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
the Americas

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October 20, 1975

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Howard Lewis/Militant

Maceo Dixon speaking at second conference of National Student Coalition Against Racism, held in Boston October 10-12. Conference

decided to open nationwide campaign against reactionary attacks on democratic rights of minorities. See page 1396.

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Defend the Democratic Rights of the WRP!

By Joseph Hansen

A sensational police raid on a training center operated by the Workers Revolutionary party in Derbyshire, which was played up by the British press, has led to widespread protests in the labor movement.

The raid, involving a hundred police officers, took place at 10:10 p.m. on September 27 and lasted until 4:30 a.m. the following day. The police made no arrests but claimed to have found nine .22-caliber bullets in a cupboard. The power of the bullets has not been reported.

The police raid appears to have been carefully timed to coincide with the appearance on the streets of the weekly *Observer*, which carried a front-page article about the training school.¹ The odd timing was reported by Clive Borrell in the September 30 *London Times* as follows:

"On Sunday *The Observer* published an article about a young actress who said she had been interrogated at the house for seven hours by members of the party after she had arrived late for the course.

"Within half an hour of *The Observer's* first edition coming off the presses in London a hundred police officers with a search warrant issued under the Firearms Act, surrounded the house."

The WRP immediately denounced the raid. In an article in the September 29 *Workers Press*, Editor Alex Mitchell said:

"It is the biggest state provocation against a working class political organisation in Britain since the war. It is designed to fuel the Red-baiting hysteria which has been deliberately whipped up for the Labour Party conference opening today in Blackpool.

"We call on Labour Party members and trade unionists throughout the country to condemn this blatant state attack on the basic democratic rights of the working class."²

The WRP demanded a trade-union inquiry into the purpose and circumstances of the police raid. At the same time, members of the WRP began circulating a petition directed against Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins.

The text of the petition reads as follows: "Let the movement speak now!"

"We the undersigned strongly protest against the raid by the police of the Workers Revolutionary Party premises in Derbyshire on Saturday night and Sunday morning, September 27 and 28, 1975.

"The raid, which was authorised under the Firearms Regulations, was nothing but a flimsy pretext to raid a working class political party which has publicly, in its Press and meetings, condemned terrorism in principle. Any member of the WRP carrying firearms would be immediately expelled.

"We demand to know who authorised this raid. Was it a decision of the Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins? Did he and or others authorise the police to occupy and search the premises for one and a half hours before permitting representatives of the WRP to accompany them? Did he and or others authorise the placing of leading officials of the WRP under what amounted to arrest and confinement in one room without charge whilst the raid was in progress?

"We believe that it is in the interests of the defence of the democratic rights of all sections of the labour and trade union movement that these questions be answered immediately.

"Fill in this form and send it to the Workers Revolutionary Party, 186a Clapham High Street, London, SW4 7UG. We will compile a grand total of signatures which will be delivered to Jenkins at the Home Office, Whitehall."

The WRP's campaign in defense of its democratic rights has met with a wide response in the British labor movement.

Two days after the raid, the *London Times* (September 30) reported that a "political stir was created in Blackpool last night when senior trade union leaders and members of the Labour Party national executive signed a petition organized by the Workers' Revolutionary Party protesting at the raid. . . ."

The *Times* noted that the signatories included the following:

"Mr Jack Jones, general secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union; Mr Emlyn Williams, president of the South Wales miners; Miss Joan Maynard, MP; Mr Lawrence Daly, general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers; Mr David Bowman, president of the National Union of Railwaymen; Mr Len Edmondson, Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers; Mr Jim Slater, the seamen's leader; Mr Brian Nicholson, London dockworkers' leader; Mr Peter Heathfield, secretary of the Derbyshire miners; Mr Norman Atkinson, MP; Mr Eric Heffer, MP; Mr Dennis Skinner, MP; Mr Martin Flannery, MP; Mrs Audrey Wise, MP (who added she did not support the Workers' Revolutionary Party) and Mr Stanley Newens, MP."

The qualification stated by Audrey Wise probably applies to close to 100 percent of the other signers. Most of them, no doubt, have considered it unnecessary to make clear that they are not in political agreement with the victims of the police raid. The petition itself, quite correctly, does not demand that signers support the views of the WRP.

The WRP is in fact quite isolated politically. It should be added that while it claims to adhere to Trotskyism, actually it has very little to do with Trotskyism either in its policies or in its practices.

The point is that no matter what the views of the WRP may be, it is a current in the working-class movement. In rallying to the defense of its democratic rights against the police, those signing the petition are displaying class solidarity in accordance with the excellent old slogan, "An injury to one is an injury to all."

On the basis of that slogan we urge full support to the campaign of the WRP. □

The Evidence Mounts

When the Senate investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency began earlier this year, committee Chairman Frank Church declined to permit the hearings to be televised. He argued that such broadcasts would irreparably harm Washington's image. It is clear that he knew what he was talking about.

The Senate committee has not yet published its findings. But continual disclosures reveal that even this reluctant investi-

gation has amassed persuasive evidence that the murder of troublesome political figures is a key function of the CIA.

Testimony before the committee so far has established the following CIA actions:

- A 1961 plan to kill Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba. Former CIA biochemist Sidney Gottlieb testified October 9 that his "technical services division" prepared a poison that would kill Lumumba and yet make it appear that he had succumbed to a

1. For full text of the article see page 1437.

2. Mitchell includes an account of the police raid. For full text of his article see page 1439.

common tropical disease. The poison was shipped to Africa but never put to use; Lumumba had already been murdered by other means.

• Attempts and plots to kill Fidel Castro during the administrations of three American presidents. Church disclosed in an October 5 television interview that the efforts to kill Castro "span the years from the Eisenhower administration through the Kennedy administration and into the Johnson administration." Some of these assassination attempts involved the use of the CIA's civilian counterpart—the Mafia.

• The existence of a special CIA assassination squad. Information about this "executive action" unit is still sparse.

"The first hint of the group's existence," the October 4 *New York Times* reported, "came in the prepared text of a speech by Senator Walter F. Mondale. . . ."

"In that speech, Senator Mondale, a member of the intelligence committee, said that Richard M. Helms, a former C.I.A. director, and Richard Bissell, a former head of the agency's clandestine operations, 'have claimed that they had "higher-level" authorization . . . for setting up and running an institutionalized assassination capability within the C.I.A. called "executive action."'"

Collective amnesia in high CIA circles has so far maintained the fiction that Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson may not have "known" about the assassination efforts.

"Pinning down responsibility for many of the actions the committee has uncovered," Mondale said, "has been like nailing Jello to a wall. Subordinates say they were told to do it; higher officials can't remember it."

The amnesia cover-up has been aided by the wholesale destruction of CIA records. According to the October 12 *New York Times*, poison expert Gottlieb is reported to have testified that in the fall of 1972 he was ordered by Helms to destroy the records of several projects in the "technical services division."

"He described the destruction of the records as a routine housecleaning before his retirement the following summer." □

Volunteers Join FBI

The following item appeared in the October 13 issue of *Newsweek*:

"The \$126 million FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., formally dedicated only last week, already has housekeeping problems. Visitors to the new structure report that rats from nearby subway excavations have invaded it, with stairwells their particular target."

Will the FBI borrow a drop of poison from the CIA? Or try to squeeze some favorable publicity out of the rats' remarkable homing instinct?

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NSCAR Sets Antiracist Actions in U.S. for November 22

By Peter Green

BOSTON—More than 1,300 activists in the fight against racism from across the United States gathered here October 10-12 for the second conference of the National Student Coalition Against Racism (NSCAR).

Boston, much in the news in the American bicentennial celebrations as the cradle of the American Revolution, is now the scene of continuing racist violence against Black schoolchildren who are being bused to schools in white neighborhoods to get a better education. Boston has become the major focus of a national campaign against busing that is being led by President Gerald Ford and the leaders of Congress. The purpose of this racist campaign is to weaken and divide the Black community, block desegregation efforts in the schools, and help push back many of the social and economic gains Blacks and other minorities have won during the past two decades.

After an extensive and wide-ranging discussion in the plenary sessions, special panels, and numerous workshops, the NSCAR conference overwhelmingly voted to reaffirm its support of busing. The participants decided to launch a national campaign to defend school desegregation and fight racism.

The conference set November 22 as the date for nationally coordinated activities to be held around the country. November 10-15 was also set as a week of protest in universities and high schools against tuition hikes and cutbacks in funds for education.

The conference registered the growth of NSCAR as an organization. The 1,300 participants came from more than sixty NSCAR chapters, as well as a broad range of other organizations. They came from as far away as California, Utah, Colorado, and Texas. Applause greeted a speaker from a newly established NSCAR chapter in Louisville, Kentucky, another focus of reactionary attacks on busing.

The wide support from individuals and organizations backing NSCAR was reflected at the rally October 10 that opened the conference. Perhaps the high point was the testimony of three Black high-school students. They spoke of the racist abuse and physical attacks they have had to endure in their fight to establish their right to attend South Boston High School, previously an all-white school. Other speakers included:

- Luis Fuentes, the first Puerto Rican

school principal in New York City, who was suspended from his post as school superintendent of New York's District 1 because of his views favoring the right of Puerto Rican, Black, and Chinese parents to control the schools in their communities.

- Robert Allen, managing editor of *Black Scholar* magazine, and author of *Black Awakening in Capitalist America*.

- Alice Cummings, a special representative of the National Education Association, whose recent conference, representing about two million teachers and education workers, endorsed the NSCAR conference and pledged to support all legal methods necessary to implement the busing program.

- Joe Madison, executive director of the Detroit branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

- Gary Kampel, vice-president of the National Student Association (NSA), representing 500 student governments across the United States.

- Jerry Paul, chief counsel for Joanne Little.

- Florynce Kennedy, lawyer, feminist, and civil-rights leader.

- Mary Watkins, mother of J.B. Johnson, a Black youth framed up by the St. Louis police.

- Maceo Dixon, a national coordinator of NSCAR.

- Arturo Rivera, president of the Federación Universitaria Socialista Puertorriqueña (FUSP—Puerto Rican Socialist University Federation), a Puerto Rican student organization that sent a large contingent to the conference.

The well-known Black activist Robert F. Williams sent greetings to the conference, as did Ralph Abernathy of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Several members of Congress also sent messages supporting the activities of NSCAR. Sgt. Leonard Matlovich, who received a less than honorable discharge from the air force for openly proclaiming that he was gay, received a standing ovation when he addressed the conference. Peter Camejo and Willie Mae Reid, Socialist Workers party candidates for president and vice-president, also sent a message of support.

Although the Socialist Workers party and the Young Socialist Alliance actively supported the conference, some other groups on the left were conspicuously absent. The Communist party and the youth organization associated with it, the Young Workers Liberation League, for example, attended

the founding conference of NSCAR in February and argued for their political positions, but did not participate this time. Similarly, the Progressive Labor party and Maoist groups such as the October League, the Puerto Rican Revolutionary Workers Organization, and the Revolutionary Student Brigade were absent.

A representative of the Workers World party spoke, promising support to the antiracist struggle and describing the work of the East Boston People Against Racism. But the Workers League, an extremely sectarian group that claims to be Trotskyist, limited its participation to distributing a tract outside the conference on "Security and the Fourth International."

Several dozen members of the Spartacist League attended, and although they stated they fundamentally disagreed with NSCAR and refused to be part of the organization, they argued for counterproposals on almost every point on the agenda.

The main resolution—adopted overwhelmingly by the conference—launched NSCAR on a national campaign to defend school desegregation and fight racism, with actions around the country on November 22. The resolution holds that the key issue is "the democratic right of Blacks to go to any school of their choice and their right to go to the best schools that the city, state and federal governments can provide. . . ."

"For Blacks to get an equal education, we must support their right to go to any school they want. The reason why Black people support busing of whites to formerly Black schools is not to force whites to attend inferior schools. It is to pressure the school committees to improve these schools so that Blacks and whites can get the best education possible."

The resolution also pointed out that support to busing for desegregation "is not at all counterposed to the rights of other oppressed minorities—for example, Chinese, Puerto Ricans and Chicanos—especially in regard to their rights to maintain bilingual, bicultural education programs and to take steps to win equal education.

"NSCAR activists should be crystal clear that any busing plan which cuts across the rights of other minorities must be amplified to uphold the rights of all oppressed minorities."

"The fight for equal education takes many forms. NSCAR supports the right and the struggles of Blacks, Puerto Ricans,

Chicanos, Native Americans and Asian Americans to control their own schools. Struggles to implement this right are directed against racist, segregated educational systems. The fight for the right of students of oppressed nationalities to attend any school they want via busing is bound up with the fight of the same students to attend schools controlled by their own communities.

"Racist forces oppose both. To be fully effective in opposing the bigots, we must take them on at each front, championing both busing and community control."

The resolution stressed the need to convince the majority of the American people that busing is necessary. "The way to do that is for the supporters of desegregation and busing to outmobilize the racists in street actions and meetings and to win over the majority of people in this country of all nationalities to the antiracist struggle."

A small group of supporters of two narrow nationalist organizations—the All African Revolutionary People's party, and United Black Strategists—had mobilized about thirty Black high-school students for the first part of the conference. They held the position that busing should be opposed and that whites should be barred from participating in the antiracist struggle. They did not attempt to present their position, but engaged in several acts of disruption, such as stealing one of the conference banners and attacking a white woman activist outside the conference hall.

The issue came up at a Black workshop attended by 200 persons, which passed a resolution urging the conference to repudiate any acts of violence, whoever they were committed by, and resolving to ask anyone repeating such actions to leave the conference. The resolution was endorsed unanimously by the conference steering committee and the conference itself.

The conference also went on record demanding that the government use all necessary force to enforce its own laws on democratic rights, including city police, state troopers, the National Guard, and federal troops. This question had been left open at the founding conference.

The Spartacist League strongly opposed this and submitted its own resolution. Virtually all others present, however, supported the resolution presented by the NSCAR coordinators. The Spartacists likewise were the only ones to oppose the resolution brought into the conference from the Puerto Rican workshop that affirmed support for bilingual, bicultural education programs. Many participants were shocked to discover that a group that bothered turning up to an antiracist conference could oppose such a demand.

The coordinators' proposal projected an educational campaign leading up to forums, teach-ins, picket lines, demonstrations,

SWP Candidates Support Conference

Peter Camejo and Willie Mae Reid, Socialist Workers party candidates for president and vice-president, sent greetings to the conference, which read in part:

"We are proud to be here with you, as we were May 17 and December 14 to join the marches and rallies for school desegregation.

"Your deliberations at this conference are crucially important in the struggle against racism. . . .

"Congress just passed two bills to cut funds for school busing. And President Ford, whose statements in opposition to busing have emboldened the racists all along, now dares to speak favorably of the 'tradition' of 'separate but equal'

schools. This is an outrage! 'Separate but equal' are the traditional racist code words for Jim Crow schools, whose purpose is to deny Black students equal access to education. We demand of Ford that he uphold the law of the land! We demand that he use all necessary force at his command to protect Black students!

"These bigots—from Boston to Washington, D.C.—must and can be stopped. It will take a massive movement of all who can be won to opposing racism to do it. . . .

"Let's go forward, inspired by the words of Joanne Little on the day of her victory: 'It was not the system that freed me, it was the people.'"

rallies, and other actions on November 22. The theme of these activities will be "Keep the buses rolling," "Stop the racist attacks on Black students," and "Desegregate the schools now."

The second focus of NSCAR's activities in the coming months will be the fight against tuition hikes and cutbacks in funds for education. A resolution adopted overwhelmingly by the conference pointed out that because minority youth have long been denied equal access to educational opportunities, any cutbacks in higher education have an especially racist character. The first programs to suffer are those directed at redressing the balance—open admissions programs, special remedial programs, and Black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Asian, and Native American studies programs, and other such programs won by minority youth and women.

NSCAR pledged to fight these attacks, calling nationally coordinated actions during the week of November 10 to 15, around the following demands: No cutbacks! No tuition hikes! No cuts in programs for Black, Puerto Rican, Chicano, Asian, and Native American students! No cuts in women's programs! A crash program of federal funds for schools and human services! Support school desegregation! Education is our right!

The conference also passed a resolution supporting and defending the implementation of all affirmative-action programs. The resolution demanded that such programs be enforced and extended and that there be no discriminatory layoffs against oppressed nationalities and women.

Workshops were held and resolutions of support passed on numerous defense cases that are being fought around the country. In many areas it was clear that NSCAR was the driving force behind these struggles.

A sampling of some of the cases the conference expressed solidarity with and pledged support to gives an indication of the breadth of this activity: the Delbert Tibbs case, a Black writer from Chicago who is on death row at the Florida State Prison; the J.B. Johnson case in St. Louis; the struggle to free Joanne Little; the struggle to free five Puerto Rican nationalist prisoners in the United States and the three being held in the Dominican Republic; the Philip Allen case in Los Angeles; the struggle for justice for the Santiago family in Philadelphia (five members of the family were burned to death when their house was fire bombed by racists); the Ray Mendoza case in Milwaukee; the San Quentin Six; and the struggle to win freedom for Hurricane Carter and John Artis.

After a democratic discussion—during which time was allotted for the presentation of all viewpoints, every resolution submitted was mimeographed and distributed to all the participants, and all those attending were given a vote—the conference unanimously adopted a proposal outlining some modifications in NSCAR's structure and elected new national coordinators. Both these moves reflected the continuing growth and broadening that NSCAR has experienced since its founding conference eight months ago. In addition to three outgoing national coordinators who stood for reelection—Maceo Dixon, Marcia Codling, and Joette Chancy—the conference elected five more activists to lead NSCAR nationally: Mike Potoman, a leader of the fight against cutbacks at the University of Massachusetts; Sheryl Brown, a coordinator of the Boston coalition; Sam Manuel, a coordinator of New York SCAR and a leader of the cutbacks fight there; Tomás González, a national leader of the FUSP; and a national leader of the NSA, to be nominated by that body. □

American Left Still Target of Secret Political Police

By Caroline Lund

The Political Rights Defense Fund released a new set of previously secret FBI documents October 6. They provide the first public evidence that the political-police agency continued disruptive operations against dissident political groups after 1971, when the late FBI director J. Edgar Hoover said the program had been ended.

The FBI files also document a new case of persecution by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of a public school teacher because of a connection with the Socialist Workers party.

The new, heavily censored documents were obtained through a court order in connection with the \$27 million suit against government harassment and surveillance brought by the Socialist Workers party and Young Socialist Alliance. The Political Rights Defense Fund is a nonpartisan civil liberties organization that is publicizing the suit and raising funds to cover the legal expenses.

The FBI's disruption program, called "Cointelpro" (for counterintelligence program), was set up in the mid-1950s and expanded in the 1960s to harass and "neutralize" Black organizations, the "new left," the Communist party, the Socialist Workers party, and other political groups. The FBI announced its termination of the program only after these top-secret operations were exposed to the public in 1971, when files were removed from an FBI office in Pennsylvania by a group of pacifists.

The SWP and YSA contended in their suit, filed in 1973, that the government continued to carry out Cointelpro-type operations after 1971. The two groups have amassed evidence of scores of incidents of such harassment of SWP and YSA members.

Now, in turning over the latest documents, the FBI has admitted the truth of this charge. The documents reveal at least thirty post-1971 cases of harassment formerly included in the Cointelpro operations but now simply carried out under a different name—"investigative" operations. This type of harassment was described in Cointelpro documents as "Interviewing or Contacting Members." It was undertaken, according to a Justice Department report, "for the purpose of letting members know that the FBI was aware of their activity."

A secret FBI circular that was among those made public in 1971 expressed the hope that the "interviews" and visits "will enhance the paranoia endemic in these

circles and will further serve to get the point across there is an FBI Agent behind every mailbox."

The new documents show that with this goal in mind, FBI agents visited directly twenty-eight SWP and YSA members, trying to get them to provide information about themselves, about the SWP and YSA, and about other SWP and YSA members.

In four additional cases FBI agents contacted members by telephone, pretending to be government functionaries inquiring about the person's qualifications for jury duty. In another case an agent pretended to be from the New York state lottery wanting information about the individual in order to determine whether he had won a prize.

In the great majority of cases, the SWP and YSA members refused to be interviewed; some gave limited information about themselves.

An example of the FBI accounts of its visits is the following description of an interview on August 29, 1972:

"CHRISTY LOUISE WALLACE was advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents as well as the fact that an interview with her was desired concerning her association with the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) at Detroit, Michigan.

"WALLACE made notes of the Agents' names and credential numbers and then stated that she had nothing to say to the FBI. WALLACE refused to discuss the matter any further and the interview was terminated.

"The following description of WALLACE was obtained through observation: Race—White, Sex—Female, Height—5'8", Weight—140 pounds, Hair—Brown, Eyes—Brown."

Syd Stapleton, national secretary of the PRDF, commented that "members and supporters of the Socialist Workers party and the Young Socialist Alliance become objects of overt attention for the FBI simply because of their political views. . . .

"This systematic attempt at intimidation has nothing to do with 'investigations' or 'internal security.' It is illegal political harassment no matter what the FBI calls it."

The 185 pages of new documents concern more than reports on such "interviews." Most of them deal with earlier FBI operations carried out against the SWP and YSA under the Cointelpro operation aimed at the Communist party. Some of these operations were filed under the anti-CP program

because they involved disruption of both the CP and SWP. Other anti-SWP actions seem to have been placed under this heading because FBI agents considered the SWP and YSA to be "a form of communist organizations [sic]."

One of these Cointelpro records shows that the FBI was successful in getting the Cleveland Board of Education to fire a music teacher simply because her husband had signed a letter soliciting support for the Socialist Workers party's 1964 presidential election campaign.

This is one more in a series of cases that the SWP suit has brought to light in which government agencies have acted to get teachers or professors fired because of political views held by them or their relatives.

Previously exposed cases include those of Evelyn Sell, who lost her teaching job in Austin, Texas, because she had been a candidate of the Socialist Workers party for public office; Maude Wilkinson, whom the FBI tried unsuccessfully to get fired from her job as an elementary-school teacher in Washington, D.C., because she was a member of the YSA; and Morris Starsky, whom the FBI got fired from his post as a professor at Arizona State University because of his antiwar and socialist views.

The FBI actions against teachers have brought strong protest from teachers organizations. At the July convention of the National Education Association, Executive Secretary Terry Herndon issued a statement condemning FBI attempts to get teachers fired because of their socialist beliefs. Citing the cases of Sell and Wilkinson, he termed such FBI tactics "reminiscent" of the witch-hunts during the McCarthy era."

He continued: "We cannot help wondering: How many more teachers were dismissed or harassed because of counterproductive surreptitious activity by the FBI into the private lives of educators?"

The NEA, with 1.7 million members, is the largest trade-union organization of teachers and the second largest union in the country.

Another plot exposed in the new documents concerned an FBI attempt to disrupt SWP and Communist party election campaigns for municipal office in San Francisco in 1961. This operation was also aimed at "increasing the animosity between the SWP and the CPUSA."

The FBI forged the signature of the CP

campaign manager on a letter to the registrar of voters claiming the SWP candidate did not fulfill the requirements for ballot status.

The plot fizzled after election officials told the SWP candidate, Hayden Perry, about the letter and Perry called the attention of the CP to it. A CP official told the elections officials the letter was a fake, and Perry retained his place on the ballot.

In these documents, both the SWP and the CP candidates are named as "Security Index subjects." The FBI's Security Index is a list of citizens targeted for detention in the event of conditions of "national emergency."

In another operation, the FBI mailed a poison-pen letter to a number of official Democratic party organizations in Michigan, including the state central committee, charging that the YSA had infiltrated the Young Democrats chapter at Wayne State University in Detroit. The FBI undertook this smear campaign because the Young Democrats had taken some positions against the Vietnam War and in defense of civil liberties.

This is the first documented case in which the FBI has tried to disrupt the affairs of either the Democratic or Republican parties, according to the PRDF.

In newspaper clippings included in the FBI papers, Jan Garrett of the Wayne State University YSA is quoted as replying that the infiltration charge was "completely ridiculous." He said infiltration of either of the major political parties would mean "support to the Democratic and Republican parties of racism and war" and would be against YSA principles.

Other operations described in the files include the following:

- In 1966 the FBI successfully collaborated with the administration of American University in Washington, D.C., to deny official recognition to a campus chapter of the YSA.

- In 1961 the FBI cooperated with a right-wing newspaper editor in order to furnish the publication "with sufficient ammunition" against the SWP.

- In 1963 the FBI anonymously sent a derogatory poem, designed to appear to be from the SWP, to the CP with the aim of "causing dissension" between the two groups.

The new documents are the third installment of FBI files the government has been forced to turn over through the suit by the Socialist Workers party and Young Socialist Alliance. The Political Rights Defense Fund expects to receive still more files from the FBI, as well as documents from Military Intelligence, the Secret Service, and the CIA's top-secret "Operation CHAOS."

The SWP and YSA suit has become a major source of information for the left and for supporters of civil liberties in the United

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Enough Is Enough

The official position of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice on the bureau's counterintelligence program (Cointelpro) is that it was foolish, misguided and sometimes illegal and that it was ended in April, 1971. Yet, according to F.B.I. documents recently obtained by the Socialist Workers' party in a lawsuit against the bureau, some Cointelpro techniques were being employed at least as late as December, 1973.

The documents show that after April, 1971, the bureau continued to contact members of the Socialist Workers' party and its youth affiliate to inform them of the bureau's knowledge of their political activities and then to seek more information about those activities. The bureau also continued to contact members of the organization by telephone to gain personal information about them under the pretext of doing a jury duty survey. Such methods were used on at least 34 occasions after the program was supposedly ended.

The Socialist Workers' party is a legal American political organization. Although it has been the subject of wiretap surveillance for thirty years, no indictments and no convictions have been obtained by the Government. The only conceivable purpose of the continuation of the Cointelpro techniques is harassment and disruption of legitimate political activity.

Attorney General Levi has recently expressed his high regard for the F.B.I. and has characterized some recent criticism of the organization as unfounded. The criticism might fade more quickly if it were clear to the bureau that disruption of legitimate political activity is not part of its mandate and if it could be demonstrated to the American people that when the Government says it has terminated a course of improper conduct, it actually has done so.

Editorial in October 10 issue of most influential paper in the United States, voicing impatience with lies of FBI and its continued harassment of Socialist Workers party.

States regarding the methods of the secret-police agencies. A news story on the front page of the October 6 *New York Times* noted that "most of what is now known about the 15-year program [Cointelpro] has been made public as a result of the party suit, the only such action filed thus far by a group that was a Cointelpro target."

The documents, now amounting to thou-

sands of pages, have been summarized and analyzed week to week in the pages of the *Militant*. In twelve of its issues over the past year, the revolutionary-socialist weekly has reproduced in full some of the most important of these documents, providing the public with a priceless glimpse into the operations of Washington's domestic political police. □

Why Australian Political Police Aped FBI's 'Cointelpro' Operation

By Jim McIlroy

[The following article appeared in the September 18 issue of *Direct Action*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Sydney.]

* * *

Hearings of the Hope Commission on Intelligence and Security, established by the Labor government in 1974, have thrown some light onto the operations of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (Asio). Recently, a number of background papers written by Asio in 1971 and 1972 were submitted to the commission by journalist Robert Mayne.

In his submission, Mayne described a couple of meetings attended by officers of Asio, at which he was given the documents. Mayne earlier wrote an article in the March 19-24, 1973, *National Times* revealing that these papers were provided by Asio to help in the production of a far-right magazine aimed at discrediting the radical movement.

Well-known New South Wales Liberal MLA [member of Legislative Assembly] Peter Coleman was involved in the magazine project, which was never carried through. The Mayne documents are part of a list of sixty-seven titles of Asio reports which were made public by Prime Minister Whitlam in July last year, and several of which were excerpted in the *Bulletin*.

The documents given by Mayne to the commission are most interesting as a further public proof of the prying activities of Australia's political police. While they obviously only scratch the surface in revealing Asio's snooping against the labor and radical movement, they show that Asio is firmly committed to opposing left-wing developments in society and that it keeps tabs on important radical organizations and individuals.

There are also hints at the role of provocateurs during the period of the anti-Vietnam War movement. A number of the papers are concerned with alleged "terrorism" and political "disruption" of various kinds.

The Mayne papers cover a number of different areas. There are files on five well-known figures in the antiwar and radical movement: Dan O'Neill, Brisbane antiwar academic; Brian Medlin, professor of philosophy at Flinders University, Adelaide; Denis Freney, journalist for the Communist

party paper *Tribune*; Bob Gould, activist in the left of the NSW ALP [Australian Labor party]; and Albert Langer, former Maoist student leader at Monash University [Melbourne].

Then there are discussion papers with titles such as Politically Motivated Incidents of Violence; A Note on Possible V.M.C. [Vietnam Moratorium Campaign] Operations During June 1971; A Note on the "New Left" in Australia; and A Note on Political Fragmentation and Its Significance for Extremist Political Developments in Australia, April 1972.

Finally, there are documents on particular organizations headed: Trotskyism in Australia, June 1972; Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist); Socialist Party of Australia (S.P.A.); Communist Party of Australia (C.P.A.); and Trotskyist Organizations in Australia—Socialist Workers' League (S.W.L.). There are also several papers on the National Socialist party of Australia (Nazis).

These documents appear to be general background papers and not "top security" material. There are no direct references to Asio activity in them, although they are indications of the sort of thinking going on behind the scenes among Australia's security cops.

The document on the Socialist Workers League was probably written around six months after the founding conference of the league at the end of 1971, and gives only a very general and not quite accurate outline of the aims and work of the organization. But it is interesting to see the relative importance given to SWL in the eyes of Asio's strategists.

In describing the league the Asio paper states: "It claims to be a 'new revolutionary Socialist' Party, and has as its youth affiliate, the 'Socialist Youth Alliance' (S.Y.A.) which is well established in most capital cities and has supplied most of the League's leaders."

The document goes on: "The new Socialist Workers League (including the S.Y.A.) could prepare the ground for . . . the formation of a powerful Trotskyist movement with strong influence in the youth field, an active press and a chain of bookshops (already operating), and a footing within the labour movement through the recently established 'Socialist Left' in

the ALP in NSW and Victoria. Such a Trotskyist apparatus could pose a strong challenge to the fragmented communist movement for leadership of the 'Left' generally."

In trying to capture the ideas of Trotskyism the Asio document explains that: "In effect, Trotskyists are left-wing communists concerned primarily with overthrowing imperialism of all kinds (Soviet as well as Western); opposed to the bureaucratic nature of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its imperialist policies, and advocates of violent and 'permanent revolution' on an international scale. However, they generally oppose world war on the basis of their opposition to imperialism."

There is a core of truth in describing Trotskyists as opposed to imperialism, to the bureaucratic nature of the CPSU, and to imperialist war. But it is definitely *not true* that Trotskyists regard the Soviet Union as imperialist. We say that the USSR is a bureaucratized workers state which, despite its bureaucratic rulers, must be defended *unconditionally* against imperialist attack.

And it is caricature of Trotskyism to say that it advocates violence. Rather, the Trotskyist movement like the Russian Bolsheviks before them, actively seek a revolutionary-socialist transformation of society on a world scale by the action of the working people and their allies, the vast majority of humankind. Violence comes from the tiny minority of capitalists who will use *any* means to protect their property and power.

This attempt to paint Trotskyists as violent carries over from Asio's picture, seen in other of the Mayne documents, of the radical movement as being full of violent minorities. The document, Politically Motivated Incidents of Violence, concentrates its fire on alleged terrorist actions carried out and planned by the short-lived tiny "Australian Liberation Army." Other similar, small organizations are also dramatized.

But the Asio papers really enter the world of fantasy with the following report from the document on "Possible V.M.C. Operations During June 1971" (the period of the third massive nationwide Moratorium marches).

The paper states: "The type of weapons used in the past [in the antiwar movement] and some of which will doubtless be used during the June operation include:

"Stones, bottles and other missiles, paint bombs . . . flour bombs, stink bombs, molotov cocktails (large and small), tear gas, animal blood, human faeces, high explosives, acid bombs, firearms, phosphorus bombs and incendiarism."

Unless this is to be considered merely as a completely lying basis for slandering and

discrediting the antiwar movement, it is possible that this list could refer to methods to be considered by police provocateurs during antiwar demonstrations. The Mayne papers only hint at this possibility, but this is one important argument why Asio must be forced to release its complete files on its activity in the radical movement immediately.

Did Asio attempt to set up and frame up antiwar activists through provoking violence? Did Asio engage in the sort of

disruption activity aimed against the radical movement such as the American FBI "Cointelpro" (Counterintelligence program) which has been exposed by the U.S. Socialist Workers party's legal suit recently?

These Asio documents are enough in themselves to prove that this supersecret spy organization, which has never given any public account of its activities, is carrying out espionage against individuals and left-wing groups and is undoubtedly

acting to disrupt their activities. Every person, every organization, named in these documents should have the right to see *all* files on them, and that means *everything*.

This will bring out a lot of dirty tricks that are only hinted at in the Mayne papers and in the revelations of such Asio agents as Max Wechsler, who surfaced earlier this year. And Asio must be abolished. Its continued existence is a permanent infringement on the democratic rights of all who live in this country. □

Accuse Leaders of 'Factionalism'

Communist Party of India Hit by Resignations

NEW DELHI—The resignation of 169 members of the pro-Moscow Communist party of India (CPI) in the Purulia district in West Bengal has assumed significance in view of their indictment of the party's leadership and the tactical line it is following. Some 218 members of the CPI had resigned earlier.

The main charge the former members make against the CPI is factionalism. They also question the way in which some party members live.

Recently tax officials raided the houses of several top leaders of both the CPI and a number of trade unions. According to Samir Chatterjee, a member of the CPI's Purulia District Council, wealth disproportionate to their incomes was found during the raids.

In Chatterjee's view the CPI can, in the existing circumstances, do no good for the country. In fact, it could do a lot of harm. That was the reason for the decisions to resign.

It will be recalled that according to the CPI the main internal danger threatening India was "right reaction," which it failed to define with any precision. The need to fight this imminent threat was the ostensible reason Gandhi gave for imposing the state of emergency.

Important national leaders of right-wing parties such as the Jan Sangh and Congress (Organisation) were rounded up, as were other political leaders such as Jaya Prakash Narayan. This no doubt dealt a grave blow to the danger of right reaction, if there ever was such a threat.

Initially the right-wing parties were stunned by the swiftness with which Gandhi moved. Now, however, a slow process of regroupment seems to be under way. Press reports indicate that in a number of places leading figures in both the Jan Sangh and Congress (O) are deserting their parties and joining Gandhi's ruling Congress party.



GANDHI: CPI's total support for her regime is stirring commotion in the ranks.

In its rejoicing over the blow dealt to the major right-wing parties, the CPI leadership seems to have overlooked several features of Gandhi's move, including her massive use of repression.

Major targets of the government's attack were basic democratic rights, which remain suspended, and several left-wing formations—a fact that seems to have escaped the CPI's notice.

Nor has the CPI explained why Gandhi's move caused all sectors of the bourgeoisie to rally round her and hail the regime's twenty-one point economic program. Previously many industrialists either vacillated or supported the right-wing parties or Narayan.

Perhaps these were some of the questions

the CPI's rank and file raised in connection with the party's thesis that the main danger was right reaction.

The process of regroupment around Gandhi is bound to penetrate even the CPI. After all, there is hardly anything to distinguish it from the ruling Congress party. Its total support for the Gandhi regime tells heavily against its separate identity as a major party on the political map of India. With complete "industrial peace" and "discipline" reigning in the country, the CPI is losing its reason for existence as a tendency in the working-class movement. □

Political Arrests Rise in Chile

The Chilean Comité de Cooperación para la Paz (Committee of Cooperation for Peace) announced in September that the number of political arrests in the country has increased since July.

During the first half of 1975, the committee reported, the number of such arrests averaged 80 a month. During August, however, 125 persons were detained, and "during the current month of September the committee has registered 95 arrests. . . . Moreover, this month all those arrested disappeared for a certain period of time. Sixty-nine percent of them have still not shown up."

The report added: "At the beginning of September a massive military operation was conducted in the zone to the south of the capital, in the communities of San Bernardo, La Cisterna, and San Miguel. The proceedings were carried out by members of the air force intelligence service, armed with submachine guns and with their faces covered with paint or mountaineers' masks."

Growing Protest Over White House Ban on Hugo Blanco

Protest against Henry Kissinger's denial of a visa to Peruvian peasant leader Hugo Blanco continues to mount.

The forced cancellation of Blanco's October 10 speaking engagement at the University of Minnesota drew a storm of protest. This included articles in two daily newspapers in St. Paul and in the University of Minnesota *Daily*; a news conference by prominent civil libertarians; a rally on the university campus; and messages of protest to the State Department from, among others, Senator Hubert Humphrey and University of Minnesota President C. Peter Magrath.

The State Department's pretext for denying Blanco a visa to conduct a speaking tour of the United States and to consult with his publisher, Pathfinder Press, is the witch-hunting McCarran Act. This law gives the administration arbitrary power to bar entry on the basis of political views.

Mirta Vidal, a national coordinator of the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA), charged at a news conference held October 9 that Kissinger's action "is a startling violation of such basic rights as the right of free speech and academic freedom." USLA was to coordinate Blanco's American tour.

In an October 10 editorial the conservative *St. Paul Pioneer Press* said:

"Blanco is a revolutionary from a country and a continent where revolution has much provocation. He has spent time in prisons both in Peru and Argentina and escaped from Chile when Salvadore Allende's leftist regime was overthrown. That he might constitute a threat to the status quo if he returned to Latin America is likely, but it is hard to see what harm he could do any established institution in the United States. Would he, as a [University of] Minnesota *Daily* editorial joshed, 'incite Wright County farmers to revolt?'"

"The State Department's ban seems a foolish and indefensible exercise in arbitrary power. If State has better reason to bar Blanco than his political beliefs, as judged by the standards of the McCarran Act, it should make it public now. If it has not, the visa should be granted. . . ."

Referring to Blanco as "a very talented writer and spokesman for his cause," University of Minnesota President Magrath touched on another aspect of the ban in his protest to the State Department:

"The Helsinki Agreement, as you well know, Mr. Secretary, explicitly provides for freedom of intellectual exchange. I know that all signatories to that agreement have

not responded to these new terms with alacrity, as witnessed by the Soviet Union's reluctance to grant many of its own citizens permission to share their knowledge and expertise with the people of other nations. . . .

"I think it is vitally important that all signatories to the Helsinki Agreement—not just the United States—observe all its provisions. But, in the same regard, I do not think the United States can be anything but scrupulous in its observance of this important international accord."

The Helsinki Agreement, whose principal signers were Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford, was concluded August 1. It pledged to facilitate international travel for educational purposes and to make possible face-to-face contact between authors and publishers.

An October 1 protest meeting at the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee was

attended by 150 persons.

Don Timmerman of the Milwaukee boycott office of the United Farm Workers told the meeting that the effort to bring Blanco into the United States was linked to obtaining "peace and social justice for our own people."

David Randall Luce, a professor of philosophy and an official of the Wisconsin Civil Liberties Union, said: "Our right to know is being seriously trampled on by the exclusion of radicals from our shores."

In a taped message to the meeting, Blanco pointed to the real reason why Washington is trying to keep him out of the country: "It has been my fate to live through, and it has been my fate to know, many of the barbaric actions that the North American government has directed or aided, both in my country and in other Latin American countries, especially Chile." □

October 26 Set as Date for Next Demonstration

25,000 March in Bonn for Right to Abortion

Twenty-five thousand persons demonstrated in Bonn September 21 against West Germany's abortion law and against a court decision earlier this year upholding legal restrictions on the right to abortion.

Germany's century-old abortion law—Paragraph 218 of the criminal code—has been under attack by women's organizations for five years. Under this pressure the West German parliament passed a law in June of 1974 legalizing abortion during the first three months of pregnancy. The new law was challenged in the courts, however, and on February 25 of this year the highest court ruled it unconstitutional.

The demonstration September 21 served as an inspiring opening for a major offensive against the abortion law that is planned by women's organizations and political groups for the month of October. A broad spectrum of organizations and prominent individuals have issued an "Appeal for Common Action Against the Prohibition of Abortion." It calls for local protest actions and informational activities in all cities, leading up to a demonstration in Bonn October 26.

The October actions are planned to coincide with the reconsideration of the abortion question in parliament.

The appeal, signed by women's organiza-

tions and women's centers in eighteen cities, calls for free and legal abortion on demand.

The size of the September 21 demonstration was particularly significant in view of the fact that it was initiated on a much narrower basis than are the actions planned for October. Although formally organized by independent "218 Committees," the main group identified with the protest was the Maoist Kommunistischer Bund Westdeutschlands (KBW—Communist League of West Germany).

The official slogans of the demonstration were "Down with Paragraph 218" and "The people themselves should decide—Referendum!" This focus on a referendum is the specific approach of the KBW and does not represent the view of many women's liberation groups and other political organizations.

The Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (GIM—International Marxist Group, German section of the Fourth International), for example, argues that a mass movement should be built around the demand for the unconditional right of women to abortion, not around any specific procedure for eliminating the antiabortion law.

Despite its disagreement with one of the main slogans of the September 21 protest,

the GIM supported the action. It is also supporting the appeal for united actions in October.

Referring to the narrow sponsorship and controversial slogan of the September 21 action, an article in the October 2 issue of *Was Tun* commented: "If in spite of this,

25,000 turned out for the Bonn demonstration, this shows what possibilities still exist for mobilizations against Paragraph 218, regardless of the Karlsruhe decision [the high court ruling], and it shows how wrong was the pessimism of those who thought a broad protest movement on this question

was no longer possible. It shows that it is possible to carry out powerful actions at the time of the reconsideration of Paragraph 218 in the Bundestag and to put pressure on the government, to the extent that the necessary breadth of forces is brought to bear." □

Cites Testimony of 45 Victims and Witnesses

Amnesty International Denounces Torture of Basques

"... violence against the general Basque population, including the use of torture, was widespread and indiscriminate." This is the conclusion drawn by Amnesty International in its report on the reign of terror Franco conducted in the Basque Country during the three-month state of exception that ended July 25. The state of exception officially suspended the few civil liberties remaining in Euzkadi.

The twenty-four-page report is based on investigations made by a fact-finding team Amnesty International sent to Spain in July. It cited from the testimony of forty-five victims or witnesses of torture, as well as statements of lawyers.

The team was composed of Thomas Jones, an American lawyer, and Burkhard Wisser, a West German professor of philosophy.

Amnesty International found that at least 2,000 persons were arrested during the state of exception. A minimum of 250 of them were systematically tortured. Every victim interviewed underwent at least one torture session a day. Some were tortured as many as five times a day; one recounted thirty sessions in twenty-one days of imprisonment.

The sessions lasted from a half hour to about six hours. Victims ranged from seventeen to seventy-two years of age. The majority were workers or members of working-class families.

Among the firsthand accounts given to Amnesty International were the following:

- "I was thrown to the floor, kicked, clubbed. They had a wooden rod about a meter long, and a club wrapped in rubber with metal bands around it."

- "They beat my husband in the Civil Guard barracks in Guipúzcoa with hard rubber tubes used for butane gas. He was bruised from the buttocks to his feet."

- "I lost consciousness twice and they woke me by throwing water on my head. On the last day, they . . . beat me with a crowbar."

- "The beatings went on for seven days and nights. They put a revolver between my eyes and pulled the trigger. After the eighth day, they left me alone."



FRANCO: Rules Basque Country with "widespread and indiscriminate" use of torture.

"The conditions in the prison were inhuman. Nearly 20 days with the same clothes, without washing, without a towel or a handkerchief. They gave you only a mouthful of food in the afternoon and another at night. . . . There was no toothpaste, and many days not even toilet paper.

"The cells were disgustingly filthy. Revolting. They gave you one filthy, repugnant sheet for three of you. We had to sleep on that floor—not even animals would sleep there.

"In the end . . . they let me go without making an accusation.

"I would rather die than go through that again. Many feel that way."

- "They took him out an hour before eating and brought him back what I would guess to be six or seven hours later. All his

body was marked, his back, his feet, ankles. He looked like a cadaver. The only thing he said was that if he had a pistol he would kill himself. They took him again two hours later—he looked half-dead. Two policemen dragged him to another interrogation. They had him an hour or so, then brought him back: his lower lip was cut, his face yellow like a dead man, his body covered with bruises, his clothes torn to shreds.

"They took him again two hours later, dragged him away by his arms, but he was unconscious, and when he collapsed near the door they brought him back to the cell and brought in a cot to lay him on.

"Earlier, he had been sick, and we helped him to go to the toilet. There was blood flowing from his rectum."

The report stated that women victims were "so sadistically beaten and humiliated that it was not easy for them to come forward. . . . Some did, however, and they told of sexual threats, including sterilization, of being made to walk naked in the police station, of being manhandled in front of male friends to force information from the men and of insults that are . . . so degrading as to be a form of psychological torture."

Right-wing vigilantes aided the campaign of official terror, attacking relatives and sympathizers of Basque separatists, as well as priests and lawyers who dared to defend civil rights. Police did nothing to stop these attacks, which included bombing, burning, and machine-gunning of homes, offices, and businesses.

In calling for a halt to these practices, Amnesty International said, "The urgency of this appeal is increased by the persistent reports of torture elsewhere in Spain."

Moreover, the organization pointed out, the new "antiterrorism" law decreed in August "increases the likelihood that such abuses as occurred in the Basque provinces during the state of exception will become more frequent throughout Spain."

A copy of the report can be obtained by sending \$.90 or 35 pence to Amnesty International Publications, 53, Theobald's Road, London WC1X 8SP, England. □

Big Struggles on the Agenda for Greece

[Giannis Felekis is the editor of *Ergatike Pale*, the weekly newspaper that reflects the views of the Internationalist Communist Organization, Greek section of the Fourth International. The following interview was conducted in Athens August 15 by Kristine Owen. It was published in the October 6 issue of the Canadian revolutionary-socialist fortnightly *Labor Challenge*, from which we have taken the text.]

* * *

Question. What is the general situation in Greece today?

Answer. The situation today is marked by the consequences of the international economic crisis, which in Greece, given its relative backwardness, has become very acute. The foreign payments deficit is extremely unfavorable for the Greek economy. In the past, this deficit was covered mainly by the incomes of the immigrant workers, seamen, tourists, and internal and foreign loans. All of these sources are now limited because of the international character of the capitalist crisis, which has led to increased unemployment in Western Europe and to a decline in international trade. All of these restrictions are putting the capitalist state in a difficult position that doesn't leave it any room for maneuver.

A few figures will illustrate the situation.

In 1974, industrial production fell 7.8 percent, according to official figures. With the deepening of the economic crisis, an even greater drop is expected in 1975.

Officially, 170,000 workers are unemployed. If we add to this figure the construction workers and other unemployed who don't receive any unemployment benefits, the total surpasses 250,000. In addition, there are 750,000 underemployed (part-time) workers. This means that out of a labor force of three million people, one-third are without full-time jobs. These workers are forced to live at a level inferior to the already low standard of full-time workers.

Last year, the inflation rate was 16 percent, with a rate of 20 percent expected for 1975. Prices are skyrocketing, especially for all services and utilities. In addition, the prices of some basic foods have risen 40 to 70 percent. All this creates a very explosive attitude for the exploited social layers, particularly the working class and peasantry.

Q. What are the plans of the ruling class to meet this situation?

A. All the economic measures it is taking are very short-term, contradictory, and spasmodic. The ruling class provides no alternative but a twofold policy of terror and illusion. This means that Premier Constantine Caramanlis spreads illusions to the masses that he is the savior, the only solution. Through demagogic means he aims to maintain illusions that things will soon be better. On the other hand, he carries out a broad campaign of intimidation and terror. Through this tactic, the ruling class tries to make the working class and peasantry pay for the crisis of the system.

During the past year, from July 1974 to July 1975, they have tried through this twofold policy to hold down the masses. The main pretexts for this policy are the danger of a new military dictatorship and the national danger of a war with Turkey. The government has had full support in its efforts to persuade the people about these dangers from all the capitalist and reformist opposition parties and even from the Maoist and centrist groups of the extreme left.

At the same time, the government follows a policy of repression. Under the new constitution, which is the same constitution presented by the junta [the deposed military rulers], the government has the right to dissolve political organizations and trade unions if the government considers them to be deviating from their real purpose. Strikes can be called illegal for not serving the real interests of the working class. For the first time, arbitrary arrest and exile is constitutionally legal.

Q. What is the reaction of the working population toward these plans of the bourgeoisie?

A. The unchallenged parliamentary majority of Caramanlis makes it easy to give an appearance of stability, but it is a very superficial appearance. Under the surface is a volcano ready to erupt. The working people are not accepting their low living standard and the need to lower it even more, through unemployment and the lowering of real wages, to help the capitalist system.

A strike wave started last fall, and broadened in the beginning of this year. Almost all sectors of the working class have taken some action, ranging from work stoppages to strikes. The strikes are characterized by their long duration, their combativity, and the formation of strike commit-

tees in all cases. Recently, a qualitative change has taken place: Strikes have developed into occupations. One case is that of shipyard workers; their strike lasted forty-five days, during which time they had control of the yards.

The peasantry is in a much more serious situation than that of the working class, because only a small part of their production is absorbed by the market and is subject to prices lower than the cost. So when each agricultural product is harvested, the producers of the product are mobilized, and in this manner broad mobilizations of producers of specific products have taken place.

The main defect of all these worker and peasant mobilizations is that they are spontaneous and sporadic. There is no coordination and centralization, because there is not an organized peasant movement and a centralized trade-union movement.

Q. What is the situation of the trade-union movement?

A. The situation of the Greek trade-union movement is very complex. There is an official Central Confederation of Labor, which is a yellow trade union; that is to say, it is just a part of the state apparatus without any base in the working class. All of the real unions, which number about 750, were expelled from this Confederation of Labor in the period between 1960 and 1967. Officially, they are still outside this apparatus. Even in these real unions elections haven't taken place since 1966.

All these real unions were dissolved in April 1967 by the military dictatorship. The Caramanlis government allowed them to operate legally only six months after the fall of the dictatorship, restoring to the leadership of these unions those elected in 1966.

We propose immediate assemblies of workers, the reoperation of the unions, and new elections of the leadership. But the Stalinists, who have hegemony in these unions and have done nothing, have been waiting for Caramanlis to arrange everything for them. And he has every reason for postponing action and thereby gaining time.

The position of our organization is that all these real unions that were expelled represent the entire organized working-class movement and must form a new central apparatus, that is to say, a new Central Confederation of Labor. While the Stalinists, who dominate these unions, are against this, they demand that Caramanlis accept them again into the yellow union from which they were expelled.

In addition, only 12 to 15 percent of the working class is organized into unions. This problem, plus the lack of a centralized

trade-union movement, is the reason that all strikes that have taken place until now have been sporadic, uncoordinated, and in many cases spontaneous. The aim, therefore, of our organization in this field is to fight for centralization of the unions and for an organizational drive to bring the majority of workers into unions.

But this is impossible without a hard struggle against the reformist leaderships which are consciously keeping the trade-union movement in this situation. If this centralization of the trade-union movement does not occur, no effective trade-union struggle can take place. But such a broad organizational drive and this battle for centralization of the existing unions is also impossible without a strong revolutionary organization. So we consider both these struggles directly connected.

Q. What are the perspectives for the future?

A. Since the margin of maneuver of the ruling class is very narrow, and since the working population has already shown its intention not to pay for the capitalist crisis, it is clear that we're heading to a direct and generalized confrontation. The labor movement, in its political organizations and trade unions, is not yet prepared for this confrontation; so we consider the time we have to become prepared very short given the low level of organization that exists now.

The illusions among the working population that were fostered by the capitalist and reformist parties are evaporating. One of the aims of our policy and propaganda is precisely to eliminate these illusions and give people a clear political perspective. We are trying to make clear to the people that all their economic problems derive from the capitalist system and that their fight must be directed toward the destruction of that system and its replacement by the socialist alternative.

Because the present government was elected through intimidation and illusions, because its constitution is dictatorial, and because its repressive policies include the breaking of strikes and violent, provocative attacks on mass mobilizations, we demand that this government be overthrown and new elections for the constitutional assembly be held. With these demands we aim to give the mobilizations some concrete direction, and through this process, to finally create a workers and peasants government, which we advocate as the only real solution.

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Denounces Balaguer's Frame-up of Trade-Union Leaders

Fact-Finding Commission Scores Wide Suppression of Democratic Rights in the Dominican Republic



David/Direct From Cuba
BALAGUER

A fact-finding commission that visited the Dominican Republic in mid-September has described the situation there as "an alarming panorama of repressive conditions" going "far beyond the reports we had before we came."

The commission conducted an investigation of violations of human rights in the Dominican Republic. Members of the group were Mirta Vidal of the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA); Philip Wheaton of the Latin American Working Group of the National Council of Churches; Edouard Morin of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Latin American Problems of the Canadian Council of Churches; Ida Langman of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; William Davis of the Office of Social Ministries, U.S. Jesuit Conference; and James Goff and Margaret Goff, reporters for *Noticias Aliadas* and *Latinamerica Press*.

At a news conference in Washington, D.C., September 22, hosted by U.S. Congressman Herman Badillo, representatives of the commission presented a six-page document detailing some of the basic types of abuses. These included torture and inhumane treatment of political prisoners, the almost nonexistent recourse to habeas corpus, obstruction of urban and rural

trade-union organizing, and arbitrary prevention of freedom of speech and assembly.

Three cases cited by the group in which abuses of human rights have been most flagrant are the following:

- The case of Johnny Sampson, Angel Gandía, and Raúl García, three Puerto Rican nationalists recently sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for allegedly transporting guerrillas to the Dominican Republic.

Sampson, García, and Gandía were tortured and held incommunicado for twenty-one days before they were brought to trial. They were denied the right to confidential discussions with their attorneys before appearing in court.

- The case of three leaders of the Central General de Trabajadores (CGT—General Workers Federation): Francisco Antonio Santos, Julio de Peña Valdez, and Eugenio Pérez Cepeda. The CGT leaders are being held on vague charges of "attempts against the security of the state."

- The case of Juan Francisco Vargas, general secretary of the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Telefónicos (Telephone Workers Union). Vargas was accused of trafficking in firearms after police planted .45-caliber shells in his home.

Efforts initiated by the USLA on behalf of the CGT leaders and Vargas have already enlisted the support of trade unions in the United States.

United Mine Workers President Arnold Miller sent a letter to Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer, which said in part:

"Mr. President, we are greatly concerned about the apparent lack of democratic rights and civil liberties for trade unionists in the Dominican Republic. The CGT is a legal trade union organization, which abides by the laws of the Dominican Republic. The United Mine Workers of America, representing more than 200,000 mine workers, add our voice of protest to those of the United Auto Workers, representing more than 1.6 million workers, and the United Farm Workers, representing 75,000 farm workers in the United States. We appeal to you, Mr. President, to immediately release the four trade union leaders, Santos, Cepeda, Pena Valdez, and Vargas. We express our international solidarity with the CGT and the labor movement in the Dominican Republic in their struggle for a better life, democratic rights and free speech. We will do whatever we can until these trade union leaders are free." □

Gandhi Escalates War Against Nagas and Mizos

By Ernest Harsch

Under cover of the rigid press censorship imposed since her June 26 dictatorial coup, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has stepped up police and military attacks against the Mizo and Naga separatist rebels in northeastern India.

According to Marcus F. Franda in the September 5 *Christian Science Monitor*, "Gandhi hopes to take advantage of the recently imposed nationwide emergency to subdue insurgents and 'lawless elements' in India's northeast."

The escalation of New Delhi's war against the freedom fighters actually began in early 1975, following an increase in activity by the Naga and Mizo independence forces the year before. This new wave of unrest in the northeastern hills, which are inhabited by numerous tribal groups, ended a several-year lull in their struggle.

In a show of strength, the separatist Mizo National Front (MNF) called a *hartal* (general strike) in Aijal, the capital of the union territory of Mizoram, for October 22, 1974. The government forces tried to weaken the impact of the *hartal* by imposing a curfew, since, according to the November 23 *Calcutta Statesman Weekly*, "it was well known that every shop would pull down its shutters on that day." In December large student and youth demonstrations were also reported in Mizoram.

Gandhi rushed additional security forces into Mizoram after three top police officials were assassinated in Aijal on January 13. The army was put on alert, a massive hunt launched for the assassins, and a curfew imposed on the city. The entire territory has been declared a "disturbed area."

"MNF leaders have formed a parallel government in Mizoram . . ." Franda stated. "According to Indian Government personnel, the MNF has used this parallel government to exact 'taxation,' to issue orders on policy matters, to enforce policy on a wide range of issues. . ."

In addition to the twenty-six other political and religious groups banned since the state of emergency was declared, Gandhi has outlawed the MNF and its military wing, the Mizo National Army. New Delhi officials claimed that more than 100 Mizo rebels have been captured in the state of Manipur and in Mizoram since the beginning of the year. In a recent interview on All India Radio, Home Affairs Minister K. Brahmananda Reddy also claimed that supply lines to the rebels from China had been "rendered ineffective."



Manchester Guardian Weekly

Resistance to continued Indian rule also mounted in the state of Nagaland. A report on the insurgencies released by the Home Affairs Ministry in New Delhi November 4, 1974, stated, "The Naga underground have also clearly exhibited their militant and defiant attitude towards the lawfully-established Government by indulging in increasing number of violent acts. . . . During the current year, they have killed 45 security forces personnel and 27 civilians. . . . In all, 635 cases of recruitment have been reported this year up to September 30, compared to 171 in 1973."

Two months before releasing the report, the Gandhi regime extended for at least two more years the application of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Under the provisions of this act, the Naga National Council (NNC), the main Naga nationalist group, and its related bodies, the Federal Government and the Federal Army, are banned. The act also gives the police and army arbitrary powers to shoot, arrest, or punish anyone they suspect of sympathizing with the separatists.

As in the case of the Mizo rebels, the federal authorities claimed to have captured or killed scores of Nagas during extensive "combing operations" carried out in Nagaland since January.

On March 22, three months before Gandhi's coup, New Delhi imposed direct federal rule in Nagaland after dissolving

the state government. The United Democratic Front, a coalition of five parties, came to power in Nagaland in February 1974. It criticized Gandhi's efforts to forcibly crush the Naga guerrillas, calling instead for negotiations with the NNC, the release of political prisoners, and more decision-making power for the state government.

After more than twenty-five years of trying to "pacify" the tribespeople of northeastern India, however, New Delhi has still been unable to bring the area under firm control.

In the June 1966 issue of *Marxist Outlook*, a Trotskyist monthly published in Bombay, Kailas Chandra described the underlying reasons for the persistent unrest in the northeast: "The problem posed by the tribal people is essentially a socio-economic one. The backward Indian bourgeoisie has failed to develop the tribal regions. The tribal people, kept in ignorance and utter poverty, feel themselves totally alienated from the rest of the Indian people. Whatever security they enjoyed in their primitive tribal way of life is being destroyed by money lenders, forest contractors and officials who are trying to 'colonise' these areas, which the tribal people have been fiercely trying to resist. The British imperialists adopted a clever policy of non-interference with the internal life of the tribal people. But the new bourgeois rulers who are anxious to expand their markets cannot obviously adopt such a 'benevolent' attitude in relation to the tribals."

The Nagas, who now number about 1.5 million, were the first ethnic group in the northeast to resist the Indian incursion into their territory. In fact, the Naga National Council, which was formed in the 1940s, raised the demand for an independent Naga state while India was still under British rule. When India gained its independence from Britain in 1947, the regime of Jawaharlal Nehru ignored the demands of the Nagas.

The NNC launched a nonviolent civil-disobedience campaign to press its demands. New Delhi sent in police and arrested Naga leaders. In the mid-1950s, the NNC led a revolt and occupied key areas of the Naga hills, establishing the Federal Government of Nagaland in March 1956.

Nehru responded brutally. More than a division of Indian troops, units of the paramilitary Assam Rifles, and battalions of police poured into Nagaland, killing 1,400 Nagas in two years, according to official government figures. Neville Maxwell wrote in *India and the Nagas** that "the Indian forces set fire to villages and granaries and destroyed crops. Some villages were burned, rebuilt, and burned

*Minority Rights Group, Report No. 17. London, 1973.

again. Reports of torture and massacre of villagers by the Indian forces accumulated."

No sooner had the Indian authorities dealt a temporary setback to the Naga rebels than separatist demands were raised by the Mizos further to the south. The Mizo National Front was formed in 1961 out of an organization that carried out relief operations during the 1959-60 famine in the area. The MNF led a revolt of limited success in 1964. In February 1966 it launched a major campaign, winning control of Aijal until Indian forces moved in.

Mohan Ram reported in the November 1, 1974, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "In the following three years of counter-insurgency operations . . . over 3,500 insurgents were killed or captured and an undetermined number driven into the jungles of adjoining Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, and Burma."

Borrowing a technique used by Washington during the Vietnam War, New Delhi herded 200,000 Mizos into "Progressive Protective Villages" in an attempt to cut the rebels off from their base of support. To prevent the Mizos from escaping back to their homes, the Indian forces systematically burned Mizo villages and crops.

The publicity given to the war in the international and Indian press undoubtedly played a role in limiting New Delhi's hand. News articles reporting that Indian troops had destroyed villages and tortured and raped civilians damaged the image of Gandhi, who at that time still tried to present herself as a "democrat." With the present muzzling of the Indian press, however, there is a danger that Gandhi will be able to concentrate enough force against the separatist rebels to crush them.

Although the Naga and Mizo hill areas have some strategic military value, the reasons for New Delhi's determination to prevent their secession are primarily political. The entire northeastern region, which has a population of more than twenty-two million, is a patchwork of numerous nationalities and ethnic groups. The same holds true for the rest of India. A successful struggle for secession or autonomy in the northeast would strengthen nationalist and regionalist tendencies in other parts of the country.

Moreover, the social problems against which the Nagas and Mizos are rebelling—the restrictions on their language and culture, bondage to the rural moneylenders, plunder of their natural wealth, and expropriation of their land—are the same as those facing tribespeople throughout India. According to the 1951 census, there were close to 230 million tribespeople in India, accounting for more than one-third of the population.

Together with the so-called untouchables

and lower-caste Hindus, these tribespeople, commonly called *adivasis*, constitute the most oppressed layer of the peasantry and of the urban and rural work force. In addition to the unrest in the northeast, some significant struggles by *adivasis* have taken place in other parts of India during the past few years: the massive upsurge of the Girijans in the Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh, the protests by the Santhals and other tribespeople in Bihar, and the land occupations by various tribal groups in Maharashtra.

The impact of the Naga and Mizo struggles, however, has been most immediate among other nationalities and tribal groups in the northeast. In Assam state, the Ahoms, Khasi, Jaintia, and Bengalis (in

Cachar district) have all raised demands for states of their own. In addition, the Bodos in Assam have launched a struggle against the imposition of the Assamese script for their written language, holding demonstrations of up to 15,000 persons.

In Manipur state, the Kanglei League has called for Manipur's secession from India, and the Kukis and Lushias have demanded the merger of their areas with Mizoram.

In Tripura, the Upajatia Yuba Samity has launched a campaign for an autonomous tribal region. The October 5, 1974, *Statesman Weekly* noted that "a large section of the enlightened tribal youths are currently highlighting the need for a 'Naga-type' political solution of the Tripura tribal problem." □

Australian Women Issue Call for Action

International Abortion Protest Set for December 6

The Australian Women's Abortion Action Campaign has issued a call for international demonstrations December 6 to demand the repeal of laws prohibiting abortion. The demonstrations are intended as a culminating event for International Women's Year, highlighting the fact that ending restrictions on abortion remains a major issue for women internationally. The call, which has been sent to groups around the world, reads as follows:

"International Women's Year has been marked by reactionary attempts to fight back the gains women have made towards winning the right to reproductive freedom. In the U.S.A., Canada, New Zealand and Australia we have seen such attempts mounted.

"We are planning national demonstrations for the repeal of all abortion laws for December 6.

"We appeal to all women and groups who support our goal to organise demonstrations on the same date. We want to build the demonstration as the major concluding event of International Women's Year. . . ."

"Build the abortion struggle on an international basis! Demonstrate December 6."

The call for the December 6 demonstrations was initiated at a National Conference on Abortion and Contraception held in Sydney June 14-15. The conference, attended by almost 400 persons, was the largest such gathering ever held in Australia. It resolved to establish a national liaison committee to coordinate organizations campaigning for the right to abortion. It also endorsed the call for international pickets of British diplomatic missions on June 21 that had been requested by the National Abortion Campaign in Britain. Pickets were

held outside British High Commission offices in Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide.

Women in New Zealand have already taken up the call for actions on December 6. The proposal was supported by the national conference of the Women's National Abortion Action Campaign, held in Wellington September 21. The conference followed a successful Tribunal on Crimes Against Women—attended by more than 200 persons—that WONAAC organized in Wellington the day before. □

Polish CP Talking About Need for 'Austerity'

Faced with growing economic problems, the bureaucrats of the Polish Communist party are expected to institute a series of austerity measures at the end of 1975.

One cabinet member cynically opined, "Things have been improving too fast for the Polish people over the last five years. . . ."

To institute some "belt-tightening," one economist advocates "higher prices, harder work and more work discipline."

The Gierk government has indicated that after Christmas it will permit price rises, reduce the rate of annual wage increases, tighten up on sick-leave benefits, and end a policy of granting additional days off each year.

The thing worrying the bureaucrats is that the last time they tried to institute austerity measures—in December 1970—the moves set off strikes that toppled Wladyslaw Gomulka from the CP leadership.

The Fort Hood Three and the August 6-9 Actions

By Fred Halstead

The antiwar movement periodically grappled with a sense of powerlessness because it seemed incapable of affecting the war itself in any direct material way. From time to time, different strategies were proposed in an attempt to overcome this problem. Many of these ideas revolved around the draft.

As early as May 1964 the May Second Movement (M-2-M) began a campaign to get signatures on a pledge of refusal to fight in Vietnam. At their founding conference in the summer of 1964, the Du Bois Clubs adopted a motion to endorse this pledge. By February 1965, M-2-M had collected some 1,000 signatures. These were almost entirely from students, however, who at the time enjoyed the automatic 2-S student deferment, so the project had no practical significance except for organizing purposes. It eventually faded away.

In October 1965, M-2-M announced a plan for the formation of antidraft unions. A few were formed in local areas and engaged in some propaganda activity but organized no actual draft resistance. They, too, faded from the scene.

As part of the First International Days of Protest in October 1965, the SDS affiliate at Ann Arbor, VOICE, led a sit-in at the local draft board and thirty-eight persons were arrested. This

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incident got wide publicity because afterward the draft board—with the approval of Selective Service Director General Lewis B. Hershey—changed the status of some of the student demonstrators from 2-S to 1-A, as a punitive measure. The case became a cause célèbre and gained wide support on the civil liberties issue. It also made Hershey a pet object of derision among students and helped put SDS in the limelight, though it had no direct effect on the draft itself.

The SDS national office several times in 1965 and early 1966 announced antidraft programs, some of which received wide publicity, but with one exception these were not carried out. The exception was not really a draft resistance program, but an activity against procedures of the Selective Service System which had begun to cut into the 2-S deferment for students.

In February 1966, General Hershey announced that local draft boards could henceforth induct college students in the lower levels of academic achievement. Two methods were devised to determine this ranking. First: the universities were asked to rank their male students according to grades and give the government this information. Second: a national examination would be given to all male students periodically to test their general intelligence and academic achievement and the results would be used by local draft boards.

At its National Council meeting in May, SDS adopted an idea

suggested by Lee Webb for a counterdraft examination. SDS printed half a million of these exams, containing questions and answers on Vietnam and American foreign policy. The idea was to pass them out at the regular draft exam centers on May 14 when the first such test was scheduled. But the council declined to accept a corollary proposal by Paul Booth that the SDSers refuse to take the regular exam as a show of seriousness.

On May 14, SDSers handed out the counterdraft exam at most of the 1,200 test centers. The students took it, read it, and many agreed that it was an effective piece of antiwar literature, but they also took the draft exam in an attempt to protect their own 2-S deferment.

It would not be until the end of December 1966 that SDS would adopt a position of draft refusal. In the earlier period it was the pacifists—those who opposed military service in principle—who organized this kind of activity, though many others talked about it. In the long run also it would be the pacifists who would organize it most effectively.

Their participation in this work did not depend on statistics, which in 1965 were not at all encouraging from the point of view of draft resistance. That year 180,000 men were drafted and there were only 341 cases of draft law violation.¹

For the pacifists draft refusal or at least legal conscientious objection was a philosophical or spiritual imperative and they'd have done it regardless of any broader effect. Some of them did, however, hope it would assume proportions great enough to interfere directly with the ability of the Pentagon to fill its manpower needs. This hope was never realized for the simple reason that the actual draft call—however large in absolute terms—was always only a small part of the available manpower pool. Advocates of draft resistance also hoped that it would help create a political atmosphere which would make the war unworkable, and this hope was realized to some degree. But that came later.

An entirely different approach was advocated by the SWP and the YSA. To some extent this *was* based on statistics, but also on a traditional Leninist view long held by the SWP and known as the proletarian military policy.

According to this approach, revolutionaries should not purposefully isolate themselves from the working class youth being drafted, enlisting under the hot breath of the draft, or already in the armed services. In fiscal 1965-66 for example, there were an average of some 28,000 men a month being drafted, additional thousands enlisting—often simply to have a choice of services rather than wait to be drafted and have no choice—and some 3 million youths of draft age (18½ to 26) were already in the military service.²

Since deferment was much easier for upper and middle class youth to obtain, those being drafted or already in the service were

1. For number drafted: Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics, May 1974, P27.61. For Selective Service Act violations: *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 1973, table 445, p. 274.

2. For number drafted: same as in note 1. For number in service: *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 1973, table 441, p. 272.



Part of crowd of 20,000 in New York antiwar demonstration August 6, 1966.

heavily weighted to the side of lower income working class youth including disproportionate numbers of Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans.

In the view of the SWP and the YSA the draft was a secondary issue in any case, subordinate to the political issue of the war itself. This contrasted sharply with the early Du Bois Club approach which leaned toward the idea that a movement against the draft could be broader than the movement against the war. In the fall of 1965 the National Peace Committee of the Du Bois Clubs issued a document which said:

"The Vietnam war and the increased draft quotas that accompany the war bring more profound focus onto the question of the draft itself. But if there is to be a successful anti-draft movement, that is, one that encompasses the broadest anti-draft feeling, the question of the Vietnam war per se will be an incidental question. That is to say, we will have to organize people where they are. We will have to include in such a movement even those young persons who may support the Vietnam war but are not willing to give their lives for it."³

Doug Jenness, one of the YSA leaders, expressed a different gut feeling on the matter in a letter to Chicago SDSer Earl Silbar when the latter made a proposal for action against draft boards. According to Jenness, "a fight against a draft board does not help organize or inspire other sections of the population. It tries to organize the sentiments of scared students who want to stay out of the army rather than build a movement directed squarely against the Johnson administration. The majority of people who come into opposition against the war are not looking for a way out of the draft—they are looking for effective ways to expose and oppose the war. . . . The ordinary American is not a pacifist and sees nothing wrong with the Selective Service System or with the army; when he opposes the war, his response is simply to get the troops out—not to dismantle the Selective Service System."⁴

While this letter was indicative of an attitude among YSAers it actually overstated the YSA position somewhat. The YSA did adopt a position of political opposition to the existing draft. It supported the defense cases of draft resisters and was often involved in support demonstrations on their behalf. But YSAers

did not advocate or engage in draft refusal. This was not out of legalistic considerations but because they didn't think it the most effective thing to do.

To them it seemed that, in a choice between spending two years or so in jail or an indefinite time in exile as opposed to spending two years in the army talking to fellow GIs against the war, the army was politically the more effective choice. This decision was left up to the individual, but with few exceptions YSAers who were drafted chose to enter the military.

Later, when antiwar activity among GIs became widespread and a number of soldiers who had been active YSAers in civilian life were prominently involved, it was assumed by many within the movement that the YSA had deliberately sent people into the army. This was never the case. They were drafted. Nor did the YSAers quietly allow themselves to be drafted. As a general rule, YSAers called by the draft would notify the authorities in writing of their antiwar position and declare their intention to maintain these views and express them within the army. When a YSAer showed up for induction, it was often with a bundle of antiwar literature under his arm and accompanied by a demonstration of friends and supporters. In the early period they were drafted anyway. After the army had some experience with these organizers, however, the letter was usually enough to ensure a reconsideration of the induction.

The YSA and SWP preferred to keep their members in civilian life if possible, where they could organize freely and spend far more time on antiwar activity—not to mention socialist political work—than was possible in the army. They had no illusion that their own small forces could make a critical difference—except by occasional example—in activities within the army, which was tenuous and difficult at best.

The proletarian military policy was a political approach, not an adventure, not a fad, and certainly not a gimmick. It advocated pointing the antiwar movement toward the great mass of ordinary working class Americans, including those in the military, and including the 99 percent who were not opposed on principle to all military service.

Nor did those of us in the YSA and SWP view GI antiwar activity as a substitute for building the antiwar movement in the civilian population. On the contrary, it was our view that the civilians were the key force. Without a mass antiwar movement in the civilian population the GI movement could never get beyond occasional isolated individual acts. There was, however, an important reciprocal factor. Any antiwar stand by GIs carried

3. *End the Draft!* Published by the Du Bois Clubs National Peace Committee, Michael Myerson, director. Fall 1965. (Copy in author's files.)

4. Letter from Doug Jenness to Earl Silbar, March 15, 1966. (Copy in author's files.)

great weight with the civilian population and cut, like nothing else could, through the "support our boys" demagoguery of the hawks. The more massive the civilian movement, the easier it was for the GIs to express their own opposition to the war.

In addition, we in the SWP also had our hopes that a GI movement could develop which would have a direct effect on the war machine. We knew this was at least theoretically possible, because it had happened before. Not only in extreme situations of social collapse like Russia of 1917, but within the U.S. military itself in what was called the "going home movement" following World War II.

In late 1945 and early 1946 the huge U.S. overseas military machine had to be hastily demobilized, contrary to plan, because of a massive campaign by GIs which had broad support in the civilian population at home. This movement involved contact with trade union and other groups within the U.S., petitions to Congress, distribution of literature by the GIs themselves on military facilities, and even large demonstrations by men in uniform. These activities took place both in Europe and the Pacific.⁵

Although this movement had been virtually ignored in history books, a dim memory of it remained and had been kept alive in particular in the SWP, which considered it an important historical development. As an eighteen-year-old sailor in the U.S. Seventh Fleet in China waters, I had seen a part of this movement personally, though I had nothing to do with organizing it.

At the time the part of the fleet I was with was actually involved in the Chinese civil war—another fact rarely mentioned in the history books—ferrying Chiang Kai-shek's troops to Northern China to fight the Communists. The GIs I was acquainted with had by and large accepted the Second World War as some kind of necessity. But we knew nothing about the Chinese civil war until we found ourselves involved, and we wanted no part of it. It was not so much a political mood as a simple desire to go home, though I remember some of the GI orators using words like "imperialism" in their agitation. As I recall, the organizers were older than I was, usually noncommissioned officers with some sort of specialized skills and a background of trade union experience.

I remember that at the time it was considered no big thing for GIs to be painting banners or turning out leaflets on military mimeograph machines, or even requisitioning space on military airplanes to attend distant meetings. I observed one of these meetings at the Red Cross building in Shanghai, which was a gathering place for GIs in the area. The lobby had a big banner in it: "GIs Unite—We Want to Go Home!"

If the officers didn't like these goings-on, there was not much they could do about it. The sentiment was too widespread and they were too dependent in day-to-day life on the noncommissioned officers who were participating. The movement was finally halted by decree, but this was possible only because the rapid demobilization had already begun and was irreversible, at least as far as that body of men was concerned.

In 1965 and 1966 we in the SWP thought a lot about that earlier experience and described it on every possible occasion to other antiwar activists. Could anything like that develop among American GIs in Vietnam? We weren't sure, but we didn't exclude it. And we did what we could to press the point that GIs had a right—if anyone did—to express their opinions on the war in Vietnam, and to organize and demonstrate against it.

In the first years of the antiwar movement the YSA was the only major radical youth group to consistently advocate work

among GIs. (The much smaller Youth Against War and Fascism also saw GIs as an important constituency.)

The other groups considering themselves Marxist did not, in principle, oppose all military service, and when drafted their members usually entered the army. But these groups had no orientation toward GIs. On the contrary, like SDS and the pacifists, they viewed antidraft work as central. The idea of looking to GIs as part of the antiwar constituency was considered bizarre at that time by most of the movement.

Peculiarly enough, it was some of the pacifists—including Muste and Dellinger—who were among the earliest to seriously consider the idea of reaching GIs. They did not counsel entering the army, even when forced by the draft. And they tended to consider antidraft activity more important in general, but they did not exclude the possibility of reaching GIs with the antiwar message, or even with their own pacifist message.

One thing the radical pacifists had in common with the Trotskyists was a strong faith in the capacity of ordinary people to learn and change. In each case, this faith had a different philosophical basis, and, regarding Dellinger and myself, this would later be reflected in serious tactical disputes as the movement matured.

* * *

The first widely publicized case of GI antiwar activity was that of Lieutenant Henry Howe, Jr., who had gained his army commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program at the University of Colorado. Howe was not a radical and had expressed pride at being able to serve in the military. But Johnson's escalation of the war in spite of the election promises of 1964 shocked Howe. He became bitter at President Johnson. While stationed at a base near El Paso he decided to join an antiwar demonstration there on November 6, 1965.

The demonstration was small, about a dozen students and faculty from Texas Western College, who had to brave a large crowd of hecklers. Nevertheless Howe, who was off-duty at the time, joined the picket line wearing civilian clothes. He carried a sign which contained two slogans: "End Johnson's fascist aggression in Vietnam" and "Let's have more than a choice between petty, ignorant fascists in 1968."

Though the demonstration was peaceful and orderly, Howe was pointed out to local police as an army officer and arrested on a subterfuge "vagrancy" charge, then turned over to military police and court-martialed. Actually, he had broken no laws. Regulations which had been outlined by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during the civil rights demonstrations of 1963 had recognized the rights of GIs to demonstrate while off-duty and in civilian clothes.

But Howe was convicted by the court-martial of conduct unbecoming an officer and using contemptuous words toward the president. He was sentenced to two years in prison. The Denver antiwar movement and Howe's family in Boulder set up a "Freedom Now for Lieutenant Howe Committee" and mounted an effective campaign of publicity while the American Civil Liberties Union appealed the case. The campaign succeeded in winning Howe's release on parole after he had served three months.

The next GI case to attract wide attention was the Fort Hood Three. At the time it was not publicly known, but the story of the Fort Hood Three is not complete without reference to a fourth GI who was not directly involved in the case but played a key role in connecting it with the organized antiwar movement. He was Pfc. Carl Edelman, a cook at Fort Gordon, Georgia. I had known Edelman slightly on the Lower East Side of New York City before he was drafted. He was a big, burly youth from a radical working class background, tough, gutsy and generally well-liked by his associates.

In the army Edelman became convinced on his own that the

5. For accounts of this movement see: *GIs and the Fight Against the War* by Mary-Alice Waters (New York: Young Socialist Pamphlet, 1967); "The Army Mutiny of 1946," by R. Alton Lee, *Journal of American History*, December 3, 1966, pp. 555-71; and *Soldiers in Revolt* by David Cortright (Garden City, New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1975), pp. 149-51.

antiwar movement could reach GIs. In February 1966 he wrote a letter to this effect to the Southern Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, an NCC affiliate in Atlanta. It began: "To the U.S. Peace Movement: The soldier is not the enemy." Edelman continued:

"The other evening a few of us were watching the news on television, Huntley-Brinkley. They showed a couple of shots of an antiwar demonstration in New York City. The immediate reaction was an outburst of nasty epithets: 'Send those bastards to Vietnam', 'All of those beatniks should be sent to the front lines', etc. Not a few seconds later, the pictures of dead and wounded American soldiers were shown. The result of 'operation masher'. Out of the mouths of the same soldiers who only a few moments before were condemning anti-war demonstrators, came 'Why in hell are those boys dying', 'They should get rid of McNamara', 'If Johnson wants to fight, he should go over there.' These are some of the contradictions. . . ."⁶

Edelman met the other soldiers while they were in signal school at Fort Gordon before being assigned to the 142nd Signal Battalion at Fort Hood. There they were given a thirty-day leave and orders to report to Oakland Army Terminal on July 13, 1966, for shipment to Vietnam. They decided to take a stand and refuse to go, and they contacted Edelman at Fort Gordon to talk it over.

There had been previous incidents, reported briefly in the press, of GIs refusing—or attempting to refuse—duty in Vietnam. But these had been quickly buried by the army, which either shipped the GIs off to Vietnam or arrested them immediately and held them virtually incommunicado. The antiwar movement heard about these cases only after the fact and had no way to reach the GIs and mount a defense.

Edelman advised the Fort Hood GIs to contact antiwar organizations and prepare for maximum publicity and backing from the civilian movement before making a move. This could be done during their thirty-day leave. Edelman had a leave of his own coming, so he took it and went North with the other GIs.

One of them, Dennis Mora, was a member of the Du Bois Clubs, which was the first group they contacted. They were referred to Vets for Peace, which in turn referred them to the Parade Committee. That's how they happened to walk into Dellinger's office in mid-June.

I was on the Parade Committee staff then and Dellinger called me in to talk it over with the GIs. Dellinger and I made sure they knew what they were doing and that they knew they would probably spend a few years in jail if they went through with it. Dellinger was in favor of the move they proposed—to refuse to go to Vietnam. I told them frankly that in their place I wouldn't do the same, that I would go to Vietnam, which would only be a year, and spread the antiwar message as best I could over there.

But we both assured them that if they went ahead with their plan we were sure the Parade Committee would back them. It was clear they knew the consequences and had their minds made up, so we consulted with Muste and worked out a procedure to make it impossible for the army to keep the case quiet. What is more, with the agreement of the GIs, we decided to use the case to encourage the movement to approach soldiers and to begin to develop that area of activity.

The three Fort Hood GIs in consultation with Edelman had figured out their own strategy in basic outline, and even contacted a lawyer, before coming to the Parade Committee. Their plan was to hold a press conference to announce their stand, to allow time for the civilian movement to mobilize behind them, then to report to the Oakland base as scheduled, but to refuse to embark for Vietnam.

We invited them to present their case before the June 18 conference of antiwar activists which had been previously

scheduled by the Parade Committee to make plans for the August 6-9 demonstration. They did so, and got the support they asked for.

A press conference for the GIs was arranged where they would publicly announce their stand. Careful preparations were made to assure that prominent figures in the movement would be present, as well as the members of the GIs' families who could make it. A public meeting was set for a week later at which the GIs were scheduled to speak. Antiwar groups on the West Coast were contacted to prepare to meet the GIs at the airport near Oakland on July 9 and to hold additional press conferences and meetings with them in the Bay Area before they reported at the Army Terminal on July 13.⁷ In addition, a legal defense committee was set up to go into operation immediately after the GIs made their public announcement, with Muste and Staughton Lynd as cochairmen and Dellinger as secretary.

On June 30 in New York's Community Church the press conference went off as planned. Present were SNCC Chairman Stokely Carmichael and CORE Public Relations Director Lincoln Lynch as well as Muste, Dellinger, Lynd, members of the GIs' families, and a large number of Parade Committee members. As the three GIs faced the TV cameras one of them, Dennis Mora, read the following joint statement:

"We are Pfc. James Johnson, Pvt. David Samas, and Pvt. Dennis Mora, three soldiers formerly stationed at Fort Hood, Texas in the same company of the 142 Signal Battalion, 2nd Armored Division. We have received orders to report on the 13th of July at Oakland Army Terminal in California for final processing and shipment to Vietnam.

"We have decided to take a stand against this war, which we consider immoral, illegal and unjust. We are initiating today, through our attorneys, Stanley Faulkner of New York and Mrs. Selma Samols of Washington, D.C. an action in the courts to enjoin the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army from sending us to Vietnam. We intend to report as ordered to the Oakland Army Terminal, but under no circumstances will we board ship for Vietnam. We are prepared to face Court Martial if necessary.

"We represent in our backgrounds a cross section of the Army and of America. James Johnson is a Negro, David Samas is of Lithuanian and Italian parents, Dennis Mora is a Puerto Rican. We speak as American soldiers.

"We have been in the army long enough to know that we are not the only G.I.'s who feel as we do. Large numbers of men in the service either do not understand this war or are against it. . . .

"The Viet Cong obviously had the moral and physical support of most of the peasantry who were fighting for their independence. We were told [in army training] that you couldn't tell them apart—that they looked like any other skinny peasant.

"Our man or our men in Saigon has and have always been brutal dictators, since Diem first violated the Geneva promise of free elections in 1956.

"The Buddhist and military revolt in all the major cities proves

7. The early communications mention four Fort Hood GIs planning to refuse orders to Vietnam. One of them dropped out before the press conference. The circumstances are interesting. This GI considered himself a libertarian conservative and a follower of the ideas of novelist Ayn Rand. The GIs were invited to a regular Parade Committee meeting at which the custom was to go around the room with each person making a self-introduction, including name and organization, for the benefit of newcomers. When it came Mike Stein's turn he said as usual: "Mike Stein, New York Communist Party." After the meeting the fourth GI told us he would have to drop out because his philosophy would not permit him to associate with a member of the Communist Party. He said he considered the Parade Committee honest and would not do anything to jeopardize the other GIs. As far as I know he kept this promise though he was detained and questioned by army authorities after the others made their public announcement. He was sent to Vietnam. Later he wrote from there saying he still opposed the war.

6. *SCC Newsletter*, February 23, 1966. (Copy in author's files.)

that the people of the cities also want an end to Ky and U.S. support for him.

"The Saigon Army has become the advisor to American G.I.'s who have to take over the fighting.

"No one used the word 'winning' anymore because in Vietnam it has no meaning. Our officers just talk about five and ten more years of war with at least a half million of our boys thrown into the grinder. We have been told that many times we may face a Vietnamese woman or child and that we will have to kill them. We will never go there—to do that—for Ky!

"We know that Negroes and Puerto Ricans are being drafted and end up in the worst of the fighting all out of proportion to their numbers in the population; and we have first hand knowledge that these are the ones who have been deprived of decent education and jobs at home. . . .

"We have made our decision. We will not be a part of this unjust, immoral, and illegal war. We want no part of a war of extermination. We oppose the criminal waste of American lives and resources. We refuse to go to Vietnam!"⁸

The announcement was front-page news in the major media. The Fort Hood Three Defense Committee immediately sent out to antiwar groups across the country fact sheets on the case including statements by the three GIs. Dozens of antiwar groups began reproducing and distributing these, concentrating on areas where GIs could be found, such as bus stations and airports near major bases.

The army's first reaction was to try to divide the three GIs. A few days after the press conference, Samas received a telegram from his parents in Modesto, California, asking him to call home immediately. The Modesto police had contacted them, told them their son was being used as a "tool of the Communists," and on behalf of the army offered Samas a deal. Said Samas: "They had told my father that if I would retract my statement and withdraw completely from the civil action now in progress that I would receive a discharge from the army and no serious repercussions would result."⁹

Samas's parents were upset but after talking it over with their son decided to back him in his stand. The three GIs were followed around New York by plainclothes agents, and, according to a statement by Samas written at the time, "They have attempted to intimidate the three of us in one way or another and have approached all of our parents in different ways. But we have not been scared. We have not been in the least shaken from our paths. And we will not be, even if physical violence is used. We are not pacifists. We are not non-violent, and if the need arises we will fight back."¹⁰

On the morning of July 7, a telegram signed by Muste, Dellinger, and Becker for the Parade Committee was sent to Attorney General Nicholas De B. Katzenbach and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and released to the press. This telegram was the result of serious deliberation and was carefully written. It outlined the response of the antiwar movement to the initial army attack against the Fort Hood Three and took the offensive by projecting an ongoing campaign toward GIs. It declared:

"We strongly condemn harassment by Federal agents of servicemen such as Pfc. James Johnson, Pvt. Dennis Mora and Pvt. David Samas, who have filed injunction in Federal Court against shipment to Vietnam on grounds of immorality and illegality of that war.

"We are reliably informed that on July 4 an officer of the

8. *The Fort Hood Three*. Pamphlet published by the Fort Hood Three Defense Committee (New York: 1966), pp. 9-16. Fort Hood Three file, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

10. *Loc. cit.*

Modesto, California, police force visited the parents of Pvt. Samas. The officer said he had been contacted by 'higher authorities' and that if Pvt. Samas would rescind his action and his statement against the war, and in effect abandon his fellows, he would not be prosecuted and would receive an Army discharge. The officer obviously acted under instruction of Federal agents in proposing such a bribe.

"Such acts show desperation in attempt to stem growing opposition to the war among young men facing the draft or already in military service. The peace movement will continue to aid in every possible lawful way anyone, civilian, soldier, sailor or Marine, who opposes this illegal and immoral war. The young men in the armed services are entitled to know the truth about the war and to engage in discussions about it. Citizens are likewise entitled to communicate the truth about the war to servicemen and the peace movement is determined to exercise that right."¹¹

Later that month in a report on the case to the New York branch of the Socialist Workers Party, I commented on that telegram: "There are many ways something like that could be said, and most of them would be wrong. But this isn't wrong. It is just right. And it ought to be given a lot of attention—a lot of thought. What could be more reasonable than that the young men in the armed services are entitled to know the truth about the war, and to engage in discussions about it? Anything else is pure and simple thought control, brainwashing, and everything else evil and outrageous. Can anybody reasonably challenge that proposition? Isn't it completely in accord with what almost every American considers reasonable? . . .

"This is not a fascist country, in spite of what some people who are very loose with words say. And it is extremely important to know that it isn't a fascist country. Extremely important. For one thing, regardless of how the liberties we are supposed to enjoy are abused by this or that authority, the traditions of free thought, free speech, freedom of discussion, and so on, run extremely deep in the American people. They haven't been burned out. They remain deep among the people, all of them, including those in the army.

"We know that in effect many of these liberties have been sham and mockery because it has been almost impossible to put them to effective use. You can vote, but you vote for peace candidate Johnson and he gives you war. You can demonstrate, but the government pays no attention. You can talk but nobody in power listens. But now these freedoms can be used to greater effect. Now the movement is going to use. . . . them. It is entitled to use them, and it is going to use them up to the hilt. It is not asking anybody to do anything wild or anything strange, or anything illegal—just to exercise these rights.

"The question is, does an ordinary American youth have the right to form his own opinion on being used, and maybe killed, in a war some place half-way around the world. A war which millions of his fellow citizens consider to be immoral and illegal. Does he or doesn't he? Obviously he does! . . .

"Now we don't want to imply that automatically this is going to be the big thing; that a point is going to be reached in a few months where thousands of GIs will be reached, and the word will get to Vietnam and there will be a big 'going home movement' and the war will be over because of this case. But it may be the beginning of that process."¹²

On the evening of July 7 some 800 antiwar activists gathered in the public meeting at the Community Church to hear the three GIs tell their own story. On their way to the church the three men were abducted by the federal agents following them and spirited off to the stockade at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The men were still on

11. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

12. This verbal report was transcribed and distributed to other SWP branches, July 21, 1966. (Copy in author's files.)

leave and had not yet broken any laws. The abduction—the men were not formally arrested until they refused orders to go to Vietnam—was an obvious attempt to prevent them from speaking and to cut off the demonstrations scheduled for their arrival in the Oakland area.

The meeting proceeded anyway with members of the GIs' families speaking on their behalf. Volunteers hastily painted signs in the back of the hall and the meeting closed with the audience marching to Times Square for an emergency demonstration on behalf of the GIs. This too got good coverage in the media.

At the meeting itself, Grace Mora Newman spoke on behalf of her brother Dennis. The other two GIs had managed to get copies of their speeches to relatives before they were hauled away.

James Johnson's speech was read by his brother Darwin.

"After basic training I began to seriously consider the prospect of Vietnam. I devoted much of my free time to reading, listening, and discussing America's role in Vietnam. I felt that I had been following blindly too long in the Army. A soldier is taught not to question, not to think, just to do what he is told. Are your convictions and your conscience supposed to be left at home, or on the block? I had to take a stand.

"I once told a Colonel about my opposition to the war. I was told that I was being paid to be a soldier not a politician. Should I let the Pentagon decide whether I should live or die? After studying the situation in Vietnam, I learned that the government was not being honest with the American people. The government tells us that the United States is in Vietnam at the request of the Vietnamese government in Saigon. They fail to tell us, though, that the Saigon government was not elected by the people. There have never been free elections there. In fact, the U.S. government installed a regime of its own choosing, headed by Diem, in 1954. Since then there has been a succession of military dictators. All supported at our expense. Not one of these governments was worth the support of the people. They were supported by our army.

"The government also tells us that we are spending our men and money to preserve freedom in Vietnam. Yet the current dictator, General Ky, declared that Adolf Hitler was his hero. Like Hitler, he uses extreme brutality to crush any opposition that may arise. President Johnson tells us that he is trying to bring about discussions for peace in Vietnam. Yet peace offers were made by North Vietnam last spring. But they were rejected by our government and the American people were not told about them. . . .

"Now there is a direct relationship between the peace movement and the civil rights movement. The South Vietnamese are fighting for representation like we ourselves. . . . Therefore the Negro in Vietnam is just helping to defeat what his black brother is fighting for in the United States. When the Negro soldier returns, he still will not be able to ride in Mississippi or walk down a certain street in Alabama. There will still be proportionately twice as many Negroes as whites in Vietnam. . . .

"It is time that the Negro realizes that his strength can be put to much better use right here at home. This is where his strength lies. We can gain absolutely nothing in Vietnam. All this is leading to the decision I have made. I know it is my right to make this decision."¹³

Samas's speech was read by his seventeen-year-old wife, Marlene. It contained the following advice to the peace movement:

"I have never been involved with any of the peace groups until a few weeks ago when we approached the Parade Committee for help. As a civilian I was interested and extremely concerned, but I neglected to show my concern. In a great way I too am responsible for the boys who already are in Vietnam.

"But even as an unaffiliated civilian, I was closer to the peace movement than most soldiers are now. To me the peace movement always looked like concerned students and citizens trying to

protect their country from war and nuclear devastation. To a soldier the movement appears very differently. The soldier is very far indeed from the outside world and the normal news media do not usually reach him. News of the free world reaches him through letters from home, or through his buddies. It often seems that the peace groups are united against the soldier, and that forces the soldiers to cling together and ignore the real issues made public by the peace movement. The stories that reach the soldiers usually show that the peace movement is backing their enemies, and is against the Army, and against the individual soldiers. Upon too many occasions groups have offered aid to the Viet Cong and too few times have they approached the G.I.'s with help.

"The G.I. should be reached somehow. He doesn't want to fight. He has no reasons to risk his life. Yet he doesn't realize that the peace movement is dedicated to his safety. Give the G.I. something to believe in and he will fight for that belief. Let them know in Vietnam that you want them home, let them know that you are concerned about their lives also. Tell them you want them to live, not die. Bring home our men in Vietnam! . . .

"In the end we depend entirely upon the public. We have placed ourselves in the hands of the people of the United States, and all of our hopes lie with them. . . ."¹⁴

Two days later the Parade Committee took several busloads of demonstrators to Fort Dix to demonstrate on behalf of the three GIs. Before the buses arrived the base authorities sent military police through the little village of Wrightstown, which lies just outside the main gate, chasing GIs off the street so they wouldn't mix with the demonstrators. A number of them retreated inside bars and restaurants, however, and watched through the windows. A line of MPs prevented the demonstrators from entering the base so they set up a picket line outside while Muste and members of the families argued with the officers in charge. Distributors ran around putting leaflets anywhere GIs might get them. It was the first large demonstration at an army base. Over the years to come there would be countless others.

When it came time to leave, my assignment was to walk the few blocks of the town making sure all the demonstrators made it back to the buses. It was a hot day and when this was done I stopped in a bar for a beer. I hadn't thought to remove my Parade Committee marshal's armband and I suddenly realized I was alone in a bar filled with soldiers. A half dozen of them, well along in their cups, surrounded me at the bar and started baiting. I tried to be friendly but they were looking for a fight. I was about resigned to getting some lumps when one of them, a wiry white Southerner with narrow-set eyes, poked at my armband. "Gimme that," he said. "I want to take it with me to Vietnam." I took off the armband, handed it to him, and said the first thing that came to mind: "OK, but don't kill any peasants." He backed away with shock on his face. "I wouldn't do that," he said quietly. The group dissolved and I finished my beer and left. It wasn't going to be easy, but the discussion, at least, had begun.

* * *

The courts turned down the injunction requested by the Fort Hood Three on the ground that they didn't have jurisdiction, and in spite of appeals they consistently refused to hear the substantial issues in the case. The court-martial also refused to consider these issues, so the three GIs were convicted and sentenced. The conviction was upheld through the military appeals and the three men spent two years in prison. For some time after they were first confined, the defense committee organized demonstrations and widespread publicity campaigns to protest harsh treatment the men received at the first stockades

13. *The Fort Hood Three*, pp. 19-20.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

where they were held. These were effective and their conditions did improve. The men never faltered, and when they were released returned to civilian life as supporters of the antiwar movement. By that time, the movement as a whole had become acutely aware of the importance of antiwar activity by GIs.

* * *

A by-product of the Fort Hood Three case was a spirit of unity in New York behind the Parade Committee in preparations for the August 6-9 protests, as well as increased standing of the Parade Committee in the movement nationally.

In addition, the war continued to escalate. Hours before the June 30 Fort Hood Three press conference, the U.S. bombed oil storage depots in Hanoi and Haiphong, the first time those population centers had been attacked by U.S. forces. As a result, demonstrations previously called for July 4 in several cities were larger than expected, including one of 5,000 in Los Angeles sponsored by the Peace Action Council there.

The August 6-9 demonstrations were not expected to be as large as those in the spring because of the traditional summer lull with vacations and schools being out. Nevertheless, in several cities, including Cleveland, Atlanta, and San Diego, the August protests were the largest antiwar actions yet held, though the turnout in such cities was still in the hundreds. Significantly, in many cities the activities were sponsored by new, broader coalitions, in some cases patterned after the Parade Committee.

In Washington, D.C., President Johnson's daughter, Lucy Baines, was married August 6. The timing of this event—which was played up in the media like a celebration of royalty—displayed a certain lack of sensitivity to the human tragedy of Hiroshima Day. Some 500 antiwar demonstrators marched in front of the White House in spite of police attempts to keep them away on the excuse that the wedding reception was being held there.

The San Francisco demonstration drew 10,000, with Vincent Hallinan, Peter Camejo, Robert Scheer, and Ann Samas, mother of one of the Fort Hood Three, among the speakers. In general, defense of the Fort Hood Three was a feature of the August actions and in many places leafletting of GIs was stressed. In Madison, Wisconsin, the university was used to feed some 2,000 reserve troops passing through on summer training and the antiwar movement there leafletted them heavily, finding an unexpectedly friendly response.

These demonstrations also featured another aspect of antiwar activity in which interest was growing. This was the exposure of the use by the U.S. in Vietnam of the terror weapon napalm, jellied gasoline which sticks to the flesh and consumes it with flames.

Demonstrations against napalm had previously taken place at factories producing it in Redwood City and in Torrance, California, where a Dow Chemical plant was located. In April 1966 two Brooklyn women, Denzil Longton and Terry Radinsky, had organized a demonstration at a stockholders meeting of the Witco Chemical Company, one of the producers of napalm. They then formed the Citizens Campaign Against Napalm and launched a nationwide consumers' boycott against Saran Wrap, one of the products of Dow, a chief producer of napalm.

Longton was a member of the Parade Committee and convinced it to make the Dow Chemical offices in Rockefeller Plaza a target of the August 6 New York demonstration.

Participants gathered in various parts of the city, including the different boroughs, and started feeder marches featuring a variety of effects. There were thirteen feeder marches in all, including one from Harlem and a Latin American contingent starting from the East Side. Three of them were led by units organized by the Bread and Puppet Theater. The marches converged in Times Square, circled the area, and then marched past the Rockefeller Plaza Dow

offices to a rally in the streets nearby. The crowd was 20,000, a remarkable turnout for midsummer.

The families of Johnson and Mora, two of the Fort Hood Three, sat on the speakers' stand and Grace Mora Newman was a featured speaker as were Lincoln Lynch of CORE and Ivanhoe Donaldson of SNCC. Dave Dellinger introduced John Morgan, a marine from Camp Lejune who while in the service had become a pacifist and was refusing to bear arms. (He was later jailed for his stand.)

While the president's daughter celebrated her wedding in Washington, another young woman, Kamiko Kosaka, her arm badly scarred from the effects of the Hiroshima bombing she had experienced as a child, was introduced to the New York demonstration as a guest of honor, representing the Japanese peace movement.

With the feeder marches the New York demonstration lasted all day and large parts of the city became aware of it. This time, there were few organized hecklers, though the feeder marchers were occasionally engaged in heated discussions along the way. (This was the demonstration from which David Loeb Weiss, using a crew of volunteer filmmakers, produced the prize-winning documentary *Anatomy of a Peace Parade*.)

As the demonstration came to a close and the crowd was dispersing, Muste sat on the edge of the stage with the wind blowing his hair, sporting a Parade Committee button and looking pleased as Punch. In his speech earlier he had said: "That we should have, increasingly, opposition to the war among the armed forces themselves is a tremendously significant development which the Johnson administration is going to have to take account of. And I am here to tell you and urge you to join in backing up the right of all the men in the armed services today to have their right of free thought, free speech and free discussion inside the armed forces, as well as outside, in opposition to the war."¹⁵

[Next chapter: *The Cleveland Conferences of 1966*]

15. *Militant*, August 22, 1966.

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AROUND THE WORLD



Sakharov Voices Hope Nobel Award Will Spotlight Plight of Dissidents

Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize October 9. He was the first Soviet citizen ever to win the award.

Upon learning of the decision of the Nobel committee in Oslo, Norway, Sakharov said in Moscow, "In the last few months I have often called for an amnesty for political prisoners, and now that I have heard about the prize, I shall repeat this call once again."

"I hope that this will be good for political prisoners in our country," he said. "I hope it will support the struggle for human rights in which I took part."

Soviet authorities, fearing that Sakharov's winning of the prize would inspire the dissident movement in the Soviet Union, took swift countermeasures in their customary manner. On October 10 Tass launched a slander campaign against Sakharov, calling him an "antipatriot."

"Sakharov's activities in recent years," declared Tass commentator Yuri Kornilov, "are well known to all: having abandoned of his own free will his scientific work [Sakharov is a nuclear physicist], he devoted himself fully to writing and circulating manifestos casting aspersions on the state system, the home, and foreign policy of the Soviet Union."

Denis Healey Dumped From Labour Executive Committee

British Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey was thrown off the Labour party's National Executive Committee September 30 during the party's annual conference in Blackpool. Healey is one of the Labour government's most prominent spokesmen for stringent wage controls. He was dumped against the opposition of Prime Minister Harold Wilson.

Healey's demotion within the Labour party does not affect his position in Wilson's cabinet.

Retirement Fund?

Did Richard Nixon deposit \$5.9 million of oil company funds into a secret Swiss bank account shortly after becoming president in 1969? The Internal Revenue Service acknowledged October 11 that it had been

investigating the charge for four months, but had run into difficulties with uncooperative Swiss banking officials.

An informant, who backed up his story with deposit slips from the Swiss Bank Corp. Overseas, said that major oil companies paid Nixon the money to assure that state governments would retain control over offshore oil deposits instead of the federal government taking control.

Puerto Rican Public Employees Strike Against Antiunion Law

More than 80 percent of all unionized public employees in Puerto Rico stayed out of work October 8. They were protesting the new Personnel Law proposed by the government of Rafael Hernández Colón.

At a rally on that day the law was described as a "Spanish-language version of the Taft-Hartley Law." Associated Press reported that 7,000 to 10,000 persons attended the rally.

The law is designed to break the public employees unions by placing hiring, firing, job classifications, promotions, transfers, salaries, grievances, and fringe benefits under the control of a politically appointed central office and the administrators of each governmental service.

The walkout paralyzed virtually all public services on the island. It had the support of University of Puerto Rico staff and students, as well as a sizable number of workers in private industry.

Shaking a Beggar's Bowl for 'República'

The Portuguese newspaper *República* has fallen on hard times. The Lisbon daily was taken over May 19 by its printing workers on the alleged grounds that its pro-Socialist party stance adversely affected its circulation and hence their jobs.

The move, which received the support of the Armed Forces Movement and the Communist party-dominated printers union, seems to have been a failure from the financial point of view. A precipitous decline in circulation following the takeover has led to a novel way of raising funds.

An October 8 Agence France-Presse dispatch from Lisbon reported: "The Association of Disabled Veterans of the Armed Forces . . . began Saturday in Lisbon to organize a collection in support of the

newspaper *República*, which faces imminent collapse owing to its desperate financial situation.

"A dozen members of the association have conducted a two-week symbolic occupation of the tollbooths on the April 25 Bridge over the Tagus River. They have in effect added an additional toll for passage over the bridge, holding out a wooden bowl to motorists 'for *República*, the people's newspaper.' Motorists, at first astonished by this new form of collection, on the whole agreed with good grace to toss in their small change to save the threatened newspaper. On Sunday alone the association collected 300,000 escudos [about US\$11,400]."

At the time of the take-over, *República's* circulation was reported to be about 40,000. According to a dispatch in the September 25 *New York Times*, it has fallen to 5,000.

Ford to Give Israel \$2.1 Billion for Loss of Sinai Oil Fields

Washington has pledged to give the Israeli regime \$2.1 billion over the next six years in compensation of the returning of the Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar oil fields to Egypt under the terms of the Sinai pact, "top sources" in Tel Aviv told *New York Daily News* correspondent Joseph Fried September 28.

White House Offers Lisbon \$80 Million Aid Package

An emergency aid package of more than \$80 million has been prepared by Washington for the Lisbon government, a "high State Department official" announced October 9. The amount, which contrasts markedly with the \$25.8 million in White House aid to Lisbon during the entire fiscal year of 1975, "can increase," the official said. The U.S. aid announcement came on the heels of a Common Market decision to lend the Portuguese regime \$187 million on easy-interest terms.

Look Who's Talking

"What we're learning from this is that there is no free lunch. Somebody pays for it. It may be the most important lesson of our time."—Vice-president Rockefeller commenting on New York City's fiscal crisis at a closed-door meeting of Republican leaders in Portland, Oregon, October 3.

Los Problemas Claves de la Revolución Portuguesa

[En el congreso mundial de 1969 de la Cuarta Internacional, el debate sobre el curso político a seguir, particularmente en relación a la lucha de clases en América Latina, llevó a la formación de dos tendencias. Estas más tarde se desarrollaron hasta convertirse en dos fracciones, la Tendencia Mayoritaria Internacional y la Fracción Leninista Trotskista.

[Las diferencias entre los dos agrupamientos se han extendido a la revolución portuguesa, como se explicó en la contribución de Gerry Foley, Joseph Hansen y George Novack, "Por un Curso Político Correcto en Portugal," publicado en el número de la semana pasada de *Intercontinental Press*.

[La resolución que presentamos constituye la posición oficial de la Fracción Leninista Trotskista sobre la revolución portuguesa. Fue adoptada unánimemente por el Comité Coordinador en una reunión celebrada el 30 de agosto de 1975.]

* * *

El estreno de la revolución socialista portuguesa es actualmente el centro de la lucha de clases internacional. Una victoria para la clase obrera en Portugal anunciaría el fin del capitalismo europeo y asestaría un golpe demoleedor a la fuerza motriz del capitalismo internacional en los Estados Unidos.

En vista del tamaño y el poder de la clase trabajadora relativo a la burguesía y sus contingentes reaccionarios, ¿por qué no ha establecido todavía su propio gobierno? La respuesta es que los trabajadores portugueses, así como los trabajadores en otros países, se encuentran ante "una crisis de dirección," según las palabras de Trotsky en el Programa de Transición.

La crisis de dirección puede ser superada sólo por medio de la construcción de un equipo de cuadros capaz de proveer una dirección política correcta. El núcleo de semejante equipo es muy pequeño en Portugal actualmente. El problema principal es el de expandir ese núcleo. Esto significa construir un partido socialista revolucionario en el curso mismo de la revolución.

La realización de este difícil requisito exige, sobre todo, un análisis marxista preciso de todas las fuerzas políticas en lucha, y, en particular, los problemas políticos en el fondo mismo de la lucha de clases que se desarrolla. Se requiere que se sea lo más concreto posible. Por más instructivas que sean las analogías con otras revoluciones, no pueden reemplazar el análisis de los eventos portugueses mismos y la determinación de su significado político en el contexto vivo de las fuerzas en lucha nacionales e internacionales.

Esta resolución es destinada como una contribución a esa tarea, la cual es la responsabilidad colectiva del movimiento trotskista en su totalidad.

Por supuesto, se requiere más que el análisis y el pronóstico político correctos. A menos que el pequeño núcleo de fuerzas trotskistas en Portugal logre aprovechar plenamente las aperturas provistas por la revolución, no podrán expandirse lo suficiente o con la suficiente rapidez para ganar la dirección de las masas revolucionarias.

Afortunadamente, el patrón que sigue la revolución portuguesa favorece sus esfuerzos. Es una revolución *proletaria* por excelencia. Entre otras cosas, esto significa que se centra en las ciudades donde los trotskistas también están basados, dándoles oportunidades extraordinarias para divulgar sus ideas entre los sectores radicalizados de trabajadores.

En una revolución en vías de desarrollo, el proletariado tiene enormes ventajas. Estas incluyen su peso económico y social, el poder de sus números cuando están unidos, la eficacia de sus métodos naturales de organización y lucha en las fábricas y en las calles, el efecto de sus luchas sobre la radicalización y movilización de sus aliados en la ciudad y el campo, y sobre todo su inclinación a moverse hacia el socialismo, una tendencia muy evidente en Portugal hoy en día.

1. Los Cálculos de la Burguesía en el Golpe del 25 de Abril

El golpe militar del 25 de abril de 1974 que derrocó a la dictadura de Caetano, fue el resultado de la conclusión sacada por el capital financiero portugués, en el sentido de que ni su imperio colonial ni la clase obrera de su propio país podrían seguir siendo dominadas principalmente por medio de la represión.

Los imperialistas portugueses se resistieron en un principio a la utilización de métodos neocoloniales para salvar su imperio. Como dirigentes del más débil de los poderes imperialistas, tanto económica como políticamente, trataron de evadir el costo de promover y mantener una burguesía neocolonial. Más aún, su aparato estatal parecía tener un fuerte control sobre la sociedad. Así, los imperialistas portugueses pensaron lograr a través de la resolución despiadada lo que otros imperialistas con mucho mayores recursos eligieron no intentar, o no pudieron lograr.

Sin embargo, después de más de una década de salvaje guerra contra los pueblos de las colonias, los imperialistas portugueses vieron que la espada fue incapaz de cortar las fuentes de la revolución colonial

De acuerdo con este modelo, los trabajadores portugueses en su primer ascenso empezaron a organizar sindicatos militantes y a establecer el control obrero de la industria. Comités de acción aparecieron en varias fábricas, así como formas similares en las fuerzas armadas y en algunos barrios, prometiendo el surgimiento de soviets u órganos similares. La dirección del movimiento obviamente favorece el crecimiento del trotskismo.

Tales fenómenos, junto con la determinación universal entre las masas de acabar con el salazarismo, o cualquier cosa semejante, y de establecer un nuevo sistema gubernamental capaz de garantizar la democracia tal como ellos la ven y la desean, han proveído una confirmación impresionante de lo asertado del Programa de Transición, que en 1938 describió la lógica de la revolución proletaria en ascenso como la de Portugal y señaló las consignas y tareas que la acompañarían, las cuales encaran los marxistas revolucionarios.

Igualmente, los trotskistas portugueses quienes han asimilado las lecciones de Trotsky, sobre todo en el Programa de Transición, están bien preparados para abordar el problema clave de resolver la crisis de dirección que encara la clase obrera portuguesa, asegurando así una victoria de tremenda importancia para los trabajadores en todos los continentes.

que continuaba en ascenso. Aún el terror, practicado a escala masiva en el norte de Angola, fue insuficiente para destruir los movimientos nacionalistas, en particular debido a que tenían el apoyo, y en algunos casos bases, de los estados africanos negros, políticamente independientes, de los alrededores.

A pesar de que los imperialistas portugueses lograron contener por un tiempo a los movimientos nacionalistas de las colonias económicamente importantes, ésto fue insuficiente para llevar a cabo sus objetivos. Finalmente se dieron cuenta que no tenían los recursos para mantener una ocupación militar de las colonias a gran escala sin socavar las bases de la estabilidad capitalista en Portugal mismo. Tampoco pudieron obtener el necesario apoyo de los poderes imperialistas más fuertes para compensar su debilidad.

De cualquier manera, los sectores de la clase dominante portuguesa que vieron la necesidad de un cambio de política, enfrentaron graves dificultades para llevarlo a cabo. El régimen se había basado en la represión corporativista por casi medio

siglo. No sólo fuerzas represivas considerables como la policía secreta y la policía antimotín estaban fuertemente interrelacionadas con el régimen, sino también el destino de los intereses económicos de una capa inflada de pequeños capitalistas atrasados y latifundistas, estaba directamente ligada al mantenimiento de este sistema especial de represión. Más aún, los imperialistas portugueses habían esperado demasiado para pasar al neocolonialismo; enfrentaban movimientos nacionalistas de masas bien organizados, profundamente arraigados en la población de muchas de las colonias, incluida Angola, la pieza clave del imperio. Estos movimientos ya eran sólidos. Con su larga tradición de lucha, no podrían ser captados a bajo costo. Tampoco las masas coloniales, después de largos años de lucha de masas y enormes sacrificios y sufrimientos, podían ser desmovilizadas fácilmente por pequeñas concesiones.

Así, el imperialismo portugués, que siempre ha tenido una débil base, se embarcó en el quizás más osado juego de los 500 años de expansionismo lusitano. Se lanzó a reorganizar sus métodos de control político y social a través de métodos violentos, a través de un levantamiento militar contra un atrincherado estrato del estado y el aparato político. Una gran indicación del pensamiento del sector gobernante fue su decisión de permitir que se publicara el libro de Spínola, *Portugal e o Futuro*, en febrero de 1974. El libro se convirtió en el libro de mayor venta y ayudó a proveer al general con una imagen revolucionaria. A través del golpe posterior, Spínola se lanzó, en fin, a desarmar y neutralizar a una parte de la propia clase dominante, purgando un considerable número de las hasta entonces sacrosantas autoridades. Esto no sólo mutiló a las fuerzas policiales por un tiempo, sino que también fue un violento golpe a los hábitos de obediencia internalizadas por las masas en casi cincuenta años de dictadura inspirados en el fascismo de Italia y España.

Los capitalistas portugueses no se embarcaron en tamaña aventura sin tomar en cuenta ciertas condiciones favorables. A pesar de que habían fracasado en el intento de frenar la radicalización de los obreros y la juventud, lo cierto es que no se había formado en Portugal aún un movimiento de masas poderoso y organizado. De la misma manera, a pesar de que el ejército imperialista había fracasado en el intento de sofocar los movimientos nacionalistas en las colonias y había sufrido algunas derrotas, así como significativas pérdidas, no había sido aún quebrado o decisivamente derrotado.

La condición favorable más importante desde el punto de vista de la burguesía era la ausencia de un movimiento de masas marxista revolucionario tanto en Portugal

como en las colonias. El movimiento de masas estaba dominado por confiables elementos reformistas. Como efectivamente sucedió, la aseveración hecha por la burguesía imperialista portuguesa acerca de la confiabilidad de los partidos obreros reformistas, resultó exacta.

Lo que los dirigentes portugueses subestimaron fue el poder y la extensión del ascenso de masas que surgiría tanto en Portugal como en las colonias, por la caída del salazarismo. No midieron bien las esperanzas que esto inspiraría en las masas en el sentido de que podrían finalmente ganar el derecho democrático a pensar, discutir y decidir por sí mismas, así como luchar por un cambio en sus condiciones

2. El Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas—Un Instrumento Burgués

El instrumento en el que la burguesía imperialista confió para la remoción del régimen de Caetano y para llevar a cabo la necesaria reorganización política fue el Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas (MFA). Comenzó como un movimiento entre los oficiales profesionales que buscaban defender sus privilegios como graduados de las academias militares, contra los graduados normales de las universidades, muchos de los cuales fueron otorgados comisiones como parte de la expansión de las fuerzas armadas requerida por la lucha de la guerra colonial.

El MFA en esencia ha funcionado como el brazo político de la jerarquía militar. Esa ha sido su ambición, y ésto es lo que la actual dirección quiere que sea. Después del intento de golpe el 11 de marzo de 1975, algunos de los más astutos demagogos militares como Otel Saraiva de Carvalho, trataron de hacer aparecer las cosas como si existiera una diferencia política entre los más altos comandantes militares que se asociaron al cambio del 25 de abril, Spínola en particular, y el "movimiento revolucionario." Con ésto se intentaba explicar las evidentes divisiones en el MFA que se expresaron en los intentos golpistas del 28 de septiembre de 1974 y el 11 de marzo de 1975.

En todo movimiento de conspiración como éste siempre hay varios estratos de oficiales con diferentes grados de compromiso, con los oficiales de menor graduación, que son los que corren los mayores riesgos, siendo generalmente los más radicales en sus discursos y los más decididos en la acción. De la misma manera, el MFA ha ganado muchos jóvenes oficiales radicalizados así como grupos de civiles también radicalizados, y ha mantenido su control sobre ellos. Sin embargo, el MFA siempre se esforzó en hacerse, en la medida posible, representativo de la comandancia militar, y desde el vuelco del 25 de abril siguió con su

económicas y sociales y determinar su propio destino.

Con la extensión de esta radicalización masiva, la burguesía encontró imposible reconsolidar suficientemente su aparato represivo, y fue obligada a permitir purgas mucho más amplias de la policía y los oficiales derechistas de lo que había planeado o de lo compatible con la estabilidad del dominio de clase burgués. La presión del ascenso de masas abrió rendijas más grandes en la disciplina de las fuerzas armadas resultando de la creciente falta de deseo de continuar la larga, infructuosa guerra colonial. A medida que se profundizaba, este proceso amenazó con destrozar las fuerzas armadas como instrumento del Estado burgués.

política de hacer ingresar oficiales en base a las posiciones que éstos tienen en la jerarquía militar. Además, los representantes de los estratos más bajos de las fuerzas armadas han sido incorporados a los cuerpos formales del MFA para convertirlos en mejores correas de transmisión para las órdenes de la dirección militar y mejores barómetros para los procesos políticos que se desarrollaban en las fuerzas armadas, así como para desviar las demandas de una verdadera democracia en las fuerzas armadas. De acuerdo con su estrategia bonapartista, los jefes militares también incorporaron algunos elementos izquierdistas a las asambleas del MFA para contrabalancear la derecha e incrementar su campo de maniobra.

Como un movimiento conspirador de oposición bajo Caetano, el MFA atrajo oficiales influenciados por varias corrientes políticas hostiles al régimen salazarista. Como una respuesta a la lógica y la presión de la lucha contra la dictadura, así como la presión de las masas después del 25 de abril, hubo una tendencia a la radicalización, en particular en los escalones más bajos del MFA. Esta tendencia se agudizó con las movilizaciones masivas en respuesta a los intentos de golpe de derecha del 28 de septiembre de 1974 y del 11 de marzo de 1975.

En estos casos, los elementos conservadores en las fuerzas armadas temían que el fermento democrático y las luchas sociales se les estaban escapando de las manos y que el proceso de reformas no podía contener a las masas sino inspirarlas a seguir luchando. Al mismo tiempo, no estaban dispuestos a aceptar las demandas mínimas de algunos movimientos nacionalistas en las colonias. Si hubiera resultado exitosa, esta "restauración del orden" hubiera significado la purga de importantes sectores del MFA, ahora vistos como "no confiables" por los conservadores. En cada caso, las

masas se movilizaron para defender el régimen militar, al que identificaban con las recientemente vislumbradas libertades y con la perspectiva del socialismo. Estos intentos de golpe comprometieron más aún a la ya desacreditada burguesía portuguesa y cambiaron el equilibrio de fuerzas en favor de la clase obrera. Como resultado, el proceso de radicalización se aceleró en los niveles inferiores del cuerpo de oficiales, y después de cada intento de golpe el MFA se vió obligado a adoptar una palabrería correspondientemente más "socialista" y "antimperialista," para poder desviar hacia el MFA el proceso político.

Sin embargo, el MFA ha permanecido el instrumento político esencial de la burguesía imperialista portuguesa. Y su objetivo sigue siendo el de modernizar y fortificar el capitalismo portugués—no el de derribarlo. Simplemente se vió obligado a utilizar fundamentalmente la demagogia para persuadir a los obreros portugueses a ayudar al capitalismo a salir de su hora más difícil. También está utilizando verborrea "socialista" para expresar las necesidades del capitalismo en forma más atrayente, como un primer paso hacia la restauración del dominio de la ideología burguesa, el "orden público" y la represión burgueses.

Un ejemplo de la demagogia del MFA es el uso que hace del nacionalismo burgués. Desde el golpe exitoso del 25 de abril de 1974, el grupo militar gobernante ha llevado adelante una campaña destinada a restaurar la influencia del nacionalismo portugués que estaba totalmente desacreditado por haberlo utilizado Salazar. Para lograr ésto, se hace pasar por un movimiento de liberación nacional, pidiendo prestado el antimperialismo de los movimientos rebeldes de las colonias. De la misma manera, ha tratado de pedir prestado los métodos represivos del bonapartismo en las colonias y de los regímenes stalinistas que, en tanto que están identificados hasta cierto punto con revolución y luchas progresistas, no están tan desacreditados como los instrumentos represivos del viejo régimen.

Desde el golpe del 25 de abril, el MFA ha servido como el verdadero gobierno de Portugal capitalista y el imperio, usando los diversos gabinetes provisionales como método para presentar una fachada civil y asegurándose el apoyo de los partidos obreros de masas. En ese interín ha presidido y mantenido un sistema capitalista e imperialista, poniéndose consistentemente del lado de la burguesía contra los obreros en los conflictos económicos. Ha hecho sólo aquellas concesiones al movimiento de masas que fueron inevitables para mantener el apoyo popular y mantener también su posición tanto contra los elementos más conservadores de la burguesía, ansiosos de contener las reformas a toda costa, como contra los elementos más combativos del movimiento obrero que

amenazan con poner al movimiento de masas fuera del control del MFA.

En todo momento, el MFA se ha esforzado en mantener todo el control posible sobre las colonias, sin poner en peligro la conversión a los métodos neocolonialistas. Ha habido diferencias acerca de cuánto hay que conceder. Un ejemplo es la disputa entre Spínola y los actuales dirigentes del MFA sobre el retiro de Mozambique. Los imperialistas portugueses han sido también forzados a hacer más concesiones de las que originalmente habían planeado.

Sin embargo, la continuidad esencial en los objetivos políticos de la burguesía imperialista ha sido mantenida por su actual representante político, el MFA. Esto se ve, entre otras cosas, porque mantiene y refuerza la intervención militar portuguesa en Angola, y por los intentos del MFA, incluyendo la supuesta ala "radical" de ganar un nuevo apoyo político en Portugal para mantener tropas en las colonias de mayor importancia económica y estratégica. El hecho de que el MFA haya usado demagogia "socialista" y "antimperialista" en su intento de persuadir a las masas portuguesas para que acepten una continua intervención militar en las colonias, así como el envío continuo de tropas, es un índice tanto de los métodos como de los objetivos.

Desde el 25 de abril de 1974 hasta agosto de 1975, han habido cinco gobiernos "provisionales" en Portugal. El rápido recambio testifica la profundización de la inestabilidad de las bases del dominio burgués ante

el continuo fermento democrático, las crecientes luchas sociales, el avance de la revolución colonial, y el empeoramiento de la situación económica. A lo largo de este proceso, los gobiernos provisionales han tenido como paralelo a los cuerpos militares que han funcionado como la verdadera autoridad gubernamental. El pacto firmado entre el MFA y los principales partidos burgueses y reformistas en abril de 1975 intentó de hecho formalizar esta situación estableciendo una estructura gubernamental de dos capas en la cual todos los poderes decisivos iban a ser ejecutados por los cuerpos del MFA.

En su composición política, todos los anteriores gobiernos han sido abiertamente frentepopulistas; y esto era realmente su principal valor para la burguesía. Las tendencias y orientaciones políticas representadas en los cuerpos militares han sido más veladas, lo cual constituye nuevamente una de las ventajas políticas principales de estos para la burguesía.

El continuo cambio desde julio de 1974 hacia más y más dependencia en las formaciones militares como la dirección política del Estado burgués ha tenido su complemento en la acentuación del rol equilibrador bonapartista del MFA. Paralelo a esta tendencia hacia el gobierno militar más abierto, el MFA ha incrementado su demagogia "socialista" y en particular ha recurrido a temas pequeño burgueses radicales como la necesidad de la "liberación nacional" en Portugal, "la democracia directa," y diversas panaceas populistas.

3. El Ascenso de Masas

Debido al repentino colapso del régimen represivo y a la extrema debilidad política y organizativa tanto de los capitalistas como de los obreros, las clases fundamentales en Portugal, la situación política y social ha sido muy fluida.

El viejo régimen cayó completamente desacreditado. En gran medida, la burguesía y las ideas burguesas compartieron su desgracia. En gran fermento, las masas empezaron a expresarse por primera vez en cuarenta y ocho años, a examinar más de cerca las ideas anteriormente prohibidas y ganar confianza en sus posibilidades para cambiar sus condiciones de vida. Como el más conocido de los grupos de oposición, el Partido Comunista tuvo el mayor prestigio. Pero todos los grupos de oposición, todos los partidos y grupos de izquierda fueron tomados seriamente por las masas. Todas las tendencias y grupos tuvieron considerable eco en la prensa. Hubo una igualdad sin precedentes para las tendencias de izquierda, y una amplitud y apertura de las masas a las ideas revolucionarias. El fermento de las ideas revolucionarias se extendió irresistiblemente, amenazando con disolver aún la

disciplina de las fuerzas armadas, el último bastión del orden capitalista.

Los obreros en las fábricas y las masas pobres en los barrios se organizaron espontáneamente. A los patronos y rompuehuelas odiados se les echó. Se apoderaron de las viviendas deshabitadas. Los obreros hicieron valer su derecho a tener reuniones y organizar asambleas en las fábricas. Las fábricas se convirtieron en centros de discusión y actividad política. Se lograron alzas salariales.

Comités de fábrica democráticos surgieron en casi todas las grandes fábricas. Estos se eligieron en asambleas generales con la participación de todos los obreros. Con un salto los obreros traspasaron la fragmentación de sindicatos por profesión impuesta por el corporativismo, dirigiéndose hacia sindicatos por rama de industria democráticamente organizados, y abrieron la perspectiva de formas soviéticas de organización.

Las divisiones en el comando militar que se desarrollaron a medida que algunas secciones de la burguesía empezaron a temer que el movimiento de masas en

Portugal y las colonias estaba saliendo de su control, abrieron el camino para la organización democrática dentro de las fuerzas armadas, especialmente en la policía militar, la marina, y algunos regimientos del ejército. Esto ha planteado el peligro más inmediato al gobierno burgués desde el golpe de abril de 1974, provocando el uso por algunas fuerzas burguesas de una demagogia "radical" en un intento de mantener el control político sobre el proceso, y a otros sectores a asestar golpes desesperados para aplastarlo antes de que se escapara aún más de su control.

Combinado con la agudización de la crisis económica y la parálisis parcial de las fuerzas represivas burguesas, el fermento en la clase obrera condujo a una serie de ocupaciones de fábricas, la imposición de elementos de control obrero, y a demandas de nacionalizaciones. Los trabajadores se dirigieron hacia las nacionalizaciones como un medio para prevenir los despidos y de oponerse a las afirmaciones de los dueños capitalistas de que no podían darse el lujo de responder a las demandas por mejoras salariales y en las condiciones de trabajo. Impusieron el control obrero para impedir el cierre de las fábricas, y en algunos casos como los bancos, impedir que los capitalistas usaran su poder económico para lanzar un ataque al movimiento obrero.

En el caso de los bancos, el gobierno fue obligado a ceder a la demanda de los trabajadores de la nacionalización, en partes para defenderse de los sectores de la burguesía quienes se oponían a la política de reforma que representaba. En otros casos, el gobierno se resistía a las demandas por la nacionalización de las empresas lucrativas. Sin embargo, debido a la crisis económica y la necesidad de orientar la economía de acuerdo con el cambio representado por el abandono del régimen salazarista, el gobierno mismo inició una serie de nacionalizaciones para sacar de apuros los intereses capitalistas claves y fortalecer el capitalismo portugués. En este contexto político estas nacionalizaciones tuvieron efectos contradictorios: Por un lado, diseminaron las ilusiones de que se les otorgaría el control de la economía a los trabajadores; por el otro, alentaron a los trabajadores a presionar por nacionalizaciones que rebasaran los límites de lo aceptable a la burguesía. Esta contradicción fue expresada más concretamente a nivel político por la demagogia del gobierno y el Partido Comunista, llamando a los trabajadores a trabajar más duro ya que ellos ahora "controlaban" la producción. Este tipo de "control obrero," ligado a una creciente producción, tuvo el efecto de reforzar la rentabilidad capitalista de las fábricas en un período de crisis política cuando los capitalistas mismos no podían manejar bien sus fábricas. Bajo estas circunstancias, los capitalistas podían acep-

tar la pérdida del control directo sobre su propiedad, aún por un período prolongado.

A medida que la radicalización se profundizó, campesinos sin tierra comenzaron a apoderarse de la tierra de los latifundistas, y los obreros agrícolas comenzaron a organizar sindicatos y a exigir igualdad con otros obreros.

Las filas de las fuerzas armadas se hicieron más y más renuentes a quedarse o a ir a las colonias para llevar a cabo los planes neocolonialistas de la burguesía portuguesa.

La caída del régimen de Caetano les dio un gran ímpetu a otros movimientos sociales. El movimiento de liberación femenil, por ejemplo, rápidamente planteó demandas que rebasaban lo que los militares estaban preparados a conceder. A pesar de la oposición del nuevo régimen y las fuerzas más cercanamente aliadas a él, como el Partido Comunista, el pequeño núcleo del movimiento femenil despertó el interés de mujeres en barrios pobres, fábricas y aldeas, indicando que tiene el potencial para desarrollarse rápidamente a medida que se profundiza el proceso revolucionario.

El movimiento de los estudiantes universitarios y secundarios contra el autoritarismo en las escuelas y el limitacionismo en la educación tuvo una poderosa alza junto con acciones por parte de los estudiantes de las colonias. Los estudiantes secundarios se convirtieron en su sector más dinámico. Entraron a la lucha contra los nuevos "salvadores" militares y lograron triunfos.

Fue esencialmente la continuación y profundización de este amplio fermento social lo que dividió al MFA y llevó a los elementos más conservadores a intentos desesperados para llevar a cabo golpes de derecha con la intención de frenar el proceso. Por el contrario, las masas se movilizaron en gran escala cuando sus derechos democráticos y otras conquistas de la revolución se vieron peligrosamente amenazados. El proceso político en Portugal ha girado alrededor de los problemas que se

volvieron explosivos debido a la preocupación de las masas con su derecho democrático de considerar libremente todos los puntos de vista y de hacer valer su voluntad como la mayoría de la población.

La lucha por la defensa y la extensión de los derechos democráticos en la fábrica, en los cuarteles y en la sociedad en su conjunto es indispensable para avanzar hacia el establecimiento de un gobierno de obreros y campesinos. Esta lucha por un gobierno de obreros y campesinos constituye el eje decisivo de la lucha actual en Portugal. Con sus fraudulentos planes de "democracia directa" subordinada al régimen militar, los demagogos intentan engañar a la clase obrera y al campesinado y evitar de esa manera su organización.

Un obstáculo fundamental en la movilización de las masas en la lucha por los derechos democráticos, la soberanía popular y un gobierno de obreros y campesinos son las direcciones de los partidos obreros reformistas y sus satélites, ya que todos favorecen la subordinación del movimiento obrero a un régimen militar no elegido por nadie, el principal defensor del capitalismo en Portugal hoy en día. Sin embargo, hay un fuerte sentimiento entre la clase obrera en su conjunto por un frente único en defensa de los derechos democráticos y otras conquistas bajo ataque, sentimiento éste que estas direcciones no pueden ignorar. Más aún, ellos ya han sido obligados, de distintas maneras, a defender ciertos derechos democráticos en determinados momentos por sus propios intereses como burócratas. La lucha por la defensa de las conquistas sociales y económicas de las masas trabajadoras, los derechos democráticos y la soberanía popular, como hilo conductor hacia un gobierno de los oprimidos y explotados, también pondrá en el tapete las contradicciones de los partidos reformistas de la manera más aguda y plantea de manera contundente la necesidad de un frente único de la clase obrera.

4. Los Stalinistas Respaldan el Orden Burgués

Durante la primera fase del nuevo régimen el Partido Comunista y su frente pequeño burgués, el Movimiento Democrático Portugués (MDP), jugó un rol político fundamental sosteniendo el gobierno militar. Era la única fuerza política no comprometida con el viejo régimen que tenía un aparato efectivo, y esa maquinaria se convirtió efectivamente en el aparato de masas del nuevo régimen. Fue la única corriente de la clase obrera que actuó como un partido de masas a pesar de su pequeñez—tomó problemas concernientes a las masas—y ésto lo ayudó a aparecer en el centro del escenario con una velocidad extraordinaria mientras las otras corrientes

trataban de evaluar la situación o se mantenían preocupadas con consideraciones sectarias. Fueron las fuerzas del Partido Comunista las que dominaron la gigantesca manifestación del 1 de mayo de 1974 y en los mítines después de la caída del gobierno de Caetano el 25 de abril, y eso los llevó a ser manifestaciones en apoyo a y adulación por los militares. Fue este aparato el que permitió al General Spínola construir su imagen bonapartista y así dirigirse rápidamente hacia la restauración de una fuerte autoridad burguesa, lo que seguramente hubiese llevado al aplastamiento del mismo Partido Comunista, entre otros.

La influencia política del Partido Comu-

nista depende de que éste mantenga su base obrera y, en una situación donde la burguesía ha sido incapaz de restablecer su dominación, los dirigentes stalinistas enfrentan grandes peligros, así como grandes oportunidades para la expansión de su aparato burocrático. Así, tanto en el caso del golpe del 28 de septiembre de 1974, como en el del 11 de marzo de 1975, se vieron obligados a llamar a la movilización masiva que, a pesar de sus límites políticos y organizativos, tuvo aspectos revolucionarios.

De todas maneras, el objetivo fundamental del Partido Comunista va en contra de la revolución. Su objetivo, como se ve claramente en el período posterior al 25 de abril de 1974, es el de servir como correa de transmisión en el movimiento obrero para el régimen burgués, como organizador de las masas en nombre del MFA. El PC portugués y sus mentores en el Kremlin han intentado también usar su influencia con el MPLA en Angola para avanzar los planes neocolonialistas del MFA. El PC portugués hoy en día, sabiendo que tiene el apoyo de una minoría de los trabajadores, prefiere un gobierno militar con una fachada populista a un régimen parlamentario. Los stalinistas creen que un gobierno de este tipo ofrece mejores posibilidades para llevar a cabo las reformas mínimas necesarias, mientras mantienen firme control sobre las masas, subordinándolas políticamente a la burguesía, y evitando que éstas vayan "demasiado lejos" como lo hicieron en Chile al decir de los stalinistas.

En vista de la situación prerrevolucionaria en Portugal, y de la extrema debilidad de la burguesía portuguesa, una solución de este tipo es más recomendable aún para los stalinistas. Un régimen militar, además, parece ofrecer mayores garantías al imperialismo norteamericano de que las masas van a ser mantenidas dentro de ciertos límites que no hagan peligrar el status quo a nivel mundial. Para los stalinistas esto parece ofrecerles la oportunidad de lograr sus objetivos sin provocar la intervención de Washington o hacer peligrar la distensión.

Como resultado de esta política, el Partido Comunista, actuando como correa de transmisión de los militares y como policía obrera en Portugal, ha logrado que su apoyo popular se haya quedado bastante atrás de la influencia burocrática que logró como resultado de la fuerza de su maquinaria y su relación privilegiada con el MFA. Así, los stalinistas portugueses se han convertido en dependientes de que el gobierno burgués se mantenga en el poder para preservar los puestos obtenidos en el gabinete provisional que sirve como fachada a los militares, así como para preservar sus posiciones en el movimiento obrero. Esta situación los ha llevado a tomar más y más posiciones abiertamente antidemocráticas y finalmen-

te asociarse al MFA en su intento de eliminar la libertad de prensa y la democracia sindical, y suprimir grupos de izquierda que no se subordinan a los militares.

Particularmente Wall Street ha capitalizado estos ataques a los derechos democráticos para hacer avances en la propaganda a costa de los stalinistas portugueses y Moscú, amenazando con lo que sucedería si los stalinistas "van demasiado lejos." Sin embargo, las acciones aparentemente agresivas de los stalinistas portugueses han sido totalmente apoyadas por el Kremlin y no representan alejamiento alguno de la política de la distensión en relación al imperialismo norteamericano.

A pesar de que el objetivo de los stalinistas es el de consolidar su posición de auxiliar indispensable de los militares y de esa manera evitar todo desafío a su posición de parte de los rivales políticos, ese curso los está haciendo objetivamente más y más cautivos del régimen militar. Al mismo tiempo, al jugar el rol de fuerza represiva auxiliar de un régimen que no puede solucionar los problemas económicos y sociales de las masas portuguesas y que está decidido a hacerles pagar a los trabajadores el precio de la profundización de la crisis económica, el Partido Comunista está preparando el camino a la resurrección del anticomunismo reaccionario a escala masiva, no solamente entre los estratos pequeño

burgueses, sino también en el seno de la clase obrera.

Actuando en nombre de un régimen burgués y en contra del desarrollo de la revolución portuguesa, el PC está ayudando a allanar el camino para la restauración de uno de los fundamentales puntales de la dominación burguesa: el miedo de las masas a que el socialismo signifique el fin de sus derechos democráticos y la subyugación a una maquinaria tiránica.

El Partido Comunista creció en el último año de un pequeño núcleo a un partido de masas y no ha tenido tiempo aún de consolidar completamente a ese torrente de nuevos reclutas. Las diferenciaciones políticas son posibles, pero hasta ahora no han aparecido corrientes de gran importancia opuestas a la dirección stalinista.

Las filas se han agrupado detrás de la dirección a causa de la adoctrinación de un espíritu fanáticamente sectario. La promesa de mejoras materiales para grandes estratos de reclutas a través de la maquinaria partidaria y la alianza con el gobierno militar también ayuda a fortificar esta actitud sectaria y a fortificar también la posición de la dirección. El Partido Comunista Portugués es, por lo tanto, una dirección plenamente stalinizada, que se distingue de sus partidos hermanos sólo por su dogmatismo y su adhesión servil a las directivas de Moscú.

5. Los Satélites Centristas de Izquierda del Partido Comunista

Los grupos centristas de izquierda tuvieron una cierta influencia en Portugal, especialmente entre la juventud y los intelectuales, pero también entre los militares y obreros. Los dos partidos de este tipo que participaron en las elecciones del 25 de abril de 1975, el MES (Movimento de Esquerda Socialista) y el FSP (Frente Socialista Popular), ganaron más del dos por ciento de los votos entre los dos, lo cual representa más de la mitad de los votos de los partidos que están a la izquierda de las organizaciones de masas reformistas.

De estos dos grupos, el MES es el más serio. Ya había roto con el frente popular dominado por los stalinistas un tiempo antes del cambio del 25 de abril de 1974 y ha intentado desarrollar una alternativa teórica al stalinismo. El FSP es una formación vulgarmente oportunista. Comenzó como una fracción del Partido Socialista decepcionada por la cantidad de puestos que les fueron acordados en la dirección. Los dirigentes de la fracción decidieron a principios de 1975 hacer su propio negocio como sostenedores de una versión extrema de la línea de MES. Parte de su mercadería incluía conexiones con los católicos radicales. Este grupo caracteriza al PS como un partido burgués. El MES, aunque no lo ha explicitado, también

insinúa lo mismo. El FSP se subordina totalmente a los militares, mientras que la posición del MES es más ambigua. El FSP firmó el Pacto-Programa. El MES no, pero dijo que en principio no tenía nada en contra de hacerlo. Ambos grupos se identifican con grupos guerrilleros latinoamericanos y atraen gente por medio de, además, su verborrea ultraizquierdista.

Hay dos grupos que se aut caracterizan como organizaciones armadas y que llevaron a cabo actos terroristas contra el régimen de Caetano, el Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado—Brigadas Revolucionárias (PRP-BR) y la Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária (LUAR).

Todos estos grupos de centro-izquierda constituyen una nueva versión ultraizquierdista del viejo modelo anarquista, a pesar de que esto sea más pronunciado en aquellos grupos que se desarrollaron alrededor de acciones guerrilleras y no simplemente con la identificación con grupos guerrilleros extranjeros. Hay varios niveles de diferencia. El MES tiende a tomar como modelo a los críticos ultraizquierdistas de Lenin en la Tercera Internacional, quienes hacían un fetiche de la forma soviética, y llamaban a formar soviets bajo toda circunstancia, en forma abstracta y románti-

ca, en lugar de tomar la tarea política concreta de conducir a los trabajadores a romper con los partidos burgueses y reformistas. Esta es simplemente una nueva forma de anarquismo, disfrazada de "marxismo" y "leninismo." El LUAR se acerca más a repetir las fórmulas de las corrientes anarquistas históricas. Pero estos son sólo matices. Todos tienen esencialmente la misma orientación y todos hacen eco de la línea del PC de apoyar a la dictadura militar con una fachada populista.

El MES tenía una relativa fortaleza respecto al Partido Comunista en el movimiento obrero, antes del golpe del 25 de abril de 1974. Sin embargo, sus grupos fueron contruidos en una orientación sindicalista. Lo que ellos llaman su orientación "de base" no apareció como débil bajo las condiciones de represión cuando las luchas obreras eran aisladas y las iniciativas de pequeños grupos tenían mayor impacto. Sin embargo, su ineficacia se volvió notoria cuando el movimiento obrero tomó su carácter masivo y tuvo que encarar problemas políticos planteados por un gobierno burgués que utilizaba concesiones y demagogia en lugar de una directa represión para contener las luchas obreras. Como resultado, los grupos del MES en el movimiento sindical tuvieron un severo bajón.

Centralmente, debido al énfasis de estos grupos en el "basismo," y las iniciativas "desde abajo," cuestiones políticas generales como la actitud a tomar hacia el gobierno burgués apoyado por los partidos obreros reformistas, y cómo proyectar una alternativa obrera, fueron oscurecidas. La necesidad de proponer un gobierno obrero de alternativa al MFA se perdió en un vago concepto de la auto-organización de masas. Concretamente, esto resultó en una aguda contradicción de los activistas del MES participando en huelgas que fueron denunciadas como "provocaciones reaccionarias" por el gobierno, mientras que el MES mismo daba apoyo político a ese gobierno. Finalmente, esta línea se redujo a la fórmula simplista que el MFA debía "fusionarse con el movimiento popular."

Lo que esta evolución demuestra es la incapacidad de las nociones renovadas de tipo anarquista para resolver los problemas políticos reales que enfrenta el movimiento obrero: los problemas de romper con el control político de un gobierno burgués demagógico y los partidos de masas reformistas. En esto, el error del MES es análogo a los errores de los anarquistas durante la guerra civil española. El hecho de que esta orientación anarquista sea encubierta con referencias implícitas o explícitas a los "soviets" no significa que esos grupos se estén acercando al leninismo. Al contrario, siguiendo su propio curso centrista pequeño burgués, han tendido a acercarse a una malinterpretación ultraizquierdista de la

experiencia de la revolución rusa, planteada por primera vez por figuras como Anton Pannekoek.

Como resultado de su confusión anarquista, así como del oportunismo que esta confusión engendra, el MES no ha podido ver los principios democráticos involucrados en el conflicto entre el Partido Socialista y el gobierno militar y ha de hecho adoptado tan sólo una versión más radical de la campaña antidemocrática del PC. A pesar de sus denuncias del "reformismo" y la "conciliación" del PC, se ha convertido en un auxiliar del stalinismo portugués, y sirve de comando de avanzada en la campaña stalinista contra el PS.

La versión más extrema de esta confusión de tipo anarquista la encontramos en el Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-

6. El Papel Confusionista de los Maoístas

Hasta ahora, una parte considerable de la juventud y los obreros que buscaban una alternativa a la izquierda del Partido Comunista, fueron atraídos a varios grupos maoístas que han tendido a estructurarse en los siguientes cuatro grupos: União Democrática do Povo (UDP); el Frente Eleitoral de Comunistas (Marxista-Leninista) o FEC (ml); el Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (MRPP); y el Partido Comunista Português (Marxista-Leninista) o PCP (ml), el cual intentó participar en las elecciones como Aliança Operária Camponesa.

El UDP era la fuerza dominante en el consejo de fábrica de los astilleros Lisnave de Lisboa desde el otoño de 1974 hasta la primavera de 1975.

El FEC (ml) ha sido el organizador de los Grupos de Acção Antifascista (GAAF) en Oporto, que se han especializado en atacar las reuniones y locales del partido burgués de derecha, el Centro Democrático Social (CDS).

El PCP (ml) ha jugado un papel de dirección en el sindicato de obreros de la química y se halla en una alianza muy estrecha con el Partido Socialista.

El MRPP ha funcionado como una estrecha secta, operando con diferentes siglas en sus varios frentes de trabajo. En cada zona, este grupo sigue la táctica teatral de levantar lo más alto posible la bandera roja, gritar lo más fuerte posible y asumir las posturas más provocadoras. No ha logrado adquirir una amplia influencia pero ha construido un grupo dedicado que probablemente sea el más grande entre los grupos maoístas.

Estos grupos maoístas difieren en varios aspectos, siendo la línea divisoria más aguda la que existe entre el PCP (ml), que actúa más bien como un aliado centrista de derecha del PS y el resto, que son general-

Brigadas Revolucionárias, que fue construido en base a un programa de guerra de guerrillas urbanas contra el régimen de Caetano. Este grupo ha creado una organización fantasma de "soviets," de "comités de obreros, soldados y marineros," y ha llamado a las fuerzas militares de seguridad, el Copcon, a abolir a los partidos políticos y a la Asamblea Constituyente, para entregar el poder a este inexistente "poder popular." Raramente la jactancia ultraizquierdista ha sido llevada a conclusiones tan aberrantes. Este grupo ultraizquierdista ha sido utilizado como un instrumento por un grupo de oficiales militares que busca la abolición de la democracia política tal como existe ahora en Portugal y la consolidación de una dictadura militar total.

mente ultraizquierdistas en sus posiciones. Sin embargo, todos tienen un marcado rasgo común: el sectarismo, que es ejemplificado en su consigna común "ni fascismo ni social fascismo—democracia popular." Los maoístas se han mostrado incapaces de entender el proceso real del desarrollo de la conciencia política de los trabajadores y han arbitrariamente contrapuesto sus propios esquemas a este proceso.

En el caso del UDP esto se expresó en un intento de contraponer los comités de fábrica a los sindicatos. Al perder de vista el proceso de organización de la clase obrera en su conjunto, el UDP obstaculizó tanto el desarrollo de los sindicatos industriales como de genuinos comités obreros. Esto resultó en el aislamiento de importantes sectores de obreros combativos, en un serio debilitamiento de los comités de fábrica y en la pérdida de posiciones por los mismos maoístas.

En el caso del FEC (ml), terminó siendo un pequeño grupo de activistas conduciendo una guerra privada contra el CDS y las fuerzas represivas del Estado burgués.

En el caso del MRPP, su estridente postura ultraizquierdista motivó la hostilidad de grandes sectores de la clase obrera y del movimiento de masas hacia todos los partidos a la izquierda de los Partidos Comunista y Socialista.

En el caso del PCP (ml), el resultado fue un refuerzo de las actitudes sectarias hacia el Partido Comunista entre las filas del otro partido obrero de masas, el Partido Socialista, ayudando de esa manera a impedir que las organizaciones obreras de masas desarrollaran acciones de frente único.

En conclusión, el programa y la conducta política de los grupos maoístas en nada han contribuido al desarrollo de una alternativa revolucionaria en Portugal. Sin excepción alguna, estos grupos han creado confusión

entre los soldados, marineros, jóvenes y trabajadores militantes bajo su influencia, llevándolos a un aislamiento con respecto de la clase obrera. Junto con los anarcocentristas, los maoístas son en gran parte responsables del mantenimiento del control

7. La Rivalidad Social Demócrata por Una Posición Privilegiada con el MFA

El Partido Socialista se ha convertido en el principal rival del Partido Comunista por obtener influencia de masas entre los trabajadores y la pequeña burguesía radicalizada. Los social demócratas, como la dirección del Partido Comunista, tienen una perspectiva reformista que se expresa en la subordinación al grupo militar dominante. El PS se diferencia del PC en sus métodos de organización y control político. No es un partido disciplinado ni homogéneo. Busca el control de la clase obrera a través de medios políticos y electorales, en vez de por medio de la construcción de una maquinaria disciplinada. Debido a su relativamente flexible organización y su composición políticamente heterogénea, es mucho menos útil que el Partido Comunista para servir de correa de transmisión del régimen militar.

El PS requiere de formas de democracia parlamentaria como medio para poder desarrollar su influencia, competir con la maquinaria del Partido Comunista, y de hecho para comunicarse con sus seguidores, si acaso no inclusive con sus miembros. Es como resultado de esta necesidad que el PS entró en conflicto con el Partido Comunista y la junta militar. Este conflicto ha venido desarrollándose desde aproximadamente un mes después de la caída de Caetano, cuando el régimen militar empezó a tomar medidas tendientes a reprimir el fermento radical. Dirigentes del Partido Socialista han repetidamente manifestado su oposición a cierto tipo de medidas represivas del régimen militar y han defendido a las víctimas de la represión pertenecientes a grupos que se encuentran a la izquierda de los partidos reformistas. Otra razón para esta defensa de los grupos de izquierda atacados por el régimen, que hasta ahora han sido por lo regular maoístas es la de ganar cierta cobertura de izquierda al asociarse con fuerzas de izquierda no social demócratas, no aliadas con Moscú. No obstante, el resultado de esta oposición limitada de la dirección del PS ha sido el de frenar una represión más severa de las ideas revolucionarias y la consolidación de un régimen burgués más estable. *

El Partido Socialista se convierte cada vez más en el núcleo que agrupa a las fuerzas del movimiento obrero que se niegan a agachar la cabeza ante los stalinistas. Al igual que el Partido Comunista, el Partido Socialista creció en un año

de los que están por la colaboración de clases—las direcciones del PS y PC—sobre la juventud radicalizada y la clase obrera y por lo tanto, de la continuación y profundización de la crisis de dirección revolucionaria en Portugal.

de un pequeño núcleo a un partido de masas. Es un partido social demócrata, es decir, un partido obrero reformista que dice representar al socialismo pero cuyas perspectivas están atadas a las posibilidades de su propio capitalismo monopolista de hacer concesiones a los trabajadores. No se esfuerza por abolir el capitalismo y establecer un sistema socialista; y no está atado a una casta burocrática de ningún país en el que el capitalismo ha sido abolido.

Sin embargo el Partido Socialista Portugués se ha desarrollado de una manera diferente a la de los partidos social demócratas en los otros países imperialistas de Europa. Es esencialmente una formación nueva y no está basada todavía en una gran burocracia sindical.

El núcleo inicial juntó una cantidad de hilos conductores de la oposición de izquierda no stalinista a la dictadura de Salazar, todos los cuales se oponían profundamente al sectarismo y dogmatismo del PC dirigido por Alvaro Cunhal. Algunos de estos elementos, sobre todo Mário Soares, buscó apoyo de los partidos socialistas de Europa Occidental y de los países capitalistas "democráticos." Algunos de ellos, como Soares, salieron del medio de la vieja burguesía liberal. Otros, también como Soares, recibieron su entrenamiento en el Partido Comunista. Una parte de la dirección del Partido Socialista viene de los stalinistas liberales que dejaron el Partido Comunista en 1968, el más notable de ellos, el dirigente del trabajo sindical del PS Marcelo Curto. Otra contribución al núcleo inicial fue hecha por la juventud involucrada en acciones terroristas contra el viejo régimen. Muchos católicos radicalizados fueron también atraídos al núcleo inicial. El grupo inicial incluía también a jóvenes intelectuales y activistas influenciados por la radicalización de la juventud a nivel internacional, quienes tenían una actitud crítica hacia el reformismo pero que carecían de una perspectiva política claramente definida o consistente. Estos elementos, que buscaban un escenario amplio de actividad política, encontraron el stalinismo del Partido Comunista y sus satélites y de los maoístas, repugnante.

Esta heterogeneidad se ha incrementado durante el crecimiento del Partido Socialista hasta convertirse en partido de masas.

La flexibilidad ideológica y organizativa del PS hizo de él un lugar común para trabajadores en proceso de radicalización pero que no estaban dispuestos todavía a someterse al conformismo político y organizativo exigido por el PC. Atrajo en particular a trabajadores e intelectuales temerosos de las características totalitarias del stalinismo, y a estratos de obreros militantes que rechazaban la política policial del PC en el movimiento obrero a nombre del régimen militar.

Esta combinación heterogénea incluía, como era de esperarse, a elementos imbuidos de anticomunismo reaccionario y prejuicios antileninistas. Más aún, en el conflicto con un Partido Comunista que intenta utilizar métodos totalitarios para apoyar el dominio de los militares, fuertes corrientes en esa combinación buscaron naturalmente el apoyo de los partidos socialistas europeos e incluso de los gobiernos capitalistas "democráticos."

Sin embargo, los hechos no apoyan la afirmación del PC y sus satélites ultraizquierdistas, de que el PS se ha convertido en el centro de organización de la reacción.

La realidad es que el PS se ha convertido en el lugar de reunión de una amplia gama de fuerzas representante de la mayoría de los trabajadores y pequeña burguesía radicalizada portugueses. La clase obrera se encuentra profundamente dividida y debilitada como resultado de la política de las direcciones del PC y el PS, y se están creando las condiciones para la restauración de un gobierno abiertamente antibrenero en Portugal. Así, la campaña sectaria del PC lanzada contra el PS, después de la victoria electoral de este último, puede en algún momento resultar suicida para los mismos stalinistas. De hecho representa un peligro mortal para la clase obrera en su conjunto. En esta campaña la motivación del PC es la determinación de defender las posiciones burocráticas que ha ganado como resultado de su papel de organizador de masas de la junta militar, así como los cálculos de Moscú de que un régimen como el del MFA llena mejor que ningún otro sus necesidades diplomáticas actuales en la distensión con Washington. Esta campaña de calumnias y demagogia contra la social democracia como el peligro principal, va en contra de los intereses de la revolución y debe de ser caracterizada como reaccionaria.

La mejor manera en que los revolucionarios pueden combatir el desarrollo de los sentimientos anticomunistas y antileninistas en las bases del Partido Socialista es mostrando en la práctica que defienden los derechos democráticos de las masas, y que están luchando por extenderlos a los cuarteles, las fábricas, los sindicatos, y cualquier comité popular; que están luchando por unir a la clase obrera y sus organizaciones alrededor de un programa que verdadera-

mente responde a sus necesidades y aspiraciones. Entre otras cosas, esto implica la denuncia de la demagogia de los stalinistas y el combatir su campaña de calumnias contra el Partido Socialista. Incluye tam-

8. El Camino Hacia el Poder y el Papel de la Asamblea Constituyente

El proceso revolucionario no ha alcanzado aún el punto en el cual formas claras de poder obrero han empezado a aparecer. Lo que ha aparecido son iniciativas espontáneas y aisladas de las masas, formas de control obrero y comités de fábrica embrionarios. Estos desarrollos pueden señalar el camino hacia el poder dual.

El progreso en este sentido depende de un curso político correcto. La tarea fundamental es llevar a los trabajadores a romper con la subordinación al Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas y a ejercer su derecho de poner un gobierno obrero y campesino en el poder.

Esta lucha en el momento actual se centra en la soberanía de la Asamblea Constituyente, en la cual los partidos obreros tienen una substancial mayoría absoluta y la cual es, además, el único organismo nacional hasta el momento, elegido por el pueblo. Esto se contrapone a la soberanía de la jerarquía militar no electa que constituye el actual gobierno. Muy estrechamente ligado a ésto está la lucha crucial por los derechos democráticos y el control democrático de las fuerzas armadas. Los variados esquemas de "democracia directa" presentados por los demagogos del MFA están dirigidos a desviar a los obreros de insistir sobre la expresión concreta de soberanía popular a través de la Asamblea Constituyente; es decir, estableciendo un gobierno obrero y campesino. La meta del MFA es mantener a los obreros cautivos de los varios gobiernos provisionales frentepopulistas, en los cuales el PC y el PS luchan por los ministerios. De la misma manera, la supuesta "democratización" del MFA, y el establecimiento de "consejos revolucionarios" bajo el tutelaje del MFA, están destinados a desviar a las bases del ejército de exigir el derecho democrático de organizarse independientemente del MFA y de participar en la actividad política.

Los esquemas ultraizquierdistas de "consejos revolucionarios" planteados en oposición a la Asamblea Constituyente hacen el juego a los demagogos militares. Esta línea de los grupos anarco-centristas de llamar a un régimen burgués a abolir el único organismo existente electo nacionalmente con representación política de las masas trabajadoras, en nombre de "soviets" fantasmáticas o a cambio de promesas de los oficiales militares demagogos, no es otra cosa que un confucionismo criminal, si no una traición abierta a la clase obrera.

La capitulación de los anarco-centristas

bién la crítica resuelta de la ligazón de la dirección del PS con el MFA y su orientación frentepopulista, la cual es un obstáculo fundamental para el establecimiento de un gobierno obrero y campesino.

ante los "salvadores" militares burgueses se expresa también en la demanda de que el régimen use sus tropas para respaldar a grupos de las colonias, que ellos consideran ser los más "progresistas" entre aquéllos que compiten por el poder. Esta demanda está ayudando al régimen imperialista a hacer retroceder el sentimiento de las masas por el regreso a Portugal de las tropas de las colonias. Por lo tanto juega un rol reaccionario. También promueve la política del MFA de restaurar a las fuerzas armadas como un instrumento efectivo de represión.

Los consejos de fábrica que aparecieron en el período posterior a la caída de Caetano fueron una respuesta a la necesidad de contar con una organización económica que representase a todos los trabajadores de una empresa, una necesidad especial creada por la fragmentación de las organizaciones económicas de los trabajadores bajo el régimen salazarista. Estos organismos se han mantenido dentro del marco sindical. No han funcionado como soviets. No han tomado iniciativas políticas; no han asumido el control de las concentraciones industriales; no han funcionado como arenas de debate político general o como centros organizadores de acciones de frente único de la clase obrera; no han lanzado a la lucha a los estratos más oprimidos de las masas; no son vistos por los trabajadores como un centro de poder paralelo o en competencia con el gobierno. Los consejos vecinales que existen actualmente representan aún menos a núcleos de consejos obreros que podrían conducir hacia el poder obrero.

Las formas democrático-revolucionarias más avanzadas que han aparecido hasta ahora en Portugal son las asambleas y comités de soldados y marineros que han aparecido en varias unidades en ciertos momentos. Sin embargo, estos no se convirtieron en comités permanentes a gran escala, salvo en la marina, que no es políticamente la rama decisiva de las fuerzas armadas.

Paralelo a su creciente ataque a la libertad de prensa y a la Asamblea Constituyente en nombre de la "democracia directa" y "el proceso revolucionario," el MFA aparece ante las masas cada vez menos como una salida para sus dificultades. Este descenso del prestigio de los militares es más marcado entre el campesinado, ya que solamente una política agraria revolucionaria puede empezar a solucionar

los problemas que enfrenta el campesinado pobre de Portugal. El nivel técnico de la agricultura debe ser elevado, el latifundismo debe ser abolido en el Sur, y se deben establecer proyectos de subvención agrícola para los campesinos pobres en el Norte, subsidiados por el gobierno.

En el Sur, el proletariado agrícola y los campesinos pobres han podido aprovechar la parálisis de las fuerzas represivas burguesas para tomar tierras y mejorar en gran medida su nivel de vida. Como resultado, se han convertido en fuertes defensores del nuevo régimen. Sin embargo, este proceso puede chocar pronto con serias limitaciones e inclusive convertirse en lo contrario bajo un gobierno burgués. Ayuda estatal es necesaria para reorganizar en forma eficaz la agricultura extensiva practicada en esta zona. A menos que la ocupación de tierra sean integradas a una política socialista de conjunto para la agricultura, las acciones de esta capa militante pero pequeña de trabajadores rurales puede servir para atemorizar al estrato mucho más grande de pequeños propietarios en el Norte quienes temen que un gobierno "comunista" les quitaría sus tierras y ganado además de someterlos a controles burocráticos y altos impuestos.

El fracaso del gobierno del MFA en el campo nos provee con un índice de su naturaleza conservadora. Por un lado, el continuo retraso de la agricultura ha significado un aumento continuo en los precios de los alimentos para los trabajadores urbanos. Por el otro lado, el fracaso en ofrecer alguna esperanza de mejora a los campesinos ha empujado a este estrato hacia "salvadores" reaccionarios. Las recientes manifestaciones por la "independencia" en las Azores son un ejemplo claro de ésto.

La falsedad de la demagogia del MFA acerca de la "democracia directa" se muestra quizás más claramente en la reaccionaria oposición del gobierno militar a las luchas por los derechos democráticos en las escuelas secundarias, una oposición reafirmada en la declaración política del Conselho da Revolução del 21 de junio. Las luchas de masas de los estudiantes secundarios por los derechos democráticos ha mostrado a ese sector del pueblo como uno de los más militantes y más altamente politizados del país, y uno de los menos influenciados por los militares y los reformistas. La declaración del 21 de junio anuncia un nuevo ataque de los militares contra este movimiento de masas, que está peleando por una verdadera democracia directa y no por una "participación" bajo la autoridad de los tutores militares.

En conclusión, hay seis ejes del proceso revolucionario en Portugal en la etapa actual.

1. La defensa de las conquistas económicas de los obreros y de otros sectores de las

masas, y la lucha por las aspiraciones económicas despertadas por la caída del régimen salazarista.

2. La lucha por el retiro inmediato de todas las tropas de las colonias.

3. La lucha por los derechos democráticos de las filas de las fuerzas armadas.

4. La lucha por los derechos democráticos y la toma de decisiones de una manera democrática en todas las áreas de la vida social.

5. La lucha por organizaciones obreras eficaces.

Los obreros portugueses están aún en una etapa inicial de organización. Los embrionarios comités de fábrica y los núcleos de sindicatos industriales que se han desarrollado, aunque muestran algunos rasgos avanzados, son todavía inadecuados a escala nacional para defender los intereses más elementales de los trabajadores. En esta situación, la propaganda y agitación por sindicatos industriales y una estructura sindical única y democrática, y la transformación de los embrionarios comités de fábrica en comités de acción que puedan movilizar a los trabajadores y a las masas pobres en los centros industriales, se combina estrechamente con otras tareas revolucionarias y forma un componente esencial en el desarrollo de una respuesta concreta y revolucionaria a las preocupaciones de las masas de trabajadores.

La lucha por el control obrero en las condiciones actuales también encaja perfectamente con estas tareas, y los obreros ya han ejercido el control en muchas ocasiones para proteger sus intereses específicos frente a los ataques del gobierno, el sabotaje de los patrones y el creciente desempleo e inflación. El control obrero es necesario para obtener la información y organización económica necesaria para defender los empleos, para evitar la fuga de capitales, para luchar contra la inflación y administrar una escala móvil de salarios y horas de trabajo. Sin embargo, el control obrero no puede cumplir sus objetivos a menos que los obreros dejen en claro que no aceptan ninguna responsabilidad por el funcionamiento de la economía hasta que no tengan verdadero poder político sobre ella.

Debido a la demagogia del régimen militar y el Partido Comunista—demagogia reforzada por las inclinaciones anarquistas de los grupos centristas de izquierda, existe el peligro de que una fachada de control obrero sea usada por el gobierno para inducir a los obreros a aceptar la austeridad. Si esa táctica tiene éxito, resultará tarde o temprano en una desmovilización y desmoralización profunda de la clase obrera.

Un ejemplo de como el gobierno y los reformistas han utilizado el tema del "control obrero" con objetivos demagógicos fue provisto por el cierre del diario *República*. En este caso-prueba, un descarado ataque a

la libertad de prensa y a la libertad de expresión del más grande partido de la clase obrera fue justificado con el argumento de que un pequeño grupo de trabajadores de la imprenta influenciados por los stalinistas tenía el derecho de imponer censura política a un diario que al gobierno y al PC no les agradaba.

El mayor peligro que se enfrenta al organizar a los obreros a nivel económico es el intento del régimen militar y sus defensores stalinistas, de imponer el tutelaje del Estado burgués sobre los sindicatos. La llamada Ley de Unidad Sindical, que impone a Intersindical como la única federación nacional legal, fue precisamente un intento de la junta militar y el Partido Comunista de subordinar a los sindicatos al Estado burgués, para convertir a los sindicatos en correa de transmisión para la política del gobierno en la clase obrera.

6. La Lucha por un Gobierno Obrero y Campesino

A nivel político, los trabajadores en su gran mayoría buscan dirección en tres fuentes: el Partido Socialista, el Partido Comunista e Intersindical, la federación de sindicatos. El Partido Socialista es el que tiene el mayor número de seguidores y el más atractivo por el momento para la mayoría de la clase obrera. El Partido Comunista y la Intersindical son las organizaciones más fuertes de la clase obrera y son buscados como dirección en la acción, tal como ocurrió en la resistencia a los intentos de golpe de septiembre de 1974 y marzo de 1975. En este momento, ninguna alternativa a estas organizaciones de masas tiene margen de confianza entre grandes capas obreras. Ni puede desarrollarse alternativa alguna hasta que las masas hayan aprendido en la práctica las limitaciones de las direcciones de estas organizaciones.

El único organismo nacional políticamente representativo, elegido por los trabajadores y las masas en Portugal, es la Asamblea Constituyente, en la cual los partidos obreros tienen la mayoría absoluta. La lucha por un gobierno obrero y campesino no puede ser librada sin defender la soberanía popular y la democracia, y concretamente sin defender a la Asamblea Constituyente contra los intentos del Partido Comunista, la junta militar y los dirigentes del PS de socavar su autoridad y limitar o destruir su soberanía.

La lucha por un gobierno obrero y campesino se centra en este momento alrededor de la Asamblea Constituyente. Los más agudos problemas son la defensa de la Asamblea Constituyente, la demanda de que represente los intereses de las masas de trabajadores que la eligieron, y el repudio de los partidos obreros al Pacto-Programa, que codificó su capitulación a la junta militar. Al firmar este acuerdo con el régimen militar, los líderes de los partidos

obreros de masas traicionaron su responsabilidad de representar a los obreros que los apoyan.

En la Asamblea Constituyente, el Partido Socialista está en una posición por demás contradictoria, ya que afirma representar a la mayoría de los obreros así como también tener el mandato de la mayor parte de la población. Más aún, los dirigentes del Partido Socialista entraron en conflicto con el gobierno militar en la defensa de la soberanía popular y los derechos democráticos de las masas. Pero continúan acatando los decretos de los dirigentes militares. Los dirigentes del Partido Socialista son también menos capaces de controlar a sus seguidores y dependen más de su popularidad electoral que el Partido Comunista.

Los órganos incipientes de poder obrero surgirán de la luchas unificadas de masas de la clase obrera, como ha sucedido anteriormente en cada ascenso revolucionario. En Portugal no se puede abrir el camino a tales luchas sin comenzar por desafiar el derecho del gobierno militar a gobernar. La aceptación de esta pretensión es no solamente la mayor fuerza que mantiene la subordinación de los trabajadores a la dirección burguesa y el mayor obstáculo a su organización, sino que es también el mayor obstáculo a que las organizaciones obreras de masas participen en acciones de frente único.

Concretamente, la defensa de la soberanía de la Asamblea Constituyente contra el gobierno militar implica el llamado a los Partidos Comunista y Socialista, como representantes de la abrumadora mayoría de los trabajadores portugueses y la mayoría del pueblo portugués, a establecer un nuevo gobierno ejerciendo su mayoría en la Asamblea Constituyente y apelando a las masas y a las bases de las fuerzas armadas a movilizarse en su favor. Estas son también las principales fuerzas políticas en Intersindical, la cual debería mantener su independencia de cualquier gobierno, aún del gobierno obrero y campesino, como el defensor directo de los intereses económicos de los obreros.

Exigir esto a los dos partidos de masas de la clase obrera es una parte esencial del proceso de plantear una alternativa gubernamental socialista al régimen militar y de exponer la incapacidad de estos partidos para proveer tal alternativa.

A medida que la desilusión de las masas con el régimen militar se profundiza, y la crisis económica empeora, la amenaza de un golpe reaccionario será cada vez más grave. Al mismo tiempo, el MFA perderá su capacidad y determinación de resistir una arremetida derechista. Dado que su poder está basado específicamente en el ejército burgués, el armar a las masas representa para él un peligro mortal. Más aún, a medida que el régimen se desacredita más y más, las masas se mostrarán cada vez más

reacias a movilizarse bajo su bandera, ya que esto las seguiría subordinando a un régimen sobre el cual ellas no ejercen ningún control, y que parece estar cada vez menos interesado en responder a sus necesidades e intereses.

9. Las Tareas de los Trotskistas Portugueses

Bajo las condiciones de la represión salazarista, los trotskistas no podían realizar discusiones políticas regulares y exhaustivas en las que participara la organización entera. Así mismo, no podían participar, excepto de una manera muy limitada, en la vida del movimiento trotskista mundial. Entre otras cosas, esto dificultó la construcción de una organización políticamente homogénea a nivel nacional y la resolución de diferencias políticas tácticas e incipientes sin escisiones. Desde abril de 1974, sin embargo, esta tendencia ha sido, al menos en cierta medida, revertida.

No obstante, aún existen dos grupos trotskistas separados. La Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI) fue reconocida por el Congreso Mundial de febrero de 1974 como grupo simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional. La existencia de la otra organización, el Grupo Marxista Revolucionário (GMR), ahora el Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT), fue conocida por la Cuarta Internacional únicamente hasta el verano de 1974. Estos dos grupos de similar tamaño han concentrado sus actividades en diferentes arenas y son ahora complementarias en determinados aspectos. Su unificación sobre una base principista representaría un avance cualitativo para el trotskismo portugués.

Ambos grupos trotskistas consisten principalmente de jóvenes reclutados del medio estudiantil. El PRT tiene muchos activistas de escuelas secundarias. La LCI tiene una mayor proporción de activistas de más edad con experiencia en las universidades y en campañas políticas. Ambos grupos han abierto trabajos en las fábricas. En esto la LCI tiene más experiencia. Pero ninguna organización tiene todavía una implantación substancial en el movimiento obrero. Bajo tales condiciones, los trotskistas portugueses tienen las siguientes tareas:

1. Abrir una discusión común para elaborar un programa acabado para la revolución portuguesa y para construir un partido trotskista de masas en Portugal.

2. Integrarse a la vida política de la Cuarta Internacional y participar en sus discusiones.

3. Regularizar y expandir su trabajo de propaganda, en particular publicando un periódico regular atractivo y garantizando la traducción y publicación de las obras de Trotsky.

Por lo tanto, la propaganda y agitación para movilizar y armar a las masas en contra de los verdugos derechistas únicamente se puede llevar a cabo con éxito en combinación con la lucha por un gobierno obrero y campesino.

4. Demostrar la aplicación práctica de las ideas y principios trotskistas en las luchas amplias contra la explotación y opresión.

El programa común de los trotskistas portugueses debería incluir los siguientes puntos:

1. La movilización de un movimiento amplio para exigir el retiro inmediato e incondicional de todas las tropas portuguesas de las colonias.

2. Defensa del derecho de todos los miembros de las fuerzas armadas de discutir todas las ideas políticas y de organizarse políticamente sobre bases de igualdad en los cuarteles y en las instalaciones militares. Completa democracia en el seno de las fuerzas armadas, incluyendo el derecho a elegir oficiales y a discutir todas las órdenes que tengan relevancia política. Defensa del derecho del personal militar a participar plenamente en la vida política del país sin restricción alguna. Movilización de un amplio frente en defensa de cualquier personal militar victimizado por razones políticas.

3. La presentación de un plan de reforma agraria radical adaptado a las condiciones portuguesas. Puesto que la gran mayoría del tercio de la población portuguesa que vive de la agricultura son pequeños propietarios, esto requiere de un programa de subsidio estatal para los campesinos a nivel individual, así como el auspicio de cooperativas auxiliadas por el Estado y granjas estatales en la zona de cultivo extensivo. Para el área donde el proletariado rural predomina, se requiere también un programa para los sindicatos de trabajadores agrícolas. La gran desigualdad en las condiciones de vida de los distintos pequeños propietarios debería también ser tomada en cuenta.

4. El planteo oportuno de demandas económicas inmediatas y demandas democráticas y transicionales para enfrentar las necesidades de capas oprimidas de la población, tales como las mujeres y la juventud en particular.

5. La concentración del frente más amplio posible para la defensa y extensión de los derechos democráticos. Los derechos políticos de la mayoría de las organizaciones obreras en Portugal han sido atacados en una u otra ocasión desde el 25 de abril de 1974, incluyendo los derechos de cada uno de los partidos reformistas de masas. Sin

embargo, el principio de la solidaridad del movimiento obrero en su conjunto contra tales ataques está lejos de haber sido establecido. Aún más, incluso las fuerzas políticas y partidos burgueses y pequeño burgueses tienen contradicciones en su seno sobre esta cuestión que pueden ser explotadas a favor de los intereses fundamentales del movimiento obrero. Por ejemplo, algunos elementos en el burgués PPD protestaron contra los ataques de la policía a los manifestantes pro-MPLA en agosto de 1974 con mucha más fuerza e insistencia que el PC. Mientras que todos los partidos políticos de importancia en Portugal afirman estar a favor de la democracia, sólo los revolucionarios son capaces de defender y extender consistentemente los derechos democráticos.

6. Impulsar el control obrero para defender los intereses de los trabajadores contra los despidos, la intensificación del trabajo, y los intentos de los capitalistas de usar su poder económico para sabotear la economía y frenar el avance del proletariado hacia la toma del poder. El control obrero es una extensión de los derechos democráticos a la fábrica y es necesario en la etapa actual para defender los derechos democráticos de los trabajadores en la sociedad en su conjunto contra la reacción capitalista. Sin embargo, puede jugar este papel únicamente si sirve los intereses de la clase obrera en su conjunto y es subordinado a la perspectiva general de desarrollar la democracia obrera. Ambos los intentos del gobierno y el Partido Comunista de obligar a los obreros a trabajar más duro y los intentos de grupos ultraizquierdistas relativamente pequeños de pasar por encima de las opiniones de la mayoría de los trabajadores con iniciativas minoritarias y campañas demagógicas no impulsan sino retrasan el desarrollo del genuino control obrero.

7. Obtener la independencia política de la clase obrera con respecto al MFA y cualquier otra dirección bonapartista que surja. Esto implica llamar a las organizaciones obreras de masas a representar verdaderamente los intereses de los trabajadores y romper con cualquier forma de colaboración con la burguesía, incluyendo al gobierno militar burgués en todos sus aspectos, como un medio para demostrar en la práctica a los trabajadores las limitaciones de sus direcciones reformistas. Esto incluye el llamar a los partidos obreros de masas a romper el Pacto-Programa y establecer un gobierno obrero y campesino.

8. Promover la unidad en la acción de la clase obrera impulsando la demanda por un frente único de todas las organizaciones que afirman representar a los trabajadores en defensa de las conquistas logradas y contra cualquier ofensiva de las fuerzas burguesas que amenace al proletariado en su conjunto. Esto incluye las medidas

apropiadas para armar al proletariado para la defensa de sus conquistas.

9. Promover la organización independiente de la clase obrera para que el proletariado pueda cumplir las tareas que la lucha de clases le impone en este período de crisis y triunfe en una confrontación directa con la burguesía. Esto implica impulsar formas más y más amplias de organizaciones obreras, sindicatos industriales, una estructura sindical unida y democrática, comités de acción y comités de fábrica democráticos

que puedan unificar y movilizar a las amplias masas de trabajadores en las zonas industriales y atraer a otras capas explotadas y oprimidas, y finalmente, congresos nacionales y regionales de organizaciones obreras que puedan adoptar una política global y dirigir a las masas trabajadoras en la toma de iniciativas decisivas. La dirección de desarrollo es hacia el establecimiento de un gobierno obrero y campesino y la organización de soviets como base de un Estado obrero. □

The View From the Crown and Cabbage

Why Shoot a Prime Minister?

By Allen Myers

[The following article appeared in the October 2 issue of *Direct Action*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Australia.]

I was walking past the Crown and Cabbage when Max stuck his head out the door and motioned me into the public bar.

"Come in and have a look at the TV," he said. "They're shooting at your president again."

"He's not *my* president," I objected as I followed Max inside. On the screen, for what seemed like the fifth or sixth time in a month, bullets were whizzing past Gerald Ford's head. Most of the pub's patrons were paying as much attention to the latest assassination attempt as they would have to the third rerun of a Western movie, and after a while the publican, to loud applause, switched the set to a channel broadcasting the football.

"Crazy people, you Yanks," Max said. "Imagine anyone wanting to bump off that poor bloody Ford. Do they think they'll be better off if Rockefeller is president?"

The question was obviously rhetorical, and I didn't try to answer. Max continued: "How many presidents have been killed? You wouldn't want to be in the business of insuring them, would you?"

"Maybe," I said, "it's a hangover from the days of the Old West, settling things with six-guns and all that sort of thing."

"Rubbish," Max answered. "Do you think Americans are more violent than Australians? Try driving your car up the Pacific Highway for half an hour and then tell me that an Aussie isn't as bloody murderous as anyone else in the world. But do you know how many prime ministers have been assassinated?"

I had to admit that I didn't.

"None. Unless of course you count Holt.¹

But if someone fed him to the sharks, it was the CIA, not an Australian. But presidents are always being assassinated by their own countrymen."

Cynthia, Max's wife, appeared engrossed in the football, but she was following the conversation sufficiently to give him an elbow in the ribs at this point.

"And countrywomen," Max added hastily.

"What causes the difference?" I asked.

"They bring it on themselves," Max answered, "with all their pomp and circumstance. Everybody takes them so bloody seriously. No wonder every dingbat thinks he can change the world by putting a bullet in the president's head. Or she thinks," he added with a glance at Cynthia.

"Australians know better, do they?"

"Too bloody right they do. You don't think anyone takes Whitlam seriously do you? At least not seriously enough to put a bullet in him. Whitlam can't drop an atom bomb on anyone, because he doesn't have any. He can't overthrow governments in Africa or Latin America, because he doesn't have a CIA. And everybody knows it. Anybody who'd want to kill an Australian prime minister in order to change the world would have to be crazy and stupid both. In America, they only have to be crazy."

"But what about people who don't want to change the world?" I asked. "What about people who just want to change Australia? The economy for instance. If I was prime minister, I'd increase my bodyguard every time unemployment went up another percentage point."

"Be serious," said Max. "How can Whitlam be responsible for the economy when he hasn't got a clue to what's happening to it? None of the Canberra mob have a clue."

disappeared while skin diving off Cheviot Beach in Victoria in December 1967.

"Fraser² says he does."

"Yeah, and my little boy sometimes pretends he's a bank robber, but not even a New South Wales copper would be enough of a drongo³ to shoot him for it."

"You mean there's no difference in your opinion between Whitlam and Fraser?"

"Of course there's a difference," Max explained, "but nothing worth shooting someone for. You Yanks are brainwashed by all the publicity: President Does This, President Does That. If the president sneezes twice before breakfast, there's a stock market crash. We don't go for that hero worship stuff here, so no one gets the idea that bumping off the prime minister would change anything very much. If Fraser gets in, the price of a middy⁴ might go up another ten cents, but neither of those blokes is going to make it free, is he?"

"Not likely," I said.

"I figure," Max said, "things are just going to go on getting worse no matter who's prime minister, or even if we don't have a prime minister at all. If the Yanks paid attention to what's happening in Australia, they wouldn't shoot so many of their presidents."

"They might shoot more husbands though," Cynthia interjected.

Max refused to be diverted. "Every now and then," he told me, "something happens to show how unimportant prime ministers are. Take September 16 for example."

"That's the day Papua New Guinea became independent."

"Right. And did your life change for the better or worse that day?"

"No."

"Well, it happens that on September 16 Australia had no prime minister. Whitlam was in Papua New Guinea, so when it became independent, he was outside the country. Cairns or Crean or whoever was deputy that week was in Iran. So until Whitlam came back the next day, Australia didn't have a prime minister."

"I didn't know that," I admitted.

"Of course you didn't. Almost no one noticed, because it didn't make any difference. Haven't I been telling you the prime minister isn't important?"

"Maybe," I suggested, "we should try sending them out of the country for a whole month, or even a year, and see what happens. Maybe nothing would happen at all."

"Those politicians aren't that stupid," Max replied. "Why do you think Whitlam cut the ministerial travel fund in the new budget?" □

2. Malcolm Fraser is head of the Liberal party and leader of the opposition.

3. A popular Australian term of abuse, roughly translated as dope or lame-brain.

4. A ten-ounce glass of beer in New South Wales.

1. Former Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt

The Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution

[At the 1969 world congress of the Fourth International, the debate over what political course to follow, particularly in relation to the class struggle in Latin America, led to the formation of two tendencies. These later developed into two factions, the International Majority Tendency and the Leninist Trotskyist Faction.

[The differences between the two groupings have extended to the Portuguese revolution, as was explained in the contribution by Gerry Foley, Joseph Hansen, and George Novack, "For a Correct Political Course in Portugal," published in last week's issue of *Intercontinental Press*.

[The resolution below constitutes the official position of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction on the Portuguese revolution. It was adopted unanimously by the LTF Steering Committee at a meeting held August 30, 1975.]

* * *

The opening of the Portuguese socialist revolution stands at present at the center of the international class struggle. A working-class victory in Portugal would sound the death knell of European capitalism and deal a staggering blow to the main powerhouse of international capitalism in the United States.

In view of the size and power of the Portuguese working class relative to the bourgeoisie and its reactionary contingents, why hasn't it already established its own government? The answer is that the Portuguese workers, like the workers in other countries, are faced with "a crisis of leadership," to cite Trotsky's words in the Transitional Program.

The crisis in leadership can be overcome only by the construction of a team of cadres capable of providing correct political guidance. The nucleus of such a team is very small in Portugal today. The prime problem is to expand that nucleus. This means constructing a revolutionary-socialist party in the very heat of the revolution.

Achievement of this difficult requisite demands, above all, a precise Marxist analysis of all the contending political forces, and, in particular, the political issues at the heart of the developing class struggle. The greatest possible concreteness is demanded. Instructive as analogies with other revolutions may be, they cannot take the place of analysis of the Portuguese events themselves and determination of

their political meaning in the living context of national and international contending forces.

This resolution is intended as a contribution in that task, which is a collective responsibility of the world Trotskyist movement as a whole.

Of course, more than accurate analysis and political prognosis are required. Unless the small nucleus of Trotskyist forces in Portugal succeeds in taking full advantage of the openings provided by the revolution, they will not be able to expand sufficiently and at a swift enough rate to gain leadership of the revolutionary-minded masses.

Fortunately, the pattern of the Portuguese revolution favors their efforts. It is preeminently *proletarian*. Among other things, this means that it is centered in the cities where the Trotskyists are also based, giving them extraordinary opportunities to spread their ideas among the radicalizing layers of workers.

In a developing revolution, the proletariat has enormous advantages. These include its economic and social weight, the power of its numbers when they move in unison, the effectiveness of its natural methods of organization and battle in the plants and in the streets, the radicalizing and mobilizing effect of its struggles on its allies in the city and countryside, and above all its inclination to move toward socialism, a trend

clearly evident in Portugal today.

In accordance with this pattern, the Portuguese workers in their first upsurge began to organize militant unions and to establish workers control of industry. Action committees appeared in many factories, as did similar forms in the armed forces and in some neighborhoods, giving promise of the rise of soviets or comparable bodies. The direction of movement obviously favors the growth of Trotskyism.

Such phenomena, along with the universal determination among the masses to finish with Salazarism, or anything resembling it, and to establish a new governmental system capable of guaranteeing democracy as they understand it and want it, have provided striking confirmation of the correctness of the Transitional Program, which in 1938 outlined the logic of a rising proletarian revolution like the one in Portugal and noted the concomitant slogans and tasks facing the revolutionary Marxists.

By the same token, those Portuguese Trotskyists who have assimilated the lessons taught by Trotsky, above all in the Transitional Program, stand well prepared to tackle the key problem of resolving the crisis of leadership faced by the Portuguese working class and thereby assuring a victory of colossal importance to the workers on all continents.

1. Bourgeois Calculations in the April 25 Coup

The April 25, 1974, military coup that toppled the Caetano dictatorship was an outcome of the conclusion drawn by Portuguese finance capital that neither their colonial empire nor the working class in their own country could be dominated any longer primarily by repressive means.

The Portuguese imperialists had at first resisted turning to neocolonial means to save their empire. As rulers of the weakest of the imperialist powers both economically and politically, they sought to evade the cost of fostering and maintaining a neocolonial bourgeoisie. Moreover, their state apparatus appeared to have a tight grip on society. Thus, the Portuguese imperialists hoped to achieve by determination and ruthlessness what other imperialists with vastly greater resources chose not to attempt, or failed to achieve.

However, after more than a decade of savage war against the peoples in the colonies, the Portuguese imperialists found that the sword was incapable of cutting off the sources of the colonial revolution, which continued to mount. Even terror on the massive scale practiced in northern Angola was not sufficient to destroy the nationalist movements, in particular since they received support, and in some instances bases, from the surrounding Black African states.

Although the Portuguese imperialists managed for a time to contain the nationalist movements in the economically important colonies, this was insufficient to accomplish their objectives. They finally realized that they did not have the resources to sustain a large-scale military occupation of the colonies without under-

mining the bases of capitalist stability in Portugal itself. Nor could they get the necessary support from stronger imperialist powers to make up for their weakness.

Nonetheless, the sectors of the Portuguese ruling class who came to see the need for a change in policy faced grave difficulties in carrying it out. The regime had rested on corporatist repression for nearly half a century. Not only were substantial repressive forces such as the secret police and the riot police strongly intertwined with the regime but the economic interests of a swollen layer of backward petty capitalists and latifundists were bound up with the maintenance of this special repressive system. Furthermore, the Portuguese imperialists had waited too long to shift to neocolonialism; they faced well-organized mass nationalist movements deeply rooted in the populations of many colonies, including Angola, the key piece of the empire. These movements were already substantial. With their long tradition of struggle, they could not be co-opted cheaply. Nor could the colonial masses, after long years of massive struggles and enormous sacrifices and suffering, be easily demobilized by small concessions.

So, Portuguese imperialism, which has always had an extraordinarily weak base, engaged in perhaps the most daring gamble in 500 years of Lusitanian expansionism. It moved to reorganize its forms of political and social control by violent means, by a military uprising against an entrenched layer of the state and political apparatus. A major indication of the line of thinking of the ruling sector was their decision to allow Spínola's book *Portugal e o Futuro* to be published in February 1974. The book became a best seller and helped provide the general with a revolutionary image. Through the subsequent coup, Spínola moved to disarm and neutralize a section of the ruling class itself by purging a considerable number of previously sacrosanct authorities. This not only disabled the police forces for a time, it was a violent shock to the habits of obedience instilled in the masses by almost fifty years of dictatorship modeled on fascist Italy and Spain.

The Portuguese capitalists did not embark on such an adventure without taking into account certain favorable conditions. Although they had failed to stop the rising radicalization among the workers and the youth, a powerful, organized mass movement had not yet formed in Portugal. Likewise, although the imperialist army had failed to crush the nationalist movements in the colonies and had suffered some defeats as well as significant losses, it had not been broken or decisively defeated.

The most favorable condition from the bourgeoisie's point of view was the absence

of a mass revolutionary Marxist party in either Portugal or the colonies. The mass movement was dominated by dependable reformist elements. As it turned out, the assessment made by the Portuguese imperialist bourgeoisie of the reliability of the reformist workers parties proved to be accurate.

What Portugal's rulers underestimated was the power and extent of the mass upsurge that would be touched off both in Portugal and the colonies by the fall of Salazarism. They failed to gauge correctly the hopes this would inspire among the masses that they could finally gain their democratic right to think, to discuss, to make their own decisions, and to struggle to

2. The Armed Forces Movement—a Bourgeois Instrument

The instrument on which the imperialist bourgeoisie relied to remove the Caetano regime and to carry out the needed political reorganization was the Armed Forces Movement (AFM). The AFM began as a movement among professional officers who sought to defend their privileges as graduates of the military academies against the ordinary university graduates, large numbers of whom were given commissions as part of the expansion of the armed forces required to fight the colonial war.

The AFM, in essence, has functioned as the political arm of the military hierarchy. That is what it has always aspired to be, and what the present leadership intends it to be. Following the March 11, 1975, attempted coup, some of the cleverest military demagogues such as Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho have tried to picture things as if a political difference existed between the top military commanders who associated themselves with the April 25 overturn, Spínola in particular, and the "revolutionary movement" itself. This line was intended to explain away the obvious splits in the AFM represented by the attempted rightist coups on September 28, 1974, and March 11, 1975.

In any such conspiratorial movement there are bound to be various layers of officers and various degrees of commitment, with the lowest officers, who take the greatest risks, generally being the most radical in speech and the most determined in action. The AFM has thus drawn the support of many radicalized young officers as well as radicalized civilians, and has maintained its control over them. However, the AFM has always striven to make itself as representative of the military command as possible; and since the April 25 overturn it has continued to bring in officers on the basis of the positions they hold in the military hierarchy. In addition, representatives of the lower ranks of the armed forces

change their economic and social conditions and determine their own fate.

In the sweep of this mass radicalization, the bourgeoisie found it impossible to sufficiently reconsolidate its repressive apparatus, and was forced to permit far more widespread purges of rightist police and officials than it intended or than was compatible with the stability of bourgeois class rule. The pressure of the mass upsurge opened wider the cracks in the discipline of the armed forces resulting from growing unwillingness to continue the long and unsuccessful colonial war. As it deepened, this process threatened to shatter the armed forces as an instrument of the bourgeois state.

have been incorporated in the formal organs of the AFM to make these bodies better transmission belts for the directives of the military leadership and better barometers of the political processes at work in the armed forces, as well as to divert demands for real democracy in the armed forces. In accordance with their bonapartist strategy, the military tops also brought some left-wing elements into the AFM assemblies to counterbalance the right and increase their maneuvering room.

As a conspiratorial opposition movement under Caetano, the AFM attracted officers influenced by various political currents hostile to the Salazarist regime. In response to the logic and the pressures of the struggle against the old dictatorship, as well as the pressure of the masses following April 25, there was a tendency toward radicalization, in the lower echelons of the AFM in particular. This tendency was reinforced by the mass mobilizations in response to the attempted right-wing coups on September 28, 1974, and March 11, 1975.

In these cases, the most conservative elements in the armed forces feared that the democratic ferment and social struggles were getting out of hand and that the process of reform could not contain the masses but would inspire them to further struggle. At the same time, they were unwilling to accept the minimum demands of some nationalist movements in the colonies. If successful, this "restoration of order" would have meant a purge of important sections of the AFM now regarded as "unreliable" by the conservatives. In each instance, the masses mobilized to defend the military regime, which they identified with their new-found freedoms and the perspective of socialism. These coup attempts further compromised the already discredited Portuguese capitalist class and shifted the balance of forces in favor of the working masses. As a result,

the process of radicalization accelerated in the ranks of the armed forces and at the lower levels of the officer corps, and after each coup attempt the AFM was obliged to adopt correspondingly more "socialist" and "anti-imperialist" verbiage in order to divert the political process into the channels of the AFM.

However, the AFM has remained the essential political instrument of the Portuguese imperialist bourgeoisie. And its objective has continued to be to modernize and strengthen Portuguese capitalism—not to overturn it. It simply found itself obliged to rely heavily on demagogy to persuade the Portuguese workers to help out capitalism in its hour of need. It is also using "socialist" phrasemongering to put capitalist needs in a better light as a first step toward restoring the dominance of bourgeois ideology and of bourgeois "law and order" and repression.

One example of the demagogy of the AFM is its use of bourgeois nationalism. Since its successful April 25, 1974, coup, the ruling military group has carried on a campaign designed to restore the hold of Portuguese nationalism, which had been largely discredited through its use by Salazar. In order to accomplish this, it has posed as a national liberation movement borrowing the anti-imperialist themes of the rebel movements in the colonies. In the same way, it has tried to borrow the repressive features of the colonial bonapartist regimes and the Stalinist regimes, which, since they are identified to some extent with revolution and progressive struggles, are not so discredited as the repressive devices of the old regime.

Since the April 25, 1974, overturn, the AFM has served as the real government of capitalist Portugal and the empire, using the various provisional cabinets as a means of presenting a civilian façade and assuring the support of the mass reformist workers parties for its rule. During this time, it has presided over and maintained a capitalist imperialist system, consistently taking the side of the bourgeoisie against the workers in economic conflicts. It has made only such concessions to the mass movement as were inescapable if popular support were to be retained and its position held against both the more conservative bourgeois elements anxious to halt the reforms at any cost and the more combative elements in the workers movement threatening to push them out of control.

At every stage the AFM has striven to maintain as much control over the colonies as possible without endangering the conversion to neocolonialist methods. There have been differences over the amount of concessions that had to be given. An example is the reported dispute between Spínola and the present leaders of the AFM over withdrawal from Mozambique. The Portu-

guese imperialists have also been forced to make more concessions than they originally intended.

However, the essential continuity in the policy objectives of the imperialist bourgeoisie has been maintained by its present political agent, the AFM. This is shown, among other things, by the maintenance and reinforcement of the Portuguese military intervention in Angola and by the attempts of the AFM, including its supposed "radical" wing, to regain political support in Portugal for keeping troops in the economically and strategically more important colonies. The fact that the AFM has used "socialist" and "anti-imperialist" demagogy in its attempt to persuade the Portuguese masses to accept continued military intervention in the colonies and continued sending of troops there is indicative both of its methods and its objectives.

From April 25, 1974, until August 1975, there have been five "provisional" governments in Portugal. The rapid turnover testifies to the deepening instability of the bases of bourgeois rule in face of the continuing democratic ferment, the growing social struggles, advance of the colonial revolution, and worsening economic situation. Throughout this process, the provisional governments have been paralleled by

military bodies that have functioned as the real governmental authority. The pact signed between the AFM and the main bourgeois and reformist parties in April 1975 in fact tried to formalize this situation by setting up a two-tier governmental structure in which all the decisive powers were to be exercised by the AFM bodies.

In political composition, the various provisional governments have all been openly popular frontist; and this actually was their main value to the bourgeoisie. The political tendencies and orientations represented in the military bodies have been more veiled, which again constitutes one of the main political advantages of these bodies to the bourgeoisie.

The steady shift since July 1974 toward more and more reliance on the military formations as the political leadership of the bourgeois state has had as its complement an accentuation of the bonapartist balancing role of the AFM. Parallel to this trend toward more open military rule, the AFM has escalated its socialistic-sounding demagogy and in particular resorted to petty-bourgeois radical themes such as the need for "national liberation" in Portugal, "direct democracy," and various populist nostrums.

3. The Upsurge of the Masses

Because of the sudden collapse of the repressive regime and the extreme political and organizational weaknesses of both the capitalists and the workers, the fundamental classes in Portugal, the political and social situation has remained very fluid.

The old regime fell completely discredited. To a large extent, the bourgeoisie and bourgeois ideas shared in its disgrace. In vast ferment, the masses began to express themselves for the first time in forty-eight years, to examine forbidden ideas, to take hope in their ability to change their conditions. As the best known opposition group, the Communist party had the most prestige. But all the opposition groups, all the left parties and groups, were taken seriously by the masses. All tendencies and groups received substantial press coverage. There was an unprecedented openness to revolutionary ideas on the part of the masses and an attitude of giving equal consideration to the proposals of all tendencies on the left. The ferment of revolutionary ideas spread irresistibly, threatening to dissolve even the discipline of the armed forces, the last prop of capitalist order.

The workers in the factories and the poor masses in the neighborhoods organized spontaneously. Hated bosses and strike-breaking goons were purged. Unused housing was seized. The workers asserted the

right to hold meetings and organize assemblies in the plants. The factories became centers of political discussion and activity. Wage gains were made.

Democratic factory committees sprung up in most of the big plants. They were elected by general assemblies involving all the workers. From the craft-union fragmentation imposed by corporatism, the workers went in one leap toward democratically organized industrial unions and opened the perspective of soviet forms of organization.

The splits in the military command that developed as some sections of the bourgeoisie began to fear that the mass movement in Portugal and the colonies was getting out of hand opened the way for democratic organization in the armed forces, especially in the military police, the navy, and some regiments of the army. This development has posed the most immediate danger to bourgeois rule since the April 1974 overturn, provoking some bourgeois forces to turn to very radical-sounding demagogy in an attempt to maintain political control of the process, and other sectors to strike out desperately to crush it before it got further out of hand.

Combined with a sharpening economic crisis and partial paralysis of the bourgeois repressive forces, the ferment in the working class led to a series of factory occupa-

tions, the imposition of elements of workers control, and to demands for nationalizations. The workers turned to nationalizations as a way of preventing layoffs and countering claims by the capitalist owners that they could not afford to meet demands for better wages and conditions. They imposed workers control to prevent factory closures and in some key cases, such as the banks, to prevent the capitalists from using their economic power to mount an attack on the workers movement.

In the instance of the banks, the government was obliged to give in to the workers' demand for nationalization partially to defend itself against sections of the bourgeoisie who were now opposed to the reform policy it represented. In other cases, the government resisted demands for nationalizing profitable enterprises. However, because of the economic crisis and the need to reorient the economy in line with the change represented by abandoning the Salazarist regime, the government itself initiated a series of nationalizations to bail out key capitalist interests and strengthen Portuguese capitalism. In the given political context, these nationalizations had contradictory effects: On the one hand, they spread illusions that control of the economy would actually be handed over to the workers; on the other, they encouraged the workers to press for nationalizations going beyond what was acceptable to the capitalist class. This contradiction was expressed most concretely on the political level by the demagoguery of the government and the Communist party, calling on the workers to work harder since they now "controlled" production. This kind of "workers control," tied to increasing production, had the effect of shoring up the capitalist profitability of plants in a period of political crisis when the capitalists could not themselves effectively manage their plants. Under these conditions, the capitalists could accept the loss of direct control over their property, even for a prolonged period.

As the radicalization deepened, landless peasants began to seize the land of latifundists, and agricultural workers began organizing unions and demanding equality with other workers.

The ranks of the armed forces became increasingly reluctant to stay in or embark for the colonies to carry out the Portuguese bourgeoisie's neocolonialist plans.

The fall of the Caetano regime gave great impetus to other social movements. The women's liberation movement, for example, quickly raised demands that went beyond what the military were prepared to grant. Despite the opposition of the new regime and the forces most closely allied with it, such as the Communist party, the small nucleus of the women's liberation movement aroused the interest of women in the

poor neighborhoods, factories, and peasant villages, indicating that it has the potential for rapid development as the revolutionary process deepens.

The movement among university and high-school students against authoritarianism in the schools and against restricted access to education assumed powerful momentum, along with actions by students from the colonies. High-school students became its most dynamic sector. They entered into struggle against the new military "saviors" themselves and won victories.

It was essentially the continuation and deepening of the broad social ferment that split the AFM and led the more conservative elements to make desperate attempts to carry out right-wing coups in order to halt these processes. Conversely, when democratic rights and other gains of the revolution appeared to be dangerously threatened the masses have mobilized on a huge scale. The political process in Portugal has centered on issues that became explosive because of the concern of the masses over their democratic right to freely consider all alternative points of view and to assert their will as the majority of the populace.

The fight to defend and extend democratic rights in the factory, in the barracks, in society as a whole, is indispensable to advancing toward the establishment of a workers and peasants government. This

fight for a workers and peasants government constitutes the decisive axis of struggle in Portugal today. With their deceptive schemas of "direct democracy" subordinated to a military regime, the demagogues seek to divert the working class and the peasantry from seeing this reality and organizing accordingly.

A major obstacle to mobilizing the masses to struggle for democratic rights, popular sovereignty, and a workers and peasants government is represented by the leaderships of the mass reformist workers parties and their satellites, since all of them favor subordinating the workers movement to the unelected military regime, the main defender of capitalist order in Portugal today. However, there is a strong sentiment among the working class as a whole, which these leaderships cannot ignore, for united-front action in defense of democratic rights, and social gains that have come under attack. Furthermore, they have already been obliged, in different ways, to defend certain democratic rights at certain times for their own specific interests as bureaucrats. The fight to defend the social and economic gains of the toilers, democratic rights, and popular sovereignty, in order to move toward a government of the oppressed and exploited, also brings out the contradictions of the reformist parties most sharply and poses the need for a working-class united front in the strongest way.

4. The Stalinists Support the Bourgeois Order

During the first phase of the new regime, the Communist party and its petty-bourgeois front, the Movimento Democrático Português (MDP—Portuguese Democratic Movement), played a crucial political role in upholding the military government. It was the only political force not compromised with the old regime that had an effective apparatus, and this machine became in effect the mass apparatus of the new regime. It was the only current in the working class that acted like a mass party despite its small size—it took up issues of concern to the masses. This helped it to move to the center of the stage with extraordinary speed, while other currents were trying to assess the situation or were preoccupied with sectarian considerations. It was the forces of the Communist party that dominated the giant May 1, 1974, demonstrations and rallies in the wake of the downfall of the Caetano government on April 25 and that turned them into demonstrations of support and adulation for the military. It was this apparatus that enabled General Spínola to build his bonapartist image and thus to move swiftly toward restoring a strong bourgeois authority,

which would have crushed the Communist party itself, among others.

The political influence of the Communist party hinges on maintaining its working-class base, and, in a situation where the bourgeoisie has been unable to restabilize its political dominance, the Stalinist leaders face great dangers as well as great opportunities for expanding their bureaucratic apparatus. Thus, in both the September 28, 1974, and March 11, 1975, coup attempts, they were obliged to accept mass mobilizations that, although politically and organizationally limited, had revolutionary aspects.

Nonetheless, the fundamental aim of the Communist party goes counter to the revolution. Its objective, as clearly shown in the period since April 25, 1974, has been to serve as a transmission belt in the workers movement for the bourgeois regime, as the mass organizer for the AFM. The Portuguese CP and its mentors in the Kremlin have also tried to use their influence with the MPLA in Angola to further the neocolonialist plans of the AFM. The Portuguese CP today, which knows it has the support of a minority of the workers, prefers a

military government with a populist façade to a parliamentary regime. The Stalinists believe that a government of this type offers better possibilities for carrying out the necessary minimal reforms while maintaining firm control over the masses, politically subordinating them to the bourgeoisie, and preventing them from "going too fast too far," as the Stalinists claim they did in Chile.

In view of the prerevolutionary situation in Portugal and the extreme weakness of the Portuguese bourgeoisie, such a solution recommends itself all the more to the Stalinists. A military regime, moreover, seems to offer greater guarantees to American imperialism that mass mobilizations will be kept within limits that will not endanger the status quo on a world scale. To the Stalinists it thus seems to offer a way of achieving their objectives without provoking intervention by Washington or endangering the *détente*.

As a result of the Communist party acting as the transmission belt and labor policeman of the military regime in Portugal, its popular support has lagged far behind the gains in bureaucratic influence it has achieved as a result of the strength of its machine and its privileged relationship with the AFM. Thus, the Portuguese Stalinists have become dependent on the current bourgeois forces remaining in power to preserve their posts in the provisional cabinet that serves as a façade for the military, as well as to preserve their positions in the labor movement. This situation has led them to take more and more openly antidemocratic positions and finally to join with the AFM in a drive to curtail freedom of the press and union democracy, and to suppress the left groups that do not subordinate themselves to the military.

Wall Street in particular has taken advantage of these attacks on democratic rights to make publicity gains at the expense of the Portuguese Stalinists and Moscow and to issue warnings about what will happen if the Stalinists go "too far." However, the seemingly aggressive moves of the Portuguese Stalinists have been publicly supported by the Kremlin, and the PCP's class-collaborationist line represents no departure from the policy of *détente* toward American imperialism.

Although the Stalinists' objective is to consolidate their position as the indispensable auxiliary of the military and thus to prevent any challenge to their position from political rivals, their course is objectively making them more and more captive to the bourgeois military regime. At the same time, by playing the role of an auxiliary repressive force for a regime that cannot solve the economic and social problems of the Portuguese masses and is determined to

make the workers pay the price of the deepening economic crisis, the Communist party is preparing the way for a resurgence of reactionary anti-Communism on a massive scale, not only among the petty-bourgeois strata but in large sections of the working class itself.

Acting on behalf of a bourgeois regime and against the development of the Portuguese revolution, the CP is helping to pave the way for restoration of one of the fundamental props of bourgeois rule—the fear among the masses that socialism means an end to their democratic rights and subjugation to a tyrannical machine.

The Communist party grew in the space of a year from a small nucleus to a mass

party and has not yet had time to thoroughly consolidate the flood of new recruits. Political differentiations are possible, but as yet no major currents have appeared in opposition to the Stalinist leadership.

The ranks have been rallied behind the leadership through training in a fanatical sectarian spirit. The promise of material advancement for large layers of recruits through the party machine and its alliance with the military rulers also helps to harden this sectarian attitude and to reinforce the position of the leadership. The Portuguese CP is thus thoroughly Stalinist, particularly distinguished among its sister parties in Europe only by its slavish adherence to the directives of Moscow.

5. The Left-Centrist Satellites of the Communist Party

Left-centrist groups have had a certain influence in Portugal, especially among the youth and the intellectuals but also among the military and the workers. The two parties of this type that participated in the April 25, 1975, elections, the MES (Movimento de Esquerda Socialista—Movement of the Socialist Left) and the FSP (Frente Socialista Popular—Socialist People's Front), won more than 2 percent of the vote between them, over half the vote of all the parties to the left of the mass reformist organizations.

Of these two groups the MES is the most serious. It had broken from the Stalinist-dominated popular front some time before the April 25, 1974, overturn and has tried to develop a theoretical alternative to Stalinism. The FSP is a crudely opportunistic formation. It began as a faction in the Socialist party that was disgruntled over the number of posts granted it in the leadership. The faction leaders decided in early 1975 to set up shop as peddlers of a more extreme version of the MES line. One of their selling points was radical Catholic connections. This group calls the SP a bourgeois party. The MES implies this but has not made it explicit. The FSP subordinates itself completely to the military, while the MES position is more ambiguous. The FSP signed the Pact-Program. The MES did not, but said it had nothing in principle against doing so. Both groups identify with the Latin American guerrillaist groups and attract a following at least partially through ultraleftist phrasemongering.

There are two groups that characterize themselves as armed organizations and that engaged in terroristic actions against the Caetano regime, the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias (PRP-BR—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades) and the Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária

(LUAR—League for Revolutionary Unity and Action).

All of these left-centrist groups constitute new ultraleft editions of old anarchistlike patterns, although this is most pronounced on the part of the groups that have actually developed around guerrillaist actions and not simply around identification with foreign guerrillaist groups. There are various shades of difference. The MES tends to take as models the ultraleft critics of Lenin in the Third International who made a fetish out of the soviet form and who called for soviets under all conditions in an abstract and romanticized way instead of taking up the concrete political task of winning a majority of the workers through leading the workers to break from the bourgeois and reformist parties. This is simply a new form of anarchism masquerading in "Marxist" and "Leninist" clothing. The LUAR comes closest to repeating the formulas of the historic anarchist currents. But these are merely nuances. All of them have essentially the same orientation, and all of them echo the CP line of supporting a military dictatorship with a populist façade.

The MES was in a relatively strong position vis-à-vis the Communist party in the labor movement prior to the April 25, 1974, coup. However, its groups were built in the syndicalist tradition. What they call their "rank-and-file" orientation did not reveal its weaknesses so clearly under conditions of repression, when workers struggles were scattered and the initiatives of small groups of fighters had more impact. However, its ineffectiveness became glaring when the workers movement reached massive proportions and had to face the political problems posed by a bourgeois government using concessions and demagoguery rather than outright repression to contain workers struggles. As a result, the MES groups in the union

movement suffered severe setbacks.

In particular, because of the emphasis of this group on "rank and file" and initiatives from below, general political questions, such as the attitude to be taken toward a bourgeois government supported by the mass reformist workers parties and how to project a working-class alternative to it, were obscured. The need to propose a working-class governmental alternative to the AFM was lost in the vague concept of the masses organizing themselves. Concretely, this resulted in the acute contradiction of MES activists participating in strikes that were denounced as "reactionary provocations" by the government while the MES itself gave political support to this same government. Ultimately this line boiled down to the simplistic formula that the AFM had to "fuse with the people's movement."

What this evolution demonstrates is the incapacity of the renovated anarchist-type notions to solve the real political problems facing the working-class movement, the problems of breaking the political hold of a demagogic bourgeois government and reformist mass parties. In this, the failure of the MES is reminiscent of the failure of the anarchists during the Spanish Civil War. The fact that this orientation is covered up with implicit and explicit references to "soviets" does not mean that these groups are moving toward Leninism. To the contrary, following their own petty-bourgeois centrist course, they have been tending to approximate the ultraleft misinterpretation of the experience of the Russian revolution first advanced by such figures as Anton Pannekoek.

As a result of its anarchist-type confusion, including the opportunism this confusion breeds, the MES has failed to see the democratic issues involved in the conflict between the Socialist party and the military government and has in effect adopted only a souped-up version of the CP's antidemocratic campaign. Despite its denunciation of the CP's "reformism" and "conciliationism," it has become an auxiliary of Portuguese Stalinism, and serves as an advance patrol in the Stalinists' campaign against the SP.

The most extreme expression of this anarchist-type confusion is to be found in the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias, which was built on a program of urban guerrilla warfare against the Caetano regime. This group has created a phantom organization of "soviets," the "Committees of Workers, Soldiers, and Sailors," and has called on the military security forces, the Copcon, to abolish the political parties and the Constituent Assembly and turn power over to this nonexistent "people's power." Rarely has ultraleft braggadocio been carried to such

aberrant conclusions. This ultraleft group has been used as a tool by a group of military officers seeking to abrogate politi-

cal democracy, such as it is in Portugal, and consolidate a thoroughgoing military dictatorship.

6. The Confusionist Role of the Maoists

Up to now, a sizable section of the youth and the workers looking for an alternative to the left of the Communist party has been attracted to various Maoist groups, which have tended to coalesce into the following four groups: the União Democrática do Povo (UDP); the Frente Eleitoral de Comunistas (Marxista-Leninista), or the FEC(ml); the Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (MRPP); and the Partido Comunista Português (Marxista-Leninista), or the PCP(ml), which sought to run in the elections as the Aliança Operária Camponeza.

The UDP was the dominant force in the factory council at the Lisnave shipyards in Lisbon from the fall of 1974 until the spring of 1975.

The FEC(ml) has been the organizer of the Grupos de Acção Antifascista (GAAF) in Oporto, which have specialized in attacks on meetings and headquarters of the right-wing bourgeois party, the Centro Democrático Social (CDS).

The PCP(ml) has played a leading role in the chemical workers union and is in very close alliance with the Socialist party.

The MRPP has functioned as a tight cult operating under different initials in its various fronts of work. In every area, this group follows the theatrical tactic of trying to raise the red flag the highest, shout the loudest, and assume the most provocative stances. It has achieved no broad influence but has assembled a dedicated following that is probably larger than that of any of the other Maoist groups.

These Maoist groups differ in many respects, the sharpest dividing line being between the PCP(ml), which acts more like a right-centrist ally of the SP, and the others, which are generally ultraleftist in their poses. However, they all have one salient trait in common—sectarianism, which is exemplified in their common slogan, "Neither fascism, nor social fascism—people's democracy." The Maoists have proved incapable of understanding the

real process of the development of political consciousness among the workers and have arbitrarily counterposed their own schemas to this process.

In the case of the UDP, this was expressed in an attempt to counterpose factory committees to the trade unions. By losing sight of the process of the organization of the working class as a whole, the UDP obstructed both the development of industrial unions and of genuine factory committees. This resulted in important sections of militant workers becoming isolated, in the factory committees becoming seriously weakened, and in the Maoists losing their positions.

In the case of the FEC(ml), it resulted in a small group conducting a private war against the CDS and the repressive forces of the bourgeois state.

In the case of the MRPP, its strident ultraleft posturing aroused the hostility of large sections of the workers and the toiling masses toward the groups to the left of the Communist and Socialist parties.

In the case of the PCP(ml), it resulted in reinforcing sectarian attitudes toward the Communist party among the ranks of the other mass workers party, the Socialist party, thus helping to impede the mass workers organizations from developing united-front actions.

Thus the political program and conduct of the Maoist groups have contributed nothing to developing a revolutionary alternative in Portugal. Without exception, these groups have induced confusion among the militant soldiers and sailors, youth and workers influenced by them, and have led them toward isolation from the class. Along with the anarcho-centrists, the Maoists bear a major responsibility for the grip retained by the class-collaborationist SP and CP leaderships over the radicalized youth and the working class and thus for the continuation and deepening of the crisis of revolutionary leadership in Portugal.

7. Social Democratic Rivalry for Favored Position With the AFM

The Socialist party has become the main rival of the Communist party for mass influence among the workers and radicalized petty bourgeoisie. The Social Democrats, like the Communist party leaders, have a reformist perspective, which is expressed in subordination to the ruling military group. The SP differs from the CP

in its methods of organization and political control. It is not a disciplined or homogeneous party. It seeks to control the working class by political and electoral means rather than by building a disciplined machine. Because of its relatively loose organization and its politically heterogeneous composition, it is much less suited than the

Communist party to serve as a transmission belt for the military regime.

The SP requires the forms of parliamentary democracy as a means of developing its influence, competing with the machine of the Communist party, and in fact communicating with its supporters, if not even its members. It is as a result of this need that the SP has come into conflict with the Communist party and the military junta. This conflict has been developing since about a month after the fall of Caetano, when the military regime began to move toward cracking down on the radical ferment. Leaders of the SP have repeatedly spoken out in opposition to certain kinds of repressive moves by the military regime and have defended victims of the repression belonging to the groupings standing to the left of the reformist parties. Another reason for this defense of the left groups attacked by the regime, which up till now have generally been Maoists, is to gain a certain left cover by association with non-Social Democratic left forces not allied with Moscow. Nonetheless, the result of this limited opposition by the Socialist party leadership has been to block more severe repression of revolutionary ideas and consolidation of a more stable bourgeois regime.

The Socialist party has more and more become the rallying ground for forces in the workers movement that refuse to bow to the Stalinists. Like the Communist party, the Socialist party expanded in one year from a small nucleus to a mass party. It is a Social Democratic party, that is, a reformist workers party that claims to represent socialism but whose perspectives are tied to the ability of its own monopoly capitalism to grant concessions to the workers. It does not strive to abolish capitalism and establish a socialist system; and it is not tied to a bureaucratic caste in any country where capitalism has been abolished.

However, the Portuguese Socialist party has developed in a way different from that of the Social Democratic parties in the other imperialist countries of Europe. It is essentially a new formation and is not yet based on a big trade-union bureaucracy.

The initial nucleus drew together a number of strands of the non-Stalinist left opposition to the Salazarist dictatorship, all of which were deeply antagonized by the sectarianism and dogmatism of the CP, led by Alvaro Cunhal. Some of these elements, most notably Mário Soares, sought the support of the Socialist parties in Western Europe and the "democratic" capitalist countries. Some of them, like Soares, came out of the old bourgeois liberal milieu. Others, again like Soares, served an apprenticeship in the Communist party. A section of the SP leadership comes from the liberal Stalinists who left the Communist party after 1968, most notably the leader of the SP's trade-union work, Marcelo Curto.

Another contribution to the initial nucleus was made by youth involved in terrorist actions against the old regime. Many radicalized Catholics were also attracted to the initial nucleus. The original group included young intellectuals and activists influenced by the international youth radicalization who were critical of reformism but without a well-defined or consistent political perspective. These elements, who sought a broad arena of activity, were repelled by the Stalinism of the Communist party and its satellites and the Maoists.

This heterogeneity has increased during the growth of the Socialist party into a mass organization. The ideological and organizational looseness of the SP made it a gathering place for workers who were radicalizing but who were not ready to commit themselves to the political and organizational conformity demanded by the CP. It attracted in particular workers and intellectuals who feared the totalitarian features of Stalinism, and militant layers of workers who were repelled by the CP's policing the labor movement on behalf of the military regime.

This heterogeneous combination included, as was to be expected, elements bearing reactionary anti-Communist and anti-Leninist prejudices. Moreover, in the conflict with a Communist party seeking to use totalitarian methods in support of military rule, strong currents in such a combination were bound to seek support from the European Socialist parties and the "democratic" capitalist governments.

However, the facts do not support the claim of the CP and its ultraleft satellites that the SP has become the rallying ground for reaction.

The reality is that the SP has become the gathering place of the broadest range of forces representing the majority of the

Portuguese workers and radicalized petty bourgeoisie. The working class is profoundly divided and weakened as a result of the policies of the CP and SP leaderships, and the conditions are being created for the restoration of an openly anti-working-class government in Portugal. Thus, the sectarian campaign the CP unleashed against the SP following the latter's electoral victory can at some stage prove suicidal for the Stalinists themselves. It in fact represents a deadly danger to the working class as a whole. In this campaign the CP is motivated by determination to defend the bureaucratic positions it has gained as a result of its role as mass organizer for the military junta as well as by Moscow's calculation that a regime like the AFM fits in best with its current diplomatic needs in the détente with Washington. This campaign of slander and demagoguery against the Social Democracy as the main danger goes counter to the interests of the revolution and must be characterized as reactionary.

The development of anti-Communist and anti-Leninist sentiments among the Socialist party rank and file can best be fought by revolutionists showing in practice that they defend the democratic rights of the masses, and are battling to extend them to the barracks, the factories, unions, and any popular committees; that they are fighting to unite the working class and its political organizations around a program that genuinely responds to their needs and aspirations. Among other things, this involves exposing the demagoguery of the Stalinists and combating their campaign of slander against the Socialist party. It also includes unflinching criticism of the SP leadership's links to the AFM and popular-frontist orientation, which is a fundamental obstacle to the establishment of a workers and peasants government.

8. The Road to Workers Power and the Role of the Constituent Assembly

The revolutionary process has not reached the point where clear forms of workers power have emerged. What has appeared is sporadic and scattered mass initiatives, forms of workers control, and embryonic factory committees. These developments can point the way toward dual power.

Progress along this road hinges on a correct political course. The fundamental task is to bring the workers to break from subordination to the Armed Forces Movement and to assert their right to put a workers and peasants government in power.

This fight at the present time centers on the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly, in which the workers parties have a

substantial absolute majority and which is the only national body thus far elected by the populace. This is counterposed to the sovereignty of the unelected military hierarchy which constitutes the present government. Closely linked to this is the crucial struggle for democratic rights and democratic control in the armed forces. The various "direct democracy" schemas floated by the demagogues of the AFM are intended to divert the workers from insisting on the concrete expression of popular sovereignty through the Constituent Assembly; that is, by establishing a workers and peasants government. The AFM aims to keep the workers captives of the various popular-frontist provisional governments in which the CP and SP vie for portfolios. In

the same way, the alleged "democratization" of the AFM, and the setting up of "revolutionary councils" under AFM tutelage, are designed to divert the ranks of the army from demanding their democratic right to organize independently of the AFM and to engage in political activity.

The ultraleftist schemas of "revolutionary councils" projected in *opposition* to the Constituent Assembly play into the hands of the military demagogues. This line of the centrist anarchist-type groups of calling on a bourgeois regime to abolish the only existing nationally elected body with political representation of the working masses in the name of phantom "soviets" and in return for vague promises from demagogic military officers amounts to criminal confusionism if not outright betrayal of the working class.

The capitulation of the anarcho-centrists to bourgeois military "saviors" is also expressed in their demand that the regime use its troops to back groups in the colonies that they consider to be the most "progressive" of those vying for power. This demand is helping the imperialist regime to roll back the sentiment among the masses for bringing all the troops home from the colonies. It thus plays a reactionary role. It also promotes the AFM's policy of restoring the armed forces as an effective instrument of repression.

The factory councils that appeared in the period following the fall of the Caetano dictatorship were a response to the need for an economic organization representing all the workers in an enterprise, a special need created by the fragmentation of the economic organizations of the workers under the Salazarist regime. These bodies have generally remained within the trade-union framework. They have not functioned as soviets. They have not taken political initiatives; they have not assumed control over industrial concentrations; they have not served as arenas of general political debate or as organizing centers of united-front action by the working class; they have not drawn into struggle the most oppressed layers of the masses; they are not seen by the workers as a center of power parallel to or competing with the government. The existing neighborhood committees represent even less a nucleus of workers councils that could lead to workers power.

The most advanced revolutionary-democratic forms of organization that have yet appeared in Portugal are the assemblies and committees of soldiers and sailors that have sprung up in various units at certain times. However, these have not become standing committees on any substantial scale except in the navy, which is not the politically decisive branch of the armed forces.

Parallel with its mounting attack on

freedom of the press and on the Constituent Assembly in the name of "direct democracy" and the "revolutionary process," the AFM has become less and less regarded by the masses of workers and peasants as offering hope for a way out of their difficulties. This decline in the prestige of the military is most marked among the peasantry, since only a revolutionary agrarian policy can begin to solve the problems facing the poor peasants in Portugal. The technical level of agriculture needs to be raised, landlordism abolished in the South, and government-subsidized aid projects established for the poor peasants in the North.

In the South, the agricultural proletariat and poor peasants have been able to profit from the paralysis of the bourgeois repressive forces to seize land and greatly improve their living standard. As a result, they have become strong supporters of the new regime. However, this process can soon run up against severe limitations and even be transformed into its opposite under a bourgeois government. State aid is necessary to effectively reorganize the extensive form of agriculture practiced in this area. Unless the land occupations are integrated into an overall socialist policy for agriculture, the actions of this militant but small layer of rural workers can serve to frighten the far larger stratum of smallholders in the North who fear that a "Communist" government would take away their land and livestock as well as subject them to bureaucratic controls and high taxes.

The failure of the AFM government in the countryside provides an index of its conservative nature. On the one hand, the continuing backwardness of agriculture has meant a continual rise in food prices for the urban workers. On the other hand, the failure to offer any hope of improvement in the lot of the peasants has turned this stratum toward reactionary "saviors." The recent "independence" demonstrations in the Azores are a clear example of this.

The deceit in the AFM demagoguery about "direct democracy" is shown perhaps most clearly by the reactionary opposition of the military government to struggles for democratic rights in the high schools, an opposition reaffirmed in the June 21 policy statement of the Conselho da Revolução (Council of the Revolution). Massive struggles for democratic rights by high-school students have shown this section of the population to be one of the most militant and most highly politicized in the country, and one of the least influenced by the military and the reformists. The June 21 statement points to a new attack by the military on this mass movement, which is struggling for real direct democracy and not "participation" under the rod of military tutors.

Thus, there are six axes of the revolution-

ary process in Portugal at the present stage.

1. *The defense of the economic gains of the workers and other layers of the masses, and the fight for the economic aspirations awakened by the fall of the Salazarist regime.*

2. *The struggle for immediate withdrawal of all troops from the colonies.*

3. *The struggle for democratic rights of the ranks of the armed forces.*

4. *The struggle for democratic rights and democratic decision-making in every area of social life.*

5. *The struggle for effective workers organizations.*

The Portuguese workers are still at an early stage of organization. The embryonic factory committees and nuclei of industrial unions that have developed, although they show certain advanced features, are still not adequate on a national scale to effectively defend the elementary interests of the workers. In this situation, propaganda and agitation for industrial unions, a united democratic union structure, and the transformation of the embryonic factory committees into action committees that can mobilize and represent the workers and poor masses in the industrial centers combine closely with other revolutionary tasks and form an essential component of a concrete revolutionary answer to the concerns of the masses of workers.

The fight for workers control in the present conditions also fits in with these tasks, and the workers have already asserted control in many instances to protect their specific interests, in the face of government assaults, employer sabotage, and mounting unemployment and inflation. Workers control is necessary to obtain the economic information and organization necessary to defend jobs, to prevent the flight of capital, to fight inflation, and to administer a sliding scale of wages and hours. However, workers control cannot serve its purpose unless the workers make clear that they do not accept any responsibility for the functioning of the economy until they have real political power over it.

Because of the demagoguery of the military regime and the Communist party—demagoguery that has been reinforced by the anarchist predilections of the left-centrist groups—the danger is that a façade of "workers control" may be used by the government to induce the workers to accept austerity. If such a tactic is successful, it will result in profound demobilization and demoralization of the working class.

An example of how the government and the reformists have used the theme of "workers control" for demagogic purposes was provided by the closing of the newspaper *República*. In this test case, a brazen attack on freedom of the press and the right of expression of the largest party in the working class was justified by claiming

that a small group of Stalinist-influenced printing workers had the right to impose political censorship over a daily paper disliked by the government and the Communist party.

The greatest danger to the organization of the workers on the economic level is the attempt by the military regime and its Stalinist supporters to impose the tutelage of the bourgeois state over the unions. The so-called Trade Union Unity Law, imposing Intersindical as the only legal national federation, was precisely an attempt by the military junta and the Communist party to subordinate the unions to the bourgeois state, to convert the unions into a transmission belt for the policy of the bourgeois government in the working class.

6. The struggle for a workers and peasants government.

On the political level, the workers in their great majority look for leadership from three sources: the Socialist party, the Communist party, and Intersindical, the trade-union federation. The Socialist party has the largest following and is the most attractive at the moment to the majority of the working class. The Communist party and Intersindical are the strongest organizations of the working class and are looked to for leadership in action such as the resistance to the coup attempts in September 1974 and March 1975. At present no alternative to these mass organizations has credibility among large layers of workers. Nor can any alternative develop except as the masses learn in practice the limitations of the leadership offered by these organizations.

The only national politically representative body chosen by the workers and the masses in Portugal is the Constituent Assembly, in which the workers parties hold an absolute majority. The fight for a workers and peasants government cannot be waged without defending popular sov-

eignty and democracy, and concretely, without defending the Constituent Assembly against attempts by the Communist party, the military junta, and the SP leaders to undermine its authority and limit or destroy its sovereignty.

The struggle for a workers and peasants government focuses at present on the Constituent Assembly. The sharpest issues are defense of the Constituent Assembly, the demand that the Constituent Assembly represent the interests of the toiling masses who elected it, and repudiation by the workers parties of the Pact-Program, which codified their capitulation to the military junta. By signing this agreement with the military regime, the leaders of the mass workers parties betrayed their responsibility to represent the workers who support them.

In the Constituent Assembly, the Socialist party stands in the most contradictory position, since it claims to represent the majority of workers as well as to have been mandated by the majority of the population. Moreover, the leaders of the Socialist party came into conflict with the military government ostensibly in defense of popular sovereignty and the democratic rights of the masses. But they continue to abide by the decrees of the military rulers. The Socialist party leaders are also less able to control their following and more dependent on their electoral popularity than their CP counterparts.

Incipient organs of workers power will arise out of united mass struggles of the working class, as they have in every previous revolutionary upsurge. In Portugal, the way cannot be cleared for such struggles without beginning by contesting the self-assumed right of the military government to rule. Acceptance of this pretension is not only the strongest force in maintaining subordination of the workers to a bourgeois leadership and the biggest impediment to their organization; it is also the main obstacle to the mass working-class

organizations engaging in united-front actions.

Concretely, defending the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly against the military government involves calling upon the Communist and Socialist parties, as the representatives of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese workers and the majority of the Portuguese people, to establish a new government by exercising their majority in the Constituent Assembly and appealing to the masses and the rank and file of the armed forces to mobilize in support of it. These are also the main political forces in Intersindical, which should remain independent of any government, even a workers and peasants government, as the direct defender of the economic interests of the workers.

Making this demand on the two mass parties of the working class is an essential part of the process of advancing a socialist governmental alternative to the military regime and exposing the incapacity of these parties to provide such an alternative.

As the disillusionment of the masses with the military regime deepens, and the economic crisis grows worse, the threat of a reactionary coup will become increasingly grave. At the same time, the AFM will lose its capacity and its desire to resist a rightist onslaught. Since its power is based specifically on the bourgeois army, it views arming the masses as a deadly threat. Furthermore, as the regime becomes more and more discredited, the masses will become increasingly reluctant to mobilize under its auspices, since this would continue to subordinate them to a regime over which they have no control, and which seems less and less inclined to respond to their needs and interests.

Thus, propaganda and agitation for mobilizing and arming the masses against the rightist hangmen can only be carried out successfully in combination with the struggle for a workers and peasants government.

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9. Tasks of the Portuguese Trotskyists

Under the conditions of Salazarist repression, the Trotskyists were unable to carry out regular and thorough political discussion involving the entire organization. Likewise, they were unable to participate, except in a very limited way, in the life of the world Trotskyist movement. Among other things, this made it difficult to build a politically homogeneous organization on a national scale and to resolve tactical and incipient political differences without splits. Since April 1974, however, this tendency has been, to some extent at least, reversed.

Nonetheless, two separate Trotskyist groups still exist. The Liga Comunista

Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League) was recognized at the February 1974 world congress as a sympathizing group of the Fourth International. The existence of the other organization, the Grupo Marxista Revolucionário (Revolutionary Marxist Group), now the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (Revolutionary Workers party), became known to the Fourth International only in the summer of 1974. These two groupings, of a similar size, have concentrated their activity in different arenas and are now complementary in certain respects. Their unification on a principled basis would represent a

qualitative advance for Portuguese Trotskyism.

Both Trotskyist groups consist primarily of young people recruited in the student milieu. The PRT has many high-school activists. The LCI has a larger proportion of older activists with experience in the universities and in political campaigns. Both groups have begun work in the factories. In this the LCI has more experience. But neither organization yet has a substantial foothold in the workers movement. Under these conditions, the Portuguese Trotskyists face the following tasks.

1. To engage in common discussion to develop a rounded program for the Portuguese revolution and for building a mass Trotskyist party in Portugal.

2. To integrate themselves into the political life of the Fourth International and participate in its discussions.

3. To regularize and expand their propaganda work, in particular by publishing an attractive regular paper and assuring the translation and publication of Trotsky's works.

4. To demonstrate the practical applicability of Trotskyist ideas and principles in the broad struggles against exploitation and oppression.

The common program of the Portuguese Trotskyists should include the following points:

1. Mobilizing a broad movement to demand immediate, unconditional withdrawal of all Portuguese troops from the colonies.

2. Defense of the right of all members of the armed forces to discuss all political ideas and to organize politically on an equal basis in the barracks and on military installations. Full democracy within the armed forces, including the right to elect officers and discuss all orders that have a political significance. Defense of the right of military personnel to participate fully in the political life of the country without any restrictions. Mobilizing a broad defense for any military personnel victimized for political reasons.

3. Presenting a plan for a radical agrarian reform suited to Portuguese conditions. Since the great majority of the one-third of the Portuguese population engaged in agriculture are smallholders, this requires a program of state support for individual peasants, as well as the promotion of state-assisted cooperatives and state farms in the area of extensive farming. For the area where the rural proletariat predominates, it requires also a program for the farm workers unions. The great unevenness in the conditions of smallholding peasants should also be taken into account.

4. Offering timely immediate economic demands and democratic and transitional slogans to meet the needs of oppressed layers of the population, such as women

and youth in particular.

5. Rallying the broadest possible front for the defense and extension of democratic rights. The political rights of most of the workers organizations in Portugal have come under attack at various times since April 25, 1974, including the rights of each of the mass reformist parties. Yet the principle of solidarity of the entire workers movement against such attacks is far from established. Furthermore, even bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political forces and parties have contradictions on this question that can be exploited to serve the fundamental interests of the workers movement. For example, some elements in the bourgeois PPD protested against the police attack on pro-MPLA demonstrators in August 1974 more strongly than did the CP. While every major political party in Portugal claims to support democracy, only the revolutionists are capable of consistently defending and extending democratic rights.

6. Giving impetus to workers control to defend the interests of the workers against layoffs, the speedup, and attempts by the capitalists to use their economic power to sabotage the economy and block the advance of the proletariat toward taking power. Workers control is an extension of democratic rights to the factory and is necessary in the present stage to defend the democratic rights of the workers in the society as a whole against capitalist reaction. However, it can only play this role if it serves the interests of the working class as a whole and is subordinated to a general perspective of developing workers democracy. Both the attempts by the government and the Communist party to make the workers work harder and the attempts of relatively small ultraleft groups to override the opinions of the majority of workers with minority initiatives and demagogic campaigns do not advance but retard the development of genuine workers control.

7. Winning the political independence of the working class from the AFM and any other bonapartist leaderships that may arise. This involves calling on the mass workers organizations to genuinely represent the interests of the workers and break from all forms of collaboration with the bourgeoisie, including the bourgeois military government in all its aspects, as a way of showing the workers in practice the limitations of their reformist leaderships. This includes calling on the mass workers parties to break the Pact-Program and establish a workers and peasants government.

8. Advancing the unity in action of the working class by pushing the demand for a united front of all organizations that claim to represent the workers in defense of the gains that have been made and against any offensive by bourgeois forces that threatens the proletariat as a whole. This includes the appropriate measures to arm the proletariat to defend its gains.

9. Advancing the independent organization of the working class so that the proletariat can meet the tasks of the class struggle in this period of crisis and win in a direct confrontation with the bourgeoisie. This involves pushing for broader and broader forms of workers organizations, industrial unions, a united and democratic trade-union structure, action committees and democratic factory committees that can unify and mobilize the broad masses of the workers in the industrial zones and draw in other exploited and oppressed layers, and finally regional and national congresses of workers organizations that can adopt general political policies and lead the working masses in taking decisive initiatives. The line of development is toward establishment of a workers and peasants government and the organization of soviets as the basis of a workers state. □

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The 'Observer' Article Used as Pretext for Police Raid

[For the information of our readers, we are publishing below the text of an article by Colin Smith and Robert Chesshyre that appeared in the September 28 issue of the London weekly *Observer*. Three hours before the *Observer* appeared on the streets, according to *Workers Press*, the newspaper of the Revolutionary Workers party, the police obtained a search warrant under which they conducted a raid on the education school described by the *Observer*.

[The raid was allegedly motivated by some of the statements included in the article, such as "Members have been known to hint at arms caches hidden in the grounds, and access to secret Cabinet minutes."

[In reply, Alex Mitchell, the editor of *Workers Press*, branded the police raid as "the biggest state provocation against a working class political organisation in Britain since the war." He also characterized the *Observer* article as a "pack of lies."

[As yet, the *Workers Press* has not made a detailed refutation of the allegations included in the article by Colin Smith and Robert Chesshyre.

[We await with particular interest what the Editorial Board of *Workers Press* may have to say about the interrogation of Irene Gorst. The interrogation is strikingly similar to the one Nancy Fields was subjected to in August 1974 under the personal direction of Gerry Healy, the general secretary of the WRP.

[For an account of the Nancy Fields case, see "The Workers League and the International Committee" by Tim Wohlforth, which appeared as a series in *Intercontinental Press*, February 24, 1975, p. 279; March 3, p. 314; March 10, p. 346; March 17, p. 379. See also, "The Healyite Reply to Tim Wohlforth's Exposures," *Intercontinental Press*, March 24, 1975, p. 411. For an assessment of Healy's methods as shown in the cases of Nancy Fields and others, see "The Secret of Healy's 'Dialectics'" by Joseph Hansen, *Intercontinental Press*, March 31, 1975, p. 437.]

* * *

WHITE MEADOWS VILLA is a red brick Edwardian mansion in two acres of land near the ancient village of Parwich, in the Dovedale dairy country of Derbyshire. It has been many things in its time: the home of a gentleman farmer; a stud farm mentioned in the racing thrillers of Mr Nat Gold (a gentleman accorded almost as much status round about as that other regional author, D.H. Lawrence); a guest house and a youth hostel. Once it even had a ballroom, but a previous owner demolished it to cut down the rates bill.

Then, in the spring of this year, the house was sold for £23,000 [£1=US\$2.04] to Mr Corin Redgrave, who was acting as a buyer for the Workers Revolutionary Party, a Trotskyist body with a large group of actors in its ranks. Its best-known member is Corin's eldest sister, Miss Vanessa Redgrave. Extensive alterations have taken place, the ballroom wing has been resurrected (but not for dancing), and the WRP have renamed White Meadows, 'The Red House.'

The Red House is a school of revolutionary indoctrination. Chosen members of the WRP pay £30 a head for an intensive two-week course in Marxist theory in an atmosphere of spartan if slightly eccentric discipline.

The warden is Mr Roy Battersby, a television producer who has directed a number of controversial and sometimes highly praised documentaries for the BBC. In November last year he produced a BBC play called *Leeds United*, about a strike by

clothing workers in Leeds, which provoked abuse from both Mrs Mary Whitehouse and the British Communist Party. (A Communist shop steward was portrayed as betraying the workers.)

It is Mr Battersby who enforces the rules, most of them designed to ensure maximum security at all times. Even on wet and windy nights, the duty guards patrol the grounds.

No books or papers must be left lying around at any time. Blankets and sleeping bags must be folded on bunks, Army fashion. Punctuality is all: any comrade who is more than a minute late for a meal goes hungry.

A child crying outside the lecture hall must be left to cry: the lecture comes before parenthood and the bourgeois concerns of family life.

The school opened five weeks ago. Fraternisation with the Parwich villagers is forbidden. The Sycamore Arms is now off limits, much to the confusion of the landlord, who cannot understand in what way he has offended.

The obsession with security and discipline at the Red House is total and it is difficult to gauge exactly where fact ends and fantasy begins. Members have been known to hint at arms caches hidden in the grounds, and access to secret Cabinet minutes.

In 1973, the 15-year-old Socialist Labour League changed its name to the Workers Revolutionary Party. But it was still run by the same person, a tubby, middle-aged Irishman called Gerry Healy, who claims that his parents were shot down by the Black and Tans. Their intention, according to the 'aims' printed on the back of their party cards, is to 'mobilise the working class for the overthrow of capitalism, the establishment of working class power and the building of a socialist society.'

To achieve this, they produce their own newspaper, *The Workers Press*, which publishes two editions a day, and central committee members like Vanessa and Corin Redgrave, and Roy Battersby, tour the countryside speaking at WRP meetings.

To date, their performance in general elections has not been spectacular. Vanessa Redgrave lost heavily to Reg Prentice in Newham North East; Roy Battersby polled 150 votes as the WRP's Merthyr Tydfil candidate. But they have been more successful in the trade unions, particularly the entertainment unions, where they make up in energy and determination for what they lack in number.

Until recently, they remained an exclusive, almost elitist organisation which didn't encourage newcomers to join their ranks. Now they have decided to enlarge their cadres. The fortnightly courses at the Red House are aimed to produce a trained cadre of about 1,500 people a year.

Irene Gorst, 28, is a fairly successful light comedy actress with a West End run behind her, and a regular part in the Thames television series, *The Whackers*. Mr Barry Brown, her agent, describes her as a particularly level-headed young woman, 'not the hysterical type at all.'

In March this year she became member 5005 of the Kilburn branch of the Workers Revolutionary Party and afterwards became Corin Redgrave's lover. Early this month she went to the Red House to begin the two-week course arranged for the party's group of actors. Thirty-six hours later she was back in London in a greatly distressed state.

Miss Gorst claims that while at the school she was interrogated by four members of the party's central committee, among them Vanessa and Corin Redgrave and Roy Battersby, for almost seven hours, excluding a two-hour break in the

questioning when she was kept under guard. They accused her of being a Special Branch spy who had infiltrated the party's highest echelons.

At one point in her interrogation she tried to leave, but says she was prevented from doing so by Miss Redgrave, who pushed her back into her seat.

Miss Gorst's story provides an insight into the psychology of this tiny but dedicated party of Trotskyists.

Irene Palin Gorst was born and brought up in Liverpool, the middle daughter of Mr Charles Gorst who is works manager of a company called Bootle Cork Growers Ltd. The importing nature of her father's job was to play a brief but damning role in her interrogation as was the fact that her paternal grandfather came from Poland. Her eldest brother is an engineer working in Charlotte, North Carolina. This too became of great significance to her inquisitors. Her elder sister, a school teacher, lives near Nottingham not far away from the Red House, which, she says, was something else the members of the central committee found positively sinister. Luckily the employment of her youngest brother was not discovered. He works for the government as a Customs and Excise officer in Liverpool.

At the beginning of this year Miss Gorst was appearing in 'Birds of Paradise' at the Garrick theatre. It is WRP policy to picket the stage doors of West End theatres. They turn up an hour or so before the 'half-hour bell' that precedes the final curtain call to sell the *Workers Press* and to talk generally to the cast about WRP policy within Equity. One of these canvassing parties turned up at the Garrick. Miss Gorst, who has been interested in the radical Left since her late teens, became interested in what they had to say. A meeting was arranged with Corin Redgrave in Lyons in the Strand. Almost before she realised it she was working practically full time for the party. Inevitably her career began to suffer.

Sometimes from 7 a.m. until late at night she would be selling papers at the BBC White City television studio, talking to actors at the Labour Exchange in Lisson Grove, Notting Hill, and visiting lunch time theatres and night clubs. 'Somehow the adrenalin just flowed and you kept going. You honestly came to believe that revolution was just around the corner and all that was needed was one more push. In a way I never felt so free in my life. Actresses usually spend hours making up and choosing what clothes they're going to wear, but there wasn't time for that.'

Irene Gorst believes that about 60 of Equity's 23,000 members are in the WRP of whom perhaps 30 are really active. A rota of duties among the members in entertainment is drawn up at the beginning of each week and everyone is expected to adhere to it strictly.

The party goes in for a lot of public criticism. Members are liable to stand up at a meeting and demand to know why Comrade X failed to sell his or her quota of the *Workers Press*. Irene recalls being reprimanded for attending a friend's birthday party in a West End restaurant instead of going to a party meeting. 'I was told that I still had a bourgeois ideology, that I had to lose all my capitalist friends.'

Miss Gorst's friends began to fight back. They urged her to quit the party. Warned of a blacklist of actors in the WRP that was being circulated around theatre managements. (The existence of this list has never been proved.) These friends were horrified when they learned she intended to go to a WRP summer school which they regarded

as a sort of finishing school in revolution.

On the afternoon of Sunday 31 August Miss Gorst was supposed to go to the party's headquarters over a butcher's shop in Clapham, known as 'the centre,' to catch a minibus to the Red House. But from the previous Friday onwards a series of events built up which were to delay her departure for two days and arouse the suspicions of Mr Battersby and his comrades on the central committee.

At 10.10 p.m. on the Friday, a bomb exploded opposite her flat in Church Street, Kensington. It killed the Scotland Yard bomb disposal officer, Captain Roger Goad, and police sealed off the area for almost three hours in case there were any other explosives in the area.

Because of the police cordon she was unable to get into her flat after returning from a WRP lecture at Vanessa Redgrave's house in Hammer-smith. For the next three hours she sat on the steps of an ambulance drinking tea with the crew while she waited for the police to clear the area. When she got home it was around 2 a.m. and she had missed several telephone calls from Corin Redgrave.

The following morning, Saturday, her old boyfriend telephoned, anxious for her safety after the bomb and also anxious to take her out to lunch. He picked her up in his Rolls-Royce and they went down the M4 to a restaurant in Maidenhead. When they had finished eating instead of driving back to London he set off in the other direction. He didn't stop until they were in North Wales.

The producer was determined to make her miss the minibus to the school. He telephoned Vanessa Redgrave's house and left a message to say that Miss Gorst would no longer be coming. He didn't drive her back to London until Sunday afternoon. He threatened to tell the Special Branch about the school. He threatened to do 'awful things' to Corin Redgrave.

During a break in the return journey Irene Gorst managed to make a rather tearful telephone call to the Redgraves' house to explain what had happened. She was told to get to the centre as soon as possible where a bus would be delayed for her.

The producer had made sure she missed all the transport to the school and by the time she got home there was only one chance left of getting to the school that day. Roger Smith, the fourth member of her committee of interrogators, had permission to use his own car. If she could get over to the centre she could have a lift up with him. But first she had to take her car to a friend's in St John's Wood because she could not park it in the Kensington street for the fortnight she was going to be away. She asked Smith if he could pick her up outside St John's Wood tube station and was told that this was impossible. Did she think the party existed for her convenience?

She still wanted to go badly. On Monday she went down to the centre in Clapham to see if there was any more transport. She said she would be willing to drive up to some point near the school where she could be picked up from. This was a mistake. She wasn't supposed to have the vaguest notion where the school was but Corin had given her a good idea.

In the end she left on Tuesday in an overnight coach carrying WRP members to Blackpool to demonstrate outside the Wintergardens where the TUC [Trades Union Congress] conference was being held. Some of the people from the school, including Vanessa, were to join them there and she could go back to The Red House with them.

She arrived at the school at about 7.30 p.m. on the Wednesday, clutching her two textbooks,

Lenin's Collected Work and *Anti-Duhring* by Engels. They were supposed to read texts that night in preparation for the following day's lectures. She was shown to the girls' dormitory.

Two recently joined comrades complained to her that they were already exhausted by the school's 18-hour day and couldn't understand their textbooks. She was shown around the library and the lecture room. The fittings were simple, white walls, wooden flooring, no pictures anywhere. In the office there was a pegboard covered with various coloured bulbs that sometimes flashed a warning. These were supposed to be connected to the various alarm systems about The Red House to warn against intruders. The office had not yet been decorated and it still had not been fitted with a door.

Cocoa is served at 11 p.m. after the evening's study session. Irene Gorst was asked to wait behind after the others had gone to bed because Corin Redgrave wished to speak to her and was in a meeting. She stayed in the dining room chatting to the two duty guards until 12.30 a.m. when Corin called her into the office. She was asked why she had missed the transport and she told him all that had happened. 'He said he knew the pressures I had been under, but I had shown a lack of discipline in putting friends before the party,' recalled Miss Gorst. 'He said he would think overnight what should be done and talk about it in the morning with other committee members.'

By party standards she considered it a mild reprimand and went to bed.

The interrogation started on Thursday morning at 9.30 after Irene had finished cleaning duties with Roger Smith, a script writer who was once married to Lord Seeborn's daughter, Caroline. In April 1973 Roy Battersby directed a television play by Roger Smith called 'The Operation' which was about property development and asset stripping. Throughout their early morning chores the playwright made no mention of what lay in store for his partner.

Irene Gorst was just about to take her place at a lecture when she was called into the office by Vanessa Redgrave. She found Roy Battersby in the office, with Corin and Roger Smith.

'Roy Battersby started off the questioning by asking me to repeat what I had said to Corin the night before,' recalled Miss Gorst. 'After I had told him this he started to ask questions about the producer. Who did he know in Special Branch? What threats had he made against the party? What threats had he made against Corin?'

'Then they started on me. How long had I been working for Special Branch? Where had I planted the bombs and drugs? Why did I miss the coach? Who had told me where the school was? Battersby did most of the talking. Vanessa seemed mostly concerned with who had told me where the school was, which was strange because she must have had a good idea.

'At first I was very flippant. I would say things like, "Let me see now, *where* did I put my little bomb? Was it in the loo? Was it under my bed?'

'They got very upset about this and called me "arrogant"—arrogant is one of the Party's favourite words—and asked me if I didn't have any respect for the party at all?'

'After about an hour I decided to leave. But when I tried to get off my chair I was pushed back down again by Vanessa who said, "Sit down." Battersby said: "Don't you dare. You're not leaving until we've found out what we want to know."

'He was particularly angry about my staying around with the ambulance crew after the Church Street bomb. He said I should have gone straight

back to Vanessa's and asked me if I didn't realise that the police planted these bombs and would have been delighted to find a WRP member on the spot.'

At about 11.30 Battersby took a telephone call and Irene Gorst again made to leave the room, saying she wanted some cigarettes. She was told she wasn't allowed to smoke. The questioning continued until 1.30 p.m. when Miss Gorst says they took her into the dining room under guard. Vanessa Redgrave gave her a packet of cigarettes and offered her food; she didn't want to eat. A little while later she was taken upstairs to the women's dormitory where she found an actor called Mike Harrigan going through her suitcase. 'I said, "Found anything interesting?"' and he said he hadn't, but he was very interested in my radio which he had taken the back off.'

From the dormitory window she could see Vanessa and Corin Redgrave pacing around the garden, obviously in deep conversation. When she was taken downstairs again she was ushered into another room, this one had a door in it and was furnished with a bed, and faced Corin Redgrave, Roy Battersby and Roger Smith. After a few minutes Redgrave went out and she was left with Battersby and Smith. 'Battersby said, "The matter has now become very serious. You have infiltrated the central committee."

'He did most of the talking. Smith went in and out fetching cups of tea. They made me empty my handbag and took my make-up to pieces. Battersby was particularly interested in a thick eyebrow pencil I have. He kept peering down it as if he expected to discover a hidden microphone.

'Then they went through my address books and diary. They seemed to find something wrong, something suspicious with almost every name in the book. First there was my brother's address: didn't I know the headquarters of the CIA was at Charlotte? Then my father's work. Where did they get the cork from? I told them that they haven't actually used cork for some time. But where *did* they get the cork from? I said I thought it was Portugal and Battersby looked grim and said, "ahaa" in a very knowing way. Why was my sister living so near the school?'

'I was quite hysterical by this time. I said, "You're all mad, let me out of this place."

'Once I asked them, "Even if you discover I am what you think I am what are you going to do? Put me up against a wall and shoot me?''

The interrogation ended at about 5.30. 'Battersby told me that he didn't really think I was a spy, but he felt I was being used by other people. He said they had done what they had done because they had to.'

Miss Gorst returned to London the following day against the wishes of the group who wanted her to 'stay and learn to be a good comrade.' It was Gerry Healy, the party leader, who insisted that she be allowed to leave if she wanted to. He arrived at the school on the Thursday night to deliver a lecture (most of it was on the need for 'discipline'). He spent a few minutes trying to persuade her to remain at The Red House, but quickly gave up when he saw she was adamant. 'Corin called me bourgeois, middle class and arrogant and said the party had taught me nothing.'

When he was told of Miss Gorst's allegations in a telephone call to his London home yesterday Mr Corin Redgrave said: 'What you are telling me is a complete lie. There is no explanation for them it is just a lie and if you use them I will take action.'

He added that these would also be the views of his sister, Vanessa, who was not available for comment. He was unable to put us in touch with

Mr Roy Battersby or Mr Roger Smith. The telephone number for The Red House is unlisted.

Meanwhile, at Parwich village the landlord of the Sycamore Arms is still hopefully awaiting the

reappearance of Mr Battersby and his friends.

• In a lawyer's statement last night Miss Vanessa Redgrave denied the substance of the story and said she would take legal action. □

Police Raid WRP School

[The following article by Alex Mitchell, editor of *Workers Press*, gives an account of the police raid September 27-28 on the education school of the Workers Revolutionary party. It was published in the September 29 issue of *Workers Press*. The subheadings, as well as the title, appeared in the original.]

* * *

A raiding party of 100 police launched a political provocation against the Workers Revolutionary Party at its education school in Derbyshire at the weekend.

In a combined operation involving Special Branch, the Special Patrol Group and the Regional Crime Squad, the police swooped without warning and occupied the school for six hours.

It is the biggest state provocation against a working class political organisation in Britain since the war. It is designed to fuel the Red-baiting hysteria which has been deliberately whipped up for the Labour Party conference opening today in Blackpool.

We call on Labour Party members and trade unionists throughout the country to condemn this blatant state attack on the basic democratic rights of the working class.

Prepared in Advance

The military-style raid was prepared well in advance. Police arrived with two generators to floodlight the grounds, electronic metal detectors, photographic equipment, and police dogs trained to sniff out explosives.

Women police accompanied the raiding party to strip and systematically search women students at the school which was opened four weeks ago.

With foreknowledge of the lay-out of the building the police went immediately to an office being used by the Workers Revolutionary Party general secretary Gerry Healy. He and other members of the leadership were detained under close arrest with police guards stationed at the door.

Everyone on the premises was interrogated. They were divided into small groups and placed in separate parts of the building. Some of the students were manhandled along the corridors by bullying police.

During one interrogation session, a senior officer threatened: 'If we don't get the information we will get it by force and arrest if necessary.'

At least two students were told that they were under arrest when they refused to answer questions.

Among the women who were stripped and searched was a visiting grandmother.

A Phoney Pretext

The phoney pretext for this police state operation was supplied by 'The Observer' newspaper which was responsible for a vicious witchhunt of the 'Militant' group this month.

Three hours before the raid, the Astor-owned newspaper published a lying attack on the WRP

which stated: 'Members have been known to hint at arms caches hidden in the grounds, and access to secret Cabinet minutes.'

These are preposterous lies. Even before 'The Observer' hit the streets, police obtained a search warrant under Section 46 of the Firearms Act giving them absolute power to break into the premises, detain everyone present, interrogate them and carry out an intensive room-by-room search.

Although leading party members were told they could accompany the police during the search of the building, they were prevented from doing so for the first one and a half hours.

During a search of the third floor stairway, near the women's accommodation, a police officer claimed to have found nine live .22 cartridges.

The Workers Revolutionary Party states categorically that these cartridges were placed there by a person or persons unknown to the party.

Prior to their discovery, dozens of police officers, plainclothed and uniformed, swarmed over the building grounds unaccompanied by members of the WRP.

Our principled political views on bombs, firearms and the like are well known. We are entirely opposed to individual terror and we have said so in our daily newspaper *Workers Press* on countless occasions.

The police know this. But when they burst into the education school at 10 minutes past 10 on Saturday night, they were acting on orders that came from the top.

We accuse Home Secretary Jenkins of personal responsibility for authorising the police-raid on the WRP's school. For an operation of this magnitude and political significance, Jenkins would have to give the go-ahead. And he would not have acted without first consulting Prime Minister Wilson.

We accuse the Rt Hon David Astor, millionaire editor of 'The Observer', of publishing a lying attack on the WRP to provide the pretext for the police swoop.

There is a conspiracy between the Home Office, Fleet Street and the police to launch a provocation against the WRP.

Element of Timing

These are the same ruling class forces which emerged recently to venomously blackguard the members of the Newham North-East Constituency Labour Party when they successfully ousted Prentice as Labour candidate at the next General Election.

The pack of lies in 'The Observer' article refers to alleged incidents which took place at the Derbyshire school three and a half weeks ago.

But publication has been timed to coincide with the opening of the Labour Party conference. It is aimed at adding spice to the 'Red scare' which has been launched by right-wing Cabinet ministers like Prentice, Jenkins and Crosland.

What a treacherous trio—the first said that the Pentonville Five dockers should be kept in jail, the second kept the Shrewsbury Two in prison to serve their full sentences, and the third has just

plunged the 11 Clay Cross councillors into bankruptcy.

They belong to a government which condones the execution of Spanish workers and students at the hands of Franco's fascist firing squads.

Political Intimidation

The police raid on the WRP is a sign of the times. Every worker must seriously consider its political implications.

The WRP is a legal organisation which campaigns openly in the labour and trade union movement. Our political viewpoint is placed before the working class each day in *Workers Press*, our daily newspaper.

The basic democratic rights of our party are the property of the entire working-class movement.

Henceforth, what happened to the WRP in the dead of night in the Derbyshire countryside could happen to any other working-class tendency or trade union.

When the Labour government, the Press barons and the police single out the WRP as a target for state provocation and political intimidation it is aimed at the working class as a whole.

Anyone who now opposes the reactionary, anti-working-class policies of the Labour government can expect the same kind of political harassment and repression.

This Labour government, with the complete backing of the Tories, the bankers and the CBI [Confederation of British Industry], has embarked on a course of systematically smashing the living standards and basic democratic rights of the working class.

It has already legally abolished the most basic right of the trade unions—the right of free collective bargaining.

For one and a quarter million unemployed workers and youth, it has abolished the basic right to work.

Through public and local authority spending cuts, the government is destroying the right to decent education, housing and health services.

Force Labour to Resign

The Workers Revolutionary Party is the only working-class organisation which has set its face firmly against the betrayals of the Labour government. We state unequivocally that it is a capitalist government that has betrayed its supporters, that it is opening the door to police dictatorship and must be forced to resign.

A fresh General Election must be called in which the Labour Party is mandated to a full socialist programme. These are the demands for which our party marched at Blackpool yesterday, on the eve of the Labour Party conference.

We know that the policies for which our party is fighting are receiving a response in the working class. That is what drives the right-wing Labour government into its anti-communist frenzy.

Saturday night's police raid only strengthens our party's determination to fight to recruit and train ever-broader layers of trade unionists and professional workers.

An alternative revolutionary leadership must be

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built in the working class as part of the preparations to smash capitalism and its state machine and establish working-class power.

We call on all trade unionists, Labour Party members and working-class organisations to take urgent note of the threat to their basic democratic rights posed by the continuation of this government of conspiracy.

There is no time to be lost. Pass resolutions denouncing this attack on the basic democratic rights of the working class. Deluge Jenkins with your protest resolutions and telegrams.

WRP Solicitors Protest Conduct of Police

[In countering the midnight police raid on their education school in Derbyshire September 27-28, the leadership of the Workers Revolutionary party has, among other things, begun legal action. As reported by the Editorial Board of *Workers Press*, "Solicitors acting for the Workers Revolutionary Party, B.M. Birnberg and Company, wrote yesterday to the Derbyshire Chief Constable, protesting about police conduct of the raid."

[The following is the text of the solicitors' letter, which we are republishing from the October 4 issue of *Workers Press*.]

* * *

1. WHILE one of the Senior Officers involved, Chief Superintendent Horibin, informed Mr Battersby (the caretaker of the school) that he was in the possession of a search warrant issued under the provisions of Section 46 of the Firearms Act 1968 and indeed read it out, he refused to show our Client the warrant although asked to do so and alleged that it was none of our Client's business. It is of course very much our Client's business; they were entitled to see the warrant and we must ask you to let us have a copy of same without delay.

2. THROUGHOUT the six hours that your officers were in occupation of the Centre they confined Mr Healy and certain other personnel of the school to a small office at the rear of the building on the ground floor allowing them out only to use the toilet. Mr Healy protested to the Chief Superintendent that he and the others were virtually under house arrest but nevertheless confinement continued throughout the duration of the police raid.

3. ALTHOUGH your officers claimed to have a search warrant, for the first hour and a half of the raid they did not permit any of our Client's personnel to accompany them in their search. It was then agreed that Mr Battersby and Mr Slaughter could accompany the police throughout the rest of their search and a little later two further of our Client's personnel were permitted to accompany the officers. Nevertheless many of your officers were not accompanied during the course of the search.

4. YOUR officers interrogated all of approximately 50 staff and students in residence in different ways dividing people into small groups. Some officers without any justification used strong arm tactics manhandling students and threatening arrest if answers to questions were declined. For the first two hours or so of the raid the general conduct of your officers was overbearing; one of our Client's members, for instance, on asking under what law your officers were acting was told (by PC 1707) 'We make the law here'.

5. IN PARTICULAR the treatment of the women students was harsh. They were taken to a room and stripped. Some protested and they were

Call for a trade union inquiry into the sinister activities of the police and their agents provocateurs. Demand the disbandment of the police and standing army and the abolition of all anti-working-class legislation.

Join us in the campaign to force the Wilson government to resign and the fight for socialist policies to unite the whole trade union movement in a new General Election to defeat the Tories and their coalitionist friends in the Labour government. □

threatened with force unless they did as instructed. They were intimidated by the women police officers who told them they were under arrest.

6. IT APPEARED to our Clients that the police operation had been carefully planned in advance. Police Officers had in their possession printed questionnaires used for the interrogation of everyone at the Centre. The question sheet was drawn up in such a way that it appeared that it had been printed specifically for the raid. We shall be glad to know whether this is indeed the position.

7. THE MOST serious aspect of the matter is an incident which occurred at about 1:45 a.m. At that time Mr Battersby was accompanying officers searching the attic. An officer diverted Mr Battersby's attention for a few moments by asking him to change a light bulb on the landing, and as he was removing the bulb an officer further down the staircase was seen to move his hand from a cupboard stating 'Look what we've found here'. Mr Battersby saw in the officer's hands a number of what appeared to be bullets. When the officer said: 'Are you suggesting that we

planted them?' Mr Battersby replied 'No, what I am saying is that they don't belong to us and I don't know how they got there'. On leaving at the end of the raid Chief Superintendent Horibin said to Mr Healy 'It's all clean'.


8. THE WORKERS Revolutionary Party is a legal Political Party which carries out work publicly in the Labour and Trade Union Movement in addition to contesting Parliamentary elections. It is completely opposed in principle to terrorism and to the possession or use of firearms or explosives. Any member of the Party found with firearms or explosives would be expelled. The Education Centre is run on strict lines; no drugs or alcoholic drink are permitted. If indeed ammunition for weapons was found by one of our officers they were not deposited by any member of our Client's Party with its authority or approval.

9. A NUMBER of foreign students were in attendance at the Centre. These persons were ordered to produce their passports. Some who declined were threatened that they would be taken to the Police Station and placed under arrest if they did not do so. The matter was later resolved by one of our Client's members when it was agreed that passports would be handed over for inspection.

We must ask you to let us know who instigated the police operation and on what information and basis was the search warrant applied for and granted. Who was the officer in overall charge of the operation and under whose orders was he acting? We require a list of all property belonging to our clients which was removed from the premises during the raid.

Finally we must ask you to let us know what action (if any) is to be taken against our Clients or any of their members. Should any criminal proceedings be instigated arising out of the police raid they will be strongly contested and we have instructions to represent any of our Client's personnel who are or may be arrested. □

Special Offer



"Capitalism fouls things up": The opinion of a member of an endangered species.

To help celebrate the tenth anniversary of *Intercontinental Press*, reproductions of sketches by Copain, artist for *Intercontinental Press*, were published by the New York Local of the Socialist Workers party and bound in an 8.5" x 11" book. The aim was to use the money gained from sales to help us begin publishing articles in Spanish.

The drawings, of various sizes, include portraits of Hugo Blanco, Malcolm X, James P. Cannon, Che Guevara, Cesar Chavez, Leon Trotsky, and many more, some of which are suitable for framing.

A limited number of copies of this collection of drawings are now available for only \$5.

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