

THE ATTEMPTED ULTRALEFT COUP IN PORTUGAL

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The Fresh Attack on Democratic Rights in Portugal

By David Frankel

Seizing the opportunity handed it by the abortive ultraleft coup of November 25, the Portuguese military regime, as was to be expected, has turned against the democracy it pretended to uphold. Once again the issue of democratic rights has moved to the fore.

In the Lisbon area, the main working-class center in Portugal, the regime declared a state of siege—that is, the suspension of democratic rights. This included the following measures:

- Security forces were empowered to make summary arrests. The right of those arrested to challenge the legality of their detention (*habeas corpus*) was suspended.
- Military courts were established to deal with “crimes against public order,” a usurpation of the right to a fair trial.
- Public meetings and demonstrations were prohibited, a violation of the right of assembly.
- Censorship of private mail and of news was imposed, a violation of the right of privacy and of freedom of the press.
- The publication of newspapers was suspended, and radio stations were forced to broadcast only government communiqués, a violation of freedom of the press.
- A curfew was imposed, a violation of freedom of movement.

Although the rebellion, limited to a few military units, was crushed within twenty-four hours and without a major battle, the MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement) did not end its suppression of democratic rights. Instead, it went further.

On November 28 the ruling Council of the Revolution announced the dismissal of management and editorial employees of eight daily newspapers. *New York Times* reporter Marvin Howe explained that this move “followed accusations by several military leaders that Lisbon’s left-wing papers had instigated the revolt through their strong anti-Government campaigns.”

This purge of the mass media, based on a denial of its right to give coverage to “strong anti-Government campaigns,” pre-sages further measures aimed at establishing strict government control of the press.

Warrants for the arrest of leaders of four ultraleft groups have been issued. Although these tendencies have frequently discussed the question of armed insurrection, no evidence linking them to the November 25

action has been produced. The government is using the attempted coup as an excuse to arrest and imprison leftists who had no part in it. Their real crime is political opposition to a capitalist government.

Bernard D. Nossiter reported in the November 30 *Washington Post* that “the crackdown on the military has struck a broad spectrum of leftist officers from all services.” Some of them have already been placed behind bars as political prisoners.

Nossiter further reported, “The purge of leftists whose loyalty is dubious has been extended to Azevedo’s own secretariat and other key offices.”

Premier José Pinheiro de Azevedo has promised that the martial law restrictions will be lifted in a few days. He may well live up to this promise.

However, the calculations of the MFA are obvious. The assault on democratic rights is part of an effort to consolidate its position, and in particular to hold back the current working-class drive for decent wages. With the proclamation of a state of siege, Azevedo immediately took the next logical step, including reneging on the concession he made November 14 of a 40 percent wage increase to the construction workers.

Marvine Howe, reporting on the move November 29, said the government announced “that pay increases would be suspended until a new wage policy could be worked out, taking into consideration the problem of unemployment, salary inequities and the real capacity of the economy.”

No one should be surprised by this. It does not represent a new turn. Since it first came to power, the MFA has sought to limit democratic rights so as to hamper the masses from struggling effectively for a higher standard of living and socialism.

An example of this was the press regulation decreed by the MFA on June 22, 1974, following a wave of strikes. The decree made it illegal “to incite military disobedience, strikes, unauthorized demonstrations, or to offend the President of the republic, or members of the Council of State and the Cabinet.”

The various parties on the Portuguese left have not rallied to the defense of democratic rights as a general principle in face of past assaults and there is no evidence that they are reacting differently now.

The Communist party has a shameful

record. The MFA government sought from the beginning to build an apparatus that would enable them to bring the Portuguese masses under their control, and the CP did its utmost to help them.

The CP used goon tactics in the trade unions to silence militants demanding action against the MFA’s wage controls.

The Stalinists also backed the take-over of the newspaper *República* in May, in gross violation of the democratic rights of the Socialist party. *República* was one of the few newspapers in Lisbon that was critical of the government at that time.

CP head Alvaro Cunhal summed up his attitude toward the right of the masses to choose their own government when he declared, “. . . I care nothing for elections. Nothing!”

Cunhal tried to cover up the real meaning of his stand by equating democratic rights with the existence of capitalism. Thus, he told interviewer Oriana Fallaci, “. . . Portugal will never be a country of democratic freedoms and monopolies.”

The ultraleft groups trailed in the wake of the CP. Unlike the Stalinists, they want a socialist revolution in Portugal. But in calling for socialist democracy they refused to defend the democratic rights already existing under capitalism. By counterposing the demand for socialist democracy to those democratic rights that were actually in existence, the ultralefts gave radical cover to the MFA’s attacks on democracy of any kind.

The Social Democratic leaders of the SP have given considerable lip service to democratic rights. In practice, however, they have defended only their own rights. As soon as the SP leaders were given a few extra posts in the cabinet, they backed the government in suppressing the democratic rights of others.

The current attempt of the MFA regime to strengthen its hand by repressing its opponents is no different in principle from the earlier attack on *República*. But instead of speaking out against the MFA’s attacks on democratic rights, SP leader Mário Soares held a news conference in Oporto to attack the CP.

The lack of a consistent defense of democratic rights in Portugal prepared the way for the MFA’s latest assault on democracy. The military regime was able to play off one section of the working-class movement against another, since the Stalinists do not favor democratic rights and the Social Democratic leaders are only concerned about their own.

With the exception of the small Trotskyist forces in Portugal, no political tendency has campaigned for a united defense of democratic rights by all groups in the working-class movement. Such a united defense of the basic interests of the working class could force the MFA government to retreat,

giving fresh impetus to the struggle for socialism in Portugal.

The response of the military regime to the attempted coup is one more indication of the way the capitalists view democratic rights. As far as they are concerned, democracy is a weapon of "the enemy"—that is, the working masses and their allies. At the first sign of trouble, the bourgeois statesmen and their agents turn against democratic rights.

Revolutionists are opposed to every violation of democratic rights by a capitalist government. In the end, attacks on democratic rights injure the working class and its struggle for socialism.

The events in Portugal offer a fresh lesson in this respect that every militant should note. □

Hands Off Timor!

A unilateral declaration of independence from Portugal was made in Dili, the capital of East Timor, November 28. The Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente (Fretilin—Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), citing Lisbon's "constant stalling" on negotiations to end armed attacks by two pro-Indonesian groups, proclaimed the People's Republic of East Timor. (The western half of the island is under Indonesian control.)

Within hours of the proclamation, the U.S.-supported military regime in Indonesia announced its intention of crushing the new republic. Gen. Ali Murtopo, the deputy chief of Jakarta's intelligence agency, declared that Indonesian troops would enter the country to overturn Fretilin's declaration of independence. If Fretilin forces resisted, he said, Jakarta was ready to use the combined might of its army, navy, and air force.

In fact, the Indonesian intervention in East Timor began weeks ago, following Fretilin's victory over the União Democrática Timorese (UDT—Timorese Democratic Union) and the Associação Popular Democrática Timorese (Apodeti—Timorese Democratic People's Association), both of which favor Timor's integration into Indonesia. Indonesian forces struck across the border to weaken Fretilin's position and aid the UDT and Apodeti.

Jakarta fears that an independent East Timor would inspire other national liberation struggles in the region, threatening its control of the Indonesian archipelago.

With the memory of the 1965 massacre of hundreds of thousands of Indonesian peasants, workers, and students by the military rulers still fresh, the present threat to the Timorese freedom fighters is clear. □

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The Attempted Ultraleft Coup in Portugal

By Gerry Foley

In a climate of sharpening confrontation, paratroop units in the Lisbon area occupied four air force bases November 25 and seized radio and television stations to broadcast revolutionary appeals to the country. The leaders of the rebellion apparently believed that the moment had come to stage a decisive test of strength with the sixth provisional government.

For months, the Communist party-controlled press, radio, and TV had created the illusion of a vast revolutionary opposition to the sixth government. In fact, in confrontation after confrontation, the government appeared to be virtually helpless, thus inspiring more and more daring acts of defiance. The ultraleftists fed these illusions and magnified them, claiming that the "revolutionary left" was already dominant in the armed forces, and that besides, the "vanguard was now armed."

Although the Communist party and its military allies had only limited objectives and the ultraleft groups lacked the strength to stage the "insurrection" they called for, it was almost inevitable under the pressures of the unstable Portuguese situation that this psychological buildup would lead to ultraleft adventures.

When the ultraleft leaders in the paratroop corps tried to act in accordance with these illusions and topple the "power of the bourgeoisie" by a military coup, they suddenly found themselves in a void. The forces they looked to for leadership and support abandoned them. Their appeals failed to win mass support, and in some instances the masses even mobilized against them. The "abundant military equipment" in which they placed their trust proved wholly inadequate.

The "helpless" government came to life with a power no one had suspected. In a matter of a few hours, most of the strongholds of opposition to the government within the armed forces were wiped out. And the bourgeois state that the ultraleftists claimed was virtually nonexistent moved to take advantage of their folly and that of the CP to inflict a grave defeat on the masses of workers who were beginning to move into struggle for their own demands outside the schemas and strategy of these political forces. Reality had caught up with the practitioners of "revolutionary theater."

The rebels staged their coup in opposition to the appointment of a figure identified with the sixth government as military

governor of the Lisbon region, replacing Gen. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who had gone into opposition to the present cabinet three weeks before. They demanded the ouster of the air force chief Gen. José Morais e Silva and his deputy Gen. José Anibal de Pinho Freire, who was held under guard for a period.

In the course of the confrontation, the rebels occupied the national television and radio stations in Lisbon and began broadcasting revolutionary manifestos to the country, calls that failed to mobilize any significant support. In at least one case, in Monte Real, eighty-six miles north of Lisbon, hostile crowds surrounded the barracks and pressured the paratroopers to abandon their rebellion.

Some mobilizations in defense of the radicalized military units were reported, although these all seemed to be small and abortive. Moreover, it is not yet clear whether these demonstrations were in response to the paratroopers' action or to the counteroffensive launched by the government.

The main radicalized units in Lisbon—the Light Artillery Regiment based near the airport and the military police centered in the area of the presidential palace and the parliament building—reportedly did not join in the paratroopers' action. They merely mobilized to defend their installations. Defensive measures were also taken at the Beirolas arsenal, where radicalized military personnel held a degree of control.

The Government Crackdown

In crushing the isolated rebellion of the paratroopers, the government took advantage of its military—but above all, its political—victory to move decisively against the other centers of radical opposition within the armed forces. According to the Brussels daily *Le Soir*, Major Campos de Andrade, the commander of the military police, placed himself "at the disposal" of the president but refused to go to the presidential palace. The Amadora Rangers, an elite unit led by the reactionary Jaime Neves, then surrounded the barracks.

A clash developed, leading in about ten minutes to the surrender of the military police. A few hundred persons from the workers and tenants commissions in the area, which worked together with the military police, came to support the unit under attack. Apparently this was a peace-

ful demonstration. However, armed civilians reportedly participated in the fighting, in which four persons were killed. It was claimed that these civilians had been armed by radicals in the services such as the military police officers who diverted weapons to the ultraleft Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado (PRP—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat).

Several hundred persons from the workers and tenants commissions linked to the Lisbon Light Artillery Regiment reportedly massed outside its barracks to show their support. However, a tank column moving in from the cavalry base in Santarém to the northeast of Lisbon forced the surrender of this unit without a fight and reimposed full government control over the Beirolas arsenal. No casualties were reported in these incidents.

The Communist party came out in strong opposition to the rebellion of the paratroopers, distributing a leaflet that denounced it as an adventure. As yet there have been no reports of explicit support for the attempted coup by any political organization.

Advocates of Armed Struggle Hunted

At first, only leaders of radical opposition in the military were arrested. Then there was a report that the progovernment forces were looking for leaders of the PRP and the LUAR,* which claim to be armed organizations. The PRP had issued calls for an insurrection in the period leading up to the paratroopers' rebellion. Its manifesto "Against Civil War, Armed Insurrection" was quoted extensively in the November 14 issue of *Jornal Novo*:

The Social Democrats and the right in general have raised the specter of civil war every time the workers and the revolutionists resist their arrogance and their maneuvers. They seem to think that everyone should behave like gentle lambs in face of plans for exploitation and subjection to imperialism. But it is these forces that have done everything to throw the "northerners" against what they call the "Lisbon Commune" (although unfortunately for them the "Lisbon Commune" already exists from North to South) and have done everything to throw the peasants against the workers. . . .

But despite their intentions, the Social Democrats and the right in general have no army in Portugal. If they want to stage a confrontation with the proletariat, they will have to resort to

*Liga de União e Ação Revolucionária (League for Revolutionary Unity and Action).

mercenaries hired in Spain or simply invaders from NATO and the U.S.A.

Unlike civil war, the plan for insurrection consists in organizing the working masses to take power, imposing this by force. The present strength of the soldiers, workers, and revolutionary militants must be coordinated and unified to form an enormous and powerful movement that can lead the mobilization in a disciplined way and defeat the bourgeoisie. In this insurrectional process, because of the enormous support that exists among the soldiers and because the reactionary officers have no one to obey their commands, the use of force will be much more a demonstration of power than actual violence.

On the other hand, the LUAR, never a large organization, was disintegrating in early November. It had, however, played an important role in the mobilization of disabled veterans that besieged the cabinet in the presidential palace in early October.

Witch-hunt Extended

Then, on November 30, the *New York Times* reported that arrest warrants had been issued for leaders of four parties in the Frente de Unidade Revolucionária (FUR—Front for Revolutionary Unity). One member group of this front is the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League), the Portuguese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. The others are the PRP; LUAR; Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left); Movimento Democrático Português (MDP—Portuguese Democratic Movement), a satellite of the CP; and the Frente Socialista Popular (FSP—People's Socialist Front). It is not yet clear if two have not come under attack, or if so, which ones.

The net of repression seems to be widening. After the rebellion was crushed, the leading spokesman of the military group identified with the sixth government, Maj. Melo Antunes, stressed that the Communist party was an "indispensable" component of the government.

However, on November 29 the military high command issued a statement accusing the northern regional leadership of the CP of having supported the rebellion. Although this was still only a partial attack, it was the first time the military has aimed directly at the CP. In the November 29 issue of *Corriere della Sera*, the Lisbon correspondent of the Milan daily reported that in Oporto anti-Communists were collecting signatures demanding the expulsion of the CP from the government.

In the North also, rightists took advantage of the unsuccessful coup to launch a new wave of anti-Communist violence. A CP union leader was gunned down in the street. The cars of four CP leaders were bombed, although no one was harmed. A CP protest demonstration in Leiria was brutally attacked.

Also in the context of this confrontation

there was an ominous reactionary mass mobilization of farmers. Some 45,000 farmers met in the central Portugal town of Rio Maior and demanded that the government guarantee that their farms would not be taken away from them. Then on November 24 thousands of farmers blocked the roads leading to Lisbon and threatened to cut off the city's water and electricity.

Purge of CP Members

In one night, the sixth government succeeded in doing what it had failed to do for two months. It broke the CP control of the broadcasting networks and the nationalized press. The studios were occupied. The administrations of the nationalized papers were dissolved. President Francisco da Costa Gomes attacked the media for creating the atmosphere that led to the rebellion. The government said the press would be "reorganized," although at the same time it promised that no workers would be fired.

This seemed to fit in with a plan for cracking down hard but doing so in stages. The CP-controlled nationalized press was generally rather unpopular because of its penchant for heavy-handed Stalinist propaganda and shrill rhetoric. Nonetheless, since the formation of the sixth government, a period in which the CP has been more or less in the opposition, these papers have generally supported the struggles of the workers.

The government cushioned its moves against the press by saying that workers unjustly fired would be rehired. The CP-dominated administration of the Lisbon morning paper *O Século* recently purged sixteen persons who had led the opposition to its editorial line.

In order to check the workers movement and other mass movements in the country, the government had to regain control of the communications media. The CP's dogmatic and opportunistic exploitation of the press for its own partisan objectives has made the government's task easier. But if General Costa Gomes is able to carry his political offensive forward, the purge will certainly go beyond the propagandists of the CP and its allies.

The government took advantage of the futile rebellion to abolish virtually all civil liberties in the Lisbon region—freedom of the press, assembly, and movement. It banned all demonstrations.

The extent of the offensive is shown by decrees freezing all wage negotiations and suspending pay increases. At the same time, the government moved to widen the gap between the North and the South by isolating Lisbon. It apparently intended to harden up a base in the North for an all-out campaign, if necessary, to crush the working-class movement in the industrial belt at the mouth of the Tejo River.

After nearly two years of a complex game

of demagogic leaderships competing to find an effective political formula for controlling the mass radicalization in Portugal, the realities of the class struggle have reasserted themselves with irresistible force. A decisive confrontation in the short run became inevitable after the construction workers' demonstration on November 12 and the following siege of the parliament building by thousands of determined workers.

The action of the workers took place in an atmosphere of defiance of the sixth government both in the military and in the labor movement. This climate was promoted by the CP's exerting pressure to regain a bigger share of posts in the government and to hold its positions in the press, unions, and military.

For example, it was the CP that led the strike of the construction workers in this case, although it previously opposed a similar action. However, the CP leadership did not want a strike of this character. It bowed to demands from a newly emergent rank-and-file committee. Nor did it want to lay siege to the parliament building. It was unable to control the movement that had been unleashed.

The construction workers' demonstration was the first really massive, concentrated, and determined struggle by a section of the Portuguese working class. It was all the more powerful because it was waged by the most disadvantaged layer of the working class, including a large percentage of Africans. It was far removed from the street theater of the ultraleftists or the sectarian "demonstrations of strength" staged by the CP and the SP to press for more positions in the government.

The action of the construction workers was propelled not by any political schemas such as "people's power" but by elementary demands deeply felt by the workers—higher wages, an end to unemployment, and a contract for the industry as a whole to increase their bargaining power. It was not specifically opposed to the sixth government as such.

Similar demands had been raised and left unsatisfied under governments that relied primarily on the CP to assure their control over the labor movement. The demands were aimed, moreover, against the middle layers of native capital considered "progressive" by the CP. In fact, former Premier Vasco Gonçalves, who was strongly backed by the CP, is the owner of a large construction firm.

The attempts of CP and ultraleft activists to get the workers to take up slogans aimed at gaining posts or taking power immediately were generally fruitless. And at the same time, the workers could not be diverted from gaining their objectives by any means they considered necessary. The result was the most powerful workers

struggle in the history of the Portuguese revolutionary process.

It showed the revolutionary dynamic that mass unionization of the Portuguese workers could have in the conditions following the fall of Salazarist repression. The organization and mobilization of the masses of Portuguese workers after forty-eight years of repression disclosed an enormous potential power, particularly in face of the weakness of the bourgeois repressive apparatus and bourgeois political control.

The outbreak of this struggle also showed the processes developing in the working class under the pressure of the economic crisis. This held perhaps the most ominous implications from the viewpoint of the Portuguese bourgeoisie. It meant that despite growing political disorientation and disappointment, the workers could still mobilize in support of their immediate demands.

And after almost two years of upheaval, in face of a deepening economic crisis, the Portuguese bourgeoisie decided it could not afford to give many more concessions. Its reserves are rapidly being exhausted and serious dislocations are appearing in the capitalist economic circuits.

Reactionary Forces Inch Ahead

On the other hand, if political confusion and sectarian infighting have not stopped the development of the class struggle, which is generated at a more profound level, they have assured that actions such as that taken by the construction workers occur in unfavorable political conditions.

The crisis of Portuguese capitalism has now been in progress almost two years. The mass movements that followed the fall of Caetano awakened tremendous hopes but brought little improvement in the lot of most of the workers and toiling masses. Many have already become tired and defensive as a result of prolonged tensions. Some sections, such as the small farmers, have been alienated and thrown toward reaction. Right-wing forces have had a chance to begin making a recovery, staging their first mass mobilizations since April 25, 1974.

A bitter sectarian political split has developed among the workers, with both opposing sections fearing that the other intends to liquidate them. In these conditions, even in the best hypothesis, there is no perspective for the workers taking power without a bloody civil war. With such tensions rising, it is possible that the extensive petty-bourgeois layers in Lisbon could quickly go over to the side of reaction.

The precipitous move of the paratroopers has brought all these problems to a head. After the government's successful crack-down, with the main working-class center in the country subjected to a state of siege and fears of an imminent civil war, it is

going to be much more difficult for the workers to increase the momentum of their struggle without some viable political perspective.

Furthermore, once the rightist officers get in a position to strike hard blows against opposition to their authority, they may be able to restore "discipline" rather quickly.

The Continuing Ferment

On the other hand, if the political radicalization continues to deepen, any "discipline" the bourgeois officer corps manages to restore will be quickly undermined. This has occurred repeatedly in Portugal since April 25, 1974.

The fall of the Caetano regime unleashed a vast ferment. Authority and all the old ideas began to be challenged in every sphere of life. The bourgeoisie and its political formulas were profoundly discredited. Such an extensive democratic ferment could not be rolled back. But with the help of the Communist party, the military leadership was able to keep it more or less channeled.

The wave of strikes and occupations were prevented from developing into coherent national movements and from leading to a massive and united reorganization of the working class. The outbreak of strikes began to subside a few months after the fall of the old regime. In July the CP mobilized its membership to break the postal workers' strike, the largest action in defiance of the government.

However, the ferment continued to spread and deepen. The Portuguese armed forces in the colonies began to disintegrate, depriving the Lisbon government of the means for pressuring the nationalist movements. It was forced to make concessions in this field that went far beyond the intentions of the more conservative sections of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA).

Spinola's Game

Spínola made an unsuccessful attempt to establish his authority in order to halt the process. He was forced to retreat and let a more demagogic element come forward, represented by Vasco Gonçalves and Saraiva de Carvalho. This second provisional government tried to find a formula for getting the situation under control by combining demagoguery with repression. It launched a new offensive against the mass movement in August. Demonstrations of the far-left groups were attacked.

Reprisals were taken against newspapers that irritated the government, including both the unofficial Socialist party paper *República* and *Diário de Lisboa*, where CP journalists were influential. They were fined for reporting protests against the repression of dissidents in the armed forces. The government ordered a military occupa-

tion of the Lisbon airport to break the strike of airline employees. It issued a decree severely limiting the right to strike.

However, the second provisional government failed in all its objectives. Its censorship attempts were defeated by the solid opposition of all the newspapers. The Socialist party and even the bourgeois liberals, although not the CP, protested against the repression of demonstrations. The military occupation failed to break the movement of the airline workers. The Lisnave workers committee, uncontrolled by the CP-dominated union structure, called a mobilization against the no-strike decree and demonstrated by the strength of this action that the law could not be enforced. The government was forced to grant independence to Mozambique.

At this point, Spínola broke with his own government and tried to organize a reactionary mass base for a "strong" regime. However, he was defeated by a semispontaneous upsurge of workers in Lisbon.

Under the impetus of pressure from below and a direct threat to its own position, the CP opened the way for a mobilization against Spínola's march of the "silent majority." Thus the split in the Armed Forces Movement led to a conflict that went over the heads of the left wing of the movement itself, much to the discomfort of Saraiva de Carvalho, who thought the task of defending the government belonged exclusively to his security forces.

Polarization of Forces

The failure of the September 28 "march of the silent majority" left the bourgeoisie politically even weaker. Spínola's withdrawal from politics, at least temporarily, was a grave loss to the right.

At the same time, the new regime proved unable to offer much satisfaction to the demands of the workers and the small farmers. It was, however, somewhat easier to make important concessions to the landless peasants in the Alentejo area, since there the main question was redistribution of the land at the expense of a backward section of the ruling class.

However, the government and its main ally, the CP, proved less and less able to hold back the demands of the workers. The CP began to lose elections in the unions. Symptomatically, the CP minister of labor in the first provisional government, Adelino Gonçalves, was overwhelmingly defeated in the Oporto bank workers' elections in early 1975.

The CP and the Armed Forces Movement adopted a "trade-union unity" law in January as a means of keeping the national union apparatus in CP hands and checking the erosion of its positions. They were still able to mobilize more than 100,000 workers in Lisbon against the challenge of the SP.

On this occasion also, the "national liberation front" rhetoric of the Armed Forces Movement proved able to bring the so-called far-left groups in behind its objectives.

On the other hand, in February, the spreading radicalization came out into the open in the armed forces, making it obvious that the military command could no longer suppress it. The Lisbon Light Artillery Regiment showed its solidarity with workers demonstrating against rising unemployment. That impelled Spínola into another attempt to halt the process by force. He sponsored a military coup involving an air attack on the offending artillery regiment. When it failed, capitalism in Portugal was left hanging by a thread.

Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of workers and toilers mobilized throughout the country to defend the democratic rights they had gained under the new regime. The CP and the Armed Forces Movement were obliged to follow the mass movement, both by its pressure and by the need to defend themselves against the right, which now viewed them as an obstacle to restoring bourgeois law and order.

The bank workers exposed the way the financial institutions had been used to prepare the coup. They forced their nationalization. The most important big capitalists fled the country.

However, in his very first speech after the coup attempt, Vasco Gonçalves attacked the airline workers, who went out on strike a few days before, as witting or unwitting dupes of the coup plotters.

The April 25 Elections

The left wing of the MFA turned to a more demagogic political formula for stabilizing the situation. They hoped to get a blank check from the people for a left bonapartist military regime in the guise of a "national liberation movement." However, the hoped-for blank vote in the April 25 Constituent Assembly elections did not materialize. Furthermore, the vote for the military's favored ally, the CP, fell far below expectations.

The Socialist party, which represented a more independent left alternative, scored a major victory. Its main selling point was defense of democratic rights, implicitly the right to oppose the Armed Forces Movement, although the SP leadership had no perspective of breaking with the military rulers.

The Armed Forces Movement and the CP began a counteroffensive against the SP immediately after the elections. The CP tried to show on May Day that if the SP could garner more votes, it was far less strong in the streets and in the unions. At the same time, the government recognized the exclusive bargaining rights of the CP-dominated national union federation without the new elections that, according to

the final version of the Trade Union Unity Law, were supposed to precede this step.

The SP moved to counter this by proving its ability to mobilize its supporters in the street. The CP struck back by supporting a move by a "workers committee" to take over the SP-influenced paper *República*. This opened a furious struggle between the two main workers parties, each trying to prove to the MFA that it was a stronger and therefore more desirable ally. One result of this was a profound split in the working class and the virulent growth of sectarianism.

But at the same time, the ability of the MFA to control the mass movement declined rapidly. Moreover, by now the CP had become an unpopular ally. This resulted from the role the party had played in defending the policy of the MFA in the unions and peasant organizations. It was also a consequence of the way the CP exploited its bureaucratic influence. All this combined with anti-Communist fears and the bourgeoisie's mistrust of the CP, especially when it could not deliver the goods, namely, social and political stability.

Declining Popularity of MFA

At the same time, during this period the first important signs appeared that the popularity of the MFA was rapidly declining because of the inability of its successive cabinets to meet the economic needs of the masses.

A sector of the MFA turned toward the SP, which promptly subordinated itself to its military allies. This sector of the MFA defeated the sector allied with the CP. However, as a result of this struggle, the MFA lost control of the forms of political organization it had created to extend its influence. The way was opened for a growth in independent soldiers' mobilizations against the MFA leadership. The first demonstrations of the Soldados Unidos Vencerão (SUV—Soldiers United Will Win) showed the potential for such struggles.

However, the fact that this movement did not effectively dissociate itself from the pro-CP faction of the MFA and its antidemocratic schemes provoked a hostile reaction from a large sector of the masses, who felt threatened by the prospect of a "left" military dictatorship. This was all the more true because the SUV leadership could not find ways to appeal to the democratic aspirations of the masses outside the armed forces.

Furthermore, illusions in the "progressive" character of the MFA leadership persisted. Vague promises from General Fabião were enough, for example, to demobilize the struggle of the soldiers in Oporto in October and pave the way for a grave defeat.

Once the SP gained the inside track as a supporter of the government after the defeat

of the pro-CP faction of the MFA, it defended antidemocratic measures in the pattern of its rival in the preceding provisional governments. It was compelled to do so for a number of reasons, including the fact that the bourgeoisie now had less room for maneuver. The SP lost the support of many of the workers who had rallied in its previous mobilizations against the antidemocratic moves of the MFA and the CP.

However, when the CP and the ultraleft were foolish enough to carry out maneuvers that made it appear as if they threatened the democratic rights of sections of the masses, the SP was able once again to mobilize large numbers, this time, essentially, in support of repression.

The struggle between the SP and the CP in August and then following the fall of the fifth provisional government presided over by Vasco Gonçalves resulted in growing disillusionment with both reformist parties among the working class. But at the same time, the workers as a whole did not fall into indifference. They were still ready to fight. They proved that by shifting around looking for an alternative; but they could not find one. Nonetheless, this search increased the instability of the political situation.

Need for a Revolutionary Party

In conditions where the bourgeoisie was extremely weak, its leadership partially paralyzed and incapable of granting the masses significantly higher living standards, the movement of the workers and toilers constantly overflowed all the political dams the reformist parties put in its way. However, there has been no political leadership capable of guiding it in a revolutionary direction, and so the potential of the mass upsurge has been continually undermined.

There was no revolutionary party to take advantage of the upsurge following Caetano's fall. The opportunity for a massive democratic unionization of the Portuguese workers was lost. The old craft unions remained under Stalinist bureaucratic domination.

There was no revolutionary party that could take advantage of the upsurge against Spínola's coup attempt in September 1974 to begin to organize union militias.

There was no revolutionary party in March 1975 to lead the masses just one step further to abolishing the capitalist system that had proved to be a threat to their newfound liberties.

There was no revolutionary party in May, June, and July that could have taken advantage of the SP's struggle against the MFA's antidemocratic schemes by leading the supporters of both reformist parties to break from the MFA and prevent the hardening of a split in the working class

based on false issues.

There was no revolutionary party in September, October, and November that could have taken advantage of the CP's tactical turn toward supporting struggles against the government's economic policies—mobilizing and uniting the workers behind deeply felt economic demands that the capitalists were less and less able to meet.

There was no revolutionary party that could force the CP to abandon its bureaucratic and sectarian "people's power" schemes and induce it to fight together with the SP workers for the interests of the class as a whole. As a result, the outbreak of the construction workers' struggle caught the entire left by surprise and precipitated a confrontation that the working class was not politically or organizationally prepared for.

How the Stage Was Set

In this situation, the dogmatic and ultraleft rhetoric the CP-controlled press and CP representatives resorted to as a means of countering the SP's broader appeal played a particularly destructive role. It could not help but blind the supporters of the CP and the far-left groups to the reality in the country. It could not help but fan the fears of sections of the masses that these forces intended to impose a dictatorship by some kind of a military coup.

An Eyewitness Account

With Lisbon's Construction Workers in Their March for Decent Wages

By Joanna Rossi

LISBON, November 16—The demonstrators assembled in the Praça do Comércio, a large square in downtown Lisbon, and marched out onto the broad Avenue of Liberty on November 12.

They walked eight abreast in the brilliant afternoon sun—young white workers, older ones, a sizable number of Blacks, and a sprinkling of women—chanting, shouting, and singing.

One contingent, wearing the pastel blue overalls common in Portugal, carried yellow and red banners. They shouted, "Salários de fome, não!" (No to starvation wages.)

A larger contingent, all wearing red safety helmets, sang, "Unidos Vencemos." (United We Will Win.)

The stage was set for a precipitous action by radicals in the military that could be used by the government as a means of getting support for a decisive move to "restore order." The fact that the government appeared to be almost helpless against the initiatives of the CP and the far left smoothed the way even more.

Obviously it was far from helpless when the time came to move. It was able to act with a force no one on the left suspected when it got the chance to appear to act not as the destroyer of the freedoms gained by the masses after April 1974 but as the defender.

Mass opposition to the paratroopers' coup is probably one of the main factors explaining how it could be so quickly crushed. The radical military units must have seen that they lacked the necessary support to make a stubborn stand.

The illusion that this government is a defender of democracy will not last long, if it has not already been dispelled. But for the moment it has won a considerable victory and regained the political initiative.

It may well prove unable to stop a new rise of massive workers struggles. But even in the best circumstances, the lack of a consistently revolutionary leadership seems bound to have more and more costly results. The Portuguese workers cannot afford to follow the twists and turns of the reformist parties any further. Their paths lead into an abyss. □

building that houses the Constituent Assembly, and the adjoining official residence of Pinheiro de Azevedo, Portugal's current premier.

The workers jammed the pinched streets. Their voices were amplified and flung back by the tall stone buildings. "Trabalhadores unidos vencerão" (Workers united will win), they chanted; and "Fascismo, não; abaixo à exploração" (Fascism, no; down with exploitation).

I fought my way through the tightly packed ranks to the São Bento Palace, where the strikers were already filling the broad area in front of the building, the entire large staircase leading up the small hillside to it, and part of the surrounding side streets.

The huge crowd shouted its demands at the members of the Constituent Assembly and the premier inside.

The workers had rejected a government offer of 4,500 escudos (about US\$160). They wanted an industrywide contract, an end to unemployment in the industry, and a wage increase of approximately 40 percent.

At one point, Premier Azevedo attempted to address the crowd from a window. Only three days before, on November 9, at a progovernment rally about half the size of the march, he had denounced "irresponsible wage demands."

The audience responded to Azevedo with a deafening barrage of boos, whistles, and catcalls. Thousands of fists were brandished, and the area rang with "No to starvation wages" and "Down with exploitation."

Azevedo gave up his attempt at oratory and withdrew from the window.

As the last ranks crowded into the area, the rear being brought up by a number of flatbed trucks on which were mounted tiers of seated workers, the palace looked as if it were under siege.

In fact, thousands of construction workers stayed on in a three-day demonstration, holding the premier virtually hostage until their wage demands were met.

Azevedo was reported to have said later: "I am tired of playing children's games. I have been besieged twice now and I dislike being besieged."

Even though the demonstration was utilized by the Communist party to help pressure the government into giving it more weight in the government, it signified much more than a narrow Stalinist show of force.

The Portuguese construction workers have served notice that their demands are yet to be satisfied and that they are prepared to take to the streets in militant and massive actions to fight for them. Their demonstration showed that the deepgoing radicalization that has gripped Portugal after forty-eight years of dictatorship is still continuing. □

South Africa's Intervention in Angola

By Tony Hodges

LUSAKA, Zambia, November 23—South African troops have advanced more than 600 miles into Angola. I and four other British and American journalists who flew to the coastal city of Benguela, 400 miles north of South African-occupied Namibia, saw South African soldiers manning armoured cars in the city.


The South African force is fighting alongside units of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) against the third Angolan nationalist party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

A joint column of South African, UNITA and FNLA troops marched on November 5 into Benguela and Lobito, Angola's largest port, 20 miles north of Benguela. MPLA soldiers who had held the cities since mid-August fled northwards to the port of Novo Redondo, 300 miles south of Luanda. The South African-UNITA-FNLA column, reportedly well-equipped with armoured cars, has now captured Novo Redondo too. The MPLA claims, however, to retain control of the next city up the coast, Porto Amboim, 55 miles further north.

South African troops first entered Angolan territory in early August. Mr Pieter Botha, the South African Defence Minister, admitted on September 9 that the South African army had crossed over the border from Namibia and proceeded about 10 miles into Angola to take control of the Ruacana Falls hydroelectric scheme on the Cunene River. Power from the Ruacana Falls is expected to satisfy nearly all of Namibia's energy needs shortly after the first three of its 80 MW turbines go into operation in 1977.

The South African government has also admitted that its troops have staged hit-and-run missions into Angola to attack freedom fighters of the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO). In mid-October, South Africa announced that its troops had crossed the border and killed 13 SWAPO militants. Again, on November 16, the South African Defence Ministry said that its forces had killed 10 SWAPO militants in the "border operational area" on the Namibian-Angolan border.

The South African government has repeatedly denied, however, that its forces have become involved in the Angolan civil war. On October 24, for example, the South African Defence Ministry denied accusa-



New York Times

tions levelled by the MPLA that South African troops had advanced 150 miles into Angola towards the city of Sá da Bandeira. In response to recent eyewitness reports of South African troop activity deep inside Angolan territory, the South African Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller categorically stated on November 23 in an interview with the South African Broadcasting Corporation that "South Africa does not intend getting involved in the civil war in Angola."

UNITA too has sought to deny charges that it has received South African aid. Speaking in New York on Angola's formal Independence Day, November 11, UNITA's representative in the United States, Jeremiah Chitunda, said that "South African intervention on behalf of an Angolan liberation movement does not exist." UNITA's Department of Information in Lusaka, Zambia, charged on November 16 that "both radio and press have been presented with false reports that white South African soldiers were fighting alongside UNITA forces in Lobito and Southern Angola." UNITA alleged that "without confirming their nationality" visiting journalists had mistaken white Angolans in UNITA's army for white South African soldiers.

But a correspondent of Reuters, a Japanese journalist, and I were able to verify that these soldiers were not white Angolans when we were allowed—due to a temporary

lapse of UNITA security—to interview three white soldiers at UNITA-held Silva Porto airport, 442 miles south-east of Luanda. They were driving two Panhard armoured cars daubed with "Viva Unita" slogans. The men could not understand Portuguese and spoke English with strong and unmistakable South African accents.

I, along with a British television crew and representatives of Reuters and the *New York Times*, saw over 50 South African soldiers stacking arms crates at Benguela airport on November 10. Two more Panhard armoured cars, manned by young, sandy-haired soldiers, guarded the airport access road. Aged between 18 and 20, these soldiers were too young to be mercenaries and appeared to be regular conscript soldiers.

The South African intervention proves that the détente policies pursued by the neocolonial regimes in "independent" Africa towards the white-ruled south of the continent have emboldened the South African racists to act with even more cavalier disregard for the rights of the African masses. The invasion is not, as it might appear on the surface, inconsistent with South Africa's détente offensive, but designed to promote it.

South African prime minister Vorster has calculated that intervention by his army at this stage can tip the balance in favour of political forces firmly committed to collaboration with South Africa. UNITA's strong pro-détente line has been spelt out on numerous occasions in interviews granted to foreign journalists. In an interview with the Luanda publication *Portuguese Africa*, UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi stated on April 28 that "economic cooperation with South Africa is only realism, however much we may be opposed to the inhumanity and injustice of apartheid." The May 2 issue of the bulletin went on to report that "Dr Savimbi said he was in favour of détente and of dialogue as a means of solving problems, and that he did not believe, in the present Southern African context, that armed liberation wars were necessarily the solution for the problems of Namibia and Zimbabwe.

"Dr Savimbi said he believed that South Africa's Premier, John Vorster, is a 'responsible leader,' and that the pressure that South Africa had put on the Smith regime was the main reason that Dr Sithole had been freed."

South African imperialism must also welcome Savimbi's espousal of the virtues of a free enterprise economy. In the same interview, Savimbi favoured a state that would "leave as much as possible of the economy to private enterprise." He stated that "we welcome any source of foreign investment, and will give the investor all facilities and guarantees."

The MPLA has not issued any public

statements to indicate its attitude to the détente in Southern Africa. Like Frelimo's* leaders in Mozambique (with which the MPLA maintains close links), the MPLA leadership may well have been favourable to collaboration with South Africa—as it was to the Portuguese government and its armed forces for the first seven months after the signing of the Alvor Accords on January 15. The South African government may have calculated, however, that the MPLA regime in Luanda would be constrained by the radical aspirations of its own rank and file supporters in the *mu-queques* (townships) of Luanda.

South Africa certainly knew that its dispatch of troops to Angola would meet with little response from the neocolonial African states and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). MPLA president Agostinho Neto has charged, during an interview with the Algerian press agency APS on November 22, that “most African countries are betraying us by remaining silent in such a situation and avoiding condemnation of South Africa.” Countries like Zambia, which have played a key part in promoting the détente with South Africa, have issued no protests against the invasion—though, according to London *Observer* correspondent David Martin, who was granted an interview with Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda on November 22, Zambia was first informed of South African intervention way back in early September.

Kaunda, who has described Vorster's détente propaganda as the “voice of reason,” has also given Savimbi strong support. UNITA has been promoted in the strictly government-controlled Zambian press, and material aid to UNITA has been funnelled through Zambia's ruling (and only legal) party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP). British journalists here have seen large crates of British-made radio equipment air-freighted out of Lusaka International Airport to UNITA territory. The crates had been sent from Racal Communications Ltd, a major British telecommunications firm, to UNIP for forwarding to UNITA.

Another factor behind Kaunda's backing for UNITA is his government's desire to reopen the strategic Benguela Railway (now controlled entirely by UNITA except in the extreme north-east) which has been used in the past to export over 45 per cent of Zambia's annual copper production of around 700,000 tons. Zambia earns over 90 per cent of its foreign exchange from copper exports and has been hit hard by the closure of the railway since mid-August. Over 140,000 tons of imports destined for

Zambia have also been held up at the port of Lobito because of the railway's shut-down.

American mercenaries are helping the UNITA war effort too. I was told by a translator working at UNITA's Capola training camp near Silva Porto that 15 Americans were based at the camp as instructors. An ex-Green Beret, named “Skip,” told me that he had offered his services as a trained pilot to UNITA.

It is widely believed that most of the war matériel arriving for UNITA and the FNLA is routed through Zaïre, a major recipient of United States military aid. The Ford administration revealed on October 26 that

it was about to propose to the US Congress a 19 million dollar military aid programme for Zaïre in addition to 60 million dollars of emergency financial aid already under consideration. This would amount to a more than fivefold increase in US military aid to Zaïre. According to pilots at Silva Porto airport, a Pearl Air Viscount runs a daily arms run for UNITA from Kinshasa, the Zaïre capital. Unmarked transport planes are also landing tons of heavy weapons at Benguela airport, apparently the main supply point for the advancing South African-FNLA-UNITA force on the coast. We saw a giant camouflaged Hercules touch down there only minutes after our arrival at the airfield. □

Landowner Crushes Occupation of Estate

Fifteen Peasants Gunned Down in Honduras

At least fifteen peasants occupying an uncultivated estate were gunned down in the Honduran province of Lempira during the weekend of November 8.

The killings were carried out by gunmen in the pay of a powerful local landowner, Pedro Reyes Ramos, who participated in the attack, according to the National Front of Peasant Unity. The National Front represents about 140,000 peasants in three different organizations.

The occupation was part of a campaign to force the government to turn over land to landless peasants. On October 9 the front demanded that the government distribute 370,650 acres of land to 30,000 peasants, setting a deadline of two weeks for compliance. When the regime failed to take action, the peasants began the occupation.

The shootings were the second murder of peasant activists in the last six months. On June 25, fifteen activists taking part in a march on the capital to demand land reform were killed in Olancho Province. Six were gunned down outright in front of a headquarters of the National Peasants Union, one of the organizations in the National Front. Nine were kidnapped by soldiers and local ranchers. Their bodies were subsequently found in a dynamited well on one rancher's property.

The killings are only part of a long series of attacks on the peasant movement, formed in the early 1960s to defend the interests of the country's two million peasants (72% of the population).

The great bulk of the peasantry is

brutally oppressed, with 67% of the farming population occupying less than 12% of the arable land. At the same time, 0.3% of the population (667 landowning families) own 28% of the arable land. A large majority of the rural population has an annual per capita income of \$30.

The military junta of Col. Juan Melgar Castro, which took power in a bloodless coup in April, gained initial support by promising speedy agrarian reform. However, there has been no action on the promises.

In fact, Harvey Jennings, writing in the November-December issue of the *USLA Reporter*, the magazine of the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners, suggested that Melgar had something quite different in mind:

“While it is clear that ranchers were involved in the murders,” Jennings wrote in reference to the June 25 massacre, “the government's role is still uncertain. . . .”

“After the bodies were discovered in Zelaya's well, a government report placed blame for the killings on him, another landlord, and three soldiers in specific, and on the landowning class in general. The three soldiers, said the junta, had acted without orders. This too was greeted with considerable skepticism.

“One reason for doubting the government's story was that on June 25, while the Olancho massacre was in progress, the junta carried out a well-planned strike against progressives across the country, with the peasant leagues and the Catholic Church the major targets.” □

*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front).—IP

Pretoria Seeks to Widen Imperialist Aggression in Angola

By Ernest Harsch

As reported by Tony Hodges elsewhere in this issue of *Intercontinental Press*, the South African regime is continuing its direct military intervention in the Angolan civil war.

There are signs that Pretoria may be preparing to throw even more forces into the Angola war. The *Johannesburg Star* reported November 20 that military units along the Angolan-Namibian border were being strengthened. Many reserve officers were placed on standby alert and leaves were canceled for soldiers undergoing training.

Washington Post correspondent David B. Ottaway reported in a November 29 dispatch from Johannesburg, "Practically every day now, there are new revelations leaked by high-level officials about the scope and extent of present South African involvement in Angola, as if the government were preparing the public for even bigger things to come."

The rise in military preparations was accompanied by a propaganda barrage against Moscow, which is backing the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola). Defense Minister Pieter W. Botha called on countries in the region, "separately and collectively," to act against Soviet plans to "subvert" southern Africa. The November 23 *Johannesburg Sunday Times* described Moscow's involvement in Angola as an attempt to gain "control of Africa."

These moves by Pretoria came amid reports that the South African-supported military column advancing northward against the MPLA positions had been stalled by an MPLA counterthrust. In addition to the white mercenaries and South African troops, who have reportedly suffered heavy casualties in the recent fighting, the column is also composed of forces from the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA—Angolan National Liberation Front) and the União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

Pretoria has sought to enlist greater participation by its imperialist allies.

Ottaway reported in a November 25 dispatch that according to Western diplomats in Lusaka, Zambia, the South African regime has asked Washington and other Western governments to become more open in their backing of the MPLA's rivals and

to step up the flow of advanced weapons into Angola.

Ottaway commented, "South Africa faces a major decision itself—whether to escalate its own involvement or to abandon its support of the military campaign against the Popular Movement.

"The attitude of other Western powers, particularly the United States, over whether to escalate their assistance could be a crucial factor in the South African decision."

One of Washington's first major public warnings to Moscow over its military backing to the MPLA came on November 10, the day before Angola gained its formal independence. Calling the Angolan war a "grave problem," Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared that Moscow's policy "was not compatible with the spirit of détente."

In a speech before the Economic Club of Detroit November 24, Kissinger's warnings were more pointed. He declared that "the United States cannot remain indifferent" to Soviet and Cuban military intervention in the Angolan civil war. "We cannot ignore, for example, the substantial Soviet buildup of weapons in Angola, which has introduced great power rivalry into Africa for the first time in 15 years."

Kissinger urged Moscow to exercise "restraint." He warned of the consequences of not doing so: "Time is running out; continuation of an interventionist policy must inevitably threaten other relationships." Washington, he said, would "never permit détente to turn into a subterfuge of unilateral advantage."

The most authoritative bourgeois newspapers in the United States supported Kissinger, echoing his cries of alarm over Moscow's role in Angola.

A November 26 editorial in the *New York Times* began, "While Portugal itself is again threatened by Communist-inspired take-over, Soviet imperialism has re-entered the African continent in crude force, this time in the former Portuguese colony of Angola."

The *Washington Post* editorialized the same day, "Since Angola is important in itself, and since the Soviet performance does suggest an experiment in power-flexing, it makes a difference how the United States responds. We would not want this country to stand idly by while the Russians play out their imperialistic game.

That would be an invitation to further power plays."

The editors of the *Wall Street Journal* repeated this theme in their November 28 issue: "And there is no reason why it [Washington] should remain mute while the Soviets use the cover of détente to attempt to establish a neo-colonialist power base in Southern Africa."

In contrast, Kissinger and the editorialists have downplayed or ignored the direct South African intervention in Angola and Washington's covert supply of arms to the MPLA's rivals.

Undersecretary of State Joseph J. Sisco and former Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby admitted in closed-door testimony before the Africa subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee November 6 that Washington was supplying arms, ammunition, and military vehicles to the FNLA and UNITA.

This arms aid, however, was not thought to be direct. Washington has reportedly given funds to the Mobutu Sese Seko regime in Zaïre, which backs the FNLA and UNITA, to finance the purchase of arms from Europe, particularly from Belgium.

At hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee November 20 on U.S. aid to Zaïre, Kissinger was asked whether Washington was helping Mobutu "do whatever he was doing in Angola." Kissinger replied, yes.

According to Ottaway, Washington is not the only imperialist power providing covert aid to the military campaign against the MPLA. "The European countries sharing with the United States in the secret arms effort are known to include France, Belgium and West Germany," he said.

The November 17 *Christian Science Monitor*, which has close contacts in the State Department, reported the possibility of an even greater U.S. intervention in Angola. "Sources close to U.S. intelligence," overseas news editor Geoffrey Godsell said, "confirm that if the need arises, funds are available to swing a massive arms lift in behind the FNLA to help expedite defeat of the MPLA—or to counter any sudden and effective increase in Soviet support to the MPLA."

State Department officials have tried to justify funneling arms into Angola by citing Washington's desire to counterbalance Soviet influence.

Shipments of Soviet and Eastern European arms to the MPLA have expanded

considerably over the past several weeks, and reportedly include machine guns, artillery, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. Between twelve and fifteen MIG jet fighters are also believed to have been sent to the neighboring country of Congo (Brazzaville) for possible use by the MPLA. Although it has been charged that several hundred Soviet advisers and technicians are in Angola, that claim has not been confirmed.

It appears that there are Cuban troops in Angola aiding the MPLA, however. MPLA sources stated that 1,200 Cuban troops arrived in Luanda November 10, bringing to 2,800 the number of Cubans thought to be in Angola at that time. The UNITA claims to have captured several Cuban soldiers.

Moscow's massive arms shipments to the MPLA are not designed to weaken capitalism in the former Portuguese colony or to aid the Angolan struggle against continued imperialist domination. The aim is to strengthen the wing of the Angolan nationalist movement that the Kremlin considers most favorable to its foreign policy objectives. The large amounts of Soviet military and economic aid sent to such dictators as Idi Amin in Uganda and Indira Gandhi in India are just two examples of Moscow's efforts to buy political favor with bourgeois regimes to further its own bureaucratic interests.

For the American and European imperialists, Angola's vast deposits of oil and minerals are a particularly valuable prize. If the Kremlin gained strong political influence over the new Angolan regime, its diplomatic hand would be greatly strengthened. The Soviet Stalinists could then bargain with Washington and the West European powers for more favorable terms within the framework of détente.

Moscow's opportunist motives in backing the MPLA become particularly evident when the quantity of its present military aid is compared with that allotted in the past. It is estimated that \$110 million worth of Soviet arms has been given to the MPLA in the last year, that is, since the struggle for power between the three rival Angolan nationalist groups reached the stage of armed conflict. During the previous fourteen years, when the MPLA was battling Portuguese colonialism, Moscow provided only \$54 million in aid.

The Castro government has not yet stated its motives for sending several thousand troops to aid the MPLA. It may be part of an understanding with Moscow in which Cubans, instead of Russians, provide training in the use of the sophisticated weapons sent to the MPLA. Havana may also be giving material aid to the MPLA to demonstrate its continued opposition to American imperialism and its aggressions in the colonial world.

Washington is well aware that the Soviet involvement in Angola does not threaten capitalism there or elsewhere in Africa. But as Kissinger's remarks indicate, Washington is interested in blocking Soviet efforts to pick up bargaining chips in Angola.

The November 26 *New York Times* editorial noted one of the limitations on Washington's ability to intervene openly in Angola. "There was a time when the United States would have responded to such a massive and menacing intervention with its own show of force," the *Times* said, "but that is something that the American people would never countenance now."

There also appear to be differences of estimation within the government on the importance of preventing the MPLA from gaining dominance over the two other groups.

According to the November 26 *Christian Science Monitor*, Senator Richard Clark, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, has criticized the American intervention in Angola. The *Monitor* reported, "He said he had had discussions a few months ago with the MPLA leaders who convinced him that if they prevailed they would 'within a year be pursuing a nonaligned policy independent of the Russians.'"

Gerald J. Bender, the author of a forthcoming book on Angola, noted in the November 23 *Los Angeles Times* that "Kissinger has little support for his policy within his own African bureau. After a thorough review of the Angolan situation within the State Department this past June, the bureau almost unanimously recommended that the United States stay out of the conflict."

Stressing that it would remain "non-aligned," the MPLA has sought to reassure Washington and the European powers that Moscow's influence in Angola under an MPLA regime would be a limited one.

Article 6 of the constitution enacted by the MPLA regime states that "the People's Republic of Angola will not join any international military organization, nor allow the installation of foreign military bases on its national territory."

Even if Moscow did win significant diplomatic leverage in Angola in the event of an MPLA victory, a shift by the Angolan regime toward other sources of "aid" would be a likely possibility as long as capitalist property relations are maintained in the country. The Kremlin's allocation of billions of dollars in military and financial aid to the Egyptian regime did not prevent President Sadat from seeking a better deal with Washington.

Even today, the MPLA does not look solely to the Soviet bloc for aid and political backing. According to its own statements, the MPLA gets support from Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Norway, and the Neth-

erlands. It is also supported by a number of African states, as well as by a wing of the Lisbon military junta.

In an effort to elicit greater backing from the imperialist powers, the MPLA has made repeated declarations that foreign investments would be welcomed in Angola. The MPLA constitution guarantees the protection of private property, "including that of foreigners, so long as it benefits the economy of the country and is in the interests of the Angolan people."

One of the foreign companies affected by this MPLA policy is Gulf Oil, which has substantial investments in the oil-rich Cabinda enclave. Bender noted in his *Los Angeles Times* article:

Ironically, and significantly, Gulf does not appear to share Kissinger's or Colby's fear of the MPLA. Saydi Mingas, the MPLA finance minister in the transitional government, recently remarked in Washington that relations between his party and Gulf were 'very good.' The company does not perceive the MPLA to constitute a greater threat to its operations than the FNLA or UNITA.

The MPLA has attempted to disguise its procapitalist policies under a heavy cover of Stalinist-inspired demagoguery. It has proclaimed itself in favor of "workers control" and "people's power," and has denounced its rivals as "fascists" and "puppets of international imperialism." From the actions taken by the MPLA in its first weeks in power in Luanda, it appears that it has also adopted Stalinist methods of political control.

The new MPLA justice minister, Diogenes Boavida, announced that "people's tribunals" would be set up first in Luanda and later throughout the country (assuming an MPLA victory). For those judged by "the will and decisions of the popular masses" and found guilty, labor camps are to be provided.

The MPLA has made it clear that these labor camps will be set up not only for members and supporters of the FNLA and UNITA. The November 14 Paris weekly *Jeune Afrique* reported:

However, the MPLA has launched a major purge: It shut down the weekly *A Voz de Angola* and arrested a number of activists charged with leftism, as well as certain intellectuals, who until recently were sympathizers of the Active Revolt* and who have maintained a critical attitude toward the leadership of [MPLA President] Agostinho Neto.

Among the persons arrested was the journalist Joaquim de Castro Lopo, a former representative of the MPLA in Algiers and the editor of the daily *Jornal de Angola*. Since his arrest in late October, no one knows what has become of him. Warned by friends, the associate editor of the same newspaper, Ricardo Ferreira, and a twenty-one-year-old

*The Active Revolt was a dissident tendency within the MPLA led by Mário and Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, who now reportedly support the Neto leadership.

reporter managed to flee after reaching the airport hidden in an ambulance.

In line with its policy of muzzling the press, the MPLA has also arrested or expelled several foreign journalists. Only dispatches based on official MPLA statements are allowed to be filed from Luanda.

Despite the MPLA's claim that it is the only nationalist group that represents the entire country, its actual base of support is still limited to the Mbundu population in the Luanda-Malange region of north-central Angola. Its antidemocratic methods of rule are sure to hamper its efforts to extend that influence.

Moreover, a recent law enacted by the MPLA Central Committee, which in effect denies Angolan citizenship to anyone collaborating with the FNLA and UNITA, will increase the hostility toward the MPLA by the northern Bakongo, who traditionally back the FNLA, and the Ovimbundu of the central plateau region, who generally support the UNITA.

The FNLA and UNITA, who have set up a coalition regime and have proclaimed the Democratic People's Republic of Angola, now reportedly control the entire central and southern sections of the country, as well as the area north of Luanda.

Although the temporary capital of the regime is in Huambo (formerly Nova Lisboa), most of the FNLA's forces have remained in the northern districts of Uíge and Zaire, with the exception of several thousand troops under the command of Daniel Chipenda. The FNLA and UNITA have fought each other in the past, and from recent reports it appears that there are still some strains in the alliance.

The UNITA, which until recently was considered the weakest of the three groups militarily, is attempting to mobilize the Ovimbundu population in its support. Godwin Matatu reported in the November issue of the London monthly *Africa* magazine that UNITA President "Jonas Savimbi and his colleagues have been extensively touring their central and southern strongholds, attracting large crowds, to explain their case to the people." After the joint military column supported by white troops recaptured the port of Lobito from the MPLA in early November, Savimbi addressed a crowd reported to number tens of thousands of Ovimbundu in the central square of the city.

In the interests of their own narrow factional struggle for power against the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA have allowed South African troops to enter the country. This could provide a pretext for other imperialist powers to intervene directly also, endangering the entire nationalist struggle.

The FNLA and UNITA have denied the participation of regular South African troops in their campaign against the

MPLA. Savimbi, however, has offered a justification for using foreign "advisers." The November 23 *Washington Post* quoted Savimbi as saying, "The Popular Movement had the Russians with them. We had to address ourselves to people who could match them."

The November 22 *Le Monde* cited a report that French advisers were aiding the FNLA and UNITA, and Savimbi has admitted that French mercenaries who had fought for the Biafra secessionist regime during the Nigerian civil war were also working for him. This may indicate the direct involvement of the French government, which in the past has actively recruited mercenaries to advance its interests. Paris provided such mercenaries to the Biafra regime, as well as to the imperialist-backed Katanga secessionist regime in the Congo (now Zaïre) in the early 1960s.

The FNLA and UNITA have also made

pleas for greater arms aid. FNLA Director of Foreign Affairs Demba Paka Ola, who was quoted in a November 23 *New York Times* dispatch from Kinshasa, Zaïre, described the aid his group and the UNITA were receiving as "paltry" in comparison to that of the MPLA.

"They have missiles by the thousands," he said, "and we have none, they have armored cars, tanks and jeeps coming every day, and meanwhile our friends in the West and Peking hesitate."

Peking has reportedly withdrawn its military mission from Zaïre, where Chinese military instructors had been training FNLA troops since the summer of 1974. In addition, in an official statement released in New York November 27, Peking said that it had ceased supplying military aid to any of the three Angolan nationalist groups after they reached the independence agreement with Lisbon. □

\$58 Million Loan Involved

Peking Wins Good Word From Pinochet

At a time when the Pinochet dictatorship's murderous repression of political opponents has isolated it internationally to the point that the blood-soaked regime is even a public embarrassment to the White House, help has arrived from the Maoist bureaucracy in Peking.

"The Chilean military junta, increasingly isolated and beleaguered at home and abroad, is seeking stronger ties with China, one of its few remaining friends," Hugh O'Shaughnessy reported in the November 23 issue of the *Observer*.

"Commandant Gaston Frez, head of Codelco, the Chilean State copper corporation," O'Shaughnessy continued, "announced in Santiago last week that China would increase its imports of Chilean copper from 8,000 tons this year to 34,000 tons in 1976."

A substantial loan from Peking is reported to be part of the deal. In a recent interview with Pinochet, *New York Times* columnist C.L. Sulzberger asked if there were any truth to a rumor he had heard that "Chile was discussing with Peking a \$58-million loan to this tottering economy" as part of the copper negotiations.

"Much to my surprise," Sulzberger said in his November 29 column, "he confirmed this."

According to Sulzberger, Pinochet "said discussions with the Chinese had begun during the Allende era but were being continued now, after having been suspended. 'The matter remains open and the loan is still pending,' he added."

Sulzberger, apparently still skeptical, sought verification of Pinochet's statement, with the following results:

"I confirmed this in conversation with the Chilean who has been a principal negotiating contact with Peking's ambassador, a man he describes as 'very, very patient.'"

Pinochet has every reason to be pleased with Peking's diplomatic representatives.

Following the coup in September 1973, the Chinese embassy in Santiago closed its doors to all political refugees. While working people were being gunned down by the thousands and political prisoners were being executed and tortured, Peking's embassy turned desperate refugees away, leaving them to the mercy of the Chilean gorillas.

Furthermore, in face of a worldwide outcry against the slaughter, Peking refused even to break off diplomatic relations with the regime.

Instead, on October 11, 1973, Peking told the pro-Allende ambassador to China, Armando Uribe, that he was no longer recognized as Chile's representative. By November 5, a representative of the military dictatorship was reported to be in Peking to take Uribe's place.

For the sake of diplomatic and trade concessions, Peking has once again betrayed the most elementary principles of proletarian internationalism. In doing so it has won approval from Pinochet.

"China has behaved well," he told Sulzberger. □

Healy's Frame-up Against Joseph Hansen

By George Novack

Gerry Healy, general secretary of the Workers Revolutionary party, has been seized by a passion for historical research. The press of his entire movement from London to Sydney has dedicated itself, week in, week out, to scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding Trotsky's assassination in August 1940 and its aftermath. Why has this event that occurred thirty-five years ago so suddenly and totally obsessed the leader of the sectarian International Committee?

Certainly not because of any desire to establish or amplify the true facts about the affair, which a scrupulous scholar like Isaac Deutscher might do. Healy's campaign has more shameful and sinister motives and his researches pursue other objectives. He is impelled to slander and discredit his political opponents in the Socialist Workers party and the Fourth International, even if that tends to dishonor Trotsky himself and his son Sedov. Then he seeks to serve notice on present or potential critical minds in his own ranks that if they voice dissenting opinions, they are liable to the same kind of abuse as has been heaped upon Tim Wohlforth, Nancy Fields, Alan Thornett, and others who have gotten crosswise with the unchallengeable guru.

The third reason is the most despicable, petty, and spiteful. That is his personal vendetta against Joseph Hansen, editor of *Intercontinental Press*. Healy is bent on destroying by the vilest means the reputation of this veteran revolutionist who has most persistently and effectively exposed his theoretical incapacity, political errors, and organizational methods. In actuality, his efforts only provide proof of Hansen's diagnosis that Healy has a streak of paranoia in his makeup. This psychological factor accounts for the frenzied drive and unrestrained viciousness of the false accusations and insinuations Healy and his acolytes have launched against Hansen in the pamphlet entitled *Security and the Fourth International: An Inquiry into the Assassination of Leon Trotsky*.

In it Healy charges that the SWP leadership of that time was "criminally negligent" in failing to prevent Trotsky's assassination (he discovered this only after breaking off years of collaboration with them); that Joseph Hansen, as one of Trotsky's secretaries, was the chief culprit; and he insinuates that Hansen may be either an FBI or a GPU agent or both. Such

lies and slanders are the ammunition with which reactionary forces have often bombarded honest revolutionists. Healy has resorted to their techniques because he feels more at ease on this level than in the give and take of political debate. That demands talents beyond his capacities.

I am writing this reply to his poison-pen attacks, not only as a longtime leader of the SWP and intimate co-worker of Hansen's for over a third of a century, but as one of the most authoritative living witnesses to the developments upon which Healy bases his false indictment. Let me briefly indicate, for those unacquainted with my early career, what my credentials are in relation to the events leading up to and following upon Stalin's assassination of his arch-antagonist.

For six years, from 1934, shortly after I joined the Communist League of America, until the day of Trotsky's death in August 1940, I was more or less occupied by assignment with matters pertaining to Trotsky's security.

In 1934, when the Russian exile was in France, being hounded by fascists and Stalinists alike—in response to a desperate appeal for help, I initiated a committee of American intellectuals that sought to obtain entry for Trotsky into the United States. We retained Morris Ernst, then general counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, to see Roosevelt at the White House to intercede with the president. The effort failed and Trotsky remained "a man on the planet without a visa" until the newly elected Norwegian Labor government gave him asylum in 1935.

When the first Moscow Trial was staged in 1936 and the Norwegian cabinet under pressure from the Kremlin interned Trotsky and Natalia so they were gagged and unable to defend themselves against Prosecutor Vyshinsky's infamous accusations, that early committee was revived under the name of the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky. I served as its national secretary. This body had the objectives of obtaining asylum for Trotsky and promoting the formation of an International Commission of Inquiry into the Moscow frame-ups.

We realized both of these aims. In December, through the mediation of the writer Anita Brenner and the artist Diego Rivera, President Cárdenas agreed to welcome the Trotskys as guests of his govern-

ment. I can vividly recall how Max Shachtman and I relayed that cheering news by phone from New York to Oslo through Walter Held. In January we met Trotsky and Natalia upon their arrival in Tampico and escorted them on the presidential train to Frida Kahlo's home in Coyoacán.

After helping to bring it together, I accompanied the Dewey Commission of Inquiry to Mexico in April 1937 where it held the memorable hearings, recorded in *The Case of Leon Trotsky*, that attracted world attention and dealt the strongest blow to the credibility of the Moscow Trials.

After that, together with comrades of the SWP and others assigned to that duty, I worked to safeguard Trotsky in every way possible against the death warrant issued against him by Stalin's henchmen. I was especially entrusted with raising the funds needed for the extensive defense measures that were instituted both before and following the May 24, 1940, Siquieros assault on the household. Indeed, one of the last letters Trotsky wrote, shortly before he was struck down, was addressed to a sympathizer friend who had contributed generously for that purpose.¹

I was also apprised of the investigations undertaken to check on persons connected with the household after the May assault and the additional measures taken to strengthen the defenses.

During that same time, because of my contacts in different circles, I was placed in charge of securing documents and visas for Trotskyists in Western Europe whose lives and liberties were menaced by the Nazis and their agents. I collaborated with several voluntary agencies and negotiated with government officials in this cause and succeeded in bringing to safety a number of endangered Jewish and non-Jewish comrades. For example, I made all arrangements for Walter Held (Heinz Epe) and his family to come to the United States, invoking the aid of high government officials, but he was apprehended by the Soviet secret police in transit through the USSR and executed. Unknown to us at that time was the presence of one GPU agent among those we brought to safety. That was Mark Zborowski (Etienne) around

1. See *Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1939-40*, Second Edition (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973), p. 329.

whom Healy has raised his hue and cry decades later.

It was better to save ten good comrades even if included in the company was one treacherous agent whose identity was in any event then unknown and unproven. If a similar situation should recur in Western Europe or elsewhere, we of the SWP would follow the same policy. We would not wait to check out the bona fides of every individual in our movement to the nth degree before coming to their rescue.

During this entire period I worked in fraternal association with Trotsky and enjoyed his confidence, as did Hansen and Cannon. This is more than Healy can claim.

What Healy does claim is that we abused that confidence and were guilty of not taking better precautions and thereby preventing Trotsky's assassination. This turns the situation upside down. It is true that we did not prevent Trotsky's death. Despite the tightest defense and constant vigilance, it is not easy, and it is in fact hardly possible, to hold off indefinitely a determined band of assassins, armed with inexhaustible resources, from carrying out their deadly objective. They can be staved off for a while, as happened by accident in May. But in the long run their chances of success are optimal, as Trotsky himself was well aware.

With all the forces at their command the Russian tsars and the two Kennedys became victims of assassins. How could an isolated exile with scant resources and a few friends in a foreign land have been expected to succeed where the entourage of these mighty heads of state failed?

That is one side of the matter. Of great importance was the positive fact that thanks to our efforts and intervention, Trotsky was enabled to enjoy a moratorium of three and a half years from January 1937 to August 1940. The execution of the death sentence was put off during those final years in which he continued to lead the Fourth International and wrote some of his most valuable contributions. In 1935 Trotsky stated in his *Diary in Exile* that he needed five more years of uninterrupted work to pass on to the oncoming generation his knowledge of the revolutionary method. He managed to receive those five years, although they were far from uninterrupted.

By August 1940 virtually all the other defendants in the Moscow Trials except the Old Man had already been done to death by Stalin. The vengeful Healy is unwilling to give Cannon, Hansen, and their colleagues any credit for that achievement. It was much more significant than the incapacity of Trotsky or his protectors to see from what quarter and through what channel the next and final long-anticipated deathblow would be delivered.

Healy likewise does not see that Hansen

and the others are only secondary figures in the drama. The principal actors were Trotsky and Sedov themselves who trusted Etienne and allowed Jacson entry into the household. By aiming at the American Trotskyists Healy strikes at the victims themselves.

Not only that. His reckless and indiscriminate allegations insinuate that Trotsky's nineteen-year-old guard Sheldon Harte; Sylvia Caldwell, Cannon's secretary; and Lola Dallin, who helped save so many anti-fascist refugees, were likewise GPU agents, although he provides no new probative evidence to that effect. Anything goes in his frantic endeavors to cast a net of suspicion around Joseph Hansen and his colleagues.

* * *

During my political career I collaborated not only with Trotsky but with Joseph Hansen and Gerry Healy. I have been a close associate and literary partner of Hansen's since we jointly wrote the introduction to Trotsky's last work, *In Defense of Marxism*, in 1942. From 1951 to early 1953 I worked on a daily basis with Healy in England. I know both men well.

From this personal experience and direct knowledge I believe I am as qualified as anyone living on either side of the Atlantic to judge the probity of both men and assay the charges Healy has leveled against his former associate. I may cite a further qualification. Since the Scottsboro case in 1931 I have been involved in defending civil liberties and labor's rights in a series of cases here and abroad too numerous to itemize. The best known are the Tom Mooney case, the Moscow Trials, the Minneapolis Case, the Kutcher Case, and currently the SWP suit against the FBI, CIA, etc. As a result I have learned to smell the frame-up of a militant from miles away and have time and again organized movements to defend the victims on a national and international scale. As an expert on frame-ups of all kinds, I feel well equipped to render a verdict on this one. It stinks to the heavens.

Apart from the total absence of a shred of evidence Healy can bring forth, to anyone who has known Hansen at the closest range for decades, it is a psychological impossibility that he could be an agent of the Soviet secret police or the FBI. On the other hand, I know that Healy is quite capable of spreading false reports about his opponents for the sake of factional advantage, especially against those who tread upon his ego.

In my judgment Healy is in this case a shameless liar, an unmitigated rascal, and a political hooligan. I state this, less to exculpate Hansen and Cannon, who do not need my defense, than to characterize Healy for what he has shown himself to be. In all my experience I have rarely seen so

odious and flimsy a frame-up as this spicy dish he has concocted.

His stupid calumnies against Hansen and Cannon are as detestable and unfounded as Stalin's accusations against Trotsky and Sedov in the Moscow Trials. Why does he refrain from including Dobbs and Novack, who were equally involved in and responsible for planning Trotsky's security—or are we being reserved for a second round?

Or, to come closer to London, they are as unwarranted as the British government's accusations when it interned Trotsky in a German prisoner-of-war camp in Nova Scotia on his way to Petrograd in April 1917. They said he was a German agent. When the news reached the Petrograd Soviet, the *Pravda* under Lenin's direction answered: "Can one even for a moment believe the trustworthiness of the statement that Trotsky, the chairman of the Soviet of Workers' Delegates in St. Petersburg in 1905—a revolutionary who has sacrificed years to a disinterested service of revolution—that this man had anything to do with a scheme subsidized by the German government? This is a patent, unheard-of, and malicious slander of a revolutionary."²

At that time Trotsky had served less than half the years in the service of the revolutionary cause that Hansen has. Healy's charges against Hansen, et al., are as baseless—and as base—as the British government's against Trotsky. We in 1975 refute them as vigorously and unequivocally as Lenin did in 1917: "Can one believe even for a moment Healy's atrocious slanders against the irreproachable Joseph Hansen?"

Until Healy withdraws his accusations and insinuations, the dishonorable brand of an unconscionable slanderer will remain on his forehead for all to see.

November 20, 1975

2. Leon Trotsky, *My Life* (Pathfinder Press, 1970), pp. 283-84.

Fighting Tooth Decay— With Lead and Embalming Fluid

The Food and Drug Administration has allowed about 30,000 dentists in the United States—one-fourth of the total number in the country—to treat millions of decayed teeth with a poisonous "wonder" drug.

Used under such names as N-2 and RC-2B, and including lead and embalming fluid, the poison has been used in "simplified" root-canal operations. Although the drug has been banned in Australia, Norway, and Sweden, and by the U.S. Army and Air Force, the FDA has allowed it to be shipped illegally across state lines for thirteen years.

Prospects for the Opposition Movement in Czechoslovakia

[The following interview with Jiri Pelikan, a reformer under the Dubcek regime and one of the exiled leaders of the Czechoslovak opposition movement, appeared in the November 6-13 issue of the Paris weekly newspaper *Informations Ouvrières*. Pelikan gave the interview while in Paris for the release of his book *S'ils Me Tuent* (If They Kill Me).

[On February 4 Pelikan received a bomb in the mail at his Rome residence. The perpetrators of this attempt on his life thus demonstrated their fear of the Czechoslovak opposition movement. Pelikan, the former director of Czechoslovak television, was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist party at an underground congress held in a factory guarded by the workers militia, August 21, 1968, during the occupation of the Warsaw Pact forces. He became one of the founders of the Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens.

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. What political objective did you have in writing this book?

Answer. It is a kind of testimony of my personal experience, which is also that of a part of my generation—of those who entered the CP [Communist party of Czechoslovakia] during the resistance, who were active in it for thirty years, were then expelled after the military intervention, and who maintained their faith in the socialist ideal.

I thought this experience was of interest because Czechoslovakia is similar to the industrially and economically developed countries in its political traditions. Thus our illusions, our mistakes, and our crimes along this path can be of use to the socialist and revolutionary left that is considering those problems. This can be a point of reflection to avoid those errors and difficulties. That is one aspect.

The other aspect is that the destiny of socialism in Eastern Europe is closely tied to its destiny in the West. The experience of Prague, after that of Budapest and Berlin, proves that attempts to get out of the mesh in a single country are bound to be crushed by the Stalinist bureaucracy. One cannot free oneself from the ideology without solidarity from Western countries. This means the establishment of an authentic socialist society in these countries, after the

image that Marx, Engels, and Lenin wanted—Trotsky also, I think, although I do not know him as well. If one avoids these errors, that will have repercussions inside the countries of the East.

One point is important for the Western left. Certain comrades have illusions that a historical peculiarity of the Eastern countries (underdevelopment) is the explanation [for what went wrong]. The danger exists in fact even if there are no tanks, even outside the zone of Soviet influence. The roots go much deeper.

The problem is how to construct a different socialism, especially in the Latin countries—France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. This entails, of course, defense against imperialist pressure and internal sabotage, but also defense against the pressure from Soviet domination. It is a situation not foreseen by any Marxist classic. The USSR is a great power and the bureaucracy cannot tolerate a different socialism, just as it could not tolerate it in Czechoslovakia. It feels threatened in its own zone of influence. Thus there are three possible circumstances: a change in position by Communists on the question of Soviet reality; a sufficiently large force of socialists who are not members of the CP—of socialists, of Trotskyists—to offset the trend of the Communists toward domination; a weakening internally of Soviet pressure by the socialist opposition. Failing that, a confrontation will take place.

This book is for the leftist youth who joined the movement on the basis of their reading, of literature, of a sentiment for justice, without going through our sad experience. So that their commitment will be more profound and less superficial than ours, which allowed us to be manipulated by the Stalinist system before getting our own proper experience.

Q. Why this title?

A. The title was chosen by the editor, taking a fragment of a sentence I wrote in the introduction. I decided to write this book after an attempt on my life in February.

Q. Is the fact that they resorted to violence against you a reflection of the internal situation in Czechoslovakia?

A. We are the most hated by the leading group because we remained loyal to socialism. Thirty percent of the émigrés are depoliticized or right-wing. But we who

criticize Moscow and Prague from a Marxist point of view are more dangerous. They are trying to condemn people of our tendency to silence. In Czechoslovakia the people who are arrested are almost always Communists, like Hubl and Sabata, who were members of the CC [Central Committee], and like Jiri Muller, a committed socialist.

There are campaigns against Dubcek, Mlynar, Kriegel, because they remained committed to the socialist way. The others, those who are indifferent to the destiny of socialism, are no longer considered dangerous enemies.

Concerning the present situation, the characteristic point is that voices are always being raised in Czechoslovakia, socialist voices. Thus there are Smrkovsky's memoirs, Dubcek's letter, Pavel Kohout's letter to H. Boll, Vaculik's to Kurt Waldheim, and lastly, Mlynar's book, still not published, a 300-page Marxist book that I differ with on a lot of things but that is an important document. There was also Mlynar's interview with Jiri Hayek on Swedish television. The military occupation has not succeeded in breaking the resistance. A protest movement exists in literature. Czechoslovak samizdat recently published its fiftieth book.

These are works of literature, poetry, and politics. Underground culture is much richer and much more popular than official culture. There are also newspapers and leaflets. The feeling of discontent exists, even if not translated through open demonstrations except at football and hockey matches. And even in the party from which 500,000 persons have been expelled—above all the best elements, a large number of workers—even in this party disputes occur.

After the sending of Dubcek's letter,¹ Husak made a speech, asking that all units of the CP pass motions condemning it. One-third of the rank-and-file units refused to

1. On October 28, 1974, Alexander Dubcek, the former leader of the Czechoslovak Communist party who was ousted after the 1968 Soviet invasion, sent a long letter of protest to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly and the Slovak National Council (parliament). An edited version of this letter, authorized by the opposition movement inside Czechoslovakia, was smuggled out of the country this spring. The letter criticized the lack of freedom in Czechoslovakia and charged the Communist party with purging thousands of persons from their jobs. Dubcek said he was under constant watch by as many as six police at a time. The *New York Times* of April 13, 14, and 15, printed extensive excerpts from the letter.—IP

vote for the motion without having seen the letter. And since the leadership did not want to circulate it . . . it cannot even control this normalized party.

In the Device quarter of Prague is situated a statue of Lenin. The day after Husak's speech demanding that Dubcek leave the country, Lenin had a packsack on his back and a walking stick in his hand. Since then the monument is guarded day and night by the police.

But one must say that the normalization has had, all the same, some very negative effects. The regime is playing the card of depoliticization of the consumer society, to break solidarity, to encourage isolation.

Otherwise the only thing that works well is the secret police. There are hundreds of thousands of persons who cannot find work suited to their qualifications, whose children cannot pursue their education. Hence, some make declarations of support for the regime they surely don't believe in.

Q. What about the problem of inflation, the crisis in Czechoslovakia?

A. The problem for the regime is to know how to deal with the consumerism it set going. The effects of inflation are more and more making themselves felt in Czechoslovakia. Contrary to what has been written in *L'Humanité* [the Paris daily of the French CP], even official statistics recognize that certain products are going up in price by 5 percent to 35 percent. Above all there is the practice of creating a new, more expensive product, making the basic product that the new product replaces disappear from the market. Rents have risen. This is a problem for young couples, leading to many divorces. They are forced to live with their parents. To get a state-owned apartment requires a wait of ten years or more. On the free and co-op market you have to have 100,000 to 150,000 crowns [5.98 crowns = US\$1] to get an apartment. The average annual salary is 20,000 crowns. A car costs 40,000 crowns; an apartment, 120,000.

Until now the regime has succeeded in slowing down the effects of inflation, through buying products on the capitalist market and through aid from the USSR. But Czechoslovakia is more and more indebted to the capitalist countries and even to some Third World countries. The USSR has raised the price of raw materials and can no longer supply them in the same quantities. Buying from the West becomes a necessity.

In the next two or three years a tense situation will exist in the countries of the East that will no longer permit holding down prices and developing consumption so as to avoid revolts. That is why the leading group must again create a cold-war atmosphere toward China and imperialism in order to impose necessary sacrifice. After



Informations Ouvrières

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what happened at Szczecin² in 1970-71 the leading group feared the reaction of the working class. Hence the ultradogmatic articles in *Pravda* and *Rude Pravo* are not a return to revolutionary theory but a justification for the new ideological rigidity; for repression against the opposition of the workers; for the banning of strikes and demonstrations, which are portrayed as imperialist provocations; and for the preparation of austerity measures.

Q. Are there strikes in Czechoslovakia or a passive resistance by workers like that in the USSR?

A. The working class has its way of reacting in defense of its own interests against those of the bureaucracy. It takes advantage of each occasion to extract the maximum of concessions from the ruling group—on hours of work, salaries, and so forth. In some enterprises, local unions have forced the administration to make concessions about lunch facilities, health, and working conditions. Short strikes take place, which end in concessions and also in persecution against the organizers.

Absenteeism, passivity, the "rape of

2. The Polish workers' uprising in December 1970. Beginning in the port city of Gdansk on December 14, the rising quickly spread to the city of Szczecin on the East German border. The workers' strike in Szczecin lasted from December 17 to 22, during which the workers exercised a measure of control over the city, including the media. These events forced the resignation of Wladyslaw Gomułka as head of the Polish CP. See *Intercontinental Press*, January 11, 1971, p. 12.—IP

socialist property" (pillage in the factories), are combated without success by official propaganda. What is important is the attitude of the workers to the party. The intellectuals were thrown out. The workers left it themselves, turning in their cards. The regime did not want to expel them.

The problem is much graver for the intellectuals who were thrown out of work. The only place where freedom of expression exists, if at all, is in the factories. But it is a very limited freedom. No newspapers, an official list for union elections . . . In the book, I polemicize with Marchais [leader of the French CP], who asserts that the Soviet worker is freer than the French worker. Is he more free because he does not have his own union?

In the factories, meanwhile, they violently criticize the administration. Certain comrades who used to be in the apparatus and who have now become workers again are surprised. However the workers told them that it was like that before but that they didn't understand it then!

In conclusion a complete rupture has opened between the regime and the masses. The base of the regime is narrower now than under Novotny. In addition a national sentiment against the Soviet army is developing.

Q. Have the events in Portugal had any impact within Czechoslovakia?

A. This has brought about much interest. Obviously the people do not believe in official propaganda. They wonder if it isn't a Soviet socialism that is about to be born there. Cunhal [leader of the Portuguese CP] does not have a good reputation in Prague. He was there in exile and immediately approved the intervention. People are turned off by his name.

Recently a statement was signed by thirty-five personalities of the Prague Spring, including Mlynar, Hayek, Mrs. Smrkowska, Vaculik, and Litera, condemning the repression in Spain. There is sympathy for the progressives in the West, people linking their struggle with what is going on in the West. For Portugal they want a different socialism and they are right. Then, they think that "if it is a victory for our enemy, it is a defeat for us." But in any case, news is very incomplete, whether on the official radio or the Western radio stations.

Q. How is your work and that of your comrades of the socialist opposition developing?

A. One of our successes is that we have maintained the regular publication of *Listy* six times a year. This year we are even preparing a seventh. And, a unique exam-

ple as far as the countries of Eastern Europe are concerned, the majority of the articles come from inside the country; the major part of the run is distributed illegally in Czechoslovakia. We receive responses from readers who make criticisms, ask for articles. The police are very unhappy and

step up their raids to confiscate the papers.

Aside from that, underground bulletins are produced irregularly in the country. There is a kind of *Chronicle of Events*—the *People's Journal*—and also *Events and Documents*, which reproduce letters sent to the leadership, and so on.

Q. A conclusion?

A. I wish that you read my book, making any criticisms you deem useful, without holding back. I am very committed to the continuation of this discussion in the near future. □

Evicted to Make Room for a Pentagon Base

Diego Garcia Islanders Protest Forced Resettlement

By Dianne Feeley

Diego Garcia is a small island located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, about 1,200 miles south of India. Until the late 1960s it and two nearby islets were the home of about 1,200 persons, mainly plantation workers and their families.

Britain bought Diego Garcia from Mauritius in 1965. The price was £3 million (about US\$7 million at the exchange rates then). By 1973 the plantations had been closed down and the entire population forcibly removed from the islands.

The Diego Garcians now live in extreme poverty in Mauritius, located near the Malagasy Republic, and are heavily discriminated against in both education and employment.

Their misfortune stems from the fact that their island home was unusually well situated to serve as an imperialist military base.

About 85% of Western Europe's crude oil, 75% of Japan's, and 25% of the petroleum products imported by the United States are shipped through the northwest corner of the Indian Ocean. This area carries more commerce than the North Atlantic.

In the late 1960s, a British-U.S. communications center was established on Diego Garcia. In 1966 London and Washington signed an agreement that declared Diego Garcia would "remain available for defense purposes for 50 years." When Britain pulled its forces out of the Arab East and Indian Ocean area in 1971, Washington assumed sole command of Diego Garcia's communications base. Shortly afterward, the Pentagon announced plans to expand its facilities on the island.

Total construction costs for the expanded facilities have been estimated at between \$108 and \$175 million. Congress voted an initial \$18 million in 1974, contingent on President Ford's stating that the island was strategically important.

On May 12, 1975, Ford told Congress that the expansion was indeed "essential to the national interest of the U.S." Five months later Congress approved another \$13.8

million. (The Senate voted 72 to 1; the House, 353 to 51.)

The construction plans include dredging and channeling an anchorage capable of mooring a carrier task force; building a pier for rapid loading and unloading of tankers; installing a fuel-storage facility that can supply a carrier task force for a thirty-day tour in the Indian Ocean; lengthening the existing runway from 8,000 to 12,000 feet, with additional parking facilities; and constructing permanent quarters for 600 personnel.

While Pentagon officials have hedged on whether the airstrip will be able to handle loaded B-52 bombers, the harbor will be deep enough to accommodate Polaris nuclear-attack submarines. In addition, Pentagon officials expect Diego Garcia to serve as a base for aircraft providing "air surveillance support to the ships in the Indian Ocean."

However the Brookings Institution, a private research center in the United States, predicts that the real cost of maintaining an expanded military presence in the Indian Ocean and the base on Diego Garcia could be as high as \$800 million a year, plus the initial \$5 billion to \$8 billion for the extra ships that would be required.

Less than three weeks after Congress approved the \$13.8 million for construction, the State Department was forced to admit that in 1966 Washington and London had made a secret agreement on use of the island. The State Department's view of the matter, entitled "Report on the Resettlement of Inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago," was inserted in the October 20 *Congressional Record*.

In return for being able to retain the military base on Diego Garcia, Washington agreed to waive up to \$14 million in research costs Britain had agreed to pay under its Polaris missile contract. The State Department said \$11.5 million had been waived so far. Britain, on the other hand, was to assume responsibility for removing all the residents of Diego Garcia.

The State Department issued its report following publication of an article by David Ottaway in the September 9 *Washington Post* describing the fate of the former inhabitants of Diego Garcia.

Writing from Mauritius, Ottaway exposed the forced expulsions of between 1,200 and 1,400 inhabitants of Diego Garcia and the two neighboring islands. One old man Ottaway interviewed recalled being told by an American official: "If you don't leave you won't be fed any longer."

Many Diego Garcians were third or fourth generation residents of the island. Most worked on the coconut plantations, which were run on a system resembling slavery. Plantation workers worked under a contract system. They received food, housing, and about \$4 a month in wages. They bought what they did not grow themselves from a company store.

In 1967, a year after the secret agreement, Britain bought the plantations. The coconut plantations were allowed to run down, and resettlement began in 1968. The largest evacuation was carried out in 1971, when the plantations were shut down. When the last seventy families were removed in 1973, the islanders protested by refusing to leave the ship when it arrived in Mauritius.

A British official was reluctant to describe these measures as forced evacuation. "He preferred to say that the islanders felt they had no option because there was no work," Edward Nossiter reported in the September 10 *Washington Post*.

The British government paid Mauritius about £650,000 (US\$1.4 million) in 1973 for the resettlement of the islanders. According to the State Department's report, however, the Mauritian government never disbursed the money.

A recent survey of the Diego Garcians revealed that only 17% of the heads of families had been able to find full-time jobs, while 33% were unemployed and 50% were part-time workers. Most of them live in the capital, Port Louis. Although they say that a family can hardly make ends meet on

Mauritius with \$65 a month, 60% of the families from Diego Garcia live on less than \$33, including welfare assistance.

In early 1975 the former inhabitants of Diego Garcia, who are formally citizens of Mauritius, petitioned the British government, sending copies to the American embassy and the Mauritian Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam. Primarily a plea for help, the petition outlines the feelings of those who were forced to leave the islands that were their home:

We the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands—Diego Garcia, Peros Banhos and Saloman—have been uprooted from those islands. . . .

Our ancestors were slaves on those islands, but we know that we are the heirs of those islands. Although we were poor there, we were not dying of hunger. We were living free. . . . Here in Mauritius when animals are debarked, an enclosure with water and grass is prepared for them. But we, being mini-slaves, we don't get anybody to help us. . . .

The statement said that at least forty Diego Garcians have died since they were resettled in Mauritius as the direct result of their poverty.


Ottaway reported that when one American relief organization attempted to raise the issue of Washington's "coresponsibility" for the Diego Garcians in 1972, the State Department replied that the United States had no such responsibility. It repeated that claim in its recent report. But accounts such as the Ottaway article have forced the British, American, and Mauritian governments to respond to the charges. The State Department gave the following explanation:

Since the island populations were almost totally dependent on the plantations, it followed that defense use would require the relocation of the workers and their families. . . .

There were several reasons for desiring uninhabited islands for military use. Security was a factor considered by both governments. The United States was concerned about the social problems that could be expected when placing a military detachment on an isolated tropical island alongside a population with an informal social structure and a prevalent cash wage of less than \$4.00 per month. It appears that the United Kingdom also was concerned with the problems involved in establishing civil administration for islands it was considering developing for military purposes. (*Congressional Record*, October 20, S 18229.)

What all these "considerations" amount to is an inhumane logic by which "problems" are simply solved by removing the people who stand in the way of turning Diego Garcia into what one U.S. naval officer called "a pit stop." And of course the entire military installation was peddled by the State Department and the Pentagon on the basis that Diego Garcia was an *uninhabited* island.

Especially interesting is the statement with which the State Department report



Wijesoma/Ceylon Observer

begins: "The British Indian Ocean Territory was established in 1965, in order to meet future UK and US defense needs." Since there are three other groups of islands included in the territory, and since the inhabitants of those islands are also contract workers and their dependents, the same forced relocation policy could be applied to them as well.

Now that the plight of the Diego Garcians has come to light, each of the governments involved is attempting to explain away its responsibility. According to a Reuters

report in the October 5 *New York Times*, Mauritius will buy two islands from a Seychelles-based company in which the Mauritius government has stock. Situated 580 miles north of Mauritius and almost as far from Diego Garcia, these two islands are to be the new home of the Diego Garcians.

No details were given on the conditions these refugees would face. Nor was it mentioned whether they had accepted the plan. As far as the three governments were concerned, everything had been swept under the rug. □

Deutscher Prize Won by Marcel Liebman

The Isaac Deutscher Memorial Prize for 1975 has been awarded to Marcel Liebman for his book *Leninism Under Lenin* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975). The prize, first presented in 1969 to Martin Nicolaus, confers a monetary award of £100.

Liebman is professor of politics at the University of Brussels. His previous publications include *The Russian Revolution*. He will give the Isaac Deutscher Memorial Lecture early next year on the subject "Leninism and Stalinism."

The next Deutscher Memorial Prize will be awarded in the autumn of 1976. Works, whether published or in typescript, should be submitted by May 1, 1976, to: The Isaac Deutscher Memorial Prize, c/o Lloyds Bank, 68 Warwick Square, London SW 1, England.

This year's jury consisted of Perry Ander-

son, E.H. Carr, Tamara Deutscher, Eric Hobsbawm, Monty Johnstone, Ralph Miliband, and John Westergaard. □

OECD Deflates Predictions of an Economic Upturn

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development foresees a slower economic upturn than did the participants in the economic summit meeting in Rambouillet, near Paris, in mid-November.

At the conference, President Ford predicted a 7% growth rate in the United States next year. The OECD foresaw only a 5.75% growth. Bonn projected a 5% growth rate; Paris, 4.7%; and Rome, 2%; the OECD predicted rates of 3%, 2.5%, and 1%, respectively. London foresaw a 2.2% growth rate for Britain, compared with a 0.2% decline projected by the OECD.

'There Is Only One Terrorist in Iran—the Shah Himself'

By Reza Baraheni

[Dr. Reza Baraheni is an Iranian poet, novelist, and social critic. He was arrested by the shah's police in September 1973 upon his return from a year of teaching in the United States. His alleged crime was the publication of his article "The Culture of the Oppressed and the Culture of the Oppressor," which defended the cultural and linguistic rights of the Azerbaijani Turks, Baraheni's people.

[The Iranian regime also charged Baraheni with writing works that have "radicalized the Iranian youth." He spent 102 days in prison before being released as a result of an international campaign in his behalf.

[Baraheni, now living in exile in the United States, has spoken extensively in defense of other Iranian political prisoners at meetings organized by the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran.* This year he has addressed meetings of 1,000 in Berkeley, California, 500 in Seattle, and 400 in Boston, among many others. The following is an abridged version of a speech given by Baraheni in Carbondale, Illinois, November 6.]

* * *

I represent the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran, a most honorable committee in that it defends the rights of those Iranian writers and authors who have suffered incarceration and torture at the hands of the shah's SAVAK, one of the most horrible secret-police forces in the history of humankind.

The committee was created in 1973, when I was in prison, by a group of Americans involved in the antiwar movement and a group of Iranian dissidents living in the United States. The committee believed, and quite rightly, that international pressure could result in the release of political prisoners.

After my release from prison, I joined the committee in order to lay bare the atrocities of the Iranian government. As a founding member of the Authors Association of Iran, and the head of this association's Committee of Struggle Against Censorship, I could testify very objectively to the workings of the shah's torture machine.

Hunted by the censorship for the last

fifteen years, pushed from one paper to another, from one printing shop to another by the spies of the regime, and finally imprisoned and tortured by the secret police, I also witnessed the torture of hundreds of Iranians.

The vanguard of those tortured are the writers. In defending the writers of the country CAIFI defends the rights of all the people in the country to know what is going on in Iran and the world. In defending the rights of the incarcerated writers of Iran we are defying the whole apparatus of oppression that keeps the people sick, ignorant, poor, and backward.

The shah's rule is totally unconstitutional. He has outlawed the Masses, the National Front, and the Third Power parties, and other associations. Early this year he decreed that there should be only one party for the whole country. When he was announcing the formation of his Resurgence party, he said that those who did not enroll in this party should be considered Communists and should be dealt with as traitors.

The shah thinks of himself as the center of the universe and calls himself Khodaygan, which is only half a rank lower than the rank of God. He sanctifies himself exactly in the manner sorcerers and charlatans would. In fact, he goes beyond these people, forgetting that it was through money spent by the Eisenhower administration that the Shadow of God regained his kingship in August 1953.

Iran is not one nation as the shah's propaganda machine claims. It has a population of 34 million people, but only 14 to 16 million of these are Persian. There are 10 million Turks, four million Kurds, two million Arabs and Baluchis, and there are two million others in the north of Iran who speak two dialects of the ancient Persian, hardly understood by modern Persians. While the constitution has given equal rights to all the people of the country, the regime has outlawed all the other languages, making Persian the sole official language of the country.

The measure has put all the other nationalities at a great disadvantage, contributing to racism, illiteracy, social segregation, and social discontent. There are 10 million Turkish-speaking people, but no Turkish schools, universities, theaters, books, and papers. The same is true of all the other nationalities except the Persians.

The shah's racist measure has divided the country into two cultures, the culture of the oppressors and the culture of the oppressed.

Until and unless these nationalities and ethnic groups are given equal rights, the country will not move forward, because these nationalities will suffer from illiteracy, and lack of culture and education. The shah has always turned a deaf ear to the needs of these ethnic groups, and whenever anyone has spoken out against this racist measure he has been arrested and tortured.

On his last trip to the United States the shah told the news media in this country that there were only 3,000 political prisoners in Iran, and that they were all Communists and terrorists. His Majesty, as usual, lied. There is only one terrorist in Iran, and that is the shah himself, who is perhaps the greatest terrorist in the world.

Terrorism means violent action in the form of kidnapping people, blindfolding them, taking them away, torturing them, and finally shooting them without trial. Or else keeping them locked up in dungeons, away from the light of the sun and the light of freedom, and away from humankind.

Terrorism means beating men and women to death; it means raping women in front of their husbands, raping the workers of the country, and shutting up the mouths of the persons who have the courage to defy the terrorist with their reasoning.

Terrorism means paying torturers the highest salary available in the country and giving carte blanche to the executioners of the state.

Terrorism means the rule of one person by force of the police over 34 million people.

The shah has arrested about 300,000 people during the last twenty years. He has tortured about 280,000 of those and killed thousands. He has killed in the streets and the prisons, in the mosques and in universities, as individuals and as groups.

The fear of incarceration, torture, and death has kept thousands of the best sons and daughters of the country abroad. Most of these men and women have felt that it is a great degradation to go back and live in an atmosphere which is suffocating to the spirit of man, in which you cannot even tell your close friend what you feel about your own country, in which you cannot find even a small piece of paper on which you can write your opinion freely and hand it to the people.

*CAIFI, 156 Fifth Avenue, Room 600, New York, New York 10010.

With an average of 45,000 to 60,000 political prisoners given for each year during the last two decades, the shah has deprived the country of all the men and women whose educational, technical, industrial, political, and literary backgrounds could easily pave the way for a free and civilized Iran.

Of this pattern your media speak very little. It is very difficult to get something printed in the *New York Times*, or to get something on NBC, CBS, and ABC [radio and television networks]. Most of them know everything and they still keep silent.

Most of the so-called Orientalists are also silent. They are wined and dined well by the Iranian government. The shah spends the oil revenues of Iran either for arms, the army, and the SAVAK, or for publicity abroad. So you see that only rallies and meetings of the kind we are having here can help bring the plight of a whole nation to the attention of well-wishing Americans.


Let me give you a personal story. I was kidnapped right from the middle of a street in Tehran by four armed men and taken home. Everything in the apartment was torn to pieces and piled on the floor. Later I was taken out, into a car, blindfolded, and taken to a prison which only later I found out to be the famous Comité prison of Iran.

On the second day of my arrest, I was beaten in front of the other prisoners by Dr. Hosseinzadeh, the head torturer (they all call themselves doctors), who later told me that he had been my student ten years earlier. Then I was taken to the torture chamber on the third floor of the torturing section, strapped on an iron bed, and given about seventy-five blows on the soles of my feet with a wire cable.

I was also beaten on my face and the sides of my body by six men, headed by Dr. Azudi, the head torturer of this particular floor. I was told that if I didn't confess, my wife and thirteen-year-old daughter would be raped in front of my eyes. I really didn't know what I should confess. When I told them that they could try me and hang me if I had been a traitor to my people, Dr. Azudi said that the torture chamber was the court, and he and the rest of the torturers were the judges and the jury.

I was threatened with a pistol pointed at my temple. When they took me downstairs, I came to; and only then did I find out that they had arrested and tortured me because of the books and articles I had written. I was taken back to my dungeon, but the psychological and physical torture went on for almost the whole of the 102 days I was in prison.

The prison was a great school, but a very painful one. The Comité is a temporary station, where most prisoners are kept for almost a month. The cases are prepared there on the basis of confessions extracted under torture. There are about twenty



Chuck Fishman

Baraheni addressing meeting in Illinois November 6 in defense of Iranian political prisoners.

torturers who work night and day on the 600 men who are either in their cells or in the torture chambers. They have to finish their job on these men in a month because other people will take their places very shortly.

Most people are tortured immediately, right after they are brought in. People are hung upside down and beaten by maces and whips; or they are put in the pressure device and pressed on the skull, which often results in the skull breaking. Or they are placed on an iron bed or mesh and burned on their backs, which in some cases results in the burning of the spine and the crippling of the prisoners.

You saw the whole world raise hell when the Spanish militants were shot by the Franco regime. They should raise hell, but they should also raise hell in the case of the victims from Iran.

Let us do everything we can to release the sociologist Vida Hadjebi Tabrizi, the famous short-story writer Fereydown Tonokaboni, the poet and playwright Saeed Soltanpour, and his writer friends Nasser Rahmani-Nejad and Mohsen Yalfani, and Saeed's brother, and his poet friend, Aslan. And the famous and precious young novelist and short-story writer Mahmoud Dowlat-Abadi, who was imprisoned and tortured a few months ago.

And above all, let us do something so that Atefeh Gorgin, the widow of the victimized poet Khosrow Golesorkhy is released immediately from prison.

Americans should know that their support of the shah's regime is support given to an illegal government which doesn't represent the aspirations of the people of Iran, which tortures the intellectuals, students, writers, and workers of the country, which abuses its powers through throttling all

human dignity and freedom in the country, which indulges in racist measures reminiscent of the slavery period of human history, and which arms itself to the teeth, not only to suffocate its own people, but also to strike at its neighbors whenever the hour comes.

The exposure of such a regime is a measure of great urgency for all those who care for liberty, democracy, and human dignity, and detest totalitarian regimes of all kinds and forms. □

Nothing Wrong With a Little Lead in Baby Food, Manufacturers Claim

Baby food manufacturers are up in arms over aspersions cast on their products by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The FDA reported October 16 that a survey conducted in 1974 showed that the amount of lead in baby foods consumed by children up to two years of age, when added to lead ingested from other sources, could be a source of concern. The FDA said that "efforts should be made to reduce the amount [of lead] in food consumed by children."

H.J. Heinz Company jumped to the defense of their products. "No health hazard exists or has existed as a result of lead levels in canned baby juices," the company asserted. And just to make sure that all legal angles were covered, it added that "dramatic improvements" in lead levels in canned baby juices have been achieved since 1973.

One company, Gerber Products, is even threatening legal action against news media that carried the FDA report, claiming that news "interpretation" of the report was "flagrant and possibly a willful misrepresentation of the facts."

Iran—Inflation Spurs General Discontent

By Javad Sadeeg

Tehran newspapers reported October 15 that as part of the "antiprofitteering" campaign the shah started two and a half months earlier, more than 19,000 shopkeepers, merchants, and industrialists in the capital were brought before the civilian courts.

More than 7,000 of them were convicted of selling at high prices and had to pay fines totaling \$700,000. Forty persons were sentenced to prison terms of up to six months. In other cities thousands more were brought before the courts.

Among the well-known capitalists who received jail terms were industrialists Habib Elganian and Mohammad Ghasemi-Far, and importer Mohammad Vahabzadeh, who holds the franchise for German BMW autos. The mayor of Isphahan as well as some other government officials were arrested on charges of complicity.

The main thrust of the campaign has hit the shopkeepers. Such spectacular announcements as the arrest of a dozen well-known capitalists, which signaled the start of the campaign, have faded away.

More common are cases like the one of the midwife in Tabriz who was fined \$400 for "profitteering" in delivering babies. The shah has also said, by way of example, that professors who do not teach adequately should be considered "profiteers."

There are no official figures for the rate of inflation in Iran. Some estimates put it at 30%, but the prices of certain items have registered a much higher increase.

The Central Bank of Iran reported that the wholesale price of cereals rose by more than 52% in the last nine months of 1974. In the same period the rise in the cost of housing was more drastic. New rentals in Tehran rose by 135%, and in smaller towns by 103%.

The cost of industrial goods, including military equipment, imported to the Middle East rose by 40% to 80%, according to the Economic Commission of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The imports carry high prices jacked up by the imperialist exporters, which are then passed on to consumers. Last year Iranian imports came to almost \$12 billion, double the amount the year before. This year imports from the United States alone are expected to reach more than \$3 billion, excluding military equipment. (The shah has estimated that military purchases abroad will amount to nearly \$4 billion this year.)

The government encourages imports, including imports of consumer goods. This is a reversal of earlier policy. It came about two years ago when shortages in consumer goods, especially agricultural products, became obvious.

Lines formed in front of bakeries, groceries, and dairy shops. Despite the shah's earlier propaganda on the accomplishments of his land-reform program, productivity in agriculture remained low and the country could not produce enough food for its population. The government turned to imports to solve the problem.

Grain imports last year amounted to 30% of internal production and cost \$500 million. According to a report issued by the Agricultural Development Bank in Iran, agricultural import prices rose by more than 165%. More than half the eggs and chicken consumed in the country last year were imported.

The influx of imports eased shortages somewhat. It eliminated the lines in front of stores, but at the cost of disrupting production and distribution. Long lines of boats and trucks were kept waiting in the overburdened ports. The 80,000 trucks on the road last year proved inadequate, a problem the shah resolved by simply encouraging the importation of more trucks.

The weekly *Tehran Economist* complained last May that "tens of thousands of trucks are being imported yearly with no attention to any standards. . . . The manufacturers are watching this policy in amazement and bafflement, and have abandoned their unfinished programs for increased production."

Low productivity, anarchy in production and distribution, and the large and sudden influx of oil revenues have further added to the inflationary pressures in the economy. Iran received \$20 billion in oil revenues last year, as compared with \$4.5 billion the year before.

This year's income is expected to be \$22 billion. These funds have enabled the government first of all to help itself and triple its general expenses in three years, now reaching almost \$15 billion a year.

The military budget this year is \$8 billion, an increase of 44% from the year before. In addition, on the basis of the increased oil revenues, the government increased its budget for the current five-year plan (ending in 1978) from \$36 billion to \$69 billion.

Inside the country the main beneficiaries of this influx of money are the capitalists

and the privileged layers of the civilian and military bureaucracy. This section of society possesses a vast sum of money over and above the value of the commodities produced in the country. Domestic and import prices soar.

According to *Rastakheez*, the organ of the shah's National Resurgence party, it was not unusual for capitalists' profits to increase by between 100% and 300% within the last year.

In comparison with prices and profits, wages are very low. The legal minimum wage, which is not always enforced, is 750 rials (about US\$110) a month. In a large city like Tehran, where the prices are comparable to those in New York, real estate sharks are charging more than \$70 a month per room in the working-class districts. (*Kayhan*,¹ July 16.)

This hits especially hard the peasants who are leaving their villages for the towns, and the workers from smaller towns who are moving to big cities in search of better-paying jobs. It widens the class differences.

A study prepared by a committee of elite university professors and intellectuals, issued in 1974, showed that only 1% of Tehran's population enjoyed an income of about \$7,000 a year, while 88% of the urban population (three million persons) had a yearly income of less than \$3,500.

Orchids for the Shah

While the shah and Tehran "society" throw parties for which fresh flowers are flown in from Europe, working-class families must share a crowded room to reduce the rent. Meanwhile, the mayor of Tehran has announced that 11,000 beggars were rounded up as part of the city's "beautification program." Begging has since been declared illegal.

The shah is aware of the explosive potential of the situation. Last spring he explained to a group of professors and intellectuals that "the interests of all will be protected when the interests of the majority of the people are protected. If a majority is deprived, dissatisfied, and possibly miserable, then the country will certainly not last."

Of course, by the "interests of all" he meant the interests of the entire capitalist class, for whose benefit he wants to preserve the country. His deeply felt fear of democracy stems from the realization that it will allow the deprived, dissatisfied, and miserable majority to organize and overthrow his monarchy, along with the capitalist system he is trying to manage.

The concern over the new mood of the working class was reported in the Tehran press this October by the bourgeois column-

1. All references to *Kayhan* are to the air edition.

ist Daryoush Homayoun, who is also a leader of the National Resurgence party. He complained that "in industry and large factories the picture is alarming. Absenteeism for all sorts of excuses, slowdowns, and the sabotage of equipment are a permanent phenomenon."

To prevent strikes, the shah has used SAVAK, his secret police, and the military. When SAVAK has proved incapable of ending a strike, the army has been called in. At times striking workers have been killed by troops.

Inflation has added fuel to the general discontent, posing the possibility of widespread strikes. A few months ago the shah expressed this fear to newspaper reporters. "A healthy economy," he said, "is not one in which every day prices go up, salaries go up, and wages go up. Eventually this will reach a definitely explosive stage." (*Kayhan*, August 13.)

The shah does not use the word strike, but how else, in a capitalist society, can wages go up? He is saying that if prices continue to rise, workers can be expected to struggle for higher wages, a struggle that will eventually reach an explosive stage.

The shah's warning on an eventual upheaval did not come in the abstract. Despite the regime's determination to prevent strikes, and its blackout of the news when they do occur, sketchy reports of three strikes in the past few months have made their way out of the country.


The strikes occurred in well-known factories, and the demands were for higher wages. One took place in the Azemayesh factory in Tehran, a plant that manufactures major household appliances. Another occurred in a regional electric company and involved 500 to 1,000 workers.

The workers at the Azemayesh factory held a demonstration June 26 in front of the Ministry of Labor to publicize their demands. Apparently the date of the demonstration was chosen to coincide with the visit of the Indonesian head of state, General Suharto, in hopes that international publicity would dissuade the government from calling in the troops.

The extent to which the workers' demands were met is not known, but according to the reports available, both strikes ended without bloodshed.

The third strike was brutally repressed. In late June 2,000 textile workers went on strike in Shahi, a town north of Tehran, near the Caspian Sea.

The workers there demanded the share of company profits they are supposed to receive by law. It appears that they had been able to obtain information that the company records showed a profit for the year of almost \$1.5 million. When the managers realized that the workers did not believe their claims that the factory was losing money, and would not go back to



Eddie Adams/Time

SHAH and SHABANOU: Claim to be Iran's chief inflation fighters.

work, they called on the government to intervene.

The workers occupied the factory. Martial law was declared in the town, and the factory was attacked. The assault left four workers dead and twelve wounded.

The government occupied the factory, but the strike continued. Reportedly, the workers ended their strike ten days later after receiving promises of a favorable settlement.

Reports indicate that the workers in the textile factory of Behshahr and the students at the teachers college in Babol, two towns near Shahi, went on strikes and demonstrations in solidarity with the striking Shahi workers. The teachers college was closed down for the rest of the term.

The 'Antiprofitting' Campaign: A Show That Flopped

The shah launched his campaign against "profiteering" about a week after the end of the Shahi strike. The Tehran daily *Ettelaat* reported in its air edition of July 17 that the shah's decree "ordered the Iranian government and the entire people, who are all organized in the National Resurgence party, to use all the national and adminis-

trative forces in the country to participate in the movement against selling at high prices. . . ."

The decree stated that if these measures did not yield satisfactory results within a month, the shah would immediately invoke a law that calls for bringing profiteers before military tribunals.

This law was passed by Majles (the parliament) April 22 but was never put into use. It stipulates that offenders can be given death sentences if it "becomes known" to the military that they intended to undermine the "security" of the country's economy.

After the shah issued his decree, the country's propaganda apparatus began rolling and the civilian courts started handing out fines and prison terms.

The shah, who was frightened by the prospect of inflation becoming a catalyst for the massive "explosion" of the "miserable" majority, put on a grand performance, handing out jail terms to a few capitalists to add some color to the show.

His intent was to persuade the workers that they did not need to carry out their own independent struggle against inflation—the shah would do it for them. In addition, he was careful to make clear, workers risk their lives when they try to do it themselves.

The shah's decree started the show, but it could not change the laws of the capitalist market.

On August 23 the *Tehran Economist* praised the shah's campaign but added that it seemed to have an unfortunate side effect:

. . . a new but predictable reaction was noticed among the producers, especially those who produce basic necessities and foodstuffs. Production either completely stopped or was brought to a bare minimum. It was possible to observe the result of this reaction in the market: The gathering and supplying of important dairy products was disrupted, quality went down, and the price was artificially raised. For example, imported cheese of low quality was sold at 200 rials [about \$3] a kilogram.

The article in the *Tehran Economist* was written a week after the deadline the shah had set for curbing inflation. But when prices did not fall, he did not carry out his promise of setting up the military tribunals. Instead he again threatened the profiteers with military trials and extended the deadline another month.

When the second deadline expired, he retreated while pretending to take the offensive, declaring that the campaign against high prices would continue "indefinitely."

This meant that the prices were still high, but there would be no more threat of military tribunals and death sentences. That show came to an end.

The September 19 issue of *MEED* (Middle East Economic Digest) quoted Mohammad Yeganeh, the governor of the Central Bank,

as saying that "in the 12 months to the end of July 1975 inflation had exceeded 20 per cent. In August, however, the cost of living index had fallen 2.2 per cent and wholesale prices by 2.8 per cent."

This contradicts the *Tehran Economist's* evaluation cited above. But what are significant are the reasons that were cited:

The success was attributed to a number of measures, including the provision of over \$1,000 million in subsidies for food products, transport costs and certain imports, as well as the campaign against profiteering, which has been given prominence in recent weeks.

Last year, in other words, the government spent more than \$1 billion to subsidize the basic necessities. This year it is cutting that down because oil revenues had fallen 35%, according to the figures given by the shah.

This decline was attributed to decreased demand for oil, owing to the depression in the industrial countries, and the resulting drop in oil production. It was also attributed to the effects of inflation on the prices of imported commodities. (The 35% figure was given before the decision by OPEC to raise its oil prices by about 10%.)

Apparently, the experience of the "anti-profiteering" campaign has convinced the regime that the workers expect something more tangible than a big show, and it is therefore resuming its welfare-type program of subsidies. But given the economic forces that are in motion, outlays of money by the government to subsidize some consumer goods cannot do much to check inflation.

These outlays are subordinate to such things as the fluctuations of prices in the international market and the shah's war budget. The main beneficiaries are the privileged layers of society, who are responsible for the rise of inflation in the first place.

Despite the shah's best intentions, there is concern among sectors of the bourgeoisie about the wisdom of his policies. A report in the October 4 issue of the *Tehran Economist* said that his policy of purchasing food abroad and selling it at lower prices at home had created "new problems" in agriculture. In particular, "the grain produced in the country did not have as many buyers as before. . . ."

The Case of Naser Ameri

The concern of at least a section of the bourgeoisie was reflected last year through the Mardom (People's) party, one of the two parties created by the shah in the late 1950s when he decided that Iran was to have a two-party system. The shah's two parties were known as the "yes" party and the "of course" party.

Last year, however, the Mardom party began to criticize the government and the ruling Iran Novin (New Iran) party on some less than trivial questions. The Mardom

party held its fourth convention in Tehran in November 1974, drawing 8,000 members from different parts of the country.

After the usual lavish tribute to the shah by the party leadership, General Secretary Naser Ameri gave a fateful speech. He criticized the governing party for trying to use the government apparatus to destroy his party, so as to make the country a one-party state.

He then cited the great opportunities that exist for bourgeois development and the government's inability to respond to them. He said that the government apparatus was corrupt and had to be overhauled, and that the party that had ruled the country for ten years had made no attempt to fight this corruption.

He also criticized the government for failing to establish a correct balance between agriculture and industry, stating that in agriculture the government had failed to reach the goals it had set for itself.

The *Tehran Economist* reported at that time that "informed sources" considered the Mardom convention a success and a new beginning in the party's history.

But the Most Informed Source, the shah, naturally did not agree. Four months later he abolished the Mardom party, along with all other parties, and established the Rastakheez (National Resurgence) party. All Iranians are supposed to belong to the new party and are forced to join it.

Before the Mardom party was abolished its general secretary met with an unfortunate accident. It seems, according to the shah's press, that while driving outside of Tehran, Naser Ameri collided with a cow and died.

Shah Bans His Own Book

Another apparent casualty of royal disfavor is the shah's own book, *Mission for My Country*, a "popular" item that has reportedly been taken off the shelves. In it, the shah said in the early 1960s:

If I were a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such as Hitler organized or such as you find today in Communist countries. But as a constitutional monarch I can afford to encourage large-scale party activity free from the straitjacket of one-party rule or the one-party state. . . ."

According to his own admission, by forming a one-party state the shah has violated the Iranian constitution.

Since abolishing the parties and declaring a one-party state, the shah has intensified repression and police terror.

On June 5 the police surrounded the Faiziye Islamic theological school in Ghom, near Tehran, where the students were commemorating the twelfth anniversary of the 1963 massacre. The massacre took place in Tehran and Ghom when the shah used tanks and gave his infamous order to

"shoot to kill" against the unarmed demonstrators protesting his regime. The number of dead and wounded reached thousands.

This year special commando units who were brought in from Tehran attacked the school. Reports in the Iranian opposition press put the number of dead at thirty, with an additional 150 wounded. Police arrested 420 students.

Political prisoners whose terms have expired are being kept imprisoned indefinitely. Even those who have gone through torturous military trials and have been given prison sentences are not safe.

Political Prisoners Gunned Down

A group of nine political prisoners, known as the Jazani group after their leader Bijan Jazani, were gunned down in prison by SAVAK. The regime announced that they had been killed while "trying to escape."

Arbitrary arrests continue. On July 9 the Iranian ambassador announced in Washington that the assassins of two American colonels in Tehran had been captured. This was later denied by the Iranian government. Possibly those who were captured had not made the proper "confessions."

On July 30 the regime announced the capture of two persons they claimed belonged to the "gang" that killed the two colonels.

The shah has stiffened the penalties for political opposition. According to a recent military ruling, anyone inside or outside the country who organizes or cooperates with a group that opposes the regime of "constitutional monarchy" can receive a life sentence. Those who acquire arms are to be given death sentences.

Any activity demanding secession of any part of the country—whether the persons involved are armed or unarmed—is punishable by death. This is particularly directed against the Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Baluchis, and Kurds in Iran, who suffer from national oppression under the shah's rule.

Along with the intensification of the repression at home, the shah is continuing his aggression against the Arab people in Oman, an attack he launched in December 1973.

He is claiming great victories for his troops in the Dhofar region, pronouncements that sound very similar to the claims by U.S. generals of victories in Vietnam. His press, radio, and television are portraying the war against the liberation fighters in Dhofar in the most chauvinist terms in hopes of arousing prejudice against the Arab masses.

The shah has openly expressed his contempt for the Iranian people and their intelligence. In an interview published in the *New York Times* September 24, he said: "Our system suits perfectly the Persian mind today."

This racist remark by a man who is completely alien to the Iranian people suits the imperialist benefactors who brought him to power and whom he serves. His problem is that *he* does not suit the "Persian mind," a people who have fought two revolutions to win their democratic rights. Opposition to his rule is developing and spreading.

John B. Oakes, the editor of the editorial page of the *New York Times*, who interviewed the shah in Tehran, observed that his "superefficient secret police have thus far been unable to destroy [the underground opposition] despite such tactics as house-to-house searches in the style of Northern Ireland." This report stands in contrast to the SAVAK's periodic announcements that the urban guerrillas have finally been wiped out.

An August 10 dispatch from Tehran in the *Washington Post* indicated the growth experienced by the guerrillas when it said: "Perhaps the most significant although not widely known fact of the past four months is the increase in terrorism that accompanied the creation of a one-party political system."

The trend indicated the sharpening of the class struggle and the inability of the regime to dampen it. Neither the extreme brutality of repression nor the unprecedented economic power at the disposal of the shah has been able to establish class peace in the country.

University students, who are closely watched and who are promised high salaries when they graduate, have chosen to be part of the opposition. For a substantial part of last year the students at the universities were either on strike or out of school because the government closed down classes following student protests.

It is a testimony to the utter degeneration of the entire capitalist system that the huge amount of wealth entering the country is accompanied by more repression and poverty. The courageous youth who are joining the guerrillas are struggling to smash this repellent system and end the rule of the shah once and for all.

In the absence of a mass Leninist party, and in reaction to the failures and political bankruptcy of the Stalinist and bourgeois-nationalist parties, the guerrillas are seeking what they view as a direct route to the destruction of the system.

But the reality of the country today shows that the assassination of a hated official does not diminish the repression, and killing a profit-hungry capitalist does not bring down prices or raise wages. Yet these are precisely the problems that are facing the masses, and the solution lies in their consciousness and their numbers.

The shah understands this, and that is why he is so uneasy. He reacts sharply to the slightest possibility of an independent



Manchester Guardian

mass mobilization, going so far as to suddenly eliminate his own parties and to put on a show against high prices.

He fears that the workers will demand to see the books of the capitalists when they go to call on them to receive their part of the company's profits. He fears this all the more because "profit sharing" is one of the principles of his "white revolution."

2. The shah's "reform" movement, initiated in January 1963.

20,000 Women Rally in Reykjavik for Equal Rights

More than 20,000 women demonstrated in the central square of Reykjavik on October 24 demanding an end to sexual discrimination. According to Mats Lundegard, the correspondent of Stockholm's *Dagens Nyheter*, it was the largest mobilization in Iceland since the demonstrations in 1972 supporting the extension of the country's territorial waters. Iceland's total population is just over 200,000.

A very large percentage of the country's female population, therefore, participated in the rally and accompanying strike.

"The banks were open," Lundegard reported, "but it was hard to do any business. The same was true in the post offices. Almost all the employees working were men, and few windows were open. In the hotels and restaurants, the service was deplorable.

"On a less spectacular plane, the strike hit even harder. Thus, practically all industry ground to a halt on the day of the strike. The fish industry continued to operate partially with male personnel, but many factories

He fears the demand that wages be tied to prices, especially since he has raised a similar demand himself in linking oil prices to the prices of commodities imported from industrial countries.

He fears independent consumer committees being formed to check up on prices, rather than leaving it to the state apparatus.

These fears will increase as his economic problems multiply, and as it becomes evident that the laws of the capitalist market cannot be changed by taking thousands of shop owners and merchants to court.

To change the laws of capitalism and end the misery they bring to the masses, the working class will have to establish its own state, and end capitalist anarchy by instituting a socialist planned economy.

The wise men of the imperialist order are already concerned about that prospect. *New York Times* editor John B. Oakes pondered while in Tehran:

If in its present overheated state, Iran should be faced with the financial stresses that could cause sudden retrenchment and retraction of commitments, could the consequent disappointments of Iran's inarticulate masses (and perhaps its upper classes) be contained? Could the internal social and economic strains already evident in unfulfilled plans, in widespread corruption, in the growing gap between rich and poor, in declining reserves and a disappearing balance of trade, then be kept within bounds?

The answer is: Not in the lifetime of your system! □

closed when the women went home. The same was true of other industries and many offices. In the ministries, only two of the two hundred women employed there were working, and in the radio and television stations, only one out of sixty.

"In Reykjavik on Friday, October 24, only one of the five morning papers appeared, and that was *Morgunbladidh*, the paper of the conservative Independence party. Even it was thin, and it came out late. . . .

"Telegraph and telephone service was also severely limited."

The male work force was limited as well: "Married men had to either stay home with the children or take them to their jobs with them."

The action was staged to protest a situation where on the average women receive only 73 percent of the pay men take home, only three of the sixty members of the national legislature are women, and none of the leaders of the trade-union federation are women, although 43 percent of the membership is female. □

West Berlin Maoists Attack Trotskyist Meeting

By Richard Herzinger

WEST BERLIN—Maoist goons armed with pointed iron poles, wooden clubs, and stones attacked a meeting sponsored here November 6 by the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (International Marxist Group, German section of the Fourth International).

The organizations responsible for the attack were the KPD/ML (Communist party of Germany/Marxist-Leninist) and the KPD (Communist party of Germany; not to be confused with the DKP, the pro-Moscow CP). The groups are two of the larger Maoist sects in Germany.

Both organizations recently adopted a "defense of the fatherland" line that—in accordance with the foreign policy of the Chinese leadership—views the Soviet Union as a "social imperialist" power and the "main enemy of the people."

Following the logic of this line, these Maoist sects are trying to organize a "patriotic front to defend West Germany against the threat of social-imperialist intervention." This project—which has led the Maoists to adopt slogans similar to those of right-wing and fascist organizations—includes an effort to win over the "patriotic section" of the West German imperialist bourgeoisie.

In response to this, the GIM organized a speaking tour by a member of its Political Bureau on the "right-wing course of the KPD and the KPD/ML." In several cities followers of both groups tried to disrupt the meetings. The climax was expected to take place at the meeting here, where the KPD has its largest number of followers.

Days before the meeting was to take place, the KPD and KPD/ML distributed leaflets in which they announced their intention to silence the "Trotskyite counterrevolutionaries" because of their criticism of the Chinese leadership. They call the Trotskyists "agents of social imperialism" who had no right to speak and whose meetings had to be broken up by any means necessary.

To defend the meeting against the expected attack, the GIM organized a squad of marshals. However, the Maoists arrived at West Berlin Technical University hours before the meeting was scheduled to start and refused to let anyone into the meeting room.

The GIM marshals, for their part, tried to prevent the meeting room from being occupied by the Maoist goons. Members of two other organizations, the Spartacusbund

and the Trotskyist League,* joined in the effort to defend the meeting.

Over a loudspeaker a member of the GIM called on the Maoists to refrain from acts of violence and instead explain their positions at the meeting, where everyone would have a right to speak during the discussion period.

The Maoists had no interest in discussion—they attacked. Armed with the iron poles, clubs, and stones, they attacked the marshals, wounding ten, including four who required hospitalization. They then destroyed the literature tables and all Trotskyist material they could find.

To the Maoists' surprise, however, what followed was an impressive act of solidarity that led to the biggest political defeat experienced by the KPD and the KPD/ML in their long history of violent attacks against other political groups.

More and more people who had intended to attend the GIM meeting began to show up. When they found that the meeting had been disrupted by the two Maoist sects, they began chanting, "KPD out" and "Stop it," clapping hands in rhythm with the chants. The crowd eventually grew to several hundred persons, a sufficient number to escort the Maoists out of the building so that the meeting could begin.

Starting the meeting, a representative of the West Berlin GIM denounced the Maoists' attack. He called on all leftist organizations on campus to join in a campaign against the Maoists' method of settling differences and to organize a joint defense of every meeting that might be disrupted in the future.

He called for support to the traditional working-class principle that all differences inside the movement should be argued out in debate, without use of physical violence or restrictions on the rights of any other tendency.

In the main speech of the evening the representative of the GIM Political Bureau analyzed the development of Chinese foreign policy and how it was reflected in the political course being followed by the KPD and the KPD/ML.

He made clear that criticism of the class-collaborationist politics of the Chinese CP

*The Spartacusbund is a group that originated in a split in the German section of the Fourth International in 1969. The Trotskyist League is associated with the Spartacist League in the United States.

does not weaken the Chinese workers state. On the contrary it helps strengthen the fight of the oppressed masses everywhere in the world by pointing to the disastrous consequences of making political concessions to imperialism. This is the only way, he said, to defend effectively the existence of a workers state against imperialist attack.

He explained that in contrast, the line of the German Maoists leads to a bloc with reactionary forces against the Soviet Union, a country where capitalism has been abolished by a workers' revolution.

Despite the Maoists' reactionary positions, he said, it would be a mistake to fall into the same violent methods they use or to allow the bourgeois state to repress them. The KPD and KPD/ML should be defended against attacks by the bourgeoisie so as to prevent any restrictions on political freedoms for the workers movement.

The speech was followed by a lively debate in which nearly all the speakers, including those rejecting the GIM's analysis, stressed the need to organize defense against similar physical attacks and to begin a campaign to politically isolate the KPD and the KPD/ML.

The meeting, which was attended by 600 persons, was a notable success. The events of November 6 had a big impact on the West Berlin left. Nearly all political groups, including the ADS (Democratic Student Group, associated with the West Berlin pro-Moscow CP), have strongly protested the Maoists' use of violence to disrupt a meeting sponsored by another political tendency. □

Didn't Want to Act Hastily

About 3,000 acres of Paris, or almost one-tenth of the city's surface, are gradually sinking, as the pockets of gypsum over which they were built dissolve. The old gypsum quarries beneath this section of the city provided the original plaster of Paris. Although efforts have been made to fill the quarries with concrete, all new building permits in the affected area, in the northern part of the city, have been barred.

"We all know that Paris is built on a layer of Swiss cheese," said Raymond Colibeau, a member of the council that advises the Paris prefect on civic matters. He said that the issue would be raised at the next council session, scheduled to open November 17.

According to a report in the November 9 *New York Times*, the problem was first noted in the eighteenth century, when pedestrians began disappearing in cave-ins as they walked through the Mémilmontant quarter.

AROUND THE WORLD



Political Prisoners in India 'Beaten to a Pulp'

Several prominent Indian political prisoners have died in jail and others have been beaten, according to documents smuggled out of the country. Washington columnist Jack Anderson described the contents of some of the documents November 22.

One report by J.P. Mathur, a leader of the rightist Jan Sangh, said that among those who died in prison were B.L. Mittal, Chaudhary Singh, Bhairon Bharati, and Shanker Bobde.

Anderson summarized another report: "Protesting political prisoners at the Central Prison were 'beaten to a pulp' by prison authorities, documents attest. The attack was precipitated by protests from the inmates against inhuman prison conditions. The guards were 'so ferocious that all the inmates ran helter skelter and tried to seek corners of safety.' But everyone was dragged out and beaten mercilessly, with many of the prisoners requiring hospitalization."

One of the documents said that the barracks at the central jail in Tihar, Delhi, "are unswept and littered with human excreta. Mosquitoes and flies by the millions are swarming all over. Latrines are choked and stinking."

Sampson, Gandía, García Pardoned by Balaguer

Three supporters of Puerto Rican independence jailed by the Balaguer regime for allegedly transporting "guerrillas" to the Dominican Republic were pardoned November 17. A vigorous international defense campaign was waged in their behalf.

Angel Gandía, Johnny Sampson, and Raúl García were originally sentenced to thirty years in prison. On appeal, their sentences were lowered to five years. Subsequently, Dominican President Joaquín Balaguer announced that they would be released and returned to Puerto Rico December 23.

Eldridge Cleaver Arrested on Return to United States

Former Black Panther party leader Eldridge Cleaver returned to the United States November 18 after spending seven years in exile. He was immediately arrested and arraigned on charges of unlawful flight

to escape prosecution. He also faces charges of attempted murder, assault, and violating parole. Most of the charges stem from an April 1968 shootout between Black Panthers and Oakland, California, police. One Panther, Bobby Hutton, was killed in the shootout.

Cleaver said that he had returned to face the charges at this time because he now expected to receive "a fair and objective trial."

He insisted on his "confidence in the American system of justice," saying, "America has brought the war of Indochina behind it, the status of the blacks has undergone fundamental changes and Watergate developed a new look at institutions by the American public."

Canadian Government to Deport Rosie Douglas December 15

The Canadian government is proceeding with its plans to deport Black activist Rosie Douglas December 15. If he is forced to return to his native Dominica, he faces jail and possible death at the hands of the regime.

To protest the deportation orders, the Toronto Alliance Against Racism and Political Repression has called a national demonstration for December 6. In early October, the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour passed a resolution demanding that the government stop its efforts to deport Douglas.

Letters of protest against the deportation proceedings may be sent to Prime Minister Elliot Trudeau, House of Commons, Ottawa, Ontario.

UN Truce Force in Golan Extended Another Six Months

The UN Security Council gained agreement for a six-month extension of the UN truce force separating Israeli and Syrian troops on the Golan Heights November 30. As a result of Syrian pressure, the resolution extending the UN mandate provided for a Security Council meeting in January "to continue the debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions."

Washington threatened to veto any resolution that attempted to tie the Golan force to a role for the Palestine Liberation

Organization in future Middle East talks, but the language of the statement paved the way for PLO representation at the January debate.

"The United States concession to Syria's demands caused considerable bitterness among Israelis here," United Nations correspondent Paul Hofmann reported in the December 1 *New York Times*.

Soviet Regime to Free Plyushch?

The Soviet government has hinted that it is planning to free Leonid Plyushch. A Ukrainian mathematician, Plyushch was arrested in January 1972 on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." After a year in prison he was declared to be suffering from "reformist tendencies" and confined in a psychiatric prison.

A November 28 Associated Press dispatch reported that Plyushch's wife, Tanya Zhitnikov, has been told by Soviet authorities to prepare exit visas for her husband and family. The action by the Soviet government comes in the wake of mounting pressure for Plyushch's release. A rally for his freedom in Paris on October 23 was attended by 4,000 persons.

Surinam Gains Independence

The former Dutch colony of Surinam was granted independence on November 25. Rich in natural resources, Surinam produces one-quarter of the aluminum used in the United States—92 percent of it at a single plant owned by Alcoa.

The main problems faced by the new country are economic development—one-third of the work force is unemployed, and the single Alcoa plant provides 80 percent of the country's foreign exchange—and the frictions between the different racial groups in the population. East Indians and Javanese number 140,000. They are slightly more numerous than the Creoles, who are mostly of African ancestry.

Auto Workers Occupy Milan Factory

About 4,500 workers occupied the Leyland-Innocenti automobile plant in Milan, Italy, November 26 after the parent company, British Leyland, announced that the plant would be shut down and its Italian subsidiary liquidated. Leyland originally planned to cut the Innocenti work force to 3,000, but the unions rejected such a "solution."

Capitalism Fouls Things Up

Uranium Discovery Threatens Yanomamö Tribe



Among the hazards of nuclear power that have received some publicity are the dangers of a catastrophic accident, the lack of any safe method for disposing of radioactive waste, and the increased incidence of lung cancer from "normal" plant operation.

There is, however, another aspect of the drive toward nuclear power that has received little coverage in the press—the effect on aboriginal peoples of the exploitation of uranium reserves in regions previously more or less untouched by penetration of the "free enterprise" system.

A report on the results of the Brazilian government's ruthless effort to exploit the uranium deposits in the northern fringe of the Amazon region was given in the spring issue of the *Brazilian Information Bulletin*, published by the American Friends of Brazil.*

The *Bulletin* reported on the plight of the 10,000 to 25,000 members of the Yanomamö tribe, who live along the border between Brazil and Venezuela. They face dislocation, death, and disease because they live in a region that is believed to contain the world's richest reserve of uranium.

In February of this year the Ernesto Geisel regime announced that the world's largest uranium field had been discovered in the Surucucus region of the Roraima territory, the major location of the members of the Yanomamö tribe living in Brazil. Actually, the existence of radioactive material in the region was known as far back as 1951, but real exploration did not begin until 1970. By 1974 more than 150 technicians were working in the Surucucus region alone.

With the discovery came the decision to step up construction of the 3,500-mile Northern Perimeter Highway, designed to transport minerals out of the Amazon region.

Spreading along the entire path of the highway is an epidemic of onchocerciasis—African River Blindness. This disease is carried by blackflies. Its symptoms include fibrous tumors on the skin and eyes as well

*P.O. Box 2279, Station A, Berkeley, California 94702. *Brazilian Information Bulletin* is published four times a year. Subscriptions cost \$5.00.

The Extermination of the Indian Tribes of Brazil



New York Times

"The trans-Amazon highways are . . . destroying one of the last original human culture groups to be integrated into 'civilization,' the Amerindian, whose many distinct tribes have shown

an astonishing ability to persist and thrive in the 'green hell' of the Amazon over many thousands of years without destroying it.

"From well over one million individuals and 230 tribal groups in 1900, the Amerindians now are reduced to a meager 50,000 people and only 143 tribes. The highways threaten to cause extermination of entire remaining tribes, mainly by diseases and malnutrition attributable to the influx of highway crews and settlers and the upheaval of an age-old aboriginal way of life.

"Such relatively mild ailments of whites as colds, influenza, measles and chicken pox are lethal to unresistant Amerindian. Pneumonia, tuberculosis and smallpox can become exaggeratedly virulent epidemics among aborigines already enfeebled by malnutrition. Mere fleeting exchanges with ostensibly healthy white laborers can thus annihilate whole villages."

—From an article in the September 15 *New York Times* by Richard J.A. Goodland, staff ecologist at the Cary Arboretum of the New York Botanical Garden.

as blindness. It was virtually unknown in the Amazon area until the early 1970s.

A medical team from the Brazilian National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) conducted an investigation of the incidence of the disease in the Northern Amazon region, the results of which were reported in the daily *O Estado de São Paulo* February 8, 1975. In one Yanomamö village the researchers visited, all the inhabitants had onchocerciasis. Its incidence in other towns ranged from 5 percent to 100 percent of the population.

Such an epidemic was predicted in 1973, when construction of the highway was announced. Twenty Brazilian doctors and scientists pointed out that diseases at that time rare in the Amazon could "turn into epidemics with the planned wave of migra-

tion" into the area. The warning was ignored by Brazilian authorities.

The Geisel regime's plans to exploit the uranium deposits include robbing the Yanomamö of their land and moving them onto a reservation. And since the reservation's boundaries were fixed to exclude every Yanomamö village identified by FUNAI, also involved is the wholesale dislocation of the tribe.

Moreover, the record shows that in other areas where FUNAI has authorized prospecting leases for mineral exploitation on aboriginal lands, tribal residents have been decimated by hunger, disease, and death. For example, in the Aripuana Indian Park, where tin mining has been undertaken, the native people have been stricken by tuberculosis, influenza, and leprosy. □

GE Admits 65 Workers Were Poisoned by Chemical It Dumps in Hudson River

The General Electric Company conceded November 10 that at least sixty-five of its employees had become ill over a fifteen-year period under conditions that "may have been caused by or aggravated by exposure to PCB's," or polychlorinated biphenyls. PCB, a pollutant derived from benzene, is extremely resistant to being degraded by natural forces.

The admission came at a hearing called by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, which has filed a complaint against General Electric. The complaint charges that the company violated water-quality standards of New York by dumping PCBs from two of its plants into the Hudson River.

The company said that 49 of about 1,800 employees working in areas exposed to PCBs had reported to its dispensaries "complaining of allergic dermatitis," and that 16 more had reported nausea, dizziness, eye irritation, nasal irritation, asthmatic bronchitis, and fungus.

This contradicted testimony by the company at an earlier public hearing in May 1974, when a GE official said that "the only medical effects that had been reported during the four decades we were in this business have been occasional cases of chloracne or other minor skin irritations of a nonchronic nature. . . ."

The company refused to disclose the names of employees who had become ill.

March of Progress

Most Eskimos in Canada have switched to hunting with snowmobiles rather than with dog teams in order to survive in radically altered social conditions. They are now suffering from serious hearing losses as a result.

A study of 3,770 Eskimos in the Baffin Island area of the Northwest Territories by a group of scientists from McGill University found that of 1,201 adult males tested, 33 percent suffered from impaired hearing.

In one village, 83 percent of the adult males—all of whom drove snowmobiles for long hours in their search for game—were found to have serious hearing difficulties.

The study found that the constant noise level around the snowmobile driver, who sits about two or three feet from the engine, ranged from 105 to 120 decibels when the engine was running full speed. This is roughly comparable to the sound of a jet airliner on takeoff 500 feet above the listener.

In the United States, the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 set daily permissible exposure levels of a maximum of 15 minutes for 115 decibels, 30 minutes for 110 decibels, and one hour for 105 decibels.

Even exposures as low as 90 decibels call for a maximum exposure of only six hours to prevent possible hearing damage.

The Eskimos often drive their machines up to ten hours a day.

Indians in Ontario Stricken by 'Canadian Minamata Disease'

An outbreak of "Canadian Minamata disease" among Indians in Ontario was publicly confirmed at an international conference on environmental protection in Kyoto, Japan, November 20. The crippling disease, which has taken a heavy toll in the Japanese village of Minamata, is caused by mercury pollution.

Seijun Harada, a professor at Kumamoto University, made the announcement that the disease has been observed in Canada. He and his colleagues conducted a medical examination of the inhabitants of White Dog and Grassy Narrows, Ontario, who have long fished for a livelihood.

Before a "recent and belated warning," New Asia News reported November 21, the Indians "had consumed large quantities of mercury-contaminated fish."

A \$10,000 Fine for \$400,000 Oil Spill

Vasilios K. Psarroulis, captain of a British-owned bulk carrier, was arrested November 7 after environmental "detectives" tracked down his ship as being the cause of a 40,000-gallon oil spill off the coast of Florida in July. The oil spill extended for fifty miles and cost \$400,000 to clean up.

The arrest was the only one of its kind under the provisions of the U.S. Water Pollution Control Act. However, he was not charged with the oil spill itself—only with not having reported it. Maximum fine, upon conviction, is \$10,000.

A Dangerous Place to Live

Repeated doses of such common worldwide pollutants as fumes in the air and chemicals in drinking water are increasing the risks of cancer, heart disease, and genetic mutations, according to a recent Library of Congress report. While a single exposure to many low-level pollutants is not harmful, the report said, repeated doses can build up toxic substances in an individual to a dangerous level.

New respiratory diseases related to pollution "have assumed a significant importance," the researchers said. Among substances cited as contributing to pollution and health problems are asbestos; chlorides; fluorides; carbon monoxide; hydrocarbons; nickel; and mercury, which affects the

central nervous system.

The report, as summarized in the November 9 New York *Daily News*, also disclosed:

"• The ability to detect chemically induced health dangers is so limited that only a portion of the damage can be recognized.

"• The costs to society of diseases linked to environmental pollution, while difficult to pin down, are staggering.

"• Expensive and arduous testing methods are not sensitive enough to detect the polluting agents."

The Library of Congress report might help explain new death-rate statistics released by the National Center for Health Statistics. Figures issued in Washington November 7 showed that in the United States, cancer claimed 5.2 percent more lives during the first seven months of this year than in the similar period in 1974.

Government researchers said they were puzzled by the increase.

Missing: 10 Million Pounds of a Deadly Chemical

PCB is a toxic chemical that is known to cause liver cancer and reproductive failures in laboratory animals. It should soon be possible to determine whether it has the same effect on human beings.

A chemist for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated November 19 that 10 million pounds of polychlorinated biphenyls are "lost into the environment each year through vaporization, leaks and spills."

The chemist, Thomas E. Kopp, said that at least ten plants in the United States dump PCBs directly into waterways, and that two others pour the chemical into municipal sewage systems.

Since no known sewage treatment process removes PCBs, the chemical can be presumed to remain in the treated sewage, eventually reaching water supplies.

Research so far has shown that PCBs are present in the drinking water of Winnebago, Illinois, and Sellersburg, Indiana. It is suspected that they are also present in the drinking water of Bridgeport, Connecticut; Escondido, California; and New Bedford, Massachusetts.

EPA Administrator Russell Train admitted that PCBs "are present in our environment to a far greater degree and at higher levels than we have previously thought." He said, however, that he was reluctant to order any individual factories to stop dumping the chemicals by invoking a 1972 federal law regulating water pollution.

"Conceivably, it could give you authority to halt PCB's, but there is a question as to whether it would hold up in court," Train said.

"I am not entirely decided on whether we can use it—it would be a very difficult route to go."

OUT NOW!

Chapter 16

April 15, 1967

By Fred Halstead

[First of three parts]

In his article in the first *Mobilizer*, Muste pointed out that it had been agreed there should be "a prompt exploration of what forces, individual or collective, might be enlisted in support of this mobilization." Two of the areas he discussed in relation to this exploration were the labor and civil rights movements.

Regarding labor, Muste expected no immediate dramatic results, but he did consider it important and expressed a certain hope for the future. "There is," he said, "no current evidence that millions could be brought into the streets at one time to demand an end to the U.S. role in the war. For that to happen, large numbers of labor unionists would have to be involved. This may some day happen, but not very likely by April 15, 1967. On the other hand, if it were to happen that tens or hundreds of thousands of labor unionists appeared on the streets in an anti-war demonstration, it would not be true, as some tend to think, that this would not make an appreciable impact on the Administration either. In such case, for example, strikes in war industries would become possible, even likely, and that would take the protest out of the 'token' or symbolic category."¹

This way of thinking was much closer to a traditional Marxist approach than that of many of the newly radicalizing youth who

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tended to view the organized labor movement as a pillar of "the Establishment" and among the last places to look for decisive aid to the antiwar cause. If one judged from the top leadership of the American union movement, the pragmatic impression of these youth was entirely understandable. The AFL-CIO Executive Council was solidly in support of Johnson's war policies, while AFL-CIO President George Meany was, if anything, more of a hawk than Johnson himself. The AFL-CIO International Affairs Department—headed by Jay Lovestone, former head of the Communist Party turned professional anticommunist—hardly concealed the fact that it acted as an ex-officio arm of the U.S. State Department in the cold war.

An incident early in the antiwar movement, at the AFL-CIO convention in San Francisco in December 1965, had further reinforced the negative impression many student radicals had of the union movement. At that time a group of about fifty student antiwar demonstrators from Berkeley, Stanford, and San Francisco State College appeared in the gallery of the Civic Auditorium where the public was admitted to observe the convention proceedings. They went there not to demonstrate against the AFL-

CIO but because Secretary of State Dean Rusk had been invited to speak. His talk was devoted to a defense of the war policy and an attack on its critics. The students were not disruptive and simply held antiwar signs as Rusk spoke. When Rusk concluded, Meany ordered the sergeants at arms to "clear the kookies out of the gallery," which was done none too gently. Meany commented:

"We were glad to have them while Secretary Rusk spoke, on the theory that it might add a little bit to their inadequate education, but now we want to go ahead with our business."²

The incident became notorious in student antiwar circles.

Two days later, San Francisco State student Kipp Dawson spoke at a Bay Area YSA conference. She gave a report on the NCC convention and her remarks did not deal directly with what happened at the AFL-CIO gathering, but in the course of her report she made the following observation:

"We must keep in mind the fact that the antiwar movement was born and is growing in a period of general economic prosperity and the corresponding high rate of living for the working class, which has bred temporary extreme conservatism in the trade union movement. This means that the movement has developed largely without the support or influence of the working class, and almost solely among one layer of the population: the students."³

The antiwar sentiment—and even the deeper radicalization among the youth—was not confined to students. It affected workers, especially young workers, as well. But it affected them as individuals or as members of doubly oppressed groups, such as Blacks, rather than as workers or as union members as such. And in most cases they could not express it through the unions.

With some exceptions the mid-1960s was not a time of sharp union struggles. When such did occur—as for example with the farm workers led by César Chávez, where the union's grape and lettuce boycotts received an important boost from the student movement—the workers involved and even the union leadership were much more inclined to be open to the antiwar cause. But as a general rule such alliances were not impelled by the prevailing economic situation. A change in that situation would provide the basis for a qualitative change in the antiwar movement. But as Muste observed, that was something over which "we in the radical anti-war movement have little or no control."⁴

Throughout this period there was a running dispute over whether or not the union movement—or even the working class—could be an ally in the antiwar struggle. As a matter of policy the YSA held that it could, and that everything possible ought to be

2. Proceedings of the Sixth Constitutional Convention, AFL-CIO, December 10, 1965, p. 133. The next order of business, incidentally, was a report by Communications Workers of America President Joseph A. Beirne, an active collaborator with the Central Intelligence Agency, providing union cover for its operations in labor movements overseas. (See *CIA and CWA* by Cynthia Sweeney, a pamphlet published by CWA Local 11500 members, San Diego, 1975. (Copy in author's files.)

3. Report to Bay Area YSA Conference, December 12, 1965, by Kipp Dawson. (Copy in author's files.)

4. *Mobilizer*, December 19, 1966.

1. *Mobilizer*, December 19, 1966.

done to involve workers and unionists in the movement. Similar hopes were held by the CP, the SWP, and a number of individuals such as Muste, Sid Peck, and Stewart Meacham of the American Friends Service Committee, all of whom had some experience with, or at least more than superficial knowledge of, the pre-1950s union movement.

SDS and most of the young self-styled new lefters, however, tended to take an entirely pragmatic view of the matter. What appeared before their eyes at the moment was the whole truth as far as they were concerned. They were influenced by such theorists as Herbert Marcuse who held that the working class in advanced capitalist countries like the United States had been more or less permanently pacified by concessions and was no longer a major force for social progress. That role was assigned to students and intellectuals. It was even declared that students as such were *the* new revolutionary force.

In my view one error involved in this approach was the identification of the union movement as a whole—and even of the working class—with the union officialdom. The weight of the union bureaucracy in holding back membership involvement in the antiwar movement is clearly revealed in a comparison of the experience of the New York Parade Committee with two different unions. These were District 65 of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Workers on the one hand, and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) on the other.

Both were affiliated with the AFL-CIO. To a significant extent they were involved in different aspects of the same industry in the same part of New York City. The ILGWU had jurisdiction over the production of women's garments, District 65 over the wholesale houses supplying cloth and other items to the factories, as well as over the major retail outlets in the city for the finished product.

The two unions therefore necessarily maintained certain cooperative relations. The membership of both these unions in New York City was largely Black and Puerto Rican; a lot of the white members were Jewish. In many cases they ate in the same luncheonettes, gathered on the same street corners, voted for the same liberal politicians, and occupied more or less the same rungs on the economic and social ladder.

The bulk of these respective memberships were no more or less inclined to be antiwar in the one case than in the other. But members of the ILGWU in New York who were opposed to the war could not express this within the union without fear of harassment, and in no case *through* the union. Members of District 65 who opposed the war could, if they chose, be active in a peace committee within the union. Al Evanoff, assistant vice-president of District 65 and a Parade Committee stalwart, was active in this group. The committee did not set policy for District 65, but it could use union facilities like other committees which involved a part of the membership. Such activists could wear union hats and carry banners identifying themselves as members of the union on antiwar demonstrations, post notices on union bulletin boards, etc.

James Johnson, Sr., father of the James Johnson of the Fort Hood Three, was a member of District 65 and one of its shop stewards. He was able to take up a substantial collection within the union for his son's defense, and to publicize the case to the entire union membership, with the sympathetic assistance of the union officials. If he had been a member of the ILGWU he would have had to keep his mouth shut on this matter inside the union.

At first only a small part of the District 65 membership was involved in these activities. The officials, who were generally sympathetic, did not impose their antiwar views on the union as a whole. But as the general antiwar sentiment increased, so it did among District 65 members, and they could express it in an organized form within the union. Eventually when the antiwar view became a majority, the union itself did adopt an antiwar

position and participate officially in many important antiwar activities.

The ILGWU membership, however, remained totally immobilized on this question throughout the war. The difference was the leadership. The ILGWU was controlled by a hidebound, right-wing Social Democratic, virtually all-white bureaucracy that maintained unquestioning support of the Meany-Lovestone line throughout. District 65, which was more democratic, had a multiracial officialdom and a radical tradition that had not been entirely buried, at least as regards resistance to the anticommunist hysteria and to slavish support of government foreign policy.

It was not prowar sentiment on the part of the rank and file that kept the bulk of the unions out of the antiwar movement, it was the bureaucracy. And the objective conditions during the 1960s for a cracking of that bureaucratic hold were not favorable. There was, however, some important union involvement that developed from small beginnings and which by 1970 was growing much more rapidly.

It is a law of political life that changes often appear first on the edges, around the cracks and fissures, in the areas somehow not quite typical, rather than in the decisive central weight of a social organism. But such exceptional situations are not just exceptional. They contain within them elements that go through the heart of the whole, but are simply more hidden there, less able to be manifest in the early stages of change. If the process is real, and not illusory or artificial, changes around the edges are both indicators of and contributors to coming change in the more decisive sectors.

The special circumstances that made possible the beginnings of union involvement in the antiwar movement fell roughly into three categories, sometimes combined. These were (1) unions where the membership *and the leadership* included large percentages of oppressed national minorities whose outlook had been affected by the civil rights movement; (2) unions with a radical history and a leadership that still retained certain features of this tradition and to that degree defied the general norm of the American union officialdom, at least as regards the anticommunist hysteria and foreign policy; (3) unions where much of the membership and leadership was fresh out of college and had themselves been part of the student radicalization. These last included unions of welfare workers and in certain areas teachers.

In addition the labor movement as a whole contained a heavy sprinkling of individual union leaders who had once been radicals. Not all of these had entirely rejected all their youthful ideas, though even those who hadn't were more than careful about expressing them. But here and there an occasional such figure who for one reason or another felt secure from reprisals by the AFL-CIO tops would take an antiwar stand. Muste's own personal history put him in a position to take advantage of this as well as anyone could.

* * *

Muste started his activist life as a Christian pacifist preacher, but between 1919 and 1936 he had been deeply involved with the labor movement, part of the time as a Marxist.

In 1919 he went to Lawrence, Massachusetts, with a group of Quakers to aid a bitter strike of 30,000 textile workers there. Among other things he wanted to introduce some ideas of mass nonviolent struggle. The strike was in bad shape when they arrived and Muste soon found himself elected executive secretary of the strike committee. He was badly beaten by strikebreaking police when he led a march, but he stuck it out and the strike was won. It was one of the early victories for industrial unionism in a mass-production industry.

For a time Muste was general secretary of the Amalgamated Textile Workers Union. Between 1921 and 1933 he was director of Brookwood Labor College, a school for union organizers for which

some AFL unions provided scholarships, though the college was independent of the AFL.

During this period he became a vice-president of the American Federation of Teachers. More important, he helped train a significant number of the organizers who later built the industrial unions of the CIO.

Many of his students later moved to the right as they became comfortable in the union bureaucracy, while Muste had moved to the left, but he generally maintained cordial relations with them, at least on a personal level. In 1929 Muste helped found the Conference for Progressive Labor Action (CPLA), whose members came to be known as Musteites. Its strategy was to work within the AFL on a program of militant industrial unionism, including opposition to racial discrimination.

The great debate within the union movement of the time was whether to continue the dominant AFL policy of organizing only certain skilled crafts into separate unions for each craft, or whether to organize all the workers in an industry—including the unskilled or semiskilled mass-production workers—into one union. In opting for the second course, the CPLA laid some of the groundwork for the rise of the CIO.

The Musteites were also active in organizing unemployed leagues in the depths of the Great Depression. In 1934, through a strategy of unity between the unemployed and the strikers at the Auto Lite plant in Toledo, Ohio, the CPLA led the first victorious strike in the auto industry. (Sam Pollock, one of the CPLA leaders of this strike, later became president of the Cleveland Meat Cutters. He was one of the very few union officials to attend the conference that gave birth to the 1967 Spring Mobilization.)

It was also in 1934 that the Trotskyists led the successful Minneapolis Teamster strikes. In part on the basis of these experiences the Musteites and the Trotskyists merged their organizations in December 1935 to form the Workers Party of the United States. By that time Muste considered himself a revolutionary Marxist and had in effect set aside both his religion and his pacifist philosophy, though he was still a practitioner of mass nonviolent direct action—at least as nonviolent as possible.

In this period Muste participated in a number of important labor struggles. In early 1936 at the Goodyear rubber strike in Akron, he was partly responsible for the successful introduction of the sit-down strike technique—borrowed from France—into the American labor scene.

But Muste was disturbed when a majority of the newly born Workers Party voted in early 1936 to dissolve the organization and seek membership in the Socialist Party of Norman Thomas. Nor did he care for the faction fighting that followed within the SP between the Trotskyists and the Social Democrats who controlled the party. He was discouraged by the defeats of the revolution in Europe, and became convinced that the revolutionary movement could not stop the gathering world war. In this mood he reached back to the origins of his own character and in July 1936 underwent a religious reconversion that was to last the rest of his life.

Muste left the Trotskyist movement and returned to pacifism and the church; but he remained a socialist and, as usual, continued to regard his old comrades without rancor.

He became industrial secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and for a time director of the Presbyterian Labor Temple in New York City. In 1940 he became executive secretary of the FOR. In this capacity he assisted those who were jailed for opposition to the Second World War and contributed to the development of a host of organizations and causes, including the Congress of Racial Equality, originally an FOR staff project.

In 1953 he left the active staff of the FOR, becoming secretary emeritus. Muste had many profound differences with the Communist Party but he demonstratively defended their civil liberties during the witch-hunt and was attacked for this by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. In the 1950s he threw himself into the campaign

against nuclear weapons and testing, personally participating in the early civil disobedience actions that called attention to the threat, and eventually helping to found both SANE and the Committee for Nonviolent Action.

Muste also had some influence with Martin Luther King, Jr., who had first come to national prominence as the leader of the Montgomery bus boycott of 1956. Bayard Rustin, then a Muste protégé who also worked in the national office of an all-Black union, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, had been the New York contact of E.D. Nixon, the working sleeping-car porter who originated the boycott and convinced King to be its spokesman. Through Rustin, Muste was consulted on many of the strategies that gave birth to the modern civil rights movement.

In 1963 King himself declared: "I would say unequivocally that the current emphasis on nonviolent direct action in the race relations field is due more to A.J. than to anyone else in the country."⁵

Developments as profound as the American antiwar movement do not just drop from the sky, and they are certainly not imported as certain red-baiting congressmen would have had us believe, and as some high government officials even deluded themselves into believing. They are intimately connected with the whole history of social struggles in the country and A.J. Muste personified this.

* * *

The Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy held a rally against the Vietnam war at Madison Square Garden on December 8, 1966. A crowd of 20,000 jammed the Garden as hundreds stood outside listening to the proceedings on loudspeakers. The rally was an interesting contrast to the one on nuclear testing six years earlier that had figured in the red-baiting attack by Senator Thomas J. Dodd and the firing of SANE staffer Henry Abrams. In 1960 Norman Thomas had been the most militant speaker on the platform. This time he was the most conservative. It was not Thomas who had changed.

SANE still represented the more conservative wing of the antiwar movement, with most speakers voicing the "negotiate" position, but the demand to bring the troops home now was raised by at least two of the speakers, Floyd McKissick of CORE and Grace Mora Newman of the Fort Hood Three Defense Committee, and received the loudest applause. Most of the speakers bitterly attacked President Johnson. Rev. William Sloan Coffin, cochairman of the rally, presented a vigorous defense of the student antiwar movement.

One of the speakers was Joel R. Jacobson, president of the New Jersey Industrial Union Council, which was composed of unions that had belonged to the CIO before the 1955 merger with the AFL. Jacobson drew a big applause when he announced that there were 5,000 union members present. Jacobson spoke on behalf of a new formation, the Trade Union Division of SANE. This group was controlled completely by trade unionists and was actually the device some union officials had chosen to begin a hesitant move to take their distance from the Meany policy on the war.

Before the formation of the Trade Union Division of SANE there existed another organization called Trade Unionists for Peace, which in New York was affiliated to the Parade Committee. It had been initiated in August 1965 by Aaron Wool, a rank-and-file New York printer who had first attempted to get a prominent union official to head up a committee of unionists opposed to the war. Failing this, he called together the rank-and-file unionists he knew who wanted to do something on the issue and launched the organization.

5. *Peace Agitator: The Story of A.J. Muste* by Nat Hentoff (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 18.



Eli Finer/Militant

Part of crowd of 20,000 at December 8, 1966, New York City rally against the war in Vietnam, sponsored by SANE.

Similar groups were formed in several other cities. They carried out educational campaigns aimed at unionists and provided some sort of union presence on the early demonstrations. Their literature was widely distributed and even reproduced in various union publications. It played a role in encouraging such discussion as there was on the war in the union movement. But these groups remained small committees of rank-and-file members from different unions, with no official standing and few resources. The Trade Union Division of SANE, however, was largely composed of union officials with considerable authority and resources at their command.

On December 17 the Chicago Trade Union Division of SANE sponsored a conference on "The Labor Movement's Responsibility in the Search for Peace." It was attended by some 350 people, mostly secondary officers of unions in the Chicago area with a few from other parts of the country. The keynote address was given by Frank Rosenblum, general secretary-treasurer of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, AFL-CIO, and an old friend of Muste's.

Rosenblum was largely responsible for the fact that the ACW, which in other political respects was not much different from the rest of the major AFL-CIO unions, did not go along with the Meany position on the war and that its officials were able to speak out on the question. Other unions with significant numbers of officials present included the Amalgamated Meat Cutters, the Packinghouse Workers (these two later merged), and the United Auto Workers.

The conference was not advertised as being against the war. The invitation simply posed certain questions: "What are the peaceful alternatives? Does Labor need peace for effective collective bargaining in 1967? Can the 'Great Society' be achieved and poverty eliminated in a wartime economy?"⁶

The conference adopted a statement of purpose for the new organization that was considerably more moderate than even SANE's recent positions. It said in part:

"We believe it is increasingly clear that the simple solution to the Vietnam war offered again and again—'victory through es-

calation'—cannot succeed, and can only intensify the suffering of the people of Vietnam. It is clear also that negotiations must take place among all those involved in this conflict.

"We shall therefore urge steps, such as a cessation to bombing, to help bring about such negotiations, rather than further escalation of the conflict. . . . And we plan to carry the discussion of these and other issues of peace and war to our trade-union brothers, to the members of our unions, and to all our fellow Americans."⁷

The teach-in professors had been bolder than that, almost two years previously. Nevertheless this conference represented a beginning of organized public dissent with the Meany position among the labor officialdom.

Muste attended the Chicago trade union conference, as did Jack Spiegel, who was one of the sponsors, Sid Lens, myself, and a few other antiwar activists who had some connection with or special interest in the union movement. One of the things we wanted to do was to solicit support for the Spring Mobilization. But the bulk of the union officials involved were not simply hesitant about this. They were downright frightened by the idea.

This did not stem from a lack of feeling on their part about the war. They knew it was wrong and doing no good for American labor. Other considerations were involved. First was fear of reprisals from the Meany forces and other top union leaders who supported the war (or more precisely, who supported government foreign policy no matter what it was). Second was fear of having the student radicalization or its spirit introduced into the ranks of organized labor. Not all of them were exactly opposed to the last possibility. They were just afraid of it. They sensed that such a development could mean a knockdown, drag-out fight with the Meany forces, would upset all sorts of arrangements the union officials had with Democratic and Republican politicians, and might well mean stirring up the rank and file.

Their whole way of existence had simply become too comfortable and routine for them to seriously contemplate entering into any such process voluntarily. And as union officials went, those at this conference were among the best. There were few social formations in the United States as profoundly conservative—in

6. An invitation: For a Trade Unionists' Conference to Seek Peaceful Alternatives, December 17, 1966. Issued by the Chicago Trade Union Division of SANE. (Copy in author's files.)

7. *Militant*, December 26, 1966.

the sense of being frightened of change—as the union bureaucracy.

The best we could do was to approach individuals in the corridors with information about the mobilization. It was simply not to be mentioned in the proceedings themselves. But the organizers couldn't quite bring themselves to snub Muste. After all, he was who he was and he was there; not pushing, but there.

They finally invited A.J. onto the platform, not in his capacity as chairman of the Spring Mobilization, but as an ordained minister—to give the invocation. And they let us know they felt damned brave about it.

* * *

The connection of the antiwar movement with labor was much more tenuous than that with the civil rights movement. One of the reasons was that the modern Southern civil rights movement had for the most part developed after the witch-hunt period known as McCarthyism had begun to ebb. The period of dramatic growth of the unions, on the other hand, had come before the shattering experience of the cold war witch-hunt, which affected the unions more than any other social formation and which almost completely severed the historic continuity of radicalism in the labor movement.

It is necessary to recall that in the 1930s and 1940s the Communist Party had dominant influence among radicals. All the other groups were a small fraction of its size. It had far more people than the others to throw into the labor upsurge of the 1930s and the building of the CIO. By the mid-1940s its members and close collaborators controlled the national leadership of over a dozen CIO unions and were a major force in many others.

In those days there was always considerable faction fighting within the union movement in which the Stalinists—there were no varieties then, just one monolithic ideology—were a major factor, sometimes blocking with other forces in the power fights over policy matters and control of various unions.

Between the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939 and June 1941, the Stalinists campaigned against the U.S. entry into the Second World War. Following the Nazi invasion of the USSR they campaigned for it. During the war they were superpatriotic, enforced the no-strike pledge, and campaigned for all-out production for the war. In this period they were tolerated by the government and even drew certain advantages from this relationship in the power fights within the union movement.

With the end of the war and the advent of the cold war, however, the government turned on them and began the anticommunist witch-hunt, first of all in the union movement. This became a central issue in the power fights within the unions. A number of top union leaders who had collaborated with the Stalinists for opportunist reasons suddenly switched for the same reasons, becoming the most virulent anticommunists.

In 1949, ten international unions⁸ were expelled from the CIO on charges of being "Communist dominated." A period of jurisdictional warfare ensued that weakened the whole union movement. The largest of these unions, for example, the half-million-member United Electrical Workers (UE), was split into the UE and the anticommunist-led International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE). After several years of jurisdictional battles, the UE was down to less than a fourth its former size and the IUE and UE combined had less than two-thirds the number of members the UE had before the split.

By the late 1950s the CP was no longer a major factor even in the expelled unions, most of which finally merged with their AFL-CIO rivals, and some of which were simply wiped out. Only the

8. The term "international union" denotes the entire union, not a local or regional part of it. It derives from the fact that many of the unions have locals in Canada as well as the U.S.

West Coast International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) survived relatively intact. It, and the much reduced UE, remained outside the AFL-CIO. These two were the first international unions to my knowledge to take a position against the Vietnam war.

In the course of this whole process not only the Stalinists but the bulk of all the active radicals in the union movement were purged, and those who weren't did not generally buck the tide. The right-wing union officials had the active support of the government and the congressional witch-hunt committees in this purge. In one industry alone, maritime, the government refused to renew the seaman's certification papers of thousands of radical unionists of all varieties on spurious "security" grounds.

By the late 1950s the radical yeast that had given the social consciousness to the union movement had been almost entirely wiped out. The "business unionists," the pure and simple bureaucrats in it for comfortable jobs, the opportunists—and here and there the gangsters—had free reign, unhampered by the criticism of the radicals for whom the union movement was a sacred cause. Not all of these were forced out, but most of those who remained were pretty thoroughly intimidated. A top union officialdom, as slavish to the State Department's foreign policy as the Stalinists ever were to Moscow's, was firmly entrenched.

* * *

Another figure whose life was intertwined in this process, in some ways similar and in others quite different from that of A.J. Muste, was the well-known Pittsburgh labor priest Monsignor Charles O. Rice.⁹

As a young priest in the 1930s Father Rice was closely associated with Dorothy Day's Catholic Worker movement. He early campaigned against racial discrimination and anti-Semitism, which was not the norm for American priests in those days. He was one of the first, if not the first, priest to walk labor picket lines in the 1930s. He participated in many labor battles, including the Heinz strike of 1935 and the Little Steel strike of 1937 in which a number of strikers were killed. On the radio and in writings for the *Pittsburgh Catholic* and other publications he supported the organizing drives of the CIO. He became a confidant of union leaders, particularly CIO President Philip Murray.

In the 1940s he figured prominently in the inner union faction fights on the anticommunist side. He was the leading figure connected with the Pittsburgh chapter of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU), which from time to time served as an ideological focus for anticommunist caucuses in the CIO. He played a particularly prominent role in the fights in and around the UE.

According to an article by Michael Harrington, Rice had some contact with the House Un-American Activities Committee and the FBI in their attacks on CP unionists.¹⁰ Harrington's article was mainly about the role of ACTU in the anticommunist caucuses and was written in 1960, long after the events it describes. It was written from an anticommunist point of view, though a moderate Social Democratic one with some implied criticism of the violations of civil liberties involved in the witch-hunt. Interestingly, Rice now says it was this article that started him rethinking the issues in the anticommunist purges. Probably

9. The term "labor priest" as used in the U.S. should not be confused with the term "worker-priest" as used in Europe. The American labor priests were active with the union movement from the outside, as educators, publicists, advisers, and supporters. They did not hold union office but were close to many union leaders. The European worker-priests lived as workers, worked in factories, etc., and endeavored to be part of the rank and file.

10. "Catholics in the Labor Movement: A Case History" by Michael Harrington, *Labor History*, Fall 1960. Harrington was himself a former editor of the *Catholic Worker*.

the situation within the unions by then, and more broadly in the world, also had something to do with it.

Of his earlier role Rice says: "In my anti-Stalinism I was very much influenced by the murder of Trotsky—that had a traumatic effect on me—and by all those trials. I remember listening and watching very carefully the news of the Moscow trials. The people pleading guilty when it was absurd. And later one of the trials when they got [Joseph Cardinal] Mindszenty, they forced him, got him to say what obviously he didn't want to say. That probably did more to make people fearful of communism than almost anything else. It was a coup so far as they were concerned over there, but it was terribly counterproductive in the United States. At the time I believed there was some chance of their taking over and messing things up for us in the United States. Foolishly I think now, but that's hindsight.

"But there was a feeling among many anticommunists that communism was irreversible. That when they took over that was it, and that as they took each little—or big—piece of territory, it moved under the monolith, the curtain shut down, freedom was ended. There was no variety, and they moved on to another piece and digested it. I really felt that. I don't feel it now but I felt it then. And then, you see, there wasn't much evidence of variety in communism.

"The Communists, the Stalinists, the CP, they played it pretty stupidly. They insisted for the longest while on these resolutions on behalf of whatever foreign policy the CP wanted at the moment. Whether the policies were right or wrong we could argue forever, but for the CP in the unions it was almost suicide. I think it was Matles [an official of the UE] who told me the Communists eventually pulled out and didn't care what the union leaders did, but by then it was too late. They had made themselves sitting ducks. There really wasn't much you could fault them on the way they handled their unions compared to the other CIO leaders. But the way they twisted and turned—at the time of the Molotov-von Ribbentrop pact¹¹ for example—and the way they shunted between [United Mine Workers President John L.] Lewis and [Philip] Murray depending on who was following the line that the Kremlin favored, that hurt them very badly. It made them vulnerable. It made them sitting ducks during the cold war because you could say, look here's what these people have done all the time.

"Looking back on it from my point of view now, it really didn't make any difference what line they followed on foreign policy. They should have been judged in the union movement on the basis of their trade unionism. I think the purging of the left wingers, the total purging of them, the cleaning out of them from the labor movement, was tragic. I think it would have been better, and it would have made a much healthier labor movement if we were able to have people of whatever persuasion remain in the unions and fight back and forth, as they were doing, and watch each other.

"But it is probably true that ACTU and the others didn't have that much of an effect on the general outcome. American labor tends to be idealistically monolithic. And it lends itself to a monolith of leadership. The trade union leaders are naturally intolerant. They insist as much as a company would insist that everyone march together and they have this business that you need unity in organization and that you have to rally around the leader and follow him. They have that feeling."¹²

In early 1965 Rice was disturbed by the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic. That is when, he says, "I began to straighten myself out and get a true antiwar view on Vietnam and

the Dominican invasion. The invasion was taking place when I was invited to speak to an American Legion Post in Mount Oliver. Prominent in that post were men like Tom Fagan, local head of the Teamsters, and other labor fellows, and I gave them a real old-time rabble-rousing antiwar speech. And they ate it up at the time. But two months later those same fellows had been brainwashed by the powers that be. The powers that be got together and through their various resources they influenced these people."¹³

In the spring of 1966 the Pittsburgh Coalition to End the War in Vietnam invited Rice to speak at a rally. Paul Le Blanc, who spoke for SDS on the same occasion, describes the circumstances:

"The antiwar movement in Pittsburgh consisted primarily of independent radicals influenced by the 'new left' and by such periodicals as the *National Guardian* (now the *Guardian*), a few members of SDS, some left-liberal college students, and members of the Communist Party and the W.E.B. Du Bois Club.

"At the time we were particularly concerned about being red-baited because the Du Bois Club members in our coalition had proposed that Hugh Fowler be a speaker at the rally, and we had all agreed on that. All of us were very much opposed to the old anticommunist exclusionary policies, and we felt solidarity with the Du Bois Club, which was being attacked by the government. At the same time we were afraid that if the only 'big shot' at our rally was the national leader of the Du Bois Clubs, the whole effort would be dismissed by the media as simply 'the work of the Communists.' Rice's participation, we felt, prevented that. We were astonished that he agreed. It seemed a turning point. The news coverage we received was quite good, although Rice was attacked quite angrily in at least one TV editorial and became a favorite target of local right-wingers."

"Rice's decision to speak at our rally at the Federal Building on the Second International Days of Protest [March 26, 1966] provided the first 'big name' for our movement. It also helped prepare the groundwork for the broad coalition of liberals (of the ADA [Americans for Democratic Action] and reform-Democrat variety) with the radicals and student activists which formed later that year. At the rally at which Rice spoke, there were about 200 people; that autumn, we filled Carnegie Hall with about 900; and that was just the beginning."¹⁴

Rice recalls that Pittsburgh Bishop John J. Wright and the pope were much more tolerant of his antiwar activities than his old associates in the labor movement. His invitations to speak at union gatherings, and his contacts with union officials fell off sharply. He chose to become a parish priest at a church in Pittsburgh's Black ghetto.

As part of the broadening process of the Spring Mobilization Committee, the Rt. Reverend Monsignor Charles O. Rice was asked to become a sponsor. He agreed. On April 15, 1967, he marched at the front of the New York demonstration.

[To be continued]

13. Ibid.

14. Letter from Paul Le Blanc to the author, October 25, 1975.

UN Panel Approves Declaration Against Torture

A declaration against torture was adopted without a vote by the UN General Assembly's Social Committee on November 24. The decision not to vote on the resolution, thereby lessening its force, was explained by a recent report issued by Amnesty International. The group said that the use of torture was documented in more than sixty countries.

Henry Kissinger had urged approval of the resolution when he spoke before the United Nations in September. The same Kissinger, upon hearing that the U.S. ambassador to Chile had raised the subject of human rights in a meeting with the Chilean defense minister in July 1974, demanded that he "cut out the political science lectures."

11. Also known as the Stalin-Hitler pact. The 1939 peaceful-coexistence treaty between the USSR and Germany, broken by the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941.

12. Taped interview with Msgr. Rice by Paul Le Blanc, October 27, 1975. (Copy in author's files.)

On the Question of Angola

By C. Gabriel

In issue No. 36 of *Intercontinental Press*, dated October 13, a document signed by Comrades G. Foley, J. Hansen, and G. Novack takes up the question of Angola after having dealt, from their point of view, with programmatic and strategic questions with regard to the Portuguese situation. As the author of a series of articles in *Inprecor*, the official organ of the international, and having been implicitly criticized in this *IP* article, I ask that you publish this statement in a forthcoming issue of *IP* in order to make the real content of the debate clear to its readers.

It is not possible for me to take up in detail here the analyses and comments contained in the *Inprecor* articles. I refer *IP* readers to them. I will content myself with pointing out the untruths that serve as central arguments to the authors of the article in question in order to attack the position on the Angolan situation taken by the European sections of the Fourth International.

1. The authors claim that we have never mentioned the withdrawal of Portuguese troops from Angola. This is false. In issue No. 31 of *Inprecor* a long section deals with the contradictions of these "Angolan troops" and ends with a slogan calling for the immediate withdrawal of Portuguese troops and leaving their arms and matériel in the hands of the MPLA and the "popular" commissions. Of course, the last part of this slogan is not to the liking of the authors of the *IP* article. But in this case, let's debate that and not the alleged lack of position on the troops question attributed to the majority of the international. Yet, curiously forgetful of our main writings, the *IP* comrades do not mention the presence of Zaïrean and South African troops on Angolan territory. That is, however, a decisive point that must be added, as we have done, to the slogan on Portuguese troops. We point out, to make the exact nature of the debate on this matter understood, that the Zaïrean and South African troops intervened clearly against the MPLA with logistical support for the FNLA and for the UNITA. The former structure the troops of the FNLA. It was following a trip by Chipenda, the vice-president of the FNLA, to Namibia that the South African high command decided to dislodge the MPLA from the Cunene River hydroelectric stations in the south. Neither the FNLA, the UNITA, nor the Portuguese high command protested. How is it that the *IP* comrades have no slogan for that?

2. The writers of the article claim that the MPLA is supported by the USSR, the Communist parties, and by European Social Democratic parties, particularly the PSP, while the FNLA is supported by China. A good balance, of sorts! First of all, let's point out that the Socialist parties of Europe are far from unconditionally supporting the MPLA. Delegations from the UNITA and from the FNLA found their best welcome in Europe from Social Democratic leaders now in power. Among the most opportunist is the PSP whose general secretary, in the all-out civil war of July 1975, preoccupied himself solely with "brother Portuguese refugees." Of course, we agree with the comrades that we do not consider the origin of aid and arms as the decisive question in settling the nature of this or that movement. But this cannot suffice for justifying neutrality toward the three Angolan organizations, because the whole history of the FNLA and the UNITA proves that these groups are *politically* controlled by imperialist factions and especially by the United States through

postcolonial plans of these factions and through economic concessions that these imperialist interests can gain in the zones under UNITA or FNLA influence. The names of American experts who, at Kinshasa, trained Holden's high command are well known, as well as the fact of the phantom trade union that the FNLA claims to have. It was built and trained starting from the Afro-American center of the Zaïrean capital. A certain Stein assured relations between it and Lubaki Ntelo, the supervisor of "social affairs" for the GRAE.¹ Correspondence between the UNITA and the PIDE² was published after April 25; the leader of this organization, J. Savimbi, worked in close collaboration with the Angolan Unity Front of Falcão, an extreme right-wing organization representing the colons of the Nova Lisboa region after April 25. Before July 10, 1975, troops of the FNLA machine-gunned meetings of the neighborhood committees in Luanda as well as workers demonstrations. It was the UNITA that put down the Lobito strike in 1974. These two leaderships denounced, in the name of anti-Communism, forms of self-management with the urban masses, and the seizure of their headquarters in Luanda in July 1975 led to the "discovery" of torture chambers, and many graveyards where MPLA militants, agitators, striking workers, and student leftists were liquidated. . . . Yes comrades, one cannot decide simply by reading a program such as you try to lecture us on. That is why one must look into the history of this country and the region, into the weight of certain tribal chieftainries, and into the political forces they produce in order to account for the qualitative differences that exist between the MPLA and the FNLA-UNITA. Also, because Angola is already divided into many concessions in the hands of different imperialist factions, one can no longer analyze "Angolan nationalism" solely in regard to its contradictions with Portugal. But this is also forgotten by the *IP* writers and also by Comrade Harsch, the author of articles on Angola.

3. The comrades claim that our support for the MPLA implies tail-endism, including the use made by the MPLA of our attitude in its diplomatic game. The comrades are making an amalgam of the positions of European centrist groups and those expressed in *Inprecor* reflecting the official positions of the Fourth International. In our articles we make a very long critique of the MPLA—of its program, its purely militaristic conception of the struggle against the FNLA, its opportunistic conception of African diplomacy, its political heterogeneity, and its bureaucratic mode of operation. In each of our articles we clearly expressed our conception of the coming political course of this petty-bourgeois nationalist leadership. We have clearly explained the meaning of our support for the MPLA, adding that through it we were speaking especially to the Angolan urban masses who have confidence in the Netoist leadership, warning them against the multiclass line of the leadership. We have always criticized the playing-up of "popular power" by the MPLA; and have advanced as an immediate perspective a workers and farmers government.

1. Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile), a body set up by the FNLA.—*IP*

2. Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (Salazarist State Security Police).—*IP*

Why do the *IP* comrades persist in hiding this in order to strengthen their proof? We also have criticized the inadequacy of the MPLA's political responses to the FNLA and the UNITA. It is not enough to denounce the former as a fascist group guided by remote control and the latter as a tribalist group. Again it is necessary to advance a body of slogans that definitively break the illusions of the small peasantry in the FNLA as defenders of the Bakongos and in the UNITA as defenders of the Ovimbundus. But because these slogans would have to be class slogans the heterogeneous leadership of the MPLA rejects these policies. Because the *IP* comrades do not see the class line that separates the urban movement, led by intermediary cadres of the MPLA, from the use of chieftains and notables by the FNLA and the UNITA to maintain social peace in their zone, they prefer to stay on the level of a false neutrality rather than making precise the exact nature of relations between each movement and the masses, at the risk of uttering incredible nonsense about the stakes in the civil war.

4. On the basis of this position, the comrades make another mistake in trying to provide an answer to the tasks for "small revolutionary groups." Size does not mechanically determine a "catalog" of tasks and responsibilities for a Trotskyist organization (which is a qualitatively different political category from that of "small" or "big revolutionary groups"). For such an organization it is not sufficient to give good "roundups" of a situation or to content oneself with benevolent or paternalistic solidarity with the right of self-determination. In Angola, for example, the Fourth International must be part and parcel of the evolution of the revolutionary vanguard and the blossoming of a clearly anti-capitalist force. We are not observers of the class struggle. We are involved in the building of the African revolutionary movement and particularly the African revolutionary Marxist groups. But the good lessons that the *IP* comrades want to give us do not suffice to begin—we mean begin—such work. It is by posing this question that one can understand just how the question of support for the MPLA is decisive for the further growth of the vanguard, starting with the appearance of a class-struggle tendency in the many neighborhood and factory committees as well as in the ranks of the MPLA. Already leaflets and writings have appeared in Luanda that are close to our conception of the permanent revolution. But this nascent radicalization knows that if the FNLA reenters Luanda it will be the first target of what Holden called the "cleanup of Communists." It is this dimension that the *IP* comrades miss. But how is it that they say nothing about the long paragraphs that end our articles on Angola? Do they view this as secondary? Must we be content not to "entangle revolutionary groups in the sometimes fratricidal politics of the nationalist groups" and not take the slightest interest in the route that the building of the Angolan revolutionary party must take? That is the curious thing. The comrades maintain such positions because implicitly they cite the established fact of no revolutionary party in Angola. But nothing comes up in their problématique to tell us and the *IP* readers how to construct it. Millions of men are confronted with a civil war that could well surpass in horror the Congolese civil war and Trotskyists must content themselves with assuring them of their solidarity with the withdrawal of Portuguese troops and the right to independence. We wager that many Angolans would consider this to be good, but a trifle inadequate. That can suffice for some support groups, but not for the growth of the Angolan revolution and for the construction of the Fourth International in Africa. That is why the attitude of the *IP* comrades seems to us to be opportunist. How can one respond in an overall manner to situations like those in Angola? Must we be astonished if the position of *IP* on Timor is not the same as that adopted on Angola? However, the formula the comrades have given us on Angola would no longer let us settle on or announce sympathy for the Fretilin. In Rhodesia would it be necessary to accept the reunification of the four groups, ANC, ZANU, ZAPU, and Frolizi, on the pretext that it is a matter of fratricidal

conflicts, whereas this "reunification" is being carried out under pressure from neocolonial states in order to help a right-wing conglomeration reduce the power of the armed groups that are implanted in the masses?

5. The comrades begin their article by trying to prove that our "errors on the MFA" lead to our "errors on Angola." This unhappy task ends in failure. But in our opinion their introductory sentences reveal their method. Because these comrades believe that the Angolan question is primarily determined by the analysis of Portugal, they engage in this nonsense on Angolan nationalism. Because they think a little in the Maoist fashion that there is a sort of "major contradiction" between the Portuguese power and Angolan nationalism, they refuse to take a position on its different components. With this method they reach an impasse on such important facts as American, French, English, German, Japanese, Belgian, and South African penetration into the Angolan economy, even in its most decisive sectors. Thus they avoid precision on the connection between the character of the Angolan economy and the purpose of the trips of UNITA and FNLA representatives to Europe, the FNLA control of the northern coffee plantations, the UNITA's control of the Cassinga iron mines belonging to Krupp and others, of the intervention of South African troops to protect the Cunene basin, and so forth. This does not mean that there are not certain tendencies inside the MPLA favorable to uniting with certain bourgeois circles (particularly Lucio Lara), but the essential thing is that *today* the mass movement that the MPLA is leading prevents these tendencies from pushing their perspective further and that because of this movement no imperialist circle will risk supporting the Netoist leadership. In this framework a defeat of the MPLA today would represent a defeat of the mass movement, a defeat of the first big experience of urban revolt in Africa, and a crushing of anticapitalist militants involved in the "popular power."

That the comrades of *IP* did not do all their homework in analyzing the Angolan situation is one thing. But we cannot accept an argumentation based on complete ignorance of the analysis put forward by the international in its official publication, *Imprecor*. That analysis is, in any case, a prerequisite for engaging in a public debate and for interesting the readers of *IP*.

October 15, 1975

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A Bill of Rights for Soviet Political Prisoners

[The following document, signed by sixty-six imprisoned Soviet dissidents, calls for a twenty-seven-point bill of rights for Soviet political prisoners. The document, which was written in mid-1975, is being circulated by the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners.* The committee has provided the translation.]

* * *

Joint appeal to: Committee for Legislative Proposals of the Council of the Union; Committee for Legislative Proposals of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

The principles of the criminal legislation of the USSR and its union republics have the aim, through criminal punishment, of correcting and reeducating the prisoner in the spirit of honest attitudes toward labor. The exact fulfillment of the laws and respect of the rules of socialist community living forestall the commission of new crimes and eradicate criminality. Accordingly, for reeducation, the following means are used for correction:

(1) the regime of serving the term of punishment; (2) socially useful labor; (3) political reeducation; (4) general professional and technical education.

These rules have become correctional labor legislation. However, these universal means do not take into account the motives for the crime. In the case of a great number of prisoners, this leads to results contrary to the aims of the legislation.

This category applies to persons who committed the crime in a condition [text unclear] which was brought about by use of force or a defense against a very severe insult or excessive use of force in self-defense or unpremeditated crimes. Up to the moment these people committed the crime, they could be completely honest citizens who respected and obeyed all rules of societal living, but which did not prevent them from committing a crime. You have to admit that compulsory labor which is applied to people of this kind becomes an element of punishment which contradicts the intention of the legislation. For a person with a sufficient level of education, political reeducation is not a sufficient means of correction because this was not the cause of the crime.

Article 7 of the correctional labor legislation prescribes the application of a consideration of to what degree the crime was a danger to society, the personality of the prisoner, his behavior, and disregards the

question of the motives of the crime. The basic means of reeducation—labor and the severity of the confinement (regime) became compulsory for all prisoners without distinction. In this way, the necessity to differentiate between means to use for prisoners becomes clear, depending on the motivation for the crime and the reasons which brought about these crimes. However, such an approach is not found in the legislation now in force, and reduces its effectiveness, and in some cases directly contradicts the demands of the basic law.

This is the case with persons sentenced for political, national and religious motives. Applying the correctional labor laws now in force against these persons is absolutely ridiculous. The great majority of these persons committed their acts not because of lack of education, labor practices, not because of a parasitical way of life but because of their political, national or religious beliefs.

Therefore it is appropriate to question not only the inadequacy of applying to these people the means of reeducation and correction which were meant for criminal recidivists but the legality of forceful change of a person's political, national or religious beliefs. The Soviet constitution grants to citizens the freedom of conscience and does not contain any restrictions in this area. Evidently, because of this consideration, the Soviet government affirmed the Declaration of Human Rights, which was accepted by the United Nations on December 10, 1948. Articles 18 and 19 of this Declaration spell out the right of a person to hold any political or religious views. The same principles are also reflected in the treaties on civil rights which were signed and ratified by the USSR. These legal documents certainly do not prevent the government from considering as crimes any actions by its citizens which arose from their political, national or religious beliefs but which nevertheless broke the laws in force in a country.

Thus, any attempts to forcefully change the beliefs of these people visibly contradict these legal documents.

Consequently, the correctional labor legislation of the USSR in its present form is not applicable to persons who are convicted for breaking the law for political, national or religious beliefs, since one of the aims of the criminal punishment in the USSR is the reeducation and correction of the prisoners. This being the case, even the name of the correctional labor legislation could not be applied to this category of people. From our point of view, we can talk only about the status of the political prisoner of the USSR. When laws are issued for them, the following must be taken into account:

The government cannot apply any forceful measures to influence a prisoner's political, national or religious beliefs. Therefore, the means of correction under Article 7 should not be applied by force, and a prisoner who refuses to fulfill the demands of the camp administration under this article should not be punished by the worsening of his legal or material condition or other undesirable consequences. In addition to these above mentioned rights of the prisoner, the right of medical care, the right to legal counsel in private, etc., persons convicted for political, national or religious beliefs should have the same rights as other citizens of the USSR, beyond those prescribed for those convicted of criminal actions. Granting of these rights to prisoners convicted for political, national or religious beliefs is necessary to secure and protect their freedom of conscience.

In this way the legal status of the political prisoners should in particular contain the following points:

1. The political prisoners—people convicted to deprivation of freedom on the accusation of breaking the law for political, national or religious motives—should be separated from the rest of the prisoners.

2. The political prisoners should be kept in confinement in the republic in which the incriminating acts were committed. The place of confinement should not be in a region with an unhealthy climate or in a place difficult to reach.

3. The political prisoner should have the right to receive, acquire and use—without limitation—books, journals, newspapers and other literature, including that published abroad (as long as it is not prohibited in the USSR). He has the right to acquire and use a radio, television and other means of receiving information.

4. The political prisoner should have the right to visits from relatives and other people, without limiting the number of visits. Correspondence should be unlimited. There should be no searches of visitors to the prisoners. Use of different languages in visits or in correspondence should not be limited.

5. The political prisoner should have the right to individual and collective religious practices, and the fulfillment of all other needs connected with religious practices, and to use and receive religious literature and objects, etc. Political prisoners should have a right to congregate by religious belief and to invite a religious functionary for services and religious holidays. The camp administration should be obligated to give a place to conduct these religious ceremonies.

6. The political prisoner—a citizen of the

* P.O. Box 142, Cooper Station, New York, New York 10003.

USSR—should have the right to actively participate in elections, providing the court has not limited this right. For this purpose, a polling place should be erected in the camp.

7. A political prisoner should not be limited in the use of his native language. There should not be allowed any manifestations of national discrimination.

8. The political prisoner should have the right to self-education and to physical culture and art. The political prisoner has the right to mutual help in these pursuits, and to acquire all necessary material for this purpose. The camp administration should be obligated to furnish a place for this.

9. Prisoners in the same camp should not be denied unlimited contacts.

10. Political prisoners should have the right to mark special occasions, both personal and historical.

11. Any form of forceful political reeducation by the camp administration should not be allowed. A political prisoner is not obligated to take part in the political reeducation conducted by the camp administration.

12. The camp administration should have no right to administer a punishment or worsen the condition of some political prisoners in relation to others for the maintenance of their political beliefs or for their behavior. However, the political prisoner could be subject by the camp administration to criminal punishment in cases mentioned in the general (outside) laws.

13. A self-organized group should be established and function outside the control of the camp administration. The use of this organization to the detriment of the rights of any prisoner cannot be tolerated.

14. No political prisoner should have any administrative function or supervision over any other political prisoner.

15. No form of compulsory work for the

political prisoner should be tolerated. The camp administration should give those who wish to work the possibility of doing so. The pay for labor by political prisoners should be according to the norms of the general economy. Any deductions from the pay of the political prisoner to cover expenses for his upkeep should not be tolerated. The length of the working day and week and the granting of periodic leave and sick leave should be in accordance with the general labor legislation. Safety standards in the work must be observed according to the general legislation. The time served by the political prisoner in the camps should be counted towards one's pension.

16. No degradation of human dignity will be tolerated. A political prisoner should not be forced to cut his hair, wear special uniforms, wear a special patch with his name and cell number, remove his hat and rise before representatives of the camp administration, etc.

17. The camp administration must inform a political prisoner and his relatives not less than three days before he is to be transferred to another camp about the new camp and the reason for the transfer.

18. The camp administration should provide a political prisoner with the maximum scientifically determined norms of nourishment, also taking into account a prisoner's health. No reduction or limitations of nourishment based on a political prisoner's behavior or beliefs should be tolerated.

19. The camp administration should furnish political prisoners free of charge with clothing, footwear, bedding articles, according to the season and local climate. The wearing of prison uniforms should not be obligatory.

20. The camp administration should be obligated to provide—at no cost to the political prisoner—living quarters, eating quarters, a place for studies and other needs in conformity with civil (outside) norms in force and sanitary-hygienic requirements.

21. In addition to the medical care of the convicted prescribed by law, the political prisoner should also have the right to prepay, according to his own discretion, to medical workers, including physicians from abroad, for medical examination and qualified consultations. If proper drugs are not available in the camp, the political prisoner should have the right to order them at his discretion, and the camp medical facilities are obligated to accept and use them as prescribed.

22. There should be no limitation of time spent by a political prisoner in the open air.

23. In addition to food, clothes, footwear, and bedding articles which are to be furnished free of charge by the camp administration, the political prisoner has the right to receive these items from relatives and other people and acquire and

use them by purchase.

24. The political prisoner should have the right to receive money from relatives and other persons, and should have the right to freely dispose of these funds.

The above enumerated list of demands is in addition to Article 1 of the corrective labor legislation, which states that the fulfillment of punishment does not have as its aim the causing of physical suffering or degradation of human dignity. To secure the strict fulfillment of the stated demands to observe legality when executing one's sentence, it is necessary, in addition to the existing system of procurator's supervision and control by the society of the USSR, to also establish control by foreign and international organizations. Thus, the following should be guaranteed:

(a) The right of appeal by the political prisoner to the press, to renowned personalities and organizations; (b) the right of representatives of social organizations, the press and individual personalities to visit the camp, and the right and possibility to learn the conditions and to meet the political prisoner; (c) this should apply to representatives of society, press and organizations of the USSR, foreign countries and international groups.

This is necessary to prevent encroachment on the freedom of conscience of the political prisoner, since according to Article 126 of the Soviet constitution, the guiding force of any social or state organization is the ruling party—the CPSU—which leads the struggle against those political, religious and national beliefs which, as a rule, appear to be the motives for the actions of the political prisoners.

Since these proposals mentioned in this appeal radically differ from the basic principles of the corrective labor law approved by legislation of July 11, 1969, a special legislative act of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is necessary to change them. This is why we appeal with a request to the Committee for Legislative Proposals to formulate a new law regarding political prisoners and send it on to the Supreme Soviet.

In Vladimir prison: Levko Lukyanenko, Nikolai Budulak-Sharygan, Vladlen Pablyenko, Alexander Chekalin, Gunar Rode, Yakov Suslensky, Yuri Vudka, Alexi Safonov, Vitold Abankin, Yury Shukhevych, Valentyn Moroz, Sergei Verkhov, Olexander Sergiyenko, Anatoly Zdorovy, Vladimir Bukovsky, Yuri Gorodetsky, Yosef Mishner, Vladimir Afanasev, Mikhail Makarenko, Georgi Davidov, Kronid Lubarsky, Hillel Butman.

In Potma labor camp: Edward Kuznetsov, Yuri Fedorov, Alexei Murzhenko.

In Perm labor camp no. 35: Zinovy Antonyuk, Ivan Svitlychny, Mykola Horbal, Ihor Kalynets, Valery Marchenko, Ivan

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In Perm labor camp no. 36: Stepan Sapilak, Dimitro Hrinkiv, Volodimir Senkiv, Roman Chuprey, Yevhen Sverstyuk, Oleg Vorobyov, Yosef Mendelevich, Wolf Zalmanson, Mark Dymshitz, Sharunao Zhukaouskas, Yonas Shilinskas, Andrias

Migraouskas, Apollony Bernichuk, Nikolai Bondar, Vitaly Kalinichenko, Andris Pupe, Villi Saarts, Ashot Pavasardyan.

In Mordovian strict-regime camps: Paruir Irikyan, Ararat Tovmosyan, Vasyl Stus, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Israel Zalmanson. □

Sakharov's Appeal for Amnesty for Soviet Political Prisoners

[The following is the text of the speech Andrei Sakharov, winner of this year's Nobel Peace Prize, prepared for delivery at the International Sakharov Hearings, held in Copenhagen October 17-19. The hearings, called to investigate the state of human rights in the Soviet Union, were not able to hear testimony from Sakharov directly because he is not permitted to travel from the Soviet Union. His speech was, however, read to the gathering. The translation was done for *Intercontinental Press* by Hilary Jaeger.]

* * *

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak out at this hearing and for the fact that it has been named after me. I consider this as recognition not only of my personal merit but also of the merits of those in my country who are striving for the open airing of views and for the realization of human rights, in particular those who pay for this with the high price of their personal freedom.

I believe that the witnesses at this hearing, relying on numerous documents and personal experience, will be able to present a convincing picture of persecution, extrajudicial and judicial—including psychiatric persecution—for convictions, for national aspirations, and for the desire to leave the country. They will take up the strictness of the regimen in places of imprisonment, which must not be tolerated in the contemporary world. They will also tell about the continuing violation of the rights of the Crimean Tatars and a number of other nationalities, and about the violation of freedom of conscience and persecution for religious conviction.

Among the documents that are important to this hearing I would especially like to mention the informational publication *Chronicle of Current Events* put out in the USSR in samizdat. The problems mentioned above are dealt with in detail and objectively in its pages, particularly in a special issue devoted to the tragically intolerable situation in the camps and prisons of our country.

In this regard I call the attention of the hearing to the intensification of repression against political prisoners. In just the last few months many of them have been transported to Vladimir prison, including

Rode, Superfin, Antonyuk, Khnokh, and Torik. The threat of a camp trial hangs over Gluzman. I feel that the central work of the hearing should be the demand for general political amnesty in the USSR, as called for in the recent appeal of Larissa Bogoraz, Anatoly Marchenko, and others.

Political amnesty would be a most important factor in changing the moral and political climate in our country and would provide decisive support for the principles of détente inside and outside the country. I am of the conviction that for every person in the West, the demand for general political amnesty and the demand for the guarantee of human rights and free speech in the USSR are not only matters of conscience, but also a defense of one's own future and the future of one's children.

Now, after the Helsinki conference, these demands are especially timely. I consider it important that the hearing speak out in defense of the prisoners of conscience known to it in the USSR, such as Leonid Plyushch, who is being subjected to psychiatric obliteration in the Dnepropetrovsk special psychiatric hospital, and the heroic prisoners of Vladimir prison and the Perm and Mordovian camps.

Among them is the priest Vasily Romanuk, sentenced for a second time in a closed trial to ten years for religious activity and for a few words of sympathy for Valentyn Moroz. The first arrest of Romanuk, the first ten-year term, did not have even this kind of basis, but nevertheless entailed exile for his whole family, starvation for his father, and the murder of his young brother. In 1959 Romanuk was rehabilitated; nevertheless at his second conviction in 1972 he was declared an especially dangerous recidivist.

Romanuk conducted a long hunger strike to protest the injustice perpetrated against him. Now his life is threatened. I urge the participants of this hearing to use all possible means to save Romanuk and ease the condition of his unfortunate family. The fate of the priest Romanuk is an accurate illustration of the religious situation in our country.

It is very important that the hearing speak out in defense of the prisoners arrested in 1974 and 1975 who are awaiting trial. I refer to Sergei Kovalyov and Andrei Tverdokhlebov, members of the Soviet group of Amnesty International, who are

being charged because of their many years of open activity in the name of human rights and in the name of free speech.

Specifically, Sergei Kovalyov is charged with distributing Solzhenitsyn's book *Gulag Archipelago*. Apparently this is one of the main points of the charges against him. Solzhenitsyn's remarkable book has been declared slanderous. Such a position in itself is self-incriminating, and I hope that at some time it will be revised. Kovalyov, a talented biologist and a man of overwhelming and vigorous kindness and honesty, is threatened with seven years imprisonment and five years exile.

I urge the adoption of a special resolution in defense of Kovalyov; Tverdokhlebov; Mustafa Dzhemilev, who is mortally weakened by physical exhaustion, having declared a hunger strike lasting many months, and who is threatened with a fourth term; and Vladimir Osipov, sentenced again to eight years.

Especially urgent is the demand for the speedy release of women political prisoners; the freeing of all prisoners who were sentenced to twenty-five-year terms before the adoption of the new legislation; the easing of the regimen for all prisoners, in particular the observance of work safety regulations and the abrogation of the compulsory character of work, the improvement of food and medical services, and the allowing of packages, as well as medicine and vitamins, into places of confinement.

The political prisoners of Mordovia gave me the right to speak at the hearing in their name. I cannot today give the individual names of these people, but I consider it my duty to the best of my understanding to reflect their aspirations.

I hope that this hearing will attract the undivided attention of the Danish and world press and will be an important step in strengthening the fight for human rights in the USSR. □

Documents discussed at 1974 Tenth World Congress of Fourth International. 128 pages, 8½ x 11, \$2.50

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The Dene Declaration of Rights

[The Dene Declaration of Rights, printed below, is an appeal for worldwide support for the struggle of these aboriginal peoples in the Northwest Territories of Canada (NWT) for the right of self-determination.

[The Dene nation (Dene means "the people") is composed of four tribes—the Loucheaux, Dogrib, Slavey, and Chipewyan. Treaties signed in 1899 and 1921 recognize them as a nation, but current Canadian federal law classifies them as "special citizens."

[The Dene Declaration of Rights was adopted at a July 17-23 Annual Joint General Assembly of the Indian Brotherhood of the NWT and the Metis Association of the NWT, held at Fort Simpson. The 300 delegates affirmed that the Dene nation includes those persons from the NWT who trace their ancestry to one of the four tribes, as well as to the NWT Crees, whose ancestors have lived in the area with the four tribes.

[The declaration is reprinted from the November 3 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Toronto.]

* * *

We the Dene of the NWT insist on the right to be regarded by ourselves and the world as a Nation.

Our struggle is for recognition of the Dene Nation by the Government and the people of Canada and the peoples and the governments of the world.

As once Europe was the exclusive homeland of the European peoples, Africa the exclusive homeland of the African peoples, the New World, North and South America, was the exclusive homeland of Aboriginal people of the New World, the Amerindian and the Inuit.

The New World like other parts of the world has suffered the experience of colonialism and imperialism. Other peoples who have occupied the land—often with force—and foreign governments have imposed themselves on our people. Ancient civilizations and ways of life have been destroyed.

Colonialism and imperialism is now dead or dying. Recent years have witnessed the birth of new nations or rebirth of old nations out of the ashes of colonialism.

As Europe is the place where you will find European countries with European governments for European peoples, now also will you find in Africa and Asia the existence of African and Asian countries with African or Asian governments for the African and Asian peoples.

The African and Asian peoples—the people of the Third World—have fought for and won the right to self-determination, the right to recognition as distinct peoples and

The Struggle of the Dene People

Native Press, a bimonthly newspaper published in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, is one of the tribunes of the call for Dene self-determination. A report on the Dene struggle in the November 3 issue of *Labor Challenge* quoted extensively from a recent series of articles in *Native Press* explaining the background to the Dene Declaration of Rights.

"The biggest difference between us and the government," *Native Press* said, "is that we want to sit down with the government as the Dene nation, but the government wants to pretend that we are not a nation. We want to survive as a Dene nation, but they wish to 'buy' our land and our rights and integrate us into their society as if there was no difference between Indian and White!

"This is the land claims issue. Too

many people have misunderstood what the land claims issue is all about. They think that the difference between the Dene and the government positions is that the Dene are asking for more land and money than the government will give us. This is not the real problem.

"The truth is that we want to survive as a people, the Dene nation, with the right to govern ourselves (make our own laws), to educate ourselves on our own lands. This is what the government will not accept. They will not accept the Dene way and its right to survive."

Land is the central issue, *Native Press* explained, because it represents "our people, our culture, our way of life and our language. When white people expect us to give up our land in a land settlement, they are really asking us to disappear as a people, as Dene."

the recognition of themselves as nations.

But in the New World, the native peoples have not fared so well. Even in countries in South America where the Native peoples are the vast majority of the population there is not one country which has an Amerindian government for the Amerindian peoples.

Nowhere in the New World have the Native peoples won the right to self-determination and the right to recognition by the world as a distinct people and as Nations.

While the Native people of Canada are a minority in their homeland, the Native people of the NWT, the Dene and the Inuit, are a majority of the population of the NWT.

The Dene find themselves as part of a country. That country is Canada. But the Government of Canada is not the Government of Dene. The Government of the NWT is not the Government of Dene. These governments were not the choice of the Dene, they were imposed on the Dene.

What we the Dene are struggling for is the recognition of the Dene Nation by the governments and peoples of the world.

And while there are realities we are forced to submit to, such as the existence of a country called Canada, we insist on the right of self-determination as a distinct people and the recognition of the Dene Nation.

We the Dene are part of the Fourth World. And as the peoples and Nations of the world have come to recognize the existence and rights of those peoples who make up the Third World the day must come and will

come when the nations of the Fourth World will come to be recognized and respected. The challenge to the Dene and the world is to find the way for the recognition of the Dene Nation.

Our plea to the world is to help us in our struggle to find a place in the world community where we can exercise our right to self-determination as a distinct people and as a Nation.

What we seek then is independence and self-determination within the country of Canada. That is what we mean when we call for a just land settlement for the Dene Nation. □

10,000 Political Prisoners in USSR

There are at least 10,000 political prisoners in the Soviet Union, according to a recent study released by Amnesty International. The findings were based largely on the testimony of former prisoners, according to a report on the study in the November 18 *New York Times*.

Among the "crimes" considered treasonable under Soviet law are "flight abroad or refusal to return from abroad," "circulation of slanderous fabrications that defame the Soviet state and social system," "participation in an anti-Soviet organization," and infringement of "the rights of citizens under the appearance of preaching religious beliefs and performing religious ceremonies."

Amnesty International stated, "These articles of Soviet criminal law restrict the exercise of fundamental human rights."

Tropas Sudafricanas Intervienen en la Lucha en Angola

Por Ernest Harsch

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "South African Troops Intervene in Angola Fighting" que apareció en el número del 1 de diciembre de *Intercontinental Press*. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

La intervención en Angola por parte de potencias imperialistas rivales—cada una de las cuales busca incrementar su porción en la explotación de la inmensa riqueza natural del país—ha entrado en una nueva y peligrosa etapa en las últimas semanas. Aún antes de que los colonialistas portugueses otorgaran la independencia a Angola, tropas de Sudáfrica penetraron el país y empezaron a luchar contra uno de los tres grupos nacionalistas rivales.

Desde la última semana de octubre, el Movimiento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) perdió una serie de ciudades importantes que había ocupado en la parte central y sur de Angola.

Las fuerzas del MPLA fueron desplazadas por una columna militar fuertemente armada compuesta de varios cientos de soldados del Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) y la União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), quienes eran reforzados por un número desconocido de tropas extranjeras.

La columna militar ocupó cientos de millas a través de Angola, tomando en rápida sucesión las ciudades de Sá da Bandeira, Moçâmedes, Benguela, Lobito, Novo Redondo, y Porto Amboim. La columna, según los informes, se dividió entonces en dos partes, una que se dirigió hacia Dondo, donde se encuentra la planta que abastece de electricidad a Luanda, y la otra hacia Malange, otra ciudad de importancia aún bajo control del MPLA.

El 11 de noviembre, el MPLA proclamó la República Popular de Angola, estableciendo su capital en Luanda. El FNLA y UNITA erigieron la rival República Popular Democrática de Angola, con Huambo (anteriormente Nova Lisboa) como su capital temporal. El FNLA y UNITA se han comprometido a capturar a Luanda y derribar al régimen del MPLA.

Varios periodistas que visitaron recientemente áreas del centro de Angola, controladas por el FNLA y UNITA, han confirmado la presencia de tropas sudafricanas en el país.

En un informe publicado en el número del

16 de noviembre del *Observer* de Londres, Tony Hodges informa:

Volé a Benguela el lunes [10 de noviembre], el día antes de que Angola obtuviera formalmente su independencia de Portugal. Poco después de aterrizar, vimos más de 50 soldados sudafricanos uniformados almacenando cajas de armamento en los hangares del aeropuerto. Dos autos blindados Panhard, conducidos por soldados sudafricanos jóvenes, rubios, custodiaban el camino de acceso al aeropuerto. Tenían entre 18 y 20 años, demasiado jóvenes para ser mercenarios.

Un periodista japonés y yo pudimos hablar con tres jóvenes soldados blancos en otro poblado controlado por la UNITA, Silva Porto, 250 millas al este de aquí. Dos de ellos conducían autos blindados cubiertos con pintas que decían "Viva UNITA."

Se negaron a revelar su nacionalidad; pero no entendían portugués y hablaban inglés con fuerte acento sudafricano. No se nos permitió fotografíarlos.

El corresponsal de Reuters Fred Bridgland dijo en un informe en el número del 16 de noviembre de *Los Angeles Times*:

En las últimas dos semanas, he hablado con soldados blancos con acento sudafricano en autos blindados en Silva Porto, 425 millas al norte de la frontera de Angola con África Sudoccidental, el territorio administrado por Sudáfrica.

He visto también soldados de piel blanca, muchos de ellos rubios, en las ciudades costeras de Benguela y Lobito, de donde se han retirado las fuerzas del MPLA. . . .

Un portugués que trabaja estrechamente con UNITA me dijo: "Los sudafricanos están haciendo un buen trabajo. Son profesionales."

"Esta es su guerra. Si no libran la guerra aquí ahora, tendrán que lucharla de su lado."

Funcionarios del gobierno norteamericano comisionados a observar los desarrollos en la región de Angola han revelado que entre las fuerzas de UNITA se encuentran apostados consejeros sudafricanos.

El Comandante Juju, un dirigente del ejército del MPLA, ha afirmado que el comandante de la columna militar fue identificado como un Coronel sudafricano, aunque no se sabía si era un mercenario o un soldado regular.

El 16 de noviembre, los periódicos de Johannesburgo, Sudáfrica, informaron acerca de la existencia de un puente aéreo entre el aeropuerto de Rand, cerca de Johannesburgo, y Sá da Bandeira, por medio del cual se transporta a Angola "mercenarios, principalmente de nacionalidad portuguesa, pero también sudafricanos y mercenarios veteranos del Congo."

Un periodista británico ha informado que el ejército sudafricano ha establecido una

base en Sá da Bandeira. (Citado el 15 de noviembre en el *New York Times*.)

Gran parte del equipo, armamento y combustible usado por la columna militar parece también ser proveniente de territorio sudafricano.

Bridgland informó en su reporte que de acuerdo con "fuentes enteradas" los soldados blancos en la columna estaban siendo abastecidos desde bases militares permanentes en Namibia (África Sudoccidental), un territorio ocupado por Sudáfrica.

El corresponsal del *Washington Post* David B. Ottaway informó en un reporte desde Luanda el 14 de noviembre, que de acuerdo con fuentes del MPLA se estaban enviando abastecimientos bélicos por barco de Sudáfrica a los puertos de Angola controlados por el FNLA y UNITA.

El número del 17 de noviembre del semanario alemán *Der Spiegel* afirmó que la columna estaba equipada con helicópteros Alouette, autos blindados Panhard, tanques ligeros Marmon-Herrington y morteros calibre 4.2—todos los cuales son usados por el ejército sudafricano. Aún más, oficiales de inteligencia militar portugueses afirman haber identificado a los Panhard como aquéllos que son manufacturados bajo licencia en Sudáfrica.

Los rivales del MPLA también han obtenido armas de otras fuentes. En septiembre, el Presidente de UNITA Jonas Savimbi dijo que su grupo había recibido considerables envíos de armamentos de "ciertas democracias occidentales." Según pilotos en el aeropuerto de Silva Porto, diariamente llega ahí una remesa de armas proveniente de Kinshasa, la capital de Zaire.

Funcionarios del gobierno de los Estados Unidos han admitido que Washington está proveyendo de manera secreta con armas y ayuda militar a los rivales del MPLA. Se piensa que mucha de esta ayuda se canaliza a través del régimen Zairota, que apoya al FNLA y UNITA.

La UNITA ha negado que tropas sudafricanas regulares se encuentren luchando con sus fuerzas. El 11 de noviembre Jeremiah Chitunda, un miembro del Buró Político de UNITA, declaró en Nueva York, "no existe la intervención sudafricana en apoyo a un movimiento de liberación en Angola." Savimbi declaró en Lobito el 14 de noviembre, "No hay tropas sudafricanas aquí que hayan sido enviadas por el gobierno Sudafricano."

Savimbi ha admitido, sin embargo, que algunos mercenarios extranjeros estaban ayudando a sus fuerzas. "Necesitamos gente que luche con los autos blindados que nosotros no sabemos cómo operar. Pueden ser sudafricanos o de Rodesia, pero la mayoría de ellos son franceses," dijo. "Hay mercenarios aquí que lucharon en Biafra." (*Jornal Novo*, 17 de noviembre.)

La lista de Savimbi era tan sólo una lista parcial. "También hay mercenarios norteamericanos ayudando a la causa de UNITA," informó Hodges. "Un ex Boina Verde, llamado Skip, quien sirvió en Vietnam, me dijo en Silva Porto que había ofrecido sus servicios a UNITA como piloto experto." Un traductor de UNITA dijo a los periodistas que había quince norteamericanos en Capola, al norte de Silva Porto, entrenando a los reclutas de UNITA.

Además, pilotos británicos fueron vistos volando aviones de Lusaka, Zambia, a Huambo. Ex oficiales y soldados portugueses, algunos de los cuales eran de hecho colonos en Angola, están ayudando a las fuerzas de ambos UNITA y el FNLA (hay también muchos portugueses con el MPLA).

El régimen sudafricano ha negado repetidamente que sus tropas estén involucradas en la lucha entre los tres grupos nacionalistas angoleses. Sin embargo, ha admitido que realiza operaciones contra las guerrillas de la South West African People's Organization [SWAPO—Organización Popular de Africa Sudoccidental], la cual lucha por acabar con el control sudafricano de Namibia.

El Ministro de Defensa sudafricano Pieter Botha ha declarado que las fuerzas sudafricanas seguirán a los "terroristas de SWAPO" a países vecinos si es necesario. El número del 18 de octubre de *Die Transvaler* afirmó que los observadores creían que los ataques contra la SWAPO habían sido llevados a cabo en el sur de Angola, donde se encuentran ubicadas la mayoría de las bases de la SWAPO.

Fuentes del MPLA y la SWAPO informaron que en agosto tropas sudafricanas atacaron a fuerzas del MPLA y de la UNITA en el sur de Angola y atacaron varias aldeas angolesas.

Además, el Ministro del Exterior de Sudáfrica Hilgard Muller admitió en Londres el 18 de noviembre que tropas sudafricanas estaban "custodiando" las instalaciones hidroeléctricas de Cunene en el sur de Angola cerca de la frontera con Namibia. La primera incursión en el área de la presa Cunene fue realizada, según se informó, en agosto.

Pretoria tuvo la cooperación plena de la junta militar de Lisboa en esta operación cuando Angola era aún una colonia de Portugal. El Ministro de Defensa Botha reveló el 22 de noviembre que el envío de tropas sudafricanas a "proteger" las instalaciones de Cunene había sido realizado con



Los Angeles Times

el conocimiento previo y aprobación de Lisboa.

Parece que el régimen de Sudáfrica está tratando de evitar la responsabilidad política por las tropas sudafricanas que luchan contra el MPLA aduciendo que son "mercenarios." Los informes periodísticos sobre el puente aéreo de mercenarios que fueron publicados en Johannesburgo el 16 de noviembre parecían diseñados para dar precisamente esa impresión. El número del 15 de noviembre de *Rand Daily Mail*, sin embargo, apareció con un espacio en blanco en su portada; los editores explicaron que un artículo sobre Angola no había sido "autorizado para su publicación." El régimen ha invocado una ley de defensa que prohíbe la publicación de cualquier noticia sobre movimientos de tropas sudafricanas.

El que las tropas sudafricanas que luchan en Angola sean de hecho mercenarios pagados que operan con el apoyo activo y estímulo de Pretoria, o sean tropas regulares bajo el disfraz de mercenarios, no está todavía claro. Cualquiera que sea la forma precisa de la intervención sudafricana, el régimen minoritario blanco tiene claramente intereses importantes cuya suerte depende del resultado del conflicto en Angola.

Además de la considerable inversión sudafricana en el proyecto de la presa Cunene en el sur de Angola, una compañía sudafricana controla un consorcio comisionado para explotar los minerales en la región entre el río Cunene y la frontera con Namibia. Hay también considerables intereses sudafricanos en otras industrias angolesas, en particular en las minas de diamantes.

A pesar de que el FNLA, UNITA y MPLA se han comprometido todos a proteger y promover la inversión extranjera en Angola, parece que Pretoria considera al MPLA menos confiable o capaz de salvaguardar los intereses particulares de Sudáfrica. Sin embargo, la protección de las propiedades

económicas sudafricanas es tan sólo uno de los factores detrás de la intervención militar de Pretoria.

Una consideración más importante puede ser el deseo de Sudáfrica de impedir que la Unión Soviética, la cual respalda al MPLA, gane una fuerte influencia política en un país colindante con el territorio ocupado por Sudáfrica de Namibia. Pretoria puede también estar contando con concesiones políticas por parte del FNLA y UNITA a cambio de respaldo militar en su lucha fraccional por el poder.

Además de intervenir directamente en la lucha en Angola, Sudáfrica ha aprovechado también la oportunidad para debilitar a la lucha nacionalista en Namibia golpeando las bases de la SWAPO en Angola.

La intervención militar sudafricana en Angola es un peligro inmediato para la lucha angoleña por la independencia. Aunque actualmente es dirigida contra el MPLA, amenaza las conquistas del movimiento nacionalista en su conjunto y podría perpetuar una guerra fratricida en la cual las masas angolesas son los principales perdedores.

La intervención sudafricana podría, además, servir como pretexto para una mayor intervención extranjera a medida que las potencias imperialistas maniobran para obtener posiciones en el país rico en minerales.

La UNITA y el FNLA, quienes por sus propias razones fraccionales estrechas han permitido que las tropas sudafricanas entren a Angola, han comprometido seriamente los objetivos de la lucha por la independencia. Sobre ellos recae la mayor parte de la responsabilidad por dar al imperialismo una coyuntura para incrementar su intervención. □

El PC Francés Condena el Antimilitarismo

Los comités formados por reclutas en el ejército francés han estado atrayendo una atención considerable.

"El gobierno," informó Jacques Isnard en el número del 7 de noviembre de *Le Monde*, "pensó que al conceder algunas mejoras financieras había disipado el descontento en el ejército que hizo su aparición durante la pasada campaña electoral presidencial con la publicación por parte de la Liga Comunista Revolucionaria de Alain Krivine del 'Llamado de los Cien' y que creció espectacularmente conduciendo a manifestaciones de protesta de soldados en las calles de Draguignan y Karlsruhe."

El 25 de octubre el comité de defensa nacional del Partido Comunista Francés respondió al persistente fermento en el ejército condenando el "antimilitarismo de elementos de la extrema izquierda" y llamando a los jóvenes comunistas que son reclutados a prestar su servicio "en un espíritu combativo."

Juan Carlos Promete 'Firmeza' en la Tradición Franquista

Por David Russell

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Juan Carlos Pledges 'Firmness' in the Franco Tradition" que apareció en el número del 1 de diciembre de *Intercontinental Press*. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Como Adolfo Hitler, el hombre que lo ayudó a tomar el poder, Francisco Franco ha pasado a la historia como un representante de la barbarie, el atraso y la brutalidad. Las noticias de su muerte el 20 de noviembre fueron recibidas con gran entusiasmo a través del mundo.

Aunque Franco no tenía escrúpulos acerca de causar la muerte de cientos de miles, le daba otro valor a su propia vida. En un país con únicamente una cama de hospital por cada 1,748 personas, un equipo de treinta y dos especialistas médicos pasaron un mes tratando de salvar al viejo fascista de la muerte.

Los grandes esfuerzos del régimen por tratar de preservar a su moribundo dirigente, reflejaban el temor a lo que sucedería una vez que desapareciera.

"Se ha informado que el General, cuyo peso se ha reducido a menos de 80 [libras], está en un estado alterado de hibernación con una reducida temperatura y el latido del corazón disminuido para minimizar la tensión que en dos ocasiones ha causado úlceras que sangran," escribió el corresponsal Henry Giniger del *New York Times* desde Madrid el 15 de noviembre. "Una máquina de diálisis ha remplazado sus riñones defectuosos. Un pulmón artificial reemplaza los pulmones congestionados."

De acuerdo con su herencia oscurantista, los partidarios de Franco buscaron además otros medios para frenar la marcha del tiempo. El Obispo de Zaragoza llevó el manto de la Virgen de Pilar a la cama de Franco con la esperanza de efectuar una cura milagrosa. Otras reliquias religiosas fueron usadas también. Giniger informó, "Un sacerdote del pueblo cercano de Alcalá de Henares trajo una reliquia semejante hoy día, y dijo que había funcionado a las mil maravillas para un hijo de Felipe II en el siglo 16."

De Hitler a Eisenhower

En la sección necrológica del *New York Times*, Alden Whitman describió la oficina de Franco, señalando que "las fotografías sobre las paredes habían cambiado a través

de los años. Antes había retratos con dedicatorias de Hitler y Mussolini; más tarde hubo una del Presidente Eisenhower; y esa fue remplazada por una del Papa Paulo VI."

Aunque Eisenhower no pudo asistir al funeral del dictador, Richard Nixon, quien era vice-presidente bajo Eisenhower, hizo pública una declaración alabando a Franco por su "política de firmeza y justicia hacia aquéllos que lucharon contra él."

La actitud oficial del régimen de Ford fue aclarada con el envío del Vice-presidente Nelson Rockefeller al funeral de Franco y al coronamiento del sucesor del dictador fascista, escogido por él mismo, Juan Carlos de Borbón, como rey de España.

El aislamiento del régimen de Franco fue enfatizado por el hecho de que los únicos Jefes de Estado extranjeros en la ceremonia eran el dictador chileno Gen. Augusto Pinochet, el Rey Hussein de Jordania, y el Rey Rainier de Mónaco.

En su investidura como Juan Carlos I el 22 de noviembre, el nuevo rey prometió lealtad a Franco, juró mantener las leyes que él había establecido, y recordó su propio "respeto" y "agradecimiento" para el dictador. "Aquéllos que querían que el nuevo rey rompiera con el pasado y anunciara en términos específicos un nuevo comienzo fueron decepcionados," dijo Henry Giniger en el número del 23 de noviembre del *New York Times*.

"Prometió 'firmeza y prudencia,'" continúa Giniger, "y parece que la prudencia dominaba en lo que era una ocasión ceremonial."

Una evaluación similar fue hecha por Miguel Acoca, quien dijo en el número del 23 de noviembre del *Washington Post* que el nuevo rey "dejó claro que la transición de los 36 años de dictadura militar a una monarquía moderna que impulsara el cambio, será lenta y medida."

No es muy probable que el prospecto de un cambio "lento y medido" después de casi cuarenta años de gobierno dictatorial sea un prospecto muy atractivo para las masas españolas. La democratización "lenta y medida" sólo puede significar que aquéllos que quieren ir demasiado rápido para Juan Carlos serán reprimidos. En España actualmente, esto significa la gran mayoría de la población.

Las familias, amigos y partidarios de cientos de presos políticos encerrados en las cárceles del régimen, por ejemplo, no están

de ninguna manera dispuestos a resignarse a una demora muy larga antes de exigir la amnistía incondicional para las víctimas de la "justicia" de Franco. ¿Tratará Juan Carlos de encarcelarlos también cuando exigen amnistía para aquéllos ya presos?

¿Qué de los miembros del Partido Comunista, que Juan Carlos insiste no legalizará? ¿Los arrestará también cuando intenten llevar a cabo cualquier actividad abierta?

Juan Carlos I encara otros problemas además de estos. Primero en la lista está el de la economía. Este aspecto de la situación fue citado por el corresponsal Giniger del *New York Times* el 21 de noviembre.

Giniger dio el ejemplo de una sesión del gabinete el 14 de noviembre "en la cual los precios de la gasolina y de otros productos del petróleo fueron incrementados notablemente junto con las tarifas de electricidad, mientras que se estableció un límite muy estricto a los salarios. Aún los españoles apolíticos, quienes supuestamente son la mayoría, sintieron que algo andaba mal, y protestas en todo el país no son un buen pronóstico para la paz social."

¿Legalizará Juan Carlos los sindicatos representativos en el momento en que el régimen intenta reducir el nivel de vida de las masas trabajadoras?

Al reflexionar sobre los problemas que encaran los capitalistas al intentar controlar las aspiraciones democráticas de las masas españolas, Jim Hoagland dijo en el número del 20 de noviembre del *Washington Post*: "Aún los supuestos grupos democráticos . . . son dirigidos por hombres quienes en el pasado han colaborado con o mantenido la comunicación con Franco. Cómo le irá a esta dirección en la España posfranquista, no es seguro."

Cuánto éxito tendrán los franquistas "moderados" en adoptar un tinte "democrático" fue indicado en el artículo del 7 de noviembre del corresponsal de *Le Monde* Marcel Niedergang. "La primera medida concreta que los moderados esperan por parte de Juan Carlos para renovar su confianza en él," dijo Niedergang, "es un indulto inmediato, una amnistía general que cubra todo menos 'los crímenes de sangre,' y el asesinato de policías y guardias civiles."

Esta fórmula no incluiría a algunos de los presos políticos más prominentes de España, como Eva Forest, quien es acusada falsamente de haber participado en el

asesinato del Primer Ministro Carrero Blanco en diciembre de 1973. ¿Aceptarán las masas los veredictos falsos de las cortes españolas, cuyos jueces fueron nombrados por Franco, o de los tribunales militares especiales establecidos para procesar a aquéllos acusados de haber asesinado a policías y guardias civiles? O, ¿llegarán en cambio, a su propio veredicto sobre los fraudulentos "demócratas" y exigirán no tan sólo la amnistía incondicional para todas las víctimas del régimen, sino también justicia para los torturadores que trabajan para él?

De acuerdo con su perspectiva de participar en un gobierno de coalición capitalista, es precisamente con estos franco-moderados que los stalinistas y social demócratas están tratando de ligarse. Santiago Carrillo, el dirigente exilado del Partido Comunista Español, anunció incluso que respetaría el período de luto por Franco.

Carrillo trató de tranquilizar a Washington al igual que a los capitalistas españoles. Sus comentarios al respecto fueron reportados en el número del 7 de noviembre del *Washington Post*. "Estamos en contra de todas las bases extranjeras en España, ya sean norteamericanas, rusas o las que sean," dijo. "Pero también somos realistas. Estamos dispuestos a continuar con las bases norteamericanas mientras que los problemas de seguridad de Europa no estén resueltos."

Carrillo agregó, "No creemos que un régimen democrático en España perturbaría el balance estratégico en Europa mientras que siga existiendo estos bloques. . . . Estamos dispuestos a cooperar con los Estados Unidos para conseguir la paz y una España democrática."

Los social demócratas en el Partido Socialista Obrero de España (PSOE) son igualmente serviles. *Jornal Novo*, un diario de Lisboa, publicó una entrevista con el Secretario General del PSOE, Antonio García López, el 5 de noviembre. García López no tenía ningún interés en discutir las posibilidades de dirigir a las masas en la lucha. El entrevistador resumió los puntos de vista de García López:

"Las fuerzas armadas tendrán la mayor responsabilidad en la transformación de España en un país democrático," nos dijo. Sin embargo, continuó, "la acción de Juan Carlos no dejará de ser importante debido a la posición que mantiene el Príncipe y, sobre todo, porque él mismo es un hombre militar. . . ."

Los stalinistas y social demócratas tendrán que vencer grandes obstáculos antes de poder realizar su sueño de sentarse en un gabinete con el nuevo rey. No hay una dirección capitalista importante en España que no haya sido manchada a través de su asociación con el régimen fascista. Y no cabe duda que los "demócratas" con un pie en el campo de la dictadura serán rebasados



Informations Ouvrières

DIRIGENTE DEL PC CARRILLO: "Estamos dispuestos a cooperar con los Estados Unidos. . . ."

por las masas en las primeras luchas verdaderas.

Aún si, contrario a todas las señales, el sucesor de Franco tendiera a introducir reformas democráticas, es dudoso si podría realmente instituir cualquier cambio significativo. Los veteranos del movimiento fascista están firmemente instalados en todas partes del aparato del Estado, especialmente en el ejército y la policía, y las organizaciones fascistas nutridas por el régimen están activas a escala muy amplia.

La determinación de los fascistas incondicionales de prevenir cualquier democratización ha sido anunciada por una ola de arrestos acompañados de ataques a los activistas políticos por parte de matones derechistas. Además, las condiciones bajo las cuales se mantienen a los presos políticos se han endurecido desde que Franco se enfermó en octubre.

Bajo el régimen salazarista en Portugal, había un movimiento derechista mucho más débil que en España, y las fuerzas armadas habían sido desmoralizadas por más de una década de guerra en Africa. Pero aún ahí era muy necesario que las fuerzas capitalistas moderadas a favor de una modernización de la economía y un fin a las guerras coloniales, montaran un levantamiento armado con el fin de alterar la política del gobierno. En España las dificultades en cuanto a la auto-reforma del régimen son mucho mayores.

El movimiento fascista montó una manifestación de 70,000 en el entierro de Franco

el 23 de noviembre en el "Valle de los Caidos." Esta amplia tumba subterránea, coronada con un crucifijo de 500 pies y construida por el trabajo forzado de los presos republicanos después de la guerra civil española, simboliza la clase de sociedad que los fascistas quisieran mantener.

Las masas españolas, sin embargo, tienen ideas diferentes. El sesenta por ciento de ellas tiene menos de treinta y cinco años de edad. A diferencia de sus padres, ellas nunca han sido derrotadas en una batalla decisiva. Es posible que le den a Juan Carlos un breve período para demostrar sus intenciones, pero un choque es inevitable. □

¿Es Racista el Sionismo?

Los siguientes son los tres párrafos iniciales de un artículo en el número del 3 de julio de *Maariv*, uno de los principales diarios de Israel:

"El Ministerio de Agricultura del Estado de Israel y el Departamento de Colonización de la Agencia Judía han lanzado recientemente una campaña vehemente para erradicar la plaga de renta de tierras y huertos a beduinos y granjeros árabes en Galilea Occidental.

"El Director de la Agencia Judía en el área de Galilea, Aharon Nahmani, dijo que su oficina envió una circular a todos los poblados. En la circular, se advierte a todos los colonos que el arriendo de tierras nacionales para su cultivo por parte de agricultores árabes y la renta de huertos para la cosecha y venta de los frutos por parte de árabes contradice la ley y las normas de las autoridades de colonización y los movimientos de colonización.

"La Administración de Galilea ordenó a las poblaciones abstenerse de esa práctica y enfatizó que el año pasado el departamento presentó demandas legales contra las poblaciones que no lo hicieron."

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El Informe Sobre los Asesinatos de la CIA

Por Michael Baumann

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "The CIA Assassination Report" que apareció en el número del 1 de diciembre de *Intercontinental Press*. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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El comité del Senado que investiga a la Agencia Central de Inteligencia [CIA] confirmó oficialmente el 20 de noviembre que los asesinatos y los golpes militares forman parte de la política exterior norteamericana.

También reveló que "oficiales gubernamentales en altas posiciones discutieron y posiblemente autorizaron, el establecimiento dentro de la CIA de una capacidad generalizada de asesinato."

El comité, que publicó un resumen de 347 páginas de sus hallazgos, concluyó que la CIA conspiró contra la vida del Primer Ministro cubano Fidel Castro "cuando menos ocho" veces.

Concluyó además que se puede "deducir razonablemente" que la conspiración de la CIA para envenar al Primer Ministro congolés Patrice Lumumba "fue autorizada por el Presidente Eisenhower."

El comité reveló que el ex Presidente Nixon dio órdenes secretas a la CIA en 1970 de organizar un golpe militar que impidiera a Salvador Allende asumir el mando como Presidente de Chile. El Gen. René Schneider, Jefe del Estado Mayor del ejército chileno, fue asesinado en relación con el complot.

Los funcionarios norteamericanos, dice el informe, también "impulsaron o estaban secretamente enterados de" las conjuras contra la vida del Presidente Rafael Trujillo de la República Dominicana y el Presidente Ngo Dinh Diem de Vietnam del Sur.

También halló "alguna evidencia" de la participación de la CIA en conspiraciones para asesinar al Presidente indonesio Sukarno y el Presidente haitiano François Duvalier.

El Presidente Ford recomendó que no se hiciera público el informe. Argumentó que "este material e información oficiales harán un daño lamentable a nuestro país."

En una carta dirigida a los miembros del comité del 5 de noviembre, Ford dijo que la confirmación oficial de las conspiraciones de asesinatos "sería explotada por naciones extranjeras y grupos hostiles a los Estados Unidos de una manera destinada a causar un daño máximo a la reputación y la

política exterior de los Estados Unidos."

El comité, cuyos miembros son todos representantes probados de la clase dominante norteamericana, estaba bastante conciente de las consecuencias de hacer público el informe. Señaló el daño "incalculable" que inflige una revelación pública de "semejantes actividades" al "buen nombre y reputación de los Estados Unidos en el extranjero, a la fé y apoyo del pueblo norteamericano a nuestro gobierno. . . ."

"Este último punto," enfatizó, "—la socavación de la confianza del público norteamericano en su gobierno—es el resultado más dañino de todos."

Pero después de unas cuantas palabras piadosas acerca de "mantener fé" en el "ideal democrático" norteamericano, explicó la imposibilidad de encubrir los hechos de la manera deseada por Ford. La realidad es que una parte de las conspiraciones ya "ha sido hecha pública," decía, y esto sólo "acentúa la necesidad" de hacer público el informe mismo.

Una ventaja adicional era que semejante revelación controlada de los hechos pudiese intentar mantener la ficción de que las conspiraciones de asesinato no habían sido necesariamente autorizadas por los diversos presidentes bajo los cuales se llevaron a cabo.

El comité se vio obligado a admitir, sin embargo, que cualquier dificultad en probar tal autorización se debe principalmente al uso excesivo por parte de la Casa Blanca del "eufemismo y la circunlocución, con el fin de permitirle al Presidente y a otros oficiales mayores negar cualquier conocimiento de una operación en caso de que sea revelada."

Los Intentos de Asesinar a Castro

Un tercio del informe trata sobre los esfuerzos de la CIA de asesinar a Fidel Castro y hacer retroceder la revolución cubana, una tarea que duró cuando menos seis años y tres regímenes—Eisenhower, Kennedy y Johnson. En su resumen de las conjuras contra la vida de Castro, el informe dice:

Hemos encontrado evidencia concreta de cuando menos ocho conspiraciones que involucraban a la CIA para asesinar a Fidel Castro entre 1960 y 1965. Aunque algunas de las conspiraciones no fueron más allá de la planificación y la preparación, una de ellas, involucrando el uso de personas del hampa, supuestamente avanzó dos veces al punto de mandar pastillas de veneno a Cuba y enviar equipos a realizar la obra. Otra conspira-

ción involucró la provisión de armas y otros instrumentos de asesinato a un disidente cubano. Los instrumentos de asesinato que se propusieron abarcaron una gama amplia: de rifles de alto poder hasta pastillas de veneno, lapiceras de veneno, polvos de bacterias fatales, y otros instrumentos que desafían la imaginación.

La más irónica de estas conspiraciones se llevó a cabo el 22 de noviembre de 1963—el mismo día que fue asesinado el Presidente Kennedy en Dallas—cuando un oficial de la CIA ofreció una lapicera de veneno a un cubano para su uso contra Castro al mismo tiempo que Castro se reunía con un emisario del Presidente Kennedy para explorar la posibilidad de mejores relaciones.

Las conspiraciones contra Castro comenzaron con los burdos intentos de sabotear su popularidad entre las masas cubanas tratando de hacerlo aparecer como mentalmente desequilibrado. Estos esfuerzos se llevaron a cabo entre marzo y agosto de 1960.

Una conspiración que se discutió fue un plan para rociar la radiodifusora de Castro con un elemento químico desorientador parecido al LSD, con el fin de hacer incoherente un discurso pronunciado por la radio.

En otra intriga, el Technical Services Division [Sección de Servicios Técnicos] de la CIA le echó un elemento químico similar a una caja de puros, con la esperanza de tentar a Castro a fumar uno antes de dar un discurso por radio.

El comité también informó sobre un plan "de destruir la imagen de Castro como 'El Barbudo,' rociando sus zapatos con sales de talio, un fuerte depilatorio que causaría que se le cayeran las barbas."

Las conjuras avanzaron rápidamente hasta adquirir un carácter letal. En julio de 1960, se hizo un intento de "planear un accidente" involucrando a Raúl Castro.

En agosto de 1960 a un oficial de la CIA se le entregó una caja de los puros favoritos de Castro con "instrucciones de tratarlos con un veneno letal." Los puros fueron tratados entonces con una toxina de botulismo "tan potente que una persona moriría al ponerlo en la boca." Los puros fueron enviados a Cuba en febrero de 1961, dijo el comité, pero los récords de la CIA no indican lo que les pasó después.

Se hizo contacto con personas del hampa antes y después de la invasión de Bahía de Cochinos de abril de 1961 para perfeccionar los planes de asesinar a Castro.

"En agosto de 1960," dice el informe, "la CIA tomó medidas para enlistar a miembros del mundo clandestino criminal con contactos entre los jugadores organizados para que ayudaran en el asesinato de Castro."

Al ex agente del FBI, Robert Maheu, "se le dijo que ofreciera dinero, probablemente \$150,000, para el asesinato de Castro." Reclutó al pandillero de la Mafia, John Rosselli, quien a su vez trajo consigo al gángster de Chicago Sam Giancana y Santos Trafficante, el dirigente de las

operaciones de la Mafia en Cuba.

Un informe de la CIA citado por el comité señaló que Trafficante tenía excelentes conexiones para un intento de asesinato. Estas incluían a pandilleros interesados en asegurar “los monopolios del juego, la prostitución, y las drogas” en Cuba después del asesinato de Castro y el derrocamiento del régimen revolucionario.

Al principio la CIA favorecía un asesinato “tipo gangsteril” de Castro, pero Rosselli y Giancana protestaron que esto era demasiado peligroso. El temor, aunque nunca se menciona, era aparentemente que la popularidad de Castro significaría muy pocas perspectivas de una evasión posterior por parte de los asesinos.

En febrero o marzo de 1961, se prepararon cápsulas con una toxina fatal que causa el botulismo en un laboratorio de la CIA y fueron entregadas a Rosselli. Fueron introducidas clandestinamente a Cuba, pero el intento de envenenar a Castro con ellas fracasó. De acuerdo con un oficial de la CIA, Castro había dejado de comer en el restaurante donde trabajaba el asesino.

Otros intentos de la CIA de asesinar a Castro incluyen los siguientes:

- Después del fracaso de la invasión de Bahía de Cochinos, un segundo intento de usar a Rosselli para entregar pastillas de veneno a contrarrevolucionarios cubanos. Esta vez ambos Che Guevara y Raúl Castro fueron blancos de asesinato.

- Un experimento de la CIA para determinar si “una concha exótica, arreglada de tal forma que explotara, podría ser depositada en un área donde Castro acostumbraba ir a bucear.” Según el comité, “La idea fue explorada por la Sección de Servicios Técnicos y descartada por poco práctica.”

- Un proyecto de asesinar a Castro infectándole con tuberculosis y una enfermedad de la piel. El plan era que James Donovan, un negociador norteamericano que estaba discutiendo con Castro la libertad de los contrarrevolucionarios capturados en el fiasco de Bahía de Cochinos, “le obsequiara a Castro un traje de buceo contaminado.”

La CIA compró un traje de buceo, “cubrió la superficie interior con un hongo que produciría una enfermedad de la piel crónica” y contaminó el aparato respiratorio con un bacilo de tuberculosis.”

Se tuvo que abandonar el plan, sin embargo, cuando Donovan, quien supuestamente ignoraba el complot, “le regaló a Castro un traje distinto por iniciativa propia.”

- El uso de un asesino identificado sólo como AM/LASH. Presentado en el informe como “un oficial cubano en una posición alta” quien “gozaba de la confianza de Fidel Castro,” AM/LASH recibió la lapicera de veneno y de menos dos alijos de armas para asesinar a Castro. Recibió además armas con silenciador.

El informe no explica por qué fracasó AM/LASH en sus intentos de asesinar a Castro. Simplemente señala que la CIA “rompió todo contacto con AM/LASH y sus asociados” en junio de 1965 “por razones relacionadas con la seguridad.”

El informe reveló que la “manifestación de una gran preocupación acerca de Lumumba” por parte del Presidente Eisenhower en una reunión del National Security Council [NSC—Consejo Nacional de Seguridad] del 18 de agosto de 1960, fue interpretada por el Director de la CIA Allen Dulles como “autorización para asesinar a Lumumba.”

“En efecto,” dice el informe, “un miembro del personal del NSC presente en la reunión del 18 de agosto, pensó que había sido testigo de una orden presidencial para asesinar a Lumumba.”

Este testigo, Robert H. Johnson, estaba especialmente preocupado porque sus deberes ese día incluían tomar notas en la reunión del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad, y no estaba seguro de cuántos de los comentarios de Eisenhower deberían ser incluidos en las actas.

Una semana más tarde, el 25 de agosto de 1960, se reunió un subcomité del NSC conocido como el Special Group [Grupo Especial]. El Grupo Especial era en aquel entonces la unidad responsable de autorizar las operaciones encubiertas de la CIA. En esta reunión uno de los principales ayudantes de Eisenhower subrayó la “necesidad de una acción muy directa” contra Lumumba.

El Grupo Especial respondió decidiendo no descartar “cualquier actividad que pudiese contribuir a deshacerse de Lumumba.”

El día siguiente Dulles mandó un telegrama al oficial de la CIA en Leopoldville diciendo que “en niveles superiores” la “eliminación” de Lumumba era un “objetivo urgente y primordial.” Dulles firmó el telegrama él mismo, un procedimiento no usual cuyo propósito es el de llamar atención a la importancia y la sensibilidad de un comunicado.

Para comprender por qué la Casa Blanca creyó que el asesinato de Lumumba era una necesidad “urgente,” ayudaría recordar los acontecimientos de ese período.

En junio de 1960, a la edad de treinta y cuatro años, Lumumba era el único dirigente congolés con partidarios a nivel nacional. Como dirigente del partido más grande del país, el Movimiento Nacional Congolés, llegó a ser Primer Ministro cuando el Congo (actualmente llamado Zaïre) logró su independencia el 30 de junio de 1960.

Después de la independencia, los belgas se negaron a retirar sus tropas, y empezaron a promover una guerra civil. Su meta era mantener una medida de control imperialista sobre las enormes riquezas del país.

Una sola compañía, Union Minière du Haut Katanga produjo en 1960 el 60% del

uranio en Occidente, el 73% del cobalto y el 10% del cobre. Una parte considerable de Union Minière estaba en manos de los intereses de Wall Street, especialmente de la familia Rockefeller.

Lumumba era considerado un obstáculo fundamental para estos planes, especialmente después de su visita a Washington en julio de 1960, reveló el informe.

De acuerdo con C. Douglas Dillon, el Subsecretario de Estado en aquel entonces, la “impresión” que Lumumba dejó era “muy mala.” Parecía ser un “individuo imposible de tratar.” Y como resultado de esto, los sentimientos del gobierno se agudizaron considerablemente en esos momentos. . . .”

Washington concluyó que Lumumba no podía ser comprado. Pero el informe reveló que se le temía por otras razones además, una de las principales siendo que era “un orador fascinante con la habilidad de movilizar a las masas para la acción.” Para Allen Dulles, era “un Castro o peor.”

Aún después de que Lumumba fue retirado del gobierno por el títere de los EEUU Kasavubu, todavía era visto como una amenaza a los intereses de Wall Street.

“Tenía esta tremenda habilidad de agitar a una multitud o un grupo,” atestiguó Dillon ante el comité del Senado. “Y si hubiera podido salir y hablar ante un batallón del ejército congolés, probablemente los hubiera tenido en la palma de sus manos dentro de cinco minutos.”

De acuerdo con la decisión de asesinar a Lumumba, un científico de la CIA identificado en el informe como Joseph Scheider, entregó un veneno fatal, junto con aparatos para administrarlo a la comida de Lumumba, al oficial de la estación de la CIA en Leopoldville a fines de septiembre de 1960.

Scheider le dijo al oficial de la estación que asesinar a Lumumba, agregando que el asesinato había sido autorizado por Eisenhower.

Según el informe, “La misión de Scheider al Congo fue precedida y seguida por telegramas de la oficina central [de la CIA] impulsando la ‘eliminación’ de Lumumba, transmitidos a través de un canal extraordinariamente restringido ‘Para Recipiente Únicamente’—incluyendo dos mensajes con la firma personal de Allen Dulles.”

El veneno nunca fue usado, aparentemente debido a la falta de una oportunidad de hacerlo sin ser detectado. “Pero,” dice el informe, “no hay ninguna evidencia de que la operación de asesinato fue terminada antes de la muerte de Lumumba.”

Lumumba fue golpeado hasta la muerte el 17 de enero de 1961 por el régimen títere de Tshombe, el cual tenía el apoyo de la Casa Blanca.

El Presidente Nixon, revela el informe, dio órdenes secretas a la CIA en 1970 de que organizara un golpe militar en Chile que

impidiera a Allende asumir la Presidencia.

El 15 de septiembre de 1970, menos de dos semanas después de que Allende ganase una pluralidad en las elecciones presidenciales chilenas, Nixon se reunió con el Director de la CIA Richard Helms, Kissinger y el Procurador de Justicia John Mitchell. El tema era Chile.

De acuerdo con el informe, "El Director Helms tomó notas manuscritas en esa reunión que reflejan ambas su orientación y las instrucciones del Presidente":

Una oportunidad en 10 quizás,
¡pero hay que salvar a Chile!
vale la pena gastar
no importan los riesgos involucrados
no comprometer a la Embajada
\$10,000,000 disponibles, más si es necesario
tarea de tiempo completo
—los mejores hombres que tengamos
plan del juego
trastornar la economía
48 horas para el plan de acción

Explicando lo que Nixon quería decir con "trastornar la economía," el Embajador de los Estados Unidos Edward M. Korry envió el siguiente mensaje al Presidente chileno saliente Eduardo Frei en un esfuerzo para "incitarlo" a tomar parte en los preparativos del golpe:

No se permitirá que ni un tornillo ni una tuerca llegue a Chile bajo Allende. Una vez que Allende llegue al poder haremos todo lo que esté dentro de nuestras posibilidades para condenar a Chile y los chilenos a las máximas privaciones y pobreza, una política diseñada para un largo período para acelerar las características duras de una sociedad comunista en Chile.

Nixon estableció lo que fue apodado un método de "dos vías" para derribar a Allende. Por un lado la CIA recibió instrucciones de "provocar" un golpe militar, informando de sus actividades sólo a Nixon, a través de Kissinger.

Por el otro lado el Comité de los 40, el nombre con el cual es conocido ahora el Grupo Especial, fue comisionado para repartir fondos para operaciones de propaganda anti-Allende.

El 15 de septiembre, dice el informe, ambas "vías" estaban funcionando hacia el mismo fin—derrocar a Allende. Entre el 5 y el 20 de octubre de 1970, la CIA hizo veintiún contactos con "oficiales militares . . . y de la policía claves en Chile."

"Aquellos chilenos que se inclinaban hacia dar un golpe recibieron promesas de fuerte apoyo de los niveles más altos del gobierno de los Estados Unidos, tanto antes como después del golpe" dice el informe.

Los planes del golpe incluían el secuestro del General René Schneider, comandante del ejército chileno, quien se negó a tomar parte en las conspiraciones. Se realizaron fallidos intentos de secuestrarlo el 19 y el 20 de octubre.

"Después de estos intentos y con conocimiento de su fracaso, la CIA pasó tres metralletas y municiones a oficiales chile-

nos que aún planeaban secuestrar a Schneider," dice el informe. En un tercer intento, llevado a cabo el 22 de octubre, Schneider recibió varios tiros y murió.

Las revelaciones en el informe muestran que Nixon y Kissinger han mentido consistentemente acerca del papel de la Casa Blanca y de la CIA en los esfuerzos por impedir que Allende asumiera la Presidencia.

Kissinger, por ejemplo, atestiguó ante el Congreso el pasado agosto que había rechazado una proposición de la CIA de organizar un golpe militar con tal objetivo.

Nixon, el maestro de la mentira descarada, dijo a un reportero del *Ladies' Home Journal* que lo entrevistaba, que cuando el

informe de la CIA fuese hecho público "mostraría que no tuvimos nada que ver con Chile o con Allende. Esos fueron los chilenos."

La CIA nunca recibió órdenes de ponerle fin a la operación anti-Allende, Thomas Karamessines, en aquel entonces Administrador Delegado de la CIA a cargo de operaciones encubiertas, dijo al Comité del Senado.

"Estoy seguro que las semillas plantadas en ese esfuerzo en 1970 tuvieron su impacto en 1973," dijo, refiriéndose al golpe respaldado por los Estados Unidos de Pinochet.

"No tengo la menor duda al respecto. . . ." □

Recuerda a Washington de la 'Amenaza Soviética'

Pekín Molesto por la Destitución de Schlesinger

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Peking Unhappy Over Schlesinger's Dismissal" que apareció en el número del 1 de diciembre de *Intercontinental Press*. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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El número del 9 de noviembre de Hsinhua, el servicio de prensa chino, contenía un artículo prominente sobre la reciente destitución por parte del Presidente Ford de James Schlesinger como Secretario de Defensa de los Estados Unidos. Aunque Pekín no hizo una declaración directa, era claro que el régimen se encontraba molesto.

"Los cambios de personal en el gobierno de los Estados Unidos han tenido fuertes repercusiones tanto dentro como fuera del país," decía el informe de Hsinhua. Citaba al Senador Henry Jackson, quien afirmaba que la democión de Schlesinger "es una pérdida para la nación," y al Senador Barry Goldwater, quien dijo, "Los soviéticos verán esto como toda una victoria."

Hsinhua mencionaba también "repercusiones" en Europa Occidental. Señalaba que "la destitución de Schlesinger fue 'muy sentida' en los círculos del Ministerio de Defensa de Bonn."

El *Daily Telegraph* de Londres se encontraba igualmente molesto por las noticias, informó Hsinhua. Lo citaba diciendo que la destitución de Schlesinger "podría tener consecuencias negativas para la OTAN y su posición frente a Rusia y los países del Pacto de Varsovia."

France Soir también fue citado. Se quejó, según Hsinhua, "de que los Estados Unidos ha sacrificado a Schlesinger en aras de la distensión." En los Estados Unidos, dijo,

"la noción de la 'amenaza soviética' ha sido guardada en el almacén de los accesorios inútiles."

El punto de vista de Pekín fue subrayado por el artículo en Hsinhua inmediatamente después del que hablaba sobre Schlesinger. Llevaba el título, "La Expansión Naval Soviética Dañina para la Estabilidad en el Norte de Europa, Dice el Comandante Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas Suecas."

Como los stalinistas de Moscú, los de Pekín están dispuestos y ansiosos de apoyar a gobiernos capitalistas. En su opinión, sin embargo, los capitalistas "buenos" son aquéllos que están a favor de la creciente militarización y mayores presupuestos bélicos para contrarrestar la supesta "amenaza soviética."

Los informes de Pekín sobre la destitución de Schlesinger contrastaban con su política hacia otros aspectos de la política de los Estados Unidos. Por ejemplo, poco después de la visita de Kissinger a China en noviembre de 1973, Chou En-lai dijo al columnista del *New York Times* C.L. Sulzberger, "Nosotros nunca usamos la palabra escándalo para referirnos a esto [Watergate]. Puesto que es completamente nuestro asunto interno, nosotros no hemos publicado nada acerca de él en nuestra prensa."

Un punto de vista similar fue expresado al Primer Ministro tailandés Kukrit Pramoj por el Presidente Mao mismo. Mao explicó que el escándalo de Watergate fue el resultado de "demasiada libertad de expresión política en los Estados Unidos."

Después de todo, si no fuera por eso, tal vez Washington gastaría unos cuantos billones de dólares más para frenar la "amenaza soviética." □