



COSTA GOMES: Skillful maneuverer.

**Gerry Foley:**

## **Portuguese CP Faces Growing Isolation**

**Kremlin's Position on Portugal**

**Coalition Regime Dissolved in Angola**

**Peronist Government Flounders**

**By Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, and Ernest Mandel**

## ***In Defense of Portuguese Revolution***

## Halt the Rightist Assault on Portuguese CP!

By Gerry Foley

A wave of reactionary assaults on Communist party headquarters in Portugal has been rising steadily since the split in the working class deepened in July. The outrages began in towns surrounded by conservative farming areas, but they have tended to spread toward the industrial centers. Clashes between supporters of the mass workers parties have helped to create an atmosphere of violence and political confusion favorable to the development of such pogroms.

On August 19, the Communist party was forced to call off a rally in Oporto for fear of rightist attacks. On the same day in Lisbon, a half-hour general strike called by Inter-sindical, the CP-controlled union federation, in support of Premier Vasco Gonçalves led to a melee outside the union headquarters. The strike was reportedly observed by a majority of workers in the key plants but was not followed by a majority of the working population.

Because of widespread opposition to the political aims of the strike, violent conflicts developed. A report in the August 20 *Washington Post* claimed that pro-CP taxi drivers were attacked by motorists when they tried to block traffic.

A constant feature of all these reports of attacks on CP supporters was the suggestion by reporters that CP members provoked or exacerbated the violence by bullying behavior or precipitous and non-political responses.

The stage was set for casting the CP as the villain when it appeared to have won its campaign against the Constituent Assembly and the Socialist party with the handing of *República*, the unofficial SP paper, over to a "workers committee" and the adoption of the "direct democracy" plan by the Assembly of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA). In fact, the Communist party seemed to have won every confrontation with the SP since the Trade-Union Unity Law dispute in January.

No one who talked to SP members in late July and early August could miss the note of frustration, fury, and paranoia in their comments on the CP. The capitalist press had portrayed the course of the CP since January as one triumphal parade; the Stalinist-controlled media gave the same picture.

Signs of CP influence far exceeding the

### LCI Headquarters Attacked

On August 26, rightist mobs in the city of Leiria, eighty miles north of Lisbon, attacked and burned the headquarters of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League, the Portuguese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). According to an August 27 Agence France-Presse dispatch: "Policemen and other security forces did not intervene."

party's actual following were highly evident. Members of the CP and its front organizations were appointed to local government positions in areas where they had almost no political support. The great majority of the big papers, as well as radio and television, were dominated by CP supporters who were far from subtle in pushing the party line.

When an SP spokesman opposed the repression of a Maoist party on the floor of the Constituent Assembly in July, CP members walked out and their supporters denounced him as a fascist. When the head of the SP delegation in the Constituent Assembly condemned the attacks on the CP, while at the same time accusing the party of helping to provoke them by its bullying tactics, the CP delegates rose, insulted him, and walked out with their arms raised in the clenched-fist salute.

In trying to prove itself the most reliable backer of the MFA, the CP turned away from trying to win the majority of the working people. In fact, to continue this policy, it was forced to make a virtue of its minority position, claiming that it alone could understand the needs of the "revolutionary government" and that its rivals were simply conscious or unconscious agents of reaction against whom the Portuguese people needed to be defended.

Both workers parties were trapped in different ways by their vying for the favor of the MFA. As a result, the workers movement was profoundly split, and the rightists who had been biding their time saw their opportunity. The course of both parties was ultimately suicidal, but it was most immediately so for the CP, which was the most vulnerable and had embued its

members with a fanatical spirit that in the circumstances could only lead to serious tactical errors.

The first grave incident in August came in the town of Famalicão near Oporto on the 2nd, when CP defense guards opened fire on a mob. Two persons later identified as rightists were fatally wounded August 4 by troops defending the CP headquarters from renewed attack. Priests were able to turn the funeral of one into a massive pogrom.

On August 10, the archbishop of Braga, the largest town in the northeast, whipped up a crowd of Catholic demonstrators who later attacked a CP headquarters. The defense guards allegedly opened fire on the mob, wounding twenty persons. Troops prevented the crowd from burning the building. The next day another mob gathered. Once again, allegedly, the defense guard opened fire. But this time no troops came. The mob burned the building.

On August 16, the CP tried to hold a rally in Alcobaça, a town in central Portugal where its offices had been attacked earlier. It sent in a strong defense guard. Although the guards were able to drive away a mob of a few hundred by shotgun fire, the meeting was a disaster. By all accounts in the international press, including those by reporters friendly to the left, the local population was overwhelmingly hostile. A *Los Angeles Times* staff writer, Harry Trimborn, played up the factionalism of the small, besieged CP crowd:

"As one put it: 'The Socialists bought the election. They are not Portuguese.'"

On August 18, CPers defending their headquarters in Ponte de Lima allegedly opened fire on a mob, wounding a number of persons. Some accounts claimed the clash began when the defense guards saw a crowd gathering, panicked, and started throwing gasoline bombs. The troops sent in to "restore order" opened fire on the headquarters, killing one of the defenders.

On August 26, a Catholic march for "religious freedom" and in protest of the take-over of the church radio station by a leftist "workers committee" ended up in a wave of attacks on the CP headquarters in Leiria, a small city about eighty miles north of Lisbon. Despite the closeness of military bases, troops did not arrive for several hours.

The pattern was clear. Both the armed self-defense of the CP and its appeals to the government for protection had failed to stop the attacks. The outrages were continuing and spreading, and the attitude of the military was more and more ambiguous. Every attempt by the CP to oppose these attacks by its own strength alone, or with the support of small left groups allied with it against the SP, led to new defeats. But it did not press the SP for help, apparently because this would weaken its defense of

the Vasco Gonçalves government against the challenge of the SP.

Nor would it be easy at this point to enlist SP support. There is an ill-concealed note of self-satisfaction in the SP's statements on the attacks, which it apparently thinks are strengthening its position as an alternative to the CP in the government. This is an extremely short-sighted view, since the SP itself has suffered red-baiting in the rural areas and will be the next target if the campaign against the CP is not stopped. But given the nature of the SP and the reaction of ambitious SP politicians to an apparent CP victory in the struggle for the favor of the MFA, only great and sustained pressure could force the Social Democrats to take up the active defense of their rival party against rightist violence.

However, continuation of the bullying tactics of the CP rules out any chance of its achieving a united front with the SP, which alone can halt the rightist attacks. If the smaller left groups concur with the factionalism of the CP, they are doing the Portuguese proletariat no service. They are only helping the Stalinist party dig its own grave, and theirs as well.

On the other hand, even a small group could exert considerable influence in the present circumstances to help bring about a united front against the attacks.

The CP is desperately isolated. At the same time, there are many signs that its ranks are becoming frightened by this and are uneasy with the party's policy. Likewise, there are many signs that substantial sections of the SP ranks are not so satisfied by the decline of the rival party's fortunes that they cannot see the dangerously accelerating shift to the right in the country.

In these conditions, a group that conducted a campaign for democracy and unity in the workers movement could have a powerful effect, if it dissociated itself from the left demagoguery the CP has used to defend its bureaucratically gained positions against the SP, and if it consistently pressed the SP leadership on the issue of defending the rights of all workers parties, without linking itself to opportunist currents seeking a separate peace with the MFA.

The SP is sensitive to left pressure internationally as well. Although the capitalist press portrays it as a purely anti-Communist party, it is anxious to maintain a left image in Portugal, and many of its ranks and middle cadres regard themselves as revolutionists. However, the campaign of most of the European far-left groups against the SP only helps fan factionalism on both sides. The best defense of the CP and the Portuguese revolution would be a campaign to clarify the principles of democracy in the workers movement and solidarity against physical attacks on any workers organization. □

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## Portuguese CP Faces Growing Isolation

By Gerry Foley

After more than a month in which suspicion and resentment of apparent Communist party influence in the government, the armed forces, and the press spread with accelerating speed through broad sections of the Portuguese population, President Costa Gomes on August 29 finally removed CP-backed Gen. Vasco Gonçalves from his post as premier.

The new head of government, Adm. Pinheiro de Azevedo, apparently has little personal influence in the military and little political following. Thus, his appointment seems to establish Gomes as the dominant figure in the junta, while relieving him of direct responsibility for the government.

In removing Gonçalves from the premiership, however, Gomes, who was chief of staff of the Portuguese armed forces under the Salazarist government and a close associate of General Spínola, voluntarily resigned his position as commander in chief of the armed forces and transferred this position to the CP's tarnished hero as a kind of consolation prize.

This appointment seemed immediately to shift the focus of the resentment and suspicion against the Communist party from the governmental level to the armed forces themselves. "A large part of Portugal's armed forces were close to open rebellion today against the appointment of Gen. Vasco Gonçalves as their Chief of Staff," *New York Times* correspondent Henry Giniger reported August 30 from Lisbon. He said that shifting Gonçalves to the post in the military had "in fact exacerbated the tensions in the country. A military alert, called last night, added to the uneasiness."

The nine top leaders of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA—Movimento das Forças Armadas) who came out openly against Gonçalves on August 7 and took the leadership of opposition to CP influence in the government reportedly refused to accept the former premier as head of the military. This group includes two regional commanders, Brig. Gen. Carlos Charais, the chief of the central military region headquartered in Coimbra, roughly midway between Lisbon and Oporto; and Brig. Gen. Pedro Pezarat Correia, commander of the southern region, whose headquarters is in Evora, the main town in Alentejo, the dry-farming area where the small rural proletariat is concentrated.

The commander of the northern region based in Oporto, Brig. Gen. Eurico Cor-

vacho, who is identified with the former premier, was reconfirmed in his command August 27 despite heavy pressure for his removal. However, Giniger reported in his August 30 dispatch: "An apparent majority of the military units in the northern region, commanded by . . . Brig. Gen. Eurico Corvacho, have reportedly deserted him and put themselves under the orders of General Charais."

Regardless of the immediate outcome of this struggle, it is not very likely that the discredited former premier can establish effective control of the armed forces. He is more a hostage than a commander, although his formal position maintains the useful scarecrow of control of the centers of decision making by a Communist minority.

Furthermore, Gonçalves's course cannot be predicted with any certainty. He does apparently represent the team in the military most identified with the formula of controlling the labor movement through the Communist party. The CP is now rapidly becoming an exhausted instrument, and the bourgeoisie and its military executors are moving rapidly to discard it, so this team is in disgrace.

However, throughout the crisis, the various teams in the Armed Forces Movement, maneuvering to come up with a political solution, have continued to subordinate themselves to the needs of the military group as a whole. Those political forces on the left that sought to win their objectives by allying with one or another of these competing teams have been both co-opted and confused. This process was particularly clear in the case of the ultraleft supporters of the "Portuguese Che Guevara," Gen. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

When Costa Gomes removed Gonçalves, Carvalho reportedly put his troops directly under the command of the president, in an apparent act of submission. Although he played an essential role in upholding the position of the military regime, Carvalho seemed to have burned himself out at least temporarily in the August maneuvering.

His ultraleft admirers were surprised to see him maneuver with the bloc of the Nine, which was supported by the Socialist party. Carvalho had been one of the strongest supporters of the CP's campaign against respect for the elections and the Constituent Assembly. He was a backer of the "People's Power" project and made a demonstrative trip to Cuba after it was approved. On his return, he denounced the SP leaders as

rightists and suggested he might have to lock a few hundred of them up in the Campo Pequeno bullring. How, then, could he align himself with what the ultraleftists saw as a reactionary campaign led by the Socialist party against burgeoning "People's Power"? Actually, he served the cause of the military government in both cases, although the ultraleftists could not see the logic.

When it published the document signed by Melo Antunes, Charais, Pezerat, Vitor Crespo, Vitor Alves, Sousa Castro, Costa Neves, Vasco Lourenço and Canto e Castro, *Jornal Novo* reported that Carvalho supported the statement. He immediately denied this.

On August 13, a document drawn up by a group of officers in the Copcon under Carvalho's command was published. It reiterated the proposal of a "soviet" system to replace bourgeois democracy and denounced "Social Democracy" as unpatriotic. The demagogic general did not explicitly identify himself with the document, which was apparently drawn up by his admirers in the ultraleftist Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias (PRP-BR—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades). However, he allowed it to be believed that he supported this position.

At the very moment the Copcon plan was published, Carvalho made overtures to the group of the Nine. He called a meeting of regional and operational unit commanders in Lisbon, including two members of the Melo Antunes group.

"This self-assured and engagingly mischievous officer is probably the man to watch in the unfolding drama," Geoffrey Godsell said in the August 14 *Christian Science Monitor*. "He has displayed a remarkable power of flexible maneuver. His natural inclination hitherto has been toward the revolutionary movements of the new left. But just where he might lead Portugal is hard to say. He may be a romantic revolutionary, but there have been many signs that, in his order of priorities, power takes precedence over ideological commitment."

In the August 15 *New York Times*, Henry Giniger commented:

"Despite their ideological differences, there seemed to be a convergence between radicals and nonradicals in their common opposition to Premier Gonçalves and the Communists.

"Captain Lourenço drove off with General Carvalho amid speculation that the latter was also eager to see the Premier leave office quickly. The captain and the general seemed quite friendly although a week ago General Carvalho and his colleagues in the triumvirate had suspended all nine dissident members from the Revolutionary Council."

In the August 23 *Le Monde* Dominique Pouchin reported from Lisbon that it was rumored generals Carvalho, Charais, and Fabião were meeting in Coimbra to prepare a coup against Gonçalves.

"In fact," Pouchin said, "the three generals reportedly were only meeting to discuss a synthesis between the document of the 'moderates' [that is, the group of the Nine] and the one drawn up by Copcon. A compromise between the two orientations was thus taken for granted. General de Carvalho announced it on the radio and shortly afterward Copcon presented the document drawn up as a 'new program of the MFA corresponding to the present stage of the evolution of the Portuguese revolution.'"

The deal between Carvalho and the Nine, Pouchin speculated, laid out the perspective of a new governmental lineup to which the CP would have to adjust: "Alvaro Cunhal knows very well that the outcome is already three-fourths determined by the synthesis that has been accomplished between the manifesto of the Nine and the Copcon document. He has severely criticized the rightist orientation of the first and noted in passing the concessions to anti-Communism of the second. But as a realist, he has come around to accepting a compromise."

The Communist party gave its support to a march organized by workers and tenants committees in Lisbon on August 20 in support of the Copcon plan. Although it reportedly did not make a major effort to mobilize its perhaps 100,000 members and supporters in the Lisbon area, by giving the action a cautious endorsement the CP apparently helped to make it considerably broader than the first demonstration of this type on July 16. The highest estimate of the number of participants was given by Pouchin, who estimated that there were more than 50,000. Nonetheless, the CP took a backseat and let the ultraleft set the tone.

"The speakers attacked the 'opportunism' of the Communist party, which they accused of having 'jumped on the bandwagon,' and the 'bourgeois conciliationist and traitor governments' that have followed one another since April 25, 1975," a dispatch reported in the August 23 *Le Monde*.

"Speakers denounced 'Russian imperialism, which is no more interested in the liberation of the Portuguese people than American imperialism.' They demanded the 'immediate' application of the Copcon document as the 'only revolutionary solution for the crisis.'

"Several foreign delegations marched behind their own banners. There were Italians from the Portugal-Italy Revolutionary Friendship Society. Germans carried a

\*Partido Socialista—Socialist party; Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—Social Democratic party of Germany.

banner saying: 'PS—SPD,\* agents of imperialism, the same enemy, the same struggle.'

"At about 10:00 p.m. on the steps of the Palácio de São Bento, the crowd, in which blue-overalled workers from the shipyards could be seen, shouted: 'Workers, peasants,



GONCALVES: CP's tarnished hero.

soldiers, and sailors, united we will win,' and 'Dissolve the Constituent Assembly!'"

According to the dispatch, all of the far-left groups took part, except the MRPP (Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party, an anti-MFA Maoist group allied with the SP).

On the following day, August 21, the Secretariat of the MFA in the navy, where the CP is strong, issued a statement supporting both the Copcon document and Gonçalves. In the August 22 issue of *Jornal Novo*, a writer evidently friendly to the far-left organizations commented:

"It seems obvious that the demonstration strengthened the positions of the far left as regards a revolutionary strategy for the political process. In a general way, at the same time, the demonstration represented a tactical acceptance by the Marxist-Leninist organizations of a solution negotiated between the Nine and the Copcon officers, since certainly at the time of the demonstration it was known that the document, which represents a possible platform for an understanding between the two lines that are now dominant in the MFA, was ready or perhaps had even already been given to the president. Tacitly accepting the margin for compromise that the Copcon officers had, by their personal initiative, granted to the signers of the document of the Nine, the promoters and supporters of the demonstra-

tion backed up on the street as well what may be the only real alternative for the grave political situation that exists.

"Some things remain obscure, however, at least as regards the Copcon officers. Unconfirmed rumors say that among the signers of the Copcon document there is an embryonic group that regards an understanding with the nine 'moderates' as an impossible compromise in revolutionary terms.

"But even if that were so, the communiqué distributed by Copcon early in the night, by referring to a 'second program of the MFA,' seemed to confirm the idea that the document, which is to be published as soon as possible, is intended to represent the ideology of the MFA as a whole. That is, this document is designed to be the government program, reinforced as it is by support coming from apparently differing sectors. While for some it represents a tactical move, for others it is clearly a strategic alternative.

"The only common point is that this document, the 'second program of the MFA,' leaves no room for other documents or programs, which will lack the revolutionary legitimacy that indisputably belongs to the Movimento das Forças Armadas. No room will be left either for the 'Lines of Action,' which, however transitional they may be, reflect the clear determination of the Fifth Provisional Government to do what almost no one wants them to do—govern." [All emphasis in original.]

The "Lines of Action," the program of the Gonçalves government for overcoming the crisis, was published August 21. The document reaffirmed the Plan of Political Action adopted on June 19 by the Supreme Revolutionary Council and the Guide-Document on direct democracy approved by the Assembly of the MFA on July 8. It "took account of the revolutionary value of the document drawn up by the Copcon officers."

In the August 24-25 issue of *Le Monde*, Pouchin reported that the attempt to work out a synthesis between the document of the Nine and the Copcon statement had failed and that the "moderates" were now proposing a government headed by Gen. Carlos Fabião, the commander of the army.

"In its broad lines this scheme provides for General Fabião succeeding Gen. Vasco Gonçalves. Under him he would have two deputy premiers, Maj. Melo Antunes, who at the same time would take foreign or economic affairs portfolio, and Vitor Crespo.

"Majors Vitor Alves and Costa Bras would take charge respectively of the ministries of information and internal administration. Along with them there would be three SP ministers (education, agriculture, and transport), two PPD [Partido Popular Democrático—Democratic People's party, the main bourgeois party]

ministers, and a single Communist. . . . Such a team would give the moderates the lion's share of the cake."

Pouchin failed to note that it also gave the "lion's share" to the military, who got the key ministries.

The radical officers of Copcon, Pouchin said, would not accept such a solution. "Firm in their convictions, feeling themselves strengthened by the far-left demonstration that drew more than 50,000 persons on Wednesday [August 20], they are refusing to underwrite an operation that would primarily profit the 'moderates.'"

It is not clear, however, whether a split occurred between Carvalho and his followers, or if it did, whether this made any difference in the relationship of forces in Copcon. Some Copcon units such as RALis (Lisbon Artillery Regiment) were mentioned in *New York Times* dispatches as pro-Gonçalves. There were also some reports that Carvalho had moved back toward the CP-backed premier. However, his subsequent actions belied these reports. Early in the morning of August 27, the Amadora rangers, a Copcon unit, occupied the headquarters of the Fifth Division of the General Staff, the political education department of the armed forces that has been the mouthpiece of the pro-CP line in the military. In a communiqué, Copcon explained that it had acted to forestall a threatened assault. However, *Jornal Novo* commented:

"This communiqué by Copcon was apparently a result of the meeting held yesterday afternoon in the Centro de Sociologia Militar to analyze the present political and military situation and to hear a report from Comandante Ramiro Correia on the events that led to the suspension of the Fifth Division.

"After the meeting began, Lieut. Col. Serodeo called and in the name of the president of the republic ordered the meeting ended and for all military personnel to return to their respective units. Immediately Ramiro Correia, as well as Comandantes Serrano and Nemésio, went to the president's office to clarify the situation. When they returned later to the Centro de Sociologia Militar, they made no statements to the press, and the meeting broke up."

Costa Gomes suspended the Fifth Division on August 24 after he claimed that it had misrepresented a communiqué by him to give the impression that he was backing Vasco Gonçalves. There was speculation that U.S. pressures forced the Portuguese president to reverse his stand. But the communiqué in question was ambiguously worded and could have been a trap. Nonetheless, according to *Jornal Novo*, pro-CP demonstrators in Oporto hailed Costa Gomes on August 25, along with Gonçalves and Corvacho.

In a dispatch August 30, Giniger speculated that Carvalho had put his troops under

the president to avoid coming under Gonçalves's orders. He noted:

"General Carvalho, a member of the supreme triumvirate with the President and General Gonçalves, had been actively trying to oust General Gonçalves from the Premiership. In a letter last week, he told the Premier to stay out of any military installation under Carvalho command."

At an earlier stage in the crisis, Gomes had removed a number of units from Carvalho's command. Giniger reported August 22 that paratroop units had been withdrawn from Copcon and put back under the army, that is, under General Fabião. The action was reportedly taken by Gomes. The reduction of the forces under Carvalho's command during the maneuvering seemed designed to dissuade the charismatic officer from making a move on his own behalf. Apparently he decided to fall in behind Gomes.

To judge from a report by Pouchin in the August 26 *Le Monde*, the left-wing officers in Copcon had been deluded once again by Carvalho, the "organizer of April 25," who is generally regarded by the left groups in Portugal as a naïve and frank type, although perhaps a little balmy.

"Major Antunes's friends have given the president of the republic seven days to oust General Gonçalves, who continues to resist all the pressures. The time expires on Tuesday [August 26].

"Everything depends on the relationship of forces on the political and military plane, which is still subject to change. Gen. Otelo de Carvalho, who had gone very far in committing himself to the moderates—even going so far as to advise the premier in a letter that he should take a 'well-deserved rest'—seems to have changed his mind and today stands with the most radicalized of his officers. He is even supposed to have made one of those 'revolutionary self-criticisms' to them that he has gotten used to making. 'Otelo was deceived by the Nine,' a Copcon captain explained. 'They bowled him over with economic theories to get him to admit that he had to be realistic. He wanted people's power mentioned. They offered him a gesture and he thought it made a good synthesis.'

"Certain they have regained their patron saint, the revolutionary officers are taking an intransigent stand toward the Melo Antunes group, which in their eyes represents an 'unacceptable rightist solution.' 'The class struggle draws a line between us and them,' a young captain said. 'If necessary we will oppose them with military force.' The radical wing of the army is trying to regain time so as to recoup 'among the ranks the territory ceded to the Nine.' It hopes to get the ranks to oppose the maneuvers of the professional officer corps, a majority of which has gone over to the moderate faction.

"For this purpose, the supporters of Copcon's 'revolutionary alternative' think they are obliged to make a tactical alliance with the premier and give 'critical support' to his government. A meeting Sunday night and Monday morning [August 24-25] clearly reflected these intentions. In a feverish atmosphere, the representatives of the 'left wing' of the MFA met with leaders of the CP and the MDP [Movimento Democrático Português—Portuguese Democratic Movement, the CP's petty-bourgeois front] and a certain number of far-left groups (the Movement of the Socialist Left, the Socialist People's Front, the Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat, and the Internationalist Communist League).

"An accord was reached that provides for supporting Gen. Vasco Gonçalves until the conditions can be assembled for installing a government of 'revolutionary unity.' An appeal may also be launched for the creation of a broad front including the CP and its allies, the far left, and the MFA. This front is to take the initiative in organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country 'against the moves of the right' and to organize 'self-defense by the workers movement.'"

The first demonstration of the new front was held in Lisbon on August 27, after an attempt at a united demonstration in Oporto on August 25 failed. It passed virtually unreported in the big U.S. press. But the American CP paper the *Daily World* played it up:

"More than 100,000 persons in Lisbon on Wednesday rallied in support of Premier Vasco dos Santos Goncalves and the Portuguese revolution. It was one of the largest demonstrations Lisbon has yet seen since the April 25, 1974, overthrow of fascism. . . .

"Premier Goncalves, addressing the rally, warned that 'an acute struggle for power, an acute class struggle, is taking place' in Portugal.

"Leadership of the revolutionary process,' he said, 'must be assumed by a vanguard consisting of a union between the Armed Forces Movement and the working masses.'"

The Stalinist paper noted that the "most important representative" of the Armed Forces Movement present was Cap. Ramiro Correia, whose command had been dissolved the day before. It described the parties other than the CP and MDP in the new "coalition" as follows: "The Portuguese Socialist Front (FSP), composed of members of the Socialist Party who broke with Mario Soares leadership of the SP in 1974 because of Soares' pro-NATO stand; the Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades (PRP-BR), formed in 1973; which carried out 'direct actions' against the Caetano fascist regime; the League for Revolutionary Unity of Action (LUAR), formed in 1967 in Paris, an anarchist and

'direct action' group; the Left Socialist Movement (MES), composed of intellectuals and Christian Socialists; the First of May group, about which little is known; and, interestingly, the International Communist League (LCI), which is affiliated to the Trotskyite 4th International."

A Tass dispatch published in the August 27 *Izvestia* also devoted considerable attention to the formation of the new front, although it did not mention the coalition's components:

"The working people of Portugal are actively supporting the initiative of the left parties and progressive organizations, including the Portuguese Communist party, that have reached agreement on a common program of action."

Giniger, however, reported that the new front ran rather quickly into difficulties:

"Meanwhile, a political maneuver, in which the Communists were united with several far-left rivals in a common front behind Premier Gonçalves, was apparently going awry, further weakening the Premier's position.

"Several of the far-left groups objected to the take-over by the Communists last night of the demonstration at the Presidential Palace."

In Oporto on August 25, the day after the new front was established, it proved impossible even to hold a joint demonstration.

There were two marches in the central square, about 600 feet apart. One, organized by the Communist party, included about 1,500 persons, according to *Le Monde's* correspondent Pierre Georges. The call defined it as a "united demonstration of the people's structures, the tenants committees, the workers committees, and the unions, in support of General Corvacho against the pressures of the rightist officers, against reaction, for the defense of freedoms, for the unity of the MFA."

The other demonstration, which was organized by the far-left groups, included about 3,000 persons according to Georges, and was defined in its call as a "unity demonstration organized by the tenants and workers committees in support of the Copcon officers' document and for reinstatement of General Corvacho as commander of the northern region."

The CP had objected to the slogan "no to both imperialisms" as well as to the one of "support for the Copcon officers' document." In this case, Georges suggested, it was the CP that was pushed around by the far-left groups: "This conflict became a political battle involving the regional CP leadership, which apparently did not know what tactic to take toward some far-left movements that were too quick in exploiting the CP's delicate position and did not weigh the risks of this offensive.

"Wasn't such a risk seeing this demonstration end in a double defeat? It was a

grave defeat for the CP, which was able to gather only about a thousand persons although it claimed to have the support of seventy unions and workers committees....

"It was also a grave defeat for the far-left



CARVALHO: Surprised his ultraleft admirers by making a deal with the "moderates."

organizations, which, despite the support of eighty-two committees, were unable in the course of a prolonged parade through the streets of Oporto to gather more than 5,000 persons."

The Communist party was in dire need of support. Throughout the month of August, rightist attacks on its headquarters multiplied and grew more violent. The military proved unable or unwilling to prevent them. In one village, Ponte de Lima, the military itself fired on CPers defending their headquarters and killed one. At the same time, the CP's deepening isolation was shown by the loss of key union elections, such as the one in the Lisbon journalists union in mid-August.

If the Portuguese Stalinists were able to form a bloc with forces that they previously denounced as "agents of reaction," such as Trotskyists and Maoists, they did not seem, however, to be able to change the political course that led them further and further into isolation and enabled rightists to fan fears of a "Communist dictatorship" among broad sections of the population in northern Portugal and to whip up mobs to attack CP headquarters.

Throughout the month of August the CP continued to rely on bluff and demagogy to defend its positions and its headquarters from attack, with increasingly disastrous results. It became so isolated in the North that it had to call off a public meeting

scheduled for August 19 in Oporto. At the same time, it explained that one of the reasons for cancelling the meeting was to avoid compromising the pro-Gonçalves northern region commander.

CP isolation reached a new level on August 30 when it was overwhelmingly defeated in elections in the bank and office workers unions in Lisbon. Following this, a group of CP activists occupied the office workers union headquarters under the pretext of defending a computer belonging to Intersindical, the CP-controlled federation.

"An anti-Communist crowd carrying sticks and stones converged on the building in central Lisbon and had to be held back by troops, which later evacuated 53 persons from the offices amid jeers and insults from their opponents," Giniger reported in the September 1 *New York Times*.

This seems to be one of the first major attacks on CP activists in Lisbon. However, a *Jornal Novo* reporter noticed that CP militants leaving the August 14 rally in the Palácio de Deportos took care to remove their party badges, although only a week before CPers still wore party emblems without fear everywhere in Lisbon. An unsuccessful attempt to stage a general strike in Lisbon August 19 to back Gonçalves also led to attacks on CP activists.

Nonetheless, despite its more and more hopeless position, the CP went from adventure to adventure, the last being its apparent attempt to hold the office workers union headquarters by force. It was obviously trapped by its politics and unable to find a way out.

Since the April 1974 overturn, both reformist workers parties, the CP and the SP, have sought to play the role of mass organizers for the military. In this, however, they differed in methods. The CP was more suited by its discipline and dogmatism to playing the role of a transmission belt for a demagogic military regime. The looser, more heterogeneous, electorally oriented SP needed at least some forms of parliamentary democracy to play its role. It was unable to take the consistent hard line against labor struggles followed by the CP. Furthermore, the CP started with the advantage of already having an apparatus in the workers movement.

This contradiction exploded when the CP, which used totalitarian methods to defend the government's policy in the labor movement, began to become unpopular among growing sections of workers. As the loyal lackey of the regime, it turned to the military for defense. The first result of this was the Trade-Union Unity Law in January, which recognized the CP-controlled Intersindical as the only legal national labor federation. The struggle over this measure opened a split in the working class for the first time, although the MFA was

still popular enough to win decisive support for its measure.

The SP hoped to recoup its losses by a victory in the April 25, 1975, elections. It did roll up an impressive vote, but this only prompted a more violent counterattack from the government and the CP in the form of an attack on "bourgeois democracy."

So as to be able to offer an alternative to the elections they lost, the MFA and the CP put their weight behind a "direct democracy" scheme proposed by ultraleftists. A convergence occurred among the Stalinists, the demagogic military chiefs, and the ultraleftists on the need for rule by a "politicalized" minority, although this was disguised as rule of the "people's grass-roots organizations." The result of this tactic was a catastrophic deepening of the split in the working class and an increasing demobilization and demoralization of broad masses.

In response to the counteroffensive of the government and the CP, the SP was forced to leave the cabinet and mobilize mass protests that tended to move in the direction of demanding working-class political and organizational independence from the military. However, since the opportunist SP was not able, any more than the CP, to break definitively with the bourgeois military, it did not follow through with this campaign. As soon as a section of the military began to openly oppose CP influence and promise "pluralism," that is, a place for the SP in the government, the Social Democrats shifted their power struggle against the CP back into the framework of the MFA.

This was a repeat of the course followed earlier by the SP when it mobilized its supporters first in defense of freedom of the press in the *República* case and then switched to calling for a mobilization in support of the Revolutionary Council and Costa Gomes, in gratitude for their reaffirmation of the need for "pluralism." This demonstration was notably smaller and more anti-Communist in character than the previous ones. It seems also that the recent SP demonstrations in support of the Melo Antunes group have been far weaker than those at the end of July, where the axis was opposition to military control of the workers movement.

The effect of this turn by the SP has been to shift the focus of political life into a conflict of military cliques and teams, with the inevitable results of demobilizing the workers and exhausting the population by rumors of obscure political combinations in the barracks and rumors of coups and possible civil war.

In their struggle for the position of the military's mass organizer, the CP and the SP are being forced to outbid each other as defenders of "national independence" and the "battle for production." The events of August have shown very clearly, however, that neither party can win in this competi-

tion. The only winner can be the bourgeois military, and the best placed is the most reliable representative of the bourgeoisie, Gen. Costa Gomes, who throughout the



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crisis has manipulated the CP and the SP, as well as the various military cliques, with consummate skill.

It has also become clear that the CP has virtually exhausted its usefulness to the bourgeoisie. Driven deeper and deeper into isolation, its attempts to defend its positions through "tough" demagoguery and arbitrary methods have taken on an almost lunatic character.

Now the Stalinists' attempts to defend their allies and their positions in the government and labor movement to the last against the will of the majority are only fanning higher and higher the flames of popular resentment, and anti-Communism will soon consume them. Gomes now has the power to break the influence of the Stalinists or bring them to heel whenever he chooses, but he is not going to let them off the hook until they and all the left forces associated with them are thoroughly discredited. Timing is very important in this, and time is working in his favor. This seems to be the meaning of his request in late August for forty-five days more before trying to put together a new government.

This also seems to explain General Fabião's last-minute refusal to take the premiership, on the grounds that "the conditions have not yet been assembled for a viable government." The general, who published a plan for restoring discipline in the military in April, knows that he will be in a better position to crack down if he gives

the left forces more time to wear themselves out and lets the resentments against the CP's antidemocratic line and methods come to a still more furious boil.

Fabião's program is "unity of the MFA." He can hope that in a few weeks the nerves of the masses will be so worn by the constant tensions and obscure power struggles that they will accept a "firm hand" to restore "unity" and "order."

The satisfaction of the U.S. capitalists at the development in Portugal was discreetly hinted at in a *New York Times* editorial August 20:

"The political configuration of contemporary Portugal gives the Kremlin alone any incentive for wanting to intervene illegitimately. The West can be content with having Portugal's fate decided democratically by the Portuguese."

The same sentiment was expressed more clearly by columnist Joseph C. Harsch, writing in the August 21 issue of the *Christian Science Monitor*, a daily that reflects the opinions of the U.S. State Department with particular fidelity:

"There is also a reminder in recent events in Portugal that Communists are neither all-powerful nor all-wise. These have generated almost no real power in Portugal. And they have done some exceedingly stupid things. They have probably set their cause back by another decade. . . ."

"The Portuguese experience has exploded the theory of a benign form of communism in Western Europe. The Portuguese Communists refused to accept the verdict of the ballot box. They reached for decisive power after being defeated overwhelmingly. They announced they were not impressed or influenced by such expressions of popular preference.

"The arrogance and baldness of their behavior in Portugal can now be added to the list of events which cause men to resist them wherever they can."

Harsch expressed the hope that the Portuguese case would show that U.S. intervention was not necessary to "stop Communism." Nevertheless, U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger took advantage of the growing isolation of the Portuguese CP to threaten intervention in support of "democracy" in an August 14 speech. He said: "We will oppose and speak out against the efforts of a minority that appears to be subverting the revolution for its own purposes."

It is possible that the United States will intervene to help the Portuguese bourgeoisie put the lid on more quickly and firmly. But Kissinger's speech had a broader objective than simply to prepare the American public for intervention in Portugal or to bring pressure on the MFA.

The speech in general was a defense of the policy of détente and of a hard bargaining line with the USSR within the context



of that policy, including discreet use of force. To put this over, he tried to take advantage of the reaction to the antidemocratic maneuvers and postures of the Portuguese CP to chop away at the restrictions imposed on Washington's machinations by the mass movement against the war in Vietnam and the discredit of the intelligence services resulting from the Watergate disclosures. He ended with this "moral."

"Above all let us face the fact that many of our difficulties abroad are of our own making. If we are to be vigilant against Communist encroachment, we must stop dismantling or demoralizing our intelligence services. If we are to maintain the world balance of power, we cannot assault our defense budget or impose arms embargoes against key allies. If we are to advance our interests in our diplomacy, we cannot deny ourselves flexibility by legislating blanket restrictions on economic relations with other countries. In short, America cannot be strong abroad unless it is strong at home."

Thus, while U.S. intervention in Portugal remains a danger to which the U.S. and international left must be alert, it is impossible to combat this threat by giving any political support or cover to the Portuguese CP or the MFA government.

Nor is it possible to halt the drift to the right in Portugal by giving political support to any of the shifting groupings in the MFA, such as the Vasco Gonçalves group that in its last days at the head of the government passed procapitalist laws. This direction cannot be changed without getting the focus of politics off the MFA and onto independent working-class mobilizations. And that involves challenging the right of the MFA as a whole or any part of it to rule Portugal. It means making the issue of democracy work for the revolutionary forces instead of against them. □

### Six Peruvian Trotskyists Arrested

Francisco Montes, editor of *Palabra Socialista*, a Peruvian Trotskyist fortnightly, was arrested in Lima in June along with five of his collaborators: Humberto Prado, Enrique Fernández, Blanca Hurtado, Fernando Gutiérrez, and Eduardo Balboa.

The six are accused of membership in an illegal organization and will be tried before a military court.

Exiled Peruvian Trotskyist Hugo Blanco, who is organizing an international defense effort for the prisoners, appealed August 7 for telegrams demanding their release to be sent to Presidente de la República, Palacio de Gobierno, Lima, Peru.

Copies of all protests should be sent to Comité Francisco Montes, c/o Amnesty International, Box 79, S-310 15 Ranneslov, Sweden.

September 8, 1975

## Cites 134 Cases of Political Murder

### Amnesty International Scores Guatemalan Regime

The torture and murder of political dissidents "is tacitly condoned, if not expressly supported" by the Guatemalan government.

This is the conclusion reached by Amnesty International after compiling a dossier of 134 cases of political murder reported in the Guatemalan press between July 1, 1974, and January 31, 1975.

"The principal implication of the dossier," Amnesty International reported June 29, "based both on the magnitude of the problem of political murder in Guatemala and the impunity with which it is carried out, is that such violence is tacitly condoned, if not expressly supported by governmental authorities."

An Amnesty International spokesman said that the dossier was far from comprehensive, representing only some of the reports of political violence that have appeared in Guatemala City newspapers.

"The real number of victims of political violence is, of course, considerably higher than press reports can indicate," the spokesman said. "Although our dossier only covers a seven-month period to the end of January, we are still receiving evidence of continuing acts of terror."

He cited the case of Efrain David Pineda, a thirty-two-year-old peasant in Escuintla Province, as a typical example. Interviewed in his hospital bed May 29, Pineda told how after leaving the fields for lunch May 23, he was visited by two plainclothes policemen at his house. They produced military-police credentials and took him to a jail cell in another village.

After a few hours there, Pineda was taken by car to an isolated area where he was tied to a tree, beaten repeatedly, shot in the leg and chest, untied, and left for dead. But he managed to crawl to the village of Tecojate and was taken to a hospital, where he is now recovering.

Pineda said he did not know the reason for the attack.

Among the other cases cited in the dossier are the following:

- The discovery on November 22, 1974, of a bullet-ridden, torture-mutilated body hanging from a tree on a farm in Quetzaltenango.

- The murder of Humberto Alvarado, exiled leader of the outlawed Guatemalan Labor party, who disappeared December 21, 1974, during a clandestine visit to Guatemala to attend the funeral of a friend. Alvarado's body was found two days later with twenty-five bullet wounds and signs of torture.

- The discovery on January 22 of a headless male body in a gorge near the Atlantic Highway leading from Guatemala City.

In a fact sheet accompanying the dossier, Amnesty International said that "two groups can be distinguished within the 134 cases. One of them shows a pattern of action characteristic of 'death squads'; acts of violence, often random, with the apparent objective of terrorizing the population at large for political motives.

"The other group shows political violence directed at specific individuals; in most of the cases victims were shot in the street or during armed confrontations. This contrasts with the other group in which victims were generally executed *after kidnapping*, and often tortured." (Emphasis in original.)

Thirty of those killed were either businessmen, landowners, or members of the police, military, government, or ruling political parties. No one in this group was tortured.

Of the remaining 104 victims—primarily peasants, students, and members of opposition parties—twenty-nine showed signs of torture or mutilation.

Amnesty International has sent copies of the dossier to President Kjell Eugenio Laugerud of Guatemala and to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States. Further information on the dossier, which contains a detailed breakdown of the 134 cases, can be obtained by writing Amnesty International, 53 Theobald's Road, London WC1X 8SP, England. □

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### MFA Dissolves Coalition Regime in Angola

By Ernest Harsch

The imperialist regime in Lisbon has scrapped its pledge to grant Angola formal independence by November 11. Fighting between the three Angolan nationalist groups—which has escalated into a virtual civil war—was used as a justification.

The open attempt by the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA—Armed Forces Movement) to reimpose its direct administrative rule over Portugal's wealthiest colony began on August 14 when the acting high commissioner, Gen. Ernesto Ferreira do Macedo, announced the dissolution of the coalition regime and his take-over of all executive powers.

A government bulletin released in Luanda, Angola's capital, announced August 29 that the agreement signed in January in Alvor, Portugal, between the MFA government and the Angolan nationalists had been suspended. The agreement had provided for a coalition government of the three rival independence forces and the Portuguese colonialists, called for elections, and scheduled November 11 as the date for ending direct colonial rule. Although the Lisbon authorities have not formally announced a postponement of the independence date, the junking of the Alvor accords gives the Portuguese imperialists a freer hand in the colony and may be a prelude to such a step.

*Washington Post* correspondent Miguel Acoca reported in an August 14 dispatch from Lisbon that Portuguese President Francisco da Costa Gomes had approved sending more troops to Angola. Mário Ruivo, the Portuguese foreign minister, told United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim August 22 that Lisbon had taken emergency measures in Angola, including assumption of power to declare a state of siege and to suspend constitutional rights.

The Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which was reported to be the only one of the three warring nationalist groups with any forces left in Luanda, declared August 15 that it would not give up its posts in the government.

The *New York Times*, one of the most authoritative bourgeois papers in the United States, expressed its satisfaction with the MFA's move. "Though often indecisive in confronting the political cross currents of his homeland," the *Times* said in an August 17 editorial, "Portugal's President Costa Gomes has taken a necessary firm stand in Angola."



Christian Science Monitor/August 13, 1975

Acoca also reported in his August 14 dispatch that "Costa Gomes, according to military sources, has declared Luanda an 'open city.' This means the Portuguese troops in the besieged capital will be ordered to disarm troops of all three liberation movements." Such an attack on the nationalist forces would be almost certain to lead to renewed fighting against the Portuguese imperialists.

There is some doubt, however, that the MFA is prepared to carry out its threat. An attempt to engage in large-scale military operations in Angola could throw the colonial army—which is saturated with antiwar sentiment—into a deep crisis, further eroding the MFA's political support within Portugal itself.

The MFA has, in fact, admitted that it cannot control the conflict in Angola. Foreign Minister Ruivo said in a letter to the UN Security Council that "it is impossible to eliminate the risk of a further deterioration of the situation." The Portuguese troops in Angola have reportedly abandoned some of their garrisons in the interior of the country and have withdrawn to the coastal towns.

President Ford received a letter from Costa Gomes August 27 requesting American assistance in the evacuation of an estimated 300,000 Portuguese settlers from Angola. Washington had previously agreed

"in principle" to an unofficial request for U.S. aid in the airlift, and the State Department announced that it would "urgently and expeditiously" reply to Costa Gomes's letter. The British, French, and Swiss governments have already agreed to participate in the operation.

In the context of the Angolan conflict, the sending of U.S. planes and pilots to airlift refugees out of the country would certainly involve the dispatching of some U.S. troops to "protect" them. This would pose a grave danger to the Angolan independence struggle. Since the early 1960s, American imperialism has increased its economic penetration of Angola, and the presence of U.S. troops could give Washington an opportunity to strengthen its foothold. Other imperialist powers involved in the airlift would also try to advance their interests. The need to "defend" or "rescue" refugees could be used as a pretext for military action against the nationalist forces.

Such a justification is already being prepared. An August 23 dispatch from Lisbon by *New York Times* reporter Marvin Howe claimed that, according to Portuguese refugees arriving in Lisbon, "300 people, most of them white, are being held prisoner in Luanda, the Angolan capital, in a bullring that has been turned into a kind of concentration camp. The refugees said they had seen people leave the bullring with marks of torture on their bodies."

Howe also cited Vasco Vieira de Almeida, the Portuguese minister of economy in the dissolved Angolan coalition regime: "The nationalist movements have barred the departure of Portuguese, particularly in isolated zones, he said. Without using the word hostages, he said he knew of cases in which pressure had been exerted to prevent Portuguese from leaving."

A similar pretext has been used in the past for direct imperialist intervention. In November 1964 Washington flew Belgian paratroopers into Stanleyville, in the former Belgian Congo, under the guise of rescuing white prisoners held by the rebel followers of Christophe Gbenya. This operation helped the imperialist-backed regime of Moïse Tshombe recapture the city and crush the rebellion.

The MFA's tightening of its formal control in Angola followed growing opposition by the nationalist groups to the Portuguese presence in the colony.

On July 27 a unit of Portuguese army commandos opened fire on the MPLA headquarters in Luanda, killing twenty MPLA members and bystanders. The Portuguese claimed they were attempting to arrest MPLA troops who had shot several Portuguese soldiers earlier. This was the bloodiest clash between Portuguese troops and Angolan nationalists since the signing of

cease-fire agreements in the fall of 1974.

Two days later Portuguese Minister of Information Jorge Correia Jesuino imposed military censorship on all news coming from Angola because, he said, reports of Portuguese troops firing on Angolans were "dangerous." He declared, "There's a state of prewar in Angola and distorted news could have a negative effect on Portuguese troops there and even here at home."

After the attack, MPLA leader Agostinho Neto called for the immediate withdrawal of all Portuguese troops from Angola, although he said that he still considered the Portuguese regime an ally of the liberation movements. By calling for the withdrawal of the Portuguese troops, the MPLA has corrected its previous position of urging the Portuguese forces to intervene in the fighting on the MPLA's side.

Although the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA—Angolan National Liberation Front) has not formally demanded the withdrawal of the Portuguese army since the establishment of the coalition regime in January, it has threatened to fight the colonial troops if they try to prevent the front from reentering Luanda, from which it was ousted in mid-July by the MPLA. FNLA President Holden Roberto warned the Portuguese that if they intervened, Angola would be "plunged into a bloodbath."

The fratricidal struggle for power between the three nationalist groups has already reached tragic proportions. According to officials involved in the evacuation of refugees, more than 12,000 Angolans have been killed in the past three months. Another source put the figure at more than 20,000 killed since January.

In the first months of the fighting, most of the clashes were between forces of the MPLA and FNLA. But on August 4, Jonas Savimbi, the president of the União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), ordered the mobilization of the UNITA's forces.

Militarily the weakest of the three groups, the UNITA had tried to keep out of the nascent civil war, but was drawn into clashes with the MPLA. Although some reporters considered the UNITA's entry into the war an indicator that it had allied itself with the FNLA, Savimbi declared August 14 that the UNITA "is on the side of neither the FNLA nor the MPLA."

Using heavy machine guns, mortars, bazookas, armored cars, and artillery, the nationalists have fought each other throughout the country. Both the FNLA and the UNITA had completely withdrawn from Luanda by early August. The MPLA and FNLA have fought battles in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda; along the Dande River just north of Luanda; and in most of the major cities in the central and southern parts of Angola, Malange, Henrique de

September 8, 1975

Carvalho, Lobito, Benguela, Moçamedes, Sá da Bandeira, Nova Lisboa, and Vila Luso.

The MPLA and UNITA have clashed in Lobito and Benguela, as well as near the Cunene dam project on the border with Namibia (South-West Africa). South African capital is heavily involved in the Cunene project and according to several reports South African troops have entered Angola to protect Pretoria's interest in the dam.

The real victims in the Angolan civil conflict are the African masses in the urban and rural areas. Luanda, Nova Lisboa, Benguela, and Lobito are swamped with refugees. The Red Cross estimated that more than 500,000 Africans have been displaced by the fighting. In Luanda stocks of food, fuel, and medicine are dwindling.

According to the August 8 *Angola Report*, published in Luanda, refugees arriving in Nova Lisboa said "that bodies are lying rotting in the streets of Malange, and that the water supply there has been contaminated. Gabela is a ghost town. . . ." Cholera has broken out in Benguela.

## Cairo Newspaper Reports Arrest of 20 'Trotskyists'

According to a report in the August 3 issue of the Cairo daily *Al-Akhbar*, twenty members of a "communist organization in contact with communist organizations in Lebanon and France" were arrested in Egypt July 3.

The newspaper report, based on information released by the state security police, identified the organization as the "Internationalist Communist League" and said its aim was to "overthrow the country's political and economic system so as to impose a 'Trotskyist' extremist-communist regime."

According to the *Al-Akhbar* account, "The accused have acknowledged being in contact with the Revolutionary Communist Group party in Lebanon, which is believed to be a section of a French communist party (the 'Fourth International'). They formed a communist organization along the lines of these two organizations and began their activities with the creation of what they called the 'Mustafa Khamis Communist Group.' The organization later became the Internationalist Communist League and adopted the Marxist-Trotskyist line."

Among the charges against those arrested are (1) accepting funds from the Lebanese group in order to purchase a typewriter, and (2) receiving copies of the Lebanese Trotskyist publication *el-Mounadil*.

*Al-Akhbar* identified the following as among those arrested:

Randa Abdel Ghaffar Al-Baassi, a student in the agronomy department at Ein Shams University.

Najwa Abdel Ghaffar Al-Baassi, a stu-

The northern part of Angola, which is the traditional base of the FNLA, has been particularly hard hit. An estimated 100,000 Ovimbundu migrant workers from southern Angola fled the coffee plantations in the north during the fighting between the MPLA and FNLA. Gen. António da Silva Cardoso, the former Portuguese high commissioner in Angola, stated that this year's coffee crop, which is one of Angola's major export earners, has been lost.

The August 1 *Angola Report* said, "Really serious is the plight of many of the Angolans who took refuge in neighbouring Zaire at the start of the Angolan war [in 1961]. Their number is estimated at about 2/3 of a million, and nearly 500,000 of them have returned. . . . the Bishop of Carmona last week told visiting correspondents that between 40 and 50 were dying of starvation every day."

Because of the war, food supplies from Luanda to the north have been blocked. Manioc (a starchy root used as a basic food) is scarce; malnutrition, particularly among women and children, is spreading. □

dent in the engineering department at Ein Shams University.

Ibrahim Azzam, a student at Cairo University.

Mozahem Takriti and Abdel Kader Chaker, alleged members of the Revolutionary Communist Group of Lebanon, visiting Egypt.

A report on the case in the August 16 issue of the newspaper *Beirut* gave the following additional names:

Oussama Khalil, an employee in the Cairo University administration.

Mohamed Béchir Al-Sibaï, an employee in the foreign relations department of the Egyptian News Agency.

Dr. Mohamed Bayoumi, a veterinarian.

Mohamed Tayel, Ibrahim Ramadan, Mohamed Saïd Al-Jerjawi, and Atef Salem and his two sisters—all students at Cairo University. □

## Cuba Blockade Partially Lifted

The White House on August 21 lifted a corner of the economic blockade that Washington has maintained against Cuba since 1962. The action makes it legal for foreign subsidiaries of American companies to trade with Cuba and ends the penalties imposed on other countries that trade with Cuba. Direct trade by U.S. companies with Cuba is still prohibited.

The move came three weeks after Washington voted with a majority of the Organization of American States to end economic and political sanctions imposed against Cuba by the OAS in 1964.

### Jakarta Threatens Intervention in East Timor

Under the cloak of a "peace-keeping mission," the Indonesian, Portuguese, Malaysian, and Australian governments were readying their forces for intervention in the Portuguese colony of East Timor in the final days of August. Their preparations followed three weeks of fighting between the nationalist Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor (Fretilin—Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente) and the pro-Portuguese Democratic Union of Timorese (UDT—União Democrática Timorese).

Jakarta was prepared to send in troops, Acting Foreign Minister Muchtar Kusumaatmadja said August 30, but was holding back until final agreement was reached with Lisbon on the four-government mission. The London *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent in Singapore reported that a fleet of four Indonesian warships and five cargo vessels were heading toward the island. Two Australian destroyers were sent to Darwin, 400 miles southeast of Timor.

The civil conflict in Timor was sparked by an abortive UDT uprising August 10-11. After a weekend of UDT demonstrations on August 9 and 10 in the capital, Dili, UDT members seized control of the police station, the radio station, the airport in Baucau, and other key installations. According to most reports, the Portuguese troops in Timor were ordered by Lisbon to remain "neutral."

Lisbon initially denied that a coup had taken place and described the events as merely an isolated attack on a police station. It claimed the governor was in full control of the situation. Radio reports from Dili, however, announced that a national front junta had been proclaimed by the UDT. In the ensuing fighting between the UDT and Fretilin, hundreds of persons were killed. More than 2,000 refugees were evacuated from the country by ship and plane, and the governor and his staff withdrew to the small island of Atauro, thirty miles from Dili.

A Portuguese government statement issued August 13 said the UDT had issued an "ultimatum" demanding immediate independence and the jailing of all members of Fretilin. Following the April 25, 1974, coup in Lisbon, however, the UDT had the position that Timor should continue to be a Portuguese colony. It later switched its line to one of favoring independence, but only after many more years of Portuguese rule. Fretilin, on the other hand, had consistently demanded immediate independence, and claimed the support of 90 percent of the population. (See the June 30



New York Times

issue of *Intercontinental Press* for an eyewitness report, "The Growing Movement for Independence in East Timor.")

According to sources quoted in the August 12 *New York Times*, the attempted coup did not appear to be directed against Portuguese rule. The situation has some of the marks of a Rhodesia-style "unilateral declaration of independence," with the UDT being strongly supported by the Portuguese settlers, administrators, and the small merchant-capitalist class. The UDT move appears to be aimed at cutting off a general move to the left as the independence movement accelerates.

The secretary-general of Fretilin, José Ramos Manuel Horta, who was on a speaking tour of Australia and New Zealand at the time of the UDT uprising, believes that the Indonesian regime could be behind the coup attempt. His views were summarized in an article by Bruce Stannard in the August 12 *Australian*.

Horta said that cooperation between Fretilin and the UDT broke down in April after UDT President Francisco Lopes da Cruz and Vice-president Augusto Mozinho returned from Jakarta, where they discussed Timor's future with Gen. Ali Murtopo, President Suharto's security chief. Murtopo also holds the official Indonesian government position of "Project Officer for the Acquisition of East Timor." Horta

believes plans for the coup may have been worked out at these meetings.

Stannard quotes Horta's response to the UDT moves: "There will be a bloodbath. A UDT coup is madness. They must know they can't grab power like that. Fretilin has the support of the national workers union, the students union and the teachers," he said.

"They may hold out for a while in Dili but there is no way they can overcome Fretilin's numbers. The only way this coup can succeed is with Indonesian help. In the end only the people of Timor will suffer."

Lopes da Cruz and two other UDT leaders made another visit to Indonesia just before the attempted coup. He later told a reporter: "We are realists. If we want to be independent we must follow the Indonesian political line. Otherwise it is independence for a week or a month."

Indonesia previously backed a small third party, Apodeti (Associação Popular Democrática Timorese—People's Democratic Association of Timorese). Apodeti has apparently not played an active role in the current conflict.

At a news conference in Sydney August 30, Horta said that Fretilin had gained control of almost all the colony and that the fighting had ended. He estimated the clashes had cost 2,000 lives.

He called for negotiations between Fretilin, UDT, and the Portuguese government, but warned that all sides must adopt a formal agreement on the future of the colony before peace-keeping troops would be allowed to land. Premature arrival of a peace-keeping force would only cause further bloodshed, he warned.

The August 18 *Sydney Morning Herald* reported radio messages from UDT forces in Dili appealing for help from "all countries of our geographical area in order to not leave Timor dominated by the communists."

The Suharto regime has been looking for an excuse to take over East Timor ever since moves toward independence began in the Portuguese colony. The Indonesian generals fear the explosive effect of an independent East Timor on other national minorities held under the Indonesian state umbrella. In a recent interview a source close to Murtopo said:

"Integration into Indonesia is the best solution. Independence has no chance. It is too weak and small and will create a problem for us in the future. If it becomes radical we will take care of it." (Cited in the August 12 *New York Times*.)

The Indonesian regime has been assured that the Australian government will not stand in its way. Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, while paying lip service to "self-determination," last year agreed that an independent East Timor would be a "threat to the stability of the region." □

# AROUND THE WORLD



## New Dictatorship Takes the Reins in Bangladesh

A section of the Bangladesh armed forces carried out a coup against the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on August 15. Rahman and his family were reported killed in the course of the coup. The former minister of commerce under Rahman, Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed, was named the new president after he swore allegiance to the armed forces.

The new president claimed that the aim of the government would be to tackle the country's poverty as well as "corruption, nepotism and attempts to concentrate powers on one head." However the composition of the new regime and its initial steps do not indicate a prospect for any significant changes in policy.

The regime of Mujibur Rahman had become increasingly exposed as corrupt, so much so that Washington and other donors of foreign aid were pressing him to spruce up his image.

Last December Rahman declared a state of emergency. He used the special powers to clear out some of Dacca's worst slums. But

instead of being rehoused, the thousands of dispossessed slum residents were driven into refugee camps.

In January Rahman named himself president instead of prime minister and imposed one-party rule. He later nationalized the press as a prelude to closing down the publications that had criticized his regime.

The cabinet of the new regime headed by Mushtaque Ahmed is composed only of politicians who previously served under Rahman. An August 20 proclamation said that martial law would be in effect "until further orders." All news is subject to censorship. Most foreign journalists were expelled from the country August 22, and others trying to enter the country have been prevented from doing so.

## Joanne Little: 'The People Set Me Free'

Joanne Little was found not guilty August 15 of the murder of a white jail guard who sexually assaulted her. Emerging from the courtroom, she was greeted by jubilant supporters who had held demonstrations at the trial site in Raleigh, North Carolina, throughout the five-week proceedings.

"It was not the system that set me free, it was the people," Little stated.

Little, who is twenty-one years old, grew up in Washington, North Carolina, in a family with nine children. When she dropped out of her segregated school at the age of fifteen, she was sent to a school for "truants." She subsequently worked as a waitress, a garment worker, and a sheet-rock finisher. She was jailed last year on a charge of breaking and entering, too poor to hire a lawyer of her choice.

The Joanne Little case rapidly came to national attention as a symbol of racial oppression, sexist oppression, the inhuman treatment of prisoners, and the lack of opportunity for poor, working-class youth. Demonstrations and protest meetings were organized throughout the country, uniting civil-rights groups, women's organizations, Black student organizations, and radical groups. Prisoners fasted in solidarity with her and donated their meager funds to her defense.

It took the jury only seventy-eight minutes to arrive at the verdict of not guilty.

Joanne Little told reporters she saw her trial as a test of whether "a Black woman could stand up for herself." She went on to say, "Black women have been used as a floor mat to walk on. But they have just as much pride and just as much dignity as white women."

Asked whether she was a feminist, Little told the reporter to define the term, because she said the word meant different things to different people. When the reporter defined a feminist as "someone who feels women as a class of people have been oppressed in particular ways and need to take positive action to deal with it," Little said yes, then she was a feminist.

Little still faces a seven-to-ten-year prison term on the breaking-and-entering charges that put her in jail in the first place. She has appealed that conviction.

## Palace Coup in Nigeria

The July 29 coup in Nigeria brought no significant changes in policy from that of the previous regime headed by Gen. Yakubu Gowon. Gowon was deposed while attending a summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Uganda. He was replaced as head of state by Brig. Gen. Murtala Rufai Mohammed, one of the architects of the 1966 coup that put Gowon in power.

Recently developed oil resources have made Nigeria one of the wealthiest of African nations. But while the gross national product has nearly quadrupled since 1972, the standard of living of the masses of Nigerians has barely changed. Inflation has soared, ranging from 30 to 80 percent since the beginning of the year. Skyrocketing prices and inadequate wage adjustments prompted a wave of strikes in January and February in various parts of the country, especially in public-service sectors.

Another source of popular unrest was Gowon's announcement last October that he would not carry out a previous pledge to transfer power to a civilian parliamentary regime in 1976. This statement was met by a series of student demonstrations demanding an end to military rule. The government responded with large-scale arrests of dissidents and the shutdown of three universities for a month last winter.



RAHMAN

## Peronist Regime Flounders in Face of Economic Crisis

By Judy White

The shake-up in the Argentine army at the end of August is the most visible recent indicator that the economic, social, and political crisis racking the country continues unabated.

Army Commander in Chief Gen. Alberto Numa Laplane was replaced by Gen. Jorge Videla August 27. The day before, newly appointed Interior Minister Col. Vicente Damasco was stripped of his military post. Damasco had been the first military officer to take a cabinet post since the Peronist regime came to power in 1973.

The steps followed widespread opposition in the army hierarchy to what was seen as an attempt to portray the military as supporting the Peronist regime. Army tops called for Numa Laplane to be replaced by Videla after the commander in chief pushed for Damasco's appointment. Videla is considered to be a hard-line anti-Peronist.

Jonathan Kandell, in a dispatch from Buenos Aires in the August 28 *New York Times*, described the situation as one of "virtual insubordination" in the army, bringing the country "to the brink of a military coup."

Since completing almost seven years of dictatorial rule, the army has for two years maintained a public image of keeping its distance from the regime.

In late June the economic crisis exploded and moved rapidly to the political level. The Argentine working class went out on strike spontaneously, protesting the attempted establishment of an austerity program and denials of collective-bargaining rights. Demonstrators called for and won the resignation of government ministers credited with responsibility for the crisis.

The army chose to play a waiting game. As one retired general put it, "When the time comes, the military does not want people to say we did not give the Peronists a real chance. Better an hour later than an hour early."

On August 11 a new cabinet, the seventh set up in the thirteen months of Isabel Perón's rule, replaced all officials associated with José López Rega, the former rightist strongman now in exile in Spain. The despised minister of culture and education, Oscar Ivanissevich, who had recently inspired student and teacher protests, was also replaced.

The new labor minister is Carlos Ruckauf, head of the insurance company employees union. He has been included in an



ISABEL PERON: Trying to buy time.

attempt to convince the three million members of the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo—General Federation of Labor) to subordinate their struggles to the bourgeois government.

The ability of the Peronist regime to keep the lid on working-class struggles appears sharply reduced after the events of the last two months. A dispatch in the *New York Times* of August 31 reported, "Most observers doubt that Mrs. Perón can survive in office beyond the end of the year." Dissension within the Peronist political party, the Justicialists, is so deep that it led to a walkout of eighty delegates from the party's national convention August 24.

The economic crisis continues to escalate. The inflation rate for July reached an all-time monthly record of 35 percent. It is expected to reach an annual figure of 250 percent before the end of the year. One economist quoted by the August 13 *Wall Street Journal* predicted that "over the next 12 months we could reach a four-digit rate."

A wave of firings and layoffs since early July has brought unemployment to at least 7 percent, an enormous figure in a society where full employment has long been considered a norm.

The *Wall Street Journal* gave the following description of conditions in one of the most important economic sectors:

"Auto prices in the last six months have risen as much as 150% so that the cheapest car now costs \$5,000. As a result, people aren't buying and auto production is expected to drop 17% from 286,000 units last year. Their suppliers' sales have gone down 30% and the country's auto exports are off 73% in value from last year.

"The chain reaction from the key auto and construction industries has spread to virtually every other industry, producing dire predictions of unemployment reaching a million workers or about 10% of the labor force by December."

Such high levels of unemployment are all the more grave because Argentina has no unemployment compensation system.

In addition, there is the problem of the country's \$10 billion foreign debt. Minister of the Economy Antonio Cafiero arrived in New York August 30 to try to obtain new loans and renegotiate the \$2 billion due on this debt by the end of 1975. Argentina's "foreign-exchange reserves have dwindled to the vanishing point," the *New York Times* reported August 31.

The trade-union bureaucracy, which regained its footing after the massive, spontaneous upsurge of the rank and file at the end of June threatened to sweep it aside, has acted to prevent ongoing mobilizations of the working class to meet the economic and political crisis.

The only force putting forward a clear, consistent line to meet the crisis is the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party). The PST calls on the CGT to push for implementation of its plan of immediate economic emergency measures (see PST statement elsewhere in this issue).

At the same time, the PST calls for the construction of a mass workers party built on the consciousness that the working class "can no longer support any sector of the bourgeoisie in the government, that we must stop being losers in the political arena and become winners as we are in the trade-union arena. We will construct a socialist workers party of the great masses capable of directing the mobilizations and strikes toward the conquest of a workers and popular government," which can build a socialist Argentina. □

## In Defense of the Portuguese Revolution

By Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, and Ernest Mandel

We would like to lodge a strong protest against the line *Intercontinental Press* has seen fit to follow in covering the events in Portugal since the eruption of the *República* affair, especially in the issues Vol. 13, Nos. 21-30. This line has been imposed on the magazine without consultation with us, three of the four contributing editors, and without taking into consideration the resolutions that have been adopted by the majority of the democratically elected leadership bodies of the Fourth International, of which we are members. It has been adopted without taking into consideration the unanimous opinion of the Portuguese Trotskyists and of the sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Portugal, the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League). In our view, the line that has been taken by *Intercontinental Press* represents a serious political mistake, a departure from the traditional position revolutionary Marxists have taken in similar circumstances of revolutionary upsurge in imperialist countries; if persisted in, it could seriously discredit Trotskyism in the eyes of advanced workers not only in Portugal itself, but throughout capitalist Europe.

The position taken by Comrade Gerry Foley in the above-mentioned articles, obviously with the approval of Comrade Joseph Hansen, editor of *Intercontinental Press*, can be summarized as follows: There exists in Portugal today an authoritarian military regime that upholds and defends capitalism, albeit with leftist-sounding phrases. This regime, on the road to an outright bourgeois military dictatorship, regards the existence of a powerful Social Democratic party with a relatively free press as an obstacle that must be eliminated. Thus, both in the conflict around the *República* affair and in the political conflict that arose from it and led to the resignation of the SP and PPD<sup>1</sup> ministers from the government, we have to give full support to the Social Democrats (and their bourgeois allies of the PPD? On this Comrade Foley has been silent) against the MFA. In fact, according to the views expressed in Comrade Foley's articles, the only realistic choice in Portugal today is between a bourgeois military regime moving in the direction of outright military dictatorship and the Constituent Assembly, which is seen as the embodiment of bourgeois democracy and as the legitimate expression of popular will. In a conflict between a bourgeois military regime (supported by the Stalinist Communist party) and bourgeois democracy (supported by the Socialist party), we must stand foursquare on the side of bourgeois democracy (the Constituent Assembly), while criticizing the SP for its class collaboration with the military. So-called organs of dual power are either fake (that is, creatures manipulated by the bourgeois army) or irrelevant. This general outlook can be seen in the following few quotations from Comrade Foley's article in the July 21 *Intercontinental Press* dealing with the MFA's plan for "popular power" (pp. 1010 and 1011):

"The July 8 plan shows with crystal clarity that the MFA is the political apparatus of the bourgeoisie and the most immediate enemy of the workers and the revolutionary movement." . . . "The move in reality represents an escalation of the offensive by the

military to roll back the democratic freedoms won by the masses following the overturn of the Caetano government." . . . "The fundamental principle of the plan is the institutionalization and perpetuation of a military dictatorship." . . . "Unlike the monolithic CP, the Socialist party, despite its equally class-collaborationist and opportunist line, was unreliable from the military's point of view . . . Its selling point was to offer 'socialism with liberty.' Thus, the SP stood in the way of the objectives of both the military and the CP. The attempts of the SP to play an autonomous role had to be ended."

This ideological construction, which bears little relation to current social, political, and economic reality in Portugal, can be easily destroyed, so many are its glaring contradictions. Comrade Foley contends that the MFA wants to restrict the Social Democrats in Portugal in order better to defend capitalism. How, then, does he explain the fact that the *entire* Portuguese bourgeoisie and the whole international big bourgeoisie support the Social Democrats in this conflict? Is this support simply a trick aimed at throwing the "ultraleftists" off the track? Has there ever been a case in which indigenous and international capital unanimously defended reformist mass parties of the working class against the armed forces of capital itself? It is sufficient simply to pose this question for Comrade Foley's schema to collapse.

If the real political conflict in Portugal today were one pitting democratic rights against a bourgeois military dictatorship, one would expect the Social Democratic leaders to center their attack around the charge that the MFA regime is authoritarian. But their major charge against the government has not been that it is too authoritarian but rather that it exercises no authority at all. Their main war cry is not against authoritarianism but against "anarchy." This happens also to be the war cry of international and Portuguese capital today. How does this undeniable fact fit into Comrade Foley's schema? It doesn't, so it has been conveniently forgotten. It has become an "unfact."

We, on the other hand, believe that the political struggle in Portugal today centers essentially not around the counterposition "military dictatorship versus bourgeois democracy," but instead around the issue "for or against socialist revolution." Since the last few months of 1974, and especially since the defeat of the Spinoist putsch of March 11, 1975, the revolutionary mass movement, based fundamentally on the working class, has gained in momentum and has begun to escape the control of the bourgeoisie and its military and reformist stooges. It is beginning to go beyond limits that are compatible with the maintenance of capitalist property relations and the bourgeois state apparatus. This has created universal fear, even near panic, among the Portuguese and international bourgeoisie. Hence the unanimous battle cry of all bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, and reformist forces: "The revolution has gone too far; stop the revolutionary process; restore the authority of the (bourgeois) government and of the (bourgeois) state," combined with the assisting slogan "Down with Communist dictatorship!" It is around these issues that the class forces in Portugal (and throughout capitalist Europe) are aligning and realigning. It is on these issues that revolutionary socialists have to take an unambiguous stand.

Comrade Foley could extricate himself from the contradictions of his schema only by erecting an even more absurd construction,

1. Partido Popular Democrático—Popular Democratic party.

one that denies that there is a genuine revolutionary process unfolding in Portugal today, that denies that there has been a serious weakening of the bourgeois army. The truth is, in fact, that the very peculiar way in which readers of *Intercontinental Press* have been informed about Portugal might indeed raise some doubts in their minds about these questions. Let us therefore briefly remind them of some basic facts.

Under the mounting pressure of the workers, all the Portuguese banks and about 60 percent of the country's industry have been nationalized; the last remaining large Portuguese financial group, the CUF, is also threatened with nationalization, for there have been many workers strikes and demonstrations demanding this. Dozens and dozens of factories are occupied by the workers. Various forms of workers control are being applied in at least 100 factories. Many large estates in the South have been taken over by agricultural workers. Many empty buildings, luxury hotels, etc., have been taken over by squatters and tenants committees.

On the other hand, in a period of less than eighteen months the Portuguese officer corps has been successively split between supporters and opponents of the Caetano dictatorship, supporters and opponents of Spínola, supporters and opponents of the MFA, supporters of the Gonçalves faction and of the Melo Antunes faction within the MFA, and among supporters of a number of political parties. Because of these many divisions, the so-called military dictatorship has gone through no less than five governments in less than a year and a half, and hardly has the fifth been installed (described by President Costa Gomes himself as a transitional or caretaker government) but a sixth one is said to be in preparation for the autumn.

In addition to these horizontal splits, the soldiers themselves are increasingly politicized and politically organized. More and more, they question the orders of the officers. In fact, one of the immediate causes of the failure of the March 11 military coup was the refusal by several key regiments in Lisbon to execute the orders they had been given, saying that they had first to meet, discuss, and gather information before they could take to the field. There have already been several cases of reactionary officers' being dismissed by soldiers' assemblies. In some half dozen barracks, soldiers and revolutionary officers have begun giving military training to hundreds of workers in the neighboring working-class districts; the basis is thus being laid for the nucleus of a mass workers militia and for close collaboration between armed workers and soldiers against the counterrevolution.

Under such conditions, it is illogical to believe that it is in the interest of the bourgeoisie to provoke a head-on confrontation between the shaky state apparatus and the moderate Social Democratic mass party. The course of all proletarian revolutions and bourgeois counterrevolutions teaches us that the bourgeoisie first tries to isolate and crush the most advanced sectors of the working class. In so doing, it tries to construct an effective repressive apparatus and to demoralize and divide the working class. Only after succeeding in this does the bourgeoisie take on the heavy battalions of the working class in a head-on confrontation.

Comrade Foley's schema is unrelated to the basic class interests and fundamental movement of the antagonistic class forces in Portugal today. His approach is wrong from top to bottom. He does not start from the questions: What is the basic relationship of forces between capital and labor? How is this relationship of forces evolving? What are the key areas of class conflict at present and what are they likely to be in the foreseeable future? Instead, he turns the Marxist method on its head and subordinates everything to the question, How do various political forces and currents relate to the MFA, which "intends" to establish a military dictatorship? It is not surprising that by approaching the analysis with such a subjectivist and arbitrary criterion he comes to conclusions that fly in the face of reality and seriously harm

the defense of the basic interests of the Portuguese working class and revolutionaries.

#### Again on the República Affair and Its Aftermath

The Fourth International and its Portuguese sympathizing organization approach the current situation in Portugal from a diametrically opposed position. We say that since the end of 1974, intensifying and radicalizing mass struggles have increasingly challenged basic bourgeois "law and order." Concurrently, there has been a constant weakening and the beginning of a decomposition of the major pillars of the bourgeois state apparatus, especially the army. This explains the sharp political crisis in the country, the constant government overturns, and the mounting street confrontations.

At the same time, the working class, although it is radicalizing rapidly, does not yet possess the organs (workers councils), level of consciousness, or revolutionary leadership needed to place the conquest of power on the agenda immediately. This implies that there will be a rather prolonged period of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary convulsions until one of the basic classes is able to shift the unstable equilibrium in its favor decisively: either the capitalist class by recreating an effective instrument of rule (and eventually of mass repression) or the working class by establishing workers councils, gathering the majority of the population around itself in support of the concept of workers power, and building an adequate revolutionary leadership to attain this goal.

With the backdrop of these diametrically opposed interpretations of what is really going on in Portugal today, two completely different interpretations of the political significance and repercussions of the *República* affair arise, as Comrade Mandel has already indicated in an article published in the June 23 issue of *Intercontinental Press*. Since the end of the affair, events in the *República* printshop, in the Portuguese press, and in the field of political struggle permit easy verification of which of these interpretations was correct and what class forces were actually involved.

In light of subsequent events, it becomes simply ludicrous to continue to say that the Social Democrats in Portugal were or are defending democratic rights that are denied them. As the main opposition leader, Mário Soares speaks on television to millions of people. He is able to organize tens of thousands of people in street demonstrations. So is the CP and so are the independent left-wing working-class organizations. In fact, so is right-wing reaction. *República's* journalists are publishing their own weekly paper, and they are preparing another daily paper, which is to appear shortly. The SP controls one of the most widely read papers in the country, *Jornal Novo Expresso*, the most widely circulated weekly paper, takes a cautious but outspoken antigovernment stand. Not a single worker militant or member of any left-wing organization is in jail (the Copcon liberated the militants of the MRPP<sup>2</sup> on July 19, 1975). More than thirty trade unions have been wrested from CP control.

Only people who have been completely mystified by bourgeois public opinion and blinded by Stalinophobia can speak of Portugal as a country in which democratic rights have been eroded by "military dictatorship." In reality, Portugal is the freest country in the world today, a country in which all political forces have the greatest possibility of speaking out and making their opinions known, in which the political and social activities of the mass of toilers is less restricted than anywhere else. Anybody who visits the country today has only to look at the graffiti on the walls, see the array of material available at all newsstands, or attend one of the innumerable public meetings that take place

2. Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado—Movement for the Reorganization of the Party of the Proletariat.



every day to note this obvious fact.

This feature of the Portuguese situation is not at all a result of the benevolence of the MFA, nor does it mean that these freedoms will be enjoyed for very long. Rather, it reflects the profound revolutionary process that is now unfolding in the country, the massive mobilization and politicization of antagonistic class forces, and the emergence of a situation of dual power, which, as Trotsky pointed out, inevitably leads to civil war. But whatever the threat of *future* mass repression (which is very real), to deny the *present* freedoms enjoyed by the Portuguese workers is to lose sight of what has been won and what must be defended tooth and nail.

Readers of *Intercontinental Press*, after having seen the photographs on the first pages of the June 9 and June 30 issues of *Intercontinental Press*, might believe that if the journalists of *República* are no longer editing the Socialist party paper in their former printshop, it is because the brutal paratroopers, armed to the teeth, are preventing them from exercising their elementary democratic rights. Nothing is further from the truth. The MFA had decided the conflict in favor of Mr. Rêgo, the owner of *República*, and the SP leadership. Indeed, Mr. Rêgo happily went back to his printshop on June 18, 1975. But he was met by an unpleasant surprise: The printshop had been occupied by the workers. So he immediately left the printshop and told the Lisbon correspondent of the *London Times* "that he and the members of the management had stipulated that all those who had been allowed previously into the building *should be evacuated by the military forces*. This stipulation had been rejected, he said." (*The Times*, June 19, 1975, our emphasis.) Soares and his fellow Social Democratic ministers left the coalition government with the same stipulation: They would not remain in a cabinet that was unable to exercise authority and would return only if the military threw the workers out of the printshop.

This does not exactly fit into Comrade Foley's schema. *To urge the intervention of a bourgeois army against workers occupying a factory is not exactly to defend democratic rights against a military dictatorship*. Comrade Foley has maintained a shame-faced and shameful silence about Soares's demand. *Does he approve of it or not?* This clear outcome of the *República* affair, which completely upsets Comrade Foley's interpretation of the political crisis in Portugal, perfectly confirms what was our analysis from the beginning: What was involved was *not* the issue of freedom of the press (which in any case nobody is in position to deny the powerful Social Democratic party in Portugal today), but rather the question of an offensive to restore both "law and order" in the factories and the authority of the bourgeois state in society. *That is the key issue of the class struggle in Portugal today*. That is the key demand international capital is making before giving the Portuguese military government the two thousand million dollars it desperately needs to avoid bankruptcy. That is the key demand Portuguese capital is making before it halts the investment strike and general economic sabotage through which it is trying to break the militancy of the workers by stimulating mass unemployment and even starvation. The *República* affair relates to this issue much more concretely and logically than it does to the issue of "freedom of the press."

The "crime" committed by the MFA in this particular case is not that it suppressed "freedom of the press," but rather that it refused to use force to evict workers from an occupied printshop. And the reasons why it refused to do so were correctly summarized in an editorial of the *London Times* of June 24, 1975: "Its (the Supreme Revolutionary Council's) desire to crack down on the extreme leftists who have been trying to set up soldiers', sailors', and airmen's councils within military units is no doubt sincere. But the breakdown of military discipline may already have gone too far to be easily reversed."

In other words, the MFA refused to use force against the workers not out of the goodness of its heart, but because it feared

that the soldiers themselves would refuse to use force against workers occupying factories. This is not exactly evidence that a repressive military dictatorship exists in Portugal. Nor does it constitute any reason for dissatisfaction among revolutionary Marxists. But it does perfectly explain the MFA's hesitations and gyrations around the *República* affair, as well as the *class content* of the issue involved.

Democratic rights are so abridged in Portugal today that the *República* printing workers, after defying the government's decisions and the reformists' injunctions, sent a delegation to West Europe to put their case before the trade unions and working-class organizations of these countries. Anybody interested in listening to their case could do so easily and could hear from the workers themselves that they are highly critical not only of the SP leadership (many of them are actually members of the SP!), but also of the CP and the MFA. In fact, in a television debate Soares was forced to admit that these workers, far from being "manipulated" by the CP (as Comrade Foley contends), greeted a visit from Cunhal with shouts of "Down with Soares, down with Cunhal!" In fact, the SP leadership soon dropped the accusation that the *República* affair had been engineered by the CP (as *Intercontinental Press* has continuously claimed) and instead accused "anarchist provocateurs" of having been responsible. (*The Times*, June 19, 1975.)

The *República* affair has been adroitly exploited to initiate and justify repressive actions against factory occupations and "lack of discipline" in the army. This has been done quite cleverly, for it has divided the working class. If, for example, the first blow in such a campaign had been struck against an occupied steel plant, 99 percent of the Portuguese workers would have supported the steelworkers. But the class is obviously divided in the case of the occupation of the *República* printshop, which may appear as a challenge to the right of the Socialist party to publish its own newspaper. Political prejudices and wrong political judgment clearly play an important role on both sides. In that sense, as we have stated unambiguously, the *República* workers fell into a trap. They made a serious political mistake in the way they answered Rêgo's and Soares's provocations. The ultraleftist groupings and the CP compounded the mistake tenfold by their disastrously sectarian and unprincipled reaction, which was hostile to proletarian democracy.

It would have been very easy for the *República* workers to turn the tables on the Social Democratic fakers, by answering the SP along the lines suggested by the Trotskyists: "We are perfectly willing to publish *República* under the old Social Democratic editors, provided: 1. You give us the right to print our own opinions and the opinions of the various political groups to which we belong as well, either in the columns of your own newspaper or in another newspaper printed on the presses you own. 2. You give us veto power over any layoffs in the plant." Working-class and democratic public opinion would then have been able to see very clearly *whose* "freedom of the press" was being denied and what workers control is all about.

But such a struggle against the reformist fakers is possible only from the principled standpoint of *workers democracy*, which neither the Stalinist nor the ultraleftists are defending. Only the Trotskyists adopted a position in this affair that combined intransigent defense of workers actions against repression by the bourgeois state with defense of full and unrestricted freedom of the press. Only on such a principled basis can the unity of the class be restored under conditions of revolutionary crisis in the country.

It is one thing, however, to criticize the mistake the *República* workers made by falling into Soares's trap and by thus facilitating a repressive maneuver against the working class. But it is quite another thing to become so hypnotized by this aspect of the affair, which is after all secondary, as to lose sight of the political role of the affair in the present political situation in

Portugal, to be prepared to cross picket lines, and to come close to demanding the intervention of the military against workers—in the name of defending “freedom of the press.”

We say that the *República* affair has been deliberately blown up out of all proportion in order to serve the cause of Portuguese and international capital. To demonstrate this, let us examine the practical aspect of the alleged denial of freedom of the press to the Social Democratic party in Portugal. This party has a strong mass following. It can bring tens of thousands of people into the streets. It has extensive financial resources and can receive even larger amounts of money from its rich allies in West Germany, Britain, the Scandinavian countries, Austria, and the Benelux countries. Under such conditions, who prevents the Portuguese SP from bringing the most modern printing press to Lisbon, staffing it with its own members and volunteers, and publishing a big daily paper? A veto by the MFA? There has been no such veto. A veto by the printers union? On the contrary, the union has proposed that Soares do just that! Isn't there something strange about the fact that the Social Democrats did not take this simple step if all they wanted was a big daily paper of their own? But their action becomes perfectly understandable if their real purpose was *not* to defend their right to have a newspaper of their own, but rather to force the MFA to settle in their favor a conflict with workers occupying a factory and a conflict with the CP, which was giving lukewarm support to these workers. And if that was the SP's real purpose, we have only to ask the question, *cui prodest?* In whose class interest could such a step be taken in Portugal today? It is then easy to understand the background and aftermath of the *República* affair.

#### Joining a Political Bloc With the Bourgeoisie?

Revolutions, especially proletarian ones, are acid tests in revealing the ability or inability of political forces to orient themselves under conditions of rapid change. From that standpoint, the Healy-Lambert sects in Britain and France, each of which claims adherence to “orthodox Trotskyism,” miserably failed the test in the case of the Cuban revolution. Now, in the case of Portugal, after various hesitations and gyrations, sometimes effected from one day to the next, they have failed even more abysmally. When the reformist leaders organized the mass demonstrations of July 17 and 18, Healy had this to say: “The Socialist party's belated call for a break with the military dictatorship [!] is a reflection of the growing pressure on the Socialist leaders from the working class, now being hammered by the capitalist crisis.” (*Workers Press*, July 16, 1975.)

As for the Lambertists of *Informations Ouvrières* (issue of July 23, 1975), they regarded the SP's demonstration in Lisbon with such “open eyes” that the only thing they noticed were shouts and demands of the type: “Socialist government” and “Socialist party, Marxist party.”

It so happens, however, that the SP mass demonstrations to which Healy and Lambert refer were not at all directed against “military dictatorship.” If shouts were heard against “dictatorship,” they were against “Communist dictatorship.” If the military officers were attacked, it was because they were allegedly “supporting the Communists.” It also happens that the SP leaders violently opposed any attacks on the military at these demonstrations. And it must be stressed that these demonstrations touched off the systematic attacks on the headquarters of the CP, trade unions, and other leftist organizations that have been going on since—not only through the anticommunist hysteria whipped up by Soares, but also through the actual burning of CP and other left-wing literature during the meeting in Porto.

In its July 21 issue, *Workers Press* made this comment: “Civil war is beginning in Portugal. Right-wingers attacked Communist Party headquarters in many northern towns while the Stalinists were provoking fights with the Socialist Party in Lisbon.” A few days later the light had dawned more intensely in Clapham High

Street: “The only way out for the bourgeoisie is to re-impose dictatorship on the working class. The ‘Financial Times’ reports ‘that lists have been drawn up with names of officers and civilians who may need to be arrested; the accompanying political plan for reinstalling authority is also said to contain potentially repressive measures. People close to a number of Ministers and State Secretaries in the fourth coalition, both military and civilian, say some are no longer spending the night in their homes, as a precaution against arrest.’

“But the real attack will have to be made on the working class, with mass repression of occupations, strikes, political groups, trade unions, publications and demonstrations.

“To this end, right-wing reactionaries are being allowed to freely organize in the north and train new forces in savage attacks on isolated Stalinist headquarters and other sections of the workers' movement.” (*Workers Press*, July 25, 1975, our emphasis.)

So, on July 25 the attacks on CP headquarters are seen as preparation for a general assault on working-class rights and organizations. On July 16, however, demonstrations organized under the slogan “Down with Communist dictatorship” were hailed as having been undertaken “under the pressure of the workers.” Were the headquarters of the trade unions also burned “under the pressure of the workers”? Was there no relation between the anticommunist hysteria whipped up by Soares and the subsequent events in the North?

Lambert too will have some trouble explaining how the “biggest working-class demonstration since May 1, 1975,” a demonstration supposedly calling for a “socialist government,” could mysteriously touch off a powerful rightist offensive against the elementary democratic rights of working-class organizations (including the right of existence) and the burning of trade-union headquarters.

We do not doubt that many Social Democratic workers genuinely in favor of socialism have been incensed by the Stalinists' bureaucratic manipulations in the trade-union movement and in some mass media, especially television. Many of the workers genuinely (though incorrectly) believed that the occupation of the *República* printshop was a “Communist plot” to deprive the Socialist party of a newspaper. But it is one thing to understand the motivation of these workers and quite another to become confused about the class significance and thrust of the anticommunist demonstrations. Portugal is a capitalist country, not a degenerated workers state. The social force in power is the bourgeoisie, not the Soviet bureaucracy. Under such social and political conditions, to support demonstrations that raise the slogan “Down with Communist dictatorship” is to capitulate to the ideological pressure of the class enemy, whether out of blind Stalinophobia or out of political confusion or misjudgment of the overall alignment of class forces.

These latest events deal the final blow to Comrade Foley's schema of “what is really going on in Portugal.” According to this schema, the fundamental conflict pits the “military dictators” intent on stamping out democratic rights against the Socialist party, which is taking a hesitant and halfhearted but nevertheless courageous stand in support of democratic rights and “popular sovereignty.” But it so happens that the real frontal attack on democratic rights was launched not against the SP, but against the CP. As far as we know, no SP headquarters has been burned; no SP local has been prevented from functioning. Moreover, this frontal attack has been launched not by the sinister MFA but by right-wing reactionaries in the North. It could be argued, somewhat weakly, that the MFA “permits” these attacks. But this is only a half-truth; many CP headquarters in the North have in fact been protected by MFA armed detachments. Should we have called upon the “military dictatorship” to mow down reactionary crowds with machine guns? Or is it the other way around? Should we rather reproach the MFA for brutally (if ineffectively)

suppressing the democratic right of the masses to burn down CP and trade-union headquarters?

The SP's campaign during the *República* affair was enthusiastically and fully supported by Portuguese and international capital. It was likewise supported by international Social Democracy, and was (cautiously) supported by the Italian and Spanish Communist parties as well. What was constituted was a political bloc of the bourgeoisie, the Social Democracy, and a few CPs. Both Healy and Lambert joined this political bloc, at least for a few days. Healy later left it, although without offering any self-criticism. What about Comrade Foley and the editor of *Intercontinental Press*? Did they join too? Have they since left?

Some Maoists, like the Portuguese Communist party (Marxist-Leninist) and the MRPP, take a stand similar to that of Healy-Lambert and Comrade Foley, but on the basis of a slightly different analysis. Portugal, they claim, is on the eve of a take-over by the Communist party. Better still, it has already become "a colony of social-imperialism." In accordance with their theory of "revolution by stages," they believe that what is on the agenda in Portugal today is not a socialist revolution but a "national-democratic revolution," the "struggle for national independence." The workers are thus rising up against "Communist dictatorship," which in reality is the rule of "state capitalism," Western-style capitalism having been overthrown by the "state bourgeoisie, lackeys of Moscow imperialism." The MFA is Moscow's second most important tool, the first being Cunhal's CP; the MFA thus becomes, after the CP, the "main enemy of the Portuguese people." It then follows with unavoidable logic that one must support the Social Democracy (the "liberal national bourgeoisie") against the "agents of foreign social-imperialism." The most extreme Maoists even applaud the burning of CP headquarters, arguing that "all foreign agents and spies will die through the wrath of the people." With such an analysis, one can easily see the "primary contradiction" as one between bourgeois democracy and "dictatorship" (Communist dictatorship, that is). This schema, while weird enough, is not particularly original. The Maoists have simply copied it from the more conservative and demagogic bourgeois newspapers throughout the capitalist world.

A more sophisticated variant of the same theory would be that what we are seeing in Portugal today is the beginning of an antibureaucratic political revolution of the workers against a process of bureaucratization in a proletarian state. That would explain both the "pressure of the workers" so dear to Healy and Lambert and the support of the international bourgeoisie, which extends verbal sympathy to mass movements against ruling bureaucracies, while carefully avoiding any step that would actually help to replace a bureaucratic dictatorship with a system of democratically elected workers councils. But Comrade Foley would not touch that theory with a ten-foot pole, for it would imply that the Portuguese CP (with the aid of the MFA), far from propping up capitalism, had actually overthrown it already.

Both these theories at least have the merit of internal coherence. They are simply at variance with reality. Comrade Foley's schema, however, combines the defect of dissociation from reality with the additional flaw of lack of internal coherence. Just examine the elements: The MFA is the major prop of Portuguese capitalism. The SP, while not extremely anticapitalist, is on a collision course with the MFA. This is allegedly the main conflict in Portugal today, in the midst of a revolutionary crisis. Capital, which presumably dislikes being propped up, fully supports the SP against its own main prop. Who can make sense of such an ideological construction?

The puzzle disappears, however, once Comrade Foley's false premises are abandoned. Once it is understood that the fundamental political conflict in Portugal today is not between military rule and bourgeois democracy but between the spontaneous attempts of the Portuguese masses to go beyond any form of bourgeois rule

or bourgeois state and the attempts of the bourgeoisie, first by guile and then by force, to press them back into channels compatible with bourgeois law and order, then it is possible to understand what the worldwide political bloc against the Portuguese revolution is all about. The violence of the class conflict and the ardent support of the Portuguese and international bourgeoisie for the Social Democracy likewise becomes perfectly understandable.

One can then understand why, as early as May 1, 1975, *Tempo Económico*, one of the main organs of the Portuguese bourgeoisie, wrote: "The most obvious strategic perspective is the one that flows from the complementary character of the SP and the PPD [the main bourgeois party]." The Paris daily *Le Monde* noted in its July 31, 1975, issue that the agitation unleashed by the SP has created an atmosphere of feverish anticipation in General Spínola's emigré headquarters in Rio de Janeiro: "In their view, the SP's reaction has certainly been 'belated.' Even so, they believe that the mass demonstrations organized by Mr. Mario Soares may lead to a reversal of the prospects. In any case, that is the general's opinion as expressed in his statements to *Le Monde* today. . . . 'I am not linked to any political party, although my ideas about how to reconstruct the country coincide with Socialist ideology on several points. That means that I do not criticize the position that has now been taken by the Socialist party and the PPD in favor of the democracy and liberty of the Portuguese people.'"

It is, of course, not surprising that the international political bloc against the thus far successful struggle of the "anarcho-populist" Portuguese workers to prevent any stabilization of the Portuguese capitalist economy and any restoration of a strong bourgeois state should include General Spínola. But should it not make Healy and Lambert, as well as Comrades Foley and Hansen, think twice about the strange company they were keeping during these fateful weeks?

#### The Present Stage of the Portuguese Revolution

The unfolding of the SP offensive, which began with the *República* affair and was followed up by the resignation of the SP ministers from the coalition cabinet, illustrates another aspect of the current political struggle in Portugal, one that delivers yet another blow to Comrade Foley's schema. With the opening of the SP offensive, the divisions within the MFA finally came into the open. The Social Democratic leaders did not refrain from taking sides in these divisions. In fact, they took a very clear stand. It is interesting to see with whom and why.

On the eve of the MFA meeting that elected the "revolutionary triumvirate," General Costa Gomes, president of the republic, issued an impassioned appeal to the officers (see *Le Monde*, July 27-28, 1975) saying that the revolution had gone too far, that it was time to call a halt. It was time to prevent the "internal and external isolation" of the revolution. The Social Democratic leaders immediately came out in enthusiastic support of Costa Gomes. Speaking before his followers in Figueira de Foz, Soares explained that Costa Gomes had taken the correct position, but that the extremist officers were on another line. He used a formulation that speaks volumes about the class camp he represents objectively, calling upon Costa Gomes to "restrain these captains who had taken their generals' stars a bit too quickly." (*Le Monde*, July 30, 1975).

Mr. Soares's hero, Costa Gomes, was army chief of staff during the bloody colonial wars under the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship. Soares is an intelligent and well informed politician. He knows the score. Who could be so naïve as to believe that Soares considers this old butcher a faithful defender of "democracy" against military dictatorship? As a faithful servant of bourgeois "law and order" against "anarcho-populist extremists," however, he is an ideal symbol.

Things became even clearer during the early days of August.

The Portuguese opposition press published a document, supposedly written by former Foreign Minister Major Melo Antunes and supported by eleven members of the MFA's revolutionary council. It expanded on Costa Gomes's call. It said explicitly:

"Instead, we have witnessed the dismantlement of half a dozen great financial and monopolistic groups; furthermore, parallel to this, the more the nationalizations succeeded each other (at a pace impossible to absorb, however dynamic the process was and however broad the support of the people may be, without a grave threat of the breakup of the preexisting social and cultural fabric, which is now occurring), we witnessed the very rapid disintegration of the forms of social and economic organization that served as support to broad layers of the petty and middle bourgeoisie, without new structures being formed capable of guaranteeing the administration of the productive units and the maintenance of an indispensable normality in the social relations among all Portuguese.

"In the meantime, there was a progressive decomposition of the state structures. Wildcat and anarchistic forms of the exercise of power began to occur everywhere (including inside the armed forces)." (*Expresso*, August 9, 1975.)

Can there be any doubt about the class nature and thrust of such an analysis, whatever its leftist phraseology about "irreversible moves toward socialism" and "democratic socialism"? Especially when we once again find the fateful words repeated by all opponents of a victorious socialist revolution in Portugal: "It is necessary to energetically reject anarchism and populism, which inevitably lead to a catastrophic dissolution of the state in a phase of social development during which no political project is viable without a state."

In the chapter on dual power in his *History of the Russian Revolution* Trotsky notes that the formulation "the anarchy of dual power" was constantly used by observers during 1917. That is indeed one of the major characteristics of even an embryonic situation of dual power. This "anarchy" can be eliminated either in the direction of workers power or in the direction of the restoration of a strong bourgeois state. It is clear what Melo Antunes's intentions are in this respect. Yet the leadership of the Portuguese Socialist party enthusiastically endorsed the Melo Antunes document in its meeting of August 10, 1975. (*O Seculo*, August 11, 1975.) It simultaneously showed great concern for democracy by suspending three members of the party's national secretariat both from the day-to-day leadership and from the "council" (equivalent of the central committee) because they dissented from Soares's right-wing course.

Soares, of course, is playing with fire—and he knows it. When some militants of the SP itself began to organize the burning of CP headquarters in a northern town, he suspended them from the party. If Costa Gomes or any other figure acting with Soares's help succeeds in restoring "democratic legality" and the "authority of the (bourgeois) state" by first crushing the advanced workers, he could well turn against the Social Democrats as a next step. The *Reichswehr*, which the German Social Democracy used to crush the radical workers in 1919, organized a military coup against the Social Democratic government as early as 1920, thus laying the basis for what would eventually become the fascist dictatorship that would destroy Social Democracy. This should be recalled again and again. By unleashing a reactionary wave against the "anarcho-populists," the CP, and the revolution itself, Soares is helping to create the noose with which he could easily be hanged himself. But this is no reason to play down or dismiss his responsibility for supporting Costa Gomes's call to halt the revolution. Nor is it any reason to conceal the class character of that call: It serves the counterrevolutionary purposes of Portuguese and international capital. That is what is involved in the offensive, and not the defense of the democratic rights of the working class.

The political developments of the last several weeks indicate

that the advance of the revolutionary process since May has been temporarily halted. The bourgeoisie has taken the counteroffensive. There can be no doubt about the immediate cause of this reversal: It is the division of the working-class forces. An additional factor, however, should not be overlooked: There is a mass base for bourgeois reaction among the smallholders of northern Portugal, ideologically dominated by the Portuguese church, whose hierarchy long collaborated closely with the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship. The economic discontent of these smallholders is on the rise, and the government is unable to meet their demands.

This mass base can be *undermined somewhat* by adequate offensive political and economic demands of the workers movement: confiscation of church property and its distribution among small peasants; state guarantees of minimum agricultural prices for small producers, provided at the expense of the landlord-controlled agricultural organizations and wholesalers; direct links between small peasants and working-class organizations of consumers in the towns, etc. But it is improbable that this mass base can be eliminated altogether. Even under the Bolshevik leadership, the Russian revolution was not able to eliminate the counterrevolution's mass base among the propertied petty bourgeoisie. The Russian revolution of 1905 was defeated because the majority of the peasantry did not even enter the revolutionary process. To forget these objective facts of life, to deny that in an imperialist country like Portugal the majority of the landowning peasantry is not and cannot be favorable to socialist revolution but can in the best of cases only be neutralized, is to fall victim to the Stalinist thesis that the class struggle can be reduced to the fight between a "handful of monopolists" and the "overwhelming mass of the people."

The division of the working class has enabled bourgeois reaction to go over to the counteroffensive. The major opening for this was provided by the SP leadership, which played the role of spearhead directly transmitting the pressure of the European bourgeoisie, as mediated by Wilson, Helmut Schmidt, and company. The reversal of the trend was then picked up by the right wing of the MFA within the army, by the urban and rural middle classes, and by the church hierarchy; organized reactionary thugs then began assaulting the headquarters of the CP and other working-class organizations. The battle cry of all these forces is the same: Stop the revolution, it has gone too far.

Given the altered relationship of forces and the temporary lull in working-class struggles, the most likely immediate outcome is a victory for the Melo Antunes wing of the MFA, that is, a compromise between the various factions of the MFA, the SP, and the CP around some variety of the "national unity" solution called for by Soares. This will mean attempts to constrain, restrain, and discipline the militancy of the advanced sectors of the working class, attempts to introduce sharper discipline against soldiers' initiatives in the army, and attempts to "restore the authority" of the bourgeois state against challenges by the far left, under the cover of promising similar repression against the far right.

But this shift to the right will not at all imply a grave defeat for the revolution. The *fundamental* relationship of forces has not been overturned. The bourgeoisie is still weak. The army is still divided. The state apparatus is still shaky. There is not yet any repressive instrument adequate to crush the proletariat. The working class has not been defeated or demoralized, just temporarily disoriented.

A new wave of strikes and radical workers struggles is possible, if not probable, in the autumn, when the workers feel the full effects of the economic crisis and of the "austerity" measures of the government. All the bodies of workers control are still functioning; it will not be easy to suppress them. In past months the Portuguese workers have shown that they can take to the streets in numbers more massive than the conservative petty

bourgeoisie in the North. They will do so again. The Portuguese revolution has not come to an end, nor has its impetus been broken. The major test of strength, which will be a violent one, is yet to come. Nobody can predict with precision when it will come.

While the main initiative in temporarily reversing the revolutionary trend was taken by the reformist leaders of the SP, the CP leadership shares equal responsibility with Soares and company for the bourgeois counteroffensive now unfolding on all key fields.

During the first several months after the overthrow of the Caetano dictatorship, the CP leaders actively participated in bolstering the tottering bourgeois state apparatus. They did nothing to radically eliminate the remnants of fascist legislation, penal laws, state institutions, and personnel, which were kept in place by the military leaders. At that time we reminded them of Saint-Just's warning: Woe to revolutionists who make revolutions halfway; they dig their own graves. Obviously, it was not possible to eradicate the remnants of fascism without crushing the bourgeois state apparatus. Through its policy of class collaboration and participation in the government, the CP protected the state apparatus instead of fighting to destroy it. Today, important sections of that very apparatus are showing their gratitude—by trying to destroy the CP.

For nearly one year following the overthrow of the Caetano regime, the CP did everything it could to restrain and break working-class militancy in the factories, closely following the Stalinist line the CPs applied in France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and elsewhere at the end of the second world war. It attempted to prevent or break all strikes, with considerably less success, let it be noted, than in 1944-47. This was one of the reasons that the SP won such a large electoral victory on April 25, 1975, for at the time the SP was behaving more flexibly toward working-class struggles.

But then, under the pressure of the March 11 events, the strengthening of the far left among the workers, and the electoral defeat of April 25, 1975 (the CP lost nearly one-fourth of its potential electoral support to groupings on its left and probably another one-fourth to the SP, for the above-mentioned reasons), the CP leadership made a left turn. Ironically, Soares now reproaches the CP leaders for this, reversing his own previous more "liberal" attitude toward the radicalized workers. The SP leadership's document of July 28, 1975, expresses astonishment about the fact that the CP is now trying to collaborate with "ultraleftists." In the "Proposta de Acção Imediata" (Proposal for Immediate Action), submitted to a July 28, 1975, press conference by Mário Soares, an explicit appeal is made for "austerity" and "sacrifices," which must be imposed on the working class. In the same document, we find the following:

"As a result, a wave of absolutely irresponsible demagoguery has been introduced into Portuguese society. The country lives enmeshed in ideology night and day. . . . Extremely aggressive groups of activists try to peddle their utopian elixir at all levels and to impose ever more extremist and radical 'solutions.' The acceleration of our process seems very dangerous even to those who already live in 'people's democracies' and who therefore know the difficulties and obstacles that must be overcome. There has been a succession of usurpations of houses and landed property. Insecurity, disorder, and fear are being progressively instilled under the cover of the 'improvised' formation of schools, child-care centers, hospitals, popular universities, agricultural cooperatives, etc. Few of these initiatives of occupations are viable. Frequently, the occupation is followed by destruction, and then abandonment. . . . Nobody seems to be interested any longer in opposing purely anarchistic acts, which are sometimes pure vandalism and contribute nothing to solving any real problem but lead instead to a general worsening of the situation. The authority of the state is being lost inexorably . . . and the way is open to successive waves

of discontent that inevitably provide grist for the mill of the counterrevolution.

"In its policy of progressive destruction of the state apparatus, the CP uses anarcho-populism as its driving lance. This is a spurious and conflict-ridden, but no less effective, alliance. . . . The Committees of Defense of the Revolution and the Revolutionary Councils of Workers, Soldiers, and Sailors—initiatives taken by the CP and the PRP-BR<sup>3</sup>—provoke identical reservations. Fundamentally, they tend to create armed groups of civilians that exert pressure on the MFA or even want eventually to substitute themselves for the MFA." (*Jornal Novo*, July 29, 1975.)

And the conclusions are obvious:

"Reaffirm the principle that the tenants and workers commissions are forms of popular power that are interesting to develop provided that they do not claim to be a 'parallel power' to the state apparatus. . . .

"Introduce severe punitive legislation against 'armed militias,' which should be suppressed within one month at the most, along with the 'popular vigilance committees' or others that have arisen. The SP thinks that no compromise is possible on this question: The formation of armed militias of a party type will lead to a disintegration of the unity of the MFA and will inevitably lead the country toward tragic confrontations. . . ." (*Jornal Novo*, July 29, 1975.)

"Socialism with liberty" thus stands revealed as a call for the repression of the "anarchistic" masses and for a monopoly of arms in the hands of the bourgeois army. The lessons of Germany, Spain, and Chile are lost on these gentlemen.

The CP's left turn was expressed through united-front proposals and actions with the far-left organizations (including the LCI), the acceptance, albeit reluctantly and with many restrictions, of the slogan calling for the generalization of workers control and initiatives of factory occupations, and the prudent reversal of the previous opposition to the strengthening of the organs of self-organization of the working class, while maintaining many restrictions and trying to control these organs through the trade-union bureaucracy and the MFA.

But this left turn soon took the form of bureaucratic adventurism and sectarianism, culminating in the accusations of "social-fascism" against the Socialist party. (It should be noted that the SP replies in kind, taking up the Maoist slogan that calls Cunhal a "social-fascist lackey of Moscow.") The CP leadership has become increasingly isolated from both the radicalized and the more moderate sections of the working class, a result of its attempts to maintain control of trade unions and mass media through bureaucratic machinations, to impede the development of workers democracy, and to prevent the SP from organizing street demonstrations.

Consequent to that isolation, the CP has increasingly attempted desperate maneuvers aimed at "conquering" the bourgeois state apparatus from within as a substitute for trying to broaden its mass base and mass appeal. The CP has miserably failed to offer political answers and perspectives to the masses along the lines of an organized and democratic united front with the SP and the revolutionary left. Instead, it has concentrated all its hopes on maneuvers with the MFA. But the MFA itself has increasingly divided as a function of the class lineup and the relationship of class forces rather than on the basis of "loyalty" to collaboration with the CP. Despite its leftist phraseology, the Kremlin is not interested in provoking a big clash with imperialism over the developments in Portugal. At the Helsinki summit, Brezhnev was told in no uncertain terms to restrain Cunhal or the "détente" would be finished. The CP's new turn (its second so far), "justified" on the basis of the anticommunist pogroms in the North, was made on August 10, when Cunhal, following Soares,

3. Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades.

called for a "halt" to the revolutionary process, thereby laying the basis for a compromise around the Melo Antunes document.

### Is It Enough to Base Yourself on the Constituent Assembly?

Just how far Comrade Foley has departed from the revolutionary Marxist tradition of analyzing class struggles in prerevolutionary and revolutionary situations like that of Portugal today is strikingly revealed by the following passage of his article in the July 21, 1975, *Intercontinental Press*: "If the CP had been interested in establishing a government representative of the workers, it had only to base itself on the Constituent Assembly and call on the delegates there to act in accordance with the clear mandate given them by the voters." (p. 1011.)

For a workers government to come to power it is sufficient to "call on the delegates" of the Constituent Assembly to act, presumably by constituting a SP-CP government. Cunhal does not do so. All the Portuguese "ultraleftists" (including, we assume, the Portuguese Trotskyists) likewise refrain from making such a call. They are therefore all guilty of "antiparliamentary cretinism."

Trotsky used the expression "antiparliamentary cretinism" to refer to the Spanish anarchists, who in a country in which there were still powerful bourgeois-democratic and electoral illusions refused to participate in parliamentary elections, under the pretext of not wanting to strengthen these illusions. So far as we recall, the Portuguese CP participated in the elections, as did the "centrists" and many of the "ultraleftists" to whom Comrade Foley refers, including the Trotskyists of the LCI. Obviously, then, Comrade Foley uses the expression "antiparliamentary cretinism" in quite another sense than did Trotsky.

Since the experience of the Russian revolution of 1917, and especially since the publication of Lenin's "Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder," it has been commonly accepted among revolutionary Marxists that it is tactically correct to call upon the mass parties claiming to represent the organized labor movement to take all power. The purpose of such a tactic is essentially a dual pedagogical one: On the one hand, to teach the workers to pose all the key questions of the class struggle as questions of power; on the other hand, to expose the misleaders of the working class as unwilling or (in the unlikely event that they do take power) unable to satisfy the burning needs of the workers.

But Comrade Foley has now come up with an entirely new variant of that propaganda slogan. It is actually "sufficient," you see, for Cunhal to call upon Soares to form a workers government for that government to actually come into being and to receive the enthusiastic approval of the bourgeois Constituent Assembly, in which there is a majority of delegates from working-class parties. What began as a propaganda device aimed at exposing the reformist misleaders of the working class has now become an illusion among revolutionaries about the willingness and ability of these misleaders to actually carry out a socialist revolution. The Portuguese workers today are facing issues of life-or-death importance for the revolution and for the day-to-day interests of the proletariat. Workers are occupying factories, implementing workers control, and creating self-defense organizations to defend themselves against the threats of unemployment, poverty, and a bloody reactionary coup. What advice does Comrade Foley give them? It is "sufficient" to give all power to the Constituent Assembly for these questions to be settled in the interests of the workers, since a majority of the seats in the Constituent Assembly are held by representatives of the SP and CP!

But what if the SP blocs with the PPD instead of with the CP? It will then be "exposed." Undoubtedly. But in the meantime, anti-working-class laws will have been voted and the gains of the workers will have been destroyed, with the solemn consent of a Constituent Assembly in which Comrade Foley would have us invest full power. And what if the CP itself blocs with the SP and the PPD to impose these anti-working-class laws? It will then also

be "exposed." But is the *main goal today* to play some propaganda game to "expose" this or that parliamentary formation? Or should one instead give priority to a tooth-and-nail fight to defend all the current gains of the workers? Should the defense of these gains be subordinated to "exposing" the SP and CP leaderships through some sort of parliamentary maneuvering? Comrade Foley took the field against "antiparliamentary cretinism." He has very rapidly reached a position of parliamentary cretinism.

In Britain today the Labour MPs hold a majority in Parliament. They have received a "clear mandate" from the voters to oppose any wage freeze or incomes policy. Just imagine a British revolutionary who would say that it would be sufficient to give all power to Parliament for the newly imposed wage freeze to be abolished! One may answer, "But it is precisely this 'sovereign Parliament,' with its Labour majority, that has adopted the wage freeze." Has this created a big crisis in the labor movement and even in the Parliamentary Labour party? To be sure. But it is a thousand times more urgent and vital to organize the struggle against that parliamentary decision outside Parliament than it is to wait until the present crisis manifests itself by creating a new Labour majority that might undo what the present treacherous one has done. Indeed, without such an energetic, extraparliamentary fight, this overturn in the composition of the Labour MPs will *never* occur. (Whether it will occur even with such a fight is another question.)

In a polemic against tendencies guilty of "constitutional illusions" not unlike those of Comrade Foley, Lenin had this to say in 1917:

"If political power in the state is exercised by a class whose interests coincide with those of the majority, a leadership of public affairs that effectively conforms to the will of the majority is possible. But if political power is exercised by a class whose interests differ from those of the majority, a leadership of public affairs in conformity with the will of the majority inevitably becomes trickery or leads to the crushing of the majority." (*Collected Works*, French edition, Vol. 25, pp. 216-17.)

In Portugal economic and state power are still held by the capitalist class, weakened though it is. To talk of "popular sovereignty" and "majority rule" without first breaking that economic power and the state apparatus that upholds it, without the previous conquest of power by the proletariat, is to deceive the workers and to deceive oneself.

This debate is far from academic. In rejecting the MFA decree on "popular power" the SP leadership specifically demanded that the status of the workers commissions, tenants committees, and workers self-defense organs be defined by the Constituent Assembly. (*Expresso*, July 12, 1975.) We ought to warn the workers: Don't let the Constituent Assembly legislate on any of your conquests; it will only restrict them!

Some comrades have come up with the following argument: Under conditions of capitalism in decay, when the bourgeoisie (especially today, after the end of the long postwar "boom") cannot grant any substantial reforms to the working class and is instead compelled ever increasingly to whittle down the democratic rights of the workers, the capitalists cannot tolerate a sovereign and democratically elected Constituent Assembly. Thus, to call for full sovereignty for the Constituent Assembly in Portugal today is to raise a demand that the capitalists cannot meet and thus to place the democratic sentiments of broad, not yet radicalized masses at the service of the revolution.

This argument suffers from erroneous extrapolation and generalization. It points correctly to a long-term *trend*. But the existence of the trend does not at all imply that under no conditions can the capitalists use a "sovereign constituent assembly" as an instrument in halting a proletarian revolution. In fact, this has already been done, and under circumstances that were not so different from those prevailing in Portugal today: in

Germany in 1918-19, in Spain (with the "sovereign Cortes") after July 1936, in France and Italy at the end of the second world war. To conclude from the long-term trend of the decay of bourgeois democracy that at no time and in no place can capitalism use bourgeois democracy as a weapon in halting a proletarian revolution is to contradict all historical experience of the past fifty years in Europe.

As a matter of fact, in the wake of the constitution of the MFA's triumvirate, Soares has already called for the formation of a "government of national unity." Where does this leave Comrade Foley's "sufficient" condition? How can Comrade Foley, Cunhal, or the unfortunate "centrists and ultraleftists" rapidly persuade Soares to abandon this call in favor of a call for a CP-SP-Intersindical government (perhaps with a few burned down CP and Intersindical headquarters thrown in for good measure)? Should the workers in Portugal wait to convince Soares before they defend their conquests? Do we now adopt the position that the pace of the revolution depends on the good will of the reformist misleaders? Were Stalin, Molotov, and Kamenev correct after all against Lenin and Trotsky in February-March 1917? Were the Bolsheviks splitting the working class when they insisted on not granting an ounce of trust to the reformist misleaders?

### **Bourgeois Democracy, Democratic Rights, Proletarian Revolution**

The root of Comrade Foley's misjudgment of the political conflict in Portugal today is a wrong, one-sided, and mechanistic conception of the relationship between bourgeois democracy and socialist revolution. This conception has now been endorsed by Comrade Hansen, editor of *Intercontinental Press*, in a "news analysis" published in the August 4 issue ("Is Democracy Worth Fighting For?"). Of course, Marxists defend democratic rights whenever they are attacked by bourgeois reaction. Marxists fight for the defense and extension of democratic rights during and after socialist revolutions. But this in no way means that a socialist revolution amounts to a "qualitative expansion" of bourgeois democracy. Nor does it mean that the extension of democratic rights is equivalent to "fighting for bourgeois democracy in the period leading up to socialism."

In the first place, it is necessary to remind Comrades Hansen and Foley that even in its most advanced and radical form, bourgeois democracy severely *restricts* political democratic rights (among other things) through the institutions of private property. The distinguishing feature of a proletarian revolution, even before the establishment of a workers state, is that increasingly radicalized mass action leads the toilers to extend democracy beyond limits compatible with *bourgeois* democracy.

The question of freedom of the press provides a good illustration of this tendency. We defend the right of even bourgeois liberal parties, not to mention workers parties, to publish their own newspaper against any attempt by bourgeois governments to suppress them. But we never defend the *monopoly of private owners* of printing presses over the expression of opinions publicly. When printing workers break that monopoly in the course of mass revolutionary struggle, when they lay claim to the right to have their own opinions printed alongside those of private owners or political parties, we say that this is an *extension* and not a limitation of democratic rights. We approve this extension 100 percent, even if the majority of the delegates to the Constituent Assembly have not voted in favor of it or have rejected it and even if the private owners protest very loudly. That is a very concrete example of how a revolution expands democracy beyond the limits of bourgeois democracy by attacking the rights of private property.

Second, bourgeois democracy consists not only of democratic rights (restricted ones that exist only on paper in part), but also of a state machine, repressive apparatus, and various institutions that limit and strangle the free democratic activity of the masses.

We oppose and challenge these institutions and their "right" to restrict the freedom of action of the masses (to limit the right to strike, for example), even in peaceful times. But when these institutions and state apparatus are challenged by the mass action of tens of thousands of workers in a revolutionary process, we stand 100 percent on the side of the workers against the institutions of the bourgeois-democratic state. We are for institutions of workers democracy, for soviets, to replace the institutions of the bourgeois state. A proletarian revolution is not simply an extension and generalization of democratic rights; in addition to that continuity, there is a strong element of *discontinuity*, of break—a break with *all the institutions of the bourgeois state*, a destruction of the bourgeois state machine and its replacement by *new* organs of power. The understanding on this point, after all, constitutes the main dividing line between Bolshevism and Menshevism in the course of proletarian revolutions. And we are convinced that these institutions of workers democracy are a thousand times more democratic than those of bourgeois democracy.

Third, in periods of intense class struggle and growing violent polarization of class forces—that is, in periods of revolution and counterrevolution—the defense of democratic rights cannot be separated from the class interests of the contending forces. The workers want to abolish exploitation, poverty, unemployment, and state repression. If, in the name of defending bourgeois democracy (or even "democratic rights" in general), one attempts to restrain their struggle, puts a brake on their "ultraleft" freedom of action, and condones or organizes repression against them, then one prepares the way for the replacement of bourgeois democracy by bourgeois dictatorship instead of by proletarian democracy.

The objective basis of bourgeois democracy, which rests on the possibility of a certain degree of conciliation between fundamental social classes, can be swept away by sharpened capitalist crisis and explosive class conflict. This is what happened in Europe during the 1930s. It happened in Chile. It is happening in Portugal today. Under these circumstances, to prevent the workers from replacing bourgeois democracy with proletarian democracy means to make the victory of bourgeois dictatorship inevitable.

In light of these theses, which were explained by Lenin and Trotsky many times, our comrades of the LCI, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Portugal, took the following positions, of which the Fourth International fully approves:

1. Support to the democratic right of the printing workers of *República* to have their own opinions printed on their presses, either in *República* itself or in another newspaper printed on the same presses.
2. Support to the democratic right of the Socialist party to publish its newspaper without any censorship or control.
3. Refusal to support any move by the authorities of the Portuguese bourgeois state to have the workers occupying the *República* printshop thrown off the premises.
4. Support to the right of the Socialist party to organize street demonstrations and refusal to collaborate with the CP in setting up roadblocks and barricades against the Socialist demonstrators.
5. Support to and active participation in any action of self-defense undertaken by the Communist party and the trade unions against attacks on their offices by reactionary crowds.

We believe that these positions are entirely correct and represent a consistent defense of democratic rights in a revolutionary situation, although they obviously go beyond the limits of bourgeois democracy. We also believe that it is only on the basis of these positions that the unity in action of the Portuguese workers can be restored.

The contradictions in the positions adopted by Comrade Hansen become all the more glaring when it is remembered that

in his article, written more than two weeks after the beginning of the storming and burning of dozens of headquarters of the CP, the trade unions, and other working-class organizations (including, in one case, an office of our own comrades of the LCI), Comrade Hansen did not see fit to mention these attacks even once, despite his crusade for bourgeois democracy against an alleged military dictatorship. One would have thought that a comrade so sensitive to democratic rights would scream at the top his lungs against these violent assaults on the most elementary right of existence and free functioning of working-class organizations—attacks a thousand times worse than anything to which the Portuguese SP has been subjected. Comrade Hansen's silence on this point only confirms that in a revolutionary situation one cannot set out to defend bourgeois democracy and bourgeois state institutions against the self-organization and mobilization of the workers without overlooking severe attacks on elementary democratic rights. The German workers found this out as early as December 1918-January 1919. It is a sad day when Comrade Hansen has to be reminded of it.

As far back as the electoral campaign of April 1975 we warned that the sectarian confrontation between Stalinist one-party schemes and Social Democratic clinging to bourgeois democracy could introduce a sharp split in the Portuguese working class, thereby threatening the advance of the revolution. Only a defense of the twin ideas of *workers democracy* and *workers councils* can assure that neither the revolutionary impetus nor the necessary united front of the Portuguese working class will be lastingly broken. We will continue to struggle tirelessly for this united front between the CP, the SP, and the revolutionary workers against the attacks of reactionary thugs and in consonance with the need to consolidate and expand the conquests of the revolution.

#### Toward Dual Power in Portugal

The wave of mass struggle, factory occupations, experiments in workers control, land occupations, squatters initiatives, and the emergence of tenants committees has raised the problem of how to coordinate and unify these variegated forms of self-organization of the toiling masses. History provides us with but one answer to this problem: the creation of soviets, of workers councils, whatever they may be called (the terminology preferably arising from the practical struggle experience of the country concerned rather than from a foreign language). The de facto creation of such workers councils is the spontaneous product of the Portuguese revolutionary process. If the Fourth International, its Portuguese organization, and other revolutionary groups have formulated this necessity systematically, they have done so *only after the first practical initiatives had been taken by the masses themselves*.

Comrade Foley does not agree. In the July 21, 1975, issue of *Intercontinental Press* he quotes a passage of Trotsky's comments on the 1931 Spanish revolution presenting soviets as "organizations of the proletarian united front" (*IP*, July 21, p. 1015.), thereby implying that Trotsky actually did not advise the setting up of soviets as long as there was no party-to-party agreement with the Social Democrats to do so. Soviets in Portugal only with the approval of Cunha and Soares! This is orthodox Trotskyism?

In fact, Trotsky never took such a preposterous position. He gave the Spanish Trotskyists just the opposite advice, in January 1931 and in April 1936, when, let it be said in passing, the relationship of class forces was less favorable to the proletariat than is the case in Portugal today and the Trotskyists were much weaker than they are today. Trotsky's advice was to propagate the creation of soviets coming out of the spontaneous mass struggles, to carefully test the willingness of the Socialist and anarchist workers to participate in them, and to go into action as soon as there were indications that this was actually occurring. (See, among other sources, his January 8, 1931, letter to the Chinese Opposition, his long article "The Revolution in Spain" of

Jan. 24, 1931, and his "Tasks of the Fourth International in Spain" of April 12, 1936, the latter two articles in *The Spanish Revolution*, Pathfinder Press, p. 67 and p. 211.) Only after this process has been set in motion is there any hope of compelling the Social Democratic or Stalinist leaders to accept the inevitable (very reluctantly). Our Portuguese comrades have been acting exactly in this way.

The most democratic form of workers councils is that in which the masses in factories and neighborhoods freely elect their delegates rather than having them nominated by parties. Parties are present in the soviets only as a result of the freely elected delegates assembling themselves into political factions, groups, etc. A system of councils in which parties delegate representatives not elected by the masses and over the heads of the masses is many times less democratic, for it tends to freeze the initial relationship of forces, and to falsify them to boot. Trotsky's criticism of this manner of composing the militia committees of the Catalan revolution in 1936-37 is well known. (See his "The POUM and the Call for Soviets," October 1, 1937, *ibid.*, p. 298.)

Of course, we oppose the nonsensical line of the ultraleftist PRP-BR: "soviets without parties." When thrown out the door, politics comes back through the window; in practice, "councils without parties" lead to a one-party system that fosters bureaucracy. We are for full freedom of political affiliation and activity of all workers and all members of workers councils. We are for a multiparty system within workers councils. But we are against agreements at the top among bureaucrats as a replacement for the free election of delegates by the masses of workers, soldiers, housewives, craftsmen, and all those toilers willing to participate in the emerging workers councils.

Real workers councils must be organs of the broadest possible unity of all the toilers. It would be criminal to say to a group of workers: You cannot participate in setting up workers councils because you are affiliated to the Socialist party. But we know of nobody who has upheld such a disastrous, divisive position in Portugal today. On the contrary, the greatest efforts must be made to involve the maximum number of Socialist party affiliates at all levels in the establishment of councils, by granting them all the required guarantees of the democratic functioning of these bodies. Attempts to draw local and regional organizations of the SP into the spreading and coordination of the councils should be multiplied. A call should be made to the national leaders of the SP to participate in the organization of the councils, and if they refuse, they should be challenged in public debate to explain the reasons for their refusal. (These gentlemen are all in favor of democracy and debates, aren't they?) The same obviously applies even more strongly to the Communist party, whose ranks and middle cadres are more inclined to participate than are the cadres of the SP, at least at this stage.

But if all ultimatum with respect to the SP and CP must be banished, all the more so should it be rejected with respect to those vanguard workers who are organized in various centrist, revolutionary, or "ultraleftist" groups, each with its particular shibboleth and ideological confusion, but each with much greater eagerness to actually set up councils than the CP and SP militants. We have uncompromising political differences with the CP and SP; nevertheless, we are prepared to build soviets with them, without demanding that they first abandon their faith in bourgeois democracy (SP) or in the one-party, bureaucratic system (the CP). Shouldn't we be prepared to build with the comrades of the PRP-BR, MES, LUAR, or UDP,<sup>4</sup> without first demanding that they abandon their various creeds—support to the MFA, "councils without parties," the "armed struggle," Mao Tsetung Thought, or

4. Movimento de Esquerda Socialista—Movement of the Socialist Left. Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária—League of Revolutionary Union and Action. União Democrático Popular—Popular Democratic Union.



whatever. We are opposed to the slogan "Dissolve the Constituent Assembly" and are equally opposed to the slogan "All power to the Constituent Assembly." But it would be irresponsible ultimatism to refuse to build workers councils along with supporters of either of these incorrect lines. Sectarianism toward "centrists and ultraleftists" is no more justified than sectarianism toward opportunists, especially when thousands of workers follow the "centrists and ultraleftists."

Councils are now arising in Portugal as the result of and at the height of tremendous mass struggles. They are genuine products of these struggles and are indispensable instruments for the extension, generalization, and final victory of these struggles. But in one article published in *Intercontinental Press* (July 21, 1975) Comrade Foley, basing himself on the *text* of the MFA decree on "popular power" and admitting that "this elaborate scheme is unlikely ever to be fully applied" (p. 1014), describes the MFA's call for these committees as an attempt to set up a "system of totalitarian military dictatorship" that "recalls Caetano's semi-corporatist union setup." (p. 1014.)

Everybody has the right to make mistakes. But there are mistakes that assume such proportions as to take on a new quality. We can only say that Comrade Foley has now completed the road to the Healy-Lambert method of politics. In fact, the definition of the MFA-proposed "people's committees" as "corporatist" originates from these great Marxists, who have creatively applied the rule of the three wise monkeys and consequently hear nothing, see nothing, and talk unlimited nonsense.

Corporatism is a fascist-type form of rule born of the crushing of every form of working-class organization and self-activity. It is the result of a disastrous defeat of the working class—in the case of Portugal, a very bloody defeat indeed, one can be sure. Its imposition requires the previous physical destruction of working-class cadres, organizations, headquarters, and presses and the total demoralization and domination of the working class.

In Portugal today the possible emergence of embryonic workers councils has been expressed by the fact that the workers commissions have begun assuming tasks whose areas of fulfillment spill out of the factories themselves. If the "progressive" wing of the MFA undertakes a pathetic attempt to "co-opt" this development into its own plans, this in no way modifies the origins or direction of development of these councils. Their gradual emergence has not been the result of a defeat but a tremendous upsurge of working-class activity. Far from being demoralized, the self-confidence and activity of the class is increasing at a pace seldom seen in West Europe since the second world war. Far from being crushed, working-class organizations are multiplying, spreading, and differentiating in a symphony (and sometimes a cacophony) but that is the price we gladly pay for workers democracy) of free exchange of opinions and free debate. Public opinion is dominated by the working-class press and working-class literature. To identify *this trend* with totalitarianism, to see a threat of fascist corporatism in *these* forms of organization, is to have completely lost one's bearings. It can only be called a re-edition of the Stalinist (and Mao-Stalinist) theory of social-fascism, for it overlooks the fundamental difference between a situation in which working-class organizations exist and a situation in which they do not exist. And in the case of Portugal, the theory has even less justification than it did during the time of Stalin-Thälmann, for there is incomparably greater workers democracy and freedom in Portugal today than there was in Germany during the final period of the Weimar Republic.

It can be predicted with the utmost confidence that in order for "corporatism," totalitarianism, or fascism to return to power in Portugal, all the initiators of the present workers councils, and not a few of the MFA "theoreticians" who drafted the decree so detested by Comrade Foley, will have first to be shot. Not the slightest scrap of any "people's council" would survive under a

victorious reactionary dictatorship. If things actually came to that, Comrade Foley would have a hard time explaining how he managed to confuse the victims with the executioners. Happily, there is still great hope that the resistance to any return to fascism will be victorious and that history will thus spare Comrade Foley this ugly hour of reckoning.

Particularly clever sophists may argue that "isolated" workers control in "a limited number" of factories does not yet represent genuine dual power and that "fragmented popular councils" restricted to some neighborhoods or branches of industry are not yet real soviets. This is certainly true. We do not maintain that there is already a situation of generalized dual power in Portugal. What we do maintain is that such a situation is gradually emerging and that we must struggle with all our might to extend and accelerate that trend. But the sophists are easily caught in their own trap. What should revolutionaries do when they are confronted with "only limited" instances of workers control in some fifty or a hundred factories? Accept the limitation? Prefer that they be suppressed by order of a "sovereign Constituent Assembly"? Or struggle for their extension, generalization, coordination, and centralization? That is surely the line of Lenin and Trotsky. And that is the line that the Fourth International upholds in Portugal today.

The solution to each of the key questions with which the Portuguese toiling masses are confronted today requires the extension and coordination of bodies of self-organization of the masses. Under conditions of galloping inflation, bourgeois economic sabotage, wholesale factory closures, a massive flight of capital, and widespread concealment of material stocks, it is impossible to fight against unemployment, for the seven-hour day, or for the sliding scale of wages through methods of "normal" trade-union negotiation. Workers control must be boldly generalized; nationalized banks and enterprises must be centralized under workers control; a state monopoly of foreign trade must be established; a workers economic plan for guaranteeing full employment and satisfying the needs of the masses must be drawn up. This requires a network of committees in the factories, neighborhoods, villages, and ports to check, verify, and organize. And that requires a system of workers councils.

Guarantees against the threat of a fascist coup and an imperialist intervention can be provided only by the massive arming of the workers and poor peasants, by close unity between the workers in their factories and neighborhoods and the soldiers in the barracks, by a system of integrated workers militias and soldiers committees, and by a system of vigilance inside and outside the barracks. This also requires an integrated system of workers and soldiers councils.

The revolutionary left today is still a small minority, although it is growing rapidly. The bureaucratic leaderships of the CP and SP still control the majority of the working class, although the prestige of these leaderships is increasingly being undermined and shattered. To overcome the present division of the working class it is necessary to establish organs within which Socialists, Communists, and revolutionaries can meet, discuss, develop their differences, and debate in front of the entire class, so that the entire class can judge. What better forum for free debate and freely accepted unity in action than freely and democratically elected workers councils?

We cannot be sure that his line will triumph in Portugal. We do not know in advance when generalized soviets will actually come into existence. For this trend to be victorious, it is not enough simply to have a correct line. It is also necessary for the relationship of forces between the classes and between the revolutionary organization and the reformist misleaders within the class to be such that the revolutionaries can win the confidence of the majority of the proletariat. We do not know whether there will be sufficient time to achieve such a relationship of forces in Portugal. But we do know this: Whatever the issue

around which the decisive test of strength takes place, whether it be the defense of the gains of the revolution against attempts to eliminate them through a reconstructed "stable" bourgeois democracy, whether it be the defense of the working class against an attempt to restore a military or fascist dictatorship, whether it be an open possibility of the seizure of power by the working class, or whether it be any combination of such issues, there is no road to victory and no road to the building of a mass revolutionary party in Portugal today other than the road of tirelessly campaigning for an extension, generalization, coordination, and centralization of democratically elected workers councils.

Comrade Foley appears not to understand this. In the July 28 *Intercontinental Press* he wrote that the July 16 demonstration in Lisbon was "a wild display of ultraleft fantasies." After that demonstration, he concluded, "it will be hard for any workers or tenants committee to gain acceptance as a genuinely representative body that can unite workers and poor masses in struggle." (p. 1063.) What an utter lack of historical perspective and sense of proportion is expressed in these words!

The Russian soviets, not to mention the German councils and the Spanish committees, committed hundreds of "ultraleft" acts and political mistakes, much graver than any that may have been committed in Lisbon on July 16. That did not prevent them from spreading, and still less from "gaining acceptance" as "genuinely representative" bodies. Contrary to Comrade Foley's predictions, the number of workers and tenants committees will not cease to grow after July 16. Attempts to coordinate and generalize them will increase in number. The Portuguese working class will follow the road of self-organization that has been followed by all working classes during genuine proletarian revolutions, regardless of any errors that may be committed along the way. This upsurge can be halted only by a crushing bloody defeat and not by some mistaken slogans in one demonstration. In fact, Mário Soares himself, who stands physically nearer to the reality of the revolutionary process in Portugal than does Comrade Foley and who above all is subject to the strong pressure of his own rank and file, who after all want to participate in the building of the committees of workers power, expressed his willingness (after July 16) to accept the workers and tenants committees, provided some form of reconciling them with bourgeois parliamentary institutions could be found. (See *Le Monde*, July 29, 1975.) Of course, "combining" soviets with bourgeois institutions is the classical path of Menshevism during proletarian revolutions. Sad to say, however, Comrade Foley finds himself both less lucid and further to the right than Mário Soares on the question of the future of Portuguese workers councils.

#### Cuba and Portugal: The Parallel and the Difference

All revolutions in the twentieth century have given rise to unforeseen developments. Nobody had ever heard of soviets before they were created by the Russian revolution of 1905. (Similarities with the Paris Commune were discovered only later, after much discussion and experience.) Workers control was a product of the revolution of 1917. The Spanish revolution of 1936 created committees of militias. Since the great defeats of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s (caused by reformism and Stalinism), unusual forms of proletarian revolutions have occurred—a result of the combination of the inventiveness of the proletarian masses and the inadequacy of the subjective factor, that is, the lack of an adequate level of class consciousness and revolutionary leadership. This has given rise to a new phenomenon: *deformed popular social revolutions*, such as the Yugoslav, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cuban revolutions.

These were popular social revolutions in the dual sense that: 1. They brought millions of people into political action; that is, they were popular in the sense in which Trotsky used the term in his *Theses on Permanent Revolution*; they were revolutions born of

the immense self-activity of workers and peasants.<sup>5</sup> 2. They led to the destruction of bourgeois state power and to an overturn of capitalist property relations; that is, they destroyed capitalism as an economic system and destroyed the power of the bourgeoisie as a ruling class. At the same time, however, they were *deformed* revolutions, in a threefold sense: First, their leaderships, either because of their Stalinist origins and education (Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam) or because of their empiricism and pragmatism (Cuba) were unwilling and unable to allow the emergence of democratic forms of self-organization of the workers and poor peasants. Second, from the outset the emerging workers states were consequently qualitatively more bureaucratically deformed than the Russian workers state had been during its initial stage. Third, as a result of these deformations, these revolutions were unable sufficiently (if at all) to act as stimulants for the international revolution, despite the fact that it was possible for them to act in such a way in the given world situation.

Our movement did not immediately and successfully tackle the political and theoretical problems posed by this unforeseen turn in world history, a turn that in the final analysis was the result of a merely partial upsurge of world revolution after two decades of crushing defeats and of the combination of that limited upsurge with the programmatic, political, and demoralizing long-term effects of those defeats, that is, of the temporary hegemony of Stalinism and reformism within the international workers movement. Our movement had to undergo a crisis before it was able to find the correct answers to the problems posed by this unforeseen turn.

Those who failed to find the correct answers and thought it was a deadly sin to recognize a social revolution if it occurred in any unforeseen way maneuvered themselves into impossible theoretical and ideological contradictions and into hopeless political sectarianism and isolation. The *Lutte Ouvrière* group in France has decided that although Russia is a workers state, the East European "people's democracies" are bourgeois states, even though their social structures, economic systems, and state powers are identical with those of the USSR. The Healy-Lambert groupings claim that China is a workers state but that Cuba remains a bourgeois state, even though bourgeois property relations were eliminated far more radically in Cuba than they had been in China. (This implies an additional contradiction as well: If only the leaders of the July 26 Movement had joined the Cuban Communist party before overthrowing Batista, Cuba could be recognized as a workers state; the only trouble is that in that case they would never have overthrown Batista.)

In most cases, the root of this theoretical bankruptcy is fear of succumbing to temptation, which is the common characteristic of sectarians, as Trotsky so aptly put it. All these sectarians have somehow managed to convince themselves that if one "admits" that Tito, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, and Castro were able to overthrow capitalism under exceptional circumstances and to successfully lead deformed revolutions, one must "logically" admit that other figures of a similar type could be capable of repeating such feats anywhere and any time; the future role or usefulness of the Fourth International would "consequently" be "liquidated."

For a quarter of a century now we have vainly attempted to convince these sectarians that the conclusion does not at all follow from the premise, that innumerable revolutionary situations since 1945 have been betrayed by the traditional bureaucratic leaderships, that the balance sheet of Stalinism on a world scale is a clear counterrevolutionary one, that Tito, Mao, and Ho

5. In this sense, every social revolution is not necessarily a popular revolution. In East Europe capitalist property relations and the bourgeois state power were overturned without popular revolutions, essentially through the bureaucratic-military actions of the Soviet bureaucracy, in some cases with limited mass mobilizations that can in no way be considered genuine mass popular uprisings.

were able to lead their deformed revolutions to victory only by breaking with key strategic and tactical theorems of Stalinism (and incidentally by breaking down the subordination of their parties and revolutions to the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy), and that the reality of a social revolution is an objective phenomenon that must be analyzed objectively and without subordinating the willingness to adopt this or that definition to the cranky "conclusions" that allegedly "necessarily flow" from the analysis. (We may note in passing that it is the school of reformist and Stalinist bureaucrats that subordinates the Marxist method of analysis as an instrument of scientific knowledge to the "needs of the organization," which means in reality the needs of the bureaucracy, thereby transforming Marxism into a handmaiden of large or petty bureaucrats.)

Again and again we have insisted that the cases of Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, and Cuba would remain exceptional, that the detour of world revolution through the phenomenon of deformed revolutions would be temporary, that as the crisis of the world imperialist system continued to deepen and the worldwide relationship of forces continued to shift against the bourgeoisie it was only a question of time before the world revolution would again hit the imperialist countries, and that the more this occurred the more the industrial proletariat would play the leading role in the revolutionary process both in the imperialist countries and in an increasing number of semicolonial countries, and the more the world revolutionary process would return to its "classical" pattern: the pattern of the self-organization of the toiling masses, the pattern of soviet democracy. We have further insisted that these "undefomed" revolutions will be able to triumph only under revolutionary Marxist leaderships, through the emergence of genuine mass revolutionary parties of the working class. The sectarians were not convinced by this argumentation. That is not surprising, for people who cannot be convinced by powerful revolutions are not likely to be persuaded by any argumentation, however valid.

Our movement was almost unanimous in formulating this type of analysis and prediction—at the 1963 Reunification Congress, after the great rallying call of May '68 in France, and at the Ninth World Congress of the Fourth International in 1969. Even though there was a sharp tendency struggle at the Tenth World Congress (1974), the political resolutions of the majority and the minority shared the above-indicated conclusions.

The Portuguese revolution is the first revolution to break out after the Tenth World Congress, the first to confront us with the need to verify our long-term analysis and prognosis about the likely pattern of world revolution. And it is here that the probable motivation for Comrade Foley's mistakes must be located, a motivation that he shares with Comrade Hansen: fear that to recognize that a genuine revolutionary process is under way in Portugal would somehow imply recognizing the ability of "petty-bourgeois officers" (or "reactionary bourgeois officers") to be magically transformed by the Communist party into "tools of proletarian revolution," thereby "justifying" the class collaborationist maneuvers carried out by the Stalinist Communist parties throughout the world.

This motivation leads to an approach that is identical to the Healy-Lambert method of examining unforeseen turns of objective events. It is an approach that is alien to Marxism and can only lead to disastrous results. Such an approach is all the more unjustified in that in reality the Portuguese revolution strikingly confirms the predictions of the documents of the Ninth and Tenth World Congresses and the theses of the Reunification Congress, namely that the eruption of a proletarian revolution in an imperialist country will involve a return to the classical pattern, to the pattern of soviets and workers democracy.

But the Portuguese revolution also confirms that each and every proletarian revolution has some peculiarity, some specific feature that must be understood but that must not allow the analysis to

be diverted from the fundamental trends and issues.

The Cuban revolution *began* with the destruction of the army and state apparatus through the guerrilla war led by the July 26 Movement. This destruction did not guarantee the outcome of the revolution. Strenuous efforts were made (especially by the right wing of the July 26 Movement) to *rebuild* a bourgeois army and state apparatus after Batista's fall. But this destruction, combined with huge mass mobilizations and the conscious choices of the Castro leadership, did open the way for the rather rapid victory of the revolution once the reconstruction of the bourgeois army and state apparatus had been prevented. That is one of the key factors that explains why a workers state was created in Cuba without the prior formation of a mass revolutionary Marxist party.

The Portuguese revolution also began in a peculiar way. Its development has been marked by a series of factors: First, the weakening of Portuguese imperialism by the fight of the national liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola; second, the attempt of a sector of Portuguese finance capital and some of the main chiefs of the army under Spínola and Costa Gomes to utilize the obvious need to end the colonial wars and the need to shift from direct to indirect rule in the former colonies as a basis from which to thoroughly modernize and overhaul Portuguese bourgeois society and the Portuguese capitalist economy by replacing the Caetano dictatorship with a "strong state" under Spínola, allowing limited fragments of bourgeois democracy (not unlike the pattern of de Gaulle's regime in France); third, the failure of the Portuguese bourgeoisie to realize the Spínolist project of a "strong state" because of the violent and ever expanding emergence of broader and broader masses onto the political scene; fourth, the growing division of the officer corps, a result of the combination of all the previously enumerated factors, and a growing polarization of the whole army; fifth, the growing political awareness and self-activity of the soldiers, which introduces an element of disintegration into the army, that is, a refusal by the soldiers to obey orders they consider politically unacceptable, a decline of discipline, and even attempts to alter the hierarchical structure of the army.

All these factors have come into play gradually, not all at once. The way they developed took many people by surprise, beginning with the Portuguese bourgeoisie and ending with not a few Trotskyists. But there is nothing "revisionist" in the analysis. Nor is there anything "liquidationist" in the conclusions that flow from it. The fact that a proletarian revolution is immensely accelerated by phenomena of division, disintegration, or temporary paralysis within the bourgeois army is after all an elementary principle of Marxism.

Comrade Foley's obsession with "undermining any faith in the bourgeois MFA" (an obsession he shares with Healy, Lambert, and their ilk) is a typical sectarian reversal of an opportunist mistake; it is based on fear that one might be on the point of succumbing to temptation. Comrade Foley's analysis shares an essential feature with the analysis of the centrist and opportunist tailenders of the MFA leadership: the assumption that everything that is happening in Portugal today depends essentially if not completely on the role, function, intentions, and actions of the MFA.

We categorically reject this approach. We maintain that what is going on in Portugal today is fundamentally a growing confrontation between the impetuous mass movement of the proletariat and poor peasantry on the one hand and all those forces that want to maintain and restabilize the capitalist economy and the bourgeois state on the other hand. We maintain that the growing divisions within the army, the officer corps, and the MFA itself are simply reflections of this growing polarization of class forces and are not at all results of the diabolical maneuvers and plans of the MFA. We therefore conclude that the key problem is to create organs of workers power and to compel all political forces to take positions on that question instead of proceeding by dividing Portugal into

those who "have illusions in the MFA" and those who do not.

The case of the "people's committees" provides a good illustration of the differences in the two approaches. If one looks at a plan (on paper) calling for the presence of a military commander in each district council by beginning from the arbitrary and mystifying starting point that we are dealing with a powerful military junta that is fully in control of the situation and intent upon establishing a "corporatist state," then such a plan becomes a "sinister omen." If, on the other hand, one sees the reality of a divided and increasingly paralyzed MFA tottering from crisis to crisis and unable to maintain any independent position between the increasingly polarized forces of capital and labor, then one sees the plan as a pathetic attempt by one wing of the MFA to co-opt and manipulate the radical initiatives of the working class, initiatives that have been taken independently of the MFA. One further sees that such attempts at co-optation are doomed to failure so long as the mass movement remains on the upswing. Instead of replying to the MFA "popular power" decree with the incredibly sectarian social-fascist-type cry of "corporatism," one should rather respond: Let that "army commander" not be nominated but instead freely elected by all the soldiers and officers of the district, on the basis of "one man, one vote." In fact, this is exactly what occurred in the first local popular assembly that gathered in Portugal—on July 13 in the town of Pontinha. It is true that the assembly met in the local barracks. But it was composed of democratically elected delegates from fifteen local workers commissions and twenty-four local tenants commissions. There was also one representative of the local army unit. But he happened to be not the hierarchical nominee of the general staff, but a man elected by the general assembly of the soldiers and officers after a mass meeting and an extensive discussion. We ask the question: Is that a soviet or is it an organ of a fascist-type "corporatist" state? And if one wants to deny the "pure" soviet character of this assembly (and we would be interested to know for what reasons), the question remains: Is that local popular assembly close to a soviet-type organ, or is it close to an organ of a fascist- or corporatist-type state?

Comrade Foley must be reminded that during the first phase of the February revolution in Russia many army commanders were deliberately invited to the provincial soviets, and the army representatives occupied a "privileged position" there. (See Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution*, Volume 1, the chapter entitled "The Executive Committee.") This was not a good development. But it was no reason to deny the character of the soviets.

We do not call upon the Portuguese workers to have the slightest confidence in the MFA. Quite the contrary. We call upon them to have confidence *only* in their own independent class strength. But neither do we call upon them to turn their backs on nationalizations, workers control, or workers councils simply because a few officers call for these goals too. Nor do we hang out a sign reading "Proletarian revolution: Entrance strictly forbidden to nonfactory workers," especially in view of the fact that, as is indicated in the above-mentioned quotation from the *Financial Times*, the counterrevolution itself classifies some of the revolutionary officers (for example, those who have begun to arm and train the workers) as its deadly enemies along with the revolutionary workers. The exact character of the Portuguese workers councils (whether they will call themselves "people's committees," "committees of people's power," or whatever) will depend on the activity, strength, and consciousness of the working class and its vanguard, and not on the plans, intentions, or maneuvers of some group of officers. That is and will remain our basic approach.

In other words: We believe that there is some similarity between the Cuban and Portuguese revolutions; but there are also significant differences. The similarity is that the weakening of the bourgeois army in Portugal, like its destruction in Cuba, aids the

revolutionary process considerably. The differences are that Portugal is an imperialist country, not a semicolonial one; that the uprooting of the political and social power of the bourgeoisie is consequently much more difficult; that the weight of the industrial proletariat is much greater; that the army has not been completely shattered but only divided and *partially* (and *temporarily*) paralyzed. It is therefore overwhelmingly likely that the Portuguese revolution will follow the *classical* pattern and will triumph only through the conquest of power by the proletariat organized in soviets and led by revolutionary Marxists and not at all through the leadership of the MFA.

To speak of growing polarization of society and growing division of the army along the lines of that polarization is to imply that some officers are likely to align themselves with the proletariat during the final test of strength. Others will not. How many will go in this or that direction is a matter of useless speculation, for it is not at all the problem at issue. *The problem at issue is to assure the maximum of autonomous democratic self-organization and self-defense of the proletariat for that future test of strength.* The attitudes of this or that part of the officer corps will be by-products of the alignment of basic social forces, as has been the case since the end of 1974; these attitudes will not at all be the major motor force.

Only if Comrade Foley returns to the *method* used by Marxists in judging all revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—that is, the method that begins by defining the basic class forces in contention—will he be able to extricate himself from the absurd positions into which he has maneuvered himself. Otherwise, he will share the sad fate of Healy, Lambert, and other sectarians during the past twenty years: He will fail to understand a living revolution when confronted with it.

#### The Necessary Tasks of Solidarity With the Portuguese Revolution

When we say that a process of rapid polarization of basic class forces is under way in Portugal, we imply that there will be a succession of violent convulsions and violent confrontations, including armed confrontations, between antagonistic class forces. It is a matter of life or death for revolutionaries to adopt a correct stand in these confrontations. That is why Comrade Foley's errors are not purely theoretical. They could lead to disastrous abstention in a key phase of the Portuguese class struggle.

During the March 11, 1975, confrontation our comrades of the LCI fought in the front lines on the barricades against the counterrevolutionary Spinoist coup. They won considerable prestige through their courageous initiatives and interventions. So much so that the CP bureaucrats were compelled to allow their leaders to address the huge crowd (some 60,000 people) assembled in Porto that evening to condemn the coup. We assume that Comrades Foley and Hansen do not criticize that behavior.

In the July 28 issue of *Intercontinental Press* Comrade Foley presents General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho as a "possible" "general on a white horse," that is, a possible Bonaparte emerging from the power struggle in Portugal. (p. 1063.) We have no interest in speculating about the secret intentions or basic character of this or that individual officer. We can only judge class and political trends. When we say that Costa Gomes and the Melo Antunes group obviously constitute the right wing of the MFA, it is not because of their secret intentions but rather because of their public defense of a program to stop the revolution, which has supposedly "gone too far."

The real situation in Portugal *today* is not one of Bonapartist dictatorship but on the contrary one of nearly unlimited working-class freedom of action, regardless of the secret intentions of the junta. To install a *real* Bonapartist dictatorship it will be necessary first to crush the existing working-class freedoms. It therefore follows that a key task of revolutionaries, not only in

Portugal, but also in the rest of Europe and in North America, should be to warn the workers against that *real danger* and call upon them to organize and arm themselves. If instead of doing this one starts with speculation about who the Bonaparte is likely to be and if one then proceeds to indentify this future Bonaparte with some figure in a government under which all working-class freedoms remain essentially intact, one runs the real risk of completely misleading the workers in regard to the question of whom they will have to direct their first blows against.

The present situation in Portugal has many similarities with the situation in Russia under Kerensky. (Obviously, there are also many differences. The greatest differences are that in Portugal the soviets are only incipient and not yet generalized and that there is no strong Bolshevik party.) Lenin and Trotsky suspected Kerensky of not a few "Bonapartist intentions" and denounced them. But the Bolsheviks never concentrated their accusations on Kerensky's presumed desire to become a dictator. Had they done so, there would have been great confusion when it was Kornilov who actually struck. Comrade Foley has no way of knowing who will strike at what time and in what form to establish a bourgeois Bonapartist dictatorship in Portugal. It is to say the least premature to decide that it will be Carvalho. If it happens instead to be Spínola, or the Portuguese legion assembled in Spain acting along with imperialist mercenaries, or Costa Gomes, or a combination of all three, Comrade Foley will have to fight in the same camp as the Copcon officers against the real Bonapartist murderers, as we all did on March 11. Or does he believe that this was a mistake and that one ought to remain neutral in a struggle between the camp of Kerensky and the camp of Kornilov?

We have had some rather heated discussion in the Fourth International about what is meant by the formula "fighting in the camp of Kerensky against the camp of Kornilov." We believe that it means not only political independence from Kerensky, but also that no political support must be given to Kerensky and that there must be no promises to defend the "continuity" of his government, whether or not that government has been elected by the majority of the people. But it obviously *does mean* fighting in the same camp. We determine the nature of the struggle not by the nature of the political leaderships of the two camps, nor by abstract considerations about the alleged "superiority" of one form of political rule over the other, but instead by the *different class character of the combatants*.

For us, the embryonic civil war in Russia between the Kerensky and Kornilov camps and the full-fledged civil war in Spain were not wars of bourgeois democracy against fascism or Bonapartism but wars between the mass of the proletariat and the bulk of the bourgeoisie, even if the proletariat was still led (or rather, misled) by reformists, class collaborationists, and individual bourgeois politicians representing nobody but themselves. To free the proletariat of these treacherous leaders it was necessary for revolutionaries to fight in their camp. Any abstentionist position would deliver the workers to the reformist misleaders, thus making the victory of reaction inevitable.

If, as Comrade Foley has read in the stars, General Carvalho turns the Portuguese army against the working-class organizations and initiates a coup to destroy these organizations and all the gains of the past eighteen months, then clearly we shall fight side by side with the Portuguese workers (and not a few soldiers) on the barricades against him. But if the future Bonaparte bears a different name from the one Comrade Foley has seen fit to bestow upon him, and if, as on March 11, 1975, Carvalho and Gonçalves fight on the same side as the Portuguese workers against the fascist threat, will Comrade Foley be prepared to struggle alongside the Portuguese Kerensky against the Portuguese Kornilov? The fact that Comrade Foley does not say a word about this possible development is rather ominous, especially since the question is not at all an academic one, but is on everyone's lips in Portugal today.

The Fourth International and the American Trotskyists have a burning task of solidarity with the Portuguese revolution. Today that revolution is being slandered throughout the world bourgeois press. The campaign of hatred against "Communist dictatorship in Portugal" has a very clear function to perform: to prepare public opinion in the West for an imperialist intervention against the revolution.

After the great success of the Vietnamese revolution and the antiwar movement in the United States and internationally and after imperialism's consequent defeat in Indochina, we do not believe that imperialism is capable of sending hundreds of thousands of soldiers for a full-scale counterrevolutionary war of intervention against the Portuguese revolution. It is, however, capable of arming and subsidizing Portuguese reaction and the counterrevolution. It is capable of organizing aggression by a "foreign legion" supporting the Portuguese legion and other indigenous fascists. It is capable of using the NATO bases and the U.S. bases in Spain to aid a counterrevolutionary coup. And it is especially capable of using economic and financial weapons to strangle the revolution, to weaken, demoralize, and starve the masses, and to aid, embolden, and reorganize the bourgeoisie.

*Intercontinental Press* would serve a useful purpose if it would draw more systematic attention to these dangers and advise revolutionaries in the United States and throughout the world about how to counter them, instead of devoting large amounts of space to the fantasies of Comrade Foley. To be sure, correctly analyzing a revolution is a necessary precondition for aiding it. An open and frank debate about the nature and perspectives of the revolution and the problems and dangers that face it is part of that aid. But it is only part. One of the gravest results of Comrades Foley and Hansen's wrong analysis of what is happening in Portugal today is that it has drawn attention away from the burning need to organize a movement of solidarity with the Portuguese revolution. *End the blockade of Portugal! Hands off Portugal! Let the Portuguese workers speak for themselves! Invite delegations of Portuguese workers to address workers and trade-union meetings throughout the Western world!* These should be the main slogans of that campaign today, a campaign that should be organized on the broadest possible united-front basis, nationally and internationally. These slogans will prepare working-class opinion for more precise tasks when the decisive test of strength comes.

We sincerely hope that *Intercontinental Press* will expand that necessary campaign of solidarity with the Portuguese revolution, even before it corrects its mistaken analysis of the revolutionary process unfolding in that country.

August 10, 1975

### **Peruvian President Velasco Overthrown in Military Coup**

Peruvian President Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado was overthrown in a military coup August 29. The new president is Gen. Francisco Morales Bermúdez, who served as premier in the previous regime.

Morales is said to represent more conservative elements in the armed forces and to have been the military's choice for confronting the popular discontent arising from the country's worsening economic situation.

Wildcat strikes, land occupations, and student demonstrations against political repression reflected the political ferment of the weeks preceding the coup. In response, the government deported in mid-August twenty-eight political figures, journalists, labor leaders, and activists considered hostile to the regime.

# Portugal: A Complex Stage of the Revolution

[The following article appeared in the August 19 issue of the Soviet daily *Pravda*. It was signed "Observer," a designation indicating that it is to be taken as an authoritative statement of the views of the Kremlin bureaucracy. The translation was done for *Intercontinental Press* by Marilyn Vogt.]

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In its public statements, the newly formed government of Portugal, headed by Vasco Gonçalves, emphasizes that at the present time the Portuguese revolution is going through a complex stage. The reactionary forces within the country and abroad have promoted an energetic offensive aimed at creating a split in the ranks of Portuguese democrats and foiling the process of bringing about progressive reforms. Two days ago, after a special session of the government, Vasco Gonçalves in a radio appeal to the people emphasized that at the present time the Portuguese people themselves have to demand that all political ambiguities that compromise the unity of the armed forces be discarded, unity within the armed forces being the basis for its alliance with the people.

In fact, in recent weeks alarming news has been coming out of Portugal. The ultraright reaction has again raised its head. In a number of regions, particularly in the northern part of the country, hooligan elements are raiding the headquarters of the Communist party and of other democratic organizations and trade unions. Socialist party representatives who have left the government, and their supporters, are making categorical demands on the Armed Forces Movement [MFA—*Movimento das Forças Armadas*], threatening to paralyze the administrative and economic activity of the country if their demands are not met.

Intense political struggle has marked the period since the fascist Caetano dictatorship was overthrown in Portugal a little more than a year ago.

Of course, the Portuguese revolution ran into a great many domestic and foreign difficulties in the course of achieving its goals and tasks. At the same time, radical reforms that are in the interest of the popular masses and of the country's independence have been instituted and continue to occur. Important sectors of industry and transport have been nationalized or placed under the control of the government. The Salazarist machinery for repression and

administration has been smashed, and new organs of power are being formed. The implementation of agrarian reform has been undertaken, corresponding to the interests of the peasant workers.

The country's revolutionary government, the Armed Forces Movement, has honestly carried out its program of granting independence to the former Portuguese colonies.

Portugal has stated its intention to carry out an independent foreign policy, open for collaboration with all the countries of the world. In addition, the new regime has declared that it will loyally observe the country's international treaties and obligations, including those concerning Portugal's participation in NATO.

The progressive reforms, steps along the way toward building a new Portugal, coming about under conditions in which the masses and the political forces with a democratic orientation were guaranteed total freedom and the population was guaranteed genuine democratic and social rights, have aroused the animosity and active opposition of the international and domestic forces of reaction.

The military revolt that broke out March 11 of this year, supported in the country by circles of the monopolistic bourgeoisie and belated followers of the Salazarist regime, was a desperate attempt by the reaction to turn the country from its revolutionary course.

This unsuccessful sortie showed that the forces hostile to the Portuguese revolution have not given up the idea of turning the course of events in the country in a direction that is advantageous to them. The problem of consolidating the democratic course of the country's development arose unmistakably for Portuguese democrats.

Not long before the elections to the Constituent Assembly, upon the initiative of the MFA, a platform was worked out for joint activity between the MFA and the democratic parties. The Portuguese revolution, the document noted, will be developed within the framework of a multiparty system and will allow for the realization of the reconstruction of the country's entire public life. On April 11, a pact was signed between the MFA and six Portuguese political parties for putting this platform into practice.

The role and function of the future Constituent Assembly was clearly stipulated—its task being to compose the text of a Portuguese constitution on the basis of the principles laid down in the joint platform. By common agreement of all the

parties of the coalition, it was stipulated that the process of the elections and their results must have no influence on either the political situation in the country or the structure of the organs of power.

Pursuant to the April 11 decisions, the government implemented a series of new changes that were warmly approved by the masses.

The parties that had entered the government thus went into the elections with a single platform, backed up by the popular measures that had been adopted by the government, and of course, attracted to their side masses of voters. But the final days of the election campaign and particularly the period following April 25 of this year already showed which of the political figures of the country were striving honestly and loyally to carry out the joint program and which were only exploiting the progressive slogans while waiting for the opportunity to discard them in the event of success in the elections.

Was Portugal ready to carry out such a massive and crucial political campaign? This complicated question had even at that time disturbed the country's genuine democrats. The masses of oppressed peasants, particularly in the North—most strongly under the influence of the church, accustomed to submitting to the large landholders and officials of the old order—cast their votes, often without realizing clearly the differences in the programs and genuine aims of the different political parties. One-third of the country's population is functionally illiterate. These people went to the polls without even being able to read the ballot.

The Portuguese reaction counted on this, endeavoring to get revenge during the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The forces of reaction hoped that the more than forty years of fascist rule, the core of which was a double-dyed anti-Communism, could not but have left its mark on the thinking of the people.

In addition, the word "socialism" popular now in Portugal is also in the name of the Socialist party and was strongly exploited by the Socialist party in the election agitation. Socialist party figures, knowing that the results of elections more often than not fail to reflect the real relationship of political forces in a country, only awaited the outcome of the voting in order to try, backed up by statistics, to speak from a position of strength, advancing terms and conditions that were in direct opposition to the main line of the Portuguese revolution.

It became clear that new events were about to happen as early as the celebrations on May 1, five days after the elections, when the Socialist party decided to hold a separate meeting apart from the other political parties under slogans bringing anti-Communism and hostility toward the MFA into the air.

The leaders of the Socialist party began to come out with outright attacks on Portuguese Communists, also taking advantage of the so-called *República* affair, in which, by the way, the Communist party was in no way involved.

The escalation of the excessive and outlandish demands, going so far as an ultimatum that the prime minister [Vasco Gonçalves] be removed, began during the "*República* affair." While securing what they were demanding and exerting relentless pressure on the government, the Socialist party demonstratively withdrew from the government. The governmental crisis in Portugal began July 10. The reaction tried to use it to create in the country an atmosphere for provocations, for a lack of confidence, and for sabotage of the progressive reforms.

It is absolutely clear that all these actions are geared toward the elements that are politically unsteady, primarily in the provincial cities and in the villages in the North, among those who "have been held in abeyance," that is, those who have been waiting for a chance to pour forth their hostility toward the democratic reforms and changes. But mainly they are geared toward organized support from outside, from NATO circles.

It is no secret that from the first days of the Portuguese revolution the international forces of reaction began to interfere in the internal affairs of the country and make attempts to turn the tide of political events in a direction that suited them. The leaders of the political and military machinery of the North Atlantic bloc ganged up in crude attacks on Portugal. Twice, NATO military maneuvers were conducted in Portuguese waters and in Portuguese territory, which progressive society viewed as a clumsy attempt to exert pressure. In keeping with the imperialists' customary schema, two levers of pressure were applied against Portuguese democrats: economic sabotage and the organization in the monopolized press in the West of a noisy anti-Portuguese, and at the same time anti-Communist, campaign.

The international monopolies, which established roots in the country during the years of fascist rule, began to cut production and curtail investments or stop them altogether. In the markets of Western Europe, difficulties were created for the marketing of Portugal's traditional exports: clothing, fruit, fish, and in particular, wine, the production of which is the fundamental

source of income for the peasants of the North.

It is impossible to call the policy of so-called economic aid to Portugal carried out by the leadership of the "Common Market" anything short of blackmail, such "aid" being granted only if outright political demands are met—making the domestic policy suitable to the capitalist West.

The mass media of the capitalist countries systematically, day in and day out, try to misinform the world public concerning the actual substance of events taking place in Portugal and to slander the democratic forces of the country, above all the Communists, having no qualms about using obvious falsifications.

This campaign occurs in a coordinated way even on an international scale. It is no accident that simultaneously with the intensification of the political crisis in Portugal, the imperialist forces and their allies in Peking are trying to kindle a civil war in Angola, dealing a blow to the most militant and popularly recognized anticolonial force, the MPLA [Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola]. Nor is it an accident that in the Azores, where the U.S. military base Lajes is located, there have begun to be stirrings of separatist groups. Peking in recent days has also moved toward open attacks on Portuguese Communists and democrats. It must be emphasized that the most active role in exerting pressure on the democratic forces in Portugal and in supporting the activities of the domestic reaction is now being played by the leaders of the international Social Democracy, although there are sober voices in their ranks warning of the dire consequences of such a policy. The leading nucleus of the Socialist International has clearly closed a hard-line position with respect to Portugal. It is encouraging the leaders of the Socialist party in their policy of disrupting the government's measures and of attempting to kindle an anti-Communist sentiment in the country.

The leaders of the Socialist party, along with their allies from the Democratic People's party (a political formation backed by petty-bourgeois layers and linked with Catholic circles), have as their aim to break apart the unity between the people and the army and to shatter the monolith and the unity of the ranks of the Armed Forces Movement. They have finally succeeded in seeing to it that disagreements have arisen within the MFA.

After "meetings" and "discussions," which emissaries of the Socialist party are conducting in provincial cities, terrorist detachments have emerged. Hooligan elements, the agents of outright reactionary forces, have raised their heads. In a number of cities, the Communists have literally had to withstand a siege from unruly toughs shouting anti-Communist slogans that

have evidently stuck in their heads from fascist times. Thus on August 17 armed reactionaries and hired terrorists provoked disorders in the city of Alcoaça, 109 kilometers north of Lisbon. They tried to disrupt a Communist party meeting. As a result of the clashes, a number of people were injured.

It is characteristic of the reaction not to resort to such methods in the large industrial centers where organized detachments of the working class would come to the defense of their conquests.

Many foreign observers point to the fact that not only by their anti-Communist and antidemocratic orientation but also by the similarity of methods the present reactionary sorties in Portugal are reminiscent of what happened in Chile on the eve of the fascist overturn. That is what the attempts, successful or not, to disorganize the economy and provoke strikes—like the strikes of the truck owners in Chile—amount to.

There is no doubt that none of those who fight for democracy against the fascist threat, none of the genuine friends of the Portuguese people, could remain indifferent to the intrigues of the reaction in the country. At the present time it is very important to show massive solidarity with the political forces of Portugal that are carrying out a sustained and difficult struggle against the offensive of the reaction from within and without. And likewise it is very important to support the Communists of the country, who, as was indicated in the preelection political program of the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party], respect and will continue to respect the wishes of the people and will oppose any attempt to betray them. "It is impermissible," the program emphasizes, "to allow the forces of reaction to exploit democratic freedoms in order to liquidate these freedoms and establish a new dictatorship."

Whether they want to do it or not, the leaders of the Portuguese Socialist party, having raised the banner of anti-Communism, having declared an open war against the genuinely progressive forces of the country, are gathering under their banner all the reactionary forces of Portugal, including those who not long ago tyrannized Communists, Socialists, and other democratic patriots and would like to continue to do this in the future. In the period when the parties, having joined the government, conducted a line they all had agreed on, such elements were afraid to raise their heads. Now, encouraged by the Socialist party's provocative line, they are beginning to consolidate their forces and bring forth their plans, which are far from being in the interests of the Portuguese people.

The Armed Forces Movement and Portuguese democrats are seriously concerned

over the heightened political crisis in the country. The military rulers have been forced in a number of instances to adopt extraordinary measures to maintain order in the country against the sorties of the reaction.

The Soviet people, firmly upholding the

principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, maintain that the very complex problems confronting the Portuguese people must be decided by the Portuguese people themselves. The Soviet people are deeply sympathetic toward the aspiration of the Portuguese democrats to

guarantee the unity in action of the Armed Forces Movement, the Communists, the Socialists, and of all left progressive forces who stand for a strengthening of the antifascist democratic regime in the country and in defense of the revolutionary gains of the Portuguese people. □

## Argentina: The Gorillas Are Preparing a Coup

[The following statement, signed by the editorial board, appeared in the August 23 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party) of Argentina. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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We are on the brink of a reactionary putsch owing to the fact that the workers movement has not responded to the political, social, and economic crisis with mass mobilizations. Although the masses have not been defeated and have emerged victoriously from the June general strike, they have been pulled offstage because of the brake of the trade-union leadership. Thus, the stage is dominated by actions of terrorist groups, by criminal provocations of fascist gangs, and finally by attempts at military "solutions."

This situation represents a grave threat to the workers movement and to all bourgeois-democratic institutions.

### The Government Is Responsible

The military appears to be divided, discussing different plans. Events show that variants from full-scale Pinochetism<sup>1</sup> to supposedly "constitutionalist" solutions are being juggled. In the latter case they aim at toppling the president and promise to respect the parliament, the political parties, and the electoral system.

In our view all such variants embody a most serious danger for the workers.

We have not the slightest doubt that the Peronist government is responsible for the current crisis and for maintaining the superexploitation of the workers movement—now under the guise of layoffs—and that it must be changed for these reasons. But only the working class, that is, the overwhelming majority of the country, has the right to carry out such a change. And it has its own way to do it: a mobilization demanding the president's resignation, the installation of a trade-union representative elected in the parlia-

1. A reference to the repression following the September 1973 Pinochet coup in Chile. Tens of thousands were killed and jailed in its aftermath and all democratic rights were abolished.—IP

ment as president of the nation, and the subsequent calling of a constituent assembly. As we see it, this is a working-class route to a democratic solution, which uses institutions to serve the working class and which can be carried through, we repeat, if the working class as a whole is mobilized to fight.

### The Workers Movement and Democratic Institutions Are Threatened

But this is not the route of the military putschists and the capitalists. In their case—even when they say and think that all they want is the president's resignation and that then they will respect the workers movement and democratic institutions—by unleashing the putschist machinery they put in motion an uncontrollable monster that will probably turn more and more to the right.

That is the lesson taught us by all military coups. The case of the Onganía coup<sup>2</sup> is a difficult one to forget. When Onganía brought down the Radical government<sup>3</sup> he summoned the trade-union leaders, offering them participation, respect, and consultation in exchange for their support. The trade-union leaders put on their neckties, attended the inauguration, and said, "We have to stand aside until the dust settles." The results are well known: We suffered one of the worst dictatorships of our history.

To open the doors to the putschist machinery, no matter how many promises it brings with it, is to collaborate with a terrible danger. However rosy a picture is painted of the coup, it will very soon try to show its true deadly image. Then it will be much more difficult, requiring much more sacrifice and struggle, to topple it.

Those sectors of the parliament, the people's parties, and even the trade-union leadership that support the putschists on the basis of the just demand for Isabel's resignation should know that they are running the grave risk of liquidating themselves, since the coup can end up

2. General Juan Carlos Onganía came to power in a coup in June 1966, overthrowing the regime of Arturo Illia.—IP

3. Unión Cívica Radical—Radical Civic Union.—IP

smashing the parliament, the political parties, and the CGT.<sup>4</sup>

### Let's Halt the Coup Now by Calling and Organizing the General Strike

Only a vigorous mobilization of the workers movement can defeat the mortal danger of a coup, and at the same time provide a response that will finish off the current government, which is responsible for the crisis and the superexploitation of the workers movement.

We call on the CGT, the unions, the coordinating committees,<sup>5</sup> and the entire workers movement to incorporate this fundamental political question into their struggles and to prepare a general strike to be launched in the face of any sign that a coup is beginning. We call on factory and trade-union membership assemblies to demand the following of the trade-union federation:

- A general strike of the CGT against the outbreak of a military coup.
- Against the firings and wage freeze. For the CGT to push for the implementation of its plan.<sup>6</sup> □

4. Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor.—IP

5. The coordinating committees are composed of trade-union militants' organizations from different companies in a given region. They began to spring up during the strike in Villa Constitución in March.—IP

6. In mid-July the CGT issued a plan to deal with the economic crisis in Argentina. Among other things, the plan calls for a price freeze, periodic wage adjustments to deal with inflation, the nationalization of foreign trade and banking, and credit for companies in financial trouble.—IP

### Iran Has \$4 Billion Deficit

Iran's much-publicized stockpile of "petrodollars" has been depleted. The shah admitted in an interview with the Kuwaiti *Al Siyassah* that Iran, the world's second largest oil-exporting country, has a deficit of \$4 billion. The shah said the deficit was caused by the drop in oil production, rising prices of industrial goods, the decline in purchasing power of oil revenue, and Iran's domestic economic projects. He said that he would seek loans to cover the deficit.