

# **FIVE TROTSKYISTS MURDERED IN ARGENTINA**

**Portuguese CP Joins in Cutting Down Gonçalves**

**Portuguese Troops Demonstrate Against Going to Angola**

**French Police Crush Protest in Corsica**

**International Protests Score Trial of Garmendía and Otaegui**

*Special Feature*

**Documents on Key Issues in Portuguese Revolution**

## Corsica in the Headlines

In early September, the Portuguese events, in which all the big French political parties have a major stake, were suddenly displaced in the headlines in France. The latest sensation was the challenge of a nationalist movement in a territory that has been considered an integral part of France for 206 years and that has a population roughly the same as the county of Cornwall in Britain, that is, about 300,000.

The French state, which historically has shown less flexibility than any other in Western Europe in dealing with separatist and autonomist movements arising within its frontiers, responded with its traditional chauvinism and violence to increased activity by nationalists on the island of Corsica.

On August 21, the Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse (ARC—Action for the Rebirth of Corsica) occupied a vineyard owned by former French settlers in Algeria. The French authorities crushed the occupation brutally, provoking a massive general strike on September 1 that completely shut down the island.

The grievance of the Corsican nationalists was similar to that of many such groups in historically and culturally distinct regions incorporated into the large West European states. While Corsican youth were forced to emigrate to the French centers to make a living, outsiders with capital were coming in and tending more and more to dominate the local economy. In this case, it was former French settlers from Algeria.

In Wales, nationalists have also protested against well-to-do English settling in the remaining Welsh-speaking areas on the west coast and tending to impose the use of English as the language of public life. In Cornwall and on the Isle of Man, where no communities use the old languages, growing nationalist groups have protested against the influx of settlers from England who tend to dominate the economic life of these areas and turn them into English suburbs.

This issue has taken a particularly violent form in the areas around Brussels, where an influx of middle-class French-speakers has tended to relegate Flemish to the second-class status it suffers in the Belgian capital.

What this process represents is capitalist economic concentration in which the more

backward, or historically disadvantaged areas—in Europe these are often submerged nations—become the suburbs of the centers. It reflects the blind forces of capitalist development that tear asunder all cultural and traditional ties and place commodities above human beings. However, while this process has uprooted tens of millions of persons in the United States in recent decades, it has not provoked any organized resistance. In Europe, where these disadvantaged areas often have a long-established tradition and distinctive character, the response has been quite different.

Corsica is not just another small and poor island. Its cession to France by Genoa in 1768 provoked a republican uprising that was a model for the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century. The leader of the Corsican republic, Pascal Paoli, was ranked by revolutionists of his time with Washington, Kosciusko, and Robert Emmet.

Since the industrialization process in France proceeded at a relatively slow pace until recent times, the French government could not, unlike the British, rely on economic forces to break down the national communities it swallowed in various conquests. The primary method was state repression, the bureaucratic imposition of conformity.

Thus, advocating the separation of any part of "la France Eternelle" remains subject to severe penalties. A whole series of nationalist organizations have been outlawed in the last few years, in Brittany and the Basque country as well as in Corsica. A Basque group was banned just for saying in

a manifesto that "we Basques are a nation."

The instrument of assimilation in France has been a caste of officials and functionaries largely recruited from the rabidly chauvinist Parisian petty bourgeoisie and indoctrinated with the dogma of "France, one and indivisible." All national differences have been denied outright.

One of the factors in the recent explosion in Corsica was the division of the island into two *départements*, the abstractly uniform administrative units of "indivisible" France.

Because of this virulent repressive tradition, nationalist movements tend to erupt more unexpectedly and to take a violent character more immediately in France than in Britain, although the British government also has been surprised by the sudden resurgence of national questions previously considered long dead or merely "marginal."

Such national sentiment can turn either to the left or the right. This tends to be determined by the attitude of the workers parties and the left in general to the aspirations of the minorities concerned. In Europe today, no rising bourgeois has an interest in founding a new state.

Corsica differs in many respects from the other small nations incorporated in West European states. The differences between this island and the rest of the French state are more pronounced than, say, the differences that distinguish Brittany or the Basque country in the same context or that set off Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom. Its relative economic situation is worse.

However, there are a number of nationalist movements developing in Western Europe similar to the Corsican one, and it seems likely that the imperialist ruling classes in these countries will experience other shocks such as that felt by their French counterpart, who woke up this August, as some French journalists put it, with a potential "Belfast" in their backyard.

## Central Intelligence Assassination Bureau

The Senate committee investigating the Central Intelligence Agency is due to deliver shortly, to a closed Senate session, a report on the CIA's plots to assassinate leaders of foreign governments.

Some commentators are already apprehensive about the impact the report will have on the American and international public. Washington correspondent Nicholas M. Horrock reported in the September 7 issue of the *New York Times*:

"There is something a little macabre about all this. The Senate of the United

States sitting down in solemn dignity to study a report on how the Government plotted to poison, shoot or somehow do away with world leaders whose policies it opposed."

Quite a spectacle, yes. Such meetings are not generally announced to the public. But the broader problem facing Washington is the fact that several of the murder plots are already well known, and the committee will have to say something about them.

"It has already been established," Horrock wrote, "through authoritative pub-

lished reports and public remarks of several members of the committee that the C.I.A. has been involved in assassination plots." Thus "informed observers" who have had a preview of the report say it will "detail at least three assassination plots" and the "death of a Chilean general killed in what appeared to be a kidnapping attempt."

Richard Bissell, head of the CIA "dirty tricks" department at the time of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, has already acknowledged that the agency arranged for Mafia racketeers Sam Giancana and John Roselli to kill Fidel Castro. Other CIA sources have confirmed that in 1960 the agency drew up a plan to assassinate Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba.

The senior senators on the committee have spent long hours debating the least damaging way to handle their poisonous dish. The committee chairman favors the "stonewall" approach practiced by Nixon, but with a special zoological twist of his own.

According to Horrock, "The strong hint as the committee staff writes and edits the report these hot August days is that they have no clear evidence to answer whether murder was Government-wide policy or not. The committee chairman, Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, has said that there is no evidence that any President ever ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to launch an assassination and he has likened the agency to a 'rogue elephant' thrashing about unrestricted by command."

Others prefer a somewhat more subtle approach. Thus, Senator Richard S. Schweiker, a Republican member of the committee, would like to conclude that "though there is no evidence a President ordered an assassination, there is no clear evidence a President objected to the idea."

A bald cover-up along these lines is not likely to enhance the credibility of the Ford administration. Yet if the report is not a total whitewash it can hardly escape confirming that murder is an established part of U.S. government policy, as normal as collecting taxes and making war. This would give added impetus to the demand to open the files of the CIA, and let the American people know what crimes they have been financing through their taxes.

What role did the CIA play in the murder of Malcolm X? What are the full facts about the murder of Patrice Lumumba? What is the CIA doing at this very moment in Portugal in an attempt to derail the revolution? How much of the international heroin trade is controlled by the CIA?

These and other questions will not disappear, even if the Senate report proves to be a whitewash job. World public opinion will not rest satisfied until it knows the full facts about the sordid crimes of the White House assassination bureau—the Central Intelligence Agency. □

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### Five Members of Argentine PST Murdered

By Judy White

Five members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party) of Argentina were found shot to death September 5.

The following day three members of the PST were kidnapped in La Plata. As of September 8, their whereabouts was still unknown.

Marks on the nude bodies of Adriana Daldua, Ana María Lorenzo, Lidia Agostini, Hugo Frigerio, and Roberto Loscertales showed that the murder victims were beaten before they were shot. Their bodies were found in a car near La Plata in an area where at least a dozen victims of rightist murder gangs have been left in recent months.

The five assassination victims had been actively involved in solidarity work with strikers at the Propulsora Iron and Steel Works in Berisso, a city near La Plata. All five were known members of the PST. In addition, Daldua and Lorenzo were prominent in the youth group associated with the PST, the Juventud Socialista (Socialist Youth).

Government-sponsored ultraright terror began in Argentina in the spring of 1974, less than a year after Perón took office. With the forced exile July 19 of former Social Welfare Minister López Rega, the official closely connected with the most active murder gang, the AAA (Argentine Anticommunist Alliance), an end to such killings was hoped for. But the assassinations continued.

*Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the PST, reported the following cases in recent weeks:

- The July 24 issue told of ten victims whose bodies had been found in Córdoba, Buenos Aires, Rosario, La Plata, and other parts of the country.

- The August 1 issue noted that nine more persons had been killed by murder gangs. In addition, four persons had disappeared, including two PST members.

The PST members, Daniel Biloni and Zaira Sierra, were arrested July 28 while driving through Tucumán Province. Police subsequently denied any knowledge of their whereabouts.

- The August 8 issue gave details on repeated threats by the AAA against Jorge Díaz, a worker at Talleres Esquiú, and against the members of the factory committee at Lorrilleaux-Lefranc, two printing establishments.

#### SWP Message of Solidarity

[The Political Committee of the Socialist Workers party sent the following message to the PST September 6.]

\* \* \*

We salute the memory of our five comrades: Lidia Agostini, Adriana Daldua, Hugo Frigerio, Ana María Lorenzo, and Roberto Loscertales. They died in the only cause worth fighting for—the struggle of the working class against capitalist exploitation. Cowardly assassins cut short their lives. But the memory of these five brave revolutionists will live on in the work of the PST and the Fourth International.

- The August 16 issue reported that a powerful bomb virtually destroyed the Tucumán headquarters of the bourgeois Unión Cívica Radical (UCR—Radical Civic Union) August 11. Just prior to this a Communist party activist was found shot to death in Lanús.

- The August 23 issue gave an account of the August 14 murder of the parents, a brother and a sister of the late Mariano Pujadas. Pujadas was one of the victims of the Trelew massacre of August 1972 in which sixteen political prisoners were killed.

Also reported in this issue was the kidnapping and beating of PST member and army draftee Mario Alfredo Moyano; a campaign of harassment against party member and worker activist Alberto Berrocal; and an August 21 raid on the party's headquarters in Neuquén. Two persons were arrested in the raid, and the police continued to occupy the site after it had been searched.

The September 5 assassination of five PST members brings to twelve the number of party members murdered since the Perón regime came to office. In addition, there have been numerous bombings of party headquarters, arrests of PST militants, death threats to members, and raids on the party's offices.

The July 19 issue of *Avanzada Socialista* printed a balance sheet on the struggle against ultraright terror and in support of

democratic rights, explaining the need for a massive mobilization of the working class. It said in part:

“A two-week mobilization of the working class was adequate to brake the advance of the right wing, to impose de facto the right to strike, to demonstrate in the streets, and to meet to discuss common problems.

“The workers struggles of those two weeks have done more for democratic rights than months on end of verbal protests and condemnations.

“More than ever it has been shown that the only discussions and negotiations that produce results are those supported by the mass mobilization of the workers.

“But the danger has not disappeared. The right wing of the government has had to stop its offensive but it still has not been dislodged from power. From the posts it maintains, it is preparing a new blow against the standard of living and the democratic rights of the workers and people as a whole.

“That is why it is increasingly urgent and important to take advantage of the government's current weakness to deliver new blows that can prevent it from reacting and prepare its definitive defeat. Now is the time to halt the reactionary offensive in all its manifestations.”

It is the PST's tireless campaign to build a movement capable of accomplishing these tasks that has marked it as a particular target of the ultraright terror gangs and their backers in the Peronist regime. □

#### PST Campaign Wins Release of Four Imprisoned Members

Four members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party) of Argentina have been released from jail.

Gerardo Romagnoli, Guillermo Díaz, Nora Albanesi, and Gloria Preiti were being held under provisions of the state of siege. No charges had been placed against them since their arrest last spring for involvement in the metalworkers' strike in Villa Constitución.

Their release came after approval of a motion submitted by the PST to the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the parliament. The motion requested that the parliament provide information on the jurisdiction under which the party's twelve prisoners were being held, and the charges against each of them.

Still imprisoned are PST members José María Fernández, Silvio Dragonsky, Juan Llanos, Juan Carlos López Osornio, Daniel Veiga, Luisa Segura, Max Abel Korilchik, and José Luis Pérez.

## Portuguese CP Joins in Cutting Down Gonçalves

By Gerry Foley

In the face of overwhelming opposition, with a majority of the delegates of the military services refusing even to attend the Assembly of the Armed Forces Movement held on September 5, Gen. Vasco Gonçalves declined nomination for chief of staff.

Gonçalves's surrender confirmed the defeat and isolation of the section of the military and state apparatus allied with the Communist party. The three-month campaign of the Stalinists to retain their positions as the mass organizers of the military had apparently ended in a decisive defeat.

Although the pro-Gonçalves naval officers held a big majority at the assembly, since the other services refused to attend, they bowed to the real relationship of forces. The membership of the Revolutionary Council was cut from thirty to twenty-four. Gonçalves was removed, along with Brig. Gen. Eurico Corvacho, the only regional commander who supported him in the power struggle, and two other reportedly pro-Gonçalves members, Capt. Luis Macedo and Capt. Ferreira de Sousa.

### Realignment in MFA

Most of the signers of the Document of the Nine that denounced Gonçalves and CP influence in the government and military were included in the Revolutionary Council. That is: the commanders of the southern and central regions, brigadiers Pedro Júlio Pizarat Correia and Manuel Franco Charais; as well as captains Vasco Correia Lourenço and Rodrigo Manuel Sousa e Castro; and majors José Bernardo do Canto e Castro and José Manuel da Costa Neves.

One signer, Vítor Crespo, was removed from the council by his service, the navy. Two others, Vítor Alves and Melo Antunes, were not nominated by their service and their membership is to be decided by the council itself. The case of a pro-Gonçalves member, the minister of labor, Costa Martins of the air force, is to be decided in the same way. In view of the way the wind is blowing, the latter's chances do not seem very good.

As for the two leaders of the Group of the Nine, the future was less clear. In a September 6 dispatch from Lisbon, *Washington Post* correspondent Miguel Açoca speculated: "The changes eliminated rival factions from the power center, giving Costa Gomes a more viable and docile membership."

Gen. Saraiva de Carvalho, who came out



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strongly against Gonçalves, was also put back on the council. He seems now to be very much in the shadow of Costa Gomes. His reported remark at the assembly, "there is no triumvirate," may not have been just a reference to the departure of Gonçalves but recognition that the president is now the strongman and that the three-man director appointed to rule the country has been superseded.

Although there was a period of tense confrontation before Gonçalves finally gave up the struggle, the outcome was never in doubt. In the army assembly early in the week, it was already clear that the former premier was defeated.

In its September 4 issue, the Oporto daily *Primeiro de Janeiro* reported: "In a nutshell, the Army said 'no' to the Assembly of the Movement [that is, refused to take part in the Armed Forces Movement Assembly until so-called unrepresentative delegates were eliminated and the allotment of delegates among the services was changed to make the army more strongly predominant] and to the appointment of General Vasco Gonçalves to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces.

"The two decisions, approved by an overwhelming majority of the delegates present, including representatives of units

in Madeira, the Azores, and Angola, were made following heated debates between supporters of Vasco Gonçalves's line and that of the 'Nine.' The former premier himself tried to reverse the direction of things by making a long presentation in which he read a document he had written criticizing the positions of the 'Nine.' This was opposed by large sections of the Assembly. Among the most prominent opponents were Melo Antunes and Vasco Lourenço.

### Gonçalves 'Fed Up'

"I am not going to take this from you. I am fed up. I've been facing a cold war for six months, and I can't take it anymore. I'm leaving." This is what Vasco Gonçalves reportedly said to Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho when, as it was already getting late, he left the meeting."

Only 4 of the 250 officers present followed Gonçalves, the paper said, and "it is supposed they had different intentions." They were Colonel Sardinha Dias; Brigadier Charais, Colonel Leal de Almeida and Major Dinis de Almeida of the Lisbon Light Artillery, and Saraiva de Carvalho.

The Lisbon regiment, although previously with Carvalho, seems to have backed Gonçalves to the end. As Gonçalves left the meeting, Carvalho sought to talk with him. The former premier reportedly told his fellow triumvir: "I am leaving. Tear up the paper. Do with it what you want. I came here to make my self-criticism and not to provoke dissension. Since they refused to understand me, I am leaving."

In the air force assembly the next day, similar decisions were taken, supporting the positions previously expressed publicly by the head of the branch, General Morais e Silva. In addition, the assembly condemned the CP-controlled media for spreading stories that the general had been forced to resign.

### Armed Forces Assembly Boycotted

Even without the change in representation demanded by the army, the result at the armed forces assembly was a foregone conclusion after these two meetings, since the army had 120 votes, and the navy and air force 60 each. Despite the decision of both the army and the air force not to attend the September 5 assembly, about forty dissident army delegates reportedly attended. Other representatives of the two

absent branches went to report the results of their assemblies and to observe.

The real objective of the boycott was probably to open up a drive to purge or intimidate leftist officers, most of whom were associated with Gonçalves, and begin to cut back the margin of representative democracy that has existed in the MFA. The only significant measure of democracy, in fact, has been observed in the navy and in Copcon units such as the Lisbon Light Artillery and the Military Police. Unit assemblies in the rest of the army and in the air force, where they have been formed, have generally been no more than sounding boards for the commanders.

After the developments in the first week in September, the leftist officers have been left isolated and very much on the defensive. Unless the shift to the right is reversed by developments elsewhere, the conservative military officers may succeed fairly soon in their aim of restoring bourgeois military discipline in the armed forces. Once that is accomplished, the stage will be set for a general offensive against the workers movement.

Almost certainly, the CP will lose many of the positions it fought so stubbornly to retain at the cost of a deep split in the workers movement. However, once the Stalinist leadership realized this battle was lost, it shifted immediately from the Third Period-type course it had followed to a line more clearly in harmony with its general popular-frontist program.

#### New Stalinist Zigzag

On August 28, the day before Gonçalves lost the premiership, the CP general secretary, Alvaro Cunhal, presented the new turn at a news conference in the Centro de Trabalho de Alcântara. He called for a summit meeting including "representatives of the president of the republic, the Provisional Government, the Revolutionary Council, representatives of the principal tendencies in the Armed Forces Movement (the military left, Copcon officers, and the 'Group of the Nine'), along with representatives of the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party], and the organizations participating in the provisional front, as well as the Socialist party."

The CP general secretary announced that his party was ready to put the interests of unity against the right above the demand for maintaining its allies in key government posts (after this battle was already clearly lost). He said, "What is at stake is not the success or failure of this or that group, sector, or personality but the victory or defeat of the Portuguese revolution."

He indicated that he was ready to help cook Gonçalves's goose: "We don't see why we should not consider solutions that do not include Vasco Gonçalves remaining at the

head of the government. Revolutionists do not defend posts; they are always ready to cooperate in achieving the solutions most suited to advancing the revolution."

The "provisional front" Cunhal referred to early in his statement was the Frente Unitária Popular (FUP—People's United Front) that had been established August 25 between the PCP and seven smaller organizations: the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International), the Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left), the Frente Socialista Popular (FSP—Socialist People's Front), the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias (PRP-BR—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades), the Movimento Democrático Português-Comissão Democrática Eleitoral (MDP-CDE, Portuguese Democratic Movement-Democratic Election Committee, the CP's petty-bourgeois front), the Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária (LUAR—League for Revolutionary Unity and Action), and the First of May Group.\*

#### Small Groups Feel Betrayed

Most of these groups were unhappy over Cunhal's shift. The first to make a public statement was the PRP-BR. It issued a communiqué saying: "These propositions are extremely grave because they involve breaking commitments made at various levels and contain clear proposals for an alliance with the Social Democracy."

On the following day, August 29, the Provisional Secretariat of the FUP issued a communiqué saying: "The FSP, LCI, LUAR, MES, and the PRP-BR took the following position on the statement of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the PCP on August 28:

"a. They consider that the proposal made by the PCP leadership opens the way to conciliation with the civilian and military forces that have served as the spearheads for capitalism and imperialism.

"b. They consider that the proposal made by the PCP leadership had the objective result of weakening the position of the civilian and military progressive and revolutionary forces.

"c. They consider that the position taken by the PCP enters into contradiction with the August 25 Platform for which masses of workers have already demonstrated their clear support both through the large demonstrations in Lisbon on August 27 and in Oporto on August 29, and through the positions taken by the organs of people's power.

"d. They categorically reject the propo-

sals of the PC of the CC of the PCP.

"e. They make the presence of the PCP in the Provisional Secretariat of the August 25 Platform conditional on the kind of position it takes toward the criticisms that have been made of it."

#### The CP's Reply

The Communist party response was published in the August 30 issue of *Diário de Notícias*:

"The interests of the revolution demand opening negotiations among the forces that are clashing violently on the political level, since if a political solution is not found quickly, this could open the way to a coup by the right.

"In all the forces involved there are many elements that sincerely want to assure a revolutionary course. This situation opens possibilities for cooperation.

"The proposal for a meeting will no doubt have a strong impact on the SP members.

"It should be noted that the document of the Copcon officers accepts a front broad enough to include the ranks of the SP, although not its leaders."

The CP denied that its proposal represented a shift from its alliance with the far-left groups: "The alliance with the revolutionary parties is today the essential nucleus of a vast front of the social and political forces that support the revolutionary process on the road to socialism."

The statement stressed that the CP had not changed its position toward the SP. "The party continues to believe that the establishment of bourgeois democracy in Portugal is neither possible nor desirable and that the Social Democracy both in Portugal and abroad is opposed to the Portuguese revolutionary process."

However, at least two groups rejected these arguments: "The PRP-BR repudiates any and all conciliation with the Social Democracy, the spearhead of imperialism in our country. For our party, the struggle against imperialism includes as a prerequisite struggling against Social Democracy. . . .

"The proposal for a 'meeting' to 'seek in common a solution to the crisis,' which the document of the PCP leadership made to the president of the republic and the SP, together with a mélange of other forces, represents a betrayal of the revolutionary organizations the PCP has worked with and of the premier who has been insulted and vilified by the SP. Finally, the greatest betrayal is of the working masses and the CP's own ranks who supported revolutionary unity against the Social Democracy by coming out to demonstrate enthusiastically in the August 28 march."

#### The LCI's Views

The LCI communiqué published in the *Intercontinental Press*

\*For text of agreement between the Stalinists and the seven smaller organizations see page 1206.

same issue of *Diário de Notícias* said, among other things, that in proposing the joint meeting, the PCP had "exchanged the unity in action with the revolutionary forces that most of its members want for deals with the Social Democratic forces jeered by its members in the August 27 demonstration." It also said this meant the PCP was abandoning "the perspective of strengthening the organs of workers and people's power."

The statement went on to say that the "August 25 accords among the various organizations were intended to offer an immediate response to the advance of the right and the Social Democracy. It was for this purpose that some mass actions were planned like the demonstration of the 27th, which were designed to offer a united mass response to resist the formation of a government of the right and create the conditions for forming a government of revolutionary unity capable of smashing capitalist reaction."

The LCI statement ended by saying that even without the CP the front must be maintained: "Only in this way will it be possible to prevent the enthusiasm demonstrated by thousands of workers for the proposed formation of a Revolutionary United Front from turning into disillusionment and disorientation."

#### Soares Goes to Bat for PPD

SP leader Soares also accused the CP of making an unprincipled turn. He used the swings of the Stalinist leadership as an excuse to press his own factional interests. His response to Cunhal's overture was quoted at length in the August 29 *Jornal Novo*:

"The SP is willing to have a dialogue with the PCP when this party convinces it by deeds and not just words that it has renounced its adventurist plan for striking for power by antidemocratic methods, when it decides to respect the people's will freely expressed in the recent elections, and the fundamental rules of political democracy—which involve a respect for pluralism in the news media, equality among parties, the absence of partisan discrimination in filling vacancies in the state apparatus, and unions that serve the interests of the workers and are not transmission belts for a political party.

"The SP never wanted to isolate the PCP. It has condemned the attacks on the headquarters of this party, regarding them as acts of intolerable violence, and it stands in solidarity with the Communists when they are persecuted. But it also does not accept the isolation of the PPD [Partido Popular Democrático, the main bourgeois party], which it regards as a party representative of certain strata of the population,

which must be won for the revolution and not driven into the arms of the counterrevolution.

"The SP believes the dragging out of the crisis, caused by the stubbornness with



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which Vasco Gonçalves has clung to power, is causing a dangerous deterioration in the political, economic, and social climate in our country. Many fronts of struggle are about to open simultaneously, and, as is apparent, the revolution is in danger of being lost. The ground has been prepared for a generalized offensive of the counterrevolution in the last weeks. The SP thinks the PCP bears considerable responsibility for this, because of its opportunist and indecisive policy, which has disarmed the workers who believe in it.

"Alvaro Cunhal's last press conference was the first sign pointing in the direction of a certain self-criticism by the PCP and the abandonment of the Vasco Gonçalves government, and even the unnatural alliance it has made with some extremist groups that it previously considered irresponsible and allies objectively of imperialism. It has now jumped to a proposal for a meeting with all groups in the MFA, including the Group of the Nine . . . and the SP. This is a zigzag policy that at bottom reveals the desperation and isolation in which the PCP leadership finds itself.

"What is fundamental for overcoming the crisis is whether the PCP accepts a meeting with all currents in the MFA and with the

democratic parties, that is, a democratic and pluralistic road for achieving socialism—or whether it is going to persist in a putschist policy in which it and its new far-left allies, which it regards as nothing more than shock troops for striking for power, are going to continue to push a minority faction of the MFA, a revolutionary pseudovanguard, to establish a Communist military dictatorship, which the premier, prompted by an irrepressible urge, described in his last speech as a 'people's democracy.'"

Soares could not be expected to acknowledge that by allying with a "moderate" military faction against Gonçalves instead of demanding a workers government responsible to the workers movement as a whole and not to any faction or team in the Armed Forces Movement, the SP shared responsibility with the CP for dividing the proletariat and opening the door to reaction. But he did seem finally to show signs of being genuinely frightened by the rise of the right.

#### Main Threat From Reactionaries

In a statement published in the September 4 *Primeiro de Janeiro*, he said perhaps for the first time, that there was no possibility of a "Communist dictatorship" in Portugal, and that the primary threat was from the reactionaries. Unfortunately, this admission was dangerously belated.

Soares did not need, moreover, to insist that the PCP accept the PPD in the common front. Although Cunhal at first left this bourgeois party out of the proposal, because of its role in the rightist mob attacks on more than fifty PCP headquarters, he made it clear on Hungarian television, the September 6 *Diário de Notícias* reported, that he intended to bring the PPD into any front.

The factional campaign of the PCP against the SP had, of course, helped prepare the way for this popular-frontist move. If it is all right to make a bid to Soares, then why not the leaders of the PPD?

The shift of the PCP and the response of the SP have made it clear once again, however, that while the leaderships of both reformist parties are opposed to any united front of the working class independent of bourgeois forces, pressure is mounting among the ranks for united action against the threat of an anti-working-class offensive.

The problem is that there is no revolutionary party in Portugal with sufficient strength or political authority to give force and direction to the instinctive urge of the working masses to unite in defense of their gains and the revolutionary hopes awakened in the past sixteen months. □

## International Protests Score Trial of Garmendía and Otaegui

Workers in the Basque region of Spain struck for the sixth consecutive day September 3. They were protesting the trial of Basque nationalists José Antonio Garmendía Artola and Angel Otaegui Echeverría.

The nationalists, members of Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA—Basque Nation and Freedom), were convicted on charges stemming from the death of a member of Spain's Civil Guard April 3, 1974. Garmendía was accused of having fired the fatal shot, Otaegui of having prepared the attack "minutely and in detail." On August 29 the two were sentenced to death.

The trial sparked a wave of international protest. Within Spain itself, a general strike involving 130,000 persons began in the Basque Country. Police opened fire on demonstrators in the Basque cities of San Sebastián, Zarauz, and Hernani. One protester was killed, several were injured, and an unknown number were arrested.

More than 300 political prisoners throughout Spain went on a hunger strike to protest the savage sentence. Prisoners in Madrid's Carabanchel prison distributed a statement accusing the government of "political terrorism" in the trial.

Demonstrations were held at Spanish government offices in Brussels and Lisbon and in a number of cities in France and Germany.

Among those sending messages to Franco protesting the death sentence and asking that Garmendía and Otaegui be pardoned were the Belgian government; the archbishop of Madrid, Monsignor Tarazona; the International Commission of Jurists; Ron Hayward, the general secretary of the British Labour party; Sven Anderson, Swedish minister of foreign affairs; the International Federation of Free Trade Unions (CISL); and Amnesty International.

When Garmendía and Otaegui were arrested more than a year ago, Garmendía received a bullet wound in the head. Medical reports from several sources reveal that he has suffered permanent brain damage as a result of subsequent surgery to remove the bullet. When he was still hospitalized, he was questioned by police. His defense attorneys reported on the eve of the trial that the evidence to be used against him was a confession signed with his fingerprints, obtained by the police during this period.

The original indictment against Otaegui specified only that he had given shelter to Garmendía, not that he had taken part in



Mundo

GARMENDIA



Mundo

OTAEGUI

any alleged assassination plan. The defense maintained that he knew nothing of any such plot.

Nonetheless, in less than five hours the military court sentenced both Garmendía

and Otaegui to death by garroting. The verdict is being appealed, and continued international protest is necessary to prevent the Franco regime from carrying out the brutal sentence. □

### Spanish Journalists Protest 'Antiterrorist' Law

An "antiterrorist" law that went into effect in Spain August 27 orders a mandatory death penalty for anyone convicted of killing a government official.

It also defines as "terrorist" the activity of the country's clandestine political parties, which include virtually all opposition groupings.

The law establishes new restrictions on individual civil liberties and the press. Anyone arrested can be held up to ten days before appearing in the courts; previously the victim had to be charged within three days. Police are now permitted to search homes without a warrant.

Persons ruled to have aided or abetted terrorist activities, defended or publicized the ideologies of illegal organizations, criticized the penalties imposed in political cases, or expressed their solidarity with the accused or condemned are liable to in-

creased fines and prison terms.

Journalists and editors judged to have broken the law can be suspended without pay for up to a year.

The law was immediately put to use. The weekly newsmagazines *Cambio 16* and *Posible* were seized as a "preventative measure" August 27. The same day the magazine *Destino* was confiscated, apparently because it published an article entitled "Terrorism? Antiterrorism? Democracy." Also reported seized were issues of *Doblón*, *Andalán*, and *Triunfo*.

The first public criticism of the new law came from the press. *Cambio 16* published an issue with a black cover, headlined "The Poor Press." An editorial said that it was impossible for editors to determine when "they have violated the press law and other limits on reporting news."

*Hoja de Lunes*, a weekly publication of

*Intercontinental Press*

the journalists union, protested that the law "goes further than its objective aim of ending terrorism."

The regular column in the September 6 issue of the Barcelona newsmagazine *Mun-*

*do* entitled "National Opinion" began:

"After contemplating and scratching my head over what topic would be of general interest and not dangerous, I found one at last: the weather."

The Franco regime has made it clear that the only permissible news of "terrorist" activities consists of official police releases, government statements, and news reports from Cifa, the government news agency. □

## 'Bring Our Soldiers Home!'

# Portuguese Troops Demonstrate Against Going to Angola

By Ernest Harsch

An estimated 5,000 persons, including 200 military police and troops from various army, navy, and air force units, marched in front of the presidential palace in Lisbon September 1 to protest against sending more Portuguese troops to the African colony of Angola.

"The noticeable presence of numerous soldiers from various companies," a report in the September 2 Lisbon daily *Jornal Novo* commented, "made this one of the largest, if not the largest, demonstration of its kind in Portugal so far."

The protesting troops, some of whom were scheduled to leave for Angola the same night, chanted with the other demonstrators, "No more troops to Angola!" "Bring our soldiers home!" and "No to a new colonial war!"

One of the soldiers told a reporter, "I'm not going to Angola; I don't care what happens." Another said, referring to the Angolans, "It is necessary to give them their independence . . . the rest is up to them."

According to *New York Times* correspondent Marvine Howe, several thousand trade unionists and students marched with the troops. They carried banners reading, "Workers, peasants and soldiers in the same fight for a real democracy."

*Jornal Novo* reported, "Various messages of solidarity with the troops of the military police were read, in particular from several factories (which were greeted with cries of 'long live the working class'), as the demonstration left along the road from São Bento."

According to *Jornal Novo*, the demonstration was supported by the Trotskyist Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT—Revolutionary Workers party) and by two Maoist groups, the Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (MRPP—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party) and the União Democrática do Povo (UDP—People's Democratic Union).

The demonstration also protested the arrest of seven military police who went to the Santa Margarida base in central Portu-

gal the previous week to persuade troops there to refuse to go to Angola. Four battalions were being trained at the camp for service in the colony. One of the chants during the demonstration was "Freedom for the imprisoned anticolonialist soldiers!" (*New York Times*, September 2.)

The arrests had followed a meeting of 500 soldiers of the Lisbon military police unit, who passed a resolution calling for a collective refusal to serve in Angola. The resolution said, according to the *New York Times*, ". . . it is not up to Portuguese soldiers to die and to kill in Angola. . . ."

The demonstrators said that a similar march would be held September 5 and that they would continue protesting "until we get what we want."

The leaders of the MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement) have expressed alarm at the opposition of some of their own troops to the neocolonialist schemes in Angola. "Among the various positions taken against the demonstration," *Jornal Novo* reported, "that of General Carlos Fabião emphasized that it was an act of indiscipline and that everyone faced possible penalties."

The MFA government has also met with continued resistance from the Angolan nationalist organizations. When the MFA announced August 29 that it had suspended the agreement granting Angola its independence next November 11, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) lodged a sharp protest.

The communiqué said, "The MPLA repudiates the assertions of the Portuguese Government, in the introduction to the decree just announced, that the movements are incapable of overcoming their differences in favor of the national interest." It also said the MPLA "vigorously rejects the evident paternalism [of the decree], reminding the Portuguese Government that the Angolan people have a long experience of struggle and know their enemies and objectives full well."

The MPLA also denounced the new

powers granted to the Portuguese high commissioner in Angola to declare a state of siege and suspend such democratic rights as freedom of association and of expression. "We, the MPLA, reaffirm once again to the Portuguese Government that the Angolan people will not abandon their rights and will not hesitate to defend them by force of arms," the statement said.

Before formally suspending the independence agreement August 29, the MFA dissolved the coalition regime of the three nationalist groups and the Portuguese administrators, investing all executive powers with the high commissioner.

The Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA—Angolan National Liberation Front) issued a communiqué from its headquarters in Kinshasa, Zaïre, August 26 denouncing the appointment of a new high commissioner. The FNLA declared it a violation of the independence agreement, which stipulated that all three nationalist groups had to be consulted on such an appointment. The FNLA communiqué concluded that "the law was not respected, and this constitutes another step in the escalating irregularities in which Lisbon is involved."

It is not yet clear whether the MFA still intends to grant Angola its formal independence November 11, the date pledged in the accords. Although the decree announcing the shelving of the accords stated the move was only "temporary," it gave no date for an end to their suspension. The August 30 *Jornal de Notícias* noted that according to "observers," the August 29 decree "opens the door for the postponement of independence if Portugal considers such a move necessary."

The MPLA declared its opposition to any attempt by the MFA to postpone Angola's independence. Its communiqué also warned its two nationalist rivals, the FNLA and UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), that the MPLA "will definitively assume total governmental responsibility on November 11, 1975." □

# French Police Crush Protest in Corsica

[A group of fifty Corsican autonomists, led by Dr. Edmond Simeoni, head of the group Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse (ARC—Action for the Rebirth of Corsica), occupied a vineyard near the village of Aléria August 21. The occupation was brutally crushed by a massive police attack, giving rise to a general strike that virtually paralyzed the island September 1.

[The following account of the events surrounding the occupation appeared in the Aug. 29 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly supported by the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

More than 1,000 troops, armored vehicles, and Puma helicopters were deployed in Corsica against fifty militants of the ARC, armed with hunting rifles. The results of [Interior Minister Michel] Poniatowski's intransigence are in: The state security police launched an attack, losing two men, while two of the autonomists were seriously wounded. There was no doubt that the so-called forces of order were entirely responsible for the blood that was shed. At present the CRS [Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité, state security police] and the state police, recently reinforced by units sent in from the mainland, are carrying out a veritable manhunt.

All the embarrassed communiqués issued by the prefect on the way in which the attack was carried out leave no doubt: Not only did the state security police actually open fire, but they also used attack grenades. This is the only response by the minister of the interior to the demands of the Corsican autonomists. This contrasts sharply with the patient discussions he carried out with the *harkis*,<sup>1</sup> giving them the opportunity to withdraw without fear of facing charges.

Hundreds of police brought in by helicopter crisscrossed the area around Corti and Aléria "to find Simeoni's accomplices." All copies of film shot during the take-over of the farm have been seized by the cops. Eleven members of the ARC have already

been arrested on warrants issued by the State Court, which has been given exceptional jurisdiction and before which Simeoni, the leader of the ARC, is going to have to appear.

What were the ARC militants demanding? The freedom of [Dominique] Capretti, a member jailed [August 6] for an infraction of the law against painting political slogans, the expropriation of the *pieds-noirs* colons who had recently been involved in a swindle, and the placing of the latter's land into communal use. These demands were far from exorbitant and yet they were used to justify a display of force of the latest in antiguerrilla matériel.

Since the beginning of the century Corsicans have had to emigrate in order to provide for their needs. They have been and remain the reservoir from which the army and the state police draw. In the past they accepted this situation. Lacking the means for doing so, they were unable to cultivate Corsican farmland, which was reputed to be sterile. Up to the present, the government has refused to give young farmers the slightest subsidy.

But things were different when the big *pieds-noirs* colons, driven out of Algeria, arrived. As if by miracle, money appeared from all sides. With the hundreds of millions of francs they were granted they cleared the scrub brush and planted grapes. A miracle in the Israeli style, in short. It is easy to understand why the Corsican farmers would be somewhat bitter.

At present, three-quarters of the vineyards are in the hands of 300 colons. The same is true for the tourist industry. All the important holdings are in the hands of big corporations like Trigano and the hotel chains. Only a few crumbs trickle down to the Corsicans. For many young Corsicans this served to spark their anger.

In addition, there is the problem of the Corsican language, which was forbidden in the schools at the beginning of the century; of lost identity; of those who return home after reaching retirement age, only to die a few years later. A Corsican proverb says: "Duve tu nasci, pasci," which may be translated as, "Where you were born is where you should live." This has become a dominant sentiment among the youth of Corsica.

As a result the autonomist movements have been growing, and particularly in the recent period, becoming radicalized. The ARC is one example of this. Apolitical at its

founding, it came out in opposition to the "political clans" and then, at its last congress [August 17] took a stand in favor of the revolutionary road to liberation, self-management, and placing the lands to be confiscated from the colons into communal use.

Does this mean that the ARC has become revolutionary? Not at all. The organization reflects the wavering of Corsican youth, their lack of politicalization, and also the aspirations of a certain sector of the local bourgeoisie. There should be no astonishment at finding within this organization right-wing elements who are trying to maneuver between the pressure of events and their class position.

There is also another autonomist group, the PPCA [Parti du Peuple Corse pour l'Autonomie—Corsican People's party for Autonomy], which calls for autonomy within a socialist framework. But the struggle for autonomy has never taken a clear position on the class struggle and the nature of the society to be built. At the same time, however, seeking to ignore autonomist sentiment as the French Communist party does<sup>2</sup> is to ignore a movement that has shown its strength, inasmuch as it has won the support of the local PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party], the Corsican CFDT [Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor], and the farm workers unions.

In Aléria, Poniatowski created a situation that threatens to become explosive if he continues the insane campaign of repression. Simeoni and all the imprisoned militants must be freed immediately. The roundups and arrests must be halted. The CP can continue to drone on about national unity. The government can ban the ARC, arrest militants. But this does nothing to alleviate the poverty of the peasants and workers of Corsica or to prevent ideas from spreading.

"Denaru e bastunate, un si pidgià senza cuntà." (Never accept money, or blows from a nightstick, without counting them.) Money, Corsica has seen very little of; clubbings it continues to receive. This cannot go on forever. Future Alérias may multiply and spread. □

2. Under the headline "Long Live France" the August 29 issue of the French CP daily *l'Humanité* published a communiqué signed by the Corsican CP. It said in part:

"We Corsican Communists . . . say no to the chauvinist, racist, and fascist slogan 'I francesi fora' [French get out]. Such racist slogans can be used by reactionary groups on the mainland against the thousands of our compatriots who live there. We prefer the old slogan, 'Proletarians of all countries unite!' . . . Long live Corsica! Long live France!"—IP

1. Algerians who fought on the side of the French during the war for independence in Algeria. A group of former *harkis* carried out kidnappings in France August 6 and 16 to press their demand for the right to travel freely to Algeria.—IP

# AROUND THE WORLD



## Toronto Rally Set for October 5 to Demand Release of Morgentaler

The Toronto, Ontario, chapter of the Canadian Association for Repeal of the Abortion Laws (CARAL) has called a protest rally for October 5 to demand amnesty for Dr. Henry Morgentaler. Morgentaler, who has been imprisoned on charges of performing illegal abortions, was acquitted twice during jury trials, but the government has refused to release him.

The call for the action, which is to be held at the University of Toronto, stated, "We are convinced that a mighty expression of indignation and protest will force the government to yield to reason and humanity. We are therefore proposing that all concerned organizations and individuals unite in a mass protest action to demand AMNESTY FOR DR. MORGENTALER NOW!"

## Colonial and Semicolonial World Hit Hardest by Inflation

The annual report of the World Bank says the colonial and semicolonial countries have been the hardest hit as a result of the international recession and inflation.

"For the 1,000 million people living in lower income countries the economic events last year have meant that average real incomes have not risen at all," the report states. It adds that on current forecasts the incomes of these 1,000 million persons may grow by less than 1 percent a year until 1980, the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* reported August 30.

## Vietnamese Refugees on Guam Demonstrate to Return Home

Four U.S. marshals were injured August 31, one of them seriously, when several hundred Vietnamese who were demonstrating to be returned home stormed a guard post at a refugee camp on Guam. The demonstrators hurled rocks at marshals and marines guarding the camp, and burned a barracks and a guard hut. Officials cordoned off the camp to prevent any refugees from leaving and fired tear-gas grenades into the crowd.

More than 1,500 Vietnamese are on Guam awaiting repatriation. They have stepped up their demonstrations, protest meetings, and hunger strikes to force Washington to act. Eight members of Congress who visited

Guam cabled Secretary of State Kissinger August 29, urging the White House to repatriate the refugees if the United Nations did not act within ten days. They said they found an extremely explosive situation on the island that could seriously embarrass the United States.

"The potential incidents, demonstrations, riots, breakouts appear to grow each day," they said.

The August 28 *Wall Street Journal* quoted the ideas of some of the refugees on Guam about the delay in their repatriation:

"Tram Dinh Tru, who was a lieutenant commander in the South Vietnamese navy, says the U.S. doesn't want to repatriate the 1,600 refugees here until all 130,000 refugees in the States have been resettled. He and other Vietnamese here believe that several thousand refugees in the U.S. would prefer repatriation to resettlement once they knew that this group had returned safely to Saigon.

"Other refugees here believe the U.S. is holding back on repatriation, hoping the PRG will agree to trade them for a list of Americans 'missing in action' in Vietnam. Still others insist they won't be sent back until the Central Intelligence Agency has infiltrated the group with spies."

## Saigon Nationalizes Sixteen Banks

The South Vietnamese authorities ordered sixteen private Vietnamese banks to shut down and be placed under the control of the National Bank of Vietnam. In a decree issued August 29, officials ordered the banks to reimburse their depositors and collect all outstanding loans. If necessary the National Bank is to assist in such reimbursements but would have the option of delaying payments.

## Growing Illiteracy Among Women

The number of women who cannot read and write has grown steadily in recent years and women illiterates now constitute almost two-thirds of the world's 800 million illiterate adults. This was a conclusion of a study released by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization at a symposium in Iran September 3.

The UNESCO report said that although the percentage of adult illiterates in the total world population was decreasing, the absolute number was increasing because of

population growth. In 1970 the total number of adult illiterates was 783 million, compared with 735 million in 1960. Women constituted 60 percent (470 million) of adult illiterates in 1970, while in 1960 they constituted 58 percent (426 million).

Today the world's population of illiterate adult women has reached almost half a billion—62 percent of the total illiterate population. This figure was given by a Canadian participant at the symposium, J.R. Kidd, who is general secretary of the International Council for Adult Education, a UNESCO affiliate.

## Puerto Ricans, Dominican Unionists Victims of Balaguer's Repression

In the aftermath of an alleged guerrilla landing in the Dominican Republic in early June, three supporters of Puerto Rican independence, three Dominican trade-union leaders, and a student remain in prison.

The Puerto Ricans—Angel Gandía, John Sampson, and Raúl García Zapata—were sentenced to thirty years in prison July 31 for allegedly having transported the guerrillas to the Dominican Republic.

On August 28 Francisco Antonio Santos, Eugenio Pérez Cepeda, and Julio de Peña Valdez, top leaders of the Dominican Central General de Trabajadores (CGT—General Workers Federation), along with economics student César Félix Santana, were bound over for trial on charges of planning to overthrow the Balaguer government. They were arrested in the roundups following the government's announcement of the supposed guerrilla landing.

None of the guerrillas said by the regime to have made the landing have been found on the island.

## Vladimir Bukovsky Put in Strict-Regime Camp

Imprisoned Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky has been placed in a strict-regime camp by Moscow authorities, his mother reported August 19. The treatment, which includes a restriction of food rations, was allegedly in retaliation for his refusal to participate in prison labor. Bukovsky was sentenced to a twelve-year prison term in 1972 for "anti-Soviet activities."

## Chapter 9

# The SANE March and the NCC Convention

By Fred Halstead

The October 15-16 demonstrations touched a sore nerve in government circles, and a rash of statements attacking the antiwar movement issued from congressmen and administration officials. Senator Thomas J. Dodd, still on his anticommunist crusade, declared: "We have to draw a line, and draw it soon, and draw it hard, between the right of free speech and assembly and the right to perpetrate treason."<sup>1</sup>

The day of the New York and Berkeley marches, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach declared at a press conference in Chicago that the Justice Department was watching the movement and that "there are some Communists involved in it and we may have to investigate."<sup>2</sup>

On November 1, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover expressed the official Johnson administration contempt for the movement in these words: "Anti-Vietnam demonstrators in the U.S. represent a minority for the most part composed of halfway citizens who are neither morally, mentally nor emotionally mature. This is true whether the demonstrators be the college professor or the beatnik."<sup>3</sup>

An editorial in the October 29 *Time* magazine entitled "Vietniks—Self Defeating Dissent" summed up the administration's stance:

"The Vietniks are not going to be able to talk the U.S. out of Vietnam. They made their best try last spring, with a tide of so-

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called teach-ins, at a time when the approaching monsoon season in Vietnam was supposed to guarantee Communist victories; rather than submitting to defeat-by-weather, President Johnson simply stepped up the U.S. effort. For a while, the Vietnik decibel count dropped, only to soar up again when it became evident that the course of the war in Vietnam had turned and that, assuming only the will to stick it out, the U.S. and its South Vietnam ally were on the way to winning. . . . This being the case, it seems just a bit improbable that President Johnson and his national constituency will suddenly succumb to the revived outcry of a thumbnail minority. . . .

"The fact is the Vietniks, by encouraging the Communist hope and expectation that the U.S. does not have the stomach to fight it out in Vietnam, are probably achieving what they would least

like: prolonging the war and adding to the casualty lists on both sides."

The assertion that "the course of the war in Vietnam had turned" was based on the massive intervention of U.S. troops and bombers into the war, which, according to the administration, was designed to "drive the North Vietnamese to the conference table,"<sup>4</sup> and actually had saved the Saigon regime from the imminent collapse it faced at the beginning of the year. By September the authoritative Paris daily *Le Monde* was reporting that U.S. saturation bombing of NLF-controlled areas in South Vietnam had reached a level surpassing the heaviest bombings in World War II. By November the Pentagon admitted there were 160,000 troops in Vietnam with stated plans for 200,000 by the end of the year.

A central feature of Johnson's escalation policy during the spring and summer had been that official reports of increased U.S. involvement were downplayed, released only piecemeal,<sup>5</sup> and accompanied by a propaganda offensive designed to undercut critics on grounds that the U.S. was seeking an end of the war through negotiations. By October the "negotiations" offensive launched in the president's Johns Hopkins speech back in April had worn thin. A candid appraisal of the situation was presented by William Beecher in the October 14 *Wall Street Journal*:

"All around Washington are high level planners who predict that the war is to be settled, not around the conference table, but more likely by the unilateral disengagement of Communist forces from the battle. It is this infinitely more desirable prospect that has made the talk of negotiations subside. . . .

"The negotiations chant served the administration designs quite well. It helped quiet criticism, both domestic and foreign, about our 'militaristic' policy in Vietnam. And at a time when we were launching a mammoth buildup of combat forces, constant talk of negotiations also served to allay the fears of Hanoi, Peking and Moscow about an ultimate invasion of the North. . . ."

Beecher advised: "For such benefits as these, some lip service to negotiations ought to continue. . . ."

Nevertheless, the administration statements about the "consensus" behind its war policy and the insignificance of its critics had a certain whistling-in-the-wind character about them. It had already become apparent that, aside from the largely student-led opposition to the war, there were doubts and divisions in many areas of the population, including within the American ruling class itself where some forces were not at all sure this was the right war at the right time.

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4. *Ibid.*, May 1, 1975.

5. For example: officially the first U.S. regular combat troops, 3,500 Marines, were ordered to Danang on March 7, 1965. The announced purpose was to protect the air base there. They soon found themselves deployed far in the field in areas previously controlled for years by the guerrillas. This was called "dynamic defense," one of the many euphemisms with which Pentagon press agents enriched the language in the course of the war.

1. *Time*, October 29, 1965.

2. *National Guardian*, October 23, 1965.

3. *New York Times*, November 3, 1965.

The reason for these doubts in high circles was pointed to by columnist Walter Lippmann:

"The essential fact which is beginning to seep through dispatches of some of the American correspondents, is that while the Americans can seize almost any place they choose to attack, the Viet Cong will almost surely come back once the Americans leave. . . . The war in Vietnam is like punching a tub full of water. We can make a hole with our powerful fists wherever we punch the water. But once we pull back our hand, possibly to punch another hole in the water, the first hole disappears."<sup>6</sup>

What is more, the weeks immediately following the International Days of Protest saw the first major ground combat by large American units. The results were inconclusive and the casualties high. The number of U.S. combat deaths was reported in the November 14 *New York Times* as over 1,000. The December draft call had been set at 40,200, the largest since the Korean War, and draft boards across the country began to sink their levies into students, married men, and young doctors.

*New York Times* editorial writer James Reston, who had echoed the administration line in criticizing the October 15-16 protesters immediately after those demonstrations, conceded in his November 14 column that "there is a quiet uneasiness in this country about the war in Vietnam—far more widespread and probably more important than the noisy demonstrations in the universities. . . . Officials go on talking as if one more summer or one more winter of American action will bring the desired result, but in private they concede that this kind of war could go on for years."

In this situation the antiwar movement prepared for its next major national activities. These were a "March on Washington for Peace in Vietnam" on November 27, initiated by forces around SANE,<sup>7</sup> and the first convention of the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NCC) Thanksgiving weekend, November 25-28.

Around these events the dispute within the movement over "negotiations" or "immediate withdrawal" reached a sharp struggle. The struggle involved basic strategy: whether the movement should orient toward those forces within the ruling class which were beginning to criticize the escalation policy, and develop a constituency behind them, or whether the movement should build itself as an independent power in the streets. Also involved in this struggle was an estimate—enunciated most clearly by SDS—that challenged the very character of the new antiwar movement as such, holding that the radicals and student youth could not really affect the war and ought to concentrate on other issues.

SANE was the group most clearly identified with the first perspective—orienting toward critics within the establishment. Under pressure of events—including the new antiwar movement as well as the escalation—national SANE had begun as early as June to take up the Vietnam issue and to consider organizing a demonstration on the question. It insisted, however, on maintaining its old exclusionary policy.

Two days after the International Days of Protest a press conference was held in Washington to publicly announce the November 27 SANE march. The event was noteworthy in that a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, George Brown, Jr. (Democrat-California), appeared as a sponsor of the march. By the standards of Congress at the time, it must in fairness be said that Brown's appearance required some courage. But it wasn't too clear whether he was against the war or for it. He declared: "I'm

not calling for withdrawal of American troops . . . and I'm not calling for a surrender to the Viet Cong. We are trying to improve the understanding of the American people of the situation in Vietnam."<sup>8</sup>

March director Sanford Gottlieb decried the government attacks on the movement, but he told the conference: "I hope the Communists would not participate. We will not welcome them, but we can't control the Communists. There will be no attempt to screen the participants."

There would, however, be an attempt to screen the signs and to prohibit organizational literature.<sup>9</sup>

The left wing of the movement, then, could come to the demonstration, but it was not allowed to express its own views on the war. And SANE's line for the march was to express its concern over, rather than outright opposition to, the U.S. involvement in the war.

All this was in line with SANE's strategic perspective. It saw itself as working within the establishment—particularly among liberal Democratic politicians—to convince them that negotiations should begin in Vietnam, and to strengthen the hand of those who did adopt this "dove" position. In this respect the "immediate withdrawal" slogans were a liability. They would shut off the friendly ears of establishment figures, all of whom accepted the basic premises of the cold war.

This perspective was clearly stated by the march organizers: "The March on Washington has a detailed, carefully elaborated set of proposals designed to encourage a negotiated settlement. This statement makes clear the distinct difference in approach between the Administration and its critics. The former assumes that increased military pressure will bring the North Vietnamese to the conference table while the critics suggest that deescalation is the proper path."<sup>10</sup>

This was accurate as far as critics within Congress were concerned. But the new antiwar movement had been having an entirely different experience in reaching out to ordinary people beginning to have doubts on the war.

The ad-hoc Committees to End the War in Vietnam and Vietnam Day Committees had spread across the country ever since the sustained bombings of North Vietnam had begun in February. With the withdrawal of national SDS from a leadership role, these independent committees became the backbone of the new movement—that is, the movement that grew up outside the exclusionary policies of the old peace movement coalitions.

These committees were nonexclusionary, almost always for immediate withdrawal, and action-oriented. They found through experience that it was easier to appeal to the ordinary people they were reaching at the campuses and on the streets with a demand for getting the U.S. out of Vietnam lock, stock, and barrel, than with the complicated and equivocal appeals that preoccupied the negotiations wing of the movement. These CEWVs and VDCs were generally referred to within the movement as "independent committees" because they were not affiliated with any national multi-issue political party or youth group such as SDS, M-2-M, YSA, Du Bois Clubs, etc. This made it possible for them to include members of all such groups as well as unaffiliated independents. They accepted anyone who wanted to work against the war, including members of various radical tendencies, Democrats, Republicans, independents, or anyone else. They were actually local united fronts.

With one exception the multi-issue radical youth groups, including SDS and the Du Bois Clubs, tended to look upon the

6. *Washington Post*, September 30, 1965.

7. The November 27 affair was commonly referred to as the SANE march. Technically, however, it was not sponsored by SANE but by a list of prominent individuals, including leaders of SANE. Sanford Gottlieb, the march coordinator, was a SANE staff member.

8. Quoted in "Report No. 2" by the coordinator, October 20, 1965. Copy in Bloom file, Library of Social History, New York.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

CEWVs and VDCs as rivals to their own local chapters. The exception was the YSA, which threw itself into building the independent committees and fought within them to maintain their focus on antiwar activity and their nonexclusive character. This necessarily meant opposing any moves to have the committees adopt any particular multi-issue political program, including that of the YSA, or to endorse political candidates.

This difference in approach led to a clash between the SWP-YSA tendency and SDS within the New York Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NYCEWV). This presaged in part the struggle which was to break out at the NCC convention.

The New York CEWV had been formed originally by SDS as a citywide coordinating group for an SDS summer project of community organizing on the war issue.

The campus and neighborhood groups which proliferated during the summer and which affiliated to the NYCEWV were, however, not local SDS chapters, but independent committees carrying out antiwar activity. When SDS pressed its multi-issue approach within the steering committee of the NYCEWV, the SWP and YSA members, who were delegated from independent committees, argued for maintaining the focus on antiwar work. A general assembly of the local groups in the CEWV was scheduled for November 4 at which this issue was to be resolved. But at a November 1 steering committee meeting, a bloc of forces led by Stanley Aronowitz, a supporter of SDS, and Carl Griffler, a supporter of the CP-Du Bois Club tendency, carried a vote to dissolve the NYCEWV. (Griffler chaired, though to my knowledge this was the first NYCEWV meeting he'd ever attended.) It was then announced that henceforth the office would operate as a regional SDS group with SDS's multi-issue program.

"This rather surprising move," commented YSAer Jon Britton, "apparently reflected fear on their part, not entirely unjustified, that our line (promoting independent Vietnam committees not officially tied to any radical organization including SDS) would carry" at the November 4 general assembly.<sup>11</sup>

The SWP and YSA were sharply denounced by some within the movement for having resisted this SDS move. The *National Guardian*, a strong supporter of SDS in this period, reported that the former NYCEWV leadership said it had failed as a coordinating body for the independent CEWVs because "groups such as the Socialist Workers Party would not accept a non-sectarian policy,"<sup>12</sup> i.e., that of SDS. This put the matter exactly on its head.

SDS National Secretary Paul Booth declared: "The Trotskyites are so new to the coalition that they don't know how to act. . . . Within the new left, you know, we work for consensus, but how can you get consensus if there is an already committed bloc? The self-destructive forces within the coalition really shouldn't be underestimated."<sup>13</sup>

The fact that the New York Committee to End the War in Vietnam had just self-destructed was certainly not in line with the perspective of the SWP and YSA for the antiwar movement. The same fact was, however, quite in line with the kind of thinking going on at that time in the SDS national office. Although there was some confusion about what SDS's multi-issue program *was* at that time, the national office attitude toward antiwar activity was becoming increasingly clear to those who studied its statements, if not to the general public.

For example, an article by Lee Webb and Paul Booth entitled "The Anti-War Movement: From Protest to Radical Politics" was published by SDS in preparation for the NCC convention. It

11. Letter from Jon Britton to YSA membership, November 12, 1965. Copy in author's files.

12. *National Guardian*, November 13, 1965.

13. Quoted by Thomas Brooks, *New York Times Magazine*, November 7, 1965.

declared: "Essentially, we think that the movement against the war in Vietnam is working on the wrong issue. And that issue is Vietnam. We feel that American foreign policy, and thus the war in Vietnam, is impervious to pressure placed directly on it. Secondly, we feel that the issue of the war in Vietnam cannot involve masses of people here in the United States. Finally, we look with extreme concern on the single-issue orientation of the anti-war protest. We think that this single issue politics, perhaps valid in another time, is simply an obstacle at this time. We are concerned about all of the issues of America and think that the only way to deal with them is together."<sup>14</sup>

YSA Chairman Jack Barnes characterized the multi-issue/single-issue argument as "largely a sham battle that covered up rather than elucidated the issues at stake." Said Barnes:

"All the radical organizations are multi-issue and none believe that society can be changed (either to socialism or some form of participatory democracy) nor war in general abolished by a program or pattern of activity around a single issue. Thus any member of SDS, YSA, Du Bois, M-2-M, has a multi-issue approach to the war.

"However, the Committees to End the War in Vietnam, one of the components of the anti-war movement, were formed around the single issue End the War in Vietnam; U.S. get out. Any attempt to add further planks to *their* program would destroy them. Those who make them up agree on this basic point and no other. To make other conditions for membership in these organizations would *narrow* not broaden them. This includes points like attitudes toward independent politics, class character of U.S. government, support for NLF, and what to do with your draft card."<sup>15</sup>

For the SDS leaders, the attempt to draw the maximum number of Americans into antiwar activity was doomed to frustration and only interfered with their work of developing a radical base in the population. For the SWP and the YSA, however, the movement to get the U.S. out of Vietnam was an imperative central objective which ought not be abandoned. What is more, the YSA viewed the growing antiwar sentiment as a key factor in building a radical base.

"Actually the radical groups have been outstripped by a radicalization of a special type," I wrote in one of three articles published by the socialist weekly the *Militant*, in preparation for the NCC convention. "It is a radicalization which has other roots besides antiwar activity to be sure—such as civil rights, free speech, etc.—but the great majority of the youth are not committed to any particular multi-issue radical approach. No radical tendency is dominant in the movement. Many of these youth are not even radicals in their general political approach. Some of them are simply Democrats or even Republicans. But they are ready, willing and able to be flatly opposed to U.S. intervention in Vietnam and to work with all tendencies opposed to the war. . . .

"This situation imposes a certain responsibility on the radical groups which they should be careful not to abuse. In the natural course of events—with the professional liberals and the Democratic and Republican politicians almost universally supporting the war or at least refusing to organize against it—the radicals find themselves initiating, playing key roles in and leading a growing mass movement. But it is a movement in which the great majority of the participants are not committed to any particular radical program on general social questions, but only on the issue of getting the U.S. out of Vietnam. . . . The worst abuse of this situation would be for any tendency to attempt to turn these

14. Original mimeographed edition distributed at NCC convention. Copy in author's files. Reprinted in *Our Generation*, May 1966.

15. Letter to YSA membership, November 12, 1965. Copy in author's files.

independent committees into a front for its particular multi-issue program, a front which draws people in on the Vietnam war issue and then uses them to support other issues which they did not bargain for when they joined. Such things have occurred in the past and the results have always been disastrous."<sup>16</sup>

In the second of the three articles, which were not simply my own view but were based on SWP and YSA positions adopted after extensive discussion, I said:

"It is well within possibility that not just a few hundred thousand, but millions of Americans can be actively involved in the struggle against the Vietnam war. A movement of that scope, even though centered around the single issue of the war, would have the most profound effects on every social structure in the country, including the trade unions and the soldiers in the army.

"It would very probably also result in a general rise in radical consciousness on many other questions, just as it has already had an impact against red-baiting. But above all, it could be the key factor in forcing an end to the Pentagon's genocidal war in Vietnam. The lives of untold thousands of Vietnamese men, women and children, and U.S. G.I.'s may depend upon it. That alone is reason enough to put aside sectarian differences to unite and help build a national organization which can encompass anyone willing to oppose U.S. involvement in Vietnam, regardless of their commitment, or lack of it, on other questions."<sup>17</sup>

That, then, was the view of the Trotskyist organizations on the potentialities of the antiwar movement. And I admit that when we heard statements such as those by Gitlin and Booth and had experiences such as that with the NYCEWV, we prepared to argue very strongly at the NCC convention. An additional factor that gave urgency to this struggle, in our way of thinking, was that the exclusionary, right wing of the movement, led by SANE, was moving to center stage once again with the march on Washington. In our view it was good that national SANE was finally becoming actively involved on the Vietnam issue. But if the nonexclusionary, immediate-withdrawal wing of the movement were to be left without national focus, the leadership would inevitably revert to SANE, which still couldn't bring itself to break with the anticommunist hysteria or to flatly oppose the U.S. involvement in the war. (SANE had even excluded Staughton Lynd, Robert Parris of SNCC, and Nobel Prize winner Linus Pauling, a major figure of the movement to stop nuclear testing, from sponsorship of the SANE march, "for tactical reasons" as Gottlieb later explained, because their past activities had apparently been too militant in the minds of some of the sponsors SANE was seeking.<sup>18</sup>)

This was the practical implication in the SDS abstentionist position—leave the organization of antiwar activity *as such* to the right wing, while the left wing concerns itself with other matters. We were not about to sit through a "participatory democracy" bull session which was going in that direction without forcing a discussion on this matter. Not even if it meant resurrecting Robert's Rules of Order.

The exact nature of the NCC had been left ambiguous by the founding workshop in August. Whether it was to be a coordinating committee for the whole antiwar movement or the national organization of the independent committees was anybody's guess. The Du Bois Clubs favored the former perspective. SDS, and a number of its older supporters who considered themselves in tune with the "new left"—though many were not without a certain "old left" experience themselves—favored the development of a multi-

issue formation for general radical social change. Some supporters of this view proposed transforming the antiwar movement into a new political party, running candidates in its own right.

Stanley Aronowitz and Irving Beinlin were spokespersons for this general view. While they did not agree with the SDS national office in its downplaying of the Vietnam issue, they wanted SDS to lead antiwar activity and use this to build a multi-issue radical formation. The SDS abdication of antiwar leadership was a source of some pain to them. (For his part, Beinlin remained consistently active in antiwar formations.)

The YSA favored the establishment of a national organization of the independent committees which could adopt the position of immediate withdrawal and be the cutting edge of the broad antiwar movement. If the NCC chose to be a broad umbrella group, then the YSA hoped the NCC convention would provide an opportunity for the independent committees to establish their national organization which would affiliate with the NCC.

A meeting of the NCC steering committee that took place in Ann Arbor September 18-19 to prepare for the convention continued the ambiguity. It decided on a delegated convention including representatives of campus and community committees against the war as well as representatives of national groups. A number of individuals were added to the steering committee at this meeting and in subsequent weeks. At this meeting Emspak expressed some irritation at the fact that SANE had not sent a representative. He was anxious that the NCC be an umbrella group, including groups like SANE. The meeting voted to change the location of the NCC convention from Madison, Wisconsin, to Washington, D.C., to allow participants to attend the SANE march, already scheduled for the Saturday of the same weekend.

Interestingly, the YSAers at this meeting first opposed this change on the grounds that it might contribute to a taming of the left. They abstained on the vote. They agreed later, however, that the change was for the best. For the nonexclusionary wing of the movement to have held its convention in direct competition with the SANE march would have weakened the movement, not strengthened it. It would have created division around an *action*, something generally to be avoided. For all its equivocation, the SANE march did call for a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and was generally seen by the public as an action against the administration's war.

A competing convention would have tended to isolate the radicals from the moderates, force even radical activists to choose between a well-publicized action and a meeting, and tend toward giving the right-wing leaders hegemony. In a mass movement, the problem of revolutionaries is not how to avoid contact with reformist forces, but how to relate to them in a principled, effective way. This was particularly important in this case because the rank and file of SANE itself was already considerably to the left of its national leadership on the war in Vietnam.

Emspak's reasons for desiring a relation with SANE were quite different from these considerations, however. It was simply that he and other supporters of the general line of the CP-Du Bois tendency had a strategic perspective for the antiwar movement which was similar to SANE's. Their central concern was promoting detente between the United States and the Soviet Union to end the cold war, and they saw the antiwar movement as building a constituency for those politicians who might be convinced to negotiate over Vietnam as the major powers had done at Geneva in 1954.<sup>19</sup>

16. *The Militant*, November 15, 1965.

17. *Ibid.*, November 22, 1965.

18. NCC Workshop Reports and Plenary Decisions. Evaluation of the SANE March: Discussion with Gottlieb. NCC mailing, December 18, 1965. Copy in author's files.

19. In this regard it is interesting to compare the demands listed in the SANE march call with those listed in a CP leaflet distributed at the NCC convention. Said the SANE call: "We ask that our government call for a cease-fire, and to this end: Halt the bombing of North Vietnam; Halt the introduction of additional men and material, and ask the other side to do the same. We ask that our government state the conditions under which it will accept peace in Vietnam, and to this end: Reiterate U.S. support for the

This meant a concentration on electoral activity—mainly within the Democratic Party—during election periods. But the congressional elections weren't scheduled until November 1966. The campaigning wouldn't begin in earnest until early summer. In the meantime, single-issue antiwar activity could gather forces. Later, these might be channeled into Democratic Party politics. The CP-Du Bois position on the NCC was then, simply to sit tight.

A memo from the Du Bois Clubs national office to the NCC outlining their suggestions for the convention said: "There is, for example, some talk of making the NCC into an organization unto itself, taking up other issues, and such; other talk is of running candidates. We believe that all of this is premature at best. We recommend that the National Coordinating Committee remain a coordinating committee, that it limit its scope to the issue of Vietnam where the broadest support and greatest unity can be built, and that discussion and decisions regarding peace candidates can be done for now on a local basis."<sup>20</sup>

Between the Ann Arbor meeting and the convention a number of additions were made to the steering committee of persons opposed to the idea of a national organization of the independent committees. These included Carl Griffler, Ed Greer of New Haven, and Arnold Johnson, an old-time national leader of the Communist Party.

During the same period a series of meetings were held in New York of an "advisory" subcommittee of the steering committee to discuss preparations for the convention. It included Beinin, Aronowitz, and Johnson, and was generally unresponsive to suggestions that the question of a national organization of the independent committees be placed on the convention agenda.

On November 4 a position paper outlining such a perspective, which had been passed by the Washington Heights (an area of Manhattan) CEWV, was circulated by members of eight New York area CEWVs, some of whom were also members of the YSA. The paper said:

"The independent committees must stress again and again that they stand on the principle of every people's right to self-determination, a principle upon which this country was founded. This is important because a great majority of the American people still believe in this principle. This is the reason the Johnson Administration tries to justify its intervention in Vietnam by claiming that the U.S. is really there to support self-determination against aggression from the North. We must therefore convince the American people that it is our government and not North Vietnam or China that is violating the Vietnamese people's right of self-determination. Consequently, we must sharply differentiate ourselves from Johnson and his demagogic appeals for 'unconditional negotiations' and demand that our government end its

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principles of the 1954 Geneva Accords—the eventual withdrawal of all foreign military forces, a prohibition against military alliances, the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, and self-determination for the Vietnamese people. . . ."

The CP leaflet said: "*We demand* that President Johnson acknowledge the right of the people of South Vietnam to choose for themselves the government they want—free of all military or political interference. *We demand* an end to the brutal slaughter of Americans and Vietnamese and an end to the drafting and shipping of additional thousands of American youth to South Vietnam. *We demand* an immediate halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and withdrawal from the South in accordance with the Geneva Agreement. *We demand* that our government meet immediately with the National Liberation Front to assure an *end to the war —Now!*" (Copy of this leaflet in author's files.)

The CP wording sounds more militant, but the demands are the same. Immediate withdrawal is studiously avoided in both and withdrawal is qualified as contingent on the Geneva Agreement, which each side in the war interpreted differently and which would obviously have to be renegotiated since it predated the U.S. invasion of Vietnam.

20. Memo to members of the NCC from W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America, November 1, 1965. Copy in author's files.

intervention. . . . Because of the danger of escalation of the war to all of Asia and even world nuclear war, we must be dead serious about ending U.S. intervention in Vietnam. We can be optimistic too. The potential exists for organizing millions of Americans, including those in the army, around this program. . . .

"We hope that out of the Washington Convention will come both a national co-ordinating structure for the entire anti-war movement and a national organization of the independent committees to end the war in Vietnam."<sup>21</sup>

But, when the Madison office released the agenda, there was no provision for discussing the latter point.<sup>22</sup> There were twelve workshops, including everything from "Ideology's Relation to American Foreign Policy" to "Civil Disobedience" but none where representatives from independent committees could meet to discuss the possibility of forming a national organization.

From discussions with those on the "advisory committee" in New York we knew the reason for this omission: some of them didn't want this question discussed. They held that the NCC was already sufficient national organization for the independent committees. They wanted it both ways: The NCC was to be considered the national organization of the independent committees and also the umbrella group for the whole movement. Therefore it couldn't adopt the immediate withdrawal position.

That would leave the immediate withdrawal wing without national focus. A number of YSAers, including Kipp Dawson, a delegate from the San Francisco State College VDC, caucused in Washington, as delegates were arriving the day before the convention. They came up with the idea of a thirteenth workshop for members of independent committees to discuss this question. When I arrived in town late that night and heard of this, I thought nothing much about it. It seemed perfectly logical and was certainly within the tradition of the new movement where at the various gatherings anyone could have a workshop on anything they wanted to discuss. Indeed, the NCC itself had come out of a previously unscheduled workshop at the August Assembly.

The YSA representatives talked the idea over with other arriving delegates, including Jack Weinberg and Jerry Rubin of the Berkeley VDC, who agreed. A call for such a workshop was drawn up, signed by thirty-three delegates from various CEWVs and VDCs, and distributed to the delegates as they entered the Lincoln Memorial Congregational Temple on Eleventh Street for the first session of the convention.

The first plenary session was scheduled to be brief: announcements on workshops and an opening address by Emspak.

Lew Jones, a member of the convention staff from the Washington CEWV, and a YSAer, began with announcements. He simply listed each workshop and the room where it would be held. When he got to the thirteenth workshop, Emspak grabbed the microphone and tried to take it out of Jones's hand. The audience looked on bewildered as the two of them did a little dance wrestling with the mike. To everyone's astonishment this was the beginning of a swirling, three-day fight—which would dominate the entire convention—over whether the independent committee workshop would be held or not.

Jones succeeded in completing the announcement and handed the mike over to Emspak, who set aside his opening remarks and sharply attacked those who had called the thirteenth workshop. He said it was an attempt to split the NCC, that the NCC itself

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21. "A Draft Perspective for the Anti-War Movement." Submitted by individual members of the Queens, New York University, Tompkins Square, Chelsea, Village View, Columbia, and City College of New York antiwar committees; passed by the Washington Heights CEWV. November 4, 1965. Copy in author's files.

22. *Peace and Freedom News*, No. 10, November 12, 1965. (Copy in author's files.)

was all the national organization the independent committees needed, and that anyone interested in a national organization should attend the workshop on "Structure of the NCC" which, along with three others, was scheduled at the same time as the thirteenth.

The rest of the first plenary session was characterized by points of order, unclear procedural motions, and attacks directed at the YSA as attempting either a "take-over" or a split. Robin Maisel, a delegate from the Philadelphia Area CEWV, stated that the purpose of the workshop was not to leave the NCC, that even if a national organization of independent committees were set up, they and the national organization would still be in the NCC. He said half the convention delegates were not from independent committees, that over thirty delegates had registered as from local SDS chapters, and that they had a national organization. The session adjourned to the workshops with Emspak insisting that the thirteenth dissolve itself and come to the meeting on NCC structure.

Meanwhile Marilyn Milligan, Jack Weinberg, and Jerry Rubin, all delegates from the Berkeley VDC and all signers of the controversial workshop call, gathered around fellow VDCer Steve Weissman to caucus. Weissman, a Berkeley leader of SDS, was against the workshop. Milligan reportedly said: "I knew we shouldn't have signed. Those so-called members of independent committees aren't independents at all. They're Y.S.A. The Trots seem to be trying to steal the movement."<sup>23</sup>

Actually all thirty-three of the workshop sponsors were prominent activists in, and all but two, elected delegates of, legitimate independent committees. Slightly less than half of them were also members of the YSA, a fact of which they made no secret. Nevertheless such accusations became a veritable campaign throughout the convention.

As the independent committee workshop convened, the room was packed, not only with independent committee delegates who came to discuss, but with people determined that the workshop should not take place. The atmosphere was ugly and there were some threats to break it up physically. The workshop was in the church cellar. I came running down one of two symmetrical staircases which led from the floor above, when I noticed a big CPer I'd worked with in a rent strike in New York a year or so before, bounding down the other staircase. We almost had it out right there. It was only then that I became aware of the forces we were up against. We were prepared for an argument with SDS, but breaking up a workshop was not their style in those days. This was going to be a fight with the CP.

Jack Weinberg, who was chairing the meeting, was obviously none too comfortable with the situation in which he found himself. What had seemed in normal conversation to be a reasonable and logical idea, now appeared in the face of the concerted attack as a dangerous move to be associated with. A motion was put to dissolve the workshop. It failed, but an orderly meeting was obviously impossible. Another motion, to adjourn temporarily into the NCC structure workshop, and meet again that evening, passed.

The NCC structure workshop was uneventful though it did become obvious that the question of a national organization of independent committees could not be discussed there because the chairman, Carl Griffler, insisted it was out of order. I admit taking an immediate dislike to Griffler's chairmanship when he allowed Beinin and Aronowitz to speak for fifteen minutes on the nature of the NCC and tried to cut me off in three, on the same subject. I took ten, which was all I needed anyway. Aronowitz, incidentally, was a delegate from the West Side (New York) Committee for Independent Political Action (CIPA), a multi-issue radical group involved in electoral politics. He considered it an "independent committee."

23. Renata Adler, *New Yorker*, December 11, 1965.

Griffler had been appointed to chair this workshop by the steering committee, which by this time had so many additions—by what standard or method was never explained—that no one was quite sure just who was on it.<sup>24</sup> I was convinced then, and still am, that it was artificially packed with supporters of the Madison office.

That evening the thirteenth workshop reconvened at the Hotel Harrington, where several others were also being held as well as a meeting of the steering committee, and where many of the 1,500 persons in attendance at the convention were housed. The thirteenth workshop room would only hold about 200 people, standing. Since I was not a delegate from an independent committee, I didn't try to get in, but stood at the edge of the crowd which was pressing at the door. Danny Rosenshine, a delegate from the Cleveland CEWV, was delivering a report on the history of the new movement and the role so far played in it by the various political youth groups and the independent committees. Suddenly Irving Beinin pushed past me into the room. He was built a bit like a bulldog anyway, and had that kind of look on his face. Though I knew he was going to try to get the meeting to disband, I couldn't help but admire his energy and fight—he was no youth—as he plowed through the crowd to the microphone.

He demanded to speak on behalf of the steering committee. Lew Jones, in the chair, made him wait until Rosenshine was finished and by then Beinin was livid. He declared the meeting out of order and an attempt to "split." For Beinin, the explanations that even if a national organization of independent committees were formed, it and the committees would still be part of the NCC umbrella was beside the point. He viewed this convention as the first national gathering of the "new left" which should contribute to the formation of a new mass multi-issue radical or broadly inclusive socialist party, of the type of the time of Debs. On this view, to organize the independent committees into a national organization centered on the war issue would tend to reduce the NCC itself to being a single-issue coordinating group.

But the arguments he used in this meeting were not that subtle. He simply declared the meeting at war with the steering committee and the prominent people on it and out of order. Those involved in calling this workshop were either dupes of or members of "a small group" trying to split the independent committees away from the rest of the movement and take them over for its own purposes. In the debate that followed, Weinberg threw in the towel. He said he still favored a national organization of independent committees, but didn't want to cause trouble with the steering committee, so he favored adjourning. Jerry Rubin stood up on a chair, declared he had been duped by the YSA, and waving the workshop call, said it was "beyond my comprehension" how he had ever put his name on it.

The motion to adjourn was defeated and Rubin led a walkout, including most of the Berkeley delegation. The workshop did not collapse, but from then on the YSA was the only organized force leading the fight for it. The meeting prepared some working papers for distribution to the convention, and, in a compromise, voted to adjourn for the next day—Friday—to see what developed in the NCC structure workshop and whether the NCC itself could adopt an "immediate withdrawal" position.

The next day a workshop on future national action decided to propose national days of protest for March 25-26, 1966, under the theme: "Bring the Troops Home Now!"

But in the Friday night and Saturday morning plenary

24. A report on the NCC convention from the National Executive of the Du Bois Clubs states: "68 out of 73 steering committee seats were controlled by independent committees. There were 5 votes for national organizations, while the independents had 68." (Copy in author's files.) No source is cited for these figures, which in any case are suspect on the face of it because they do not account for the committee seats held by prominent individuals, who were not placed on the committee as representatives of organizations.

sessions, the convention proved incapable of adopting the immediate withdrawal position for the NCC.

Friday night, the question of participation in the next day's SANE march was being discussed in a wild session when a delegation of Southern civil rights activists moved that the convention support the SANE march by attending it under the slogan: "Freedom Now—Withdraw Now!"

There was much cheering, but a counter motion was quickly made by Aronowitz that the SANE march be supported but no recommendation be made on slogans. He declared that personally he would carry the withdrawal slogan, but that the NCC was a broad body, coordinating for many groups, some of which would not accept the withdrawal slogan, and that therefore it would be incorrect for the convention to adopt it.

Bob Heisler, a delegate from the New York Du Bois Club, opposed the motion of the Southern delegation on the simple basis of opposition to the withdrawal slogan.<sup>25</sup> He said the movement "should not let Johnson steal the 'negotiate' slogan." The Aronowitz motion passed.

Aronowitz, however, remained one of the leading opponents of the idea of a national organization of the independent committees which *could* adopt the withdrawal slogan, in spite of his clear statement as to the umbrella perspective for the NCC. This was not his only contradiction. Like Beinin, he also envisaged the NCC developing into a new multi-issue radical group, something the moderate forces such as SANE certainly wouldn't involve themselves with. The inevitable logic of a multi-issue umbrella including such groups as SANE would have to be a coalition of radical-liberal forces subordinated to the multi-issue program of the liberal politicians, to a wing of the Democratic Party, in the practicalities of the situation. In Marxist terminology, the technical name for such a coalition is a "popular front." (This is one reason the SWP and the YSA wanted no part of it. We were willing to work with liberal politicians on a point of agreement—that is, in a single-issue coalition—but not to support the rest of their program or to vote for them.) This held out no contradiction for the CP or the Du Bois Clubs, however. It was part of their strategic perspective for the movement.

The Saturday morning plenary was calm and orderly, chaired by Dave Dellinger. It took up the proposed March 25-26 national action. It was here that Paul Booth, in a quiet, almost apologetic tone, outlined the SDS position, including the point that the antiwar movement couldn't affect this war, that it was necessary to build a grass-roots radical movement that would grow and eventually "stop the seventh war from now." He made a motion against another national antiwar demonstration. "It's defeated unanimously," announced Dellinger as the vote was taken, "including Paul Booth." In the interest of not hurting the action, Booth said he would not vote for his own negative motion.

The theme of the national action was voted separately. Not only Trotskyists, but many others, including Staughton Lynd, a consistent supporter of "immediate withdrawal," though not of the thirteenth workshop, spoke for "Bring the Troops Home Now!" Hugh Fowler, national chairman of the Du Bois Clubs, spoke against it, and for specifying no theme. Once again the

motion not to specify carried. It was clear that the NCC itself could not adopt immediate withdrawal.

The convention adjourned to attend the SANE march. Meanwhile the rest of the convention—including most of the other workshops—had not been going well by anybody's standards. In part this was due to the atmosphere created by the fight over the independent committee workshop. The corridors were full of accusations and counterarguments. The great bulk of those present had not attended the disputed workshop and had only the vaguest idea of what was going on in that respect, which only added to the confusion.

Most workshops had accomplished little, for the simple reason that the forces at this convention did not, and could not, agree on much more than what had brought them together in the first place—opposition to the war in Vietnam. The "multi-issue" discussions were confused and frustrating, as they would inevitably have been whether the fight over the thirteenth workshop had occurred or not. In addition, the steering committee had been in almost continuous session, trying to agree on what to do, and failing for the same inexorable reason.

Even some ardent supporters of the "immediate withdrawal" position, like Staughton Lynd and Dave Dellinger, appalled by the heat of the dispute, blamed the shambles on the YSA, not for the YSA's position, with which they had much agreement, but for fighting for it on the level of parliamentary debate and maneuver. The whole atmosphere reminded me of a line from Kipling: "If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs and blaming it on you . . ."

By this time the supporters of the Madison office had convinced themselves that if the independent committee workshop—which was scheduled to reconvene after the march—actually succeeded in meeting for a full session, it would mean the capture of the convention by the YSA. The only grain of truth to this was that the YSA was the only national youth group that supported the independent committee workshop and that workshop was the only place where a specific realizable proposal—aside from March 25-26 and a February 12 demonstration in the South—was being considered. The steering committee itself had not come up with one.

After briefly checking out the SANE march, I came back to the hotel and sat in on the steering committee meeting, just listening. Someone tapped me on the shoulder and handed me a note asking me and Jack Barnes, national YSA chairman, to go to a certain room in the hotel. We left quietly and went there.

It was the proverbial smoke-filled room—a small one—crowded with a number of prominent members of the steering committee whom I now noticed had not been at the meeting downstairs. These included Dellinger, Lynd, Beinin, Aronowitz, and several others. We asked what was wanted of us and one of them replied: Isn't there some way we can work this thing out? So we told them our views, which was nothing we hadn't already stated in front of the convention delegates. They seemed to have difficulty grasping our point that what happened with the independent committee workshop was not up to us but to the delegates from the independent committees.

Two astounding facts struck me—and Jack—after only a little of the conversation. First, there was no one present from the CP or the Du Bois Clubs or the Madison office. Second, these people—and apparently those in the meeting downstairs as well—did not know that the independent committee workshop was scheduled to try to meet once again, when the delegates returned from the march. They would have been able to find this out if they had simply milled about among the ordinary delegates where it had been announced.

Jack and I felt no obligation to tell them, either, so some of them could run down and try to break up the workshop again. So we just sat there, passing the time of day, as long as we could.

Suddenly there was loud knocking at the door. It was Adam

25. A peculiarity of the Du Bois Clubs' own brand of participatory democracy must be noted here. The group's founding convention in 1964 had adopted a statement on Vietnam including the following: "This convention demands the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops and war material from South Vietnam and a return to the Geneva Agreement of 1954." The resolution made no mention of negotiations as such (copy in author's files). Formally the "negotiations" demand was not added, and the "immediate" dropped, until the Du Bois National Committee meeting in Philadelphia December 2-4, immediately after the NCC convention. The Du Bois Club spokespersons operated on the negotiations line, however, at the NCC convention and for some time beforehand. (*Dimensions*, Discussion Journal of the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs. Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1966. Copy in author's files.)

Schesch of the NCC staff in Madison, who had finally noticed who was missing from the meeting downstairs. He had put two and two together and gone searching for the culprits. He demanded the meeting disband and return to the steering committee. "Is this participatory democracy?" he shouted. (Indeed it *was* a logical outcome of the "new left" affectation of contempt for the rules of give-and-take debate. In themselves these are no guarantee of democracy, but without them decision by a self-appointed clique is impossible to avoid.) With Schesch riding herd, we all returned to the steering committee meeting where Jack and I continued to pass the time of day, until the independent committee workshop was well under way.

When word of this finally reached the steering committee, it broke up immediately, some of its members running down the hall yelling, "The Trots have taken over." This time, however, the workshop had placed guards at the door who wouldn't let anyone in who wasn't a member of an independent committee. An exception was Lynd, who spoke before the group. The meeting proceeded without disruption, with about 170 present. The steering committee waited dejectedly for the outcome. In light of their fears, the outcome was anticlimactical.

The workshop decided that the formation of a national organization of independent committees would be premature at this point. Instead it formed a caucus of individuals to advocate the idea. It adopted some working papers describing what such a national organization might look like, and it drew up a proposal for the structure of the NCC to present to the final session of the convention on Sunday morning.

With this news, the steering committee reconvened for another night-long session in which it tried to agree on a different proposal for NCC structure.

\* \* \*

Meanwhile, the SANE march had drawn some 35,000 participants, the biggest antiwar action so far. Signs carried by the marchers expressed a variety of views on ending the war, including "immediate withdrawal." Since the issuance of the call, the march organizers had modified their position on this score to one of asking "courteously" those with such "unauthorized" signs to put them down, but letting them participate anyway if they didn't. Dierdre Griswold, of Youth Against War and Fascism, had announced at the NCC convention that YAWF had printed a large number of such signs which were available for those who wanted them.

The platform, however, was so moderate that it was difficult to tell whether some of the speakers were against the war. Norman Thomas, Coretta King, and Dr. Spock were distinguished exceptions, but still quite mild. SANE had, however, invited Carl Oglesby, then president of SDS, to be a sponsor and to speak at the affair. He was to represent the radicals. He was shunted to nearly the end of the long rally and the crowd was beginning to leave around the edges. The edges hesitated as he began to speak, then stayed, enraptured, and the crowd gave him an ovation when he finished. The chairman, Sanford Gottlieb, walked over to him and raised Oglesby's arm like a prize fighter who'd just won a bout.

Oglesby's speech was a work of art. It was, at one and the same time, a moving indictment of the U.S. involvement in the war, and a summary of the current thinking of the best of the SDS "old guard." With a kind of equivocal anger, it captured the mood of the liberals betrayed by their own kind in government, which is one reason it was so deeply felt by so many of those who heard it. Said Oglesby:

"The original commitment in Vietnam was made by President Truman, a mainstream liberal. It was seconded by President Eisenhower, a moderate liberal. It was intensified by the late President Kennedy, a flaming liberal. Think of the men who now

engineer that war—those who study the maps, give the commands, push the buttons, and tally the dead: Bundy, McNamara, Rusk, Lodge, Goldberg, the President himself.

"They are not moral monsters.

"They are all honorable men.

"They are all liberals. . . . Maybe we have here two quite different liberalisms: one authentically humanist; the other not so human at all."

He conjured up a conversation between the revolutionaries of 1776 and the liberals who now ran the country:

"Our dead revolutionaries would soon wonder why their country was fighting against what appeared to be a revolution. The living liberals would hotly deny that it is one: there are troops coming in from outside, the rebels get arms from other countries, most of the people are not on their side, and they practice terror against their own. Therefore: *not* a revolution.

"What would our dead revolutionaries answer? They might say: 'What fools and bandits, sirs, you make then of us. Outside help? Do you remember Lafayette? . . . And what's this about terror? Did you never hear what we did to our own Loyalists? Or about the thousands of rich American Tories who fled for their lives to Canada? And as for popular support, do you not know that we had less than one-third of our people with us? That, in fact, the colony of New York recruited more troops for the British than for the revolution? Should we give it all back?'"

"Revolutions do not take place in velvet boxes," continued Oglesby, "they never have. It is only the poets who make them lovely. What the National Liberation Front is fighting in Vietnam is a complex and vicious war. This war is also a revolution, as honest a revolution as you can find anywhere in history. And this is a fact which all our intricate official denials will never change.

"But it doesn't make any difference to our leaders anyway. . . . There is simply no such thing, now, for us as a just revolution. . . . Never mind the melting poverty and hopelessness that are the basic facts of life for most modern men; and never mind that for these millions there is now an increasingly perceptible relationship between their sorrow and our contentment.

"Can we understand why the Negroes of Watts rebelled [in August 1965]? Then why do we need a devil theory to explain the rebellion of the South Vietnamese? Can we understand the oppression in Mississippi, or the anguish that our Northern ghettos makes epidemic? Then why can't we see that our proper human struggle is not with Communism or revolutionaries, but with the social desperation that drives good men to violence, both here and abroad?"

There followed a summary of American foreign policy, and its pursuit of counterrevolution with "6,000 military bases on foreign soil." Then he continued:

"We have lost that mysterious social desire for human equity that from time to time has given us genuine moral drive. We have become a nation of young, bright-eyed, hard hearted, slim-waisted, bullet-headed make-out artists. A nation—may I say it?—of beardless liberals. . . .

"Some will make of it that I overdraw the matter. Many will ask: What about the other side? To be sure, there is the bitter ugliness of Czechoslovakia, Poland, those infamous Russian tanks in the streets of Budapest. But my anger only rises to hear some say that sorrow cancels sorrow, or that *this* one's shame deposits in *that* one's account the right to shamefulness. And others will make of it that I sound mighty anti-American. To these, I say: Don't blame *me* for *that*! Blame those who mouthed my liberal values and broke my American heart . . ."26

\* \* \*

Back at the convention, the full steering committee failed to

26. Quoted from *Biweekly Information/Action Report*, early December 1965. Ann Arbor. Copy in author's files.

agree on a proposal for the structure of the NCC. A hurried meeting Sunday morning, attended by less than half the members, finally agreed to present a draft, originally submitted by the Madison CEWV and revised by Weinberg and others. As revised, it was similar to that proposed by the thirteenth workshop, with only two significant points of difference: The workshop proposal contained a specific nonexclusion clause: "No group shall be excluded from participating because of its political views." The steering committee proposal did not. The workshop proposal limited national political organizations to one vote, the steering committee proposal gave a vote to any local chapter of a national political organization that was the sole antiwar group in its area.<sup>27</sup>

Because of Sunday services, the final session of the convention could not be held in the church. Unfortunately the alternate hall held only 400 people, not much more than the voting delegates. The fact that so many of the 1,500 persons who had attended the convention did not attend this last session also contributed to the confusion that so many carried away with them.

The session consisted of some workshop reports and a debate on structure. The steering committee proposal was adopted by a vote of 110 to 45. Most of the delegates simply didn't vote. (There were 378 delegates registered, exactly half of whom were registered from independent committees.<sup>28</sup>) The significance of the session was not the adopted structure document—which was never implemented anyway—but the fact that the session took place at all, and was orderly with Dellinger in the chair. This indicated that the convention had ended without a split, and that there would at least be unity around the calls to the next scheduled demonstrations—a February 12 day of antiwar actions in the South and March 25-26 nationally.

Immediately following the convention the caucus from the thirteenth workshop held a meeting attended by 140 members of independent committees. A motion to form a national organization of independent committees then and there got only a handful of votes. A motion to continue as a grouping of individuals in the "Caucus to Constitute a National Organization of Local Independent Committees for the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops Now" was passed. A caucus steering committee of three was elected: Kipp Dawson, Danny Rosenshine, and Jens Jensen, chairman of the Cambridge, Massachusetts, CEWV. It was also decided that the caucus would put out a "Bring the Troops Home Now Newsletter." A motion to support the NCC was passed unanimously.

\* \* \*

The reports on the convention often credited—or blamed—the YSA for leading the fight for immediate withdrawal and the thirteenth workshop. Very few, however, mentioned the leading role played by the CP and the Du Bois Clubs which had blocked with the older "supporters of SDS" to lead the fight on the other side.

A report on the convention from the National Executive of the Du Bois Club, however, took credit as follows: "In the steering committee, the DBC played a decisive role. We were able to take many of the [Du Bois] caucus conclusions into these discussions, to contribute ably to the deliberations, to build close working relations with key independents, and to gain the respect of most of the delegates present. We provided a strong backstop to the independents who finally exposed the maneuvers of the minority faction without becoming the sole source of that exposure. . . .

"Though we did not play a dominant role in providing

27. "Convention Resolutions on NCC Structure," *Bring the Troops Home Now Newsletter*, December 4, 1965. (Library of Social History, New York.)

28. "Reflections on the NCC Convention's Credentials" by Jens Jensen, *Bring the Troops Home Now Newsletter*, December 25, 1965. Jensen was a member of the credentials committee.

programmatic suggestions, we contributed greatly in finally bringing the issues of program to the plenum, and far outshined all others in the overall contribution we made."<sup>29</sup>

SDS itself, it was generally recognized, played no role at all beyond Booth's "seventh war from now" speech.

A remark by Jack Weinberg during the structure debate indicated the discomfort of many self-styled "new lefters" at finding themselves in a struggle essentially led—on opposite sides—by the two main ideological tendencies of the "old left." Weinberg was explaining why he and others had modified the Madison proposal in an attempt to reach a compromise when he said: "We didn't want to come out of here . . . with a Third and Fourth International of the peace movement." The response of the audience indicated he wasn't the only one who knew what the lineup really was.<sup>30</sup>

Following the convention the YSA was roundly denounced for its role there. Some of this was simply traditional vilification of Trotskyists by Stalinists. Some of it came from moderates who resented the unequivocal character of the immediate withdrawal demand. But much of it came from movement figures not particularly prejudiced against the YSA as such who blamed it for the fact that so sharp a dispute had occurred. The fact that the steering committee had not put a key point on the agenda in spite of repeated requests was ignored. The other fact that the YSAers and other delegates from independent committees had maneuvered around the steering committee to make sure it would be on the agenda was considered the major crime. To Staughton Lynd, for example, the problem was one of "trust" and "feeling." An article by Lynd and Bill Tabb in the NCC newsletter declared:

"Although we resented the attempt to form a new organization based on the position 'Bring the Troops Home,' we think many if not most of the delegates agreed with the position and that the group obliged us to face the key question of the difference between demanding negotiations and demanding troop withdrawal. . . . Although the steering committee and the NCC generally are not dominated by Stalinists, the Du Bois Clubs, or a conspiracy of persons favoring a popular front, in making this false charge, the YSA did bare the critical failure of the NCC: the absence of trust and communication—and of 'being in touch'—between the coordinating committee office and the local groups. . . . The problem involves structure and requires structural changes, but is essentially a problem of feeling."<sup>31</sup>

James P. Cannon, the seventy-five-year-old national chairman of the SWP, took a different view of the matter of trust.

" . . . If I would criticize our comrades who were in charge of the fight in Washington, it would perhaps be for a fault that is hard to avoid in the absence of experience of this sort. That is, the underestimation of political opponents; an assumption that everything is going to be on the level, which is a very bad assumption when you have Stalinists and Social Democrats to deal with. They may possibly have been caught by surprise. I didn't doubt for one minute about the ambush being prepared after I heard that several weeks before the conference was held the *Daily Worker* and the *People's World* suddenly began to promote the conference in high gear. I know what that means. I don't have the slightest doubt that they stacked the convention with every kind of delegate from every kind of paper organization they could mobilize. I don't doubt that they stacked the steering committee, that they rigged the agenda, in such a way that the

29. Report on the Convention of the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam. From the National Executive of the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America. Copy in author's files.

30. This incident is also described in *New America*, December 18, 1965.

31. *Peace and Freedom News*, No. 12, December 13, 1965. (Copy in author's files.)

delegates of many independent committees and our own people ran into a prepared fight in which there was room for everything except the one thing they were most interested in. That was promoting the real slogan of the movement. . . . And of the right and necessity of the independent committees organized under that slogan to unite themselves nationally. . . .

"I think our comrades were correct to adopt that slogan [Bring the Troops Home Now!] and their militancy at the conference and their refusal to be bluffed or bulldozed is quite admirable. All the more so that they were perhaps taken by surprise and hadn't had previous experience with what the perfidy of Stalinism and the Social Democracy is really like. I will guarantee you that they will never be taken by surprise again."<sup>32</sup>

It is now known, from documents released through the SWP's lawsuit against government harassment, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation tried to add fuel to the fires roasting the YSA after the NCC convention. This was part of the FBI's COINTEL-PRO efforts to disrupt various radical, Black, and antiwar groups. One of these FBI-authored documents, entitled "An Open Letter to Trotskyites" and purporting to come from within the radical movement, was mailed anonymously to members of the SWP as well as to antiwar committees and other radical groups. It said in part:

"Presently, you've been struggling with your party in its efforts to become part of the greatest ground swell of opposition to this country's imperialist policies that has ever existed. To this end, you had high hopes as the party's youth arm, the Young Socialist Alliance, was dispatched to Washington, D.C. last Thanksgiving to participate in anti-war conferences and a massive demonstration of protest to U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Surely, this was an unprecedented opportunity to militate against Washington and Wall Street. But, true to the SWP's history of sectarianism, you witnessed the young 'Trots' promote a divisionary and undermining line of 'immediate withdrawal' at these conferences.

"Prophetically, you saw your party and its youth soundly defeated at this conference in yet another attempt to recruit through division and domination. Your attempt to 'save face', following this debacle, was the promotion of a Caucus of 'independent' anti-war committees based solely on immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces in Vietnam. And you justly suspect now that this tactic is viewed by radicals and independents alike as a 'paper front' composed of committees hastily formed and led by YSA members throughout the country. . . . Your humiliation in the public and radical press is now complete. . . ."<sup>33</sup>

But this was a police provocateur's pipe dream. Actually, the morale of the YSA and its influence within the antiwar movement were greatly enhanced by the fight it helped lead around the issues at the NCC convention. This was one of the convention's few lasting results. Before the convention the YSA was generally considered the smallest and least influential of the three major radical youth groups (SDS, Du Bois Clubs, and YSA). After the convention it was recognized as a leading force in the immediate-withdrawal wing of the antiwar movement.

That wing had as yet no national organization, but it was clear that it would not be buried and it did retain a national voice in the *Bring the Troops Home Now Newsletter*, within the broader movement.

One report on the convention, by Renata Adler in the *New Yorker*, was entitled "The Price of Peace Is Confusion." This pretty much summed up the impression gained by the media as well as some of the delegates. Many observers at that time viewed

32. "Revolutionary Policies in the Antiwar Movement," by James P. Cannon, in *Revolutionary Strategy in the Fight Against the Vietnam War* (New York: Education for Socialists Bulletin, April 1975), pp. 15-16.

33. Appended to: U.S. Government Memorandum: To Director, FBI. From Special Agent in Charge, New York. March 10, 1966. Reproduced in the *Militant*, May 30, 1975.

the dispute at the convention as a sign of sectarian madness as well as a tempest in a teapot—an apparent power struggle in a movement with little power and certainly no emoluments for those who were fighting so desperately over what seemed a minor organizational issue. And at times the fight did assume grotesque forms. But the issue at stake was not really that simple, any more than the battle of Gettysburg was really over possession of some Pennsylvania wheat fields, all proportions guarded.

The calling of the thirteenth workshop was the point on which those with two fundamentally different perspectives for the antiwar movement happened willy-nilly to find themselves locked in struggle to decide which program would prevail.

Oglesby's speech at the SANE march was generally considered to have been the high point of the Thanksgiving antiwar events. It was reprinted again and again as an effective and moving piece of antiwar literature. But so far as direction for the movement was concerned, Oglesby was ambivalent. Toward the end of the speech, he said:

"Those allies of ours in the government—are they really our allies? If they *are*, then they don't need advice, they need constituencies; they don't need study groups, they need a *movement*. And if they are *not*, then all the more reason for building that movement with a most relentless conviction."

Should the movement become a constituency for the liberal politicians, or should it be built as an independent movement in the streets? Oglesby raised the question, but he didn't answer it. Neither did SDS at the time. The Du Bois Clubs and the YSA did, each in their own way. The two opposite answers they gave to that question underlay the outwardly confusing fight at the NCC convention.

[Next chapter: *The "Peace Offensive" and the Crisis in the NCC*]

### American Banana Companies Lose Special Concessions in Honduras

The Honduran government announced August 15 the ending of all special concessions granted to U.S. banana companies operating in the country. Beginning September 15 these companies will be subject to the same laws as local companies, according to Chief of State Col. Juan Melgar Castro. He said that while the new measures did not amount to nationalization, "the Honduran people and government will exercise a direct influence" over decisions affecting the country's economy.

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## Portugal: Text of the August 25 Unity Accord

[The following is the text of the unity accord signed by various left groups in Portugal August 25. It is taken from the August 29 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly supported by the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

In the presence of representatives of the MFA,<sup>1</sup> who simply convened the meeting, the representatives of the following parties and political organizations met: FSP, LCI, LUAR, MES, MDP, PCP, PRP-BR,<sup>2</sup> and the First of May Group. They approved the following points:

1. The document drawn up by Copcon<sup>3</sup> and the document entitled "Lines of Programmatic Action and Tasks of Transition" constitute a valid working basis for the elaboration of a revolutionary political program. [Both documents are printed elsewhere in this issue of *Intercontinental Press*.]

2. Such a program represents the indispensable instrument for uniting and organizing the actions of the political forces involved in the revolutionary process, and of the popular masses.

3. The document entitled "Lines of Programmatic Action and Tasks of Transition" constitutes the basic guide document for the activity of the government as long as the necessary conditions have not been met for the formation of a government of revolu-

tionary unity.

4. The creation of a front encompassing the revolutionary parties and other revolutionary political organizations, revolutionary militants, the MFA, and the auto-

## LCI Statement on the Unity Accord

[The following communiqué was issued August 25 by the Executive Committee of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (Internationalist Communist League), sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Portugal. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

The LCI has reached an agreement with the FSP, LUAR, MES, MDP, PCP, PRP-BR, and "First of May" aimed at uniting in action the forces of these organizations so as to halt and defeat the current offensive of capitalist reaction.

An agreement usually means concessions by the signatories on questions not involving political principles. That was the case this time.

The LCI, as an independent organization, is in disagreement with the concrete formulation of certain points in the agreement it reached with the organizations mentioned above.

This is particularly true in regard to the part concerning the integration of the MFA in a front of organs of workers and people's power, of workers and revolutionary parties.

The aim of this front is to coordinate the actions of these organizations in the struggle against capitalist reaction, a struggle the various organizations are engaged in building.

The LCI believes the MFA, such as it has existed, cannot and must not be considered a revolutionary force and therefore capable of being integrated into a revolutionary front. Not only does the MFA include within its ranks many right-wing and Social Democratic officers, such as Jaime Neves and Melo Antunes, as well as elements inclined toward conciliation with them, such as Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. But also, given the objective political role it

has played, the MFA has permitted the bourgeoisie to gain time and to delay the decisive conflicts between the classes.

5. The above-signed have decided to set up a provisional secretariat with the intention of organizing actions that will facilitate a common offensive against the reaction and for the advance of the revolutionary process. The signatories declare that this platform is open to all organizations, revolutionary militants, and organs of people's power that wish to join it.

has played, the MFA has permitted the bourgeoisie to gain time and to delay the decisive conflicts between the classes.

In the present period the divisions within the MFA are a known and recognized fact. A split in the MFA, that is to say, its end, is inevitable.

In the present situation both progressive and revolutionary militants as well as the Social Democrats and the right wing support the MFA. In the split that is approaching, the latter will join, or have already joined, the camp of counterrevolution. The former will join the revolutionary camp.

It is obviously the first group whom the agreement involves. It was their representatives who participated in drafting it. Thus it is not really a case of the MFA being included in the agreement, but rather the MFA's progressive and revolutionary soldiers, sergeants, and officers.

For this reason, the possibility of integrating these military men into the front signifies that the split in the MFA will be, or will become, an accomplished fact. And they will be integrated not as the MFA as such, but as military men joining the camp of proletarian and socialist revolution.

Furthermore, the LCI believes the essential point is that the agreement reached permits the first steps to be taken in unifying the working class; in setting in motion mass actions against the reactionary right; in strengthening the tenants committees, workers committees, and people's assemblies; and in organizing the self-defense of the masses. It also promotes the forging of links between the workers and the progressive and revolutionary soldiers, sailors, and officers, as well as advancement toward the formation of a workers government of revolutionary unity, armed with a clear anticapitalist program, supported by the organs of workers and people's power, and controlled by them. □

1. Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement.—IP

2. Frente Socialista Popular—Socialist People's Front.

Liga Comunista Internacionalista—Internationalist Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

Liga de União e Ação Revolucionária—League for Revolutionary Unity and Action.

Movimento de Esquerda Socialista—Movement of the Socialist Left.

Movimento Democrático Português—Portuguese Democratic Movement.

Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party.

Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado—Brigadas Revolucionárias—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat—Revolutionary Brigades.—IP.

3. Comando Operacional do Continente—Mainland Portugal Operations Command, the regime's military security forces.—IP

# Concerning the Unity Accord

By Ernest Mandel

[The following article was printed in the August 29 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly supported by the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

1. In the present stage of the Portuguese revolution, an agreement between workers organizations must obviously be sought, but it should be sought from the point of view of:

- Organizing the response to the reactionary offensive by encouraging all forms of self-defense and the linking up of the autonomous workers and soldiers organizations. In this sense an agreement between workers organizations could constitute an important starting point.

- Ensuring the defense of the economic, social, and political gains of the working class.

- Promoting the development, extension, and centralization of the structures of self-organization (workers commissions, neighborhood commissions, people's assemblies) and replying in this way to the divisions in the ranks of the workers.

But the August 25 communiqué does not mention any concrete initiative organized in correspondence with these objectives.

2. One of the major obstacles to the advance of the revolutionary process lies in the division introduced into the working class by the policies of the Stalinist leadership of the PCP and the Social Democratic leadership of the Socialist party. The absence of concrete objectives and the total lack of initiatives toward the SP with the view to engaging in a common struggle around the objectives that are understood and shared by the SP workers amounts in practice to endorsing the sectarian policy of the PCP and cutting oneself off from an audacious policy of building a united front that is both indispensable and possible in Portugal today.

3. The "unity agreement" also implies support to the actions of the fifth provisional government, which proposes an "austerity policy" (point 1-b) in its document ("Lines of Programmatic Action and Tasks of Transition")—while in the streets and factories the workers are putting demands such as expropriation under workers control on the agenda. The government could be confronted with these demands any day.

4. At a time when the MFA is being torn apart under the effects of class polarization, the "unity agreement" calls on the MFA in the same way that it does on the workers

commissions, neighborhood committees, people's assemblies, etc., and on the revolutionary parties and organizations of the workers movement, to form a "front"!

Here again it can only be interpreted as an endorsement of the PCP's reformist project for creating a "popular, democratic, and socialist front." By supporting the guide document of the people-MFA alliance, the agreement also places the workers commissions, the neighborhood commissions, and the people's assemblies within the framework of a project of integration that is in opposition to the real autonomy of the mass movement in relation to the institutions of the bourgeois state.

5. To be sure, the agreement is an

## 'Rouge' Statement on the Unity Accord

[The following unsigned article, entitled "Truth on the Other Side of the Pyrenees," was printed in the August 29 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly supported by the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

Beyond the criticisms (printed elsewhere in this issue) of the content of the common agreement signed between the PCP and the Portuguese far-left groups, the document has been rightly seen by many militants in the workers movement as a small historical event. And commented on in this light.

In fact it is the first time a Stalinist party, faced with a rising revolutionary ferment that is radicalizing increasingly important fringes of the workers vanguard to its left, negotiated and signed an agreement on this level with several far-left groups, including a Trotskyist organization.

The breach is rather large. Will it be necessary to revise the almost fifty-year-old police fables about "Hitlerite-Trotskyism"? Or to abandon them altogether?

The fact is that *l'Humanité* is somewhat embarrassed. It was three days ago that the agreement was signed. And the French CP daily has still not informed its readers of the exact list of signatories. It has been content to speak modestly and in general about a text of agreement between the Portuguese CP and some "minority left movements."

In no way do we support the basis of this agreement. But if a Communist party that is considered one of the most traditionalist in Europe can associate with Trotskyists under the perspective of a "workers govern-

ment of revolutionary unity," it should be possible to attain concrete unity in action between the Communist and far-left parties in countries other than Portugal, and on more limited points.

As far as we are concerned, we are ready to organize a common campaign with the Communist party, the Socialist party, and all the workers organizations, a common campaign of support to the Portuguese revolution, against the intrigues of reaction, against NATO and the threats of the imperialist bloc, for the defense and extension of the conquests of the Portuguese proletariat, and for the defense of the organs (commissions, committees, assemblies) that they have set up for themselves.

We formally propose such a campaign and are ready to discuss the exact bases for it.

6. The revolutionary left and the workers vanguard must strive to set their course according to the dynamic of the mass response to the reactionary offensive, revealed by the August 20 demonstration, so as to advance the objectives mentioned in point 1. □

ment of revolutionary unity," it should be possible to attain concrete unity in action between the Communist and far-left parties in countries other than Portugal, and on more limited points.

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# United Secretariat Resolution on Portugal

[The United Secretariat of the Fourth International adopted the following resolution by majority vote September 2.]

\* \* \*

The prerevolutionary situation that opened in Portugal with the beginning of 1975 has gone through an exacerbation marked by the government crisis, the growing division of the MFA, and the fascist attacks in the North of the country, but *above all* by the massive emergence of the autonomous movement of the masses, as revealed by the August 20 demonstration, the impact of which has begun to make itself felt on the reformist organizations.

1. The division of the MFA, triggered by the rise of the class struggle, makes it impossible to stabilize the army, which has been profoundly undermined by the crisis of the hierarchical system and by the political debates and divisions (especially around the COPCON document and the "document of the nine"). In the short run, this breakdown of the army, which is occurring in a context of generalized social crisis, makes it impossible to launch a reactionary coup d'etat without running the risk of civil war. In face of the MFA's incapacity to stabilize its Bonapartist function, the bourgeoisie has moved to counterattack on several fronts:

- internationally, through blackmail threats of economic strangulation on the part of the European imperialist powers (whether with or without Social Democratic governments) and through the financial and military pressure exerted by American imperialism on Portugal and the Portuguese dependencies (the Azores, Madeira, Timor, and Angola).

- nationally, through the de facto junction of the terrorist attacks, the anticommunist mobilizations exploiting the discontent of the petty bourgeoisie of the North, and the civilian and military political offensive combining the orientation of the SP leadership with the great maneuvers of Melo Antunes and sections of the military hierarchy.

2. The August 20 demonstration, which drew 50,000 people, more than a thousand of whom were soldiers, revealed the maturation of the combativity and the elevation of the level of consciousness of important sections of the working class, especially in the workers bastions of Lisbon and the southern region. The radical character of the demands advanced by these sectors—for the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, workers control, and the reconversion of production—objectively place on the agenda the necessity of a centralization of the autonomous organs of the workers (workers

commissions, popular assemblies, "moradores" commissions) in order to respond to the need for socialist planning of the economy.

Nevertheless, the present geographical limitation and uneven development and functioning of these organs must be stressed.

3. The situation is thus characterized by an increased polarization between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, although this does not imply that there will be an immediate qualitative modification of the relationship of forces between the two fundamental classes.

With the accentuation of the economic crisis, which will provoke an intensification of workers struggles that will run up against the government's inability to meet the workers demands, the possibility of the current prerevolutionary situation being transformed into a real revolutionary crisis emerges.

For this, it is important that all initiatives be taken so that the autonomous organs of the workers are developed, coordinated, and centralized, thus permitting a real response to the demands of the toiling masses and to the division of the working class that has been accentuated by the leaderships of the SP and the CP. Toward this end, it is necessary that the autonomous organs take charge of the defense and generalization of workers control, the ex-

propriation of the capitalists, the arming of the proletariat, and the enactment of measures to establish a monopoly of foreign trade, to deepen the agrarian reform, and to institute planning.

In face of the attempts of the "group of nine" to reestablish discipline in the army, to put an end to the beginning of the emergence of workers militias, and to stabilize the MFA as an instrument of the hierarchy, it becomes all the more imperative to forge links between the revolutionary soldiers and officers and the workers commissions, moradores commissions, etc., and to generalize the election of officers by assemblies of soldiers.

Likewise, it is necessary to advance adequate measures (selective price support, moratoria on debts, credit, direct liaison between consumers and small-scale producers, etc.) in order to neutralize reaction's utilization of layers of the petty bourgeoisie, the minifundistas of the North among others.

Finally, the centralization of the autonomous organs of the workers in order to carry out these tasks will take the form of the convocation of a National People's Assembly composed of delegates of the workers commissions, the moradores commissions, the assemblies of military units, and the popular assemblies.

4. The essential obstacle to the realization of this strategic objective lies in the policy of division followed by the leaderships of the SP and the CP.

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The policy of the Social Democratic leadership, which manifestly aims at halting the revolutionary process, is beginning to meet the first signs of resistance from the SP's rank-and-file workers, in spite of the sectarianism and bureaucratic methods utilized against the SP by the CP leadership.

Concurrently, the zigzags of the Stalinist leadership of the CP have provoked disorientation among the CP rank and file at a time when a workers vanguard is forcefully emerging onto the political scene.

Thus, it is not only necessary but also possible to carry out an audacious policy of workers united front directed at both the SP and the CP in order to consolidate a response by the working class as a whole to capitalist reaction, to defend the gains of the workers, and to spur on the development of the revolutionary process. The autonomous organs of the toiling masses are the bodies that are best suited to realize this united front, for in their present form they already group together Socialist workers, Communist workers, revolutionary workers, and workers who belong to no political party.

5. The unitary accord of August 25 testifies to the shift of the relationship of forces between the workers vanguard and the reformist apparatuses.

In the present conjuncture, it was politically correct to seek a united front accord with the CP. But the accord of August 25 did not respond to the actual requirements of the situation.

a) The accord in effect sanctioned the CP's policy of supporting the government and maintaining the unity of the MFA, precisely at the moment that the MFA was being ripped apart by the pressure of antagonistic class forces.

b) The accord mentioned no concrete objective that would permit the unification of the working class and the actual stimulation of workers self-defense and self-organization.

c) Because of this absence, and because of the lack of proposals to the SP (a party that currently groups together nearly half of the proletariat), the accord sanctioned the present division of the workers movement and did not contribute to surmounting this major obstacle to the development of the revolutionary process.

d) Furthermore, the "unitary accord" envisaged the formation of a "front" in which the MFA is included on the same footing as the autonomous organs, parties, and revolutionary organizations of the workers movement. This not only appeared as a stamp of approval of the CP's project of creating a "democratic and socialist popular front," but also fell within the framework of the perspective of integrating the autonomous organs in opposition to their real independence of the institutions

of the bourgeois state.

e) Thus, the accord could easily serve the objective of the CP (as it did during the August 28 demonstration), which is to utilize the weight of the workers vanguard to negotiate compromises on the level of the state apparatus, the government, the army, and the MFA under the best possible conditions.

Now, the relationship of forces permitted revolutionaries to seize this opportunity to lead the CP to take a position on the implementation of the essential tasks necessary for the progress of the revolution. Here, again, the lack of concrete objectives and the concessions made to the CP's political orientation prevented the lessons of the policy of the CP leadership and of the rupture of the "front" from being clearly drawn before the masses.

## Demand Release of Jailed Senegalese Militants

[The following statement was issued by the Groupe Ouvrier Révolutionnaire (GOR—Revolutionary Workers Group) in Dakar, Senegal, June 27. The translation from the French is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

Following a series of arrests of revolutionary militants, many of whom were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to three years, another thirteen militants have just been arrested by the Senegalese government, led by Senghor and his fascist-like cronies Bazacar Sa, minister of finance; Jean Collin, minister of the interior; Moustapha, director of the presidential cabinet; and Doudou N'Gom, minister of education. Those arrested include:

- Eugenie Rokheya, journalist on *Soleil*.
- Decroix Diop, worker.
- Lamine Tope, worker.
- Oumar Gueye, sociologist working at the IFAN (Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noir—Basic Institute for Black Africa).
- Boubacar Keita, laboratory assistant in the science department at Dakar University.
- Ibra Wone, worker.
- Joe Diop, former trainer of the national soccer team.

Thirteen militants arrested, and the Senegalese government is not stopping there. In fact, it has a long list, and many militants are threatened with arrest in the medium or short term. Their names are waiting on the list prepared by the Senegalese political police, who were trained by the French DST [Direction de la Surveillance Territoriale—Bureau of Internal Security] and received further instruction from the Brazilian torturers.

6. In the workers and people's counteroffensive based on the real dynamic of the mass movement, the Trotskyist militants of the LCI will stand in the front ranks of all initiatives fostering the extension, generalization, and centralization of the autonomous organs of the workers and the self-defense of the workers.

It is through the capacity of revolutionary Marxists to fulfill these tasks that the revolutionary party, indispensable for the victory of the Portuguese socialist revolution, will be able to develop.

The Fourth International and all its sections and sympathizing organizations will support the comrades of the LCI by all the means at their disposal and will press for all mobilizations of solidarity with the revolutionary struggle of the Portuguese workers. □

Faced with a disastrous economic situation, a rate of inflation that has climbed to 200 percent in two years, and growing unemployment, the Senegalese government has offered no other solutions but to militarize the education system, to step up the use of spies in the factories and among the peasantry, and to increase the technical, material, and numerical strength of the state police, the security police (the Senegalese equivalent of the CRS [Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité—state security police in France]), and the local police—in short, the whole Senegalese repressive apparatus.

The constant repression going on below the surface is accompanied (heaping irony on top of efficiency) by much noise about democracy, allowing the regime to make use of, among others, the Western Social Democracy. This was shown by the recent visit to Senegal by the secretary of the Socialist International, which in reality represented (even granting ignorance of the facts) support for the repressive policy of the Senegalese regime, thus succeeding in camouflaging it and therefore accentuating it.

We call on national and international public opinion, and in particular all the democratic, left, and far-left press, to demand the immediate and unconditional liberation of all the militants imprisoned in Senegal, to denounce the repressive policies of the Senegalese government, and to demand real and total freedom of expression and the press. □

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# Copcon Draft Outline for a Political Program

[The following document was drawn up by a group of officers in Copcon (Comando Operacional do Continente—Mainland Portugal Operations Command, the military security forces) and published in the Portuguese press August 13. Gen. Saraiva de Carvalho allowed his name to be associated with the document, although he did not commit himself to it. The Portuguese press generally speculated that the actual authors were supporters of the PRP-BR (Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades, a former urban guerrilla group).

[The groups to the left of the Communist party that supported the Gonçalves government accepted the document as an expression of their own programmatic views. Despite the explicit criticism of the CP contained in it, the Portuguese Stalinists also gave it backhanded support and participated in the demonstration called by the “workers and tenants committees” on August 20 and the “People’s United Front” demonstration on August 27 that supported this document. It has been translated by *Intercontinental Press* from the August 13 issue of the Lisbon daily *Jornal Novo*.]

\* \* \*

## I. The Current Situation

1. The situation into which the country was led by the demonstrated incapacity of all organs of power to resolve the concrete problems confronting them has precipitated a general economic decline, with the inevitable aggravation of the imbalance between the urban and rural areas, the Lisbon industrial areas, and other less developed industrial areas.

Heavy-handed bureaucratic rule and attempts by political parties to control the state apparatus, in which the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party] played a particularly prominent role, led some officers who have held a responsible position in the revolutionary process to put forward a document purportedly designed to clarify the present situation.\* In reality, because of the obvious ambiguities it contained, it only caused further confusion.

2. In view of this, the need has arisen for a real clarification of the situation. And this requires us to state our position clearly to the country, because we think the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement] should recognize the

errors it has made to date and expose their causes without any hesitation.

3. The deterioration of the economic situation, with its political and social implications for the broad masses of toilers, is ascribable above all to the failure to establish an objective political line and a consistent governmental program. No combination of economic measures was found that could fill the void created by the breakup of the existing capitalist structure. At the same time, the subordination to imperialism was maintained in all its aspects and with all its consequences—the closing of factories, flight of foreign investment capital, unemployment, and blatant political pressures violating our sovereignty.

4. Supported by class organizations rooted in a rich tradition of struggle, the workers in the cities and in the countryside, as well as large sections of service employees, have managed to wage a more effective struggle to defend their standard of living against inflation, even though this section of the population has been hardest hit by spreading unemployment.

5. Although widely publicized, the structures and policies established to aid small and middle merchants and industrialists have proved totally ineffective. On the contrary, the situation of these groups has grown considerably worse as a result of an increase in taxes and other levies.

6. The small and middle farmers in the North and Center of the country, facing the rising cost of living, higher prices for materials and goods essential to agriculture, and growing difficulty in distributing and marketing their produce, have seen their situation grow steadily worse since April 25.

Domestic trade has not been organized. Speculation by middlemen has not been eliminated, nor has a distribution network been set up that would facilitate circulation between producer and consumer, for the benefit of both.

Without question, it is the small and middle farmers who are suffering most acutely from the effects of the economic decline.

7. With respect to government aid, the areas outside Lisbon have never received the human and material means required to meet, even minimally, the most pressing needs of their people.

8. On the other hand, political education campaigns have been aimed at the rural populations that, because of a lack of proper preparation, have often failed to respect the social and cultural characteristics of the milieu, and in some cases blatantly offended the views and customs of the people. These campaigns were based on verbiage

devoid of any meaning for those to whom they were directed. They did harm in most cases, since they were not accompanied by any concrete measures that could demonstrate to the people that the real objective was to improve their conditions of life.

9. A climate of demoralization and doubt has arisen among the people, alienating from the revolution those who stand to benefit the most from it. The causes of this are fundamentally the following:

a. In most cases, the fascist administrators of the local government bodies were replaced by local petty- and middle-bourgeois elements whose allegiance was to the PCP and the MDP-CDE [Movimento Democrático Português-Comissão Democrática Eleitoral—Portuguese Democratic Movement-Democratic Election Committee, the CP’s petty-bourgeois front]. These types proved incapable of solving the main problems that existed.

b. The distribution of benefits by the Small and Middle Farmers Leagues, whose formation was a response to a long held aspiration of these classes, became a means of showing favoritism to those who followed the political line of those who dominated these organizations [i.e., the Stalinists—IP].

c. The committees set up to dismantle the old Grémios de Lavoura [Agricultural Organizations, corporatist bodies in the countryside] never got beyond the incipient stage. They never dismantled anything. In handing out benefits, they followed the same criteria as those referred to in the case of the Small and Middle Farmers Leagues.

The realization of this fact and the growing discontent resulting from it have been exploited by the reactionaries. They have manipulated and exploited this well justified discontent, managing to touch off an escalation of violent confrontations that has brought the local populations into open opposition to the MFA, because they identify it with the political line responsible for this situation.

10. Holding elections in the conditions under which they were held helped to engender confusion among the people about the instruments they could use to control the apparatus of the state and political power, since the bourgeois structure in which Portuguese society was and is organized did not permit and does not permit instilling a revolutionary consciousness in the broadest toiling masses. In a bourgeois structure, only one thing can come from universal suffrage: a bourgeoisie. In a bourgeois structure it is the bourgeois and reformist parties that have the financial means to take their message to the entire country.

In a bourgeois structure, there is no attempt to debate and resolve the concrete problems; there is only political demagoguery that consists of verbalistic tricks designed to play on the emotions of the people and

\*A reference to the document circulated by Maj. Ernesto Melo Antunes and eight other “moderate” officers, printed elsewhere in this issue.—IP

confuse them. After forty-eight years of fascism, they were unable to see through these tricks. A large measure of responsibility for this has to be laid at the door of the MFA, which made holding elections a point of honor. This aspect was well exploited by forces that had an interest in such elections.

11. The ineffectiveness of four provisional governments was not only the result of the bureaucratic control the PCP tried to impose by infiltrating the state apparatus and the communications media. The SP, the PPD [Partido Popular Democrático—Democratic People's party, the main bourgeois party], and the MDP-CDE, which were also present, shared responsibilities in this that they are now shamelessly trying to cover up.

From the parties to the right of the SP, as well as from the tops of this party itself, nothing can be expected but an attempt to block and turn back the advance of the revolutionary process in order to guarantee the privileges of the big bourgeoisie and its unbridled exploitation of the workers.

12. The MFA's insistence on trying to resolve the contradictions through compromises negotiated with bourgeois parties, and the cover it has been giving to party maneuvers, are discrediting the military in the eyes of the workers.

## II. Analysis of the Document [of the Nine]

1. But the solution to the present situation, for which the MFA bears a great responsibility, will not be found in right-wing palliatives such as are proposed by the document that led us to take this stand.

The construction of socialism will certainly not be advanced by maintaining the coalition in the government. It is not by rejecting Social Democracy, state capitalism, people's democracy, and the gains of the working masses all mixed in together that we can enable these masses to take the leadership of the process or even consolidate the positions already won.

The proposal presented will be taken over by the right, which will gain a field of maneuver to destroy the revolution, regardless of the democratic and patriotic intentions in the minds of the signers of the document.

2. The economic perspective offered by strengthening our ties with the EEC [European Economic Community] and the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] will reinforce the reduction of the country to a shameful economic, financial, and political dependency. Anyone who still had illusions about the designs of these bodies lost them completely when the latest conditions on financial aid to Portugal were made public. Revitalizing private initiative through massive investment of foreign capital will result purely and simply in the loss of national independence. Such a disaster cannot be concealed by saying that

we should also trade with the Third World and the East European countries. It is not by opening the door to imperialism that we will be able to carry out the correct kind of decolonization in the territories still under Portuguese administration, which are also victims of imperialist exploitation.

3. It is not by taking a position of being above parties and failing to draw a line between us and the parties of the right that we can regain credibility, because we have said that our aim is to build socialism, and not to achieve a bourgeois democracy, which would still be capitalist; and this would obviously be the result. How can a plan be described as left when it obscures the role of the masses and rejects the activity of their vanguard? How can they criticize the rate at which the nationalizations have been carried out? Can these means of production be put to the service of the masses while they remain in the hands of the bourgeoisie? How can they ignore the existence of mafia-like capitalist domination in the countryside and the role of the class struggle in destroying it? How can they call for harmony, without distinguishing between the exploiters and the exploited?

4. To concretize this part of the critical analysis of the document, we should note the fundamental point that was not understood, or was overlooked by its signers. It is the key point in the present situation, and it refers to the increasing activity of the fascists. Concrete facts show that the fascists have come out of their defensive positions and gone clearly and deliberately on the offensive in violent actions, showing their faces in broad daylight.

Historically it has been shown that moderate personalities who try to blunt the violent actions of the fascists by conciliatory positions become their first victims, or in other cases these moderates become the oppressors of the masses they claim to be liberating.

## III. Proposals

1. A revolutionary program for solving the situation has to involve first of all achieving the plan for an alliance between the Armed Forces Movement and the people, which assures the leadership of the workers in solving their problems. Without this participation, socialism is impossible. Therefore, a structure must be set up for organizing the masses through establishing and recognizing village, factory, and neighborhood councils that will be organs through which the workers can make decisions to solve their own problems.

These organs of workers power will have to be instruments for economic solutions and for social planning (schools, hospitals, housing, transport). Finally, they will have to be the real organs of political power, the

only effective barrier to fascist and imperialist aggression.

2. The economic solutions for this country must involve a change in structure, reconverting the economy toward giving full and effective support to agriculture. The aim is to begin rapidly to produce a much greater quantity of foodstuffs, since buying food abroad is at the moment one of the causes of the "deficit" in our balance of payments. In order to carry out this reconversion we have to raise the technical level of agriculture, implementing an agrarian revolution in accordance with the will expressed by village assemblies and other bodies representing the small and middle farmers. In the South, such bodies would be democratically elected by the rural workers. Both types would receive the financial and technical help necessary to assure their economic viability and a steady narrowing of the gap between the living standard of the peasants and that of the city workers.

3. Mechanisms should be established making it possible to give effective immediate aid to the small and middle traders and industrialists; at the same time conditions should be developed for promoting associations and cooperatives.

4. On the other hand, Portugal has to put an end to its subordination to imperialism, a subordination that is the cause of the present economic crisis. It has to end its financial and technological dependence on the imperialist countries, even if this means temporarily shutting down or reconverting industries that were established in our country to exploit the cheap labor power of the Portuguese workers. By the same token, we have to end our subjugation to the EEC and EFTA, which have practiced a policy of blackmail toward Portugal.

Once we have set out on the path of an economic policy of real national independence, our country will be able to do the following:

a. Align itself with the countries of the Third World, giving precedence to the former Portuguese colonies in new terms of equality and fraternity.

b. Maintain and establish relations of trade and cooperation with all the countries of the world, on the basis of reciprocity and mutual advantage.

In these conditions, our country will be in a position where it can defeat the imperialist blockade by exploiting the internal contradictions of imperialism itself. One of these contradictions is the public opinion of the respective countries and particularly the solidarity of the respective working classes with the peoples of the Third World, for whom our revolutionary process represents an enormous hope, a force for unity, and an encouragement to struggle.

5. The problem of hundreds of thousands of unemployed must be solved by economic

planning for full employment. For this purpose, it is necessary to create jobs in agriculture and civil construction. We realize that the reconstruction of the economy in such terms—beginning socialist planning, independence from imperialism, and a policy of full employment—will bring great difficulties and great sacrifices. However, these must be shared by the entire people. The workers alone cannot be asked to bear the burden.

In line with this, we will have to reduce greatly the national maximum wage, which will mean taking away privileges from certain minority strata of the population.

6. In relation to housing, a correct policy must be laid down that will directly attack the big landlords, who have made speculation their way of life, and defend small landlords, who get just the acceptable return needed to support their families. A rent ceiling must be set in line with the locality, type of building, number of floors, and so on. The Tenants Committees will have a decisive role in determining the criteria that may be adopted.

7. As regards the problem of health, medicine must be socialized and medical service assured in the outlying areas. This includes drawing on the technical and human resources of the armed forces.

As a complementary measure, we will also have to nationalize the drug industry and thus restrict its production of a very large number of medicines that differ only in brand name. This will eliminate the large advertising expenses that at present contribute heavily to the cost of these drugs.

8. With regard to education, conditions will have to be assured for really extending basic education to all the people, with secondary and higher education subordinated as of now to the interests of the working classes.

9. Beyond this general program, which is applicable in the short term and must be discussed, written up, and spelled out with the collaboration of all bodies representing the people and the military, it is understood that the following urgent measures, among others, should be taken: lowering the price of fertilizers and buying agricultural products at prices that guarantee a fair return to the labor of the small and middle farmers; using, when necessary, military means of transport to get produce from the land to the market; lowering the price of fodder and guaranteeing fair prices for the small and middle producers of cattle, goats, pigs, as well as fowl; restriction of food imports, which must be substituted for by food produced in the country; guaranteed credit at little or no interest, depending on the case, in quantities sufficient to assure its efficient and reproductive use; sanctions against committees to dismantle the old Grêmios da Lavoura and the Small and Middle Farmers Leagues whenever there is

any political discrimination in handing out benefits; creating the conditions for providing technical and veterinary services to the small and middle farmers and stock raisers; emergency measures to help those uprooted from Angola, including them in the general policy of jobs and houses for all. This policy includes the following: requisitioning hotels, building prefabricated houses and others that are considered suitable as solutions, if only temporary ones; measures to aid children and old and invalid persons living in conditions incompatible with a minimum of security; planning that would permit the rapid reconversion to useful tasks of industrial enterprises closed as a result of sabotage carried out by the capitalists and reactionaries or through the activity of the imperialists; creation of conditions guaranteeing the physical and moral security of persons in the sense of maintaining the right of property when this is not actually an instrument of exploitation.

10. The mass media must serve this program by encouraging frank, free, complete, and unrestricted debate. In this way they will destroy once and for all any kind of manipulation. The fundamental principle is that only by such methods is it possible to serve the interests of the working class and that it is only in this way that the contradictions among the people can be resolved.

11. To assure the application of this program, it is necessary to establish an executive power that will take on the responsibility; this must be a transitional power. This transitional power will be constituted by a distillation of the best elements of the armed forces and by all the genuinely revolutionary organizations that support workers power. Thus, the first measure that must be assured and the keystone of power to be built is the genuine achievement of the MFA-People Alliance. This power, therefore, will be the political leadership in this transitional period until the establishment of the National People's Assembly.

#### IV. Internal Organization of the Armed Forces

1. It would be a grave error to formulate a proposal such as this one, which claims to be revolutionary and based essentially on the MFA-People Alliance, and deal only with the popular sector without taking up, even if superficially, the internal aspect in the armed forces. The obvious contradictions of such an error could assume counterrevolutionary aspects.

2. So, very briefly, we think it is essential in the immediate future to rethink the internal structure of the armed forces, concentrating on the following aspects.

a. The form for organizing the grades.

The military personnel must organize according to the various existing grades, freely discussing the problems of all those in their rank and democratically electing their representatives to the ADUs [Assembleias de Delegados de Unidade—Unit Delegate Assemblies], which will be the organs for expressing the conclusions reached. The solutions that are advocated in the ADUs and that have implications for the collective life of the unit must be debated in the ADUs so as to make it possible to arrive at a general consensus, the indispensable basis of cohesion and discipline.

b. Military allowances.

Steps must be taken immediately to bring about a marked improvement in the standard of living of privates. This involves, in particular, modernizing the barracks, substantial pay increases, the issuing of family allowances to all, and so forth.

c. Strengthening discipline.

The only way to assure the complete devotion of soldiers to their patriotic mission of intransigently defending the interests of the Portuguese people is to step up the political education in the units, to discuss and analyze the problems in common without any restrictions, and to consolidate cohesion through willingly accepted discipline.

The plan presented here constitutes the only viable and realistic plan that has been offered to the Portuguese people for the socialist society they seek to achieve. It represents a firm and total rejection of fascism, Social Democracy, and state capitalism, which are forms of exploitation opposed to the real emancipation of the working class.

Long live the alliance of workers and peasants.

Long live the indestructible alliance between the workers and the revolutionary armed forces.

Long live the MFA-People Alliance.

Long live the Socialist Revolution.

Long live Portugal. □

#### Peking Aids U.S. Drive to Shelve UN Vote on Puerto Rican Independence

The United Nations Decolonization Committee voted August 20 to shelve a resolution on the colonial status of Puerto Rico. The vote was 11 to 9 to take no action on the resolution, which reaffirmed "the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determination and independence."

Washington's successful campaign to table the resolution received the support of Peking when the Chinese representative did not participate in the vote. According to the August 21 *New York Times*, he "cited the sharp divisions on the issue among third world delegates as a reason for his own course of inaction."

*Intercontinental Press*

# Summary of the Gonçalves Document: Lines of Programmatic Action

[On August 21, the Portuguese Council of Ministers announced the completion of the program of the fifth provisional government headed by the now ousted premier, Gen. Vasco Gonçalves. It was a document of fifty pages, entitled "Defend the Revolution—Lines of Programmatic Action and Tasks of Transition." It was not distributed, the government said in a communiqué, because of its length.

[In an article in its August 22 issue, *Jornal Novo* gave the text of the communiqué, as well as statements by government officials explaining the document. The article began by citing the outline given in the communiqué.]

\* \* \*

## I. Mandate and Orientation of the Fifth Government

"1. On the Government and its mandate.

"2. Lines of action and orientation of the Fifth Government.

## II. Economic Policy

"1. Fundamental transitional tasks.

"2. The battle of the economy.

"3. Strategy of development.

"4. Support for national production and employment.

"5. Austerity policy.

"6. Qualitative aspects of the transitional economic system.

## III. Social Policy

"1. Health.

"2. Social security.

"3. Education and scientific research.

"4. Housing and public works.

"4.1 Land Policy.

"4.2 Structure of the sector.

"4.3 Housing.

"4.4 Public works."

Since the public is unable as yet to consider the entire content of this program, [Information Minister] Correia Jesuino explained over national television some of the points he considers essential.

He said the Fifth Government was seeking a form of united and nonpartisan action "that would make it possible to achieve a pause in politics so as to overcome the political-military crisis," defend the revolution against the maneuvers of domestic and international reaction, and oppose the "attempts to stabilize the Portuguese revolutionary process in capitalist molds of the Social Democratic type."

For this purpose, it was said, the govern-

ment needs popular support and the confidence of the MFA.

"The support of the armed forces will have to be consolidated through a firm and coherent political orientation by the Directory of the Revolutionary Council, and by its maintaining a line of action in harmony with the revolutionary and patriotic options and directives formulated by the MFA.

"Since the government has presented no other program than carrying out and defending the revolution, independently of any party commitments or conflicts, it must be accorded all the authority and strength the revolution has at its disposal. In this context, any sign of weakness by the government in carrying out its minimum program will be confused with a crisis of revolutionary authority itself."

Clarifying the thinking of the MFA and the structure of political power, he said the Fifth Government was the loyal executor of the progressive vanguard of the movement, dedicated to the revolutionary commitments it has made to the people. It is prepared, if necessary, to act "with the same decisiveness as in the dawn of April 25, when it began the liberation of our fatherland."

The program presented now does not claim to be more than a transitional solution, like the government that issued it. The context in which both the Fifth Government and its program stand is the documents published in recent months, with the exception of the Document of the Nine.

"So, the guides for the concrete measures and policies of the various ministries are the program of the MFA included in the platform of constitutional agreement [i.e., the Pact-Program the MFA obliged the political parties to sign before the April 25 elections] and the Political Action Plan [adopted by the Revolutionary Council on June 19], the general principles of the Guide Document [on "direct democracy" adopted by the MFA assembly July 8], which were approved by the armed forces assembly in broad outline only, and the document drawn up during the Fourth Provisional Government on the problems of transition to socialism. Besides this, taking into consideration the revolutionary value of the document drawn up by Copcon officers, the Fifth Government also took account of the principles and proposals contained therein."

[The following tasks were set.]

"In these terms, the concrete tasks before us are to achieve the following objectives:

"• Progressive unification of the political vanguard of the revolution and of its social base.

"• Progressive structuring of the united grass-roots organs in alliance with the MFA.

"• Developing a consciousness among the masses of the process under way by means of a cultural revolution and correct and responsible use of the mass communications media.

"• Overcoming the crisis resulting from the dismantling of the monopolistic power of big capital.

"• Creating the conditions for a planned economy controlled by the workers and oriented effectively to achieving the transition to socialism.

"• Administrative decentralization in conjunction with the organization of planning.

"• The adoption of principled lines of activity in foreign policy following the principle of national independence and the promotion of plans for cooperation that will genuinely contribute to building socialism in Portugal."

Correia Jesuino said he was apprehensive about the possibilities of distributing the full text of the document. "We do not know how such a large document can actually be published."

In a general way, the document and the tasks it proposes are a legacy of the program of the Fourth Government, and the new laws recently approved by the Council of Ministers are the result of the work done in the ministries in the interregnum between the Fourth and Fifth Government. There is "a veritable mountain of bills and the work of the cabinet involves marathon approval of the bills already prepared." □

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# Portugal: The Melo Antunes Document

[The following document was circulated in the Portuguese military in August by Maj. Melo Antunes and eight other "moderate" officers. It has been translated by *Intercontinental Press* from the August 8 issue of the Lisbon daily *Jornal Novo*.]

\* \* \*

Mr. President  
Your Excellency

1. The recent developments in the political situation in Portugal, including the evolution in the armed forces, have led a group of officers to take a critical stand on the events most prominent in the unfolding of the various episodes that in recent weeks have marked the troubled political life of the Portuguese.

It seems to these officers that the revolutionary process initiated on April 25, 1974, has reached a critical point and that the time has come when, with calm and unshakable firmness, we have to make some major choices concerning the future of this country.

It seems to them also that the time has come for clarifying political and ideological positions and putting an end to the ambiguities introduced and gradually extended by those who, both inside and outside the armed forces, had an interest in discrediting certain persons in order to better promote and impose their own ideas.

To begin with, the officers who have chosen to express themselves in this form reject the epithet of "divisionist" used in an attempt to defame them, an attempt carried to the scandalous and shameless extreme of suggesting they should be expelled from the armed forces. They refuse to abdicate their right to criticize, a right that at this grave moment in the life of the nation takes on the character of a patriotic duty.

2. The *Movimento das Forças Armadas* [MFA—Armed Forces Movement] was born in the minds and hearts of a handful of democratic, patriotic, and antifascist officers who decided to end the long night of fascism and to set out, together with the Portuguese people, on a new road of peace, progress, and democracy, based on a universally accepted and respected political program. It is well known how the great mobilizations of the toiling masses opened up new perspectives for the democratic revolution that began April 25, 1974, and how after the elections for the National Constituent Assembly the course toward socialism became irreversible.

The Program of the Armed Forces Movement was the theoretical leaven in the democratic revolution, but it continues to be the essential ingredient in the political propositions pointing toward a certain model of socialism. In virtue of this, the left

thinking that underlay the formulation of this document was by no means opposed to "advances" that really represented the destruction of the political, economic, and social structures of the old regime and their replacement in practice by new functioning structures that constituted the basis for a new social and political organization of the socialist type.

Unfortunately, on the other hand, this type of transformation has hardly ever been carried through.

So, we have seen the dismantling of half a dozen big financial and monopolistic groups, with these nationalizations proceeding at such a rate that they could not be absorbed, no matter how dynamic the process and how great the degree of popular support, without running a grave risk of rupturing the preexisting social and cultural framework—which is what is happening now. We have seen a very rapid breakdown of the forms of social and economic organization that served to support large strata of the small and middle bourgeoisie, without new structures being created that could take on the running of the productive units and arteries of circulation and maintain the indispensable minimum of normality in social relations among Portuguese.

Along with this, we have seen the progressive breakdown of the state structures. Uncontrolled and anarchical forms of exercising power were gradually introduced everywhere (even in the armed forces). Profiting most from this disorder were the political parties with the greatest experience and thirst for control of the centers of power. The MFA, which had initially declared itself above parties, found itself more and more entangled in the self-interested political manipulations of parties and mass organizations. Finally it came to find itself committed to a certain political scheme that corresponded neither to its original desire nor to the role the majority of the population expected it to play—that of guiding a process profoundly transforming Portuguese society, with a clear political plan for transition to socialism, independent of the parties although not without their help, and with the broadest possible basis of social support.

3. The confidence of the country has been profoundly shaken; it feels that it has been cheated of the great hopes that sprang up with the MFA. A more acute period in a very grave economic crisis is approaching. Its consequences will not fail to make themselves felt in engendering a split between the MFA and the majority of the Portuguese people. Such a split is already imminent. The gulf is widening day by day between a social group that is very much a minority (part of the proletariat in the

Lisbon area and part of the proletariat in the Alentejo region), which supports a certain revolutionary project, and virtually all the rest of the country, which has been reacting violently to the changes a certain "revolutionary vanguard," ignoring the complex social, cultural, and historical reality of the Portuguese people, has been trying to impose.

Finally, the most acute phase of decolonization (Angola) has come upon us without consideration being given to the fact that in this we could not guarantee a peaceful transition to genuine independence without solid internal cohesion of the political power. Above all it was not realized that until completed "decolonization" had to remain the primary national objective. Now we are grappling with a problem that will probably be beyond our capacity to meet. As a result, a nationwide conflict is developing that may, in the short term, have catastrophic and tragic consequences for Portugal and for Angola. The future of a real revolution for Portugal and for Angola is at stake. In any case, the future of a real revolution in Portugal is threatened by the course of events in Angola, a country to which we are bound by responsibilities, immediate social and human responsibilities to the Portuguese who live and work there.

4. This whole body of grave problems threatening the national life has been systematically hidden, and what is more, profoundly falsified by a large part of the communications media as a result of the rigid party control to which they are subjected. This is particularly true of the nationalized news media. So, today we see the shameful spectacle of a large part of the population flocking to listen to the news broadcasts of foreign stations for information about our country.

As if this were not enough, this process has been carried to the extreme of preparing a bill that would establish an "Analysis Committee" (why don't they call it a "Censorship Committee"?), which would serve as a spearhead against the last bulwarks of a free press in this country.

5. This document does not claim to offer an exhaustive criticism of the activity of the regime established after April 25, nor in particular of the institutions in force since September 28, 1974. Recently, many critical contributions have come to the public eye that clarify the fundamental weaknesses of the present regime.

What was important for the group of officers who realized the moment had come for taking a stand was to make their position as clear as possible to the Portuguese people and to the various levels of political power, especially in the MFA. And so, they want to make the following points clear:

- They reject the East European model of

socialist society to which we will inevitably be led by a political leadership that obstinately believes a "vanguard" resting on a very narrow social base will make the revolution in the name of all the people and that in practice has allowed this "vanguard" to infiltrate the centers of political power and the military structures.

The bureaucratic control typical of totalitarian regimes is roundly rejected by those who fought in the past against fascism and now, consistent with this, have turned toward struggling against new forms of totalitarianism.

- They reject the Social Democratic model of society in force in many countries of Western Europe, because they believe the great problems of Portuguese society cannot be surmounted by repeating the classical schemas of advanced capitalism in our country.

It would be a tragic error at a time when everything points to the onset of a general and all-embracing crisis of capitalism to try to repeat the Social Democratic experiments, even if not doing so means giving up real immediate benefits that would prove illusory.

- They fight for a left political objective that includes building a socialist society.

- That is, they fight for a classless society where the exploitation of man by man will be ended. But they fight also to assure that this goal will be achieved at a rate suited to the concrete social reality of Portugal, so that this transition will be made gradually and peacefully without convulsions.

This objective will be achieved only if we counterpose to the Leninist theory of a "revolutionary vanguard" imposing its political dogmas in a sectarian and violent form an alternative strategy of forming a broad and solid social bloc of support for a national plan of transition to socialism.

This model of socialism is inseparable from political democracy. It must therefore be built in a context of political pluralism, with the participation of the parties prepared to support this national plan. This model of socialism, moreover, is inseparable from fundamental freedoms, rights, and guarantees. We do not deny its content could be transformed with the advance of the historical process. However, for a European country like Portugal, in the political and strategic context in which it finds itself and with the historical and cultural past it has, a revolutionary conception of socialism does not detach the key problem of human freedom from that of building socialism.

- They demand and fight for real national independence (both political and economic), which means consistently following a foreign policy that is suited to our historic, cultural, and geopolitical realities and involves the following:

—Opening relations with all the countries of the world on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in the internal affairs of any country, and keeping in mind the need for independence from the great powers.

—Maintaining our links with Europe, reinforcing and deepening our relations with certain economic areas (the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association).

—A broad opening toward the Third World (in particular our former colonies) and Arab countries.

—A deepening of our relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

—The development of a strategy for the Mediterranean area in conjunction with all the interested countries, both European and Arab.

- They fight to restore the original image of the MFA. That is, the MFA had universal acceptance only as an apparatus independent of political and ideological production.

This explains the consensus that formed around its program. Therefore, in order to correctly resolve the acute crisis through which the country is passing, we consider it essential for the MFA not only to declare itself above parties but to develop a political practice really free from any and all influence by the parties. Only in this way can it assemble the conditions for recovering its credibility and fulfilling its historic vocation as the respected arbiter and driving force of the revolutionary process.

Only in this way, moreover, can it hope that a broad social bloc of support, embracing the urban and rural proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and broad strata of the middle bourgeoisie (including technicians and progressive intellectuals), may yet form and provide the indispensable foundation for really carrying out the great transformations through which Portuguese society must pass.

- They reject the institution of a policy based on demagogic measures and practices, no matter what its character. This simply demonstrates the inability in reality to face the great problems of Portuguese society and find adequate and just solutions for them, to maintain a policy of balance and truthfulness, which is the only legitimate way to achieve a broad mobilization of the social bases of support.

- They understand that the much-talked-about question of the "crisis of authority" reflects the more general question of "political power." Where does the political power lie? Who really holds it? How do they use it?

We consider that the question of power involves not so much the government authorities as the MFA. That is, the question of power is the question of power within the MFA.

Clarifying this question is a primary

task. Without this, it is not possible to take up in a thorough way the problem of organizing the state and avoiding its complete ruin. The differences that have arisen within the MFA are the reflection of distinct ideological schemes. These schemes are incompatible, since it is not possible to reconcile a totalitarian conception of organizing society with a democratic and progressive conception or with vague populist and anarchistic notions.

We must vigorously condemn the fascist spirit underlying the scheme that, although it is presented as socialist, would end in practice in a bureaucratic dictatorship exercised over the uniform and inert mass of citizens of a country.

We must energetically repulse the anarchism and populism that inevitably lead to the catastrophic dissolution of the state, in a phase of development of society where, without the state, no viable political plan is possible.

- There is no way to resolve the crisis of power in the MFA—and therefore in the state—as long as this problem is dealt with only on the level of ideological disputes. It is essential in practice to find an adequate solution for the problem of the dispersion of "power centers." Without a minimum "unity of command," the political leadership will prove more and more fluid, adrift in a turbulent sea of arbitrary decisions by a Fifth Division of the General Staff, an Assembly of the MFA, ad hoc military assemblies meeting mysteriously and without notice, Political Education Departments, the Council of the Revolution, Copcon, unions, and so on. In such conditions, what political room for maneuver does the government have left, and what authority does it have when it moves? No plan can be systematically formulated and applied unless there is a government that leaves no room for doubt about its ability to carry out the overall political plan established by the MFA and has the necessary authority to see it is obeyed.

6. Every day, every hour that passes, there are more and more clear signs of a social agitation tending to spread dangerously and plunge the country into a wave of uncontrollable violence.

Factors are accumulating that are promoting the development of a broad base of social support for the return of fascism. It is ridiculous to say, as certain political formations and certain news media do, that these are "maneuvers by reaction." The discontent, uneasiness, and anguish are real, and furthermore they are manifest. And their underlying cause rests in the errors of the political leadership that have accumulated throughout these last months and in the grave deviations that have occurred inside the MFA itself.

*What is to be done?*

We find ourselves at another crossroads

in our history, and once again the main responsibility to the Portuguese people falls on the MFA.

It is essential that we consciously choose a path to socialism without going counter to the wishes of the great majority of the Portuguese, that we win over the hesitant or discontented by persuasion and example. The MFA must assume this responsibility in complete independence from the political parties but at the same time taking account of the role they can and must play in developing a political plan for transition to socialism.

We must regain the confidence of the Portuguese by putting an end to appeals to hatred and incitement to violence and resentment. Our goal is to build a society of tolerance and peace, not one subjected to new mechanisms of oppression and exploitation. This cannot be achieved with the present ruling team, not even if it is partially changed, in view of its lack of credibility and its manifest incapacity to govern.

Finally the country must be led with justice and fairness, according to firm and well-established rules, toward socialism, democracy, and peace.

Signed: *Capt. Vasco Lourenço, Maj. Canto e Castro, Comdr. Vitor Crespo, Maj. Costa Neves, Maj. Melo Antunes, Maj. Vitor Alves, Brig. Franco Charais, Brig. Pezarat Correia, Capt. Sousa Castro.*

The following officers have expressed their support for the spirit and letter of this document, which is circulating in the military units: Col. Garcia dos Santos, Maj. Aventino Teixeira, Maj. Loureiro dos Santos, Lt. Col. Costa Braz, Lt. Col. Adérito Figueira, Capt. Tomaz Rosa, Comdr. Mário de Aguiar, Capt. Lopes Camilo, Maj. Rebelo Gonçalves, Maj. Gordalina, Capt. Parente, Brig. Rocha Vieira, Capt. Salgueiro Maia, Lt. Col. Ramalho Eanes, Lt. Col. Fisher Lopes Pires, Lt. Col. Castro Alves. □

### **New Peruvian Junta Says Political Exiles May Return**

Political exiles who were deported by the Velasco Alvarado regime in Peru will be allowed to return, and publications that were closed may resume publishing, according to the country's new military junta. The decree was issued September 2, the day after President Francisco Morales Bermúdez named a new cabinet.

However, the decree continued, the government will not tolerate anyone who tries "to impede the achievement of the objectives of the revolution."

An estimated 1,000 Peruvians currently live in exile, deported for acts or ideas the previous regime considered to be "impeding the revolution."

## **Free Rohana Wijeweera!**

[The following declaration was adopted by unanimous vote by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International June 1.]

\* \* \*

On December 20, 1974, after more than two years of show trials, the Sri Lanka Criminal Justice Commission condemned Rohana Wijeweera to life imprisonment\* and thirty-one other militants of the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna—People's Liberation Front) to a total of 157 years in prison.

The brutal sentences imposed on Wijeweera and his comrades are part of a reactionary campaign that has been carried out for four years by the coalition regime of Sirimavo Bandaranaike.

Wijeweera himself was arrested on March 13, 1971. On March 16, the government declared a nationwide state of emergency, initiating a draconian repression against the JVP. Thousands were murdered, and more than 18,000 were arrested during the high point of the repression in 1971.

Thus was exposed the real face and precapitalist purpose of the coalition government, which had attempted to put forward a "progressive" image, and which enjoyed the support and participation of the Communist party and the Lanka Sama Samaja party (Ceylon Equal Society party). Against the JVP and in support of this bourgeois government in Sri Lanka there developed an extraordinary "holy alliance"; arms and financial aid poured in from Great Britain and the USA, from India and Pakistan, from Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and China. Only the Fourth International and a few progressive workers and intellectuals raised their voices to denounce this international crime and to show their solidarity with the militants of the JVP undergoing such a repression.

It is necessary to break this wall of silence and indifference.

The victories of the Indochinese liberation forces, victories so important to the world working class, call attention once again to the tremendous importance of the revolution in all of Asia. In this context, the need to defend the victims of repression in Sri Lanka assumes particular importance.

Rohana Wijeweera's closing speech in his own defense at his trial is a splendid example of revolutionary courage and tenacity in the face of adversity. The struggle for his freedom and for the freedom of all his comrades is a struggle that deserves the support of revolutionists and

\*According to a report in the January 30, 1975, issue of *Ceylon News*, Wijeweera's sentence has been reduced to twenty years rigorous imprisonment.—IP

liberation fighters the world over.

A real international campaign for the liberation of Wijeweera and his comrades can force the government of Sri Lanka to release them, just as campaigns elsewhere freed Peruvian revolutionist Hugo Blanco and saved the lives of Isko and his comrades in the Burgos trials.

The Fourth International appeals to all currents in the workers movement, to all those who participated in the international movement against U.S. aggression in Indochina, and to defenders of civil liberties everywhere to participate in this campaign on behalf of these victims of repression in Sri Lanka. □

### **Coup Attempt Crushed in Ecuador**

An attempted coup in Ecuador September 1 was defeated within twelve hours, leaving seventeen dead and more than eighty wounded. The rebels were led by Gen. Raúl González Alvear, army chief of staff.

The coup was triggered by discontent among sectors of the bourgeoisie with the Rodríguez Lara regime's economic policies, especially the new import duties of 60 percent imposed in late August. The duties were announced as a step to compensate for a drop in oil exports that occurred when the Texaco-Gulf consortium cut its production in Ecuador because of the government's insistence on setting oil prices.

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