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Por Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, y Ernest Mandel

En Defensa de la Revolución Portuguesa

Lisbon's New Strictures on Freedom of the Press

The "restructured" Revolutionary Council in Portugal adopted Organic Law No. 5 on September 8. The decree bans publication of any communiqués, documents, or statements reflecting the opinion of military personnel except when issued by the president of the republic, the Revolutionary Council, the chiefs of staff of the three armed services, or the commander of Copcon (Comando Operacional do Continente—Mainland Portugal Operations Command, the military security force).

The measure is in line with the main objective of the new government—to "restore discipline" in the armed forces. In fact, this was the first general offensive against the political rights of military personnel since the abortive coup of March 11, 1975.

The remodeled Revolutionary Council felt it could take this step not only because of the divisions in the workers movement and the growing strength of the right but because of the outcry over the crude Stalinist manipulation of the press. The specific pretext for the move was the campaign of distorted reporting waged by the CP-dominated papers in a futile effort to strengthen the hand of Vasco Gonçalves in the power struggle within the Armed Forces Movement. One such paper even went so far as to publish a false report that the anti-Gonçalves air force commander had been forced to resign.

The obvious "big lie" campaign created yet another scandal about the CP-dominated press that the military could utilize in its efforts to reinstitute direct government controls on the media.

Furthermore, the Stalinists in the press chose to respond to the move toward censorship, now directed against them, by shouting still louder that they had the right and duty to tailor the news to fit the needs of "the revolution" and to eliminate "counterrevolutionary" views from the media.

In early September, Armando Pereira da Silva, the Stalinist editor of *Diário de Lisboa*, told Mats Holmberg, correspondent for the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter*:

"We have promised to fight for the revolution. We don't think that Social Democracy, for example, has anything to do with revolution. If we are forced to slacken our defense of the revolution, that means a loss for freedom of the press in Portugal."

The CP-controlled printers union denounced calls for reducing Stalinist influence in the press as "terrorism." On September 12 it issued a communiqué that said, among other things: "Phrases such as 'freedom of the press,' 'freedom of criticism,' 'independence,' 'censorship,' 'manipulation,' and 'nonpartisanship' are some of the main weapons in the powerful arsenal the international bourgeoisie has been perfecting since the past century and is now using in our country as it did in Chile."

The communiqué went on to say: "A reading of the back issues of *Expresso* or *Jornal Novo* (of the CIP [Confederação da Indústria Portuguesa—Confederation of Portuguese Industry]), which are examples of the press controlled by the capitalist bourgeoisie, shows how, as the working classes and the Armed Forces Movement were advancing toward socialism, these papers dropped the mask of 'independence' and 'objectivity' and even fell into the most abject methods of counterrevolutionary intrigue."

Jornal Novo is close to the Socialist party. *Expresso* is a liberal weekly, whose editor is a member of the bourgeois Partido Popular Democrático. From the standpoint of journalistic honesty and independence, both papers stand head and shoulders above the CP-dominated press, which has specialized in singing the praises of the Armed Forces Movement and printing the handouts of the various Soviet bloc propaganda services.

For example, when the SP deputies in the Constituent Assembly, apparently fearing to alienate their new military allies, failed

to speak out immediately against the September 8 decree, *Jornal Novo* publicly prodded them: "Contrary to what many persons expected, the SP (notably the journalists Raul Rêgo, João Gomes, Mário Mesquita, and Arons de Carvalho) kept quiet." The editor of *Expresso*, Pinto Balsemão, who is also a deputy in the Constituent Assembly, did rise to condemn the decree.

However, on September 10, *A Luta*, the daily edited by João Gomes, spoke out strongly against the censorship law.

On the same day, speaking for the Frente de Unidade Revolucionária, Ezequiel Vicente of the Portuguese Democratic Movement, a CP satellite, indicated that while the FUR was opposed to the present censorship law because it was "aimed at silencing progressive officers," it would have favored such measures when allies of the CP still held leading positions in the government. Then such measures would have been "even patriotic."

The bloc of Stalinists and ultraleftists that formed against "bourgeois democracy" and "freedom of the press" when the SP-dominated paper *República* was closed down in May was obviously still alive. Its actions helped smooth the way for a right turn by the bourgeois military regime.

Many of the ultraleftists correctly pointed to the reactionary objectives of the Melo Antunes Group of Nine, which were hidden under talk about "democracy" and "pluralism." However, because they accepted the premise of this group, that democratic rights stand in contradiction to socialist revolution, they ended up assisting the very right turn they feared the victory of the group would bring about. Ironically, the nine themselves were forced to disavow the censorship decree because of the general outcry it aroused in the SP and independent press as well as the CP-dominated media.

The case illustrates a more general problem. Dazzled by the abstract campaign against "Social Democracy," which the CP encouraged for factional reasons, the groups to the left of the mass reformist parties missed an opportunity to push for a united front on a crucial question for the Portuguese revolution, one on which working-class unity was clearly possible. □

The Right to Hear Sergio Segre

The Council on Foreign Relations in New York has scheduled a joint conference with the Italian Institute of International Affairs for October 24. Invited guests include David Rockefeller, chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and Arthur A. Hartman, an assistant secretary of state. Despite this august sponsorship, Washington's political

police may prevent another of the scheduled participants, Sergio Segre, from attending.

Segre is the head of the foreign section of the Italian Communist party. The White House has made clear that it will not permit him to enter the United States without a fight.

Next Week . . .

How a "political tourist" was given a lesson in "democratic rights" at one of Lisbon's campgrounds.

The message came in an interview U.S. Ambassador to Italy John Volpe gave to the Italian newsmagazine *Epoca*. In the interview Volpe reiterated White House displeasure with the growing electoral strength of the Italian Communist party, emphasizing that Washington would give "no encouragement" to any but the most subservient supporters of Italian capitalism.

"It was clear," the September 14 *New York Times* reported in a dispatch from Rome, "that Mr. Volpe believed that visas for Communist officials would represent a form of encouragement."

In case there was any doubt about the specific target, an obliging State Department official in Washington acknowledged that Volpe's interview was intended as a "signal" that Segre's application for a visa would be turned down.

This arrogant stricture on the right of free travel and the right of American audiences to hear controversial speakers deserves the attention of all who support democratic rights.

Volpe's remarks touched off a demonstration in front of the American embassy in Rome September 12. A group of Communist senators have demanded that the Italian government make known what steps it plans to take in the matter. The Turin daily *La Stampa* denounced Volpe's comments as "open interference in Italian affairs."

The Communist party daily *L'Unità* pointed out that the United States "is one of the very few countries in the world where the granting of an entry visa depends on the political and ideological position of a citizen."

According to the *New York Times* dispatch, even "diplomats friendly to the United States" found the denial of a visa to Segre difficult to justify.

"Washington signs agreements on freedom of movement in Helsinki and puts pressure on the Russians to allow travel," one commented, "but then it stops the Communists from here from traveling to your country. . . . it is sometimes rather curious."

American supporters of civil liberties have a particular interest in protesting the White House ban on Segre. The decision, if left unchallenged, would give Washington's political police fresh encouragement in their campaign to screen all those whose ideas they consider to be dangerous to the "American way of life."

A similar case, the Justice Department's ban prohibiting Marxist economist Ernest Mandel from coming to the United States to lecture at a number of leading universities in 1971, aroused a storm of protest. Washington's attempt to keep Sergio Segre from entering the United States deserves a similar response. □

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Three Kidnapped Trotskyists Murdered in Argentina

By Judy White

Three more Argentine Trotskyists have been murdered by ultraright terrorists. Oscar Lucatti, Patricia Claverie, and Carlos Enrique Povedano were found shot to death on the outskirts of La Plata September 6.

Their murder brought to eight the number of members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party) and its youth affiliate Juventud Socialista (JS—Socialist Youth) assassinated by ultrarightists within forty-eight hours.

On September 5 the bullet-riddled bodies of Adriana Zaldúa, Ana María Lorenzo, Lidia Agostini, Hugo Frigerio, and Roberto Loscertales were found in a car near La Plata, in an area where at least a dozen other victims of ultraright murder gangs have been found in recent months.

The latest three victims were kidnapped in the center of La Plata September 5 as

they left the PST headquarters to mobilize protest against the murder of their five comrades.

In a statement September 5, the PST called on the provincial and federal governments to investigate the assassinations and punish those responsible. The party stressed the need for the parties and organizations of the working class to organize a massive mobilization to halt the ultraright murder gangs and defend democratic rights.

A memorial meeting was held September 6 to pay tribute to the eight slain comrades' contributions to the revolutionary movement.

Despite rumors that a third wave of terrorist assassinations would be carried out and a death threat against a PST leader at Petroquímica Sudamericana, a large

number of workers from that plant attended the funeral.

"We found out about the murder of the compañeros yesterday when we were mobilized here in La Plata," a leader in the factory told a reporter from the PST newspaper *Avanzada Socialista* September 6. "Later we discussed what we could do at a factory assembly. It was decided to send a delegation from the factory here to the memorial meeting and funeral. In addition, messages condemning the assassinations have been sent from the Asociación Obrera Textil [Textile Workers Association] and from SETIA, the organization of supervisors and technicians. Plus the compañeros in the factory put up a sign saying, 'Curi pays goons to kill.'"

Curi is the owner of Petroquímica Sudamericana, a chemical plant whose workers are out on strike. The murdered PST

PST Members Gunned Down by Ultraright Assassins



Lidia Agostini



Patricia Claverie




Hugo Frigerio



Ana Maria Guzner Lorenzo



Roberto Loscertales



Oscar Lucatti



Carlos Povedano



Adriana Zaldúa

members had been actively involved in organizing solidarity for the strikers.

The strike began September 4 with a plant occupation. The workers demanded a 300,000 peso advance on wages and the signing of a collective-bargaining agreement granting a minimum wage of 800,000 pesos a month. On the fortnightly payday September 2, many workers received only 150,000 pesos.

The meaning of these figures becomes clear if it is kept in mind that at the end of June, Isabel Perón announced a new minimum wage of 360,000 pesos, which was protested as starvation pay. During July and August, official statistics showed an additional 58.3 percent rise in the cost of living.

The PST memorial meeting was addressed by a worker from the Propulsora Iron and Steel Works in La Plata, representing his shop stewards committee. He issued a call for action, pointing out that "the mercenary gangs that count these eight compañeros among their new victims will not stop here."

Ernesto González spoke in the name of the National Executive Committee of the PST. He denounced the Peronist government for not taking any action to prevent these assassinations and the hundreds of others carried out against trade unionists, political activists, and liberal opponents of the regime.

"As guilty or even more guilty than the actual murderers are those who incite them, those who direct the assassins and cover up for them from the shadows," he said.

More than twenty organizations in Argentina, as well as sister parties in other countries, sent messages of solidarity. The Justicialist, Communist, and Intransigent parties were among those sending messages.

The message from the Juventud Radical, Movimiento Línea Nacional (National Line Movement, Radical Youth) said in part:

"The PST and JS have once again been attacked by parapolic gangs that by means of assassination try to halt workers' and students' struggles. The unity of the people and their mobilization is the only guarantee for wiping out these assassins who serve imperialism."

The September 8 issue of *Avanzada Socialista* provided brief biographies of the eight slain Trotskyists.

• Roberto Loscertales, 31 years old, was a member of the La Plata regional leadership of the PST. He joined the Trotskyist movement in 1967 as a university student, and became a founding member of the party's student group in La Plata. He traveled throughout Argentina helping the party obtain legal status for the 1973 elections, and worked in the trade-union movement.

• Hugo Frigerio, 30 years old, joined the

PST in 1973. A leader of state workers, he ran for public office on the PST ticket in 1973.

• Lidia Agostini, 27 years old, joined the PST this year. She was a doctor at the Municipal Hospital of La Plata.

• Ana María Lorenzo, 36 years old, joined the PST in 1973. A member of ATULP (Asociación de Trabajadores de la Universidad de La Plata—University of La Plata Workers Association), she was fired when the Peronists took over the university. She then worked for an economists association.

• Adriana Zaldúa, 22 years old, was a member of the Juventud Socialista, which she joined in 1971 as an architecture

student. She had done political work on the campus.

• Patricia Claverie joined the JS in Bahía Blanca as a student activist. At the time of her death she was attending the University of La Plata and working in the provincial legislature.

• Carlos Enrique Povedano was a member of the La Plata regional leadership of the PST. He joined the party in 1971 when he was studying economics. He was a recognized leader in the recent struggles of welfare workers.

• Oscar Lucatti joined the party in 1972 during the election campaign. He helped build the JS in the Ensenada area while serving as a shop steward in the La Plata Ministry of Public Works. □

Threatened With Tax Claim, Demolition of Offices

International Campaign to Save Russell Foundation

Wide support has been won in the campaign to save the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation,* an organization active in the defense of political prisoners around the world, from a twofold government attack. Donations to aid the foundation's legal defense effort have been received from dozens of countries, reaching the sum of £10,000 (£1=US\$2.11) by the end of July.

In Britain, after Labour party members of Parliament Anthony Benn and Michael Foot joined forces with trade-union leaders Jack Jones, Lawrence Daly, Clive Jenkins, and Hugh Scanlon to issue an appeal, hundreds of trade-union branches throughout the country made contributions to the defense effort. In addition, both the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers and the Transport and General Workers Union made official donations.

In the United States, Professor Noam Chomsky of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology gave the campaign his public support. A number of other academic figures also responded.

In Australia, Nobel Prize winner Patrick White wrote to numerous newspapers calling for support to the foundation.

One side of the two-pronged assault against the foundation is a complex tax claim pressed against it as a test case in an attempt to reverse a High Court ruling unfavorable to the Inland Revenue. The claim concerns gifts made to the foundation as far back as 1967. The money has long

since been spent on the foundation's campaign against the Vietnam War and in the construction of its headquarters and printing plant.

The tax claim has already been ruled against by the Inland Revenue's own special commissioners. Continued prosecution of it, however, would compel the foundation to sell its material assets and prevent it from pursuing its extensive work in publishing and in defense of political prisoners.

Widespread protests from Labour party members of Parliament and other public figures persuaded the Inland Revenue to drop its original demand that the foundation pay the legal costs for all the hearings involved. Even so, the organization estimates that it needs a total of £30,000 to ensure its survival.

At the same time, the foundation faces an attack by the municipal government in Nottingham, the site of its offices and printing plant. The Nottingham Corporation has so far ignored international protests and decided to go ahead with plans to demolish the Russell Foundation's offices so as to facilitate the passage of large trucks to a nearby industrial park. An appeal to the Department of the Environment remains unanswered.

Protests against the tax suit may be sent to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, 10 Downing Street, London, England. Letters protesting the plan to demolish the foundation's offices may be sent to the Lord Mayor of Nottingham, Old Market Square, Nottingham, England. Copies of all protests should be sent to the foundation. □

*Bertrand Russell House, Gamble Street, Nottingham NG7 4ET, England.

Bandaranaike Kicks LSSP Leaders Out of Her Cabinet

By Caroline Lund

Sri Lanka's Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on September 2 kicked out of her cabinet all three ministers from the Lanka Sama Samaja party (LSSP—Ceylon Equal Society party), an organization that claims adherence to Marxism. She charged the LSSP with making too many public criticisms of her policies and of her husband, the former prime minister, who was assassinated in 1960.

This ended an eleven-year class-collaborationist alliance between the LSSP and Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP), a capitalist party. The SLFP and LSSP, together with the small, pro-Moscow Communist party, have ruled the country in a popular-front-type coalition government since 1970.

Expelled from the cabinet were Finance Minister N.M. Perera, Plantation Industries Minister Colvin R. de Silva, and Transport Minister Leslie Goonewardene. They were replaced with three members of the SLFP. The SLFP has a majority of 97 members of parliament out of a total of 157. The LSSP has 18.

The pro-Moscow CP, with one cabinet post, remains in the Bandaranaike government.

According to a September 3 Reuters dispatch from Colombo, "Police barricaded roads leading to parliament and enforced tight security to prevent demonstrations by supporters of the LSSP." The LSSP has sizable influence in the trade unions of tea and rubber packers, dockers, railway workers, bus drivers, and among employees in the public sector.

A dispatch from Colombo in the September 12 *Far Eastern Economic Review* predicted that "a purge of employees placed in managerial positions in several state corporations by the Sama Samajists is almost certain to be carried out."

In press accounts of the ouster, the LSSP is frequently referred to as "Trotskyist." This is false, since the party betrayed the program of revolutionary socialism when it crossed class lines and accepted cabinet posts offered them in 1964 by Bandaranaike. Because of that betrayal, the LSSP majority was expelled from the Fourth International, the world party founded by Leon Trotsky.

A minority group split with the LSSP and carried forward the struggle for revolutionary socialism. This group, now called the Revolutionary Marxist party, is the Sri Lanka section of the Fourth International.

The immediate frictions that preceded the ouster of the LSSP from the ruling coalition centered on a government plan for nationalization of the tea estates. The nationalization plan is expected to be passed by parliament later this month.

The big tea estates, almost all formerly controlled by British companies, bring in 80 percent of the country's foreign exchange. British companies still own directly 30 percent of the tea acreage. In June of this year the Companies (Special Provisions) Act went into effect, requiring all foreign companies to incorporate in Sri Lanka. But thus far the Bandaranaike regime has resisted actual take-over of the British concerns.

At a rally August 12 in commemoration of the powerful 1953 *hartal* (general strike) in Sri Lanka, LSSP leader Perera was reported to have said "that if the nationalization of estates was not going to be done in a satisfactory way the LSSP would leave the United Front government" (as paraphrased in the August 14 issue of the *Ceylon Daily News*). He also asserted that such nationalizations as had already taken place resulted from the pressure of left parties like the LSSP and from mass actions like the 1953 strike.

In a reference interpreted as aimed at the SLFP and its former leader S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Perera charged that "some persons" had "embarked on nationalisation in order to perpetuate their names" (again, as paraphrased in the *Ceylon Daily News*).

In its public statements the LSSP has claimed to support a faster pace of nationalizations. The party adopted the slogan, "There can be no halting places on the road to socialism." It has also criticized the vagueness of the current nationalization plan in leaving open whether the British-owned companies that market the tea crop would also be nationalized.

This demagogic stance reflects the mass pressure from the working masses of Sri Lanka for action to halt the rapid decline in their standard of living. Earlier this year the progovernment trade unions also called for faster nationalizations.

The immediate conflict with the SLFP, however, involved jurisdiction over the nationalized tea estates. Bandaranaike had decided that control over them would go to the minister of agriculture, who is a member of her party, rather than to the LSSP minister for plantation industries, Colvin de Silva.

Control of the tea and rubber plantations, which employ about one million workers, is a big political plum. "The Sama Samajists resent a powerful political weapon and a means of patronage being taken out of their hands," wrote B.H.S. Jayewardene in the August 29 *Far Eastern Economic Review*.

The lack of real differences between the LSSP and the SLFP on the question of nationalization was evident from a public exchange of letters between Bandaranaike and LSSP leaders Perera and de Silva in August. The letters set the stage for the ouster of the LSSP.

Bandaranaike to Perera

In her letter of August 14 to Perera, reprinted in the August 28 *Ceylon News*, Bandaranaike referred to the speech by Perera two days earlier:

"The attempt by your party to show that the Sri Lanka Freedom Party headed by me is opposed to nationalization as you are perfectly well aware is without foundation. The programme of nationalization commenced in 1956 with the Government of the late Prime Minister at a time when your cooperation was not available to the late Mr. Bandaranaike, because of ideals you held then but which you have since abandoned on questions such as parity of status on language and citizenship for all persons of Indian origin not to mention the armed struggle and proletarian revolution.*

"I clearly remember when we were drawing up the manifesto for the 1970 elections and it was suggested by the S.L.F.P. that the proposal for the nationalization of banks be included, you thought it was not necessary as they could be controlled by other means, and thereafter on our instance you did not mind it being listed. The point I am trying to make is that even this important proposal was initiated by the S.L.F.P. and it found a place in the manifesto as a result of that initiative.

* The reference to the LSSP's position on "parity of status on language and citizenship for all persons of Indian origin" is an allusion to the party's pre-1964 stand in support of equal rights for the oppressed Tamil people. The Tamils, who came to Sri Lanka from southern India, are among the lowest-paid agricultural laborers.

As part of the price of its coalition with the SLFP, the LSSP dropped its criticism of the chauvinist, anti-Tamil policies of the SLFP, a party that is based on the Sinhalese-speaking Buddhist majority.—IP



Far Eastern Economic Review

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DE SILVA

Under these circumstances, it is regrettable that statements are being made in public by members of your party that certain S.L.F.P. ministers are standing in the way of the nationalization of banks.

"During the last 5 years, though the question has been raised in the cabinet and the parliamentary group as to why this has not been implemented, your answer was that the time was not opportune due to various reasons. I am not here contesting the validity or otherwise of the reasons given. All what I am seeking to do is to indicate my disapproval of the attempt by your party to mislead the country on this issue. . . .

"If your party had felt so strongly on the subject of land reform or nationalization of estates how is it that in the recent election manifesto of 1970 this item was excluded from the discussions in which you participated. It was not even raised by you. If your party held such strong views regarding the nationalization of foreign owned estates how is it that the LSSP agreed at the Cabinet as well as in their speeches in Parliament to the exclusion of foreign owned estates from the operation of the land reform ACT NO.1 of 1972."

Bandaranaike concluded by warning that "this kind of vituperative politics must cease. . . if we are to continue to work together as a front."

She chided Perera for not being subservient enough to the SLFP: "I have been very patient with you all this time because I have never wanted petty personal differences to stand in the way of real unity among the people of our country in the cause of socialist progress, and I have made every effort to prevent personalities and

personality differences from clouding political issues."

Perera's Reply

In his reply, also printed in the August 28 *Ceylon News*, Perera claimed that his party is equally sincere in its desire for nationalizations. In his belly-crawling he ended by reaffirming his loyalty to the capitalist Bandaranaike government and pleading for a deal:

"I now turn to what appears to me to be the real matter in issue. Time and again each of the Parties that constitute the United Front has stated its own independent position on various issues. Following from this there has been criticism both implied and explicit. These things have not deterred us from continuing to operate as a Party in agreement with the other two Parties. It is our view that despite our differences the common grounds on which we stand in the Front is ample to enable us to continue to function in unity.

"Nevertheless, it would appear from your letter that my reference to the late Prime Minister Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike has hurt you. I do not know what has been reported to you but may I say at once that I am sorry that anything I have said should have hurt you.

"In any event I am sure I did not indulge in what you term 'vituperative politics.' I have never done so. You have said in your letter to Dr. Colvin R. de Silva: 'I am willing to overlook and forgive a great deal for the sake of left unity as indeed I have done already where attacks have been made against me personally.'

"I myself have tried to observe the same principle. In that context I should like to

emphasise that it has always been the view of both my Party and myself that public attacks should not be made on each other by the constituent parties of the United Front. . . .

"I assure you that my Party and I will cooperate in helping the rule of refraining from public attacks to be observed thus helping actively to preserve the unity of the parties who have already achieved so much through the United Front."

This was not good enough, however, for Bandaranaike, who had clearly reached the conclusion that the LSSP's usefulness to her regime had come to an end. When the three LSSP ministers refused her request that they resign, Sri Lanka President William Gopallawa simply removed them from office.

The September 11 issue of the *Ceylon News* reported a speech by Bandaranaike September 2 in which "she said the decision to break up with the LSSP was taken after careful consideration by the entire leadership of the SLFP. It was not her decision alone. It was unanimously accepted by the party through a vote."

The prime minister said "that the SLFP must be prepared to face numerous obstacles in the future. These obstacles will come in the form of strikes etc., but having faced coups and an insurgency [a reference to the 1971 rebellion of radical youth that was brutally crushed by the government] this Government will not run away or be frightened."

The service the LSSP had provided to the SLFP was to use its influence in the labor movement to hold back working-class struggles. The September 12 *Far Eastern Economic Review* noted that "there has been an erosion of support for the Sama

Samajists, because they were associated with the Government's severe anti-strike measures."

With the country in the grip of inflation and facing severe shortages of food, the coalition government was becoming discredited. This was reflected in a decline in support for the government parties in by-elections earlier this year. A right wing within the SLFP has been gaining strength, as has the United National party (UNP), a bourgeois opposition party that has traditionally been most directly associated with British colonial interests.

The UNP has been making political hay over the fact that the SLFP government refused to call the elections scheduled for the spring of this year. The coalition government was elected in 1970 for a five-year term, but the Bandaranaike regime simply voted itself another two years in office by adopting a new constitution that allowed this.

The desire by the masses of Sri Lanka for radical change to satisfy their pressing needs is reflected in the fact that all the major parties claim to be in favor of socialism. For example at a May Day rally this year, J.R. Jayewardene, leader of the UNP, announced "that a victory for his party at the next election would spell the certain doom of capitalism in Sri Lanka," according to the May 16 *Far Eastern Economic Review*.

Correspondent Harvey Stockwin speculated in the September 12 issue of the same publication that Bandaranaike's next move will be to try to form a coalition with the UNP for the 1977 general election. Another possibility, he suggested, is that "Mrs Bandaranaike may well follow Indian Premier Indira Gandhi's example" in dealing with the growing discontent with the SLFP regime.

In June, in response to court action and mass protests against her regime, Gandhi instituted personal dictatorial rule, banning opposition political parties and arresting thousands of dissidents.

The Bandaranaike regime has already employed such methods. In 1971 she declared a state of emergency and moved to militarily crush a movement of radical youth led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP—People's Liberation Front). Thousands were killed, censorship was imposed, and 18,000 persons were arrested. JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera still remains in prison, condemned to twenty years imprisonment.

The LSSP, as part of the government, gave full backing to this ferocious repression. Now, shoved out of the coalition, the LSSP could well become the target of new repressive measures made possible by the eleven years of faithful service to Bandaranaike performed by Perera, de Silva, and Goonewardene. □

Admiral Pinheiro's Program

A Popular Front Cabinet to Mask a Rightist Course

By Gerry Foley



AZEVEDO and GONCALVES

On September 13, the Portuguese premier, Adm. José Pinheiro de Azevedo, went on national radio and television to announce that the three largest parties—the Communist party, the Socialist party, and the bourgeois Partido Popular Democrático (PPD—Democratic People's party)—had reached an agreement on the program of a new government.

The incoming cabinet, the sixth provisional government, a September 13 dispatch in the *New York Times* said, would "take a more moderate revolutionary course and guarantee representation of the major political parties."

By resorting to antidemocratic maneuvers to acquire and defend bureaucratic influence, and then justifying these moves by "revolutionary" phrasemongering and gestures, the Communist party had given the admiral an excellent pretext for linking respect for democratic rights to a reestablishment of "law and order" and guarantees for capitalist property rights. He obviously intended to take advantage of the opportunity.

The premier promised to reduce the influence the Communist party has gained by antidemocratic methods in the press, trade unions, and local government, an influence that has become the focus of widespread resentment among masses of workers and other poor strata.

"He said the program would seek to assure wide representation in news media

belonging to the state," the September 14 *New York Times* reported.

"Democracy in the trade unions would be enforced . . . and municipal bodies 'irregularly constituted against the democratic will of the people' would be replaced. The functioning of the constituent assembly now drawing up a constitution providing for elected institutions would be guaranteed. . . ."

In addition, "The admiral served notice that nationalization of the basic sectors had been completed and that efforts would now concentrate on making the public sector more dynamic and efficient. At the same time, he said, the private sector would be helped and efforts would be made to restore the confidence of investors and bank depositors."

But this "moderate" program was presented in as defensive a way as possible:

"The pledges to reduce radical influence and to moderate the pace of the revolution were accompanied by pledges not to undo economic and social gains of the last 16 months."

Pressing for acceptance of stronger governmental authority, the premier said this was needed to fight "counterrevolutionary forces that seek, through violence and terrorism, a return to fascism."

In a dispatch from Lisbon September 12, *New York Times* correspondent Henry Giniger had reported that Pinheiro de Azevedo had promised to return the daily *República* to its Socialist party editors and the station Radio Renascença to the Catholic church. Both were seized by "workers committees" a few months ago during the military government's demagogic campaign to pit "direct democracy" against the Socialist party and the Constituent Assembly.

In the case of *República*, there was a de facto alliance between Maoists and other ultraleftists on the "workers committee" and the CP-controlled printers union.

However, the September 13 dispatch in the *New York Times* did not mention any reference by the premier to these cases. The allusion to the Constituent Assembly, moreover, was vague.

The governmental program announced September 13 by Pinheiro de Azevedo remained clearly within the popular-frontist context of the previous cabinets. This orientation was underscored by the announcement on September 12 that the president, General Costa Gomes, would

visit the Soviet Union and Poland following the selection of the new cabinet.

Social Democrats Want CP in Cabinet

It was evident that the Socialist party was anxious to keep the CP in the government. SP leader Mário Soares has insisted on this since April 1974. As an electoralist party, the SP does not want to take sole responsibility for a class-collaborationist policy, letting the CP gain the image of being the less corrupted workers party. If it did this, the SP would risk the same kind of depreciation in its appeal the Italian Social Democrats have suffered through their association with the various "center left" governments.

Costa Gomes, also, has shown that he does not want to expel the CP from the cabinet and from the positions it holds until its usefulness has been exhausted. In the first phase of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) regime, the CP was useful primarily as a means of assuring the political support of a large part of the industrial working class and as a transmission belt for the government in the labor movement. The CP's utility in this regard has inevitably diminished.

However, it is still profitable for the bourgeoisie to keep the Communist party tied to the government. It retains the support of an important section of the workers in big industry. Furthermore, it serves as a counterweight against the SP; and encouraging competition between the two workers parties gives Costa Gomes more room for maneuver. It is also useful during a period of economic crisis to keep the CP in a position where it can be used as a scapegoat for the failures of the bourgeois regime. To leave it in a more independent position would make it more subject to pressures from its base.

Spinola Without a Monocle

The president, a shrewder and lower-profile version of his colleague and close associate General Spínola, has proved himself a master in manipulating the opportunist workers parties. Some of his aides, in fact, were so impressed with his skill that they could not help talking about it.

"The general [Costa Gomes] is a gambler," said a presidential aide who played a prominent role in the intrigue," *Washington Post* correspondent Miguel Acoca reported September 8 from Lisbon. "We were counting guns, but we never planned to fire a shot. The first move was to get Goncalves out of the premiership, then we would see whether the military wanted him to be their boss. They said no. That was the end of Vasco."

The wily old general fooled the Stalinists.

But he also fooled the anti-Goncalves faction in the military.

"The president also cut down the anti-Communist officers who effectively turned the Armed Forces Movement against Goncalves, refusing to let the anti-Communists emerge as the movement's dominant faction and putting in question the position of Maj. Ernesto Melo Antunes, theoretician of the vocal anti-Goncalves coalition, and of Maj. Vitor Alves, another leading anti-Communist officer.

"The president wanted Goncalves out, said an aide, but he did not want Antunes and his crowd running the Armed Forces Movement and telling him what to do. A moderate, the president shares the ideas of the Antunes faction, but he didn't want to split the military into irreconcilable sides."

So the general kept the Antunes faction on a leash:

"In fact, presidential aides met frequently with members of the Antunes group, and plotted strategy and tactics together. This was why the Antunes group became angry with Costa Gomes last week, and threatened to rise against him unless he acted quickly to remove Goncalves.

"But Costa Gomes would not be rushed. He wanted the movement to deny Goncalves the post of armed forces chief of staff, and he wanted more backing from the navy, the most radical of the Portuguese services. . . .

"Whether the present military equilibrium survives will depend on how the army accepts his crackdown on the rival factions, which affirms the old general's power."

At the moment, Acoca said, the Antunes faction was the main problem. However:

"The president is aware of their attitude, and his aides say that he is confident that he can handle their opposition."

Stalinists Play Their Cards

The Communist party also tried to play a complex game. However, it was a loser from the start because of the contradictions of its opportunist strategy. Nonetheless, its hand was strengthened temporarily by the fact that some of its objectives converged with those of Costa Gomes.

In the first place, the CP faced the problem of minimizing its losses following the defeat of its allies in the Armed Forces Movement. A sharp deterioration in its position as the privileged political instrument of the government threatened the jobs of a large number of influential CP members and supporters ensconced in the leading positions in the unions, governmental bodies, and the press.

There is no reason, for example, to believe that the CP members and supporters on the main Lisbon morning paper, *Diário de Notícias*, are more dedicated to revolutionary principles than the CP leadership. But

they were obviously very unhappy about the CP's move to accept the consequences of its political defeat and make some concessions to the SP. They printed a front-page editorial September 1 condemning the turn and calling for a stronger "revolutionary authority."

"There is no revolution without revolutionary authority. If Copcon [Comando Operacional do Continente—Mainland Portugal Operations Command, the military security force headed by the now tarnished hero of the ultraleft Saraiva de Carvalho] assaults, invades, and occupies the Fifth Division of the General Staff but does not give even minimum protection to the offices of the parties that are for socialism—where is the revolution and authority? If the command of the Central Region carries out threatening maneuvers—what kind of insurrection is this? If Copcon is not under the authority of the General Staff of the Armed Forces but of the President of the Republic—where does this logic lead?

"If the commander of Copcon can forbid Vasco Goncalves entrance to the units under his command, will he continue to do this now under the pretext of respect for the hierarchy? Is this a country where common sense prevails? If the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party] forms a united front with God and the Devil [i.e., the SP], how should we define strategy and tactics after that? If the Nine are at the same time nine and 80 percent of the armed forces, as it is adventuristically claimed, if they issue communiqués like a party and apply force as if they had it—what kind of Nine are they and what do they want that they cannot say frankly?

"If the SP insults everyone, and makes slander its great specialty, hasn't it opted for the right, hasn't it accepted, and isn't it promoting, reaction? There is no revolutionary authority and so there is no revolution. . . . Officers of the MFA, the two, or four, MFAs that are running around now, permit us to ask what kind of cannibalism have you turned to? . . . You have no authority, let's not even say revolutionary authority, because we are far from that, but simply authority that civilians can respect and accept. When the armed forces don't respect the armed forces, or the socialism they have promised to help build, where can they expect to find respect?"

Ironically, this CP-dominated paper is now echoing the complaints earlier voiced by the SP against the arbitrary decisions and bonapartist maneuvers of the Copcon chief during the *República* affair.

Pathetic Appeal to the MFA

The day before Goncalves's ouster, *Diário de Notícias* made a final appeal in its September 4 issue to the MFA not to capitulate to the "real country"—meaning not to give in to majority opinion—but to

remain true to the example it gave in the April 25 coup:

"That dawn, *companheiros* of the MFA, marked your first moment of courage. At that time you forgot about the real country, this sleepy Portugal, sleepy and therefore exploited, and therefore colonialist, and you stood up as our historic vanguard."

The CP-dominated paper humbly offered its action in purging twenty-four journalists who publicly objected to its Stalinist editorial line as an example of courage that the MFA should imitate by defending Gonçalves against overwhelming popular opposition:

"For our part, we *Diário de Notícias* workers, all our activity has been dedicated to backing up and strengthening your courage. So, we have tried, with all possible realism and lucidity, with the inevitable errors and failings, to offer revolutionary reporting in harmony with an editorial line that sets as our objective ending the exploitation of man by man in Portugal. This, after all, is the objective you first of all established.

"But revolutionary reporting cannot be done by counterrevolutionary reporters. And therefore these types were ousted. So, many people, who are part of this 'real country' that you have not yet managed to awaken, will come to protest—perhaps violently—in front of our building. That will not weaken our resolve. Our example is your first moment of courage."

In fact, there have been violent demonstrations in front of the *Diário de Notícias* building in protest against this purge. And the likelihood that the first cutbacks in CP influence will come in the press, where this influence is most obvious and most directly offensive to the majority of the population, was probably a major factor in the "revolutionary intransigence" of those responsible for this dreary Stalinized sheet.

But it is probably also true that much of the CP following believed the "revolutionary" arguments that were offered to justify the party's antidemocratic maneuvers. So, it could be expected that there would be resistance to a sudden turn to an openly conciliationist policy.

May Go Into Semiopposition

For these reasons, as well as the more fundamental one of the needs of the specific Stalinist strategy of reformism, the CP seems to have opted for the role of a semiopposition party, with one foot in the government and the other outside. The formula the party general secretary, Alvaro Cunhal, chose was a "government of national unity" made up of individuals identified with the coalition parties but not formally representing them. In the September 13 issue of the Oporto daily *Jornal de Notícias*, he was quoted as saying:

"The PCP will not give its approval to a right turn. . . . There are rightist forces that would like to see a 180 degree turn in Portuguese politics, to form a government



COSTA GOMES

that would put in question the gains of the revolution, and have the Communist party there to give its endorsement to this right turn. . . . We will not accept a coalition government, but we will accept a government that has a fundamentally just policy and is presided over by a progressive man. . . ."

Cunhal stressed that his party would not meet with the PPD; but he took a "somewhat different" attitude to the SP because of its working-class support. He agreed to attend meetings with the president to which the SP was also invited. In point of fact, the CP also carried on negotiations with the PPD, as Soares pointed out and Cunhal did not deny. This arrangement suited the objectives of both opportunist workers parties. It gave Soares a chance to present the SP as an interlocutor with the "democratic bourgeoisie," and took the onus for class collaboration off the CP.

Moreover, the formula of a "government of national unity" skirts the thorny problem of whether posts in the new cabinet should be divided up on the basis of the April 25, 1975, election results, in which the CP won 12.5 percent as against 38 percent for the SP. According to this formula, the government will not be one of parties, but of individuals chosen by the military. This suits the CP's purpose by maintaining the principle of a government above popular sovereignty, where the CP can advance its interests by serving the military directly. It also suits the military's purposes, including those of the Nine. For example, the Septem-

ber 13 *Jornal de Notícias* reported:

"Reliable military observers think that the Nine may disagree—and in fact they do seem to disagree—with some points presented by the SP and the PPD (and not only with the CP's points, as some of the press has claimed). With the strength they derive from the support of a large section of the armed forces, the Nine will be ready to expose the 'party-political opportunism' to which Pinheiro de Azevedo is already supposed to have made some concessions."

This formula also allows the CP to remain a government party and at the same time to keep a free hand to pressure the government from the outside. This could be expected to prove useful in defending key positions from attack and minimizing the sacrifices the CP can look forward to having to make.

However, the main value of this tactic has to do with a more fundamental strategic concern. Facing a large Social Democratic party, the CP has to cultivate a tougher, more "revolutionary," image to be able to compete. By taking a certain distance from the new government, which is obviously going to try to whittle down some of the gains the workers have made, the CP can hope to turn its defeat to advantage and perhaps recoup some of its losses in the labor movement.

Although this contradiction can be exploited by militant sections of the working class, just as the "democratic" strategy of the SP has offered a defense for such strata against the bureaucratic regimentation pushed by the CP, it holds grave dangers.

The Road to Isolation

Stalinist "militancy" is dogmatic and fanatical in character. It stands in the way of clear political and strategic thinking on the part of the most combative workers. It can thus lead to the isolation of whatever vanguard elements are misled by it. Furthermore, it remains fundamentally subordinated to opportunist objectives, and thus where taken for good coin, leads to disorientation and disillusion.

One of the greatest dangers of this illusory "militancy," moreover, is the way the capitalist class can use the shortsighted posturing of the Stalinists as a pretext for counterrevolutionary mobilizations and repression. In an explosive situation, it is suicidal to pretend to be revolutionary when you have no intention of carrying out a consistent campaign to unite and mobilize the working masses to take power.

Most of the groups to the left of the mass reformist parties in Portugal, however, have fallen into the CP's trap. The neoanarchist confusion of most of these groups plays in with the limited objectives of Stalinist "militancy." In their fascination with advanced forms of organization and militant initiatives by the most radicalized

strata, the Portuguese ultraleftists have tended to lose sight of the relationship of forces in the society as a whole and of the importance of timing in a revolutionary process.

For the ultraleftists, the question of a political strategy for taking power becomes dissolved in a vague and timeless process of the "self-guided organization of the masses." Instead of focusing on the key issues in the class struggle at each given moment, they offer formulas that are supposed to be "intrinsically revolutionary." Thus, however radical their activity may seem, it can be kept within safe limits, overall, for the bourgeoisie. It becomes a diversion, a kind of reformism, in which "exemplary" gains are substituted for decisive advances.

The August 25 Bloc

Fortunately for the Stalinists and for the bourgeoisie as well such ultraleftists are numerous in Portugal. By forming a bloc with the CP on August 25 they enabled the Stalinists to give a broader and more "revolutionary" allure to the August 27 demonstration in support of Gonçalves. They are continuing to cover the CP's retreat.

The August 25 bloc defended the whole record of the Gonçalves government. Most of the components of this front took their distance from the CP when it turned to a more openly conciliatory position on August 28. But they continued to push the more left-sounding aspects of the CP's opportunist line. For example, the manifesto of the Frente de Unidade Revolucionária (FUR) published in the September 11 *Diário de Notícias* condemns "Social Democracy" in the abstract, linking it with "fascism."

The manifesto defends the Fifth Division of the General Staff, which used Stalinist propaganda in the interests of the regime. It panders to Portuguese nationalism, which the CP and demagogic military officers have tried to use against the SP. Furthermore, it offers no concrete program for uniting the workers against the coming capitalist offensive.

More immediately damaging than all these failings, the front identified itself at its first news conference with the antidemocratic methods of the CP.

When one representative of this bloc, Ezequiel Vicente of the Portuguese Democratic Movement, a front group of the CP, was asked about the September 8 decree banning the publication of statements by "unauthorized" military sources, he gave the following answer, as summarized in the September 11 *Diário de Notícias*:

"He said that the secretariat of the Front had taken a position on this and that it repudiated the law. But it also considered that such methods would have been effective and even patriotic at other times when

the Revolutionary Council was in a very good situation to do this but that 'now they are aimed at silencing progressive officers.' Revolutionary measures to halt the abuse of freedom of the press were never taken, and now they seemed belated."

This was a particularly shortsighted position, since, as it turned out, the press close to the SP also repudiated the law, and the de facto common front of the SP and CP press forced the government to retreat. Furthermore, the government had been emboldened to try this attack because the CP had tried to use its control of the press to give the impression that Gonçalves had more support than he did, and this crude maneuver was quickly exposed. Such a line fits in moreover with that taken by the CP-dominated printers union, which denounced an offensive against "progressive" journalists, at the same time as it slandered a paper like *Jornal Novo*, which is close to the SP, as reactionary, although it is less crudely biased than the CP press, and it opposed the censorship law.

In all, the FUR's activity fits in with the campaign against "Social Democracy" that is still being carried in the CP-dominated press. Thus, the FUR has essentially strengthened the CP's hand in the double game it is playing, where it deals with the SP only through the military government, and continues to refuse to open the way for a united front in action with the SP.

The CP may lose certain layers of its membership to the ultraleftists as a result of this policy. But as long as there is no

viable alternative to the left of the CP, these losses will remain the acceptable overhead costs of the party's opportunist policy. And it is obvious that the FUR is not, and cannot be, an alternative to the CP. Nor is it helping to prepare the conditions for the emergence of such an alternative. It blocks the way.

The pressures of the situation in Portugal have apparently led some revolutionists to opt for joining the biggest militant bloc immediately available. It is to be hoped that they will realize their error before the process goes too far.

However, regardless of the errors of some sincere revolutionists and the confusion of the ultralefts, the CP bears the main responsibility for the diversionary role of the FUR. Although it is not in it directly any longer, it is present by proxy through the Portuguese Democratic Movement. Furthermore, without direct or indirect CP support, this front could have no significant influence.

Nor is it likely that the support of Stalinist circles for this front is an example of the CP being outdistanced by its ranks. No doubt it has problems in controlling the ultraleft moods it has instilled in its membership. But it has been able to rally them behind unpopular policies before, and there is no evidence as yet that the Stalinist machine has lost its grip. The FUR and the ultraleft campaign in the CP-dominated press still fit in too well with its overall policy objectives. □

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American Stalinists Attack Trotskyist Position on Portugal

By David Frankel

[The following article appeared in the September 19 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

* * *

The *Militant's* thorough coverage of the events in Portugal has been well received by our readers. There have been some exceptions, however. Chief among the critics was the Communist party's *Daily World*, which felt it necessary to run three extensive articles by Erik Bert detailing its objections.

The Stalinists try to dismiss the arguments raised in the *Militant* by "proving" the existence of a bloc including, among others, the *Militant*, the CIA, George Meany, Portuguese Socialist party (SP) head Mário Soares, and the Wallaceite American party.

Bert claims that the *Militant's* reports on how the Portuguese Communist party (CP) has attacked democratic rights, and its defense of the rights of the SP, are all a right-wing maneuver.

"The enemy, as far as the Trotskyite Militant is concerned," he writes September 4, "is the same as for the agents of the Salazar-Caetano fascist dictatorship, the same as for U.S. imperialism and Mario Soares' right social democracy. Their mutual enemy is the Communist Party of Portugal. . . ."

"George Meany and the CIA agree with the Trotskyite Militant about the Communists' 'attacks on the democratic rights of others; . . .'"

According to this line of argument, also known as guilt by association, all those who criticize the Portuguese CP and its policies are in league with American imperialism and Portuguese reaction. We will return to Bert's arguments and take them up in detail, but first it is necessary to establish the framework of the dispute.

Bert's crude amalgam is an attempt to evade the fundamental question facing the Portuguese working class and its supporters around the world. Portugal is a capitalist country; the question for socialists is what policy should be followed to bring the working class to power and transform Portugal into a workers state?

This question has not been posed abstractly. The Portuguese masses clearly indicated their support for socialism following the overthrow of the Caetano dictator-

ship. The military regime was forced to adopt very radical rhetoric and govern with the help of the CP and SP in order to retain its credibility.

The Stalinist policy in Portugal has been to lead those under their influence to support the capitalist government, instead of attempting to mobilize the masses independently in their own interests. This course of tying the working class to the representatives of the bourgeoisie can never lead to victory in a socialist revolution.

From this point of view, the general approach of the SP is not different from that of the Stalinists. When it withdrew from the government in July, after more than a year of collaboration, the SP made clear that its objections were to specific policies and individuals, not to participation in a capitalist government as such. Currently a new cabinet is being formed, which the SP will no doubt take part in.

However, for a period of about seven weeks, from early June until late July, the SP took the lead in organizing mass demonstrations in the streets against the government's attempts to restrict democratic rights. These attacks on the rights of the working class—which were in the interests of the capitalist military regime, not the socialist revolution—were spearheaded by the Stalinists.

But Bert tries to turn the Trotskyist position in defense of democratic rights, and in support of specific actions to that end, into an endorsement of social democratic politics and bourgeois anti-Communism.

He starts with the article by Joseph Hansen, "Is democracy worth fighting for?" which appeared in the August 15 *Militant*. Writing in the August 29 *Daily World*, Bert says:

"Hansen pretends to defend the revolution and democracy against its enemies. He admonishes the 'militants' in Portugal, warns against their 'ultra-left course,' and the like. But his defense of 'democracy' against all its detractors and would-be destroyers' is in fact, a cover-up for Trotskyism's collaboration with Right social democracy, allegedly in defense of 'democracy.'"

Bert contends: "The Trotskyite Militant has sold its affections to Soares and what Soares says is what the Trotskyite Militant will echo."

But the supposed SP connection is only

the first link in the amalgam. As Bert elaborates in his September 4 article:

"There is not one reactionary force in Portugal, from the Salazar-Caetano counterrevolutionary 'hit' men, to Henry Kissinger's 'moderate' social democrats; from the reactionary pro-fascist Catholic hierarchy to the expropriated monopolists and the feudal latifundists, which does not beat the drums for 'democracy,' as do the Trotskyites, and denounce the communists as anti-democratic, as the Trotskyites do also."

The basic Stalinist argument, here as always, is that because the capitalist press has been on a campaign to discredit the Portuguese CP, the Portuguese CP must be revolutionary. In reality, the capitalists have no such illusion. They are taking advantage of the situation in Portugal to drive home the false idea that socialism and democracy are incompatible.

The tragedy is that the Portuguese CP, and Stalinism everywhere, play right into the hands of the capitalists by pursuing their bureaucratic course and dismissing democratic rights as irrelevant. World Stalinism—with good reason—has come to be regarded as the enemy of democratic rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as in countries like India and Portugal, where the Stalinist parties have supported the restriction of democratic rights.

In the Soviet Union Stalinist policies have been responsible for the purge trials and political murders, the labor camps and psychiatric prison wards, and the other hideous features of the Soviet police regime. The bureaucratic regime inside the USSR has been complemented by the crushing of movements for socialist democracy in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Stalinists have done more than capitalist propaganda could have ever hoped to achieve in helping to discredit socialism in the eyes of the people of the world.

In Portugal, the Stalinists were helped by the military junta to gain control of the trade-union federation, after which rival union formations were banned. Again with the help of the military, the Stalinists were placed in key positions in the mass media. As late as the middle of July, six of the seven daily newspapers in Lisbon were carrying the CP line, among them the newspaper *República*, which had reflected the views of the SP until its take-over by a

coalition of ultralefts and Stalinists.

These attacks on freedom of the press and freedom of association in Portugal were supplemented by threats to abolish the Constituent Assembly—the only elected governmental body in the country—and attempts to prevent SP protest demonstrations.

After fifty years of capitalist dictatorship, at a time when the workers and peasants see democracy as a crucial issue, the bourgeoisie, thanks to the role of the Stalinists, have been able to present themselves as defenders and partisans of democracy.

In view of all this, it is understandable that the CP feels the need to immunize its ranks against the facts and arguments raised in the *Militant*. Bert thinks that if he can link the Trotskyists with the CIA, it will do the trick.

But the attempt to make an amalgam between all those who criticize the Portuguese CP is only the beginning. While slandering the *Militant* by accusing it of supporting the rightist attacks on the CP that have been going on since July, Bert is faced with the fact that we favor a united front of the workers organizations to repel such attacks.

Bert gives the following arguments on why a united front with the SP for defense against the rightist attacks in Portugal is not necessary, desirable, or possible.

- The CP represents the majority of the working class.

- The SP is opposed to a united front to defend the CP's democratic rights.

- The SP is linked to European imperialism.

- The SP broke up an existing united front when it left the government.

The SP is in league with the extreme right.

Bert is especially annoyed because "the Trotskyite *Militant* argues, in the face of all the evidence, which shows the opposite, that the Socialist Party of Portugal is the party of the working class."

He attacks Joseph Hansen for writing about "the rallies of a Social Democratic party backed by the majority of the working class." "That sentence, however one reads it, is false," according to Bert.

Just as bad as Hansen, according to Bert, is David Frankel, "the Charley McCarthy for Soares," who "proclaims that the Communist Party is 'clearly a minority of the working class.'"

In spite of Bert's protests, the Marxist method requires us to begin with the real world. The three biggest parties competing in the elections to the Constituent Assembly held in Portugal last April were the capitalist Popular Democratic party and two working-class parties, the SP and the CP.

The procapitalist vote was a minority; 26

percent of the total went to the Popular Democrats. The prosocialist vote was divided mainly between the CP and SP—12 percent for the Stalinists and 38 percent for the Social Democrats.

Since then, the SP has proved its ability to mobilize mass demonstrations many times larger than those of the CP. Does Bert think that the 100,000 who mobilized in Lisbon July 19 to defend the democratic rights of the SP, or the 50,000 that turned out for the SP rally in Oporto on July 18, were all sons and daughters of the ruling class? How else is the strength of a political party to be determined except through elections and its ability to mobilize people under its banner?

Of course Bert knows that the SP is bigger than the CP. What he is trying at all costs to evade is the fact that the Portuguese Stalinists have been locked in conflict not just with the rightist thugs who have been attacking their headquarters, but also with the majority of workers and peasants in Portugal, who justifiably oppose the CP's policies and fear its antidemocratic methods. It is this split in the working class that has enabled the rightists to mobilize with impunity.

The responsibility for the split in the Portuguese working class lies squarely on the shoulders of the Stalinists. Although a minority party, they have tried to impose their policies on the toiling masses. Even if the CP did represent the majority, its attempts to silence its critics would have drawn legitimate opposition.

Reference to this simple fact sends Bert into convulsions. "The venomous anti-Communist line of the Trotskyites has led them into explicit endorsement of the fascist-like attacks on the Communist Party," according to his September 3 article. "Thus the *Militant* wrote (August 8) that the CP policy 'has opened the way for a wave of violent mob attacks on CP headquarters throughout the northern two-thirds of the country.'"

Bert's claim that the *Militant* supports the rightist attacks in Portugal is a shameless falsification. Similarly, his clinching argument on why a united front with the SP is impossible is that the SP also favors the assaults on the CP.

"It is not true that the 'SP has denounced the violent attacks on the CP headquarters,'" according to Bert.

"It is not true, as implied," he continues, "that the Soares' leadership has expressed any interest in the defense of the democratic rights of the Communists."

Bert's attempt to deny the facts in this case is no less ludicrous than his performance in regard to the size of the SP and CP. The truth is that the head of the SP delegation in the Constituent Assembly condemned the attacks on the CP, while at the same time accusing the party of helping

to provoke them by its bullying tactics. The CP delegates responded by getting up, insulting him, and walking out with their arms raised in the clenched-fist salute.

The August 29 issue of the Lisbon daily *Journal Novo* quoted a statement by Soares: "The SP never wanted to isolate the PCP. It has condemned the attacks on the headquarters of this party, regarding them as acts of intolerable violence, and it stands in solidarity with the Communists when they are persecuted."

It is certainly true that the reformist SP leaders would prefer to give only verbal support to the CP. Only great and sustained pressure could force the social democratic politicians to actively defend their rivals against rightist violence.

But the fact is that the SP itself has suffered red-baiting in the rural areas, and if the rightist campaign is not stopped it will be the next victim. A consistent political campaign could convince the SP ranks that only a united response could stop Portugal's ominous shift to the right.

The Stalinists, however, take an attitude toward those who disagree with them that in practice precludes any common action. Thus, in his September 4 article Bert goes into a long description of the links between the Portuguese SP and its cothinkers who run the Swedish, British, and German governments. This, says Bert, illuminates "the depth of political corruption involved in the Trotskyite *Militant* support of Soares" and is presumably meant as an argument against calling for a united front with the SP against the rightists.

This argument is reminiscent of the dead-end sectarianism that opened the way for the triumph of Hitler in Germany. Under the leadership of Stalin, the German CP called the Social Democrats the left wing of fascism and refused to press for a united front with them against Hitler.

All the bad things that Bert recounts about the Social Democracy have been true since World War I. It was the German SP that was responsible for the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and the strangling of the German revolution of 1918-19. Revolutionists could find countless equally shameful crimes in the history of Stalinism. The point is that when the working class is divided it can only defend its basic interests through agreements by the major working-class parties to struggle together around specific issues.

However, the Stalinists are opposed to a workers united front for the defense of democratic rights. The only front they want is one with the capitalist government—a popular front. Bert converts the concept of the united front as a method of working-class struggle into the idea of a front to support the capitalist government.

"It is a fact," he writes in his August 29 article, "that the Soares leadership has

been the main disrupter of the post-revolutionary united front.

"It undermined the government while a part of it; it broke up the united front by leaving the government; . . . and it has been the point of convergence for all anti-revolutionary forces, within Portugal and from abroad."

Similarly, Bert writes on September 4, "The truth is that the Socialist Party, Soares specifically, were part of the government. The truth is that the Socialist leadership quit the government, deliberately and disruptively. The truth is that the Socialist Party and Soares specifically, has been inciting relentlessly to bring down the government."

Bert condemns the SP for quitting a capitalist government and "inciting" against it! The procapitalist Soares becomes a real revolutionary the way Bert tells it.

For Bert, "The Trotskyite Militant's call for SP-CP unity is cynical deceit. It does not represent support of unity of the Portuguese working class, but support of Soares' disruption [of the government]."

In other words, the Stalinists were ready to collaborate with the SP leaders in a capitalist cabinet, but not with the masses of SP workers in actions in the streets.

Since Bert's articles appeared, the CP has found it necessary to make an adjustment. Having lost their battle for sole partnership with the military, the Portuguese Stalinists are talking about unity with the SP. "Cunhal: 'We seek unity with SP,'" reads the headline in the September 6 *Daily World*.

Gone is the charge that the SP is in league with the CIA, Salazarist goons, and worse still, the Trotskyists. "The appeals [for unity] are not new: Cunhal and the PCP have been making them for the past 17 months," assures Tom Foley in the September 9 *Daily World*.

Didn't Erik Bert know? Perhaps he should write three more articles to prove that unity with the SP is necessary and possible after all.

However, the fundamental line being pushed by the Stalinists is still the same: unity in defense of capitalism, unity inside the capitalist government, not a united front of action in the streets to defend the interests of the working class.

As the *Daily World* explained in a September 9 headline: "Unity in Portugal sought via a new cabinet."

But the Stalinists are in for a rude surprise if they think that the restoration of CP-SP collaboration in a new government dominated by the military will end the attacks on them.

The Portuguese working class is confused and disoriented, but by no means broken. The radicalization continues to run very deep. Under these circumstances, both the

class struggle and the rightist attacks will flare up again. The necessity of a united defense of democratic rights will again become apparent.

This task cannot be left to the military junta. The Portuguese officer corps has already shown its inclination to move to the

right. Currently, it is working to restore discipline in the armed forces. The danger is that the supposedly "patriotic officers" will turn on their former allies as they did in Chile. The SP and CP, by participating in the bourgeois government, help give the Portuguese bourgeoisie the time they need to prepare the reaction. □

Vientiane Rally Hails Total 'Liberation' of Laos



SOUVANNA PHOUMA: "There is no change I am still Prime Minister."

The Pathet Lao forces have now asserted control over the whole of Laos.

A mass rally August 23 in Vientiane, the capital, celebrated the "liberation" of Vientiane Province. According to broadcasts of the Vientiane radio and the Pathet Lao news agency, some 300,000 persons attended the rally, which was held to "welcome the people's revolutionary administration." Other reports put the attendance at 100,000 or 200,000.

The rally marked the end of a process that began in May. At that time the Pathet Lao forces began assuming control of areas nominally under the control of the coalition regime, after students and workers organized demonstrations protesting Washington's continued presence in the country. Most of the right-wing and proimperialist forces fled the country, and nearly all the American "aid" officials have gone.

Vientiane radio also announced on August 23 that Pathet Lao control of the Laotian royal capital, Luang Prabang, had been greeted by a similar rally earlier in the

week. The radio repeatedly hailed the "liberation" as a victory over "the United States imperialists and their henchmen."

The Vientiane rally was apparently prepared weeks in advance. According to a report by David A. Andelman in the August 26 *New York Times*, elaborate preparations were made for the ceremony, and all persons between the ages of sixteen and thirty were officially required to attend. On the morning of the rally, however, announcements were made throughout Vientiane that everyone was to attend, and Pathet Lao police officers went from door to door to make sure no one stayed home.

Although the event was hailed as a "liberation" and the new regime was described as the "people's revolutionary administration," the trappings of the old coalition regime seem to have been retained. Andelman spoke over the telephone with Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma the day after the rally. Souvanna Phouma maintained that the coalition continued:

"Everything is calm here, always calm," he said. "There is no change. I am still Prime Minister."

The program to be followed by the new regime was outlined by Phao Phimphan, chairman of the "people's revolutionary administration of the Vientiane municipal area," who gave the main speech to the Vientiane rally. He announced a ten-point policy that includes a pledge to "respect and uphold the throne"; to support the coalition government with Prince Souvanna Phouma as prime minister and the Lao Patriotic Front with Prince Souphanouvong as its president; and to "carry out the duty of making Laos a peaceful, independent, democratic, neutral, unified and prosperous country."

A report from Vientiane August 26 by Agence France-Presse said the new regime had issued a program agreeing to respect the position of King Savang Vatthana and Premier Souvanna Phouma as well as the coalition government's National Political Council. The program also gave assurance that the right to individual property and the freedom to invest private capital would be respected. □

1,600 Attend American Trotskyists' National Convention

By Andy Rose

[The following article appeared in the September 19 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

The twenty-sixth national convention of the Socialist Workers party, held August 17-21 in Ohio, analyzed a new stage in the development of the class struggle in the United States and the ramifications of this new stage for the tasks of the revolutionary party.

The Socialist Workers party believes that a fundamental shift is taking place in the political scene: the beginning of the radicalization of the American working class and its advance to a new and higher stage of political consciousness.

This qualitative change is the cumulative result of several interrelated developments:

- the radicalized attitudes that developed in the 1960s and were expressed through the antiwar movement, the Black liberation struggle, and other social protests;
- the definitive end of the long post-World War II period of capitalist expansion and relative prosperity; and
- the impact of the new crisis of world capitalism on the thinking of masses of working people.

It was the judgment of the convention that the period ahead will be one of political polarization and sharpening class battles. The opening of this new stage in the radicalization means new opportunities, new challenges, and new tasks for revolutionary socialists. It dictates a turn in the attitudes, priorities, and functioning of the Socialist Workers party.

This turn was the central political axis of the convention. At plenary sessions, classes, and more than thirty workshops, convention participants discussed the meaning of the new stage of the radicalization and its implications for every area of the party's work.

With more than 1,600 delegates and observers attending, this was the largest convention ever held by the SWP. It brought together party activists and supporters from the trade unions, the Black, Chicano, and Puerto Rican struggles, the women's movement, and the high schools and college campuses, as well as a large number of observers from other countries.

The national convention, the highest decision-making body of the Socialist Work-

ers party, was the culmination of a three-month period of thorough and democratic discussion.

Two resolutions were submitted to the membership by the outgoing national leadership of the party: the main political resolution, "The Decline of American Capitalism: Prospects for a Socialist Revolution"; and a resolution on "The Fight for Black Liberation, the Current Stage and Its Tasks." All members of the SWP had the opportunity to contribute articles and resolutions on any aspect of the party's program, perspectives, and tasks to the SWP internal discussion bulletin. In addition, discussions were organized in each party branch.

At the end of the preconvention discussion, each branch voted on the resolutions and elected its delegates to the convention. There, after reports and further discussion, the delegates decided on the party's perspectives for the period until the next convention. The delegates also elected the national leadership that will direct the party's work in that period.

The two draft resolutions and the reports to the convention by the outgoing SWP Political Committee were approved by unanimous vote of the elected delegates.

Mary-Alice Waters, reporting on the draft political resolution, outlined the origins and significance of the new stage of the radicalization. A report on tasks and perspectives, presented by Betsey Stone, discussed in greater detail the implications of the turn for the party's work.

New openings were seen in the trade unions and other mass organizations of the American working class. Eleven workshops were held by party members active in different unions and industries, ranging from teachers to steelworkers. One workshop heard a firsthand report from the United Farm Workers convention, which has just taken place in Fresno, California, and discussed organizing massive support for the UFW's boycott of scab grapes, lettuce, and wine.

Growth of SWP

An important aspect of the new political situation is the heightened receptivity to socialist ideas and the greater potential for expanding the party's influence and winning new members.

Symbolizing the geographic growth of the

party, representatives were present from five cities where new party branches are being established: Newark, New Jersey; Baltimore, Maryland; New Orleans, Louisiana; San Antonio, Texas; and San Jose, California.

It was also announced that the Chicago branch is expanding by dividing into two branches, one on that city's South Side, the other on the West Side. The former Lower Manhattan, New York, branch has become the Lower East Side branch and will be based in that predominantly Puerto Rican community, where the SWP has won respect for its active participation in the fight for Puerto Rican, Black, and Chinese control of the schools.

Workshops discussed the 1976 SWP presidential campaign, a fall circulation drive for the *Militant*, and how to win new members to the party.

Another theme running through the convention was the SWP's deepening involvement in the new stage of the fight against racism, especially centering at this time on defense of school desegregation in Boston and other cities.

The convention opened with an enthusiastic ovation celebrating the release of Joanne Little, acquitted just two days before of a frame-up murder charge for defending herself against a rape attack by her white jailer. SWP members throughout the country had been active in Little's defense, helping to organize picket lines, teach-ins, and fund-raising events on her behalf.

Tony Thomas, reporting for the Political Committee on the Black struggle resolution, pointed to the devastating effect the capitalist crisis has had on the oppressed Black masses. Not only has progress toward social and economic equality been blocked, but a mounting racist offensive is trying to roll back the gains of the civil rights movement.

"In making a turn to the opportunities opened up by the change in the objective situation and the beginning of a working-class radicalization," Thomas said, "we put special emphasis on the democratic struggles of Black people against discrimination and oppression."

A report on the activities of the Young Socialist Alliance, presented by YSA National Chairperson Malik Miah, focused on the desegregation struggle in Boston and the work of the National Student Coalition

Against Racism. Miah said the YSA and SWP would be active in NSCAR's efforts to mobilize a massive defense of Black students' rights to be bused in safety to any school.

Another major aspect of the convention was discussion of the world political situation and the international revolutionary movement. Here the focus was on the revolutionary upsurge in Portugal since the April 25, 1974, overthrow of the Salazarist dictatorship. A banner hanging directly above the speaker's platform declared: "Solidarity with Portuguese Workers! Portugal Out of Angola!"

Two reports were presented, one by SWP National Secretary Jack Barnes, the other by SWP National Organization Secretary Barry Sheppard. They took up the crucial questions of program, strategy, and tactics posed by the developments in Portugal, including the attitude of revolutionaries toward freedom of the press and other democratic rights, attitude toward a capitalist military regime that cloaks itself in radical demagoguery, how to apply the united-front tactic, and other issues.

The discussion at the SWP convention was greatly enriched by the participation of leaders of revolutionary groups from around the world, including leaders of two Portuguese Trotskyist groups, the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (Internationalist Communist League) and the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (Revolutionary Workers party).

In addition to the convention sessions and workshops, the week's activities included several class series, a wind-up rally, and two presentations by veteran Trotskyist leaders and educators. Joseph Hansen, editor of *Intercontinental Press*, spoke on "James P. Cannon, the Internationalist." George Novack, Marxist historian and philosopher, discussed basic tenets of materialist philosophy in a talk titled "In Defense of Engels."

* * *

The convention's political resolution does not deal with immediate political or economic prospects. Rather, it steps back to take a broader look at the roots of the present crisis of American imperialism, the structural and ideological changes in the working class and among its allies since the 1930s, and the revolutionary perspective that flows from the new stage in the radicalization.

The first section of the resolution puts the present crisis in the framework of the growing contradictions of world imperialism.

This crisis represents the exhaustion of the motor forces of the long post-World War II economic boom. The world capitalist economy has entered a new period of long-term stagnation, inflation, and decline.

There will still be ups and downs in the economic cycle, but the ups will be lower and shorter and the downs will be longer and deeper.

Under these circumstances, the resolution points to the real perspectives continued capitalist rule holds out for the American workers:

- First, to boost its profit rates and strengthen its competitive position on the world market, American capitalism will try to hold down real wages, whittle away at working conditions, and generally lower the workers' standard of living.

- Second, to uphold American imperialist interests around the world, the rulers will press forward with new military adventures, continually raising the threat of new Vietnams and the danger of nuclear holocaust.

- Third, to undercut the ability of the workers to resist, the ruling class will seek to curtail democratic rights on the job and in general.

Consciousness of American workers

The heart of the resolution is its analysis of the developing new consciousness among the American workers. One element of this process is the radicalization of the 1960s, which began with the Black struggle, was carried to a new stage by the anti-Vietnam War movement, and spilled over into a questioning of more and more institutions of capitalist rule. New layers of the oppressed—women, Chicanos, Native Americans, prisoners, and others—began to demand their human rights.

On top of what Vietnam did to the credibility of the rulers and to the image of American "democracy" came the Watergate revelations. "The 'credibility gap' represents in reality a crisis of political confidence in the government . . .," the resolution states. "For the first time since the 1930s growing numbers of the American working people not only disbelieve what the rulers tell them but question the goals and values of the ruling class."

The new situation represents not simply the further extension of this radicalization to broader layers of workers. The impact of the economic crisis—the wage freeze, double-digit inflation, speedup, meat crisis, oil crisis, and now the depression—has brought about a qualitative change.

Mary-Alice Waters put it this way: "It was in this period, between the August 1971 wage freeze and the 1975 depression, that a bridge was crossed in the consciousness and the expectations of the American working class. On the 1971 side of the bridge, the working class was still relatively optimistic, with relative security and confidence, even if there were doubts and questions.

"On the 1975 end of that bridge stands a

working class with a growing sense of insecurity, with a fear of what the future will bring, and with the feeling that whatever it is, it will be worse than what has been. At the 1975 end of that bridge stands a working class that is beginning to sense that what is involved is not just a temporary dip in an upward curve, but an enduring social crisis and a curve that is heading downward. . . .

"We have entered a new historical period, one that is going to be our generation's equivalent of the great social crisis of the 1930s."

The resolution sums up the significance of the new period as follows: "The U.S. is not heading back to the prolonged prosperity, reaction, and quiescence of the 1950s and early 1960s. The road ahead is one of increasing class consciousness, class struggle and class polarization, leading from radicalization toward a revolutionary situation, regardless of the oscillations along the way.

"The world crisis of capitalism does not favor extensive and effective long-term capitalist *reform* in the United States but development of the prerequisites for a *revolution*."

The resolution goes on to examine the changing character and composition of the working class, the changes that have taken place since the last period of labor radicalization in the 1930s and '40s, and how these changes affect the perspective of growing social and political consciousness in the coming struggles.

"The extensive industrialization, automation and monopolization of factory, farm and office in the 1950s and 1960s," the resolution states, "led to a massive increase in the size of the American working class, both in absolute terms and in relation to other classes."

Contrary to the myth of the workers all becoming "middle class," the resolution observes that "American workers tend to think of themselves nowadays more as workers than as potential independent producers. Few believe they will one day be able to have a shop, farm, or small business of their own, assuring them an independent livelihood."

This question of social composition is different from the so-called middle-class standard of living of American workers. The belief by masses of workers that they have a *right* to a decent—and rising—standard of living is a revolutionizing, not a conservatizing, factor.

The long period of economic expansion brought millions of women into the labor market for the first time. Waters noted in her report that "the willingness of women today to fight to keep their jobs, their refusal to accept it as normal that they should be thrown out of the work force to bear a disproportionate weight of the crisis,

their resistance to being simply relegated back into the home, is one of the most important changes that have taken place." It leads both to an increasing class consciousness among women and to the radicalism and militancy of women spurring on the class as a whole.

Another crucially important change, Waters said, "is the forging of the American state as a new, modern, imperialist show-case 'prison house of nations.'" The Black population, which at the end of World War II still lived in its majority on the land, is today more urbanized and proletarianized than the white population. Masses of Chicanos and Puerto Ricans have entered the urban work force, as well as the agricultural proletariat, under conditions of superexploitation.

The resolution explains that "the oppressed nationalities and national minorities play a double role. They constitute a growing percentage of the working class and at the same time they are the most important allies of the working class. . . ."

"Oppressed nationalities and national minorities are exploited as proletarians. This exploitation is intensified by their pariah status since they are at the same time oppressed as a distinct people. The struggle against this twofold oppression is one of the central driving forces of the third American revolution. . . ."

These superexploited and nationally oppressed workers will more and more "furnish leadership in the fight to transform the labor movement into a fighting social movement, using its power to back the struggles of all the oppressed."

The foremost question of revolutionary strategy in the United States is overcoming the divisions within the working class—between Black and white, employed and unemployed, male and female, skilled and unskilled, young and old, public employees and workers in the private sector.

The SWP's position on how this can be done is unequivocal. The resolution states: "We press for revolutionary unity based on support for the demands of the most oppressed. We press the working class to give clear and concrete answers to the problems faced by its allies. And we unconditionally reject any concept that the oppressed should 'wait' for the labor movement to support them before entering into struggle."

This question is posed most sharply and concretely today around the issue of discriminatory layoffs. While the union bureaucrats and all other fair-weather friends of the Black movement back away from defending the job gains won by Blacks in the 1960s, upholding instead the relative privileges of white workers to hold jobs at the expense of Blacks, the SWP demands that the layoffs not reduce by so much as

SWP's Largest Convention

The total attendance of 1,613 at the recent SWP convention made it the largest ever held. By comparison, the previous convention, held in 1973, was attended by 1,478 people, the 1971 convention by 1,100, and the 1969 convention by 660.

Convention participants came from twenty-eight states. Some of the largest groups were 299 from New York, 257 from California, and 94 from Pennsylvania. In addition, observers were present from eighteen foreign countries.

Forty-three percent of those present were women. Thirty percent were attending their first SWP convention. Members of sixty-two different trade unions were present.

one percentage point the gains made through affirmative action.

This issue, which is being hotly debated at all levels of the labor, Black, and women's movements, was the main focus of discussion under the political report. Several speakers explained from their own experiences in the labor movement the necessity for the unions to champion the interests of the most oppressed.

Catarino Garza, a bilingual teacher in New York City, graphically described how the United Federation of Teachers had been weakened in its battle with the city administration by UFT President Albert Shanker's support for the privileges of high-seniority white teachers against young, bilingual, Black, and Puerto Rican teachers.

The sharpening contradictions of world capitalism impel the workers onto the road of revolutionary struggle. But even the most devastating breakdowns of American capitalism cannot automatically produce a victory for the socialist revolution. Moreover, the misleadership of the union bureaucracy stands as a tremendous obstacle not only to the socialist revolution but even to the defense of the workers' most elementary interests, as the unions' capitulation in the New York City crisis has vividly demonstrated.

The problem facing the as yet small revolutionary forces is twofold:

- to help the masses, through their own experiences of struggle, to cross the bridge from general dissatisfaction and immediate demands to revolutionary socialist solutions; and

- to gather fresh forces and train the cadres who, in the course of the class struggle, can build a mass revolutionary party capable of leading millions of working people to victory.

To solve this problem requires a clear and precise revolutionary program and an understanding of how to apply it *in the living class struggle as it arises*. The political resolution presents such a program—not the precise slogans, which cannot be foreseen, but the general line of march—as applied to the particular features of American society and the international role of U.S. imperialism.

Embodied in this program is the necessity for the American workers to begin to *think socially* and *act politically*. The resolution explains: "They must see the big social and political questions facing all the exploited and oppressed of the United States as issues of direct concern to them. To act politically means they must break the stranglehold of the bourgeois two-party system. . . ."

The program falls into three sections. First are demands against the war machine, for disarmament of the American imperialist world cops, for an end to U.S. interference with struggles of workers and oppressed peoples around the globe, against the massive war budget. It includes demands relating to the democratic rights of GIs, for an end to secret diplomacy, and for giving the American people, not Congress, the right to vote on war.

A second group of demands flows from defense of the workers' standard of living and conditions of work. It includes demands for protection against inflation and unemployment and for safety on the job, and progresses through other demands toward workers control of production, opening the books of the monopolies, and a rational reorganization of the economy by the workers themselves.

Finally, the program shows the need to defend human rights, not property rights. It links the fight for a decent standard of living for all to the fight against all forms of discrimination and oppression. It points toward extending the social and economic rights of the workers and establishing forms of direct democracy, both political and economic.

"The problem for us," Waters concluded, "is to prove ourselves capable of fully understanding that program and applying it. In the coming period there are going to be ample opportunities. There are new openings for us in all sectors of the mass movement, and our job is to get out there and find them.

"The task is to provide the program and leadership to help our class move forward on the road to the socialist revolution, and construct a mass revolutionary party that is capable of leading the way to victory. And we can confidently say that in the perspectives before us in the United States, there is no other force but the Socialist Workers party that will be able to provide that necessary leadership." □

Political Prisoners Brutalized in India's Jails

By Ernest Harsch

In a televised interview broadcast in the United States August 24, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi explained why no charges were being brought against the tens of thousands of political prisoners arrested throughout the country since her June 26 coup. "Court cases go on for years and years and it is very difficult to prove anything," she said. "If a person has not personally indulged in arson or whatever, you couldn't convict him."

Immediately after the coup, Gandhi cited a "deep and widespread conspiracy" as justification for her suppression of democratic rights. In the interview, she presented her sole "evidence" that a "conspiracy" existed: "There was violence. Students were not attending college. We had strikes. In fact, at all levels there was such indiscipline that even government functioning was becoming extremely difficult."

Although Gandhi refused to say how many persons had been arrested in the two months since she declared the state of emergency, opponents of the Indian dictator have put the figure in the tens of thousands.

According to an August 4 *New York Times* dispatch from London, the secretary of the International Transport Workers Federation, M.S. Hoda, said that he was informed during a recent trip to India that the central government has seized about 15,000 persons and the state governments more than 40,000. George Fernandes, a leader of the Socialist party of India, said in a document circulated clandestinely that 60,000 persons were detained. An opposition member of Parliament has put the figure as high as 80,000.

These political prisoners are in addition to the tens of thousands that were already in jail. Claire Sterling said in the August 10 *New York Times Magazine* that in Bihar state alone, about 70,000 persons were imprisoned for political offenses before the state of emergency. About half were alleged members of the Communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist), commonly known as Naxalites. The rest were followers of Jaya Prakash Narayan, the jailed leader of the mass anticorruption movement based in Bihar.

A.K. Gopalan, a leader of the Communist party of India (Marxist), gave details of the repression against the CPI (M) and other opposition groups in a July 21 speech to the Lok Sabha (House of the People, the lower house of Parliament). Gopalan also put the CPI (M) on record in opposition to Gandhi's

state of emergency. He said that with the declaration of the state of emergency "parliamentary democracy has been replaced by the dictatorship of one party with full power concentrated in the hands of one leader, Mrs. Gandhi. This is not an expression of the strength of the ruling party but the expression of an extreme weakness and crisis of the party and the ruling classes."

Gopalan said that between 2,000 and 3,000 members of the CPI (M) were in jail at the time of his speech, including such party leaders as Jyotirmoy Basu, Noorul Huda, Mohan Punamiya, and M. Basavapunniah. Both Gopalan and E.M.S. Namboodiripad, the CPI (M) opposition leader in the Kerala Legislative Assembly, were arrested and later released.

"In Kerala, for example," Gopalan said, "thousands of political workers belonging to the Opposition parties including the CPI (M), the Kerala Congress, the Socialist Party and so on were arrested and large numbers brutally beaten up by the police."

He said that meetings and demonstrations were banned throughout Kerala under Section 144, a repressive law originally introduced in India by the British colonialists. He also said that in the city of Indore, in Madhya Pradesh, the offices of the CPI(M) and of the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, a labor federation politically dominated by the CPI(M), were raided and shut down.

Kerala is ruled by a coalition regime including the pro-Moscow Communist party of India (CPI), the Congress party, the Muslim League, and other groups. Its chief minister is Achuta Menon, a leader of the CPI.

Andrew Davenport reported in the August 22 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "At Cochin's Maharajah College, the largest educational institution in Kerala, there was a strike in the first week of July. Police immediately moved in with batons. After a few hours, the strike was over and 40 students were in hospital."

Noting that CPI(M) members were being rounded up almost every day in West Bengal, Kerala, and Maharashtra, Davenport continued, "In Maharashtra the authorities have jailed a number of party activists. In Bombay, Mrs Ahilya Rangnekar, a municipal corporation member, has been detained for demonstrating against the declaration of the Emergency. Two other women associates, members of the Women's Anti-Price Rise Committee, are being held with her. One of them is Mrs

Pramila Dandavate, wife of the socialist leader, M.R. Dandavate. Another woman detainee in Maharashtra is Miss Usha Thombre, an activist of the Student Federation of India, which is sponsored by the Communist Party of India (Marxist)."

Included in Gandhi's roundup were several Socialist party trade unionists, as well as leaders of the federal and state government employees and of other unions.

In addition to the twenty-six organizations already outlawed since the state of emergency was declared, Gandhi has banned the Mizo National Front and its military wing, the Mizo National Army. The MNF was formed in 1961 and is one of several separatist groups in the northeastern hill states that have been fighting for independence from India for years. A New Delhi official said August 5 that 108 Mizo rebels had been arrested since January 1. Another nationalist group in the northeast, the Naga National Council, was outlawed several years ago.

The methods used in the crackdown—arbitrary arrests without trial, secrecy surrounding those detained, planting of informers in the universities, the stress on "discipline"—are all designed to spread fear and uncertainty among the general populace. "The Emergency," Davenport reported, "is encouraging police *zoolum* (terror rule). More policemen carry guns now than before."

The police have also quickly learned how to profit from their new powers of arbitrary arrest. "In Bombay, as in New Delhi, there are arrests without reasons given, and releases after payments are made," Davenport said. "A boy flying a kite was detained in New Delhi. His mother had to 'bail' him out by paying Rs 250 (US\$31)."

There are some indications that Gandhi is planning to institutionalize the rigid press censorship imposed after the June 26 coup. The *National Herald*, which is considered the unofficial organ of the Congress party leadership, suggested in an August 11 editorial that constitutional restrictions be placed on India's newspapers. Information Minister V.C. Shukla told reporters August 23 that the government was drawing up plans to reorganize the country's newspapers "to make the press really free."

In keeping with Gandhi's new status as Empress of India, the Congress party promotional experts have launched a personality cult to brighten up her tarnished image. The student wing of the party is reported to be organizing "Indira Study Circles" at all major universities. Articles in *Socialist India*, the official magazine of the party, carry such titles as "Why We Should Have Complete Faith and Trust in Indira Gandhi." One artist has done a painting depicting Gandhi as Durga, the Hindu goddess of bravery. In case the message was lost on anyone, a progovernment

newspaper stated in an article that "Indira Gandhi is not a mere Prime Minister."

Consistent with the propaganda campaign, Parliament obediently passed a series of amendments designed to place the Empress above her own earthly courts. On August 5 the Lok Sabha approved retroactive amendments to the law under which Gandhi was convicted of election malpractice by the Allahabad High Court June 12. It also removed the section of the law under which Gandhi would have been barred from holding office for six years if her appeal had been turned down.

Introducing the amendments, Justice Minister H.R. Gokhale said they were designed to remove "ambiguities" in the original law. "It is not introduced for the benefit of any single individual," he claimed, "and if any individual benefits from it, that does not affect the merits of the legislation."

To ensure that Gandhi's divine right is not challenged again in the future, Parliament also passed constitutional amendments a few days later placing the prime minister, president, vice-president, and speaker of the house outside the jurisdiction of any court, including the Supreme Court. Under the amendments, no criminal charges or civil suits may be filed against them while in office or afterward for anything done in office. The Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), under which many of the arrests were made, was also placed above court challenge.

Shanti Bhushan, the lawyer for imprisoned Socialist party leader Raj Narain, who filed the election malpractice suit against Gandhi, argued before the Supreme Court August 11 that Parliament did not have the power to pass amendments that changed the basic structure of the constitution. Although Gandhi had hoped that the Supreme Court would automatically dismiss her case after the passing of the amendments, it agreed to Bhushan's request to delay the appeal hearings to give him time to prepare his case against the new laws. Under the present climate of repression, however, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will rule against the prime minister.

Intelligence experts in Washington view Gandhi's coup as a permanent shift toward repressive rule in India. An official who participated in a study conducted by the State Department, Defense Department, National Security Agency, and Central Intelligence Agency was quoted in the August 10 *New York Times* as saying: "... we don't feel Mrs. Gandhi will permit a return to the pre-June 25 conditions. We don't see the state of emergency being abandoned in 1976 or even later."

It appears that some members of the CPI are uneasy about the Stalinist party's policy of full support to Gandhi's dictatorial



'I FIND MYSELF NOT GUILTY!' Far Eastern Economic Review

coup. Indrajit Gupta, a CPI leader and a member of the Lok Sabha, issued a "friendly warning" to the Congress party August 7 when he protested the constitutional amendment putting MISA above the courts. He said that the amendment "seems to make it a permanent law, even after the emergency." He also complained of the press censorship of CPI speeches in Parliament, stating, "Censorship of speeches in Parliament is only helping the enemies of democracy."

Jacques Leslie said in the August 8 *Los Angeles Times* that many of the CPI's "members are said to be unhappy that Mrs. Gandhi has not used the state of emergency to move India to the left. Some reportedly are fearful that she may instead strike next at the Communist Party."

Any uncertainty that some members of the party may have over the CPI's alliance with the "progressive bourgeoisie," which Gandhi is said to represent, could only have been heightened by the remarks of Gandhi's son, Sanjay. He claimed in an interview that the CPI was dominated by some of the country's richest and most corrupt figures. The censors originally approved publication of the interview, but then barred it. Although Sanjay later retracted his statement, the warning to the CPI was still clear.

The CPI, true to its class-collaborationist policies, is still insistent on allying with the Congress party, although it may prefer more favorable terms. Gupta, in his Lok Sabha speech, told the Congress party members, "If you want that cooperation, which we are quite willing to give, then please treat us as an independent party with an identity of our own and not as your own subsidiary." As proof of the CPI's continued desire to cooperate with Gandhi, General Secretary C. Rajeswara Rao gave his backing, in an interview published in

the August 15 *Patriot*, to the constitutional amendments limiting the powers of the Indian courts to challenge the actions of the government.

The massive repression seems to have temporarily disoriented and weakened the organized opposition groups. Nevertheless, some protests against the dictatorial coup have continued.

In Gujarat, which is ruled by a coalition of parties opposed to Gandhi, the Lok Sangharsha Samiti (People's Struggle Committee) called for a week of nonviolent protests from August 9 to 15. August 9 is the anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi's launching of the Quit India movement against the British in 1942. The program was to include a "real news day," classes on democratic rights, and *satyagraha*, or nonviolent civil disobedience actions, against press censorship.

Lawrence Lifschultz reported from Gujarat in the August 29 *Far Eastern Economic Review* that rallies were held throughout the state August 9 and were attended by representatives of the ruling Janata Morcha (People's Front). □

Saigon Bishop Was on CIA Payroll

Included on the Central Intelligence Agency's extensive Saigon payroll at one time was a South Vietnamese Catholic bishop, according to John Marks, a former State Department intelligence specialist. Marks has prepared a study on the CIA relationship with church groups, an Associated Press dispatch in the July 25 *Washington Post* reported.

The bishop, who headed a diocese outside Saigon, was employed as recently as 1971, Marks said, and a CIA "case officer" would fly in from Saigon to hold secret meetings with him. According to Marks, the CIA regularly infiltrates church and missionary groups working abroad.

Chapter 10

The 'Peace Offensive' and the Crisis in the NCC

By Fred Halstead

Reverend A.J. Muste was respectable enough to receive an invitation to sponsor the SANE march, but he turned it down because the call was too equivocal. SANE insisted on a multilateral approach, blaming both sides for the war and calling on both sides to take initiatives for peace. As a pacifist, Muste was prepared to appeal to both sides to stop the killing. But he also felt it was important for Americans to demand a unilateral cease-fire by the U.S. The call did not reflect his view, he said, that the U.S. "has no business—and never had—in Vietnam and should withdraw."¹ At the same time he urged people to attend the march because he felt a small turnout would be a setback for the cause of peace.

Muste attended at least part of the NCC convention. That white-haired old man even sat through one of the late-night sessions of

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the steering committee. As I recall, it was crowded and the table and chairs had been removed to make more room. People, including Muste, sat on the floor. He was tall, but lean, and looked more comfortable than I with his legs folded under him, his well-worn suit and tie unruffled. But he did not speak.

A.J.—everybody called him that—was not exactly close-mouthed, but he wasn't given to aimless talk either. He had long since decided who he was and where he was going and he didn't do his thinking out loud. He would sometimes offer an apparently offhand remark, often a bit of whimsy, but it seemed to me these always made a point. At the convention proceedings, however, he said nothing.

Yet that gathering of antiwar radicals must have had a certain importance for him. Nearly half a century of his life had been spent opposing wars—not simply in the abstract, but in particular, while they were being prepared *and* while they were being prosecuted. After the advent of atomic weapons he viewed his work with even greater urgency, not simply as a spiritual need for individual moral witness, or a struggle for desirable social change—both of which motivated Muste—but as a necessity of human survival. Moreover, Muste was not a passive pacifist. For him nonviolence was a method of affecting events.

He was also very practical. Unlike most of the pacifists, Muste had a background of personal experience in the rise of industrial unionism in the United States, having spent sixteen years, from 1919 to 1935, deeply involved in working-class struggles and contributing in no small measure to the victory of several important strikes. He understood mass movements, had no fear of

them, and well knew the key role played in the birth of such developments by handfuls of persecuted organizers.

What is more, he had often cast his lot with the unrespectable radicals—ever since he had to leave his Congregationalist pulpit in Newtonville, Massachusetts, for remaining a pacifist *after* the country entered World War I. Now a movement against a war in progress presented the possibility of involving popular masses. Muste took it seriously, if anyone did.

This is not to say that Muste agreed with what the Trotskyists did at the convention. His well-established aversion to faction fighting would have inclined him to be critical. But he did not join the chorus denouncing the YSA. His published comment was rich in content and evenhanded, and typical of his approach to reconciliation. Significantly, it came in the context of a defense of the new antiwar activity against some of the criticisms raised by a group of Social Democrats in the right wing of the old peace movement.² Said Muste:

"It was to be expected that in the midst of this upsurge of anti-war sentiment and of such a war as the Vietnamese war, proposals for an end-the-war 'movement' should emerge and efforts to build such a 'movement'—*the* movement which would do the job—should be undertaken. It was also inevitable that the question whether the end-the-war 'movement' might not be made the starting point for a new political alignment, a new 'revolutionary' line-up, and what have you, should be broached and that various groups should think they have *the* answer to that broader question and proceed to act upon it. All this is obviously too vast a matter to go into in detail here.

"I am not at the moment sanguine that *the* 'movement' is about to come into existence. I must in all honesty confess my distress over the fact that, e.g. at the Convention of the National Coordinating Committee in Washington, November 25-28, and on other occasions there have been displays of sectarianism and embittered ideological controversy, which will not facilitate the emergence of a movement of radical opposition to the war, if they persist. But I am convinced that movement, revolt [against the war], cannot be suppressed and that this is in itself a 'revolutionary' development. If the revolt is to express itself in various ways and not in a single 'movement,' then it is my hope that the adherents of each tendency or program will work very hard at their job as they see it and while not abandoning political dialogue, will not dissipate energy in personal or organizational attacks on each other. The issue will in any event be decided largely by forces and developments over which none of us exercise a substantial measure of control."³

On December 3, a few days after the NCC convention, I was invited to a meeting at 5 Beekman Street, where Muste had his office. Those present included Muste, Dellinger, Beinin, Eric

2. Muste answered an article in the November 25, 1965, *New York Review of Books* signed by Irving Howe, Michael Harrington, Bayard Rustin, Lewis Coser, and Penn Kimble. Howe and Coser wrote for the magazine *Dissent* and Kimble was a member of New York SDS.

3. *Liberation*, January 1966.

1. *National Guardian*, December 4, 1965.

Weinberger, Beverly Sterner, who was Muste's secretary, and Jerry Rubin.

The meeting opened with Beinin raking me over the coals. He said the real question was whether the SWP and YSA were going to remain part of the movement. He did not say we ought to be excluded, but suspected we were intent on a split. There were similar thrusts from around the room. Bev Sterner was particularly incensed, saying something like: Fred, how could you *do that*? Muste spoke last, directly to me, asking where I thought we should go from here. I told them we were certainly not contemplating any kind of split, and that I thought the Parade Committee was a good model of how the various groups could work together. Muste replied simply, we can start from there. That ended the roasting.

The rest of the meeting was devoted to a proposal by Rubin for reorganizing the NCC office. For the time it was a grandiose plan. It involved a \$100,000 budget for one year, a fifteen-member full-time staff, including regional desks, traveling organizers, fund-raisers, and even a printer. The plan called for the NCC office to be moved from Madison to Chicago. Rubin said he would go there and bring five full-timers from Berkeley with him. Rubin would present the plan at the first standing committee⁴ meeting of the NCC projected for January 8-9 in Milwaukee.

Rubin made no bones about the fact that a major motivation for his proposal was to avoid domination of the NCC office by one ideological tendency, at least one from the "old left." In the printed version of his proposal he said: "The healthiest aspect of the current movement is the involvement within [it] of large numbers of people not previously organized. They are new to politics. They examine matters empirically and they are developing a perspective. Many of their friends still believe in the American Dream. The Stalin-Trotsky conflict as applied to 1965 America and the world seems like an ecclesiastical debate.

"It is these independent radicals who have formed the basis of the Berkeley VDC. The national organizations, with their ideological world views, and their pattern tactical approaches, are active in the VDC. But they are far outnumbered by the independents. This is the strength of the VDC. This has kept the friction of Du Bois, YSA, Third Camp, and SDS to a minimum. . . . This should also be the model for the NCC. Concerning two points: The NCC should be located in an area of heterogeneous political tendencies, which offset one another and in which the opportunity for independent point of view is greatest.

"Most of the staff members of the NCC should be independents. Leadership should be diffused and balanced between various points of view, representing individuals of various sized groups, various regions, and of various perspectives.

"Close control on the office should be exercised by a representative administrative body representing the independent committees throughout the country, a group small enough so that it can maintain democratic control of the staff."⁵ This obviously implied

4. As used here the term "standing committee" refers to the body composed of representatives of the constituent groups. The structural document adopted at the NCC convention contains that usage, and the term "administrative subcommittee" for a much smaller body of seven members which the standing committee was empowered to elect. It uses the term "steering committee" to refer to the larger body as it existed before and during the convention.

There is some confusion in other documents over these terms. According to one version, the "steering committee" was the larger body of some seventy members and the "standing committee" was the smaller body of eight members. In another version these terms appear to be reversed. As I recall it, the "administrative subcommittee" was never elected—though it may have existed informally—and the term "steering committee" was used throughout to refer to the larger body. In this book, however, the usage is the same as in the most authoritative document available to me, the structural document adopted at the convention (copy in author's file).

5. *Peace and Freedom News*, No. 13, December 31, 1965.

a certain criticism of the current NCC office under Emspak's direction.

Rubin returned to Berkeley, met with the VDC, and on December 9 held a press conference together with VDCers Windy Smith and Larry Laughlin in which they announced the plan, as well as the March 25-26 "international days of protest." They also announced they would be joining the NCC staff. All this, apparently without consulting Emspak, who, when he read it in the December 10 *New York Times*, was not pleased.

By phone Rubin apologized for not emphasizing to the press that the plan was simply a proposal to the January 8-9 meeting. It was then printed with that explanation in the NCC newsletter along with statements supporting its main points by Dellinger, Lynd, Beinin, Weinberg, and others.

For my part, I was ambivalent toward the Rubin proposal. I was willing to vote for it, but if Emspak resisted, it would take a fight to implement it. Frankly, I was not eager for another experience with Rubin as an ally in a faction fight. In a letter to YSAers recommending support for the Rubin plan, Doug Jenness said: "Rubin's proposal is actually the same proposals we were making before the convention when we thought it would be possible for the NCC to become a national organization based on and responsible to the independent committees. The major difficulty with Rubin's proposal is that more likely than not the centrists who support it will not wage a determined fight for it. It is impossible for us to fight for this proposal which would place Rubin in the staff unless Rubin himself is willing to fight for it. We are not sure at this point how hard Rubin and Co. will fight."⁶

Meantime, events in the war itself set the stage for a substantive political debate at the January 8-9 meeting. Two weeks before Christmas the NLF proposed a twelve-hour truce for the Christmas holiday. On December 22 the U.S. announced it would observe a thirty-hour truce beginning Christmas Eve. Senators Mike Mansfield and Robert F. Kennedy proposed extensions. Fighting resumed the day after Christmas, but the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam did not.

On December 30 the White House announced that a major probe for negotiations was under way. Johnson played the "peace offensive" for all it was worth, ostentatiously sending prominent personal emissaries around the world—including to Warsaw, where in those days U.S. diplomatic messages were passed to the Chinese—to look for signals that Hanoi was willing to talk terms. The pause lasted thirty-seven days and ended after Johnson piously declared on TV January 31, "Now the world knows more clearly than ever who insists on aggression and who works for peace."⁷

There was never any real secret about Johnson's purpose in the bombing pause. It was twofold: first, to once again tell Hanoi to abandon the revolution in the South or face destruction of its own cities, and second, to prepare the political atmosphere for continued massive escalation of the war. Johnson still refused to have anything to do with negotiations with the NLF.

"No matter how the Hanoi regime responds to the U.S. pause in the bombing of North Vietnamese targets," William Beecher commented in the *Wall Street Journal* December 30, "the Johnson administration plans to go to Congress next month with double-barrelled requests for more money so the war can be pressed harder if necessary. . . . If Hanoi fails to rise to the opportunity for a peaceful dialogue then the President will have gone a long way to disarming his critics at home and abroad who have raised doubts about the sincerity of his interest in a negotiated settlement."

Hanoi gave its answer January 4: "The United States is

6. Letter to YSAers from Doug Jenness, YSA national office, December 20, 1965.

7. *Washington Post*, February 1, 1966.

thousands of miles away from Vietnam. The Vietnamese people has never laid hands on the United States. The United States Government has no right to send troops to invade south Vietnam and to launch air attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It has no right to impose on the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam any condition whatsoever in exchange for stopping its air raids on north Vietnam.

"United States aggression is the deep root and the immediate cause of the serious situation now prevailing in Vietnam. With the ending of this aggression peace will be immediately restored in this country."⁸

Seventy-seven congressmen and some twenty senators, including Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, appealed for an extension of the bombing pause and more serious attempts to negotiate, but studiously avoided any threat to vote against the increased war funding. After all, the argument went, you can't expect the president to negotiate from weakness.

The "peace offensive" was accompanied by the first full-scale U.S. attack on the Mekong River Delta region of South Vietnam, with U.S. forces burning out villages that had for years been in NLF control. It was prepared by massive air strikes, including B-52 bombers shifted from Northern targets. By January 9 it had become the largest ground operation of the war.

The "peace offensive" presented the antiwar movement with a crisis around the problem of how to cut through Johnson's duplicity. The negotiations wing of the movement concentrated its efforts on Congress, but its arguments were easily parried by the administration. It came down to a matter of trust, of whether the president was sincere or not. What is more, the hawks replied with an argument designed to appeal to the war weariness itself: strike hard and get it over with.

Fulbright himself would later refer to this in one of a series of lectures at Johns Hopkins University in which he described some of the dangers inherent in the situation:

"... as the war goes on, as the casualty lists grow larger and affect more and more American homes, the fever will rise and the patience of the American people will give way to mounting demands for an expanded war, for a lightning blow that will get it over with at a stroke. The first demand might be for a blockade of Haiphong; then, if that doesn't work, a strike against China and then we will have global war."⁹

In line with the hawk arguments, various prowar groups began organizing rallies to "support our boys," by which they meant support the war. This was also a central argument used to keep the doves in Congress in line on votes for military appropriations. It was one thing to criticize, but it was another to actually use congressional power to block the war effort. That was characterized as stabbing "our boys" in the back.

In the face of these developments the immediate-withdrawal wing of the movement had a clear, popular response: If you want to get it over with, get out of Vietnam now! If you want to support our boys, bring them home now! What had seemed to many merely a moral position now assumed greater practical significance, and the pressure for the immediate withdrawal demand increased within the movement.

Emspak, however, stuck to the negotiations position. Declaring "the peace movement has been disarmed by the peace offensive," he said: "We in the peace movement can either ignore the ploy as a 'hoax' or we can respond in such a way as to attempt a change in the nature of the offensive itself." He emphasized a demand "that the U.S. agree that the inclusion of the NLF is necessary in any government in South Vietnam."

"To this end," he continued, "we must support the Senators,

8. *Militant*, January 17, 1966.

9. Speech by Fulbright before the Advertising Bureau of the American Newspaper Publishers' Association, *New York Times*, April 29, 1966.

etc., who are more or less in agreement with this position."¹⁰

The National Executive of the Du Bois Clubs commented as follows on the "peace offensive": "Many Americans have been heartened by this move, as they welcome any serious attempt to end this brutal war. President Johnson tells us he wants a negotiated peace in Vietnam; so does the whole world. But the only basis for peace in Vietnam is that there be free elections in Vietnam, and that the Vietnamese people are guaranteed self-determination under the Geneva Accords."¹¹ The Geneva Accords called for internationally supervised elections.

This was a common formula with the congressional doves and was often presented by SANE. I had commented on this position as follows in an article analyzing the NCC convention debate: "Right off the bat, this whole business of calling for self-determination for the Vietnamese through internationally supervised elections is a contradiction in terms. If a people has self-determination it determines things for itself, including how its elections shall be run or whether it shall have them or not.

"To make the point sharp, put it this way: 'self-determination for the Soviet people, internationally supervised elections in the Soviet Union.' Or: 'Internationally supervised elections in the United States.' Neither the Soviet Union nor the U.S. would brook any such nonsense, and the Vietnamese should not be asked to accept it either. . . .

"It is true, of course, that Hanoi did accept the Geneva Accords in 1954 to end the fighting with the French. It is also true that the Vietnamese might once again feel they have to negotiate and accept something short of full sovereignty as the price of ending the fighting. That is their right. It is they, after all, who are under the gun.

"But it is a different matter for U.S. citizens to ask the U.S. government to negotiate anything in Vietnam. Such demands implicitly recognize some sort of U.S. rights in Vietnam. But it has none, and the only correct thing for it to do is get out. . . . The Johnson administration already claims that it respects the Geneva Accords. Demands to end the war which are couched in these terms give the administration a way out, a way to equivocate, a way to claim they are meeting the demand while they proceed with the war."¹²

The NCC standing committee meeting, which took place in Milwaukee January 8-9, featured a lengthy discussion of the "peace offensive." Almost everyone present agreed with an analysis presented by Ed Greer of New Haven, who characterized the Johnson move as a hoax designed to cut the ground out from under critics of the war. It was decided to put out a press statement on the "peace offensive." A draft drawn by Robin Maisel of the Philadelphia CEWV was hotly debated. It declared:

"It has become evident over the past two weeks that President Johnson's 'Peace Offensive' is not aimed at producing a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war which will guarantee the right of self-determination for the Vietnamese people. The purpose of the President's recent foray in diplomacy is to disarm his critics at home and abroad.

"The NCC Standing Committee meeting in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, January 8 and 9, demands that the President immediately withdraw American forces from Vietnam and leave Vietnam for the Vietnamese. The alternative is a further escalation of the war, the loss of tens of thousands of American lives, and an ever-increasing economic and social burden on the American people."¹³

Opponents of the statement, including Emspak, argued that the

10. *Peace and Freedom News*, No. 14, January 21, 1966.

11. "To: All Du Bois Clubs, Key Contacts, and Peace Groups. From: National Exec. W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs." January 4, 1966. (Copy in author's files.)

12. *Militant*, December 13, 1965.

13. *Bring the Troops Home Now Newsletter*, No. 4, February 1, 1966.

meeting was too sparsely attended to make policy for the NCC. Someone—as I recall it was Dellinger, who favored the immediate withdrawal statement—then proposed that it be released simply in the name of those present. Maisel accepted the amendment and the debate proceeded on the substance of the matter. Greer opposed the statement on the grounds that the movement should advocate negotiations. He said that though “the overwhelming majority here is for withdrawal now,” including himself, he was against saying so publicly because the moderates and “peace candidates” he wanted to appeal to would be alienated by such a move. He said he was also opposed to characterizing the Johnson maneuvers as a hoax for the same reasons, though he had done so in so many words in his own analysis earlier in the meeting.

Jerry Rubin, fresh from a jail sentence in San Francisco for his part in the Maxwell Taylor demonstration the previous summer, was outraged at this. The job of the movement, he declared, is to convince the American people of the truth about the Vietnam war and American society and it can't do that with “tricks or mirrors.” The movement can't maneuver with the American people, he said, and fairly shouted: “Tell the truth!”¹⁴

Mary Walters, a longtime peace activist from Denver with the powerful hands and torso of one who has had to use canes to walk, declared this was no time for the antiwar movement to be diverted into a “liberal swamp.”¹⁵

When the hand vote was taken it was 19 for releasing the statement and 18 opposed. Emspak and Greer then demanded a vote on the basis of proxies and weighted votes. Each committee was entitled to one vote for each 100 members or fraction thereof, and some committees which could not send representatives had given proxies to other delegates. In any case, it was all on the honor system, since no one could really check what a committee's membership was. Rubin and Weinberg cast four votes for the Berkeley VDC—a modest enough claim for a group that had called events attended by tens of thousands. They both groaned, and Rubin did a little dance of the absurd near the stage, as Greer cast seven votes, five of them proxies from a single high school group. When the proxies and weighted votes were counted, the result was 38-25 against releasing the statement.¹⁶

The media reported this outcome as a victory for the “moderates” in the antiwar movement. In truth it was the beginning of the end for the NCC. There are some things you just can't get away with unless you've got a lot of crude power, and Emspak and company certainly didn't have that.

The rest of the Milwaukee meeting was desultory, since it was evident nothing could really be decided there. The Rubin proposal for enlarging and moving the national office was set aside to be discussed at another meeting projected for April. Rubin went back to Berkeley, leaving Weinberg on the NCC staff in Madison. He was uncomfortable there—the NCC newsletter listed him as a “guest member” of the staff. He lasted a short time and gave it up. Lynd, Dellinger, and Beinin gradually lost interest in the NCC.

The April meeting was never held. In March, Emspak wrote a letter to Henry Abrams in New York, copies of which were sent to several people in the movement. It was not generally well received. It said: “Re: The Meeting—we have two basic questions: should we have it? and then, if we do, would we win? At first I felt that we should have it. In other words, take the bull by the horns, walk in well organized, win all the votes, and walk out after having accomplished something. . . .

“If this plan is to work, then we have to have overwhelming majorities there. If we do not, then we will be stymied at the outset. The object of this whole plan is to get the idiocy out of the

way beforehand and spend 90% of our time on the summer project.

“The other alternative is not to have the meeting at all and then risk a battle over that. I do not think too many people give a good God damn whether or not we have a meeting. If we propose a good summer project and organize regional meetings in April to discuss it, I think most people would agree to it. We are going to find out with a special poll to be taken this week.”¹⁷

Though no poll had been mentioned at the standing committee, a ballot was sent out containing three choices: to have an April meeting, to have regional meetings which would then “submit reports to the NCC office,” to have no meeting. The covering letter contained the following statement: “Failure to respond will have to be regarded as a disinterest in having a meeting.”¹⁸

Just to keep things on the up and up, Emspak invited YSAer Lew Jones to Madison to help count the ballots after they were returned in the mail. Jones didn't bother.

Emspak was right about one thing. Not too many people in the know gave “a good God damn” whether the NCC had another meeting or not.

The NCC staff continued to work hard—at no small personal sacrifice for some of them—doing some useful research and turning out a newsletter which helped spread the word about the March 25-26 demonstrations and other activities before and afterwards. But the one factor which had made the NCC more than just another information center—on a very modest scale at that—was gone. It could no longer be a form for unification of the new antiwar movement or provide a national focus for action. In part this was due to the awareness—which spread more or less slowly through the movement after the Milwaukee meeting and more rapidly after the March demonstrations were over—that as far as policy was concerned Emspak was running a one-man show, which in his case meant a one-tendency show. He lacked both the political and human sensitivity to other points of view and their spokespersons to be an effective central figure in a coalition of heterogeneous forces.

Emspak was only twenty-two, and lacked experience, but in a movement largely composed of rebellious youth this in itself was no drawback. But Emspak was no rebel. He had an ideology of sorts, it is true, though even there he was fuzzy, unsure of himself, and dependent on others for ideas. But politics above all involves people and their relations with one another. And radical politics is, above all, people and their dreams. For Emspak, politics was a post. His main initial advantage over others was his name and his connections—which he had inherited from his father, Julius, along with the name's prominence. But the antiwar movement of 1966 was not the half-million-dues-paying-member United Electrical Workers Union of the 1940s. Frank Emspak was essentially an officeholder—some would say a bureaucrat—in a movement whose only power was a dream.

The second reason for the demise of the NCC as a national unifier of the new movement was the particular perspective that Emspak represented. He had little further interest in keeping the movement in the streets beyond the March demonstrations, but looked toward the fall congressional elections, and campaigning on behalf of “peace candidates,” mostly within the Democratic Party. The NCC summer project never amounted to much except for a few sparsely attended “regional conferences” and reports in the newsletter on activities carried out by local groups on their own without initiative from the NCC.

Material from the Madison office increasingly focused on the elections, with long lists of “peace candidates” being mailed out. Technically, the NCC did not endorse particular candidates and the lists were just “for information,” but the general thrust was

14. Ibid.

15. From the author's handwritten notes taken at the January 8-9, 1966, NCC standing committee meeting.

16. *Bring the Troops Home Now Newsletter*, No. 4, February 1, 1966.

17. Letter from Frank Emspak to Henry Abrams, March 10, 1966. Copy in author's file.

18. Copy of the ballot and covering letter in author's file.

clear enough. It caused dissension among antiwar activists who opposed these particular candidates, or who were backing rival candidates who were not listed.

On June 4, 1966, the *New York Times* carried a report of an NCC press conference in New York at which it said Emspak had endorsed Ted Weiss, a candidate in the Democratic Party primary from the nineteenth congressional district, as well as Herbert Aptheker, the historian, who was a prominent member of the Communist Party running as an independent in Brooklyn. This report caused disaffection from the NCC from both the right and left. (Muste also endorsed Aptheker, as well as Judy White, the SWP candidate for governor, as a personal demonstration against the anticommunist hysteria, but he made it clear these were personal endorsements, not connected with organizations of which he was an officer.)

James Weinstein, who also ran in the nineteenth district and was the chairman of the West Side Committee for Independent Political Action, an NCC affiliate, wrote Emspak as follows:

"I was shocked to see that the NCC has endorsed Ted Weiss without consulting those organizations which it supposedly coordinates that are located within his congressional district. . . .

"If you are a coordinating committee, I suggest you stick to coordinating. If you are a policy making body, I suggest you inform your affiliates of how that policy is made so that they may then consider whether to remain affiliated. If you think that under cover of participatory democracy you can do whatever you please and then deny responsibility for it, I suggest you think again."¹⁹

In a letter to Jack Smith of the editorial staff of the *National Guardian*, Emspak complained that Smith had reportedly referred to the NCC as "Emspak's NCC," and explained: "I personally cannot publicly endorse any campaign, or candidate, nor can anyone else in the employ of the NCC. This was the staff vote after all the confusion over Weiss began. Furthermore, the NCC did not endorse specific political candidates at the press conference on summer projects. We simply listed them, the list coming from the American Friends Service Committee National Legislative Committee, as we listed all other peace activity that was going on this summer. Hence, we did not endorse Weiss, nor did we take a position that political action is the only way to end the war or anything else like that.

"I hope you will pass the above on to people and read this to Irving [Beinin], since apparently he believes that we endorsed political candidates."²⁰

Emspak's claim to have listed "all other peace activity going on this summer" was an exaggeration, to say the least. That would have taken a book. The listing, including that of candidates claiming to favor peace, was highly selective. In any case, the circulation of the *New York Times* was considerably greater than the NCC staff's letters of denial, and the movement as a whole was left with the same general impression that the *Times* reporter carried away from the press conference.

The difficulty posed by Emspak's general approach was not limited simply to the disaffection it created among those not wishing to be associated with specific candidacies—though this was enough to destroy the NCC as a coordinating group of electorally diverse forces. But it came precisely at a time when the tendency toward dilution of the new movement's antiwar thrust was greatest, that is, during the months preceding an election. It was inevitable that during such a period, the leaders of the right wing of the movement—such as SANE—would devote themselves largely to electoral activity behind establishment candidates, and the various individuals and multi-issue groups in the left wing

19. Letter from James Weinstein to Frank Emspak, June 8, 1966. Copy in author's file.

20. Letter from Frank Emspak to Jack Smith, June 27, 1966. Copy in author's file.

would divide on which candidates to support, or whether to support any. (Dellinger, for example, was something of an anarchist, averse to electoral activity, as well as a pacifist, and didn't endorse any candidates for office.)

Equally important, no candidate for Congress really ran on only one issue. To support them for election meant supporting their whole program. The electoral thrust meant turning the antiwar movement into a constituency behind the program of liberal politicians, which was an entirely different thing from getting politicians, liberal or otherwise, to support the antiwar movement.

After the March actions, Emspak flatly refused to take the one initiative that a national coordinating group could do well. That is, provide a national focus for demonstrations which could unify in action those opposed to the war regardless of what electoral position they had. This left a vacuum which was not easy to fill, especially since Emspak resisted anyone else doing so.

In a comment on the NCC convention written in January, Dave Dellinger had stated: "If some group captures the NCC, it will capture a shell, because at that moment most of the people will go elsewhere to continue their anti-war activity undistracted."²¹

In the long run this would prove to be true. But it was easier said than done. It didn't happen in a moment and it didn't happen automatically. Old formations sometimes die hard, particularly when they are backed by even one significant tendency in a movement. In the heat of events not everyone is in a position to follow every significant detail. An understanding of what has transpired works its way more or less slowly through the body of the movement, accompanied by much hesitation and confusion, until some more or less dramatic development dispels the illusion which sticks to the form long after its content has been lost.

So it was with the NCC. After the January 8-9 Milwaukee gathering it never held another standing committee meeting, never held another convention, never called another demonstration, never initiated another activity of national significance. But it continued to enjoy a certain authority within the movement until events passed it by.

The supporters of the *Bring the Troops Home Now Newsletter* campaigned effectively both before and after the March demonstrations to build the independent committees, to keep them focused on antiwar activity, and to educate for the immediate-withdrawal position. But the *Newsletter* (the term "caucus" was dropped after the Milwaukee meeting in favor of "supporters of the *Newsletter*") was not a national organization, much less one with the authority to initiate a national focus for antiwar action.

Fortunately, there existed in the movement a figure who was everything Emspak was not, and who would throw his immense personal authority behind any reasonable move to reconstitute a national focus for action. His purpose was not to bypass the NCC—although that proved to be necessary—but to keep the antiwar movement visible and in the streets, putting maximum pressure on all the politicians. That figure was A.J. Muste, and the initial instrument he used in this process was the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee.

[Next chapter: *The Second International Days of Protest*]

21. *Liberation*, January 1966. Contained in the introduction to an article by Steve Weissman.

It Figures

The U.S. Department of Commerce has granted \$239,000 to the Advertising Council to help finance an ad campaign "to improve public understanding of the realities that make our American economic system work." The federal grant came from funds earmarked for minority business and job programs.

AROUND THE WORLD



Lockheed Admits Paying \$106 Million to Secure Saudi Arabian Contracts

The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation paid \$106 million in "agents' commissions" in Saudi Arabia from 1970 through mid-1975, according to company documents released by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations September 12.

Most of the money was paid to Adnan M. Khashoggi, a Saudi multimillionaire, who reportedly served as an intermediary for payments made by Lockheed to Saudi officials. In addition, Lockheed paid bribes directly to Saudi officials through numbered bank accounts in Switzerland and Lichtenstein.

Documents released September 11 established that Lockheed also used influential "sales agents" in Iran, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

Three Sentenced to Death in Spain

Three members of the Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico (FRAP—Revolutionary Antifascist and Patriotic Front) were sentenced to death by a military court near Madrid September 12. The three were Manuel Antonio Blanco Chivite, Vladimiro Fernández Tovar, and José Humberto Baena Alonzo. Two others, Pablo Mayoral and Fernando Sierra Marco, were sentenced to thirty and twenty-five years in prison respectively.

The five were accused of having killed a policeman July 14. Although the defendants acknowledged membership in the FRAP, they denied the killing. Defense attorneys said they would appeal the ruling.

Fretilin Claims Victory in East Timor Fighting

Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente—Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) held a victory celebration in Dili, the capital of East Timor, September 11. The nationalist group claimed to be in almost complete control of the country after a month of fighting with the rightist União Democrática Timorese (UDT—Timorese Democratic Union), which staged a coup attempt August 10-11. According to Fretilin, about 2,000 persons died in the clashes.

Fretilin's military commander, Rogerio Lobata, said September 13 that his group

had captured twenty Indonesian troops, who reportedly infiltrated into East Timor from West Timor, the Indonesian-ruled half of the island. Although the military regime in Jakarta denied the report, an Indonesian Defense Ministry official was quoted in the September 8 Lisbon daily *Diário de Notícias* as saying, "We have declared many times that if Portuguese Timor became a Communist state it would be a danger to Indonesia. . . ." Foreign Minister Adam Malik said September 13 that Jakarta was "prepared to take any action" if civil war in East Timor threatened Indonesia.

Fretilin General Secretary José Ramos Horta said September 8 that Fretilin had dropped its demand for immediate independence from Portugal, calling instead for independence in a few years. Two days earlier he declared, "The Portuguese flag continues to fly over Timor. Fretilin recognizes the Portuguese government as the only authority in East Timor."

António de Almeida Santos, a representative of the Portuguese regime, said September 11 that he would meet with leaders of all three Timorese groups, Fretilin, the UDT, and the Associação Popular Democrática Timorese (Apodeti—Timorese People's Democratic Association), which favors a merger with Indonesia.

Amnesty International Observer Confirms Use of Torture in Spain

An American lawyer who recently returned from a ten-day mission to Spain on behalf of Amnesty International has confirmed the widespread torture of detainees in the Basque region.

In a report Amnesty International described as "conclusive and appalling," Thomas Jones, a Washington, D.C., attorney, said he was convinced that all police forces had participated in the torture of Basques: the Policía Armada, Guardia Civil, and Brigada Político Social (security police).

Jones, who visited both Madrid and the Basque region during his stay in Spain July 19 to 29, interviewed fifteen victims of torture who had been released from prison. He said he heard convincing and self-consistent accounts of severe and systematic beatings with a variety of weapons, of *falanga* (beating on the soles of the feet), of burning with cigarettes, and of near drown-

ing through being submerged in water while suspended upside down.

One of the victims, whose scars were visible three months after his torture, told Jones, according to an August 3 press release from Amnesty International, "The second interrogation lasted about two hours. I was beaten in the same way with the same whips by five or six policemen. This time my hands were handcuffed under my legs, and while squatting I was made to walk as they beat me."

Jones said most of the torture occurred during the first five weeks of the state of emergency declared in the Basque areas of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa.

"Mr. Jones's findings are conclusive and appalling," Amnesty International Deputy Secretary-General Hans Ehrenstrale said in a statement about the mission. "It is beyond doubt that the Spanish security forces have defied all accepted international legal standards, including the European ones, prohibiting the use of torture and have violated the constitution of Spain itself."

Venezuela to Pay \$920 Million for Nationalized Oil Companies

The Venezuelan regime has agreed to pay about \$920 million in compensation to the oil companies scheduled to be nationalized January 1, according to a report in the September 12 *Wall Street Journal*. Mines and Hydrocarbons Minister Valentín Hernández did not say whether the amount was the regime's final and official offer. The companies to be taken over include the subsidiaries of five American oil companies.

Sign of the Times

TOKYO, Sept. 7 (UPI)—Japanese said today that two college seniors committed suicide yesterday after failing to get jobs because of the current recession in Japan.

Hisayoshi Kato, 23, killed himself with gas from the kitchen stove in his family's home in Nagoya, they said. His parents said Kato failed a Nagoya Province civil service examination and was then turned down by five different trading companies.

In Fukuoka, on the southern island of Kyushu, Masahiro Abe, 23, a business administration senior at Fukuoka University, took his life after his latest job application was turned down by a bank.

En Defensa de la Revolución Portuguesa

Por Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, y Ernest Mandel

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "In Defense of the Portuguese Revolution" que apareció en el número del 8 de septiembre de *Intercontinental Press*. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Queremos presentar una fuerte protesta contra la línea que *Intercontinental Press* ha estimado conveniente seguir al cubrir los eventos en Portugal desde el estallido del caso *República*, especialmente en el Vol. 13, Números 21-30. Esta línea ha sido impuesta sobre la revista sin consultarnos a nosotros, tres de los cuatro editores contribuyentes, y sin tomar en cuenta las resoluciones que han sido adoptadas por la mayoría de los organismos democráticamente electos de la dirección de la Cuarta Internacional, de los cuales somos miembros. Ha sido adoptada sin tomar en cuenta la opinión unánime de los trotskistas portugueses y de la organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional, la Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI). A nuestro parecer, la línea que ha sido adoptada por *Intercontinental Press* representa un grave error político, un alejamiento de la posición tradicional que los Marxistas revolucionarios han tomado en circunstancias similares de ascenso revolucionario en países imperialistas; si se insiste sobre esta línea, se podría desacreditar gravemente al Trotskismo ante la opinión de los trabajadores avanzados, no sólo en Portugal, sino a través de toda Europa capitalista.

La posición adoptada por el camarada Gerry Foley en los artículos mencionados anteriormente, con la obvia aprobación del camarada Joseph Hansen, editor de *Intercontinental Press*, puede ser resumida de la manera siguiente: Existe en Portugal actualmente un régimen militar autoritario que sostiene y defiende el capitalismo, no obstante con una fraseología izquierdista. Este régimen, que sigue el camino de una dictadura militar burguesa abierta, considera la existencia de un poderoso partido Social Demócrata con una prensa relativamente libre, como un obstáculo que ha de ser eliminado. Por lo tanto, en el conflicto sobre el caso *República* y en el conflicto político que de ahí surgió, y llevó a la renuncia de los ministros del PS y del PPD¹ del gobierno, tenemos que brindarles nuestro pleno apoyo a los Social Demócratas (¿y sus aliados burgueses del PPD? el camarada Foley ha mantenido silencio sobre este punto) contra el MFA. En realidad, de acuerdo con los puntos de vista expresados en los artículos del camarada Foley, la única alternativa realista en Portugal actualmente está entre un régimen militar burgués que se mueve hacia una dictadura militar abierta, y la Asamblea Constituyente, que es vista como la encarnación de la democracia burguesa y como la expresión legítima de la voluntad popular. En un conflicto entre un régimen militar burgués (apoyado por el Partido Comunista stalinista) y la democracia burguesa (apoyada por el Partido Socialista), debemos mantenernos firmes del lado de la democracia burguesa (la Asamblea Constituyente), criticando al mismo tiempo al PS por su colaboración de clases con las fuerzas armadas. Los llamados órganos de poder dual son falsos (criaturas manipuladas por el ejército burgués) o irrelevantes. Se puede ver esta perspectiva general en las siguientes citas tomadas de un artículo del camarada Foley de *Intercontinental Press* del 21 de julio, sobre el plan del MFA para el "poder popular" (pp. 1010 y 1011):

"El plan del 8 de julio demuestra con gran claridad que el MFA es el aparato político de la burguesía y el enemigo más inmediato

de los trabajadores y del movimiento revolucionario." . . . "Este plan representa en realidad una intensificación de la ofensiva por los militares para coartar las libertades democráticas ganadas por las masas después del derrocamiento del gobierno de Caetano." . . . "El principio fundamental de este plan es la institucionalización y la continuación de una dictadura militar." . . . "A diferencia del PC monolítico, el Partido Socialista, a pesar de su línea igualmente oportunista y de colaboración de clases, no era confiable desde el punto de vista de los militares . . . Ofrecía el 'socialismo libertario' como su línea fundamental. Por lo tanto, el PS se interponía los objetivos de los militares y del PC. Era necesario acabar con los intentos del PS de jugar un papel autónomo."

Esta construcción ideológica, que tiene poca relación con la actual realidad social, política y económica de Portugal, puede ser fácilmente destrozada debido a su gran cantidad de notorias contradicciones. El camarada Foley afirma que el MFA quiere restringir a los Social Demócratas en Portugal con el fin de defender mejor al capitalismo. ¿Cómo, entonces, explica él el hecho de que *toda* la burguesía portuguesa y toda la gran burguesía internacional apoyan a los Social Demócratas en este conflicto? ¿Acaso este apoyo es sólo un truco para despistar a los "ultraizquierdistas"? ¿Ha existido un caso en que el capital nacional e internacional haya defendido unánimemente a los partidos de masas reformistas de la clase trabajadora contra las fuerzas armadas del mismo capital? Es suficiente simplemente plantear esta pregunta para que el esquema del camarada Foley se derrumbe.

Si el verdadero conflicto en Portugal hoy día fuese el de contraponer los derechos democráticos a una dictadura militar burguesa, sería de esperarse que los dirigentes Social Demócratas centraran su ataque alrededor del cargo de que el régimen del MFA es un régimen autoritario. Pero el cargo principal contra el gobierno no ha sido que es demasiado autoritario, sino que no ejerce ninguna clase de autoridad. Su principal grito de guerra no es contra el autoritarismo, sino contra la "anarquía." Este es también el grito de guerra del capital portugués e internacional actualmente. ¿Cómo cabe este hecho innegable en el esquema del camarada Foley? No cabe, y por lo tanto, ha sido muy convenientemente olvidado. Ha llegado a ser un "no hecho."

Por el otro lado, nosotros creemos que la lucha política en Portugal actualmente se centra alrededor de la cuestión "por o en contra de la revolución socialista," y no alrededor de la contraposición "dictadura militar contra democracia burguesa." Desde los últimos meses de 1974, y especialmente desde la derrota del putsch spinolista del 11 de marzo de 1975, el movimiento revolucionario de masas, basado fundamentalmente en la clase obrera, ha cobrado ímpetu y ha comenzado a salirse del control de la burguesía y de sus secuaces militares y reformistas. Empieza a desbordar los límites compatibles con el mantenimiento de las relaciones de propiedad y del aparato de estado burgués. Esto ha causado un miedo universal, casi pánico, entre la burguesía portuguesa e internacional. De ahí, el grito de guerra unánime de todas las fuerzas burguesas, pequeño-burguesas y reformistas: "La revolución ha ido muy lejos; paren el proceso revolucionario; restauren la autoridad del gobierno (burgués) y del estado (burgués)," combinado con la demanda "¡Abajo con la dictadura comunista!" Es alrededor de estos puntos que las fuerzas de clase en Portugal (y a través de Europa capitalista) se alinean y realinean. Es sobre estos puntos que los socialistas revolucionarios tienen que tomar una posición inambigua.

El camarada Foley podría escapar a las contradicciones de su

1. Partido Popular Democrático.

esquema sólo erigiendo una construcción aún más absurda, una que niega la existencia de un verdadero proceso revolucionario en Portugal hoy día, una que niega un debilitamiento serio del ejército burgués. De hecho, la verdad es que la forma muy peculiar en que han sido informados los lectores de *Intercontinental Press* sobre Portugal, puede causarles algunas dudas sobre estas cuestiones. Recordémosles, por lo tanto, brevemente, algunos hechos básicos.

Bajo la creciente presión de los trabajadores, todos los bancos portugueses y alrededor de 60 por ciento de la industria del país han sido nacionalizados; el último gran grupo financiero portugués, el CUF, es también amenazado con la nacionalización, porque ha habido huelgas obreras y manifestaciones exigiéndolo. Docenas y docenas de fábricas han sido ocupadas por los obreros. Varias formas de control obrero están siendo aplicadas en al menos 100 fábricas. Muchas de las grandes haciendas en el Sur han sido tomadas por los obreros agrícolas. Muchos edificios vacíos, hoteles de lujo, etc., han sido ocupados por comisiones de inquilinos.

Por otra parte, en un período de menos de dieciocho meses, el cuerpo de oficiales portugueses ha sido dividido sucesivamente entre partidarios y oponentes de la dictadura de Caetano, partidarios y oponentes de Spínola, partidarios y oponentes del MFA, partidarios del ala Gonçalves y del ala Melo Antunes dentro del MFA, y entre los partidarios de varios partidos políticos. Debido a estas numerosas divisiones, la llamada dictadura militar ha pasado por no menos de cinco gobiernos en menos de año y medio y, apenas instalado el quinto (descrito por el mismo presidente Costa Gomes como un gobierno de transición), se habla de la preparación de un sexto gobierno para el otoño.

Además de estas divisiones horizontales, los mismos soldados se politizan más y más e incrementan su organización política. Cuestionan más y más las órdenes de los oficiales. En realidad, una de las causas inmediatas del fracaso del golpe militar del 11 de marzo fue que varios de los regimientos claves en Lisboa se negaron a ejecutar las órdenes recibidas, diciendo que primero tenían que reunirse para discutir y obtener información antes de salir a la lucha. Ya se habían dado varios casos de despidos de oficiales reaccionarios por las asambleas de soldados. En media docena de cuarteles, soldados y oficiales revolucionarios han estado impartiendo entrenamiento militar a cientos de trabajadores en distritos obreros vecinos; por lo tanto, se está asentando la base del núcleo de una milicia obrera de masas y de una estrecha colaboración entre los trabajadores armados y los soldados contra la contrarrevolución. Bajo semejantes condiciones, es ilógico pensar que favorece los intereses de la burguesía provocar una confrontación de lleno entre el inestable aparato de estado y el moderado partido de masas Social Demócrata. El curso de todas las revoluciones proletarias y contrarrevoluciones burguesas nos enseña que la burguesía primero trata de aislar y aplastar a los sectores más avanzados de la clase obrera. Al hacerlo, trata de construir un aparato represivo efectivo y desmoralizar y dividir a la clase obrera. Sólo después de lograr estos propósitos, empieza la lucha frontal contra los batallones pesados de la clase obrera.

El esquema del camarada Foley no está relacionado con los intereses de clase básicos ni con el movimiento fundamental de las fuerzas de clase antagónicas en Portugal actualmente. Su método está equivocado de pies a cabeza. No empieza con las preguntas: ¿Cuál es la relación básica entre las fuerzas del capital y del trabajo? ¿Cómo evoluciona esta relación de fuerzas? ¿Cuáles son las áreas claves del conflicto de clase en estos momentos y cuáles serán las áreas probables en un futuro previsible? En lugar de hacer esto, voltea el método Marxista de cabeza y subordina todo a la pregunta, ¿Cómo se relacionan las variadas fuerzas y corrientes políticas al MFA, que "intenta" establecer una dictadura militar? No es sorprendente que al enfocar el análisis con un criterio tan subjetivista y arbitrario, llega a conclusiones que chocan con la realidad y dañan seriamente la defensa de los

intereses básicos de la clase obrera portuguesa y de los revolucionarios.

De Nuevo Sobre el Caso República y Sus Consecuencias

La Cuarta Internacional y su organización simpatizante en Portugal enfocan la situación actual en Portugal desde la posición contraria. Nosotros decimos que desde fines de 1974, las luchas de masas, intensificadas y radicalizadas, han desafiado más y más el "orden público" básico de la burguesía. Al mismo tiempo, ha habido un debilitamiento constante y el comienzo de la descomposición de los pilares más importantes del aparato de estado burgués, especialmente el ejército. Esto explica la aguda crisis política en el país, los constantes cambios en el gobierno, y las crecientes confrontaciones en las calles.

Al mismo tiempo, la clase obrera, aunque se radicaliza rápidamente, no posee todavía los órganos (consejos obreros), nivel de conciencia, o dirección revolucionaria necesarios para poner inmediatamente en el orden del día la conquista del poder. Esto implica que habrá un período prolongado de convulsiones revolucionarias y contrarrevolucionarias hasta que una de las clases básicas sea capaz de desplazar el equilibrio inestable a su favor decisivamente: ya sea la clase capitalista, creando un instrumento efectivo de dominio (y eventualmente de represión masiva) o la clase obrera, estableciendo consejos obreros, aglutinando la mayoría de la población a su alrededor en apoyo al concepto de poder obrero, y construyendo una dirección revolucionaria adecuada para obtener este fin.

Con estas interpretaciones diametralmente opuestas de lo que realmente está sucediendo en Portugal, surgen dos interpretaciones completamente diferentes del significado político y de las repercusiones del caso *República*, como lo ha señalado ya el camarada Mandel en un artículo publicado en *Intercontinental Press* el 23 de julio. Desde el final del caso los eventos en el taller de imprenta de *República*, en la prensa portuguesa, y en el campo de la lucha política permiten una fácil verificación de cuál de estas dos interpretaciones fue la correcta y qué fuerzas de clase estaban involucradas en realidad.

En vista de los eventos posteriores, se hace completamente ridículo continuar diciendo que los Social Demócratas en Portugal estaban o están defendiendo los derechos democráticos que les son negados. Como el principal dirigente de la oposición, Mário Soares habla a millones de personas en la televisión. Puede organizar a decenas de miles de personas en manifestaciones callejeras. También el PC y otras organizaciones izquierdistas independientes de la clase trabajadora, e incluso la reacción de derecha. Los periodistas de *República* están publicando su propio periódico semanal, y están preparando otro diario que aparecerá muy pronto. El PS controla uno de los periódicos más ampliamente leídos en el país, *Jornal Novo Expresso*, el periódico semanal con el tiraje más grande, toma una posición cautelosa pero abierta contra el gobierno. Ni un sólo trabajador militante ni miembro de cualquier organización de izquierda está en la cárcel (el Copcon liberó a los militantes del MRPP² el 19 de julio de 1975). Más de treinta sindicatos han sido arrancados del poder del PC.

Sólo aquéllos que han sido completamente mistificados por la opinión pública de la burguesía y cegados por la stalinofobia pueden hablar de Portugal como un país donde los derechos democráticos han sido corroídos por una "dictadura militar." En realidad, Portugal es el país más libre en el mundo hoy día, un país donde todas las fuerzas políticas tienen las mayores posibilidades de hablar abiertamente y de dar a conocer sus opiniones, donde todas las actividades políticas y sociales de las masas trabajadoras son menos restringidas que en cualquier otra parte. Cualquiera que visita el país hoy tiene tan sólo que ver las pintas en las paredes, ver la gama de material disponible en los

2. Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado.

puestos de periódicos, o asistir a una de las incontables reuniones públicas diarias, para notar este hecho tan obvio.

Esta característica de la situación portuguesa no es de ninguna manera el resultado de la benevolencia del MFA, ni tampoco significa que se podrá gozar por mucho tiempo de estas libertades. Mas bien, refleja el profundo proceso revolucionario que se está desarrollando en el país, la movilización y politización masiva de fuerzas de clase antagónicas, y el surgimiento de una situación de poder dual, que, como señaló Trotsky, conduce inevitablemente a la guerra civil. Pero cualquiera que sea la amenaza de una futura represión masiva (que es muy real), negar las actuales libertades que gozan los obreros portugueses, es perder de vista lo que se ha ganado y lo que se tiene que defender encarnizadamente.

Los lectores de *Intercontinental Press*, después de haber visto las fotografías en las primeras páginas de los números del 9 y 30 de junio de *Intercontinental Press*, podrán creer que si los periodistas de *República* ya no editan el periódico del Partido Socialista en su ex taller de imprenta, se debe a que los brutales soldados paracaidistas, armados hasta los dientes, les están impidiendo ejercer sus más elementales derechos democráticos. Nada más lejano de la verdad. El MFA ha decidido el conflicto a favor del Sr. Rêgo, el dueño de *República*, y de la dirección del PS. En efecto, el Sr. Rêgo regresó felizmente a su taller el 18 de junio de 1975. Pero, lo esperaba una desagradable sorpresa: El taller había sido ocupado por los trabajadores. Así que se retiró inmediatamente del taller y le dijo al corresponsal del *Times* de Londres "que él y los miembros de la gerencia habían estipulado que todos aquéllos que habían sido permitidos entrar al edificio anteriormente, deberían de ser evacuados por las fuerzas militares. Esta estipulación había sido rechazada, dijo." (El *Times*, 19 de junio de 1975, énfasis nuestro.) Soares y sus compañeros, los ministros Social Demócratas, se retiraron del gobierno de coalición con la misma estipulación: No permanecerían en un gabinete incapaz de ejercer autoridad, y regresarían sólo si los militares expulsaban a los trabajadores del taller de imprenta.

Esto no cabe muy bien dentro del esquema del camarada Foley. *Incitar a la intervención de un ejército burgués contra la ocupación obrera de una fábrica no es precisamente defender los derechos democráticos contra una dictadura militar.* El camarada Foley ha mantenido un silencio avergonzante y vergonzoso acerca de la demanda de Soares. *¿La aprueba o no?* Este resultado claro del caso *República*, que da al traste con la interpretación del camarada Foley de la crisis política en Portugal, confirma perfectamente lo que fue nuestro análisis desde el principio: No se trataba de la libertad de prensa (que en cualquier caso nadie está en una posición para negárselo al poderoso partido Social Demócrata portugués hoy día), sino de la cuestión de una ofensiva para restaurar el "orden público" en las fábricas y la autoridad del estado burgués en la sociedad. *Ese es el punto clave en la lucha de clases en Portugal actualmente.* Esa es la demanda central que hace el capital internacional antes de otorgarle al gobierno militar portugués los dos mil millones de dólares que necesita tan desesperadamente para evitar la bancarrota. Es la demanda central que hace el capital portugués antes de poner alto a la huelga de inversión y al sabotaje económico general a través de los cuales trata de romper la militancia de los trabajadores, estimulando el desempleo masivo e incluso la inanición. El caso *República* se relaciona a este asunto mucho más concreta y lógicamente que al asunto de "libertad de prensa."

El "crimen" cometido por el MFA en este caso particular no es que haya suprimido la "libertad de prensa," sino que se negó a usar la fuerza para expulsar a los trabajadores de un taller de imprenta ocupado. Y las razones por las cuales se negó a hacerlo fueron resumidas correctamente en un editorial del *Times* de Londres el 24 de junio de 1975: "Su (del Supremo Consejo Revolucionario) deseo de reprimir a los militantes de extrema

izquierda, quienes han estado tratando de formar consejos de soldados, marineros, y aviadores dentro de unidades militares, es sin duda sincero. Pero es posible que el colapso de la disciplina militar haya ido demasiado lejos para ser fácilmente revertido."

En otras palabras, el MFA se negó a usar la fuerza contra los trabajadores, no por buena voluntad, sino porque temía que los mismos soldados se negarían a usar la fuerza contra los obreros que ocupan las fábricas. Esto no es precisamente evidencia de que existe una dictadura militar represiva en Portugal actualmente. Tampoco constituye ninguna razón para el descontento entre los Marxistas revolucionarios. Pero explica perfectamente los titubeos y giros en torno a la cuestión de *República*, así como el contenido de clase de este asunto.

Los derechos democráticos están tan limitados actualmente en Portugal que los trabajadores de la imprenta de *República*, después de desafiar las decisiones del gobierno y los mandatos de los reformistas, mandaron una delegación a Europa Occidental para presentar su caso ante los sindicatos y las organizaciones de la clase obrera de estos países. Cualquiera que estuviese interesado en escuchar su caso lo podía hacer fácilmente y podía oír de los mismos trabajadores, que son muy críticos, no tan sólo de la dirección del PS (muchos de ellos son miembros del PS), sino también del PC y del MFA. De hecho, en un debate televisado Soares fue obligado a admitir que estos trabajadores, lejos de ser "manipulados" por el PC (como sostiene el camarada Foley), recibieron una visita de Cunhal con gritos de "¡Abajo con Soares, abajo con Cunhal!" En realidad, la dirección del PS pronto abandonó la acusación de que el asunto de *República* había sido gestionado por el PC (como *Intercontinental Press* ha sostenido continuamente) y en cambio, acusó de responsables a los "provocadores anarquistas." (El *Times*, 19 de junio de 1975.)

El caso *República* ha sido hábilmente explotado para iniciar y justificar acciones represivas contra ocupaciones de fábrica y la "falta de disciplina" en el ejército. Esto se ha hecho muy inteligentemente, porque ha logrado dividir a la clase obrera. Si, por ejemplo, el primer golpe en semejante campaña hubiera sido asestado contra una planta de acero ocupada por los trabajadores, el 99 por ciento de los obreros portugueses hubiera apoyado a los trabajadores del acero. Pero es obvio que la clase está dividida en el caso de la ocupación del taller de imprenta de *República*, que puede parecer un desafío al derecho del Partido Socialista de publicar su propio periódico. Los prejuicios políticos y un juicio político equivocado claramente juegan un papel importante de ambos lados. En este sentido, como hemos declarado sin ambigüedades, los trabajadores de *República* cayeron en una trampa. Cometieron un grave error político en la manera en que contestaron las provocaciones de Rêgo y Soares. Los grupos ultraizquierdistas y el PC reforzaron el error diez veces con su reacción desastrosamente sectaria y sin principios, hostil a la democracia proletaria.

Hubiera sido fácil para los trabajadores de *República* voltearles el asunto a los charlatanes Social Demócratas, contestando al PS de la manera sugerida por los Trotskistas: "Estamos completamente dispuestos a publicar *República* bajo los viejos editores Social Demócratas, siempre y cuando: 1. Nos den el derecho de imprimir nuestras opiniones y las opiniones de varios grupos políticos a los cuales pertenecemos, ya sea en las columnas de su periódico o en otro periódico impreso en sus imprentas. 2. Nos den poder de veto sobre cualquier despido en la planta." La opinión pública obrera y democrática hubiera podido ver claramente a quién se le estaba negando "libertad de prensa" y de qué se trata el control obrero.

Pero semejante lucha contra los charlatanes reformistas es posible solamente desde el punto de vista principista de la *democracia obrera*, que no defienden ni los stalinistas ni los ultraizquierdistas. Sólo los Trotskistas adoptaron una posición en este asunto que combinaba la defensa intransigente de las

acciones de los trabajadores contra la represión por el estado burgués con la defensa de la plena e irrestringida libertad de prensa. Sólo sobre semejante base principista se puede restablecer la unidad de la clase bajo condiciones de crisis revolucionaria en el país.

Una cosa es, sin embargo, criticar el error que cometieron los trabajadores de *República* al caer en la trampa de Soares y facilitar de esa forma una maniobra represiva contra la clase obrera. Pero otra muy diferente es el dejarse hipnotizar tanto por este aspecto del asunto, que después de todo es secundario, hasta perder de vista el papel político del asunto en la actual situación en Portugal, estar dispuestos a cruzar las líneas de piquetes, y casi llegar a exigir la intervención de los militares en contra de los trabajadores—en nombre de la defensa de la “libertad de prensa.”

Nosotros decimos que el caso *República* ha sido deliberadamente inflado fuera de toda proporción para servir la causa del capital portugués e internacional. Para demostrar esto, examinemos el aspecto práctico de la supuesta falta de libertad de prensa del partido Social Demócrata en Portugal. Este partido tiene un fuerte apoyo de masas. Puede llevar decenas de miles de personas a las calles. Tiene grandes recursos económicos y puede recibir cantidades de dinero aún más grandes de sus aliados en Alemania Occidental, Bretaña, los países Escandinavos, Austria, y los países Bajos. Bajo semejantes condiciones, ¿quién impide al PS portugués de traer la imprenta más moderna a Lisboa, proveerla de personal de entre sus propios miembros y voluntarios, y publicar un gran diario? ¿Un veto del MFA? Tal veto no ha existido. ¿Un veto del sindicato de impresores? ¡Todo lo contrario, el sindicato propuso que Soares hiciera exactamente eso! ¿No es extraño que los Social Demócratas no hayan tomado este paso tan sencillo si todo lo que querían era un gran diario propio? Pero se comprende perfectamente bien su acción si su verdadero fin no fue el de defender su derecho de tener su propio periódico, sino el de obligar al MFA a resolver a su favor un conflicto con los trabajadores que ocupaban una fábrica y un conflicto con el PC, que daba un apoyo tibio a los trabajadores. Y si ese fue el verdadero fin del PS, tan sólo tenemos que plantear la pregunta, ¿cui prodest? ¿A favor de qué intereses de clase se podrá tomar ese paso en Portugal actualmente? Entonces, es fácil comprender los antecedentes y los resultados del caso *República*.

¿Uniéndose a un Bloque Político con la Burguesía?

Las revoluciones, especialmente revoluciones proletarias, son la prueba de fuego para revelar la capacidad o incapacidad de las fuerzas políticas de orientarse bajo condiciones de rápido cambio. Desde ese punto de vista, las sectas de Healy-Lambert en Bretaña y Francia, ambas reclamando su adherencia al “trotskismo ortodoxo,” fracasaron miserablemente la prueba en el caso de la revolución cubana. Ahora, en el caso de Portugal, después de varios titubeos y giros, a veces llevados a cabo de un día a otro, han fracasado aún más profundamente. Cuando los dirigentes reformistas organizaron las manifestaciones de masas del 17 y 18 de julio, Healy tuvo esto que decir: “La llamada tardía del Partido Socialista a una ruptura con la dictadura militar [!] es un reflejo de la creciente presión sobre los dirigentes Socialistas de parte de la clase obrera, actualmente golpeada por la crisis capitalista.” (*Workers Press*, 16 de julio de 1975.)

En cuanto a los Lambertistas de *Informations Ouvrières* (número del 23 de julio de 1975), ellos ven la manifestación del PS en Lisboa con unos “ojos tan abiertos” que la única cosa que notaron fueron los gritos y consignas de tipo: “Gobierno Socialista” v “Partido Socialista, partido Marxista.”

Sucede, sin embargo, que las manifestaciones de masas del PS a las cuales Healy y Lambert se refieren, no fueron dirigidas contra la “dictadura militar.” Si se oían gritos contra la “dictadura,” se referían a la “dictadura comunista.” Si los oficiales militares fueron atacados, se debió a que se suponía que “apoyaban a los

comunistas.” También sucede que los dirigentes del PS se opusieron violentamente a cualquier ataque contra los militares en estas manifestaciones. Y es necesario enfatizar que estas manifestaciones provocaron los ataques sistemáticos a los locales del PC, los sindicatos, y otras organizaciones de izquierda que han estado sucediendo desde entonces—no sólo a través de la histeria anticomunista causada por Soares, sino también a través de la quema de la literatura del PC y otra literatura de izquierda durante el mitin en Oporto.

En el número del 21 de julio, *Workers Press* hace el siguiente comentario: “La guerra civil comienza en Portugal. Los derechistas atacaron los locales del PC en varios pueblos del norte, mientras que los stalinistas provocaban peleas con el Partido Socialista en Lisboa.” Unos días más tarde, la luz brillaba más intensamente en Clapham High Street. “La única salida para la burguesía es la de reimponer una dictadura sobre la clase obrera. El ‘Financial Times’ reporta ‘que se han hecho listas de los nombres de oficiales y civiles que pueda ser necesario arrestar; se dice que el plan político adjunto para reinstalar la autoridad también contiene medidas potencialmente represivas. Alguna gente cercana a ciertos Ministros y Secretarios de Estado en la cuarta coalición, tanto militares como civiles, dice que algunos de ellos ya no pasan la noche en sus hogares, como precaución contra el arresto.’”

“Pero el verdadero ataque tendrá que ser sobre la clase obrera, con una represión masiva contra las ocupaciones, huelgas, grupos políticos, sindicatos, publicaciones y manifestaciones.

“Con este fin, se permite la libre organización de grupos derechistas, reaccionarios en el norte y su entrenamiento de nuevas fuerzas para llevar a cabo ataques salvajes contra los locales stalinistas aislados y otras secciones del movimiento obrero.” (*Workers Press*, 25 de julio de 1975, énfasis nuestro.)

Por lo tanto, el 25 de julio, los ataques a los locales del PC son vistos como los preparativos de un asalto general a los derechos de la clase obrera y sus organizaciones. Sin embargo, el 16 de julio, las manifestaciones organizadas bajo la consigna “Abajo con la dictadura comunista” fueron saludadas como si se hubieran llevado a cabo “bajo la presión de los trabajadores.” ¿Acaso los locales de los sindicatos también fueron quemados “bajo la presión de los trabajadores?” ¿No hubo ninguna relación entre la histeria anticomunista avivada por Soares y los eventos posteriores en el Norte?

Lambert, también, tendrá problemas tratando de explicar cómo “la manifestación más grande de la clase obrera desde el 1 de mayo de 1975,” una manifestación que supuestamente hacía un llamado para “un gobierno socialista,” pudiera provocar misteriosamente una poderosa ofensiva derechista contra los derechos democráticos más elementales de las organizaciones de la clase obrera (incluyendo el derecho a existir) y la quema de los locales de los sindicatos.

No dudamos que muchos trabajadores Social Demócratas, realmente a favor del socialismo, hayan sido enfurecidos por las maniobras burocráticas de los stalinistas en el movimiento sindical y en algunos de los medios de comunicación, especialmente la televisión. Muchos de los obreros verdaderamente (aunque incorrectamente) creyeron que la ocupación del taller de imprenta de *República* fue un “complot de los comunistas” para privar al Partido Socialista de un periódico. Pero, una cosa es comprender la motivación de estos trabajadores, y otra confundirse acerca del significado de clase y el empuje de las manifestaciones anticomunistas. Portugal es un país capitalista, no un estado obrero degenerado. La fuerza social en el poder es la burguesía, no la burocracia soviética. Bajo semejantes condiciones sociales y políticas, apoyar manifestaciones que usan la consigna “Abajo con la dictadura comunista” es capitular a la presión ideológica del enemigo de clase, ya sea debido a una ciega stalinofobia o a una confusión política o un error de juicio sobre la alineación general de las fuerzas de clase.

Estos últimos acontecimientos le dan el golpe final al esquema del camarada Foley sobre "qué exactamente está sucediendo en Portugal." De acuerdo con este esquema, el conflicto fundamental opone el intento de "los dictadores militares" de acabar con los derechos democráticos al Partido Socialista, que está tomando una posición tambaleante y poco entusiasta pero de cualquier manera valiente en apoyo de los derechos democráticos y la "soberanía popular." Pero, resulta que el verdadero ataque frontal contra los derechos democráticos fue lanzado contra el PC y no contra el PS. Hasta donde nosotros sabemos no se ha quemado ningún local del PS; a ningún local del PS se le ha impedido funcionar. Además, este ataque frontal ha sido lanzado por reaccionarios en el Norte y no por el siniestro MFA. Se podría argumentar, aunque algo débilmente, que el MFA "permite" estos ataques. Pero esto es sólo una media-verdad; varios de los locales del PC en el Norte han sido protegidos por destacamentos armados del MFA. ¿Deberíamos de haber llamado a la "dictadura militar" a aplastar a estas multitudes reaccionarias con ametralladoras? ¿O es al revés? ¿Deberíamos de reprochar al MFA por haber suprimido brutalmente (aunque ineficazmente) el derecho democrático de las masas de quemar los locales del PC y de los sindicatos?

La campaña del PS durante el caso *República* fue apoyada plenamente y con mucho entusiasmo por el capital portugués e internacional. También fue apoyada por la Social Democracia internacional, y fue apoyada también (cautelosamente) por los partidos Comunistas Italiano y Español. Lo que se constituyó fue un bloque político de la burguesía, la Social Democracia y unos cuantos PCs. Ambos Healy y Lambert se unieron a este bloque político, al menos por algunos días. Healy lo abandonó después, aunque sin ofrecer una autocritica. ¿Y qué del camarada Foley y del editor de *Intercontinental Press*? ¿Se unieron también? ¿Lo han abandonado desde entonces?

Algunos Maoistas, como el Partido Comunista portugués (Marxista-Leninista) y el MRPP, toman una posición similar a la de Healy-Lambert y del camarada Foley, pero sobre la base de un análisis un poco distinto. Portugal, afirman ellos, está en vísperas de un golpe por el Partido Comunista. Mejor aún, ya se ha transformado en "una colonia del social-imperialismo." De acuerdo con su teoría de "la revolución por etapas," ellos creen que lo que está en el orden del día actualmente en Portugal no es una revolución socialista, sino "una revolución democrático-nacional," la "lucha por la independencia nacional." Por lo tanto, los trabajadores se están sublevando contra la "dictadura comunista," que es en realidad el dominio del "capitalismo de estado," el capitalismo de tipo Occidental habiendo sido derrocado por la "burguesía de estado, lacayos del imperialismo de Moscú." El MFA es la herramienta de segunda importancia para Moscú, el primero siendo el PC de Cunhal; por lo tanto, el MFA se vuelve, después del PC, el "enemigo principal del pueblo portugués." La conclusión más lógica e inevitable es que se tiene que apoyar a la Social Democracia (la "burguesía nacional liberal") contra los "agentes del social-imperialismo extranjero." Aún los más fuertes Maoistas aplauden ante la quema de los locales del PC, argumentando que "todos los agentes y espías extranjeros morirán a causa de la ira del pueblo." Con semejante análisis, es fácil ver que la "contradicción principal" es aquella entre la democracia burguesa y la "dictadura" (eso es, dictadura comunista). Este esquema, por muy raro que sea, no es muy original. Los Maoistas lo han copiado de los periódicos burgueses más conservadores y demagógicos a través del mundo capitalista entero.

Una variante más sofisticada de la misma teoría sería que lo que estamos presenciando en Portugal actualmente es el comienzo de una revolución política antiburocrática de los trabajadores contra un proceso de burocratización de un estado proletario. Eso explicaría la "presión de los trabajadores" tan querida por Healy y Lambert, y el apoyo de la burguesía internacional, que extiende

una simpatía verbal a los movimientos de masas contra las burocracias en el poder, evitando al mismo tiempo cualquier paso que ayudaría a reemplazar una dictadura burocrática por un sistema de consejos obreros democráticamente electos. Pero el camarada Foley no tocaría esa teoría ni de lejos, porque implicaría que el PC portugués (con la ayuda del MFA), lejos de apoyar al capitalismo, ya lo ha derrocado.

Ambas teorías al menos tienen el mérito de coherencia interna. Simplemente discrepan con la realidad. Sin embargo, el esquema del camarada Foley combina el defecto de la disociación de la realidad con el defecto adicional de la falta de coherencia interna. Simplemente examínense los elementos: El MFA es el sostén principal del capitalismo portugués. El PS, aunque no extremadamente anticapitalista, sigue un curso que lo lleva a chocar con el MFA. Este es, supuestamente, el conflicto principal en Portugal, en medio de una crisis revolucionaria. El capital, que supuestamente no quiere ser apoyado, apoya plenamente al PS contra su sostén principal. ¿Quién puede darle sentido a semejante construcción ideológica?

Sin embargo, el rompecabezas desaparece una vez que las premisas falsas del camarada Foley son abandonadas. Una vez que se entiende que el conflicto político fundamental en Portugal no es entre el dominio militar y la democracia burguesa, sino entre los intentos espontáneos de las masas portuguesas de *ir más lejos de cualquier forma de dominio burgués o estado burgués* y los intentos de la burguesía, primero con astucia y después con fuerza, de empujarlas hacia canales compatibles con el orden público burgués, entonces es posible comprender lo que significa el bloque político mundial contra la revolución portuguesa. La violencia del conflicto de clase y el apoyo intenso de la burguesía portuguesa e internacional a la Social Democracia también se hace perfectamente comprensible.

Entonces se comprende por qué, tan temprano como el 1 de mayo de 1975, *Tempo Económico*, uno de los órganos principales de la burguesía portuguesa, escribió: "La perspectiva estratégica más obvia es una que fluye del carácter complementario del PS y del PPD [el principal partido burgués]." El diario parisiense, *Le Monde*, notó en el número del 31 de julio de 1975 que la agitación montada por el PS ha creado un ambiente de febril anticipación en el local de emigrados de Spínola en Río de Janeiro: "Desde su punto de vista, la reacción del PS ha sido definitivamente 'tardía.' Aún así, ellos creen que las manifestaciones de masas organizadas por el Sr. Mário Soares pueden llevar a una reversión de las perspectivas. En todo caso, ésa es la opinión general, expresada en sus declaraciones a *Le Monde* hoy día. . . . 'Yo no estoy vinculado a ningún partido político, aunque mis ideas sobre cómo reconstruir el país coinciden en varios puntos con la ideología de los socialistas. Eso significa que no critico la posición que han tomado el Partido Socialista y el PPD a favor de la democracia y la libertad del pueblo portugués.'"

No es, por supuesto sorprendente que el bloque político internacional contra la (hasta ahora) victoriosa lucha de los trabajadores portugueses "anarco-populistas" para prevenir cualquier estabilización de la economía capitalista portuguesa y cualquier restauración de un estado burgués fuerte, deba incluir al General Spínola. Pero, ¿no debería esto obligar a Healy y Lambert, tanto como a los camaradas Foley y Hansen, a pensar dos veces acerca de qué clase de compañía mantuvieron durante esas semanas decisivas?

La Etapa Actual de la Revolución Portuguesa

El desarrollo de la ofensiva del PS, que empezó con el caso *República* y fue seguida por la renuncia de los ministros del PS del gabinete de coalición, ilustra otro aspecto de la actual lucha política en Portugal, uno que le da otra bofetada al esquema del camarada Foley. Con el comienzo de la ofensiva del PS se revelaron las divisiones dentro del MFA. Los dirigentes Social Demócratas no dejaron de tomar partido en estas divisiones. En

realidad, tomaron una posición muy clara. Es interesante ver con quién y por qué.

La noche anterior a la reunión del MFA donde se eligió el "triumvirato revolucionario," el General Costa Gomes, presidente de la República, lanzó un llamado apasionado a los oficiales (ver *Le Monde*, 27-28 de julio de 1975), diciendo que la revolución había ido demasiado lejos, que ya era tiempo ponerle un alto. Ya era tiempo de impedir el "aislamiento interno y externo" de la revolución. Los dirigentes Social Demócratas le dieron su apoyo inmediato y entusiástico a Costa Gomes. Hablando ante sus seguidores en Figueira de Foz, Soares explicó que Costa Gomes había tomado la posición correcta, pero que los oficiales extremistas estaban en otra línea. Usó una formulación que dice cantidad sobre el campo de clase que él representa objetivamente, llamando a Costa Gomes a "restringir a esos capitanes que habían tomado muy de prisa sus estrellas de general." (*Le Monde*, 30 de julio de 1975.)

Costa Gomes, el héroe de Mário Soares, fue el jefe de estado mayor del ejército durante las sangrientas guerras coloniales bajo la dictadura Salazar-Caetano. Soares es un político inteligente y muy bien informado. Conoce el juego. ¿Quién podría ser tan ingenuo como para creer que Soares considera a este viejo carnicero un defensor leal de la "democracia" contra una dictadura militar? Sin embargo, es el símbolo ideal del sirviente leal del "orden público" burgués contra los "extremistas anarco-populistas."

Las cosas se hacen aún más claras durante los primeros días de agosto. La prensa portuguesa de oposición publicó un documento, supuestamente escrito por el anterior Ministro del Exterior, Mayor Melo Antunes, y apoyado por once miembros del consejo revolucionario del MFA. Extendió el llamado de Costa Gomes. Decía explícitamente: "En cambio, hemos presenciado el desmantelamiento de media docena de grandes grupos financieros y monopolísticos; además, paralelo a esto, mientras más las nacionalizaciones se sucedían una a la otra (a un paso imposible de absorber, no importa qué tan dinámico fuera el proceso ni qué tan amplio fuera el apoyo de las masas, sin una gran amenaza de resquebrajamiento del existente orden social y cultural, como ya ocurre), presenciamos la muy rápida desintegración de las formas de organización social y económica, que sirvieron de apoyo a las amplias capas de la pequeña y mediana burguesía, sin que se formen nuevas estructuras capaces de garantizar la administración de las unidades productivas y el mantenimiento de una normalidad indispensable en las relaciones sociales entre todos los Portugueses.

"Mientras tanto, hubo una descomposición progresiva de las estructuras estatales. Formas espontáneas y anarquísticas de ejercicio del poder empezaron a ocurrir en todos lados (incluyendo dentro de las fuerzas armadas)." (*Expresso*, 9 de agosto de 1975.)

¿Puede existir cualquier duda acerca de la naturaleza de clase y el motivo de semejante análisis, cualquiera que sea su fraseología izquierdista acerca de "los avances irreversibles hacia el socialismo" y el "socialismo democrático"? Especialmente cuando encontramos de nuevo las palabras decisivas repetidas por todos los oponentes de una revolución socialista victoriosa en Portugal: "Es necesario rechazar enérgicamente la anarquía y el populismo, que llevan inevitablemente a una disolución catastrófica del estado en una fase de desarrollo social durante la cual ningún proyecto político es viable sin un estado."

En el capítulo sobre el poder dual en su libro, *La Historia de la Revolución Rusa*, Trotsky dice que la formulación "la anarquía del poder dual" fue usada constantemente por observadores durante 1917. En realidad ésa es una de las principales características aún de una situación embrionaria de poder dual. Esta "anarquía" puede ser eliminada, ya sea en la dirección del poder obrero, o en la dirección de la restauración de un fuerte estado burgués. Las intenciones de Melo Antunes en este respecto están claras. Pero la dirección del Partido Socialista portugués

respalda con entusiasmo este documento de Melo Antunes en su reunión del 10 de agosto de 1975. (*O Seculo*, 11 de agosto de 1975.) Mostró simultáneamente una gran preocupación por la democracia, suspendiendo tres miembros del secretariado nacional del partido de la dirección cotidiana y del "consejo" (equivalente al comité central) porque disidieron del curso derechista de Soares.

Soares, por supuesto, está jugando con fuego—y lo sabe. Cuando algunos de los militantes del mismo PS empezaron a organizar la quema de los locales del PC en un pueblo norteño, los suspendió del partido. Si Costa Gomes o cualquier otra figura actuando con la ayuda de Soares, logra restaurar la "legalidad democrática" y la "autoridad del estado (burgués)" aplastando primero a los obreros avanzados, bien podría voltearse en contra de los Social Demócratas como siguiente paso. El *Reichswehr*, que la Social Democracia usó para aplastar a los trabajadores radicales en 1919, organizó un golpe militar contra el gobierno Social Demócrata tan pronto como 1920, asentando así la base de lo que sería eventualmente la dictadura fascista que destrozaría a la Social Democracia. Esto debería de ser recordado una y otra vez. Al desatar una ola reaccionaria contra los "anarco-populistas," el PC y la revolución misma, Soares está ayudando a crear la soga con la cual él mismo podrá ser fácilmente ahorcado. Pero ésta no es ninguna razón para disminuir o desechar su responsabilidad por apoyar el llamado de Costa Gomes de poner un alto a la revolución. Tampoco es ninguna razón para esconder el carácter de clase de ese llamado: Sirve los propósitos contrarrevolucionarios del capital portugués e internacional. Eso es lo que está involucrado en la ofensiva y no la defensa de los derechos democráticos de la clase trabajadora.

Los acontecimientos políticos de las últimas semanas indica que el avance del proceso revolucionario desde mayo ha sido temporalmente parado. La burguesía ha tomado la contraofensiva. No hay duda acerca de la causa inmediata de esta reversión: Es la división de las fuerzas de la clase trabajadora. Sin embargo, no se debería de olvidar un factor adicional: Existe una base masiva para la reacción burguesa entre los pequeños propietarios en el norte de Portugal, dominados ideológicamente por la iglesia portuguesa cuya jerarquía colaboró muy estrechamente y por mucho tiempo con la dictadura Salazar-Caetano. El descontento económico de estos pequeños propietarios se está incrementando, y el gobierno no es capaz de resolver sus demandas.

Esta base masiva puede ser *minada un poco* por demandas ofensivas, políticas y económicas adecuadas del movimiento obrero: confiscación de la propiedad de la iglesia y su distribución entre todos los pequeños campesinos, garantía estatal de precios agrícolas mínimos para pequeños productores, provisto a expensas de las organizaciones agrícolas controladas por los terratenientes y comerciantes; vínculos directos entre pequeños campesinos y organizaciones de consumidores de la clase obrera en las ciudades, etc. Pero es improbable que esta base masiva pueda ser eliminada completamente. Aún bajo la dirección de los Bolcheviques, la revolución rusa no pudo eliminar la base masiva de la contrarrevolución entre la pequeña burguesía propietaria. La revolución rusa de 1905 fue derrotada porque la mayoría del campesinado ni siquiera entró en el proceso revolucionario. Olvidar estos hechos objetivos de la vida, negar que en un país imperialista como Portugal la mayoría de los campesinos dueños de tierras no es y no puede ser favorable a una revolución socialista, pero en el mejor de los casos, únicamente puede ser neutralizada, es caer víctima de las tesis stalinistas que la lucha de clases puede ser reducida a una lucha entre un "puñado de monopolistas" y la "abrumadora mayoría del pueblo."

La división de la clase obrera ha permitido que la reacción burguesa pase a la contraofensiva. La mayor apertura para esto fue provista por la dirección del PS que jugó el papel de punta de lanza, transmitiendo directamente la presión de la burguesía europea, mediada por Wilson, Helmut Schmidt, y compañía. La reversión de la tendencia fue tomada, entonces, por el ala derecha

del MFA dentro del ejército, por la clase media rural y urbana, y por la jerarquía eclesiástica; matones reaccionarios organizados empezaron a asaltar los locales del PC y otras organizaciones de la clase obrera. El grito de guerra de todas estas fuerzas es el mismo: Paren la revolución, ha ido demasiado lejos.

Dada la alterada relación de fuerzas y el reflujo temporal de las luchas de la clase obrera, el resultado inmediato más probable es una victoria para el ala Melo Antunes del MFA, es decir, un arreglo entre las diferentes fracciones del MFA, el PS y el PC alrededor de alguna variante de la solución de "unidad nacional" llamada por Soares. Esto significará intentos de constreñir, restringir y disciplinar la militancia de los sectores avanzados de la clase trabajadora, intentos de introducir una disciplina más aguda contra las iniciativas de los soldados dentro del ejército, e intentos de "restaurar la autoridad" del estado burgués contra los desafíos de la extrema izquierda, con la justificación de prometer una represión similar contra la extrema derecha.

Pero este desplazamiento a la derecha no implicará de ninguna manera una derrota de la revolución. La relación fundamental de fuerzas no ha sido volcada. La burguesía todavía es débil. El ejército permanece dividido. El aparato de estado permanece inestable. No existe aún ningún instrumento represivo adecuado para aplastar al proletariado. La clase obrera no ha sido aún derrotada, ni desmoralizada, sólo desorientada temporalmente.

Una nueva ola de huelgas y luchas de los obreros radicales es posible, si no probable, para el otoño cuando los trabajadores sientan todos los efectos de la crisis económica y las medidas de "austeridad" del gobierno. Todos los organismos de control obrero siguen funcionando; no será fácil suprimirlos. En meses pasados los trabajadores portugueses han demostrado que pueden lanzarse a las calles en cantidades mayores que la pequeña burguesía conservadora en el norte. Lo harán nuevamente. La revolución portuguesa no ha llegado a su fin, ni ha sido quebrado su ímpetu. La prueba de fuerza decisiva, que será violenta, todavía está por llegar. Nadie puede predecir con precisión cuándo llegará.

Mientras que la iniciativa principal para revertir el proceso de la tendencia revolucionaria fue tomada por los dirigentes reformistas del PS, la dirección del PC comparte igual responsabilidad con Soares y compañía por la contraofensiva de la burguesía que se está desarrollando actualmente en todos los campos.

Durante los primeros meses después del derrocamiento de la dictadura de Caetano, los dirigentes del PC participaron activamente en reforzar al tambaleante aparato de estado burgués. No hicieron nada por eliminar radicalmente los restos de la legislación fascista, las leyes penales, las instituciones del estado y el personal, que fueron mantenidos donde mismo por los dirigentes militares. Entonces les recordamos de la advertencia de San Justo: Ay de los revolucionarios que hacen revoluciones a medias; ellos cavan sus propias tumbas. Obviamente, no fue posible eliminar los restos del fascismo sin destrozarse el aparato de estado burgués. Con su política de colaboración de clases y su participación en el gobierno, el PC protegió el aparato de estado en vez de luchar por destrozarlo. Actualmente, secciones importantes de ese mismo aparato están demostrando su agradecimiento—tratando de destrozarse al PC.

Por casi un año después del derrocamiento del régimen de Caetano, el PC hizo todo lo posible por restringir y quebrar la militancia de la clase obrera en las fábricas, siguiendo de cerca la línea stalinista que los PCs aplicaron en Francia, Italia, Bélgica, Holanda y otros lugares al final de la segunda Guerra Mundial. Trató de impedir o romper todas las huelgas, con mucho menos éxito, hay que notar, que en 1944-47. Esta fue una de las razones por la cual el PS ganó una victoria electoral tan grande el 25 de abril de 1975, porque en ese momento el PS se comportaba con más flexibilidad hacia las luchas de la clase obrera.

Pero, entonces, bajo la presión de los acontecimientos del 11 de marzo, el fortalecimiento de la extrema izquierda entre los obreros, y la derrota electoral del 25 de abril de 1975 (el PC perdió casi la

cuarta parte de su apoyo electoral potencial a grupos a su izquierda, y probablemente otra cuarta parte al PS por las razones ya mencionadas), la dirección del PC dió un giro a la izquierda. Irónicamente, Soares ahora reprocha a los dirigentes del PC por esto, invirtiendo su propia actitud previa más "liberal" hacia los trabajadores radicalizados. El documento de la dirección del PS del 28 de julio de 1975, expresa asombro acerca del hecho de que el PC esté tratando de colaborar con "ultraizquierdistas." En la "Proposta de Acção Imediata" (Proposición para la Acción Inmediata), presentada a una conferencia de prensa del 28 de julio de 1975 por Mário Soares, se hace una llamada explícita a la "austeridad" y "sacrificios," que deben ser impuestos sobre la clase obrera. En el mismo documento encontramos lo siguiente: "Como resultado, una ola de demagogia absolutamente irresponsable ha sido introducida a la sociedad portuguesa. El país vive enredado en ideología noche y día. . . Grupos de activistas extremadamente agresivos tratan de vender su elixir utópico a todos los niveles y de imponer 'soluciones' cada vez más extremistas y radicales. La aceleración de nuestro proceso parece ser muy peligrosa aún para aquéllos que ya viven en 'democracias populares' y que, por lo tanto, conocen las dificultades y los obstáculos que hay que vencer. Ha habido una sucesión de usurpaciones de viviendas y de bienes raíces. El desorden, la inseguridad y el temor son inculcados progresivamente bajo pretexto de la formación 'improvisada' de escuelas, estancias infantiles, hospitales, universidades populares, cooperativas agrícolas, etc. Pocas de estas iniciativas de ocupación son viables. Frecuentemente, la ocupación es seguida por la destrucción y luego el abandono. . . Parece que a nadie le interesa ya oponerse a actos puramente anarquísticos, que a veces llegan a ser puro vandalismo y no contribuyen nada a resolver ningún problema real, sino que llevan a un empeoramiento general de la situación. Se pierde inexorablemente la autoridad del estado . . . y se abre el camino a oleadas sucesivas de descontento que inevitablemente alimentan a la contrarrevolución.

"En su política de destrucción progresiva del aparato de Estado, el PC usa como impulsor al anarco-populismo. Esta es una alianza falsa y llena de conflictos, pero no por eso menos efectiva. . . Los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución y los Consejos Revolucionarios de Obreros, Soldados y Marineros—iniciativas tomadas por el PC y el PRP-BR³—provocan reservas idénticas. Fundamentalmente, tienden a crear grupos armados de civiles que ejercen presión sobre el MFA o aún quieren sustituirse eventualmente por el MFA." (*Jornal Novo*, 29 de julio de 1975.)

Y las conclusiones son obvias:

"Reafirmar el principio de que las comisiones obreras y de inquilinos son formas de poder popular que estamos interesados en desarrollar, siempre y cuando no se reclamen como un poder paralelo al aparato de estado. . ."

"Introducir legislación punitiva severa contra las 'milicias armadas,' las cuales deberían ser suprimidas en el plazo máximo de un mes, junto con los 'comités de vigilancia popular' u otros que han surgido. El PS piensa que no es posible ningún compromiso en esta cuestión: La formación de milicias armadas de tipo partidario lleva a la desintegración de la unidad del MFA y conducirá inevitablemente al país hacia confrontaciones trágicas. . . ." (*Jornal Novo*, 29 de julio de 1975.)

El "socialismo libertario" queda descubierto así como un llamado a la represión de las masas "anarquistas" y por el monopolio de las armas en manos del ejército burgués. Las lecciones de Alemania, España y Chile no fueron comprendidas por estos caballeros.

El giro de izquierda del PC se expresó a través de las proposiciones y acciones de frente único con las organizaciones de extrema izquierda (incluyendo a la LCI), la aceptación, aunque renuente y con muchas restricciones, de la consigna llamando a la generalización del control obrero y las iniciativas

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de ocupaciones de fábrica, y la prudente reversión de su oposición previa al fortalecimiento de los órganos de autorganización de la clase obrera, manteniendo sin embargo, muchas restricciones y tratando de controlar estos órganos a través de la burocracia sindical y el MFA.

Pero este giro de izquierda pronto tomó la forma de sectarismo y aventurerismo burocrático, culminando con las acusaciones de "social-fascismo" hechas al Partido Socialista. (Cabe hacer notar que el PS responde en igual forma, tomando la consigna maoísta que tilda a Cunhal de "lacayo social-fascista de Moscú.") La dirección del PC se encuentra crecientemente aislada de ambos de los sectores más radicalizados y los más moderados de la clase obrera, como resultado de sus intentos de mantener el control de los sindicatos y los medios de comunicación a través de maquinaciones burocráticas, para impedir el desarrollo de la democracia obrera y para impedir al PS organizar manifestaciones callejeras.

Como consecuencia de ese aislamiento, el PC ha intentado de manera creciente maniobras desesperadas encaminadas a "conquistar" el aparato de estado burgués desde adentro, en sustitución a tratar de ampliar su base y simpatías de masas. El PC ha fallado miserablemente en ofrecer alternativas y perspectivas políticas a las masas bajo la línea de un frente único organizado y democrático con el PS y la izquierda revolucionaria. En cambio, ha concentrado todas sus esperanzas en las maniobras con el MFA. Pero el MFA mismo se encuentra cada vez más dividido en función de las alineaciones de clase y la relación de fuerza entre las clases, más que en base a la "lealtad" a la colaboración con el PC. A pesar de su fraseología de izquierda, el Kremlin no está interesado en provocar una fuerte confrontación con el imperialismo alrededor de los desarrollos en Portugal. En la conferencia cumbre de Helsinki, se le dijo a Brezhnev en términos nada ambiguos que restringiera a Cunhal o se acabaría la distensión. El nuevo giro del PC (su segundo hasta ahora), "justificado" en base a los ataques anticomunistas en el Norte, fue realizado el 10 de agosto cuando Cunhal, siguiendo a Soares, llamó a un "alto" al proceso revolucionario, sentando, así, las bases para un compromiso alrededor del documento de Melo Antunes.

¿Es Suficiente Basarse en la Asamblea Constituyente?

Qué tanto se ha alejado el camarada Foley de la tradición Marxista revolucionaria al analizar las luchas de clases en situaciones prerrevolucionarias y revolucionarias como la de Portugal hoy día, se revela notablemente en el siguiente pasaje de su artículo del 21 de julio de 1975 en *Intercontinental Press*: "Si el PC hubiese estado interesado en establecer un gobierno representativo de los trabajadores, tenía tan sólo que basarse en la Asamblea Constituyente y llamar a los delegados en ella a actuar de acuerdo con el mandato claro que les fue dado por los votantes." (p. 1101)

Para que un gobierno obrero llegue al poder, es suficiente "llamar a los delegados" de la Asamblea Constituyente a actuar, presumiblemente constituyendo un gobierno PS-PC. Cunhal no lo hace. Todos los "ultraizquierdistas" portugueses (incluyendo, asumimos, los Trotskistas portugueses) se abstienen asimismo de hacer tal llamado. Son, por lo tanto, culpables todos de "cretinismo antiparlamentario."

Trotsky usó la expresión "cretinismo antiparlamentario" para referirse a los anarquistas españoles, quienes, en un país en donde todavía había poderosas ilusiones electorales y democrático-burguesas, se rehusaban a participar en las elecciones parlamentarias bajo el pretexto de no querer reforzar esas ilusiones. Hasta donde recordamos, el PC portugués participó en las elecciones, así como los "centristas" y muchos de los "ultraizquierdistas" a los que se refiere el camarada Foley, incluyendo a los Trotskistas de la LCI. Obviamente, entonces, el camarada Foley usa la expresión "cretinismo antiparlamentario" en un sentido bastante diferente al de Trotsky.

Desde la experiencia de la revolución rusa de 1917, y especialmente desde la publicación de "La Enfermedad Infantil del Izquierdismo en el Comunismo" de Lenin ha sido comúnmente aceptado entre los Marxistas revolucionarios que es tácticamente correcto llamar a los partidos de masas que reclamen representar al movimiento obrero organizado, a que tomen el poder. El propósito de tal táctica es esencialmente pedagógico y dual: por un lado, enseñar a los obreros a plantear todas las cuestiones claves de la lucha de clases como cuestiones de poder; por el otro, exponer cómo los que maldirigen a la clase obrera no desean o (en el caso improbable de que sí tomen el poder) son incapaces de satisfacer las necesidades candentes de los obreros.

Pero el camarada Foley ha creado una variante enteramente nueva de tal consigna propagandística. Es de hecho suficiente, vean ustedes, que Cunhal llame a Soares a formar un gobierno de los trabajadores para que ese gobierno de hecho se constituya y reciba la aprobación entusiasta de la Asamblea Constituyente burguesa, en la cual hay una mayoría de delegados de partidos de la clase obrera. Lo que empezó como un instrumento de propaganda dirigido a exponer a los reformistas que maldirigen a la clase obrera se ha convertido ahora en una ilusión entre revolucionarios acerca de la disposición y habilidad de estos "dirigentes" para llevar a cabo la revolución socialista. Los obreros portugueses están hoy en día encarando cuestiones de importancia de vida o muerte para la revolución y para los intereses cotidianos del proletariado. Los obreros están ocupando fábricas, implementando control obrero y creando organizaciones de autodefensa para defenderse de las amenazas de desempleo, pobreza y un sangriento golpe reaccionario. ¿Qué consejo les da el camarada Foley? ¡Es "suficiente" darle todo el poder a la Asamblea Constituyente para que estas cuestiones se arreglen en interés de los trabajadores, puesto que la mayoría de los puestos en la Asamblea Constituyente son ocupados por representantes del PS y el PC!

Pero, ¿qué sucede si el PS forma un bloque con el PPD en vez de con el PC? Quedarán "expuestos." Sin duda. Pero mientras tanto, leyes contra la clase obrera serán adoptadas y las conquistas de los obreros serán destruidas, con el solemne consentimiento de la Asamblea Constituyente a la que el camarada Foley quiere que otorguemos plenos poderes. ¿Y qué si el PC forma un bloque con el PS y el PPD para imponer estas leyes contra la clase obrera? Quedará también "expuesto." Pero, ¿es la principal meta hoy en día jugar algún juego de propaganda para "exponer" tal o cual formación parlamentaria? ¿O debería en su lugar dársele prioridad a la lucha encarnizada para defender todas las conquistas actuales de los trabajadores? ¿Debería estar la defensa de estas conquistas subordinada a "exponer" a las direcciones del PS y PC a través de una forma de maniobras parlamentarias? El camarada se lanzó a la lucha contra el "cretinismo antiparlamentario." Se ha desplazado muy rápidamente a una posición de cretinismo parlamentario.

En Gran Bretaña hoy en día los miembros Laboristas del parlamento tienen una mayoría en éste. Han recibido un "mandato claro" de los votantes de oponerse a cualquier política de congelación de salarios o ingresos. ¡Imagínense tan sólo a un revolucionario Británico que dijese que sería suficiente dar todo el poder al Parlamento para que la recientemente impuesta congelación de salarios sea abolida! Podría contestarse, "Pero es precisamente este 'Parlamento soberano,' con su mayoría Laborista, el que ha adoptado la congelación de salarios." ¿Ha creado esto una gran crisis en el movimiento obrero y aún en el partido Laborista parlamentario? Definitivamente. Pero es mil veces más urgente y vital organizar la lucha contra esa decisión parlamentaria fuera del Parlamento, que esperar hasta que la crisis actual se manifieste en la creación de una nueva mayoría Laborista que deshaga lo que ha hecho la actual mayoría traidora. De hecho, sin esa enérgica lucha extraparlamentaria, este recambio en la composición de los miembros del parlamento Laborista *nunca*

ocurrirá. (Si ocurrirá o no aún con tal lucha, es otra cuestión.)

En una polémica contra tendencias culpables de "ilusiones constitucionales" no muy diferentes de las del camarada Foley, Lenin tenía esto que decir en 1917:

"Si el poder político del estado está en manos de una clase cuyos intereses coinciden con los de la mayoría, una dirección de los asuntos públicos que se conforme efectivamente a los deseos de la mayoría es posible. Pero si el poder político está en manos de una clase cuyos intereses difieren de los de la mayoría, una dirección de los asuntos públicos en conformidad con la voluntad de la mayoría, inevitablemente se convierte en un engaño o conduce al aplastamiento de la mayoría." (*Obras completas*, ed. Francesa, vol. 25, pp.216-217.)

En Portugal el poder económico y estatal están aún en manos de la clase capitalista, a pesar de su debilitamiento. Hablar de "soberanía popular" y "gobierno de la mayoría" sin antes romper ese poder económico y el aparato de estado que lo sostiene, sin la conquista previa del poder por el proletariado, es engañar a los obreros y engañarse a sí mismo.

Este debate no es académico. Al rechazar el decreto del MFA sobre el "poder popular," la dirección del PS exigía específicamente que el status de las comisiones obreras, comités de inquilinos y órganos de auto-defensa obreros fueran definidos por la Asamblea Constituyente. (*Expresso*, 12 de julio de 1975.) Nosotros debemos advertir a los obreros: ¡No dejéis que la Asamblea Constituyente legisle sobre ninguna de vuestras conquistas; únicamente las restringirá!

Algunos camaradas han avanzado el siguiente argumento: Bajo las condiciones del capitalismo decadente, cuando la burguesía (especialmente ahora, después del fin del largo "boom" de la posguerra) no puede conceder ninguna reforma substancial a la clase obrera y se ve, por el contrario, obligada a arrancarle los derechos democráticos a los trabajadores, los capitalistas no pueden tolerar una Asamblea Constituyente soberana y democráticamente electa. Por lo tanto, el llamar a la soberanía plena para la Asamblea Constituyente en Portugal hoy en día, es elevar una demanda que los capitalistas no pueden satisfacer, y por lo tanto es poner los sentimientos democráticos de amplias, si bien todavía no radicalizadas, masas al servicio de la revolución.

Este argumento padece de extrapolación y generalización erróneas. Apunta correctamente la tendencia a largo plazo. Pero, la existencia de esta tendencia no significa de ninguna manera que bajo ninguna condición pueden los capitalistas usar una "asamblea constituyente soberana" como instrumento para detener a la revolución proletaria. De hecho, esto ya ha sido llevado a cabo, y bajo circunstancias que no eran tan diferentes de las que prevalecen en Portugal actualmente: en Alemania en 1918-1919, en España (con las "cortes soberanas") después de julio de 1936, en Francia e Italia al final de la segunda guerra mundial. El concluir de la tendencia a largo plazo de decadencia de la democracia burguesa, que en ningún lugar o momento puede el capitalismo usar a la democracia burguesa como arma para detener a la revolución proletaria, es contradecir toda la experiencia histórica de los últimos cincuenta años en Europa.

De hecho, en vísperas de la constitución del triunvirato del MFA, Soares había ya llamado a la formación de un "gobierno de unidad nacional." ¿Dónde deja esto la "condición suficiente" del camarada Foley? ¿Cómo puede el camarada Foley, Cunhal o los desafortunados "centristas y ultraizquierdistas" persuadir rápidamente a Soares para que abandone este llamado en favor del llamado a un gobierno PC-PS-Intersindical (tal vez con algunos locales quemados del PC y de Intersindical agregados de pión)? ¿Deben los obreros de Portugal esperar a convencer a Soares antes de defender sus conquistas? ¿Adoptamos ahora la posición de que el ritmo de la revolución depende de la buena voluntad de sus "dirigentes" reformistas? ¿Tenían razón Stalin, Molotov, y Kamenev, después de todo, contra Lenin y Trotsky en febrero-marzo de 1917? ¿Estaban los Bolcheviques dividiendo a la clase

obrera cuando insistieron en no dar ni una onza de confianza a los "dirigentes" reformistas?

Democracia Burguesa, Derechos Democráticos, Revolución Proletaria

La raíz de los juicios falsos del camarada Foley sobre el conflicto político actual en Portugal es una concepción equivocada, unilateral, y mecanística de la relación entre la democracia burguesa y la revolución socialista. Esta concepción ha sido ahora apoyada por el camarada Hansen, editor de *Intercontinental Press*, en un "análisis de las noticias" publicado en el número del 4 de agosto ("Is Democracy Worth Fighting For?" [¿Vale la Pena Luchar por la Democracia?]). Por supuesto, los Marxistas defienden los derechos democráticos cuando son atacados por la reacción burguesa. Los Marxistas luchan por la defensa y extensión de los derechos democráticos durante y después de las revoluciones socialistas. Pero esto de ninguna manera significa que una revolución socialista equivale a una "expansión cualitativa" de la democracia burguesa. Ni significa que la extensión de los derechos democráticos es equivalente a "luchar por la democracia burguesa en el período que conduce al socialismo."

En primer lugar, es necesario recordar a los camaradas Hansen y Foley que aún en su forma más avanzada y radical, la democracia burguesa restringe severamente los derechos políticos democráticos (entre otras cosas) a través de las instituciones de la propiedad privada. La característica distintiva de una revolución proletaria, aún antes del establecimiento de un estado obrero, es que la crecientemente radicalizada acción de las masas lleva a los trabajadores a extender la democracia más allá de los límites compatibles con la democracia burguesa.

La cuestión de la libertad de prensa provee una buena ilustración de esta tendencia. Nosotros defendemos el derecho aún de los partidos burgueses liberales, ni qué decir de los partidos obreros, de publicar sus propios periódicos contra cualquier intento por parte de los gobiernos burgueses de suprimirlos. Pero nunca defendemos el monopolio de los propietarios privados de las imprentas sobre la expresión de opiniones públicamente. Cuando trabajadores de la imprenta rompen ese monopolio en el curso de una lucha revolucionaria masiva, cuando reclaman el derecho de que sus opiniones sean publicadas junto a aquéllas de los propietarios privados o los partidos políticos, nosotros decimos que esta es una extensión y no una limitación de los derechos democráticos. Nosotros aprobamos esta extensión 100 por ciento, aún si la mayoría de los delegados a la Asamblea Constituyente no hayan votado a favor de ella o la hayan rechazado, y aún si los propietarios privados protestan ruidosamente. Este es un ejemplo muy concreto de cómo una revolución expande la democracia más allá de los límites de la democracia burguesa al atacar los derechos de propiedad privada.

Segundo, la democracia burguesa consiste no solamente de derechos democráticos (restringidos que existen, en parte, sólo en papel), sino también de una máquina estatal, aparato represivo, y varias instituciones que limitan y estrangulan la actividad democrática libre de las masas. Nosotros nos oponemos y desafiamos a estas instituciones y su "derecho" de restringir la libertad de acción de las masas (de restringir el derecho de huelga, por ejemplo), aún en tiempos pacíficos. Pero cuando estas instituciones y el aparato de estado son desafiados por la acción masiva de decenas de miles de obreros en un proceso revolucionario, nosotros estamos 100 por ciento del lado de los obreros contra las instituciones del estado democrático burgués. Nosotros estamos por instituciones de democracia obrera, por soviets, para reemplazar a las instituciones del estado burgués. Una revolución proletaria no es simplemente una extensión y generalización de los derechos democráticos; además de esa continuidad, hay un fuerte elemento de discontinuidad, de rompimiento con todas las instituciones del estado burgués, la destrucción de la máquina del estado burgués y su reemplazo por nuevos órganos de poder. El

entender este punto, después de todo, constituye la principal línea de división entre el Bolchevismo y el Menchevismo en el curso de las revoluciones proletarias. Y estamos convencidos de que estas instituciones de democracia obrera son mil veces más democráticas que aquéllas de la democracia burguesa.

Tercero, en períodos de intensa lucha de clases y de creciente polarización violenta de las fuerzas de clase—es decir, en períodos de revolución y contrarrevolución—la defensa de los derechos democráticos no puede ser separada de los intereses de clases de las fuerzas contendientes. Los obreros desean abolir la explotación, pobreza, desempleo y represión estatal. Si, en nombre de la defensa de la democracia burguesa (o aún de los “derechos democráticos” en general) uno intenta restringir su lucha, pone un freno a su “ultraizquierdista” libertad de acción, y permite u organiza la represión contra ellos, entonces uno prepara el camino para el reemplazo de la democracia burguesa por una dictadura burguesa en vez de la democracia proletaria.

Las bases objetivas de la democracia burguesa, que descansan en la posibilidad de un cierto grado de conciliación entre las clases sociales fundamentales, pueden ser barridas por una crisis capitalista agudizada y conflictos de clases explosivos. Esto es lo que sucedió en Europa durante los treinta. Sucedió en Chile. Está sucediendo en Portugal actualmente. Bajo estas circunstancias, el prevenir que los obreros reemplacen a la democracia burguesa con la democracia proletaria, significa hacer inevitable la victoria de la dictadura burguesa.

A la luz de estas tesis, que fueron explicadas por Lenin y Trotsky muchas veces, nuestros camaradas de la LCI, organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional en Portugal, tomaron las siguientes posiciones, las cuales son aprobadas plenamente por la Cuarta Internacional:

1. Apoyo al derecho democrático de los trabajadores de la imprenta de *República* de que sus propias opiniones sean publicadas en sus imprentas, ya sea en el mismo *República* o en otro periódico impreso en las mismas imprentas.
2. Apoyo al derecho democrático del Partido Socialista de publicar su periódico sin ninguna censura o control.
3. Negativa a apoyar cualquier paso de las autoridades del estado burgués portugués para hacer que los obreros que ocupan la imprenta de *República* sean echados del edificio.
4. Apoyo al derecho del Partido Socialista de organizar manifestaciones callejeras y la negativa a colaborar con el PC en el levantamiento de barricadas contra los manifestantes socialistas.
5. Apoyo y participación activa en cualquier acción de auto-defensa que tome el Partido Comunista y los sindicatos bajo ataques a sus oficinas por turbas reaccionarias.

Nosotros creemos que estas posiciones son enteramente correctas y que representan una defensa consistente de los derechos democráticos en una situación revolucionaria, a pesar de que obviamente van más allá de los límites de la democracia burguesa. También creemos que es únicamente en base a éstas posiciones que la unidad de acción de los obreros portugueses puede ser restaurada.

Las contradicciones en las posiciones adoptadas por el camarada Hansen se vuelven más evidentes cuando recordamos que en su artículo, escrito más de dos semanas después del inicio del saqueo y quema de docenas de locales del PC, los sindicatos y otras organizaciones de la clase obrera (incluyendo, en una ocasión, una oficina de nuestros propios camaradas de la LCI), el camarada Hansen no consideró conveniente mencionar estos ataques tan siquiera una vez, a pesar de su cruzada por la democracia burguesa contra una supuesta dictadura militar. Uno habría pensado que un camarada tan sensitivo a los derechos democráticos gritaría con toda la fuerza de sus pulmones contra estos violentos ataques a los más elementales derechos de existencia y libre funcionamiento de las organizaciones de la clase obrera—ataques mil veces peores que cualquier cosa a la que ha

sido sujeto el Partido Socialista. El silencio del camarada Hansen sobre este punto únicamente confirma que en una situación revolucionaria no se puede salir a la defensa de la democracia burguesa y las instituciones del estado burgués contra la auto-organización y movilización de los obreros, sin pasar por alto severos ataques sobre los derechos democráticos elementales. Los obreros alemanes aprendieron esto desde diciembre de 1918-enero de 1919. Es un día triste aquél en que se le tiene que recordar esto al camarada Hansen.

Ya desde la campaña electoral de abril de 1975 advertimos que la confrontación sectaria entre los esquemas unipartidistas de los stalinistas y el aferramiento social-demócrata a la democracia burguesa, podía introducir una aguda escisión de la clase obrera portuguesa, amenazando así el avance de la revolución. Únicamente la defensa de las ideas gemelas de *democracia obrera* y *consejos obreros* pueden asegurar que ni el ímpetu revolucionario ni el necesario frente unido de la clase obrera portuguesa sean rotos en forma duradera. Continuaremos luchando incansablemente por este frente unido entre el PC, el PS y los obreros revolucionarios contra los ataques de los matones reaccionarios y en consonancia con la necesidad de consolidar y expandir las conquistas de la revolución.

Hacia el Poder Dual en Portugal

La oleada de luchas masivas, ocupaciones de fábrica, experimentos en control obrero, ocupaciones de tierra, iniciativas de tomas de terrenos, y el surgimiento de comisiones de inquilinos, ha planteado el problema de cómo coordinar y unificar estas formas variadas de auto-organización de las masas trabajadoras. La historia nos provee tan sólo una respuesta a este problema: la creación de soviets, de consejos obreros, cualquiera que sea el nombre que reciban (el término debe surgir, de preferencia, de la experiencia de la lucha práctica en el país de que se trata en vez de de un idioma extranjero). La creación de facto de tales consejos obreros es el producto espontáneo del proceso revolucionario portugués. Si la Cuarta Internacional, su organización portuguesa, y otros grupos revolucionarios han formulado esta necesidad sistemáticamente, lo han hecho *únicamente después de que las primeras iniciativas prácticas habían sido tomadas por las mismas masas*.

El camarada Foley no está de acuerdo. En el número del 21 de julio de *Intercontinental Press* cita un pasaje de los comentarios de Trotsky sobre la revolución española de 1931 que presentaba a los Soviets como “organizaciones de frente unido proletario” (*IP*, 21 de julio, p. 1015), implicando, por lo tanto, que Trotsky de hecho no aconsejaba la creación de soviets mientras no hubiera acuerdo de partido a partido con los Social Demócratas para llevarlo a cabo. ¡Soviets en Portugal únicamente con la aprobación de Cunhal y Soares! ¿Esto es el trotskismo ortodoxo?

De hecho Trotsky nunca tomó una posición tan descabellada. El les dió a los Trotskistas españoles precisamente el consejo opuesto, en enero de 1931 y en abril de 1936, cuando, dicho sea de paso, la relación de fuerzas entre las clases era menos favorable al proletariado de lo que es el caso actualmente en Portugal, y los Trotskistas eran mucho más débiles de lo que son hoy en día. El consejo de Trotsky era el de propagar la creación de los soviets que surgían espontáneamente de las luchas de masas, el medir cuidadosamente la disposición de los obreros Socialistas y anarquistas de participar en ellos, y el pasar a la acción tan pronto como hubiera indicios de que esto estaba ocurriendo. (Ver entre otras fuentes, su carta a la Oposición China del 8 de enero de 1931, su largo artículo “La Revolución en España” del 24 de enero de 1931, y su “Tareas de la Cuarta Internacional en España” del 12 de abril de 1936, los últimos dos artículos en *La Revolución Española*, Pathfinder Press, p. 67 y p. 211.) Únicamente después de que este proceso se haya echado a andar hay alguna esperanza de obligar a los dirigentes socialdemócratas o stalinistas a aceptar

lo inevitable (muy renuente). Nuestros camaradas portugueses han estado actuando exactamente de esta manera.

La forma más democrática de consejos obreros es aquella en que las masas en las fábricas y los barrios eligen libremente a sus delegados en vez de que sean nominados por partidos. Los partidos se encuentran presentes en los soviets únicamente como resultado de la alineación de los delegados electos libremente en fracciones políticas, grupos, etc. Un sistema de consejos en el cual los partidos deleguen representantes no electos por las masas y por encima de las masas es mucho menos democrático, porque tiende a congelar la relación inicial de fuerzas y, encima de eso, a falsificarla. La crítica de Trotsky a esta forma de componer los comités de milicias de la revolución Catalana en 1936-37 es bien conocida. (Ver su "El POUM y el Llamado a los Soviets," el 1 de octubre de 1937, *ibid.*, p. 298.)

Por supuesto, nos oponemos a la línea absurda del ultraizquierdista PRP-BR: "soviets sin partidos." Cuando se le arroja por la puerta, la política vuelve por la ventana; en la práctica, los "consejos sin partidos" conducen a un sistema unipartidista que promueve el desarrollo de la burocracia. Nosotros estamos por la plena libertad de afiliación y actividad política de todos los trabajadores y todos los miembros de los consejos. Estamos por un sistema multipartidista dentro de los consejos obreros. Pero estamos en contra de acuerdos tomados desde arriba entre burócratas, como sustituto de la libre elección de delegados por las masas de obreros, soldados, amas de casa, artesanos, y todos los trabajadores que estén dispuestos a participar en los consejos obreros que surjan.

Los verdaderos consejos obreros deben ser órganos de la más amplia unidad posible de todos los trabajadores. Sería criminal decirle a un grupo de trabajadores: no pueden participar en la construcción de los consejos obreros porque están afiliados al Partido Socialista. Pero no sabemos de nadie que haya mantenido una posición tan desastrosa y divisoria en Portugal actualmente. Por el contrario, se deben hacer los más grandes esfuerzos por envolver a todos niveles al mayor número de afiliados del Partido Socialista en el establecimiento de consejos, dándoles todas las garantías requeridas de funcionamiento democrático de estos órganos. Los intentos de atraer organizaciones locales y regionales del PS al trabajo de extensión y coordinación de los consejos, deberían ser multiplicados. Se debería hacer un llamado a los dirigentes nacionales del PS a participar en la organización de los consejos, y si se rehúsan, deberían ser desafiados en debate público a explicar las razones de su negativa. (Estos caballeros están todos a favor de la democracia y los debates, ¿no?) Lo mismo se aplica obviamente aún más especialmente al Partido Comunista, cuyas bases y cuadros medios están más inclinados a participar que los cuadros del PS, al menos en esta etapa.

Pero si todo ultimatismo con respecto al PS y al PC debe ser liquidado, con más razón debe ser rechazado con respecto a esos obreros de vanguardia que están organizados en varios grupos centristas, revolucionarios, o "ultraizquierdistas," cada uno con su retórica y confusión ideológica particular, pero cada uno con más afán de realmente erigir consejos que los militantes del PC y PS. Nosotros tenemos diferencias políticas irreconciliables con el PC y el PS; sin embargo, estamos listos a construir soviets con ellos, sin exigir que primero abandonen su fé en la democracia burguesa (PS) o en el sistema unipartidista, burocrático (PC). ¿No deberíamos estar prestos a construir soviets con los camaradas del PRP-BR, MES, LUAR, o UDP,⁴ sin primero exigirles que abandonen sus diversos credos—apoyo al MFA, "consejos sin partidos," "lucha armada," pensamiento Mao-Tse-tung, o lo que sea? Nos oponemos a la consigna, "Disolución de la Asamblea Constituyente" y estamos igualmente opuestos a la consigna, "Todo el poder a la Asamblea Constituyente." Pero sería

ultimatismo irresponsable el rehusarse a construir consejos obreros con personas que apoyen cualquiera de estas líneas incorrectas. El sectarismo hacia los "centristas y ultraizquierdistas" no es más justificado que el sectarismo hacia los oportunistas, especialmente cuando miles de obreros siguen a los "centristas y ultraizquierdistas."

Los consejos están surgiendo ahora en Portugal como resultado de y en el punto más álgido de tremendas luchas de masas. Son un producto genuino de estas luchas y son instrumentos indispensables para la extensión, generalización, y victoria final de estas luchas. Pero en un artículo publicado en *Intercontinental Press* (21 de julio de 1975) el camarada Foley, basándose en el texto del decreto del MFA sobre "poder popular" y admitiendo que "este esquema elaborado es improbable que sea alguna vez plenamente aplicado" (p. 1014), describe el llamado del MFA por estos comités como un intento de erigir un "sistema de dictadura militar totalitaria" que "recuerda a la estructura sindical semi-corporativista de Caetano." (p. 1014.)

Todos tienen el derecho de cometer errores. Pero hay errores que asumen proporciones tales que toman una nueva calidad. Tan sólo podemos decir que el camarada Foley ha completado el camino al método político de Healy-Lambert. De hecho, el definir a los "comités populares" propuestos por el MFA como corporativistas, tiene su origen en las enseñanzas de estos grandes Marxistas, quienes han aplicado creativamente la regla de los tres monos sabios y en consecuencia no oyen nada, no ven nada, y hablan disparates sin límites.

El corporativismo es una forma de dominación de tipo fascista surgido del aniquilamiento de cualquier forma de organización y actividad independiente de la clase obrera. Es el resultado de una derrota desastrosa de la clase obrera—en el caso de Portugal, una muy sangrienta derrota por cierto, podemos asegurar. Su imposición requiere de la destrucción física previa de los cuadros, organizaciones, locales y prensas de la clase obrera y la total desmoralización y subyugación de la clase obrera.

En Portugal actualmente el posible surgimiento de embrionicos consejos obreros ha sido expresado por el hecho de que las comisiones obreras han empezado a asumir tareas cuyo cumplimiento desborda el marco de las mismas fábricas. Si el ala "progresiva" del MFA inicia un patético intento de "coptar" este desarrollo dentro de sus propios planes, esto de ninguna manera modifica los orígenes o la dirección del desarrollo de estos consejos. Su surgimiento gradual no ha sido el resultado de una derrota, sino de un ascenso tremendo de la actividad de la clase obrera. Lejos de encontrarse desmoralizada, la confianza en sí misma y la actividad de la clase se incrementa a un ritmo raramente visto en Europa Occidental desde la segunda guerra mundial. Lejos de encontrarse aplastadas, las organizaciones de la clase obrera se multiplican, extienden, y diferencian en una sinfonía (y en ocasiones una cacofonía, pero ése es el precio que gustosamente pagamos por la democracia obrera) de libre intercambio de opiniones y libre debate. La opinión pública está dominada por la prensa y literatura de la clase obrera. El identificar *esta tendencia* con el totalitarismo, el ver una amenaza de corporativismo fascista en *estas* formas de organización, es el haber perdido completamente el quicio. Únicamente se le puede llamar una re-edición de la teoría stalinista (y Mao-stalinista) del social-fascismo, pues pasa por alto la diferencia fundamental entre una situación en la cual las organizaciones de la clase obrera existen y una situación en la cual no existen. Y en el caso de Portugal, la teoría tiene aún menos justificación que la que tuvo durante los tiempos de Stalin-Thaelmann, pues hay incomparablemente más democracia obrera y libertad en Portugal que la que había en Alemania durante el período final de la república de Weimar.

Se puede predecir con absoluta confianza que para que el "corporativismo," totalitarismo o fascismo vuelva a Portugal, todos los iniciadores de los actuales consejos obreros, y no pocos

4. Movimento de Esquerda Socialista. Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária. União Democrática do Povo.

de los "teóricos" del MFA que redactaron el decreto tan detestado por el camarada Foley, tendrían antes que ser fusilados. Ni el más mínimo rastro de cualquier "consejo popular" sobreviviría bajo una dictadura reaccionaria victoriosa. Si las cosas llegaran a eso, el camarada Foley se vería en dificultades para explicar cómo se las arregló para confundir las víctimas con los victimarios. Felizmente, todavía hay grandes esperanzas de que la resistencia contra cualquier regreso al fascismo será victoriosa, y que la historia salvará de esta manera al camarada Foley de este desagradable momento de ajuste de cuentas.

Sofistas particularmente listos pueden argumentar que el control obrero "aislado" en "un número limitado" de fábricas no representa aún un genuino poder dual y que los "fragmentados consejos populares," restringidos a algunos barrios o ramas de la industria, no son todavía verdaderos soviets. Esto es verdaderamente cierto. Nosotros no mantenemos que hay ya una situación de poder dual generalizado en Portugal. Lo que sí mantenemos es que tal situación está surgiendo gradualmente y que debemos luchar con todas nuestras fuerzas para extender y acelerar esa tendencia. Pero los sofistas se enredan fácilmente en su propia trampa. ¿Qué deben hacer los revolucionarios cuando son confrontados con "únicamente" casos "limitados" de control obrero en unas cincuenta o cien fábricas? ¿Aceptar la limitación? ¿Preferir que sean suprimidos por orden de la "Asamblea Constituyente soberana?" ¿O luchar por su extensión, generalización, coordinación, y centralización? Esa es seguramente la línea de Lenin y Trotsky. Y esa es la línea que la Cuarta Internacional mantiene actualmente en Portugal.

La solución a cada una de las cuestiones claves con que las masas de trabajadores portugueses son confrontados actualmente, requiere de la extensión y coordinación de organismos de auto-organización de las masas. Bajo condiciones de inflación galopante, sabotaje económico de la burguesía, cierre masivo de fábricas, fuga masiva de capitales, y la especulación con bienes materiales extendida ampliamente, es imposible luchar contra el desempleo, por la jornada de siete horas, o por la escala móvil de salarios a través de métodos "normales" de negociación sindical. El control obrero debe ser generalizado audazmente; la banca y empresas nacionalizadas deben ser centralizadas bajo control obrero; un monopolio estatal del comercio exterior debe ser establecido; un plan económico de los obreros para garantizar pleno empleo y satisfacer las necesidades de las masas debe ser redactado. Esto requiere de una red de comités en las fábricas, barrios, villas y puertos para revisar, verificar, y organizar. Y eso requiere de un sistema de consejos obreros.

La garantía contra la amenaza de un golpe fascista o una intervención imperialista sólo puede ser provista por el armamento masivo de los obreros y campesinos pobres, la unidad cerrada entre los obreros en sus fábricas y barrios y los soldados en los cuarteles, por un sistema de milicias obreras y comités de soldados integrado y un sistema de vigilancia dentro y fuera de los cuarteles. Esto también requiere de un sistema integrado de consejos obreros y de soldados.

La izquierda revolucionaria es actualmente todavía una pequeña minoría, aunque crece rápidamente. Las direcciones burocráticas del PC y PS todavía controlan a la mayoría de la clase obrera, aunque el prestigio de estas direcciones se erosiona y fragmenta cada vez más. Para sobreponer la presente división de la clase obrera es necesario establecer órganos dentro de los cuales los Socialistas, Comunistas, y revolucionarios puedan reunirse, discutir, desarrollar sus diferencias, y debatir frente a la clase entera, para que la clase entera pueda juzgar. ¿Qué mejor foro para el libre debate y la unidad de acción aceptada libremente que consejos obreros libre y democráticamente electos?

No podemos estar seguros que esta línea triunfará en Portugal. No sabemos de antemano cuando aparecerán los soviets generalizados. Para que esta tendencia llegue a ser victoriosa, no es suficiente simplemente tener una línea correcta. Es también

necesario que la relación de fuerzas entre las clases y entre la organización revolucionaria y los "dirigentes" reformistas en el seno de la clase sea tal que los revolucionarios puedan ganar la confianza de la mayoría del proletariado. No sabemos si habrá suficiente tiempo para alcanzar tal relación de fuerzas en Portugal. Pero sí sabemos esto: cualquiera que sea la cuestión alrededor de la cual el enfrentamiento decisivo se lleve a cabo, ya sea la defensa de las conquistas de la revolución contra los intentos de eliminarlos a través de una "estable" democracia burguesa reconstruida, ya sea la defensa de la clase obrera contra un intento de reinstalar una dictadura militar o fascista, ya sea una posibilidad abierta de la toma del poder por la clase obrera, o ya sea una combinación de tales cuestiones, no hay un camino a la victoria y ningún camino a la construcción de un partido revolucionario de masas en Portugal en la actualidad, que no sea el camino de trabajar incansablemente por una extensión, generalización, coordinación, y centralización de los consejos obreros democráticamente electos.

El camarada Foley parece no entender esto. En el número del 28 de julio de *Intercontinental Press* escribió que la manifestación del 16 de julio en Lisboa fue "una extravagante exhibición de fantasías ultraizquierdistas." Después de esa manifestación, concluye, "será difícil para cualquier comité obrero o de inquilinos ganar aceptación como un genuino organismo representativo que puede unir a los obreros y masas empobrecidas en la lucha." (p. 1063.) ¡Que increíble falta de perspectiva histórica y sentido de la proporción se expresa en estas palabras!

Los soviets rusos, para no mencionar a los consejos alemanes y los comités españoles, cometieron cientos de actos "ultraizquierdistas" y errores políticos, mucho más graves de los que se pudieron haber cometido en Lisboa el 16 de julio. Eso no previno su extensión y mucho menos el que "ganaran aceptación" como organismos "genuinamente representativos." Contrario a las predicciones del camarada Foley, el número de comités obreros y de inquilinos no cesará de crecer después del 16 de julio. Los intentos de coordinarlos y generalizarlos se incrementarán en número. La clase obrera portuguesa seguirá el camino de la auto-organización que ha sido seguido por todas las clases obreras durante revoluciones proletarias genuinas, a pesar de cualquier error que se cometa en el camino. Este ascenso sólo puede ser detenido por una aplastante y sangrienta derrota y no por algunas consignas equivocadas en una manifestación. De hecho, el mismo Mário Soares, quien está físicamente más cercano a la realidad del proceso revolucionario en Portugal que el camarada Foley y quien, sobre todo, está sujeto a la fuerte presión de su propia base, quienes después de todo están dispuestos a participar en la construcción de comités de poder obrero, expresó su disposición (después del 16 de julio) a aceptar a los comités obreros y de inquilinos, siempre y cuando se pudiera encontrar alguna forma de reconciliarlos con las instituciones parlamentarias burguesas. (Véase *Le Monde*, 29 de julio de 1975.) Por supuesto, "combinar" soviets con instituciones burguesas es la clásica vía del Menchevismo durante las revoluciones proletarias. Es triste decir, sin embargo, que el camarada Foley se encuentra a la vez menos lúcido y más a la derecha que Mário Soares en la cuestión del futuro de los consejos obreros portugueses.

Cuba y Portugal: El Paralelo y la Diferencia

Todas las revoluciones en el siglo veinte han dado lugar a desarrollos imprevistos. Nadie había oído nunca hablar de soviets antes de que fueran creados por la revolución rusa de 1905. (Las semejanzas con la Comuna de París sólo fueron descubiertas más tarde, después de mucha discusión y experiencia.) El control obrero fue un producto de la revolución de 1917. La revolución española de 1936 creó comités de milicias. Desde las grandes derrotas de los 1920s, 1930s, y 1940s (causadas por el reformismo y el stalinismo), formas no usuales de revoluciones proletarias han ocurrido—un resultado de la combinación de la inventiva de las

masas proletarias y de la insuficiencia del factor subjetivo, es decir, la ausencia de un nivel adecuado de conciencia de clase y de una dirección revolucionaria. Esto ha dado lugar a un nuevo fenómeno: *revoluciones sociales populares deformadas*, tales como las revoluciones yugoslava, china, vietnamita, y cubana.

Estas fueron revoluciones sociales populares en el doble sentido en que: 1. Trajeron millones de personas a la actividad política; es decir, fueron populares en el sentido en que Trotsky usó el término en sus Tesis sobre la Revolución Permanente; fueron revoluciones nacidas de la inmensa actividad de obreros y campesinos.⁵ 2. Condujeron a la destrucción del poder estatal burgués y al derrocamiento de las relaciones de propiedad capitalista; es decir, destruyeron el capitalismo como sistema económico y destruyeron el poder de la burguesía como clase dominante. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, fueron revoluciones *deformadas*, en un sentido triple: Primero, sus direcciones, ya sea por sus orígenes y educación stalinistas (Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam) o por su empiricismo y pragmatismo (Cuba), no estaban dispuestas o fueron incapaces de permitir el surgimiento de formas democráticas de auto-organización de los obreros y campesinos pobres. Segundo, desde el principio, los estados obreros que surgían estaban consecuentemente cualitativamente más burocráticamente deformados que el estado obrero ruso lo estuvo durante su etapa inicial. Tercero, como resultado de estas deformaciones, estas revoluciones fueron incapaces de actuar suficientemente (si no del todo) como estimulantes de la revolución internacional, a pesar del hecho de que era posible para ellas actuar de tal manera dentro de la situación mundial dada.

Nuestro movimiento no resolvió inmediata y exitosamente los problemas políticos y teóricos planteados por este giro imprevisto de la historia mundial, un giro que en último análisis fue el resultado de un ascenso meramente parcial de la revolución mundial después de dos décadas de derrotas aplastantes y la combinación de ese ascenso limitado con los efectos programáticos, políticos y desmoralizantes a largo plazo de esas derrotas, esto es, la hegemonía temporal del stalinismo y el reformismo en el seno del movimiento obrero internacional. Nuestro movimiento tuvo que pasar por una crisis antes de que fuera capaz de encontrar las respuestas correctas a los problemas planteados por éste giro imprevisto.

Aquéllos que no pudieron encontrar las respuestas correctas y pensaron que era un pecado mortal el reconocer una revolución social si ocurría de una manera imprevista, maniobraron hasta caer en contradicciones teóricas e ideológicas imposibles y en sectarismo y aislamiento político irremediable. El grupo Lutte Ouvrière en Francia ha decidido que si bien Rusia es un estado obrero, las "democracias populares" de Europa Oriental son estados burgueses, aún si sus estructuras sociales, sistemas económicos y poder estatal son idénticos a los de la URSS. Los grupúsculos de Healy-Lambert argumentan que China es un estado obrero pero que Cuba aún es un estado burgués, aún cuando las relaciones de propiedad burguesas fueron eliminadas mucho más radicalmente en Cuba de lo que lo fueron en China. (esto implica también una contradicción adicional: si tan sólo los dirigentes del Movimiento 26 de julio hubiesen ingresado al Partido Comunista cubano antes de derrocar a Batista, Cuba podría ser reconocida como estado obrero; el único problema es que en ese caso nunca hubiesen derrocado a Batista.)

En la mayoría de los casos, la raíz de esta bancarrota teórica es el temor a sucumbir a la tentación, la cual es la característica común de los sectarios, como Trotsky correctamente lo señalara.

5. En ese sentido, toda revolución social no es necesariamente una revolución popular. En Europa Oriental, las relaciones de propiedad capitalistas y el poder de estado burgués fueron derrocados sin revoluciones populares, esencialmente a través de acciones burocrático-militares de la burocracia soviética, en algunos casos con limitadas movilizaciones de masas que no pueden de ninguna manera ser consideradas verdaderos levantamientos populares de masas.

Todos estos sectarios de alguna manera se las arreglaron para convencerse a sí mismos que si uno "admite" que Tito, Mao, Ho Chi Minh y Castro pudieron derrocar al capitalismo bajo circunstancias excepcionales y dirigir exitosamente revoluciones deformadas, uno debe "lógicamente" admitir que otras figuras de tipo similar pueden ser capaces de repetir tales hazañas en cualquier lugar y momento; el rol o utilidad futuro de la Cuarta Internacional quedaría "consecuentemente" "liquidado."

Por ya un cuarto de siglo hemos intentado en vano convencer a estos sectarios que tal conclusión de ninguna manera sigue a la premisa, que innumerables situaciones revolucionarias desde 1945 han sido traicionadas por las direcciones burocráticas tradicionales, que el balance del stalinismo a escala mundial es claramente contrarrevolucionario, que Tito, Mao, y Ho fueron capaces de conducir sus revoluciones deformadas a la victoria, únicamente rompiendo con los teoremas estratégicos y tácticos claves del stalinismo (e incidentalmente rompiendo con la subordinación de sus partidos y de sus revoluciones a los intereses de la burocracia soviética), y que la realidad de una revolución social es un fenómeno objetivo que debe ser analizado objetivamente y sin subordinar la disposición a adoptar tal o cual definición, a las "conclusiones" lunáticas que supuestamente "fluyen necesariamente" del análisis. (Podemos señalar de paso que ésta es la escuela de los burócratas reformistas y stalinistas que subordinan el método Marxista de análisis como instrumento del conocimiento científico a las "necesidades de la organización," lo cual en la realidad significa las necesidades de la burocracia, transformando así al Marxismo en sirviente de los pequeños o grandes burócratas.)

Una y otra vez hemos insistido en que los casos de Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, y Cuba permanecerían como casos excepcionales, que el desvío de la revolución mundial a través del fenómeno de revoluciones deformadas sería temporal, que a medida que la crisis del sistema imperialista mundial continuara profundizándose y la correlación de fuerzas a escala mundial continuara desplazándose contra la burguesía, era sólo cuestión de tiempo para que la revolución mundial tocara de nuevo a los países imperialistas, y que mientras más ocurriera esto, más y más jugaría el proletariado industrial el papel dirigente en el proceso revolucionario, ambos en los países imperialistas y en un número creciente de países semi-coloniales, y más y más volvería el proceso revolucionario mundial a su modelo "clásico": el modelo de la auto-organización de las masas trabajadoras, el modelo de la democracia soviética. Hemos, además, insistido en que estas revoluciones "no-deformadas" podrían triunfar sólo bajo una dirección Marxista revolucionaria, a través del surgimiento de genuinos partidos revolucionarios de masas de la clase obrera. Los sectarios no fueron convencidos por este argumento. No es sorprendente, pues la gente que no puede ser convencida por poderosas revoluciones no es probable que sea persuadida por ningún argumento, por válido que sea.

Nuestro movimiento formuló este tipo de análisis y predicción casi unánimemente—en el Congreso de Reunificación de 1963, después del gran llamado a la acción de mayo de 1968 en Francia y en el Noveno Congreso Mundial de la Cuarta Internacional en 1969. Aún cuando hubo una aguda lucha de tendencias en el Décimo Congreso Mundial (1974), las resoluciones políticas de la mayoría y la minoría compartían las conclusiones mencionadas arriba.

La revolución portuguesa es la primera revolución que estalla después del Décimo Congreso Mundial, la primera que nos confronta con la necesidad de verificar nuestros análisis y predicciones a largo plazo acerca del modelo probable de la revolución mundial. Y es aquí donde debe ser ubicada la motivación probable de los errores del camarada Foley, una motivación que comparte con el camarada Hansen: el miedo a que el reconocer que un proceso revolucionario genuino está tomando lugar en Portugal implique de alguna manera el reconocer la

capacidad de "oficiales pequeño-burgueses" (u "oficiales burgueses reaccionarios") de ser mágicamente transformados por el Partido Comunista en "instrumentos de la revolución proletaria," "justificando" así las maniobras colaboracionistas de clase llevadas a cabo por los partidos Comunistas stalinistas alrededor del mundo.

Esta motivación conduce a un método que es idéntico al método de Healy-Lambert para examinar giros imprevistos de los eventos objetivos. Es un método que es ajeno al Marxismo y que únicamente puede conducir a resultados desastrosos. Tal método es más injustificado, siendo que la revolución portuguesa en realidad confirma notablemente las predicciones de los documentos del Noveno y Décimo Congresos Mundiales y las tesis del Congreso de Reunificación, a saber, que el estallido de una revolución proletaria en un país imperialista implicaría el retorno al modelo clásico, al modelo de soviets y democracia obrera.

Pero la revolución portuguesa confirma que toda y cada una de las revoluciones proletarias tiene alguna peculiaridad, algún rasgo específico que debe ser entendido pero que no debe permitir que el análisis sea desviado de las tendencias y cuestiones fundamentales.

La revolución cubana empezó con la destrucción del aparato de estado y el ejército a través de la guerra de guerrillas dirigida por el Movimiento 26 de julio. Esta destrucción no garantizaba el resultado de la revolución. Esfuerzos tenaces fueron llevados a cabo (especialmente por el ala derecha del Movimiento 26 de Julio) para *reconstruir* un ejército y aparato de estado burgués después de la caída de Batista. Pero esta destrucción, combinada con las enormes movilizaciones de masas y las decisiones conscientes de la dirección de Castro, abrió el camino para la rápida victoria de la revolución, una vez que la reconstrucción del ejército y aparato de estado burgués había sido detenida. Ese es uno de los factores claves que explica por qué un estado obrero fue creado en Cuba sin la formación previa de un partido Marxista revolucionario de masas.

La revolución portuguesa se inició también de una manera peculiar. Su desarrollo ha sido marcado por una serie de factores:

Primero, el debilitamiento del imperialismo portugués por la lucha de los movimientos de liberación nacional en Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, y Angola; segundo, el intento de un sector del capital financiero portugués y algunos de los principales jefes del ejército bajo Spínola y Costa Gomes de utilizar la necesidad obvia de terminar las guerras coloniales y la necesidad de cambiar de una dominación directa a una indirecta en las antiguas colonias, como base a partir de la cual modernizar y renovar cabalmente la sociedad burguesa portuguesa y la economía capitalista portuguesa, remplazando la dictadura de Caetano con un "estado fuerte" bajo Spínola, permitiendo fragmentos limitados de democracia burguesa (no muy diferente del modelo del régimen de de Gaulle en Francia); tercero, el fracaso de la burguesía portuguesa en llevar a cabo el proyecto Spínolista de un "estado fuerte" debido a la irrupción violenta y cada vez más extendida de masas cada vez más amplias, en la escena política; cuarto, la creciente división del cuerpo de oficiales, como resultado de la combinación de todos los factores anteriormente mencionados, y una creciente polarización del ejército entero; quinto, la creciente conciencia política y actividad independiente de los soldados, lo cual introduce un elemento de desintegración en el ejército, es decir, una negativa de los soldados a obedecer órdenes que consideren políticamente inaceptables, un descenso en la disciplina e inclusive intentos de alterar la estructura jerárquica del ejército.

Todos estos factores han venido a actuar gradualmente, no todos a la vez. La manera en que se desarrollaron tomó a muchos por sorpresa, empezando con la burguesía portuguesa, y terminando con no pocos Trotskistas. Pero no hay nada "revisionista" en este análisis. Ni hay nada "liquidacionista" en las conclusiones que fluyen de él. El hecho de que una revolución proletaria es

inmensamente acelerada por el fenómeno de división, desintegración, o parálisis temporal dentro del ejército burgués es, después de todo, un principio elemental del Marxismo.

La obsesión del camarada Foley con el "socavar cualquier fé en al MFA burgués" (una obsesión que comparte con Healy, Lambert y gente de su tipo) es una típica revocación sectaria de un error oportunista; está basada en el miedo de que uno pueda estar a punto de sucumbir a la tentación. El análisis del camarada Foley comparte un rasgo esencial con el análisis de los seguidistas centristas y oportunistas que van a la cola de la dirección del MFA: la suposición de que todo lo que está sucediendo en Portugal actualmente depende esencial, si no completamente, del papel, función, intenciones, y acciones del MFA.

Nosotros rechazamos categóricamente este método. Mantenemos que lo que sucede en Portugal actualmente es fundamentalmente una creciente confrontación entre el impetuoso movimiento de masas del proletariado y el campesinado pobre, por un lado, y todas esas fuerzas que quieren mantener y estabilizar la economía capitalista y el estado burgués por el otro lado. Mantenemos que las crecientes divisiones en el ejército, el cuerpo de oficiales, y el mismo MFA son simples reflexiones de esta creciente polarización de fuerzas de clase, y no son de ninguna manera los resultados de los planes y maniobras diabólicos del MFA. Por lo tanto, concluimos que el problema clave es crear órganos de poder obrero y obligar a todas las fuerzas políticas a tomar posiciones sobre esa cuestión, en vez de proceder a dividir a Portugal en aquéllos que "tienen ilusiones en el MFA" y aquéllos que no las tienen.

El caso de los "comités populares" provee un buen ejemplo de las diferencias entre los dos métodos. Si uno ve a un plan (en papel) llamando a la presencia de un comandante militar en cada consejo distrital, partiendo del punto arbitrario y mistificante de que estamos encarando a una poderosa junta militar que está completamente en control de la situación y resuelta a establecer un "estado corporativista," entonces tal plan se convierte en un "presagio siniestro." Si, por el otro lado, uno ve la realidad de un MFA dividido y crecientemente paralizado, tambaleándose de crisis en crisis, e incapaz de mantener cualquier posición independiente entre las cada vez más polarizadas fuerzas del capital y del trabajo, entonces uno ve el plan como un patético intento de un ala del MFA de cooptar y manipular las iniciativas radicales de la clase obrera, iniciativas que han sido tomadas independientemente del MFA. Uno además ve que tales intentos de cooptación están destinados al fracaso, mientras que el movimiento de masas se mantenga en un alza. En vez de responder al decreto sobre "poder popular" del MFA con el pregón increíblemente sectario y de tipo social-fascista de "corporativismo," uno debería en su lugar responder: Que ese "comandante del ejército" no sea nominado sino que sea electo libremente por todos los soldados y oficiales del distrito, sobre la base de "un hombre, un voto." De hecho esto es exactamente lo que sucedió en la primera asamblea popular local que se reunió en Portugal—el 13 de julio en el poblado de Pontinha. Es cierto que la asamblea se reunió en el cuartel local. Pero estaba compuesta de delegados electos democráticamente provenientes de quince comisiones obreras locales y veinticuatro comisiones de inquilinos. Había también un representante de la unidad local del ejército. Pero sucede que no era el nominado jerárquico del estado mayor general, sino un hombre electo por la asamblea general de soldados y oficiales después de una reunión masiva y una discusión extensa. Preguntamos: ¿es eso un soviét o es un órgano de un estado "corporativista" de tipo fascista? Y si uno quiere negar el carácter soviético "puro" de esta asamblea (y nosotros estaríamos interesados en saber por qué razones), sigue planteada la pregunta: ¿es esa asamblea popular local parecida a un órgano de tipo soviético, o es parecida a un órgano de un estado corporativista o fascista?

Al camarada Foley hay que recordarle que durante la primera

fase de la revolución de febrero en Rusia muchos comandantes del ejército fueron invitados deliberadamente a los soviets de la provincia, y los representantes del ejército tuvieron una "posición privilegiada" ahí. (Ver *La Historia de la Revolución Rusa* de Trotsky, Volumen I, el capítulo titulado, "El Comité Ejecutivo.") Este no fue un desarrollo positivo, pero no por eso se iba a negar el carácter de los soviets.

No llamamos a los trabajadores portugueses a que tengan la más mínima confianza en el MFA. Todo lo contrario. Les decimos que tengan confianza *sólo* en su propia fuerza de clase. Pero tampoco les decimos que den la espalda a las nacionalizaciones, el control obrero, o los consejos obreros simplemente porque algunos oficiales también hablan de estas metas. Tampoco colgamos un letrero diciendo "Revolución proletaria: Estrictamente prohibida la entrada a trabajadores que no son de fábrica," especialmente en vista de que, la contrarrevolución misma clasifica a algunos de los oficiales revolucionarios (por ejemplo, aquéllos que han empezado a armar y entrenar a los trabajadores) como sus enemigos mortales junto con los trabajadores revolucionarios, como lo indica la anteriormente mencionada cita de *Financial Times*. El carácter exacto de los consejos obreros portugueses (aunque se autodenominen "comités populares," o "comités de poder popular" o lo que sea) dependerá de la actividad, la fuerza y la conciencia de la clase obrera y su vanguardia, y no de los planes, intenciones o maniobras de algún grupo de oficiales. Este es y seguirá siendo nuestro método básico.

En otras palabras: Nosotros creemos que existe alguna semejanza entre la revolución cubana y la portuguesa; pero también hay diferencias significativas. La semejanza es que el debilitamiento del ejército burgués en Portugal, como su destrucción en Cuba, ayuda considerablemente al proceso revolucionario. Las diferencias son que Portugal es un país imperialista, no un país semicolonial; que el desarraigo del poder político y social de la burguesía es mucho más difícil como consecuencia; que el peso del proletariado industrial es mucho mayor; que el ejército no ha sido completamente destruido, sino sólo dividido y *parcialmente* (y *temporalmente*) paralizado. Por lo tanto, es mucho más probable que la revolución portuguesa siga el modelo *clásico* y que triunfe sólo con la conquista del poder por un proletariado organizado en soviets y dirigido por Marxistas revolucionarios y de ninguna manera por los dirigentes del MFA.

Hablar de una creciente polarización de la sociedad y una

creciente división del ejército, alrededor de esta polarización, es implicar que algunos de los oficiales probablemente se alinearán con el proletariado durante la prueba de fuerza final. Otros oficiales no lo harán. Es inútil especular cuántos irán en esta u otra dirección, porque no es el problema actual. *El problema actual es el de asegurar un máximo de auto-organización democrática y autónoma y de auto-defensa del proletariado para esa prueba de fuerza.* Las actitudes de una u otra parte del cuerpo de oficiales serán los derivados de la alineación de las fuerzas sociales básicas, como ha sido el caso desde fines de 1974; estas actitudes no serán de ninguna manera la principal fuerza motriz.

Sólo si el camarada Foley regresa al *método* usado por los Marxistas para juzgar todas las revoluciones de los siglos diecinueve y veinte—o sea, el método que comienza con una definición de las fuerzas de clase antagónicas básicas—podrá desembarazarse de las posiciones absurdas en que se ha metido. De lo contrario, compartirá el triste destino de Healy, Lambert y otros sectarios durante los últimos veinte años: No logrará entender una revolución cuando se vea confrontado con ella.

Las Tareas Necesarias de Solidaridad con la Revolución Portuguesa

Cuando decimos que ha comenzado un proceso de polarización de las fuerzas de clase básicas en Portugal, nosotros implicamos que habrá una sucesión de convulsiones violentas y confrontaciones violentas, incluyendo confrontaciones armadas, entre fuerzas de clase antagónicas. Adoptar una posición correcta en estas confrontaciones es una cuestión de vida o muerte para los revolucionarios. Es por eso que los errores del camarada Foley no son puramente teóricos. Podrían llevar a la abstención desastrosa durante una etapa clave de la lucha de clases en Portugal.

Durante el enfrentamiento del 11 de marzo de 1975, nuestros camaradas de la LCI lucharon en las primeras filas de las barricadas contra el golpe contrarrevolucionario Spínolista. Ganaron un prestigio considerable con sus iniciativas valientes y sus intervenciones. Tanto que los burócratas del PC fueron obligados a permitir a sus dirigentes hablar a la gran multitud (unas 60,000 personas) reunida en Oporto esa tarde para condenar al golpe. Suponemos que los camaradas Foley y Hansen no critican semejante comportamiento.

En el número del 28 de julio de *Intercontinental Press* el camarada Foley pinta al General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho como un "posible" "general sobre un caballo blanco," o sea, un posible

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Bonaparte emergiendo de la lucha de clases en Portugal. (p. 1063.) No tenemos ningún interés en especular sobre las intenciones secretas o sobre el carácter básico de este u otro oficial individual. Sólo podemos juzgar tendencias políticas y de clase. Cuando decimos que el grupo de Costa Gomes y de Melo Antunes obviamente constituye el ala derecha del MFA, no es por sus intenciones secretas, sino por su defensa pública de un programa para parar la revolución, la cual supuestamente ha "ido muy lejos."

La verdadera situación en Portugal no es una de dictadura bonapartista, sino al contrario, una de casi ilimitada libertad de acción de la clase obrera, a pesar de las intenciones secretas de la junta. Para instalar una verdadera dictadura bonapartista será necesario primero aplastar las existentes libertades de la clase obrera. Sigue lógicamente que una tarea clave de los revolucionarios, no sólo en Portugal, sino en los demás países de Europa y en Norte América, debería de ser la de advertir a los trabajadores contra ese verdadero peligro y llamarlos a armarse y organizarse. Si en vez de esto, uno empieza especulando sobre quién será el más probable Bonaparte, y si entonces uno procede a identificar este futuro Bonaparte con alguna figura en un gobierno bajo el cual todas las libertades de la clase obrera permanecen esencialmente intactas uno corre el riesgo de desviar completamente a los trabajadores con respecto a la cuestión de contra quién tendrán que dirigir sus primeros golpes.

La situación actual en Portugal tiene muchas semejanzas con la situación en Rusia bajo Kerensky. (Obviamente, también hay muchas diferencias. Las más grandes son que en Portugal los soviets son sólo incipientes y no todavía generalizados, y que no hay un fuerte partido Bolchevique.) Lenin y Trotsky sospecharon a Kerensky de no pocas "intenciones bonapartistas" y las denunciaron. Pero los Bolcheviques nunca concentraron sus acusaciones sobre el supuesto deseo de Kerensky de llegar a ser dictador. Si lo hubieran hecho, hubiera habido gran confusión cuando fue Kornilov el que en efecto golpeó. El camarada Foley no tiene ninguna manera de saber quién golpeará ni en qué momento ni en qué forma para establecer una dictadura bonapartista burguesa en Portugal. Es, por decir poco, prematuro decidir que será Carvalho. Si resulta ser Spínola, o la legión portuguesa reunida en España junto con los mercenarios imperialistas, o Costa Gomes, o una combinación de los tres, el camarada Foley tendrá que luchar en el mismo campo que los oficiales del Copcon contra los verdaderos asesinos bonapartistas, como lo hicimos todos el 11 de marzo. ¿O acaso cree que esto fue un error y que uno debe de permanecer neutral entre el campo de Kerensky y el campo de Kornilov?

Hemos tenido una discusión bastante acalorada en la Cuarta Internacional acerca de lo que significa la fórmula "luchar en el campo de Kerensky contra el campo de Kornilov." Nosotros creemos que significa no sólo independencia política de Kerensky, sino también que no se debe de dar ningún apoyo político a Kerensky y que no debe de haber ninguna promesa de defender la "continuidad" de su gobierno, aunque el gobierno haya sido elegido o no por la mayoría del pueblo. Pero obviamente sí significa luchar en el mismo campo. Nosotros determinamos la naturaleza de la lucha no por la naturaleza de las direcciones políticas en los dos campos, ni por consideraciones abstractas acerca de la supuesta "superioridad" de una forma de dominio político sobre la otra, sino por el diferente carácter de clase de los combatientes.

Para nosotros, la embrionaria guerra civil en Rusia entre los campos de Kerensky y Kornilov y la plena guerra civil en España no fueron guerras de la democracia burguesa contra el fascismo o el bonapartismo, sino guerras entre la masa del proletariado y el grueso de la burguesía, aún si el proletariado fuera dirigido todavía (o mejor dicho, despistado) por los reformistas, colaboracionistas de clase, y políticos burgueses individuales que no representan a nadie más que a ellos mismos. Para liberar al proletariado de estos dirigentes traicioneros, fue necesario que los

revolucionarios lucharan en su campo. Cualquier posición abstencionista entregaría a los trabajadores al campo de los desviadores reformistas, haciendo, así, inevitable la victoria de la reacción.

Si, como el camarada Foley ha leído en las estrellas, el General Carvalho vierte al ejército portugués contra las organizaciones de la clase obrera e inicia un golpe para destrozar estas organizaciones y todos los logros de los pasados dieciocho meses, entonces lucharemos lado a lado con los trabajadores portugueses (y no pocos soldados) en las barricadas contra él. Pero si el futuro Bonaparte tiene otro nombre que el que el camarada Foley estimó conveniente darle, y si, como el 11 de marzo de 1975, Carvalho y Gonçalves luchan del mismo lado que los trabajadores portugueses contra la amenaza fascista, ¿estará preparado el camarada Foley para luchar junto con el Kerensky portugués contra el Kornilov portugués? El hecho de que el camarada Foley no dice una sola palabra sobre este posible acontecimiento es una mala señal, especialmente debido a que la pregunta no es una pregunta académica, sino una que está en los labios de todos los Portugueses actualmente.

La Cuarta Internacional y los Trotskistas americanos tienen una ardiente tarea de solidaridad con la revolución portuguesa. Actualmente esa revolución está siendo calumniada a través de la prensa burguesa mundial. La campaña de odio contra la "dictadura Comunista en Portugal" tiene una clara función que realizar: preparar la opinión pública en el Occidente para una intervención imperialista contra la revolución.

Después del gran éxito de la revolución vietnamita y el movimiento antibélico en los Estados Unidos e internacionalmente, y después de la consiguiente derrota del imperialismo en Indochina, no creemos que el imperialismo sea capaz de mandar cientos de miles de soldados para una guerra contrarrevolucionaria de intervención en gran escala contra la revolución portuguesa. Sin embargo, sí es capaz de armar y subvencionar a la reacción portuguesa y la contrarrevolución. Es capaz de organizar la agresión por una "legión extranjera" en apoyo a la legión portuguesa y otros fascistas nativos. Es capaz de usar las bases de la OTAN y las bases de los EEUU en España para ayudar al golpe contrarrevolucionario. Y es especialmente capaz de usar armas económicas y financieras para estrangular la revolución, para debilitar, desmoralizar, y hacer morir de hambre a las masas, y ayudar, envalentonar y reorganizar a la burguesía.

Intercontinental Press cumpliría una función útil si pudiera atraer más atención sistemática a los peligros y advertir a los revolucionarios en los Estados Unidos y a través del mundo acerca de cómo oponerse a ellos, en vez de dedicar grandes cantidades de espacio a las fantasías del camarada Foley. Por cierto, para ayudar a una revolución es necesario hacer un análisis correcto de ella. Un debate abierto y franco acerca de la naturaleza y las perspectivas de la revolución y los problemas y peligros que encara es parte de esa ayuda. Pero es sólo una parte. Uno de los resultados más graves del análisis incorrecto de los camaradas Foley y Hansen acerca de lo que ocurre en Portugal es que ha desviado la atención de la ardiente necesidad de organizar un movimiento de solidaridad con la revolución portuguesa. ¡Fin al bloqueo a Portugal! ¡Fuera de Portugal! ¡Que los trabajadores portugueses hablen por sí mismos! ¡Invitar a delegaciones de trabajadores portugueses a dirigirse a reuniones de trabajadores y de los sindicatos a través del mundo Occidental! Estas deberían de ser las principales consignas de esa campaña hoy en día, una campaña que debería de ser organizada en la base más amplia de frente único, nacional e internacionalmente. Estas consignas preparan la opinión de la clase obrera para tareas más precisas cuando llegue la prueba de fuerza decisiva.

Esperamos sinceramente que *Intercontinental Press* extienda esa campaña necesaria de solidaridad con la revolución portuguesa, aún antes de corregir su análisis incorrecto del proceso revolucionario que se desenvuelve en ese país.

10 de agosto de 1975

Fourteen Trotskyists Tortured in Uruguay

[The following article appeared in the September 11 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

A very severe repression against worker and revolutionary militants is raging in Uruguay, creating an extremely difficult situation for the clandestine organizations.

On March 23, seven militants of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Uruguay) [PST(U)—Socialist Workers party (Uruguay)], sympathizing organization of the Fourth International, were arrested by the "Fuerzas Conjuntas"¹ during a search operation. The following week, seven more militants were arrested. New searches and arrests are still going on.

The fourteen arrested comrades were held for two months in the barracks of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment and were then transferred to the barracks of the Fifth Cavalry Regiment. The FF.CC. utilized physical and psychological torture, "scientific torture" under medical control, in an attempt to wring statements out of the arrested comrades that would enable the police to diagram certain organizations and arrest other militants.

Through the same methods the police tried to force the prisoners to sign confessions declaring themselves advocates of the principles and actions of guerrilla organizations.

The torture was intensive during the first three weeks; it was conducted not only on a daily basis, but several times a day. Throughout these three weeks, the prisoners were kept hooded and handcuffed, even when they were allowed to sleep. Their hands were untied and the hoods were partially removed only when they ate or went to the toilet (twice a day).

For twenty days the lives of these comrades were in danger: There were electric shocks, the "baths,"² blows from special rubber clubs, death threats, and threats of rape against women comrades.

On June 9 the military court pronounced sentence: Twelve of the militants were



Uruguayan President Bordaberry: Orders "scientific" torture of political prisoners.

sentenced to terms of two-to-six years in prison. Ten of the comrades sentenced were accused of "conspiracy and attacks on the Constitution"; the two others were accused of "attacks on the Constitution and conspiracy followed by preparatory acts," one being accused of founding a nucleus of the Juventud Socialista de Avanzada (Vanguard Socialist Youth), the other of being a leading member of the PST(U). Three days later another of the accused, a minor, was released. One militant remains in prison without having been tried.

After three months of total isolation, during which they were denied the right to write or to be visited by their families, the prisoners were authorized to receive limited (censored) correspondence from their immediate families. They are now serving out their terms in an old railroad car, separated by sex, awaiting their final transfer to one of the barracks or prisons in which the 7,000 political prisoners of the regime are held.

In the meantime, sixteen other militants have been cited by the military court, which means that a warrant has been issued ordering that they be brought before the court.

In this situation, the most difficult that

PST(U) Political Prisoners

Following is a list of the prisoners, as reported in the May 29, 1975, *El País*:

Carlos Raúl Astellano del Río, 29, teacher.

Fernando Alfredo Souto Souto, 25, employee.

María Liliana Caviglia de Soto, 19, student.

Freddy Sixto Cabrera Dos Santos, 19, employee at Plastela S.A.

Ricardo Francisco García Demonte, 19, student.

Ramón Suárez Trelles, 19, employee at Cambio Bafa.

Luis Alberto Villarrubia Mesones, 31, student.

Aldo Bruno Gili Baptista, 19, employee.

Hugo Javier Martínez Baez, 19, employee at the Anglo-Uruguayan Institute.

Walter Roberto Longo Porcile, 19, student.

Rubén Schubert Coronel Clavijo, 19, employee at Fábrica de Ladrillos Morris.

Julio César Vuolo Castro, 19, employee.

María Cristina Araújo López, 20, employee at a shirt factory.

María de los Angeles Barboza Peña, 21, teacher.

has confronted worker militants under the dictatorial regime established in the country in June 1973, we call on all democrats and revolutionaries throughout the world to initiate powerful solidarity actions.

The persecution of militants and the dangers faced by the thirteen militants presently in the hands of the military must be denounced. These denunciations must be conveyed by letters and telegrams to the Uruguayan embassies in all countries, demanding that the rights of the prisoners be respected, that the torture be stopped, that humane conditions of detention be established, that the prisoners be allowed visiting rights and free correspondence, that they be granted medical care and daily exercise as well as the right to receive and read all the press that legally circulates in the country and the right to carry on any manual or intellectual activities that they desire.

Democratic organizations throughout the world, the mass movement, all the committees set up to defend democratic rights and the rights of man, trade unions, intellectuals, and student organizations must exert pressure on the Uruguayan government for the defense of political prisoners. □

1. The "Fuerzas Conjuntas" (FF.CC.—Joint Forces) is the name of the body that coordinates the three military branches and the police.

2. "The baths" are a form of torture that consists of plunging the prisoner into water or excrement, threatening suffocation.

Manifesto of the Front for Revolutionary Unity



Eduard o Tomé/Diário de Notícias

September 10 news conference in Lisbon announcing the formation of the Front for Revolutionary Unity. Representatives of the six constituent groups are (from left): Ezequiel Vicente (MDP-CDE), Francisco Vale (LCI), Pedro Goulart (PRP-BR), Afonso Barros (MES), Fernando Marques (LUAR), and Rui Carneiro (FSP).

[On August 25, eight Portuguese parties of the left, including the Communist party, formed the Frente Unitária Popular (People's United Front), also referred to as the "August 25 Platform." The agreement was based on a common program (for the text, see *Intercontinental Press*, September 15, p. 1206).

[Three days later, after CP General Secretary Alvaro Cunhal proposed a summit meeting of all the main political forces, including both his party and the Socialist party led by Mário Soares, the majority of the component groups in this bloc expressed opposition to continued membership by the CP until it had clarified its attitude toward the "Social Democracy," represented in Portugal by the leadership of the Socialist party.

[Although the CP had constituted the major force in the front, the other groups decided to maintain the bloc. The Communist party's petty-bourgeois satellite, the Movimento Democrático Português (MDP—Portuguese Democratic Movement), chose to remain in the front as well, insisting that the way be kept open for renewed cooperation with Cunhal's party.

[On September 11, the CP-dominated Lisbon morning paper *Diário de Notícias*

reported a news conference given the previous day by this bloc, now called the Frente de Unidade Revolucionária (FUR—Front for Revolutionary Unity). Along with this story, it published the manifesto of the FUR.

[At the news conference, the MDP was represented by Ezequiel Vicente; the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League, the Portuguese sympathizing group of the Fourth International), by Francisco Vale; the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias (PRP-BR—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades), by Pedro Goulart; the Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left), by Afonso Barros; the Liga de União de Acção Revolucionária (LUAR—League for Revolutionary Unity and Action), by Fernando Marques; and the Frente Socialista Popular (FSP—Socialist People's Front), by Rui Carneiro.

[There was no mention of the First of May group, which had been one of the components of the August 25 Platform.

[The representatives who spoke at the news conference said applications for membership in the FUR by individuals and

groups should be directed to the offices of the component parties, until secretariats of the front itself could be formed.

[The manifesto of the FUR is given below. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Through the [April 25, 1975] elections and up to the latest events, we have seen the unfolding since March 11 of a reactionary bourgeois offensive aimed at bringing the [revolutionary] process in the country under control and wiping out the gains made by the working class and the toiling masses.

The following have been the fundamental features of this offensive, which has had, and increasingly will have, the active support of imperialism, either directly or through economic and military blackmail: The imposition of bourgeois elections and the resulting vote for the Social Democracy; the successive crises of the political-military power; the exploitation of the social situation existing in the Center and North of the country; the actions unleashed by the church hierarchy; the presentation of the Document of the Nine; the reactionary exploitation of the problem of the returnees from Angola; and the rightist maneuvers in the military assemblies.

Since it is impossible in reality to establish a stable system of bourgeois rule in Portugal through "democratic" forms, it is understandable why this Social Democratic offensive objectively helped the fascist right to reorganize itself and regain positions. In this context, the Social Democratic "solution" for the present crisis will inevitably lead to a fascist coup.

The working class, the toilers, and the progressive and revolutionary forces, both civilian and military, thus find themselves facing an all-out bourgeois offensive that can be defeated only by a firm and massive counterattack.

The following are the main aspects of this reactionary escalation:

In the Military Field

The advance of the rightist contingents within the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement] aimed at dissolving the movement in the general framework of the armed forces, which have the same structure today that they had on April 24, 1974 [i.e., the day before the coup that overthrew the Salazarist regime].

The downgrading of the ADUs [Assembleias de Delegados de Unidade—Unit Delegate Assemblies] and the GDUs [Grupos Dinamizadores da Unidade—Unit Political Education Groups] aimed at dissolving these bodies and reestablishing a hierarchical chain of command controlled by reactionary officers.

Dissolution or neutralization of those

bodies that tried to defend the interests of the laboring classes. An example of this is the dissolution of the Fifth Division of the General Staff, whose activity, despite some errors, was positive on the whole, a fact that has been systematically covered up.

Isolation and even, in some cases, purges of progressive and revolutionary members of the armed forces, aimed at annihilating the military component of the revolutionary forces that are ready now to oppose the advance of the right.

Preparation for the reactionary military coup that will be unleashed when the institutional offensive has achieved its objectives.

The so-called Nine and their collaborators, regardless of their cohesion or lack of it, have functioned as a pole of regroupment for the entire right (both fascist and Social Democrat), thereby creating a base for the reactionary political-military offensive.

In the Civilian Field

The political offensive of the Social Democracy, seeking to restore the coalition among the PPD [Partido Popular Democrático—Democratic People's party, the main bourgeois party], the SP, and the CP on the basis of the bourgeois election results.

Exploiting the justified discontent of sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry in order to mobilize these strata against the advance of the revolutionary process.

The attempt to polarize these sections of the population around the military units under the reactionary Central and Northern Regional Commands.

The opening up of room for intervention by the terrorist forces of the ELP [Exército de Libertação Portuguesa—Portuguese Liberation Army].

The launching of an extensive campaign of false propaganda through the reactionary press, the local strongmen, the church hierarchy, and so forth, designed to create confusion and disquiet among the toiling masses.

The support of the workers for the general lines of the political plan presented by some officers in Copcon [Comando Operacional do Continente—Mainland Portugal Operations Command, the military security force], as well as the support demonstrated for the formation of the Frente de Unidade Revolucionária, have shown that broad masses are ready for the revolution. This, of course, involves a consciousness on their part that to avoid a defeat we have to go forward.

Thus, it is clearly urgent to launch a broad mass offensive that can mobilize the workers and unite them around their organs of people's power for an immediate

and unhesitating advance of the revolutionary process, to defeat the bourgeoisie, to destroy their state apparatus, and to build a workers power. This vital objective can be realized only if the various revolutionary political organizations and all the revolutionary activists are able to combine their efforts. Revolutionary unity is essential and cannot be postponed.

Unity in Action

The Frente de Unidade Revolucionária we are going to build to unite the political organizations in action is designed to help unify the revolutionists behind a revolutionary platform of struggle that the toiling masses will take up as their own.

The Frente de Unidade Revolucionária will enable us to combine the forces of all the revolutionists so as to promote, strengthen, spread, and coordinate the organs of people's power.

The Frente de Unidade Revolucionária is not a substitute for the self-guided organization of the working class and toiling masses. The role of the front is to help create the conditions that will enable the organs of people's power to come increasingly to the fore as the fundamental means for the taking of power by the workers and for the exercise of revolutionary power by the proletariat.

By its activity, the Frente de Unidade Revolucionária will help to bring about the strengthening of the class alliances the proletariat needs to take power and build the socialist society.

The Frente de Unidade Revolucionária represents a contribution to uniting and organizing the vanguard of the class, which is a historic need for the proletariat on the road to taking power and to exercising it in a revolutionary way.

Revolutionary Unity Points the Way for the Toiling Masses

The Frente de Unidade Revolucionária points out the road for the working class; the peasants and all the working people; the progressive and revolutionary soldiers, sailors, noncommissioned and commissioned officers; the students and progressive intellectuals. It points out the road for a massive offensive to defeat the Social Democracy and to crush fascism.

The Frente de Unidade Revolucionária points out the road for the toiling masses, the road for struggle against capitalism, for people's power, for socialism, and for national independence from imperialism.

The Frente de Unidade Revolucionária points out the way for the toilers of the cities and the countryside, as well as the soldiers and sailors, to strengthen their autonomous organizations of people's power (workers committees, tenants commit-

tees, village assemblies, soldiers assemblies, sailors assemblies, Assembleias de Delegados de Unidade).

The Frente de Unidade Revolucionária points out to all the exploited and oppressed the need from here on out to unite the force of arms with the organized will of the working people by promoting the growth of local, district, and regional assemblies everywhere, with a view toward calling a national people's assembly.

The Frente de Unidade Revolucionária points out the following as immediate objectives for the struggle of the toiling masses:

Organizing self-defense, in particular through the organs of people's power, against the armed attacks of capitalist reaction.

Struggle to purge all the fascist and Social Democratic putschists from the armed forces.

Struggle for full freedom of the soldiers and sailors to meet and organize. This is the only way the ADUs will be genuinely democratic and revolutionary.

Struggle to force exemplary punishment of the fascists and counterrevolutionists of all stripes, of the local strongmen and reactionary clergy, who are responsible for the wave of anti-Communist violence that has been rising in many areas of the country.

Struggle for the formation of revolutionary tribunals that can exercise the class justice of the exploited and oppressed against the counterrevolutionists.

Struggle against the power of those capitalist conglomerates that still exist, for nationalizing the big industrial and agricultural enterprises, as well as foreign banks and insurance companies, without compensation and under workers control, on the road to collectivization of the means of production.

Struggle for generalizing workers control over production and for the organized control of the working people over the entire economy.

Struggle to deepen and extend the agrarian reform so as to satisfy in a revolutionary way the needs and aspirations of the rural workers and small and middle peasants organized in their organs of people's power, that is, the village councils.

Struggle against layoffs and for full employment.

Struggle against the scarcities suffered by the working people in the cities and in the countryside, scarcities that profit parasitic middlemen.

Struggle for national independence vis-à-vis imperialism, national independence based on an alliance with the anti-imperialist countries and the militant solidarity of the workers of the entire world.

This requires Portugal's immediate depar-

ture from NATO and the end of the Iberian Pact.

Struggle for a revolutionary alliance of the Portuguese toilers with the Angolan people, represented by their only liberation movement, the MPLA [Movimento Popular

de Libertação de Angola—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola].

Demanding the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and exposing its bourgeois character.

Struggle to form a Government of Revolutionary Unity. □

Fourth International's Warning Against Trap of Posts in Ceylonese Bourgeois Government

[The following letter from the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, dated April 23, 1964, was sent as soon as it was learned that the leadership of the Lanka Sama Samaja party (at that time the Ceylon section of the Fourth International) was negotiating entry of the party into a bourgeois coalition government. The letter was addressed "To the Central Committee and Members" of the LSSP.]

* * *

Dear Comrades:

On the eve of your Annual Conference we address you on certain issues which we consider crucial for our movement in Ceylon. Indeed, we are of the opinion that some of the questions facing you today could be decisive for the entire course of the working-class and mass movement in Ceylon for many years to come.

From the information at our disposal it is clear that the economic and political situations in the country have entered a phase of severe crisis. First, the financial situation in the country has deteriorated to such an extent that mere palliatives on the part of the government can no longer suffice to tide over the current day-to-day problems facing it. This, in turn, has led to a crisis of government and confusion among bourgeois circles about their perspectives for the future. On the one hand, we witness the inability of the ruling SLFP¹ to continue much longer in office, expressed in its rapidly dwindling parliamentary majority, its sudden prorogation of parliament and its "behind the scenes" maneuvers to negotiate a fresh lease of life through an alliance with the parties of the left. On the other hand, the current demagoguery of the UNP² is an admission of its own awareness of the crisis facing bourgeois rule as such, and the growing strength of the mass movement in the country. It is in this

context that we are faced with a spate of rumors about a possible coup d'état and extraparliamentary action from the right.

As far as the SLFP is concerned, two factors appear to motivate its present course of action: (1) lack of confidence in its ability to continue in office for the rest of its constitutional term; (2) a deep-seated fear of an upsurge in the working-class movement and the real possibility of the emergence of a government of the left. Clearly, it is this latter possibility which drives it today to seek a modus vivendi with the left and attempt a realignment of forces through a coalition with the United Left Front.³

Its calculations are fairly obvious. It hopes to gain strength by an infusion from the left. It hopes to disorient the masses by taking on left coloration. It hopes to weaken the threat from the left by splitting the left organizations (since acceptance of a coalition would obviously not be unanimous and would most likely open the most bitter factional struggles). It hopes to associate prominent left figures with its rule and thereby utterly discredit them for the following phase when this one comes to its inevitable end and social forces have reached unendurable tension and polarization.

Its primary immediate aim is to stem the tide of rising mass unrest, contain the parties of the left within its own control and commit them to "progressive" formulae within the framework of the capitalist structure. It is clear that the "concessions" proposed by the Prime Minister and reported to the Central Committee meeting remain mere sops insofar as they leave intact the structure of capitalism and in no way touch the essential productive bases of the economy.

2. United National party. The party of the layer of the bourgeoisie most directly linked with British imperialism. The SLFP arose out of a split from the UNP led by Bandaranaike's late husband in 1951.—IP

3. The United Left Front was a front of working-class parties—the LSSP, the Communist party, and the MEP (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna)—formed in 1963 on the basis of united action by the trade unions around a platform of twenty-one demands.—IP

It is necessary to declare at this stage, quite categorically, that we oppose our party entering any coalition government wherein decisive control is held by a party that has proved time and again its reluctance to move against the capitalist order, and furthermore has demonstrated in action its essentially anti-working-class character. We do not believe that the character of the SLFP is determined by the declarations of one or another of its individual leaders. Its character has been revealed by its whole history during its years in power. In this sense we see no reason for changing our characterization of it as a party essentially functioning within the framework of capitalism and utilized by certain layers of the bourgeoisie as a possible bulwark against the growing forces of the working class. Any form of coalition with such a party, as long as it remains the dominant majority within such a coalition, can only lead to the immobilization of the left in advance and its becoming itself a target for the growing resentment of the masses.

It is necessary to hark back to the recent past and draw the necessary conclusions from the results of the policy of support which the party once extended to the government of Mrs. Bandaranaike. As the Central Committee's own resolution expressed it, this was a factor which was partly responsible for the serious setbacks suffered by the party in the Colombo Municipal and other local government elections. The experience of Philip Gunawardena in the government of the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike is a demonstration of the futility of a captive minority within a bourgeois government seeking to utilize its position to change the social structure of the country. Despite the changed circumstances, despite even the emergence of a so-called left wing within the SLFP, we see no reason to foresee any other outcome for a similar "entry tactic" on our part.

The realistic alternative road for the party is evident from the crisis itself. The government could make its offer to the United Left Front only because it saw the ULF as already a power, as the key formation to the left, as the one potentially in position to *install its own government*. This quite evidently is how the political brains in the present government read the situation. There is no doubt they are right. This is shown by the huge rally alone where most significantly, all political currents in the mass movement were impelled to participate. What the government sees and wishes to counter—by moving forward to meet it—is the possibility that vigorous and systematic development of the ULF, particularly through a series of well-considered actions and organizational measures, could quickly bring the ULF to power. Only one

1. Sri Lanka Freedom party—Holy Ceylon Freedom party. Led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, it is essentially the party of the national bourgeoisie. The party also has strong support among the peasantry, based on demagogic appeals to Sinhala chauvinism and Buddhism at the expense of the Tamil minority.—IP

conclusion is possible in principle, and it also happens to be the most practical and realistic. The party must now fight hard and in a determined way for nothing short of a government of the United Left Front. For the first time in the country's history there has grown an unprecedented unity among the working class. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie has proved its bankruptcy and a lack of confidence in itself. The alternative to a UNP government must therefore be a government of the United Left. But such a struggle must not be conceived purely within the limitations of the parliamentary framework or purely in terms of parliamentary arithmetic. It must become a means of actively mobilizing the masses in action, above all through the unfolding struggle of the united trade unions. To make the United Left Front a living reality it is also necessary to continue within it the struggle for our perspectives, *never surrendering for a moment our own independence and freedom of criticism*. In struggle we must seek to make of it a dynamic center of polarization for the important working-class forces that still remain outside it. Every effort must be made, in action, to draw in the forces of the plantation workers and the unions led by the Peking-inspired Communist party. *Every anti-working-class manifestation even within the ULF must be fought consistently and not glossed over or ignored in the name of a formal unity*. The United Left Front will be a viable force only to the extent that we lead it in struggle and seek to make it a center for all the sectors of the developing mass movement in the country.

Comrades, it seems to us from afar that a most favorable situation is unfolding in Ceylon which can well bring the left to power if they now proceed self-confidently and in a businesslike way. Your tactics in this situation can make the decisive difference between success and the possible decimation of the working-class movement and the eventual consolidation of the right in its most reactionary form. You face, it seems to us, a great historic opportunity. The United Front of the Left, strengthened by mass struggle and directed to the establishment of its own political power on a genuinely socialist program, provides a means for stemming the tide of reaction and uniting the masses and the ranks of our own party for the ultimate realization of our perspectives. Ceylon can become another Cuba or Algeria and prove to be of even greater inspiration to revolutionary-minded workers throughout the world.

No coalition at the expense of socialist principles and the possibility of a socialist victory!

Forward with the masses in struggle for a government of the United Left Front!

With warmest comradely greetings,
The United Secretariat

The Wearing Out of a Revolutionary Leadership

By Pierre Frank

[The following article first appeared in the July 17, 1964, issue of *World Outlook* (the former name of *Intercontinental Press*). We are reprinting it to provide our readers with background material on the betrayal carried out by the leaders of the Lanka Sama Samaja party (LSSP—Ceylon Equal Society party) in joining a bourgeois government in 1964, now that the Bandaranaike regime in Sri Lanka has dumped her coalition partners after eleven years of faithful service. (See news article elsewhere in this issue.)

[Pierre Frank, a leader of the Fourth International, attended the special conference of the LSSP held in Colombo June 6-7, 1964, where the majority of the party supported a proposal by N.M. Perera to support a bourgeois coalition government. As the official representative of the Fourth International at that gathering, Frank supported the struggle of the left wing against that proposal, or any variation of it.]

* * *

The vote at the Special Conference of the Lanka Sama Samaja party June 7, authorizing Perera and his friends to enter a bourgeois government, was a blow against the Fourth International and the Ceylonese masses. It was the end result, as we shall see, of the wearing out of a revolutionary leadership.

The Origin of the LSSP

The LSSP always occupied a unique place in the Fourth International. Its origin was completely different from that of all the other sections of our movement. In brief, our movement everywhere else was born in more or less profound struggles within an established labor movement. In Ceylon, the labor movement itself was created toward the end of the thirties by a team of young revolutionaries educated in the English universities, who, attracted toward Communism just as the great struggle of the Left Opposition against Stalinism reached its height, decided in favor of the theory of the Permanent Revolution.

It is necessary to add that they came to national prominence in a period when the Ceylonese bourgeoisie did not itself attempt to mount the least struggle against British imperialism, not even by way of imitating their Indian neighbors.

During the war, the leadership of the LSSP expelled the Stalinists, who wanted to collaborate with imperialism. The Trotskyists were persecuted, arrested. Some of them escaped to India and continued their

struggle in the underground. Thus, following the war, they returned to their own country with great prestige and at the head of the labor movement.

Like every political formation, the LSSP underwent many internal struggles. Petty-bourgeois currents were eliminated, while the majority of the leadership likewise held in check the well-known opportunist tendencies of N.M. Perera, who gained his authority through systematic trade-union work.

The real leadership of the LSSP, composed of a group of figures that included Colvin R. de Silva, Leslie Gunawardene, Bernard Soysa, Doric de Souza, and Edmund Samarakkody, was of high intellectual capacity and great militancy. It was recognized throughout Ceylon as constituting the genuine leading team. This team has now broken up, the majority having gone to pieces politically. This is the real tragedy which the LSSP has just experienced. What were the causes of this event? How did it come about?

It is necessary to say that alongside most excellent qualities, this leadership had weaknesses, the consequences of which have now become fully apparent.

In the first place, on the level of political education there was a big gap between these men, who followed the activities of the international Trotskyist movement, and most of the party rank and file, who knew no English and lacked adequate material in their own language for a political education. This leadership *followed* the life of the International, but was not sufficiently immersed in it nor inclined to bring the party as a whole into it.

This weakness was well-known among the leaders of the Trotskyist movement on an international scale. Whatever other issues temporarily divided them from time to time, there was common concern about this problem. The general organizational and financial weakness of the Fourth International made it impossible to bring more vigorous measures to bear such as sending Trotskyists of top capacity for sustained work in Ceylon to help bring up the political level of the party. The split in 1953 did not help, as was recognized by both the International Secretariat and the International Committee; and the reunification undertaken last year was not granted sufficient time to bring new united efforts to bear in a strong healthy way in this situation.

The second weakness of the majority of the LSSP leadership was that the parliamentary successes following the war developed parliamentarian tendencies which were not combatted vigorously from the

beginning and the ultimate consequences of which were not visualized. Even the intensive activities of the party centered on struggles for the conquest of seats in parliament.

A third weakness was, so to speak, the exclusively "labor" character of the party during its first years. Through their activities, the leaders of the LSSP had won the confidence of the majority of the Ceylonese workers (workers of Colombo, transport workers, white-collar brackets, etc.). But for a long time they have not tackled the most important part of the proletariat of Ceylon, the plantation workers, consisting of Indians "imported" originally by the British and who today have no citizenship—neither Ceylonese nor Indian. The LSSP at one time registered good gains in this field, controlling a strong trade-union organization of these workers. But, with this exception, they scarcely penetrated the rural masses who constitute the majority of the population.

Ceylon, it might be mentioned, does not have a poor peasantry like India or so many other underdeveloped countries. However low the standard of living is among these masses, they do not suffer from famine, from despair. The situation is quite variegated and to our knowledge no serious study has been made of it. In any case, the LSSP never developed a program for these masses. (The Communist party of Ceylon is in the same boat.)

After Independence

In Ceylon, as in India, British imperialism granted independence following the second world war. Power passed into the hands of the UNP [United National party], the party representing the thin layer of the Ceylonese bourgeoisie directly linked through their plantations, their export trade, with British imperialism. The first elections gave the LSSP the leading place among the opposition formations. From this followed not only parliamentary illusions but also the idea that with the wearing out and the bankruptcy of the UNP its hour would come.

But during the fifties another formation developed, the Sri Lanka Freedom party [SLFP]. To the surprise of the leaders of the LSSP, this new party won an election victory in 1956 that brought it to power. At the time, the leaders of the LSSP characterized the SLFP as a bourgeois party based on wider layers than the UNP, but they thought that this party would also be rapidly worn out in power and that the LSSP would then move forward.

This perspective was demolished by the outcome of the elections of March 1960. The majority of the leading team of the LSSP lost their bearings and began to vacillate. At the same time Perera, with his reformist concepts, began to press forward more and

more. At the time he proposed a coalition government with the SLFP. This was rejected, but the parliamentary group of the LSSP did cast a vote of confidence in the government. The Fourth International publicly disavowed this vote.¹

With the evolution of the Bandaranaike government towards the right, the LSSP resumed its opposition, without, however, undertaking any serious self-criticism of its previous stand. It raised the slogan for a genuine socialist government. Then, together with the Ceylonese Communist party and the MEP [Mahajana Eksath Peramuna—People's United Front], a petty-bourgeois formation, it constituted what was called the United Left Front [ULF]. This was a political combination with an insufficient program, which did not bring in the trade-union formations involving the citizenless Indian workers, and this combination did not conduct itself as a candidate for power, in opposition to the SLFP government, although the broad Ceylonese masses gave the ULF a warm welcome precisely in anticipation of this perspective.

Finally, about three months ago, Perera secretly opened personal negotiations with the Prime Minister. While the left wing of the LSSP, organized about a year ago, firmly opposed any suggestion of a coalition, the majority of the leadership favored a coalition, not with the LSSP alone, but with all the formations of the ULF.

To justify this position, they argued that the SLFP was a petty-bourgeois formation, although it had already governed the country within the framework of capitalism for eight years; and they made a false analogy with the examples of Cuba and Algeria. But they did not want the LSSP to carry out the operation alone. As in the case of Perera, what was involved here was a gross error characteristic of all reformists. To reach the petty-bourgeois masses, the rural masses of Ceylon in this instance, they hoped—instead of winning them through a fighting program—to gain them through a combination with a bourgeois party that does not represent these masses but exploits them, playing on their reactionary sentiments, especially against the minorities of the country, in order to maintain the capitalist regime.

The Conference of the LSSP

Perera became all the more audacious in the LSSP as the vacillating, indecisive attitude of the majority of the leaders caused them to lose ground in a party which they had stopped educating for some time. The party conference, hastily called it is true, provided a striking illustration of this.

1. See *Quatrième Internationale*, special number of the Sixth World Congress (1961).

Three resolutions were offered. After a two-day debate, it was decided to present the Samarakkody-Tampoe motion first because it was opposed in principle to any coalition. It received 159 votes, about 25% of the party.

Then, in second place, the De Silva-Gunawardene motion was presented; that is, the motion of the men who had actually led the organization for more than twenty-five years. It was presented by Gunawardene as in "the nature of an amendment" to Perera's motion. It got 75 votes, some 10% of the party.

This was not all. Perera's resolution received 65%; but among the 75 votes for the De Silva-Gunawardene motion, about two-thirds voted for the Perera resolution. Thus, the men who had played such an eminent role in the past, who had won so much prestige, found themselves, after a quarter of a century of leading the party, with around 25 votes, less than 4%.

During the debate, while the other two tendencies displayed confidence in their positions—the Perera group in their reformism, the Samarakkody-Tampoe faction in the program of revolution—the centrist tendency could only express their own uncertainties, their demoralization. Forgetting what they had written with regard to the Permanent Revolution, they did not see that a bourgeoisie which failed to struggle for national independence would do everything possible to maintain its social domination. They no longer saw the SLFP as a bourgeois party.

The most tragic aspect of this crack up was that it occurred in the face of the most brilliant opportunity yet provided the leadership of the LSSP. The governmental crisis in Ceylon is one of the signs that the colonial revolution that has rocked the world all the way from China, across Africa to Cuba, is ripening in this island. The very necessity felt by the bourgeoisie to seek a coalition with the leaders of the labor movement is an indication of how close these same leaders stand to the possibility of establishing a workers and peasants government in Ceylon. The tragedy consists in their failure to see this and their readiness to give way to the demand that the opening for which they had prepared for a quarter of a century should be converted into the small change of posts in a bourgeois government.

Ceylonese Trotskyists Continue the Struggle

With this conference, a team of revolutionary leaders came to an end. Perera won the vote for his reformism and the majority of the old leaders decided to follow in tow. The banner of the socialist revolution in Ceylon passed into the hands of the comrades of the left wing, who left the

conference following the tally and at once proclaimed the Lanka Sama Samaja party (Revolutionary Section).

This organization, which constitutes the continuing body of the Ceylonese section of the Fourth International, begins in a difficult situation, inasmuch as illusions in the politics of Perera exist among the masses. The overall conditions, however, are not unfavorable. First of all, the split was made in the full light of day over a decisive political issue and all of Ceylon was aware of it. The leadership of the organization contains figures known to the whole country: Edmund Samarakkody, one of the earliest leaders of the LSSP, as well as another member of parliament, Meryl Fernando; Bala Tampoe, one of the main leaders of the trade-union movement in Ceylon, and other well-known leaders such as Karalasinghe and O. Jayaratne. The organization includes many trade-union cadres plus the biggest part of the young militants, including the students.

After solving its immediate organizational problems, the young party will face important political tasks. The situation in Ceylon was marked not only by the split in the LSSP, but also by splits in two other formations of the United Left Front. The Ceylonese Communist party split into a rightist, pro-Khrushchev organization which supports the coalition government and a pro-Chinese organization that is opposed to it. The MEP also split over the issue of supporting or opposing the coalition government.

We greet the new formation which is continuing the best revolutionary traditions of the old LSSP. The entire world Trotskyist movement is with it in its task of reconstructing a new revolutionary leadership capable of assuring the victory of socialism in Ceylon.²

July 7, 1964

2. The crisis in the LSSP was taken by Healy, leader of the Socialist Labour League of Great Britain, as an occasion for an attack against the reunified Fourth International, which he has not ceased to campaign against since he refused to participate in the Reunification Congress held in 1963.

First of all, we will take up a small lie. The June 20 *Newsletter* asserts that Healy "requested admission" to the conference, "but when it was discussed at the conference presidium, Pierre Frank . . . joined hands with the coalition renegades and urged that Healy's application be rejected." The rejection of Healy's request was made by the entire Presidium, which included left-wing representation. On this point, all the tendencies, for once, were unanimous and my opinion was not asked.

A second point: Healy does not reveal that he demanded that the revolutionary tendency, after leaving the conference, should break not only with Perera, de Silva, etc., but also . . . with the

Fourth International. This happened to be the real aim of Healy's trip to Colombo, where he hoped to fish in troubled waters. He does not mention this, because he met with a rebuff.

We now come to another lie, which has all the appearance of being calculated. According to him, the representative of the Fourth International, who took the floor at the conference of the LSSP to voice the opinion of the world Trotskyist movement, supported the De Silva-Gunawardene resolution advocating a coalition of the whole United Left Front with the SLFP. It happens to be a matter of public record that the Fourth International opposed any coalition whatsoever with the SLFP and supported the left-wing tendency which is now functioning as the Ceylonese section of the Fourth International.

The reasons for Healy's departure from the standards of truthful reporting are clear enough. This is not an instance of *The Newsletter's* habitual carelessness with facts. In Colombo Healy announced his support for the left wing of the LSSP. But the left wing has been conducting its struggle for the past year in consultation with the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, where it has had direct representation. Healy has been denouncing the United Secretariat as guilty of all kinds of "betrayals." Thus if he were logical, he would have to admit either that he had decided to participate in a "betrayal" perpetrated by the United Secretariat, or admit that he had been mistaken about its politics, at least in the case of Ceylon. In face of this dilemma proletarian morality lost out to political expediency. Healy chose to amalgamate the position of the United Secretariat with the very proposals which in fact it was battling against! Thus he was free to display himself before the readers of *The Newsletter* as the champion of the left wing of the LSSP against . . . the United Secretariat!

However deliberate the lie may be, it happens to cast a most revealing light on the nature of Healy's politics. The Fourth International—both before and during the conference—in opposition to the proposal for a coalition with a bourgeois party, advocated the positive slogan of a workers and peasants government, and did this in the concrete instance by suggesting that as against a coalition with the SLFP, the Trotskyists should advance the formula of a government of the United Left Front.

For Healy such a slogan is identical to a coalition with the bourgeoisie, hence constitutes betrayal. This is not one of Healy's passing aberrations; it is part of his general concept, a manifestation of his failure to understand the Transitional Program of the Fourth International and his failure to properly appreciate the colonial revolution. He thus excludes governmental transitional slogans and any possibility of a transitional government coming into existence.

Even without a detailed examination of his policies in England, it is easy to gather, simply from reading his newspaper, that to him the Tories and the Labour party amount to one and the same. He never comes out in favor of going through the experience of a Labour government.

In the field of the colonial revolution, basing himself on the premise that in the absence of a revolutionary Marxist party, there can be no successful revolution, he denies the triumphs registered by the theory of the Permanent Revolution in Algeria and Cuba. He likens Castro to . . . Batista, Chiang Kai-shek and Ataturk. In Zanzibar, he reduces the revolution to a comic opera, and so on.

Healy's politics is very simple. You cannot open any issue of his newspaper without finding the very latest on how someone has betrayed some-

thing somewhere. *The Newsletter* deals in "sell-outs" the way some papers deal in sex. It appears to keep standing headlines in which it is necessary only to replace the names of those who have sold out each week. Castro, we are told, has betrayed the Cuban masses; it is necessary to construct a revolutionary leadership. Ben Bella has betrayed the Algerian masses; it is necessary to construct a revolutionary leadership. The Socialist Workers party has betrayed the American masses; it is necessary to construct a revolutionary leadership. The United Secretariat has betrayed Trotskyism; it is necessary to "reorganize" the Fourth International. On this political level, where—outside of Healy—the whole world is committing betrayals, there is no need for profound analysis, no need even for cerebral effort. Each side in the two camps—Healy and the rest of the world—follows its predestined course. In any case, for such politics, there is no need to belong to an international organization, to take part in its congresses; it is sufficient to turn on the phonograph and place the needle in the groove.

Healy has really invented nothing novel. He simply represents today's version of the insular British sectarianism which Engels and Marx's daughter fought in the nineties and which Lenin scored in the twenties in *The Infantile Disease*.

A final word: In Colombo Healy sought to debate me on numerous questions, including Marxist "philosophy." The Ceylonese workers movement, obviously, ought not to be denied the opportunity to witness the capacities of such a genius in action.

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