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
the Americas

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October 6, 1975

75¢



Secret White House Decision

CIA Ordered to Go Into Action Against Portuguese Revolution

Why Ford Attracts Potential Assassins

On September 5 Lynette Alice Fromme, a twenty-seven-year-old follower of murder cultist Charles Manson, shouted: "The country is in a mess! This man is not your President!" Standing no more than two feet away from Gerald Ford she then allegedly aimed a loaded .45-caliber pistol at him. What happened next is not yet clear. The gun did not fire.

On September 22 Sara Jane Moore, a paid informer for the San Francisco police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms bureau of the Treasury Department, allegedly fired a shot at Ford and missed. She said: "It was a kind of ultimate protest against the system."

The fact that would-be assassins got close to Ford cannot be attributed to insufficient police protection. Consider the following description, given in the September 26 New York *Daily News*, of normal security procedures each time Ford appears in public:

"The usual routine involves a trip by a Secret Service advance team to the location of a future Presidential visit a week or so ahead of time to recruit help from among local law-enforcement agencies and to check out such things as motorcade routes, speech sites and the like.

"The agents clock as precisely as possible the estimated travel time along a motorcade route, noting potential danger points that will require special security, such as traffic bottlenecks that could stall the Presidential limousine or vantage points for possible snipers.

"Just before the arrival of the President, agents lift manhole covers along the route and check all bridges for bombs."

Even greater precautions are taken at places where Ford will stop. "Auditoriums and meeting halls are sealed off before his arrival and are searched for bombs. Backgrounds of employees of establishments to be

COVER PHOTO: Barry Goldwater demonstrating use of CIA's poison-dart gun.

visited by the President are checked, and those who, for one reason or another, are deemed to be a possible threat are asked to keep away while the President is around."

Ford and at least two Secret Service agents ride in a "big bullet-proof Presidential limousine, which is flown in the night before the President's arrival. In the motorcade, there are open cars full of agents in

front of and behind the Presidential limousine."

When Ford steps out of the car "he is surrounded by about a dozen agents, who gently but firmly move him through crowds. If he decides to do some handshaking, there are agents on three sides of him, carefully watching all persons within reach, especially their hands."

Thus the security measures would appear to be as thorough as the strongest government in the world can make them. The fact is that there are simply too many potential assassins.

The same media that reported the two attempts on Ford's life gave other news that helps explain some of the factors motivating potential killers. A big item is the endless revelations about CIA murder plots, poison-dart guns, and secret toxins so lethal that two teaspoonfuls are capable of killing hundreds of thousands of persons.

The message? It is that murder is a perfectly ordinary aspect of American capitalist rule. The graves of Patrice Lumumba and Malcolm X stand as eloquent

Why Does Washington Fear Hugo Blanco?

Henry Kissinger has refused to grant Peruvian revolutionist Hugo Blanco a visa to come to the United States, where Blanco had scheduled a speaking tour on political repression in Latin America and had planned to consult with his publisher on future writing projects.

The State Department dragged out the witch-hunting McCarran-Walter Act on September 24 to justify Blanco's exclusion, claiming he is "ineligible" under section 212 A-28 of the act. A State Department representative said the law prohibits entrance to the United States to persons who "write, or publish, or advocate, or teach" the overthrow of the United States or any other "organized government," "communist doctrines," assaulting or killing police officers, "damage, or entry, or destruction of property," or "sabotage."

When asked to specify which of these categories applied to Blanco, the State Department representative claimed such information was "classified."

Why does Washington fear allowing the American people to exercise their right to hear Hugo Blanco?

Is it the facts he will present about the suffering undergone by the Chilean people

testimony, as do the CIA's numerous attempts to poison and shoot Fidel Castro.

In addition, millions of Americans have watched on their television screens Washington's bloody slaughter of the Vietnamese people. Napalm, carpet bombing, tiger cages, butchered villagers—these horrors are burned into the minds of an entire generation.

Marxists argue against assassinations. They assert that only the concerted action of the masses can bring about changes in official policy or overturn a government and replace it with a better one. They point out that if one of the recent assassination attempts had been successful, Rockefeller would have become president. Is he any better?

And in this poisonous climate of American capitalism in decay, Ford's antihuman course of cutting back wages, eliminating social programs, sanctioning the pollution of the environment, permitting inflation to go unchecked, and approving mass unemployment has earned him the hatred of millions—nearly every one of whom has access to one of the estimated forty million handguns in the United States.

Some of these people are unstable. They have been taught by American capitalism itself to think in terms of murder. Small wonder that increasing numbers of them dream of lying in wait for Ford as he seeks to impress the people of his qualifications to stay in the White House after 1976. □

since the September 1973 military coup, which the White House helped engineer?

Is Washington apprehensive because Blanco will speak out about the case of the 119 in Chile? They were opponents of the junta reported in midsummer to have been killed abroad, only to have it later revealed that they were arrested inside Chile, subsequently "disappeared," and never entered the countries where they allegedly died.

Would it embarrass Washington to hear Blanco denounce the regime it supports in Chile, which still holds at least 8,000 political prisoners in concentration camps, jails, or under house arrest?

Or is it Blanco's advocating that people the world over do their utmost to free these victims of the Chilean military?

Is it Blanco's insistence that supporters of democratic rights join together to expose the abuses of regimes like the Pinochet junta and mount international pressure for an end to such barbaric practices?

Blanco himself stands as a powerful example of the effectiveness of such a campaign. It took a seven-year international effort to save his life and win his release from prison in Peru in 1970 after he was sentenced for organizing peasants on a

broad basis and leading them in seizing land.

The American people have the right to hear what Hugo Blanco has to say about political prisoners under regimes supported by Washington. They have the right to discuss and debate with him and decide for themselves whether to accept or reject his ideas.

Initial protests against the State Department's infringement of these rights have forced Washington to agree to reconsider its exclusion of Blanco. A stepped-up campaign is needed to force Kissinger to grant Blanco a visa. □

Free the Imprisoned Chinese Trotskyists!

Following up his propaganda coup last March when he released 293 Kuomintang war criminals and other reactionary opponents of the Chinese revolution, Mao Tsetung has now freed another 144 prisoners. This time, "95 special agents and 49 crew members of vessels carrying armed agents" captured between 1962 and 1965 were set free, the New China News Agency reported September 22.

The special agents were given the same choice as those released earlier—they would be given jobs and citizens' rights if they chose to remain in China, or they could return to Taiwan. Ten in the first group who chose Taiwan, however, got only as far as Hong Kong. The gang in Taipei would not accept them back.

Le Monde's correspondent in Peking speculated that Taiwan will find it a little harder to refuse entry to the latest bunch—their counterrevolutionary credentials are much more recent.

As for the Trotskyists still locked up in Mao's prisons, however, not a hint has been forthcoming that they might benefit from the same generous treatment Mao is now handing out to convicted war criminals and Kuomintang agents. In fact, since 200 Chinese Trotskyists were seized in midnight raids in 1952 and 1953, the regime has not even acknowledged their existence.

Revolutionists like Chen Chao-lin, Chiang Tseng-tung, Ho Chi-sen, Ying Kwan, and others are rotting in Mao's prisons. Their ranks include founders of the Chinese Communist party, veterans of the 1925-27 revolution, and leaders of the struggle against Japanese imperialism.

Mao, bureaucrat that he is, has his own priorities. The Kuomintang butchers can be released; Chiang Kai-shek's secret agents pose no danger; but the voices of the Chinese Trotskyists remain stifled. If elementary proletarian democracy is to be observed in China, these revolutionists must be released. □

October 6, 1975

In This Issue

Closing Date: September 30, 1975

FEATURES	1328	<i>Out Now!</i> —Chapter 12: New York and Berkeley: Reaction to the Buddhist Demonstrations—by Fred Halstead
SPAIN	1316	Execution of Political Prisoners Arouses Storm of International Protest —by Judy White
FRANCE	1317	20,000 March in Paris —by Estelle Cordano
U.S.A.	1318	CIA Ordered Into Action Against Portuguese Revolution —by Michael Baumann
PORTUGAL	1321	Fresh Attempt by MFA to Stabilize Its Rule—by Gerry Foley
IRAN	1324	The Shah Sounds Off
BRAZIL	1324	Hundreds of Political Prisoners Tortured
ARGENTINA	1325	Argentine Senate, Québec Unionists Denounce Murder of PST Members
GERMANY	1326	Georg Jungclas: Veteran of Six Decades in the Socialist Movement
AUSTRALIA	1327	Activists in Black Movement Face Frame-up
NEWS ANALYSIS	1314	Why Ford Attracts Potential Assassins
	1314	Why Does Washington Fear Hugo Blanco?
	1315	Free the Imprisoned Chinese Trotskyists!
AROUND THE WORLD	1335	
DOCUMENTS	1343	PRT Stand on the August 25 Unity Accord
	1344	LCI Reply to PRT
EN ESPAÑOL:		
E.U.A.	1336	Revelan Arsenal Secreto de Venenos Mortíferos de la CIA —por Michael Baumann
PORTUGAL	1339	Los Stalinistas Atacan la Posición Trotskista—por David Frankel
	1342	"Turistas Políticos" Reciben una Lección Sobre la "Democracia"—por F.L. Derry

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Execution of Political Prisoners in Spain Arouses Storm of International Protest

By Judy White

Five Spanish political prisoners were executed by Franco's firing squads at dawn September 27. Six other condemned prisoners had their death sentences commuted only hours before.

The sentences, handed down in the last four weeks, touched off an international storm of protest. Several European governments felt compelled to urge the Franco regime to spare the lives of the prisoners.

Two of those executed were members of the Basque nationalist Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA—Basque Nation and Freedom): Juan Paredes and Angel Otaegui. The three others were members of the Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota (FRAP—Revolutionary Antifascist and Patriotic Front): Ramón García, José Luis Sánchez, and José Baenz.

Spared from death were ETA member José Antonio Garmendia and FRAP members Manuel Chivite, Vladimiro Tovar, María Jesús Dasca, Manuel Canaveras, and Concepción Tristán.

With the announcement that the executions had been carried out, angry protests were staged in a number of countries. According to initial reports, in the following forty-eight hours, demonstrations occurred in most major cities of Europe, as well as in Ankara, Mexico City, and Bogotá.

Thousands of workers in the Basque region of Spain began a forty-eight-hour general strike September 29. Thirty thousand Basque workers in San Sebastián and 1,500 in Algorta had already downed tools two days before. When 2,000 silent demonstrators marched through the streets of Algorta September 28 behind a Basque flag, they were fired on by the Civil Guard, leaving six persons wounded. In Madrid,

1,500 protesters tried to turn a mass at San Isidro Cathedral into a requiem for the five executed prisoners. Police dispersed them, arresting several persons.

Forty thousand persons in Utrecht heard Dutch Premier Joop Den Uyl score the executions as an act of terror. Ten thousand persons marched in Paris, and a similar number rallied in Rome in response to a call by the Communist party and other political organizations.

Demonstrators in many cities occupied or attacked Spanish government installations. In Lisbon, 5,000 demonstrators sacked and burned the Spanish embassy and consulate while soldiers and police looked on. The following day the consulate in Oporto met the same fate.

In Paris a sit-in in front of the Spanish embassy was broken up by helmeted police wielding truncheons and hurling tear-gas grenades.

Pope Paul VI deplored the executions at an audience of 5,000 at the Vatican. The pope had appealed to Madrid three times for clemency.

Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, East and West Germany, Portugal, France, and Poland recalled their ambassadors from Madrid.

The head of the Common Market's Executive Commission, François-Xavier Ortoli, condemned the executions and said they were expected to block moves toward a free-trade agreement between the Common Market countries and Spain.

Mexican President Luis Echeverría called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to suspend Spain from the UN.

The sizable Basque community in Cara-

cas called a demonstration for October 1 to protest the executions.

All eleven prisoners had been convicted for alleged involvement in the killing of members of Franco's police and Civil Guard. The death penalty is automatic and no judicial appeal is permitted in such cases under the "antiterrorism" law decreed in Spain August 26.


Several of those sentenced were convicted on the basis of "confessions" they made under torture. José Baenz, arrested July 22, testified to this from Carabanchel Prison. His exposé was reprinted in the supplement to No. 57 of *Agencia de Prensa España Popular*:

"At the DGS [Dirección General de Seguridad—General Security Offices] they told me that I had participated in the murder of a policeman and that they were going to beat me until I confessed. They were going to leave me alive long enough to sign a statement, although it wouldn't be for long, because they were going to garrote me. When I refused to confess, the beating and torture began. They bounced me back and forth hitting me with clubs and their fists. I fell down several times, but they picked me up right away to continue the beating. Once while they were holding me from behind, they grabbed me by the throat and banged my head over and over again against a piece of metal furniture, injuring my face—especially my forehead, cheek, and left eye—on the edges of the furniture. They continued beating me and one of the blows knocked out a molar. (The DGS medical report on me refers to this simply as 'tooth decay'.)

"They also tortured me by making me kneel down and hitting me across the soles of the feet with a stick so that when I stood up I felt as if my feet would split open. And they made me stand facing the wall and hit me for almost half an hour with a BIC ballpoint pen on the left side of my backbone. At first this didn't hurt too much, but afterward I could hardly move at all. On the night of July 25 when I couldn't walk, when I was almost totally immobilized from the back pains, when I couldn't see out of my left eye, and when my face was mashed to a pulp from the beatings (I



Juan Paredes



José Baenz



Ramón García



Angel Otaegui



José Luis Sánchez

had various nosebleeds and once I bled from the mouth), I signed the statement."

The executions were part of what a dispatch in the September 28 issue of the *New York Times* called "the most rigorous repression in 30 years" in Spain. The crackdown on opponents of the Franco dictatorship had resulted in 200 to 500 arrests in the last month. Moreover, Franco's prosecutors are asking the death penalty in approximately 150 cases now before the courts.

The new "antiterrorism" law not only made the death penalty mandatory in killings of police and government functionaries, it also placed Spain under a virtual state of siege for the next two years. It suspended the guarantees on the few rights remaining to the Spanish people, stiffened penalties for those convicted of political offenses, and gagged the press even more tightly than previous censorship regulations.

The new repression is aimed at maintaining the regime's control in face of the worldwide economic crisis of capitalism and the expected demise of the aging Franco. There have been growing demands over the past two years for democratic rights and economic change. Large strikes have occurred, and the revolutionary movement has been growing in size and influence.

Added to this is the influence of the revolutionary process taking place in neighboring Portugal. A mass mobilization of similar character in Spain would be much more of a threat to European capitalism because of the greater social weight and higher degree of organization of the Spanish working class and oppressed nationalities.

The Franco regime is not unanimously agreed that harsh repression will solve its problems, even in the short run. There were reports that a number of cabinet ministers opposed the executions. In addition, the international wave of protests following the sentencing obviously had an impact on the regime's decision to commute six of the sentences.

The steps taken by several European governments in the name of "humanitarian concerns" show that they, too, have their doubts about the effectiveness of Franco's course.

Olof Palme, premier of Sweden, described Franco's action as one of "desperation." Henry Giniger commented in the September 28 issue of the *New York Times*: "Only the United States Government seems disposed to make a show of friendship now in the interest of saving its military bases in Spain."

The concern of the European capitalists is that the crackdown could set off protests going far beyond the demand that Franco halt the executions. □

'Save Those Condemned to Death in Spain!'

20,000 March in Paris

By Estelle Cordano

PARIS—"Sauvons les condamnés à mort en Espagne!" (Save those condemned to death in Spain!) was the major slogan of a united demonstration of 20,000 persons here September 20. The demonstration was part of a series of actions to save the lives of the political prisoners Franco sentenced to death.

The campaign in their defense is a major political issue in the French workers movement, not only because of France's proximity to Spain, but also because of the French government's complicity in the activities of Spanish police on French territory.

The giant lead banner in the demonstration was inscribed with the names of the ten organizations who called the action: the League for the Rights of Man, French Communist and Socialist parties, Parti Socialiste Unifié (United Socialist party), Libres Pensées (Free Thought), Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche (Movement of Left Radicals), Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor), Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail (French Democratic Confederation of Labor), Fédération de l'Education Nationale (National Education Federation), and Jeune République (Young Republic).

The CP contingents clearly formed the bulk of the march, but nearly every tendency in the French left participated. Several groups marched in a united contingent under the banner of the Eva Forest Collective, including the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist League), PSU, and *Révolution!*

The Eva Forest contingent was followed by groups marching under the banners of *Lutte Ouvrière*, the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste, several anarchist groups, and Amnesty International.

One incident marred the unity of the demonstration. A few blocks after beginning the march the demonstrators found the parade route already occupied by a contingent carrying a large banner reading, "Peuple de France, Peuple d'Espagne, Solidarité!" (Solidarity between the people of France and Spain!). The banner bore the initials of several groups, including the FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota—Revolutionary Antifascist and Patriotic Front), and ETA (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna—Basque Nation and Freedom), and the Communist party (Marxist-Leninist).

This group of 500 persons tried to take the lead in the demonstration. A line of CP and

CGT marshals from the main parade advanced to come between the group and the lead contingent of the main march, leaving a gap of 250 meters between the two groups. In this fashion the entire demonstration advanced up the street for another three blocks. Then the main march took a sudden turn, advanced up another street, and proceeded by a new route. The other contingent, left alone, decided to continue marching by themselves along the original route.

The evening before the demonstration a meeting of 2,000 persons was held at the Mutualité, sponsored by the FRAP and several other groups. The rally was a spirited defense of the political prisoners. Its theme was summed up by Virginia Fernández, a young Spanish militant who had just escaped from Spain after being sentenced to fifteen years in prison. She ended her speech by saying, "We must save them!" □

Famine Is Good Business

[From the September 19 *Far Eastern Economic Review*.]

A macabre little item in *The Australian* recently revealed plans by Dr T. Beck, owner of an obesity clinic in Sydney, to extract a slimming preparation (Fat Mobilising Substance—FMS) from starving people in Bangladesh, for export to Australia where it will be used to help rich, fat people lose weight.

FMS begins to be excreted from the body after a person has fasted for more than 12 hours. Dr Beck claims there is nothing macabre in his scheme: "I came up with the idea that here is a nation of 80 million starving people and, on the other side of the world, a nation of overweight people are willing to pay to lose weight." Dr Beck would not reveal how much he would pay the Bangladesh donors, but hopes to set up clinics there to extract and refine the urine at low cost. In Sydney he is reported to be charging about A\$118 (US\$155) for a course of treatment.

FMS was first isolated by three British scientists. Previous urine donors have been volunteers and religious groups, such as Jews, who fasted for some length. It was then that Dr Beck said he "came up with the idea of using starving nations. It would be of benefit to them and us."

CIA Ordered Into Action Against the Portuguese Revolution

By Michael Baumann

Sharply reversing Washington's previous policy of maintaining that there has been no clandestine CIA intervention in Portugal, "four official sources" have revealed that the White House secretly ordered the CIA into action against the Portuguese revolution several months ago.

Instead of poison pellets fired from dart guns to dispense with troublesome political figures, this operation reportedly involved channeling millions of dollars to the Portuguese Socialist party and "other parties."

The same sources also said that the CIA has provided material aid, including arms, to the FNLA and UNITA¹ in an effort to influence the outcome of the liberation struggle in Angola.

The first public disclosure of these CIA operations came in a front-page article in the September 25 *New York Times* by Washington correspondent Leslie H. Gelb.

"Millions of dollars are being poured covertly into Portugal and Angola by East and West, according to four official sources in Washington," Gelb wrote. "The funneling of the funds is part of the continuing struggle for control of the Mediterranean and for influence and raw materials in Central Africa.

"United States money for the Portuguese Socialist party and other parties is being funneled by the Central Intelligence Agency through West European Socialist parties and labor unions, the sources said. The C.I.A. involvement, the sources said, amounted to several million dollars a month over the last several months."

Gelb portrayed this effort as minor compared with Soviet and Chinese aid.

"It is also reliably reported that the Soviet Union and its East European allies have poured \$50-million to \$100-million into Portugal since April, 1974, and hundreds of tons of military equipment into Angola since March alone.

"The sources also said that about 200 Chinese military advisers were operating from bases in Zaire to help at least one of the two liberation fronts being supported by Washington."

CIA funding of Portuguese political parties represents a departure in Washington's policy, Gelb claimed.

1. Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (Angolan National Liberation Front). União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

"Until the spring, most of the Western aid to anti-Communist forces in Portugal was being given secretly by the West German Social Democratic party and the Belgian Socialist party without any American involvement. . . .

"The C.I.A. cash-funneling operations to Portugal were said to have revived dormant but traditional connections between the agency and anti-Communist West European socialist and labor movements. . . .

"The funds going to Portugal from the United States and Western Europe were said to be aimed at keeping non-Communist parties intact, in the streets, and in the business of competing with the Communists for the support of military leaders and soldiers. . . .

"One of the sources said that Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger made the decision some time after they went to Brussels for a NATO meeting in late May."

To be sure, everything was done in strict accordance with new congressional rules regarding supervision of clandestine CIA operations.

"The sources maintained that William E. Colby, the director of the agency, had notified members of six Congressional subcommittees several months ago of the covert operations, and that no serious objections had been raised. Mr. Colby gave the notifications after the operations were already under way, as he is permitted to do under the law."

The reported CIA operations in Angola and the assessments upon which its course of action was purportedly based were described in unusual detail.

"The sources said that the funds earmarked for two anti-Soviet liberation fronts in Angola had been dispersed mainly through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. In order to maintain good relations with Mr. Mobutu, the State Department has been seeking to arrange a refinancing of hundreds of millions of dollars in Zaire's short-term debts and to increase American aid to Zaire to about \$60-million this year, from about \$20-million.

"... the operations in Angola, the sources said, led to the reactivation of Holden Roberto, head of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, the man chosen in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy and the C.I.A. to forge a link between the United States and the indigenous groups that were

expected to drive Portugal from Angola one day. . . .

"As described by these sources, the main purpose for the covert American effort in Angola was to underline the Administration's support for President Mobutu, the man on whom Secretary of State Kissinger is banking to oppose Moscow's interests in Africa and to further Washington's interests in various international forums."

Part of the bargain, the sources said, was to let the CIA keep its largest African station in Zaire.

Washington's planning for this effort goes back to the early 1960s, Gelb said. At that time the White House concluded that Lisbon could not retain control over its African colonies indefinitely and that contact should be made with some of the leaders of the liberation movements. "In 1962, on the advice of the C.I.A. among others, Mr. Roberto, the brother-in-law of General Mobutu, was selected as a future leader for Angola.

"The sources said that from 1962 to about 1969, the C.I.A. supplied Mr. Roberto with money and arms, but to little avail. At that point, they said, he was deactivated and put on 'retainer.'

"Mr. Roberto was reactivated this spring, according to the sources, at about the time it became clear that the then Communist-leaning government in Portugal ordered its armed forces in Angola to give active support to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola headed by Agostinho Neto."

The CIA is also said to have recommended throwing support behind Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the UNITA. Thus, by this account both Washington and Peking were backing the same groups as a counterweight to the MPLA. How far this cooperation is supposed to have gone is left unclear.

"It could not be learned whether Chinese and American officials had ever discussed or sought to coordinate their efforts against Mr. Neto. What was learned was that American funds were being used to buy

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arms for both Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi, and that the Chinese were providing military advisors for Mr. Roberto and perhaps for Mr. Savimbi as well."

A Deliberate Leak

There is every indication that these disclosures are a calculated ploy on the part of the White House. For one thing there was no outcry from the CIA, despite the fact that an unchallenged report of this nature would presumably at least reduce the usefulness of alleged CIA agents Soares, Mobutu, Roberto, and Savimbi. For example, how persuasively will Mobutu be able to "further Washington's interests in various international forums" if he remains identified as a pliant tool of the CIA?

Consider by way of contrast the sustained legal battle mounted by the CIA in 1973 and 1974 to suppress the book *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. After failing to halt publication altogether, the CIA ordered the deletion of 339 passages of varying length on the grounds that exposing hitherto secret operations would "result in grave and irreparable injury to the interests of the United States."

The second indicator that the disclosures were decided on by the White House is the fact that Ford himself tried to steer reporters toward the story the week before.

"The President almost blew the whole Portugal thing last week in his interview with *The Chicago Sun-Times*," one of the *Times* sources said. "But nobody picked him up."

Gelb explained: "This was a reference to Mr. Ford's reply to a question about the absence of C.I.A. involvement in Portugal. He noted 'our strong stand' along with NATO allies against a Communist government in Lisbon, then said: 'I don't think the situation required us to have a major C.I.A. involvement, which we have not had.'"

"The source was pointing to the fact that Mr. Ford was not denying that the C.I.A. had an involvement." From this it was a short step to providing sufficient detail to assure major coverage in the main daily newspapers.

A certain overhead cost was involved in making the revelations. In addition to throwing four allegedly loyal CIA foreign agents to the wolves, the disclosures exposed as bald lies earlier White House statements that whatever "excesses" the CIA may have been guilty of in other countries, at least its hands were clean in Portugal.

Only a few weeks previously Mr. Ford had said in an interview: Some West European governments are "helping their Social Democratic friends in Portugal.

"I think it's very tragic that, because of the CIA investigation and all the limitations placed on us in the area of covert



Wijesoma/Ceylon Observer

operations, we aren't able to participate with other Western European countries." (*U.S. News & World Report*, August 11.)

Ford's mouthpieces in the bourgeois press had long played the same lying theme:

- "We learned from Chile what happens when the CIA moves into a country to block a possible Communist take-over.

"We are about to learn from Portugal what happens when the CIA is no longer able to play such a role." (Columnist Joseph C. Harsch, in the March 20 *Christian Science Monitor*.)

- "There appears little that the United States can do either to block a leftist dictatorship or keep Portugal a useful member of NATO. Our close ties with the old rightist dictatorship, and the current incapacitation of the CIA's foreign operations branch, ensure a hands-off stand." (The editors of the *Washington Post*, July 22.)

- Kissinger "promised [August 14] that the U.S. would do whatever possible to prevent a Portuguese 'antidemocratic and doctrinaire minority' from seizing power there. Just what form this support might take wasn't stated. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have complained that the Central Intelligence Agency, due to its current political problems, isn't able to conduct covert operations in Portugal on behalf of anti-Communists." (Robert Keatley, in the August 15 *Wall Street Journal*.)

Now that Washington admits having ordered the CIA into action in Portugal, what about the rest of the story? Is there any reason to assume that the operations it has so far acknowledged constitute more than a small part of its actions?

It would be interesting to know, for example, what role CIA provocateurs played in helping whip up the wave of rightist attacks carried out on the headquarters of the Communist party and other workers

organizations in the north of Portugal in July and August. An extremely active role would certainly fit the pattern of previous CIA handiwork in Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, and Iran, to name only a few examples.

Ford's Bid to the Ultraright

Gerald Ford has made no secret of his thirst for the Republican party nomination for president in the 1976 election.

In a party that is at present content to dispense with any pretense of supporting liberal reform so as to hold on to its hard core of conservatives, Ford need not fear a challenge for the nomination from his left.

The far-right wing of the Republican party on the other hand offers potential challengers who must be undercut. An additional threat is a third-party push by racist Alabama Governor George Wallace, who in a general election would be competing with Ford for the same reactionary vote.

It is this context that helps explain why the White House deliberately leaked some aspects of its secret operations in Portugal and Angola. Ford is in effect telling the right wing of the Republican party that although his hands are tied to a certain extent by all the unfavorable publicity the CIA is getting, he is doing the best he can in a difficult situation.

In Ford's view, the importance of his bid for another term in office far outweighs any damage the disclosure may do to the CIA's alleged accomplices in Lisbon, Kinshasa, and Luanda.

In addition, the disclosure is designed to help polish the CIA's badly tarnished image. At a time when there is an outcry in the United States for the CIA to be curbed or even abolished altogether, Washington leaped at the opportunity to defend the CIA by claiming that it was necessary to help uphold democracy in Portugal.

It was not entirely original in this. A few months earlier the reactionary forces in the north of Portugal took advantage of the divisions in the Portuguese working class to mount an assault on the Communist party in the name of democracy.

If the Catholic church and other elements thoroughly discredited by nearly fifty years of Salazarist rule could begin to make a comeback by taking "defense of democracy" as their watchword, what is to stop the CIA—whose difficulties are of a more recent vintage—from adopting the tactic?

How did it happen that the CIA, an organization whose crimes have been so widely exposed, now believes that it can get away with using the issue of democracy as a cover for its open intervention in Portugal?

Responsibility for this must be placed squarely with the Portuguese Communist party and its ultraleft followers. The CP's campaign against bourgeois democracy has

once again helped convince millions that socialism is synonymous with the end of democracy. The Portuguese Stalinists could not have done a better job of paving the way for the CIA if they themselves had been paid by Washington.

CIA Laundry Service

Portuguese Socialist party leader Mário Soares has denied that the SP ever took funds from the CIA. When he learned that the State Department at first refused either to confirm or deny the *Times* report he said, "That's a mean trick of the United States government, because we didn't receive any money. . . . Maybe there has been some diplomatic support, that sort of thing, but no money."

On September 26, however, a State Department official confirmed the *Times* account, saying that the CIA had been sending \$2 million to \$10 million a month to the SP.

The two accounts are not necessarily contradictory. No one has claimed that the CIA simply gave the SP a check each month. The money, it is said, was channeled to the SP through the European Social Democratic parties and unnamed European unions.

Thus, unless one wishes to argue that the Portuguese SP has no right to accept funds from Social Democratic parties and unions in Europe, responsibility for giving the CIA an entry belongs in the first place with the conduits that agreed to "launder" Washington's money.

The fact that the SP, the party that is supported by a majority of the Portuguese working class, may have accepted funds that originated with the CIA does not mean that it is the spearhead of reaction. What it does show is the dangerous consequences of the reformist course being followed by the leadership of this party.

The wrong course followed by the Soares leadership is its continued reliance on the European Social Democratic parties, the same force the CIA looks to in its search for instruments to help stabilize capitalist rule in Europe. The party's real base of strength is the Portuguese masses, who have shown their readiness again and again to go into the streets in defense of the gains of the revolution. It is here that the SP should have turned for support.

The consequence of Soares's reformist course has been to make the SP an inviting target for CIA intrigue.

As of September 28 nothing had been heard from the mysterious unnamed "other parties" referred to in the *Times* account as having also received funds from the CIA. Which parties were they? The PPD,² the only probourgeois party with any substan-

2. Partido Popular Democrático (Democratic People's party).

tial following? The ultraright outfit backed by Spínola and currently headquartered in Spain? We aren't told. Such information would not further the CIA's image as Portugal's most stalwart defender of democracy.

Nor are we told anything about the CIA's relationship with the MFA,³ the political arm of the military hierarchy, the real government in Portugal. How many millions has the CIA poured into its coffers?

When MFA Cabinet ministers Jorge Correia Jesuino and José da Costa Martins visited Washington in May for secret talks with the White House, Costa Martins told the press: "The United States Government has shown real understanding for Portugal. It doesn't intend in any way to become hostile to Portugal. Quite the contrary, the United States intention is to give us help." (Quoted in the *New York Times*, May 18.)

What kind of help? The latest disclosures reveal that this visit immediately preceded Ford and Kissinger's decision to order the CIA into action in Portugal. Is this what was discussed behind the closed doors of the White House and State Department during the MFA ministers' visit?

Costa Martins also met with George Meany, president of the American trade union federation AFL-CIO, who has for decades helped the CIA channel funds to anti-Communist unions abroad.

"Mr. Meany was like a grandfather to me," Costa Martins said, "very friendly and understanding." (*New York Times*, May 18.)

The masses in Portugal have won big gains. Despite some setbacks, they have yet

3. Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement).

to be defeated. Through détente Washington has combined with Moscow in efforts to derail or crush the revolution. But within this agreement both sides have also retained for themselves the right to jockey for position.

Washington's normal channels are blocked. The Salazarist forces it supported for nearly five decades are of no immediate political use—they are too discredited. Thus it has for the time being chosen to back the Portuguese SP, hoping thereby to gain some leverage in the revolutionary process that is unfolding. When the SP is exhausted or broken, Washington will then go all out in backing formations further to the right.

The CIA's reported course of action in Angola is similar.

The MPLA is at present lined up with Moscow, its major source of material aid. Washington and Peking have given their backing to the two other major groups. This lineup of forces could change, for there are no key differences of program between the three liberation groups.

There is nothing unusual about this situation. Nationalist movements seek to exploit whatever contradictions exist among the world powers. They are forced to seek material aid, including arms, from any available source, and no one can deny them the right to do so.

The test to be put to a national liberation movement is not the source of its arms, but whether or not it has made political concessions—either to imperialism or Stalinism—to obtain them. This is the central question, and only the course of action followed by the contending groups will provide the final answer. □

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Fresh Attempt by MFA to Stabilize Its Rule

By Gerry Foley

Premier José Pinheiro de Azevedo declared a "de facto state of emergency" September 29 throughout Portugal. Military units were put on alert, leaves were canceled, and bases isolated from the public. At the same time, the premier sent troops to occupy the radio and television stations in the Lisbon area.

The objective seemed to be to force a showdown with radicalized units in the military and to initiate a crackdown on "radical minorities" challenging the authority of the government. According to a September 30 dispatch in the *New York Times*, Azevedo charged that "some information organs, especially radio and TV," had launched a 'provocative campaign of seditious attitudes that endanger the revolution.'

The statement reportedly went on to claim that leftist demonstrators and broadcasters were trying to "paralyze the capital's whole life." Azevedo said that he had not declared a formal state of emergency because he wanted to avoid interfering with the civil liberties of the population at large.

In response to the premier's action, the *New York Times* dispatch said, the Frente de Unidade Revolucionária (FUR—Front for Revolutionary Unity) called on workers to "mobilize against the counterrevolution, occupy plants and businesses and stop all work." A number of left groups called for a demonstration in Rossio, the main square of Lisbon. According to the above report: "... the call for what amounted to a general strike was scarcely heeded, and the demonstration fizzled."

In two radio stations, the fifty-man units sent to establish military control reportedly balked at their orders. One of these stations refused to broadcast the premier's communiqué. A broadcaster said: "Now, the only thing left to do for us is to stop work and to fight in the streets." However, protest demonstrations were relatively small, according to the *New York Times*. Most of the radio and TV stations did broadcast the premier's statement.

It is not yet clear whether this repressive move by the government will rekindle mass mobilizations in defense of democratic rights, in particular, freedom of the press. The answer, however, should be in shortly.

Although on August 28 the Portuguese Communist party began to shift back toward a more conciliatory stance on the governmental level, it has continued to

resort to adventurist demagoguery. Its aim is to maintain control over followers who might be disillusioned and to maintain its grip on as many of its positions as possible.

The Communist party's tactic is to keep one foot in the government and the other in the street, threatening to go into full opposition if the other forces in the government drive it to the wall. It accomplishes this balancing trick with the help of the ultraleft groups, using them both as a cat's-paw and a scarecrow. It has let them take the lead in the demonstrations against the new government, while hinting that if it is pushed too far, it might throw all its weight behind them.

The CP has announced it is losing members to the ultraleft groups, which is probably true. But this also has the effect of warning the other political forces that if it is stripped of its positions, one of the main defenders of "order" in the labor movement will be eliminated and its place taken by "dangerous revolutionary groups."

The political cover for this operation is "defense of the gains of the workers and peasants," which the CP says the new government cannot be relied on to maintain. "By its composition, this government is far from corresponding to the political forces interested in assuring the revolutionary process," the CP leadership said on September 19, at the time of the installation of the sixth provisional government in which the party has only one minister.

This line corresponds to the attitude of the ultraleft groups and the CP's own fanaticized followers, who came to regard the Socialist party as virtually "social fascist" during the July-August crisis and thus considered the victory of the MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement) faction with which the SP allied itself as nothing less than the triumph of the counterrevolution.

The latest provisional government, like its predecessors, is in fact trying to clamp a lid on the mass upsurge.

This is being attempted by shifting somewhat from Stalinist and "third world" propaganda themes to Social Democratic ones. As a result, the government is stressing the need for "moderation" and "responsibility" based on "democratic" cooperation between the workers and the bosses. In this, the MFA has the advantage that the factional conflict between the CP and the SP and the artificial excitements offered by the ultraleft are accelerating the

process of wearing out the workers.

The Communist party's "defensive" campaign and the febrile alarmism of the ultraleftists assist the government's present strategy. In fact, President Costa Gomes was not ready to make a sudden hard turn to the right. The popular-frontist character of the new cabinet shows that. There has not yet been a clear enough shift to the right by the government to convince those workers who did not support the CP's campaign in defense of the ousted Gonçalves government that they have to mobilize to keep the present one from taking away their gains. Thus the campaign of the CP and the ultraleft appears, and objectively is, simply a rearguard action by the discredited and isolated bloc that formed behind former Premier Vasco Gonçalves.

When the Revolutionary Council tried to introduce a measure going against the interests of both reformist parties—the censorship decree of September 8—it was forced to retreat. The decree was formally repealed on September 19, after it had already become a dead letter. But every one of the mobilizations by the Communist party and the ultraleftists has failed to achieve its main objectives. These demonstrations, while still large turnouts, have grown steadily smaller and more provocative, resulting only in deeper isolation of these forces.

This activity has continued to identify the Communist party and the ultraleft with antidemocratic methods and objectives and more and more with putschism. Now it has led to new grave dangers for the Portuguese workers movement as a whole.

'Soldados Unidos Vencerão'

After the defeat of the pro-Gonçalves faction in the September 5 Assembly of the MFA, the ultraleft and the CP shifted their emphasis toward clandestine organization in the barracks. A number of officers associated with the defeated bloc gave interviews to sympathetic reporters to explain that they were disillusioned with the MFA and prepared to turn toward "more revolutionary" activities.

Their reaction could have been utilized to revive the tendency toward independent democratic organization in the barracks. However, the opportunity was squandered in an ultraleft binge that played perfectly

into the hands of the military command.

The clandestine soldiers front called "Soldados Unidos Vencerão" (SUV—Soldiers United Will Win) appeared for the first time in Oporto on September 10. It assembled about 10,000 persons, the usual number for combined CP and ultraleft demonstrations in that city, plus a reported 1,500 uniformed military personnel. The military contingent apparently came from all over the country. The units based in Lisbon seemed to be strongly represented.

The slogans were either quite general or related to the economic interests of the soldiers: "Soldiers always at the side of the people," "Reactionaries out of the barracks," "Portugal will not be Europe's Chile," "Free transportation now for soldiers," "Down with starvation wages for soldiers." The only political slogans were linked to the "people's power" proposals of the defeated pro-Gonçalves faction.

There were no demands for democratic rights in the armed forces that could have appealed to the civilian masses who have mobilized again and again to defend these rights in the society at large.

The attitude of the organizers of the march tended to present the SUV as a dangerous secret society. Some of the participants, reportedly, were masked. By-standers with cameras as well as newspaper photographs were attacked. There were threatening demonstrations outside newspapers that were unpopular with the marchers.

The speakers encouraged open defiance of the military commanders. One said that Gen. Carlos Fabião, the chief of staff of the army, had sent a note to the various bases claiming that the demonstration would be "counterrevolutionary."

According to the September 11 *Diário de Notícias*, the crowd reacted by chanting, "Death to the ELP [Exército de Libertação Portuguesa—Portuguese Liberation Army, right-wing terrorists] and those who support it," and "Down with Fabião," the army commander who played a decisive role in defeating the Gonçalves faction in the MFA. At the end of the rally, the CP-dominated Lisbon paper indicated, the demonstrators took up the shout of "We want Corvacho."

Brig. Eurico Corvacho, the commander of the Northern Military Region and the only regional commander to support the ousted premier, had become a kind of little Vasco Gonçalves for the CP and its allies. Like Gonçalves, he had become a target of the SP and the faction with which it was allied in the MFA. Corvacho protested that he was nonpartisan and had defended the rallies of the conservative Centro Democrático Social (CDS—Social Democratic Center) against ultraleft demonstrations.

Nonetheless, he became the focus of conflict between the two blocs, and the CP

went all out to defend him, but with no success. He was removed from his command September 12, two days after the SUV demonstration, and replaced by Brig. Pires Veloso, the former military high commissioner in the colony of São Tomé and Príncipe.

The new commander tried to present himself as a defender of the rights of the majority against bullying radical minorities. He pledged to assure that "the people's will is respected."

Rifles Diverted From Barracks

The day after the Oporto demonstration, one of the most prominent supporters of the ultraleft bloc in the military, Capt. Henrique Fernandes, diverted 1,000 G-3 automatic rifles to the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias (PRP-BR—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades).

The PRP-BR is a radical populist guerrilla group with a number of contacts among the most radicalized middle-ranking officers. It is one of the strongest groups in the Frente de Unidade Revolucionária which originated in a programmatic accord between the ultraleft groups and the Communist party. The CP was obliged to leave after its turn toward compromise with the SP, but it left its front group, the Portuguese Democratic Movement, behind as a proxy, and continued to ally itself in the street with this bloc.

The diversion of these weapons quickly became known. It was reported in the Socialist party paper *A Luta*, the independent Oporto paper *Jornal de Notícias*, and in *Luta Popular*, the daily of the MRPP (Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian party, a sectarian Maoist group allied with the SP).

There had been some previous threats to form clandestine armed groups. The bourgeois Partido Popular Democrático (PPD—Democratic People's party) claimed to be ready to put 40,000 men in the field if necessary. As early as the April 25 elections, there were signs of activity by PPD goon squads. But this party's threat to form an armed militia did not seem to be taken very seriously by the Lisbon press. The party general secretary, Emidio Guerreiro, a former member of a guerrilla group, has an apparently well-earned reputation as a windbag.

However, the diversion of 1,000 automatic rifles to the PRP-BR, which may have about that many members, created a sensation. Statements by Captain Fernandes and this organization itself seemed calculated to heighten the sensation.

A detailed account of the operation was given in the September 20 *A Luta*.

"On September 11 at 11:00 a.m., a Berliet truck from the Lisbon Light Artillery

Regiment [the most well known of the radicalized units] drove up to the Calçada da Ajuda barracks of the Military Police Regiment. It was driven by a candidate officer of the National Guard and loaded with a thousand G-3 rifles from the Beirolas arsenal. It parked at a depot located next to the barracks, where there were two civilian pickup trucks. An hour later, they left, loaded up. The operation was carried off by the PRP-BR, but there was also a military man involved—Captain Fernandes of Copcon. Part of the Military Police comes under this umbrella command."

Captain Fernandes admitted in an interview September 24 in *República*, which is now identified primarily with the ultraleft bloc, that he had turned over the weapons to forces outside the military. Extensive quotes were given in the September 25 *Jornal de Notícias*, including the following:

"I was convinced that the only consistent way forward for the process is the road of insurrection. The opportunity to arm the workers vanguard and the toilers interested in a revolutionary approach arose when it was realized that keeping so many weapons ready for instant use in one arsenal was a violation of the minimum security rules for storing arms. In view of the conviction I had and my firm belief that this opportunity could not be wasted (without endangering the defense of what the workers have gained in Portugal), I did not hesitate to divert as many weapons as possible.

"Unfortunately this diversion was noticed, and the number began to be quoted in the mass media. They said a thousand weapons had gone astray, but the actual figure was many times that.

"While the report of the diversion of these arms has made it difficult to obtain the larger number of weapons needed to advance the process, I believe that in any case the working class is not so disarmed as it was before this operation."

In a radio broadcast after publication of this interview, Captain Fernandes announced that he had left the armed forces and gone underground.

Carvalho Approves Action

The PRP-BR denounced *A Luta*, *Jornal de Notícias*, and *Luta Popular* for linking it to this action. Its statement was published in the September 25 issue of *Jornal de Notícias*:

"The PRP-BR, which fought arms in hand during the fascist regime and never let itself be disarmed by either Caetano or Spínola, is not afraid of the veiled and flabby violence of the SP and is ready to deal blow for blow, as the needs of the situation may require.

"As for the MRPP, by taking on the job of informing on the revolutionary activities of the left, it has only revealed its rightist role,

making it increasingly easy to understand its behavior and its extensive financial resources. Both the MRPP and the SP have seen their designs thwarted by the statements of Captain Fernandes, an exemplary revolutionist who will silence the counterrevolutionaries. Moreover, they will never feel safe knowing that these arms are in the hands of the workers and peasants, and this obliges those who hold these weapons and revolutionists in general to maintain strict vigilance."

The communiqué ended:

"In view of this turn to the right by the political-military authorities, there is no longer any chance for revolutionists to carry out a transformation within the present structures. The only way to assure a seizure of power by the workers will be to arm the working class and the peasantry, and at the present moment, this must be the essential task of all revolutionists."

Jornal de Notícias hinted that this diversion of weapons was part of a new strategy by the MFA faction defeated September 5: "At that time, this group stated—specifically through Captain Clemente—that it was necessary to seek *new forms of struggle* [emphasis in original] to keep the country from being dominated by Social Democrats. And this precisely is how observers interpret the recent disappearance of arms, for which a leading member of the group opposed to the Nine [i.e., the Melo Antunes faction] took public responsibility."

The Oporto paper also hinted that Sarai-va de Carvalho, the commander of Copcon, had a certain responsibility in this, noting that he had appointed Fernandes to handle the transport of the arms to new depots. It pointed out as well that Copcon had made no statement on the diversion of the weapons and had apparently taken no action to recover them.

When Carvalho returned on September 25 from an official visit to Sweden, he made a statement that appeared to condone the expropriation. *New York Times* correspondent Flora Lewis reported in a September 26 dispatch:

"General Carvalho said that it would have been dangerous 'if the arms had been given to the right, but since it was a leftist group I am satisfied they are in good hands.'

"Still, he said, it was unwise to distribute arms to one political group because it might 'alarm the country.'

"My intention,' General Carvalho said, 'was not to distribute weapons to one political party but to several political parties in a moment of national emergency.'"

Carvalho has been trying to regain some of the credibility he lost among the ultraleft in the August crisis. His objective was probably to restore an independent image

and gain some room for maneuver.

Carvalho has used his command to co-opt the most radicalized regiments. His tactic for dealing with violations of "discipline" has been to ride the wave before moving to "restore order."

He followed this pattern, for example, in



PORTUGUESE PREMIER AZEVEDO: Declares "de facto state of emergency."

handling the problem of the Amadora regiment, which tried in early August to remove its reactionary commander. He turned it into one of the most "reliable" regiments in the armed forces.

The most immediate political effect of the PRP-BR operation was on the Military Police Regiment. Because of its refusal to go to Angola, this unit had become the focus of the campaign to "restore discipline" within the armed forces. A number of officers resigned, claiming that the regiment was uncontrollable.

The charge that the military police were involved in the diversion of a large quantity of heavy automatic rifles to an ultraleft guerrillaist group tended to identify its resistance to hierarchical authority with a plot to organize armed actions against the new government.

The September 25 Demonstration

It was in this atmosphere that the September 25 SUV demonstration took place in Lisbon.

According to Lewis, about 3,500 uniformed military personnel took part in the march and "at least 25,000 civilians." The Communist party was not officially a sponsor but apparently mobilized its supporters to participate through the workers committees it controls. One of these was the

committee at the CP controlled *Diário de Notícias*.

The slogans approved for the September 25 demonstration were the following: "Purge the reactionary officers," "Down with starvation wages for soldiers," "We are workers in uniform and we will not be manipulated by the lackeys of the bourgeoisie in the barracks (generals, brigadiers, colonels, and captains)," "We are the children of the working people, and our struggle is the same as theirs," "Soldiers, sailors, workers, and peasants, united we will win," "Soldiers always shoulder to shoulder with the people."

A section of the marchers crossed the Tejo River to the town of Trafaria, where two members of the SUV were being held in a military prison. They surrounded the prison and barricaded off the area to prevent the guard from being reinforced.

The two prisoners, corporals Luis de Figueiredo and Alfredo Pinto of the Escola Prática de Infantaria, were charged with "engaging in propaganda and distributing pamphlets inside the barracks for an organization outside the MFA bodies in the unit."

The governor of the prison reportedly refused to negotiate with the demonstrators. However, Carvalho ordered the two released.

The political climate in the country was obviously still unfavorable to repression in the military. Thus, a broad campaign could have forced the release of these two SUV activists. That would have been a major victory for democratic rights in the military and a sharp setback for the high command. Instead, the September 25 demonstration isolated the left still more within the armed forces and encouraged more dependence on the demagogues of the MFA.

However, the ultraleft in Portugal had gotten used to trying to gain its aims by "direct action," without bothering about politics. As a result of the political weakness of the bourgeois authorities, these groups had in fact been able to avoid disaster and even win some victories.

Their successes now threatened, however, to prove to be only the bait in a political trap. On September 26, the government announced the formation of a new "Military Intervention Force," apparently designed to play a more openly repressive role than Copcon. □

Lawyers Behind Bars in 23 Countries for Defending Political Prisoners

Amnesty International published September 21 a list of eighty-five attorneys in twenty-three countries who are now in prison because of their professional activities, especially in defense of political prisoners.

Argentina holds the record with twenty-five lawyers behind bars.

The Shah Sounds Off

A secret CIA study made public a few months ago found that the shah of Iran, the "King of Kings," suffers from insecurity and is a brilliant but dangerous megalomaniac. According to columnist Jack Anderson, the study was conducted to help Washington determine just how secure an ally the shah really is.

"... the psychological study suggests that the shah is an uncertain ally," Anderson wrote in his July 11 column. "His dreams of glory, apparently, exceed his ability to finance them. . . ."

"CIA psychologists believe that all these elements—his cruel father, his years as a pawn of the West, his undistinguished lineage, his fear of impotence—contributed to an enormous inferiority complex.

"Now this insecure man, showered with oil billions and bolstered by the United States, is determined to show the world, the psychologists suggest."

"Showing the world" apparently includes giving off-the-cuff interviews in which the King of Kings—who unlike Gerald Ford needn't worry about the next election—can think aloud about the splendors of his rule. Here are a few gems from a September 23 interview granted to the *New York Times*:

On his decision to convert Iran into a one-party state: "Our party is representing the whole nation. There are so many different shades of opinion in the party, but not in what concerns these three points: the principle of the Iranian monarchy; second, the Constitution; third, the revolution of the Shah and the people.

"On that everybody agrees. You can ask people. Who could disagree with that in this country?"

The shah has had no difficulty rationalizing the dissolution of the Novin and the Mardom parties, both of which he had created in the first place. He nicknamed them the "Yes and Of Course parties." When setting up the new "National Resurrection party" in March, abolishing all legal political parties, he said: "All those Iranians who believe in the Constitution, the monarchy and the Shah-People Revolution are eligible to join the party. Those who do not wish to do so can either stay home without having rights to criticize or leave the country forever."

On freedom: "If what you call freedom is abuse, or if you think that freedom is only if you could insult the king, well you are not familiar with this country. Nobody would even think of that. Freedom is to express your opinion, that this should be better and so on.



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"Our approach to the meaning of the word freedom in our two languages is different. What suits you may be right for you, and if you are happy with it, keep it. But don't judge us by your standards. If we're happy with what we have, we are going to keep it and we are not going to

obliterate it just to please you. This is not really a question of controls. Our system suits perfectly the Persian mind today."

On Iranian students abroad: "Those in the United States, we have 15,500 students maybe we have eventually 500 students who mask themselves and who protest. I could say nearly 100 percent of them are Marxists. And they are always mixing with other people, of other nationalities and are demonstrating most of the time. There are even Americans among them. But also many other nationalities so we know exactly who they are."

On political prisoners: "They are all Marxists. All Marxists. And something very new. People who call themselves 'Islamic Marxists.' How can people be religious and Marxist at the same time?"

On nuclear arms for Iran: "Honestly, I am not really thinking of nuclear arms. But if 20 or 30 ridiculous little countries are going to develop nuclear weapons, then I may have to revise my policies. Even Libya is talking about trying to manufacture atomic weapons—God knows for what purpose."

The shah has stated that he receives messages from God. The King of Kings might well have more to say on this topic in the future. □

Geisel Regime Charged With Systematic 'Medieval' Torment

Hundreds of Political Prisoners Tortured in Brazil

"They gave me what the torturers call the 'round' treatment. Relay teams questioned me twenty-two out of every twenty-four hours. For twenty days I got only two hours sleep a night. I got only two spoonfuls of rice and a glass of water each day. I was hung on the 'pau-de-arara' [parrot's perch] so they could apply electrical torture to all parts of my body. They burned me with a cauterizing iron and with projectors, then poured salt water on my chest. Most painful were the electric shocks on my eardrums. I wouldn't talk. They made me watch others being tortured; or they made me listen to their cries. They threatened to go after my wife and children."

That was how Marco Antônio Tavares Coelho described his prison experience at the hands of the Brazilian military police following his arrest in January. Before testifying in court September 4, Tavares Coelho showed the deep scars on his wrists and legs to back up his description of the tortures inflicted on him.

Tavares Coelho is a former deputy in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. He was deprived of his seat in 1964 and forced to go

underground, living clandestinely until his imprisonment. His arrest is part of a new wave of repression against the pro-Moscow Communist party of Brazil that began at the beginning of this year.

Several hundred persons have been arrested since January. Hearings against several alleged CP leaders and militants are now being conducted, and news is continuing to surface about the tortures inflicted on most of the detainees. Many of those arrested are affirming with medical certificates that they were cruelly tormented with "medieval tortures."

Following the arrest of Tavares Coelho, the police imprisoned Osvaldo Pacheco da Silva, reported to be head of the Brazilian CP's trade-union work. Several arrests were made in the truck drivers union, and police charged that the textile and bakery workers unions were "infiltrated" by the Communist party.

In Rio de Janeiro, police seized the head of the CP organizational department, Aristeu Nogueira Campos. Arrested with him were two members of the party's Central Committee, Fernando Pereira Cristino and

Wenceslau de Oliveira Morais, as well as fifteen other party militants from the region.

How was the regime able to strike such heavy blows on the CP? Commenting in the September 18 *Le Monde*, Charles Vanhecke said: "As for the methods used to obtain such results, the testimony of these last weeks leaves hardly any doubts. Already last May, in a letter to the president of the republic, Pacheco da Silva's wife related that when she was taken to see her husband on the third day of his incarceration she saw that 'his hands and ears were burned from electric shocks, his feet were swollen, and some of his teeth were yanked out.' Several days later she saw him again. He was, she wrote, 'covered with blood, with a huge gash on the right side of his chest. He gave me the impression that he was dead, because he didn't look at me or recognize me.'"

Vanhecke explained that "most of the arrested militants testify that they are threatened with death if they do not talk. Also, when prisoners disappear it is not difficult to discern from political and military sources that they died under torture."

Since the beginning of this year five CP leaders have "disappeared." They are Elson Costa, Central Committee member, arrested in São Paulo in January; Jaime Amorim Miranda, member of the secretariat of the Central Committee, disappeared last February in Rio; Hiram Pereira, arrested last February in São Paulo; and Itai José Velloso and Sebastiao Vitorino da Silva, both of whom disappeared in Rio in May.

Five other CP leaders "disappeared" last year, as well as some twenty militants of other organizations.

The campaign of repression against the Brazilian CP is in the hands of the Rio military police and the Internal Operations Department, the notorious DOI (Departamento de Operações Internas).

Earlier this year Lyanesas Maciel, a member of parliament from the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB—Brazilian Democratic Movement, the main opposition party), called for a congressional committee to investigate these violations of human rights. The MDB raised in the Congress the question of the use of torture.

Little has come of this so far. Lackeys of the Geisel regime argue that the repressive campaign against the CP proves that there is extensive subversion in the country and that the state must maintain intact its special measures and repressive apparatus.

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Argentine Senate, Québec Unionists Denounce Murder of PST Members

[Following the murders of eight members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party) in Argentina in early September by ultrarightists, the party appealed for broad support to its effort to halt this campaign of terror.

[Among the responses to the PST's call were a resolution passed by the Argentine Senate and a statement of protest signed by political organizations and prominent labor leaders in Québec.

[*Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the PST, reprinted the Senate resolution in an article in its September 13 issue. This article and the text of the Québec protest have been translated by *Intercontinental Press*.]

Last Thursday, September 11, the Senate of the nation passed a resolution condemning the massacre that took the lives of eight members of our party.

The day before, compañero Juan Carlos Coral went to parliament and met with senators Saadi [Frejuli—Frente Justicialista de Liberación Nacional, National Liberation Front for Social Justice] and Perette [UCR—Unión Cívica Radical, Radical Civic Union]. He also met with the UCR leader in the Chamber of Deputies, Dr. Troccoli. He gave all of them the background on the case.

In the Senate the draft resolution was introduced by the Radical bloc and argued for by Dr. Perette in the following way:

"This episode must unfortunately be added to the series of unpunished acts of violence that have occurred in the country, growing so frequent in the last fifteen days as to cause a profound sense of uneasiness in Argentine life. . . .

"Although they were our political opponents, the eight members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores belonged to an organization, headed by Dr. Juan Carlos Coral, that has a deep affinity for the people. . . .

"This call on our part, this sharing in the grief caused by the death of these eight members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, speaks to the problems faced by the country on this matter."

The resolution, later passed unanimously, is as follows:

"The Honorable Chamber of Senators of the Nation RESOLVES:

"To condemn the barbaric assassination of eight members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores. This deed once again shows the persecution that makes victims of the PST's members, who are involved in the democratic, institutional process of the country."

We must add that both the Senate

resolution and the condemnation made by the Partido Justicialista [Justicialist party], the principal force in the parliament, were practically ignored by the press. The daily paper *La Prensa* reported it in part and *La Nación* mentioned it. The rest were silent.

* * *

Montréal, September 22, 1975

M. Italo Luder
Interim President
Casa Rosada
Buenos Aires,
Argentina

Mr. Luder,

The undersigned vigorously protest the recent murders of eight members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores [PST—Socialist Workers party]. The bodies of Adriana Zaldúa, Ana María Lorenzo, Lidia Agostini, Hugo Frigerio, and Roberto Loscertales were found in an automobile outside La Plata September 5. The next day, the bodies of three other PST members were found in the same region: Patricia Susanna Claverie, Carlos Enrique Povedano, and Oscar Lucatti.

This brings to fifteen the number of PST members assassinated by right-wing terrorists since the Peronist government came to power. Moreover, several other opponents of the government have been assassinated and political headquarters have been attacked. Everyone knows that the right-wing terrorists operate under the protection of the government.

We demand that the government undertake all necessary measures to stop the right-wing terrorist attacks. We demand the liberation of all political prisoners, including those jailed under the state of siege. We demand that those responsible for the murders of PST members and of other revolutionary and trade-union militants be brought to justice.

Comité Québécois pour la Défense des Prisonniers Latino-Américains [Québec Committee for the Defense of Latin American Prisoners]; Groupe Socialiste des Travailleurs du Québec [Socialist Workers Group of Québec]; Groupe Marxiste Révolutionnaire [Revolutionary Marxist Group]; Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière [Socialist Workers League]; Michel Chartrand, president of the Montréal Central Council of the Confederation of National Trade Unions; Jacques Beaudoin, president of the Union of Garage and Maintenance Workers of the Montréal Urban Community Transport Commission; Pierre Lemaire, president of the Teachers Alliance of Montréal, and Céline St-Pierre, professor, University of Québec at Montréal. □

Georg Jungclas: Veteran of Six Decades of Struggle in the Socialist Movement

[The following statement, signed by the Political Bureau of the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (International Marxist Group), the German section of the Fourth International, appeared in the September 18 issue of the Trotskyist fortnightly *Was Tun*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *


Georg Jungclas is dead. "Schorsch"—as we all called Georg Jungclas—embodied the unbroken continuity of the best traditions of the German workers movement. If today his death has no meaning to the German working class—whose historical consciousness has been extinguished by a bourgeoisified leadership that wants to get rid of its socialist past and that ties its future to a declining capitalism—this certainly does not reflect against Schorsch.

It only points to the terrible conditions under which he had to struggle for decades. His stature is shown by the fact that he remained unshakably convinced of the ultimate victory of socialism even at this dark hour. His unerring class instinct, as well as his political abilities, was demonstrated by the fact that in the period of capitalist reconstruction following the war he did not retreat defensively into sectarian righteousness.

With political astuteness Schorsch persistently analyzed the steps taken by the German working class on the road to recovery of its class consciousness, the consciousness of its historical role. Moreover, he always knew how to intervene so as to develop the first beginnings of consciousness into organizational commitment capable of bearing fruit.

The road of Schorsch's life led him finally into the ranks of the Fourth International—as a fourteen-year-old who joined the Social Democratic youth group that broke with the SPD¹ leaders after they voted credits to finance the first imperialist war of plunder; then to the Communist youth; then the punishment he received as a dock worker for the occupation of the Blohm & Voss wharf; his participation in the "Hamburg Uprising"; and his joining the Left Opposition in the Communist party, which defended the revolutionary heritage against

1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—Social Democratic party of Germany.—IP



Was Tun

GEORG JUNGCLAS

Stalinist reaction. Schorsch was not alone on his decades-long thorny road, which for him also meant emigration and imprisonment in a concentration camp. He traveled this road with many other comrades who came out of the Social Democratic and Communist parties.

But the full strength of his revolutionary fiber is shown by his contribution to the construction of the German section of the Fourth International, following his release from the Nazi concentration camp. And this he did without ever losing his humanity, his proletarian savvy, his joy of life. At a time when many Trotskyist comrades slackened in their struggle—worn down, broken, and tired after years of confinement in prisons and concentration camps, many succumbing to the enticements of the capitalist upturn and others to the pressure of the anticommunist witch-hunt—Schorsch gave up an excellent job in Bayreuth.²

Most of the analyses of Germany that appeared at that time in the political and

2. Schorsch was administrator of the Wagner fortune in Bayreuth after being released from the concentration camp, and later became director of the land office.

theoretical publications of the Fourth International came from Schorsch's pen (usually under the pseudonym G. Gerbel). One has only to read back over them to realize how far they stand above the prattle of the Social Democratic capitulators and the blind worshipers of Stalinist pearls of wisdom.

Whatever difficulties this former dock worker had in writing, he had fully mastered the language of Marxism. And he always knew how to translate his ideas into practical politics. There was hardly a single initiative toward the development or consolidation of a left wing in the Federal Republic in which Schorsch did not actively participate and work to involve the then tiny German section of the Fourth International—from the struggle against remilitarization, to the founding of the "Titoist" Independent Workers party, to the publication of *Sozialistische Politik* [Socialist Politics].

It is thanks to his organizational abilities, his close collaboration with the Fourth International, and his gift for winning young people, that Trotskyism survived those years. Almost all other groups that trace their origins back to before 1933 disappeared, with the exception of the two traditional parties of the German working class, the SPD and the KPD.³ For years Schorsch literally carried the organization on his shoulders.

His severe illness left him no time to write the history of the German section of the Fourth International. In the last days of his life he followed the events in Portugal and Spain with the greatest interest and concern. With great effort—he already found it difficult to speak—he warned: "Portugal and Spain are decisive for the fate of the European revolution. We cannot miss this boat if we don't want to be set back for years."

When the German working class has regained its historical consciousness, when it fulfills its historical role in the struggle for socialism that is necessary to avoid sinking once again into barbarism, it will rediscover Schorsch as a bearer of its lost revolutionary heritage and its socialist hope for the future.

September 14, 1975

3. Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands—Communist party of Germany.—IP

UN Votes 123 to 0 to Reverse Veto Excluding Hanoi and Saigon

The United Nations General Assembly voted 123 to 0 September 19 to send back to the Security Council for immediate and favorable consideration the applications of North and South Vietnam for UN membership. Washington, which had vetoed the applications in the Security Council in August, abstained on the vote.

Activists in Australian Black Movement Face Frame-up

An emergency campaign has been launched in Australia to defend the Brisbane Three—three activists in the Black movement who are victims of a vicious frame-up attempt by the racist Country party government of the state of Queensland.

The three—Lionel Fogarty, John Garcia, and Denis Walker—face possible fourteen-year jail sentences if convicted on trumped-up charges of attempting to extort money from Jim Varghese, the former president of the Queensland University student union.

A delegation of Black activists visited Varghese in August 1974 to ask for help in raising money for a Black community school on Palm Island Aboriginal Reserve. During the meeting, Varghese attempted to provoke members of the delegation into making threats against him if he did not cooperate with their efforts. Unknown to the defendants, several persons, including a police officer, were behind a partition in Varghese's office during the discussion.

The meeting ended on a cordial note, with Varghese promising to look into the possibilities for fund raising. But at 4:00 a.m. the following morning police raided the houses of several Black activists in Brisbane and arrested Fogarty and Garcia. Walker was later arrested in Sydney September 12.

The whole affair was clearly a trap set by the police to victimize some of the most vocal and active Black rights activists in Queensland.

Denis Walker waged a vigorous campaign against his extradition to Brisbane. He and his supporters argued that he would not receive justice at the hands of the racist Queensland legal system. Pickets and demonstrations were held in the eastern states' capital cities, but he was eventually extradited to Brisbane by the high court. One of the judges, Lionel Murphy, dissented from the ruling, stating, "There is no evidence that a prima facie case has been established against Walker."

Fogarty's case was heard in the children's court in January and dismissed. However, after he turned seventeen, he was again charged and forced to appear before the adult court.

When Garcia and Fogarty were first arrested they were charged with conspiracy to extort money by threats and menaces, an offense carrying a maximum seven-year prison sentence. The charges were later altered to bring them into line with Walker's—intent to extort, which carries a fourteen-year penalty. The police dropped

the conspiracy charge, but they have the option of reintroducing it later if their first frame-up bid fails.

Defense efforts began in Brisbane shortly after the three were arrested. A broad campaign in their defense is now being organized nationally on an emergency basis. During recent weeks, motions of support have been passed by the New South Wales Young Labor Council, the Victorian Young Labor Association state executive, the Australian Union of Students national executive, the National Conference of Secondary Students, and the Oatley (NSW) branch of the Australian Labor party.

Emergency Committees to Defend the Brisbane Three were established in Adelaide on September 4, Sydney on September 9, and Melbourne on September 11. All three committees decided to hold actions around October 13, the date when the case first comes up for consideration by the court. The trial may not begin on October 13, but an opening date will probably be set then.

The September 9 Sydney meeting attracted about fifty persons, including members of the Young Labor Association, Campaign Against Racial Exploitation, Macquarie University Anti-Racist Society, Student Action for Aboriginal Australians (Sydney University), University of New South Wales Students Union, the Communist party of Australia, the Socialist Workers League, the Communist League, and the Spartacist League.

The newly formed committee decided to hold a public meeting on October 17 and to organize a petition campaign. The committee is also making plans to raise funds for the campaign and the legal defense. (John Garcia, who is not Black, cannot be defended by the Aboriginal Legal Service and has to pay his own legal defense costs.)

The Melbourne Emergency Committee was founded by a meeting that included representatives from the Australian Union of Students, the Campaign Against Racial Exploitation, and several political organizations. The committee decided to organize a demonstration outside the Queensland Tourist Bureau on October 13, as well as public meetings on campuses.

In Adelaide, the Emergency Committee has scheduled a rally for October 14 and is planning meetings on campus and in the city.

The ad hoc Committee for the Defence of the Brisbane Three in Brisbane is planning a demonstration outside the Queensland Supreme Court for October 13.

A speaking tour by John Garcia in late August gave a boost to the effort to build a defense campaign on a national scale. Meetings were held in Sydney, Adelaide, Melbourne, and Brisbane, jointly sponsored by the Communist League and the Socialist Workers League. The meetings drew between forty and eighty persons and endorsed the call for an emergency defense effort.

Opening the first of the meetings in Sydney, Jim McIlroy of the SWL said of the frame-up attempt against the three: "This is probably the biggest frame-up attempt since the Wobblies were railroaded to jail during and after the first world war." (In 1916 twelve leaders of the Industrial Workers of the World were framed up on a charge of conspiracy to commit arson and sent to prison. The government used the opportunity to pass repressive legislation and ban the organization. The IWW's widely circulated newspaper *Direct Action* was soon forced to cease publication.)

The defense campaign has appealed for international support and solidarity for Walker, Fogarty, and Garcia, whose only crime was to stand up and fight to improve the lot of Black people in Australia. Letters of protest may be sent to Queensland Premier Bjelke-Petersen in Brisbane. A dossier on the case has been prepared, outlining the history of the harassment of the three as well as providing information about conditions for Blacks on Palm Island and in other areas of Queensland. Copies may be obtained for 50 cents from the Ad Hoc Committee for the Defence, 19 Fortescue Street, Spring Hill, Queensland 4000. □

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New York and Berkeley: Reaction to the Buddhist Demonstrations

By Fred Halstead

The unity in New York was not merely formal. It was organized around specific actions. This would generally prove to be the key to unity in the antiwar movement for the duration of the war. The movement as a whole was composed of such diverse forces that it could not unify on any sort of extensive program but only around some specific action against the war. The various programs found expression in speakers, literature, and even in different contingents all involved in the same action.

The problem of effecting unity then came down to the calling of actions around which the various forces could unify. But after the Second International Days of Protest the NCC refused to do this. The SDS national office was no less remiss, though SDS was still growing and its local chapters were still often mainly devoted to antiwar activity on their own.

SDS had long since ceased to lead in national antiwar initiatives. If anything, it catered to the moods of frustration and

groups, such as SDS, the Du Bois Clubs, and Progressive Labor, but was a strong sentiment among some of those who were not affiliated with a multi-issue radical group. The particular antiwar committee or coalition to which they belonged seemed the logical form to use for the implementation of their general radical program.

A feeling of frustration with antiwar activity intensified this attitude. "We're tired of marching" was a common complaint, by which was meant not physical exhaustion, but boredom and a sense of futility. This mood would often take over immediately after a successful activity—successful in the sense that it involved relatively large numbers and included many people who had not been involved before. Then the escalation of the war would continue. Without a clear historical perspective—something the "new left" in general and SDS in particular disparaged—it appeared that the antiwar movement was powerless to change policy on the war itself.

In the March 1966 issue of *Liberation*, Muste commented:

"One hears it said by some that groups like Students for a Democratic Society should not concentrate on anti-Vietnam war activity as S.D.S. did in 1965 leading up to the April 17 demonstration in Washington. The reason often given is that the U.S. course in the war is only a symptom of a deeper trouble, that the real problem is to build a democratic society from the ground up. This, the reasoning continues, should lead to community projects in which people are helped in a 'participatory democracy' pattern to deal with their own problems. From a very different quarter I have heard people criticize the peace and pacifist movements as 'crisis oriented' and hence ineffective."

Referring to the "seventh war from now" argument, Muste said:

"It seems to me that the idea of accepting one's impotence in relation to the present war but getting ready to prevent or stop a later one is, on reflection, sophistry. . . . The war which in one way or another we support or acquiesce in or, on the other hand, oppose is always the going one."

Muste then touched upon what could prove to be the truly historic role—in the long-term sense—of the American movement against the Vietnam war. That is to break the traditional pattern of domestic reform movements concerning themselves solely with national or local issues while going along with the foreign policy of American capitalism including its imperialist wars. This pattern even involved the expectation among many union officials and some civil rights leaders that concessions for their constituencies would be paid for out of the profits resulting from successful prosecution of imperialist wars abroad. At the very least it involved tacit agreement by such reformist leaders not to rock the boat on foreign policy, in return for a more sympathetic ear within the government. Such considerations underlay the approach of the bulk of American labor leaders, and of the leaders of the NAACP and the Urban League toward the war. They were a factor in the hesitancy of even such pacifist figures as James Farmer of CORE and Martin Luther King to campaign against the war.

With this chapter we continue the serialization of **Out Now!—A Participant's Account of the American Antiwar Movement** by Fred Halstead. Copyright © 1976 by the Anchor Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed by permission. To be published by Monad Press.

impotence that from time to time would take over much of the organized movement. These were strongly manifest in the late spring and early summer of 1966 and continued through the elections. Even before the Second International Days of Protest, for example, SDS President Carl Oglesby characterized the antiwar activity as a "wilderness of warmed-over speeches and increasingly irrelevant demonstrations."¹

The reasons for the periodic ebbs were not always due to the objective conditions, such as events in the war itself, or the centrifugal pressures of an election period. There were also significant subjective factors which would repeat themselves with remarkable regularity.

From 1965 to 1973, the antiwar sentiment was the main—but by no means the only—engine for a broader radicalization. People would challenge the war and many would find themselves looking for the causes, questioning other features of American life, and beginning to develop one or another general radical perspective. There was a tendency to assume that everyone else opposed to the war had come to the same conclusions as themselves and to try to use the antiwar committees or coalitions for other purposes. This tendency existed not only with the liberals seeking to reform the Democratic Party and with certain of the multi-issue radical

1. *Studies on the Left*, January-February 1966, p. 54.

Said Muste:

"There is what seems to me an even more basic reason why all true democrats and revolutionaries have to face up to the Vietnam issue. The prevailing pattern of American development and of the reaction of liberals, progressives and radicals to that development since about 1910 has been that of attempts, more or less successful, to deal with domestic economic and social problems, accompanied by what basically amounted to drifting into an international course which led to war, to uncontrolled military-technological escalation, to 'hardening into bitter empire.' . . . [B]y that fatalistic process we moved as a sleep-walker might to the devastation of Europe and Japan, to the production of A- and H-bombs, to the unspeakable atrocities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to Santo Domingo and Vietnam. It seems to me it will be a fatal mistake if we lose this perspective now. It is true that there are poor here, but the problem of poverty is most acutely one of the poor in Asia, Africa and Latin America. . . . The Great Society has yet to be built here and not by appropriations from above. But the Great Society, if there is to be one, will be a world phenomenon, not an American."

In the same article Muste declared: "So this is a call to escalate the protests. I have in mind demonstrations, parades, picketing, vigils, sit-ins, fasts, mass rallies, street-corner meetings, draft-card burnings, nonviolent invasions of missile bases, arms factories, the White House and the Pentagon, 'unauthorized' journeys of Americans to Vietnam, anything and everything of this kind anyone can think of."

Muste himself made a trip to Vietnam in April, not to the North, but to South Vietnam. According to Bradford Lyttle of CNVA, the idea for the trip had first occurred some months previously "when Premier Ky passed a law in South Vietnam saying that anyone publicly advocating peace would be liable to summary execution. A number of us noted this in the *New York Times* and it seemed to us that this created a situation in which one could carry out a very effective nonviolent action project for peace in Saigon. The Ky law was somewhat like the law which Congress passed recently against draft-card mutilation. [Johnson signed that measure into law August 30, 1965.] As soon as a law like this is passed, there is something inside pacifists which says that this law must be publicly and openly violated in order to show that such laws cannot terrify or terrorize the people."²

While the CNVA members were getting passports and making preparations for such a trip, a wave of demonstrations swept South Vietnam. Initiated by Buddhists on March 10 when Ky ousted Buddhist sympathizer General Nguyen Canh Thi from the ruling group, the protests soon spread to soldiers and students and assumed an antiwar character, calling for peace and American withdrawal. These demonstrations and the attempts by Ky to crush them had been going on for over a month when Muste led a delegation of six CNVA members on a flight to Saigon.

At the same time the Parade Committee held a demonstration in Times Square April 16 in solidarity with the Vietnamese demonstrators. This Parade Committee action did not involve civil disobedience, but for the time it was a bold plan. The idea was to ring the six-block Square area with marchers walking single file on the sidewalks. No permit was necessary for this. Such a strung-out demonstration, however, would mingle with the regular Times Square crowds and could not be defended against concerted attacks if the bystanders were hostile. The object was to prove that the antiwar sentiment was not really confined to the relatively small numbers who had demonstrated, but that such demonstrators would not meet with serious hostility from the ordinary American in the street, not even in Times Square, an area frequented by GIs on leave.

Some 4,500 demonstrators showed up and there was remarkably

little heckling and no violence. Such hecklers as appeared were isolated by the ordinary bystanders who, if they were not outright friendly to the demonstrators, at least respected the right of the demonstrators to dissent on this war. Such an atmosphere had never previously existed in the U.S. during a war in modern times.

We did not attempt this kind of demonstration blindly. We knew that the atmosphere was changing rapidly in spite of the frustration and discouragement felt in some movement circles. The war was being questioned ever more widely in the population as a whole. In part this was due to the cumulative effect of antiwar activity in face of the escalation, in part to the effect on the American population of the Buddhist demonstrations in South Vietnam, and in part to the recent hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which were widely publicized. The hearings had effectively exposed as ridiculously weak many of the administration arguments in support of its war policy, though the committee members, including Fulbright, continued to vote for the war appropriations. They invoked the "support our boys" problem—or excuse.

We had an interesting experience in this regard with the GIs who happened to be visiting Times Square the day of the demonstration. When they first saw us they would tend to be hostile. They had probably never seen antiwar demonstrators face to face before, and from the major news media or their orientation officers could only have obtained the impression that we were unsympathetic to their situation. But when we showed them our signs that said: "Support Our Boys—Bring Them Home Now," they were taken aback. A little face-to-face conversation soon revealed that some of them were as opposed to this war as we were—even more angry about it. And the rest were full of doubts and for the most part willing to listen to our arguments.

The six pacifists who went to Saigon were Muste, Lyttle, Karl Meyer of the *Catholic Worker*, Professor William Davidon of Haverford College, Barbara Deming, an editor of *Liberation*, and Sherry Thurber, a student who had been active in civil rights. They discovered a visa wasn't necessary for Americans traveling to Saigon for a week or less, so they bought tickets in their own names, stopped in Tokyo to make contact with pacifists in Saigon through the Japanese peace movement, and got into Saigon without incident.

On April 20 they held a press conference in a Saigon hotel which was broken up by plainclothes agents of the Saigon regime. On April 21 they attempted a vigil outside the American embassy, were immediately arrested by the South Vietnamese authorities, and put on a plane for Hong Kong. An American reporter was beaten by Saigon police in the process and the whole affair received considerable publicity worldwide. Muste returned to the U.S. more convinced than ever that the American antiwar movement had to stay in the streets during the summer regardless of the election campaign.

But in spite of repeated suggestions the NCC declined to act. On May 4 the Parade Committee held a meeting at which it decided to call a major mass action during the August 6-9 period, the anniversary of the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In a separate vote it decided to call on other groups and countries to do likewise, that is, to call another International Days of Protest August 6-9. A motion was made that the theme of the New York demonstration be "Bring the Troops Home Now." It passed with only one dissenting vote.³

The meeting also set a Manhattan Center rally for May 23, at which Muste would speak on his Saigon trip and the call for August 6-9 would be released publicly. In the meantime, Muste agreed to send a letter appealing for the August 6-9 actions to committees around the country.

On May 10 Muste sent the letter on Parade Committee

2. *Liberation*, May-June 1966, p. 11.

3. Parade Committee minutes, May 4, 1966. Parade Committee file, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison.

stationery, also signed by committee coordinators Norma Becker and Dave Dellinger. Anticipating some of the arguments against the action, the letter declared: "Despite the traditional summer lull, the Committee feels that the urgency of the Vietnam situation requires large-scale protests that cannot be postponed till the fall without the danger of cruel insensitivity to heart-rending appeals of the Vietnamese people. The main anti-Ky, anti-U.S. demonstrations took place *after* the March 26 International Days of Protest, further exposing the hypocrisy of U.S. pretensions and creating new reservoirs of persons who are disillusioned with the war and ready to take part in public protests. Intensive community organizing campaigns have been planned for many areas of the country, as part of a determined effort to broaden the base of the movement. These campaigns should activate new people, and major demonstrations, in turn, will add drama, color and concreteness to these crucial organizing efforts. . . . Let multitudes rally in all parts of the world on those days. Let peace-minded persons and organizations in every state of the United States and in every country of the world devise ways to call for an end to military intervention in Vietnam as a first imperative step to ending the threat of nuclear war and bringing justice, freedom and peace to mankind."⁴

During this period the Parade Committee staff called both the NCC Madison office and the office of the *Bring the Troops Home Now Newsletter*, then published in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to ask for their support for August 6-9.

On May 11, the *Newsletter* sent a letter to all supporters informing them of the Parade Committee plans and saying: "We urge you to take this up with your committee and get the ball rolling. Even though many campuses have no summer session, the potential still exists to build a large and effective Days of Protest."⁵

The May 9 issue of *Peace and Freedom News*, the NCC newsletter, made no mention of August 6-9 and devoted its front page to an article on the various candidates who would be speaking at a SANE convention, and a "voters pledge" presentation outside the White House scheduled for May 15 by SANE.

On May 15, Emspak wrote to Dellinger as follows: "I received the call from the NY Parade Committee on Friday. It sounds very final. I was under the impression from my conversation with you that you intended this to be a sort of a poll of opinion, not a statement of fact. It seems that you are going to call a press conference no matter what people say."

Emspak said he did not object to the International Days of Protest, only to the timing. With schools out, a summer demonstration would be smaller than those the previous fall and spring, inviting unfavorable comparison. Certain international groups had decided to commemorate July 20, the anniversary of the 1954 Geneva Accords, and couldn't move again by August 6. "Furthermore," said Emspak, "a demonstration provides an excuse not to think about tactics and strategy carefully. People have something that is easy to do and which does not require real long term commitment. It seems to me that we should allow enough time to elapse to develop both thinking and projects for long term aims. Also, I think that summer projects will have a tendency to be turned into campaigns to organize for another demonstration which will not be as useful as the long term work they can be doing."

In this letter Emspak also indicated that he knew the NCC was being bypassed and didn't like it. ". . . if national action is called now, we have the means in the NCC to hold polls and try to get a national feeling about it. It seems to me that the actions of the

Parade Committee in this light do great harm to the idea of national coordination and democracy within the movement."⁶

The last point was not well received by the Parade Committee staff. We knew Emspak was avoiding a meeting of the NCC standing committee, and we were not willing to wait while the decision to *act* was submitted to the tender mercies of one of Emspak's polls.

At the May 18 Parade Committee meeting the whole question was opened again in light of the NCC opposition. After long discussion, it was voted to proceed with August 6-9 in New York, to invite other groups around the country to join in, but, in a compromise suggested by Muste, to hold off announcing it as an International Days of Protest.

It was also agreed that speakers at the May 23 meeting would include I.F. Stone and Isaac Deutscher, who would be in the country, having been invited to Berkeley for the first anniversary of the Vietnam Day teach-in there.

In a sense the May 23 meeting was in itself a test of strength. Partisans of the NCC national office were afraid of it. At best the CP and the Du Bois Clubs took an ambivalent attitude toward it. They couldn't denounce the gathering openly, but they didn't build it either, partly because of the problem with Emspak and partly because they were not too eager to build a meeting featuring Deutscher, the biographer of Trotsky and a well-known critic of Soviet policies from a Marxist point of view.

Some 1,500 showed up, however, which made it a modest success. There Dellinger made the public announcement about August 6-9, reporting that groups in twenty-five cities across the country had indicated plans for demonstrations on those days, as well as groups in a number of other countries. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Otto Nathan, the executor of Albert Einstein's estate, and a Parade Committee stalwart. Nathan opened the rally with a statement that the committee had a clear-cut reply to President Johnson's recent demand that his critics should state an alternative policy. To loud applause Nathan declared: "Mr. President, bring our boys home now!"

Muste charged that the Johnson administration was fanning a dangerous anticommunist hysteria in the country. (On March 4, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach had petitioned for the registration of the Du Bois Clubs with the Subversive Activities Control Board, a remnant of the McCarthy witch-hunt period.) Muste referred to recent incidents such as the bombings of the San Francisco Du Bois Club headquarters and the Berkeley VDC office and the murder of Leo Bernard—a YSAer and an activist in the Detroit CEWV—by an anticommunist fanatic. Said Muste: "I hope none of us will slow down our opposition because of such incidents." Referring to the growing questioning of the war policies in Congress, he said the administration may be trying to find a way to "save face" in Vietnam, but that is not the responsibility of the antiwar movement which must keep up the pressure. "If we yield in any way," he concluded, "or slow down our intransigent opposition to the war, we shall be traitors to everything human. But if we continue, we shall have the undying gratitude of the overwhelming majority of the people of the earth."⁷

Deutscher delivered a stirring defense of the Vietnamese revolution, and concluded with a tribute to the American antiwar movement, declaring its emergence a momentous development in U.S. and world history and a great source of optimism for the future. "I hope you won't permit your voice to be stifled," he said. "See yourself in the historical perspective. See the weight of what you are doing!"⁸

4. Parade Committee mailing, May 10, 1966. A Call for International Days of Protest Against the War in Vietnam on August 6 to 9. Parade Committee file, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.

5. To All Newsletter Supporters. From Gus Horowitz for the *Newsletter*, May 11, 1966. (Copy in author's files.)

6. Letter from Emspak to Dellinger, May 15, 1966. Parade Committee file, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.

7. *Militant*, May 30, 1966.

8. *Ibid.*

After the meeting Deutscher spoke with Muste and a few others of us in a nearby restaurant. He and Dellinger had just returned from the Berkeley event and had been disappointed that it was much smaller than the previous year. Clearly, the movement on the West Coast was in crisis, and in an ebb for the moment. But Deutscher was sure the movement nationally would find its resurgence and was pleasantly surprised that the ebb had not affected New York to the same degree.

* * *

The same frustrations and centrifugal tendencies that affected the movement nationally also affected the Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee—even more drastically. Berkeley had long been a peculiar sort of island unto itself. It was a lovely little city occupying a geographically distinct and favored spot. It lay between the water on the west and high rolling hills on the east, free of the summer heat on the other side of the hills, of the chill fog of San Francisco across the bay, and of the factories and urban sprawl of Oakland to the south with its large working-class Black ghetto. Berkeley was near enough to be acutely aware, but not really a part, of the urban, industrial, military, agribusiness, and transportation complexes surrounding it.

Both the city and the university had always been comfortably controlled by California's richest families, largely through an appointed board of regents in which all power over the university was—and still is—vested. But certain material privileges were consciously cultivated for the community and a superficial freedom in philosophical matters was tolerated, if not encouraged.

These factors—not the least of which was the relatively cheap and easy living for those who could maintain some connection with the huge university—had long attracted a radical-intellectual-bohemian milieu which included perpetual students in their late twenties or early thirties and nonstudent hangers-on. Because of this, Berkeley in a very small measure escaped the total impact of the witch-hunt of the 1950s when the "silent generation" dominated America's campuses and none of the major radical tendencies were able to maintain viable student groups. Berkeley was one of the very few universities in the country—if not the only one—where an avowedly socialist organization existed throughout that decade.⁹

Beginning in 1960 and for some years following the breakthrough of the Free Speech Movement in 1964, the Berkeley milieu was like a hothouse in which every sort of experimental idea, mood, and fad could take root and even flourish until it was tested in the real world outside the rarefied atmosphere of the street and coffeehouse culture of Telegraph Avenue. As with many ephemeral offshoots of bohemia, much of this would not pass the test, though something of lasting value would occasionally emerge that would not have had the chance to get started elsewhere.

But the very factors that allowed Berkeley to act as a vanguard—a high degree of sensitivity to changing trends in the general population combined with a separation from the often conservative concerns of the workaday world—made the Berkeley milieu even more subject to moods of frustration and impotence as the antiwar movement faced the ebb following its first exciting year. The Berkeley milieu was also quicker to grasp at straws and seek solutions, not in persistent groundwork for the next upsurge, but in grandiose schemes and shortcuts.

All of this was personified in the figure of Jerry Rubin. Some of his strongest qualities now became his weakest. Rubin returned from the Milwaukee NCC meeting in a determined mood, but it

9. It was the Third Camp-oriented Independent Socialist League of which Hal Draper was a leader. Michael Harrington was also a member of the ISL until it entered the SP-SDF in 1958. Some of its members founded the Independent Socialist Club, which later became the International Socialists (IS).

quickly shifted from one focus to another. Following his report on the NCC to a VDC general membership meeting, he supported a motion to put the VDC formally on record as standing for immediate withdrawal. It passed unanimously. The pressure in Berkeley on this issue was so strong that the Du Bois Club members simply didn't fight for this aspect of their own organization's national policy. But Rubin soon gave up his plans to breathe new life into the NCC. Instead, he threw himself into an election campaign in the seventh congressional district, which included Berkeley and part of Oakland's Black ghetto.

Robert Scheer, the author of the by-then famous pamphlet *How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam*, an editor of *Ramparts*, and a well-known Berkeley radical-liberal, was planning to run in the Democratic Party primary against Congressman Jeffrey Cohelan, a moderate liberal who was then still a down-the-line supporter of Johnson's Vietnam policy.

Rubin, Steve Weissman of SDS, and most of the leaders of the VDC had already supported a motion at a VDC meeting November 19 to endorse the Scheer candidacy. That was before the campaign was officially announced. It was, however, understood that those who didn't choose to back Scheer could remain in the VDC and build its antiwar activity. The motion passed by a two-thirds majority in a meeting of 150 activists, with the YSAers, Weinberg, and some of the other radicals opposed, the CP and the Du Bois Clubs in favor. At that time the question of how much the VDC itself would be involved in Scheer's campaign was left open.

Scheer had the support of the Berkeley liberals, and even of part of the left wing of the Democratic Party machine, including Simon Casady, head of the California Democratic Council (CDC). (The orthodox Johnson forces punished Casady by removing him from this post.) But Scheer also appealed for support and direct participation from the radicals. He declared he would campaign for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam and emphasize other radical issues.

In mid-January, Rubin declared, "I decided to stay in Berkeley at this time instead of going to work for the NCC because I believe that we here in this area are about to launch the most exciting political development in the left in the country. . . ."

"The Bay Area is a radical's dream. Oakland is a city teeming with unrest, exploitation and potential new social forces. The potential coalition includes a mass radical student base, a liberal middle class, and the large Negro ghettos. These forces must now combine issues—ranging from poverty, slums and racial discrimination to the war in Vietnam, to the *quality* of life in America—and offer new politics in the Bay Area."

Rubin retained what he regarded as his radical perspective but exhibited a certain naiveté with regard to its chances inside the Democratic primary:

"The Berkeley VDC has not yet decided whether or not to make this move. Certainly if it does it will maintain its own identity within the new alliance and continue direct action protests. But I am going to argue that we put much of our energy into the new direction of a political candidate in this district against liberal-fink Congressman Jeffrey Cohelan. The goal of this campaign will be quite simply, the beginning of a long-range change from radical protest to radical protest-politics."

"I reject the notion of electoral politics which argues that we must get the best we can in a liberal-labor coalition today. I am talking about a radical alternative, and probably a 20-year struggle. The question for me is whether or not our beautiful movement is ready now to begin the task of constructing nonviolent revolution."

"The experiment to be launched very shortly in the Bay Area with the campaign against Cohelan . . . will be, along with the political experimentation in the South,¹⁰ the seeds of a third-party

10. Rubin's reference to the South was to the Mississippi Freedom

radical new left in America.

"I am very excited at these possibilities."¹¹

Earlier in a debate with Steve Weissman, Duncan Stewart, assistant editor of the *VDC News*, declared that socialist candidates could make a better case for VDC endorsement, since they were running for office under a political party that was against the war and not for it. But he opposed the VDC endorsing them either, in order to avoid forcing nonsocialists out. Stewart continued: "To turn the VDC into the 'campus arm' of the forces in the Democratic Party that are supporting Scheer would be a very serious blow to the Berkeley VDC. It will make Berkeley the first independent committee against the war to fall prey to coalition politics. Let those who want to join the . . . Democratic Party do so—but let them not try to drag the Vietnam Day Committee with them."¹²

On January 19 the VDC held a meeting to decide whether or not to work with the Scheer campaign. A statement was presented in support of this proposition signed by Barbara Gullahorn, Marilyn Milligan, Steve Weissman, and Jerry Rubin. It said in part:

"We believe that the building of a new America—a radical and human America—based on independent power at the grass roots is the most pressing need in our society. At present, however, because of California election law, there is no effective forum other than the Democratic primary in which to advocate the creation of this independent power. Thus our participation in the Democratic primary is purely tactical: We do not believe that the Democratic Party can be reformed. We believe that the Democratic Party is a barrier to the social changes which the people of this country so desperately need."¹³

Stewart's position was supported by the YSA, as well as by the ISC of which Weinberg was now a member. For Rubin, the fact that Scheer was running in the Democratic primary was just a detour through which he hoped to maneuver. For the Du Bois Clubs, however, as well as for the liberals, it was directly in line with their settled perspective.

The YSAers knew they were at a distinct disadvantage in this discussion. Their own electoral stand, while quite straightforward and clear—under no conditions would they support a Democrat or Republican in an election—was simply rejected out of hand by almost everyone else. For almost all other Americans—including 90 percent of the radicals—the SWP and YSA position on elections was and still is, in great measure, the most difficult of concepts to grasp, or at least to agree with.

Unlike many countries where masses of workers—not to mention radicals—would no more think of voting for a capitalist party than they would think of voting for their boss as president of their union, in the United States the two major parties have had such a total monopoly on the electoral process that the tradition of independent working-class political action that flourished before the First World War has been largely wiped out. In 1966 it had been half a century since any candidate on a socialist ticket had been elected to Congress. A vote for a socialist candidate was generally considered a wasted vote.

The Socialist Workers Party enjoyed a certain grudging respect for keeping alive the dim embers of independent socialist electoral action, and the other radicals would often speak of the need to

Democratic Party—a move by civil rights forces to reform the state Democratic Party—and to the Lowndes County (Alabama) Freedom Organization, an independent Black-dominated electoral party whose symbol was a black panther and which advocated self-defense. The symbol would soon be taken by a group of Black radical youth in Oakland who would found the Black Panther Party.

11. *VDC News*, January 28, 1966.

12. *Ibid.*, November 15, 1965.

13. Statement on the Scheer Campaign by Rubin, et al. (Copy in author's files.)

resurrect the tradition. But when it came down to an actual election in which there appeared to be some difference on an important issue between the candidates in the two major parties, the rest of the radicals would generally react in shocked disbelief when the SWP and YSA stood by their anticapitalist electoral principle.

During the debate at the January 19 meeting YSAer Syd Stapleton drew an ovation when he declared: "You shouldn't be burning your draft cards, you should be burning your Democratic Party cards."¹⁴ But the great majority nevertheless endorsed the Scheer campaign.

For the Trotskyists the fundamental issue involved was very simple: An election poses the question of state power. As socialist revolutionaries they would never support the right of a capitalist party to hold state power. But the simplicity of this idea didn't make it any easier for the others to accept, and Rubin's tortured arguments about maneuvers inside the Democratic primary appeared far more relevant and realistic to the average Berkeley radical than the electoral stand of the YSA.

The YSAers had no chance to convince the majority of the VDC activists—not to mention the mass of students who had responded to VDC calls for action—not to vote for Scheer because he was running in the Democratic primary. Nor did they consider this necessary so far as their work in the VDC was concerned. Their strongest argument was that the VDC as such should not endorse candidates, but should concentrate on antiwar activity directly, while VDC members could, as individuals or members of political groups, take whatever electoral stand they wished. But in January 1966 the YSAers could not yet carry this point.

The January 19 meeting resulted in effect in a cold split, with Rubin, Steve Weissman of SDS, the Du Bois Clubs, and the liberals concentrating their time and energies on Scheer's campaign, and the YSA, Weinberg, and some of the independents trying to keep the VDC alive in direct antiwar activity. The latter group included independents such as Bill Miller and Mike Delacour, who personally endorsed Scheer, but who wanted the VDC to concentrate on antiwar activity.

Scheer kept his promise to make opposition to the American presence in Vietnam a central feature of his campaign, and the primary in the seventh district came to be widely regarded as a referendum on the war. But this very fact increased the tendency—pushed hard by the liberals and professional Democratic politicians backing Scheer—to water down any general radical thrust in the interest of getting out the maximum vote and winning the election.

Those who had expected this campaign to be the beginning of a new multi-issue radical formation became increasingly disillusioned. What is more, in order to vote in the primary it was necessary to be registered as a member of the Democratic Party. Pressure on the radicals to do so and to join the CDC was an early feature of the Scheer effort. The roughly one thousand students who worked actively on Scheer's campaign found themselves building the Democratic Party apparatus, not an apparatus for a new radical politics, and some of them didn't like it.

For a short time Rubin was Scheer's campaign manager. But Rubin was neither a careerist nor a liar. He actually tried to do what he said he was going to do—use the campaign to build a base for his conception of a new radical politics. The liberals and hard-nosed politicians were appalled at Rubin's approach—proposing a "Jefferson-Marx" fund-raising affair, for example—and he was soon forced out.

At the election in June, Scheer got 45 percent of the vote, a remarkable showing, especially considering the money and muscle the national Democratic Party machine had marshaled against him. The shaken Cohelan soon began slipping over to the ranks of the congressional doves, along with many others taking

14. Taped interview with Lew Jones, September 2, 1975.

their distance from Johnson's reputation on the war. (By 1968, Cohelan would lose to Ron Dellums, an outright supporter of the antiwar movement.) Scheer did not go on—as Rubin had first hoped he would—to run an independent campaign in the 1966 general election as part of the “seeds of a third-party radical new left in America.”

Most of the students who had thrown themselves into the Scheer campaign simply dropped out of antiwar activity for the next period, and some of the radicals among them renounced all electoral activity as an effective means of building a multi-issue radical movement. Scheer himself would later embrace this position, for a time, at least.

Meanwhile the VDC faced an uphill battle to maintain antiwar activity. In February the VDC began pressing for a campus-wide referendum on the war. In preparation for this they organized a move to turn the classrooms into discussions on the war. Four hundred teaching assistants voted to endorse this plan and these discussions were actually held in more than one-third of the classes. On February 9, between four and five thousand students walked out of classes to attend a rally against the war. The administration granted the referendum. When it was finally held in May as part of the student elections, there were six positions on the ballot: Immediate withdrawal, UN-supervised elections, negotiations and cease-fire, stay in but maintain a defensive posture, endorse Johnson's current position, all-out escalation. The eight groups on campus considered radical, including the YSA, the ISC, the Scheer campaign, the Du Bois Clubs, and the Faculty Peace Committee, issued a joint statement calling for a vote for immediate withdrawal. It won, with the other positions gaining a descending number of votes in the order listed above. It was clear the antiwar sentiment was still spreading, but many antiwar activists were nevertheless becoming discouraged.

In early March, while the leading YSAers were out of town attending the YSA convention, a group of former activists in the VDC, including Du Bois Clubs members, but not Rubin, declared the VDC moribund and set up a new, multi-issue radical organization called the Peace/Rights Organizing Committee. It carried out only one significant activity. It produced most of the signs distributed to the audience at the March 25 ceremonies where Ambassador Goldberg spoke. It broke up and disappeared soon afterward. Once again, its founders simply couldn't agree on what the multi-issue program should be.

In early April, the remaining VDC activists called a demonstration for Telegraph Avenue on April 12 in solidarity with the South Vietnamese protests then in full swing. The liberals in the Scheer campaign were afraid the VDC action would reflect badly on the campaign, and tried to get it called off.

The VDC persisted. The VDC tried but failed to obtain a permit for Telegraph Avenue where the rally was scheduled. Four days before the demonstration, the VDC headquarters was bombed, injuring four persons and destroying the office. The VDC announced it would proceed with the demonstration on Telegraph Avenue anyway.

On April 12 about 4,000 persons gathered on the avenue near Moe's Book Store, where the demonstration had been scheduled. The committee's sound truck was quickly approached by police to halt the rally, but it turned out the main sound equipment was set up in a second-story apartment above the bookstore. The speakers, including the writer Paul Goodman and Peter Camejo, were barricaded inside and started speaking from the fire escape outside the window. The police started breaking down the barricade. They tried to arrest everyone in the room but somehow Camejo and Syd Stapleton slipped out—they were later indicted—to join the crowd. After some difficulty, they got about half of it to march on city hall, with Patty Iiyama leading a group of about 100 women to get it started. There the police charged again and the crowd dispersed.

The liberals among the Scheer forces were furious lest the

campaign be connected in the public mind with such goings on. Scheer denounced the demonstration. That made the VDC activists furious.

A week later a general membership meeting was held to refurbish the VDC and elect a steering committee. (Before that, the steering committee had been voluntary, which sometimes meant anyone who could catch Rubin's ear.) Three YSAers, Jaimey Allen, Pete Camejo, and Syd Stapleton, presented a position paper which declared: “We cannot let the problems and difficulties of sustaining the VDC lead us to simply throw it aside as though it were a passing phenomenon of Berkeley radicalism. The Berkeley VDC has simply been an expression of the protest against the Vietnam war and as such it is part of the general phenomenon throughout the country. The VDC is not an answer to all problems. It cannot be the organizational form for protest on many issues precisely because it has succeeded in uniting us around the question of Vietnam and provided a working basis for people with many different approaches to unite in support of self-determination for Vietnam.”¹⁵

Some 120 activists attended the meeting, but except for Rubin, who had already had his falling out with the Scheer campaign committee, the Scheer forces, including Steve Weissman and the Du Bois Club members, stayed away. The tenor of the meeting was captured in a letter written at the time by Lew Jones, who described the election of the steering committee:

“Syd [Stapleton] received a near unanimous vote—by far the largest anyone else received. Weinberg was second. Three independents were next, followed by Peter [Camejo], who got a majority of votes of those present, followed by Jaimey [Allen] and another independent. . . . Rubin was nominated, but didn't receive a majority of votes and so was not elected. The meeting was very spirited—during the nominations people like Bettina [Aptheker, a leading Du Bois Club member] and Weissman were nominated, but that just resulted in riotous laughter and their names were not even put on the blackboard. Rumors were afloat that Scheer would show and ‘expose the VDC’ as he had threatened. So at one point in the meeting a coed got up and moved that they send a message to Scheer telling him, ‘to go fuck himself.’ This was not voted on, but would have passed.”

All of this might have seemed a victory for the YSA's line, but, according to Jones, “it was too much of a victory. It is important that Bettina and Rubin, and maybe a couple of others be on that steering committee. . . . Hopefully that will be taken care of at the next meeting.”¹⁶

Since the steering committee was to have fifteen members, and only eight received a majority vote at the first meeting, the next meeting had a runoff election for seven more. But in spite of Jones's admonition, Rubin didn't make it then either, and Aptheker and Weissman refused to attend.

These meetings also decided that the next major action would be another teach-in on May 21, 1966, the first anniversary of the massive first Vietnam Day.

In those days the YSA was still quite small, and its members were far outnumbered by others in the VDC; but it and the ISC were the only organized radical groups still trying to build the VDC. Though only three YSAers—Stapleton, Allen, and Camejo—sat on the fifteen-member steering committee, they were among the most active and they were all strong characters. Those opposed to the existence of a single-issue antiwar formation—which included the Scheer campaign and the Du Bois Clubs—simply dismissed the VDC as a “Trot front,” and actually campaigned against it.

15. Preliminary Suggestions for Reactivating the VDC by Stapleton, Allen, Camejo. Undated. (Copy in author's files.)

16. Letter from Lew Jones to Gus Horowitz and Peter Buch, April 22, 1966. (Copy in author's files.)

In part because of this, in part because of the general ebb then manifest, there was no chance that May 21 could repeat the success of the previous year. The organizers hoped for perhaps 3,000. But the event was rained out, and only about 1,000 showed up.

The crowd contributed some \$2,400, enough to cover expenses and pay off a small part of the enormous debt left over from the Rubin regime, but the event was otherwise considered a failure.

At the initiative of the YSAers, the Berkeley VDC called a broad meeting of the various antiwar groups in the Bay Area in an attempt to heal the split and lay plans for the August 6-9 protests called by the New York Parade Committee. The meeting, on June 23, was well attended. It agreed—with the CP and the Du Bois Clubs abstaining on the vote—to set up a Bay Area-wide committee to organize the August event. It was first called the August 6-9 Committee, and later the United Committee to End the War in Vietnam and was structured more like the Parade Committee than the old student-radical-dominated VDC. The VDC became the “campus VDC” with the more modest task of organizing the UC contingent for the broader action. The days of the old Berkeley VDC acting as the main focus for Bay Area antiwar work and playing a key role in initiating national and international activities were over.

For his part, Rubin swung from the Scheer campaign to pushing for a new mode of propaganda. The last issue of the *VDC News*, published a week before the May 21 event, carried the plaintive headline: “Do You Still Care?” On the back page appeared an article by Rubin about the film “Days of Protest,” a documentary on the October 1965 Berkeley demonstrations. Said Rubin: “To reach people we are going to have to develop a new political expression. Our puppet shows are a small start in this direction. We cannot rely on the printed word. People don’t like to read; we are an ear and eye culture. We need to develop the following tools of expression to develop new political communication: the film, music, rock-and-roll, comic strips. . . . The problem of the left is that so often when it talks it sounds so much like the Left, so sectarian. Few speakers can overcome this barrier. Mario Savio [a prominent figure in the 1964 Free Speech Movement] and Bob Scheer are rare exceptions. This film is a rare exception. It may be the best left progaganda made in recent history, and it may be our most important tool in rebuilding our movement.”¹⁷

The film wasn’t bad, but it could not possibly play the role Rubin hoped for it. Like many other Berkeley radicals—and not only in Berkeley—Rubin simply faded from the antiwar scene into the psychedelic street culture, then heavily influenced by the still legal drug LSD.

He showed up in August in Washington, exhibiting some of the old flare, wearing the costume of an American revolutionary of 1776 at a hearing of the House Un-American Activities Committee to which he had been subpoenaed. He was among a group arrested on the Berkeley campus in November in a demonstration against navy recruiters. In the spring of 1967 he ran his own impish campaign for mayor of Berkeley, emphasizing cultural radicalism. But it would be a full year after the Scheer campaign before he would once again step center stage in the antiwar movement.

* * *

For six weeks following the Parade Committee’s call for demonstrations August 6-9, 1966, the NCC Madison office continued to resist the idea. An example of the strained relations between the NCC and the Parade Committee was a June 6 letter

17. *VDC News*, May 14, 1966.

signed by Muste, Becker, and Dellinger and sent to committees across the country. It said:

“Through a misunderstanding, an inaccurate report on the Parade Committee’s action in relation to the suggested August 6-9 days of protest appeared attached to the May 19 issue of the *Peace and Freedom News*, published by the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam in Madison, Wisconsin.

“The letter stated: ‘Recently, many committees received a letter from the New York Parade Committee suggesting another International Days of Protest for the August 6-9 weekend. Originally, the letter stated that the Days would be announced at a meeting May 23. Subsequently, the Parade Committee voted to reconsider its program.’

“It is the last sentence which is inaccurate. Actually, the Parade Committee, at its May 18 meeting, voted to proceed with its plans for action in New York on the August 6-9 days, and to ask other groups nationally and internationally to have actions on the same dates. This was announced as planned, at the Manhattan Center rally May 23. The Parade Committee did, however, decide not to use the phrase “International Days of Protest” pending further discussion and contact with groups overseas.”¹⁸

Within the Parade Committee itself the centrifugal tendencies of the elections, the lack of unity on a national level, and the general ebb were being felt. The committee set June 18 for a citywide Peace Action Conference to develop plans for August 6-9. But as the meeting approached it appeared some of the affiliated groups were having second thoughts. There was little chance the action would be called off, but another sharp dispute was shaping up and the success of the August actions was in doubt.

A few days before the conference, however, a new development appeared which unified the Parade Committee, involved even broader forces, and laid out a new area of activity. A group of soldiers walked into Dellinger’s office and asked the Parade Committee for help in publicizing an action some of them were about to take. Thus began the case of the Fort Hood Three.

[Next chapter: *The Fort Hood Three and August 6-9*]

18. Parade Committee file, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.

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
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AROUND THE WORLD



Philippine Civil Liberties Group Demands Lifting of Martial Law

The Philippine Civil Liberties Union called on President Ferdinand Marcos September 23 to lift the state of emergency, which has been in effect for three years, and restore "democratic processes." The statement released by the group said that "after three years, martial law has failed in its avowed purpose of reforming society: if it has removed one set of oligarchs, it is only to replace them by others."

New Delhi Court Orders Release of Jailed Journalist

The New Delhi high court overturned the arrest of Kuldeep Nayar, a prominent Indian journalist, September 15. It declared that the arrest was illegal and unjustified since the regime had not brought any charges against Nayar.

The court ruling was a direct challenge to an amendment passed by Parliament in July putting arrests under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act above the Indian judicial system. "No order under the Security Act is beyond challenge," the judges declared. In anticipation of the ruling, the regime had released Nayar three days before.

Seven other persons arrested since Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's June 26 coup were released by the West Bengal government September 8. Among them were Haripada Bharati of the Hindu chauvinist Jan Sangh and Sushil Dhara of the rightist Bharatiya Lok Dal (People's party of India).

Home Affairs Minister K. Brahmananda Reddy claimed September 18 that 40 per-

cent of those arrested since the coup have been released. In early September, however, New Delhi announced that 380 persons had been arrested throughout India for publishing and displaying clandestine pamphlets and wall posters criticizing the state of emergency. In addition, fourteen printing presses were seized.

Ethiopian Unionists Call for Restoration of Democratic Rights

The Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU), which has 125,000 members throughout the country, released a manifesto September 24 denouncing the policies of the military regime. It threatened a general strike in one month if democratic rights are not restored. The statement by Ethiopia's largest labor federation was the most significant indicator so far of the growing opposition in Addis Ababa to military rule.

The CELU called for the release of CELU President Beyene Solomon, Vice-president Giday Gebre, and General Secretary Fiseha Tsion Tekae, who were arrested by the military regime in September 1974. It also warned that if more CELU leaders were arrested or if the regime interfered with the distribution of the manifesto to workers, "we will stop work immediately and will not return until our demands are met."

The CELU also demanded freedom of the press and assembly; an end to censorship; the right to strike; the right of civilian organizations to elect their own leaders democratically; the institution of a multi-party system; and the release of all detained students, teachers, and labor leaders. It denounced the extension for a second year of the regime's campaign of sending students to the countryside. The CELU called for the institution of workers councils to administer the nationalized companies and for the firing of state managers who were former owners of the companies.

Havana Pledges Support for Puerto Rican Independence

The international solidarity conference for the independence of Puerto Rico, meeting September 6-8 in Havana, called for "increased worldwide support for the independence of Puerto Rico and support for the Puerto Rican people."

Seventy-nine governments were repre-

sented at the conference, which was called by the World Peace Council. Representatives of eighteen international bodies were present.

The final document of the conference called for international protests to "denounce the danger posed by American military enclaves on Puerto Rican territory" and pointed to the need for a campaign "to stop the massive sterilization of Puerto Rican women."

Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós declared that his government's support for the cause of Puerto Rican independence is "not negotiable with the United States" and must not even constitute the theme of discussions with Washington.

The conference condemned Washington's control of Puerto Rico as "the most flagrant act of colonialism" in Latin America.

The Canadian Government Is Not Our Government

The native people of the Mackenzie Valley in the Northwest Territories (NWT) of Canada are demanding recognition as the Dene nation and recognition of their claim to 450,000 square miles of land in the western Arctic.

The Dene people make up the bulk of the population of this territory (they outnumber whites 30,000 to 12,000). The territory includes the area where the proposed Alaska natural-gas pipeline is to be built.

Labor Challenge, the Canadian revolutionary-socialist fortnightly, reports in its September 22 issue that 300 native delegates from twenty-five Mackenzie Valley communities voted at a July 17-23 conference in favor of a Dene Declaration of Rights. The declaration states in part:

"The Dene people find themselves as part of a country. That country is Canada. But the Government of Canada is not the government of the Dene. The government of the N.W.T. is not the government of the Dene. And while there are realities we are forced to submit to, such as the existence of a country called Canada, we insist on the right to self-determination as a distinct people and the recognition of the Dene nation."

Canadian Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Judd Buchanan rejected Dene demands September 10. "The concept of two nations is no more acceptable in the N.W.T. than in Quebec," he said.



Le Nouvel Observateur

Revelan Arsenal Secreto de Venenos Mortíferos de la CIA

Por Michael Baumann

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Reveal Secret CIA Arsenal of Deadly Poisons" que apareció en el número del 29 de septiembre de *Intercontinental Press*. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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En estremecedoras nuevas revelaciones, el testimonio dado ante el Comité Senatorial Selecto sobre Inteligencia ha revelado que la Central Intelligence Agency [CIA—Agencia Central de Inteligencia] gastó \$3 millones de dólares en el curso de dieciocho años para producir algunos de los venenos más letales conocidos por la ciencia. Dos cucharadas de un veneno de la CIA, una toxina de marisco, bastan para eliminar a cientos de miles de personas. No se conoce un antídoto.

Ha sido revelado además, a través de un reportaje del *Washington Post*, que el ex agente de la CIA E. Howard Hunt informó a sus compañeros que había recibido órdenes de envenenar al columnista de *Washington* Jack Anderson.

Las audiencias del Senado, las cuales continúan, han también hecho públicas las siguientes actividades del escuadrón de asesinato de la Casa Blanca conocido como la CIA:

- Además de la toxina de marisco, la CIA mantiene un arsenal de venenos que incluye veneno de cobra, estricnina y cianuro. Ha desarrollado también una poderosa pistola de dardos capaz de arrojar proyectiles venenosos a una distancia de cien metros casi en completo silencio.

- Ha acumulado sustancias que pueden causar enfermedades letales como tuberculosis, antrax, fiebre del valle, intoxicación con salmonela, y viruelas. Mantuvo disponible una buena provisión de sustancias que causan abortos en animales, así como un variado surtido de materiales "incapacitantes" que pueden reducir la presión arterial, causar amnesia temporal, dañar el funcionamiento de los riñones, y causar un agudísimo dolor.

- A mediados de la década de los sesenta la agencia llevó a cabo un simulacro de asesinato masivo durante el cual saturó una sección del sistema del tren subterráneo de Nueva York con un gas venenoso simulado.

- En 1969 la CIA realizó un experimento similar, en esta ocasión para probar la efectividad del envenenamiento del sistema central de agua potable de un edificio de

oficinas entero.

- La CIA ignoró una orden de la Casa Blanca de destruir las toxinas en 1970. La explicación actual del incumplimiento de la orden es que ninguna instrucción por escrito llegó a los "niveles medios" de la burocracia de la CIA. El ex director de la CIA Richard Helms y el anterior administrador delegado a cargo de las "operaciones encubiertas" Thomas Karamessines atestiguaron el 17 de septiembre que estaban "sorprendidos" al oír cinco años más tarde que la orden no fue cumplida.

De acuerdo con un reportaje de Jack Anderson del 15 de septiembre, el depósito secreto de venenos es tan sólo una pequeña parte del equipo de asesinato de la CIA.

"El comité de inteligencia del Senado," escribió, "tiene evidencia de que focos eléctricos explosivos, metralletas con silenciador con forma de portafolios, y docenas de otras armas de asesinato tipo James Bond han sido adquiridas en años recientes por las agencias de inteligencia de los Estados Unidos.

"Este arsenal secreto de instrumentos de asesinato exóticos incluye utensilios del hogar mortíferos pero con apariencia inofensiva y complejos sistemas explosivos de control remoto para volar a víctimas confiadas a millas de distancia.

"El comité tiene documentación sobre estas armas, así como información de primera mano sobre otra empresa de los servicios de inteligencia estadounidenses: un equipo de asesinato entrenado domésticamente cuyos miembros aprenden a matar sin dejar pista alguna."

El comité supuestamente ha sido incapaz de encontrar pruebas de que los instrumentos hayan sido utilizados. "Pero," dijo Anderson, "nuestros informantes comentaron mordazmente, 'si no estuvieran interesados en matar, ¿para qué necesitan estas cosas? Uno no usa un foco que le vuelva en pedazos la cabeza para leer el periódico.'"

Los investigadores del Senado no parecen haberse esforzado en investigar el asunto: "Por seis meses," descubrió Anderson a través de sus fuentes, "... el comité ha tenido en su posesión evidencia sobre las armas de asesinato y el escuadrón de exterminio. Algunos senadores obviamente ni siquiera estaban concientes de que el material se encontraba en los archivos del comité."

El plan de la Casa Blanca para asesinar al mismo Anderson fue publicado en la primera página del *Washington Post* del 21

de septiembre. Bob Woodward, escritor del periódico, da los siguientes detalles:

"E. Howard Hunt Jr. dijo a sus compañeros después del incidente de Watergate [de junio de 1972] que se le había ordenado en diciembre de 1971 o enero de 1972, asesinar al columnista Jack Anderson, según fuentes fidedignas.

"Según estas fuentes, Hunt les dijo a sus ex compañeros de la CIA que la orden fue cancelada en el último momento—pero sólo después de que se había elaborado un plan para hacer aparecer la muerte de Anderson como accidental.

"Su supuesto plan involucraba el uso de un veneno que sería obtenido de un médico que había trabajado anteriormente para la CIA, dijeron las fuentes, quienes añadieron que el veneno era de una variedad que no sería detectado durante un exámen médico o una autopsia rutinaria.

"Hunt dijo a las fuentes que Anderson iba a ser asesinado porque estaba publicando información delicada sobre seguridad nacional en su columna diaria, basado en documentos secretos que estaban llegando a manos de Anderson. . . .

"Hunt dijo a sus compañeros después de los arrestos de Watergate en junio de 1972, que la orden de asesinar a Anderson había provenido de un funcionario mayor de la Casa Blanca de Nixon. . . .

"La elaboración de los planes para el asesinato se extendió por varios días, dijeron las fuentes. . . ."

Woodward dijo que no pudo averiguar por qué el asesinato fue cancelado en el último momento. Se sabe, sin embargo, que ésta fue la segunda ocasión en que Anderson fue señalado como blanco de un asesinato de la Casa Blanca. La manera en que fue escogido como blanco por primera vez provee un vistazo iluminante a los mecanismos internos de la "más grande democracia del mundo."

El plan de asesinato de Hunt, dijo Woodward, es distinto de "un incidente reportado previamente en el cual el conspirador de Watergate G. Gordon Liddy aparentemente pensó que se le había dado la orden de asesinar a Anderson.

"El incidente de Liddy, de acuerdo con testimonios ante el Comité Senatorial sobre Watergate, fue provocado por un comentario casual del administrador delegado de la campaña del ex Presidente Nixon, Jeb Stuart Magruder, quien expresó su deseo de 'deshacerse' de Anderson. Liddy aparentemente lo tomó literalmente, pero Magruder

pronto le aclaró que no hablaba seriamente, según el testimonio de Watergate.”

La divulgación de un informe del ejército a la CIA sobre cómo usar técnicas de guerra biológica para atacar un sistema de agua potable de Washington constituye confirmación adicional de que las actividades homicidas de la CIA no están restringidas a operaciones en el extranjero. Un informe proveniente de Washington publicado en el *New York Post* del 18 de septiembre, dice:

“Este último plan fue descrito ayer por el Senador Gary Hart (Demócrata-de Colorado) resumiendo un informe del ejército a la CIA sobre un experimento llevado a cabo entre junio 1 de 1968 y junio 1 de 1969.

“Este experimento fue realizado en el sistema de agua del edificio de la Food and Drug Administration [Administración de Alimentos y Drogas] en Washington, D.C.

“Una sustancia no tóxica fue introducida en el sistema usando la técnica que un saboteador usaría,” informó Hart.

“Ni los ocupantes ni el personal a cargo del edificio fueron informados de que el experimento había sido planeado. Las personas que condujeron el experimento no fueron detectadas ni detenidas.

“La conclusión a que llegaron es que sería posible desarrollar procedimientos sencillos para planear un ataque contra un grupo de personas que trabajen en un edificio con un sistema de bebederos de agua fría.”

Un segundo experimento de la CIA sobre técnicas de asesinato masivo salió a la luz el 16 de septiembre, cuando se reveló que la agencia utilizó el sistema de tren subterráneo de Nueva York secretamente para medir la vulnerabilidad de los trenes subterráneos a ataques de armas biológicas.

El experimento, de acuerdo con un memorándum de la CIA hecho público durante las audiencias del comité del Senado ese día, “provee una manera de evaluar el peligro de infección para los pasajeros del subterráneo” y mostró como usar un ataque de ese tipo “ofensivamente.”

El memorándum, que fue escrito en octubre de 1967, no especificaba cuándo fue realizado el experimento ni su duración. Deja bastante claro, sin embargo, las razones por las cuales fue llevado a cabo:

“En anticipación a una futura necesidad de información y para establecer una capacidad, se condujo un estudio sobre la vulnerabilidad de los sistemas de trenes subterráneos a ataques encubiertos.

“La conveniencia de los sistemas fue medida y evaluada de manera secreta, utilizando el tren subterráneo de Nueva York como *modelo de ensayo*.

“Los resultados proveyeron información sobre la distribución y concentración de organismos con la que ahora contamos. Los datos suministraron un medio de evaluar el peligro de infección de pasajeros del subterráneo. El estudio suministró un *modelo de la amenaza* e información sobre la facilidad

Se le Diagnosticó un Catarro a Víctima de Toxina Secreta

En 1951 William A. Boyles, quien se dedicaba a la investigación para el ejército de los Estados Unidos en su laboratorio de guerra biológica de Fort Detrick, Maryland, contrajo una enfermedad. De acuerdo con el relato que su hija dió a los reporteros el 20 de septiembre, la enfermedad fue descartada como un catarro común por los doctores del ejército y se le negó a Boyles la admisión a un hospital militar. Al agravarse su fiebre, un médico privado lo llevó a un hospital público. El médico fue amonestado por llevar a un paciente “con una enfermedad tan contagiosa.” Boyles falleció un poco después.

El ejército reveló el 19 de septiembre que la causa de la muerte de Boyles había sido la contracción de antrax, una infección bacteriológica transmitida por el ganado. En el momento de la muerte de Boyles, sin embargo, el ejército falsificó su certificado de defunción, indicando que había fallecido víctima de pulmonía. Un vocero del ejército dijo que, a su parecer, los oficiales del ejército

implicados en el caso habían mentido en aras de la “seguridad nacional.” La mayor parte de la investigación sobre guerra biológica llevada a cabo en Fort Detrick es clasificada como secreta.

Boyles no ha sido la única víctima en Fort Detrick. Joel Eugene Willard, un electricista, también murió de antrax en 1958. En 1964, Albert Nickel, un cuidador de animales, murió de fiebre hemorrágica boliviana, causada por un virus que se encuentra en roedores de Bolivia. Cuando Willard contrajo la enfermedad, se le dijo simplemente que tomara una aspirina.

Un vocero del ejército dijo que otra razón para el encubrimiento de las muertes fue la de evitar “alarmar” a los residentes de la vecina población de Frederick, quienes se podrían haber opuesto a la continuación de los experimentos. “No hubo un intento de ocultar las muertes,” dijo, “pero no se indicó su verdadera causa. Hacerlo hubiera hecho que los habitantes de Frederick se cagaran del susto.”

para la diseminación y sobre métodos de suministro *que se podrían usar de manera ofensiva.*” (Énfasis nuestro.)

El memorándum no indicó si Nueva York fue escogida para el experimento porque los pasajeros probablemente no podrían detectar emanaciones adicionales de cualquier naturaleza que no sea letal.

Charles Senseny, el experto en armas secretas que dirigió el experimento, testificó ante el comité del Senado el 18 de septiembre.

De acuerdo con un informe del 19 de septiembre de United Press International, “describió como dirigió un grupo de cerca de veinte personas que dejaron caer focos falsos que contenían un gas no dañino sobre la vía del tren subterráneo. Dijo que el equipo de control mostró que el gas se esparció por un área entre las calles catorce y cincuenta y ocho.” Esa sección de la ciudad incluye a una de las concentraciones de edificios de oficinas más densas de Nueva York.

Senseny, quien trabaja para la “División de Operaciones Especiales” del ejército, también inventa instrumentos para asesinar. De acuerdo con el informe de UPI: “Las armas que él contribuyó a desarrollar, dijo Senseny, van desde pistolas de dardos disfrazadas como bastones y paraguas hasta latas de aerosol explosivas y focos eléctricos llenos de gas.

“La CIA frecuentemente pedía prestadas tales armas pero él no sabía con qué fines, dijo Senseny a los senadores. . . .”

Haría bien en estudiar el pasaje siguiente, tomado de un informe del 15 de septiembre del *New York Times*:

“El Comité Senatorial Selecto sobre Inteligencia ha escuchado testimonios de que la CIA transportó veneno a un puesto de avanzada en Africa en 1961 para ser utilizado en el asesinato de Patrice Lumumba, el dirigente congolés, pero que el veneno nunca fue administrado, dijeron hoy fuentes familiarizadas con el testimonio.”

Por Qué la CIA Decidió Asesinar a Lumumba

La información provino de una fuente autorizada—el agente que estaba a cargo del veneno una vez que éste llegó a Africa. Contradijo informes previos de que la CIA tan sólo había estudiado la “posibilidad” de asesinar a Lumumba. El informe del *Times* hace el siguiente resumen de su relato:

“El testimonio en manos del comité, según fuentes familiarizadas con él, da la impresión de que los planes fueron más allá de meras ‘posibilidades.’ Este testimonio indica que se preparó un veneno en la sección de bioquímica de la división de servicios técnicos [de la CIA] y fue enviado al oficial de inteligencia de los Estados Unidos en Africa. El plan para matar a Lumumba fue detenido antes de que el veneno fuera entregado a aquéllos que lo administrarían, dijeron las fuentes.”

Para realmente entender el significado de la última frase es necesario recordar los

últimos meses de la vida de Lumumba—el período durante el cual fue sentenciado a muerte por la CIA.

En junio de 1960, a la edad de treinta y cuatro años, Lumumba era el único dirigente congolés con apoyo nacional. Como dirigente del partido más numeroso, el Movimiento Nacional Congolés, obtuvo una mayoría en el parlamento y se convirtió en Primer Ministro cuando el Congo (ahora llamado Zaire) logró su independencia el 30 de junio.

Los imperialistas belgas, incapaces de aceptar la pérdida de las riquezas del Congo, se rehusaron a retirar sus tropas. Lo que estaba en juego era de una magnitud enorme.

La mayoría de los recursos minerales del Congo se encontraban en la provincia de Katanga y eran propiedad de un monopolio gigantesco controlado por Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña y Bélgica, la Union Minière du Haut Katanga. En 1960, con ventas anuales por \$200 millones de dólares, Union Minière producía el 60% del uranio en el Occidente, el 73% del cobalto, y el 10% del cobre. Tenía también veinticuatro afiliadas, incluyendo a plantas hidroeléctricas, plantas químicas y ferrocarriles. Una porción sustancial era propiedad de los intereses de Wall Street—principalmente la familia Rockefeller.

Después de la independencia, los imperialistas belgas empezaron a promover una guerra civil por medio de agentes nativos como Moïse Tshombe. En vez de consolidar su gobierno y enfrentar la amenaza contrarrevolucionaria frontalmente, Lumumba cometió el error trágico de pedir a las Naciones Unidas que enviaran tropas. Aparentemente se basó en consejos de Moscú; al menos los delegados soviéticos a las Naciones Unidas votaron a favor de la moción.

Lumumba pidió a la ONU que desarmara a las tropas belgas y las sacara del país. En vez de ello, las "fuerzas de mantenimiento de la paz" desarmaron a las tropas congoleñas, dejándolas a merced de los belgas completamente armados. La ONU debilitó y obstruyó a Lumumba mientras los imperialistas fortalecían metódicamente su base.

La política belga consistió en impedir la formación de un gobierno central fuerte por cualquier medio. El razonamiento era sencillo: Bajo un gobierno fuerte las fuerzas proimperialistas, siendo una minoría, tendrían que ceder ante la mayoría que deseaba la liberación.

De acuerdo con esta política, el títere de los belgas Tshombe declaró a la provincia de Katanga un país separado. Puesto que representaba a pocos congoleños, Tshombe reclutó a grandes números de mercenarios del exterior. Los congoleños a quienes aterrorizaron tenían un nombre para estas tropas: "Los Temibles." Como uno de los mercenarios comentó en un momento de

sobriedad, "la gente no nos quiere. Nos pagan bien por matar a mujeres y niños." (Citado en un informe del 5 de febrero de 1961 de Associated Press proveniente de Katanga.)

Mientras que Tshombe alquilaba los servicios de mercenarios, el Presidente Kasavubu en Leopoldville erigió una dictadura militar bajo Mobutu, el actual dirigente de Zaire. Lumumba fue depuesto. Fue arrestado más tarde—junto con el Ministro de la Juventud Maurice Mpolo y el Vicepresidente del Senado Joseph Okito—y entregado a Tshombe. Los tres fueron enviados a Elisabethville (ahora Lubumbashi) para "mayor seguridad" en un avión DC-4.

Lumumba, informó la revista *Time* en aquel entonces, fue "vendado y esposado" con los otros dos.

"En el trayecto," dijo *Time*, "los guardias golpearon a Lumumba tan severamente que el piloto intervino para advertirles que podían dañar el avión."

Al llegar, los prisioneros fueron golpeados de nuevo. "Los policías de Katanga se lanzaron sobre los tres, los arrojaron al suelo en medio de una lluvia de culatazos. En seguida, echaron a Lumumba en un Jeep. Con cuatro gendarmes sentados sobre él, Lumumba fue transportado apresuradamente a una nueva cárcel secreta."

El 10 de febrero de 1961, Munongo, el nuevo Ministro del Interior de Katanga, anunció que Lumumba y sus dos ayudantes habían "escapado."

La historia original fue que Lumumba y sus dos ayudantes habían subyugado a "dos guardias" de la "granja" donde se encontraban detenidos. La historia era tan increíble que al día siguiente una nueva fue dada a conocer:

"Un grupo de hombres de piel bronceada" aparecieron repentinamente en la granja, según el relato, y "ordenaron" a los guardias que liberaran al ex Primer Ministro. Los "hombres de piel bronceada" eran supuestamente marroquíes de las tropas de las Naciones Unidas.

El 12 de febrero, el gobierno provincial de Katanga cambió de nuevo la historia. En esta ocasión informó que los tres mártires habían sido "masacrados" por los habitantes de una "población" sin nombre después de que habían "escapado" del resguardo de seguridad.

Las "tropas marroquíes" se esfumaron tan rápidamente como habían sido inventadas. Lumumba y sus ayudantes fueron atrapados solos, de acuerdo con la nueva historia oficial, por aldeanos que "pensaron que los fugitivos portaban armas."

En su anuncio del triple asesinato, Munongo se negó a revelar el nombre de la aldea o la ubicación de las tumbas de las víctimas. Los cadáveres, dijo, fueron "enterrados inmediatamente en un sitio que no vamos a identificar."

Pocos se tragaron la historia. Joseph

Hansen, en el número del 20 de febrero de 1961 del semanario socialista revolucionario americano *The Militant*, afirmó que Lumumba, Mpolo y Okito habían sido asesinados a sangre fría.

La golpiza implacable que recibieron en Elisabethville tomó lugar "tan sólo 23 días antes de la supuesta fuga," escribió. "Algunas sencillas preguntas nos vienen a la mente: ¿Fueron suficientes 23 días para que las tres víctimas se recuperaran de la terrible paliza? ¿Quedaron sus huesos rotos lo suficientemente firmes para permitirles usar un misterioso 'trozo de hierro' para cavar un hoyo en la pared de la impugnable 'granja' y enseguida golpear a sus dos guardias (únicamente dos guardias!) con 'ramas de árboles' que convenientemente encontraron disponibles, como lo asegura la historia oficial? *O fueron asesinados a golpes 23 días antes?*"

"Lo que parece más probable es que los prisioneros hayan sido asesinados al arribar a Elisabethville. Esto explicaría la negativa persistente y enigmática de Tshombe a permitir que la Cruz Roja o los funcionarios de la ONU visitaran a los prisioneros. Los tres habían sido ya enterrados."

Más tarde ese año, las Naciones Unidas nombró una comisión para investigar. Concluyó que el peso de la evidencia contradecía la versión oficial. La comisión declaró que pensaba que Lumumba y sus dos ayudantes habían sido asesinados el 17 de enero, no el 12 de febrero, y que "probablemente" Munongo y Tshombe presenciaron el asesinato.

Y, podríamos añadir, lo más probable es que la razón por la cual el plan de la CIA para envenenar a Lumumba fue cancelado es que los dirigentes títeres del Congo apoyados por la Casa Blanca lo habían ya matado a golpes. □

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Los Stalinistas Atacan la Posición Trotskista Sobre Portugal

Por David Frankel

[El siguiente artículo apareció en el número del 19 de septiembre del *Militant*, un semanario socialista revolucionario publicado en Nueva York. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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El reportaje extensivo del *Militant* de los eventos en Portugal ha sido muy favorablemente recibido por nuestros lectores. Han habido, sin embargo, algunas excepciones. El principal de los críticos fue el *Daily World* del Partido Comunista, que consideró necesario publicar tres largos artículos por Erik Bert escribiendo detalladamente sus objeciones.

Los stalinistas tratan de hacer a un lado los argumentos presentados en el *Militant* con "pruebas" de la existencia de un bloque que incluye, entre otros, al *Militant*, la CIA, George Meany, el dirigente del Partido Socialista Portugués Mário Soares, y el Partido Americano wallacista.

Bert afirma que los informes del *Militant* sobre como el Partido Comunista Portugués (PC) ha atacado a los derechos democráticos, así como su defensa de los derechos del PS, son todos una maniobra derechista.

"El enemigo, según el *Militant* trotskizante," escribe el 4 de septiembre, "es el mismo que para los agentes de la dictadura fascista de Salazar-Caetano, el mismo que para el imperialismo de los EEUU, y para la social democracia de derecha de Mário Soares. Su enemigo común es el Partido Comunista de Portugal. . . ."

"George Meany y la CIA están de acuerdo con el *Militant* trotskizante sobre 'los ataques' de los comunistas 'a los derechos democráticos de otros;'. . . ."

De acuerdo con este tipo de argumento, también conocido como culpabilidad por asociación, todos aquéllos que critican al PC portugués y su política están en alianza con el imperialismo americano y la reacción portuguesa. Regresaremos a los argumentos de Bert y los consideraremos más detalladamente, pero primero es necesario enmarcar la disputa.

El amalgama vulgar de Bert es un intento de evadir la pregunta fundamental que la clase trabajadora portuguesa y sus partidarios a través del mundo están encarando. Portugal es un país capitalista; la pregunta que se hacen los socialistas es, ¿qué política hay que seguir para llevar a la clase obrera al poder y transformar a Portugal en un Estado obrero?

October 6, 1975

Esta pregunta no ha sido planteada de una forma abstracta. Las masas portuguesas indicaron claramente su apoyo al socialismo después del derrocamiento de la dictadura de Caetano. El régimen militar fue obligado a adoptar una retórica muy radical y gobernar con la ayuda del PC y el PS para poder mantener su credibilidad.

La política stalinista en Portugal ha sido una de conseguir el apoyo para el gobierno capitalista de parte de aquéllos bajo su influencia, en lugar de intentar movilizar a las masas independientemente en defensa de sus propios intereses. Esta trayectoria de sujetar a la clase obrera a los representantes de la burguesía no puede llevar nunca a la victoria de la revolución socialista.

Desde este punto de vista, el método general del PS no es muy diferente de el de los stalinistas. Cuando se retiró del gobierno en julio, después de más de un año de colaboración, el PS dejó muy claro que sus objeciones eran en contra de políticas e individuos particulares, y no a la participación en un gobierno capitalista en sí. Actualmente se forma un nuevo gabinete, en el cual el PS participará, sin duda.

Sin embargo, durante un período de alrededor de siete semanas, desde principios de junio a finales de julio, el PS dirigió la organización de manifestaciones de masas en las calles contra los intentos del gobierno de restringir los derechos democráticos. En estos ataques contra los derechos de la clase obrera—a favor de los intereses del régimen militar capitalista, y no de la revolución socialista—los stalinistas sirvieron de punta de lanza.

Pero Bert trata de transformar la posición trotskista en defensa de los derechos democráticos y en apoyo a ciertas acciones con ese fin, en una aprobación de la política social-demócrata y del anticomunismo burgués.

Comienza con el artículo escrito por Joseph Hansen, "Is Democracy Worth Fighting For?" que apareció en el *Militant* del 15 de agosto. En el *Daily World* del 29 de agosto, Bert escribe:

"Hansen pretende defender a la revolución y la democracia contra sus enemigos. Amonesta a los 'militantes' en Portugal, advierte contra su 'curso ultraizquierdista,' etc. Pero su defensa de la 'democracia contra sus difamadores y potenciales destructores' es, en realidad, un velo para la colaboración trotskista con la social demo-

cracia derechista, supuestamente en defensa de la 'democracia.'"

Bert afirma: "El *Militant* trotskizante se ha encariñado con Soares y lo que dice Soares es lo que el *Militant* trotskizante repetirá."

Pero la supuesta conexión con el PS es sólo el primer eslabón en el amalgama. Como elabora Bert en su artículo del 4 de septiembre:

"No existe ni una sola fuerza reaccionaria en Portugal, desde las huestes contrarrevolucionarias de Salazar-Caetano, hasta los social demócratas 'moderados' de Henry Kissinger; desde la reaccionaria jerarquía católica profascista hasta los monopolistas expropiados y los latifundistas feudales, que no enarbole la bandera de la 'democracia,' como lo hacen los trotskistas, y que no denuncie a los comunistas como antidemocráticos, como también lo hacen los trotskistas."

El argumento stalinista básico, aquí como siempre, es que debido a que la prensa capitalista ha lanzado un campaña para desacreditar al PC portugués, el PC portugués ha de ser revolucionario. En realidad, los capitalistas no mantienen semejante ilusión. Están aprovechando la situación en Portugal para impulsar la falsa idea de que el socialismo y la democracia son incompatibles.

La tragedia es que el PC portugués, y el stalinismo en todas partes, cae en el juego de los capitalistas al seguir su curso burocrático y desechar como irrelevantes a

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los derechos democráticos. El stalinismo mundial—con mucha razón—ha llegado a ser visto como el enemigo de los derechos democráticos en la Unión Soviética y Europa Occidental, así como en países como India y Portugal donde los partidos stalinistas han apoyado la restricción de los derechos democráticos.

En la Unión Soviética la política stalinista ha sido responsable por las purgas y los asesinatos políticos, los campos de trabajo forzado y salas siquiátricas en las prisiones, y las otras características espantosas del régimen soviético policíaco. El régimen burocrático dentro de la URSS ha sido complementado con el aplastamiento de los movimientos por la democracia socialista en Hungría y Checoslovaquia. Los stalinistas han hecho más de lo que la propaganda capitalista pudiera haber logrado para ayudar a desacreditar al socialismo ante los ojos de la opinión pública mundial.

En Portugal, los stalinistas fueron ayudados por la junta militar para ganar el control de la federación sindical, después de lo cual se prohibió la formación de sindicatos rivales. También con la ayuda de los militares, los stalinistas fueron colocados en puestos claves en los medios de comunicación. A mediados de julio, seis de los siete diarios en Lisboa seguían la línea del PC, entre ellos el periódico *República*, que había reflejado los puntos de vista del PS hasta ser tomado por una coalición de ultraizquierdistas y stalinistas.

Estos ataques contra la libertad de prensa y la libre asociación en Portugal fueron suplementados por amenazas con abolir la Asamblea Constituyente—el único cuerpo gubernamental electo en todo el país—e intentos de impedir manifestaciones de protesta de parte del PS.

Después de cincuenta años de dictadura capitalista, cuando los obreros y campesinos ven a la democracia como una cuestión crucial, la burguesía, gracias al papel de los stalinistas, se ha podido presentar como la defensora y partidaria de la democracia.

En vista de todo esto, es comprensible que el PC sienta la necesidad de inmunizar a su base contra los hechos y argumentos expuestos en el *Militant*. Bert piensa que si puede ligar a los trotskistas con la CIA, será suficiente.

Pero el intento de hacer un amalgama entre todos aquéllos que critican al PC portugués es tan sólo el comienzo. Aunque calumnia al *Militant* al acusarlo de apoyar a los ataques derechistas contra el PC que han estado sucediendo desde julio, Bert se encuentra encarado con el hecho de que nosotros favorecemos un frente único de las organizaciones de la clase obrera para rechazar semejantes ataques.

Bert avanza los siguientes argumentos sobre por qué un frente único con el PS contra los ataques derechistas en Portugal

no es necesario, ni deseable, ni posible.

- El PC representa a la mayoría de la clase obrera.

- El PS está en contra de un frente único para defender los derechos democráticos del PC.

- El PS está ligado con el imperialismo europeo.

- El PS rompió un frente único ya en existencia cuando abandonó el gobierno.

El PS está coludido con la extrema derecha.

Bert está especialmente fastidiado porque “el *Militant* trotskizante argumenta ante toda la evidencia que demuestra lo contrario, que el Partido Socialista de Portugal es el partido de la clase obrera.”

Ataca a Joseph Hansen por haber escrito sobre “los mítines del Partido Social Demócrata respaldado por la mayoría de la clase obrera.” “Esa frase, no importa cómo se le lea, es falsa,” de acuerdo con Bert.

Tan malo como Hansen, según Bert, es David Frankel, “el muñeco de Soares,” quien “afirma que el Partido Comunista es ‘claramente una minoría de la clase obrera.’”

A pesar de las protestas de Bert, el método marxista requiere que nos basemos en la realidad. Los tres partidos más grandes que compitieron en las elecciones a la Asamblea Constituyente en abril en Portugal fueron el Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) capitalista y los dos partidos de la clase obrera, el PS y el PC.

El voto procapitalista fue minoritario; 26 por ciento del total correspondió al PPD. El voto prosocialista estuvo dividido principalmente entre el PC y el PS—12 por ciento para los stalinistas y 38 por ciento para los social demócratas.

Desde entonces, el PS ha demostrado su habilidad para movilizar manifestaciones de masas mucho más grandes que las del PC. ¿Acaso piensa Bert que los 100,000 que se movilizaron en Lisboa el 19 de julio en defensa de los derechos democráticos del PS, o los 50,000 que participaron en el mitin del PS en Oporto el 18 de julio, eran todos hijos e hijas de la clase dominante? ¿De qué otra forma se puede medir la fuerza de un partido político, si no es a través de las elecciones y su habilidad para movilizar a la gente bajo su bandera?

Por supuesto, Bert sabe que el PS es más grande que el PC. Lo que él trata a toda costa de evadir es el hecho de que los stalinistas portugueses han estado envueltos en un conflicto no sólo con los matones derechistas quienes han estado atacando sus locales, sino también con la mayoría de los obreros y campesinos en Portugal, quienes justificadamente se oponen a la política del PC y temen sus métodos antidemocráticos. Es esta división en la clase obrera lo que ha permitido a los derechistas mobilizarse con impunidad.

La responsabilidad por la división en la

clase obrera portuguesa recae completamente sobre los hombros de los stalinistas. A pesar de ser un partido minoritario, han tratado de imponer su política sobre las masas trabajadoras. Aún si el PC representara realmente a la mayoría, sus intentos de silenciar a sus críticos hubieran causado una legítima oposición.

Cualquier referencia a este hecho tan sencillo hace que Bert se trastorne.

“La venenosa línea anticomunista de los trotskistas los ha llevado a aprobar explícitamente los ataques fascizantes contra el Partido Comunista,” según su artículo del 3 de septiembre. “Así, el *Militant* escribió (el 8 de agosto) que la política del PC ‘ha abierto el camino a una ola de violentos ataques de turbas a los locales del PC a través de las dos terceras partes al norte del país.’”

La afirmación de Bert que el *Militant* apoya los ataques derechistas en Portugal es una falsificación desvergonzada. Igualmente, su argumento decisivo sobre por qué es imposible un frente único con el PS es que el PS también apoya los ataques al PC.

“No es cierto que el PS haya denunciado los ataques violentos a los locales del PC,” según Bert.

“No es cierto, como ha sido implicado,” continúa, “que la dirección de Soares haya mostrado cualquier interés en la defensa de los derechos democráticos de los comunistas.”

Los intentos de Bert de negar los hechos en este caso no es menos ridículo que su comportamiento con respecto al tamaño del PS y PC. La verdad es que la dirección de la delegación del PS a la Asamblea Constituyente condenó los ataques al PC, mientras que acusaba al partido de haber ayudado a provocar los ataques con sus tácticas agresivas. Los delegados del PC respondieron levantándose, insultándolo y abandonando la sala con el puño en alto.

El número del 29 de agosto del diario de Lisboa *Jornal Novo* citó una declaración de Soares: “El PS nunca quiso aislar al PCP. Ha condenado los ataques a los locales de este partido, considerándolos actos de violencia intolerables, y se solidariza con los comunistas cuando son hostigados.”

Es definitivamente cierto que los dirigentes reformistas del PS preferirían dar sólo un apoyo verbal al PC. Sólo una presión tremenda y prolongada podría obligar a los políticos social-demócratas a defender activamente a sus rivales contra la violencia derechista.

Pero la realidad es que el mismo PS ha sufrido la persecución anticomunista en las áreas rurales, y si no se pone un alto a la campaña derechista, el PS será la siguiente víctima. Una campaña política consistente podría convencer a las bases del PS que sólo una respuesta unida podría parar el peligroso giro derechista de Portugal.

Los stalinistas, sin embargo, toman una actitud hacia aquéllos que discrepan con

ellos, que en la práctica elimina cualquier acción conjunta. Por lo tanto, en su artículo del 4 de septiembre Bert hace una larga descripción de la ligazón entre el PS portugués y sus correligionarios, los dirigentes de los gobiernos sueco, británico y alemán. Esto, dice Bert, ilumina "la profundidad de la corrupción política involucrada en el apoyo del Militant trotskizante a Soares" y es supuestamente un argumento contra el llamado a un frente único con el PS contra los derechistas.

Este argumento recuerda el sectarismo sin salida que abrió el paso para el triunfo de Hitler en Alemania. Bajo la dirección de Stalin, el PC alemán llamaba a los social demócratas al ala izquierda del fascismo y se negó a propugnar un frente único con ellos contra Hitler.

Todo lo que Bert dice en contra de la social democracia ha sido cierto desde la primera guerra mundial. Fue el PS alemán el que tuvo la responsabilidad por el asesinato de Rosa Luxemburgo y el sofocamiento de la revolución alemana de 1918-19. Los revolucionarios pueden encontrar innumerables crímenes igualmente vergonzosos en la historia del stalinismo. Lo importante es que cuando la clase obrera está dividida, la única manera de defender sus intereses básicos es a través de acuerdos entre los grandes partidos obreros para luchar juntos alrededor de cuestiones específicas.

Sin embargo, los stalinistas se oponen a un frente único clasista para la defensa de los derechos democráticos. El único frente que quieren es un frente con el gobierno capitalista—un frente popular. Bert convierte el concepto del frente único como método de la lucha de clases en la idea de un frente para apoyar al gobierno capitalista.

"Es un hecho," escribe en su artículo del 29 de agosto, "que la dirección de Soares ha sido el principal desorganizador del frente único posrevolucionario.

"Minó la capacidad del gobierno mientras formaba parte de él; rompió el frente único al abandonar el gobierno; . . . y ha sido el punto de convergencia de todas las fuerzas contrarrevolucionarias, de dentro y fuera de Portugal."

De la misma manera, escribe Bert el 4 de septiembre, "La verdad es que el Partido Socialista, Soares específicamente, era parte del gobierno. La verdad es que la dirección socialista abandonó el gobierno deliberadamente y en forma trastornante. La verdad es que el Partido Socialista y Soares específicamente, ha estado incitando constantemente a derribar al gobierno."

¡Bert condena al PS por abandonar un gobierno capitalista e "incitar" contra él! Soares el procapitalista se transforma en un verdadero revolucionario según lo describe Bert.

Para Bert, "el llamado del Militant trotskizante a la unidad del PS y el PC es

un engaño cínico. No representa un apoyo a la unidad de la clase obrera portuguesa, sino un apoyo a la campaña de trastorno [del gobierno] de Soares."

En otras palabras, los stalinistas estaban prestos a colaborar con el PS en un gabinete capitalista, pero no con las masas de obreros socialistas en acciones públicas.

Desde la aparición de los artículos de Bert, el PC ha considerado necesario hacer un ajuste. Habiendo perdido la lucha por la asociación exclusiva con los militares, los stalinistas portugueses hacen declaraciones sobre la unidad con el PS. "Cunhal: 'Buscamos la unidad con el PS,'" reza el encabezado del *Daily World* del 6 de septiembre.

La acusación de que el PS se halla coludido con la CIA, los matones salazaristas, y peor aún con los trotskistas, ha desaparecido. "Los llamados [a la unidad] no son nuevos: Cunhal y el PCP los han estado haciendo durante los últimos 17 meses," nos asegura Tom Foley en el *Daily World* del 9 de septiembre.

¿No lo sabía Erik Bert? Quizás debería escribir tres artículos más probando que la unidad con el PS es necesaria y posible después de todo.

Sin embargo, la línea fundamental propugnada por los stalinistas es la misma todavía: unidad en la defensa del capitalismo, unidad dentro del gobierno capitalista, y no un frente único para la acción en las

calles en defensa de los intereses de la clase obrera.

Como lo explica el *Daily World* en el encabezado del 9 de septiembre: "Se busca la unidad en Portugal por medio de un nuevo gabinete."

Pero una dura sorpresa les espera a los stalinistas si piensan que la restauración de la colaboración PC-PS en un nuevo gobierno dominado por los militares pondrá fin a los ataques contra ellos.

La clase obrera portuguesa se encuentra confusa y desorientada pero de ninguna manera aplastada. La radicalización sigue siendo profunda. Bajo estas circunstancias, ambos la lucha de clases y los ataques derechistas volverán a intensificarse. La necesidad de una defensa unificada de los derechos democráticos se mostrará de nuevo claramente.

Esta tarea no puede dejarse en manos de la junta militar. El cuerpo de oficiales portugueses ha demostrado ya su inclinación a desplazarse a la derecha. Actualmente, está esforzándose por restaurar la disciplina en las fuerzas armadas. El peligro es que los supuestamente "patrióticos oficiales" se volverán contra sus antiguos aliados como lo hicieron en Chile. El PS y el PC, al participar en el gobierno burgués, contribuyen a darle a la burguesía portuguesa el tiempo necesario para preparar la reacción. □

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'Turistas Políticos' Reciben una Lección Sobre la 'Democracia'

Por F.L. Derry

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Political Tourists' Given a Lesson in 'Democratic Rights'" que apareció en el número del 29 de septiembre de *Intercontinental Press*. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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"El Turismo Político se Incrementa en Portugal" rezó el encabezado en un despacho del *New York Times* del 6 de septiembre, proveniente de Lisboa. "Enjambres de Visitantes Acuden a Ver a la Revolución en Acción—Algunos Juegan un Papel Activo."

Estos turistas fueron descritos por el corresponsal Marvine Howe como "estudiantes de Gran Bretaña e Italia, profesores de Alemania, exiliados políticos de Bolivia, Chile y Brazil, y un pequeño grupo de radicales de los Estados Unidos. . . ."

"La nota clave es la política práctica: participación en manifestaciones políticas, visitas a partidos políticos y fábricas, trabajo voluntario en granjas cooperativas."

Howe visitó una ciudad de tiendas de campaña erigida atrás de la Universidad de Lisboa, que hospedaba a casi 1,000 personas. Parecía ignorar, sin embargo, la existencia de un campamento mucho más grande en el Parque Monsanto al otro extremo de Lisboa.

Al no haber visitado este campamento más grande, ella creyó erróneamente que el grupo más grande de turistas era de Alemania. En realidad, el grupo más grande de turistas políticos era de Francia, y de éstos, un gran número eran miembros o simpatizantes de la Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR—Liga Comunista Revolucionaria), la sección francesa de la Cuarta Internacional.

El Parque Monsanto es un extenso terreno que pertenecía antes a un monasterio cercano. Una parte del parque ha sido convertida en campamento y parque de trailers. En julio había ahí alrededor de 5,000 personas, muchas de ellas residentes permanentes del parque de trailers.

Trabajadores portugueses se mezclan con refugiados de la España franquista. Anteriores agentes de la PIDE (policía secreta) y otra gente asociada con el régimen salazarista viven ahí, habiendo abandonado sus hogares más cómodos para esperar un cambio en el clima político. Este verano se agregaron cientos de jóvenes activistas políticos, en tiendas de campaña y bolsas de

dormir, provenientes de todos los países de Europa.

A mediados de julio los trotskistas franceses en el campamento erigieron una mesa de literatura. Vendieron literatura revolucionaria en varios idiomas y le dieron publicidad a las reuniones y mítines en Lisboa. No fue sino hasta el último día de julio que ocurrió un problema serio.

A veces la naturaleza de los grandes eventos se revela más claramente a través de las luchas cotidianas desapercibidas que juntas causan una situación de agitación masiva. Tal fue el caso en la lucha que se desató cuando el gerente del campamento exigió que se removiera la literatura porque era "una actividad comercial." Para justificar su exigencia, produjo un libro de reglamentos impreso en 1967 bajo la dictadura salazarista. Los trotskistas se negaron a moverse.

Una gran multitud se reunió para debatir los puntos planteados por esta amenaza contra los derechos democráticos. Durante las siguientes cinco horas, unas cien personas se encontraban en todo momento alrededor de la mesa discutiendo la cuestión en portugués, francés e inglés. El sentimiento era abrumador contra el gerente, quien era visto por la gente como un reaccionario.

El debate cobró rápidamente el carácter de una confrontación entre los residentes portugueses del campamento, así como entre ellos y los revolucionarios franceses, sobre la cuestión de los derechos democráticos.

"Tenemos suficientes problemas con el CDS [Centro Democrático Social, el partido burgués derechista]," alegó un portugués de mediana edad. "Esta gente viene de afuera y no debería de interferir. Sólo causa problemas, y ya tenemos suficientes."

"Todo el mundo tiene derecho a hablar, ¿no es así?" contestó alguien. "Sólo están distribuyendo literatura. Las reglas del campamento son fascistas. El gerente es un fascista."

"Mira," replicó el hombre de mediana edad, "si ellos distribuyen su literatura, ¿por qué no el CDS? ¿Y el PPD [Partido Popular Democrático, el principal partido burgués]?"

"Todos deberían de tener el derecho," contestó alguien. "Para eso luchamos, ¿no?"

Una mujer en traje de baño que se dirigía a la piscina, se detuvo a escuchar. Empezó a defender a la LCR, primero en portugués y luego en francés. "Las reglas son fascistas

y el gerente es un fascista," dijo.

Más tarde habló aparte con algunos de nosotros de la LCR. "Estoy en el Partido Comunista, y la gente aquí no tiene la menor comprensión del verdadero internacionalismo proletario. Además, nosotros tenemos una alianza con los trotskistas, con la LCI [Liga Comunista Internacionalista] en Portugal."

"No, eso no es cierto," contestó un miembro de la LCR francesa. "Eso fue sólo una maniobra de parte del PCP [Partido Comunista Portugués]." El debate se desplazó hacia la cuestión de los frentes únicos. Yo volví a la discusión principal sobre quién debería de tener derechos democráticos.

Más tarde el gerente regresó con los guardias del campamento. Cuando los guardias comenzaron a destrozar la literatura sobre la mesa, la gente se volcó contra el gerente, poniéndolo contra la pared y exigiendo en varios idiomas que dejara la literatura en paz. Se escapó sólo con la llegada de cuatro jeeps militares con unos veinticinco soldados del Copcon [Comando Operacional do Continente, la fuerza de seguridad del régimen militar].

Los soldados, en lugar de atacar a la gente, comenzaron a participar en la discusión. Muchos de ellos tenían cortes de pelo y barbas estilo "Che Guevara" y, excepto por sus uniformes, muy pronto no se les podía distinguir de los demás.

El gerente me señaló ante el comandante, alegando que yo era el dirigente. Aunque ni siquiera había estado trabajando en la mesa, accedí a explicarle el problema.

"El gerente ha estado tratando de ejercer las reglas salazaristas de 1967," le dije. "Nosotros nos oponemos a esas reglas y queremos seguir distribuyendo literatura que ayuda a explicar y defender el proceso revolucionario en Portugal entre todos los visitantes internacionales presentes."

"La profunda participación de las masas portuguesas en todos los asuntos políticos, y los amplios derechos democráticos que han ayudado a construir y defender esta movilización masiva, son la verdadera fuente de la fuerza del movimiento."

"Si permitimos que el gerente retroceda y comience a restingir algunos derechos democráticos, sólo ayudará a desarmar y desmovilizar al movimiento entero en Portugal. Los mismos argumentos que sostienen que demasiada democracia en el campamento sólo causará muchos disturbios y divisiones, serán usados mañana en

Portugal en general para limitar la disidencia, reestablecer la censura y prohibir a los grupos considerados demasiado militantes.”

El oficial del Copcon respondió que él también discrepaba con las “leyes fascistas.” “En Portugal no existen leyes que daten desde antes del 25 de abril. Sin embargo, todavía no existen reglamentos para los campamentos. Aunque estamos completamente en desacuerdo con estas reglas, ¿por qué no acceden a obedecerlas hasta que la gerencia haya adoptado reglas nuevas?”

Nos negamos a hacer ésto. Se hizo claro muy pronto que la gente apoyaba nuestros derechos. Después de más de una hora de discusión los soldados se retiraron, prometiendo conseguir una decisión por parte de las autoridades del Copcon. Llegó en media hora—había que ejercer el cumplimiento de las reglas salazaristas, y la mesa tenía que ser clausurada.

Entonces, el gerente exigió que yo fuera llevado a su oficina para una reunión “privada.” La gente me cercó para asegurar que los guardias del campamento no causarían ningún problema. Al fin, el oficial del Copcon acordó acompañarme personalmente para asegurar que regresara ileso.

La gente desconfiaba mucho de las intenciones del gerente. La mujer que se había identificado anteriormente como miembro del PCP reiteró su punto de vista de que el gerente era un reaccionario, que hospedaba a agentes de la PIDE en el campamento, y que se le tenía que poner un alto.

Fue sólo en la reunión privada conmigo, el gerente, el oficial del Copcon y uno de los guardias del campamento, que la verdadera razón tras el incidente se reveló.

El gerente, después de exigir mi expulsión del campamento, se presentó como “más a la izquierda probablemente” que yo. En realidad, “no era un reaccionario, sino un comunista” y miembro del PCP. Además, vi claramente que el oficial del Copcon lo sabía también. Aparentemente, los dos habían colaborado en el pasado en ocasiones similares.

Encima de todo, el oficial dijo que no discrepaba con los reglamentos salazaristas de 1967, como lo había dicho a la gente afuera. Todo lo contrario: Ya existía demasiada disidencia en el campamento, según él, y las reglas ayudarían a “evitar problemas.”

“¿No se aplican esos mismos argumentos a Portugal en general?” le pregunté. “¿No seguiría a la lógica de esos razonamientos restringir todos los derechos democráticos a través del país?”

El admitió, con una risita, que “existe cierta tendencia de esa naturaleza en el ejército.”

Con eso se cerró el debate sobre este punto. Fuí expulsado del campamento. □

DOCUMENTS

PRT Stand on the August 25 Unity Accord

[In its August 27 issue, *Combate Socialista*, the fortnightly paper of the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT—Revolutionary Workers party, a group that has declared its adherence to the Fourth International) gave its interpretation of the pact that came out of the August 25 meeting of the Communist party, a section of the Armed Forces Movement, and a number of small groups to the left of the mass reformist parties. Following this, the PRT appealed to the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League, the Portuguese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International) to leave the bloc based on the August 25 accord. Both statements are given below. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

According to the communiqué issued after the August 25 meeting of the Copcon¹ group and the eight left parties—the FSP, LCI, LUAR, MDP, MES, PCP, PRP-BR, and Primeiro do Maio²—a platform was established on which these organizations in general agreed. It included the Copcon document and the “Lines of Action” of the Fifth Government [headed by Vasco Gonçalves].³ It was this government that was entrusted with carrying out the program in question until the necessary conditions are assembled for forming a Government of Revolutionary Unity. The PRT believes that those organizations that had not signed the Pact-Program [and thus previously capitulated to the military government]⁴ have now capitulated to a bourgeois government, the supporter of the antilabor “battle for production” and the neocolonialist maneu-

1. Comando Operacional do Continente—Mainland Portugal Operations Command, the military security forces.

2. Frente Socialista Popular (Socialist People's Front); Liga Comunista Internacionalista (Internationalist Communist League); Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária (League for Revolutionary Unity and Action); Movimento Democrático Português (Portuguese Democratic Movement); Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (Movement of the Socialist Left); Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist party); Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias (Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades); the First of May Group.

3. For the text of these documents, see *Intercontinental Press*, September 15, pp. 1210-1213.

vers evident in Angola and Timor.

The decision to “set up a provisional secretariat with the intention of organizing actions that will facilitate a common offensive against the reaction and for the advance of the revolutionary process” was a correct decision. For this very fact it cannot be subordinated to supporting a weak, probourgeois, and conciliationist government that so far has managed to do nothing but swell the ranks of the counterrevolution.

* * *

With all our strength we support unity of the workers organizations and coordination of their forces against the threat of a coup. However, we have pointed out above some of the basic features that make the agreement signed by the eight organizations a popular-frontist deal.

The popular-frontist orientation that appears here is not new. Historically it has already led to terrible defeats (the latest was in Chile), and we have had to fight it here in Portugal, too. It is the policy of the PCP. The fact that other left organizations have now formally accepted this policy is also not entirely new, because the path of the spontanéists and centrists of all stripes is always going to lead to this conclusion. In every revolutionary situation the danger of such a front arises.

We Trotskyists have always fought with all our strength against the danger of class collaborationism and its most disastrous form, the “popular front.” Despite the differences that divide it from the LCI, the PRT has never failed to recognize that this sister organization has maintained a principled position of independence from the bourgeoisie, its state, and its parties. (It was for this reason that we gave critical support to these comrades in the elections.)

We think now that, impelled by a sound desire to fight against the threat of a coup, your organization has committed a terrible error, an error that tragically endangers your chances of helping to accomplish the

4. Before the April 25 elections, the Armed Forces Movement asked the parties on the ballot to sign the Pact-Program agreeing to a continuation of military rule no matter what the results of the vote might be. The mass reformist parties, the bourgeois parties, and the FSP signed. The LCI and the Maoist groups participating in the elections did not. The MES did not sign but said it had no objection in principle to doing so.

central task of Portuguese Trotskyists—building a Leninist combat party with mass influence in order to assure the triumph of the socialist revolution.

However, your previous work, your programmatic adherence to the principles of the Fourth International, and your political struggle against the reformist positions all

lead us to believe that this was only a grave but correctable error. So, we call on you, comrades, to denounce this popular front yourselves, we appeal to you to continue to combine forces with us in the task of unifying the revolutionary Marxist forces in a solid Revolutionary Workers party [Partido Operário Revolucionário]. □

represented by the putschist moderates." (Our emphasis.)

Very good! In fact, the advance of these forces does not favor but goes counter to assembling the necessary conditions for forming a government of revolutionary unity.

To sum up, our position, which is safeguarded in the accords and shared by the majority of the signatory organizations, is the following:

1. The only revolutionary solution for the crisis lies in the development, coordination, and centralization of the organs of workers and people's power.

2. This process can proceed rapidly only if there is a government of revolutionary unity armed with a clear program of anticapitalist measures.

3. This government of revolutionary unity can be imposed and defended only by uniting and mobilizing the working class and the toiling masses, and by coordinating the efforts of the workers and revolutionary organizations.

4. This whole process requires defeating the offensive of the civilian and military rightist, Social Democratic, and capitalist forces.

This was what we agreed on. We accept the fact that the form adopted was unfortunate.

We accept the fact that the agreement could be read in different ways than the one explained above.

However, the dynamic of the platform has shown that this is the way it should be read, and that the majority of the organizations will not permit the accords to be used to reinforce the class-collaborationist policy practiced by the reformists.

The rejection of the slogan "Fifth Government-Transition to Socialism" in the August 27 demonstration and the withdrawal of the PCP from the secretariat as the result of the reaction of the other organizations to Alvaro Cunhal's press conference² are the proof of this.

It is true that *Combate Socialista* came out on the 27th. This was too early to get a more rounded idea of the significance and dynamic of the August 25 accords. But, then, the least we can say is that the PRT was rather hasty in drawing the political conclusions it did. We hope they will make a rectification of this. □

2. The news conference given by the general secretary of the CP on August 28 calling for negotiations with the SP and other forces.

LCI Reply to the PRT

[The following article was published in the September 12 issue of *Luta Proletária*, the paper of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The time has not yet come for discussing the August 25 accords in depth. A reading of issue No. 16 [August 27] of *Combate Socialista* shows that the PRT comrades still do not have a very clear view of the political significance and dynamic of these accords.

The comrades think that the LCI has become tied to a popular front. However, they regard this decision as "a grave but correctable error." Everything would be solved if we also attacked the popular front and continued to "combine our efforts" in the "task of unifying the revolutionary Marxist forces in a solid Revolutionary Workers party."

So, is our supposed joining a popular front such an unimportant event that a mere self-criticism would immediately put us in shape to advance firmly toward unification "in a solid Revolutionary Workers party"? No, comrades, it can't be like that. If the PRT comrades join a popular front—a real popular front—they cannot expect the same benevolent attitude on our part. This "grave but correctable error" would have to be very thoroughly analyzed.

We would not consider building a "solid Revolutionary Workers party" with forces that were recently tied to a class-collaborationist policy and a popular front. How can the PRT, an organization that claims to be revolutionary Marxist, think differently?

The reason seems obvious to us. The comrades of the PRT leadership are not very sure that the August 25 Platform constitutes a popular front. And the first indication of this fact is that in the article addressed to us they do not talk about the classical examples of popular fronts in France and Spain during the 1930s that were analyzed by Trotsky. The contrast would be too obvious. These examples would show that their claim was without foundation.

So, the comrades had to resort to an

abstract allusion to Allende's Chile and the policy of the PCP. But why? For what concrete political reasons did they feel obliged to make such allusions? Nothing is presented to explain this. We think that by acting in this way in a public polemic with a "sister organization," the comrades of the PRT have shown a certain irresponsibility.

We will wait, however, for the PRT to offer a more serious treatment of these questions and for now just take up the only concrete accusation included in the whole issue No. 16 of *Combate Socialista*.

"It also establishes political support for the government by the organizations comprising the front on the basis of completely general programs that are full of promises but in the concrete leave the power in the hands of those who now hold it." (Stress by the comrades of the PRT.)¹

In the first place, there is no front but an agreement signed by various organizations that recognize the need for forming a front. In the second place it does not establish any support for the class-collaborationist government. If this had been the objective, then the platform would have said so clearly. But there was no question of this. The formula adopted pointed to the need for forming a government of revolutionary unity. The signatory organizations pointed to such a government as the only alternative to the class collaboration whose failure has been clearly shown in the history of the five provisional governments.

By the way, it is not a matter of indifference for revolutionists how a government falls. It is not irrelevant for the advance of the revolution if a class-collaborationist government is overthrown by the concerted action of civilian and military forces in the service of capitalism and imperialism.

Moreover, the comrades recognize this also when they say: "The Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores has *fundamental political differences with the Fifth Government and with its predecessors*," but that "the gravest danger at the moment is

1. This refers to a statement in the lead article of the August 27 *Combate Socialista*, which presented the same position as in the section previously quoted but in a more condensed way.

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