

Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 15, No. 14

© 1977 by Intercontinental Press

April 18, 1977

75¢

More Powers Stick Fingers Into Zaire Civil Conflict



MOBUTU: Seeks help to stabilize dictatorial regime.

By Pierre Frank

Giscard's Defeat in the French Elections

Back to Secrecy in Disarmament Talks

By Joseph Hansen

In face of Carter's insistence that the March 28-30 "arms limitation" conference between Vance and Brezhnev was productive, the voices depicting it as a disaster have died down. The consensus among the commentators now is that Carter scored some telling propaganda points.

The cynical editors of the London *Economist*, for instance, remarked in the April 9 issue:

By a master stroke of Soviet diplomacy, Mr Brezhnev has now presented himself to the world as the great opponent of disarmament as well as of human rights. He has simultaneously strengthened President Carter's claim—which he is now using in a nose-to-nose chess game—to be the champion of both. For the first time in many years, an American secretary of state went to Moscow with an armful of detailed proposals that would involve the two superpowers in actually disarming, not just in regulating the progress of their nuclear arms race. Mr Brezhnev publicly slapped him down. No discussions, no suggested amendments, no new counter-proposals: just a flat rejection. Mr Brezhnev even contrived to encourage the idea that his refusal to talk about disarmament had something to do with his anger at Mr Carter's stand on human rights.

Since, on paper, the Soviet leaders have long been solemnly committed both to disarmament and to the coexistence of different political systems, they must lose credibility—on both counts—when they depict themselves as too miffed even to discuss arms cuts merely because the Americans are, as Americans should be, speaking up against oppression and for freedom of debate. Mr Carter is being true to his system: Mr Brezhnev, in rejecting all criticism, to his.

Jackson Ecstatic

As for the domestic front, which was what Carter primarily had in mind in his "arms limitation" maneuver, Mary McGroary, who plays the liberal side of the street, put it aptly, if wryly, in her April 9 column:

He sent Cyrus Vance off to negotiate a new era in peace. Vance went to Moscow, opened his briefcase and put his offer on the table. Leonid Brezhnev gave him a couple of hours to get out of town.

A fiasco? Not at all. It was a success, Carter told the American people, and if we have one more like it, I'll start up the arms race again.

Nobody seemed disturbed. Looked at in a certain way, it was a triumph. He didn't disarm the Soviets. But he disarmed Henry Jackson, who told Carter to "hang tough."

Jackson was ecstatic about Carter's offer to the Soviets. It couldn't have been better if he had written it himself.

Carter may not have a treaty, but he has the votes in the Senate, and the cold warriors have joined his fan club.

Jackson's stand is important to Carter. The anti-Soviet crusader is a senior member of the Armed Services Committee and chairman of the Senate subcommittee on a treaty limiting strategic arms. In fairness to the senator, however, it should be noted that he was not altogether uncritical of Carter's Moscow ploy. At an April 5 breakfast meeting with reporters, according to the *New York Times*, he said:

Frankly I would not have gone public on this. I suspect the Soviets have never been approached this way with a public buildup. It is something that should be reviewed by this Administration.

Kissinger, too, implied that he was critical of Carter's tactical approach, particularly the public "rhetoric." In his first public speech since leaving office, given April 5 at Georgetown University, he said among other things:

Whether reductions should be sought in one major step or several; whether the result of negotiations conducted over a period of years by the top leaders of both countries should be set aside or built upon, are matters of tactical judgment.

Negotiations must proceed in a calm, nonconfrontational way without self-imposed deadlines or rhetorical battles that publicly stake the prestige of both sides.

'Partners'

Moscow's first attempt to counter the gains made by Carter came in the form of a speech assigned to Gromyko.* The well-trained bureaucrat mounted the tub, twitched his tail, and gave a roar.

Even then, the scruffy lion made clear that he was only voicing a sad complaint and that there were no "insurmountable obstacles" to renewing the talks.

Lest Gromyko's roar might have sounded too "harsh," thus frightening the new president of the United States, Brezhnev in turn mounted the tub on April 5. Keeping his rhetoric down to a modest bray, he said that "a reasonable accommodation is possible" in arms control if the United States seeks "mutually acceptable solutions not in words but by deeds."

He blamed Washington for lack of progress but held that relations could be repaired and a new treaty achieved for the limitation of strategic arms:

Objectively speaking, there would seem to be a rather good basis, especially in Soviet-American relations, for practical steps in that direction.

* See *Intercontinental Press*, April 11, page 378.

That basis, of course, would have to be strengthened and expanded. But recent contacts and talks have shown that instead of moving forward, our partners have been losing their constructive approach and have been keeping, so far, to a one-sided position.

"Partners"—that's the American imperialists Brezhnev is talking about. The word was well-chosen, for that is precisely how the Kremlin boss views himself, a partner of Wall Street in maintaining the status quo against the revolutionary pressures mounting throughout the world.

Through the Garage

Anatoly F. Dobrynin took the next step. The Soviet ambassador returned from Moscow on April 5. Two days later, Washington reporters accidentally noticed his limousine parked in the State Department's garage. The discovery compelled the State Department to disclose that Dobrynin had telephoned Secretary of State Vance April 6 to ask for a secret meeting.

The press learned that among the subjects discussed was the possibility of advance negotiations in Geneva to renew discussions before a planned meeting set for late May between Gromyko and Vance.

Dobrynin's visit apparently coincided with a White House decision to shift tactics. Paul C. Warnke, Carter's arms control chief, told reporters about the shift at a breakfast meeting April 7, the same day Dobrynin went through the State Department's garage to meet Vance.

According to the *New York Times*, Warnke "said the Government was concerned about the public debate around the rejection of the American proposals and was now seeking 'immediate negotiations with the Soviet Union which would not be public.'"

For Carter, who is agile if nothing else, the shift to secret diplomacy came easily. First of all, the State Department is not without experience in proceeding behind closed doors; secondly, the blame for resorting to such ways was neatly fixed on Moscow, with the new president shining as an advocate of aboveboard discussions open to public observation.

Love Letter From Brezhnev

To show his readiness to mollify the hurt feelings of the Kremlin leaders, Carter said April 8 that in private correspondence Brezhnev had assured him that the Soviet Union was as serious as the United States about an eventual agreement on the limitation of strategic arms.

Carter added that a full reading of the transcript of the conversations between Brezhnev and Vance was also a source of optimism for him.

As a further concession, he said that his administration is "reassessing some objections raised by the Russians to see whether there would be some fair alternative to both sides."

He still felt that the proposals made by Vance at the Moscow conference were completely fair; but if the current reassessment should reveal a long-range inequity with respect to the Russians, he would "be very eager to change it."

Reporters questioned Carter about his private correspondence with Brezhnev. The president fobbed them off by saying that it was "a routine sort of exchange, nothing dramatic or startling." Carter, like his predecessors in the White House, stands for the sanctity of private letters.

The tragedy for humanity in this obscene diplomatic jockeying is that no effort at genuine disarmament is involved. Seated on their stockpiles of nuclear arms, either of which is capable of destroying all human beings many times over, Carter and Brezhnev are haggling over items that do not affect their overall death-dealing capacities—the cruise missile, the so-called Backfire bomber, some slight cuts in nuclear weapons.

In an article in the April 3 *New York Times*, when the editors of that paper were of the opinion that Carter had lost a round, John W. Finney discounted the supposed setback. He put the current negotiations in the following framework:

In 1963, they finally agreed on a limited test ban treaty, primarily because they had developed about all the atomic warheads they needed and any improvements could be obtained through underground testing. They also agreed on a treaty banning nuclear weapons on the seabeds, mostly because neither could figure out much reason for putting them there. They banned nuclear weapons in outer space because it was much easier and more reliable to fight with atomic weapons based on earth. And they agreed to stop production of biological weapons because they seemed superfluous when they already had the power of the apocalypse on their hands.

Clearly it would be a fatal policy to rely on either Washington or Moscow to halt the arms race and dismantle their nuclear stockpiles. The hope for peace will remain illusory so long as the imperialist powers and their "partners" in the Kremlin remain in control. Eventually both will be ousted by insurgent masses committed to socialism. The struggle for this outcome is the one that counts. □

Copies Missing?

Keep your files of Intercontinental Press complete and up-to-date. Missing issues for the current year may be ordered by sending 75¢ per copy. Write for information about previous years.

Intercontinental Press
P.O. Box 116
Varick Street Station
New York, N.Y. 10014

In This Issue

Closing News Date: April 11, 1977

| | | |
|------------------|-----|---|
| FEATURES | 428 | <i>Out Now!</i> —Chapter 24: The Vietnam Moratorium—by Fred Halstead |
| FRANCE | 412 | Giscard's Regime Suffers a Defeat in Elections—by Pierre Frank |
| | 416 | Two Revolts in SP—by F.L. Derry |
| | 417 | Pollution—An Important Issue in Election—by F.L. Derry |
| ZAIRE | 418 | Growing International Involvement in Conflict—by Ernest Harsch |
| SPAIN | 420 | Communist Party Legalized—by Gerry Foley |
| ITALY | 421 | Italian CP Chiefs Make New Concessions to Capitalists—by Gerry Foley |
| ROMANIA | 422 | Stalinist Thugs Attack Human-Rights Fighters |
| BRITAIN | 423 | Big Business Salutes Callaghan's Pact With Liberal Party |
| | 431 | The Case of the Disappearing Letters to Soviet Dissidents |
| ARGENTINA | 424 | Interview With a Former Political Prisoner |
| SOVIET UNION | 425 | Grigorenko Issues Appeal to West European CPs—by Marilyn Vogt |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 426 | An Appeal for Support to Charter 77—by Petr Uhl |
| SOUTH AFRICA | 432 | The U.S. Corporate Stake—by Ernest Harsch |
| NEWS ANALYSIS | 410 | Back to Secrecy in Disarmament Talks—by Joseph Hansen |
| CAPITALISM | | |
| FOULS THINGS UP | 436 | SST Foes Plan Protest at Kennedy Airport |
| SELECTIONS | | |
| FROM THE LEFT | 438 | |
| AROUND THE WORLD | 440 | |
| DRAWINGS | 409 | Mobutu Sese Seko; 413, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing; 422, Nicolae Ceausescu; 423, James Callaghan—by Copain |

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Varick Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Published in New York each Monday except the first in January and the third and fourth in August.

Application to mail at second-class postage rates is pending at New York, N.Y.

Editor: Joseph Hansen.

Contributing Editors: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

Editorial Staff: Michael Baumann, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Susan Wald, Steve Wattenmaker, Judy White.

Business Manager: Pat Galligan.

Copy Editors: Jon Britton, Fred Murphy, Sally Rhett.

Technical Staff: Paul Deveze, Ellen Fischer, Larry Ingram, Arthur Lobman, James M. Morgan. Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material stands on the program of the Fourth International.

Paris Office: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guéméné, 75004, Paris, France.

To Subscribe: For one year send \$24 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Varick Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail.

For airmail subscriptions in Europe: Write to Pathfinder Press, 47 The Cut, London SE1 8LL. In Australia: Write to Pathfinder Press, P.O. Box 151, Glebe 2037. In New Zealand: Write to Socialist Books, P.O. Box 1663, Wellington.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Varick Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Intercontinental Press is published by the 408 Printing and Publishing Corporation, 408 West Street, New York, N.Y. 10014. Offices at 408 West Street, New York, N.Y.

Copyright © 1977 by Intercontinental Press.

Giscard's Regime Suffers a Defeat

By Pierre Frank

[The following article appeared in the March 31 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

The municipal elections held in France March 13 and March 20 have an importance that goes well beyond the local context in which they took place, first of all because of the situation in the country and second because everyone viewed them primarily as a kind of "first round" prelude to the legislative elections to be held in March 1978, if not before.

France is one of the four countries of Western Europe in which the crisis of capitalism is preparing great struggles which will not be limited to the economic questions over which they will probably break out. In face of the economic crisis, the Raymond Barre government, formed last autumn, has implemented an "austerity plan" which essentially amounts to a barely concealed plan to freeze and even reduce wages. Under the terms of the plan, wages cannot rise by more than the increase in the officially recognized price index. In the meantime, after approving a balanced budget for 1977, the government has since been compelled to present a "corrective" bill which records an initial deficit of 10,000 million francs (about \$2,000 million)—and the first quarter of the year is not over yet. The trade deficit for last year was more than 21,000 million francs and the balance of payments deficit was 27,500 million francs. The exchange value of the franc has declined by about 17% in the course of one year. Production is stagnating, except in the automobile industry. Unemployment will inevitably rise under the Barre plan. Officially, one million people are listed as unemployed, but the real figure is more like a million and a half. Unemployment has risen 4.6% during the past two months. Among the unemployed, 48% are less than 25 years old and 41.2% are women. Such is the economic situation after six months of a government headed by the man President Giscard d'Estaing has called "the best economist in France." The only positive result this government can boast about is the reduction of the rise of the cost of living index to 0.3% for January 1977; but it is notorious that this index, false even in normal times, was further rigged on the eve of the elections.

In a previous article in *Inprecor* (No. 57, September 9, 1976), written on the occasion

of the change in government at the end of last summer, we explained the factors that had provoked division among the bourgeois leadership. After the cantonal elections (March 1976), which recorded an advance for the Union de la Gauche (Union of the Left, the bloc of the Socialist party, Communist party, and Left Radical politicians), Jacques Chirac, who was then prime minister, began beating the drums for early legislative elections, his aim being to catch the Communist and Socialist parties unawares. Giscard opposed this, suggesting that even if the Union de la Gauche won the 1978 elections, he would stay in office until the end of his term, 1981. Clearly, he believed that by keeping his post even if the 1978 elections went against him, he would be in a position to retain control of the situation when the inevitable crisis broke out between the Union de la Gauche and his government. Dismissing Chirac, he called upon Barre to draw up a "plan" aimed at bringing about an improvement in the economic situation before the 1978 elections.

Tension between Giscard and Chirac has steadily increased since then, and the municipal elections brought this tension to the surface in a striking manner. Giscard won the CNPF, the French employers organization, over to his side against Chirac. Chirac retaliated by creating a sort of association of small and middle-sized entrepreneurs, leaders of the unions of supervisory personnel, and leaders of the big peasantry. (The association is known as the GIR, Initiative and Responsibility Groups.) Up to now, this has not amounted to much and it is doubtful that such an association has a great future. On the other hand, Chirac does command a solid political machine, the old Gaullist UDR (Union of Democrats for the Republic), which has since been transformed into the RPR (Rally for the Republic). The RPR's caucus in parliament has sufficient strength to force early elections at any moment.

With arrant clumsiness, Giscard decided to use the municipal elections to challenge Chirac and the RPR. The Gaullists have held the majority of the Paris city council ever since 1947, when De Gaulle managed to have his mafia elected behind the leadership of his own brother, who has since died. The Paris elections took on special importance this year because the capital city now has a new status. For the first time, a mayor of Paris will be elected—a person who, in terms of the

number of votes he represents, will be the second-most powerful figure in the country and could thus become a competitor of the president. Giscard's candidate for this post was Michel d'Ornano, the present minister of industry, close to Giscard both personally and politically. The aim was to cut down on the number of Gaullist elected officials. In other words, it was an attempt to challenge the RPR and simultaneously carry off a very ripe plum. Under the Fifth (Gaullist) Republic, the president of the republic must be an uncontested figure, in particular not dependent on what is essentially a rump parliament; such is the fundamental exigency of the Bonapartist constitution, which was tailored to fit De Gaulle. But since his election, Giscard has exhibited enormous weakness, and since he dismissed Chirac as prime minister, incident after incident has reduced the Bonapartist aspect of the regime to nothing. The parliament has become unmanageable, the president contested by the very majority which elected him (just barely). The RPR rose up in arms after Giscard's designation of d'Ornano, and, rising to the challenge, Chirac decided to counterattack by presenting himself as the Gaullist candidate for mayor of Paris. His objective, although he denied it, was clear: to create a current in his support which, after winning him the mayoralty of Paris, would carry him into the presidency. Toward this end he relied on his Parisian petty-bourgeois base, among other things.

The election campaign in Paris set the national political tone, one of division in the bourgeois camp, even though nearly everywhere else the candidates of the presidential majority (whether Giscardians or Chirac supporters) defended themselves against the Union de la Gauche. We will leave aside the many incidents, great and small, which marked this campaign, except to mention that in the Paris municipality the crisis of bourgeois leadership was expressed in an exchange of public letters among ministers which was so heated that it nearly broke up the unity of the government.

As far as the Union de la Gauche is concerned, there is little to say about its behavior during the campaign. A certain degree of rivalry between the Communist and Socialist parties continued to exist, but it remained limited to the first round vote in seventeen cities with populations greater than 30,000, for it was understood that wherever SP and CP candidates were running against each other on the first

round, both parties would support the leading candidate on the second round. This agreement was implemented everywhere, without the slightest discord. The leadership of the Communist party, which had been burned by the by-elections which had occurred since 1974, tried to avoid clashes with the Socialist party, provided the latter would not take too much distance from the CP. Places were left open on the Union de la Gauche lists for some "Left Radicals," "left Gaullists," and members of the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU—United Socialist party), but in nearly all cities the lists were made up in their great majority of members of the Socialist and Communist parties.

In many cities "ecology" candidates ran in the elections; they were most often difficult to classify politically before the second round. To a not inconsiderable extent this phenomenon is a by-product of May 1968, which generated a reaction against the "consumer society," as well as a desire to "change life," the development of consciousness of the dangers of pollution, the dangers of the nuclear industry, and so on. In general the people who first began to conduct "ecologist" propaganda were known to consider themselves as among the left, such as Professor René Dumont. Since then, however, the issue has been taken up by all sorts of people, some quite sincere, others simply looking for a way to gain personal publicity. These candidates scored relatively high votes on the first round, to such an extent that the distribution of their votes on the second round could have been decisive in about fifteen cities. It should be added that wherever pre-election polls indicated that the ecology lists would win some success, all the candidates—including, of course, those who had done their best in the recent past to pollute the cities and make life there unbearable—suddenly became warm partisans of ecology and began making the most glorious promises, never giving a thought to the social spending that would be necessary to carry these promises out. The candidates of the presidential majority thus forgot all about the "Barre plan." In general, those who voted "ecology" on the first round cast their second-round ballots for the candidates of the Union de la Gauche in considerable proportions, although the ecology candidates themselves did not issue any call for support to any particular list on the second round.

Let us now examine the overall results, the results in Paris, and finally, the results of the revolutionary lists, as well as the conditions under which they were formed.

Electoral victory of the Union de la Gauche

Except for Paris, the Union de la Gauche won an incontestable victory even on the first round. Its second-round victory was so great that even Minister of the Interior Michel Poniatowski could no longer find any way to present the figures in any other

way. The Union de la Gauche now controls 70% of the cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants (155 out of 221). The government candidates had previously controlled fifteen of the country's twenty largest



GISCARD D'ESTAING

cities; the Union de la Gauche now controls twelve. The Socialist party was the big winner, now directing 80 cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants. It should be emphasized that before these elections, in the cities which the SP already controlled, it was generally on the basis of combinations with the center bourgeois parties. But this time the SP won these cities by ousting the members of the bourgeois formations from the city councils and replacing them with members of the Communist party. This was the case in Marseille and Lille, for example.

The CP also benefitted extensively from the Union de la Gauche victory. It now controls 22 cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants. In addition to Havre, it now also directs such important cities as Reims, Le Mans, Saint-Etienne, and others. In addition, the CP will have council members in many cities with Socialist mayors. Since the Union de la Gauche was formed, second-round Communist votes have gone almost exclusively to SP candidates who lead in the first round, but the reverse had not always occurred. This time, however, second-round Socialist votes went to CP candidates without any important exceptions.

In the municipalities in the Paris region the Union de la Gauche further reduced the number of people who cast ballots for bourgeois parties. One point quite characteristic of these elections was that the Union de la Gauche swept the West of France, a region which had been one of the most conservative in the country, a result of the influence of the Catholic church. There were also some important Union de la Gauche successes, although with some delay and less force, in the East, the other large conservative region of the country.

The presidential majority is composed of three factions: the RPR, the Independent Republicans (Giscard's party), and other varieties of bourgeois centrists. In the provinces all these factions suffered defeat. They all tried to console themselves by citing the cities they managed to retain control of with great difficulty.

The vote in Paris

Paris—that is, the section of the Paris region which *administratively* constitutes the city of Paris—is a particular case in the sense that for years the regime has deliberately provoked the displacement of large numbers of workers from the city itself. Thus, since 1971 there has been a decline of about 300,000 voters; the number of workers living in the city has fallen 26%, while the number of well-off white-collar workers and members of the liberal professions has risen by the same figure. It was because Paris has undergone such a sociological transformation that the bourgeoisie believed it possible to give itself a mayor of Paris, which it has rarely done during the two centuries it has been ruling the country. Hence, a gigantic thrust to the left would have been required to oust the bourgeoisie from the Hôtel de Ville, the city hall.

The shift to the Union de la Gauche which occurred throughout the country was also manifested in Paris, to a relatively appreciable extent considering the social composition of the city. On the first round the candidates of the Union de la Gauche won 600,000 more votes than they had in 1971 (the previous municipal elections); on the second round they gained 3% over their score in the presidential election in 1974. The result is that the Union de la Gauche not only preserved the five sectors it had held previously but also gained a new sector in the center of the city, thus increasing its number of council seats.

But the bourgeois parties continued to hold the majority, and it was between them that the struggle was fierce. Chirac clearly beat Giscard, whose stalking horse, d'Ornano, was beaten by the Union de la Gauche in the 18th arrondissement. Other anti-RPR Giscard supporters were also beaten, such as the government minister Françoise Giroud. Chirac will thus become the mayor of Paris, heading up a city council composed of 52 candidates from

his own list, 17 from pro-Giscard lists, and 40 council members of the Union de la Gauche. Nevertheless, this Chirac victory, won at Giscard's expense, is not of such a character as to be able to give any great impetus to the RPR in counterbalancing the spirit generated throughout the country by the victory of the Union de la Gauche. We will return to this question when examining the prospects opened by the March 13 and 20 elections.

The revolutionary lists

Given the political importance of these municipal elections, the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR—Revolutionary Communist League, French section of the Fourth International), believed it was indispensable for candidates to run in a form suited to defending a revolutionary program. The election laws make it difficult to present such candidates. Unlike the legislative elections, the municipals require a relatively important local base, for one cannot become a recognized candidate without being inscribed on the voting lists of the city. Thus, being on the ballot in all the sectors of Paris meant presenting 200 candidates; the proportions are even higher in the provinces: in a city of about 200,000 inhabitants, Clermont-Ferrand for example, more than 80 candidates were needed. Another problem which had come up during by-elections in past months in the city of Tours and in one arrondissement in Paris was the competition resulting from the presentation of different candidates of far-left formations. In the two cases mentioned there were four or five such candidates; the voters were unable to distinguish the differences among them and the audience of each was consequently reduced.

The need to have a local base certainly limited the second danger, but did not eliminate it completely. Thus, the LCR proposed the formation of united lists, a proposal to which Lutte Ouvrière (LO—Workers Struggle) and the Organisation Communiste des Travailleurs (OCT—Communist Workers Organization) responded favorably. These three organizations signed a common national platform (see *Inprecor*, No. 66, January 27, 1977, for the text of the platform).¹ Other organizations which were in agreement with the platform and wanted to participate in the establishment of a common list and the waging of a common campaign in the framework of the political principles set down in the platform were invited to sign as well. The platform declaration put forward a revolutionary program against the capitalist system and warned the workers against the incapacity of the Union de la Gauche to resolve the prob-

lems and satisfy the demands of the workers. The platform also made it clear that the common lists, called "Pour le socialisme, pouvoir aux travailleurs" (For socialism, power to the workers), would support Union de la Gauche lists composed of candidates of the SP and CP on the second round.² Thus, revolutionary lists were presented in all eighteen sectors of Paris and in some thirty cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants.

Never had there been such silence about such lists on the part of the television, radio, and bourgeois press, as well as on the part of the parties of the Union de la Gauche. Although these lists were never mentioned before the first round, they received national attention after the voting. For never had revolutionary lists attained so many votes, never had they won such high percentages. The table records the scores achieved. It can be seen that the far-left lists generally doubled or tripled the scores they had received in the past. It should be noted that these percentages recurred in widely dispersed cities around the country. It should also be noted that in several cases even higher scores were achieved in working-class neighborhoods in some cities. Thus, in Nancy, where the revolutionary list won 8.3% of the vote overall, it won 14.4% in Haut-de-Lièvre, a concentration of several thousand workers; the list won 11% in the St-Epvre neighborhood. The same phenomenon occurred in Rouen, where the overall percentage was 7.6% but rose to nearly 11% in a concentration of railway workers. In Clermont-Ferrand, where the overall score was 5.6%, percentages in the working-class neighborhoods ranged from 8.1% to 8.3%. In Orléans, where the overall vote was 12%, it sometimes hit 17% and even 18% in one neighborhood, La Source, where the employees of the largest postal check-cancelling establishment in France live. If the results were low in Grenoble, Toulouse, and Montpellier, this was because in these cities the ecology lists placed themselves explicitly to the left of the Union de la Gauche and were sometimes allied to strong local groups, such as Lutte Occitane in Montpellier or the PSU. Even in Paris, the lists "Pour le socialisme, pouvoir aux travailleurs" achieved better scores than ever, even though the particular election conditions in this city extensively contributed to polarizing the first-round votes between the government majority and the list of the Union de la

2. To indicate its refusal to support the presence of Left Radicals or other bourgeois candidates, the LCR, for its part, called on people not to vote for lists associated with the Union de la Gauche when they were led by such candidates. This was the case, for example, in Perpignan. In such cases, voting for the Union de la Gauche list would have meant electing a city council under bourgeois leadership and not under the leadership of a workers party.

Gauche, since the latter seemed to have a serious chance of winning because of the division of the majority.

By all evidence, the results obtained by the revolutionary lists have a political significance which ought to be highlighted. There is no point in even bothering to answer certain journalists and Union de la Gauche candidates who claimed that the whole thing was the result of "mistakes" made by the voters—mistakes which seemed to have been committed roughly uniformly throughout the country. The leaders of the PSU explain the high scores by the fact that their own party did not run candidates, since they figured among the lists of the Union de la Gauche this time. There is no doubt that the revolutionary lists did pick up votes which had gone to the PSU in the past. But all this proves is that these votes were not the property of the PSU and that the voters concerned have not followed the PSU in its de facto integration into the Union de la Gauche. The political significance of the vote for the revolutionary lists is not affected by the votes cast in previous elections. The most one can say is that the present vote is more conscious politically than the old PSU vote.

It should also be noted that the revolutionary vote was high enough to give the two mass workers parties pause for thought, if only on the municipal level. Thus, in Saint-Etienne and Montpellier the local organizations of the Communist party agreed to give the floor to LCR militants during their meeting and also published the revolutionaries' communiqué announcing their withdrawal on the second round. In Lille the outgoing mayor, Pierre Mauroy, a leading Socialist who speaks in a different tone on a national scale, invited our comrades to participate in a press conference held before the second round. We have no illusions in these attitudes. We know what three or four thousand votes can mean to opportunists trying to get elected. But the fact is that this is a rather new situation, one which arises from changes in the relationship of forces.

The more general lessons which can be drawn from the scores of the revolutionary lists are as follows:

a. First of all, these results reflect the general current of radicalization advancing among the French working class. This current is certainly stronger than we could have thought, for during the past year the masses have been thrown onto the defensive as far as economic demands are concerned and have exhibited wait-and-see attitudes politically, because of the prospects of victory for the Union de la Gauche.

b. The results also testify that even before the entry of the Union de la Gauche into the government, there is already a relatively substantial current among the

1. See also *Intercontinental Press*, February 28, 1977, p. 212.—IP

workers which at least has doubts about the capacities and will of the parties of the Union de la Gauche and believes that it will be necessary to take things into its own hands in order to go further than these parties desire. As a whole, the vote for the revolutionary lists reflects not so much adherence to a precise program as distrust of the present policy and projects of the Union de la Gauche.

c. This vanguard current was able to make its weight felt because the three organizations (LCR, LO, and OCT) acted in a *united* manner in these elections (while not concealing, it should be noted in passing, the differences that divide them). This is an extremely important point, because this factor, unlike the two previous observations, is not an objective feature of the situation of the far-left organizations but is something which depends on them. This united action was able to give the mass parties of the working class pause for thought and contributed to electing working-class city councils in some areas. But it would be much more important and decisive if such unity were realized in other domains of the class struggle, domains in which the masses can intervene in other ways than with ballots, in which the slogans, objectives, and methods advanced by revolutionaries can allow for a much greater intervention than their numbers would appear to permit.

The prospects

Since the results have just been released, it is still a bit too early to draw definitive conclusions about the prospects. Raymond Barre, the head of the government, after noting the success of the Union de la Gauche, declared that the government would continue to apply his "plan" in the economic domain and called upon his "majority" (which has now become a minority in the country) to "unite" to win the 1978 legislative elections. Economically, the bourgeoisie, whether it supports Giscard or Chirac, has no choice as to the means by which to make the working masses bear the costs of the crisis. In the more strictly political realm, all factions of the bourgeoisie have responded to their defeat by screaming, "Unity, unity, unity." But unity behind whom? Unity how? Undoubtedly, there will be no lack of worthy souls to come forward with good advice for these gentlemen. But everyone knows that just as nothing succeeds like success, nothing heats up tensions and differences like defeat. The president and the head of the government now stand between a left which holds a majority in the country and a Gaullist party which, while asserting that it stands behind the chiefs of state and government, no longer has confidence in them and commands a position of strength in the capital itself. Attempts at reconciliation will be made, but there will inevitably be no lack of

Results of the Far Left in the Elections

| City | Presidential elections of 1974 (Krivine and Laguiller) | Municipal elections of 1977 |
|---------------|--|--------------------------------|
| Aubervilliers | 2.7% | 6.7% |
| Belfort | — | 4.7% |
| Besançon | 2.7% | 3.3% |
| Bordeaux | 1.7% | 4.6% |
| Bourges | 1.4% | 4.7% |
| Caen | 2.9% | 8.3% |
| Carcassonne | — | 6.0% |
| Cenon | 2.2% | 6.4% |
| Clermont | 2.8% | 5.6% |
| Colombes | 2.5% | 4.8% |
| Dijon | 1.9% | 5.2% |
| Grenoble | 1.9% | 1.4% |
| Lille | 2.4% | 6.4% |
| Lyon | 1.8% | 5.5% |
| Marseille | 1.8% | 1.8% |
| Montbeliard | 2.2% | 9.5% |
| Montpellier | 1.6% | 1.9% |
| Nancy | 1.6% | 8.3% |
| Orléans | 2.05% | 12.0% |
| Paris | — | 2.88% |
| Perpignan | 2.0% | 3.1% |
| Rennes | 2.2% | 2.31% |
| Rouen | 2.0% | 7.6% |
| St-Etienne | 2.2% | 3.2% |
| St-Ouen | 2.8% | 9.5% |
| Strasbourg | 1.1% | 5.0% |
| Toulouse | 2.2% | 1.9% |
| Tours | 1.3% | 4.2% |
| Vierzon | — | 4.6% |
| Villeurbanne | — | 2.4% |
| Venissieux | — | 9.8% |

opportunities for tensions to be manifested. And neither Giscard nor Chirac has any real possibility of asserting hegemony.

The government's policy can only accentuate the class struggle. The "Barre plan" is now moving to the attack in an area complementary to its attack on wages, that of social security, a particularly sensitive point for the workers at a time when unemployment is steadily rising. The workers have gained self-confidence through the municipal elections. The situation will thus be very favorable for actions that could bring down such a fragile government. In such a situation, what serves the bourgeoisie more than anything is the foot-dragging policy of the leaders of the Union de la Gauche. Their only objective is to win the 1978 elections, riding the current favorable to them while doing nothing to really utilize it.

The leadership of the CP is primarily busy savoring its electoral victories and consolidating its positions. For his part, SP leader François Mitterrand is no longer in a hurry to enter the government; he too, while sharpening up his sarcastic and derisive remarks about the men in power (a game in which he excels), is

thinking only about consolidating his party and avoiding adding fuel to the fire. In a television interview during the election campaign he expressed his fear that "the atmosphere of extreme polarization between now and March 1978 could be prejudicial to France and the French people."

The far-left has increased its forces of intervention in the class struggle, but not to the point that it could take decisive initiatives to set broad masses in motion. It is the development of the class struggle which could energize a spontaneous movement before 1978 which could upset the electoral calculations of the leaders of the Union de la Gauche. In any event, revolutionary militants, particularly those of the LCR, must more than ever call for action to oust Giscard, Barre, and Chirac, contrary to the leaders of the two mass workers parties and the two central trade-union federations, the CGT and the CFDT, whose eyes are fixed on 1978 while the government and employers are continuing their attacks on the living and working conditions of the working class.

March 20, 1977

Two Revolts in French SP

By F.L. Derry

PARIS—During the legislative by-elections last November, occasional reports in the press commented on possible internal unrest inside the Socialist party in Bordeaux. Many militants appeared to be upset about the decision to back Dr. Julien, a bourgeois Left Radical, as the common candidate of the Union of the Left. However, there was no public rupture.

Such was not the case in this year's municipal elections. In at least two cities, public revolts by SP members dealt heavy blows to the plans of the leaders of the Union of the Left to broaden the coalition by including Left Gaullists.

The revolt in Toulon seems to have ended in a split in the SP. Toulon is a large industrial city in southeastern France. The nearly 400,000 residents in the city and its associated suburbs make it the eleventh largest urban area in France. Moreover, the city has a militant tradition of working-class action. A semi-insurrection led by workers at an arsenal in 1935 was what convinced Trotsky that France was close to a revolutionary explosion. The upsurge came less than a year later, with the general strike of June 1936.

The arsenal is still the center of heavy industry in the area. Reports indicate that workers there were heavily represented among those who protested the addition of Vice-Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, a national leader of the Left Gaullists, to the list of candidates of the Union of the Left. Many of these workers were probably members of the Communist party and the CGT.¹ The SP National Executive Board's demand that Sanguinetti head the list of candidates seems to have pushed things to the point of an explosion. As head of the list, Sanguinetti would have been elected mayor in the event of a Union of the Left victory. The Communist party refused, probably as part of a factional maneuver to split the SP, proposing one of its own members to head the list.

On February 23, a trade-union demonstration against unemployment turned into an anti-SP action. As the marchers passed the Socialist headquarters, anti-SP chants were started, probably in the ranks of the CGT. This prompted both the FEN²

and CFTD³ to leave the march.

It is still unclear whether this action was organized in advance by the CP and CGT leaders or whether it was a spontaneous response by workers at the arsenal. In any case, the CP soon after announced that it could not support a list headed by Sanguinetti and formed its own list.

This forced an open crisis between the majority of the local Socialists, who also opposed Sanguinetti, and the national SP leadership. On March 3, the SP leaders called on the people of Toulon to "have confidence in Admiral Sanguinetti as well as in the militants of the Left Radicals and Socialists." They publicly announced that any SP members who joined the CP list would be "committing a grave breach of discipline, placing themselves outside of the Socialist party."

This threat seems to have had little effect on the majority of the SP members in Toulon. That night a pact was signed for a joint slate of the SP dissidents and the CP. The slate was to consist of twenty-one Communists, twenty Socialists, and two independents named by the CP. The Sanguinetti slate, calling itself the "Union of the Left," consisted of Sanguinetti and his fellow Gaullists, the Left Radicals, and Socialists adhering to the line of the SP national leadership.

The Socialist militants in Toulon had been members of the CERES⁴ tendency in the SP. This tendency has, in the past, taken positions close to those of the CP on some issues. In the Toulon crisis, however, the CERES national leaders made clear that they were fervent supporters of Sanguinetti. CERES leaders who were national leaders of the SP were dispatched to Toulon and unsuccessfully tried to convince the dissidents to abandon their independent stance.

The first-round election gave the slate fielded by the SP dissidents and the CP more than 19,000 votes (23.64%), as compared to 11,000 votes (13.13%) for the Sanguinetti list.

The second round only compounded the dilemma of the SP leadership. While the national SP and even the Left Radicals gave their support to the joint CP-SP slate

for the second round, Sanguinetti refused. Early reports that he was calling for a vote for the slate of the workers parties were later denied at a special press conference. While withdrawing his candidacy he refused—"in order to avoid a scandal" in the Union of the Left—to take a position on how his supporters should vote in the second round. In other words, he urged his supporters to vote for the bourgeois slate. Many of them did so, and the slate of the workers parties was defeated.

The second revolt in the SP ranks occurred in Brive, a smaller city in central France. As in Toulon, the controversy centered on a leading Gaullist, in this case Jean Charbonnel, the incumbent mayor and a former Gaullist minister. He is also the national head of "La Fédération des Républicains de Progrès" (Federation of Republicans for Progress), the largest of the small Gaullist groupings that have joined the Union of the Left.

In an apparent effort to blackmail the SP and CP leaderships into giving him more weight in the Union of the Left electoral list, Charbonnel resigned from the agreed-upon slate and announced one of his own. The CP leadership issued a communiqué in which they called for rebuilding the joint list. The SP national leadership followed the same course.

Although it is not known whether an organized opposition developed inside the CP, it is known that many CP members publicly criticized the party's efforts to get the Gaullist back on the list.

The most vocal opposition, however, developed inside the SP. It is known that a number of SP activists and at least one leader resigned. SP members organized around the weekly journal *La Corréze Républicaine et Socialiste* waged a public campaign to prevent Charbonnel from getting back on the SP-CP list.

Efforts were made to launch another electoral list in the event that Charbonnel was returned. This new list would, presumably, have represented the point of view of SP and CP dissidents. A communiqué was issued stating the dissidents' intention to "work through our respective parties so as to break up this unnatural alliance." It called for the formation of a "list of left militants, excluding any alliance with the right," and asked all "militants and voters in Brive who wish to preserve the dignity and future of the left" to join them.

In the case of Brive, the SP leaders did not push the question to the point of a split with their local militants. They called on Jean-Pierre Chevènement, the national leader of the CERES tendency, to make one last attempt to convince the local SP members. Since the CERES is the "semiofficial left" of the SP, Chevènement spoke with some authority. His praise for the Gaullist Charbonnel was calculated to disarm the local militants. Charbonnel, Chevènement said, was a "prisoner of his electorate" but was moving toward the left.

1. Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor, strongly influenced by the CP).

2. Fédération de l'Éducation Nationale (National Education Federation, the country's largest teachers union).

3. Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail (French Democratic Federation of Labor, strongly influenced by the SP).

4. Centre d'Études, de Recherches et d'Éducation Socialistes (Center for Socialist Study, Research and Education).

However, the SP rebels refused to back down.

In the end, Charbonnel maintained his own list of Gaullists and Left Radicals. The SP national leadership, including "left-winger" Chevènement, continued to praise him lavishly and in effect urged a vote for him.

The official slate of the CP and SP was also maintained. Although the SP national leadership made clear that they were not supporting it, no one was excommunicated, as was the case in Toulon. Unfortunately, with the support of voters from the right, Charbonnel won the election in the second round. □

27% said they supported the center, right, or far right; 36% said they supported the left; and 23% said that they supported the "far left." However, when it came to choosing between different parties rather than expressing general political sympathies, 33% had no party preference. Among the parties of the left, the Socialist party received the support of 29%, while the CP received the support of only 3%.

The general picture seems to be that of a newly radicalizing layer, with general sympathies for the left but retaining a strong mistrust of all the organized groupings. Although the SP has been able to make some gains out of this movement, clearly the CP has not, providing another example of the fact that the image of the Union of the Left is becoming tarnished. This helps account for the strong general sympathies for the "far left," although in the eyes of the environmentalists no party has emerged as a fighting champion against pollution.

The environmentalists' mistrust toward the CP and SP is not misplaced. A party such as the CP, which in the middle of the election campaign launched a fight in defense of the Concorde with a threat to boycott American goods if the "flying ecological disaster" was not allowed to land in New York, cannot hope to win the confidence of these young radicals. While the Socialist party has been somewhat more agile in words, it has not taken the lead in organizing the mass demonstrations against the nuclear power plant at Fessenheim. For the SP, the pre-election period was not the correct time for demonstrations.

At times the SP was not able to conceal its real position. For example, SP leader Pierre Mauroy is quoted in the March 7 *Le Nouvel Observateur* as saying that "to reject nuclear power is a crime against intelligence."

It is not true that the environmentalists are "against progress." They are very much against the "destruction for profit" type of progress that takes place under capitalism. This is not against the interests of the workers but very much in their favor.

The fact that more than one-quarter of the voters for environmental candidates in Paris claimed sympathies with the parties of the right and center demonstrates the vitality, not the "reactionary nature," of the environmental movement.

In the cases in which the movement has taken the form of mass action, as in the numerous demonstrations against nuclear power plants, it has been able to mobilize people of all political persuasions, including those who in general support the bourgeois parties, and lead them into combat against a concrete expression of capitalist exploitation.

Regardless of the political beliefs of its participants, the struggle to protect the environment is an objectively anticapitalist struggle. □

Ecology Candidates Win 10% of Vote in Paris

Pollution—An Important Issue in French Election

By F.L. Derry

PARIS—Unrest inside the Socialist party is not the only sign of newly radicalizing layers' growing mistrust of the reformist leaders of the Union of the Left. Another such indication was the vote received by candidates running on a platform of defense of the environment.

In 1973, a local environmental group decided to run a candidate. To the surprise of most observers, he received 2.9% of the vote in the first round of the election in the city of Mulhouse in Alsace.

In the 1974 presidential election René Dumont ran as an environmental candidate and received 337,000 votes, 1.22% of the national total. From that point on, running in election campaigns has been considered one of the important tactics of France's rapidly growing anti-pollution movement.

In last year's cantonal elections, the environmentalists ran campaigns in several regions. In Alsace, they averaged more than 10% of the vote.

In last November's legislative by-election, the first antipollution candidate to run in Paris won 6.57% of the vote in the Fifth Arrondissement, compared to 11% for the Communist party. In the same district in the recent election, the environmental candidate received more than 14% of the vote, thus passing the previous tally of the CP.

The "green tide," as the environmental movement is sometimes referred to by the press, was represented by more than 1,200 candidates in the March municipal elections. In Paris they received more than 86,000 votes, 10.1% of the total. In Mulhouse they received more than 13%, and in Montpellier and Lyons, more than 10%. In many small towns in the Department of Haut-Rhin, the region of Alsace that has been one of the centers of struggle against nuclear power plants, they were in the leading position for the second-round runoff election.

How did a movement with no central organization and only a network of small committees receive such electoral support? The environmental movement seems to

have two major bases. One is in the "periphery" of France, regions such as Alsace, Brittany, Corsica, and Languedoc. The second is in a growing number of large cities, such as Paris and Lyons.

The periphery regions all have similar problems. They are areas of small peasants and fishermen who have come under heavy economic pressure from large agribusiness trusts based in the center of France. They have given rise to regionalist and nationalist movements aimed at protecting the local language, culture, and traditions from domination by the centralized French state.

The struggle against destruction of the environment is seen as one aspect of the defense of their way of life. Thus, for instance, one of the first actions in Corsica that was able to involve masses of people outside the traditional Corsican nationalist movement was the revolt of small Corsican fishermen, who in February 1973 protested the pollution of the Mediterranean by the Italian company Montedison.

Demonstrations in Alsace today, as well as in parts of Brittany, are directed against the construction of unsafe nuclear power plants. As long ago as May 7, 1972, 6,000 persons demonstrated against the construction of the giant nuclear plant at Fessenheim in Alsace. In these areas, the environmental movement has been able to touch a responsive chord, reaching small peasants, radical young people, and the generalized revolt against the suppression of the local language and traditions.

The situation is much different in cities such as Paris. A public opinion poll of potential environmental voters was published in the February 7 issue of the Paris weekly magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur*. This poll showed that the environmentalists were young (55% were under thirty-four years of age), rather well off (10% were blue-collar workers, 34% were white-collar workers, and 35% were professionals or executives), and tended either to sympathize with the left or to be suspicious of all parties.

In terms of general political sympathies,

Growing International Involvement in Zaïre Conflict

By Ernest Harsch

Charging that the Zaïrian regime was "a victim of armed subversive activities on its territory originating from abroad," French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing announced April 10 that a fleet of French transport planes would fly a contingent, expected to number 1,500 troops, of Moroccan forces to Zaïre. In reply to a question about the pilots, a government official said, "They are French officers, in uniform."

The day before, the Moroccan Foreign Ministry announced that an initial contingent, also reportedly numbering 1,500 troops, had arrived in Kinshasa, Zaïre's capital, in response to a request by Zaïrian President Mobutu Sese Seko.

The move comes in the face of continuing reverses suffered by the Mobutu regime, which admitted March 31 that its military headquarters at the town of Mutshatsha had been taken by anti-government Katangan troops. Mobutu has claimed that the Katangans, whom he termed "foreign mercenaries," first entered Shaba Province (formerly Katanga) March 8.

In addition to the aid from France and Morocco, Mobutu's other international allies—particularly the governments in the United States, Belgium, and China—have rushed in supplies to help bolster his dictatorial regime.

Although there have been no reports of further direct American assistance to Mobutu since President Carter approved an initial shipment of \$2 million worth of supposedly nonlethal supplies March 15, indirect backing has been given in the form of Washington's approval for the sending of Moroccan troops.

A State Department spokesman, Hodding Carter III, denied April 8 that Washington had encouraged or known in advance of the Moroccan military intervention. But Graham Hovey reported in the April 9 *New York Times*:

In response to questions, Mr. Carter said today that both by law and bilateral agreement, Morocco would have to obtain Washington's permission in advance if its army used American weapons outside Morocco. Morocco has received \$30 million in credits for fiscal 1977 for the purchase of American military equipment.

Although Administration officials were emphatic in saying that Washington had not encouraged the Moroccan decision, they made no secret in private of their hopes that King Hassan's soldiers could stabilize the military situation in Zaïre's Shaba Province, formerly known as Katanga.

Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that

the French government would have intervened in such a potentially explosive situation without securing Washington's approval in advance. Paris had already announced on March 18 that it would send emergency military supplies to help Mobutu defeat the Katangan forces. The French Foreign Ministry said that most of the supplies consisted of ammunition. It denied reports that French military advisers would also be sent.

The Belgian government—the former colonial master of Zaïre, when it was called the Belgian Congo—has also agreed to send in military equipment, offering up to thirty plane-loads of supplies. A representative of the Belgian Foreign Ministry declared March 16 that the supplies were being sent "in the name of our ties of friendship with Zaïre."

By taking action through these former colonial powers, Carter is seeking to avoid the impression that Washington is rushing into another foreign military adventure similar to the war in Vietnam, which would have disastrous results for his efforts to restore popular confidence in the White House.

In addition, the editors of the *Washington Post* pointed out March 25 that overt military backing to Mobutu could damage American interest throughout the African continent. "American involvement," they said, "even if token, is bound to stir African nationalism."

In these circumstances, Carter has gained a valuable assist from the Stalinist bureaucracy in Peking. A Zaïrian official announced April 7 that the Chinese regime has agreed to send Mobutu thirty tons of military equipment.

Peking has made no secret of its backing for Mobutu. The *People's Daily* said March 19, "We firmly support the just struggle of the Zaïrian armed forces and people in resisting foreign aggression and safeguarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity."

A Hsinhua News Agency dispatch of the same day explained this support in terms of Peking's rivalry with Moscow, which is alleged to be backing the Katangan forces. The Hsinhua dispatch began, "The recent armed invasion of the Republic of Zaïre by several thousand mercenaries from Angola shows that it is a premeditated and planned aggression engineered by the Soviet social-imperialists, another major step of the latter to intensify their infiltration and expansion in Africa."

The Chinese ambassador in Kinshasa

personally conveyed Peking's support to Mobutu March 24.

The Chinese Stalinists, in the interests of their own narrow factional conflict with Moscow, have gone so far as to approve Washington's involvement in Zaïre. According to a March 18 dispatch from Peking by *New York Times* correspondent William Safire, "A Chinese Foreign Ministry official says that his Government would have 'no reason' to oppose American aid to Zaïre if the United States aim is to aid the African country and 'to oppose Soviet expansionism' on the continent."

The official lamely added that if Washington aimed at "hegemony" in Africa, "then China will certainly oppose it."

The Mobutu regime has claimed that Soviet and Cuban troops are fighting with the Katangans, but has failed to present journalists with any proof. Both Moscow and Havana have denied involvement. Although the Katangan forces were based in northern Angola since the 1960s and were thought to have launched their actions from that country, the Angolan regime has also denied any direct role in the conflict.

Despite these denials and lack of proof, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called on the Carter administration to publicly condemn both Moscow and Havana. Speaking in Washington April 5, Kissinger declared,

Whatever the details of the current invasion of Zaïre, it is clear that the attack took place across a sovereign border from a country in which the government was installed by Soviet arms and the military personnel of a Soviet client state.

It could not have taken place—and it could not continue—without the material support or acquiescence of the Soviet Union—whether or not Cuban troops are present.

The American, Belgian, and French aid to Mobutu reflects the concern of the imperialist powers to protect their important stakes in the country.

Zaïre has huge mineral deposits, particularly in Shaba Province. It supplies about 7 percent of the world's copper, 67 percent of its cobalt, and a third of its industrial diamonds. It also produces manganese, tin, zinc, and other minerals. In December 1975, the country's first oil wells went into operation. U.S., Belgian, French, British, Japanese, and South African companies have significant investments there.

The biggest single concentration of minerals is at the mining complex of the state-owned Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gecamines) near Kolwezi. It is just

60 miles from the Katangan-held town of Mutshatsha.

Zaire's location in the center of the continent, as well as its size (it is the third largest African country), gives it a strategic importance. *Los Angeles Times* correspondent David Lamb noted April 1, "Washington considers Zaire economically significant and an important counterbalance to growing Soviet influence in Africa."

Since 1965, Washington has provided the Mobutu regime with more than \$250 million in economic and military assistance. In fiscal 1975, U.S. military assistance totaled \$3.8 million, but climbed to \$30.5 million by fiscal 1977. The Carter administration has asked Congress to approve \$32.5 million worth of military aid for fiscal 1978. Moreover, it was revealed in February that Mobutu has been a recipient of CIA money.

During the Angolan civil war, Mobutu displayed his usefulness to Washington by funneling money, arms, and mercenaries to the FNLA and UNITA, which were fighting against the MPLA* for control of Angola.

Whatever the aims of the Katangan forces, Washington and the other imperialist powers are concerned that the present conflict could weaken the Mobutu regime, possibly leading to its overthrow and thus endangering their interests.

The situation in Shaba itself remains obscure. Since journalists are barred from visiting the front lines, many of the news accounts of the military situation there are based on rumor or unconfirmed reports. Moreover, the local newspapers and radio have been silent on the fighting and Mobutu has installed censors at Kinshasa's telegraph office, from which most of the reports by foreign journalists are sent. A few foreign correspondents have been expelled for writing articles considered "demoralizing" by the regime.

In a communiqué released in Paris March 11, the Front National de Libération du Congo (FNLC—National Liberation Front of the Congo) claimed credit for the antigovernment actions in Shaba.

Many of the forces in the FNLC are thought to be troops who fought with the imperialist-backed Katangan secessionist movement of Moïse Tshombe in the early 1960s. After their defeat, they fled to northern Angola where they fought with the Portuguese colonialists against the Angolan liberation struggle. During the Angolan civil war they sided with the MPLA against the Zaïrian-backed FNLA and UNITA.

*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (Angolan National Liberation Front), União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), and Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola).



New York Times

The Lunda people of the area live on both sides of the Zaïrian-Angolan border. They have maintained family and social ties and frequently move back and forth across the border. Some also live in northern Zambia.

The aims of the Katangan forces are still unclear. According to some reports, they have once again raised the separatist flag. FNLC representatives, however, have stated that they are not secessionist. FNLC spokesman Matumba Cartier was quoted in the April 4 *Africa News* as saying that his group seeks to overthrow Mobutu's regime in Kinshasa and end "the exploitation of the Congolese people."

With the occupation of Mutshatsha, the Katangans are thought to hold about one-third of the province. In the March 24 *Washington Post*, correspondent Robin Wright described the situation in Mutshatsha shortly before it was taken. Wright reported that

the residents shun government troops. They scatter and hide when they see a government soldier and they refuse to provide food for the army. . . .

The African peasants who fled do not fear the militant Katangans. They are running from the government troops, men of alien tribes and other regions of the vast central African country.

A Zaïrian railway employee who said he witnessed the Katangan takeover of Mutshatsha said that the occupation had been "peaceful."

Murray Marder said in the March 19 *Washington Post*, "American intelligence assessments are reported to be pessimistic about the ability of Mobutu's army to cope with the current attack. . . ." According to similar intelligence sources, many of the Katangan advances have been made with little actual fighting, and there have been desertions from the Zaïrian army.

Carlyle Murphy reported in the March 19 *Washington Post* that, according to "informed sources" in Washington, Mobutu has been unable to halt the Katangan advance partly because of "profound disaffection" with his regime.

Discontent throughout Zaïre has been heightened by the country's severe economic problems. The fall in the world price of copper—Zaire's major export item—has greatly undercut the regime's foreign exchange earnings. Its foreign debts are estimated at more than \$2 billion, of which \$500 million is owed to U.S. banks. Inflation, which was about 30 percent in 1974, is now up to 60 percent. Corruption is widespread, there are food shortages in some urban centers, and unemployment is rising.

Besides the conflict in Shaba, there have been small-scale guerrilla actions for a number of years in several provinces, including Kivu, Kwilu, and Haut-Zaïre. Some have been carried out by former followers of Patrice Lumumba, the first president of the Congo, who was murdered in 1961 by imperialist-backed forces.

Since the conflict in Shaba began in early March, there have been new signs of unrest and discontent in other parts of the country. According to the March 30 *Le Monde*, leaflets have been distributed at some army camps accusing the high command of corruption and demanding "just treatment" for lower-ranking officers and troops. On March 29 an appeal was read over the national radio calling on troops to "remain loyal" to Mobutu.

In Kinshasa and the province of Bas-Zaïre, leaflets have also been distributed calling on the Bakongo people to rise up against Mobutu.

The Mobutu regime's growing isolation was most evident at a rally organized by the government in Kinshasa April 3. Although the rally was billed in advance as "the most gigantic demonstration in Kinshasa's history," the 40,000-seat stadium was filled to barely half its capacity. There was almost no cheering or other signs of enthusiasm.

Reporting from Kinshasa April 3, Robin Wright described the speech by Sakombi Inogo, the city's governor. "In one embarrassing moment," she said, "the governor shouted, 'We will vanquish, victory,' then threw up his arms as a gesture for cheers from the crowd. There was only silence. Sakombi repeated the cry in a louder noise, again throwing his arms upward. Silence again."

Large sections of the audience began to leave after about forty minutes. Soldiers closed the gates to prevent further departures.

Three days later Wright quoted a European businessman in Kinshasa as saying, "It's all building up against him [Mobutu], and not only in Shaba. I feel it among my African employees and associates." □

Communist Party Legalized in Spain

By Gerry Foley

On April 9, the eve of the Basque national holiday *Aberri Eguna*, the Suárez government legalized the Communist party.

The decision to register the CP as a legal party was made directly by the government after the Supreme Court refused to rule on the question. This action comes in the context of a new series of concessions.

Apparently, the government felt compelled to give more ground in order to stop a dangerous breach from opening up between it and the opposition parties. *Le Monde's* correspondent reported in the April 6 issue of the Paris daily:

If the CP is not legalized, several opposition parties (liberals, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Socialists) may decide not to participate in the elections, as they have made known. Such a defection of the moderate left would destroy the credibility of the democratization process.

Since the government's strategy for controlling the mass upsurge depends on the cooperation of the Communist and Socialist parties, in the present circumstances it had no alternative but to recognize the CP. This is particularly true in view of the deterioration in its relations with the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE—Spanish Socialist Workers party, the main Social Democratic formation).

The PSOE was pushed into a harder stance toward the government by indications that Suárez intended to continue relying on the fascist union and political apparatus, in refurbished form, to control the country—rather than open up space for the Social Democrats to play a leading role in parliament and in the labor movement.

Suárez has made new concessions apparently designed to entice the PSOE to return to a more conciliatory attitude. On March 30, his appointed parliament voted to grant the right of workers to organize in defense of their interests as workers, which presumably means that the illegal unions can now gain legal recognition. The vote was 320 to 41, with 41 abstentions.

It remains to be seen what the parliament's decision will mean in practice. Obviously a large part of the 150 members of parliament associated with the fascist union apparatus voted for this measure. It seems likely that they had some assurance that the bill did not mean the end of their role. Moreover, at virtually the same time this law was passed, the government banned a rally planned for April 2 in Madrid by the Workers Commissions, one

of the main independent unions.

On April 1, the government abolished the General Secretariat of the National Movement, the top body of the fascist "mass organizations," and thus the cabinet post assigned to the secretary general of this apparatus. The "minister for the Movement" had control over all matters involving sports, youth, and the family. The government announced that these responsibilities would be assumed by a special Undersecretariat of State. The concession, thus, may be only formal.

At the same time, the cabinet announced that the "press of the Movement," including about forty newspapers and dozens of radio stations, had been placed under the Ministry of Information. In itself, this is essentially a formal change. It remains to be seen if it will mean anything in practice.

It is likely that the government wanted to complete its latest series of concessions before *Aberri Eguna* (The Day of the Basque Nation), since it is in the Basque area that the political tensions are highest. In the December 15 referendum on the "democratic reform," the government's first experiment in using elections, close to a majority abstained in the Basque country.

The fight for amnesty for political prisoners has been concentrated in the Basque provinces, and in recent months there have been more and more violent confrontations between police and crowds demonstrating against repression. In the last few weeks, both the Spanish and international press have raised an alarm about the growing anger in the Basque country.

The headline of the lead article in the March 26 issue of the Barcelona weekly *El Mundo* was "The Basque Country Is Going Up in Flames." The article said:

According to our data, more than 150,000 persons—prisoners, exiles, relatives, sympathizers, innocent passers-by, and demonstrators have been directly or indirectly hit by repression in recent years. [The population of the Basque heartland is 2.5 million.]

In the April 3 issue of the *New York Times*, correspondent James M. Markham described an indiscriminate attack by Spanish police on a crowd in Zarauz, a town of about 10,000 inhabitants on the coast near San Sebastián.

Several thousand youths were squeezed into the small plaza on one recent Sunday when, at 10:15 P.M., six Land Rovers of the paramilitary

Civil Guard drew up and disgorged angry, uniformed men who began clubbing wildly with the butts of their submachine guns while others fired hard, round rubber bullets at short range. . . .

For two hours, the . . . guardsmen rampaged through the . . . streets of this . . . town, firing their guns wildly in the air and shouting insults and cries of vengeance for one of their number who was killed early that morning by Basque guerrillas.

"If you want war, you will have it," they shouted, and "Get him, get him—there goes another Basque."

Even as the Madrid government has been releasing some prisoners, Markham said, the jails have been filling up with others:

Juan Maria Bandres, a prominent lawyer, recently said that "the arrests have started again—and the tortures have resumed, above all at the level of the Civil Guard."

As Mr. Bandres spoke in his San Sebastian office, a colleague telephoned, saying that he had just returned from the Civil Guard headquarters. "He says they were torturing two of his clients, a 52-year-old woman and her daughter," related Mr. Bandres. "He just called to get it off his chest. The worst part is that the woman could hear her daughter's screams."

Even the head of the CP in the Basque province of Guipúzcoa was quoted as saying: "In this climate, to talk of elections will be totally hypothetical."

The government obviously hopes to quiet the Basque country somewhat by releasing more political prisoners a few at a time. But the return of jailed fighters has been greeted with militant demonstrations.

In its April 4 issue, the French Trotskyist daily *Rouge* reported that virtually the entire population of Sestao, an industrial suburb of Bilbao, turned out to welcome Maité Arévalo, who had been sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for associating with an illegal organization (Basque nationalist guerrillas) and participating in an armed attack.

On April 2, some 5,000 persons turned out in Bilbao to welcome Carmelo Garitao-nendia and Julen Arregui, members of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR—Revolutionary Communist League, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). The former had been sentenced to thirty-one years in prison in 1971. *Rouge* wrote:

"When the train pulled in, it was almost taken by storm. People sang *Eusko Gudariak* [Basque Warriors] and the *Internationale*. Carmelo and Arregui appeared at the door. . . . They began a chant picked up by the crowd: 'Presoak Kalera' [Free the Prisoners]." □

Intercontinental Press will give you a week by week analysis of the most important world events.

Subscribe now!

Italian CP Chiefs Make New Concessions to Capitalists

By Gerry Foley

"The governing Christian Democrats, who cling to power without a parliamentary majority, have been strengthened by an unusual agreement with Italy's trade unions on wages," *New York Times* correspondent Alvin Shuster wrote April 2 from Rome.

The "unusual agreement" was that for the first time, the union leaders let the government touch what they had previously maintained was "untouchable"—the sliding scale of wages.

The unions agreed March 30 to let the government remove urban transportation, newspapers, and electricity from the price index on which automatic cost-of-living increases are calculated. These were by no means minor concessions. Transport and electricity are necessities and account for a substantial part of workers' expenses. The prices of both are related to petroleum prices, which are rapidly increasing.

However, the most significant aspect of the agreement was that the union leaderships yielded on the principle of protecting workers' buying power.

Shuster pointed out the importance the sliding scale has had, quoting an unnamed Italian economist: "These cost of living clauses explain why the economy is in trouble but the Italians are not."

Now, apparently, the capitalist economy will be in less trouble, and the Italians, that is the masses of wage earners, in more. That is why the main party of the Italian capitalists was strengthened.

This reinforcement of the Christian Democrats' position would have been impossible without an assist from the Communist party, whose cadres dominate the union movement.

The CP compounded this favor on March 31, the day after the union agreement, by letting the Christian Democrats get a new austerity package through the Senate. The CP senators abstained, with the result that the bill passed with more abstentions than favorable votes.

But in contrast to the Christian Democrats, the CP was not strengthened. In fact, it has been showing more and more signs of malaise.

The union leaderships were not strengthened either. In fact, they appeared to be in more trouble.

On April 2 in Milan, delegates from 260 factory committees in Lombardy held a press conference. They announced:

"We challenge the agreement between the unions and the government on reducing labor costs [i.e., wages] because the

rank and file were not consulted on this question."

Such a reaction was evidently not unexpected by the top union bureaucrats. In an interview published in the February 21 issue of *Der Spiegel*, reporters for the West German weekly's business section pressed Luciano Lama, head of the Italian General Confederation of Labor, on the issue of the sliding scale:

"Why is the sliding scale such a sacred cow for you, even though it promotes inflation?"

Lama replied:

"The sliding scale is no sacred cow. . . . It is a very concrete means of defending the wages of the workers."

Lama, a leading CP member, was not impressed either by the argument that other top CP leaders such as Giorgio Amendola stress the need for subordinating wages to "productivity" and capitalist profitability:

"We have no time to write clever newspaper articles like Amendola. We have to convince our members that we are following a course that can defeat inflation."

The CP union head had already had to face widespread discontent and sporadic rank-and-file revolts last October, when his party gave the Andreotti government the necessary support to pass an earlier austerity plan. The most hated of those measures was a provision increasing gasoline prices, and thus the amount workers have to spend on transport to and from work.

The fact that union chiefs such as Lama have now let the government stick a knife in the "sacred cow" of the sliding scale indicates that within the framework of their class-collaborationist perspectives they feel that they have less and less of an alternative to capitulation.

In fact, in his interview in *Der Spiegel*, Lama said that he did not disagree in principle with Amendola on the need to assure the capitalists' profits.

In October, the discontent of the rank-and-file workers was immediately reflected in tensions in the CP Central Committee. The traditional left face of the leadership, Luigi Longo, warned of the dangers for the party in becoming too associated with the Christian Democratic government and getting out of touch with the masses.

The tensions in the Central Committee appeared sharper in its mid-March meeting. In its March 27 issue, the Rome weekly *L'Espresso* wrote:

Luigi Longo's cry of pain . . . was taken up this time by a large part of the Central Committee. Gianni Borgna, responsible for educational work in the youth, made explicit the prevailing mood in the top CP body:

"We fell into a serious error after the June 20 elections. We sought more to defend the existing political framework than to build the conditions for overcoming it. While the question of the government's ouster cannot be posed today, at the same time we cannot let ourselves be blackmailed by the threat of a power vacuum and new elections and remain paralyzed."

The mass student rebellions against cutbacks in February, *L'Espresso* wrote, had convinced the CP that "no magic formula can conjure away the concrete threat of a gulf arising between the party and stormy protest movements."

The result was "a prevailing tone of self-criticism that gave the impression that the Central Committee was united in mourning."

A possibly more direct cause of the Central Committee's unhappiness was described in an article by F. de Vito in the same issue. The leadership was able to test the mood of the party ranks in the branch conferences held throughout February and the first half of March. It was obviously disturbed by what it found.

CP leaders denied that opposition currents or focuses of opposition had developed. But they admitted that there was a widespread mood of "reticence." De Vito quoted an unnamed CP leader as saying:

"You get a feeling that there is a lack of the conviction needed . . . to go into the factories and neighborhoods and defend the party's policies."

Even in Bologna, de Vito noted, where the city government has been in CP hands since the end of World War II and where there is one party member for every three CP voters, the party had proved unable to control the mass movement during the student revolts.

Furthermore, the CP's new recruitment itself threatened to transmit the pressures of the radicalizing youth and women into the party. De Vito pointed out that in a sample of 6,000 of the party's new recruits, the proportion of workers was 48.84%, as against the CP's national average of 39.86%. The proportion of youth under twenty-five was 37.58%, as against the present average of 15%. And for women, the proportion was 31.20%, as against an average of 24%. De Vito wrote:

"It is precisely these new members who cause [the CP leaders] the most worry." □

Stalinist Thugs Attack Romanian Human-Rights Fighters

"The Romanian authorities seem determined to stamp out the movement for democratic rights that has been developing in this country for several weeks, under the leadership of the writer Paul Goma," *Le Monde's* Central Europe correspondent Manuel Lucbert wrote in the April 1 issue of the Paris daily.

In the last days of March, Romanian police detained a number of figures associated with public demands that the authorities respect their own laws and guarantees regarding human rights. Among those taken in, according to Lucbert, were the computer specialist Ion Ladea, Tufoi, Dimboviceanu, Enrik Becescu, and Dasealu. He noted that it was not yet known whether they had been released or were still being held. Likewise it was not known if there were any actual charges.

In fact, since the start of the new upsurge of protests against bureaucratic dictatorship, the Soviet and East European authorities have apparently opted for playing a cat-and-mouse game with protesters.

Threats are mixed with certain concessions. Despite a massive campaign of harassment and intimidation, and even hints of preparations for old-style Stalinist "treason" trials, there have been relatively few arrests and fewer actual indictments.

In the cases of well-known dissidents, the authorities have not made their intentions clear. At the same time, arrests of persons not internationally known have come to light only long after the fact, and there may be many more such cases still unreported.

The cat-and-mouse tactic corresponds to the position the Stalinist bureaucracies now find themselves in. To take advantage of electoral opportunities, the big West European CPs have been forced to stop defending Stalinist repression. This strips away the bureaucracies' political cover.

At the same time, the bureaucrats can maintain their position in society only by denying the workers the right to express themselves or to hear opposition views. Thus, the Stalinist bosses now have to try to break the opposition by more insidious methods.

Such tactics have been most clearly illustrated in Romania. On March 24, for the first time in four years, an official literary publication printed a small article by Paul Goma. The next day, two unknown men tried to drag him from his apartment, according to Lucbert's dispatch in the April 1 *Le Monde*.

In Romania, public opposition is a new phenomenon, and the government responded rapidly to the first expressions of



ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU

opposition. On February 13, an appeal to the signatories of the Helsinki accords was made public in Belgrade. It was signed by nine persons, including Goma, who earlier spent six years in prison for his support of the Hungarian revolution.

On February 17, the homes of the dissidents who signed this appeal were sealed off by uniformed police. President Ceausescu publicly denounced them as "traitors." However, insofar as is known, none were arrested. The following day the cordon around their homes was relaxed, and the bureaucracy began to hint about concessions.

In a telephone interview published in the February 28 issue of *Der Spiegel*, Goma expressed hope of better treatment:

"I have just come from Burtica [secretary of the CP Central Committee and deputy premier]. . . . Nothing was clarified on either side. But our discussion was very promising."

On the other hand, Goma described an intense campaign of harassment:

"Immediately after I wrote those open letters, the scandal began. The phone rang

constantly. All sorts of threats were made. My life was threatened, not just mine but that of my fifteen-month-old son. The threats were always anonymous. They gave names like Jonescu or Popescu [two of the most common Romanian names]."

Goma was uncertain about what happened to the other signers of the letter sent to Belgrade:

"Stefanescu may have been arrested, I can't reach him by telephone. His phone also has been cut off."

The police guard around his home had assumed a lower profile, Goma said. But the government continued its harassment:

"I am told that there are no more uniformed guards in front of my door, instead there are two secret policemen in civilian clothes. I complained about being shadowed to Burtica. He told me I was suffering from hallucinations."

Intimidation was combined with blandishments. In the March 31 issue of the French Trotskyist daily *Rouge*, Alain Paruit reported:

"Burtica proposed a deal. Some of his [Goma's] previously banned books would be published . . . he would be given a passport, the literary fund would pay him money owed to him for years, he could even collect fat advances on possible future books, on condition that he refuse to accept any further signatures [on the appeal to Belgrade]. Otherwise, he would face more serious annoyance."

Goma did not refuse to accept other signers. By March 27, according to Paruit, this appeal had been signed by 180 persons. Of these, the professions of seventy-one, coming from every province in Romania, were known. The breakdown was given as follows: Workers and technicians, 40.85%; writers and artists, 23.94%; engineers, economists, and scientists, 16.90%; professionals (doctors, architects, lawyers), 9.86%; teachers, 7.04%; clerics, 1.41%.

The antibureaucratic protesters also began to broaden their exposure of repression. In an interview given to United Press International in mid-March, Goma reported the use of psychiatric imprisonment against political dissenters. He said that four "hospitals" were used for that purpose: Balancea and Coula in Bucharest, and the Poiana-Mare and Petrov-Groza hospitals.

Another signer of the appeal, Doctor Ion Vianu, wrote a statement, reported in the March 19 *Le Monde*, describing cases he witnessed of the misuse of psychiatry against political dissenters.

According to the French Committee for

the Defense of Human Rights in Romania,* Vianu's nine-year-old son was at-

*The address is Comité Français pour la défense de droit de l'homme en Roumanie; c/o Mme Duroudin; 47, rue Jouffroy; 75017 Paris. Telephone: 227-99-42.

tacked on the street and beaten March 23.

The committee also reported, according to a March 29 Associated Press dispatch, that a former boxer named Horst Stumpf forced his way into Goma's apartment on March 19 and beat him up. On March 26, the committee said, the same man broke in

again twice and beat up the writer, forcing the family to barricade itself in.

According to the committee, the prominent literary critic Ion Negoitescu, a signer of the appeal released in Belgrade, is now facing trial on "morals charges." □

London Stock Exchange Jumps 19 Points

Big Business Salutes Callaghan's Pact With Liberal Party

The London Stock Exchange rose nineteen points and financial interests breathed a sign of relief after Britain's Labour government survived a "no confidence" vote in Parliament March 23.

Conservative party head Margaret Thatcher called for the vote in hope of toppling Prime Minister James Callaghan's minority government, forcing new elections to be held. An eleventh-hour pact between Labour and the Liberal party, a small bourgeois formation, gave Callaghan the slim margin of votes needed to beat back the challenge.

The editors of the *Sunday Times*, the *Times* of London, and the *Observer* spoke in favor of a Labour-Liberal pact to keep the current government in office at least temporarily. The seeming paradox of leading bourgeois newspapers rooting for the supposedly "socialist" Labour party over the openly probusiness Tories was explained by the editors of the London *Financial Times* March 23.

While conceding that the country still faced problems, they said business prospects might well fare better under a Callaghan administration than under a weak Tory government that would provoke confrontations with the trade unions.

"We're all itching to get rid of this dangerously leftist Government," a report in the March 22 *New York Times* quoted a leading British investment broker as saying. "On the other hand, it would appear that there's an almost total lack of leadership in the Conservative Party at the moment."

Of particular concern to Britain's capitalists is the mounting resistance of workers to the government's policy of wage restraints—known as the Social Contract—initiated in 1974. The March 26 London *Economist* reported that the real income of British workers will have dropped another 5 percent under Phase II of the wage control program, which ends this July.

The wildcat strike by toolroom workers that crippled the giant automobile producer British Leyland in March was interpreted as a warning that the ranks of labor are



CALLAGHAN

ready to fight the next phase of controls, due in August.

In fact, paving the way for a new round of attacks on workers' standard of living is really what the "Lab-Lib" pact was all about, the editors of *Red Weekly*, newspaper of Britain's International Marxist Group, wrote in the March 31 issue.

All the most important sections of ruling class opinion welcomed the votes of the Liberal MPs against the Tories' "no confidence" motion in the Labour Government.

Given the present mood of a reviving working class, a Labour Government police for the third round of wage controls is seen to be essential. As the *Economist* put it: "A newly elected Thatcher government would not be ideally suited to soothe the subsequent squawking."

This was the main concern of the ruling class: the continuation of a *Labour Government*. The presence of the Liberals will make it easier for Labour to find a cover for further viciously anti-working class measures. . . . The votes of Liberals will also insure a greater parliamentary stability. . . .

For these reasons, the pact must be repudiated. Callaghan's Government is prepared to line up with openly ruling class forces, rather than reverse his policies and respond to the demands of the working class. . . .

This Lib-Lab pact has not at all altered the basic lines already drawn in Labour's policies. In reality it will allow the Government to implement its plans—especially its wage-cutting pay limits. Labour's anti-working class measures have nothing to do with the Liberal pact. The central element of class collaboration is the Social Contract, not the pact.

A week after Labour won the no-confidence vote, Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey presented the Labour government's budget for the coming year. Reacting to the new austerity measures in the proposal, stock prices shot even higher on the London exchange.

Red Weekly correspondent Dodie Wepler commented on what lay behind the warm reception accorded the budget in Britain's corporate board rooms:

Healey's budget has been prepared with one thought in mind—to con the working class into accepting another round of wage restraints. . . .

The carrot Healey is offering to sell his incomes policy is a cut in taxes. This so-called "concession" has a familiar ring to it. Last year, £1300 million were offered in tax concessions. The cost of tax cuts was "sacrifices" from the working class.

But what has one more year of wage limits brought? Healey predicted last year there would be a fall in unemployment. It has risen to 2 million—not including the "shadow" half a million women not officially registered as unemployed. He also promised a fall in inflation to a "mere" 10 per cent a year. The figures are now reaching 20 per cent.

This year Healey has suddenly found about £1500 million to offer—at a price of course. It seems that the £80,000 million cuts in social spending . . . were so stringent that there is a bit of surplus for emergencies like Healey faces today. . . .

"Only a mass movement based on a programme of class struggle, not of class collaboration, will put an end to Labour's cons," Wepler concluded. "A vote against this budget [by Labour party MPs] would be one step in the right direction." □

Conditions Are Worse One Year After Military Coup

[The following interview with a political prisoner recently released by the Argentine junta appeared in the March 23 issue of the French Trotskyist daily *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. How did the deterioration in the conditions under which political prisoners are held come about?

Answer. After December 1975, the military took direct control of the prison system nationwide. In face of the disintegration of bourgeois institutions and the very marked upturn of the mass movement after the large mobilizations of June 1975, the military was already getting ready to take over on the political level. Direct military control of the prisons brought on an immediate worsening of the situation faced by political prisoners, since the officers took away some of the "privileges" we had won.

The military tried to impose a uniform set of regulations in the prisons, modeled after the "maximum security" system, where the prisoners are kept under strict surveillance.

Q. Did this happen overnight?

A. No, because the regulations they tried to impose showed, for instance, that they had been devised by persons who were not familiar with the way prisons work. So, in La Plata, they began by trying to cut back on recreation. They wanted to lower it from five hours a day with sports to three half-hour periods a week with no sports, and to force the prisoners to go out one at a time. This was materially impossible, given the personnel shortage and the number of prisoners. The prison officials were forced to go around the rule, allowing the prisoners to go out for recreation in groups of ten for an hour each day.

Q. The military coup took place on March 24. Did this have an immediate effect on the prisoners' lives?

A. For the first three weeks after the coup, we remained completely isolated from the outside world, from our lawyers and families. The change was marked at first by a series of small incidents, reflecting the authorities' desire to "normalize" the situation in La Plata, while at the same time avoiding a direct confrontation with us.

La Plata had been designated as a regroupment center for political prisoners from all over the country. The political

prisoner population was to be multiplied five or six times.

At the time of the coup, there were 200 of us. According to the latest figures I know about, there are 1,200 prisoners. Once La Plata had been made into a strategic center for regrouping political prisoners, it became important for the administration to break down the tradition of organization and resistance that existed among the original core of 200. They had to keep this original group from "contaminating" the others. This need was all the more pressing because the initial core of prisoners included a high percentage of members of political organizations, while the majority of political prisoners who came in after March 24 were militant workers.

So the administration followed a tactic of deliberate provocations. A button left undone, or a poorly made bed, meant no recreation. Sending people to solitary confinement became a standard practice.

At the same time, they did everything they could to deny us any regular mental exercise. They took away our radios and cut down on the number of daily newspapers allowed into the prison. They "impounded" the small libraries we had put together with books that had already gone through censorship. Anything having to do with economics, history, or sociology—even academic sociology—was removed. For example, according to the new criteria, Malraux's *Anti-Memoirs* were considered subversive, and Garcia Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, pornographic.

Along with this, they cut down on the frequency and length of visits, as well as the number of people allowed to visit us.

These provocations continued to escalate until August 13, 1976. On that day, one of the "delegates," who acted as an intermediary between the administration and the prisoners in the cell block was put in solitary confinement. This provoked a spontaneous collective reaction that took the form of an "uproar." We were all locked up in our individual cells, so it was hardly a rebellion. Half the prisoners in the cell block, about thirty of them, were put in solitary confinement.

Q. Is that when they sent you on the transfer trip from which you thought you would never return?

A. Yes. Five days later, at midnight, soldiers came and took me out, together with four other comrades who were also in solitary confinement. They loaded us abruptly into a truck, with no explanations. In that truck was everyone whom the administration considered "agitators,"

as well as Martín Guevara, Che's brother, who is a member of the PRT [Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—Revolutionary Workers party], and who has been singled out for attack because of his name. He had been placed in solitary confinement for having shared his meal with a fellow prisoner. During the entire six hours that the ride lasted, we feared the worst: namely, that we would be slaughtered, pure and simple, in one of those classic "attempted escapes"—especially since this was already standard procedure in other areas, like Córdoba.

Finally we arrived at Sierra Chica, a prison that is completely isolated, in the middle of Buenos Aires province, 400 kilometers from the capital. Our punishment lasted almost five months—two months in solitary confinement, and three months in isolated cells.

Q. But weren't your families notified about this transfer?

A. Our families had a very bad time of it for more than a month. The authorities refused to give them any information about what had happened to us. The anxiety of our families and comrades was heightened by the date of the transfer. It had, in fact, occurred just before August 22, which in Argentina is the anniversary of the massacre of sixteen revolutionists in Trelew in 1972. And, as a matter of fact, on August 22, 1976, around thirty bodies were discovered in a village in Buenos Aires province, in unrecognizable condition. The rumor immediately began circulating that these were political prisoners executed by the authorities in "commemoration" of the anniversary of Trelew. You can just imagine how frightened our comrades and relatives were.

Q. Was the regime harsher at Sierra Chica?

A. Yes, much harsher than at La Plata. At Sierra Chica, for instance, they actually followed the system of three half-hour recreation periods per week; and visits were limited to one-half hour per week. At Sierra Chica, it was the "common law" prisoners who got the "political" prisoners' treatment: five hours of recreation per day, and three hours of visits per week.

Then prisoners from other parts of Argentina began to flow into Sierra Chica, which was also one of the regroupment centers in the country. One day, while we were in solitary confinement, we heard screams and cries of pain. It was a group of prisoners being transferred in from

Córdoba. They were forced to run the gauntlet between two rows of guards who were clubbing them very hard. The incident that provoked the guards to such reprisals is symptomatic. The guards had beaten the prisoners with rifle butts, just as they were coming off the trucks. A shot went off accidentally and killed a guard on the spot. This is what brought on the reprisals.

Each time a new transfer took place, the same scenes of humiliation and sadism were repeated. The guards ordered the prisoners first to run, then to stop, undress, and do exercises in the halls. They shaved the prisoners' heads. These were comrades who had come from the Córdoba area, and they were in pretty bad shape. They looked like the photographs of concentration camp survivors in *Nacht und Nebel* or the Polish films or [Alain] Resnais's films about the Nazi camps that I saw a few years ago. The Córdoba comrades' heads had the same look.

Q. So you were able to gather firsthand information about the bloody repression enforced in the Córdoba area, and the hostage policy followed by the military authorities?

A. Córdoba in particular was a living hell. The prisoners there were cut off from the outside world for ten months after the coup. Every day they were subjected to physical punishment. During these ten months, about thirty political prisoners were taken out and shot in retaliation for guerrilla operations carried out on the outside.

The most tragic case is that of the left Peronist attorney, Vaca Narvajo. One day, after a guerrilla operation, he was taken out of the prison to be shot as a hostage. When he arrived at the military district headquarters, they told him that some suspects in preventive detention had been shot in the meantime, making the hostage quota, but that he was at the top of the list of the next batch.

So they took him back to the prison. In the midst of all this, his birthday came around. According to what some eyewitnesses have told me, this was a particularly moving event. All the prisoners who "celebrated" his birthday were in fact saying goodbye to him, knowing that he would be part of the next batch. And, in fact, a few days later, he was shot.

The military openly posted the going "exchange rates" in the most cynical way. For every civilian killed, three political prisoners were shot; for every officer killed, it was five political prisoners. This is the measure of the Córdoba military's respect for human life.

And now this policy is tending to become generalized, because I have heard that the situation has gotten considerably worse, even in La Plata. Corporal punishment occurs daily. Now they are torturing people

right inside the prison, and there have been several prisoners who have died as a result, like Comrade Rafael Lasalla. [See *Intercontinental Press*, December 13, 1976, p. 1796.]

There have also been some cases of hostages being executed there; Dardo

Cabo, the Montonero leader, is one example. Rappoport, the lawyer, is another. Worse still, around forty "agitators," some of them comrades, have been grouped together in a separate cell block. There is every indication that they constitute a "reservoir" of hostages for La Plata. □

Demand Release of Ginzburg and Rudenko!

Grigorenko Issues Appeal to West European CPs

By Marilyn Vogt



Der Spiegel

PYOTR GRIGORENKO

Pyotr Grigorenko has appealed to European communists and Communist parties to demand the release of Aleksandr Ginzburg and Mikola Rudenko, two civil-rights activists arrested by Kremlin political police in the first week of February.

Grigorenko, a communist dissenter and former major general in the Soviet army, made his appeal at a press conference in his apartment in Moscow February 8.

News of the press conference, based on reports from Agence France-Presse, UPI, and Reuters, appeared in the February 15 issue of *Svoboda*, a New York Ukrainian-language daily.

According to the *Svoboda* report, Grigorenko declared that the arrest of Ginzburg and Rudenko was part of a new campaign of repression. He called on the West European CPs to demand a halt to it, as well as an amnesty for all political prisoners.

Ginzburg and Rudenko are two of the five members of the Helsinki monitoring groups known to have been arrested recently in the Kremlin's drive to crush the groups. The groups were organized by activists in the Soviet civil-rights movement to promote Moscow's compliance with the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki accords.

In his statement, Grigorenko accused the Kremlin of organizing a frame-up against Rudenko because of his writings and human-rights activity. Rudenko is also a member of the Soviet section of Amnesty International, which has been a target of police repression.

The police planted \$39 in Rudenko's apartment, Grigorenko said, so that they could "find" it in a search in January, laying the basis for charges of speculation in foreign currency.

Another reason for Rudenko's arrest, Grigorenko said, may have been his book *Economic Monolog*, which contains criticism of Marx's theory of surplus value. The book is denied publication in the Soviet Union but will soon be published in Ukrainian in Paris.

Communists are persecuted in the Soviet Union in the same way they are in fascist countries, Grigorenko said. If you criticize the rulers, you are arrested. Grigorenko reaffirmed that he is a communist.

Grigorenko has twice been sentenced to psychiatric prison-hospitals because he advocates restoration of democracy in the Soviet CP and champions the rights of the nationalities deported by Stalin.

He is one of the founding members of the Helsinki monitoring group in Moscow and acts as the Moscow representative of the monitoring group in Kiev, of which Rudenko is the chairman.

Grigorenko's appeal is important not only because it will facilitate efforts to bring pressure on the West European CPs to defend imprisoned dissidents, but also because it makes clear that it is communists and socialists abroad—and not capitalist government figures—who are the real allies of the fighters for democracy in the USSR. □

'The Most Significant Movement in Czechoslovakia in Recent Years'

By Petr Uhl

[The following appeal for support to the Charter 77 human-rights movement in Czechoslovakia was issued in Prague March 3 by Petr Uhl. We have taken the text from the March 31 issue of the British Trotskyist newspaper *Red Weekly*. The translation is by Mark Jackson.

[A student leader at the time of the Prague Spring in 1968, Petr Uhl was one of a number of members of different radical currents who came together around the magazine *Informacny Materialy*.

[After the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, some participants in this group tried to form a Marxist opposition group called the Revolutionary Socialist party. In 1971, Uhl was put on trial for belonging to the RSP, convicted, and sentenced to four years in prison. He was described at that time by the bureaucracy as a "Trotskyist," and continued to be characterized as such in the official press.

[Uhl has come under attack most recently as a signer of Charter 77.]

* * *

Comrades!

The revolutionary left, especially in the bourgeois democratic countries, often displays an aversion to the defence of civil rights and democratic freedoms which flows from their opposition—often justified—to the reformist movements whose first and sometimes only aim is to achieve at least partial improvement in the area of social relations, most frequently through a so-called dialogue with the state power.

We well know that the free development of society, based on the free development of each individual, is realisable only in a classless society, and that this is the result of a long process of the development of democracy opened up by the proletarian social revolution. But it is the common belief of all of us Marxists and revolutionary socialists that already the first revolutionary phase of communist development must bring to every member of society more rights and freedoms than can be assured by even the best bourgeois democracy—especially in the light of a critical analysis of those proletarian revolutions which have taken place up until now, and all aspects of their degeneration.

This opinion—if using other phraseology—is shared with us by all the

reformists and recently by their latest component, the Eurocommunists. In distinction from them, however, revolutionaries do not suffer from the illusion that socialism and the liberation of man and society can be achieved through the gradual democratisation of bourgeois society, retaining capitalist relations of production, or with their gradual removal. Neither do they suffer from the illusion that a fascist or any other totalitarian power is likely to concede any extension of civil rights or democratic freedoms, or will be ready to engage in a dialogue on this theme.

But we can also understand that many of those who struggle for human rights against regimes of an autocratic kind or military, bureaucratic or other dictatorships are as aware as us that their efforts cannot lead to the results that they publicly demand. At the same time, however, they know that the *demands themselves* for democratic freedoms and civil rights which cannot be realised under dictatorships can arouse the working class and other important layers of the working population, can heighten their fighting power, and shake the very foundations of the dictatorship. The example, near to us all, of Spain, is proof of this.

The pro-capitalist illusions and reactionary myths that may guide this struggle initially weaken to the extent that the self-consciousness and self confidence of the working class are raised. I think that the role of revolutionaries is to stand at the head of this struggle, to fight against illusions and myths and at the same time always remember that no struggle for human rights, even if it is led by the Communist Party of Spain, can replace the revolutionary activity of the masses, transforming social relations from the bottom up, as history demands.

A struggle for human rights, however, is one of the roads that leads to revolution; it is one of the ways in which the subjective preconditions for the social and political revolution can be created. While it is certainly possible to doubt that such a strategy is suitable for the countries of bourgeois democracy, it is evident that it is useful and sometimes the only strategy under military and bureaucratic dictatorships and fascist regimes.

Everyone in the milieu of the revolutionary left recognises this when it is a

question of evaluating a struggle for civil rights in the countries which belong to the so-called Western sphere of influence. They have reservations if they are evaluating such a movement in the countries of Eastern Europe. It seems to me that the difference, and sometimes confusion of the approach of the West European and American extreme left to this problem flows from a different, often superficial or even wrong, analysis of the social and political systems in this part of the world.

I can well understand, as an opponent of parliamentarism and other junk of bourgeois democracy, that the Charter 77 appeal—and Charter 77 is in deadly earnest and I identify myself with it—can have a repellent effect on Marxists when it sets as its one aim the effective introduction of principles contained in international agreements about civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights, and that these pacts, ratified, legally enacted and published by the Czechoslovak state power—are the basis and starting point of its activity. (A side remark: The Czechoslovak workers do not have such a firmly negative attitude towards bourgeois democracy as I would like; in this they proceed from their own experience of Stalinism and the autocratic regime.)

It might also put people off that the rights codified in both pacts are insufficient, aimed rather at the interests of intellectuals than workers; that both pacts have only a declarative value, as was the case with the old Universal Declaration of Human Rights; that they are expressions of efforts towards class reconciliation and of such a conception of peaceful co-existence as temporarily enables the survival of social and political formations doomed to destruction by history, involving not the peaceful co-existence of peoples but of state formations and confederations.

I would have liked to have written more about this, also about my opinions on the social and political system in Czechoslovakia, but the problem is that if I were to write something untrue, or rather something which the authorities found to be untrue, I could be imprisoned for it for up to 3 years. And if you do not believe me, comrades, look at article 112 of the Czechoslovak criminal code. And precisely because of this, I think that both pacts have their significance for the workers of Czechoslovakia and other countries and that it makes sense to refer to them since they have been legally enacted and published by the state power.

I do not see this significance in the fact that in a year or two I will be able to write without risking imprisonment—then I will still not be able, but in the fact that collective 'legal'—the quote marks because you cannot visualise what such 'legality' is like—struggle for the realisation of the principles contained in both pacts arouses the workers, who can see their own interests contained in this activity, and

raises their self consciousness and self confidence.

But I have already written about this, when I evaluated the struggle for civil rights and democratic freedoms under military and bureaucratic dictatorships. For reasons which I have mentioned, I am, of course, far from designating Czechoslovakia as a bureaucratic dictatorship.

Charter 77 is not a political opposition, nor does it wish to become one. It is too politically heterogeneous for that, and its aim—to struggle for civil rights and democratic freedom on the basis of international pacts, which are part of the Czechoslovak legal regulations—is too narrow. It is nonetheless the most significant movement in this country in recent years and has had significant resonance amongst the workers. It expresses their interests, even if not fully or directly.

The clause in the pact on social, economic and cultural rights which says that workers should have the right to build trade union and other organisations in defence of their interests without any hindrance, and that they should have the right to strike could perhaps be the starting point of the road which leads to the emancipation of the workers, which they will achieve *themselves* by means of *their own* organisations.

When I say the starting point, I am thinking of the subjective preconditions of that road, and I do not share any illusions about a reformist 'dialogue' or even some spontaneous way leading to the achievement of these rights. And as to what that road might be if it is not the road of reformism, a revolutionary Marxist, burdened as he is by the threat of 3 years—in this case in fact 10—must not mention. The active and passive support which is shown in one way or another to Charter 77 by workers—mainly by young workers—is the promise of this road.

It is likewise not possible to accept the idea that the propagation of the ideas of Charter 77 and the publication of information about the deprivation of human rights in the countries of Eastern Europe distracts attention from the economic crisis, unemployment and other problems of the universal crisis of capitalism. The apologists of bourgeois society certainly try to divert attention from these problems—and will use anything for the purpose—but the supporters of socialism and progress have quite different motives for solidarity with the struggle for human rights in Eastern Europe.

There is only one world, and the boundaries of class and the class struggle pass across every society without paying any attention to the borders of states, and there are good reasons why it is not possible to offer the arrangement of Czechoslovak society as a model to the workers oppressed by capital. To be silent about the problems of Czechoslovak society would mean to be silent about the rich experience

An Appeal to the Revolutionary Left

Petr Uhl's appeal is addressed to the following organizations and individuals:

Revolutionary Communist League of Spain; Revolutionary Communist League of France; International Communist League of Portugal; International Communist Organization of France; the organizations grouped around Proletarian Democracy in Italy; Socialist Workers party of Great Britain; Socialist Workers party of the United States; Communist party of Australia; Movement of the Revolutionary Left of Chile; Socialist Bureau of Hamburg, West Germany; Communist party of [West] Germany;

Communist party of [West] Germany (Marxist-Leninist); International Marxist Group of West Germany; and all the national and international organizations of the revolutionary left, and the press of these organizations.

Alain Krivine, Pierre Broué, Ernest Mandel, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jacob Moneta, Ernst Fischer, Rudi Dutschke, Sybille Plogstedt, Wolf Biermann, Livio Maitan, Leonid Plyushch, Ivan Hartl, and Karel Kovanda, with the request that they bring this letter to the attention of their comrades, friends, and the public.

which the Czechoslovak workers have accumulated over the past 30 years.

Only truth is revolutionary, lies and the concealment of facts are counter-revolutionary. And just an aside: nobody in Czechoslovakia complains when the official press publishes long articles about unemployment, the crisis and the infringement of human rights in the West. Even if the majority of foreign news is made up of such articles—which was not the case before 1 January 1977—even if they are distorted and tendentious—if for example a lot is written about a particular social and political conflict, but when it works out well for the workers then only a little or nothing at all is written—even if sometimes they are downright funny when compared to Czechoslovak reality—as for instance concerning the possibility of controlling the secret service in West Germany—the Czechoslovak workers accept this information with interest and sympathy, as information about serious problems of the capitalist world.

Nobody complains that this distracts attention from domestic problems, whose very essence frequently remains hidden. The time will certainly come when the Czechoslovak workers will not only be better informed, but will have the same or other problems to solve along with the workers of the European and other countries.

For these reasons, I ask all comrades to help Charter 77 and to solidarise with it in whatever way you can. It is clear that the international problem of human rights and their infringement, or the existence of countries where the fight for democratic freedoms in the framework of the system brings serious and immediate consequences, is a matter of concern to us all, revolutionary Marxists, Christians, Humanists, and reformists; I know that it is also the concern of Charter 77 which is at this moment fighting for its very existence, to

acquaint the Czechoslovak workers with the problems of the infringement of civil rights in capitalist countries.

Help can be very concrete. Three signatories of Charter 77 have been in prison since the middle of January of this year; a spokesman for the Charter, writer Vaclav Havel, another writer Frantisek Pavlicek, and a journalist Jiri Lederer. With them in prison is the director Ota Ornest.

Even though they are accused of other political crimes of a verbal character—I have already shown you the Czechoslovak legal code—it is clear that their imprisonment is a direct, and until now the most vicious act of repression against Charter 77. The cases of two young technicians are analogous: Vladimir Lastuvka from Decin and Ales Machacek from Usti nad Labem, who are also imprisoned in connection with the Charter 77. Only international solidarity can help here.

As in other similar cases each will choose their own forms of protests and measures, according to their possibilities and being basically confined to verbal protests, and even these are very risky. In countries where workers are organised in trade unions and political organisations, which are independent of the state power, the forms of solidarity and protests can be more effective.

Free Vaclav Havel, Frantisek Pavlicek, Jiri Lederer, Ota Ornest, Vladimir Lastuvka and Ales Machacek!

Free the Czechoslovak political prisoners! □

Documents discussed at 1974 Tenth World Congress of Fourth International. 128 pages. 8½ x 11, \$2.50

Intercontinental Press

P.O. Box 116

Varick Street Station
New York, N.Y. 10014

The Vietnam Moratorium

By Fred Halstead

[Second of two parts]

Throughout this period, the Nixon administration maintained a public posture of dismissing the antiwar movement as irrelevant. On September 26 the president held a press conference in which he announced that the "Vietnamization program" was "moving forward."⁹ At the time, Senator Charles Goodell (R-NY) had introduced a bill calling for a 1970 deadline on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, and there were stories of caucusing among congressmen to discuss support to the Moratorium. Nixon denounced these congressional moves as "defeatist" and declared that "under no circumstances" would he be affected by antiwar demonstrations.

There is now ample documentation that the White House was on the contrary very much disturbed by the demonstrations. For example: Jeb Stuart Magruder, one of those later convicted in the Watergate scandal, was at the time just going on the White House staff. To acquaint him with the president's thinking, he was given some memos on public relations that Nixon had dictated on September 22, 1969. In his book *An American Life*, Magruder

With this chapter we continue the serialization of **Out Now!—A Participant's Account of the American Antiwar Movement** by Fred Halstead. Copyright ©1977 by the Anchor Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed by permission. To be published by Monad Press.

says: "The President's memos had been inspired by the fact that two great antiwar demonstrations were approaching, the national moratorium on October 15 and the rally at the Washington Monument on November 15. We all felt threatened, put on the defensive, by the imminence of these two well-organized, well-publicized demonstrations, and the President was taking the initiative in suggesting how we might counter our critics."¹⁰

The sections of these memos that Magruder quotes are mainly concerned with managing the news, planting stories implying that congressional critics were dupes of Hanoi, and so on. But one such memo—to "Mr. Haldeman"—contains the following: "I wonder if you might game plan the possibility of having some pro-administration rallies, etc. on Vietnam on October 15, the date set by the other side. Inevitably, whenever we plan something, they are there to meet us; perhaps we can turn the trick on them."¹¹

The proadministration rallies intended for October 15 never materialized. The government did, however, use other much dirtier and downright illegal tricks to attempt to derail the antiwar demonstrations.

9. *New York Times*, September 27, 1969.

10. Jeb Stuart Magruder, *An American Life* (New York: Atheneum, 1974), p. 78.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

For example, in August, 1969, copies of a letter purporting to be from an organization called the Black United Front in Washington, D.C., were received by the New Mobe steering committee and Abe Bloom. The letter demanded an initial payment of \$25,000 on a levy of one dollar for each demonstrator the New Mobe would attract to Washington, "because of the expressed strong opposition to any white-led convention in our Black City. . . ." and "As a show of good faith from the New Mobilization on its commitment to assist black people to end colonial rule."¹²

The reference to colonial rule dealt with the fact that the local government of the District of Columbia was appointed by the federal authority, and its citizens had no effective vote in national elections since they did not reside in a state. Proposals for a change in this status, such as "home rule" or "statehood," were important issues among the city's predominantly Black population. The Mobe was aware of this, of course, and more than willing to publicize such demands and invite local speakers in support of them on its platform. But the Black United Front's demand for money for itself, in the name of the whole Black community, was something quite different.

Over two years later a disaffected FBI agent, Robert Wall, wrote an exposé in the *New York Review of Books* in which he revealed that this letter had been written by the FBI. Wall further explained: "At the same time we instructed some informants we had placed in the black organization to suggest the idea of a security bond informally to leaders of the organization. The letter we composed was approved by the bureau's counterintelligence desk, and was signed with the forged signature of a leader of the black group. Later, through informants in the NMC [New Mobe] we learned that the letter had caused a great deal of confusion."¹³

It certainly did. Some of us on the Washington staff were opposed from the beginning to having anything to do with this demand. Not because we had any proof that it was a government provocation, but because it was politically wrong on the face of it. We stressed that those who presented themselves as spokespersons for the BUF didn't have the authority to speak for the whole Black community of Washington, much less collect money for it. Also that the New Mobe didn't have that kind of money anyway. But the main point was that the Blacks of Washington were generally against the war for the same reasons other people were; if anything more so. The notion that any large number of them would oppose the right of people to come to the capital for a peaceful antiwar demonstration didn't hold water.

But some people on the New Mobe steering committee, despite our opposition, thought it best to negotiate with the BUF on this matter. In his book *More Power Than We Know*, Dave Dellinger, who was in Chicago when he first saw the letter, recalls the circumstances this way:

"I was informed by Washington black intermediaries, whom I had asked to check out the situation, that the letter writers seemed dead serious and threatened, in the absence of such a payment, to wreck arriving cars and buses and attack disembarking

12. Letter from Black United Front to the New Mobilization Committee, undated. Copy on file at Library of Social History, New York.

13. *New York Review of Books*, January 27, 1972.

passengers. This threat was repeated in lurid terms a week or so later when I went to Washington. . . ."¹⁴

Dellinger writes that he and a few other New Mobe officers, including Stewart Meacham and Ron Young, "met with about a dozen angry blacks. After some initial sparring, they ostentatiously locked the door and told us that if we knew what was good for us we would give them a check for the first ten thousand dollars then and there. Fortunately, we didn't yield [Had they done so, the check would have bounced.—F.H.], and probably because most of the blacks present were honest revolutionaries who responded to honest dialogue, a couple of hours later we emerged unscathed, without paying or promising to pay any money but with a better understanding of the problems of the black community, including those exacerbated by insensitive white protesters."¹⁵

The negotiations extended over several weeks. At the September 13 meeting of the New Mobe Washington Action Committee, Meacham proposed that the New Mobe "ask every marcher to withhold one dollar from taxes and turn it over to the BUF." The quote is from the minutes, which continue: "Most who spoke did not support Meacham's proposal. Several speakers emphasized the importance of clearly identifying those with whom we are negotiating and who they represent. [Bob] Haskell reported on discussions with several prominent black militant leaders who cautioned against giving in to demands for money. Someone suggested that we should send copies of all future communications to all BUF steering committee members, especially when those communications deal with upcoming meetings between New Mobe and BUF spokesmen."¹⁶

The problem dragged on until the decisive intervention of Julius Hobson, a venerable figure in the Washington Black community, a leading advocate of statehood, and an antiwar activist himself. Hobson had been contacted earlier and had said the BUF demand was ridiculous. He finally told the New Mobe that if they didn't quit giving credence to it, they could take *his* name off the New Mobe sponsors' list. After that the demand was rejected.

In early October Abe Bloom got a letter from John P. Carter of the Black United Front which said: "After thinking about the Black United Front's proposal. . . . I've decided that the money is coming from the wrong source. To ask the mobilization for it, is like taking money from allies. We should be asking enemies for it instead. . . . We all know we must put a stop to the war and death machine. Part of that machine's death has been the death of Black Americans. . . ."¹⁷ Carter pledged support to the October 15 Moratorium and the November antiwar activities. The incident was over.

There were too many such government political provocations to recount in detail here, so crude as to be obvious even at the time. But this was one of the more crafty ones. It was designed to play on a situation where there was a lot of anger among Black militants and a certain paternalistic "white guilt syndrome" among some elements within the antiwar coalition. In this case the trick didn't do nearly as much damage as it might have, thanks especially to Julius Hobson.

The SDS national action in Chicago was finally set as a series of demonstrations October 8-11 which came to be called the "Days of Rage." Few people showed up, however, and some of those who did had second thoughts and bowed out at the last minute. It began Friday night, October 8, when some five hundred youths gathered in Lincoln Park. Tom Hayden spoke there, but did not go

14. Dave Dellinger, *More Power Than We Know* (Garden City, New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1975), p. 71.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

16. Washington Action Committee of the New Mobilization, minutes, September 13, 1969. (Copy in author's files.)

17. Letter from John P. Carter to Abe Bloom, October 1, 1969. (Copy in author's files.)

along on the action that followed. At a signal from the Weatherman leaders, perhaps three hundred ran south through the Gold Coast, an exclusive apartment district, breaking windows and smashing cars. It took about an hour for the police to disperse, arrest or beat them down. Six were hit by police gunfire, dozens more clubbed or injured by patrol cars which drove pell-mell into their ranks, and over sixty were arrested.

Over the next few days a few smaller activities took place. RYM II, which by this time had publicly split with the Weatherman, carried out a few orderly marches with a couple of hundred participants. On Saturday no more than two hundred Weatherpeople gathered at Haymarket Square for what was to have been the major mass march. Surrounded by a much larger force of police, they walked toward the Loop, then broke through to smash windows, bang on cars, and fight the cops. It took the police about fifteen minutes to mop up. The "Days of Rage" resulted in more than 200 arrests, as many injuries, and serious charges against almost all the Weatherman leaders. Their bail was over \$2 million dollars.

A different sort of demonstration occurred on October 12 at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Several thousand youths gathered for a rally at the GI coffee house in Wrightstown, demanding freedom for antiwar GIs held in the Fort Dix stockade. They marched onto the base through an open field. Led by a front rank of a hundred women, they made it a mile inside before being stopped by special military police. They were driven back under a barrage of teargas. The retreat was orderly and there were no serious injuries. This demonstration had been organized in good part by people from the former SDS milieu who had given up on the idea of participating in the Chicago action.

In general, the SDS chapters across the country turned away from both Weatherman and RYM II SDS, and except for a few, from PL-SDS as well. They either dissolved, became independent local groups, or affiliated with the SMC or other national organizations. SDS (Chicago) was destroyed. Weatherman would soon go underground, its leaders fugitives.

On October 15, 1969, the antiwar movement for the first time reached the level of a full-fledged mass movement. Before that there had been huge demonstrations, but only a large vanguard of the whole population of the country was directly involved. On October 15, millions of ordinary Americans were out in the streets demonstrating, canvassing door to door, picketing, leafleting, and so on.

As the October 24 *Life* magazine reported: "It was a display without historical parallel, the largest expression of public dissent ever seen in this country."

Hundreds of major universities were turned over to antiwar activities. In almost every city the size of the major rallies was unprecedented: 100,000 in Boston; over 50,000 in Washington, D.C., drawn from the local area only; 25,000 in Ann Arbor, Michigan; 25,000 in Madison, Wisconsin; 20,000 in Minneapolis; 20,000 in Philadelphia; 20,000 in Detroit; 11,000 in Austin, Texas; 5,000 in Salt Lake City; to name but a few.

There were Moratorium events in virtually every state, in Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Even in Anchorage, Alaska, where it was already winter, there was an indoor rally of 600 with the prominent antiwar GI Pvt. Joe Miles the featured speaker.

The scope and variety of the events defy full description. In New York City, for example, hundreds of thousands took part in rallies all over the city, many occurring at the same time—10,000 at Columbia, over 5,000 Manhattan high school students in Central Park, 4,000 at a rally of people who worked in the city's publishing houses, 7,000 in the financial district, and so on. The city's board of education estimated 90 percent absenteeism in high schools and 75 percent in junior high and elementary schools that day. Four of the city's TV stations suspended all regular programming to cover the activities nationally. More than one plane flew over the city writing peace slogans in the sky.

In the late afternoon more than 100,000 New Yorkers gathered



Dick Roberts/Militant

NEW YORK, October 15, 1969: Part of protest of 100,000.

in and around Bryant Park creating a monumental traffic jam. The rally there was chaired by Shirley MacLaine and Tony Randall; other entertainment stars including Janis Joplin appeared. There were speeches by Mayor John Lindsay and three U.S. senators as well as representatives of the antiwar movement. This crowd was largely moderate in temper but gave massive applause to New York SMC coordinator Joanna Misnik when she said, "October 15 is just the beginning. . . . We're going to stay in the street until every last GI is brought home."¹⁸

By the time the major events for October 15 had been set, there were so many that the Moratorium, the New Mobe, and the SMC, as well as all the New Mobe's constituent groups that chose to do so, were able to schedule all the speakers they could muster for large rallies and there still weren't enough to go around.

I appeared at several demonstrations in Philadelphia October 15 and was the featured speaker at a rally that night at Villanova, a major Catholic university in eastern Pennsylvania. It was hard to go anywhere in Philadelphia that day without coming across some sort of antiwar event. The mood was not tense or angry, but more like a holiday, with a lot of friendly banter between demonstrators and passers-by. In many localities the October 15 Moratorium had a semiofficial character about it, with school administrations going along, here and there city councils endorsing, and local elected politicians making appearances at demonstrations.

18. *Militant*, October 24, 1969.

At the Villanova rally that night I pointed out that Nixon's stated policy was to use force to extract concessions from the Vietnamese in negotiations. I said that it would be immoral for the U.S. to either win the war or to succeed in extracting any concessions. I was surprised at the applause these points evoked from that not very radical audience. There was a Democratic Party politician on the platform who squirmed and gritted his teeth, but the rally ate it up. Even the nuns were clapping.

The response of that audience convinced me that the antiwar movement had indeed made some profound changes in America. Henceforth it was a question of how much damage the government would do to itself, and unfortunately to the victims of the war, before it caught on to that fact.

At the huge rally on Boston Common, Senator George McGovern got a standing ovation when he appeared. The enthusiasm was repeated only once in an otherwise dull speech, when he said: "The most urgent responsible act of American citizenship in 1969 is to bring all possible pressure to bear on the Administration to order our troops out of Vietnam now."¹⁹

There had been an unsuccessful attempt to exclude Peter Camejo from the Boston Common speakers list because some of the Democratic Party politicians objected. Ken Hurwitz, one of the insiders in the Boston Vietnam Moratorium group, later described the scene as Camejo got up to address the rally:

"The last speaker of the day [was] Peter Camejo, the Venezuelan revolutionary who had had us all ready to write a press release of disassociation. [Camejo was born in the U.S. of Venezuelan parents and spent some of his youth in Venezuela.] Still a step or two away from the microphone, he started on his speech. He didn't want a single person to leave the Common before he had a chance to work his spell. The words came in a high pitched, staccato cadence, and his whole body vibrated to the rhythm.

"Vietnam, he said, isn't a mistake but an absolute inevitability of the system.

"And to those politicians who are joining the bandwagon,' he continued, 'this antiwar movement is not for sale. This movement is not for sale now, not in 1970 and not in 1972.' I expected the next shot of the crowd [The rally was televised.—F.H.] to show five thousand people sitting in front of the platform and ninety-five thousand people heading for the Park Street subway station. But that wasn't so. People were listening and responding. Certainly the majority wasn't agreeing entirely with the revolutionary stance, but they were listening. . . . It didn't matter whether we were socialist revolutionaries or not. He made us hate the war perhaps more than we ever thought possible. It was a scourge, a plague—there could be no 'timetable' for ending it, it had to be ended now. Camejo spoke with such easy power, it was demagogic and frightening. This was a day of peace, but he made me see just how close the peace in the antiwar movement always is to something far more charged and militant. Our own latent emotionalism and contempt surprises us all. Camejo ended his speech at the peak, and the crowd applauded until their hands were weary."²⁰

Except for the fact that Camejo was an especially gifted speaker, this incident—and Hurwitz's reaction—was not atypical. The Establishment politicians who had jumped on the Moratorium bandwagon, and even some of the liberal youth who had initiated it, were not entirely comfortable with what they helped set in motion October 15. This would soon become evident as the Moratorium Committee—which had not yet officially endorsed the New Mobe's November march on Washington—came face to face with that decision.

[Next chapter: *The March Against Death and the November 15, 1969, Demonstrations*]

19. Ken Hurwitz, *Marching Nowhere* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1971), p. 140.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 143-44.

The Case of the Disappearing Letters to Soviet Dissidents

Unable to secure the cooperation of British postal authorities in pressing Moscow to deliver letters to Soviet dissidents, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has appealed to the European Commission on Human Rights.

At issue are more than 100 registered letters sent to dissidents by the foundation more than a year ago but never delivered.

In documents filed with the commission March 9, the foundation asks that the British government be brought before the organization on the grounds that it has not done enough to protect the right of British citizens to write to whomever they choose.

This right, the foundation points out, is specifically guaranteed under articles 8 and 10 of the European Human Rights Convention, which assure "the right to respect for . . . correspondence" and "the right to freedom of expression . . . to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers."

Initially, the foundation applied to the British Post Office for reimbursement for the undelivered items, as provided for under the regulations of the Universal Postal Union.

According to this international charter, postal authorities are required to pay compensation for registered letters lost in transit. When two countries are involved, the postal service in the country where the letter originated is expected to pay compensation and to collect later from the postal service responsible for losing the letter.

However, after paying the Russell Foundation a total of nearly £500, at the rate of £5.50 for each "missing" letter, the British Post Office declared that further compensation for items "lost" in the Soviet mail would not be paid.

In a January 30, 1976, letter to the foundation, L. Moakes of the British Post Office Operations Department explained the government's position as follows:

Many of the enquiry forms sent to the USSR on your behalf have been returned to us together with a very large number of other enquiries about non-delivery and claims for compensation in respect of registered letters sent to the Soviet Union. Many of these have been outstanding for a long time and compensation would normally have been paid. The situation is, however, far from normal and we have been very concerned to learn what the attitude of the USSR postal administration is to accepting liability for compensation for registered letters sent to them but not delivered or returned to sender. They have now stated quite clearly that they will not accept liability for registered letters confiscated or destroyed because of their contents. They have

informed us that, in their view, the persons sending such letters are using the postal service for activity incompatible with the domestic legislation of the USSR. . . . In these circumstances, the British Post Office is not prepared to pay compensation in these cases since no fault attaches to it.

Post Office officials have made a great effort to assist posters to the USSR and we really cannot do more. Whatever we may think about this hindrance of communications to Soviet citizens, there is little doubt that the USSR authorities are acting in this matter within their own laws and we are unfortunately in no position to challenge them on this.

In reply, the Russell Foundation pointed out that the Soviet regime was in fact acting in violation of its own laws. Article 128 of the Soviet constitution says that "secrecy of correspondence is guaranteed by law." Article 135 of the Soviet criminal code further stipulates that violation of secrecy of correspondence by individual persons and state departments is liable to prosecution under the law.

In a letter to Moakes February 3, 1976, Kenneth J. Fleet of the Russell Foundation suggested that the British postal authorities could do far more in pressing the matter with their Soviet counterparts:

If the Soviet authorities believe that our letters are, as you say, "incompatible with the domestic legislation of the USSR" then it is quite clear that they are confessing to having read them. In this manner, they are violating their own constitution. We think that the very least regard for the principles of human rights would require you to press the Soviet postal authorities on this matter. They should be asked who has authorized the illegal reading of our mail, so that appropriate action can be pressed against the individual or state department responsible.

Soviet law lays down that the mails may not be intercepted without an order from the procurator, which may only be granted in certain clearly defined circumstances. Which procurators issued the order to intercept which of our letters? We cannot accept your claim that you are not responsible for the loss of our registered letters until you are prepared to furnish us with this crucial information.

Further, the charge that our letters contained material which was "incompatible with domestic legislation of the USSR" is quite wrong. It is not illegal in the USSR to discuss this or that aspect of governmental policy more or less critically.

After a year of further inquiries and protests proved fruitless in obtaining assistance from the British postal authorities, the foundation made its appeal to the European Commission on Human Rights. In a statement issued April 4 announcing the appeal, foundation director Ken Coates explained why the organization had taken this step:

When the Soviet Post Office informed its

British opposite numbers that our mail had been opened, and confiscated because of its political content, they were admitting to behaviour which is criminal under Soviet law. The British Post Office should therefore have the right of redress in Soviet Courts. Why do they not avail themselves of this right? In our view, anti-Soviet prejudice blinds the British authorities to the obvious means of redress which are open to it. It is assumed that Soviet law is inferior to British justice, that all the Soviet authorities' protestations about the "restoration of socialist legality" have merely propaganda value, and that legal action in the Soviet courts would therefore be pointless. Not having any preconceived opinions on such matters, we would like to believe that appeals in the Soviet courts would be fairly heard, and that the Soviet Post Office could be compelled to observe provisions in the Soviet constitution. In our opinion, violation of the Soviet constitution by the Soviet Post Office is a form of anti-Soviet behaviour, and the British postal services are condoning this when they refuse to uphold our rights against those who have stolen our mail.

It is interesting to note the type of material the Stalinist censors are concerned to keep out of the hands of Soviet citizens. Twenty-seven of the "missing" letters sent out by the foundation contained copies of articles from the *Morning Star*, the newspaper of the British Communist party. Some of the *Morning Star* articles dealt with a film shown in Europe that detailed conditions in Soviet labor camps. The film, which had been smuggled out of the USSR, provoked a storm of protest against the treatment of political prisoners from the French CP, among others. □

Still Available

Complete Back Files (Unbound) Intercontinental Press

| | | |
|------|-------------------------|------|
| 1967 | 42 issues (1,072 pages) | \$25 |
| 1968 | 44 issues (1,176 pages) | \$25 |
| 1969 | 43 issues (1,152 pages) | \$25 |
| 1970 | 43 issues (1,120 pages) | \$25 |
| 1971 | 45 issues (1,128 pages) | \$25 |
| 1972 | 47 issues (1,448 pages) | \$25 |
| 1973 | 46 issues (1,520 pages) | \$25 |
| 1974 | 47 issues (1,888 pages) | \$25 |
| 1975 | 47 issues (1,888 pages) | \$35 |
| 1976 | 49 issues (1,888 pages) | \$35 |

P.O. Box 116
Varick Street Station
New York, N.Y. 10014

The U.S. Corporate Stake in South Africa

By Ernest Harsch

[Second of four parts]

The symbols of American corporate involvement in South Africa are prominent almost everywhere in the country. The skylines of Johannesburg and other major cities are dotted with the sign of such familiar American companies as General Motors, Mobil, Coca-Cola, Ford, General Electric, Avis. Appliance stores display the products of Westinghouse, Singer, Black and Decker, Motorola, Eastman Kodak, Hoover. The shelves of drugstores are stocked with cosmetics by Revlon, Colgate-Palmolive, Johnson and Johnson. Offices are supplied with business equipment from Xerox and Burroughs and farms are plowed with Caterpillar, Allis-Chalmers, and International Harvester tractors.

Although American companies account for only about 16 percent of all foreign investment in South Africa, Pretoria sets a particularly high premium on them. For the racist rulers of South Africa, U.S. investments represent an indispensable lifeline from the strongest imperialist power in the world.

U.S. companies did not invest heavily in South Africa until after the Second World War, but some had already established operations there many years earlier, even before the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. Mobil Oil began doing business in South Africa in 1897 and General Electric followed a year later. Texaco (then known as the Texas Company) began selling kerosene, gasoline, and lubricants in 1911, later forming the subsidiary Caltex with Standard Oil of California. Besides J.P. Morgan's role in the formation of the Anglo American Corporation in 1917, Ford set up a South African subsidiary in 1923, Colgate-Palmolive in 1929, and Gillette in 1930. Although still small in comparison to the British stake, U.S. investments grew to more than £30 million by 1929.

After the war, there was a large influx of American capital into South Africa, mostly in the form of direct investment in U.S. subsidiaries. Unlike British subsidiaries, the American ones were usually wholly owned. As the U.S. stake in South Africa grew, it tended to shift more and more toward the manufacturing sector. In 1959, about 34 percent of American direct investment was in manufacturing; by 1970 it had grown to 50 percent.

The U.S. corporate stake in South Africa grew faster than its investments in the rest of the continent, increasing 100 percent in the decade between 1965 and 1975. By 1974, the United States had 40 percent of its direct investments on the entire continent in South Africa. The book value of all U.S. direct investments in the country stood at \$1.6 billion in 1976. The real value could be several times larger. For the same year, indirect investments in the form of loans by American banks and their subsidiaries surpassed \$2 billion, twice what it was a year earlier. In a 1975 report on American investments in South Africa, Donald McHenry wrote:

According to United States Department of Commerce and Department of State publications, more than 340 firms in South Africa are American-owned or have significant U.S. investment. The figure is subject to dispute. At least one South African bank source informed the American Consulate in 1971 that not all firms with American direct investment were included on the list. And, of course, this figure does not include companies such as Holiday Inns, Hertz, Avis, Polaroid, etc., which maintain an agency or distributorship relationship with South African businesses or which, like Chase Manhattan Bank, have an interest in foreign firms which in turn have an investment interest in a South African firm. In 1970, a South

African government agency estimated that at least 6,000 American firms maintain agency relationships in South Africa.²⁰

Of the top fifteen American corporations, only three do not have holdings in South Africa. Of the top 100, fifty-five have South African investments. According to McHenry, about 70 percent of the U.S. stake there is held by only a dozen corporations.

As of 1975, the United States was also South Africa's third largest trade partner, supplying South Africa with \$1.25 billion worth of imports and taking \$850 million of its exports. Among the much-needed products U.S. companies sell to South Africa are transportation equipment, mining machinery, computers, and telecommunications equipment.

Automobiles and Oil

Although the dollar value of American capital investment in South Africa is impressive by itself—making the United States the second largest foreign investor after Britain—it nevertheless tends to undervalue its real influence. The heavy concentration of investments in oil and in manufacturing, particularly in the auto and auto-related industries, gives American firms a dominant role in some of the most important sectors of the South African economy.

Ranked in terms of assets, the General Motors and Ford subsidiaries in South Africa are among that country's fifteen largest companies. Together with Chrysler, they controlled 60 percent of the South African auto market in the early 1970s.²¹ In 1973, American auto investments in South Africa were estimated at between \$240 million and \$260 million. The concentration of U.S. auto firms in Port Elizabeth has earned that city the nickname of "Little Detroit."

According to one South African economist, the auto industry was Pretoria's "chosen instrument" for the development of a sophisticated and diversified economy. Besides the wide range of technologically advanced production methods the auto companies themselves brought to the country, the production of cars, trucks, and other motor vehicles stimulated a number of other industries, including steel, rubber, auto parts, glass, and petroleum. General Motors alone utilized the services of more than 600 other firms.

Many of the auto-related industries in South Africa are also strongly represented by American companies. Mobil, Texaco, Standard Oil of California, and, to a lesser extent, Exxon and Lubrizol, are involved in oil refining and exploration. Of the major American tire and rubber manufacturers, Goodyear and Firestone have major facilities, and General Tire and Rubber, Uniroyal, and B.F. Goodrich have smaller operations. Auto components manufacturers include Borg Warner, TRW and Maremont, and Fram filters.²²

After the economic crisis that followed the Sharpeville massacre

20. Donald McHenry, *United States Firms in South Africa*, edited by the Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia (South-West Africa), (Bloomington, Indiana: African Studies Program of Indiana University on behalf of the Africa Publications Trust, 1975), pp. 3-4.

21. In late 1976, Chrysler merged its subsidiary with an Anglo American Corporation subsidiary to form the Sigma Motor Corporation, which will continue to produce Chrysler cars. Although Chrysler owns only 24.1 percent of the stock, it will receive 35 percent of the profits.

22. McHenry, *United States Firms*, p. 11.

of 1960, Pretoria adopted a "local content" program to reduce the economy's dependence on imported products and to stimulate the production of a broader range of manufactured goods within the country. The American auto companies moved quickly to satisfy Pretoria's aims. Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler built eight new engine assembly and machine plants by 1968. The book value of the auto parts industry grew from \$18.6 million in 1960 to \$210 million in 1970 and was expected to reach about \$300 million by 1976. "The local content plan," McHenry wrote, "was so successful that the South African Minister of Economic Affairs is said to have commented that the program 'far exceeded anything ever expected or even thought possible.'"²³

Oil is the second major sector of the South African economy in which American firms have taken the lead. It is the area in which Pretoria is most vulnerable to international sanctions or boycotts. Since oil is the one crucial raw material that South Africa has no known deposits of, Pretoria must import 90 percent of its oil needs. The rest is provided by the expensive process of converting coal to oil, which has been developed by Sasol.

Mobil and Caltex (a jointly owned subsidiary of Texaco and Standard Oil of California) refine more than half of South Africa's imported oil. The Caltex refinery was first planned only a few months after the United Nations passed a resolution in 1963 urging member states to refrain from supplying oil to South Africa.²⁴ In 1975, Caltex announced that it planned to invest another \$134 million by 1978 in the expansion of its Milnerton refinery near Cape Town, doubling its refining capacity to 100,000 barrels of crude oil a day. Mobil, which has \$333 million invested in South Africa and controls 20 percent of the South African oil market, also refines about 100,000 barrels of crude a day, 60,000 of which are supplied by Mobil Oil from Iran. Some of the oil refined by these companies has been used to fuel Pretoria's military vehicles.²⁵

In an effort to overcome its reliance on imported oil, Pretoria has carried out a desperate search for oil deposits. The American oil companies, again, played a central role. In 1970, U.S. firms were operating six onshore and eleven offshore oil exploration concessions in South Africa and Namibia. Although no exploitable oil deposits have been found, the regime's Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (Soekor) and its partners, Superior Oil, Cities Service, Highland, and Tenneco, announced a significant petroleum gas discovery in 1969.

The participation of the American oil companies with Soekor has given Pretoria's technicians invaluable training in oil exploration. According to a commentator quoted by McHenry, "Five years ago SOEKER had practically no personnel trained in these very specialized and technical fields, and was largely dependent upon imported skill and experience. Today [1971], the corporation, almost independent of overseas consultants, maintains a high standard of work."²⁶

Summarizing the impact of American investments on South Africa's industrialization, First, Steele, and Gurney stated:

In crucial sectors it is with American corporate assistance, and in some instances, leadership, that South Africa has developed into the major industrial power on the African continent and is achieving integration into the Western economic system, itself dominated by the United States. For although the total percentage of the United States' investment in South Africa is small as a proportion of its total foreign investment, it has been applied there to areas critical to the development of an industrial society.²⁷

23. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

24. First, Steele, and Gurney, *The South African Connection*, pp. 31, 105.

25. Jennifer Davis, "US Corporation Support for Apartheid—IBM and the Oil Companies," testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, September 29, 1976, pp. 5-6.

26. McHenry, *United States Firms*, p. 35.

27. First, Steele, and Gurney, *The South African Connection*, p. 280.



Social Action

Johannesburg skyline.

With the steady growth of South Africa's manufacturing sector, gold has lost some of its luster in foreign investment portfolios. But it still remains an attractive item on the stock exchanges, particularly with the sharp rise in gold prices in the early 1970s. Moreover, it has been joined by other South African minerals as a result of the world boom in base metals in general. Since South Africa has the largest and most varied mineral resources of any country except the United States and the Soviet Union, Pretoria is in a particularly strong position to cash in on that boom. Besides its vast deposits of gold and diamonds, South Africa has three-fourths of the world's chrome ore reserves, one-third of the known uranium reserves, and the largest known reserves of platinum, vanadium, and coal. It also has important deposits of manganese, copper, asbestos, nickel, tin, zinc, antimony, fluorspar, titanium, and vermiculite. Altogether, the country has at least sixty commercially exploitable minerals.

Not only is the United States a major importer of these minerals, but American companies have actively jumped into the boom in mineral exploration and production. According to a report in the September 4, 1972, *New York Times*, "Some of America's largest mining corporations—United States Steel, the Phelps Dodge Corporation and Newmount Mining—are stepping up their operations in South Africa, and more American companies are entering the South African quest for minerals." The fruits of the efforts by Phelps Dodge came quickly. Within a few years, it had discovered new deposits of zinc, copper, lead, silver, and antimony in the northwestern part of the Cape. It was reported that the new mineral complex might contain the world's largest zinc deposits. The new mines scheduled for the area were expected to mill up to 100 million tons of ore a year.

Although the Union Carbide Corporation already produced 20 percent of South Africa's chrome, it opened a new \$50 million, 120,000 ton ferrochrome plant in the Transvaal in 1976 in partnership with the Afrikaner-controlled General Mining and Finance Corporation. United States Steel also has a ferrochrome plant in the Transvaal, as well as a share of Prieska Copper in the northern Cape and of Associated Manganese (both in partnership with the South African mining house Anglo Transvaal Consolidated). Other significant American mineral operations in South Africa include a titanium mine near East London owned by King Resources; a one-third stake in the \$100 million Phalaborwa copper-phosphoric and vermiculite mines by American Metal Climax and Newmount Mining; and a 39 percent stake in a \$290 million titanium slag, pig iron, and zircon mining operation on the coast of Natal by Quebec Iron and Titanium, a company two-thirds owned by Kennecott and one-third by Gulf & Western.

Nor have American investors been reluctant to buy shares in South Africa's most famous mineral asset—gold. According to a report in the February 22, 1976, *London Sunday Times*, Ameri-

Rates of Return on U.S. Direct Investments in South Africa

| Year | Mining and Smelting | Petroleum | Manufacturing | Other Industries |
|---------|---------------------|-----------|---------------|------------------|
| 1961 | 28% | 19% | 21% | 20% |
| 1962 | 29 | 20 | 28 | 14 |
| 1963 | 21 | 16 | 32 | 18 |
| 1964 | 32 | 14 | 26 | 13 |
| 1965 | 50 | 15 | 20 | 13 |
| 1966 | 69 | 17 | 17 | 18 |
| 1967 | 62 | 17 | 16 | 14 |
| 1968 | 31 | 17 | 12 | 16 |
| 1969 | 44 | 16 | 14 | 15 |
| 1970 | 45 | 12 | 16 | 18 |
| Average | 41% | 16% | 20% | 16% |

Source: *United States Firms in South Africa*, by Donald McHenry. Compiled from Department of Commerce data.

cans own between 20 percent and 30 percent of South African gold shares. The London *Economist*, on February 28, 1976, put the U.S. share at up to a third. A survey conducted by Max Pollak and Freemantle, a Johannesburg stockbroking firm, suggested that the turnover in some gold shares was three times higher in New York than in Johannesburg itself.²⁸

As of November 1976, the market value of the total shares issued by the South African gold mining houses stood at about \$5.5 billion, which would place the American stake at between \$1.1 billion and \$1.8 billion.²⁹ This American money, moreover, tends to be attracted by the most lucrative of the gold mines. The Free State Geduld mine, for instance, paid out dividends of 400 percent in 1976, the second highest for any gold mine in the Anglo-American group. Americans own nearly half of it.

Profiting From Racism

The major attraction that South Africa holds for American investors is, of course, the country's fabulously high profit rates. As the South African government publication *Scope* put it, South Africa offers "the richest return on American capital invested abroad except for foreign oilfields."

The difference in profit rates on American investments in South Africa and in the rest of the world are striking. Although the average rate of return on direct U.S. investments worldwide was 11 percent for the decade from 1960 to 1970, American capital in South Africa earned 18.6 percent. In manufacturing, where most American investments in South Africa are concentrated, the difference was comparable. In 1970 alone, U.S. manufacturing firms earned 16 percent in South Africa, but only 9.4 percent worldwide. Of the major sectors of the South African economy, mining and smelting brought the highest rate of return on American investments, with manufacturing coming in second (see table). Official profit figures, however, often tend to be greatly underestimated.

The central factor behind the high profitability of U.S. investments in South Africa is the very low labor costs. And when it comes to paying Black workers starvation wages, American companies are little different from their South African counterparts. "Only a handful of the 350 American companies operating in South Africa pay their black workers more than the \$170 (about £70) a month, which is regarded by American economists as being the present subsistence level in South Africa, where the level

varies from city to city," Simon Winchester reported in the March 24, 1973, *Manchester Guardian Weekly*.

Many of the companies, such as Firestone Rubber, Chrysler, International Harvester, and Polaroid, were paying their Black employees well below the government's official poverty level, called the Poverty Datum Line (PDL), which at that time ranged between \$97 and \$110 a month. Newmount Mining Corporation paid its African employees only \$40 a month. The PDL, however, did not count the costs of education, clothing, rent, and other essentials, so it could more accurately be called the official starvation level. A more precise guide to the Black subsistence level in urban areas is the Minimum Effective Level (MEL), which generally is about 50 percent higher than the PDL. Winchester reported that only one American company, IBM, was thought to have paid its Black workers above the MEL rate of \$170 a month for Johannesburg.

When Black workers at American companies organize to fight for higher wages and better conditions, they face the same response they would get from most South African employers. For instance, Colgate-Palmolive, which employed Blacks at extremely low wages at a plant outside Johannesburg, fired nearly its entire Black workforce after they attempted to go on strike to press for pay increases. After two general strikes in August and September 1976, Jim Hoagland reported in the January 16, 1977, *Washington Post* that many "American firms were joining South Africa companies in threatening to fire employees who observed political strikes demanding black advances."

Partly as a result of the public outcry in the United States in response to the exposures of the wretched working conditions, some American companies in South Africa began a series of well-publicized "reform" measures in the early 1970s, raising Black wages, promoting some Blacks to skilled and semi-skilled positions, and easing some of the more blatantly discriminatory practices. Although the U.S. corporations publicly ascribed these changes to their own professed revulsion against apartheid, the public pressure and a wave of massive strikes carried out by Black workers between 1972 and 1974 were the real factors behind the wage increases.

The most well known of the reform programs was carried out by the Polaroid Corporation, which had paid Blacks abysmally low wages and supplied photographic equipment to the government for the production of the passes that all Africans must carry. In response to demands by Blacks in the United States that the company pull out of South Africa entirely, it launched an "experiment" in late 1970, claiming that it was better for American companies to stay in South Africa and improve the conditions of their workers than to withdraw. After raising African wages to the MEL subsistence level, or slightly higher, and contributing some money to African education, Polaroid declared the experiment a "success," thus trying to justify its

28. M.S. Mendelsohn, "Kruger's Golden Rand: A Survey of Gold and South Africa," special supplement to the *London Economist*, March 22, 1975, p. 25.

29. *The Stock Exchange Official Yearbook 1975-76*, (London: Thomas Skinner & Co. [Publishers] Ltd., 1975); *Johannesburg Star*, November 13, 1976; *London Financial Times*, January 21, 1977.

continued presence there. The Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement, which organized the initial protests against Polaroid's South Africa operations, termed the experiment a "deliberate fraud" and an "insult."³⁰

In some cases, the pay increases granted by American companies only revealed how low Black wages were to begin with. After General Electric raised the wages of its Black employees 41 percent between 1968 and 1973, most GE workers still earned barely more than the PDL level. One of the claims that a number of American companies in South Africa have made is that they pay Black and white workers the same wages for equivalent jobs. But considering that most Black workers are kept in unskilled positions, while whites get the top jobs, this claim is little more than a calculated deception. Even when Blacks are promoted to skilled positions (generally when there are no white skilled workers available), they still do not receive the same wages, since employers often change the requirements of the job slightly as an excuse for establishing a new, lower pay scale.

American companies have tried to palm off their responsibility for low Black wages and discriminatory practices by blaming them on the government's apartheid laws. But even the *Wall Street Journal* could not swallow this excuse. On September 22, 1971, the newspaper noted that American companies "sometimes blame the South African Government for the wide differences in pay between White and non-White employees. This is one of the misconceptions often cited about South Africa. These facts emerge from a study of governmental regulations, [white] trade union rules and labor-management agreements: There is no limit to what a company may pay a Black or any other non-White for a job."

Since the discriminatory practices of U.S. firms in South Africa hardly differ from those of other companies, or even from the South African government itself, it is not surprising that many of their executives openly favor Pretoria's racist policies. A 1969 report by a Johannesburg researching firm entitled "A Study of the Attitudes of American and Canadian Businessmen Based in South Africa" found that 77 percent of those who responded to a questionnaire felt that Pretoria's racial policies represented "an approach that is, under the circumstances at least, an attempt to

30. Alan R. Booth, "Polaroid's Experiment in the Disengagement From South Africa Debate," in *The Policy Debate*, p. 75.

develop a solution." Less than 10 percent thought that the policies were "altogether incorrect."

These attitudes are also reflected in the racist comments made by American businessmen from time to time, some of which were quoted in a study of American corporations in South Africa by Timothy H. Smith.³¹ R.J. Scott, the managing director of Ford Motor Company of South Africa, responded to a question about interracial contacts by stating, "I didn't mix with them in the States; I don't mix with them here, and if I went back to the States, I wouldn't mix with them there either." In explaining his support for Pretoria's Bantustan policy, International Harvester's managing director, James Hatos, said, "This Bantustan thing—I agree with it 100%. It is economically and politically sound. I am sympathetic to what the South African government is trying to do. I don't want hundreds of Africans running around in front of my house." One Chrysler official claimed that "the African doesn't want a trade union. He isn't used to democracy, he is used to an authoritarian hierarchical tribal structure. He accepts the white man as his guardian."

[Next: Pretoria's Partners—From London to Tokyo]

31. Timothy H. Smith, *The American Corporation in South Africa: An Analysis*, (New York: United Church of Christ, undated), pp. 6, 7, 24.

A Little Sawdust in Your Sandwich?

"Fresh Horizons" brand bread is manufactured by ITT Continental Baking Company, which is a subsidiary of the giant multinational corporation ITT. The bread is advertised as a "high fiber" loaf.

"As one who grew up in the Great Plains, I assumed that the fiber was the natural fiber found in wheat," Senator George McGovern said recently. But the senator was surprised to learn that the fiber content of Fresh Horizons actually comes from "wood pulp or sawdust."

ITT's bakery promptly denied the charge. The company said the fibers weren't sawdust but "a highly refined food grade powdered cellulose."

The sale of Fresh Horizons bread has been banned in Canada.

定期購読で

インターコンティネンタル・プレスを!

"Regularly buy and read the periodical INTERCONTINENTAL PRESS!"

That's the handwritten advice from one of our supporters in Tokyo.

Right on!

We can only add that the easiest way to "regularly buy and read" is to subscribe.

So fill out the blank and mail it in.

Intercontinental Press
P.O. Box 116
Varick Street Station
New York, New York 10014

Name _____

Street _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

() Enclosed is \$12 for six months.

() Enclosed is \$24 for one year.

Capitalism Fouls Things Up



SST Foes Plan Protest at Kennedy Airport

The residents of Howard Beach, New York, and other communities plagued by jet noise from Kennedy International Airport will take direct action April 17 to demand that the ban on landings at Kennedy by the supersonic transport jet, the Concorde, remain in force.

"Plans already have been made to shut down Kennedy . . . by having 2,500 people drive cars through the airport at five miles an hour," columnist Jimmy Breslin wrote in the April 5 *New York Daily News*.

Breslin reports the feelings of many residents that pressure on the New York Port Authority from the French and British airlines and their government sponsors has become so great that the authority will vote April 19 to lift the ban. "Everybody in Howard Beach believes the French and English have hired so many high-priced fixers that the Port Authority will be bought."

Air France and Aerospatiale, the French manufacturer of the Concorde, have hired

the law firms of former U.S. Senator Charles Goodell and ex-Secretary of State William Rogers to help get the ban lifted. The companies have paid almost \$900,000 to be represented by these former government officials. Concorde opponent Debby McGuire told Breslin: "They're not paying for a courtroom lawyer. They're getting fixers. . . . You won't see either of them in a courtroom. They do all of their work out of sight and the people get screwed."

President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is also keeping the pressure on. He warned Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Paris on April 2: "It's not just a technical problem. It is a political problem that will have inevitable political consequences if New York refuses Concorde landing rights."

Several Port Authority commissioners have complained of hints from Concorde lobbyists that their business interests in France and Britain will suffer if the plane remains banned from Kennedy.

But the SST's opponents aren't giving up. Breslin says "many Howard Beach people feel they are going to have to tie up the airport for the next 100 or so Sundays. They plan to award prizes to those families making the most trips per year to close the airport."

On April 5 two locals of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters representing 3,000 workers at Kennedy airport announced their opposition to Concorde landings. The union locals broke with the New York Central Labor Council and AFL-CIO chief George Meany, who claim the SST will create jobs. The Teamsters' statement said low-frequency sound waves produced by the jet would affect sensitive machinery in the area. Thus "the Concorde . . . could only result in a further flight of industry and erosion of jobs."

Power Companies May Have to Pay for A-Plant Accidents

A federal court in North Carolina has struck down a law that limits the financial responsibility of utility companies in the event of a nuclear power plant accident. The Price-Anderson Act, passed by Congress in 1957 at the behest of the nuclear industry, places an upper limit on liability of \$560 million in a single atomic accident.

The Carolina Environmental Study

Group and forty persons who live near a nuclear project challenged this law. According to the April 1 *New York Times*, "They contended that a serious accident . . . could cause thousands of deaths or illnesses from radioactive poisoning, and human injury and property losses valued at many times the \$560 million limit.

"If such an accident should happen, they said, the law would arbitrarily prevent the public's recovering damages that might run in billions."

Judge James B. McMillan agreed, ruling that the limit is "an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law."

The defendants in the case were Duke Power Company and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Duke Power Chairman Carl Horn, Jr., said the ruling will be appealed to the Supreme Court.


Poisonous Children's Pajamas Banned

The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission voted April 7 to ban the use of Tris, a chemical fireproofing agent, in children's sleepwear. Tests by the National Cancer Institute and other researchers have shown that the substance causes tumors and genetic defects in laboratory animals.

"Tris is not only a carcinogen but an extremely strong carcinogen. So much Tris is added to sleepwear that 5% to 10% of the weight of the garment represents the weight of this chemical," said Robert Harris of the Environmental Defense Fund.

The EDF filed a lawsuit in March to force the commission to act. Numerous previous complaints and petitions by the EDF dating back to October 1975 had failed to get the chemical banned.

The commission also prohibited the sale of 20 million garments now in retail inventories, but took no action to recall the 120 million already in use. Neither did it issue any guidelines for disposal of the clothing. Harris had warned earlier that "if the garments are thrown out, it is very likely that their disposal might cause the chemical to leak into ground water, thus contaminating the water supply." The EDF is going back to court to seek action



Rigby/New York Post

forcing retailers to repurchase all Tris-containing sleepwear.

The American Apparel Manufacturers Association (AAMA) called the ban "an injustice," contending it would drive many manufacturers out of business. The industry is now seeking to replace Tris with other chemicals in order to comply with the Flammable Fabrics Act. But, said AAMA spokesman Fred Shippee, "We are using substitutes that we're not sure won't later be found unsafe. . . ."

French Farmers Battle Polluter

Farmers in the Haute-Durance Valley in central France have formed an Antipollution Association to demand compensation from the Pechiney corporation, according to a report in the April 2 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly *Lutte Ouvrière*.

Fluoride wastes from the smokestacks of a nearby Pechiney aluminum plant have contaminated some forty kilometers of the surrounding area. The fumes have caused the deaths of nearly 1,000 sheep in the last year.

In the most recent incident, *Lutte Ouvrière* reports, 290 diseased sheep had to be slaughtered and burned March 18.

The farmers are demanding that the company compensate them for the loss of their crops and livestock, provide unpolluted feed for the animals, and install equipment to halt emission of the fumes.

Pechiney has agreed to install new equipment, but says work will not be completed for two years.

Seabrook A-Plant Still Stymied

Plans for the Seabrook, New Hampshire, nuclear power plant have suffered another setback. On March 31, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reaffirmed a January ruling by the NRC atomic safety and licensing appeal board lifting the construction permit for the plant.

Environmental Protection Agency head Douglas Costle is now reviewing a regional EPA decision that the proposed cooling system for the Seabrook plant would be harmful to marine life (see *Intercontinental Press*, April 11, p. 405). The NRC said that if a final EPA decision is not made soon, all construction on the plant could be resumed except for work on the cooling system.

Opponents of the Seabrook project are planning another demonstration at the construction site for April 30.

No Worse Than a Hurricane?

A panel of top American scientists and economists recommended March 21 that current U.S. programs to develop plutonium-fueled nuclear plants be scrapped, along with the extraction of plutonium from the spent fuel of currently

operating uranium-based reactors. (Plutonium is one of the deadliest substances known—inhalation of less than a milligram can cause lung cancer.)

In place of rapid development of plutonium power, the panel recommended increased reliance on coal and on conventional uranium-fueled atomic reactors as the chief energy sources for the United States until some time in the next century.

The proposals were the result of a study sponsored by the Ford Foundation and organized by a think tank called the MITRE Corporation. Two persons who are now high officials in the Carter administration participated in the project—Defense Secretary Harold Brown and Deputy Undersecretary of State Joseph S. Nye, Jr. There has been much speculation in the American press that Carter's upcoming energy proposals will reflect the study's recommendations.

Implementation of the proposals would mean the end of government funding for the Allied Chemical Corporation's Barnwell, South Carolina, plutonium-reprocessing plant, a \$500 million project now under construction. Work would also be halted on the \$2 billion experimental fast breeder reactor being built at Clinch River, Tennessee. (Breeder reactors are fueled with plutonium and can be made to operate so that they create, or "breed," more plutonium than they consume.)

Plutonium is an indispensable component of nuclear explosives. Much attention was focused in the report on the risk that quantities of the fuel might fall into the hands of "terrorists," as well as on the possibility of sabotage at nuclear power plants. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently adopted stringent new security guidelines calling for ten guards armed with semiautomatic rifles on every shift at U.S. atomic plants. Regarding such steps, the MITRE report said:

We are convinced that measures to improve security substantially can be taken without infringing on the civil liberties of employees of the nuclear industry and the general public. Overzealous and ill-conceived measures, however, could endanger civil liberties and set dangerous precedents.*

The study did not propose a total end to plutonium development efforts. It recommended that research continue and that commercialization of plutonium-based energy sources be put off until sometime after the year 2000. The report said:

There is a strong possibility that postponement will help in restraining large-scale, worldwide commerce in plutonium, and buy time to develop institutions to deal with this problem.

The panel concluded that such alternative energy sources as wind, solar, fusion,

* All quotes taken from the summary section of the report "Nuclear Power Issues and Choices," reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, March 21, 1977, pp. S4490-S4501.



Nereth/Liberation News Service

and geothermal power will be too costly to develop until well into the next century. In arguing for coal and uranium, they claimed that the safety of uranium compares favorably with coal:

[A] new coal plant . . . has been estimated to produce from two to twenty-five fatalities per year. Accidents in coal mining and transportation account for roughly two fatalities per year, and the rest of the range is attributed to the health effects of sulfur-related pollutants. . . .

The average rate-of-loss [of life] could be as high as ten fatalities per year for a 1,000 MWe [megawatts of electric capacity] nuclear power plant. However, even in this extremely unlikely situation, the average fatalities would not exceed the pessimistic end of the range of estimated fatalities caused by coal.

But the report went on to make the following argument:

An extremely serious accident under very adverse conditions is estimated . . . to kill as many as three or four thousand people over a few weeks, cause tens of thousands of cancer deaths over thirty years, and cause a comparable number of genetic defects in the next generation. . . . While such an accident would clearly be a major disaster, the consequences would not be out of line with other peacetime disasters that our society has been able to meet without long-term social impact. For example, the United States has experienced a number of hurricanes that have taken over a thousand lives. . . .

The "experts" neglected to add that no one has yet proposed a large-scale effort to create conditions that would make destructive hurricanes more likely to occur.

Effective for What?

The U.S. Agency for International Development has been carrying out a \$60 million program in Pakistan aimed at eliminating malaria. The disease is said to have reached epidemic proportions.

The only concrete results reported to date, however, have been the deaths of three Pakistani workers and the poisoning of many more who have been spraying with malathion.

Malathion was described in a U.S. Senate foreign relations subcommittee report on the program as "the only cheap, effective insecticide now available for malaria control programs. . . ."

Sixty percent of the Pakistanis who sprayed the insecticide became ill.

Selections From the Left

rouge

"Red," *Revolutionary Communist daily*, published in Paris.

The March 22 issue reports: "Breton activists brought before the State Security Court—this sort of thing has gotten to be a habit for the government. This time their names are Jean-Charles Denis, Aimé Lebreton, Jean Laluyaux, André Le Gall, Yann and Corentin Puillandre, and René Kerhouse. They are all accused of reconstituting a banned organization (the Breton Liberation Front), and also of bombings and conspiracy. . . ."

"The Bretons are accused of some definite actions (some of them deny any involvement), but behind these accusations the real charge can be seen more and more clearly—that is, attempting to separate a 'part of the national territory.' All the ministerial directives that have set in motion the heavy machinery of the Security Court indicate that the target is separatism. Facing what they apparently think is an imminent threat of secession, the authorities, contrary to their usual practice, have not spared any of the judicial pomp and circumstance. But at the same time, they are blithely dispensing with the rules of jurisprudence."

Ang KATIPUNAN

National newspaper of the Union of Democratic Filipinos. Published twice monthly in Oakland, California.

The March 16-31 issue carries an editorial condemning the CIA's role in the Philippines.

Associate editor Samuel P. Bayani says, "Recent disclosures of massive CIA payoffs to foreign heads of state in exchange for classified information about their country have had repercussions in the Philippines. One of those who figured prominently as a recipient of CIA monies was the late Philippine president, Ramon 'Guy' Magsaysay (1953-1956)."

Citing a recent book by former CIA agent Joseph Smith, Bayani writes, "It was the CIA, according to Smith, which made 'Guy' president in 1953, wrote his speeches and made important decisions in Philippine foreign affairs which dovetailed United States policy of aggression in Indochina. . . . It was this 'Defender of Democracy' who, working closely with the CIA, ruthlessly crushed the popular peasant-based Huk guerrilla army."

In addition, "Smith describes his dealings with well-known Filipino politicians, among them Diosdado Macapagal, Raul

Manglapus, Manuel Manahan and Ferdinand Marcos."

An article in the issue blasts Washington's present aid to the Marcos regime. "The Carter administration," writes Severina Rivera, "has claimed that its foreign assistance package reflects a new commitment to the protection of human rights abroad. Yet as far as the Philippines is concerned, it does not differ from the Ford administration's practice of supporting the repressive Marcos dictatorship. Carter has even proposed more economic and military aid to the Marcos regime for FY [fiscal year] 1978.

"In the same token, undermining legislation barring aid to repressive regimes, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stressed that whatever the human rights violations in the Philippines, aid will not be cut off because of 'overriding security considerations' (that is, the presence of U.S. bases). Human rights violations in the Philippines are only secondary considerations, Vance said."

LISTY

"Letters," magazine of the Czechoslovak Socialist Opposition, published monthly in Rome.

The February issue includes a translation of an article by Roberto Romani that appeared in the December 29 issue of the Italian Communist party organ *l'Unità*. The headline is "The Italian Communists on the 'Opposition' in East Europe." The introduction says:

"In the recent period in the pages of the Italian and French Communist party newspapers an interesting discussion has developed over the problems of the East European countries. So far these Communist parties have limited themselves to criticizing specific cases of repression and discrimination in the countries of 'real socialism,' regarding them as partial deviations or 'deformations' of socialism, or as the results of objective conditions that can be corrected by further development. This argumentation is running into more and more opposition not only from the non-Communist left but also from many leading intellectuals belonging to the Communist parties who are beginning to raise questions about the reasons for the appearance of opposition currents in the East European countries and about the real character of the regimes in those countries. Representatives of these Communist parties now do not avoid direct discussions with participants in the opposition movements in the East European countries."

Listy notes that the Italian CP publishing houses had not only put out a book by Soviet dissident Roy Medvedev, but one on Czechoslovakia by Zdenek Mlynar, one of the signers of Charter 77. In this context, *Listy* thought its readers would be interested in Romani's article.

The Italian CP journalist made a number of points in defense of the dissidents: "Statements are often published against the opposition . . . claiming that it is undermining society by its lack of loyalty and its ungratefulness to the socialist state, and that it is plotting with hostile groups and powers. We have to note that in saying this the state avoids any clarification, dialogue, and polemics, or any sharp confrontation in the political and cultural field. There are only two authorities on the scene—the state-party in the role of defender of the law, of the ideological tradition, and finally of the public morality. . . ."

"The problem fundamentally involves the value these societies assign to the democratic organization of the masses, to free thought, and to human rights. This is the core of the problem. And we see that the state-party not only monopolizes political power but assumes direct and indirect control over all social relations. . . ."

"It goes without saying that intellectual freedom is more than freedom for intellectuals. Karel Kosík [a Czech philosopher persecuted by the "normalizers"] said in an essay: 'The working class cannot play its political role in socialism without freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and free access to information.'"

HNH

"Nedeljne Informativne Novine" (The Week's News), published in Belgrade by "Politika" enterprise.

In the April 3 issue, Miodrag Marovic takes up the question of when Tito "broke" with Stalinism:

"Recently, Edvard Kardelj reminded us about an idea that continues to be stubbornly held not only here and there in the world in general but here and there in Yugoslavia. We hear and read sometimes, Kardelj says, that Yugoslavia was one thing before 1948 and something else after the 'fight with Stalin.' Thus, with the sudden appearance of the Informburo resolution [excommunicating Tito], Yugoslavia was supposed to have been transformed, not only as regards its relations with other socialist countries but also as regards its internal life. From a Stalinist state, it is supposed to have become a self-managed one! If we were really Stalinists

up to that time, Kardelj asks, why did Stalin turn against us?

"Everyone who listened just last week to the account Tito gave . . . which was shot through with genuine, inspiring, and vital truths, and those who listened even partially to the TV broadcast, could see the unbroken thread of independence and originality in our struggle to transform ourselves, the party, and social relations, going back four decades.

"Tito clearly and precisely described the events in which he was not only a participant but was the helmsman who, as is well known, guided us through those stormy waters. . . .

"In fact, in 1936, the Comintern, already a tool of Stalin's tyranny, almost decided to dissolve the Yugoslav party as it did the Polish one. Tito persuaded them not to by saying that he was taking on his shoulders the full burden and responsibility for restoring order in a party that had been profoundly divided by an unprincipled factional struggle.

"Indeed, at that time, Tito already had his own vision of the Yugoslav revolution, of how to unite around him the healthy core of the party, of how to carry out a program based on the vital interests of the workers themselves. This went against the submissive practices of the time, when you were supposed to wait to hear what was said by those who held the scepter of power in Moscow."

After such glorification of Tito, it is clear enough that the "cult of personality" did not end in Yugoslavia in 1948. However, Marovic neglected to mention an important chapter in Tito's career after 1936. The Yugoslav president was assigned to direct the liquidation of those elements in republican Spain that Stalin wanted out of the way, such as the Trotskyists.

Tito knew from experience how quickly Stalin could move to get rid of any leader with the slightest independent personal authority or power. He knew that there could only be one "father of the people." Marovic's article indicates that Tito is still trying to get out from under Stalin's shadow. Perhaps the article was also intended to answer questions about the possibility that there might be a certain carry-over from the "Stalinist past" in the Yugoslavia of today.

rood 

"Red," Flemish weekly paper of the Revolutionary Workers League, Belgian section of the Fourth International.

The lead article in the April 1 issue warns that the Belgian government is preparing to intervene in Zaïre to rescue the Mobutu regime.

"In 1960, the Belgian Congo became independent, but the Société Générale . . . continued to regard the copper, magnesi-

um, tin, uranium, gold, and diamonds under the soil of the Congo as its property. To defend its 'property,' it sought to put 'friendly heads of state' in power. When these 'friendly heads of state' were not able to defend the Société Générale's 'property,' the Belgian army was sent in."

Rood reviews the history of Belgian interventions in 1960 and 1964. Belgian troops, ostensibly sent in to save Belgian lives, supported the removal of a premier considered too radical, gave Katangan secessionist leader Moïse Tshombe time to build up his own armed forces, and helped to put down an insurrection against the neocolonial government in 1964.

"Now that the Zaïrian dictator Mobutu is threatened by the advance of the Congolese National Liberation Front into the former Katanga province, Belgian paratroopers have again been put on alert. Immediately after the recent events in Zaïre became known, the paratroopers at the Jambes base were ordered to take part in special exercises.

"They were awakened in the middle of the night. They were told not to put on their standard uniform. They were given brand new equipment fresh from the military depots. They were given uniforms without any insignia. They were told to leave anything behind that could serve to identify them. . . . Shortly afterward, they were in the air. It was a trip to the sea and back, just long enough to explain to them how the operation would be carried out if they had to intervene in Zaïre."

The article appeals to the Belgian forces not to believe the sort of pretext that has been used many times before to justify intervention:

"Soldiers, they are going to tell you, just as they did in 1960 and 1964, that you have to go in to save Belgian lives. In fact, you are going to be asked to risk your own lives and those of Black militants who have been fighting for real independence for seventeen years in order to defend the riches of the Société Générale."

DIRECT ACTION

Socialist weekly published in Sydney, Australia. Presents the views of the Socialist Workers party.

Goh Siong Hoe, coeditor of *Malaysian Socialist Review*, is currently on a tour of Australia sponsored by the Socialist Youth Alliance, Judy Siddins writes in the March 24 issue. Hoe is speaking on the topic "Recent Upheavals in China," and Siddins reports that his first three meetings in Melbourne were very successful:

"The largest meeting was held at Melbourne University, where he spoke to more than 120 students. About one-third of the audience was composed of overseas students, especially from Malaysia and Singapore. At the other meetings—at Monash University where 60 people were in attend-

ance and La Trobe University where a further 30 attended—the proportion of Asian students was about the same. This in itself was quite significant as Asian students are under constant surveillance from their governments and are strongly discouraged from taking part in any type of political activities. It reflects the growing interest among Asian students in alternative views of the events in China to the ones presented by Peking or the capitalist media."

Hoe's talk tracing developments in China from the Cultural Revolution to the recent campaign against the "gang of four" provoked "a lot of interest and discussion," prompting several students to inquire about joining the Socialist Youth Alliance.

Internationalen

"The International," central organ of the Communist Workers League (Swedish section of the Fourth International). Published weekly in Stockholm.

An article in the April 1 issue comments on the ostensible growth of the Swedish Communist party following the walkout of the old-line Stalinist faction at the end of February:

"Many people have been astonished by the apparent increase in the membership of the Communist party since the split. In shrill announcements, we have been told that in a couple of weeks the CP has signed up 1,000 new members. This would be the fastest growth in the party's sixty-year history.


"We doubt these claims. But regardless of how much Werner [the CP general secretary] and the others in the party leadership exaggerate their statistics, it seems clear that new members are being registered rapidly.

"But signing up new members is not the same thing as recruiting active members. That can be shown by sifting through the public communiqués of the CP's Skane [south Sweden] conference and the motions presented recently for a vote in the district.

"This is what the district leadership writes about its trade-union work last year: 'The dominant feature in Skane has been the absence of Communist activity in the workplaces. There have been no reports from the local organizations on activity in the shops in connection with the election campaign, except in Lund and Malmö. . . .'"

The Lund CP wrote: "If we look at the local organization's obligations according to the statutes, we can see that many of these in our district do not live up to these demands. Some of them carry on no activity, while they do fulfill their obligation to give membership reports. Some neither carry on any activity nor give reports."

AROUND THE WORLD



Protesters Gunned Down in Pakistan

Dozens of demonstrators were reported killed in Pakistan's Punjab Province April 9. Most of the protesters were slain in Lahore, when police fired into demonstrations organized by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a rightist coalition of nine opposition parties.

The PNA has charged that Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's party (PPP) won the recent general elections as a result of massive vote fraud. The demonstrations in Punjab were called to protest the opening of the Punjab provincial assembly.

Just six days before the protests in Punjab, the PNA charged that more than 150 persons had been killed by Bhutto's police during the previous three weeks, about 100 of them in Sind Province. The PNA also charged that 24,000 persons had been arrested since the PNA launched its campaign of demonstrations and strikes against the regime.

On April 8, four leaders of Bhutto's PPP split to form a new party. Three of them were members of Parliament and one was Taj Mohammad Langah, the former deputy secretary general of the Punjab provincial PPP. The new party is called the Pakistan Awami Jamhoori party (Pakistan People's Democratic party).

Djibouti to Gain Freedom in June

The French secretary of state for overseas territories, Olivier Stirn, announced March 19 that France would grant independence to its last African colony on June

27. The territory of Afars and Issas, more commonly known by the name of its capital city, Djibouti, is located at the southern tip of the Red Sea and bordered by Ethiopia and Somalia.

After meeting with representatives of the colony's political groups, Stirn said they had agreed to a referendum and a general election to be held May 8. But Hamadou Barkat Gourat, majority leader in the territorial Chamber of Deputies, told reporters he would not commit himself to the agreement. He did not elaborate.

Vietnam Presses For \$3.25 Billion In Postwar Aid Promised By Nixon

During negotiations leading up to the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, former President Nixon is reported to have sent a secret memo to Hanoi promising \$3.25 billion in postwar reconstruction aid. Both Nixon and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger deny sending the memo.

In his March 31 nationally syndicated column, however, Jack Anderson prints quotations from the document, supplied by a "top U.S. source." They confirm that Nixon did indeed offer the \$3.25 billion in "grant aid" to North Vietnamese leader Pham Van Dong. Anderson also disclosed that the House Asian Affairs committee will seek authorization to subpoena Nixon and Kissinger to question them under oath about the memo.

In an interview published in late March by Vietnam News Agency, Vietnam's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Phan Hien said it was the "undeniable duty" of the United States, "in terms of the legality of the Paris agreement on Vietnam, in terms of international law, as well as morality and human conscience" to provide Indochina with reconstruction aid.

More Black Activists Arrested in South Africa

The South African police have begun a new series of arrests of anti-apartheid activists.

So far, the most prominent victim of Vorster's dragnet has been Steve Biko, a founder of the South African Students Organisation (SASO) and the Black People's Convention (BPC). Along with thousands of others, Biko had been arrested in September 1976 during the massive Black protests against the Vorster regime, but

was later released. He was rearrested March 21 in Kingwilliamstown for allegedly "defeating the ends of justice."

At least five other members of the BPC in Kingwilliamstown and East London were also arrested in connection with pamphlets about "Heroes Day," which the BPC and SASO called to commemorate the March 21, 1960, Sharpeville massacre and the killings of hundreds of Black protesters during the Soweto uprisings.

Two Black journalists who had been previously arrested and released were also detained again. They are Duma Ndlovu and Joe Thloloe, both reporters for the Johannesburg *World*, South Africa's largest circulation Black newspaper. Thloloe is also president of the Union of Black Journalists.

Percy Qoboza, the editor of the *World*, said that the arrests were part of "a sustained and cruel campaign of terrorism against black journalists. . . ."

Constitution Suspended in Congo

The Congo's new president, Col. Joachim Yombi Opango, suspended the country's constitution April 5. The next day the ruling military junta dissolved the National Assembly and suspended all mayors, prefects, and subprefects.


Opango's appointment as president April 3 followed the March 18 assassination of President Marien Ngouabi, Opango's cousin. Former Congolese President Alphonse Massamba-Débat was executed March 25 for allegedly plotting Ngouabi's assassination. The following day six other persons charged with participation in the alleged plot were also executed.

'Easy Atom Bombs'

Within two years any small country will be able to build a small atomic bomb, even without sophisticated test facilities or a huge investment, according to a Congressional study made public April 4.

By using increasingly available supplies of plutonium and assembling a small group of knowledgeable scientists, it would not be difficult to manufacture an atomic explosive with the power of 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT, the report said.

The study was prepared by a fifteen-member panel of nuclear experts for the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee, which is holding hearings in Washington on nuclear proliferation.



New York Times