunderstood the lessons of the civil-rights movement and followed courses of action that helped to bring about its decline.

"Officials" vs. Provisionals

The "Officials" became entrapped in the view that the civil-rights movement could not lead directly to an anti-imperialist revolution. The Provisionals, on the other hand, came to believe that it already had, and that the fight could be carried forward only by the traditional military means.

The Provisionals were also misled by the illusions prevailing in most Irish political circles, even among those who considered themselves revolutionary Marxists, that the British imperialists did not have a fundamental interest in remaining in Northern Ireland or in maintaining the Protestant ascendancy. This apparently led them to underestimate the amount of military pressure necessary to persuade the British to pull out.

In fact, a guerrilla struggle actively supported only by a minority of the minority in the North and a far smaller militant minority in the South, has no chance of wearing out the imperialists. The Provisional leadership itself has come to acknowledge this to a certain degree. This was the message of Jimmy Drumm's keynote speech at the Bodenstown commemoration in June 1977.

This annual gathering at the tomb of Wolfe Tone, considered the founder of Irish republicanism, is the biggest national mobilization of members and supporters of the republican movement, and so the keynote speech is usually a major statement of political orientation.

Drumm, a veteran Belfast republican leader, said:

We find that a successful war of liberation cannot be fought exclusively on the backs of the oppressed in the Six Counties, nor around the physical presence of the British army.

Hatred and resentment of this army cannot sustain the war; and the isolation of socialist Republicans around the armed struggle is dangerous.

We need a positive tie-in with the mass of the Irish people who have little or no idea of the sufferings in the North because of media censorship and the consolidation of conservatism throughout the country. We need to make a stand on economic issues and on everyday struggles of the people.

So, the Provisional leaders have evidently recognized that something is wrong. But they seem unable to find an alternative. What Drumm projected was no more than a repetition of the scheme tried unsuccessfully by the "Officials" in the early 1970s.

The idea is that support can be won for a guerrilla organization through involvement in day-to-day social struggles. This is not a strategy for mobilizing the masses to

achieve a revolutionary breakthrough. The Provisionals, no more than the "Officials," have any concrete conception of the way specific social struggles themselves link up with revolutionary goals, much less any line for intervening in them. They do not seem to have any idea of what they want to accomplish by participating in these struggles, other than to win the goodwill of the workers.

In their turn toward "class politics," the "Officials" ultimately failed totally to link their participation in social struggles to a strategy for leading the Irish people to liberate themselves from imperialist domination. First, they removed the perspective of national liberation to a later historical stage, and then they began to counterpose their concept of economic struggle to the fight against imperialism.

In this way, they came to view the Provisional military campaign as a greater danger to the Irish working class than imperialist domination, since they believed it prevented the Catholic and Protestant workers from uniting on economic issues.

Following from this position, the "Officials" came logically to begin to see the imperialists as playing at least a temporarily positive role in the Northern Ireland situation, preventing a full-scale civil war. They began to use all their influence to oppose the development of a movement in Britain to demand the withdrawal of the troops.

Finally, the "Officials" came to see imperialism as playing a historically progressive role in the development of a modern economy in Ireland. In the spring of 1977, they published a pamphlet, entitled *The Irish Industrial Revolution*. This work argued that it was the Irish bourgeoisie that was responsible for the underdevelopment of the country and that imperialist investment should be welcomed, since it alone would create a working class that could advance toward socialism.

Although the "Officials" and the Provisionals came to represent opposite poles in their attitude toward the place of the anti-imperialist struggle, there has come to be a curious similarity in their response to the turns of the bourgeois nationalist forces. This is the result of the one-sidedness that afflicts both and the subjectiveness that arises from this attitude.

When the Dublin government was obliged to make some gestures of support for the Northern Catholics in 1969-70, the "Officials" saw this solely as a danger. They argued that the Catholic bourgeoisie would not do anything to improve the conditions of the workers and that if the embattled Catholic masses accepted any help from them this would drive a wedge into the working class, dividing Catholic and Protestant.

The "Officials" came to follow the logic of this position more and more consistently, to the point that they now view P

Devlin's break with the SDLP as a left split. Thus, presumably, they think that the SDLP's moving toward opposing British and Unionist repression is another attempt to divide the workers.

At the beginning of the present conflict, the Provisionals were more interested in getting support from bourgeois nationalist elements. Initially, in fact, there was no clear line between them and the bourgeois nationalists.

However, as Dublin and the SDLP lined up behind the British repressive campaign in 1973-74, a strong reaction against them developed among the ranks of the Provisionals and their supporters. This was one of the major factors in the radicalization of the militant nationalists. But insofar as this reaction did not lead to a rounded understanding of the dynamic of the national struggle in Ireland, it had its negative side.

The negative aspect is shown most clearly in the Provisionals' attitude toward the SDLP's moving into conflict with the imperialist repressive forces. They do not view this as an opportunity but as a threat. They think that if the SDLP is allowed to associate itself with protests against repression, it will be able to regain its credibility in the eyes of the nationalist masses and get into a position where it can obstruct the anti-imperialist struggle more effectively.

Thus, the Provisionals have not learned that the only way the hold of a formation like the SDLP can be broken is by taking advantage of its contradictions to get those under its influence involved in supporting concrete struggles against the imperialists. That is, they have not yet

learned the lessons of the civil-rights movement.

Stand of Irish Trotskyists

Explaining these lessons has become one of the main tasks of the Irish section of the Fourth International, now in the process of unifying with People's Democracy, a Belfast-based group that played a leading role in the rise of the civil-rights movement. This task was laid out in the December-January issue of People's Democracy's paper *Unfree Citizen* (the last issue, since it is to be replaced by *Socialist Republic*, the organ of the fused group). The lead article said:

The fight back is on—but it is still diffuse and scattered. Our task in the coming year must be to strengthen and draw together the many different strands and weld them together, linking the anticapitalist and anti-imperialist struggles North and South and forging a powerful mass movement based on the working class.

Another article said:

There has been some opposition to inviting the SDLP to the Coalisland Conference [to build a movement against repression]. We believe that the SDLP are opportunists who have betrayed the anti-imperialist struggle, but equally we recognise that thousands of ordinary decent people are still taken in by them. . . . If we are to rebuild a strong mass movement, we must win these people away from the SDLP, but they will not be convinced merely by repeated denunciations of the SDLP. If, however, they can be involved in mass political opposition to brutality and repression, where the SDLP can be put to the test and where they can see for themselves that the SDLP won't back up their words with action, they can be won from their illusions. . . . □

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FROM OUR READERS

"I was so happy to read the good news . . ." a long-time supporter in the California Bay Area writes. "The enclosed check will, I hope, help toward paying the extra expenses" of the combined Intercontinental Press/Inprecor.

The check was for \$150.

V.H. in San Francisco, another long-time supporter, answered our appeal for an extra dollar or two by renewing his subscription for two years in advance, along with this note:

"I have been fortunate enough to have a virtually complete collection of I.P. and its predecessor World Outlook going back well over a decade. I often refer back to the old issues, especially 1968.

"Besides being far-and-away the best English-language weekly Marxist journal, the IP has served and will continue to serve as a chronicle of world revolution, a chronicle of the transition to a new epoch.

"When we've finally been done with capitalism, I have a hunch the Intercontinental Press will prove to be an exciting encyclopedia of the fight for socialism."

"I haven't noticed too much of a change," B.H. of Radford, Virginia, writes, but then adds: "perhaps that's because I don't always finish the longer articles. The Fourth International statements are good, however.

"For my own interests, coverage of health/medical and psychological issues (e.g., psychiatric abuses in W. Germany's prisons) is always welcome."

The interview on p. 244 of this issue, with exiled Soviet psychiatrist Marina Voikhanskaya, may be just what the doctor ordered.

"I note that your journal has merged with Inprecor," S.Z. writes from Bayside, New York. "Am I to assume that the portion of my Inprecor sub which will not be delivered will be added to my IP sub?"

"Since the amalgamation of IP and Inprecor," a reader in Melbourne, Australia, writes, "I have become confused about the status of our subscription.

"Could you please let me know as soon as possible when we have to renew?"

Several readers have asked the same question. When we consulted our business manager, Harvey McArthur, he told us that all former subscribers to the English-language Inprecor would receive one issue of Intercontinental Press/Inprecor for each issue of Inprecor due them from their

unexpired subscriptions.

He pointed out however that since IP/I is published every week, whereas the English-language Inprecor was printed every two weeks, these subscriptions would now run out twice as fast.

"But we'll send out renewal notices well in advance," he said, "so that no one misses a single issue."

D.D. in Detroit, Michigan, thought he noticed something amiss in the January 30 issue. He writes:

"Although the vast majority of IP readers are undoubtedly appreciative of the magazine's excellence, you probably don't get many letters that don't include some kind of complaint. Not wanting to disrupt a pattern . . .

"In your article titled 'Vorster Orders Demolition of Black Shantytown' the second paragraph describes the structures as 'jerry-built.'

"Several years ago, when I used the term to describe some of my own handiwork . . . I was informed by an older comrade that 'jerry-built' was derived from the wartime reference to Germans as 'jerries.'

"I had never made the connection myself, but the explanation sounds reasonable. If it is accurate, 'jerry-built' would appear to be an inappropriate term for use

in a magazine of revolutionary internationalism and opposition to all forms of chauvinism.

"So with that . . . keep up the good work, including the South Africa articles."

When we asked Ernest Harsch, the author of the article, about this, he told us that he himself had checked the expression in the dictionary before using it.

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the first known usage of the term "jerry-built," which means something "built unsubstantially of bad materials," was in 1869.

A letter published in British newspapers in January 1884 said that the term commemorated the name of a building firm on the Mersey River in northwestern England, although the dictionary itself was not able to confirm this origin.

"I'm sending you part of my Christmas bonus to get a one-year sub to the IP," M.M. writes from Chicago. He then added this welcome note:

"I'll soon send a big packet of newspaper and magazine clippings from Europe and Israel, including a couple of key issues of *Il Mondo*, the Italian equivalent of *Fortune*. . . . There'll even be a bunch of clippings from Israel on the Sadat visit.

"Sorry I haven't had time to send this stuff before now . . . but I've been doing a lot of overtime and have had no time to get to the postoffice.

"But—don't wait for the packet to start sending me my IPs!"

Sketches by Copain

A sampling of sketches by Copain. Published in 1974 to help celebrate the tenth anniversary of *Intercontinental Press*.

The reproductions, of various sizes, include portraits of Hugo Blanco, Malcolm X, Bernadette Devlin McAliskey, James P. Cannon, Che Guevara, Leon Trotsky, and others, some of them suitable for framing.

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