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The New Theft of the Panama Canal

**The Facts About Brazil's
'Economic Miracle'**

**How CIA Sought Secret
of 'Mind Control'**

**Botswana—Rising Instability Under
Impact of Zimbabwe Struggle**

**30,000 in France March Against
Nuclear Power Plant**

A Review Article

Joseph Hansen:

Trotskyism in Latin America

The New Theft of the Panama Canal

By Michael Baumann

In his campaign for the White House last year Jimmy Carter vowed that as president he would never surrender "complete or practical control" of the Panama Canal.

Details of the new treaty reached with Panama August 10 reveal that for once he was telling the truth. Of the hundreds of promises he made as a candidate, this above all others was intended to be kept to the letter.

Information on the accord released so far shows that the American imperialists "surrendered" virtually nothing in the way of continued political, economic, and military control over Panama, the canal, and the Canal Zone.

A few face-saving concessions were extended to Panama's "maximum leader of the revolution" Gen. Omar Torrijos, to help him throw the best light possible on the terms dictated by Washington.

These included eventual control over canal operation by the end of 1999 (according to some estimates, the limit of the waterway's useful life), control over more than half of the Canal Zone once the treaty takes effect, and a financial package totaling \$295 million in loans and an annual rent of \$40 million to \$70 million.

In return, however, the White House demanded and won the Panamanian government's agreement to sufficient concessions to guarantee American domination over the canal forever.

The major concessions extracted by Washington are the following, as taken from an official White House summary of the key elements of the accord, released August 12. Although they are couched in the customary Pentagon doublespeak of "neutrality" and "defense," their meaning is clear enough.

- The U.S. will have the permanent right to defend the neutrality of the canal from any threat, for an indefinite period.
- U.S. warships will have the permanent right to transit the canal expeditiously and without conditions, for an indefinite period.
- For the rest of the century U.S. military forces [currently numbering more than 9,000] will have the primary responsibility to protect and defend the canal.
- The Government of Panama guarantees the U.S. the right to station troops in Panama and to use all lands and waters necessary for the canal's defense.

The United States will maintain control over all lands, waters and installations—including military bases—necessary to manage, operate and defend the canal. A new agency of the U.S.

Government will operate the canal [until the end of 1999].

These infringements on the Panamanian people's sovereignty are so scandalous that the negotiators did not even dare to include most of them in the main body of the treaty. Instead they relegated them to a separate "protocol," to be signed later by Panama and, Carter and Torrijos hope, other Latin American governments.

The obvious concern is that without such support, Torrijos could never present these concessions to the Panamanian people as a "victory."

In its August 22 issue *Time* magazine gave further details of the lopsided accord:

Not until the year 2000 will the U.S. relinquish complete control of the 51-mile-long waterway. In the meantime, the U.S. will continue to operate the canal, as well as the 14 military bases in the zone. The bases will be phased out at U.S. discretion over the life of the treaty. Under the terms of a separate treaty to be signed later by all of the hemisphere's nations, the U.S. will guarantee the neutrality of the canal and its accessibility to all the world's shipping even after the year 2000. If the safety of the canal is threatened, the U.S. is free to intervene with military force.

Once the treaty is approved by both countries, the venerable Panama Canal Company will be replaced by a board of directors consisting of five Americans and four Panamanians. The Panamanian members will be proposed by their own country but appointed by the U.S. Until 1990 the canal administrator will be an American and his deputy a Panamanian. . . .

Apart from the most jingoist right-wingers, who consider even verbal concessions on American rights over the canal to be tantamount to treason, the American ruling class views the proposed new treaties as, if anything, an improvement over the current situation. They recognize that continued naked American occupation of the Canal Zone and control of the canal serve as a festering sore, poisoning American diplomatic relations throughout Latin America.

This point was underscored by Sol Linowitz, one of the two main American negotiators, in an August 12 news conference in Washington.

The new treaties are a "good investment," he said. They "not only preserve but enhance the national security interests of the United States."

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger lauded the new treaty August 17, calling it an act of "statesmanship, patriotism and wisdom." According to a

report in the August 18 *Washington Post*, he "said that his discussions with Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with [U.S. negotiator Ellsworth] Bunker and others, assure him that 'the new treaty marks an improvement over the present situation' for 'secure access' to the Panama Canal."

Former President Gerald Ford said August 16 that he was "absolutely convinced" that the new treaty was in the "national interest." According to a report in the August 17 *New York Daily News*, Ford also took part credit for the accord, saying that it "followed guidelines" set by his administration in earlier negotiations with Panama.

The Pentagon's Joint Chiefs of Staff, on August 11, assured Carter of their "full support" for the accord.

The editors of the *Washington Post* chimed in August 12, hailing the cosmetic advantages of the new treaty. The old treaty, they pointed out "has been a serious embarrassment to American hemispheric diplomacy and, by its own provocative nature, the largest potential threat to continued American use of the canal."

The "key American concession (to yield control 'in perpetuity')," they said, "was more than matched by the key Panamanian concession (to permit Washington a defense role after 2000)."

The Panamanian government, stuck with defending the indefensible, at first remained silent. "Although foreign correspondents were briefed by American officials on the treaty and their reports have been published extensively outside Panama," Alan Riding reported in the August 13 *New York Times*, "Panamanian newspapers have yet to inform their readers of the details of the agreement."

The demagogic way in which the Panamanian regime did attempt to line up support for the treaty is telling.

Speaking before a student audience August 12 in a speech broadcast by radio across the country, Panama's chief negotiator, Dr. Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, argued that the negotiated accord with Washington was the only way of avoiding "the massacre of the best of our youth."

The Panamanian government, he said, was too "responsible" to seek a bloody confrontation with Washington over control of the canal and the canal zone.

Panamanian chief of state Torrijos used a similar argument in an interview published in the August 22 issue of *Time*:

We have two ways to go: either the slow way, over a generation, or by liberation war, which would be quicker, with a high price in blood—the lives of 50,000 young Panamanians. We prefer the treaty. If the United States does not keep its treaty pledges during the time ahead, then there surely will be trouble. The treaty must be observed. We shall observe it, and we expect the U.S. to do the same.

Torrijos has called for a national

plebiscite, at a date yet to be announced, in which the Panamanian people are to vote on the proposed treaty. Leaving little to chance, the government has mounted a publicity campaign branding any criticism of the treaty as bordering on "treason against our fatherland."

A major target of the government's attack are the Trotskyists of the Liga Socialista Revolucionaria (LSR—Revolutionary Socialist League), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

In a statement widely reported in the American press, the LSR on August 10 denounced the Torrijos regime for not demanding a "just" treaty and pointed out that contrary to Torrijos's claim, there was probably no better time to take on Washington than right now.

"There is no guarantee that the Americans will withdraw from our territory in the year 2000," the LSR said. "Today we have the eyes of the world on us, today we have international support, today imperialism has been weakened by Watergate and Vietnam." (Quoted in the August 11 *New York Times*.)

The LSR also pointed out that no democratic discussion of the treaty could possibly be held so long as scores of prominent Panamanians who oppose continued U.S. control over the canal remain exiled.

Among these exiles is Miguel Antonio Bernal, deported by Torrijos in February 1976 for his outspoken anti-imperialist views. The LSR demanded that Torrijos keep his promise to declare a general amnesty and that he allow all the exiles to return to participate in the debate on the treaty.

In the United States, American Trotskyists of the Socialist Workers Party made clear their solidarity with the struggle of the Panamanian people to regain control of the canal and oust the American military forces. In a front-page statement in the August 26 *Militant* headlined "U.S. Hands Off Panama Canal!" Catarino Garza, a leader of the SWP, said:

"... Carter's new agreement simply continues U.S. domination by more 'modern' means. . . ."

"In contrast to the intrigues of these big business politicians, the Socialist Workers Party offers a simple one-point plan:

"U.S. Hands Off Panama!"

"Let the Panamanian people run their own country without the threat of intervention from Washington!"

Only an outcry around the world to demand that the White House stop bullying the Panamanian people can help pave the way for a rejection of this monstrous treaty, negotiated by Washington with a pistol on the table. Support to such a campaign is an elementary duty of all who support the right of nations everywhere to determine their own destiny, free of imperialist domination. □

In This Issue

Closing News Date: August 22, 1977

FEATURES	930	<i>Out Now!</i> —Chapter 25: The March Against Death and the November 15, 1969, Demonstrations —by Fred Halstead
BRAZIL	924	The Facts About Brazil's "Economic Miracle"—by Otto Buchsbaum
FRANCE	926	Strikes by Immigrants Punch Hole in Wage Controls—by F.L. Derry
	934	The Superphénix Breeder Reactor
BOTSWANA	928	Rising Instability Under Impact of Zimbabwe Freedom Struggle —by Jim Atkinson
CHAD	929	French Intervention Disclosed
MALI	943	Student Protests Halted by Riot Police
USA	938	CIA Sought Secret of "Mind Control" —by Steve Wattenmaker
NEWS ANALYSIS	922	The New Theft of the Panama Canal —by Michael Baumann
CAPITALISM		
FOULS THINGS UP	936	30,000 in France March Against Nuclear Power Plant
BOOKS	939	Trotskyism in Latin America —reviewed by Joseph Hansen
DOCUMENTS	944	On the Character of the Algerian Government
DRAWINGS	925	Ernesto Geisel; 926, Jacques Chirac —by Copain

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The Facts About Brazil's 'Economic Miracle'

By Otto Buchsbaum

[Otto Buchsbaum is the publisher of *Abertura Cultural*, a monthly magazine in Rio de Janeiro. He is also the founder and president of *Resistência Ecológica*, a Brazil-wide organization for the defense of the environment. The translation of the following article is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

RIO DE JANEIRO—Decades have gone by since Stefan Zweig called Brazil "the land of the future." It is still that. But the horizon of the future is receding further and further into the distance.

Among the privileged sections of the society, there was optimism, or wishful thinking, at certain periods that the Brazilian economy was nearing the takeoff point and that in a majestic collective flight we would soar over the boundaries of underdevelopment and take a place beside the rich and advantaged countries.

The military government's economists continually explained that such an economic leap was an absolutely natural process, in view of the potential and resources of the country, and that nothing could prevent Brazil from achieving its manifest destiny, including the status of the southern hemisphere's first world power.

Certain distortions, such as a marked concentration of income in relatively few hands and a drastic cut in the buying power of the producing classes, was explained as a transitory phenomenon characteristic of the first stage of economic growth. This first stage was supposed to be one of concentrating wealth, and the following phase would involve distributing it.

However, in a country where the future never comes, the "economic miracle" completely evaporated. At the end, there was a feeling that this process had never really gotten under way and never got anywhere near the point where there could be any thought of a "second distributive phase."

It was discovered that the whole so-called miracle was an attempted "great leap forward" that would benefit less than 20 percent of the population by creating an island of consumer society, of advanced technology, of well-being, an island of development in a sea of underdevelopment, poverty, and hunger.

But the miracle ended, not with a resounding crash but with barely a whimper. The result now is that there is a

foreign debt of \$30 billion and an internal debt that no one can calculate, because no one inside or outside the system can calculate what guarantees there are for this debt, or what credit entries are fictitious. An example of such false entries on the credit side are the famous buildings of the Banco Nacional de Habitação, which began to fall down before they were even finished.

Typical of the present climate is the slogan of the São Paulo state savings plan: "The only savings account that is doubly guaranteed." They explain: "It is guaranteed both by the state and federal governments." In fact, all the other savings plans are guaranteed only by the federal government.

This slogan has been used for some time, having proved effective. The general situation is such that no one has yet pointed out how peculiar it is to claim that it would be useful to have another guarantee besides that of the federal government.

When you look at what was achieved with all the resources represented by this accumulated foreign and domestic debt and the economic surplus gained by freezing wages, the picture is a melancholy one.

The Transamazonian Highway largely sank into the mud or became impassible, or else went from nowhere to nowhere. The plans for settling the Amazonian region did not take into consideration the facts about tropical rain forests; they did not take into consideration that more than 90 percent of the lands crossed by the Transamazonian Highway are extremely poor and that there is an ecological balance between the soil and the jungle. Once the jungle is destroyed, these soils are incapable of supporting tillage or animal husbandry.

There was a great concern with basic industry, and so bold plans were drawn up for expanding steel production. An important element in this structure was to be the "Steel Railroad," which General Geisel wanted built in a thousand days as a basis for the expansion of the Volta Redonda steel mill.

This project was begun with great enthusiasm, 20,000 workers, and specially imported modern equipment. It foundered completely at the end of 1976, ending in layoffs of workers and in big debts to the construction companies. Now, there are barely 500 workers left, who are guarding machinery and trying to protect certain sections already completed against erosion.

All the plans for expanding the steel industry are either running far behind schedule or have not even gotten off the drafting boards. The same can be said for all sorts of projects that were planned.

This goes for the Itaipu hydroelectric plant, which was supposed to generate 12,000 megawatts and be the biggest such facility in the world. It goes for the eight nuclear reactors, each of which was supposed to generate 1,300 megawatts. And it goes for the uranium enrichment plant and the factory for reprocessing nuclear waste included in the West German-Brazilian treaty and which the West Germans hailed as the "business deal of the century."

Other such abortive projects are the enormous mines at Serra dos Carajás south of Pará. The hydroelectric plant and highway that complement this project are another pharaonic undertaking. They are still in the planning stage. There are many other gigantic projects on the drawing boards in various regions.

Although Brazil imports 80 percent of the petroleum it consumes, the automotive industry is continuing to dump a million cars on the market every year. So as not to increase the burden on the balance of payments, they are planning to produce alcohol as an automotive fuel. The aim is to supply the needs at least of the automobiles and trucks already in service.

It is estimated that in order to produce enough alcohol for this purpose, 80,000 to 100,000 square kilometers of land will have to be planted with manioc and sugar cane, and about 1,000 distilleries will have to be built. It is argued that this is a small area, since it represents about 1 percent of the surface of the country. But if we consider that at present no more than 8 percent of the country is used for all tillage and stock raising, it can be seen that this project involves increasing the land under cultivation by one-eighth.

The lines of credit have already been opened for this alcohol-producing project and a lot of money has already been released for "getting it under way." A number of elementary facts could be noted, and it is extremely surprising that so-called official circles have not taken them into account.

This is the biggest agricultural-industrial project yet conceived. It requires a fabulous infrastructure. Since they are trying to use mainly poor soils, the project will depend mostly on manioc. And Brazil has no experience in running manioc distilleries.

The environmental impact will be tremendous, because the areas to be exploited are still reserves in the ecological system, and waste from the thousand distilleries planned will pollute the rivers, land, and air throughout vast regions. Thus, not only the 1 percent of the national territory required for these plantations will be affected, but even regions far removed

from those utilized, with unforeseeable results.

In the south and west of the Amazon basin, enormous areas are being handed over to multinational corporations, such as Kings Ranch, Swift, Armour, Volkswagen, Liguigas, and other such companies, as well as to international consortiums.

These trusts intend to destroy the rain forest to establish cattle ranches. Their projects are in full swing. Such large areas of jungle have been burned off that they can be seen from satellites.

But these projects as well do not take into account regional peculiarities or what is known about stock raising in tropical conditions. Even if they fail, however, as Ford failed with his rubber plantations in Belterra, destruction is certain, and the total destruction caused by these projects will be enormous.

As the destruction advances in the Amazon region, financed by the multinational corporations and by national speculators, all other projects tend to arouse automatic pessimism.

The \$30 billion foreign debt has left little sign of productive operations that could help pay interest and amortize loans. Moreover, because of the trend in the balance of payments, along with outflows for interest and royalties, the foreign debt will continue to grow steadily.

Already they are trying to reduce the deficit in the balance of payments by exporting large quantities of agricultural products. The cultivation of these export crops has, and continues to, cut into production for internal consumption.

With half the Brazilian people undernourished, the perspective is for a steady decline in the per capita consumption of calories and proteins, especially for those sections of the population already living barely above the subsistence level.

At the same time, none of these official projects can stand up against the most elementary examination, against a little use of arithmetic, adding up the resources necessary for all this. The system that the military dictatorship created takes on the appearance of a real play of the absurd. They are squandering enormous resources at a time when the economic structure can no longer support the weight of the past waste.

This situation is being aggravated by constant inflation and a relative decline in the economic surplus produced by the extractive and manufacturing industries, which can no longer support the service sector or even provide for the minimum needs of the population. They are incapable even of maintaining the existing facilities. In this context, the political situation is becoming more and more strained.

The dictatorship is unwilling to let go of its absolute powers. It wants to perpetuate itself at any cost. For every economic project that goes bust, they launch two

more. Isn't this the "country of the future"? So, they live off the future.

However, in view of the growing gulf between the regime and the nation, it is



GEISEL: Still looking for a way to face the voters—and win.

becoming more and more difficult to maintain certain appearances. Elections? They are always changing the rules of the game. But they have not yet been able to find a way to face the voters in the coming elections.

To be sure, for the executive posts such as president and the state governors, there are indirect elections, through specially rigged up electoral colleges, which only ratify choices made beforehand. A third of the officeholders will also be appointed. But what about the other elections? The governmental party ARENA [Aliança Renovadora Nacional—Alliance for National Renewal] is in such bad shape that in any election the dictatorship would face resounding repudiation.

The regime is hardening up. Such actions as the expulsion from the legislature of Alencar Furtado, leader of the parliamentary fraction of the tolerated opposition party, because he criticized the government on a TV program, point in a clear direction. This move was organized by the Board of Elections itself.

The conflicts between the students and the rector of the University of Brasilia are illustrative. The rector suspended sixteen students. The university went on strike. A committee of senators led by Senator Magalhães Pinto tried to pour oil on the waters.

The rector asked what the students

wanted to end the strike. The senators said that they were demanding the abrogation of the suspensions. The rector said that if that was all they wanted it was a small price to pay. He asked the senators to tell the students that they could return to classes and that the suspensions would be reviewed.

The students continued their strike, distrusting the rector's promise. The rector promptly called a meeting of the University Council to review the penalties, but he himself recommended to the council that these measures be upheld, and they were.

The students continued the strike and the rector closed the university. He declared early vacations and said that the university would reopen on July 25. Now, a few days after this date, the rector has decided to expel thirty students and to suspend dozens of others. The students have already responded. The strike continues.

In their statement declaring resumption of the strike, the students put their action in the context of the Brazilian situation as a whole. The tougher line by the rector in Brasilia, who had said earlier that giving in to the students' demands would be a small price to pay, is symptomatic. He, of course, is following orders. In view of the powerful student demonstrations in the first half of the year, the "punishments" handed down at the University of Brasilia could only be intended as a provocation.

During the student demonstrations, which were determined but orderly and nonviolent, General Geisel said: "They [the students] want a dead body, but they won't get one."

Now, it seems that the regime's intention is the opposite. It has already exhausted all the arguments to justify a permanent state of emergency. Despite all the restrictions on the opposition, an inevitable defeat for the government looms in the elections.

Is the government's new tactic to drive the students or other sectors of the population to desperation? Does it want to drive individual sections of the population to a desperation that will lead to violence, which will then serve to justify the arguments about security and the need for keeping the Brazilian people under permanent tutelage? In that case, who wants a body, who is looking for violence? □

Highway Robbery

The U.S. Transportation Department recently concluded a \$225,000 study that determined "another ice age would drive Americans southward and that a guerrilla war would make driving dangerous," United Press International reported August 20.

In the event of a new ice age, the report predicts, "a very large number of people will be forced or attracted to move to the South and Southwest to escape an undesirable climate."

Strikes by Immigrants Punch Hole in French Wage Controls

By F.L. Derry

PARIS—A wave of strikes by immigrant workers earlier this year left a gaping hole in the French government's austerity program. For the first time, wage increases in excess of the 6.5 percent government-imposed limit were won.

The victories are doubly important because of the pariah status of immigrants in France. They faced police repression, threats of deportation, racist attacks, and strikebreaking activities by France's largest union federation, the Communist Party-dominated CGT.¹ Having resisted these attacks, the immigrant workers emerged as clear winners.

Immigrants play a vital role in the French economy. There are more than 4.5 million registered immigrants in France, about 8 percent of the total population. The number who have not registered may be a million or more.

The registered immigrants make up 11.3 percent of all wage earners. Since they are concentrated in the worst paying jobs, they represent 20 percent of all blue-collar workers (*ouvriers*). On the production line of any major automobile plant, for example, immigrants are an overwhelming majority. Reports from some of the largest plants in France indicate that up to 80-90 percent of the production line workers are immigrants.

Few of the recent strikes took place in large factories, however. Sanitation workers, street cleaners, and the workers who sweep the Paris subways were the ones who took the lead. Their victory over the government austerity plan in May is an example not only for the immigrant workers in the factories, but for all French workers as well.

The government austerity program was launched by Premier Raymond Barre last September. Although it was greeted by loud protests and a twenty-four hour general strike October 7, no union was willing to lead a serious struggle against the Barre Plan, particularly in a preelection period. Strike victories became less frequent, while strikes became longer. Inflation mounted and is now running at a rate twice as high as the limit on wage increases in the Barre Plan.

Unemployment has also mounted sharply. Both the government and the employers have made efforts to put the burden of unemployment on the backs of the immi-



PARIS MAYOR CHIRAC: Finds bayonets not suited for picking up garbage.

grants. For example, last year the government launched a campaign to "dignify manual labor." According to François Ceyrac, president of the National Council of Employers, the aim of this campaign is to "encourage the French to look for certain types of jobs that until now have been held by immigrant workers" (*Le Monde*, June 18, 1977).

Former Premier Jacques Chirac, now the mayor of Paris, was, as usual, even more blunt, noting that "there should not be an unemployment problem in France while there are one million unemployed and 1.8 million immigrant workers."

A crisis is now developing in the steel industry, leading to tens of thousands of additional layoffs. A campaign is being conducted, particularly in the center of the French steel industry in the Lorraine region, to victimize immigrant workers to "save French jobs."

Mohamed B., an Algerian steelworker in the Lorraine, told how this campaign had affected him:

Now the French will no longer speak to me on the street. They think that I have stolen their job. At the coke ovens it is even worse. I came to Marienau (in the Lorraine) some ten years ago, when I was twenty years old. At first I slaved away as an unskilled laborer, then for the last five years, as a skilled worker.

One month ago the foreman once again put a shovel in my hand. "It's either that or the door. If you don't like it, go back to your own country." My pay has been lowered to the legal minimum wage. I had to accept it because I have a wife and a sick child, who arrived at the beginning of the year. But the French no longer want to work in the mine or the coke ovens.

In June, the government proposed a new solution to the jobs crisis. Immigrant workers who were unemployed would be offered 10,000 francs (about US\$2,000) to return to their native country. They would be forbidden to ever return to France. The aim was to get 100,000 immigrant workers to "voluntarily" leave France, thus giving future job openings to French workers.

While strong pressure is being placed on immigrants to accept the offer, its real purpose is to subtly persuade French workers that "the foreigners" are to blame for rising unemployment, not the government or the capitalists.

Unfortunately, the CGT has done everything in its power to hold back the immigrant workers. The February 14 *Le Nouvel Economiste*, a weekly financial journal, recounted one such effort that took place at the giant Renault plant at Billancourt on the edge of Paris.

With 32,000 workers it is one of the largest plants in France. More than 90 percent of the *ouvriers spécialisés* (semi-skilled workers) are immigrants. The incident took place just two and a half months before the current wave of strikes by immigrant workers.

Le Nouvel Economiste reported:

Thirty days before the municipal elections, the CGT does not want to make Renault the detonator of a social explosion. . . . It has bluntly refused to light the match at its fiefdom on the Seguin Island at Billancourt.

On January 27, 500 semiskilled immigrant workers decided not to go back to work on the assembly lines for the Renault 4 and Renault 6. . . . Their demands could easily have spread to all the lines at Billancourt. The management was aware of the danger. It was in one of these shops, a small bastion of immigrants in fortress Renault, that one of the harshest struggles the Renault management has known began on February 13, 1975. . . .

Michel Certano, the new CGT secretary, knows the shops on the Seguin Island very well, because for a long time he worked at the side of the immigrant workers. . . . However, in spite of the pressure from the CFDT,² which called for an

2. Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail (French Democratic Confederation of Labor, supported by the Socialist Party).

1. Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor).

extension of the conflict, the CGT, supported by the French Communist Party, preferred to cool things off. "The workers have not chosen an unlimited strike. We are convinced that they will know how to avoid this trap by modifying the form of their action . . .," explained a leaflet distributed by the Communist activists at the factory gates.

Unhappy, the 500 workers of Seguin Island have gone back to the line after six days of a fruitless strike. 'Preelectoral prudence' was the scornful reply by the CGT's opponents.

The CGT did take part in one of the recent strikes, that of the Parisian sanitation workers in April. This was the first of the strikes to win a clear-cut victory and it helped to spark a wave of other strikes.

More than three-quarters of the 4,500 sanitation workers are immigrants, mostly Africans, Arabs, and Portuguese. Two years ago, a similar strike was crushed when the army was used to collect the garbage. In July 1976, a strike of sanitation workers in the city of Marseilles was also broken through the use of the army.

Most of the sanitation workers in Paris are supporters of the CGT.

With the walkout still less than a week old, Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac called on the army to break the strike, which had begun on April 21. However, in contrast to previous strikes, the sanitation workers were able to win in spite of the use of the army, through a combination of winning public support from other workers and a "go slow" policy of the soldiers themselves.

After one week it became evident that the soldiers were not keeping pace with the ever-mounting piles of garbage. CGT mechanics refused to repair the broken machinery being used by the soldiers. Expressions of support were received from a small number of soldiers.

The strikers provided one of the lead contingents in the Paris May Day demonstration. Here the true character of the strike became evident. Hundreds of African strikers, in African dress and playing African music, marched to enthusiastic applause from bystanders. In four hours the strikers collected 15,000 francs (about US\$3,000) for their strike fund.

Two days later, Chirac made a new offer and the strike was settled May 4.

As with other recent strikes by immigrant workers, the central demands concerned wage increases and bad working conditions. While the sanitation workers' wages are still low and they did not win all of their demands, their wage increase of 10-11 percent was the first settlement to break through the 6.5 percent government-imposed limit.

The fact that the settlement was made with the agreement of Chirac and ratified by President Giscard d'Estaing meant that the first breach of the austerity program had a semi-official character.

The next day, sanitation workers in Orleans declared their intention to strike and they were soon followed by sanitation workers in Marseilles. Then, on May 31,

both the Paris subway cleaners and 1,200 immigrant workers in a factory in Strasbourg walked off the job.

The strike at the Roth Frères factory in Strasbourg involved immigrants from Turkey, Morocco, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal. Roth manufactures foam rubber seats for Renault automobiles.

The workers receive slightly over the legal minimum wage with hardly any wage increases, even after years of work. They work in excessive heat and are exposed to toxic gases without adequate ventilation. Extreme repression had prevented the formation of a union until small gains were made by the CFDT just before the strike broke out.

The 1,000 Paris subway cleaners are not directly employed by the subway administration but by six private companies who subcontract the work. Virtually all the workers are immigrants who work forty-five hours a week for a monthly salary of 1,700 francs (about US\$340).

The minimum salary for those who work directly for the subway administration is 2,300 francs (about US\$460). These workers, however, are French, not immigrants. One of the central demands of the subway cleaners was for a minimum wage equal to that of the French subway workers.

Their work is dangerous, as the employers refuse to turn off the high voltage lines when the tracks are cleaned. Two workers have been electrocuted this year while cleaning the rails. The workers demanded that this practice stop.

Not only do the subway cleaners not receive any bonus for Sundays or work on holidays, they are even forced to purchase their own gloves and safety goggles. They have to eat in the area where the garbage is stored.

In addition to their demands for a 2,300 franc minimum salary and better safety conditions, they asked for a 40-hour week, a year-end bonus equal to one month's pay, double pay for Sundays and holidays, a night-work bonus, and full pay for the time spent on strike. They also demanded better sanitary conditions.

The bosses believed they could divide the strikers, since many different nationalities were involved. But the striking workers organized regular, democratically run assemblies with simultaneous translations into four different languages and elected a leadership to conduct the strike.

The workers had never been on strike before, nor had they ever formed a union. However, most of them supported the CFDT, which led the strike support efforts. By the end of the strike, 930 of the workers had joined the CFDT.

Every night, delegations from many different CFDT unions went down into the subways with the striking workers to speak to those few workers still on the job. In this way the discipline of the strike was

maintained and the strikers were protected from police harassment.

The solidarity displayed by the CFDT towards the immigrants was unfortunately offset by the strikebreaking activities of the CGT. The CGT Federation of Ports and Docks views the growing influence of the CFDT among the immigrant workers as a threat. More than 83 percent of this CGT federation's members are French.

In the one area in which the CGT initially had some influence among the subway cleaners, they refused to call a strike. Only when their supporters were down to fewer than 100 did they finally join the action, although they never attended the broad strike meetings.

After a brief period on strike, they accepted the first offer from the bosses and led eighty workers influenced by the CGT back to work. The last week of the strike saw the sorry spectacle of the CGT strikebreakers cleaning the subway, escorted by police guards.

The workers gained their demands on work safety and a "promise" to improve work and sanitary conditions. They won an immediate wage increase of 120 francs, an increase of 2 percent in October, and a 350 franc year-end bonus.

This means that by the end of the year their salary will have risen from 1,700 francs to 1,900 francs, an increase of nearly 12 percent. While this is still far from the 2,300 francs of other subway workers, it is nearly twice the government limit for wage increases.

The recent series of strikes have shown several characteristics. One is the extraordinary tenacity of the immigrant workers in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds.

Second, they have taken place in sectors which are not traditional strong points for the union movement. Except for the Paris street cleaners, unions were either very new or nonexistent at the start of the strike.

Third, and most important, they were victorious in breaking through the austerity program for the first time, thus playing a vanguard role for the rest of the workers, French and immigrant alike. □

Second Thoughts

Plans by New York Mayor Abraham Beame to proclaim August 23 "Sacco and Vanzetti Day" have been canceled, a spokesman for City Hall said August 20.

The day was to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the execution of the two immigrant anarchists, framed up on false charges of murder and robbery.

Beame, who is running for reelection on a "law-and-order platform," was to have read a proclamation in honor of the two, until questions were raised about his recent call for a return of the death penalty.

"We received indications from various sources that the simple ceremony we had planned might have turned into something else," and could be "construed in poor taste," Beame's representative said.

Rising Instability Under Impact of Zimbabwe Freedom Struggle

By Jim Atkinson

FRANCISTON, Botswana—"Botswana continues to be subjected to all sorts of aggressive acts," Botswana President Seretse Khama charged during the Commonwealth summit in London last June. "Various incidents of murder, abduction and destruction," he said, were occurring "with increasing frequency and brutality."

According to government officials here, the Rhodesian white settler regime has violated Botswana's borders more than 100 times since Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. The vast majority of incidents have been in the last year. Now, border violations are an almost weekly occurrence.

On May 16, 150 Rhodesian soldiers, supported by helicopters and troop carriers, crossed six kilometers into Botswana and clashed with a unit of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) at the village of Mapoka, northwest of Francistown.


Two weeks later, on June 2, Rhodesian troops opened up with mortars and small arms against a BDF camp and a police station at Kazungula in the extreme north of the country.

Then, on June 13, five armed Rhodesian soldiers hailed down an American motorist on the Nata-Kazungula road, ten kilometers inside Botswana and stole P340¹ in cash and travellers cheques and P1,000 of property.

Sources here also place the blame on Rhodesia for a deadly grenade attack against the Mophane Club, Francistown's most popular nightspot. Two people were killed and scores injured May 6 when unknown assailants lobbed a hand grenade onto the club's packed dance floor.

Evidence has also come to light that members of the Selous Scouts, Rhodesia's elite counterinsurgency unit, have been operating inside Botswana. Their main assignments here, it seems, are to kidnap opponents of the Smith regime and abduct them across the border.

On June 15, a member of the Selous Scouts, Amon Nyathi, was sentenced to four years' imprisonment by the Gaborone Magistrates Court for his part in the abduction of four people from Botswana into Rhodesia at the end of last year. Nyathi, who admitted in court that he was a Selous Scout, was arrested at a police station in Selebi-Pikwe, fifty kilometers from the Rhodesian border, posing as a refugee.



New York Times

There is a widespread mood of anxiety here about the Rhodesian raids. Some villagers in the border areas have decided to abandon their homes and resettle farther from the frontier. And, after the succession of much more serious Rhodesian incursions into Mozambique (most recently the seizure on May 30 for three days of the town of Mapai, eighty kilometers inside Mozambique), many Tswana fear stepped-up aggression by the settler regime's troops in the months to come.

At the same time, thousands of Zimbabweans are streaming across the Botswana border to escape the Smith regime's terrorist assaults against the civilian population and to enroll with the nationalist insurgents. According to official sources here, about 800 Zimbabweans—mainly teen-agers—have been arriving in Botswana every week since the beginning of March. At least 11,000 have arrived here since March 1 and probably more than 15,000 since the beginning of the year. The majority, about 600 to 700 a week, are being flown to camps in Zambia within days of their arrival here.

Conditions in the Francistown refugee camp—where there are about 2,000 refugees—are appalling. The camp, which was built in 1975, was designed to accommodate a maximum of 250 persons. Now, there are hundreds sleeping outside—many under makeshift cardboard shelters—and there are not enough blankets to go around. Temperatures here (on the edge of the Kalahari Desert) drop to freezing during the southern hemisphere winter. There is a real danger that an epidemic could sweep the camp.

According to government officials, there

are about 400 refugees in the other refugee center in Botswana, at Selebi-Pikwe. They are sleeping in tents.

There is an obvious danger that the Rhodesian regime might stage a direct assault against the refugee centres in Botswana—as happened against the Nyadzonia camp in Mozambique in August 1976, when (according to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees) more than 600 Zimbabwean refugees were massacred by Rhodesian troops.

South African refugees here are also unsafe. In 1974, Abraham Tire, a leader of the South African Students Organisation (SASO), was killed by a parcel bomb in Khale. There are between 500 and 550 South African refugees here and about 50 more are arriving each month.

What is perhaps most striking about the mounting tension between the Smith regime and Botswana is that the neocolonial government in Gaborone is proving incapable of defending the Tswana people against the settler forces. In February, 800 people marched through Francistown, which is only eighteen kilometers from the border, to the district commissioner's offices to demand that the government provide greater protection.

Until April, Botswana did not even have an army. Then the BDF was set up but even today its total troop strength is only a little over 300. Company A, which is supposed to guard the entire 800-kilometer border with Rhodesia, from Kazungula in the north to the Limpopo River in the south, has only 140 soldiers.

The most effective way to defend the country's borders would be to train and arm the masses in the border regions. But Khama's bourgeois government is not prepared to run the risks of placing the workers of Francistown or the rural poor under arms.

Moreover, Khama's Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) is being dragged by events beyond its control into the spiraling conflagration in Zimbabwe. The problem facing Khama is that the Zimbabwean revolution is a destabilising factor throughout southern Africa, including capitalist Botswana itself. And, while the BDP regime has always banned—and still does ban—the Zimbabwean nationalists from setting up bases in Botswana, it is virtually impossible for it to prevent freedom fighters from crossing the 800-kilometer border. So to defend its own interests, the Botswana ruling class wants a swift removal of the settler regime and

1. One pula is equivalent to US\$1.15.—IP

the installation of a neocolonial administration in Zimbabwe. This, it hopes, will reestablish stability in both Zimbabwe and the whole southern African region.

Khama's BDP gives verbal support to the "armed struggle" in Zimbabwe, but in fact—like the other "frontline states"²—his government is anxious to restrict the guerrilla war to a kind of pressure mechanism on the settler regime. The aim is to goad Smith and the settlers into a negotiated settlement and achieve a stable transition to neocolonial forms of rule.

The Botswana regime is also a partner to the "frontline states" policy of encouraging the divisions in the Zimbabwean nationalist movement by giving one-sided support to the Patriotic Front, the bloc between Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the faction of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe. Botswana, like the other "frontline states," refuses assistance to supporters of the ZANU faction led by the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and of Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC).

When Zimbabweans cross the border into Botswana, the police require them to reveal details of their political allegiance. At the Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe camps, they are then segregated along political lines, making it very difficult for the supporters of the different factions to thrash out their differences through discussion.

Since Botswana borders on the western region of Zimbabwe from which Nkomo draws the bulk of his support, the majority of Zimbabweans who arrive here are ZAPU followers. However, there are significant minorities of UANC, ZANU-Sithole and ZANU-Mugabe supporters who enter Botswana.

But, in line with its policy of partisan backing for the Patriotic Front, the Botswana government allows only those who declare allegiance to Nkomo and Mugabe to proceed to Zambia for guerrilla training. Samuel Kanhanda, the UANC's representative in Botswana, told me that UANC and ZANU-Sithole supporters were being forced to remain for months in the Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe camps—in indescribable conditions—while those who back the Patriotic Front normally remain for only a few days in the two Botswana camps before being flown on special twice-daily charter flights to Zambia. This report is confirmed by other sources.

The Botswana government is also clearly worried about the radicalising impact that the influx of nationalist militants here could have on Botswana society. Three recent government actions reveal this.

On June 15, one day before the anniversary

of the Black uprising in the South African township of Soweto, the Office of the President in Gaborone issued an order banning all political speeches at a planned commemoration rally. The organisers, and eighteen-member working committee that represents the South African student refugees here, were forced to limit their programme to an evening of dance, music, poetry, and drama. About 1,000 persons, half of them South Africans, packed Gaborone's town hall for the rally.


A month earlier, on May 16, armed soldiers of the BDF raided the homes of South African refugees in Gaborone, supposedly to search for arms. No weapons

were found, and the students deny that they have any.

In addition, the government recently banned an academic conference on the liberation of southern Africa. The conference, which was originally slated for June by the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University College of Botswana, was deemed a "security risk" by the government.

The regime is worried that the activities of the South African militants here could endanger the generally cordial relations Khama has enjoyed with the Pretoria regime, and that they could start influencing the political outlook of Tswana youth.

French Intervention in Chad Disclosed



New York Times

acting under its military-cooperation agreement with Chad, sources in Paris say, helped transport Chadian troops within the country and supplied some ammunition, vehicles and spare parts."

At the time of his announcement, de Guiringaud claimed that the intervention had ended. "Not a French soldier is engaged on Chadian soil and not a French transport plane is in the Chadian sky," he said.

Before his announcement, Chadian military representatives had stated that fierce fighting had broken out between government forces and Toubou rebels in the northern Tibesti desert region. The three northern regions of Tibesti, Borkou, and Ennedi were under direct French military control until 1965 and Paris maintained a substantial military force in its former colony until two years ago.

French troops have aided Chadian forces against the rebels several times in the past. In one instance, in April 1969, more than 3,000 fighters of the Front de Libération National du Tchad (National Liberation Front of Chad) were claimed to have been killed.

Lewis noted that "the timing of the intervention and its announcement have interested diplomatic observers here [Paris]. For both seem to confirm the new policy that the Government of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is adopting in Africa.

"The President stated recently that France went to the aid of the pro-Western Government in Zaire only because the Carter Administration was prevented from giving help by Congressional opposition."

Giscard has suggested that European powers, Africa's former colonial masters, might be in a better position to bolster the Black capitalist states in Africa than Washington. He has called for the establishment of a "security pact" between Europe and the Black states.

For the second time this year, French military forces have intervened directly in a Black African country. French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud announced July 18 that French military transport planes had provided "logistical support" to the government of Chad in its war against Toubou rebels in northern Chad in early July.

According to a report by Paul Lewis in the July 20 *New York Times*, "France,

2. Besides the Botswana government, the "frontline states" include the regimes in Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Angola.—IP

OUT NOW!

Chapter 25

The March Against Death and the November 15, 1969, Demonstrations

By Fred Halstead

[First of three parts]

The period between the October 15 Moratorium and November 15 was one of tension within the antiwar movement. In part, this reflected the fact that the movement had reached the point where it was putting great pressure on the government. The government in turn was putting its pressure on the movement.

For some time the Vietnam War had been the central focus of U.S. foreign policy and, in a sense, of world politics. The American ruling class itself had become sharply divided on what to do about Vietnam. That was the reason for the backing the Moratorium got from a significant section of the Establishment. The inside details were not then public, but it was generally assumed that the administration was in the throes of making major decisions about the war, and, in spite of Nixon's public stance, the antiwar movement was one of the factors that had to be taken into account in these secret deliberations.

Some facts have subsequently come to light about the nature of these decisions. Roger Morris, then an assistant to Henry

With this chapter we continue the serialization of **Out Now!—A Participant's Account of the American Antiwar Movement** by Fred Halstead. Copyright © 1977 by the Anchor Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed by permission. To be published by Monad Press.

Kissinger, Nixon's chief foreign-policy adviser and troubleshooter, has revealed that in the fall of 1969 "there was an NSC [National Security Council] study of the mining of Haiphong and the carpet bombing of Hanoi—a 'savage' blow, as he [Kissinger] told his staff, to bring a 'fourth-rate' industrial power to its 'breaking point' . . ."

But "the option" was set aside, according to Morris, "complete with draft presidential speech."¹

Daniel Ellsberg, the Rand Corporation expert who worked with the Pentagon Papers and later made them public, was still on speaking terms in 1969 with Vietnam advisers within the administration. Later, in commenting on Kissinger's attitude toward the 1969 "savage blow" plan, Ellsberg declared: "And he [Kissinger] said then as he'd said on other occasions, when his staff told him this wouldn't work, as I'd told him essentially . . . in December of '68, his answer was: 'Are you telling me that this is the first country in history with no breaking point?'"²

It is Ellsberg's view that the antiwar offensive of October 15 and November 15 contributed materially to the shelving of the 1969 "savage blow" plan. "I think," said Ellsberg in a 1974 Harvard speech, "it seems to have derailed a plan to mine Haiphong in the fall of '69, and postponed it for what turned out to be two and a half years. That probably saved hundreds of

thousands of lives in North Vietnam and probably—speculation here, but I think a good bet—probably kept us from invading North Vietnam and using nuclear weapons ultimately. That's more speculative. The life aspect in North Vietnam I think is not really speculative."³

Evidence to substantiate this view is contained in Jeb Stuart Magruder's memoir, where he quotes from a long memo from White House aide Dwight Chapin to H. R. Haldeman, Nixon's chief White House staffer. The date of the memo is October 16, 1969, and it deals with plans for countering the antiwar movement through November 15. A major presidential speech on Vietnam had been scheduled for November 3. The memo said in part:

"For example, if the President should determine the war has to be escalated and it is announced November 3, unless the stage is properly set, the action will only fuel the November 15 movement. (If the President de-escalates the war on November 3, then the action can be built upon in order to head off November 15.)"⁴

The rest of the memo is a game plan for dealing with the threat of November 15. Since its key suggestions were actually implemented, though not always with success, it is worth quoting from it at length:

". . . The objective is to isolate the leaders of the 'Moratorium' event and the leaders of the 'Mobilization' committee. They are one and the same and their true purpose should be exposed. At the same time, those people who are loyal to the country and who have been disillusioned by the war should be pulled back into the fold of national consciousness. . . .

"PROPOSITION:

"Only the President can work out the peace. He must be given the nation's support, trust, and understanding. Unity during the next few months is of primary importance.

"ACTION TIMETABLE

"October 17 to 20. Tone—very low key.

"1. Congressmen and Senators who endorsed the October 15 activity are approached by moderates within their parties—told not to rush off on the November 15 thing—it is different.

"2. The media is contacted—maybe by rumor—the same as above. Friendly columnists should be given the line—for Sunday stories and next week's articles.

"3. The Cabinet, agency heads and other appropriate officials should be given some facts about the November 15 mobilization groups—they should start talking it down in private situations.

"4. The Business Council in Hot Springs should adopt a resolution of Presidential support and put out a resolution to ask the business community to rally to the President at this time.

"October 20-26

"1. Congressional activity should be pressed hard—resolutions of support until November 3. Try to quiet all except the real fringe—talk responsibility. Congressional support is the main

3. Ibid.

4. Jeb Stuart Magruder, *An American Life* (New York: Atheneum, 1974), pp. 87-88.

1. *Washington Monthly*, July-August, 1974.

2. *Harvard Crimson*, November 12, 1974.

mode of public support for the moratorium group.

"2. A full-fledged drive should be put against the media. . . . Letters, visits to editorial boards, ads, TV announcements, phone calls. (In New York, the networks should be visited by groups of our supporters—the highest level—and cold turkey should be talked.)

"3. A representative of the Justice Department and a spokesman for the FBI should hold a press conference on Monday, October 20. They would brief the press with documented information on the leaders of the two movements. . . .

"A Monday, October 20, press meeting should point up a dedicated President—not detoured by the Moratorium . . . a man who has been working for peace and has stepped up the activity. It should not be an appeal—it is fact, he is strong, confident, undeterred. . . .

"October 27 to November 3

"Setting—speculation will be building.

"All of the activity of the preceding week would be sustained at a higher pitch. The President would spend most of the week meeting advisors and talking about keeping the country together.

"November 3 and after

"The time to go for a display of support to the President is immediately after the November 3 speech. . . . If properly handled, many of those who might be considering becoming involved in the November 15 activity can be won over. It will also tend to make the November 15 group more vocal—less rational and appear properly as the fringe groups they are.

"This would also be the right time for the appearance of pro-Administration sentiment. It should be shown by all—each in their own way—but what they do must be visible. . . . It might be an idea to ask the networks to tell it to Hanoi—what if the networks were set as the sounding board for the vast segment of American people who support the President and his peace efforts. Thousands of wires, letters, and petitions to the networks. . . .

"On Saturday—November 15—most Americans will do what they normally do on a Saturday—go shopping, work on the lawn or go to the ball games. Football games—half times—are the things to shoot for—and the President should also attend a game that weekend. It would work."⁵

Nixon's November 3 speech did not announce a major escalation, and was couched in terms to imply de-escalation, but essentially it offered more of the same, indicating that U.S. forces would stay in Vietnam as long as necessary to keep the Saigon puppet regime firmly in power. I. F. Stone commented:

"Those who say there was nothing new in the Nixon speech are badly mistaken. Never before has he disclosed how committed he is emotionally and ideologically to this war."⁶

* * *

One event that helped cut across the administration attacks was that a large number of church groups across the country were involved in a special project that was part of the November mobilization. The proposal for this had been adopted at the founding conference of the New Mobe in July at the suggestion of Stewart Meacham, then community peace education secretary of the American Friends Service Committee. The idea developed out of the reading-of-the-war-dead demonstrations, with the amendment proposed by Meacham, that each name be represented by a demonstrator. As eventually developed, the plan was for each of some 43,000 people to start outside the Arlington National Cemetery on the Virginia side of the Potomac, carrying a placard with the name of a dead GI or of a Vietnamese village, and walk single file across the Memorial Bridge to Washington, past the White House, and on to the Capitol where the placard would be placed in a coffin to be carried in the November 15 mass march. The project was to begin Thursday evening, November 13, and

end as the Saturday march was assembling. The object, of course, was to show in graphic terms the cost of the war in human lives.

In early October, Meacham, Susan Miller of the Episcopal Peace Fellowship, and I attended a meeting in Philadelphia where Meacham presented the idea to a group of Quakers and other religious peace activists. They decided to organize church groups across the country to take part in the project. Miller was put in charge of it on the New Mobe staff, assisted by Trudy Young. The project was given the name "March Against Death" and became a major part of the plans for the Washington action.

* * *

The remarkable thing was not that the Nixon administration red-baited the antiwar movement at this time, but that this smear had so little effect within the general population. The opening salvo occurred on the eve of the October 15 Moratorium. The excuse was a letter of greeting from Pham Van Dong, the premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi). It was released in Paris, October 14, with copies cabled to the Moratorium, the New Mobe, and the Student Mobilization Committee. The message declared:

"The Vietnamese people demand that the United States Administration withdraw totally and without conditions American troops and those of foreign countries in the American camp out of Vietnam and let the people of Vietnam decide themselves their own affairs." It also wished "the progressive American people" success "in your autumn offensive."⁷

The letter came unsolicited and was not the first such greeting sent to American antiwar groups. On this occasion, however, Nixon decided to use it to red-bait and drive a wedge between the Congressional supporters of the Moratorium and the rest of the movement. Vice President Spiro Agnew appeared at a White House press conference, denounced the Pham Van Dong letter, and challenged the backers of the Moratorium to "repudiate the support of a totalitarian government which has on its hands the blood of 40,000 Americans." He declared the Moratorium leaders and the members of Congress who supported them "were now chargeable with knowledge of this letter" and must differentiate their position from that contained within it.⁸ This was reminiscent of the blackmail demand made by witch-hunting Senator Dodd back in 1960 on the leaders of SANE that they "clearly differentiate" their position on atmospheric nuclear testing from that of the Soviet Union, which was calling for a bilateral halt to the tests.

The Agnew attack had little effect on October 15 itself, an indication that red-baiting simply didn't carry the same punch as before.

The Moratorium did its best to ignore the attack. Their public response was a two-sentence statement: "October 15 is an appeal to the conscience of the American people. It is regrettable the Administration would seize this straw in an attempt to discredit the patriotism of the millions of Americans who sincerely desire peace."⁹ Some of us in the New Mobe thought a much stronger stand was called for. We felt that the basic assumption in Agnew's argument ought to be challenged. Accordingly, at the October 16 New Mobe steering committee meeting, I introduced a motion to send a public reply to Pham Van Dong, acknowledging receipt of his message and saying we agreed the U.S. ought to get out of Vietnam. The motion passed without dissent. The proposed reply also said: "Vice President Agnew, speaking on behalf of President Nixon, said that such a message from you to Americans was a 'shocking intrusion into the affairs of the American people.'

7. Letter from Pham Van Dong to the New Mobe, October 14, 1969. *New York Times*, October 15, 1969.

8. *New York Times*, October 15, 1969.

9. *New York Times*, October 15, 1969.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-90.

6. *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, November 17, 1969.

We wish President Nixon's intrusion into the affairs of the Vietnamese people was limited to letters."¹⁰

After the meeting, however, Stewart Meacham told Ron Young, who was in charge of the office, not to release anything to the press on this matter. I hit the roof, but Young and Meacham wouldn't budge and stalled for over a week. Meantime the SMC released its own reply to Pham Van Dong—similar to the New Mobe's—but the moment had been missed for a big news break in reaction to the Agnew attack.

Meacham's motive for this behavior had to do with the negotiations he was involved in with the Moratorium leaders over their support to November 15. The congressional doves were wavering and the Moratorium had apparently demanded of Meacham that the New Mobe not play up the Pham Van Dong message. Meacham wanted to remove any obstacle to joint action that he could. So did I, but our tactical instinct in this matter was different. From the point of view of developing the mass movement—which was not necessarily the same thing as currying favor with congressmen—it would have been better to take the red-baiting head on.

What is more, for a couple of officers of the Mobe to override the decisions of the coalition on so important a matter of substance was an ominous development, especially when pressures from the right could be expected to increase. To inhibit such unilateral actions in the future I took the unusual step of circulating a letter on the incident to all members of the New Mobe steering committee. A subsequent meeting of this body once again voted to send out the Pham Van Dong reply.

In the meantime, the Moratorium finally endorsed November 15, at a joint press conference with the New Mobe on October 21. It soon became clear that there were other elements in the deal that had been made over the Moratorium endorsement. The Moratorium leaders were anxious to be more heavily involved in the decision-making process regarding November 15. In itself this was perfectly understandable and entirely in order. But on October 25 a meeting of the New Mobe executive committee—which was made up of the officers and project directors but not the other members of the steering committee—was held. The four coordinators of the Moratorium committee were invited, but when the SMC also asked to attend, it was excluded by a vote of 9 to 5.

The SMC protested this exclusion in a letter to movement activists. It declared in part:

"Some of the more establishment-oriented forces have been pressuring the New Mobe to remove from the speakers list the more militant spokesmen of the antiwar movement, including the Student Mobilization Committee. To invite a Senator is one thing, but to remove the Student Mobilization Committee or anyone else because the Senator may object, is quite another.

"Our generation has given more than numbers to the peace movement. Even more important has been our contribution in helping to establish the political principles which have built the movement and kept it strong. These principles include the following points on which the SMC is based. (1) For immediate and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam; (2) for non-exclusion, for rejection of red-baiting of any form; (3) for mass legal peaceful demonstrations which are independent of any political parties or candidates; and (4) for democratic decision making in the movement.

"Some of the new forces that are speaking out against the war do not agree with all these points. This makes it all the more imperative that in welcoming their support to the antiwar cause, and strengthening the unity of the movement, we do not alter or abandon these principles which can really force an end to the war."¹¹

10. Draft answer to Pham Van Dong from the New Mobilization Committee, October 16, 1969. (Copy in author's files.)

11. Letter to "Dear Friend" from Carol Lipman for the National Interim Working Committee of the SMC, October 31, 1969. (Copy in author's files.)

As it turned out, the struggle over speakers in Washington for November 15 ended without the exclusion of the radicals, and the final list included Carol Lipman of the SMC and several others, as well as two U.S. senators, the Democrat George McGovern and Charles Goodell, a New York Republican.

The pressures brought by the White House on members of the House of Representatives proved effective, however, and only one endorsed November 15, compared to sixty-five for the October 15 Moratorium. That one was Allard Lowenstein, who had been reported as using his influence to attempt to exclude the radicals, and as being very annoyed by the New Mobe's refusal to do so. Murray Kempton caught the frightened mood in Congress when he commented that "Allard Lowenstein of New York . . . being closer to the movement than any other Congressman, was more conspicuous for the agony and calculation that preceded his choice and got less credit than he may deserve for finally making it."¹²

* * *

The problem of exclusion had developed to a much greater extreme in San Francisco than in Washington. There the Moratorium was weak. It was another grouping—which included forces around the Communist Party, acting as self-appointed proxies for the liberal Democratic politicians—that made the attempt to bar the radicals.

The delegates from San Francisco who had attended the founding conference of the New Mobe in July began preparations for the West Coast action by calling a meeting to which all ninety-nine antiwar groups in the Bay Area were invited. About 150 activists showed up and established a coalition open to building the action. A group led by Terrence Hallinan and Karen Talbot, however, refused to participate. Hallinan was the son of prominent San Francisco attorney Vincent Hallinan, and was likewise a lawyer. He was widely known in his own right as the defense attorney for some of the GIs in the Presidio Twenty-seven case. He was also a founder and leading member of the Du Bois Clubs. Talbot was associated with the *People's World*, a West Coast weekly that expressed the views of the Communist Party.

In August, Sid Peck went to California, chaired a meeting of the coalition, and then set up a small working committee headed by Hallinan and Donald Kalish, the UCLA professor who was a member of the national New Mobe steering committee. Peck also used his influence to have Kalish and Hallinan appointed as temporary New Mobe cochairmen for the West Coast. There was some logic to this step since both Kalish and Hallinan were fairly widely known, and apparently Peck did it to make sure Hallinan and his group would participate. Out of deference to Peck, the coalition agreed to this arrangement. The working committee was known as New Mobe West and the coalition was called the Bay Area Peace Action Coalition and sometimes the New Mobe Membership Committee, the Bay Area affiliate of New Mobe West. Both groups were set up in the same San Francisco headquarters, which also housed the San Francisco SMC.

The Membership Committee proceeded to build the action through large, open meetings of activists who volunteered for subcommittees such as publicity, finances, Third World task force, labor task force, the SMC women's task force, and so on. The working committee concentrated on plans for the program for November 15 itself.

Hallinan and Kalish were adamant that there be only one political speaker and the rest of the program be devoted to cultural events, poetry readings, music, and the like. Hallinan dubbed it "Woodstock West," after the famous rock music festival that had taken place in upstate New York in August. According to Hallinan, the single political speaker would outline a program of "what next" for the antiwar movement. Since this perspective had not even been discussed, let alone decided, the Membership

12. *New York Review of Books*, December 18, 1969.

Committee viewed this as an attempt to stifle all points of view but one.

In a memo to the national New Mobe steering committee, New Mobe West co-project director Marjorie Colvin complained: "The obvious question—what would the 'what next' speaker say, and what was the money [from the collection, if any were left after expenses] to be used for. This was left vague; it would be worked out by some small committee. In my opinion, the Hallinan group has in mind some sort of preliminary work for the 1970 gubernatorial election campaign here."¹³

It was no secret that Hallinan's group favored channeling the antiwar movement into partisan electoral activity within the Democratic Party. Colvin, a member of the SWP and a consistent advocate of keeping the antiwar coalitions out of partisan electoral campaigns, commented: "It is their right to try and build such a movement on their own, but not to use the antiwar movement for their own factional purposes."¹⁴

The idea of limiting the list of speakers to a small number had a certain attraction to those who had listened through the long parades on the platform that seemed to be the norm at big antiwar rallies. But when it came down to deciding who the speakers would be it had always been impossible to come to agreement on one or two alone in a genuine coalition. The antiwar movement was just too heterogeneous. The New Mobe officers in the East—who, unlike Hallinan, had a lot of experience organizing big demonstrations—had reconciled themselves to this reality and opted for a list long enough to be more or less representative, interspersed with cultural features. But Hallinan and Kalish tried to take the bull by the horns by exerting purely mechanical control as the cochairmen. Hallinan declared that the Membership Committee had no decision-making authority.

He was voted down on the number of speakers even within the working committee, which on October 11 decided on a list of five plus a chairperson, with two or three to be added later. Hallinan, a former Golden Gloves boxer, shouted: "Anyone who wants to fight with me over this, meet me outside."¹⁵ Nobody took him up on this challenge, but after the meeting Hallinan lost his cool and threw a couple of punches at Roland Sheppard, a representative from Painters Local Union 4, who had voted against him.

On October 16 a meeting of the Membership Committee reaffirmed the list as adopted by the working committee. It was also announced that the San Francisco cast of *Hair*, the popular rock musical of the time, had volunteered to perform. So had singer Buffy St. Marie and other top artists. But those who thought this was a reasonable compromise had underestimated the obsession of the Hallinan group.

Late the next night Hallinan's supporters removed all the New Mobe West and New Mobe Membership Committee desks, tables, chairs, leaflets, and posters from the office. In the morning the staff discovered the phones had also been disconnected and the mail stopped—by order of Terrence Hallinan as New Mobe cochairman. Hallinan and Kalish set up a new "Regional Working Committee"—by invitation only. At its first meeting a squad led by longshoreman Archie Brown of the Communist Party kept out the members of the old working committee who had not been invited, including the SMC representative, and many others.

The Membership Committee refurbished its offices, had its phones turned on, and proceeded to build the action as before. But two weeks before November 15 both groups were applying for permits for the demonstration and the city was holding them up pending resolution of the dispute.

* * *

13. Memo to all New Mobilization Committee steering committee members from Marjorie Colvin, October 24, 1969. (Copy in author's files.)

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

Meanwhile the New Mobe in Washington had no permits either, not because of a split among the organizers, but because the Nixon administration was holding them up on the allegation that the demonstration would lead to violence. This was also a major theme of the stories planted in the press by the White House game planners.

In the midst of this atmosphere, Jerry Rubin, Abbie Hoffman, and a few others around the "Conspiracy" came bouncing into the New Mobe Washington office one day with the news that they had just called a demonstration of their own to protest the trial of the "Conspiracy Eight." The trial was then in progress in a federal courtroom in Chicago and the Justice Department, of course, was responsible for the prosecution. The demonstration, then, would be held in front of the Justice Department building in Washington at 5:00 p.m. November 15, at the end of the major mass march and rally. Rubin and associates wanted our endorsement. Before telling us about it, however, they had unilaterally announced their intention at a press conference outside the Justice Department, with Rubin posing for pictures wearing boxing gloves.

I was not amused. Neither was the SMC, and the Moratorium was outraged. My own feeling was that Rubin and company had just handed Nixon exactly what he was looking for, on a silver platter.

Brad Lyttle, who along with me was in charge of logistics and marshals for the November 13-15 Washington activities, later described his apprehensions at the time:

"My own position was based on a scenario that seemed inescapable. The Justice Department demonstration had been set up with the symbolism and tone of angry combativeness. At the Monument rally [where the major crowd of the day would be assembled] there would be references to the cruel treatment of Bobby Seale [the defendant who had been bound and gagged in the Chicago federal courtroom] that would anger many. At least one major speaker would urge people to go to the Justice Department. At 5:00 p.m., at dusk, and after a cold, tiring day, tens of thousands of angry people would flow toward Pennsylvania Avenue and the Department. The authorities had made clear that they feared an attack on the White House and government buildings in that area. They would meet the crowd with a line of heavily armed police backed up with troops. Justice Department rally speakers would taunt the police as 'pigs' and perhaps invite an attack on them. Probably there would be government provocateurs in the crowd who would see violence and a riot to be in the government's interest; a means to discredit the New Mobe and the demonstrators. They might curse and throw things at the police. At some point, the police, many of whom would be rightists and out of sympathy with the demonstrators—possibly also in league with the provocateurs—would attack the demonstrators. They would use at least gas and perhaps clubs as well. In the darkness and the dense crowds there would be a good deal of brutality. The disorganized demonstrators might panic and run, or there could be a riot."¹⁶

Within the New Mobe there were some who favored the Justice Department demonstration, particularly Dellinger. By that time RYM II and some other groupings from the dissolving SDS had been attracted by the November 15 buildup and were sending representatives to the New Mobe steering committee. They were strong backers of the Justice Department demonstration, though not all of them wanted a physical confrontation.

The issue was fought out at the steering committee meeting November 2, and a motion that we not endorse or sponsor passed handily, in part because the Moratorium was present in force. We considered the possibility that New Mobe should sponsor and try to assure the peaceful character of the Justice Department demonstration by, in effect, taking it over. This was rejected as

16. Bradford Lyttle, *Washington Action, November 13-15. A report and comments from the viewpoint of a practical organizer*, February 10, 1970, p. 48. (Copy in author's files.)

too risky. Brad and I agreed on this. Later, after the New Mobe marshals proved so effective in organizing the other events November 13-15, Brad would express the opinion that full sponsorship might have been better. But I still think we made the right choice.

The success of the marshals depended on the whole tone that was set in building the action. But the very conception of the Justice Department demonstration was dead wrong from the start, and in blatant contradiction to the decision of the July conference that rejected a repeat of Chicago, 1968. In effect it was an attempt by a small group to reverse that decision. The wrong tone had already been set for the Justice Department demonstration and continued to be built up in the small meetings of ultraleft groups that were mobilizing for it. The best we could do was discourage it and isolate the trouble as much as possible. New Mobe endorsement or cosponsorship would have cut across that, giving some authority to small groups bent on sucking the large

crowd into a reckless confrontation.

On the other hand we couldn't put ourselves in the position of denouncing anybody's right to hold a peaceful demonstration. What we did was refuse to endorse or sponsor the action, and instruct the chairpersons at the New Mobe rally to make that point clear in case any speaker urged people to go to the Justice Department. We also insisted on expressions of peaceful intent from the sponsors of the Justice Department affair. They could hardly refuse without splitting among themselves. On that basis we agreed to allow those who were concerned with the technical details—which in the nature of things excluded Rubin and Hoffman—to recruit their marshals from the New Mobe pool. As it turned out, these marshals did help keep the trouble down and relatively isolated—and got a good dose of police tear gas for their pains—but they couldn't work miracles.

[To be continued]

'One of the Most Reckless Nuclear Development Programs' in the World

The French Superphénix Breeder Reactor

[The following article was published in the July 9 issue of the Swiss Trotskyist fortnightly *La Brèche*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The July 30 and 31 demonstrations against the Superphénix breeder reactor near Creys-Malville raise a series of questions concerning the French bourgeoisie's nuclear development program. What part does Superphénix play in this program? What danger does it represent? What is at stake in the struggle?

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, its member countries estimated in November 1976 that their total nuclear generating capacity would be on the order of 325 billion watts by 1985. Six months later, this estimate was lowered to 253 billion watts (*Le Monde*, May 11, 1977).

The United States domestic market provides a telling example. Between 1974 and 1976, the number of reactors on order dropped from thirty to three (*Sciences et Avenir*, No. 363). (See box.)

There will apparently be no new orders in 1977. As for reactor sales abroad since 1974, there have been very few (*Le Monde*, May 12, 1977).

While the French nuclear development program is still one of the most extensive, it has gone through a "slight reversal." Instead of having an installed capacity of six billion watts in the next few years, EDF (Electricité de France) will have a capacity of only five billion. The Commission on Nuclear-Generated Electricity might soon bring this figure down to four billion watts (*Le Monde*, May 11, 1977).

There are two reasons for the slowdown

in nuclear development programs taking place nearly everywhere—economic factors combined with the emergence of an unprecedented, massive opposition movement.

The 1975 recession shattered expectations of energy needs. Between 1960 and 1973, the total energy needs of the OECD countries grew by an average of 5.1% a year. In 1974-75, energy consumption showed a slight decline. In 1976, there was a slight recovery, but even optimistic projections of annual growth do not exceed 3.6%.

The international uranium cartel, headed by Gulf Oil, managed to quintuple the price of a pound of uranium oxide within five years, blaming the increase on competition!

But the pressure of the mass movement has also been responsible for undermining the program. It has led to the reinforcement of safety measures and inspection procedures, lengthened construction time, and so on.

Thus, the cost of one kilowatt generated by a nuclear plant built in the United States in 1969 to go into operation in 1975 was \$250. This rose to \$750 in 1973 for a plant that would not go into operation until 1983 (*Le Monde*, May 12, 1977).

Confronted by this situation, the ruling classes in the various countries are making different choices in accordance with their specific interests—fossil fuel resources (oil, coal), energy independence, competitive position, and so on. The American imperialists appear to have opted for enriched-uranium reactors (first generation). Consequently, nuclear fission energy in the United States will last around thirty years, given the depletion of uranium 235 fuel.

A section of the European bourgeoisie,

headed by the French, advocates a different policy.

Building Superphénix near Creys-Malville, in the department of Isère, as a model for the industry (paid for by EDF, with a 51% capital investment; ENEL of Italy, 33%; and RWE of West Germany, 16%) represents one of the cornerstones of the French nuclear development program. Indeed, the development of fast-neutron breeder reactors should theoretically make it possible to produce *more* new fissile material [nuclear fuel], in the form of plutonium 239 (Pu 239) than would be consumed in the form of uranium 235 (U 235). This is the principle on which breeder reactors operate.

Thus, EDF intends to solve the problem of the depletion of uranium 235 resources by means of these reactors—the so-called second-generation reactors—which are supposed to supersede conventional plants, or first-generation reactors.

This strategy requires rapid production of an abundant supply of plutonium from uranium 238. However, what is referred to as a breeder reactor's doubling time—the amount of time necessary for the reactor to produce enough plutonium 239 to fuel a second reactor of the same size—is estimated at around a quarter of a century. Since a bottleneck in the supply of uranium 235 has been projected for around 1990, "*there is every reason to believe that, despite the efforts being made to promote them, breeder reactors have arrived too late.*" (*L'Enjeu Nucléaire* [The Nuclear Stakes], by Jean Rossel, Editions Pierre-Favre. Our emphasis—*La Brèche*.)

In fact, the only real motive behind such misleading and irresponsible activities is the prospect of fast profits.

The breeder reactor has considerable

importance for the European capitalists, particularly the French, who have something of a head start in this area, as P. Wyart of OPEN [Organisation des Producteurs de l'Energie Nucléaire—Organization of Nuclear Energy Producing Countries, representing West Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, and Switzerland] stated (*Le Monde*, May 7, 1977).

The European bourgeoisie, headed by a number of French companies, such as Creusot-Loire (the Empain-Schneider trust), the Compagnie Générale d'Electricité (CGE), and Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann (PUK), has fond hopes of achieving an industrial breakthrough by forcing adoption of European—especially French—breeder reactors. The market is huge. This is also the reason why EDF is putting forward one of the most reckless nuclear development programs.

Therefore, more than for any other plant, the stakes involved in Superphénix are *international*.

While development of the fast-neutron (breeder) reactor does away with some of the problems created by conventional reactors, it has other dangers that are qualitatively greater. The possibility of a "nuclear excursion" occurring—a euphemism that refers to a miniature atomic explosion on the order of one-tenth of a low-yield atomic bomb—cannot be ruled out.

Superphénix is designed to hold 5,000 tons of liquid sodium. This liquid, which is heated to 560 degrees Celsius [1,040 degrees Fahrenheit], removes the heat produced by the nuclear reaction. The high chemical reactivity of sodium, which explodes on contact with moist air or water, as well as the metal's effects on the reactor's structural materials (particularly concrete) demonstrate an aspect of the *irresponsibility* of the project: At present, there is no known way to extinguish a "sodium fire" involving more than one or two tons of the liquid metal.

The dangers inherent in the use of 4.6 tons of plutonium in a breeder reactor like Superphénix are even greater. In fact, at each step on the chain of operations called the fuel cycle (extraction, transportation, processing, and storage), severe accidents can occur, resulting in the dissemination of radioactive matter such as plutonium. And yet, if current trends continue, there will be hundreds of tons of plutonium in circulation throughout Europe.

Pu 239 is radioactive. It gives off alpha particles. Its half-life is 24,000 years, meaning that it remains radioactive for a very long time, with terrifying biological effects.

The critical mass for Pu 239 leading to a nuclear explosion is around six kilograms—which is very little in relation to the enormous amounts in circulation! Furthermore, breeder reactors generally produce higher-grade plutonium than the

Status of U.S. Nuclear Plants

	Reactors in Operation	Reactors Ordered	New Projects Announced
1974	55	30	30
1975	57	4	11
1976	65	3	2
1977*	67	0	0

*1977 figures through June 30 from Atomic Industrial Forum. Although two plants have been ordered since June 30, there have also been cancellations of four previously planned nuclear plants in the United States during the first half of this year.—IP

kind produced by a first-generation plant. There is a genuine risk of theft, loss, or diversion of this substance.

For the proponents of nuclear power, the solution to this problem lies partly in the widespread use of special monitoring systems and safety devices, which cost—in the case of the Gösgen, Switzerland, plant alone—more than 20 million Swiss francs [about US \$8.3 million]. It also involves building up private armed militias, which goes hand in hand with reinforcing the police state and, by the same token, repressing antinuclear dissidents.

In metallic form, plutonium can ignite spontaneously upon contact with air, forming a suspension of fine dust particles in the atmosphere. The effect on the lungs of inhaling radioactive particles presents one of the most severe types of contamination. The "maximum acceptable dosage" of Pu 239 in the lungs is .26 millionths of a gram.

What would the consequences of a nuclear accident be?

To begin with, there are studies on this subject that have been put forward by the proponents of nuclear energy. An example is the Rasmussen report, which indicates that there could be several thousand deaths, although the probability is less than for some natural disasters—so there's nothing to worry about!

Next, there are reports designed to be kept confidential, so as not to interfere with brainwashing the public. These reports come to light only because of leaks. The most recent is the one prepared by German experts whose job it was to give an *official* estimate of the risk of unusually severe but not impossible accidents—such as a reactor core meltdown caused by failure of the cooling system, the spread of radioactive matter into the atmosphere, or total failure of the cooling system of the storage basin for spent fuel in a reprocessing plant. The resulting estimated dosages of radioactivity are frightening: *more than 20,000 rems would be spread over a 100-kilometer radius from the site of the leak* (a dose of 600 rems is fatal).

The Bundesverband Bürgererinitiativen Umweltschutz [Federal League of Citizens' Committees for Protection of the Environment] in West Germany has estimated the

consequences of such findings. If the leak occurred in northern Germany, radiation exceeding the fatal dosage could spread 2,000 kilometers and cover all of Western Europe. More than thirty million persons would be contaminated in West Germany. Several thousand square kilometers of land would become uncultivable and uninhabitable for dozens of years.

The nuclear industry is extremely vulnerable in case of an armed conflict. Conventional weapons are quite capable of penetrating a nuclear plant's containment. Thus, a radioactive nuclear war could easily be fought with conventional weapons.

Of course, the dangers of nuclear energy are not confined to accidents. The "normal" functioning of the fuel cycle involves the discharge of various wastes into the atmosphere. But the large increase in the amount of radiation absorbed by workers in the nuclear industry was specifically what led the atomic energy section of the French Democratic Confederation of Labor to call attention to the deterioration of safety measures as private ownership of the nuclear industry in France gradually increased. This is what gives the struggle waged by workers at the reprocessing plant in La Hague, France, its importance as an example.

Breeder reactors, because they involve a huge increase in the day-to-day and potential risks to workers and the general population, the spread of reprocessing plants, the heavy use of plutonium, and a more repressive society, can only intensify the barbaric aspects of capitalism in its death agony.

There are three reasons why revolutionists should take part in antinuclear demonstrations. First, because of the serious potential danger of nuclear energy, which is exacerbated by the use of breeder reactors. Second, because alternative energy sources exist—less profitable, perhaps, from the capitalists' point of view, but cheaper and more rational from the standpoint of the interests of society as a whole. And finally, because the public as a whole has not had a say in setting energy priorities, and has no control over either the way in which nuclear energy is used or the purposes it is used for. □

Capitalism Fouls Things Up



30,000 in France Protest Nuclear Power Plant

Between 30,000 and 50,000 antinuclear demonstrators gathered during the weekend of July 30-31 near the site of the Superphénix breeder reactor in Creys-Malville, France, twenty-eight miles east of Lyons. Many of the protesters came from West Germany, Switzerland, and a number of other European countries.

During the weeks leading up to the action, a violence-baiting campaign was fostered by the French government and the bourgeois press, despite the announced intention of the organizers to hold a nonviolent protest.

On July 28, René Jannin, police prefect of the department of Isère, issued five decrees. He banned all nonresidents from the area within fifteen kilometers of the construction site. Bridges over the Rhone river near Creys-Malville were closed to traffic. Vehicles traveling on National Route 75 were rerouted away from the area, and all boats were banned from the west bank of the Rhone. Camping in the area was prohibited for a one-week period.

"The nuclear site is national property," Jannin said. "It is therefore necessary to take measures to prevent its being damaged."

With the assistance of Interior Minister Christian Bonnet, Jannin mobilized 3,000 police, 10,000 police reserves, and a police parachute squadron recently returned from the former French colony of Djibouti. Before going on duty, the cops were shown a film made by the West German government of repressive police actions at antinuclear demonstrations held at Grohnde and Brokdorf.

Jannin made it clear that a provocation was being prepared. "If the demonstrators cross the borders of the proscribed zone, the forces of order will go into action," he warned.

Jannin and the press also sought to whip up an antiforeigner hysteria before the demonstration, warning of "well-trained bands of extremists" and "German anarchists." The Paris daily *Le Matin* tried to link West German participants in the antinuclear movement with the "Baader-Meinhof gang."

As protesters began gathering at camping sites west of Route 75 on Friday evening, July 29, police combed the area,

checking identification papers and searching for weapons.

The demonstrators gathered at four locations on Saturday, July 30, for debates and discussions on nuclear power. Then, early on Sunday morning, July 31, three peaceful marches set off toward the construction site. The main column was headed by a group of local elected officials from the towns and villages near Creys-Malville. The marchers converged and stopped near Faverges, a village three kilometers from the construction site. A massive police force was concentrated several hundred yards away.

Around noon, several dozen demonstrators left the main body of the march and headed for the construction area. At this point the cops began to assault the entire demonstration with tear gas and concussion grenades. After an hour and a half of this, the police charged the crowd. In the ensuing melee, Vital Michalon, a thirty-one-year-old chemistry teacher, was killed. More than 100 demonstrators were injured.

The confrontation continued until about 3:30 p.m., when most of the protesters were able to escape the cops and return to their camping sites. That evening, police detachments combed through the farms and villages of Isère, seeking the leaders of the demonstration. In the town of Morestel, the cops conducted house-to-house searches.

The August 2 *Le Monde* quoted the reaction of a resident of the area to the conduct of the "forces of order": "When the opponents of the nuclear plant said that a nuclear society would be a police society, we didn't believe them. Now we know they were right."

Police prefect Jannin escalated his xenophobic campaign after the police riot. "For the second time, Morestel is occupied by Germans," he said, denouncing the "aggressions of the German ecologists."

All but twelve of the demonstrators arrested on Sunday were released. Those held were charged under the notorious "antiwrecker" law, which permits prosecution of the organizers of actions at which violence occurs, even if they bear no direct responsibility for such incidents. Of the twelve, seven were West German, three were French, and two were Swiss.

After Sunday's events, the leadership of the Malville Committees, which organized the protest against the Superphénix, accused Jannin of "creating . . . a climate bordering on racism." They said they had "underestimated the hostility of the prefect of Isère."

The committee leaders affirmed their solidarity "with all the demonstrators, regardless of political affiliation, nationality, or method of action." They denounced the government attacks, saying that such actions "make cruelly real the slogan 'nuclear society, murderous society, police society.'"

But Interior Minister Bonnet had nothing but praise for Jannin and his cops: "Thanks to their courage and dedication, the Creys-Malville plant, which is being built with public funds to supply a portion of France's energy needs, has not been damaged."

A 'Heart Attack'?

Although the media reported immediately after the events that Vital Michalon had died of a "heart attack," an autopsy later revealed that the cause of his death was "pulmonary lesions resulting from a blast." Despite the obvious implication that a police concussion grenade was responsible, the cops then tried to claim that a "homemade device" killed Michalon.

Concussion grenades containing ninety grams of TNT are commonly used by French riot cops. Their destructive power is indicated by the fact that two demonstrators lost hands and one lost a foot in concussion grenade explosions at Faverges. Several cops were injured in a similar way.

In the days following the Creys-Malville protests the focus of the antinuclear campaign in France shifted to defense of the twelve persons charged under the "antiwrecker" law and to demands for an inquiry into the death of Michalon and into Jannin's role in the police riot.

Protest meetings were held August 5 and 6 in Strasbourg, Rennes, Reims, Cherbourg, Carnac, Toulon, and other cities. In addition, solidarity actions took place in

Brussels, Geneva, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and West Berlin.

On August 6, 2,000 persons gathered outside the court building at Bourgoin-Jallieu, where the twelve arrested demonstrators were being tried. Six of them were sentenced to prison terms of one to three months. Two were given one-month suspended sentences, and four were acquitted.

More than 1,000 persons attended the funeral of Vital Michalon on August 8 in the department of Drôme.

Government statements before the protests and the heavy-handed police action indicate that the French ruling class remains firmly committed to full nuclear development, including breeder reactors, of which the Superphénix is only the first.

On July 29, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing visited the main French nuclear research and development installation at Pierrelatte, where he declared: "Nuclear energy is at the crossroads of the two independences of France: the independence of her defense and the independence of her energy supply." Giscard rejected a call by Socialist Party leader François Mitterrand for a national debate and a referendum on nuclear policy. Such a step would be "unconstitutional," Giscard said.

The SP has taken an ambiguous position on the French nuclear program—best demonstrated by Mitterrand's comment on television July 27: "We don't favor [nuclear power], but we have nothing against it." The SP refused to support the demonstration at Creys-Malville.

Jannin Gets Some Help

In a July 20 statement on energy policy, the leadership of the CGT, the Stalinist-dominated trade-union federation, denounced the "backward, illusory, and pernicious positions" of the antinuclear movement. The CGT affirmed that "production of electricity by nuclear plants is necessary in order to meet energy needs."

The CFDT, the other major union federation, withdrew its early support to the protest against the Superphénix on July 13, citing a "climate of violence." Various local organizations of the CFDT did support and participate in the demonstration, however.

The Communist Party not only supports nuclear power but has also come out in favor of the French government maintaining nuclear weapons. At the same time it has gone along with the SP's call for a public debate.

After the police attack at Creys-Malville, the CP charged the government with seeking a confrontation. But it also lent credence to Jannin's slanders: "We condemn again the violent actions of groups organized in France and other countries, operating and hiding behind antinuclear slogans." A cartoon in the July 30 issue of the CP daily *l'Humanité* even sought to

portray antinuclear demonstrators as right-wing thugs.

Just the opposite approach was taken by the French Trotskyists of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist League, French section of the Fourth International). The LCR's newspaper *Rouge* carried daily articles publicizing and helping to organize the Creys-Malville demonstration for weeks in advance.

A front-page article in the August 1 *Rouge* summed up the impact of the protest:

"Despite the pogrom atmosphere created by the government, this action was the first large international demonstration against nuclear power in Europe. It was an appropriate response to the supporters of nuclear madness in all the countries of capitalist Europe. The presence of thousands of foreign demonstrators—Germans, Swiss, Italians, Belgians, Dutch—testifies to the power of an international movement that is on the rise and that no amount of repression can stop. This is what was unacceptable to those who rule us—the same ones who, a little over fifty years ago, fired on workers demonstrating for an eight-hour working day." □

U.S. Navy Hid Asbestos Hazard

Medical examinations of 359 workers at Mare Island Naval Shipyard in California have shown that more than half suffer from lung abnormalities that could have been caused by exposure to asbestos.

The examinations were conducted by the union representing the workers, the Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, after the navy had failed to inform some workers that they had lung problems. All the workers had been exposed to asbestos for at least ten years.

Union officials released the results of the study July 12. They called for legislation that would provide continuing medical surveillance and guarantee compensation for all such cumulative diseases and injuries.

The Navy declined to comment.

Antinuclear Views Expressed in Chemical Industry Magazine

Chemical & Engineering News opened the pages of its May 16 issue to a guest editorial on "The hazards of nuclear power." It was written by Ken Bossong of the Center for Science in the Public Interest.

Bossong said:

A review of the safety record of domestic nuclear facilities during the past three decades reveals a history of worker deaths, plant accidents, acts of terrorism, and other incredible mishaps. . . .

Whereas federal and industrial spokespersons have extolled the safety record of nuclear power,



Colette/Hong Kong Insight

studies issued—but kept unpublicized—by the old Atomic Energy Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other agencies document a far different story. They report that in the previous 33 years, there have been over 10,000 disabling work injuries at domestic nuclear facilities including more than 300 fatalities. Hundreds of other workers are expected to die of radiation-induced cancers by 1990. . . .

"Acts of God" also have taken their toll. Lightning and cold weather have disabled plant safety/security systems. Gale force winds damaged AEC's Amarillo, Tex., facility in 1967. A tornado passed through the site of a proposed plant in Dixon Springs, Tenn., and another came within 10 miles of an operating reactor in Athens, Ala. . . . On at least two occasions, B-52 bombers have crashed within sight of nuclear facilities.

The power level of fissile systems has become uncontrollable on 26 occasions in the past three decades; that is, nuclear accidents either occurred or were just avoided. . . .

Thus, while nuclear supporters have glorified their industry in terms that have bordered on outright fabrication, serious mishaps have been occurring with frightening regularity. . . .

For these reasons, the U.S. should immediately declare a moratorium on new reactor construction and begin a phaseout of all existing nuclear programs other than perhaps some research efforts.

Our experience with nuclear facilities has already proven [that] "If anything can possibly go wrong, it will"; further test data are not needed.

Besides the facts Bossong cited about nuclear power, it is also noteworthy that such views would appear in *Chemical & Engineering News*. The magazine is a publication of the American Chemical Society, and is aimed primarily at professionals in the chemical industry.

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CIA Experiments Sought Secret of 'Mind Control'

By Steve Wattenmaker

Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian research scientist for the army, committed suicide in 1953 by throwing himself from the tenth floor window of a New York City hotel.

Twenty-four years later, an investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency turned up evidence that Olson had killed himself while under the influence of LSD, a mind-altering drug. He had been slipped the drug as an unwitting guinea pig in a CIA "thought-control" experiment.

According to new CIA documents recently released under the Freedom of Information Act, the agency carried out sweeping experiments with dangerous drugs, psychosurgery, radiation, electric shock, and other techniques to find a possible means for controlling human behavior.

More than 1,000 pages of documents describing the experiments were turned over to John Marks, a freelance journalist who made the material public at a July 20 news conference in Washington. Marks is also an associate of the Center for National Security Studies, a private organization set up to uncover abuses by the CIA and other government spy agencies.

While the existence of the CIA's investigations into behavior control has been known since 1975, the new documents provide chilling details of the vast scope of the CIA's efforts throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

A follow-up investigation by reporters Nicholas Horrock, John Crewdson, Boyce Rensberger, Jo Thomas, and Joseph Treaster, published in the August 2 *New York Times*, revealed that prominent hospitals in the United States and Canada were also involved in the CIA's \$25 million thought-control program.

In all, some eighty private and public institutions participated.

According to the new information, the CIA conducted secret medical experiments from 1950 until the mid-1970s under the code names Bluebird, Artichoke, MK Ultra, and MK Delta. A 1963 CIA report described the twenty-five-year program as "research and development of chemical, biological and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior."

High on the program's priorities was an attempt to develop methods "by which we can get information from a person against his will and without his knowledge," according to a 1952 project Artichoke memorandum.

The memo went on to ask whether it was possible "to get control of an individual to

the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation?"

In pursuit of that goal, CIA and civilian scientists performed experiments on allegedly "voluntary" subjects in federal prisons and mental hospitals as well as on an undetermined number of unwitting participants—like Frank Olson.

Earlier in the same year Olson died, the army sponsored a similar test of psych chemicals at the New York State Psychiatric Institute in Manhattan. In the secret experiments, Harold Blauer, a professional tennis player, died after being given a fatal dose of a mescaline derivative.

In 1955 the CIA made arrangements with agents of the Bureau of Narcotics to surreptitiously test LSD on unwitting patrons of New York City and San Francisco bars. Some of the subjects became violently ill and had to be hospitalized, never knowing exactly what happened to them.

Other LSD experiments were conducted across the United States:

- *U.S. Public Health Service Hospital, Lexington, Kentucky*—From 1952 to 1963 LSD was tested on alcoholics and drug addicts confined here. The researcher heading the program, Dr. Harris Isbell, was eager to please the CIA.

On one occasion he wrote to his agency contact, "I will write you a quick letter as soon as I get the stuff into a man or two.

- *Atlanta federal penitentiary*—LSD experiments were carried out here on prisoners from 1955 until 1964. Dr. Carl Pfeiffer, a pharmacologist, was paid \$25,000 a year by the CIA for his work in Atlanta and the similar experiments on prisoners at the Bordentown Reformatory in New Jersey.

- *Mt. Sinai hospital, New York City*—Another doctor who contracted with the CIA was a prominent New York pediatrician, Dr. Harold Abramson, who tested LSD on patients at Mt. Sinai hospital. Abramson's name first surfaced when it was disclosed he had treated Frank Olson shortly before Olson's suicide.

- *Massachusetts Mental Health Center, Boston*—Beginning in 1957, Dr. Robert Hyde tested LSD for the CIA on doctors, nurses, and attendants at the hospital. Hyde then continued his experiments after he transferred to the Butler Health Center in Providence, Rhode Island.

Other behavior-control research spanned a wide range of possibilities, from research

on other drugs to the implantation of electrodes in the brain's "pain center."

At McGill University in Montreal, scientists tested drugs and other "brain-washing" techniques suggested by the CIA. While psychiatric patients were the primary subjects, at least one experiment involved a group of nurses shut in dark, soundproof rooms for up to thirty minutes at a time. Leonard Rubenstein, a researcher who worked on the project, reported that one of the nurses had to be treated subsequently for schizophrenia.

In 1962 a CIA doctor approached the head of Tulane University's department of psychiatry and neurology to ask if he was interested in doing research on the "pain center" in the brain. The researcher, Dr. Robert Heath, was known for his pioneering work in implanting tiny electrodes in the brain's "pleasure center" as a way to treat schizophrenia.

Heath reportedly turned down the CIA but later did some drug experiments for the agency.

A summary of a 1953 meeting reported that CIA scientists were seeking to work with scientists of an unidentified foreign country, since unlike the United States that country allowed experiments with anthrax, a disease contracted from cattle and sheep.

At Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and at other institutions, the CIA funded tests of "knockout" drugs on terminally ill cancer patients. In related experiments two biochemists were paid \$43,000 to analyze the "bodily fluids" of terminally ill patients who had lapsed into delirium or coma.

The object of the experiment was to isolate a natural toxin that the CIA could use to artificially induce delirium or mental confusion.

Evidently the similarity between their own research and earlier experiments performed in Nazi concentration camps didn't escape the CIA's attention.

The August 2 *New York Times* reported that CIA scientists—undaunted by the Nuremberg convictions of Third Reich doctors for "crimes against humanity"—pored over the works of psychologists who worked on behavior-control projects under Hitler. □

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Trotskyism in Latin America—1

Reviewed by Joseph Hansen



[This is the first installment of a two-part review article.]

* * *

Robert J. Alexander, a professor of economics and political science at Rutgers University, is the author of various studies of the labor movement and communism in Latin America, of which perhaps the best known is *Communism in Latin America* (1957). In the preface to his most recent work, Prof. Alexander says:

Trotskyism has been a small but persistent force in Latin American left-wing politics for over forty years, and Latin Americans have helped make Trotsky's Fourth International the most long-lived dissident group within international Communism. And yet very little serious history has been written about Trotskyism in any part of the world, and none about its place in the Latin American republics.

In a quarter of a century of wandering through Latin America I have met and talked with many believers in international Trotskyism; for an even longer period, I have known some of their counterparts in this country. Although I have often disagreed with these persons, I believe that Trotskyism is a serious political movement, worth careful study, and that the information they have given me, as well as the written material I have collected over several years, may qualify me to write a short history of the movement in Latin America.

The author mentions some of the difficulties that faced him, such as the ephemeral nature of much of the written material, the proclivity of many Trotskyists to use "party names" (an elementary precaution taken by most revolutionists under the repressive dictatorships they have had to face in Latin America), and the impossibility of obtaining exact figures on party membership, places, dates, and attendance at meetings.

Another difficulty that ought to be added to the list is Prof. Alexander's political views:

In any work dealing with a highly controversial group, it behooves the author to state his own position. I have never been a Trotskyite, and for most of my adult life I have belonged to the Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Federation, organizations on the left which have opposed the Fourth Internationalists. I have tried to be as objective as possible in all matters, even though it may not be possible for me to be completely impartial.

There can be no doubt of Prof. Alexander's desire to be objective. His political calling card, however, was not of a kind to invite a friendly reception from most Trotskyist militants. As a result the sources used by the author are heavily weighted on the side of former Trotskyists, some of whom became bitter enemies of the movement in which they once participated. The paucity of good current sources also shows up in the author's handling of the recent history of the Trotskyist movement.

Trotskyism in Latin America, by Robert J. Alexander. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1973. 303 pp. \$10. Index, bibliography.

The Social Democratic concepts of the author lead to a certain bias in a broader way. Trotskyism, he maintains, originated in a "struggle for power in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union . . . in the late 1920's." In this power struggle, Trotsky was "badly out-manuevered politically by Joseph Stalin. . . ."

The inadequacy of this view can be illustrated without stretching things too much by the analogous argument that Bolshevism originated in a struggle for power in the Social Democratic movement in tsarist Russia in which Kerensky was badly out-manuevered politically by Lenin and Trotsky. In this instance, the context of the upsurge of the Russian masses leading to the climax of a socialist revolution is left out. Similarly, in his account of the origin of Trotskyism, Prof. Alexander leaves out the context of the exhaustion of the Russian masses and the ebb of the revolution in the 1920s. Trotsky and Stalin were representatives of different class forces, and it was the movement of these forces on a colossal scale that determined their political fate as individuals.

The point is relevant to answering a question that would seem to be of some interest in a study of this type. What has given Trotskyism its attractiveness, so that without state power or a bureaucratic base of any kind it has nevertheless survived sometimes savage persecution for

such a long time and continually attracted fresh contingents of rebel-minded youth? Was it because Trotsky was "badly out-manuevered politically by Joseph Stalin"? Or is it ascribable to something else, something germane to the entire set of problems facing humanity in the epoch of the death agony of capitalism, including the problem of overcoming the totalitarian rule of the bureaucratic caste in the Soviet Union and elsewhere?

No answer to this question is attempted in *Trotskyism in Latin America*.

Trotsky vs. Shachtman

On the other hand, the author asks "whether, a generation after Trotsky's death, the movement bearing his name really continues to represent the ideas he espoused." He cites a letter from Max Shachtman dated December 7, 1970, in which this former Trotskyist argues that "Trotskyism died with Trotsky; the remains merely bear his name and honor (worship, venerate) his memory."

Perhaps the best short answer to this argument was written by Leon Trotsky in 1940: "Only the other day Shachtman referred to himself in the press as a 'Trotskyist.' If *this* be Trotskyism then I at least am no Trotskyist."¹

Prof. Alexander appears to concur with Shachtman's view. He even seeks to find support for it in Trotsky's writings:

However, one may ask whether Leon Trotsky himself, shortly before his death, did not provide a rebuttal to his "orthodox" followers of a quarter of a century later. In an article which he published in the Mexican Trotskyist journal *Clave* in October 1939, there is a passage which raises grave doubts whether Trotsky himself would have remained an orthodox Trotskyist had he survived World War II. This passage is significant enough for the relevant parts of it to be reproduced completely.

Prof. Alexander then quotes the passage, which is from Trotsky's article "The USSR in War." Unfortunately he chose to supply a translation from the somewhat faulty Spanish version in *Clave*, and he leaves out a number of key sentences (without indicating where the omissions occur) that are essential to Trotsky's argument. Con-

1. See *In Defense of Marxism*, Pathfinder edition, p. 168.

sequently I will cite the English translation from the Russian original, including the omitted sentences, which was first published in the November 1939 issue of the *The New International* and which is readily available today in the book *In Defense of Marxism* (pp. 8-9), a collection of correspondence and articles by Trotsky:

If this war provokes, as we firmly believe, a proletarian revolution, it must inevitably lead to the overthrow of the bureaucracy in the USSR and regeneration of Soviet democracy on a far higher economic and cultural basis than in 1918. In that case the question as to whether the Stalinist bureaucracy was a "class" or a growth on the workers' state will be automatically solved. To every single person it will become clear that in the process of the development of the world revolution the Soviet bureaucracy was only an *episodic* relapse.

If, however, it is conceded that the present war will provoke not revolution but a decline of the proletariat, then there remains another alternative: the further decay of monopoly capitalism, its further fusion with the state and the replacement of democracy wherever it still remained by a totalitarian regime. The inability of the proletariat to take into its hands the leadership of society could actually lead under these conditions to the growth of a new exploiting class from the Bonapartist fascist bureaucracy. This would be, according to all indications, a regime of decline, signaling the eclipse of civilization.

An analogous result might occur in the event that the proletariat of advanced capitalist countries, having conquered power, should prove incapable of holding it and surrender it, as in the USSR, to a privileged bureaucracy. Then we would be compelled to acknowledge that the reason for the bureaucratic relapse is rooted not in the backwardness of the country and not in the imperialist environment but in the congenital incapacity of the proletariat to become a ruling class. Then it would be necessary in retrospect to establish that in its fundamental traits the present USSR was the precursor of a new exploiting regime on an international scale.

We have diverged very far from the terminological controversy over the nomenclature of the Soviet state. But let our critics not protest; only by taking the necessary historical perspective can one provide himself with a correct judgment upon such a question as the replacement of one social regime by another. The historic alternative, carried to the end, is as follows: either the Stalin regime is an abhorrent relapse in the process of transforming bourgeois society into a socialist society, or the Stalin regime is the first stage of a new exploiting society. If the second prognosis proves to be correct, then, of course, the bureaucracy will become a new exploiting class. However onerous the second perspective may be, if the world proletariat should actually prove incapable of fulfilling the mission placed upon it by the course of development, nothing else would remain except only to recognize that the socialist program, based on the internal contradictions of capitalist society, ended as a Utopia. It is self-evident that a new "minimum" program would be required—for the defense of

the interests of the slaves of the totalitarian bureaucratic society.

In 1939-40 Shachtman and James Burnham (who still claimed to adhere to Trotskyism at the time) sought to interpret this passage as indicating that Trotsky had begun to revise his stand on the class nature of the Soviet Union and of the entire perspective facing humanity. Prof. Alexander adds his comment:

This quotation certainly seems to indicate that had he lived after World War II, Trotsky would no longer have argued that the Soviet Union was a "workers state," and certainly he would not have maintained that the new Communist regimes set up after the war had this character.

If the quotation is placed in context, however, it is difficult to avoid an opposite conclusion. The article from which it is taken is a sustained polemic against the unscientific concept of "bureaucratic collectivism" which was subsequently espoused, with minor variations, by both Burnham and Shachtman. In other articles written in the succeeding months (included in *In Defense of Marxism*), Trotsky demonstrated in the most convincing way that his position on the class nature of the Soviet Union was grounded on the most fundamental principles of Marxism, including dialectical materialism. In their essential argumentation, these articles have lost none of their forcefulness or relevancy.

Trotsky Explains His Point

In the particular quotation cited by Prof. Alexander, Shachtman failed to grasp the point Trotsky was making. As part of his answer to the "bureaucratic collectivists," Trotsky drove their arguments to their logical conclusion; namely, that if you actually held to them seriously, then you had to say that Marxism itself was not scientifically grounded and that the whole perspective of socialism as a worldwide classless society was illusory. The real perspective in that case would be the rise of a new barbarism and the eclipse of civilization. The essence of Trotsky's argument is quite old—socialism or barbarism. Trotsky merely put the alternative in terms relevant to the arguments of the "bureaucratic collectivists" and sought to compel Burnham and Shachtman (particularly Shachtman) to face up to the dilemma.

That this was Trotsky's intent is easily shown. In a letter to James P. Cannon dated September 12, 1939,² Trotsky listed the main points of the article, which he was then writing. Four "fundamental ideas" were to be included. He said the following on the fourth point:

4. The USSR question cannot be isolated as unique from the whole historic process of our

times. Either the Stalin state is a transitory formation, it is a deformation of a worker state in a backward and isolated country, or "bureaucratic collectivism" (Bruno R., *La Bureaucratization du Monde*; Paris, 1939) is a new social formation which is replacing capitalism throughout the world (Stalinism, Fascism, New Deal, etc.). The terminological experiments (workers' state, not workers' state; class, not class; etc.) receive a sense only under this historic aspect. Who chooses the second alternative admits, openly or silently, that all the revolutionary potentialities of the world proletariat are exhausted, that the socialist movement is bankrupt, and that the old capitalism is transforming itself into "bureaucratic collectivism" with a new exploiting class.

The tremendous importance of such a conclusion is self-explanatory. It concerns the whole fate of the world proletariat and mankind. Have we the slightest right to induce ourselves by purely terminological experiments in a new historic conception which occurs to be in an absolute contradiction with our program, strategy and tactics? Such an adventurist jump would be doubly criminal now in view of the world war when the perspective of the socialist revolution becomes an imminent reality and when the case of the USSR will appear to everybody as a transitory episode in the process of world socialist revolution.

For good measure and in the hope that it will help to finally lay to rest the misinterpretation of the famous quotation, let me add Trotsky's comments after he learned how Shachtman and Burnham were trying to convert it into some kind of support for their evolution away from Trotskyism and in the direction of bureaucratic collectivism:

Some comrades evidently were surprised that I spoke in my article ("The USSR in the War") of the system of "bureaucratic collectivism" as a theoretical possibility. They discovered in this even a complete revision of Marxism. This is an apparent misunderstanding. The Marxist comprehension of historical necessity has nothing in common with fatalism. Socialism is not realizable "by itself," but as a result of the struggle of living forces, classes and their parties. The proletariat's decisive advantage in this struggle resides in the fact that it represents historical progress, while the bourgeoisie incarnates reaction and decline. Precisely in this is the source of our conviction in victory. But we have full right to ask ourselves: What character will society take if the forces of reaction conquer?

Marxists have formulated an incalculable number of times the alternative: either socialism or return to barbarism. After the Italian "experience" we repeated thousands of times: either communism or fascism. The real passage to socialism cannot fail to appear incomparably more complicated, more heterogeneous, more contradictory than was foreseen in the general historical scheme. Marx spoke about the dictatorship of the proletariat and its future withering away but said nothing about bureaucratic degeneration of the dictatorship. We have observed and analyzed for the first time in experience such a degeneration. Is this revision of Marxism?

The march of events has succeeded in demonstrating that the delay of the socialist revolution engenders the indubitable phenomena of barbarism—chronic unemployment, pauperizat-

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2. *In Defense of Marxism*, pp. 1-2.

ion of the petty bourgeoisie, fascism, finally wars of extermination which do not open up any new road. What social and political forms can the new "barbarism" take, if we admit theoretically that mankind should not be able to elevate itself to socialism? We have the possibility of expressing ourselves on this subject more concretely than Marx. Fascism on one hand, degeneration of the Soviet state on the other outline the social and political forms of a neo-barbarism. An alternative of this kind—socialism or totalitarian servitude—has not only theoretical interest, but also enormous importance in agitation, because in its light the necessity for socialist revolution appears most graphically.

If we are to speak of a revision of Marx, it is in reality the revision of those comrades who project a new type of state, "non-bourgeois" and "non-worker." Because the alternative developed by me leads them to draw their own thoughts up to their logical conclusion, some of these critics, frightened by the conclusions of their own theory, accuse me . . . of revising Marxism. I prefer to think that it is simply a friendly jest.³

How a Wrong Theory Affects Judgment of Political Currents

All of this may hardly seem relevant to a study of the history of Trotskyism in Latin America. Yet it is more pertinent than appears on the surface. It concerns the question of precisely *what is Trotskyism?* If Trotskyism died with Trotsky, as Shachtman maintained, and if Trotsky himself might have junked his fundamental positions had he survived World War II, as Prof. Alexander believes is possible, then a historian holding Social Democratic positions is quite likely to find himself a bit at sea in exploring the subject. Thus the author seems to follow a quite pragmatic criterion—a Trotskyist is anyone who claims to be a Trotskyist.

Prof. Alexander does apply certain elementary criteria besides this such as

3. "Again and Once More Again on the Nature of the USSR," *In Defense of Marxism*, pp. 30-31.

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support of the theory of permanent revolution, defense of the Soviet Union coupled with opposition to Stalinism, advocacy of class-struggle policies, and insistence on the need to build a revolutionary party to assure success of the proletarian struggle for socialism. However, the mesh in this screen is much too wide and leads to considerable imbalances in the author's delineation of the international Trotskyist movement.

Take for instance the weight he gives to the current headed by J. Posadas (Homero Cristali). In April 1962, this minority grouping staged an "extraordinary congress" (probably in Uruguay) that "expelled" all other Trotskyists in the world and set up a "Fourth International" of its own. On the face of it, this was a politically irrational act. It was followed by the development of no less irrational positions. One of the more striking was to advocate that Moscow ought to launch an atomic war, since an atomic war is not only inevitable but will signify the immediate destruction of capitalism and the equally immediate victory of socialism. After the first salvos of intercontinental rockets, the followers of Posadas were to get in touch at once with their leader to receive instructions on what to do.

The megalomania of this sad figure extends to the conviction that his speeches were assiduously followed in Peking and shaped Mao's policies.

In the beginning, the Posadas grouping included some talented members. As the nature of Posadas Thought became more evident, they dropped away and the grouping disintegrated. The fate of his Algerian "section" will serve as an example. By 1965 this consisted of one person who had already taken his distance from Posadas and was discussing with members of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. Eventually he returned to Argentina, his native country. That made no difference to Posadas. From his viewpoint the "Algerian section" continued to exist and he continued to list it.

The reduction of the Posadas current to a tiny core of cultists explains in part why his press consists of virtually nothing but the speeches of Posadas in which Posadas himself, taking an objective stance, not infrequently praises the thought and the achievements of Comrade Posadas. To judge from the documentation in *Trotskyism in Latin America*, the author has not had the opportunity to interview former followers of Posadas and thus is unaware of how things developed internally in this grouping; he is ignorant in particular, it seems, of some of the practices of Posadas that belong more to the field of psychiatry than politics. But isn't the material supplied by Posadas in his publications sufficient evidence of what is involved? It is hard to explain how Alexander could have been taken in by the

front put up by Posadas.

Alexander lists the Posadas grouping as one of "four" existing Fourth Internationals. He places as No. 2 the Alliance Marxist Révolutionnaire, the French group headed by Michel Pablo, a former secretary of the International Secretariat (now United Secretariat) of the Fourth International. However, Pablo never claimed that he was organizing a "Fourth International" of his own in the pattern set by Posadas. Pablo's objective, in breaking with the United Secretariat in 1965, was to set up a public faction within the general framework of the Fourth International established by Leon Trotsky in 1938. Pablo's political evolution, nonetheless, was clearly in a direction away from Trotskyism. In May 1972 a conference of the AMR voted to "abandon the reference to the 'Fourth International' that has appeared up to now in the name of our International Organization," the conference likewise abandoned use of the term "Trotskyism" in reference to their views.⁴

Alexander may have finished his manuscript before this document was published or he may have missed it. In any case, so much for his Fourth International No. 2.

Third on his list is the International Committee consisting of the Socialist Labour League of Great Britain and the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste of France together with small supporting groups in other countries. Their objective as a bloc in the International Committee was to "reconstruct" or "reorganize" the Fourth International. In 1971 the SLL and the OCI split, as Alexander notes. This effectively ended the International Committee. Since then the SLL has renamed itself the "Workers Revolutionary Party." Aside from this change, the WRP leaders have continued their previous course of deepening their differences with all other claimants to the name "Trotskyist," resorting more and more to misrepresentations of opposing positions.

The OCI, contrariwise, has moved toward improving relations with the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, which represents the main current of the world Trotskyist movement, although Alexander considers it to be but one of "four" Fourth Internationals.

To picture the Fourth International as having evolved into "four" Fourth Internationals puts things askew. It would be more accurate from the historical point of view to describe the movement as marked by the appearance of various tendencies and factions that have engaged in sharp internal struggles, either maintaining the continuity of the program of Trotskyism, or moving away from it to one degree or

4. See *Intercontinental Press*, July 17, 1972, p. 846, for the full text of the AMR's statement.

another. Some currents that joined the Fourth International could not accurately be called Trotskyist in the beginning, although in the course of struggle, study, and the accumulation of experience many members graduated into excellent cadres. On the other hand, losses have been registered when currents that arose within the Fourth International broke up after seeking to substitute novel schemas for the program and practices of Trotskyism.

Such a standpoint would facilitate a more accurate account of the interrelationships, which have been quite fluid over the years, ranging from close collaboration to mutual hostility, generally on the basis of substantial political differences.

A Dubious Source of Material

The approach adopted by Alexander tends to foster confusion. A good example is the following paragraph on page 31 of *Trotskyism in Latin America*:

The long-time Secretary-General of the Fourth International, Michel Pablo, played a significant—and quite controversial—role in Algeria's affairs in the early years of that country's independence. *Workers Press*, the organ of the Healyite Socialist Labor League in Great Britain, noted in its edition of January 17, 1970, that Pablo "soon became an economic adviser of Ben Bella when he came to power." It added that "Algeria, after Ben Bella's accession to power, was proclaimed a 'workers state' by the revisionists, and Pablo, on Ben Bella's behalf, stomped Europe with bourgeois liberals to collect tinned milk for the starving Algerian masses, who hardly benefited from the meager reforms of Ben Bella's government." The article notes that when Ben Bella fell, Pablo escaped to Europe.

Alexander offers this "documentation" without comment. Presumably he takes it at face value. A more cautious attitude toward this source was in order. The *Workers Press* (now the *News Line*) is notorious in the British left and elsewhere for its indifference to factual accuracy. The source of this attitude is factional bias rather than mere carelessness. The quotation selected by Alexander is sufficient to show this without citing more striking instances.

To begin with, Pablo was secretary, not "Secretary-General" (Stalin's title in the Russian Communist Party) of the International Secretariat of the Fourth International. Secondly, Pablo did not become an "economic advisor" to Ben Bella. He worked mainly in the area of agrarian reform, holding no posts involving political responsibility although he did follow a policy of trying to influence Ben Bella and other leaders of the Front de Libération Nationale to move in a revolutionary-Marxist direction. Thirdly, the campaign to collect medical supplies, clothing, and food for Algeria in the wake of the immensely destructive and murderous war waged on the colony by French imperialism was fully supported by the Fourth International.

The FLN came to the fore because of the

popular support engendered by its struggles. In that difficult period, Healy supported the group led by Messali Hadj, who later became a turncoat. After the victory of the colonial rebellion, Healy busied himself trying to explain away his previous support of Messali Hadj, a task that was more imperative from his viewpoint than collecting "tinned milk" for colonial victims of imperialism.

We come to a point that shows still more clearly the importance of a thorough knowledge of basic Trotskyist positions if documents are to be given proper evaluation. *Workers Press* avers that "Algeria . . . was proclaimed a 'workers state' by the revisionists. . . ." This is the exact opposite of the truth. The United Secretariat—the "revisionists," according to Healy—in a statement dated February 17, 1964, recognized that the Ben Bella regime represented a workers and peasants government. But this government rested on a capitalist state. In its declaration, the United Secretariat held open the possibility that the contradiction in character between the state and the government in Algeria might be resolved by the capitalist state being smashed and replaced by a workers state as in the case of Cuba, an outcome, however, that remained to be seen. (Since this document is no longer readily available, it has been republished elsewhere in this issue.)

On June 19, 1965, Colonel Houari Boumédiène staged a military coup that brought down the workers and peasants government. The contradiction between state and government that had existed under Ben Bella was resolved along reactionary lines, the army setting up a bourgeois government consistent with the capitalist character of the state.⁵

Importance of Trotsky's Distinction Between State and Government

An understanding of the distinction between state and government is essential to grasping some of the main positions of Trotskyism. It is required, for instance, to appreciate Trotsky's reasoning in calling for a political (in contrast to a social) revolution in the struggle to overcome Stalinism in the Soviet Union. A capitalist state is based on the preservation of private property in the means of production. A workers state is based on the expropriation of private property in the

5. See "On the Character of the Algerian Government," *World Outlook* (former name of *Intercontinental Press*), February 21, 1964, p. 1. Also the resolution of the Second World Congress Since Reunification (Eighth World Congress) "The Progress and Problems of the African Revolution," *International Socialist Review*, spring, 1966, pp. 58-63. And the resolution by the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International "The Algerian Revolution from 1962 to 1969," *Intercontinental Press*, March 16, 1970, p. 231.

means of production and the preservation of collectivized property forms, which are requisite to a planned economy. Just as a capitalist state may have various forms of government ranging from bourgeois democracy to fascist dictatorships, so a workers state may have forms of government ranging from proletarian democracy as complete as that seen in the Paris Commune to regimes as repressive as the one headed by Stalin.

Inasmuch as a workers state (as defined above) still existed in the Soviet Union despite its degeneration under Stalin, Trotsky's position was to defend it as the main achievement of the October 1917 revolution. This meant defending it not only against the imperialist powers seeking its destruction but also against the bureaucratic caste that constituted a parasitic growth on the workers state. Since the Stalinist regime had closed all doors to a peaceful change of government, the working class was left with no alternative but to resort to forceful measures to install a democratic workers government.

How Trotsky applied this position in practice was shown in a graphic way during the conflict with Finland on the eve of World War II. The case is apropos in view of Alexander's assertion that Trotsky "argued that the Soviet invasion was justified in order to defend Soviet frontiers, that any Soviet government would have had to act in much the same way that Stalin had done, and that the 'strategic interest' of the workers' state took priority over Finland's right to self-determination." This does not do justice to Trotsky. As against capitalist Finland, Trotsky supported the workers state. But he did not support or "justify" Stalin's course. Here is a typical statement:

Stalin's assault upon Finland was not of course solely an act in defense of the USSR. The politics of the Soviet Union is guided by the Bonapartist bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is first and foremost concerned with its power, its prestige, its revenues. It defends itself much better than it defends the USSR. It defends itself at the expense of the USSR and at the expense of the world proletariat. This was revealed only too clearly throughout the entire development of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. *We cannot therefore either directly or indirectly take upon ourselves even a shadow of responsibility for the invasion of Finland which represents only a single link in the chain of the politics of the Bonapartist bureaucracy.*

It is one thing to solidarize with Stalin, defend his policy, assume responsibility for it—as does the triply infamous Comintern—it is another thing to explain to the world working class that no matter what crimes Stalin may be guilty of we cannot permit world imperialism to crush the Soviet Union, reestablish capitalism and convert the land of the October Revolution into a colony.

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This explanation likewise furnishes the basis for our defense of the USSR. [Emphasis added.]⁶

It was in line with the distinction drawn between state and government in the case of the Soviet Union that the cadres trained by Trotsky recognized in the period following World War II that the *states* established by Moscow in Eastern Europe by bureaucratic-military means were workers states. They were replicas of the degenerated workers state. Likewise, the *governments* set up under the auspices of the Kremlin were replicas of Stalin's regime. The Fourth International therefore took the position that these "deformed" workers states must be defended against imperialism. As in the Soviet Union this defense included struggling for a political revolution to establish governments based on proletarian democracy.

In Alexander's opinion, had Trotsky lived he certainly would not have contended that the "new Communist regimes" set up in Eastern Europe were workers states. But Alexander does not indicate what Trotsky's reasoning might have been, or how Trotsky could possibly have dropped so low in political level as to confuse regime and state.

Throughout the history of the Trotskyist movement the relationship between state and government, especially in the case of the Soviet Union, has been a perennial question of internal debates and divisions. For that matter it was a key issue in the primary division between Trotskyism and Stalinism. On the theoretical level, what divided the Stalinists and Trotskyists was the Stalinist insistence of viewing Stalin's regime as the same thing as the workers' state.

In recent years the question of the relationship between government and state arose anew in relation to the problem of characterizing the regimes and states that emerged from the postwar revolutions, above all in China and Cuba.

In the current platforms of the Trotskyist movement in various countries the distinction between state and government plays an important role in a different way. The governmental slogan constitutes a central axis for everything else. In countries all over the world, the Trotskyists propagandize in favor of the establishment of a workers and peasants government, or a workers government, as a transitional measure. This has included urging Stalinist and Social Democratic parties in areas where they have mass support to stop serving as agencies of the capitalist state and to seek instead to establish governments on an independent basis; that is, in opposition to all the capitalist parties.

Such governments would be in obvious contradiction to the capitalist state. If that

state were to remain intact for long, a repetition of the Algerian experience could be expected. From the Trotskyist point of view, however, the establishment of governments of this type is to be desired as a step that would open up extremely favorable prospects for a socialist victory.

Alexander's lack of understanding, or lack of appreciation, of such seemingly

fine points mars his presentation of the differences among the various groupings claiming to adhere to Trotskyism. It also makes it more difficult to understand why Trotskyist theory is attractive to young people desirous of reaching a deeper understanding of world developments and how to intervene in them most effectively.

(Part two in next issue.)

Mali—Student Protests Halted by Riot Police

Lt. Col. Tiecord Bagayoko, the director-general of the security services in the West African country of Mali, has acknowledged that several persons were arrested after the May 18 funeral of former President Modibo Keita. Several thousand persons attended the funeral for the late president, who had been deposed by the present military rulers in 1968, and a considerable number of antigovernment slogans were displayed.

The day after the funeral, the ruling Military Committee of National Liberation warned that it had authorized head of state Col. Moussa Traore to assume emergency powers if necessary to "preserve order, discipline and the dignity of our people."

In announcing the arrests, Bagayoko claimed that the protesters had used the funeral as an opportunity to "commit certain acts and to make certain statements which our penal laws forbid." He refused to release the names of those arrested or even to state how many had been detained. According to a report in the June 27 issue of the London weekly *West Africa*, "Col. Bagayoko said investigations were continuing and if it appeared that the detainees had acted in a manner likely to jeopardize internal security, they would be tried."

The same issue of *West Africa* provided an example of the kind of "justice" dispensed by the military junta. The Special State Security Court sentenced twelve persons to death, seven of them for alleged involvement in a coup attempt last year and five for their participation in a secessionist revolt in l'Adrar des Iforas, in northern Mali, nearly fifteen years ago.

The protests at Modibo Keita's funeral came after three months of student unrest in the capital of Bamako. In February, secondary-school students launched a strike and carried out street demonstrations to protest new government restrictions on the rights of high-school graduates to enter the country's Ecoles Supérieures. They were joined by both primary school students and those from the Ecoles Supérieures.

The junta cracked down, briefly detaining hundreds of student protesters. According to a report in the July issue of the

London monthly *Africa*, many were said to have been beaten, some severely.

In April, the students again launched a strike. This time the regime closed down all schools and institutions of higher education and canceled student grants.

The schools were opened two weeks later, but the National Union of Students decided to continue the strike. Secondary schools outside of Bamako also began to join in. "Once again," *Africa* reported, "there were some serious clashes between students and the anti-riot forces; in May when a student march through Bamako was broken up there were an unknown number of casualties including some deaths and hundreds of arrests."

In face of the heavy repression, the student strike was called off and the students returned to their classes. "It is clear, however," *Africa* reported, "that there is still very considerable resentment among the students, who have failed to get their free right of entry to the higher schools back again."

In an effort to bolster its image, the junta staged a series of support rallies by the National Union of Workers, the Union of Women, and the Association of War Veterans.

The report in *Africa* predicted, however, "The government is likely to have to face further demonstrations despite the public expressions of support that it has managed to rally in recent weeks." □

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6. "Balance Sheet of the Finnish Events," *In Defense of Marxism*, p. 176.

On the Character of the Algerian Government

[The following statement was issued by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International on February 17, 1964. We have taken it from the February 21, 1964, issue of *World Outlook*, the former name of *Intercontinental Press*.

[We have republished the document at this time because of the reference to it in the review article by Joseph Hansen on Prof. Robert J. Alexander's book *Trotskyism in Latin America*, which appears elsewhere in this issue.]

* * *

For some time the course of the new regime in Algeria has shown that it is a "Workers and Peasants Government" of the kind considered by the Communist International in its early days as likely to appear, and referred to in the Transitional Program of the Fourth International, as a possible forerunner of a workers state.

Such a government is characterized by the displacement of the bourgeoisie in political power, the transfer of armed power from the bourgeoisie to the popular masses, and the initiation of far-reaching measures in property relations. The logical outcome of such a course is the establishment of a workers state; but, without a revolutionary Marxist party, this is not guaranteed. In the early days of the Communist International it was held to be excluded in the absence of a revolutionary Marxist party. Experience has shown, however, that this conclusion must be modified in the colonial world due to the extreme decay of capitalism and the effect of the existence of the Soviet Union and a series of workers states in the world today.

An essentially bourgeois state apparatus was bequeathed to Algeria. A crisis in the leadership of the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale] came to a head July 1, 1962, ending after a few days in the establishment of a de facto coalition government in which Ferhat Abbas and Ben Bella represented the two opposing wings of neocolonialism and popular revolution. The struggle between these two tendencies within the coalition ended in the reinforcement of the Ben Bella wing, the promulgation of the decrees of March 1963 and the ouster successively of Khider, Ferhat Abbas and other bourgeois leaders although some rightist elements still remain in the government. These changes marked the end of the coalition and the establishment of a Workers and Peasants Government.

As is characteristic of a Workers and Peasants Government of this kind, the Algerian government has not followed a

consistent course. Its general direction, however, has been in opposition to imperialism, to the old colonial structure, to neocolonialism and to bureaucratism. It has reacted with firmness to the initiatives of would-be new bourgeois layers, including armed counterrevolution. Its subjective aims have repeatedly been declared to be the construction of socialism. At the same time its consciousness is limited by its lack of Marxist training and background.

The question that remains to be answered is whether this government can establish a workers state. The movement in this direction is evident and bears many resemblances to the Cuban pattern. A profound agrarian reform has already been carried out, marked by virtual nationalization of the most important areas of arable land. Deep inroads have been made into the old ownership relations in the industrial sector with the establishment of a public and state-controlled sector. Yet to be undertaken are the expropriation of the key oil and mineral sector, the banks and insurance companies, establishment of a monopoly of foreign trade and the inauguration of effective counter measures to the monetary, financial and commercial activities of foreign imperialism.

Among the most heartening signs in Algeria are (1) in foreign policy the

establishment of friendly relations with Cuba, Yugoslavia, China, the Soviet Union and other workers states with the possibility this opens up for substantial aid from these sources; (2) the active attitude of the government toward developing the colonial revolution in such areas as Angola and South Africa; (3) within Algeria the establishment of the institution of "self-management." "Self-management" with its already demonstrated importance for the development of workers and peasants democracy offers the brightest opening for the establishment of the institutions of a workers state.

As a whole, Algeria, as we have noted many times, has entered a process of permanent revolution of highly transitional character in which all the basic economic, social and political structures are being shaken up and given new forms. This process is certain to continue. It will be greatly facilitated and strengthened if one of the main problems now on the agenda—the organization of a mass party on a revolutionary Marxist program—is successfully solved.

The appearance of a Workers and Peasants Government in Algeria is concrete evidence of the depth of the revolutionary process occurring there. It is of historic importance not only for Algeria and North Africa but for the whole African continent and the rest of the world. □

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