

Intercontinental Press

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75¢

OST Presidential Candidate Jailed Again

Wide Protests in Costa Rica Demand Release of Activists



CARLOS CORONADO: Trotskyist candidate held without charges.

Biko Inquest—Whitewash of Vorster's Police



Part of protest of 10,000 at Biko's funeral September 25. Time

Rising Protest in Iran

British CP in Crisis

Carter's Tax Flimflam

High Stakes in Coal Strike

Analysis of Greek Election

Interview With Paul Goma

Healy's Pact with Qaddafi

NEWS ANALYSIS

High Stakes in United Mine Workers Strike

By Matilde Zimmermann

"No contract, no work" is a tradition among the 277,000 coal miners in the United Mine Workers of America. Therefore when direct negotiations between the union and coal operators broke down November 25, it became virtually certain that miners would go on strike when the current contract expired December 6.

On two questions in particular, the union is resisting efforts by the operators to drive the miners backwards. The first issue is the miners' health and pension plan, and the second is the right to strike.

Miners want their new contract to restore the free medical care and pension plan they enjoyed before these benefits were sharply cut last July. Miners now pay as much as \$500 a year for health services that previously were free. Up to 85,000 miners struck in protest of the July cuts, even though that strike was not sanctioned by the union leadership. Nearly a thousand of them demonstrated in Washington D.C. August 5, chanting "no cards, no coal."

All indications are that even if no other contract issues were in dispute, the miners would be prepared to strike to force the employers to refinance the health and pension fund.

The union also wants the new contract to include the local right to strike over conditions at a single mine. This is the only recourse miners have when employer violations of health and safety standards make the mines too dangerous to enter. The UMWA has also found that miners' grievances tend to be ignored unless a local has the right to strike at some point in the grievance procedures.

The operators, on the other hand, seem determined to do away with even the limited right-to-strike clause contained in the 1974 contract and propose to dock miners' wages for participation in "wildcat" or unauthorized strikes.

The coal operators have several advantages as the strike begins. Major users of coal have three to four months' supply stockpiled and claim they will not be affected by a strike for several months. The union has been losing ground in the industry as a whole: as recently as 1974, 70 percent of U.S. coal was mined by union workers; now the UMWA's members account for only 50 percent of the coal mined.

Union President Arnold Miller announced even before the strike began that all medical benefits would cease December 6, and that retirement payments would be reduced and eventually halted. This will

mean severe hardship for the miners and their families over the cold winter months.

On the union's side is the miners' proud history of struggle and hard-fought strikes. Miners in Stearns, Kentucky, for example, have faced trigger-happy company thugs for over a year in their strike to win a UMWA contract at the Blue Diamond Coal Company.

'They Have Killed Steve Biko'

By R. D. Willis

Even before the inquest into the death of Steve Biko was over, Justice Minister James T. Kruger "forecast" that the magistrate, Marthinus J. Prins, would exonerate the police of any blame in the young Black leader's death. Biko, one of the foremost figures in the Black Consciousness movement, died in police custody September 12.

On December 2, Prins, who is a paid civil servant ultimately accountable to Kruger, took care not to disappoint his boss. His ruling upheld the police claims that Biko's head injuries resulted during an alleged scuffle with his interrogators (supposedly when he "accidentally" bumped his head against a wall) and absolved Biko's jailers of any responsibility in his death.

In a terse statement of less than 120 words, Prins ignored all the contradictions that surfaced during police testimony at the inquest. Biko's "interrogators" gave different accounts of the alleged scuffle and retracted portions of their testimony when their lies were exposed. They admitted that he had been kept naked in a cell for nineteen days and had been subjected to more than fifty hours of grueling questioning. He was also kept in iron shackles.

One brain specialist testified that Biko's

But even the militant miners cannot win this strike unless they get the help of other sections of the American labor movement. Solidarity actions will be vital for the miners, and they are also in the interest of the entire union movement.

As Harry Patrick, secretary treasurer of the UMWA has put it, "if the Mine Workers lose this strike, I think it would be the death knell for labor, as we know it anyway. It would be the first step for the corporations to take on all labor unions.

"You're getting the granddaddy of them all when you get the Mine Workers. I hope that other labor unions realize that."

The country's corporate rulers certainly realize it. They are out for the miners' blood. □

brain injuries resulted from at least three separate blows (the police version tried to account for only one.) After the effects of his injuries became obvious, the police prevented him from receiving proper medical treatment.

In light of this evidence, and what is known about the generalized brutality inflicted on Black political prisoners in South African jails, there was little doubt among Blacks in the audience over how Biko died.

After the ruling, they gathered outside the courtroom and sang, "They have killed Steve Biko." Their chants were punctuated with clenched-fist salutes. One of them, Benedicta Ramahano, laid the blame for Biko's murder directly on the apartheid regime itself. "Unjust!" she said. "The injustice was committed by the state. . . ."

Before Prins's verdict, a lawyer for the Biko family said that an exoneration of the police would encourage them to continue "to abuse helpless people with impunity."

As if to confirm his prediction, at least thirteen persons were detained briefly in police raids in Soweto on the morning of the verdict, among them Steve Biko's brother, Kaya, and cousin, Solomon. □

Why Carter Is Sounding Alarm Bells Over Cuba

By Conrad Strauss

The Carter administration, which claims that it favors improved ties with Havana, is once again beating the drums against what it says is an expanding Cuban military involvement in Africa.

In remarks before a group of newspaper

editors November 11, Carter claimed that there were 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola. Echoing a frequent charge made by President Ford during his bellicose campaign against Cuba at the height of the Angolan civil war, Carter said, "The Cubans have, in effect, taken on the colonial aspect that

the Portuguese gave up in months gone by."

Carter added, "And we hope there will be some inclination on the part of the Cubans to withdraw their forces from Angola." Charging that Cubans were "spreading into other countries in Africa," he warned, "We consider this to be a threat to the permanent peace in Africa."

Three days after Carter's remarks, the State Department claimed that there were 400 Cuban troops in Ethiopia and that some of them were fighting against Somali rebel forces in the Ogaden desert region. Nearly a week earlier, however, the Castro government had specifically denied that it had any troops in Ethiopia fighting with the Ethiopian forces, although it made it clear that it opposed what it termed an "aggressive war" by the Somalian regime in the Ogaden.

On November 17, the State Department took its barrage of charges a step further when spokesman Hodding Carter III released detailed figures purporting to give a breakdown of the number of Cuban troops, advisers, and technicians said to be stationed in sixteen African countries. The spokesman repeated Carter's warning, stating, "We believe the presence of large numbers of Cubans in Africa is bound to have an unsettling effect and is a threat to peace in Africa."

He went on to threaten that Washington might hold up recognition of the Castro government, stating the situation in Africa "will have an impact on peace and even the possibility of normalizing relations."

Correspondent Hedrick Smith commented in the November 17 *New York Times* that the White House now interprets the Cuban involvement in Africa "as a deliberate strategy by President Fidel Castro to intervene in Africa much as he promoted Cuban revolutionary intervention in Latin America in the early 1960's."

However, the editors of the *New York Times* themselves discounted such an interpretation. "While Ché Guevara lived," they said November 23, "Cuba tried to spread revolution to mainland Latin America—not at Moscow's bidding but out of its own revolutionary élan. It failed. By contrast, Cuba's African involvement in this decade aims to support governments, not to undermine them. That support is spelled out in duly ratified and publicized treaties."

The editors went on to note possible domestic considerations behind Carter's strident denunciations of Havana: "The Administration is being pressed by opposition to the Panama Canal treaties, to SALT, to more normal relations with China, to the withdrawal of troops from Korea and, indeed, to its effort to resume diplomacy with Cuba. Talking tough about Cubans in Africa is no doubt a cheap way to score political points; the domestic dividends are immediate while the costs in Havana are hard to measure." □

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Charges Dropped Against Costa Rican Black Leader

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica—All charges against Costa Rican Black leader Marvin Wright Lindo were dropped by a court in Limón on December 5.

Wright had been charged, along with six activists from the Limoncito community and two leaders of the Organización Socialista de los Trabajadores (OST),* with "instigating a riot" in Limoncito on November 23. Wright was not present at the Limoncito events, however, and was able to produce a number of witnesses to verify that fact.

Among those testifying on Wright's behalf were the bus driver, the ticket taker, and a passenger from the bus the Black leader had ridden from Limón to San José on the day in question.


While Wright has been released, OST presidential candidate Carlos Coronado Vargas has been arrested for the second time in eleven days. He was picked up on undisclosed new charges while collecting funds for himself and the other Limoncito defendants in a public park in Limón on December 4.

Coronado and Alejandra Calderón Fournier, OST chairperson and candidate for the national assembly, had been released on bail December 1 after eight days in jail with the six Limoncito activists. All eight had participated in a demonstration of 500 Limoncito residents on November 23 that was brutally attacked by the police. They all remain charged with "instigating a riot."

Marvin Wright Lindo was sought by police for eight days after the November 23 protest. He had gone into hiding after learning that the authorities had ordered him shot on sight.

Wright remained underground while his attorney, Edgar Trejos, negotiated conditions under which he could surrender in safety. Trejos was led to believe that Wright would be placed in a separate cell and afforded special protection, and that his friends would be allowed to bring in his meals. (An attempt had been made to poison the Black leader during a previous incarceration.)

Marvin Wright turned himself in on December 1, accompanied by Trejos and three witnesses ready to testify that Wright had been in San José on November 23. But the judge to whom he surrendered denied the attorney's requests that either the charges be dropped altogether for lack of evidence or that at least the bail be set



MARVIN WRIGHT LINDO

very low. The judge demanded that more witnesses be brought in to corroborate Wright's story.

The agreement that Wright would get his meals brought in by friends was also violated, so the Black leader went on a hunger strike.

Wright is the central leader of the Partido Auténtico Limonense (PAL—Limón Authentic Party), which is based among the Black workers of Limón province. He is one of the best-known leaders of the labor movement in Costa Rica, and the main leader of the country's oppressed Black population.

The residents of the Limoncito community, mostly Black, have been struggling for twelve years for such basic necessities as clean drinking water, electric power, and sewage lines. On November 23, many of them, mostly women and children, gathered in a spontaneous demonstration to press these demands. They blocked the main highway and railway line into Limón as a means of dramatizing their struggle.

The police attacked the crowd with clubs late in the day, kicking and beating many persons, including pregnant women. They arrested six leaders of the Limoncito community, along with Coronado and Calderón, who were there to express the OST's support for the Limoncito struggle.

The formal charges against these eight are the following: "riot, aggravated assault, instigation of a riot, and intimidating others to participate in a riot." If

convicted, they could be sentenced to five to eight years in prison.

Bail for the eight was initially set at 5,000 colones (US\$585—an extremely high sum considering that the annual per capita income in Costa Rica is only about US\$500; most of the detainees are dock workers). Bail was later lowered to 3,000 colones for Calderón, 2,000 colones for each of the six men, and 500 colones for María Cedeño Rivera, the only other woman arrested.

When Coronado and Calderón were released on bail December 1, a crowd of about 200 was on hand to greet them. Everyone then marched through downtown Limón, and the two OST leaders spoke to a crowd of about 400 at a busy street corner. Later that evening a public meeting of 250 at the Limoncito Community Center heard Calderón and a number of community leaders.

Similar demonstrations demanding freedom for the imprisoned activists have taken place on an almost daily basis in Limón. On November 25, more than 1,000 persons held a march that ended in front of the jail.

On Sunday, November 27, the residents of Limoncito organized a mass visit to the jail. So many people came to express their solidarity that the authorities had to let them enter in large groups.

Another large demonstration was held on December 5 to demand the dropping of charges against Wright. This march proceeded from Limoncito to the jail and then to the court where Wright's hearing was taking place.

The men are being held in a six-by-eight-meter room with 100 common prisoners. They had declared a hunger strike to protest these conditions, but so many people from Limoncito brought them food and encouraged them to eat that they decided to end the strike on November 29.

The two women were being held in a separate cell and didn't know about this mass support, so they continued their hunger strike until December 1, when Calderón was released.

Committees to defend the prisoners have been organized both in Limoncito and San José. They have been publicizing the Limoncito struggle and raising funds to cover bail for all the prisoners.

Messages of solidarity have come from many mass organizations, trade unions, and student groups. All the unions in Limón—except for those affiliated with the CGT—have expressed support for the struggle in Limoncito. (The CGT, Central General de Trabajadores, is controlled by

*Socialist Workers Organization, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

the Partido Vanguardia Popular, the Costa Rican CP.)

So far neither the PVP nor the several other left parties that are allied with it in the Pueblo Unido electoral bloc have made any statements of support or participated in any of the demonstrations to demand release of the prisoners. Nevertheless, a strong feeling of solidarity exists among the ranks of these parties and in the workers movement as a whole.

The major news media in the country have given little information about the prisoners and the events in Limón. News stories have sensationalized the alleged "violence" of the protesters but have often omitted the names of the detainees and have even failed to point out that political candidates of the OST and the PAL were among those arrested. That the press should be withholding information on the imprisonment of candidates during an election campaign raises questions about Costa Rican "democracy"—something the country's rulers are fond of boasting about internationally.

The government's attitude was spelled out clearly in statements by presidential aide Fernando Volio Jiménez on November 23. He said in a radio interview that the Trotskyist leaders of the demonstration in Limoncito were simply trying to cause trouble, and that the government would act with maximum force to prevent this. "Costa Rica has too many tensions as a developing country for us to permit extremists to create obstacles," Volio said. "This is a country of law and those who abuse democracy act against the national interest."

The OST answered Volio in a leaflet issued November 25:

The government has launched a campaign to portray the struggle of the residents of the Limoncito barrio as "violent" and "extremist," in order to justify its repressive actions.

The government wants to obscure the truth about the conflict in Limoncito.

During twelve years of inhuman existence in this barrio, without light, without water, without sanitation, the residents have tried to solve their problems, exhausting all the administrative channels. They have not secured anything but promises. The government and the authorities have only responded with tricks to the demands of the Limoncito residents during these twelve years.

In face of the criminal inaction on the part of the government, the residents found themselves obliged to carry out action to call their problems to the attention of the entire country.

That is the true significance of the conflict in the Limoncito barrio. It is not a conflict created by 'provocateurs'; rather it is the government itself that has brought about this conflict by perpetuating the inhuman living conditions in the barrio.

The OST organized a picket line to greet visiting U.S. Senator George McGovern when he spoke at the National Theatre in San José on December 2. The picket signs said: "To fight in the streets for water and



ALEJANDRA CALDERON FOURNIER

electricity is not a crime!" and "McGovern: What do you think about the case of Marvin Wright?"

McGovern took questions from the audience after his speech, and Marta Trejos, secretary of the OST, was able to speak for twelve minutes on the Limoncito struggle and the cases of Wright and the others who face jail terms. The senator responded that he did not know very much about Costa Rica or about the case, but that the world has much to learn from Costa Rica.

International solidarity can help in winning the release of Carlos Coronado and the other victims of the Costa Rican government's repression. Telegrams and letters demanding the dropping of charges against the eight activists, and an end to police harassment of the OST, should be sent to Costa Rican embassies or consulates, or to President Daniel Oduber Quirós, San José, Costa Rica. Send copies of such messages along with statements of solidarity to the Comité de Defensa de los Presos de Limón, c/o Marta Trejos, P.O. Box 949, San José, Costa Rica.

December 5, 1977

Five 'Trotskyists' Arrested in Chile

The Chilean police announced November 29 the arrest of five persons, alleging that they are members of the Trotskyist group Liga Comunista (Communist League).

According to a report in the December 4 issue of the Santiago daily *El Mercurio*, those arrested were identified as Carlos Arturo Altamirano Corder (23), Héctor Víctor Gómez Orellana (27), José Gabriel Cea Muñoz (24), Mario Roberto Godoy Jara (26), and Rosa Ester Fuentes Polanco (27).

According to *El Mercurio*, they are being charged with holding "regular meetings of a subversive character," in violation of the "State Internal Security Act." The police also claim to have found a large quantity of political literature in the possession of the five detainees.

Further charges may be in the offing, for *El Mercurio*, summarizing the police report, added that the Liga Comunista is a "powerful organization that appears to be receiving a financial subsidy from abroad."

It is urgent that letters and telegrams of protest be sent immediately to the Chilean government, demanding the release of the five. These may be addressed to Gen. Augusto Pinochet, Government House, Santiago, Chile. □

Uruguayan Lawyers Jailed

Four Uruguayan lawyers have been arrested by the military regime, according to a recent report by the International

Commission of Jurists cited in the November 26 issue of the Amsterdam weekly *Vrij Nederland*. They are:

- Dr. Rodolfo Schurmann Pacheco, one of Uruguay's top lawyers, a lecturer at the University of Montevideo, and the author of numerous works on criminal law. He was arrested on charges of "supporting a subversive organization," "abusing" his functions as a lawyer, and contempt of court.

- Dr. Fraga, a colleague of Schurmann's.

- Dr. Emilio Biasco, who was arrested for presenting a petition on behalf of a client that included a term construed to be an "attack on the reputation of the army."

- Dr. Hugo Fabri, a well-known expert in criminal law, who was imprisoned for attacking the "reputation of the army." He had turned in a petition that referred to the torture of his daughter, who has been in prison for five years on charges of belonging to the Tupamaros.

A Step Closer to Reality

Santiago Carrillo, general secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, said that the party would soon stop referring to itself as "Leninist," according to a November 26 Reuters dispatch.

Carrillo, addressing a news conference in Madrid, said that the change would probably be made at the CP's next congress, scheduled for February or March 1978.

The Miners' Strike and Elena Ceausescu's New Furs

[Paul Goma, a Romanian writer and leading figure in the dissident and human-rights movements in Romania, recently arrived in Paris for a visit.

[Goma is the author of an open letter to signers of Charter 77, and co-author of an appeal addressed to the Belgrade conference to review the Helsinki accords. Arrested in April, he was released the following month under the conditions of an amnesty decreed by the government. He has since received a one-year permit for travel abroad.

[The following interview, obtained by Alain Parvit and Michel Rovere, appeared in the November 28 issue of the French Trotskyist daily *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. The Romanian regime has a somewhat special reputation in the eyes of Western opinion. The economic "disengagement" of Romania at the time of the Moscow conference in August 1961, its special position in the Sino-Soviet debate, Ceausescu's reactions to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and to the dispute between Moscow and the Eurocommunists, have all reinforced the image of a Romania "independent" of Moscow and therefore "liberal."

Can you explain what "Ceausescuism" is?


Answer. First let me clarify one thing. It was not Ceausescu, but his predecessors—Giorghiu-Dej and Maurer—who were behind Romania's "disengagement." Here is the first truth that must be established, even if Ceausescu pretends to Romania and the outside world that "Dej equals Stalinism and Ceausescu equals liberalization."

It was Dej who got the Soviet troops to leave Romania and who declared a general amnesty. And it was Maurer who sealed the political estrangement between Bucharest and Moscow. All Ceausescu did was step into Dej's shoes. When he came to power in 1965, Ceausescu announced that there would be a liberalization, that there would be no more arrests, and he kept his word for a few years. The main event of Ceausescu's arrival to power was not so much the "liberalization"—cautious as it was—but the glorification of Romanian nationalism that followed, and that was exploited by the regime to the hilt.

Under the Soviet occupation, you see, they went so far as to declare that Romanian was a Slavic language. So the people were overjoyed by the arrival of Ceausescu

and the regime's new nationalist policy, because it enabled us to say, "Yes, we are Romanians."

This unbridled nationalism was so overused by the regime that nowadays it has become an object of ridicule. A comic-opera



E. Kagan/Rouge
PAUL GOMA

kind of nationalism cannot substitute for bread and freedom. What good does it do us to know that we are descended not only from the Dacians but also from the Thracians?

Q. When did this liberal period end?

A. Ceausescu came to power in the spring of 1965. It was in 1966 that the excesses of the political police were publicly unmasked. The high point of Ceausescu's liberalism was reached at the time of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. But this "high point" lasted two-and-a-half days. We counted it, hour by hour. For two-and-a-half days, the Romanian radio broadcast directly everything that was happening in Prague. This was unprecedented. Then there was silence, a typically Romanian silence, typically "Balkan," that bore no resemblance to what was happening in other Eastern European countries at the time—a total blackout in the press, while at the same time, leaders

of the Romanian CP came to visit us writers and explained, winking broadly, "You don't know about all we're doing for the Czechs."

After that things just got worse. We realized that Ceausescu could not and would not really liberalize. We realized that there was a kind of "specific equilibrium" in Eastern Europe. If Ceausescu wanted an "open" foreign policy, he could only apply a "firm" domestic policy. At any rate, he could not conceive of any other policy because he had the mentality of an apparatchik, a bureaucrat.

But he remained a kind of legend for a long time. When this or that outrage occurred, people would say, "Ah, if Ceausescu were informed about this, it would change." This explains why in Romania there is such a high percentage of letters addressed directly to President Ceausescu, asking him to settle private quarrels, between tenants and officials, and so on.

What's really bad in Romania is to see how the government has open contempt for the working class, perhaps even more than in Poland or Czechoslovakia. The most cynical measure they took was last year, when Ceausescu named the same person minister of labor and president of the unions. It's unbelievable. That's not even cynicism, it's foolishness.

The workers don't have even a token means of defense. They are entirely at the mercy of the state plan and the way it is carried out. Sometimes workers do not get paid for four or five months, even if the setback in the plan is not their fault but results from an earlier stage of production.

With respect to the unions, Romanians are beginning to say that they are experiencing more and more of the drawbacks of the capitalist system and fewer and fewer of the advantages of a socialist system. During the "Stalinist" period, vacations at the seashore or in the mountains were free for workers and their families, as were health care and medicine. This is no longer the case. There is a charge for everything, except in cases of syphilis or tuberculosis.

It's interesting to see how our movement, which wasn't as organized as in Poland or Czechoslovakia, has snowballed, and how workers have become a large part of it.

Q. How do you explain this?

A. Their courage can be explained by the fact that they have less to lose than the intellectuals. In case of repression, the disruption in their lives—unless they are imprisoned—would be less than for some-

one who was president of the Writers' Union and who finds himself out of a job.

When the repression started, the workers were the ones who were treated the worst. Paraschive, a worker who has fought for years to restore democracy in the CP, was tortured. They poured wood alcohol down the throat of Mihail, another worker.

Q. Have there been movements in Romania demanding that the unions act like unions, demanding greater democracy in the party, and so on?

A. Prior to 1977, there were already signs of discontent. In Brashov, in the tractor and truck plants, there were uprisings in which the workers destroyed machines and wrote, "Down with Ceausescu," "We want workers' rights," "We are trade-unionists, where is the trade union?" and so on. That was in 1976. But even this year, after our movement was crushed, and after the repression of the miners, signs of discontent were shown. At the August 23 steel mills, the largest ones in Bucharest, at the port of Constantza, and at the Galatz steel combine, party officials were jeered and even jostled. The most well-known of those roughed up was General Dinca, the mayor of Bucharest, who was slapped and spat upon by the workers at the August 23 plant.

Q. But the best-organized movement was the miners' strike in August 1977?

A. They revived a form of organization almost a century old, the "council of elders." Of the thirteen members of this council, elected by the strikers, a majority were party members. The strike was very sober and disciplined. They didn't let themselves get carried away by anger. This sector of the working class has some of the strongest traditions in Romania, going back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The great strike of 1929 was led by one of these "councils of elders."

When Ceausescu arrived, three days later, the workers asked him how much he made—the official wage scale in Romania is from one to five. "Even if you make five times as much as we do, we want to know how Mrs. Elena Ceausescu can have so many furs, which she wore walking through the ruins of the earthquake."

After the earthquake, you see, the Ceausescus were shown on television several times a day in one or another part of the city, giving orders for the rebuilding work, and each time the TV showed that Elena Ceausescu was wearing a different fur.

Q. Four thousand miners' families, about 16,000 persons, were expelled from the Jiu valley after the strike. We have no information on the fate of the most militant strikers. And yet, among the Western workers' parties, particularly the Italian, Spanish, and French CPs, or the trade unions, we did not see the slightest state-

ment of support parallel to those made by the French General Confederation of Labor, for example, after the Ursus and Radom events in Poland. This silence was not surprising, given the special relations between the Bucharest regime and the so-called "Eurocommunist" CPs. What is your view of this?

A. It's true that in Romania, unlike what is happening in other Eastern European countries, the influence of Eurocommunism on the dissidents is practically nil.

We do not know the content of the discussions that took place a little more than a month ago between Verdreets and the French CP delegation that went to Bucharest. That would have been interesting, because Verdreets was the one in charge of repressing the miners.

If I were malicious, I would say that the French CP could have put this meeting to good use to prove to the entire world that it is prepared to honor its election promises.

Smith Claims Slaughter Was 'Self-Defense'

Rhodesian Troops Massacre Refugees in Mozambique

On the morning of November 23, Rhodesian warplanes roared over the town of Chimoio in Mozambique, about fifty miles from the Rhodesian border. For two days they bombed a Zimbabwean camp located just outside of the town, with helicopter gunships also moving in to rake the camp with machinegun fire. According to survivors of the raid, troops alighted from the helicopters and began systematically killing the residents of the camp.

A Mozambican relief column tried to reach the camp, but was driven off by aerial bombardment. After the Rhodesian forces left, it finally managed to enter the camp—and found the scene of yet another brutal massacre of African civilians by the forces of the racist white minority regime in Salisbury.

According to preliminary estimates, at least 100 persons were butchered during the assault. Although the Rhodesian regime claimed that the camp was a Zimbabwean guerrilla base and that they had attacked it "in the interests of self-defense," the bulk of the victims were civilian refugees.

London *Observer* correspondent Ian Christie, who visited the scene of the massacre, reported in a November 29 dispatch:

The pages of a blood-spattered school book fluttered in the breeze at the edge of a mass grave. In the bulldozed hole lay the bodies of 20 young girls, their ages between 10 and 14.

For us Romanians, it's a disgrace that the Romanian CP sent as a representative someone who was up to his ears in the repression against the miners. But the French CP should not have ignored the role that Verdreets played. Was there a communiqué in *l'Humanité* [French CP daily], some statement on the miners' strike?

Q. No, nothing.

A. Well, then, if there was nothing, it was complicity. If the Eurocommunists want to take their distance from repression in Eastern Europe, the French CP should have taken its distance from the Romanian CP. Knowing the Romanian government's sensitivity about its reputation, we see what importance such statements could have, especially since they would not be coming from sectors that the Romanian government could classify as enemies of the working class. □

They had been sitting in their classroom when the Rhodesians attacked last week. It was hard to see exactly how they died. On the face of one pretty teen-ager there were the marks of tears that had streamed down her cheeks. On the face of another, the black skin had been burned off, leaving only the white flesh underneath. . . .

I personally counted 70 bodies, mostly women and children, when I visited the scene over the weekend. A doctor at the Chimoio hospital told me that 10 people had died there, and survivors said that at least 20 were unaccounted for. . . .

In the hospital grounds nearby, the bodies of eight men lay beneath a cashew nut tree. They had been dragged from a mobile clinic and shot in the back of the head. The rear door of the clinic, with a large red cross painted on it, squeaked eerily on its hinges as we walked past.

A further grim testimony to the slaughter was the corpse of a man with his hands tied behind his back. His leg had been shot off just below the knee. He had apparently been tortured in an effort to find out where the senior guerrilla commanders were.

Besides those known to have been killed, some 600 wounded persons were being treated at the Chimoio hospital. About 200 of them were in serious condition.

On November 28, the Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith claimed that it had killed 1,200 guerrillas in raids on two Zimbabwean camps, the one at Chimoio and another near Tembue. Although it will take weeks before the final death toll in the massacre at Chimoio is known, the Rhodesian claims may be highly exaggerated, with the aim of boosting the sagging

morale of the white settler population.

According to a report from Salisbury in the November 29 *Washington Post*, "The government announcement of the twin raids electrified the white population of Rhodesia. Whites began trading enthusiastic congratulations and praising 'our troops' as soon as the military command broke its silence on the operations. . . ."

In the raid on Tembue, Mozambican authorities reported no deaths, aside from those of five Rhodesian troops who were killed when the assault was repulsed.

Although the raids may partly be conducted for their psychological effect on the settlers, they are also part of a long-standing policy of the Smith regime to terrorize the Black population of Zim-

babwe as a whole. The recent raids were only the latest in a series. An estimated 1,500 civilians, either Zimbabwean refugees or Mozambicans, were killed in the earlier attacks.

The massacre at Chimoio likewise appears to have been staged as a counterpoint to Smith's announcement on November 24 (while the attacks were in progress) that he was willing to open a new round of negotiations with Zimbabwean nationalist leaders based within the country. It was no doubt intended as a reminder that the white minority regime, though increasingly isolated, was still capable of inflicting heavy casualties in defense of its basic interests.

Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the leader of the United African National Council, condemned the massacre and called a week of mourning for the victims. But he made it clear that he was still willing to participate in the negotiations with Smith.

The other major nationalist figure who has agreed to talk, Ndabaningi Sithole, sent a representative to the first meeting with Smith December 2. Chief Jeremiah Chirau, a government-paid tribal chief, also attended.

In a pro forma statement issued by the State Department, the Carter administration mildly rebuked Smith for the raids, declaring that they "complicated" the American and British efforts to arrange a negotiated settlement of the conflict. □

Master Plan Disclosed in South Korean Bribery Operation

By Steve Wattenmaker

Washington's sluggish Korean bribery probe got a major jolt November 29 with the publication of a previously unknown Korean Central Intelligence Agency master plan for conducting clandestine operations inside the United States.

The detailed, twenty-four-page document described the KCIA's elaborate schemes to pay off influential persons in government, academic, and religious circles, and the news media.

Among its various aspects the program called for infiltrating the Pentagon, hiring "paid collaborators" in top congressional offices, and establishing "an intelligence network in the White House." Plans to silence Korean-American opponents living in the United States were also outlined.

The document came to light during two days of public hearings on the KCIA before the House International Organizations Subcommittee. Sohn Ho Young, a former KCIA agent who testified at the hearings, confirmed the authenticity of the document. He explained it was drafted in late 1975 to guide the agency's U.S. operations for 1976.

About \$750,000 was earmarked for the effort with even more set aside for bribing members of Congress, according to subcommittee chairman Rep. Donald Fraser.

While the new revelation provides dramatic confirmation of many charges already leveled against the KCIA, the document proves that Korean influence-buying operations went far beyond the widely reported escapades of South Korean agent Tongsun Park.

The plan envisioned \$100-a-month payoffs to at least fourteen employees of the White House, Pentagon, State Department, and CIA. The document identified those to be contacted, but names were deleted in the version made public by the subcommittee.

Also named were two reporters for the *New York Times* and one from ABC News who were slated to receive all-expense-paid visits to Korea.

The plan allotted \$11,000 to "invite influential journalists to visit Korea and convert them." It also called for a "search among the reporters of influential papers (WP, CSM)" in order to "co-opt and utilize" them. The papers referred to by initials are the *Washington Post* and the *Christian Science Monitor*.

In Congress, the KCIA budgeted \$500 a month to pay each of three collaborators in the "office of the Speaker (Senate and House)." The KCIA document also noted that an agent had already made contact with 44 members of Congress. It stated "collaborators already secured: 40" and "newly created friendly relationships: 32."

Suzi Park Thomson, a longtime personal aide to now-retired House Speaker Carl Albert, has already been the focus of various investigations because of her alleged ties to the KCIA. Albert himself has been subpoenaed to testify about the bribe scandal before a closed session of the House Ethics Committee, according to a December 1 report in the *New York Daily News*.

Within the Pentagon, the plan said, the KCIA would "concentratedly infiltrate the Military Assistance Division under the Assistant Secretary for International Security." Also to be penetrated was the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "collect U.S. Far Eastern military strategy."

Even the KCIA's sister intelligence services were not exempt from being targeted. Plans were outlined for ten U.S. CIA officials to visit Seoul where they presumably would be won over to the Park regime's requests for continuing aid.

An FBI agent who apparently was assigned to keep tabs on South Korean

dissidents living in the United States was to be showered with \$50 gifts to "supply information on the movements of [deleted] a Korean resister who should receive special attention."

The document went on to suggest that Korean agents should support scholars considered friendly to the Seoul regime while trying to "convert" hostile professors with free trips and grants.

In the religious field, the KCIA's ambitious undertaking called for agents to "manipulate" an Episcopal priest and "strengthen utilization" of a friendly Baptist minister. It also budgeted \$1,200 for "utilization of Jewish lobbyists."

The immediate reaction of Justice Department and congressional investigators looking into the bribery scandal was to play down the significance of the revelations. Officials "expressed caution yesterday over the significance of the KCIA operations plan," the November 30 *Washington Post* reported.

"The names of targeted officials were viewed as promising leads, but there is no evidence of how much of the plan was carried out."

In fact, the KCIA document represents a major breakthrough in the case. What dismayed government officials is fear that following up the leads in the KCIA plan may provide the spark that finally blows Washington's latest scandal sky high. □

150,000 March for Jobs

In a protest organized by the metalworkers union, 150,000 demonstrators from throughout Italy converged on Rome December 2 to demand action against high unemployment. According to official figures, two million persons are at present without jobs.

Case of Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu

By Ernest Harsch



New African Development
BABU: Behind bars since 1972.

Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, Tanzania's best-known political prisoner, is now being held at Ukonga Prison in Dar es Salaam in permanent solitary confinement, according to a report in the fall issue of *Matchbox*, a newspaper published in New York by Amnesty International.

In early 1977 he was reported to have become almost blind as a result of poor prison conditions and lack of qualified medical care, although his sight has since improved after special treatment.

Babu has been in jail since April 1972, when he was detained in connection with the assassination of President Sheikh Karume of Zanzibar (a group of islands off the coast of mainland Tanganyika, with which it forms Tanzania). He was tried and sentenced to death *in absentia* by the Zanzibari authorities, but he has never been charged in Tanganyika itself, nor has he been brought before a court.

Babu, now fifty-three years old, was educated at the University of London. He was active in the British Labour Party and was a trade unionist. After returning to Zanzibar, he became, in 1957, the general secretary of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), which called for independence from British rule.

An avowed communist, Babu established an office in Zanzibar in 1960 officially connected to Peking's Hsinhua

News Agency. It published the journal *Zanews*. Babu became the only major nationalist figure in Zanzibar to be jailed by the British authorities, serving six months on "sedition" charges.

In 1963, he led a split from the ZNP and formed the Umma (Masses) Party. During the last half of that year it built up its support within the labor movement and among members of the youth wing of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP).

According to an essay by Hank Chase in the May-August 1976 issue of the London journal *Review of African Political Economy*, "These gains stemmed from the Umma Party's mass work among the dock and transport workers and the landless labourers, and its popularising of a political programme which called for a socialist reconstruction of Zanzibar based on a class dictatorship led by these strata."

In December 1963 the British colonialists finally relinquished direct control of the islands and handed the reins over to a neocolonial regime headed by the Arab sultan, Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdulla. The regime was based on the largely Arab class of plantation owners (most workers and peasants were Africans).

But the following month, in January 1964, the sultanate was overthrown by an armed uprising led by Babu's Umma Party and by the youth wing of the ASP. The sultan fled and a Revolutionary Council was set up, with Karume of the ASP as president and Babu as minister of external affairs and trade.

A. J. Hughes has described the economic steps taken just after the revolution. "The clove export industry has been nationalized," he wrote, "together with almost all other import-export business. Large estates have been expropriated and in the main redistributed to peasants. Most large businesses have been transferred to state control, and the small amount of industry existing has been taken over."*

Alarmed by the increasingly radical measures of the new regime, President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanganyika moved to stifle the revolution's development by pushing for a union of the two states, which was formally established in April 1964. In addition, both Nyerere and Karume tried to isolate Babu by transferring him to the mainland, where he held a number of cabinet posts in subsequent

**East Africa: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 243-4.

years.

Meanwhile, in Zanzibar, Karume tightened his grip over the regime. In 1967 a number of left-wing leaders of the ASP (with which the Umma Party had merged) were executed. Karume had also demanded Babu's extradition to Zanzibar, but Nyerere refused, no doubt concerned about the effect that Babu's execution would have on the Tanzanian president's "socialist" image. (But Nyerere did turn over some other Zanzibari dissidents to the executioners.)

In early 1972, Karume was assassinated. The Zanzibari authorities accused Babu of having planned it. Together with scores of others, he was detained by the Nyerere regime. In Zanzibar itself, about 1,100 persons were arrested and interrogated.

The "evidence" presented in the subsequent trial in Zanzibar consisted of the testimony of nine persons who had been sentenced to death and were awaiting the outcome of their appeals, "confessions" extracted under torture (each of which was later repudiated), the defendants' personal and political links with Babu, and circumstantial evidence concerning the whereabouts of Babu and others at the time of the assassination.

The state prosecutor, Wolfgang Dourado, also served as the defendants' only legal counsel.

The witch-hunt character of the trial was evident in Dourado's references to Babu's political positions during the 1964 revolution. "What policy really did Babu and his comrades wish to introduce in Zanzibar?" he asked the court. "The weight of evidence indicates that they were after scientific socialism."

Aside from the nine persons who had already been condemned, a total of thirty-four defendants were sentenced to death. Fourteen of them, including Babu, were under detention on the mainland.

During the appeals, the prosecutor himself admitted that much of the "evidence" could not stand up, since it had been extracted by force. But the final judicial appeals against the death sentences on Babu and six others were rejected in February 1977 by the Supreme Council of the ASP.

So far, Nyerere has continued to turn down the requests for Babu's extradition. But over the past year the ties between the administrations in Zanzibar and in Tanganyika have drawn closer with the formal merger of the ASP and Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union to form a single governing party, the Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Association).

Should the regime decide to allow Babu's extradition, his life would be in immediate danger.

Amnesty International has requested that appeals for Babu's immediate release be sent to: President Julius Kambarege Nyerere, State House, P. O. Box 9120, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. □

Rising Protest Against Dictatorial Rule in Iran

By Ali Golestan

"They attacked everyone. The number of dead and wounded is extraordinary. They even beat up twelve year olds. They poured into the mosques. They beat everyone up. Nobody is immune. . . . Things are happening very fast. People of the world must know what is happening to us."

This is how a leading intellectual in Iran described the situation there to a friend in the United States. He was telling of a single incident in the wave of crackdowns on the dissident movement carried out by the government in mid-November, at the same time the shah was being wined and dined at the White House by Carter.

The most recent attacks began November 15, the first day of the shah's visit to Washington. Some 6,000 persons had turned out at Aryamehr Stadium in Tehran for a poetry reading featuring Saïd Soltanpour, a former political prisoner and one of Iran's best-known dissident poets.

However, after about 4,000 had entered the stadium, the officials closed the gates, preventing the rest of the crowd from entering. Those held outside began to protest. The police moved in and attacked them, injuring thirty or forty and arresting about fifty.

In an act of solidarity, those inside, mostly students, refused to leave the stadium until the following demands were met:

1. A guarantee that other readings and speeches scheduled at Aryamehr University will continue.
2. Release of all those arrested while trying to enter the stadium.
3. A written guarantee by the university chancellor that all arrested students would be released no later than November 20.

The students finally left the stadium after twenty-two hours, having received a guarantee of safe passage from the chancellor. But as they began to file out they were attacked by mobs of police and severely beaten. Some reports indicate that a number of students were killed. Protests against this atrocity continued throughout the week, including a number of demonstrations.

Events took another turn on November 21. On that day Mahmoud Etemadzadeh, also known as Beh-Azin, a famous writer and leader of the Writers Association, was scheduled to speak at the university.

About 5,000 persons turned up to hear him. They were waiting for the gates to open when they were attacked by a mob dressed in civilian clothes and chanting progovernment slogans. In a November 21



SHAH: Doesn't like what he sees in the streets of Tehran.

Washington Post dispatch, correspondent William Branigan described the assault:

A mob brandishing wooden clubs, brass knuckles and chains and shouting "Long Live the Shah" attacked a group of dissidents gathered for a lecture today at a university here [Tehran].

The obviously orchestrated attack was the latest in a toughening crackdown. . . .

Dressing the police in civilian clothes seems to be a change intended to convey the impression that clashes are taking place between dissidents and progovernment groups, and that the regime is not involved in this. The success of this ploy appears somewhat limited, however, as Branigan reported that "no bystanders joined the attackers or participated in their pro-shah sloganeering afterwards."

During the clash the police singled two prominent intellectuals out of the crowd—Homa Nategh and Nemat Mirzazadeh—and beat them severely. When Nategh and Mirzazadeh went to a police station to complain about the attack on them, they were thrown out.

They took a taxi to leave, but as it turned out the taxi was operated by a SAVAK (political police) agent who took them to a deserted building on the outskirts of

Tehran where eight men were waiting to continue beating them up. Only the intervention of passers-by saved their lives. They were badly injured and required hospitalization.

The next day, November 22, coincided with a traditional Muslim holiday, the Day of Sacrifice. Some of the dissidents took the opportunity to gather in mosques and other places where festivities were held, to protest against the past and recent repressive measures taken by the government.

The regime continued its reign of terror, sending squads of police dressed in civilian clothes to beat up the speakers and those listening to them.

In Karevansara-Sangi, on the outskirts of Tehran, some 400 or 500 invaders posed as a "group of patriotic factory workers" returning home from their jobs. They claimed they happened to be passing by when they heard "antinationalist" slogans being chanted. They also happened to be carrying clubs and chains, which they used to attack the crowd of more than 1,000, singling out in particular leaders of the dissident movement.

The government failed to explain why these "factory workers" had been at work on a national holiday, or why all the press carried identical reports of the incident.

The Writers Association issued a statement November 25 condemning these attacks.

Attacking all student and nonstudent activities has become a routine policy of the government. The police who previously engaged in beating up and injuring people are now attacking them in civilian clothes and with truncheons and chains, pretending to be supporters of the regime combating "agents of foreign countries."

On Monday [November 21], when more than 5,000 persons had gathered at Aryamehr University to hear a speech, they were attacked in this manner and many were injured and imprisoned. And on Tuesday, when another group was celebrating the Day of Sacrifice on a farm, it was attacked by a large group of police agents dressed in civilian clothes and posing as "patriotic workers." Many persons, both young and old, were injured.

Thus today no one is immune in Iran. The people are deprived of any kind of normal and democratic activities. The university strikes are continuing nationally. The Writers Association of Iran, while condemning all these atrocities, because of the lack of any guarantees of safety and while taking a great risk, issues this brief statement and will refrain from issuing a detailed statement.

On November 24 one of the leaders of the

Writers Association, Mahmoud Etemadzadeh (Beh-Azin) was arrested, along with his son, on charges of "incitement to riot."

Many protests have been lodged against the repressive measures taken by the Iranian government, including demonstrations and hunger strikes by some student groups in the United States and Europe.

In Britain, a group of thirteen members of Parliament signed a telegram sent to the Iranian government demanding an end to the police violence and recognition of the right of the Writers Association to exist. The action was initiated by the London-based Committee Against Repression in Iran (CARI).

In a news conference in Washington November 23, organized by the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran (CAIFI), a protest was launched against the brutalities of the Iranian regime.

Participants in the news conference included Representative Fortney Stark; Alex Karmel of PEN, the international writers organization; Morton Halperin, director of the Project on National Security and Civil Liberties; Reza Baraheni, a former political prisoner of the shah; and Babak Zahraie, CAIFI national field secretary.

The repressive measures taken by the regime and the severe wave of crackdowns seem to have been intended not only to silence the opposition but also to demoralize and disorient it. This method was also used in the days after the coup of 1953, which opened the current period of repression.

There is, however, a marked difference in the present period. Today, a new generation of Iranian youth that has not experienced the defeat of 1953 is going through a process of radicalization.

At the same time, there is a great discontent among the general population, ascribable to such social and economic factors as political repression, inflation, and serious shortages of various goods. Such a situation has provided fertile ground for the emergence of an opposition on a mass scale.

The deepgoing process of radicalization is beginning to penetrate all layers and classes of Iranian society and promises to be much stronger than previous such periods Iran has witnessed.

It is with this understanding that the current rebirth of protests and mass opposition can only be hailed as a signal of the beginning of a movement that will fight for the interests of the majority of the population.

It is also with this understanding that we know that even though the regime may succeed in temporarily crushing this movement by resorting to the most barbaric methods, nevertheless another round is yet to come. In that round the government will face a broader and more determined struggle. □

Background to the Current Protests

The current mood of protest was manifested initially by a letter sent to the prime minister in June by forty well-known intellectuals.* The letter demanded that the Writers Association of Iran be officially recognized, that it be allowed to publish a journal, and that it be allowed to assemble and organize. These demands remained unanswered and the signers of a subsequent letter of protest to the prime minister increased to ninety-eight.

In addition, scores of protest letters written by individuals or by groups of lawyers, former politicians, or former government officials began to surface. They all demanded freedom in one form or another.

The next bold step was again taken by the Writers Association which, despite much harassment from the government, organized ten evenings of public poetry reading from October 10 to 19. These Evenings of Poets and Writers, as they were called, proved to be enormously successful. The best-known writers and poets participated, a great majority of them using the occasion to oppose violations of democratic rights and demand an end to them.

It was during these ten evenings that the depth of opposition to the repressive regime and the willingness to publicly defy it was demonstrated. Crowds began to exceed 10,000 after the third evening. Every time a speaker mentioned the word freedom the audience would applaud, at times rising in a standing ovation. A jubilant mood reigned throughout.

The government did everything short of storming the meetings to sabotage them. Advance publicity in the press was limited to short announcements in obscure pages of the newspapers. The country's entire press was ordered not to report the events. Agents provocateurs were sent in to disrupt the meetings. Despite all these efforts, the evenings proceeded successfully.

In a statement issued after the final meeting, the Writers Association summed them up as follows:

For the first time after years of repression, a group of poets, writers, and thinkers has exposed the antidemocratic methods of the government . . . and denounced the naked, relentless brutality that has been used in our

country as a governmental principle in place of any kind of logic, discussion, or debate of the issues. They took the risk of explicitly demanding the abolition of censorship and all the institutions and departments that implement it.

For years Tehran has not witnessed a crowd of 8,000 or 10,000 or more voluntarily gathering, at times under a heavy downpour, to hear words that were not a sickening repetition of the official lies and deceptions.

How did this extraordinary event come about? Has there been a deal or a compromise? Not at all! The Writers Association of Iran is still despised by the government and is not receiving any attention from it. Letters sent to Hoveida and Amouzegar, the past and present prime ministers, demanding official recognition, an office, and the right to have a publication remain as yet unanswered, after several months.

Has there been a change in the institutions of the administrative government of Iran, or in the policies of the government? No, all the autocratic institutions and organizations remain untouched. All regulations that are in clear violation of the constitution and its supplement . . . remain in force.

Thought and pen remain crucified by censorship. The press is monopolized by the traditional agents and mercenaries of the government, who distort the truth, rearrange the figures, and pass to the public words that are void of any true content. They resort even to slander and libel to discredit members of the Writers Association.

Such a press, during these ten days and nights, did not print even one word about what was announced in the loudspeakers, exciting everyone in an unprecedented manner. That was because the hired writers had received the following instructions from the Ministry of Information:

" . . . Regarding the poetry evening of the poets. Not one article, news item, or poem recited in the poetry evening must be printed. What you have in the inside pages will suffice."

Nevertheless, the question crosses the mind as to why the intolerant and brutal government of Iran showed this much toleration, and unlike its customary methods for many years, did not storm and perhaps massacre the people.

"The reason for this," the association said, "must principally be sought within Iran. The general discontent felt from the ever-increasing pressure by the autocratic government and the mood of the public that after repeated experiences has discovered the incompetence of the government in leading the country . . . has forced the present officials to be more cautious and has to a certain extent tied the hands of the government in implementing its traditional brutality. . . ."

* See *Intercontinental Press*, July 18, 1977, p. 826.

Behind Carter's Tax Flimflam

By Jon Britton

The U.S. ruling class has reached a consensus in favor of a series of tax cuts next year aimed at counteracting an expected slowdown in the American economy owing to lagging capital investment and the multi-billion-dollar tax hikes President Carter has demanded in Social Security and energy legislation now pending in Congress.

American workers should not hold their breath in anticipation of overall tax relief, however. All indications are that Carter and his big business backers intend to further shift the federal tax burden onto the shoulders of working people.

In 1949 corporate and business taxes represented 47.5% of the total federal tax revenue. By 1976 only 31% of federal tax revenue came from such taxes, a 35% reduction. The growth in state and local sales and income taxes makes this regressive shift even more dramatic.

Moreover, the stimulative effect of the cuts being discussed will be modest indeed, if account is taken of the higher Social Security and energy taxes soon to be signed into law.

Carter campaigned for president on a promise of "reforming" the highly inequitable U.S. tax structure. Although the "reforms" he has been considering (such as reducing the tax deduction for "three-martini business lunches") would be little more than window-dressing, the mouthpieces of the employers and bankers have been telling him that first priority be given to tax reductions. The editors of the *New York Times* said on November 7:

President Carter cannot have it both ways next year. If he tries to cut taxes at the same time that he tries to reform them, he may fail at both objectives. The tax cut deserves priority. Without it, the nation may sink again into recession. Tax reform . . . can wait until 1979 and a new Congress.

At a news conference November 30, Carter indicated that he had taken this advice to heart. He told reporters that he "would defer his more controversial tax-revision proposals next year to insure early enactment of 'substantial tax reductions'" (*New York Times*, December 1).

Jimmy Carter's tax proposals will not be submitted to Congress until January, at the earliest. But indications are that the contemplated cuts are anything but substantial.

In October administration officials were projecting tax reductions totaling \$20-22 billion, to be phased in over several years.

More recently, the figures have been lowered to \$15-20 billion.

A major portion of these cuts will benefit big business and wealthy individuals. Sam Nakagama, chief economist at Kidder, Peabody & Co., a Wall Street firm, contended in late September that "this nation is on the brink of what promises to be the most favorable changes in the tax laws affecting savings and investment since 1947."

"The (indicated) \$5 billion to \$7 billion cut in corporate taxes is likely to take the form of a reduction in the corporate income tax from 48% to 45% or 46%, a boost in the investment tax credit, and possibly, one-year write-offs for pollution equipment," he said (*Wall Street Journal*, September 28).

"Administration sources" told reporters December 3 that the projected cut for a family of four in the \$15,000-\$20,000 bracket will be about \$300 a year, or less than \$6 a week.

A further indication of the modest reductions being considered by Carter is provided by the deficit projected by the administration for fiscal year 1979 (which starts on October 1 of next year), when a tax bill passed in 1978 most likely would take effect.

Acting Budget Director James McIntyre, Jr., was quoted in the November 12 *New York Times* as saying that the budget for that fiscal year will show a deficit "in the neighborhood of \$40 billion." This is a sizable reduction from the red-ink figure of \$58.5 billion now estimated for the current fiscal year (1978), and is also lower than the \$45 billion deficit actually incurred in fiscal 1977. "We're going to have to show a steady decline in the deficit if we're going to balance the budget" by 1981 as President Carter has pledged, McIntyre told reporters November 10.

Carter has also said that he wants to bring federal spending down to 21% of the national income. Officials have estimated the ratio at 21.9% for 1977 and 22.4% for 1978, and have set a preliminary figure of 21.8% for 1979. The extent of cuts already made in government expenditures relative to national income is indicated by the fact that six years ago the ratio stood at nearly 25%.

This constraint on government spending, together with the reduced deficit projected for 1979, would imply an upper limit on any tax cut, assuming no further slowing of the economy, of something less than the net tax increases that Congress man-

dates in the Social Security and energy bills it passes. (If the cut were greater than that, the deficit would go up.)

The November 21 issue of *Newsweek* provides figures on the added tax bite that could result from the new levies being debated in Congress. These add up to a whopping \$36.5 billion by 1979, \$34 billion of this in increased Social Security taxes.

Thus what Carter is hoping to put over, slick demagoguery to the contrary, is an overall increase in taxes, with the added burden falling mainly on working people. What he is counting on to "stimulate" the economy is solely the multi-billion-dollar tax windfalls he plans for big business.

In view of the widely discussed (and feared) possibility that another worldwide economic downturn is in the making, why is the "populist" Jimmy Carter following such a conservative course—projecting an increase in taxes and moving toward a balanced budget, the opposite of the traditional Keynesian prescription?

Carter's course also seems to conflict with the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund in September that "all countries in relatively strong [financial] positions should make every effort to ensure adequate growth of domestic demand compatible with containing inflation."

In reality it doesn't conflict. The fact is that the U.S. government is too weak financially to prudently step up the use of Keynesian pump-priming measures to boost the economy.

And to capitalist policy-makers, "containing inflation" means cutting back government spending on social services and accepting high levels of unemployment to keep wages down and discipline the work force—precisely Carter's policy.

The government's financial weakness is reflected in the decline of the dollar against gold. From July to late November, the value of the U.S. dollar by this important measure sank by about 13%. Since August 1976, it has declined by more than 35%.¹

In fact, it is this decline, and what underlies it, that provides the key to understanding Carter's tax maneuvers.

1. Marx explained that paper money is merely a stand-in for gold: "Paper money is a symbol of gold, a symbol of money. Its relation to the values of commodities consists only in this: they find imaginary expression in certain quantities of gold, and the same quantities are symbolically and physically represented by the paper. Only in so far as paper money represents gold, which like all other commodities has value, is it a symbol of value" (*Capital, Volume One* [Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976], p. 225).

The amount of gold represented by a unit of paper money, Marx explained, is determined by the ratio of the currency circulating to the amount of gold that would be needed if gold itself were used as the medium of circulation (*ibid.*, p. 224). In turn, the amount of circulating media of

The fall of the dollar and other paper currencies in relation to gold results from soaring government deficits, financed in part by resort to the printing press.

Government finances, in turn, have been gravely undermined by a deep-seated, long-term malady of the capitalist economy in the 1970s, namely the dimming prospects for profitable productive investment owing to sharpening international competition, the relative decline of some major capital-intensive industries, such as steel, a spreading crisis of overproduction, and soaring costs of new plant and equipment. The capitalist economy has become more susceptible to sudden shocks and breakdowns.

A key indication of this economic malaise is a growing tendency of investors to seek to *preserve* their capital, as opposed to their normal tendency to seek ways to *expand* it. The depreciating dollar has become a less reliable store of value. Gold retains this function, however, and so hoarding gold has become more popular among the rich.

The increased interest in gold is reflected in the accelerating pace of trading in gold and in contracts to buy gold (futures).

Dr. Henry Jarecki, chairman of the Mocatta Metals Corporation of New York and one of the world's leading experts on precious metals, said in a recent interview that in the United States, which has now taken the lead in gold dealings, gold futures trading has reached the "level of 10,000 to 20,000 contracts a day—somewhere between one million and two million ounces of metal, or \$165 million to \$330 million in daily value, \$1.5 billion a week or \$75 billion a year" (*New York Times*, November 11).

An estimated 22,000 tons of the metal are now in private hands worldwide, in comparison to official government holdings of roughly 32,000 tons.

The period leading up to the 1974-75 slump provides a good illustration of the government's mounting financial woes, and the growing importance of gold as a haven for investors concerned about pre-

serving their capital when economic storms begin to blow.

At that time, the prospect of a sharp downturn in the economy, which the big capitalists anticipated well in advance, caused American investors to shift part of their funds out of corporate stocks and bonds beginning in early 1973.

In earlier downturns, during the long post-World War II boom, capitalists generally purchased government securities with money temporarily taken out of stocks and other relatively risky investments, because such securities were nearly risk-free and paid interest.

This time, however, something new happened. A portion of this capital flowed instead into gold or shares in gold-mining companies. The prospect of declining tax revenues and a burgeoning federal deficit, on top of earlier deficits, had put a question mark over the government's creditworthiness and therefore over government securities and the dollar as stores of value.

The net result was a slide in security prices generally and an accompanying rise in interest rates to their highest levels since the Civil War of 1861-65.

To prevent a collapse of the bond market and to slow the rise of interest rates, the Federal Reserve (the U.S. central bank) had to step in and buy up government bonds in massive quantities, paying for them, in effect, with newly printed dollars. Thus, between 1972 and 1974, Federal Reserve holdings of government bonds jumped from \$69.9 billion to \$80.5 billion. An explosive growth of the money supply ensued, and by late 1974 the price of gold had soared to nearly \$200 an ounce, up from around \$70 in early 1973.²

What these events signified in reality was the partial withdrawal of credit from their own government on the part of bankers and individual investors. The main difference between the fiscal crisis faced by the federal government and that of New York City in 1974-75 was the power of the former to meet a part of its deficit by printing money. The result was a new phenomenon: double-digit inflation in the midst of the slump.

Actually "slumpflation," as it came to be called, was new only in form, since prices in gold fell sharply (i.e., the purchasing power of gold rose), as has always been the case during generalized downturns in the past. But this new form was devastating to the working class and much of the middle class as prices and unemployment jumped simultaneously.

In the past year, with the economy

showing early signs of another downturn, and with the government deficit mounting to a record peacetime level of close to \$60 billion, the same tendencies have begun to make their appearance once again: Stock and bond prices have tumbled while interest rates have climbed. The price of gold has risen, reflecting increased hoarding and an inordinate expansion of the money supply. The Federal Reserve once again has been forced to step in to support the government bond market and slow the rise of interest rates.³ Its holdings of government securities have jumped from \$91.6 billion a year ago to \$102.7 billion now.

The much-publicized "feud" between Carter and Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns, by the way, concerns a real tactical division in the U.S. ruling class over the degree to which the Federal Reserve should intervene in this fashion. Burns speaks for those who are more concerned about propping up the sagging dollar. Carter voices the worry that rising interest rates will choke off economic growth—and also worsen the Democrats' election chances in 1978.

It is now clear why Carter—in the face of a weakening economy—dropped the tax rebate proposal earlier this year, is now moving to raise taxes overall, and is aiming for a balanced budget by 1981. Any substantial increase in the government's deficit would require an even more massive outpouring of newly printed paper dollars to finance it, which in turn would accelerate the depreciation of the dollar and the flight into gold.

Ironically, at the very time that the economy needs added governmental stimulus, Keynesian pump-priming has become not only relatively ineffectual but a real threat to capitalist stability. Jimmy Carter is being forced willy-nilly to adapt government spending and taxation to an economy in deep trouble. He must do so or run the risk of rapidly accelerating inflation and even a form of government bankruptcy.

To avoid such an outcome, Carter is shoring up government finances with increased taxes. At the same time, he is trying to coax more productive investment by reducing the tax load on big business, hoping that the slide toward another slump can be stemmed.

Indeed, it may work for a time; the late-November rally in the stock market and drop in gold prices indicate the capitalists think it might. But the underlying economic trends cannot be reversed. Another engineer who occupied the White House, Herbert Hoover, found that out in the early 1930s. □

a given value needed (either gold or its representatives) is ultimately determined by the circulation of commodities (ibid., p. 219).

Thus, if during a period of economic stagnation or decline the U.S. government meets a portion of its expenses by printing money, the above ratio tends to rise, causing the dollar to represent less value in terms of gold (as well as other commodities). In times of boom, on the other hand, the government can increase the amount of paper money in circulation with little or no loss in the gold value each dollar represents.

That gold retains its character as money was recently confirmed by Carter when on October 28 he put his signature to a bill allowing U.S. citizens to sign contracts tying payments to the value of gold.

2. Actually, "price of gold" is not a price in the strict sense. "Price" is the exchange ratio between a commodity and gold or its equivalent representative currency unit. "Price of gold," on the other hand, expresses what a given currency unit, such as the dollar, represents in terms of gold, the money commodity.

3. The media myth is that during periods of "tight money," rising interest rates are brought about by the Federal Reserve. In reality, rising interest rates stem from heavy private and public borrowing in such periods.

Papandreou Outflanks Stalinists in Greek Election

By Elsa Oikonomou and Angelos Exarcheiu

ATHENS—The new relationship of forces among the political parties after the elections has been characterized as a “shift to the left.”

For some, this “shift to the left” is represented by the larger share of the vote won overall by the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement, the Communist Party-Exterior, and the Alliance. (For a report on the vote totals, see *Intercontinental Press*, December 5, p. 1332.)

Others think that what is involved in this “shift to the left” is “the expression by the majority of the people of a desire for democratic changes,” which would include the vote for the Democratic Center Union.

The two interpretations can coexist without difficulty. Thus, *Nea* [a bourgeois daily] and *Rizospastis* [the CP-Exterior daily] have struck up tunes that harmonize.

In any case, the 1977 elections did mark a turning point. But the point of comparison is not the 1974 elections but the political picture that existed prior to the dictatorship. This is true in particular since Caramanlis's campaign three years ago had a plebiscitary character, the main theme being “me or chaos.” The very stabilization of the New Democracy government led to a registering of the real strength of the political currents, which makes it possible to get a more concrete picture of the relationship between the social and political shifts.

A shift has occurred first of all in the right-center-left lineup of the 1960s. It is clear today that the center, representing an attempt to form a programmatic bridge between the parties of the radicalizing poor masses and the right, has definitively failed. The Democratic Center Union was decimated, and this inspired the headline in *Nea*, “Dramatic Changes in the Political Arena.”

The relationship between the disastrous decline of the Democratic Center Union and the rise of PASOK is obvious. But it would be an oversimplification to see this merely as a shift within a defined constituency, that is among the traditional liberal voters. Conversely, it would be an error to present the gains for PASOK as an expansion of the left.

A few days before the founding of PASOK [in 1974], Papandreou himself stressed that it would be “something new for Greece and Europe that would transcend the differences between right and left.”

In reality, the “originality” of the alternative presented by PASOK consists in offering a political and to a certain extent organizational framework for the radicalization of the petty-bourgeois masses, while maintaining constant control over them. It is able to do this so long as the workers movement remains politically isolated. In accomplishing this, it has gained an unquestionable credibility in the eyes of an important section of the bourgeoisie.

It is true that the disappearance of the center is leading to the feared “polarization.” This is another aspect of the shift we referred to above. Bourgeois rule, which for virtually the entire period since World War II has meant a government of the right, has been more endangered than protected by the existence of a party such as the Center Union. Instead of playing the role of buffer for which it was intended, it was dangerously outflanked in the July Days [the mass mobilizations of July 1965].

Today the Greek bourgeoisie cannot afford the luxury of a two-party parliamentary system as a shock absorber for social clashes. The “polarization” is a result of its own social and political weakness. However, the polarization has not been between two fundamental social forces but between two somewhat different bourgeois programs for solving the crisis of capitalist rule.

The National Radical Union (ERE) failed to establish a stable regime based on the counterrevolutionary victory of 1949. And the New Democracy is even more vulnerable than the ERE to the kind of centrifugal forces that can operate in a society such as ours. While the situation is

not ripe for those tendencies in the bourgeoisie that favor military rule, the Caramanlis regime can assemble only a very fragile social base.

From this standpoint, the recent elections were a warning for the New Democracy. The “new identity” [i.e., the Gaullist-type image of ND as opposed to the more traditional one of the ERE] assumed by the right has apparently not achieved the hoped-for results.

The decay of the right over these past three years is something that the bourgeoisie cannot fail to be concerned about, even though it has not undermined the stability of the regime on the political level.

The combined score of New Democracy and National Regroupment represents a drop of 6.8% from Caramanlis's vote in 1974. New Democracy's total loss was 12.58%. Allowing for the vote the ultrarightists got in 1974, that means that Caramanlis lost 5.74% to forces to the right of him. Another 6.78% of his vote went to PASOK.

In the big cities, the New Democracy seems to have held up better than in the provinces. The right in general suffered its biggest losses (up to 15%) in some of its traditional bastions, such as Phthiotis, Argolis, and Grevena. Parallel to this, in many of the traditional rightist strongholds PASOK doubled its vote (Laconica, Arkadia, and Eurytania).

In Athens and Salonika, as in 1974, the New Democracy vote equaled or slightly exceeded its national average. But although the party did not suffer the same kind of electoral losses here as in some



Demis Argyropoulos/Time

PASOK leader Andreas Papandreou at postelection rally.

provinces, its decline was shown in the defeat of certain ministers.

Especially significant was the narrow victory for Rallis [the present minister of education, who was minister of the interior in the first cabinet formed by Caramanlis in 1974]. He got only a third of his 1974 vote. Also important was the defeat of Deputy Premier Koutepharis. Both of these men had passed through the Ministry of Education.

National Regroupment (EP) cut significantly into New Democracy's vote. It managed to attract part of the 30% of the electorate that voted for the king in the referendum on the monarchy. It appealed for support for a "tough" stand against the workers movement. The campaign of the ultraright could lead to greater political differentiation within the New Democracy. By winning 6.8% of the vote, National Regroupment has already begun to exercise a certain pressure on Caramanlis's party.

The New Democracy will be forced to give certain guarantees to the ultraright. However, it is not likely to accept the "collaboration with the constructive opposition" proposed by [EP leader] Stephanopoulos.

The fascist [EP] vote rose to over 4% in 45 out of 56 districts. In 17 districts, it went over 10%. In most of those districts where National Regroupment made the greatest gains, the right suffered relatively greater losses than in the rest of Greece. In those same areas, however, PASOK made gains overshadowing those of the monarchofascists. This result confirms the fact that PASOK is the main force in the present polarization and that the traditional left is playing almost no role.

The vote won by National Regroupment creates a problem for the New Democracy in electing the premier. Caramanlis no longer has the necessary two-thirds of the votes in parliament.

The Democratic Center Union's fiasco deprives the New Democracy of an "ally" that could make up for the decline in the strength of the government. Its only success was in the Dodecanese Islands, where it made substantial gains as a result of Zigdis's popularity. In other provinces (e.g., Arta, Leukas, and Trikkala), its vote remained stable. In the rest of the country, it lost from one-third to two-thirds of its previous vote. Even in Crete, it lost a third of its vote to PASOK and the New Liberals. In the big cities, its losses equaled its average drop nationwide. In some districts (Phocis, Achaea, Zakynthos, Prebeza, and Kastoria) it suffered total disaster.

It was in the provinces that PASOK scored its greatest gains. In Phthiotis, Zakynthos, and Cephalonia, it more than tripled its vote. Everywhere it won votes from the Democratic Center Union. It even made appreciable inroads into rightist strongholds. It does not mean to have

Guide to Greek Political Parties

The Alliance, a bloc of five small parties in which the predominant force was the Communist Party (Interior), the "Eurocommunist" faction of Greek Stalinism.

Center Union, the main liberal bourgeois party in the 1950s and 1960s. Led by Georgios Papandreou, father of Andreas. Came to office on crest of mass upsurge in 1964 elections, after being robbed of victory in 1961 elections by rightist vote fraud. The Center Union government provoked fears on the part of the monarchy and reactionary military officers that their role would be reduced. The palace and the bourgeoisie forced enough defections of Center Union deputies to bring down government of Georgios Papandreou in 1965, ushering in a period of mass protests that were finally suppressed by the establishment of a military dictatorship in 1967.

Communist Party (Exterior), the result of a Moscow-encouraged split in 1968, when a majority of the Greek CP leadership condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Has become the dominant Stalinist group since the fall of the junta.

Democratic Center Union. Formed by majority of the old Center Union parliamentary party, which was led by

Georgios Papandreou, the father of Andreas.

National Radical Union, the main party of the parliamentary right in the 1950s and 1960s. Its historical leader is Constantine Caramanlis.

National Regroupment, an ultraright party of supporters of the monarchy and the line of the deposed junta.

New Democracy, the party formed by Caramanlis in 1974, when he was called back to take over from the junta. Consists primarily of the National Radical Union plus other forces attracted to the idea of participating in a Gaullist-type party.

New Liberals, formed by those who defected from the Center Union in the mid-1960s.

Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the party of Andreas Papandreou. The initial forces came from the section of the old Center Union that followed Andreas, who was denounced as a dangerous leftist plotter in his father's government. Radicalizing elements were attracted to the Center Union in the early 1960s when the Stalinists presented this party as the only realistic alternative to rightist rule.

People's Democratic Unity, a Maoist group.

Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece, a Maoist group.

gained any votes from those who supported the United Left [the bloc of the two CPs] in the 1974 elections, except in a few cases such as Leukas. However, the vote it won in the farming districts as well as in the cities shows that the "PASOK operation" succeeded in driving a wedge between the radicalizing petty-bourgeois masses and the workers movement.

In bourgeois centers, PASOK also scored important gains. It almost doubled its vote in District No. 1 of Athens, District No. 1 of Peiraieus, and District No. 2 of Salonika. It more than doubled its vote in Athens No. 2, Peiraieus No. 2, and Salonika No. 1. In Peiraieus and Salonika, it took votes away from the Democratic Center Union and the New Democracy. In Athens, its gains seem to have come exclusively from the Democratic Center Union.

Especially significant is the fact that in working-class neighborhoods, the PASOK vote equaled or surpassed that of the New Democracy.

The score of the CP-Exterior showed the desire of the workers to cast a class vote. But PASOK rose to first place in many working-class neighborhoods. These gains must be the result of the political passivity of the workers movement over the entire

past period, except for the struggle against the antilabor law [in May 1976], which was very limited.

Thus, not only has PASOK been able to isolate the workers movement from the radicalizing petty-bourgeois masses but it has succeeded, as a result of this, in attracting certain sections of workers, especially among the recently proletarianized strata.

In a recent statement in [the Athens daily] *Eleutherotypia*, Papandreou made it clear that he intends to keep the organized workers movement marginalized.

"We can agree to forming an opposition bloc. But the people voted for PASOK. The Greek people have no great confidence in democratic 'coalitions.' Only a big and powerful Socialist Party can effectively oppose the right."

Does PASOK, then, pose a danger to the present political "stability"? It does, because of the weakness of Greek capitalism. But at least at present the strength of the workers movement is not a factor in this.

From reading *Rizospastis*, you could get the impression that the only relevant comparison is between the vote the CP-Exterior got in the recent elections and what it got in 1974 [as part of the United

Left bloc]. But this vote has to be compared with the vote for the components of the United Left overall. And this vote did not increase in accordance with the gains of the CP-Exterior.

There was only a small overall increase [for the workers parties], which was distributed fairly evenly throughout the country. In some districts where the United Left got its highest vote, however, as in Leukas, the total vote of the CP-Exterior and the Alliance [essentially, the CP-Interior] decreased from 27.14% to 22.57%. And in Lesbos, their combined vote rose only from 24.54% to 26.6%.

The workers' rejection of the CP-Interior's coalitionist policy and its trade-union and electoral expression enabled the CP-Exterior to double its vote, reaching a total of 10% that is not likely to frighten the bourgeoisie.

This strengthening of the CP-Exterior relative to the CP-Interior did reflect a hardening of class lines to some extent. But it did not bring any substantial increase in the strength of the workers parties. It is true that there was a steady rise in most districts, but it was very small.

Characteristically, in Peiraieus [the port of Athens and a traditional working-class

center], the CP-Alliance vote remained almost exactly the same as the vote for the United Left, while PASOK more than doubled its vote.

Furthermore, the two CPs made no gains in the old rightist districts where PASOK rolled up big victories. They made significant gains only in Zakynthos, Larissa, Samos, and Iraklion.

The Alliance suffered a disastrous failure in the provinces, as well as in traditionally left districts. Its vote exceeded its national average mainly in the big cities.* In the balance sheet it has promised, the CP-Interior can point to some other positive indexes. In Peiraieus No. 1, Brillakis came in first with 2,700 votes, while his nearest rival, Giotopoulos, got only 565.

There seem to be two different points of view in the CP-Interior as to what attitude to take to the election results. A lead article in *Avge* [which reflects the viewpoint of the CP-Interior] stressed that never in the fifty-nine-year-long history of the Commu-

*The vote of the Alliance and the CP-Exterior in Athens No. 1 was respectively 6.00% as against 11.50%; in Athens No. 2, it was 5.21% as against 16.09%; in Peiraieus No. 1 it was 4.26% as against 11.02%; in Peiraieus No. 2, it was 5.18% as against 19.33%.—IP

nist Party had "the election results matched its real strength." This article focused on the need to "reinforce the working-class revolutionary character" of the CP-Interior and its perspective of "renewal."

On the other hand, Dhrakopoulos has said that he thinks "the only realistic solution is a democratic coalition government." He has not said whether this should include the "enlightened right."

The 20,000 votes won by the Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece (EKKE) and People's Democratic Unity (LDE) reflect a general tendency toward a differentiation within the left from the reformist parties. However, we oppose the sectarian and divisionist direction that these groups have given to this process of differentiation.

EKKE got more votes than the LDE, both in the cities and in the provinces. In the cities, it got most votes in the workers neighborhoods and topped the LDE there as well. In the provinces, it ran candidates in reactionary districts and got a fair number of votes, while the LDE preferred to run in left districts. It is hard to say anything more concrete about the vote of these organizations. □

To Convey Their 'Great Admiration' for Ethiopian Junta

Free TV Time for American Stalinists in Addis Ababa

By Ernest Harsch

The Ethiopian dictatorship is now facing massive opposition to its rule throughout the country. The oppressed nationalities—the Eritreans, Somalis, Oromos, and others—have mobilized to fight against the dominant Amhara rulers based in the capital, Addis Ababa. In addition, the military junta, known as the Dergue, is confronted with continuing resistance to its repressive and antilabor policies from the urban masses of Addis Ababa itself.

Despite its growing isolation within the country, the regime of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam has managed to garner a broad spectrum of foreign supporters, ranging from American imperialism and the Israeli colonial-settler state to Moscow and the Eastern European regimes.

As a by-product of the Soviet Stalinists' backing to the Ethiopian junta, the American Communist Party, which follows every twist and turn in the Kremlin's self-serving foreign and domestic policies, has jumped onto the bandwagon as well.

Compared to the Communist parties in a

number of other capitalist countries, the American CP is quite small and its political influence within the United States is minimal. Yet the Dergue has considered its utterances on the situation in Ethiopia significant enough to give them prominent display.

The CP sent its national education director, James E. Jackson, to represent it at the third anniversary festivities of the Ethiopian junta's September 12, 1974, seizure of power. According to the September 22 issue of the American CP newspaper, the *Daily World*, Jackson met with Mengistu and presented him with greetings from the party's Central Committee and personal felicitations from National Chairman Henry Winston and General Secretary Gus Hall.

It went on to note, "Jackson was accorded the special privilege of addressing the nation on television and over the radio. The media reported his talks at Dire Dawa and at Debre Zeit with keen interest."

The government-controlled *Ethiopian Herald*, in its September 11 issue, devoted

a number of paragraphs to Jackson's remarks upon his arrival in Addis Ababa, running a photograph of him along with the article. It quoted him as saying, "Our party looks with enthusiasm and great admiration to the Ethiopian Revolution."

The *Ethiopian Herald* continued, "He expressed his party's solidarity with the Ethiopian people and the PMAC," the Provisional Military Administrative Council, the official name of the Dergue.

The CP had proclaimed its political backing to the Ethiopian junta a month earlier as well, when the August 12 *Daily World* published an article by veteran CP propagandist William Pomeroy, who referred to "the revolutionary government of Ethiopia with its declared socialist program."

In reality, however, there is nothing "socialist" about the Dergue other than its demagoguery. In claiming that there is, the CP is helping to provide a left cover for an extremely repressive capitalist regime. In this, it is simply following the counterrevolutionary lead set by Moscow, which, in

addition to its political support, provides arms and other material assistance to the junta.

The only evidence that the American Stalinists seek to offer in justification for their hymns to the "revolutionary government" is the Dergue's land reform measures and its nationalization of a number of foreign and domestic companies and banks. But in all their enthusiasm for the "Ethiopian Revolution," neither Jackson nor the *Daily World* have a word to say about the capitalist economic policies of the junta, which seek to encourage private Ethiopian businessmen and entrepreneurs and try to entice more foreign investments.

Nor do they mention the Dergue's ban on strikes and demonstrations, its efforts to enforce speedup in the factories, its arrests of trade-union activists, its dissolution of the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions, its executions of political dissidents, or its massacre of hundreds of young supporters of the underground Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) earlier this year.

The *Daily World* does at least acknowledge the existence of the Maoist-leaning Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), but refers to the party in its October 6 issue as "counter-revolutionary terrorist," thus presumably justifying the cold-blooded killings of its supporters.

The political and material aid given to the Ethiopian junta by a number of capitalist and imperialist powers is embarrassing to the CP, so that, too, is ignored.

For instance, Washington, which armed, trained, and funded the Ethiopian military for more than two decades, still has ties with the Dergue, despite the reduction in American military aid earlier this year. There are at least seven Defense Department officials stationed in Ethiopia, and Washington recently agreed to provide \$200,000 in economic assistance and is considering \$10 million more. Mengistu, moreover, is seeking renewed American arms supplies.

According to numerous reports, the Israeli regime (which opposes the Eritrean and Somali struggles) supplies spare parts for the Dergue's American-made F-5 jet fighters and has helped train some Ethiopian military units. The *New York Times* reported August 1, "The United States is aware of the Israeli involvement and has not opposed it. . . ."

In their speeches and articles, the American Stalinists have expressed particular contempt and hatred for the struggles of Ethiopia's oppressed nationalities. Jackson is quoted approvingly by the *Ethiopian Herald* as condemning them for raising "a phoney flag of self-determination."

In a lame attempt to justify this position, the CP claims that the Eritreans and Somalis are simple pawns of imperialism. In the words of Pomeroy, "Imperialism, in other words, has fanned extreme nationalist and separatist feeling [among Somalis],

which it has also done in the case of the Eritrean movements, in order to create and foster conflict in the Horn of Africa."

In light of the gains made by both the Eritreans and Somalis in recent months, it



MENGISTU: Appreciates CPUSA's silence on executions, strike breaking, and union-busting.

is quite likely that the imperialists, including Washington, are trying to establish some influence with them. But their aim is not to encourage struggles for national liberation. It was Washington, in fact, that originally railroaded a resolution through the United Nations in 1950 incorporating the former Italian colony of Eritrea into Ethiopia.

Rather, what the imperialists are trying to do is to bolster their influence in the region so as to be in a better position to sidetrack or contain the Eritrean and Somali struggles and to prevent them from going in a socialist direction.

Mengistu and his Stalinist praise-singers would like to cover over the fact that the Ethiopian state, as it now exists, was established through a process of conquest. The Somalis, Oromos, and a number of other nationalities were forcibly subjugated in the last decades of the nineteenth century during the expansion of the feudal Amharic empire. Their lands were expropriated by the conquerors and their national rights were suppressed.

The Somali territories were, in addition, partitioned between the Ethiopians and various European powers, so that today some Somalis live in Somalia, some in

Ethiopia, some in Kenya, and some in Djibouti.

During the 1950s, the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie, with American backing, gained control of Eritrea, crushed the Eritrean labor movement, and sought to suppress the various languages spoken by Eritreans.

In response to this oppression, the Somalis have launched a drive to end Ethiopian domination and to unify all Somalis within one independent state, while the Eritreans have waged a determined struggle for their national independence.

The CP's only reply to these just demands is to heap on vilification and slander. Jackson, for instance, terms the Somali guerrillas, who are backed by the Somalian regime, as "invading aggressors." He calls Eritrea, which had a separate existence for many centuries before it was incorporated in the 1950s, "an integral part of Ethiopia."

This latter position is ironical, since Moscow has not always considered Eritrea part of Ethiopia. In fact, during the period after the Second World War when the Italian CP was in the government, the Kremlin favored the return of Eritrea to the Italian colonialists!*

The CP's position on the national question in Ethiopia is partly a reflection of the Kremlin's hostility to struggles for national self-determination in general. After all, the Soviet bureaucrats are themselves vociferous proponents of Great Russian chauvinism and oppose any struggles for national rights among Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Jews, and other oppressed peoples in the Soviet Union.

The American CP's support to the Ethiopian junta and its condemnation of the various struggles against it is also an index of how much Moscow fears any change in the status quo that could disrupt its class-collaborationist relations with Washington.

Both Moscow and its American apologists, through their backing to the Dergue, bear a direct responsibility for its repressive, chauvinist, and antilabor policies. In their position on the Horn of Africa, they have once again shown their willingness to betray any real struggles by the masses for social change. □

*See "The Eritreans, the Somalis and the Powers," by Richard Greenfield in the October 17, 1977 issue of the London weekly *West Africa*.

Portuguese CPers Arrested

Forty members of the Portuguese Communist Party were arrested in Oporto for pasting up posters and painting slogans protesting a right-wing demonstration scheduled to be held on November 19, according to a dispatch published in the November 16 issue of *Le Monde*.

The demonstration was called in support of General Pires Veloso, the former commander of the Northern military district.

The British Communist Party in Crisis

By Pat Jordan

[The following article was written before the Thirty-fifth Congress of the British Communist Party (see box). It appeared in the November 24 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

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The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) is undergoing the most far-reaching discussion in its history. Already this ferment has resulted in a split (the formation of the so-called New Communist Party-NCP) and there is an extremely vocal opposition inside the party which is conducting an organized public struggle for its views.

The present discussion ostensibly revolves around a new draft of the CPGB's program, *The British Road to Socialism*, issued in preparation for its Thirty-Fifth National Congress due to be held in mid-November this year. However, the implications are far broader: at stake are fundamental questions concerning the party's history, strategy, and even its continued existence. This discussion has been conducted at a number of levels: in public and internal party meetings; in the columns of the CPGB's daily newspaper, the *Morning Star*; and in *Comment* (a fortnightly catering to CPGB activists).

The discussion around the new draft program is a continuation of a previous public debate that shook the party during much of 1976. This was initiated by a 20,000-word article on the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet CP by the late John Gollan, the CPGB's former general secretary. The article appeared in the January 1976 issue of the CPGB's theoretical monthly *Marxism Today* under the title, "Problems of Socialist Democracy," and was followed by a year of discussion in the columns of that journal. The views expressed in this debate ranged from extremely strident hard-line pro-Moscow outpourings to others calling for the right of tendency and for a study of the writings of the Old Bolsheviks, including Bukharin and Trotsky. The debate was also taken up in a series of meetings throughout Britain; at some of these, Gollan was assailed as being "Trotskyite," "anti-Soviet," etc., because of his insipid criticism of some of the crimes of Stalinism.

The turmoil in the CPGB is, of course, an integral part of the international crisis of Stalinism and shares the features outlined in previous *Inprecor* articles on Eurocommunism. However, it is also necessary to take into account some of the specific features of the CPGB which greatly influence the particular form taken by this party's crisis.

Features of the CPGB

A more detailed examination of the CPGB's origins belongs elsewhere, but for the purpose of this article it is necessary to note:

a. Unlike many other Communist parties of Western Europe the CPGB did not develop from the emergence of a left current in an existing mass organization of the working class. Instead, it came into existence in 1920 as a result of the bringing together of a number of small propaganda groups, some of which were marked by sectarian deviations and practices.

b. The CPGB has throughout its history been confronted by the Labour Party, which has had a nearly 100% grip on the political representation of the organized working class. At no time has it been seen in the eyes of the masses as a serious political

alternative to the Labour Party. Moreover, the CPGB has never developed a strategy for dealing with this situation. Instead, it has oscillated between opportunist tail-ending of Labour Party and trade-union lefts and a sectarian dismissal of the Labour Party. Usually both elements have coexisted, and both are present in the current discussion.

c. Notwithstanding its political weakness, the CPGB is relatively strong in the industrial field and has the allegiance of thousands of shop stewards and trade-union militants. The CPGB inherited a strong influence in the shop stewards movement from its founding components; but in addition, its policies and methods of struggle have often expressed the thinking of layers of workers with a militant sectoral consciousness. Considerable numbers of trade-union bureaucrats are part of the CPGB's trade-union election alliances for opportunist reasons.

d. Owing to the peculiar structure of the labor movement in Britain, with affiliation of most trade unions to the Labour Party at all levels, the historic split between Social Democracy and the forces of the Third International was a protracted process. Indeed, because of this federated structure and the unitary trade-union movement, it was never completely consummated. As late as the 1923 general election five leading members of the CPGB stood as official Labour parliamentary candidates (in the 1922 general election, one CPGB member, Saklatvala, was actually elected as an official Labour Member of Parliament). It was not until 1926 that members of the CPGB were barred from individual Labour Party membership. Even today, most CPGB members can indirectly take part in formulation of Labour Party policy through their trade-union structures.

The CPGB leadership considers the party to be within the framework of Eurocommunism. General Secretary McLennan took the opportunity of the discussion around the Kremlin's criticism of Carrillo to spell out the CPGB's position. In an interview in the July 4, 1977, *Morning Star* he gave the most precise definition of the party's views to be published so far. Explaining his dislike of the term Eurocommunism, McLennan went on to say that those who use it were really referring to the "fact that a number of CPs have independently arrived at broadly similar views on how to open up the road to socialism in their respective countries." These broadly similar views include:

- The road to socialism will be a revolutionary process based on mass democratic struggles encompassing a combination of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activity.
- The essential aim of this struggle will be to democratically transform the state.
- The struggle will be led by the working class in alliance with other classes and social forces, and the unity of working class parties will be forged in the process.
- The CPs will play a leading role in the struggle but will not exercise exclusive leadership.
- In the transition to socialism and after socialism has been won, democratic rights will be extended in a situation where all democratic parties, including parties hostile to socialism, will contest in elections. The CPs will accept the verdict of the electorate.¹
- The judiciary and trade unions will be independent of

1. It is noteworthy that the CPGB seeks to restrict the concept of democracy to that of the existence of bourgeois elections.

The Thirty-fifth Congress of the British CP

The congress of the British Communist Party concluded November 15. The leadership pushed through ratification of its "Eurocommunist" draft program without difficulty, but at the same time made clear the limitations of this tactical turn.

In the November 17 issue of *Socialist Challenge*, the weekly paper that reflects the views of the British Trotskyists, Dodie Wepler and Oliver MacDonald wrote:

"McLennan [the CP general secretary] also dissociated the leadership from the concept of Eurocommunism. He declared himself as loyal to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as any other CP leader in Europe. He declared in a carefully worded statement that the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] was making a 'decisive contribution' in the world-wide movement for progress and peace."

Including a lot of formulas about the need for parliamentary democracy and pluralism under socialism, the new CP draft program has frightened the most unconditional supporters of the Soviet bureaucracy. Although such formulas are tactically useful for the CP leader-

ship in Britain, they cannot help but imply criticism of the system that exists in the USSR and East Europe.

McLennan's response to the criticisms of the pro-Kremlin ultras was to stress the continuity of the new draft program with the past gradualist and "democratic" strategy of the party.

"Avoiding any ideological challenge to the Brezhnevite wing," Wepler and MacDonald report, "McLennan argued that the points they contested in the new *Draft* were either orthodox Marxism, or else they appeared in the previous versions of the *British Road* [the party program]."

"He seemed to say 'What on earth is all the fuss about? There is nothing of any importance that is new.'"

The delegates were not prevented from expressing their feelings, but the discussion was organized in such a way that the leadership's line could not be effectively challenged from the floor.

The Kremlin-first wing decided not to try to offer new amendments that would be lost in a welter of proposals, none of which could be more than 350 words long. CP rules against "factions"

prevent the presentation of general alternatives.

The main speaker for the most servile pro-Moscow wing agreed that the draft should be accepted until at least 1979, and thus apparently pulled back from any threat of a split.

The Kremlin also took a conciliatory attitude toward the McLennan leadership. The congress was reported extensively and in a friendly way in the Soviet press.

Despite the inherent limitations of the congress, the leadership's talk about the right to express more than one view is having a heady effect on the membership. There was a new boldness in expressing dissent. This was increased by the lack of authority of a leadership unable to halt the party's decline.

The mood of the membership was expressed in an explosion over the CP daily newspaper, *Morning Star*, whose circulation has dropped another 2,000 copies since the last congress. For the first time in decades, the delegates voted down the leadership, rejecting a motion to refer the question of improving the paper to the executive.

political parties and the state, and there will be a clear differentiation between the function of political parties and those of the state.

The new draft program attempts to concretize these policies as well as provide a long-term framework for the CPGB's strategy. The draft speaks of a "broad alliance" "reflected in parliament" which must be the political expression of the "struggles in defense of gains and for the extension of democracy" and adds that "parliament has to be won by the people. It goes on: "In this way, the growth of the broad alliance will result in a parliamentary majority enabling the formation of left, and eventually socialist governments." "Thus the possibility exists of advance to socialism without armed struggle. Democracy can be carried to its utmost limits, breaking all bourgeois restrictions to it, through the democratic transformation of society, including the state, in all stages of struggle." "The next stage," says the draft, "is to expand and unify all aspects of the working class and democratic struggle, and raise its aims to the winning of a Labour government carrying out a left policy."

Nothing Really New

There is nothing especially new in these positions. As CPGB leaders have been proud to point out, their party was the first in Western Europe to specifically adopt a "peaceful road" program. In the issue of *Comment* that launched the discussion on the draft program, the late James Klugman tried to establish the pedigree of the present edition of the draft by citing discussions which took place in the international Stalinist movement in the immediate post-Second World War period. Klugman quoted extensively from the 1946, 1947, and 1950 writings of Harry Pollitt, long-time general secretary of the CPGB, to show that the latter stood for the peaceful transition to socialism and for an overall struggle for

democracy to establish a "People's Democracy." The latter term was written into the first draft of *The British Road to Socialism*, issued in 1951, but dropped at the Twenty-Fifth (Special) Congress of the CPGB in 1957. No doubt the aim of achieving a "people's democracy" was felt to be inappropriate in the year after the Hungarian revolution.

Klugman was also very anxious to establish that the 1951 version of the program had advocated the parliamentary road to socialism. According to him the following extract expressed the essence of the 1951 draft: "Britain will reach socialism by her own road. . . . The people of Britain can transform capitalist democracy into a real people's democracy, transforming parliament, the product of Britain's historic struggle for democracy, into the democratic instrument of the will of the vast majority of the people."

It is hardly necessary to polemicize against these revisionist views in the columns of *Inprecor*, but it is worthwhile considering to what extent the new draft codifies the reformist theory and practice of the CPGB leadership. Of course, the essence of the revisionism of the new draft is the idea that the capitalist state can be transformed into an instrument for workers power by the use of bourgeois-democratic institutions. In this respect, the new draft does not markedly differ from earlier versions—none of these subscribed to the need to destroy the bourgeois state and replace it with one based on soviet-type bodies.

The pro-Moscow critics of the draft raised a hue and cry in the early stages of the debate about the dropping of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The response of supporters of the leadership was devastating and unanswerable—with great glee they pointed out that *no* draft of the program had used this term. Thus the critics were obliged to move to a safer terrain. They accused the new draft of replacing the "antimonopoly alliance" with the "broad democratic alliance"; of revising the concept of the working

CPGB Votes per Parliamentary Candidate in General Elections

Year	Number of Candidates	Number of Votes*	Votes per Candidate
1945	21	102,000	4,857
1950	100	91,000	910
1951	10	21,000	2,100
1955	17	33,000	1,940
1959	18	30,000	1,666
1964	36	45,000	1,250
1966	57	62,000	1,087
1970	58	37,000	638
1974 (Feb.)	44	32,000	727
1974 (Oct.)	29	17,000	586

*For convenience, these figures have been rounded to the nearest thousand.

class by including intermediate strata in the "broad" definition of the proletariat; of liquidating the leading role of the vanguard party by being hazy about the respective roles to be played by the Labour and Communist parties; of "not learning the lessons of Chile" by dismissing the possibility of the need for a violent overthrow of capitalism; of not understanding the class nature of democracy because of the pledge to respect the results of elections even if they resulted in a "left" or "socialist" government being turned out of office; of not being "internationalist" (and, by implication, being anti-Soviet) because of the scanty reference to the "achievements of the socialist countries," etc.

These criticisms—some of which are formally correct—have been expressed in a most abstract manner; in hardly any case have they been related to the practice of the CPGB or to living political questions. Thus in all the contributions on the question of "peaceful" versus "violent" overthrow of capitalism only one referred to the struggle in Ireland. The daily use of violence by the British state to defend a relatively small part of its interests has gone unnoticed by most of these doughty opponents of revisionism. In all the letters devoted to the superiority of the antimonopoly alliance, the need to have a "narrow" definition of the working class, etc., there has been scarcely a reference to the consequent implications for day-to-day politics, in trade-union struggles for example.

Actually, the nuances of formulation in the new draft of *The British Road to Socialism* can be explained in terms of the following pressures on the CPGB:

- The complete failure of its electoral policy;
- Its determination to maintain its alliance with Labour and trade-union lefts when the latter have offered no real opposition to the Labour government's increasingly right-wing policies;
- The impossibility of defending or ignoring the crimes of Stalinism in the same old way;
- The decline of the CPGB's influence and membership;
- The complexity of the class struggle in Britain and especially the rise of struggles over social issues;
- The decisive change in the relation of forces between CPGB and the far-left groups.

The majority of the pro-Moscow critics have no answer to these problems; they yearn for the "good old days" when they could get away with a line based on slavish adherence to the positions of the Soviet bureaucracy. They take refuge in the sectarian heritage of the CPGB, although their day-to-day practice is just as opportunist as that of the leadership. One different element, however, does exist in part of this current: a desire to return to the days of the CPGB as a cadre organization (i.e., before the adoption of the "mass party" line in 1935, with the resulting preponderance of a card-holding, inactive membership).

We will refer later to other currents which do challenge some aspects of the CPGB's day-to-day politics, but it is now necessary to look more closely at the various facets of the crisis facing the party.

As noted before, the CPGB has always been politically weak in relation to the Labour Party. As a consequence of its sectarian origins, its inability to adopt a strategy to confront the Labour Party's grip on the organized working class, and its Stalinization, the CPGB never developed even a political toehold in the parliamentary arena. In this respect it is weaker than most of the other small West European Communist parties. At no time has the CPGB had more than two MPs in a House of Commons of over 600 members. Even in 1945, at the height of the CPGB's influence and size, when it did have two MPs elected in its own name, this was the result of special circumstances and both seats were lost in the next election in 1950. In the period since then the decline in the CPGB's electoral support has been continuous. It is extremely doubtful that there is one single seat where the CPGB could get back its deposit (parliamentary candidates in Britain forfeit their £265 deposit if they gain less than 12.5% of the votes cast).

It would seem that there is some mathematical relationship between the CPGB's commitment to the parliamentary road to socialism and its electoral support. The relationship is an inverse one: the more emphasis the CPGB puts on winning seats in parliament the less votes it obtains.

The decline is even more dramatic if one considers West Fife, a seat which the CPGB held from 1935 to 1950. (The constituency ceased to exist before the 1974 general elections):

Year	1945	1950	1951	1955	1959	1964	1970
% of Votes	32.5	18.5	9.2	10.1	6.8	5.4	1.7

But it appears that an even more humiliating situation is possible. Results in recent by-elections and local government elections indicate that it is not unlikely that candidates of the revolutionary left (especially those of Socialist Unity²) could get

2. Socialist Unity is an electoral alliance involving the IMG (International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International), Big Flame (a group which had some connection with the the Italian organization, Lotta Continua), Workers League (an organization resulting from a split in the Socialist Workers Party, the British state capitalist group) as well as local groupings and individual socialists. It has contested two parliamentary by-elections, Stechford and Ladywood. Socialist Unity is holding a conference in late November which will plan its intervention in the coming election and update its class struggle action program. The conference will also aim to win other far-left groups to the alliance.

as many if not more votes than CPGB candidates. (This has already happened in one case; the CPGB was beaten by the IMG in the May 1977 Greater London Council elections in the Lambeth Central district.)

This electoral decline is matched by a crisis that affects nearly all aspects of the CPGB's work and organization (some exceptions will be dealt with later). One of the telling indicators is membership. As noted before, the CPGB operates on the basis of the "mass party" line as far as membership is concerned. This leads to a situation where only a small minority of the official membership is active. In an interview given just before he split from the CPGB, Sid French claimed that the actual membership was around 4,000 out of the (then) official figure of some 25,000. Membership fees are nominal and even attendance at the monthly branch meeting is not a condition of membership. There is considerable evidence that a fair number of members do not read the *Morning Star* (some CPGB district organizations like Yorkshire have reported sales of the paper that are lower than their membership). Thus there seems little reason to doubt French's figures.

Even on this basis there has been a steady decline in official CPGB membership in the last ten years. In 1967, the figure was just under 33,000, by 1972 this was down to 28,500, and this year's July Executive Committee received reports giving a figure of only 25,293. This Executive Committee report tends to confirm French's figures: it gives only a 56% level of dues payment, despite the fact that these payments are fixed at only 25 pence per month (about US\$.43). The financial report for the years 1975-76 indicates an even worse position: average dues payment per member is a mere 50 pence (US\$.88). (Actual payments are probably somewhat higher, since local party units retain a percentage.) The situation in the Young Communist League (YCL), the party's youth wing, is even worse, as these membership figures show: 1967—5,642; 1972—3,000; and down to 1,638 as of July 1977.

The Executive Committee's report for the two years up to July 1977 does not give circulation figures for the *Morning Star*, but comments: "There have been some good sales of the paper on special occasions (but) the grave decline in circulation has not yet been halted." In earlier reports covering the period between February 1974 to January 1976, this "grave decline" was an average loss of 4,300 in daily circulation; this decline continued through 1976 with a further loss of over 600 copies per day. By mid-1976, daily circulation was down to 40,796 (an unofficial report gives 38,533 as the latest figure).

As a parliamentary-oriented party lacking any significant electoral support, the CPGB has no option other than to base itself on an alliance with Labour Party and trade-union lefts. The ideological cement of this alliance is a mutual commitment to reformist methods and a common chauvinism (best illustrated by the campaign against Britain's entry into the Common Market and the call for import controls). There have been many apparent successes for this policy: the Labour Party National Executive Committee has a majority of what the CPGB would term as lefts; Tribune MPs (supporters of a loose caucus around the paper *Tribune*) and trade-union lefts have shown a much greater willingness to work with the CPGB; and a whole variety of organizations and campaigns have seen the CPGB and these lefts working side by side. Yet the CPGB's size and influence continues to decline.

The basic problem for the CPGB is that it has been precisely the Labour and trade-union lefts who have been in the forefront of formulating and pushing through some of the worst anti-working-class policies of the Labour government. The social contract, with its vicious cuts in real wages, was the brainchild of Jack Jones, the most powerful of the trade-union lefts. Michael Foot, heir to the mantle of Bevan, the classic British left Social Democrat, was responsible for getting both the Parliamentary Labour Party and the party's annual conference to accept the social contract. Hugh Scanlon, leading light in the CPGB's broad left alliance in the engineering union, was responsible for the Labour government's

gaining a majority at this year's Trade Union Congress for its proposal to bar new wage settlements until twelve months after previous agreements, trampling his own union's democracy underfoot in the process.

This has led to the situation where CPGB members are supposed to fight the social contract on the one hand, but find themselves in electoral alliances with the very people supporting this contract on the other hand. Even when the CPGB has been obliged to make mild criticisms of Jack Jones and company, it simultaneously gives them a left cover. The CPGB leadership is caught in this position because its only bargaining power is its industrial influence. This is, of course, precisely what the Labour and trade-union lefts are interested in, but they drive a hard bargain: they will associate with the CPGB in its projects to the extent that that latter shields them from the anger of the rank-and-file militants. This situation is profoundly demoralizing for many CPGB members.

The Ambiguous Discovery of Pluralism

Undoubtedly, the most contentious aspect of the new draft program is the commitment to pluralism of political parties after the formation of left and "socialist" governments. This change can be explained in part by a response to the British workers' democratic sentiments. In Britain, the workers' mistrust of Stalinism expresses itself in a very striking manner: tens of thousands of British workers will vote for members of the CPGB as trade unionists, but not as politicians. In a typically pragmatic way, these workers will explain: "Brother Smith is a good fighter against the bosses, so we vote for him as a shop steward; but if we voted him and his party into parliament, we don't know if we could ever get them out again." British workers have good reasons to be suspicious. The CPGB's twists and turns on foreign policy are only part of the story; British workers have also experienced Stalinism on the domestic front, with its devious use of front organizations, sudden changes in policy due to bureaucratic deals, maneuverist behavior in labor movement organizations and conferences, and, on occasion, ballot-rigging. In addition, tens of thousands of British workers have been through the CPGB and have seen dissidents treated as "rotten elements." These practices have the common denominator of manipulative politics, an integral component of Stalinist ideology.

The aim of the new draft is to try to bury this reputation once and for all. In particular, it wants to answer "yes" to the worker who asks, "could I get you out?" Thus, in an indirect manner the new draft reflects the pressure of working-class concern for democracy. But this is only part of the story. Without doubt the formulations in the new draft also reflect the pressure of bourgeois "public opinion" mediated through the CPGB's allies. The latter find it easier to associate with the CPGB if it has taken steps to make itself more "respectable." But there are limiting factors on the CPGB leadership's "conversion" to democracy. First, there is the fact that it has been directly implicated in the crimes of Stalinism. Older members of the leadership knew what was happening in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and they took a conscious decision to cover up for these crimes even when members of the CPGB were involved. This pattern was repeated in the post-war purges, etc. A recent incident illustrates the inflexibility that is imposed upon these CPGB leaders by their past. The first issue of the New Communist Party's journal contained a story saying that John Gollan had originally opposed the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. There was an immediate and angry response from the *Morning Star*—the story was a slander, it declared in outrage. The second reason for the inability of the CPGB leadership to make a break on this front is that there are substantial political and material reasons why it cannot sever the umbilical cord connecting it to the Soviet bureaucracy.

Politically, the CPGB cannot afford to be simply a British party. This would leave it without any political profile to distinguish it from left Social Democracy. To break completely from the

"family of communism" and from its claim to the heritage of the Russian, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions would mean its reduction to a small left Social Democratic sect. The CPGB leadership knows that there is no place on the British political spectrum for such a formation. Thus such events as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the upsurge of the Polish working class, the Kremlin's treatment of dissidents, etc., hit the CPGB doubly hard. They not only fuel British working-class mistrust of Stalinism, but they also undercut the only feasible basis—other than breaking with Stalinism, which is precluded—for the CPGB to have a distinctive political profile.

Material considerations are not unimportant. According to the 1975-76 *Morning Star* balance-sheet, no less than 14,500 out of its total average sale of 40,796 (i.e., more than one-third) were sold overseas—overwhelmingly to the Soviet bloc. The Morning Star Marketing Board, which sells a wide range of consumer goods, gets most of its supplies from these same countries, and a big majority of the *Star's* advertising revenue comes from this mail order operation. The CPGB's highly successful chain of bookstores rests essentially on the sale of Russian publications. It is extremely unlikely that the CPGB could maintain its daily paper and bookshops, not to speak of other concerns, without such links.

But this is a two-way process. At this stage the Moscow bureaucracy needs the CPGB. It requires an organization in Britain that can assemble MPs, trade-union leaders, religious figures, and, most important of all, progressive bourgeois personalities for its international projects (the "peace" conferences, world front organizations, etc.). Under present circumstances, this means the CPGB. This explains why the CPSU is sending a delegation to Britain to participate in CPGB public functions on the eve of the party's crucial congress. This can only bolster the CPGB against its pro-Moscow critics. Should there be a substantial split from the CPGB, it is possible that the Kremlin might play this off against the CPGB in order to dampen the latter's enthusiasm for making an occasional criticism of Moscow.

The Pressure From the Left

The relation of forces between the CPGB and the far-left groups started to change after the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet CP and the Hungarian revolution. A small number of the ten thousand or so people who left the CPGB in 1956 and 1957 joined the left groups. In the next few years the CPGB missed out on successive stages of the youth radicalization (anti-nuclear movement, Labour Party youth upsurge, anti-Vietnam war movement, and student struggles). In each case, it was less attractive to the radicalizing youth because of its compromised politics. Thus at each stage the relation of forces tended to evolve to the disadvantage of the CPGB. But it was during the anti-Vietnam war and university upsurges that the CPGB started to find itself outflanked on certain fronts. What was new in the situation was that the CPGB found that it had to respond to the initiatives of forces to its left. The most notable of these was the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC). After having denounced this as a "Trotskyite splitting operation," the CPGB was obliged to eat its own words and join the VSC in building demonstrations under slogans which it had previously castigated, such as "Victory to the NLF."

The period of the last year of the 1964-70 Labour government and the years of Heath's Tory government brought the main focus of struggle on to a terrain more favorable to the CPGB—the industrial front. Here, the great weight of the CPGB's industrial implantation could be used to give it the initiative. But because of the effects of the CPGB's alliances, the left groups were able to meaningfully point out how it was holding back the struggle. It was after the election of the 1974 Labour government that the CPGB's system of alliances made it most vulnerable to the criticisms of the left groups. Moreover, the left groups had recruited heavily in the student milieu in the earlier period, and by now these recruits were going into white-collar jobs, where there had been a big expansion of trade-unionism. Thus the left groups

developed small bases in the trade-union movement. In some sectors, such as teaching, the relation of forces between the CPGB and left groups has changed drastically.

Faced with this new situation, the CPGB leadership has changed its tactics in relation to the left groups. In the war years (and before) the CPGB characterized Trotskyists as "Hitler's agents," a clear call for state and lynch-law action against them. To this very day, there is a clause in the constitution of the CPGB which bars the recruitment of ex-members of "fascist and Trotskyist organizations" unless this is cleared by the party's Political Committee. After the far-left groups started to increase in size, the CPGB published an occasional article and pamphlet heavily caricaturing their politics, but the main tactic was that of trying to ignore these groups "because of their irrelevance."

But such tactics are no longer viable. In face of the growing impact of the state capitalist International Socialists (now the Socialist Workers Party), the CPGB produced a special pamphlet on the class nature of the Soviet Union. Because the party's old guard found this a difficult topic, they had to get a CPGB recruit from the International Socialists, Dave Purdy, to write it. This pamphlet had to draw heavily on the writings of Isaac Deutscher and Ernest Mandel to deal with the argument about state capitalism. Subsequently, the CPGB leadership sanctioned, and then encouraged, debates between the party's membership and the "ultraleft." Articles have appeared in the *Morning Star* examining, with a degree of objectivity, the positions of the left groups. An article on the IMG by Geoff Roberts ended with a call to IMG members to join the CPGB.

Although the new draft does not mention far-left groups, at the press conference to introduce it, General Secretary McLennan stated that although the CPGB had many differences with the ultralefts, it would work with them in united actions where there was political agreement. In March this year the CPGB established a study group on Trotskyism, which has produced a pamphlet attempting to answer the theory of permanent revolution. One of its members, Betty Reid, has publicly polemicized against other members of the CPGB for holding Stalin's position on Trotskyism.

But this new approach has evoked opposition, and is only applied in certain sectors. Generally, the differences on this question have coincided with other differences. Many of the contributors to the draft program discussion have made references to the "ultraleft," usually complaining that some errors of the leadership have played into the hands of the far-left groups. Others, including the "Revolutionary Democrats," have tried to score some points by making an amalgam between the "Stalinists" and "Trotskyists" because both characterize the draft program as revisionist. However, there have been some contributions in favor of united action with the left groups. CPGBer Bob Rowthorn of *New Left Review* (another former member of IS) criticized the CPGB's dismissive reply to the SWP's call for unity in action, while another contributor timidly called for greater unity at a local level "with Tories (sic) and the ultraleft."

The long period of virtual class stalemate, the increasing failure of the traditional organizations of the working class to even begin to offer a way forward for the exploited and oppressed, the dramatic increase in fascist activity, the rise of such movements as women's liberation, etc., have given the class struggle in Britain a complex and multi-faceted character. In many of the new forms of struggle the CPGB cannot use its industrial implantation to gain an advantageous position. For this reason the militants of the CPGB find themselves having to respond to united action initiatives taken by other forces, even in cases where there is an overlap with trade-union struggle, such as in the Working Women's Charter Campaign.

Faced with the option of responding to this situation with either a sectarian economist response or by trying to adapt itself, the CPGB leadership eventually chose the latter course. This has not been a thoroughgoing or consistent process, but it is clear that the CPGB wants to give itself a new image. From the CPGB leader-

ship's point of view it has been a wise choice and has paid off in terms of some limited recruitment and increased influence. The CPGB leadership has sought to project this new image by giving its militants a relatively free hand in a wide variety of campaigns and activities. Even this has had its limitations; during the summer, for instance, *Link*, the journal of the CPGB women's department, was "withdrawn"—a fact criticized in several contributions.

The combination of greater flexibility, a flowering of specialized party journals, open conferences on topics such as "class structure," the Marxist festivals and Communist universities, the creation of a multitude of collectives and subcommittees on such questions as health, science, literature, economics, women's oppression, gay oppression, working-class history, etc., has led the CPGB to make gains in the intellectual field. It is rather extraordinary that this discredited party can make such gains in this stage of its development. The weakness of the far left partially explains this, but other factors are more important. In addition to its greater flexibility, the CPGB has pursued a policy of open and continuous discussion in its journals. Indeed, this policy has been so marked that *International*, theoretical journal of the IMG, remarked "... one of the most lively journals of discussion and debate today does not belong to any of the groups of the far left, but the CPGB. *Marxism Today* has initiated a number of important discussions and debates." These successes are related to the growth of the CPGB in the student field in the past period. Steady work in student unions—ignored for a period by the left groups—and a downturn in student militancy has assisted this growth. But this growth has also been accompanied by extremely opportunist behavior, such as forming voting blocs with Tory students against far-left candidates.

These successes, which have not negated losses in other fields, are likely to bring very severe problems. The CPGB leadership will find it very difficult to reassert conformity, especially because of its emphasis on democracy. Precisely because of these successes and the methods by which they have been achieved, new opposition currents will most probably emerge. Indeed, this appears to have already started.

The group which broke away to form the New Communist Party was part of an opposition of some years standing. It first emerged as a national force at the CPGB's 1969 congress where, challeng-

ing the CPGB's mild criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it obtained 118 votes against 295 for the leadership. Later, at the 1973 congress, it obtained as much as 30% of the votes. It had also been relatively strong in the YCL, obtaining a number of votes roughly equal to those of members supporting the party leadership at conferences in the early 1970s. Various known as the "Frenchites" (from Sid French, the long-time Surrey district secretary) or "tankies" (because of their support for the Russian tanks invading Czechoslovakia), they have also taken up questions like the "neglect of industrial work" and "excessive concentration on electoral activity." But their distinguishing feature has been—and remains—uncritical support for the leadership of the Soviet Union.

In the first stages of the draft program discussion the "tankies" presented a united opposition to the CPGB leadership, intervening with virulent contribution pieces in *Comment* and sending anti-draft speakers to public meetings up and down the country. It would appear that some kind of split developed about what to do if the new draft was approved by the November CPGB congress. The May 1977 Executive Committee meeting of the CPGB received a report which claimed that party members were being asked whether "they would join a new party it would be necessary to form if the congress carried the draft." The CPGB EC, claiming that it was reluctant to initiate disciplinary proceedings in the middle of the pre-congress discussion, instructed the Political Committee to interview three members of the Surrey District Committee about the allegations. As it turned out, the formation of the NCP was announced before the interviews took place.

The launching of the new organization took place on July 17 and a weekly newspaper, the *New Worker*, was published in mid-September. The NCP has announced a founding conference for late October. In the period before the launching of their weekly, supporters of the NCP concentrated on selling the Russian Embassy publication, *Soviet Weekly*—an apt comment on their political orientation. Without inside information it is difficult to judge the motive for the hasty launching of the NCP. Two reasons have been offered: first, that the Surrey District Committee members were pushed into action by the coming investigation; and second, that the splitters sought to outmaneuver those remaining in the party by having an organization already in existence at the time of the November congress.

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Extremely bitter feelings have been provoked by the split. Both the CPGB and the NCP have gone to the bourgeois courts, the former to get back the Surrey district headquarters from the NCP, and the latter to obtain three years' back wages for three organizers. It is difficult to gauge the support for the new organization and the "tankies" still inside the party. The CPGB claims that it lost less than "2 percent of its 25,300 members" to the breakaway. On the other hand, the NCP claims that 65 branches were represented at its founding conference and that 300 supporters attended its first London public meeting.

A meeting held in early September under the title "Against the Split—Against the Draft" attracted some 400 participants. In addition the internal pro-Moscow opposition is reported to have strong support in Scotland (especially Glasgow) and the Midlands.

The internal opposition appears to have adopted the tactic of calling for the reference-back of the new draft at the November congress. One of its leading lights, Fergus Nicholson, stated in the October *Comment* that if this happened it "would be relevant to the election of the new Executive Committee." If the congress adopts the new draft, which seems the most likely variant, it is almost certain that more people would leave the CPGB. In view of the violent language with which the opposition's main leaders have denounced the draft, they would be in an extremely difficult position if it were passed.

Other Currents in the Discussion

Those supporting the new draft are extremely heterogeneous and nearly every contribution in support makes some criticism or suggestion for amendment. One of the most rightist currents in the discussion has come from within the central leadership and may be articulating the views of the majority. These people, Jack Woddis, head of the international department; Dave Cook, national organizer; and Irene Brennan, a member of the Political Committee and one of the CPGB's leading philosophers, go much further than the new draft on the question of the state, alliances, and strategy. In a series of articles in the *Morning Star*, they have systematized and deepened the concept that the existing state machine can be transformed by changing its personnel. In an article on the class alliances, Woddis attacked "the sectarian idea" that socialism in Britain could be achieved by the efforts of the working class alone. In the absence of a peasantry, Woddis located the class allies of the proletariat as being the small anti-monopoly employers. This is an extraordinary concept—these layers tend to support the right wing of the Tory Party and extreme-right formations.

Because of the CPGB's ban on tendencies and factions, people with similar views are unable to get together to elaborate alternative lines to those of the leadership. However, other oppositionist currents are emerging. One is around a clandestinely distributed pamphlet called, significantly enough, *Out of the Ghetto*. (The September 18 issue of *Socialist Challenge*, newspaper of the IMG, published extracts from this pamphlet.) Sometimes called the "Manchester School" (some of its leading lights come from that town), it has the support of a number of academics on the party's economic advisory committee. Basing themselves on the Italian "historic compromise," they advocate a line which amounts to support for a "socialist" incomes policy under capitalism. In the words of their representative Dave Purdy, their strategy is frankly "gradualist."

The "Revolutionary Democrats" are another current. The most coherent statement of their views has come from Jon Blomfield, Birmingham CPGB organizer. While supporting the new draft "as a step forward," he also said: "If we follow the present leadership and draft we're likely to stay in our existing sticky clay." He lists the differences with the leadership as revolving around three points: 1) the "leadership fails to grasp the real roots and strength of ruling class hegemony"; 2) "the frequent economism" of the party; and 3) the "limited role" of the CPGB and the fact

that the bulk of its work "is still done through other organizations." It would appear that Blomfield is striving for an activist, non-economist Social Democratic party of the pre-First World War variety. However utopian such a project may be, this current has received support in many contributions to the discussion. The "Revolutionary Democrats" project themselves as being strongly anti-Stalinist (several of them welcomed the NCP split) and, to a lesser extent, anti-Trotskyist (accusing the latter of dogmatism).

Even before the pre-congress discussion started, the columns of *Comment* saw the emergence of another current, this one calling for a campaign to gain affiliation to the Labour Party. Willie Thompson, editor of the Scottish CP's journal *Scottish Marxist*, even went so far as to say that the "only place for a mass Marxist party in Britain is within the Labour Party as part of its federal structure." As explained elsewhere, there are powerful objective reasons for such a trend emerging within the CPGB. This trend will express itself in disputes about election policy—arguing for a very reduced electoral intervention by the CPGB.

Probably the most positive views to emerge in the discussion have been around questions of women's liberation. Contributions from individual members and CPGB women's groups have attacked the draft's inadequacies in its analysis of social questions, such as its failure to analyze the family. This has led them to make explicit and implicit criticisms of the CPGB's sectarianism and workerism. There seems little doubt that their views at least partly reflect the effects of working in united action organizations.

A number of contributions have mentioned the need for organs of popular or workers power. Paul Fauvet of the CPGB's international department accused the draft of dishonesty in not spelling out the need for new organs of state power in the revolutionary process. It would appear that both of these latter trends are very influenced by the "Revolutionary Democratic" current. In addition, supporters of the "Manchester School" have expressed solidarity with contributions from the "Revolutionary Democrats."

Toward the end of the discussion various questions have been raised concerning inner-party democracy. A lively parallel discussion has taken place in *Comment* on this question. Some contributors have called for a new inner-party democracy commission, others for a thorough overhaul of congress procedures, and yet others complained about the way the question of the breakaway was handled. In many of these contributions there has been a hint of a taboo subject—the right of tendency. But one contribution from Mike Power, secretary of a London CPGB branch, made a proposal that concretizes one of the aspects of the right of tendency when he called for the bringing together of "delegates representing party organizations with amendments and resolutions . . . which have common points of substance" to work out the way their positions should be presented to the congress.

The November congress of the CPGB will solve none of the problems facing the members of that organization. Indeed, because of the Stalinist traditions of that party (particularly the ban on groupings), these questions can't be posed in a coherent manner. For this reason the discussion will continue in one form or another. The relevance of the Trotskyist program, real continuator of the tradition of the Russian revolution, to these discussions is very evident. Already, well over a thousand people attended an official debate between the IMG and the CPGB (see *Socialist Challenge*, September 15). On another front, individual militants from the CPGB have supported Socialist Unity candidates in recent elections because they felt that this was an effective way of challenging the government-led offensive against workers' rights and standards.

Members of the IMG are very confident that increasing numbers of socialists, now trapped in the CPGB, will find their way to revolutionary Marxism by engaging in fraternal debate and joint activity with supporters of the Fourth International.

October 25, 1977

Healy's Political Pact With Qaddafi

By Steve Wattenmaker

Libyan strongman Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi addressed a large rally September 1 in Tripoli. The occasion was the eighth anniversary of the 1969 coup that brought Qaddafi and a junta of young army officers to power.

Qaddafi's speech, in itself, was nothing out of the ordinary. It extolled Libya's economic development, called for Arab unity, and denounced imperialism in the standard rhetoric of petty-bourgeois nationalist leaders.

What was sensational was the treatment given the oration by the *News Line*, daily newspaper of Gerry Healy's Workers Revolutionary Party in Britain.

The September 14 issue devoted two pages to reprinting excerpts from Qaddafi's speech. The feature was headlined "GADDAFI SPEAKS"; it was accompanied by a montage of photographs taken at the anniversary celebration.

"The situation which exists on our soil is different from any other situation existing in the world today," *News Line* quoted the colonel as saying.

"Our Libyan Arab people on this date, the date of the eighth anniversary of the upsurge of the great revolution, stand with power in their hands, with wealth in their hands, with weapons in their hands."

Qaddafi modestly added: "This has not been achieved by any other people on the surface of the earth; but it has been achieved in every sense of the word by the Libyan Arab people, out of all the peoples of the world."

News Line printed the article without comment.

Regrettably, this was not the only instance of the thoughts of Colonel Qaddafi turning up in the Healyite press. For the past year and a half *News Line* has carried on a full-blown publicity campaign for the Libyan regime.

The unusual effort began a few days after Healy launched *News Line* in May 1976. The paper's forerunner, *Workers Press*, had folded three months earlier for lack of funds.

"MAY DAY IN LIBYA"—a two-page feature in the May 7, 1976, issue—first introduced *News Line* readers to Qaddafi. Photographs of him riding a white stallion and being mobbed by admiring throngs filled one of the pages.

The on-the-scene report confined itself to simply describing the day's events. Whatever the article lacked in political content,



QADDAFI: Messenger of Allah.

however, it made up for in unrestrained enthusiasm.

TRIPOLI—May 1 in Sidi Sa'ah, a country area on the way to the desert, 30 miles southeast of the capital of the Libyan Arab Republic.

Here it's not called May Day but the Spring Festival. Everywhere great lines of Peugeots, VWs, and Datsun and Toyota pick-up trucks. . . .

Today the great release of revolutionary energy that began on September 1, 1969, will roar on non-stop till 8:30 in the evening; slogans, rhythmic, firm hand-clapping, the high pitched yodel that sounds like a battle cry. . . .

As six o'clock approaches the crowd, which had swayed, sat and stood for four hours at least, pressed closer to the stand; plastic jugs of water were passed around. Then President Qaddafi arrived to an enormous welcome.

Standing in an open Range Rover (the first British car we'd seen in a week) he was greeted by one great cry . . . "Fateh . . . Fateh . . . Fateh . . . Fateh" . . . Revolution.

Everyone stretches out their hands. Qaddafi is 34; the son of [a] Bedouin family. On September 1, 1969, his father, Abumeniar, heard the news of

the overthrow of the monarchy on a transistor in his tent in the desert and recognized his son's voice. . . .

The horsemen surge forward, some standing on their saddles with guns firing into the air, some with the red, white and black Libyan flag, others with pictures of Qaddafi and Nasser. . . .

Finally, a white horse is brought to the platform steps. Qaddafi rides out to the open ground, the clenched fist salute from the saddle. . . . Qaddafi rides a brisk trot along the crowd, striking hands, touching fingers. A short pause and then he goes past at a wild gallop coat flying, to huge cheers. Think of Princess Anne and laugh. . . .

A last huge round of slogans and Qaddafi returns to the platform in a good sweat. . . .

As he steps to the microphone a truly tremendous cry from all around . . . Al Fateh . . . Al Fateh . . . Al Fateh . . . the crowd, the platform, the horsemen.

A short speech, not demagogic or falsely emphatic, punctuated by chants, cheers and claps. A last short sentence and straight into the waiting Range Rover. The mercurial colonel is off again.

In their euphoria, Healy's reporters even managed to explain away the absence of women at the festivities.

"Remember too, that the overwhelming majority here were men and boys. Very few women attend these meetings yet, but no-one can doubt for a second where their allegiance lies," *News Line* informed its readers.

Who Is Qaddafi?

The 1969 coup led by Qaddafi and his fellow officers overthrew the decaying, feudal regime of King Idris, one of the Arab world's most slavishly pro-imperialist rulers.

The young officers began immediately to carry out a number of nationalist reforms, taking as their model the "Arab socialism" of Egypt's Nasser. But even their first modest steps, such as doubling the minimum wage and buying controlling interest in foreign-owned banks, provoked the wrath of imperialism.

British and American military bases in Libya presented an especially grave threat and Qaddafi ordered them closed. The junta also moved up its timetable for partially nationalizing the country's vast oil wealth.

Faced both with economic sabotage by foreign oil companies and growing pressure by the Libyan masses, the government began buying 51 percent of the oil giants' Libyan subsidiaries. Three Ameri-

can and several European subsidiaries were fully nationalized—with compensation—in 1974 after violating the joint ownership agreements. Others continued to operate under partial Libyan control.

The subsequent increase in state revenues allowed Libya to launch development programs and begin small-scale industrialization. This in turn lifted the standard of living for the Libyan masses.

Qaddafi has also supported the Palestinians, maintaining close ties with the so-called rejection-front wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Neither Qaddafi's opposition to Zionism nor the gains registered by the Libyan masses since 1969, however, alter the character of Libya as a capitalist state—a fact of little concern to *News Line*.

The purchase of controlling interest in foreign banks, insurance companies, and oil producers propelled Libya into an economy based on "joint ownership."

"Large-scale ownership which may be a means for exploitation or which affects the cohesion of the society will be transformed into joint ownership," the regime explained in an advertisement in the July-August 1977 issue of *Africa Report* magazine.

Each participant will receive profits according to his capital or efforts. On the same basis the losses shall be shared. In this way the problem which exists in both the [government] monopolist and capitalist systems is solved. . . .

Therefore the participation of the people in their different groups and classes in the political, administrative and economic organizations, is essential for establishing the ideal economic system.

How Qaddafi is putting the joint ownership theory into practice was reported in the June 1977 issue of the Libyan magazine *Arab Dawn*.

Among the companies entering into partnership with the Qaddafi regime were the giant Italian Montedison industrial group and West Germany's Krupp and Kilgenstein corporations. Plans were also announced for a joint shipbuilding venture with Turkey and electrification projects with companies in Malta and Great Britain.

One of the largest "joint ownership" ventures was the Libyan government's decision to purchase 9.6 percent of FIAT for more than \$400 million. A December 1976 meeting between FIAT head Giovanni Agnelli and Qaddafi in Moscow sealed the bargain. Libya received two seats on FIAT's board of directors.

These measures evidently conform to Qaddafi's Third Universal Theory for achieving the kind of real democracy that hasn't been seen, he says, since the days of Athens.

Codified in his *Green Book* published in 1977, Qaddafi's philosophy condemns the "discredited" systems of communism and

capitalism, calling for the creation of "people's committees at every level which decide on their own affairs. . . ."

A "General People's Congress" held last March rubber-stamped Qaddafi's propos-



News Line

HEALY: Messenger of Qaddafi Thought.

als after the colonel, with "the aid of a blackboard . . . lectured his audience on their new responsibilities."

Libya was henceforth to be called the Socialist Popular Libyan Arab Jamahiriya [roughly "people's state"]; the teachings of the Koran were to guide society; and "people's committees" were to be the basis of government.

Unstated but well understood, however, was that Qaddafi and his fellow officers were to retain real power.

In practice, Qaddafi's version of "people's power" serves to mask the political repression of Libya's working class and peasantry. Trade unions are completely integrated into the state. Strikes are forbidden. Any attempts at independent working-class organization are suppressed.

As for political parties, they are ruled out. Attempting to form a party is one of the highest forms of treason in Libya.

"All party forms and systems reveal the . . . encroachment on the right of the masses to rule themselves by themselves. . . ." Or as Qaddafi puts it more simply in his *Green Book*: "Representation is falsification."

As proof of the firmness of his views, in January 1976 Qaddafi ordered the police to shoot down students at Libya's Benghazi University who were protesting the government's undemocratic decision to overturn the results of a student union election. At least eight students were killed and thirty wounded.

In early 1977 Qaddafi also personally intervened in the trial of seventeen persons accused of being "Marxists, Trotskyists, and members of the Islamic Liberation

Party." The defendants at first won acquittal, but Qaddafi ordered them retried. When the second tribunal handed down sentences Qaddafi thought too lenient, he ordered penalties of life imprisonment and death, according to a report by Amnesty International.

Last April the human rights organization reported that twenty-two army officers and five civilians had been executed. Two of those hanged were reportedly students arrested after the Benghazi University protests.

With WRP delegations frequently traveling to Tripoli, Healy cannot claim lack of knowledge of the repression directed against Libya's students and working class.

Yet the February 26, 1977, *News Line* complained that "Qaddafi's writings and his drive toward people's democracy hardly received the attention [in Britain] they deserve.

"The [*Green Book*] is an uncompromising rejection of Western bourgeois parliamentary democracy in favour of 'the authority of the people.'"

Despite passing disclaimers that the WRP has "political differences" with Qaddafi, the *News Line* has not even hinted at what those differences might be—although it has published more than twenty articles on Libya since 1976.

If any doubts remained that the WRP had decided to join Qaddafi's clique, they were resolved during the four-day border clash between Egypt and Libya last July. The WRP Central Committee utilized the incident to issue a statement going all out for Qaddafi:

Unlike Sadat, the Colonel enjoys universal support amongst the Libyan workers and peasants and commands considerable support amongst Arabs abroad, and the oppressed Africans fighting arms in hand against imperialism. . . .

The overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi would be a major setback for Palestine and for Africa and a victory for Zionist-imperialist conspiracy. . . .

The Workers Revolutionary Party calls on the Egyptian workers and students to put an end to the imperialist gangsterism of Sadat and to rally to the defence of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Colonel Gaddafi.

Abandoning any pretense of objectivity or regard for fact, *News Line* simply reprinted accounts of the fighting sent out by the Tripoli news service and interviewed Qaddafi's ambassador to Britain. A *News Line* reporter toured the battlefield after the fighting had ended.

While *News Line* beat the war drums for Qaddafi, WRP Central Committee members Michael Banda and Vanessa Redgrave picketed the Egyptian embassy in London to denounce Sadat.

In the heat of the moment even dictator Idi Amin got a favorable mention in the Healyite press. The same "Zionist-imperialist conspiracy" that threatened

Libya, the WRP explained in its Central Committee statement, was also behind the "unprecedented campaign to discredit General Amin in Uganda."

In Holy Wedlock

The culmination of the love affair was a political marriage between Qaddafi and the British Healyites. A "joint communiqué" dated August 8 announced the formation of an "Anti-Imperialist Alliance" between Libya and the Workers Revolutionary Party.

As loyal purveyors of Qaddafi Thought, the August 10 *News Line* wrote:

We are confident that our readers will support the principles contained in this important revolutionary document which we are proud to publish and which constitutes a major step forward in the united struggles of the colonial peoples and metropolitan working class. . . .

The communiqué also said, according to *News Line*:

[The communiqué] pledges both parties to a common struggle against the conspiracy of US imperialism and elements within the Arab ruling class who want to weaken the Arab revolution, undermine the struggle for Palestinian self-determination and facilitate the war preparations of Zionism and imperialism. . . .

This represents a united front of the forces of the Libyan revolution and the Workers Revolutionary Party, as a section of the International Committee of the Fourth International, to defend the common interests of the Libyan and Arab peoples and the British working class.

The radical press in Britain quite rightly has excoriated the WRP's spectacular opportunism. Qaddafi as the messenger of Allah and Healy as the messenger of Qaddafi is a sight of some novelty, especially to those unaware of Healy's previous sectarian exploits.

In trying to reply to the criticism, the Healyites, as was to be expected, only sank deeper into the quicksand.

Answering an article in *Socialist Press*, a newspaper reflecting the views of a former leader of the WRP, Alan Thornett, *News Line* attempted to defend its sudden swerve into the camp of the Libyan dictator.

The August 31, 1977, *Socialist Press* article was particularly embarrassing to the WRP because it recalled what the Healyite paper *Newsletter* wrote about Qaddafi in 1969:

The first pronouncement of the "revolutionary council" broadcast over Radio Tripoli on September 1, spoke on the one hand of "building a revolutionary Libya, a socialist Libya," and of the efforts of the "third world" to end social and economic under-development, and on the other hand promised to defend and maintain "the moral values of the Koran."

This is plainly the demagoguery of a Bonapartist group attempting to balance between different political forces. . . .

This kind of future [the kind promised by Qaddafi] can only be achieved by a real socialist revolution, led not by nationalist army officers,

but by a Marxist party based on the workers and peasants. (*Newsletter*, Vol. 13, No. 685, Sept. 16, 1969)

By calling attention to their earlier position, said the Healyites, Thornett simply betrays a "Talmudic approach to politics—that political analysis is fixed like Holy Writ for ever and a day."

However, *News Line* stopped short of answering the obvious question: what changed since 1969—the nature of the Libyan regime or Healy's principles?

Perhaps still more revealing was *News Line's* attempt to answer the British Trotskyist weekly *Socialist Challenge*.

In its July 28 edition, *Socialist Challenge* explained that the border fighting was a clash between two bourgeois nationalist regimes, each of whom used the brief conflict to shore up political support at home.

News Line responded August 4: "This philistine approach ignores the basic fact that such conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa are deliberately stirred up by United States imperialism.

"And the favourite Arab leader of the United States leaders today is Anwar Sadat of Egypt."

How about yesterday and tomorrow? The State Department no doubt would prefer a less mettlesome animal, but Qaddafi is still part of their neocolonial stable along with Sadat.

Going a step further, *News Line* struck what it thought was an especially telling blow against *Socialist Challenge*.

"Arguments about Gaddafi's treatment of internal oppositionists are presented as reasons for not supporting the Libyan Jamahiriya against the Egyptian bourgeoisie—and this from a tendency which defended Cuban leader Fidel Castro when he ordered the type of Trotsky's 'Revolution Betrayed' to be smashed up."

Leaving aside the slander—so typical of the Healyites—that supporters of *Socialist Challenge* defended the smashing of type anywhere under any circumstances, *News Line* is to be congratulated for bringing up the case of Cuba. It is to be hoped that having broken their long silence, they will speak further on this subject.

Healy split from the Fourth International in 1963 on the basis of his view that Cuba remained a capitalist state—a position he still holds today. But leaving that crucial question aside, aren't Castro's credentials in opposing imperialism at least as good as those of Qaddafi? Why hasn't the Castro leadership been accorded at least a portion of the delirious praise allotted to the Libyan colonel?

The solution to the enigma, of course, lies in Healy's abandonment of Trotskyism, for which he has substituted his own upside down view of the world. Those who can't learn to distinguish between toads and geese, an old saying goes, are apt to return from the hunt with mud on their face and a serious case of warts.

To which Healy might be expected to rejoin: "Why look a gift horse in the mouth?" □

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AROUND THE WORLD



British Troops Land in Bermuda

British troops have been sent to Bermuda to help put down protests that followed the execution of two Blacks convicted of political murders.

Erskine Burrows and Larry W. Tacklyn were hanged on December 2, the first executions in Bermuda in more than thirty years. Demonstrations against capital punishment the week before failed to prevent the executions.

A petition against capital punishment was submitted to the government bearing the signatures of 13,128 persons—nearly one-quarter of the population of the island.

Following the hangings, protests by Black youths were attacked by riot police, and about forty persons were arrested. Fires occurred at several resort hotels. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed.

On December 3 the government of Prime Minister David Gibbons asked for British help in quelling the protests in the majority-Black island. The 260 British soldiers arrived in battle gear the next day.

Perish the Thought

The National Association of Manufacturers, the major employers group in the United States, announced December 1 the formation of a national organization intended to help keep unions out of factories, stores, and offices.

The new organization is to be called the Council on Union-Free Environment.

According to NAM President Heath Larry, it "is not a union-busting organization, despite what anyone may say about us."

Cops Prepare for Next 'Blackout'

A committee made up largely of police, wardens, and prosecutors has come up with a solution to the crisis caused by New York City's blackout last summer. They think New York needs an updated emergency plan for carrying out mass arrests.

The commissioners, appointed by New York Governor Hugh Carey, made some suggestions about how to streamline the arrest and trial procedure. Most of their recommendations would simply railroad the prisoner through to sentencing faster. They propose to use the cop's arrest report as an official court complaint, for example, and to accept photographs of prisoners with arresting officers at the time of booking as a means of identification.

More than 3,000 persons, overwhelm-

ingly Black and Latino, were arrested for "looting" at the time of the blackout last July. They were held in crowded cells during a record heat wave and often denied the right to contact their families or get legal advice. (See *Intercontinental Press*, July 25, 1977, p. 844.) Even Carey's commissioners had to admit that the majority of those arrested had to wait three days or more in "overcrowded" and "inhumane" conditions.

A study of the sentences meted out to blackout prisoners has shown that they received considerably more severe punishments than those convicted of non-blackout-related burglaries. The first wave of sentences after the blackout were particularly harsh.

Soares to Get Loan From Faisal

Saudi Arabia has agreed to lend Portugal \$250 million on a long-term basis, according to a November 4 report in the Tokyo Mainichi Daily News.

The bargain was struck at a meeting in Paris on November 1 between Portuguese Prime Minister Mário Soares and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal.

In return for a promise of aid, Riyadh reportedly sought assurances from Soares that there would be no political upheaval in Portugal while he remained in power and the Portugal would remain in NATO.

Executions in Haiti

More than 200 political prisoners were executed in Haiti's Fort Dimanche prison in 1971-72, according to accounts by former prisoners, details of which were published in the *Manchester Guardian* on November 20.

Among those shot was a group of nineteen construction workers who had been arrested after complaining about not being paid. Also executed was a radio journalist, Marie-Thérèse Feval, whose husband, sister, and father were all murdered by the Duvalier regime.

The former prisoners, a group of eleven recently expelled from Haiti, also gave details of 176 other prisoners who have died in Fort Dimanche, mostly within the past two years. Most died of tuberculosis as a result of the conditions of detention. Others fell victim to malaria, typhoid, insanity, or starvation.

In September it was announced that 104

prisoners would be granted a presidential amnesty to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Duvalier family's rule. However, the group of expelled prisoners said that a number of political prisoners had not been freed in September, and that others had later been rearrested and returned to jail.

Demand Freedom for Shcharansky

A letter signed by thirty Leningrad Jews demanding an end to the "illegal interrogations" connected with the upcoming trial of Jewish dissident Anatoly Shcharansky was recently sent to the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, according to a report in the November 17 issue of *Le Monde*.

The letter also demanded that Shcharansky be freed and allowed to emigrate.

Shcharansky, a member of the Moscow Helsinki monitoring group, was arrested in March and accused of collaborating with the CIA. If convicted, he could be sentenced to death.

Strikes in East Germany Over High Price of Coffee

Strikes and protests broke out in East Berlin at the beginning of October against a coffee price increase, according to the West Berlin daily *Tagesspiegel*.

The paper, quoted in the November 15 issue of *Le Monde*, said that the protests had begun in a factory, and that fifty persons had been arrested, including all the organizers of the protests.

Turkish Film-makers Score Censorship

About 400 members of the Turkish film industry marched from Istanbul to Ankara on November 5-7 to protest a new censorship decree and demand better working conditions.

"We have taken to the streets to be able to make films expressing your problems," stated one of the marchers, Kadir Inanair, one of the country's most popular actors.

Only a dozen films have made it past the censors this year, out of fifty-two granted permission to begin filming.

No Experience Necessary

Australia's major newspapers carried advertisements on November 12 inviting

job-hunters to test their abilities in a rapidly growing field—spying.

The advertisement offered a starting salary of \$220 a week and said that applicants should be university-educated, stable, discreet, mature, and objective.

"Officers can expect to undertake duties directly related to the Australian Security Intelligence Organization's statutory responsibilities in regard to espionage, sabotage, and subversion including terrorism," the advertisement said.

It added that there were opportunities for promotion within the organization.

Peking Denies Executions

Chang Hsians-shan, director of China's Central Broadcasting Administration, said on November 3 that recent reports of wholesale executions in China were groundless. Chang's statements were reported in the November 4 issue of the *Mainichi Daily News*, published in Tokyo.

A recent article by the Peking correspondent of the London *Sunday Telegraph* said that thousands of persons accused of "counterrevolutionary activities" and of association with the "gang of four" had been shot in several Chinese provinces.

Soviet Advisers Expelled From Somalia

The Somalian military junta headed by President Mohammed Siad Barre on November 13 ordered all Soviet advisers to leave the country and broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.

An announcement over the government-controlled radio by the Somali information minister indirectly charged Moscow and Havana with aiding the rival military junta in neighboring Ethiopia.

Within a week, all Cuban diplomatic personnel and an estimated several thousand Soviet advisers had left Somalia.

The regime of Siad Barre, which claims that it is "socialist," had maintained especially close ties with Moscow for a number of years, receiving substantial military aid from the Kremlin. In 1974 it became the first Black regime in Africa to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow.

However, since the escalation of fighting in Ethiopia's Ogaden desert region earlier this year, in which Somali nationalist forces backed by the Somalian junta are fighting for the Ogaden's separation from Ethiopia and incorporation into Somalia, the relations between Moscow and Siad Barre have cooled considerably. The Soviet bureaucrats sharply reduced their aid to Siad Barre and publicly declared their support for continued Ethiopian occupation of the Ogaden.

Referring to the conflict in the Ogaden, the Soviet press agency TASS responded to the expulsions November 15 by attacking what it called the "chauvinist, expansionist moods" of the Siad Barre regime.

The day after the expulsion order, the U.S. State Department applauded the move, but indicated that it would not yet supply arms to the Siad Barre regime.

The editors of the *New York Times* suggested November 18 that Washington use the offer of American assistance to induce some concessions from the Somalian junta, most particularly in relation to its aid to the Somali forces in the Ogaden.

"The time may be right, therefore," they said, "for an American diplomatic approach to persuade Somalia to pull back from its dangerous adventure in exchange for defensive arms and needed development assistance."

London Strikers Battle Cops

Police clashed violently with thousands of strike pickets outside the Grunwick film-processing plant on November 7.

Scores of strikers and a number of cops were injured, according to a report in the November 8 issue of the *London Times*. Police arrested 113 persons.

The most serious clashes occurred when a police cordon blocking off both sides of the main entrance to the plant denied access to a group of pickets.

After the picketing, about three thousand persons marched to the nearby police station to protest the cops' brutality. Condemnation of the police methods was

widespread. Martin Flannery, a Labour member of parliament, said: "The violence was provoked by the show of force, by the use of mounted police, and by their hostile attitude generally to the pickets."

The strike at Grunwick began in August 1976 when more than 200 workers, many of them Indian women, walked off the job to press demands for higher wages, better working conditions, and recognition of their union, the Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staffs.

Moroccan Prisoners Begin Hunger Strike

More than 100 political prisoners in Morocco began an unlimited hunger strike on November 8 to protest conditions in the prisons of Kenitra and Casablanca, according to a report in the November 24 issue of *Le Monde*.

The prisoners are demanding an end to torture, being stripped naked, isolation without food, solitary confinement, harassment, and pressure on their relatives.

Freon Banned in Sweden

A decree signed recently by the Swedish government bans the use of freon as an ingredient in aerosol sprays beginning January 1, 1979, because of its harmful effects on the atmospheric ozone layer.

Immigrants in Toronto Protest Racist Attacks



Darrell Furlotte/Socialist Voice

Two thousand persons, mostly East Indians, took part in march and rally in Toronto November 6 to protest government inaction on physical attacks against immigrants. Speakers at rally charged that police and Human Rights Commission had done little to protect immigrants despite 1,710 complaints about racist attacks and discrimination in the last year.

Selections From the Left

DAILY WORLD

Newspaper of the Communist Party
U.S.A. Published in New York.

Santiago Carrillo, general secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, began a visit to the United States November 15 by crossing the picket lines of striking workers at Yale University.

Carrillo told reporters he felt "linked with the labor movement here in the United States and with this particular strike at Yale," but that "the American labor movement has done nothing to promote democracy in Spain."

His interpreter further explained that Carrillo "is sure the strikers would not deny the right of the Spanish Communist leader to speak." Carrillo had been invited by the university to address students on November 15 and to speak as a "Chubb Fellow" on November 16.

Vincent Sirabella, a leader of the Yale workers' union, said the Spanish CP leader's explanations were "a weak excuse for the most heinous act that a supposed defender of labor could commit." Sirabella noted the "irony of choosing to lie in bed with the capitalist host."

The November 19 issue of the *Daily World* carried the text of a statement by American CP leaders Henry Winston and Gus Hall protesting Carrillo's scabbing:

"Carrillo manifested noninterest in the fact that the striking maintenance and service workers of the Yale University Corporation are among the most exploited and underpaid workers, and a large percentage are of the Black and Spanish-speaking community of workers who contend against added handicaps of racial and national discrimination.

"Carrillo is reported to have also maintained that he had a contractual obligation to appear at Yale at the appointed time, as his rationale for breaking through the lines of striking workers. Carrillo has chosen to adhere to his capitalist business contract and violate the lifetime duty and obligation of loyal working people (not to speak of Communist leaders) to uphold inviolate their contract with their working brothers and sisters. . . .

"Thanks to the initiative and persistence of the Soviet Union in seeking peace, the Helsinki Conference was successful in adopting conventions which further strengthened the pressures of public opinion to remove the barriers to travel.

"We would expect that Carrillo would appreciate the fact that his visit was made possible by a background of struggles for democratic rights in which the

Communists and important sectors of labor were in the forefront."

The American Stalinists took the opportunity of Carrillo's actions to score some points in the factional tug-of-war between the Kremlin and its unconditional supporters (among whom the CPUSA stands in the front rank), and such "Eurocommunists" as the Spanish CP leader: "His act of strikebreaking at Yale cannot be divorced from his notorious revisionism in respect to the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism.

"It is the logical crossing over the line from the defamation of Soviet socialism and abuse of the working class in state power in the Soviet Union and socialist states, to breaking the picket chain of unionists battling for bread."



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VANGUARD

Official monthly organ of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. Published in Eritrea, reprinted in the United States.

The August issue takes up the claims of the Ethiopian junta of Mengistu Haile Mariam that it is "socialist."

"Ever since coming to power, *Vanguard* states, "the Dergue [the junta] has been striving to disguise itself in the eyes of the Ethiopian and the world's peoples. While it is in reality against progress, democracy, peace and socialism, it tries to pose as the champion of progress, democracy, peace and socialism. In any case, far from being the peculiar character of the Dergue, this is a common feature of all fascists."

It goes on to point out that the military officers "usurped state power by riding high on the spontaneous revolt of the oppressed Ethiopian masses and the mutinous rumblings of the Ethiopian aggressor army badly mauled and demoralized by the powerful blows of the Eritrean revolution and taking advantage of the absence of a vanguard party capable of organizing and leading the Ethiopian people's mass struggles to victory. . . .

"To prolong its rule, the Dergue strives to arouse and mobilize the unconscious and unorganized Ethiopian masses for its war of aggression by issuing contradictory declarations and chauvinist slogans, such as 'Ethiopia First,' 'Revolutionary motherland or death,' 'Ethiopian socialism,' etc. . . . Similarly, the fascist Dergue strives to consolidate its power by putting factories and excess urban houses under its control (not under the control of workers!) and misrepresenting socialism as the nationalization of property (irrespective of whose interests the nationaliza-

tion serves). It tried to mobilize the masses into the so-called 'peasant volunteers' for its war of aggression. When the 'peasant volunteers' campaign was smashed to shreds, the Dergue set out to establish a new army under the name of the 'people's militia.' In the process, it has been murdering and jailing thousands of Ethiopian democrats, workers and students simply because they expressed opposition; it has converted all Ethiopian towns harboring anti-fascist movements into big concentration camps. Nevertheless, it has not been able to win over the Eritrean revolution and the Ethiopian democrats fighting it; and it shall not win."



"Breton People," magazine of the Democratic Union of Brittany, published monthly in Brest.

Running on the Union of the Left slate, the Democratic Union of Brittany won a number of seats of city and town councils in the French municipal elections last March. Other groups representing the smaller nationalities in the French state refused to join the popular-frontist alliance, arguing that the bloc and its component parties had not broken with French chauvinism. In its November issue, *Le Peuple Breton* comments on the breakup of the Union of the Left:

Two events have marked these last weeks—the dramatic increase in the disunity of the left and the resumption of terrorist actions in Brittany.

Let's take up the left first. We thought that a common program had been arrived at in 1972. We did not sign it (this should be noted, because some people have not hesitated to write the contrary), but we thought it represented an opportunity for Brittany and the Breton workers.

In view of the sharpening quarrel between the Communist and Socialist parties, people are soon going to have to face the facts. There was no common program for these two parties. We do not think that the SP has "made a right turn." It remains the same as it was before, as is the CP. As these parties came close to having a chance to take power, this reality has been revealed to the masses of workers. The masses are downcast, disgusted, and furious as they see the threat emerging of another electoral victory by the right in March 1978!

For us in the Democratic Union of Brittany, since we based our strategy on the perspective of a victory by the Union of the Left, the breakup of this alliance is a defeat and a disillusionment, and we must have the courage to say so.

The right may be crowing too soon. But if Mitterrand [the SP leader] wins . . . it is not the Common Program that will win but the Social Democratic program of the SP.

We are not taking the side of the CP. Their

demagogic upping of the ante is undermining the credibility . . . of the left's perspective. But if the CP's proposals were applied, this would bring deep and irreversible changes in French society. A process would be initiated in which we could hope that the major administrative and cultural reforms we call for would also be achieved.

But in the context of the disunity of the left and with the semifascist pressure of Chirac and Sanguinetti's gangs, an SP victory would bring, at most, a government that would manage the crisis in the style of Schmidt or Soares. And the fact that some SP elected representatives have more advanced views on regional autonomy than their CP colleagues does not change this.

First of all, for every Josselin, Philipponneau, or Le Penec (who scarcely count for anything in the SP), there are plenty of Mauroys, Defferres, and Chandernagors, who are fervent supporters of Jacobinism [this term is used by autonomists to mean bourgeois centralism]. Secondly, the SP's aim of governing by itself is suicidal. Without solid unity of all the workers, the essential changes will be impossible! Facing the crisis and its isolation, the SP will have other things on its mind than regional autonomy. We know how the song goes already.

So, what should we do? Resort to terrorism? In fact, there is a lot of evidence that some Bretons hope this road offers a way out of the impasse in which their country finds itself! We repeat here, that this idea is totally wrong. It is a political error because the Breton people are not in favor of bombings.

Those who engage in loose talk about wars of liberation should consider well what this means in terms of funerals, suffering, torture, and martyrs. Because of our deep love for the Breton people, on whose behalf our organization was created, we cannot accept this absurd policy of "the worse, the better," before we have exhausted all the possibilities for legal and democratic work.

And there is work to do! There is work in the neighborhoods, the factories, the schools, and in the cities and towns. In view of the crisis of the left, in view of the severe disillusionment of the workers, we must work all the harder to achieve unity among Bretons around the Democratic Union of Brittany. This is the best answer to the quarrels of the Paris party bosses. This is the best answer to the irresponsible bombers.

Perspectiva Mundial

"World Outlook," a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in New York.

On October 26, nearly four years after the Dominican Communist Party filed a petition requesting legal status, Joaquín Balaguer, president of the Dominican Republic, sent a bill to the senate providing for the party's legalization.

Writing in the December 5 issue, B. Díaz Camilo reports on the reaction in bourgeois political milieus as well as among organizations in the workers movement to this event:

Various organizations and prominent individuals expressed themselves in favor [of legalizing the CP], demanding that anticommunist laws 6, 70, and 71 be abrogated, and that legalization be

extended to all groups on the left.

Among those persons was the former president of the republic, Professor Juan Bosch. "We think that all political parties in the country should be legalized," Bosch declared. "If parties on the right are legalized . . . why not those on the left?"

Spokesmen for other bourgeois formations, including the Dominican Revolutionary Party and the Social Christian Revolutionary Party, echoed the position that legalization should now be extended to all other groups on the left.

The one dissenting voice in this chorus, according to Díaz Camilo, was that of the chairman of the Movement for National Salvation, a right-wing splitoff from the ruling Reformist Party, who said: "Joaquín Balaguer is the champion of socialism, and . . . the communists are in the process of seizing power."

The CP itself issued a statement declaring that the legalization was "a great step forward for the extension of civic freedoms in the country."

A few organizations on the left recognized that legalization of the CP would open the way for public activity on the part of other groups, Díaz Camilo reports.

However, the majority of left organizations took a sectarian position:

. . . Proletarian Banner, a Maoist organization, took out an ad in the October 29 issue of the daily *La Noticia* condemning legalization of the CP:

"The legalization of the Dominican 'C'P, besides being discriminatory and antidemocratic . . . tends to cripple and suppress political initiative on the part of genuine communists, patriots, and democrats. . . ."

The recently formed Patriotic Union, which describes itself as "independent and anti-imperialist," considered that "this bill represents a thank-you from the Dominican government to the CP for the political endorsement given by this small grouping to the current ruling team, and especially to its demagogic agrarian policy."

Díaz Camilo points out that, far from acting as a brake on the struggle to overturn the anticommunist laws, the new bill would help to advance it:

The bill legalizing the Dominican CP tends to strike down the anticommunist laws, since article 4 of this bill declares: "The present law annuls any legal provision that contradicts it."

Thus, this annulment will have to be applied to laws 6, 70, and 71, which are precisely the ones that expressly prohibit communist activities.

REPUBLICAN NEWS

Reflects the views of the Provisional republican movement, published weekly in Belfast, Ireland.

Representatives of a Basque nationalist organization attended the congress of Provisional Sinn Féin, which was held in Dublin over the weekend of October 22-23. One member of this delegation spoke from the platform, expressing his

organization's solidarity with the Irish republican movement. He got an enthusiastic response.

In its November 19 issue, *Republican News* publishes the following interview with one of the Basque representatives:

[Question]. What are the origins of your political party?

[Answer]. The EIA—Euskal Iraultzaraki Alderdia-Party for the Basque Revolution, was formed a year ago at the 7th National Assembly of ETA [Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna—Basque Nation and Freedom, a guerrilla organization] where it was decided to separate into two organisations. ETA continues as the military organisation, but we created an autonomous, and if possible, legal political party as well. This is the EIA.

Q. What are the aims of EIA?

A. Full independence of the Basque Country, the reuniting of the parts under French and Spanish rule into a socialist state. We believe in the Marxist analysis of the class struggle. We will not be really independent unless we control the resources and production of our country. A major reason for our lack of freedom is the capitalist system. At present, for instance, many of those who own Basque resources are Basque themselves by race, but are part of the Spanish system which oppresses us.

Q. Haven't there been changes in Spain since Franco?

A. Yes, there have. Trade unions can organise legally, and there is more political expression, but as far as we Basques are concerned, the method of oppression has changed, but the system still remains. Through the people's struggle they have been forced to give almost an amnesty, but it's not a complete amnesty.

Q. What is your attitude to the Spanish Communist Party?

A. We have no links with them. We cannot have links as we differ completely from them. They have said that violence is anti-revolutionary. We believe that the armed struggle is necessary for national liberation. They propose that we should be part of a Spanish federal state—that is, they would give us no more independence than the parties of the Right! The French Communists merely propose that 'one day' the part of the Basque Country which is under French rule will be part of a federation.

Q. You reject autonomy in favour of full independence?

A. Autonomy would be within the Spanish and French states. Our country would still be divided, and only full independence would give us control over our own country. As an independent socialist state we will not be isolationist. We will work in co-operation with other states; no state can exist alone.

Q. Your struggle is cultural as well as political and economic?

A. We regard the cultural dimension as very important. Restoration of the Basque language, Euskara, spoken by 35% of our people is a major aim. In some areas 70-80% speak it, despite the fact that it has been strongly suppressed. Now it is permitted, but we have no way to promote it. It can be taught in private schools, but parents have to pay. There is only a half an hour a week on television. There are some Basque language newspapers but obstacles are put in their way. As a first step we want our national language made co-official with Spanish and French, its use by the mass media and free schooling through Basque.

Capitalism Fouls Things Up



German Social Democrats Vote for Nuclear Power

The congress of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD), held in Hamburg November 14-18, voted overwhelmingly to support the pronuclear policies of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's coalition government.

The actual formula adopted by the SPD ostensibly places primary emphasis on the use of coal as an energy source, and calls for the construction of more nuclear plants if the country's energy needs cannot otherwise be met.

This is reminiscent of Carter's energy policies in the United States: He calls for stepped-up use of coal and says that nuclear power should be a "last resort." But this has not prevented him from calling for the construction of 300 more nuclear plants by the year 2000.

The SPD resolution will not deter Schmidt from carrying out a policy similar to Carter's. Even before the congress opened, the chancellor made it clear that he would not be bound by an antinuclear resolution.

In the months leading up to the SPD gathering, news commentators had predicted that antinuclear forces inside the party would be able to gather enough votes to repudiate Schmidt's nuclear policies. But leaders of this grouping compromised with the party leadership on the "coal" formula, and only about one-third of the delegates voted against it.

That the antinuclear forces inside the SPD caved in so easily can probably be partly attributed to the overall political shift in West Germany brought about by the campaign against "terrorist sympathizers" mounted by the right wing and much of the mass media and helped along by the repressive stance of Schmidt's own government.

The degree to which this campaign has affected politics was indicated when an antinuclear SPD leader recently argued in the party magazine *Neue Gesellschaft* that perhaps the main danger of nuclear plants is that they provide too vulnerable a target for terrorism.

The last big antinuclear protest in the country was the September 24 march of almost 50,000 against the Kalkar fast-breeder reactor. Since then a pronuclear

campaign has mounted rallies of 14,000 in Bonn at the end of September and 40,000 in Dortmund on November 10, shortly before the SPD congress.

This campaign has been orchestrated by an "Energy Action Committee" set up among power plant shop stewards by Alfred Schaller, an entrepreneur and friend of SPD President Willy Brandt. The power companies and other nuclear-related industries have helped out by providing free transportation in company buses, time off from work, and expenses to workers willing to attend the rallies.

Schaller's committee echoes the argument of the nuclear bosses that five to eight million jobs could be lost if atomic plant construction is halted in West Germany.

Leaders of the DGB, the West German trade-union federation, had expressed skepticism about nuclear power earlier this year. But they failed totally to counter the Energy Action Committee's arguments. A number of top DGB bureaucrats ended up speaking at the Dortmund rally.

The SPD's default on nuclear power and the DGB leadership's change of position are expected to lend impetus to recent moves by a section of the antinuclear movement to organize a "green party" to run proenvironment, antinuclear candidates in local and national elections.

Such a prospect makes the SPD leadership nervous. Schmidt's ruling coalition now holds only a five-seat majority in the Bundestag (parliament), and "green" votes are likely to be at the SPD's expense. One delegate at the congress warned that a pronuclear SPD policy would "do midwife service for an ecological party."

Rise in Antinuclear Sentiment

Public opinion samples conducted regularly by EDF, the government-controlled public-utility company in France, show "growing distrust of nuclear power," Marc Ambroise-Rendu reports in the October 16-17 *Le Monde*.

"Among the major projects viewed as priorities, nuclear power has fallen from second to fourth place, whereas solar energy now has the support of a majority of those polled," he reports.

"More and more of those questioned view nuclear power as the most costly form of energy, and the power plants as dangerous polluters. The proportion of the French population favoring nuclear power has fallen from 76% to 50% in three years, while those 'opposed' have increased from 16% to 41%."

French Anti-Uranium Protest

Two thousand persons marched in Ille-sur-Tet, France, on November 6, to protest uranium prospecting being carried out by the Minatome company.

Minatome has found the soil of the region of southern France known as Catalogne-Nord (North Catalonia) to be rich in uranium. Since early October bulldozers have been at work near Ille-sur-Tet digging trenches twenty meters deep. Explosives—not approved by the local authorities—have also been used.

The November 6 march was organized by the Catalan Ecological Movement. The majority of participants were local residents. A number of trade unions lent support to the protest, and the Socialist Party marched under its own banners.

The mayor of Ille-sur-Tet is a member of the Communist Party. According to a report in the French Trotskyist daily *Rouge* November 5-6, he "decided at the last minute to send a delegation to the demonstration to explain that nuclear power is a means of guaranteeing the independence of France."

More Nukes Needed, Says French Utility

The ten million inhabitants of the Paris metropolitan area can look forward to the building of three more nuclear plants by the year 2000, according to J.P. Milliat. The regional director of Electricité de France (EDF), the state-owned electric utility, says that's what it will take to make Paris and its suburbs "self-sufficient" in energy.

EDF is in the process of studying several possible locations for the plants. One previously selected site, at Nogent-sur-Seine, has already come under heavy opposition from local antinuclear groups.