



## ANGOLA-- ANOTHER VIETNAM?

KISSINGER: Escalates "covert intelligence activities" in Angolan civil war.

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# NEWS ANALYSIS

## Angola—the Parallel With Vietnam

By Joseph Hansen

A dispute in the State Department over how far to go in intervening in the civil war in Angola was made public by Seymour M. Hersh in a front-page story in the December 14 *New York Times*.

The divisions became so sharp that Nathaniel Davis resigned last August as assistant secretary of state for African affairs. In opposition to Secretary of State Kissinger, who was for plunging ahead, Davis favored seeking a diplomatic "settlement" in Angola and playing no "active" role in the civil war there.

Davis sent a "steady stream of memoranda" to Kissinger in which, according to an "official," he made the following arguments:

"First of all, Davis told them it won't work. Neither Savimbi or Roberto are good fighters—in fact, they couldn't fight their way out of a paper bag. It's the wrong game and the players we got are losers."

Secondly, when involvement of the United States in the Angolan civil war failed, as would be inevitable, such American supporters in Africa as Mobutu of Zaïre and Kaunda of Zambia would be injured.

Finally, the United States would end up with racist South Africa as its only ally.

Kissinger brushed aside all these arguments. The "first significant decision on Angola policy was made in the spring, when the Administration authorized the C.I.A. to supply about \$300,000 in military arms and aid to the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi. . . .

"The funds were authorized after the C.I.A. formally began reporting the increases in Soviet military aid to the Popular Movement. . . .

"The C.I.A. also has been aiding the National Front, headed by Holden Roberto,

since the early 1960's, much of that help being funneled through neighboring Zaïre, headed by President Mobutu Sese Seko."

The most important step was taken by the "40 committee" at a formal meeting last July. The decision was to send \$10 million worth of supplies to Angola.

"The '40 committee,'" Hersh explained, "is a four-man subcommittee of the National Security Council with responsibility for

### Schedule

**This is a reminder that our last issue of the year will be dated December 29. It will contain our index for 1975. There will be no issue for January 5. We will resume our regular weekly schedule with the January 12 issue.**

approving all proposals for covert intelligence activities carried out by this country abroad. Mr. Kissinger is the committee's head, and the other members are Mr. Colby, William Clement, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

Since last July, the Ford administration has escalated its "covert intelligence activities" in Angola. (See article by Ernest Harsch elsewhere in this issue for the latest revelations.)

The parallel to the first phase of American involvement in the Vietnamese civil war is so striking that it is already causing public concern in the United States.

Kissinger, apparently anticipating this development, said in Brussels December 12 that the situation in Angola is "not analogous" to the one in Vietnam a decade ago.

CIA Director William E. Colby voiced the

same opinion before the House Select Committee on Intelligence. According to the December 13 *New York Post*, "Colby said there is no similarity between any U.S. action in Angola and American involvement in Vietnam. Angola is a situation where the United States must decide whether to participate in a 'modest' way, he said, while Vietnam was a case of 'massive military commitment.'"

Colby's reasoning did not impress the publishers of the *New York Times*. An unsigned article in the December 14 "Week in Review" cited Colby's arguments and then quoted from a statement made by President Kennedy on March 23, 1961, concerning the need for a policy to counter the military aid granted by the Soviet Union to one of the factions in Laos:

"It is this new dimension of externally supported warfare that creates the present grave problem . . . We strongly and unreservedly support the goal of a neutral and independent Laos . . . If these [Communist] attacks do not stop [the United States and others] will have to consider their response . . . No one should doubt our resolution on this point . . . Laos is far away but the world is small . . . The security of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence . . . Its own safety runs with the safety of us all . . ."

The parallel between Kennedy's language and that used by Kissinger today is quite impressive.

It is obvious that the *New York Times* sides with those in the top ruling circles who consider that another Vietnam is the last thing they need. However, as in the case of the dispute in these same circles over the error of massive military intervention in Indochina, the differences are purely over what course best serves the interests of American imperialism.

In the case of Vietnam, tactical differences of this kind did not arise until after President Johnson had committed the United States to intervention in the civil war in Indochina on a huge scale. Debate was set off by the enormous cost, the unexpected toughness of the freedom-seeking nationalist forces, and above all by the mounting mass opposition inside the United States that became epitomized in the slogan, "Out Now!"

Today, in striking contrast, comparable differences have appeared among the ruling circles at the very beginning of involvement in the Angolan civil war.

This significant development can be ascribed to the experience in Indochina. A sector of the ruling class recognizes that a new adventure abroad similar to the one in Vietnam would in all likelihood meet with mass opposition from the start. This sector understands that neither Ford nor anyone who might replace him in the White House can repeat Vietnam without placing at

### Political Line of Articles in Intercontinental Press

Owing to the current debate in the radical movement over policies in various areas such as Portugal, in which some of our regular contributors have taken variant positions, we should like to call special attention to the following paragraph in our masthead:

*Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental*

*Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.*

Up to now, statements, declarations, and resolutions of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International have appeared under the general heading of "Documents." As a matter of further clarification, we are now listing them under a separate heading.

stake the foundations of capitalist rule in America. So they ask, is the risk worth it?

Meanwhile, the Ford administration, following the pattern of previous administrations, has already become involved in the Angolan civil war.

The public reaction is being watched, as the arguments of Kissinger and Colby testify, but the Washington conspirators hope to get away with it; perhaps by escalating the aggression in bits, each so "modest" as to seem unlikely to trigger an avalanche of public opposition.

The accompanying propaganda is a reissue of the arguments used to justify intervention in Vietnam: The threat of a Communist take-over. The threat of Moscow gaining naval bases that would "jeopardize" American shipping in the South Atlantic. Dominoes falling the length and breadth of Africa.

The propaganda concerning the warring factions in Angola is equally dubious. All three stand on nationalistic programs based on assurances of safeguarding investments. The MPLA, it is true, speaks of "socialism." But even if the MPLA were to prove more socialistic than Nasser in Egypt and Nkrumah in Ghana, there are indications that such a course is discounted in Wall Street.

In any case, such questions are for the Angolans to decide—not the Fords and Kissingers.

To cite the involvement of the USSR in the civil war in Angola is equally spurious. The Kremlin's game is to improve its bargaining position *within the détente*. No one knows this better than Kissinger.

The Cuban participation has not aroused much excitement in the State Department. It is viewed there as subsidiary to Moscow's moves. The Cubans are said to be serving largely as instructors in the use of the sophisticated equipment that the Soviet Union has been sending to Luanda.

Besides relieving Brezhnev of the diplomatic hazards involved in sending Russian troops to Angola, the Cubans stand to gain through reinforcement of their anti-imperialist political image.

Whatever one's opinions may be of the issues at stake in the conflict between the MPLA, the FNLA, and the UNITA, it is clear that the main enemy in Angola is imperialism. Until recently, the main enemy was *Portuguese* imperialism, which fought savagely to retain its grip. Today the main enemy is *American* imperialism and its satellite powers, the natural heirs to the Portuguese empire, as they see it.

For all those who believe in the democratic right of peoples to determine their own fate, these considerations dictate a course similar to the one followed in opposing the imperialist aggression in Vietnam. The slogan ought to be "Get them out before they get us in!" □

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### \$50 Million for CIA Operation in Angola

By Ernest Harsch

Washington has supplied \$25 million in arms and support funds over the past three months to one of the sides in the Angolan civil war, according to a recent White House leak. A "high-ranking Government official" quoted by David Binder in the December 12 *New York Times* said that this secret operation was designed "to create a stalemate" in the war.

The official said that another \$25 million worth of supplies was earmarked for Angola. The aid, he said, was to counter the Soviet and Cuban support to the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

The first \$25 million in arms, according to the source, was distributed by the Central Intelligence Agency, mostly through the Mobutu Sese Seko regime in Zaïre, which supports the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA—Angolan National Liberation Front) and the União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

He said the American supplies were flown aboard U.S. C-141 Starlifter transport planes to landing fields in Zaïre, where they were turned over to the Zaïrean army.

Binder reported:


American military supplies have consisted mainly of portable infantry weapons, the official said, including large numbers of antitank missile launchers and antipersonnel rocket launchers—"the kind you hold on your shoulder that you could use with a minimum of training." . . .

"There are no American advisers in Angola, either civilian or military," the official said. He added that no Americans were involved in the ground fighting.

However, he said that the United States had supplied five artillery spotter planes that flew into the Angolan battle zones, returning to bases in Zaïre. "They fly in and out," he said of the American pilots.

Although the use of regular U.S. troops in Angola may at present be limited to a few reconnaissance pilots, there are reports that American mercenaries are fighting against the MPLA. *Intercontinental Press* correspondent Tony Hodges (see issue of December 8, p. 1705) reported seeing one American mercenary in Angola and was told that fifteen others were at a UNITA training camp near Silva Porto.

According to David Bufkin, who placed an advertisement in a Fresno, California, newspaper to recruit mercenaries to fight in Angola, as many as 300 Americans have



FORD: Gave CIA the green light.

already left for that country. He said that he and other recruiters in Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, and other U.S. cities had offered \$1,200 a month to the mercenaries.

"Bufkin declined to say who is bankrolling the mercenaries," the November 28 *Los Angeles Times* reported, "but said there was a rumor that 20% of the funding was from private citizens in Portugal, 40% from Angolan refugees and the remainder from interests in the United States, including 'large Portuguese organizations.'"

The source cited by Binder claimed that the second \$25 million worth of arms and funds, which are to be sent to Angola "shortly," would exhaust the CIA's "contingency funds." Officially, additional aid for the MPLA's rivals would need congressional authorization. Besides directly channeling arms and money to the FNLA and UNITA through Zaïre, Washington has sought to bolster the Mobutu regime's ability to aid its allies. In November, the White House requested congressional appro-

val for \$19 million worth of military equipment to Mobutu, up from \$3.5 million the year before.

President Ford, according to Binder's source, authorized the current \$50 million supply operation because "the Russians are in to win" all of Angola. "Our effort is to have a stand-off between the factions," the government official said, "so as to get all the parties together in a coalition."

In his most direct warning so far against Soviet involvement in Angola, Secretary of State Kissinger declared in Brussels December 12 that Washington would push for a negotiated settlement among the three nationalist groups "free of outside interference." He then added, ". . . failing that, the United States will try to prevent one party, by means of massive introduction of outside equipment, from achieving dominance."

An MPLA victory with the aid of Soviet arms shipments could increase Moscow's bargaining power with the imperialist governments. One of Washington's aims in intervening in the Angolan civil war is to prevent this.

Kissinger's policy, however, is running into opposition. For example, the *Los Angeles Times* said in a December 4 editorial that "an Angola controlled by the MPLA is not likely to be the monster some portray," and found "the arguments for abstinence persuasive."

Similar considerations were apparently behind the congressional proposal of Senator Richard Clark, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, that would bar any further covert CIA aid to Angolan groups without the specific authorization of Congress.

Some sectors also appear skeptical that the MPLA's rivals can win the civil war. For instance, the *New York Times*, in a December 4 editorial, commented that "it seems obvious that the FNLA, recipient of much of the American aid and heavily backed by Zaïre, can never emerge a winner in Angola."

However, even a "limited" U.S. intervention is a serious threat to the Angolan struggle for independence. By funneling arms to the FNLA and UNITA, Washington is attempting to perpetuate the fratricidal war with the aim of weakening the entire Angolan nationalist movement.

The imposition of a feeble and divided coalition regime, as suggested by the U.S. government official cited in Binder's account, would also give Washington and the other imperialist powers the opportunity to continue playing the rival nationalist groups off against each other. Their aim would be to press for further concessions from each of the groups to ensure the continued imperialist exploitation of the country's vast natural resources, as well as hamper Moscow's efforts to expand its influence.



Another direct and immediate threat to the Angolan nationalist struggle is the intervention of South African troops in the civil war.

Although Pretoria has officially denied participating in the war, South African newspaper reports and government leaks to foreign journalists have confirmed some aspects of the intervention. A November 27 Associated Press dispatch from Pretoria cited "authoritative Government sources" as saying that the regime had sent troops into Angola and was providing advisers and logistical support to the FNLA-UNITA military column fighting against the MPLA.

The November 29 issue of the Cape Town *Die Burger*, an Afrikaans-language newspaper that serves as the official mouthpiece of the ruling National party, also hinted that advisers were active in the war. "It is no longer a bush war of a small resistance band," the paper said. "It is becoming a sort of conventional war of rapidly moving vehicle columns, artillery and projectiles. This requires know-how, leadership and planning on a level which is not readily available among Angola's black population."

In a dispatch published in the November 23 *Washington Post*, Reuters correspondent Fred Bridgland reported that according to "informed diplomatic sources" in Lusaka, Zambia, many of the drivers of the armored cars in the military column fighting against the MPLA in central Angola were members of the South African army. The sources also said that the column was being supplied for permanent military bases in northern Namibia (South-West Africa).

Dial Torgerson reported in the November 27 *Los Angeles Times* that he saw a dozen members of a South African artillery battalion in the northern city of Ambriz, an FNLA headquarters.

U.S. intelligence sources, cited by Binder, estimate that about 1,000 South African troops are in Angola. However, *Washington Post* reporter David B. Ottaway said in the November 30 issue that sources in Lusaka placed the number at between 2,500 and 6,000 troops and officers fighting simultaneously against the MPLA and the Namibian independence forces based in southern Angola.

Pretoria has also made preparations for a possible escalation of its role in the Angolan war. Military units along the Angolan-Namibian border have been strengthened, reserve officers placed on alert, and Christmas leaves canceled.

On November 27, South African Defense Minister Pieter W. Botha sought to widen the imperialist aggression in Angola by calling for "more direct Free World action" to counter Moscow's involvement. Pretoria, he said, would "surely take part" in such a campaign.



New York Times

MPLA holds strip in center. Arrows mark areas of recent fighting.

However, the white supremacist regime in South Africa has voiced reluctance to step up its role in Angola without greater participation from its imperialist allies. The *Die Burger* article declared, "If they [the Western powers] do not want to help out of fear of the Soviet Union, or if they want to wait and see, they cannot expect that South Africa will intensify its role so that in the end it is left carrying the baby alone."

In addition to requesting that Washington and the other imperialist powers increase their arms shipments to Angola, Pretoria has also called on them to become more open in their intervention, apparently as a sign of political support for South Africa's aggression. The White House leaks providing details of Washington's role in Angola appear to be designed partly to fulfill this South African request.

Pretoria's threats to escalate its operations against the MPLA came amid reports that the MPLA forces had driven back its rivals on three fronts.

With the aid of a large number of Soviet-supplied 122mm rockets, which have a range twice that of the FNLA's 120mm mortars, the MPLA pushed the FNLA army north of Luanda back about fifty miles within ten days in late November and early December. The MPLA captured the towns of Caxito and Barra do Dande and shelled the port city of Ambriz.

Even with its superior firepower, the MPLA may face difficulty pushing farther into the FNLA's traditional base area. "The northernmost districts of Angola," Ottaway cabled from Kinshasa, Zaïre, December 5, "are regarded as a National Front stronghold and are the heartland of the Bakongo people who are its main supporters. The further the Popular Movement penetrates into the north, the more hostile the population is likely to become."

In eastern Angola, MPLA forces reported-

ly took the cities of Luso and Cangumbe. Both lie on the Benguela railway, which served as the main transport route for copper exports from Zaïre and Zambia. The UNITA forces had attempted to gain control of the entire railway.

The joint FNLA-UNITA column, despite the support of South African troops and white mercenaries, was halted in its drive toward Luanda by the MPLA at Gabela, reportedly suffering heavy losses. The FNLA-UNITA column, which had captured Porto Amboim on the coast in early November, has withdrawn from that city.

The MPLA has also made gains in its campaign for diplomatic recognition as the only "legal" Angolan government. In addition to the political support extended to the MPLA by more than a dozen African and Soviet-bloc governments, the regimes in Nigeria and Benin (formerly Dahomey) recognized the MPLA in late November; the Nyerere regime in Tanzania did so in early December. The Nigerian military junta declared its support for the MPLA on the basis of the South African intervention on the side of the FNLA and UNITA. Both Nigeria and Tanzania wield significant political influence within the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

The regime set up by the FNLA and UNITA in Huambo has not been recognized by any government. Moreover, the FNLA and UNITA have come under increasing African diplomatic pressure because of the participation of South African troops in the FNLA-UNITA campaign. OAU Chairman Idi Amin warned the two nationalist groups November 28 that African states "may have to review their positions on the Angolan situation and their attitude to your two parties in particular" because of the South African intervention. The formal position of the OAU at this point is not to recognize any of the three groups and to press for negotiations between them.

Like the FNLA and UNITA, the MPLA has continued its efforts to solicit greater backing from imperialist sources, in addition to the massive Soviet aid it receives.

London *Telegraph* correspondent A.J. McIlroy reported from Luanda in the November 30 issue that the MPLA was calling on Portuguese settlers who had fled Angola to return. "These include businessmen who will be encouraged to play a part in reviving the Angolan economy, which is in a critical situation. Ironically, the M.P.L.A. will be co-operating with capitalist companies, including international banking, to get money flowing through Luanda once again," McIlroy said.

The most important imperialist companies the MPLA is collaborating with are Gulf Cabinda, a subsidiary of Gulf Oil, and Diamang (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola, S.A.R.L.), which is controlled by

Portuguese, U.S., Belgian, and South African capital. Gulf is the largest investor in Angola and operates more than 100 oil rigs off the coast of the Cabinda enclave. Diamang owns vast diamond fields in eastern Angola. Both areas are occupied by the MPLA. According to a report in the December 8 *New York Times*, the MPLA is receiving concession payments from the oil and diamond companies.

The royalties from Gulf Cabinda alone are enough to more than match the reported amount of Soviet aid the MPLA has

received. Noting that "American elements are aiding and bankrolling opposing sides," David Anable reported in the December 15 *Christian Science Monitor*:

Gulf Oil Company, which has oil wells in the MPLA-controlled enclave of Cabinda, has confirmed that it has handed over hundreds of millions of dollars this year in royalty and tax payments to the Luanda-based "tax collector of the State of Angola."

The latest payment (about \$100 million) was made in September when the MPLA was in full control of Luanda. MPLA finance minister Saydi

Mingas, according to highly reliable sources, has confirmed receipt of this payment.

Dial Torgerson reported from Cabinda in the December 4 issue of the *Los Angeles Times* that according to Gulf Cabinda head Sidney Anderson, the next quarterly payment to the Luanda regime, of about \$125 million, will be made on December 31 (Gulf pays \$500 million a year in taxes and royalties).

Saydi Mingas has described the relations between the MPLA and Gulf as "very good." □

## 'Hot Pursuit' 200 Miles Into Angola

# Pretoria Steps Up War Against Namibian Nationalists

By Ernest Harsch

During the past few months, the South African army has escalated its war against the freedom fighters in Namibia (South-West Africa). In addition to intensifying its repression within Namibia, Pretoria has taken advantage of the civil war in neighboring Angola to expand the scope of its operations. South African planes and troops have swept into the southern part of Angola to attack guerrilla bases of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), the main Namibian nationalist group.

The November 29 issue of the Cape Town daily *Die Burger*, an Afrikaans-language newspaper that serves as the official mouthpiece of the ruling National party, carried a front-page article describing the attacks against the SWAPO bases as part of a three-pronged South African intervention in Angola.

The two other parts were the stationing of more than 100 troops at the Calueque hydroelectric dam project on the Cunene River, in which Pretoria has large investments, and the participation in the "joint struggle" with two of the Angolan nationalist groups against the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

*Die Burger* said the assaults against SWAPO would escalate to the extent that SWAPO "tries to merge its struggle with the MPLA."

The newspaper also referred to the South African policy of "hot pursuit" against the Namibian rebels. "There is a lot of hot pursuit on the border," it said. "It does not need much imagination to see that a considerable clearing up operation is being conducted there."

Through news leaks to Western journalists, Pretoria has made it known that it is

ready to penetrate more than 200 miles into Angola to attack SWAPO guerrillas. *Die Burger* admitted that South African troops were effectively in "occupation" of part of Angola.

Dozens of SWAPO rebels were reportedly killed and at least two bases destroyed in South African assaults carried out in October and November. The December 3 *New York Times* reported that at least thirteen South African troops were killed in the Angolan-Namibian border area in November.

All Christmas leaves for soldiers scheduled for duty along the border have been canceled, and some of South Africa's most experienced troops have been sent to Namibia to strengthen its military units there. Part of this army buildup may be in support of the South African forces fighting in Angola against the MPLA.

In addition to protecting its investments, Pretoria's occupation of the installations at the Calueque dam project may also be a preventive measure aimed at SWAPO. The November issue of the London monthly *African Development* reported, "Official concern at the possibility of the disruption and delay of the project has been building-up throughout the year. The main fears are of the influence by Angolan liberation movements and the South West African Peoples' Organisation over the African construction workers."

A December 6 Reuters dispatch from Calueque noted, "The dam is an obvious target for a SWAPO attack, as a symbol of South Africa's disputed control over Namibia." The dam, when completed, is scheduled to provide electricity for all of Namibia and part of South Africa. This is particularly important for the mining companies in the region.

The South African incursions into southern Angola are also directed against the civilian population. The Ovambos, among whom SWAPO gets much of its support, straddle the Angolan-Namibian border (about 400,000 live in Namibia and 100,000 in Angola).

According to a SWAPO press release issued in September, "South African military forces have now begun to strafe and attack villages and remote areas in southern Angola. . . . Now, recent Angolan refugees to Zambia tell of strikes into Angola by low-flying South African military aircraft."

The attacks against villages in southern Angola were accompanied by efforts in northern Namibia to isolate SWAPO guerrillas from their supporters. According to SWAPO Administrative Secretary Moses Garoeb, who was quoted in the September issue of the London monthly *Africa*, the regions of Ovamboland, Okavangoland, and Eastern Caprivi have been placed under total South African military occupation. In some areas the inhabitants have been herded into "protected villages" after their own villages were destroyed.

*New York Times* correspondent Peter Hawthorne reported from Johannesburg December 2 that several thousand Namibians have been removed from the border area to create a restricted zone.

Pretoria had been steadily bolstering its military strength in Namibia even before the current escalation of the war, particularly during the past two years. In June 1974 the presence of regular South African troops in the country was acknowledged for the first time. Pretoria maintains a military base at Katima-Mulilo in the Caprivi Strip, which has a runway suitable for jet fighters. The October 27 issue of the German



weekly *Der Spiegel* reported that a large army and air force base was under construction near Grootfontein. It is scheduled to be completed by February 1976.

In addition, Pretoria has begun the recruiting of Africans in Ovamboland to form a full-time border militia and has trained tribal police in Ovamboland and Okavangoland in the use of counterinsurgency techniques.

The current attacks against SWAPO bases in southern Angola were preceded by a crackdown earlier this year that forced thousands of SWAPO supporters to flee Namibia. Pretoria used the assassination of the progovernment Ovambo tribal chief, Filemon Elifas, on August 16 as a pretext for arresting almost all the leaders of SWAPO and the Namibia National Convention (NNC) who were in the country.

Theophilus Kalimba, a SWAPO member who escaped from prison after being arrested in August, described the treatment of the political prisoners in a letter to SWAPO:

Our legs and arms are tied, we are hung from the roof, and tortured. Sometimes we are hung by the legs, sometimes by the arms, from the roof, and tortured. . . . The people in jail are watched over by soldiers so that they do not get a chance to sleep. . . . if the others are being treated in the same way I was treated for those days I was in jail, then they will die or their mental capacity will be damaged. (Quoted in *Africa*, November 1975.)

Pretoria's war in Namibia is designed to maintain South African domination of the country, which dates back to 1915. In that year, South Africa, as a participant in the First World War on the side of the Allies, drove the German colonialists out of Namibia and occupied the country.

A few years later the League of Nations granted South Africa a mandate to administer Namibia as a "sacred trust of civilization." When the League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations after World War II, Pretoria refused to yield its mandate. In 1966, the UN revoked the mandate, declaring the continued South African occupation illegal.

Pretoria ignored the ruling and tightened its control of the country. By 1969, virtually the entire governmental and economic apparatus in Namibia was being directly administered from Pretoria. South Africa's repressive laws and apartheid policies were also extended to Namibia.

Namibia is the world's second largest exporter of gem diamonds, after South Africa itself, and the Oranjemund diamond mine is the largest in the world. In addition, the country has deposits of lead, zinc, copper, and uranium. South African mining companies dominate the exploitation of these resources. Cattle and dairy products from Namibia are also sent to South Africa.

In response to this South African colonization, several nationalist currents emerged



New York Times

during the post-World War II period. The most important of these, SWAPO (formerly the Ovambo People's Organisation), was primarily based on the Ovambo population, which is by far the largest of Namibia's ten ethnic groups and comprises about 46 percent of the entire population. Since its formation, SWAPO has sought to extend its geographical and social influence. In 1971 it formed the Namibia National Convention with several other organizations in various parts of the country.

One of the motivations for Pretoria's crackdown was the nationalists' growing political strength. The October *Africa* reported that the NNC's "influence has been growing in the last six months, with SWAPO branches formed under its aegis for the first time in the north-west and south of the country, and several large protest demonstrations held in the streets of Windhoek, with placards calling for the withdrawal of South Africa's occupation regime."

The South African regime has also attempted to politically isolate SWAPO and the other nationalist groups by opening a "constitutional" conference of white officials and tribal leaders September 1 in Windhoek, Namibia's capital.

The purpose of the conference, from Pretoria's viewpoint, was to reach a settlement with the most conservative African figures that would eventually allow South Africa to relinquish its formal control of the country (and thus ease the international diplomatic pressure), while in fact maintaining its economic domination.

To safeguard the position of the local

whites (who number about 12 percent of the population) in such a settlement, Pretoria has also sought to heighten whatever rivalries may exist between the various African ethnic groups.

Before deciding to convene the talks, Pretoria also raised the possibility of granting "independence" to a partitioned Namibia, in which the whites would continue to control the most economically valuable part of the country.

The talks won the endorsement of the ruling National party in Namibia at a recent congress in Windhoek. *Africa* reported in its November issue, "The two white delegates from the talks, Dirk Mudge and Eben van Zijl, won the approval of the congress for the 'declaration of intent' after stressing it involved no commitment to majority rule, a unitary state, referendum, or general election in Namibia." □

### Bring Your Own Gas Mask

During the past two years more than 14,000 Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and Cub Scouts have gone camping at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA), the Pentagon storage site in Colorado where nerve-gas bombs and other lethal substances are stockpiled.

In an internal report, Pentagon safety experts suggest that this might not be such a good idea. The "confidential" study, declassified at the request of Colorado Senator Gary Hart, called attention to a number of hazards. According to a report in the January issue of the *Progressive*, these included the following:

Electrical power lines had been installed over and near above-ground ammunition storage facilities; munitions components, such as fuses and relays, were stored in substandard containers; a straight ladder with metal hooks was found hanging on a 600-volt cable near an ammunition storage building; mustard gas contamination was detected in building areas, sumps, and interconnecting drainage lines which discharge directly into an open industrial basin; open areas contaminated by chemicals and explosives were not marked with appropriate warning signs; cluster bomb debris was found inside storage and unloading facilities.

The report concluded that "youth groups should not be permitted to use RMA for camping and other activities," since "toxic-chemical-agent protective masks which would protect children in the event of an agent accident are not available."

Eight months later, D.F. Abernethy, the army's deputy director for safety, overruled the report's findings, stating that camping at the arsenal had "proven to be a valuable asset in public and community relations."

"It is preferable," he added, "to continue the youth group activities rather than terminate them on the basis of a highly theoretical hazard and incur the resultant bad publicity and loss of credibility."



# How the American Stalinists and Ultralefts Sized Up Attempted Ultraleft Coup in Lisbon

By David Frankel

Left-wing groups in the United States assessed the abortive ultraleft coup in Portugal November 25 in a variety of ways. In some cases initial reactions have been declared "inoperative" and new ones have been announced.

The American Communist party, whose co-thinkers are deeply involved in the events in Portugal, has restricted its coverage to short news articles. At first, the CP's Tom Foley talked tough.

"A state of emergency was declared by Portuguese President Francisco da Costa Gomes yesterday and the country seemed to be on the brink of civil war," Foley said in the November 26 issue of the CP newspaper, the *Daily World*. He added, "The Portuguese Communist Party earlier had issued an alert to all its members to be prepared to deal with a possible rightist coup d'etat."

But in his next article, on November 28, Foley hit a different note. "The Portuguese Communist Party urged Wednesday that a political solution be found to the present crisis as quickly as possible," he said. "The PCP stressed that a political solution is in accordance with the line of policy the PCP has advocated publicly all along."

Further coverage in the *Daily World* stressed the purge of the armed forces and news media being carried out by the regime of Premier José Pinheiro de Azevedo. Several articles argued that there had been no coup attempt by forces on the left, but rather, as Portuguese CP leader Alvaro Cunhal explained, "scattered military resistances and uprisings."

However, the Stalinists failed to advance any program for uniting the masses in defense of democratic rights. Their real intentions were so transparent that in his December 4 article Foley was obliged to quote Cunhal, who asserted, "We are not fighting for cabinet posts, but rather for a political solution to the crisis."

While attacking its political opponents within the MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement, the ruling military group), the Portuguese CP continued to defend the MFA government and its previous attacks on democratic rights. Thus, Foley argued in the November 29 *Daily World* that "the 'civil liberties' campaign waged by Antunes and the right this summer could be seen for the hollow

mockery it really was" because of the current attacks on democratic rights by the same forces.

The argument is really aimed at white-washing the antidemocratic record of Azevedo's predecessor, Gen. Vasco Gonçalves, whose government was backed by the Stalinists. Foley implies that because the Social Democratic leaders attacked democratic rights after they gained posts in the MFA government, it is excluded that they could have defended democratic rights when they were outside the government.

The crowning example of the CP's subservience to the bourgeois officer corps came in Foley's December 4 article. He warned, "The Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces Movement (CR-MFA) was scheduled to meet late yesterday to discuss what could be the most reactionary move in the last 19 months of the development of the Portuguese revolution."

What was the deadly danger, the worst in nineteen months? "The item on the CR-MFA agenda to be discussed," Foley said, "is the scrapping of the agreement signed last March\* between all political parties and the MFA. This agreement . . . made the CR-MFA the supreme body in Portugal. It also made the MFA itself an integral part of Portugal's political system for at least three years."

In attempting to put a left-wing veneer on this reactionary position, Foley tried to identify the demand for an end to the pact with the MFA with the demand for an end to democratic rights for the rank and file of the armed forces. He said: "The call for 'soldiers back to the barracks' was first made by Francisco Sa Carneiro, head of the neo-fascist Popular Democratic Party (PPD), and it has become a major plank in the PPD platform."

Although Foley characterized the PPD as "neofascist," short articles in the December 10 and December 12 *Daily World* discussed divisions inside the PPD as if something might come from them for the CP. The Portuguese Stalinists obviously hope that the PPD will drop its opposition to including the CP in the government and agree to what the CP calls "an all-round political solution on the basis of a broad mutual

\* Among other goofs, Foley has the date wrong. It should be April.—IP

understanding among all left forces."

Most Maoist groups in the United States have not made public what they think of the attempted coup in Portugal. The largest Maoist sects, the Revolutionary Communist party and the October League, both publish monthly newspapers that appeared before the latest events in Portugal.

However, their lack of comment is not too far afield from the attitude in Peking. The December 5 issue of *Peking Review* limited its comments on Portugal to a third of a page of news. *Peking Review* did not say which side it was on, but it did report: "General Secretary of the Portuguese Socialist Party Mario Soares pointed out in a statement that the pro-Soviet forces should be held responsible for the military coup."

### 'Guardian' Tails CP

In contrast to this, the weekly *Guardian* had quite a bit to say. The *Guardian* has been beating the drums in favor of a Maoist regroupment in the United States for a number of years, but has met with little but disappointment. Furthermore, its own lack of zeal in denouncing "Soviet social imperialism" as the main enemy of the people of the world has made it suspect in some Maoist circles.

Writing from Lisbon in the December 3 *Guardian*, Wilfred Burchett said, "Portugal appears to be experiencing its most severe crisis since fascism was overthrown in April 1974.

"The question of civil war is on the agenda."

Burchett made no political criticism of the ultraleft action. He said, "It was the removal of Otelo [Saraiva de Carvalho] from the military command, plus what looked like the preparations for a rightist coup that seemed to have persuaded the parachutists to take over the air bases. Unfortunately, they did not discuss their moves beforehand either with other sympathetic military units or with leftwing political parties and mass organizations—who may have mobilized massive support for them."

For Burchett, the problem of mobilizing the masses is a technical one that could have been solved by a few phone calls.

Although Burchett regularly refers to the "revisionist" CP, he is incapable of offering any political alternative to its leadership. He agrees with the CP on the need to support "the progressive government of Premier Vasco Gonçalves," and the "leftist forces" inside the MFA.

He also agrees with the CP that the pact with the MFA must be preserved. Thus, in an article in the December 17 *Guardian*, Burchett said of the government's offensive that in addition to replacing Carvalho, "there is also a very strong risk [that] Spínola's other aim—sending the AFM

back to the barracks—will also be attained. The AFM would be eliminated as a political force.”

Burchett obviously thinks that this would be a big setback, but in the December 10 *Guardian* he repeated his earlier assessment that “a step-by-step advance into a genuine civil war cannot at all be ruled out.”

#### Marcy: 'CP May Orient in Revolutionary Direction'

Another view was taken by Sam Marcy, who said that the Portuguese working class has suffered “a very heavy defeat.”

Marcy heads the Workers World party, which split from the Socialist Workers party in 1959. A supporter of Moscow's invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Marcy later swung over to Peking. Currently his group is urging both wings of world Stalinism to get together and patch up their quarrel.

In the December 5 issue of the *Workers World*, Marcy said of Portugal, “The central question at the moment is whether the working class organizations can in sufficient time reorient themselves, regroup, and refashion the united front which they reached in late August and which for a brief period showed considerable promise.”

Although taking note of the fact that “part of the agreement for the Unitary Front was to support Premier Goncalves,” Marcy insisted that this was secondary. “The main point, regardless of the wording of the agreement, was that the CP had joined with revolutionary elements in a common front to combat the reaction.”

Like the *Guardian*, Marcy tails after the CP, claiming that this summer “it did appear that the CP might be orienting in a revolutionary direction. Cunhal himself . . . said (and did not repudiate) that he was opposed to a ‘Western-style bourgeois democracy.’ By inference he favored a proletarian dictatorship with the CP, of course, as the vanguard party, in a coalition which would effectuate a revolutionary socialist transformation. Now, of course, he didn't say that in so many words.

“Nevertheless,” continued Marcy, “the subsequent formation of the Unitary Front . . . lent credence to the possibility that the CP was orienting in a revolutionary direction.”

#### 'Workers' Power' Calls Off Civil War

Not all the groups on the American left are trailing so closely in the wake of the CP. The International Socialists, a state-capitalist grouping linked to the British organization of the same name, has set itself up as the American cheering section for the ultraleft PRP (Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat).



GONCALVES: Still the hero of American CP.

The November 28 issue of *Workers' Power*, the IS newspaper, declared in a front-page statement:

The first shots in the Portuguese civil war have been fired. The lines have been drawn and there can be no turning back. . . .

There is just one question left—who will win, the workers or their exploiters.

Right now, in the working class quarters of Lisbon, Oporto, and Setubal, arms are being distributed. The revolutionaries are mobilizing. And soldiers are taking their places beside the people. . . .

There can be no hesitation. In Portugal, everything is at stake—the end of fascism, the new democratic freedoms, the workers' councils and workers' control. . . .

All power to the workers. Long live the revolution.

An unsigned article inside the paper claimed: “Today, there is no effective capitalist government authority at all.” The author solidarized with the call for an armed insurrection.

Of course, IS had misjudged the situation. The following week the editors ran a correction admitting that their previous report “gave a false impression of events,” and explaining that they had received wrong information over the telephone from Portugal.

In a front-page editorial, the December 5

*Workers' Power* said, “It is now clear why this setback occurred. It was the treachery and cowardice of the Portuguese Communist Party. The Communist Party called left-wing soldiers out to revolt—then left them stranded.”

As *Workers' Power* saw it, the participation of the Communist party was all that was needed to make a successful revolution. An article in the same issue stated, “Before last week, all the necessary conditions for a successful workers' insurrection existed in Portugal. Only the Communist Party was able to prevent it. . . .”

The fact that the majority of the working class and peasantry in Portugal does not follow the Stalinists and ultraleftists was left out of consideration.

#### Hysteria at the 'Bulletin' Office

A similar flaw appeared in the coverage of the events in Portugal in the *Bulletin*, the organ of the Workers League. This sectarian cult is the American appendage of Gerry Healy's Workers Revolutionary party in Britain.

In the November 28 *Bulletin*, Melody Farrow argued that there had been a revolutionary situation in Portugal. “Only one week ago,” she said, “when thousands of construction and metal workers laid siege to Prime Minister Azevedo and his government, the CP could have mobilized the working class to take power.”

Farrow went on to say that “at the decisive point when all the conditions for the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system have been created, the Stalinists knife the working class in the back.”

However, a slightly different view was given by David North in the December 9 *Bulletin*. North compared the November 25 coup attempt to the July Days of 1917, when masses of Russian workers and soldiers in Petrograd mobilized against the Kerensky government and suffered a setback because the rest of the country had not yet reached the same level of consciousness. The trouble with this comparison is that the masses were not involved in the abortive ultraleft coup in Lisbon.

North's two-page article is the only substantial piece on Portugal published by the Healyites in either Britain or the United States since the attempted coup. But North's real interest is not at all in the Portuguese revolution. His objective is stated in the title of the article: “Report from Hansen's Man in Lisbon: SCABS ON THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION.”

North is out to smear the Socialist Workers party, and *Intercontinental Press* editor Joseph Hansen in particular. He said:

The revisionists of the Socialist Workers Party have joined in the general jubilation among all reactionaries now celebrating the defeat of the



left-wing soldiers' rebellion in Portugal. . . .

Gerry Foley—Joseph Hansen's man in Lisbon—has added his shovel full of slime to the mountains of slanderous filth being piled upon the soldiers who dared to resist the conspiracy of right-wing officers aimed at imposing a military dictatorship. . . .

All the spiteful hatred of the Hansenites is directed against the heroic soldiers who took up arms against the capitalist state and were betrayed by their Stalinist and reformist leaders.

North goes so far as to claim that the coverage of the events in Portugal in *Intercontinental Press* "is nothing less than an open declaration of support for the government putsch. In the eyes of the SWP, the defense of the state against the rebellion of the soldiers is the defense of the 'freedoms gained by the masses after April 1974.'"

This word salad obviously has nothing to do with the position of *Intercontinental Press* on the events in Portugal. It is the Healyite way of answering the article by Joseph Hansen in the November 24 *Intercontinental Press* entitled, "On Healy's 'Investigation'—What the Facts Show." The Healyites have been slandering Hansen, picturing him as an agent of the Stalinist secret police, Washington's FBI, or, if possible, both. Hansen's article demolished that frame-up. Their immediate response was a new frame-up on a different topic.

#### Robertson Shows How Easy It Is

The Spartacist League, a sectarian group that claims to be Trotskyist, stated its position in the December 5 issue of *Workers Vanguard*. Led by James Robertson, the Spartacist League originated in a 1963 split from the SWP. It calls for "rebuilding" the Fourth International.

*Workers Vanguard* correctly pointed out how useful soviets and a Trotskyist party would have been, saying, "The events of the last week made brutally clear the desperate need for soviet organs bringing together the workers and soldiers and for a revolutionary Trotskyist party capable of breaking the reformists' hammerlock on the proletariat and leading it forward with both audacity and vigilance. A centralized council representing the hundreds of workers, soldiers and neighborhood commissions—a national workers assembly—could have coordinated the leftists' defense."

No Trotskyist could quarrel with this sentiment. In fact, the paragraph could be used without changing a word in depicting the situation in Spain in 1936. Soviets and a revolutionary party are always needed, as the Spartacist League never tires of pointing out. It proclaimed the same sentiments from the sidelines of the American antiwar movement for eight years while refusing to take part in the fight to end Washington's dirty war.

Having demonstrated their incapacity to

lead any real struggle in the United States, the sages of the Spartacist League have now set up shop as advisers on how to build soviets in Portugal. It's easy, they say.

"A revolutionary leadership, taking advantage of the support for the [recent construction workers'] strike among the entire Lisbon working class (who are being hard hit by inflation), would have called a general strike for a substantial across-the-

## The Pentagon's 'Unexpected Opportunity'

### Round Two at Wounded Knee

In the spring of 1973 about 250 Indians seized the community of Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. The seizure of Wounded Knee, the site in 1890 of one of the U.S. Army's most infamous massacres, dramatized the oppression still faced by the descendants of the victims of that and countless similar massacres.

However, not everyone looked at it that way. A December 1 news article in the *Washington Star* reported that the U.S. Army seized on the protest as "an unexpected opportunity to test its contingency plan for handling civil disturbances."

When the Wounded Knee siege began, the Pentagon put into action a secret plan known by the code name "Garden Plot." According to the *Star* report, "Col. Volney Warner, then chief of staff of the 82nd Airborne Division, and Col. Jack C. Potter, deputy chief of staff for logistics of the Sixth Army, were ordered to Wounded Knee soon after the uprising began. . . . They were told to wear civilian clothing to avoid calling attention to the Army activity."

The army representatives vetoed a Federal Bureau of Investigation recommendation to overrun the reservation with 2,000 regular army troops. One report argued, "Because of its isolated geographical location, the seizure and holding of Wounded Knee poses no threat to the nation, the State of South Dakota or the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation itself. However, it is conceded that this act is a source of irritation if not embarrassment to the Administration in general and the Department of Justice in particular."

Colonel Warner also argued, according to a memo on his assessment, that killing too many Indians "would reflect badly on the Army."

But Warner and the other Pentagon "advisers" had no objection to the several hundred FBI agents and U.S. marshals who were surrounding the village making use of army equipment. The government

board raise equal to that demanded by the construction workers and for a sliding scale of wages. SP workers could have been drawn to such a call, thus facilitating working-class unity in struggle against the bosses. Such a strike could also have served as the springboard for establishing a central workers council representing all the workers commissions. . . ."

If only the Spartacist League were there to lead the Portuguese revolution! □

force was supplied with fifteen armored personnel carriers, 100,000 rounds of M-16 ammunition, twenty sniper rifles with scopes, along with gas masks, bulletproof vests, and similar paraphernalia.

Also, "A squadron of aerial reconnaissance planes, which had just been turned over to the Nebraska Air National Guard after use in Vietnam, made at least one photo pass over Wounded Knee. The Indians later said they thought they were about to be bombed by the low-flying aircraft."

As the *Washington Star* story makes clear, they had good reason for their suspicions. □

#### Breytenbach Appeals Sentence

Breyten Breytenbach, one of South Africa's best-known poets, announced in Pretoria December 4 that he is appealing the nine-year sentence he received November 26 under the Terrorism Act.

Breytenbach, an opponent of apartheid, lived in exile in France for more than ten years. He was arrested in August a few weeks after secretly returning to South Africa.

Following a three-day trial, he was found guilty of charges of being a founding member of the organization Atlas/Okhela, a group whose aim was said to be the overthrow of the white minority South African regime. The prosecution charged that the organization was a branch of the outlawed African National Congress.

### Correction

The News Analysis in the December 1 *Intercontinental Press*, entitled "Martin Luther King—Targeted for Death by FBI," contained an error. The FBI document referring to Martin Luther King as a possible "messiah" was obtained through a suit filed by NBC television reporter Carl Stern, not through the Socialist Workers party's suit, as the article reported. □

*Intercontinental Press*



## The Portuguese Revolution in a State of Siege

By A. Udry

[The following article appeared in the December 4 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

\* \* \*

November 25, like April 25, September 28, and March 11, marks a new stage in the Portuguese "revolutionary process" that opened eighteen months ago.

After the victory of the construction workers (see *Inprecor*, No. 38, November 20), more than 100,000 people demonstrated on November 16. In spite of the efforts of the Communist party to avoid frontal attacks on the sixth government as such, the most commonly chanted slogans were directed squarely against Prime Minister Pinheiro de Azevedo. In addition, the bakers threatened to use the same methods as the construction workers if the Ministry of Labor persisted in opposing their demands. They "gave" the government six days to come up with "a positive response on the question of our working hours and wage guarantees, . . . (otherwise) we will use new forms of struggle that will openly expose the fake socialist policy of this government, which is actually against the workers."

In the army the "revolt" of the Tancos paratroopers occupies a position of prime importance. After blowing up the Rádio Renascença broadcasting tower, the Tancos paratrooper regiment itself exploded. The paratroopers elected a new commander and "placed themselves at the service of the revolution" with all the confused haste characteristic of a completely new radicalization. The government then went "on strike," on the grounds that the "armed forces can no longer assure the government the authority necessary to govern." On November 25, the government entered its sixth day of "strike."

In this context a polarization developed around the nomination of Vasco Lourenço (a member of the Council of the Revolution and one of the leaders of the "group of nine" of Melo Antunes) to the post of commander of the Lisbon Military Region (RML). In effect, this nomination meant that Otelo de Carvalho, who has been strongly supported by the CP in recent weeks, was to be deprived of command of the military region of the capital. Within

the army, or at least within many units of the RML, a polarization then took place around this nomination and the consequent removal of Carvalho.

For example, the EPAM (Practical School of Military Administration), which occupied the television station on November 25, adopted the following motion in a general assembly: "We consider that the removal of General Saraiva de Carvalho must be viewed as a real purge of the left; if it goes through, it would open the door to a chain of purges of commanders of many progressive and revolutionary units, purges aimed at the establishment of a military discipline that, while repressing the organization of the soldiers, would allow the soldiers to be used against the workers struggles. The soldiers of the EPAM, united in general assembly on November 18, 1975, decide:

"1. To reject the attempted purge of General Otelo, declaring that we are opposed to this reactionary maneuver;

"2. To maintain ourselves on a state of alert in defense of the revolution;

"3. To demand that the maneuvers at the top cease once and for all and that there be no cabinet decisions before the soldiers in the units have been consulted;

"4. To alert the soldiers of all units, calling on them to offer a firm and united response to any machinations aimed at weakening the progressive and revolutionary forces both inside and outside the barracks."

Thus, in a deformed and dangerous way, the dynamic of politico-social confrontation tended to be reduced to the battle around the commander of the Lisbon Military Region. Such a battle resulted in a military confrontation not effectively linked to the mass movement or even to the independent movement of soldiers. At the beginning of September in Porto, the SUV (Soldados Unidos Vencerão—Soldiers United Will Win) had approached a similar problem—the removal of General Corvacho from the Northern Military Region—from an entirely different angle (see *Inprecor*, No. 35, October 9), an angle that permitted a stimulation of the organization of the soldiers themselves.

But to locate the meaning of the events of November 25 and 26 more exactly, it is useful to recall the fundamental characteristic of the current period. In fact, the whole specificity of the situation lies in the lack of

synchronization between the extremely profound crisis of the state apparatus (especially the army) and the degree of development and centralization of embryonic organs of dual power. Such a situation cannot persist for long. It has to be resolved either through a more or less partial restabilization of the state apparatus, or through a growing over toward a situation of dual power, whatever the intermediary steps. In addition, the deep crisis of the state apparatus, which allowed a workers upsurge to go on without meeting any major obstacles, gave rise to illusions in the bourgeoisie's capacity for political initiative and, even more important, in the operational possibilities of the military hierarchy. We have stressed these illusions on many occasions. At the beginning of October, for example, we wrote: "The outcome of this confrontation (the government's attempt to occupy the radio stations), which turned out favorably for the working class, is part of a process of step-by-step revolutionary upsurge in which the workers have won victories without meeting any great resistance from the class enemy. This could create the *false impression* that the bourgeoisie is politically impotent and that it is definitively incapable of reconstituting a military striking force. This *illusion* fuels an ultraleftism that is translated into adventurism by the PRP-BR (Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades), which claims that 'it is now time for the revolutionary forces and the workers to pose the problem of an insurrection.' . . . If the far-left groups continue to play this game, they could well be caught in the same trap the German Communists fell into in January 1919." (*Inprecor*, No. 35, October 9, p. 29.) Once again, at the beginning of November, we pointed out:

"While the crisis in the army is extremely deep and while the progress of self-organization among the soldiers is important, in the present situation it would be erroneous and dangerous to believe that the disintegration of the army has gone so far that the hierarchy is incapable of taking any initiative." (*Inprecor*, No. 37, November 6, p. 4.) Although the crisis of the state apparatus did not allow the bourgeoisie to confront the mass movement head on (without risking civil war), it certainly did

not prevent the success of a military counteroffensive against an adventurist operation of the type launched on November 25 and 26.

In examining the initiative taken by the Tancos paratroopers on the morning of November 25, it is difficult to separate provocation, "mad adventure," and the application of a plan. At about eleven o'clock in the morning they occupied the base at Tancos, the bases of Montijo, and the installations of the first air force region at Monsanto and took control of access to the Monte Real base. They then demanded the resignation of Morais e Silva, air force chief of staff, who was responsible for the operation against Rádio Renascença and is one of the leaders of the "hard-line" wing of the hierarchy.

Nevertheless, the links among these initiatives, the measures taken by various units to occupy radio (Emissora Nacional) and television stations, and the appearance on television of Durand Clemente, one of the heads of the former Fifth Division, indicate that the elements of a "military plan" reminiscent of putschism were being applied on November 25, even if the Tancos paratroopers carried out this plan in a precipitous and disorganized manner.

This sort of adventurism does not simply drop from the sky. For two or three months now, various centrist organizations, essentially the MES (Movimento de Esquerda Socialista—Left Socialist Movement) and the PRP-BR, as well as some radicalized sectors of the army, have been developing an adventurist conception that has taken the form of a putschist orientation, under the pretext of anticipating a "reactionary coup."

A manifesto distributed on November 21 entitled "Manifesto of the Revolutionary Officers to the Soldiers, Sailors, Working Class, and Toiling People" and signed by Tome (the major of the Lisbon Military Police), Durand Clemente, and Matos Gomez stressed the imminence of a reactionary offensive: "We are now seeing a desperate reactionary escalation; the parties and officers of the sixth government are joining in attempts to crush the powerful popular offensive." What is reflected here is the position of centrist organizations that confuse the desire of various sectors of the military hierarchy to carry out a reactionary coup, and even the preparation of the coup, with the establishment of the general conditions for doing so with any serious chance of success. The bourgeoisie is capable not only of preparing coups, but also of canceling them or postponing them; the fact is that it is impossible to artificially create conditions favorable to stimulating coordination and synchronization of the efforts of the major part of reaction.

What do these revolutionary officers, most of them now arrested, in hiding, and

hit by repression, propose to do today? Their response is unambiguous: "In face of this situation, the undersigned officers, conscious that their place can only be at the side of the workers, soldiers, and sailors in their struggle for emancipation, popular power, socialism, and national independence, consider that the only outcome for the Portuguese revolution lies in the establishment of a regime of revolutionary unity with an action program publicly defended before the popular masses with the central objective of the most rapid possible transfer of power to the workers organized in a structure that culminates in a National People's Assembly. . . . The outcome of the crisis lies in the construction of a revolutionary regime based on a program of revolutionary unity founded on the ideas expressed in the Copcon document."\*

This manifesto appeared on the front page of the November 21 issue of the weekly newspaper of the PRP-BR. On November 10, this same PRP-BR held a press conference during which Isabel do Carmo declared: "For us, at this moment, there is no solution except armed insurrection. As all history shows, the bourgeoisie unleashes a civil war every time it wants to defend its interests. Fortunately, the forces of the right possess no army in Portugal. To get one, they must resort to mercenaries based in Spain or to the armies of the United States or NATO." (*A Capital*, November 10.)

This position reflects the dominant orientation of the two largest organizations of the FUR (Frente de Unidade Revolucionária—Front of Revolutionary Unity), the PRP-BR and the MES (although the position is expressed much more cautiously in the writings of the MES), as well as of the sectors of the military around the signers of the manifesto.

This ultraleft and adventurist orientation takes shape around several points:

a. A considerable underestimation of the capacity for military initiative by the sectors controlled by the militarist hierarchy, which is combined, paradoxically, with a multitude of assertions about the imminence of the establishment of "an authoritarian regime that will assume fascist forms, that will rapidly resort to bloodbath and terror in order that 'peace and discipline' may reign." (*Revolução*, PRP-BR weekly, November 17.) This latter assertion rests essentially on a simplistic conception of the relationship between the economic crisis and the establishment of "an authoritarian regime that will assume fascist forms."

b. A radical misunderstanding of the level of consciousness of broad sectors of the masses, of the grip of democratic

illusions among significant layers of the working class because of the lack of an experience of dual power that would enable the legitimacy of bourgeois institutions to be shifted to the organs of workers power, and an underestimation of the negative effects of the division of the working class and of the uneven development of struggles among various branches and regions. All this leads to the most impressionistic judgments about the conjunctural situation. For example, the MES declares: "The military, political, and economic conditions exist for the development of a popular offensive. From the military point of view, the right does not possess the soldiers to carry out a coup; from the economic point of view, the rising cost of living, unemployment, and the satisfaction of the most immediate needs are problems that cannot be resolved without a revolutionary regime; from the political point of view, illusions in bourgeois democracy, illusions in reformists, are beginning to be clearly overcome and the workers finally understand that it will not be the politicians who will make the revolution in their name; only the masses through their organization and their struggle will be able to make the socialist revolution triumph." (*Poder Popular*, weekly of the MES, November 5-11.) On the basis of this analysis, the theme of the "popular offensive" is placed on the agenda, bolstered by the idea that the question of power has to be resolved *before* the bourgeoisie has created "a professional army, constructed its repressive apparatus, and assembled the forces needed to crush us, to demolish all our efforts." (*ibid.*) It is obvious that such an orientation, even if it does not utilize the PRP-BR formulation on "armed insurrection," implies seeing the revolutionary officers and the SUV as sources of a military instrument with which to resolve the question of the seizure of power, which is itself conceived of as a technical complement to the development of "organs of popular power" (which are, in fact, *embryonic*, noncentralized, organs of dual power). On this point, there is a striking analogy between the formula that serves as a governmental slogan in the manifesto of the revolutionary officers and the formulation used by the MES in its editorial in the November 19-25 *Poder Popular*: "We must create the conditions for the formation of a government of revolutionary unity that holds power until the creation of the National People's Assembly."

c. The mistaken view of the real relationship of forces among the "revolutionary left" (which the PRP-BR and the MES consider to be subsumed by the FUR) is equaled only by the illusions in the Communist party. The MES claims: "It is not the 'revolutionary left' that is being dragged in the wake of the Communist party, but the Communist party that, since giving support

\*For text of document, see *Intercontinental Press*, September 15, p. 1210.



to the Copcon document systematically at decisive moments of the struggle, has been dragged in the wake of the revolutionary left. At the moment, there is an important new aspect of the civilian and military situation, which is that for the first time a dispute is unfolding between the revolutionary left and reformism for the leadership of mass struggle on the essential fields, in the factories, the barracks, the neighborhoods, and, above all, at the overall level of the political struggle of the working class and the toilers." (*Poder Popular*, November 5-11.) In reality, since the beginning of October the Communist party has taken the initiative again, after having been routed during August and early September. Further, there is no need to insist on the confusion of the MES on the subject of the strategic orientation of the CP, a confusion that explains the group's lack of understanding of the nature and limits of the tactical turns made by Alvaro Cunhal's party. Finally, one of the very characteristics of the revolutionary upsurge in Portugal is precisely the spontaneous, partially spontaneous, and semiconscious movement, which is expressed, among other ways, in the relatively low degree to which the workers are organized *within* the revolutionary and centrist groups; this is, however, combined with powerful capacities of initiative and self-organization among broad sectors. This latter feature of the rise of the mass movement has stimulated a process of self-intoxication among the centrist groups, in spite of (or perhaps because of) their limited size. We would wager that after November 25-26, the MES will revise this position.

d. An ultraleftist attitude toward the Social Democracy, which is expressed in formulas and a line analogous to those of the ultraleftist currents in the communist movement during the years 1921-23 and is even reminiscent of the policy of the Stalinized Communist International during the "third period." The MES says: "Thus, the Social Democratic forces serve the advance of the fascist forces; consequently, we cannot separate our slogan 'Death to the ELP [Portuguese Liberation Army] and those who support it' from the slogan 'Down with Social Democracy.' That, comrades, is why the MES says—and this is ever more correct and appears ever more clearly—that the Social Democracy is a phase in the transition to fascism." (*Poder Popular*, November 5-11.)

The classic themes of ultraleftism emerge here: gradual transition to fascism and the necessity of defeating Social Democracy in order to crush fascism. There is a risk that a direct confrontation with the state apparatus will flow from these types of assertions when it is simultaneously claimed that the Social Democracy holds military and politi-

cal hegemony. Thus, the MES, like most of the organizations of the FUR, is incapable of grasping the real counterrevolutionary nature and function of the SP. The Socialist party, under the cover of the defense of



NEVES: High praise from the military brass.

bourgeois democracy, was and is aiming at disarming the workers, eliminating the soldiers commissions, and maximally reducing the role of the workers commissions, while not suppressing the democratic rights of the reformist organizations or challenging the functioning of the institutions of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism.

It is certainly true that this policy allows the bourgeoisie to stabilize the organs of state power, but it does not follow from this that the SP is the functional instrument for crushing the working class. This appears clearly when, after a success for the democratic counterrevolution led by the SP, the second phase of the direct offensive of the bourgeoisie opens up.

On the basis of their characterization of the SP, the centrists rejected any coherent policy of united front taking advantage, for example, of the tensions that exist within Mário Soares's party because of his opposition to the movement for the demands of the construction workers and metalworkers. Hence, the centrist organizations not only consolidate the division of the working class, but also fail to offer any response to the uneven development of the mobilization in the North and the South, an unevenness that is linked to, among other factors, the varying influence of the SP among the workers of the two regions.

The events of November 25 and 26 must also be seen within the general framework of the ultraleft policy of the centrist organi-

zations, which fuses with the extremely narrow technical-militarist conceptions held by a nucleus of revolutionary officers who have some influence in Lisbon.

For two days, November 25 and 26, slightly more than 400 commandos literally waltzed around from one area to another in the region of the capital. Colonel Jaime Neves emerged as a brilliant orchestra conductor capable of using a very small number of troops to whip several of the major military units of the Lisbon "commune" into line. Neves, firmly supported by the SP since the end of July, had already established order in his own unit, the Amadora commandos. The homage paid to him on November 20 by Captain António Brás, who had just been "expelled" from the Tancos base, suffices to indicate the respect this colonel commands within the military hierarchy: "Intelligently, Colonel Jaime Neves was able, at the opportune moment, to once again lend the commandos their real function. . . . He was able to cut the disease at its roots. . . . He was able to energetically denounce the origins of this disease in the army. . . . He did so in order to preserve the unity and cohesion of the armed forces at any price." (*Expresso*, November 22, 1975.)

But on November 25 and 26 it was not fundamentally the strict military efficiency of the commandos that carried the day. In spite of the profound crisis of the state apparatus and of bourgeois political leadership, what was asserted during these two days was the capacity for *centralized initiative* still possessed by the bourgeoisie despite its weakness.

Militarily, the command of the counteroffensive was coherent and centralized. But we must also note Costa Gomes's cleverness and haste in making sure that the mass media, crucial instrument of centralization, would be in the hands of the government. The broadcasting towers of Portuguese national radio and television and of Emissora Nacional were silenced; Rádio Clube Português shut down its transmitters on the night of November 25 under the threat of intervention by the EPC (Practical Cavalry School). By eight o'clock at night, the government was on the airwaves from Porto, broadcasting its orders throughout the country. The North was available as a more reliable base, and the government had certainly prepared in advance to transfer its radio centers there.

Finally, inscribing his response within the framework of the "democratic counterrevolution," the president of the republic took care to have the Constituent Assembly vote on the state of emergency. The motion was carried by a majority composed of the SP, the PPD (Partido Popular Democrático—Popular Democratic party), and the CDS (Centro Democrático Social—Democratic Social Center). The state of emergen-



cy allowed Costa Gomes to take command of all military units and to enact a series of measures aimed at facilitating the political utilization of the immediate military advantages that had been won. In fact, the state of emergency gives the authorities the right to conduct searches and arrests without warrants and to censor all forms of correspondence, including the press, publicity, and propaganda. Further, street demonstrations were banned.

The movement initiated by the Tancos paratroopers, the soldiers of the EPAM, the Lisbon military police, and the RALIS (Lisbon light artillery regiment) was totally disorganized in offering any military response to all this. The combination of the elements of provocation, spontaneous initiative, partial application of aspects of a putschist military plan, and the possible hesitations at the highest level of the military hierarchy go a long way toward explaining the unfolding of this adventure, which some people certainly saw as the beginning of an armed insurrection.

The soldiers of the units involved in this operation not only possessed no central command, but, above all, were not prepared to launch into a confrontation that would open the way to civil war. The hesitations in the ranks of these soldiers increased from hour to hour. In face of determined troops who appeared as defending "legality" against "rebellion," these vacillations inevitably increased, especially when the "dynamization commission" (linked to the former Fifth Division) gave the order to cease fighting at four o'clock in the morning of November 26.

As is logical, the working class took a *wait-and-see attitude* toward this obscure military confrontation, with the exception of some sectors among whom a mobilization took place (at Setenave, for example, where the PRP-BR has some influence).

Clearly, the Communist party did not join into the operation, contrary to the possible expectations of the centrist groups or the forces nostalgic for the Fifth Division. The CP was content to mobilize defensively in the work places. On November 27 the CP published a communiqué stating: "The left forces committed a grave error by overestimating their own strength and attempting this desperate act. . . . The attempt of the forces of the right to take advantage of a favorable situation to impose such hegemony would be dangerous. The solution must be political and negotiated." *The CP was only reaffirming its orientation.* For the CP, the false battle engaged around the nomination of Vasco Lourenço, even if its dynamic was very dangerous, fell within the general framework of the CP policy of exerting pressure for a recomposition of the Council of the Revolution and the government.

As for the "revolutionary left," and more

precisely the MES and the PRP-BR, they of course called for "armed insurrection" and denounced the "betrayal" of the CP. Here again, there is continuity.

The counteroffensive decided on by the commandos of Jaime Neves and supported by the tanks of Salgueiro Maia (commander of the EPC) won very rapid success. Although this success has allowed the military initiative to pass back into the government camp, the real scope of this victory must nevertheless be measured carefully.

Some days before November 25, Melo Antunes described how he viewed the government's priorities. He said: "The army must be an instrument for action and not a political laboratory. We must correct this error today. We will do this by altering the structures and shifting personalities around. . . . The debate (in the Council of the Revolution and the hierarchy) is very lively right now. A struggle is going on, a struggle on which everything depends. For the only way to continue to be able to govern along with the CP. . . is first to win the battle in the army, a battle that is going on at nearly all levels. That is vital. A second imperative is nearly as important, though, and that is the battle over the news media." (*Nouvel Observateur*, November 24-30.)

The victorious military counterattack offers the Pinheiro de Azevedo government an opportunity to take the initiative again in the areas mentioned by Melo Antunes and to try to make a few tests in other realms as well. For the moment, the government is making gains, or trying to make gains, in four areas, while maintaining the state of emergency:

1. The measures of demobilization of the Military Police (temporary?); changes in the command of various units (RALIS, EPAM, Military Police); the return of the sergeants to the Military Police; arrests of many officers; the removal-resignation of Carvalho and Fabião all point in the direction of regaining a grip on the army and of attempting to homogenize the command structures. After the abortive attempt to construct the AMI (Military Intervention Group) on the basis of the example of the Amadora commandos, the hierarchy is now seeking to reconstitute a viable intervention force *within the army itself*, in collaboration with the police forces of the National Guard (GNR) and the Public Service Police (PSP).

2. The nationalization of Rádio Clube Português, the handing of Rádio Renascença back to the Catholic church, and, most important, the strict control over the national radio and television station and over Emissora Nacional are concretizations of the measures that the sixth government has been vainly trying to impose since Septem-

ber. These measures reflect a not inconsequential change in the political situation. Previously, because of the influence of the workers of these radio stations and because of their declared collaboration with the struggles of the working class, the working class commanded both a fantastic tool for publicizing its battles and stimulating politicization and a possible instrument of centralization. The bourgeoisie understood this very well. It is thus trying to bring all the means of mass communication back into its camp. In addition, in the realm of written information, the administrative councils of the newspapers have been modified and right-wing editors who had been removed are retaking their posts. It is not at all impossible that the battle around *República* will come up again.

3. The searching of the headquarters of the MES and the PRP-BR may represent a first step in a policy of *selective repression* that will initially be carried out around the decree on the "obligation to return all arms" and the decree against "armed militias."

4. The suspension of collective contract negotiations until the end of December is undoubtedly extremely significant. In fact, in taking this measure the Azevedo government is trying to transfer its military advantage into the social and political spheres. More precisely, this decision implies a rejection of the victories that have already been won or appeared probable in many sectors (textiles, construction, bakers).

But once these measures have been taken, even if all of them have not yet been successfully applied, two central questions come up.

First, within the political and military institutions the right and the far right are trying to take maximum advantage of the favorable conjunctural situation. The bourgeoisie has recovered its confidence somewhat. CDS and PPD leaflets are screaming for blood, particularly since there is a big panic right now. The Antunes group must be afraid that it will be outflanked on the right. If that happens, the government could be led to make decisions that do not correspond to the real relationship of social forces. And this in turn could precipitate a workers mobilization openly supported by the CP, which today is not frontally opposing the state of emergency and is instead seeking negotiations. Such a mobilization would highlight the *presently precarious character* of the victory on the government and military level. Antunes is quite conscious of this and has clearly proposed a different option.

He declared on television: "I think that the roads to the right can be definitively cut in Portugal and that the military men who now hold political leadership can be the bearers of an alternative left program,

which is a historic bloc for the building of a democratic and pluralist socialist society. The participation of the CP in the building of socialism is indispensable." (November 27.)

Because of the present relationship of social forces and the tensions among the various tendencies within the government, the bourgeois crisis of political leadership has not yet been resolved.

Second, the working class as such has not been hit and the economic crisis is continuing. Of course, because of the many links between workers and soldiers that have been forged during past months, the success of Neves's counteroffensive has certainly produced some trauma among the ranks of the workers. *But it would be an exaggeration to claim that the modification of the relationship of forces on the military field will be directly reflected on the social field.* The capacity of the working class to break down the policy of the government and the employers in the realm of material demands remains the real test. The fact that 10,000 people turned out to a demonstration called by the Intersindical (the trade-union federation) and the SUV in Porto on the night of November 27 indicates that the potential for combativity is significant.

In addition, the victory on the military field is far from absolute. On the one hand, many units in which the CP and the far left have broad influence remained apart from the events and have not suffered the demoralizing effects of a defeat without resistance. Further, certain units are already reacting. For example, the RIOQ (Operational Infantry Regiment of Queluz) has decided to take over the functions of the Military Police. It is organizing patrols in Lisbon so that the GNR-PSP will not be able to operate alone during the state of emergency.

On the other hand, the military success of the right is going to permit the establishment of a striking force and the imposition of tight control over arms depots. That changes the situation. But it does not resolve the crisis in the army as a whole. Coming weeks will provide a basis for measuring the effects of November 25 and 26 more exactly.

The defeat suffered in this adventure by a part of the vanguard of soldiers can certainly not be compared to the defeat of the German proletariat in January 1919. The position adopted by the MES and the PRP-BR of creating a "united antifascist commando" goes back to the same orientation that led up to placing the armed insurrection on the agenda. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the blows that have been dealt will permit the bourgeoisie to take measures to reestablish the state apparatus, and this will modify the terms of future confrontations.

November 30, 1975

## Palestinian Militancy and Economic Difficulties

### Israeli Regime Faces Growing Internal Problems

By David Frankel



RABIN: "We are quite isolated."

In an interview in the December 15 issue of *Newsweek* magazine, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin outlined the basic situation confronting the Zionist state. "Admittedly, we are quite isolated," he said.

But Rabin insisted that Israel's isolation would make no difference to his government, arguing that "we have to conduct a policy knowing that we are still at war after 27 years and that this war might last another 27 years."

Despite Rabin's show of confidence, Israel's deepening international isolation and bleak economic prospects have resulted in a sharpening of the internal divisions in Israeli society. One sign of this has been the militancy of the Palestinian population inside Israel and the occupied territories in fighting for its national rights.

The Israeli occupiers were faced with a new sense of hope among the Palestinian masses in the occupied territories following the Arab showing in the October 1973 war. When Yassir Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, spoke before the United Nations in November 1974, his speech was marked by nearly two weeks of Palestinian demonstrations on the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River. It was the

biggest upsurge among the 700,000 Palestinians there since 1968.

Recent events show that the nationalist movement has retained its strength on the West Bank and also penetrated into Israel proper. Terence Smith reported on three days of Palestinian demonstrations in a dispatch from Ramallah in the November 11 *New York Times*.

"Dozens of students were arrested and several hospitalized over the weekend after stick-wielding soldiers broke into the walled courtyard of a girls' high school here and dispersed the chanting, demonstrating students," Smith reported.

"... Israeli radio and the Hebrew press," he said, "have so far ignored this week's demonstrations, apparently in an effort to prevent them from spreading throughout the West Bank."

A dispatch from Tel Aviv in the December 5 *Times* reported an incident in the village of Anbata. Arab residents there set up a barricade and stoned a convoy of right-wing Israeli settlers who were attempting to dramatize their demand that all restrictions on Jewish colonization of the West Bank be lifted.

The rightists were attempting to start a settlement near Nablus without authorization of the Israeli government. Their action provoked street demonstrations in the Arab town of Nablus.

These protests in the occupied territories were followed on December 9 by the election of a Communist mayor in Nazareth, the largest Arab town in Israel.

The Rabin government attempted to prevent this embarrassment by openly threatening the Arab voters. Minister of Labor Moshe Baram said December 1 that the government "could not be expected to show consideration for a city headed by a man who may be an agent of Arafat or of murderous gangs."

In addition, the regime stationed hundreds of Israeli policemen in the town on the day of the vote, according to a report in the December 10 *New York Times*.

But the regime's heavy-handed attempts at intimidating the Palestinian population proved unsuccessful. Seventy-five percent of the eligible voters turned out. In a five-way race, they gave Toufik Zayad 67 percent of the vote. Eleven of the seventeen city council seats also went to his ticket.

Since Arab nationalist parties are illegal in Israel, the Communist (Rakah) party has generally been the only alternative to the



Zionist parties in Israeli elections. In assessing the significance of the election, *New York Times* correspondent Terence Smith said in a December 10 dispatch from Jerusalem:

"The landslide election yesterday of an outspoken Arab nationalist as Mayor of Nazareth was regarded here today as the most conspicuous display of Palestinian nationalist sentiment among the Arabs of Israel since the founding of the nation."

Meir Zarmi, the general secretary of the ruling Labor party, declared December 10: "What happened in Nazareth had nothing to do with municipal politics, but was a result of a new trend, expanding among the Arabs, thriving on anti-Israel incitement, and being fed by UN resolutions against Zionism."

Along with the spread of nationalist sentiment among the Palestinian population, the Rabin government has had to cope with growing discontent among Jewish workers over the economic burden they must bear.

"Although ready to make enormous sacrifices in wartime, Israelis so far have shown little inclination to heed the government's pleas to work harder, to consume less and to lower their living standards in peacetime," Felix Kessler reported in the December 5 *Wall Street Journal*.

"Teachers, dockers, transport workers, librarians, El Al airline mechanics, tax collectors, defense-industry workers—these are but a few of those who have gone on strike recently," Kessler said.

Labor militancy has been fueled by inflation that ran at a rate of 56 percent in 1974 and is expected to climb 30 percent this year. Unemployment, officially estimated at 34,000, is expected to double next year. Prime Minister Rabin warns that "some dramatic changes in the way of life of the Israeli citizen" are going to be necessary to pay for Israel's huge military outlay.

Twenty-five percent of Israel's total potential labor force is employed in some aspect of military production or the military apparatus. About 16 percent of Israel's gross national product of \$10.2 billion was spent on the military in 1975. But even this is only part of the story.

The Ford administration has asked Congress to appropriate \$2.3 billion in aid for Israel this year, including \$1.5 billion in direct military aid. Henry Kissinger told a House of Representatives subcommittee November 14 that aid to Israel—currently amounting to half the Ford administration's foreign aid program—will continue at the present level "for as long as I can see."

The artificial character of the Israeli economy is also indicated by its balance-of-payments deficit. The cost of imports not covered by the sale of exports is expected to reach \$4 billion next year, compared with

the current \$3.7 billion. This has led to repeated devaluations of the Israeli pound, whose value has fallen to less than half of what it was a year ago.

However, the economic sacrifices being demanded by the Rabin government are the least of what will be demanded of the Israeli workers in the coming years. The past successes of the Zionist settlers in shoving aside the Palestinian people and seizing territory from the neighboring Arab states cannot be repeated indefinitely. Having driven the Palestinians out of their homeland, the Jewish settlers have built themselves a bloody trap.

During the recent congressional hearings on aid to Israel, former CIA chief William Colby testified that if Israel had to fight another war against Egypt and Syria it would suffer an estimated 36,000 casualties, including 8,000 dead. This compares with 2,500 Israelis killed during the October 1973 war.

## Unemployment Hits 1.17 Million

## 20,000 March in London for Jobs

By Skip Ball

LONDON—In response to Britain's steadily rising unemployment, 20,000 persons marched through London to lobby Parliament November 26. Their central demand was, "No return to the '30s—defend the right to work."

The day before the action, the Department of Employment issued the jobless figure for November, which it said was "the worst November figure since current records began in 1948." According to a report in the November 26 *Guardian*, this figure, which boosted the total unemployment level to nearly 1.17 million (5%), "was helped only by students returning to school and school leavers finding work."

However, school leavers who did not find work numbered 43,764, as compared with 9,394 a year ago. The average monthly increase in the unemployment level is 37,000 and has been over 35,000 for the last six months. "That's a rate of a thousand more a day thrown on to the dole queues since this government took office," one marcher said.

The day after the march, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research issued its economic review forecasting trends over the next two years. It described the forecast as "perhaps the most depressing since this review was launched in 1959," predicting unemployment during the

"The next war will be far deadlier for both soldiers and civilians than the past four wars were," said a British military analyst quoted by Michael Parks in the November 23 *Baltimore Sun*. "The buildup of arms is frightening," he added. "Each side has more weapons with a greater killing power."

Parks added: "The net effect of the growing deployment of surface-to-surface missiles by both sides is one of the major unknowns, according to Western analysts."

But, the logic of the Middle East arms race is clear. As Parks himself explains, "The U.S. and Soviet missiles originally were designed to carry tactical nuclear warheads aimed at military targets on a central European battlefield. In the Middle East, their likely targets would include major cities as well, and few military analysts believe Israeli assertions that it will not fit nuclear warheads to the American Pershings if it gets them." □

next two years at a minimum of 1.23 million. Real income will fall 0.2%, it said.

Furthering the spirit of gloom is the saga of the Chrysler auto giant. It is threatening to pull out of Britain by the end of the year, leaving its 27,000 workers jobless, unless the government comes through with a £100 million [£1=US\$2.02] rescue operation.

So far all public statements by Chrysler and the government have been along the lines of "saving" Chrysler. The march on Parliament presented another solution, raised at a meeting of 6,000 Chrysler workers at the Linwood plant near Glasgow: "Nationalize Chrysler."

The march stood in marked contrast to the solutions offered by the government and the leaders of the Trades Union Congress (TUC). In fact, the TUC leadership tried to have the march called off and succeeded in getting the North West TUC, the original sponsor of the action, to withdraw its support. The action was sponsored instead by the London area of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions.

The TUC's general secretary, Len Murray, responded to the unemployment figures by saying, "I am confident that cooperation between the unions and the government will achieve both these objectives," the curtailment of inflation and unemployment.

The kind of cooperation Murray has in



mind was made clear in a document called the "Chequers Blueprint," issued November 6. It was a joint TUC, government, and CBI (Confederation of British Industry) statement.

"Above all," the document said, "we must get away from the policies of confrontation and work together towards agreed objectives." Whose objectives were agreed upon was spelled out in surprisingly clear terms: "The Government intends to give greater weight, and more consistently than hitherto, to the need for increasing the national rate of growth through regenerating our industrial structure and improving efficiency. For the immediate future this will mean giving priority to industrial development over consumption or even our social objectives."

What this policy means in real terms was hammered home in the economic reports issued the week of the jobs march.

Chants of "Work sharing, no loss of pay" and "Occupy, nationalize, defend the right to work" were heard up and down the march. More than 200 trade-union banners led the march, and took an hour and a half to pass by. As the march filed past the TUC headquarters, Murray held a news conference denouncing the action as merely "extremist groups exploiting this concern" over jobs.

Contingents from the workers occupying their plants against redundancies at the Glasgow Personna razor blade factory and the *Scottish Daily News* were on the march. Also heavily represented were the country's Chrysler workers. The contingent from the Stoke plant numbered 750; most of them were out of work that day because of the "short time" Chrysler has imposed.

The marchers, most of whom were trade unionists, came from all over the country and represented a cross section of industry. Student unions were also much in attendance. Local trades councils, ignoring Murray's advice to boycott the action and marching under their own banners, included those from Slough, West Ham, Ayrshire, Newton, and Coventry.

Heavily represented by branches present were the engineers, electricians, teachers, and the two health workers unions. The biggest union of white-collar workers, NALGO (National Association of Local Government Officers), mobilized several branches for the march.

Because it was originally called as a lobby of Parliament, the demonstration lacked a central rally where the different programs to solve unemployment put forward in the British workers movement could be heard by all. The political tendencies present at the action filled in for this somewhat with their own sound vans and speakers, and by leafleting the march. This fell short, however, of the function a broad platform of speakers plays.

While many groups on the left distributed leaflets or sold their press, the only groups with significant numbers present were Labour party branches, the International



WILSON: Planning to 'save' Chrysler.

Socialists, the Communist party, and the International Marxist Group (IMG, British section of the Fourth International).

A van leading the march from the CP's newspaper *Morning Star* added to the chants for the right to work a call to "Stop imports." This demand for import controls to "save jobs" is the focus of the program put forward by "left" Social Democrats in the Labour party and echoed by the CP.

This question was taken up in a pamphlet distributed on the march by the IMG, whose 800-member contingent carried placards calling for "Defend the Right to Work" and "Work Sharing, No Loss of Pay."

The IMG statement said that the proposed controls would simply make workers in weaker countries suffer and lead to retaliation by Britain's imperialist competitors. "In this, as in every other case," the IMG said, "internationalism is not merely a moral gesture but is in the material interests of the working class."

Instead of import controls, the IMG proposed a series of measures including a shorter workweek with no loss of pay; "smash the £6 pay limit"; nationalization under workers control of all failing companies; an end to cuts in public expenditures; the implementation of "socially useful public works"; and open the books to "prepare a workers plan for production which defends jobs."

Special emphasis, the IMG said, must be placed on the needs of young, Black, and women workers to guarantee that they are

not "the first victims of unemployment and scapegoats of the capitalist crisis." The labour movement must support the independent organization of Blacks and women, the IMG said, and defend their right to separate caucuses in the unions. The statement also called for the repeal of the racist 1971 Immigration Act and for defence of the rights of immigrant workers.

To implement its proposals, the IMG called for "united action with all the labour movement" to establish Right to Work Committees, and a replacement of the Harold Wilson/Denis Healey leadership of the Labour government with one that will "fight in the interests of the working class."

The International Socialists, who organized contingents under the banner of the Rank-and-File Caucuses, were perhaps the most visible political tendency on the march. Their program, put forward in a special issue of *Socialist Worker*, called for a series of economic demands, including a shorter workweek with no loss in pay, an end to the pay limit, occupation and nationalization of firms threatening redundancies, and the establishment of trade-union rights for the unemployed.

The Healyite Workers Revolutionary party organized a contingent of about forty persons behind the banner of the Central London Building Workers Action Group.

The Workers Socialist League, formed by about 200 trade-union activists expelled from the WRP last year, organized a contingent and leafleted in support of the march. "We call for a rising scale of wages to offset inflation, work sharing on full pay instead of redundancies, opening of the books to workers' committees, and organising of the unemployed into the trade unions," their leaflet said. □

### Might Work Better as Gasoline

Production has been halted at two Seven-Up soft-drink bottling plants in Canada after federal testers found impermissible levels of lead in the carbonated beverages.

Seven-Up Ltd. of Mississauga, Ontario, and Seven-Up Montréal Ltee. recalled all cans of their soft drinks from stores December 5, agreeing to halt production until obtaining a supply of cans that are not sealed with lead solder.

Philip Campbell, general manager of the Ontario plant, said that it had been canning soft drinks for three years. He declined to estimate how long it had given customers a free dose of unadvertised lead. "We haven't any three-year-old cans to test," he said.

Company officials assured the public that "there is no danger of a person becoming immediately ill from drinking the canned product."

### Growing Support for Women's Rights in Ireland

By Rebecca Finch

DUBLIN—"We're from Sligo—that's in the west of Ireland, where W.B. Yeats lived. I saw you on television the other night. I've been in Dublin visiting for only a day and you don't know how good it is to meet you."

"I read your pamphlet *Abortion and the Catholic Church* not too long ago. Do you know about Constance Markievicz? She was a famous Irish feminist."

"You really gave it to them the other night. Irish women will really support someone like you."

Evelyn Reed and I had stopped at a tea shop in central Dublin. In the short time we were there, three people approached us to talk about Reed's appearance on station RTE's (Radio-Telefis Eireann) "Late Late Show." Produced and moderated by Gaye Byrne, the program is known as the one that "opens the debate on controversial subjects."

Reed, a leader of the American Socialist Workers party, is a noted anthropologist and author of the book *Woman's Evolution*. RTE had flown her to Dublin to appear on the show, and 1.25 million viewers saw her on November 29 explaining women's role in history. Ever since, both men and women had been coming up to her on the street to tell of their support for her ideas and about the struggle of Irish women for their liberation.

Irish law is strongly influenced by Catholic church doctrine. Students attend sex-segregated schools run by the church hierarchy. The church's position on contraception and abortion is written into law.

The sale or prescription of contraceptive devices is illegal, although individuals may import nonmedical contraceptive devices for private use. According to the Dublin newspaper *Irish Press*, 1,217 Irish women went to England for abortions last year, with the number of illegal abortions unknown but presumably higher.

The church hierarchy's attitude toward the family is inscribed in the 1937 Irish constitution, which enforces the view that women's place is in the home:

In particular the State recognizes that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in economic labour to the neglect of their duties in the home. (Article 41/2/1 and 2.)

This same constitution forbids divorce. In 1972, a court ruling found that a woman is

still merely her husband's "chattel."

Groups like the Family League and the League of Decency campaign to keep these laws on the books. When public meetings are called to gather support for the right to contraception or other rights for women, these groups use disruptive tactics to try to break them up.

The obvious need for a strong movement of women for their liberation has not gone unanswered in Ireland. During her five-day visit to Dublin, Evelyn Reed talked with a broad sector of Irish feminist activists about the growing women's liberation movement.

On November 30, Reed spoke at the Royal Dublin Society, a prestigious academic institution. About 175 feminists, students, and academicians heard her lecture on "Feminism and Women's Biology." Within ten minutes of the end of the meeting, the twenty-five available copies of *Woman's Evolution* and eighteen copies of *Problems of Women's Liberation*, also written by Reed, had been sold.

After the lecture, a reception attended by fifty persons was held at the AIM Women's Center. AIM is a women's group organized to work on legal and social welfare matters related to women and the family.

We talked with June Levine, one of the organizers of these meetings and a founder of the first women's liberation group in Ireland, called the Irish Women's Liberation Movement.

Levine is a researcher at RTE for the "Late Late Show" and helped organize Reed's television appearance. She described one of the first demonstrations of women in Ireland for the right to contraceptives—the "Contraceptives Train Event" of May 1971.

"The demonstration was a protest against the law that at the time made not only the sale but also the importation of contraceptives illegal," Levine said. Forty women, single and married, went by train from Dublin to Belfast (where contraceptives are legally sold) and bought them in bulk. They returned later that day, openly showing their purchases to customs officials (they were not impounded) and held a rally attended by 300 supporters.

The struggle for the right to contraception has been carried on by two campus women's liberation groups, which also sponsored meetings for Reed. The University College of Dublin Women's Group invited Reed to give the opening speech at its Women's Week on December 1. One hun-

dred students attended the lecture. Other speeches that week were to cover such topics as abortion, sexuality, and the family.

On December 3, the Trinity College Women's Group invited Reed to hold a question-and-answer session about the women's liberation movement. The 110 students attending were primarily interested in the need for autonomous women's groups that could plan action campaigns on such issues as the right to contraception.

One of the main activities of this group is putting up posters throughout the city advertising the student government's voluntary contraceptive services. An article in the *Irish Press* reported that the response was so overwhelming that the contraceptives had to be immediately restocked.

The fight for free and legal contraceptives is a focus for Irish Women United, a Dublin women's group that sponsored a meeting for Reed on December 2 at the Powers Hotel. Speaking to an audience of 125 persons on "Women's Evolution and Human Nature," Reed explained during the question-and-answer period that she thought the availability of contraception and abortion were necessary prerequisites for women's liberation, and encouraged women to join the organized feminist movement in Ireland.

After the meeting, Reed spoke with Anne Speed, an activist in the group and also a member of the Revolutionary Marxist Group (Irish section of the Fourth International). Speed told us about two recent actions in the campaign for the right to contraception.

On November 12, Irish Women United sponsored a "Right to Choose" rally of 400 persons for free and legal contraceptives. Some weeks before, 110 men and women picketed a bishop's home to protest an antiabortion, anticontraception pastoral letter that was read in all the churches. "The main themes of the picket line were 'Separation of church and state,' and 'A woman's right to choose,'" Speed said.

Reed was also interviewed by reporters from the *Independent* and *Irish Press*, and her lecture at the Powers Hotel was reported by the *Irish Times*.

I asked Reed at the end of the tour what she thought about the prospects for the feminist movement in Ireland. "Irish women have a special problem—the very strong dominance of the Catholic church," she said.

"In many respects, church and state in Ireland are not separate. To answer the church's claims of being the 'guardian of morality,' women here must convince others of the greater morality of saving women's lives through the legalization of abortion and contraception. That's a big task, but one I know the growing Irish feminist movement is equal to." □



## Peronist Regime Mounts Campaign to 'Annihilate Subversives'

By Judy White

Military and police forces escalated the Peronist regime's "antisubversive" campaign to new heights starting in mid-November. What had up to then been operations in the rural areas of Tucumán designed to ferret out guerrillas were extended to cities throughout the country.

Roadblocks, occupations of neighborhoods, and house-by-house raids were carried out by more than 5,000 troops in Santa Fe Province starting November 17. Operations of similar scope took place in Rosario, Mendoza, San Luis, Entre Ríos, Zárate, Mar del Plata, Bahía Blanca, Río Negro, Chaco, Ishuaia, and Río Gallegos in the first four days of the "antisubversive crusade."

On December 1, for the first time since the November 1974 declaration of the state of siege, troops were seen on the streets of Buenos Aires.

Traditional year-end vacations for all military officers were canceled November 29 and special training in "annihilating extremists" was begun.

Meanwhile, operations in the province of Tucumán were escalated to include daily bombing missions by the Argentine air force.

The operations were accompanied by massive arrests. While no precise data is available on their scope, a report in the December 5 issue of *Le Monde* estimated that at least 3,000 persons were detained in the first days of the campaign.

Targets of the repressive sweep have included members of left organizations and of bourgeois formations that have been critical of official policy.

However, the main target of the "crusade" is the latest discovery of the Peronist regime—"the factory guerrilla" or worker militant.

A trial run in hunting this variety of "guerrilla" was carried out November 20 in the camp of striking miners at Sierra Grande. The police and military assaulted the camp and arrested more than 300 of the 1,500 miners who work at the complex. Among those arrested were the leaders of the local AOMA (Asociación Obrera Minera Argentina—Argentine Mine Workers Association) and the strike committee.

On November 26 the army and Buenos Aires provincial police fired on the headquarters of the Asociación Obrera Textil (AOT—Textile Workers Association) in Ramos Mejía, where a meeting of metalworkers was in progress. The meeting had

been called to plan strategy in a fight for wage increases and other benefits. Outside, awaiting the decisions of the meeting, a large crowd of metalworkers had gathered. They became agitated as the meeting dragged on because of a dispute between official union leaders and class-struggle tendencies from several of the factories.

Supporters of the illegal guerrilla organization Montoneros began painting slogans on the walls of the union headquarters and hung their flag from the building.

This provided the pretext for repressive forces to move in. Tear gas was used and machine guns were fired, breaking up the meeting. Fifteen persons were arrested, including Mercedes Isabel Morillas, a member of the PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party), who was wounded in the attack. Morillas is a metalworker at the FAPESA plant in the area.

Side by side with the escalation of official violence has been a step-up in the actions of ultraright murder gangs. There are reports of as many as forty deaths from terrorist actions in the first six days of December.

Eleven persons were killed in two attacks

in Tucumán.

A truck containing seven bodies was blown up in an explosion that rocked the whole city at dawn December 1. The truck had been stationed at the site where army Captain Humberto Viola and his daughter were killed by guerrillas exactly a year ago.

Four more persons died the following day when a bomb exploded in the home of Clarissa Lea Place. Her father, Arturo, a couple living in the house, and their four-year-old child were the victims. Clarissa Lea Place was one of the political prisoners gunned down in the 1972 prison massacre at Trelew.

Also bombed in the same wave of violence were the Tucumán headquarters of the Communist party and of the Frente de Izquierda Popular (People's Left Front), and the home of the vice-president of the Partido Revolucionario Cristiano (Christian Revolutionary party).

Nine Argentine, Peruvian, and Bolivian university students were kidnapped from a home where they were studying together and gunned down in Córdoba December 4. A rightist commando group took credit for the murders. □

## Mobilizations Defeat Attempt to Smash Auto Union

An attempt by the Peronist regime to smash the 120,000-member Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor (SMATA—Union of Automotive Machinists and Allied Trades) failed December 3 when Labor Minister Carlos Ruckauf was forced to rescind an order that would have placed the union under the control of the Unión Obrera Metalúrgica (UOM—Metalworkers Union).

Ruckauf backed down after SMATA led its members in a ten-day general strike that paralyzed auto production and mobilized tens of thousands of auto workers in a series of street demonstrations, marches, and rallies.

José Páez, a leader of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party) and former leader of the auto workers in Córdoba, explained what was behind the regime's move in an article in the December 5 issue of the PST's weekly newspaper, *Avanzada Socialista*:

If we look at what has happened in recent months, there can be no room for doubt that the auto workers have been in the vanguard. SMATA was in the vanguard in Córdoba in forcing the

removal of Lacabanne.<sup>1</sup> The union there conducted the biggest workers mobilizations against the rightist kidnappings and assassinations and in support of the release of imprisoned trade-union leaders.

It was SMATA that broke the Cafiero Plan,<sup>2</sup> winning a 40 percent wage increase for workers throughout the industry, although the government left the quarterly wage-adjustment clause in their contract pending. And it was also the auto workers who ensured that the 150,000 pesos granted by the government were not counted as part of that raise.

It was through SMATA that the compañeros at Mercedes Benz won the leadership they wanted, thanks to their struggle and the sympathy they were able to arouse in other factories of the industry.

And, once again, it will be the compañeros of SMATA who go out to fight in two or three months for their most precious conquest—the quarterly wage adjustment. □

1. Raúl Oscar Lacabanne, the rightist governor of the province of Córdoba, appointed by the federal government after the February 1974 provincial coup that ousted the liberal Peronists there. Lacabanne was finally removed from office September 18, 1975.—*IP*

2. One of the austerity programs the Peronist regime has tried to impose in recent months.—*IP*

## French Draftees Form Union to Fight for Democratic Rights

By F.L. Derry

PARIS—After about six months of relative quiescence, the French soldiers movement has struck a new and dramatic note with the formation of a Union of Soldiers affiliated with the CFDT (Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor) local in Besançon.

The soldiers union was immediately condemned by leaders of the Socialist party, the Communist party, the CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor), and by Edmond Maire, national head of the CFDT.

The new union itself is small. Reportedly it has only nineteen members and thirty to forty sympathizers in the Nineteenth Regiment, but it has been officially recognized by the CFDT local in the area. This has brought the question of the defense of democratic rights of soldiers to the center of the stage in the organized workers movement.

The appeal circulated by the soldiers called on other soldiers committees to follow their example and organize themselves into trade unions, to coordinate their efforts, and to "unite in a general assembly for the creation of a soldiers trade union independent of the military hierarchy and linked to all other workers trade unions." The union has been declared illegal by the army and must function clandestinely.

Information pour les Droits du Soldat (IDS—Information for the Rights of the Soldier), an antimilitarist group led by the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU—United Socialist party), initiated the formation of the new union.

IDS also has ties to the left wings of both the CFDT and the Socialist party. It was originally led by the Alliance Marxiste Révolutionnaire (AMR—Revolutionary Marxist Alliance), headed by Michel Pablo. The AMR has since merged with the PSU, but the former leaders of the AMR are still in the leadership of the IDS.

For more than a year, soldiers committees have been forming in the army. The movement began with circulation of a petition, the "Appeal of the One Hundred," directed to the presidential candidates in the May 1974 elections. The appeal called for full democratic rights for soldiers.

For the last five or six months, the visible activity of the various soldiers committees seemed to decline. Many leaders of the soldiers' struggle said that this was not the time for demonstrations and other "spectac-

ular" actions, and they concentrated instead on building and solidifying the soldiers committees.

About seventy soldiers committees are now said to exist, most of which publish their own clandestine newspaper directed to their fellow soldiers. Occasionally these journals are mimeographed by local trade unions. A few committees now meet in union headquarters. The Besançon committee, however, is the first to be granted the right of direct affiliation to a trade union.

Attending the news conference that announced the formation of the union was Charles Piaget, national secretary of the PSU and head of the local union federation in Besançon. He is also the union delegate at the Lip watch factory and was one of the central leaders of the famous strike and factory occupation that took place there two years ago. Also in attendance were representatives of the IDS.

No representatives were there, however, from the other two important antimilitarist groupings in France, the Comité de Défense des Appelés (CDA—Committee for the Defense of Draftees) and the Comité Antimilitariste (Antimilitarist Committee). Both these groups, while supporting the formation of the soldiers union, have criticized the IDS for acting in a sectarian manner.

*Rouge*, the weekly supported by the Trotskyist Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR—Revolutionary Communist League), said in its November 7 issue: "The attitude of the IDS in this affair is somewhat surprising. Once again the impression prevails that this group has sought to turn a development to its own account, taking credit for a correct initiative by the soldiers movement."

There were others, however, who criticized not only the tactics used to form the union but attacked the very existence of the union itself. The November 9-10 *Le Monde* reported that three days after the announcement of the formation of the union, "all the traditional parties of the left, with the exception of the PSU, expressed their disapproval of the initiative. . . ."

"As for the trade unions, the CGT and Force Ouvrière [Labor Force] reiterated their opposition to union organizing in the army. For its part the CFDT has to a certain extent disavowed its union local in Besançon, along with one of the local's leaders, Charles Piaget. . . ."

Against such a formidable array of opposition, the formation of a soldiers

union is a daring step indeed. But the truth of the matter is that all the mass organizations of the French working class are fundamentally opposed to the basic demand of the soldiers movement: Full, unconditional democratic rights for all soldiers.

The response of Charles Hernu, who speaks for the Socialist party in all matters involving military affairs, was unfortunately all too typical. He urged his followers to halt the growth of "the ranks of those who are organized—or claim to be—around adventurist and irresponsible demands."

Following the news conference at which the soldiers union was announced, Hernu said: "There are many on both our right and left who would like to destroy the army, that is, injure the freedom of our country to remain independent within the framework of existing alliances." If the French government wants to create a professional army or to reintegrate into NATO, he claimed, "the initiative taken in Besançon paradoxically runs along the same lines. . . ."

This is not the first time the threat of the formation of a professional army has been used against the soldiers movement. If you fight for too many democratic rights, if you struggle against conscription, if you improve the salary of the French soldier, it is claimed, you are only increasing the danger of the formation of a professional army.

Hernu recognizes that one of the main dangers to the continued existence of the bourgeois army is the belief by broad masses of soldiers that they are entitled to full democratic rights. He noted this threat in an article in the November 12 *Le Monde*: "In uniform, the soldier remains a citizen—although there has to be a certain minimum of discipline, particularly in combat and combat training, or otherwise there would be no national defense." (Emphasis added.)

Democratic rights except when they conflict with the needs of military discipline means no democratic rights at all. This is the argument of the French government—soldiers have been given all democratic rights compatible with the needs of national defense.

French soldiers, however, see no need to sacrifice any of their rights. It is this that gives the call for full democratic rights a revolutionary dynamic. It fundamentally clashes with the needs of the bourgeois state while appealing to the soldiers at the level of mass consciousness.

Unfortunately, the policy followed by the



French Stalinists in relation to the soldiers movement is not much different from that of the Social Democrats. This was displayed in its most bizarre form by the pro-Peking branch of Stalinism.

The Maoists of *l'Humanité Rouge* have attacked the activities of the French Communist party in the soldiers' struggle. They accuse the CP of undermining France's sovereignty and national defense by supporting, no matter in how hesitant and critical a manner, even some of the soldiers' demands.

Their attack was best expressed in the form of a leaflet widely distributed on May Day and addressed "to all workers, to all patriots." While a little long, it is worth quoting in full in order to really appreciate the ultimate logic of Stalinist politics.

A war threatens Europe.

The two superpowers, the U.S.A. and the USSR, have entered into a relentless conflict for the domination of Europe.

American imperialism, held in check in all regions of the world, is seeking to maintain its positions in Europe at any price. This is a matter of vital importance for it. That is why it is reinforcing its combat troops in Europe.

Russian social-imperialism for its part is seeking to eliminate its rival. It is on the offensive. It has already imposed its fascist yoke on Eastern Europe. It does not tolerate the slightest desire for independence in these countries. It controls their economies and pillages their riches. Like Hitler in the past, it has invaded Czechoslovakia. It imposes military dictatorship on the countries it dominates.

Today it is preparing aggression against Western Europe. It is massing several million soldiers on its frontiers while relentlessly increasing its number of tanks, planes, and missiles. Its ships and submarines sail the oceans and seas that border Western Europe.

While it prepares war and churns out militarist propaganda for the Soviet people, it continues to talk about "détente" and "peace" in the West European countries. Like Hitler, it is trying to lull the vigilance of the peoples and countries of Europe.

In our own country it has a fifth column that is paving the way for its aggression: the leaders of the P"C"F. They will do anything to weaken the national defense of France and render it incapable of preserving its national independence. At the same time that their masters are increasing their nuclear armaments, they call on France to renounce them.

In the army they are conducting a campaign to reduce military service to six months—whereas in the USSR it lasts three years. Their aim is to make it impossible to give draftees any military training, thus opening the way to a professional army.

The Marchais's, Leroy's, and Kanapas are the heirs of the Déats and Dorjots. *They are the new kollabos.\**

On this May 1, 1975, Marxist-Leninist Communists call on you to demonstrate:

- For the defense of national independence in face of the two superpowers. . . .

- For strengthening the national defense.
- For a rapprochement between France and the countries of the Third World, particularly socialist China.
- For the satisfaction of the workers and people's demands, for democratic rights. [All emphasis in original.]

The Maoists function as "patriots of People's China." They hold that the "social imperialism" of the Soviet Union is a more immediate danger than American imperialism because they believe it to be a more direct threat to China itself. They have followed this position to its logical conclusion by allying themselves with French national patriotism as a weapon against the Soviet Union, a position impermissible in revolutionary politics.

They claim to support French independence and national sovereignty and are therefore against any moves that might conceivably weaken the French army, which they see as a bulwark against the "imperialist ambitions of the two superpowers." Naturally they oppose any movement for democratic rights for the soldiers in the French army, and they accuse the French Communist party of serving Moscow's foreign policy aims by giving even partial and reluctant support to this movement.

In Paris on June 19 *l'Humanité Rouge* cosponsored a meeting with two other groups. The other organizations involved were the Union des Jeunes pour le Progrès (UJP—Union of Youth for Progress, the main Gaullist youth group) and Nouvelle Action Française, a monarchist group of the extreme right. Thus the Maoists, posing as superpatriots, have found common cause with some of the most reactionary forces in the country today.

The Maoists of *l'Humanité Rouge* serve as a grotesque caricature of their more sophisticated Stalinist brethren in the Communist party. Like the Maoists, the Moscow-oriented Stalinists claim to be the best defenders of French independence—that is, the best patriots.

Pierre Villon, a CP deputy, expressed this point of view on the floor of the French National Assembly last year: "For our part we believe that in times of peace the army must prepare the nation in its totality to defend itself against any aggressor whatsoever."

Political Bureau member Paul Laurent told the CP's Twenty-first Congress that "for Communists, assuring the nation's security and independence is an imperative. Democratic France requires a policy of national defense and a military capacity appropriate to this endeavor."

At a major news conference on military affairs reported in the February 27 issue of *l'Humanité*, daily newspaper of the French Communist party, Pierre Villon related this "policy of national defense" to soldiers'

demands for democratic rights.

"In seeking to suppress the citizen's democratic rights once the citizen becomes a soldier, the government is giving the army an unfavorable image," he said. "It is making the army into a body that is isolated from the people, turned inward on itself.

"It is confusing that which is necessary in military discipline with that which is arbitrary."

This "policy of national defense" involving a "necessary" amount of military discipline is fundamentally opposed to the concept of *full and complete democratic rights* for soldiers. No matter how they twist and turn, no matter which individual democratic rights they are willing to grant the soldiers, they can never support this general demand.

The French Stalinists and Social Democrats oppose the slogan "full and complete democratic rights for soldiers" in the same way their American counterparts opposed the slogan "for immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam." By supporting a "necessary" amount of military discipline they cannot be consistent defenders of democratic rights for soldiers.

Thus, after some initial hesitations, the CP refused to support the Appeal of the One Hundred, the petition that launched the soldiers movement. This in spite of the fact that many of the members of the Young Communists in the army signed the petition as individuals.

The CP was not able to directly oppose the appeal but instead launched its own "Statut Démocratique de Soldat" (Soldier's Bill of Rights). This was a long resolution presented by Communist deputies in the French parliament. It recognized many of the same reforms spelled out in the appeal while at the same time pointing to the need for a "minimum amount" of military discipline "solely" for the purpose of providing an adequate fighting force to protect France's national sovereignty.

The CP has also refused to back the call for a trade union for soldiers. There are many different concepts of what such a union should be. The Comité Antimilitariste and *Révolution!*, an ultraleft group, support one conception. The LCR and the Comité de Défense des Appelés hold a second view. And the IDS and the PSU hold another.

But the Communist party's attacks on the new union stem from a fear of any steps that may result in the development of a strong, independent organization of soldiers committees, struggling without compromise for full democratic rights. Such attacks can only weaken the soldiers movement and open it to the threat of police victimization and repression. The French government and the military hierarchy have shown themselves to be only too ready to oblige. □

\*Déat and Doriot were CP leaders who became fascists in the 1930s. Marchais, Leroy, and Kanapa are three leaders of the CP today. "Kollabos" was the term used to describe French collaborators with the Nazis during the Second World War.

## Trotsky's 'Writings'—A Unique Tool for Marxist Education

[Pathfinder Press, publisher of the series *Writings of Leon Trotsky*, has announced that copies of the latest volume, covering the year 1929, are now available.

[In twelve volumes, the series covers the writings of Trotsky's last exile—from the time Stalin deported him from the Soviet Union to Turkey in 1929, to the time of his assassination in Mexico in 1940—except for books and pamphlets of those years that are permanently in print.

[The following interview with George Breitman, an editor of the series, appeared in the November 21 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

*Militant:* Ever since the Trotsky Writings series began, Pathfinder Press has given the *Militant's* readers a progress report every two years or so on how the series is developing and what to expect in the way of further volumes. The last report was printed in our paper in September 1973. Is the publication of the latest volume—for the year 1929—a good occasion to bring us up to date?

*Breitman:* Yes, the publication of the 1929 volume is an excellent occasion for a new report. It marks the beginning of the last stage of the project. And it happens to be the first, chronologically, of the whole series.

*Militant:* Perhaps you could explain that a little? You started publishing the volumes about six years ago and you're only now publishing the opening volume, chronologically. Why is that, why did you do it backwards?

*Breitman:* The main reason, I think, was that we were impatient to get started. We already had translations of the most complete material for the years of Trotsky's Mexican exile (1937-40), and we didn't want to wait until we had collected and translated the earlier material, which would take years. So we began with Trotsky's last year, 1939-40, and worked our way backwards a year at a time.

We thought this was acceptable because each of the volumes is independent of the others in the sense that it can be read and understood by itself, with the help of the prefaces and explanatory notes.

But I must admit that we have got some

criticism for the sequence in which we published the volumes. A number of people have told us that while they are glad we put them out, they are not going to start reading them, and in some cases buying them, until the initial volume of the series is available.

Well, for their benefit I want to stress the fact that the initial volume, covering the first eleven months of Trotsky's last exile, is now out. So they can start reading the series without further delay.

*Militant:* Then the series is now complete?

*Breitman:* No, not entirely, or rather, not in its final form. Of the twelve volumes, the first seven, for 1929 to mid-1935, covering Trotsky's stay in Turkey and France, are finished and will not be revised. Also in their final form are the last two years of Trotsky's stay in Mexico, 1938-40. That makes nine.

But we are revising and expanding the volumes covering Trotsky's stay in Norway (1935-36) and the first half of his stay in Mexico (1937-38). Since we put out the first edition of those volumes in 1970, we have acquired a great deal of "new" material, including some that had never been published before.

So we have been reediting them. They are so much bigger than the first editions that they will take three volumes, instead of the original two. One of these has already been sent to the printer.

*Militant:* In the Pathfinder report two years ago, it was said the project would be completed in 1975. What would you give now as the final date?

*Breitman:* Publishers and editors tend to suffer from overoptimism, even the ones trying to be accurate. So all I'd better say is that the project could be finished in 1976, and we hope it will.

At the risk of sounding too defensive, I'd like to add that we haven't done badly with the schedule we set. When we began in 1969, we said we would try to publish two volumes a year. Six and a half years later we have nine volumes all finished, not counting the two we did over completely and the ones that are partly ready.

The record looks even better when you recall that we decided to take some of the material that could have been used in the *Writings* and publish it as specialized "companion" volumes. Three of these have already been published—*The Transitional*

*Program for Socialist Revolution*, *The Spanish Revolution (1931-39)*, and *The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany*—and a fourth is on the way, *Leon Trotsky On France*, an expansion of the old *Whither France?*

If you count them, and important companion pamphlets like *On the Trade Unions*, then you can say we have even surpassed our schedule. Which is pretty good, considering the fact that Pathfinder's financial resources are quite limited.

*Militant:* In round numbers, how much has been added to the published body of Trotsky's work in English by the *Writings*, or by the *Writings* and companion volumes combined?

*Breitman:* I think I can answer that question if it is limited to the eleven-and-a-half-year period between 1929 and 1940. The *Writings*, when completed, will be around 5,000 book pages and the companion volumes around 1,000.

Besides this there exist another 4,000 book pages—the body of work prepared outside of the project we began in 1969, which includes such books as *The History of the Russian Revolution*, *My Life*, *In Defense of Marxism*, etc.

So altogether there will be around 10,000 book pages in English from Trotsky's last exile, of which our project will have collected and published or republished 6,000 in book form. This includes everything by Trotsky from those years published in any language, and much that has never been published before.

*Militant:* How much of the *Writings* has never been published before, or what proportion of the whole is it?

*Breitman:* I can't say for the series as a whole, but I can for the new volume covering 1929.

Around 10 percent of the book has never been published before anywhere. Another 33 percent has never appeared in English before. So for people who read only English, over 40 percent of the book can be called "new."

In addition, another 15 percent of the book was retranslated for this volume, because the original translations done almost half a century ago were so poor or incomplete.

As for the remainder of the book, which was published a long time ago in various



periodicals that are now difficult to locate, I doubt that there are fifty people alive who ever read it all.

In a certain sense, therefore, in a real sense, and for all practical purposes, it is a new book for today's readers.

*Militant:* What has been the public response to the *Writings* so far? How are they selling?

*Breitman:* Better than we anticipated. We were afraid that only a few hundred people would be interested enough to buy them, but each of the early volumes has been selling out its first printing of 3,000 to 4,000 copies in the first two to three years, and four already have had to be reprinted. All the companion volumes have also been reprinted.

*Militant:* So the *Writings* volumes are a commercial success?

*Breitman:* No, no, no. I didn't say that and I didn't mean to imply that.

No commercial publisher in his right mind would sink so much money into such a large project unless he had reason to expect sales two or three times as big as ours. When you publish books with a small press run, as we do, the cost per volume is quite high.

If the books continue to sell, the best we can hope for in the long run is that we'll break even or almost even. And that will be possible only because a number of friends have made substantial financial contributions toward their publication and because most of the editorial and translation work was donated, that is, unpaid.

We are hoping that sales will go up now that the beginning of the series has been published. And we are counting heavily on continued financial donations from friends, especially now when the inflation of printing, paper, mailing, and distribution costs is curtailing the number of books Pathfinder can publish.

*Militant:* Are there any other points you want to make before we stop?

*Breitman:* You mean that after all these technical questions you aren't going to ask me why I think it important to read the *Writings*?

*Militant:* All right, consider yourself asked.

*Breitman:* There are obviously many different ways of learning and absorbing the ideas of revolutionary Marxism, and reading is only part of the process. But it is an important part—experience in mass movements and struggles is not sufficient by itself.



Walter Lippmann/Militant

### GEORGE BREITMAN

The greatest teachers were Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky. It doesn't matter which one you begin with; once you connect and break through to one of them, you can easily continue to the others.

But the one who is most accessible to young readers or other beginners, the one it's easiest to begin with today, is Trotsky, I think.

That isn't because Trotsky was a greater revolutionary or a deeper thinker than the other three—not at all. It's because he was closer to us in time, because he lived in a later period, and therefore concerned himself with problems that the other three did not come up against, problems that we are still coping with.

For example: Marx and Engels did not live to see the degeneration of the first workers state, and Lenin lived to see only the very beginning of it. Trotsky not only lived through seventeen years of it, but was able to work out the Marxist explanation and answer to the degeneration.

Similarly, Trotsky, unlike his predecessors, lived through the experiences with fascism in the 1930s, and was able to illuminate that subject like no one before or since.

In addition, Trotsky was a remarkably talented writer and one of the greatest orators of the century, both of which strengthened his capacities as a propagandist and popularizer of Marxism and Leninism.

Trotsky's last exile coincided with the stormy decade of the thirties, when the capitalist world was stricken by the Great Depression, the growth of fascism, imperialist invasions of China and Ethiopia, civil war in Spain, and finally World War II, and when the Soviet Union was convulsed by

forced collectivization, totalitarian purges, and the decimation of the generation that led the revolution in 1917.

He wrote at length and in detail about all these and the other events of the period that posed the basic questions of revolutionary strategy and tactics, always from the standpoint of the interests of the workers and their need for a revolutionary party at home and internationally.

Among these basic questions were the ones dealing with the internal life and struggles of the Fourth International. Looking back a few years before his death, Trotsky said that his work in building the Fourth International was the most important of his life. I think that future historians will support that estimate.

Anyhow, the *Writings* series is the only place where this material can be found, outside of the parts that were printed in *The Spanish Revolution* and *In Defense of Marxism*. Many letters and articles are devoted to his advice and suggestions to the national sections of the Fourth International and its predecessors and to the members of the International Secretariat, and many more record his criticisms when he felt they were making mistakes. Also included are the transcripts of several instructive discussions he held with visitors on problems of both the International and various national sections.

I do not mean to belittle the excellent writing Trotsky did before 1929, but I think his writings in his last exile represent the richest, most mature expression of his political thought, presented in the most lucid and effective fashion.

That is why I think his writings of this period provide a unique kind of educational tool for people who are willing to do a little work to learn what Marxism really is.

The heart of Marxism is its method, its method of analysis. I can't think of a better way of grasping it than by following Trotsky, a master of this method, as he applied it concretely and creatively to a great variety of political and theoretical problems as they arose at a given moment and then as they underwent change throughout the decade.

Readers won't find any cheap, ready-made formulas fitting all situations from such a study, but they will learn how an intelligent Marxist thinks, and some will undoubtedly be helped to learn how to think like Marxists themselves.

I am not advocating that everybody give up other activity and hole up in a reading room. But people who want to equip themselves for an extended period of revolutionary activity should learn everything they can about the Marxist method. I really can't think of a better or more satisfying way of starting to do this than by reading and studying the writings of Trotsky's last exile. □

## 'We Are Outraged at How Much Socialism Is Defiled Here'

[The following interview with dissident East German poet and balladeer Wolf Biermann and philosopher Robert Havemann was conducted a few days before the East German government denied Biermann permission to attend an anti-Franco demonstration in West Germany (see box).

[The interview appeared in the October 23 issue of the West German weekly *Stern*. The translation is by Russell Block.]

\* \* \*

*Stern.* Professor Havemann, Mr. Biermann, about ten years ago both of you were blacklisted in the GDR,<sup>1</sup> but just the same you remain among the most ardent defenders of socialism. We have listened to Biermann's newest love songs, but these love songs are a political indictment. We listened to a record that was brought into the GDR illegally. It was taped in your apartment in East Berlin, Mr. Biermann, and produced in the West, although it is intended for the citizens of the GDR, where it will never be sold. How much schizophrenia does one have to get used to as a citizen of the GDR?

*Biermann.* This is the kind of schizophrenia that results from social conditions in a divided Germany. In my case, certain social conflicts, problems, and paradoxes find their expression in an especially drastic form and with particular clarity.

*Stern.* Are you in this respect a typical representative of the GDR?

*Biermann.* In any case, I am one of the forms in which the GDR expresses itself. Of course, these songs are primarily intended for the people of the GDR. It would certainly be better if VEB Deutsche Schallplatten distributed these songs.

*Stern.* But they don't. What laws did you have to circumvent in order to get this sample record?

*Biermann.* Well, the fact that it is here is certainly not illegal, that it was brought in from across the border. . . .

*Havemann.* So many things come here from the West, why not a record like this? There are certainly a lot of books that are not allowed in through official channels,

but can still be found in the libraries and are even read by [East German CP leader Erich] Honecker.

*Biermann.* Well, to tell the truth, I also wonder how the record got here. I don't know.

*Stern.* One day you found it under your front door?

*Biermann.* One day I woke up and in my mailbox there was this record, neatly folded up. I flattened it under my iron, put it on the turntable, and what do you know, it was my own songs. How nice, I thought, more of these should be made. And as it turns out, there is a company in the West that is willing to do the pressing for me.

*Stern.* And you have never developed doubts about the system that forces you to rely on elves when you are waiting for a package from the West?

*Havemann.* That is not part of the system.

*Stern.* So, you unremittably defend the idea of the GDR?

*Havemann.* No, we are not for the idea of the GDR. We are for socialism in Germany. Naturally, in the GDR at least the first step has been taken. That is why we are for the GDR. That is the only reason. But we are outraged at how much socialism is disavowed and defiled here.

*Biermann.* There is no special GDR "idea."

*Havemann.* We are for overcoming and abolishing capitalism in all of Germany, in all of Europe, everywhere, and for replacing it with socialism.

*Stern.* Might that not have as its result—to take a small example—that no Biermann records would be produced at all?

*Biermann.* Like everyone else, I can only choose between the possibilities open to me, not those I would like to have. There are different concepts about the idea of socialism, ones that are so divergent they have to be discussed with tanks, as we learned in Prague in 1968.

*Stern.* The reflection of this conflict is

also found in your love songs. Really, what kind of socialist country is it that considers a relationship between two people to be a threat to the state?

*Biermann.* That is precisely the polemical aspect of these love songs—social relations come under attack because they strive to disrupt human relations—and, what is more, under the label of socialism. This has its high point in the monopolistic bureaucracy's pet project right now—the palace of the republic.<sup>2</sup>

*Stern.* Your friend Tine, the girl you wrote your songs about, is the daughter of the "design director" for the palace of the republic . . .

*Biermann.* As you can guess when you hear the song, it is once again not a matter of literary invention, but straight, documentary reality. You can imagine that a man like that, who is also a high-level party functionary, isn't exactly a nobody in the social hierarchy of the GDR.

*Stern.* This then was the source of your personal difficulties?

*Biermann.* Tine had begun her medical studies. She was threatened with not being allowed to continue her studies unless she broke off personal relations with me.

*Stern.* How did Tine react?

*Biermann.* She grew up in a carefully protected, ideologically sterile home. Being hurled into the center of the conflict because of love, as ill luck would have it, without really wanting it—this seemed to her like a calamity. It was a bad situation, since she wasn't at all prepared for this sort of confrontation.

*Stern.* Is she at all political?

*Biermann.* Yes and no. Through her upbringing, her parents instilled in her, in the least doctrinaire manner possible, a feeling of absolute love for the GDR and the cause of socialism—but in an interpretation of the GDR and socialism that is contrary to my own.

2. Future home of the GDR Volkskammer (parliament) on the Marx-Engels Platz in East Berlin. Scheduled for completion in March 1976.

1. Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic).—IP



*Stern.* How was the conflict resolved?

*Biermann.* Social pressure, family considerations, naïveté in political matters—all of this led to the collapse of our relationship. She thought she could escape. She ran away from me.

*Stern.* And how long did she stay away?

*Biermann.* Nine months. All of the songs were written during the time of our separation. In this sense, they have everything and nothing to do with Tine. It's the old song of the prince and princess who couldn't get together because the water, the German Democratic water, was much too deep. This coincidence of shocking events was perfectly suited for the literary form of the ballad.

*Stern.* Well, the meaning and the justification of a political system cannot really be to give you material for ballads.

*Havemann.* It does so unwillingly.

*Biermann.* Hence it deserves no thanks.

*Stern.* Is Tine living with you again?

*Biermann.* Yes. The fact that the record doesn't apply, in the nicest way I can imagine, is another story. It could be the theme of another record.

*Stern.* Is Tine able to continue her studies?

*Biermann.* Yes, she still can.

*Stern.* When the record comes out, isn't it possible that it will again complicate your situation, Tine's situation, and her father's situation, too?


*Biermann.* We shall see. Presenting a love story in its political dimensions is a rather bold move, it will inspire anger, enthusiasm, outrage, hate, and sympathy. But I don't want to exaggerate. A song is not a tank, and a volume of poetry is not an army.

*Havemann.* Tanks can be put out of commission by relatively simple technical means; love songs are much harder to deal with.

*Biermann.* And we learned from Brecht that every tank has a fault: It needs a driver. And if the driver has a good song in his head . . .

*Stern.* Is the text known to the authorities in the GDR yet?

## The Wolf Biermann Case



Stern

WOLF BIERMANN

[The following statements were issued by Biermann to protest the East German government's refusal to grant him permission to travel to West Germany to participate in an anti-Franco demonstration. The first was printed in the October 18 issue of the West German daily *Frankfurter Rundschau*. The second was printed with the interview in *Stern*.]

Friday, October 17, 1975

Five days ago (Monday, October 13) I was informed by two officials of the Ministry of Culture that my application for approval for a trip to an anti-Franco rally in the Federal Republic had been approved.

Early this morning when as arranged I went to pick up my visa for an official trip at the Ministry of Culture, instead a gentleman told me: "It is my duty to inform you that your trip cannot be approved. I cannot tell you any more than this." I gave the man the two new songs I had written for this anti-Franco rally, and he promised me that he would forward the text to the people who made the decision. "These people," I said, "should know what they have prevented. Now, since I cannot go, I will tell you that I would have conducted myself in a manner consistent with the political line formulated in these two new songs, and that it goes without saying that I would not have expressed myself on internal socialist problems of the GDR while in the Federal Republic."

I consider this new ban as a provocative insult to all the communists and anti-fascists who organized this rally against the Franco regime scheduled for the day after tomorrow. This gross

disrespect will incense many socialists in the GDR and West Germany.

In addition, those responsible for this arbitrary decision will be forced to justify the step they have taken among themselves and before the public by reheating the old stew of slanders against me. And they will possibly be forced to quash the protest against this cultural cold war with measures that give me every reason for apprehension.

I consider it appropriate to make public on this sad occasion the fact that a little more than a year ago (on May 24, 1974) Staatssekretär Löffler in the Ministry of Culture conveyed to me a malevolent invitation to leave the GDR.

I have the firm intention of continuing to live in the GDR. My relationship to this state is characterized by an attitude of critical solidarity. As it says in the song: None of us has found the red philosopher's stone. Despite all the unpleasantness, all the difficulties of my personal lot, I consider the GDR to be the better of the two German states.

\* \* \*

After ten years of blacklisting, I unexpectedly received on Monday, October 13, permission to go to the Federal Republic for an appearance at an anti-Franco rally in Offenbach. On this nice Monday I felt that the interview I gave *Stern* five days ago about my love songs had been outdated in the most pleasant way.

By now five days have passed again. In this short time I wrote three new songs against the terror of the Franco regime. But two hours before my scheduled departure, instead of receiving the promised visa from the Ministry of Culture, I was abruptly and without comment informed that the trip was not approved. I am frustrated, sad, and indignant. But it might interest the reader of the *Stern* interview to know that my next record after the love songs will not have the far too obvious title "songs of hate." My attitude of critical solidarity toward the GDR is based on the belief that the GDR is a society in transition to socialism despite all the bureaucratic deformation. And therefore in my political judgment this state is historically superior in principle to any bourgeois society.

If you know not only my shocking name but also my songs, you will understand that my attitude toward this "better German country" does not depend on whether I am being celebrated or persecuted here at the moment.

*Biermann.* I'm absolutely sure it is.

*Stern.* And there has been no reaction as yet?

*Biermann.* No.

*Havemann.* I don't think anything will happen.

*Stern.* Why? Have conditions become more liberal in the GDR under Honecker?

*Havemann.* You have to grant the people around Honecker one thing: They're at least smart enough to understand that it is in their interests not to start a row with us—what do you say in the West—"critics of the system." They have recognized that they actually help us when they do this, that they would create a deep receptivity for the record and its political content. They don't want this kind of row. They want to appear in the West as serious, worldly people.

*Stern.* Then the system hasn't become more liberal, just smarter?

*Havemann.* The Russians have gained experience, too. They don't throw Sakharov into prison. With other people, where there is less publicity, less attention—they are a bit less cautious about how they handle them.

*Stern.* Are politically disagreeable people still jailed in the GDR?

*Biermann.* Just as before. We know of cases enough.

*Havemann.* These so-called ordinary people are jailed for a fraction of what we say or do every day.

*Stern.* Aren't you afraid?

*Biermann.* I am afraid.

*Havemann.* The only people who are not afraid are those who do not know that they are in danger or are too dumb to see it.

*Biermann.* Once our ideas about democratic socialism have brought the people of the GDR into motion—then the rulers may decide that it is more useful, more expedient to jail us. At such a time, it may seem necessary to them to smash us in a spectacular manner, just to let others see what is in store for them.

*Stern.* How many supporters do you have?

*Havemann.* More than the party.

*Biermann.* You wiseacre.

*Stern.* The SED<sup>3</sup> has two million persons.

*Havemann.* Two million members, not supporters.

*Stern.* How can you determine who your supporters are?

*Havemann.* You notice it in the receptivity of people you meet, who you don't know at all, but who know who you are.

*Stern.* What would your chances be to organize your criticisms of the system that you now put forward in an individual, and thus in a certain sense nonbinding, way?

*Havemann.* We don't need to do this. All the organizational prerequisites for the dissemination of ideas are already present in the GDR. They don't have to be created. There is the party, the mass organizations . . .

*Stern.* But they are not going to disseminate your ideas.

*Havemann.* On the contrary. Even while refuting us they organize the dissemination of our ideas. Many comrades have to read what we publish in the West as a part of their job. Broadcasts from the West having to do with us are transcribed ten times over and sent to party bodies where they are read by hundreds and thousands of people, and, of course, by thousands more who are not supposed to read them. This has an influence on the politically active portion of the population—namely, those middle and upper party functionaries who are already burdened with second thoughts. These people are not party supporters. They are people who have to make a living by putting their time in this apparatus, and they are not at all in agreement with it. They have their gnawing disagreements, and no good way of getting things off their chests except among themselves and in private. Our ideas our spread everywhere. They all listen to Biermann. The Stasi<sup>4</sup> listens to Biermann just like in the Stasi ballad.

*Stern.* That's very sly.

*Biermann.* Why not? Of course, that is only one channel for dissemination—the official one, so to speak. But there are other, lower-level channels, the direct ones. The young people, almost all of whom have

cassette recorders, copy tapes. I think my songs have a wider distribution in the GDR than in the West. All that's necessary is for a single record to get in, it's recut, "re-sawed," as they say here, many, many times. You know the story about the chess board and the grains of wheat.

*Stern.* If you put twice as many grains on each square as you put on the previous one, eventually it amounts to *x* billion. On this account both of you still choose to live in the GDR instead of the Federal Republic?

*Havemann.* Yes, of course. Things in the Federal Republic are getting lousier all the time. Franz Josef Strauss, official blacklisting . . .

*Stern.* Perhaps that's a trick they learned from the GDR.

*Havemann.* . . . the disillusioning developments in the left, and the marked tendency toward restoration. Add to that crises, mass unemployment. As the capitalist crisis deepens, its fascist tendencies grow stronger.

*Stern.* In comparison with the GDR, the Federal Republic is still more liberal by far.

*Biermann.* From a historical point of view it certainly is unjust and politically perverse that bourgeois society, this syphilitic whore with three coats of makeup, can parade in front of us while we stand there hanging our heads—heads full of great ideas, great plans and expectations, and great real opportunities.

*Stern.* You say from a historical point of view. Can you give an example of where there are more individual liberties in a socialist society than there are in bourgeois society?

*Biermann.* Czechoslovakia in 1968 has shown how quickly purely formal socialism can develop into the next higher phase—socialist democracy.

*Stern.* Doesn't the example of Czechoslovakia in 1968 prove just the opposite—the complete suppression of freedom of opinion?

*Biermann.* I completely disagree because in this connection I always remember that fine quotation from Brecht: "Our defeats prove nothing except that we who fight against baseness are too few, and from the observers we expect that they are at least ashamed." For me the Prague Spring has very much in common with the Paris Commune. The fact that the commune was crushed after seventy-two great days, rich in experience, was not taken by the commu-

3. Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity party, the East German CP).—IP

4. Staatssicherheits Dienst (State Security Agency, political police).—IP



nists of that day as proof that it is not possible to carry out a socialist revolution. Just the opposite.

*Havemann.* Marx and his friends celebrated this event as the first instance of historical proof that democratic socialism is possible, despite the defeat.

*Stern.* *The GDR is, however, very far removed from your conception of a socialist society?*

*Havemann.* Of course. In the GDR as in the Federal Republic the negative signs are growing stronger. Here they are following a course whose object is to imitate the West. What the GDR represents politically is not socialism but a highly perfected state monopoly system. There is no socialist economic planning. Basically they are striving for the same economic goals as the West.

*Biermann.* . . . allegedly only better and freer from crises.

*Stern.* *Better in what way?*

*Biermann.* Better—this they can boldly proclaim as long as the people are confined and have no opportunity for making comparisons.

*Stern.* *If the wall were torn down tomorrow would there be mass flight?*

*Havemann.* If nothing else were changed, people would flee en masse.

*Stern.* *Then the only thing that is better about the GDR is the means of repression?*

*Havemann.* Actually socialism should provide freedom of opinion on a scale far beyond the capacities of capitalism, where to a large extent freedom of opinion is only formally maintained.

*Stern.* *How so?*

*Havemann.* To the extent that people could say anything they want without being jailed. Only they would not be allowed to disseminate their opinion at all. But you are right: Under our present-day form of socialism it is worse here. The state functions as the direct agent of repression with police violence. That is why everything here is so wretched, that is why most writers and poets speak only the language of slaves. Compared with conditions here, the freedom of expression in the West is naturally an advance. But it should actually be the other way around.

*Stern.* *A real socialist revolution has not taken place in the GDR at all?*

*Havemann.* It has taken place to the extent that private ownership has been eliminated. But the private owners have not been replaced by the workers as a whole, those who work for a living, in short the people who produce; instead they have been replaced by a party clique, a state hierarchy.

*Biermann.* Nevertheless, this is a decisive, precious step forward over every bourgeois capitalist society. And the example of Prague has led me to understand how quickly a socialist democracy can develop out of a bureaucratically deformed socialism.

*Stern.* *What are the most important criteria you set for a real socialist society?*

*Havemann.* Freedom of speech, freedom of information, freedom to choose one's profession and place of residence, freedom to travel, and the ability to leave the country.

*Biermann.* And in addition, individuals should not be free to make others work for them, to secure privileges for themselves, to organize themselves into a privileged caste, to prevent others from developing by means of a repressive apparatus. There should be no freedom to reestablish bourgeois relations of property and power. In short, no freedom to turn the clock back historically.

*Havemann.* Of course, there is more too. Even now, in socialism human society is making history consciously for the first time. That means that it is indeed necessary to plan the future, to develop visions of our goals. This entails an imaginative attitude toward reality.

*Stern.* *Are you a utopian then?*

*Havemann.* Yes, in the sense that I believe that in order to have progress in historical development it is necessary to be able to imagine the repeal of the conditions one lives in, to be able to imagine how different the world could be from the world we live in.

*Stern.* *But how can you change the world you live in against the party and the Soviet Union?*

*Havemann.* It can only be done with the party and the Soviet Union. Of course, that is a fact that at first could make one very pessimistic. But in Czechoslovakia in 1968 they succeeded in moving the party and the state to change themselves from within.

*Stern.* *But not the Soviet Union.*

*Havemann.* Of course. We found out in

Prague that every development will simply be suppressed as long as there is a regime in the Soviet Union that feels threatened by such developments. But that can change too. There are a huge number of people in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, in the GDR, in Poland, and in the Soviet Union who are of the opinion that the course we have mapped really leads out of the difficulties we face. Capitalism is no longer in a position to solve these problems; this has been clear at least since the ecological crisis. The limits of growth are the limits of capitalism.

*Stern.* *Aren't you grabbing at this growth-crisis argument like a drowning man grabs at a straw? You obviously find it welcome as a new argument for justifying your socialist ideas.*

*Havemann.* What do you mean a straw? It is a historical necessity.

*Stern.* *Originally the idea of socialism was based on, and defended by, human and not ecological necessities.*

*Havemann.* I am convinced that the grounds for the necessity of socialism formulated by Marx one hundred years ago can no longer be formulated today with the same form and the same content as they could then. That does not mean, however, that Marx's analysis was wrong. Modern capitalism lives from growth—that is basically clear even in Marx—but Marx naturally thought that the limits of growth would be reached much earlier.

*Stern.* *Mr. Biermann, on your record there is a song called "The Elbe at Dresden." The last line is: "Everything remains as it is." Have you really resigned yourself?*

*Biermann.* When you are sad, disillusioned, in despair—whether it is because of love or an idea, socialism, for example—then you can easily lose your feeling for change in the world. Then it is easy to arrive at the false conclusion that everything will remain as it is. The Elbe song ends with cautiously happy music, which conflicts with the basic pessimistic tone. And this music is the real message of the record and perhaps our attitude in general: Everything—despite all—changes. □

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## Puerto Rican Socialist Party Holds Second Congress

By Judy White

HATO REY, Puerto Rico—Eight thousand persons attended the closing rally of the second national congress of the Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño (PSP—Puerto Rican Socialist party) December 7. The gathering repeatedly rose to applaud enthusiastically.

“¡Independencia ya! ¡Socialismo ahora mismo!” (Independence now! Socialism immediately!), the crowd chanted, and “¡Mari, seguro, a los yanquis dales duro!” (Mari, really let the yankees have it!)—addressed to PSP General Secretary Juan Mari Brás.

Those attending were predominantly young, about 40 percent women, but there was a sprinkling of older persons. A delegation of PSP members and supporters from the United States numbered in the hundreds.

The PSP is the most visible proindependence force in Puerto Rico. Four years ago, when the party held its founding congress, it published a twenty-four-page weekly newspaper with a circulation of 15,000. For the past year it has published a daily paper, with circulation currently reported at 20,000.

The rally came at the end of a nine-day congress. It was advertised as the public presentation of the main decisions of the deliberative sessions, which had been open to 296 elected delegates. Full texts of the documents approved by the congress have not yet been published.

After the members of the newly elected PSP leadership were introduced, greetings were given by Hassan Rahman, Palestine Liberation Organization deputy representative to the United Nations, and Guy Anatole Moyascko, representative of the Congolese party of Labor, among others.

The main shift in party policy came on the question of participation in the November 1976 elections. For the first time since the PSP and its predecessor, the MPI (Movimiento Pro Independencia—Pro-Independence Movement), were founded more than fifteen years ago, the organization will field candidates.

The decision was explained at the rally as one directed at “propagandizing for socialism, making the party grow, and exposing the electoral system as a fake that does not bring about political change.”

At the same time, the PSP’s motion on the elections stated the goal of electing a legislator who would denounce imperialism,

press for workers’ immediate demands, and publicize the struggle for independence and socialism.

All substantive decisions on the naming and number of candidates, the timing of the campaign, and the question of whether to use the colonial government’s official campaign fund were referred to the Central Committee. No mention was made of the election platform, although a draft of it was presented in the main political resolution to the congress.

The presentations on electoral activity were interspersed with reassurances that the shift did not mean giving up an armed-struggle perspective. This reflected internal disagreements in the PSP, one delegate who attended the congress commented later. About one-third of the delegates opposed running candidates, he stated.

“Does the electoral strategy mean that we set aside the armed struggle?” asked Mari Brás. “We answer definitely and categorically—no! We won’t renounce our right to armed struggle until the day the imperialists give up their last gun.”

The PSP intends to become a mass Marxist-Leninist party, Mari Brás said. Participation in the elections is viewed as a step that can help bring that about.

Citing Fidel Castro, the general secretary stated, “There can be no victorious revolution if you have the arms and you do not have the masses. But there cannot be a victorious revolution without arms.”

Carlos Gallisá, a legislator in the Puerto Rican congress who joined the PSP in 1973, also insisted on the need for armed struggle.

“We must meet violence against the people with revolutionary violence,” he said after denouncing the government’s efforts to intimidate those planning to attend the party’s congress.

“In the four years since our first congress, we have faced constant repression,” he continued. “Our answer to [colonial Governor] Rafael Hernández Colón’s campaign of repression is the biggest and most combative rally ever held by the party.”

On the day the PSP congress opened, the U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee released a 496-page document entitled “Terroristic Activity; the Cuban Connection in Puerto Rico; Castro’s Hand in Puerto Rican and U.S. Terrorism.” The report named the PSP as a Castroist vehicle to carry out the Puerto Rican revolution and attempted to link the party to terrorist

actions that have been carried out on the island and in the United States.

Hernández Colón jumped on the bandwagon, as did the major bourgeois papers in San Juan. They raised the specter of thousands of committed terrorists massing in the Clemente Coliseum.

Mari Brás pointed out that this attempt to link the campaign for Puerto Rican independence to isolated acts of terrorism in the United States made it more urgent than ever to develop a broad campaign of solidarity with those in the United States who support the independence struggle.

This was the only mention made during the rally that would suggest the party’s orientation for its section in the United States.

Up to now party policy has been epitomized in the slogan “Una Sola Nación, Un Solo Partido” (A single nation, a single party). The PSP holds that the most important struggle of Puerto Ricans everywhere, including the nearly two million who live in the United States, is the struggle to win independence and socialism for Puerto Rico.

On questions of foreign policy, the PSP passed motions of warm support for the government and people of Cuba; the People’s Republic of Angola and “its only legitimate representative, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA]”; the people of Vietnam and “their efforts to swiftly reunify the country”; the solidarity of the People’s Republic of the Congo; the struggle of the Panamanian people to recover the Panama Canal; and “the difficult and self-sacrificing fight of the Chilean resistance to overthrow the criminal fascists.” No resolution was passed on the struggle in Portugal.

Defining PSP policy as “independent” with regard to international questions, Mari Brás hailed the Soviet Union and its Communist party as “the most powerful bases in the socialist camp” and denounced those who claim that the USSR is “social imperialist.”

The party also noted the contribution made by the Chinese revolution in “shifting the relationship of forces on a world scale,” but criticized Peking’s support to the Chilean junta and its position on Puerto Rico in the United Nations. (Peking did not participate in an August 20 vote to shelve a resolution on the colonial status of Puerto Rico in the UN Decolonization Committee.)



# AROUND THE WORLD



## Death Penalty Rejected in Britain

The British House of Commons rejected a motion to bring back the death penalty for acts of terrorism December 11 by a vote of 361 to 232. The death penalty was abolished in Britain, except for treason and piracy, in 1969, after an experimental four-year ban. However, the growth of terrorism in Britain as a result of the conflict in Northern Ireland has led to pressure for the reintroduction of capital punishment.

A Harris poll taken forty-eight hours after the killing of publisher Ross McWhirter, who had offered \$100,000 in rewards for the capture of terrorists, showed that 88 percent of the British population favored the return of the death penalty. Tory leader Margaret Thatcher, a friend of McWhirter's, said, "Those who have committed these terrible crimes have forfeited the right to live."

Sentiment in favor of the death penalty is growing in Parliament. In 1965, 104 members of Commons voted to keep capital punishment. After a terrorist bombing last year, 217 MPs voted for it. And the 232 figure in the December 11 vote represents a further gain for the right wing.

In an opinion column in the December 10 London *Times* it was argued that although the death penalty for terrorists would be "morally permissible," it would aid the terrorists because "they would gain support from the Irish Catholic communities that they could not otherwise gain."

## UN Demands Halt to Torture in Chile

By a vote of 95 to 11, with 23 abstentions, the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9 denounced the Pinochet junta's "constant, flagrant violations of human rights" in Chile.

The resolution also called for an end to the "institutionalized practice of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."

## Moroccan Troops Charged With Killing 150 Civilians in Occupied Sahara

Moroccan troops have killed about 150 civilians in towns they have taken over in the Spanish colony of Sahara, according to a statement issued in Madrid December 3 by the Frente Polisario (Frente Popular para la Liberación del Sahara y Río de

Oro—People's Front for the Liberation of Sahara and Río de Oro).

The front said that in one town, the oasis of Smara, all but about 250 of the previous population of about 4,000 were forced to flee, and that about 5,000 Moroccan troops are now stationed there.

The front charged that the Moroccan forces regularly carry out reprisal killings whenever they receive word of the death of Moroccan soldiers in skirmishes with the liberation forces.

## MIR External Committee Denies Report Two Leaders Were Ordered Executed

According to a report in the December 5 issue of the British weekly *Latin America*, the External Committee of the Chilean organization Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR—Movement of the Revolutionary Left), based in Havana, has "denied the authenticity of a communique supposedly issued by its central committee in Santiago."

The communiqué in question, quoted in a December 1 Associated Press dispatch from Santiago, said that the organization had condemned to death two of its top leaders, Andrés Pascal Allende and Nelson Gutiérrez, who took refuge in two foreign embassies in Santiago.

## Senate Committee Charges FBI With Political Spying Since 1940s

The Federal Bureau of Investigation carried out political surveillance against journalists, politicians, civil-rights leaders, and various groups opposed to Washington's policies since the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, according to a report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released December 3.

These operations were carried out under six presidents, Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, the committee said.

Among the documents released by the committee were authorization by attorney generals Robert F. Kennedy and Nicholas Katzenbach for the wiretapping and bugging of civil-rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. The FBI organized a "special squad" to attend the 1964 Democratic party convention in Atlantic City. The main

purpose of the squad, according to the Senate committee, was to watch King and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party, which was trying to gain delegate recognition.

One of the earliest instances of political spying outlined by the Senate committee was launched by President Roosevelt, who had the FBI investigate hundreds of persons who sent telegrams opposing his foreign policy.

Amid the growing revelations, public "esteem" for the FBI has dropped sharply, according to the Gallup polling organization. Gallup reported that in 1965 about 84 percent of those questioned were "highly favorable" to the FBI. This rating has now dropped to 37 percent.

Gallup also noted that while the drop in popularity began among college students, it has now spread through the entire population.

## Union Leader Juan Francisco Vargas Freed on Bail in Dominican Republic

Following an international campaign in his behalf, Juan Francisco Vargas, general secretary of the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Telefónicos (SNTT—National Union of Telephone Workers), was released from jail in the Dominican Republic November 27 on \$50,000 bail. He still faces trumped-up charges of "threatening the security of the state."

Two other labor officials remain in prison on the same charge—Francisco Antonio Santos, general secretary of the Central General de Trabajadores (CGT—General Workers Federation), and Eugenio Pérez Cepeda, CGT secretary of grievances. A third CGT leader, Julio de Peña Valdez, was released October 16.

## Rally in Manila Protests Low Wages

During President Ford's visit to Manila in early December, Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos staged massive and well-planned rallies to greet him. In addition, however, another, unofficial, rally took place. Several thousand Filipinos, led by Catholic priests, rallied a few blocks from Ford's hotel to protest low wages and bad living conditions. This protest was held in defiance of martial law regulations that have been in effect since 1972.

## Chronicle of Current Events

Reviewed by Marilyn Vogt



The Russian samizdat journal *Chronicle of Current Events*, one of the central targets of the intensified secret-police repression launched in January 1972, is again appearing with regularity.

The first issue of the journal was dated April 1968. Until the stepped-up repression led to a lapse in the journal's appearance, twenty-seven issues were published, carrying uncensored reports on the activities of dissidents—religious, cultural, intellectual, and political—and on the efforts of the Stalinist rulers to halt these activities.

After issue No. 27, dated October 1972, no new issues circulated for a year and a half.

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*Chronicle of Current Events*, issue No. 35. New York: Khronika Press, 1975. 64 pp.

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In the spring of 1974, however, issues No. 28 to 31 appeared, carrying reports of events that occurred since October 1972. From that time, the *Chronicle of Current Events* has appeared roughly on schedule, about four times a year.

Issue No. 35, dated March 31, 1975, which has just recently been published abroad in Russian, provides a general summary of some of the important developments during the last months of 1974 and the first months of 1975.

- *The condition of Leonid Plyushch.* The mental and physical condition of Plyushch, a mathematician from Kiev imprisoned because of his opposition to political repression, has continued to deteriorate as a result of the compulsory psychiatric treatment he is receiving. In addition to forced injections of drugs and confinement with dangerously deranged patients, Plyushch must undergo "therapeutic sessions" with his "doctor." In these sessions, he is asked to relate the substance of his articles that served as the basis for the "anti-Soviet" charges against him, to explain why he wrote these articles, and to admit that these articles show he is mentally ill.

During a meeting with Plyushch, his wife, Tanya Zhitnikova, asked whether he might be intending to write a declaration apologizing for his previous statements. Plyushch, who had until then been sluggish and distant, suddenly regained control of

himself and answered: "I will write nothing for them."

- *The case of Anatoly Marchenko.* A chronological listing of his activities and of attempts to silence him, from 1958 through February 1975 when he was arrested, is given. Following this is a report on his trial in which he defended himself against the authorities' charges. He was accused of violating the conditions of the parole that was imposed on him because of his more recent public political activity.

Upon his arrest, Marchenko went on a hunger strike to support his earlier request that he be allowed to emigrate to the United States. His request was denied, although the bureaucrats offered to allow him to go to Israel, an offer he refused.

Marchenko was sentenced to four years exile in a remote area of the Soviet Union.

- *The trial of G.P. Vins.* Vins was arrested in March 1974 and charged with playing an important role in illegal Baptist organizations and in printing and circulating Baptist literature, part of which was in defense of Baptist political prisoners. During his trial he stated that between 1929 and 1941, 25,000 Baptists were arrested, of whom 22,000 perished. He demanded that a commission be set up, composed of Soviet officials and representatives of international public opinion, to review the crimes against Soviet Baptists. His sentence was five years strict-regime camp and five years internal exile.

- *The trial of Vladimir Maramzin.* Maramzin, a writer, was arrested in July 1974 for possessing forbidden literature and for writing and circulating "anti-Soviet" literature. There was a great deal of publicity abroad on his case. The bureaucrats pointed to this publicity as incriminating evidence, noting during the trial that Maramzin was supported by the "Trotskyist" newspaper *Novoe Russkoye Slovo*. (*Novoe Russkoye Slovo*, a right-wing Russian-language daily published in New York, is notably hostile to Trotskyist ideas.)

Maramzin admitted the charges against him, received a five-year suspended sentence, and was released.

- *The investigation of Case No. 345.* Sergei Kovalyov, an activist in the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International, was

arrested in late December 1974 for allegedly having links with the *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*. The bureaucrats have used his case as a pretext for hauling in a number of persons for interrogation, searching their apartments, and confiscating their literature.

Some of these individuals were simply colleagues or acquaintances of Kovalyov's, and others were active proponents of democratic rights. In most cases no literature having any bearing on Lithuania was found during the searches, and the interrogations have had more to do with Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* than with the *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*.

- *The Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church.* Some of the material in issue No. 14 of this samizdat journal is described. One example is a report on the case of Mindaugas Tamonis, who was required to undergo compulsory psychiatric treatment because he "refused to participate in the restoration of a monument to Soviet troops and demanded that a monument to the victims of Stalinism be erected."

Confined in June 1974 in a psychiatric hospital, he received "eighteen injections as a result of which he developed chronic insomnia, his weight decreased by seventeen kilograms, and his vision was greatly weakened." He was freed three months later.

The *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church* contains condemnations by church officials of authorities who persecute individuals for their religious practices. It also reports on the harassment and arrests of those who strive to protect the Lithuanian language and culture from Russification.

- *In the prisons and camps.* Events in the major camps for political prisoners—in Mordovia and in the Perm region—are reported, including several protests against the deteriorating quality of camp food and general living conditions.

In a report on Vladimir prison, the *Chronicle* states that not long after dissident Ukrainian historian Valentyn Moroz ended his 145-day hunger strike in late November 1974, he was thrown into a special punishment cell for fifteen days (January 4 to 19).



• *Bukovsky Day*. On Bukovsky Day,<sup>1</sup> March 29, "many Soviet citizens spoke out in Bukovsky's defense." The *Chronicle* published the texts of five statements issued by dissidents demanding his release.

• *Letters and statements*. Periodically, in response to the official Kremlin statements that there are no political prisoners in the Soviet Union, political prisoners have issued appeals declaring that they are, in fact, political prisoners and not common criminals and demanding that they be recognized as such.<sup>2</sup>

A statement from Ukrainian political prisoners in the Mordovian camps called on all citizens who value freedom to appeal in their name to the International Women's Congress, held in Berlin in October 1975, demanding freedom for Stefaniya Shabaturova, Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets, Nadia Svitlychna, Nina Strokata, Iryna Senyk, and other women, whose names the *Chronicle* did not give. This appeal said: "In order to give our demand more weight, we, a group of Ukrainian political prisoners in Mordovian camp, are declaring a one-day hunger strike on March 8." The appeal was signed "Zoryan Ponadyuk, Kuzma Matviiv, Vasil Ovsienko, Vasil Dolishny, Igor Kravtsov, Roman Senyuk, and others."

• *Short communiqués*. This section is often the most interesting because it is a sort of "news in brief" from widespread areas in the Soviet Union. For example:

In Tallin, capital of the Estonian Soviet Republic, at least five persons were arrested December 13, 1974, in connection with what the *Chronicle* called "the case of the Estonian Democratic Movement."

In Krasnoyarsk in south-central Siberia, the home of Arkadia Sukhodolsky was searched in November 1974. Typewritten copies of *A Chronicle in Defense of Human Rights in the USSR*, published in New York, were confiscated.

Included in this section are reports of nine cases of persons who were sent for compulsory psychiatric treatment, most of them for signing a protest statement or for

1. An international appeal initiated by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Pavel Litvinov, Andrei Sakharov, and Jiri Pelikan included a call for worldwide actions on March 29, 1975, demanding that Vladimir Bukovsky be released. Bukovsky was sentenced in 1972 to a twelve-year term for making available abroad documentary evidence that the Kremlin imprisons political dissidents in mental hospitals.

2. An appeal to this effect was issued by eight Ukrainian political prisoners November 2, 1974. The signers were Danilo Shumuk (sentenced in 1972 to 15 years confinement), Valentyn Moroz (sentenced 1970 to 14 years), M. Osadchy (sentenced 1972 to 10 years), V. Stus (sentenced 1972 to 10 years), Ihor Kalynets (sentenced 1972 to 9 years), Yuri Shukhevich (sentenced 1972 to 15 years), V. Romanyuk (sentenced 1972 to 15 years), and Iryna Senyk (sentenced 1973 to 9 years).

## Dissident's Entire Family Declared Mentally Ill

[The following is an excerpt from *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 35.]

\* \* \*

On February 19, [1975], Boris Dmitrievich Vinokurov, head of the technical maintenance personnel department of the State Committee of All-Union Radio and Television organizations and enterprises, spoke at a meeting of the state committee party activists. He declared that things are going badly not only in the sphere of propaganda but also in the economy, and that our society is close to catastrophe. He saw the only means for correcting the situation to be the establishment of a two-party system. Vinokurov announced his intention to organize a second party and resign from membership in the Communist party of the Soviet Union. He ended his presentation with the words, "Someone must begin!"

Of those present, the well-known reviewer Valentin Zorin reacted most

strongly against Vinokurov: "This is a class enemy; we must dissociate ourselves from him!" Then the Central Committee employee Agapov got up and said that this most likely was not a provocation but something else, and that by their behavior [i.e., by their silence—*Chronicle*] those at the meeting justified the confidence of the party in them. The chairman of the state committee, Lapin, spoke in the same spirit.

On February 24, Vinokurov was taken away to a psychiatric hospital. At the beginning of March, during the next meeting of the party activists, it was reported that Vinokurov and his wife and daughter as well were mentally ill. A biography of Vinokurov was given: an old party member, who was the commander of a partisan detachment during the war, decorated with many orders and medals. Recently, the speaker announced, Vinokurov's condition had worsened. The name of the doctor who had delivered this conclusion was given.

requesting to emigrate.

• *Samizdat news*. An extensively annotated bibliography of some recent samizdat writings is given. These include:

*A Dissident's Guide to Psychiatry*, by Vladimir Bukovsky and Semyon Gluzman, the first a former "mental patient," and the second a former psychiatrist, as they describe themselves. (For the full text of this document, see *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR*, No. 13, dated January-February 1975, Khronika Press, New York.)

Issue No. 2 of the Russian nationalist journal *Zemlya*, whose original editor, Vladimir Osipov, was arrested in November 1974 and sentenced to eight years imprisonment for "anti-Soviet agitation."

Solzhenitsyn's response to those who criticized his "Letter to Soviet Leaders."

• *The case of Ivan Khudenko*. Khudenko, who had been a finance expert for the Council of Ministers of the USSR, was granted official permission in 1960 to organize experimental agricultural production teams in the Kazakhstan Soviet Republic. The experiment proved to be remarkably successful in increasing agricultural productivity while reducing the amount of labor required. Khudenko estimated that if his system were to be applied throughout the Soviet Union, agricultural production would be increased fourfold while the agricultural work force could be reduced from the present 30 million to 5 million.

The success of his experiment was hailed at various times throughout the 1960s and

early 1970s in the Soviet press.

However, opponents of his program succeeded in transferring Khudenko to another state farm, halting his experiment. Khudenko then sued the Kazakhstan Ministry of Agriculture for the back pay owed his agricultural workers, since the experiment was closed down at the height of the production season and the workers had not been paid. After his suit was won in a lower-level court, the prosecutor of the Kazakhstan Republic brought charges of misappropriating state property against Khudenko and his assistant (normally grounds for a very harsh sentence). In August 1973, Khudenko and his assistant were sentenced to six and four years imprisonment, respectively.

Khudenko died in a prison hospital November 12, 1974.

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Issues No. 28 to 31 of the *Chronicle of Current Events* are now available in English from Amnesty International.<sup>3</sup> English translations of Issues No. 32 and 33 will be available in early 1976. Issues No. 35 to 37 of the *Chronicle* are currently available in Russian only and can be obtained from Khronika Press.<sup>4</sup> □

3. 53 Theobald's Road, London WC1X 8SP, England; or 200 West Seventy-second Street, New York, New York 10023.

4. 505 Eighth Avenue, New York, New York 10018.

# OUT NOW!

## Chapter 16

### April 15, 1967

By Fred Halstead

[*Second of three parts*]

The civil rights movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s was centrally concerned with the elimination of de jure segregation in the South. Before it began, the "Jim Crow" laws passed after the Reconstruction period were still in force. Blacks in most areas of the South and in some border states could not attend the same schools as whites. In many areas they were required by local law to sit in the back of buses, to use separate and invariably unequal public facilities, such as waiting rooms, lunch counters, and so on. In many areas of the South they were barred from the polls by bureaucratic manipulation or by terror, usually combined.

This Southern system was recognized in federal law through Supreme Court decisions upholding the so-called separate but equal doctrine. In 1954 the Supreme Court reversed its previous stand and declared the "separate but equal" doctrine to be in violation of the U.S. Constitution. A crucial factor in forcing this ruling was the pressure of the colonial revolution—especially the Chinese revolution. The U.S. government was embarrassed in its relations with the nonwhite world by the judicially sanctioned segregation in its Southern states.

In the narrow sense the ruling dealt with a Kansas school district, but it laid the legal basis for a campaign to challenge the whole Southern system of de jure segregation. The original suit was brought by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which emphasized proceeding with the campaign through the courts.

The movement assumed a mass direct-action form with the Montgomery, Alabama, boycott of segregated city buses which began in December 1955 and lasted through most of 1956. Its success made Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., a national figure and led to the formation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). This group, headed by King, was a coalition mainly of Black Southern preachers who called upon their church congregations to participate in or support the Gandhian nonviolent direct-action projects led by King.

The Southern student sit-ins against segregated public facilities that began in 1960 gave birth to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), whose chapters were located on Black campuses in the South.

The Freedom Rides of 1961 against segregation on interstate buses traveling through the South catapulted the previously small Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) into becoming a major force in the movement.

These four were the major organizations of the civil rights movement. The Urban League, a middle-class-oriented Black group composed largely of business and professional people, was also sometimes involved.

Until 1966 none of these groups had adopted a formal position against the war. Individual SNCC leaders, including the group's chairman, John Lewis, had stated their opposition, but not in the name of their organization. Both Martin Luther King and James Farmer, head of CORE, were pacifists and had expressed opposition as individuals to the killing in Vietnam, but in the early years they avoided association with the antiwar movement. Whitney Young and Roy Wilkins, respective heads of the Urban League and the NAACP, simply supported U.S. foreign policy.

The stated reason why SNCC, CORE, and SCLC did not take a position from the first against the war was that foreign policy as such was not the concern of their organizations, and they felt that becoming involved with it would reduce their effectiveness in the struggle for equality for Blacks.

In the early period the most prominent Black leader to speak out strongly against U.S. policy in Vietnam was Malcolm X, whose base was in Harlem, not the South. He, too, was centrally concerned with the struggle for equality by Afro-Americans, rather than Vietnam or other questions. But he often spoke of the need to internationalize the Afro-American struggle so that American Blacks would not look upon themselves as a minority. For example, in November 1964 Malcolm said:

"[What] I would like to impress upon every Afro-American leader is that there is no kind of action in this country ever going to bear fruit unless that action is tied in with the over-all international struggle. You waste your time when you talk to this man, just you and him. So when you talk to him, let him know your brother is behind you, and you've got some brothers behind that brother. That's the only way to talk to him, that's the only language he knows."<sup>15</sup>

The real reason behind the stands of Whitney Young, Roy Wilkins, and to a certain extent Martin Luther King, Jr., and James Farmer, was that if civil rights leaders didn't rock the boat on U.S. foreign policy, if they proved themselves supportive in that sense, or at least kept their mouths shut, it would be easier to gain domestic concessions. Malcolm's approach was different. In January 1965 he declared:

"... In 1964, the oppressed people of South Vietnam, and in that entire Southeast Asia area, were successful in fighting off the agents of imperialism. . . . Little rice farmers, peasants, with a rifle—up against all the highly-mechanized weapons of warfare—jets, napalm, battleships, everything else, and they can't put those rice farmers back where they want them. Somebody's waking up. . . ."

"Now, in speaking like this, it doesn't mean that I am anti-American. I am not. I'm not anti-American, or un-American. And I'm not saying that to defend myself. Because if I was that, I'd have a right to be that—after what America has done to us. This government should feel lucky that our people aren't anti-American. They should get down on their hands and knees every morning and thank God that 22 million black people have not become anti-American. You've given us every right to. The whole world would side with us, if we became anti-American. You know, that's something to think about.

"But we aren't anti-American. We are anti or against what America is doing wrong in other parts of the world as well as here. And what she did in the Congo in 1964 is wrong. It's criminal, criminal. And what she did to the American public, to get the American public to go along with it, is criminal. What she's doing in South Vietnam is criminal. She's causing American soldiers to be murdered every day, killed every day, die every day, for no reason at all. That's wrong. Now, you're not supposed to be so blind with patriotism that you can't face reality. Wrong is wrong no matter who does it or who says it. . . ."<sup>16</sup>

In a radio interview January 28, 1965, Malcolm pointed out a weakness in the government's position on Vietnam which the civil rights leaders had declined to exploit:

"It's a problem anytime the United States can come up with so many alibis not to get involved in Mississippi and to get involved in the Congo and involved in Asia and in South Vietnam. Why that, right there, should show our people that the government is incapable of taking the kind of action necessary to solve the

15. Exchange with Jesse Gray at the Audubon Ballroom, November 29, 1964. *Malcolm X Speaks* (New York: Merit Publishers, 1965), p. 89.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 148-49.



problem of black people in this country. But at the same time she has her nose stuck into the problems of others everywhere else."<sup>17</sup>

At this time a drive to register Black voters was in progress around Selma, Alabama. The local white authorities resisted with arrests and beatings. On one occasion Rev. James Bevel of the SCLC walked out of the Clark County courthouse in Selma after demanding that Blacks be registered to vote there, and was clubbed down by Sheriff James Clark himself.

SNCC workers invited Malcolm X to speak in Selma on February 5, 1965. He was well received by the young demonstrators and expressed a desire to cooperate with the civil rights groups. But Malcolm was assassinated two weeks later before anything more could come of it, and just as the new antiwar movement was being born. Had he lived he may well have played an important role in it.

In March 1965, when the Alabama drive reached a peak with a Selma-to-Montgomery march, aimed at forcing the federal government to intervene to protect the voting rights of Blacks, the question of Vietnam actually was interjected into the civil rights struggle.

On March 7, state troopers under orders from Governor George C. Wallace, and local possemen had stopped the march with a brutal assault, injuring at least eighty-six marchers.

SNCC Chairman John Lewis, who had been clubbed and was later hospitalized, spoke to an angry crowd of marchers taking sanctuary in a church:

"I don't see how President Johnson can send troops to Vietnam . . . to the Congo . . . to Africa and can't send troops to Selma, Alabama." The next day even NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilkins, referring to the landing of 3,500 U.S. marines in Vietnam the previous week, burst out at a press conference with: "Dammit, they can send somebody to Alabama and defend the government right here!"<sup>18</sup>

Fannie Lou Hamer, a leader of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, sent a telegram to President Johnson demanding that he pull U.S. troops out of Vietnam and send them to Alabama to protect the rights of Blacks. Lewis also announced SNCC support to the April 17, 1965, SDS march on Washington against the war in Vietnam.

The federal government was so embarrassed over the Selma events that President Johnson was forced to use the national guard to protect the marchers and to announce a voting-rights bill, the details of which were stronger than anything he had previously promised. The introduction of the Vietnam issue was not, of course, the reason for this, but it certainly helped increase the pressure on the government.

With the exception of SNCC, however, the civil rights organizations deliberately abstained from the antiwar movement through 1965. At its convention that fall SCLC adopted a resolution declaring that "the primary function of our organization is to secure full leadership rights—for the Negro citizens of this country" and limited the efforts of SCLC in mass actions to the question of racial brotherhood. It did say that in the event of "perilous escalation of the Vietnam conflict we respect the right of Dr. King and the administrative committee to alter this course and turn the full resources of the organization to the cessation of bloodshed and war."<sup>19</sup> The door was open but King didn't walk through it for another year and a half.

On January 6, 1966, SNCC released a statement that made it the first of the major civil rights groups to make opposition to the government's Vietnam policies a part of its formal program as an

organization. The incident that precipitated this statement was the murder of another SNCC worker, Samuel Younge, shot down while attempting to integrate a gas station restroom in Tuskegee, Alabama. The statement also declared, "We are in sympathy with and support the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to the military draft which would compel them to contribute their lives to U.S. aggression in the name of the 'freedom' we find so false in this country."<sup>20</sup>

It was Julian Bond's refusal to dissociate from this statement that was used by the Georgia state legislature as grounds for depriving him of the seat in that body to which he had been elected.

In March 1966, James Farmer resigned as executive director of CORE to take a post as head of a social work foundation recently set up by the Johnson administration. Under his successor, Floyd McKissick, CORE moved to an antiwar position. In April the executive board of SCLC adopted a resolution asking President Johnson to consider withdrawing from Vietnam, but continued its reluctance to become involved directly in antiwar activity.

Martin Luther King did become a sponsor of Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, but he continued to abstain from strong public criticism of the government's Vietnam policies through 1966. The reason was not a lack of personal opposition to the war. Nor was King ignorant of the connection between the colonial revolution and the struggle of American Blacks. King, like Malcolm X and A.J. Muste, was a person of considerable depth and not a superficial thinker. During the early days of the movement in Montgomery, the colonial revolution was one of the themes he used in his speeches to the mass meetings of the boycotting Blacks there. In March 1956 I heard one of these speeches, which I was told by others present was not atypical. In it King said:

"You know whether we want to be or not, we are caught in a great moment of history. . . . It has reached the point where you are part of this movement or you are against it. . . . It is bigger than Montgomery. . . . the vast majority of the people of the world are colored. . . . Up until four or five years ago most of the one and one-quarter billion colored peoples were exploited by empires of the West. . . . India, China, Africa. Today many are free. . . . And the rest are on the road. . . . We are part of that great movement."<sup>21</sup>

But that had been before King was a national figure, before his speeches were widely reported, before every controversial statement he made was dissected by powerful "friends," and before U.S. troops were in Vietnam. In my opinion that early speech, which had other themes as well, and whose central thrust was to raise the morale of the then-beleaguered ranks of the Montgomery protesters, was far richer in content and more beautiful in form than the widely heralded "I have a dream" speech at the 1963 March on Washington. King was always best when he was closest to the common people, rather than the liberal establishment.

The reason for King's abstention from the antiwar movement in 1965 and 1966 was political expediency. He occupied the central—as well as the center—position in the civil rights movement. It was on him that the greatest pressures fell, and the greatest responsibility. His policies were not undisputed, but he was the only single figure with the authority to unify the whole movement—and its supporters—around particular campaigns.

While his strategy included mass actions, it was not aimed at building an independent power. King's approach was heavily dependent on the old idea of a labor-liberal-civil rights coalition within the Democratic Party. He had entrée to high government officials and liberal politicians, especially within the Democratic Party.

He was constantly besieged with advice and warnings that for

17. Interview on WBAI-FM. From transcript in the *Militant*, February 8, 1965.

18. *Militant*, March 15, 1965.

19. *Liberation*, September 19, 1965.

20. *Militant*, January 17, 1966.

21. *Militant*, March 19, 1956.

him to campaign against the war would jeopardize these relations. And in truth King's standing in the country and in the world was so high—outside the U.S. no doubt higher than any other American—that for him to take up the antiwar cause would be a tremendous symbolic blow to the administration. Washington could not be expected to react kindly to it.

On one occasion in 1965 King actually tested this out, with due regard for the anticommunist posture then required by anyone wishing to remain "in" with the liberal establishment. Speaking at Virginia State College in Petersburg on July 5, he said:

"I'm not going to sit by and see war escalated without saying anything about it. . . . It is worthless to talk about integration if there is no world to integrate in. I am certainly as concerned about seeing the defeat of Communism as anyone else, but we won't defeat Communism by guns or bombs or gases. We will do it by making democracy work. . . . The war in Vietnam must be stopped. There must be a negotiated settlement even with the Vietcong."<sup>22</sup>

King was promptly called by administration officials and vilified in political circles. "Friends of the movement" such as New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller let him know they didn't like it. The antiwar movement at the time was still small and the favorable response seemed to come from sources with little influence. King backed off.

Through 1966 A.J. Muste would occasionally telephone King to inform him of some antiwar project and indicate there was a standing invitation if King could see his way clear to participate. As was his habit, Muste never used strong pressure but he was not above pointing out that the young people in the nonviolent movement were asking questions.

In truth King's authority with the youth in his own movement had been eroding for some time. The disputes between King and the militants, especially those in SNCC, did not turn around the war in Vietnam. More central were such questions as the strategy of the movement, Black nationalism—which King opposed and to which the Black youth were attracted—and philosophical nonviolence as opposed to a posture of self-defense. But King's moral authority in these arguments could not be separated from his abstention on the Vietnam question. As the militants saw it, King had put himself in the position of actively advocating nonviolence only to the Blacks in their struggle, while in effect remaining publicly silent on the government's policy of wholesale violence in Vietnam.

By mid-1966 the civil rights movement as King had shaped it was in deep crisis. The fight against de jure segregation had largely been won, and that for voting rights in the South was being won. But there was little celebrating. The spontaneous uprisings in the big city Black ghettos—which broke out on a small scale in Harlem in 1964 and then on a huge scale in Watts in 1965, hit several Northern cities in the summer of 1966. The focus of attention shifted from the rural South to the big cities, mostly in the North where there had never been Jim Crow laws and where Blacks could vote, but where de facto discrimination and segregation was as bad as in the South.

The slogan "Black Power" was being popularized by SNCC's new chairman, Stokely Carmichael. The Black Panther Party was beginning to organize on a program of independent Black political action and armed self-defense, and its rhetoric was getting less and less defensive.

There was an intimate connection between the war and the arguments during this period in and around the civil rights movement over nonviolence. The war was not the origin of the dispute—that lay in the experiences of the movement itself, particularly with racist murders. But the war was a constant

underlying theme. The fact that liberals who supported, or did not oppose, the Johnson war policy were constantly admonishing Blacks to stick to strict nonviolence in their own struggle, was enraging not only to the militants but to masses of ordinary Black people.

Strangely, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP was not as vulnerable on this point as King, because Wilkins was not a pacifist and the NAACP had always recognized the right of self-defense. While King was not usually attacked openly on this question, by implication he was constantly referred to.

For example, CORE Associate Director Lincoln Lynch, in explaining why CORE in spite of its pacifist origins had at its 1966 convention supported self-defense, declared:

"Let no one ask us to sit idly by, with hands in our pockets, knees on the ground, praying to some supreme being up there, while Ku Klux Klaners are murdering the Chaney's, the Goodmans, the Mrs. Liuzzos, the Evers and so on. Let *no man* ask us to sit by and see such things happen while we pray and say that we are nonviolent. Let the American public begin to talk to us about nonviolence when the President practices nonviolence in Vietnam."<sup>23</sup>

This contradiction was a factor in the rage of the Black youth of the 1960s. The government was advising them to be patient and strictly nonviolent in their own struggle for freedom at home, while threatening them with prison for not being violent in Vietnam. The majority of the Black population understood the issues in the war much earlier than the whites in part because of such contradictions.

All these pressures increased through 1966 and by the time the Spring Mobilization Committee started building for the April 1967 demonstration, we began to get signals that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference—and Martin Luther King himself—were preparing to move on the Vietnam question.

\* \* \*

On January 13, 1967, Rev. James Bevel of the SCLC attended a meeting in New York of the working committee of the Spring Mobilization. In previous discussions between Bevel and Dellinger the suggestion had been made that Bevel become national director of the Spring Mobilization and the purpose of the meeting was to hear Bevel's ideas on the project.

Most of us on the committee were quite anxious to have Bevel aboard—especially since it meant a chance that King would speak at the April event.

We knew there had been some soul searching over the war question going on in the leadership of the SCLC, but we were not prepared for Bevel's presentation. It was in fact one of the strangest meetings I have ever attended. Bevel began with what I could only assume was some sort of allegory that I was not equipped to understand. It was a long, rambling story involving someone he spoke to in his cellar during recent long periods of meditation. Perhaps he meant God, but I don't really know.

I looked around the room for some indication of what the others were thinking. It might as well have been a poker game in west Texas. Finally Cora Weiss caught my eye. She was one of those people who could say a great deal with a look. This one said something like "I don't get it either, but be careful, Fred."

Anyway, in the course of the process in Bevel's cellar, he had a revelation that the war could be stopped, and soon, but not by demonstrations in the United States. Instead we should get large numbers of people, including prominent figures, to go to both North and South Vietnam, perhaps on a special ship, and in some unexplained way they would interject themselves between the warring armies, forcing them to shoot the "peace brigade" or stop

22. *Martin Luther King* by William Robert Miller (New York: Weybright & Talley, 1968), p. 236.

23. *Militant*, August 8, 1966.



the killing entirely.

It was not really a new idea. Bevel himself had been known to suggest something similar as far back as 1965, long before his more recent meditations. And it wasn't new then either. As far as I was concerned it was a harebrained scheme at best, and politically wrong in any case. The last thing the Vietnamese needed was another large batch of uninvited foreigners messing around in their country, with or without guns.

But as per Weiss's admonition, I was careful in the discussion. It was clear no one else wanted to take the blame either, for shutting the door to the man who had the "in" with Martin Luther King. The discussion was long, and rather delicate. Two things did become clear in the course of it. First, the peace brigade idea was Bevel's alone, not SCLC's or King's. Second, Bevel's participation in a leading capacity with the Mobilization had the approval of both King and the SCLC. The only thing to do was to make the best of it.

The minutes of this discussion are quite succinct and do not reveal its details or its flavor. They are, instead, a diplomatic summary of the result as far as the committee was concerned. They read in full:

"Discussion with James Bevel: (a) James Bevel outlined his views on non-violent approaches to a program of actually ending the war in Vietnam, including a campaign around a 'Declaration of Civilization' and an international team of prominent figures to visit Vietnam.

"(b) Much discussion centered on the proposal of organizing a visit to Vietnam, north and south, by a team of world figures, Americans like Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., and prominent people like Gunnar Myrdal from other countries, with a perspective of thousands of people eventually traveling to Vietnam from all countries and backgrounds. The April 15 mobilization was seen as a possible launching occasion for such a project. There was discussion pro and con on this proposal. Bevel said he was flexible on details, but thought strongly that the April 15 mobilization should be viewed not as an end in itself but as a beginning, the launching of a serious campaign for ending the war and that this would make the April 15 action more attractive.

"*Proposal on National Director:* Dave Dellinger proposed that James Bevel be National Director of the Spring Mobilization. This was supported with the general agreement and enthusiasm of the body. James Bevel agreed to accept the position."<sup>24</sup>

Bevel proved to be no mere figurehead director. He swept into the New York operation with all the energy he had displayed in the Southern civil rights campaigns, bringing with him a group of young Black preachers from SCLC. Some of them—like Bernard Lafayette—had been members of the old guard of SNCC.

Bevel spent little time on organizational detail, concentrating instead on outreach to new forces and publicity. His colleagues from SCLC kept an eye out for anything that might reflect badly on Martin Luther King should he decide to associate himself with the activity. In this regard we had some discussion about the reasons for our policy on nonexclusion, and Bevel went along with it. As time went on he spoke less and less about the peace brigade idea and it faded away. Overall he played a positive role in building April 15.

And he did succeed in getting Martin Luther King's agreement to speak at the New York demonstration.

\* \* \*

Not long after Bevel joined the Mobilization it became clear that King had made up his mind to enter the fight against the war. He knew very well it meant a break with the Johnson administration, probably the loss of significant financial supporters to SCLC, and possibly even a rupture in relations with the NAACP and the

24. Minutes of the Working Committee of the Spring Mobilization Committee, January 13, 1967. (Copy in author's files.)

Urban League. He made the move in a careful but deliberate way, covering his right flank as best he could. The April 15 Mobilization was not to be his opening shot, but a culmination of a series of preparatory public statements. These were made in association with certain people inclined to be tolerant of the antiwar cause who were also a part of the groups he was most concerned about maintaining ties with, such as liberal politicians and clergymen.

The first such statement came on February 25, 1967, in Beverly Hills, California, at a conference on the war sponsored by *Nation* magazine. Also speaking at the conference were Democratic Senators Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, George McGovern of South Dakota, and Ernest Gruening of Alaska as well as Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon, a Republican. All were prominent doves. Said King:

"The promises of the great society have been shot down on the battlefield of Vietnam. The pursuit of this widened war has narrowed domestic welfare programs, making the poor, white and Negro, bear the heaviest burdens both at the front and at home. The recently revealed ten billion dollar mis-estimate of the war budget alone is more than five times the amount committed to anti-poverty programs. The security we profess to seek in foreign adventures we will lose in our decaying cities.

"We are willing to make the Negro 100 per cent of a citizen in warfare, but reduce him to 50 per cent of a citizen on American soil. Half of all the Negroes live in substandard housing and he has half the income of whites.

"There is twice as much unemployment and infant mortality among Negroes. There were twice as many Negroes in combat in Vietnam at the beginning of 1967, and twice as many died in action—20.6 per cent—in proportion to their numbers in the population as whites."<sup>25</sup>

In the same speech he called the war immoral, a violation of the UN Charter and of the principle of self-determination, and declared: "We must demonstrate, teach and preach until the very foundations of our nation are shaken."<sup>26</sup>

In mid-March the Mobilization Committee got word that it could announce King as a speaker for April 15.

On April 4 in a major speech at Riverside Church in New York, King explained his dilemma during the previous period:

"As I have walked among the desperate, rejected and angry young men I have told them that Molotov cocktails and rifles would not solve their problems. . . . They asked me if our own nation wasn't using massive doses of violence to solve its problems, to bring about the changes it wanted. Their questions hit home, and I knew that I could never again raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today—my own government. . . ."<sup>27</sup>

The reaction of the liberal establishment was classically articulated by an editorial in the *Washington Post* of April 6:

"Dr. King has done a grave injury to those who are his natural allies in a great struggle to remove ancient abuses from our public life; and he has done an even graver injury to himself. Many who have listened to him with respect will never again accord him the same confidence. He has diminished his usefulness to his cause, to his country and to his people."

On April 15, 1967, Martin Luther King, Jr., joined Msgr. Charles Owens Rice at the head of the New York march. Later he stood together briefly on the platform with Floyd McKissick of CORE and Stokely Carmichael of SNCC, their arms around each other's shoulders, to greet the giant crowd.

[To be continued]

25. *Militant*, March 13, 1967.

26. *Martin Luther King*, p. 266.

27. *New York Times*, April 5, 1967.

# Capitalism Fouls Things Up



## The Amazon Jungle May Become World's Largest Parking Lot

"The basic theory of Brazil's highway program—that the Amazon jungle can be cleared and turned into productive farmland by hungry colonists from the country's drought-devastated northeast—rests on a tragically false premise."

This is the conclusion reached by Robert J.A. Goodland, staff ecologist at the Cary Arboretum of the New York Botanical Garden. Along with Dr. Howard S. Irwin, president of the New York Botanical Garden, Goodland recently completed an environmental assessment of the effects of the Brazilian government's program to build 8,000 miles of highway through the Amazon jungle.

It is true, Goodland said in the September 15 *New York Times*, that the Amazon forest "manages to be the most productive ecosystem in the world in spite of sterile soils, excessive rainfall and a superabundance of disease-causing organisms, and pests."

This occurs because "photosynthesis is rapid in the jungle under the propitious combination of light, moisture and temperature that commonly prevail, while elevated carbon-dioxide concentration speeds photosynthesis in the shade beneath the heavy

canopy of leaves."

What Brazilian authorities have not taken into account, however, is that the "soil that supports this seemingly lush vegetation is singularly deficient in nutrients." Once the jungle is cleared by burning, "it promptly loses fertility."

This land cannot support intensive modern agriculture, Goodland said. "Indeed, there is much truth to the aphorism that 'the tropical wet forest is ecologically a desert covered by trees.'"

"At stake in the Amazon," Goodland said, "is the future of an area of one-half million square miles, larger than all of Europe and containing one-third of the world's remaining forest land."

"Under Brazil's present development policies, it is being obliterated."

## Noise Pollution Can Drive You Nuts

Sustained exposure to high noise levels can cause severe emotional distress, researchers have found.

People who live near airports "have higher rates of admission to mental hospitals than would be expected," David Dempsey reported in the November 23 issue of the *New York Times* magazine.

"A survey of one residential area around

Heathrow terminal, outside London," he said, "found that psychiatric admissions were significantly higher there than in quieter sections of the city. This study indicated that noise was especially hard on people who were already vulnerable to stress for personal reasons. . . ."

## Oil Spills Threaten Earth's Climate

Oil spills on Arctic Ocean ice could create changes in the earth's climate, a Coast Guard scientist reported December 9.

An experiment conducted last year at Point Barrow, Alaska, demonstrated that ice contaminated with oil melted very rapidly while nearby uncontaminated ice remained intact, he said.

The scientist, Charles Rodney Weir of the Coast Guard Oceanographic Unit in Washington, D.C., explained that the sun radiates extensive energy onto the ice, but most of it is merely reflected away. Ice contaminated by oil, however, absorbs up to 93 percent of the incoming sunlight and melts rapidly.

Many meteorologists believe that the Arctic Ocean plays an important role in controlling climatic conditions in the Northern Hemisphere, and that an ice-free Arctic might generate a new ice age.


The possibility of oil spills that would melt large amounts of ice thus becomes an important factor. This is particularly true in view of the fact that American oil companies plan to begin offshore drilling in the Arctic after 1980.

## No Escape

Residents of the Southern Hemisphere who may have drawn consolation from the fact that they live many thousands of miles away from the Arctic oil fields may be interested in the following news item:

HONOLULU, Feb. 28 (UPI)—The Navy has disclosed the possible existence of an offshore Antarctic oil field that might be larger than Alaska's gigantic North Slope discovery.

Capt. Eugene E. Van Reeth, commander of the Navy's Antarctic support force, said yesterday that various geologists working in the Antarctic had surmised that the continental shelf off Marie Byrd Land "could have up to 45 billion barrels of oil." . . .



In case of danger break glass.

Chenez/Le Monde



## Revolution and Counterrevolution in Portugal

By Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, and Ernest Mandel

[Continued from last week]

### Rearguardism Against 'Vanguardism'

The question of the centrality of the struggle to create workers councils in a prerevolutionary situation rapidly growing over into a revolutionary situation is closely linked to another question that has played and is playing an important role in the internal discussion in the Fourth International.

Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack assert that their opposition to the line followed by the majority of the Fourth International "is in accordance with the stress on party building that our tendency (and later faction) has fought for within the world Trotskyist movement over the past seven years." (*IP*, October 13, p. 1357.) We strongly deny this. The majority of the Fourth International places no less "stress" on party building than the minority does. Further, the record shows that there has been no less practical and political success in this endeavor on the part of the majority than on the part of the minority, quite the contrary. What the debate is really about is *how* to build the party, *what layers* should be concentrated on in recruiting to the party, and *what kind of party* will emerge from these options.

The whole analysis of Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack was to orient toward the followers of the Social Democratic party, allegedly because this was the party of the majority of the working class. This concept is completely and disastrously wrong in revolutionary situations. It would have implied, to give but one example, that the German Communists in November 1918–November 1920 should have oriented toward the Social Democracy and not toward the centrist (and, at times, a bit ultraleft) Independent Socialist party. For after all, the Social Democratic party still represented "the majority party of the working class" (it scored 44 percent of the popular vote in the January 1919 elections to the Constituent Assembly, a higher score than that achieved by the Portuguese SP in April 1975). But we don't know of a single communist who made such a preposterous proposal at the time. It seems obvious to us, as it did to Lenin and Trotsky, that the first task for revolutionary Marxists in a revolutionary situation is to attempt to assemble around their program and in their organization the most revolutionary-minded and most active layers of the working class. Only when this task is achieved can the subsequent task of *winning the majority of the working class* be successfully tackled. There are two reasons for this:

First, because it is ludicrous to believe that small nuclei of a few hundred, or even a few thousand, revolutionary Marxists could in one leap be catapulted into the leadership of millions of workers who would follow them politically and have confidence in them without these groups' first passing through the "stage" of becoming many thousands and fighting at the head of "only" tens of thousands. In a revolutionary situation, there are many opportunities to lead and recruit thousands of workers, provided you do not systematically and contemptuously turn your back on massive "vanguard struggles." Revolutionary cadres, especially during revolutionary situations, must possess not only organizational capacities, but also and more particularly capacities of audacity, of taking revolutionary initiatives, of leading revolutionary mass strikes, revolutionary street demonstrations, soldiers'

revolts. Generally speaking, these capacities are not to be found among the more moderate layers of members of the majority parties of the working class, but rather among "vanguard elements."

Second, because the masses learn very rapidly in revolutionary situations. The process of political differentiation, which in "normal" times involves only small segments of the class, begins to involve broader and broader layers. Consequently, although the majority parties continue to make gains (especially among sectors that previously did not even understand the necessity of becoming politically interested or active, the most moderate strata of the toiling masses, successive layers of the petty bourgeoisie in process of radicalization), the key sectors of the working class, those that have the greatest authority in the large plants, those that lead the great strikes and demonstrations "on the spot," tend increasingly to break with reformist and class-collaborationist policies and the moderate "majority parties." To win these working class *leaders* means to win the layers that are decisive in gaining mass influence; this is the indispensable springboard to winning the more moderate majority during the following phase.

In any case, that is how Trotsky saw the problem of party building under such circumstances. For example, in June 1936, speaking of the situation in France, he wrote:

"That leaders have come forward in the industries and in the factories is the foremost conquest of the first wave. The elements of local and regional staffs have been created. The masses know them. They know one another. Real revolutionists will seek contact with them. Thus the first self-mobilization of the masses has outlined and in part brought forward the first elements of revolutionary leadership. The strike has stirred, revitalized and regenerated the whole colossal class organism. The old organizational shell has by no means dropped away. On the contrary, it still retains its hold quite stubbornly. But under it the new skin is already visible." ("The French Revolution Has Begun," in *Whither France?*, Pathfinder Press, p. 154.)

Lenin applied the same approach, and he was, after all, something of an expert in Leninist party building, as Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack will have to admit. In his very polemics against the ultraleftists among the young Communist parties of the West, he had this to say:

"The main thing—not everything, by a very long way—but the main thing *has already been achieved in that the vanguard of the working class has been won over, in that it has gone over to the side of the Soviet power against parliamentarism, to the side of the dictatorship of the proletariat against bourgeois democracy.* Now all efforts, all attention, must be concentrated on the next step—which seems, and from a certain standpoint really is, less fundamental, but which in fact is much closer to the practical carrying out of the task—namely, on seeking out the forms of transition or approach to the proletarian revolution.

"The proletarian vanguard has been ideologically won over. This is the most important thing. *Without this, we cannot take even the first step towards victory.* But from this first step it is still a long way to victory. With the vanguard alone, victory is impossible. To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle before the whole class, before the broad masses, have taken up

positions either of direct support to the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality toward it and one in which they cannot possibly support the enemy, would not merely be folly but a crime." (V.I. Lenin: "*Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, emphasis added.)

The comrades of the minority of the Fourth International have accused us of advocating a "stage theory of party building" because we adhere to these Leninist principles. But isn't Lenin clearly defining two stages of party building, a first stage during which revolutionaries must win ideological hegemony and political leadership within the vanguard (educating the vanguard *against bourgeois democracy*, as Lenin says) and a second stage during which all efforts are concentrated on winning broader masses?

Indeed, it is criminal folly when ultraleftists plunge into a decisive test of strength between the class enemy and the still limited forces of the vanguard. But nothing is further from our mind. We have not and we are not calling for a Portuguese October, that is, for an insurrection. That would be a disaster at this point; it would represent putschism of the worst sort. All we are trying to do, modest and moderate as we are, is prepare for a Portuguese February, that is, a situation of generalized dual power. In such a situation, it becomes much easier to "win the broad masses" to the revolutionary party, for "soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat." In fact, history demonstrates that at least in imperialist countries it is *only* in such a dual power situation that this result can be achieved.

The problem of choosing the right audience is especially important in Portugal today, because the unfolding revolutionary process in that country has strikingly confirmed one of the central points advanced by the majority in the discussion prior to the Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International and contested by the minority tendency, with which Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack are in sympathy: The single most important change in the situation in West Europe since May 1968 has been the emergence of a new mass vanguard of increasingly proletarian composition, which, for the first time since the beginning of the degeneration of the Communist International, is capable of challenging in action the control over the working class still by and large exercised by the traditional bureaucratic, conservative, and counterrevolutionary apparatuses of the organized labor movement.

After the April 1974 coup, the Portuguese bourgeoisie followed a policy that was similar if not identical to that followed by the Italian and French bourgeoisie in 1944-47: avoid a victorious proletarian revolution, switch over to a bourgeois-democratic regime, grant some reforms to the workers, have the CP and the SP share in government responsibilities, and use the conservative bureaucracies of these parties to divert the revolutionary energy of the masses into channels compatible with the maintenance of capitalist property and the bourgeois state.

From an objective standpoint, the Portuguese bourgeoisie's chances of success with such a policy were greater than those of the French or Italian bourgeoisie at the end of the Second World War. The Portuguese army, though in deep crisis, was certainly not weaker than the French or Italian bourgeois armies in 1944-45. The Portuguese proletariat had fewer arms than the French or Italian proletariat. Even the Portuguese economy was stronger than the Italian and French economies after the ravages of the war. The Portuguese working class was less numerous than the French or Italian, and it was certainly less experienced and educated politically. Finally, it would be hard to demonstrate that the Portuguese workers were any more militant than the French or Italian workers.

It is true that the Portuguese bourgeoisie received less help from international imperialism (primarily U.S. imperialism) than did the French and Italian bourgeoisie at the end of the Second World War. It is also true that world imperialism's capacity for direct

and immediate military intervention is weaker today than it was at the end of the war. But this factor is certainly not important enough to offset all the other factors (except in the minds of the Stalinists, who have always claimed the presence of U.S. troops in Europe as an excuse for the abject betrayal of the interests of the working class in the immediate postwar period).

An inescapable conclusion flows from all this: The *decisive* factor that accounts for the success of the bourgeois political plan in France and Italy in 1944-46 and the failure, at least up to now, of that plan in Portugal lies in the difference in the working-class movement itself, that is, in *the shift in the subjective factor*. Again, it would be hard to prove that Soares and Cunhal are in any way "superior" to Blum and Thorez or Nenni and Togliatti. *What has changed is their degree of control over the working class*. For a variety of reasons, most of which were analyzed in the documents adopted by the Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International, a broad vanguard emerged in the Portuguese factories and barracks that opposed the basic class-collaborationist line of the CP and SP leadership ("bourgeois discipline," the "battle for production," recognition of authority, "no strike" pledges, etc.). This enabled significant sections of the working class to oppose the stabilization of the capitalist economy and the bourgeois state. This factor, and this above all, has made the Portuguese revolution follow a fundamentally different line (that is, a constantly advancing one) from the one that was followed in France and Italy at the end of the Second World War.

In other words, when we talk about the "mass vanguard" in Portugal today, we are not talking about small revolutionary sects or groups of radicalized "ultraleftist" students, but working-class cadres and leaders who have led and are leading the major strikes, factory occupations, mass demonstrations, and soldiers revolts of the past months, the cadres who are the most active and dynamic both in leading the workers commissions, tenants commissions, and soldiers assemblies and committees and in trying to coordinate and centralize them. An important part of this layer has already broken politically with the CP and SP leadership. A second important segment, probably still a majority, remains in the CP, although with an increasingly critical attitude toward the leadership. A third, smaller, sector remains in the SP, also with increasing criticisms of the leadership.

We believe it is vital to win political and ideological hegemony in that working-class vanguard. In fact, without fear of being contradicted by history, we can say that if the revolutionary Marxists do *not* win political and ideological hegemony over these vanguard layers, no mass revolutionary party will be built in Portugal at the present stage and the Portuguese revolution will be doomed to defeat. That is what our "vanguardism" is all about.

We say: The Fourth International must win political and ideological hegemony within that vanguard. This means a dialectical policy of united action and merciless political and ideological struggle within this vanguard. This vanguard is very young and inexperienced politically. It makes many mistakes, both opportunist and ultraleftist. On many occasions it exhibits the greatest confusion, but it is also capable of magnificent political and organizational initiatives. *We must win this vanguard to Trotskyism and to the Liga Comunista Internacionalista. That is the top priority in Portugal today*. Obviously, we must conduct this struggle in such a way that it does not obstruct dealing with the subsequent task: winning the majority of the working class for a regime of workers councils. We must combat all forms of sectarianism toward the broad masses among vanguard elements; we must combat the stupid theories of "Soares=social fascism," "Cunhal=social fascism," "break Social Democracy in order to smash fascism," "CP, main agent of social-imperialism," just as we must combat the concepts of putschism or "workers councils without parties." The success of this struggle for a *real* mass line (and not a purely verbal or platonic one) will



be measured by the number of revolutionary vanguard elements, of real working-class cadres, that are won over to the Trotskyist policy of united front toward the traditional mass political organizations of the working class. We must also understand the need for independent political initiatives by the LCI, including initiatives taken independently of the other far-left organizations, particularly when it is necessary to take initiatives that correspond to the needs of the masses and the need to radicalize the mass movement but that go "against the stream" of the prevailing trends within the revolutionary vanguard.

But in order to do that, we have to fight *within* the vanguard. Lenin was quite clear on this subject, too:

"It is better to be with the revolutionary workers when they are wrong on a particular or secondary point than to be with the 'official' Socialists or Social Democrats if they are not sincere and firm revolutionaries, if they do not want or are unable to conduct revolutionary action among the worker masses but have a correct tactic on this particular point." (Letter to Sylvia Pankhurst, August 28, 1919, in *Collected Works*, French edition, vol. 29, p. 567.)

And more precisely, in astonishing parallel to current developments in Portugal:

"Messrs. Philistines . . . probably dream of a revolution (assuming that they have the slightest idea of revolution in their heads) in which the masses rise up in a *sudden* and *perfectly organized* fashion.

"Such revolutions do not exist and cannot exist. Capitalism would not be capitalism if it did not maintain the immense majority of the masses of workers in oppression, brutalization, poverty, and ignorance. Capitalism cannot be brought down except by a revolution that through struggle awakens hitherto inactive masses. When the revolution rises, spontaneous explosions are inevitable. There has never been and there cannot be a single revolution without this.

"It is a lie that communists favor the spontaneous movement. . . . a lie exactly identical to the one we have heard so often from the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. Communists *do not* favor the spontaneous movement, *are not* advocates of dispersed outbreaks. Communists educate the masses for organized, coherent, unanimous, opportune, mature action. . . .

"But the Philistines are incapable of understanding that communists consider it their duty (and they are perfectly right) *to be with the fighting oppressed masses* and not with the heroes of the petty bourgeoisie who stand aside in expectant cowardice. When the masses struggle, errors are inevitable; communists, while seeing these errors, explaining them to the masses, seeking to correct them, and struggling relentlessly for the victory of conscious action over spontaneity, *remain with the masses*. It is better to be with the fighting masses, who will progressively overcome their errors in the course of the struggle, than with the intellectual gentry, Philistines, and Kautskyites who stand apart waiting for 'complete victory.'" (The Heroes of the Bern International, *Collected Works*, French edition, vol. 29, p. 401.)

Trotsky did not think otherwise. Here is what he had to say about the abortive and tactically incorrect uprising of the vanguard of the Petrograd workers and soldiers in July 1917:

"It was precisely the July defeat that accelerated the rise of the Bolsheviks, who were not only able to estimate correctly the situation without any illusions or embellishments but also did not break away from the masses during the most difficult days of failure, sacrifice, and persecution." ("Before the Second Stage," *Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1935-36*), Pathfinder Press, p. 63.)

The Lambertists apply these teachings to the Portuguese revolution in a very peculiar way. In the September 10, 1975, issue of *Informations Ouvrières* they boldly state that "the radicalization of the masses is going through the channel of the Socialist party." We ask: What radicalization is referred to here? Where, in what town, in what factory, in what barracks, have the militants

of the SP advanced the revolution a single step toward soviets? Where have they developed the germs, buds, and shoots of dual power? Were not all the radical vanguard initiatives taken under the leadership of militants vehemently hostile to the Soares leadership? Isn't *Informations Ouvrières* confusing the vanguard with the rearguard? Or have the Lambertists reached the conclusion that in a revolutionary situation in an imperialist country it is not the generalization, coordination, and centralization of workers councils that is the key task, but rather the stabilization of organs of bourgeois parliamentary democracy? The least that can be said about such a position is that it is not exactly Leninist or Trotskyist.

Comrade Foley, with the obvious approval of Comrade Hansen, did not go quite so far in his articles as the Lambertists did in theirs. But he was not very far behind. In his article entitled "Why Portuguese Military Placed Troika in Power," for example, published in the August 4 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, we read the following:

"What is certain is that the real vanguard of the Portuguese working class at the present time participated in the SP demonstrations. That proletarian vanguard is not to be found among the ultraleftists who followed a shadow of 'people's power' into isolation and even allowed themselves to be used by military demagogues as pawns in a campaign to rob the masses of their democratic rights. Nor were the most intelligent, class-conscious, and courageous sections of the proletariat with the Stalinist myrmidons who were mobilized to sing the praises of military rulers and help deny the majority of the working class the right to demonstrate." (p. 1114.)

Presumably, the "real vanguard of the Portuguese working class" is not the vanguard that has consolidated and spread the coordinating bodies of the workers commissions. It is not the vanguard that has extended workers control. It is not the one that has introduced massive "indiscipline" into the bourgeois army against the wrath of Soares and his lieutenants. It is not the one that has challenged the entire military hierarchy by raising the call for the election of officers and the formation of elected soldiers committees. No, the "real vanguard," we are told, is fighting for the "popular will" to be expressed by the Constituent Assembly, a really striking way of defending the "germs" of workers power. Here we have rearguardism in a nutshell. The correct Leninist position that the revolutionary vanguard fighting for soviet power against bourgeois democracy should patiently attempt to win over the less advanced masses who still hesitate and cling to bourgeois-democratic illusions is converted into its exact opposite: The hesitant, moderate layers become the "vanguard"; the real vanguard becomes an enemy to be despised and fought systematically, if not abandoned to repression. We have told the comrades of the minority before and we tell them again: It is but one small step from tail-ending the rearguard of the masses to tail-ending the reformist leaders. Once one succumbs to the logic of tail-ending, it is easy to take this step.

Comrade Foley carries his ideas through to the end. In the July 28 issue of *Intercontinental Press* he wrote: "The July 16 demonstration was a wild display of ultraleft fantasies. It further isolated the most radicalized elements and helped discredit the embryonic forms of workers power that have been developing. After this, it will be hard for any workers or tenants committee to gain acceptance as a genuinely representative body that can unite workers and poor masses in struggle." (p. 1063.)

Will it now? How has this prediction stood up against the test of subsequent events? A few months later, these allegedly isolated committees in Oporto and Lisbon succeeded in bringing into the streets crowds just as large as those drawn by the massive SP demonstrations that excited such ecstasy in the hearts of Comrades Foley and Hansen. In fact, many Social Democratic workers actually participated in the massive demonstrations in

favor of the SUV (Soldados Unidos Vencerão—Soldiers United Will Win). The difference was that these crowds—whatever the partially confused slogans some of them raised—had a much clearer consciousness and understanding of the next step forward than did the crowds mobilized by the SP: to generalize, coordinate, and centralize the organs of workers power, and not to transmit power to the Constituent Assembly. Which crowds represented the vanguard? Which the rearguard?

How far Comrades Foley and Hansen's blindness to the specific tasks in a revolutionary situation can go is revealed by Comrade Foley's article in the October 6 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, which criticizes the September 25 mass demonstration organized by the SUV, a demonstration that drew tens of thousands of people. This demonstration ended in a march to a military prison, where the first two soldiers imprisoned for leftist political activity (possession of leaflets, in this case) were being held. The march resulted in the release of the imprisoned militants. This was, Comrade Foley wrote, an ultraleft adventure:

"The political climate in the country was obviously still unfavorable to repression in the military. Thus, a broad campaign [?] could have forced the release of these two SUV activists. . . . Instead, the September 25 demonstration isolated [!] the left still more within the armed forces and encouraged more dependence [?] on the demagogues of the MFA." (p. 1323.)

Comrades Foley and Hansen appear not to understand that if you let soldiers be kept in jail for breaches of discipline (and that would have been the objective result of organizing a "broad campaign") instead of freeing them immediately through mass action, you make the greatest possible contribution to the restoration of discipline in the bourgeois army. What other soldiers will dare to break discipline if the mass movement is unable to free the first victims? How does marching on a military prison along with tens of thousands of people demanding the release of imprisoned militants encourage dependence on the demagogues of the MFA? In fact, the victory won by the September 25 demonstration helped spread "indiscipline" throughout the army, far from helping to "isolate" the left. It helped spark the solidarity between the soldiers and workers in the occupied radio and television stations and helped spark and carry to victory the occupation of the RASP barracks (Artillery Regiment of Serro do Pilar) in Oporto. The "isolated" SUV brought tens of thousands of people into the streets in successive waves. All this is dismissed by Comrades Foley and Hansen as "ultraleft vanguardism." To stand with tens of thousands of revolutionary workers and soldiers, even if they commit some mistakes, is a piece of advice of Lenin's that Comrades Foley and Hansen now choose to dismiss, along with many other pieces of advice from the same source.

What characterizes Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack's position is a complete withdrawal toward propagandism, an abandonment of all sense of initiative in action, which presumably is to be a domain strictly monopolized by the leaders of the bureaucratized mass organizations that still "control the majority of workers." Here again, the analogy with Healy and Lambert is striking. With such an attitude, our French comrades could never have made their contributions to the barricades in May 1968 in Paris, which triggered a strike of 10 million workers. Nor, for that matter, could the comrades of the Socialist Workers party have initiated the mass antiwar movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Both would have had to limit themselves to propaganda campaigns calling upon the CP and SP bureaucrats in France and the trade-union bureaucrats in the United States to themselves initiate the struggle against the repression of the student movement or the struggle for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, struggles that would then never have begun in reality but would have remained buried in the pages of revolutionary newspapers.

## On the Slogan: SP-CP to Power!

Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack make extensive use of a passage from an article written by Trotsky in 1931 in which he severely chides the Spanish anarchists and Stalinists for not calling for general elections in 1931. It is alleged that we are imitating that mistake in Portugal today, leaving the MFA a monopoly on the "national political questions." At the very least, these comrades claim, we are contributing to a situation in which the only "national political alternative" posed to the masses is one of various political coalitions between the working-class parties and wings or sectors of the bourgeois MFA. To this allegedly "anarcho-populist" position of ours, they counterpose the call for the CP and SP leaders to break with all bourgeois ministers (those of both the MFA and the PPD—Partido Popular Democrático, Popular Democratic party) and form a "workers and peasants government."

Contrary to what Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack allege, we do not "grudgingly" recognize that the call upon the leaders of the traditional bureaucratized workers parties to break with the bourgeoisie and take power in their own name is part of Leninist and Trotskyist tradition. We have used this propaganda slogan on many occasions, even in Portugal, from April 1974 to May 1975. We may well have to use it again. What we contest, and what Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack cling to, is the transformation of that propaganda slogan into a panacea applicable to all situations regardless of the relationship of class forces and the relationship of forces within the working class itself, regardless of the immediate priority tasks that are posed.

In Portugal today the fate of the revolution depends on the capacity of the toiling masses to generalize, coordinate, and centralize the workers, soldiers, and poor peasants committees. If this centralization does not occur in coming months, the revolution will suffer a defeat that will be serious (although perhaps not as decisive as that suffered in Germany in January 1919).

Under such circumstances, to give the general propaganda formula "workers and peasants government" the specific form "SP-CP government" means to erect an additional stumbling block on the road to the formation of the national workers assembly (or national people's assembly), which is the next decisive step forward that must be taken by the Portuguese revolution. Given the present political line and orientation of the SP and CP leaderships, the masses cannot and will not understand the slogan "SP-CP government" in any other way than as a government based on the Constituent Assembly, that is, the reconstruction of the bourgeois state apparatus, of bourgeois "law and order." That is precisely the immediate goal of bourgeois counterrevolution; we must oppose it with all our strength.

Under the present circumstances, then, and as long as the situation remains at the present transitional stage (the transition from a prerevolutionary situation to a revolutionary one, from one of embryonic dual power to one of generalized dual power), we should formulate the government slogan in such a way as not to clash with the immediate central task at hand. What we must call for is a *workers and peasants government based on a national workers assembly*. When asked what political forces will compose that government, we answer: That will be determined by the composition of the assembly itself, that is, by the constantly shifting relationship of political forces within the mass movement. It is premature to lend this algebraic expression a precise arithmetical content. Rather, the emphasis must be placed on the *program* the workers and peasants government must implement to prevent an economic collapse and a rollback of the revolution as well as on the organizational form on which this government must be based: generalized self-organization and self-defense of the broad masses.

In general, the exact formulation of government slogans in an



agitational form must be governed by the greatest flexibility. These formulations are conjunctural by nature, and they must reflect not only the general structure of the workers movement, the general level of class consciousness, and the relationship of particular layers of the working class to particular organizations of the class, but also and especially the key tasks of the moment, the specific stage of the class struggle, the main trend of development of working-class consciousness. From that standpoint, we have dropped the slogan "For an SP-CP-Intersindical-workers commissions government" as a specific and conjunctural formula. We have not at all dropped it as a matter of "principle" or "strategy."

The formula "SP-CP to power" could again become appropriate in at least two, quite different cases:

- If a national workers assembly is actually convened and has an SP-CP majority; that is, in the event of a situation similar to the one in Russia after the convening of the First All-Russian Soviet Congress. In that case, the call for an SP-CP government would dovetail with the call for soviet power, as it did in Russia in April-July 1917, and would be entirely correct;

- If the revolution suffers a serious setback, if the "democratic counterrevolution" is triumphant and the embryonic organs of workers power are destroyed, but if, at the same time, the triumph of counterrevolution is limited and the strength of the working class, still undefeated overall, makes it impossible for reaction to crush the workers organizations, while the counterrevolution is feverishly preparing for taking on that task in the following stage. In such a situation, similar to the one that arose in Germany after the Kapp putsch of March 1920, the slogan of an SP-CP government would again be correct; the slogan would then be an instrument for broadening mass struggles and mobilizations independent of the bourgeoisie and for once again setting in motion a process of self-organization of the working class, which could once again lead to the emergence of bodies of the workers council type.

At the present stage, however, that slogan does not help the Portuguese workers understand what the next step forward must be. It diverts attention from that step, fosters dangerous illusions in the SP-CP leaderships, and tends to strengthen bourgeois-democratic illusions, which are already beginning to decline (although they could grow again, and powerfully, if the revolution suffers defeats).

Behind the reasoning of Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack is the assumption that the grip of the CP and SP leaders on their followers is so strong that their followers will not generalize the embryonic organs of workers power before first going through a parliamentary experience with an SP-CP government, or at least without a protracted campaign of propaganda and agitation around the slogan of an SP-CP government. We believe that this assumption is incorrect. We think it is rooted in an underestimation of the depth of the revolutionary process now going on in Portugal, of the depth of the crisis of the capitalist economy and the bourgeois state machine.

Under the dual impact of this crisis and the broadening mass struggles, it is perfectly possible that broader and broader layers of the Portuguese working class (including, in the end, the majority of the working class) will set up workers councils that function as soviets and will begin to coordinate and centralize them before they have gone through the experience of an SP-CP government based on the Constituent Assembly and before they have broken *electorally* with the SP or the CP. The history of all past proletarian revolutions in Europe confirms this.

Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack fail to understand the implications of the *uneven development of class consciousness* in revolutionary situations like the one now developing in Portugal. We do not agree with them when they say that "the key to building workers power is political" if what they mean by "building workers power" is the development of a situation of

generalized dual power and not the actual conquest of power, which comes later. Far from being able to arise only out of "national political questions" and from agitation around slogans like "SP-CP government" or "For a sovereign Constituent Assembly," *the real workers councils are now arising and will continue to arise around all the issues of immediate mass struggles*. These struggles combine specific political issues—like the fight against fascist conspiracies, the defense of the political rights and activities of the soldiers, and the fight against government-imposed censorship—with issues that are also largely economic and social. *The political synthesis will come at the end, not at the beginning.*

To believe otherwise is to fail to take account of the uneven development of class consciousness and the initial weakness of the revolutionary party. It means, under the pretext of opposition to "anarchism," "spontaneism," and "gradualism," to once again cling to the rearguard, to be tail-endist, and to underestimate the growing capacity of revolutionary vanguard workers to draw their class comrades who still vote for the SP and the CP into the actual extension and generalization of dual power, even before they have broken with their bureaucratic misleaders.

If lending priority to the generalization, coordination, and centralization of workers councils under given circumstances means "abandoning national political questions to the bourgeoisie," then several times in their lives Lenin and Trotsky were as guilty of that sin as we are now. It is easy to list a whole series of instances in which revolutionary Marxists *did not* advance a concrete government slogan: Russia between the July days of 1917 and the Kornilov uprising; Germany between the January 1919 defeat and the Kapp putsch in March 1920; France between the beginning of the revolutionary upsurge in 1935 and the outbreak of the general strike; Republican Spain between the dissolution of the Central Committee of the Militias and the new working-class upsurge of the beginning of 1937.<sup>4</sup> All these situations have one aspect in common: The immediate key task is the constitution (or political reconstitution) of organs of workers power. The similarity with the current situation in Portugal is striking.

#### The International Proletariat's Experience With Stalinism and the Struggle for Workers Democracy in Portugal

Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack strongly insist on the fact that it would be "abstract" to view the question of workers councils and workers democracy in Portugal independently of the experience of the international and Portuguese working class with Stalinism and the ruthless suppression of any form of workers self-organization or self-expression in those countries in which the Soviet bureaucracy rules. Undoubtedly, they have a point here.

It is not only anticommunist propaganda that makes the Portuguese workers and the workers of West Europe as a whole suspicious of the maneuvers and intentions of the Stalinists in the

4. Since its initial publication in 1937, Felix Morrow's *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Spain* has been hailed as a Trotskyist classic. In 1974 it was reprinted by Pathfinder Press, without any criticism. Yet it contains a stinging attack on the POUM for having raised, in the revolutionary situation of March 1937, the slogan of a government of all working-class political and trade-union organizations without regard to the concrete conditions of the moment. (See pp. 134-5 of the 1974 edition.) Incidentally, in the same book, Morrow offers a description of the way workers councils arise; it completely conforms to our line and is in strong opposition to the line of Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack:

"One must never forget—what the Stalinists have completely buried—that soviets *do not begin* as organs of state power. They arise in 1905, 1917, in Germany and Austria in 1918, rather as powerful strike committees and representatives of the masses in dealing with immediate concrete problems and with the government. Long before they can seize state power, they carry on as organs defending the workers' daily interests. Long before the workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies have united in an all-national

imperialist countries. That propaganda would not have even a small fraction of its impact were it not for the reality of the conditions of the working class in Soviet society and in those countries that live under the rule of the Soviet bureaucracy. Suspicion and reticence among the workers of the West was further strengthened by the brutal crushing of the "Prague Spring" by the invading armies of the states of the Warsaw pact.

The fact that wherever CP bureaucrats wield real power within the imperialist countries—that is, essentially within the trade unions—they have suppressed workers democracy and engaged in all sorts of bureaucratic manipulations and maneuvers<sup>5</sup> fuels the fires of anticommunist propaganda and prejudices and increases the genuine and justifiable suspicions of the workers in the imperialist West toward the Soviet bureaucracy and the local CP leaderships.

If comrades in the Fourth International underestimate the importance of this factor, tend to dismiss it, or fail to take it sufficiently into account in their reportage and analysis of the political crisis in Portugal since May 1975, they are committing a serious mistake. In our writings we have always incorporated this factor into the analysis, and especially into the formulation of slogans and tasks. Nonetheless, we are prepared to take responsibility for insufficient rapidity and clarity in correcting these mistakes.

In our writings, we have repeatedly insisted that in reconstructing the unity in action of the Portuguese working class it was vital to avoid any step, any formula, or any mistake that could create the impression that we deny the Socialist party freedom of organization, freedom of the press, freedom of demonstration, or freedom to advocate and agitate for policies opposed to those of the CP, the revolutionary vanguard, or the Fourth International. Not to understand the vital importance of defending proletarian democracy in practice today, and in any revolutionary process, means to gravely underestimate the damage that has been done to the consciousness of large parts of the international proletariat by fifty years of Stalinism. In that sense, Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack misrepresent our position when they allege that we defended the right of the SP to its own free press only in a future, "ideal" workers state. We defended this right for Portugal *today*, not only in articles appearing in our own press, but also in daily and weekly papers with circulations of tens of thousands in Portugal itself. (Comrade Mandel's interview published in the weekly *Sempre Fixe* in August 1975 is an example.)

Any section, press organ, or representative of the Fourth

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congress there must have been formed the city, village, regimental soviets which are later to be united in a national organ. The way to begin getting such a congress is to begin electing factory, peasants' and combatants' committees wherever the workers can be taught to function through their own committees. The example of a few committees in a few factories and regiments will win the masses to this form, the most democratic method of representation known to mankind. Then, only, can one organize an all-national congress in a bid for power." (Ibid., p. 136, second emphasis added.)

Another "gradualist" sinner. And Comrade Hansen never noticed—in nearly forty years! Or perhaps this quotation confirms how much the position we defend is in the Trotskyist tradition and how much Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack are moving away from that tradition?

5. It should be added, however, that in this the Stalinists are only imitating the example set by the reformist labor fakers and Social Democratic bureaucrats. Soares is an enthusiastic believer in the "right of tendencies" within the Intersindical in Portugal, because he happens to be in a minority there. But in countries in which they control the trade unions, the Social Democratic bureaucrats, far from applying workers democracy and respecting the right of tendencies, often exercise a regime of expulsions of "leftists," trample on the democratic rights of the membership, institutionalize bureaucratic rule (sometimes years go by between general assemblies of members), and generally conduct themselves no differently from the Stalinist bureaucrats who lead mass trade unions in other places in the capitalist world.

International committing a mistake on this question objectively serves the Stalinist and reformist attempts to dismiss workers democracy as irrelevant and places additional obstacles in the way of the return of the world revolution to the classical pattern of soviet power and soviet democracy based on a multiparty system. While the centrists and ultraleftists are a thousand times more guilty here than some Trotskyists, the program and tradition of the Fourth International are so clear and unblemished on this point that even the slightest ambiguity should not be tolerated from any of our comrades. (It ought to be noted in passing that Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack distribute blame on such matters in a rather uneven manner, correctly denouncing the Stalinists for accusing Soares of "social-fascism," but failing to mention the parallel and no less criminal stance of the Socialist party and the Maoist MRPP in calling Cunhal "social-fascist.")

But while Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack undoubtedly have a point in stressing the effects on working-class consciousness of the international experience with Stalinism, they transform this merit into a demerit and a disastrous mistake when they draw the conclusion that because of the impact of world Stalinism on current revolutions in the West, it is "abstract" and "ineffective" to counterpose workers democracy and workers councils to both Stalinist-type "people's democracy" and bourgeois democracy:

"Comrade Mandel in particular has offered blueprints of what ought to be done and could be done in cases like the seizure of *República* if the institutions of proletarian democracy were further advanced and if they adhered to the programmatic norms of Trotskyism.

"This purely propagandistic approach (Comrades Frank, Maitan, and Mandel might call it playing 'some propaganda game') was ineffective, since the number of countries that can be pointed to as upholding proletarian democracy is zero.

"To avoid appearing like utopian schematists, it was necessary for our comrades to show in action their capacity to defend whatever democracy existed, even if it was in the form of no more than pinched, narrow bourgeois democratic rights." (*IP*, October 13, p. 1389.)

Rather formidable conclusions follow from this line of argument. The "number of countries that can be pointed to as upholding proletarian democracy" will be zero right up until the first "pure" model of workers state arises. In the minds of Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack, the absence of such a pure model constitutes an insuperable obstacle on the road to the development of workers councils and workers democracy and transforms propaganda and agitation in their favor into a "utopian scheme." Doesn't that rule out any "pure" proletarian revolution anywhere, anytime, after the terrible experience of Stalinism? How can you have soviets without propagandizing for them? Is that propaganda condemned to remaining "utopian" and "abstract" as long as there is no model country that can be pointed to?

In fact, what Social Democrats, centrists, and Stalinists are saying today throughout West Europe is that the only realistic choice is between bourgeois democracy and reactionary dictatorship; workers democracy is "unrealistic," "abstract," and "utopian" (because it has failed in Russia and East Europe, say the Social Democrats; because it is impractical anyway, add the skeptics; because workers consciousness is still insufficient, lament the centrists; because the "international relationship of forces" or the "backwardness of the working class" doesn't allow it, echo the Italian, French, Spanish, Belgian, West German, and Swedish Stalinists). So, all these gentlemen conclude: Bourgeois democracy? Yes. Advanced democracy? Yes. "Mixed economy?" By all means. But the democracy of workers councils? Impossible; utopian, abstract, ineffective, unrealistic. Have Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack now joined this international brigade, under



the pretext of having thoroughly understood the effects of Stalinism?

We, while recognizing the additional obstacles that Stalinism has placed on the road to workers democracy, also note the additional strength this "schema" has acquired as a result of the growth of the proletariat in West Europe during the past twenty-five years, the spread of the concepts and practices of self-organization to other strata of the population, the further decay of bourgeois democracy and of bourgeois social relations in general, the increase in the cultural level, leisure, and skill of the laboring population, the growing conviction among many people that the democracy of workers councils is a step forward compared with parliamentary democracy, and the increasingly powerful instinctive thrust toward self-organization growing out of current workers struggles (elected strike committees, for example). If the damaging effects of Stalinism are weighed against the positive effects of these factors—not to mention the strength of the mass vanguard in West Europe, which has been largely won over to the concepts of workers power and workers democracy—the overall balance is decidedly more favorable than Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack seem to believe. Whether in Portugal or Spain, France or Italy, *the possibility of making workers democracy and workers councils credible and acceptable as a concrete alternative to millions of toilers does not depend essentially on the existence of a foreign model* ("a country that can be pointed to as upholding proletarian democracy"), *but rather on the depth of the revolutionary crisis, the extent of mass action and mobilization, the size of the mass vanguard, the altered relationship of forces between that vanguard and the bureaucratic apparatuses of the traditional working-class organizations, and the strength and influence of the revolutionary party.*

We are deeply convinced that, especially since May 1968, the working class of West Europe is capable of creating a "model workers state" based on workers councils and workers democracy *without any previously existing model*; the resolutions adopted by the Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International include that conviction. Indeed, it will be the working class of West Europe that will be the first to create these states—and in several countries. That is why we are so "obsessed" by the "concept of the self-organization of the proletariat." The formidable obstacles of anticommunist prejudices, bourgeois-democratic illusions, and genuine and justified suspicions toward Stalinist bureaucrats will be overcome in practice, *in the actual process of building the workers councils*, based on a jealous defense of workers democracy and a real respect for the pluralism of the various political organizations that represent the masses within the councils. History and history alone will settle the question of whether this approach and this prediction are "utopian," "abstract," and "ineffective" in Portugal. In point of fact, it is becoming less "utopian" every week. And we are rather confident that "realism" and "effectiveness" will turn out to be on our side in Spain, France, and Italy as well.

The position defended by the Fourth International and the LCI offers the only possibility of *reestablishing the unity in action of the whole class in practice*. To the SP and CP workers, and to the workers who already follow the revolutionary left, we say: Obviously, we do not all agree on the Constituent Assembly, on "parliamentary" or "popular" democracy, on judgments about Social Democracy or Stalinism, or even communism. But prior agreement on such questions is not required before defending the revolution and bringing it a step forward. We *all* agree on the need to defend all the conquests our class has made since April 25, 1974, both the democratic ones and the anticapitalist ones. We *all* agree on the burning need to fight unemployment, inflation, factory shutdowns, bourgeois economic sabotage, censorship, curtailment of the democratic rights of soldiers. We *all* participate in committees on the factory, village, and barracks levels (yes, *all*, for many workers led by the SP participate as well) in order to

further these goals. *Let us coordinate our efforts at these levels where we are already active.* Let us create a minimum of coordination and unity of action among us that will make us invincible, that will enable us to paralyze all our enemies and eliminate all our mutual suspicion and prejudice. Instead of convening *separate* conferences of MRPP and SP-led commissions, CP-led commissions, UDP-led commissions, MES-led commissions, let us call *a single conference of all workers, soldiers, and peasants commissions of the entire country.* This is the only practical way to restore the unity of the toiling masses, which has been broken since May 1975. Within this conference, all of us, Socialists, Social Democrats, Communists, revolutionary Marxists, anarchists, will be absolutely free to defend our positions and to agitate for the solutions we support. But we will do so while strengthening and not weakening the organization of the working class as a whole.

Such an appeal, which gives expression to the deeply felt desire for class unity that is always present among the working class, would draw a powerful response from the Portuguese masses. It would gain important political credit for the only current that is capable of actively defending a platform of unity in action against all splitters: the Trotskyist current, the current of the Fourth International.

Does this mean that we counterpose the "united front from below" to the "united front from above and below"? Not at all. It simply means that we do not consider an agreement between Soares and Cunhal (or between the revolutionaries and Soares and Cunhal) to be a precondition for setting this process in motion. In reality, the process has already begun spontaneously and is spreading as a result of vanguard initiatives. At each moment, around each specific problem, all the various factors must be weighed in order to decide whether public appeals should be addressed to the SP, the CP, and the Intersindical calling on them to support, participate in, or lead this or that additional initiative to raise the movement to a higher level of organization. Whenever this can be done credibly, that is, whenever a minimum of political preconditions exist, the vanguard and the LCI should by all means supplement the call to the masses with a call to the leaders of the mass organizations.

### The Danger of Succumbing to Sectarian Subjectivism

There is a real danger that the method used by Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack in analyzing the revolutionary process in Portugal will play havoc with the politics of the SWP itself. For the ultimate result of that method can be seen in the evolution of the political analyses of the Healy and Lambert groupings. That end result is the dead end of sectarian subjectivism.

The characteristic of a sect of the Healy-Lambert type is its inability to view a political problem, especially a revolutionary process, in a rounded and all-sided way. In the hands of such sects, Marxism ceases to be an instrument for understanding reality in its totality and dynamic in order to achieve revolutionary change. Instead it becomes a dogma designed to verify, often against all objective evidence, the particular *raison d'être* of the sect in question, that sect's special shibboleth, the vehicle through which it justifies its separate existence from the organized current of revolutionary Marxism. Healy and Lambert each maintain a number of these shibboleths, some in common, some not, "Pabloite revisionism" being the most usual one. A rich, complex, and constantly changing reality is torn apart; some partial aspect of reality is extended out of all proportion until it becomes the "main trend" around which all comments and interventions must be centered; complex reality is "reorganized." Pronounced subjectivism leads to dogmatism and an incapacity to intervene in the class struggle in any decisive way. With each new turn in the situation, regardless of the dismal balance sheet, the

shibboleth is advanced again and again; in spite of the sect's failure to influence the course of the class struggle, it will try to stabilize itself by turning inward, particularly by launching a good old faction fight against the mainstream of Trotskyism, the "Pabloite revisionists" of the Fourth International.

The day-to-day politics of such a sect may be ultraleft or right opportunist. Its character as a sect is expressed in its subjective dogmatism, its refusal to analyze objective reality in its totality, its obsession with some particular aspect of reality that happens to be closely tied to the sect's self-justification.

A streak of similar irrational subjectivism can be detected in Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack's approach to the Portuguese revolution. Moreover, they have extended these traits, borrowed from the arsenal of Healy-Lambert, from the field of the analysis of the Portuguese revolution to the field of polemical methods within the world Trotskyist movement.

All the comments of Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack center around one aspect of Portuguese reality and one aspect only: the bourgeois character of the MFA, the key task of "destroying illusions" in the MFA, and the alleged softness of the majority of the leaders of the Fourth International on these subjects. Something has obviously gone awry here. Indeed, the struggle for the class independence of the proletariat in a revolutionary situation (or a prerevolutionary situation rapidly growing over to a revolutionary one) is a key task for revolutionary Marxists. But this can in no way be reduced to the "struggle against illusions in the MFA." The working class can be and has been tied to the bourgeoisie not only through governmental collaboration with bourgeois parties and ministers and illusions in "military demagogues," but also and even more so through illusions in bourgeois-parliamentary institutions and reformist politics in general. It is completely one-sided and subjectivist to regard "illusions in the MFA" as the *main* danger in Portugal today, as a greater danger than illusions in bourgeois democracy or reformism. "Reorganizing" the reality of the revolutionary process around this particular shibboleth leads to wrong and ludicrously misleading analyses, such as interpreting the forms of coordination of the nuclei of workers power, which have arisen spontaneously, as the product of "demagogic maneuvers" by "bourgeois officers," or such as condemning a mass action to release imprisoned soldiers as an "ultraleft adventure" that only enabled Carvalho to make a demagogic gesture. The objective impact of these events and processes becomes unimportant or secondary. (Healy even calls it "diversionist.") The "essence" of the matter is that under no conditions should Carvalho be allowed to gain additional prestige.

We have never left any room for doubt about our position on the bourgeois character of the MFA, the Portuguese state, and the Portuguese government. We have not been and we are not now "soft" on these questions. Any claim to the contrary can be based only on distortion or deliberate slander, as is the case with the Healyites.<sup>6</sup> But we have refused and will refuse to view all events of the struggle in Portugal through the prism of whether or not they could be "exploited" by "demagogic officers." We view them from the standpoint of their overall impact on the class struggle. From that standpoint, and in view of the depth of the revolutionary crisis and the degree of decomposition of the bourgeois state, we put the main emphasis on the building and centralization of workers councils and on the arming of the working class. To close one's eyes to the disintegration of the army and the deep divisions in the officer corps that arise from this disintegration under the impact of the extreme polarization of class forces is to become a prisoner of subjectivism of the Healy-Lambert type.

6. In face of all evidence to the contrary, the Healyite *Workers Press* continues to "interpret" our references to the divisions in the army as meaning that we "really think" that a socialist revolution could be led to victory by the left wing of the MFA. (*Workers Press*, October 7.)

Not to understand that on the eve of a civil war, when both class camps are preparing for the decisive test of strength, it makes some small difference whether an officer distributes machine guns to the workers or tries to give them to the fascists is to fall into hopeless sectarianism. It would be wiser for Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack to abandon that dogmatic-sectarian stance and listen to what Comrade Trotsky had to say on the subject:

"During the revolution, inevitable oscillations will occur in the army, an internal struggle will take place. Even the most advanced sections will not go over openly and actively to the side of the proletariat unless they see with their own eyes that the *workers want to fight and are able to win*. The tasks of the Fascist detachments will be to prevent the *rapprochement* between the revolutionary proletariat and the army. The Fascists will strive to annihilate the workers' insurrection at its outset in order to destroy among the best sections of the army any idea of the possibility of supporting the insurgents. At the same time the Fascists will come to the aid of reactionary detachments of the army to disarm the most revolutionary and the least 'reliable' regiments.

"What will be our task in this case?"

"It is impossible to tell in advance the concrete course of the revolution in any given country. But we can, on the basis of the entire experience of history, state with certainty that the insurrection in no case and in no country will assume the character of a mere duel between the workers' militia and the army. The relationship of forces will be much more complex and immeasurably more favorable to the proletariat. *The workers' militia*—not by its armaments but by its class consciousness and heroism—*will be the vanguard of the revolution. Fascism will be the vanguard of the counter-revolution*. The workers' militia with the support of the entire class, with the sympathy of all the toilers, will have to smash, disarm and terrorize the bandit gangs of reaction and thus open up the avenue to the workers for *revolutionary fraternization with the army*. The alliance of workers and soldiers will be victorious over the counter-revolutionary section. Thus victory will be assured." ("Once Again, Whither France?" in *Whither France?*, Pathfinder Press, pp. 95-96.)

Understand, exploit, and take account of the inevitable divisions of the bourgeois army through a daring policy of independent revolutionary mobilization and class action: That is the course Trotsky urged upon the French revolutionaries in March 1935, when the bourgeois army was far more stable than it is in Portugal today. We can turn Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack's question back at them: Was Trotsky right, wrong, or irrelevant?

Despite the façade of their "mass approach," Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack's handling of the key tasks of the Portuguese revolution is marked by frightful sectarian ultimatism toward the masses. The main task for revolutionary Marxists, we are told, is to destroy illusions in the MFA. The MFA, however, counterposes the workers councils to the Constituent Assembly. Thus, to place any confidence in the workers councils is to place confidence in the MFA, which is exactly the opposite of what must be done. Hence, we revolutionary Marxists forbid the workers to build workers councils until illusions in the MFA have been eliminated. If the workers and soldiers do not follow our advice and are "ultraleft" enough to set up councils despite our warnings, we simply decide that we will not recognize these organs as genuine soviets. Instead, we will defend only the "expression of popular will," that is, a bourgeois parliament, against the councils.

The real Leninist and Trotskyist approach, of course, is diametrically the opposite. We revolutionary Marxists, while fighting against any illusions the masses still have in the MFA, in an SP-CP "popular front" policy, in parliamentarism, and in reformism, will support and push forward all attempts at self-



organization of the masses. Any committee or council elected is a practical step toward overcoming these illusions, a step that is a thousand times more effective than any propaganda campaign, no matter how well carried out. It is through the establishment, extension, generalization, coordination, and centralization of these committees that the credibility and possibility of a workers and peasants government will be understood by the broad masses in a revolutionary situation like the one now developing in Portugal. That is the way the masses will break any stranglehold of the MFA in practice. One has only to read Trotsky's article "For Committees of Action, Not the People's Front" (November 1935) to see how far removed Trotsky was from the sectarian ultimatism of the Foley-Hansen-Novack type.

When turned toward inner-party polemics, subjectivism leads to blind factionalism. One-fourth of Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack's article is devoted to obscure and tedious polemics around quotations from press organs of the Fourth International in more than half a dozen different countries, polemics that are completely beside the point. What is disturbing about these polemics is the fact that, aping the method of Healy and Lambert, they do not ask such questions as, What is the actual line of *Red Weekly, Rouge*, or *Rood* on the MFA or the tasks of revolutionary Marxists in Portugal? No, they airily dismiss as irrelevant dozens of articles and published resolutions voted by leading bodies that clearly state the positions of these comrades on the bourgeois nature of the MFA and the fifth and sixth provisional governments and instead "infer" an opposite position from some isolated sentences taken out of context or from "facts" such as the absence of comments about what Coutinho says in an interview with Alain Krivine. In the same way, one could "infer" from the *Militant's* publication "without comment" of an interview with a spokesman of the bourgeois el-Fateh that the newspaper had abandoned the theory of permanent revolution and had endowed the national bourgeoisie with the capacity to lead the Palestinian revolution to victory. In fact, such accusations have been directed against the SWP by some sectarians. Why dip your cup into this poisoned well, Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack?

### The Real Record of the LCI

But Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack have one last ace up their sleeves:

"The comrades of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista, who are directly involved in the situation and who are seriously trying to apply the orientation that Comrades Frank, Maitan, and Mandel have helped to give them, . . . ended up tail-ending the ultraleft and centrist groups. These groups in turn have been tail-ending the Portuguese Communist party. The outcome represents a grievous political setback for the LCI and also for the Fourth International.

"In fact, the recent errors of the LCI are sadly reminiscent of those of the POUM in Spain in which the majority of the Trotskyist forces were lost to the Fourth International and its program.

"The POUM began by capitulating to the anarchists and ended up in fact capitulating to the Stalinists when the anarchists, because of their political confusion, were drawn into the wake of the Communist party." (*IP*, October 13, p. 1389.)

Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack try to make factional use of the fact that the leadership of the LCI signed a statement (on August 25) that was politically wrong, a statement that was signed in common with the CP and some centrist formations. The trouble is that everything is wrong in the contorted manner in which Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack try to make use of this incident.

In the first place, the comparison with the POUM is especially revealing and inadmissible. The POUM crossed class lines by joining a popular front *with bourgeois parties* and then by

entering a bourgeois coalition government in Catalonia. The LCI made a bloc with *working-class parties*, albeit opportunist, centrist, and ultraleftist ones. But there is no *principled* ground on which to object to that. It does not represent crossing class lines. The important thing is whether the objectives and platform of the bloc are correct or not. We believe they were not; the leadership of the LCI believed they were. This is a difference in tactics, not principles. The question of joining a bloc with bourgeois parties is a matter of principle, not of tactics. It means crossing over from a position of class struggle to a position of class collaboration. That is what the POUM did by joining the Popular Front. The LCI has done nothing of the kind. Once again, Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack have shown how easily they abandon the class criterion.

Second, even though they know better, Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack write that the "comrades of the LCI . . . [are] . . . seriously trying to apply the orientation of Comrades Frank, Maitan, and Mandel," who thereby are allegedly responsible for the mistake of the LCI's signing the August 25 declaration. This is completely untrue. The second congress of the LCI was held in early August. There were four tendencies at that congress, one of which, by agreement of the congress as a whole, received an absolute majority of members of the Central Committee, although this tendency represented only a plurality and not a majority of the delegates to the congress. At the congress, the comrades who lead this tendency expressed views on the CP and the SP with which the representative of the international leadership strongly and clearly expressed disagreement. The comrades who lead this tendency are in no way members of the international majority tendency, nor are they "products," either direct or indirect, of the education of the present leadership of the Fourth International. They disagree with us on a number of important points, and we disagree with them.

Although we expressed our misgivings about the line of the tendency that was elected as the majority of the leadership at the second congress of the LCI, we also expressed confidence in the capacity of that young organization to correct any mistakes that would be made, to correct them through a process of democratic and constructive internal debate in consonance with a rhythm imposed by the revolutionary process itself. This confidence has not shown itself to be unfounded. An extraordinary congress of the LCI has been convened by the Central Committee for December 1975. All indications tend to confirm that a majority of the members of the LCI, including all the cadres who are "seriously trying to apply the orientation that Comrades Frank, Maitan, and Mandel helped to give them," have come out *against* the mistake of signing the August 25 declaration. On this occasion, the education and leadership they had received proved to be not as "ineffective" or "disastrous" as Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack presume.

Third, the leadership and press of all the sections of the Fourth International that are in agreement with the "orientation that Comrades Frank, Maitan, and Mandel helped to give them" immediately and unanimously condemned the August 25 declaration. Thus, the conclusions that flow from this incident are rather the opposite of those Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack try to insinuate. In fact, the "education" received from us old sinners inculcated the majority of the Fourth International, including in Portugal, against opportunist mistakes of the kind Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack are eagerly trying to uncover in our camp.

Fourth, simultaneously (or within twenty-four hours) as they mistakenly signed the August 25 declaration, the comrades of the LCI leadership *publicly condemned any support to the bourgeois MFA*. But the comrades of the PRT (Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores—Revolutionary Workers party) had this to say in a "public self-criticism" published on July 10, 1975, and never corrected since then:

"Confusion is mounting within the MFA; it is beginning to divide. One sector, the 'Spinolists,' has lost ground and has been successively pushed back, because the workers struggles advanced and decisively defeated their designs. Today, almost all the officers who before April 25 had called for the Caldas coup are in prison.

"Another sector, under the pressure of the internal and external contradictions and the class struggle, turned to the left; its democratic, populist aspirations deepened and it began to systematically initiate political discussion and controlled democratization in the barracks, mainly in order to combat the influence of the reactionary 'Spinolist' sectors of the armed forces. This process appears most important to us, decisive in the present Portuguese situation; the MFA, or at least one of its sectors, is beginning to define itself: *It is the MFA that is introducing another organization, another power, into the bourgeois armed forces, a dual power.*" (*Combate Socialista*, July 10, 1975, emphasis added.)

Thus, the factional construction of Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack collapses with a loud thud. The comrades allegedly misguided by us, the bad guys, who are supposedly soft on the MFA, staunchly cling to the definition of that military grouping as bourgeois. On the other hand, the good guys, who were presented as being in ideological sympathy with the factional companions of Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack and are therefore presumably 100 percent "hard" against any illusions in the MFA, present a whole wing of that military grouping not only as "petty-bourgeois populist" but as consciously introducing "dual power" in the bourgeois army, "dual power" that the bad guys at least attribute to and try to have initiated by rank-and-file actions *by the soldiers themselves.*

We want to stress that we say all this without any hostility to the comrades of the PRT, who during the past four months have followed a line that is closer to that of the Fourth International than it is to the analysis that has been presented in *Intercontinental Press*. Despite their mistakes, the comrades of the PRT center their propaganda around the need to extend, coordinate, generalize, and centralize the embryonic organs of workers power, as does the Fourth International. They therefore correctly condemned the political offensive unleashed by Soares as an objective attempt to halt and drive back the revolution. We hope that these comrades can soon unify with the LCI. And in one respect their attitude confirms what we wrote in our previous article: No Trotskyist group in Portugal has been able to follow the line presented in Comrade Foley's articles. Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack would do better to think about that than to try to make illegitimate factional use of the tactical differences between the present LCI leadership and the leadership of the PRT.

We must add that the worst aspect of Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack's factional and subjectivist approach to the LCI is the irresponsible exaggeration of their "criticism." Yes, the young leadership of the LCI made some mistakes, one of which was signing the August 25 declaration. Yes, we have criticized these mistakes in a form adequate to their importance and to the key task of helping them to correct themselves and helping the membership to redress the internal situation of the organization. But to say, as Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack do, that "the outcome represents a grievous political setback" to the Fourth International; to state that the action of the LCI leadership "discredited Trotskyism in the eyes of advanced workers, not only in Portugal itself but throughout capitalist Europe and the entire world"; to state in a completely preposterous way that "in joining the bloc, the leadership of the LCI approved the whole record [!] of the bourgeois government headed by Gonçalves, a record that included a procapitalist foreign investment code, censorship proposals, and other reactionary laws" (*IP*, October 13, p. 1390); and to top it all off with the allegation that the LCI has

"abandoned revolutionary principles" and gives "support to the bourgeois MFA" is to distort the actual record to the point that it becomes ludicrously unrecognizable and slanderous.

The truth of the matter is that by playing an important role in the establishment of the SUV, the comrades of the LCI have been among the few political forces in Portugal that have managed to introduce an open and public differentiation with the MFA into the broad vanguard of the working class.<sup>7</sup> The truth is that as a result of that initiative and as a result of the subsequent call of the Lisbon light artillery regiment (RALIS) for the election of soldiers committees, such elected committees now exist in more than a dozen barracks, where the MFA has lost control. The truth is that by stimulating this modest "ultraleft action" the LCI has done more to expose and undermine the confidence of the masses in the MFA than would be done by a thousand dogmatic articles of the type of Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack's, written on the basis of a wrong analysis and a tail-endist orientation toward the Social Democratic rearguard of the working class, even if such articles were distributed by the millions.

The truth is that the LCI is an extremely young organization. At the time of the overthrow of the Caetano dictatorship, it had no more than a couple of dozen members. After forty-seven years of dictatorship and underground existence, all the Portuguese working class organizations, cut off from the mainstream of the great political experience of the international labor movement, have encountered great difficulties in assimilating that experience. The LCI is no exception to this rule. The existence of the Fourth International, however, and the LCI's integration into it give the LCI a great advantage over all other revolutionary organizations. This makes it much easier to assimilate that experience rapidly, through the dialectic of the internal debate in the LCI and in the International, and between the LCI and the International. In that sense, we can already be rather proud of the growth, record, and capacity for self-correction of the cadre of the LCI. And while we shall continue to pursue the fraternal discussion with the LCI members to help them redress whatever mistakes that have been committed or are still being committed, we shall at the same time defend them against factional critics who blithely ignore the key tasks Lenin and Trotsky posed during revolutionary situations, even when these tasks are staring them in the face as clear as day.

7. The first manifesto of the SUV states explicitly: "Already on several occasions we have made concessions to the bourgeoisie, particularly by subordinating our struggle to the alliance with the MFA, a movement of officers which, because of its contradictions and hesitations in the past, serves a counterrevolutionary policy today." This statement is repeated in the SUV appeal to the workers and soldiers of Europe. (See *Inprecor*, No. 35, October 9, 1975, for the text of the manifesto and the appeal.) In an interview granted to *Inprecor*, a spokesman of the SUV speaks even more explicitly in response to the question, "Why and how did this break with the MFA take place?" He says: "When we soldiers raised demands, we found ourselves running up against the officers, some of whom were members of the MFA. These officers were not only frequently applying militarist discipline; they were also proving to be incapable of satisfying our demands.

"This resulted in the soldiers in uniform taking some distance from the MFA; this was not felt so clearly by the civilian workers, who had moved into struggle earlier on.

"All this made our task easier and increased our audience among broad layers of soldiers in the region [in the North]. This distrust was also built up around the theme: 'We have been wronged; the officers are speaking in our name, but we were never consulted.' This was important in denouncing the attempts of the right to use the soldiers against the workers and against other soldiers. These explanations were combined with propaganda about the need to respond to the conspiracies of reaction" (*Inprecor*, No. 35, October 9, 1975, p. 20).

It should be noted that the SUV rejects any form of integration into the military hierarchy, which has been proposed by army Chief of Staff General Fabião. The organization has taken all necessary precautions against the threat of repression, but its main line is to serve as a launching pad for *democratically elected soldiers committees in all barracks.*



## The Fundamental Issues at Stake in the Debate

One of the ways the Fourth International has shown its growing strength has been its capacity to conduct important political debates, both internally and in public, without provoking splits. This represents a return to the classical tradition of revolutionary Marxism, when such debates were conducted in public, before and after the First World War.

But such debates can and must be combined with the maintenance of revolutionary unity of action and discipline. Following the statutes of the Fourth International unanimously confirmed at the Tenth World Congress, all sections and sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International must apply the clear majority decisions of world congresses and leading bodies within the limits the statutes allow such decisions to be taken, for example, on broad questions of international politics such as the Portuguese and Angolan revolutions today. This duty is not obviated by the holding of public debates, just the opposite. Otherwise, the Fourth International would be transformed into a federated-type organization in which decisions are taken only by consensus, a conception against which Trotsky fought with all his strength in the Third and Fourth Internationals. In the present debate, we are defending the line adopted by the Tenth World Congress and by the leading bodies of the Fourth International democratically elected at that congress, where clear majority-minority relations prevailed.

The differences between the International and the minority, whose positions are defended by Comrades Foley, Hansen, and Novack, are not around issues like "principled revolutionary politics" vs. "adaptation to ultraleftism"; "defense of the democratic rights of the masses and of working-class organizations" vs. "support to a bourgeois military dictatorship"; characterization of the Portuguese government and the MFA as bourgeois vs. "capitulation to the demagoguery of the military"; Leninist combat party building vs. substituting a mishmash of centrist and sectarian groupings of the "broad vanguard" or the "far left" for the Trotskyist party; accepting vs. rejecting the need for immediate withdrawal of Portuguese troops from Angola; "basing oneself on the Transitional Program" vs. "abandoning the method of the Transitional Program." Anyone who would make such claims simply does not know the record of the positions of the Fourth International or is distorting them deliberately, that is, engaging in slander.

What the differences really center around are the following issues:

1. The depth of the revolutionary crisis in Portugal, the degree of decomposition of the bourgeois state apparatus, and the level that has been reached by spontaneous anticapitalist mass actions.

2. In light of that, the danger that the first stage of counterrevolution will be a "democratic" one—that is, an attempt to destroy the nuclei of the organs of workers power, the arming of the workers, and the fraternization of the workers and soldiers—carried out in the name of the "popular sovereignty" of the Constituent Assembly, of consolidating the bourgeois-democratic state. This would be a short interlude to a more reactionary and bloody counterrevolution of an openly dictatorial, if not fascist, type.

3. The need to give priority to the defense of all the conquests of the masses since April 1974 and not only or primarily the democratic ones. This implies that the political campaign launched by the SP after May 1, 1975, be condemned as the spearhead of the "democratic counterrevolution."

4. Whether, in this situation, the central political task of revolutionary Marxists is to engage in propaganda, agitation, and initiatives in action to extend, generalize, coordinate, and centralize the embryonic organs of workers power (workers commissions, tenants commissions, soldiers commissions, poor

peasants commissions, and peasant leagues) into a generalized system of dual power based on the arming of the workers and their alliance with the soldiers, that is, a system of self-defense based not only on revolutionary soldiers, but also and especially on the bodies of self-organization of the masses and their systematic arming and training with the help of the revolutionary soldiers. We believe that the formulation of a concrete agitational government slogan and the specific form of fighting for the united front of all working-class organizations are subordinate to the accomplishment of this task as long as there is no fundamental change in the situation. Propaganda for the workers and peasants government based on an Assembly of the workers, soldiers, and peasants committees and not on the Constituent Assembly is the correct government formula at this stage.

5. Whether a clear distinction must be made between the democratic rights and freedoms of the masses, which we always defend and try to extend, and the institutions of bourgeois democracy, which are forms of the bourgeois state power. Our position is that while we must resist any attempt by bourgeois reaction to introduce more backward forms of bourgeois rule, since they threaten or undermine the democratic rights of the masses and the "strongholds of proletarian democracy within bourgeois democracy," we never oppose mass struggles and mass initiatives under the pretext that they threaten, weaken, undermine, or go beyond the institutions of bourgeois democracy.

6. Whether party building efforts must be centered on attempts to win to the Fourth International the most conscious and energetic elements of the mass vanguard engaged in the actual mass revolutionary struggle of the workers (around workers control and workers self-defense), soldiers, poor peasants, agricultural workers, women, and student youth. In our view, our capacity to attract the more radicalized elements who still follow the CP and the SP will be a function of our struggle for a correct program (including a correct and concrete application of the united-front tactic in each specific situation) and of the growing shift in the relationship of forces in favor of the vanguard sector of the mass movement.

7. On Angola, the need to combine a struggle for anti-imperialist demands (including the withdrawal of *all* imperialist and neocolonial foreign troops from the country, Portuguese, Zairois, and South African ones at this stage, possibly UN ones tomorrow) with clear support to the Angolan workers and poor peasants, who are today following the MPLA, against the neocolonialist

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forces of the FNLA and UNITA in the civil war now unfolding in that country. This does not imply placing any political confidence in the petty-bourgeois nationalist leadership of the MPLA, but it does imply understanding the different class nature of the forces confronting each other in the present civil war.<sup>8</sup>

We have no doubt that the rapid development of revolutionary

8. The positions *Intercontinental Press* has been taking on Angola of late are even more in contradiction with the line of the Fourth International and the whole tradition of Trotskyism than those it has taken on Portugal since June 1975. As late as its November 17, 1975, issue, it tried to whitewash the counterrevolutionary FNLA-UNITA forces by stating: "Whether the reports of mercenaries in Angola are accurate, however, remains unclear. Dispatches by foreign journalists in Angola are frequently unreliable, often being based on rumor or secondhand information." (p. 1572.) The MPLA is even accused of "slandering" the FNLA-UNITA. Here is a dispatch from an eyewitness from the liberal British weekly the *Observer* (issue of November 16, 1975): "I flew into Benguela on Monday [November 10], the day before Angola became formally independent of Portugal. Shortly after landing, we saw 50 uniformed South African troops stacking arms crates in the airport hangars. Two Panhard armoured cars, manned by young sandy-haired South African soldiers, guarded the airport access road. They were aged between 18 and 20, too young to be mercenaries." But then comes the most shameful argument used by *Intercontinental Press*: "In reality, all three Angolan independence groups have white members." (p. 1573.) And, it is added, "non-Angolans" are

situations in several European countries, the further rise of the world revolution, and the increase in the class consciousness of the proletariat in the advanced capitalist countries will come to play an increasingly decisive role in the struggle for defending the present line of the Fourth International. Our internal debates will be intertwined with new phases of rapid and dramatic growth of the Fourth International, even more so than after May 1968.

We are convinced that the majority of revolutionary Marxists will understand that we are struggling for the unity and political and organizational integrity of our movement. History will totally confirm the correctness of that fight.

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fighting in both camps anyway, according to a Portuguese newspaper. Yes, most probably they are. But is that the criterion by which one makes a Marxist analysis of a *civil war*? What about the class nature of these "whites" and these "non-Angolans"? Do we place an equals sign between the Portuguese fascists of the ELN (National Liberation Army), South African racists, British, French, Belgian, and American mercenaries, and U.S.-equipped troops from Zaïre on the one hand and Cuban soldiers, Soviet advisers, and Portuguese revolutionaries on the other hand? What about the "foreigners" present in both camps of the Vietnamese civil war? Did we describe that as a "fratricidal war"? Should the NLF have made peace with Diem and Thieu in order to avoid "foreign intervention" by the United States and the Soviet Union alike? Have we now abandoned the class criterion in favor of the criterion of keeping the "superpowers" out?

## FROM OUR READERS

A letter from C.S., a reader in Lawrence, Kansas, brings up one of our favorite hobbies—reading maps: "You gotta use maps. Take a look at the article on the Spanish Civil War, for example." ["How Franco Came to Power" in the November 10 issue.]

David Frankel mentions Sevilla, Casas Viejas, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Asturias, Barcelona, Bilbao, Madrid, and Málaga, "but there ain't no damn map for us. This is not to say that Frankel's fine article was nothing but print. No, you treated us to a picture of Franco, showing graphically how ugly he is."

C.S. continues: "... we want people to remember the importance of Catalonia, Barcelona, and Bilbao in the Spanish Civil War, but they're unlikely to do so if all they know is that these places are somewhere in Spain. You just can't build internationalism in people who don't know where the hell the other people are."

Watch for more maps in coming issues. Or for references to pages in previous issues where you can find them.

"First an accolade and then a brief criticism," begins a letter from R.J. of Southfield, Michigan, who has "avidly read the IP since its World Outlook days."

R.J. prefaces his accolade by mentioning that he has "followed other tendencies and groups over this period both in the U.S. and abroad. I have lived in the Soviet Union

and travelled extensively in Europe . . . participating with the French comrades in demonstrations in Paris in 70 and 75. Of course, I keep up with the bourgeois press.

"And with all of that in mind I would like to say that absolutely nothing published anywhere is more intelligent, informative, and interesting than the IP. Nothing. Moreover, feeling familiar with the editor's penchant, I also think that you can be rightfully proud of the high technical quality of the IP. What I read avidly in the past I read almost fanatically in the present.

"In particular your coverage of the war [in Vietnam], Mandel's articles on the monetary and economic crises (excepting the business about the new center of finance capital in the Middle East), your engrossing coverage of Watergate, Halstead on the anti-war movement, and especially Gerry Foley's unsurpassed reporting on and from Portugal stick out as high points in the IP's history. So too is the 'Documents' section extremely valuable.

"Now for the criticism.

"Not long ago you serialized a rather fascinating 'confession' by Tim Wohlforth on his experiences with Gerry Healy and the functioning of the IC and its U.S. supporters. ["The Workers League and the International Committee," a four-part series beginning in the February 24, 1975, issue.] This was a very valuable and informative account; it also presented a candid picture

of the politics and psychology of the long time Novack baiting dialectical materialist theoretician Wohlforth. It seemed to be a beautiful expose all around.

"Then in the November 10 IP appeared another piece by this same theoretician. I know that it appeared in the 'Documents' section and was published for the information of the readers. I know that it was not meant to represent the opinion of the IP. . .

"I was pleased that the article appeared. My criticism is this. Why was there not at least a brief editorial comment in a non-sectarian manner placing the article in the context of the past activities and politics of the writer?"

Three points: (1) Joseph Hansen, the editor of *Intercontinental Press*, commented at length on the serialized article by Tim Wohlforth (see "The Secret of Healy's 'Dialectics,'" March 31 issue). (2) The piece in the November 10 issue was written by Tim Wohlforth and Nancy Fields. (3) Comrade Wohlforth is obviously reevaluating some of his past positions, and doing so in an open way. From the lessons he learned all of us stand to gain.

Most of our readers, we think, will welcome further contributions from Tim Wohlforth and Nancy Fields—including topics other than the bad practices of the International Committee. □