

# Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 14, No. 11

© 1976 by Intercontinental Press

March 22, 1976

75¢

**General Strike Sweeps Basque Areas**

## ***Police Attack Spurs Protests in Spain***

*Interview With Leonid Plyushch*  
**Trotsky Still Remembered for  
Role in Winning Civil War**

**More Troops Sent Against  
Zimbabwean Guerrillas**

**A Puzzle for the Australian  
Maoists**

**Hugo Blanco Interviewed  
in Lima**


**Perón Strikes Blow Against  
Democratic Rights**

**The Class-Collaborationist  
Course of Portuguese CP**

**Report on Egypt's Political  
Prisoners**

*Draft Resolutions*

- **Theses on the Portuguese  
Revolution**
- **The Test of Lines in the  
Portuguese Revolution**



Rouge  
Spain's Carabanchel prison. For account of conditions in this hellhole, smuggled out by political prisoners, see p. 437.

## International Meaning of Boston Action

Black leaders have called on supporters of desegregation throughout the United States to demonstrate in Boston on April 24. "Boston is at the center of the racist drive to prevent the Black liberation struggle from moving forward," the action call states.

"Boston is where racists and other reactionary forces nationwide get inspiration to advance their own attacks against Black rights. We have to point the way for the national Black community. A failure to win school desegregation here will encourage further attacks on Black rights in cities across the country."

The struggle for school desegregation, one of the main issues in the civil-rights movement in the American South during the 1950s and 1960s, has now moved to the industrial cities of the North, with their huge Black ghettos.

Racist scum, aroused by the specter of Blacks moving out of the ghettos, have organized in the Ku Klux Klan, the American Nazi party, and the more "respectable" antibusing groups such as ROAR (Restore Our Alienated Rights). They have received aid and comfort from Supreme Court decisions limiting earlier desegregation rulings, from antibusing resolutions and laws passed by Congress, and from antibusing statements by President Ford.

Not a single one of the capitalist presidential candidates has taken a forthright position in support of busing and

against the racist violence designed to deprive Black children of their constitutional right to an equal education. Instead, they are vying with each other to court the racist vote.

The capitalists are trying to roll back some of the gains made by Blacks over the last twenty years. This counterattack against the Black liberation movement is of international importance. The colonial freedom movement in Asia and Africa was one of the great forces that inspired Blacks in the United States to go into action, and the American Black movement in turn has become a major factor in the international class struggle and a powerful aid to the anti-imperialist fighters around the world. Fear of the reaction among American Blacks, for example, is one of the biggest reasons why Washington has hesitated to give more open support to the South African regime.

The struggle in Boston, as the call to the April 24 demonstration makes clear, is the sharpest point in the confrontation between the Black people in the United States and their capitalist oppressors. The American Trotskyists in the Socialist Workers party and Young Socialist Alliance are deeply involved in this struggle, and regularly report on it in the *Militant*, the American Trotskyist weekly.

The oppressed elsewhere in the world have a stake in this struggle. They can help the Blacks in the USA by vigorously supporting their action in Boston. □

To date, the fate of only one of the twenty is known abroad. A report in the August 3 issue of the Cairo daily *Al-Akhbar* said that Najwa Abdel Ghaffar Al-Baassi had been placed under house arrest. No information about the trial, conditions of confinement, or health of the others has been released by Cairo authorities.

The only news on the case remains a series of dispatches printed in the Cairo and Beirut press in the month following the arrests. The most extensive account appeared in the August 3 *Al-Akhbar*.

According to *Al-Akhbar*, the twenty persons arrested were alleged to be members of a "communist organization in contact with communist organizations in Lebanon and France."

The report, based on information released by the state security police, identified the organization as the "Internationalist Communist League" and said its aim was to "overthrow the country's political and economic system so as to impose a 'Trotskyist' extremist-communist regime."

The group's chief weapon for accomplishing this aim appears to have been a typewriter.

The charges against the twenty include:

1. Possession of a typewriter, allegedly purchased with the financial assistance of Lebanese Trotskyists.

2. Use of the typewriter in the production of pamphlets and leaflets.

3. Possession of copies of the Lebanese Trotskyist publication *Al-Mounadel*.

In addition, strenuous efforts were made to link the group to an "international conspiracy."

According to the *Al-Akhbar* account, "The accused have acknowledged being in contact with the Revolutionary Communist Group party in Lebanon, which is believed to be a section of a French communist party (the 'Fourth International'). They formed a communist organization along the lines of these two organizations and began their activities with the creation of what they called the 'Mustafa Khamis Communist Group.' The organization later became the Internationalist Communist League and adopted the Marxist-Trotskyist line."

It is clear from the political nature of these charges that the real target includes far more than the twenty persons arrested. Their detention and the continued secrecy around their case is an assault on the democratic rights of all Egyptians, particularly the right to free association and to the free exchange of ideas.

Nor is it any accident that, as reported in the July 5 issue of the Cairo weekly *Akhbar El-Yom*, some of those arrested were from the area of Mahalla El-Koubra, the site of workers protests earlier in the year. The Sadat regime has brutally suppressed workers demonstrations against inflation and low wages, most notably in major clashes in late December

## Release Egypt's Political Prisoners!

A popular new film in Cairo, *Karnak*, depicts the detention and torture of student political prisoners under Nasser.

The film was released with the approval of the Sadat regime's censors. Its obvious message is that the police-state methods of rule of the Nasser era are a thing of the past.

This is a lie, as any worker or student militant in Egypt can attest. Despite the fine words in the constitution defining Egypt as a "democratic socialist state," it is neither democratic nor socialist.

A case in point is the arrest last July 3 of twenty\* alleged "Trotskyists" on witch-

hunt charges of having "established relations with foreign communist organizations."

Najwa Abdel Ghaffar Al-Baassi, a student in the engineering department at Ein Shams University.

Ibrahim Azzam, a student at Cairo University. Mozahem Takriti and Abdel Kader Chaker, alleged members of the Revolutionary Communist Group of Lebanon, visiting Egypt.

A report on the case in the August 16 issue of the newspaper *Beirut* gave the following additional names:

Oussama Khalil, an employee in the Cairo University administration.

Mohamed Béchir Al-Sibaï, an employee in the foreign relations department of the Egyptian News Agency.

Dr. Mohamed Bayoumi, a veterinarian.

Mohamed Tayel, Ibrahim Ramadan, Mohamed Said Al-Jerjawi, and Atef Salem and his two sisters—all students at Cairo University.

\*The August 3 *Al-Akhbar* identified the following as among those arrested:

Randa Abdel Ghaffar Al-Baassi, a student in the agronomy department at Ein Shams University.

1974 and early January 1975.

In line with the government's efforts to blame such demonstrations on "extremist elements," a report in the July 5 *Akhbar El-Yom* charged that those arrested in Mahalla El-Koubra were seeking to carry out "subversive activities" in factories and student circles.

The motive behind such arrests is clear. They are aimed at providing an example of the treatment that can be expected by any worker who questions the regime's policy or speaks out against the steady decline of living conditions.

Cairo's cry against "foreign plots" and "foreign agitators" is merely a diversion, the standard ploy of a repressive government whose real fear is the demands of its own oppressed masses.

International protest against the continued detention of these twenty victims of Sadat's political police are urgently required. They can strike a blow for the entire Egyptian working class. At stake is not only the lives of these political prisoners but the basic democratic rights of all Egyptians.

If these twenty political prisoners can be locked away without even the pretense of a trial or the right to face their accusers, no worker militant in Egypt is safe from the same fate.

Protests demanding the release of the twenty may be addressed to President Anwar el-Sadat, National Assembly, Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt. Additional protests may be sent to Egyptian embassies abroad. □

### Abortion Fight in Italy

Abortion has emerged as a major issue for the new minority government of Premier Aldo Moro in Italy.

Last year, more than 500,000 signatures were collected to force a referendum on Italy's reactionary abortion law, adopted under the fascist regime of Mussolini. In an attempt to avoid the referendum, which they feared would end in defeat for them as did a similar one on divorce, the ruling Christian Democrats worked out a compromise bill with the Communist party in December.

The compromise proposal, which put the final decision on abortion in the hands of a doctor rather than the woman involved, was rejected by the Socialist party. In January, the old government fell before it could push the proposed law through the parliament.

A new law is needed by the end of April if the Christian Democrats are to avoid the referendum they fear. In such a referendum, the main allies of the Christian Democrats would be the neofascists.

The pressure on the Christian Democrats is indicated by the fact that an estimated 800,000 illegal abortions take place in Italy every year.

## In This Issue

Closing News Date: March 15, 1976

SPAIN	436	Murderous Police Attack Provokes Huge Protests—by Steve Clark
BRITAIN	438	Callaghan Hobnobs With Francoist Executioner
RHODESIA	439	More Troops Sent Against Zimbabwean Guerrillas—by Ernest Harsch
AUSTRALIA	440	A Puzzle for the Maoists—by Jim Percy
PERU	441	Hugo Blanco Interviewed in Lima
SOVIET UNION	442	Interview With Leonid Plyushch
PORTUGAL	448	The Class-Collaborationist Course of the CP—by David Frankel
U.S.A.	450	Arms Madness or Arms Addiction?
ARGENTINA	451	Perón Strikes Blow Against Democratic Rights—by Enrique G. Broquen
IRELAND	452	Provisional IRA Urges Fight for Women's Rights
NEWS ANALYSIS	434	International Meaning of Boston Action
	434	Release Egypt's Political Prisoners
AROUND THE WORLD	446	
DOCUMENTS	437	For Solidarity With the Workers of Aiava!
	437	An Appeal From the Political Prisoners of Carabanchel
	445	Open Letter to the Communist Parties of East and West—by Leonid Plyushch
DRAFT RESOLUTIONS	453	Meeting of the International Executive Committee
	453	Theses on the Portuguese Revolution
	466	The Test of Lines in the Portuguese Revolution
DRAWINGS	440	Nelson Rockefeller; 440, Richard Nixon; 447, Ronald Reagan—by Copain
EN ESPAÑOL:	477	Sobre Estrategema de Healy contra Hansen y Novack—por Betty Hamilton y Pierre Lambert

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Editor: Joseph Hansen.

Contributing Editors: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

Editorial Staff: Michael Baumann, Gerry Foley, David Frankel, Ernest Harsch, Judy White.

Business Manager: Steven Warshell.

Copy Editor: Mary Roche.

Technical Staff: Paul Devezé, Larry Ingram, James M. Morgan, Bill Razukas, Earl Williams.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial

opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

Paris Office: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guéménée, 75004, Paris, France.

To Subscribe: For one year send \$24 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail.

For airmail subscriptions in Europe: Write to Pathfinder Press, 47 The Cut, London SE1 8LL. In Australia: Write to Pathfinder Press, P.O. Box 151, Glebe 2037. In New Zealand: Write to Socialist Books, P.O. Box 1663, Wellington.

Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright © 1976 by Intercontinental Press

## Murderous Police Attack Provokes Huge Protests

By Steve Clark

[The following article appeared in the March 19 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

A massive general strike swept through the oppressed Basque provinces in northern Spain March 8, while thousands of workers and students staged solidarity strikes and assemblies in Madrid.

The protests came in response to the killings of several Basque workers in the city of Vitoria the previous week.

"Labor sources said the strike brought out 250,000 Basques in the biggest stoppage in the north since the 1936-39 civil war," according to a Reuters dispatch from Bilbao. Other estimates ranged as high as half a million.

Eighteen-year-old Vincente Ferrero, a metalworker participating in the strike, was shot through the head by Spain's paramilitary Civil Guards, as they dispersed a crowd of demonstrators near the Basque city of Bilbao. Ten thousand workers rallied the following day, pledging to continue their strike "until the police explain this atrocity."

Other attacks occurred throughout the Basque region. According to Reuters, "Shots, tear gas and rubber bullets were fired by security forces in Bilbao, the heartland of Spain's heavy industry, and riot police with clubs charged 2000 demonstrators in San Sebastian."

This current round of protests grew out of a two-month-long strike by 5,000 Vitoria steelworkers. Employers answered the workers' wage demands by firing strike leaders.

On March 3 an estimated 80 percent of Vitoria's work force staged a general strike in support of the striking steelworkers. "Thousands of workers surged through the city in an effort to close it down completely," *New York Times* correspondent Henry Giniger reported.

Police attacked the demonstrators and arrested picketers outside shops that had remained open. Reinforcements were called in from nearby provinces to help quell the strikers.

According to Giniger, "When 3,000 workers gathered in a church in late afternoon, the police fired smoke bombs and tear gas to dislodge them. The workers rushed out and in the ensuing melee the police opened fire."

The groups that called the March 3 protest say that six people were killed in the assault and that more than 100 were wounded. Government sources and most newspapers list four deaths.

"The hospitals quickly filled with injured," Giniger said, "and when a group of women gathered at the general hospital to make inquiries, the police attacked there as well, according to an account in the local newspaper."

"The newspaper said tear gas was fired into operating rooms and emergency wards."

The murders in Vitoria touched off strikes and demonstrations in the Basque cities of Pamplona, Bilbao, and San Sebastián. Protests also occurred in Barcelona, Madrid, and at several universities. Authorities tried to break up most of these demonstrations.

During the weeks prior to the killings, major strike struggles had broken out among truck drivers, bakery workers, teachers, nontenured professors, and construction workers. Campuses throughout Spain also continued to be centers of opposition to the regime of King Juan Carlos.

Since the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco last November, his hand-picked successor has failed to widen political freedom in Spain. Trade unions and political parties are still illegal, for example.

Juan Carlos has also imposed an unpopular wage freeze; denied amnesty to most political prisoners; and refused to grant any real autonomy to the oppressed Basque and Catalan nationalities, whose languages and cultures constantly fall victim to Madrid's chauvinism.

The new king claims that he has put Spain on the path toward "orderly" democratization, but his cabinet's statement on the Vitoria murders shows what these promises are worth.

The statement, issued March 5, said that the actions of the Vitoria police were "directed toward protecting the exercise of individual freedom." It called the Vitoria general strike "a clear attempt to hinder the program of reform that the Spanish people desire and which the Government is not disposed to abandon."

At the same time, activity among hard-line veterans of Franco's ironfisted dictatorship has also picked up in recent weeks. These forces—who hold high positions in the government and military and are honeycombed throughout the state

apparatus—are steadfastly opposed to even the most minor reforms of Spain's fascist structure.

Five masked rightists kidnapped the editor of a liberal Madrid magazine March 1 and forced him to denounce his own publication. The thugs warned him that he would be killed if he remained in Spain.

*Cambio16*, a newsweekly that has criticized the pace of Madrid's reform measures, received a bomb March 6, but the device was discovered before it exploded.

Meanwhile, Washington has been doing its best to help Madrid spruce up its image around the world.

Ambassador-at-Large Robert McCloskey appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the day of the Vitoria massacre to urge congressional approval of a proposed treaty with Madrid strengthening its ties with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

McCloskey told the senators that Juan Carlos "has made a good start" toward democratizing Spain and "taken a number of steps" for the release of political prisoners.

He added, "It is impossible to change history overnight."

Maybe so. But the events of the past several weeks leave no doubt that workers and students throughout Spain intend to "change history" just as fast as they possibly can. □

### Three OAS Staff Members Resign to Protest Inaction Over Chile

The failure of the Organization of American States to act on the violations of human rights in Chile has provoked the resignation of three members of the OAS Human Rights Commission.

Justino Jiménez de Arechaga of Uruguay, Genaro R. Carrio of Argentina, and Robert F. Woodward of the United States served on the commission when it prepared an extensive report on repression in Chile two years ago. The OAS General Assembly refused to take up the substance of the report.

"The experience has left me skeptical about the dedication of many Latin American countries to human rights," Arechaga said, according to a report in the March 5 *Washington Post*.

The last straw for the three was the OAS announcement that it was planning to hold this year's general assembly in Chile.

### For Solidarity With the Workers of Alava!

[The following leaflet was issued March 4 in Barcelona by the Catalan National Committee of the Liga Comunista (Communist League), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain. CNS refers to the Central Nacional Sindicalista (National Federation of Syndicates), the official Falangist union structure. UTTs are Uniones de Trabajadores y Técnicos (Workers and Technicians Unions), another part of the fascist state structure. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

Weeks ago, the workers of [the province of] Alava began a mass struggle to win their demands and rights, and for the reinstatement of those fired and the release of those arrested in the course of the strike. For this purpose they built assemblies in all the factories, elected delegates, and coordinated them in a *Representative Assembly of all the factories*. The mobilization was led by this assembly, which took charge of the direct negotiations with the boss. This forced a break with the CNS and the UTTs and the resignation of the delegates to the official trade unions in the majority of plants. The

student youth joined the workers struggle, electing, in assemblies of up to 5,000 youths, strike committees that were integrated into the Representative Assembly. All the oppressed population, including government employees and small businessmen, joined the fight. A notable aspect was the massive participation and militancy of thousands of women, who added their own demands and their strength to the general action.

In face of the provocative attitude taken by the government and the bosses, who arrested workers and youths and penalized working people, the Representative Assembly called a Day of Struggle for yesterday, March 3, in response to the wave of attacks. In a situation in which the control of the CNS bureaucracy and of those who try to support it from inside the workers movement had been bypassed and broken, the government that talks so much about democracy reasserted its role as the defender of "order" at any cost—the order that makes it possible to have wage freezes, lockouts, arbitrary firings, and to suppress freedoms . . . Faced with a people massed in the streets, Fraga's police once again took up "the arms of order"—their bullets once again shed the blood of workers and youth, of workers defending

their livelihood, their right to jobs, and freedom.

The capitalist press has been quick to label the Vitoria workers, the 90 percent of the working population (according to the official figures themselves) who participated in the strike, as "provocateurs." It has been quick to pin the label of "provocateur" on the three persons struck down by police bullets as they marched at the head of the demonstration.

*People of Catalonia:*

More than ever the struggle of the workers and people of Alava is our own fight. While we cannot stop building mobilizations on all the demands that lead toward uniting the masses in a common struggle, *there must be an immediate response to the attack by Arias's police, a demonstration of solidarity with the workers of Alava*. There must be a mobilization of solidarity, involving all the factories, neighborhoods, schools, faculties . . .

We must demonstrate our support and our indignation by holding assemblies, strikes, rallies, demonstrations, that are defended from the police.

Pay no attention to the voices that call on us to place confidence in the tolerance of the police or the government, the voices that want us to believe that we can fight for, or win, our demands through the CNS and its UTTs.

*Everybody, join the fight to support the workers and people of Alava!*

*For the dissolution of the repressive bodies! (Police, Civil Guard)*

*For the reinstatement of those fired! For the release of those arrested!* □

### An Appeal From the Political Prisoners of Carabanchel

[The following statement was issued in January by political prisoners in Spain's Carabanchel prison. We have taken the text from the January 30 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly newspaper supported by the French Trotskyists of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist League). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

Shortly after the announcement of the decree-law on the prevention of terrorism [August 27, 1975], a special section for political prisoners was set up in the "sixth wing" of Carabanchel prison. The number of prisoners placed there recently has varied between sixty and seventy.

The special regimen is marked in particular by a more rigid repression, in effect, the suppression of all rights enjoyed by the other prisoners.

The living conditions imposed on us are aimed at making any communication impossible—the regimen is halfway be-

tween being solitary confinement and normal imprisonment.

We are now kept in individual cells eighteen hours a day, under constant harassment and gibes with no other aim but to humiliate us.

The cells offer similar sanitary conditions—the walls drip with water along their entire length and one can always hear the rustling of the swarms of rats who live in the space between the floors.

Most of the toilets are stopped up. Water does not reach more than 50 percent of the cells. It has to be brought into the cells in buckets from the fountain in the courtyard, and then only when authorized by the guards. . .

The cold and the humidity make the situation intolerable.

We are forced to eat our meals alone, in our cells. Our meals arrive cold, whereas the other prisoners are allowed to eat in a dining hall, where the meals are kept hot.

During an entire day we are allowed to spend no more than six hours outside our

cells. We are taken to a small courtyard near the building we occupy and locked up there. We are forbidden to form in groups of more than five persons.

Surveillance of our activities is conducted by a guard in a sentry box and by a closed-circuit television camera that operates permanently.

The other prisoners have a reading room, schools, and access to the prison library. Furthermore, they are allowed the use of a canteen, which sells coffee and alcoholic beverages and has a barber and a shoe repair shop.

They are allowed to choose the television programs they want to watch, whereas we are allowed to watch only the news.

As we have said, it is impossible for us to communicate with the other prisoners. There is, for example, the case of two brothers—José Lara, who is imprisoned in the sixth wing, and Jesús Lara, who is imprisoned in the third wing—who have never been able to see or speak to each other.

Communication with one's family is

conducted by microphone. It is completely forbidden to speak in any language other than Spanish. When a lawyer comes to visit us, he is forced to wait for hours before being accorded visiting rights. One lawyer, Ventura Pérez Marino was told that his client, Manuel Albacete (now free), was not being held in this prison, when actually he was being held "in secret."

Degradation is total, both as a prisoner and as a human being. Anything can serve as a sufficient pretext for the officials to worsen our situation.

For having protested when we were kept locked in our cells one rainy day, when in fact it would have been possible to allow us to walk about in our wing, José Lara, our representative before the assistant director, was condemned to forty days in solitary.

Vicente Fuente was given the same punishment for having kept a half glass of wine. The same punishment was given to

Miguel Morán, who had supposedly written his name on the wall of a dungeon cell where he was being kept in secret. Miguel Sanz and Renaldo Timor were both sent to solitary confinement for not having risen when a guard passed by as they were playing cards in a corner of the courtyard.

We are forbidden any form of communal life such as, for example, the right to borrow books or money, or even to share our meals.

The officials hold up the medical prescriptions sent by our families, at times forcing us to wait as long as two months to receive them. Attempts are even made to incite conflicts between the common and political prisoners.

As for the Basque prisoners, their situation grows worse daily. They are under constant harassment.

The Prisoners of Carabanchel (provincial prison), Sixth Wing

Areilza, otherwise known as the Count of Motrico. This is one of those members of the post-Franco regime now posing as a "liberal."

To put the record straight, this "liberal" was installed as the first mayor of Bilbao, Euskadi, after the desperate fight of the Basque nation to preserve its 11-month-old independence against the Fascists' invasion ended in defeat in mid-June 1937.

To mark his arrival he made a speech (July 1, 1937) in which he declared:

"This horrible nightmare which calls itself Euskadi, a product of socialism on the one hand, and Biscayenne idiocy on the other, has gone for ever.

"It is the new Spain that has won, to establish nondisputable internal unity combined with military discipline and the vigorous service of the common people.

"Up to now the extremists could argue about the supposed right of the Biscay region to independence and self-government. But there is now a superior motive to the arguments and legal papers—THE SPILLING OF BLOOD.

"Biscay is now a piece of Spain by military conquest, pure and simple."

In the two months which followed, the bloody regime instituted by this acolyte of Franco incarcerated 16,000 people in the area of Bilbao alone.

During August 1937, in the space of five days, his tribunals sentenced 48 people to death and another 45 to imprisonment for life—out of a total of 159 cases.

He didn't of course succeed in stamping out the Basque nation. It is still very much alive and kicking and en route to restoring its independence.

But in the meantime, it would be interesting to know how the MP for Cardiff South East squares his socialist conscience with entertainment of a man who has so much blood on his hands. □

## In Tradition of British Imperialism

### Callaghan Hobnobs With Francoist Executioner



Welsh Nation

CALLAGHAN: British foreign minister rolls out red carpet for butcher of Euzkadi.

[James Callaghan, the present foreign minister in the British Labour party government, was the minister of the Home Department (Interior) when British imperialist troops were sent to occupy Northern Ireland in 1969-70. While Labour was out

of power, on April 11, 1972, he was assigned to foreign affairs. He is also a member of Parliament from Cardiff, the main city in Wales. In its March 12-18 issue, *Welsh Nation*, the English-language paper of Plaid Cymru (the Welsh Nationalist party), took up an episode in the latest phase of Callaghan's career.

[The Welsh Nationalists are anxious to discredit the socialist claims of the Labour party, which still commands the loyalty of the overwhelming majority of workers in Wales and is the main political force opposing Welsh self-government. On the question of anti-imperialist struggles and the rights of small nations, the record of the Labour party in general and Callaghan in particular offers an easy target. The article from *Welsh Nation* follows.]

\* \* \*

The indignation of Cardiff MP Mr James Callaghan over tortures in Chile would be very worthy if he didn't spend the rest of his time as Foreign Secretary behaving in the worst reactionary traditions of British jingoistic imperialism.

Not content with using the Royal Navy to bully the Iceland Government, anxious to prevent its one natural resource from being fished out of existence, Mr Callaghan has now taken to hobnobbing with Fascists.

Last week he was lavishly entertaining the Spanish Foreign Minister, Sen. M.

### Marseille Women's Center Launches Quarterly Bulletin

The Centre d'Orientation, de Documentation et d'Information Féminin (CODIF—Women's Orientation, Documentation, and Information Center) of Marseille has begun publishing a quarterly bulletin to provide information to women on a range of topics, among them women's legal and professional rights.

The bulletin, with a press run of 10,000 copies, is the latest effort of CODIF, which was formed in October 1974. The group has 3,000 supporters in the Marseille region, a full-time staff of two persons, and nineteen women volunteers from all walks of life who work part time in the center.

CODIF provides information and organizes debates on women's problems and helps women's groups organize on a neighborhood level. Its address is 81, rue Sénac, 13001 Marseille, France.

### More Troops Sent Against Zimbabwean Guerrillas

By Ernest Harsch

The white supremacist regime ruling Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) has publicly acknowledged that it is facing growing resistance from the Zimbabwean freedom fighters. On March 9, Edward Sutton-Pryce, a deputy minister in the office of Prime Minister Ian Smith, announced that since late January guerrilla forces have extended their activities along the entire length of the 800-mile border with Mozambique.

He estimated the number of Black guerrillas within the country at 1,000, most of whom are in the northeastern region. Thousands of other guerrillas are reported to be based across the border in Mozambique, either undergoing training or ready to engage in action.

While seeking to downplay the seriousness of the situation in eastern Zimbabwe for the white regime, Sutton-Pryce nonetheless disclosed that the number of troops in the area had been increased by 60 percent since January. The number of reservists called up for active service rose by a similar percentage. He said that the Rhodesian military forces would be further expanded, and he extended an invitation to foreign "volunteers" to join up. A number of white foreign mercenaries, including Americans, are already fighting with the Rhodesians.

The military budget for the current fiscal year totals R\$9.2 million (one Rhodesian dollar is equivalent to US\$1.23), a 33 percent increase over the previous year. R\$5.1 million of that amount was specifically earmarked for counterinsurgency operations.

"In pursuit of the security effort," *New York Times* correspondent Henry Kamm reported from Salisbury March 9, "Mr. Sutton-Pryce said that Rhodesia was spending 'a tremendous amount of money' to improve communication and transport facilities in the border region. Air strips are being built and roads surfaced to deter mining. Rhodesia has developed and is producing a combat vehicle that he described as having 'counterambush and countermine capabilities.'"

In addition to these military measures, Sutton-Pryce described the efforts of the regime to isolate the guerrillas from their supporters in the countryside. He said that between 175,000 and 200,000 Blacks have already been moved from their old homes into so-called protected or consolidated villages. This program is to be expanded.

Although Rhodesian officials have claimed that Black villagers moved into these enclosed compounds voluntarily, the



SMITH

Der Spiegel

Rhodesians are in actuality carrying out a program of forced resettlement similar to the "strategic hamlet" program enacted by Washington during its war in Vietnam. The "protected villages" are kept under constant guard, with all inhabitants required to show passes and undergo searches when entering or leaving.

The expansion of this program, which uproots and disrupts entire communities, may heighten the Black opposition to white rule even further. A white policeman, cited by Kamm in a March 10 dispatch from Bindura, in northeastern Zimbabwe, said that the principal reason for Black hatred of whites was the resettlement program. "The young," the policeman said, "are like animals, they hate us so much."

During the news conference, Sutton-Pryce added that it was questionable whether Joshua Nkomo has control over any of the guerrilla forces. Nkomo is a Zimbabwean nationalist leader with whom the Rhodesians are holding secret negotiations. Sutton-Pryce said that the guerrilla war would continue even if the regime reached a political settlement with Nkomo. "It would be daydreaming to say it will come to an end," he said.

In addition to the mounting opposition from the Black guerrillas, the Smith regime is also under greater diplomatic pressure from the imperialist powers,

which are seeking to defuse the explosive Zimbabwe conflict before it endangers imperialist interests in the rest of southern Africa.

On March 12 President Ford declared that Salisbury should make "more progress" toward reaching a settlement with the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders. "There ought to be movement toward a majority government," he said. "That, I think, has to be inevitably the result."

Ford coupled this call, however, with a warning to Moscow and Havana not to become directly involved in the Zimbabwe conflict, as they had in the Angolan civil war. Warning them against "international adventurism," Ford said that Washington had "all kinds of contingency plans for all kinds of potential action" by Moscow and Havana against South Africa or Rhodesia. Ford's warning followed a similar one by Secretary of State Kissinger a week earlier.

A member of Nkomo's negotiating team, Willie Musarurwa, condemned Kissinger's statement March 10, terming it "very badly timed." He said that Kissinger's threats of U.S. action against possible Cuban involvement in Zimbabwe could stiffen the white Rhodesian opposition to Black majority rule.

Musarurwa compared it to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's statement, just before the white settlers declared Rhodesia's "independence" from Britain in 1965, that London would not use force to prevent the white coup. Wilson's declaration served to encourage the Rhodesian settlers to go ahead with their plans to perpetuate white rule over the country's more than six million Blacks.

On March 8 Nkomo called on Washington to increase its pressure on the Smith regime. He said that Washington should "state very categorically they will not support in any way a white minority regime, and support majority rule now."

According to Kamm, in the March 9 *New York Times*, Nkomo also appealed to Washington to consider repealing the 1971 Byrd Amendment, under which Rhodesian chrome, nickel, and other mineral imports are allowed into the United States in violation of United Nations economic sanctions against the Rhodesian regime. That bill was passed shortly after President Nixon, in 1970, adopted the "Tar Baby" policy that "tilted" Washington more in favor of the white minority regimes of southern Africa.

The diplomatic and economic pressures on the Smith regime from the imperialist powers, including Washington, have so far been limited. The white Rhodesian rulers have not yet made any significant concessions to the Black majority.

On March 6 Smith again rejected the idea of immediate Black majority rule, stating that he would "never accept in principle a government which depends on the color of a man's skin. . . ." □



PERSONA NON GRATA



PERSONA GRATA

## A Puzzle for the Australian Maoists

By Jim Percy

[The following article appeared in the March 4 issue of *Direct Action*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in Sydney.]

\* \* \*

During the beginning of the revolt among youth in the 1960s many young people in Australia were attracted to Mao Tsetung "thought," especially in the aftermath of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. They were attracted by the militant, anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Red Guards and the Chinese leaders at the same time as they were rejecting the Social Democratic reformism of the ALP [Australian Labor party].

Of course, this meant swallowing whole not only the anti-imperialist slogans of the bureaucrats who rule China but also their sectarian and Stalinist outlook, their rantings against revisionists, Trotskyists, and other "freaks and monsters." And of course there was the infantile ultraleftism, the confrontations with the police and so on, that the student wing of this phenomenon promoted in the anti-Vietnam War movement and elsewhere.

But this process received a sharp jolt in 1971 when Mao invited the then-President Nixon to Peking. What was signaled by this action was an agreement by Washington to take up the Chinese bureaucracy's

offer of "peaceful coexistence"—an offer of long standing, but one which the new young Maoists had failed to reckon with.

As Mao dined with Nixon while the bombs rained on North Vietnam, and while Peking held back aid to the Vietnamese, thus carrying out, with the Kremlin, a clear betrayal of the Vietnamese revolution, it was hard to rally support for the new détente. Desertions, dropouts, disillusionment, the collapse of organizations like the Melbourne Worker-Student Alliance—all these reflected the fate of many of the new recruits.

So the hardened Maoist ideologues had to come up with something new—or at least something old dressed up a bit. They decided on a vigorous campaign in favor of Australian nationalism, and argued that Australia is an oppressed and exploited country and therefore that militant nationalism has a progressive character.

Of course some new or revived symbols were found—the old Eureka flag, the southern cross on a blue background—and all things truly Australian were glorified. Remember the campaign to save the Chico roll against U.S. take-over?

But if Australia is oppressed there must be an oppressor—U.S. imperialism is the obvious choice, along with Japanese militarism to be sure. New slogans—U.S. bosses out, U.S. bases out—are daubed

over walls everywhere.

And, of course, socialists are against the U.S. war machine and against all capitalist exploitation. But not just *foreign* bosses and not because they are foreign. In fact our strongest slogan is: *Australian bosses out!*

The narrow outlook of the Maoists leads straight to national chauvinism. And that leads straight into the hands of the ruling class here and leads to support for *their* adventure and interests.

The latest in the string of Maoist anti-U.S. campaigns is the campaign against the visit in late March of U.S. Vice-president Nelson Rockefeller. This has been the main concern of the Maoists during the last few turbulent months. And yet again they have attracted a number of activists by their militant rhetoric.

And this is all to the good, so long as the protests are aimed at Rockefeller as a representative of the largest imperialist power of them all, and against Australian government complicity in the latest schemes of imperialism in Southeast Asia.

But we must be clear that Rocky comes here not as a colonial conqueror, to impose the latest U.S. plans for "domination of Australia," but as a partner-in-crime to swap notes with the genuine Australian gangsters, Fraser and his crew, about how to jointly exploit the peoples of the region.

But even as the local Maoists prepare to give Rockefeller a hot reception, a ghost has appeared to haunt them. Yes, Mao has done it again. He's invited the world's No. 1 living war criminal, Richard Nixon, to China yet again.

What an irony! Can't the local Maoists see it? Rockefeller, the butcher of Attica comes to Australia and rightly meets with protests.

But Nixon, the man who tried to bomb Vietnam into the stone age, the most reviled politician in the U.S. today, gets the red carpet treatment in Peking. Massive crowds are rolled out to greet him. To the Maoist bureaucrats in China, who openly hero-worship Stalin and follow in his footsteps politically, this mass murderer Nixon is a man of honor.

Can anything be more bizarre than this? How can the local Maoists possibly justify it?

What would they do if *they* were in China today? Would their demonstrations be *for* or *against* Nixon's visit? If Nixon came to Australia would the Australia-China Society organize sumptuous banquets for him?

The truth is that the Maoists cannot explain away these contradictions. They have tied their fortunes to the interests of the Chinese Stalinists and so they are forced to tail behind every change in the Maoist wind. We say: Down with all the Nixons and all the Rockefellers of the world. And that applies *wherever* they go and *whoever* they're talking to. □

## 'The Masses Have Realized How Little Has Changed'

[The following article by Mats Holmberg appeared on the front page of the January 15 issue of the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter*. Holmberg is well known for his exposés of conditions under the Latin American dictatorships, particularly in Chile. The translation from the Swedish is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

LIMA—Among the houses on the low hills, the midday heat felt still more oppressive than down on the highway. There was a dead silence around the main street. But when a newcomer began to walk up the road, whispers followed him from house to house.

"It's him. Don't you see, it's him. That's Hugo Blanco!"

When Hugo Blanco entered the marketplace, the news of his coming had preceded him.

The shantytown in the desert had no name. Those who live here usually call it "Kilometer 14," after its distance from Lima.

Hugo Blanco had been there only once before. But slogans in big letters on walls remained from his visit:

"Hugo Blanco, the indefatigable defender of the peasants," the signs said. "Hugo Blanco, champion of the working class." "Welcome, Hugo Blanco!"

In a few minutes after he sat down in the square, he was surrounded by people who wanted to talk with him about what had happened in the neighborhood since he was here last, to ask him for advice, or just to say hello.

The name Hugo Blanco—the name of the most outstanding Peruvian peasant leader of the 1960s—still stirs memories and hopes among the poor of his country.

Three months have gone by since Hugo Blanco returned to Peru. Five whole years have passed since he was deported. And in that time he was forced to flee from three different countries until he ended up as a teacher in Kramfors, Sweden, his final place of exile.

Now forty-one years old, he was sitting here in a shantytown outside Lima and continuing the political work that had already cost him eight years in prison and five years in exile.

"You must organize yourselves," he urged his listeners. "You must protest. You must break with the authorities—otherwise there will be no changes for the better."

He realized, he said, that just such appeals could prompt the Peruvian mili-

tary government to exile him once again.

Hugo Blanco has never made his peace with the military. Many leftists who, like him, were hunted down and jailed in the 1960s were later to join up with the military's "Peruvian revolution." But Hugo Blanco will not consider collaborating with it.

"It is not a revolution," he says, "and the military are not socialists. The government in Peru is only one of capitalism's many forms."

He does not consider the record of the military's six years in power completely negative. And he rebuts groups on the ultraleft in Peru that equate the government here with military dictatorships such as those in Chile and Brazil.

"It would be dishonest to dismiss the military's land reform," he said. "When I worked among the peasants in Peru, they were still living in a strictly feudal relationship to the landlords. Now the big estates have almost disappeared. What I oppose is the fact that the feudal oppression has been replaced with capitalist oppression, and that the land reform has been carried out on conditions set by the state bureaucracy rather than by the peasants."

Today, Hugo Blanco lives and works mainly around Lima, far from the peasant districts where he still has his political roots.

He sat on a platform in the marketplace in "Kilometer 14" and again and again came back to the need to unite outside the organizations the government has set up to support its own revolution.

This is a sensitive subject. One of the cornerstones of the Peruvian military's revolution is precisely that they will not accept any departure from the organizational forms they have set up. And Hugo Blanco has been attacked by the pro-government Peruvian left as a splitter and provocateur.

"Is it true, Hugo, that you have betrayed the revolution?" an uneasy listener asked. He had read that in a Lima newspaper that morning. Hugo Blanco replied, waving the newspaper in question.

"How should I answer this? I might, of course, put a statement in the newspaper, but they wouldn't accept it."

The questioner fell silent, but he was not convinced, and for a long time he watched Hugo Blanco with troubled eyes.

While he was in Sweden, Hugo Blanco was often angered by the way Peru was portrayed. The Peruvian poor were often presented as passive and lacking in political initiative.

"That's especially false about the people who live in Lima's new shantytown belt," he said. "The very fact of living in some of these neighborhoods means that the people involved have made an audacious political choice. Because you have to occupy the ground yourself and fight your way through endless battles with the police and the authorities."

He noted that precisely in Lima's new outlying shantytowns, he had found a political militancy that he often found lacking in Swedish workers.

"I think this tendency is growing throughout Peru," he said. "In the first years after the military coup in 1962, the people waited to see the results of the government's revolutionary promises. I think the government's own demagoguery helped radicalize people. Now the masses have realized how little has changed, and they have started to think in revolutionary terms."

He is certain that sooner or later the people will come to demand that the Peruvian revolution be put into practice. Until now, he maintains, it has consisted mostly of empty demagoguery.

"I mean, of course, that we will defend the government against any coup from the far right," he said. "But at the same time, we must expose it so that the people will see clearly how hollow its promises are. We should not let ourselves be deceived by the apparent conflicts between the government and other capitalist groups in Peru."

It seems that Hugo Blanco is in a hurry to make up for the time he lost in exile. □

### Gulf Oil Pays MPLA \$102 Million

The Gulf Oil Corporation announced March 9 that it had released \$102 million in royalty and tax payments to the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

The payments had been placed into an interest-bearing escrow account in December after the State Department pressured Gulf into suspending its operations in Angola's Cabinda enclave. By that time Gulf had already paid the MPLA \$116 million.

On March 2 the State Department officially ended its commercial embargo on the MPLA regime and allowed Gulf to continue with its operations. While announcing the \$102 million payment to the MPLA, Gulf said that it was discussing with MPLA officials "the basis for the resumption of operations in Cabinda under new arrangements."

## Trotsky Still Remembered for Role in Winning Civil War

[The following interview with the Ukrainian antibureaucratic fighter Leonid Plyushch, and his wife, Tatyana Plyushch, was published in the February 27-March 4 issue of *Informations Ouvrières*, the weekly paper of the French Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI—Internationalist Communist Organization). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

*Question. In your various statements and interviews, you have given a picture of bureaucratic repression in the Soviet Union. For a long time, Leon Trotsky thought that Stalin had no need to resort to physical torture to get the defendants in the Moscow trials to confess crimes they had not committed. Leon Trotsky thought that those marked for extermination by Stalin had been brought to such a state of collapse (by political pressure, threats to their families, moral torture, etc.) that this was unnecessary. However, in his report to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev revealed that at Stalin's orders the KGB [the secret police] systematically utilized physical torture in setting the stage for the monster trials. Is torture used today against the dissidents? Can the capitulation of Yakir be explained, for example, by physical pressure?*

*Answer.* When I heard the statements of Krasin and Yakir on the radio, I said: "They confessed under torture." But other information I have found since leads me to doubt it. The statements by Krasin and Yakir sounded so much like those of the Bolsheviks in 1938! In particular, Krasin's statements were completely out of character.

I don't think there was any physical torture or use of drugs that affect the mind. Why did they capitulate? I don't know. Krasin was a great fighter who struggled all his life. Yakir is a different matter. He is an alcoholic. He thought that there wasn't, and had never been, anything good in the country. As he saw it he could do nothing in such a country. But he said: "Despite everything, I don't want to go along with this." He reacted as an individual, and in such a case you have to have an extraordinary force of character to hold such opinions and keep them to yourself. I have been told that the KGB threatened Yakir and Krasin, threatened them with the death penalty. For Yakir, in such circumstances, there was nothing to counterbalance such a threat.

As for torture, personally I was always treated courteously. They only screamed at me once. They never threatened reprisals against my family. There were hints of this. They told me that my case was connected to that of a Belgian spy! The fact remains that the KGB used a provocation against a person I knew well, Lyuba Seredniak. They showed her what were purported to be notes from me and Gluzman, which said that we advised her to confess and give evidence. The KGB advised her to tell all. Lyuba Seredniak was young. She believed the KGB, and it was largely because of her testimony that Gluzman was arrested and sentenced to ten years.

Certainly, isolation in cold rooms, a semistarvation diet, and the absence of any medical care can be called torture.

*Tatyana Plyushch.* There is a system of solitary confinement that is well known. For a period the guards give you a cold meal every two days instead of giving you the half ration you are supposed to get daily. After that they give you "food" that is considered "hot." Feldman was given this punishment in the solitary confinement cell of the camp where he is serving his sentence because one day he refused to work to protest anti-Semitic remarks directed at him.

*Q. What issues in particular have motivated the dissidents to take up the struggle against the bureaucracy?*

A. The main motivations are moral. This is what Solzhenitsyn calls "refusing to live a lie." Human beings with a conscience cannot live without protesting when they see around them permanent deception and unrelenting repression. Another motive, in the case of the Ukrainian dissidents, was that they were stirred to protest against the poverty of the workers and peasants, since Ukrainian intellectuals are closer to the masses than the Russian intellectuals. Finally, for the neo-Marxists, there is a third motive, the gap between what they have learned about Marxism and the reality. I would like to point out how much a man like Gluzman learned about fighting from a man like Bukovsky.

To conclude on this question about physical torture, for my part, I never heard of, or saw, it being used.

*Q. One of the problems that most disturbs us is that the Soviet intellectuals and workers have literally been cut off by the totalitarian bureaucracy from any inter-*

*change with the international workers movement. Do you think there has been any continuity in political experience in the Soviet Union? If so, how is it expressed? If not, how can you explain the writings of Grigorenko, Medvedev, and others?*

A. The continuity has been at the level of Russian historical experience and culture.

*Q. You said that you read an article on Thermidor written by L. Trotsky after he was expelled from the Soviet Union?*

A. An Old Bolshevik showed me a copy in secret.

*Q. Unless I am mistaken, a samizdat publication referred to a letter by a young Communist (Anonimov, "A Morning of Joseph Stalin") that was sent to Stalin after the war denouncing the bureaucracy. How did this young Communist arrive at this conclusion?*

A. I think this young man reached this conclusion because he read Lenin carefully and wanted to make the reality conform to what was written. In the case of almost all the Marxists, the starting point for their struggle was thinking about the October 1917 revolution. I also read Trotsky's *Lessons of October*. It was given to me by a person who had been a fellow traveler of the Trotskyists and who attended Joffe's funeral in 1927.

*Q. How does the younger generation get hold of documents the bureaucracy has tried hard to hide.*

A. I always tried to find out about the hidden documents concerning the Left Opposition, the Right Opposition, and other currents. But it was very difficult. I only managed to read two articles by L. Trotsky and Bukharin's *ABC of Communism*.

*Q. Did you think these documents existed or that some people had them?*

A. I knew that Trotsky's *My Life* existed. One of my friends had a copy, but he was an anti-Marxist and refused to lend it to me. I was able to learn about some documents from the Czech journal *Listy*. I read *The Unfinished Revolution* by Isaac Deutscher and a book on Stalin.

*Q. We came to communism here in the West on the basis of an immense Marxist*

literature. Since you didn't have access to this literature, on the basis of what books did you reach your communist conclusions?

A. Only anti-Marxist literature reaches the USSR from the West. The only foreign Marxist literature we had access to was Czech.

Q. In a report to the Bolshevik party congress in 1919, I think, Lenin said in essence: "The imperialists have been inflicting great destruction on us; the piles of rubble are mounting. But as long as one piece remains intact, all the advances of civilization will be preserved in it. And from that fragment, we will reconstruct everything."

A. If the only ones fighting are groups of intellectuals, and they are most of all in the provinces, their struggle will not produce any results.

Q. Are you pessimistic?

A. No, I am not a pessimist. The task is to put an end to this situation and recreate the links with the peasant and worker masses.

Q. And the intelligentsia?

A. The Ukrainian intellectuals are of peasant origin. In Moscow, the intellectuals themselves came from the intelligentsia. In the provinces, there are closer ties between the people and the intellectuals, and this is why there are Marxists.

Q. What about the other nationalities?

A. I can only talk about what I knew four years ago, before I was imprisoned. I know nothing about what has happened since then. In Armenia and Georgia, the intellectuals weren't interested in having ties with intellectuals in Moscow.

For this reason, not much is known about things there. The repression against the Crimean Tatars is ferocious, and it is driving a part of the intelligentsia away from Marxism.

However, I can point to the example of Yuri Osmanov, whose father fought heroically against the fascists in the war. Yuri Osmanov, one of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar movement, is a convinced Marxist.

In the Baltic republics, I don't think a gap existed between the intellectuals and the people. I would add that the Ukrainian intellectuals were in touch with the intellectuals in Moscow.

Q. How many dissidents do you think there are?

A. Only the KGB can answer that question. It is said that Andropov, one of the



LEONID PLYUSHCH

leaders of the KGB, called for the arrest of 3,000 persons. But those are rumors. Personally, I think the number of dissidents is much larger than 3,000.

Q. How does the opposition operate?

A. Obviously, I will say only what can be made public. Connections are made by telephone and trips to Moscow and other cities.

Q. Can you give us any information on the resistance to the bureaucracy by the workers and peasants?

A. There was a transport strike in Odessa, in 1966 or 1968, if I remember correctly. In 1969, I learned about a workers demonstration in Kiev, and then about a strike in Zhdanov in 1971. There have also been workers rebellions in Novo Aleksandrovsk near Moscow and in Nalchik in the Caucasus, in Ashkhabad, in Frunze, and a demonstration at Novocho-kash. In all these rebellions, except the one in Novo Aleksandrovsk, the workers fought the police because comrades of theirs were killed or wounded. I know nothing about mobilizations by the peasants.

Q. Does the bureaucracy favor the peasants over the workers?

A. Under Stalin and Khrushchev, the bureaucracy ignored the peasants, except insofar as police repression was concerned. After 1964, the situation of the Ukrainian peasants improved. It is hard to say how much or how.

Q. What do the names Trotsky, Zino-

viev, Bukharin, and Rakovsky represent for the fighters for democratic freedoms in the USSR?

A. Almost nothing is known about them. The Old Bolsheviks don't think much of Zinoviev. Personally, all I know about Trotsky is that he played a big part in the civil war and in winning the victory. I have had, and continue to have, a feeling of admiration for Trotsky, although some of his ideas don't appeal to me. But I admired Trotsky as a person.

What I liked about Bukharin was his links with the peasantry and his intelligence. But I had to revise my estimate when I learned about his relations with Stalin. I think that if Bukharin had been a Bolshevik, he would have appealed to the people and to the party against Stalin. He would have won because the majority would have supported him. Bukharin should have been closer to the people. I got a very bad impression of him after reading his letter to the Central Committee of the party. Bukharin speaks there about his personal tragedy and not about the tragedy of the revolution. As for Rakovsky, although I have since learned that he was the chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, I know nothing about him.

Q. Did opinions change about these figures after Khrushchev's report?

A. No.

Q. In what terms is the national question posed in the Soviet Union as you see it? Is the struggle of the Soviet peoples for self-determination and against Great Russian chauvinism leading to the breakup of the federation, or can this struggle be contained within the framework of the federation?

A. That is a question of vital political importance for the Soviet people and the youth. Historical experience has shown that independent republics were better for Soviet society. There is the problem of the immensity of Soviet territory, the differences of culture and language. The centralizing tendencies of the state and leaderships promote a debasement of all the cultures and inevitable bureaucratization of the apparatuses.

Q. Then, for you, the federation does not represent the future?

A. Apparently it no longer does. But I have fought against that. Before his death, Lenin defined three main dangers (he thought the bourgeois specialists working in the state apparatus also represented a great danger). The first was bureaucratization. The second was petty-bourgeois tendencies. And the third was Great Russian chauvinism. When Lenin ob-

served the growth of Great Russian chauvinism, he told the party that this would make independence necessary.

To sum up: These three dangers appeared as signs of the degeneration of the revolution. I would like to point out to you that a former leader of the right in the Duma, Vladimir Shulgin, one of those who founded the Provisional Government after the February revolution, a member of the White Guard, who made a pact with the monarchists against Soviet power during the civil war, is living today in the USSR and is one of the sycophants of the "socialist system." In 1921, Shulgin wrote a book, where, in essence, he explained:

"The Whites lost because they had dirty hands, but the ideas of the Whites will win with red hands. We forced the Bolsheviks to revive the old Russian army. The Bolsheviks returned to the old frontiers. Under the flag of the International, Russian has become the main language. One of the Bolshevik leaders will become an autocrat such as Russia has not yet seen." Shulgin was asked what he thought about Lenin or Trotsky as possible future autocrats. He answered: "No, not them. They believe too much in socialism."

*Q. In the program of the Fourth International drawn up under L. Trotsky's leadership, the following program was outlined for the Soviet Union:*

*"A fresh upsurge of the revolution in the USSR will undoubtedly begin under the banner of the struggle against social inequality and political oppression. Down with the privileges of the bureaucracy! Down with Stakhanovism! Down with the Soviet aristocracy and its ranks and orders! Greater equality of wages for all forms of labor!"*

*"The struggle for the freedom of the trade unions and the factory committees, for the right of assembly and freedom of the press, will unfold in the struggle for the regeneration and development of Soviet democracy."*

*"The bureaucracy replaced the soviets as class organs with the fiction of universal electoral rights—in the style of Hitler-Goebbels. It is necessary to return to the soviets not only their free democratic form but also their class content. As once the bourgeoisie and kulaks were not permitted to enter the soviets, so now it is necessary to drive the bureaucracy and the new aristocracy out of the soviets. In the soviets there is room only for representatives of the workers, rank-and-file collective farmers, peasants, and Red Army men."*

*"Democratization of the soviets is impossible without legalization of soviet parties. The workers and peasants themselves by their own free vote will indicate what parties they recognize as soviet parties."*

*"A revision of planned economy from top to bottom in the interests of producers*

*and consumers! Factory committees should be returned the right to control production. A democratically organized consumers' cooperative should control the quality and price of products."*

*"Reorganization of the collective farms in accordance with the will and in the interests of the workers there engaged!"*

*"The reactionary international policy of the bureaucracy should be replaced by the policy of proletarian internationalism. The complete diplomatic correspondence of the Kremlin to be published. Down with secret diplomacy!"*

*"All political trials, staged by the Thermidorian bureaucracy, to be reviewed in the light of complete publicity and controversial openness and integrity. Only the victorious revolutionary uprising of the oppressed masses can revive the Soviet regime and guarantee its further development toward socialism. There is but one party capable of leading the Soviet masses to insurrection—the party of the Fourth International!"*

*"Down with the bureaucratic gang of Cain-Stalin!"*

*"Long live Soviet democracy!"*

*"Long live the international socialist revolution!"*

*"An uncompromising disclosure of the roots of race prejudice and all forms and shades of national arrogance and chauvinism, particularly anti-semitism. . . ."*

*What is your opinion of this program?*

A. I'll have to think about the question of Stakhanovism. It's all correct. But Trotsky doesn't talk about the place of the intellectuals in the soviets.

I agree with the demand about legalizing all parties. There is no reason to be afraid of bourgeois parties, since going back to private property is impossible in the USSR.

The demand "Down with secret diplomacy" is very good.

I have questions about the sentence in the program that says: "Only the victorious revolutionary uprising of the oppressed masses can revive the Soviet regime and guarantee its further development toward socialism." I wonder about this. The masses have no political consciousness whatsoever. A revolutionary situation takes form when "the masses can no longer live as they have before." In the Soviet Union, living conditions are improving. It is a slow process but real. There might be a chance if there were a war. But war is too monstrous and it would not bring democratization.

*Q. There is another question we have already discussed. We Trotskyists think that the Soviet Union is a degenerated workers state. You, Comrade Plyushch, think the Soviet Union is a state-capitalist system. Do you think that what we*

*consider socialist gains in the Soviet Union—expropriation, abolition of private property, collectivization of the land—define the USSR as a state-capitalist regime?*

A. I think that one of the Trotskyists' errors is their belief that the state in the USSR is a degenerated workers state. It would be a workers state if the workers exercised the slightest control over the government. In the Soviet Union, you have no say about who governs. The workers can only vote for a single candidate who is imposed on them. A worker can cross out a name or write another in. But this is ridiculous because the person whose name is written in will not be elected. Moreover, in order to eventually get my candidate elected, I would have to join with others. But if I started to discuss with other people, I would automatically be accused of turning anti-Soviet.

As a sign of protest, some workers cross out the name of the candidate, tear up their ballots, or write obscenities on them. Personally, I didn't go to vote.

On the question of expropriation, what has expropriation brought? Property has passed from the hands of private owners to those of what Marx calls "collective capitalist society," the government.

What has collectivization brought? The same thing. The kolkhozy have to turn over the better part of their income to the government. Under Stalin, the kolkhozy were more a form of feudalism than anything else. The peasants did not even have the right to passports so that they could move from one province to another. They were slaves.

The planned economy remains. But there was also a planned economy under Hitler. In the Soviet Union, planning is from the top down, without any consultation. At the bottom you have no right except to shut up and obey. Some kind of decentralization would be necessary; at the same time, the need for central direction of the economy would have to be taken into account. Then, it would be a scientific economy, which is essential to a socialist economy.

*Q. Do you think we can advance toward socialism without abolishing private ownership of the major means of production?*

A. No. Only in a period of transition will small private property continue to exist. □

### Ugandan Students Protest

Hundreds of students from Makerere University marched through the streets of Kampala, Uganda, March 6 to protest the police killing of a student the day before. A statement from the Ugandan Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed that the student, Paul Serwanga, was shot while trying to break into a house near the university campus.

# Open Letter to the Communist Parties of East and West

By Leonid Plyushch

[The following statement was issued February 23 by the Ukrainian antibureaucratic fighter Leonid Plyushch, who is now living in France. The translation from the Russian is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

Dear Comrades,

The Twenty-Fifth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) will soon begin. Your representatives will be at this congress. It is for this reason that I appeal to you in this letter in the name of all the Communists in the Soviet Union who stand in opposition to conditions existing in the USSR.

So as to make our position clear, I will remind you of some tragic events in the history of the international Communist movement.

I realize that many of you find the testimonies of the samizdat authors unconvincing. Therefore, I will try to base myself solely on generally known facts with which you can acquaint yourselves by carefully reading the materials of the Twentieth and Twenty-Second Congresses of the CPSU, the historical studies of Soviet scholars during the period of the Khrushchev "thaw," and samizdat articles written by persons who remain Communists.

In the 1930s, the Comintern concentrated its forces not so much against the Nazis as against the Social Democrats, who were regarded as the accomplices of Hitler. As a result, the working class was split, and its struggle against fascism was paralyzed.

In 1939, the CPSU concluded a treaty of "peace and friendship" with fascist Germany. Molotov declared that after three months the war had undergone a dialectical transformation, and that France and England had become the aggressors. And many Western Communists followed the turn in the course of the CPSU. Theodore Dreiser, for example, made indignant protests because the United States began to help England and France.

The blindness of the Comintern went to the point of dissolving the Polish Communist party at a time when all forces had to be mobilized for the struggle with fascism.

The Stalin gang wiped out foreign Communists after the war as well. I need only mention the trial of Slansky, the first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist party.

Thanks to the geographic position of their country and their firmness, the Yugoslav Communists averted KGB interference in their state affairs. You remember what a flood of lies was unleashed against Yugoslavia. Tito was supposed to

be an "agent of the Gestapo," and "friend of Franco," and so on.

You might reply that all this is over with, and that since the Twentieth Congress the CPSU has set out on a Leninist course.

Remember the fate of Czechoslovakia. No sooner did the Czechoslovak CP decide to set out on an independent course than it was invaded and occupied by Soviet troops. All of you can acquaint yourselves with the documents of the "Prague Spring" and see the falseness of the accusations against the Czechoslovak Communists. I want simply to note the most important fact—Dubcek had the full support of the people and the party.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia exposed the CPSU in the eyes of all peoples; it exposed the great-power chauvinist course of the Soviet government's international policy. The events of 1968 are a grave warning for all peoples: Too close ties with the USSR constitute a threat to their independence.

I want to remind you about the domestic policy of the CPSU. In the Twentieth and Twenty-Second Congress, unfortunately, most of what was said focused on the fate of Communists. The leaders of the CPSU were afraid to talk about the tragic fate of millions of nonparty workers, peasants, and intellectuals. They did not decide to hold a public trial of the hangmen of the Soviet people.

The Stalinist Gestapo liquidated virtually all the figures in the October revolution and the civil war who had played any significant role—party leaders, officials in the Soviet apparatus, trade unionists, leaders of the Communist Youth, commanders of the Red Army. The party of the Bolsheviks was physically and morally destroyed and replaced by the party of Stalin (and even in Stalin's party, any independent thinking was systematically wiped out).

In the Twentieth and Twenty-Second Congresses, it was said that the secret political police—the GPU-NKVD—stood above the party. It was not said that the top-level party bureaucracy usurped the power of the soviets. In the USSR, the workers, peasants, and intellectuals have no influence over their government (remember the "palace" coup in 1964, when Khrushchev was ousted without the people knowing anything about it).

I want to remind you of one of the most terrible crimes committed by the Stalinist party.

At the end of the Second World War, many peoples of the Caucasus, Crimea, and the Volga region were accused of "betraying the fatherland" and were exiled

to Central Asia and Siberia. Now some of them have returned to their homelands. But the Crimean Tatars, the Meskhis, the Greeks, and the Volga Germans cannot return to their homelands.

The Meskhis and Crimean Tatars have been waging a struggle for many years to return to their ancestral lands. Active participants in this struggle are prosecuted and jailed in prisons and camps. The fate of these peoples is yet another lesson for other nations.

In the 1960s a movement arose in the Soviet Union for democratizing the country. The participants in this movement demanded respect for the political, economic, and national rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, rights that are also written into the Soviet constitution, which formally promises elections, freedom of speech and conscience, the right of national self-determination, and so on.

The democratic movement unites both Communists and non-Communists.

We Communist oppositionists believe that with the democratization of the Soviet government, power will pass from the hands of the party and Soviet bureaucracy to the hands of the workers. We believe that a restoration of private property is impossible in the USSR (if there is a democratization of the country). Bitter historical experience has taught us that a state cannot develop normally if opposition is banned.

We appeal to you to struggle for an amnesty for political prisoners throughout the world and especially in the "socialist" countries.

You Communists in the capitalist countries say that you are fighting for a humane, democratic, communist society. But the peoples of your countries can make their own judgments about events and choose their road. The CPs of the so-called socialist countries have discredited and are discrediting the ideals of communism. Only if you resolutely and uncompromisingly support the democratization of the "socialist countries" and amnesty for political prisoners in these countries can you prove to your peoples that you will not bring them the horrors of Stalinist dictatorship.

Socialism without democracy is antisocialism.

Respectfully,  
L. Plyushch

A subscription to *Intercontinental Press* is still a BEST BUY.

Check rates inside cover.

# AROUND THE WORLD



## Bolivian Student Strikes Continue

Student strikes broke out again in Bolivia March 6, eight days after the Banzer regime briefly succeeded in ending an earlier strike wave that had been going on for almost a month.

Police arrested twelve students in La Paz on the day the new strike began. A number of social science students occupied the archbishop's office, where they launched a hunger strike. Students at the Technical University in Oruro suspended activities for thirty-six hours.

The strikes resumed after the Banzer government refused to meet student demands on examinations and to release seven student leaders arrested in the earlier strikes. The regime has indicted these students under the state security law for being involved in an alleged subversive plot along with sectors of the labor movement and the teachers.

Support to the students' demands has come from the 7,000 miners at Catavi and Siglo XX. On March 6 they completed a seventy-two-hour work stoppage demanding that Banzer settle the university conflict. The 30,000-member Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (Trade-union Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers) called on Mining Minister José Antonio Zelaya to intercede on behalf of the students.

The 25,000-member Federación de Cooperativas Mineras (Federation of Mining Cooperatives) also endorsed the students' demands.

In addition, the Comité de Bases del Magisterio (Teachers Rank-and-File Committee), which has strong support among Bolivia's teachers, declared its readiness to join the students if the government does not meet their demands.

## Gandhi Takes Over in Gujarat

More than 100 opposition political figures were arrested March 13 in Gujarat state, one day after president's rule—direct federal control—was imposed by the Gandhi regime. The imposition of president's rule brought the last opposition center remaining in India under New Delhi's dictatorial rule. The move had been expected ever since Gandhi ousted the opposition state government in Tamil Nadu a month earlier.

The imposition of federal control in

Gujarat followed the collapse of the nine-month-old Janata Morcha (People's Front) coalition government. The state government was forced to resign after it lost a state assembly vote by 89 to 87 votes. The Congress party in the assembly was not strong enough to form its own majority state government, however, and called on the Gandhi regime to step in.

George Fernandes, a leader of the Socialist party and one of the most hunted opposition figures still at large, was reported to have escaped the arrests in Gujarat.

## Protest British Army's Use of Forged Press Cards in Belfast

The British army has been forging press cards for use by plainclothes soldiers in Belfast and other cities in Northern Ireland, according to a disclosure in the February 16 London *Times*. The credentials were used as a cover for surveillance activities.

The revelation brought protests from the National Union of Journalists, the Institute of Journalists, and Robin Corbett, a Labour party member of Parliament. They demanded that the British army halt the practice and destroy the existing forgeries.

## Mitterrand, British MPs Demand Freedom for Hernán Cuentas

The wives of imprisoned Peruvian miners union leaders Hernán Cuentas and Víctor Cuadros announced February 28 that their husbands had gone on hunger strike a week before to demand their release. Cuentas, Cuadros, and four labor attorneys were arrested in December.

In a letter in the Lima paper *Expreso* the union leaders' wives said: "Our husbands have been unjustly and illegally imprisoned for sixty days without any charge being lodged against them or any action taken on the writ of habeas corpus submitted to the court on their behalf. They have not been allowed any contact with their families or lawyers.

"Because of the way they have been treated, they are in a perilous situation. Their health has been endangered by the lack of proper nutrition, medicine, and medical care, and as they have informed public opinion, by their constantly being

transferred from prison to prison, where they have no mattresses and have to sleep on the ground. They are subjected to all sorts of intimidation, housed with common prisoners, and threatened with being sent to El Sepa." (El Sepa is a notorious death camp in the Amazon jungle.)

On the eve of the March 6 cantonal elections in France, in which his party emerged as the largest French party, SP First Secretary François Mitterrand sent a telegram to the Peruvian embassy in Paris demanding the release of Cuentas and his comrades.

In its March 11-18 issue, *Informations Ouvrières*, the paper of the French Organisation Communiste Internationaliste, reported that forty-seven British Labour members of Parliament sent a telegram to Peru's London embassy demanding the release of the mine leaders. In Lima, the magazine *Marka* has begun a campaign to mobilize support and raise money for the imprisoned unionists.

## Paris Warns Plyushch Against Criticizing USSR

French Premier Jacques Chirac issued a clear warning to exiled Soviet dissident Leonid Plyushch February 15, stating that political refugees in France are mistaken if they think they can freely criticize the country they fled while receiving French hospitality.

"Such an attitude does not conform to my concepts of morality," Chirac stated in answer to media questions on Plyushch. "In no case does it conform to the interests of France."

## Yugoslav Lawyer Sentenced for Agreeing With Client

Yugoslav attorney Srdja Popovic was convicted of "maliciously spreading false information and causing public disorder" March 10. Popovic, who is well known internationally for his defense of dissidents, was sentenced to one year in prison. The charges stemmed from his defense of Yugoslav writer Dragoljub Ignjatovic, who was tried in April 1974 for spreading "false information."

Ignjatovic was arrested after making a speech in which he criticized Yugoslavia's high unemployment, mass illiteracy, declining industrial productivity, problems

in agriculture, and bureaucratic corruption.

In his defense of Ignjatovic, Popovic attempted to introduce evidence that most of the "false information" his client was charged with spreading had been drawn from the official Yugoslav press.

The court refused, however, to allow Popovic to introduce a series of newspaper clippings in support of his contention. Instead, Ignjatovic was found guilty and sentenced to three and a half years in prison.

Popovic himself was brought to trial on the grounds that in defending Ignjatovic in court, he had publicly expressed agreement with his client's views. Two witnesses testified, corroborating the prosecution's charges. The court refused to admit any evidence or testimony on Popovic's behalf.

### Israeli Troops Club Arab Students

The wave of Palestinian demonstrations that began January 27 took on a new dimension March 10, when the Israeli occupiers were confronted with the resignation of the mayors and city councils of three West Bank towns. The resignations—in Ramallah, Al Bira, and Bir Zeit—were in protest against a brutal attack on students at Bir Zeit College by Israeli troops.

According to a dispatch by Terence Smith in the March 12 *New York Times*, the Israeli soldiers were enraged when some Bir Zeit students threw rocks at them after they attacked a protest march. Smith reported that "the angered soldiers charged the college dormitories, smashing windows and doors with riot clubs, overturning furniture and dragging students out to a pair of waiting jeeps."

"Fourteen students were injured in the melee and hospitalized, while five were arrested and fined the equivalent of a year's tuition at the college."

The city council of Nablus, the largest West Bank town, had already resigned earlier in the week, and other councils are reportedly considering similar actions. Meanwhile, Smith reported, demonstrations and strikes by students and shopkeepers were continuing throughout the West Bank.

The actions have been in opposition to the Israeli occupation and Israeli settlement in the occupied territories, as well as against attacks by the occupation forces.

### Abortion Fight Erupts in Portugal

On March 12 Maria Antonia Palla, a Portuguese journalist, appeared in court to answer charges of "offense to public morals" brought by Lisbon's main maternity hospital. Palla's "offense" is that she was one of the authors of a television program on abortion.

The Portuguese church hierarchy de-

nounced the program for "shamelessness" and "irresponsible daring," while the right-wing Social Democratic Center and Christian Democratic parties issued statements attacking the program as "an insult" to the conscience of the Portuguese people.

"The leftist political parties have preserved an embarrassed silence in the controversy," according to a report by Marvine Howe in the March 13 *New York Times*.

Howe gave the example of a Socialist party militant who said, "We favor legalized abortion but the program was inopportune, coming just before parliamentary elections."

Abortion in Portugal is illegal, with a penalty of two to eight years in prison. Palla, quoting medical sources, estimates that about 180,000 abortions are performed each year in Portugal, more than the annual number of births. More than 2,000 women die annually as a result of the dangers associated with clandestine abortions.

"While the high society can go to clinics in Switzerland and England and have their abortions in comfort, security and legality," Palla told Howe, "the poor and middle classes have to suffer humiliation and useless risks because of social hypocrisy."

Palla and others working with her hope to begin a struggle for legalized abortion.

### British Pound Falls to New Low

The British pound fell below US\$2 March 5 for the first time in history. On March 12 its market value dropped further to US\$1.92. The drop was encouraged by the Bank of England, in the hope that it would help alleviate Britain's ongoing economic crisis. Although British capital will benefit from the increased exports and tourism expected to follow the devaluation, the British working class will suffer additionally because of the higher cost of imported goods.

### Peter Camejo Tells Off Reagan on U.S. Theft of Panama Canal

A March 9 press release from Peter Camejo, Socialist Workers party candidate for president of the United States, called for the return of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone to the Panamanian people.

Answering a statement by the reactionary Republican candidate Ronald Reagan, who said, "When it comes to the Canal, we bought it, we paid for it, it's ours, and we should tell [Panamanian President Omar] Torrijos and company that we are going to keep it," Camejo responded:

"The \$10 million treaty signed in 1903 giving the U.S. control over the Canal 'in perpetuity' was signed behind the backs of the Panamanian people. The Canal is Panama's most significant resource, and could provide jobs for thousands of Pana-



REAGAN

manians. The people of Panama have repeatedly demonstrated their opposition to U.S. control of Panama, and against the presence of thousands of U.S. troops, and the use of Panama as a military base for troop training and counterinsurgency training against other Latin American countries."

### Charan Singh Released in India; 100,000 Others Still in Prison

New Delhi announced March 7 that the oppositionist political leader Charan Singh has been released from prison. Singh, chairman of the Bharatiya Lok Dal (People's party of India), is the second major opponent of Indira Gandhi to be freed since emergency rule was declared in India by the dictator in June 1975.

According to conservative estimates, more than 100,000 persons are still being held in the country's jails as a result of the state of emergency. Some groups, such as the London-based Committee for Justice for Indian Political Prisoners, place the figure at 200,000.

Tending to substantiate the higher figure are government statistics listing 32,000 political prisoners in the states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh alone. The combined population of these states is less than a third of India's 600 million people.

Most of the prisoners are being held without formal charges and denied recourse to the courts through writs of habeas corpus, a right that has been suspended since the state of emergency was declared.

## The Class-Collaborationist Course of the Portuguese CP

By David Frankel

At the end of February, leaders of the Italian, British, and French Communist parties spoke at the congress of the Soviet CP in Moscow. They claimed to favor democratic rights and tried to convey an impression of independence from the Kremlin, although none of them brought up the touchy subject of repression inside the Soviet Union.

The speeches in Moscow were a sequel to earlier actions, the most important being those taken at the congress of the French CP in early February. In search of broader electoral support, the French Stalinists declared their allegiance to "pluralist democracy," claimed that they were seeking a gradualist road to a "Communism under the French colors," and tried to dissociate themselves from the persecution of dissidents in the USSR.

These moves have led to speculation in the American capitalist press as to whether these Stalinist parties have changed their character, giving up the program of socialist revolution. In fact, as a previous article pointed out (see *Intercontinental Press*, March 8, p. 355), the Stalinist parties ceased being revolutionary long ago—they have practiced class collaborationism for more than forty years. Several of the West European Stalinist parties have simply found their previous revolutionary rhetoric inconvenient and have sought to adjust their public image to one they think will fit better with their electoral wheeling and dealing in the bourgeois parliamentary system.

However, the Portuguese CP has certainly not been one of these parties. Its attitude was expressed by party chief Alvaro Cunhal, who hailed the wisdom of the Kremlin leaders at the Soviet CP congress as "sunshine for the planet earth."

It is ironic that while the illusions held by many persons in the revolutionary character of the French and Italian Communist parties have been destroyed by recent events, the last two years have seen the opposite process in regard to the Portuguese Stalinists. After all, the French and Italian Stalinists are still trying to win seats in capitalist governments; the Portuguese CP has just played a central role in actually administering a capitalist government and preventing its overthrow by the masses.

A closer look at how the Portuguese Stalinists reacted to the revolutionary upsurge in their country shows that they proceeded from the same political concepts as those followed by the Stalinists in

France and Italy. In Italy, the Communist party calls for its inclusion in a coalition government with the dominant capitalist party, the Christian Democrats. In France, the Stalinists call for a capitalist coalition government that would include the Socialist party and the bourgeois Radical party.

French CP head Georges Marchais, speaking at his party's recent congress, indicated that Gaullists willing to participate would also be welcome. He called for a "union of the French people" that would include "all forces of the nation active against the barons of large capital."

In Portugal, the unwavering strategy of the Stalinists was to join in a government with the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA—Armed Forces Movement), the dominant bourgeois political formation in the country after the overthrow of the dictatorship.

### 'Cunhal Into the Government'

The basic perspective of Portuguese Stalinism was stated by Cunhal when he arrived in Lisbon on April 30, 1974, only five days after the overthrow of the Caetano dictatorship. Cunhal stressed the necessity "to unite the Armed Forces Movement and the popular masses."

He called for "a government representative of all democratic forces," and was answered by his assembled supporters with the chant of "Cunhal into the government."

Fresh from "normalized" Czechoslovakia, whose invasion by Soviet troops he had supported in 1968, Cunhal assured his listeners that a government such as he advocated would be "the best guarantee of genuinely free elections."

Cunhal was taken into the government as strikes spread throughout the country. *New York Times* correspondent Paul Hofmann described the role of the Stalinists in a May 29, 1974, report from Lisbon. He said, "The Government and members of the military junta, which keeps supervising the activities of the civilian department chiefs, have during the last few days been almost permanently in session to grapple with the labor conflicts."

"A Communist, Labor Minister Avelino A. Pacheco Gonçalves, is in the forefront of attempts to settle the strikes. He is assisted by the party's secretary general, Alvaro Cunhal, who is a Minister without Portfolio in charge of labor matters."

In their activity as the labor lieutenants of the capitalist class, the Portuguese

Stalinists and the labor federation, which they were leading, sponsored a demonstration in Lisbon on June 1, 1974, under the slogan, "We say No to strikes."

Just like the French CP when it was backing a popular-front government in 1936, the Portuguese Stalinists denounced strikes as "fascist inspired."

This policy was explained by Portuguese CP leader Catarina Mendes in the July 1974 issue of *World Marxist Review*, the North American edition of the Prague journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*.

"Our Party stresses the limited nature of the Provisional Government's objectives," Mendes said. While favoring "a number of reforms," Mendes insisted that "to expect such a widely based administration to pursue a popular-government policy or, as some would like, a 'socialist orientation' policy, would mean disregarding the real situation. It would only cause friction between the component parts of the present alliance, leading to its split and disintegration, which would open the way for counter-revolution."

An overall outline of the program of the Portuguese CP was given by Cunhal in his report to the party's seventh congress in October 1974. The need for the working class to restrain its economic demands—a theme of capitalist governments from Australia to Argentina—was a major part of the report.

Cunhal warned the workers to "refrain from demands demagogically suggested by reactionaries or pseudo-revolutionary 'Leftists' who want to create impossible situations, provoke clashes and drive a wedge between the working people and the provisional government."

### 'Antimonopoly' Rhetoric

Aside from the demands of the workers, Cunhal's main target was the monopolists and landowners—never the capitalist system as a whole. For example, he argued:

The main threat to freedom is posed by economic power hindering the country's progress and serving as a political and financial basis for counter-revolution. The monopolies and latifundists resist the new democratic process. . . .

If we want to preserve and strengthen the regime of freedom and democracy we must curb and then abolish the economic power of monopolists and latifundium owners. The state should participate ever more actively in the solution of economic problems without prejudice to private non-monopoly enterprise. It should proceed to nationalize key economic branches and transfer the latifunda to the peasants.

... Either the monopolists and latifundium owners will regain political power and restore dictatorship, or the democratic forces will end the economic power of monopolists and latifundium owners in the interest of building a democratic Portugal.

This type of antimonopoly rhetoric is common to every Stalinist party. The Spanish CP, for example, calls for a phase of "political and social democracy or antimonopolist and antilatifundist democracy."

The French CP would exclude only "the small caste which dominates the economy and the state," "the barons of large capital," from its "union of the French people," while the American CP has long called for an "antimonopoly coalition."

In summing up, Cunhal listed eight basic objectives of the Portuguese CP. Socialism was not among them, although "freeing Portugal from the shackles of imperialism" was. Since Portugal itself is an imperialist country, the purpose of this demagogic demand could only be to direct the attention of the masses toward foreign rather than Portuguese capitalism.

The same tactic was used two years ago by the American imperialists. They conducted a racist campaign to convince the American people that their interests were threatened by the foreign Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, rather than by Exxon and Mobil.

Finally, at this seventh congress the Portuguese Stalinists formally deleted the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat" from their program, thus beating the French Stalinists by more than a year.

#### 'I Care Nothing for Elections'

Although its program remained unchanged, the rhetoric of the Portuguese CP shifted to the left in order to keep in tune with the deepening mass radicalization, especially after the March 11, 1975, coup attempt by Gen. António de Spínola. The demagoguery of the Stalinists was aimed in particular against those who demanded democratic rights and defended them against the capitalist military government.

Perhaps the most infamous example of this type of Stalinist demagoguery was Cunhal's interview with Oriana Fallaci. Having done poorly in the April 25, 1975, elections, he told the interviewer, "... I care nothing for elections. Nothing!"

This contempt for the rights of the masses was covered up with supposedly revolutionary phrases, such as the statement, "... Portugal will never be a country of democratic freedoms and monopolies."

The French Stalinists also showed themselves quite adept at this game. As early as January 27, 1975, the French Stalinist daily *l'Humanité* said:

Democracy for what? For whom? Will it be merely a semblance of democracy leaving the



Lutte Ouvrière

#### FRENCH CP LEADER MARCHAIS

structures of a lingering past intact and serving as a facade for maintaining an economic system inherited from Salazar and capable of being used as a spring-board for a leap back? Or will it be genuine democracy having its source in the people and deriving its vigor from them, a democracy conceived and put into practice with the aid and participation of working-class and popular forces, in close cooperation with the Armed Forces Movement?

As their record shows, the Stalinists have never cared about democracy—neither in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, nor in Portugal. Cunhal's speeches were intended to help provide a leftist façade in the CP leadership's factional struggle with the Social Democrats. At issue was which of the mass reformist workers parties would serve as the primary helper to the military regime and the capitalist system in Portugal.

An example of how the Stalinists tried to cloak their sordid aims in seemingly revolutionary verbiage is the following excerpt from an editorial in the May 28, 1975, issue of *Avante!*, the newspaper of the Portuguese CP:

This attitude [of the Socialist party] ... throws into relief the existence of two contradictory dynamics: One, electoralist, aims at setting up a bourgeois-parliamentary democracy of a Social Democratic type; the other, drawing its support from the revolutionary process embodied in the alliance between the people and the MFA aims at the democratic revolution on the road to socialism. The electoralism is irreconcilable with the revolutionary process and could even wind up destroying it in the short term.

The editorial went on to call for the "strictest union with the MFA" and "workers 'control' in the nationalized state enterprises, the formation of agricultural

cooperatives and of peasant organs for agrarian reform ... and the proliferation of workers commissions, tenants commissions, popular assemblies, and other varied forms of popular organs. ..."

#### Centrists Take the Bait

The majority of the centrist groups in the world socialist movement accepted Cunhal's propaganda at face value. A typical case was the *Guardian* newspaper in the United States, a perpetual fellow traveler currently identified with Maoism.

Wilfred Burchett said in the June 11, 1975, *Guardian*, "The PCP—regardless of what some of its critics say—has not shown itself to be a run-of-the-mill revisionist party."

Another example of the illusions of the centrists was the evaluation by Sam Marcy, the leader of the American Workers World party. Marcy said in the December 5, 1975, issue of that group's paper that during the summer of 1975, "it did appear that the CP might be orienting in a revolutionary direction. Cunhal himself ... said (and did not repudiate) that he was opposed to a 'Western-style bourgeois democracy.' By inference he favored a proletarian dictatorship with the CP, of course, as the vanguard party, in a coalition which would effectuate a revolutionary socialist transformation."

Marcy failed to understand that bourgeois democracy is not the only form of bourgeois rule. Another is an antidemocratic but benevolent military government, a variant that the MFA and its Stalinist allies seriously considered, as Cunhal explained in a June 15, 1975, interview: "A military government doesn't necessarily mean a dictatorship. A military government can safeguard freedoms that are in jeopardy."

In Portugal itself, the Stalinists were able to turn the gullibility of most of the smaller groups on their left into account in their factional struggle against the Social Democrats. This was the case during the take-over of the newspaper *República*. An organ identified with the Socialist party was silenced—a development that benefited the capitalist MFA regime as well as the Stalinists by setting a precedent for suppression of freedom of the press.

A further triumph for the Stalinists came when seven groups on the Portuguese left signed an accord with them on August 25, 1975, which listed both the Portuguese CP and the ruling MFA as part of the "revolutionary" left. The confusion about the real nature of Stalinism, and the failure to understand its counter-revolutionary objectives, led these groups into supporting the capitalist government. At the same time, the Social Democracy was called the twin of fascism. In fact, from the point of view of its reformist politics, the Social Democracy is more like the twin of Stalinism.

The Stalinists were always careful to

reaffirm their reformist perspective, even when the illusions of the centrists were at the highest pitch. An article by a Portuguese CP leader, Carlos Costa, in the August 1975 issue of *World Marxist Review* is indicative of how the Stalinists bent to the pressure of the mass radicalization while nonetheless reaffirming their counterrevolutionary course.

Costa begins with arguments calculated to give him a "revolutionary" aura:

Our Party is certain that establishing a genuinely democratic regime depends largely on a correct solution of economic problems. And they must be promptly solved by curtailing monopoly privileges and economic power. . . .

For us Communists freedom is not just the right to express one's aspirations, set up organizations, freely hold meetings, and so on. Freedom for the working people means life without exploitation, without having to work for others. "Democracy for all" in a society dominated by private ownership of the means of production is nominal equality based on actual inequality. . . .

All Portuguese democrats agree that socialist development is the only way for Portugal if it is to overcome its economic difficulties, guarantee democratic progress and freedom denied to the people for 50 years, and raise the standard of life.

Having given verbal approval to the need for socialism, Costa proceeds to relegate this perspective to the dim future. The immediate stage, he argues, is one of a democratic revolution within the "anti-monopoly and anti-latifundium" framework advocated by Stalinists the world over. "The country's leadership does not propose to nationalize the whole economy, nor is it against private enterprise," Costa insists.

According to his view, the problem facing the "national-democratic revolution" in Portugal is that "production is decreasing in many industries, due often to economic subversion. Strikes provoked by reactionaries or 'leftists' sometimes paralyze key industries."

Costa quotes with approval an appeal by the MFA to "work better to boost output in the main branches of industry and agriculture." The whole point of the article is to push the military government's campaign for labor discipline and speedup. Costa argues:

Neither the interests of the working people, nor the interests of social change can be served by artificially aggravating the forms of struggle, by attempts to incite a wave of strikes, which in the present conditions would be directed not against the bosses, not against reaction, but against progressive measures, against the democratic forces, against the Provisional Government and the AFM.

In the Kremlin's view, the MFA regime (with the Portuguese CP playing a leading role in it) was a major asset in dealings with the American imperialists, whereas an actual revolution would have been a diplomatic disaster. Moscow strongly supported the line of the Portuguese CP, while

taking pains to point out that no challenge to the status quo in Europe was intended. For example, an article in the August 19, 1975, issue of *Pravda* (cited in *Soviet News*, September 2, 1975), explained:

"Portugal has proclaimed its intention of pursuing an independent foreign policy open to co-operation with all countries of the world. At the same time, the new regime pledged itself to honour Portugal's international treaties and commitments, including those relating to membership of NATO."

## Arms Madness or Arms Addiction?



Lutte Ouvrière

"War is my daily bread."

Consideration in the U.S. House of Representatives of a new arms export control act has led the American capitalist press to publicize the extent of military spending on an international scale and the role of the United States as a leading merchant of death.

The total world outlay for arms rose to nearly \$300 billion in 1975, John W. Finney reported in the *New York Times* March 1. The figure has continued to mount in recent years despite the international economic crisis. Finney based his article on a study done by Ruth Leger Sivard for several arms control groups, including the Arms Control Association, entitled "World Military and Social Expenditures." (Available for \$2.50 from WMSE Publications, Box 1003, Leesburg, Virginia.)

As the chief economist for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the same author did similar studies for the

This policy of participation in NATO, completely supported by the Kremlin bureaucracy, is the same as that followed by the Italian CP. Those who were taken in by the revolutionary verbiage of the Portuguese CP did not allow for the ability of Stalinist parties to shift their stance according to varying tactical needs without changing their essential character. The same mistake is made by those who believe that the French, Italian, British, or Spanish Communist parties have changed in character because they have claimed to be independent from Moscow. □

U.S. government. However, the studies were stopped in 1972, Finney said, when then Defense Secretary Melvin Laird "objected that the studies contained misleading comparisons between military and social spending and were complicating the Pentagon's task of presenting the defense budget to Congress."

The report noted, among other things, that global military spending was "two-thirds more" than the total amount spent on the health care of the world's four billion people. It also cited a number of other relevant facts such as: "Half the world's school-age children are not yet attending school; one-third of the adults are illiterate."

Moreover, the arms business has become an increasingly important item in world trade, and Washington is the biggest dealer, exporting more weapons than all other countries combined.

In an editorial March 3, the *New York Times* noted that official U.S. arms sales abroad are expected to reach \$12 billion in the current fiscal year. The editors went on to say: "The sale of arms for commercial purposes—to aid the United States balance of payments—is the most shameful aspect of the arms trade."

The comment in the *New York Times* and other American newspapers has tended to center on how unfortunate it is that semicolonial countries are buying more and more weapons that they cannot "afford." For example, the *Times* deplored the fact that the United States is the "chief pusher" to the firepower "addicts" of these countries.

On this basis, isn't the United States the worst addict of all?

Some other considerations were raised in a March 2 *New York Post* editorial entitled "The Arms Madness":

"Admitting that the oil-producing customers have a glut of cash on hand right now, how much more U.S. weaponry can they be expected to buy in the next few years? . . . How solvent are the less-developed Third World customers? If they default on what they owe, what are the implications for U.S. producers?" □

## Perón Strikes Fresh Blow Against Democratic Rights

By Enrique G. Broquen

[The following article appeared in the February 23 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, weekly newspaper of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

In the final hours of Tuesday, February 17, an executive-branch decree was announced. For all practical purposes, it swept away the right granted to political prisoners to leave the country and eliminated the right of habeas corpus, which was one of the first gains made by the bourgeoisie in their struggle for power and which constitutes a basic guarantee, among all civilized peoples, of personal freedoms.

The new decree grants a prisoner the right to go into exile only if he chooses a country outside the Americas, and then only if the president of the republic approves his exercising the option. In practice, it means annulling that constitutional right, since it is well known that the right to asylum has been fully recognized only by the Latin American countries and, on rare occasion, by some European states in very special situations. In addition, moving to Europe—in cases in which someone manages to be accepted by some country on that continent—means travel and moving expenses that make such a right unobtainable for persons who do not have great resources. It is a right available only to millionaires.

But there is more. In order to obtain the option, a person is required to go through a procedure that takes months. It is enough to note that official letters from the provincial police and national and provincial judges will have to be obtained, and that the Defense Council has to hold a hearing.

The signers of the decree—some of them, curiously, lawyers—forgot that Article 23 of the constitution is categorical. Its clear wording rules out a double interpretation when it states that a person can be detained or transferred on order of the president of the republic only if he is not willing to leave the country. That is, once the prisoner indicates his willingness to leave Argentine territory, his departure should be automatically authorized or he should immediately be released. He should not be subjected to any statutory procedure that prolongs his arrest for months, converting it into a de facto sentence imposed by the president against the express prohibition contained in Articles 23 and 95 of the nation's constitution.

This decree violates the letter and spirit of the national constitution. It gives the executive branch the power to deprive any inhabitant of freedom on the basis of mere whim. It comes close to conceding extraordinary powers to the president, a step denounced as treason to the homeland in Article 29 of the Argentine constitution.

Equally ominous is the fact that the decree introduces fundamental modifications in habeas corpus proceedings. Under a fully constitutional regime, only the legislative branch makes and recasts laws. However, on the pretext that the Congress is not in session—and the fact that it is not is the result of an arbitrary and capricious decree by the same executive branch\*—the president has taken upon herself the power to change by decree nothing less than the Criminal Code. This despite the fact that according to Article 67 of the constitution, it can be promulgated or revised only by an act of Congress.

The president is eliminating the division of powers—the basis of representative, republican institutions. She is taking on legislative functions that—if this outrage is agreed to—could be exercised in whatever sphere she wishes, for example, in reforming civil or penal law. This is a confirmation of her decision to take upon herself the totality of public power, uniting in her hands the three powers into which the government is divided.

There is little point in dwelling on the technical errors of the decree. For example, it speaks of “the sentence handed down in habeas corpus proceedings” when no sentence whatsoever is pronounced in such proceedings, since it is not a trial but rather a special procedure. And it says that a sentence (what sentence?) can be appealed when the verdict is acquittal. In habeas corpus proceedings the only matter resolved is whether or not the arrest order conforms to the law. The ruling cannot be for acquittal or condemnation because in such proceedings no crime is attributed to anyone. The honorable judges are going to go around in circles to decide when an “acquittal” will be given.

But let us leave all this aside. The serious thing is that the decree, which unconstitutionally changes the law, totally nullifies the sense and scope of the right to habeas corpus.

From the days of the Roman Empire, the Magna Carta of the English barons, and the legal codes of Castille and León, this

right was designed to create a flexible and speedy procedure that would make it possible to ensure the release of those illegally detained. It does not judge any question in depth. It does not resolve any question of law, nor does it rule on the guilt or innocence of anyone. The only thing it determines is whether or not a person has been arrested on the order of the appropriate authority. And if this is not the case, it orders his immediate release. Once someone is accused of a crime, it provides an opportunity for the proper authority to intervene and assure all the constitutional guarantees intended to protect a person's free defense by trial and his rights.

Under the current decree the arresting officer will have the right to appeal a judge's order for release of the illegally detained prisoner. The officer can go before the Appellate Chamber and carry the case to the Supreme Court, which will have the final say in resolving the matter. Until then, the illegally detained prisoner will remain in jail. How long will it take to go through three courts (judge, Appellate Chamber, Supreme Court)? How long will the Supreme Court delay in resolving the cases in which it intervenes, since this decree compels it to hear hundreds of habeas corpus appeals—made in defense of the human rights that are constantly ignored by the current “people's government”—from all the tribunals of the republic?

With the enforcement of this monstrous decree, habeas corpus proceedings would become one more trial whose outcome must be awaited, from jail, for months or perhaps years.

A government that has lost the support of the working class and of the people in general, that has failed to fill all its preelection promises and has lowered all its alleged principled banners, that clearly expresses the impotence of the bourgeoisie to respond adequately to the extremely serious problems compromising the subsistence and freedom of the entire people, can only resort to the suppression of constitutional guarantees and democratic rights so as to be able to prolong its existence a short time longer.

Today more than ever, the united action of the people, headed by the working class, must give an adequate response to this way station on the road toward open dictatorship. Such action must restore the freedoms created by the bourgeoisie during its revolutionary beginnings, which it shamelessly forgets and tramples in its death agony. □

\* On February 16, Perón decreed an end to the current session of Congress.—IP

### Provisional IRA Urges Fight for Women's Rights

[In the Irish republican split of 1969, the leaders of what was to become the Provisional Irish Republican Army reaffirmed, and even exaggerated, the IRA's traditional distrust of politics and mass agitation. Since then, however, they have been forced to adopt positions on social and political questions. This has been an extremely slow process because of their militarist conception of the struggle against British imperialism and Irish neocolonialism.]

[It has probably been on the questions raised by the women's movement that the Provisionals have been most backward. Here the process of radicalization came into conflict with the heavy weight of religious indoctrination in Ireland. Although often striving to offer a secular perspective, the Provisionals' representatives have by no means always avoided the traditional confusion between Catholicism and Irish nationality. Their paper *An Phoblacht*, for example, has had articles claiming that abortion is an attribute of English society while joy in motherhood is characteristic of the Irish.]

[Historically in Ireland, there has tended to be a gap between the anti-imperialist movement and movements for democratic rights in spheres other than the national.]

[So, when the January 30 issue of *An Phoblacht* ran a lead editorial on women's rights, it seemed to mark a new interest in these questions by the Provisionals, and it probably reflected a changing attitude both in their ranks and in the anti-imperialist and radical movements in Ireland in general. The editorial is interesting for this reason, although the positions it presents are still undeveloped and contradictory in many respects.]

\* \* \*

Alone among the regimes of Europe the Dublin government tried to wriggle its way out of its obligations, laid down in a law enacted by its own legislature, to respect the principle of equal pay for equal work, thus ensuring that women would get the same pay as men doing the same job.

We do not know if the attempt to wriggle out of the obligation will succeed. There are widespread indications that the workers will not let them get away with it this time; but the workers have been conned in the past and may very well be conned again.

The Republican Movement, of course, backs the women in their fight. It could not do otherwise. The Republican tradition is one of equality between men and women. The Republican Movement led the fight for the liberation of woman and, in

fact, the first woman elected to a national assembly in these islands was a Republican.

The armed forces of the Republic were among the first in Europe to admit women on a basis equal to men, a decision which has been justified completely by the history of the last six years, during which our armed heroines have covered themselves in glory, true successors to Betsy Gray, Anne Devlin, Pamela FitzGerald, Countess Markievicz and the rest of that gallant band.

But it is not only on the basis of the Republican principle of equality that this issue is being fought. An enslaved woman implies an enslaved man and the exploitation of women, paid less than men though doing the same work, has, in turn, led to increased exploitation of the male worker. The imperial principle of divide and conquer was a daily fact of life on the factory floor.

Many is the man who, realising he should be paid better and about to demand more, was halted in his tracks by the thought that if he insisted he might be sacked and a woman employed in his place (at an even lower wage still). Many is the unscrupulous employer who fired men and replaced them with women, or who employed only women from the start, thus increasing his already bloated profits.

We would prefer that, instead of demanding, for example, a bill of rights for women, organised labour would demand a bill of rights for workers covering men and women, banning discrimination on grounds of sex, religion, colour, language, class or marital status. This is the non-sectarian approach.

Why include language, you may ask? We believe that both languages, Irish and English, should be given equal status. To make a knowledge of Irish no longer essential at a time when a knowledge of English is made compulsory by the facts of Irish servitude is to discriminate in a particularly vicious manner against the men and women of the Gaeltacht [Irish-speaking areas] and to strike a heavy blow against their language and, indeed, their entire culture.

The fight for equality of rights for women too often tends to be thought of exclusively in terms of the English speaker. It is for this reason that we highlight an injustice that too often is overlooked, the discrimination on linguistic grounds against the Gaeltacht woman. Again, the state is the main offender.

We have no intention of joining the

liberal parrot calls to the effect that men and women are equal in all things for we believe that, in some spheres, women are superior just as, in others, men; generally speaking, men and women are complementary to each other and success in the class war demands that they work together for the freedom of all. For men and women to allow themselves to be split into male and female liberation movements is to play into the hands of the class enemy.

Even when the principle is conceded to the full the fight will continue because of the many women workers who do not belong to trade unions and the shameful number of non-union firms. A law demanding equal pay for equal work surely should be backed by another law making it compulsory for all workers, men and women, to be paid-up members of the trade union of their choice. Without the watchful eye of the trade union the pay exploitation of women will continue.

It is extraordinary that even still women do not have the same rights to unemployment assistance as men. The shameful fact is that girls leaving school and unable to find employment are not allowed to sign on at the labour exchange, to draw the dole, while boys in the same predicament can at least have the help of the dole.

The result of this discrimination often means that the girl is forced to emigrate to a state where, if workless, she will get state financial aid, or to go on the labour market at one of the lowest levels, seeking a job in a non-union house at the pay-rate decreed by the market. Again, the equal-pay act hardly is worth very much when woman is discriminated against by the state in such a fundamental manner.

Oddly enough, it is the state which discriminates most against women on countless issues. What is needed is not piecemeal legislation but an act banning discrimination against women on any basis, guaranteeing them a fair deal, and amending the various acts to ensure this in every important detail. If the Dublin regime had been any way sincere about its alleged concern about discrimination against and exploitation of women it would have produced such a bill and have got it through both houses before the end of last year.

In fact, however, as proved by its loathsome tactics to postpone a fundamental right to women, the state is still dominated by male chauvinists who will move only when forced by the weight of organised labour, that of men and women. The lesson is to push harder, to bring the maximum pressure to bear, even if necessary a general strike. □

#### Workers Win Pay Hike in Iceland

Workers in Iceland won an immediate 6 percent pay raise, with additional increases later, as the result of a twelve-day general strike that began February 17.

# DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

## Meeting of the International Executive Committee

[The following press release was issued by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

\* \* \*

In mid-February 1976, a plenary session of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International was held in Europe. Members of the IEC and observers from sympathizing sections from some thirty countries were present.

The political discussions at the IEC centered around the problems of the Portuguese revolution and of the civil war in Angola. Three tendencies emerged on the first question, two on the second. Theses on an intermediary balance sheet of the Portuguese revolution and a resolution coming out in support of the MPLA military camp against its opponents in the civil war were adopted by large majorities. These documents are in the process of being published in the press of the Fourth International [see the Theses on the Portuguese Revolution in the March 4 issue of *Inprecor*; the resolution on Angola will be published in the March 18 *Inprecor*].

The IEC Plenum also heard information-

al reports on the current developments in Spain as well as on the civil war in Lebanon. It commemorated the death of Comrade Georg Jungclas, a founding member of the Fourth International and its German section who had been a member of the IEC for twenty-five years, and voted motions of homage to two Angolan comrades killed in the civil war, an Arab comrade killed in the civil war in Lebanon, and the Argentine comrades killed by reactionary murderers.

The IEC Plenum resolved some organizational disputes that had arisen in the ranks of the Fourth International in various countries; a new and larger United Secretariat was elected; a call was issued for convening the Eleventh World Congress of the Fourth International (fifth congress since reunification), and a provisional agenda for that congress and the modalities of the pre-congress written discussion were set.

All these questions were decided by unanimous votes. Once again the Fourth International has shown that it has learned to combine lively and frank political debate—even when conducted in public—with the maintenance of organiza-

tional unity and the strengthening of the common organizational framework of the movement.

The proposed provisional agenda for the Eleventh World Congress is as follows:

1. World political situation.
2. Intermediary balance sheet of the Portuguese revolution.
3. European perspectives document.
4. Theses on the Arab revolution.
5. Balance sheet of the Indochinese revolution.
6. Theses on women's oppression and women's liberation movement.
7. Organizational norms of the Fourth International.
8. The outgoing international leadership's activity report.
9. Election of the International Executive Committee.

If a revolutionary situation breaks out in Spain before the Eleventh World Congress, Spain will be a special point on the World Congress agenda. Likewise, any other important change in the world situation could lead either the United Secretariat or the World Congress delegates themselves to add additional points to the agenda. □

## Theses on the Portuguese Revolution

[The following resolution, proposed by the International Majority Tendency at the February meeting of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International, received the following vote: 40 for, 21 against, and 1 abstention.]

\* \* \*

November 25, 1975, opened a *new stage* in the "revolutionary process" in Portugal. For broad sectors of workers, it is more evident that any new progress of the Portuguese revolution now depends on the capacity of the working class to increase its degree of self-organization and to take a step forward in the extension and centralization of the workers commissions and in the generalization of workers control in order to push through working-class solutions in the economic and political realms, *independent of the relations among the various factions of the army.*

The defeat of the officers of the so-called "military left" and of a part of the vanguard of soldiers, in spite of its

demoralizing effects on a layer of workers, cannot be considered a defeat of the toiling masses. An important recomposition is going on in the workers movement. The "revolutionary process" is going through a *limited retreat*, but the working class has not suffered a setback in a frontal and open battle against the employers and their state.

After attaining the highest peak of mobilization during the preceding weeks, the working class has not lost its capacity to resist the attacks of the bourgeois state, nor has it lost its potential of combativity. The factors that have determined the outlines of the Portuguese revolution since December 1974 have not disappeared, *even though the dialectical relationships among these factors have changed*; these factors are *radically revealing the limits of the semispontaneous and semiconscious movement of the masses that was dominant during this first phase.* Confronted by a profound social and economic crisis, the Portuguese working class remains in a position to recover its strength, to reorgan-

ize its ranks after an inevitable pause, and to relaunch its attacks against the capitalist system. But the bourgeoisie, with the aid of imperialism, now commands increased political, economic, and repressive means with which to attempt to drive back the revolutionary process and then drown it in blood.

Thus, tests of strength are inherent in the dynamic of the present situation. Revolutionary Marxists must prepare both themselves and the toiling masses for these tests of strength. The experience of November 25 must serve as an aid to the working class in concentrating its forces and organizing the preparation for these decisive battles.

After December 1974, and more radically since March 1975, the revolutionary rise has increasingly taken on the features characteristic of all revolutions in the imperialist countries. The main outlines of this revolutionary rise were shaped by the

combination of four factors whose reciprocal relations and respective weight were modified by November 25, but which will once again exert their effects during the next stage of the Portuguese revolution.

1. The proliferation of wildcat strikes during the period following April 25, 1974, the purge actions (*saneamentos*) in response to economic sabotage, and the initiatives of "popular vigilance" (September 1974 and March 1975) reflected the emergence of a *broad workers vanguard* prepared to act independently of the Stalinist and Social Democratic reformist apparatuses. The ranks of this vanguard were made up of a unification of seasoned cadres of the working class and a new generation of workers who joined the ranks of the proletariat during the years of decline and crisis of the Salazarist regime. The openly antistrike policy of the Portuguese CP during the first few months after April 25, 1974, and the quantitative and qualitative weakness of the CP's cadres made it easier for this broad vanguard to play an important role in the strategic factories of the Lisbon industrial region and, although less massively, in the Porto region as well. This vanguard was to absorb, at a higher level and in a more generalized manner, the gains of the latest phase of workers struggles in capitalist Europe—workers commissions, experiments in workers control, linkup with the soldiers, and so on. This vanguard initiated a process that was to expand and spread with the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975.

2. The impact of this workers vanguard—in spite of its relatively limited size, its divisions, and its political confusion—must be seen in relation to the *objective dynamic* of workers struggles determined by the very weakness of Portuguese imperialism, by the deep structural crisis of entire sectors of industry, sharpened by the international capitalist recession. The upsurge of the movement for workers demands, initially centered around demands for wage increases and reductions in hours, led to a sharp attack on the rate of profit of a capitalism whose development had been based on low wages and very long hours and whose production was oriented toward exports. The resulting imbalances, strongly accentuated by deliberate economic sabotage, placed initiatives of factory occupations, workers control, and demands for nationalization on the agenda. With layoffs and unemployment on the rise since the beginning of 1975, the cumulative process of strikes-occupations-workers control went beyond the limits of the largest factories of the Lisbon region and extended to branches in which small and middle-sized companies predominated, the sector of distribution as well as the banks and insurance companies. The conjunction between this effervescence of

struggles and the mobilization of March 1975 led to a wave of nationalizations that in turn stimulated the emergence of more advanced demands and bolstered the weight of the workers vanguard.

The interaction between the advance of the "revolutionary process" and the structural and conjunctural crisis of the Portuguese economy produced a situation in which normal capitalist functioning became impossible, while the dominant features of the market economy were not eliminated. It is here that the overall demands put forward by the advanced wing of the Portuguese proletariat—reconversion of the production of entire branches, socialist planning, generalized workers control—have their roots. In addition, this situation impelled many workers commissions (for example, Setenave, Lisnave, Sacor) to initiate discussions on the nature of the socialist economy, the function of workers control, and the possibility and necessity of a centralization of the embryonic organs of dual power.

3. The rapid succession of political events, cabinet crises, and more or less violent clashes among the fundamental political forces and social classes propelled the mass movement onto the political scene and assured its *growing politicization*, even though the effects of forty-eight years of rule by a corporatist regime and the lack of any experiences in national mobilization were not rapidly dissipated. The sharpness of the economic and social crisis and the very nature of the successive political difficulties (debate over the Inter-sindical, the República affair, the various MFA documents, the role of the organs of "popular power" when the SP and PPD left the government, etc.) resulted in the process of *politicization beginning to become rooted in the organs* that the workers themselves created in the course of their struggle: workers commissions, moradores (tenants) commissions, peasant leagues. During the demonstrations of August 20 and November 16, 1975, this phenomenon came to the fore with undeniable clarity; its repercussions within the CP in large part account for the maneuvering of the CP leadership. This phenomenon constitutes one of the elements that could facilitate the *transformation of these instruments into effective structures of dual power*.

Under the impact of these forces, the *pace of development of workers struggles was very rapid*. Now, for the first time in four decades, the working class was able to come forward as a class and constitute an independent workers movement. The dialectic that developed among the structure of the working class, its history, and the sudden effervescence of struggles—occurring in a context in which the old regime's apparatus of social control was

crumbling without being replaced—was expressed in a *very deep uneven development of class consciousness, a combined process* of construction of traditional organs of the workers movement (unions and parties) and of instruments of the workers themselves (workers commissions, moradores commissions), a *fluidity of political influences* among the toiling masses.

An erroneous comprehension of these dominant features of the revolutionary upsurge leads to two errors. The first consists of overlooking the decisive importance of this workers vanguard (strongly rooted in the strategic factories), the modification in the relationship of forces between the Stalinist and Social Democratic reformist apparatuses and this workers vanguard and the consequent possibilities of initiatives, and the growing and increasingly decisive role of the organs of proletarian democracy. The second consists of big underestimation of the *still broadly majority* influence of the reformist apparatuses within the working class, of the necessity of winning the majority of the working class, of the importance of a correct united-front policy toward the reformist organizations, of the necessity of a systematic political battle around these themes within the broad vanguard itself and the far left, and of the capacity for maneuver and co-optation still commanded by the reformist parties, a capacity that is increased by the political confusion of this vanguard and the weakness of the revolutionary Marxist organization.

4. The interaction between the dynamic of workers struggles and the crisis of the army—a product of the army's function of dominating political and social life, which accorded it its role in April 25, and the weakness of the structures of political domination commanded by the bourgeoisie—facilitated the penetration into the ranks of the soldiers of the process of self-organization that was being consolidated within the working class.

The two attempted coups (September 1974 and March 1975) introduced an initial element of breakup of the hierarchical relations between soldiers and officers. Military discipline began to be challenged. In the eyes of the soldiers, acceptance or rejection of an order was justified according to the political options of the commanders. Little by little, political debates came to coexist with the system of military authority. The splits in the hierarchy and the confrontations that occurred within the MFA under the effects of social polarization stimulated centrifugal tendencies. In the Lisbon military region, the integration bodies set up by the MFA beginning in October 1974, especially the Assemblies of Unit Delegates, were able to fulfill their functions only partially, because of the radicalization of the rank-and-

file soldiers. Thus, for the soldiers, the way was open for the search for their own channels of expression both for their material demands and for the determination of their political options in face of the choices made by the hierarchy. After September 1975, the *independent movement of soldiers* became a new and decisive element in the deep crisis of the bourgeois state apparatus.

The relative disintegration and paralysis of the army in turn allowed the mass movement to take many initiatives without clashing with any formidable and effective repressive apparatus. The available space for the proliferation of extremely advanced experiences (factory occupations, land occupations, initial experiments in the creation of self-defense organs, utilization of the radio by the organization of wounded war veterans (ADFA), siege of the Ministry of Labor by the metalworkers, encirclement of São Bento by the construction workers) was broadened by this decomposition of the instruments of repression. But, concurrently, there was a consequent illusion about the degree of paralysis of this army and about the capacities of military initiative still commanded by the hierarchy. Consequently, the objective elements that would have compelled maximum development of self-defense were weakened. Finally, this crisis favored the grip of the orientation of the reformists and centrists who falsely locate the center of gravity of the "revolutionary process" in the army itself, thus sacrificing the independence and autonomy of the movement of the toiling masses.

## II

5. In July-August 1975, in face of the deepening of the revolutionary upsurge that was expressed in the strengthening of the workers commissions, the *moradores* commissions, etc., in the deep shaking of an army that was being transformed into a political battleground, and in the acute crisis of bourgeois political leadership, the bourgeois camp devoted itself essentially to the restoration of a coherent instrument of political authority and of a repressive apparatus with some degree of effectiveness.

The growing polarization of social forces brought the crisis of the MFA to a head. Under the hammerblows of the workers, the MFA could no longer fully carry out its Bonapartist function; its unity was openly broken, and it was therefore incapable of initiating a policy of repression. Then, the majority of the officers of the MFA got together and launched an offensive leading to a recomposition of forces within the military hierarchy in order to permit the creation of a repressive striking force and in order to stabilize the institutions of the bourgeois state.

The ruling class did not command a state apparatus and political structures

capable of *breaking* the revolutionary upsurge; simultaneously, however, the level of self-organization and mass consciousness was still by far insufficient for a qualitative leap in the "revolutionary process." Hence, the primary objective of the bourgeoisie became an *offensive to reconstitute the bourgeois order through the legal and parliamentary road*.

The campaign launched by the Soares leadership of the SP fit in perfectly with this project of reasserting the authority of the Constituent Assembly and the institutions of the bourgeois state *against* the workers commissions, *moradores* commissions, etc., all of which, as the SP itself put it, constituted a "parallel power" to the bourgeois state apparatus. On the field of struggle against "anarcho-populism," the PPD dogged the steps of the SP, as did the "group of nine."

The division of the working class, provoked by the SP leadership and fed by the orientation and methods of the Stalinist leadership of the CP, impeded a new leap forward of the revolution. It facilitated the open reemergence of the right and the far right, without any determined response by the working class. The attacks on the headquarters of the CP, the Inter-sindical, and the far left, combined with the organization of terrorist initiatives by the far right, showed what the dynamic of this *inversion* of the "revolutionary process," an inversion initiated by the leadership of the SP, would have led to if it had continued and succeeded.

At first, the great maneuvers of Costa Gomes, Soares, and the group of nine seemed to be making gains. A process of recomposition of forces was going on in the bourgeois camp. Militarily, the appeals for discipline were getting a favorable response within a hierarchy that was regaining its self-confidence and was seeking to bolster its positions from the bases it commanded in the North. The petty bourgeoisie, more particularly the smallholding peasantry of the North, offered a social fulcrum for the defenders of "order" against "anarchy." Indeed, this peasantry, which had been promised wondrous miracles by the MFA "dynamization" campaigns, was hard hit by the economic crisis and by the government's inability to respond to their most immediate problems (prices of fertilizers, seed prices, credits, purchase prices of products in comparison to sales prices, etc.). In addition, the overlapping links between the smallholding peasantry and the working class in the North created favorable ground for expanding the audience for the themes being developed by the SP leadership among politically backward layers of workers integrated into branches of industry in profound crisis. This was one of the most negative features of the serious political division of the proletariat, for the uneven development of class consciousness took the form of a division between

the various regions of the country.

6. At the moment when the bourgeois counteroffensive seemed to be achieving an initial success with the resignation of the fifth government and the establishment of the Pinheiro de Azevedo government, a new upsurge developed in the proletarian camp, an upsurge which combined the *affirmation of the broad workers vanguard on the political scene*, the development of the *autonomous movement of soldiers* independent of any reference to the MFA and even against the MFA, and the initiation of a *wave of demands* by entire sectors of the working class (metals, construction, textiles, agricultural workers). In this context, the crisis of the fifth government of Vasco Gonçalves, which advocated a program combining reforms and austerity measures, must not be analyzed solely as a function of the offensive of the bourgeoisie toward the restoration of the authority of the institutions of the bourgeois state, but also in relation to the instinctive push of significant sectors of the mass movement toward workers democracy, toward the strengthening of the workers commissions and *moradores* commissions, and of soldiers toward soldiers commissions.

The conjunction of these various movements illuminated the fundamental relationship of social forces that had previously been obscured by the division within the workers movement, the sudden shakeups in the government, and the realignment of forces in the military hierarchy. *The period that opened in August 1975 was thus characterized by the highest level of confluence of the factors molding the dynamic of the Portuguese revolution:*

a. The autonomous movement of soldiers broke out in the North, stimulated by the initiatives of the SUV, a united vanguard grouping struggling for the emergence of soldiers commissions and their linkup with the workers and *moradores* commissions. The SUV conjuncturally played a unifying role within the working class to some extent and facilitated a new upsurge of mobilizations. In Lisbon in September it also functioned as a mediating force between the workers vanguard and broader ranks of the class. But most important, it disintegrated the keystone of the project of all those represented by Pinheiro de Azevedo: an army capable of making sure that the decisions of the government of "order and discipline" would be carried out. It even defeated the attempt to reconstitute a military striking force: the AMI (Military Intervention Group).

b. The instinctive push of the masses toward the creation of organs of proletarian democracy was strengthened. Coordinating bodies of workers commissions at branch levels arose in some cases. Regionally, the first steps were taken toward the formation of intercommissions of *moradores* and Popular Assemblies. Of course,

because of the lack of existence of a revolutionary party, the lack of tradition of the workers movement, and the social and political heterogeneity of the working class, this movement was very uneven. The degree of representativeness of the moradores commissions and the tasks they assumed were uneven (this was even true of the workers commissions).

The divisions within the workers movement were reproduced within these bodies and often led to a multiplication of moradores commissions in the neighborhoods, thus transforming these commissions into simple appendages of political organizations, integrating them into sectarian maneuvers and thus placing a question mark over their capacity to become centralized and carry out genuine initiatives of "social control."

The development of the moradores commissions reached its limit rather rapidly. After drawing their spirit from housing occupations, the moradores commissions proved incapable of providing solutions to other social problems: transport, health, supplies, structural crisis of housing. A qualitatively higher level of centralization would have been necessary to begin to resolve such questions. Here, the semispontaneous mass movement was exhausted. Only a policy of the broadest unity in action could have enabled the first steps toward centralization to be taken; the sectarianism of the centrist and reformist organizations made this impossible. But in the more specific realm of the workers commissions, the basic trend was toward a growing homogenization, toward an increase in the degree to which they represented the workers, and an expansion of their functions. In fact, the workers commissions were much more able to provide partial solutions, even at the branch level, and the framework in which they developed limited the effects of political division and made their initial centralization easier (CUF, textiles, etc.).

c. The upturn of the movement for workers demands was intermeshed with these two processes. First, the conjunction between the level of self-organization and the depth of the economic crisis strengthened the strategic position of the workers commissions in the process of working out and concretizing the demands for reconversion and socialist planning and the initiatives of workers control. Second, more radical demands were raised and more radical forms of action were taken by the more backward sections of the working class. Finally, for the first time, the movement for demands clashed frontally with the government and assimilated this new dimension.

The paralysis of the sixth government in face of these mobilizations indicated the depth of the crisis in the army and the consequent impossibility of using the army for a direct attack on the mass movement. The "capture" of São Bento Palace and the

"strike" of the Pinheiro government symbolized the depth of the crisis of the bourgeois state apparatus and the political leadership of the bourgeoisie.

The dominant features of the general situation were then as follows: The disintegration of the state apparatus attained a very high level under the blows dealt by the autonomous movement of soldiers, which was "infecting" even troops considered "reliable." The revolutionary upsurge was not meeting any repressive force capable of containing it. But at the same time, this upsurge did not give rise to sufficiently generalized and, above all, *centralized* bodies of workers power. *The specific character of the period lay in this desynchronization, the extreme form of which could only be transitory.* This lack of generalization and centralization of the organs of the toiling masses themselves sharpened the difficulties in overcoming the uneven development of consciousness and forms of organization of the working class, in merging the various components of the working class with the backbone of the revolution represented by the workers of the industrial belt around Lisbon and the agricultural proletariat of the Alentejo, and in responding to the political divisions of the toiling masses.

Inasmuch as the unity in action exhibited on September 28, 1974, and March 11, 1975, was not able to be institutionalized in effective organs of proletarian democracy, this division created favorable ground for reaction to make use of the petty bourgeoisie—which had taken a wait-and-see attitude on March 11, 1975—and allowed reaction to consolidate a real social base as a bridgehead of counterrevolution in some regions.

7. After March 1975 the SP openly revealed its counterrevolutionary function, as soon as the question, Which class shall rule? was clearly posed. The form and import of the SP counteroffensive were determined by the very characteristics of the revolutionary upsurge: the level attained by the spontaneous anticapitalist actions of the masses; the unquestionable manifestation of the embryonic organs of workers power; the weakness of the bourgeois state apparatus, incapable of breaking the mass movement; the fragility of the bourgeoisie's instruments of political rule.

Under the cover of respect for and defense of the "popular will," the SP threw itself into deliberate support of the institutions and authority of the bourgeois state *against* the forms of self-organization and direct expression of the workers in the factories, in the agricultural enterprises, the neighborhoods, and the army. At that time, the SP put itself forward as the advance point of the counterrevolution; it aimed at guaranteeing the difficult transition from the fall of the corporatist state to the establishment of a bourgeois parlia-

mentary democracy. Trotsky characterized an analogous process this way: "As for the German revolution of 1918, it was not at all the democratic completion of a bourgeois revolution, but a proletarian revolution decapitated by the Social Democracy; more exactly, it was a *bourgeois counterrevolution* which, after its victory over the proletariat, was compelled to conserve fallacious democratic appearances."

In the tradition of the German Social Democracy in 1919, the Soares leadership made itself the agent of what could be called the "democratic counterrevolution": the defense and consolidation of a bourgeois state through the elimination of the organs of the workers themselves while nevertheless maintaining the possibilities of action and freedom of expression for the reformist parties of the workers movement. A parliamentary framework would then assure the SP, which was strong electorally, a role as an intermediary between the bourgeoisie and the working class. Whatever the chances of success for such an operation, which historically has always been followed by a rapid advance of reaction, this was nonetheless the basic project of Soares, Régio, Zenha. For this reason, Portuguese capital and European imperialism unanimously supported the counterattack launched by the SP leadership. It is true that during June and July 1975 some sectors of workers participated in the demonstrations of the SP for motives that cannot be assimilated to the actual and coherent project of the SP leadership. In the minds of these workers, an anticapitalist will was combined with a reaction against the bureaucratic and antidemocratic methods of the CP in the trade unions and municipal governments, which the Social Democratic leadership was able to make use of. Thus, *from this angle*, these demonstrations had a contradictory character expressing both the profoundly uneven development of class consciousness and the consequences of the CP's orientation and sectarianism.

The Soares offensive took on broad scope just at the time when the effects of social polarization on the MFA revealed the MFA's inability to play a pivot role in constructing a state apparatus after April 25. The assembly of the MFA in June 1975 reflected the social and political confrontations that were racking society and the army, confrontations that had repercussions on the MFA. The assembly's adoption of the document on "popular power"—a "popular power" that was to be integrated into the institutions of the bourgeois state apparatus and was not intended to replace that apparatus—expressed the MFA's inability to effectively counter a mass movement that it even seemed to sanction.

This campaign against "anarcho-populism" *logically* led the SP to support the interventions of the sixth government, from the occupation of the radio and

television stations to the destruction of the Rádio Renascença broadcasting tower to the purge of radicalized officers. Moreover, the SP frontally opposed the movement for workers demands which, beginning in September 1975, drew sectors of the working class into action on a national scale (metals, construction).

The conjunction between the dynamic unleashed by the mobilizations of the SP and the divisions within the working class created favorable conditions for a strong reemergence of the bourgeois parties. By making use of some sectors of the petty bourgeoisie, the CDS and particularly the PPD made significant appearances on the political scene and presented themselves as the most consistent defenders of the capitalist order.

In the North, this was reflected in the key role played by these parties in the assemblies for "order and discipline." Beginning in November 1975, these mobilizations of reaction moved from the political field to the organization of a massive battle against the agrarian reform (first concentration of small, middle-sized, and large landowners of Rio Maior), in which the far right assumed an increasingly active role.

On the eve of November 25 the SP began to find itself in a state of disequilibrium under the pressure of the growing polarization between the two fundamental social classes. On the one hand, in the North the PPD and the CDS were seizing the initiative and transforming the mobilizations in support of the sixth government into demonstrations of reaction, while the SP was increasingly less capable of mobilizing its working-class base to support Pinheiro de Azevedo. On the other hand, in the industrial and agricultural South, where the SP faced massive mobilizations, its links with the working class, the agricultural workers, and the small-holding peasants became increasingly tense.

There were many reasons why the potential in October-November 1975 for a break between the policy of the Soares leadership and the rank and file organized or influenced by the SP was still not concretized in an open crisis, in the emergence of opposition tendencies of rather precise outlines, or in significant splits.

First, the sectarian policy of the CP, which reached its peak when "barricades" were built against the SP demonstration in July, reunited the Social Democratic rank and file around the leadership. Second, the CP's bureaucratic grip on the Intersindical, its manipulation of the press and the other mass media, and its crude monopolization of municipal governments lent credibility to the democratic proclamations of the SP leadership. In addition, the ultraleft course followed by most of the organizations of the so-called revolutionary left was an impediment to chipping

away SP workers who were critical of the leadership's policy and hostile to the bureaucratic methods of the CP. Finally, the very history of the SP, its lack of tradition as an organized party in the working class, and the low political level of its membership limited the expression of the party's internal contradictions in the form of an alternative orientation and favored the anticommunist maneuvers of the leadership.

8. The overall reformist project of the CP consists of getting into the bourgeois state apparatus so as to subject it to a process of "democratization," which objectively implies the survival of that apparatus. Whatever the tactical turns, the overall project of the CP remains the establishment of "advanced democracy." The MFA is only an element that can be used to try to concretize this project, even if it acquired a major importance for a whole period. Within this perspective, the mass movement is thus deprived of all autonomy and must serve solely to prop up this plan.

The decisive role of the MFA in the overthrow of the corporatist state and the nature of the crisis of the institutions of the old regime provoked by April 25 determine the concrete forms of the CP strategy and shed light on its tactic of penetrating the institutions of the bourgeois state. The main points of this tactic are the attempt to monopolize the municipal administrations and the mass media, the control of the trade-union structure inherited from the previous period (law on trade-union unity), and, above all, the winning of influence in the MFA, essentially in its leadership bodies: the MFA assembly and the Council of the Revolution.

Hence, the CP was to systematically put the emphasis on the unity of the MFA, which is presented as the motive force and guarantor of the process of "democratization" of the state apparatus and the channeler of the mass movement. The class independence of the workers movement is sacrificed and the relationship of forces within the military becomes the determining factor in all initiatives to mobilize the workers. In the context of the deepening of a prerevolutionary situation, the oscillations in the application of this orientation must inevitably be numerous; the ways in which these oscillations are carried out will be determined by various factors.

The crisis of the MFA, symbolized by the Tancos assembly and the emergence of the autonomous soldiers movement, forced the CP to hastily revise the formulation of its orientation. It sought to utilize the soldiers movement to push for a realignment of forces within the MFA and to aim at a recomposition of the MFA. At the same time, the rise of the mass movement and its growing degree of self-organization,

combined with the partial challenging of the CP's control of the Intersindical, forced the CP to readjust its tactics and hook up with this radicalization. The CP created the provisional secretariat of the workers commissions of the Lisbon industrial belt, which was intended to enable the CP to contain the push toward strengthening of the autonomous bodies and direct it toward the objective of reshuffling the civilian and military bodies of power. In this perspective, the workers commissions are intended to be, in reality, comanagement councils in nationalized industry; the moradores commissions are supposed to be bodies that complement the bourgeois state apparatus on the local level, in the sense in which they were "legalized" by the MFA document of June 1975.

The tactical adaptations are not simply the product of a policy of maneuver, but are also expressions of pressure from the CP ranks themselves for the development of democratic forms of direct representation and initiatives of workers control. This pressure can be reflected all the more easily within the CP, since there are very few party cadres capable of defending the fundamental orientation of the leadership and of politically training the young militant rank and file, which has many links with the workers vanguard and the militants of the far left and is undergoing many experiences of struggle.

In addition, the absence of a long practice of class collaboration in the framework of bourgeois parliamentary democracy, the lack of legalist traditions among the party ranks, and the consequences of the struggle against the corporatist dictatorship result in a certain adaptation on the part of the CP cadres to the spirit of the toiling masses, which has given rise to more than one illusion among the centrist currents about the real nature of the CP's strategic orientation.

The development of the class struggle during this period was to undermine the project of the CP; the beginning of the crisis of the CP—at the end of August and during September—was the product of the dynamic of class confrontation. On the one hand, the CP's links with the Soviet bureaucracy, its structural independence of the bourgeoisie, and its relations with the working class do not make the CP, unlike the SP, a viable instrument for initiating a counteroffensive to assert the authority of the bourgeois state. On the other hand the CP's program of "democratization of the state apparatus," its opposition to the independence of the mass movement, and its hostility to workers democracy place it in contradiction to the activity and aspirations of the advanced wing of the mass movement.

The possibilities for the exacerbation of the contradictions within the CP, of the CP being bypassed, and even of partial

breakups could not be realized in practice because of the ultraleftism and triumphalism of the centrist current and because of the sectarianism of the Maoist current. Hence, the CP was able to take advantage of its capacities of intervention and its organizational strength to maximally limit its loss of control over sectors of the working class.

9. *The influence of the far left*—linked to its quantitative importance, the place it occupies in some key sectors of industry, and the ability of the workers vanguard to take initiatives—increased significantly during this period. The rapid pace of the radicalization of layers of young workers, the atmosphere of permanent political debate, amplified by the mass media, the willingness to engage in political discussion among significant sectors of the masses, the emergence of the autonomous movement of soldiers, and the space created by the disintegration of the repressive apparatus all created propitious conditions for an expansion of the audience of the organizations of the “revolutionary left.” Nevertheless, this influence found no direct correspondence in the capacity of these organizations to educate and organize those layers of workers prepared to join in the mobilizations they were stimulating.

The coincidence of the crisis of the CP, still reeling under the shocks of the breakup of the MFA, and the emergence of a broad workers vanguard onto the political scene gave the far left (the organizations of the FUR and the UDP) an opportunity to independently stimulate demonstrations of some breadth (July-August-September 1975). Nevertheless, the division of the far left and especially its political confusion constituted major obstacles both to undertaking a process of unification and centralization of the embryonic organs of dual power and to breaking down the grip of the reformist parties. The weakness of the revolutionary Marxists did not permit the elements of political clarification and action proposals capable of responding to these two exigencies to be provided. It even made the revolutionary Marxists susceptible to centrist pressures:

a. The signing on August 25, 1975, of the agreement among the CP, MDP, FSP, LUAR, LCI, MES, and PRP-BR reflected this double phenomenon. On the one side, in order to dam up and take advantage of the combativity and initiative capacity of the workers vanguard, the CP signed an accord with these organizations, the content of which conformed to the political conceptions of the CP. On the other side, these organizations were politically incapable of taking advantage of the CP's need to make this maneuver in order to launch an offensive of unity in action around precise objectives corresponding to the needs of the toiling masses, to their

aspirations for unity and for developing, unifying, coordinating, and centralizing the independent organs of the workers. On the contrary, whatever their reserves, the organizations that signed the agreement sanctioned a conception *denying all autonomy* to the workers commissions, *mora-dores* commissions, and the popular assemblies, which were placed on the same level as the MFA or the political parties in a front. In addition, the accord called for support to the fifth government of class collaboration, which, in the name of the “battle for production” was calling for an austerity policy and an integration of the independent organs into the state apparatus at the very moment when the objective possibilities for these organs' growing over into organs of dual power were maturing. Finally, at a time when the MFA was splitting at the seams and the autonomous movement of soldiers was surging forward, the accord sanctioned the MFA. In a distorted way, the August 25 accord reflected the new relationship of forces between the broad workers vanguard and the reformist apparatuses, between the revolutionaries and the traditional leaderships; nevertheless, the signing of the accord led to sanctioning an orientation divergent from the dynamic of the mass movement, which had created the conditions for the execution of the accord in the first place.

b. After the expulsion-resignation of the CP on August 29, 1975, the question of the relations among the organizations that had signed the August 25 accord was posed in a new way. Insisting on the necessity for unity in action could have contributed to partially overcoming the limits of the intervention of the far left: the scattering of initiatives, the inability to bring the full weight of the broad workers vanguard to bear in strengthening the autonomous organs and the development of the soldiers movement, the weakness of political action proposals that could get a response among the ranks of the reformist workers organizations.

Now, the September 10 platform of the FUR did not provide the bases for such unity in action, but instead aimed at the constitution of a front. The grouping together of organizations that had the allegiance of only a minority of the working class, even within the broad workers vanguard, was identified with “the unification and organization of the class vanguard.” This logically led to discarding any united-front orientation directed toward other political currents within the workers vanguard (like the UDP) or toward the reformist parties. And this even though a policy of the broadest possible unity in action, centered on the development of organs of workers democracy and linked to the fight for concrete objectives felt by the masses, would have been able to strengthen the workers vanguard, to permit it to draw

more backward layers of the working class into mobilizations, and to respond to the division in the ranks of the workers.

This “frontist” conception, which impeded the concretization of an effective policy of united front, was topped off by the characterization the FUR made of the SP. The SP is considered a bourgeois party, the real “advance guard of fascism” that must be defeated before reaction can be crushed!

Moreover, the FUR displayed a triumphalist vision of the relationship of forces, which fed a sectarianism and ultimatism toward the CP that was equalled only by the illusion that the CP would fall into line behind the FUR's initiatives, compelled to do so because of the supposed strength of the FUR and its military links.

This line was subtended by a total overestimation both of the degree of political consciousness that had been attained by the workers, even those of the most combative sectors, in the course of *fragmented experiences* and of the level of “development of organs of popular power,” a formulation that in reality encompassed numerous ambiguities about the nature of dual power and the qualitative leap involved in the destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus. As time went on, the major components of the FUR abandoned the conscious and systematic search for direct support for the initiatives of the vanguard among the broad masses, the imperative necessity of winning over the majority of workers. In reality, the policy of the FUR led to *isolating the vanguard and to consolidating the division of the working class*, which in turn strengthened substitutionist and adventurist tendencies.

In the last instance, what predominated in the FUR was a spontanéist conception of an automatic transition from the level of consciousness attained by the workers vanguard through the experiences of struggle over eighteen months to the level of consciousness required for the accomplishment of the tasks of the socialist revolution.

Finally, the conception of the *relations between the independent organs and the parties*, as well as the absence of a *consistent defense of the principles of workers democracy*, raised a supplementary obstacle to the possibility of counterposing the division and bringing about a united-front orientation. By denying organizations in the workers movement the right of expression as such in the organs of proletarian democracy, under the pretext of “nonpartyism,” the FUR retarded the process of political maturation, which is linked to the free confrontation of the ideas of all the currents of the workers movement, and thus prevented the linkup between the more backward layers and the vanguard.

By not proclaiming the inalienable right of all tendencies of the workers movement to command adequate means of organiza-

tion and expression, to have access to the mass media, and to be present in the embryos of workers power, the organizations of the FUR did not offer any alternative either to the democratic demagoguery of the SP or to the bureaucratic methods of the Stalinists.

In this revolutionary upsurge, combining the coming into motion of backward sectors of the working class and an extension of self-organization in the factories and the army, the full tragic scope of the crisis of the subjective factor came to the fore. The nonexistence of a revolutionary party, even a small one, impeded a generalization and centralization of the experiences of struggle and thus also impeded a qualitative leap in the consciousness of the masses.

In addition, there was not even any politically credible reference pole that, through its analyses, proposals, and intervention, could have contributed to a political clarification within a vanguard dominated by centrist currents (MES, PRP, etc.) and Maoist ones (UDP). In this sense, the LCI's signing of the September 10 platform and its adaptation to the ideas dominant in the FUR (on the SP and the united front) represented a serious political error that could not fail to retard the construction and consolidation of the Trotskyist organization in Portugal. The events of November 25 were to give a sharp rebuff to this erroneous orientation.

### III

10. The desynchronization between the deepened crisis of the state apparatus and the lack of centralization of embryonic organs of dual power could not persist for very long. The following alternative is inherent in such a state of affairs:

— Either a centralization of the instruments of proletarian democracy takes place (essentially on the level of the workers commissions) and a situation of generalized dual power results;

— Or the bourgeoisie is able to more or less completely reconstitute tools of repression that offer it the possibility of driving back the advanced points of the proletarian upsurge.

This alternative does not mean that a radical change in one direction or the other must take place immediately, but rather that the means commanded by the two opposed camps will modify the terms of the coming test of strength.

This desynchronization had many implications:

• In spite of its extreme weakness and crisis of leadership, the bourgeoisie still commanded instruments with which to centralize its political will, which the working class lacked completely. The centrists' confusion of the paralysis of the government (the "strike of the sixth government") with the total disintegration of the bourgeois state apparatus expressed

their complete lack of comprehension of this phenomenon and accounts for their astonishment at the prepared, rapid, and relatively effective bourgeois response on November 25 and 26.

• Militarily, the many fissures in the hierarchical system were not accompanied by sufficient development of soldiers commissions and above all by the coordination and junction of such commissions with the organs of the workers. In addition, the spread of the self-organization of the soldiers was very different in the North and South, which facilitated the maneuvers of the military hierarchy. This was capped off by the gap between the crisis of the army and the lack of any political outlet that would have provided for a centralization of the workers commissions, which induced some of the radicalized soldiers and officers to seek a political way out in a military solution.

Finally, the disintegration of the army gave rise to the illusion in the mass movement that the outcome of a possible test of strength was assured in advance inasmuch as the mass movement had already won over a large number of soldiers. Hence, the necessity both for the self-defense of the organs of the toiling masses themselves and for the arming of the proletariat was obscured for the majority of the workers, even the most advanced workers.

• The dispersion of the structures of self-organization did not permit the masses to go through the experiences that would have led to a qualitative rise in the level of class consciousness. By assuring the direct and broadest possible participation of the toiling masses in discussing their problems, in working out measures able to respond to those problems, and in beginning to enact these solutions on a general level, a centralization of the autonomous organs would create propitious conditions for overcoming democratic illusions among the active majority of the working class in order to win these workers over to the side of the workers councils against bourgeois parliamentary democracy. Only then can the search for the forms through which to move to the proletarian revolution properly so called be broached. By obscuring the function of a situation of dual power in the development of class consciousness of the majority of the workers and by spreading the myth of a real "popular power" that had only to be extended a bit (when in fact what were involved were still only dispersed embryos of potential organs of workers power that had to be developed), the centrists (PRP, BR, MES) were led to present the insurrection as a precondition for a qualitative leap of the mass movement, which could then be won over to the socialist revolution. The march of the socialist revolution is turned the wrong way around!

11. The confrontations of November 25

and 26, 1975, must be grasped within this perspective. For the bourgeoisie, it was indispensable to quickly get out of the impasse into which it had been plunged by the failure of its interventions, the disintegration of the army, and the successes won by the metalworkers and the construction workers. The bourgeoisie set itself two priority objectives: put an end to the political turmoil in the army in order to neutralize a series of units and reconstitute a police-military force; and retake control of the mass media, which had been broadening the scope of the mobilizations of the workers, even the sectoral ones, inciting solidarity, and providing the workers with a partial element of coordination.

The bourgeoisie thus sought to provoke a test of strength on a very restricted field: the question of the commander of the Lisbon military region. The "strike" of the government created an atmosphere favorable to such an operation by casting responsibility for it onto the military officers alone and by concentrating decision-making power in a circle that commanded dominant positions in the General Staff and the Council of the Revolution. The nomination of Vasco Lourenço acted as a provocation that permitted the preparation of a plan of counterattack against any attempt by any sector of the army to prevent the application of this measure.

Instead of relying on the development of a network of soldiers commissions capable of neutralizing the initiative of the majority of the Council of the Revolution in practice, the so-called revolutionary officers and the Gonçalvesist current responded on the terrain chosen by their adversaries. On this level, there was an objective confluence of the "insurrectionist" conceptions of the centrists (MES, PRP)—which interpenetrated with the militarist positions of the "revolutionary officers"—and the desire of Gonçalvesist sectors of the army to undertake a coup de force to respond to the advances of the reactionary military hierarchy and to reshuffle the bodies of military power. The CP's campaign for a "return of revolutionary officers" to the Council of the Revolution and for support to Carvalho as commander of the Lisbon military region gave a de facto stamp of approval to these plans and suggested the organization of mass support for their implementation, which in turn strengthened centrist illusions in the options of the Cunhal leadership.

The sudden intervention of the Tancos paratroopers precipitated the implementation of elements of an unfinished plan on the part of the "military left." On the other hand, Costa Gomes's "response" had been carefully prepared and studied for weeks. It unfolded simultaneously on the military, political, and media levels: militarily

thanks to the Amadora commandos, politically through the vote of the Constituent Assembly in favor of the state of emergency, in the mass media through the immediate transfer of radio and television to Porto, which guaranteed government control of telecommunications. The genuine coup of reaction was not improvised!

Within the logic of its campaign for "order and discipline," the SP openly supported the establishment of the state of siege and the police measures that accompanied it. The SP voted for them in the Constituent Assembly.

As for the CP, its aims fell within the narrow framework of a personnel shakeup within the Council of the Revolution and, later, within the government. At the most, the CP intended to utilize the modifications the Tancos paratroopers could have brought about in the relationship of forces within the reactionary bastion of the air force in order to make it easier to implement its plans. In no case was the Cunhal leadership inclined to commit itself to a "coup d'etat." The search for a compromise within the framework of a strategy of "democratic revolution" remained constant—before, during, and after November 25. The CP did not even mobilize against the state of siege, in spite of its official position during the debate in the Constituent Assembly. It immediately shifted the axis of its alliances a notch to the right. The essential point remained clinging to its positions in the state apparatus on the chance of altering its points of support.

The centrists, more particularly the PRP and the MES, while manifesting complete incompetence on the terrain on which they had chosen to fight, nonetheless declared that "the hour has come to give the bourgeoisie a definitive lesson." Their separation from the real movement of the masses was sharply brought to light. Their denunciation of the betrayal of the CP was in consonance with their illusions about the strategic orientation of the Stalinists and about the relationship of forces between their organizations and the reformist apparatuses.

At no time did the working class participate in this "stillborn coup"; at the most, the workers reacted to defend their gains by mobilizing in the factories. Both the form and the apparent objectives of the "rebellion" of November 25 inevitably made a mobilization of the broad masses almost impossible and gave rise to the greatest uncertainty and confusion among the masses. The soldiers took a wait-and-see attitude. Isolated from the mass movement, they were not prepared to throw themselves into a battle whose protagonists and results eluded them.

12. The victorious military "counteroffensive" gave the bourgeoisie the opportunity to initiate a process of reconsolidation of the state apparatus, a precondition for

any possible partial reestablishment of order in the factories and the countryside and for implementation of the economic plan whose general lines were worked out at the beginning of November. Thus the bourgeoisie primarily emphasized:

—taking control of arms stocks and constituting a repressive apparatus centered on the PSP and the GNR, which were transformed into operational forces (this was an implementation of the original intention of the sixth government, which has not yet taken the risk of sending the soldiers out against the workers);

—making changes in the officer corps in order to guarantee control over the wave of new conscripts and reducing the number of troops in an attempt to professionalize some strategic units;

—gaining control of the radio and television and restructuring the press in order to provide the government with means by which to manipulate public opinion, cut down on the audience of struggles, even partial ones, that had been reached by the press and the radio and put an end to the permanent political debate they had been fostering.

Utilizing its fulcrums within the army and the state apparatus in general, the bourgeoisie sought to bring its regained political initiative to bear in the social sphere. The government extended the period of suspension of labor contracts and thus challenged the gains of the mobilizations for workers demands that had occurred during October and November 1975. The CIP (Confederation of Portuguese Industry) resurfaced. It proposed an austerity plan, a wage freeze, and the reestablishment of the power of the employers in the factories. The right and the far right took advantage of the breach that had been opened to challenge not only land occupations, but also the very principle of agrarian reform; in this they were supported by the mobilization of the landowners. A process of restructuring of the bourgeois forces took shape and *its center of gravity shifted clearly to the right*: The Spínolists and representatives of similar currents took over key posts in the military command; the social bloc of reaction consolidated its positions in entire regions and is seeking to transform them into strongholds to serve as rear areas for a future test of strength; the far right reappeared on the political scene, its links with the official parties of the bourgeoisie and a sector of the military hierarchy becoming visible. Thus, November 25, 1975, gave confidence to the bourgeoisie once again. The bourgeoisie reorganized its forces, tried to fashion a state apparatus capable of driving back the mass movement and breaking the most advanced struggles in the short term.

The first phase of this offensive took place precisely in the sphere in which the bourgeoisie's success was clearest. In the social domain, the bourgeoisie is seeking to

maneuver, to postpone the date of a genuine frontal battle, while at the same time establishing the elements of an overall offensive. Since the working class was not a protagonist on November 25, the bourgeoisie is conscious that it still has to settle accounts with the workers. Because the test of November 25 provided no proof of the state of the respective forces, sectors of the bourgeoisie perceive the possibility of a discordance between the initial strengthening of the state apparatus and the capacity to impose antiworker measures *in a lasting manner*. This is reflected in the differences within the PPD, the divisions within and among the bourgeois parties on the question of alliances with the reformist parties of the working class, and the cleavages, albeit limited, within the officer corps.

Nevertheless, the crisis of the *functioning* of the capitalist system, like the depth of the recession and the collapse of certain branches of industry, hardly enables the bourgeoisie to postpone application of its attacks on the gains of the toiling masses in order to rigorously restrict them. The government decrees of December 1975 and January 1976 herald this tendency.

Here lies the fundamental contradiction between the objective requirements from the standpoint of the bourgeoisie—requirements which determine the nature of the measures that must be taken to slow down the mass movement again and assure an upturn in investments—and the relationship that was not suddenly modified in a qualitative manner by the effects of the military defeat of a sector of the army.

Of course, imperialist aid could enable various investments to be made, in public works, for example, and the effects of such investments could provide some respite in unemployment. But this would not eliminate the question of the *functioning* of the capitalist system, that is, the reestablishment of capitalist and employer order (elimination of workers control, increase in productivity, halt to factory occupations and land seizures, lengthening of the workweek, reduction in real wages to permit an upturn in the rate of profit). On the contrary, the investments depend precisely on these factors being fulfilled; rather rapid confrontations at least in *this realm* are inevitable. All this indicates that a real stabilization is impossible unless a deep defeat is inflicted on the proletariat. Even in the rather unlikely event that some delay in sharp measures against the standard of living of the workers (because of imperialist aid and a broad mobilization of internal reserves) is combined with significant hesitation in the camp of the workers, a test of strength in the social and political spheres will not be able to be put off for long.

13. The transfer of the defeat of a part of the soldiers and "revolutionary officers" to the sphere of the relationship of social

forces has not had the effect of qualitatively modifying that relationship of forces. Nevertheless, this defeat did serve to reveal the political and organizational weaknesses of the semispontaneous and semiconscious workers upsurge and exposed the uneven development of combativity and consciousness. This does not imply, a posteriori, that a different judgment of the nature of the relationship of forces before November 25 must be advanced. Over eighteen months it shifted in favor of the working class and against the ruling classes, to such an extent that during autumn 1975 the workers broke the major decisions of a government that wanted "order and discipline" (the occupation of the radios on the order of Pinheiro de Azevedo rebounded against the government's objective; the creation of the AMI was challenged almost from the moment the decision was made; defeats were inflicted on the Ministry of Labor). In fact, the very maturity of the objective situation made an overall anticapitalist strategy, an extension and centralization of the organs of the workers themselves, indispensable for any step forward. This maturity underscored the limits of the spontaneous and empirical upsurge of the mass movement. The weakness of the subjective factor was thus to be strikingly revealed and was to affect the evolution of the relationship of forces.

After November 25, 1975, the limited ebb in the "revolutionary process" was to express itself, among other ways, in a complex process of recomposition of the organized workers movement.

a. The more backward layers of workers who entered into struggle during the mobilizations for workers demands in autumn 1975 went through a rapid and superficial radicalization and politicization that made them vulnerable to the bourgeois counteroffensive. Their dependence on the reformist apparatuses increased, while the government attack was located precisely on the level at which these organizations play a decisive role in the organization of an overall response. Thus, the limited ebb in the workers movement has intensified the differences in the political maturity of the working class among different regions and branches of industry. The fissure between the proletariat of the Lisbon region and the Alentejo on the one hand and the rest of the toiling masses on the other hand threatens to deepen if there is a prolonged delay in the response on the economic level on the part of entire sectors of workers whose contracts have been suspended. The workers' delay in organizing a response could combine with mobilizations and a change in attitude among the petty bourgeoisie and thus generate a modification in the overall relationship of social forces.

b. The lack of centralization of the organs of the workers themselves—which, during a period of upsurge, did not permit

the uneven development of consciousness and of the degree of self-organization to be counterbalanced—sharply reveals the *qualitative differences between the workers commissions and the moradores commissions* as well as the varying degrees to which the workers commissions are representative. This process facilitates the reformists' operation aimed at co-opting the workers commissions and integrating them into the trade-union structures; this is particularly the case since the reformists are the only ones who command coordinating bodies, means of effecting some centralization, and since they have decisive influence in the Intersindical.

Concurrently, the weight of the trade-union organizations increases in this period of recuperation of strength of the working class. A new stage is opening in the extension of unionization. It combines three aspects: deeper penetration of the trade-union organizations in sectors that had never been organized in the period before April 25, 1974 (teachers, public services); broadening of professional unions emerging from the old corporatist "trade-union" system; the birth and expansion of branch-based trade unions (metals, civil construction, postal system). After November 25, 1975, some unions led by the SP affiliated to the Intersindical. A new debate is opening both on the type of response to offer to the measures taken by the government and on democratic functioning in the unions. This process is shaking the bureaucratic control of the CP and tends to aggravate the contradictions in an SP that finds itself serving as the mainspring of the government.

c. The very nature of the workers upsurge, which proceeded through successive stages without encountering any major obstacles, fostered a capacity for initiatives and a real audience for the broad workers vanguard. Nevertheless, the semispontaneous and semiconscious character of the movement reflected itself in a distortion between the level of *political organization* of this vanguard and its size. Within this same logic, the identification of the victories of the soldiers with those of the workers was a decisive feature of the vanguard's political perception and explains the impact the defeat of a part of the soldiers had on the vanguard.

Thus, during a period of retreat, the quantitative weakness of the organized fraction of this workers vanguard is revealed; its political confusion loosens its links with its periphery and thus facilitates a grip by the organized force of the reformists (especially the CP) over this periphery. The nonexistence of a credible revolutionary organization capable of drawing the lessons of November 25, of helping this broad vanguard assimilate this experience, and of using the educational aspects of the confrontations to increase class independence, heightens the disarray of the vanguard, slows down the

pace of its recovery, and limits its ability to take the lead in a determined response to the government's economic offensive.

d. Since the strategy of the CP was essentially determined by a reformist project of "democratic revolution" and by concern to maintain positions in the state apparatus and more particularly in the military apparatus, the conclusions the CP has drawn from November 25 have logically led it to a right turn. Once again, the CP is giving priority to the antifascist struggle, within the perspective of the construction of a democratic regime. Hence, the CP is insisting on an alliance with the SP, while also making overtures to the split from the PPD, in the context of seeking an alliance with the urban petty bourgeoisie and sectors of the middle classes.

The weakness and confusion of the "revolutionary left"—which did not manage to take advantage of the tensions within the CP after November 25—can facilitate this utilization of the autonomous organs by the Stalinist current. It may even permit this current to back down on some conquests of the masses without taking too great a risk. But its links with the working class and the combativity of a good part of its worker militants will force the CP to respond on the economic terrain, trying to channel the movement into the framework of the trade unions in order to prevent a resurgence of the workers commissions as embryonic organs of dual power. Likewise, it will be difficult for the CP to remain silent about government repression without running the risk of stimulating internal tensions and of further limiting its influence among "leftist officers." Nevertheless, the CP will seek to avoid new clashes at all costs, and its statements opposing the government's economic and social policy will certainly not be followed up by precise indications on the form the response should take.

e. The SP has taken another step further in its counterrevolutionary course by supporting the repression and the government decrees. Now, the rightest regroupment in the military hierarchy, the offensive against the agrarian reform, and the reactionary proclamations of the PPD and the CDS indicate both who will benefit from the stabilization of the bourgeois state and the measures needed to set the market economy in order again and who the real artisans of a reestablishment of the capitalist order are. The character of the SP and its relations with the working class do not make it a functional instrument for assuring application of measures that frontally attack the living standard of the workers. The coming elections and the political situation are forcing the SP to strengthen its organized presence within the workers movement. Concurrently, in order to compete with the PPD among petty-bourgeois voters, the SP has to come forward as a factor supporting order.

These two *contradictory requirements*, like the government's attacks on the gains of the workers, including those workers organized in SP trade unions or influenced by the SP, may generate internal contradictions that have hitherto been covered over by the struggle against the CP and may enable opposition tendencies to arise. Finally, the confirmed danger of a strengthening of the far right is reactivating aspirations for unity among the workers movement, and this may throw the Soares leadership off-balance.

f. The discrepancy between the real development of the class struggle and the perspectives that had been traced out by the centrist and ultraleftist currents is causing a deep crisis within these organizations. The turnabout in the position of the MES and the PRP has led them to develop an "antifascist line" whose dynamic is laden with opportunist adaptations to the CP and the sectors that follow the lead of the "left of the MFA." As for the UDP, it is intensifying its hypersectarian attitude toward the CP, characterizing it as social-fascist. The UDP calls for the formation of an "antifascist united front" based on the organs of "popular will." The crisis of the centrist organizations of the MES-PRP type, combined with the weakness of the Trotskyist pole, leaves some room for a current like the UDP in the immediate future.

The adoption of this antifascist line by all these currents once again, whatever the motivation for it, increases the uncertainty in the working class and the demoralization of its vanguard and contributes to dissolving the slogans needed to respond to the economic attack of the bourgeoisie into a confused perspective of "antifascist struggle."

14. The new stage opened by November 25 is not characterized by a qualitative modification of the relationship of social forces between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Nevertheless, the period characterized by a deepened crisis of the state apparatus that was not rounded out by a centralization of organs of dual power is over. The dominant features remain those of a prerevolutionary situation. The bourgeoisie has regained a certain political initiative and has begun to restructure its state apparatus, but without having overcome its own crisis of political leadership. The divisions in the PPD and in the military hierarchy and the debates between the CDS and the PPD reflect this crisis. The CDS wants to appear as the sole consistent defender of the interests of the bourgeoisie and is seeking to put itself forward as an alternative leadership in the bourgeois camp. It is trying to make use of significant layers of the petty bourgeoisie to provide itself with a social base, a petty bourgeoisie that is also furnishing the troops for a rising far right.

The industrial and agricultural proletariat, whose combat potential is very significant, for the first time finds itself facing a challenge to its major gains. It commands important levers (trade unions, workers commissions, peasant leagues, parties) and has a rich experience of struggle, which permits it to respond to the bourgeois offensive and to initiate economic struggles in the short term. A new rise of the movement for demands against the attacks on the standard of living would allow new life to be breathed into the autonomous organs of the masses, the backbone of which would be the workers commissions. Once again, their centralization and transformation into organs of dual power would become an immediate objective.

An economic or political provocation by the bourgeoisie or by some sectors of the bourgeoisie blinded by excessive confidence might not only accelerate such a response but might also result in a massive and united form of mobilization that could beat back the effects of the consolidation of the state apparatus and once again objectively place the question of power on the agenda for the toiling masses.

A delay in the workers counteroffensive would foster consolidation of the instruments of the bourgeoisie for entering into a test of strength that could be postponed a bit but would be no less decisive.

The dynamic, rhythm, and crucial dates of the Portuguese political situation will also be determined by the deepening of the succession crisis of Francoism and the *entry of the working masses of Spain onto the political scene*. Thus, in the relative short term, an element of disequilibrium may be grafted onto the *structural factors of instability* in Portugal itself.

The tasks the Portuguese proletariat will have to confront in this new stage underline the urgent necessity of the construction of a revolutionary leadership capable of assuring a rise in class consciousness and of leading the proletariat and its allies to the conquest of power.

#### IV

15. Whatever the fluctuations in the "revolutionary process," a decisive test of strength between the two fundamental classes is inevitable. Revolution or counterrevolution, victory of the working class and establishment of a workers state or political crushing of the struggles of the workers and the establishment of a "strong regime" (military dictatorship, fascist or semifascist dictatorship, etc.)—that is the real alternative facing the Portuguese working masses. The LCI must throw all its efforts into preparing the masses for such a conflict, basing itself on the many and rich experiences undergone

by the workers before November 25, attempting to have the lessons of November 25 and 26 assimilated by the broadest possible layers of the working class, and putting forward an overall political program, credible in the eyes of the toiling masses, to transform the initial response to the attacks of the bourgeoisie on the conquests of the masses into a generalized offensive.

a. Taking advantage of the reformist policy of the leaderships of the workers movement, the bourgeoisie is now trying to extend the military and political victory it won on November 25 into the social sphere. In this context, the priority task of revolutionary Marxists is to stimulate—through propaganda, agitation, and practical initiatives—the most united and radical possible counterattack *against the effects of the government austerity plan*, against the challenging of workers control and all the manifestations of the contesting of the power of the employers in the factories as well as against the attacks on the agrarian reform.

The relationship of social forces, the potential of combativity, and the instruments commanded by the working class and the agricultural workers permit them to mount a stinging rebuff to the present offensive of the government and the employers. Any postponement of the response can accentuate the limited disorientation of the workers, strengthen the reformist grip, empty the structures of self-organization (the workers commissions) of their content, and broaden the space available for a regroupment of forces within the bourgeois camp and the consolidation of a leadership within that camp. Under these conditions, the elections in April could concretize, accelerate, and consolidate this process.

Revolutionary Marxists must therefore attach great importance to the organization of solidarity with and popularization of the partial and radical struggles that are now developing, since the policy of the reformist leaderships contributes to isolating these struggles. Demonstrating that victory is possible and permitting the most advanced forms of struggle of the previous phase to be placed on the agenda again can constitute a factor favoring broader mobilizations.

In the present conjuncture, the key battle will unfold against the measures suspending the trade-union contracts, that is, the negation of the gains made by the workers mobilizations of autumn 1975. In suspending the contracts the government is testing the reactions of the bulk of the working class. At the same time, it is directing the attack toward an area in which the responses of the workers are heavily determined by the policy of the trade-union organizations and thus of the reformist apparatuses. Given the conjunction between the scope of the attack on the

standard of living and the potential of struggle that still exists among the ranks of the workers, it is quite improbable that the government will succeed in implementing the totality of these measures, even by taking advantage of the orientation of the reformist organizations. But a very fragmented response might allow the government to concentrate its efforts on the sectors that are most backward politically and weakest organizationally, even if it is unable to advance all along the line. Thus, the division in the working class among the various sectors and regions could deepen. That is why revolutionary Marxists, on the basis of the mobilizations that will develop in one branch or another, will insist on the necessity of *coordinating and generalizing the response* in order to defeat the attacks, which are in reality hitting the entire working class. Nevertheless, a mobilization of broad scope to block the austerity measures acutely poses the question of the overall functioning of a capitalist economy facing a sharp conjunctural and structural crisis. Any overall response and above all any persistence of a high level of struggle requires clear general perspectives and a solution worked out from the standpoint of the working class. Hence, it is imperative for revolutionary Marxists to work out *a body of demands and a plan of struggle* constituting a concrete response to the social and economic problems of the country and standing as an alternative to reformist solutions of all stripes. Such a project must be the framework of the intervention of the LCI. Agitation for immediate demands in partial struggles must be combined with propaganda for overall solutions in order to increase all the possibilities of translating them into mass initiatives.

b. The application of the government austerity plan implies the challenging of the freedom of organization and expression won by the workers in the course of eighteen months of struggle.

For the moment, the government is still not in position to unleash a broad repressive offensive. It is limiting itself to selective measures aimed at laying the groundwork for hitting the vanguard harder. These measures come more sharply into political relief given that the soldiers and officers arrested on November 25 are now in prison, while the plotters of March 11, 1975, and the police personnel of the Salazarist regime are free.

For the entire workers movement, the organization of a broad campaign for the *immediate release of the political prisoners* must make the bourgeoisie and its government back down and prevent them from damaging the rights of expression and organization of the workers movement. Concurrently, the purge of the many ex-agents of the corporatist state who are getting their jobs back must be demanded; initiatives must be taken in this direction

wherever this is possible and can receive popular support.

The reactivation of the GNR and the PSP, striking forces of the old regime, and the increase in their personnel and resources place on the agenda the necessity of launching intense agitation for the *disarming and dissolution of these repressive bodies*.

In the present conjuncture, the government may try to rely on anti-working-class legislation (law on the press and on the right to strike) that has not been applied up to now because of the rise of the mass movement. Thus, the struggle for the abrogation of these decree-laws becomes primordial, along with the struggle for the unconditional defense of the workers' right to strike and demonstrate, of the right of expression and organization for all currents and parties of the workers movement and for the structures of the working masses themselves. It is within this perspective that one must situate a *campaign against the Pact* proposed by the Council of the Revolution, which is trying to consolidate its positions, including through a presidentialist operation, in order to develop an antiworker policy and to challenge the conquests of the toilers.

c. The main instruments for a mass response to the attacks of the employers and the government on the conquests of the workers and people remain the workers commissions and the trade unions. The orientation upheld by revolutionary Marxists in the workers commissions and trade unions must avoid any counterposition of these bodies and must stress their *complementary* character. Against the reformist project of integrating the workers commissions into the trade-union structures, of negating their autonomy and their specific function, it is necessary to emphasize the preservation of this autonomy and the mass representativeness of the commissions. This can be done only through the workers commissions' demonstrating that they can take on tasks that fall within the general framework of workers control, conceived as a genuine means of defending the interests of the class, and can begin to realize the aspirations of the class. The decisions of the government and the process of recomposition of the workers movement lend the trade unions an increased role and underline the importance of developing systematic work within the unions to construct a revolutionary tendency. This trade-union activity must enable a series of transitional demands and a discussion around themes linked to workers control to penetrate into the most backward sectors. In addition, the presence of revolutionary militants in the trade unions on a national scale and their active work within the unions can prevent the isolation of the workers commissions in certain branches.

On the trade-union level, the strategic objective remains that of constructing a

*united, independent, central trade union organized by branches of industry and functioning according to the norms of the greatest workers democracy*. The battle for this democratic functioning and for the liquidation of the corporatist structures can be combined with the development and strengthening of the workers commissions and can even facilitate branch-level centralization of these commissions.

In face of the economic crisis and the government decrees, the definition of overall options to consolidate the trade-union counterattack requires the freest discussion of the various orientations and highlights the importance of a democratic *trade-union congress*. The expression of needs, the formulation of demands, and the definition of a strategy of struggle require the right to form tendencies, that is, the possibility of an unhindered debate in which each current of the workers movement can put forward its solutions before all the workers. This confrontation of ideas constitutes a real precondition for the respect for and implementation of the decisions taken by the majority. This concept must be constantly presented as an alternative to the manipulative practice of the reformist leaderships in the trade unions and particularly of the CP in the national apparatus of the Intersindical.

d. Revolutionary Marxists reaffirm *the decisive role of the workers commissions in the future of the Portuguese revolution*; these commissions are the fruit of the movement of the masses themselves and have permitted the overcoming of the trade-union division by profession, the assumption of permanent tasks of workers control and embryonically of self-defense, the guaranteeing of the linkup with the popular masses, and the taking of radically anticapitalist initiatives (beginning of reconversions, links between industrial and agricultural workers, etc.).

The central place of the workers commissions is a necessity because of:

- the deeply felt need in the factories for the required unity in struggle;
- the need to generalize workers control, especially in the nationalized sector;
- the need, already expressed in the platforms of demands in certain branches, for an overall plan of struggle against unemployment, for the reconversion of entire branches, for the establishment of direct links between the various sectors of industrial production and between these sectors and agriculture, for the definition of production priorities in the nationalized sector.

The strategic objective thus remains the *development, coordination, and centralization of the workers commissions* as the central axis of the development of organs of dual power.

In this perspective, branch-level coordination can constitute an intermediary step leading to a *national congress of workers commissions* and the emergence of a

situation of dual power.

Propaganda and agitation for centralization takes root in the concrete struggles and needs of the workers; its revolutionary dynamic lies in attributing to the workers commissions functions that are those of workers councils and that lead the commissions into direct conflict with the coalition government and the bourgeois state machine.

A national congress of the workers commissions must be presented as the most adequate organizational framework for the bringing together of widespread experiences and the gathering of the information needed to elaborate a workers plan for the reorganization of the Portuguese economy and to guarantee the preconditions for carrying out the decisions made. The elaboration of this plan must go hand in hand with the development of workers control. In fact, this plan rests on the balance sheet of the productive capacities of the agricultural and industrial enterprises, on the state of the means of communication and transport, and on a verification of the workers' needs in the realm of private and social consumption as well as the need for producer goods. Hence, a national congress of the workers commissions emerges as a central element in an autonomous response of the working class to the social, economic, and political crisis and can permit the workers' allies among the urban and rural masses to be cemented around the proletariat.

The defense by revolutionary Marxists of the full exercise of *workers democracy* in the constitution and functioning of the workers commissions becomes a decisive task in attaining these objectives, which requires a *unification of the working class* and a growing over of the organs of the workers themselves into genuine united-front bodies at the highest level.

The following points flow from this:

- the free and democratic election of the workers commission delegates and their revocability by the ranks and not their designation by parties according to arbitrary and fixed proportions;

- the right of delegates to group themselves together into political tendencies and the strictest right of discussion on all problems according to the ideology of the delegates.

Only the scope and results of such a campaign of explanation can expunge from the minds of the workers the false polarization provoked by the SP leaders and fostered by the orientation and bureaucratic methods of the CP between a "democratic" state in fact located within the framework of the capitalist system and a "Communist dictatorship" destroying democratic rights. The massive experience with workers democracy within the workers commissions at the level of a branch or national congress is the only thing that can pave the way for the recomposition of

the unity of the proletarian front and can convince the workers that a workers state based on councils will guarantee democratic liberties qualitatively superior to those conceded by traditional bourgeois democracy.

Finally, an expansion of the activity of the workers commissions in this direction can provide a reference point that would facilitate a *reemergence of the moradores commissions* as organs of the working masses themselves in the neighborhoods and localities and could break down the reformist-inspired tendency to make these commissions appendages of the state apparatus (the municipal governments). The bourgeoisie's attempts to recover the occupied housing during the post-March 11 period and the attacks on the living conditions of the masses offered, at the time, an opportunity to revivify and extend the moradores commissions. One of the centers of gravity of their intervention must be to take initiatives to control prices, to forge links with the agricultural cooperatives for the sale of products and for the struggle against the capitalist distribution networks and against stockpiling speculation in consumer goods.

- e. After organizing support for the attempted coup of September 28, 1974, the large landed proprietors met the progress of the agrarian reform with dispersed resistance without being capable of organizing a mass mobilization.

The preferred weapons of the latifundia proprietors remained refusal to apply the agrarian reform law, hijacking of livestock and agricultural matériel, failing to repair machinery, burning harvests, and carrying out individual attacks. In face of the exacerbation of the class struggle in the countryside (land occupations under the fifth and sixth governments, linkup between the metalworkers in the South, the agricultural wage-earners, and the small poor peasants), the second "assembly of farmers" of Rio Maior, held in November 1975, marked an important advance for capitalist reaction. Apart from land occupations, it was the agrarian reform itself that came under violent attack. On this occasion, the expropriated latifundistas succeeded in reuniting the small and middle-sized merchants (whose speculation operations are threatened by the rationalization of the trade circuits linked to the agrarian reform), the rich peasants, and the small and middle peasants of the North and the West.

Reaction's attempt to crystallize a social bloc, especially in the North and the Center, represents a weighty threat to the Portuguese revolution. The workers movement can envisage a victorious outcome of a test of strength with the bourgeoisie only if this bloc is disintegrated at least partially and if the social base of support for the workers is expanded.

For this, stress must be placed on all the measures the trade unions and the workers

commissions in the industrial and banking sectors can take to provide a response to the immediate needs of the agricultural workers and smallholding peasants (fertilizer, credits, machinery, etc.). Further, proof must be offered of the community of interests that links them together to the progress of the revolution, by demonstrating as concretely as possible that only central planning, under workers control, of fertilizer production and production of machinery and agricultural implements, as well as central utilization of credit and a planned reconversion of cultivation and agricultural production can permit aid to the cooperatives and to the expropriated land that has become collective state property.

A modification of the relationship of forces in the countryside requires a strengthening of the agricultural trade unions, the leagues of poor peasants, and the commissions of agricultural workers and a growth of the weight of the poor peasants, as well as of the tenant farmers and sharecroppers, in the village councils throughout the areas where small property predominates.

This consolidation of *the organization of the land workers themselves* must strengthen the linkup between these organs and those of the workers in industry, banking, and trade in order to assure the application and deepening of the agrarian reform, independent of the structures of the bourgeois state. Finally, the instruments of self-defense must be strengthened in order to counter the operations of reseizure of land and of intimidation now being mounted by the latifundistas and their armed militias.

16. (a) Revolutionary Marxists will take advantage of the main lessons of November 25 and 26 to combat adventurist and minority conceptions and to develop propaganda for mass self-defense in the extension of the *embryonic organs of proletarian power* and for the protection of all the political and trade-union organizations of the workers movement. This is the only way to prepare broad sectors of workers to respond to any reactionary attempts.

In the immediate future, the campaigns of the far right, like the utilization of the GNR-PSP or the possible utilization of specialized military units, lends particular importance to the organization of *self-defense pickets*.

Moreover, in light of the importance the hierarchy itself attaches to regaining control of the arsenals, the experiences of the pre-November 25 period in controlling arm stocks and all the initiatives taken in the realm of arms manufacture must be exploited to develop concrete propaganda around the theme of control of arms stocks and use of weapons by the workers and by committees of soldiers.

- b. The counteroffensive of the military

hierarchy, while it has profoundly modified the conditions under which the soldiers can mobilize, has nonetheless not eliminated all possibilities of struggle in the barracks, possibilities that are bolstered by the experiences through which many soldiers have lived. The audience of the past movements among the new conscripts can favor resistance to military discipline.

The objective of the activity of revolutionary militants in the army is *the defense of democratic rights*, the right of organization, and the right of expression of the soldiers. The structures of the soldiers themselves which can lead to the resurgence of an autonomous movement can take shape around this axis.

Such a movement remains the greatest guarantee that the government will not be able to use the soldiers against the workers. Revolutionaries must do everything possible for the perpetuation of what constituted one of the most important gains of the movement of soldiers: their massive refusal to ever be turned against the workers. On this basis, revolutionaries can insist on the necessary *linkup* between the organs of the soldiers and those of the working class as well as on the prior discussion of orders, which can further facilitate agitation in favor of the election of officers by the soldiers themselves.

Antimilitarist propaganda must be integrated with the various aspects of mass work (in the unions, the workers commissions, the *moradores* commissions). The antimilitarism of revolutionary Marxists must differ radically from the pacifism of the reformist and must seek to free the workers of any hope that clemency will be forthcoming from the "democratic" bourgeoisie once that bourgeoisie opts for moving from political maneuvers to a determined attack on the working class and its allies. *The principle of the disarming of the bourgeoisie and the arming of the proletariat* must be the thread that runs through all our antimilitarist work, both inside and outside the barracks.

c. The attack on the living standard of the workers and the bolstering of the reactionary measures, along with the dangers they entail for the working class, not only create objective conditions that demand the solid unity of the proletariat front, but also sharpen the aspiration for unity. Unifying slogans corresponding to the most pressing needs of the proletariat must serve as instruments for the realization in struggle of a *united front* against economic and political reaction. The tactic of the workers united front is the keystone of any real attempt to initiate mass actions and thus to start down the road to *winning over the majority of the working class*. This does not mean that any initiative must be subordinated to the prior agreement of the reformist leaderships of the workers movement. Indeed, unity in action

must be sought with all political forces prepared to engage in struggle, without delay, both in defense of the conquests of the masses against repression by the government and the employers and in favor of the development and coordination of the workers commissions and, in some cases, of the *moradores* commissions. Concurrently, unifying demands must be emphasized in the trade unions; the formation of groupings (for common trade-union lists, for example) can become an important lever in bringing forward alternative solutions to those advanced by the reformists who lead the unions.

Such a step—which can reinvigorate the activity of the broad workers vanguard and find a response in the reformist ranks (especially in the CP)—must be constantly articulated along with unitary propaganda directed toward the reformist leaderships and the multiplication of proposals aimed at involving the workers influenced by the SP and the CP in action.

This permanent propaganda and agitation for the united front, the assertion of a will for unity, even at cross current with the immediate sensibility of certain layers of the vanguard influenced by ultraleftism, can pave the way for a united response to any political, military, or economic provocation by reaction. By creating actual unity in action, such a response could in turn result in a new step forward in the construction of organs of proletarian democracy. Concrete successes in this area are preconditions for a perspective of dual power opening up once again.

17. The dominant features of the social and political situation remain those of deep instability. In this context, the test of the relationship of forces between the two fundamental classes of Portuguese society *is yet to come*; it will probably take place around the suspension of trade-union contracts, the major questions of the economy (inflation and unemployment), workers control, and the agrarian reform.

Hence, in their propaganda for a workers and peasants government, revolutionary Marxists will *emphasize the program* that this government should apply to defend the conquests of the working class and meet the needs and aspirations of the toiling masses. In addition, they will indicate that it is only *through the mobilization and self-organization* of the proletariat that this government will find the strength to resist the sabotage of the bourgeoisie and to carry out its own decisions in practice.

The translation of the government formula into agitation depends essentially on the degree of mobilization and unity in action of the masses and the dynamic of development of a movement around initially defensive objectives. During this transitional phase, the aim of a government slogan remains to politically counterpose the working class as such to all other

classes, that is, to all government combinations emanating from the bourgeois system.

• In the event that the capitalist and reactionary offensive intensifies and the credibility of an SP-CP rapprochement gains ground among the masses, the government formula would immediately incorporate these facts and would express itself in the demand for an SP-CP government applying a program of defense and extension of the workers' conquests. In the present context, united-front initiatives toward the SP and the CP must be articulated with the demand on the Social Democratic and Stalinist leaderships that they "break with the bourgeoisie," that is, that they break collaboration with the bourgeois parties and the bodies that preserve the interests of the bourgeoisie, particularly the Council of the Revolution.

• If a new upsurge of the movement and of self-organization of the masses expresses itself in the possibility or realization of a democratic congress of trade unions (going beyond the pure trade-union level) and of a national congress of workers commissions, then conditions would be present for the organization and expression of the working class itself against the projects of capital and the government. These facts would then have to be integrated into the government slogan in order to effectively allow the objectives of the masses to be translated into terms of power.

The general propaganda formula "workers and peasants government responsible to the mass organizations of the workers" corresponds to this orientation.

This formula will have to be concretized at each precise stage in light of the evolution of the relationship of forces, the turns in the political situation, and the resulting recomposition of the workers movement.

18. During the autumn of 1975 the desynchronization between the state of mind of the masses and the fact that they could not see *any clear political outcome*, in addition to their low level of political organization, reflected the tragic lack of a revolutionary leadership. The post-November 25 situation puts on the agenda a recomposition of the workers movement and of its political forces. Revolutionary Marxists can play an important role in this process if they are capable of creating a political reference pole basing themselves on the limited forces they already command and carrying out a genuine process of political correction.

This necessitates systematic public intervention demonstrating the ability of Trotskyist militants to provide an analysis and perspectives for the development of struggles. Then they will be able to take part in and even stimulate debate and unity in action within the far left and

wage a political offensive toward the workers of the SP and CP who are disoriented by the policy of their leadership.

This central political activity will be able to assert its full political impact only if it is based on a permanent and patient effort toward gaining an *implantation in the broad workers vanguard* by winning to the Trotskyist organization the advanced workers who command a capacity for initiative and audacity and are able to strengthen their influence and authority among the ranks of the workers.

In addition, the expansion of the striking force of the revolutionary Marxists requires the regroupment of all the Trotskyist forces into a single organization, Portuguese section of the Fourth International. This implies the attempt by the LCI to establish priority unity in action with the PRT with a view toward fusion.

19. The Portuguese Trotskyist militants will stand at the head of mobilizations in solidarity with the *Angolan masses*, who are fighting to defend the independence won through fifteen years of determined struggle. They chose the camp of the *People's Republic of Angola* against the holy alliance of imperialists, racists, and local reactionaries. Likewise, they will support the struggle of the FRETILIN against the invasion of East Timor by Indonesian troops.

The links between the struggles of the workers of Spain and Portugal confer special importance on a campaign of solidarity with the battles of the proletariat of the Spanish state against the Juan Carlos regime, given their objective repercussions on the development of the situation in Portugal. Moreover, this campaign provides precious support to the militants of the Spanish revolution. The close

relations that must be established among the militants of the Iberian Peninsula constitute stable support for this internationalist activity.

Whatever the limited ebb resulting from the events of November 25, for hundreds of thousands of workers the Portuguese revolution still incarnates the hope of socialist revolution in capitalist Europe. In light of the decisive dates now looming in the course of the Portuguese revolution, the *militant international solidarity* of the workers of Europe with their Portuguese brothers and sisters must exert its full weight in determining the outcome of the coming battles. The Fourth International will fully participate in the construction of this movement of solidarity, one of the central objectives of which is the release of all militants and soldiers hit by the repression that followed November 25. □

## The Test of Lines in the Portuguese Revolution

[The following resolution, proposed by the Leninist Trotskyist Faction at the February meeting of the International

Executive Committee of the Fourth International, received the following vote: 17 for, 45 against, 0 abstentions.]

### I. The Lesson of the Attempted Coup of November 25, 1975

The attempted coup of November 25, 1975, marked a turning point in the Portuguese revolution that has had wide repercussions both domestically and internationally.

The result of the adventure was to strengthen the hand of the capitalist government. Since crushing the putsch, the regime has stepped up its offensive against the working class. While it is proceeding cautiously out of fear of provoking a new upsurge, the government aims at restricting and pushing back the economic and political gains made by the Portuguese masses since the April 1974 coup that overthrew the Salazarist dictatorship.

While some of the details of the November 25 events still remain unknown, the picture has become clearer with the publication of various reports.

#### The Government Sets a Trap

There is ample evidence that the military regime calculated it could provoke the "leftist" officers into an adventurous action.

Leading figures in the government and the Socialist party had been issuing warnings against a "leftist" coup attempt in the period leading up to November 25. The government publicly announced certain contingency plans to deal with such an eventuality, such as moving the center of communications to the North. The

government moves were facilitated by the course of the Revolutionary party of the Proletariat (PRP) and the Movement of the Socialist Left (MES), which had adopted a line of "insurrection." The PRP actually publicized its calls for an insurrection in the immediate future in campaign fashion.

In the week before the putsch, the government was in a weak position, but the key ministers feigned still greater weakness, claiming they could not govern because they were not backed sufficiently by the military command of the Lisbon region. The government went on "strike" to demand the removal of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho as commander of the Lisbon region.

Their charges against Carvalho stemmed from the construction workers' strike in early November. The construction workers had surrounded the Palácio de São Bento, trapping Premier Azevedo inside until the government granted their demands for higher wages. This massive, militant demonstration was the first action on that scale to challenge the government's austerity program. It expressed deepening determination in the working class to defend its interests against the capitalist government. The danger from the regime's point of view was that the construction workers' victory could encourage emulation by other powerful sectors of the workers.

Carvalho refused to send troops to clear the construction workers away from the

Palácio. His personal reasons for doing so may have had something to do with his attempts to refurbish his "leftist" image. Indeed, he had by then apparently allied himself with the Communist party. But more important was the fact that any attempt to send radicalized troops against the massive construction workers' action could have failed. It could have triggered a reaction in wider layers of the working class and among the soldiers. The government did not act against Carvalho at the time because it was interested in provoking an adventure of the type of November 25, not a confrontation with the working class itself.

The Council of the Revolution, the military body that wields real power in Portugal, meeting the night of November 24-25, ordered Carvalho dismissed as the Lisbon regional commander. The regime evidently thought that this would be viewed as a provocation by the Communist party, the centrist groups of the "far left," and the "leftist" officers. The removal of Carvalho signified a further reduction in the power of such officers, that is, those who sought to base themselves in part on support from the CP and the centrists.

The "leftist" officers fell into the government trap. They had apparently made some sort of plan in anticipation of the action by the Council of the Revolution, and moved on the night of November 24-25 to put it into effect.

The Communist party issued a call for a mobilization against the "shift to the right." However, while its actual involvement in the planning and execution of the putsch remains unclear, it certainly did not mobilize the forces it leads for a concerted attempt at taking power.

The PRP, MES, and other groups of the

self-styled revolutionary left were apparently taken by surprise. According to their own version of the events, the PRP "joined the movement" only after they had heard the calls for mobilization from the CP and had received an appeal from a delegation of the "leftist" military men.

During the night, paratroopers under orders from their first sergeants seized four air force bases. Many of the first sergeants were known as pro-CP by the ranks. The paratroopers' spokesmen demanded that Carvalho be retained and that Gen. José Morais e Silva be removed from the air force command.

The paratroopers, up until a few weeks before, had been known as among the most conservative units in the armed forces. They were among the units that General Spínola had relied on for his abortive coup attempt on March 11, 1975. These troops had been used by the government to blow up the transmitters of Rádio Renascença on November 7. The rank-and-file paratroopers reacted against being used this way and claimed that the government had tricked them. When General Morais e Silva addressed an assembly of paratroopers at the Tancos base attempting to justify the Rádio Renascença affair and threatened the paratroopers with demobilization, they expelled their officers.

When the paratroopers seized the four bases, the privates at first knew nothing of the coup attempt. They thought they were staging a military action to demand the removal of Morais e Silva as head of the air force. Once mobilized, they went along with the attempt.

After the paratroopers' action began, some units under "leftist" control took action. The Lisbon military police took control of several buildings. The Lisbon Light Artillery Regiment on the outskirts of the city set up armored vehicles and recoilless rifles to guard the northern approaches to the city. Carvalho's military security command took control of the national radio station.

Pro-CP officers of the disbanded Fifth Division marched into the television stations. Along with them was the former head of the national television network under the previous regime headed by Vasco Gonçalves. He announced to the station workers that "People's Power is giving the orders now."

### The Trap Shuts

The move by these pro-CP and "far left" officers was what the government had anticipated and was waiting for. The military Council of the Revolution, with the support of the SP leadership, moved swiftly to close their trap. Using commandos that had been tested in a number of situations for their reliability, the regime quickly put down the challenge, isolated the paratroopers, and waited for their

surrender. "People's Power" wasn't able to give very many orders after all.

The workers had basically nothing to do with the whole affair. They observed from the sidelines.

The CP, seeing how things were going and never intending a confrontation with the main force of the military, reversed engines, called off the mobilization of its followers and the unions it leads, and issued appeals for "serenity."

The government was able to present its emergency measures against freedom of the press, assembly, and other democratic rights as a defense of "democracy" against a putsch of adventurers.

The regime moved quickly to strike other blows for capitalist "law and order." A state of siege was proclaimed for six days, with the military empowered to make summary arrests. Military courts were established to deal with "crimes against the public order." Meetings and demonstrations were prohibited, and censorship imposed.

The government announced a wage freeze that among other things annulled the victory of the construction workers on the wage front.

Political parties were banned from the armed forces in a drive to restore traditional hierarchical discipline.

The government moved to purge CP influence in the nationalized press.

### Capitalist Offensive

With a single sharp blow, the government was able to regain the initiative against the workers. The workers' rising determination to fight for their basic needs, as evidenced in the construction workers' demonstration, was cut short.

On December 20, Azevedo called for "voluntary and conscious acceptance of sacrifices." In a television speech three days later he warned that "unrealistic wage claims and overemployment had caused many enterprises to close."

Since it came to power in April 1974, under all the various provisional governments, the military with the support of its CP and SP allies has been trying to force the masses to pay for the capitalist economic crisis. At one point this objective was cloaked in the demagogic call to win the "battle for production." Now Azevedo stated the same objective more openly, talking about "overemployment" at a time when 13 percent of the work force was unemployed.

The government ended subsidies on essential goods, with a resultant jump in prices, while it clamped down on wages.

Another aspect of the government's offensive was manifested January 9 when it announced that the land-reform program would not be applied at all in the northern two-thirds of Portugal, nor in parts of the South.

The regime also launched new attacks

on the rights of assembly and protest. To test its course, it chose the occasion of a January 1 demonstration in Oporto called to demand the release of 140 persons arrested in the wake of the November 25 adventure.

Members of the Republican National Guard opened fire on the crowd of 3,000 killing three and wounding many others, one of whom later died. A similar demonstration in Lisbon was broken up by commandos driving armored cars and firing over the heads of the crowd.

On January 13 the ruling Council of the Revolution proposed a plan that would ensure continued military rule in Portugal until 1980.

Rightist forces have been emboldened to organize more openly. In late January, the regime released from prison key hangmen of the Salazarist regime.

### Blow to Workers

It is the workers who have suffered most from the November 25 adventure of the pro-CP and "far left" officers. The blame for the setback lies primarily with the leaderships of the Socialist and Communist parties. The leaders of the forces that consider themselves the "revolutionary left" also share a large part of the responsibility.

The "leftist" officers who carried out the adventure were not demanding a workers government, to replace the capitalist regime. They demanded only the retention of the command of a "leftist" officer, Carvalho, and the dismissal of Morais e Silva. The logic of their challenge, if successful, would have been to reconstitute the Council of the Revolution and the government, putting different officers, with ties to the CP, in key positions. This would amount to returning to a situation similar to the one during the fifth provisional government last summer under Gonçalves, in which the CP played the role of favored junior partner to the Armed Forces Movement (MFA).

It was not an attempt to establish a government that excluded bourgeois political forces such as the MFA and the Democratic People's party (PPD—Partido Popular Democrático), a government that would represent the interests of the working class and poor peasants.

The November 25 adventure, therefore, did not represent an attempt to go beyond the policy of class collaborationism followed by both the Stalinists and the Social Democrats. Both have sought to keep the workers they influence subordinated to the military, while they vie with each other to prove how indispensable they are to the Portuguese capitalist class.

### The Armed Forces Movement

Faced with the upsurge of the Portuguese masses following the April 1974 overthrow of the Salazarist dictatorship,

the Portuguese capitalist class found itself in a weak political position. Virtually the only force to emerge from the old regime with credibility among the masses was the Armed Forces Movement. The MFA was the political arm of the rebellious officer caste.

From the beginning, the aim of the MFA was not to overthrow capitalism and begin the construction of socialism. Quite the opposite.

In bonapartist fashion, the MFA cultivated the image of being above the classes. As the radicalization deepened both in the civilian population and in the armed forces, the MFA was compelled to use more "socialist" and "anti-imperialist" rhetoric to retain support. It combined attempts at selective repression with concessions and demagogic promises to the masses.

At each stage there have been sharp divisions and conflicts within the MFA over whether to rely on the carrot or the stick. Sections of the MFA became identified with either the Socialist or Communist parties, or the bourgeois parties. Officers like the president, General Costa Gomes, succeeded in maintaining an appearance of being "above it all" while using all these forces and shifting among them. Throughout, the MFA remained a capitalist political instrument.

Arrogating to itself the role of bonapartist arbiter of the class struggles, the MFA itself found it had to resort to arbitration more and more to settle its own internal differences. The struggles within the MFA always carried an implicit threat of violence from the contending factions. There were even two right-wing coup attempts (September 1974 and March 1975) and now an attempted "leftist" coup. More and more power has been concentrated in the hands of the Council of the Revolution. Today, all key decisions are made by the council, without convoking the 200 or so officers of the MFA general assembly.

The real power in Portugal has remained in the hands of the military. The various provisional governments were set up mainly to draw in the major working-class parties, the SP and the CP, as collaborators. The policy of the leaders of both parties has been to fall in with this scheme and practice coalitionism with the bourgeois military, blocking the thrust of the workers toward forming their own government.

One of the objectives of the military regime was to divide the working class, in order to progressively demoralize and demobilize the workers and dispel the threat of united action, which could lead toward a socialist revolution.

To this end, the MFA worked to set the Communist and Socialist parties against each other. The policy of both vying to be the favored junior partner with the military played right into the hands of the MFA.

At first, the military leaned more on the CP. The Stalinists had an effective apparatus, which they put at the service of the MFA. The CP became the labor policemen for the military, portraying the "battle for production" as in the interests of the workers and socialism.

In return, as part of an attack on the independence of the unions, the regime supported the Stalinists' position in the labor movement. For example, the Trade Union Unity Law passed in early 1975 froze CP control of the union structure.

Before the elections to the Constituent Assembly last April, both the SP and CP signed a "pact" with the military, guaranteeing that military rule would continue no matter what the outcome of the balloting. In the vote, the SP and CP together got a majority. The vote for the bourgeois parties was a distinct minority. The SP received the highest vote of any party, 38 percent. The election results reflected the desire of the masses for socialism and constituted a mandate to push in that direction.

In response to the setback suffered by the capitalist forces in the election, the MFA launched a demagogic campaign against the Constituent Assembly. The MFA began to promulgate a program for what they called "people's power," which would supposedly be a higher form of democracy than the Constituent Assembly. This plan called for the creation of "people's assemblies" under the control of the MFA. The plan itself was never implemented, to any major extent.

At the same time, the MFA sought to deepen the division in the working class by denouncing the SP, charging it with being the "main danger" to socialism. The Stalinists became supporters and organizers of this campaign. They passed off their low vote relative to the SP as simply an example of the evil results to be expected from "bourgeois democracy" and attacked the Constituent Assembly in favor of the MFA's fake "people's power" plan. They even resurrected for a time the old Stalinist line of the early 1930s that the SP was "social fascist" or something very much like it.

#### Attack on Democratic Rights

The CP gave full support to the take-over of the newspaper *República* from its Socialist party editors. Then it unsuccessfully attempted, along with the MFA and the "far left," to block mass mobilizations called by the SP to protest the government's restrictions on democratic rights, including the take-over of its newspaper.

The popularity of the Stalinists had already dropped, as was shown by its vote in the Constituent Assembly elections, about 13 percent of the total. In large measure, this could be attributed to its support for speedup in the plants and its bureaucratic methods in the labor move-

ment. As it stepped up its campaign against the SP and against the democratic rights of the majority of workers who supported the SP, its popularity dropped further. And as this happened, the CP began to rely more and more on the MFA to defend its positions in the labor movement. Its stance was that progress toward socialism should be strictly controlled by a minority—by the CP in alliance with the MFA—guarding against any interference from the "moderate majority" of workers who supported the SP.

The CP's campaign for the "battle for production" and against democratic rights helped pave the way for restoration of one of the props of capitalist rule—the fear of the masses that socialism constitutes a threat to their rights and subjugation to tyranny.

The Stalinist campaign played into the hands of reactionary forces. For the first time since the April 1974 overturn, rightists at the end of July and in August were able to mobilize mobs that attacked and burned CP headquarters, especially in the North. The SP leaders said they were against these reactionary attacks but did not mobilize against them.

The SP leadership made capital of the issue handed to them. Radicalized workers and layers of the petty bourgeoisie turned increasingly toward the SP as a result of the Stalinist campaign. In July, the SP resigned from the government. It did this not out of revolutionary desire to defend the democratic rights of the masses, under attack by a capitalist government, or to fight for a class break with the MFA and for a united front of the workers in defense of their rights and interests against the capitalists.

The SP leadership's goal was to further its own campaign to displace the CP as the dominant workers party in the capitalist coalition government. In pursuit of this aim, the Social Democrats deepened the division in the working class.

Under the impact of the mobilizations of SP workers and supporters, the MFA decided to make a shift. In early September, officers most closely identified with the CP, such as the premier, General Gonçalves, were dumped from the ruling Council of the Revolution, and officers favoring at least a temporary alliance with the SP were elevated. Along with this change in the composition of the top MFA body, a new—the sixth—provisional government of collaboration with Portuguese capital was installed. The CP was reduced to a token role, with the major role of junior partner of the military being filled by the SP.

#### The Sixth Provisional Government

The new government, taking advantage of the deep division in the working class, made fresh efforts to implement the military's austerity program. Like its

predecessor, it called for capitalist law and order in the factories and barracks.

But the continuing combativity of the working class hindered their plan. In early September, there were sizable demonstrations of soldiers organized by the Soldiers United Will Win (SUV). The SUV was organized independently of MFA control. While embracing only a small minority of soldiers, the SUV reflected the continuing radicalization among the rank and file, pointing toward an increasing breakdown of military discipline.

The militant strike by construction workers in November indicated the growing readiness of the workers to fight for their interest.

The CP leadership gave support to one degree or another to the SUV demonstrations, the action by the construction workers, and the mass mobilization November 16 that was called by the Lisbon workers commissions under CP leadership.

The CP's oppositional stance, like that of the SP in the previous stage, provided openings for the masses. Its support to the construction workers, for example, ran directly counter to its policy, up through the fifth government, of opposing such struggles in the interests of the "battle for production."

But its support to mobilizations against the sixth provisional government did not signal any break with its policy of subordination to the military. During these actions, the Stalinists did not call for a class break with all bourgeois forces, including the MFA. On the contrary, they called for a return of Vasco Gonçalves, a return in essence to the fifth provisional government.

Thus the November 25 adventure occurred within the framework of the rivalry between the CP and SP leaders as to which could better sell out the workers to the military regime.

#### The FUR Also Bears Responsibility

The leaderships of the groups that call themselves the "revolutionary left" share responsibility with the Stalinists and Social Democrats for the setback that the November 25 events and their aftermath have signified for the workers.

The largest of these groups are the PRP and the MES. But far from being the "revolutionary left," they are centrist formations. They are repelled by the opportunism of the Stalinists and Social Democrats. But they do not counterpose a Marxist program based on class-struggle principles to the opportunism of the leaders of the Communist and Socialist parties. Instead they take a super "leftist" stance, project sectarian schemas and adventurous actions as shortcuts through which they hope to bypass the political problem of winning the majority of the working class from support of the CP and SP. Brushing aside the principles of class

independence, they are open to class-collaborationist schemas dressed up in "leftist" phrases. Thus they oscillate between, and sometimes combine, rank opportunism and wild adventurism. The one element that remains constant in their politics is sectarian contempt for the majority of workers who still follow the CP or SP. They place their own concerns above the needs of the proletariat and its allies.

The PRP and MES politically dominated the Front for Revolutionary Unity (FUR) that was formed last August. The CP was briefly in this front as part of its campaign to save the fifth government. Although the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP) was a CP front organization, it remained in the FUR. In addition to the PRP, MES, and other centrist groups, the Internationalist Communist League (LCI), the sympathizing organization of the Fourth International, was a member of the FUR.

The FUR was formed on the opportunist basis of critical support to the fifth provisional government, and support to the Copcon plan for building "people's power" committees under MFA control. The LCI, while critical of the support offered by the FUR to a capitalist government, held that this support should not be permitted to bar participating in the FUR itself.

The November 25 attempted coup discredited the entire "far left," and led to the breakup of the FUR, showing that from the revolutionary point of view, there was nothing to be gained from participating in the FUR.

The reasons the centrists advanced for critically supporting the fifth provisional government were different from those of the Stalinists. Their view was that a "left" MFA government of "revolutionary unity" should be set up in place of the sixth government. This government would then turn power over to the "workers organized in a structure that culminates in a National People's Assembly," as the PRP put it in the November 21 issue of its paper.

The MES declared about the same time, "We must create the conditions for the formation of a government of revolutionary unity that holds power until the creation of the National People's Assembly."

This schema amounts to placing faith in a "left" capitalist government to turn power over to the workers.

To understand this reactionary utopia, we have to examine the concepts of the centrists on building "soviets."

These groups presented a false picture of the real extent of the formation of soviets in Portugal.

The workers commissions that appeared in the period following the downfall of the Salazarist dictatorship foreshadowed the development of council-type organizations if the upsurge was not diverted or blocked

politically. The workers commissions were formed in response to the need for economic organizations representing all the workers in an enterprise, a need the workers felt acutely because of the fragmentation of the trade-union-type organizations of workers under the dictatorship. Up to now these bodies, which emerged in most of the factories, have generally remained in the framework of organizations of economic struggle and have not functioned as soviets. That is, they do not as a matter of course discuss and act on the broad social and political questions facing the working class and its allies.

The workers commissions have been further limited and weakened by the division in the working class. Progress along the road of developing the potential of the workers commissions to become broad factory councils pointing toward soviets hinges on the success of building united-front actions and the inclusion of broad social and political questions on the agenda as legitimate concerns of these commissions.

Some of the centrist groups have set up their own "soviets." These are little more than caucuses of their own supporters. The neighborhood commissions are even more fragmented—sometimes even giving rise to several commissions in the same neighborhood—each dominated by a different tendency.

The most direct challenge to the authority of the bourgeois government to yet appear in Portugal were the assemblies and committees of soldiers and sailors that sprang up at certain times in various units. However, they did not become standing committees on a national scale.

Thus it is inaccurate to say that the stage of dual power has been reached in Portugal. Organs of a soviet or council type, embracing the masses of workers, and beginning to function as centers of authority and power on all economic and social questions, parallel to and in competition with the government, have not emerged in Portugal up to now.

The revolutionary phrasemongers made propaganda for "building soviets" the axis of their work while at the same time advancing a political line that only deepened the divisions in the working class and blocked the road toward united workers' actions and united-front action committees that could lead toward the creation of genuine council-type organizations. This led the PRP to set up its own sectarian "soviets," and made the centrists easy game for the MFA's "people's power" demagoguery.

When the MFA announced its "people's power" plan during the summer, the centrist groups thought it had come over to their position on building "soviets." On July 16, the centrists, ultralefts, and Maoists organized a demonstration in support of "people's power" that marched

on the Constituent Assembly under the slogan, "MFA—People's Power" and "Dissolve the Constituent Assembly."

In this campaign of support to the MFA, the centrists played the role of "leftist" cat's-paws for the Stalinists. The majority of the Portuguese toilers, for whom the elections to the Constituent Assembly were the first and only national elections they had actually been allowed to participate in for five decades, could only interpret this campaign as directed against their interests and rights.

By counterposing "MFA—People's Power" to the Constituent Assembly they not only reinforced illusions that the MFA would lead the struggle for socialism. They presented the idea that workers democracy—socialist democracy—is contradictory to defending and extending democratic rights that the workers require in struggling to overthrow capitalism.

The Socialist party workers could only interpret the campaign to abolish the Constituent Assembly as being aimed against them, because their party had won a strong plurality in the elections.

The "revolutionary contingent" of centrist, Maoist, and ultraleft groups supported a Stalinist campaign that resulted in strengthening the hand of the reactionary and bourgeois forces generally, as well as the class-collaborationist leadership of the SP.

These sectarians failed in general to understand the relation between bourgeois democracy, workers democracy, and socialist revolution. To them, Lenin's injunction that the proletarian revolution "means a gigantic, world-historic extension of democracy, its transformation from falsehood into truth, the liberation of humanity from the shackles of capital, which distorts and truncates any, even the most 'democratic' and republican, bourgeois democracy" remains a mystery. (*Collected Works*, vol. 28, p. 371, emphasis in original.)

They joined the Stalinist campaign against democratic rights. They supported an attack on the real rights of a workers party under a bourgeois regime in the *República* case, claiming that the take-over represented the road to workers control of production. They called for the capitalist military regime to abolish the Constituent Assembly, as if that would advance the march to soviet democracy.

And they placed confidence in the ability and willingness of at least a wing of the MFA to lead the way to socialism. They overlooked the fact that the transition from a bourgeois regime to one of workers democracy takes place through a revolution that dismantles the capitalist state apparatus and replaces it with the new power of a workers state, and that it is a fatal illusion to think this step will be carried out by a section of the capitalist state apparatus, no matter how much its representatives talk of "people's power."

The groups that dominated the FUR

combined this rank opportunism with extreme sectarianism and adventurism. They attacked the Socialist party as a "phase in the transition to fascism," and called for an insurrection against the sixth provisional government.

In early November, the MES wrote: "Thus, the Social Democratic forces serve the advance of the fascist forces; consequently, we cannot separate our slogan 'Death to the ELP [Exército de Libertação Portuguesa—Portuguese Liberation Army, a right-wing terrorist group] and those who support it' from the slogan, 'Down with Social Democracy.' That, comrades, is why the MES says—and this is ever more correct and appears ever more clearly—that the Social Democracy is a phase in the transition to fascism."

This sectarian campaign, breathing contempt of the working class, cast further light on just what the small centrist groups meant by "soviets." Their concept has nothing whatever to do with real soviets, which arise out of united-front struggle committees.

Their campaign was to "centralize" commissions and committees that, far from having won the allegiance of the majority of workers, were often seen by them as organizations leading the fight to deny them their democratic rights.

Their campaign was part of a political offensive that blocked the development of united-front struggles against the capitalist government and cut across the formation of genuine workers councils to organize and generalize these struggles.

Soviets or workers councils represent the highest form of the united front—they seek to embrace all the workers of all tendencies, lead them in action against the class enemy, and provide an arena where all the tendencies in the workers movement can try to win a majority to their proposals.

But the "revolutionary" new leftists of the FUR had renounced the united front in practice through their sectarian campaign against the majority of the workers that support the Socialist party.

Real soviets can be built only on the basis of fighting to unite the working class in struggle around concrete issues and demands, not by calling for the "centralization" of organizations that the majority of workers have no confidence in.

#### Adventurism

The FUR leaders have an ultraleft, sectarian conception of a *minority revolution*. They had consigned the majority of workers to the extreme right. The British supporters of the PRP expressed this view openly. In a recent press statement, the British International Socialists declared, "We completely disagree with those, like [the French] Lutte Ouvrière, who pin their hopes on cooperation—on whatever level—with the Portuguese Socialist Party. It is Mario Soares who is attempting to organ-

ise gangs of storm-troopers . . . to drown the revolution in blood. It is the PS, *leadership and membership*, who cheer the blowing up of the Radio Renascença transmitter—symbol of workers' control." (Emphasis added.)

The petty-bourgeois revolutionists of the FUR do not believe that the fundamental job in Portugal remains that of winning the majority of workers from the policy of the class-collaborationist leaders of the SP and CP and from illusions in the MFA.

They reject the Marxist view that this must be accomplished before the question of power can be placed on the agenda. They believe that the determined action of a "militant minority" can spark the majority into action or bring it to give tacit support to their "insurrection."

Related to this is an incorrect view of the role of the soldiers. The PRP and MES saw the radicalization that developed among the soldiers and that deepened in October and November as a sufficient basis for revolution. If the revolutionary soldiers made a bold move, the workers would support them.

This was especially so, they believed, since, in the impressionistic view of the FUR leaders, the government was powerless. On November 10 PRP leader Isabel do Carmo declared at a press conference: "For us, at this moment, there is no solution except armed insurrection. As all history shows, the bourgeoisie unleashes a civil war every time it wants to defend its interests. Fortunately, the forces of the right possess no army in Portugal."

The centrists reversed the real relation between the workers and soldiers in a genuine revolution. In his *History of the Russian Revolution*, Trotsky took issue with those who "portray Bolshevism as a soldier movement."

Trotsky answers, "Fundamental historic facts were here ignored: the fact that the proletariat was the first to come over to the Bolsheviks; that the Petrograd workers were showing the road to the workers of all countries; that the garrison and front much longer than the workers remained bulwarks of compromise; that the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks created all kinds of privileges for the soldier at the expense of the worker in the soviet system, struggled against the arming of the workers and incited the soldiers against them; that the break in the troops was brought about only by the influence of workers; that at the decisive moment the leadership of the soldiers was in the hands of the workers."

In the aftermath of the coup attempt, the centrists criticized the treachery of the CP.

The CP did turn its back on the forces it helped set in motion on November 25, which compounds its criminal role in the whole affair. But the FUR muddleheads themselves believed that the CP was capable of following a revolutionary

course, and they helped foster illusions in the Stalinists.

In early November, the MES wrote: "It is not the 'revolutionary left' that is being dragged in the wake of the Communist

party, but the Communist party that, since giving support to the COPCON document systematically at decisive moments of the struggle, has been dragged in the wake of the revolutionary left."

## II. Balance Sheet on the Line of the IMT

Throughout the middle of 1975 right up to the eve of the November 25 adventure, the leadership of the International Majority Tendency held that the main danger to the Portuguese revolution was the "democratic counterrevolution." Their schema was summed up by Comrade Charles Michaloux in the July 31 issue of *Inprecor*. Michaloux stated that the MFA could "no longer adequately play" the role of reestablishing "a coherent, effective instrument of political authority and the initial elements of a functioning repressive apparatus" because its "authority has been sapped within both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat."

"Under these conditions," he continued, "the bourgeoisie has opted in an initial phase for the reconstruction of the bourgeois order through parliamentary legal channels. . . . Such is the sense of the offensive of Mario Soares, who puts forward the Constituent Assembly in counterposition not to a nonexistent 'military dictatorship,' but instead (and explicitly) to 'anarchy' and the 'absence of government authority,' which would lead to 'communist dictatorship' if it continued."

"The whole Portuguese and international bourgeoisie is supporting this maneuver."

The IMT schema was wrong on every count. The MFA was not abandoned by the "whole Portuguese and international bourgeoisie" in favor of a "democratic counterrevolution" based on the Constituent Assembly. On the contrary, the MFA was and remains the "essential political instrument of the Portuguese imperialist bourgeoisie," as the Leninist Trotskyist Faction insisted in its August 1975 statement, "The Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution."

The sixth provisional government is not based on the Constituent Assembly. This government was not set up through "parliamentary legal channels." The Constituent Assembly has not replaced the military government—it has remained hamstrung by the pact-program. The Council of the Revolution of the MFA remains the real power, and this power is hardly "nonexistent." It is in fact carrying out an offensive against the working class in the wake of the November 25 adventure.

In addition to pointing out that the MFA was the essential political instrument of the Portuguese capitalist class in the face of the upsurge of the masses, the LTF pinpointed the class collaborationism of the Stalinists and Social Democrats, ex-

pressed in the concrete situation in Portugal as *subordination to the MFA*. The LTF noted that this was central to the ability of the MFA to play its bonapartist role for the bourgeoisie.

The IMT virtually ignored this central political obstacle to the independent mobilization of the working class and the necessity of mounting a campaign to overcome it. Thus they failed to see that a major element in the betrayal of the Social Democrats during the summer was their subordination to the MFA—not a "democratic counterrevolution" to replace the MFA with a government based on the Constituent Assembly.

The schema of the "democratic counterrevolution" was complemented by the conception of the existence of "two camps," the "camp" of the "democratic counterrevolution" and the "camp" of those who oppose this danger. Since the entire world bourgeoisie was placed in the camp of the "democratic counterrevolution," the other camp was that of the working class. Thus the two-camp schema was presented as a "class analysis."

The "military hierarchy, the SP leadership, and the Portuguese and international bourgeoisie were all lined up in one camp, while a growing section of the Portuguese workers, soldiers, and poor peasants stood in the opposing camp," Comrades Mandel, Maitan, and Frank wrote in "Revolution and Counterrevolution in Portugal." (See *Intercontinental Press*, December 15, 1975, p. 1769.)

On the governmental level they saw a setback for the working-class camp: "The Soares-spearheaded offensive was successful on the government level. The Gonçalves government was brought down."

In which camp did the IMT place the Stalinists? Where did they place the Gonçalves government? The Gonçalves wing of the MFA? The Copcon wing of the MFA? Since these forces were opposed to the "Soares-spearheaded offensive" they must have been in the camp of the "workers, soldiers, and poor peasants."

The "two-camps" schema is not a "class analysis." It was a *substitute* for class analysis of the political events in Portugal and for arriving at an independent class line. When the Stalinists and the fifth provisional government opened an attack on the democratic rights of the Socialist party, the IMT failed to see that this was an attack on the working class itself. They opposed a forthright campaign to defend the democratic rights of the Socialist party while opposing the class-collaborationist

perspectives of the SP leadership. They did not see the necessity to oppose the Stalinist-supported campaign of the capitalist military government against the SP, while also opposing the Social Democrats' counterrevolutionary objectives. They were against participating in the big SP demonstrations of July 18 and 19 in defense of its democratic rights; they favored the counterdemonstrations organized by the Stalinists and the "far left," which were correctly seen by the majority of workers as demonstrations directed against their rights. They failed to see that the masses seized the opening provided by the SP's oppositional stance in the July 18 and 19 demonstrations, to fight for their own interests in spite of the SP leadership. The IMT made no distinction between such demonstrations and those called by the SP to support the "group of nine." In place of seeking to find an opening for revolutionary Marxists to intervene with their own program in the situation created by the SP's oppositional stance, the IMT supported demonstrations that had as their main objective the defense of the fifth provisional government, such as the August 20 demonstration in Lisbon.

Judging reality from the simplistic standpoint of "two camps," the IMT deduced that a political position based on the interests of the workers, independent of either wing of the MFA and of the Stalinists and the Social Democrats, really meant standing in the "camp" of the bourgeoisie. That is how they characterized the LTF's refusal to line up with them in the "camp" of the "left" MFA officers.

The IMT failure to project an independent class line led to other deviations. They counterposed the Constituent Assembly to "building soviets," losing sight of the fact that the masses need to learn through their own experience the superiority of soviet forms of organization over any forms of bourgeois democracy. The IMT rejected projecting a class line in relation to the Constituent Assembly, out of fear of fostering "illusions" in it and thus aiding the "democratic counterrevolution." In the elections for the Constituent Assembly in which the SP and CP received a majority, they rejected utilizing the favorable outcome to propagandize for a workers and peasants government by demanding that the SP and CP break their pact-program with the bourgeois MFA.

Comrades Mandel, Maitan, and Frank rejected the demand for an SP-CP government, as a concretization of the demand for class unity and independence at the governmental level, on the grounds that "the masses cannot and will not understand the slogan 'SP-CP government' in any other way than as a government based on the Constituent Assembly, that is, the reconstruction of the bourgeois state apparatus, of bourgeois 'law and order.'"

That is precisely the immediate goal of bourgeois counterrevolution; we must oppose it with all our strength." ("Revolution and Counterrevolution in Portugal.")

Here we find a pithy expression of revolutionary phrasemongering. The bourgeois state apparatus has practically collapsed. The "immediate goal" of the bourgeois counterrevolution is to reconstruct it through the "Constituent Assembly." This bourgeois goal must be opposed "with all our strength."

Everything is turned on its head. Instead of beginning with the real needs of the masses of workers to break with the MFA and all bourgeois political formations, the IMT starts with a plan which might possibly be entertained by the bourgeoisie, and deduces from this possibility that it is dangerous to call for an SP-CP government as part of the fight against the popular frontism of the CP and SP leaderships.

"What we must call for," Comrades Mandel, Maitan, and Frank wrote, "is a *workers and peasants government based on a national workers assembly*." The demand for an SP-CP government erects "an additional stumbling block on the road to the formation of the national workers assembly (or national people's assembly). . . ." They say that the slogan for an SP-CP government could become applicable "if a national workers assembly is actually convened and has an SP-CP majority; that is, in the event of a situation similar to the one in Russia after the convening of the First All-Russian Soviet Congress. In that case, the call for an SP-CP government would dovetail with the call for soviet power, as it did in Russia in April-July 1917, and would be entirely correct."

This makes the formation of soviets, which do not yet exist, and the convocation of a national workers assembly, a *pre-requisite* for fighting the popular-frontist policies of the Stalinists and Social Democrats on the governmental level. The key obstacle to the independent mobilization of the working class is left unchallenged, and the revolutionary Marxists are left without an answer to one of the central problems of the Portuguese revolution.

In replying to Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack, the authors of "Revolution and Counterrevolution in Portugal" wrote: "We do not agree with them when they say that 'the key to building workers power is political' if what they mean by 'building workers power' is the development of a situation of generalized dual power and not the actual conquest of power, which comes later. Far from being able to arise only out of 'national political questions' and from agitation around slogans like 'SP-CP government' or 'For a sovereign Constituent Assembly,' *the real workers councils are now arising and will continue to arise around all the issues of immediate mass struggles*. These struggles combine

specific political issues—like the fight against fascist conspiracies, the defense of the political rights and activities of the soldiers, and the fight against government-imposed censorship—with issues that are also largely economic and social. *The political synthesis will come at the end, not at the beginning.*" (Emphasis in original.)

We agree that soviets can come into being out of the development of united-front action committees fighting around issues of immediate concern to the masses well before the majority of the workers break from the popular frontism of the Stalinists and Social Democrats. But the key to advancing united-front actions and struggles is political. Comrades Mandel, Maitan, and Frank hold the position that revolutionary Marxists must wait for a situation of dual power to arise before they can demand that the parties supported by the great bulk of the Portuguese workers break politically from the bourgeoisie and embark upon a struggle for a workers and peasants government. This innovation is false and pernicious.

The Transitional Program points out that the "central task of the Fourth International consists in freeing the proletariat from the old leadership, whose conservatism is in complete contradiction to the catastrophic eruptions of disintegrating capitalism and represents the chief obstacle to historical progress. The chief accusation which the Fourth International advances against the traditional organizations of the proletariat is the fact that they do not wish to tear themselves away from the political semi-corpse of the bourgeoisie. Under these conditions the demand, systematically addressed to the old leadership: 'Break with the Bourgeoisie, take the power!' is an extremely important weapon for exposing the treacherous character of the parties and organizations of the Second, Third, and Amsterdam Internationals. . . ."

"Of all parties and organizations which base themselves on the workers and peasants and speak in their name we demand that they break politically from the bourgeoisie and enter upon the road of struggle for the workers' and farmers' government. On this road we promise them full support against capitalist reaction. At the same time we indefatigably develop agitation around those transitional demands which should in our opinion form the program of the 'workers' and farmers' government.'"

While fighting for the policy of the united front in the workers commissions, the unions, in action committees, etc., the Trotskyists in Portugal from the beginning must center their work against the class collaborationism of the "traditional organizations of the proletariat," and that requires a governmental slogan directed toward the two big workers parties. Far from contradicting our united-front policy,

which goes in the direction of building organs of workers power, the demand for an SP-CP government furthers that policy. In 1922, in writing about the need for the new French Communist party to raise the demand for a workers government in relation to the Social Democracy, Trotsky explained, "Right now, it provides a general perspective for the whole struggle for immediate demands, provides a general perspective for the struggle not only for Communist workers, but for the broad masses that have not yet come over to Communism, by linking them, by uniting them with the Communists through the unifying effect of a common task. This formula is the capstone of the policy of the United Front." ("The Case for a Workers Government in France" in *The Workers and Farmers Government*, Education for Socialists, p. 46.)

Raising the demand for an SP-CP government in Portugal today is essential to success in carrying out the task of building a revolutionary party based on a class-struggle program, in opposition to the class collaborationism of all the other political tendencies.

The idea that raising the demand for an SP-CP government sets up a "stumbling block" to building soviets because it would "create illusions" in the Constituent Assembly must be classified as simon-pure ultraleft sectarianism. Even when there were real soviets in Russia, the Bolsheviks did not counterpose them to the slogan calling for a Constituent Assembly. They took a class-struggle attitude toward the question of the Constituent Assembly, defending it against the bourgeoisie and the compromisers. Revolutionary realism demands that only when a revolutionary soviet government *actually* arises in the course of the real struggle do those who follow the Bolsheviks counterpose it to a bourgeois government based on a Constituent Assembly.

It is worth recalling what the policy of the Russian revolutionaries was on this point: "But the Bolsheviks also, although finding no way out on the road of formal democracy, had not yet renounced the idea of the Constituent Assembly. Moreover, they could not do this without abandoning revolutionary realism. Whether the future course of events would create the conditions for a complete victory of the proletariat, could not with absolute certainty be foreseen. But outside of the dictatorship of the soviets, and up until this dictatorship, the Constituent Assembly was to be the highest conquest of the revolution. Exactly as the Bolsheviks defended the compromiser soviets and the democratic municipalities against Kornilov, so they were ready to defend the Constituent Assembly against the attempts of the bourgeoisie." (Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*.)

In the tradition of the Bolsheviks, the LTF favored calling on the Socialist and

Communist parties to take power on the basis of the mandate given to them in the Constituent Assembly elections. We favored advancing the slogan as a step toward establishment of a soviet-type government. We were, of course, completely opposed to placing any political confidence whatsoever in the Constituent Assembly as a bourgeois institution.

The IMT took as the axis of its position the so-called strategy of building dual power. The "next step forward," according to Comrades Mandel, Maitan, and Frank, is "to generalize, coordinate, and centralize the organs of workers power, and not to transmit power to the Constituent Assembly."

In this sentence, the IMT leaders seem to be saying that organs of workers power actually exist. Elsewhere they talk of "embryos" of such organs, and assert that dual power does not yet exist in Portugal. In any case, in the stage preceding the November 25 attempted coup, the IMT portrayed the situation as one in which dual power was rapidly coming into existence. For example, an article in the July 25 issue of *Rouge* declared: "Inside the MFA itself differences are deepening. The right wing, which for the time being has taken refuge in support of the policies of the SP, is striving to bring to heel the progressive elements of the MFA who are being swept along by the torrent of revolution and who are looking confusedly for a new base of power in grass-roots committees. The key to the present situation lies in the rise of these committees. As emerging organs of dual power, they are bringing into being the highest unity of the working class, the workers united front."

In this campaign, the IMT confused very different elements. They lumped together the very important development of the workers commissions, and the soldiers and sailors committees that appeared in certain units at different times, with the sectarian "soviets" set up by the centrist groups as well as with the "people's power" plan publicized by the MFA.

The workers commissions were embryonic factory councils. The soldiers and sailors committees were embryonic councils in the armed forces. They pointed toward soviet-type formations. Progress toward building real council-type organizations depended upon a correct political course. Part of the correct political course was to explain that the sectarian "soviets" set up by supporters of the centrist groups were obstacles to building real soviets embracing wide circles of the workers in a genuine united front. Another essential in a correct political course was to expose the MFA people's power plan as an obstacle to building soviets. Still another essential was to defend the Constituent Assembly uncompromisingly against the attempts of the capitalist government to wipe it out.

The IMT did the opposite. They portray-

ed the sectarian "soviets" as the real thing, as among those "organs of workers power" to be "generalized" and "coordinated" and "centralized." The July 17 *La Gauche* said in an editorial: "Already our comrades of the LCI have established a united front with the left socialists of the MES which popularizes and initiates the establishment, generalization, and coordination of such councils." (Emphasis added.)

But real soviets cannot be created merely through the initiative of small groups. They must grow out of real united-front struggles, action committees, etc., which small groups can help initiate, if they have a correct line. The "soviets" launched by the centrists—exemplified by the proliferation of neighborhood commissions—were never embryos. They were born dead.

The real basis of the IMT's view that dual power was flowering in Portugal was its hope that the capitalist government's plan to build grass-roots support committees could be utilized for building soviets. The same editorial in *La Gauche* stated: "The recent plan of the 'MFA-People' calls for the generalized establishment of committees of the masses (with the aim of maintaining and expanding the social base of the MFA in the barracks, the factories, and the neighborhoods). This appeal furnishes the basis for the entire toiling population to organize and arm itself in councils of workers, peasants, neighborhood councils, and soldiers councils, INDEPENDENT of the capitalist state apparatus."

The quotation from the July 25 *Rouge* above was in the same vein. In the same issue of *Rouge* an article declared: "Today the Popular Assemblies are multiplying, following the decision of the Assembly of the MFA. The next stage could be the calling of a National Popular Assembly, a decisive step toward the creation of a workers state in Portugal."

In the July 18 *Rouge* Comrade Michaloux wrote: "... in Portugal, the governmental power is vacillating, while the power of the rank and file is taking shape. It already has a name: People's Assemblies, which will elect a National Assembly of the workers and soldiers. The National Assembly will create a Workers and Peasants Government. . . ."

The *Red Weekly*, *Was Tun*, and the other papers hewing to the IMT line voiced the same conclusion: The capitalist government's plan was not an obstacle to building soviets, but opened the road to them. The IMT became, willy-nilly, purveyors of the MFA's demagoguery.

The real purpose of the MFA plan was to deepen the division in the working class. The fake "people's power" scheme was part of the fifth provisional government's campaign against the Socialist party and the Constituent Assembly. By supporting this plan, the IMT's "strategy of building dual power" helped deepen the division in

the working class to the benefit of the bourgeoisie. The majority of radicalized workers and petty bourgeoisie saw the plan as directed against their rights. Thus the IMT's campaign was indistinguishable from that of the centrists and ultralefts, and made building the united front and therefore real soviets more difficult.

The embryonic factory councils and the soldiers and sailors committees could be strengthened, and action committees and united-front formations created, pointing toward the formation of soviets, only by advancing a united-front policy along class-struggle lines, that is, along the lines indicated in the Transitional Program, utilizing immediate, democratic, and transitional demands on up to the slogan for soviets.

The IMT's campaign to "generalize, coordinate, and centralize the organs of workers power" did not follow the method of the Transitional Program. The IMT tore the slogan for soviets out of context with the rest of the program, that is, tried to implement it without tying it to the living political struggle through a class-struggle program. This led to supporting the sectarian campaigns of the centrists and ultralefts to build their own "soviets" and, finally, to supporting a demagogic ploy of a capitalist regime that helped block the formation of soviets. The slogan for soviets crowns the Transitional Program; it does not substitute for it.

The IMT acted as if it believed that if the major political questions could be ignored, soviets could be built even perhaps by the MFA (which they nevertheless held to be powerless). The CP workers and "moderate" SP workers would swarm into these exemplary bodies once they were set up, and the objective political obstacles could be bypassed.

#### Errors of the PRT

The comrades of the Portuguese Revolutionary Workers party (PRT) changed a previously correct position on the bourgeois nature of the MFA in a "self-criticism" printed on July 10. Their self-criticism included the statement: "It is the MFA that is introducing another organization, another power, into the bourgeois armed forces, a dual power." In practice, the PRT moved away from the implications of its position on the MFA, refusing to join the FUR because of its populist platform. But they never explicitly corrected their error.

At the same time, the PRT comrades have, like the IMT, called for the "centralization" of embryos of dual power as a central axis of their work. The PRT claims that a situation of "atomized dual power" exists in Portugal. But the very term "atomized dual power" is self-contradictory. Dual power refers to the existence of two class powers, parallel and competing. While the bourgeoisie certainly has its

power, its government (which is not atomized), there is as yet no parallel power of the workers. Power cannot be "atomized." It is by its nature centralized, to the extent it is power. "Atomized dual power" is power so pulverized it is more likely "powerless dual power."

### The Turn of the 'Ninth World Congress'

The origin of the IMT's line on Portugal can be traced back to the ultraleft turn taken by the majority of delegates at the Ninth World Congress. This turn was codified for Europe in the document, "Building Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe."

The IMT's European resolution considered three "tactics" for building the party in the present period. One was entryism *sui generis*. Another was "massive organic growth." The document rejected these two "tactics" in favor of a third. The third "tactic" was described as "winning hegemony" within the "new mass vanguard" in order to "transform it, making it an adequate instrument for recomposing the organized workers movement." In order to carry out this "tactic," the document advised "organizing national political campaigns on carefully chosen issues that correspond to the concerns of the mass vanguard, do not run against the current of mass struggles, and offer a chance for demonstrating a capacity for effective initiative. . . ."

The minority of the IEC, which later formed the Leninist Trotskyist Tendency, voted for a counterreport to the IMT's European resolution given by Comrade Mary-Alice Waters at the December 1972 IEC meeting. This counterreport warned that the line projected by the IMT resolution departed from the method of the Transitional Program:

"In other words, the document proposed that the sections of the Fourth International should determine what actions they will initiate by starting with the 'concerns of the vanguard' and then making sure such actions do not contradict the struggles of the masses!

"What is wrong with such a guideline?

"The starting point for revolutionary Marxists is not our own subjective concerns or the immediate outlook of the 'vanguard.' We start with what is objectively in the interests of the broadest working masses and what must be done to advance the class struggle nationally and internationally. We never start with the vanguard and then try to make its interests and concerns compatible with the needs of the working class. We do just the opposite. We start with the objective needs of the masses. We then mobilize the broadest forces we are capable of reaching and influencing and lead them in struggle to win concrete demands that correspond both to the needs and consciousness of the broad masses, and that can move the struggle

forward and thereby heighten their level of consciousness. We employ methods of struggle that increase the confidence of the masses in themselves and teach them to rely on their own independent power.

"The difference between these two starting points—the concerns of the vanguard or the objective needs of the working masses—is neither minor nor hairsplitting. From the two different starting points flow two divergent courses of action. One tends toward maximalist demands and so-called 'militant' actions that presumably reflect the level of consciousness of the 'vanguard.' In reality they are adaptations to its political backwardness. The other is firmly based on the *method* of the Transitional Program, which aims at mobilizing the masses in struggle, whatever their level of consciousness, and moving them forward toward the socialist revolution.

"Even when we are not yet able to mobilize the working masses behind our own banner (or the banner of a united front in which we participate), even though only the 'vanguard' is following us, we still organize that 'vanguard' large or small, in actions that speak to the needs and consciousness of the masses, not the concerns of the 'vanguard.' We do not proceed according to a two-stage theory—today we win the vanguard; tomorrow the working class. The two aspects of our intervention are totally interrelated and proceed simultaneously. To win recruits to our sections from vanguard elements we must convince them of the correctness of our program for the working masses."

The warning made by the IEC minority that the IMT line foreshadowed adaptation to the political line of the "new mass vanguard" was unfortunately borne out in Portugal. The "new mass vanguard" (also dubbed the "far left," or the "revolutionary left") turned out to be centrist or ultra-left groups. The IMT line was dovetailed to fit the current course of these heterogeneous formations, although the IMT's formal adherence to the Trotskyist program restrained them from falling into the worst opportunist or sectarian errors.

To "generalize, coordinate, and centralize the organs of workers power," as used by the IMT in Portugal, was not an example of advancing the slogan for soviets as promulgated by the Transitional Program, but a reduction of that slogan to a sectarian level. The IMT campaign was cut to fit the "concerns" of the centrists. The IMT theme of "minority initiatives" focused on supporting the small "soviets" initiated by the centrists and ultralefts. It was reflected in their support to the July 16 "vanguard" action called by the fake "soviets" to demand that the bourgeois government dissolve the Constituent Assembly.

The IMT conception of "minority violence" or "exemplary actions" by a small

group, which fitted in with the turn taken by the majority of delegates at the Ninth World Congress toward raising guerrilla warfare from a tactic to a strategy in Latin America, and which was codified at the Tenth World Congress in the IMT document on armed struggle, accorded with the calls of the centrists and ultralefts for a minority "insurrection" on the eve of the November 25 putsch. The IMT differentiated itself from these particular calls (although much more vigorously *after* November 25 than before), but remained supporters of the FUR while the major components of that unprincipled bloc played into the hands of the capitalist regime with their dangerous, petty-bourgeois demands for an "insurrection."

The IMT conception of a "democratic counterrevolution" and a dangerous Constituent Assembly that had to be blocked corresponded with the campaign of the petty-bourgeois FUR itself in tow to the Stalinists. It was this "vanguard" that counterposed "soviets" to the Constituent Assembly, saw the struggle as one between "two camps," believed that the existing capitalist military government was no real danger, and fostered illusions in the "left" MFA officers and Stalinists.

It was this "vanguard" that was opposed to calling for a CP-SP government. They called for expelling the SP from all areas, and linked the Social Democracy to fascism. The IMT's refusal to call for a CP-SP government was an adaptation to this "concern." It was the centrists and ultralefts in Portugal who did not believe that it was necessary or possible to win the majority of workers from the class collaborationism of their Stalinist and Social Democratic leaders. The IMT reflected that position. Comrades Mandel, Maitan, and Frank even contemptuously referred to the "moderate" majority of the working class, as opposed to the "revolutionary" vanguard composed of petty-bourgeois centrist and ultraleft groups.

For whatever reason, purposeful or otherwise, the IMT's European resolution and their writing on Portugal remain vague in their political description of the "vanguard."

We may speak of a general social vanguard, such as the vanguard of the working class and the role it plays in the transition to socialism.

Marxists stress the vanguard role that certain layers play at times within the working class as a whole—youth, women, oppressed nationalities, etc.

By virtue of their struggles certain sections of the working class come to the fore and inspire other sections. The construction workers in November, for example, took the lead in the fight against the government's austerity program although they were part of the supposed "moderate majority."

The word "vanguard" is used in a different sense to refer to the *political van-*

guard of the working class. The political vanguard can only be those organized on the basis of the revolutionary Marxist program.

The IMT vagueness as to what "vanguard" they are talking about serves to mask their political adaptation to the centrists and ultralefts whose "revolutionary" phrases and tactics attract them. This blurs the line that must be drawn between centrists and adventurers and the program of Trotskyism.

The IMT line of transforming the "new mass vanguard" into an "adequate instrument for recomposing the organized workers movement," or, as Comrade Mandel put it in his report on the IMT European document at the 1972 IEC meeting, to "regroup the vanguard as a serious striking force within the workers movement to lead the masses in a global confrontation with capitalism that has the possibility of winning" was put to the test with the formation of the FUR, which in practice regrouped or "recomposed" the "vanguard."

By joining the People's United Front (FUP), as the FUR was initially called before the CP pulled out, the LCI carried out the IMT line, albeit in an extreme fashion. The IMT criticized the LCI for signing the platform of the FUP, but supported the LCI's remaining in the FUP and then the FUR. The IMT supported the notion that achieving a united front with the Stalinists was an important accomplishment even though this was done on the basis of supporting the CP's class-collaborationist program and sectarian objectives. Thus it viewed the FUP's and the FUR's popular-frontist program—and the IMT did, of course, differentiate itself from that platform—as secondary to the positive achievement of the "regroupment" itself.

The critical support given by the IMT to the FUR was a clear expression of adaptation to the centrist and ultraleft groups. With the departure of the CP, the FUR issued a manifesto that included denunciation of the Constituent Assembly elections as part of a "reactionary bourgeois offensive," and demanded the "dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and exposing its bourgeois character." The manifesto linked the Social Democracy to fascism and called for purging "all the fascist and Social Democratic putschists from the armed forces." It defended the Fifth Division of the General Staff. It espoused the reactionary nationalism of an imperialist country. In practice, the groups dominant in the FUR launched a sectarian and adventurous campaign, coupled with a class-collaborationist conception of forming a "left" MFA government. By supporting this formation, however critically, the IMT helped block the development of the political vanguard based on the class-struggle program of revolutionary Marxism.

The turn taken by the majority of delegates at the Ninth World Congress raised a tactic—guerrilla warfare—to a strategy, replacing the Leninist strategy of party building along the method indicated in the Transitional Program. This ultraleft deviation from a Marxist strategy was deepened and extended, and then codified by the IMT in its European perspectives document and other documents adopted by the IMT at the Tenth World Congress.

### III. The Strategic Line of March of the Portuguese Workers

Since November 25, the military has sought to assert its authority and to make as many inroads on the gains of the workers as it can. How far this process will go depends upon the response of the masses. The workers have not been defeated, nor have their organizations been dismantled. As the demonstration of the construction workers showed, there is deep opposition to the MFA's policy of forcing the working class to bear the brunt of the soaring inflation and economic slump.

The workers are cautious and confused in the aftermath of the coup attempt. It remains to be seen how and when they will regather their forces for a new rise of struggles capable of upsetting the plans of the regime to reestablish capitalist law and order.

The SP and CP leaderships have renewed their pledge of loyalty to the military. The sectarian schemes and leftist phrasemongering of the FUR have been exposed as capable only of leading to adventures and demoralization for the Portuguese workers.

In the forefront of a revolutionary strategy in Portugal must be the campaign to mobilize the workers and their allies in united actions in defense of their basic interests, their economic gains, and their democratic rights. This united front is necessary to overcome the bitter sectarian divisions in the working class, to strengthen the defense of the workers against the growing threat from the bonapartist regime, and to prepare the ground for a new wave of upsurge of the toiling masses.

The revolutionary process has not reached the point where forms of workers power have palpably emerged. The upsurge has led at this point only to the appearance of sporadic and scattered mass initiatives, factory committees, and elements of workers control. These developments point the way toward the emergence of broader action committees and eventually dual power. Progress along this road hinges on a correct political course. The fundamental political task is to break the workers from the class-collaborationist course of the Stalinists and Social Democrats, which signifies subordination to the Armed Forces Movement. What must be

The payoff came on November 25. That debacle also constituted a debacle for the IMT's European resolution. This was the verdict of a developing proletarian revolution. In practice, the IMT's ultraleft deviation, which signaled a turn away from the method and strategy of the Transitional Program, led the IMT to adapt to centrism and ultraleftism in Portugal. This in turn meant adapting to the Stalinists, and finally to the MFA itself.

asserted is the right of the workers to put a government in power that represents and fights for *their* interests, a workers and peasants government.

The development of the revolutionary struggle of the workers and their allies in Portugal toward a socialist victory requires defending the immediate economic interests and democratic rights of the masses in combination with demands and transitional organizational steps going beyond the economic and political structure of capitalism. The strategic line of march can be summarized as follows:

1. Defense of the gains of the workers and other layers of the masses against the attempts by the capitalist government to make the workers bear the cost of the economic stagnation and inflation. This includes fighting for an emergency government program for jobs, for a reduction in the hours of work without any reduction in pay to spread the available work, and for escalator provisions in union contracts to protect the workers from capitalist-caused inflation.

The struggle of the construction workers illustrates both the need for a determined fight on this front and the potential of mobilizing workers in struggle on these issues.

A radical agrarian reform must be demanded to meet the needs of the small peasants, as well as to promote state-assisted cooperatives and state farms in the area of extensive farming. The need for state support for individual small peasants has become especially acute, since the procrastination and betrayals of the capitalist government, supported by the CP and SP leaderships, have become identified with "socialism," pushing many of the small farmers into the hands of the right wing.

In addition, special attention is needed to defend and extend the rights and gains won by women and by the youth.

2. Defense of democratic rights in the armed forces. The MFA is attempting to use the adventurist coup attempt of November 25 as an excuse for clamping down on all democratic rights of the soldiers and sailors. Sectarian and putschist propagand-

da must be rejected. The rank-and-file soldiers need to organize in defense of their civil rights. The broad masses must be educated that citizens in uniform retain every basic right to organize themselves independently of the military hierarchy so as to be able to participate effectively in the political life of the country.

3. Defense of the democratic rights of the citizen-soldiers is closely linked to the defense of democratic rights and democratic decision-making by the masses. The political rights of most of the workers organizations have come under attack at various times since April 1974, including the rights of both mass reformist parties. Now the MFA is using the adventurist attempted coup to strike additional blows against democratic rights. The principle of solidarity of the entire workers movement against such attacks must be vigorously advanced.

4. Opposition to any attempts by the capitalist government to intervene in the affairs of the former colonies.

5. Defense of the elementary interests of the workers. The workers commissions and nuclei of industrial unions that have developed are still unable to mount an effective defense of the elementary interests of the workers on a national scale. To overcome this defect, revolutionists must propagate and agitate for industrial unions, for a united and democratic union structure free of governmental interference such as that represented by the Trade Union Unity Law. The struggle to transform the workers commissions into united-front-type action committees that can mobilize and represent the workers and poor masses in the industrial centers combines closely with other revolutionary tasks.

6. Extension of the nationalization of capitalist property. The expropriation of the key industries is a prerequisite for the planned economy of socialism.

7. The fight for workers control under present conditions also fits in with these tasks. In many instances the workers have already asserted control to protect their specific interests in the face of government assaults, employer sabotage, and mounting unemployment and inflation. Workers control is necessary to obtain the economic information required to defend jobs, to prevent the flight of capital, to fight inflation, and to administer a sliding scale of wages and hours.

Workers control cannot serve its purpose unless workers make clear that they do not accept any responsibility for the functioning of the economy until they have real power over it. This means fighting against the "workers control" promulgated by the military government and supported by the CP and SP leaderships, which amounts to workers accepting in a disciplined way the capitalists' austerity program.

8. Advancement of the struggle for a

workers and peasants government. On the political level, the workers in their great majority look for leadership to the Socialist party, the Communist party, and the Intersindical, the trade-union federation. At present no alternative to these mass organizations has credibility among large layers of workers. Nor can any political alternative develop until the masses learn in practice the limitations of the current class-collaborationist leaderships of these organizations.

Concretely, at the current stage, the fight for a workers and peasants government includes calling upon the Socialist and Communist parties, as the representatives of the Portuguese workers and the majority of the Portuguese people, to break with the pact-program that codified their capitulation to the military junta. It means calling for the establishment of a new government without any bourgeois forces or parties through the CP and SP leaderships exercising their majority in the Constituent Assembly and appealing to the workers, peasants, and rank and file of the armed forces to mobilize in support of it. It means, as the Transitional Program states, "At the same time we indefatigably develop agitation around those transitional demands which should in our opinion form the program of the 'workers' and farmers' government.'"

The Intersindical should remain independent of any government, including a workers and peasants government, since the unions must be the direct defenders of the economic interests of the workers.

The only national politically representative body chosen by the workers and masses in Portugal up to now is the Constituent Assembly, in which the workers parties hold an absolute majority. The fight for a workers and peasants government cannot be waged without defending popular sovereignty and all democratic gains, against efforts by the ruling class to restrict them. Concretely, this means defending the Constituent Assembly against attempts by the military junta to abolish it. And it means demanding that the SP and CP repudiate their pact with the MFA, which subjected the Constituent Assembly and their majority in it to the control of the military.

As a fundamental part of a united-front campaign of struggle, the demand that the two mass reformist parties of the working class form a workers and peasants government is an essential part of the process of advancing a working-class governmental alternative to the military regime and exposing the incapacity of these parties to provide such an alternative.

Incipient organs of workers power can arise only out of united mass struggles of the working class along these lines. Workers councils or soviet forms cannot be imposed on the workers.

Advancing the independent organization of the working class is necessary so

that the proletariat can meet the tasks of the class struggle in this period of crisis and win in a confrontation with the bourgeoisie. This involves pushing for broader and broader forms of workers organizations, industrial union structure, action committees, and democratic factory committees that can unify and mobilize the broad masses of the workers in the industrial zones and draw in other exploited layers. This process would culminate in regional and national congresses of workers organizations that can adopt general policies and lead the working masses in taking decisive initiatives.

The arming of the masses to defend their rights against attacks by reactionaries likewise cannot be accomplished separately from building united-front struggles along these lines. No minority, no matter how heroic, can substitute itself for the masses in the decisive showdown.

This strategic line of march begins with the immediate and elementary needs of the working class, and leads toward the establishment of a workers and peasants government and the organization of soviets as the basis of a workers state.

The traitorous policies of the SP and CP leaderships and the sectarian schemas of the centrists and ultralefts have taken a severe toll. A Marxist course based on the independent organization and mobilization of the working masses assumes ever greater importance. The construction of a revolutionary party to provide correct leadership becomes more and more urgent. Such a party does not yet exist in Portugal. It must be created in the heat of the struggle itself.

But even a small nucleus of revolutionists, armed with a correct program and strategy, can make swift gains. By fighting along the basic axes indicated, such a nucleus can play a decisive role in building the revolutionary party necessary to resolve the crisis of leadership in the Portuguese revolution. □

### Watergate Construction in Iran

Extortion, bribes, and even outright robbery in connection with a \$3 billion construction project in Tehran have led to the arrest of Mahmoud Naimi-rad, a former administrator of the project. He has been charged with extorting more than \$500,000 from owners of property adjacent to the construction.

In return for the bribes, Naimi-rad is said to have promised property owners that their buildings would not be affected by the construction or that a high valuation would be placed on their property if it were to be purchased for the project.

Other unofficial reports are circulating that functionaries involved with the project have illegally made off with more than \$3 million.

## Sobre Estratagema de Healy contra Hansen, Novack

Por Betty Hamilton y Pierre Lambert

[El siguiente artículo, traducido por *Intercontinental Press*, apareció en la edición del 27 de febrero al 4 de marzo (número 740) de *Informations Ouvrières*, la publicación semanal de la Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI), con sede en París.

[Betty Hamilton, que ha militado en las filas del marxismo revolucionario durante cincuenta años, estuvo entre los fundadores de la Socialist Labour League (Liga Laboral Socialista, que más adelante adoptó el nombre de Workers Revolutionary Party: Partido Obrero Revolucionario). Por sus años de experiencia personal, está en una posición que le permite hablar sobre los métodos seguidos por Gerry Healy.

[Pierre Lambert es el editor de *Informations Ouvrières* y uno de los dirigentes del Comité d'Organisation Pour la Reconstruction de la Quatrième Internationale, la organización internacional a la cual se adhiere la OCI. Junto con Healy, fue uno de los dirigentes del sector del Comité Internacional que se rehusó entrar a la reunificación de la Cuarta Internacional en 1963. Sin embargo, debido a diferencias políticas y organizativas que se profundizaban, la OCI rompió con el ala healista en 1971.]

Hemos leído los indescriptibles artículos escritos por órdenes de Healy, en los cuales se intenta comprobar que Joseph Hansen y George Novack son agentes de la CIA y de la NKVD.<sup>1</sup> Confesamos que fue difícil el forzarnos a nosotros mismos a leer estos "artículos." Pero consideramos que era nuestro deber, como representantes de nuestras organizaciones en el Comité Internacional de la Cuarta Internacional—que en 1953 estaba formado por el Socialist Workers Party [SWP, Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores], la Socialist Labour League (SLL), el PCI (Parti Communiste Internationaliste, actualmente Organisation Communiste Internationaliste), y las organizaciones suiza y china—, expresar nuestra solidaridad y simpatía con el SWP. Decidimos preparar esta declaración no sólo como miembros fundadores del Comi-

té Internacional, sino también como representantes de la SLL y de la OCI (PCI) que, estando en desacuerdo con el SWP, decidimos mantener el Comité Internacional en 1963.

Acusamos a Gerry Healy de arreglar el escenario inescrupulosamente con la esperanza de dificultar el desenredo de tal maraña de mentiras, insinuaciones infundadas y suposiciones gratuitas que extrae a partir de datos que nadie niega. Hizo esto para crearse una imagen de imparcialidad, y así justificar la calumniosa amalgama que ha fabricado en contra del SWP y dos de sus dirigentes.

Las falsas acusaciones, las calumnias y las mentiras siempre han sido una especialidad en la que han destacado los representantes de las clases opresoras y en el poder. Mas los representantes directos de las clases gobernantes han sido claramente superados en esto por aquellos dentro del movimiento obrero que se han subordinado a los intereses de la burguesía. Los mencheviques, por ejemplo, tuvieron que atacar a Lenin como "agente del Kaiser," de la misma manera en que más tarde los estalinistas iban a sostener que Trotsky era un "agente de la Gestapo." Así que, durante un período histórico en el que la lucha por la emancipación de la humanidad es inseparable de la lucha para liberar a la clase trabajadora de aquellas direcciones que se han atado al imperialismo, a través de la lucha para reconstruir la Cuarta Internacional, es extremadamente importante evitar que esta tradición contrarrevolucionaria de mentiras y calumnias se filtre a las filas de vanguardia.

La única justificación que podrían tener estas monstruosas acusaciones lanzadas contra Joseph Hansen y George Novack—y, de hecho, como demostraremos más adelante, lanzadas también contra la dirección del SWP y contra el mismo Leon Trotsky—, sería la existencia de evidencia fehaciente, de pruebas, documentos de los cuales lógicamente se podría deducir que es necesaria una investigación, fueran o no culpables de los crímenes de los cuales se les acusa.

Sin embargo, la meticulosa fabricación de G. Healy se desbarata como un castillo de naipes cuando se aplica este criterio básico. Cuando se trata de Hansen y Novack (los blancos nominales de este ataque), todo se reduce a un tipo especial de lógica, misma que Vishinsky intentó hacer respetable pero que ciertamente no tiene nada que ver las tradiciones de nuestro movimiento.

Joseph Hansen tuvo una reunión con el cónsul norteamericano en México. Bueno, como ustedes saben un cónsul norteamericano tiene que ser agente del FBI. Así que Hansen, ya que tuvo una reunión con un agente del FBI, tiene que ser también un agente del FBI, o al menos puede serlo.

Entonces ¿qué conclusiones debemos extraer del hecho que Leon Trotsky, después del asesinato de L. Sedov, no sólo presentó una demanda con las autoridades francesas, sino que también les ordenó a algunos activistas que atestiguaran ante la policía que conducía la investigación? Si seguimos el mismo razonamiento de Healy, tendríamos que concluir que, ya que L. Trotsky levantó una demanda ante las autoridades imperialistas francesas, ya que le pidió a camaradas que atestiguaran ante la policía del imperialismo francés, ¡L. Trotsky era un agente del imperialismo y de la policía franceses! El procedimiento al que ha recurrido Healy es típicamente estalinista.

Pero Healy, el calumniador, no se detiene aquí. Recurre a argumentos donde se apoya en la autoridad (porque yo lo digo, así sucedió).

Por ejemplo, en 1938 un agente de la GPU entró en contacto con Hansen. Hansen explicó que Trotsky le dijo que "mantuviera el contacto." ¿Cómo explica esto Healy?

"Declaramos categóricamente que Hansen miente al decir que Trotsky le dijo que se asociara con el agente de la GPU 'John' Rabinowitz. Es inconcebible que el dirigente bolchevique haya instruido al principal responsable de sus medidas de seguridad en Coyoacán para que se reuniera con un agente de la GPU durante un período de tres meses." No nos ofrece evidencia alguna para apoyar esta aseveración. Es suficiente con que Healy piense que esto es "inconcebible." Tenemos que creer a G. Healy, porque él lo ha dicho. ¿Ha pensado alguna vez G. Healy que el aparato internacional del Kremlin y sus agencias nacionales están controlados por la GPU? A cada paso, en cada momento, los trotskistas han tenido contacto con dirigentes de los partidos comunistas, quienes muchas veces son agentes de la GPU. Escondido tras la virtuosa indignación de Healy está el filisteísmo pequeñoburgués.

Algunos dirán que estamos juzgando la "base" de este caso por adelantado, cuando hablamos de manera general sobre la monstruosidad de las acusaciones que son levantadas contra Joseph Hansen. De

1. En *Workers Press*, el órgano del Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) de la Gran Bretaña, se han publicado tres series de artículos dedicados al tema de la "seguridad en la Cuarta Internacional." Son siete artículos en la primera serie, que comenzó en la edición del 19 de abril de 1975; luego diecinueve, comenzando con la edición del 14 agosto del mismo año; y finalmente ocho artículos más, que comenzaron el 5 de enero de 1976.

hecho, no pensamos que el camarada J. Hansen esté "en el banquillo de los acusados," o que esté siendo sometido "a juicio" y deba probar su inocencia. Cuando Trotsky tuvo que encarar la abominable máquina de mentiras, ofreció como primera prueba para mostrar lo absurdo de las acusaciones que se lanzaron, el historial de su actividad política pública.

La continua actividad de Joseph Hansen, por más de cuarenta años, como miembro y dirigente de la organización trotskista norteamericana, su papel en la historia y en los debates en el seno de la Cuarta Internacional—en donde, a pesar de que ha habido profundas diferencias entre nosotros, siempre ha permanecido dentro del marco del Trotskismo—son en sí mismas la mejor contestación a los alegatos de aquellos que ponen en tela de juicio su honor revolucionario.

¿Esto significa que debido a su trabajo el camarada Hansen goza de algún tipo de inmunidad? De ninguna manera. Pero si no estuviera amañado de pies a cabeza este "juicio" en el que Healy quiere jugar el papel de fiscal, éste comenzaría atacando este aspecto y esto es lo que no hace ni una sola vez. Y lo que es más, en largas planas en *Workers Press*, que entre todas podrían formar un libro, Healy no ha podido presentar ni un ápice de evidencia o un sólo documento emitido ya sea por Hansen o por algún ex-agente de la GPU que haya desertado al FBI (y Healy considera al FBI, sin verificación alguna, como el portador de la verdad), que pueda apoyar su monstruoso cargo de que Hansen es "un cómplice de la GPU."

Así que, si dedicamos un poco más de espacio para tratar sobre estos cargos—antes de llegar a las conclusiones políticas—no es para defender al camarada Hansen, sino para mostrar que el método utilizado por Gerry Healy está en total contradicción con los principios y tradiciones de la Cuarta Internacional y del movimiento obrero.

La serie que ha llenado cuatro planas de cada número de *Workers Press* durante el mes anterior a la fecha en que dejó de aparecer, adopta la forma de una novela detectivesca incoherente en la cual cualquier dato preciso que pueda encontrarse ya era conocido desde hace tiempo y en donde abundan las especulaciones infundadas, las aseveraciones gratuitas y las contradicciones.

Tomemos un ejemplo. *Workers Press* arma un gran escándalo acerca de una visita que hizo Joe Hansen al consul norteamericano, McGregor, visita que realizó en calidad de secretario de Trotsky, once días después de que éste fue asesinado. El hecho de que se llevó a cabo un sábado y no en un día laborable es usado para justificar la insinuación de que había algo raro al respecto, de que Joseph Hansen podía estar vinculado al FBI (de pasada, ¡como si el asesinato de Trotsky no hubiera sido un acontecimiento internacio-

nal de suficiente importancia como para que el consul norteamericano decidiera ceder una parte de la mañana del sábado!).

Sigamos la línea de "razonamiento" de *Workers Press*. De esta "prueba," que no prueba nada, concluye que Hansen muy bien pudo haber mantenido relaciones con el FBI y más adelante continúa como si esta relación ya hubiera sido establecida. Pero esta curiosa línea de "razonamiento" se contradice a su vez con los cargos que sus autores lanzan contra Joseph Hansen. ¿Qué fue lo que le dijo Hansen al consul, de acuerdo al informe de este último? Que la GPU fue responsable del asesinato y que el crimen debió haber sido manipulado desde los Estados Unidos. Señaló que "Mornard hizo un viaje a los Estados Unidos entre la fecha del primer atentado contra la vida de Trotsky y la del segundo, en el cual tuvieron éxito," y de esta manera insistió en que la policía norteamericana debería verificar sobre el hotel en el que Mornard se había alojado en Nueva York.

¿Qué conclusión extrajo *Workers Press*? Que Joseph Hansen trataba de engañar a la Cuarta Internacional, porque el asesinato había sido manipulado desde París por Zborowski, y no desde Nueva York. Pero si esto fuera cierto, de acuerdo a las acusaciones previas, Hansen hubiera estado engañando a sus supuestos "jefes."

Pero, nos pueden contestar los imaginativos editores de *Workers Press*, ¿y si Hansen era agente de la GPU? Entonces, uno puede preguntarse por qué insistió en la culpabilidad de la GPU. Pero (como los calumniadores siempre tienen una salida a la mano), su papel como dirigente trotskista lo obligaba a insistir en eso.

Entonces (si estamos de acuerdo en aceptar el marco de un juicio es en aras de la claridad), en cualquier caso se trataba de una conversación oficial con el consul de los EUA y precisamente porque era oficial no prueba nada, ¡está fuera del marco del debate! De hecho, tendremos que regresar más adelante a las razones por las cuales se intenta utilizar esta conversación.

Permítanos agregar que Gerry Healy "se olvidó" del hecho de que J. Hansen dio la razón por la cual realizó esta visita—tratar de establecer la identidad exacta del asesino, que entonces era desconocida—y que desde este punto de vista la visita al consul produjo resultados.

#### Cínica Indiferencia hacia la Verdad

Seamos serios. El centro donde se preparó y se decidió el asesinato de Trotsky fue el Kremlin. Como lo demostraron sus confesiones en 1956, Zborowsky actuó en París, operando como un agente provocador en el seno de la Cuarta Internacional, jugando un papel central en preparar el escenario del crimen. Para esto, sin embargo, otros eslabones de la cadena eran necesarios en los Estados Unidos y en México. En la etapa en la que se encontraba la investigación once días después de la

muerte de Trotsky, ninguna persona dotada con un mínimo de sensatez y honestidad podría haber encontrado algo "censurable" o "extraño" en el hecho de que Joseph Hansen presionara a la policía norteamericana a que hiciera una investigación en los Estados Unidos. Sólo estaba cumpliendo con su deber como revolucionario. A este respecto, sólo seguía el ejemplo de Trotsky, quien recomendó a Ignace Reiss a que se colocara bajo la protección de la policía.

Pero el espíritu en el cual ha conducido *Workers Press* su investigación está demostrado por el hilo que recorre todos los ataques lanzados contra el camarada Hansen; esto es, que supuestamente trató de distraer la atención, para "encubrir" a los agentes estalinistas que fueron plantados en el SWP y que operan en los Estados Unidos.

El informe del consul establece lo contrario. Con su muy especial tipo de lógica, Gerry Healy encuentra en este hecho un nuevo "cargo." Sin duda que tales contradicciones pueden ser resueltas por medio de la versión que tiene Healy sobre la dialéctica, ¡que está a la par con su lógica! Pero esta contradicción establece muy claramente que lo que aquí está involucrado no es un intento de descubrir la verdad o de clarificar los problemas de "seguridad en la Cuarta Internacional." Por el contrario, lo que aquí estamos viendo es una aplicación del método del "con tal que sirva para mis fines. . .," y del refrán que reza: "Aventando suficiente lodo, algo pegará aunque no todo."

Otros ejemplos demuestran la cínica indiferencia a los requisitos mínimos para contar una historia que parezca creíble. Lo principal es apilar suficientes disparates que, aunque no convengan, al menos puedan despertar dudas.

En el caso de Robert Sheldon Harte, el joven guardaespaldas que fue encontrado muerto después del intento de asesinato del 24 de mayo de 1940, mientras que *Workers Press* no afirma categóricamente que tuvo alguna responsabilidad en el asunto, sí implica que pudo haber sido cómplice de los asaltantes, quienes más tarde se deshicieron de él. La dirección del SWP mantiene la misma posición que adoptó después del crimen y que, más aun, compartía Trotsky. Robert Sheldon Harte se mantuvo leal al trotskismo y fue víctima de la GPU. Una vez más uno puede preguntarse acerca de qué es lo que Healy trata de probar y qué relación tiene esto con los cargos lanzados contra Joseph Hansen.

Si se demostrara (y notamos que *Workers Press* no nos ofrece nueva evidencia) que Trotsky y la dirección del SWP estuvieron equivocados acerca de Sheldon Harte y que éste era un agente de la GPU, ¿cómo podría esto probar que Hansen y otros dirigentes del SWP "encubrieron a agentes de la GPU?" ¿Cómo podría esto justificar el plantear, aunque sólo como

hipótesis, este cargo infame que, ya que Trotsky no pensaba que Sheldon Harte fuera un provocador, está dirigido conjuntamente contra Hansen y L. Trotsky?

Sin embargo, lo que aquí nos interesa, de nuevo, son los métodos de Gerry Healy. Este extrae una cita del siguiente fragmento del libro de Julián Gorkin sobre el asesinato de Trotsky:

"Si se admitiera que Sheldon era un espía, esto pondría la cuestión de la responsabilidad sobre los dirigentes trotskistas en Nueva York, quienes lo habían mandado a México. Nosotros nada más mencionamos este aspecto de la cuestión. Dejemos que cada quien obtenga sus propias conclusiones." Y nos describe a Julián Gorkin como "una autoridad sobre los crímenes de Stalin." Desdeña mencionar que simplemente desde el punto de vista de los hechos históricos verificables, ha salido mucho a la luz desde que Gorkin escribió su libro. También desdeña decirnos que Julián Gorkin era uno de los dirigentes más hostiles a la Cuarta Internacional dentro del POUM (del cual se retiró ya en el exilio y que su libro fue escrito en colaboración con el General Salazar, el jefe de la policía mexicana, quien tenía la intención de que la culpa recayera lo más posible sobre el séquito de Trotsky.

Fue este objetivo del libro el que *Workers Press*, para usar uno de sus términos favoritos, "encubrió." Esto no le impidió presentar otro artículo, para sus propios fines, con declaraciones—que eran más bien confusas—de un ex-guardaespalda de Trotsky, Harold Robins, que acusa a Hansen de encubrir las calumnias de la policía mexicana!

Un último ejemplo: *Workers Press* sube el volumen cuando se trata del hecho de que fue la dirección del SWP la que ayudó a Zborowski a regresar a los Estados Unidos.

¿Tenemos que señalar lo absurdo que es culpar a los camaradas del SWP por el hecho de que Zborowski estuviera entre ciertos cuadros del movimiento trotskista que fueron llevados a los EUA a través de la labor de miembros y dirigentes del SWP cuando sucedieron las victorias de Hitler en Europa? Como dice *Workers Press*, más aun (como si fuera un "argumento" contra Joseph Hansen), el área de actividad de Zborowski estaba en Europa. Fue a través de su integración entre los cuadros del movimiento trotskista en Europa que llegó a ser miembro de la dirección internacional, y que fue reconocido por Leon Trotsky como colaborador cercano de Leon Sedov. Como dirigente de la Cuarta Internacional, Leon Trotsky le confió la organización de la conferencia de fundación de la Cuarta Internacional en septiembre de 1938.

Lo absurdo de esta calumnia es sorprendente. En 1940, Zborowski no había sido desenmascarado como agente de la GPU. Si culpa a la dirección del SWP y a Hansen por organizar su viaje a los EUA, G.

Healy naturalmente debería echarle la culpa a L. Trotsky y sacar la conclusión de que este último, como Hansen, era un agente de la GPU. Permítanos hacer notar de nuevo que es difícil para los revolucionarios escarbar entre todo el lodo que G. Healy ha lanzado, quien en su irresponsabilidad no pone atención a los dañinos golpes que le está dando a la Cuarta Internacional, a la cual todavía dice estar adherido.

Repetimos: ¿Qué culpa en particular puede ser atribuida a los cuadros del SWP? Y aunque se puede sostener que deberían haber sido más "vigilantes"—lo que, enfatizamos, sería una aseveración gratuita—¿cómo se podría justificar con esto el llamarlos "cómplices"? A menos que el simple hecho de asociarse con Zborowski, como lo hicieron también L. Sedov y L. Trotsky, sin haberlo identificado inmediatamente como agente provocador, sea motivo de culpa para la "teoría healista acerca de la evidencia." Pero, entonces, repetimos, la búsqueda de "cómplices" llevará a Healy mucho más lejos que Joseph Hansen y George Novack, y aun de la dirección del SWP.

Permítanos repetirlo, en la voluminosa investigación de *Workers Press* no hay los más mínimos documentos o hechos que justifiquen plantear—aun bajo la forma de una posibilidad que todavía está por comprobarse—las infames acusaciones lanzadas contra Joseph Hansen y George Novack.

Lo que es infame—y denigrante para los autores—es haber planteado tales cargos. El método que utilizaron, su cinico desprecio hacia la verdad, los descalifica políticamente. Esta es una irresponsabilidad criminal, contraria no sólo a los principios de la Cuarta Internacional sino también a las tradiciones básicas del movimiento obrero.

Debemos, sin embargo, tratar sobre el extraño caso que nos presenta Healy desde otro punto de vista.

Al principio de esta declaración nos referimos a la forma en que Healy y sus "investigadores" usaron la visita de Joseph Hansen al Cónsul McGregor. En este caso, Joseph Hansen correctamente aseveró que G. Healy había provocado todo un "géiser de lodo." Pero el lodo ha salpicado sólo a G. Healy.

En primer lugar, la forma en que el episodio fue utilizado ilustra la perfidia política de G. Healy. El sabe, al igual que cualquier camarada que mantenga una posición dirigente que involucra responsabilidades en el movimiento revolucionario de los trabajadores, que el contacto que Joseph Hansen tenía que mantener con el consulado norteamericano era sólo una expresión general de una realidad mucho más amplia. La actividad política debe involucrar todos los aspectos de la lucha; esto es, incluyendo la necesidad de la diplomacia, el "contacto" con el campo enemigo. Esto es lo que para Gerry Healy

constituye la prueba de la "culpabilidad" de Joseph Hansen. ¿Pero es que puede haber alguien que no se dé cuenta que esta "culpa" tendría que ser atribuida primero que nadie a Leon Trotsky? Como indican los informes oficiales, otros miembros de la guardia de Trotsky, Charles Cornell y Walter O'Rourke, estaban en contacto con el cónsul al igual que Leon Trotsky (y, en el caso del fundador de la Cuarta Internacional, el cónsul lo visitó en su misma casa!). Entonces—estamos divulgando un "espantoso secreto"—, había contactos regulares del consulado norteamericano con Trotsky y su séquito. No es tan difícil entender algo que comprendieron los representantes del imperialismo norteamericano, quienes se opusieron ferozmente a la entrada de Trotsky a los EUA. En vista de lo que Trotsky representaba, las relaciones con este exilado que se encontraba aislado adoptaron en cierta medida la forma de relaciones de gobierno a gobierno. Y, desde el punto de vista de su seguridad, Trotsky tenía intereses en juego con respecto a estas relaciones.

El curso de G. Healy y sus investigadores tiende a convergir con el de los asesinos de Trotsky, como correctamente lo hace notar el camarada Hansen.

#### El Viejo Método de la Amalgama

Hay aun otro aspecto, que puede parecer pequeño pero que pensamos puede ser significativo, ya que muestra que hay algo putrefacto en el pequeño reinado de Clapham High Street (la sede nacional del WRP en Londres).

Ese "algo" es el llevar a la práctica el tipo "clásico" de la amalgama estalinista. Los artículos en *Workers Press* hablan acerca de un agente estalinista que fue plantado en el seno del SWP, Floyd Miller, quien fue desenmascarado más tarde. Debido a que este agente funcionaba en el frente de trabajo marítimo del SWP, *Workers Press* dice que su trabajo le permitía señalarle a la GPU a los marineros trotskistas que iban en camino a la URSS. Sobre este asunto, de pasada, Hansen dice simplemente que el tal Miller nunca ocupó una posición dirigente, aun al nivel del frente de trabajo marítimo, y que en cualquier caso nunca llegó a desaparecer marino trotskista alguno. Y agrega:

"Varios marineros trotskistas, cuyos navíos fueron hundidos por los alemanes, junto con otros miembros de las tripulaciones pudieron lanzar botes salvavidas y eventualmente llegar a Murmansk. Debido a que estuvieron expuestos a las inclemencias del tiempo en esas aguas, varios de ellos tuvieron que pasar meses en el hospital. Ahí recibieron un tratamiento de primera y el personal se portó muy amistosamente."

Este es el comentario que inspiraron estas líneas a *Workers Press*:

"'Soviet Weekly' [Semanario Soviético], el periódico estalinista en inglés publicado

por el PCUS, contiene un artículo a dos páginas sobre Murmansk durante la guerra en su edición del 20 al 27 de diciembre de 1975.

"Se trata de un putrefacto artículo de relaciones públicas para la burocracia estalinista y trata sobre una visita a Murmansk por un tal Ian Highet, oficial de comunicaciones en un barco británico.

"Tengo memorias muy alegres sobre Murmansk, a pesar del intenso frío de enero y a pesar de la indescriptible devastación. El frío fue más que compensado por la calurosidad de la gente soviética, que nos extendió la más tremenda bienvenida con típica hospitalidad soviética, hospitalidad que había que ver para creerla."

"Lo único que iguala esta efusiva descripción de Murmansk durante la guerra ha sido producido por la pluma de . . . Joseph Hansen. . . ."

"La similitud entre estos dos extractos demuestra una afinidad que no debe pasar desapercibida para ningún trabajador o joven con conciencia de clase."

Este tipo de cosas no requieren comentarse; o más bien dicho, requieren de un sólo comentario. Casi no es necesario llamar la atención de los jóvenes y trabajadores concientes sobre la similitud entre este tipo de pruebas y aquellas que produce el aparato estalinista.

#### ¿Quién es el Blanco?

Uno de los escasos nuevos elementos que aparecen en *Workers Press* es que la Sylvia Callen que fue mencionada en 1969 como codefensora en el juicio al agente estalinista Robert Soblen era la misma Sylvia Franklin que fue secretaria de James P. Cannon, el dirigente del SWP. Había sido acusada por Louis Budenz, un ex-dirigente estalinista en los Estados Unidos que se pasó a trabajar para el FBI. Después de una investigación, una Comisión de Control del SWP refutó estos cargos. Más aun, James P. Cannon denunció a Budenz, asegurando que Sylvia Franklin era "una camarada honesta que había rendido años de valiosos servicios a la causa."

No sabemos si la Sylvia Callen de la que habla *Workers Press* es realmente Sylvia Franklin, pero estamos convencidos de que, si los hechos lo ameritan, el SWP revisará las conclusiones de su Comisión de Control.

Sin embargo, suponiendo que *Workers Press* estuviera en lo correcto y que Sylvia Franklin, la secretaria de James P. Cannon, hubiera sido una agente de la GPU, ¿cómo puede esto justificar que se escriba que "Joseph Hansen y George Novack protegieron y encubrieron a SYLVIA FRANKLIN, la agente de la GPU en el Socialist Workers Party . . . ?"

Fue James P. Cannon quien denunció las declaraciones y mentiras de Budenz. La Comisión de Control confirmó esta posición. ¿Por qué *Workers Press* no lleva

su argumentación hasta sus conclusiones lógicas? ¿Por qué no dice que James P. Cannon "encubrió" a una agente estalinista? Hay mucha más de la susodicha "evidencia" en contra de él que en contra de Hansen y de Novack. ¿Por qué no acusa a la dirección del SWP y a J.P. Cannon de "encubrir" una agente de la GPU?

Es cierto que el hecho de que Cannon es recordado como el fundador y constructor del Trotskismo en los Estados Unidos y como una figura sobresaliente en el movimiento obrero internacional dificulta esta tarea. Es más expedito hacer insinuaciones que correr el riesgo de hacer tales declaraciones.

Sin embargo, es ahí a donde nos conduce la lógica. Naturalmente, esto también querría decir que Lenin encubrió a Malinovsky, y que de ahí se desprende que fue su cómplice; y que Trotsky y Sedov encubrieron a Zborowski y que de ahí se desprende que fueron sus cómplices.

Detrás de Hansen y Novack podemos vislumbrar otros blancos. El primero que discernimos es el SWP. La introducción a la última serie de artículos publicados en *Workers Press* dice:

"ACUSAMOS a Joseph Hansen y a los dirigentes del Socialist Workers Party (USA) de encubrir deliberadamente los asesinatos y la penetración de la GPU en el seno del movimiento trotskista. . . ."

Este vago artículo de autores anónimos es una atrocidad más, pero el blanco de la calumnia está claramente indicado. Es el SWP, al que nos tratan de presentar como si se tratara de un semillero de agentes de la GPU, y como una organización con una serie de dirigentes que eran cómplices "deliberados" de la GPU. Claramente, tratan de presentarnos al SWP como si se tratara de una organización que ha sido "mantenida" por el aparato estalinista.

Pero el SWP ha jugado un papel considerable en la historia de la Cuarta Internacional. No sólo era una de sus más fuertes secciones, sino que su dirección era la que mantenía los vínculos más estrechos con Leon Trotsky. El SWP fue el campo de batalla para una lucha decisiva para el futuro de la Cuarta Internacional, o sea la que se libró en torno a la cuestión de la defensa de la Unión Soviética. Si tuviéramos que aceptar las normas de Gerry Healy para determinar la verdad, tendríamos que concluir que esta lucha fue dirigida por un grupo, una mayoría del cual era "cómplice" de la GPU.

#### Un Ataque Contra la Cuarta Internacional

Detrás del SWP, el verdadero blanco es la Cuarta Internacional misma, junto con Leon Trotsky y su trabajo. La Cuarta Internacional aparece como una organización "manipulada" por la GPU; de hecho, como si se tratara de una organización confeccionada por la GPU.

Sería injusto comparar el libro de Vereec-

ken con los artículos aparecidos en *Workers Press*.<sup>2</sup> Pero es interesante hacer notar el hecho de que *Workers Press* cita frecuentemente esta obra sin reservas ni comentario. Mientras que es indudable que los provocadores como Zborowski envenenaban las relaciones en el seno del movimiento internacional, al mismo tiempo no podían conjurar el hecho de que había verdaderas posiciones políticas involucradas. Fue sobre este tipo de cuestiones donde ocurrió el rompimiento de Trotsky con Vereecken. Y lo que hace del libro de Vereecken un escrito falso y prejuiciado es que lo que intenta probar es que son las maniobras de estos agentes las que nos explican su rompimiento con Trotsky.

Refiriéndose a Vereecken, *Workers Press* asevera:

"Hoy en día el Comité Internacional de la Cuarta Internacional está recibiendo el mismo tratamiento calumnioso que tuvieron que aguantar otros durante los años de preguerra en Europa."

¿Debemos concluir que la decisión de fundar la Cuarta Internacional fue inspirada por la GPU?

La abominable campaña conducida en contra de la dirección del SWP sólo puede servir a los enemigos de la Cuarta Internacional y facilitarles sus empeños a aquellos que tratan de minar y perjudicar a nuestro movimiento en interés del imperialismo o del estalinismo.

Como índice de la profunda degeneración de la dirección del WRP, esta campaña le está propinando un rudo golpe al trotskismo en Inglaterra. El hecho de que *Workers Press* dejó de aparecer casi inmediatamente después de que aparecieron estas series de artículos calumniosos es más que una coincidencia.

El rechazo a tales métodos, y al tipo de política que les permite desarrollarse, es indispensable para avanzar la reconstrucción de la Cuarta Internacional.

Como trotskistas que han estado en la lucha desde los años de preguerra, cuando el programa de la Cuarta Internacional fue elaborado por Leon Trotsky, consideramos necesario el hacer pública esta declaración. Consideramos que todos los militantes que se reclamen trotskistas, no importa qué diferencias existan entre sus organizaciones, quienes han participado en la lucha por la Cuarta Internacional deben tomar una posición ante esta cuestión. Pensamos que todas las organizaciones que se relamen del trotskismo deben también condenar los métodos de G. Healy, métodos que sólo sirven a los enemigos de la Cuarta Internacional. Esta es la misma lucha, emprendida en 1923, contra el estalinismo, al cual Trotsky denunció como una maligna enfermedad del movimiento mundial de los trabajadores. □

2. *La Guépéou dans le mouvement trotskyste*, por G. Vereecken, Éditions de la Pensée Universelle. Vereecken fue miembro de la Oposición de Izquierda en Bélgica y Trotsky se vio forzado a romper con él debido a sus posiciones sectarias.