

# Intercontinental Press

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# WHY PORTUGUESE MILITARY PLACED TROIKA IN POWER

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## Is Democracy Worth Fighting For?

By Joseph Hansen

Indira Gandhi's coup, which ended bourgeois democracy in India for the foreseeable future, has met with a critical reception in the Western press, particularly in the United States.

One of the main reasons for this is the blow dealt by Gandhi to a pet subject of the editorialists and columnists for the past quarter of a century—the contrast offered by democratic India to the totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China.

When the capitalist system was overthrown in China and replaced by a planned economy, India was singled out as a Western showcase. Here the world was to witness what free enterprise could accomplish in contrast to planned economy, while preserving the "values" of democracy.

On the economic side, of course, China soon proved—as had already been demonstrated in the Soviet Union—the enormous advantages of planning even if hampered by all kinds of obstacles, including the shackles of a bureaucratic caste. The bourgeois propagandists had to trim their arguments accordingly. India, they said, had at least stoutly maintained democracy—one of the great acquisitions of civilization.

That presentation of the superiority of India over China has now likewise gone down the drain.

Of course, democracy under both Nehru and Gandhi was feeble, rickety, and corrupted. It existed mainly for the rich. Nonetheless, it offered certain safeguards and it was possible to offer accurate information in the press and to voice political opposition.

The fate of democracy in India offers fresh evidence of a general phenomenon—the growing incompatibility of capitalism and democracy on a worldwide scale. Gandhi brought down Indian democracy because she would have lost office if she had upheld it. The Indian bourgeoisie as a

whole backed her in turning to totalitarianism because capitalism in India would go down if it abided by the norms and rules of democracy.

The same pattern by and large was followed by the capitalists in Chile, in Uruguay, in Brazil, and in Indonesia, to cite but some of the recent instances.

The erosion of democracy is apparent in the most powerful capitalist country—the United States. There were the years of the McCarthyite "aberration," then the presidential assumption of antidemocratic powers in violation of the constitution—shown most scandalously by Nixon—which has given the political police, both domestic and foreign, an inordinate place in the American system of government.

Moreover, American capitalism, which is pictured by its propagandists as the main bulwark of democracy in the world today, has actually become the worst subverter of democracy on all continents. It is sufficient to point to the long record of the CIA in toppling governments that did not measure up to Wall Street's standards in insuring the investments and superprofits of American companies.

Washington's achievements in this respect extend from Iran to Guatemala, not to mention Korea and Indochina.

Clearly, capitalism in its death agony has become antithetical to democracy.

The socialist program, as conceived by Marx and Engels and as advanced by Lenin and Trotsky, takes democracy as its heritage, defends it against all encroachment, and proposes to expand it and extend it so that it becomes one of the main features of the society of the future.

The only strictures on democracy admitted in this view concern the rights of the bourgeoisie if they open a civil war against the working class in hope of blocking a socialist victory. During such a civil war *and only then*, the socialist forces would have to restrict such things as freedom of the press for the bourgeoisie. In this situation *the rules of civil war* would apply, a turn brought on by the bourgeoisie refusing to abide by the will of the majority and taking up arms.

Following the victory of socialism, the restrictions would be lifted. It can easily be seen why. In a society of abundance, the ideas of capitalism would appear complet-

ly irrational—as they are in reality—and would soon have few advocates.

Those who argued for turning back the clock and reestablishing capitalism would find themselves evaluated by the public as standing on about the same level as those who might advocate going back to feudalism, slavery, or the stone age, or those who still contended that the available evidence sustains the long-held biblical view that the earth is flat.

To previous generations of the proletarian vanguard, the importance of democracy was considered part of the ABCs of socialism. Socialists were the strongest advocates of freedom in all spheres. Unfortunately this is not the case today.

The antidemocratic regimes in the countries modeled on the Stalinist pattern of rule have struck terrible blows against the very concept of socialist democracy. We are presented with such a scandalous action as Moscow's approval of Gandhi's coup.

In fact, totalitarian forms and practices have been accepted by many revolutionary-minded militants as the norm in countries that claim to be socialist. They have come to believe that the abolition of democracy is a distinctive and praiseworthy characteristic of socialism.

This has not only inflicted great damage to the cause of socialism because of its reinforcement of the erosion of democracy in the capitalist countries, it has led to suicidal political positions.

Some militants have not hesitated to take the lead in demanding restrictions on democratic rights in capitalist countries. They believe that it is correct for protagonists of socialism to demand that a bourgeois government curtail the democratic rights of reactionary currents, although they thus set a deadly trap for themselves, for they have approved in principle that a bourgeois government should in certain circumstances deny freedom of expression and assembly to minority organizations. In this way they help pave the way for suppression of their own democratic rights.

A case of prime importance is to be seen in Portugal today. Here good militants have been induced to *oppose* bourgeois democracy and to offer help to a bourgeois government in narrowing it down if not abolishing it completely.

They have, for instance, demonstrated in favor of dissolving the Constituent Assembly in favor of dictatorial military rule. They have joined in pressing for the curtailment of freedom of the press (the *República* case). They have even served as activists for the bourgeois government in attempting to block the rallies of a Social Democratic party backed by the majority of the working class.

These militants were thus inveigled into acting as auxiliaries of the capitalist class

### Summer Schedule

This is the last issue of *Intercontinental Press* before our summer break. We will resume our regular schedule with the issue dated September 8.

in Portugal, which, like the capitalists elsewhere, cannot live with democracy and are intent on destroying it, the better to maintain their outmoded economic system.

It is to be hoped that these militants in Portugal, who are now following an ultra-left course that is highly injurious to the proletarian revolution and that can doom them, too, will wake up to the danger.

The source of their error lies at bottom in believing that socialism simply abolishes bourgeois democracy instead of expanding it qualitatively, that is, extending it into the economic structure and thereby liquidating one of the features that distinguishes capitalism—totalitarian command on the level of production.

From this error, these militants derive the conclusion that the proletarian revolution can be advanced by shattering democracy while the capitalist state remains intact.

Unfortunately, this does not mean that proletarian democracy is thereby advanced. That is a delusion typical of ultraleft political cretinism. Instead, the efforts of the most reactionary forces to bring the workers commissions and assemblies, including those of the armed forces, under bourgeois control are greatly facilitated. If the efforts of the reactionaries succeed, this would cut short the possibility of these initial formations developing into soviets. The final outcome would be to liquidate them.

Consequently the conclusion that must be drawn is that those who want to advance the struggle for a soviet form of government in Portugal must take the lead in defending democracy against all its detractors and would-be destroyers.

It would be a mistake to center blame for this error on the Portuguese militants. They are merely repeating an error that has been committed elsewhere and that reflects the thinking of various currents in the so-called far left.

It is high time that revolutionary socialists in all countries again examine the fundamental postulates of socialism. Were the founders of scientific socialism correct in championing democracy? Is bourgeois democracy worth fighting for in the period leading up to socialism? Will socialism after all offer a new birth of freedom?

Or do the antidemocratic forms of government offered by Brezhnev, Mao, and Gandhi, however different the economic bases, represent the wave of the future? □

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### Why Portuguese Military Placed Troika in Power

By Gerry Foley

The dominant group in the Portuguese armed forces took another step July 25 toward consolidating an open military dictatorship. The Assembly of the Movimento das Forças Armadas<sup>1</sup> set up a triumvirate of generals entrusted with full military and political power. According to *New York Times* correspondent Marvine Howe, the Assembly agreed on the need for "a strong political direction [leadership]."

The "need" for "strong authority" in fact is the one thing the Stalinists, the Social Democrats, and the bourgeois parties all agree on. Even the ultraleftists, hoping for a "revolutionary" military dictatorship, have arrived at the same destination by a more tortuous route. Every political shift the regime has made since the outbreak of open struggle between the Communist and Socialist parties has been in the direction of establishing a naked dictatorship.

The government has not yielded an inch to SP mobilizations of hundreds of thousands of workers demanding democracy. The reason is twofold. First, the actual government has been a military dictatorship from the start. It is difficult to force such a government to make changes on the political level, because of its authoritarian nature. Moreover, for the same reason, the regime is extremely inflexible. Once it began to make such changes under popular pressure, it would be doomed to disintegration and would inevitably be forced to give way to a parliamentary regime.

This is probably what the president, General Costa Gomes, meant when he said that if he agreed to the SP demand to oust Premier Vasco Gonçalves it would be a "blow against the revolution of the armed forces." That is, it would undermine the authority of the MFA by in effect transferring a share of the power to the SP.

This was also the implication of the statement issued in the name of the MFA by the Fifth Division Command on July 20: "On the basis of the revolutionary legitimacy won on April 25 and confirmed by the immediate support of the Portuguese people, the Movimento das Forças Armadas declares the following with regard to the statements of the secretary-general of the Socialist party at the rally-demonstration on July 19:

"1. It does not recognize any party as sufficiently representative to offer opinions on the appointment of heads of govern-

ment. This is the exclusive province of the MFA. . . .

"3. The frequent people's demonstrations in support of Premier Vasco Gonçalves and the votes of confidence given him by successive assemblies of the MFA are a completely clear demonstration of the fact that General Vasco Gonçalves not only personifies military cohesiveness and national unity but that his presence at the head of the Provisional Government constitutes a guarantee that the Portuguese revolutionary process will advance firmly toward socialism."

Another reason that the regime has been able to continue consolidating itself in the face of mass demonstrations against its policies, something that no other government in Western Europe is strong enough to do, is that the opposition is completely reformist and as such is neither able to face the facts about the military rulers' intentions or to respond in the only way possible to block this course—that is, by breaking definitively with the bourgeois government and mobilizing the workers to struggle for a government of their own.

The SP has yet to wrest a single material concession from the junta. Nonetheless, although all its demands in the crisis that began with the seizure of *República* on May 19 were rejected or put off, the SP accepted the MFA's June 21 Plan of Political Action as satisfaction of its objections.

While in every specific feature this document represented a continuation of the move toward institutionalizing military dictatorship, it made some purely verbal concessions to the SP.

For example: the document rejected the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "people's democracy" of the East European type, while reaffirming "pluralism." The SP leaders were so grateful that they organized a demonstration to "thank" the MFA for its devotion to democracy.

Having scored such a notable success by invoking words that have magic power for the Socialists, the military government seems to have decided to try the same tactic again. In his speech to the MFA Assembly, Costa Gomes stressed the need for maintaining Portugal's ties to the West:

"It seems to me that national independence cannot be attained in the short run by any way that involves hostility to the West." However, he said: "A concerned maneuver by the West, with a reduction in

trade and the return of the emigrants, is a threat to which we have no valid response."

If the conflict was over whether Portugal should turn to the West and follow a "democratic model" or toward the East and follow a "revolutionary model," which both the SP and CP claim is the issue, the Socialists could certainly be reassured. Of course, at the same time, Costa Gomes gave the Stalinists a consolation prize by saying that Portugal would increase its trade relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc.

However, the Western capitalist powers are no more interested in guaranteeing democracy in Portugal than are the Stalinists in Lisbon or in Moscow in establishing a "people's democracy" in the heart of NATO. The arguments between the SP and CP about whose big brother is tougher and richer were mostly electoral politics. While the two reformist workers parties engaged in shadowboxing, the military government was putting on its brass knuckles.

The new military junta has separated itself still further than the previous governmental forms from any real or theoretical democratic control or responsibility. At the same time, it may be able to balance still more easily among the contending forces. The CP could be expected to view as a victory the fact that Vasco Gonçalves was reconfirmed in his position, since it had mobilized its supporters in an all-out campaign to defend him. Its ballad singers even launched a new ditty in his honor: "March on firmly, companheiro Vasco, we will be your wall of steel."

At the same time, such devious politicians as Mário Soares could be expected to note that according to the new formula Vasco Gonçalves is no longer the effective head of government, his position now being held by a collective leadership in which he is outnumbered 2 to 1 by certified non-Communists. In addition, Soares would not be likely to miss the fact that this formula strengthens the position of Costa Gomes, whom the SP leaders obviously regard as their man in the MFA. One of the SP's main criticisms of the "people's grass-roots democracy" scheme voted by the MFA Assembly on July 8 was that it did not mention the role of the presidency of the republic.

In fact, Costa Gomes, long a top military commander and former chief of staff of the armed forces, is the Portuguese bourgeoisie's anchorman in the MFA leadership. A close friend and associate of Spínola, he comes fundamentally from the same school, although he has proved far more flexible than the ousted strongman.

The ultraleftists who look to the MFA to make or at least begin the process of socialist revolution in Portugal would certainly be delighted to see their hero,

1. MFA—Armed Forces Movement.

Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, included in the all-powerful triumvirate. Some of them have even added his photograph to the far-left pantheon of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tsetung, Fidel, and Che. The charismatic general's followers no doubt are certain that he will emerge as the dominant figure in the new government. One of his ultraleft supporters told a *Der Spiegel* reporter just after the adoption of the Plan of Political Action: "Ultimately it's guns that count, and Otelo has the guns."

De Carvalho does seem to be a promising candidate for military dictator, and not just because of the arsenal he commands, or his strategic position in the military structure, although these are certainly formidable advantages. He has been able to build a reputation as a "revolutionary" that enables him to influence the most radicalized workers, soldiers, sailors, and far-left groups and bring them into line with the objectives of the military government.

The military tops also know all the magic words for the centrist and ultraleft groups—"workers control," "unity of the soldiers and the people," "people's power," "national independence," and "soviets." All these have been promised by the military, just so long as the legitimacy of rule by the generals is not challenged, so long as nobody raises awkward questions about who has the right to make the fundamental political decisions.

De Carvalho has demonstrated his skill at manipulating the ultraleftists in the process of consolidating the position of the military dictatorship. He cautiously encouraged the most left-wing military units to participate in the march to the Palácio São Bento on July 16, which had been called by a number of workers and tenants committees, thereby assuring that it would be a success in the eyes of the ultraleft. It was, in fact, the latest thing in the Lisbon revolutionary theater.

The ultraleftists who had been working themselves up to it for the last year by pumping their fists up and down, waving red flags, and chanting rhyming slogans, were ecstatic over the arrival of tanks and soldiers. They reportedly gave their finest performance. No doubt General de Carvalho, who comes from a family of actors, was the most appreciative.

The demonstration did not threaten capitalism or the capitalist state apparatus. It mustered no more than 6,000 to 7,000 persons, who covered only a small part of the approach to the palace, no more than the usual ultraleftist crowd. Furthermore, the military could be sure that not all the ultraleft groups could ever unite in one action. Sure enough, some stayed away and would not let their "soviets" participate either.

Nonetheless, the demonstration was useful as a provocation against the Constituent

Assembly, which, as the symbol and focus of the principle of popular sovereignty, did pose a threat to the military. The guard was conveniently removed to facilitate this provocation. In the actual political circumstances, such a demonstration could not but become a mobilization against the Constituent Assembly, and thus a part of the campaign by the military and the Stalinists to dissolve the body. It also helped to lend a "revolutionary" luster to this campaign.

It would after all be rather unpopular to dissolve the assembly in the name of military dictatorship. That could lead to a confrontation. It was far more effective to do this in the name of a more perfect democracy, workers democracy, a government of workers councils.

This could be done quite safely, since the mass movement is still far from having reached the point where workers committees actually pose a possible governmental alternative. Such forms are still marginal, and their growth has been hindered rather than promoted by ultraleftists who view them already as full-blown organs of "people's power," or embryos that by their very nature are certain to grow into this overnight.

Thus, the "people's organizations" have not figured as an alternative here and now to military rule; in fact, their only credibility for the time being as an alternative to the Constituent Assembly has come from what the military has promised to make them in the future.

The Communist party and the Kremlin recognized this and gave their strongest support to the "people's power" plan. The Stalinists have followed a consistent policy of supporting a "progressive" military dictatorship. This support, in fact, posed certain problems for the generals, since it enabled the SP to appeal to fears of a "Stalinist dictatorship." But in the short run the Stalinists were useful to the military; and whatever discredit came to the generals from such an association was far less dangerous than the democratic forms supported by the SP.

Actually, the fears of a "Communist takeover" stirred by the CP's alliance with the military only made the Stalinists more dependent on the junta, which could throw them to the wolves whenever it thought their political usefulness was exhausted.

Regardless of any qualifications or reservations the ultraleft groups might raise, by joining in the military's campaign against the Constituent Assembly they were in fact trading the opportunities to build real workers power, which was offered by the struggle for democratic rights, in return for a promise by the military rulers that they would assume this task. The ultraleftists thus subordinated themselves politically to

the junta. They turned away from the masses and toward military saviors.

At the same time, to defend the Constituent Assembly and its parliamentary perspectives, the moderate, thoroughly unrevolutionary Socialist party was forced to mobilize hundreds of thousands of workers, toilers, and radicalized petty bourgeois against the government. It was not a course on which the SP leaders willingly embarked. They tried every way possible to avoid it. But the Socialist party was forced to fight for its life.

The SP had been denied any voice in the government. It had been pushed back into a precarious bridgehead in the press. With the help of the government and its own machine, the Communist party had gained overwhelming predominance in the mass media. All forms of parliamentary pressure had failed to wrest concessions from the regime. The military was now preparing to do away with any pretense of parliamentary government or political democracy. The SP thus would be denied any possibility to use its larger numerical following and greater popularity to counterbalance the more cohesive line and efficient machine of the CP in the trade-union movement, to say nothing of counterbalancing the advantages the CP gained from an obviously privileged relationship with the government. If Soares accepted this position, his electoralist party could quickly lose its momentum, break up, and fade away.

On the other hand, by launching a limited mass struggle against the government's antidemocratic maneuvers, the SP had at least the possibility of cementing together its loose electoral bloc.

In his news conference on leaving the government, Soares offered a Social Democratic argument, which while conservative enough in the larger context, had contradictory implications in a poor country like Portugal.

"We have heard and we have made appeals for production, and we are absolutely in favor of increasing production. This is essential in our country. We are in favor of the austerity measures that are beginning to be discussed. But we want to know what the overall economic plan is behind this battle for production, behind these austerity measures. We want to know whether it is thought that this country should fall into international isolation and close itself off from the outside world. We, on the other hand, think that in order to get out of the profound crisis that exists in the country, we must define very clearly what the private sector is, stimulate this private sector, and define very well what the public sector is in order to know what rules orient and govern it.

"As we said, we are not interested in any state capitalism. We are interested in democratic workers power. In accordance

with this orientation, we proposed a common plan of national reconstruction, a plan that involves domestic and foreign investment, while safeguarding national independence. When we talk about investments and when we talk about Europe, where there are a million Portuguese workers from whom we cannot cut ourselves off, Europe to which we are bound by 70 percent of our foreign trade and our foreign economic relations, when we talk about Europe, they throw the charge of Social Democracy and subimperialism against us. To our knowledge, the Soviet Union has not been colonized by Germany because it accepted German capital and technical aid to develop a region as vast as Siberia. We know of course that without economic aid from Europe, without a coherent plan with regard to Europe's role in our economic future, what we will have to build here will not be a socialism bringing a higher standard of living for all but a socialism of scarcity, a socialism of poverty. And we do not want this, nor do the Portuguese people want it. But we intend to safeguard national independence. There is no one more zealous of national independence than we Socialists, who are not subordinated to any foreign country, who do not accept guide-states, or guide-parties, in the international Socialist movement."

#### Why Soares Sounds Attractive

The SP has tended to stress that the best prospects for developing Portugal are offered by better relations with the European capitalist states. Since some of the richest of these countries are ruled by Social Democratic parties, this gives them an obvious advantage among the Portuguese masses, who generally are more impressed by the higher standard of living, the social benefits, and the civil liberties that exist in northern Europe than by denunciations of the reactionary and imperialist nature of Social Democracy.

Soares has had no difficulty in denouncing as demagogy the invocations of a great breakthrough by means of economic cooperation with the Soviet bloc countries and the "third world." In fact, economic relations with Eastern Europe, while praised to the skies by the Stalinist-dominated daily press, have not been very profitable for Portugal. Furthermore, in his references to guarantees for foreign and domestic investors, Soares said nothing that the military leaders, including figures popular among the ultraleft such as Adm. Rosa Coutinho, have not said. The difference is that in the case of the military officers such points tend to be overshadowed by the invocations of "socialist revolution" and "workers power" that they resort to whenever their "revolutionary legitimacy" is challenged.

For the ultraleftists, and for some sec-

tions of the workers and toiling masses, the promise of "socialism" is sufficient to outweigh fears of dictatorship or economic ruin. For the majority of the working people of Portugal, that is almost certainly not true. Although the country is poor in general, with some extremely backward areas, it is not a hopelessly impoverished, chronically backward colonial or neocolonial nation. There has been rapid economic development in the last decade in particular. The masses are not so desperate that they are willing to stake everything on some generals' promise of a new society. Furthermore, the worst of the economic crisis hit after the new regime was established, in particular after its left turn.

Soares offered a perspective of socialism that probably seemed more practical and reasonable than that offered by the forces that were trying to justify maintaining a "progressive" military dictatorship by appealing to the people to sacrifice for "national liberation." Furthermore, despite the Social Democratic political framework in which Soares operates, there is no reason to conclude that his encouraging the masses to hope for a standard of democracy and material welfare more like the developed countries of Western Europe is any more reactionary in its effect than the nostrums of the Stalinists, liberals, and ultraleftists who call on the Portuguese people to renounce such hopes and accept the need for privation and dictatorship. Quite the contrary!

The captains, who are now generals, had the approval of the population for ending the repression of the old regime. This support was rather superficial. The military men had not won deepgoing loyalty by leading struggles against oppression or exploitation. Nor did the change in government mean a great improvement in the standard of living of the toilers, with the exception of some sections of the rural proletariat and landless peasantry. The overturn promised far more than the generals were able to deliver, and so it was only a matter of time until the universal adulation faded. The small number of abstentions in the April 25 elections, despite the military's muted but clear appeals for a blank vote, indicated that the masses were not prepared to give the military such a mandate.

Thus, the SP's strongest card was that it was the masses that should decide about the way socialism would be built in Portugal. Soares stressed this in his news conference on the SP's withdrawal from the government:

"It is beginning to be said that electoralism conflicts with this or that so-called revolutionary dynamic, an expression that means a little bit of everything but nothing in particular. If electoralism and elections conflict, then what does the Constituent

Assembly represent? The Constituent Assembly was elected by 90 percent of the Portuguese people who went to the polls to choose their representatives. This assembly seems to have no legitimacy today. What has legitimacy is the Assembly of the MFA, and we have yet to find out how the persons making it up are chosen, by what democratic forms they were selected. Now it is evident that this is causing some problems.

"Communist party cells are beginning to call for shutting down the Constituent Assembly, and naturally the tendency is to try to silence the legitimate representatives of the Portuguese people, the only ones who are legitimate representatives, because they were elected. If they didn't believe in elections, if they didn't want elections, then they should not have held elections, should not have promised the Portuguese people that they would hold elections. But the fact is that they promised elections, from the first day, and this is why the MFA was unanimously accepted and hailed by the entire Portuguese people, because it had a democratic program. . . . But now they are trying to institute a parallel power that has nothing democratic about it. It is going to have successive levels of delegated power and end in a summit that will be a kind of corporatist assembly or corporatist chamber."

Soares rejected the claim of the Stalinists, the ultraleftists, and the military that the only alternative was total subordination to the MFA or collaboration with the counterrevolution:

"The position the Socialist party took toward the MFA was not to lick the boots of our military men, who have the rank in the military hierarchy that they do. We never intended to 'shut our mouths' out of servility toward the MFA. . . .

"Other parties, on the other hand, have made attaching themselves to the MFA their *raison d'être*. We are beginning to see a shadow, still vague, taking form behind every member of the MFA, the vague shadow of a certain party that draws its *raison d'être* from attaching itself to the MFA.

"We think the MFA should defend itself from this, because if it allows this it will naturally suffer from the same discredit among the Portuguese people that this current has in fact suffered. We Socialists are not anti-Communists and we never have been. We proved this during a struggle of many years in which we always defended the Communists. And today we have better relations with the Italian Communist party, with the Spanish Communist party, which observe the rules of democracy, which do not have an adventurist and antidemocratic line for taking power."

When Soares was asked by a journalist obviously influenced by Stalinist and/or ultraleftist attacks on the SP whether there

was not a link between the party's mobilizations and rightist assaults on CP headquarters in many northern towns, the SP general secretary replied: "It is true that the right may polarize. There is that danger. There is great discontent and dissatisfaction in many areas of the country, and this worries us. We know that this cannot continue, and we, we who are revolutionists and are with the revolution, with the positions we have taken, are one of the few guarantees that the country will believe in our revolution."

#### Soares Scores Some Points

Soares made some references to the need for order and condemned the "disruptive" influence of the far left. But in this, he did not in the least distinguish himself from the other forces and figures in the government. What distinguished him from the CP, the MFA, and the ultraleftists was that he appealed to the masses: "They talk a lot about the people, but you only begin to defend the people when you respect the will of the people, the will expressed by them in the elections in which they participated with enthusiasm, with dignity, with civic responsibility for the first time after a half century of fascism."

At another point, Soares said: "I call the attention of the gentlemen and ladies of the press to the fact that the Socialist party is the only Portuguese party that can mobilize mass demonstrations at the same time in all areas of the country, is capable of mobilizing 150,000 persons in Lisbon without resorting to television or radio, which are in the hands of entities of which the least that can be said is that the SP is not very fond of them nor they of the SP. So, without these mass media, we can get 150,000 persons to come out in support of our demands in Lisbon, 50,000 in Oporto, or bring out demonstrations in Faro, in Castelo Branco, or in any part of the country. If we consider the latest demonstrations, the publicity there was for them, and the numerical result, their representativeness is clear."

While it remained no less reformist, no less procapitalist, and thus unable to break with the MFA and move toward a workers government, the embattled SP at this point at least did not rely on military saviors or bureaucratic positions. Nor did it appeal to the still unrepresentative and marginal "people's committees" that so fitted in with what the ultraleftists thought the masses should be or would be that they led these currents to ignore what the masses thought and wanted here and now, the present reality of Portugal. The SP turned to the masses. And for this, it came under a frenzied wave of demagogic attacks from the Communist party, which accused the

Social Democrats of organizing "fascist" marches on Oporto and Lisbon.

This campaign, in varying keys, was echoed by the ultraleft groups and armchair ultraleftists on "intellectual" weeklies like Lisbon's *Vida Mundial*, and even some West European and capitalist dailies, who inveighed against the original sins of "Social Democracy" and "anti-Communism."

#### The Mobilization Against SP

In their theological enthusiasms, the ultraleftists and "red professors" forgot that the SP was not in the government, that it did not control the press or any of the powerful institutions of the country. In order to come to the SP rallies, people had to pass barricades called for not only by the Communist party but by the national trade-union federation. In Lisbon on July 19 they had to pass the guns and tanks of the military. Furthermore, they had to brave a furious campaign in the press.

Six of the seven daily papers in Lisbon carried huge headlines portraying the SP rallies as reactionary assaults on the city. The banner head in the July 18 *A Capital* was "People's Vigilance to Block Reaction." The story under it started as follows: "The people's progressive forces throughout the country are vigilant in the defense of the revolutionary gains and for advancing and strengthening people's power, the fundamental basis for building socialism."

The issue of *Diário de Notícias* that hit the streets on the morning of July 19 carried the headline: "People and Military to the Barricades in Defense of the Revolution." The story under it began:

"Many thousands of workers started a mass mobilization last night in the Lisbon and Oporto regions to block possible reactionary maneuvers." Directly under the headline was a box:

"Today at 3:30 a.m., the national Intersindical distributed the following communiqué:

"National Intersindical, considering the need for a better coordination of the efforts of the people's and military forces involved in the defense of the Revolution, calls on the workers—

"To fall in behind the barricades being set up by the forces of Copcon.<sup>2</sup>

"To actively support the military forces in their tasks as an effective way of tightening the alliance between the people and the MFA.

"United, organized, vigilant, we will win."

The headline on the story underneath this was: "Facing the reactionary escalations,

2. Comando Operacional do Continente—Mainland Portugal Operations Command, the military security forces.

arms will be used if necessary, Copcon has announced in a communiqué."

*O Século*, the other CP-controlled morning paper, to be sure ran a more restrained headline. Its story, moreover, began with a slightly more conciliatory sentence:

"While the toiling masses rushed yesterday to the main entrances to Lisbon and Oporto to block the attempts of the reactionary and counterrevolutionary forces that are trying to stage a march on Lisbon to halt or drive back the revolutionary process, an important meeting was being held in the Palácio de Belém between members of the Revolutionary Council and representatives of the Communist party, Socialist party, and Intersindical."

The editors of this daily must have been among the first Stalinist publicists to get the message that the military was not going to give the CP the backing it expected.

The headline in *Diário de Lisboa* was "Copcon and the People Guard the Revolution." The headline in the purged *República* was "Workers and Soldiers Keep Watch on the Bourgeoisie." Its story began:

"The workers and soldiers are on the watch in a national situation dominated by a sharp conflict between two poles of power representing respectively the interests of the bourgeoisie (the Socialist party) and those of the workers (the MFA)."

Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of workers, however, had a different idea as to who represented their interests. They swept over the feeble barricades set up in Oporto and filled the giant Antas sports stadium to overflowing. The pitiful gangs mustered by the Stalinist bureaucrats in Intersindical did not dare offer any resistance.

In its July 19 issue, the Oporto daily *Jornal de Notícias* reported: "As for the barricades on the Circunvalação, the following poster was put up. 'Attention barricade watchers, the Matosinhos fishermen are coming through at 4:30 heading for Antas stadium.' And they went through."

Another local daily, *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, reported: "Over the loudspeakers in Antas it was announced that Mário Soares 'was on the way to the stadium, on foot, surrounded by thousands of comrades.' The many thousands of persons concentrated there began to shout in unison: 'Victory! Victory! Victory!' 'The people's will must be respected.'"

The first speaker was António Macedo: "I am proud of all of you," he told the crowd. "I am very proud of my party. I speak to you as an old antifascist, a longtime Socialist here in this home town of Humber to Delgado, the general without fear."<sup>3</sup>

Macedo continued: "The Socialist party is

3. Delgado campaigned against the Salazarist regime in the token elections permitted in 1958. He was murdered by the secret police in 1965.

the party of the people. The Socialist party is the party without fear." He was constantly interrupted with shouts of: "The people's will must be respected." At another point he said: "Where is the people? The people are here. We are the people."

Gomes Fernandes, the second speaker said:

"The future will not be built with defensive tactics, nor with aggressive and threatening barricades. Nor with minorities that preach broad democratic freedoms trying to silence all voices but their own, calling themselves revolutionary vanguardists when they are nothing but opportunist elements of the vanguard.

"The future will be built with the people, with the workers, with those who believe they have the capacity to build a free country here. This socialist people, these socialist workers, are the real revolutionary vanguard."

The Young Socialist speaker Luis Carlos concentrated on attacking the controlled press: "The mountains of communiqués issued in recent days are nothing but an attempt at intimidation by parties that call themselves democratic and revolutionary. The threats and the reminder that this demonstration could turn into a bloodbath are the most refined form of terrorizing people, in a desperate attempt to show that the real and overwhelming majority today are minority political groups.

"To those who call themselves the only true revolutionists, we say that they are going to have to reconsider their methods, because the Portuguese people know what they want. For long years they had only one voice on the radio, on television, and one single will was imposed.

"The only way such uniformity can be imposed is by the mass media that reach the entire country saying that those who are not for them are enemies of the entire Portuguese people. We ask: What people? The people of the north whom they were calling reactionaries even before the elections? Of the central region, around Rio Maior [where a CP headquarters was attacked]? Or in the south, where those who call themselves the saviors of the people are constantly holding back agrarian reform? What people, then? Only the people who accept a dictatorship."

Manuel Alegre asked: "Is everybody here a bourgeois? Are the people of Oporto reactionary? If not, then why the barricades? They tried to intimidate us with them. But here we are and we didn't need armored cars to destroy these barricades.

"We came on foot from Batalha Square and we didn't need security cordons, because the power of the Socialist party is the power of the people and of the working masses."

The Stalinists' attempt to use their bureaucratic positions to mobilize the

unions against the SP rally failed so completely that it endangered their position as the labor lieutenants of the military regime, even despite the "trade-union unity" law decreed by the government to protect the CP from any outflanking movement.

"Since Saturday," Dominique Pouchin wrote in the July 22 issue of *Le Monde*, "visibly demoralized CP members have been calling for a self-criticism of the northern regional leadership, which went very far in the anti-SP escalation. The CP, of course, can make a quick change in direction, but in this operation it involved a number of union leaderships (thirty-one for the Oporto region alone), which are now going to find themselves in a very difficult position."

After the humiliation of the CP-controlled union leaderships on the weekend of July 18-20, Soares began to refer to Intersindical simply as the "CP's transmission belt," giving it no recognition whatever as an independent or representative workers organization.

In Lisbon, on July 19, SP demonstrators filled the gigantic Afonso Henriques Square, the assembly point for the May Day demonstrations. There were certainly far more people at the SP rally than formed up there last May Day.

Soares told the crowd: "Today is a grave one in the history of our people. After an unprecedented campaign of alarmist rumors, after false stories about a coup attempt and a reactionary plot were spread in an attempt to deceive the people, they set up barricades to prevent the people from the suburbs of Lisbon, deputations of the people of Portugal, from coming here to demonstrate freely in support of freedom, of democracy, of socialism. The inventors of this monstrous falsehood have to answer to the Portuguese people. They cannot provoke or lie to the Portuguese people with impunity, divide the masses of workers with false rumors, put our revolution in danger. Where was the counterrevolution today in this square? The truth is that the counterrevolution was on the barricades organized by the fanatics, agitators, and goons, to prevent the people of Portugal from demonstrating and expressing their will."

Soares denounced the CP leaders as "paranoics" and said that neither they nor the Intersindical leaders represented the Portuguese people. He criticized the MFA directly for setting up the barricades.

"In Oporto the fanatics of the CP regional leadership also gave orders to paralyze the city, for the shops to close, for transport to stop, to cut down trees and lay them across the roads to block access to the city. But since they were not protected by troops, no one followed their orders.

"Yesterday in Oporto, thirty-one union leaderships gave orders to halt the life of

the city, but nothing stopped, nobody obeyed. Here in Lisbon if the barricades were not protected by soldiers there would be more than half a million Portuguese here, to take up arms at our side in defense of freedom, of socialism, of the revolution, of democracy."

Reports were broadcast over the loudspeakers of attacks on persons crossing the barricades. "The crowd reacted strongly to these," *Jornal Novo* reported, "shouting 'thugs,' 'people's justice,' and 'action, action.'"

In the midst of his invocations of mass uprisings and the shouts of more than 100,000 people for "action," Soares cautiously noted: "The prime minister entrusted with forming a provisional government does not seem to us to be a factor of national unity."

Nonetheless, this brought a furious response from the Fifth Division, which reiterated that only the MFA had any right to choose the leaders of the country, and the CP launched a campaign in defense of Premier Vasco Gonçalves. The Stalinist-controlled press and broadcasting media were loaded with statements from unions hailing the premier as the "guarantor of people's power." The only noticeable popular demonstration in his defense in this period, however, was in the CP stronghold of Barreiro.

Despite its previous defeats, the CP seemed intent on continuing its policy of trying to break the SP campaign of protest by force.

"The SP on Tuesday night [July 22] in Lisbon deliberately staged a provocative rally in the suburb of Almada, where Communist strength is high," the American CP paper *Daily World* reported July 24. "As might have been expected, there were clashes and some fistfights."

The implication was that the SP had no business calling a demonstration in an area where CP strength was "high." However, the SP is also strong in Almada. In fact, this working-class neighborhood, where the Lisnave shipyards are located, was one of the areas where the SP dealt the CP one of its most unexpected and stunning defeats.

In another CP stronghold, Evora, one of the larger towns in the rural proletarian area of Alentejo, the CP reportedly broke up an SP rally on July 26. This indicates that the Stalinists are trying to defend their fiefs by goon tactics. There are two obvious reasons for this. First, they are rapidly becoming discredited. Second, they apparently still think they can count on government support, since the SP is clearly stronger.

The CP would hardly continue using such tactics unless it thought the military would give it enough support to either cow or break the SP. Apparently it is also trying to enlist the ultraleft groups that in their



rejection of the SP's campaign for democratic rights handle the Social Democrats as "Social Fascist," whatever their various formulations may be.

Some of these elitist groups have been carried so far by their ultimatist rejection of "bourgeois democracy" and their opportunist adaptation to the "left" military officers that there is a real possibility the Stalinists could use them as goon squads in such an operation. Ultraleft groups that believe the junta is a real "national liberation movement" and that it is possible to impose "revolutionary organization" on the masses may go still further along this road in the future.

#### Can SP Campaign Get Out of Hand?

Perhaps continuing pressure from the Stalinists and their ultraleft advance patrols is one of the reasons the SP reportedly has not yet accepted the new governmental formula and has threatened to continue its mass mobilizations. However, mass action also has its logic and it may be difficult now for the SP leaders to call off the process they started without risking a disastrous loss of momentum and possibly even a split in the party.

This tendency has evidently worried the SP's bourgeois "friends" both inside and outside Portugal. "Millions of Portuguese are suddenly discovering just what a heady feeling opposition to the government can be," the *Economist's* Lisbon correspondent wrote in the July 19 issue of the British capitalist weekly.

Furthermore, the bourgeois Partido Popular Democrático (PPD—Democratic People's party) took a considerably more conciliatory position toward the government than the SP, although the West European ultraleft see the two parties not as "antipodes" but as "twins."

In the July 22 issue of *Jornal Novo*, the general secretary of the PPD, Emídio Guerreiro, a former member of the guerrilla group led by Palma Ignácio, according to the purged *República*, gave this answer to a question about the possibility of an alliance with the SP:

"The SP has taken positions that in my opinion may endanger the freedoms that exist in Portugal." But although the SP was dangerously militant in its opposition to the Stalinists' antidemocratic policies, it was not reliably anti-Communist either:

"There is also the political attitude of the SP. It knows very well that from the start it has attacked the PPD. Furthermore, it joined with the CP in these attacks. Then, it made a shift, or rather got mad at the CP, but did not move any closer to the PPD. Then it tried again to maintain friendly relations with the CP. Finally, the *República* case came along and they broke with



Informations Ouvrières

Part of Socialist party demonstration of 100,000 persons in Lisbon July 19.

each other. I don't say that they broke definitively, since it would not be surprising if in three or four months they were 'married again,' to use an expression that accords more with accepted law and the Christian society in which we live."

Guerreiro also attacked the SP for demagoguery:

"There is no doubt that we are living in an atmosphere of lies. On the one hand the SP tells us it is Marxist, but it repudiates the dictatorship of the proletariat—a historical necessity of Marxism. The SP in its politics has presented itself as the Social Democratic party it is."

Guerreiro is an adept in Marxist studies. He has described himself as a "Leninist Social Democrat."

Where the momentum of its mass campaign will carry the SP, however, is yet to be determined, since there is no evidence that there is any current able or willing to carry this struggle beyond the very limited objective of pressuring the military government. Unless the crisis in the country is rapidly deescalated, the party will probably split under the pressures that arise from mobilizing masses of people in opposition to the established authority, pressures that no Social Democratic party can long withstand.

What is certain is that the real vanguard of the Portuguese working class at the present time participated in the SP demonstrations. That proletarian vanguard is not to be found among the ultraleftists who followed a shadow of "people's power" into isolation and even allowed themselves to be used by military demagogues as pawns in a campaign to rob the masses of their democratic rights. Nor were the most intelligent, class-conscious, and courageous sections of the proletariat with the Stalinist myrmidons who were mobilized to sing the praises of military rulers and help deny the majority of the working class the right to demonstrate.

The most courageous and independent-minded sections of the Portuguese proletariat braved furious demagoguery from the Stalinist-controlled media, physical threats from the military, and the demented anathemas of the ultraleftists, to demonstrate their determination not to be intimidated or deluded into giving up their right to political freedom, their right to decide for themselves who will run the country and the workers organizations.

### The CP Under Attack

Since the Communist party is the main political supporter of the military's attack on the democratic rights of the masses, it was inevitable that such mass mobilizations would express anti-Communist feelings. Objectively, this was certainly no more reactionary than the denunciations

leveled by the Stalinists and the ultraleftists against the SP supporters as "reactionaries," "proimperialists," "enemies of the people," and so on.

In fact, the anti-Communist feeling in the SP demonstrations was less backward, since it was a reaction to real efforts at repression suffered at the hands of the Communist party and its allies. The dogmatic denunciation by the Stalinists and ultraleftists amounted to a demagogic campaign in defense of military rule.

While it is true that the Stalinists in Portugal today stand against the masses and deny them their democratic rights, it is equally true that they do this only by the grace of a bourgeois military government and not on a firm power base of their own. Thus, this policy followed by the Stalinists is suicidal. It has opened the way for a wave of violent mob attacks on CP headquarters throughout the northern two-thirds of the country.

The government has not tried to repress these attacks and probably could not without risking civil war, since powerful local interests are certainly favorable to them.

As a result, the CP appears likely to be destroyed or driven underground in a large part of the country even while it continues to cling to the military government. In Aveiro, a backward but populous center, the existence of Intersindical itself is reportedly threatened.

Although the SP itself has suffered from red-baiting in the backward part of the country, the Stalinists are too determined to pin a black and brown label on the Social Democrats to make a common front with them against the right. For example: This is the way Meira Burguete, an SP activist in Rio Maior, described the origin of one of the worst anti-Communist mob outbreaks. A few persons only, those considered reliable by the local CP organization, got invitations to a meeting of a new farmers organization. Others found out about the meeting, and rumors started going around. It became clear that the organization was dominated by the CP. A group of farmers decided to go to the meeting. The CPers tried to get them to leave. The farmers' suspicions were aroused and fighting broke out.

"Some of them [the CP members] were protected by our comrades, who took them into our headquarters. . . .

"It was at that point that the people went to the headquarters of the CP and the FSP [Frente Socialista Popular—Socialist People's Front, a Stalinist satellite party] and destroyed everything. The SP immediately put out a communiqué deploring the violent incidents and asking why the local CP had not asked for our collaboration in holding the meeting. But what infuriated the people were the reports in the news media attribut-

ing the violence to local strongmen and even to political parties, namely the SP, which did everything to keep the worst from happening, even protecting the members of the party that organized the meeting."

The CP reaction was just to say that the SP had attributed the pogrom to a "popular initiative," which showed how reactionary it was. Furthermore, some of the left-inclined foreign correspondents at the rally on July 15 where this report was given apparently paid no attention to what was said but focused on some shouts that the people in Rio Maior knew "how to handle the CP."

Conditioned reflexes seem to keep many foreign left-wing observers as well as the local ultralefts from making a balanced appraisal of the SP rallies and the speeches of party representatives.

The fact is that if the military and the Stalinists succeed in breaking up the Socialist party, they will be preparing the way for an anti-Communist witch-hunt that will prove far wider and deeper than the incidents to date.

### Ultraleft Delusions

The delusions of the ultraleftists about the right-wing Social Democracy being the main danger are themselves one of the greatest dangers in the situation, because they lend a greater luster to the CP's sectarian campaign. A right-wing Social Democratic government is not a very likely variant in a country as backward as Portugal. In Greece, a capitalist country in a similar stage of development but under far greater big-power pressure because of its strategic position, there has never been a Social Democratic government. The closest thing to it was the Papandreou government in the mid-1960s that was toppled in short order by an imperialist-sponsored military coup.

The danger in Portugal to the workers movement is precisely the establishment of a military dictatorship under the cover of "left" nationalist demagoguery, which is exactly the outcome the Stalinists and the ultraleftists are doing everything in their power to promote.

The fundamental rights of suffrage and popular sovereignty have already been undermined in the name of "organs of people's power" that are far from representing any real alternative power recognized by the workers. The real stage of the Portuguese revolution is shown by the fact that the reformist leadership of the SP could mobilize hundreds of thousands of toilers in defense of the Constituent Assembly, which is where struggle for these rights focuses for the moment. At the same time, the so-called incipient soviets, even with the support of the military government, could mobilize only a few thousand ultraleftists.

Since the days of the Constituent Assembly seem numbered and its end has apparently been brought even closer by the establishment of the all-powerful triumvirate, the "organs of people's power" used as a pretext by the military rulers may, however, become an important arena of struggle. The fact that the SP and CP are now entering such formations and fostering them has already given them more political reality. If the military proves unable to control the mass mobilizations, even the rigidly controlled structures authorized by the MFA may become the scene of political struggle and thus develop toward real soviets.

But if this process actually develops, the illusions that led the ultraleftists to support the military's moves can become even more diversionary. The most pernicious of these illusions is that such structures in themselves are intrinsically revolutionary and guarantee unity of the working class. Actually this is a revival of the ultraleft Stalinist notion of the "united front from below" within the framework of a fundamentally anarchist conception.

The events in the last two weeks of July have also shown that if the "workers committees" ever do develop into soviets, the hundreds of thousands of toilers who braved demagogy and intimidation to attend the SP rallies, to declare their independence from the government and their determination to think for themselves, will have advanced the cause of workers power incomparably more than those who, in the name of soviets, served only as pawns of aspiring military dictators. □

## After the Withdrawal of the Socialist Party

# The Governmental Crisis in Portugal

By Charles Michaloux

[The following article appeared in the July 18 issue of *Rouge*, the French Trotskyist weekly. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

Two crises in a little more than two weeks is a lot. Especially when the "guide document" adopted July 8 by the Assembly of the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement] to put an end to the second crisis only opened up a third, the most serious so far—the crisis of the coalition government, set off by the withdrawal of the Socialist ministers and the departure of the PPD.<sup>1</sup>

### From the Action Plan to the 'Guide Document'

The Political Action Plan published June 21 by the Revolutionary Council announced that a study of a series of economic measures designed to confront the catastrophic situation in the country would be undertaken. But the study was dragged out, the proposals remained vague, and no deadline was set for their implementation. The growing discontent in the working class was indicated by the struggle of the TAP [the national airline] workers, and of the telephone and postal workers.

In this context, the government clumsily decreed a series of unpopular measures such as the increased railway fares (which brought about an organized boycott by prospective purchasers) and above all the return of Rádio Renascença, which has been occupied since May 25, to its owner, the church. This decision unleashed a wave of workers' solidarity actions to defend the station as "revolutionary radio serving the working class."

On the other hand, the plan called for building a "socialist society by the pluralistic road," implying "recognition of the various political parties and currents of opinion, including those that do not necessarily defend socialist positions." But some of these various parties and currents of opinion, not content with refusing to defend socialist positions, are fighting them.

The well-organized escape of the eighty-seven PIDE agents [Salazarist political police] (loosely) incarcerated in the Alcoentre prison added to the people's exasperation with a "pluralism" that permits sabotage and plots to occur, and lets the reaction

reorganize with support from within the state apparatus. This exasperation was given massive expression in the big demonstration organized by the metalworkers of Lisbon calling for "revolutionary justice" and "the purging of the state apparatus."

The Revolutionary Council, meeting in a crisis session July 3, had to repudiate the government by revoking the increased fares, nationalizing Rádio Renascença, and recognizing the extreme seriousness of the escape of the PIDE agents. In addition, under the pressure of the mounting occupations, it had to decree the seizure of the property and companies of bosses who are letting their factories run down as they prepare to go abroad.

### A Reflection and an Encouragement

The MFA Assembly meeting July 8 thus faced a crisis that was already under way. The "guide document" adopted by the delegates formalized an already existing situation so as to better control it. The tone of the document is clearly more firm than that of the plan of June 21. The economic measures it envisages tend toward the extension of the nationalizations, agrarian reform, and workers control. The "pluralist society" has disappeared, to be replaced by "committees of workers and neighborhood residents combined with the assemblies of delegates of military units (ADUs<sup>2</sup>) within Local and Regional People's Assemblies, with the perspective of convening a National People's Assembly to establish a regime of the working masses," in which "all bodies will be elected and subject to recall by a show of hands."<sup>3</sup>

The "guide document" incorporates and thereby encourages the development of the self-organization of the workers. But it also seeks to structure it. The People's Assemblies are in effect flanked by their respective

2. Assembleias de Delegados de Unidade—Unit Delegate Assemblies.—IP

3. This appears to be a summary of the following three points in the "guide document":

"3.3.1—The leadership of the people's organizations will be elected in plenary sessions by a hand vote.

"3.3.2—In grass-roots organizations, the members elected are subject to recall by a plenary session of the same kind as the one that elected them.

"3.3.3—In the People's Assemblies the members elected are subject to recall by the assemblies themselves."

Other sections of the document make clear,

1. Partido Popular Democrático—Democratic People's party.—IP

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ADUs, some of which are elected but the majority of which are composed of representatives of the MFA. And they must be integrated into—and not substituted for—the official state apparatus (municipalities and governmental bodies).

However, the “guide document” of the MFA Assembly is a clear advance in relation to the action plan of the Revolutionary Council. According to the terms of the “guide document” itself, the Revolutionary Council is “the supreme body of national sovereignty,” the real government of the Portuguese state. The conflicting currents within it are no doubt confronting each other more and more intensely, but they can find grounds for compromise in the document’s preservation of the supremacy of the Revolutionary Council. The MFA Assembly, although bureaucratically appointed, in reality reflects much more the pressure of the external situation.

The MFA Assembly adopted the “guide document” by only a very small majority. The political orientation report by Vasco Gonçalves won the support of an even smaller majority. The radicalized sectors of the MFA—whose leaders are at this time Gen. Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho, commander in chief of Copcon;<sup>4</sup> Gen. Morais e Silva, commander in chief of the air force; and Adm. Rosa Coutinho, commander in chief of the navy—would have liked to have gone further. They came out against the line advocated by Vasco Gonçalves, who is generally committed to the Communist party’s concepts of a “peaceful and gradual transition to socialism.”

The probourgeois right wing considered that the document and the report still left too big a role to the mass movement, which “talks too much and doesn’t work hard enough,” as President Costa Gomes stated during a speech on television. The president, however, had to leave the MFA Assembly before the vote “for health reasons,” while his associate Melo Antunes, the minister of foreign affairs, did not even attend the meeting in order “to be able to prepare for his trip to Angola!” Thus they avoided compromising themselves on a document they do not approve of, while agreeing to continue to present in public—and no doubt only for the time being—the image of the united MFA.

The facade is, however, becoming highly transparent. Each public appearance of the MFA sees Costa Gomes or Melo Antunes escorted by Carvalho or Coutinho keeping

an eye out for squalls. On Friday, July 11, Carvalho, Coutinho, and Morais e Silva appeared on television to defend their interpretation of people’s power. But on Monday night, it was the political commission of the Revolutionary Council that was explaining on the airwaves that it is really “people’s participation” rather than “people’s power.”

### The Symptoms of a Chile

While the “guide document” envisages the establishment of a National People’s Assembly in an undefined future, it carefully refrains from clarifying the way it will be established and its powers. The essential thing, however, is that despite all its ambiguities and compromises, in the present situation in Portugal, the “guide document” appears to the workers as a general expression of their aspirations and therefore as an encouragement to achieving them as quickly as possible.

The bourgeoisie has not failed to note this. Its parties, the PPD and the CDS,<sup>5</sup> and the bosses’ confederation, the CIP,<sup>6</sup> as well as its bishops have denounced the MFA with one voice—and not only the MFA’s “guide document.” There is no more bowing and scraping, no more polite civility toward this regime, which has revealed its incapacity to hold the line against the rise of militancy. Now it’s war. They are not saying so yet, but in any case it has begun, and the first skirmishes resemble those that occurred in Chile.

In the north of the country, at Aveiro, 8,000 persons gathered on Sunday, July 13, to greet their bishop, who had returned from Rome, with cries of: “Anarchy, no; Order, yes!” and “Who is running Portugal?” The bishop addressed the crowd as follows: “Christians, wake up, we must demonstrate en masse throughout the country.”

On the same day at Rio Maior, 60 kilometers from Lisbon, thousands of demonstrators mobilized by the PPD, the CDS, and the local chiefs of the SP, prevented the Peasant League from holding an assembly. Throughout the day they hunted down members of the Communist party and sacked the offices of the CP and the FSP.<sup>7</sup> On the following day they seized trucks bringing the daily newspapers from Lisbon and burned their contents in the city square. “That’s how we deal with the Communists’ lies,” some of them said.

At Cascais, they have announced they will hold a meeting of small-shop keepers on Saturday; the workers and revolutionary organizations are mobilizing against it. The meeting will not be allowed to take place. The employers in the CIP decided to adjourn their convention indefinitely “to demonstrate their concern at the seriousness of the situation.”

### The Failure of the SP’s Blackmail

The leaders of the SP would have liked to take a left stance so as to save face. But they made a poor job out of their exit from the government.

Immediately after the MFA Assembly meeting, the national secretariat of the SP launched its offensive in the form of a public communiqué that Mário Soares was to echo later during his news conference. Here are quotations: “There are many proposals outlined in the ‘guide document’ that interfere with the powers of the Constituent Assembly, which has the responsibility, for example, of defining the status of the workers commissions and neighborhood committees, the institutions of local, municipal, district, and regional power. . . . It is really strange to be trying to convert the workers commissions and neighborhood committees into a police body and even self-defense organs. . . . But even more shocking is the proposal to establish, alongside the organs of people’s power, a people’s court to resolve noncriminal problems. . . . It is inadmissible to be told that we are still living in a private-enterprise economy, dominated by monopoly capitalism, which is said to paralyze the development of production. . . . Why destroy it, and not proceed to a profound transformation of the state apparatus?”

Citizens, to the ballot boxes! To elect a Constituent Assembly and a legislative assembly every two years, by universal suffrage and secret ballot; and, above all, let’s hear nothing about those irresponsible assemblies where votes are held—how shocking!—by a show of hands, in order to know who is defending what and how. “The need for pluralism,” that is, the routine of parliamentary combinations, “recently reaffirmed by the Revolutionary Council, has largely disappeared from this document,” the national secretary of the SP indignantly exclaims in a veiled appeal to the Revolutionary Council.

It is possible that this latter body would have been willing to make a deal with the SP leadership, and retreat to the June 21 action plan. But who knows how the MFA Assembly would have reacted under the pressure of the probable popular opposition? So, anxious to preserve “the unity of the MFA,” the Revolutionary Council accepted the withdrawal of the Socialist ministers without further ado.

however, that the People’s Assemblies will be under the control of the military command. For an English translation of the full text of the document, see *Intercontinental Press*, July 21, p. 1050.—IP

4. Comando Operacional do Continente—Mainland Portugal Operations Command, the state military security forces.—IP

5. Centro Democrático Social—Social Democratic Center.—IP

6. Confederação da Indústria Portuguesa—Confederation of Portuguese Industry.—IP

7. Frente Socialista Popular—Socialist People’s Front.—IP

With consternation, the SP leadership watched its staged exit become transformed into a real rout. This leadership, which cannot flirt too openly with the right wing of the PPD and the CDS without running the risk of losing its working-class base, is in an impasse. Consequently, it has to hide its real intentions behind an anti-Stalinist—actually, an anticommunist—vocabulary, while trying to push the right wing of the MFA to break away and to establish with it a “pluralist” alternative to these People’s Assemblies that inspire such spirited opposition on its part.

In the short run, the SP leadership cannot do much except to show that it exists. This week it is organizing a series of meetings in the big cities throughout the country. At these meetings, Mário Soares will repeat what he stated Monday night at a meeting in Lisbon: “The government has been incapable of confronting the crisis (but wasn’t he part of that government for fifteen months?), we must encourage European and American investment to remedy the unemployment problem, but the first condition for doing that is to restore confidence. If there is a political way out, it is through respect for universal suffrage.” Soares gets along very well with Schmidt and Wilson, and not badly with Giscard and Ford. The Socialist workers who have joined the workers commissions and neighborhood committees, and who still take the side of their party leadership, should quickly come to understand that.

The withdrawal from the government of the SP, followed soon after by the PPD, shattered the fragile edifice of the coalition. What will it be replaced with? Probably by a more or less military government with the addition of “competent” personalities carefully allocated in accordance with their political allegiance and the relative weight of the CP and perhaps even of the SP, if some pieces can still be pasted together again.

The CP has already indicated its agreement with this type of government “without parties” but “not against the parties.” Given its weight in the state apparatus and in the MFA itself, the CP will easily accommodate to a situation that for it has the enormous advantage of preserving the unity of the MFA. The CP is more and more walking a tightrope. On the one hand, this immense aspiration to build a people’s power, in which tens of thousands of its members are participating fully, threatens to rapidly put in question the superficial unity of the MFA. It will not be long before the right wing of the present military hierarchy takes the place of the Spinolists, jeopardizing the unity of the MFA to which the CP clings.

But to remain passive would also be dangerous. Forty-eight years of fascism was

quite enough, and the CP, which endured the harshest blows, has no desire to return to that. Thus it must find a middle way that mobilizes the workers against the reaction sufficiently to prevent the reaction from launching an offensive, without however pushing it too far. Hence the wild fluctuations that now tend to characterize the CP’s strategy of alliance with the MFA, whose prestige as a liberator still provides about the only assurance that the rising tide can be contained.

But this is to ignore the reactionaries’ determination to launch a hostile offensive. Not to carry out a coup—that would be suicidal in the present relationship of forces—but to demonstrate their strength by a dazzling blow designed to show their presence, to regroup their forces nationally, to draw on their international support, and to establish a climate of disorganization and division that would facilitate the launching of a real armed counteroffensive by the reaction if the regime hesitated to assert itself.

#### Birth of a Power

The word is rarely pronounced in speeches or written in the press, but Chile is an increasing obsession in Portugal—both the Portugal of the bourgeoisie and the Portugal of the workers. The power above, that is, the MFA regime, is hesitant to take the economic, political, and social decisions the situation requires. And when decisions are made, they are so delayed that the problems are ten times greater. That is what happened, for example, in the recent seizures of machinery on the big landholdings as part of the agrarian reform that the peasant leagues in the south have consistently been in advance of. That is also what happened with the promised nationalization of the CUF,<sup>8</sup> and the July 10 decree nationalizing the petrochemical industry, along with the ammonia, nitrate, and brewing industries. The regime is running behind events, revealing its indecision to the petty bourgeoisie, which is beginning to lean dangerously to the right.

Nor are the workers any more satisfied. The most exploited are wondering how long they will have to wait to have their most basic demands met. The most politicized and combative are questioning the actual ability of this regime to resolve the crisis that is now hitting them with full force. Occupations and strikes can no longer constitute the only response to the current problems. The only measure that can get Portugal out of the stagnation the international capitalist recession has plunged it

into is socialist planning of the economy under workers control.

In face of this failure to take energetic initiatives by a regime that only a few weeks ago they would not have dared to question, the workers are now proceeding to build their own power. This power is not only the workers commissions elected to lead the struggle in a factory or to control its production, but the setting in motion of tens of thousands of workers, who are starting to implement workers control throughout key sectors of industry.

The example of the coordinating committee of the 120,000 CUF workers is already known. On July 14, the workers in the building-trades sector began to form a national council of building workers, and instructed the regional councils in Oporto, Lisbon, Coimbra, Beja, and Faro to prepare for a national congress of that sector. On the agenda: the complete expropriation of the sector, and the reconversion of production under workers control within the framework of industry-wide planning. On the same day, the first national meeting of shipbuilding workers was held in the Lisnave yard. Delegates from the workers commissions of all the maritime construction and repair companies discussed a plan to develop and reconvert the sector “under workers control.”

For the first time, the barracks are concretely proceeding to organize meetings to elect assemblies of rank-and-file delegates, based on democratic guidelines that go beyond the tortuous recommendations of the MFA. Last Sunday, general assemblies in two Lisbon barracks passed motions and initiated election procedures, in many instances with the active encouragement of MFA officers. On Saturday and Sunday, People’s Assemblies were held in almost all the neighborhoods, districts, and urban centers.

The coordinating committee of all the Lisbon committees tonight issued a call for a demonstration, with the open support of the assembly of the soldiers in the RALis (the former RAL 1).<sup>9</sup>

In Portugal, the governmental power is vacillating, while the power of the rank and file is taking shape. It already has a name: the People’s Assemblies, which will elect a National Assembly of the workers and soldiers. This National Assembly will create a Workers and Peasants Government, which the international solidarity movement must help to defend against the blows that the reaction is already preparing against it. There is no doubt that the coming weeks will be decisive for Portugal and for the socialist revolution in Europe.

Wednesday, July 16, 1975

8. Companhia União Fabril, the holding company that accounts for more than one-tenth of all corporate assets of Portugal.—IP

9. Regimento de Artilharia Ligeira No. 1—Light Artillery Regiment No. 1.—IP

## Demonstrators Support MFA's Call for 'People's Power'

By Dick Fidler

LISBON—It was early evening, and the shadows were beginning to lengthen across the Terreiro do Paço, the wide plaza at the foot of Lisbon's business district, overlooking the harbor. In the center of the square, groups of young people unfurled banners and red flags, and gathered in contingents. They had come to demonstrate their support to the July 8 decisions of the Assembly of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), calling for "People's Power."

As we arrived in the square, we were handed a leaflet. Signed by two workers commissions and two neighborhood committees, it described the aim of the demonstration that night, July 16: "To carry out a large demonstration of the popular masses of the Lisbon area, in support of the measures decided by the Assembly of the MFA and to further the process of Socialist Revolution against the maneuvers of the counterrevolutionaries, for a revolutionary government, for economic measures that correspond to the interests of the workers and attack the privileges of the bourgeoisie. . . ."

Political parties were not to be represented, the leaflet said, although "members of parties should join the contingents of their workers or neighborhood committees or unions."

The official slogans, as decided by a planning meeting a few days earlier, were listed as follows:

- Workers Commissions, Neighborhood Commissions—Workers Power, People's Power!
- Unity of the Workers With the Progressive Wing of the MFA!
- Dissolution of the Provisional Government! For a Revolutionary Government!
- Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly!
- Workers and People's Power—the Road to Socialism!
- Against Capital and Reaction—Proletarian Unity!

Similar leaflets were handed out by a few other neighborhood commissions. All contained the same slogans or slight variations on them.

The July 16 issue of *Esquerda Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Movimento de Esquerda Socialista,<sup>1</sup> had listed twenty-four workers commissions, twelve neighborhood

commissions, and the soldiers assembly in the Lisbon Light Artillery Regiment (RALis) as having endorsed the action.

But it was clear as we gathered in the Terreiro do Paço that the attendance fell considerably short of the organizers' hopes. There were at most only a few thousand—the highest figure reported the next day by sympathetic newspapers was the new Stalinist-backed *República's* 10,000. One could not help noting the contrast in size with the crowd of at least 20,000 to 30,000 persons that had gathered the previous night in front of the Socialist party headquarters, in opposition to the Armed Forces Movement and in defense of the Constituent Assembly. And three nights later the Socialist party was to assemble about 100,000 persons in Lisbon in one of its biggest demonstrations so far.

Of course, some of the most militant sectors of the Portuguese working class were not represented in the July 16 demonstration. There was no contingent from the Lisnave shipyards, for example—although several thousand Lisnave workers had marched two weeks earlier in support of similar demands.

Sectarianism may have limited the participation. While the organizers had banned any slogans or banners indicating the names of participating political groups, virtually all of the workers commissions and neighborhood commissions that sponsored and built the demonstration were led by one or another of the numerous Maoist, anarchist, centrist, and Trotskyist groups that make up the Portuguese "far left." The Socialist and Communist parties, the main tendencies in the Portuguese workers movement, were apparently not encouraged to join. Some individual members of the CP marched, we were told. But the choice of slogans of course excluded any participation by workers influenced by the SP.

The political groups involved made their views known through leaflets distributed to the demonstrators.

The MES, which played a key role in initiating the July 16 action, limited its demands to the official slogans of the demonstration.

Another major force in the demonstration, the Maoist União Democrática do Povo,<sup>2</sup> issued a leaflet with the title: "Against Fascism—People's Unity; Against

the Imperialists—Alliance With the Third World." Like most of the other currents represented at the demonstration, the UDP had some rather harsh words for the Socialist party.

"The fake socialists of the 'SP [sic] did not hesitate to initiate the crisis, by struggling against the organization of the workers in People's Assemblies, in order to rescue their den of thieves, the Constituent Assembly, from bankruptcy.

"The 'SP thereby seeks to defend the interests of its European and American bosses, who have no hope of maintaining a foothold in our country."

As for the "fake Communist party," it was out to "sell Portugal to Russian social-imperialism."

Calling for "People's Democracy," the UDP proposed these slogans: "For the Complete Liquidation of the Big Bourgeoisie," "For an Agrarian Reform Under the Control of the Farm Workers," "Power to the People's Organizations," and "Imperialists Out of Portugal."

Another Maoist grouping, the Organização para a Reconstrução do Partido Comunista (Marxista-Leninista),<sup>3</sup> said the SP was "following the example of the German Social Democracy, which opened the road to Hitler's rise to power." It called for formation of a "Government of National Independence," "Power to the People's Assemblies," and "Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly."

The Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária<sup>4</sup> presented two slogans: "Long Live People's Power!" and "Long Live the Socialist Revolution!"

The only grouping to offer any criticism of the MFA was the Liga Comunista Internacionalista.<sup>5</sup> A leaflet issued by the LCI's Lisbon regional committee said that "the coordination of the struggle between the workers in and out of uniform, and the demands being put forward in the people's assemblies, have obliged the MFA to

3. ORPC(ML)—Organization for the Reconstruction of the Communist party (Marxist-Leninist).

4. LUAR—League for Revolutionary Unity and Action.

5. LCI—Internationalist Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

1. MES—Movement of the Socialist Left.

2. UDP—People's Democratic Union.

recognize these structures as the organized expressions of the workers."

According to the LCI, "The only response to the present political crisis, to the MFA's attempts to control the organizations of the workers, is the struggle for rapid coordination of the people's assemblies at the regional level, and the achievement as quickly as possible of a National People's Assembly."

The leaflet also called for immediate dissolution of the special police forces and their replacement by "workers and people's militias . . . the arming of the workers commissions and neighborhood commissions, the unions and the Intersindical."

Another group that claims to be Trotskyist, the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores,<sup>6</sup> also participated in the July 16 demonstration. Its leaflet, entitled "Extend and Support the Workers and People's Power," described "People's Power" as "the only guarantee of the victory of Socialism."

The PRT urged that the assemblies projected by the MFA include "all the workers organizations and parties." In this respect, it criticized the decision of the organizers of the demonstration to exclude organized political tendencies from participating in their own name.

The PRT also criticized the demand for dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. "Hundreds and hundreds of thousands of workers," it said, continue to have illusions in the Constituent Assembly. Those illusions would only be dispelled if the Constituent refused to recognize the people's assemblies, thereby exposing it as counter-revolutionary and justifying the demand for its dissolution.

The PRT demanded: "The Constituent Assembly Must Recognize the People's Assemblies!" In addition, it urged that the CP and SP join the people's assemblies, along with other political currents.

The demonstrators in the Terreiro do Paço readily accepted these leaflets. But few stopped to read them. Most were probably already aware of their contents. The center of interest was now a half dozen military vehicles, which had just arrived in the square. Young people began to climb up on armored cars and trucks and talk to the soldiers, who were from the RALis and a few other regiments in the Lisbon area.

Suddenly, a small group of about twenty soldiers started circling the square in formation, holding aloft a banner with the crudely lettered slogan: "Soldados sempre ao lado do povo" (Soldiers always at the side of the people). While onlookers applauded, the contingents from the various workers and neighborhood commissions lined up behind the soldiers and soon began to march out of the square.

It was a colorful sight as the demonstra-

tors, mainly young people but with a sprinkling of older workers, marched with their banners and red flags through the narrow streets of one of Lisbon's poorer working-class neighborhoods. The march was held tightly together by rings of marshals who led the militant chants.

As we passed through a neighborhood that obviously had a large population of African immigrants, some of the demonstrators attempted to appeal to the Blacks watching from sidewalks and windows. "MPLA, MPLA," became the chant. But these were no noticeable response from the spectators. In fact, many Black people seemed a little nonplussed at the sight of the soldiers in their spotted green camouflage gear shouting support to the Angolan liberation organization.

As the march neared the top of the hill on the Rua de São Bento, the head marshals dramatically halted the column. The chant changed: "Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly." The demonstrators surged forward into the square facing the Palácio de São Bento, which houses the Constituent Assembly, swarming up the broad driveway and onto the steps in front.

Strangely, there were no guards on duty at the building, which is normally protected during demonstrations. The next day, *Diário de Notícias* reported that a Republican National Guard officer had said no instructions were issued, "probably due to the fact that the authorities had confidence in the demonstrators."

By now it was almost dark. The massive palace was unlit, and the demonstrators, grouped in front of the central entrance, presented a curious sight—a few thousand persons shaking their fists in unison and chanting. "Dissolve the Constituent Assembly now." "MFA-People's power." Or simply, "Dictatorship of the proletariat."

A leader of a neighborhood commission—he was said to be a member of the MES—began to speak. He was interrupted by the rumble and clatter of armored troop carriers that lurched up the hill from Avenida de Carlos I and took up position in front of the assembly building, amid the demonstrators.

Young people clambered over the armored vehicles, chatting with the soldiers. Speakers from a few of the sponsoring commissions addressed the crowd from an armored car.

The rally went on for a couple of hours. Late that night, as the demonstration disbanded, the military vehicles roamed the streets loaded with youths waving banners and shouting slogans.

It all made interesting revolutionary theater. But for this observer, the July 16 demonstration posed a number of troublesome questions.

If it was intended to demonstrate the power and influence of the rank-and-file organizations of the workers, tenants, and

soldiers that have begun to develop in recent months, the demonstration was a notable failure. What it clearly revealed was the still very limited scope of these movements.

It was very much a minority action, despite the ample advance publicity it received in the press. The majority of the demonstrators probably belonged to or supported one or another of the "far left" groupings that identified with the march.

The participation of troops in the action drew much attention. A soldier from the RALis told us that his regiment—including the officers—had voted to attend the demonstration. But at most only 200 soldiers participated, and they were by no means a majority of their own regiments.

That they were allowed to take their vehicles to the demonstration underscored the fact that significant sections of the military hierarchy were not unsympathetic to the aims of the demonstration. And why should they be—it was called to support the MFA's own program.

It is doubtful that the small size of the demonstration actually reflected the number of workers in Lisbon who are sympathetic to the workers commissions. Why was the demonstration not bigger? Could it have had something to do with the themes and slogans? The major theme of the demonstration—the destination of the march assured this—was the call for dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. That was the demand highlighted the next day in the Lisbon papers, most of which are controlled by the CP.

But there is no evidence that the masses' attitude toward the assembly has substantially altered since April 25, when more than 90 percent of the Portuguese people went to the polls and in their majority voted for the mass workers parties, the SP and CP. The size and composition of the SP rallies this same week indicated that many more workers were prepared to mobilize in defense of the Constituent Assembly than in response to calls to abolish it.

The masses of workers, concerned at the growing attacks on their democratic gains by officers in the MFA, are unlikely to respond favorably to a demonstration that presents the MFA program as the road to the future.

The July 16 action, with its calls for a "Revolutionary Government," was scarcely calculated to convince the Portuguese working people that the workers commissions can offer at this time a viable alternative to the Constituent Assembly or the military government. Its overall effect was probably to further isolate the revolutionary-minded elements and to increase the prestige of the SP leaders, who could more easily pose as the only defenders of the masses' democratic rights. □

6. PRT—Revolutionary Workers party.

## LCR Analyzes 'República' Affair and Replies to the OCI

By Dick Fidler

The meaning of the government-imposed closure of *República*, the Lisbon daily that reflected the views of the Portuguese Socialist party, led to an interesting exchange between the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR—Revolutionary Communist League, the French section of the Fourth International) and the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI—Internationalist Communist Organization).<sup>1</sup>

The LCR first referred to the *República* affair in the May 23 issue of *Rouge* in an article signed D.B.

"The newspaper edited by the former minister of information, Raul Régo, is known for its closeness to the Socialist party and for the very partial and peculiar way that it reports workers struggles. So the workers in the printshop decided to occupy the offices, holding the editor hostage and demanding that he be replaced. The offices were evacuated only after the intervention of the military following a night's siege by members of the Socialist party, who were called to the rescue with a copious supply of anti-Communist slogans."

Apparently of greater importance to D.B. was the session of the Assembly of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA—Movimento das Forças Armadas) held at the Alfeite naval base on May 19, the day before the seizure of *República*. At this meeting the officers took a major step toward setting up a civilian movement to support the MFA. As the May 21 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde* described it: The project called for "reinforcing the MFA's direct relations with all the structures of popular participation, such as the neighborhood committees, the residents committees, and the workers commissions in order to consolidate the 'alliance of the people with the MFA' and to overcome partisan divisions in the common battle for production and the actual construction of a socialist society."

The decisions, D.B. said in *Rouge*, "expressed above all the MFA's desire to develop direct links with the people through committees of tenants and residents, and

workers commissions that go beyond partisan divisions."

D.B. quoted from a recent MFA bulletin analyzing the "Portuguese process."

"In Portugal the days are numbered for the system of exploitation of man by man. . . . Nationalizations are not a magic formula but only political and juridical acts which it would be utopian to think guarantee the birth of a new mode of production. Since socialism is characterized by social ownership of the means of production, the workers must begin to participate in defining the stages of transition to socialism through organized control of production. . . ."

In D.B.'s opinion, the decisions of the MFA assembly were "double-edged." On the one hand, they were intended "to strengthen the paternalistic links of the military with the various commissions and committees . . . to integrate them, of course." On the other hand, they "legitimize the forms of independent organization denied under the trade-union law, and encourage those forms indirectly. The workers can respond: Yes, to the assembly of the committees of workers, soldiers, and tenants! No, to military trusteeship!"

The May 30 issue of *Rouge* carried an article by D. Bensaïd devoted entirely to the *República* affair.<sup>2</sup>

"The *República* affair," said Bensaïd, "has provided the excuse for a twofold campaign by the Socialist party directed at swaying public opinion. In Portugal itself, in the name of 'freedom,' it has organized mass demonstrations on a scale that would have been totally beyond its capacity a few months ago. . . . Internationally, the indignant chorus of democrats has conveniently pushed into the background Gerald Ford's more or less open threats against Portugal."

Bensaïd held that it was necessary to "clear up two points of fact that have been deliberately obscured in the discussion around this affair.

"First, *República* is not the official paper of the Socialist party, and is not part of the militant press of the workers movement. It is a private newspaper whose opinions

today are to a great extent influenced by the Socialist party—that is all. . . .

"Next, contrary to what the Socialist party would have us believe, it was not the Communist party that prevented the paper from coming out. It was the decision of the workers commission, in which members of the CP play an influential role as do members of the Maoist group, the UDP.<sup>3</sup> One has only to note the embarrassment of the CP over the affair to see who has really benefited, to understand that it was not the CP leadership that was pulling the strings."<sup>4</sup> (Emphasis in original.)

Bensaïd cited the statements by the unions involved that the *República* affair was a "labor conflict."

"They even add that the battle at *República* must be seen in the context of the battle for production, to safeguard a small company!"

### Whose 'Freedom of the Press'?

Bensaïd contended that revolutionists must reject the campaign being waged by the Portuguese Socialist party in defense of *República* and "freedom of the press."

"What is this freedom of the press?"

3. União Democrática do Povo—People's Democratic Union.

4. A different version of the events and their meaning was given by the *Old Mole*, the monthly newspaper of the Revolutionary Marxist Group, a Canadian sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. In its June issue, the *Old Mole* offered the following interpretation:

"The SP is now intensifying pressure upon the AFM leadership from without. [SP leader] Soares publicly demands 'a more equitable distribution of political power'. He makes hysterical ultimatums for an end of the CP's monopoly of the Intersindical trade union federation and the press and condemns the AFM's inaction on these demands.

"The dynamics of this manoeuvre are highly dangerous with the CP being forced to retaliate. The CP physically prevented the SP from participating in the May Day celebrations, and recently CP printers seized the SP's daily newspaper *República*. . . ."

The fortnightly *Labor Challenge* and the monthly *Liberation*, which reflect the views of the League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière, Canadian section of the Fourth International, protested the attack on *República*, publishing among other items Trotsky's "Freedom of the Press and the Working Class," which first appeared in the June 9, 1975, issue of *Intercontinental Press*.

1. The OCI, whose main leader is Pierre Lambert, refused to participate in the reunification of the Fourth International in 1963. It constitutes the biggest component of the international "Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International."

2. An English translation of excerpts from the article can be found in the June 12 issue of *Red Weekly*, the newspaper of the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International.





Lutte Ouvrière

Copcon troops enforce seizure of "República" by Portuguese junta.

Freedom of expression? Not exactly. In the first place, it is freedom for the owners to maintain their hold over the means of information and communication.

"That is why the struggle of the *República* workers could coincide with the general interests of the Portuguese workers. We revolutionary communists demand first the *immediate nationalization without compensation of the paper mills, printing plants and stocks of printing materials, the radio and television networks, and the news agencies*. By itself that would not resolve the problem of a critical and democratic news service. But it is a necessary precondition if the workers and cultural organizations, the different local and labor groupings, are to have access to the communications media to exchange their experiences and proposals; if they are to have at their disposal the necessary means to conduct the great collective debate that will be required for any democratic elaboration of an overall economic plan."

Bensaïd said that nationalization of the communications media should not mean state control of all news, since unions and academic and cultural organizations could be allowed to retain a voice in the news

media on the basis of a national reallocation of existing facilities.

"Within this framework," Bensaïd continued, "the workers in a printshop or a newspaper should not set themselves up as censors in the name of the whole working class, of which they are only a tiny fraction. *Workers control of the organs of information cannot justify the right of censorship, but only the right of counterinformation*. Thus, instead of blocking publication or cutting out articles, the workers of the *República* coordinating commission could have demanded *simultaneous publication of their own views* whenever they thought that news coverage was biased."

These points were reiterated in a statement by the Political Bureau of the LCR published in the June 6 issue of *Rouge*.

An accompanying editorial observed that the French Socialist party accused the French Communist party of "associating itself with the strangulation of the Portuguese newspaper *República*" while the CP retorted by accusing the SP "of adding its voice to the anticommunist campaign."

The real issue at stake in both France and Portugal, *Rouge* maintained, was the "freedom of all the exploited."

"Of course there are democratic freedoms won by the workers. We defend them intransigently against the encroachments of a strong, authoritarian state—against electronic listening devices and card files, against restrictions on the right to strike, against police infiltration and thuggery, against the private militias of the bosses, against antiwrecker laws and other emergency legislation. For years we have fought in this struggle without letting up.

"But in addition to these rights, what we want is freedom for those who are exploited. And that freedom will exist only when the workers are emancipated from unemployment and the necessity to work, when they are no longer the playthings of the blind laws of the capitalist market. This emancipation will go hand in hand with coercion against the former profiteers, who will not lightly give up their privileges. But for the workers it will mean the broadest and truest democracy ever experienced."<sup>5</sup>

5. To *Was Tun*, the fortnightly newspaper of the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (GIM—International Marxist Group, German section of the Fourth International), the suppression of

The Organisation Communiste Internationaliste was the only group in France claiming to be Trotskyist that opposed the suppression of *República*. A communiqué published in the May 22-28 issue of the OCI's weekly *Informations Ouvrières* (Workers News) denounced the seizure as a "violation of freedom of the press."

The communiqué emphasized the importance of democratic rights to the Portuguese masses. It noted that the Socialist party had won the highest vote in the April 25 elections, while the MFA's call for abstention or casting a blank ballot had been "massively repudiated."

The communiqué concluded by saying that the workers of France "have a right to demand that the leaders of the CP, the SP, and the trade unions, who claim to respect democratic rights and universal suffrage, engage in every kind of united action in behalf of rescinding the grave measure taken against the Socialist daily *República*, and of compelling the MFA to respect the democratic rights of the workers and reverse its decision."

In a statement published in the May 28-June 4 issue of *Informations Ouvrières*, the OCI declared its "unconditional support to the Portuguese Socialist party against these reactionary attacks." It would "support any initiative that would lead to the lifting of the ban on *República*, of maintaining respect for the Portuguese Socialist party's right to free speech."

This and subsequent issues of the paper published resolutions of support for *República* passed by French trade unions, civil liberties organizations, and members of the Communist and Socialist parties and the OCI.

The OCI sponsored a meeting in Paris on June 3 in defense of the right of the Portuguese Socialist party to publish *República*. According to *Informations Ouvrières*, 2,500 persons attended.

Why is the Portuguese Socialist party being singled out for attack? *Informations Ouvrières* asked in its May 22-28 issue. It cited the reply by a "progressive" leader of the MFA, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, as recorded in an interview with Alain Krivine published in the May 16 issue of *Rouge*.<sup>6</sup>

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*República* appeared to be a victory along this road. In an article in the May 30 issue, F.S. stated: "The Western governments are anxious about the newly won freedom in Portugal: The 'last voice of freedom,' the Socialist party-controlled daily *República*, was shut down on Tuesday, May 20, by COPCON soldiers on order of the government. The capitalist media are not mistaken: (Bourgeois) freedom of the press no longer exists in Portugal. It has been eliminated. Indeed, not through the censorship of a 'military dictatorship,' but through the control and initiatives of the workers."

6. For an English translation see "An Interview

The admiral said that it was because the Socialist party was linked to the Scandinavian and German Social Democrats. "Because of this we lack a real Socialist party."

In contrast to his unfavorable view of the SP, the admiral praised the Portuguese Communist party. It "has always been loyal and doesn't pose any problem for us."

"But is it really the 'Social Democratic' nature of the SP that presents a problem to the leaders of the MFA?" asked *Informations Ouvrières*.

It held that the real reason for attacking the SP was indicated in a resolution adopted by the Assembly of the MFA that met while the *República* conflict was brewing.<sup>7</sup> The resolution attacked the SP for "its inadequate participation in the 'battle for production,' and the lack of control by the leadership over its members."

In the opinion of *Informations Ouvrières*, the SP, as in the April 25 elections, had been selected by the working class as the principal "channel to express its aspirations. The main reproach that the MFA and the CP make against the SP is not that it is 'Social Democratic' but that it is unable to be as 'loyal' as the CP, that is, it is unable to break strikes and to destroy the workers commissions."

But now CP influence among the workers is on the decline. In this context, the reason for the attack on the Socialist party newspaper becomes clear. It was a step toward "the MFA taking direct control of the country."

"The MFA," said the May 28-June 4 issue of *Informations Ouvrières*, "is trying to patch up . . . the bourgeois state, an organ of defense for the class interests of the capitalists and the big landlords."

The article leveled several charges against the MFA government. Together with the CP leaders, it has imposed legislation enforcing a single trade-union structure in Portugal. The OCI, on the contrary, favors "a single democratic Portuguese union federation that would scrupulously respect the right to form tendencies, independent of any state, party, or government."

The MFA, "in deciding to intervene in the affairs of the Angolan people, has affirmed its desire to preserve the interests of the Salazarist capitalists of Portugal, against the right of the Angolan people to determine their own policies."

And the MFA has attacked freedom of speech, as shown in the *República* affair.

What's more, the OCI paper noted in its May 22-28 issue, the MFA was decisively repudiated in the April 25 elections for the

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With Admiral Rosa Coutinho," *Intercontinental Press*, June 23, p. 892.

7. The reference is apparently to the May 19 meeting of the Armed Forces Movement.

Constituent Assembly. "The MFA took all possible precautions to prevent the Portuguese working class from finding a point of support in the elections for an advance forward. The MFA recommended casting a blank vote. It made the workers parties sign a constitutional pact that bound them to the demands of the MFA officers and limited the sovereign power of the Constituent Assembly. And, immediately after the elections, the MFA recognized [the Inter-sindical as] the sole union federation and definitively adopted the union law aimed at destroying the workers commissions and assuring state control over the trade-union movement.

"Despite all that, the working class and the laboring masses voted massively for the workers parties, the CP and the SP, demonstrating their preference for the SP. They thereby repudiated the leadership of the CP, which has been in the front lines of the anti-working-class policy, engaging in continual attacks on the workers commissions and on strikes.

"Despite the appeals of all the parties of the governmental coalition and the MFA, the working class refuses to shed its blood in the 'battle for production,' for a government that protects the flight of capital, that refuses to take the indispensable measures required to avoid economic catastrophe, and that continues to include the PPD [Partido Popular Democrático—Democratic People's party], the representatives of finance capital."

The OCI formulated its governmental slogan accordingly: "Power to the bloc of workers parties: repudiation of their policy of supporting the MFA, their coalition with the bourgeoisie. Power to a Soares-Cunhal government, a government representing the majority of the country."

The May 28-June 4 issue of *Informations Ouvrières* carried a front-page statement along the same lines.

The workers parties had obtained a total of 58 percent of the popular vote in the election, it said, including 38 percent for the SP and 13 percent for the CP. "A strong majority of workers deputies was elected. If the wishes of the masses are to be respected, in accordance with the principles of 'democracy,'" there should be:

- A sovereign Constituent Assembly.
- An SP-CP government "chaired by Mário Soares."

A statement by the "Liaison Committee of Portuguese Revolutionary Militants," the OCI's Portuguese cothinkers, published in the same issue of *Informations Ouvrières*, boiled the slogan down to: "Soares government."

The thinking of the OCI on the question of the Constituent Assembly and a governmental formula was spelled out before the April elections, in an article by Jacques Meyrand that appeared in the March issue

of *La Vérité*, the OCI's theoretical journal.

"A fully sovereign Constituent Assembly," Meyrand wrote, "would mean that the fragile political regime organized around the MFA would be put in question. It would lose its axis. The question of power would thus be posed openly. A phase of total political instability would begin and would necessarily overflow the limits of a sober election campaign. What kind of government? What kind of regime? Those would be the questions opened up. An explosive situation! It cannot be excluded that an all-out campaign by the workers parties will give them a majority in the Constituent Assembly. But whatever the case, the absence of power, the political situation that results, would pose the problem of a government representing the masses—a government of their parties, the SP and CP—and all the more so if they were to be the majority in the Constituent. But for that very reason, the leaders do not want the question of such a government to be posed and still less for such a government to be constituted. That would be a call to the masses to proceed to the complete expropriation of the bourgeoisie and the landlords."

The leaders of both the CP and SP, Meyrand said, intent on "defending the maintenance of bourgeois order," have counterposed their support for "institutionalization of the MFA" to the concept of a sovereign Constituent Assembly. That meant that "the leaders of the CP and SP agree that fundamental democratic rights, such as freedom of assembly, of association, and of the press, will not be guaranteed, as the anti-trade-union law decreed in mid-January demonstrated. The champions of the Portuguese bourgeois republic thereby show that they have no desire to really fight for democratic rights.

"This paradox rests on the simple fact that the real exercise of all these rights would powerfully accelerate the movement of the working class and the peasantry against the bourgeoisie and the big landlords, toward the complete destruction of their state apparatus. To maintain the coalition is not only to violate the principles of democracy, which they claim to uphold, but to support at all costs the last rampart that can save the bourgeois state. . . ."

#### OCI Concept of United Front

The OCI denounced the French CP for its support to the suppression of *República*. When the Stalinist trade-union leader Georges Séguéy argued that the printers union had a right to censor the contents of *República* in the interests of workers "self-management," *Informations Ouvrières* noted that this attitude contrasted markedly with the CP's hostility to workers control in virtually all other labor struggles in Portugal.

An article in the May 28-June 4 issue of *Informations Ouvrières* noted the contrast between the French CP's attitude on *República* and its fine phrases about "freedom of the press" in its "Déclaration des Libertés," the bill of rights the Stalinists say they want to incorporate in the French constitution.

The OCI paper published the statements by the Italian and Spanish CP leaders criticizing the *República* closure.

However, this involved publishing without any criticism the Italian CP's defense of the Portuguese SP because it was "participating in the government alongside other democratic and antifascist forces," and the Spanish CP's hailing of "everything that strengthens the unity of the workers and democratic parties with the MFA."

And *Informations Ouvrières* reprinted without comment a message of greetings to its June 3 rally from the Portuguese SP, placing its campaign on behalf of *República* in the context of support for the regime's "battle for production" in Portugal.

In its June 4-11 issue, *Informations Ouvrières* expressed regret that the *República* affair had served to reopen "the French CP's divisive polemic against the SP." It drew an analogy between this polemic and the German CP's refusal to form a united front with the Social Democrats to combat Hitler's rise to power. The resolution adopted at its June 3 public rally said that "the division in France between the SP and the CP," including the French CP's campaign against *República*, had "become the main obstacle to carrying on the struggle against the Giscard-Chirac government."

These positions apparently reflect the OCI's peculiar concept of the united-front tactic and its application to the governmental formula. In France it calls for a "CP-SP government without bourgeois ministers." But a petition to that effect it circulated earlier this year included the demand for an end to the public debate between the CP and SP. Moreover, it contained no explicit dissociation from the class-collaborationist Common Program of the Union of the Left, the electoral coalition of the CP, the SP, and the bourgeois Left Radicals.

This left the OCI open to the charge that it was appealing in an opportunistic way to the feeling among some workers that the debate, which they did not understand, was ruining the prospects for a victory of the Union of the Left.

This approach was justified by the OCI as an application of the "united-front tactic." But the united-front tactic has never meant suppression of public differences between the various partners. On the contrary, the tactic, as elaborated by the Communist International under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky, was precisely a

means for revolutionary forces to win a hearing for their program among the masses of workers still influenced by the reformists.

That is why revolutionists should welcome public polemics between the Stalinists and Social Democrats. Since such debates inevitably interest wide layers of the workers who follow these leaderships, they can provide a small propaganda group with valuable openings to advance its program for consideration in the debate.<sup>8</sup>

The "main obstacle" to the struggle against the Giscard government is not the public polemic between the CP and SP, but their class-collaborationist policies. Similarly, an effective campaign in defense of democratic rights in Portugal must include a consistent exposure of the class-collaborationist policies of the Portuguese SP as well as the CP.

The OCI criticized the position taken by the LCR on the *República* affair. The May 28-June 4 issue of *Informations Ouvrières* attacked *Rouge* for "giving total support to the provocation and the splitting operation mounted by the leaders of the Portuguese CP and the Intersindical against *República* and the SP."

Succeeding issues of the OCI weekly reported debates in the high schools be-

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tween members of the Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme (AJS—Alliance of Youth for Socialism), the OCI's youth organization, and members of the Cercles Rouges (Red Circles), which follow the line of the LCR.

### 'Rouge' Answers the OCI

In an article in its June 13 issue, entitled "Whence Their Crush on Social Democracy?" *Rouge* answered the OCI's criticism. *Rouge* made four main points:

1. The OCI's call to defend the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly was "electoral cretinism." The April 25 elections, with a large rural vote, and influenced by the reactionary pressures of the Roman Catholic Church, had not expressed the real relationship of forces established by the working masses in the wake of the March 11 attempted coup. "Confronted with the class-collaborationist pact signed between all the major parties in the Constituent Assembly (including the SP) and the MFA," said *Rouge*, "it is not the Constituent Assembly that must be advanced, but organs that have arisen in the masses' struggles—the workers, tenants, and soldiers committees. . . . For Marxists, it is elementary that workers democracy does not coincide with abstract bourgeois democracy, or the verdict of universal suffrage. . . ."

2. *Rouge* objected to the OCI's call for an SP-CP government headed by Soares. Today, it said, both the CP and SP were holding back the mass struggles. "To demand that they be given the power, without saying a word about the far-left organizations (the UDP,<sup>9</sup> MES,<sup>10</sup> FSP,<sup>11</sup> LCI,<sup>12</sup> LUAR,<sup>13</sup> and the PRP<sup>14</sup>), without putting in the forefront the organizations in

which the masses have organized themselves, such as the committees, is to serve as an auxiliary for the reformist bureaucracies, and in no way to help expose them in the eyes of their ranks.

"We call for the workers parties to break with the bourgeois parties. We demand that the officers in the MFA who are ready to rally to the revolution agree to join the soldiers committees and to submit to their democratic decisions, and that they end the superficial unity that has bound them to the right-wing officers within the MFA. We call for a government of the workers organizations based on the committees and controlled by them.

"It is not by signing petitions in Portugal for reconciliation between Cunhal and Soares, or in France for reconciliation between Marchais and Mitterrand, that the workers unity will be developed most rapidly, but above all by strengthening the workers' organs of democracy and independent organization."

3. *Rouge* ridiculed the OCI's publicizing international opposition to the suppression of *República*. It suggested that the OCI was in a "front" for "freedom of the press" with bourgeois politicians and newspaper publishers in France, who, it seems, have also commented on the *República* affair.

4. *Rouge* objected to the OCI's call for unconditional support to the Portuguese SP against the attacks of reaction, as well as its argument that in voting for the Socialist party, the masses had expressed their rejection of the CP's role as "a direct agent of the counterrevolutionary offensive."

"We know that the CP has broken strikes and practices class collaborationism," said *Rouge*. "But it is the SP that, during the March 11 coup attempt, abstained from calling for a general strike, and it is the SP that has denounced the occupation of vacated houses."

*Rouge* also objected to the statement by an OCI leader that the SP struggle to "restore the framework of bourgeois parliamentary democracy" had created "openings for the proletariat."

Here, said *Rouge*, "is a new version of the democratic stage that is conveniently designed to theoretically justify a position of barely critical support to the Portuguese SP."

### OCI's Reply to Rouge

The OCI attempted to reply to these

8. Moreover, the OCI's own record undercuts its ability to project a programmatic alternative to the reformists. Replying in the June 11-18 issue of *Informations Ouvrières* to the charge of the Stalinists that the Trotskyists oppose workers unity against the bourgeoisie, Pierre Lambert said it was well known that "all the members of the OCI, without exception, called for a vote for François Mitterrand on the first and second rounds of the [1974] elections. . . ."

This reply is open to criticism from the Trotskyist point of view. Mitterrand, the leader of the SP, was running as the candidate of the Union of the Left, which the OCI claims to oppose as a class-collaborationist coalition.

9. In the June 20 issue of *Rouge*, Charles Michaloux listed the UDP among the Maoist groups that campaign "for national independence and people's democracy," against the concept that socialism is on the agenda in Portugal.

10. Movimento de Esquerda Socialista—Movement of the Socialist Left.

11. Frente Socialista Popular—Socialist People's Front.

12. Liga Comunista Internacionalista—Internationalist Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

13. Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária—League for Revolutionary Unity and Action.

14. Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat.

points in the June 18-25 *Informations Ouvrières*. At stake, it said, was whether Portugal was to have "a military government or an SP-CP government headed by Soares." The workers commissions had played a key role in the unfolding of the Portuguese revolution, initiating most of the progressive steps that had actually been taken. But the Communist party was doing everything in its power to oppose and smash these commissions, with the support of the MFA. The MFA's proposal to form its own mass organization and to set up a single-party system, as outlined by Admiral Coutinho in the interview he granted to Alain Krivine, had nothing in common with soviet power, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the plurality of workers parties that existed in the Soviet republic of Lenin and Trotsky.

"No. It is another kind of dictatorship that the leaders of the MFA and the CP . . . are trying to impose—a military dictatorship. . . . A government whose composition goes counter to the desires of the masses as they were clearly expressed in the recent elections to the Constituent Assembly."

In counterposing the workers, tenants, and soldiers committees to the Constituent Assembly, the OCI said, *Rouge* was pointing the way for the MFA and the CP, which certainly had no intention of putting "organs of self-organization" in the "forefront." Stalin had liquidated the soviets in the name of the soviets. Now *Rouge* was "in the camp of the CP-MFA who intend, we repeat, to liquidate the delegates commissions elected by the workers in the name of the delegates commissions elected by the workers!"

As for *Rouge's* charge that the OCI was fronting with bourgeois politicians in campaigning for freedom of the press, "We are sorry to have to inform the editors of *Rouge*, organ of the LCR, which claims to be the French section of the Fourth International, that it forgets that this front includes Joe Hansen, Gerry Foley, and the leaders of the SWP [Socialist Workers party] in the United States, an organization that is in sympathy with the 'United Secretariat' in which the LCR is represented, and that has taken a position in defense of freedom of expression for *República*."

"*Rouge* also does not bother to cite the name of Ernest Mandel, with whom it is familiar . . . and whose newspaper *La Gauche* has also denounced the seizure of *República*."

The same issue of *Informations Ouvrières* published Trotsky's article on "Freedom of the Press and the Working Class," for the first time in French, together with the introduction published in the June 9 issue of *Intercontinental Press*. □

Article by Trotsky Reprinted in 'Jornal do Caso República'

A crowd of 20,000 to 30,000 persons gathered in front of the Portuguese Socialist party headquarters July 15 on Lisbon's Rua de São Pedro de Alcântara to voice support for their leaders' decision to leave the government in protest against Stalinist-backed moves toward open military dictatorship.

The demonstration was a spirited one, with the crowd pressing for a break with the military government despite placating remarks by the SP leaders.

For the first time since the establishment of the new regime in April 1974, throngs of workers in the streets thus began to defy the self-appointed military saviors. They chanted: "The people are not with the Armed Forces Movement anymore!"

The Socialist party journalists who were expelled from the offices of the daily República by Stalinists and ultraleftists acting in collusion with the military have brought out a newspaper called Jornal do Caso República (Journal of the República Case).

One of the actions at the demonstration was selling copies of the latest issue (No. 10) of the new publication.

The same issue was sold at the SP rallies the following weekend. Sales were lively among the hundreds of thousands of persons who demonstrated throughout the country against the military dictatorship and its Stalinist supporters.

The headline on page 3 read: "An Article by Trotsky Republished in Defense of the 'República' Staff."

The article, "Freedom of the Press and the Working Class," was translated from Intercontinental Press by the staff of Jornal do Caso República. The editors provided an introductory note that begins with a quotation:

"In its affirmation of principles, and with but few changes in the details, the editorial [the article was written as an editorial for the Mexican Trotskyist magazine Clave] could have been written in response to the reactionary attack today on freedom of the press in Portugal. It is striking, although not accidental, that the initiative in closing down República was taken by the Portuguese Stalinists, most likely in connivance with leaders of the Armed Forces Movement, who would like to reestablish government control of the press."

"These were the words used by Intercontinental Press (June 9, 1975) . . . in introducing this article by Trotsky written [in

UM TEXTO DE TROTSKY REEDITADO EM DEFESA DA REDACÇÃO DE «REPÚBLICA»

Devido às suas posições de princípio e inoculando apenas alguns pormenores, este texto de Trotsky poderia ter sido escrito como resposta ao ataque reaccionário contra a liberdade de imprensa verificada em Portugal. O que é mais impressionante registar, mas não se deve ao acaso, é que a iniciativa de encerramento do «República» se deve aos estalinistas portugueses, muito positivamente de acordo com os dirigentes do M.F.A. que gostariam de restabelecer um controlo governamental sobre a imprensa.

Estas foram palavras utilizadas pela Intercontinental Press (No. 7-5) — boletim informativo editado pelo S. W.P. (Socialist Workers Party), organização trotskista norte-americana, simpaticamente do Secretariado Unificado da IV Internacional — a introduzir um texto escrito por Leon Trotsky, em 1936, acerca do problema da liberdade de imprensa. Os jornalistas do «República» não querem deixar de publicar esta importante alicha para a compreensão do significado contra-revolucionário do ataque ao nosso jornal. A posição assumida por esta corrente trotskista demonstra claramente que houve sectores da extrema-esquerda revolucionária que souberam entender a importância da luta pela liberdade de imprensa, no contrário do que se dá a entender nos meios de comunicação social portugueses que se publicam sob a tutela do ministro Correia Jesuino.

O artigo que a seguir se transcreve foi publicado pela primeira vez como editorial do jornal teórico mexicano «Claves», sob o título «La libertad de prensa y la clase obrera». Esta afirmação de princípios era feita em nome do conselho da redacção, com vista a definir claramente a posição do jornal quanto à liberdade de imprensa.

A Intercontinental Press sublinha que a diferença entre a situação portuguesa e a ofensiva desencadeada pelos estalinistas no México, em 1938, reside no facto de que o governo mexicano Cardenas não apreciava a intervenção de Moscovo nos assuntos internos mexicanos (o que explica o falhanço da campanha de que fala o artigo de Trotsky). O burguês Cardenas era, neste caso, um democrata mais consequente do que os dirigentes do M.F.A. que proclamam em alto e bom som os seus objectivos socialistas. Finalmente, informa o jornal trotskista que «Vicente Lombardo Toledano, adepto da colaboração de classes, dirigente da Confederación de Trabajadores de México e editor do jornal da confederação «El Popular», era um companheiro de route dos estalinistas que tomou parte activa nas manobras para fomentar uma atmosfera de caça às bruxas, facilitando os planos da policia secreta de Estalin para o assassinato de Trotsky».

O ARTIGO DE TROTSKY: A CLASSE OPERARIA E A LIBERDADE DE IMPRENSA

Está a decorrer, no México, uma campanha contra a imprensa reaccionária. Esta ataque é orquestrado pelos dirigentes da CMT, mas exactamente por Lombardo Toledano em pessoa. O objectivo desta campanha é «inutilizar» a imprensa reaccionária, submetendo-a a uma censura democratica ou proibindo-a totalmente. Os sindicatos foram postos em pé de guerra. Os democraticos incuráveis, corrompidos pelos seus contactos com Moscovo estalinizada e empurrados pelos seus senhores de GPU (policia secreta sovietica), lançaram esta campanha, que se impõe considerar como suicida. De facto, não é difícil prever que, mesmo se esta campanha triunfar e chegar a resultados praticos a gosto de Lombardo Toledano, as ultimas consequencias recairão, antes de mais, sobre a classe operaria.

A teoria, como a experiencia historica, provam-no: toda a ditadura da democracia, assim sociedade burguesa, é, em ultima analise, inevitavelmente dirigida contra o

proletariado, exactamente como cada imposto instituido recua sobre os ombros da classe operaria. A democracia burguesa só é útil ao proletariado na medida em que abre caminho ao desenvolvimento da luta de classes. Consequentemente, todo o dirigente operario que dá ao Estado burguês meios especiais para controlar a opiniao publica em geral e a imprensa em particular, é muito exactamente um traidor. Em ultima analise, a encerramento da luta de classes levará todas as camadas da burguesia a realizarem um compromisso entre elas: adoptar, então, leis de excepção, toda a especie de medidas restritivas e toda a especie de censuras democraticas contra a classe operaria. Quem não tiver compreendido ainda isto, deveria abandonar as fileiras da classe operaria.

«Mas às vezes — objectar-não-ão certos amigos da URSS — a ditadura do proletariado é obrigada a recorrer a medidas de excepção, em particular contra a imprensa reaccionária.

Nos respondemos: «Esta objecção prende-se a uma tentativa de identificação do Estado operario ao Estado burguês. Ainda que o México seja um país semi-colonial, é também um Estado burguês e de maneira nenhuma um Estado operario. De resto, mesmo do ponto de vista dos interesses da ditadura do proletariado, prohibir ou censurar os jornais burgueses não constitui, de modo nenhum, um «programa» ou um «princípio» ou a situação ideal. Tais medidas não podem ser senão um mal temporario inevitavel.

Uma vez no poder, o proletariado não pode ter forçado a tomar, por um certo tempo, medidas de excepção contra a burguesia, se a burguesia se recusa abertamente, contra o Estado operario. Nesse caso, restringir a liberdade de imprensa constituirá um dos meios utilizados para ganhar uma guerra civil. Naturalmente, quando se é obrigado a utilizar artificio e avies contra o inimigo, não se pode permitir a esse mesmo inimigo que mantenha os seus próprios centros de decisao e propaganda no seio do campo armado do proletariado. Isto não invalida que, também neste caso, se estas medidas de excepção forem mantidas a ponto de se transformarem numa característica permanente, não tragam em si próprias o perigo de se tornarem incontroláveis e de darem à burocracia operaria um monopólio politico que seria uma das fontes da sua degenerescência.

Temos, diante dos olhos, um exemplo vivo de uma tal dinâmica: a vergonhosa supressão da liberdade de palavra e de imprensa que é, actualmente, a regra em vigor na União Soviética. Isto nada tem a ver com os interesses da ditadura do proletariado. Pelo contrário, trata-se da protecção dos interesses de nova casta dirigente contra a oposição operaria e camponesa. Esta burocracia bonapartista de Moscovo está a ser inutilizada, presentemente, pelos seus. Lombardo Toledano e C. a., que identificam as suas carreiras pessoais com os interesses do socialismo.

As tarifas reais do Estado operario não são a imposição da moedada politica à opiniao publica, mas sim, e muito mais, liberdade do jogo do capital. Isto só é realizado quando se remetem os meios de produção, incluindo a produção da informacao publica, para as mãos de toda a sociedade. Uma vez efectuada esta medida socialista fundamental, todas as correntes de opiniao publica que se desenvolvem em consequencia da ditadura do proletariado devem ter a liberdade de exprimir-se livremente. É dever do Estado operario pôr à disposição de todos, em funcao da sua importancia numerica, os meios técnicos de que têm necessidade, tais como as tipografias, o papel, os transportes.

Uma das causas principais da degenerescência do aparelho do Estado é o controlo da imprensa pela burocracia estalinista, que ameaça conduzir à ruina total todas as conquistas da revolução de Outubro.

Se fosse necessario procurar exemplos da influencia nefasta

do Komintern sobre o movimento operario nos diversos países, a actual campanha de Lombardo Toledano oferece-nos-la em dos exemplos mais estranhos. Toledano e os seus discipulos doutrinaristas tentam, fundamentalmente, introduzir, num sistema democratico burguês, os meios e os métodos limitados no tempo, revalidados inevitavelmente sob a ditadura do proletariado. E o que é mais, eles não «lo» realmente buscar esses métodos à ditadura do proletariado mas, antes, aos seus modelos bonapartista. Por outras palavras, eles inoculam, a uma democracia burguesa já existente, o virus dumha burocracia estalinista em declinio.

A democracia anémica do México enfrenta, permanentemente, uma ameaça mortal que vem de duas direcções: por um lado, a do imperialismo estrangeiro; por outro, a dos agentes reaccionarios no interior do país, que controlam as publicações de maior tingimento. Mas só os cegos e os fraços de espirito podem imaginar que praticar a imprensa reaccionaria permitira que os trabalhadores e os camponeses se libertassem da influencia das aldeias reaccionarias. Na realidade, só a maior liberdade de palavra, de imprensa e de organizacao pode criar as condições favoráveis ao desenvolvimento do movimento revolucionario da classe operaria.

É necessario combater sem tréguas a imprensa reaccionaria. Mas os trabalhadores não podem deixar que a repressao do Estado burguês se substitua à luta que eles devem travar através das suas proprias organizações e de sua própria imprensa. Hoje, o Estado pode parecer «bem» disposto em relação às organizações operarias; amanhã, o governo pode cair, cair inevitavelmente nas mãos dos demagogos mais reaccionarios da burguesia. Nesse caso, todas as leis restritivas existentes seriam

utilizadas contra os trabalhadores. Só avestruarros que apenas pensam no momento presente, podem permanecer cegos a este perigo.

O meio mais eficaz de combater a imprensa burguesa é desenvolver a imprensa operaria. É claro que jornais semanarios do género «El Popular» não incapazes de realizar uma tal tarefa. Foihas desse genero não têm lugar na imprensa operaria, na imprensa revolucionaria e, até, na imprensa considerada democratica. «El Popular» serve as ambições pessoais do sr. Lombardo Toledano que, por sua vez, terre a burocracia estalinista. Os seus métodos — colonias, mentiras, caça às bruxas, falsificações — são também os métodos de Toledano. O seu jornal não tem nem programa, nem ideal. É incontestavel que um jornal não poderá encontrar um verdadeiro eco na classe operaria, sem afiançar o proletariado dos jornais burgueses.

Chegamos assim à conclusão inevitavel de que o combate contra a burguesia começa pela rejecção dos «elementos» corrompidos das organizações da classe operaria, em particular libertando a imprensa operaria da tutela de Lombardo Toledano e de outros arrivistas burgueses. O proletariado mexicano precisa de um jornal honesto que exprima as suas aspirações, defenda os seus interesses, alargue os seus horizontes e abra os olhos à via da revolução socialista. E é que o «Claves» se propõe fazer.

Por isso, conhecemos por decisão uma guerra sem tréguas às manobras perversas bonapartista de Toledano. E estamos convencidos de que seremos acompanhados, neste combate, por todos os trabalhadores de vanguarda, os marinistas e os democraticos autenticos.

Leon Trotsky  
21 de Agosto de 1936

**AS DISTRAÇÕES DO ÁRBITRO**

Segundo o já famosa Comissão de Trabalhadores de «República», o jornal «Lotta Continua» (extremamente «aguarda» italiana) trocou-se o primeiro número da edição-pirata da «República» de 10 do corrente.

Como é do domínio público, o ministro Jesuino classificou a publicação do «Jornal do Caso República» no «Quotidien de Paris» de criminosas.

O silêncio do ministro Jesuino relativamente a publicação da «República-pirata em Itália, mostra de que lado ele está.

Poder-se-ia pensar que o ministro Jesuino, perito em Leibnitz e Marcus, estaria — comunicante e social — do lado da verdade ou, pelo menos, «árbitro do gosto». Mas não. Ele só se mete no jogo das vezes e não dá mostras de conhecer os regras. Quanto o remora, nem sombro; que em invocando o Revolucionar aos almas inoculados.

Issue of "Jornal do Caso República" containing Trotsky's article "Freedom of the Press and the Working Class" was sold at SP rallies of hundreds of thousands beginning July 15.

Mexico] in 1938." The introductory note by *Jornal do Caso República* went on to say that the publication of this article by a revolutionary Marxist magazine such as *Intercontinental Press* showed that "some sectors of the revolutionary far left understand the importance of the struggle for freedom of the press, contrary to what the Portuguese mass-circulation papers, published under the tutelage of Minister Correia Jesuino, would have us believe." □

### How PST Proposes to Meet Crisis in Argentina

The July 19 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party), featured a statement by the editorial board on the current crisis in Argentina and what should be done about it.

The statement considers the intervention of the leadership of Argentina's three million-member Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT—General Confederation of Labor) in the political field to be an important step forward. However, the PST insists, the CGT leaders should discuss their policies with the rank and file and not with the bourgeoisie behind closed doors as is their custom.

Other forces are also proposing solutions to the crisis. The Communist party calls for a "democratic coalition cabinet," which would include the current president, Isabel Martínez de Perón; the armed forces; the leader of the main bourgeois opposition party, Ricardo Balbín; the CGE (Confederación General Económica—General Confederation of Commerce, the national employers association); and the trade-union leaders.

The Authentic party, a left-wing split from the official Peronist party, calls for President Perón's resignation and new presidential elections.

The PST rejects both of these proposals—the first because things would remain as they are now, with the masses tied down by decisions made by higher-ups; the second because there would be no time for the workers to develop their own electoral apparatus. Thus the proposal for elections could help open the way for some sector of the armed forces to set up a new military dictatorship or it could signify nothing more than an electoral maneuver by a sector of the bourgeoisie to maintain power.

Instead, the PST calls on the government to resign, and on the legislature to name a new, provisional president, perhaps a representative of the CGT. The PST insists on the government resigning because it is responsible for the crisis affecting the country.

"In all honesty we believe that these twenty years [since Perón fell in 1955], and especially the last two years during which the Peronist leadership ruled directly, have been tragic for the country and the workers . . .," states the declaration.

"The Justicialist government is the government of the Rodrigo Plan, the state of siege, and impunity for the AAA [Argentine

Anticommunist Alliance, a right-wing terrorist group—IP]

What is needed to work out a correct solution to the crisis is, among other things, a forum for the free interchange of ideas among all sectors of the society, culminating in decisions as to what course to take. In furtherance of this objective, the PST calls for a constituent assembly.

The legislature must use the authority vested in it to convoke such an assembly. However, the PST makes it clear that only through the mobilization of the workers and other oppressed layers can the legislature be forced to implement such a step.

Furthermore, the masses must press the CGT and the political parties to carry out some minimal immediate measures until the constituent assembly can be organized and reach decisions on the main questions. First, they must convoke the assembly. Second, they must temporarily take over the government. Third, they must take interim measures to freeze prices, institute a sliding scale of wages to compensate for inflation, free all political prisoners, immediately disband the AAA, legalize all political parties, suspend all state payments on debts and all loan negotiations with the imperialists, grant unrestricted access to the mass media for all working-class and political forces, and carry out democratic elections for the members of the constituent assembly.

The PST views the proposed constituent assembly as the place where the question of establishing a workers and popular government can be debated and the masses won to the need for the socialist reorganization of Argentine society.

The final section of the PST's declaration bears the subtitle: "We must build a socialist workers party that wants to fight for a workers and popular government."

It reads as follows:

"The last twenty years taught us one fact: In order to defend our standard of living we have had to confront *all sectors of the bourgeoisie, the oligarchy, and the imperialists, who alternated in governing the country.*

"Gorillas, sectors favoring industrial development, Radicals, military men of various stripes, and Justicialists ruled here. We had to confront all of them with strikes, struggles, and mobilizations. In all cases the trade-union leaders—who slowed down, disorganized, and negotiated, or directly called for confidence in the governments—in the end had to pledge themselves to the struggle, using their own methods.

"This is a truth that has been drilled into our working class. It has confronted and will confront all bourgeois variants.

"Our party believes that the decisive hour has arrived when this truth will be crystallized in the form of a mass political party of the workers. It is impossible for us to spend our lives politically supporting the same bourgeois, oligarchical, and imperialist forces that we fight, almost without respite, in the trade-union arena. It is impossible for us to vote for, support, and trust our exploiters politically; for us to expect political solutions from those we confront as enemies every day.

"The CGT has been and continues to be in some small measure the incarnation of that drama of our working class. It has been and continues to be our top trade-union organization. Thanks to it we were able to defeat our exploiters on the trade-union level. All of them—Aramburu, Frondizi, Illia, Onganía, Levingston, Lanusse, and the present Justicialist government—either underwent tremendous struggles and strikes, or fell, directly toppled by these actions.

"But it is that very CGT, or rather, its leaders, who invariably ended up negotiating in the successive crises and who agreed to turn over power and to politically support new sectors of the bourgeoisie.

"It is only fair that we recognize too that it was not just the Peronist trade-union leaders who did this; the Communist party and the various ultraleft groups did the same. They fought one another, at times even with guns, but they ended up supporting some bourgeois variant.

"Our history is the same as that of many armies of antiquity, which ended up losing at the political negotiating table what they had won on the battlefield.

"This tragic experience can be repeated again. It is true that the trade-union leadership has broken out of the straitjacket of 'verticalism' [the hierarchical system of command, which historically characterized Peronism—IP]. It is true that it is slipping into acting like a real political party. It is true that for the first time the CGT leadership wants to impose its own political solutions. All this strikes us as something very good. But it is also true that the political solution they want to impose is a new variant of arrangements with the bourgeoisie and the imperialists. It is not the demand for a workers government. Instead it is an agreement for greater participation in a power, in a government shared with the armed forces and the various wings of the bourgeoisie, oligarchy, and imperialists who always were, are, and will be our out-and-out enemies. It is what is called a 'popular front.'

"They are moving toward such a scheme, in agreement with the Communist party and perhaps other tendencies who are up to

their ears shouting against the union bureaucracy but who have exactly the same political objectives. The proof that that is what they are moving toward is that all the negotiations are secret, that the ranks do not know anything about what is being cooked up in the top circles. The workers movement, made up of millions of persons, will never take power 'secretly.' It will do so as the result of a conscious decision to get going and mobilize its ranks. That is its unique and unbeatable power.

"Our party thinks that the hour has finally arrived in which we will be able to construct a mass workers party built on the consciousness that we can no longer support any sector of the bourgeoisie in the government, that we must stop being losers in the political arena and become winners as we are in the trade-union arena. We will construct a socialist workers party of the great masses, capable of directing the mobilizations and strikes toward the conquest of a workers and popular government.

"We are constructing such a party and we invite all compañeros to join. Such a party will be built by immediately providing a politically correct approach to the current crisis. Such an approach is none other than the call to fight for the resignation of the entire executive branch; for the election of a deputy, senator, or governor of trade-union extraction to serve as provisional president; and finally, for the calling of a constituent assembly to democratically discuss the total reorganization of the crisis-ridden republic.

*"For the resignation of the entire executive branch!*

*"For an interim executive who would be a deputy, senator, or governor from the trade-union bloc!*

*"For a constituent assembly to democratically discuss the total reorganization of the republic!*

*"For a workers and popular government to build a socialist Argentina!"* □

### U.S. Merchants of Death Step Up Sales in Mideast

One sector of U.S. capitalism that is still doing a booming business despite the depression is the arms industry. For the fiscal year that ended June 30, contracts abroad for U.S. military hardware totaled more than \$9 billion, up from an estimated \$8.2 billion the previous year.

The most lucrative market was the Mideast. Sales to states in the Arab-Persian Gulf area totaled \$4 billion in fiscal year 1974, but increased to at least \$4.4 billion in 1975. Best customers were Iran, with purchases of \$2.4 billion, and Saudi Arabia, with \$1.4 billion.

August 4, 1975

## 'Very Disappointed' at Life in U.S.

### Vietnamese Refugees Demonstrate to Go Home



John Partipilo/Arkansas Gazette

Vietnamese refugees in Arkansas demand right to go home: "This is like a prison."

Some Vietnamese refugees have discovered that life in the Land of the Big PX isn't all it was cracked up to be and have demanded a ticket home. Many who are awaiting repatriation in the refugee camps are getting very impatient at Washington's stalling.

"We want to leave as soon as possible," one refugee said. "We are depressed, and this is like a prison . . . a big open jail."

The Pentagon had no second thoughts when it whisked thousands of Vietnamese out of their country in a hasty retreat—often snatching up in its net people who had no wish to flee, along with children who had little say in the matter.

Now, however, when thousands want to return, the red tape miraculously appears. Refugees have to undergo a grilling, fill out the answers to twenty-nine questions, and wait on Washington's good graces.

A group of 164 refugees at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, staged a demonstration in an attempt to speed up their return. Washington responded by flying them at least part of the way, to Camp Pendleton in California.

"We wait a long, long time already, almost two months," said Le Minh Tan, a former Saigon fire inspector who was elected leader of the group.

"I am not a troublemaker," he said, "but we want to go back as soon as possible. If for any reason they try to keep us in the United States, we might have a demonstration after this month."

Tan said he fled because the Thieu regime said anyone who had worked with the Americans would be killed. Later, he said, he learned that "the P.R.G. didn't kill anybody."

According to the United Nations official who is handling the repatriation at Camp Pendleton, the two main reasons given by the refugees who want to go back "are the wish to return to rejoin their families and the wish to return to participate in the reconstruction of their homeland."

On July 3, Washington began flying refugees from the United States back to Guam. Refugees there have also demonstrated against delays in sending them home. Washington attempted to imply that the new regime in South Vietnam was responsible for holding up the repatriation process. But according to a UN spokesman, Saigon is willing to accept all refugees who want to return, and in fact initiated the request for UN help.

Nearly 2,000 Vietnamese and 700 Cambodians have made requests to the UN to return home. Among these, said a UN spokesman, were about "60-odd" requests from persons not in the camps, including refugees who had already been resettled with sponsors.

One refugee said he knew about fifty persons who have received letters from friends who had gone out into various parts of the country under sponsorship, and that many had written that they were "very disappointed." □

## Armed Clashes Continue in Angola

By Ernest Harsch

The continuing armed clashes between two of the Angolan nationalist organizations, the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA—Angolan National Liberation Front) and the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), are verging toward civil war. The military junta in Lisbon is considering sending in more troops in hope of "pacifying" Portugal's last—and wealthiest—African colony.

At a news conference in Rome July 19, Portuguese Foreign Minister Maj. Ernesto Melo Antunes threatened to take military action against the FNLA. The July 21 issue of the Lisbon daily *O Século* said: "Minister Melo Antunes asserted that in order to prevent a massacre of the civilian population, the Portuguese government has decided to block the military reconquest of Luanda by the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola." The FNLA's headquarters in Luanda were destroyed and most of its troops pushed out of the city by the MPLA the week before.

The July 22 Lisbon *Diário de Notícias*, in a dispatch from Luanda, said that "a Portuguese military spokesman declared in this city yesterday that troops belonging to one of the African nationalist movements involved in the fighting in the Angolan capital had begun to infiltrate along the coast yesterday in the direction of Luanda.

"However, he added that Portuguese forces would intervene to intercept these troops, belonging to the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (F.N.L.A.), and prevent them from entering the city."

Whether the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA—Armed Forces Movement) will actually carry out its threat remains to be seen. *New York Times* correspondent Charles Mohr reported in a July 26 dispatch from Luanda that the decision to halt an FNLA advance had been rescinded "to avert a bloodbath."

However, *Washington Post* reporter Miguel Acoca said in a dispatch filed from Lisbon the same day that the newly formed Portuguese military triumvirate had ordered its army in Angola to fight the FNLA. He reported that the decision had been discussed by the MFA assembly July 25. He quoted military sources in Lisbon as saying that Portuguese troops now in Angola would fight the FNLA "because their morale is good and we just can't let the Front violate cease-fire agreements and



MELO ANTUNES: Weighing chances of "postponing" independence for Angola?

take advantage of our desire to free the colony."

The FNLA has vowed to regain its positions in the capital, stating that "the battle for Luanda is not over." Luanda Radio reported a statement of the Political Bureau of the FNLA affirming: "If Portugal continues to obstruct the FNLA's advance, the FNLA will respond with force."

On July 20, the day after Major Antunes made his declaration, the FNLA announced that "the Lisbon government has declared war on the FNLA." The FNLA called for "a general offensive against the Portuguese neocolonialists and the agents of social-imperialism." The latter term is apparently a reference to the MPLA, which gets political and material support from the Soviet Union and East European governments. The FNLA, which gets some aid from Peking, occasionally uses Maoist terminology.

N'gola Kabangu, the FNLA minister of the interior and an acting co-premier in the coalition regime, repeated the FNLA appeal when he called on the Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola (ENLA, the FNLA military wing) and the Brigades da Juventude Revolucionária (BJR—Revolutionary Youth Brigades) to mobilize against "Portuguese neocolonialism."

Holden Roberto, the principal leader of the FNLA, said in a July 25 radio broadcast

that he was declaring war on the MPLA "as an organ of Soviet imperialism."

Speaking in Kinshasa, the capital of neighboring Zaïre, July 15, FNLA leader Johnny Eduardo invited the third Angolan nationalist group, the União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), to join forces with the FNLA. So far, the UNITA, which reportedly is not as well armed as the two other groups, has attempted to stay out of the factional warfare. In fact, the UNITA began to evacuate 5,000 of its troops from Luanda to southern Angola July 20.

Despite the many cease-fire agreements reached by the MPLA and FNLA, the fratricidal war continues. Fighting has been reported in the cities of Henrique de Carvalho, Vila Luso, Dalatando, Dondo, Lucala, and Malange.

Although most of the FNLA forces have been pushed out of Luanda for the time being, the FNLA still has troops in the Cazenga slum area and in the São Pedro da Barra fort overlooking Luanda harbor. Moreover, the FNLA controls the industrial area north of Luanda, from which the capital gets its electricity and water. Portuguese officials claim that Luanda would be vulnerable to an FNLA offensive. The FNLA reportedly captured Caxito, just thirty-five miles northeast of Luanda, July 24.

The Portuguese high commissioner in Angola, Gen. Silva Cardoso, announced July 21 that a Portuguese air force plane had been shot at and one crew member killed. Although the announcement did not say where the incident took place or who fired the shots, Cardoso declared that the air force would retaliate if attacked.

A correspondent of the Stalinist-controlled *Diário de Lisboa*, which supports the MPLA, claimed that the FNLA had fired on the plane. The same reporter said that FNLA troops had opened fire on a Portuguese escort ship on the Dande River north of Luanda.

In its July 20 issue *Pravda*, the newspaper of the Soviet Communist party, added a new twist to such reports, stating that it was "notable that the armed detachments of the FNLA are trained by Chinese instructors sent by Peking. From China come also the supplies of arms, with which Angola's patriots are killed."

In the July 15 issue of the Stalinist-controlled Lisbon daily *O Século*, columnist U. Tavares Rodrigues said: "It is known—and we were frozen with horror—that in the FNLA bases now occupied by MPLA troops, there were found refrigerators containing hearts, livers, and other human remains, as well as bottles full of blood and ditches full of mutilated corpses. This means there are cannibals among the ranks of the FNLA."



The Stalinist and ultraleft supporters of the MFA justify their support to the continued occupation of Angola by Portuguese troops on grounds of the "reactionary" and "neocolonialist" danger allegedly represented by the FNLA and the UNITA. They claim that the Lisbon authorities have the responsibility of ensuring that the "progressive" MPLA emerges victorious from the factional struggle.

This line helps provide a left cover for Portuguese imperialism, which is reluctant to end its intervention against the Angolan independence struggle. It fits in with the propaganda about "protecting" Portuguese settlers and refugees and ensuring a "peaceful transition to independence."

The MFA has also threatened to call on United Nations "peace keeping" forces to intervene in the colony, although both the MPLA and FNLA have opposed such a move.

Some of the African capitalist leaders have offered to aid the MFA's efforts to control the Angolan conflict. At the Organization of African Unity ministerial conference, which opened in Kampala, Uganda, July 18, the president of Uganda, Gen. Idi Amin, proposed that the OAU send an African military force to Angola to maintain "peace" and oversee the elections tentatively scheduled for November. This suggestion was seconded by William Eteki, the secretary-general of the OAU. The FNLA delegate at the Kampala meeting rejected the proposal.

The intervention of Portuguese or UN troops would aim at safeguarding the imperialist economic interests in Angola and prepare the ground for an even greater exploitation of the country's vast natural resources. However, the interests of the African capitalist states in Angola are essentially political; a civil war could disrupt the entire region. An OAU force in Angola would undoubtedly attempt to channel the independence struggle toward a "safe" neocolonial outcome.

In addition, some MFA leaders indicated weeks ago that they might try to "renegotiate" the accords that set up the coalition regime and promised Angola's formal independence in November. They have said that the factional clashes between the MPLA and FNLA proved that Angolans were "not ready" to govern themselves. *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Geoffrey Godsell noted in the July 21 issue that such suggestions are still being made.

He reported that "a senior Portuguese official in Luanda, the Angolan capital, told the Associated Press Saturday [July 19] that if the opposing factions do not come to terms, Portugal may have to postpone granting the territory independence on Nov. 11." □

## Chile Under the Junta—An Eyewitness Report

### Pinochet's Campaign to Crush the MIR

By Jean-Pierre Beauvais

[The following article, the last in a series of four, appeared in the June 6 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly, *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

"The Resistance Will Win! MIR"

This hastily painted slogan ran along an entire wall in the working-class quarter of San Miguel. In the early hours of the morning a squad of soldiers, under the jeering stares of numerous passersby, is already hard at work whitewashing the "seditious" inscription.

Undoubtedly painted the previous night, just before the curfew, it remained for barely a few hours. The officers seem to fear this sort of wall painting. Not only do they rush to cover them up immediately, but the orders to the patrols are strict: Shoot without warning any person caught in the act of painting slogans.

Moreover, woe to those who live opposite a wall carrying such an inscription. They are considered jointly responsible, because they did not see nor denounce the perpetrators of the crime. They risk a prison sentence or worse.

This is one form, among many others, the Chilean junta's deliberate policy of terror takes. One aspect of this policy is to whip up an incredible hysteria against the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left].

Listening to the radio, reading the gutter newspapers, or watching television is enough to become convinced that the MIR is responsible for a thousand and one heinous crimes everywhere.

A woman is raped in an isolated district: it was the MIRistas who did it. Some drug traffickers are arrested: again they are MIRistas. A robbery is committed: inevitably it is the hand of the MIR that is behind it.

To believe the junta, the MIR is everywhere, behind all the shady deals and foul crimes from the north of the country to the south.

Such a systematic campaign has a dual purpose. The aim is first to discredit the organization by attributing to it everything that smacks of gangsterism or common delinquency; and second, to justify the continuation of the repression by playing up the strength, the omnipresence, of the MIR.

The effects of this campaign are not always the ones the junta planned. No Chilean worker can seriously believe that



PINOCHET: Made in USA.

the MIR, whose positions under the Unidad Popular were known to all, has changed from a revolutionary organization into a gang of delinquents. And many, looking for the faintest glimmer of hope, draw the naïve conclusion that such a campaign reflects a considerable strength on the part of the organization, whose prestige—already large before—is still growing.

The reality is much more complex.

"This defeat is not that of the working class, nor is it ours. It is the defeat of the reformist organizations and their strategy. . . . We are now facing the historic responsibility of creating the conditions for a successful mobilization of the workers to overthrow the dictatorship, for the socialist revolution. Having gone through the experiences they have, the Chilean masses will never again allow themselves to be dragged into such a dead end. . . ."

It was a comrade of the MIR Central Committee who told us that, a few weeks after the coup in mid-October 1973. His remarks accurately reflected the thinking and state of morale of the militants in the organization. They were surprised at the nature of the coup and the breadth of the repression, but were optimistic even when faced with the new responsibilities and the tasks these involved.

In the first weeks of the dictatorship, the

organization proved its cohesiveness and solidarity. There were no desertions and the disorganization was in the end limited. Many of the leadership's analyses were—unfortunately—confirmed, and they responded with great political maturity to the new situation. This included their opposition to all ultraleft temptations to counterattack or to initiate actions that were isolated from the organization and its apparatus.

Eighteen months have passed during which hundreds of militants have fallen. At the cost of considerable effort, it was necessary to fill in the gaps, to rebuild as quickly as possible what was undone, and to stubbornly reconstruct what was destroyed. Few organizations in the history of the world revolutionary movement have undergone repression as severe as the drive against the MIR. It was the prime target of the Chilean military's effort to destroy all forms of workers organization and the even stronger campaign to wipe out all revolutionary tendencies. Even fewer organizations have survived under such circumstances.

The MIR has survived. The slogans on the walls, like the tiny stickers overlooked here and there in public places, are testimony. Further proof is provided by those militants who for several months have been rebuilding the activity of the organization in one of the principal slums of Santiago, setting up several cells of sympathizers there. It has also won over a nucleus of worker militants, members of the Commu-

nist party under the UP and recruited since the coup.

Numerically small—in comparison with what it was at the time of the coup—the MIR is still not in a position to capitalize on the increased prestige it has won. The conditions of political activity in Chile today force most militants to spend the greatest part of their time in preserving the organization under conditions of the utmost clandestinity. External activity is reduced accordingly.

The organization has been weakened politically as well as numerically. A large part of its best cadres, including the core of its leadership team, are dead or imprisoned. And this at a time when crucial political problems are being posed or will inevitably be posed.

The orientation worked out in the months following the coup have not appreciably varied. The context in which they were elaborated is no longer exactly the same, however. The hopes for a relatively rapid realignment of forces in the workers movement, for which the MIR wanted to be an important pole of attraction, have not been fulfilled. What is more serious, the historic defeat of reformism in Chile has not led to what the MIR predicted, somewhat mechanically: new relationships of forces within the workers movement.

Moreover, the Communist party has broken the occasional ties with the revolutionary left that were established in the wake of the coup. Undoubtedly it decided that this conflicted with its strategy of

seeking to establish a front with the Christian Democracy.

In these conditions, and leaving aside the ambiguities in the situation that we have mentioned several times, the unity proposals made by the MIR to the whole of the Chilean left have hardly any chance of being put into practice, even partially. The political front of the resistance to regroup the parties of the UP, the "left" sectors of the Christian Democracy, and the MIR that was proposed more than a year ago by Miguel Enríquez is more unworkable than ever. The fact that in a process of realignment the entire Christian Democracy has become part of the opposition clears the path for reintegrating those "left" sectors into the bourgeois opposition. At the same time, it reinforces the credibility of the CP's orientation.

Efforts to set in motion the rank-and-file resistance and united mobilizations the MIR proposed along with the political front were limited both by the reality of the objective situation and by the relationship of forces inside the workers movement. Where they exist, the resistance committees are structures more suitable for mobilizing the periphery of the revolutionary left than for providing the basis for organizations of a broader, united character.

The political isolation resulting from the influence and tactics of the reformists poses with greater sharpness than ever the problem of a revolutionary front. Because the MIR dominates the far left, it is the only organization that can serve as the axis, the backbone, of such a front. But at the same time, precisely because it is such a dominant force, it plays down the need for a revolutionary front. Numerically, the forces that such a front would embrace would not be—at the beginning—qualitatively different from those of the MIR itself.

Politically, on the other hand, the impact of such a front would be very different on confused sectors; on waverers in the left of the Socialist party; on those who, although isolated, continue to make demands in the critical style of the MAPU [Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria—Movement for United People's Action]; and on a number of Communist party militants.

This is what our comrades in the Liga Comunista de Chile [Communist League of Chile] are pressing for in the resolutions of their second congress—held a few weeks ago in Chile—which we will give an account of in a future article. The remarkable activity of this small nucleus of Trotskyist militants, their progress over these past months, just like the heroic and difficult resistance of the MIR, is not without significance in Santiago as the month of April draws to an end.

Defeat and repression, betrayals and maneuvers, have not been able to snuff out the flame of revolution in Chile. □

## Special Offer



Larissa Daniel, anti-Stalinist dissident.

To help celebrate the tenth anniversary of *Intercontinental Press*, reproductions of sketches by Copain, artist for *Intercontinental Press*, were published by the New York Local of the Socialist Workers party and bound in an 8.5" x 11" book. The aim was to use the money gained from sales to help us begin publishing articles in Spanish.

The drawings, of various sizes, include portraits of Hugo Blanco, Malcolm X, James P. Cannon, Che Guevara, Cesar Chavez, Leon Trotsky, and many more, some of which are suitable for framing.

A limited number of copies of this collection of drawings are now available for only \$5.

Intercontinental Press P. O. Box 116, Village Station New York, NY 10014

# Capitalism Fouls Things Up.

## West Germans Say, 'No' to Nuclear Power Plants

"Death Rays From Atomic Power Stations?" was the cover title on the July 21 issue of the German weekly *Der Spiegel*. The magazine devoted eleven pages to the dangers of nuclear power plants and the mass resistance to them that has developed in a number of European countries.

Ten plants have already been built in West Germany and forty more are scheduled for construction by 1985. In addition, on June 27 the West German government concluded one of the biggest nuclear deals in history. Germany is to provide Brazil with nuclear power equipment and technology worth between \$4 billion and \$8 billion.

A set of pamphlets on "the peaceful use of atomic energy" put out by the West German government in June claims that "the technology of peaceful use of nuclear energy" is now "definitely controllable."

However, in an article titled "A Fearful Undertaking," *Der Spiegel* details the grave dangers involved in the production of nuclear energy:

- No one knows whether the emergency

cooling system currently used by the more than 100 reactors around the world really works—it is to be tested for the first time in 1976.

- A breakdown of a reactor could release a mass of radiation comparable to that of 1,000 Hiroshima bombs. In Germany this could mean 100,000 immediate deaths followed by as many as 1.67 million slow deaths.

- Every increase in the radiation level caused by transportation and utilization of atomic material increases the incidence of cancer.

- Governments have still not come up with any method of safely disposing of the radioactive wastes created by the power stations.

Attention has been focused on these dangers by mass protests held in central and northern Europe. One of the longest and sharpest of these struggles has centered in the small German town of Wyhl on the Rhine River, where 20,000 French and German demonstrators stopped construction of a nuclear power plant last February by occupying the site.

Referring to the question of nuclear power, *Der Spiegel* says that "with no other issue so far has a popular initiative so cut across the political parties and generated such energy. For months now the site at Wyhl has been occupied. And from Kaiser-augst in Switzerland to Flamanville in Normandy, from the tip of Dannenberg near the East German border to Kalkar in the lower Rhine area, where German and Dutch farmers came together, the virus of resistance has gripped everyone."

In a referendum held in Wyhl (population 2,700), 55 percent of the villagers voted in favor of occupying the nuclear plant site. Protesters have vowed to continue the occupation until they receive written assurance that the construction will not take place.

The Wyhl residents have special reasons for opposing the building of the nuclear station. More than 50,000 tons of water a day would be used by the cooling system and the resulting evaporation would create clouds over the region. The many grape growers in the area fear that this would



reduce the amount of sun reaching their crops.

The occupation at Wyhl is supported by twenty-one "citizen initiative" groups and a score of political and other organizations. Scientific experts, student groups, farmers, housewives, and political figures have gone to Wyhl from around the country to lend their support. An "occupation newspaper" is published, and T-shirts are sold with the imprint "KKW-Nein" (Kernkraft Werke-Nein—Nuclear Power Stations-No).

*Der Spiegel's* correspondent Peter Brügge says that after what they have learned from scientists in the course of the occupation, the residents of Wyhl "feel more than ever that they are in the right to resist" construction of the plant. □

### Just Don't Breathe for a Day or So

Schoolchildren were ordered to stay indoors and factories were asked to cut their fuel consumption by 40 percent under an air-pollution warning issued July 15 by authorities in Tokyo.

In a smog alert issued to the eastern, central, and western areas of the city, the metropolitan government reported that oxidant concentrations in the air were six times their normal level.

The concentrations, which are a serious health hazard, reached 0.31 parts per million at noon in western Tokyo. The normal level is 0.05 parts per million, officials said.

### Suicide, Anyone?

Washington columnist Jack Anderson reported the following item July 7:

"The Food and Drug Administration has given its blessings to a plastic disposable bottle which, if burned in a hot campfire or bunsen burner, emits hydrogen cyanide. This is the deadly poison used in gas chambers. The FDA says the gas, caused by incineration, is not their concern. 'That's not what the bottles are intended for,' said an FDA spokesman. 'Our concern is if any plastic would get into the food.'"



Der Spiegel

Demonstrators in Wyhl. Banner with skull reads: "Today fish, tomorrow us."

## Unrest Continues to Mount in Ethiopia

By Ernest Harsch

According to recent reports, opposition to the policies of Ethiopia's nationalist military regime is mounting in both the cities and the countryside. In addition, the Eritrean rebels are continuing their struggle for independence.

In a series of three articles in the June 5-7 issues of *Le Monde*, Jean-Claude Guillebaud observed among other things: "The threat to the military from 'the left' is more significant [than from the right]. Students, teachers, unionists, and intellectuals in Addis Ababa are irritated by the regime's methods and its determined 'militarization,' although they approve of the Dergue's\* socialist program. Civilians already constitute an unorganized, but irreverently critical, opposition."

Although the military authorities have imposed censorship of the news media, at least three underground journals—*The Voice of the Masses*, *Democracy*, and *Revolution*—have appeared in Addis Ababa, the capital. The clandestine papers, Guillebaud reported, have called for a "return to civilian government, real freedom of the press, and the right of assembly and association." In particular, they have criticized the exercise of power by a group of soldiers "completely cut off from the masses."

The newspapers have also denounced the Provisional Military Administrative Council's "policy of force in Eritrea."

In the May Day parade, which was officially celebrated for the first time in Ethiopia's history this year, some participants opposed to the military regime carried signs reading, "Forward to a socialist republic!" According to a report in the June 8 *Washington Post* by David B. Ottaway, police at the May Day parade smashed signs calling for a "People's Government."

In addition to the official delegations in the march, there were contingents led by the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions. Women, who have been one of the most exploited sectors of Ethiopian society and who are beginning to organize on a countrywide level, also had contingents in the parade.

One indicator of the deep interest in

\*The Dergue is the armed forces coordinating committee that ousted Emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974. It reportedly functions as a directing body with the ruling Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC).

political ideas in Ethiopia has been the success of the country's first radical bookstore, which recently opened near the National University science campus in Addis Ababa. Guillebaud reported that in five weeks the store sold 95,000 copies of Marxist and Maoist literature.

The radical agrarian reform announced by the PMAC March 4 (see *Intercontinental Press*, April 14, p. 499) has had a profound impact in the countryside, where feudal social relations had remained virtually unchanged for centuries. The PMAC decree nationalized all rural land, promised the distribution of land to landless peasants, and canceled all debts and obligations by tenant farmers and sharecroppers.

However, the PMAC is attempting to keep the agrarian reform under its control and has stated that tenant farmers and landlords have an "equal" right to share land until the reform is put into effect. But in some areas, especially in the southern provinces, the peasants have already begun to seize land and crops, and are pressuring the regime toward a speedy implementation of the decree.

"Foreign observers in the southern districts of Gemu Gofa," Guillebaud said, "are stunned by an extraordinary phenomenon: The sharecroppers, for centuries subservient to the authority of the large landlords and the junior clergy, are drawing up 'petitions of grievance,' denouncing, in general, the arbitrariness of the governors, the slowness of imperial justice, the misery of the Ethiopian 'third estate' [the peasantry], and famine. Their example is spreading. At Awassa, farm workers are driving the old landlords away with pitchforks and are refusing to share with them (as decreed) the draft teams and the agricultural implements of the nationalized farms."

The land-reform decree provided for the setting up of peasant associations, composed of tenants, landless peasants, agricultural workers, and small farmers, to oversee the distribution of the land and organize farm cooperatives, called *chika shum*.

According to Ottaway, about 150 of these peasant associations have been set up in Egu, Arussi Province, south of Addis Ababa. The region is called "the breadbasket of Ethiopia."

Some of the peasants in the area are impatient with the pace of the land reform. "It seems many of the very small and landless peasants," Ottaway said, "want

the associations to begin redistributing the land now instead of waiting until after the fall harvest is in, as official policy dictates."

Both Ottaway and Guillebaud noted that there was some opposition among peasants to the idea of rapid collectivization of agriculture. After generations of working land that belonged to others, it is not unusual that poor peasants and agricultural workers want to farm their own plots of land and are distrustful of bureaucratically imposed collectivization.

As a way of getting the politically active student population out of the cities, the military regime closed universities for a year and sent at least 35,000 students to the countryside to participate in a work campaign, called *zemecha*, to explain the land reform, organize peasant associations, and reduce illiteracy. In some areas the students have sided with the peasants in conflicts with large landlords.

In Jimma, the capital of Kefa Province in southwestern Ethiopia, which is a fertile farming region, there have been reports of armed clashes. "The students have set up 'People's Tribunals,'" Ottaway reported, "stolen guns from policemen and thrown a few landlords and police into prison. . . ."

"The students charge that together the police and the big coffee growers—both mainly Amharas [the traditionally dominant ethnic group in Ethiopia]—are blocking the swift application of land reform."

Ottaway said that there was "hand-to-hand combat in the streets between the *Zemecha* and local high school students on the one hand and police and landlords on the other."

A PMAC delegation arrived in Jimma from Addis Ababa. "The delegation is apparently in a quandary," Ottaway said. "It wants land reform applied but it also wants law and order maintained. It tries to negotiate, but fails."

"The order goes out to crack down and at least 24 *Zemecha* students are killed, dozens imprisoned and many others flee back to the capital." Throughout Ethiopia, Ottaway estimated, several hundred students had been arrested.

In addition to the peasant and student unrest in the countryside, the PMAC has also had to contend with sporadic, uncoordinated revolts led by the remnants of Selassie's feudal hierarchy. Almost all these revolts have been minor and have posed no real threat to the regime.

Sultan Ali Mirah Hanfare, the ruler of the Afar (Danakil) tribespeople in the northeastern plains of Ethiopia, has opposed the application of the land reform measures to the area under his nominal control. According to Ottaway, the Afars claim all the land in the region. Although the Afars themselves are nomadic, they grow cotton, using agricultural laborers from the plateau areas in central Ethiopia to cultivate the land.

Under the decree, the land is to be redistributed to those who till it, in this case the farm workers. Ottaway reported that the PMAC initially agreed not to enforce the land reform in the Afar region for five years. But a June 4 United Press International dispatch reported that heavy fighting had broken out between Ethiopian troops and the sultan's forces.

The military regime's war against the Eritrean independence fighters has also continued.

"By all available accounts," Ottaway said in a May 13 dispatch from Addis Ababa, "the Eritrean war has become an extremely brutal and bloody affair with many hamlets and villages being burned or bombed out by the Ethiopian army seeking to rout the guerrillas and deprive them of local support." He noted that while most estimates put the number of casualties at 10,000, no outside observers actually know how many persons have been killed since the escalation of the fighting in January (all journalists are barred from Eritrea).

Osman Saleh Sabbe, a representative of the Eritrean Liberation Front-People's Liberation Forces, said April 30 that there were 350,000 refugees in the mountains of Eritrea. He called on Addis Ababa to allow Red Cross observers to inspect their living conditions.

The fighting appears to have died down for the time being. According to both Guillebaud and Ottaway, the government forces have regained control of the major cities (Asmara, Keren, Massawa), but have abandoned virtually all of the countryside to the rebels.

"By and large," Guillebaud said, "the situation today is similar to that of 1973. . . ."


"Yet the guerrilla actions continue, especially in the regions of Omhajer [near the Sudanese border] and Adi Caieh [southeast of Asmara], where fighting takes place almost every day. Fifteen Ethiopian troops die each week, and there is a danger of the war dragging on indefinitely. Moreover, the latest crackdown in February has touched off a massive flight of young people toward the guerrillas, whose strength has grown to 10,000 combatants, compared to 20,000 Ethiopian soldiers in the region."

A representative of the Eritrean Liberation Front said in Damascus June 25 that Eritrean forces had surrounded a unit of 2,500 government troops near Asmara since the beginning of June. He also said that Addis Ababa had threatened to wipe out the Asmara population if the siege was not lifted.

Sudanese President Maj. Gen. Gaafar al-Nimeiry announced May 27 that Addis Ababa and the Eritrean rebels had agreed to his "peace" plan, which called for an immediate cease-fire, amnesty for Eritrean rebels, and the opening of negotiations with

no prior conditions. But so far no moves toward negotiation have materialized.

The PMAC is still receiving arms shipments from Washington. In March, the



Christian Science Monitor

Pentagon agreed to supply \$7 million worth of ammunition, although the PMAC had requested a \$30 million emergency arms airlift, in addition to other long-range military aid. The PMAC, however, is apparently receiving more than has been publicly announced.

"... American material now being sent to Ethiopia," Guillebaud reported, "is said to be worth much more than the \$7 million officially announced by a State Department spokesman. About thirty M-60 tanks (worth \$600,000 each), several dozen artillery pieces, and about fifty troop carriers are now being delivered to Addis Ababa."

The military regime has also sought contact with the bureaucratized workers states. Chinese diplomats and advisers have been reported in Ethiopia, and the government-controlled news media often uses Maoist terminology. Addis Ababa's *zemecha* campaign seems patterned after Mao's policy of dispersing millions of youths in the countryside. According to Ottaway, an Ethiopian military delegation is on a three-month tour of the Soviet Union.

There have been some indications of differences within the PMAC, although their precise nature remains unclear. According to the June issue of the London monthly *Africa*, the Second and Third Divisions of the Ethiopian army, based in Eritrea and Hararge Province respectively, sent a twenty-five-point memorandum to the Dergue in mid-April.

Included among the points was a call for the resumption of negotiations with the Eritrean rebels. Other reports said that some members of the Third Division were opposed to the application of the land reform to military personnel (under Selassie, officers and soldiers were traditionally

rewarded with gifts of land). According to Guillebaud, the PMAC tried to appease these soldiers by offering them some compensation for the nationalized land.

Citing an alleged coup attempt, the military rulers arrested twenty high-ranking officers and civilians in Addis Ababa on April 21 and 22, including two members of the PMAC. Fifty others were reported to have been arrested at the Third Division headquarters in Harar, the capital of Hararge.

Of the 120 officers and enlisted men who originally made up the PMAC, Guillebaud said, only about forty were still left in Addis Ababa to direct the functioning of the government apparatus. The rest were either sent to provincial capitals or were posted abroad; since November, a few have also been arrested, executed or forced to flee the country.

On July 13, Brig. Gen. Tafari Banti, the chairman of the PMAC, announced that a political party would be formed, although he did not say when. "The proposed party," he said, "will be guided by the aims of Ethiopian socialism and will take over the administration of the country as soon as it is set up."

The demagogic military rulers espouse a nationalistic "Ethiopian socialism." They appear to have won some mass support through their ouster of Selassie, the proclamation of the land-reform measures, and the nationalization of some foreign and domestic companies. But this support could quickly change to disenchantment or opposition when it becomes clear that the PMAC is incapable of ending the country's extreme poverty and economic stagnation.

Although Ethiopia's foreign reserves stand at \$300 million, the world market prices for some of its key exports (coffee, dried beans, cotton) have fallen drastically. With the continuation of serious famine in the Ogaden desert region and other parts of the country, these reserves could become quickly depleted if the regime tries to import enough food to ease the famine conditions.

Moreover, Guillebaud noted, "Despite the recent opening of public works projects in Addis Ababa, the overall price increases and the endemic unemployment in the cities are adding to a widespread discontent that could become explosive." □

### Fish-in Protests Seine Pollution

Scores of French fishermen blockaded Deauville and Trouville harbors with their boats July 19 to protest pollution of the Seine estuary. Hundreds of sailboats and other pleasure craft were trapped in resort areas. The fishing boats carried banners saying: "The ocean is being turned into a garbage can."

## Gujarat Government Stages Protests Against Gandhi Coup

By Ernest Harsch

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's seizure of dictatorial powers has met with continued resistance in parts of the country.

Protests were held throughout the state of Gujarat July 26, with about 10,000 persons demonstrating in Ahmedabad, the state capital, to mark the first month of Gandhi's coup. "Our leaders should be immediately released," the crowd chanted. "Our fundamental liberties should be restored. Democracy should be restored."

The demonstrations were organized by the coalition state government, which includes the conservative Organization Congress, the Socialist party, the rightist Bharatiya Lok Dal (People's party of India), and the Hindu chauvinist Jan Sangh. Chief Minister Babubhai Patel addressed the Ahmedabad rally, stating that the opposition parties pledged "to carry on a peaceful and nonviolent agitation."

A campaign of nonviolent civil disobedience actions, or *satyagraha*, had been carried on in Gujarat for more than a week before the rally. Although hundreds of protesters were arrested by the state government, which organized some of the actions, they were released after token sentences of from two to ten days.

Patel indicated, however, that the state government would limit the protests. "We have to see to it that we don't lead people into violence or destruction of property," he told a reporter. "But public feeling has to be given expression, though in a restricted way."

More than 300,000 persons demonstrated July 9 in Amritsar, in the northern state of Punjab, according to a report by Dr. Chohan, the president of the International Council of Sikhs. The rally was organized by the Akali Dal, an opposition party based on the Sikh religious community, which is a large minority in Punjab.

New clandestine journals and statements of opposition groups circulated in New Delhi and other cities. One, signed by Socialist party Chairman George Fernandes, was distributed by the thousands in Hindi, Urdu, and English. It called for the formation of "action units" to organize strikes, put up posters, obstruct transport and communications, and carry out other protest activities. Fernandes is also president of the All-India Railwaymen's Federation and was a leader of the massive railway strike that paralyzed the country in May 1974. In the statement he called on all



Herblock/Washington Post

opposition forces to bury their differences and join forces to resist the "fascist dictatorship."

Eight veterans of the Indian independence struggle, all more than sixty years old, sent Gandhi a letter stating that they would begin a campaign August 9 to advocate "the right of public speech and public association and freedom of the press." Gandhi had them arrested July 26. Kuldip Nayar, the son-in-law of one of the eight independence fighters and a well-known journalist, was arrested the day before.

Gandhi has sent police to patrol the campus of Delhi University, with plainclothes officers planted among the students and faculty. Police in Calcutta were deployed to oversee college examinations to prevent "cheating."

The rigid censorship regulations that were clamped on both the Indian and foreign press have been strengthened. Several more foreign journalists, who refused to sign self-censorship pledges, were expelled from the country.

In speeches before both houses of the Indian Parliament July 22, Gandhi left little doubt that she intended to continue her dictatorial rule for some time. "There can be no return to the pre-emergency days

of total license and political permissiveness," she declared. "Political liberties and political rights," she said, "can exist only so long as order remains."

With the support of the parliamentary representatives of the Communist party of India, which backs Gandhi, the Congress party majorities in both houses approved the state of emergency. The upper house voted July 22, by 136 to 33, to endorse Gandhi's coup. The lower house did the same the next day by a vote of 336 to 59. A constitutional amendment, which barred the courts from challenging the state of emergency, was also passed.

Precautions were taken to ensure that Parliament was not used by opposition members as a public forum to denounce the prime minister. The question period, in which members are allowed to grill cabinet officials, was eliminated from the agenda. Press passes to the parliamentary sessions were recognized only for correspondents who signed self-censorship pledges. While reporters could quote government statements under the censorship, they were barred from quoting opposition members.


Despite the restrictions in Parliament, some of the statements by opposition members were reported. Mathew Kurian, a member of the Communist party of India (Marxist), declared, "Democracy has been smothered by the Congress party and the Prime Minister. The butchery of democracy has been done to save the skin of Mrs. Gandhi."

Other opposition members denounced the censorship, the arrests of parliamentary members, and the suspension of civil liberties. One representative said that 80,000 persons have been arrested so far. Another shouted, "Murder of democracy!" during the proceedings.

Following the votes approving the state of emergency, the opposition members staged a walkout. N.G. Goray, a member of the Socialist party, said that the parliamentary session "is clearly in no position to discharge the functions of a free and democratic Parliament."

Gandhi's cabinet has also reportedly decided to postpone elections scheduled for September in the state of Kerala. This was seen as an indication that Gandhi might also postpone the national elections scheduled for February 1976. Under the state of emergency, elections can be deferred for up to three years. □

# AROUND THE WORLD



## 14 Uruguayan Trotskyists Accused of Conspiracy

Fourteen members of the Uruguayan Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party) have been railroaded to prison on charges of "conspiracy" against the nation's constitution. The charges came more than two months after the arrest of the Trotskyists. They are: Fernando Alfredo Souto, María Liliana Caviglia de Soto, Freddy Sixto Cabrera do Santos, Ricardo Francisco García Damonte, Ramón Suárez Trelles, Luis Alberto Villarubia Mesones, Aldo Bruno Gili Baptista, Walter Roberto Longo Porcile, Rubén Schubert Coronel Clarijo, Julio César Vuolo Castro, María Cristina Araujo López, María de los Angeles Barboza Peña, Carlos Raúl Astellano del Río, and Hugo Javier Martínez Baez.

If convicted, the fourteen could receive sentences of from two to six years.

## Famine Kills 20,000 in Somalia

The official death toll in Somalia's four-year drought and famine now stands at more than 20,000. The drought affected two-thirds of the country and wiped out more than a fourth of Somalia's livestock, on which the Somali nomads depended for their livelihood. Exports of bananas, the major cash crop, fell 10 percent from 1972. The regime estimates that the drought cost the country about \$500 million. A campaign to resettle 200,000 nomads in potentially fertile areas or along the coast has been launched.

## Turkey Suspends Operations of American Military Bases

The House of Representatives voted 223 to 206 July 24 to continue the U.S. arms embargo placed on Turkey in February. The vote defeated a White House proposal to partially resume arms shipments to Turkey. Both Ford and Kissinger urged Congress to reverse its decision.

The Turkish government announced July 25 that it was suspending operations at all but one of the twenty-seven U.S. military bases in Turkey. Some of the bases are sophisticated intelligence-gathering centers designed to spy on Soviet naval and air traffic between the Mediterranean and Black seas.

The only base not affected by the move was the air base at Incirlik, which houses a squadron of F-4 fighter-bombers. The base was described as the only one in the eastern Mediterranean from which Washington could launch nuclear-armed air assaults.

## State of Emergency Declared in Four Peruvian Provinces

A state of emergency suspending all constitutional guarantees was instituted in four southern departments of Peru July 18. It was the military junta's response to a general strike in Arequipa, launched the previous day, of about 50,000 laborers, rail workers, and the employees of the daily newspaper *Correo*.

The strikers were protesting the inadequacy of a 400 sol (about US\$9) cost-of-living increase granted by the Velasco Alvarado regime earlier in July. They also demanded lower public transport fares, price freezes on essential goods, and the return of a newspaper to the control of the unions.

The strike was called by the Federación Departamental de Trabajadores de Arequipa (Department of Arequipa Workers Federation).

## Police Attack Demonstration by Building Workers in Athens

About seventy persons were injured when police attacked a demonstration by construction workers in central Athens July 23. It was the first anniversary of the collapse of the military dictatorship in Greece.

About 4,000 construction workers held a rally to demand higher wages and better working conditions in defiance of the trade-union leadership. After the rally, they tried to march to the Ministry of Labor. Police ordered them to disperse. When the workers refused, the police charged with clubs and tear gas.

## Peruvian Junta Nationalizes American Iron-Ore Company

The Peruvian military junta has nationalized the Marcona Mining Co., an iron-ore venture largely owned by two U.S. companies, Cyprus Mines Corp. and Utah International Inc. The company's iron-ore mining and processing facilities have a capacity of about ten million tons a year.

Peru's minister of Mines and Energy, Jorge Fernández Maldonado, accused the company of causing "serious damage to our country by actions typical of the immoral conduct that the great multinational consortiums traditionally exercise." He also said that Marcona had violated contracts with the government, was indebted to state agencies, and had wasted ore lodes through negligent extraction procedures.

According to the report in the July 18 *Wall Street Journal*, the minister said government auditors would decide how much compensation will be paid.

## Remember the Mayagüez?

Although at the time, the "recapture" of the *Mayagüez* from Cambodia May 15 was hailed as President Ford's finest hour, after a few days of jingoistic cheering the incident was quietly dropped from the news.

A series of "corrections" and "amplifications" in the White House account of the operation led many to conclude that the entire incident was a provocation cooked up to counteract the black eye the White House had just received in Vietnam. Too many embarrassing questions were being asked.

But White House publicists refuse to give up, apparently thinking that more mileage can be squeezed out of the incident. At a ceremony in Washington July 24, the captain of the *Mayagüez* presented Ford with the wheel of the ship as a souvenir.



Interlandi/Los Angeles Times

## The Prerevolutionary Situation in Portugal Ripens

[The following declaration was adopted by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International by a majority vote June 1. We have taken the text from the June 19 issue of *Inprecor*.]

\* \* \*

The abortive coup d'etat of March 11 represented a heavy political defeat for the Portuguese bourgeoisie. The powerful popular mobilization paralyzed the political and military instruments on which capitalist reaction thought it could base itself. Today the bourgeoisie has been thrown onto the defensive, although this does not eliminate the possibility of putschist attempts by certain bourgeois factions. Its crisis of leadership is only intensifying. The degree of combativity, organization and self-organization, and class consciousness of the workers has taken a new leap forward. Within the army, not only did the soldiers and sailors demonstrate a very great capacity for responding to the seditious elements, but the politicization and process of self-organization of the rank and file also developed forward. The crisis of the army is deepening. This has facilitated the counter-offensive of the so-called socialistic wing of the MFA against the currents more or less explicitly claiming allegiance to the Spinozist project. While the grip of the neoreformists has been strengthened, the audience of the revolutionary left, within the framework of the impetuous rise of workers struggles, is broadening considerably—in the factories, the neighborhoods, the trade unions, and the army. This was confirmed during the elections of April 25, in which the workers parties received a majority whose size was virtually unprecedented in the history of the workers movement. Thus, in a little more than a year there has been a progressive radicalization of the rising workers struggles, which is leading to the ripening of a prerevolutionary situation.

### 1. Crisis and Economic Sabotage

Portuguese capitalism is facing a crisis of rare depth. To the structural weaknesses and disequilibrium inherited from the Salazarist era have been added the effects of the international recession, of decolonization, and of the sudden change in the relationship of forces between capital and labor. Economic sabotage, investment strikes by Portuguese finance capital and by multinational trusts, restriction or sup-

pression of credits to small and middle-sized companies, and the flight of capital have further worsened the economic mess. Sectors as important as the construction and textile industries are going through a virtually generalized crisis. Agriculture, imprisoned in archaic economic structures, is unable to produce a sufficient quantity of food products at low prices.

Over the past year, the rate of inflation has officially been 35%, but in reality it is much higher for food products. The buying power of the workers has been heavily affected. Factory closings and layoffs have been proliferating since the beginning of autumn 1974. Some 250,000 workers are unemployed.

Both the reconversion of the apparatus of production with a view toward accentuated integration into the Common Market and the end of the colonial war required a profound change in the forms of bourgeois domination as well as a channeling of workers mobilizations whose anticapitalist dynamic could only be strengthened in such a situation.

The resistance and counteroffensive of the workers broke through the presidentialist coup d'etat of September 28, the law on the right to strike and lockout, the law on occupations of houses, and the attempt to paralyze the workers through the creation of a vast army of unemployed. In face of this response of the toiling masses, which nullified the projects of industrial reorganization, capital is more and more utilizing the weapon of economic sabotage, the intention being to rally the support of broad sectors of the petty bourgeoisie by proving that the government is incapable of cleaning up the economic situation.

### 2. The Rise of Struggles

Since December 1974 a new phase has opened in the rise of workers mobilizations. First of all, broader and broader sections of the working class are becoming aware of the precarious character of the wage gains that were won at the beginning of the summer of 1974. For example, on January 14 some 300,000 workers demonstrated in Lisbon. They partially transformed the demonstration—which had been organized by the Intersindical (Trade Union Federation) and the Portuguese Communist party in order to support the MFA and the law on trade-union unity—into a vast mobilization against capitalist exploitation and for the

unity of the workers in struggle. Second, the attack on job security, especially in the small and middle-sized companies, has touched off struggles of a new type: occupations, restarting of production, experiments in workers control. Finally, in face of the economic sabotage and the attempts of reaction to organize, many initiatives were taken that prepared the mobilization against the attempted coup.

Almost spontaneously and with extraordinary rapidity, the Portuguese working class is taking up, assimilating, and sometimes enriching the most advanced experiences of struggle that have developed in Europe since 1968. This is a result of the conjunction of various factors. First of all, the acuteness of the structural and conjunctural crisis of Portuguese capitalism limits considerably the objective base for the development of reformist experiments and explains in large part the process of progressive radicalization that has taken place over the past year. Second, since the second half of the 1960s, the working class has been strengthened socially. In the Porto and Lisbon regions a new generation of workers who have lived through the decline of the Salazarist regime has entered production in large numbers. This generation constitutes an essential part of the workers vanguard. Finally, a relative politicization was stimulated among these layers by the struggle of the African fighters; moreover, tens of thousands of workers who emigrated to other European countries not only gained an apprenticeship in workers struggles, but also acquired an understanding of the new situation that has been developing in Europe since 1968. In the framework of the fall of the fascist regime, a very great receptivity to the ideas that had been ferociously combatted by the dictatorship has been added to all this. The combination of the intensification of the economic and social crisis, the rise of struggles, and the permanent atmosphere of political debate creates an extremely favorable terrain for the ripening of anticapitalist consciousness, even though the effects of forty-eight years of fascism on the workers' capacity for independent political intervention have not been fully erased.

Thus, beginning in mid-December, various experiences developed that augured the mobilization that was to unfold on March 11 and during the movements that followed.

1) *Factory occupations* became more and more numerous. Very often, they were



coupled with the struggle to purge fascist managers and administrators, the struggle against economic sabotage, and the struggle for the demand for *nationalization*. Control of inventories, control over hiring and firing, and the opening of the companies' books became weapons that were increasingly utilized by the workers. Obviously, this did not mean that the workers had already assimilated all the richness or political implications of the totality of experiences in which they were actively participating. In addition to factory and bank occupations, there were land occupations in the South; these were defended militarily by the peasants and agricultural workers.

2) The workers went *beyond the legal limits* and, in reality, shattered the law on strikes, which forbids occupations, plenary meetings within the factories, etc. Similarly, the rank-and-file soldiers organized and held general assemblies in some barracks.

3) A significant workers vanguard reacted forcefully to the attempts of the fascists to reorganize: some meetings of the CDS (Democratic and Social Center), which includes many notables from the old regime, were boycotted, as happened on January 25 in Porto. The administrators of the Salazarist regime in the factories, the press, and the radio were swept away by the initiatives of commissions of workers and trade-union sections.

4) The *trade-union movement* was strengthened and expanded. Battles for the democratic functioning of the trade unions proliferated. Concurrently, the influence of the *workers commissions* grew, especially in the big factories in the Lisbon area. These bodies constantly include the workers vanguard and can represent the major part of the workers during times of mobilization. During the September 28 events they took the first initiatives in the workers mobilization. On February 7, more than 30,000 workers participated in the especially combative demonstration organized by the coordinating body of the workers commissions of Lisbon. In the factories, general assemblies elected committees of workers in order to strengthen the united organization of the workers. During occupations of the social infrastructure (private clinics, hotels transformed into child-care centers or rest houses for workers) *management committees* were set up, sometimes elected. In certain cases these committees established relations with the workers commissions in order to plan the utilization of the occupied institutions and to "place them at the service of the people." *Popular assemblies*, often stimulated by the CP, arose in the popular neighborhoods. They debated problems of sanitation, housing, and transport, and more or less took charge of the organization of these social services. In this way there emerged on various levels bodies

that could provide the embryo of forms of dual power.

5) The linkup between workers and soldiers was manifested clearly for the first time on February 7. On that day the soldiers of RAL 1 joined the front ranks of the demonstration of the workers commissions and took up the slogans raised by the workers.

6) Manifestations by Portuguese of solidarity with the struggle of their Spanish comrades increased in number. Opposition to the Iberian Pact and Portugal's participation in NATO was asserted more sharply and testified to the advance of *proletarian internationalism* in the consciousness of broad sectors of the working class.

The response to the attempted coup d'état must be viewed with this backdrop. The mobilization indicated that the lessons of September 28 had been assimilated by tens of thousands of workers. The mobilization itself embodied the richness of the experiences that had begun to mold the consciousness of the workers. But it also had the effect of multiplying the workers' initiatives, since it ended with a crushing victory over reaction and confirmed the confidence of the toiling masses in their own strength.

### 3. A Political Defeat for the Bourgeoisie

After the failure of September 28, the dominant faction of the Portuguese bourgeoisie was counting above all on strengthening its central party, the PPD (Popular Democratic party), so as to forge an electoral victory. Later, within the perspective of a deterioration in the relationship of forces between the two fundamental classes of society, the bourgeoisie showed that it was prepared to accept a process of institutionalization of the MFA as an instrument serving as a last resort in controlling the situation and rebalancing the state apparatus. This institutionalization, an expression of the Bonapartist function of the MFA, was supposed to take shape, according to the wishes of the bourgeoisie, under the cover of an electoral victory for the center-left, of an offensive by the Spinolista sectors within the MFA, and of a certain degree of control over the process of decolonization, especially in Angola, through lending weight to the FLNA and UNITA.

Another faction of the bourgeoisie did not share this view. This faction, made up of the sectors most strongly hit by the fall of the Salazarist regime and decolonization, prepared for a frontal attack on the working class and its social conquests, for regaining a grip on the enlisted men, and for eliminating the most radicalized elements of the MFA.

The acceleration of the workers upsurge, the growing crisis within the army, the several Spinolista successes during the MFA

elections at the beginning of March, and the lack of ability to sense political opportunities and to judge the real social relationship of forces (after forty-eight years of the corporatist regime) were the factors that certainly incited these circles to throw themselves into the attempted coup d'état. There were two significant features to the failure of the coup. The putschists were incapable of effectively organizing coordination between the military and civilian sectors and of assuring themselves direct support from the social layers prepared to back up such a project. The rapidity of the response, its breadth, and the resistance or open opposition of the soldiers and sailors to all the putschist maneuvers of the officers deprived reaction of the possibility of getting control of a significant part of the military and political apparatus in order to carry out its plans.

On March 11, after the attempted constitutional coup of July 1974 and the attempted civilian coup of September 28, the bourgeoisie fired a new round—without results, or rather, with results directly opposite to those that had been hoped for. The loss of Spínola, who could have played the role of a rallying point, intensified the crisis of political leadership in the bourgeois camp.

The economic emergency plan, which had been approved on February 7 by the council of ministers and reflected the influence of the PPD and the SP, was swept away. The nationalization of the banks and insurance companies, which was not explicitly called for in the plan but was carried out under the pressure of the mobilization of the workers, created a dynamic able to break through the limits within which possible nationalizations had been envisaged by the emergency plan.

Within the MFA, the relationship of forces was shifted in favor of the non-Spinolista sectors. The institutionalization, imposed against the coup d'état, took on an objectively contradictory character. On the one side, it was carried out against the putschist sectors and in this sense tended to foster initiatives by workers and soldiers aimed at purging the fascist cadres; on the other side, the MFA consolidated its position as a body of autonomous power to a certain extent playing the role of Bonapartist arbitrator above the classes and tending to shunt aside the traditional instruments of bourgeois democracy (parties, parliament, etc.). Nevertheless, the failure of the coup represented neither a definitive victory for the so-called socialistic sector of the MFA nor the liquidation of the Spinolista sector of the armed forces. The latter, although weakened, not only continues to occupy a position in the High Council of the Revolution itself, but may recover lost positions inasmuch as the hierarchical structure of the army is maintained. In this

sense, while it is certain that the institutionalization of the MFA guarantees the stability of the coalition government of class collaboration, this does not eliminate the long-term possibility of a gradual turn toward a rightist regime.

Under the impact of the massive mobilization of the workers, and in the hope of receiving financial aid following the nationalization of the banks, the petty bourgeoisie could certainly no longer provide a very stable support to the political formations of the bourgeoisie, which had to give ground to the CP-MDP<sup>1</sup> within the government as well as within the economic and state apparatus.

On the defensive, the bourgeoisie after March 11 found itself compelled to accept the measures nationalizing the banks, insurance companies, transport, electricity, and steel, as well as the institutionalization of the MFA in a form that it was unable to have any say in. Confronting the April 25 electoral target date, it had to recover some credibility, with the hope that an electoral victory would permit it to influence the nationalization process and to enclose that process within a framework compatible with the survival of the capitalist system.

Under the cover of the signing of the Pact, and in view of the possibility of utilizing the electoral tribune, the bourgeois parties—more specifically the CDS—were able to reorganize their base and prepare for the counteroffensive. In this sense, it would be absolutely erroneous to underestimate the electoral results obtained by the PPD and the CDS, especially if they are compared with those of the CP.

Nevertheless, the bourgeoisie as a whole was not going to limit itself to concentrating all its efforts on the legal field alone, although after March 11 it emphasized strengthening itself electorally and working toward achieving a certain realignment within the government, which included taking advantage of the anticommunist campaign of the SP. The bourgeoisie's crisis of political leadership, aggravated by the upsurge of the mass movement after March 11, will encourage it to opt for a terrorist tactic of harassment, sabotage, and attacks on the workers organizations and worker militants.

On the international field, the bourgeoisie is keeping open two options: aid or strangulation. For the moment, the European bourgeoisie, while utilizing various means of pressure and blackmail, seems to have decided to play the card of aid, understanding that in the immediate future economic strangulation could have radicalizing effects. Obviously, this does not prevent it from also directing efforts toward structur-

ing and financing the reactionary offensive both in Portugal and in the colonies, especially Angola.

#### 4. The Acceleration of the Revolutionary Process

The defeat of the putschist project on March 11 by a massive and rapid mobilization of the toiling masses has led to a modification of the relationship of forces on two levels: on the one side between the bourgeoisie and the working class; on the other side between the revolutionary vanguard and the reformist currents.

1) This new shift in the relationship of forces is expressed in the intensification of the crisis in the army—its division and the proliferation of cases of discipline being broken and of the rejection by the rank-and-file soldiers of the “new hierarchy” to which the MFA claims allegiance. Politicization within the army has taken a great leap forward. It is being fed by the linkup that was made in several areas between the workers and soldiers on March 11, to such an extent that arms were distributed to popular vigilance committees. It was strengthened during the electoral campaign by the systematic political debate that went on among the troops. This, added to the problems of the very functioning of the army—weakness of barracks control, debility of officer control, miserable social and material conditions—is bolstering the process of self-organization, the open participation of soldiers in the work of the revolutionary organizations, and the rapprochement and common activities between soldiers and workers. Nevertheless, these phenomena are developing at a *very uneven rate* within the armed forces nationally, and this may facilitate reactionary maneuvers. In the short term, the armed forces thus no longer represent an entity sufficiently homogeneous and tightly enough controlled by the military hierarchy to be easily used in a putschist project. This fact can only contribute to accentuating the general instability and to prolonging the period of crisis of bourgeois political leadership.

2) The massive rising of the workers at the announcement of the attempted coup led not only to the crushing of the seditious elements, but also to a considerable victory for the toiling masses: the *nationalization* of the banks and insurance companies in the initial period, and later the nationalization of about thirty companies in the transport, electricity, steel, cement, tobacco, and food industries, as well as the new measures preparing an agrarian reform.

From the objective standpoint, these nationalizations may obviously be part of a project that consists of supporting or strengthening the profit margins of certain private sectors within the framework of a

capitalist economy. The nationalized sector would then function as the guarantor of the profitability of the private sector, furnishing raw materials and energy supplies at low prices by granting very low interest credits or by making pure and simple gifts and socializing the costs of developing the infrastructure necessary for national and imperialist investment.

Nevertheless, this series of nationalizations was decided on at the very moment when tens of thousands of workers, beginning in December, were demanding the nationalization of their companies, occupying the offices of the banks and insurance companies, and threatening to take the transportation sector under their control. Furthermore, the branches of the banking system throughout Portuguese industry create objective conditions favorable to touching off a dynamic going beyond the function that the major part of the MFA and significant sectors of the bourgeoisie initially assigned to the state takeover of the banking system and the various basic sectors.

A certain number of conditions must nevertheless be met in order to assure the development of such a process, in order to assure the destruction of capital's economic power and of all the positions of control and decision-making that capital holds within the economic structure. First of all, it is imperative to *nationalize without compensation all the decisive sectors of the economy*: heavy industry, the banks, transportation, the energy sector, the distribution sector, and foreign trade. To this must be added the elimination from the nationalized sector of all bourgeois administrators, the rejection of “co-management” and the generalization of workers control, centralized management of all property and all nationalized companies by a central body placed under the control of the workers organizations and founded on the application of an emergency economic plan drawn up by these organizations.

But such measures of expropriation of the bourgeoisie are not possible within the framework of the present bourgeois state, in a context in which the bourgeoisie still holds political power and organizes its response in many forms, economic sabotage and the flight of capital being the preferred weapons in the present conjuncture.

The economic crisis that Portuguese capitalism is now going through, the nationalization measures weakening the bourgeoisie, and the rise of the mass movement clearly indicate that the precondition for taking economic power away from the bourgeoisie, for depriving it of its power of economic sabotage, lies in the *elimination of its political power*. It is here that all the initiatives of workers control, the occupation of factories, the restarting of production under workers control, the

1. Communist party-Portuguese Democratic Movement.—IP

coordination of tenants committees to deal with questions of housing and of the social infrastructure take on their full importance and express the more or less conscious will of the toiling masses to take over political and economic power, to pass from a capitalist economy to a socialist one, which can only be achieved by the *centralization* of the instruments of self-organization of the masses. The very dynamic of the movement goes radically against the objectives proposed and ceaselessly repeated by the CP and the MFA, summed up as *the battle for production*, in a context in which the bourgeoisie still commands the determining decision-making posts and holds power on the economic and political field.

3) The change in the relationship of forces after March 11 and the deep radicalization, which attained a new stage after December, was also expressed on the electoral field.

On March 11 there was a fusion between the workers upsurge and the emergence of the mass movement onto the political scene. This was rapidly reflected in the demand for a deepening of the purge process at all levels—the army, industry, the press—and by the emergence of a more or less confused demand for “popular government,” combined with the demand to expel the representatives of the PPD from the government. March 11 thus functioned as a catalyst for the political consciousness of the toiling masses.

Both the feelings of victory and strength acquired by the workers through the mobilization, through winning the nationalizations, and through the acceleration of the purges and the extreme weakness of any alternative bourgeois policy were reflected in *the massive vote for the workers parties*. Overall, the electoral results can only increase the workers' confidence in their own strength, intensify the anticapitalist mobilizations, and generate among the rank-and-file workers a will for unity in the struggle against the bourgeoisie and its parties.

Of course, the votes for the Socialist party came partially from the petty bourgeoisie under the impact of the anticommunist campaign of the Socialist leaders and thus represent votes in favor of a solution of order and of defense of private property. Even some factions of the bourgeoisie encouraged votes for the SP.

But it would be totally erroneous to reduce the vote of the SP to that. In its majority, the SP vote represented the primitive will of broad sectors of the workers to struggle against the conditions of exploitation and oppression to which they are subject and to struggle for socialism; it also represented an elementary defiance of the bureaucratic methods used by the Stalinist current. Moreover, it is significant that the SP obtained the most votes precisely in the

regions in which the percentage of wage-workers is highest. In fact, the SP vote was the product both of a shift in the relationship of forces between capital and labor and of the still backward level of consciousness of many layers of workers who are radicalizing and becoming politicized slowly and at varying rates.

The CP obtained an electoral result that does not precisely reflect its capacity to mobilize and its organizational strength. Electorally, the CP paid a price for its policy of class collaboration, which led it to more or less openly betray many struggles and to subordinate any possibility for unifying the working class in anticapitalist struggle to the possibility of putting pressure on the state apparatus. The fact that the far left and the centrists got one-third as many votes as the CP indicates the scope of the CP's losses on its left. Finally, at the moment when the debate over what model of socialism should be followed is of concern to broad layers of workers, there is no doubt that the CP also paid a price for its unconditional defense of the “socialist model” represented by the bureaucratic regimes in the deformed or degenerated workers states. As for the MDP/CDE,<sup>2</sup> it was totally marginalized and hence will more and more appear as a simple cover for the CP and a supporting body of the MFA.

Finally, the total results obtained by all the organizations claiming allegiance to the revolutionary left express the progress of the influence and implantation of the various Maoist, centrist, and revolutionary Marxist currents and the existence of broad layers of workers who are breaking with the policy of the reformist organizations, especially in workers bastions like Porto, Lisbon, Setúbal, etc.

There is no doubt that the SP will seek to use its electoral strength to intervene within the MFA and achieve a certain reorganization of the relationship of forces and to try to develop a weight within the trade unions and the factories that corresponds to its electoral strength. As for the CP, while asserting itself as the unconditional defender of the MFA, it will have to demonstrate its capacity for mobilization in order to consolidate its position and to counteract the projects of the SP.

4) At first sight, it appears as though March 11 and April 25, 1975, fostered the strengthening of the reformist organizations. During the attempted coup, the CP and the Intersindical took the leadership of the workers movement and succeeded in the immediate sense in capitalizing on a large part of the mobilization.

The initiatives taken by the Intersindical and the calls for the general strike—which was a break with what the Intersindical

had done on September 28—place the trade-union organization at the head of the response and can only strengthen its role as the unique representative of the working class in the eyes of the workers. Obviously, the Intersindical may offer its services to marginalize the instruments of self-organization, to limit somewhat the experiences pointing in this direction, and to increase the credibility of its campaign for the “battle for production.”

On the other hand, the election results allow the SP to put itself forward as the principal workers party (on the electoral field) and hence to raise its claims within the government, the municipalities, and the trade unions.

Nevertheless, this affirmation of the strength of the reformist and neoreformist workers parties is occurring in a context of the rise of the mass movement, of radicalization of new layers of workers, and of proliferation of independent actions of the masses in the neighborhoods and factories, actions that consolidate the workers' feelings of strength and independence. Thus, conditions are being created for the exacerbation of the *contradictions within the reformist formations themselves* and for the *strengthening of the revolutionary vanguard and the expansion of its audience among the layers influenced and organized by the reformist parties*.

This twofold process is at the root of the leftist tactical adaptations the CP has made since the end of 1974. The time has not yet come for the CP to oppose mobilizations head on. After March 11, for instance, contrary to the policy that was followed after September 28, the CP and the Intersindical demanded nationalization measures and many trade-union sections took initiatives within this perspective. The adaptations that the CP and the Intersindical have to make to recover, preserve, or strengthen their position nevertheless act to intensify their internal contradictions and modify the relationship of forces with the vanguard. Viewed in this light, the continuation of the relative hegemony of the reformist formations, which is the major negative factor for the future of the revolutionary upsurge, will be subject to many modifications, depending on the independent activity of the masses and on the capacity of the revolutionary vanguard to unify broad layers of workers around its initiatives.

During the phase opened by March 11, the CP is thus trying to isolate the struggles of the vanguard and hold back all experiments in self-organization, whether in the barracks, the neighborhoods, or the factories.

Just as it crudely opposed strikes in the name of consolidating the democratic stage during the first period, today the CP is

2. Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Election Committee.—IP

putting the emphasis on the "battle for production" in order to guarantee the "economic and financial stability gravely threatened both by the recession and by the disorganization provoked by economic sabotage." The "battle for production" is replacing the "battle for power," as was previously the case in Chile. The CP thus regards sticking as closely as possible to the MFA as a guarantee that the "democratic stage" will be consolidated. This line can only strengthen illusions among the workers in the "vanguard role of the MFA" and divert the anticapitalist dynamic of the struggle toward a project of class collaboration. Nevertheless, after waging an electoral campaign with triumphalist overtones, the CP has to demonstrate its capacity to mobilize and its organizational strength, and thus assert its role as the leading party structuring the workers, as opposed to the SP, which is the leading workers party on the electoral field. A certain sectarianism toward the SP rank and file does not make for an adequate response to this problem, especially in that there is real pressure toward unity within both parties. Hence, it will be difficult for the CP to stick strictly to the battle for production. It will have to either participate in or go along with the mobilizations of the workers and peasants, while at the same time trying to control these mobilizations. The CP will not escape from these oscillations very quickly.

As for the SP, during the election campaign it found itself torn between its attempt to capture votes from the petty-bourgeois clientele of the PPD and the necessity of reestablishing, preserving, or if possible consolidating its links with the working class. In the post-electoral period, it continues to be affected by the same type of contradictions. The program of its leadership consists of trying to chip off a wing of the MFA that, under the jargon of "Portuguese socialism," would take measures that could maximally limit the import of the nationalizations, give assurances to imperialism, and "reestablish order." (It is more interested in doing this than in forming any alliance of a center-left type with the PPD.) The pressures that the SP is subjected to from the European Social Democracy tend in the same direction, and the anticommunist campaign falls perfectly within this framework.

Nevertheless, this party has been swollen with thousands of members who have just emerged onto the political scene; they are not marked by the legalist Social Democratic tradition and are liable to radicalize rapidly. This will inevitably have repercussions within the party; it augurs the formation of new leftist currents and centrist splits. The themes of workers control and self-management demagogically put forward on the May 1 posters of the

SP already indicate the existence of this type of pressure within the SP.

In face of the very rapid expansion of the ranks of the CP and the SP, in face of the weakness of the political training of the members and their receptivity to the propaganda of the far left in the atmosphere of permanent political debate and of intensified combativity, revolutionaries command very great objective possibilities for expanding their audience among those workers organized or influenced by these parties. This dialectic of relations between reformists, neoreformists, and centrist forces and the revolutionary left is such that the latter already commands sufficient weight to initiate movements that effectively win the adherence of significant sectors of the masses.

Hence, the audacious and flexible application of the tactic of *united front* as developed on various levels—from the factory and the neighborhoods up through the most important initiatives—is decisive for the revolutionary vanguard both in responding immediately to any reactionary offensive, to any challenging of the democratic rights of the workers movement, and in expanding the influence of the revolutionaries and cutting down on the duration of the reformists' grip on the working class. By calling for the unity in action of the entire working class and of all its currents without any exclusion, revolutionaries will be able to take advantage of the desire for unity that exists among broad sectors of workers in order to strengthen the anticapitalist front.

Any real rupture of this unity in action threatens to profoundly disorient the toiling masses, to generate phenomena of disarray and of the beginning of demoralization, and thus to provoke a stagnation of the revolutionary process that would facilitate a reactionary counteroffensive. That is why the bureaucratic methods used by the CP leaders against workers democracy, the sectarianism of these leaders (obstruction of trade-union elections, the República affair, etc.), and the attempts of the SP leaders to slow down the revolutionary process in the name of defense of bourgeois democracy are now stirring up division within the ranks of the proletariat and constitute real attacks against the interests of the proletariat.

Against these sowers of division, revolutionary Marxists *struggle for strengthening the unity in action of all the organizations and representative bodies of the working class and for the consolidation of these bodies through the creation of a network of democratically elected workers, soldiers, and peasants committees that can both guarantee respect for the broadest democracy and assure the forward march of the revolution. The most urgent task is to move toward the creation of such bodies of democratic and proletarian power.* Any delay in the emergence, coordination, and

generalization of these councils threatens to drive back the advancing revolutionary process that was accelerated after March 11, 1975.

The disastrous aspect of the policy of the Maoist current, which characterizes the CP as "social fascist" and makes it the main enemy, is especially highlighted if one considers the fluidity that exists within the very ranks of the CP and the SP and the response that the far-left currents are able to receive there. Insofar as the Maoist current, and more especially the UDP,<sup>3</sup> commands significant influence in the broad workers vanguard, the Maoist policy effectively functions as an element dividing the class and threatening to isolate this workers vanguard from the heart of the class.

## 5. The Role of the MFA

In a context marked by an open crisis of bourgeois political leadership, by a real division within the army, by the growing influence of the reformist workers parties, and by the continuing rise of workers struggles, the MFA after March 11 consolidated its position, centralizing the essential legislative and executive priorities.

Since April 25, 1974, the assertion of the strength of the MFA has been the fruit not only of the role it played in the organization of the coup d'état, but also of the crisis in the army generated under the blows of the defeat suffered in the colonial war and of the political weakness of the two fundamental classes of society.

On the one side, after half a century of corporatist rule, the bourgeoisie did not command political instruments capable of functioning effectively in the framework of bourgeois democracy in face of a progressive upsurge of the mass movement. On the other side, the workers' lack of political experience after forty-eight years of dictatorship did not enable the working class to immediately give expression to its own solutions. It is the convergence of this twofold political weakness that created the possibility of the MFA's occupying this central place, especially after the failure of the two hasty presidentialist coup attempts in July and September 1974 and after the March 11 debacle.

In reality, the MFA represents two different phenomena: on the one side an integral part of the state apparatus (President of the Republic, Council of the Revolution, Army General Staff, etc.); on the other side a movement composed of a part of the officer corps having a base among the noncommissioned officers and soldiers and permeated by all the social and political currents of a Portugal drawn into a revolutionary process. As an integral part of the

3. People's Democratic Union.—IP

state apparatus, it guarantees the maintenance of capitalist relations of production, especially during times when the rise of the mass movement within the context of a deep crisis of political leadership of the bourgeoisie places in danger the very survival of the system of capitalist rule. As a movement, its social composition, petty bourgeois in its majority, implies that it is far from homogeneous ideologically. Likewise, there has been a modification in its composition, a radicalization of certain of its sectors, and, at the same time, a growing polarization among its diverse components. Along with Spinoist currents, which do not occupy stage center during the present phase, there are various currents that are more or less influenced by the reformist ideologies of the workers movement but that possess no organic link with that movement. Most of them are manifesting deep distrust of the mass movement, distrust that is characteristic of this military elite that has established paternalistic relations with the masses. They are placing the emphasis on strict control of the activity of the masses, on the arbitrator task that the MFA must fulfill, which reveals the will of the MFA officers to perpetuate their Bonapartist role.

Moreover, this Bonapartist function is expressed concretely both in the MFA's institutionalization and in the pact that it pushed through between the bourgeois and reformist workers parties, a pact whose objective function is to conceal the exacerbated contradictions between capital and labor, between exploiter and exploited, that are manifesting themselves more sharply every day.

*Nevertheless, it is difficult to stabilize this objectively Bonapartist function inasmuch as the mass mobilizations themselves on the one hand stimulate the differentiations within the MFA and thus generate realignments among the various tendencies and on the other hand necessitate permanent adjustments aimed at more or less controlling the mass movement.* Confronted simultaneously with a crisis within the army, an acceleration of the radicalization of the working class, and a deeper and deeper economic crisis, the MFA will find it difficult to preserve its ever more fragile unity, especially since the options that will present themselves will make it increasingly risky to play a game of balancing and of making concessions to both the left and the right.

In the event of a convergence between a new wave of struggle on the one hand and a bourgeois offensive taking the twofold form of a campaign of economic sabotage by international capital and a reorganization of the reactionary current within the army on the other hand, a breakup of the MFA is not excluded. In this context, the generalization of forms of self-organization and self-

defense and the confrontation of the workers movement with the bourgeoisie could precipitate a new situation characterized both by the emergence of organs of dual power in the factories, countryside, and barracks and by the emergence of the first experiments in coordinating these various organs. In face of this polarization, it is not excluded that some elements of the MFA influenced by reformist currents and even by the far-left organizations, could pass to the camp of the working class at decisive moments.

But revolutionary Marxists, contrary to centrists, will not passively wait for this possible division to weaken the apparatus of the bourgeois army, nor will they simply wait for the beginning of the mobilization that will lead to the armed insurrection; rather, they will seek to create all the conditions such that this split may accompany the development of the struggle of the laboring masses. Such a split will be strongly stimulated by the generalization of a system of dual power that permits the immense majority of the working class to be won to the camp of the revolution and prepares the final confrontation.

From now on, the transformation of the struggle for the generalization and centralization of the instruments of self-organization (resignation of officers, election of committees to control military operations) and the linkup of the organized struggle of the soldiers and sailors with the workers movement will enable the ground for the confrontation to be prepared.

On the other hand, in the event that international capital does not strangle the Portuguese economy, that the social and economic crisis is prolonged without any modification in the relationship of forces between the classes, that reformist hegemony is maintained because of the delay in the emergence of a revolutionary pole, and that the mass movement retreats because of divisions within the working class and the absence of precise objectives for advancing the revolution, there could possibly be a relative stabilization of the Bonapartist function of the MFA and a counteroffensive of the currents more or less openly owing allegiance to Spinoism. This could not but find expression in measures aimed at regaining a grip on the army, imposing limits on the activity of the mass movement, repressing the revolutionary organizations, strengthening the hierarchy, and suppressing the organs created by the soldiers. Obviously, this does not imply that the period of instability that resulted from the March 11 victory would end, but rather that the process of upsurge would go through a certain retreat before new confrontations occurred.

The not very distant prospect of the *fall of the Francoist regime* introduces into this

overall picture a factor that will be decisive for the future of the Portuguese revolution. A radical change in the political situation in Spain could either relaunch the mass movement in Portugal in the event that there had been a certain pause or combine with the ongoing rise of struggle and create an explosive situation in the whole Iberian peninsula, the fantastic repercussions of which would rapidly be manifested throughout all Europe.

## 6. The Tasks of Revolutionary Marxists

1) The fusion between the March 11 mobilization and the general rise of struggles since December has accelerated the spread of experiments in self-organization at all levels and in self-defense and workers control and has also raised the level of anticapitalist class consciousness.

Nevertheless, these experiments remain fragmented and dispersed and hence prevent the potential combativity that was manifested on March 11 from being channeled into a unified effort. In order to safeguard the gains of the victorious response to capitalist reaction, to fully utilize the advantages that the working class commands in the present situation, and to rout any new anti-working-class counteroffensive, it is essential *through a flexible tactic of united front to regroup around the initiatives of the proletarian vanguard the broadest layers of the working class, the poor peasantry, and the soldiers and to strengthen the autonomous combat organs with which the toiling masses have endowed themselves during successive mobilizations.* In order to do this it is crucial for revolutionary Marxists to make use of all possibilities of coordinating, centralizing, and unifying all these instruments of struggle of the workers and soldiers: workers commissions, building and neighborhood commissions, committees of soldiers and sailors, antifascist vigilance committees, leagues of poor peasants, etc. *The democratic centralization on a national scale of all these organs within a structure permitting the linkup with all the workers organizations, trade unions, and parties would be capable of stimulating the emergence and generalization of organs of dual power.* In this way a state of affairs would be created limiting or preventing the co-opting of the workers upsurge and creating the best conditions for the rapid rise of class consciousness through overall confrontations with the regime and for the construction of the revolutionary party.

It is within this perspective that during the election campaign, during the huge demonstrations of May 1, and during their daily propaganda, our comrades of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista put forward the slogan of a *national assembly of workers.*

2) In the present phase the LCI, unlike most political currents, is systematically emphasizing:

- the vital importance of the nonexclusive united front of the working class to defend its social and economic gains and its democratic rights and to wage the offensive against capital;

- the necessity of a permanent mobilization of the workers that enables them to impose their demands, to expel all bourgeois ministers from the government, and to form a WORKERS AND PEASANTS GOVERNMENT, that is, a government of the workers organizations and of representatives of the agricultural workers and poor peasants: a government of the SP, CP, the Intersindical, and other bodies representing sectors of the working class and of the agricultural workers. In order to advance the revolutionary process decisively, such a government would have to base itself on a system of workers, peasants, and soldiers councils.

3) In order to definitively sweep aside capitalist reaction and deepen the workers upsurge and the independent activity of the masses, revolutionary Marxists will wage massive political campaigns around the following axes:

- for the nationalization without compensation and under workers control of the major industries and sectors of distribution, and for the state monopoly of foreign trade;

- for the generalization of workers control in all sectors already nationalized, which means, among other things, the right to remove administrators named by the state, the right to hold meetings and general assemblies in the workplaces during working hours, veto right over hiring and firing, etc.;

- for the centralized management of all property and of all nationalized companies by a central body placed under the control of the workers organizations and founded on the application of an emergency economic plan drawn up by these organizations;

- for the expropriation of the large landed estates under workers control and for a radical agrarian reform;

- for the *strengthening of the antimilitarist movement, the generalization and coordination of the committees of soldiers, sailors, and airmen*, in order on the one hand to assure the total purge of reactionary officers, to elect commanders in general assemblies, to control the functioning of all military operations, and to take charge of the defense of the material interests and rights of the soldiers and on the other hand to assure the systematic linkup with the workers organized in the neighborhoods and with the workers organizations and trade unions in order to prepare the most rapid and determined response both to fascist provocations and to any new attempted coup;

- for the dissolution and disarmament of the police of big capital: the GNR and the PSP;<sup>4</sup>

- for a central united trade union with respect for the right of tendencies, democratic elections of delegates and officials at all levels, and total independence from the state;

- for the suppression of all laws restricting trade-union action, the action of workers in the factories, and occupations of empty housing, and against any measures restricting the activity of the revolutionary organizations;

- for the generalization of armed self-defense pickets and the arming of the trade unions and workers commissions;

- for Portugal's withdrawal from the Atlantic alliance and for the breakup of the Iberian Pact;

- for the active solidarity of the Portuguese workers with their comrades in Spain in their struggle to bring down the Francoist dictatorship.

To deal with all these tasks, the comrades of the LCI will have to:

- assure themselves of an ever broader implantation in the working class;

- extend the influence of the revolutionary Marxists in all the sectors that are now mobilizing and offer them a perspective of struggle for socialism;

4. Republican National Guard; Public Security Police.—IP

- consolidate the organization of hundreds of adherents in order to make the LCI a real political striking force capable of contesting reformist hegemony on the concrete field of class struggle.

In face of the workers upsurge in Portugal, an international anticommunist campaign is being intensified and imperialist threats are proliferating. There is no doubt that at the moment of an accentuation of the revolutionary upsurge, especially if it coincides with the fall of the Francoist dictatorship, the imperialist threats will become ever more pressing. The European and American bourgeoisies are not prepared to rest with folded arms when the revolution breaks out on the Iberian peninsula.

From this point on, revolutionary Marxists, the Fourth International, must take all possible initiatives of political solidarity with the struggle of the Portuguese workers in order to prepare the broadest layers of the working class and the youth to prevent a counterrevolutionary intervention in the future. The rise of struggles in Europe since 1968, the strengthening of the revolutionary vanguard, and the response that has already been acquired within the European working class by the fight of the Portuguese toiling masses represent the best guarantees of the mobilization of the European working class against international capitalist reaction. □

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# The Situation in Portugal

[The following editorial, signed D.B., appeared in the July 18 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly, *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

Will they be as intransigent, as outspoken, as energetic? Will all those who yesterday defended *República* throughout the pages of the press be as prompt to respond? Will they be as quick to denounce the bonfire in Rio Maior, where the reactionaries burned in the main square the newspapers arriving from Lisbon? The firebrands in Rio Maior whipped themselves up: "That's what you do with Communist lies!"

Have the editors of *l'Aurore* and *Le Figaro*, the bootlickers of the groveling press, read *A Capital*, *O Século*, or *Diário de Notícias*? Certainly, these papers are influenced by the Communist party. But they are open, by and large, to the statements, communiqués, and declarations of the smallest organization, of the smallest committee.

It is clear that a struggle is taking place in the news media, and that no patroness of democracy can keep her hands lily-white. The front defending *República* is assembling in the name of a certain sort of democracy. In the past, the German Social Democratic press called for the murder of the Spartakists in the name of "pure democracy." And again it was in the name of "pure democracy" that the Christian Democrats shackled the hands of the Chilean Popular Unity to the goodwill of a reactionary parliament.

To be sure, things have not reached that point in Lisbon. But when the bishop of the little port of Aveiro says to his flock: "Christians, wake up. . ." the call sends shivers up one's spine. The outlines of each camp are taking form; the shape of the battle between irreconcilable classes is beginning to emerge.

The Portuguese Socialists complain of having been mistreated by the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement]. One could justifiably reply to them: "What did you do in the spring?" You went dancing in the streets. They did not go dancing. But you signed the pact with the MFA. You yourselves renounced the "sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly." Frightened by the workers mobilizations that occurred after March 11—more than by the putsch attempt itself—you accepted without complaint the institutionalization of the MFA that you rejected the day before. At that time you saw in the MFA the best bulwark against the revolution. Today the bulwark is cracking, and the Socialist party would like to pull back to its earlier line of

defense, turning back the wheel of history.

But the Portuguese masses are already far ahead of them.

Not only the Constituent Assembly, but the MFA itself has already been outflanked by the flowering of committees and assemblies that are being coordinated by region and by industry, that are demanding workers control, expropriation of the capitalists, and a planned economy. They did not renounce genuine popular sovereignty—which is emerging in the factories, the neighborhoods, and the fields—neither for the Constituent Assembly, nor for that pact of collaboration with the MFA. Today, as workers democracy begins to penetrate even the barracks in the form of soldiers assemblies, they will be the first to take at its word the perspective opened up by the last

Assembly of the MFA: Regional People's Assemblies leading up to a National People's Assembly composed of delegates from committees that are elected and subject to recall. Not ten years from now, not a year from now—immediately! And totally independent, both from the military hierarchy and the municipalities. Independent and fully sovereign.

Elsewhere, throughout Europe, it is necessary to extend a bridge of vigilance toward Portugal, without any letup for the summer. Events could move fast. Especially since civil war has almost broken out in Angola, which will not fail to have a heavy impact on the situation in Portugal and speed up the course of events. Wherever they are, militants must remain alert. Wherever they are, they must be ready to take the necessary initiatives.

Portugal is a blazing ship on capitalist Europe's flank. It must not burn out. □

## Declaration by the Journalists of 'República'

[The following statement by the journalists of *República* was published in the July 15 issue of *Jornal do Caso República* (Journal of the República Case). The journalists were driven out of their offices on May 19 by a group of Stalinists and ultraleftists who managed to win some support among the technical staff by demagoguery about "workers control." The Stalinist operation was supported by the military and in particular by the sections of the junta that under the cover of "left" demagoguery are most outspoken about their intention to establish an open military dictatorship.

[The offices of *República* are now under the control of a "workers committee" headed by a government-appointed major. The paper that comes out under the name of *República* is one of the most rabid mouthpieces of the campaign by the Communist party and the ultraleftists against political democracy and in support of "revolutionary" military dictatorship. The translation of the journalists' statement is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

Accustomed to fighting for freedom of expression by long years of fascist repression, the journalists of *República*—the only daily paper of resistance before April 25, 1974—have found themselves forced to take up this struggle again a little more than a year after the restoration of civil liberties in Portugal.

To keep faith with our record as antifascists and anticapitalists, as fighters for democracy and socialism, we must reject

the easy comfort of the opportunisms in vogue and refuse ever to abdicate our right to criticize and to hold our own opinions. Today this right has been largely hamstrung by the maneuvers of those who think they own the socialist revolution, while they ignore the real aspirations of the great majority of the Portuguese people.

We know that minimizing the historic role of *República* in the liberation from fascism can be justified only by taking the tortuous routes of demagoguery, because among those leading the fratricidal struggle aimed at eliminating democratic freedoms are many April 26, September 29, and March 12 "progressives."\*

The attempt to avoid political struggle by suppressing ideas and facts is a sign of weakness that has nothing revolutionary about it; this attitude bears within it the seeds of a new repressive censorship.

The future will show those who cannot, or will not, understand how much is at stake in our struggle, how important it is to assure that there will be no turning back in the process of liberating the Portuguese people, no turning back on the road to a socialism with a human face that cannot be crushed under the treads of the tanks of any imperialism.

Many of those who defame us today, who are trying to convince public opinion that we are nothing but a bunch of counterrevolutionists, awakened to politics after the

\* That is, those who proclaimed themselves "progressives" only the day after the defeat of reaction.—IP

fascist repressive machine was dismantled and have not yet learned that truth is revolutionary. They are falling back into fear of political debate and into autocratic schemas, which elsewhere on the globe have established a world of silence in the name of the classless society that cannot be built on the basis of such notions.

Rejecting the opportunistic support of rightist forces, we voice our firm determination to continue this fight for freedom of expression and for the right of the Portuguese people to know the facts, a struggle that is inseparable from the struggle for socialism. In line with this, we reject both anarcho-populist adventurism and one-party dogmatism.

We believe that in this way we are maintaining the political principles acquired and tempered in the difficult times of fascism, and that by so doing we are showing respect for the will clearly expressed by the Portuguese people when they hailed the liberation of April 25, 1974, and confirmed at the ballot box on April 25, 1975.

Conscious of the essential role information plays in building the new society, we cannot fail to express our indignation at the way the news is being more and more controlled so as to manipulate the people and hide the reality, with a monopoly being given to unrepresentative voices that every day more clearly reveal a utopian deliriousness that is completely out of touch with the real country and the aspirations of the toiling masses.

Let us fight today as we did yesterday against all privilege. In this we are at the service of the Portuguese people as intellectual workers, rejecting equally all forms of elitism and subordination to sectarian interests or new catechisms.

Desanctifying, demystifying, and demythologizing should be proud tasks for revolutionists.

We do not think that human reality is so poor that it has to come down always to a struggle between Good and Evil. All dictatorships begin with this kind of disrespect, regarding persons as Christians or atheists, Aryans or Jews, Whites or Blacks.

Because we believe in human beings, who always upset the crude schemas to which totalitarian systems try to reduce them, we affirm our determination to struggle for freedom and the end of exploitation. Since we have no weapons but words, only force will reduce us to silence. □

Documents discussed at 1974 Tenth World Congress of Fourth International. 128 pages, 8½ x 11, \$2.50

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## Gandhi's Straitjacket for the Press

[The following are the "Censorship Guidelines for the Press" distributed to foreign correspondents July 21 by the Press Information Bureau of India. We have taken the text from the July 22 *New York Times*.]

\* \* \*

### [1]

The purpose of censorship is to guide and advise the press to guard against publication of unauthorized, irresponsible or demoralizing news items, reports, conjectures or rumors. To this end, these guidelines are intended to enlist the voluntary cooperation of all sections of the press in maintaining an atmosphere conducive to the maintenance of public order, stability and economic growth in the country.

### [2]

Censorship covers any news, report, comment, statement, visual representation, film, photograph, picture and cartoon.

### [3]

Censorship applies to the publication of news comments or reports relating to the proceedings in Parliament, any legislative assembly or a court of law. The following should be kept in view for the publication of the proceedings of:

#### A

Parliament and legislative assemblies:

i. The statements made on behalf of government may be published either in full or in a condensed form, but its contents should not infringe censorship.

ii. Names and party affiliation of members speaking on a subject and their support for or against the subject may be mentioned.

iii. The results of voting on a bill, motion or resolution may be factually reported, and in the event of voting, the number of votes cast for and against mentioned.

iv. No extraparlimentary activity, or anything excluded for the official proceedings of Parliament-legislative assembly, should be published.

#### B

Courts of law:

i. The names of the judges and the counsels may be mentioned.

ii. The operative part of the order of the court may be published but in appropriate language.

iii. Nothing should be published which infringes censorship.

### [4]

The following should be kept in view in publishing news, comments or reports:

#### A

The factual accuracy of all news and reports should be insured and nothing should be published which is based on hearsay or rumor.

#### B

Reproduction of any objectionable matter already published is not permissible.

#### C

No unauthorized news or advertisement or illustration should be published in regard to vital means of communication.

#### D

Nothing should be published about arrangements relating to the protection of transport or communications, supply and distribution of essential commodities, industries etc.

#### E

Nothing which is sought to be published should relate to agitations and violent incidents.

#### F

Quotations, if torn out of context and intended to mislead or convey a distorted or wrong impression, should not be published.

#### G

There should be no indication in the published material that it has been censored.

#### H

No reference should be made to the places of detention and the names of the political personalities detained.

#### I

Nothing should be published which is likely to:

i. Affect India's relations with foreign countries;

ii. Subvert the functioning of democratic institutions;

iii. Denigrate the institutions of the prime minister, president, governors and judges of Supreme Court and high courts;

iv. Threaten internal security and economic stability;

v. Cause disaffection among the members of the armed forces or public servants;

vi. Bring into hatred or contempt the government established by law in the country;

vii. Promote feeling of enmity and hatred between different classes of citizens in India;

viii. Cause or produce or instigate or incite, directly or indirectly, the cessation and slowing down of work in any place within the country;

ix. Undermine the public confidence in the national credit or in any government loan;

x. Encourage or incite any person or class of persons to refuse or defer payment of taxes;

xi. Instigate the use of criminal force against public servants;

xii. Encourage people to break prohibitory laws.

### [5]

Quotations from air broadcasts, news



agency reports and statements officially released by government are permissible provided that such quotations give a true and faithful account of what has been stated and nothing is taken out of the relevant matter.

[6]

Confirmation of any report picked up by correspondents from a source which is not official or authentic can be obtained from the press information officer.

[7]

If any report, comment or other matter, save and except editorial comment, is published in any newspaper, journal, periodical or other document which is contrary

to the letter and spirit of these guidelines, and if it is apparent that it could only have been based on material supplied by the local correspondent, responsibility for it shall be fixed upon the local correspondent unless otherwise proved.

[8]

Copies of all press dispatches not subjected to precensorship should be filed with the chief censor for his information.

[9]

In case of any doubt about the advisability or otherwise of publishing any news, report of publishing any news, report of comment, the chief censor should be consulted. □

policies rather than a class-struggle line based on the needs of the masses. Thus, while the CPI has attached itself to the coattails of Indira Gandhi, the CPI(M) has blocked with other bourgeois forces, even right-wing communalists.

The decision of the CPI, with the full backing of *Pravda*, to support the state of emergency and offer its full cooperation to Indira Gandhi once again reveals the political and moral bankruptcy of Stalinism. Under guise of opposing reaction, the CPI now openly backs repression, justifies the arrest of its former comrades in the CPI(M), and praises press censorship.

While unequivocally condemning the new measures of the Indira Gandhi government and demanding their immediate repeal, we emphasize that these are the culmination of a series of repressive measures which have taken place in India since 1967-68, and which have been directed against the workers movement. The world bourgeois press, which is now shedding hypocritical tears over the demise of "Indian democracy," has been silent about the continuing imprisonment, torture, and killing of radicals. There are today some 40,000 political prisoners, many of whom belong to Maoist groups. Hundreds have been killed in prison. Two of them, Kista Gowd and Bhoomia, are still awaiting execution in Andhra Pradesh prison. On these prisoners the bourgeoisie remains silent.

The Fourth International calls for a resolute campaign in the international workers movement to demand the immediate end of the state of emergency in India and the release of all political prisoners. We call for the broadest possible united-front efforts toward this objective. □

## End the State of Emergency in India!

[The following declaration was adopted by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International by unanimous vote July 6.]

\* \* \*

The Fourth International condemns the declaration of a state of emergency in India by the Indira Gandhi government and the measures which have followed it, such as the arrests of thousands of people, the outlawing of twenty-six organizations, and the imposition of a rigid press censorship. While directed mainly at the right-wing parties at the present time, they include attacks against working-class parties like the CPI(M) [Communist party of India (Marxist)] and the banning of several Maoist organizations. These measures constitute an attack on the Indian workers movement and the oppressed masses as a whole, who will be the ones to suffer the most from the dictatorial turn of the Gandhi regime. This has already been exemplified by the wage freeze and attacks on the right to strike. The measures taken by the Congress government mark a further deterioration of an already fragile bourgeois democracy in India, and bring the Indira Gandhi regime into line with the other regimes of South Asia: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are now all ruled under a state of emergency. In Bangladesh, the newest of these states, this has already been institutionalized by the creation of a one-party state, mass arrests of radicals, and the banning of the left-wing weekly *Holiday*.

The suspension of civil liberties reflects the inability of the Indian bourgeoisie to find a solution to the social crisis which has plagued the country for nearly two decades, and which has led to a massive loss of confidence in the Gandhi regime.

The overwhelming election victory of Indira Gandhi in the 1971 general elections

was the result of her appearance as the "liberator of Bangladesh" and her radical demagoguery throughout the election campaign, encapsulated in the slogan, "End Poverty." This was given added credibility by her alliance with the CPI [Communist party of India], while at the same time she dispensed with the services of many veteran right-wing Congress leaders and party managers. But the worsening of the social crisis since 1971 gradually began to erode the popular support for Gandhi and the Congress. Mass famines on a level not seen since the 1930s and 1940s, food hoarding, a thriving black market, smuggling on a vastly increased scale, and a further generalization of corruption caused the discontent seething among the masses to erupt in huge mobilizations. The failure of the mass workers organizations to provide leadership for this explosive mass discontent, and to provide a national focus for an opposition to Congress based on class politics, enabled reactionary forces, employing populist demagoguery, to assert a strong influence at the leadership level in these mass mobilizations. This explains the Gandhi regime's attack on right-wing forces as a prelude to the broader general attack on the masses as a whole.

The tragedy of the Indian workers and poor peasants lies precisely in the fact that the two largest workers parties, the Communist party of India and the Communist party of India (Marxist), are totally incapable of developing a struggle against Indian capital and in the interests of the working class and oppressed poor. This failure was clearly manifest in the inability of these parties to organize any response at all to the wage freeze, and in the abject failure to mobilize support and solidarity for the railway workers strike of 1974, which was brutally crushed by the Indira Gandhi government. The CPI and the CPI(M) put forward class-collaborationist

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## Chapter 8

# The First International Days of Protest

By Fred Halstead

The NCC did a modest job of coordinating and publicity in building the October 15-16 International Days of Protest. Far more was done by the Berkeley VDC and by other local committees and coalitions that organized the activities in particular cities. The VDC was chiefly responsible for spreading the word internationally. But the success of these demonstrations in the United States depended not so much on the activity of the NCC as on its very existence, which signified a unity behind the initiative of the Berkeley VDC. The important thing is that a national call went out. The mounting escalation of the war and the spreading antiwar sentiment assured a significant response to a unified call, particularly since no major force within the antiwar movement challenged it.

In this regard the attitude of SANE was important. To its credit, SANE proved it had learned a lesson from the fiasco of the earlier attacks by the right wing of the movement on the SDS march on

York school system and chairperson of a citywide teachers' antiwar committee, called some meetings to gather forces interested in organizing a New York response to the call for October 15-16. Nonexclusion was the rule, but as more groups became involved some balked at public association with others. A compromise was worked out whereby formally a committee was established as a group of individuals, but each was understood to be a prominent member of an antiwar committee, or of a community, trade union, political, or pacifist group. In effect the committee became the most broadly representative united-front-type coalition on the left to develop in New York City in decades. Abner Grunauer, a retired professional who was a member of New York SANE, participated actively, though SANE would not allow him to have his name listed on the committee's literature for October 15-16. This was a formality, however, since New York SANE contributed its share both to the committee's discussions and to the building of its activities, as well as to its finances through the purchase of leaflets, and sending out its own mailings.

The New York plans called for a speakout possibly involving civil disobedience, to be held at the Whitehall Street military induction center on October 15, and a mass march and rally on Saturday, October 16. The October 15 affair was organized by the pacifists and sponsored by anyone else who wished, while the Saturday event was sponsored by the entire committee. This was necessary because some of the groups involved with the full committee did not wish to be associated with civil disobedience.<sup>3</sup>

At Grunauer's suggestion it was agreed that the mass march would be on Fifth Avenue. For some reason Grunauer insisted it be called a parade, so the group was dubbed the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee. Thus the rather incongruous name of what developed into the largest and most important local antiwar coalition in the United States in the late 1960s.

At first the Parade Committee had no staff, no money, and no office. Constituent groups were asked to donate whatever they could. The office was set up in a cubbyhole occupied by the Teachers Committee at 5 Beekman Street where the top two floors were largely devoted to a complex of pacifist groups including the War Resisters League, the Committee for Nonviolent Action, the Catholic Peace Fellowship, *Liberation* magazine, and the offices of Dellinger and A.J. Muste. From the start Muste took a keen interest in the project. (After the October events he became the Parade Committee's chairman.) Dellinger and Becker were the coordinators, and for the October 16 event a staff of four was loaned by constituent organizations. Eric Weinberger of CNVA, Dave McReynolds of the WRL, Linda Dannenberg (later Morse), a pacifist from Philadelphia, and myself from the Socialist Workers Party. Al Urie, also of CNVA, staffed the October 15 affair.

I recall this telling incident during one of the first staff meetings where Muste was present. He reported that a man "of

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Washington. SANE changed the date of its not widely publicized plans for an October 15 event in Washington "in order to avoid a conflict with events sponsored by other organizations."<sup>1</sup> This gave its chapters an opening to participate in the October 15-16 events locally, though not without registering a certain discomfort with the situation.

Referring to the NCC, SANE declared: "While the Coordinating Committee, an outgrowth of the 'Assembly of the Unrepresented,' is itself an unrepresentative group of the Left and those radical pacifists with a penchant for civil disobedience, SANE believes its chapters and members should indeed help to promote community-centered activities at that time—as long as they involve a cross-section of groups in your city. And while activities of a protest nature are wholly inadequate to the present intricate and fast-changing situation, there is a gamut of useful community activities which might be undertaken."<sup>2</sup> There followed a list of suggested activities of an educational nature which did not include, yet did not exclude, demonstrations.

This was a concession of no small import because it meant that the building of October 15-16 could proceed without open attacks from the right wing of the movement and where local sponsors chose to do so, they had a good chance to involve the more moderate forces. That's the way it worked out in New York City.

There Dave Dellinger and Norma Becker, a teacher in the New

1. *SANE Action*, September 7, 1965.

2. *Ibid.*

3. David Miller, a Catholic pacifist, burned his draft card in front of the TV cameras at the October 15 Whitehall speakout, in defiance of a law passed by Congress earlier in the year outlawing this particular form of symbolic protest.



Militant

Part of crowd of 30,000 persons at New York demonstration October 16, 1965. Dave Dellinger and I.F. Stone are at speaker's stand.

some experience in this type of organizing" had volunteered his services and that though the offer was for only part time, Muste thought it might be important to add him to the staff and list it that way in the committee's literature. The man was Henry Abrams, who had been fired by SANE back in 1960 because of Senator Thomas Dodd's red-baiting attack. Muste made this proposal in the tentative way he had of throwing out a suggestion to see what the reaction would be. It was clear he took a certain pleasure in seeing it accepted, and later adopted by the entire committee, including the representative of SANE. It was a new day.

The first leaflet advertising the New York march not only contained the name of Henry Abrams at the top of the staff list (it worked out that way alphabetically) but also the names of many of the committee members, each of whom was recognizable as prominent in one of the various groups supporting the march, though none of the organizations was listed.

The list included Al Evanoff of District 65, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Workers, AFL-CIO; Moe Foner of Hospital Workers Local 1199; Elizabeth Sutherland of SNCC; Margery Haring of the American Friends Service Committee; Dixie Bayo of the Movement for Puerto Rican Independence (MPI); Lila Hoffman of Women Strike for Peace; Levi Laub of the Progressive Labor Party; Clifton DeBerry of the Socialist Workers Party; Robert Thompson of the Communist Party (who died the day of the march); John Fuerst of SDS; Dave McReynolds, who in addition to his WRL position was also a member of SP-SDF;

Stanley Aronowitz of *Studies on the Left*; Irving Beinin of the *National Guardian*, and many others.<sup>4</sup>

To the sizable and sophisticated New York radical milieu the appearance of such a list backing the same action in itself contained a certain magical appeal. Partly this was due to the attractiveness of unity, partly because the unaffiliated could feel assured that this was not just another "front" controlled by one group for its own narrow purposes, but also because it represented a refreshing challenge to the cold-war, witch-hunt atmosphere.

The unity was not easily come by and at times the committee seemed on the verge of breaking up. It might have, if it hadn't been for the deep respect virtually everyone involved had for A.J. Muste, and for his skill as a conciliator. This respect stemmed from Muste's long involvement with the pacifist, labor, radical, and civil rights movements,<sup>5</sup> and from his habit over the years of helping out anyone who was suffering discrimination, harassment, or imprisonment because of activities on behalf of unpopular social causes. It was not a question of asking him for money, though if the case were desperate enough, A.J. could usually find a source for bail or aid in providing personal items for prisoners and things of that sort. Often it was just the use of his name on a letterhead, his appearance at a picket line, or his intervention—as an ordained minister—on behalf of some radical,

4. Parade Committee leaflet for October 16. (Author's files.)

5. See Nat Hentoff's biography, *Peace Agitator: the Story of A.J. Muste* (New York: Macmillan, 1963).

like as not an atheist, forced to deal with a prejudiced agency where a word from a religious source would ease the way.

Muste, it must be said, had about him a certain aura of respectability, not entirely uncultivated, which he never hesitated to use on behalf of the unrespectable. There were never any political strings, certainly not general political agreement, attached to his aid. If he didn't think something was right in and of itself, Muste wouldn't do it. And if he did think so, that was enough for him. There was hardly a person on the Parade Committee, except the very youngest, whose life—either personally or through friends and political associates—had not been touched at one time or another by these unstinting efforts of A.J.

Nor did his effectiveness at conciliation depend on his bending his own views to the middle. Occasionally he did straddle issues under dispute, but as a rule Muste was a person of sharply defined, often quite radical, views. In the Parade Committee discussions he would state his own position and seek to convince others of it, but he never cut off relations or expressed anger with anyone because they didn't agree with him. He would listen carefully to the other side's argument, find the logic in it, then try to find a point where there was agreement and work together on that, biding his time for movement in his direction on other matters. So it was with the main bone of contention within the Parade Committee in preparing for October 16—the question of what the demands of the demonstration would be.

Some of the smaller groups such as the Spartacist League, which originated in a split from the SWP, wanted slogans like "Victory to the Vietnamese Revolution." Needless to say, such suggestions were anathema to groups like SANE.

I spoke against excluding such slogans, but saw no useful purpose for them in a demonstration appealing to Americans with demands directed at the U.S. government. We were, after all, not speaking to Vietnamese. Both from the point of view of those simply opposed to the war, and those who, like myself, were partisans of the Vietnamese revolution, our central task as Americans was to put maximum pressure on the U.S. to get out of Vietnam. That would help the Vietnamese revolution more than anything else we could possibly do. And we would be far more effective in that respect with activities and slogans designed to mobilize the maximum number of Americans around the key point of getting out of Vietnam than with revolutionary-sounding but, from the point of view of mobilizing the mass of Americans, essentially empty rhetoric.

The main debate centered around "negotiations" versus "immediate withdrawal," or some form of it like "Bring the Troops Home Now." SANE, backed by other liberal-oriented forces including the CP, insisted on adopting the demand for "negotiations." Most of the radical pacifists, including Dellinger and Muste; the Trotskyists; and the representatives of the campus committees supported "immediate withdrawal."

The former group presented themselves as concerned with the practicalities: All wars end with some type of negotiations. This one will too. The U.S. is not about to just pack up and leave unilaterally (not everyone in SANE was convinced that it should). The problem, then, was to get the negotiations started, to have a cease-fire while they proceeded, get the U.S. to negotiate with those they were fighting, including the National Liberation Front. What is more, the argument went, it is clear there are differences within the establishment in the U.S., reflected in Congress. We must back the "doves" in this debate and raise demands which can convince the powers that be that there was a way to end the fighting.

Most of the other group were concerned with the principles in the case: Of course there will eventually be negotiations. But our problem is not to advise U.S. statesmen, or even congressmen, but to put maximum pressure on the U.S. government to stop its invasion of Vietnam. The U.S. simply has no right whatever to be militarily involved in Vietnam, and only a demand for getting out

immediately can clearly and unequivocally express this moral imperative. The "negotiations" demand does not clearly differentiate between our outrage and Johnson's maneuvers. Johnson also claims to favor negotiations. What is more, the "negotiations" demand when directed by Americans at the American government implies some right of the U.S. in Vietnam, something over which to negotiate, and implicitly violates the sovereignty of the Vietnamese.

Once, when the argument reached this point, one of the "negotiations" supporters shouted: "Bullshit. How do you even withdraw without negotiations?"

To which several on the other side shouted in unison: "On ships and planes, the same way you got in."

When it became clear there was no meeting of minds, it was agreed to disagree. SANE, however, objected to the proposals that everyone simply carry whatever slogan they wished, or that the committee adopt several slogans, including one on "negotiations" and another on "withdrawal." SANE insisted that "immediate withdrawal" could not even appear, that if it did they would have to dissociate themselves from the affair. To this the others replied, then "negotiations" can't appear either. It was finally agreed that the committee would adopt only one slogan: "Stop the War in Vietnam Now," with which both sides could agree.

SANE then insisted that only the single official Parade Committee slogan be permitted. I and others balked at this on the grounds that we had had enough of the attempts to remove signs from the hands of movement people and that we would not be a part of any such thing.

Muste listened to this heated debate and then said directly to me: "But will *you* and *your people* agree not to organize flooding the parade with other slogans?" Under the circumstances it was a reasonable point.

So it was finally resolved that the sponsoring groups would each refrain from making signs with slogans other than the one agreed to, that we would ask our members to carry the Parade Committee signs, that if any individual or small group that was not party to the agreement brought their own, the Parade Committee would not attempt to physically remove them. It was also resolved that all the groups would be welcome to distribute their own literature. This agreement was honored by all the major groups.

As part of the agreement, the call to the demonstration contained this statement:

"A variety of groups have programs and platforms for ending the war. We urge you to consider them seriously and to make up your own mind which activities and groups you should work through. We all agree that any solution must include the removal of all foreign troops from Vietnam and the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own future, free from external interference. . . .

"Many groups and individuals are cooperating in organizing this parade. They have agreed upon a single slogan which will appear on the hundreds and hundreds of posters and banners which will be carried—a massive sea of posters and banners each with the slogan STOP THE WAR IN VIETNAM NOW. Posters will be supplied to the marchers—if you wish to make your own, please use the slogan STOP THE WAR IN VIETNAM NOW."

The Spartacist League walked out of the committee over this question, carried their own slogans the day of the march, and chastised the SWP for being party to the one-slogan agreement.<sup>6</sup> It is true that this was an uncomfortable compromise for those of us in the SWP, particularly since virtually every member of the Parade Committee with the exception of the SANE representative, professed to be personally in favor of immediate withdrawal from Vietnam, and those who supported the "negotiations" slogan

6. Spartacist leaflet. (Copy in author's files.)

claimed to do so only because they thought it was a better way to appeal to broader forces. This concession went against our grain because we were thoroughly convinced—and remained so—that SANE's equivocal position on the war was not only morally unacceptable but not nearly as popular an approach to the mass of the American people as the immediate withdrawal position. But we made the agreement for October 16, lived up to it scrupulously, and never regretted having done so.

For us this was a way to remain in the best possible position to continue the fight for a mass movement with the principled program of unequivocal opposition to the U.S. military presence in Vietnam. To have split the committee over slogans would either have greatly reduced the size of the demonstration or isolated the left wing from the rank and file of the liberal-oriented groups, probably both, precisely at a time when thousands of people were opening their minds to new ideas.

If the compromise had meant subsuming the left wing under the program of the right wing, we would not have agreed to it. But the agreed-upon slogan did not exclude the immediate withdrawal solution. Also the Parade Committee was nonexclusive. We all had a chance to participate in working out common agreements. And what is crucial, each group maintained its right, within the committee and publicly, to press its own point of view in discussions and literature. Under those conditions the compromise was both principled and tactically wise, in my opinion. It gave us a chance to patiently explain to a receptive audience, and to await a change in the relationship of forces which would make possible a new step forward in our strategic goal of developing a mass movement to force the unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam.

The Parade Committee printed up several thousand placards to be carried by marchers October 16, and because only the single slogan was used, variety was provided by art work—such as a detail from Picasso's *Guernica*, and big photographs of Vietnamese to give the observers a look at the "enemy." Different effects were also provided by different contingents. One of the most effective that day was the Bread and Puppet Theater, directed by Peter Schumann, which was led by a huge puppet of President Johnson followed by depictions of Vietnamese victims of the bombing and relatives in mourning.

In addition the slogan was printed on balloons filled with helium which were distributed to the children in the march. The object of all this was not just color and variety, but to set a tone which would make it as easy as possible for onlookers to open their minds to the demonstrators, and as hard as possible for hostile forces to attack the march. We were all well aware of the bitterness with which prowar forces viewed what we were doing. Antiwar demonstrators in those days were consistently labeled traitors who were stabbing "our boys" in the back.

The New York demonstration was prepared in the context of a generally hostile atmosphere from the major news media and the city officials, not to mention the federal government. The event got almost no favorable publicity beforehand in the daily press and had to be publicized mainly by leaflets distributed by volunteers, by word of mouth, and a few hundred dollars worth of ads, mainly in the alternate press.

After considerable haggling, a permit was obtained from the city authorities for a march in the street on Fifth Avenue from Ninety-first to Sixty-eighth streets, but Parks Commissioner Newbold Morris refused to allow the rally at the Mall in Central Park, so it had to be held in the street. This was a headache both for the organizers and for the traffic, which was blocked for an extended period. There was no good technical reason for this. It was just bureaucratic hostility to the new movement. But the demonstration probably had a greater impact as a result. It was the last time the parks were refused to the Parade Committee.

Along the route of march there were several organized bands of

prowar hecklers. Some of them tried to rush the march and start fights. The marchers kept themselves in general good order, however, flowing past the hecklers, isolating them, and refusing to be provoked. What made this possible was the size of the demonstration—some 30,000—and the fact that the great bulk of the onlookers were either friendly or simply curious in a nonhostile manner. The organized groups of hecklers and provocateurs found themselves isolated and, to their surprise, unable to get support for attacks on the march from bystanders on the street.

This in itself made the marchers feel they had won a significant victory, for in truth no one really knew beforehand what the reaction of the general public would be. Two weeks later, on October 30, a march to support the U.S. role in Vietnam was held, also on Fifth Avenue. In spite of front-page publicity for a week ahead of time in a major New York daily, the *Journal American*; backing by the City Council, American Legion, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars; the presence in the reviewing stand of Senator Jacob Javits; and the use of twenty-five marching bands, the prowar parade was smaller than the October 16 affair, and far smaller than its backers had predicted.

\* \* \*

Meanwhile in Berkeley the discussions within the VDC in preparation for the International Days of Protest assumed a different character than those in the New York Parade Committee. At that time the question of "immediate withdrawal"—essentially that the U.S. had no right whatever in Vietnam—was a settled issue within the radical, student dominated VDC. The more moderate groups in the Bay Area peace movement—like Turn Toward Peace—were simply not involved. The discussions in the loosely structured, "participatory democracy"-type meetings of the VDC tended to center around style and tactics, and the decisions were made less by vote than by experiment. Those who liked an action participated and those who didn't simply abstained from that particular activity.

This period of VDC activity was characterized by imaginative and nettlesome forms of protest. For example, a VDC activist discovered that dogs were being trained for possible use in Vietnam at a small army facility in Tilden Park, not far from Berkeley. Soon, official-looking signs appeared all over the park warning that military dogs were being trained in the area, were vicious, and would attack people. A signature in small type said the sign was posted as a public service by the Vietnam Day Committee.<sup>7</sup> The army was thereafter plagued by protests and was soon forced to close the facility.

When it became known that napalm bombs were being manufactured in Redwood City, about thirty miles south of San Francisco, and transported on the highways to Port Chicago, about twenty miles north of Berkeley, VDC activists painted a pickup truck an official-looking gray and mounted a large, yellow sign with flashing lights on the back that said: "Danger, Napalm Bombs Ahead." They would then follow the trucks carrying the napalm through the heavily populated Bay Area. This contributed to the furor about napalm which was growing in the country.<sup>8</sup>

The VDC organized well-publicized picket lines against President Johnson in June when he appeared at a United Nations anniversary ceremony in San Francisco, and in August against General Maxwell Taylor when he returned from Vietnam. At Taylor's hotel, demonstrators blocked an elevator while Taylor was on it and distributed a flyer with the general's picture and the caption: "Wanted for war crimes."

7. One of these posters was made available to the author by Paul Montauk of Berkeley.

8. Letter to the author from Syd Stapleton, June 17, 1965.

Always sensitive to the international implication of the Vietnam issues, the VDC organized picket lines to cheer the crews of a Mexican and a Greek ship after they refused to accept U.S. war cargoes for Vietnam.

In August the VDC organized several attempts to stop trains carrying troops and materiel bound for Vietnam. Students as far away as Utah informed the VDC beforehand when the trains were coming through. These demonstrations varied from a few dozen to a few hundred. They succeeded only in slowing down the trains briefly, but they got wide publicity. They also provided the first concerted experience in reaching GIs with the antiwar message. The results of this aspect of the troop-train demonstrations were not entirely positive. Some of the demonstrators carried signs and shouted slogans that were hostile to the GIs.

The YSAers raised some sharp discussion within the VDC on this question, but it would take many months and a lot of experience before the movement as a whole would come to see GIs as an important element of the antiwar constituency.<sup>9</sup>

One by-product of these discussions, however, was the plan for leafleting GIs at the Oakland Army Terminal as part of the October 15-16 demonstrations. The VDC printed up a special leaflet for the purpose, written by Jerry Rubin and heavily edited by Asher Harer, a San Francisco longshoreman, a Trotskyist, and a longtime activist in labor and radical causes in the Bay Area. It was headlined: "Attention All Military Personnel" and it began:

"You may soon be sent to Vietnam. You have heard about the war in the news; your officers will give you pep talks about it. But you probably feel as confused and uncertain as most Americans do. Many people will tell you to just follow orders and leave the thinking to others. But you have the right to know as much about this war as anyone. After all, it's you—not your congressman—who might get killed."<sup>10</sup>

As it turned out, the demonstrators never got to the Oakland Army Terminal so these leaflets had to be distributed elsewhere. Originally the Berkeley VDC plan for October 15-16 had been announced as a teach-in at the UC campus followed by "massive civil disobedience," something that always proved easier to talk about than to actually organize. In July the *VDC News* carried an article on October 15-16 signed by Rubin, Gullahorn, and Smale which said:

"If on October 16 in Berkeley, for example, thousands of students and others block the gates of the Oakland Army Terminal where munitions are shipped to Vietnam, and are arrested, attention will be focused dramatically on the issues in Vietnam to an extent that no atrocity in Vietnam can match. The issue will be opened. Scenes of thousands of middle-class youth being carried away by military police will be in every American living room. . . ."<sup>11</sup>

As the demonstration approached, the plan was modified as follows: After the teach-in October 15, demonstrators would march through the streets of Berkeley and Oakland to the terminal at Maritime Street, where army barracks lay on one side and ships loading for Vietnam on the other. There, according to the VDC announcement, "we intend to continue our teach-in in an empty lot opposite the barracks and to beam it to the soldiers, asking them to consider seriously the implications of their participating in an immoral war. . . . If the police try to interfere with the march or try to disperse the teach-in, we will be arrested rather than submit to this infringement of our civil liberties. . . . Of course even in this case there will be an opportunity to avoid arrest for those who wish to."<sup>12</sup>

The teach-in went off as planned. That evening some 15,000

demonstrators left the campus marching toward Oakland. The Oakland authorities had refused a parade permit. As the marchers approached the Oakland city limit they could see some 400 Oakland police wearing riot helmets, brandishing special riot weapons, blocking the way. The march stopped less than a hundred yards from the police line. As spectators and a group of about 100 right-wing counterdemonstrators filled the gap between the march and the police, a previously agreed to subcommittee of the VDC held a swirling, confused discussion on what to do. Smale says he favored asking the whole crowd to sit down on the spot but Steve Weissman and Jack Weinberg favored turning the march to a nearby park in Berkeley. They convinced the majority of the subcommittee and the march proceeded to the park, where the teach-in was continued and another march called for the next day.<sup>13</sup>

On Saturday, October 16, only 5,000 marchers returned to the Oakland city limits where they were again stopped by police. Actually there were two lines of police, one directly in front of the march, made up of Berkeley cops, and the other just across the city line, made up of Oakland cops. At this point, members of the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang, rushing from the Oakland side, tried to attack the front of the march, shouting "America for the Americans." To do this, however, they had to pass through the two lines of cops. The Oakland cops let them through, and the Berkeley cops tried to stop them at the border. A fight ensued in which a Berkeley policeman's leg was broken, whereupon the Hell's Angels were hauled off to the Berkeley jail. The antiwar demonstrators held a sit-down, but were not arrested. They dispersed peacefully.<sup>14</sup>

The VDC managed a comeuppance against both the Hell's Angels and the Oakland authorities. On October 20 the VDC received a call from the Central Labor Council of Richmond, a city just north of Berkeley, seeking support for a strike in which the Hell's Angels and another motorcycle gang, called Hitler's American Sons, were acting as strikebreakers.<sup>15</sup>

The VDC responded with pleasure, sending 150 pickets to the plant to join various unionists who had also been called. The Richmond police then cordoned off the area and the strikebreakers couldn't get in. Union business agent Clyde L. Johnson of Millmen's Local 550 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters publicly thanked the VDC saying, "This is the best picket line I've seen since the 1930s."<sup>16</sup>

The VDC also announced another march through Oakland. Oakland Mayor John C. Houlihan appealed to Governor Edmund G. Brown to declare illegal the use of the Berkeley campus for organizing the march. A general uproar ensued in civil liberties circles, and even the liberal Republican San Francisco *Chronicle* ran a biting editorial, declaring: "Last weekend there was introduced into the free and great society of the East Bay the concept of the Oakland Wall. Here at checkpoint Houlihan, foreigners were held up by the city's defense forces, impregnable against all comers except the Hell's Angels."<sup>17</sup>

On behalf of the VDC, attorney Vincent Hallinan obtained a court order allowing the march through Oakland, though not to

12. VDC leaflet, undated. (Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.)

13. Author's interview with Stephen Smale, October 6, 1973. Taped.

14. Author's taped interviews with Stephen Smale and Paul Montauk, October 6, 1973, and with Syd Stapleton, October 28, 1973.

15. VDC defense guard leaflet. (Copy in author's files.)

16. *The Militant*, November 1, 1965.

17. *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 21, 1965.

9. *Ibid.*

10. VDC leaflet dated October 16, 1965. (Copy in author's files.)

11. *VDC News*, July 1965. (Copy in author's files.)

the Army Terminal, and enjoining the Oakland authorities from interfering with it.

On November 20 the VDC finally made it past the Oakland border, this time with 20,000 antiwar marchers en route to a rally at De Fremery Park. Speakers at the rally included two state assemblymen, as well as Nathaniel Walker, a Black student who headed a delegation of civil rights fighters from Selma, Alabama; and Donald Duncan, a retired master sergeant of the U.S. Special Forces who had turned against the war during eighteen months in Vietnam.

\* \* \*

The October 15-16 demonstrations were the largest up to that time. In addition to Berkeley and New York, they took place in some sixty cities across the United States, mainly where campus-based Committees to End the War in Vietnam (CEWVs) had been formed. All told, perhaps some 100,000 Americans demonstrated on those days. The movement was still relatively small, but October 15-16 put it on the map as not just a flurry, and provided

a visibility proving that Johnson's claimed "consensus" on the war did not really exist.

In addition, the VDC's international call was responded to by hundreds of organizations around the world in one way or another. There were demonstrations in twelve European countries and in Canada, Australia, Mexico, Chile, and many other places. The effect of the American antiwar movement overseas was perhaps best expressed by a letter to the VDC from the National Anti-Atomic March Committee in Brussels (where 3,000 demonstrated October 16):

"We admit that we did not dare believe . . . that the students of the United States would express so widely and with such energy, their criticism of a policy which causes such great anger in our country. . . ."<sup>18</sup>

[Next chapter: *The SANE March on Washington and the NCC Convention*]

18. Report by International Committee of VDC, undated. (Copy in author's files.)

## FROM OUR READERS

Bill Warren of Champaign, Illinois, sent us the following comments on the article by Joseph Hansen "The Forced Evacuation of Cambodia's Cities," which appeared in our issue of May 19 (page 642):

"While I agree with your disapproval of the forced evacuation of Phnom Penh, I must disagree on several theoretical points.

"Your article implies that the leadership of the 'Khmer Rouge' was of purely peasant origin. Actually, as proved in *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War* by Malcolm Caldwell (Monthly Review Press), the leadership consisted both of city intellectuals and more importantly of militants from the *rubber plantation workers strike movement*.

"Secondly, you claim that after the evacuation of the Lon Nol people there was no significant number of exploiters in Cambodia. This is not true as the dominant mode of exploitation in most of Cambodia was usurious money-lending to free-holding peasants by petty money lenders, who often lent money in turn lent to them by foreign banks. Thus, although there was a politically powerful group of large landlords, the social base of the landlord system was confined to Battambang province.

"The fact that a significant portion of the Phnom Penh population consisted of petty usurers, together with the fact that most urban workers were unproductive since Phnom Penh was not a large industrial center equivalent to Petrograd explains the peculiar hostility of the peasants toward Phnom Penh.

"Furthermore, according to the bourgeois

press, half of the population of Phnom Penh consisted of peasant refugees from the bombing of the countryside, which would have left the city anyway.

"Pronouncements by the regime about overcoming the contradiction between the city and countryside and setting up small industries in the countryside indicate that rather than remaining underdeveloped, the regime will engage upon an industrialization course in the ultraleft form of 'backyard blast furnaces.' This means that not only will the mistakes of the Chinese 'great leap forward,' as far as waste of labor in the industrial sector be repeated, but also—by the implications of this policy—that a brutal forced collectivization will be carried out."

*In reply:*

1. Some of the leaders of the peasant armies were former intellectuals and some of the ranks were former workers. The point is, however, that the main social force in these armies was peasant. The command structure created by these armies was not proletarian by either class origin or ideology.

2. The "capitalists or would-be capitalists," in Cambodia, as the article pointed out, were very weak, and after the departure of Lon Nol and his gang constituted no serious danger.

3. The evacuation of Phnompenh (and it now appears *all* of the cities and towns except those long held by the peasant forces) was directed against the urban toiling masses. The refugees who had fled

from the countryside to the cities do not appear to have been treated with more consideration than the rest of the urban population.

4. Thus the program being followed by the liberation forces "is not a communist program" no matter what excuses or apologies are offered for it. Of course, for revolutionary Marxists the main consideration is to understand the pattern of the Cambodian revolution. Otherwise it is not possible to influence, perhaps help it to develop in a more favorable direction, or even adequately defend it.

In writing us to change her address, W.J. of Winnipeg, Manitoba, enclosed a clipping of a report that appeared originally in the *Montréal Gazette* on the UN International Women's Year Conference held in Mexico City:

"It's a really good article that points out the ironies of the conference—like its being addressed by Echeverría, who, in 1968, shot down hundreds of students in cold blood. Also noted in the article is the fact that, despite all Echeverría's fine words, more than 1,600,000 illegal abortions are performed in Mexico each year—90 percent of them *self-induced*!!

"Talk about women's oppression and liberation is cheap these days and I am always grateful for ICP's fine coverage that shows up this tokenism for what it is."

Noting an error in Intercontinental Press, Paul Deveze of New York sent us the following note:

"We are a southeastern people, a Mediterranean people; fond of the scrubby green and gold of our Cévennes, the ramparts of Uzès, Orange, and Aigues-Mortes, our Rhône and the bulls of its delta, the gardens of Nîmes, the hilly, hurly-burly of Marseille.

"We taught the people of the damp, grey north the difference between butter, oil, and lard, in short, how to cook and eat; our footloose and rascally *troubadour* youth, how to sing and love in a new way.

"We are proud of our history of resistance to tyrannies whether of the Church of Rome, the Valois and Bourbons of Paris or fascist Nazis. In the majority we belong to and vote for working class organizations. We have made and do make mistakes. But contrary to the July 21, 1975 issue of *IP*, p. 1039, the peoples of Languedoc and Provence have not made the mistake of having designs on the peoples of southwestern France. Occitanians are a southeastern people, a Mediterranean people."

Will the person who borrowed it, please return the compass the editor keeps on his desk. No questions asked.

Grady W. Vandiver of Morongo Valley, California, is still recruiting for the socialist cause. He sent us the following letter along with his renewal:

"Besides food, clothing, and shelter there are two other things I cannot afford to be without and that is the Militant and the Intercontinental Press.

"I wish I was young and in better health. I would enjoy being active again in the Socialist Workers party and to be associated with the most beautiful people in the world who are dedicated to the socialist revolution.

"I will continue, for the rest of my life, to propagandize and agitate for a world socialist revolution."

Marty Rothman of Los Angeles, California, sent us the following letter:

"The opening statement of the July 7, 1975 issue of Intercontinental Press reads: 'To Washington's political police, the American Trotskyists of the Socialist Workers party and the Young Socialist Alliance represent the wave of the future—a movement that is tiny now but could come to represent the will of tens of millions of revolutionary-minded workers.'

"I find this statement most unfortunate. The left in America desperately needs nonsectarian, objective sources of information. The Intercontinental Press is a sophisticated attempt to provide such a service. But the above statement is sectarian and subjective.

"Washington's 'political police' focused their attention on many organizations, among which the SWP and YSA were two. Without doubt, the Trotskyists were re-

garded as 'dangerous' by the police agencies, but these two organizations were not the *only* groups treated to intensive surveillance and harassment. As for 'a movement that is tiny now but could come to represent the will of tens of millions of revolutionary-minded workers,' don't you think it's stretching things quite a bit to imply that the political police regard the SWP and the YSA as exclusively the tiny movement in question?

"Mistakes such as the above described are highly detrimental to your (our?) magazine. They narrow the appeal of the magazine to party members, and exclude 'independents' and allied leftists who seek reliable sources of information.

"The Intercontinental Press can be an important magazine of the left. But the left is notoriously critical and is supersensitive to manifestations of sectarianism. The unfortunate tone set by this 'news analysis' will drive away potential subscribers and will discourage SWP periphery.

"At the present historical moment in America, when growth of the left is slow, it is more important than ever to encourage unity and to reject sectarianism."

Marty Rothman is quite correct in stressing the fact that Washington's political police have subjected a much broader spectrum to surveillance and harassment than just the SWP and the YSA. The truth is that the illegal activities of the FBI, CIA, and similar agencies have been directed not only against organizations of the left, but against mass organizations, bourgeois liberals, governmental departments, and even members of Congress, as the mounting evidence shows unassailably.

Intercontinental Press has sought to do its part in publicizing the continuing exposures and in joining in the common defense effort against America's political police. Within this context, the article in question was intended only to call attention to a new batch of evidence of some size—98 dossiers totaling 256 pages—dealing with FBI harassment of the SWP and YSA specifically. This fresh evidence is, in our opinion, worthy of special attention by the entire left, the trade unions, and similar organizations.

The question concerning *why* the political police have devoted such extraordinary efforts to harassing and spying on the SWP and the YSA deserves consideration, too, in our opinion. The evidence dragged out of the FBI and CIA files so far shows that these efforts go back at least to the early 1950s. Other evidence, such as that brought out in the Minneapolis trials in 1941, shows that FBI surveillance and harassment date back still further.

The explanation as we see it is that the late and unlamented J. Edgar Hoover and

his cohorts punched the Trotskyists into their computers as representing *real* communism. Washington's political cops then operated according to the concept *crush it in the egg*.

John Markham, the former industrial reporter on the *Newsletter* (now the *Workers Press* of the Revolutionary Workers party), sent us the following letter from Oxford, England:

"I am writing to congratulate 'IP' on two counts. Firstly, the principled position you have taken on the defence of democratic rights in Portugal combined with the timely publication of Trotsky's article on freedom of the press.

"In Britain the position taken by *all* the main tendencies calling themselves 'Trotskyist' has in my opinion been a disgrace. Not one of them has come out unequivocally for the rights of the majority party of the Portuguese working class.

"As a former full-time professional worker and founder-member of the old SLL (now WRP) I still believe the SWP's reunification with the US [United Secretariat of the Fourth International] was incorrect. But let me say this. I am enormously impressed by the wealth of published material, documentation and reports you (and only you) make available to the world movement. Without your reports on Portugal it would have been almost impossible to unmask the new counter-revolutionary designs of the Portuguese Stalinists. I believe it shows a great sense of responsibility to the world movement." □

### Is Exxon a CIA Conduit?

Exxon Corporation has said the \$46 million to \$49 million in bribes it gave Italian political parties from 1963 to 1971 came from regular corporate funds. A report in the July 15 *Wall Street Journal* suggested, however, that the money may have been from a different source.

Staff writer William Carley said there was a "possibility that the Central Intelligence Agency might have used the oil companies as conduits to contribute funds to Italy's democratic parties, helping them fight the Communists. . . . Ashland Oil Inc. recently disclosed that one of its former European officials was on the CIA payroll, carrying out missions for the agency."

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