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Free Enrique Broquen!

By Judy White

Enrique Broquen, the main legal adviser of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers Party), was kidnapped in Buenos Aires July 5.

The sixty-nine-year-old attorney and PST leader was noted for his work in defending political prisoners—including the close to 100 members of the PST who are in jail or missing.

He has also been an outspoken opponent of the activities of right-wing terrorist groups and the official protection they enjoy.

As a result, he has repeatedly been the target of death threats and has been arrested several times by military authorities when trying to visit jailed militants.

Broquen has been active in the Argentine socialist movement for more than forty years. In 1930 he joined the Socialist Party and became general secretary of the Socialist Youth Confederation. One of the leaders of the left wing in these formations, he became the central leader of the Partido Socialista Obrero (PSO—Socialist Workers Party), which was formed under the impact of the Spanish civil war.

Later he left the PSO because of its adaptation to Stalinism and spent several years giving courses on Marxism to young people in Argentina.

In 1964 Broquen once again affiliated to a socialist organization—the Movimiento de Unidad Socialista (Movement of Socialist Unity).

Two years later he joined the Argentine Socialist Party (PSA) and participated actively in the subsequent fusion of the PSA with the *La Verdad* group, a Trotskyist organization. This fusion led to the formation of the PST in 1972.

Broquen's kidnapping was one of many that took place during July. He is one of countless attorneys who have disappeared or been jailed or murdered by the military junta headed by Gen. Jorge Videla.

Evidence of the extent of this aspect of the repression was presented by Gustavo Roca, a member of the Argentine Commis-

sion on Human Rights, to a subcommittee of the U.S. Congress in September 1976.

Roca listed the cases of twenty-five prominent lawyers who were victims of repression in the six months following the March 1976 military coup. Several of them were found dead after their kidnappings.

"Our only crime," he told Subcommittee Chairman Donald Fraser, "has been for many years to carry out the task of defending human rights in Argentina and to have exercised our right as lawyers in the courts of our country to defend citizens persecuted for political, social or ideologi-

cal reasons."

The kidnapping and killing of lawyers continues—what correspondent Juan de Onis described in the July 18 *New York Times* as "a tendency by forces involved in repressing left-wing subversion to treat lawyers giving professional services to clients involved in political or labor conflicts as if they were part of the guerrilla movement."

In the case of Broquen, the danger is heightened by the victim's age and delicate state of health.

As part of an international campaign on his behalf, the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA) has issued a special appeal for telegrams to be sent to Argentine authorities demanding that Broquen be released immediately.

Protests may be sent to Gen. Jorge Videla, Casa Rosada, Buenos Aires, Argentina. Copies of all such messages should be sent to USLA, 853 Broadway, Suite 414, New York, New York 10003. □

Sacco and Vanzetti—Yes, It Was a Frame-up

By Susan Wald

"I wish to tell you that I am innocent and have never committed a crime, but perhaps some sins. I am innocent of all crimes, not only of this one, but of all. I am an innocent man."

With these words, Bartolomeo Vanzetti, along with Nicola Sacco, went to his death in the electric chair on August 23, 1927.

Fifty years later, on July 19, 1977, Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts, the state that executed the two Italian anarchists after convicting them of payroll robbery and murder in 1920, signed a proclamation acknowledging that Sacco and Vanzetti had not indeed received a fair trial.

"The conduct of many of the officials involved in the case shed serious doubt on their willingness and ability to conduct the prosecution and trial of Sacco and Vanzetti fairly and impartially," the proclamation stated.

"... any stigma and disgrace should be forever removed from the names of their families and descendants, and so, from the name of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."

However, what was involved in the Sacco-Vanzetti case was not merely a "miscarriage of justice" but a deliberate frame-up. The conviction of Sacco and Vanzetti was upheld even though another man, Celestino Madeiros, had confessed to the crime with which they were charged. The two were executed for their political beliefs and sacrificed to the climate of anticommunist hysteria that prevailed in

the United States after World War I.

James P. Cannon, founder of the Socialist Workers Party, wrote about the seven-year battle to save the lives of Sacco and Vanzetti in an article published in February 1927 in the *Labor Defender*, newspaper of the International Labor Defense, of which he was then the national secretary.

Rarely has the vital importance of international solidarity of the working class been so decisively shown as in the world campaign for Sacco and Vanzetti. Had there not from the very beginning been demonstrated that unbreakable determination of the workers everywhere to make the fight of the two Italian agitators their fight; had there not been that splendid series of labor demonstrations in the capitals of the world; the incessant flow of resolutions and protests against this hideous conspiracy to murder two innocent workers—then the judicial vultures of Massachusetts might long ago have seized and demolished their prey. . . .

Mass meetings were held in every large city. In New York City alone some 18,000 workers came to Madison Square Garden to protest against the proposed legal assassination. Resolutions poured into the office of Governor Alvan T. Fuller of Massachusetts. Hundreds of thousands of leaflets, an appeal by International Labor Defense, and a stirring call to action by Eugene V. Debs, were distributed everywhere. Posters, buttons, articles for the press, the *Labor Defender*—every means of publicity and agitation was utilized in the campaign. The Sacco-Vanzetti Conferences, into which hundreds of thousands of workers were organized, made the names of the two Italian workers the symbol of solidarity and united efforts. . . .

In the German Reichstag, a large group of

Summer Schedule

This week's issue is the last before our summer break. We will resume our regular schedule with the issue dated August 29.

members of various parties combined to send a telegram of protest to Governor Fuller. . . . Dozens of the prominent leaders of the German trade unions aligned themselves with the movement. . . . Scores of meetings were held in every German center. . . .

From England came the protests of the Trade Union Congress, from the British Labour Party, the Independent Labour Party, the Communist Party and the "Minority Movement." . . .

In Italy, despite the incredibly difficult situation [under fascism], meetings were held wherever possible. . . .

. . . demonstrations were held in front of the American embassies at Paris, Sofia, Lisbon, Buenos Aires, Berlin, Montevideo, and Mexico. . . .

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, literally millions of workers and peasants have recorded their opposition to the planned execution of the two American radicals. [Reprinted in *Notebook of An Agitator*, New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973, pp. 6-8.]

Despite this massive campaign, Sacco and Vanzetti were executed. Now, fifty years too late, officials of the same state that sent them to the electric chair have admitted that the case against them was in fact a frame-up. Can there be a more powerful argument for overturning once and for all that most barbaric aspect of capitalist rule—the death penalty? □

Carter's Escalation of Arms Race in Africa

As part of its overall policy of increasing American political influence with African regimes, the Carter administration announced July 27 that it was prepared to supply arms to the Sudanese regime and that it would "consider sympathetically" military requests from Chad.

The day before, the State Department announced that Washington was also willing to supply arms to the Somalian regime, which now gets almost all of its military equipment from Moscow. A State Department representative declared, "We do think it is desirable that Somalia knows it does not have to depend on the Soviet Union but can obtain arms from other sources."

The Carter administration is also seeking Congressional approval for the sale of \$200 million worth of arms to the Egyptian regime.

According to a report in the July 28 *New York Times*, "One State Department official said that the Administration, after a long study of the issues involved, had decided to become a military supplier in the region for two major reasons: to challenge the Soviet Union in a strategically important part of the world and thereby avoid giving the impression that it was passively watching the Russians make inroads there, and to demonstrate strong support for President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt. . . ."

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Carter Dusts Off Old Plans for a New Canal

By Judy White

"My guess is that before many more years go by we might well need a new canal at sea level . . . I would say we will need a new Panama Canal," President Carter said in a July 21 speech in Yazoo City, Mississippi.

A "larger, wider, deeper" canal, he said, would allow the passage of American "major warships, large tankers and cargo ships," which are too big to pass through the present waterway. Accordingly, it "might be in the interest of our national security militarily as well as economically."

With this statement, Carter resurrected one of American imperialism's earliest plans for a transisthmian canal, one dating from the mid-nineteenth century—a sea-level waterway to be constructed across Nicaragua. Behind-the-scenes maneuvering led Washington to opt in 1903 for the Panama route (see *Intercontinental Press*, May 30, pp. 604-605).

The idea of a sea-level canal was revived once again in the mid-1960s when protests against the U.S. presence in Panama led the Johnson administration to consider alternative routes.

In Carter's speech no mention was made of whether the people of Panama or Nicaragua would have anything more to say about such a project than they did about the original canal.

He did acknowledge, however, that certain difficulties exist. He noted, for example, that in the mid-1960s, "we did not have the additional problem then of very serious disputes with Panama on continued management of the canal under the 1903 treaty."

On the other hand, he added, "We also did not have the additional problem of having to distribute Alaskan oil and gas to the eastern part of our country."

The "disputes" Carter referred to were widely interpreted to be related to the question of financial compensation for continued use of the canal. Panamanian head of state Omar Torrijos is reportedly asking for a \$1 billion "down payment" plus "around \$150 million to \$200 million" in annual fees until the end of this century.

Such a sum is "immensely large," Carter administration officials have said, and may preclude reaching a speedy conclusion to the talks.

"Just why Panama has made the demand is unclear," the editors of the *Christian Science Monitor* said July 20. In their view, Washington will simply have to wait "for Panama to show just what it has



TORRIJOS: Prefers secrecy when negotiating American control of canal.

in mind and how far it is prepared to go."

While it may be "unclear" why Torrijos is asking precisely this amount, a few facts about the canal and U.S. use of the Canal Zone make it clear that the Panamanian people deserve far more in financial compensation than this:

- Panama received only \$2.3 million in revenues from Washington last year in payment for U.S. use of a ten-mile-wide strip cutting Panamanian territory in half—a sum that totaled only 1.7 percent of the revenues from canal tolls alone.

- Canal tolls have always been kept artificially low to benefit American shipping interests, which account for approximately 79 percent of the cargo going through the canal.

- The canal reduces the delivery price of American exports and imports by \$1.5 billion a year, according to an estimate cited by the editors of the *New York Times* February 14.

- All land and housing in the 2 percent of Panamanian territory making up the Canal Zone has been owned by Washington since the 1903 treaty was signed.

What Washington views as a "snag" in the negotiations was greeted with dismay by supporters of the Carter administration for another reason as well:

"U.S. negotiators think it is important to get a new treaty to the Congress for ratification before its August recess," Daniel

Southerland reported in the July 15 *Christian Science Monitor*, "or the danger arises that approval of the treaty will be put off until next year. In that case, this highly emotional issue would get involved in congressional election year politics—something the administration would like to avoid at all costs."

Democratic Party strategists recall the political hay Republican presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan made by appealing to rightwingers on the canal issue in the 1976 campaign. They fear vote losses to the Republicans if Carter cannot report having successfully completed treaty negotiations before the fall electioneering begins.

Just how eager Carter is to ensure speedy ratification was indicated by his recent naming of a top aide, Hamilton Jordan, to help line up the two-thirds Senate vote needed to approve a treaty.

"That means Carter is turning to his most trusted lieutenant, architect of his presidential nomination, for what promises to be one of the most heated treaty ratification fights in Senate history," Evans and Novak commented in their syndicated column July 23.

Carter's speech July 21 also acknowledged another element in Washington's interest in the canal—the "problem of having to distribute Alaskan oil and gas to the eastern part of our country."

The Alaskan pipeline project has been in the works since at least 1970, so the question of how the fuel it carried would be transported from the line's terminus is not something the capitalists have not considered before.

What is new is concern for protection of the environment, which has mushroomed in the United States since the Alaska project started. California residents are opposing oil company efforts to build a massive terminal at Long Beach to connect with a converted gas pipeline from Texas. This line would absorb the 500,000-barrel-a-day surplus over West Coast refinery capacity that is expected once the Alaska pipeline is fully productive.

If the Long Beach facility is not allowed to be built, the oil will have to be transferred from the big Alaska tankers to smaller ships that can navigate the current canal.

Carter's conclusion that a sea-level canal across Panama might now be in Washington's "interest" may well be based in part on a desire to portray transport of the Alaskan oil as a "temporary" problem. Talk of a new canal may also be aimed at placing additional pressure on Torrijos to sign a treaty on "reasonable" terms guaranteeing continued U.S. control over the existing canal.

Still another possibility exists, of course. Perhaps, as with other aspects of the treaty negotiations, Carter and Torrijos have already secretly agreed to keep the old canal functioning just long enough for a new one to be built. □

Charges of Torture in Israeli Jails Confirmed

By Steve Wattenmaker

An extensive dossier documenting the regular use of torture in Israeli jails appeared in the "Insight" section of the June 19 London *Sunday Times*. Based on five months of research in Israel and the occupied territories, the article concluded:

Torture is organized so methodically that it cannot be dismissed as a handful of "rogue cops" exceeding orders. It is systematic. It appears to be sanctioned at some level as official policy.

A subsequent issue of the *Sunday Times* carried an official Israeli government reply to the allegations. Finally, in the newspaper's July 10 edition, the reporters responsible for the original article answered Israel's rebuttal:

Israel's reply to our investigation dealt with the central points by flat denial, rather than with detailed evidence; it raised side-issues; it devoted great energy to attacking two of its own citizens [attorneys Felicia Langer and Lea Tsemel] who were by no means our principal witnesses; it contained a number of untruths.

Lest anyone get the wrong impression that the bourgeois paper had taken sides with the Palestinian people, the *Sunday Times* editors reminded their readers on July 10:

We are not "anti-Israel." We believe strongly in her right to peace and security. We have said so consistently over many years. But no State is above criticism.

Stung by Israel's accusation of "selective and misleading reporting," however, the Insight investigators took pains in their final article to refute Israel's defense point by point.

In the original story they had charged Israel with using torture primarily to force confessions from political detainees who otherwise could not be convicted. For the sake of its international reputation, Israel was reluctant to admit holding political prisoners without charge, they had written.

The *Sunday Times* reporters had also quoted six attorneys who defend Palestinian prisoners in security cases. These lawyers' "unanimous opinion is that the military courts collude in and knowingly conceal the use of torture."

The July 10 article was in the form of excerpts from Israel's answer to these charges, followed by the investigators' comments on those responses:

Israel: "Torture is a crime under Israeli law."

Insight: So it is in most countries that use it.

Israel: "We possess a judicial system which

Tsemel's Account of Bias in Israeli Courts

[Two Israeli attorneys, Lea Tsemel and Felicia Langer, who are well known for their defense of Palestinian political prisoners, were singled out by the Israeli reply to the *Sunday Times* story on torture as biased and unreliable sources.

[The July 10 edition of the *Sunday Times* printed long letters by both Langer and Tsemel defending the accuracy of their information. Tsemel's letter, excerpts from which are printed below, also adds new facts to the case against Israeli torture.]

* * *

The practice in the occupied territories is not to allow lawyers or Red Cross representatives access to prisoners until after 18 days, which usually means until after the interrogation is over and the marks of ill-treatment have had time to fade.

In Jerusalem lawyers are allowed to see clients while they are under interrogation but only to obtain power of attorney in writing. They are accompanied by interrogators and are not allowed to talk to their clients.

I am named in the Embassy statement as one of the lawyers who claims that every client of mine who makes a statement to the police does so under pressure. This is not so. In many cases I

and other lawyers do not claim torture has been used even though our clients have complained of it—because we are afraid it might be worse for the client.

Only after I have warned the client that there is no chance of winning the "small trial" to check his confession and that this could expose him to severer punishment, and only if he still wants to complain of being tortured despite this, do I bring it up in court.

One of the mitigating circumstances affecting punishment is that the defendant "co-operated with the interrogators." This is why, though lawyers are sure their clients have been ill-treated, they have to change their tactics after losing the "small trial." In the last stage of pleading before sentence, they point out that as the court ruled that the accused "co-operated" with his interrogator, this should be in his favour.

Israel prisons are not open to lawyers' inspection. When we are allowed to see our clients after they have been interrogated the meeting takes place in a special "lawyers' room," we do not have access to the cells or to interrogation centres. I have never visited [the secret interrogation prison at] Sarafand, which is not mentioned in the Embassy's reply. . . .

Lea Tsemel
Jerusalem

. . . is both fair and of extremely high calibre."

Insight: True. That is what makes its reluctance to confront the issue of torture the more disturbing. For example, we cited a specific case where the Supreme Court dismissed a string of torture allegations solely on the basis of brief statements taken by the police which the plaintiffs could neither see nor challenge and medical reports by doctors who were far from independent. The plaintiffs' lawyer was not even allowed to be in court. We found that procedure remarkable. The Israelis do not deny it.

Israel: "All Israel prisons are open to inspection."

Insight: Not true. Most of Israel's prisons are open to inspection. But the prisons we cited—Ramallah, Hebron, Nablus and Gaza—have special cells, sometimes called X-cells, where prisoners under interrogation are held by the

security forces. Those cells and their inmates are not open to inspection, even by the International Red Cross. Nor does the Red Cross—or anyone else—inspect the special interrogation centres.

Israel: "All the people mentioned were convicted terrorists."

Insight: Not true. Many were never charged, let alone convicted of anything. In its repeated assertions of this point, moreover, Israel seems to us to come perilously close to implying that if the complainants were terrorists then ill-treatment or torture would be justified.

But our main criticism was of the military courts—run by soldiers and not by Israel's judiciary—which deal with security offences in the occupied territories. We said: "Most convictions in those courts are based on confessions by the accused; most of those confessions, the lawyers are convinced, are extracted by ill-

treatment or torture; almost without exception, the courts reject that contention.

In its response, Tel Aviv relied primarily on pious assertions that the Zionist state is governed by a rule of law so strict and sacred that obtaining convictions through torture was unthinkable. For example, the government statement said, it is impossible to obtain a conviction based on confession alone. Corroborative evidence is needed.

"Technically correct," the *Sunday Times* writers answered, "but in practice not true."

Israel admits two sorts of corroboration. Truly independent corroboration is needed in cases like rape or when one group of accused has turned State's evidence. But for acceptance of a confession, all that is needed is "something"—in Hebrew *dvar-ma*—and the military courts have reduced this to a minimum.

In most cases before then, it now consists of a "reconstruction report" by police who have photographed the defendant at the places mentioned in his confession. The police then say the picture was taken as the defendant pointed out to them what he did. Or the "something" may be the finding that a third party named in the confession does exist. Military courts do not require truly independent evidence.

Tel Aviv fared little better when trying to discredit the stories Palestinian torture victims told the *Sunday Times* investigators.

One of the most appalling accounts of torture discussed in the original article was the case of Omar Abdel-Karim, who was arrested in October 1976. Karim stated that for five months he had been beaten and subjected to prolonged electric shocks and sexual assaults. *Sunday Times* investigators were able to confirm much of his story.

Karim was released and deported to Jordan in February 1977. He did not recognize his family and was unable to walk. Although he was only thirty-five, a *Christian Science Monitor* reporter said that "he looked like an old man."

Israel's defense? Karim was ill before his arrest.

Insight: Not true. He was fit, happy and holding down a job as a carpenter. He did have old rib fractures, and occasional pains in his chest and back; for these he sometimes went as an out-patient to an orthopaedic hospital. By contrast, he left Israeli hands a stretcher case What happened to him? We challenge Israel to release the reports on Karim's condition made by the International Red Cross delegate Bernard Münger.

The Case of Ghassan Harb

The original article also told the story of Ghassan Harb, a well-known Palestinian intellectual, who was detained without trial or charge by Israeli authorities from April 1974 to January 1977. Harb was tortured in a secret interrogation center and the *Sunday Times* was able to verify

his account through similar accounts given by other Palestinians.

For seventeen days Harb was beaten, stripped, blindfolded, and periodically placed in a tiny torture cell he called "the cupboard." In the two-foot-square, five-foot-high box it was impossible to either sit down or stand straight.

But, Harb remembered, the most curious feature was the floor. It was concrete, and set into it at close but irregular intervals were stone spikes.

"They were sharp, and they had acute edges. . . . I could not normally stand on them. I could stand on them but with great difficulty and pain. I would lift one leg and put the other down, and then lift that one when it got tired and put the other down, and so on."

Israel: "The fact, for instance, that prisoners were at such-and-such a prison together and both describe it, is indeed evidence, but it is evidence of facts that are not in question."

At Opening Session of Cortes

Two LCR Leaders Arrested in Madrid

Jaime Pastor and Javier Maestro were arrested in Madrid July 22 as the newly elected Cortes (parliament) met for its first session.

Pastor and Maestro are both leaders of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR—Revolutionary Communist League). They had entered the area near the Cortes to demand legalization of the LCR and all other political parties that have been denied legal recognition.

According to a report in the July 23 issue of the Madrid daily *El País*, the two were arrested and taken to the Retiro police station after authorities saw them in a car containing two posters.

Pastor had headed the Madrid slate of candidates run by the Frente por la Unidad de los Trabajadores (FUT—Front for Workers Unity) in the June 15 elections. Maestro is a university professor. Their arrests provoked a storm of protest.

Following the closure of the Cortes session, several senators and deputies went to the Retiro police station to demand their release.

Among those forming the delegation were Francisco Letamendía of Euskadiko Esquerra (Basque Left); Enrique Múgica of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE—Spanish Socialist Workers Party, the main Social Democratic formation); Simón Sánchez Montero of the Partido Comunista de España (PCE—Spanish Communist Party); José María Bandrés, a senator from Guipúzcoa; and Marcelino Camacho, the central leader of the Workers Commissions.

Insight: This appears to admit a crucial part of our witnesses' testimony. The only time we compared descriptions in that way was in the case of the interrogation centre where Harb and his compatriots, among others, were taken. We did it because they were held separately, not "together," and it was not a "prison" but a secret interrogation camp. And the key point on which they all agreed was to assert the existence of a tiny cell—a "frigorifero"—with concrete spikes set into the floor. Israel thus appears to concede the point that prisoners were held in these conditions.

"This process of assertion and rebuttal could go on for a long time," the *Sunday Times* editors said. They therefore proposed to the Israeli government "a simple solution": Provide the International Red Cross with immediate access to all prisoners from the moment of their arrest, and turn over to an international inquiry the confidential reports on the condition of prisoners that the Red Cross has already filed with the Israeli government. □

An LCR statement quoted in *El País* protested "such an attack on freedom of expression and the outrageous actions taken against our party and other workers organizations that are still illegal."

Breytenbach Acquitted of 'Terrorism'

Breyten Breytenbach, one of South Africa's leading Afrikaans-language poets, was acquitted July 15 of charges of plotting "terrorist" activities from his prison cell. If convicted, he would have received a minimum five-year prison sentence under the draconian Terrorism Act. He is already serving a nine-year prison term as a result of his conviction in 1975 on charges of participating in anti-government actions.

In addition, Breytenbach was acquitted of charges that he had plotted to escape from jail and that he had urged his prison guard to go to the Soviet Union for guerrilla training.

The judge also dismissed the prosecution's allegation that Breytenbach was a member of an alleged underground group called Okhela. According to a report in the July 16 weekly edition of the *Johannesburg Star* the judge "found there was no evidence that Okhela—an organisation allegedly dedicated to the overthrow of the Government—existed in South Africa."

At the same time, however, Breytenbach was found guilty on the relatively minor charge of smuggling letters out of prison and was fined 50 rand (US\$57.50).

Menahem Begin OKs New West Bank Land Grab

By Steve Wattenmaker



BEGIN: Recovers quickly from public slap.

Three Israeli settlements built on occupied Arab territory were given official approval July 26 by Prime Minister Menahem Begin.

The three—Camp Kadum near the West Bank town of Nablus, Ofra near the town of Ramallah, and Maale Adumim situated between Jerusalem and Jericho—were settled under the previous Labor Party government, but had never been fully sanctioned as permanent communities.

The announcement came one day after Begin returned to Israel from a visit to the United States that included two days of talks with President Carter.

In Washington, administration officials feigned surprise at Begin's land grab. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance immediately issued a statement criticizing the Israeli decision as "contrary to international law and an obstacle to progress towards peace." President Carter said he shared Vance's "deep disappointment."

Political sources in Jerusalem suggested that Begin's move was not altogether unexpected at the White House.

Israeli officials, speaking privately, "asserted that the seeming clash . . . was in accordance with a scenario devised during Mr. Begin's visit to Washington," correspondent Moshe Brilliant reported in the July 28 *New York Times*.

Within a day, Carter's disappointment seemed to have washed out. Speaking at a July 28 news conference, the president

repeated that Begin's decision "increases the difficulty in ultimate peace." But, he added sympathetically, "I think it would not be proper to castigate him unnecessarily . . . because he's continuing policies that have been extant in Israel for a long time."

United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim expressed his disapproval of the Israeli decision in a statement released July 27.

Waldheim said he considered the move "most unfortunate" and feared that it "cannot but affect the current efforts to resume the negotiating process in the Middle East."

He also referred to a statement by U.N. Security Council President Jorge Illueca of Panama, in which Illueca rejected Israeli settlements on occupied territory as having "no legal validity."

Since the 1967 Middle East war, the Zionist regime has established some seventy settlements on occupied Arab land. Under pressure from ultranationalist Israelis, Begin's predecessor as prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, announced plans in May 1976 to intensify colonization of the West Bank. Several dozen new settlements were planned.

However, Rabin's Labor Party government stopped short of recognizing Camp Kadum and a handful of other settlements built without government sponsorship by right-wing Zionist groups such as Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful).

Concerned that Israeli settlements near the larger West Bank Arab towns might provoke Arab protests, Tel Aviv tried to discourage the "unauthorized" settlers from remaining in restricted sections of the West Bank.

Rather than evict them, however, Rabin characterized the defiant settlements as "temporary" and winked at their continued existence.

Two days after his May 17 election victory, Begin visited Camp Kadum to assure the residents that his Likud-bloc government would end any temporizing on the settlement issue.

"We stand on the land of liberated Israel, settled and made flowering by the wonderful pioneers and workers of the soil," Begin told 200 wildly cheering Kadum squatters.

There would be "many" such settlements in areas that had previously been off bounds for Zionist settlers, he added.

In line with the Likud's policy, Israeli

Minister of Building and Housing Gideon Patt began preparing a five-year plan for new settlements in occupied territory.

The Golan Heights would receive first preference, according to a July 11 Israeli radio report. In addition to the twenty settlements now on the Golan, the report said, development of four new communities is planned. Zionist housing units in the central Golan center of Kasrin would be increased from 350 to 1,200 to accommodate a population of 10,000 settlers.


Patt said there was room for a total of thirty settlements on the Golan Heights. "Under no circumstances will we leave the Golan Heights," he asserted.

The new Israeli cabinet was also considering a plan to establish eight new towns on the West Bank with a total of 38,000 housing units, according to a report in the July 3 Tel Aviv daily *Haaretz*.

The settlement of Kiryat Araba, near the Arab town of Hebron, would receive 2,000 new housing units, the newspaper said.

In addition, the Likud intended to locate new settlements "near densely populated Arab areas in whose vicinity the previous government usually refrained from establishing Israeli settlements," *Haaretz* reported.

Among the six towns that fell into this last category, *Haaretz* mentioned Ofra and Maale Adumim—two of the three settlements that Begin sanctioned July 28. □



New York Times

Huey Newton's Return to United States

Huey P. Newton, president and cofounder with Bobby Seale of the Black Panther Party, returned to the United States on July 3 after two and a half years in Cuba. He was greeted at San Francisco International Airport by a crowd of 500 supporters chanting, "Justice for Huey."

Newton fled the United States in 1974 after being charged with murder. At the airport rally, he told supporters: "I want everyone to know I have not killed anyone. I believe I will be acquitted although it will be difficult to get a fair trial."

Newton was taken to the Alameda County jail in Oakland, California, where he was held on \$100,000 bail. On July 19, bail was reduced to \$80,000, which the Black Panthers were able to raise, and on July 23 Newton was released from prison.

New York Times reporter Les Ledbetter conducted a ninety-minute prison interview with Newton on July 15.

Newton said that "changes in the political climate," including revelations of government spying on the Black Panther Party and frame-ups of its leaders, had induced him to return to the United States. "The people saw that the conspiracies we had talked about for 10 years were not paranoia," he said.

Describing the goals of the Black Panther Party today as "full employment first, and socialism based on the American experience at some distant time," Newton explained that "violent revolution" was not necessary to bring about a socialist society because "full employment will be a revolutionary accomplishment all by itself."

"It is not impossible for a form of socialism to be voted in peacefully in the United States at a later time," Newton said. But, he added, "Even under capitalism, full employment is possible."

Newton said that full employment in the United States could be achieved if "the multinationals and big companies would give up some of their profits and if some unions would give up wage demands where certain workers are paid so much more for their skills than others."

Discussing his stay in Cuba, Newton said that what had impressed him the most about Cuban society was "the full employment and the absence of racism there."

"They encouraged me to teach at the university," Mr. Newton continued, "but I wanted to work in the country to get a proletarian experience. I asked to work in the sugar fields, but they said they didn't think a North American could stand the heat and would only slow down the work schedule."

He said he was then assigned as truck

mechanic at a cement factory in Santa Clara Province and given a free, fully furnished apartment for himself, his wife, Gwen, and his two children, Jessica, 9, and Ronnie, 12. . . .

Discussing the New York City blackout, Mr. Newton said that, because of oil shortages, Cubans have blackouts every night, lasting from two to six hours, with "no looting, no police."

He added that the looting in New York "troubles me" and reinforced his belief that "the difference was unemployment in New York."

Cite White House 'Human Rights' Stand

GIs Petition Carter to Halt Aid to Seoul

Seventeen American GIs stationed in South Korea have petitioned President Carter to withdraw U.S. support from the South Korean regime of President Park Chung Hee.

The petition reads in part: "We believe that with the current administration's stand on human rights it is time for the American government and the American people to position themselves against the regime of President Park Chung Hee."

The signers of the 250-word statement are all enlisted men in the 2nd Infantry Division. The release of their petition corresponded to the July 24 visit by Pentagon chief Harold Brown to military units in South Korea.

Speaking to troops at Camp Pelham, Brown said: "It would be even more important that our ground-combat forces along with the other U.S. units here in Korea remain fully combat-ready . . . capable of helping to deter aggression by being able to fight effectively if necessary."

In the petition, the seventeen GIs dismiss as "basic military propaganda" the explanation that the U.S. military is in Korea to defend a democratic nation. They call upon President Carter to cease supporting a dictatorship "which is against our principles as Americans."

We are personally not prepared to fight, die, or support for another minute a narrow-minded government that:

- Under the guises of "anti-communism" and "democracy" allows its leader absolute power over his subjects.

- Legally and illegally jails, tortures, harasses, and when it can, executes on trumped-up charges of subversion, those who would seek constructive change of the Korean government and . . . basic freedom of speech, press, and expression that are the hallmarks of democracy.

While Newton said he doubted that Carter had the "moral platform" to make the "essential changes in this country," he spoke favorably of Oakland Mayor Lionel Wilson and of California Governor Edmund G. Brown, who he said was an improvement over former governor Ronald Reagan because of his appointments of women and Blacks to positions in the state government.

Newton blamed former Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver for the party's loss of influence in the Black community, saying that Cleaver's "rhetoric" had contributed to the deaths and imprisonment of "a lot of our most courageous younger brothers." □

One of the signers, Pfc. Edward Cracraft, explained to *Washington Post* correspondent John Saar what motivated their action.

"We believe the people putting their lives on the line for the political decisions have a right to take part in the decision-making," he said.

"I don't feel as an American that my tax dollars and my life should be on the line for a corrupt government which will not allow basic human rights."

Cracraft and two of the other GIs who signed the petition told Saar that their anger with the South Korean government mounted steadily over the last few months as they read about Seoul's multimillion dollar scheme to bribe members of the U.S. Congress. □

Fools Rush in . . .

Underwater explorer Jacques-Yves Cousteau says that the Mediterranean is so polluted he no longer swims in it, according to a report in the July 19 *Christian Science Monitor*.

"Today I don't swim [there] at all because I haven't the time to go 10 or 12 miles offshore to find clean water," he says.

Cousteau was speaking to reporters after the opening session of the United Nations Environment Program meeting in Monte Carlo, called to review the findings of seventy-six laboratories in fifteen countries that have been studying pollution in the Mediterranean.

The noted explorer pointed to an added problem: "The trouble is, even when you close a beach because it is dangerous, thousands of tourists insist on lying on the sands and swimming in the water."

Old Hooch in a New Bottle

By Ernest Harsch

The collapse of Portugal's African colonial empire, following the overthrow of the Salazarist dictatorship in Lisbon in April 1974, was an important catalyst to the Black freedom struggles, not only in the Portuguese colonies themselves, but throughout southern Africa.

The attainment of independence in Mozambique and Angola, the outbreak of the Angolan civil war, and the rapid growth of the liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa set off alarms in imperialist capitals around the world, especially in Washington. As they saw it, the conflicts in southern Africa were mounting at a dangerous pace and threatened to escape their control. Major imperialist interests in the region, including billions of dollars in investments, were at stake.

Beginning with the direct American involvement in the Angolan civil war in 1975, Washington decided to greatly increase its intervention in southern Africa. Henry Kissinger's visit to several African countries in April and May 1976 was a sign of the importance the Ford administration attached to political developments there. Within four months of Jimmy Carter's inauguration in January 1977, the American representative to the United Nations, Andrew Young, was sent to Africa twice.

While there are some significant differences in style and approach between the southern Africa policies of the Ford and Carter administrations, the basic aims remain the same: to contain and derail the Black liberation struggles and to maintain imperialist economic domination.

Carter's Smokescreen

Shortly after assuming office, Carter initiated a major review of Washington's policy toward southern Africa. Its purpose was to lay the basis for stepped-up American intervention and to modify those aspects of the previous administration's approach that had proven ineffective.

In line with the standard practices of American secret diplomacy, no details of this review, which has been codified in a Policy Review Memorandum, have yet been publicly revealed. But the essential points of Carter's "new" policy have emerged through the pronouncements of various government officials.

The most complete exposition of the White House's official policy so far was presented by Secretary of State Cyrus R.

Vance in a speech before a convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) July 1.

Like other American officials, Vance tried to portray Washington as a champion of the Black freedom struggle and an opponent of the repressive and racist regimes. "We will be firm in our support of individual human rights. Our concern is not limited to any one region of the continent," he said.

"Abuse of human rights is wrong on any grounds. It is particularly offensive when it is on the basis of race."

He then went on to outline U.S. objectives in the three main "hot spots" of southern Africa.

In Zimbabwe, which is ruled by the racist Rhodesian regime, he said that Washington was working toward a negotiated settlement "that would allow free elections, open to all parties and in which all of voting age could participate equally." The proposed elections would aim at establishing an independent Zimbabwean government, possibly during 1978.

In Namibia, which is ruled as a de facto colony by the white-supremacist regime in South Africa, Vance also stressed the need for a negotiated settlement that would allow "free elections" with United Nations involvement, the freeing of political prisoners, the repealing of discriminatory measures, and "the withdrawal of instruments of South African authority."

In South Africa, the main bastion of racist rule, Vance was more vague, calling for "a progressive transformation of South African society" that would open the way for "full political participation by all South Africans."

Vance pointed out that the ferment in these countries endangered "our own national interests." He also noted, "The success or failure of the search for racial justice and peace in southern Africa will have profound effects among the American people."

Toward Zimbabwe and Namibia, the official position put forward by Vance is almost the same as the one first advanced by Kissinger in 1976. But unlike the Carter administration, with its "new" policy, Kissinger studiously avoided raising even rhetorical calls for majority rule in South Africa itself. Kissinger, moreover, publicly linked South African assistance in dampening the Zimbabwe and Namibia conflicts with the possibility of closer American ties to the apartheid regime.

These diplomatic overtures to the Vors-

ter regime in Pretoria, as well as the American collaboration with the South African military intervention in Angola, made it politically difficult for the Black regimes and the liberation movements to publicly associate themselves with Kissinger's proposals. As the editors of the *New York Times* pointed out May 17, "Mr. Kissinger thus lacked credibility where it counted most, and the policy faltered."

Accordingly, Carter has sought to polish up Washington's political image among Blacks in Africa—as well as in the United States—in hopes of gaining a better position from which to sidetrack the Black freedom struggles.

The main job of lending some credibility to the White House's policy toward southern Africa has been given to Andrew Young. Using his credentials as a former civil-rights activist and as the first Black U.S. representative to the UN, Young has conducted an intensive effort to curry influence with Black regimes and liberation organizations. His condemnations of the Vorster regime as "morally illegitimate" and "unrepresentative" have been designed to capture headlines and enhance his prestige.

As part of this public relations campaign, Carter, Young, and Vance have also downplayed American denunciations of the Cuban and Soviet involvement in Africa.

The recent pronouncements by White House officials have betrayed an acute concern over the deep opposition of the American population—especially Blacks—to any new military adventures like the war against Vietnam or the intervention in Angola.

On March 7, Young discounted the possibility of sending American troops to aid the South African regime in the event of a war with neighboring states. "You'd have civil war at home," he said. "Maybe I ought not to say that, but I really believe it. An armed forces that is 30 per cent black isn't going to fight on the side of the South Africans." A month earlier, he said that the White House "will not fall into any trap involving U.S. troops in southern Africa."

In discussing Washington's inability to send troops to Zimbabwe, Young has stated, "In a sense, I regret that, because the transition period is critical, and no one has any confidence in the British."

By fostering illusions in Carter's policy toward southern Africa, as well as toward Blacks in the United States, Young is aiming to defuse this antiwar sentiment in order to give the White House a freer hand in implementing its imperialist designs. He has achieved some initial success. The Black American press has been generally uncritical of Carter's policies in southern Africa. And when Vance mentioned Young's name at the NAACP convention, the audience cheered.

The White House campaign has scored

some gains in Africa itself. Diplomatic ties have been restored with the People's Republic of the Congo; American relations with the regimes in Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique have improved.

Nigerian representative to the UN Leslie Harriman, who has been prominent in the UN debates on southern Africa, has declared, "We have great hopes in the Carter administration. If it were left to the U.S. there would be considerable forward movement in all these fields. The constraint comes from American allies in Europe which are linked with South Africa."

While still expressing some reservations about U.S. policy, Robert Mugabe, one of the main Zimbabwean nationalist leaders, said of Young May 15, "His utterances are very good." Percy Qoboza, the editor of the Johannesburg *World*, the largest circulation Black newspaper in South Africa, called Young "a refreshing tonic."

Some Old-Style Neocolonialism

Behind this rhetorical smokescreen, the Carter administration is preparing for a major escalation of American imperialist intervention in Africa.

Because of the political limitations on its ability to use military force, or even the threat of force, the White House has been compelled to adopt subtler and more sophisticated methods of advancing its aims. High on this list is a greater use of American imperialism's substantial economic weight, particularly in its efforts to impose neocolonial "solutions" in Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Signs that Washington was moving toward a more explicit reliance on economic pressures were already evident in the last days of the Ford administration. In early October 1976, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William Rogers met with the heads of some twenty American corporations and banks to encourage greater American investments in Zimbabwe during the projected "transition period" to majority rule.

Robert Manning reported in the January issue of the London monthly *New African Development*, "At that time in October, a steering committee of corporate executives was set up to continue meeting with the US State Department to closely co-ordinate activities. Mr. E.F. Andrews, Vice-President of Allegheny Ludlum Industries, who was appointed to head the steering committee, explained the task: 'The question is what can the private sector do with an eye to keeping Rhodesia and other African nations in the Western sphere?'"

On March 15 a 338-page study on Namibia and Zimbabwe was submitted to the U.S. Agency for International Development by the African-American Scholars Council. It had been commissioned by AID nine months earlier and was originally scheduled to have been completed by

January 15 for immediate consideration by the new Carter administration.

According to the report, Washington could play "an instrumental role in facilitating the financial underpinning of an African government during the immediate period following independence if a crisis resulted in lack of working capital or foreign exchange."

In neither Zimbabwe nor Namibia, the report stated, would "traditional external assistance" be appropriate. "Instead," David B. Ottaway reported in the April 17 *Washington Post*, "the council concludes that general American policies as they affect international trade, investment and in particular the operations of the multinational corporations in Southern Africa will be far more important in helping a newly independent Zimbabwe and Namibia."

Young, in particular, has been unusually forthright in spelling out Washington's neocolonialist objectives. "My work is to compete with those who advocate armed struggle . . .," he has said. On April 11 he elaborated, "When the fighting stops and the trading starts, we will win. . . . Those nations with rich resources are going to have a wide door open to the West."

In an interview in the March issue of the London monthly *Africa*, Young asserted that "Africa has got to sell its resources to the West. It's got to turn to the West for capital to develop those resources, which means that governments that emerge in southern Africa are going to be, essentially, mixed economies with strong ties to the West regardless of what their ties to the Communist bloc are."

Before being appointed American representative to the UN, Young was even more candid about what he saw as the Carter administration's likely policy. At a news conference in Chicago on November 17, 1976, shortly after Carter won the elections, Young was asked what options Washington had in southern Africa. Young replied:

I don't think the United States has but one option and that's neo-colonialism.

As bad as that has been made to sound, neocolonialism means that the multinational corporations will continue to have major influence in the development and productive capacities of the third world. And they are, whether we like it or not. I don't think any American administration—and I don't think any African administration—has yet been able to escape from that.

. . . the problems of Africa directly relate to the fact that their wealth is mineral wealth and nobody has the technology to extract that wealth other than the multinational corporations. And even a so-called leftist government like Angola has from the beginning, including in its revolutionary days, been closer to Gulf Oil Company than they have been able to get to the State Department.

Speaking before a gathering of 200 South African businessmen in Johannesburg May 21, Young dusted off the same spurious rationale that has been employed

by foreign investors for decades. "My argument," he told the delighted South African capitalists, "boils down to my conviction that the free market system can be the greatest force for constructive change now operating anywhere in the world."

The Zaïre Example

Another consequence of Washington's difficulties in sending troops to Africa in a crisis situation has been a greater American reliance on collaboration with the imperialist powers in Europe, as well as with the pro-American regimes on the African continent itself. This was most clearly underscored by Carter's response to the outbreak of fighting in Zaïre in March.

According to Zaïrean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, antigovernment Katangan troops entered the mineral-rich province of Shaba (formerly Katanga) March 8 from bases in northern Angola. Facing little resistance from Zaïrean troops, the Katangan rebels quickly took a series of towns, including the Zaïrean military headquarters at Mutshasha, and appeared to be threatening Kolwezi, an important mining center.

Whatever the actual aims of the Katangans, the White House feared that their military actions could bolster antigovernment resistance in other parts of the country and possibly lead to the downfall of the Mobutu regime, which has been a longtime American ally. The American imperialists also feared the renewal of mass unrest similar to that which shook Zaïre—then known as the Congo—in the 1960s.

Carter reacted quickly. On March 15 he approved the shipment of \$2 million worth of supposedly "nonlethal" military aid to help prop up Mobutu. Less than a month later he sent another \$13 million in supplies. This action raised the danger of yet greater American military intervention in Zaïre and began to rouse opposition among the American population.

Anticipating this antiwar sentiment, Carter moved cautiously, stressing the limited amount of aid to Mobutu and its "nonlethal" nature. He also declared that no American troops or technicians would be sent to Zaïre.

At the same time, however, the White House took action through some of Africa's former colonial masters, particularly the French government, which provided French pilots and planes to airlift 1,500 Moroccan troops into Zaïre to assist Mobutu's forces. French military advisers were also sent.

French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing revealed April 12 that the French airlift of Moroccan troops had been under consideration as early as April 2, when he met with Vance to discuss the situation in Africa. He denied, however, that the airlift came up in the talks.

In addition to the American, French, and Moroccan intervention, the Belgian regime sent light weapons to Mobutu, and Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat provided about fifty Egyptian pilots. Thanks to this foreign assistance, Mobutu's forces were able to drive the Katangans back. The last rebel-held town was recaptured in late May.

Although the State Department denied at the time that it was coordinating its intervention in Zaïre with its European and African allies, Vance later admitted as much. Referring to the conflict in Zaïre, he said in his July 1 speech before the NAACP convention, "We prefer to work with African nations—and with our European allies—in positive efforts to resolve such disputes."

The Carter administration is also collaborating more closely with other imperialist powers on the diplomatic plane. A joint British and American Consultative Group has been established to work toward a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe. In relation to the conflict in Namibia, a similar body, known as the Contact Group, has also been set up. It is composed of American, British, French, West German, and Canadian representatives.

Zimbabwe—Preventing 'Radical Solutions'

It is the rapidly escalating conflict in Zimbabwe that most immediately threatens imperialist interests in southern Africa.

More than six million Zimbabweans are ruled by a white minority regime headed by Prime Minister Ian Smith. The white settlers, numbering only about 250,000, own most of the fertile land in the country, and, together with American, British, and South African companies, virtually all mining and manufacturing concerns.

Of the remaining white regimes in southern Africa, Smith's is the weakest. The white population, already outnumbered by Blacks by more than twenty to one, continues to dwindle as more and more whites leave the country. The Rhodesian regime, moreover, has not been formally recognized by any government in the world since Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain in 1965. Most importantly, the struggle for Black majority rule has mounted sharply since early 1976.

Rhodesian military officials admitted that there were 2,500 Zimbabwean guerrillas operating within the country as of April. Thousands more are undergoing training in camps in Mozambique and Zambia.

The freedom fighters have wide support among the Zimbabwean population. Selwyn Spray, an American missionary who was expelled by the Rhodesian regime, said June 22 that in nearly three years in a district of about 200,000 Africans near the Mozambique border, "I never found anybody who spoke against the guerrillas."

The main groups leading the guerrilla struggle are the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African Peo-



CARTER: Tries on sheep's clothing.

ple's Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo, which are allied within the Patriotic Front. Another group, Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC), has demonstrated its mass support by repeatedly mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Blacks in rallies near Salisbury.

Smith has responded to the broad sentiment for Black majority rule by launching a terror campaign against the Black population as a whole. Several hundred thousand Africans in rural areas have been herded into so-called "protected villages," which are little more than modified concentration camps. Villagers found outside of them during the 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew period are frequently shot on sight. Amnesty International has reported that the Rhodesian forces widely employ torture against Black civilians.

The Smith regime has also struck out at those African countries that have provided aid and sanctuary to the Zimbabwean freedom fighters. On several occasions since late 1976, Rhodesian troops have conducted major military campaigns across the border into Mozambique, killing hundreds of Zimbabwean refugees and Mozambican civilians. A number of incursions have been reported into Botswana and Salisbury has warned that it would also carry out "hot pursuit" operations in Zambia.

Although the struggle against the white-supremacist regime has been limited so far

to a moderate-level guerrilla campaign in the countryside, the imperialists fear that Smith's continued intransigence could provoke more massive resistance, possibly involving Black urban uprisings similar to those that have shaken South Africa. A mass Zimbabwean upsurge could inspire Blacks throughout southern Africa.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vance expressed concern over the escalation of the Zimbabwean struggle. "The Rhodesia situation," he said, "is of great urgency . . . for the extent of armed struggle is broadest and the threat of escalation most immediate. . . . If the Rhodesian authorities . . . persist in the inevitable outcome will be a bitter legacy for the future. . . ." (Quoted in the May issue of *Southern Africa* magazine.)

Vice-President Walter Mondale underscored one of the Carter administration's chief considerations when he said April 28 that negotiated settlements in Zimbabwe and Namibia were essential in order to reduce the risk of "civil war" in South Africa itself.

The British imperialists share these concerns. Speaking before a NATO foreign ministers conference in December 1976, British Foreign Secretary Antony Crosland declared that "if the issue were settled on the battlefield it would seriously lessen the chance of bringing about a moderate African regime in Rhodesia and would open the way for more radical solutions. . . ."

Precisely to prevent the development of "more radical solutions," Washington and London have joined hands to try to steer the conflict toward the negotiating table where it can be more easily controlled. Their overall aim is to remove the Smith regime with the least amount of unrest and replace it with a Black neocolonial regime both willing and able to protect imperialist interests.

The obstacles they face are the intransigence of the white settlers, who would lose many of their privileges under even a "moderate" African regime, and the persistence of the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders, who are under considerable pressure from their supporters not to compromise on the basic issue of Black majority rule. The history of British attempts to arbitrate a negotiated settlement is strewn with numerous failures.

Following the breakdown of the most recent round of talks in Geneva in December 1976, the Carter administration decided to openly throw Washington's political weight behind the negotiation efforts.

The White House's first move was to push through Congress the repeal of the so-called Byrd Amendment, which had allowed the American importation of Rhodesian chrome in violation of United Nations economic sanctions against the

racist regime. The move was designed to put some pressure on Smith to come to terms. The White House has also indicated that it has urged the Vorster regime in South Africa, which provides economic aid to Smith, to reduce its assistance.

In contrast to the earlier British attempts to convene a major constitutional conference, the new Anglo-American campaign is relying more on secret diplomacy. The May 7 *New York Times* reported that Vance and British Foreign Secretary David Owen "considered it crucial to keep things flexible, avoid confrontations and operate as much as possible behind the scenes."

An indication of the kind of schemes the imperialists are considering was revealed in the June 29 *Christian Science Monitor*. According to correspondent Takashi Oka, Vance and Owen had worked out a tentative three-point plan that included a constitution embodying the Black nationalist demand for universal suffrage, a "development fund" for an independent Zimbabwe, and the employment of a British Commonwealth "peace-keeping force" composed of both Black and white troops. Washington would provide money and supplies for such a force.

Reflecting the difficulties the imperialists face in selling their proposals was Smith's public rejection July 18 of Anglo-American calls for a new constitution that would provide for universal suffrage. Smith announced general elections for the predominantly white electorate to set the basis for his own "internal solution," in which he would attempt to draw a few token Blacks into the government. Owen denounced the move the next day and stated that the joint British and American negotiation efforts would continue.

Central to the neocolonialist schemes for Zimbabwe are the roles of the "front-line" states, the regimes in Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, and Angola. Like the imperialist powers, these Black-ruled capitalist states fear the impact a Zimbabwean upsurge could have on their own tenuous positions. They have used their influence over the Zimbabwean nationalist groups to try to limit the struggle to a carefully controlled guerrilla campaign, while at the same time using it to apply pressure on Smith to step down.

The "front-line" states have also helped heighten the rivalries among the various Zimbabwean nationalist organizations by throwing their political and military support behind only one grouping, the Patriotic Front composed of ZAPU and ZANU, to the exclusion of the groups led by Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole. This gives the imperialists an opportunity to play the groups off against each other and weaken the Zimbabwean freedom struggle as a whole.

In a television interview in New York June 9, Young said that it was urgent for contingency plans to be made that would

provide a strong role for the "front-line" states. According to a report in the *New York Times*, "Mr. Young said that the countries adjacent to Rhodesia would have to assume responsibility for such matters as the dismantling of the guerrilla army that has been fighting the Smith Government."

To encourage these African regimes to go along with Washington's plans, the House of Representatives voted May 24 to provide \$100 million in aid to Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania, and to Angola if diplomatic relations are established with that country. Although nothing has yet been allocated, the White House has also raised the concept of establishing a Zimbabwe Development Fund to entice the Zimbabwean nationalist groups, as well as the white settlers, to make some compromises.

The recent Anglo-American diplomatic maneuvers have met with a mixed response from the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders themselves, at least publicly. Abel Muzorewa was willing to meet with Vance in Washington and Ndabaningi Sithole, who disputes Robert Mugabe's leadership of ZANU, has already expressed his willingness to participate in a new round of negotiations. Both Mugabe and Joshua Nkoma have rejected any direct U.S. role, but they have raised no objections to the involvement of the British imperialists in negotiations or even in the setting up of a Black regime.

As in similar situations elsewhere, the Carter administration undoubtedly has a number of contingency plans ready in case its diplomatic efforts fall through and Smith is overthrown. John F. Burns commented in the April 13 *New York Times*, "If the most militant of the nationalist groups, or some faction within it, is eventually going to take power in Salisbury, the practical thing for Britain and the United States to do—if not necessarily the most honorable—is to keep their lines to its leaders open."

Demise of the Turnhalle Scheme

In many respects, the situation in Namibia is similar to that in Zimbabwe. The estimated one million African inhabitants of Namibia are relegated to the poorest areas, while whites own most of the mineral-rich regions in the southern two-thirds of the country. As in Zimbabwe, there is a local white-settler community, numbering nearly 100,000. Direct control, however, is exercised by the South African regime in Pretoria, which has ruled Namibia as a direct colony since the end of World War I.

The main Namibian nationalist group is the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), which has carried out guerrilla actions against the South African occupation forces since the 1960s and which commands wide support among the

Namibian population. The Namibian working class has also shown its strength; in 1971 about 20,000 migrant workers launched a general strike to protest against the racist contract labor system imposed by the South African authorities.

In its war against the Namibian nationalist forces, Pretoria has sent an estimated 50,000 South African troops to the "operational area" in northern Namibia, along the Angolan border. The three northern areas of Ovamboland, Okavangoland, and Eastern Caprivi have been placed under virtual martial law. Namibian civilians are routinely tortured by South African troops.

In its own attempts at a neocolonialist settlement in Namibia, Pretoria initiated a series of talks between white officials and African tribal chiefs in Windhoek in 1975. Known as the Turnhalle talks, they were aimed at setting up a formally independent regime acceptable to the South African racists. In August 1976 the participants announced plans for a "multiracial" government that was to pave the way for "independence" by the end of 1978. The proposal provided for the safeguarding of the near total economic domination of the white settlers and the foreign mining interests.

Pretoria's imperialist allies calculated, however, that SWAPO would continue its resistance against any South African imposed regime. Consequently, they sought to persuade the South Africans to adopt a new formula that would include SWAPO and would thus have a chance of ending the war.

The five Western members of the UN Security Council—the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada—sent representatives to meet with Vorster in April to urge him to scrap the Turnhalle plan. Carter warned May 17 that Washington and the other four powers would take "strong action" if Pretoria did not act to end its direct rule over Namibia.

At the same time, Pretoria's allies sought to head off calls in the UN for economic sanctions against the South African regime. (The UN has ruled that South African control of Namibia is illegal.)

After a meeting with the representatives of the Western "Contact Group" in Cape Town May 10, Vorster reportedly agreed to most of their demands. These included the scrapping of the Turnhalle plan, the holding of elections to a constituent assembly under UN supervision, the repealing of some apartheid laws, and the release of some Namibian political prisoners. Pretoria indicated that it would appoint an administrator general in the interim. It did not agree, however, to withdraw the South African troops beforehand.

Although this agreement included some significant concessions, it was not suffi-

cient to derail the struggle for Black majority rule. On June 28 SWAPO issued a statement declaring that it would not participate in any elections while South African troops still controlled the country.

SWAPO stated that "it is necessary to create an atmosphere conducive to the holding of free elections, to enable the Namibian people to freely determine their own future. To do this it is necessary to remove the causes of war and insecurity in Namibia; *this can only be achieved through the complete withdrawal of the South African army of occupation.*" (Emphasis in original.)

Explaining the inadequacy of the provision for UN supervision of elections, SWAPO Information Secretary Peter Katjavivi said in an article in the July issue of *New African Development*, "It is impossible for one UN representative or a host of international jurists to oversee the activities of 50,000 troops, let alone the police and BOSS [Bureau of State Security, the South African secret police]. The world knows from past experience how South Africa has been able to intimidate voters in past 'Bantustan' elections, and through its control of the state apparatus, to determine election results." Katjavivi called instead for UN control of the elections, rather than just supervision.

While holding out for a more favorable settlement, SWAPO has signaled its willingness to cooperate with the foreign companies now exploiting Namibia's fabulous mineral wealth. "Of course we will accept foreign investments," SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma was quoted as saying in the February 14 *Business Week*.

Reassuring Vorster

The occasionally sharp criticisms of the South African regime emanating from the White House are a significant departure from Kissinger's purely *pro forma* objections to apartheid. The American denunciations are undoubtedly embarrassing to Pretoria, but they are still relatively restrained and extremely vague. The White House has issued no specific calls, for instance, demanding the freeing of South African political prisoners.

Shortly before his meeting with Vorster in Vienna May 19, Mondale sought to reassure the South Africans by stating that there would be no confrontation at the talks. He also said that he preferred to speak of "full participation" by Blacks in the South African administration, rather than call for "black majority rule."

After some statements by South African Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha suggesting that Pretoria feared Washington was calling for a universal franchise for Blacks, the State Department declared June 22, "It would be a misinterpretation of our policy to suggest that we are demanding the immediate implementation

of any kind of policy. We have not demanded one man, one vote tomorrow."

And after Vance's speech before the NAACP, in which he again used the vague call for "the establishment of a new course toward full political participation by all South Africans," the South African Foreign Ministry reacted by calling the speech "encouraging."

During his visit to South Africa in May, Young counseled Blacks to employ moderate forms of struggle, such as pressing for reforms by carrying out economic boycotts of white businesses. He also sought to bolster the political position of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the South African-appointed head of the Kwazulu Bantustan, who has urged Blacks to "work within the system."

Young at the same time encouraged South African businessmen to make a few economic concessions to "four or five million" Africans—that is, only about one quarter of the country's impoverished African majority—so as to dampen political unrest. He assured a gathering of 200 businessmen that "when goods are shared with those at the bottom of the system, it doesn't mean they have to be taken away from those at the top."

An editorial in the South African *Rand Daily Mail* commented on Young's visit, "When he arrived Mr Young was an ogre in White South African eyes. But in the flesh he became something very different. Businessmen who went to hear a man who had been billed as a wild radical found instead a moderate who took their breath away." The editorial continued, "They discovered that Mr Young actually spoke their own language—in terms of the free enterprise system to which he is totally committed." (Quoted in the May 24 *London Daily Telegraph*.)

The White House has, however, considered taking some active steps to pressure Pretoria into modifying its racist policies, so as to better protect white supremacy in the long run. The possible measures include the withdrawal of the American military attaché from South Africa, the tightening of visa requirements for South Africans seeking to visit the United States, an end to nuclear cooperation, the severing of links between American and South African spy agencies, and the abolition of tax credits for American companies investing there.

None of these steps would seriously reduce American collaboration with the apartheid regime. The end to nuclear cooperation would be at most symbolic, since the South Africans have already launched their own nuclear industry, thanks to considerable American assistance over the years. Pretoria has a sophisticated spy network of its own, the Bureau of State Security, which can probably get all the information it needs without its CIA connection. And given the

extremely low wages paid to Black workers in South Africa, American companies will still find it profitable to invest there without the present U.S. government tax credits.

If actually implemented, the Carter administration is sure to use such measures as part of its smokescreen aimed at hiding American imperialism's real ties with South African racism.

Those ties include some \$1.6 billion in direct investments and another \$2 billion in loans to South African companies and the Vorster regime. Washington does not supply arms to Pretoria directly, but has approved the sale of millions of dollars worth of "dual purpose" equipment, such as aircraft and computers, that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. There are also indirect American military links to Pretoria through other NATO countries.

The American economic interests in South Africa are significant in their own right, but Washington also considers the country to be strategically important. South Africa overlooks the vital sea route around the Cape of Good Hope, past which much of the world's trade is shipped. As the only imperialist power on the African continent, Pretoria has the economic and military strength to advance its own interests and those of its Western allies well beyond its borders and to serve as a powerful bulwark against the African revolution. As Carter noted in April, Pretoria "is a stabilizing influence in the southern part of that continent."

While the American imperialists would prefer to see some changes in Pretoria's apartheid policies, they are still committed to preserving white supremacy itself. Unlike Zimbabwe and Namibia, there is a powerful Black working class in South Africa, numbering more than seven million. Given the close interconnection between class and national oppression in South Africa, a successful Black freedom struggle would directly threaten capitalist property relations. A socialist revolution in South Africa, moreover, would have a profound impact throughout the African continent, inspiring Blacks in other countries to throw off their own imperialist exploiters.

The Carter administration's "new" policy toward southern Africa is thus similar, in its essentials, to those of previous administrations. The demagogic declarations of Young, Carter, Vance, and Mondale are designed to cover a stepped-up American offensive against the Black liberation movements and continued U.S. collaboration with the apartheid regime.

However, the continued Black mobilizations in South Africa and the sharpening conflicts in Zimbabwe and Namibia show that the White House will face considerable difficulties in implementing its designs and in halting the Black freedom struggle.

The Winners Confront the Victors

By Miguel Romero

[The following article appeared in the July 21 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

"Suárez Won, But González Is the Victor." This headline, which appeared in a Madrid magazine, is a good summary of the results of the Spanish elections of June 15. Indeed, the election results were just as contradictory as the political process we have been experiencing during the past eighteen months and will surely continue to experience in the immediate future.

This article is aimed at analyzing the election results, which is necessary in order to proceed to another, even more crucial task: drawing the political balance sheet of the evolution of the Spanish situation since the death of the dictator and, on that basis, newly defining the tasks of the Trotskyists in the Spanish revolution. What follows is only an initial contribution to accomplishing that task.

The Results

Looking at the results presented in the three tables, we can deduce a series of important conclusions:

1. The workers candidates obtained 44% of the vote (and 41% of the seats in the Congress, the lower house of the Cortes), compared with 34% of the vote (and 47% of the seats) for the major bourgeois coalition, the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD). The candidates of the workers parties won the absolute majority of the seats in Madrid, Barcelona, Andalusia, and Valencia, and came close to a majority in Catalonia (23 seats out of 48).

These results were obtained despite a number of adverse factors: People between 18 and 21 years old (about 2 million people) could not vote, nor could the emigrant workers in other European countries (about 800,000); the legal status of the workers parties was precarious (the PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers Party, the largest Social Democratic formation, had been legal for only slightly more than three months; the Communist Party, PCE, had been legal for only two months, and the trade-union federations for one month, while the organizations of the "far left" remained illegal); there was deep division among the workers parties (an average of six or seven lists in each province). Above all, the workers parties that command the allegiance of the majority of the class

presented no clear and firm alternative of power.

Given these conditions, it is easily understandable that most of the toilers greeted the election results as a "victory." At the same time, however, the limits of this "victory" must be understood, both the *objective limits*, even on the purely electoral level (since the "winner" of the elections was Suárez, who is only 12 seats short of an absolute majority in Congress and holds an absolute majority in the Senate), and the *subjective limits*, since the toilers have not understood their victory as representing a possibility for an *immediate, radical change* in the situation. Instead they have understood it in terms of "resistance"; they feel that they prevented the victory of the enemy and have created good conditions for coming battles. We believe that the rather precipitous conclusions about the "workers electoral victory" must be tempered by these observations.

2. Undoubtedly the most spectacular result of the elections was the breakthrough of the PSOE. The final figures will probably give it 30% of the vote, which means about 5.5 million people. The PSOE got the majority of the vote in eleven provinces out of fifty-two: Asturias, Barcelona, Gerona, Valencia, Alicante, Murcia, Jaén, Córdoba, Seville, Málaga, and Cádiz. It is the majority party in Euskadi, Catalonia, Andalusia, and Valencia. It got three times as many votes as the PCE and established itself as the leading workers party in the electoral domain. (Moreover, it is probable that the PSOE will absorb the Popular Socialist Party, PSP, before too long; because of its modest vote, the latter party will have less chance of playing an independent political role or of negotiating its incorporation into the PSOE from a position of strength.)

To analyze the causes and consequences of the PSOE results, which point to a radical shift in the traditional relationship of forces in the Spanish workers movement under Francoism, is a task of great importance. We are not yet in a position to broach it in any depth. As a first approximation, however, we may posit the following conclusions:

• Fundamentally, "voting PSOE" represented the will to "break with Francoism," to achieve "non-truncated democracy." The PSOE was able to lend itself an image capable of capturing these two aspirations of the toilers and the Spanish people and to appear as the *effective* alternative to Suárez.

• The very conception of the election campaign and its development allow the previous conclusion to be made more precise: The PSOE conducted its campaign not with a government program but with a blend of banalities and generalities aimed at "selling an image" (advertising language was more appropriate for this than political language). In the entire twenty-six pages of its program there is only one reference to the problem of government ("We want a government responsible to the Cortes. . ."). During the first phase of its campaign the PSOE assiduously avoided presenting itself as a candidate for power, but it exercised equal care *not to appear* as though it was openly capitulating to the regime, and it systematically criticized Suárez, even making some vague references to "republicanism." It was only during the second phase of the campaign that the PSOE began responding demagogically to the perceptible radicalization of the people attending its election meetings and put itself forward as "a party prepared to govern."

• In this manner the PSOE garnered the vote of a very broad spectrum of "aspiration for change," including significant sectors of the left disappointed by the PCE's attitude of capitulation. *But very probably the greater part of its vote came from workers entering political activity for the first time, for whom the image of the PSOE was more "effective" and "democratic" but also less "radical" than that of the PCE* (among other reasons because everyone noted the grave political crisis posed by the legalization of the PCE, compared to the "normality" with which legalization of the PSOE was accepted).

• Although the PSOE emerges from the electoral test strengthened for the immediate future, it is obvious that in the medium term powerful contradictions will build up within the PSOE, both because of the diverse political opinions that coexist within it *and because of the progressive radicalization of the workers who have just been awakened to politics and have placed their confidence and hopes in the Socialists*. This phenomenon will also arise, even more strongly, within the UGT, the PSOE-dominated trade-union organization.

• The leadership of the PSOE is conscious of this problem. Its refusal to enter the Suárez government (in spite of the "clever" Carrillo's calls for this) and its assertion of an "alternative of socialist power . . . within two years" are aimed at assuring its political hegemony among the workers while avoiding immediate government compromises and promising to assume these compromises in a sufficiently far-off future. At the same time, a campaign of internal "homogenization" is now under way, which is intended to eliminate the most conflict-generating aspects of the party's policy (like "republicanism"), and the proposal of radical rank-and-file sec-

Results in the Spanish Elections

Division of Seats in Congress

Party	% of Seats	Number of Seats
PSOE	33.71	118
PCE	5.71	19
PSP	1.71	6
UCD	47.42	166
AP	4.57	16
PNV	2.28	8
PDC*	2.85	11

* The PDC (Democratic Pact of Catalonia), a "center" bourgeois nationalist electoral coalition, suffered a split of one of its wings, which formed the PSC, a right-wing Social Democratic group that took 4 of the 11 deputies originally attributed to the PDC.

The 10 remaining deputies are divided as follows: Christian Democracy of Catalonia (2), Independents (close to UCD) (2), PSC (4) Euskadiko Eskerra (1), Esquerra de Catalunya (1).

Overall Results

Party	Number of Votes	% of Vote
UCD	6,142,460	33.86
PSOE	5,211,038	28.73
PCE	1,673,765	9.22
AP	1,480,657	8.16
PSP	783,593	4.32

The results achieved by the far-left slates were as follows: PTE (including Esquerra Catala): 265,584 votes in forty provinces, ORT: 44,959 votes in twenty-five provinces, FUT (LCR-OIC): 38,052 votes in eighteen provinces, MC: 41,872 votes in five provinces.

Division of Seats in Senate

Nominated by the king: 41
AP: 2
UCD: 105
Center Democrats: 11
PDC: 2
FDC (Christian Democracy): 5
PNV: 4
PSOE: 47
PCE: 3
Euskadiko Eskerra: 1

tors that a discussion for a party congress be opened has been rejected.

• For its part, the bourgeoisie is also conscious of the problem. As soon as the election results were known, very significant sectors of the bourgeois press launched a campaign warning the PSOE leadership against "ultraleftist dangers," "largocaballerismo,"* etc. and clearly registering bourgeois uneasiness about the PSOE's results, as well as a certain lack of confidence in its ability to play the sort of stabilizing role the bourgeoisie needs. These pressures, along with those of the international Social Democracy (of which the PSOE ceaselessly proclaims itself the "legitimate Spanish representative"), will not diminish but on the contrary will tend to intensify. It is quite probable that the PSOE will be called upon to participate in the government well before the "two-year" interval the leadership wants. That is when the real "test of fire" for the Social Democratic leadership will begin.

3. The electoral score of the PCE was spectacular in the opposite sense. Apart from Catalonia (where the PSUC, the Communist Party there, achieved good results), the PCE will have only 12 deputies throughout the country, divided among only eight provinces; there are no PCE deputies from Euskadi or Galicia. The entire PCE rank and file recognized the

defeat, and the leadership had difficulty covering it up (claiming, for example, that "the Communist vote represents a mass vanguard" or that "had it pursued a different policy, the PCE could have emerged from these elections at the same level as the PTE, the ORT, and other groups which have come out of the test in a clearly marginal situation").

The reality is that the PCE, which reasonably could have expected 15% of the vote, got only 9%, clearly out of proportion to its complete hegemony in the Spanish workers movement under Francoism. Even taking account of the real influence of the desire to "make your vote count" by casting it for the PSOE and the "fear" of communism which still exists in some parts of the country, there is no doubt that the string of obvious capitulations the PCE engaged in from the very day of its legalization—its position on the monarchy, the Francoist flag, the army, Suárez ("my most worthy opponent," said Carrillo in the midst of the campaign), and above all on the workers and people's struggles (as in Euskadi)—cost the party many thousands of workers' votes. (Under these conditions, the crude attack by the Soviet bureaucracy was welcome for Carrillo, for it acted as a temporary factor of cohesion for a relatively demoralized rank and file concerned about the immediate future of "the party," especially in the trade unions.)

There is no reason to expect that the PCE will abandon the "ultrareformist" course of past months and risk grabbing the tiger of the autumn mobilizations by the tail. A combative position on the part of the PCE (within which, and there must be no forgetting this, the absolute majority

of the leaders of the Spanish workers movement are active) would have explosive effects on the entire political situation, and it is very improbable that the PCE will assume such risks. But the maintenance of the present orientation would contribute to fueling internal tensions which already exist among broad sectors of militants. The coming opening of the discussion for the Ninth Congress of the PCE (a congress which will be held under legal conditions and in full "Eurocommunist" enthusiasm and which will thus not be able to be stage-managed in as shameless a bureaucratic manner as the previous ones) will provide an excellent occasion to deepen and clarify the roots of the nefarious present course of the PCE leadership.

4. There were four "far-left" slates in the election campaign (one of them rather sheepish; the PTE energetically refused to stand "to the left of the PCE," and there is no doubt that programmatically it did not; the PTE candidates defined themselves as "consistent democrats"). The other slates may be briefly defined as follows:

The ORT (Revolutionary Workers Organization) aimed at asserting itself as a "radical Maoist" party upholding a "leftist" version of the popular-front policy during its campaign. The MC (Communist Movement) attempted a sort of alliance with sectors of left socialists and nationalist or regionalist groups; the alliance was oriented toward creating a "movement of popular unity" patterned after the Otelo candidacy in Portugal. The LCR (Revolutionary Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International), basically along with the OIC (Left Communist Organization), presented a clear class-independent and anticapitalist

*Largo Caballero, a Social Democratic leader during the 1930s and head of the UGT, the Socialist-led trade-union organization, was noted for his maximalist demagoguery, which did not prevent him from following a consistently reformist practice, serving in the Popular Front government.—*Inprecor*

slate, but serious problems came up during the campaign because of the sectarian character of the OIC and its erroneous positions on various fundamental themes (trade unions, women, the national question, etc.).

On the whole, the electoral results of the far left were very poor in comparison to the real weight it has in struggles and even in comparison to the attendance at its campaign meetings. (And also in comparison to the illusions some organizations had about the results they would get. The PTE, for example, expected 20 deputies, the ORT 10). *The "far left" has thus undergone an experience in how the change in the political situation drastically diminishes its central political weight, to the advantage of the great workers parties.* Only the LCR was prepared for this experience and has thus been able to draw the balance sheet of its campaign calmly (a balance sheet which is, moreover, quite self-critical, and one which is now being drawn by the entire organization).

A very serious crisis has broken out in the rest of the organizations. The effects of this crisis will probably come to the surface in September; the ORT has called its first congress in its eight years of existence; the MC has decided not to launch the "movement of popular unity" and has suffered an intensification of its "identity crisis" consequent to its dissolution as a party into the electoral slates; the PTE, realizing that reality is not very favorable, has decided to ignore it and claims that everything that has happened confirms "the correctness" of its "analysis." It is maintaining its fictitious electoral coalition for the future (the Democratic Front of Lefts, FDI, made up of the PTE and its trade-union fronts, women's organizations, and so on). The OIC has also witnessed the wreck of its project of creating a "movement of anticapitalist popular unity."

In reality, the key factor in the crisis of the "far left" must be located in the policy of the united front, in the attitude that has been taken toward the unity and class independence of the workers, and in each and every one of the key questions of the future (the "national question," stabilization plan, municipal elections, the "trade-union question," the problem of the government, etc.).

5. The only radical nationalist organization that played an important role in the elections was the EIA (the Party of the Basque Revolution, which embodies the tradition and includes most of the cadres of the ETA-V, Basque Nation and Freedom-Fifth Congress). The only far-left Cortes deputy belongs to this party: Francisco Letamendia, "Ortzi," one of the best known theoreticians of the ETA. In addition, the slate in which the EIA held hegemony (Euskadiko Eskerra, or Basque Left, in which the MC also participated) got excellent results in the three Basque

provinces in which it ran (some 60,000 votes in Alava, Guipúzcoa, and Vizcaya, 4.5% of the vote in all and nearly 10% in Guipúzcoa).

The explanation for this success compared to the weak showing of the rest of the "far-left" candidates (with the exception of the ORT in Navarra, almost 6%) is twofold. On the one hand Euskadiko Eskerra garnered practically all the votes of the "radical nationalist" current, which is very strong in Euskadi; on the other hand this slate appeared as an "effective left list" of candidates who had a chance of getting elected. Finally, it also appeared as the "most unitary" slate under conditions in which the pressure for the "unity of the left" was especially strong.

The evolution of the EIA, an organization which is in a phase of ideological clarification, remains open. It must now submit itself to two important practical tests: first, its permanent presence in a statewide political institution (whereas all the experience, intervention, and analyses of the EIA have hitherto been limited to Euskadi); second, its confrontation with bourgeois nationalism around concrete and urgent answers to the national oppression of the Basques. (The EIA has always held an interclass position for the "first stage" of the struggle against national oppression in Euskadi, combining it with radical slogans like dissolution of the repressive corps, "anti-oligarchical measures," and so on.)

In any event, the presence of an EIA militant among the Basque members of parliament is already acting to impede the bourgeois projects of neutralizing the struggle of the Basque people through an "autonomy status" of a formal character negotiated with and granted by the central power. It is significant that one of the first political acts of the EIA since the elections has been to call for the unity in action of the entire left "unrepresented in parliament" (which makes the mistake of excluding the PSOE and including the PCE, which is surprising in view of the traditional anti-PCE position of the Abartzale left). This represents a clear challenge to the "Assembly of Basque Members of Parliament," an organism that has proclaimed itself Euskadi's representative to the central power for "negotiating autonomy."

6. Moving on to the bourgeois camp, we must begin by taking a look at the "winner" of the elections: the UCD. The coalition headed by Suárez obtained the majority of the vote in thirty-eight provinces of the country (that is, all the provinces except Lerida, where the PDC won the majority, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, where it was the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV, and those provinces where the PSOE got the majority). It has also gained a position in the Cortes strong enough to make its parliamentary defeat unthinkable. Thus, there may be talk of "success," but no more than that, for this result was far from

what the bourgeoisie expected and, more important, *needed*. This is true for the following reasons:

• Since the formation of the Suárez government about a year ago, the political situation of the country has been characterized by the "dialectic of fragmentary mass struggles and fragmentary concessions by the bourgeoisie" referred to in the editorial in the last issue of *Inprecor*. Suárez's objective was to move to general elections accepted by the entire country from which an incontestable bourgeois majority would emerge. This majority was an essential objective since Suárez had "shelved" a number of basic political and economic problems in the name of the elections and needed an *overwhelming electoral victory that would leave him a free hand to negotiate the inevitable "pacts" with the workers parties and trade unions from a position of strength.*

• For the bourgeoisie, Suárez's "success" is more apparent than real. Neither the national problem, nor that of the coming municipal elections, nor above all the economic crisis will admit being shelved again. The bourgeoisie now commands some maneuvering room (particularly that which the reformist workers parties grant it), and it will use and is using this, as we shall see. But it does not command the "position of strength" it needed. On the contrary, since the elections the workers are more convinced of their strength than ever; they are more than ever confident that they will achieve their political and social objectives. *In spite of the unevenness, illusions, and influence of the reformist leaderships, this "state of spirit" of the working class and the people underpins a relationship of forces which is favorable to the toilers. And there lies the fundamental weakness of Suárez's "success."*

Suárez has now undertaken a forced march to transform the electoral coalition of the UCD into a political party, the political party the Spanish bourgeoisie needs. This is especially important since apart from the UCD there is no even minimally significant bourgeois party on a countrywide scale. This operation has a dubious future. The fact that the UCD is practically alone as the political representative of the bourgeoisie does foster centripetal tendencies within it, but it also means that the UCD will be torn by all the political contradictions of the bourgeoisie, which are and will be quite serious. It may thus be concluded that the Spanish bourgeoisie is now closer than ever in recent years but still very far from resolving the problem of its own political organization.

7. The electoral defeat of the Popular Alliance (AP) was another significant feature of the elections. This party won parliamentary representation in only fourteen provinces (the four Galician provinces, Asturias, León, Santander, Zamora, Logroño, Toledo, Vizcaya, Barcelona, and

Madrid) and remains a minority lacking in credibility or political influence. If to this we add that the fascist groups (Falange, Fuerza Nueva) obtained only about 60,000 votes (0.3%), the electoral defeat of Francoism becomes overwhelming.

There are several significant consequences of this. First, the specter of a coup and the alleged necessity for an "anti-AP" coalition, which had played a central role in the policy of the PCE in past months and had been of real concern to broad sectors of workers, has lost its effect; second, any possibilities of an AP-UCD bloc, which had been among the projects of the furthest right wing of the UCD, have practically disappeared (even though the sum of AP and UCD seats in the Cortes would constitute a majority, it must be taken into account that the formation of such a bloc would result in the immediate breakup of the UCD); third, the defeat will have a disintegrating effect on the AP itself, which will lose influence over the sectors of the state apparatus it has previously controlled.

The only road that remains open to the AP is that of "capitalizing on chaos," feeding on the future political and social instability and aiming for support in the barracks rather than at the polling places. This road quite naturally presupposes making use of fascist and parapolic activity, of the "strategy of tension," which will very probably be one of the permanent features of coming months. (A recent example: During a football game in Madrid attended by several thousand Basques a 12-year-old girl was raped in the street by a group of fascists because her parents had raised the national team banners of Euskadi.)

8. The Christian Democracy has been practically wiped off the political map. Apart from the PNV (which is a very special component of the Christian Democratic "team," and to which we will refer further on), the Christian Democrats won only two deputies, in Barcelona; their best known "historic" leaders (Gil Robles, Ruiz Giménez) were not elected to parliament. The efforts of the international Christian Democrats, extended during the campaign to support their Spanish "brothers," had no result. The DC had wanted to occupy a "populist" interclass space with a certain radical tinge in certain respects ("federalism," "advanced" measures of economic policy, etc.). But such a space barely exists in a society as polarized as Spanish society is today.

Nevertheless, it would be premature to bury the Christian Democracy. First, because two of its factions are part of the UCD (the Christian Democratic Party, a rightist split from the Ruiz Giménez group, and the sector that is loyal to Suárez and holds posts of responsibility in the present government and perhaps in future ones); second, because the DC is still the only possibility for a "left" bourgeois alterna-

tive to the UCD, very improbable in the medium term but not completely out of the question; third, because a relatively autonomous "Christian Democratic pole" could



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take shape within the UCD itself, as a possible alternative leadership to the Suárez group. In any event, however, the dream of an "Italian-style" DC as the fundamental bourgeois option for post-Francoism is finished.

9. The electoral scores of the bourgeois nationalist formations were uneven. The Basque Nationalists (PNV) won a modest vote (finishing first in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa and second, behind the PSOE, in Euskadi as a whole). The PDC achieved bad results, which triggered an immediate crisis in the coalition and a comprehensive reframing of the political organization of the Catalan bourgeoisie. There had been no significant bourgeois nationalism in Galicia and this did not change: the big winner there was the UCD . . . and abstention (which came close to 50% in Orense and Lugo); the weight of bossism and the marginalization of the Galician peasants played a decisive role here.

One feature must be highlighted: the "popular" character of the vote of the PNV, which recovered its traditional influence in considerable sectors of the petty bourgeoisie and also among the Basque toilers, at the price of radicalizing its program and even its symbols (the present symbol of the PNV is a clenched fist superimposed on an *ikurriña* [Basque flag]). But the demagogy of this "radicalization" will rapidly clash with the limits of the ability of the bourgeoisie to make concessions on the "autonomy" of Euskadi. This confrontation will be especially harsh because of the strength and depth of Basque nationalist consciousness and because of the existence of a sector of radical nationalist masses, of which Euskadiko Eskerra was the electoral expression.

The role of the PNV-PSOE axis (between them these two parties account for two-thirds of the Basque deputies and also constitute the central forces of the "Basque government in exile") as the administrator of the "strong state" in Euskadi will be contested on the social and national terrain, and this will mark the immediate course of events in Euskadi.

10. Finally, we must refer to the role and composition of the Senate. According to the political reform law, the Senate has practically the same powers as the Congress, especially on the great political questions (such as constitutional reforms). Thus, it acts as a "security mechanism" for the bourgeoisie, and its ultraconservative character is further intensified by the forty-one Senators who are appointed by the king (who, in order to forestall any possible leftist victory, drew up an extremely reactionary list laden with Francoist politicians and representatives of big capital).

The composition and very function of the Senate sap the credibility of the line of "constitutional pact" upheld by both the PCE and the PSOE. In fact, it would be difficult for a constitution negotiated under these conditions to have a content acceptable to the workers. The constitutional debate, cornerstone of the legitimation of the strong state in general and the monarchy in particular, will be one of the key political questions in the future.

Initial Conclusions: Fragility of the 'Strong State'

Such is our interpretation of the results of the elections. To conclude, we will sketch out some general conclusions on the Spanish political situation and its perspectives.

During the days just after the elections four sorts of events occurred or were on the point of occurring which, although of uneven importance, are all useful symptoms of the new situation:

- First, the workers struggles which had been under way prior to June 15 have continued and gained in strength, resulting in important mass actions (50,000 demonstrators in Asturias, 3,000 in Vizcaya, 2,000 in Vitoria). Moreover, there has been a new rise of struggle by Andalusian day laborers and peasants (who have, with thousands of tractors, taken to the highways of Valencia).

- Second, on July 1 the vertical trade union was formally liquidated. Even before the formal liquidation, this was already spurring an enormous rise in affiliation to the workers trade unions. Overall membership figures may stand at about 2 million by September (about 20% of the work force). This is still a modest figure, but it goes well beyond the present feeble one.

- Third, there has been a semispontaneous spread of a generalized demand for

the resignation of the present municipal councils, the great majority of which are composed of Francoists; the proposal is to replace them with administrative commissions formed in accordance with the election results. The major forces interested in halting this movement have been the PSOE and the PCE in its zones of influence, both invoking the necessity of avoiding "hollow municipal councils."

• Fourth, things have developed in a complex way with respect to the national and regional question. Even before the elections, the majority tactic of the "opposition" in Catalonia and Euskadi consisted in general lines of forming assemblies of members of parliament immediately after June 15 which would become the representatives of the nationality and would take charge of negotiating autonomy with the central power. Obviously, the point was to establish an instrument of automatic control aimed at warding off any assertion of national sovereignty by the Basque and Catalan peoples.

In Catalonia, however, because of the progressive national radicalization among the population (which culminated in the largest meeting of the campaign: 400,000 people in Montjuich demanding the re-establishment of the 1932 autonomy status and the reinstatement of the Generalitat), the possibility arose of the masses themselves imposing national Catalan demands in the event of an electoral victory of candidates favoring autonomy.

In face of this threat, Government Vice President and Defense Minister Gutiérrez Mellado warned against acts of this type on the eve of the elections. On June 15 itself the traditional Plaza de S. Jaime (where Maciá proclaimed the Catalan Republic, which Andreu Nin correctly considered "the most revolutionary act of April 14") was surrounded by the military. Before this military encirclement, however, a "political encirclement" of the Catalan people had already begun, carried out by the future election victors (various Socialist and Communist speakers) calling for a "sense of responsibility," for "avoiding adventures," and so on.

Nothing happened on June 15. The forthcoming constitution of the assembly of members of parliament was immediately announced and a mass demonstration was called. Before this, however, a delegation of Socialist election winners paid a "courtesy call" on the king and Suárez, conveying their proposals. Upon the delegation's return to Catalonia the assembly of members of parliament was convoked (and was reduced to an inoffensive exchange of patriotic literature) and the mass demonstration was called off.

Then and only then did Suárez make his "big move." Tarradellas, the president of the Generalitat in exile, a bourgeois politician with ambitions of becoming the Catalan bonaparte, showed up in Madrid to call on Suárez, met with him and the

king several times, and established a provisional "compromise" whereby the "first step" toward the recovery of Catalan autonomy would be taken while respecting



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the present law on local regimes, a law worked out before the death of the dictator.

It is a long story, but one worth recounting, for it clearly expresses two important points: first, that the "maneuvering room" of the Spanish bourgeoisie derives fundamentally from the servility and cowardice of the great workers parties, and second, that this servility and cowardice are limitless as soon as there is a threat of action by the masses capable of winning their demands.

In addition, a genuine "autonomy fever" has swept the country and "assemblies of members of parliament" are cropping up everywhere. Curiously, the major protagonist of this fever is the UCD, which intends in this way to bury the real national problems under a mountain of "regional problems." But it is quite possible that the UCD may find itself turning into a sorcerer's apprentice if it continues on this path.

This series of events constitutes the initial skirmishes of the new situation, the preparation for September.

The period we have lived through since the death of the dictator has very clearly expressed the depth of a contradiction we had detected many years ago: the contradiction between the combativity and political consciousness of the Spanish toilers. The fundamental responsibility for this "lag" in consciousness, for this political and organizational weakness of a workers

and people's movement that has given proof on many occasions of its will to struggle and its class instinct, naturally falls on the reformist workers leaderships. But the situation of illegality and the forty years of dictatorship are also a decisive factor in this. Hence the immense importance of the political phase now opening.

For millions of Spanish toilers the election campaign was the first opportunity to listen to workers parties, to be able to buy their newspapers, to discuss directly and openly with their militants. For three weeks Spain was a giant meeting hall swept by the growing enthusiasm and radicalization of the workers and people. The results themselves heightened the "politicizing" effect of the elections.

Moreover, there will be two other elections in the coming six months: general elections to the factory councils (in October or November) and municipal elections (in December or January). And during this same period the "stabilization plan" of the bourgeoisie will be set in motion, definitive amnesty for political prisoners and exiles will be won, the legality of the entire workers movement will be achieved, the national and regional question will be broached, and the constitutional debates in the Cortes will begin.

It would be a serious error, or rather the repetition of a serious error, to head into this situation with apocalyptic visions, once again announcing that "the revolution is coming, it is drawing nigh, it is even here." We will not issue ultimatums to the Spanish working class, which has just experienced an important change in political coordinates and now has to learn to orient itself in the new system. The pace of radicalization will probably be slower than we had predicted in the past.

But it would be an even more serious error to consider the Spanish situation "stabilized," and naturally the consequences of this sort of error would be injurious to the political orientation of those who made it.

We are entering the "parliamentary prelude" of the Spanish socialist revolution. The "prelude" has been preceded by many years of struggle and the toilers are moving into it with their strength and morale intact. Moreover, this "prelude" will be combined with harsh social and political struggles which will go well beyond parliament and which will occur in a favorable international context.

The bourgeoisie has achieved a significant renovation of its political personnel, has made it through the first phase of crisis opened with the death of the dictator, has established an institutional framework intended to channel and integrate the aspirations of the toilers by relying on the maneuvering room granted by the capitulatory policy of the reformist workers leaderships, and has succeeded in maintaining a solid and effective repressive apparatus.

The toilers have entered the political scene massively, extending their politicization and organizations; they are maintaining their illusions in but also their demands on the reformist parties, and they will now begin to undergo practical experiences with these illusions and will see how the reformists respond to these demands.

The class polarization of Spanish society is not new. What is new is that this

polarization now exists under conditions in which it can assert itself and deepen with much greater force, although perhaps not quite so spectacularly as in the past.

This is what the Fourth International must prepare for, and it is especially what we Spanish Trotskyists must prepare ourselves for. We have been able to build a large and combative organization linked to the working class and capable of understanding new phenomena, an organization which, while it is far from having achieved

the necessary programmatic and organizational firmness, is nevertheless fully conscious of its own responsibility. What is on the agenda now is to build a *party*.

Situations like those of the elections, where the "winners" and "victors" are different, will not be repeated in the future. This *party* is the precondition for the "victors" of June 15 definitively vanquishing the "winners," for the workers vanquishing the bourgeoisie.

June 30, 1977

Moscow's Attack on Santiago Carrillo

The Eurocommunists and the Kremlin Face New Times

By C. A. Udry and C. Michaloux

[The following article appeared in the July 21 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

On June 23 the Soviet weekly *Novoye Vremya* (New Times) launched an inquisitorial attack on Santiago Carrillo, secretary general of the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), because of his book "*Eurocomunismo*" y *Estado* ("Eurocommunism" and the State). The three major counts of the indictment were these: "opposing the Communist parties of the European capitalist countries to the Communist parties of the socialist countries"; "denigrating real socialism, that is, the countries which have already created a new society, and first of all the Soviet Union"; upholding a conception "which in practice amounts to maintaining the division of Europe into opposed military blocs and, in addition, to strengthening the aggressive NATO bloc." The Soviet press agency distributed the text of the attack widely; it was reproduced on the front pages of *Tribuna Ludu* and *Rude Pravo*, the central organs of the Polish and Czechoslovak Communist parties respectively.

Where It Hurts

Thus, one year after the conference of Communist parties in East Berlin, where the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) was compelled to renounce the rule of unanimity, Brezhnev has issued a warning to Carrillo, one also aimed at Georges Marchais and Enrico Berlinguer, the leaders of the French and Italian Communist parties. The Kremlin associates are not given to improvisation. Although the attack was carefully timed, it had been prepared long in advance and certainly polished up in Sofia, Bulgaria, last March, where Boris Ponomarev convoked the leaders of the CPs of the "satellite countries" to examine "the case" of those who were meeting in Madrid at the same time, namely Berlinguer, Carrillo, and Marchais. It was the Bulgarian Telalov who was assigned to demand a resolution against "Eurocommunist deviationism." *New Times* responded to this demand by targeting the secretary general of the PCE, for this party had just run up a rather inglorious electoral score, in spite of (or because of) its reverence for the Spanish monarchy. The Kremlin bureaucracy has thus officially taken note of a new stage in the crisis of Stalinism, bringing it into the public domain.

On June 29 a delegation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) arrived in Moscow. It was composed of three members of the leadership, Gian Carlo Pajetta, Paolo Bufalini, and Emanuele Macaluso. The attack on Carrillo, or more precisely the themes of the diatribe, were at the center of their discussions, as Berlinguer's three confrères confirmed upon their return.

A new stage in the crisis of Stalinism, which has been ripening since 1968, has now spilled out into the public square. What has come to be called "Eurocommunism" constitutes one of the facets of this crisis, that of the relations between the Soviet CP and the CPs of Western Europe; many of these CPs must confront a rise of the mass movement and some of them are planning to participate in governments before too long.

The whole content of the indictment concocted by the Kremlin scribblers indicates that what is involved here is not at all a debate on the strategy of the West European CPs in coming to power. The function of the few murmurs on this subject is to gain the ear of a minority of militants trained during the period when two-faced language was used to get the reformist line across. Instead, the *New Times* article is entirely devoted to defending the bureaucratic regime in which, according to Moscow, "the working class constitutes the motor force of society, in which it assumes, along with the peasantry and the intelligentsia, the full plenitude of power." Now, in his book Carrillo contests precisely this dogma, which constitutes one of the ideological foundations of this bureaucracy which has expropriated the working class of all political and economic power. This central aspect of the conflict comes through very clearly in the accounts of the discussions in Moscow. Reviewing the themes broached by the CPSU and PCI delegations, Bufalini declared: "We examined various international questions, among them the *New Times* attack. On this latter question, the Soviets told us that the assertions of Comrade Carrillo on the non-socialist character of society and the state in the USSR were unacceptable." (*Repubblica*, July 5, 1977.) In a front page article in *l'Unità*, the daily of the PCI, Bufalini asserted: "The Soviets exhibited a different concern: that the criticism of the USSR, the importance attributed to the 'dissidents,' and the tone sometimes used (not by us, it is true) in discussing Soviet society could be used by forces interested in impeding the détente. . . . In other words, for the Soviets the 'dissidents' are a false problem, a diversion, an expedient concocted to prevent détente, something that does not concern the masses or the real processes." (July 5, 1977.) These assertions reported by the Italian delegation clearly highlight what the

Kremlin bureaucracy's real fear is: Above all they are afraid of their own proletariat; they fear that the Soviet workers might be contaminated and encouraged by certain ideas and criticisms now formulated even from "within" the "international Communist movement" that Moscow assembled in Berlin less than a year ago.

The Eurocommunists, the Dissidents, and Soviet Society

The marked sensitivity of the Brezhnevs, Suslovs, Ponomarevs, and others to the interaction that has developed between "dissidence" in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and the other "people's democracies" and the positions of the various "Eurocommunist" CPs has a real basis. First of all, the statements of the French, Spanish, and Italian CPs on the situation in their own countries somehow legitimize the oppositionists in the USSR and East Europe in the eyes of the international workers movement. Thus, when the French Communist Party (PCF), following a French television broadcast on "labor camps" in the USSR, comes out against the existence of this prison system, the PCF is objectively stating that in the conflict between the Soviet bureaucrats and those in the USSR who wind up in that prison system one fine day precisely because they denounce it, the latter are correct.

Second, a portion of the opposition has fully grasped this dialectic. It has been able to make use, for its own particular needs (which may also correspond to those of a policy of putting pressure on the bureaucracy from within), of the West European CPs' obligation to take some distance from a bureaucratic dictatorship which they have long presented as a model society. For instance, on March 17, 1977, eleven former members of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP addressed an appeal, from their isolation, to the European CPs on the occasion of the repression against the signers of Charter 77. They were able to state their case in such a way as to have some effect on the leaders of the CPs, who have to count votes and know how to do so: "This is not the first time since 1968 that important population groups have been victims of discrimination because of their convictions. . . . [These methods] heap discredit on socialism not only in Czechoslovakia, but throughout Europe. . . . These practices damage the interests of your own parties and cannot be considered merely internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Communist Party." (*Le Monde*, March 19, 1977.)

Finally, some oppositionists who themselves have a project of reforming the system from within may also be encouraged by the positions and declarations of the Eurocommunist CPs. After semi-official relations were established between the PCI and Dubcek, Carrillo has now gone so far as to declare: "Why not imagine that a Dubcek, or a new Khrushchev, might arise in the USSR one day and make the necessary changes?" (Television broadcast on Antenne 2, July 14.) This must raise the hackles of Bilak and Brezhnev. Even though the words fit into a perspective of bureaucratic reformism, after Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia the Soviet leadership has learned to regard these reformists as dangerous sorcerer's apprentices.

Nevertheless, there is another dimension to the crisis of relations between the Soviet bureaucracy and the CPs of West Europe. Because of the exigencies of their own reformist strategy, the "Eurocommunists" put forward a series of themes which enter into resonance with the social contradictions of the bureaucratically degenerate or deformed workers states. In the long run these themes may be perceived by layers of workers as partial responses to their own aspirations. Indeed, taken in different social formations (in which the private appropriation of the means of production and generalized commodity production do not exist), these themes assume subversive properties, for the central question in these countries remains that of proletarian democracy, as is clearly shown by all the beginnings of mass movements. For instance, when declarations such as those of Berlinguer and

Carrillo in Livorno in July 1975, Berlinguer and Marchais in Rome in November 1975, or the three together in Madrid in March 1977 stress the inseparability of democracy and socialism, call for a multiparty system and respect for civil and political liberties, and preach the development of democracy as a condition for the development of socialism, the words are perceived in the East as an encouragement to demand the conquest and application of these rights and norms. The fact that these themes are organically linked to counterrevolutionary strategy, to the social conservation of a capitalist system in crisis, do not prevent them from being able to constitute, in the immediate sense, elements of reference for the development of movements of antibureaucratic demands. In an interview granted in Moscow to the Spanish weekly *Cambio 16* Roy Medvedev affirmed: "Undoubtedly, many of the aspects of Eurocommunism certainly appear dangerous in the Soviet Union. . . . The successes of pluralist socialism (Eurocommunism) in the West can exert strong attraction on socialist countries like Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, and even on Soviet public opinion. Carrillo, Berlinguer, and Marchais go further than Dubcek-type reformers, and it was a similar fear that moved the Warsaw Pact tanks to occupy Prague." (July 17, 1977.) Elleinstein, high priest of Eurocommunism in the colors of France and theoretical ambassador of the leading nucleus of the PCF, has written in the review of the CERES (the Socialist Party minority), "What could be the source of the Soviet Union's uneasiness about a political transformation in France and Italy? To my mind, it would relate to one essential point, the construction of another type of socialism than that which exists in the Soviet Union and the countries that are close to it. Let us put it clearly: a democratic socialism in France could constitute a pole of attraction for those in the Soviet Union or the socialist European countries who aspire to more democracy within the framework of the existing socialism." (*Repères*, March 1977.) Through their distorting lenses, these two reformists of differing horizons confirm the fear of the Soviet bureaucracy, each in their own way. They are in good position to know. It is no accident that the same issue of *New Times* that contained the attack on Carrillo also published an article in which F. Patrenko asserted: "Pluralism is purely and simply a defect of bourgeois society."

On this point we find ourselves confronting a historic paradox. Although in the past Stalinism concocted the theory of "socialism in one country" in order to subject the entire international Communist movement to its strategy, today the Communist parties are turning the same argument against Moscow. On the one hand, the Stalinist strategy has stimulated the adaptation of the Western CPs to their own respective national realities (one of the decisive material bases of their present orientation); on the other hand, these parties are preaching the "national road" in order to justify their autonomy and the need for a public debate. Alfredo Reichlin, editor of *l'Unità*, wrote in an editorial, "We have taken a position on the *New Times* attack on Carrillo not only because of the tone used, which incidentally appears inadmissible to us, but because of the substance of the attack itself: we consider it not so much an excommunication (who excommunicates and who is excommunicated when there is no longer any discipline or leading center, let alone a church?), but more a direct public attack on a party and its principal leader. Which is different from a completely legitimate criticism of an essay that formulates debatable hypotheses and explores open problems." (July 10, 1977.)

Eurocommunist Diplomacy

It is true that the "Eurocommunists" have no common strategy except to respond to their own national exigencies. But from the standpoint of the Soviet bureaucracy there is another common denominator: the criticism of, the distance taken from, the "Soviet model," and the demand for autonomy, which does not mean independence. So long as the PCI was a voice in the wilderness,

the PCE was consigned to the background because it was illegal, and the PCF could still pass for one of the Kremlin's loyal subjects, despite its reticence, the situation was not too worrisome for the old men in the Kremlin.

But as of 1975 the PCF began trumpeting its "Eurocommunist" faith with the fervor of the newly converted. The conversion was formalized at the twenty-second party congress in 1976, at which Fiterman, a Marchais loyalist, no longer defended the "unjustly slandered socialist states" and Kirilenko, Brezhnev's emissary, no longer received the applause of a hall packed with unconditional supporters, as had been the case at the twenty-first congress. Moreover, the death of Franco in November 1975 inaugurated a situation that was to see the PCE come out openly. It was therefore able to express with more authority the ideas Santiago Carrillo had already expounded in his interview with Rossana Rossanda published in the Italian daily *il Manifesto* in November 1974 (an interview which had provoked some discontent at PCI headquarters).

The Eurocommunist regroupment then began to take shape and exhibit a dynamic of its own. This was of greater import than the dissidence of an Australian or even Japanese Communist Party. In fact, it involved the CPs most directly linked to the October Revolution, the creation of the Communist International, its Stalinist degeneration, and the important moments of its history (the Popular Front, the Spanish revolution, the anti-Nazi resistance, the Liberation). But these were also CPs which command a mass audience and which, in the current European situation, present themselves as credible candidates for government participation. The debate with Berlinguer or Marchais as leaders of parties thus threatens to become a debate among men of state. This is enough to provoke anger in the Kremlin, but controlled anger. Roy Medvedev, who knows the milieu, explained in his interview: "Thus, the possibility of Western Communist parties participating in the governments of their respective countries, of becoming parties in power instead of simple opposition parties, is becoming more concrete. The USSR has to consider them real forces. This novelty is shaking the bureaucratic and dogmatic mentalities of the Kremlin." Macaluso of the PCI delegation noted upon his return: "The clear impression I came away with was that this was not the beginning of a salvo against the Eurocommunist parties. Now that the opening round has been fired, the Soviets want to muffle the consequences." (*Panorama*, July 12, 1977.)

The role played by the European CPs in the current period not only has implications for their relations with Moscow, but is also involved in the internal balances between the Soviet CP and the CPs that hold power in Eastern Europe, which relations constitute yet another facet of the crisis of Stalinism. It was no accident that in Sofia, Kadar of Hungary seems to have been slapped on the wrist for his December 1976 declaration in Vienna that "Eurocommunism is not a new form of anticommunism." (*Espresso*, July 3, 1977.) Nevertheless, in Rome on June 9, 1977, Kadar sinned again, saying of the European CPs' claims of the right to differ: "This is not only their right, but also their duty. With or without the dictatorship of the proletariat, with a pluralistic or some other socialism, all I wish is that they open their people's road to socialism as quickly as possible." (*Le Monde*, June 26-27, 1977.) Thus, the government perspectives, at least of the PCI and the PCF, like their intrinsic weight in Italian, French, and Spanish political reality, foster diplomatic initiatives by these CPs not only toward "third world" countries, but also toward the "people's democracies." This desire corresponds to the specific interests of some bureaucracies of Eastern Europe (especially the Hungarian and Rumanian), which would look kindly on changes of regime in France or Italy, even if only because of the increased diversification of their trade and the favorable credit conditions that would result. In addition, they would like to take advantage of the centrifugal tendencies intensified by Eurocommunism. Nevertheless, one must not lose sight of the contradictory aspects of such a situation. On the one hand, it constrains Western CPs to be

cautious with the Soviet "big brother," whose economic and military power remains the largely dominant factor for the "people's democracies." On the other hand, the East European bureaucrats must also take account of the effects of "contamination" of their own working classes some of the themes developed by Eurocommunism could have. The Eurocommunist road is thus a narrow one.

The Kremlin and the Status Quo

There is no doubt that the Kremlin bureaucrats, who seem to have learned nothing from their previous attempts, have tried to create difficulties for Carrillo within his own party. Several weeks before they had failed in an attempt to have Jeannette Vermeersch-Thorez raise the Stalinist clarion against Marchais, through attacking Elleinstein.

On June 25 the Central Committee of the PCE passed a unanimous motion (with one abstention) supporting Carrillo. The latter declared, mincing no words: "At this stage no diplomatic caution can prevent me from saying that the splitting attempts first of Eduardo García and then of Enrique Lister were organized and stimulated by the same people who wrote this article. They did not succeed then and they probably expected greater success from this offensive. After each of these attacks, realizing their failure, they have held back for some time, at least publicly." (*Triunfo*, July 2, 1977.) There are at least two reasons for the failure of Stalin's heirs. First, the latter have lost the authority of their testator. Second, in the social and political context in which they find themselves, the CP leaderships—who tend to be thrown off balance among their own bourgeoisie, their working class, and the Soviet bureaucracy—cannot afford the luxury of instituting in their own ranks the sort of public discussion they demand between themselves and the Kremlin. They have to close ranks to negotiate a perilous turn. Macaluso understood the reaction of the PCE Central Committee very well: "In any event, they (the Soviets) made a mistake. The Spanish party has proven united, and there are profound reasons for this unity." (*Espresso*, July 3, 1977.)

The splitting operations having been aborted, the Kremlin will not take initiatives that would result in a break, at least not in the present period. Having no available alternative option, the Kremlin is acting empirically, aware that this is a permanent problem whose roots lie in the present historical phase. Indeed, in large part Eurocommunism represents an attempted political response from CP leaderships confronted with a series of common questions: the pressures of the national context are coming to bear with increased force; the trauma provoked by Stalinism in the ranks of the workers movement in the European countries has left deep traces and the limits of the twentieth congress of the CPSU are felt especially strongly; the junction of the crisis of capitalism and the rise of the mass movement has fostered the flowering of a lively antibureaucratic sentiment among broad sectors of the working class; through demagogic references to self-management the SPs have often been able to capture a part of this radicalization and to put themselves forward as both competitors and necessary allies of the CPs in the perspective of assuming government power. Hence, the Kremlin will seek a *modus vivendi* with the Eurocommunist CPs. This is just what Macaluso reported in *l'Unità*: "The Soviets affirmed that they did not want to envenom the polemic with the Spanish CP and still less to undertake one with the other CPs of West Europe. They thus hope to come to a more tempered discussion, one which does not exclude, they stressed, this or that criticism of socialism in the USSR but does exclude general condemnation of it." (July 5, 1977.)

The desire of the CPSU leadership to reach an accommodation in spite of its brutal actions (which do not have much effect in any case) rests in the final analysis on a material base: to maintain the status quo in Europe in order to preserve its own stability. The

bureaucracy dreads the activity of its own working class. For this reason, it fears that the discontent of the latter could be fueled by some of the themes articulated by the Eurocommunists. But what frightens the bureaucracy more than anything is that these words of socialism and freedom trumpeted by the Eurocommunists might actually take shape in the course of a victorious workers upsurge in Western Europe giving rise to a genuine Soviet system, to a democratic regime of workers councils. Then the working class in the USSR and the people's democracies would no longer turn to the (misleading) formulas of the Eurocommunists, but to the example of self-managed socialism, the living negation of the bureaucratic regime and usurpation. Brezhnev knows very well that in face of this mortal danger *the CPs remain a decisive element in damming up, controlling, and driving back the rise of the mass movement*. They therefore remain, even the Eurocommunists, a factor preserving the status quo in Europe. Granted, history has already shown (in Germany, France, and Spain) that this is a shortsighted view. But the bureaucratic caste responds to its own immediate interests. Very often when the Kremlin speaks of the "risks courted by the détente" or of the "destabilization of the socialist community" it is actually referring to the specter of socialist revolution in Europe.

The Eurocommunists Seek Accommodation

An amiable solution is also in the interests of the apparatuses of the CPs of Western Europe. They also do not want a break. There is an inertia in the links forged with the USSR over decades. When he returned from Moscow Bufalini repeated once again: "None of us has forgotten what the Soviets have represented for the struggle against Nazi-fascism and for the development of socialism in the world after the war. Nevertheless, this attachment is not in opposition to the Italian road to socialism." (*Repubblica*, July 5, 1977.) But above all the bureaucracies of the CPs have to assert their own political identity at a time when their strategies of "historic compromise," "union of the French people," or "national reconciliation" make it difficult to trace out strategic differences with the Social Democracy. To the question, "Are there great differences between the PCE and the PSOE (the Social Democrats)?" Carrillo responded, "There are many similarities in the theses developed by the two parties." (*Le Monde*, June 28, 1977.) Nevertheless, on July 13 he told French television, "What I am concerned with is to give a theoretical basis to Eurocommunism, otherwise Eurocommunism and Social Democracy could be confused."

Avoiding confusion is fundamentally an electoral consideration and not a theoretical one. Without a simple and perceptible difference clear to broad masses of worker-voters just awakening to politics, the CP bureaucracies face the prospect of electoral defeats which would precisely undermine the essence of their present material base in bourgeois society. The reference to the USSR as a "socialist country" remains the cornerstone of the construction of this identity. *Rinascita*, the PCI weekly, has written: "To those who ask that the PCI denounce the non-socialist character of the USSR and make political democracy the axis of a new international organization, we answer, once again, No. The basic problem remains the political one of the reality of the socialist countries in the world, of what they are and represent in the concrete equilibriums of the world these days." (July 1, 1977.) And in his *l'Unità* editorial of July 10, Reichlin reiterated this position with embellished formulas in order to respond to Craxi, the secretary of the Socialist Party, who had enjoined him to go to the end and adopt the Social Democratic position that capitalism reigns in the USSR.

Nevertheless, the necessities of the present political period require of the Eurocommunist apparatuses more than this recognition of the USSR as a "socialist country" and "force for progress in the world." The poverty and ossification of the ideology diffused by the Soviet bureaucracy are such that this ideology is of no aid to them in elaborating a political justification

for their strategy, especially in face of a rising mass movement and a real renaissance of Marxism in West Europe. Manuel Azcárate, a member of the Political Bureau of the PCE, has said: "The profound weakness of the socialist regimes and concretely of the Soviet regime . . . is undoubtedly directly linked to the lack of existence in these countries of a real democratic political system. The regime in the East is based on authoritarianism, founded in face on an a-Marxist conception of metaphysical origin, which consists of believing that one can impose ideology through diktats." (*Triunfo*, reprinted in *Politique-Hebdo*, March 14, 1977.) Fraudulently calling upon Gramsci, the CP leaderships are attempting to coherently codify their reformist practice, which leads them not only to renounce any literary reference to the "dictatorship of the proletariat," but also to explicitly reject any even artificial reference to Leninism and specifically to Lenin's whole analysis of the bourgeois state. The PCI and the PCE have done this and the PCF is preparing to. Hence, paradox of history, those who have blithely manipulated "Leninism" to justify all their turns are now denouncing Lenin's taste for quotation as a symptom of social conservatism in their tutor. On returning from Moscow, Pajetta declared: "There is still (among the Soviets) a love of old definitions: of right, left, Trotskyist. Although the PCI is trying to reconsider the history of polemics, for some Soviet leaders everything remains unchanged. For them, for example, everything there is to say about Karl Kautsky was already said by Lenin in 1917: renegade." (*Panorama*, July 12, 1977.)


The Achilles' heel of this vast and open revision and of this attempt to "give a theoretical basis" to Eurocommunism remains how to integrate the analysis of the USSR into the framework of the system now under construction. Berlinguer, educated in the Philistine tradition of Togliatti, rapidly understood that Carrillo was opening a Pandora's box when he directly took to the field of analyzing the *character of the USSR* and not simply of criticizing "deformations," "errors," and "backwardness." But even with all his diplomatic talents, Berlinguer will have difficulty preventing the public debate from extending to this question.

But another complex diplomatic task awaits Berlinguer and his colleagues. They are conscious that the maintenance of the social status quo—along with their own survival (as shown by the example of Chile)—once they accede to government and face an active mass movement necessitates at least a certain "neutrality" on the part of the imperialist bourgeoisie. A vast economic blockade immediately after the formation of a "left government" would stimulate uncontrollable reactions among the toiling masses. That is the origin of the efforts deployed by the PCI toward the German and North European Social Democrats. Berlinguer has met with Brandt, Pajetta has seen Mitterand, Sergio Segre, the PCI's minister of foreign affairs, has visited Palme. Napolitan, another PCI leader, has discussed with representatives of the British Labour Party. In autumn Cerardo Chiamonte is to tour the whole Scandinavian Social Democratic circuit (Norway, Denmark, Sweden). The PCF will not be left behind. One of the stakes of its quarrels with the SP is precisely the strengthening of its position in directly negotiating at Mitterand's side with the German and Scandinavian Social Democracy, and also, why not, with the American ambassador, whose address the PCF knows. The autonomy of the Eurocommunist CPs must also be measured by this yardstick.

For many years the European CPs have been built and developed on the basis of the contradictions of the capitalist system as well as the economic progress and growing strength of the USSR as a world power. Today the junction between the exacerbation of the contradictions of the capitalist system and the crisis of control of the Kremlin bureaucracy over Soviet society are fueling the present crisis of the monolithism of the Stalinist system. This can only lead to a crisis of the *internal monolithism* of each national CP. The second chapter of the history of Eurocommunism will open when that occurs.

July 15, 1977

AROUND THE WORLD



Albanian CP Attacks Peking

An editorial sharply attacking China's foreign policy was published in the July 7 issue of the Albanian Communist Party newspaper *Zeri i Popullit*.

Copies of the text in English, French, and German translations were hand-delivered by the Albanian embassy in Belgrade to foreign correspondents and embassies a few days later.

Though the editorial did not mention China by name, it attacked Peking's theory of "three worlds"—used to justify its support for capitalist regimes hostile to the Soviet Union—as "opportunistic and anti-Marxist."

The editorial also described the Soviet Union as the "fire extinguisher of the revolution" and portrayed Albania as the center of world revolution.

Since the 1961 split between Albania and the Soviet Union, Albania has been China's only European ally.

A July 25 Associated Press dispatch from Belgrade reported "diplomatic sources" as saying that Albania had asked China to withdraw its technical advisers, estimated to number between 700 and 2,000.

However, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called the reports "unfounded," according to a July 26 Reuters report. A spokesman for the Albanian embassy in Belgrade also denied the reports. "It's not true," he said July 25. "We have no information like that at all."

Striking Mine Workers Win Victory in India

A few weeks after the massacre of twelve striking mine workers by Indian police in Madhya Pradesh, the strikers have won most of their demands.

The ferment at the Dalli-Rajahara iron mines began earlier this year after a non-recognized union, the Chhattisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh led by Shanker Guha Niyogi, called a strike in support of its demands for abolition of the contract labor system, payment of bonuses, and other benefits. Most of the mine workers supported the unofficial union, instead of the recognized All-India Khadam Mazdoor Sangh, which is led by the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India.

After Niyogi was arrested with other union leaders, about 3,000 workers and their supporters staged a protest, leading

to the police attack and the massacre June 3 (see *Intercontinental Press*, July 4, p. 773).

According to a report by N.K. Singh in the July 9 issue of the *Bombay Economic and Political Weekly*, the strikers won their demand for a bonus of 100 rupees (one rupee equals US\$0.11) and an increase in their hut-repair allowance from Rs 20 to Rs 100. By negotiating with the strikers, the management had in effect recognized the authority of the Chhattisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh. Niyogi, however, has not yet been released from jail.

"What marks the Rajahara workers' agitation is the emergence of a leadership from among the workers," Singh commented.

Singh also noted, "Another significant development is the radical role played by women workers in the agitation. A large chunk of the total labour force consists of women, who have occupied their due place in the new union. . . . Women workers braved police bullets as much as their menfolks (one of the workers killed was a woman)."

Both the mine management and government officials are worried about this new labor militancy. A wealthy labor contractor told Singh that "they are not the same old workers." And a high police official lamented, "These same workers used to be so peaceful."

500 Rally at Kent State

About 500 persons attended a rally at Kent State University in Ohio on July 22 to protest administration plans to build a \$6 million gymnasium on part of the hillside where four antiwar demonstrators were killed by National Guardsmen in May 1970.

Speakers at the rally included Alan Canfora, a former student who was wounded during the shooting; Alyson Kennedy, Socialist Workers Party candidate for mayor of Cleveland, Ohio; and representatives of the Kent State student government, a Black student organization, and a faculty union.

On July 25, an Ohio judge lifted a temporary ban on construction of the gym. Early the next morning, workers began erecting a six-foot-high chain link fence around the site.

At a closed meeting held July 26, the

Kent State University board of trustees voted 7-2 to begin construction of the gym.

The judge also issued an order permanently barring the May 4 Coalition from the construction site. The coalition led a two-month-long occupation of the hillside that ended when police removed protesters on July 12. (See *Intercontinental Press*, July 25, p. 855.)

Representatives of the coalition announced that preparations for a new demonstration had begun.

Armed Clashes Between Egypt and Libya

The frequent verbal confrontations between the Egyptian and Libyan regimes erupted into a four-day armed conflict July 21.

Each government blamed the other for provoking the fighting. The Egyptian regime of President Anwar el-Sadat claimed that Libyan forces had attacked the Egyptian village of Salum. Libyan officials said the attack followed Egyptian incursions into Libya. The military communiqués issued by both governments were conflicting and no reporters were allowed near the border area.

On July 22, Egyptian officials admitted that its planes had bombed and strafed an air base outside the Libyan city of Tobruk. In a speech the same day, Sadat referred to Libyan head of state Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi as a "maniac." Sadat declared, "Yesterday and today our armed forces gave him a lesson he could never forget."

In the next two days other Egyptian raids were also reportedly carried out, including more against the Tobruk air base and one against Libyan radar installations and an airfield at the Kufra oasis, 500 miles south of Tobruk. The Egyptian regime admitted that two of its planes had been shot down during the attacks.

Following mediation efforts by Algerian President Houari Boumédiène and Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, Sadat ordered a tentative cease-fire July 24. He also sent a list of conditions to Qaddafi, indicating that new Egyptian attacks might be launched if they were not met. The conditions included removal of an electronic surveillance system on the Libyan side of the border and an end to Libyan political "agitation" in Egypt, the Sudan, and Chad.

FROM OUR READERS

Apparently word is getting around about Bob Pearlman's article "Spartacist: The Making of an American Sect" published in our June 6 and 13 issues. Since our last report additional requests for it have come from different areas in California.

These two issues of *Intercontinental Press* can be obtained by sending \$1.50 to our Business Office.

D.L. of Ann Arbor, Michigan, sent this note with a one-year subscription:

"If possible, I'd like to make the subscription for the period of 1 Jan. 1977 to 31 Dec. 1977, and thus get the back issues for the first part of this year."

No problem at all. A one-year subscription can begin any time—even last year.

Or, if you're late in renewing your subscription for whatever reason, you can write us as E.S. of Carlsbad, California, did and we'll be glad to comply:

"Please pick up my renewal from the beginning of May, as you indicated was possible. . . ."

P.M., Toronto, Ontario, renewed his subscription, explaining:

"I don't want to have spaces in my collections so could you send me those issues which have come out since it ran out. I believe it ran out with May 30. I have that issue but no more have come."

T.M., a subscriber in Jersey City, New Jersey, solved the gap between expiration and renewal in a different way:

"Please start with No. 27, July 18. I picked up the missing issues on the newsstand. Many thanks for your fine publication."

J.L. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, wrote: "The enclosed is payment for complete series of issues from the years 1975 and 1976. . . . I would also like to purchase the first 12 issues of Volume 15 [1977] and numbers 14-18 as well."

J.L., in another letter, asked us to send one copy each of our April 11 and May 30 issues to the *Iran Free Press* in Washington, D.C. Both issues contain material on Iran.

Complete volumes of *Intercontinental Press* are still available for the years shown in the ad below.

The Postal Service doesn't seem to have improved any during the past weeks. Some mail just doesn't get there.

For instance, D.A., Los Angeles, California, writes:

"This is to alert you to the fact that I have not received an issue of *Intercontinental Press* since the March 21, 1977 (#10) copy. I am certain that my subscription has not yet lapsed, since I renewed for a six month period last December. In any event, I did not receive the usual notices to that effect.

"I would greatly appreciate clarification on this matter and, of course, copies of the issues due me should that be the case. Information as to exactly when my subscription ends would also be helpful since I intend to extend it."

D.A.'s alert enabled us to set matters right. His name had been taken off our list because the post office returned a copy stamped "Moved, not forwardable"—another postal goof. . . .

V.H. of San Francisco, California, had the same experience because the post office returned a copy of *Intercontinental Press* stamped "undeliverable."

"Help! I have received no issues of IP from No. 10 on. Please check your records. My sub doesn't run out till Dec. I believe."

But whatever is wrong with the Postal Service now, Postmaster General Benjamin F. Bailar has come up with a scheme that will take care of everything: a dual rate for first-class postage—up 3 cents an ounce for business to 16 cents, a "citizen rate" of 13 cents for others.

How to distinguish between business and citizen mail? Business mail will bear a typed delivery address; citizen mail will bear a handwritten address and/or a handwritten return address. In addition, the "citizen rate" will be available only for envelopes of standard size, shape and thickness that can fit in mail-handling machines.

Suppose a "citizen" has been in the



BAILAR: Technology is bunk—13 cents handwritten; 16 cents typewritten.

habit of typing envelopes for personal mail? You can go to the post office and explain to a clerk that you're not a business, you're a citizen. If the explanation doesn't convince the clerk, you can add another 3-cent postage stamp and let the letter go through as business. Or you can prepare another envelope, writing the delivery address by hand.

The Postmaster General has a couple of other schemes, too. He is still considering ending Saturday mail deliveries and also considering further closings of small post offices. He said, according to the *New York Times* of July 7, that he hoped the new "citizen rate" for individual letters would "produce a climate of public acceptance of our cost-cutting measures."

Herblock in his cartoon expresses our reaction to Bailar's schemes to a "t." □



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