

Intercontinental Press

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75¢



Donna-Marie Gilligan/Militant

At International Women's Year Conference, held in Houston, Texas, November 18-21, delegates

overwhelmingly backed Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, and end to discrimination against lesbians.

15,000 Attend Women's Conference

**Two Trotskyist
Leaders Jailed
in Costa Rica**

Gerry Foley:

**Report on the Provisional
Sinn Fein Congress in Dublin**

Adolfo Gilly:

**The New Course of the
Latin American Revolution**

NEWS ANALYSIS

More Secrets of the FBI

By Matilde Zimmermann

The Newark FBI proposed to spray a "foul-smelling" chemical on Black Panther newspapers to "disrupt distribution." J. Edgar Hoover suggested that the New York City FBI introduce "uncomfortable" odors into the cooling system of the 1966 Communist Party national convention.

It would not be surprising if a stink clings to the more than 52,000 pages of FBI files made public November 21 as well. The documents describe fifteen years of government dirty tricks against the antiwar movement, Black nationalists, Puerto Rican independence fighters, radicals, and even Mexican communists.

The heavily-censored files were obtained by eight reporters through a Freedom of Information Act suit. They represent the largest single batch of FBI counterintelligence files released thus far and further reveal the scope of the FBI's targets.

Much of what was known prior to this about the FBI's Cointelpro activity was disclosed through the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance's \$40 million lawsuit against the FBI and CIA.

The FBI has claimed that its secret operations were necessary to prevent violence, but the files show that the bureau's goal was exactly the opposite.

A letter purporting to be from the Puerto Rican Independence Movement was sent to a member of the Puerto Rican Socialist League who was "known to be extremely sensitive to criticism and prone to violence," in an effort to set the two groups at each other's throats. The FBI bragged that the phony letter was "calculated to infuriate" its recipient.

While marshals of the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam were trying to keep the huge antiwar demonstration at President Nixon's 1969 inauguration peaceful and orderly, FBI agents were broadcasting false and confusing information over the marshals' walkie-talkies.

Cointelpro actions were often designed to paralyze organizations with internal squabbling or to prevent united action through stirring up animosity between different political groups. "Sources will be encouraged to undertake leadership roles in various factions and stimulate dissension among them," was the way a 1969 memo put it.

Cruel attempts to discourage and intimidate political activists were the FBI's stock in trade. Sexual blackmail and obscene letters were a favorite ploy. The FBI used cooperative realtors and social workers to

get dissidents thrown out of their homes and to take away welfare benefits. Efforts were made to embarrass and inconvenience radicals by arresting them for technicalities. False stories were leaked to the press to discredit individuals and groups.

The FBI did not limit itself to disruption of domestic political activity. In at least one case it encroached upon the territory of the CIA by carrying out extensive Cointelpro operations against radical groups in Mexico.

The FBI's Cointelpro (counter-intelligence-program) operations began in

New Holes in Official Account of Biko's Death

By Ernest Harsch

During the second week of an official inquest into the death of Steve Biko, further evidence surfaced confirming that the young Black leader was beaten to death by his white jailers. Biko, a central leader of the nationalist current in South Africa known as the Black Consciousness movement, died in police custody September 12.

Under questioning from Sydney W. Kentridge, a lawyer for the Biko family, two pathologists involved in the autopsy on Biko gave conflicting accounts of how he received the brain injuries that ultimately led to his death.

Dr. J. D. Loubser, the chief state pathologist in charge of the autopsy, gave an interpretation of Biko's death that coincided with one advanced by police officials—that Biko bumped his head during an alleged struggle with his interrogators. Although Loubser conceded that Biko had received five different brain injuries, he maintained that they were all the result of a single blow.

However Dr. Neville S. Proctor, a brain specialist, testified that Biko's brain injuries had been incurred on at least three, and possibly four, separate occasions. He also said that Biko must have become unconscious immediately after being injured. This conflicted sharply with all the previous accounts put forward by the police, none of which mentioned more than one blow or a period of unconsciousness.

Other doctors called for questioning provided details of how the security police

1956 as part of the effort to disrupt the American Communist Party. By 1970, any group involved in working for social change was likely to be targeted.

Although the bureau claims that the program was ended in April 1971, Cointelpro actions against the Socialist Workers Party have been documented after that date. The Senate Intelligence Committee concluded in 1976 that it was unable to determine whether Cointelpro actions were still being carried out.

Cointelpro targets were legal political organizations. Sometimes, as in the case of the antiwar movement, they represented majority sentiment in the United States. The illegal, secret, and destructive activities described in these documents are all carried out by government agents, not by their victims. It seems safe to assume that even fouler episodes are contained in the 16,000 pages of Cointelpro files withheld completely by the FBI when the latest documents were released. □

prevented Biko from receiving medical treatment.

Dr. Ivor Lang said that he had recommended that Biko be transferred to a local hospital after examinations showed signs of brain damage, but had been forbidden to do so by Col. Pieter J. Goosen, the head of the security police in Port Elizabeth, where Biko was held.

Kentridge maintained that the police had refused to move Biko to a hospital to prevent him from revealing that he had been beaten. He also compelled Dr. Lang to admit that he had issued a medical report claiming that Biko was in good health, omitting any reference to his head injuries, a cut lip, a bruise on his chest, or the cuts and swelling caused by the iron shackles he had been forced to wear.

The testimony by the doctors further undermined the apartheid regime's efforts to cover up its responsibility for Biko's murder. The attempts had already been seriously damaged by earlier testimony, in which police gave conflicting accounts of how Biko received his head injuries.

Although Biko was only one of dozens of Black political activists who have died at the hands of Vorster's jailers, his prominent position in the Black liberation struggle has thrown a sharp spotlight on the routine brutality meted out to opponents of white supremacy. Like the frequent arrests of activists and the bannings of Black organizations, the torture and killings of political prisoners is aimed at terrorizing the Black population as a whole.

But it also generates resistance. On November 26, about 8,000 Blacks rallied in the Black township of Kagiso, near Krugersdorp, for the funeral of Bonaventura Siphon Malaza, an eighteen-year-old Black youth who died while in detention by the security police November 18. The police claimed that he had hanged himself, a common official explanation for the death of prisoners under torture.

Police opened fire into the crowd after the funeral, wounding at least two Black youths. □

Smith Offers More Talks

By Conrad Strauss

In yet another bid to stall for time, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith announced November 24 that he was willing to open a new round of negotiations with Zimbabwean nationalist leaders based within the country. As bait, he said that he was prepared to concede the principle of majority rule based on universal adult suffrage, a central demand of all the major Zimbabwean nationalist groups.

Smith has made many similar promises in the past, only to later retract them or to tack on so many escape clauses as to make them superfluous. This time may be little different. According to a summary of his remarks in the November 26 *New York Times*, Smith insisted that there had to be "safeguards" for the white minority that would include "the maintenance of the forces of law and order and special parliamentary representation."

By excluding the Zimbabwean leaders based outside of the country from his negotiations offer, Smith is also trying to drive a wedge into the already faction-ridden Zimbabwean nationalist movement.

Joshua Nkomo, a coleader with Robert Mugabe of the Patriotic Front, which is based on guerrilla forces located in neighboring countries, denounced Smith's statement as "rubbish."

It was greeted, however, by the two main Zimbabwean leaders now living within the country, Ndabaningi Sithole and Abel Muzorewa.

Muzorewa said that he was willing to talk with Smith. But he also listed a series of demands. He called for an immediate end to the executions of freedom fighters, for "immediate and open negotiations," and for a "safe return" policy toward the guerrillas.

Perhaps in anticipation of charges of capitulating to Smith's divide-and-rule efforts, he also called for a constitutional conference attended by all the nationalist organizations, including the Patriotic Front.

Meanwhile, the white minority regime's war against the Black liberation struggle continues. □

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Two Trotskyist Leaders Imprisoned in Costa Rica

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica—A brutal police attack on a demonstration in the port city of Limón, seventy-five miles east of here, on November 23, resulted in the arrest and jailing of eight persons. All have been charged with "inciting violence," and face up to eight years imprisonment.

Among the eight are two central leaders of the Organización Socialista de los Trabajadores (OST—Socialist Workers Organization), a sympathizing group of the Fourth International.

Authorities have also ordered the arrest of Marvin Wright Lindo, one of the best-known figures in the labor movement and the main leader of Costa Rica's Black population. Although not involved in the November 23 protest, Wright has been charged with "moral responsibility" for it. The police have been ordered to shoot him on sight and are conducting a house-to-house search for him in Limón. Fearing for his life, Wright has gone underground.

On November 25, police in San José, the capital city, raided the OST's national headquarters. Such a move by the government is highly unusual, especially since the OST is a legal organization and is fielding candidates in the national elections to be held in February 1978. Many consider such a raid on a party headquarters to be without precedent in the country's recent history.

The residents of the Limoncito community in Limón—many of them Blacks¹—have been struggling for more than a year for improvements in their living conditions.

On November 23, 500 persons, almost all women and children, began a demonstration at ten o'clock in the morning in support of the community's demands for running water, sewage lines, and electric power.

The residents are also asking for the diversion of the Limoncito River, which is heavily polluted with sewage, chemical wastes, and the runoff from a nearby cemetery; and for the grading of streets that are at present little more than swamps.

The protest continued throughout the

1. Black workers were brought to Costa Rica from Jamaica and elsewhere in the late 1800s to solve a labor shortage on the banana plantations in the eastern part of the country. At present, Blacks constitute 2 percent of the Costa Rican population. They face racial oppression as well as discrimination based on the fact that most have English as their first language in a predominantly Spanish-speaking country.



MARVIN WRIGHT LINDO: Hunted by police, with "shoot-to-kill" orders.

day, and was joined by the husbands of many of the women as they came home from work. The demonstrators blocked traffic on roads and railway lines, the main means of access to Limoncito.

At 5:45 p.m., police moved in to break up the crowd, wielding clubs and kicking people. Many demonstrators were injured, including several pregnant women.

A number of arrests were made, and the detainees were further beaten on the way to jail. Most were later released, but the following eight persons were held on the charge of "inciting violence":

José Cruz Angulo, a Limón community leader; Sherman León Muller, a dock workers union shop steward; Carlos Coronado Vargas, the OST's candidate for president; Alejandra Calderón Fournier, the principal OST candidate for the national legislative assembly; and four other community activists—María Cedeño Rivera, Edgar Tapia Mora, José Manuel Ramírez Valverde, and Reynaldo Sánchez Chávez.

Seven of these persons are being held with almost 120 other prisoners in a 4-by-8-meter room with no toilet facilities. Alejandra Calderón is on a hunger strike to protest such intolerable conditions, and has been separated from the other prisoners by the authorities.

Calderón was already well known before her arrest. She comes from a family that is

very prominent in Costa Rican politics. Her father is ex-President Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia, for many years the leader of a conservative bourgeois party, the Partido Republicano Nacional. Her brother, Rafael A. Calderón Fournier, is a deputy in the national assembly. There was thus a big stir in the news media earlier this year when Alejandra Calderón applied for legal recognition of the OST in her capacity as its chairperson.

Marvin Wright Lindo is the central leader of the Partido Auténtico Limonense (PAL—Limón Authentic Party), which he recently founded. The PAL is based among the Black workers of Limón province.

Wright has been a key figure in many labor struggles in Costa Rica in the past twenty years, particularly among dock workers, railway workers, and small agricultural proprietors. For a long time he was a leader of the Partido Vanguardia Popular, the Costa Rican CP.

When the PVP sent him to study in Moscow, he became disillusioned with Stalinism. He broke with the PVP when it lent support to a bourgeois candidate in the 1966 elections. Wright is forty-two years old and has been jailed sixty-one times for his role in leading workers' struggles in Costa Rica.

The Oduber government's repressive moves have generated protests. Eight hundred persons demonstrated in Limón November 25 to demand that the eight activists be released and that the manhunt for Wright cease. The OST has distributed 20,000 leaflets with similar demands.

Statements of solidarity with the government's victims have been issued by the headquarters of nearly all the country's major trade unions. Only the Confederación General de los Trabajadores, which is dominated by the PVP, has so far failed to respond.

The Costa Rican bourgeoisie has long prided itself on maintaining democratic forms of rule, with regular elections, no press controls, and a constitution that guarantees civil liberties.

This sudden turn to repressive measures on the part of the government may be an attempt to test the relationship of forces in the country.

Among the political changes that have occurred relatively recently are the formation and growth of the OST and the increased radicalization among Blacks that has given rise to the PAL. Marvin Wright has worked closely with the OST in recent months, and another Black leader,

Guillermo Joseph Wignal,² has joined the OST and is its candidate for first vice-president.

2. See "Costa Rican Blacks—An Oppressed Nationality," interview with Guillermo Joseph Wignal, *Intercontinental Press*, September 19, 1977, p. 1012.

The government may be probing to see how far it can go in heading off further development of revolutionary socialism and Black nationalism and the growing links between the two.

International solidarity is needed to help put a stop to the Costa Rican government's repressive measures. Telegrams and letters

demanding the dropping of charges against the eight imprisoned activists and Marvin Wright, and an end to police harassment of the OST should be sent to Costa Rican embassies or to President Daniel Oduber Quirós, San José, Costa Rica.

November 26, 1977

At Expense of PLO

Sadat Moves Closer to Separate Deal With Israelis

By David Frankel

Just five days after his return from Israel, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat again captured headlines around the world with his proposal for a meeting in Cairo of "all the parties in the [Middle East] conflict, including the two superpowers. . . ."

In form, Sadat's call was for preparatory talks leading to a Geneva conference and an overall settlement of the Mideast conflict. But in substance, it was one more step in the direction of a separate deal with Israel.

Sadat, of course, denied any such intention. In regard to the Palestinians, he insisted in his November 26 speech to the Egyptian People's Assembly, "Egypt will never cede any of their rights."

Defending his visit to Israel, Sadat claimed, "I have not jeopardized any Arab rights." He maintained that "we did not have to concede in any way that we should have a separate agreement with Israel."

He struck a similar theme in his speech before the Israeli Knesset (parliament) November 20. ". . . I have not come here for a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel," he said. "This is not part of the policy of Egypt."

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin addressed this issue as well. "We do not want to separate or divide [the Arab countries]," he claimed in his reply to Sadat. "We want a true peace with all of our neighbors. . . ."

Such assurances were repeated frequently—perhaps a little too frequently—by Egyptian and Israeli officials both before and after Sadat's trip to Israel. Not many believed them even before Sadat's latest move.

As columnist William Safire noted in the November 21 *New York Times*, Sadat's claims of devotion to an overall settlement were rightly taken by other Arab leaders "as a warning that a separate peace is possible should the Sadat lead not be followed."

Any move toward a separate agreement between the Israeli and Egyptian regimes would severely weaken the position of Syria and Jordan in relation to Israel. It would be an even harder blow to the struggle of the Palestinian people for their right to self-determination.

The logic of Sadat's course in regard to the Palestinians was made clear from the very beginning when he failed to mention the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in his speech to the Knesset. The PLO is the dominant organization in the Palestinian liberation movement, and Sadat's intention was to signify his willingness to bypass that movement in negotiations with the Zionist state.

A second step in this direction came November 24, when officials in Cairo announced that Palestinian "leaders" from Israel and the territories occupied by Israel in June 1967 would be invited to Egypt to discuss Sadat's trip to Israel. "The invitation was apparently part of a strategy to stake out a role for moderate Palestinians in future Arab-Israeli peace talks that would not require the cooperation of the more militant P.L.O.," *New York Times* correspondent Christopher S. Wren reported from Cairo.

In his speech proposing the meeting in Cairo of "all parties to the conflict," Sadat again left out any mention of the PLO. Acting Foreign Minister Butros Ghali told reporters that the PLO would be invited to the Cairo conference, but when invitations were issued November 27, the PLO was not among those receiving them.

Until now, the full impact of Sadat's stab in the back to the Palestinians has been cushioned by the reaction of the Syrian regime, which has publicly denounced him for "betraying the Arab nation" and refused his invitation to come to Cairo.

However, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad is hardly a reliable ally for the Palestinians. As Sadat himself pointed out in his November 26 speech, referring to

Assad's military intervention against the Palestinians during the Lebanese civil war, "Who has actually shot them [the Palestinians]? Who has directed the bullets into their chests? Was it Egypt?"

Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam made his government's position clear when he said November 27, "We have not said that we will not continue the dialogue with President Sadat but we have said that he took an isolated step without consulting other Arab countries."

While Assad is holding open the option of joining the "betrayal of the Arab nation" in his dealings with the Zionist regime, King Hussein of Jordan has shown even warmer interest in such a course.

The day after Sadat's return from Israel a trial balloon was sent up by the Jordanian minister of information. Reporters were told that Sadat's trip had brought "fresh hope" for convening the Geneva conference, and that it had "broken the ice and removed the psychological barriers" between Arabs and Israelis. This statement was later repudiated, with the Jordanian regime taking a more reserved attitude, but the message was hardly accidental.

Pressure on Sadat

On the surface, Sadat seems to be taking a remarkably independent course. After his November 26 speech, he made his attitude to the other Arab regimes explicit, telling NBC News that "Whoever comes here, I shall be starting the conference with them. . . . If only the Israelis come, I will start the conference."

Both Moscow and Washington appeared to be as surprised as the Arab regimes by Sadat's new moves. But, as the editors of the *Washington Post* commented November 20—not without some satisfaction—"it was American diplomacy that gave thrust and focus to a settlement drive that . . . the parties were demonstra-

bly unable to generate on their own."

When Sadat went to Jerusalem, he gave the Israeli state perhaps the greatest political victory in its history. This was not a reflection of his independence, but rather of the immense pressure that he is under.

To begin with, Sadat faces direct military pressure. *New York Times* military analyst Drew Middleton summed up the results of the enormous amount of U.S. military aid to Israel since the October 1973 war in an article that appeared November 7, only two weeks before Sadat's trip to Israel.

"American intelligence analysts and civilian experts on the military balance in the Middle East," Middleton reported, "believe that Israel is so far ahead of any alliance of Arab powers in weapons and trained manpower that outside pressures would have only a peripheral effect on its strategic decisions."

Middleton made clear that, having successfully built up the Israeli war machine to a point where the Arab regimes cannot challenge it, Washington is trying to put itself in a position of being able to disclaim direct political responsibility in the event of another Mideast war.

"Israel's reliance on [American] weapons, most sources agreed, would not prevent Israel from fighting a short, successful war even if the American administration decided at the outbreak of war to halt all arms shipments," Middleton explained. "The consensus is that the Israelis would require at the most three weeks to defeat the Arabs and that, given the present temper of the Israeli Government, the army would not be restrained by American pressure from seeking a complete victory."

The American imperialists, of course, were well aware of the effect that their vast military aid to Israel would have. This has been a topic of discussion for years in military and diplomatic journals.

Washington Post correspondent Jim Hoagland reported October 26 on the attitude of the Israeli regime. He said that "Israel is actively preparing to fight what senior Israeli defense officials privately describe as 'a war of annihilation' against the Egyptian and Syrian armies if the Carter administration's new Middle East peace effort fails."

State Department officials announced the day after Hoagland's article appeared that they were recommending another \$1 billion in military aid to Israel for the 1978-79 fiscal year. Israeli officials were reported to be "privately pleased" with this news.

Nor is the Israeli military threat an abstract one. According to *Times* correspondent Wren, Sadat's November 26 speech confirmed that "a potential clash between Israeli and Egyptian forces was averted in the Sinai Peninsula less than two weeks ago. . . . The President said

that the incident proved how 'jittery' the Israelis were and implied their fears of a new attack had contributed to the urgency of his trip to Israel."



SADAT

Military threats were the crudest form of imperialist arm-twisting against Sadat. Economic pressure was also used to wring recognition of Israel from him.

Fritz Besser—1908-1977

Fritz Besser (also known as Brink or Ernst Most) died in London of a heart attack October 23. He was born in Remscheid, Germany, in 1908.

Before World War II, along with his fellow townsman Walter Held (Heinz Epe), Josef Weber (Johre), Georg Jungclas, Oskar Fischer, Rudolf Klement, Erwin Wolf, Marcel, and others, he was among the key cadres of the Internationale Kommunisten Deutschlands (IKD—Internationalist Communists of Germany, the German section of the Fourth International).

In the 1939-40 conflict between Leon Trotsky and the Socialist Workers Party on the one hand and the Burnham-Shachtman petty-bourgeois opposition on the other, the IKD sided with Trotsky. Towards the end of the war, however, most of the leadership shifted ground. They rejected the Marxist premise that the working class was the only progressive, revolutionary class in modern society. With few exceptions, notably Georg Jungclas, they parted company with the Fourth International.

Sadat has followed a policy of relying on foreign investment to revive Egypt's ailing economy. But imperialist investors have made clear that they consider Egypt to be a poor risk as long as it has not reached any settlement with Israel.

Thus, Sadat was caught between the pressures of world imperialism and the demands of his own people for economic progress and the recovery of occupied Egyptian territory. He is gambling that by giving in to imperialist demands and recognizing the Zionist state, he will get enough in return to placate the Egyptian masses and end the destabilizing effect on his own regime of the ongoing conflict with Israel.

It is already clear that Sadat's concessions to the Israeli state will be used as leverage for the imperialists to demand similar concessions from the other Arab regimes. And the weaker the Arab countries are, and the more they give up, the less pressure there will be on the Israeli regime to give anything in return.

The fact that Sadat's course has been forced upon him by imperialist pressure doesn't make it any less suicidal. What both the Israeli regime and its American backers want is not peace in the Middle East, but unchallenged domination of the region. That is why the Arab governments will never be able to make enough concessions to placate the Zionists. And that is why Washington, regardless of any temporary frictions, will continue to back Israeli intransigence. □

It should be noted that Klement, the secretary of the Fourth International, was brutally murdered in Paris in 1938; Wolf disappeared during the civil war in Spain; and Held disappeared in the Soviet Union on his way to the United States with a transit visa—all at the hands of the GPU.


In 1947 the surviving IKD leaders started a magazine, *Dinge der Zeit*, which is still published intermittently and to which Besser contributed under the pen name of Ernst Most.

Jungclas alone among the old-time leaders was instrumental in the postwar period in founding a new German section, the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (International Marxist Group), to which he adhered until his recent death at the age of seventy-three.

Although political differences widened, Fritz was always helpful in many ways to the comrades of the Fourth International who sought aid of one sort or another that only he could give.

Despite his later retrogression, the name of Fritz Besser will remain on the rolls of the Fourth International for his pioneering work. □

AROUND THE WORLD



'Mad Bird' Caged

Park Yang Ho, a South Korean university lecturer, was recently arrested when it became clear to the authorities that his short story "Mad Bird" was an allegory about life in South Korea.

The editor of the literary magazine in which the story was published was also arrested, and attempts were made to retrieve the copies already sold. The story has also been published in a Japanese weekly.

According to a report in the November 20 issue of the *Manchester Guardian* weekly, the story takes place on a chicken farm, where the chickens are terrorized by watchdogs to make sure they don't step out of line. Into their midst comes the "mad bird" of the title, who is convinced he can fly, and who persuades his fellow chickens to begin flying practice in secret.

Torture of Palestinians Denounced in France

The Campaign for Human Rights in Israel, a French umbrella organization composed of six pro-Palestinian groups, held a news conference in Paris on November 7 at which Lea Tsemel, an Israeli attorney who has defended many Palestinian prisoners, spoke.

The press conference was called to publicize the release by the group of a series of documents attesting to the use of torture by Israeli authorities in the occupied territories and in Israel. One of the documents was a letter from Tsemel confirming allegations of torture contained in a recent series of articles in the London *Sunday Times* (see *Intercontinental Press*, July 4, 1977, p. 762, and August 8, 1977, p. 901).

100 Protest Publicly in Chile

One hundred persons gathered in a peaceful protest vigil November 17 in a busy plaza outside the Chilean Foreign Ministry in Santiago.

The protesters belonged to the group called Relatives of Disappeared Prisoners, and wore pictures of political prisoners pinned to their clothes. The group carried out a hunger strike earlier this year at United Nations offices in Santiago in support of their demands for information concerning the fate of 566 persons who have "disappeared" following arrest by security forces.

Police hustled forty of the protesters, mostly women, into vans as newly ap-

pointed U.S. Ambassador to Chile George W. Landau was arriving for his first meeting with Foreign Minister Patricio Carvajal.

Most of those arrested were released the same day. It was the first public street protest in Chile since the 1973 military coup.

Kostava and Gamsakhurdia Interned in Soviet Psychiatric Hospital

Merab Kostava and Zviad Gamsakhurdia, members of the Georgian Helsinki monitoring group, were recently transferred from a prison in Georgia to the Serbsky Institute of Legal Psychiatry in Moscow, according to a report in the November 17 issue of *Le Monde*.

The Serbsky Institute is notorious for its "fourth section," where human-rights activists are subjected to psychiatric treatment to "cure" them of their dissident views.

Whites Leave Rhodesia in Record Numbers

Government statistics for September showed that 1,479 whites left Rhodesia in that month while 455 immigrated. This brought the net loss of whites since January 1977 to 8,737, the highest number on record. Previously, the record year was 1964, when 8,710 whites left Rhodesia.

Torture in Bolivia

The Permanent Assembly for the Rights of Man, a Bolivian human-rights organization, has published a list of persons said to have worked as torturers for the Banzer government over the last six years. According to the Assembly, many persons have been tortured and thousands of others jailed for political reasons since 1971. The Assembly estimates that there are now 450 political prisoners in Bolivia.

Political Violence on the Rise in Italy

A November 15 report on crime in Italy by Interior Minister Francesco Cossiga revealed that in the last ten months, there were 345 attempts on the lives of individuals, 339 attacks on various institutions, and 300 on political headquarters. Of these, 122 were directed against the Christian Democrats, 90 against the neofascist Italian Social

Movement, and 58 against the Communist Party.

Cossiga appears to have used the occasion of the report to test the ground for a political witch-hunt in Italy similar to the one being conducted in West Germany. According to a dispatch in the November 17 *Le Monde*, he praised West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, alluded to "links" between Italian ultraleftists and the Baader-Meinhof group, and deplored what he called "implicit or explicit complicity" between the traditional left parties and terrorist groups.

Another Medal for Brezhnev

Leonid I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, was awarded the Karl Marx gold medal on November 16.

The Soviet Academy of Sciences's highest honor was bestowed on Brezhnev for his "role in the development of Marxism-Leninism, in the scientific analysis of developed socialism, and in the historic worldwide struggle for communist ideals and for lasting world peace."



BREZHNEV: Adds "Karl Marx" award to crowded collection.

15,000 Attend International Women's Year Conference

By Jane Sellers

HOUSTON, TEXAS—"Seneca Falls 1848—Houston 1977" was the theme of the International Women's Year conference held here November 18-21. Like the women who drafted the first bill of rights for women in Seneca Falls, New York, more than 100 years ago, the 15,000 delegates and observers who flocked to Houston felt that they too were making history.

For the first time the ideas and issues raised by the women's liberation movement were discussed before a nationwide television audience. Never before had a more diverse group of women gathered together to demonstrate their solidarity with the aims and demands of the women's movement.

Millions of Americans saw the 2,000 delegates adopt a National Plan of Action that in effect condemned the antiwoman policies of the Carter government, which had sponsored the conference.

Following the 1975 International Women's Year conference in Mexico, the United States government established an IWY Commission and allocated \$5 million for a national women's conference. State conferences were held last summer to elect delegates and to vote on the Plan of Action.

A certain momentum was built up by these conferences. The overwhelming majority of the 130,000 women attracted to them gave their enthusiastic support to the plan.

But women's rights supporters were not the only people to mobilize. Right-wing groups opposed to abortion, homosexual rights, and the Equal Rights Amendment also used the state conferences to rally support. They won a majority on five of fifty-five state and territory delegations. One of these right-wing delegations, Mississippi, included several men from the Ku Klux Klan.

The women who came to Houston expected a showdown with the antifeminist forces. They came in response to the increasing attacks American women face on their rights to abortion, affirmative action, child-care, equal pay, and employment.

The National Plan of Action, which was drafted by the IWY Commission and amended by the state conferences, was positive to the extent that it reaffirmed these major demands of the women's liberation movement. But the plan carefully avoided acknowledging the fact that what is blocking the implementation of

these rights is the Carter government.

Democratic Party women leaders were prominent throughout the conference. These included Bella Abzug, the presiding officer of the gathering; Eleanor Smeal, president of the National Organization for Women (NOW); Carol Bellamy, New York City Council president; and Gloria Steinem of *Ms.* magazine.

They also played a major role in organizing delegates who favored the National Plan of Action into a "pro-plan" caucus.

Other participants in the "pro-plan" caucus included leaders of Women's Political Caucus, National Gay Task Force, Coalition of Labor Union Women, National Abortion Rights Action League, as well as leaders of the various national-minority caucuses.

The primary strategy of this caucus was to pass the plan without allowing a real discussion on the attacks women face and how they can fight back. In the name of "unity" against the right wing, the "pro-plan" caucus insisted on the rigid adherence to the agenda and firmly discouraged any proposals to strengthen or amend the Plan of Action.

This led to an angry clash in the caucuses of oppressed national minorities, where some women expressed the view that the three paragraphs on their specific oppression were totally inadequate. They proposed drafting a new resolution.

The most hotly debated sections of the Plan of Action were those dealing with the Equal Rights Amendment, minority women, abortion, and lesbian rights. Abortion and lesbian rights were placed near the end of the agenda by the conference organizers.

The main concern of the "pro-plan" caucus was to ensure the endorsement of the Equal Rights Amendment. Betty Friedan, the feminist author and a founder of NOW, justified this by saying: "Realistically, there is only one issue for women this year and that's the equal rights amendment. Any group that puts their issue ahead of that is playing right into the hands of the right wing."

The Equal Rights Amendment, which would change the country's constitution to outlaw discrimination based on sex, was first introduced into Congress in 1923 and has been stalled by both the Democratic and Republican parties ever since. Congress finally passed the ERA in 1972, but to take effect it must be ratified by thirty-eight state legislatures by March 1979. At

present the approval of three more states is needed.

Reactionary forces have united in a vocal and well-organized campaign to block the ERA. Under pressure from this right-wing mobilization, some states that previously ratified the ERA have asked for their endorsement to be withdrawn.

It was expected that this issue would provoke a major confrontation between right-wing and feminist delegates.

But what happened instead was that the debate took the form of parliamentary filibustering. The political arguments raised by the anti-ERA delegates remained unanswered as the conference organizers consciously tried to stifle discussion.

There was no doubt that support for the ERA was overwhelming among both the delegates and observers, although right-wing delegates masqueraded as representatives of the "silent majority," wearing ribbons with "majority" printed on them.

On several occasions prior to the ERA debate, the conference auditorium shook with the shouts of thousands of women in the observers' galleries and on the conference floor: "ERA! ERA! ERA!" When the ERA vote was overwhelmingly carried a wild cheer went up and delegates danced in the aisles.

But this steamroller approach played into the hands of the right wing. A priceless opportunity to explain before a national television audience why women need the ERA was lost.

Moreover, by quashing all discussion from the floor, the "pro-plan" caucus enabled the right-wingers to pose as proponents of an open and democratic debate on the issues.

The counterproductiveness of this strategy was illustrated even more graphically during the debate on abortion.

American women won the right to legal abortion in January 1973. Since that time antiabortion forces have organized a series of challenges to that right, beginning by pressing for tighter restrictions. Legislation championed by Congressman Henry Hyde, which became law earlier this year, cuts off government Medicaid benefits for abortion. This denies millions of poor women any possibility of obtaining a safe, legal termination of an unwanted pregnancy.

The defense of women's right to abortion ought therefore to have been a central concern of the Houston conference. However, when the agenda finally reached this



Diane Wang/Militant

Women's rights rally before the conference was attended by several hundred delegates and observers.

point, two feminist delegates were given only two minutes each to explain why abortion should remain legal with access guaranteed to all regardless of income.

They were followed by antiabortion speakers who demagogically championed the "rights" of fetuses, comparing the Supreme Court decision on abortion to the nineteenth-century "Dred Scott" ruling, in which the court declared that Blacks had no legal status.

These arguments were never answered. The next proabortion delegate to speak called for the vote to be taken. When a large majority of delegates approved the motion for legal abortion, with federal funding, the antiabortion delegates filed up to the front of the hall, singing and carrying a six-foot long photographic display of fetuses. Many feminist delegates and observers responded by standing on their chairs with raised fists, shouting "Choice! Choice!" and "Down With Hyde!"

The crying need to counter the arguments of the right-wingers was made even more evident by a mass "pro-family" rally of well over 15,000 persons held during the conference. The rally launched a national "Pro-Family Coalition" to campaign for forcing women back into the home.

One highlight of the national women's conference was the fact that women from the national minorities (Black, Chicana, Native American, Asian, and Puerto Rican women) emerged as prominent leaders of the women's liberation movement.

A substitute resolution on women of oppressed nationalities was one of the few major changes permitted by the "pro-plan" caucus. This was largely due to the pressure of conference observers within the separate minority caucus groups.

The substitute resolution included a few significant improvements, such as the demands for tribal rights for Native

Americans and the implementation of affirmative-action programs in education. (Under these programs, women applicants and members of minority groups are entitled to preference to help counter the effects of decades of previous discrimination.)

No one spoke for the original resolution. When the alternative motion was clearly carried, delegates burst into singing "We Shall Overcome." Only the right-wing delegates rose to vote against the new minority resolution, again betraying the racism behind their "pro-life" program.

Mass sentiment again swept onto the floor during the debate on lesbian rights. The lesbian caucus was among the largest and best organized at the conference.

Following the victory of antigay bigots in a Miami referendum on homosexual rights earlier this year, gay-rights supporters had organized a series of mass protests across the country. Lesbians hoped the national women's conference would help turn the tide against the antihomosexual crusaders.

The strength of the lesbian caucus forced the leaders of the "pro-plan" caucus to allow a real discussion to take place on this issue.

During the debate Eleanor Smeal and Betty Friedan spoke in favor of the resolution. This was widely noted, for Smeal is president of the country's largest women's organization, and in the past Friedan has been well known for her opposition to having the women's movement take a clear stand condemning discrimination against lesbians.

The enthusiastic display when the gay-rights resolution was carried by a clear majority surpassed all others. Thousands of balloons declaring "We are everywhere" were released. A large group of women behind a huge "Lesbian rights" banner

shouted out, "Thank you, sisters!"

The celebration then spilled out of the auditorium and continued outside. Women felt they had won a real victory. Lesbians and feminists had finally had a chance to answer their enemies publicly.

Unfortunately the concluding session of the conference did not maintain that same spirit. The entire morning was spent considering a proposal for a government women's department. There was no discussion on any real strategy for women to defend their rights. Instead women were urged to step up lobbying activities within the Democratic and Republican parties.

The National Plan of Action will now go to President Carter, so, as one woman put it, "we can find out now how committed he really is to women's issues." But American women should know by now what to expect from the Carter government.

Nevertheless, the conference on the whole was contradictory in its effects for Carter. On the one hand he had hoped to polish up his "pro-woman" image. But on the other hand it was a resounding statement of the sentiment of the majority of American women in favor of the very rights Carter is attempting to take away. Moreover, the national publicity the conference received can only help broaden support for women's rights in the country at large.

Above all else, the assembly of so many spirited and self-confident women who feel that they have a right to full equality shows the enormous potential for building a mass, independent women's movement as a major force for social change in the United States.

As one woman unionist commented as she left the conference: "Well, I learned a lot watching this. This time it was *their* turn. But one of these times it will be *our* turn!" □

Fukuda Steps Up Police Measures Against Political Activists

By Mutsugoro Kawasaki

TOKYO—Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, the Japanese government is cracking down on the far left, and tightening a whole range of criminal legislation. A hysterical press campaign has created the proper climate for the authorities to intensify their efforts to isolate revolutionists and militants from the labor movement.

The pretext for this crackdown was created in October, when the "Japanese Red Army" hijacked a Japan Air Lines DC-8, and the Fukuda cabinet handed over \$6 million and six prisoners in exchange for the passengers held hostage.

In addition to strengthening special "antiterrorist" laws, the government is also pushing through changes in the Criminal Procedure, Criminal, Prison, Juvenile, and Passport laws, and is increasing police powers.


There has been no significant opposition to these moves, and indeed many labor leaders—including representatives of Japan's Socialist and Communist parties—have joined in the clamor for a crackdown on "extremists."

To this end, immediately following the hijacking, police raided the offices of eighteen groups alleged to have "some connection with the Red Army Faction." These included the Legal Defense Contact Center, a united-front, nonpartisan organization.

The center has sent defense lawyers to aid more than 10,000 arrested militants in the eight years since it was founded, and had never been harassed by the cops before now. In ordinary circumstances such a raid would have drawn loud protests from the labor movement. A few days later the cops carried out a second series of raids, blitzing the homes of about twenty relatives and friends of Red Army Faction members.

The order in which these raids took place belies the government's real target—the militant organizations of the working class. The howls of indignation and cries for revenge from the bourgeois press and reformist politicians have served to label all militants as terrorists, and to confuse the masses of workers and farmers into thinking they need the "protection" of the police and the law.

The range of legislation to be tightened is enormous, and some of the proposals are already in force. On November 15 the lower house of the Diet (parliament) unanimously approved some changes in the "antiterrorist" laws, which include



Mainichi Daily News

FUKUDA: Backed by Stalinists and Social Democrats in drive against "extremists."

giving the police greater powers of arrest and detention and raising the minimum sentence for air piracy to ten years.

The issuance of passports is also to be restricted. Many conservative Diet members criticized these moves as "lukewarm," and won assurances that further stiffening of the laws is almost certain. The hawks are demanding the death penalty for hijackers, even if no one is killed or injured by their action.

The government has announced its intention to modify the Criminal Procedure Law, making it possible to speed up court proceedings. Previously, a trial for a crime which carried a minimum sentence of ten years or more could not proceed without a defense lawyer present. This provision will be completely abolished, thus creating a judicial framework in which someone could be sentenced to death in an uncontested trial. For example, if a dispute arises between a defendant and his or her lawyer, or if a lawyer is dismissed for failing to follow the judge's instructions, the trial could go on with no defense counsel present.

Tightening of the Criminal Law will give authorities the power to hand out much heavier sentences to anyone taking part in a prison disturbance, and to detain indefinitely anyone judged to be insane.

Two new categories of crimes will be created under these laws. The first is the charge of "conspiracy," to be used as in

Britain or the United States when no proof of participation in a criminal act is available. A second law will make it a criminal offense to leak "corporate secrets," and will carry a penalty of three to five years' imprisonment. This will discourage workers from blowing the whistle on violations of pollution or safety regulations, or other illegal practices by their employers.

Prisoners' rights will be severely restricted by amendments to the prison laws. The authorities aim to make life much harsher for political prisoners, with fewer visits, restricted access to lawyers, and isolation from the rest of the prison population.

This already occurs to some extent, and since officially there is no "political prisoner" status, the government simply expands the arbitrary powers of prison authorities in order to intensify the victimization of far-left militants. Prisoners on death row, previously treated like remand (pretrial) prisoners, have now had all privileges withdrawn.

Changes to the Juvenile Law will mean that youths from eighteen to twenty years old, previously under its jurisdiction, will now be tried by a special procedure. This move is an obvious response to the success to Japan's revolutionary groups in attracting many young workers and students, and is a glaring contradiction in a country where the voting age is still twenty.

In addition to stepping up security measures at airports, the government intends to recall and replace all of the 5.6 million Japanese passports now in use. The reissuance of passports is an extension of the government's long-standing policies aimed at preventing Japanese militants from exchanging views with their counterparts in other countries. Although presented as simply an administrative procedure to prevent the circulation of forged passports, it can also be used by authorities to deny a passport to anyone suspected of being a "threat to public security."

The government has publicly announced the creation of a special unit of twenty to thirty officers within the National Police Agency for the express purpose of monitoring and combating the activities of the Red Army Faction. The authorities have been quick to stress that the new police squad will not be a commando unit like the one which killed the German

hijackers in Mogadishu, but will only be engaged in "surveillance of terrorist suspects in Japan."

With this very vague definition of its activities, the special unit presents a very real threat to the constitutional rights of all left activists, including those who are in no way sympathetic to terrorism as a political tactic. Of course the National Police Agency has had officers assigned to spy on left groups for a long time, but the public announcement of the formation of this unit is significant because it represents a deliberate attempt to legitimize this type of police activity, thus making it more difficult for political activists to defend themselves against it.

Among the many political organizations which claim to stand to the left of the SP and CP, the great majority have not made any public criticism of the Red Army's terrorist tactics. Indeed, the sectarian degeneration of many of the groups which evolved out of the New Left of the 1960s has left them so far out of touch with the consciousness of the masses of Japanese people that they did not even view the hijacking incident as a political event worthy of comment in their press.

One of the few groups which did make some statement was the Japan Revolutionary Communist League (Japanese section of the Fourth International). The October 17 issue of their paper *Sekai Kakumei* (World Revolution), carried an editorial spelling

out their position on the hijack.

The editors laid the blame for isolated acts of "inhuman violence" first of all on the capitalist government, which through its repressive policies drives small groups of people to commit desperate acts.

They denounced the traitorous role of the Social Democratic and Stalinist leaders who are working hand in hand with the bourgeois politicians, using the Red Army incident to teach the oppressed to trust the capitalist state and fear the revolutionary left. (The CP daily *Akahata* [Red Flag] refers to the Japanese Red Army Faction as "Trotskyites"—a designation the terrorists themselves emphatically reject.)

They repudiated the use of terrorist tactics in the present situation in Japan, and counterposed the JRCL's view of the tasks facing Japanese revolutionists:

At this time we must consciously prepare for revolution, which means we must smash the Fukuda government by developing a mass movement of workers and farmers through the struggle against the Sanrizuka [New Tokyo International] Airport. From this point of view, the activities of the Red Army aid Japanese imperialism and the Fukuda government in crushing the developing workers and farmers movement. The activities and existence of the Red Army are not only divorced from the Japanese and international revolutionary movements, but are in fact a huge obstacle to their progress.

We recognize that this [terrorist] tendency is a result of the incomplete development of the workers and farmers movement since the 1960s. The only way to overcome this tendency is to

develop a healthy, militant, and active mass movement.

These points were emphasized again in the next week's issue of *Sekai Kakumei*:

The strategy of the Red Army is different from the strategy of a working-class struggle against the bourgeois state. The most important thing is to make a principled stand, to organize the working class and anticapitalist forces in a mass movement to smash the bourgeois state and replace it with a workers state. We struggle from this standpoint, but the Red Army has given up this struggle in favor of terrorism . . . this terrorism simply focuses government repression on real working-class struggles, such as at Sanrizuka.

As he draws up the balance sheet of the hijacking incident, Prime Minister Fukuda must be feeling quite smug. In exchange for only \$6 million and six prisoners, he has been able to divert—at least temporarily—the rising consciousness of the masses, and step up his moves to isolate them from the revolutionary left.

This has happened at a crucial time for Japan's workers and farmers movement, which is preparing for a major test of strength against state power. The twelve-year struggle at Sanrizuka to prevent the opening of the New Tokyo International Airport will culminate next March, and could spell a massive defeat for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. This is the real political arena, and if this workers struggle is successful, it will be in spite of the Red Army's action, not because of it. □

Another Prison 'Suicide' Feared

Thousands in France Protest Extradition of Klaus Croissant

By Susan Wald

Klaus Croissant, a West German lawyer well known for his defense of the democratic rights of members of the Red Army Faction, was extradited by French authorities at midnight on November 16.

Croissant was taken to Stammheim prison to await trial on charges of "setting up and running a system of communications among prisoners belonging to a criminal organization." If convicted, he faces six months to five years in prison—provided, of course, that he escapes becoming a "suicide" victim like Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Carl Raspe, and Ingrid Schubert.

A storm of protest greeted the French government's decision to hand Croissant over to West German authorities. On the evening of November 18, 20,000 persons marched in Paris at the call of several

organizations, including the Committee to Free Klaus Croissant, United Socialist Party, Communist Workers Organization, Communist Committees for Self-Management, Revolutionary Communist Party, Union of Libertarian Communist Workers, French Democratic Confederation of Labor and the Revolutionary Communist League (French section of the Fourth International).

Demonstrations took place in other cities as well. There were turnouts of 1,500 in Caen, 1,200 in Rouen, 1,000 in Toulouse, 1,000 in Lyons, and 700 in Clermont-Ferrand.

An appeal signed by more than eighty prominent supporters of democratic rights, as well as the sponsoring organizations, appeared on the front page of *Rouge* on the morning of November 18, calling for

demonstrations that evening. Despite the short notice, the momentum gained in previous weeks by the campaign against extradition helped insure a large turnout.

On October 26, several thousand persons had filled the Mutualité meeting hall in Paris for a protest rally sponsored by several left organizations and the Judicial Action Movement, an organization of lawyers concerned with defending civil liberties.

On November 15, 6,000 persons demonstrated in Paris and nearly 2,000 in several other cities.

Lawyers' associations, in particular, were outspoken in their condemnation of the government's decision. About 100 members of the Union of French Lawyers, the Judicial Action Movement, and the French Association of Democratic Law-

yers demonstrated outside the Palace of Justice on November 16 when the public prosecutor's decision to extradite Croissant became known. These and other groups called a press conference the following day at the Paris headquarters of the League for Human Rights.

A representative of the Union of French Lawyers said that the court's decision meant that "a lawyer has been handed over for having seen to the defense of his clients."

Both the General Confederation of Labor and the French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT) issued statements condemning the extradition and pointing to its effect of undermining the fundamental democratic right to political asylum. The CFDT called for participation in the November 18 demonstrations.

However, the leaderships of the Communist and Socialist parties declined to back the protest actions, limiting their reply to a verbal denunciation of the extradition.

The breadth and immediacy of the response by civil-liberties groups, rank-and-file trade-union organizations, and others, indicated that a broad current of opinion in France opposes the government's complicity in the witch-hunt launched by the West German government.

In particular, they have pointed out that neither the French nor West German government has produced the slightest shred of evidence linking Croissant to terrorist actions carried out by the Baader-Meinhof group.

Croissant was arrested in Paris on September 29 on the basis of a September 10 West German arrest warrant accusing him of, among other things, being an accessory to murder and genocide, including conspiracy to set off a nuclear explosion.

The public prosecutor's office tacitly admitted the phoniness of these charges by basing its recommendation that Croissant be extradited on the lighter charge contained in an earlier warrant—that of aiding the exchange of information among prisoners belonging to the Red Army Faction.

A November 18 editorial in *Le Monde* said that the judges had based their decision on "a weighty record, but one in which assumptions replaced facts."

However, despite the obvious fact that Croissant was being pursued for his political views rather than for any supposed terrorist activity, and despite the unmistakable signs that extraditing him would ignite large protests, there was little doubt from the start that the French government intended to hand him over.

Minister of Justice Alain Peyrefitte signaled the government's intention by declaring, a few days prior to the final hearing before the public prosecutor: "It is not possible for France to become a land of

asylum for terrorists."

By complying with the extradition request, the political representatives of the French ruling class could earn their stripes in the international "antiterrorist" campaign. This they are eager to do, for it prepares the ground for similar antidemocratic actions against domestic political opponents.

Now that Croissant has been extradited, protest activities are centering around the conditions under which he is being held in Stammheim prison and the fact that his life may well be in danger.

On November 16, Croissant wrote a

letter to his attorney in which he stated:

"In view of the danger of my being extradited to the German Federal Republic and incarcerated in one of its prisons, I declare that, although I am familiar with the special-detention regime to which political prisoners in West Germany are subjected, which is designed to destroy their physical and psychic integrity and annihilate their political identity, I will never put an end to my life by committing suicide. If my death in a German prison should be discovered, it will never be by suicide. Do not believe the lies of the murderers." □

Greek Elections Reflect Increasing Polarization

By Gerry Foley

The Greek parliamentary elections held November 20 reflected the radicalization of the workers and poor petty-bourgeois strata that has accelerated in the past year. They reflected as well a slow recovery of confidence by the people after the fall of the dictatorship and the eclipse of the military *gorilas*.

The majority bloc that Caramanlis was able to put together in 1974 broke up. He had presented his government of the parliamentary right as the only viable alternative to a return of the dictatorship.

The vote for the "father of the people's" New Democracy fell from 54.37% to 41.85%, about the same as the vote in 1958 for his old party, the Radical Union (the traditional party of the right). The 1958 elections marked the beginning of the decline of the right that had established itself in power following the civil war. The New Democracy vote now, moreover, is only a few percentage points higher than the Radical Union vote in 1963 (39%), when its defeat opened up the Greek political crisis of the mid-1960s.

One of the reasons for the sharp drop in Caramanlis's vote was that the ultraright ran a serious independent campaign in this election, winning 6.82% of the poll, nearly all of which must have come from the constituency Caramanlis attracted in 1974. However, the total vote of the ultraright and New Democracy still equals only 48.67%, or 5.70% less than Caramanlis's vote in 1974 and less than a majority.

Although the New Democracy got a minority of the popular vote, the new electoral laws rammed through gave it 173 seats in a 300-seat parliament. In view of these laws, it would have been extremely difficult for the opposition parties to win a majority in the legislature, and the voters' understanding of this fact had an impact on the vote for all the parties.

Moreover, the workers and radicalized

masses found no clear alternative at the ballot box, and thus their growing combativity could be expressed only partially and indirectly by the results of the elections. Nonetheless, the vote showed that vast sections of the population are in motion and looking for a way to fight the Caramanlis regime. The parties that gained were those that seemed to promise the toughest opposition to the government.

The biggest winner was the party of Andreas Papandreou, the Panellenio Socialistiko Kinema (PASOK—Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement), a demagogic populist formation with some similarities to the Peronist movement in Argentina in the late 1950s and in the 1960s.

PASOK doubled its vote, going from 13.57% and 15 seats to 25.33% and 92 seats. It gained a position of absolute dominance among the parliamentary opposition parties, and Papandreou took advantage of this to call for a union of the entire opposition under his leadership.

Andreas Papandreou has something of the aura of a nationalist martyr and embattled hero of the poor that Perón had after he was toppled by the military in 1955. The right-wing offensive that prepared the way for the 1967 military coup was focused against him. He was portrayed as the center of a leftist conspiracy in the government headed by his father, Georgios Papandreou. This campaign was openly encouraged by Washington. And when the junta took over, Andreas was imprisoned.

In the 1974 elections following the fall of the junta, Andreas challenged Caramanlis's pretensions to be the sole savior of the nation in sharper language than the two CPs, and was denounced by them for his "irresponsibility." (In reality, he bowed to the rightist leader as "the only viable alternative," as the two CPs did).

Papandreou has projected the image of

an intransigent nationalist, as well as a more militant though "undogmatic" socialist than the representatives of the two CPs.

Actually Greek Stalinism helped pave the way for Papandreou's success. In the mid-1960s, it so tailed the Center Union party of his father that it not only lost substantial sections of its votes to this formation but began to lose its youth as well. Moreover, Papandreou has been in the best position to exploit the nationalist attitudes encouraged by the Stalinist parties.

In this election, Andreas Papandreou scored a decisive victory over the section of his father's party that refused to accept his leadership. While the Democratic Center Union got 20.42% in the 1974 elections, its vote dropped to 11.95% this time. It was reduced from 61 seats in parliament to 15.

The Democratic Center Union failed to differentiate itself clearly from the New Democracy. Its leader, Georgios Mauros, joined Caramanlis's first cabinet after the fall of the junta, and the party did not rule out the possibility of a repeat of such coalitions.

The divided Greek Stalinist movement remained marginalized. But within this sphere, the Communist Party (Exterior) succeeded in winning the overwhelming majority of the traditional CP vote. It won 9.36%, almost equaling the 9.47% scored in the 1974 elections by the bloc of the two CPs plus the Movement of the Democratic Left, the old CP electoral-front party. It won 11 seats in parliament, as opposed to 8 for the bloc in the previous elections.

The Exterior was the only party running under the name of the Greek Communist Party. The "Eurocommunist" CP (Interior) ran on the "Alliance" slate of five parties. One of these was the Union of the Democratic Left. The other three represented small independent groups that had allied themselves with the "Eurocommunists": Sosialistike Poreia (Socialist Road), a group that split from PASOK; Sosialistike Protoboulia (Socialist Initiative), a Social Democratic group that entered and then split from the Center Union; and the Christian Democracy, a group of radicalized Christians who opposed the dictatorship.

The Interior was unquestionably the predominant force in the Alliance, and the program of the bloc represented the basic program of Greek Stalinism, and thus did not differ from that of the CP (Exterior).

Although the polls had predicted 6% for the Alliance, as opposed to 8% for the CP (Exterior), the bloc ended up with only 2.72%. The prediction was in line with the relationship of forces between the two CPs shown by various indices. The outcome represented a decisive shift in favor of the Exterior.

In the November 27 issue of the Athens daily *Eleutherotypia*, Elias Eliou, chairman of the Alliance (and of the Union of the Democratic Left), said in an interview:

"The decline of the Democratic Center Union and the Alliance is the result of a feeling that a vote for these parties would be wasted and of illusions in the promises of PASOK."

In its November 24 issue, *Avge*, the daily that reflects the views of the Interior, complained that the Exterior had won votes by "crude revolutionary demagoguery" and "exploiting the most sacred feelings of Communists, who were called on to vote for the graves of thousands of our dead comrades," that is, for the party symbol on the ballot.

The Interior is in a good position to recognize the demagoguery of the Exterior's "tough" talk, since they come from the same tradition. They apparently failed to realize that it is hard to expose such demagoguery as long as both CPs remain relatively marginalized opposition parties. The Portuguese CP, which resembles the Exterior, was discredited only when it took responsibility for a government. A minority party has to project a clear image, which apparently is what the Interior failed to do.

The polarization in Greece is almost certainly going to continue. The Democratic Center Union is no longer in a position to present any kind of alternative. A single parliamentary right bloc should emerge. Likewise, any forces in the opposition without a clear socialist program and perspective will find it hard not to be drawn into the wake of the Papandreou forces.

Some commentators in the press are already predicting that at least a section of the Interior will join the Exterior, at the urging of both Moscow and the Italian CP leadership. □

To Head Off Spreading Strikes

Argentine Junta Forced to Grant Major Wage Increases

By D. Marcelo

[The following article appeared in the November 21 issue of *Perspectiva Mundial*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in New York. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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BUENOS AIRES—Beginning in mid-October, important sectors of the working class began to enter into struggle, despite a plethora of antilabor laws and fierce repression.

These mobilizations were preceded by several months of multiplying conflicts, which were of varying scope but were always limited in their extent. They remained isolated and were prevented from making any broader impact by the

censorship and self-censorship of the entire press. Many of these little wars, however, resulted in some victories for the workers, at least as regards one aspect of their struggle—the fight for higher wages.

Moreover, during the nineteen months of military rule the true face of the dictatorship's economic program has been revealed. In the last quarter, the phony arguments used by the regime in its attempts to conceal the continuing acceleration of an already high rate of inflation were exploded by economic reality. By the end of September, according to the government's own statistics, real wages had fallen to 60% of their March 1976 level. During the month of October, the official index of the price of an average worker's "market basket" rose by 14%.

Discontent began to be expressed openly in the unions, especially among public-sector and civil-service workers. At the same time, various sectors of the bourgeoisie itself began an unconcealed campaign against the excessive greed of the financial interests, whose major representative in the country, Martínez de Hoz, runs the Ministry of Finance.

In mid-October, the IKA-Renault workers in Córdoba demanded a 50% wage increase. The bosses countered with an offer of 15%. The workers rejected this and began a sit-down strike. The next day the army came into the factory and forced them back to work at bayonet point.

In one section of the plant, in an obvious provocation, an officer lectured the workers, telling them that they ought to

obey their superiors and not demand wage increases, just as soldiers do not go on strike for higher wages.

The reaction was immediate. All sorts of projectiles began to rain on the officer, and a pitched battle broke out. The military, needless to say, did not hesitate to open fire. The tragic result was that four workers were killed.

Although news of this event was totally blacked out by the press, even in the city of Córdoba itself, the workers responded with a massive walkout. The next day, October 14, they came to work, punched in, and immediately left the plant. Without any legal organization and facing ruthless repression, six thousand workers mobilized en masse and in a united way.

That same day, more than 130 workers had been prevented from entering the plant, and had in effect been fired.

The next day, the bosses, backed up by the minister of labor, announced in the daily papers that anyone who did not show up for work Monday [October 17] would be automatically fired, without the right to compensation of any kind. This was to be done on the basis of Law 21,400, also known as the "Industrial Security Act," under which workers can be dismissed and given sentences of up to nine years in prison for the simple act of joining together to make a demand on a boss or backing up such a demand by a show of strength.

Although the workers were forced to call off their strike, it lasted for four days and broke through the curtain of silence in the national press. The main newspapers began to write about the "threat of another Cordobazo,"* and noted signs of broad support for the IKA-Renault workers' action in several unions, which had already begun to organize to join in the struggle.

Furthermore, the IKA-Renault workers won a wage increase bigger than that initially offered by the company, and many of those who had been fired were reinstated. The management in a number of auto plants in Greater Buenos Aires tried to head off similar mobilizations by granting raises of up to 40%.

However, the main thing was that in the Córdoba conflict, the workers had managed to force their way back onto the streets and had raised the perspective of strikes in defense of wages for the entire country.

During the first three weeks of October, prices shot up, reflecting a 34% increase in fuel costs. In an attempt to deal with the crisis, interest rates were jacked up. Banks offered an annual rate of more than 230%

* This was the name given to the insurrectional general strikes in Córdoba in 1969 and 1971, which forced the Argentine bourgeoisie to abandon the previous military dictatorship and open up the way for a period of bourgeois democratic liberties. —IP

in an attempt to obtain funds to solve their growing liquidity problems.

Confronted with worker unrest and demands by the trade-union bureaucrats, the National Telephone Company granted an increase in real wages (by means of various bonuses) of 100%.

In the rail industry, workers' base pay was 2.6 million pesos a month, or US\$52 at the prevailing rate of exchange. In the context of the other struggles starting up, a railway strike broke out. The main demand was for a minimum wage of 10 million pesos.

A spontaneous work stoppage by the smallest union in the industry, the switchmen, on just one line in the national capital, spread immediately to the other two unions—the Unión Ferroviaria (Railway Workers Union), which organizes yard workers and is under military trusteeship; and the Fraternidad (Brotherhood), which organizes conductors and guards. The strike spread to the five other lines and did not remain confined to the capital but extended to the country's other main rail centers.

Two days later, the five subway lines in Buenos Aires joined the strike. Other unions of workers employed by the government joined in the struggle, including the ground crews of the airlines and 350 pilots, who threatened to resign en masse.

In Rosario, in addition to the railway workers, the workers in the National Grain Board operations, the water and electrical utilities, and on the docks went out on strike, along with members of the Association of Government Workers.

In the face of this widespread explosion, the government was paralyzed. Its internal contradictions came out into the open, and the press reported clashes between the ministers of labor and finance.

After the mobilizations, *La Nación*, the country's main daily, made a revealing analysis of the situation in its November 6 issue:

All the component parts of the vast government machinery [for dealing with labor conflicts] have to be reexamined, including the procedures used by the military trustees appointed to oversee the unions. It is not out of the question that the perspective of some of these trustees may have become distorted. This is understandable from a sociological standpoint. People have a tendency to adapt to conform to the role associated with positions. But in this case, such a tendency is hardly in accordance with the government's general political interests.

The problem for the government, however, was obviously not that the generals and colonels who have usurped the union leadership positions tended to overidentify with the workers. It was the social and political power of the workers' mobilizations. This is what threw the dictatorship off balance and forced not just the military officers 'leading' trade unions but the armed forces as a whole to negotiate.

On October 30, in its regular Sunday commentary, the army general staff said: "Let us think carefully. Natural and foreseeable differences of opinion . . . must not lead us into head-on confrontations, from which it will be difficult to pull back."

In other words, the military was trying to make a deal with the union bureaucracy by offering wage increases of 20% to 25%. But in this widening strike, the bureaucracy had little chance of being able to exercise any control.

Of course, the Coordinating Committee of Public Employee Unions, set up a few months ago by the bureaucracy to fill the void left when the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT—General Confederation of Labor) was put under military trusteeship, could not entirely fail to play a role. It has been trying to channel the unrest of the rank and file by issuing demands for wage increases.

However, the strike was called and maintained by going around and against the union leadership. From the very beginning, the bureaucracy tried to call off militant actions. But the activity of the ranks themselves outside the union structures brought the unions to life and enabled the workers to utilize these instruments—unquestionably the only ones that yet exist—to coordinate and carry through the struggle.

Assemblies of rank-and-file workers and workers delegates were held, where the bureaucracy was voted down time and time again. This is what made it possible for the conflict to continue to spread rapidly and on the initiative of the workers themselves. Caught between two fires, the bureaucracy, which was openly trying to stop the strike, was often forced by the rank and file to help them in their struggle.

This contradiction in the role of the bureaucracy had to be resolved quickly because the stakes were high and because signs were already appearing that the walkouts were developing into a general strike. (The workers in private mass-transit companies began to carry out isolated strikes, and other unions of state workers began to demand wage increases.)

However, the government was in a dilemma. If it cut off the "dialogue," throwing all its repressive force against the workers, as the minister of finance suggested, that would mean abandoning any attempt to reconstitute an effective union bureaucracy.

On the other hand, if it agreed to a sizable wage hike, that would mean giving up the attempt to balance the budget, letting inflation run rampant, opening the door to big increases in wage levels in all sectors, and, in a nutshell, altering its entire economic policy, which could not be done without bringing on a political crisis.

The government split over which road to take, giving the strikers some breathing

space. The bureaucracy proved powerless to control the rank and file, and this rang an alarm bell in the minds of the bourgeois ideologues.

The ultraconservative daily of the English-speaking community, the *Buenos Aires Herald*, which unconditionally backed the minister of finance, described the situation in stark terms in its October 30 issue:

The railway union leaders, such as heads of the Railway Workers Union, the Brotherhood, and the Switchmen's Association, were not behind this strike, and to hear them tell it, they do not support it. This may be a tribute to these labor leaders' sense of "responsibility," but it is not necessarily a good sign. If even the most respected union leaders, backed up by the massive weight of the military government with its arbitrary antistrike legislation, cannot keep the workers on the job, then things have taken a bad turn. . . . The long delay in carrying out a reform of the trade-union movement is dangerous.

After four days out on strike, the railway workers went back to work because the bosses promised to grant their demands. The subway workers, however, voted in an assembly to continue their strike as long as necessary to win their demands.

Meanwhile, of course, the repression was at work. There were arrests, kidnappings, and murders. But the step to be expected in such a situation, the drafting of the workers into the army, was not taken.

Moreover, the repressive measures that were resorted to proved to be counterproductive. A worker urging his fellow workers on the General Roca line to continue to struggle was murdered. The result was that the line did not accept the government's offer of a 40% raise and resumed the strike.

After staying out on an all-out strike for five days, the subway workers had agreed to return to work, just to comply with the formal requirement that the increase not be granted under the pressure of labor action. Then, when they heard about the arrest of some of their comrades, they immediately went out again en masse. Nor did the kidnapping of a leader of the light and power workers intimidate the 2,400 members of this union who had called a seventy-two-hour strike in Rosario.

On Wednesday, November 2, the struggle had been going on for eight days, and railway workers all over the country had gone back on strike after rejecting the government's offer. It was at this time that the minister of the interior—for the first time in nineteen months—clamped down prior censorship on the entire press. This was to prevent publication of the rumor going around in leading circles that the resignation of Martínez de Hoz had been called for.

The minister of finance did not resign. But the price he paid to keep his position was to abandon his own economic plan. It

had become impossible to hold the line any longer.

The state oil workers, private oil workers, retail and warehouse clerks, and post-office employees were all beginning to plan actions. Two private mass-transit lines essential for bringing workers into the capital city had been shut down.

Municipal workers walked off the job, raising demands that must have struck fear into the government and the bosses. They called for a minimum wage of 10 million pesos, restitution of social services, legal recognition of shop stewards assemblies, and rehiring of laid-off workers as well as defense of jobs.

The government, which had already announced a 100% increase in family allowances, granted wage raises of 38% to 43% to all the striking unions. It promised another big raise within sixty days and no reprisals. At the same time, it began to enforce Law 21,400, as it had been threatening to from the very beginning but had not yet dared do.

Pockets of resistance remained. The railway-yard workers in Rosario tried to keep up the struggle. But most workers went back to their jobs. Left isolated, the Rosario workers called off their strike, following a tumultuous mass meeting. The walkout had lasted twenty-four hours.

The limits of spontaneous action by the rank-and-file workers had been reached. A whole series of moves by the government and the union bureaucracy combined to bring the struggle to a halt before it could develop into a general strike.

Unexpected wage concessions by the government were combined with selective but bloody repression. Coercion was brought to bear by means of Law 21,400. Finally, the concessions gave the bureaucracy a basis for regaining control over the workers.

At the outset, the militancy of the workers swept over the obstacles placed in their way by the bureaucracy. The momentum of this upsurge made it possible for the workers to utilize the unions in their mobilization. But the absence of independent organization and a revolutionary political leadership gave the dictatorship and the bureaucracy the advantage they needed to regain control.

Despite all the shortcomings, there is not a shadow of a doubt that the outcome of this struggle was a resounding victory for the strikers and for the working class as a whole.

The dictatorship had summarily rejected wage increases for state workers. It ended up having to grant increases that in many cases, counting increments in family allowances, went as high as 60%, with the promise of additional increases within two months.

Such a settlement represents a mortal blow to the dictatorship's economic plan.

Most important, however, is the political result of the battle.

In fighting for a decent wage, the workers had to confront the dictatorship, to challenge all its laws and question the authority of the military government. And they did this so massively and with such power that they took even the most farsighted bourgeois leaders by surprise.

"This development should open up a new period of reflection about the course of the Process of National Reorganization," *La Nación* said.

"It was the workers who won this test of strength," the *Buenos Aires Herald* lamented.

"A new element will have to be taken into account in drawing the picture of the Process of National Reorganization," said *Clarín*.

"An irreversible process has begun," *La Opinión* said. "The collective-bargaining mechanism has started functioning again to determine wage adjustments."

La Nación adopted a weighty and ominous tone: "In the top echelons of the government they are trying to gauge what repercussions the recent railroad and subway strikes will have. . . . Something more than wages was at stake in these conflicts . . . we suspect that the full implications of the outcome have not yet been seen."

This is only the beginning for the workers. The dictatorship is still on the offensive, and will continue to press its advantage. But the first political result of this battle is going to be that the government will move more quickly to conclude agreements with the union bureaucracy and to "reorganize" the workers movement.

New and growing possibilities are going to open up for the working class to reorganize its forces independently and to fight the dictatorship every inch of the way for its democratic rights.

Along with this, there will be greater opportunities to build the revolutionary party of the working class by audaciously implementing the Transitional Program. □

Set Record Straight

Church officials attending the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in Washington, D.C., issued a statement November 16 condemning a study on sexuality made public last spring by a group of theologians. The study suggested easing the church's traditional ban on certain sexual activities.

The bishops' statement branded the report "deceptive and poor moral guidelines" to Catholics. It said that the church had always condemned as sinful "such behavior as fornication, adultery and masturbation."

Nigerian Junta Tightens Reins on Unions

By Ernest Harsch

Like its predecessors, the Nigerian military junta headed by Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo has promised to gradually end direct control of the government by the armed forces and return Nigeria to some form of civilian rule, tentatively by 1979.

At the same time, however, it is stepping up police measures, particularly against workers and students, in an effort to contain growing political and industrial ferment.

In September, Federal Commissioner for Labour Maj. Gen. Henry Adefope revealed that the economy had lost 600,000 working days through strikes in the two years up to July 1977. Out of a total of 883 reported trade-union disputes, 453 had resulted in strikes. This new round of labor unrest followed a massive strike wave in the first half of 1975 that wrested significant concessions from both the government and private employers.

Several weeks after General Adefope issued his report, oil workers at the Shell-British Petroleum installations at Forcados walked off their jobs to press demands for higher wages and improved service conditions.

The strike disrupted the pumping of crude oil from the oil terminal, in which the Nigerian government owns a 60 percent share, resulting in the loss of 800,000 barrels of oil a day, nearly a third of Nigeria's entire oil production. Oil, moreover, accounts for 93 percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings and 84 percent of its total exports.

In an effort to break the strike, army and police units were sent into the area, ostensibly to guard the installations from "sabotage" and to prevent the strike from spreading to oil workers in nearby Rivers State.

The Shell-BP and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria and the Senior Staff Association of Shell-BP were banned by the military regime, on the grounds that "the strike action called by the two bodies was calculated not only to disrupt and obstruct the smooth running of Shell-BP's operations but also disrupt the economy of the nation." Leaders of the banned unions were arrested, as were three television journalists who had covered the strike.

A representative of the workers was quoted in the government-owned *Nigerian Observer* as stating that the strike would continue until the disputed issues had been resolved. "Our struggle is for economic and social freedom," he said.

One factor fueling industrial unrest in Nigeria has been the junta's policy of freezing wages. Although wage increases of up to 7 percent were approved for some workers in June, the raises could not even begin to catch up with the 35 percent inflation rate.

The Nigerian working class has a long tradition of militancy and trade-union activism, despite numerous government restrictions. Of a labor force of about three million wage-earners, one million are organized in unions. But to limit the right of workers to organize freely and to bring them under tighter government control, the junta has instituted a series of new antilabor measures during the past two years.

In December 1975, General Adefope announced that the regime had decided to pursue a "policy of guided democracy in labour matters" that would "involve limited government intervention in certain areas of labour activity to ensure industrial peace, progress and harmony."

Less than two weeks later the junta drove its point home. On the eve of a trade-union congress in which the four main labor federations were planning to merge into one body, police arrested many delegates. Adefope declared that a tribunal would be set up to investigate the trade-union movement, because it had "become the haven for ill-informed and ill-motivated persons masquerading as trade union leaders."

As a justification for this attack on the working class, the regime charged that a number of union leaders had been guilty of "corruption."

In February 1977, eleven top trade unionists were banned from further union activities. One of them was Michael Imoudu, president of the National Union of Railway Workers of Nigeria, who was a veteran of the anticolonial struggle against British rule, a prominent labor leader since the 1940s, and a key figure in the general strikes of 1945 and 1964.

The entire trade-union movement itself is now being restructured under government control. The 1,870 previously existing unions (many of which were small and fragmented) are being reorganized into forty-three industrial unions. However, the general secretaries of the new unions are to be appointed, not elected. By early November, some 300 unions that did not fit into this reorganization scheme had been outlawed and more than 100 trade unionists had been barred from running for the

elected posts in the authorized unions.

In addition, a "code of conduct" has been issued that prohibits union officials from engaging in political activities or supporting political causes.

The Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Decree of 1976, moreover, bans virtually all strikes in what the regime describes as "essential services," that is, all government departments at both the federal and state levels, broadcasting and other communications, hospitals, ports, transportation, airports, and all services that supply electricity, water, or fuel. Union leaders violating the law can be imprisoned for up to five years.

The regime, however, has been confronted with some resistance to its new trade-union scheme. At their inaugural meetings, several of the new industrial unions defied the junta's guidelines and chose their own general secretaries. The Radio, Television, and Theatre Workers Union declared, "Secretaries cannot be imposed on us."

New repressive measures are also being enacted against students. The regime has announced that in some states troops will be sent into post-primary schools "to maintain discipline." The junta has also proposed the reintroduction of whipping in schools, and to make his point General Obasanjo personally whipped a student during a visit to a secondary school in Sokoto, supposedly because he was "shabbily dressed."

These moves are aimed at quelling the almost continual ferment among Nigerian students, who have staged frequent demonstrations, strikes, and other protests over the past few years. This unrest erupted most forcefully in April and May 1976, when a series of demonstrations and strikes over local issues swept several universities and colleges around the country.

E.A. Ayandele, the vice-chancellor of the University of Calabar, has complained about the growing rejection of established authority by young people in general, stating that "they have bad manners, they have contempt for adults, they show disrespect for the elders, and have become tyrants over their parents and teachers."

Some military figures have drawn apocalyptic conclusions from this. According to a summary of his remarks in the October 31 issue of the London weekly *West Africa*, Wing Commander Ikpebe,

the governor of Ondo State, warned during a public ceremony that the "growing decadence in Nigeria was such that if nothing was done about it, everybody might be swept away by the imminent deluge. . . ."

One reflection of the mood among Nigerian youth has been the tremendous popularity of Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, Nigeria's best-known musician. He is also one of the country's most prominent dissidents and his songs are sharply critical of the military regime, as well as of imperialist economic domination. His performances have frequently drawn clenched-fist salutes from audiences.

On February 18 of this year, however, about 1,000 troops attacked Fela's home in the Surulere slum area of Lagos, burned it, and beat him and scores of others, resulting in the hospitalization of about sixty persons in all. Fela, who had been arrested six times before, was again detained. Although he was later released, he has been barred from giving any further performances.

In the July 24 *New York Times Magazine*, correspondent John Darnton described some of the conditions in Nigeria that have helped produce the unrest. "The people are deserting the land and flooding into the cities," he said, "unemployment and inflation are running rampant, agricultural production is declining and the infrastructure—telephones, lights and water supply—is crumbling. . . ."

Darnton continued, "At the root of Nigeria's malady is the simple fact that so far the [economic] development has not bettered the existence of most of its people: One-half of 1 percent of the population controls 75 percent of the wealth."

Nigeria's military rulers now apparently realize that repression, by itself, is insufficient to maintain control indefinitely over a country of between 70 and 80 million, which has enormous economic problems and which has been marked in the past by civil war, coups, assassinations, and massive strikes. The junta's promise to restore civilian rule by 1979 is no doubt designed to defuse the unrest, channel grievances in a parliamentary direction, and head off the emergence of any major challenge to authoritarian rule.

As the recent repressive measures signify, however, the junta does not intend to allow, in Obasanjo's words, the development of "indiscipline, lawlessness and disorder." Obasanjo has made it clear that the transition period to a civilian regime will be closely regulated.

In October 1976, a Constitution Drafting Committee appointed by the junta published a draft constitution for the proposed civilian regime. It specifically rejected provisions for the safeguarding of freedom of the press and expression and provided that the regime would be headed by an executive president with sweeping

powers. Furthermore, as Ndele Jinadu, a professor at the University of Lagos, pointed out, "The Draft Constitution as it is now is heavily weighed in favour of the propertied and entrepreneurial class. . . ."

In early 1977, elections were held to



New African Development

M. A. O. IMOUDU: Veteran leader of rail workers banned from union activity.

establish local government councils. A majority of the councils, however, were not directly elected. These councils then formed an electoral college from which the majority of members of a Constituent Assembly were chosen August 31. Of the 203 members of the assembly, 20 were nominated by the military regime, and the 49 chairmen of the junta's Constitution Drafting Committee subcommittees were given automatic seats. This Constituent Assembly is entrusted with the task of debating and approving the draft constitution.

Chief Rotimi Williams, the chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, conceded that even after the constitution is approved, the military regime could "by decree supersede or purport to supersede or modify the constitution as enacted by the Assembly."

The debate over the constitution, both within the assembly and through the press and public meetings, has been greatly constrained by the continued ban on all political parties. The junta has promised to lift the ban in time for the projected elections, but only after the constitution has been approved. Even then, there will still be restrictions on parties, including those that may seek to represent the interests of one or another of Nigeria's various nationalities.

Fearing that the moves toward a civilian regime could get out of hand, the junta warned November 18 against any

unauthorized revival of political activities. An official statement stressed that the ban on politics would be lifted only after the conditions for the establishment of parties had been published, warning that anyone who violated the ban would be dealt with severely.

"It has been observed," the statement said, "that some people have been organizing political meetings in the country under the guise of social associations and solidarity unions, under which they engage in political activities."

In other words, the return to civilian rule—if it actually takes place—will be marked by a form of "guided democracy," under which a powerful and centralized administration will govern the country with the aid of some "democratic" trappings. Moreover, the military itself would continue to exercise considerable influence from the wings.

In a speech at the opening of an armed forces college in Jaji, Obasanjo outlined the junta's current thinking. According to the November issue of the London monthly *New African Development*, he declared that Nigerian society was now "not sufficiently disciplined." He went on to explain, "To me discipline is restraint and self-control in individuals for the good and happiness of all. It is the axial principle on which my idea of society rests."

Laying out the guidelines for behavior expected from the Nigerian masses, he said, "A politically disciplined society knows its political obligations and these obligations and duties are rendered without government invoking sanctions." The implicit threat, of course, is that without such "discipline," the military would again step in directly to maintain "order."

Stressing the need for austerity as part of the regime's economic plans, he said, "As a nation we must moderate our consumption, make sacrifices and save resources for investment." The new restrictions on the trade-union movement may thus be aimed at preparing the way for an even greater assault against the living standards of the working class.

Obasanjo's call to Nigerians to "make sacrifices" apparently does not apply to the armed forces themselves. In the 1977-78 budget, half of all expenditures are allocated for the military and police forces.

Signaling its approval of Obasanjo's "human rights" policy, the Carter administration is now seeking to further bolster his arsenal. According to the October 31 *West Africa*, the Defense Department has announced that it plans to sell seven Boeing Ch-47C military transport helicopters and support equipment to the Nigerian junta. Valued at an estimated \$45.5 million, the sale would amount to more than twice the total American military sales to Nigeria since 1950. □

Selections From the Left

rouge

"Red," revolutionary communist daily, published in Paris.

The October 25 issue contains an interview with José Sandoval, a long-time central leader of the Spanish Communist Party. Sandoval was instrumental in marshaling support for Santiago Carrillo within the Spanish CP when Carrillo's book, "Eurocommunism" and the State, came under fire from the Kremlin.

The interviewer commented on the fact that in his book Carrillo used some of the same terminology that Trotskyists have used in analyzing the nature of the Soviet state, referring, for example, to the ruling caste in the Soviet Union as a bureaucratic layer. He asked whether this reflected any rethinking on the part of the Spanish CP with regard to Trotskyist positions.

Sandoval replied:

"I cannot speak for Santiago Carrillo. Rather, on this point, I am going to give you my personal opinion. I think that the entire evaluation of Trotskyism that was made under Stalin was wrong, unacceptable. . . . Today we consider that Trotskyism is a current that has sprung from the complex ideological struggle that took place inside the Soviet Communist Party, and one that has been transformed into a genuine current in the workers movement. Personally, I think that many aspects of Trotsky's criticisms of Stalin were correct. History has proven this.

"Perhaps the most instructive proof came from the Soviet CP itself, at the time of Khrushchev's report to the Twentieth Congress. He pointed out everything that was insane and repressive in the phenomenon we call Stalinism. In light of this, a series of judgments and evaluations made by Trotsky were historically justified. This is my personal viewpoint."

I MAYIS

"May 1," the paper of the Turkish lumber workers union, published monthly in Ankara.

This paper is offset from a hand-printed original. On the masthead are the slogans "Workers of the World Unite" and "The Liberation of the Working Class Will Be the Act of the Working Class Itself."

Featured on the front page of the September issue is an open letter to the Republican People's Party of Bülent Ecevit, which won a large plurality in the general elections but was kept out of the government by a bloc of all the right-wing

parties.

The ruling rightist coalition is gravely discredited and lacks a credible mandate for running the country. Thus, it is in a politically very weak position in the face of a galloping economic crisis and a mass upsurge of the workers and poor masses. So, sections of the Turkish ruling class have been pressing for a national coalition in which Ecevit's party would participate as a minority.

In the open letter, Hosca Kalin writes:

"In the June 5 elections, a large majority of us workers voted for you [the Republican People's Party]. But you should know that we did not do this because we think you are going to establish socialism. The Republican People's Party is not a socialist party.

"We supported you only because no working-class party exists that embraces broad sections of the working class. You made certain commitments to us. You promised to outlaw lockouts, to pass a law granting the right to organize general strikes, and you promised to call the fascists to account. At bottom our problems go far beyond these questions, but you could not deal with these as we think necessary. . . . We have not organized in a party today, but we did not want a new National Front Government [as the right-wing coalition calls itself]. We saw preventing the return of such a government as a goal of our struggle in the elections. That is why we voted for the Republican People's Party.

"But now you cannot form a government. . . . You did not accede to our demand to mobilize the masses so that you could get your vote of confidence [in parliament]. You said that 'men of honor in the other parties will support us in the vote of confidence.' . . . But we told you not to make any deals with the bosses. We supported you for the sake of our struggle against them. Finally, you propose a partnership with the Justice Party [the main rightist party, led by Suleyman Demirel]. You should know that this opens the way for your losing our conditional support. Do not forget that. . . .

"Our aim is socialism. But we cannot get that in this parliament, with these parties, with these politicians, and with this system. But at least we will struggle to block this parliament's working against us. In this parliament, your party has the largest number of members. If you are attentive to our demands, if you stand with us in our struggle, you will retain our conditional support.

"In the coming period, the workers will fight for the following objectives:

"We will resist the attacks of the National Action Party and the corps of Idealists [the fascist gangs, also known as

the "Grey Wolves"] and break up these nests of fascists.

"We will smash the attacks of the capitalists on our economic and democratic rights; we will defend our neighborhoods, and move forward.

"We will struggle for repeal of the antilabor law on strikes and lockouts. We will fight for totally outlawing lockouts and for the unconditional right to strike.

"We will struggle for abolition of all antidemocratic provisions such as Clauses 13, 17, and 25.

"We will strive to get the limitations on socialist propaganda in Clauses 141 and 142 repealed.

"We will smash all attempts to deprive us of the right to organize.

"We will organize politically in our own parties.

"These are only some of our objectives. Keep your ears open to what we say. Do not join any coalition behind our backs. Don't forget, you need us, we don't need you."

ПРАВДА

"Pravda" (Truth), organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Published daily in Moscow.

Along with the Communist parties of the U.S., Canada, and Luxembourg, the small Irish Communist Party (about 200 members) is a supporter of the Kremlin in its dispute with the "Eurocommunists." In its November 12 issue, *Pravda* paid tribute to the Irish CP general secretary, Michael O'Riordan, on his sixtieth birthday. The article was entitled "Illustrious Son of the Irish People." It said, among other things:

The outstanding feature of the Irish Communists is their strong feeling of internationalist duty. A fiery workers' tribune, Michael O'Riordan has consistently defended the unity of the international Communist and workers movement on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. In his articles and speeches, he expresses great appreciation of the support given by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and all Soviet citizens to the peoples who are waging a struggle against imperialism and fascism, for peace, democracy, and social progress. In his article on the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution, he wrote: "No other party, no other government, has followed the principles of proletarian internationalism as selflessly as the peoples, the party, and the government of the fatherland of Great October."

Constantly propagating the experience of the USSR, the example of the peace-loving foreign policy of the country of the soviets, the successes of existing socialism, including the solution of the national question—one of the most burning questions in Ireland—the general secretary of the CPI has constantly stressed their enormous

historical importance and revolutionizing effect on world history. . . .

He has constantly stressed that the achievements of the USSR are the triumph of the world Communist movement and of all progressive humanity, and that it is the duty of every Communist to expose the slanders of the bourgeoisie aimed at blackening the magnificent achievements of the Soviet Union and to firmly oppose anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism. He has stressed that it is the duty of every Communist to show the falseness of those 'theories' designed to divert the peoples from the path marked out by the party of Lenin sixty years ago.

LUTTE OUVRIERE

SOUS LE PATROCINE DES TRAVAILLEURS DU QUÉBEC
SOUS L'INFLUENCE DE LA SCISSURE

"Workers Struggle," a fortnightly paper published in Montréal. Presents the views of the Ligue Ouvrière Révolutionnaire/Revolutionary workers League.

In the October 26 issue, Danielle Frégault reports on the third congress of the Groupe Socialiste des Travailleurs du Québec (Socialist Workers Group of Québec), which was held on October 6-10 in Montréal. The LOR/RWL was invited to send a delegation to observe the congress and present greetings.

The congress showed that on a number of points, a process of political convergence is taking place between the two organizations, Frégault writes:

"... [The GSTQ] adopted the perspective of struggling for the independence of Québec, and the slogan 'For a free republic of Québec.' It thereby recognized not only the importance of the national question in the struggle to dismantle the Canadian state, but also the need for revolutionists in Québec to concretize the Marxist principle of the right of nations to self-determination through the fight for independence.

"The LOR, which puts forward the perspective of independence and socialism and of a workers' republic of Québec, certainly welcomes the taking of this position. . . .

"Another example of the favorable evolution of the GSTQ's positions is its recognition of the importance of the fight for free abortion on demand. The GSTQ is clearly determined to see the unions take up this struggle, and to participate in the mass movement around this demand. As on the question of independence, this opens the way to concrete, united work on the part of the LOR and the GSTQ. . . .

In addition, the convergence between the two organizations is reflected in the joint campaign of the LOR and of the Rally of Youth for Socialism, the independent youth organization in political solidarity with the GSTQ, in student elections at the University of Québec in Montréal, on the basis of a common platform.

"GSTQ and LOR trade-union activists are collaborating as well, particularly within the Caucus of Trade-Union

Militants, in the struggle for a mass labor party based on the unions.

"Several delegates at the GSTQ congress called attention to the importance of this common work. Both the collaboration and the political convergence were mentioned in the LOR's greetings as an indication of the possibility and necessity for the LOR and GSTQ to consistently aim for unity in action, as well as to continue the political discussion without either compromises or sectarianism on the questions that still need to be clarified or on which differences persist.

"In the view of the LOR, the aim of this process is to seriously explore the possibility of fusion between the GSTQ and the LOR."

Militant

DIRECT ACTION

Socialist weekly published in Sydney, Australia. Presents the views of the Communist League and the Socialist Workers Party.

Jim McIlroy reports in the November 17 issue on the results of the state elections in Queensland November 12. Federal elections are to be held in Australia December 10, so the Queensland results may be indicative of voting trends across the country.

"For the second week running, the growing national support for Labor has been shown. . . . The swing to the ALP [Australian Labor Party] from the 1974 State election disaster is 7.3 per cent, giving Labor an overall vote of 43.3 per cent. . . .

"Undoubtedly, the Liberal Party [which heads the ruling coalition on the federal level] has been the major loser in this election, with a swing of 8.2 per cent away from its candidates in the Brisbane region. This is a reaction by urban voters, both working class and middle class, to the reactionary policies and actions of the State government—and especially Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen."

The Bjelke-Petersen government in Queensland has spearheaded the Australian ruling class's attacks on the living standards of working people and on civil liberties. On September 4, Bjelke-Petersen imposed a ban on political street demonstrations; since then there have been frequent police attacks on civil liberties and anti-uranium-mining demonstrations in Brisbane.

"... the ALP leadership have continually backtracked before these right-wing policies," McIlroy said.

"Yet it has been precisely the mass mobilisation against uranium mining and against Bjelke-Petersen's attacks on civil rights which have given impetus to the swing to labor in Queensland.

"Labor's do-nothing stand on these

issues has in fact *limited* that swing rather than, as the conservative-minded ALP brass pretend, increased it."

THE MILITANT

A socialist weekly published in the interests of the working people. Printed in New York City, New York.

An article by Steve Clark in the November 18 issue comments on recent evidence that disillusionment with Carter is growing among working people and Blacks, those groups that voted most heavily to elect him to office one year ago:

"According to the latest *New York Times-CBS* News poll, Carter's overall approval rating slipped to 55 percent in October from 62 percent in July and 66 percent in January. The poll is taken quarterly.

"Carter's promise to 'put America back to work' was his biggest selling point during the 1976 campaign. Jobs were a major thing on the minds of 87 percent of those who voted for him, according to an NBC News poll at the time. And that issue helped him win more than 60 percent of all trade-union voters.

"Today the *Times-CBS* poll reports, only 36 percent of those interviewed think that Carter will be able to 'reduce unemployment to any real extent' . . .

"The official jobless rate for Black workers in October was *higher* than it was a year ago, while the level for white workers was only a percentage point lower. . . .

"This helps to explain another finding in the *Times-CBS* poll: the precipitous drop in Carter's popularity among Blacks. The new poll shows that only 57 percent of Blacks now approve of Carter's handling of the job. . . .

"The slide in Carter's popularity among Blacks certainly also reflects their disillusionment over White House attacks on affirmative-action quotas, busing plans and the availability of federal Medicaid funds for abortions.

"Carter also promised to restore trust in government. Last April, according to the *Times-CBS* poll, nearly 70 percent of those interviewed thought he could.

"But today that figure has dropped to 51 percent. . . .

"Most recently there is the decision by the Carter 'Justice' Department to forego perjury charges against former CIA Director Richard Helms because the trial might 'jeopardize national security.' Helms had lied to a Senate committee about the CIA's role in plots to overthrow the elected government of Chile.

"... the kid-glove treatment of Helms doesn't quite jibe with Carter's statement in his acceptance speech at the Democratic Party Convention that 'I see no reason why big-shot crooks should go free, while the poor ones go to jail.'"

Provisional Sinn Fein Holds Congress in Dublin

By Gerry Foley

The *ard-fheis* (national congress, pronounced ard-ESH) of Provisional Sinn Féin was held in Dublin over the weekend of October 22-23. The annual event held special interest for revolutionists this year.

This was the second Provisional *ard-fheis* since the degeneration and breakup of the "Official" republican movement left the Provisionals in a position of unchallenged dominance in the anti-imperialist movement. It was the first since important signs began to appear that the long decline in the combativity of the Irish people was ending.

The anti-imperialist struggle went into a downturn in late 1972, following the disappearance of the mass movement for democratic rights for the nationalist Catholic population in the British enclave of Northern Ireland. It reached a low point in 1976. In 1977, the tide began to turn, in particular in the formally independent part of the country.

It became clear that there was a growing uneasiness among the population about the extent of the repression and about the failure of the openly proimperialist government to deliver on its promise of prosperity. In June 1977, the ruling coalition in Dublin was overwhelmingly defeated in the parliamentary elections.

The 1977 Provisional *ard-fheis* seemed to reflect this change in the political situation in the formally independent part of the country. This gathering was larger than last year, and there was not as much open police intimidation.

Nonetheless, the crowd appeared smaller than at the 1972 Provisional *ard-fheis*, held when the general downturn was just beginning. Maximum attendance at any one point was around 500. This was about the same number as attended the "Official" *ard-fheis*, which was held in the same hall in 1972. However, a smaller proportion of the members of the Provisional republican movement belong to the political organization than was the case in the "Officials."

Nonetheless, the attendance at this assembly must have represented a very substantial proportion of those who can be considered members of the Provisional republican movement in a political sense. There were two delegates from each *cumann*, or local unit, plus the national and regional leaders and rank-and-filers who asked permission to attend. In theory, the *cumann* are supposed to have about twelve members. Less than half those present were voting delegates.

In the past year in particular, an increasing interest in socialist ideas and revolutionary struggles outside Ireland has been expressed in the statements of Provisional leaders and in the press that reflects the Provisional point of view. This was another reason why this year's *ard-fheis* took on special political significance.

In June, the leadership of the Provisional movement seemed to announce the beginning of a political turn. This was done at the commemoration of the birth of Wolfe Tone, who is considered the founder of republicanism. These annual ceremonies are usually the biggest mobilization of the republican movement's members and supporters during the year.

The keynote speaker at the Tone commemoration this year was Jimmy Drumm, a veteran Belfast republican and husband of one of the most popular Belfast republican leaders, Máire Drumm, who was murdered by a Loyalist assassination squad in October 1976. He said, in part:

We find that a successful war of liberation cannot be fought exclusively on the backs of the oppressed in the Six Counties [of Northern Ireland], nor around the physical presence of the British army. Hatred and resentment of this army cannot sustain the war, and the isolation of socialist Republicans around the armed struggle is dangerous and has produced at least in some circles, the reformist notion that "Ulster" is the issue, which can be somehow resolved without the mobilisation of the working class in the 26 counties [of the formally independent area].

We need a positive tie in with the mass of the Irish people who have little or no idea of the sufferings in the North because of media censorship and the consolidation of conservatism throughout the country. We need to make a stand on economic issues and on the everyday struggles of people.

The forging of strong links between the Republican Movement and the workers of Ireland and radical trade unionists will create an irrepressible mass movement and will ensure mass support for the continuing armed struggle in the North and will make for a competent force in the event of serious conflict.

Republican News, the Belfast weekly that reflects the views of the Provisional republican movement, has run many articles expressing militant socialist views and an interest in struggles in other countries against imperialism and capitalism.

Moreover, in the months preceding this year's *ard-fheis* a debate developed in the pages of *An Phoblacht*, a Dublin weekly reflecting the Provisionals' views, over the

question of socialism and relations between the struggle of the Irish people and that of other oppressed peoples.

One such debate, in the letters column, was touched off when *An Phoblacht* published a report of a statement by the Socialist Workers Party candidate for mayor of New York City, Catarino Garza. Garza denounced attacks on the Irish movement in the U.S. by so-called Irish-American politicians such as New York State Governor Hugh Carey. He also said that Carey's stab in the back should show Irish national liberation fighters and their supporters that they could not get very far relying on such bourgeois politicians. He advised them to make common cause with the oppressed in the United States, in particular the Blacks.

Garza's statement was reported prominently in *An Phoblacht*, and this prompted a right-wing Irish-American figure, Tom Duffy, to write a letter to the editors, condemning them for publicizing such views. He was answered very sharply by letters from other Irish-American readers, such as Cathal Seán O hAire, who said:

Unfortunately, the Irish support movement in America is full of people with Mr. Duffy's attitudes, to which I respectfully feel the Republican Movement sometimes caters, and this is one of the reasons why it is next to impossible to bring young Irish-Americans into the movement or to do any kind of solidarity work.

Readers in Ireland also objected to the coverage given to socialist points of view in *An Phoblacht*. A letter by one, who signed himself "Disgusted Student," was published in the July 13 issue. He wrote:

... I reject completely that the Republican Movement always was inclined to the left. At a time when this was happening we felt it was time to part company with the "Officials." Remember the split?

In the August 17 issue of *An Phoblacht*, "Disgusted Student" was answered in the following terms by a group of Provisional IRA prisoners in an English jail:

The vast majority of Irish political hostages in English gaols would vehemently object to your assertion that they are "not rotting for the cause of the red flag." . . . the political hostages in this prison strongly contend that the "green" can realise its full potential only through incorporating "the cause of the red."

In its article on the upcoming *ard-fheis*, the October 19 issue of *An Phoblacht*

promised: "Lively Debate Certain." The unsigned article also introduced another controversy. It pointed to what the author or authors considered political weaknesses from a republican point of view in the resolutions that had been submitted for discussion by the local units.

The first problem noted was that there was a tendency to call for making demands on the Dublin government, which according to the traditional republican outlook is a usurper regime and cannot be recognized as a legal authority. The article said:

Consider Rún [resolution] 130: That Sinn Féin demand the nationalisation of all our national resources (etc.)

Demand from *WHOM*? Are we forgetting our loyalties, our allegiance, prepared to demand something from a regime the legitimacy of which we deny?

The second tendency the article disapproved of was the following:

Consider this amazing Rún 154: That Sinn Féin reject the concept of party rule which is the hallmark of so called "western style parliamentary democracy." That we do not aim to attain power in this country *as a political party* (our italics), but by seeking to give real power to the people . . . we are seeking to remove the necessity for the existence of Sinn Féin as a "party style organisation."

They may have a point but it does not come across here. Sinn Féin's policy is to come to power democratically and, having come to power, to put its policies, those of a political party, into effect. . . .

There was, thus, no lack of political questions that obviously needed discussing in the Provisional ard-fheis. Very little debate, however, took place. At most the assembly served as a sounding board. It also pointed up the difficulties the Provisionals are having in concretely implementing the orientation projected by Jimmy Drumm toward involvement in workers struggles.

In the first place, the traditional way of organizing debate at republican ard-fheiseanna tends to promote diffuseness and arbitrariness in deciding what questions will be discussed. The agenda is made up of resolutions submitted by the cumainn, as well as by various leadership bodies. This year's *clár*, or agenda, included 209 resolutions.

Among the resolutions were such proposals as the following: "That more emphasis be placed on the positive aspects of Sinn Féin policy in An Phoblacht and less valuable space wasted on negative criticism of the 'Free State' administration." "That the True Gaelic way of life be restored. Sinn Féin functions should be of an Irish-Ireland nature and no foreign dances allowed." "That a Telex Machine be installed in Ard-Oifig [National Headquarters].

Obviously not all these resolutions could be debated. A committee chosen prior to the ard-fheis decided which would be

brought to the floor. The time for discussion was very limited. For example, forty-five minutes was allotted to all organizational questions, and a half an



Republican News

SINN FEIN PRESIDENT O BRADAIGH

hour for foreign affairs. Much of this time, moreover, was taken up in reports by national officers. Contributions from the delegates were limited, in general, to three minutes.

Some motions of a clearly controversial nature did not reach the floor, for example, the following:

"That Sinn Féin within the next twelve months, draw up and publish a policy on matters of Divorce and Contraception."

The point on youth work was dropped altogether, although the leadership's report had pointed to general failure in this area in the preceding year.

The vagueness of the debate indicated that there had not been systematic prior discussion in the local units. At best such discussion could be quite uneven and fragmentary because of the division of the organization into so many small cumainn. Some delegates did raise suggestions that preparatory discussions take place on a broader basis in the future. Representatives of the national leadership replied that such proposals were impractical.

The "Official" republican leaders had begun to grapple with developing better methods for organizing discussion at ard-fheiseanna before their organization went into crisis in 1973-74. However, they found themselves confronted with political problems that they were unable or unwilling to resolve by democratic debate. They overcame this difficulty by instituting a Stalinist-style regime and driving away the bulk of their membership.

Although the possibilities for debate

were somewhat limited at the Provisional ard-fheis, it was obvious that the delegates were neither passive nor intimidated. Political confrontation occurred. Some organizational weaknesses and past failures were frankly admitted.

A confrontation occurred over the following resolution: "That this Ard-Fheis accepts that Sinn Féin is a non-Marxist Revolutionary Party, and fully endorses the stated policies as outlined in the *Eire Nua* programme." The hall divided sharply on this question. The problem was resolved, however, by changing the resolution to simply reaffirm support for "Eire Nua," the program that the Provisionals adopted after the split in the republican movement in 1969. No doubt both sides continue to hold their own views about what relation this program has to Marxism.

A similar confrontation occurred when a veteran republican delegate from Ballyshannon urged the movement not to become "entangled with international socialism or communism," saying: "We are not engaged in a class struggle but a mass struggle." Another delegate, some decades younger, replied that James Connolly was one of the greatest republicans and he believed the Irish struggle was a class struggle.

Both speakers were fervently applauded. The defender of class struggle got somewhat louder support. But there was clearly very substantial opposition to the movement adopting definite socialist positions.

The president of Sinn Féin, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, took part in this discussion. He said that he did not know what the dispute over terms was about, but that the republican movement supported the vast majority of the Irish people against the 5 percent who held 70 percent of the wealth, and if anyone wanted to call that "class struggle," they were welcome to do that. Ó Brádaigh's remarks ended the confrontation on this point.

The crowd was divided essentially between two large strata, veteran republicans in their fifties and sixties and younger people in their twenties and early thirties. At the time of the 1969 split, most of the older republicans went with the Provisionals. The younger people joined the movement in the upsurge of militant nationalism that began in that year.

The national leadership belongs mostly to the older group. At one point, Daithí Ó Conaill, a man of about forty, referred to himself as probably close to the youngest member of the *Ard-Chomhairle* (National Executive). At the time of the 1969 split, most of his generation of leaders went to the "Officials."

Ó Conaill is an extremely polished and effective speaker. He tended to identify himself more strongly than the other national leaders with left-wing positions. He got great applause when he rose to

speak.

Among the older generation at the ard-fheis, there was very vocal and emphatic opposition to any turn toward clearly socialist or internationalist positions. This was expressed under a number of points on the agenda, and in particular in the discussion on *An Phoblacht*. These objections were at times accompanied by threats, such as "we're watching you." This determined rightist opposition, though apparently a minority, was quite large.

On one question, there has been striking evolution in the Provisionals since the 1969 split. One of the issues in the break with the "Official" leaders, then the leadership of the movement as a whole, was traditionalist protests against their dropping the principle of refusing to recognize the courts in political cases. Adhering to this principle had meant accepting automatic sentences.

In this year's Provisional ard-fheis, traditionalists complained that the movement was backsliding on the principle of nonrecognition of the courts. However, this protest was virtually shouted down by young delegates. Obviously, the membership is not willing to accept automatic sentences when many hundreds of republicans and their supporters are being jailed for long terms.

There was still strong sentiment for abstaining in elections, however, and this seemed strongest among the younger people from the North. The views they expressed tended to approximate traditional anarchist positions. They argued that running for office was in contradiction to the movement's aim to destroy the existing Irish states. They called for building "people's organizations" from the ground up to replace the present state institutions.

Older republicans reminded the younger ones that the movement was opposed only to the "partition states," since these stand in the way of the jurisdiction of the republican government established in 1919 over the whole of Ireland.

The republican position is that the legislature elected in 1918 swore allegiance to an all-Ireland republic and thus had no right to settle for anything less. When the majority later accepted partition, they simply disqualified themselves, and the authority of the republic devolved on the anti-treaty minority, who passed it on to the Army Council of the IRA. Accordingly, while republicans may not recognize the parliaments established by partition, they are free to run in local elections and serve on elected local bodies.

Some older republicans carried their argument against abstaining in local elections further. They maintained that local governments are genuinely democratic because they are close to the people. They maintained that the decentralized form of government

advocated by "Eire Nua" meant that rather than being for doing away with the existing local governments, republicans were for creating more local government bodies and transferring the powers of the existing states to them.

A number of delegates talked about a need to build "people's assemblies" and a "people's" police force (to maintain order in the Catholic ghettos in the North). O Conaill said that the formation of such assemblies in Portugal from May to November 1975 had been an example of the people beginning to take control of their own lives, and that the CIA broke the People's Assemblies the same way it did the Allende regime in Chile.

However, no concrete proposals were put forward to develop any such organs of "people's power." Previous attempts by the Provisional republicans to form parallel-government bodies have been notably unsuccessful.

On the other hand, there were few if any concrete proposals for intervention in the struggles of workers and other poor strata. There was only a general point on the agenda on "Community Involvement." Virtually all the resolutions under this heading were appeals to members to pay more attention to community affairs or to join unions. The specific proposals made were to establish Community Advice Centers and co-operatives.

The perspectives for the coming year were presented in the speech of the president, which is not considered a report subject to approval or rejection. The proposals contained in it, however, were discussed and voted on under other points.

O Brádaigh sought to focus the work of the organization on the 1978 local elections in the twenty-six county area and on a campaign against Dublin's membership in the Common Market, centering on the upcoming elections for the European parliament. He had said earlier in the discussion of the resolution on the anti-Common Market campaign that if the movement did not involve itself in this work, the issue would be left to people such as "Mr. Mac Giolla" (president of "Official" Sinn Féin).

O Brádaigh said:

Fighting this campaign will be hard, expensive and will put strains on the organization which will be without precedent in our time. But it could also present an opportunity for growth and development, for gaining the leadership of the people at every level, and for funnelling the massive pockets of dissent and disillusionment that we see all around us.

O Brádaigh obviously saw the need for campaigns aimed at the masses of Irish people who do not now support the Provisionals' political views and still less their methods. The perspectives he outlined could have been adopted just as well by an organization that had nothing to do with any military activities. Thus, he

clearly does not expect the "military struggle" to change anything this year.

However, the Provisional leadership made an obvious effort to squash rumors that it was contemplating a cease-fire. The statements made in the ard-fheis were followed by articles in *An Phoblacht* stressing that the "war" was continuing and the commanders were confident of victory.

This year's ard-fheis was marked by progress in developing international contacts. Delegations were present from the political organizations in solidarity with ETA [Euzkadi ta Askatasuna—Basque Nation and Freedom], and from the Corsican National Liberation Front.

Speaking from the platform, one of the Basques said:

You will always find the support of our party and our country for you to obtain a reunited and socialist republic. . . .

Long live Ireland. Long live a free and socialist Basque country! Warm revolutionary greetings to you and the Irish people!

The Basque speaker got a standing ovation.

Messages also came from the National Front of Catalonia, Jean-Paul Sartre's Committee Against a Europe Dominated by Germany and America, the Breton National Front, the Breton Republican Army, the Cornish National Party, and the Portuguese Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat.

In its November 2 issue, *An Phoblacht* reported that statements of solidarity also came from the South West African People's Organization, Soweto Students' Representative Council, the Law Study Group of Belgium, and the Brussels Defense of Political Asylum Committee. Sinn Féin International Affairs Director Risteárd Behal wrote:

We wish to form stronger links with our fellow brothers and sisters throughout the world, believing that the struggle of one is the cause of all, from our Celtic cousin nations in Europe to the hunted Indians in the deepest jungle in South America.

The Provisional leaders naturally expressed the most interest in those groups representing small European nationalities that were closest to them in political outlook and methods.

However, despite their special interest in these groups, the leaders of the Provisionals' international work indicated their willingness to work with as wide a spectrum of organizations as possible in building support for the rights of Irish people.

One of the most prominent displays at the ard-fheis was a montage of mastheads from a very broad range of publications, including *Intercontinental Press* and *Socialist Challenge*, the weekly reflecting the views of the British section of the Fourth International. □

The New Course of the Latin American Revolution

By Adolfo Gilly

[The following article appeared in the first issue, dated October-December 1977, of *Coyoacán*, a quarterly published in Mexico City. The translation and accompanying editorial note are taken from the November 10 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

We are publishing below the lead editorial of a new Mexican magazine called *Coyoacán*, the editorial board of which includes Comrade Adolfo Gilly, as well as various revolutionary intellectuals, both members and non-members of the Fourth International. The editorial presents a point of view on a subject which is being widely discussed in the Latin American vanguard today.

We do not necessarily agree with all the positions upheld in this editorial. In particular, we would stress two differences. First, we do not believe that a process of construction of socialism is under way in Cuba; this country remains fixed at an initial stage of transition between capitalism and socialism. Second, we do not believe that the Latin American working class as a whole has only a "nationalist" level of political "consciousness" (bourgeois or petty bourgeois). One of the major characteristics of the past decade has been precisely the fact that significant sectors of the Latin American proletariat—particularly in Chile and, to a different extent and in a different form, in Argentina—has begun to go beyond this level of consciousness.

* * *

The military coup in Argentina closed a cycle of capitalist economic development in Latin America during which the political regime of the bourgeois state sustained itself socially through an alliance of the leading sector of the national bourgeoisie with the proletariat and other exploited sectors of the population. This does not mean that this cycle had not been closed earlier in other countries of the continent, nor that it did not continue in more limited forms in some other countries. But it does mean that in the most developed capitalist country in Latin America, the one with the best organized and most socially powerful proletariat, the possibilities for survival of this alliance of classes under bourgeois hegemony were exhausted, although the influence of national bourgeois ideology on

the consciousness of the working class did continue, taking the political form of Peronism. As this occurred in the most mature country, the possibilities for a new surge or recovery of bourgeois nationalism in Latin America as a whole were closed—which does not mean that bourgeois nationalist tendencies disappeared from the political scene, nor that they can no longer intervene in the event of fresh crises, in the absence of a workers leadership.

The decline and fall of the bourgeois nationalist regimes enjoying mass support, whose paradigm was Argentine Peronism, were ultimately rooted in the insoluble contradiction between the limits of the economic possibilities of these regimes in the current international situation and the impossibility of continuing to use their usual policies and methods of holding the working class down. Only a new cycle of capitalist economic recovery, the preconditions for which do not exist and are not on the agenda, and an excessive extension of the delay in the formation of a workers leadership would be able to create the possibility of a future rise of bourgeois nationalism. But this variant appears more remote and improbable today.

The maintenance of the rate of capitalist accumulation is caught between two antagonistic forces: the fall of the rate of growth of the dependent economies of the Latin American bourgeoisies and the resistance of the proletariat and the masses (who use the organizations created under the nationalist regimes, on which these regimes in turn relied in mounting relative resistance to imperialism) to the loss of their gains and fall of their living standards which would be required to preserve this rate of accumulation.

Behind these antagonistic forces lie a series of factors which require a change in the forms and methods of organization of capitalist accumulation and preservation of the political and social structures of the capitalist system in Latin America.

Among these factors are:

a) The world crisis of capitalism, the end of the long postwar boom (which coincided with the rise of the bourgeois nationalist regimes in Latin America and made their alliance with the masses possible), and the beginning, as of 1968-70, of a new long wave of recession of the world capitalist economy;

b) The economic growth of the camp of the workers states (despite internal crises

and persistent economic imbalances), whose overall rate was greater than that of the capitalist camp as a whole, in spite of the latter's continued advantage in the most advanced economic sectors and in technology;

c) The dependent Latin American bourgeois economies found it difficult, and later impossible, to absorb and incorporate the conquests of the technological revolution and to prevent an accelerated widening of the technological gap between themselves and imperialism, especially the U.S. metropolis (the effects of this were particularly devastating precisely in those Latin American countries with the greatest capitalist development and the strongest proletariat);

d) The general reorganization of imperialist strategy after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973-75 centered on reinforcing the central ramparts of capitalism—the United States, West Europe, Japan—and the consequent attempt to consolidate the economic, political, and especially military submission of the Latin American zone of imperialist security in accordance with the objectives of the overall strategy against the workers states and the European proletariat;

e) The organizational and programmatic advances of the working class—despite its obvious unevenness and interruptions in various countries—which was linked on the one hand to its numerical increase and social insertion into the process of industrialization in Latin America and on the other hand to the objective (and also subjective) influence of the development of the workers states, the worldwide advance of revolution (Vietnam in particular), and the struggles of the European proletariat (especially Italy, Spain, France), all of which shaped a process of general rise in the specific weight and consciousness of the proletariat.

These five factors, which were fundamental but not exhaustive, caused a shift in the relationship of forces between the national bourgeoisie and the working class in Latin America. This took different forms in the various countries, depending on the previous level of organization and consciousness of the contending classes.

In general, however, the decisive factor in the outbreak of the social crises which brought the police-military dictatorships to power in the southern part of the continent was not the emergence of a "new model of capitalist accumulation" resulting from the combination of the economic develop-

ment already in progress with the capitalist crisis and technological revolution, as some economic interpretations of Marxism claim. The decisive factor was the resistance of the working class to the reorganization of the Latin American capitalist economy at the expense of the workers' conquests and social positions. Without this resistance, without this "inelastic" element, the reorganization could have been carried out peacefully, meeting the new requirements of capitalist accumulation through unemployment, wage cuts, and a general reduction in mass consumption.

End of Bourgeois Nationalist Course

The explanation for the sharpening of the social crisis and for its violent outcome must be sought not in the economy, but in the class struggle, although its ultimate roots obviously do lie in the economy. But this is not the immediate explanation for the terrorist dictatorships; rather, it is the inability of the regimes of the national bourgeoisie to make greater concessions to the masses or to overpower and defeat their resistance in the absence of concessions.

The situation is not the same in countries in which the level of organization or specific weight of the working class in society did not allow it to mount the same resistance to the new plans of capitalist accumulation or to raise the class struggle to a level intense enough to threaten the stability of the state. This explains, among other things, the specificity of the Central American countries as well as the "exceptional" course of the Mexican regime. But the same basic tendencies operate in these societies. For this reason, although new national reformist regimes are not excluded, they will absolutely not enjoy the economic and historical conditions (and the consequent maneuvering room) that previously existed in Argentina, Bolivia, or Chile. The splendors of the sunset can sometimes resemble those of the sunrise, but they are at the opposite side of the horizon.

Under the new international, national, and Latin American conditions, this resistance of the proletariat posed the question of whether the pace of capitalist accumulation would continue. In the last instance, it posed the question of the functioning of the system. But in the absence of a revolutionary class political leadership, neither the state nor power of the bourgeoisie was placed in question.

The military dictatorships in Uruguay and Argentina did not take power bloodlessly, but after great general strikes—in 1973 in Uruguay and 1975 in Argentina—which objectively posed the question of power in both countries, although the working class lacked the party and leadership that could have offered a class

response. The organizational strength of the proletariat posed the question of power; its lack of a revolutionary leadership prevented it from becoming conscious of this question and resolving it. In Chile and Bolivia the rise of the proletariat within the nationalist and reformist course of the Latin American revolution placed the problem of power on the agenda in other ways, but no one could offer a working-class response. In all four cases it was this sharpened challenging of the bourgeois regimes and the latter's inability to find a way out while still maintaining the "democratic" structures of the state which resulted in the resort to the army and a military-police dictatorship as an ultimate solution. It was the same response, albeit with differences in time and place, as that of the Italian bourgeoisie when it opted for the fascist coup in face of the general strike and factory occupations of 1920, when the workers severely threatened but did not destroy the bourgeois state.

In both cases the crisis marked the exhaustion of the bourgeois nationalist course and the end of its policy of social reforms from the top down.

The precocity of the Brazilian military dictatorship, which took power in 1964, resulted among other things from the fact that Goulart's bourgeois nationalist course had begun to open the way not to the seizure of power by the working class—whose level of consciousness and organization in Brazil was far from adequate for this—but to an agrarian reform and a latent or overt peasant war, which under Brazilian conditions would have triggered a revolutionary dynamic that would have finally overturned the entire stability of the capitalist system. Both imperialism and the Brazilian army had studied the logic of the Cuban example sufficiently to realize that they could not afford what would have amounted (in Brazil, no less) to a peasant mobilization from below for the expropriation of the *latifundistas* and an agrarian reform. Hence the "modernizing" character of the Brazilian military regime, bankrupt as it is, of course. Moving to the other extreme, the Peruvian officers attempted to respond to a similar problem through a reformist road: modernize the social structures of the country from above, without the intervention of the masses, at the cost of partially sacrificing the interests of the landholding oligarchy and compelling it to "recycle" its capital, investing in industry.

In spite of their apparently contradictory features and very different political methods, which depend on the situation in each country, the military regimes of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, and even Ecuador do have a common denominator: They aim at maintaining the continuity of the bourgeois state against the masses, at containing, substituting for,

or violently repressing the revolutionary mobilization of the working class, and at overcoming the threat of violation of the interests of the bourgeoisie as a whole, even at the cost of sacrificing some immediate interests of specific sectors. For this reason, imperialism, in the course of the complexity of its relations with the military regimes, offered them greater or lesser support (or in some cases went so far as to withdraw support, as happened by stages in Peru and Ecuador), but did not promote or encourage any real mobilization against them, not even by significant sectors of the "civilian" bourgeoisie and its parties. The most it did was stimulate "minor skirmishes," but not violent coups like the ones against Allende or Goulart.

But the persistence of these military regimes without any civilian alternative in sight indicates the depth of the crisis of the bourgeois system in Latin America, and not its strength. It is an expression of the fact that the bourgeoisie in these countries lacks the traditional political vehicles, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties. The army has to fulfill the function of guaranteeing the continuity of the state (and acts as an arbiter which takes power in emergency situations and later restores it to "civilians"). The army is transformed into the direct executor of bourgeois policy against the masses.

State, government, and army form three distinct categories which are interlinked and complement each other. They do not function under the rules of a bourgeois republic. Because of the sharpening of the crisis of the entire system, the three are compelled to fuse into one—in the form of a military-police dictatorship. This leaves the bourgeoisie without political alternatives. Under such conditions, to overturn the government would amount to destroying the army, which forms a single entity with the dictatorial regime, and that would mean destroying the state. This would create a "Cuban" or "Vietnamese" situation of the type that existed under Batista or Thieu.

The bourgeoisie has no alternative to this sort of situation, unless it manages to endow itself with a reformist workers leadership whose political convictions lead it to try to guarantee the continuity of the bourgeois state. In the last instance, this is the common logic of the policies of the Argentine and Chilean Communist parties, which, under different conditions, oriented toward solutions that did not lead to posing the question of workers power, that did not open a process toward workers power, which they see as a "blind alley" (and according to their conception of revolution by stages, the same held by the Cuban Communist Party in 1959, there is indeed no "way out" of this problem). In this sense, these Communist parties—and this is not the exception, but the rule—share the rightist logic of "Eurocommu-

nism," although they do not make even the most minimal of Eurocommunism's "leftist" criticisms of the Soviet bureaucracy, but continue to be the most loyal defenders of Moscow orthodoxy. (This is enough, it may be said in passing, to belie the sincerity of the supposedly "Leninist" criticisms the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party has made of the reformism of the "Eurocommunists," since Moscow's most faithful followers in Latin America practice a reformism of the most nefarious sort without receiving the slightest criticism from Moscow.)

Under these conditions, the dictatorial road did not open a new cycle of capitalist accumulation. But no return to the nationalist and reformist road was possible, not only because the economic premises for it were lacking, but also because the level of mass mobilization that would have been necessary to overturn the military dictatorships could not have been contained within the framework of the capitalist system. This represented one of the greatest difficulties in developing a bourgeois alternative to these regimes, a Frei or a Balbín, or some equivalent.

Nevertheless, in its turn the working class did not have its own alternative either. Now it must be constructed under more difficult conditions. The workers are defending their standard of living. Under especially adverse conditions they are maintaining their organizational tradition, relying on it to carry out the minor or medium economic struggles that are possible. The class has suffered severe defeats, but has not been atomized or disintegrated. It enjoys a world situation favorable to the maintenance of its cohesion.

But it does not have its own program: its level of consciousness is still nationalist (that is, subordinated to the hegemony of bourgeois ideology), although its level of organization is proletarian (that is, separate from and opposed to the bourgeoisie, through trade-union organizational forms). Because the working class has not put forward a proletarian program in response to the situation, it has been unable to attract the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie to its banner. It could do so in action, but the possibilities for action are quite limited and, since they are not linked to a working-class political program, time and time again they end within the limits of the programs of the bourgeoisie.

This explains the programmatic limits even of the most heroic actions of the vanguard. They have not succeeded in building a bridge between the needs and elementary democratic demands around which the united front against the dictatorship is organized and the subsequent development of a democratic, revolutionary, anti-imperialist, and anticapitalist process as an alternative to these military-police dictatorships and their states.

The difficulty in organizing this transition does not lie solely in the reality of the

terror of the dictatorships, great as it is, but also in the concrete level of consciousness and organization of the proletariat and the masses. It is here that the vanguard must root the development of a class alternative to the bourgeois state, the break of the consciousness of the class as a whole (and not only a limited vanguard) with the ideology of the bourgeoisie and its state, the development of socialist consciousness. This is something we did not do, not even in Chile. To organize this programmatic and organizational alternative in the consciousness and life of the working class means in practice to organize the mass revolutionary Marxist party, the absence of which, for reasons of specific historical circumstances, was a decisive element in the defeats of the previous stage, in the failure of the mass movement to make the transition from the nationalist phase to the socialist one.

The persistence of the struggle of the working class under these conditions, albeit on the trade-union and factory level, has not only practical consequences, but also theoretical repercussions (as is shown by Argentina and Bolivia, and, to a lesser extent, by Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil). This cannot be directly expressed by the class, which lacks a party and is subjected to cruel persecution. But it is manifested in a visible programmatic maturation among sectors of the revolutionary vanguard, in the overcoming of the "guerrillaist" ideologies which substitute the "heroic presence" of the vanguard for the organized action of the class, and in the concern for Marxist theory and for the necessity of a party of the working class.

The programmatic maturation has been made difficult in many countries because of repression and the exile of militants. In other countries the masses lack any party organs. Above all, it is expressed only by an intellectual vanguard. But it arises not from revolutionary intellectuals, but from the struggle of the proletariat and the masses under the dictatorial or authoritarian governments or under the conditions of limited and precarious democracy that prevail in other Latin American countries.

This advance of the Marxist program is decisive for the foundation of the alternative to the bourgeois state. Before it can take form among the masses, it must be organized in theory. Hence the decisive importance of the discussion of the program of the Latin American revolution for the task of building mass workers parties in these countries.

This discussion has gone beyond, or is in the process of going beyond, one of the most sterile polemics: that of the "armed road" versus the "democratic road." This polemic identified the armed struggle with the revolutionary road, ignoring the fact that it is perfectly possible to wage an armed struggle for completely reformist and democratic objectives (as the recent history of various Latin American coun-

tries has confirmed), struggles that in no way attack the essence of the bourgeois state. This polemic raises to the level of strategic and principled problems what are in fact only alternative tactics. It thus avoids the essential problem of the socialist revolution itself: the question of the state.

The organization of the revolutionary Marxist party is precisely the response to this problem. The character of the party is defined by its program, which consists not merely of the enunciation of a series of particulars, but above all involves the methods, conceptions, and objectives around which the party organizes the masses on the basis of the given levels of organization and consciousness they have attained. The revolutionary party does not commit the infantile mistake of rejecting as a matter of principle the conquests of bourgeois democracy and legality; by definition, these are always concessions wrenched from the bourgeois state by the organized strength of the proletariat. On the other hand, the existence and functioning of the party must not depend on whether or not the bourgeoisie respects these conquests.

The essential characteristic of the Leninist party is not its organizational schema, but the fact that the party's existence, functioning, and thought in no way depend on its relations with the bourgeois state, the party's seats in parliament, or its freedom of the press and association. By the same token, the absence of these freedoms is not a precondition for the maintenance of revolutionary principles. The party expresses the complete independence of thought and decision-making of the working class with respect to the state of the bourgeoisie, whether "democratic" or dictatorial. In this sense, it may be said that the party is the counter-state and that the seeds of *State and Revolution* are already contained in *What Is to Be Done*.

This independence does not result from a simple material break with the state provoked by the repression of a dictatorial government. It arises from a *programmatic* break; it is founded on the program of the party in the construction of a new state, the state of the working class, whose foundations begin to arise through the conquest of the organizational independence of the working class in the factories and work places, even when the government and state of the bourgeoisie still exist.

It is this programmatic and organizational independence of the proletariat which makes its alliance with the peasantry possible, winning the latter away from the influence of the ideology of the bourgeoisie and its state or party organs. And the worker and peasant alliance continues to be, under very different conditions in the various countries of Latin America, the indispensable condition for the victory of

the proletariat and wage earners over the state, army, and government of the bourgeoisie and over its foreign supporter, imperialism.

Since the new course opened in Latin America with the closure of the cycle of the bourgeois nationalist movements at its highest point, in Argentina, the working class and its actual or potential allies have found themselves in a new situation. A new power bloc—composed of the agrarian bourgeoisie oriented toward exports, national banking and finance capital, and the foreign multinationals—controls the governments or is preparing to impose complete control. The bourgeois state is strong in that its character is dictatorial and authoritarian, but it is weaker than ever in terms of its consent from the masses. Most of the national-bourgeois movements are exhausted or in decline because they lack the national or international economic conditions for offering the masses a “new alliance” and for recovering the former support of the masses for the state. The new power bloc is closely linked to imperialism and directly depends on its support. The old alliance of the national-bourgeois movements with the masses, under the ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie, cannot contend for power. But at the same time, the working class does not command the instruments with which to organize and put forward its own alternative, primarily its own party. Nor has it completely broken with its dependency on national-bourgeois ideology. Its organization in the unions and the factories is class organization, as we said above, but its ideology is nationalist, not socialist.

The central task of the Marxist vanguard is to organize—in practice, not in documents—the transition from this nationalist and anti-imperialist consciousness to anti-imperialist and socialist consciousness.

There is a decisive element in this transition: the anti-imperialist struggle. With the decline of the hegemony of the national bourgeoisie and of its possibilities for recovery; with the indispensable role of imperialist support in maintaining the power bloc that props up the military dictatorships or aspires to impose them in the rest of Latin America; with the new global strategy of imperialism, which regards all of Latin America as falling within its economic-military security zone and maintains its technological and financial grip on the reorganization of capitalist accumulation in the region; with all these conditions, the leadership and major responsibility for the struggle against imperialism once again objectively falls on the shoulders of the working class.

But precisely because of this interlacing of the military and economic interests of imperialism on the one hand and the new bourgeois power bloc on the other (even

though the political frictions which normally exist in an association of this kind continue to persist in this bloc), the struggle against imperialism acquires something like an anticapitalist character. Although it is not directly anticapitalist, but rather national and anti-imperialist (and this results in large part from the insufficient maturity of the consciousness of its protagonists), the defeat and expulsion of imperialism is interlinked, in an uninterrupted and unintermittable process, with the expropriation of capitalism, which would be deprived of its major military and economic support if imperialism were expelled.

To maintain its positions and respond to the exigencies of its own nationalist and anti-imperialist consciousness, the working class is led to occupy the position that the national bourgeoisie, previously the bearer of this consciousness, has abandoned: the resistance to imperialism. It is thus led to take the leadership of the struggle against the penetration and domination of foreign imperialism, to take the lead in the national struggle. But this struggle, abandoned by bourgeois nationalism, can be successful only if it goes beyond the limits of this nationalism, which has led it to the present defeats and retreats. The proletariat is now facing the necessity of moving from anti-imperialist nationalism to socialist anti-imperialism. It has begun to use its proletarian class struggle and forms of class organization (factory councils, trade unions, parties) as a lever for the organization of the struggle of the nation against imperialism, relegating to second position the purely “national” considerations which blur the class line dividing the workers from the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie.

This means completely altering the content of anti-imperialism and changing the force that holds hegemony within it. The transition from anti-imperialist nationalism to socialist anti-imperialism retains a common link with anti-imperialism, but its class character changes. It means shifting from anti-imperialism as a (nationalist or petty-bourgeois) national-bourgeois ideology to proletarian anti-imperialism. The program must include the expropriation of all imperialist enterprises, the expulsion of imperialism from the country, the agrarian revolution and the distribution of all land to the peasants, and the full conquest of democracy. It also includes the social organization of the entire proletariat, peasantry, and poor petty-bourgeoisie, the trade-union organization on a workshop basis of all the wage earners of the city and the countryside, and consequently the affirmation of their democratic decision-making power over all the forms of organization of social production. In Latin America the complete and radical expulsion of imperialism means the foundation

of a new state that holds a monopoly of foreign trade and plans production and builds socialism; its social base is the organic alliance of the workers and peasants, and it must resolve the land question in an equally radical manner. This makes the revolution, and with it democracy, indestructible. It is the logical consequence of the process of permanent revolution, which begins from the present level of consciousness and organization of the working class and the masses and leads from the anti-imperialist struggle to the socialist revolution. This is precisely the lesson of the Cuban revolution, which, even twenty years later, must be studied in depth in order to generalize its fundamental theoretical and programmatic lessons.

The struggle for this course of the revolution is national, but also continental, in scope. The new power bloc, interlinked with imperialism in each country, is only formally national, unlike the industrial bourgeoisie linked primarily to the domestic market, which was previously dominant in some of these countries. Consequently, its extranational interests, which are determined by its association with imperialism, lead these regimes to a continental policy whose common basis, in spite of the persistence of competitive interests among them, is provided by the senior partner, the United States, and is determined by the collective necessity to confront the workers movement and the masses socially and militarily.

This accentuates the continental character of the struggle and of the objectives of the Latin American workers movement. Obviously, there are specific features in each country. Only an abstract and sectarian conception of the struggle for socialism would ignore these. Conditions in Mexico and Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, are not identical, nor are the forms of bourgeois domination or the organizations and traditions of the proletariat, peasantry, and the masses. It would be absurd to place all of them under a common denominator, just as it is absurd and at bottom reactionary to ignore or efface the economic, political, and historical specificities of the various countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, lumping them all in a single category labeled Third World.

But even though the revolution begins from specific traditions, forms of organization, and roads in each of the Latin American countries, the form of imperialist domination accentuates the continental character of the revolutionary struggle more than in the past. In turn, this will be further accentuated as the objective content of the struggle passes from the anti-imperialist nationalist phase to the socialist program, internationalist by definition and in its essence. Thus, it is necessary to grasp both the national peculiarities and the general Latin American articulation,

which is not subsumed by the mere coordination of the struggle of each country, but is based above all on the programmatic features common to all of them: anti-imperialism and socialism.

The forms of maturation and levels of organization and consciousness are different in the various countries. But the Latin American and worldwide process tends to bring them to the same level. As this tendency toward equalization unfolds, the tone will be set by the more advanced

sectors. The class consciousness of the Latin American proletariat lies in its vanguard, which through the many and violent forms of its struggles is advancing toward socialist consciousness and toward recognition of the necessity for a mass revolutionary Marxist vanguard party. This advance is not linear; it is a transition laden with obstacles and difficulties, momentary interruptions in one place and rapid advances in another. But the general course will not be interrupted: it is a

permanent transition in which one country, Cuba, is already building socialism.

The essential and decisive element in the new course of the Latin American revolution is embodied in this process. Its most general objective may be summed up as the anti-imperialist unification of Latin America in the form of a Federation of Socialist Republics, whose first link, the Cuban one, has already proven its validity, resistance, and permanence.

July 1977

Eurocommunism, Goldilocks, and the Three Bears

In Reply to Eugenio Greco

By Gerry Foley

Revista de América, the magazine reflecting the views of the leadership of the Socialist Workers Party of Argentina (published in exile in Bogotá, Colombia) has been considerably expanded and technically improved.

With a cover in six colors, the August issue—the latest to be received in New York—comprises forty-eight pages. The well-illustrated articles cover a wide range of countries—Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, the USSR, British Honduras, Peru, Paraguay, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Costa Rica, Pakistan, and Ethiopia. Such subjects as ecology and international youth employment are also dealt with. The article on Ethiopia was translated from *Intercontinental Press*.

The price of *Revista de América* has been set at the equivalent of US\$0.83 a copy in Colombia, and at US\$4 outside the country.

Unfortunately, this issue of *Revista de América* is marked by narrow factional concerns that contrast with its format which was obviously designed to appeal to a wide audience.

For example, the article on ecology includes in a special box a quotation from an article by Nahuel Moreno, the leader of the Argentine Socialist Workers Party, that was submitted for internal discussion more than four years ago in the Fourth International. Moreno's article was entitled "A Scandalous Document," and its subject was not ecology.

The main article in this issue, by Eugenio Greco, exhibits this house-organ spirit in a glaring way. The title, "Eurocommunism—New Crisis of World Stalinism," indicates that it deals with a topical subject that is certainly of general interest. However, the article does not offer much information about Eurocommunism. Only a few developments in the dispute between the Kremlin and the West European CPs are referred to—and that

solely in passing. It offers but two short quotations from the dispute between the Kremlin and the West European CPs, and these are used to introduce a number of general questions:

Is it true that the time has passed when Moscow had its own party in every country? This central question leads to other important questions. Is Eurocommunism a new or an old phenomenon? Is it progressive or reactionary? Will the Eurocommunist parties become centrist, or possibly revolutionary, or remain counterrevolutionary? Will they continue to be Stalinist, or have they ceased to be so?

Greco continues:

These questions have been answered in the most widely varying ways. Some say that the Eurocommunist parties will evolve toward centrism, or even toward a line favoring soviets and workers democracy, or possibly toward a revolutionary line. At the other extreme, there are those who maintain that the Eurocommunist parties will remain essentially Stalinist.

This approach is obviously designed for a limited audience. The various assessments of Eurocommunism in political life in general or even in the left as a whole are not confined to these two poles. There are the positions of some left Social Democratic currents that the so-called Eurocommunist parties are evolving toward "pluralism." Commentators in the capitalist press think that these parties may be moving toward accepting the "rules of the democratic game." Why is nothing said about their positions?

When Greco refers to "those who maintain that the Eurocommunist parties will remain essentially Stalinist," is he referring to right-wing Social Democratic parties who equate Stalinism with Leninism, or to Trotskyists who view Stalinism as the antithesis of Leninism? He does not specify. How are readers to know whom he is referring to by the word "those" unless they have been informed by other means?

On the other hand, if Greco is referring

to a debate in specific circles, he should have spoken less vaguely so that his readers could judge whether he is giving an accurate picture of the positions he refers to. It would be especially interesting to know who, in his opinion, holds that the Eurocommunist parties are moving toward revolutionary positions.

For the sake of clarity, it is obviously important to know whom Greco is referring to by "those" or "some," since he says that his article will supply answers that have eluded them.

Our interpretation of this phenomenon [Eurocommunism], much less one-sided and more contradictory, will be developed below.

Names Maitan, Mandel

This statement is followed by a long section that offers "the only scientific definition of Stalinism" and a summary of the development of contradictions in world Stalinism from the victory of the Chinese and Yugoslav revolutions to the Cuban revolution. It is only after all this beating about the bush that Greco mentions the name of one person who has failed to give an adequate answer, in his opinion, to one of the questions he has posed. That person is Livio Maitan, one of the leaders of the Fourth International. Greco quotes the following two sentences from an article by Maitan in the July 7 issue of the fortnightly magazine *Inprecor*:

The political and theoretical evolution that has brought the largest Communist parties of the capitalist countries to adopt so-called Eurocommunism has been under way for twenty years now. In fact, in several respects this evolution goes all the way back to 1935-36.

The trouble with this statement, Greco says, is the following:

With this definition, Maitan is committing an error that we will find repeated by many others. He does not define as the fundamental feature of Eurocommunism a dynamic toward a new crisis

and split in the apparatus of world Stalinism.

The sentences on which Greco bases his criticism are the first two in an eight-and-a-half-page article. Such a criticism, however, seems rather precipitate, since Maitan's statement is quite general and does not in itself exclude the point Greco makes. The sort of confusion that such hasty criticisms can create is indicated by the fact that further on in his article Greco writes:

As we have already anticipated, Mandel and his disciples go to the other extreme. They do have the merit of having pointed to the process of Social Democratization of the CPs.

But does not the process of the Social Democratization of the CPs go back at least to 1935? Trotsky, to whom Greco refers as the originator of this view, said that. But how can what was an error on the part of Maitan become a "merit" on the part of "Mandel and his disciples"? What kind of political sense is there in this alternate bestowal of kicks and kudos to various leaders in the Fourth International? Apparently Greco himself became confused about what point he was making.

Who precisely are Ernest Mandel's disciples? How does Maitan differ from Mandel? There is no answer to these questions. But at least we are told the name of someone standing at the "opposite extreme" from Mandel.

Barnes at Other 'Pole'

The other "pole," Greco says, is represented by Jack Barnes, national secretary of the Socialist Workers Party of the United States (SWP). The opposite extremeness of Barnes, if we are to believe Greco, was evident in his report to the April 1976 plenum of the National Committee of the SWP, "Europe vs. America and the Erosion of World Stalinism." Greco says that the following quotations from his summary show that Barnes believes that "a break of the European CPs with Stalinism is impossible":

After Stalinist parties consciously foster and promote social patriotism as an adjunct to Soviet foreign policy, they lose a layer of trade-union functionaries, municipal counselors, a wing of the party when they try to swing back. . . .

But they lose individuals, sometimes a large number—not parties. They lose trade unionists, they lose elected officials, they lose functionaries in foreign trade corporations and paid full timers in sections of the mass movement, but they don't lose parties.

Greco says that his interpretation of this statement is confirmed by the following passage from Barnes's summary:

What Kissinger understands is that if there were a sudden shift tomorrow in world politics, if American imperialism took the offensive, if the relations between the NATO powers and the

Soviet Union shifted, the CPs in Italy and France . . . would react on behalf of the Soviet Union.

Greco comments:

For Barnes the differences between the Eurocommunist parties and the Kremlin are matters of language and tactics, and in no wise reveal an underlying dynamic leading to a break.

He attempts to further prove this by quoting the following passages from Barnes's summary:

As Adam B. Ulam commented . . . Brezhnev did "not seem unduly perturbed by the new language employed by their Italian and French comrades." In fact, Brezhnev "obliquely endorsed the main drift of their tactics" by drawing attention to the successes of the popular-front approach.

I think this is an accurate assessment. It is very much in the interests of the aims of the Soviet bureaucracy.

Greco says of this:

Thus, for Barnes there are no fundamental differences between the parties that subordinate themselves in a servile way to the world Stalinist apparatus and the Eurocommunist parties."

Greco goes on to quote the following passage from Barnes's summary:

The Kremlin would trade a servile Gus Hall for a "critical" American Marchais. . . .

For some reason Greco leaves out the end of the sentence, which is as follows:

. . . if they could go from a CP of several thousands, or whatever they have in this country, to a CP of 200,000.

The following sentence is also important, although it is not quoted by Greco:

That's the framework in which the Soviet bureaucracy operates, the real world of options open to world Stalinism.

Moreover, right after this sentence, there is a paragraph that reads as if it were intended to answer in advance complaints about "one-sidedness" such as those advanced by Greco:

To make sure comrades don't misunderstand our opinion on this, it's important to point out the other side. We don't think there is any way of putting Humpty Dumpty together again. Not only is putting a Cominform or Comintern back together again precluded; the odds are against another world conference of all Communist parties on the old basis. They can't even get unanimous agreement from the pro-Moscow CPs to read the Chinese out of the world Communist movement.

Nonetheless, Greco skips this paragraph and begins shouting:

It is lamentable that a Marxist could make such a superficial, subjective, and mechanical analysis. As Barnes sees it, the rich dynamic of the class struggle, in particular the 1968 upsurge, has no effect on the political superstructures. "Stalinism" in general and in the abstract

remains as hieratic as an Egyptian god, impervious to the vulgar and pedestrian laws of the class struggle. The pressures of a rising workers movement, of the imperialist bourgeoisie, of a rising political revolution in the workers states, of the sectors of privileged workers within the CPs, do not exist. Still less does he consider the fundamental fact that the European CPs are building mass apparatuses and finances that are continually more independent of Moscow and that exert a pressure both for the Social Democratization of these CPs and the formation of national bureaucracies.

Barnes insists correctly that *at this moment* the European CPs are still Stalinist because they "remain subordinate to the Soviet bureaucracy's foreign policy interests." But he does not reason like a materialist. He does not stress that this "subordination" has an objective material basis—the financial dependence of these apparatuses on the world Stalinist apparatus. He does not recognize that with the increase of their mass influence the CPs are moving steadily toward having apparatuses more and more independent of Moscow and more and more dependent on the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie, leading to their becoming national bureaucracies, that is, toward Social Democratization.

For this reason, Barnes's analysis is subjective. Were it not for this material tie of dependency between the apparatus of the national CPs and that of Moscow, how could you explain Stalinism? Perhaps by a merely ideological subjective affinity with the Moscow bureaucracy?

Finally, by roundly refusing to accept the inevitable process of the Social Democratization of the CPs, Barnes overlooks a living example, although it is not a European one—the Venezuelan MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo). Born as the product of a previous crisis in world Stalinism (the impact of the Cuban revolution), emerging from a split in the Venezuelan CP, the MAS today is channeling the mass movement for socialism by means independent of Moscow in order to keep it under the control of the democratic bourgeoisie. The MAS is the image of the future Eurocommunist parties, with which it has excellent relations.

What Aroused Greco?

What was it in Barnes's report that led Greco to abandon the spirit of fraternal discussion in this way? Barnes did not deny the possibility of major splits from the CPs, such as the one that gave rise to the MAS. In fact, there are "European" examples of this, in particular in Scandinavia. What Barnes did say is that such splits do not usually take whole parties. Has the Venezuelan CP, perhaps, ceased to exist?

Barnes described the strength of the ties binding Stalinist parties to Moscow in the context of explaining that the Eurocommunist CPs are still Stalinist. That was the fundamental point of the section of the report dealing with Eurocommunism. But Greco says he agrees with this conclusion! So why the histrionics?

Moreover, despite Greco's shouts about the need to get down to the nitty gritty, to the "vulgar and pedestrian laws of the

class struggle," he remains on the level of broad historical generalities and speculation. He does not comment on Barnes's references to the concrete political obstacles to the completion of the process of the Social Democratization of the CPs. Does he agree or not with the following passage?

If the Social Democracy did not exist, that would open another option for the evolution of Stalinist parties. If the Social Democracy had been transformed into pure and simple bourgeois outfits, into parties with no base in the labor movement, that would change a great deal. If the Social Democratic parties had evolved into formations like the Tories or the Republican or Democratic parties, instead of petty bourgeois or bourgeois currents within the framework of the labor movement, it is possible that there would be room for the Stalinist parties to evolve and fill the political space now held by the Social Democracy.

But neither of these "ifs" materialized. And that demarcates the limits within which the vacillations and maneuvers of the Stalinist parties take place.

Greco does not take up any of Barnes's concrete arguments. Nonetheless, he feels compelled, even though he agrees with Barnes's general conclusion, to object that this conclusion is presented in a way that implies rigidity, one-sidedness, a static conception. Such criticisms in themselves are rather vague. To demonstrate that they are not meaningless, you would have to show how the alleged shortcomings are reflected in the assessment of concrete developments in the conflict between Moscow and the Eurocommunist CPs.

Why doesn't Greco look at what SWP members have written about the actual developments in the conflict between the Kremlin and the West European CPs? He would find that they have not failed to stress its explosive character. For example, take the article I wrote, "High Stakes in Conflict Over Carrillo," published in the July 11 issue of *Intercontinental Press* (p. 786). I said, among other things:

Despite this opportunistic wavering all the "Eurocommunist" parties have a very large stake in the policies that have aroused the Kremlin bureaucrats. So, the conflict is likely to continue and may well escalate.

In any case, something more and more like an open faction fight has developed, directly involving the interests of hundreds of thousands of militant workers in the Stalinist parties in the advanced capitalist countries, as well as those of the workers oppressed by the ruling Stalinist bureaucracies themselves.

This conflict is potentially far more damaging to the Kremlin and to Stalinism in general than the Sino-Soviet break. . . .

If he had actually studied what SWP members have written on Eurocommunism, presumably Greco would have been much relieved and would not have felt the painful obligation to make such sweeping denunciations of his comrades in the United States.

Barnes's report did no more than suggest a general framework for analyzing the conflict between Moscow and the Eurocommunist parties. He put it in the context of a conflict among Stalinists about how to apply the policies they all agree on. To make a serious criticism, Greco would at least have to make clear whether he agreed or disagreed with this framework. But he does not do this. In fact, he raises arguments that lead in opposite directions.

Origin of Eurocommunism

In the beginning of his article, Greco defines Eurocommunism as a product of the 1968 upsurge:

For us, the present phenomenon of Eurocommunism has a profound similarity with the previous crises of world Stalinism. It is the product of the upsurge that began in Europe in 1968. It includes an important difference in that it is not the result of the taking of power in any country but of the formation of strong apparatuses with a certain independence on the part of the big mass Communist parties.

Greco fails to explain concretely how the upsurge produced this phenomenon. The development of the apparatuses of the big West European CPs occurred primarily in the period immediately following the Second World War and has not advanced qualitatively since that time. In fact, except in the case of the Italian CP, it has not advanced even quantitatively. The Spanish CP apparatus, of course, has grown very rapidly since the death of Franco, but it is still far from having reached the level that the French and Italian CPs did in the postwar period.

But the Spanish CP, which Greco claims has reached the point of breaking with Moscow, has the weakest apparatus of all the big CPs. And the British CP, which is also on the Eurocommunist side in the conflict, has an apparatus that is not qualitatively larger than that of the American Communist Party.

Greco obviously has not thought out his "materialist" analysis. In the crude terms in which he presents it, it bears little relation to the facts. Moreover, what does he mean by "material dependence on Moscow"? Does he think these parties have lived up till now solely on financial aid from Moscow?

If, on the other hand, Greco means that the CPs have to appear more independent and have to clear their skirts somewhat of the onus of the views and practices of the Kremlin in order to attract the newly radicalizing layers, most Trotskyist writers on the subject have already made this point. Certainly Barnes, Mandel, and Maitan, to whom Greco refers, have done so.

However, the implications that flow from the need of the CPs to appeal to newly radicalizing layers in order to maintain or expand their influence and

thus their apparatus are different from those that would flow simply from an already accomplished physical growth of their bureaucratic apparatus. So, what is the purpose of Greco's chip-on-the-shoulder defense of "materialism"?

In hope of finding something in Greco's reasoning, let us begin with the relationship between the post-1968 upsurge in Europe and the positions taken by the Eurocommunist parties that are objectionable to the Kremlin. Greco argues that a result of the mass upsurge in Europe has been to accelerate the "Social-Democratization of the CPs."

Greco begins his argument by citing the thought of a fellow writer for *Revista de América*.

Finally, Rodríguez points out that Yankee imperialism's raising the banner of human rights in the workers states and its support for the opponents of bureaucracy is an important part of this imperialist plan against the workers states.

These considerations, which we share, place Eurocommunism, or the process of the Social-Democratization of the CPs, in a much broader context. It has to do with the two sides of the imperialist plan. On the one hand, it has to do with the side of establishing direct ties with imperialism to guarantee governments of "democratic counterrevolution" on the Soares model, which will contain the upsurge of the European workers movement. And it will have to do, on the other, to the extent that this dynamic gains momentum and reaches the qualitative point of a break with the world Stalinist apparatus, with the plan of detonating crises in the workers states by developing social contradictions within them, based on "free trade" with the capitalist world.

In this second aspect, the position of the European CPs supporting the Soviet dissidents—while not without its positive aspects—helps to reinforce this imperialist plan.

Greco goes on to chide Ernest Mandel for giving, as he puts it, only the positive side of the Eurocommunist CPs' attempt to dissociate themselves from Stalinist repression.

We think Mandel's observation is brilliant but one-sided. He forgets other aspects of the Eurocommunists' policy which are closely related to the imperialist plan. There is Carrillo's position in support of a Europe that is "neither in NATO nor the Warsaw Pact," and Berlinguer's position in favor of a "united Europe." Will not these be the first step toward a future campaign for free-trade relations between the East European countries and, as a minimum, the European imperialist states? Is it not because the Soviet bureaucracy or sectors of it perceive this danger that the tensions between Moscow and the Eurocommunist parties have reached such an extreme?

Has the pressure of the mass upsurge thus pushed the West European CPs to the right of the Kremlin? But in the beginning of his article, Greco equates the rise of Eurocommunism with the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions. It is easy for Greco to argue that Eurocommunism is a "contra-

dictory" phenomenon. But he still must say which aspects reflect the demands of the masses and which are contradictory effects of this pressure.

This lack of clarity on Greco's part makes his polemics against other Trotskyists virtually incomprehensible. For example, he says that he agrees with "Mandel and his disciples" about the need for stressing the process of Social Democratization of the CPs. But no Trotskyist disputes the "Social Democratization" of the CPs as a general historical process. The question remains—what is the relationship between this and the specific aspects of the conflict between the West European CPs and Moscow? Greco contends:

But Mandel and his disciples draw from the Social Democratization of the CPs the alarming conclusion that this is leading in a positive direction.

The conclusion that a development toward the program and practices of the Social Democracy could represent something positive would certainly be a strange one for a Trotskyist. But what does this actually mean? Greco himself earlier compared the rise of Eurocommunism with the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions, which he obviously thinks led in a positive direction.

Future Foreshadowed in MAS?

What is more, Greco cites the Venezuelan MAS as the model toward which the Eurocommunist parties are evolving. And the Venezuelan Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers Party), a party whose leaders are closely associated with the leadership of the Argentine PST, has just entered the MAS. In the September issue of the MAS magazine *Reflexiones*, Emilio Ortiz Guinand, a former leader of the now dissolved Venezuelan PST, explained his organization's decision as follows:

When we decided to enter the MAS at our special conference at the end of June, we did so convinced that we were joining the mass pole, the socialist alternative that is coming to the fore in our country.

Ortiz Guinand went on to say:

Contrary to what many think, for the worker, the housewife, the student, or the professional, socialism in Venezuela has a name—the MAS. That is a powerful objective reason for revolutionists to consider entering the MAS. You can stay your entire life in a glass bubble and call yourself revolutionary (as some do) but the revolution cannot be carried out without the masses and these are to be found outside the sterilized glass bubble.

But, Ortiz Guinand said, it was not just the MAS's size that made it attractive:

The MAS, on the other hand [unlike the other main centrist party in Venezuela] will more than ever raise socialism as the only real alternative

for change in our country and will do this in a forthright way.

Since Greco writes that the MAS foreshadows the future development of the Eurocommunist parties, the question arises, then, whether the Venezuelan PST leaders are the "some" people who, to quote him, "say that the Eurocommunist parties will evolve . . . possibly toward a revolutionary line."

But if this is so, why doesn't Greco direct his criticisms toward them rather than toward "Mandel and his disciples"? Moreover, does Greco think the evolution of the MAS is "positive" or not? He never makes this clear. How can anyone take his accusations seriously when he loses himself so hopelessly in contradictions and ambiguities?

The fact that when Greco does make a definite accusation against Mandel, he resorts to an outright falsification, is another indication that he has chosen his targets arbitrarily:

Once again, Mandel and his disciples attribute the progressive aspects of an objective process (mass upsurge, crisis of the world Stalinist apparatus) to the parties in which this process is manifested.

If this means anything, it must be that "Mandel and his disciples" hold the position that the nature of the Eurocommunist parties as parties is shifting to the left, that they are ceasing to be counterrevolutionary parties. It must mean that, because Greco himself has just said that "progressive aspects of an objective process" are "manifested" in the Eurocommunist CPs. But where is the evidence for such a fundamental political accusation against Mandel? There should be no lack of objectively verifiable evidence, because such an attitude would reflect a basic revision of Trotskyist principles and would have to be expressed in political practice. But Greco does not produce any evidence.

Greco's charge is derived from nothing but a schema based on two quotations attributed to Mandel, dating respectively from 1954 and 1957. That is, the alleged position is drawn from Mandel's supposed historic attitude to Stalinism. The schema has two sides:

Thus, we see expressed clearly two one-sided and mechanical interpretations of the Chinese and Yugoslav phenomenon. The interpretation of the SWP [no quotation is provided to give an idea of the position of the SWP] pointed to a real *element*—the *continuity* of Stalinist policy on the part of these parties. Mandel based himself on another real *element*—the *break* of these parties from Stalinist discipline, reflecting the pressure of the masses. From both interpretations, Mandel and the SWP drew conclusions that overall were false and mechanical.

In the case of the SWP, the *continuity* of the Stalinist features . . . overshadowed the progressive aspects of the phenomenon. In the case of Mandel, the *break* with the world

Stalinist apparatus and its progressive consequences . . . overshadowed the negative aspects of this phenomenon.

This one-sidedness arose from a failure to understand the *dialectic* of this process, which like any objective process was contradictory. . . .

To sum up, the SWP did not see that the Chinese and Yugoslav process was progressive, as an overall process, because it reflected the upsurge of the masses, the taking of power in two countries, and the crisis of Stalinism as a world counterrevolutionary apparatus. On the other hand, Mandel attributed this progressive character of the objective process to the Chinese and Yugoslav CPs. . . .

This schema is actually the entire point of Greco's article. Everything else depends on it and is designed to bolster it. This is a neat juxtaposition, thesis and antithesis. Greco promises his readers that he will offer the *synthesis*—something fundamentally different and superior. The historical contribution is heralded with polemical trumpets and drums, with imperious proclamations and rumbling denunciations. Despite all the fanfare, however, the mountain still gives birth to only a mouse.

After denouncing the SWP for being too rigid, Greco agrees with Barnes's analysis of the fundamental nature of the Eurocommunist parties. After denouncing Mandel for supposedly having illusions about the positive implications of Eurocommunism, he ends up echoing Mandel:

Without going further, the fact that the Eurocommunist leaderships talk about "democracy" opens up for the Trotskyists immense possibilities to establish, for the first time in several decades, a rich dialogue with the masses still in the bureaucratic straitjacket of the Communist parties. In this dialogue, . . . the reformists have everything to lose and the Trotskyists have everything to gain.

To disregard the contradictory character of this process leading to Eurocommunism, with its positive pole in the rise of the masses and the

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crisis of the world apparatus of Stalinism, and its negative pole in the incapacity of the Communist parties to alter their counterrevolutionary course, would mean failing to understand that this process offers extensive possibilities for the formation of progressive tendencies inside the CPs. If the Trotskyists work effectively on these tendencies, they can lead them to break with the CPs, to a deepening of the crisis of these counterrevolutionary apparatuses, and a qualitative enrichment of the Fourth International.

Purpose of the Article

What Greco says here is fine. But in the Trotskyist movement it is not new; it has been said over and over again, in particular by Barnes and Mandel. Why was Greco not content simply to present his view of Eurocommunism and its implications as other Trotskyist writers have? That would have served a useful purpose. Not much has been written about this development in the publications of the Argentine Socialist Workers Party and of the groups with which it works most closely in Latin America.

To come out with little but horn-toting gives a painful impression. It suggests the carnival barker intent on making the audience forget that the promised "wonder of the age" was not really so wondrous.

Greco's sweeping and arbitrary generalizations about the trajectory of Trotskyist leaders and organizations going back twenty years or more are very telling. They show that his schema serves no analytical purpose. The schema, in fact, constitutes a substitute for objective analysis of reality.

As Greco presents it, the attitude of the SWP is too negative; Mandel "and his disciples," on the other hand, suffer from excessive optimism. Thus, one must look elsewhere for just the right combination of the negative and the positive. This is the method followed by Goldilocks in her encounter with the three bears. The SWP's porridge is too cold. Mandel's porridge is too hot. But a porridge in between is just right. Baby Bear wins out.

Greco is entitled to his taste. But if all he has to offer is a mixture of subjective judgments and prejudices, what purpose does the article serve? One purpose is to help introduce false differences among Trotskyists, to create a differentiation for the sake of that alone, without a principled political basis.

A result of such articles can be the development of real political differences in the most destructive and irrational way. It short-circuits the process of common discussion of shared theory and experience and then a testing in practice of the conclusions.

Greco's arbitrary approach has already apparently led him to flirt with positions that are really different from those of the rest of the Trotskyist movement and would lead him very far astray if he developed

them consistently. He does this when he says that the Eurocommunist CPs' defense of the dissidents against bureaucratic repression promotes an "imperialist plan" against the workers states, and when he makes statements indicating that the Eurocommunist CPs are becoming a battering ram for imperialism against the economic underpinnings of these states.

Greco is not the first to advance these

positions. Among those claiming to be Trotskyist, the award for originality goes to such sectarian groups as the Spartacist League in the United States and the Workers Revolutionary Party in Britain. Let us hope that Greco proves capable of seeing the deadly logic involved and that he draws back in time.

October 15, 1977

Bomb-Scarred Vietnam Faces Food Shortage

With an anticipated shortfall in rice production of two million tons in 1977, Vietnam is facing a severe food shortage and tighter rationing for the coming year.

This was the theme of recent ceremonies marking the thirty-second anniversary of the country's independence, where Communist Party and government leaders appealed for "sacrifices" and "renewed effort" on the part of the population.

Vietnam's agriculture was disrupted as part of the legacy of the Pentagon's military intervention. Millions of tons of U.S. bombs devastated Vietnam's rural areas, leaving the countryside pockmarked with craters. The use of chemical herbicides and defoliants destroyed crops and caused lasting environmental damage.

An article by Nayan Chanda in the November issue of the Paris monthly *Le Monde Diplomatique* enumerates some of the other factors responsible for Vietnam's setback in farming.

A long dry spell hit the central region in 1976 and spread to the rest of the country in 1977. This was responsible for the poor harvest in the Mekong delta, the main rice-growing area of the south. At the same time, hurricanes and heavy rains destroyed part of the second harvest in the north, and because the rice fields were flooded, crop harvesting had to be delayed for two months.

Because of an already burdensome trade deficit, Chanda explains—estimated at \$714 million for 1976—Vietnam could not bridge the gap between its food production and the needs of its population by increasing its commercial imports. So it sought help from the World Food Program and asked Sweden, France, and Australia to make good on some of their pledges of aid by sending 200,000 tons of wheat.

Washington, for its part, refused to acknowledge any responsibility to provide aid to Vietnam. The Carter administration refused to honor a secret pledge of \$3.25 billion aid made by former President Nixon as part of the 1973 Paris peace accords. Echoing the cynical excuses of his predecessors, Carter claimed in March 1977 that the North Vietnamese "take-

over" of the south had canceled the agreement.

The Vietnamese government attempted to secure short-term loans that would have enabled it to buy grain in the West, but these efforts met with little success: "Whatever Vietnam's potential, Western bankers prefer to wait and see how it is going to repay its debts in the next two years before offering it extensive credits."

Chanda also points out that, except for commercial imports, little help has been forthcoming from other quarters:

"The Soviet Union recently shipped [Vietnam] 204,000 tons of wheat, but, according to diplomatic sources in Hanoi, shows few intentions of increasing the shipments provided for in the annual aid agreement, at least as long as Hanoi maintains its refusal to give up its current status of observer on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and become a full member. China, for its part—which in the past had provided [Vietnam] with half a million tons of free rice per year—has now become less generous. It is prepared to finance rice purchases with a long-term loan, but the amounts offered seem to have been reduced, owing partly to the cooling of relations between the two countries, and partly to China's own economic difficulties."

In addition, the government has acknowledged that its own policies are partly responsible for the current difficulties.

Chanda points out that, in the south, many peasants who do achieve a surplus of rice refuse to sell it to the government, preferring to sell it on the black market or to take advantage of shortages to engage in hoarding. The government is unable to check such practices because of the maintenance of private enterprise in the south.

A resolution on agriculture approved by the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party in July noted: ". . . we have made big mistakes in leadership, especially in guiding and organizing and implementation of the party's line and policies on agriculture." □

Capitalism Fouls Things Up



Pesticide Workers: 'We Have Won!'

Two hundred striking workers returned to their jobs at the Littorale (Union Carbide) pesticide plant in Béziers, France, on November 23. The workers marched back into the plant chanting, "*Nous avons gagné!*" (We have won).

The strike, which began November 7, focused on demands that measures be taken to prevent methyl isocyanate poisoning. This highly toxic and flammable chemical is a basic ingredient in a pesticide called TEMIK, which the Littorale plant manufactures for sale to beet growers (see *Intercontinental Press*, November 28, p. 1320).

According to a report in the November 28 issue of *Rouge*, the workers "had demanded a minimum wage of 2,400 francs; they won 2,300 francs. . . . They had demanded control over safety conditions; they won a TEMIK committee composed of shop delegates, two experts to be named by the unions, one representative of the municipal government (which is controlled by the Union of the Left), and one representative of management."

Rouge said that "besides the exemplary organization of the struggle inside the plant (elected strike committee, general assemblies, etc.), solidarity was built in a big way by the Committee for Struggle Against Pollution. This strike was one of the first to link workers' mobilizations to those of the ecologists."

A meeting of 800 had been held in Béziers November 15 in support of the strike—the largest meeting of its kind in the area since 1974, according to *Rouge*.

Celtic League Says 'No Nukes!'

The Celtic League is an organization that seeks to defend the traditional Celtic language and culture in Scotland, Wales, Brittany, Ireland, Cornwall, and the Isle of Man against English and French cultural domination. At its annual general meeting in July, the league adopted a resolution on nuclear power:

"This conference of the Celtic League considers that the development of nuclear energy for military and industrial purposes constitutes an excessive and immeasurable danger for human survival; . . . condemns the dumping of nuclear wastes in Celtic sea-areas and totally

rejects the projected burying of such wastes in Celtic lands; urges governments to apply adequate financial resources to the development and exploitation of renewable energy sources." (Reported in *Carn*, quarterly periodical of the Celtic League, Autumn 1977.)

Two Victims of Nuclear Power

British Nuclear Fuels Limited, which owns the Windscale nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, recently agreed to pay compensation to the widows of two former Windscale employees who died after contact with plutonium.

The widow of Jonathan Troughton, who died in 1975 of myelomatosis, a disease of the spinal marrow, will receive £2441 (US\$40,394). The widow of Henry King, who died in 1973 of a brain tumor after having suffered from partial blindness for several years, will receive £8,000 (US \$14,400), according to a report in the November 17 issue of *Le Monde*.

In both cases, autopsies had revealed traces of plutonium.

Mexican Children at Risk From U.S. Lead Pollution

Heavy metal pollution from an ASARCO company smelter near El Paso, Texas—just across the Rio Grande from Juárez, Mexico—forced the abandonment of a community near the plant in 1972. Medical studies had shown that more than 2,700 U.S. children in the area could be suffering from "undue lead absorption."

In 1974, Mexican health authorities estimated that more than 8,000 Juárez children 1-9 years old were similarly affected.

The U.S. Center for Disease Control recently did a follow-up survey to determine what effect pollution controls at the ASARCO smelter have had. Dr. Philip Landrigan of the center said, "There was no question that the situation had improved here since 1972, that the levels of lead in environmental samples were lower—that is in air, soil, dust—and levels of lead in the children were lower."

However, Landrigan also said that "directly across the river into Mexico, near the smelter, there is a very, very large population, and I'm told that the popula-

tion in that area has grown very remarkably in the last couple of years."

The center's report said "only three children live within one-half mile of the smelter on the U.S. side; of concern are the many children in Mexico living within one-half mile of the smelter." Mexican health officials plan to test children in Juárez in early 1978.

According to Landrigan, El Paso still ranks about fifth among U.S. cities for air lead pollution, and "in the top two or three" for arsenic and cadmium levels.

Soviet Scientist Joins Fans of Nuclear Power

Nuclear power "must play a significant role" in meeting energy demands during the next several decades if "extensive social evils" are to be avoided. That was the position taken by fourteen prominent physicists in a statement issued November 16 in Miami.

Among the signers were Dr. Edward Teller, "the father of the H-bomb"; Karl Cohen of the General Electric Corporation, a leading U.S. manufacturer of nuclear reactors; Edwin Zebroski of the Electric Power Research Institute, a subsidiary of the Edison Electric Institute (the trade association of privately owned electric utilities in the United States); and two top officials from the U.S. government's Oak Ridge, Tennessee, nuclear complex.

Joining this assortment of scientific apologists for the U.S. nuclear industry was Nikolai G. Basov of the P. N. Lebedev Physical Institute in Moscow. Basov is a Nobel laureate and a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The *New York Times* quoted a spokesman for the signatories as saying that "while Professor Basov was in agreement with the tenor of the document, 'he has not cleared it yet with his associates in Moscow.'"

Nuclear Moratorium in Québec

The Parti Québécois government of Premier René Lévesque announced November 15 that it was calling a halt to the development of nuclear energy in Québec for three years, according to a report in the November 17 issue of *Le Monde*.