


## Junta Unveils Plan for Military Rule in Portugal



CARVALHO: General presses antidemocratic scheme to bring revolutionary process under control of military hierarchy.

## *Spectacular Victory Scored by Argentine Workers*

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An Interview With Séamas Costello

Wilson Clamps Lid on Wage Increases

NAACP Defends Black Job Gains

A Bircher Joins 'Terrorist' Smear Campaign

## A Military Straitjacket Dyed in Red

By Gerry Foley

The "people's grass-roots democracy" plan adopted by the Assembly of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) on July 8\* does not reflect a "radicalization" of Portugal's ruling military group as has been suggested by some bourgeois journalists, the Stalinists, and various confused elements on the left.

The move in reality represents an escalation of the offensive by the military to roll back the democratic freedoms won by the masses following the overturn of the Caetano government. It is a scheme to impose tight controls over the entire mass movement. It would convert the mass organizations into brakes upon further development of the revolutionary process. The plan was adopted under the pressure of a deepening economic crisis and the advance of a new wave of strikes, in nationalized industry in particular.

This step toward imposition of a military straitjacket constitutes striking evidence of the inability of the Portuguese ruling class to defend capitalism within the framework of bourgeois democracy. As the political representatives of a weak and battered imperialist bourgeoisie, besieged by a socialist-minded mass movement at home and explosive liberation movements in the colonies, the leaders of the Armed Forces Movement have resorted to the most extravagant demagoguery to disguise a scheme that, if applied, would give the government even more extensive control over the society than that exercised by the Salazar regime. It constitutes a charter for interfering immediately in all existing organizations of the workers and toiling masses for the purpose of subordinating them to the will of a bourgeois bonapartist junta.

The military leaders have been able to count not only on the Communist party, which is acting in accordance with Mos-

cow's policies in applying the détente in Western Europe, but on left-centrist and ultraleft groups that are opposed to Stalinism. These groups have made such a fetish of "rank-and-file organizing" and "direct initiatives" that they have lost sight of the current key political issues in Portugal. They have forgotten such vital questions as what class is ruling the country, what class the coalition government actually represents, and how the masses of workers must be educated politically if they are to win power.

The military has granted these left-centrist and ultraleft groups forms of organization tailored to look like the "soviets" and "people's power" they were calling for. But instead of heralding a new, more democratic, socialist society, the military's adoption of these purportedly miraculous formulas threatens to set up a stifling prison for the masses.

The fundamental principle of the plan is the institutionalization and perpetuation of a military dictatorship. The Communist party is well aware of this, but accepts it as the best available variant, and is grateful for the assignment given to it by the military of maintaining "order" in the labor movement and running the regime's propaganda apparatus. The CP's "success" amounts to recognition by the military of its "loyalty" in performing these reactionary functions.

At the same time, this very "success" precludes the possibility of the Stalinists winning deepgoing support from the majority of the workers and the poor masses.

The CP's material interests as an opportunist, bureaucratic organization have thus become wrapped up with maintaining the military regime at all costs. That is why the CP leaders have not hesitated to attack the exercise of democratic rights and to appear as champions of totalitarian forms of rule. And that is one of the reasons why the military junta has tolerated, used, and promoted the Stalinists. The junta has found that under the present conditions in Portugal, the forms of political democracy stand in the way of subordinating the masses effectively to their bourgeois objectives.

Unlike the monolithic CP, the Socialist party, despite its equally class-collaborationist and opportunist line, was

unreliable from the military's point of view. It was too loosely organized, too heterogeneous, and vulnerable to pressure from below. Its perspectives, electoralist to be sure, depended on being popular with the masses. Its special selling point was to offer "socialism with liberty."

Thus, the SP stood in the way of the objectives of both the military and the CP. The attempts of the SP to play an autonomous role had to be ended.

The attack on the SP began with the Trade-Union Unity Law in January, which made it illegal for the Social Democrats to try to go around the government-supported, Stalinist-controlled union federation.

The decree was made necessary by a series of defeats of Stalinist officials in union elections. In effect, the military went to the defense of their hard-pressed labor policemen. This also confirmed the dependence of the CP on the military to maintain its position in the labor movement. And it paved the way for imposing military control over all aspects of the mass movement, as the "people's grass-roots democracy" plan in fact now proposes.

It was in this struggle that the military and the Stalinists tested the technique that became a well-oiled operation in the closing of *República*, the daily that reflected the SP's views. The SP was trying to "divide" the workers on behalf of American imperialism, they alleged. They called on the workers to demonstrate in support of "working-class unity" and Portuguese independence.

The struggle over *República* also brought the ultraleft and left-centrist groups into a de facto alliance with the Stalinists against the SP that reached its culmination in the latest crisis, marked by the departure of the SP leaders from the coalition government.

Like the Stalinists, the ultraleft and left-centrist groups were opposed to holding elections for the Constituent Assembly. They viewed the elections as an obstacle to "radicalization" under the aegis of the military. Both currents regarded the big SP victory in the elections as a victory for the right, and therefore for the West European bourgeoisie and American imperialism.

The ultralefts were quick to seize on the *República* confrontation as a way of discounting the elections and putting the "rightist" Constituent Assembly out of commission.

Actually, the April 25 elections, in which 91 percent of the population over the age of eighteen voted, reflected the extreme political weakness of the bourgeoisie in Portugal. In these conditions, the workers parties won a substantial majority, perhaps for the first time in any country in Western Europe. Furthermore, the SP vote obviously was a reflection of this radicalization. Consequently the SP became even more subject to its pressures.

### Summer Schedule

The last issue of *Intercontinental Press* before our summer break will be the issue dated August 4. We will resume our regular schedule with the issue dated September 8.

If the CP had been interested in establishing a government representative of the workers, it had only to base itself on the Constituent Assembly and call on the delegates there to act in accordance with the clear mandate given them by the voters. Instead of following this revolutionary course, the Stalinists preferred to lick the boots of the military. For this privilege they were willing to scuttle the Constituent Assembly, as well as trample on popular sovereignty and the democratically expressed will of the masses.

The ultralefts who supported the Stalinists in their attack on the Constituent Assembly displayed the same "antiparlamentarian cretinism" as the Spanish anarchists whom Trotsky denounced in the period following the fall of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, a situation very similar to that opened up by the fall of Caetano in Portugal.

In the take-over of *República*, the Stalinists and the military were able to turn the political confusion and blindness of these groups to good account in mounting their attack on the SP. Ultraleftists may have even played the role of prime dupes in the seizure. Certainly they supported it to the hilt.

The military were evidently divided on how far the attack should be pushed. Should they go further than silencing *República* for the moment? Should they draw back temporarily? They proceeded cautiously in their foray, testing the ground in their attack on the democratic rights of the masses and not forgetting to maintain a heavy smokescreen of "socialist" demagoguery.

On such a course there was no returning after a certain point. If the objective was not won, the military regime would be destroyed. All the currents in the Armed Forces Movement now appear to have agreed on taking this gamble.

The military is counting heavily on the confusion sowed by the ultralefts; in particular, the anarchist concept that the masses can build their own governing bodies without confronting the question of who holds political power and without building a revolutionary party.

The new antidemocratic turn by the military has increased the possibility of a reversal of the revolutionary process in Portugal. Were revolutionists to support this government, they would play into the hands of the right and be dragged to inevitable ruin along with the opportunist allies of the MFA.

The July 8 plan shows with crystal clarity that the MFA is the political apparatus of the bourgeoisie and the most immediate enemy of the workers and the revolutionary movement. □

July 21, 1975

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Editor: Joseph Hansen.

Contributing Editors: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

Editorial Staff: Michael Baumann, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Caroline Lund, Judy White.

Business Manager: Reba Hansen.

Assistant Business Manager: Steven Warshell.

Copy Editor: Mary Roche.

Technical Staff: Robert Des Verney, Paul Deveze, Larry Ingram, James M. Morgan, Earl Williams.

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Paris Office: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guémenée, 75004, Paris, France.

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### Portuguese Junta Unveils Plan for Military Rule

By Gerry Foley

On July 8, the Assembly of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA—Movimento das Forças Armadas) approved a plan for "people's grass-roots democracy" guided and supervised by the military.\* On July 10, the day following the announcement of the plan in the press, the Stalinist-controlled union federation, Intersindical, held a demonstration in support of the ruling military group. A prominent slogan was "Workers Back Trade-Union Unity." This suggests that the demonstration had an anti-Socialist party orientation, since the conflict between the two reformist workers parties began over the question of the government recognizing the Stalinist-controlled union federation as the only legal one.

On July 11, the take-over of the Lisbon daily *República*, whose editorial policy was formerly controlled by the SP, was confirmed. An editorial board made up of the "workers committee" that seized the paper and an officer appointed by the military government began publishing the daily with a new editorial line. The first issue "under new management" said nothing about the SP's protests against the military group's latest measures but rather played up the Intersindical demonstration, with a headline in red ink: "United Workers and Soldiers Demonstrate Together."

On July 11, the Socialist party ministers announced their withdrawal from the government. The reason given was the take-over of *República*. The SP complained that while the Revolutionary Council and the Press Council had decreed that the paper should be returned to its editors, and the president of the republic had promised this, these commitments had not been carried out. The statement said that "the alliance between Portuguese political forces" could not be maintained unless pledges were kept.

This formulation also suggested criticism of the "people's grass-roots democracy" project, since this seemed to be a unilateral abrogation of the "pact-program" agreement between the military rulers and the capitalist and reformist parties signed before the April 25 Constituent Assembly elections. In subscribing to this accord, the parties in effect granted the military the right to retain all fundamental powers of government, while the military agreed to permit the forms of parliamentary rule, including elections. The SP suggested that

the government's failure to honor its pledges reflected a breakdown in legal authority.

This call on the government to exercise its "authority" was an attack on the CP and the left-centrist and ultraleft groups that follow a policy similar in its logic to the Spanish anarcho-syndicalism of the 1930s. These groups are more tightly organized than the SP and thus able to take minority initiatives that "create facts," such as the take-over of *República*. It was also an attack on General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who has used his security forces to carry out his own policy during the crisis. The July 9 issue of the SP organ *Portugal Socialista* launched a veiled attack on him for creating a "state within a state."

By this tack also, the SP could make sharp criticisms of the government's actions without challenging the regime as such, and at the same time, having been forced at least partially into an opposition role, it could hope to become a gathering place for all currents in the population that are becoming discontented with the inconsistency and ineffectiveness of the government, as well as the situation of chaos and uncertainty that has been developing.

Thus, instead of appealing clearly to the workers, the SP chose to make an electoralist maneuver that in the present situation is extremely dangerous for it as well as for the Portuguese working class.

The military officers and the Communist party have also stressed the need for "reinforcing authority" and it seems apparent that they are determined to do so in a way that will deny the SP any room for political self-defense or free political expression, and may even end in abrogation of its legal existence.

The SP also made an implicit appeal for support from the Western "democracies," in particular the influential Social Democratic parties, in accusing the military of wanting to set up a Stalinist dictatorship in Portugal.

#### Capitalists Weigh the Options

The Western capitalist press and government representatives have used the CP's antidemocratic maneuvers for all they were worth to discredit socialism and encourage fears of "Communism" and the Soviet Union. They may use this to justify intervention or supporting a rightist coup if they think the upsurge of the workers and poor

masses in Portugal is getting out of hand. But it is not likely that they will intervene or bring their pressure to bear simply for the sake of the SP and still less for "democracy."

The capitalists may go right over the heads of the Social Democrats and let the Stalinists serve as their agents in the labor movement for the time being, as they did during the Second World War, at the time of that "détente" with Moscow. The Portuguese CP has proved more determined in imposing "labor discipline" than the SP, and has taken a clear position denouncing the latest wave of strikes as "reactionary maneuvers," while the SP has taken an ambiguous attitude toward them.

It is notable that the main bourgeois party in the coalition, the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD—Democratic People's party), has not yet decided whether to pull out of the coalition and is reported deeply divided on the question. This is an indication that the bourgeoisie has not yet made up its mind on the military's formula. During the latest crisis, the new leadership of the PPD has tended to try to take on a Marxist coloration and move toward a rapprochement with the CP, arousing bitter but veiled criticism in *Jornal Novo*, a liberal daily close to the SP.

The PPD has issued an "ultimatum" to the government demanding guarantees of freedom of the press and parliamentary government. But the Confederation of Portuguese Industry has been preparing an economic "plan of action" to submit to the government and there is apparently a discussion going on among Portuguese capitalists about the status of the economy. The PPD may be waiting for the outcome of these discussions and for some indication of how effectively, under the new formula, the military can discipline labor. In any case, its delay in moving gives the military a certain support in making its turn.

The military government announced July 11 that it was going to nationalize the Companhia União Fabril (CUF). This is not the first time, however, that it has promised to do this. A campaign had been developing among CUF workers demanding implementation of this pledge. Before the July 8 Assembly vote, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, called the "Red Admiral" by some of his admirers, told a delegation of workers that some CUF holdings would be nationalized.

Some such steps were obviously necessary to present the "people's government" project as a step to the left worthy of working-class support. There were indications, furthermore, that some CUF enterprises were in financial trouble. The largest of these, the Lisnave shipyards, in which CUF shares control with a foreign consortium, has been running up a huge debt. It remains to be seen, however, how extensive these concessions will be, or what response

\*See text on page 1050.

they will provoke from the workers. Before the new moves, *Jornal Novo* pointed out that the new wave of strikes was centered in nationalized industry, since the economic crisis had made workers in private firms more cautious.

If further nationalizations encourage more militancy instead of persuading workers that they have to produce more and demand less, since the economy is going to "belong to them," then the demagoguery of the present regime may prove unacceptable to the capitalists. In a period of crisis, they are prepared to grant very broad concessions and accept the most "revolutionary sounding" demagoguery, as long as the survival of the system is ensured. Once the crisis has passed, the concessions can be taken back and the worn-out demagoguery discarded. The capitalists in Portugal and elsewhere will watch the effects of this new political plan on labor militancy very closely.

The most authoritative capitalist newspapers in the United States have not yet commented editorially on the turn in Portugal. Such silence is unusual. Although there was some anti-Communist scare talk in early reports, the emphasis in the news in general has been kept on the joint U.S.-Soviet space project and the détente.

#### Social Democrats Hit Soares

The first editorial comment of the Stockholm daily *Aftonbladet*, which reflects the viewpoint of one of the main European Social Democratic parties, was not particularly favorable to the Portuguese SP. Moreover, this comment was reprinted on the editorial page of the July 12-13 *International Herald Tribune*:

"Socialist leader Mario Soares's withdrawal was not unexpected, just the opposite. The overwhelming victory his party captured in the elections was never followed by increasing influence. . . . The Socialists will now choose the road of opposition. It is doubtful whether the Armed Forces Movement will accept such liberties. . . . The AFM will regard the Socialists' decision as a confirmation of their own suspicions about the unreliability of the party leadership, its dependence on the West, its susceptibility to foreign pressure and unwillingness to subordinate itself to the 'dynamics of the revolution.' To a certain extent Soares himself is responsible for this deep mistrust. His party, from the beginning, neglected to build up a trustful line of cooperation with the AFM. Soares has made statements abroad about a threatening civil war that has badly hurt the party. . . . The Portuguese revolution will go and be radicalized, but its popular legitimacy will be gravely weakened with the Socialists in the opposition. . . . The question now is whether it is possible for

the AFM to reach its goal—an alliance between the people and the armed forces—when the party of the people has gone to the opposition."

That was very tepid support indeed from



SP LEADER SOARES

the Social Democrats in Sweden, where the union federation, which is controlled by the Social Democrats, recently refused to accept a visit from an Intersindical delegation on the grounds that the Portuguese Stalinists had followed totalitarian aims in their campaign against the SP.

In a front-page editorial July 11, the most authoritative French capitalist daily, *Le Monde*, made this comment on the "people's grass-roots democracy" project: "Despite its aggressively revolutionary formulations and its perspectives based on 'a correct understanding of the class struggle,' the plan adopted by the Assembly is a moderate one."

The Lisbon correspondent of *Corriere della Sera* said in the July 12 issue of the Milan daily, the most authoritative Italian capitalist paper: "The risk, a more real one than in the past, is that the military officers, tired of polemics and determined to go ahead on their road, will dissolve the coalition government in which Communists and Socialists have coexisted in a tumultuous way for fourteen months, and launch a new cabinet made up exclusively of officers and friendly technical ministers." This bourgeois journalist did not stand with

Soares on principle either but seemed rather to sympathize with the military "tired of polemics."

#### More 'Patriotic' Bureaucrats Needed

In fact, the military seem to have decided, to end the existing coalition and perhaps dump the popular-front Provisional Government altogether. The Socialists did not resign. They only announced their intention to stop functioning as ministers until they got some satisfaction in the *República* case. However, on July 12 the Revolutionary Council instructed Premier Vasco Gonçalves to replace the SP ministers with "competent and patriotic people who place national interests above party interests," as Henry Giniger summarized it in a dispatch in the July 13 *New York Times*.

For some time a layer of opportunist politicians has been developing who have sought to further their careers by establishing direct relations with the military rather than by going through the political parties. César Oliveira and other former leaders of the Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left), who were ousted at the last congress of this group, are among them.

"The Communists began a campaign through their local sections and the unions they control to end the Government coalition and to dissolve the Constitutional Assembly, where they hold only a minority position," Giniger reported in a July 11 dispatch.

The Stalinists have said before that if the SP left the government, a coalition would not be viable, and in that case a purely military government would be acceptable to them. This is probably their perspective now. Moreover, they have undoubtedly recognized the meaning of the military's choice, which left even an opportunist electoralist politician like Soares no alternative but to risk a break with the military and threaten to mobilize masses in demonstrations against the government, a course apparently incomprehensible to the better positioned Social Democrats on *Aftonbladet*.

The governmental scheme adopted by the Assembly of the Armed Forces Movement on July 8 includes formulations attractive both to the Communist party and to the left-centrist and ultraleft currents following in the footsteps of the treacherous leaders of Spanish anarcho-syndicalism. These currents have been drawn in behind the charismatic strongman, General de Carvalho, who has used them as a political cover in his drive to establish a "nonparty" military dictatorship.

In fact, while it is larded with demagoguery designed to appeal to these two tendencies, each of which for its own purposes has blocked with the military against the

Socialist party and popular suffrage, the scheme proposes a system of totalitarian military dictatorship that can prove distinctively "unhealthy" for both.

#### Meaning of New Guide Document

While this elaborate scheme is unlikely ever to be fully applied, any more than was the complex dual government outlined in the "pact-program," it does establish some principles and procedures quite clearly. Its basic meaning is the same as the former "guide document." The military is boss. The new document just carries this principle further, stipulating that the military is the supreme arbiter and will rule society directly, reaching down to the local, factory, and neighborhood levels.

Among other things, the adoption of this scheme shows the suicidal character of the SP's class-collaboration policy, since the plan is not only a logical extension of the "pact-program" that the SP signed but of the June 21 "Program of Political Action," which the SP hailed as an affirmation of democracy and "pluralism."

Leaving aside what the document says about its more distant goals, the immediate proposals are reminiscent of corporatism, similar to the system in force under Salazar but actually more thoroughgoing. It leaves no room even for the formal national elections that Salazar permitted following the defeat of the fascist powers in World War II. After all, like Salazar and Caetano, the ruling military group has just had its fingers burned by an election that it intended to be purely formal in character.

The only "people's assemblies" envisioned at the moment are local ones. No "people's grass-root organizations" will be allowed to federate until the military decides the time is ripe. Furthermore, the military will decide whether to "recognize" all such organizations, and recognition will depend on its evaluation of their activity.

While the military pledges to encourage the formation of workers and tenants committees where they do not as yet exist, it also stipulates that the existing committees must be "broadened" to carry out the tasks set for such organizations. These tasks include "political work through educating and informing sections of workers or the population," and "strengthening the alliance between the people and the MFA" as "a constant activity." The MFA itself will be the judge of whether these tasks are carried out, and presumably this will determine which "grass-roots people's or-

ganizations" are "recognized" and which are not.

Not only does this eliminate the independence of any groups that are set up, it empowers the government to begin interfering immediately in the embryonic factory and neighborhood organizations that do exist. Any organization that develops spontaneously to meet the needs of a group of workers or the poor masses is required, according to point 3.1, to affiliate to "recognized" structures and adjust its composition and activity to meet the "tasks" and standards set by the military.

This provision carries the attack on freedom of association begun with the "Trade-Union Unity Law" to the point of totalitarianism. Even the most elementary forms of mass organization can be diluted and packed to suit the purposes of the military government.

This system recalls Caetano's semicorporatist union setup in a specific aspect. The factory and neighborhood groups may be "representative" to a certain extent, but as soon as these groups begin to federate, government representatives enter directly into the picture. The local "people's assemblies" are to include representatives of the local government authorities. The municipal people's assemblies are to include representatives of military units. In the district "people's assemblies," the military unit commander must be included. In the regional "people's assemblies," the head of the regional military command must be included.

The representatives of local government authorities include appointed officials, such as members of planning boards, who have "right to voice, vote, and to introduce resolutions."

Moreover, all military representatives in these various "people's assemblies" must be representatives of the MFA as a whole and not chosen by the military personnel to represent any specific political platform. This scheme specifically incorporates the Program of Political Action, which stipulates: "No political-military organizations outside the MFA will be permitted in the armed forces, whether they represent parties or not, since all military personnel must gradually be integrated into their own movement."

#### Airtight Military Rule

The "people's government" scheme implicitly defines the character of the MFA as representative of the military hierarchy, when it stipulates that the unit and regional commanders must be included in the district and regional "people's assemblies." This is also implied by the reference to "gradually" integrating military personnel into the MFA. This converts the lower bodies of the MFA itself into transmission

belts for the top group of officers. It also makes the MFA into an elite and not a voluntary political association or a representative body. In fact, the role of representative elections in the selection of members of the MFA bodies is very limited.

Actually the MFA is a junta with an expanded system of transmission belts and sounding boards. Full decision-making power, in any case, is vested in the Revolutionary Council. The Assembly is defined as a "deliberative" body and must reach a "consensus" in making its recommendations.

The role of workers organizations under this scheme is quite clear, since one of the basic goals is defined as "winning the economic battle," as the "battle of production" has been euphemistically renamed, and sweetened with a note that present production is "not sufficient to meet the overall needs of the country." Furthermore, since all "grass-roots people's organizations" are obliged to make "strengthening the alliance between the people and the MFA" a "constant activity," the function of these committees is now to enforce the government's economic policy.

The whole record of the regime shows what the military rulers mean by this phrase about "strengthening the alliance between the people and the MFA," and that also holds for the MFA "purified" by the departure of openly rightist elements. In his speech celebrating the failure of the March 11 coup, Vasco Gonçalves included the strike of the TAP (Transportes Aéreos Portugueses, the Portuguese airline) workers as part of the "reactionary machinations" that allegedly prepared the way for the putsch.

Furthermore, the possibility of any organized opposition to the military rulers developing in these "people's organizations" is specifically ruled out by the provision that the "best guarantee" in assuring "unitary" character of these bodies and their "independence from all parties" is "the MFA, a movement standing above parties . . . and recognizing those organizations that by their activity merit recognition."

It is specifically set down, in addition, that all decisions of "people's organizations" will be taken by hand vote. In the May 15 metalworkers assembly in Lisbon, the military security forces clubbed the workers who tried to oppose a poor contract settlement imposed by a Stalinist group that has seized control of the union.

Although the "people's government" scheme theoretically grants powers to workers and people's bodies that would amount to creating a democratic workers state, although it says these bodies are to be "democratic," "independent," and "unitary," and although this structure is supposed to develop "in a correct class-struggle perspective," in its specific provisions this

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plan does not leave the slightest opening for independence, class struggle, or unity in action. It is an airtight system of military rule.

### Opposite of Soviets

The most pathetic illusion of those elements on the left drawn into supporting the military and the CP against the SP is that such a scheme will bring "working-class unity." In fact, it is founded on a denial of the political rights of a majority of the workers, that is, ganging up on the SP through an alliance of the CP, the left-centrist, and ultraleft groups with the bourgeois military caudillos. Its objective is to strip all workers of every political, trade-union, and human right. The peace it will bring in the struggle between the workers parties can only be a peace of the grave.

For the SP is not simply the Soares leadership or an apparatus. It is all those workers and poor masses who are looking for socialist solutions but for one reason or another are skeptical of the military and the Stalinists.

This "people's government" bears no relationship whatsoever to workers democracy or soviets, despite the demagogic effort to make it appear so. It is exactly the opposite. Real soviets are organs of struggle and a workers united front in action. This is how Trotsky described the way they develop in a letter to the Spanish Left Opposition in 1931, a period similar to the one that has existed in Portugal since April 25, 1974: "Communists participate in all strikes, in all protests and demonstrations, arousing more and more numerous strata of the population. Communists are with the masses and at the head of the masses in every battle. On the basis of these battles, the communists put forward the slogan of the soviets, and at the first opportunity build soviets as the *organizations of the proletarian united front*. At the present stage, the soviets can be nothing else. But if they emerge as the combat organizations of the proletarian united front, then under the leadership of the communists they will inevitably become, at a certain stage, organs of insurrection and then organs of power."

Moreover, even if the MFA were a revolutionary workers leadership, such control as outlined in the plan would not be justifiable, since it would still be necessary to guarantee complete independence of the workers' economic organizations from the state.

Of course, the MFA is not such a leadership. Every move to the left, including the recent belated agrarian reform, has been made under the pressure of workers mobilizations. The agrarian measure simply recognized the de facto situation and tried to impose legal limits on it.

"The land occupations in Alentejo date back to March or April," *Jornal Novo* said in its July 7 issue. "At that time people began thinking seriously about agrarian reform for the first time for the southern part of the country. But the avalanche of such occupations in recent days created a certain agitation in the region, causing some even to talk about Portuguese jacqueries." The present regime differs from the previous one in that it is prepared to ride this wave until the crisis is over. But this "people's government" scheme gives it greater possibilities for damming up the upsurge.

### Intended to Disarm Masses

Nor can this structure be defended from the standpoint of the needs of mobilizing the masses to defend such gains from rightist coups or imperialist intervention. Its actual effect will be to disarm the masses against the right, since workers self-defense is completely subordinated to the MFA.

General de Carvalho was adamantly opposed to the vigilance groups that sprang up in September 1974 and defeated Spínola's first putsch. His position on this has evidently not changed with the "radicalization" of the regime, and now he is apparently ready to act to prevent such developments. Over the weekend of July 4, there were rumors of a move by more conservative officers to oust Vasco Gonçalves. "Alvaro Cunhal, the general secretary of the Portuguese CP, was called in by General Otelo de Carvalho," *Le Monde* reported July 9. "Carvalho told him that there 'must be no street demonstrations and barricades like there were in previous crises.'"

One of the most striking things about the new document is the way it uses anarchist-type conceptions as a political cover for subordinating the organizations of the workers and toiling masses to the capitalist state.

The masses are supposed to assume power gradually as they build up their "rank and file" nonpolitical organizations. In fact, the scheme is almost identical to the proposals of the MES about building up organs of "people's power" that would be "linked to the MFA," with the MFA itself gradually "fusing with the people's movement." Similar formulations have been used by the former guerrilla group, the Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária, which most clearly carries on the old anarcho-syndicalist ideology.

In a news conference July 7, representatives of the "soviet" organization pushed by the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias, the grouping that first provided Carvalho with a political cover for his "antiparty" campaign, explained their perspectives as follows, ac-

ording to a summary in the July 8 *Jornal Novo*:

"In a way, the formation of the Revolutionary Councils of Workers, Soldiers, and Sailors represents, according to the conception of its founders, a step beyond the stage of struggling for concessions into the stage of organizing. That is, these bodies are independent, nonparty organs of the working class designed to take power and exercise the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . .

"'As we organize,' said a worker who took part . . . 'we are taking power.'"

But although the July 8 document was drawn up to suit the predilections of both the CP and the left groups with an anarchist-type line, there are sharp contradictions between these two currents. In the July 7 conference of the "Revolutionary Councils," representatives of this grouping correctly denounced the CP's proposal for Committees for the Defense of the Revolution as a "new Portuguese Legion," that is, an auxiliary police body.

In fact, the essence of the CP proposal was incorporated in the plan. But the MFA leaders borrowed the notions of the neoanarchist left to integrate such committees, in which the CP would have a strong position, into a much larger scheme controlled directly by the military.

Thus both the neoanarchists and the CP got what they appeared to ask for but in a way that rather than giving them more political influence tied them tighter to the military's chariot. The first to feel the rope tighten will probably be the neoanarchists. MES, for example, condemned the Program of Political Action as a concession to the right because it renounced the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Now the military has accepted their plan for a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in a document that reaffirms the Program of Political Action, which calls for a "struggle against ultra-leftism" by "armed force if necessary." □

### 200 French Riot Police Sent to Comoro Islands

When the Comoro Islands Chamber of Deputies voted to make a unilateral declaration of independence from France July 6, the former French governor declared a state of emergency. He lifted it three hours later, but the following day 200 French riot police landed in the islands and took up positions around public buildings.

On July 9 the French government said it would retain rule over Mayotte, one of the four main islands in the Comoro chain. In a national referendum last December, 64 percent of the voters in Mayotte cast a ballot in favor of maintaining ties with France, while the population as a whole voted 95 percent for independence.

## Spectacular Victory Scored by Argentine Workers

By Judy White

The Argentine trade-union movement won a spectacular victory July 8 when the regime of Isabel Martínez de Perón backed down on its attempts to impose a wage ceiling and to cancel wage contracts that included raises of up to 130 percent. Three days later the regime gave in to labor's other central demand—the resignation of its astrologer and rightist strongman, José López Rega.

The government was forced to concede because of the massiveness and solidity of the trade-union movement's actions. During a period of two weeks, wildcat strikes and two general strikes paralyzed the country. The second general strike, which began July 7, was ended when the government yielded to the workers' demands.

Although 23,000 federal police were deployed in a menacing and provocative way in the capital, there were only occasional minor clashes with demonstrators.

The mobilizations were spearheaded by workers in the most important sectors of Argentine industry—metals, textiles construction, and automobiles. But they also included the bulk of white-collar workers, sectors of the middle class, and students.

In an article in the June 28 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*, Enrique Raab described the June 27 rally of 100,000 persons in front of the presidential palace during the first general strike:

"Shortly after noon the working-class composition of the demonstration was altered by the incorporation of sizable contingents of middle-class elements: Men in raincoats with briefcases and women with umbrellas began to appear in great numbers along Avenida de Mayo. With difficulty they advanced through the already assembled lines of trade unionists. . . .

"The furor of the slogans and chants contrasted curiously with a climate of extreme civility. The much sought after public telephone in Plaza de Mayo was besieged by a long line. Those waiting displayed a mutual courtesy not customarily seen in daily life of the capital. 'Go ahead and talk compañero,' insisted a Light and Power worker to a man with a briefcase who was asking permission to make two consecutive calls without getting in line again. The prevailing impression . . . was that of a sort of amiable solidarity among the demonstrators, contrasting with the virulence spewed out in the slogans."



Tejeda/Mundo

"I'm nervous, López Rega; this thing is shaking too much."

"Everything is shaky these days, honey."

ISABELITA MARTINEZ DE PERON, president of the Argentine Republic is barely keeping her balance following the recent workers' demonstrations. Can it be that López Rega's astrology and Perón's charisma fill no stomachs?

*Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party), compared the current situation to that of 1969-73, the period from the semi-insurrection in Córdoba to the fall of the seven-year military dictatorship. In the June 21 issue, an editorial signed by J.A.T. pointed out that "the mobilizations that are beginning now are much bigger than those of 1969, spreading all across the country

and especially into the industrial center of Buenos Aires."

The CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor) bureaucrats attempted to cut across the unity and militancy of the actions. When they were forced by rank-and-file pressure to call the second general strike, they issued a communiqué urging workers not to be taken in "by maneuvers of those who want to use our forces for dark purposes." They echoed Isabel Perón's truculent speech of June 28 in which she called strikers "antipatriotic mercenaries."

The CGT communiqué advised the ranks of labor: "The workers should stay at home, confident that the CGT and the Justicialist government are pursuing efforts to find a solution."

But the bureaucrats failed to persuade the three million members of the organization to stay home and refrain from sweeping the regime's new wage ceiling into the dustbin.

One of the central cries of the demonstrators was "Enforce Law 14,250." This is the Ley de Contrato de Trabajo (Work Contract Law), which grants workers the right to negotiate wages and working conditions.

On March 27, 1974, General Juan Perón had announced that "as of June 1, 1975, the *paritarias* will once again function in full in conformity with Law No. 14,250."

The *paritarias* are tripartite negotiating committees of labor, big business, and government representatives.

Perón's announcement was viewed as a big victory by the working class, which had lost the right to collective bargaining under the years of dictatorship.

Negotiations for contracts that were to go into effect June 1 actually began in March 1975.

Despite the high rate of inflation (100 percent in the last year), the Argentine working class maintained a wait-and-see attitude throughout the spring as negotiations went on. The one significant exception was the sixty-day strike of 10,000 metalworkers in Villa Constitución, which met with sympathy from the rest of the Argentine labor movement but not with solidarity strikes.

Even when the Rodrigo Plan was announced in early June, it did not spark strikes, although it devalued the peso, raised fuel prices drastically, and lifted most price controls.

What ignited the nationwide confrontation was the regime's announcement June 26 that it would not ratify collective-bargaining agreements if they exceeded a 50 percent wage ceiling.

That announcement escalated the struggle to the political level.

The Peronist trade unions—which Perón called the backbone of his movement—struck against the regime they had overwhelmingly elected two years ago. They

were unwilling to pay for the economic crisis brought on by "the people's government." They were unwilling to sacrifice the right to collective bargaining they had won by bringing down the military dictatorship. And they would not let the matter rest there: The rank and file demanded the ouster of the two government ministers seen as the architects of the crisis—Economics Minister Celestino Rodrigo and Social Welfare Minister López Rega.

López Rega has also recently been charged by the Argentine press, military leaders, and opposition party politicians with masterminding the right-wing terrorist organization, the AAA (Argentine Anticomunist Alliance).

Reflecting the pressure of the masses, the Senate ignored Isabel Perón's plea not to name a new president of the Senate. Such an act would raise the question of her stepping down, she said, since the parliamentary leader is next in line of succession to the nation's presidency. On July 8 the Senate elected the Peronist Italo Luder as its provisional president.

On the eve of the latest confrontation, *Avanzada Socialista* noted the changes that have been occurring in the thinking of the workers. The June 21 editorial by J.A.T. said:

"In the years 1969 to 1972 they hated the government and had confidence in Peronism, a movement the workers and people considered their own. Today in 1975, the masses have not yet turned with hatred against the Peronist government but they have seen its lack of responsiveness and they are beginning to challenge it to some extent. Along with the street demonstrations, the factory occupations, the strikes, and the Villazos [strikes like the recent one in Villa Constitución], a no less explosive struggle in the consciousness and minds of the masses is appearing too. It is the struggle to find a new path, a new political party that this time *will* respond as they want it to, because it really is theirs, because it serves their class interests on all levels.

"If the masses construct such a workers party, that instrument—which they lacked in 1969—will mean that the new phase of bigger and richer struggles will culminate in a total triumph for the working class and the people."

It remains to be seen what the bourgeoisie will do in the weeks ahead. The government's authority has been seriously weakened by its attempt to impose an austerity program. However, its retreat in no way solves the economic crisis that inspired the Rodrigo Plan.

Commenting on the situation, the July 13 *New York Times* said:

"One result may be, some experts say, that the present 100 per cent inflation rate may reach 200 per cent this year. Material



Jornal Novo

Troops standing guard over the Plaza de Mayo, site of the recent workers' demonstrations.

and product shortages are likely to worsen. The Government may find itself defaulting on \$2-billion in foreign debts."

On the political level, the naming of a new cabinet July 11 does not suggest a departure from its previous "tough" stance. Although López Rega was forced to resign as social welfare minister and presidential secretary, his replacements—Carlos Villone in the cabinet and Julio Gonzales as presidential secretary—are trusted lieutenants of the Argentine Rasputin.

Moreover, four other appointees—Economics Minister Celestino Rodrigo, Labor Minister Cecilio Conditi, Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes, and Education Minister Oscar Ivanissevich—who were retained from the old cabinet, are allies of López Rega.

There are three new faces in the cabinet, who are considered to be political nonentities: Defense Minister Jorge Garrido, Interior Minister Antonio Benitez, and Justice Minister Ernesto Corvalan Nanclares.

*El Cronista Comercial*, the Buenos Aires financial daily, expressed its reaction to the new cabinet in the headline, "López Rega leaves the cabinet but maintains his predominance."

Francisco Manrique, leader of the conservative Partido Federalista (Federalist party), who previously had said nothing about the crisis, described the cabinet shifts as merely "dilatatory maneuvers" that mean "nothing for the country."

The only proposal put forward by the major bourgeois opposition party, the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR—Radical Civic Union), was to reopen a dialogue between the Peronists and other bourgeois forces. It was Isabel Perón's reliance "on a small

group of friends"—to the exclusion of the UCR, one must suppose—that led to the political sharpness of the crisis.

The big question now is the role the military contemplates playing in the unfolding crisis. Contradictory reports have appeared in the press as to the positions the various military figures took on the CGT wage and cabinet demands, and on the question of the election of a new Senate president. But, so far, they have maintained a low profile. They are apparently biding their time.

Isabel Martínez de Perón, however, made her position clear. She told a group of dissident Peronist legislators: "I have not packed my bags to leave the country and I will not surrender without a fight. I am going to oblige you to hang me on the Plaza de Mayo."

Is the president counting on being hanged because of the absence of a guillotine in Argentina? □

#### President of Gabon Linked to \$150,000 Oil Company Bribe

Gabon President Albert-Bernard Bongo received a \$150,000 bribe in 1972, according to "informed government sources" cited in the July 10 *Washington Post*. The bribe was reported to have been made by Ashland Oil Company shortly after it bought the Union Carbide Petroleum Company, which had \$4.3 million invested in Gabon.

Ashland, in a report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission July 8, admitted that it had made payments of \$150,000 and \$40,000 to "two high Gabonese officials."

## Wilson Orders Drastic Cut in Workers' Standard of Living

By Tony Hodges

LONDON—The Labour government announced July 1 that it would soon publish plans for new statutory wage controls. According to Denis Healey, the chancellor of the Exchequer, who made the announcement in Parliament, the government will outlaw wage rises above 10%.

The new measures threaten the sharpest cut in workers' living standards in decades. They come at a time of soaring inflation; in the past three months prices have risen at an annual rate of more than 50%.

Healey's announcement flies in the face of repeated government promises, Labour party conference decisions, and party election-manifesto pledges to oppose statutory pay curbs. The party was elected to government in the February 1974 general election, sparked by the miners' strike against the Tories' incomes policy, on a programme of clear opposition to compulsory wage controls.

Healey's announcement is the most dramatic step yet taken by the Labour government to unload the burden of the crisis wracking British capitalism onto the backs of the British workers. For sixteen months the reformist Labour leaders tried to con the working class into accepting real wage cuts "voluntarily" through the "social contract," a deal between the government and the union bureaucrats.

Prime Minister Wilson hoped that by trading off the unions' loyalty to the Labour government he could succeed where the Tories had failed in cutting real wages and restoring the competitive ability and profits of British capitalism. But workers were not prepared to pay the price. Now the Labour government, like the Tories before them, is going to use the law to try to enforce its wage-cut policy.

Various estimates of the effects of the new policy have been advanced. According to John Palmer, the business editor of the *Guardian*, writing on July 2, "given a 10 per cent wage norm this will involve substantial cuts in real living standards. Although Mr Healey put the cut in standards at around 2.5 per cent on average, independent estimates put the figure at 5 per cent or higher."

Retail prices, according to official government figures, rose 4.2% in May alone and stood 25% higher than a year before. The rate of inflation has literally "taken off" in recent months. According to information supplied to Parliament on June 16 by

### Why the Tories Are Cheering

The accompanying article was written before Prime Minister Wilson made public how the new incomes policy would be enforced. The major features of his proposal, as announced in a July 11 white paper, are the following:

In wage negotiations beginning after August 1, no increases above £6 a week will be permitted. In Wilson's estimate, this will work out to an average 10 percent increase nationally.

Cost-of-living adjustments in union contracts will be suspended.

The nationalized industries and the National Health Service will not be given subsidies to pay for wage increases above the £6 limit. Local governments will be denied tax subsidies on the same basis.

Private corporations will not be allowed to pass on wage increases above £6 in the form of higher prices.

Prices in general, however, will not be frozen. In Wilson's view, "a general price freeze is not realistic" because it "would simply depress investment."

Shirley Williams, the misnamed secretary of state for prices and consumer protection, the Retail Price Index rose in the previous three months at a rate equivalent to 53.1% a year.

Although the details of the government's new plan were not spelled out by Healey in his announcement, the statutory character of the policy was made quite clear.

"We would much prefer," Healey told the assembled members of Parliament, "to proceed on the basis of a voluntary policy agreed with the CBI [Confederation of British Industry] and the TUC [Trades Union Congress]. But a voluntary policy will not be acceptable to the Government unless it satisfies the targets it has set for reducing inflation, and includes convincing arrangements for ensuring compliance."

Healey underlined his warning by stating that "it is no good having an agreed limit for pay increases unless we are certain it will not be exceeded."

Healey went on to give the broad outlines of how the 10% limit would be imposed. "The government will use a battery of weapons for this purpose. We propose to fix cash limits for wage bills in the public sector so that all concerned may understand that the government is not prepared to foot the bill for excessive settlements through subsidies or borrowing or by loading excess costs on the public through increases in prices and charges. We will take action through the Price Code to encourage compliance by private employers."

By imposing cash limits on public-sector wage bills, the government is warning workers in the nationalized industries and

other public employees that the work force will be cut if the 10% norm is ignored. In the private sector, the government, acting on behalf of the capitalist class as a whole, is warning individual employers not to break ranks. The implication is that if any company agrees to wage rises above 10% it will be penalized through price controls and taxes.

Healey's announcement was broadly welcomed by the ruling class. Share prices on the London Stock Exchange soared on July 1 to give the *Financial Times* index its biggest one-day gain in its forty-year history. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Tory spokesman on economic affairs, told the House of Commons after Healey's speech that "the House will welcome the fact that the Government has at last begun to grapple with the nation's economic problems."

The response of the *Tribune* group of "left wing" Labour members of Parliament was muted. There were a few cries of protest but no call to action by the labour movement to force the government to withdraw its plans. Tony Benn, the energy minister, and Michael Foot, the employment minister, the leading Tribunites in Wilson's cabinet, did not utter a word.

This cooperation was mirrored by Jack Jones, general secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), the biggest union in the country, whose annual conference took place in the same week as Healey's speech. Jones himself took the rostrum to head off a move by some delegates to hold an emergency debate on the new measures.

Opposition to the government was tantamount to treachery in Jones's view: "We

would be pigmies to let that Government collapse. In all history there have been times to advance and times to stand still, even to retreat a little in order to advance later on. That time is now."

Jones held up the bogey of a Labour-Tory coalition as the only alternative to wage cuts. The fact is, however, that the anti-working-class policies of the Labour government are undermining support for the Labour party among the less class-conscious workers and putting wind in the sails of the Conservative party. In a by-election in the parliamentary constituency of Woolwich West on July 3, the Tory candidate turned a Labour majority of 8.5% at the last general election in October into a Tory majority of 6.7%.

On the same day the voters of Woolwich West went to the polls, Denis Healey won support for his wage-cut plan from the top union bureaucrats assembled in London for an emergency meeting of the TUC Economic Committee.

"TUC leaders," the *Financial Times* reported July 4, "yesterday took a big step towards voluntarily accepting the Government's 10 per cent inflation target, which most of them consider should lead to £6 a week flat-rate rises in the next pay round." TUC General Secretary Len Murray announced after the meeting that there was a "very good chance that we will reach a mutually agreed approach."

But will the TUC brass be able to "deliver" a pay policy? That is what the government doubts after the failure of the social contract and that is why this time there are to be statutory powers. It remains to be seen whether Wilson, Healey, and Foot will be any more successful than the Tories were in forcing cuts in workers' living standards with the backing of the law.

It should be recalled that Wilson himself had the experience in 1966 of imposing a pay freeze which backfired by fueling the radicalization then beginning in the British labour movement. Although the union and Labour party leaders will continue to threaten workers with unemployment as the alternative to wage cuts and will attempt to appeal to workers' loyalty to the Labour party, the runaway inflation is bound at some point to rouse workers' hostility to the 10% norm. □

### Opiate of the Bankers?


The archbishop of Canterbury, Donald Coggan, called on his flock to pray for the pound sterling July 1. He told the general synod of the Anglican Church that the faithful should "pray earnestly" to help the pound.

"His remarks coincided with a halt in the pound's slide," Agence France-Presse reported, "but this was attributed to political and economic causes."

July 21, 1975

## Beneath the Pillsbury Label a Warm Heart Beats

### Funny Face Soft Drinks for Vietnamese Refugees



Oliphant/Philadelphia Inquirer

The Pillsbury Company, a food-processing outfit located in Minneapolis, is making a rather spectacular effort to help out the Vietnamese refugees stranded in the United States. For the first 600 families sponsored by Americans, and thereby admitted into the country as residents, Pillsbury is donating \$170,000 in foodstuffs.

"Of the \$170,000 contribution," Bill Farmer explained in the May 25 issue of the *St. Paul Pioneer Press*, "about \$13,000 goes for transportation costs of distributing the packages through the Red Cross to the refugees. Profit margins, both retail and wholesale, can be deducted so that the actual cost to Pillsbury will be approximately \$100,000, according to one estimate.

"A certified public accountant estimated that the tax break to Pillsbury—if it decides to attempt to declare this as a philanthropic deduction, say, through the Red Cross—will reduce the company's out of pocket costs to about \$50,000."

Of course, \$50,000 is still a commendable bit of charity. On the other hand, Pillsbury may estimate it to be something like casting your bread on water; you can expect a quick floatback. As Bill Farmer puts it, "The publicity that has emanated from this philanthropy . . . has to be worth several times the \$50,000 estimated real expenditure."

There also appears to be some question as to the quality of the food products Pillsbury is putting into the packages for the refugees:

"About half of the 14 items listed in the dole from Pillsbury to the refugee families are among the less popular items in the Pillsbury inventory. One grocer said his catalogues would not include five of the items."

Bill Farmer does not give a complete inventory, mentioning only the following:

"Averaging out at \$260.56 per family, the foods donated include some questionable priorities. For instance, the top item in terms of monetary value goes to \$40 worth of Funny Face soft drink mixes. Next is \$32 worth of Quick Bread, \$28 worth of instant potatoes and \$25 worth of food sticks. Others include \$14 worth of gravy, \$23 worth of hot roll mix and \$8 worth of flour."

William H. Spoor, the chairman of Pillsbury, said that the purpose of the donation is to show that the company "will support organizations that are working to improve the well-being of the populace as a whole and with special emphasis on the needy and underprivileged."

He hoped that the example set by Pillsbury will "inspire others in the private sector to do what they can to help."

To this he added: "Unless the private sector helps, there will be increased demands upon governmental agencies." □

## Gandhi Cracks the Whip

By Ernest Harsch

In a demagogic effort to win support for her June 26 dictatorial coup, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced several economic measures July 1, including what were said to be steps to control prices, distribute surplus land to landless peasants, and reduce peasant debts. "The emergency provides us a new opportunity to go ahead with our economic tasks," she proclaimed. "There is a chance now to regain the nation's spirit of adventure."

D.K. Barooah, the president of Gandhi's ruling Congress party, described the measures as "the beginning of a renewed and vigorous battle against poverty, for laying the foundations of a new social order."

As a justification for her suppression of democratic rights, Gandhi tried to blame her political opponents for the country's deteriorating economic conditions. "The campaign of lawbreaking, paralyzing national activity and inciting our security forces to indiscipline and disobedience would have led to economic chaos and collapse," she said.

Six days before she declared the state of emergency, Gandhi claimed that such problems as high unemployment were controllable, but added: "how can they be controlled when constantly we are being attacked, when constantly as we try to build society there are people who have power and strength who try to break down what we are doing?"

Shortly after her July 1 speech announcing the campaign to build a "new social order," it became clear that Gandhi's attack on the "people who have power and strength" included not only the imprisoned opposition leaders, but the Indian labor movement as well. Under the cover of preventing "economic chaos," she banned all strikes and other labor actions.

Gandhi met with top trade-union officials July 5, including those of the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) and the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), two of the country's largest labor federations. She ordered them to refrain from "any agitation or strike or go-slow" while the state of emergency was in effect, proclaiming, "This is not the time."

"It is a moment when the nation has to fight against internal and external odds, she said. "The government wants the full co-operation of the trade unions in increasing production."

A dispatch in the July 6 *Washington Post*

reported, "The prime minister told the union chiefs that their task is to persuade workers to contribute to a stronger economy. They should avoid 'policies of the trade unions in capitalist countries' where labor's aim is to benefit one segment at the expense of others, she said."

An official government account of the meeting said that the union leaders had "assured the Prime Minister of fullest cooperation from the workers."

The INTUC is controlled by the Congress party and supports Gandhi's policies. The AITUC is politically dominated by the Communist party of India (CPI), which has supported Gandhi since 1969. The AITUC general secretary, S.A. Dange, is also chairman of the CPI.

"Mrs. Gandhi's no-strike order reflects concern over production lost because of labor agitation," the *Washington Post* report said. "She has complained that more than 1.5 million man-days were lost to the economy last year because of strikes."

The biggest strike in 1974 was the twenty-day national rail strike in May, which cost the Indian capitalists an estimated \$267 million. There was also a general strike of nearly two million workers in Maharashtra, India's most industrialized state, in January and another one in October. Since the last quarter of 1974, the southern state of Tamil Nadu has been rocked by strikes of hundreds of thousands of workers in the textile, cement, and sugar industries.

In January 1975, dock workers around the country walked off their jobs to press their demands for higher pay. There have also been strikes of textile, airline, government, and engineering workers this year.

The Gandhi regime's recent crackdown on the labor movement actually began during the May 1974 railway strike, when 30,000 to 50,000 unionists were arrested under the provisions of the Defence of India Rules and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act.

Two months later, the regime imposed a partial wage freeze, which impounded all wage increases for one year in compulsory "savings" accounts, to be paid back in five annual installments. The ordinance also applied to 50 percent of all cost-of-living allowance increases for two years.

In the meeting with the union officials, Gandhi singled out the government workers for attack, saying, "They even do not show elementary courtesy" on the job.

Labor militancy among the three million government workers has been increasing since 1974. It was fueled by the regime's withholding of cost-of-living payments. "This has understandably given rise to a wave of protest among government employees," a correspondent for the *Bombay Economic and Political Weekly* said in the December 28, 1974, issue, "and a situation of confrontation, on a scale much bigger than even what was witnessed at the time of the railwaymen's strike last May, is developing."

A thirty-seven-day strike of government employees in Maharashtra ended just a month before Gandhi's coup.

Since the imposition of the state of emergency, Gandhi has launched a drive to "discipline" government workers. A dispatch from New Delhi in the July 5 *Washington Post* quoted one government employee as saying, "CID [Central Intelligence Department] is everywhere. There were some arrests today of government workers."

*New York Times* correspondent Eric Pace reported in a July 6 dispatch from Bombay, the capital of Maharashtra, that the Congress party had "held a meeting of neighborhood party workers to discuss plans for vigilante squads to enforce economic control."

The next day Pace reported, "Businessmen in particular are pleased by aspects of the Government's new economic program—notably a recent statement by Mrs. Gandhi indicating that the Government will not tolerate strikes or other labor disruptions that might undercut its drive for greater production."

Naval Hormusji Tata, a member of one of India's most powerful ruling-class families and the president of the Employers Federation of India, praised Gandhi's economic measures July 5, calling them a sign of "the Government's earnestness."

Moscow, which hailed Gandhi's June 26 coup, gave its stamp of approval to her economic program as well. Sergei Losov, writing in *Sovietskaya Rossia*, said, "The people of India received with deep satisfaction the social reform program announced by Premier Gandhi on July 1, the program that foresees a number of measures to improve the lot of the poor."

An aspect of Gandhi's economic program that was particularly pleasing to the Congress party's capitalist backers was her emphasis on "hard work." In her July 1 speech she declared, "We must go all out to increase production." This theme was repeated in the meeting with the trade-union officials. "The present opportunity," she said, "should be used for increasing production and to improve service to the people."

Appeals for "discipline" and for a "rededication" to the "task of nation-building"

have become a major feature of government propaganda. "One minister after another," *New York Times* reporter William Borders said in a July 5 dispatch from New Delhi, "has appealed for greater productivity and harder work for longer hours. In the uncertain atmosphere engendered by the mass arrests, there have been noticeable, if limited, results."

The Ministry of Steel and Mines, in a July 6 statement calling for greater production, said that it was making changes that would result in "the entire steel industry gearing itself up to the tasks flowing from the declaration of national emergency."

Minister of Communications S.O. Sharma said his employees had "agreed" to exceed the production target for telecommunications equipment by 10 percent. The workers in the Department of Irrigation "voted" July 2 to work a half hour a day longer.

The increase in production is to be coupled with a crash program to expand exports in an effort to ease India's vast balance-of-payments deficit. To make greater production attractive to some of the capitalists, the regime has announced subsidies to "rejuvenate" old tea plantations.

In addition, Gandhi has stated that she did not intend to nationalize any industries or place new government controls on business.


In order to mask the anti-working-class and probusiness features of her economic program, Gandhi reserved a few demagogic promises for the poverty-stricken masses in the cities and countryside.

In language similar to her *gharibi hatao* ("abolish poverty") campaign slogan during the 1971 elections, she promised the distribution of some surplus land, an end to bonded labor, legislation to limit the size of landholdings, a "crackdown" on smuggling and the hoarding of essential commodities, and price controls.

None of these measures are new. A Land Ceiling Act, for instance, has been on the books in Gujarat state for fifteen years without appreciably affecting the large landholdings. A few prominent smugglers and black marketeers were arrested in 1974 for propaganda purposes (the regime needed scapegoats to take the blame for grain shortages), but hoarding and smuggling still continued.

Prices of grain in the government's ration shops have been controlled for several years. However, since the regime was unable to buy enough grain for the ration shops from the large farmers and merchants, and was unwilling to force them to sell more, the poor in the cities had to turn to the black market, where grain was plentiful but sold at exorbitant prices.

Without breaking the power of the merchants and large farmers—and consequent-



"OK, children, repeat after me..."

Lurie/Sunday Times

ly the smugglers, hoarders, and black marketeers allied with them—it would be virtually impossible to control prices under the present conditions of scarcity.

Gandhi's "land distribution" scheme is a complete fraud. *New York Times* reporter James M. Markham, in a July 3 dispatch from Patna, the capital of Bihar state, noted that the state government had acquired 20,000 acres of surplus land over the past two months, which it promised to turn over to poor peasants.

"One Bihari here," Markham said, "scoffed at the land redistribution plan as tokenism, saying: 'Five or six families in Purnea District can give them 20,000 acres.'"

"I don't think there will be any fundamental change," he said sadly.

There is a burning need for real agrarian reform in India. According to Charles Bettelheim in his book *India Independent*, 38 percent of the Indian peasantry are landless agricultural workers. Another 45 percent own some land or work a property-owner's land as tenants or sharecroppers. The rich peasants and landlords, 17 percent of the rural population, own more than half the cultivated land. An end to such conditions would require a social revolution in the countryside.

The Congress party, however, gets much of its support from these wealthy peasants and landowners, as well as from the industrial bourgeoisie in the cities. Although it may launch numerous diatribes

against the evils of the "feudalists" and the "monopolists," and may even be forced to decree a few minor economic reforms, it is incapable of fundamentally improving the conditions of India's millions of peasants and workers.

As evidenced by the mass struggles that have developed against the Gandhi regime during the past year, the prime minister's "populist" facade has worn very thin. She has now sought to strengthen it with the iron fist. But in face of India's desperate economic conditions, repression and unfulfilled promises can only add to the mass unrest. □

#### Mao's Kind Word for Nixon

When Thai Premier Kukrit Pramoj returned from his visit to China, he brought greetings to former U.S. President Richard Nixon from an old friend. According to Kukrit, Mao Tsetung told him he remembered Nixon's visit to China in 1973 and added: "Please tell him I still think of him."

Mao thought the Watergate scandal was the result of "too much freedom of political expression in the United States," Kukrit reported. He said Mao told him: "What's wrong with taping a conversation when you happen to have a tape recorder with you? Most people in America love playing with tape recorders."

### The Christian Democrats Begin to Grumble

By Jean-Pierre Beauvais

[The following article, the second in a series of four, appeared in the May 16 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly, *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Readjustment and realignment of the relationship of political forces—such formulas might appear somewhat exaggerated in face of the realities of daily life in Santiago, in face of the insolent cynicism that characterizes the military's implementation of its policy of terror.

In fact, both these sides of the Chilean reality, seemingly contradictory, are directly linked. In continuing to carry out large-scale repression, the junta has two goals:

- To prevent a realignment of forces in the workers movement—both on the trade-union and political level—through possible mobilizations or actions, however modest they might be.

- To prove to the bourgeoisie—both those sectors already in opposition and those who will be in opposition in the future—as well as to the imperialist powers, that since such a policy is necessary, there can be no serious bourgeois alternative to the military regime and its leadership, the junta; that it alone is capable of implementing this course of action. The aim is to destroy the credibility of these bourgeois opposition sectors, and of their political and economic proposals.

This is Pinochet's crucial problem. Apart from the fact that the dictatorship still exists, it shows how much the political climate in Santiago has changed since September 11, 1973.

At the time of the coup the entire bourgeoisie was grateful to the junta for having eliminated the revolutionary peril. The reactionary petty bourgeoisie also gave the junta its full backing. But now this support has given way to division, for the most part disaffection, and in certain cases even opposition.

The political isolation of the regime is above all the result of its economic policy. In the context of both the Chilean and the international economy, this policy has produced an unprecedented economic crisis throughout the country. The only sector that has benefited from it is the big bourgeoisie most closely tied to traditional export activities and to international capital.

Taking this fact as a starting point, we can analyze the evolution of the whole

Christian Democracy and no longer just some sectors of it, as was the case a few months ago.

Apart from the purely formal references the Christian Democracy makes to the need for "democracy," its main criticism of the junta is over economic policy.

For the Christian Democrats, the real balance sheet of the regime is the drop in demand in the internal market, which they calculate at about 40 percent. How predictable they are!

As one of the traditional mouthpieces of owners of small and medium-sized industries, including those making durable consumer goods, the Christian Democracy represents the capitalist sectors most directly affected by the crisis in the internal market.

For the first year of the military regime, the Christian Democrats accepted the consequences of the junta's economic policy without much grumbling. In the end, however, they came to see the economic results as too high a price to pay for pushing back the specter of revolution!

But the hopes and calculations that entered into the military's economic plans—largely shared, in the beginning, by those bourgeois sectors not directly favored by this economic policy—were shown to have been in vain.

Under these circumstances, the only perspective for the Christian Democrats, and for those whose interests they represent, is a radical change in economic planning and policy.

"The internal market must again be the motor of economic activity. It must be reactivated and even enlarged," the Christian Democratic economists explain.

But in a country like Chile in 1975, such an economic decision has considerable political implications. It runs in opposition to the immediate interests of the big bourgeoisie on which the military regime bases itself and whose profits it defends. It implies a different distribution of government aid and subsidies; a more "flexible" wage policy toward the workers; less competitive and less profitable export activities; and above all, a total revision of the junta's agrarian policy, which is aimed at restoring the system of great landed estates.

Clearly established in the opposition camp and limited in their activity by the censorship and repression, the Christian Democrats have come to realize that to offer a credible alternative to the junta it is not

sufficient merely to represent or speak for an important sector of the bourgeoisie.

Their influence in the military apparatus is much reduced today, although it was once quite significant. The repression, as far as one can tell, is heavy inside the military hierarchy itself, and the officers too closely linked to the Christian Democrats have been systematically weeded out. Thus it is not there that the Christian Democratic leaders hope to win real influence, in the short term at least.

The Christian Democrats' credibility as a bourgeois opposition actually comes from the workers, a situation they consciously cultivated. This is a shrewd tactic. Its chances of success with the workers movement, and its political consequences, should not be underestimated.

In spite of all the difficulties that the junta has created for it, the Christian Democracy still has some trump cards, the first and most powerful of which is the Catholic hierarchy. Above and beyond its traditional tactical shrewdness, the great majority of the church hierarchy has come out in opposition to the dictatorship, after much beating around the bush. Consequently, its role and its weight have grown to the point where its leader, Cardinal Henríquez, has without doubt become the leading political figure in the country after Pinochet.

But the Catholic hierarchy is also an army of priests who have seen their influence and prestige grow in the countryside and in the workers' quarters because of the social and humanitarian role they play there. Soup kitchens, committees to help the unemployed, child-care centers, clinics, and homes for children and old people have for the most part been organized on their initiative.

Linking up again with their populist tradition, the militants and sympathizers of the Christian Democracy have taken part in these activities and won prestige and influence.

Before the coup the Christian Democracy was also a force in the unions. In elections to the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores—United Federation of Workers] it received about 30 percent of the vote, the same as the Communist party and the Socialist party. Its cadres and militants are still on the job, having suffered little from the repression in comparison with the Communists or Socialists. Some of them play an important role in the structures set up by the dictatorship, but they are a minority. The others, working under difficult conditions but taking advantage of the vacuum created by the repression against the left-wing parties, are working to rebuild an opposition union movement.

The Christian Democracy is thus taking advantage of the ambiguity in the situation, mixing the demands of the bourgeois

sector that it represents—the expansion of the internal market—with populist and humanist demagoguery. Having played a decisive role in the preparation and success of the coup, in this initial stage it is a pole of major importance for the reorganization of the union movement and for rebuilding political structures among the workers and popular masses.

That is not one of the smallest paradoxes of the Chilean situation.

The fact is that the working class of the industrial belts and the neighborhood councils, the working class that such a short time ago was mobilized for the socialist revolution, is to a large extent beginning to reorganize itself behind the bourgeois leadership of the Christian Democracy.

That, also, is the consequence of the defeat and therefore of a political strategy.

Who could deny it, when one of the powerful trumps this bourgeois leadership has in its hand is none other than the Communist party, which by its general orientation and concrete work openly supports this readjustment by the Christian Democracy?

[Next: The Parties of the "Popular Unity" Continue to Flounder]

### Chilean Gen. Rene Schneider Was Victim of CIA Plot

The 1970 assassination of Gen. Rene Schneider, the commander of the Chilean army, was part of a CIA-engineered coup attempt, according to "informed sources" cited in the July 7 *Washington Post*.

The *Post* report said that the Central Intelligence Agency "had Schneider on what amounted to a worldwide 'enemies' list' of individuals considered inimical to U.S. interests. . . ."

Schneider was murdered October 22, 1970—two days before the Chilean Congress ratified the election of Salvador Allende as president. During the election campaign, Schneider had declared that the army would respect the decision of the voters.

He was murdered during a kidnapping attempt. According to the *Post* account, the abduction was "encouraged" by the CIA with the hope that it would touch off a coup.

Secret memorandums circulated among executives of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company—first made public by Washington columnist Jack Anderson in 1972—had already revealed that in mid-September 1970 Washington gave the "green light" to the U.S. embassy "to move in the name of President Nixon."


The U.S. ambassador was given "maximum authority to do all possible, short of a Dominican Republic type action, to keep Allende from taking power," the ITT documents said.

July 21, 1975

## Machel's 'Marxism' Exploited by 'New York Times'

### Purge of Frelimo Critics Under Way in Mozambique

By Caroline Lund



Manchester Guardian

Samora Machel, president of the newly independent People's Republic of Mozambique, has declared that his government will become the "first truly Marxist state in Africa."

However, the policies adopted by the new regime indicate that its perspectives are far from Marxist.

In two articles in the *New York Times* (July 2 and July 7), Charles Mohr describes these policies:

"While Frelimo\* will undoubtedly move eventually to nationalize Mozambique's industry and commerce and impose collective agriculture, the first priority is not on such administrative or legislative measures, which might be premature, but on efforts to transform public thinking, to eliminate 'individualism' and to inculcate the party line into the consciousness of the people rather than merely to impose rhetoric."

Frelimo is attempting to enforce one-party rule through what are called "dynamic groups" that were set up last year in factories, schools, neighborhoods, and rural areas.

At a meeting of Frelimo leaders in February, the party resolved that "it is

\*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique—Mozambique Liberation Front.

necessary to pursue a purge campaign within the ranks of the dynamic groups to detect, denounce and expel infiltrated elements." Scheduled to be purged from the groups were those "compromised with capitalism" and also, according to Mohr, those "guilty of tribalism, racism, regionalism, encouraging strikes or 'easy profits.'"

In a report in the May 18 *Los Angeles Times*, Tom Lambert said that also marked for purging were "those who attack our policies or engage in economic sabotage."

The February resolution also called for steps against "all forms of undisciplined behavior, such as so-called leftism; liberalism, lack of respect for [party] hierarchy," and "elitism."

Lambert reported that by the time of his article about 500 persons accused of opposing Frelimo had been detained. Many had been sent off to the countryside to "learn from the peasants," in the style of the Mao regime in China.

Frelimo's perspective of one-party rule and suppression of any criticism of its regime is in fact the opposite of Marxism. It is modeled on the purges and repressive measures characteristic of the Stalinized workers states.

The problems confronting the Mozambican people indeed cry out for Marxist solutions. Five centuries of colonial rule have left the country with an 85 percent illiteracy rate, endemic famine, rampant disease, and oppression of women. The economy has been paralyzed by the exodus of thousands of Portuguese technicians, businessmen, and big landlords.

In face of these problems, Frelimo is not moving toward a planned economy and workers democracy. The regime has stated that private ownership of industry will be permitted unless it is considered to conflict with state interests. It has also made it clear that foreign investments are welcome.

Last fall, according to the July 7 *Time* magazine, Frelimo crushed a wave of strikes after entering the transitional regime leading to formal independence. Today, the magazine said, "there is also talk about dispatching armed soldiers to the docks to force greater efficiency, perhaps at gunpoint."

The *New York Times* drew attention to Samora Machel's professions of "Marxism" because they helped strengthen the contention of capitalist propagandists that socialism equals totalitarianism. □

## The Need to End the Feud Between 'Officials' and IRSP

[The following interview was given to Gerry Foley May 16 in Dublin by Séamas Costello, one of the most prominent leaders of the Irish Republican Socialist party. The IRSP is a grouping formed in December 1974, primarily by former members of the "Official" Irish Republican Movement.]

[Conflict developed between the IRSP and the "Officials" in Belfast soon after the formation of the new group and led to armed incidents beginning in February. A truce was declared in April, which broke down in a short time. After an escalation of incidents following the April 28 shooting of Billy McMillen, the "Official" commander in Belfast, new truce negotiations began in mid-May. There has been a decline in reported incidents since that time.]

\* \* \*

*Question. What happened to the truce that was in effect the last time I was here, in early April?*

*Answer.* What the truce consisted of was our people staying "offside," not staying at home, not going to work, or not going to the Labour Exchange if they were unemployed. We decided and the Belfast Regional Executive decided that the members would return to their homes and their jobs and resume party activity on a certain date, and we issued a public statement to that effect. The night that they returned, one of them was shot—five bullets—by the "Officials" in the Andersonstown area. So, that effectively ended the truce.

*Q. What are the reasons for the escalation of the conflict since then?*

A. It has escalated because the "Officials" chose to escalate it. They have consistently ignored every single attempt at mediation made by people outside of both organizations. We have consistently called for mediation and indicated our willingness to accept the various mediators who offered their services. But the "Officials" refused, and this is the reason why it has got worse.

*Q. You said earlier that it was the policy of the "Officials" to physically smash the IRSP. Do you think that is still their policy?*

A. At the moment I could not answer that question, since attempts at mediation are under way again. A few days ago, Tomás Mac Giolla [the president of "Official" Sinn Féin, the political arm of the movement]

issued a public statement calling for mediation.

This was the first declaration by any leader of the "Official" movement that in any way indicated that they were interested in peace. And it came four days after the attempted assassination of myself in Waterford. There's no doubt this caused a lot of support to be lost by the "Officials." People were very critical of it in many parts of the country. This may have had something to do with the statement by Tomás Mac Giolla. Since last Monday we have been in touch with mediators and it seems at the moment that there is some kind of intention to engage in peace discussions.

*Q. To what extent do you think that the "Official" IRA leadership is in control of the situation that has arisen? To what extent are these incidents the result of conscious decisions by the leadership?*

A. That's a difficult question to answer. You have to understand the situation here. Basically what you have to understand is that the "Official" leadership is completely in control of the situation. They initiated the campaign against the IRSP by a conscious decision of their Army Council. And they can call off the campaign by a decision of their Army Council. I've no doubt they can make that decision stick.

But as for the individual acts that have been committed in keeping with this policy, the Army Council wouldn't necessarily have control of those. The control at that level would rest with the local OC [Officer Commanding] in Belfast; up to his death, that was Billy McMillen.

*Q. Do you have any ideas about who killed Billy McMillen?*

A. No, we've no idea. We have opinions about it. Two days before Billy McMillen was killed, discussions had been taking place in Belfast between some of our people and Billy McMillen's brother Art. We had been led to believe by Art McMillen that the "Officials" were going to issue a statement the following Monday or Tuesday, which would have the effect of ending the conflict. We weren't too sure what that meant but we assumed the "Officials" were going to issue a public statement saying that they were calling off their offensive against the IRSP.

Some of this information was relayed over various telephones that happened to be tapped. The Cyprus Street [the "Official" Republican Clubs headquarters in Belfast]

telephone was used, the telephone of one of our members was used. A telephone in Dublin was used. All three telephones are known to be tapped. So, there's no doubt in our mind that at least two security services knew of the possibility of peace two days before Billy McMillen's death. Obviously one possibility that has to be considered is that the killer was an agent provocateur acting on behalf of the Southern, Northern, or British administration.

*Q. How large a part in the conflict do you think agents provocateurs have played?*

A. I would think the British must be very happy with the conflict that has arisen, that they must consider it one of the most encouraging developments. One of the principal effects of the conflict between the two organizations has been to discredit the anti-imperialist forces in general; not just the "Officials" and the IRSP, but all radical, left, and anti-imperialist organizations have suffered from it. From that point of view, I think the British have a vested interest in the promotion of the conflict. So, also, have the administration here in the South. The political issues between the two organizations have become increasingly clouded, as the conflict developed.

*Q. The "Officials" say that a shadowy military organization linked to the IRSP has carried out attacks on their members. They draw two different conclusions from this. Some say that you don't control it. Others say that you are trying to use it as your assassination squad without taking responsibility for what it does. What is the relationship between the IRSP and the military groupings that have expressed support for it in the conflict with the "Officials"?*

A. Well, the relationship with the PLA [People's Liberation Army] and the other armed groups that have acted in this way is as follows: The PLA and other groups that haven't chosen to say publicly what their names are offered to assist us in defending our members against the "Officials." This followed the death of one of our members in Belfast. The Belfast Regional Executive accepted that offer. The basis of this acceptance was that as long as the "Officials" attacked IRSP members, these groups would defend IRSP members against such actions and retaliate for such actions.

It's true to say that we don't control the

individual actions carried out in pursuit of this policy, any more than the Army Council of the "Official" IRA controls the individual actions of members of its organization. But we are quite satisfied that as soon as agreement is reached between the IRSP and the "Official" IRA and as soon as we have some concrete indication that the "Officials" are going to call off its campaign, there will be no difficulty whatsoever about ensuring that there are no attacks on members or supporters of the "Official" IRA.

*Q. The "Officials" say that they had to defend themselves against persons associated with the IRSP and that they don't know who to negotiate with, the IRSP or the PLA.*

A. They have no basis for saying that. They launched a campaign against the IRSP and carried it out in a vicious way. There was absolutely no retaliation against the "Officials" until one of our members was killed. There is no reason for them to negotiate with the PLA. The dispute is with the IRSP.

*Q. The "Officials" claim that these armed groups are just irresponsible, criminal cliques looking for a political cover for thuggery. There is a pattern of gang activity in the Catholic ghetto. How can you be sure that you can control these groups?*

A. The Belfast Regional Executive knows the leadership of these groups. They are quite satisfied that there won't be any difficulty in ensuring that there is a halt to their activities. The Ard Comhairle [National Executive] of the IRSP accepts their judgment of the situation.

*Q. What is the political character of these groups?*

A. They're broadly republican, radical republican groups. None of them are very large. They have a certain amount of arms at their disposal, like hundreds of other people in the Belfast area. They would be broadly sympathetic to the political position of the IRSP, and are certainly very opposed to any attempt to deny the IRSP the right of organizing, or the right of expression. They are also people who have been involved in activities against the British army.

*Q. What about the claims that these groups are a magnet for "extremists" from both the "Officials" and Provisionals?*

A. It would be true to say that they come from diverse origins. I personally don't know many of the individuals involved, but I understand that some of them may have

been involved with the "Officials," the Provisionals, the People's Democracy, or other organizations.



Hibernia

SEAMAS COSTELLO

*Q. Were any of them connected with Saor Eire [a terrorist grouplet with an ultraleftist rhetoric]?*

A. Not that I know of.

*Q. Do you see a danger of spreading Catholic-Protestant warfare in the North? How do these groups fit into that context? Are they able to defend the Catholic ghettos, or are they organizing people to defend the Catholic ghettos?*

A. The indications are at the moment that we could have a serious outbreak of sectarian [communal] warfare this summer, particularly after the results of the Convention elections. [The ultraright proimperialist group won an overwhelming majority of the Protestant vote; a substantial percentage of the nationalist-minded population boycotted the elections to the Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention—G.F.]

I don't think any individual organization is going to be able to protect the Catholic ghettos against this form of attack. I don't think the "Official" IRA can do it, I don't think the Provisional IRA could do it on their own, I don't think any other armed group on its own could effectively fulfill this function.

I would take the view that what's required in that situation is some form of coordinated defensive measures. Previous

experience unfortunately has shown that such coordination probably won't come about until the attacks become a reality.

*Q. You say coordination, that is, coordination of the armed groups of various political tendencies. But what about the formation of a united defense force that would include representatives of all the tendencies present but represent the community as a whole and be under the control of a united community organization?*

A. Well, I think you have the problem there of established organizations wanting to preserve their own identity. I can't see the Provisional IRA, or the "Official" IRA, or any other armed organization willingly abandoning its identity within the framework of such an organization. I think that realistically the best that can be hoped for is some kind of umbrella organization, which would encompass the various organizations and would deal specifically with defensive measures.

This form of organization has existed on a couple of occasions between the "Officials" and the Provisionals on a local level in different areas of Belfast. It's more than likely that something similar will arise again. But unfortunately it'll probably happen at the last minute, and for that reason will be rather haphazard and maybe ineffective.

*Q. What about the lack of community control over these armed groups? Do you see that as a problem, and if you do, how do you propose to solve it?*

A. Well, of course it's a problem. I think that what's required to solve it is something more than just coordination on defensive measures. I think some form of coordinated political approach is also required. We would like to see the emergence of a broad anti-imperialist front in the situation that's developing in the North.

But to have this we have to have cooperation among the principal revolutionary organizations. And it has to be cooperation on the basis of a principled anti-imperialist stand. That's a political question, and it's a question that goes side by side with the military aspect. And it's going to prove equally difficult to achieve.

*Q. Is there any political debate between you and the "Officials" at this stage?*

A. No, there's absolutely no political debate, and no communication at all between us and the "Officials," other than the current peace discussions that I mentioned earlier.

*Q. If the current round of peace discus-*

sions fails, how do you think the conflict can be stopped?

A. If these peace discussions fail, the only way I can see the conflict being stopped is through exhaustion, exhaustion on the part of both organizations.

Q. You don't think it can be stopped by political pressure?

A. Well, certainly political pressure would help. There has been a considerable amount of political pressure to date. I think the results of the Convention elections were a form of political pressure on the "Officials." Their vote was absolutely disastrous measured against the results of recent elections. This may have contributed in some way to bringing about the present indications from the "Officials" that they are willing to engage in peace discussions.

We would certainly welcome any form of political pressure to end this conflict. We have encouraged such pressures from the beginning and will continue to do so. But it's difficult to know what the reactions of the "Officials" will be to such pressure. It may be that they have already decided that there is absolutely nothing that they can gain politically in the present situation and

that they have decided to continue the conflict irrespective of the political costs.

They may decide that it's of more benefit to them simply to preserve an organizational structure, even if that structure has no popular appeal in the short term. If they do that, then they're obviously going to be immune to political pressure.

Q. In that context, what attitude do you think revolutionary groups in other countries should take toward the conflict between you and the "Officials"?

A. I think the first thing they should do is examine the situation for themselves on the ground. And, having done so, I think that they should make whatever political criticisms they think are justified. I think that they have to understand that there is a clear difference between the attitude of the leadership of the "Officials" and the rank and file. Most rank-and-file members don't want this conflict and seem to recognize instinctively that it's bad in republican terms, and they want it ended. The problem is the leadership. And any pressure that's exerted should be brought to bear directly on the leadership, without putting the blame on the entire membership of the "Official" organization.

I think that support groups abroad that have supported the "Officials" during the last four or five years have a part to play as well. They can indicate that they're going to withhold their support until this conflict is ended. And they can demand that the "Officials" bring the conflict to an end by engaging in discussions. As far as we're concerned, it's quite easy to end the conflict. All that is needed to end it is for each organization to agree to leave the other organization alone and allow them to pursue their political policies without interference. It's not very complicated to end it; it is quite simple.

Q. How much of this conflict can be attributed to Stalinism in the "Officials"?

A. I would say it's a factor insofar as some members of the "Official" leadership are concerned. But I wouldn't classify the entire leadership of the "Officials" as Stalinists. There are, as I said, some individuals there whom I would put into this particular category.

Q. What role does the Stalinist training of some elements in the leadership play in the conflict?

A. Well, I would say that the role it plays is that certain elements in the "Officials" have reached the conclusion that the primary objective is to maintain their organizational structure. And they're willing to do virtually anything to maintain

that structure, apart of course from engaging in political debate and discussion. They're not willing to do that, because they recognize the weakness of their political position. So, they adopt this extreme hard-line attitude, and resort to arms and thuggery to wipe out a group that has a different political viewpoint from theirs. I think this is one of the concrete effects of this particular attitude.

Q. You mean that their Stalinist training led them to make a fetish of the apparatus as such?

A. Yes. That appears to be the case. Billy McMillen told our members who were kidnapped on December 12 in the first wave of kidnappings of our members that the object of the exercise was to smash the IRSP. And, if they didn't get out of the IRSP, that he would smash them. Now, I'm not saying that Billy McMillen was a Stalinist. I don't think he was. But certainly he was influenced by people who have a Stalinist approach, and I think the remarks he made on that occasion were indicative of this attitude.

Q. You don't think that this could derive from some of the negative aspects of the republican tradition?

A. It can be partly explained in those terms. But in the context of this dispute, I don't think it can be explained solely in those terms.

Q. Worship of the apparatus is not part of the republican tradition?

A. It is a part of the republican tradition. But I have never known this to lead to such acts before in the republican tradition. There have been splits and divisions in republicanism before and nobody felt sufficiently strongly about them to go around killing people over the preservation of the apparatus. But in this particular case, they seem to have adopted that attitude.

Q. In other words, this Stalinist training injected an element of political fanaticism foreign to the republican tradition?

A. I believe it did, yes.

Q. How did this fanaticism come into the organization? Does it lie mainly in the middle cadres trained by Stalinist "educators" or is it in the top leadership?

A. I would say that it's primarily at national leadership level. There may be a few isolated cases where it's also visible at local leadership level. But primarily it's at national level. □



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## A Fratricidal Struggle for Power

By Ernest Harsch

[Last of three articles]

The first major clashes in Luanda following the installation of the coalition regime on January 31, 1975, were between the MPLA forces of Agostinho Neto and those of Daniel Chipenda's faction.

The clashes followed the MPLA's refusal to recognize the right of any group other than the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA to exist and function. On February 14, the MPLA released a statement trying to justify this position. "Our organizations were recognized as the only negotiators with the Portuguese Government, whose cooperation made the decolonization process possible," the MPLA said. "All organizations and military forces not integrated in the liberation movements thus were considered illegal, and therefore subject to disbanding."<sup>15</sup>

The official MPLA leadership had already asked Chipenda in January to disband his forces. The January 31 *República* reported that Chipenda had attempted to enter the eastern city of Luso with an armed force, but was halted by Portuguese and MPLA troops.

The clashes in Luanda in mid-February, which left an estimated twenty persons dead, were the result of an MPLA attempt to prevent Chipenda from establishing his group in the city. According to an MPLA communiqué, the MPLA had not intended to engage in an armed conflict, but had tried to give the coalition regime more time in which to neutralize or disperse the Chipenda forces. The National Defense Council, on which the MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the Portuguese were represented, condemned the MPLA's attacks against the Chipenda forces. Two months later Chipenda joined the FNLA.

A month after the MPLA-Chipenda clashes, armed units of the MPLA and FNLA fought in various parts of the country, particularly in the muceques of Luanda. According to the MPLA radio program "Fighting Angola," battles also took place in Lubango, Lobito, and Huambo. The FNLA, after claiming that the MPLA was responsible for the initial fighting, admitted attacking MPLA forces in Luanda when it said in a communiqué

15. This is the MPLA's own interpretation of the Alvor accords. While the accords bar any group other than the three main nationalist forces from participating in the regime or running in the elections, they are not specifically made illegal.



COSTA GOMES: MFA's "active neutrality" does not rule out military intervention.

that "the ELNA<sup>16</sup> occupied, on March 24, various military quarters of the MPLA in Luanda." But the FNLA denied any responsibility in the alleged massacres of MPLA recruits that had been reported in the press.

Heavy fighting between the MPLA and FNLA again broke out at the end of April. "Eyewitnesses," according to the May 3 *New York Times*, "said numerous teen-age boys carrying automatic weapons fired at political opponents in buildings in the black slum areas surrounding the capital, but most of the shooting was confined to attacks on the headquarters and political offices of the two parties."

The May 2 *Jornal Novo* reported that the rival nationalist forces used heavy machine guns, mortars, and anti-aircraft weapons fired on the ground. The morgue in Luanda said May 3 that 500 bodies had been brought in, but since many of the dead had not yet been taken to the morgue, the

16. Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola—National Liberation Army of Angola, the military wing of the FNLA.

estimates of the death toll reached as high as 1,000.

In an apparent show of strength, the MPLA-affiliated trade union, UNTA, called a general strike in Luanda May 22. It had originally been scheduled for May 1, but was then banned by the coalition regime because of the fighting. According to Reuters, the strike was generally successful, with 15,000 persons attending a rally.

From the beginning of May and into June, the fighting spread to most of the important towns in northern Angola; there were reports of clashes in Santo António do Zaire, Uíge, Ambrizete, Malange, Dalatando, and Carmona. Fighting also took place in the oil-rich Cabindan enclave, in the central city of Nova Lisboa, and in Teixeira de Sousa on the Benguela railway in eastern Angola.

According to a report by David B. Ottaway in the June 10 *Washington Post*, much of the fighting in the northern part of the country appeared to be the result of efforts to clear pockets of rival troops out of areas that had been under the influence of either the MPLA or FNLA. He said that the FNLA in the Bakongo area "has now pretty well eliminated the presence of Popular Movement [MPLA] troops throughout this region." The MPLA was likewise moving against FNLA forces in the territory north and east of Luanda.

Although the UNITA throughout the first months of the fighting said it was not involved in the clashes, it was drawn into the fighting in early June. "In an official statement," the June 8 *Washington Post* reported, "Portugal authorities accused the MPLA of attacking UNITA, but added that the MPLA forces were apparently acting without orders from their high command." The UNITA later issued a statement saying that it had "no quarrel" with the MPLA.

On June 9, Portuguese forces actively intervened by attacking troops of both the FNLA and MPLA.

According to some of the reports, many of the hundreds of dead were civilians who had been caught in the middle of the fighting, particularly in the crowded muceques. In addition, the warfare disrupted communications and cut off food and water supplies to some of the embattled towns. The June 12 *Washington Post* reported that hundreds of Africans had demonstrated outside the government building in Luanda, demanding to be transported out of the city.

The fighting also caused panic among the settler population. Thousands of settlers fled the plantations of northern Angola and the suburban areas of Luanda. The June 9 *Los Angeles Times* reported that 50,000 to 100,000 settlers were trying to book passage to Portugal. However, Luanda's port was partly blocked by a dockers' strike.

Some of the foreign interests in Angola have already begun a partial evacuation.

The U.S., British, West German, and South African embassies advised their citizens to leave the country until "the situation stabilizes." As a result of the fighting in Cabinda, Gulf Oil evacuated the dependents of its employees. But a Gulf official noted that production at its Malongo facilities twenty miles north of Cabinda city was "normal." Texaco likewise evacuated all of its personnel from Santo António do Zaire, close to its offshore exploration facilities, after the town was captured by the FNLA.

The April 18 *A Provincia de Angola* reported that the UNITA had begun to set up "peace committees," which the UNITA said were designed to help prevent clashes. The UNITA also claimed that it was the only group capable of establishing a "peaceful society."

The MFA on May 10 called for a meeting with the three main nationalist groups, ostensibly to avert a civil war. The following day, FNLA head Holden Roberto stated: "Given the evident partiality and lack of objectivity shown by certain members of the Government of Lisbon to our movement . . . the FNLA categorically refuses to take part in a meeting of the three Angolan movements with which a member of the Portuguese Government will be associated."

UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi also rejected Portuguese participation in such a meeting.

However, Savimbi managed to organize a summit meeting of the heads of the three rival nationalist groups that began in Kenya June 15, without the participation of the Portuguese.

On June 21 the three groups agreed publicly to halt the fighting, free prisoners held by each group, disarm civilians, and merge their forces into a "single army." But while the number of clashes in Angola declined within a few days, the factional atmosphere remained. A breakdown of the agreement—which is little different from the many other cease-fire agreements reached by the rival organizations in the past—could lead to the resumption of fighting, perhaps on an even bloodier scale than before.

#### Point Fingers at Each Other

Throughout the fighting, each group has blamed the other for the conflicts.

The April 8 *República* reported that the FNLA had accused the MPLA of seeking a civil war. In January, the FNLA claimed, "Dangerous agitators in the pay of international imperialism" were functioning in Angola under the guise of "international revolutionaries." In May the minister of the interior, an FNLA leader, expelled a Brazilian, a Soviet, a Czechoslovak, a German, a Romanian, a Finn, and a Congolese as "provocateurs."

The MPLA has accused the FNLA of attacking the civilian population in the muceques. The April 2 issue of the Dutch daily *De Volkskrant* reported that Neto said, "UNITA seems to be neutral, but in reality supports the FNLA and is guilty of the same malpractices as the FNLA." In March the MPLA criticized "the passivity of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Angola, which constitutes a clear violation of the Alvor accords and aids the political destabilization fomented by imperialism."

The National Defense Council, headed by the Portuguese high commissioner for Angola, Brig. Gen. Silva Cardoso, has condemned both the MPLA and FNLA for various clashes. The May 18 *New York Times* reported that Cardoso blamed the MPLA for "distributing arms to civilians and children in an indiscriminate manner." The coalition regime, according to a May 2 United Press International dispatch, ordered a Yugoslav ship, reportedly carrying arms for the MPLA, to leave port without unloading.

Adm. Rosa Coutinho, a former Angola high commissioner and an important member of the MFA, said on April 28 that the regime in Zaire was fomenting discord among the three Angolan nationalist groups.

While the three groups, particularly the MPLA and FNLA, are clearly contending for eventual power in Angola, none of the clashes indicate that any of the groups is ready for a full-scale civil war. So far, they seem to be testing each other and consolidating their control over parts of the country, either as a base of support for a future war or for greater political control within the coalition regime or any regime that follows the proclamation of formal independence.

Moreover, it is questionable whether the clashes are fully under the control of the MPLA and FNLA leaderships. Both groups have recently recruited and armed hundreds of young, untrained Angolans, making it difficult for the groups to observe cease-fire orders issued by the nationalist leaders. *Jornal Novo*, in its May 2 issue, noted that the rivalries had increased the "internal breaches of discipline within each of the two groups in conflict. This factor certainly is preoccupying the leaders of the two parties involved."

The FNLA member on the presidential council of the coalition regime, Johnny Eduardo, was quoted in the April 5 *South African Star Weekly* as saying, "We almost came into conflict with the president (of the FNLA [Holden Roberto]) by trying to force him to wage war against the MPLA with all the machinery available.

"The president refused to let us do so, saying that when the time came the war

must be between two armies, without the civilian population in the middle."

While the Eduardo statement may be an indication of differences within the FNLA on its approach toward the MPLA, it could also be interpreted as a warning to the MPLA that the FNLA was considering total war.

Nationalist leaders have also indicated that provocateurs may have been involved in some of the clashes. A communiqué released jointly by the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, quoted in the May 3 *Jornal Novo*, stated that "individuals or isolated groups" had fired on units of the liberation movements.

A few days later, Roberto declared that "certain government circles in Lisbon have been pulling strings backstage with the aim of creating confusion." He accused Portuguese elements of having provoked incidents the week before by firing on an MPLA military installation. MPLA forces then attacked the FNLA, he said.

If provocateurs are functioning in Angola, the factional strife between the MPLA and FNLA facilitates their work.

In the feud atmosphere now reigning in the country, with undisciplined troops and possibly provocateurs setting off clashes that lead to ever greater retaliation, it is quite possible that the factional warfare could get completely out of control, as the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA are forced to commit more and more of their forces to the fratricidal struggle. Even if the leaders of the nationalist groups do not intend to plunge the country into civil war, such a danger is acute.

At a news conference in Paris, cited in the April 25 *Marchés Tropicaux*, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi pointed out, "If Angola enters on the road to civil war, it will not be won by any of the Angolan liberation movements, but by outside powers who will intervene in the conflict in our country in order to plunder its wealth."

#### The Prizes: Oil, Coffee, Diamonds

For the imperialist interests, the stakes in Angola are attractive. Its vast economic potential, probably the greatest of any African country south of the Sahara (with the exception of South Africa), has barely been tapped.

Angola is the second most important coffee grower in Africa and the third largest in the world, producing more than 200,000 tons a year, much of it exported to the United States. Most of the robusta coffee is grown on white-owned plantations in the northern part of the country. Angola also exports raw cotton and sisal. Yet only about 2 percent of the country's vast land area is under active agricultural exploitation.

Angola is a treasure house of oil and minerals. Because of the weakness of

Portuguese imperialism, which lacked the necessary capital to set up adequate mining ventures, much of this sector fell into the hands of other imperialist interests.

The principal diamond fields are exploited by the Companhia de Diamantes de Angola (Diamang), which is controlled by De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. (a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa) together with Belgian and American interests. Before the Lisbon coup in April 1974, the Portuguese administration in Angola required a 50 percent share of the diamond profits. In 1972, Angola produced 2,155,057 carats. Extensive diamond prospecting rights were recently granted for the offshore area between Lobito and the Namibia (South-West Africa) border.

The capital for the exploitation of the iron ore deposits in the Cassinga area, estimated at 1 billion tons, and for the railway from there to Moçamedes port, was invested by the Portuguese government, as well as by the West German Krupp steel empire and the Companhia Mineira do Lobito. Iron ore exports average 7 million tons a year.

Other mineral products from Angola include manganese, phosphate, copper, beryl, kaolin, granite, marble, sea salt, asphalt rock, and gypsum. Since the country has been very little prospected, it is probable that it has significant deposits of other valuable minerals.

From the imperialist viewpoint, Angola's most important asset at this time is its oil. The first oil company to cash in on Angola's petroleum deposits was the Belgian Petrofina (Compagnie Financière Belge des Pétales), which began production in 1955. In 1957 it turned over a third of its shares to the Portuguese administration in Angola, forming Petrangol.

The most important oil fields so far are those under exploitation by Gulf Oil in Cabinda. With a production of about 10 million tons a year, the Cabindan fields now rank Angola as the fourth largest oil producer in Africa, after Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria. It is estimated that the oil deposits in Cabinda could produce between 100 million and 150 million tons by the turn of the century.

A number of other companies are exploring the area off the coast of Angola proper, including the U.S. companies Occidental and Exxon, and the French Total. At Santo António do Zaire in northern Angola, there are thirty-three wells under exploration or in production. In November, it was reported that the U.S.-controlled Texaco Petróleo de Angola had made a major oil discovery near Santo António do Zaire. Although Texaco did not confirm how extensive the find was, the reserves were estimated by other sources to be as high as ten times those of Cabinda.

In May, the coalition regime signed a

contract with Texaco for the production of oil from its concession area.

The regimes in the countries bordering on Angola also have an interest in the outcome of the struggle there.

The Mobutu regime in Zaïre, despite its



MOBUTU: Eyeing Cabindan oil fields?

denials, may very well have an eye on the Cabindan oil fields, as well as the Cabinda port, which could give Zaïre better access to the ocean than it now has. It also uses the Benguela railway through central Angola for the transport of its copper exports from Shaba Province (formerly Katanga). Copper sales account for three-fourths of Zaïre's foreign exchange earnings, and under the Portuguese administration in Angola about 40 percent of its copper exports were shipped along the Benguela.

On the political level, it is important to note that the Mobutu regime favors stability in Angola. It has only been a decade since the many rebellions and secessionist movements in the Congo were suppressed. Civil strife in Angola could lead to a revival of those currents within Zaïre, especially since the Bakongo in northern Angola and the Lundas and Chokwes in the north and east live on both sides of the border.

So far the Mobutu regime has backed the FNLA of Holden Roberto, which has a strong base among the Bakongo, in the hope that if Roberto comes to power his regime would be an ally. But with the entire situation in Angola now so uncertain, and with none of the groups holding a clear

superiority over the others, Kinshasa has gone along with the efforts of the Organization of African Unity to "unify" the three groups. Mobutu has also established contacts with the UNITA by allowing Savimbi to set up offices in Kinshasa, and according to Colin Legum in an article in the January-February 1975 *Problems of Communism*, he has also established contacts with the Pintó de Andrade faction of the MPLA.

Washington may try to use the Mobutu regime to influence the struggle in Angola. Aldus Donald B. Easum, secretary of state for African affairs, said in an interview published in the February 22, 1975, issue of the Tunisian weekly *Jeune Afrique*: "The United States has no plans to invade Angola militarily. We count entirely on the authorities in Zaïre to protect American citizens and interests."

Since 1962, the regime in Kinshasa has received \$376 million in loans and nearly \$50 million in military aid from the United States.

However, the subservience of the Mobutu regime to Washington may not be as abject as is assumed by some. After a purported "coup attempt" in Kinshasa, the government-controlled daily *Elima* stated editorially in its June 17 issue that "in the United States there are bandits who are masters of political assassination. . . ." A few days later the U.S. ambassador was expelled from the country. Such an anti-American posture, of course, may be purely for show.

The regime of Marien Ngouabi in Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, despite its "socialist" pronouncements, has also shown an interest in Cabindan oil and has been backing the Cabindan separatists, as well as the MPLA.

The Kaunda regime in Zambia has publicly supported all three Angola nationalist groups. Its main economic interest is in the Benguela railway, which now transports nearly all<sup>17</sup> of Zambia's copper exports (the country's only important export) to the port of Lobito.

Zambian concern over the unrest in Angola was expressed in an article in the December 12, 1974, *Times of Zambia*. It said, "Recent reports from Angola say that since the Lisbon coup in April, workers and dockers at the port [Lobito] have been busy forming trade unions and organizing strikes.

"It is known that the question of disciplining the workers and persuading them once again to work round-the-clock shifts

17. Zambia had previously shipped about half its copper on the Benguela railway, but after the regime in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, increased its port charges, Kaunda began conveying much of the copper formerly transported through Dar es Salaam to Lobito.

will be one of the first tasks facing a black and independent government in Angola."

Kaunda can thus be expected to back any plans that aim at an orderly transition to formal independence for Angola within the capitalist framework. But since the MPLA and UNITA no longer need Zambian sanctuary for their bases, Kaunda can now do little to directly pressure the nationalist groups.

### The Cabindan Separatists

Although the Alvor accords between the nationalists and the Portuguese stress the "territorial integrity" of Angola, continued fratricidal warfare could give the Cabindan separatist forces an opening to press their own aims.

The Portuguese imperialists, at the end of the fifteenth century, claimed most of the coastal area north of Angola, including Cabinda. But they lost almost all of their "possessions" around the Congo River to their French and Belgian competitors in the mid-nineteenth century. At the 1885 Berlin Conference where the European powers carved up the African cake, Lisbon managed to hold on to Cabinda and a portion of the southern bank of the Congo River, which is now part of northern Angola.

For decades, however, Cabinda was administered separately from Angola. It is inhabited by about 80,000 Mayombes, Ngaoyas, Kakongas, Vilis, and Sundis. According to Gilbert Comte in an article in the May 16 *Le Monde*, the Cabindans have closer language and cultural ties with the peoples around Pointe-Noire, Republic of the Congo, and around Matadi, Zaïre, than with those in Angola.

It was not until 1956, shortly after oil exploration began in the area, that the Salazar regime in Lisbon placed Cabinda under the control of the Portuguese administration in Luanda. This was opposed by some Cabindans and led to the formation in 1963 of the Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC—Cabinda Liberation Front), led by Luis Ranque Franque, a Cabindan businessman. Opposed to the FNLA and MPLA, FLEC sought a constitutional conference with Lisbon, an amnesty, and independence for Cabinda alone. It is headquartered in Pointe-Noire and probably has some influence over Cabindan refugees in Brazzaville.

As with the rivalries among the main nationalist forces in Angola, it appears that the imperialist interests may have also sought to influence the direction of the Cabindan separatist movement. In the 1960s, according to Comte, a group of Cabindans, led by Alexandre Taty, a former FNLA leader, defected to the Portuguese and formed a special military force to fight the Angolan rebels, particularly the MPLA,

which carried out a few actions in Cabinda and which openly opposed Cabindan secession.

There have been charges by the Angolan nationalists that FLEC is backed and financed by the oil companies. According to Comte, one of the FLEC leaders, Alexandre Tchoufou, was the vice-president of the French Elf-Congo oil company. But at a FLEC congress in January he was repudiated.

While Spínola was in power, he attempted to get FLEC to participate in his maneuvers against the three main liberation movements. FLEC claims that it has a June 16, 1974, telegram from Spínola inviting FLEC to Lisbon for a meeting. FLEC says it refused.

A month after Spínola's downfall, there were clashes between FLEC supporters and MPLA forces in Cabinda. Portuguese soldiers and a company of MPLA troops then moved into the enclave and occupied key installations.

Following the signing of the "unity" accords between the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA in January, which stipulated that Cabinda would remain part of Angola, FLEC released a statement declaring that "Cabinda is a territorial entity distinct from Angola," and that "the Cabindan people will never accept a Transitional Government installed in Luanda."

FLEC now receives aid from the regimes in Zaïre and the Republic of the Congo, both of which have their own interests in the outcome of the Cabindan conflict. There is one FLEC training camp in the Republic of the Congo and two in Zaïre, as well as a "Voice of Cabinda" radio program broadcast from Kinshasa. FLEC has also been allowed to set up offices in Pointe-Noire and Kinshasa.<sup>18</sup>

The Brazzaville and Kinshasa regimes are playing both ends in Cabinda by backing FLEC as well as the MPLA and FNLA. According to Comte, one FNLA leader, who refused to be identified, criticized the Mobutu regime for its proposal that a "referendum" be held in Cabinda.

Mobutu had declared, according to the May 8 *República*, "Whether Cabinda remains Angolan or becomes independent, it is necessary, in either case, to organize a referendum and listen to the opinions of the Cabindans themselves."

Mobutu left unclear the question of who would organize the "referendum." Under the present conditions it would most likely be a farce. What the Cabindans themselves want is still unknown.

One of the reasons why the MPLA,

18. There were two factions within FLEC, one led by Franque and based in Kinshasa and the other led by Tchoufou and based in the Republic of the Congo. But since Tchoufou's repudiation at the FLEC congress, it is unclear what the present internal situation is.

FNLA, and UNITA oppose Cabindan secession is that, as Savimbi has publicly stated, it "would spark separatist movements elsewhere in Angola." Similar considerations in other African countries led to the Organization of African Unity rejecting FLEC's request for recognition as a liberation movement.<sup>19</sup>

### 'Breakdown in Labor Discipline'

The wave of strikes that followed the April 25, 1974, Lisbon coup has continued.

In December, dock workers in Cabinda walked off their jobs, demanding the same wages the Luanda dockers had won through their strike actions.

The March 1975 issue of the London monthly *Africa*, after describing the Angolan economy's difficulties, noted that the economic situation "has been exacerbated by a breakdown in labour discipline. For instance, it is estimated that in the ports of Luanda, Lobito and Mocamedes there are about 60 ships waiting to be handled; the stevedores have been striking for better wages or, as one labour leader said, 'to accelerate independence.' The Benguela Railway . . . has also been similarly affected. The cumulative effect of all these problems has been to threaten the seven per cent real growth target that is envisaged for 1975."

Gilbert Comte, in the May 14 *Le Monde*, reported, "After a long subservience to their employers, the workers are discovering the right to strike. Twenty-five ships paralyzed in the port of Luanda alone, and the unfinished skeletons of about a hundred buildings on which work has been interrupted since April 25 [1974], testify to the fact that they are making use of it. . . ."

Following the nationalization of all Portuguese-owned banks and insurance companies after the defeat of Spínola's March 11 coup attempt, which also affected the Angolan branches of those banks, the bank workers union in Luanda called an assembly to vote on demands for the transfer of the assets of the nationalized Angolan banks to the Angolan government and for a voice in choosing the new bank administrators.

The fighting in Angola, and more importantly the participation of the liberation organizations in the government, has given the Portuguese the opportunity to crack down on the workers movement.

On February 3, a few days after the installation of the coalition regime, the presidential council, on which all three

19. The OAU's general policy is to maintain the present borders that had been drawn by the imperialist powers and to oppose any secessionist currents in Africa. Consequently, it did not recognize the Biafran secession from Nigeria or the right of the Eritreans to self-determination against Ethiopian claims.

nationalist groups were represented, appealed to "workers and trade union organizations to suspend all their strikes until the necessary regulations and measures safeguarding the rights of the working class are passed and adopted by the Transitional Government."

Shortly after, the coalition regime passed a decree that, the February 28 *Portuguese Africa* reported, "allows the government to mobilize workers and place them under military control, discipline and jurisdiction."

The decree was then used to break the dockers' strikes at Lobito and Luanda.

Connected with the attacks on the right to strike were those on freedom of the press. Angolan newspapers were barred from printing the communiqués of any organizations other than the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA. In addition, newspapers have been temporarily banned and journalists expelled for reporting the clashes between the nationalists.

All three of the nationalist groups, by their participation in the government, have endorsed these antilabor actions. And at least two of them, the UNITA and the MPLA, have actively sought to implement them.

The June 1975 *Africa* reported, "In January this year, Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, appealed to strikers at the docks [of Lobito port] to return to work. Pointing to a Zambian journalist, he said to the dockers, 'Do you think that the people of his country can do without these goods? They are in the front line of the liberation struggle.' His words settled this dispute and traffic to Zambia flowed once again."

At a news conference in Angola in February, MPLA leader Agostinho Neto appealed to all Angola workers "to apply themselves more to their work, because now, more than ever, it is necessary to work to help the reconstruction of the country." He then added, "Striking is the defense of the worker and the worker has the right to defend himself, to show that he is against exploitation, of which he is, in most cases, a victim."

Neto continued, "It is, however, necessary that strikes are duly organized through the proper organs, in this case the unions, and not by just anybody without qualifications for this."

The Lisbon *Diário de Notícias*, which generally favors the MPLA in its news coverage, reported in the February 28 issue, "The MPLA accused UNITA of being responsible for the strike that paralyzed the harbor of Lobito. In an MPLA declaration issued in Lobito, Savimbi's movement is being accused of provoking tribal and regional disturbances. MPLA troops occupied the harbor and tried to make the workers change their minds. These workers were mostly Bailundos, on whom the MPLA

has little influence. According to press reports UNITA then sent a military unit to the waterfront, whereupon the MPLA forces withdrew."

Despite the repressive measures, Luanda



KAUNDA: Bothered by reports that Angolan workers are "busy forming trade unions."

dock workers again walked off their jobs on May 28. A few days earlier dockers with five and ten years seniority were granted 15 and 30 percent wage increases respectively. Those with less than five years seniority then demanded equal rates of pay. The May 30 *Angola Report*, a Luanda news service, reported, "The dockers union, SINTAPA, said the strike was unofficial and did not have the union's support, and called on the Government to take adequate measures."

The strikers, however, were steadfast. "The strike in the port of Luanda continues," said the June 6 *Angola Report*, "despite appeals by the dockers union, SINTAPA, for the men to go back to work and despite personal visits by ministers and senior officials who talked to the strikers. The authorities say they have paid the men everything that had been agreed on; no new claims have been presented."

On March 8, according to a Reuters dispatch, a demonstration organized by "people's committees" was held in front of the government building in Luanda to protest the law placing workers at ports and in other key industries under military discipline. Although the MPLA reportedly had considerable political influence on these "people's committees," the demonstration was not linked to the MPLA. In fact, Lopo do Nascimento, the MPLA member on

the presidential council, declared after the protest that the law was "not against the interests of the people."

#### Toward What Independence?

None of the major Angolan nationalist organizations, despite the "socialist" rhetoric of the MPLA and UNITA, have given any indications that they will carry out sweeping nationalizations or land reform measures or mobilize the Angolan peasants and workers to rid the country of imperialist control.

MPLA leader Agostinho Neto has often been termed a "Marxist" by bourgeois commentators as well as by the Stalinists. Replying to such a description, he said, "I dislike these classifications. I am not a Communist, I am not a Socialist, I am first of all a patriot."

Less than two weeks after the April 25, 1974, Lisbon coup, Neto provided assurances to the Portuguese settlers in Angola. On May 3 he told *Le Monde* that "after independence, the Portuguese living in Africa can remain. . . . They will not lose their economic interests and there will be no violence. If the Portuguese are afraid, it is because of the tendentious propaganda against us and perhaps also because we have not sufficiently defined our objectives for after the war."

In an interview in the April 6 *Tanzanian Sunday News*, Lopo do Nascimento of the MPLA was asked: "Is it the intention of your Movement to nationalise these [foreign economic] interests, or to hand them over to individual Angolans?"

Nascimento replied, "We call for state participation in companies which are exploiting our country's resources. We uphold the principle of development which makes it possible to transform our country's resources in such a way that there really is economic development which benefits Angolans. . . ."

"The nationalisation of enterprises is a fairly complex problem which implies having national cadres and sound knowledge of new techniques, so as to ensure that such enterprises will continue to operate properly after nationalisation. So we have set aside this possibility for now."

In discussions with a reporter for the American Maoist weekly *Guardian*, FNLA representative Mangali Tula indicated that the FNLA would carry out some kind of land reform. "How did they get the land, these people [the white plantation owners]?" Tula asked rhetorically. "They stole it. They came, they took the good lands, and sent the Africans to the bad lands. Now we are going to send the Africans back to the good land. Without necessarily throwing these big farmers and coffee plantation owners out of Angola. But we just will have

to find something else for them to do."

On the question of the imperialist interests in Angola, according to the *Guardian*, Tula was more vague. "Tula said FNLA had not yet definitely finalized its specific policies for how to deal with the foreign companies in Angola," the *Guardian* said. "This would be settled after independence."

In response to the MPLA's slogan of "people's power," Holden Roberto, according to a February 18 Agence France-Presse dispatch, said that "people's power leads to a people's dictatorship and the population of Angola, which is Christian, actively rejects Communism."

According to Tanzanian *Daily News* correspondent Iain Christie, writing in the March 27 issue, Roberto said in a radio broadcast that "within the context of our country, as you know, direct democracy is not possible."

At a news conference in southern Angola in April, FNLA Interior Minister N'gola Kabanku pledged future aid to the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), which is fighting for independence for Namibia. However, he noted that SWAPO was functioning "illegally" in Angolan territory and should contact the authorities in Luanda to establish ties.

In an interview published in the February 22 *To The Point International*, UNITA head Jonas Savimbi explained that "we want good relations with the West and particularly with the EEC [European Economic Community]. We already have contact with some EEC countries and want to deepen these relations because we think Europe will play a moderating role in the international situation. . . . We must have free enterprise. If we took away the stimulus of profit then we would have stagnation . . . I think we should follow the example of that great African statesman, President Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast."

The South African *Star Weekly*, in its May 3 issue, noted that at a news conference in Luanda Savimbi said, "Economic co-operation with South Africa is only realism, however much we may be opposed to the inhumanity and injustice of apartheid."

However, in February, Savimbi said the UNITA would be willing to aid guerrilla movements in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), South Africa, and Namibia, but would not help them open offices abroad. "If the movements want our help they must return to their own countries and fight alongside their own people."

Although all three groups at this stage appear committed to an "independent" Angola within the capitalist framework, it is still too early to make definitive predictions on the courses they will follow.

In a tumultuous situation marked by the sudden collapse of a centuries-old empire

and a steady rise of the colonial revolution, the nationalist forces may yet be pushed further than they are now willing to go. It is also possible that other, revolutionary currents can develop, either within the present organizations or outside of them.

#### 'Active Neutrality' of the MFA

The Movimento das Forças Armadas in Lisbon has been watching the Angolan events carefully. Lt. Col. Pezazar Correia, a member of the High Council of the Revolution and a key MFA leader in Angola, has stated that Angola is discussed at all sessions of the council.

The MFA's response to the possibility of a breakdown of the Angola coalition regime was in the imperialist tradition.

"Faced with the growing danger of civil war in Angola," according to an account published in the June 9 *Los Angeles Times*, "Portugal's Supreme Revolutionary Council reportedly has taken a decision to reinforce its 24,000-strong army in the African colony."

Explaining the MFA's policy of "active neutrality" in Angola, Portuguese President Costa Gomes said, according to the June 6 *Jornal Novo*, that the Portuguese armed forces "would not hesitate to intervene" in the colony to prevent a "deterioration of the situation."

Other MFA leaders have made similar threats. "Portuguese Foreign Minister Major Ernesto Antunes," reported the April 4 *Times of Zambia*, "warned in Lusaka yesterday that Portugal would use force in Angola if the present political confrontation between MPLA and FNLA escalated." Following a visit to Angola in May, Antunes said, "To think that the pacification in the Angola case can be secured without the intervention of Portuguese troops is a Utopian scheme."

In February, Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves said during a television broadcast that the "colonial problem" had not been resolved and that "Portuguese soldiers may have to continue dying."

In Luanda, the MFA ordered its troops to shoot any member of the nationalist groups seen fighting. A spokesman for the Portuguese high command in Luanda said June 9 that Portuguese paratroopers had stormed the strongholds of the MPLA and FNLA and seized their arms stocks. A few weeks before, according to the May 17 *South African Star Weekly*, Portuguese troops intervened against the MPLA and FNLA in Nova Lisboa.

On the question of the role of the Portuguese troops in Angola, the MPLA has made a grave error.

The May 2 *Jornal Novo* reported that Neto released a statement in which he said that the Angolan "people continue to wait for the high commissioner and the Portu-

guese troops to assume their responsibilities."

The MPLA even gave the MFA a political rationale for its armed intervention. Referring to those forces in favor of establishing a "neocolonialist regime" in Angola (i.e., those groups opposed to the MPLA), the MPLA declared in a March statement: "A victory for the imperialist forces in Angola would represent a mortal threat to the future of democracy in Portugal and will imperil peace in all of Africa. The MPLA is the only progressive movement in Angola, the only movement that will support and loyally cooperate with the progressive Portuguese forces."

The MPLA's implicit invitation to the Portuguese troops to intervene on its side in the factional struggle is a very dangerous step. It gives the imperialist troops of the MFA a "progressive" cover to move in and reverse the gains made by the Angolan liberation struggle. It politically disorients those forces in Angola and Portugal, including the Portuguese troops themselves, that are capable of countering Lisbon's policy of seeking to retain its most important interests in Angola.

Even from the MPLA's own limited factional viewpoint, the call for Portuguese intervention was very risky, as the June 9 Portuguese assault against both the FNLA and MPLA strongholds showed.

The neighboring African regimes, which have "supported" the Angolan nationalists over the years, have also shown their willingness to betray the Angolan independence struggle in exchange for a "solution" that could avert a dangerous civil war. "Portugal's decision to reinforce its army," the June 9 *Los Angeles Times* reported, "has the backing of the African leaders most directly concerned with the Angolan situation, including President Mobutu of Zaïre, President Kaunda of Zambia and President Nyerere of Tanzania."

Following a visit by Maj. Vitor Alves to Kinshasa, a joint Portuguese-Zaïre communiqué was released. The June 6 *Angola Report* stated that according to the communiqué "the Zaïre government will support all the efforts made by the Portuguese government to restore peace in Angola."

Holden Roberto said in an interview published in the June 6 *Le Monde*, "We consider the intervention of the Portuguese army as an interference in the internal affairs of Angola."

The MFA's military options in the colony are limited. Even if the MFA used the subterfuge of intervening in Angola against "neocolonialism," it is highly unlikely that Lisbon could move thousands of reinforcements back into the colony or use the army there in a massive way. If it tried, the results could be politically explosive.

On June 8 about sixty Portuguese troops in Lisbon refused to board a plane sche-

duled to transport them to Angola. A spokesman for the MFA claimed that the demonstration had been the result of drinking by the soldiers. But a few days before, three Portuguese soldiers were buried in Angola, the first to be killed there since the end of the war.

"The prospect of civil war in Angola and the political uncertainty in Portugal has created a strong impetus among the remaining Portuguese troops in the West African territory for their withdrawal to be speeded up," reported the April 26 *Manchester Guardian*.

The MFA, however, is still capable of limited intervention under the guise of "maintaining order." It is quite probable that the MFA would like the nationalist organizations to weaken each other and sow confusion, as the Portuguese troops occasionally moved in to push things in a direction most favorable to maintaining imperialist influence.

The MFA has also shown its desire to amend the Alvor accords to fit Lisbon's needs still more favorably. In an interview published in the April 24 issue of *Jornal Novo*, Minister for Interterritorial Coordination Almeida Santos noted that "an accord can always be modified by another."

During a visit to Angola, Portuguese Foreign Minister Antunes said May 13 that he was there to find "forms more adjusted to the Angolan reality, so that this period of transition should be really as we always imagined it should be—a period of transition in peace and harmony."

If the situation in Angola threatens to deteriorate beyond the MFA's ability to contain it, there is still one more option left. The June 14 London *Economist* reported that the MFA "has now warned the leaders of the three rival liberation movements that if the fighting between them does not stop it will ask the United Nations to send in peacekeeping forces."

Such a UN "peacekeeping force" would constitute nothing more than a plausible way for Lisbon's imperialist allies to move in and cripple the Angolan independence struggle in a fashion similar to that used by the imperialists in the Congo tragedy of the early 1960s. □

### 200 Killed in New Angola Clashes


Heavy fighting between forces of the MPLA and FNLA resumed in Angola July 10, leaving an estimated 200 persons dead in the first two days of clashes. The battles were the first major armed conflicts since a cease-fire agreement was reached between the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA in Kenya in June.

Portuguese troops and forces from the liberation movements "sought to quell the fighting," according to a July 12 Reuters dispatch. Seven Portuguese soldiers were reported wounded.

July 21, 1975

## Layoffs Called 'Cutting Edge of Racism'

### NAACP Vows Fight to Defend Black Job Gains



NAACP LEADER WILKINS: No "preferential firing."

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the largest and oldest civil-rights organization in the United States, met an important challenge at its national convention in Washington, D.C., June 30-July 4.

The 3,558 delegates, nearly all Blacks, voted to reaffirm the organization's stand against the discriminatory layoffs that are hitting Blacks and other minority workers in the current depression. This stand was adopted despite a concerted effort by officials of the AFL-CIO, the American trade-union federation, to force a reversal.

The question of layoffs is one of the most crucial issues facing the Black community today. As NAACP Labor Director Herbert Hill put it, "For Black workers, and indeed for the entire Black community, the civil-rights issue now is the job issue." He noted that discriminatory layoffs "are the cutting edge of the new racism."

The background of the dispute between the NAACP and the AFL-CIO officials goes back to the Black struggle of the 1960s. This movement won passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawing job discrimination on the basis of race or sex. Using this law, Black workers in many industries were able, with the help of the NAACP, to win preferential hiring and job advancement programs, generally called "affirmative action" plans.

Today employers are firing many workers hired under the affirmative-action plans, thus wiping out gains made by the Black struggle. The employers have been aided in this by the position of most unions, which has been to uphold strict seniority in the face of the layoffs—that is, "last hired, first fired," which means Blacks and women get fired.

NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilkins and other leaders of the organization have fought for the position that union seniority provisions should be modified in the case of large-scale layoffs so that the percentage of Black and women workers hired under affirmative-action plans remains the same after the layoffs.

The other major issue discussed at the convention was school desegregation. The NAACP has just launched the most sweeping school desegregation suit ever filed, challenging racial segregation in thirty-three Northern and Western states.

Maceo Dixon of the National Student Coalition Against Racism addressed a workshop of 300 young people at the convention; and NAACP youth from seven cities decided to form new chapters of NSCAR. The student group worked with the NAACP to build the May 17 march of 15,000 in answer to the racist forces in Boston that have been trying to prevent school desegregation there. □

## The Mass Movement Slowly Revives

By Luiza Maranhão

[Second of two installments]

Parallel to all the events on the economic level, a slow but steady recovery of the mass movement is taking place in both the working class and the middle class. The rise began among the students, intellectuals, bank workers, and professors and has even reached more backward sectors like housewives (in poorer neighborhoods) and public functionaries.

These mobilizations are still molecular. They take place on the job or in school, starting with minimum immediate demands. They also occur as violent explosions of a mass character as in the stoning of a bus in Brasilia and trains in Guanabara to protest the abysmal public transportation. However, these movements tend to spread and to take on a more political character. The government has avoided repressing the masses, striking against the activists and at the same time making concessions. With this type of double game, it is trying to control the mass movement and win over some sectors.

All indications are that imperialism, as well as the big industrial bourgeoisie and the oligarchy, is beginning to accept the "softening" of the regime, since this does not represent any immediate serious threat. In addition, the big bourgeoisie and the oligarchy need a certain freedom of expression to deal with their own interplay of bourgeois interests. That explains why the daily newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo*, voice of the São Paulo oligarchy and imperialism, suddenly became an ardent defender of freedom of the press. For these sectors the liberalization can even be welcomed, as long as it does not permit a return "to the anarchy and chaos that existed prior to 1964."

The government is continuing to try to keep the "liberalization" within limits that suit it. Thus, the government decided to reduce the censorship of *O Estado de São Paulo* while maintaining it in the cases of *Opinião, Crítica, Pasquim*, and others that reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, the interests of the national bourgeoisie or the radicalized middle class.

As for the national bourgeoisie, its small and medium-sized sectors were by and large definitely won over to the parliamentary solution and dialogue. This does not mean that they will stop using pressure, simply that they will depend more and more on

their class instruments (employers associations) and the MDB for this end.

One thing must remain clear about the national bourgeoisie—the MDB is moving more and more toward becoming its party. Contrary to what Fernando Henrique Cardozo claims, for example, the MDB is not the party of the salaried workers. The national bourgeoisie understood the results of the elections;<sup>2</sup> in practice, it gained by them. It won an adjustment of the government's line and a better negotiating position. That is why the national bourgeoisie wants to strengthen its party—it gives greater public weight to the "autênticos," while it allows a dialogue of the "adesistas" or "moderates" behind the scenes. But, we repeat, to be able to do this the MDB must be strengthened, winning support from the salaried workers. Cardozo, one of the "theoreticians" of the MDB, very much likes to cite the British Labour party as an example to follow.

The Communist party, putting into practice its policy of forming an unprincipled bloc with the national bourgeoisie, plays a noteworthy role alongside the MDB. The CP is getting its trade-union leaders, intellectuals, and professionals to act as members of this bourgeois party. And this will be a decisive factor in the MDB's growth, which has already begun to occur mainly in the big industrial centers.

### The Proletariat and the Middle Class

But if in the short run the strengthening of the MDB is almost an accomplished fact, in the long run its breakup is inevitable. This is true because it includes many sectors with conflicting interests. The "autênticos" themselves consider the MDB to be a transitional party, a sort of mother cell of something that is about to be born.

The proletariat does not have the slightest hopes in the Geisel government and is still waiting to see what will happen with the MDB. This is quite understandable, because all the concessions it won in the last two years were due to its own mobilizations. Thus the MDB still remains a distant promise.

2. In November 1974 the MDB won the majority of seats being contested in the federal parliamentary elections. The MDB campaigned on a platform of restoration of democratic rights.

However, certain tendencies should be pointed out:

1. The increase in combativity and mobilizations at the factory level—spearheaded mainly by the biggest plants—beginning with immediate demands (wages and working conditions), but often in combination with demands of a democratic character.

Especially in São Paulo, there are some important examples:

- In the Alpargatas factory the workers mobilized for better working conditions, holding assemblies in which a large number of workers participated. Although there was repression of the mobilization from the outset (its leaders were fired), some victories were won.

- At General Motors and Volkswagen the workers downed tools for several hours for a wage increase. They won 8.5 percent at GM and 10 percent at Volkswagen. At Volkswagen, when threatened with intervention by the factory's security force, the workers pounded the machines with their tools, forcing the bosses to retreat. Strikes were conducted in some departments of Ford and Chrysler.

- At the daily newspaper *Folha de São Paulo* the workers also downed tools for three hours for better working conditions. The strike was repressed and all participants forced to appear before DEOPS [Departamento de Ordem Política e Social—Department of Political and Social Order, the political police]. Two workers were fired, but the demands were met.

- At the Dolza clothing factory and at the Pescanova factory the workers mobilized against a shutdown, which would have left them out of work.

2. The increase in unionization and strengthening of trade unions as an instrument to press for economic demands.

This fact opens possibilities for work in such groupings, since there is a tendency for the masses to move ahead of their leaders. With such a perspective, trade-union opposition currents take on a great importance in the struggle to revive the unions, to fight gangsterism, and to end government take-overs.

The tendency toward the strengthening of opposition currents can already be noted. In Guanabara, for the first time since 1972, the bank workers reorganized the opposition, which will contest the elections this March. The metalworkers of Guanabara also organized an opposition and brought an end to the trusteeship. Metalworkers in São Paulo are also building an opposition.

Thus it is again possible that the Movimento Sindical Classista [Mosicla—Class-Struggle Union Movement], which began to develop in 1971-72, will reappear. A program must be elaborated for it, one that can unite all trade-union opposition currents, centralizing and organizing their activity through a class-struggle newspaper. Once

the opposition currents are reunified through Mosaicla, the workers movement will again be able to raise the highest slogan on the trade-union level—for the *Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores* [CGT—General Confederation of Workers].

But we must be clear that the reconstruction of the CGT has as its starting point the trade-union opposition currents. It will occur through Mosaicla and will be concretized in fact only with the real recuperation of the unions.

It is also necessary to assess the fact that all of this is occurring in the context of something we are all experiencing—democratic rights are more and more becoming the central demand of the Brazilian proletariat, uniting all its struggles and ending the atomization of mobilizations for local demands.

In this sense, democratic rights are becoming for us and for the Brazilian proletariat the axis of all struggles—the transitional slogan for this stage.

The middle class, which during the years 1969-73 was greatly favored by the “economic miracle” (through credit and financing) and which in part supported semifascist rule (denouncing left militants and applauding assassinations carried out by reactionaries—for example, when they praised the torturer Fleury after the death of Marighela<sup>3</sup>), began to experience an intense process of pauperization.

Inflation, which previously had been partially controlled, began to mount rapidly, threatening to upset the famous equilibrium reached by the Brazilian economy. The middle class was one of the main sectors that felt the problem in its flesh and blood (since the suffocation was continual for the working class, while the middle class enjoyed a respite between 1969 and 1973).

Thus pressed by the increased cost of living and the lack of freedom, the middle class tends to radicalize, supporting slogans for a return of democratic rights.

The greatest radicalization naturally has taken place among students, although there were also mobilizations of bank workers, professors, and professionals (attorneys and scientists). In 1974 there was a great advance in student struggles, which began with local mobilizations but which quickly took on a political character. Here is a brief summary:

- In São Paulo the mobilizations began with assemblies against the increase in tuition and dining-room prices, reaching their high point in April of last year with the *Comitê de Defesa dos Prêcos Políticos*

[CDPP—Committee to Defend Political Prisoners]. The arrest of thirty students and professors provoked an apparently unexpected reaction, since it meant a leap from merely immediate struggles to a political struggle—for the release of the political prisoners. A general assembly of the entire University of São Paulo was called, which formed the committee. The committee came to have 2,000 student members at its high point, as well as participation from the MDB, the church, and the *Colégio de Advogados do Brasil* [Brazilian Lawyers College].

During the same period other important demonstrations occurred, like the celebration of the overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship.

During the second semester the axis was the elections—both student and national. In the student elections the tendencies to the left of the CP were strengthened, and student participation was greater than expected. New student newspapers were issued. The programs of the contesting slates were widely distributed and discussed in assemblies, and the majority of them focused on the problems politically. There were also opposition groupings organized in several schools that had previously been controlled by the reformists.

The national elections were also widely discussed, with the students divided in three camps: those favoring a blank ballot, those for an unconditional vote to the MDB, and those supporting our position for candidates linked to the mass movement, trade-union and student leaders, or CP members. In several schools public debates were held on the elections with candidates participating.

After the elections came vacations and a lull in the mobilizations, although some sectors of the vanguard continued intense activity looking toward 1975 for the restructuring of student groupings closed down by the 1964 coup.

In addition to actions at the University of São Paulo, the main center of struggle, important mobilizations with very well-attended assemblies occurred at Catholic University against tuition increases and repression in the university.

- In Guanabara the reopening at the end of 1973 of academic centers closed in 1968-69 made a revival of the student movement possible. Some important mobilizations took place: the struggle for approval of the social sciences curriculum at Fluminense Federal University; the organization of a university-wide opposition to the reformists at the same university; the struggle at Catholic University against the dismissal of professors; and the medical students' mobilization demanding pay for their practical work.

- In Minas Gerais a plebiscite against tuition mobilized 90 percent of the students

at the Federal University, who demonstrated for free education.

- In Rio Grande do Sul the leadership of the Central Student Board of Directors, in practice ignoring Decree 228—which instituted indirect elections for university groups—tried to hold direct elections.

- In addition there were statewide or interstate mobilizations. In São Paulo the First Conference of Social Science Students took place with five schools participating, and in Bahia five states were represented at the National Conference of Economics Students. Both conferences decided to call for the holding of national gatherings to form National Student Associations, a formation to help in the fight to rebuild the National Student Union.

### The Fight for Rights

At the same time, student newspapers multiplied, both in the academic centers and among the opposition tendencies.

However, it must be pointed out that in the fight for democratic rights the middle class is more backward than the proletariat. While the latter is already going beyond the economic struggle to make clear political demands, the middle class as a whole (excluding the most radicalized sectors like the students and intellectuals) still remains indecisive when faced with more general demands. This has been one of the triumphs of the government: faced with a middle class that is still not mobilized, it can present a policy to neutralize it.

Thus Geisel, in a transparent maneuver to win the middle class, ordered the National Housing Bank to return to those who bought their own homes the extra money charged because of the monetary adjustment criterion of the previous government. Playing on the knowledge that buying a piece of real estate is a highly emotional experience for the middle class, Geisel managed to satisfy broad sectors. But, at the same time that it makes concessions, the government tries to keep the middle class frightened.

### The Exploited of the Countryside

Still, we point out that, contrary to the situation in 1969-73, there no longer exist the economic or political conditions to neutralize the middle class for very long.

Our task today is to raise slogans that will not only radicalize the middle class but also bring it into step with the proletariat. Along with the elaboration of a program to provide answers to certain demands of the middle class, we cannot ignore one of the main sectors of the petty bourgeoisie—the peasants.

The peasantry, despite regional differences of production and customs, tends more and more to support the demands of

3. Sergio Fleury was chief of the São Paulo police and a leader of the death squads in 1969 when guerrilla leader Carlos Marighela was assassinated. He was widely reported to be Marighela's murderer.

the working class and the middle layers.

Official figures present clearly and dramatically the story of an agriculture dominated by the interests of the big landowners. Although concerned about the countryside, the government's agrarian policy is not one of reform of the property system on the land. Fundamentally it seeks to modernize agriculture through imperialist penetration of the countryside and opening up export markets. This policy creates new conflicts, mainly between the oligarchy and the imperialists, and aggravates social tensions by increasing the rural exodus and unemployment (since imperialist agribusiness uses little labor). That situation provides one of the most important transitional demands for the countryside—expropriation of all big landholdings and the formation of cooperatives for production.

Logically, this demand cannot be implemented without a determined, vigorous job of rural unionization. Thus, the demand for "expropriation of big landholdings and the formation of cooperatives for production" will be met by carrying out the task of rural unionization. If this is combined with demands corresponding to the immediate needs of the country dweller, it will win the support of broad sectors of the small and medium-sized landowners.

With regard to the rural proletariat, it is advancing demands that are more and more like those of its brothers in the city. There, more than ever, the job of unionization takes on a central role in firmly organizing the struggles for immediate demands. The recent past of the mass movement's history shows this, and the activity in the sugarcane workers unions, carried out by some companheiros on the left, confirms it.

#### Our Tasks

Against the government propaganda, we point out that the economic situation is tending to worsen in 1975 with diverse effects on all sectors of the population. Likewise, the internal contradictions of the bourgeoisie will sharpen even more. And although we cannot say that there will be big mobilizations, undoubtedly there is a tendency toward the strengthening and organization of the mass movement.

Starting from this characterization—of upsurge and strengthening of the mass movement—we derive a policy of greater penetration in the workers movement and stepped-up trade-union work.

It is clear to us that once again the Brazilian proletariat will play a fundamental role in the struggles for democratic rights, and that the Liga Operária [Workers League] is obligated to struggle untiringly, shoulder to shoulder with the mass movement, for the construction of the socialist

party of the Brazilian working class.

Our task is to draw up a program with democratic demands as its axis to mobilize the working class. On the basis of our activity with the mass movement during the entire year of 1974, we include in the program the following fundamental points:

- For a minimum wage of 750 cruzeiros [US\$97.50].

- For wage increases every three months, compensating 100 percent for the rising cost of living, based on the figures of the DIEESE [Departamento Intersindical de Estatísticas e Estudos Socio-Econômicos—Trade-Union Department of Socio-Economic Statistics and Studies].

- For freedom of the trade unions—against ideological discrimination in elections and for an end to government takeovers of unions.

- For the right to strike and for the formation of factory committees to defend the workers' interests.

- For the reorganization of all workers organizations, including the CGT.

- For the reestablishment of democratic rights—for the abolition of Institutional Act No. 5<sup>1</sup> and all repressive legislation.

- For a general amnesty for political prisoners and the return of all exiles.

- For an end to the military dictatorship.

- For the formation of a Constituent Assembly with a majority of its participants from the parties and organizations of the workers, peasants, and people.

*For the reestablishment of democratic rights!*

*For the construction of the socialist party of the working class!*

*For a workers and peasants government!*

4. A decree issued December 13, 1968, giving the government power to suspend Congress indefinitely, to remove members from it, and to suspend the political rights of any citizen.

## A Victim of Israel's Tiger Cages

# An Appeal for Samir Shafik Darwish

Dr. Israel Shahak of the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights has called our attention to the case of Samir Shafik Darwish, a political prisoner who is being held under barbaric conditions in Israel.

Originally from the town of Acre in Israel, Darwish moved to Jordan in 1957 and became a Jordanian citizen. After the 1967 war he was arrested when his new home was conquered and was sentenced to twenty years for "armed infiltration." Since then he has been behind bars in Ramleh prison.

In March 1974 Darwish was accused of aiding the escape of two prisoners and was placed in a solitary-confinement cell as punishment. He has been completely isolated for more than fourteen months. He was not allowed to meet another human being—apart from his jailers—until May 4, 1975, when he had a meeting with his attorney.

"According to his story," Dr. Shahak writes, Darwish "was beaten and tortured for a prolonged period after March 3, 1974, and also kept chained, first both by hands and feet, and subsequently, for a longer period 'only' handcuffed.

"He was first held in one of the notorious punishment cells made with specially sharp and rough cemented walls and was then transferred to a 'better' cell in the 'X' Wing (maximum security) of Ramleh jail, where he has been ever since. The size of his present cell is 3x2x2 meters approximately."

Darwish was eventually allowed books and began to study Spanish, Russian, and economics. But in April of this year all his books and every scrap of paper in his cell were confiscated.

"Subsequently, and after his attorney's intervention, he was restricted to *three single volumes*. Since one of his dictionaries consists of eight volumes, one can understand the senseless cruelty of such a ruling!"

Darwish was forbidden visits by the Red Cross "upon the excuse that being an Israeli citizen in the eyes of the Israeli authorities, the Red Cross had no right to intervene in his behalf. On a visit made May 26, 1975, to the Red Cross offices in Jerusalem, I have ascertained that the Red Cross has indeed accepted the contention of Israeli authorities that every person whom they declare to be an 'Israeli' is 'out of bounds' to the Red Cross."

Dr. Shahak asks that all individuals and organizations concerned with human rights protest this case to Minister of Police Shlomo Hillel,\* who is in charge of prisons in Israel. He requests that protests be directed "especially towards two immediate points where Samir Shafik Darwish's situation must be altered:

"1. His right to have books and writing paper, even in a solitary cell.

"2. The cessation of the cruel isolation in solitary confinement for 14 months." □

\*Ministry of Police, Jerusalem, Israel.

## Baader-Meinhof Trial—German Justice Puts on a Show

[The following article, signed T.D., appeared in the May 30 issue of *Was Tun*, fortnightly newspaper of the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (GIM—International Marxist Group, German section of the Fourth International). The translation was done for *Intercontinental Press* by Russell Block.]

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
When there is public discussion about "the trial" these days, everyone knows what is meant—the proceedings against Red Army Faction members [Andreas] Baader, [Ulrike] Meinhof, [Gudrun] Ensslin, and [Jan-Carl Stefan] Raspe, which began on May 21. Actually there should have been a fifth defendant in the prisoners dock. Holger Meins died, however, during a hunger strike against the grueling conditions of pretrial confinement.

The bourgeois state is mounting a grotesque spectacle. At a cost of 12 million deutsche mark [DM1=US\$0.42], a fortress was constructed especially for the trial. It is guarded by heavily armed detachments of the MEK [Mobiles Einsatz-Kommando—Mobile Strike Commandos], mounted police, and the Bundesgrenzschutz [Federal Border Guard]. Eight hundred submachine guns, rifles with telescopic sights, and bulletproof vests make up part of the equipment of this small army. A net of synthetic material reinforced with steel spread over the court building is supposed to offer protection against "remote-controlled aircraft carrying bombs."

On entering the courtroom, spectators' pockets and wallets are searched, and they are subjected to screening by an electronic metal-detector. By order of the president of the court, each person is allowed only one ballpoint pen. Obviously, these exaggerated security measures are not intended to further "the search for truth."

Of course, the constitution says that before the verdict has been returned, the accused can be regarded neither as convicted nor condemned. But these formal rights have long since ceased to apply to the RAF defendants. Bourgeois justice passed judgment and exacted punishment immediately after the arrests. Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin, and Raspe have now spent three full years in pretrial confinement. The length and severity of this imprisonment have worn them down in both body and spirit (as even the bourgeois-liberal newspapers affirm).

According to traditional bourgeois legal concepts, pretrial confinement is only meant to assure that the accused will be



Der Spiegel

ULRIKE MEINHOF

available to stand trial and possibly serve a sentence. However, in the RAF case this is meaningless. The Bundestag changed the criminal-procedures code (among other things) especially for the RAF trial so that proceedings can continue even in the absence of the accused, if they should be removed for "disruptive behavior" or if they have rendered themselves "culpably incapable of standing trial." Whether the pretrial confinement itself has rendered the defendants "incapable of standing trial" does not, of course, enter into the matter.

In reality this makes pretrial confinement an instrument of terror. The organs of state power wanted to be sure that, whatever the result of the subsequent proceedings, the punishment would already come crushingly into effect through the pretrial confinement. Whenever the bourgeois state and its justice system find it politically opportune, they place themselves above their own laws.

The most drastic change in the criminal-procedures code is the measure enabling the court to exclude a defense attorney from the trial if "he is suspected of being implicated in his client's criminal act." This law was used to deprive the defendant Baader of all his chosen attorneys—although so far\* no legal proceedings have been initiated against excluded attorneys [Klaus] Croissant, [Christian] Ströble, and [Kurt] Groene-

\* On June 23 West German police arrested Croissant and Ströble on that charge and also searched the office of Marie-Luise Becker, an attorney for one of the defendants.—IP

would in relation to the charge of "supporting a criminal conspiracy." The application of this law is thus left up to the discretion of the Criminal Senate.

Two days after the trial opened, the Second Criminal Senate ruled that the exclusion of the attorneys from the Baader defense was also applicable to the representatives of the other defendants, since the same criminal conspiracy was involved.

For months the attorney Croissant has been denied permission to visit Gudrun Ensslin. The Criminal Senate has received fifty new dossiers, but not the defense. The court named three of the "neutral" court-appointed defense attorneys only one month before the beginning of the trial. The defense attorneys—but not the judges or prosecutors—are subjected to a body search before entering the courtroom.

Who can still believe this is a fair trial in the bourgeois sense, when the court and the prosecution stand on one side and the defendants and their attorneys, with severely restricted rights, stand on the other?

Why should the bourgeois state be interested in a "fair trial" anyway? It knows that the RAF prisoners are "violent, unscrupulous criminals," "extremely dangerous terrorists," and "bandits."

Chancellor Schmidt said so publicly before the Bundestag.

And according to the *Bild-Zeitung*, Baader and Meinhof are "vulgar" and "raving" subhuman creatures.

The bourgeois state is organizing a show of force with pomp and publicity, thereby confirming what they have so heatedly denied—that this is a *political* trial.

Everyone is supposed to get the message: Resistance and struggle against the capitalist system and the bourgeois state will be severely punished. The hand of the law is always an extension of the arm of the ruling class.


Our support and solidarity extends to all political figures and victims of this system who have struggled against capitalism. And among these are, without any doubt, Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin, and Raspe—even if the methods they have chosen are totally incorrect. □

Documents discussed at 1974 Tenth World Congress of Fourth International. 128 pages, 8½ x 11, \$2.50

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# AROUND THE WORLD



## **Solzhenitsyn Plans to Rewrite History of Russian Revolution**

Fresh from the triumphant reception accorded his anti-Communist tirade in Washington by George Meany, other labor bureaucrats, and imperialist politicians, exiled Soviet author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn made another venture into politics July 10. He proposed that Columbia University back his plans for a multivolume history of the Russian revolution that would correct what he considers faulty views about it prevalent in the West.

He revealed his plan after a visit to the university's Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture. According to a source there, Solzhenitsyn intends to use his account to "correct the false impressions of the Russian Revolution that are based on memoirs by the revolutionaries themselves and other writers."

## **Exxon Admits \$46 Million Payoff to Italian Political Parties**

The Exxon Corporation admitted July 12 that it had made at least \$46 million in payments to political parties in Italy between 1963 and 1972. A company spokesman said the gifts were designed "to further democracy."

Exxon said it authorized its affiliate, Esso Italiana, to give \$27 million to the parties. The rest was paid out by an employee of Esso Italiana.

An Exxon official said that one of the vouchers indicated that \$86,000 had been earmarked for the Italian Communist party.

## **São Tomé and Príncipe Win Independence**

After 500 years of direct Portuguese colonial rule, the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe off the western coast of Africa gained their formal independence July 12. Manuel Pinto da Costa, the head of the Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP—Liberation Movement of São Tomé and Príncipe), was proclaimed president of the new republic.

The day before the independence ceremonies the last of the Portuguese troops withdrew from the country.

The economic future of the islands, which have a population of 70,000, appears bleak.

The economy is based largely on cocoa exports and has been hit hard by the decline in world cocoa prices. The country has an annual trade deficit of \$2.3 million.

Carlos Graça, a leader of the MLSTP, said that there were no plans to nationalize "efficient" cocoa plantations. He also said that talks would be held with a British oil company to persuade it to resume its oil explorations.

In March, two members of the MLSTP who were officials in the transitional government that preceded formal independence were expelled from the government after they called for the nationalization without compensation of all land left uncultivated or abandoned by the Portuguese settlers.

## **Pinochet Cites 'Soviet Subversion' as Excuse for Barring UN Inquiry**

The Pinochet dictatorship said July 8 that it canceled a visit by United Nations Human Rights Commission investigators because "there has been discovered within the country a subversive plan, encouraged and guided by Soviet radio stations, designed to fill foreign embassies with furious political (opponents of the government), to promote agitation in the streets and to unleash a guerrilla struggle."

## **Moscow Continues Crackdown Against Ukrainian Nationalists**

Moscow's drive to eliminate Ukrainian national opposition in the Soviet Union is continuing. Since February, a number of officials have been purged from communications and educational institutions in the Ukraine.

Vasyl Sahaydak and poet Valentyn Moroz (not to be confused with the imprisoned dissident with the same name), a member of the Communist party and the Ukrainian Union of Writers, were fired from their jobs as editors of the oblast (provincial) radio station in Odessa for allegedly fostering "nationalism."

The purge of radio and television personnel began when several communications officials were summoned before the Communist party Central Committee in Moscow and warned of the "low ideological level of radio and television programs in Ukraine."

In March, the head of the history department at Odessa University was fired, and a

lecturer, Tel'chak, was dismissed for his "nationalist views." Two professors of Ukrainian literature at the university were interrogated by the Soviet secret police for violating party directives in their teaching of Ukrainian literature.

Five high-school principals in Dnipropetrovsk were fired in February on charges of "nationalism." In addition, hundreds of students at Dnipropetrovsk University were reported to have been expelled.

## **Carlos Feliciano Released**

Carlos Feliciano, the Puerto Rican nationalist imprisoned in New York on trumped-up charges of possessing explosives, was released July 9 after serving almost two years in jail.

Feliciano was originally arrested on May 16, 1970, and accused of bombing several office buildings in New York City. When his case finally came to trial, he was ruled innocent of charges in one court but convicted in another on almost identical charges.

At the time of his arrest, Feliciano had not been active in the independence movement for fourteen years.

## **Troops Occupy Public Hospitals to Break Dominican Doctors' Strike**

Dominican armed forces and police occupied all public hospitals on the island July 5 after doctors and nurses went on strike demanding release of the funds earmarked for public health in the current government budget.

In response to the Balaguer regime's claim that the strike was a threat to public health, Rafael González Peña, public-relations director for the Asociación Médica Dominicana (Dominican Medical Association), stated:

"There is a permanent threat [to public health] when the medical centers lack medicines and materials used in the most elementary work, such as adhesive tape, alcohol, gauze, surgical thread, laboratory chemicals, and X-ray plates."

## **Montréal Police Raid Offices of Abortion Information Center**

Montréal police raided the offices of the Committee for Contraception Information and Free and Legal Abortion June 25. They

seized files containing the names of women who had sought legal abortions through the committee. Six women and one man were interrogated for seven hours.

Claire Bossard, a member of the committee, said, "We were treated very roughly, asked accusing questions about our group's services and then interrogated about our sex lives."

The raid on the abortion referral center was part of the Canadian government's attack against the right of women to safe, legal abortions. Opposition to the government's drive has focused on the case of Dr. Henry Morgentaler, a Montréal physician jailed on charges of performing illegal abortions.

Demonstrations, rallies, and pickets have been held across Canada to protest Morgentaler's arrest. In one of the most recent actions, about 150 persons attended a rally in Vancouver June 26 demanding his release.

### Canadian NDP Picks New Leader

The eighth federal convention of Canada's labor party, the New Democratic party, elected parliamentarian Ed Broadbent as its new leader July 7. Broadbent defeated Rosemary Brown, a Black Jamaican-born member of the British Columbia legislature, on the fourth ballot by 948 votes to 658. Brown had urged the convention to adopt policies clearly supporting public ownership of industry, rather than merely adopting commitments to "modify" the monopolies. She was also firmly identified with feminist sentiment in the NDP.

The NDP women's caucus at the convention tried to get a resolution passed calling for the "immediate release of Dr. Morgentaler" and declaring that "repeal of the federal abortion law is now more than ever urgently necessary in view of this persecution of a man whose only aim was to provide women with medically safe abortions." The NDP leadership prevented the resolution from reaching the floor of the convention for discussion and vote.

### European Nationalist Movements Meet

A secret meeting of nationalist movements from across Europe took place last year in Trieste, Yugoslavia, according to representatives of the ETA (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna—Basque Nation and Freedom).

The participants represented activist groups of Basques, Croats, Bretons, Irish, Catalans, Galicians (Spanish), Welsh, Scots, Corsicans, Sardinians, Flemings, the Frisians of the northern part of the Netherlands, Piedmontese of northern Italy, and Occitanians of southwest France. Their demands ranged from language rights to independence.

Those involved said they had a concept of Europe quite different from the Europe of the Common Market. They called their concept "a Europe of peoples."

"We don't want to set up more frontiers and more checkpoints," said a Basque spokesman quoted in the July 8 *New York Times*. "That's ridiculous, that's what we want to get rid of. But we want people to be able to live in their own way, with their own language and culture. We are a nation, equal with French or German or British even if the numbers are smaller. We want equal treatment."

### Protest in Turin Voices Solidarity With British Abortion Demonstration

TURIN—About 200 persons gathered here June 21 in Piazza Carlo Felice in response to a call issued by the British National Abortion Campaign for international solidarity actions.

The demonstration was sponsored by Comitato Cittadino per L'Aborto Libero, Gratuito e Assistito (City Committee for Free Abortion on Demand).

The organization is a coalition of members of feminist groups, the Radical party, the Socialist party, and several smaller left groups including the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist Groups, the Italian section of the Fourth International).

Protest activities began early in the day and continued through the afternoon. A table was set up by the Radical party to collect signatures for Italy's abortion referendum. If successful, the referendum will annul Italy's anti-abortion law.

### Israeli Attack in Lebanon Killed Thirteen Persons

Thirteen persons were killed and scores of refugee homes were destroyed in the Israeli land, sea, and air attack on southern Lebanon July 7. The main raid was on the Rashidiyah refugee camp south of Tyre, which was attacked by an Israeli landing party of more than 100 men. Combined action by the Lebanese army and Palestinian resistance fighters prevented Israeli troops from landing at other parts of the coast near Tyre.

### Castro Reports Dozens of CIA Murder Attempts

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro said July 10 that he knew of plans for dozens—perhaps as many as forty or sixty—attempts against his life by counterrevolutionary groups controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency.

In 1961, he said, an attempt was made to poison him with a chocolate milk shake. Preparations for another attempt were made during his 1971 trip to Chile, when a



The Gang That Couldn't Shoot Straight

Conrad/Los Angeles Times

group of newsmen with Venezuelan television credentials planned to kill him with guns hidden in television cameras.

Castro also told of an attempt to kill Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, currently deputy premier in charge of foreign affairs. He said that nine men ambushed Rodríguez's car in 1961, but Rodríguez escaped unhurt. One of the attackers who was captured confessed that the attempt had been organized by the CIA.

### Iranian Dissident Forced to Recant His Views

The Iranian dictatorship has forced Dr. Gholamhossein Sa'edi, Iran's best-known playwright, to make a public recantation of his views.

Sa'edi was arrested by agents of SAVAK, the shah's secret police, in June 1974. He was released in March 1975 following an international campaign on his behalf but was forced under torture to make a videotaped statement supporting the regime.

The shah published the statement in the June 19 issue of the government-controlled daily *Kayhan*. In it, Sa'edi called his writings "a bunch of trash" and said that "thanks to the wise leadership of the Shah of Shahs, the Light of the Aryans, Iran has achieved comprehensive progress, which has had great reflections on the international scene."

Following the taping of the statement, the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran\* send a telegram to the shah April 4 stating that "such extractions of statements against one's convictions reflect not Sa'edi's views but disclose the nature of his torturers."

\*156 Fifth Avenue, Room 600, New York, New York 10010.

## Chapter 6

### The Teach-ins: Ann Arbor, Washington, Berkeley

By Fred Halstead

While preparations were under way for the march on Washington, another important part of the new antiwar movement was initiated at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. A meeting of some two dozen faculty members—most of them on the young side and without tenure—took place March 11 to discuss a response to the Vietnam situation, possibly through an ad in a newspaper signed by a large number of faculty. Marc Pilisuk, a professor on the staff of the Mental Health Research Institute, was present and later observed: "Meetings of this type were not new in Ann Arbor. Many of the same faces were present again, veterans of a string of advertisements for the test ban, for a fair housing ordinance, for the election of Lyndon Johnson."<sup>1</sup>

This time the sense of anger and frustration led to discussion about more serious action. William Gamson, a sociologist, proposed a one-day faculty strike during which a special school would be held to teach the hidden truth about American intervention in Vietnam. There was considerable hesitation over

students of the subject knew the U.S. government's public rationale for intervention in Vietnam was a tissue of inaccuracies and that the country badly needed to learn the facts. What better way could the academic community use its expertise at this stage of the struggle? "Be true to yourself" is always a good rule in movement struggle, as in other areas of life.

The strike threat itself, coming as it did in the aftermath of the traumatic events of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, was not without its positive results. The university administration was so relieved at the change in plans that it offered cooperation in providing facilities. It even suspended the rules regarding women students to allow them to stay out of the dorms past curfew to attend the teach-in. (The women's liberation movement was yet to come.)

Faculty and students threw themselves into preparations. Long-distance calls were made to colleges across the country. Teachers visited the student dorms and fraternity and sorority houses to spread the word and ask for help organizing. A new relationship with the students was born. The response was beyond expectations. By the night of March 24 dozens of other campuses had scheduled teach-ins, and by eight o'clock that night over three thousand students showed up for the event in Ann Arbor.

The lectures were held in four halls. At one point the building had to be temporarily evacuated because of a bomb threat. A midnight demonstration was held outdoors in below-freezing weather. At that rally, Frithjof Bergman of the philosophy department declared: "The Viet Cong is a popular movement in the classic sense." He called on the U.S. government to allow "the Vietnamese to be governed by the government they have chosen themselves."

The teach-in was picketed by some seventy-five students organized by right-wing groups, but they made no dent. An organized attempt to break up the midnight rally was overcome when students attending the teach-in formed a line to prevent the right-wingers from breaking into the ranks of the demonstration.

Above all the teach-in was an educational experience. The arguments of the State Department were analyzed, in some cases by experts in the field, including some who had worked for the government and knew parts of the story from the inside. The students were not passive participants. They asked questions, argued, probed, challenged assumptions. In addition to the lectures, over a dozen smaller discussion groups were formed which, in Pilisuk's words, "reached a depth of concern and an intensity of argument rarely seen at universities. One honors student later told me that this was her first educational experience provided by the University during four years' attendance. . . . On that night, people who really cared talked of things that really mattered."

Professor Robert S. Browne, an economist who spent six years as a State Department adviser in Vietnam, spoke at Ann Arbor and then flew to New York, where he lectured and reported on the Ann Arbor event to a similar teach-in the next night at Columbia University attended by 2,500.

Many of the speakers publicized the April 17 march on

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such a bold move but it was agreed that an attempt would be made to obtain signatures from faculty pledging such action. If the number of signers was large enough, the strike would be called. The university administration and even the state legislature got wind of the proposal and began to threaten reprisals. The faculty Senate considered taking action against those who signed the first call, only three of whom out of forty-nine had tenure.

On March 16 a group of these met to reconsider. Their main motives were not worry about their own jobs—though that was a legitimate concern—but the fear that the issue of Vietnam would get lost in a dispute over faculty responsibility and the chance to make a broad impact would be dissipated in an isolated action by a handful. A teacher of anthropology, Marshal Sahllins, came up with the idea of staying in regular classes but holding the school on Vietnam at night—all night long if interest were great enough.

This proposal was put to a meeting of signers of the strike call held Wednesday, March 17, 1965, and finally adopted after an all-night discussion. The protest was scheduled for March 24-25 beginning at eight o'clock at night and running to eight in the morning. In addition, faculty pledged themselves to spread the idea to other campuses. By analogy with the sit-in tactic of the Southern civil rights movement, the action was called a "teach-in."

Some of the angrier faculty and students considered the decision a copout under pressure. But those who were serious

1. *Teach-Ins: U.S.A.* Edited by Louis Menashe and Ronald Radosh (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 8.

Washington and on the single night of the first Ann Arbor teach-in over a hundred students signed up for the long bus ride to the Washington demonstration.

During the next month the teach-ins spread to hundreds of campuses across the country and were to become a feature of campus life for the next year, often being the first antiwar activity on a particular campus, especially in conservative areas. In the course of this period, the government position on Vietnam lost its moral authority in the academic community. This in turn had profound—if not so immediate—effects in many other areas of American life.

The impact of the teach-ins went far beyond the issue of the war itself in the narrow sense. The teach-in tactic together with the nonexclusive stance of the new antiwar movement generally shattered the norms of “the silent generation” and helped break down the stultifying effects of the anticommunist hysteria. For the first time in years, and on a level previously unknown in the modern United States, the academic world was alive with the discussion of controversial ideas.

In a sense, the Free Speech Movement had spread across the country. Even the previously excluded radicals found it possible to set up literature tables, sell their books, distribute their leaflets, get their spokespersons on campuses to talk to significant numbers of students willing to seriously consider all ideas.

What A.J. Muste had sensed in his admonition to SANE during the Dodd attack back in 1960 became clearly manifest in the period of the teach-ins: the resurgence of a reservoir of “young people, fed up with conformism and apathy.”

The Ann Arbor teach-in was organized as a protest against the war, not simply as an even-handed debate with proponents of U.S. policy in Vietnam, though the government position was voiced there. But in many places the format was one of debate and the State Department was besieged with requests for speakers to present the government point of view. As it turned out it didn't really matter too much either way, for with few exceptions such debates ended in defeat for the government side. Their experts could point to occasional errors of assumption which were widespread among opponents of the war—the fact that neither the U.S. nor Saigon representatives at Geneva had signed the part of the accords calling for elections in 1956, for example—but these were really just quibbles. What the government spokesmen couldn't sell was a convincing and compelling reason for the U.S. being involved in the war in any case.

In the course of the teach-ins tens of thousands of persons became serious students of the available literature on U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The essential outline of the developments later exposed from a government source itself in the Pentagon Papers actually became common knowledge in teach-in circles from 1965 on. In this process two pieces of literature played a particularly important role. One was the analysis by I.F. Stone of the State Department's *White Paper on Vietnam* published in April 1965. The other was a report written by Robert Scheer on a grant from the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, called *How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam*. If the American antiwar movement can be said to have had a work which played a role analogous to that of Tom Paine's *Common Sense* in the American Revolution, Scheer's little pamphlet was it.

On April 23, 1965, Secretary of State Dean Rusk made a speech in which he referred to the wave of teach-ins with the following comment: “I sometimes wonder at the gullibility of educated men and the stubborn disregard of plain facts by men who are supposed to be helping our young to learn—especially to learn how to think.”<sup>2</sup>

The next day an uprising began in the Dominican Republic with the aim of restoring the popular reform constitution

overthrown by a military coup in 1963. Within three days the Constitutionlists had defeated the old regime in a decisive battle on the outskirts of the capital. The dictatorship, however, was saved by an invasion of 24,000 U.S. troops sent on the initial pretext of rescuing a handful of U.S. citizens (none of whom were in any case threatened by the Constitutionlists).

From the point of view of imperialist policy the Dominican invasion was a success, since the Constitutionlists were eventually defeated and a regime headed by Joaquin Balaguer, a former appointee of the old Trujillo dictatorship, was imposed on the island nation. But the Dominican events in 1965 contributed to the “credibility gap” already widening over the question of Vietnam.

During May an Inter-Departmental Speaking Team on Vietnam Policy, composed of three U.S. officials who had recently served in Vietnam, was sent to a number of Midwest campuses. The team had no success in stemming the tide of opposition, though in most places it was politely received. At the University of Wisconsin at Madison, a large part of the audience of some 700 wore black armbands, stood during the talks, and besieged the lecturers with hostile questions. One such exchange went like this:

Student: “Why do prisoners we take confess to infiltration only after a month of interrogation?”

Thomas F. Conlon, of the State Department: “Have you ever had anything to do with interrogation?”

Student: “No, and I don't want to.”

Conlon: “Sometimes it takes a long time before a prisoner wants to talk.”

Another student shouts: “Torture!”

Conlon: “Do you also charge the North Vietnamese with torture?”

The second student: “I condemn torture whoever does it.”

Conlon: “The Americans do not torture.”

“But we run the show,” shouts someone in the audience.

Conlon: “We do not run it.”

Shouts from all over the hall: “Aw come on, let's be honest.”<sup>3</sup>

An article on the team's tour by Barry Sheppard in the May 17, 1965, *Militant* concludes: “We can only hope that the administration does go ahead and send out other teams all over the country, because there apparently is nothing like these direct confrontations with the administration's spokesmen to further expose the lies and hypocrisy of the government and build up the university opposition to the Vietnam war.”

The first government “truth team” on Vietnam, however, proved to be the last.

\* \* \*

The same Ann Arbor faculty meeting which had changed the original strike idea to the teach-in also agreed that if the first event were successful a national teach-in in Washington would be initiated. Later on it was decided that for the national event “the overwhelming consideration was the prospect of confronting Administration spokesmen,” according to Professor Anatol Rapoport, one of the original organizers. Therefore a debate, rather than a protest format, was agreed to.

A letter signed by 400 Michigan University faculty members was sent to McGeorge Bundy, one of Johnson's top foreign-policy advisers and a member of the group of ivy league intellectuals originally recruited to the service of the John F. Kennedy administration. In reply Bundy invited representatives of the teach-in group to Washington to negotiate. According to Rapoport, “Mr. Bundy's first objection to our proposed format was based on the fact that we did not represent a whole spectrum of the community. In this he was undoubtedly right, although to our way of thinking, this was irrelevant to what we thought the

2. From a speech before the American Society of International Law Quoted in *Facts On File: World News Digest*, April 22-28, 1965, p. 145.

3. *Teach-Ins: U.S.A.*, p. 134.

country needed—namely, a confrontation between the Administration and a responsible opposition. We felt that such an encounter was made necessary by the fact that a meaningful debate on foreign policy had been effectively prevented in Congress, where it should normally take place if the democratic process were not to become a dead letter.”<sup>4</sup>

The agreement arrived at with Bundy was for the main event of the national teach-in to be a debate between Bundy and an academic figure critical of government Vietnam policy, with each side being supported by a panel of other academics. Thus, said Rapoport, “the impression would be avoided—as Mr. Bundy insisted it should be—that the academic community was unanimously opposed to the present policy on Vietnam.”

Bundy’s acceptance was announced and the Inter-University Committee for a Public Hearing on Vietnam began building the national teach-in from a headquarters in Ann Arbor. The event was scheduled for May 15, 1965, in Washington.

A telephone network connected with local radio stations and campus public-address systems was set up to carry the proceedings to 122 university areas. In addition National Educational Television broadcast the event in full and live, as well as later repeats of the highlights.

The government side insisted on having a say about who the opposition debater would be, as well as bringing other pressures. The final result was a format which bore little resemblance to the teach-ins around the country. Nevertheless the event had a powerful effect in further undermining the authority of the government’s position.

One reason was that Bundy canceled out at the last minute, on the excuse that, of all things, he had to work on the crisis in the Dominican Republic. When this was announced to the generally polite live audience in Washington, the groans were audible. The audience then listened with subdued but rising anger to a classic of cold-war double-speak, contained in Bundy’s brief statement of regret:

“It has been argued that debate of this kind should be avoided because it can give encouragement to the adversaries of our country. There is some ground for this argument, since it is true that Communists have little understanding of the meaning of debate in a free society. The Chinese will continue to pretend that American policy is weaker because 700 faculty members have made a protest against our policy in Vietnam. The American people, whatever their opinion, know better. They know that those who are protesting are only a minority of American teachers and students. . . . They understand what Communists cannot understand at all, that open discussion between our citizens and their government is the central nervous system of our free society. We cannot let the propaganda of such totalitarians divert us from our necessary arguments with one another any more than we can let them be misled by such debates if we can help it.”<sup>5</sup>

Seven hundred faculty members indeed! The audience looked around at itself. There were several thousand in the Washington hall alone—far more than 700 of them protesting faculty members—not to mention the 122 other audiences on the telephone hookup. Bundy’s statement was absurd while its arrogance was frightening. Right then and there, the credibility gap began to widen into a chasm.

Bundy wasn’t the only one that day to attempt to wrap himself—and U.S. Vietnam policy—in the cloak of defense of free speech while disparaging those who exercised it on a meaningful question. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., another of Kennedy’s academic brain trust—though not then still in the administration—spoke for the government side, with some criticisms. (“A limited increase in the American ground force

commitment and a decreased emphasis on air power are indispensable to negotiations. Indeed if we took the Marines now in the Dominican Republic and sent them to South Vietnam, we would be a good deal better off in both countries.”<sup>6</sup>) At one point he appealed to the audience to remember that one thing the U.S. was defending in Vietnam was the right of the academic community to debate issues. A good part of the audience actually hissed. Schlesinger was visibly shaken. The best government brains simply couldn’t understand that people don’t like to be abused that way.

In the absence of Bundy the main government debater was Professor Robert Scalapino of the University of California at Berkeley. His opponent was Professor George M. Kahin of Cornell, backed up by Hans Morgenthau, professor of political science at the University of Chicago. Both Kahin’s and Morgenthau’s presentations shot gaping holes thorough the government position, though neither challenged the right of the U.S. to be in Vietnam. In general, the opposition spokespersons at the national teach-in did not advocate immediate withdrawal, but stayed within the framework of how to make U.S. foreign policy more effective and realistic. As William Appleman Williams later commented, it had aspects of a seminar on “finding even better ways of doing what we [the U.S.] are already doing too well.”

Nevertheless it was the first time in their lives that a mass audience of Americans had witnessed a real debate on U.S. foreign policy, and recognized the simple fact that the government position appeared very weak. Another important feature of the affair was the appearance—for a special lecture on the origins of the cold war—of Isaac Deutscher, the Marxist biographer of Trotsky.

The very fact that Deutscher was invited by the organizers was an indication of the depth of questioning going on in the academic community. For many years it had been virtually impossible to hear a Marxist at any but a very few American universities, and most American students—not to mention the general public—had never heard the notion challenged that Russia and China were to blame for the cold war. But here was Isaac Deutscher, short, bald, grey goatee, with impeccable credentials as a historian, Western Europe’s most renowned expert on Soviet affairs, telling a mass audience of Americans across the country that it was the Western capitalist world, not the noncapitalist countries, which was the source of the cold war. And what is more, doing it with convincing logic in terms not only academicians could understand.

I was sitting in the press section at the time and some of the Washington reporters, who had been grinding out the State Department line so long they didn’t know anything else existed, had difficulty catching the tenor of Deutscher’s speech though it would have been crystal clear to any average high school student. They reacted with crude jokes at the old man’s appearance. But Deutscher’s lecture was not the least of the contributions to a change in attitudes which the national teach-in helped stimulate.

\* \* \*

The greatest of the local teach-ins occurred at Berkeley May 21-22, 1965. Organized as Vietnam Day at the University of California, it attracted spokespersons for virtually the entire spectrum of opposition to U.S. policy in Vietnam and a few who defended the State Department position. In the course of the thirty-six-hour affair some 30,000 persons participated with crowds for some speeches reaching 12,000.

This event gave rise to the Vietnam Day Committee (VDC) as well as to the next major national and international initiatives of the new antiwar movement.

Berkeley’s Vietnam Day was quite different from the national teach-in. It was not that its organizers did not want to debate government spokesmen. They offered Professor Scalapino what-

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 174-75.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 170.



Militant

Part of crowd of 12,000 at May 1965 teach-in in Berkeley. About 30,000 persons participated over the course of the 36-hour meeting.

ever time he wanted on the program, and even invited the government team of speakers on Vietnam.

But the Berkeley organizers refused to allow the government or the university, or even the more establishment-oriented movement figures, to set the terms of the debate. To a certain extent the government had succeeded in this at the national teach-in. In general the position of the liberal establishment was that certain ideas were simply not open to challenge—anticommunism, for example, or the very right of the U.S. to be in Vietnam.

The attitude of the Berkeley organizers is summed up in this comment written by James Petras after the event on the attempt by Robert Pickus of Turn Toward Peace to set the terms of the program:

“He sought to impose an organizational apparatus to check the credentials of all participants, in order to insure that they agreed with his general views. He agreed to join if all others submitted to his particular form of ‘democracy.’ His method of operation seemed to us a ‘rule or ruin’ approach.

“Nevertheless, Pickus did have the chance to speak at Vietnam Day. His line was the most absurd heard that day: he said that he was opposed to U.S. violence in Vietnam, but he declined to support the withdrawal of U.S. soldiers. To oppose American

intervention in Vietnam, as Hal Draper [of the International Socialist Club] pointed out in his debate with Pickus, is to call for the *immediate* withdrawal of U.S. troops. To call for it ‘later’ (under whatever pretence) is to legitimize violence in the here and now—since one cannot impose utopian dreams on what the U.S. army does in fighting a war of conquest. One would not be too irreverent to refer to this type of ‘peace’ approach as ‘War now—Peace later.’”<sup>7</sup>

The idea for Vietnam Day originated with a small group of unaffiliated “new left” students, Barbara Gullahorn, Bob Fitch, and Jerry Rubin, a graduate student originally from Cincinnati who had flirted briefly with the Progressive Labor Movement.

During preparations for the April 17 San Francisco demonstration (which coincided with the SDS march on Washington) these students had met Stephen Smale, a young professor in the local mathematics department at Berkeley who was active in the local American Federation of Teachers. They proposed the idea of a giant town meeting on Vietnam at the Berkeley campus. Smale, in cooperation with another professor, Morris Hirsch, approached

7. *We Accuse* (Berkeley: Diablo Press, 1965), p. 3. (This book was a transcript of the major speeches at Vietnam Day. Petras supplied an editors’ preface on behalf of the VDC.)

the university administration with demands for facilities. Smale recalls:

"The Free Speech Movement was fresh in mind in those days and had quite a threat on the administration which was worried about precipitating another free-speech issue. This was important. We made big demands. A super teach-in, with outdoor loudspeakers and everything. They opposed it at first, but timidly. We got the essentials."<sup>8</sup>

The impish, iconoclastic Rubin had found a kindred soul in Smale, and, what is more, one who had some influence and a feel for a mass movement. After a sharp struggle with some of the local union officials, Smale got the local AFT to join in sponsorship of Vietnam Day. People started paying attention.

The event was organized in open, nonexclusive meetings where ideas for speakers were discussed and committees formed to do the work. Much of this was done out of Rubin's apartment by volunteers. One of these was Paul Montauk, a chef in his forties then teaching culinary arts for a Job Corps program, who became secretary-treasurer for Vietnam Day. Montauk was a longtime member of the Socialist Workers Party. Hanging on the phone in Rubin's apartment, tying up practical details—never Rubin's strong point—Montauk became enthusiastic and he convinced the Trotskyists, including the Young Socialist Alliance, to throw themselves into the project. After similar initial hesitation, the other organized radical tendencies participated as well, and a significant unity was forged—with the "independents" taking the lead—which carried beyond the event and into the first period of the VDC.<sup>9</sup>

Both Rubin and Smale tended to be contemptuous of the existing radical groups, considering them "old left" and almost irrelevant. But they were not exclusionists and welcomed the participation of everyone willing to help. Rubin made no secret of the fact that he viewed his role as helping to build an entirely new type of radical movement. Just what the program of this new movement would be was never very clearly articulated by Rubin. But its methods would be pragmatic, cultural as well as political, and aimed first of all at challenging the stifling norms of the cold-war liberal establishment. For Rubin, style was as important as program in politics. Later it would be politics in the sense of

8. Author's interview with Smale, October 6, 1973. Taped. Library of Social History, New York.

9. Author's interview with Montauk, October 6, 1973. Taped. Library of Social History, New York.

Marshal McLuhan's the Medium is the Message.

Rubin's overall approach wasn't worth much in the long-term task of constructing a movement. But for building a relatively simple operation like a big teach-in it had its positive sides. The object of the teach-in, after all, was not to hammer out a particular program or organization, but to challenge previously unchallenged ideas before the widest possible audience. Its thrust was to feed the awakening desire to consider new or previously proscribed ideas, to break down the xenophobia of the cold war, and to awaken a morality of human solidarity within an America long dominated by the ethic—and the style—of the corporation ledger. All this Rubin understood. In addition it was Rubin who first of all pushed for Vietnam Day—and afterward the Vietnam Day Committee—to have an international character. He was deliberate in his attempts to bring to bear on the United States the weight of the rest of the world's thinking about Vietnam.

Smale and Rubin pressed for the dramatic and the colorful. Though they were often in the minority, their stamp was left on the affair, which had a cultural quality in the broad sense. In part because of this it produced an effective moral statement on the quality of American life under the liberal establishment. As Hirsch, Smale, and Rubin put it in a reply to an attack on the event by Professor Scalapino, "the problem of Vietnam is the problem of the soul of America."<sup>10</sup>

Scalapino's attack came in a statement issued before the teach-in explaining his refusal to speak. Said Scalapino:

"A few individuals, most of whom would not dream of treating their own disciplines in this cavalier fashion, have sponsored a rigged meeting in which various ideologies and entertainers are going to enlighten us on Vietnam.

"Only a handful of the performers have ever been to Vietnam or made any serious study of its problems. The objective is propaganda, not knowledge. . . . This travesty should be repudiated by all true scholars irrespective of their views on Vietnam. . . ."<sup>11</sup>

At the teach-in itself this was answered in kind by Paul Krassner, the editor of *The Realist* and an expert in the cavalier treatment of pomposity. Quipped Krassner: "I noticed at the lunch wagon back there that there was a change in the menu, and veal scalapino has now been changed to 'chicken scalapino.'"

The reply to Scalapino by Hirsch, Smale, and Rubin, released a few days before the event, was more political:

"The purpose of Vietnam Day is to present to the Bay Area community alternatives to current U.S. policy. The information and ideas that will be related on these days cannot be found in the mass media, the State Department *White Paper*, or even in university classrooms. We are contributing to democratic dialogue by expressing views which, although widespread in Asia and Europe, are rarely presented to the American people. . . .

"Professor Scalapino has implied that the only people who are qualified to discuss Vietnam in public are academic or State Department experts on Vietnam. We do have such technical experts on the program: Professor Stanley Scheinbaum, who designed the strategic hamlet program for the Government, but who now regrets it, is one example. But to restrict public discussion to 'experts' leads to a dangerous elitism because, in the end, decisions on foreign policy are based on value judgments, not just on a simple recording of facts. The issues in Vietnam are too important to be settled by Cold War gamesmanship or academic hair splitting. One of the purposes of Vietnam Day is to transfer the discussion from the Rand Corporation to the streets."<sup>12</sup>

This remarkable statement would work out in real life for the next eight years, even literally with the Pentagon Papers exposé

10. *Teach-Ins: U.S.A.*, pp. 30-31.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

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in 1970. None of the Vietnam Day organizers in 1965 had ever heard of Daniel Ellsberg or Anthony Russo, the two Rand Corporation experts who would make those papers public. At the time Ellsberg was just another JFK intellectual dedicated to winning the war in Vietnam. But the moral offensive of which Vietnam Day was an important part would work its way into the most unlikely places.

\* \* \*

Isaac Deutscher also appeared at Vietnam Day, where he delivered an eighty-minute lecture after midnight, outdoors, to one of the largest audiences at the affair. It covered the same ground as his Washington speech, but in addition he took on the essence of the argument in McGeorge Bundy's letter to the national teach-in on free speech under Communist governments. Said Deutscher:

"I still believe that class struggle is the motive force of history, but in this last period, class struggle has all too often sunk into a bloody morass of power politics. On both sides of the great divide, a few ruthless and half-witted oligarchies—capitalist oligarchies here, bureaucratic oligarchies there—hold all the power and make all the decisions, obfuscate the minds and throttle the wills of nations. They even reserve for themselves the roles of the chief protagonists and expound for us the great conflicting ideas of our time. The social struggles of our time have degenerated into the unscrupulous contests of the oligarchies. Official Washington speaks for the world's freedom, while official Moscow speaks for the world's socialism. All too long the peoples have failed to contradict these false friends, either of freedom or of socialism. On both sides of the great divide the peoples have been silent too long and thus willy-nilly have identified themselves with the policies of their governments. The world has thus come very close, dangerously close, to a division between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary nations. . . .

"Fortunately, things have begun to change. The Russian people have been shaking off the old conformism and have been regaining their critical attitude towards their rulers. . . . I am sure that without the Russian de-Stalinization there would not have been this amount of freedom and critical thinking that there is in America today. And I am also sure that your continued exercise of freedom and continued voicing of criticism and of critical political action will encourage the further progress of freedom in the communist part of the world. . . .

"The more you exercise your freedom, the more will the Russians feel encouraged to speak up critically against the mistakes and blunders of their government."<sup>13</sup>

Deutscher concluded with a peroration, the more remarkable for the standing ovation it evoked from an audience of not-so-out-of-the-ordinary American youth. He said:

"The division may perhaps once again run within nations rather than between nations. And once the divisions begin to run within nations, progress begins anew, the progress toward the *only* solution of our problem, not of all our problems, but of the critical political problems and social problems, the *only* solution, which is a socialist world, one socialist world. We must, we can and we must, give back to class struggle its old dignity. We may and we must restore meaning to the great ideas, partly conflicting ideas, by which mankind is still living; the ideas of liberalism, democracy, and communism—yes, the idea of communism."<sup>14</sup>

\* \* \*

One international figure the organizers of Vietnam Day sought to get without success was Jean-Paul Sartre. The great French

existentialist philosopher and novelist, whose courage in speaking out against inhumane policies of his own government in Algeria had been an inspiration to many intellectuals in America, refused all invitations to speak in the U.S., even canceling a scheduled appearance at Cornell after Johnson's February escalation of the war. In explaining his reasons Sartre said the U.S. would change only slowly, "and more, I think, if one resists it, than if one preaches to it."

Regarding those Americans opposed to the war, Sartre said: "The problem is not whether or not I would have helped such Americans more or less by going there. The fact is that I cannot help them at all. Because their political weight unhappily, is nil. . . . These people are totally impotent. One of them wrote me: 'If you do not come to us, if you break off all communication with us, it must be that you regard us as the accursed of this earth!' I do think, in fact, that a man of the American Left who has a clear view of the situation, and who sees himself isolated in a land entirely conditioned by the myths of imperialism and anticommunism, such a man, I say, and with all respect, is indeed one of the accursed of this earth. He totally disapproves of the politics carried on in his name and his action is totally ineffective—in any case, for the present. . . .

"American opinion can become sensitive on this subject only as a result of a deep crisis; a military disaster or the threat of world war. The only way we have of contributing to this awareness is by making a brutal and global condemnation of American policy in Vietnam and by trying to provoke wherever possible—that is to say, in Europe—protests against that policy."<sup>15</sup>

Norman Mailer was as close to an existential-minded novelist as Vietnam Day was able to provide. In his speech, which drew perhaps the largest crowd of the event and a standing ovation, he expressed a feel of the situation in the United States in one way similar and in another in striking contrast to that of Sartre. Said Mailer:

"If we wish to take a strange country away from strangers, let us at least be strong enough and brave enough to defeat them on the ground. Our marines, some would say, are the best soldiers in the world. The counter-argument is that native guerrillas can defeat any force of a major power man-to-man. Let us then fight on fair grounds. Let us say to Lyndon Johnson, to monstrous [Secretary of Defense] McNamara, and to the generals on the scene, 'Fight like men. Go in man-to-man against the Vietcong. Call off the Air Force. They prove nothing except that America is coterminous with the Mafia. Let us win man-to-man or lose man-to-man, but let us stop pulverizing people whose faces we have never seen.' But, of course, we will not stop, nor will we ever fight man-to-man against poor peasants. Their vision of existence might be more ferocious and more determined than our own. No, we would rather go on as the most advanced monsters of civilization, pulverizing instinct with our detonations, our State Department experts in their little bow ties, and our bombs.

"Only listen, Lyndon Johnson, you've gone too far this time. You are a bully with an Air Force, and since you will not call off your Air Force, there are young people who will persecute you back. It is a little thing, but it will hound you into nightmares and endless corridors of night without sleep. It will hound you. . . . They will go on marches and they will make demonstrations, and they will begin a war of public protest against you which will never cease. It will go on and on and it will get stronger and stronger."<sup>16</sup>

[Next chapter: *The SDS Default and the Birth of the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam*]

15. "Why I Will Not Go to the United States," by Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nation*, April 19, 1965.

16. *We Accuse*, pp. 21-22.

13. *We Accuse*, pp. 51-52.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

# Portugal: el Caso 'República' y la Libertad de Prensa

[La siguiente declaración, firmada por el Comité de Redacción, apareció en el número del 21 de junio de *Avanzada Socialista*, semanal del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores.]

\* \* \*

## Se Silencia a República y se Permite la Prensa Reaccionaria

Podría argumentarse que el PS portugués tiene una posición reaccionaria. Más adelante volveremos sobre esta cuestión. Pero lo que invalida por completo semejante argumento es el hecho de que la prensa burguesa, reaccionaria y proimperialista no encuentra ningún obstáculo para su publicación y difusión.

Esto no significa que propiciemos una censura sobre la prensa de derecha de Portugal. Pero sí pone en claro que quienes atacan a *República* no lo hacen con el objetivo de censurar a la reacción sino con el de coartar la libre expresión del Partido Socialista.

Queda así en evidencia que el caso *República* es una maniobra antidemocrática, que no persigue el objetivo de reforzar la lucha contra las conspiraciones de la reacción, sino la de recortar los derechos democráticos del PS para facilitar el camino a la política del MFA inspirada en este caso por el PCP.

Algunos sectores de izquierda claudicantes ante el peronismo llevan más de veinte años reprochando a nuestra corriente su oposición a la expropiación del diario oligárquico *La Prensa*, realizada por el gobierno del general Perón en 1951, para entregárselo a la CGT. Entonces señalamos que estábamos de acuerdo con la expropiación de toda la prensa patronal y su puesta bajo control democrático del movimiento obrero para garantizar así la irrestricta libertad de prensa.

Los marxistas revolucionarios defendemos el *derecho irrestricto a la libertad de expresión* de todas las corrientes, aun las burguesas. No tememos a la confrontación de ideas y posiciones. Queremos que todos tengan la posibilidad de ser leídos en la prensa, oídos por la radio, vistos y escuchados por la televisión. Denunciamos que la burguesía coarta esos derechos al movimiento obrero. A través de medidas directas del gobierno, a veces. Por la falta de medios económicos de los trabajadores, permanentemente.

## ¿Qué Gobierno Es el que Actúa contra República?

Es natural que la izquierda mundial tome con gran interés este problema y que lo

debata atentamente. Portugal es uno de los procesos revolucionarios más importantes de nuestros días, especialmente porque se ha constituido en la puerta por la que la revolución mundial entra en Europa. El rumbo de los acontecimientos allí tiene una importancia muy grande para el futuro revolucionario en todo el mundo.

En el curso de este debate se han expresado posiciones peligrosas por lo que significan de claudicación ante el gobierno portugués y la maniobra antidemocrática que montó junto con el PCP.

Por ejemplo, se ha acuñado una ingeniosa expresión, "servicio público," para indicar que todas las empresas papeleras, imprentas, etc., deberían ser nacionalizadas y puestas a disposición de los diversos sectores sociales. Esta solución sería aplicable, no sólo en Portugal sino incluso en Francia.

Semejante salida deja completamente de lado el problema fundamental: *quién ejerce el control de la prensa nacionalizada*. Los marxistas no hacemos un dogma de la nacionalización de empresas. En el caso de la nacionalización de bancos y compañías de seguros y de los grupos financieros CUF y Champalimaud en Portugal, las aplaudimos porque debilitan a los más poderosos sectores patronales y recortan la capacidad de maniobra de la reacción.<sup>1</sup>

Pero el caso de los medios de difusión es muy distinto, puesto que afecta a la libertad de expresión. La prensa burguesa monopolizada por el estado no es mejor que la prensa burguesa dominada por empresas privadas. Es peor, porque (aunque pueda no hacerlo inmediatamente) da al estado burgués las armas para cerrar al movimiento obrero todo acceso a los medios de difusión.

Esto no significa que en todos los casos, los socialistas revolucionarios debamos oponernos a la nacionalización de la prensa. Si, por ejemplo, los gobiernos de las colonias portuguesas independizadas o en proceso de independización (Guinea, Mozambique, Angola) decidieran expropiar la prensa imperialista para descolonizar sus países también en el terreno de los medios de difusión, deberíamos apoyar esa medida.

Pero aún en ese caso, es decisivo reclamar *el control de las masas* sobre los medios de comunicación nacionalizados.

La noción de "servicio público" es peligrosísima, porque la prensa no es, como la electricidad o el agua corriente, una cuestión puramente económica. *Es un problema político y como tal debe ser encarado*.

Exigir al estado burgués (en Francia como en Portugal) que nacionalice "el

papel, las imprentas" sin poner como condición *esencial* el control obrero de la misma equivale a entregar al enemigo de clase un arma decisiva.

El gobierno portugués, más allá de sus vacilaciones, contramarchas y demagogia, es un gobierno burgués. Es el gobierno de un estado burgués, no es el gobierno de los organismos de poder del movimiento obrero y el campesinado, tiene en su seno partidos burgueses y defiende (en la medida en que las circunstancias se lo permiten) la propiedad privada de la gran patronal. *Sus avances sobre la prensa son un peligro para toda la prensa obrera y de izquierda*.

Sobre todo si tomamos en cuenta que se trata de un gobierno que ha ilegalizado a dos organizaciones maoístas por sostener una política distinta a la oficial. No es nuestra intención discutir acá la política de esas organizaciones, a la que hemos criticado en su momento. Pero sí señalar que su ilegalización demostró que el gobierno portugués no está dispuesto a respetar los derechos democráticos de las corrientes de izquierda disidentes.

## Una Peligrosa Interpretación de un Texto de Trotsky

Esta no es la única posición peligrosa que se ha expresado ante el caso *República*. Sobre la base de un artículo de Trotsky de 1938,<sup>2</sup> se presenta a la libertad de prensa como absoluta, no sometida a los vaivenes de la lucha de clases. En realidad, el artículo en cuestión no puede interpretarse separado de las condiciones concretas en las que y para las que fue escrito. En México, en 1938, el stalinismo reclamaba al gobierno burgués que censurara a la prensa de derecha. Trotsky señaló, con toda razón, que ese reclamo era "suicida." Que los controles que el estado impusiera a la prensa reaccionaria se volverían más adelante contra la prensa obrera y de izquierda.

Trotsky señalaba entonces que *"sólo la mayor libertad de palabra, de prensa y de reunión pueden crear las condiciones favorables para el desarrollo del movimiento revolucionario de la clase obrera."* Y que era deber de los socialistas revolucionarios defender esas libertades y luchar por su ampliación.

Sin embargo, es evidente que no pretendió con eso eximir a la libertad de prensa de las condiciones reales de la lucha de clases. Frente a una corriente obrera que pedía al estado la censura en manos de un gobierno y estado burgués, Trotsky defendía la más irrestricta libertad de prensa. Pero en

1. A partir del 11 de julio CUF y Champalimaud no se han nacionalizado aunque sí se han nacionalizado algunas propiedades de las mismas.—IP

2. El texto de este artículo fue reproducido en *Intercontinental Press*, el 9 de junio, p. 792.—IP

cambio, aprobaba al Soviet de Petrogrado que "el 5 de marzo [de 1917]... confirmó el acuerdo: clausurar las publicaciones de derecha y someter al Soviet la salida de nuevos periódicos... La prensa no está por encima de la sociedad. Las condiciones de su existencia durante la revolución reflejan la marcha misma de ésta... El Soviet tenía razón cuando quería mantener en sus manos el control sobre la prensa."<sup>3</sup> Esto sostenía contra el oportunista Sujánov, quien defendía en ese caso la libertad de prensa irrestricta.

Entendámonos, el Soviet (es decir, el conjunto de los delegados obreros) con su dirección pequeñoburguesa y oportunista. No el gobierno de la burguesía. Unos meses

3. La cita es de la *Historia de la Revolución Rusa* de Trotsky, tomo I (Buenos Aires: Editorial Tilcara, 1962), p. 274-75. El texto del párrafo entero es el siguiente:

Ya en la noche del 27 al 28 de febrero, el Comité ejecutivo suprimió la prensa monárquica y no dejó publicar más periódicos que los autorizados. Se levantaron numerosas protestas. Los que más alzaban la voz eran los que estaban acostumbrados a cerrar la boca a todo el mundo. Unos días después, el Comité ejecutivo hubo de plantear nuevamente la cuestión de la libertad de prensa: ¿Autorizaba o no la salida de los periódicos reaccionarios? Surgieron discrepancias de criterio. Los doctrinarios tipo Sujánov sostenían el de la absoluta libertad de prensa. Tcheidse, en un principio, no se mostró de acuerdo con esto: ¿Cómo se iban a dejar las armas en manos de los enemigos mortales, sin ninguna traba? Digamos de paso que a nadie se le ocurrió someter la cuestión al Gobierno. Y se comprende, pues hubiera sido inútil: los tipógrafos no acataban más disposiciones que las del Soviet. El 5 de marzo el Comité ejecutivo confirmó el acuerdo: clausurar las publicaciones de derecha y someter al Soviet la salida de nuevos periódicos. Pero ya el día 10 esta decisión fue anulada bajo la presión de los elementos burgueses. "Bastaron tres días para que la gente entrara en razón," decía Sujánov, triunfante. ¡Entusiasmo infundado! La prensa no está por encima de la sociedad. Las condiciones de su existencia durante la revolución, reflejan la marcha misma de ésta. Cuando la revolución toma o puede tomar el carácter de guerra civil, ninguno de los campos beligerantes admite la existencia de prensa enemiga en la órbita de su influencia, de la misma manera que no se desprende voluntariamente del control sobre los arsenales, los ferrocarriles o las imprentas. En la lucha revolucionaria, la prensa no es más respetable que el derecho a la vida, que la revolución se abroga también. Puede afirmarse como ley, que los gobiernos revolucionarios son tanto más liberales, tolerantes y "generosos" con la reacción, cuanto más mezquino es su programa, cuanto más comprometido se halla con el pasado y más conservador es su papel. Y a la inversa: cuanto más grandiosos son los fines y mayor suma tiene de derechos conquistados e intereses lesionados, más intenso es el Poder revolucionario y más dictatorial. Podrá ser esto un mal o un bien, el hecho es que hasta ahora la humanidad ha avanzado siguiendo ese camino. El Soviet tenía razón, cuando quería mantener en sus manos el control sobre la prensa. ¿Por qué renunció tan fácilmente a ejercerlo? Porque había renunciado a toda lucha seria. El Soviet no aludía para nada a

más tarde, esta misma dirección soviética en el gobierno burgués usaría la más implacable represión contra la prensa bolchevique.

No ignoramos que la creciente conspiración reaccionaria en Portugal pueda exigir la supresión de la prensa fascista. Pero, para ello, no confiamos en el aparato estatal burgués. Sólo puede hacerlo un frente único del PS, PCP, la Intersindical y los restantes partidos de izquierda.

Pedir al gobierno burgués que tome la tarea de eliminar la prensa fascista puesta al servicio de la conspiración golpista es darle armas que en la primera oportunidad usará contra la prensa obrera.

Volviendo al ejemplo de las colonias portuguesas en Africa, es innegable su derecho a extirpar la prensa colonialista. Sería absurdo que los marxistas, en nombre de la libertad de prensa, defendiéramos el derecho del imperialismo a conservar uno de los más importantes medios de dominación en los países liberados por la lucha de sus pueblos.

Hace un año, cuando la prensa oligárquica peruana era el eslabón principal de la preparación de un golpe de estado proimperialista contra el gobierno nacionalista burgués, éste expropió todos los diarios. Entonces, *Avanzada Socialista* señaló que se trataba de una medida defensiva contra la prensa que siempre se había opuesto a las reformas progresivas del gobierno militar (reforma agraria, nacionalizaciones, etc.) y que ahora era la punta de lanza del golpismo. Defender la "libertad de expresión" de la oligarquía y el imperialismo hubiera constituido en esa situación concreta un error gravísimo. Sin embargo, también aclaramos: "esto no significa que brindemos un apoyo incondicional a Velasco Alvarado ni que aceptemos sin más trámites el control de los diarios por parte del gobierno burgués, que no representa los intereses de los obreros y campesinos peruanos y que aspira a sacar el control de la prensa a la oligarquía para sus propios fines, que no son los de las masas populares." Y precisábamos nuestra posición: "el control de la prensa no debe quedar en manos del gobierno patronal sino bajo el control de las organizaciones obreras, campesinas y populares."

En esa misma oportunidad, remarcamos: "sin el control de las masas a través de sus organismos reales y existentes, sin una

la paz, ni a la tierra, ni siquiera a la república. Cuando entregó el Poder a la burguesía conservadora no tenía motivos para temer nada de la prensa de derecha ni para pensar que se vería en el trance de luchar contra ella. En cambio, pocos meses después, el Gobierno, apoyado por el Soviet, adoptaba una actitud de implacable represión contra la prensa de izquierda. Los periódicos bolcheviques veíanse suspendidos, sin empacho, uno tras otro.—IP

amplia movilización obrera y popular, no habrá real libertad de expresión y los diarios serán tan ajenos a las necesidades de los explotados como lo eran en manos de la oligarquía."

En México, por la misma época en que Trotsky escribió el artículo en cuestión, el gobierno nacionalista burgués expropiaba a los monopolios petroleros imperialistas. Si una gran movilización de masas hubiera planteado la expropiación de la prensa ligada a esos monopolios, dudamos mucho que Trotsky se opusiese en nombre de la libertad de prensa. Sí creemos que hubiera llamado a las masas a no confiar en el estado burgués y a luchar para ganar el control de los diarios expropiados.

Otro ejemplo suficientemente categórico está dado por Gus Horowitz en la *International Socialist Review* de junio de 1975 en la página 8. Comentando la movilización obrera contra la ofensiva derechista, que iba a culminar con una gran manifestación de la "mayoría silenciosa" el 28 de septiembre en Lisboa, recuerda como un hecho altamente positivo que "los tipógrafos se negaron a imprimir los anuncios de la manifestación para los derechistas." No nos imaginamos a Horowitz diciendo a los obreros que debían respetar la libertad de prensa. Los socialistas revolucionarios peruanos frente al peligro y la preparación de un golpe mucho más grave que una manifestación derechista propusieron, con justa razón lo mismo que los tipógrafos de Lisboa y elevándose a la formulación de una consigna: expropiación de la prensa reaccionaria con control obrero.

#### Devolver República al PS Inmediatamente

Nadie otorgó a los dirigentes del gobierno portugués, ni al PCP, ni siquiera a los trabajadores gráficos de *República* la función de controlar, en nombre de todos los trabajadores portugueses, la prensa.

Por el contrario, el PS es un partido obrero y fue el que recibió la mayor cantidad de votos en las elecciones del 25 de abril. Por esa circunstancia, no solamente tiene derecho a seguir editando *República*. También lo tiene a que se le entregue una proporción de todos los medios de difusión portugueses igual al porcentaje de votos que obtuvo hace un mes y medio.

Esto no significa defender la política del PS. Es cierto que el PS intenta conformar un Frente Popular con las fuerzas patronales, al servicio de los imperialismos europeos. Es cierto que defiende la propiedad privada y que obstaculiza la toma del poder por la clase obrera.

Pero, lamentablemente, no es muy distinta la política del otro partido obrero numéricamente importante, el PCP. El también dirige sus esfuerzos a la concreción de un Frente Popular que preserve la propiedad

privada y la existencia del estado burgués. Veamos lo que dice de su dirigente máximo Alvaro Cunhal, el diario norteamericano *Wall Street Journal* del 20 de febrero: "A veces, el señor Cunhal usa un tono tan moderado que hay que recordar su historia para estar seguro de que no pertenece a algún partido de clase media. Habla de darle un lugar a la empresa privada en el Portugal del futuro. Está en contra de las huelgas, silencia toda crítica a la OTAN, evita la propaganda violenta y le extiende una mano a EE.UU. Además, no tiene una posición dogmática respecto de la nacionalización de la industria."

Es cierto que el PS ha aprovechado el episodio del diario clausurado para lanzar una campaña anticomunista, pero no es menos cierto que el PCP y el gobierno iniciaron la cadena de provocaciones que hoy permite a los dirigentes del PS aprovechar los sentimientos democráticos de miles de trabajadores portugueses.

Defender el derecho del PS (el partido que obtuvo mayor apoyo electoral el 25 de abril) a tener su prensa no significa defender su política. Significa cortar desde el comienzo todo intento de silenciar (incluso con pretextos "izquierdistas") a las corrientes obreras que no claudican ante el gobierno o que no se adaptan a las pretensiones del PCP de imponer su propia variante de reformismo contra las otras.

Porque, en definitiva, no es nada difícil calumniar a las corrientes opositoras de izquierda como "reaccionarias" para imponerles la misma mordaza que hoy se procura imponer al PS.

No nos detendremos en algunos argumentos formales que utilizan los defensores del gobierno portugués y el PCP en este asunto. Nos referimos al argumento de que *República* no es órgano oficial del PS y que el origen del conflicto es una cuestión gremial. Los acontecimientos han puesto en evidencia que se trata de un problema político promovido por el PCP y por lo menos avalado por el gobierno militar. Para determinar el carácter partidario del diario, debe bastar con la afirmación que hacen sus dirigentes de que lo reconocen como propio.

La inmediata devolución del diario *República* a sus directores no es sólo el estricto cumplimiento de un elemental derecho democrático. Es también cerrar el paso a un grave peligro para el desarrollo de la revolución portuguesa: el de que se anulen las libertades democráticas que permiten el debate y la resolución consciente por parte de las masas de los pasos a dar. Y también el peligro de que medidas como la supresión de la prensa del partido más votado por los trabajadores y el pueblo arroje a muchos portugueses a los brazos de la reacción, que no vacilará en levantar mentirosas banderas "democráticas." □

## Declaración de la Liga Juventud Comunista

# Exigen Libertad de Presos Dominicanos

[La siguiente declaración, recibida por *Intercontinental Press* el 7 de julio, es de la Liga Juventud Comunista, grupo trotskista recién formado en Puerto Rico.]

\* \* \*

Es un principio de todos los revolucionarios el defender los prisioneros políticos. No podemos mantenernos cruzados de brazos ante esta situación.

Los tres puertorriqueños prisioneros, Angel Gandía, Raúl García y John T. Sampson son inocentes de los delitos hasta que se les pruebe lo contrario. No ha sido encontrado ningún guerrillero en Santo Domingo, no se han encontrado las alegadas armas que ellos transportaron en el barco con los supuestos guerrilleros.

Lo que sí sabemos, es que hace más de un mes el pueblo dominicano está siendo reprimido por las tropas y la policía balaguerista. Más de 250 personas han sido arrestadas e interrogadas en relación a las guerrillas hasta el día de ayer. Hasta donde sabemos todos son inocentes. Esto ha sido una excusa del gobierno de Balaguer para reprimir a las masas trabajadoras dominicanas.

La situación en la República Dominicana es una de inestabilidad. El desempleo, el alto costo de la vida y la emigración de dominicanos hacia E.U. y Puerto Rico es algo que continúa en ascenso.

Sobre la segunda acusación de haber entrado ilegalmente a la República Dominicana sabemos que es falsa. Aunque fuese cierto que hayan sido capturados buscando gasolina en la costa sur, los ciudadanos norteamericanos no necesitan pasaporte para entrar en la República Dominicana.

A los puertorriqueños se nos impuso la ciudadanía norteamericana en el 1917 para que fuesemos a servir de "carne de cañón" en las guerras imperialistas, Corea y Vietnam e inclusive habían puertorriqueños en las tropas norteamericanas que invadieron a Sto. Domingo en 1965. Estos no sabían a donde los llevaban, si a Vietnam o otro lugar.

Por lo tanto no importan nuestras diferencias ideológicas con el PSP [Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño], por principio nos solidarizamos con los tres prisioneros puertorriqueños. Apoyamos incondicionalmente al PSP en su campaña en pro de la liberación de los compañeros.

Debemos enviar inmediatamente telegramas a la embajada norteamericana y al gobierno de Balaguer, exigiendo que inter venga en el caso y exigiéndole la liberación

inmediata de los tres prisioneros respectivamente.

Debemos conseguir circular la situación actual en la prensa de la Cuarta Internacional, que todas las seccionales y organizaciones simpatizantes hagan llegar su protesta al gobierno de Washington y Balaguer.

Debemos enviar a USLA [U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners—Comité Estadounidense pro Justicia a los Presos Políticos en la América Latina] la información necesaria para que popularice el caso en los E.U.

Debemos proponerle al PSP que organice un comité de defensa amplio para la defensa de sus tres miembros que se encuentran prisioneros en Sto. Domingo, que se encargue de llevar a cabo actividades de apoyo y divulgación en Puerto Rico y a nivel internacional. Que al mismo tiempo se exija que se ponga fin a la persecución de líderes sindicales, obreros, estudiantes y miembros de la oposición dominicana y que se liberen todos los presos políticos dominicanos.

Todo esto ayudará a desenmascarar nuestro sistema colonial, a popularizar aún más el caso de Puerto Rico y a educar a las masas sobre la falta de libertades democráticas en Sto. Domingo y América Latina.

*¡Por la libertad de Angel Gandía, Raúl García y John T. Sampson, prisioneros en Sto. Domingo!*

*¡Por la libertad de los presos políticos en Sto. Domingo!*

*¡Por la creación del comité amplio de defensa de los prisioneros políticos puertorriqueños!* □

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## A Bircher Joins 'Terrorist' Smear Campaign Against SWP and World Trotskyist Movement

[Under the heading "ARGENTINE TERRORIST RING BROKEN UP," the following item was published in the June 27, 1975, issue of the *Congressional Record* (p. E3593). It was placed in the "Extensions of Remarks" section by the "HON. LARRY McDONALD of Georgia."

[The Honorable McDonald does not indicate who drew up the material included in this document. It is obviously based on a report by the Argentine political police made public in Buenos Aires. (See "Try to Smear Fourth International—Police Kill Five Members of Argentine LCR" in the June 9 issue of *Intercontinental Press*.)

[Besides material of more than dubious authenticity extracted under torture from those seized by the Argentine political police, the document includes items that appear to have been provided by the FBI, perhaps as a continuation of the "Cointelpro" operation set up by J. Edgar Hoover and directed against such targets as the Socialist Workers party.

[It continues the "terrorist" theme publicized by *Newsweek* in its September 18, 1972, issue. (See "A Smear Attack Against the Trotskyist Movement—'Newsweek' and the Real 'Terrorist International'" in the September 25, 1972, issue of *Intercontinental Press*; and "Ernest Mandel Answers *Newsweek* Smear" in the October 9, 1972, issue of *Intercontinental Press*.)

[The Honorable McDonald's own political credentials indicate why he is trying to gain recognition as a purveyor of this kind of material. He was elected in 1974 on the Democratic ticket in the Seventh Congressional District in Georgia and took office last January 3. He represents a district known as Lockheed country, in which the majority of voters are notorious for their white racist prejudices and their loyalty to the giant aircraft corporation. Nominally a Democrat, he is better known as a member of the National Council of the John Birch Society, an ultraright formation.]

\* \* \*

Thursday, June 26, 1975

Mr. McDONALD of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, the Argentine federal police have broken up a Trotskyist terrorist organization with links in the United States and Europe. The terrorist group, called the Revolutionary Communist League, is affiliated with the

Fourth International, a worldwide Trotskyist movement. The Socialist Workers Party is the affiliate of the Fourth International in the United States. I note that the SWP has complained, in the June 27 issue of its newspaper, *The Militant*, about my earlier exposure of SWP contacts with foreign terrorists. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, February 19, 1975, page E571.)

The police investigation and raids that broke up this terrorist ring began in December 1974, with a raid on a so-called "people's jail," where the Trotskyite terrorists kept kidnap victims. An extensive investigation revealed the participation of this organization in numerous kidnappings and other terrorist actions.

The Revolutionary Communist League was formerly called the Red Faction of the Revolutionary Workers Party, PRT, of Argentina. The PRT was the official section of the Fourth International in Argentina until early 1973 when it broke with the International. The PRT, through its armed section operating under the name of Revolutionary Army of the People, ERP, carried out most of the terrorist attacks in Argentina during the past 5 years.

Many millions of dollars in ransom money have been paid to these Argentine Trotskyite Communists by major corporations including EXXON as ransom for corporate executives kidnaped by the terrorists.

In early 1973, the PRT/ERP broke with the Fourth International during a faction fight.

The Red Faction of this movement remained with the Fourth International and in March 1974, changed its name to Revolutionary Communist League. In August 1972, Mario Roberto Santucho, the leader of the ERP, led [sic] a number of his members, who had been captured during terrorist operations, in a prison break from a military prison in Argentina. He fled to Chile where he was greeted by officials of the Allende regime. He subsequently went on to Cuba where he again received a warm welcome from the officials of that Communist government.

After leaving the ERP, the Red Faction decided to kidnap Aaron Bellinson, an Argentinian business executive. He was kidnaped on May 23, 1973, and a demand of a million dollars was made for his release. The ransom was paid and he was

released on June 3, 1973. Of the \$1 million in ransom, a \$100,000 was given by the Red Faction to Livio Maitan, a leader of the Fourth International. Half of the money was assigned to the financing of the Fourth International and the other half was presented to the MIR, the Communist terrorist movement in Chile.

Maitan, an Italian, is in charge of coordinating Trotskyite terrorist activities throughout Latin America. He received the \$100,000 from Flavio Koutzii and Paulo Antonio Parangua, who are leaders of the Red Faction. In August 1973, shortly after receiving the ransom payoff money, Livio Maitan entered the United States to attend the 1973 convention of the Socialist Workers Party where he spoke extensively in defense of terrorism as a useful revolutionary tactic now.

The leadership of the Socialist Workers Party opposes terrorism at this time, arguing that they do not have either the manpower or the facilities to carry out such operations. They do, however, argue that terrorism may be an appropriate tactic in the future. According to Socialist Workers Party officials, Peter Camajo [sic], in a secret document distributed only to members of the Socialist Workers Party—

In the process of an insurrection, terrorist acts may be advantageous to the Workers movement.

But he says that such acts should not be isolated from the mass armed struggle at that time. *International Internal Discussion Bulletin*, June 1973, page 11.

About 10 percent of the members of the Socialist Workers Party support the pro-terrorist majority of the Fourth International. They have been organized into a group called the Internationalist Tendency. In July 1974, most of the Internationalist Tendency were expelled from the Socialist Workers Party, not because they advocated terrorism, but because they had violated some of the party's organizational principals [sic].

Some of the proterrorists remain within the Socialist Workers Party, the rest, organized under the leadership of William Massey and John Barzman, have asked for reaffiliation with the Socialist Workers Party and are in constant contact with the leadership of the Fourth International, Ernest Mandel and Livio Maitan. The headquarters of the Internationalist Tendency is Chicago, Ill.

In August 1973, Dania [sic] Bensaïd, a French official of the Fourth International, arrived in Argentina, met with the leaders of the Red Faction and invited them to send six delegates to the World Congress of the Fourth International to take place in Sweden in February of 1974. The six delegates chosen were:

Paulo Antonio Parangua—party name "Saul"—who is presently under arrest. He was the leader of a group of Brazilians

assigned to the Fourth International in 1971-72 to work in Argentina;

Flavio Koutzii—party name “Rene”—Brazilian, now under arrest;

Manuel Rallis—party name “Beto”—now under arrest;

Maria Regina Pilla—party name “La Negra”—Brazilian, now under arrest;

Mario Vencente Rodriguez—party name “Gallego”—killed in a shoot out with the police in December 1974; and

Klachko—party name “Pelado”—who now heads a rival terrorist group called the Communist League. He is still a fugitive from Justice although some members of his group are in custody.

At the World Congress of the Fourth International, Parangua made the majority report on Argentina under the party name “Saul Lopez.” Among the speakers at the congress who discussed terrorism in Argentina were Rodriguez under the name “Gallego”, Jack Barnes the national chairman on the Socialist Workers Party under the party name “Hans”, Klachko under the party name “Pelado,” Livio Maitan under the party name “Claudio,” Rallis under the party name “Beto,” Koutzii under the party name “Rene,” and Ernest Mandel the world leader of the Fourth International under the party name “Walter.” All supported continuing the terror in Argentina except Barnes.

Massey and Barzman, the two leaders of the Internationalist Tendency, also attended the World Congress of the Fourth International where they collaborated with Maitan, Mandel, the Argentinian Red Faction, and other supporters of “terrorism now.” After returning from the World Congress the Red Faction continued the kidnappings and terrorism.

Mr. Speaker, there are no laws on the books which prevent foreign terrorist leaders such as Livio Maitan from entering the United States and meeting with their American supporters. He is only one of many. Our colleague, the gentlemen [*sic*] from Ohio (Mr. ASHBROOK), has introduced a bill to curb terrorism which includes a section which would bar foreign terrorists from entry into this country. That bill is now pending before the Judiciary Committee but hearings concerning it have not been announced. □

### New Lead for Rep. McDonald?

Robert Welch, Jr., the 76-year-old candy manufacturer who founded the John Birch Society to battle the “worldwide Communist conspiracy,” said seventeen years ago that the most prominent “Communist dupe” was President Eisenhower.

In updating his list of those involved in the conspiracy, which he has discovered to date back almost 200 years to May 1776, Welch has now included Napoleon Bonaparte.

## Portuguese Junta's Decree on Role of 'People's Committees'

[The following document was issued July 8 as an appendix to the official communiqué of the assembly of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA—Armed Forces Movement), a body of 240 military men. It was reportedly prepared by the Gabinetes de Dinamização (Political Education Departments) of the three branches of the armed forces and by Copcon (Comando Operacional do Continente—Mainland Portugal Command, the armed forces special political security division).

[The communiqué noted that the assembly had approved the document “in general as a consistent and viable plan for building a socialist society in Portugal.” The assembly called on the Revolutionary Council, the supreme body of fifty officers of the armed forces, to “move with urgency to issue revolutionary legislation recognizing the unitary grass-roots bodies and according them the support they need from the MFA to establish a base, become active, and develop.”

[The assembly voted that “such legislation must recognize the independent and nonpartisan character of these people’s organizations and the need for their fusing progressively with the local and regional administration.”

[The translation of the text of the document, published in the July 9 issue of *Jornal Novo*, is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

The alliance between the people and the MFA has remained a constant reality of the revolutionary process up to now. The April 25 liberation, carried forward by a series of positions of the MFA and the progressive political parties and by political and economic measures put into practice, has made it possible to maintain a sufficient level of cohesion between the people and the MFA. Nonetheless, maintaining and consolidating the alliance between the people and the MFA involves primarily satisfying the deepest aspirations of the exploited classes. In this respect, it is urgent to continue the work begun on April 25, 1974. It is in the context of a Cultural Revolution, through the exercise of both civilian and military potential in the material, human, and technical fields that the people will be decisively mobilized for the Revolution.

Practice has begun to demonstrate the truth of this statement, which is obvious anyway. The essential prerequisite for consolidating this alliance lies in developing and creating the conditions for maintaining and consolidating the dual locomotive

of the Portuguese revolutionary process [i.e., people-MFA].

Furthermore, in order to mobilize the people behind the Revolution, the working masses must be assured conditions for participating actively, through forms of people’s organization, in democratic, independent, and united practice.

It becomes necessary to draw concretely on this fundamental reality, the alliance between the people and the MFA, by promoting it and supporting it in order to defend and give dynamism to the Revolution in progress.

Defending the Revolution and lending it dynamism in the present phase involves achieving the following tasks:

a. Promoting revolutionary involvement of the masses, that is, creating and promoting united groups with the perspective of their taking root as real organs of people’s power.

b. Defending the Revolution from the attacks of the reactionary forces by giving the masses a profound understanding of the requisites of the process and the need for creating defensive bodies.

c. Winning the economic battle. Since production is not sufficient to meet the overall needs of the country, great exertion is called for from the working masses. It is essential, therefore, to win the economic battle and overcome the low level of development of the productive forces, to extend and advance workers control, to widen the scope of the state sector, and to promote the accumulation necessary for our economic independence.

In order to assure the achievement of the above points, attention will have to be given to the following measures:

### 1. On the Domestic Front

a. Creating and promoting a broad state sector reflecting the control of the national economy by a Democratic State, which will replace a private economy dominated by monopoly capital that paralyzes the development of production.

b. Replacing an agrarian structure with deep feudal roots by another that will permit accelerated progress, an objective clearly defined in the Agrarian Reform, the implementation of which must be rigorously controlled by the organized rural working masses.

c. Purging and decentralizing the state apparatus with a view to building a new state apparatus on a popular base so that, through effective coordination, the potential for initiatives by the local people’s bodies will be promoted. For this purpose, these

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local bodies will have broad freedom in decision making and capacity for response in the area of finances, which will put the product of the nation's labor effectively in the service of the working masses.

d. Encouraging and supporting forms of workers "control" over the means of production.

e. Defining an overall economic policy, taking account of the most important sectors for development.

f. Defining an economic policy in each of these key sectors.

## 2. On the Foreign Front

a. Assuring the continuation of the decolonization process in Africa to its final consequences. In a clear-sighted and dispassionate historic perspective, the independent future of Portugal will have to be based on fraternal relations with our ex-colonies in the political, social, and economic areas.

b. Avoiding any kind of ideological, political, or economic domination of the Portuguese revolutionary process. Guaranteeing the maintenance of cordial relations with all peoples on the globe. Consolidating an economic power that will guarantee national independence.

There is no intention *either to ignore the parties* dedicated to building socialism *or to militarize the people*.

The intention is to create a form of mass organization that at the present moment, and in a correct class-struggle perspective, can unite the workers and mobilize them to carry out the concrete tasks of defending the Revolution that were described previously.

It is clear that a Revolution must be *defended through consolidating the gains achieved, through organization, vigilance, work, discipline, and authority, and through a real advance* in the organic growth of the power of the *working masses*.

This organization of the masses, by its formation and practice, will promote the unity of the working masses. It will establish conditions enabling those political parties interested in building socialism to find ways of cooperating and mutual understanding that will lead to a combining of their efforts to achieve the proper consolidation of the political vanguard of the revolutionary process.

These objectives involve carrying out the Program of Political Action issued by the Revolutionary Council for united action by the Provisional Government, for a news policy at the service of the revolutionary process, and for the practice of exemplary unity, austerity and discipline by the MFA. The latter point embraces the revolutionary exercise of criticism and self-criticism within the MFA.

In view of the above points, the following

structure for the alliance between the people and the MFA is suggested:

### 2.1 Explanation of Structure

2.1.1—The structure of the alliance between the people and the MFA will have three fundamental lines: the MFA, the people's organizations, and the government.

In this transitional phase, the state apparatus will be purged and progressively replaced, with its powers (administrative and financial) being decentralized, thus permitting local initiative, under the "control," supervision, and gradual assumption of power by the people's bodies.

2.1.2—The Tenants Committees, Workers Committees, and other grass-roots people's organizations will form People's Assemblies on a local, parish, or other level as may be determined.

2.1.3—These Local Assemblies will form Municipal Assemblies and so on to the National People's Assembly.

2.1.4—Direct participation by the MFA will begin in the Municipal and Regional Assemblies. The bodies involved will be the ADUs in the municipalities and districts, and ADRs in the regions, and the AMFA [Assembleia do Movimento das Forças Armadas] at the national level. The ADUs are the unit assemblies of the army, navy, air force, and security forces.

2.1.5—The Revolutionary Council is the supreme organ of national sovereignty.

2.1.6—The People's Assemblies will be supported by the MFA and organs of the state apparatus, which will exercise "control" over them in the aspects of public administration in which they participate.

### 2.2 Launching the People's Organizations

2.2.1—In the first phase, the ADUs will encourage the formation of Tenants Committees and Workers Committees where they do not exist through educational and informational sessions.

In localities where such structures already exist, there will also be educational and informational sessions on the real objectives of the MFA.

Subsequently, in contact with these grass-roots organizations, the experience of their activity will be collected and the lessons will be drawn and offered as a means of improving procedures and achieving more correct results.

After an evaluation by the MFA, these organizations will be recognized.

2.2.2—In a second phase, before long, the formation of Local and Municipal People's Assemblies will be encouraged.

2.2.3—In a third phase, in the coming period, the formation of District People's Assemblies will be encouraged.

2.2.4—In a fourth phase, more distant, the

formation of Regional People's Assemblies will be encouraged.

2.2.5—The National People's Assembly, the supreme organ of people's participation, will be the final and faraway stage of this structuring process.

## 3. Statutory Norms

### 3.1 General Principles

The type of people's organization proposed is based fundamentally on the Workers Committees and Tenants Committees. Also considered are Village Councils, Cooperatives, Leagues of Small and Middle Farmers, Collectives, and other grass-roots people's associations.

Structures launched under various initiatives must link up with defined grass-roots organizations, Tenants Committees [TCs] and Workers Committees [WCs], which will broaden their composition in order to absorb and discipline attempts to consolidate and guarantee the revolutionary process in conformity with the tasks of grass-roots organizations mentioned in point 3.2.2.

In conclusion, the TCs and WCs, as well as other grass-roots organizations, will take up the tasks of defending the Revolution.

The present statutory norms respect those already existing in the various organizations, which should be broadened to include the objectives defined here.

### 3.2 Guiding Principles of People's Organization

#### 3.2.1 Objective

The fundamental and final objective is to build a socialist society defined in the Revolutionary Council's Plan of Political Action.

Since this objective can only be achieved in the context of unity, all levels of people's organization must be unitary.

This concept of unity is defined in the following way:

- Independence from all parties.
- Democratic representativeness based on sections of the population or units of production.
- Association to resolve concrete problems.

The achievement of this objective can best be guaranteed by the MFA, a movement standing above parties, accompanying this process and encouraging it by supporting it, coordinating it, and recognizing those organizations that by their activity merit recognition.

#### 3.2.2 Tasks of the Grass-Roots Organizations

Besides performing their specific func-

tions, the Workers Committees, Tenants Committees, etc., must contribute in the following fields in accordance with their character:

- Political work through educating and informing sections of workers or the population.

- Social action in the areas of health, popular education, and sports, promoting literacy, housing and city services, transport, etc.

- Economic action through economic struggle, "control" over the means of production in the nationalized and private sectors, supply and prices, etc.

- Vigilance, by defending plants and urban areas through mounting watch in various shifts, through exercising "control" over the entry of persons, channeling information to the competent official bodies, etc.

This activity in specific cases (at strategic points in the economy), through the initiative of the MFA itself or under its "control" and supervision, can become converted into tasks of self-defense.

- Strengthening the alliance between the people and the MFA must be a constant activity of these organizations.

### 3.2.3 Tasks of the People's Assemblies

The People's Assemblies will have the following essential missions:

- Transmitting the aspirations, opinions, and demands of the people to the proper decision-making levels.

- Taking part in local, regional, and national planning through the competent bodies, acting as the representatives of the people.

- Monitoring the activity of the administrative bodies and their capacity and speed in responding to the needs of the people.

- Joining with the local organs of people's power to form a people's tribunal for adjudicating noncriminal cases.

### 3.3 Formative Process

3.3.1—The leadership of the people's organizations will be elected in plenary sessions by a hand vote.

3.3.2—In grass-roots organizations, the members elected are subject to recall by a plenary session of the same kind as the one that elected them.

3.3.3—In the People's Assemblies the members elected are subject to recall by the assemblies themselves.

### 3.4 Composition

3.4.1—Of the grass-roots organizations (TCs, WCs, etc.).

Their present composition will be broadened to meet the tasks set.

3.4.2—Of the Local People's Assemblies.

- Delegates of the grass-roots organizations.

- Delegates of the local authorities.

3.4.3—Of the Municipal People's Assemblies.

- Delegates of the military Unit Assemblies.

- Delegates of the Local People's Assemblies.

- Delegates of the local authorities and governmental bodies.

3.4.4—Of the District People's Assemblies.

- Delegates of the military Unit Assemblies, including the commander of the unit.

- Delegates of the local authorities and governmental bodies.

- Delegates of the trade-union organizations.

3.4.5—Of the Regional People's Assemblies.

- Delegates of the military Regional Assembly (including the commander of the military region).

- Delegates of the District People's Assemblies.

- Delegates of the local authorities and governmental bodies.

- Delegates of the trade-union organs.

3.4.6—Of the National People's Assembly.

- To be defined.

### 3.5 Functioning

3.5.1—Decisions in all these bodies will be taken by hand vote.

3.5.2—The representatives of the local authorities, government bodies (regional planning boards, IRA, etc.), and delegates of the trade-union bodies have equal right to voice, vote, and to introduce resolutions.

3.5.3—The decisions made in assemblies link all the structures together in carrying them out.

### 4. Final Dispositions

4.1—The present norms do not have a rigid character and their application will depend on specific local characteristics and conditions determined by the dynamism of the process.

4.2—The present document must be regarded as a guiding document for practical action by the military units and people's organizations. The structure corresponding to the present development of people's organizations goes as high as Local People's Assemblies.

This phase should be properly consolidated, since it is through the dynamic of the process itself that the viability of an advance to higher forms of organization will be confirmed. □

## The Take-over of Rádio Renascença

[The following statement was issued June 23 by the National Secretariat of the Partido Socialista Português (PSP—Portuguese Socialist party). It explains the party's common front with the Catholic hierarchy in opposing the take-over of the church radio station by a committee of the station's workers.

[The PSP position is couched in terms of support for the bourgeois military junta, some of whose members have encouraged these seizures, and the junta's demagogic claims that Portugal is in transition to socialism.

[The statement tries to base itself on a utopian concept of "revolutionary legality" under an unelected military regime. However, it also correctly points up some dangers of these take-overs in the present situation in Portugal. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

The Rádio Renascença case has raised more acutely the problem of the position and role of radio in a democratic society in transition to socialism. A peculiarity of this case is that it also involves the question of whether or not the Catholic church has a right to utilize its own organs of mass communication. It is in this political con-

text that the problem should be analyzed and not in the narrow framework of a labor conflict between a company management and a group of workers.

It is true that this conflict began when the management fired workers who refused to subject themselves to psychotechnical examinations that were intended as a means of political discrimination. But it is no less true that this was made into a pretext for yet another attempt to manipulate radio broadcasting on behalf of the ideology and political convictions of the small minority of workers (19 out of at least 60) who took the initiative of occupying the Lisbon studios.

While we could not approve of the management's action, as the SP labor committee made known at the time, this decision should have been taken up in the existing legal framework and through the proper channels for resolving labor conflicts. For a few workers to use the radio studios on their own is a flagrant violation of revolutionary legality, since this group has no more right to use those studios than any other group of citizens. Its initiative, therefore, was an invitation to replace the legality of the revolution with the law of the jungle.

This initiative was all the more dangerous and all the more apt to play into the

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hands of the counterrevolution inasmuch as it can offend the religious feelings of a considerable part of the Portuguese people. The well-known and undeniable ties of the Catholic hierarchy to the fascist regime cannot be a pretext for attitudes that would once again raise the religious question. This is undesirable, inopportune, and prejudicial to the revolution.

For the Socialist party, freedom means not just freedom of worship but also freedom of public expression for the various religious persuasions. The prerequisite for this freedom, as for all others, is that it not be used to support counterrevolution. Once

this principle is accepted as a vital part of the democratic and pluralistic conception of socialism, any violent limitation on its exercise becomes intolerable.

Of course, the most correct form for exercising this freedom in a society such as ours that is in transition to socialism can be discussed. It can be debated whether the best form is using your own media of communication, that is, your own radio transmitters, or taking a certain allotment of time from a nationalized radio broadcasting system.

The SP, for its part, has already declared its support for nationalized radio.

The Socialist party, therefore, calls on the Revolutionary Council and the Provisional Government to guarantee respect for freedom of information. If the solution lies in nationalizing radio broadcasting, as we believe, then it is essential to assure a fair, nonpartisan, and pluralistic orientation for the radio stations and thus avoid the prolongation of a situation that cannot benefit the revolutionary process. This principle was recognized implicitly by the Revolutionary Council when it dealt with the communications media in its recent Plan of Political Action [formally issued on June 21]. □

## Portuguese SP Statement on Withdrawal From Government

[The following is the text of the Portuguese Socialist party's announcement July 10 of its withdrawal from the government. The translation is by the *New York Times*.]

\* \* \*

The newspaper *República* resisted fascism for 48 years. It sheltered all antifascist resisters without discrimination, in all professional sectors, ranging through the editorial, the office, the accounts department and the printers. The pay of printers and employes was the highest in the Portuguese press. It is enough to say that a printer earned 11,800 escudos, a head of section 18,000 escudos, the commercial director—Senhor Belo Marques—21,500 escudos, and his assistant, the present "leader" of the so-called workers' committee, Senhor Delmar, 18,500 escudos a month, while an assistant editor earned 11,000 escudos—that is, less than a printer. (Note that some of the editorial staff, such as reporters or trainees, got even less than the editors.) Some printers worked at the same time at *República* and other papers, such as *Diário de Notícias*, so they could earn still higher wages.

At the end of April a group of Communist editors left *República* to take up similar positions on other newspapers recently "monopolized" by the Communist party such as *Diário de Notícias* and *O Século*. At that time there were indications that this withdrawal of the Communist editorial group was aimed at preparing an offensive against *República*, and so it was.

As everyone knows, a pirate edition of *República* appeared on May 19. Raul Rego, editor of *República*, and the editors were abducted or "defenestrated," *República*'s installations were occupied by armed "gorillas." And during these purely fascist events, there appeared a pirate edition of *República* in which Senhor Belo Marques was described as editor.

In consequence of the lively indignation

which these acts of counterrevolutionary vandalism provoked, the *República* installations were "sealed."

Then followed a long crisis during which the following facts were verified:

A. The Council of the Revolution decided that the newspaper *República* should be handed over to the management and the editors, who were responsible for its ideological orientation under the terms of the press law.

B. The Press Council made the same decision.

C. The President of the Republic declared in France that the case of *República* was already resolved (sic), thus publicly assuring respect for revolutionary legality.

D. Admiral Rosa Coutinho and Commandants Correia Jesuino and Rui Montes (Minister and Director General of Information) said on repeated occasions that the case of *República* was without importance and that it had been "ignobly" exploited.

Contrary to all these statements and promises, however, it is established that yet another pirate edition of *República* appeared today, vouched for by an army officer whose name appears as editor.

For several days past *República* installations had been occupied by groups of civilians, strangers to *República*, armed with G-3's [a submachine gun] and saying they belonged to known party militias. The editors and administrators of *República* were prohibited from entering *República*.

From this it is concluded that:

A. The word of the President of the Republic was not respected.

B. The decision of the Council of the Revolution had no real effect or significance.

C. The decision of the Press Council was ignored.

D. The statements by Admiral Rosa Coutinho and Commandants Jesuino and Montes must be valued in the way that each one judges to be the most adequate.

For this reason the secretariat of the Socialist party decided that its ministers and secretaries of state should immediately cease their functions in the Government.

They will take them up again only if:

A. The word of the President of the Republic is confirmed by the facts.

B. The decision of the Council of the Revolution is carried out.

The alliance between Portuguese political forces on the path to a pluralist socialist democracy must be based on the carrying out of pacts signed between them and respect for the pledged word. In any other way it will not be possible to progress either toward democracy or toward socialism.

There is no state without authority. Neither is there revolution without revolutionary authority. □

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# Portugal: The 'República' Affair and Freedom of the Press

[The following statement, signed by the editorial board, appeared in the June 21 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, weekly newspaper of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

## República Is Gagged While the Reactionary Press Continues

It could be argued that the Portuguese Socialist party takes reactionary positions. Later we will return to this question. But what totally invalidates such an argument is the fact that there are no obstacles whatsoever placed in the way of the publication and distribution of the reactionary, proimperialist bourgeois press.

This does not mean that we favor censorship of the right-wing press in Portugal. But it does make it clear that those who attack *República* do so not with the aim of censoring the reactionaries but with the aim of restricting the Socialist party's freedom of expression.

Thus it is evident that the *República* affair is an antidemocratic maneuver not aimed at strengthening the fight against reactionary conspiracies. Instead, inspired by the Portuguese Communist party, it is aimed at suppressing the SP's democratic rights in order to smooth the way for the policies of the MFA [Armed Forces Movement].

Some left groupings that capitulated to Peronism have spent more than twenty years reproaching our current for its opposition to the expropriation of the oligarchical daily *La Prensa*, which was carried out in 1951 by the government of General Perón in order to turn the paper over to the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor]. At that time we pointed out that we favored expropriating the entire bourgeois press and placing it under the democratic control of the workers to guarantee unrestricted freedom of the press.

Revolutionary Marxists defend *unrestricted freedom of expression* for all currents, even bourgeois currents. We are not afraid of the confrontation of ideas and positions. We want to make it possible for all to have their positions read in the press, heard on the radio, seen and heard on television. We condemn the fact that the bourgeoisie limits such rights for the workers movement—sometimes through direct government measures, always through the workers' limited economic resources.

## What Sort of Government Is Acting Against República?

It is natural that the left internationally

should take great interest in this question and discuss it attentively. The Portuguese revolutionary process is currently one of the most important, especially because it has become an entryway to Europe for the world revolution. The direction of events there is of very great importance for the future of revolution everywhere.

In the course of this debate dangerous positions have been expressed, dangerous for what they mean in terms of capitulation to the Portuguese government and the antidemocratic maneuver it mounted along with the PCP.

For example, an ingenious expression has been coined—"public service"—to suggest that all paper companies, printshops, etc. should be nationalized and placed at the disposal of different sectors of society. This solution would be applicable not only to Portugal but even to France.

Such a solution leaves aside completely the fundamental question of *who exercises control over the nationalized press*. Marxists have no dogma about the nationalization of companies. In the case of the nationalization of the banks and insurance companies and of the CUF [Companhia União Fabril] and Champalimaud financial groups in Portugal, we hail them, because the nationalizations weaken the most powerful sections of the bourgeoisie and cut into the reactionaries' ability to maneuver.<sup>1</sup>

But the question of the mass media is very different, since it affects freedom of expression. A bourgeois press monopolized by the state is no better than a bourgeois press controlled by private enterprise. It is worse because (although it may not do so immediately) it gives the bourgeois state the weapons to shut the workers movement off from all access to the mass media.

This does not mean that in all cases revolutionary socialists should oppose nationalization of the press. For example, if the governments of the now independent Portuguese colonies or those in the process of obtaining their independence (Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola) decided to expropriate the imperialist press in order to decolonize their countries, we would have to support that measure even in the arena of the mass media.

But even in such a case, it is decisive to demand that the *masses control* the nationalized communications media.

The "public service" notion is extremely dangerous because the press, unlike electricity and running water, is not a purely economic question. *It is a political problem and must be dealt with as such.*

1. As of July 11, CUF and Champalimaud have not been nationalized, although some holdings of these groups have.—IP

To demand that the bourgeois state (in France as in Portugal) nationalize "the paper industry, the printshops" without making workers control an *essential* condition of the nationalization is equivalent to turning over a decisive weapon to the enemy class.

The Portuguese government—over and above its vacillations, reversals, and demagoguery—is a bourgeois government. It is the government of a bourgeois state, not the government of the organs of power of the workers movement and the peasantry. It has within it bourgeois parties and it defends (insofar as circumstances permit) the private property of the big bourgeoisie. *Its aggressions against the press are a danger to all the working-class and left press.*

This becomes clear above all if we take into account that this is a government that has banned two Maoist organizations for having a political line different from the official one. It is not our intention here to discuss the politics of those organizations, which we have criticized at appropriate times. But we do want to point out that their banning showed that the Portuguese government is not willing to respect the democratic rights of dissident left currents.

## A Dangerous Interpretation of a Text by Trotsky

This is not the only dangerous position that has been expressed in the *República* affair. On the basis of a 1938 article by Trotsky,<sup>2</sup> freedom of the press has been presented as an absolute, not subject to the oscillations of the class struggle. In reality the article in question cannot be understood apart from the concrete conditions in which and for which it was written. In Mexico in 1938 the Stalinists were demanding that the bourgeois government censor the rightist press. Trotsky pointed out, totally correctly, that such a demand was "suicidal," that the controls the state imposed on the reactionary press would later on be turned against the working-class and left press.

Trotsky pointed out at the time that "*only the greatest freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly can create favorable conditions for the advance of the revolutionary movement of the working class,*" and that it was the duty of revolutionary socialists to defend those freedoms and fight for their extension.

However, it is obvious that by this he was not attempting to exempt freedom of the press from the real conditions of the class struggle. Faced with a current in the working class that was asking a bourgeois government and state to establish censor-

2. For text of article, see *Intercontinental Press*, June 9, p. 799.—IP

ship, Trotsky defended the greatest freedom of the press. But, on the other hand, he voiced approval that the Petrograd Soviet "on March 5 [1917] . . . confirmed this fact as follows: 'The right press is closed and the issue of new papers will depend upon the decision of the Soviet.' . . . The press does not stand above society: the conditions of its existence during a revolution reflect the progress of the revolution itself. . . . The Soviet was right when it wanted to retain control of the press."<sup>3</sup> Trotsky held this position against the opportunist Sukhanov, who, in this case, was defending unrestricted freedom of the press.

3. The quotation is from Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution*, vol. I (London: Sphere Books, 1967), pp. 227-28. The text of the complete paragraph is as follows:

On the night of the 28th of February, the Executive Committee closed up the monarchist press and established a licensing system for newspapers. Protests were heard, those shouting the loudest who had been accustomed to stop the mouths of others. After a few days the Committee had to take up again the problem of a free press: to permit or not to permit the publication of reactionary papers? Disagreements arose. Doctrinaires of the type of Sukhanov stood for absolute freedom of the press. Cheidze at first disagreed: how can we leave weapons at the uncontrolled disposition of our mortal enemies? It occurred to nobody, by the way, to turn over the whole question to the decision of the government. Anyway, that would have been useless; the typographical workers took orders only from the Soviet. On March 5 the Executive Committee confirmed this fact as follows: "The right press is closed and the issue of new papers will depend upon the decision of the Soviet." But as early as the 10th, under pressure from bourgeois circles, that resolution was annulled. "They took only three days to come to their senses," exults Sukhanov. Ill-founded exultation! The press does not stand above society: the conditions of its existence during a revolution reflect the progress of the revolution itself. When the latter assumes, or may assume, the character of a civil war, not one of the warring camps will permit the existence of a hostile press within the sphere of its influence—no more than it will let escape from its control the arsenals, the railroads, the printing establishments. In a revolutionary struggle the press is only one kind of weapon. The right to speech is certainly not higher than the right to life. A revolution takes the latter too into its hands. We may lay this down as a law: Revolutionary governments are the more liberal, the more tolerant, the more "magnanimous" to the reaction, the shallower their programme, the more they are bound up with the past, the more conservative their rôle. And the converse: the more gigantic their tasks and the greater the number of vested rights and interests they are to destroy, the more concentrated will be the revolutionary power, the more naked its dictatorship. Whether this is a good thing or bad, it is by these roads that humanity has thus far moved forward. The Soviet was right when it wanted to retain control of the press. Why did it so easily give this up? Because in general it was refusing to make a serious fight. It remained silent about peace, about the land, even about a republic. Having turned over the power to the conservative bourgeoisie, it had neither a reason for fearing the

Let's be clear. We are referring to the Soviet (that is, the totality of the workers delegates) with its petty-bourgeois and opportunist leadership. Not the government of the bourgeoisie. Some months later, this same Soviet leadership in the bourgeois government was to use the most implacable repression against the Bolshevik press.

We do not ignore the fact that the growing reactionary conspiracy in Portugal may require the suppression of the fascist press. But, for that, we place no confidence in the bourgeois state apparatus. Only a united front of the SP, CP, the Intersindical [the trade-union federation], and the other left parties can do the job.

To ask the bourgeois government to assume the task of eliminating the fascist press, which is serving the putschist conspiracy, is to give the government weapons, which at the first opportunity it will use against the workers press.

Returning to the example of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, their right to stamp out the colonialist press is undeniable. It would be absurd for Marxists, in the name of freedom of the press, to defend the right of imperialism to maintain one of its most important means of domination in countries liberated by the struggle of their peoples.

A year ago, when the Peruvian oligarchical press was the main link in the preparation for a proimperialist coup against the bourgeois nationalist government, the latter expropriated all the daily newspapers. *Avanzada Socialista* pointed out that this was a defensive step against a press that had always opposed the progressive reforms of the military government (agrarian reform, nationalizations, etc.) and that was now serving as the putschist spearhead. To defend the "freedom of expression" of the oligarchy and imperialism in that concrete situation would have constituted an extremely serious error. Nonetheless, we also made clear: "This does not mean that we offer unconditional support to Velasco Alvarado nor that we simply accept control of the daily papers by the bourgeois government, which does not represent the interests of the Peruvian workers and peasants and which hopes to take control of the press from the oligarchy for its own ends, which are not those of the oppressed masses." And we spelled out our position: "Control of the press must not remain in the hands of the bourgeois government. Instead it must be under the control of the workers, peasants, and people's organizations."

right press, nor a possibility of struggling against it. The government, on the other hand, began after a few months, with the support of the Soviet, to suppress ruthlessly the left press. The Bolshevik papers were shut down one after another.—IP

On the same occasion we commented: "Without control by the masses through their real, existing organizations, without a broad workers and people's mobilization, there will be no real freedom of expression and the daily papers will be as removed from the needs of the exploited as they were in the hands of the oligarchs."

In Mexico during the same period in which Trotsky wrote the article in question, the bourgeois nationalist government expropriated the imperialist oil monopolies. If a tremendous mass mobilization had proposed the expropriation of the press tied to those monopolies, we doubt very much that Trotsky would have opposed it in the name of freedom of the press. We do believe that he would have called on the masses not to trust the bourgeois state and to fight to win control of the expropriated daily newspapers.

Another quite categorical example is given by Gus Horowitz in the June 1975 *International Socialist Review*, page 8. Commenting on the workers mobilization against the rightist offensive that was to culminate in a big rally of the "silent majority" in Lisbon September 28, he mentions as an extremely positive act that the "typographers refused to print rally announcements for the rightists." We cannot imagine Horowitz telling the workers that they should respect freedom of the press. Peruvian revolutionary socialists, faced with the danger and preparation of a coup that was much more dangerous than a rightist rally, rightly proposed the same thing as the Lisbon typographers and formulated a slogan to express it: expropriation of the reactionary press under workers control.

#### Return República to the SP Now

No one offered the leaders of the Portuguese government, the CP, or even the printers of *República* the job of controlling the press in the name of all the Portuguese workers.

On the contrary, the SP is a workers party and the one that received the biggest vote in the April 25 elections. For that reason, not only does it have the right to continue editing *República*. It also has the right to have turned over to it a portion of all the Portuguese mass media, equal to the percentage of votes it got a month and a half ago.

This does not mean defending the policies of the SP. It is true that the SP is trying to form a popular front with bourgeois forces to serve European imperialism. It is true that it defends private property and that it is an obstacle to the taking of power by the working class.

But, unfortunately, its politics are not much different from those of the other

numerically important workers party, the CP. The CP also is directing its efforts at the formation of a popular front to preserve private property and the bourgeois state. Here is what the American daily the *Wall Street Journal* said about its top leader, Alvaro Cunhal, on February 20:

*"Sometimes Mr. Cunhal sounds so moderate that you have to recheck his history to make sure he doesn't belong to some middle-class party. He talks of seeing a place for private enterprise in Portugal's future. He discourages strikes, mutes any criticism of NATO, avoids vitriolic propaganda and extends a hand toward America.*

*"Moreover, he doesn't take a dogmatic position on the nationalization of industry."*

It is true that the SP has taken advantage of the episode of the shutting down of the daily paper to launch an anti-Communist campaign, but it is no less true that the CP and the government initiated the series of provocations that today permits the SP leadership to take advantage of the democratic aspirations of thousands of Portuguese workers.

To defend the right of the SP (the party that got the greatest electoral support April 25) to have its own press does not mean to defend its politics. It means to nip in the bud any attempt (even with "leftist" pretexts) to muzzle currents in the workers movement that do not capitulate to the government or that do not adapt to the CP's aims to impose its own variant of reformism as opposed to the others.

Because it is definitely not difficult at all to slander opposition left currents as "reactionaries" in order to gag them in the same way the SP is being gagged today.

We will not bother with formal arguments used by defenders of the Portuguese government and the CP in this affair. We are referring to the argument that *República* is not an official organ of the SP and that the origin of the conflict was a trade-union dispute. Events have made it clear that it is a political question instigated by the CP and at least supported by the military government. To determine the political character of the newspaper, it is enough to take the statement of the SP leaders recognizing it as their own.

The immediate return of *República* to its editors is not merely the formal carrying out of an elementary democratic right.

*It also meets a grave danger for the development of the Portuguese revolution—that of annulling the democratic rights that permit discussion and conscious decisions by the masses on the steps to take. And there is also the danger that steps like the suppression of the press of the party that received the most votes from the workers and the people would throw many Portuguese into the arms of the reactionaries, who will not vacillate in raising deceptive banners in favor of "democracy."* □

## Statement of the Liga Juventud Comunista

### Free the Prisoners in the Dominican Republic!

[The following statement, received by *Intercontinental Press* July 7, is from the Liga Juventud Comunista (Communist Youth League), a Trotskyist group recently formed in Puerto Rico.

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

The defense of political prisoners is a principle of all revolutionists. We cannot stand aside in such situations.

The three Puerto Rican prisoners—Angel Gandía, Raúl García, and John T. Sampson—are innocent until proved otherwise. Not a single guerrilla has been found in Santo Domingo; the arms they allegedly transported in a boat with the supposed guerrillas have not been found.

What is true is that for more than one month the Dominican people have been repressed by Balaguer's troops and police. As of yesterday, more than 250 persons had been arrested and interrogated in relation to the guerrillas. As far as we know, all of them are innocent.

This has been taken as an excuse by the Balaguer government to repress the Dominican working masses.

The situation in the Dominican Republic is unstable. Unemployment, the high cost of living, and emigration to the United States and Puerto Rico continue to rise.

With regard to the second accusation—that the Puerto Ricans entered the Dominican Republic illegally—we know this is false. Even if it were true that they were captured while trying to obtain gasoline on the southern coast, citizens of the United States do not need passports to enter the Dominican Republic. American citizenship was imposed on the Puerto Ricans in 1917 so that we could serve as "cannon fodder" in imperialist wars. There were Puerto Ricans in Korea and Vietnam and even among the American troops that invaded Santo Domingo in 1965. In the case of Santo Domingo, these Puerto Ricans did not know where they were being taken—to Vietnam or some other place.

Our ideological differences with the PSP [Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño—Puerto Rican Socialist party] do not matter in this situation. In principle we are in solidarity with the three Puerto Rican prisoners. We unconditionally support the PSP in its campaign to win the release of the compañeros.

We should send telegrams immediately to the American embassy and to the Balaguer government demanding, respectively, that

they intervene in the case and that they immediately release the three prisoners.

We must publicize the current situation in the press of the Fourth International so that all sections and sympathizing organizations will protest to Washington and the Balaguer government.

We must send the necessary information to the USLA [U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners] so that it can publicize the case in the United States.

We must propose to the PSP the organization of a broad defense committee to defend their three members who are prisoners in Santo Domingo, a committee that will take charge of carrying out support activities and getting out information in Puerto Rico and internationally, a committee that at the same time will demand that the persecution of trade-union leaders, workers, students, and members of opposition parties in the Dominican Republic be ended and that all Dominican political prisoners be freed.

All this will help to expose our colonial situation, make better known the case of Puerto Rico, and educate the masses on the lack of democratic freedoms in Santo Domingo and Latin America.

*Release Angel Gandía, Raúl García, and John T. Sampson—prisoners in Santo Domingo!*

*Freedom for Dominican political prisoners!*

*For the formation of a broad defense committee for Puerto Rican political prisoners!* □

#### Honduras Commission Calls for Take-over of Banana Companies

A special advisory commission to the Honduran government unanimously recommended the nationalization of concessions and property of two American companies, United Brands Inc. and Castle and Cooke Inc. According to a report in the July 10 *Wall Street Journal*, the commission also suggested taking legal action in the United States against United Brands. The company has admitted paying a \$1.25 million bribe to a high Honduran official to obtain a reduction in the tax on banana exports.

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