

GANDHI LOWERS IRON CURTAIN



ISABEL PERON: Bangs fist on table and tells workers to sacrifice more.

Peronist Regime Faces Crisis

Labor Upsurge in Argentina

Other Features:

Portuguese Junta Pleads for Tranquillity

Moscow Salutes Gandhi

Torture in Santo Domingo

6,000 Attend UN Women's Conference

Livio Maitan: The Italian Elections

Solzhenitsyn's Performance in Washington

A Bad Year for Banzer

Chile Under the Junta—Eyewitness Report

NEWS ANALYSIS

Solzhenitsyn's Performance in Washington

On June 30 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn made his first major public speech since his exile from the Soviet Union in February 1974. The occasion was a banquet in Washington, D.C., organized in honor of the famous author by the old war dog and belligerent anti-Communist George Meany, the president of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations.

Solzhenitsyn began his oration with the words, "We are all workers in this room." He recalled his years as a bricklayer and smelter worker in Soviet labor camps. Several times during his speech he said bitterly that while the American unions had held aloof from Russia, "there was an alliance between our Communist leaders and your capitalists."

The audience laughed at these references, as well they might. Those present consisted of 2,500 top labor lieutenants of the capitalist class and top officials of the Ford administration, although Ford himself refrained from going because of obvious diplomatic reasons.

At the head table sat Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, who the very next day would proclaim that the United States might make a "first strike," using strategic nuclear weapons against selected targets in Russia. Sitting beside this vulture, who thinks in terms of tens upon tens of millions of dead in the first hours of a coming nuclear armageddon, were former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Labor John Dunlop, former Secretary of State William P. Rogers, and Ford's newly appointed ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel P. Moynihan. Fellow workers, indeed!

Before this select audience of labor parasites and imperialist politicians, Solzhenitsyn ranted in a style not seen since the days of Senator Joseph McCarthy twenty-five years ago.

The distinguished author singled out for special attack the *détente*, picturing it as

an immense danger to Washington:

"Nikita Khrushchev came and said, 'We're going to bury you.' They took it as a joke. They don't say we are going to bury you now, they say *détente*."

He denounced the Vietnam accords because, as he put it, they "made it possible for North Vietnam to take over South Vietnam. . . ." This stance put Solzhenitsyn in the political camp of the Thieus and Kys and the ultraright wing of warmongers in the United States who wanted to keep up the war in Vietnam, no matter what the cost in blood and destruction.

Even a newspaper as reactionary as the New York *Daily News* drew back from the spectacle put on by Solzhenitsyn. Jerome Cahill, writing in the July 2 issue, commented: "It was a familiar recital, not unlike the sort of campaign oratory that was popular among conservative politicians during the McCarthy era a quarter-century ago."

Among the items Solzhenitsyn denounced as crimes were the recognition of the Soviet Union, granted under the Roosevelt administration in 1933, and the World War II alliance with the Soviet Union against the Axis powers.

"We have an old Russian proverb," he said. "You do not call the wolf to help you fight the dogs."

The atmosphere at the banquet can be gathered from the following paragraphs in the account by the well-known columnist Mary McGrory:

"The audience, largely composed of middle-aged union faithful, was carried away. It was the hottest Cold War speech any of them had ever heard, and it was being made by one of the 20th Century's most thundering celebrities. . . ."

"Meany was in his element. It was probably one of the most satisfactory moments of his 82 years. He despises *détente*; no political figure on the scene quite reflects his views. He gave Mrs. Solzhenitsyn, the author's pretty, dark-haired second wife, a bouquet of roses. He beamed.

"Let us pray his courage is contagious," he said when the time came to present his great prize. Solzhenitsyn, cued by his interpreter, leaped to his feet, placed his hand over his heart and let the applause roll over them both.

"We need to hear echoes in the White House," shouted Meany, "in the Congress, in the State Dept., in the universities, in the

media.' The applause for each institution was deafening. There was not a vote in the house for *détente*. It was no place for Henry Kissinger."

Solzhenitsyn is a prime example of how the policies of Stalin and his heirs produce opponents of socialism. At one time, Solzhenitsyn considered himself a Marxist. Imprisoned for eleven years after criticizing Stalin in a letter, Solzhenitsyn came to identify Stalinism with Leninism and Marxism, and ultimately turned to religion, Great Russian nationalism, and an utterly utopian vision of returning to a preindustrial society.

It was the crimes of Stalinism that turned this great artist, but very mediocre political thinker, into an anti-Communist crusader, just as they have created distrust of socialist ideas among many workers throughout the world.

Solzhenitsyn's low political level is shown by his belief that the American imperialists are interested in fighting for democratic rights in the Soviet Union. Their real attitude on this question has been shown by their actions in Chile, Vietnam, South Korea, Iran, and Indonesia, to cite but a few examples.

The truth is that Wall Street appreciates Stalinist totalitarianism because it allows its publicists to equate socialism with a brutal antidemocratic dictatorship, thereby helping to confuse the masses.

Solzhenitsyn, an eloquent exposé of some of Stalin's crimes, turns into a pathetic clown when he advises the White House on what its policies ought to be.

Contrary to Solzhenitsyn's view, *détente* is not a trick thought up by the Kremlin to try to "bury" capitalist democracy. From the viewpoint of the Soviet ruling caste, the current *détente* is merely the continuation of a policy initiated by Stalin after he had smashed Lenin's party and its main figure following Lenin's death, Leon Trotsky. Stalin's policy was *class collaboration* or a common front with imperialism in maintaining the status quo. The Kremlin's term has been "peaceful coexistence," which means heading off revolutions wherever possible.

When the Pentagon had a monopoly of the atomic bomb, American imperialism opened the cold war. After some years, Washington reverted back to "*détente*" for a number of reasons, including a weakened world position.

In his performance at the banquet, wearing the warbonnet of George Meany, Solzhenitsyn struck a treacherous blow at the dissident movement inside the Soviet Union and the other workers states. The Kremlin and all its agents will happily seize on what he said and did to smear those courageous dissidents, claiming that what they really stand for is the themes preached by Solzhenitsyn in Washington, and that

Next Week . . .

"An Interview With Séamas Costello." Costello, one of the most prominent leaders of the Irish Republican Socialist party, discusses the feud with the "Official" republicans, the shooting of Billy McMillen, and the issue of Stalinism in the republican movement. An *IP* exclusive.

they thus in reality constitute agents of imperialism.

The truth is that most of the dissidents, unlike Solzhenitsyn, are solidly against imperialism and for socialism. Their goal is to reinstate or to move forward to proletarian democracy.

These dissidents are certain to denounce Solzhenitsyn. Soviet historian Roy Medvedev has already stated that the recent writings of Solzhenitsyn have "produced a decisive protest by most readers among the dissidents."

The most important currents in the dissident movement understand the meaning of Washington's machinations and are completely opposed to them. They understand that the conquest of the workers states by American imperialism would lead to a situation even worse than the one they have had to endure under the rule of the bureaucratic caste.

In the struggle against Stalinist oppression they look to the Soviet people, supported by the working masses of the world, as the only power that can end the grip of the bureaucracy and lead to a great new birth of freedom on the basis of the planned economy established through the October 1917 revolution.

In the March 18, 1974, issue of *Intercontinental Press*, Allen Myers assessed the changed role of Solzhenitsyn after his forced exile:

"Now that he has been artificially cut off from Soviet society, there is a real danger that his views will serve exclusively to promote reactionary, antisocialist causes. But his attempt within the Soviet Union to discover and portray the truth about Stalinism will contribute to the eventual overthrow of the bureaucrats and the restoration of socialist democracy despite all the limitations of his outlook." □

Gov. Strangelove

"I don't stop at anything," New Hampshire Gov. Meldrim Thomson told a recent news conference. And so it seems.

Perhaps impressed by the wide press coverage given to President Ford's bomb rattling in Washington, Thomson proposed that the National Guard of the "Granite State" be equipped with nuclear weapons.

"If we could double the size and give them the most sophisticated instruments of war, including missiles and nuclear warheads," he said, "we'd have tremendous protective power."

"Against what, Thomson didn't say," *Newsweek* reported June 30, "though New Hampshire has been involved in a long and bitter dispute with Maine over lobster-fishing grounds." □

July 14, 1975

In This Issue

Closing Date: July 7, 1975

FEATURES	1006	<i>Out Now!</i> —Chapter 5: The SDS March on Washington—by Fred Halstead
INDIA	980	Gandhi Lowers Iron Curtain—by Ernest Harsch
	982	Moscow Salutes Gandhi's Ending of Democracy—by Ernest Harsch
MEXICO	983	UN Conference Shows Impact of Women's Struggle—by Caroline Lund
IRAN	983	4,000 Women Face Torture in Shah's Prisons
PORTUGAL	984	Junta Pleads for Tranquillity and Discipline—by Gerry Foley
ARGENTINA	988	A New Upsurge of Workers Struggles—by Judy White
INDONESIA	989	Indonesia's Political Prisoners—A Decade Later
ITALY	990	Massive Shift to the Left Shown in Elections—by Livio Maitan
SOVIET UNION	991	Threat to Transfer Moroz to Psychiatric Prison—by Marilyn Vogt
CHILE	992	A "Climate of Terror" in the Streets of Santiago—by Jean-Pierre Beauvais
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	993	Three PSP Members Tortured in Santo Domingo
BOLIVIA	994	A Bad Year for Banzer—by Alicia Mamani
BRAZIL	996	Geisel and the Economic Situation—by Luiza Maranhão
ANGOLA	1002	The Battle Against Portuguese Neocolonialism—by Ernest Harsch
NEWS ANALYSIS	978	Solzhenitsyn's Performance in Washington
CAPITALISM		
FOULS THINGS UP	998	Antinuclear Demonstrators Defy Clubs of Franco's Cops—by Judy White
AROUND THE WORLD	1000	
FROM OUR READERS	1008	
DRAWINGS	977	Isabel Martínez de Perón; 987, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho; 990, Enrico Berlinguer; 992, Augusto Pinochet; 997, Ernesto Geisel—by Copain

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Gandhi Lowers Iron Curtain

By Ernest Harsch

"Even today we are more democratic than any developing country in the world," Prime Minister Indira Gandhi claimed July 2. The assertion could have been used by Orwell in his novel *1984* as a perfect example of "Newspeak."

However, "too much" democracy has its drawbacks. "In India, democracy has given too much license to people," she said. "Whether it were newspapers or opposition, they were trying to misuse it and [weaken] the nation's confidence."

Two days later, India's new dictator proclaimed: "I am proud of democracy in the country, and want to see it strong."

Between demagogic pronouncements, Gandhi moved to strengthen her dictatorial rule. On July 4, she banned twenty-six political and religious groups. A United Press International dispatch from New Delhi reported that the decree "outlaws virtually all of the more extreme political parties and organizations on the left and the right."

"It does not affect the major national opposition parties, but many of the leaders of those groups are already in jail."

The government accused the groups of "indulging in activities prejudicial to the internal security, public safety and maintenance of public order."

The available news reports name only four of the groups on the banned list. One is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Protection Union), a paramilitary youth group affiliated to the right-wing Hindu communalist Jan Sangh. Although the Jan Sangh itself has not yet been banned, many of its top leaders have been arrested. Another group that has been outlawed is the Jamaat-e-Islami, a Muslim group based in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, an area long claimed by Pakistan. In addition, the Anand Marg, a religious sect that has been active in the mass anticorruption movement in Bihar state, was banned.

The Maoist Communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist), whose members are referred to as "Naxalites," after the 1967 peasant uprising in Naxalbari, West Bengal, was also banned. The CPI(ML) has been functioning under a de facto ban for several years, its members having been arrested or shot on sight. Thousands of Naxalites were in prison before the state of emergency was proclaimed.

Police raided the regional offices of some

of the banned groups and arrested hundreds of leaders and members. Party offices were closed and sealed and files were confiscated.

Although the ban did not yet legalize the major opposition political parties, they have been crippled by the jailing of their leaders.

It is not known precisely how many persons have been arrested so far. The regime has put the figure at more than 1,000; opposition sources estimate that up to 6,000 have been arrested.

"In New Delhi alone," *New York Times* correspondent Eric Pace said in a June 30 dispatch from the capital, "the municipal administration reported in a communiqué, 653 'bad characters' have been arrested in the last few days. . . ."

The regime admits that about 500 persons (other sources put the figure at 1,000) have been detained in Bihar state, where mass demonstrations against high prices and corruption have been staged in the past year. Jaya Prakash Narayan, a former Socialist leader and a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi who became the chief leader of the movement, was one of the first to be seized. But the arrests were also directed against the secondary leadership in a clear attempt to cripple the mass struggles in Bihar.

James M. Markham, of the *New York Times*, reported in a July 3 dispatch from Patna, the capital of Bihar, "Many of those arrested—political leaders and organizers, students and what the censored press now calls 'bad elements'—were in the forefront of the demonstrations last fall that sent tens of thousands of Mr. Narayan's followers surging through Patna's clogged and rutted streets, demanding the ouster of the state's Congress party government."

Jans Janitschek, the general secretary of the Socialist International, said in London July 1 that all fifteen members of the national executive of the Socialist party in India are under arrest, as well as the seven Socialist members of Parliament and the editors of three Socialist newspapers.

There have been reports that police fired on protesters in parts of Bombay and Calcutta. *Los Angeles Times* correspondent Jacques Leslie reported from New Delhi in the June 29 issue: "Confrontations between police and workers involving shooting and casualties earlier last week were reported in the Indian cities of Kanpur [in Uttar Pra-

desh] and Bhopal, capital of the central state of Madhya Pradesh."

Eric Pace reported in the July 1 *New York Times* that travelers from Patna who had reached New Delhi "gave reports that indicated that the disorders in Bihar have been graver and of greater scope."

"One traveler reported that a total of 30 persons had been killed by the police in a port in the Patna district, and in several other towns in the state."

On June 30, the regime issued another decree under the state of emergency, giving it the power to detain those arrested for one year. Although the original state of emergency decree provided that prisoners must be told the reason for their arrest within a few days, the new decree stipulated that they need only be told that it was "necessary" under the emergency. In addition, the decree empowered authorities at all levels to make arrests.

The Gandhi regime also tightened its control over the news media. The *Motherland* and the *Organizer*, two publications of the Jan Sangh, have been shut down by the regime. *Everyman*, the weekly newspaper of the anticorruption movement in Bihar, as well as two New Delhi papers, the Hindi-language *Prajaniti* and the Urdu-language *Mulq-O-Milet*, have suspended publication rather than submit to the censorship.

Issues of the American magazines *Time* and *Newsweek*, which carried reports of Gandhi's coup, were seized at the airport. A source at the Press Trust of India, the country's largest news agency, told *Washington Post* correspondent Lewis M. Simons that out of fifty articles on the state of emergency that it submitted to the censors, only four were passed. The censorship regulations have also been extended to cover photographs, cartoons, and advertisements.

Simons reported in a June 29 dispatch from New Delhi, "Several foreign journalists learned that their homes and offices were being watched by secret police and their local employees were being questioned."

"Indian journalists working for foreign media were summoned to a meeting with Information Minister Vidya Charan Shukla and told that they would be treated as 'criminals' and imprisoned if their publications printed articles not approved by the censor, whether the Indians wrote them or not."

Simons was expelled from India June 30 for refusing to abide by the censorship regulations.

Because of the gagging of the press, it is difficult to ascertain how much active opposition there is to Gandhi's dictatorial coup. Reports of strikes and demonstrations in several states and territories have appeared abroad despite Gandhi's tight censorship.

A report in the July 3 *Washington Post* said that "travelers and political foes of Mrs. Gandhi reported that killings by police, sabotage and anti-government protests had taken place in the three populous states of Gujarat, Bihar and Tamil Nadu in defiance of the state of emergency."

Leaflets signed by the Communist party of India (Marxist), attacking the Gandhi regime, were circulated in New Delhi June 28. Some of the CPI(M) leaders have been arrested.

In Bombay, lawyers and court officials, led by the chairman of the Bar Council of India, issued a statement denouncing the state of emergency and the arrests, calling them "the beginning of the end of democracy and the rule of law in India." Courts in Bombay were closed June 26 in protest. On July 5 Indian journalists appealed to Gandhi to lift or ease the censorship regulations.

There have also been reports of protests in the states of Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Kerala, and Madhya Pradesh. From the sketchy information available, it appears that the greatest unrest is in Bihar and Gujarat, the two states that were rocked by mass upsurges last year against the Congress party state governments.

Before his expulsion from the country, *Washington Post* reporter Simons made a hasty opinion survey of persons in several parts of New Delhi. "As the impact of the past 48 hours settled over this capital tonight," he reported June 27, "Indians responded with shock, apathy, cynicism, hostility, but with almost no approval to the sweeping measures taken by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi." He found only one person who favored the state of emergency, a junior executive at the Dunlop Rubber Company.

Public protest against the state of emergency may increase when students and teachers return to India's nearly 100 universities after the annual June vacations.

Gandhi also faces some opposition from the non-Congress party state government in Gujarat.

The state government of Gujarat was sworn into office June 25, the day before the state of emergency was imposed. Under the banner of the Janata Morcha (People's Front), a bloc of opposition parties had defeated the Congress party in elections to the state assembly earlier in June.

The opposition parties included the Jan Sangh, the Organization Congress, the rightist Bharatiya Lok Dal (People's party of India), and the Socialist party. After the elections a coalition government was formed. The Kisan Mazdoor Lok Paksha, a party backed by landlords and wealthy peasants and led by the former Congress party chief minister of Gujarat, Chimanbhai Patel (who was deposed during the

1974 mass upsurge), joined the coalition regime.

In a direct challenge to Gandhi's authority, the Gujarat government has ignored her orders to arrest demonstrators protesting the state of emergency.

On June 27, Gandhi ordered units of the federally controlled Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police into Gujarat. According to opposition sources, she also moved in additional units of the army.

Markham, in a June 30 dispatch from Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarat, reported; "A well-known student leader said that, in view of these troop movements and the arrests outside of Gujarat, he planned to go 'underground' soon. He said that the student movement was ready for a crack-down.

"With newspapers censored, 'wall papers' in black and white paint have appeared on buildings and walls in Ahmadabad. In its many parks, organizers have been delivering lectures with bullhorns, and an underground newspaper has appeared."

Some opposition figures in Gujarat, according to Markham, expected Gandhi to declare president's rule in the state, which would involve the ouster of the elected state government and the imposition of direct federal control. To avoid the imposition of president's rule—and its loss of power—the Janata Morcha has asked its supporters to "maintain calm."

Gandhi's coup has also run into some resistance from the opposition-controlled government in the southern state of Tamil Nadu. According to the July 2 *Washington Post*, which cited the reports of travelers from Madras, Tamil Nadu's capital, "newspapers are ignoring press censorship and have run articles critical of Mrs. Gandhi and her ruling Congress party.

"The sources said one newspaper printed a caricature depicting Mrs. Gandhi as Hitler."

The travelers produced copies of what they said was a resolution passed June 29 by the state's ruling party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK—Dravidian Advancement Association). The statement denounced Gandhi's state of emergency as "the advent of dictatorship." On June 27 Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Muthuvel Karunanidhi said that Gandhi "has thrown democracy into the dustbin."

The DMK, founded in 1949, arose out of the Dravidian nationalist movement in southern India. The DMK demanded an end to the domination of Dravidians by the northern Aryans and called for a separate Tamil-speaking state (which was granted in the late 1950s with the reorganization of Madras state, later renamed Tamil Nadu). The party came to power in 1967 and has been traditionally hostile to any political interference in the state by the federal government.



© Herblock in The Washington Post
"Who's the fairest one of all?"

However, despite the DMK's public statements, it has gone along with the state of emergency to some extent and has reportedly arrested a few persons.

Although Gandhi's Stalinist allies have claimed that American imperialism and the Central Intelligence Agency were backing the antigovernment opposition in India, Gandhi herself has reassured Washington that her seizure of dictatorial powers was not intended to damage relations between the two states.

"It is very far from the truth to say that the government of India is anti-American," she told a group of visiting American teachers. "India is seriously trying for better relations with the United States."

Gandhi also said she wanted President Ford to continue with his plans to visit India later this year. □

Israel Bombs Refugee Camps in Southern Lebanon

Israeli gunboats and aircraft attacked Palestinian refugee camps on the coast of Lebanon July 7. According to a Lebanese military spokesman, a large fire was started at the Rashidiyah camp near Tyre. The Dahr Maaroud camp in the same area was hit by "at least 51 rockets and bombs," the spokesman said.

An Israeli army spokesman said the attacks were reprisals for guerrilla actions inside Israel. He said the camps "are mainly starting-out bases for terrorist raids."

The Rashidiyah camp houses 5,000 of the 300,000 Palestinian refugees who live in Lebanon because they were forced out of their homeland by the Israeli Zionists.

Moscow Salutes Gandhi's Ending of Democracy in India

By Ernest Harsch

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's June 26 declaration of a state of emergency throughout India and the arrest of thousands of political opponents on both the left and right won instant endorsement from her Stalinist backers.

According to an article by Tom Foley in the June 28 *Daily World*, the newspaper of the American Communist party, the Indian pro-Moscow Stalinists backed Gandhi's assumption of dictatorial powers almost two weeks in advance: "The Communist Party of India (CPI), in a June 13 statement by its national council, gave support to Premier Gandhi against what it called a drive by Indian reactionaries allied with international imperialism to oust the Indian Premier from office by any possible means."

India's largest trade-union federation, the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), also gave its public backing to Gandhi. The AITUC's general secretary is S.A. Dange, the chairman of the CPI.

The CPI's pledge of support was repeated after Gandhi's dictatorial coup. Trying to give the suppression of democratic rights in India a left cover, the CPI, in a statement distributed by the Soviet news agency, Tass, said that Indian reactionaries "put forward their plans for subverting democratic institutions at a time when U.S. imperialist circles threaten the independence, security, and unity of India by setting up military bases in the Indian Ocean and encouraging the splitting of India and of counterrevolutionary forces."

Tass also released a statement by the Stalinist-controlled World Peace Council in Helsinki, Finland, which said that the Central Intelligence Agency had "considerably widened its activity in India" and "millions of dollars are placed at the disposal of Indian reactionaries and neofascist elements."

Pravda, on June 27, stated: "The measures taken by the president and the government are aimed at defending progressive gains and frustrating plans of the reaction."

The following day, the Moscow daily *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Young Communist League, compared the situation in India with that in Portugal. It said that in both India and Portugal "reaction" was opposed to the "progressive transformation of society and the growing people's unity." The paper



Conrad/Los Angeles Times

continued, "In both cases, the provocateurs have been unmasked."

L'Unità, the daily newspaper of the Italian Communist party, claimed that the state of emergency had been declared in order to disrupt the plans of "reactionary forces" to foment a "mutiny." This was an apparent reference to a speech given at a rally of 50,000 persons in New Delhi June 25 by Jaya Prakash Narayan, the main leader of the mass anticorruption movement in Bihar state, in which he called on the police and army to disobey "illegal orders" and to "protect Indian democracy."

Hanoi also echoed Moscow's support for the Gandhi regime. The Hanoi army newspaper *Quan Doi Nhan*, according to a June 27 Agence France-Presse dispatch from Hong Kong, declared support for Gandhi in what it described as her fight against "reactionary rightists."

"The current campaign of the rightists to denigrate and slander Mrs. Gandhi is meeting with the opposition of broad sections of public opinion in India," the Hanoi paper said.

However, Peking, which has been hostile to the Indian regime since the 1962 India-Chinese border war, criticized the state of emergency and the mass arrests. A June 27 New China News Agency dispatch said that the arrests were "not only a bitter mockery of bourgeois democracy, but an exposure of the unstable and weak ruling position of Indira Gandhi." The June 29 *People's Daily* commented that India has

been thrown "into the lap of revisionist Soviet social-imperialism."

Moscow's main interest in the politically explosive Indian subcontinent is to maintain "stability." From the Stalinist viewpoint, the preservation in power of Gandhi's Congress party is the best way, at this point, of ensuring that goal.

Moscow's support for Gandhi was concretized in the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty, in which the Soviet Stalinists promised to supply Gandhi with military and economic aid. During Soviet Communist party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973, a fifteen-year "economic development" agreement was signed, which provided for increased trade between New Delhi and Moscow and Soviet participation in India's iron, steel, and oil industries. Moscow also promised to supply SAM-6 anti-aircraft missiles.

In line with Moscow's foreign policy initiatives, the CPI has been supporting Gandhi since the mid-1969 split in the Congress party, in which the right wing of the ruling party left.

Stating that Gandhi represented the "progressive national bourgeoisie" in India, the CPI has pressed for popular-front coalition governments with the Congress party. It is at present part of a coalition with the Congress party in Kerala state, in which the Congress has a majority. However, the chief minister, Achuta Menon, is a CPI leader.

At its tenth national congress in February 1975, the CPI called for the installation of CPI-Congress governments in all of India's twenty-one states.

The CPI has also aided the regime by attacking the mass movements against high prices and corruption that have developed during the past year and a half, particularly in Gujarat and Bihar states. On November 11, 1974, the CPI held a mass demonstration in Bihar against the "rightist offensive."

At the CPI's congress in February Chairman S.A. Dange said that India faced two main dangers: imperialism and the "fascist movement" led by Jaya Prakash Narayan. One CPI slogan has been "Strengthen the hands of Mrs. Gandhi to fight the combined reaction."

Gandhi has recognized the value of the CPI's support. Shortly after Brezhnev's visit, she noted that the Congress-CPI alliance "has helped to contain communism." □

Mexico City Gathering Draws 6,000 Participants

UN Conference Shows Impact of Women's Struggle

By Caroline Lund

The United Nations International Women's Year conference ended July 2 with the adoption of a World Plan of Action. The document says that women should have "in law and in fact, equal rights and opportunities with men" in political affairs, education, and employment.

The conference, held in Mexico City, was the first major UN gathering to discuss the problems of women. It was attended by about 6,000 official delegates and unofficial participants. Its size and impact are testimony to the growing influence of the international struggle for women's rights.

Although the Plan of Action is not binding on the participating governments, it adds legitimacy to the demands that are being raised and fought for by women throughout the world.

The document does not mention the right to abortion, which has been the most widespread single focus of women's struggles internationally. But it says: "Individuals and couples have the right freely and responsibly to determine the number and spacing of their children and to have the information and means to do so."

Among other things, the plan calls for equal pay for equal work; for the rewriting of textbooks to "reflect an image of women in positive and participatory roles in society"; and for equal rights for unmarried mothers and for children born to unmarried parents.

It also called for "socially organized services," including "services for children," to lighten work in the home and to allow for "women's equal participation in all societal activities."

The plight of women political prisoners throughout the world was discussed at the UN-sponsored "Tribune," a forum for unofficial conference participants. Among those who spoke was Hortensia Bussi de Allende, the widow of Salvador Allende. She called on the UN to name a committee of women to investigate the crimes of the Chilean junta against women.

The issue of women political prisoners was "unexpected" by conference organizers, according to a report by Judy Klemesrud in the July 1 *New York Times*. But it received widespread support among the delegates.

A major topic of discussion was the relationship between the struggle for women's rights and for broader social change. Most of the official delegates counterposed the two, in a debate that saw delegates from the colonial and semicolonial world lined up

against those from the advanced capitalist countries.

The first position was typified by the speech made by Mexican President Luis Echeverría Alvarez in opening the conference. He said that "the worldwide crusade for women's rights is meaningless without a total transformation of the world's economic order."

The second position stressed narrowly defined "women's issues." Patricia Hutar, co-head of the U.S. delegation, contended that "women must be in decision-making positions in the power structure along with men to build a more just world order."

The debate was largely phony. The delegates "representing" the peoples of the colonial world included such figures as Imelda Marcos, wife of the Philippine dictator; Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, sister of the shah of Iran; and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, prime minister of Sri Lanka, who crushed in blood the 1971 movement of young people who were demanding democratic rights and social reforms.

These delegates generally had little in common with the masses of women in their own countries. For example, Annie Jiagge, delegate from Ghana, told a reporter that

she had no problem with housework. "In Africa, you have house help," she explained. "You pay through the nose for it, but you have it."

On the other side, posing as a supporter of women's rights, was the U.S. delegation, headed by Daniel Parker, administrator of the CIA front, the Agency for International Development, and Patricia Hutar, former assistant head of the Republican National Committee.

Wynta Boynes of the Congress of Racial Equality, a Black civil-rights organization, was among a group of American women who accused the Washington delegation of being unrepresentative. According to Stanley Meisler, reporting in the June 22 *Los Angeles Times*, Boynes contended that "the delegation reflected the thinking mainly of the State Department and AID—agencies that, she said, subvert the rights of men and women throughout the world."

Both sides in this debate were more interested in making demagogic appeals than in bringing out the fact that the struggle for women's rights and for broader social change complement and strengthen each other.

Delegates from the workers states, especially the Soviet Union and China, did nothing to clarify the issue or to explain the stake of women in the fight for a socialist revolution. They concentrated on attacking each other and attempting to cover up for the gross inequality that women still face in those countries despite the great gains brought about by the revolutions. □

4,000 Women Face Torture in Shah's Prisons

On the occasion of the United Nations International Women's Year conference, the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran (CAIFI)* issued a special appeal in defense of women political prisoners in Iran.

"As the United Nations celebrates International Women's Year in the name of peace, equality, and development," the statement said, "Vida Hadjebi Tabrizi, a social researcher from the University of Tehran, enters her third year of imprisonment in Iran." Tabrizi was arrested in 1972 while investigating the living conditions of Iran's peasant population.

The Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter* reported two years ago that as a result of torture in Evin prison, Tabrizi had already "lost any sense of feeling in her hands and feet, has developed a bad heart, bad blood

circulation, meningitis, and no longer menstruates at all."

CAIFI notes: "Tabrizi's case highlights a system of torture imposed on women political prisoners whose number has been estimated at 4,000, based on the number of women who have been seen processed each month at the Comité detention center before being transferred to other prisons.

"These women belong to the growing number of women whose increased role in the political, social, economic, and literary activities of their countries has made them subject to torture and detention. They are also the spouses and teen-age daughters of male political prisoners."

The appeal also calls attention to the case of Atefeh Gorgin, imprisoned at least two years ago after publishing an anthology of contemporary Iranian literature. She is the widow of the poet Khosrow Golsorkhi, a political prisoner executed last year by the shah. □

*156 Fifth Avenue, Room 600, New York, New York 10010.

Portuguese Junta Pleads for Tranquillity and Discipline

By Gerry Foley

Although both the Communist and Socialist parties—which together won a substantial majority in the April 25 Constituent Assembly elections—expressed satisfaction with the June 21 policy statement of the Conselho da Revolução, this declaration has clearly not solved the governmental crisis in Portugal.

President Costa Gomes had to go on television July 4 to appeal for calm and to reassure the population that the MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement) remained united. Two developments apparently motivated the president and former chief of staff of the armed forces to make a special plea for tranquillity and “discipline.” One was a wave of rumors about a power struggle in the military junta. The other was a new upsurge of strikes and economic struggles.

“At one point today, Premier Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves, who is close to the Communist party, was reported to have quit or been dismissed,” *New York Times* correspondent Henry Giniger reported in a July 4 dispatch from Lisbon. He went on to note:

“Workers in the national airlines, TAP, led by a strong contingent of extreme leftists, announced a strike for Monday over a demand for higher wages. There was wage agitation elsewhere despite warnings that the country could not support unreasonable demands.

“The true revolutionary is one who works more and who produces better than yesterday and who limits his demands and needs,” the President declared tonight.”

Costa Gomes described the rumors as a “veritable offensive” by counterrevolutionaries. It does in fact seem that rightists have found the time ripe for stepping up their pressure.

Lisbon’s chief delegate to the United Nations, José Veiga Simão, chose the anniversary of the signing of the UN charter June 27 to make an implicit attack on the military regime in the name of democratic rights. He was dismissed the day after, he said.

As minister of education under Caetano, Veiga Simão did not distinguish himself as a defender of democratic rights. Furthermore, he had already tendered his resignation in March, around the time of the unsuccessful coup led by General Spínola. Apparently, he thought the time was ripe for a public break with the regime, and that

the issue of democratic rights was the most effective.

A number of imprisoned former political police seem also to have thought the atmosphere was right in late June for making a move. Eighty-nine members of the PIDE (Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado—International State Security Police) chose to stage a breakout from Alcoentre prison at 4:30 p.m. on June 29. Seventeen were quickly recaptured but the majority managed to make good their escape.

The report by a former guard, José Joaquim Macedo, in the July 1 issue of *Jornal Novo*, the only Lisbon daily not yet dominated by the government or by its unconditional supporter, the Communist party, indicated that the PIDE agents could have broken out of this “maximum security” prison at any time:

“The PIDE agents were very well treated. They were transferred from the Monsanto prison. . . . They were in a position of strength, and even the prison guards (especially the older ones) called them ‘senhor agente de primeira’ [first-grade agent, sir] or ‘senhor chefe de Brigada’ [Brigade chief, sir].

“There was no limitation on their recreation. They could walk anyplace from morning to night, and some of them took part in the work of running the prison. One who fled, Neto, was a cook. More significant is that the eighty-nine who escaped were from Cellblock A, where the most trustworthy prisoners were put. These were two-man cells that were left open even at night, so they could have continual, easy contact with prisoners in every block.

“Besides being rather well provided for, with a good number of comforts, they led a pleasant existence. In this season, many went out with their towels under their arms in the morning to lie in the sun as if they were going to the beach. They played various sports. Several ping-pong tables and other things had been brought in. They also practiced with a karate instructor.

“They controlled the audio room, using it to present their programs, and their delegates presented their ‘demands’: ‘Today we did not eat dinner because the wine did not come.’ And then the wine turned up, even if a truck had to be sent to Lisbon to get it.

“Once even we civilian guards were quite upset and irritated when they read a communiqué over the sound system, appar-

ently with relish, expressing the solidarity of the ‘Pides’ with their ‘colleagues’ of the MRPP [Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party, a Maoist group] who were then being held in Caxias prison and were supposed to have been mistreated.”

The “Pides” were treated quite differently than the Maoists. Among other things, the relatives of the imprisoned secret police were allowed to demonstrate outside the prison and thus to cover the escape. The Maoist demonstrations outside Caxias have been tear-gassed and broken up by troops firing into the air.

Deterioration in the Azores

The month of June started with the first successful right-wing demonstrations against the military regime. In Ponta Delgada in the Azores, rightists mobilized under the pretext of demanding self-government for the islands.

They forced the resignation of the governor, António Borges Coutinho, who, like many provincial heads appointed after April 25, 1974, is a member of the Communist party’s petty-bourgeois front, the Movimento Democrático Português (MDP—Portuguese Democratic Movement). Neither the CP nor the MDP have extensive popular support locally.

In the April 25, 1975, elections, the MDP got 2.7% of the vote in the Ponta Delgada district, and the CP got 1.47%. The bourgeois Partido Popular Democrático (PPD—Democratic People’s party) got 54.83% and the SP, 30.34%. In the Horta district, the MDP got 3.11%; the CP, 2.33%; and the SP, 22.91%. In the other Azorean district, Angra do Heroísmo, the MDP scored 1.8% and the CP, 2.35%; while the PPD got 62.84% and the SP, 22.9%.

From the fact that the only parties gaining a large vote in the Azores were the PPD and the SP, some left centrists drew the conclusion that the Ponta Delgada demonstration fitted in with the SP demonstrations in Lisbon and Oporto against the closure of *República* as part of an offensive by a “reactionary bloc” against the MFA.

Esquerda Socialista, the weekly organ of the Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left), carried a cartoon in its June 11 issue showing Henry Kissinger leaping into

Portugal from the Azores with two guns blazing, over a bridge held up by the SP and the PPD.

The logical implication was that the large share of the vote given to the SP, although less than that given to the PPD, showed that it was a reactionary, counterrevolutionary party, too. It had to be since it got a strong vote in a "reactionary area."

The SP candidate for Ponta Delgada, Jaime Gama, conceded in a round table discussion published in *Jornal Novo* June 13 that right-wing influences were very strong in the Azores, which have been allowed to stagnate in poverty and backwardness by successive governments in Lisbon. However, he did not grant that the population was intrinsically reactionary or hopelessly dominated by reactionary priests and local strongmen. He argued that the neglect and conservatism of the military government itself had created the conditions for the June 6 demonstrations.

"April 25 [that is, the end of dictatorial government] took a long time in coming to most of the parishes in the Ponta Delgada district, if it arrived at all. The left parties had great difficulty in establishing themselves. I remember that after April 25, the SP activists were persecuted. There were violent scenes, and in the rural parishes, local people aroused by the reactionary petty bosses and the reactionary sector of the clergy, which is in the majority, waged a big campaign against the democratic forces.

"During the election campaign, I had a chance to make contact with many people in these rural parishes and see this. The campaign included nighttime processions to exorcise the SP, old women saying that we were 'demons,' and a series of other attitudes. . . .

"The fact is, moreover, that a large part of the parish councils were not purged, and the administrative structures remained as

they had been. Furthermore, no concrete economic measures had been taken since April 25—in particular no agrarian reform—that could have involved the more disadvantaged classes, especially the poor peasants, in the revolutionary process that was unfolding.

"The result was that these strata, who saw their concrete living conditions get worse after April 25, either because the prices of consumer goods increased, or because the cost of fertilizer went up, were left discontented and ready to be exploited by the reactionary forces. I think the reason why April 25 did not come to the Azores lies in the lack of a regional development policy for the islands. In the Ponta Delgada district, this failure was felt especially acutely."

The *Jornal Novo* moderator asked: "Does this mean that the April 25 movement failed to win the Azores to the revolution?"

Gama answered: "That's what I think."

An Azorean student leader, Hamilton Costa, amplified the point: "There was no political, social, or economic opening in the Azores after April 25. The military apparatus was not purged of fascists. From the economic standpoint, the situation changed greatly for the worse. After April 25, they tried to implement the farm and ranch development plan supported by ITT [International Telephone and Telegraph has important investments in Azorean agriculture], which would involve a considerable distortion of the already very distorted Azorean economy. The living conditions of the rural wage workers and the small and medium peasant proprietors worsened. The balance sheet of April 25, it seems to me, is quite negative."

Borges Coutinho protested that the purges of rightists from the administration were limited by the availability of competent specialists: "My criterion in carrying out the purge was just putting less apathetic and incompetent persons in the place of more apathetic and incompetent ones. A political purge is impossible in an Azorean rural parish."

Gama, moreover, did not view the PPD as an ally of his party: "In the Ponta Delgada district, the PPD was a reactionary front (I said so several times during the electoral campaign) and in many of its positions it stood to the right of the CDS [Centro Democrático Social—Social Democratic Center, the right-wing bourgeois party]. The PPD waged its campaign against the Socialist party on the basis of claiming that the SP was going to take away people's cows, houses, and land. In the PPD rallies, they shouted, 'Death to the CP,' and 'Death to the Socialists.'"

The fact that Lisbon appointed a governor to administer the islands from a party distrusted by the overwhelming majority of the population clearly did not help this

situation. Nor did the attempts by the government, the Communist party, and the CP's neanarchist ultraleft satellites to minimize the importance of elections and to characterize whole populations as reactionary.

This sort of thing, in fact, seems to have provided the pretext for the other major rightist demonstration in early June, which took place in the northern mainland town of Bragança. According to a statement by Major Fernando Augusto Gomes, the governor of Tras-os-Montes Province, where the town is located, the mobilization started as a protest against an article in an Oporto paper on which CP journalists are influential. The article claimed that the authorities were "with the population but not with the revolution."

The CP Strategy

According to the antidemocratic Stalinist view, conservatism among the masses can be overcome only by force or deception, by adapting to conservative prejudices, or by using the weight of a state machine against the recalcitrant masses. This idea goes hand in hand with trying to portray all political opponents as in league with the ubiquitous right. Such tactics, however, appear to have had as bad results among the Lisbon dock workers as they did among the small-town population in the backward north.

When Intersindical, the national trade-union federation controlled by the CP, attacked the president of the dock workers over a radio station, also controlled by the CP, as a "fascist and a reactionary," the stevedores went out on strike in protest. They viewed the denunciation as an attack on them, their communiqué said: "Because we elect our leaders." (*Jornal Novo*, June 30.)

The CP's strategy in Portugal is basically a combination of force and deception. By proving itself the military's most reliable ally in the mass movement, it has obtained a vast network of bureaucratic positions. But at the same time this alliance with the bourgeois military junta has been used as a substitute for policies and demands that could win the support of the working class and the poor peasants as a whole. Thus the CP's fate is inseparably bound up with that of the military regime.

The CP has to take the blame for the military's failure to make the changes that could offer the prospect of fundamental improvement in the lives of the workers and poor peasants. Moreover, since large sections of the populace regard the CP as the most suspicious element in the government and see it as a minority trying to impose its control over them through its influence with the military officers, the Stalinist party draws the bitterest resentment over the

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failings of the regime. So, not only can it be the biggest loser if the government is ousted, but the regime would have wide popular support for jettisoning the CP.

In the conditions of a deepening economic crisis, the CP has supported the government in pushing aside the Constituent Assembly, the only body elected by the workers and the poor masses. By doing this, the CP has at least temporarily removed the only forum where the problems of the masses could be discussed openly. Thus, all the questions of the composition and policy of the government have been drawn back into the framework of obscure clique struggles within the ruling military group. This creates ideal conditions for rightist rumormongering and provocations.

The Question of Soviets

Some left-centrist tendencies that generally have an anarchist orientation have proposed replacing the Constituent Assembly with soviet-type organs of direct democracy. The Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias (PRP-BR—Revolutionary Workers party-Revolutionary Brigades, a former guerrilla group) has given impetus to the formation of "Revolutionary Committees of Workers, Soldiers, and Sailors." In support of this proposal, it has argued that such forms make it possible to surmount the problem of interparty struggles such as the one between the CP and the SP.

The PRP-BR arguments are pretty much in the anarchist antipolitical tradition, in which rank-and-file organization is supposed to be a way of surmounting party differences. This has nothing to do with soviets, in which the organized tendencies in the proletariat are represented and the decisive political questions fought out. The PRP-BR's argument reveals an anarchist desire for avoiding specific political questions and political struggle.

It is true that the differences among the political currents in the working class could be clarified and resolved more easily in soviet-type formations than in parliamentary-type bodies such as the Constituent Assembly. In the first place, the question of workers power would be clearly posed. Secondly, such bodies would not only represent the workers politically but would also have to lead the concrete struggles of the workers and poor masses, and thus the programs of the various currents could be tested in action.

However, the anarcho-centrist groups, such as the PRP-BR, the MES, and others, that are pushing such proposals admit implicitly in their political arguments that such bodies do not now exist. Nor do they propose a program for mobilizing the masses in support of concrete objectives, a program for mass struggle that alone could

create the conditions for genuine soviets.

Instead the soviet proposals are generally offered as a purely political formula for overcoming the political conflict in the military government and its parliamentary facade. This fact reveals both their centrist and anarchist character.

By proffering unreal bodies, or organizations that exist only in the most embryonic form, as an alternative to the only national body elected by the masses, and elected in a situation where the bourgeoisie is politically very weak and the majority of the press is controlled by left parties, the advocates of these "soviet" proposals are in effect taking an antidemocratic position. In the present concrete conditions, these proposals play exactly the opposite role that the development of genuine soviets would play.

The bourgeois press can easily dismiss such projects as unrepresentative of the masses: "Such revolutionary councils as exist are self-appointed cliques of gleaming-eyed zealots," the London *Economist* wrote in its June 28 issue.

Although the anarcho-centrists try to confuse the issue, the only real political alternative at the moment is between the military junta and the Constituent Assembly. It is impossible to avoid making a political choice between them, since they are the only bodies that have effective power or authority over the masses. The anarcho-centrists have, in effect, chosen the military junta, in the belief that either the ruling group as a whole or a part of it can evolve into a revolutionary leadership that can put the necessary power behind their schemes of "organization from below."

'People's Power' and the MFA

The MES has explicitly proposed "people's power linked to the MFA." The Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária (LUAR—League for Revolutionary Unity and Action) presented the following formula in the June 14 issue of its paper:

"So, it is necessary to give impetus to the self-organization of the workers, to promote the coordination of the existing committees on a higher and higher level, so that they will assume greater dimensions in organizational terms. All revolutionists must concentrate their efforts on this. But this must be done in the perspective of creating an alternative workers power to which the organized vanguards and the existing power must subordinate themselves, with the present power gradually losing its features of a ruling-class power."

The only thing, in fact, that has made the PRP-BR's proposals a factor in the political situation is the tacit support of one of the MFA leaders.

The PRP-BR looks to General Saraiva de Carvalho as the leader of a wing of the MFA which they think wants to make a

socialist revolution and which thus should be ready to base itself on a soviet form of government. They were probably the organizers of the July 4 march Giniger mentioned in his dispatch from Lisbon quoted earlier:

"The far leftists who marched tonight said they were backing 'progressive elements' within the High Council of the Revolution. One of their heroes was Gen. Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho, the commander of security forces, who has taken the workers' side in the disputes over República and the radio station.

"One rumor spoke of efforts by the general to seize power on behalf of workers' revolutionary committees. But General de Carvalho has fended off all efforts to separate him from moderate elements in the military. . . ."

There have been indications of a conflict in the Conselho da Revolução between Saraiva de Carvalho and other elements favorable to maintaining a parliamentary facade and an alliance with the reformist workers parties. This dispute apparently has not yet been settled. It appears to have been the source of the rumors Giniger referred to. It may also explain the contradictory behavior of Copcon toward some strikes and conflicts.

Rouge's correspondent in Lisbon analyzed Carvalho's moves in the following way in the June 27 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly:

"On June 17, COPCON, led by General Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho, sent a ten-point motion to the Conselho da Revolução. These points have been kept secret because they resemble an ultimatum more than a 'recommendation.' But Carvalho is a blabbermouth. He let it be known everywhere that his officers were demanding a 'military government without parties' and a firm hand against 'the maneuvers of the politicians' and the reactionaries who should have been sent to the Campo Pequeno stadium at the start.

"In a few days, the COPCON became an MFA within the MFA. It published communiqués on everything. On the slowdown strike by telephone operators in Lisbon and Oporto, which it considered 'inopportune'; on the attitude of the postal and telegraph workers that COPCON considered 'revolutionary' when they finally decided to break off their struggle; on the demonstration of solidarity with the Radio Renascença workers fighting the church, a demonstration COPCON supported; on the editors of *República*, with whom COPCON got into conflict and 'denounced.'

"To this General de Carvalho added loud declarations of his support for the Revolutionary Committees of Workers, Soldiers, and Sailors, launched by the PRP-BR. He approved their slogan calling for a 'revolutionary government without parties.'

"But behind all this phraseology, the reality of what Carvalho proposes is less 'revolutionary.' The general is carrying out a power play, building up a mass following at top speed and by every means for a 'military government without parties.' This would be a government that would settle accounts with the CP, which is all powerful in the state apparatus under construction, where it has taken the choice positions. By demagogy first, and then by toughness, this government would discipline a workers movement whose struggles would be regarded as 'inopportune.'"

The Peruvian military regime has shown that it is possible to co-opt and use anarchists and adventurers to strengthen the demagogic facade of a bourgeois military dictatorship. Carvalho may need some "political experts." He certainly needs a political cover. But he does not need the development of real soviets to take power. The London *Economist* listed his cards in its June 28 issue:

"The stalemate makes it increasingly possible that the crisis will be resolved by means other than words. General de Carvalho is the military governor of Lisbon, and was formally confirmed as head of the country's internal security command, Copcon, on Monday. He can in theory call upon any unit in the country for his purposes, although in practice it is the commando and paratroop regiments around Lisbon he chiefly relies upon."

Need for 'Austerity' and 'Authority'

The reason for Carvalho's "power play" is probably not his personal ambition, although he has emerged as the strongest figure and cleverest politician in the military government. The fact is that the political formulas the regime has relied upon up till now seem to be failing, and so, under the pressure of the situation, elements in the military are looking for new methods to establish stronger authority.

Naturally, there are conflicts over the precise political formulas, and these conflicts are given particular intensity by the collapsing economy and the threat of violence that is always an immediate possibility in a military regime.

The government's problems were explained quite frankly to David R. Francis, the correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, a paper that reflects the briefings of the U.S. State Department in a particularly clear way:

"We must have austerity,' Portugal's Finance Minister, Jose Joaquim Fragoso, told this correspondent. 'Sacrifices are necessary!'" (*CSM*, June 30.)

In the July 3 issue of the Boston daily, Francis reported the rest of the discussion. The minister had drafted an austerity program:

"Then comes the hard part for Portugal

today. Notes Mr. Fragoso: 'It is necessary to implement the decisions. It is a matter of authority.'

"Portugal, he explained, is suffering from a 'euphoria of liberty'. . . ."

Not only the bourgeois military govern-



CARVALHO

ment but both reformist mass workers parties agree that this "euphoria of liberty" has to be ended. But they cannot agree on how to do it.

The SP needs the institutions of parliamentary democracy in order to build its influence. Political democracy and open party conflicts, however, make it more and more difficult for the military to play its bonapartist role.

The Communist party has done everything it can do, without losing its working-class base, to subordinate the mass movement to the needs of the government; but it does not seem to have gotten enough results to guarantee the stability of the regime.

Although the CP was able to canalize the mass movement behind Spínola after April 25, 1974, the general was not satisfied. The Lisnave workers' demonstration against his no-strike law, and the continuation of the TAP strike, apparently helped convince him that an openly anti-working-class government was needed. He was unable to carry off his rightist coup in September 1974, but the continued penetration of revolutionary ideas into the armed forces drove him to make another desperate try in March 1975.

The Ferment Continues

Now the threat of new strikes seems to show once again that the CP has not been able to impose the necessary "discipline" on the workers movement. It has been even less successful in the schools. "The universities

have not yet been able to get fully functioning," *Jornal Novo* noted in its July 1 issue, "and despite the efforts of the Student Communist Union and the CP, student civilian service [a voluntary labor scheme] is a recognized failure."

Undoubtedly, the CP will call on the government for more support against the "left extremist groups" that have opposed its attempts to subordinate the workers movement to the regime. The government may very well increase its attempts to repress these groups, but such intervention could accelerate the decline in the political authority of both the CP and the government.

On the other hand, outright restoration of an openly anti-working-class government would still be a very costly and risky operation. In these conditions, General de Carvalho's demagogic scheme of establishing a tough military government under the guise of setting up a regime of "soviets" might win the support of sections of the bourgeoisie. They must certainly have noticed that he succeeded in drawing an important section of the Lisnave workers behind his proposals, the same militant workers who scuttled Spínola's no-strike law.

Whatever option the bourgeoisie takes, the anarcho-centrist groups have put themselves in a position of being easily disposed-of pawns. They can serve either as scapegoats justifying the repression of "uncontrollable elements" or as the acolytes of a military dictator. In their hope that a hero on horseback will suddenly lift them from being small groups to the position of advisers of a "revolutionary dictatorship," they are cutting themselves off from the real processes of developing mass political consciousness.

Under the pressure of the crisis, the military may make important concessions to the masses, as the radical land reform adopted on July 5 shows. But even if the military were capable of stepping over the line between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, it is impossible for any leadership to back into a socialist revolution in a society as complex as the Portuguese. The land reform is already dangerously belated.

Furthermore, although it continues to give some concessions to the masses and to try to balance between the workers and the bourgeoisie, there has been a consistent trend since the elections toward more repression against the left and labor.

As the standard of living of the masses drops and the repressiveness of the military government grows, along with its divisions, the only forces on the left that can gain credibility among the workers are those that clearly differentiate themselves from the MFA and demonstrate that they intend to carry out a socialist revolution based on the democratically expressed will of the majority of the workers and the poor masses. □

A New Upsurge of Workers Struggles in Argentina

By Judy White

On the eve of the second general strike in two weeks, the entire cabinet of President Isabel Martínez de Perón resigned July 6. The action came after a ten-day confrontation between the regime and the trade-union movement that brought industrial activity to a standstill.

The July 7 general strike, scheduled to last forty-eight hours, was called after union bureaucrats found that they were unable to either force the regime to back down on its austerity program or to control the angry ranks of the labor movement.

A dispatch by Jonathan Kandell in the July 5 *New York Times* reported that the strike call was merely a "formality," since "workers have abandoned factories in Buenos Aires and other large cities during the last several days."

The confrontation began June 27 when tens of thousands of workers in major unions walked off the job, protesting the government's announcement that collective-bargaining agreements would not be ratified if they exceeded a 50 percent ceiling on wage increases, despite a jump of 100 percent or more in prices in the past year.

About 100,000 workers massed in front of the presidential palace demanding approval for contracts they had just negotiated that included raises of between 80 and 130 percent. In addition, the demonstrators called for the resignation of Economics Minister Celestino Rodrigo and the regime's right-wing strongman, Social Welfare Minister José López Rega.

On July 3 another march of thousands of workers heading toward the presidential palace was broken up by police using tear gas.

The unions spearheading these protests—the metalworkers, construction workers, textile workers, and public employees—had been the backbone of the Peronist regime in the struggle against what the caudillo used to call the "infiltrators who work from within . . . the majority of whom are mercenaries in the service of foreign capital." The union bureaucrats provided the goons who assaulted radicals and dissidents of all hues whenever they protested Perón's policies.

The confrontation sparked increasing talk about the possibility of a military coup.

In a July 1 editorial, the French daily *Le Monde* pointed to the "extreme gravity" of

the step taken by Isabel Perón in refusing to ratify the contracts.

"Deprived of one of the pillars of the regime, will Mrs. Isabel Perón and Mr. José López Rega, who guides her policies, now try to base themselves on the army?" the editors asked.

The only reason there had not already been a coup, Kandell said in the July 3 *New York Times*, was "the continued reluctance of the armed forces to take over with no easy solutions to the economic and political problems in sight."

However, he continued, "Many officers undoubtedly share the opinion of the retired army general who said: 'When the time comes, the military does not want people to say we did not give the Peronists a real chance. Better an hour later than an hour early.'"

The Argentine economy is in deep crisis. Among the problems are a triple-digit rate of inflation, a burgeoning black market, and foreign debts of \$2 billion falling due shortly with only \$750 million on hand to meet them.

On June 5, the government announced the first in what were to be a series of "shock treatments." It devalued the peso 50 percent, raised fuel prices 300 percent, and lifted almost all price controls.

On June 6, Isabel Perón announced a new minimum monthly wage of 330,000 pesos (about US\$132) and issued an appeal against strikes and absenteeism. As a trial balloon, a 38 percent ceiling on wage negotiations was suggested.

Throughout June continuing strikes and protests demonstrated the unions' unwillingness to accept a wage ceiling that signified a deep slash in their standard of living.

A survey published by the Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas (Foundation for Latin American Economic Research) revealed that only workers receiving the minimum wage registered an increase (49 percent) in their real wages during the last two years. All other workers suffered a loss.

This study was completed in March, several months before the most recent austerity measures. According to figures released July 1 by the *Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo*,* these measures

*MID—Movement for Unity and Development, one of the bourgeois parties in the governing coalition.

have meant that "real wages today are the lowest they have been in the last thirty years."

Protest actions reported in the July 2 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Nación* give an indication of the scope of the dissatisfaction with this wage cut:

"In Córdoba the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor] local called off the work stoppage. Nonetheless, production remained at a standstill in several metal plants; in Buenos Aires there was a work stoppage of public employees in Mar del Plata and the regional CGT insisted on calling for the ratification of the collective-bargaining agreements. . . .

"In all sections of the Greater Buenos Aires industrial belt metallurgical plants remained paralyzed, as did textile firms in the La Matanza section. It should be noted that in no case did the national leaderships of the affected unions realize that these events were about to occur.

"SANTA FE—Yesterday morning the employees of Fiat Concord in Sauce Viejo held a mass meeting, which voted to carry out a stoppage of indefinite duration. . . .

"The employees at Tool Research in Sauce Viejo also supported the shutdown, and the coordinating committee of bank workers decided to implement a work-to-rule slowdown. . . .

"LA PLATA—The Acuerdo de Gremios Estatales de la Provincia de Buenos Aires [AGEPBA—Deliberative Body of State Workers of Buenos Aires] decided yesterday to conduct a work stoppage. . . .

"Employees from the manufacturing plants of Propulsora Siderúrgica and Astilleros Navales from the neighboring city of Ensenada stopped work yesterday noon and after brief deliberations marched toward this city to express their protest. . . .

"ROSARIO—The Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores Municipales de la Provincia de Santa Fé [Federation of Unions of Municipal Workers in Santa Fé Province] held a special congress yesterday. . . . It called on all affiliated unions to remain in a state of alert and in contact with the federation to determine what steps were to be taken.

"SALTA—The Unión Obrera Metalúrgica [UOM—Metalworkers Union] yesterday voted to strike from noon to midnight. . . ."

An article in the same issue of *La Nación* reported on the situation in the industrial center of Rosario:

"Starting at 9:00 a.m. yesterday, metalworkers who had been conducting a strike and occupation demanding ratification of the collective-bargaining agreements since the day before yesterday began to leave the factories and workshops. Contingents with signs demanding the application of Law 14,250 [Ley de Contrato de Trabajo—Work Contract Law, giving workers the right to demand redress of grievances] converged on the headquarters of the local UOM from different points in the city. . . . Police estimat-

ed the number of demonstrators between 3,500 and 4,000.

"At the same time there was a mass meeting of the local unit of the Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor [SMATA—Union of Automotive Machinists and Allied Trades], which had also voted for a work stoppage and occupation starting at noon the day before yesterday. There was an air of expectancy and when they found out that the metalworkers were already marching on the CGT, SMATA voted hurriedly to send delegates to different plants to tell its members that they should leave their workplaces and join the demonstration. . . ." □

scattered throughout the Indonesian archipelago. In some, the death rate is very high because of harsh treatment and inadequate food. Prisoners are not given clothes, bedding, or soap. In many of the camps medical facilities do not exist. Prisoners in some camps are required to do forced labor.

"Torture is used widely," the Tapol pamphlet states, "in particular during interrogations when *tapols* are being pressed to make self-incriminating confessions or to name others; it is also used for intimidation and demoralisation purposes. A great variety of torture methods are employed including electric shock, sexual torture and brutality, cigarette burning, throwing *tapols* into pits filled with broken glass, dragging them along tied to moving vehicles, beating, isolation in tiny, windowless cells and total deprivation."

An article in the June 14 *Bombay Economic and Political Weekly* described the conditions of women political prisoners in Indonesia. The largest detention center for women is in Plantungan in Central Java, where 386 women are known to be held. Others are the Bukit Duri Women's Prison in Jakarta and the Bulu Women's Prison in Semarang. It is estimated that more than 1,000 women are being held without trial.

Many of the women now in detention were members of Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia—Indonesian Women's Movement), which was banned in 1965. Some were trade-union activists or members of the PKI. According to the report, a trial of some Gerwani leaders has been scheduled.

"The tortures inflicted against women," the correspondent for the *Economic and Political Weekly* said, "include beatings, attacks with knives or daggers, burning with cigarettes, being trampled upon, pummeling of breasts for women who are still suckling babies, and insertion of implements into the vagina. Sexual assault is a particular hazard to which women have been subjected."

Following the January 1974 student protests in Jakarta during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, about 850 persons were arrested. Most were later released. According to the International Commission of Jurists, 42 of these political prisoners, most of them intellectuals and students, were still being held as of December 1974. Hariman Siregar, the chairman of the University of Indonesia students council, was the only one to have been charged and brought to trial.

Tapol has called for international protests in defense of Indonesian political prisoners. The committee noted that the international defense efforts so far were a factor in forcing Indonesian authorities to promise the release of all category "C" prisoners. □

Tens of Thousands Still Held, Tortured

Indonesia's Political Prisoners—A Decade Later

Almost a decade after the October 1965 military coup that brought General Suharto to power, Indonesia's jails and prison camps are still filled with tens of thousands of political prisoners.

Tapol,* the British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners, estimates that there are at present about 70,000 political prisoners throughout Indonesia, most of whom have been held without trial since 1965. Other estimates range as high as 100,000.

A representative of Tapol, Carmel Budiardjo, recently toured several cities in the United States in defense of Indonesian political prisoners. A British citizen married to a member of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI—Indonesian Communist party), Budiardjo was arrested in 1968 and imprisoned for three years.

A pamphlet published by Tapol, *Indonesia: The Prison State*, describes the conditions and legal status of the prisoners. It notes that after the 1965 right-wing coup, "the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and all related or allegedly related organizations were declared illegal and widescale arrests took place. Then followed the horrendous massacres in the latter months of 1965 and early 1966 during which an estimated one million people were killed."

General Suharto set up Kopkamtib (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) immediately after the coup. It gave military commanders at all levels the power to arrest anyone for political reasons. The witch-hunt against PKI members and sympathizers continued

for years; as late as 1973, "mopping up" operations were still under way in the Celebes islands (see *Intercontinental Press*, December 3, 1973, p. 1381).

The charges against the prisoners are vague: "direct or indirect involvement" with the PKI or any other banned organization or with the September 30, 1965, alleged putsch attempt against the military leadership (which was used as a pretext for the rightist coup). Political prisoners are deprived of all legal counsel and have no way to challenge their arrests.

The prisoners are divided into three categories. Category "A" prisoners are charged with "direct involvement" in the 1965 events and are slated to be brought to trial. According to official statements, about 800 have been tried since 1966; it is thought that about 2,000 in this category are still awaiting trial.

"There are virtually no acquittals and most of the sentences range from fifteen years to life, with a number of death sentences. . . . There must be several hundred *tapols* being held under death sentence, awaiting replies to their appeals for commutation."

Category "B" includes prisoners against whom there is insufficient evidence to bring to trial. But "for security reasons," they are not released. These prisoners are subject to "ideological rehabilitation."

The category "C" prisoners are slated to be released. At first the regime claimed that all category "C" prisoners had been released by the beginning of 1972, but in September 1974 Prosecutor-General Gen. Ali Said admitted that the release of the category "C" prisoners would take until "the end of 1975."

There are hundreds of prison camps

*Tapol is an acronym for the Indonesian term *tahanan politik* (political prisoner). The address of the organization is 103 Tilehurst Road, Wandsworth Common, London SW18, Britain.

Massive Shift to the Left Shown by Italian Elections

By Livio Maitan

[The following article appeared in the June 30 issue of *Bandiera Rossa*, the fortnightly newspaper of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist Groups, the Italian section of the Fourth International). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

The question whether the Italian bourgeoisie could hope to find a solution to its crisis of leadership and lay the bases for a restabilization was answered by the June 15 elections with a more resounding "no" than anyone expected. Far from recovering from the blow it received in the divorce referendum, the Christian Democracy has suffered a still harder one. It retains only a thin plurality and has now been passed by the Communist party in almost all the larger cities, in all the more dynamic sections of the country.

If the drop in its percentage of the vote did not reach absolutely catastrophic proportions, this was because the Christian Democrats managed to partially make up for their losses by winning votes from the right. But now there is no further room for maneuver in this direction. The Partito Liberale [Liberal party, the classical right] has been pruned back to its roots, and the MSI [Movimento Sociale Italiano—Italian Social Movement] and nationalist right bloc has been cut down to size. Altogether, the right accounts for less than 10 percent of the vote.

June 15 marked the most radical shift in the relationship of forces since the establishment of the republic. It has shown that, far from ebbing, the great processes that have taken place in the country during the last seven years have reached a higher level of ripeness and are now reflected clearly even in the distorting mirror of bourgeois elections.

This vote has confirmed that the working class retains its combative spirit and remains determined to exert its increased specific social weight, that the radicalization among the petty bourgeoisie is continuing to spread, and that significant movements are taking form even among the traditionally most backward peasant strata. The appearance at the polls for the first time of the generation that has come of age in the crisis probably accentuated these results, but this was not the principal cause of the shift in the relationship of forces.

After the great struggles of 1972-73 shipwrecked Andreotti's attempt at restoring a



CP LEADER BERLINGUER: Still waiting for partner for "historic compromise."

strong bourgeois government, the persistent combativity in these last months and the political ripening of the working class and other exploited strata of the working people created the preconditions for June 15. This election marked the stunning collapse of the attempt initiated two years ago when Fanfani returned to the leadership of the Christian Democrats and undertook the latest in the innumerable versions of the Center-Left.

Fanfani deluded himself and may have deluded some groups in the ruling class about the possibility of reinforcing his position through an aggressive electoral campaign. A success would have enabled him to advance with greater consistency and authority the policy that he outlined in the past year. From the standpoint of the bourgeoisie, it was a policy that produced indisputable results (imposition of the economic policy pushed by the Bank of Italy, the launching of the Reale bill, the relative success of the delegated decrees). But these were partial successes, completely insufficient to restabilize the situation and consolidate a new leadership.

June 15 swept away any such illusions, and now the bourgeoisie and those political groups that most represent it find themselves in a vastly more difficult situation, marked by a further shift in the relation-

ship of forces in favor of the working class.

There is scarcely any need to point out the importance of the fact that all the left parties and groups taking part in the elections contributed to this result. While the PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano—Italian Communist party] was by far the greatest beneficiary of the massive shift to the left, the PSI [Partito Socialista Italiano—Italian Socialist party] also showed a notable advance, and the scores of the far left—Democrazia Proletaria and similar slates—were by no means insignificant, especially in the important political centers (the case of Milan needs no explanation).

As quickly became clear from the comment in the most representative newspapers and magazines, even before the various leaders had taken positions, the bourgeoisie found itself facing difficulties considerably graver than at any time in the last thirty years. In the present state of things, no one can see how these contradictions can be overcome.

The principal contradiction lies in the fact that the most influential groups in the ruling class are convinced that the Christian Democracy is a worn-out instrument. They see the disadvantages increasing as the results decline. The Christian Democracy appears less and less able to maintain or regain the hegemony over broad strata of the masses that it achieved following the war. But at the same time, they cannot fail to see that no other instrument exists that has the slightest credibility and that there is no perspective for the situation changing radically in the short term.

On the other hand, the editorial writers for the big papers—from *il Messaggero* to *Corriere della Sera*—have been quick to talk about the need for "change" and "renewal." But when they have to go beyond bromides and take concrete positions, give specific indications, then they become totally vacuous, or reach the brilliant conclusion that there is no other alternative than the Center-Left.

A situation in which the dominant party of the ruling class is in such a profound crisis and no real alternatives are shaping up can lead to a crisis of the system. However, the relationship of forces and tendencies in play in this phase prevent the bourgeoisie from making a fundamental change in its methods of rule.

Of course, there will be more right-wing extremist tendencies than ever, more

putschists, terrorist conspirators, and more organizers of goon squads against the workers and students. But the possibility that substantial sectors of the ruling class may choose the perilous road of putsches and attempts to establish dictatorships can be excluded. Such moves would be all too likely to end in pitiful failures and in a further disintegration of the apparatuses of the system. Or if they were more serious they could unleash a civil war with enormous repercussions for all of capitalist Europe.

So, it is likely that after all the moaning and groaning about short-lived maneuvers and minimanuevers, after all the denunciations of the policy pursued hitherto and how disastrous these methods were, the same old shows will be staged for the nth time. The status quo will be prolonged by the force of inertia, with a danger that the situation may sour completely. On the other hand, it does not seem likely that the bourgeoisie will translate all these calls for change into action by taking the only concrete option it has left, that is, accepting the reformist proposal of a historic compromise.

From a general objective standpoint,

June 15 could bring about a ripening of the conditions for the historic compromise, given the sharpening political crisis, the absence of credible alternatives, and the increased weight of the PCI. But to judge from the indications that have appeared in the first days after the elections, no section of the bourgeoisie is ready to cross the Rubicon.

The diminished Christian Democracy will be still more restricted by its right-wing electoral base and by the need to defend the vested interests from which it draws its strength fundamentally. Moreover, in the context of the radicalization and politicization that led to the June 15 results and were accelerated by them, the great fear of the Christian Democrats and the bourgeoisie is that even the historic compromise will prove unable to hold back and canalize the mass movements. To the contrary, this turn could open still wider breaches in the system's political structures. It could aggravate the social imbalances and make them explosive.

Thus, more than in any other period since the start of the great crisis in 1968, the bourgeoisie finds itself in a vicious circle. It

realizes that grand initiatives and radical turns are called for. But it is incapable of making such moves, not because of any lack of understanding of the need, but because of the risks involved, which are by no means imaginary. Their dilemma does not spring from subjective failings; it is an intrinsic, objective one.

Having emerged strengthened from the electoral test, the workers movement must not let its enemy get the truce required to reorganize. The workers movement must keep on the heels of the class enemy with its struggles. It must not operate within the framework of reformist reasoning, which in the last analysis is illusory, but adopt the perspective of mobilizations with an anticapitalist dynamic. It must struggle not only to bury the Center-Left. It must reject all solutions that involve new forms of collaboration with the ruling class, such as the historic compromise. It must offer a general, anticapitalist alternative. Its fundamental perspective must be for a workers government capable of imposing a working-class solution to the crisis that has originated in the growing contradictions of capitalist society. □

Kremlin Threatens to Transfer Moroz to Psychiatric Prison

By Marilyn Vogt

Moscow officials are preparing to transfer Ukrainian historian Valentyn Moroz from Vladimir prison to a prison-hospital for compulsory psychiatric care, according to recent reports from the Soviet Union.

Moroz was sentenced in November 1970 to nine years imprisonment and five years exile. His crime was to have written four essays upholding the social, cultural, and language rights of Ukrainians against Moscow's official policy of Russification.

After being subjected to extremely harsh conditions in Vladimir prison, including nearly two years of solitary confinement, Moroz began a hunger strike July 1, 1974. He continued to refuse food for 145 days, until November 22, 1974, when he was transferred to a cell with another prisoner.

Moroz suffers from heart, liver, and kidney disorders and lost forty-five pounds during the protest. In addition, he suffered internal injuries from the forced feeding. Yet after he ended the hunger strike he was neither hospitalized nor given (as far as is known) any special medical attention.

There has been little up-to-date news on his condition, but it is known that despite deliberate official neglect, his physical condition has been gradually improving.

Recently, however, Vladimir prison officials have begun to talk about moving Moroz to a hospital—not for medical care but for psychiatric treatment.

According to a report from the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners,* the Vladimir prison physician said Moroz requires psychiatric treatment because "a normal individual could not have endured a five-month hunger strike."

Kremlin officials have used similar bizarre and cynical analyses to justify ordering compulsory psychiatric treatment for other dissidents. Dissident communist Pyotr Grigorenko, for example, was said to be suffering from "reformist illusions," and mathematician Leonid Plyushch was told he was "as crazy as Grigorenko."

Behind this vicious abuse of psychiatric techniques is the Kremlin's drive to force the dissidents to recant. If a dissident, like Moroz, will not retract his views, the bureaucrats set out to ensure his physical and mental destruction.

Moroz, like S.I. Karavansky, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Ivan Dzyuba, and other prominent dissidents who have become victims of the Kremlin's repression, has defended the elementary democratic rights of Ukrainians, that is, the right of an oppressed people to retain their native language and culture.

A proponent of such a position is viewed as especially dangerous by the Stalinist bureaucrats because national oppression of

non-Russian peoples—Russification—is an explosive issue.

These opponents of Stalinism pose a particular threat because they have retrieved their own people's history from beneath the rubbish of official nonhistories, riddled with Stalinist falsifications. They have discarded the right-wing, pro-capitalist, and often profascist answers supplied by many émigré circles (whose literature appears to be relatively easy to obtain in the Soviet Union) and have arrived at the most "subversive" conclusion of all: Stalin and his successors do not, as they claim, represent the ideas of socialism, Lenin, and the October revolution but rather a vicious distortion of this tradition.

On the national question the dichotomy between Lenin's policy of Ukrainization and Stalin's policy of Russification is glaring. And, as Moroz said in his essay "In the Midst of the Snows," among Ukrainians consciousness of this dichotomy is quite widespread. Those who articulate this position are potential poles of attraction for popular unrest.

Activities in defense of Moroz, carried out internationally during his hunger strike, must now be resumed with renewed effort. The threat that he may be incarcerated in a psychiatric prison-hospital should be protested by supporters of democratic rights everywhere. □

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A 'Climate of Terror' in the Streets of Santiago

By Jean-Pierre Beauvais

[The following article, the first in a series of four, appeared in the May 9 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly, *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Nineteen months of military dictatorship, misery, and terror. Nineteen months of counterrevolution, during which an entire people have seen their hopes destroyed. For those whose whole activity has been devoted simply to surviving—that is, the great majority—it has been an eternity.

There have been many changes during this period. Comrades and friends have died or disappeared, in the camps or in exile. The faces one recognizes are tired and aged. There is calm and silence everywhere—the silence of the crowds in the streets; the silence of the army of beggars that has invaded the downtown areas; the silence of the walls, all carefully painted over so that no trace remained of the mobilizations of the past.

As of April 1975, 20.5 percent of the working population were unemployed, with no unemployment compensation, to be sure. Sixty percent of the workers who have been spared unemployment were getting the minimum wage for a forty-nine-hour work-week. (The minimum wage is 80,000 escudos [US\$21] a month.) The inflation for the last twelve months was 527 percent. The productive apparatus—the durable consumer goods sector—is operating at 45 percent of its capacity. And to achieve that—for the two are inseparably linked—more than 30,000 persons were killed, 25,000 were deported or imprisoned, and more than 200,000 have fled into exile.

This is the end result of the work of Pinochet; the Chilean officers; and their North American advisers, who more or less discreetly are now scurrying about in Santiago.

But what is the meaning of such figures, such percentages, for the Chilean people? What does it mean to live on 80,000 escudos a month?

At the end of March, after a new "readjustment," a liter of milk cost 900 escudos, a kilo of bread 850 escudos. A kilo of medium-grade meat cost about 5,000 escudos. The great majority of working-class women have lost their jobs or been forced to give up working because of the elimination of most child-care centers in the working-class



PINOCHET: Worried about the unemployed losing "good work habits."

neighborhoods or because of their prohibitive cost.

Thus the 80,000 escudos a month is in most cases the only source of income for the whole family—not to mention the fact that very often a person who is "lucky" enough to keep his job must help maintain his parents or friends who have nothing, or elderly persons whose pensions have lost up to 90 percent of their purchasing power through inflation.

In fact, there are very few Chilean workers and their families who eat enough after the tenth of each month. How many of those hundreds and thousands of sad and humiliated women who come downtown on this or that day to beg near the hotels lodging foreigners were workers and activists, mobilized in the struggle for a better world, before the coup of September 11, 1973?

Whether or not one can work, whether or not one can get a square meal—these are not the only preoccupations of the Chileans. Every aspect of daily life is a problem—for example, getting around in Santiago, one of the most sprawling cities in the world. A bus ride cost half an escudo at

the time of the coup. Today, one must spend 350 escudos! Taking the bus has become a luxury available only to a minority. A worker who makes a roundtrip from his home to the factory every day has spent one-fifth of his pay by the end of the month. So every morning and evening crowds of pedestrians can be seen in all the neighborhoods. It is common to walk two hours to go to work, and two hours to return home after working ten hours in the shop.

Reading a newspaper has also become a luxury. Even the worst rag costs 500 escudos. A weekly sells for 2,000 escudos. It is easy to figure out what that costs in a month. So there are continual queues around the kiosks to read the front pages.

The response of the officers, in fact their policy, can be summed up in two words: *terror* and *cynicism*.

Above all, terror. Although there is no organized force that constitutes a serious threat to the regime in the immediate future, the repression, which is massive yet selective at the same time, continues with the same intensity. Every night there is a curfew throughout the country. Residential areas are cordoned off and systematically searched, with helicopters flying overhead beforehand. The police raids and arrests are given enormous publicity.

All of this has a very precise function. Apart from their immediate effects, such operations conducted consistently and on a daily basis are aimed at making the whole population feel concretely the weight and the reality of the repressive apparatus. The aim of maintaining this climate of terror is to discourage any form of opposition, no matter how modest or politically limited it may be.

The cynicism of the official propaganda surpasses the imagination.

At the beginning of April, the Chilean junta became alarmed at the debacle of its North American defenders in Vietnam and Cambodia and decided to go on the offensive. A great campaign was launched to adopt Vietnamese orphans, "victims of Communist barbarism." The press, radio, and television carried daily reports about how the "Reds" were eating abandoned children during their offensive.

A member of the junta made a speech on television hailing the humanist and Christian tradition of the Chilean people. He concluded that to save the children from this barbarism, each Chilean must consider

it his responsibility to adopt or pay the travel costs of one of these unfortunate Vietnamese!

In the same vein, the campaign to aid the unemployed must be mentioned. To "help" the hundreds of thousands of unemployed, the junta decreed that each municipality must hire in rotation and for a period of two months (so more people would benefit) several dozen (!) unemployed, mainly to sweep the streets.

Here too a great propaganda campaign was launched around this drop in the bucket. And in a very "official" manner, the officers explained that the central objective was not so much to give some income to those who were hired temporarily, but "to keep them from losing the habit of working, since good work habits are a precondition for a sound social structure."

The beastly terror and feeble-minded cynicism cannot make the Chileans forget the total failure of the officers and their economic and political policies. Quite the contrary.

The regime is now almost totally isolated, in a context of crisis and economic disorganization that is unprecedented in Chile. This is demonstrated by the fact that the *whole* of what remains of the Christian Democrats and the great majority of the Catholic hierarchy have gone over into open opposition.

But to conclude from this that the dictatorship will collapse by itself, the victim of its excesses, its incompetence, and its isolation, would be to feed on gossip and tragic illusions. Paradoxically, one of the junta's strengths even today is that by repressing the workers movement as it has, and by gagging bourgeois sectors opposed to its orientation, it has created a fantastic political vacuum. It is this vacuum that the terror is designed to maintain. In these conditions, there is virtually no credible alternative *in the short term*, either among opposing bourgeois elements or, even more so, in the labor movement.

Yet the outlines of a readjustment or even a realignment in the relationship of political forces are appearing. In the last analysis, the fate of the regime will depend on these embryonic phenomena as well as on the international and Latin American political situation.

[Next: The Christian Democrats Begin to Grumble]

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Forced to Confess to Phony 'Invasion'

Three PSP Members Tortured in Santo Domingo

Three supporters of the Puerto Rican independence movement, arrested in early June in the Dominican Republic, confessed to trumped-up charges of aiding a "guerrilla invasion" only after they were savagely tortured, they testified at a court hearing June 30.

In statements at the Santo Domingo hearing, the three prisoners—Raúl García, Johnny Sampson, and Angel Gandía—charged that they were beaten with rubber saps, given electric shocks, and kept naked and bound for two weeks until they agreed to sign the phony confessions. All three are members of the Puerto Rican Socialist party (PSP).

The hearing capped a series of disclosures that have completely discredited the Balaguer regime's assertion that it is the victim of a powerful guerrilla-warfare operation, imported from nearby Cuba.

Sweeping repressive measures started with a June 5 roundup of more than 300 opponents of the Balaguer regime and an official announcement two days later that a band of guerrillas had invaded the island. Dominican authorities claimed that Claudio Caamaño, Torbio Peña Jáquez, Manfredo Casado Villar, and other unnamed Dominican rebels had been transported from Cuba and dropped off somewhere near San José de Ocoa. (See *Intercontinental Press*, June 23, p. 858.)

On June 11, Juan Bosch, former president of the Dominican Republic and leader of the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD—Dominican Liberation party), announced that three Puerto Ricans had been arrested off the coast of the Dominican Republic. They were accused of having transported Caamaño and the others from Aguadillas, Puerto Rico, in a fishing boat.

The story that the guerrillas had been brought from Cuba was quietly dropped.

Puerto Rican attorneys who flew to the Dominican capital to defend the three prisoners could get no information on their clients.

Then a United Press International dispatch, published in the June 24 issue of the New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario*, reported that García, Sampson, and Gandía had confessed to the charges. At a news conference held at a military installation, the three prisoners said they had acted under orders from the PSP.

The habeas corpus hearing for the three on June 30 placed the story in an entirely different light.

The prisoners testified that they were tortured and constantly threatened with death during their detention. Hence the

"confessions" and the staged news conference.

Sampson said that in addition to the other tortures, he was threatened with castration and told that his wife would be a young widow. All three were threatened with being thrown out of an airplane, shot, or simply made to disappear, Gandía testified.

The prisoners were promised that they would be returned to Puerto Rico if they signed a statement saying they had brought Caamaño and the two other rebels to the Dominican Republic.

Explaining how they happened to be on Dominican soil, Sampson and García said that they had accompanied Gandía on an expedition to survey Mona Island in the channel between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. They were attempting to confirm reports that the United States had begun constructing a superport there.

There has been ongoing protest in Puerto Rico over U.S. plans to build such a facility, which would pose a serious ecological threat to the region.

Bad weather drove their boat off course. They were lost and running out of fuel when they met a fisherman who told them that the Dominican town of La Romana was nearby. They were in La Romana refueling the boat and buying provisions when they were arrested.

In addition to the "invasion" charge, at the habeas corpus hearing García, Sampson, and Gandía were also accused of trafficking in drugs. The district attorney produced no evidence to substantiate either charge, but claimed that on the political charge, he considered the confessions sufficient proof.

Protests in Puerto Rico against the frame-up have begun to mount. The 15,000-member Teamsters Union has announced that it will not move any cargo destined for the Dominican Republic until the prisoners are returned to Puerto Rico. Rubén Berríos, the president of the Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño (PIP—Puerto Rican Independence party), made an appeal for setting aside ideological differences to defend the human rights of García, Sampson, and Gandía. Even the bourgeois daily *San Juan Star* made an editorial appeal that the rights of the three be guaranteed.

Meanwhile, almost one month after the alleged guerrilla landing, not a shred of evidence has been presented to confirm the presence in the Dominican Republic of Caamaño, Peña Jáquez, Casado Villar, or any other members of the phantom guerrilla band. □

A Bad Year for Banzer

By Alicia Mamani

[The following article appeared in the May issue of the revolutionary-socialist monthly *Revista de América*, published in Buenos Aires. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The year 1975 got off to a bad start for the Bolivian dictatorship. In the first part of January, Colonel Miguel Ayoroa (a former Banzer minister) called for a coup, and ex-president Hernán Siles Zuazo secretly entered the country, causing a new political crisis. This led Banzer to make an unexpected tour of inspection through the military garrisons. A few days later the closing of the miners' radio stations, and along with them Radio Pío XII, property of the church, suddenly aggravated the conflict between the church and the government. And, above all, the regime suffered a harsh political defeat at the hands of the miners, who launched a strike of unspecified duration, demanding the return of their radio stations, a strike that lasted two weeks and forced Banzer to retreat.

While the miners' strike marked another possible ascending wave of struggles—momentarily at a standstill during the second half of 1974—the clash with the church has continued to worsen rapidly in recent days with the expulsion of two priests¹ and the campaign for 100,000 signatures organized in response by an ecclesiastical "Justice and Peace" commission.

Everything points toward continued deepening of the already serious crisis of the regime and the rise of workers and people's struggles. This makes it all the more necessary to study and analyze Bolivian reality carefully to prepare the theoretical tools that will enable us to construct what is undeniably the basic need of the Bolivian workers: a revolutionary party, armed with a correct program and method, enabling them to gain power.

In this short article we are not trying to go beyond the necessary discussion about the Bolivian reality—more precisely, about one part of that reality: the character of the



Guardian

crisis of the regime and the ruling classes as a whole.

The relative economic expansion of recent years—achieved thanks to the influx of capital, the superexploitation of labor, and favorable export business—did not benefit the entire bourgeoisie. Some sectors of it, most of all the powerful mining bourgeoisie, found themselves displaced from a share of the profits. And if interbourgeois frictions began there, the revival of struggles starting in 1973 ended up undermining the unity of the bourgeoisie and the stability of the regime. It was this very rise of struggles that marked the division of the exploiters into two main camps—the "oficialistas" [supporters of the Banzer regime] and the "institucionalistas" [those favoring liberalization].

Oficialistas in Trouble

The pro-Banzer camp is made up of the vigorous Santa Cruz agribusiness bourgeoisie (main beneficiary of the government's economic policy); Brazilian and imperialist sectors; and at least for now, the new bourgeois sectors born in the heat of the economic expansion of recent years, which are partially a subproduct of the growth of agribusiness. The military hierarchy, the majority of officers of the armed forces (primarily the air force and the navy), and the Falange Socialista Boliviana [FSB—Bolivian Socialist Phalanx]—the traditional party of the Santa Cruz bourgeoisie—obey these sectors.

Their position is expressed very well in the January 7 issue of *El Diario*, which says that "there is an error of perspective among those who expect to benefit by changing the 'schema.' This convulsion is the extremely serious evil that has always stopped the progress of the country, leading it to a terrible crossroads."

In other words, to make concessions would mean a greater mobilization of the masses instead of a brake on them. A "democratic" change would lead us again to place "the institutions in danger of being superseded by the eruption of events." That is why it is necessary to close ranks around the dictatorship, because at least "if it is feasible to point to a positive result . . . of the current government, it is none other than the painfully achieved political and social stability."

In summary, the oficialista wing believes that the only solution to the current crisis is to smash the masses. Moreover it is not willing, for now at least, to make "democratic" or "nationalist" concessions, because it knows that they would go directly against its interests.

But Banzer is not in a position to carry forward his plans. Each of his steps in that direction has ended up in the most disgraceful retreat. Perhaps the two clearest examples were the rowdy demolition of the ultrareactionary *Nuevo Orden* in November 1974—a fruit of the miners' strike—and the victory of the miners' strike itself.

Other reflections of this weakness include the "social pact" launched in February of this year (which apparently was stillborn), the attempts to establish agreements with the trade-union and peasant bureaucracies, the obvious incapacity to repress the bourgeois and military opposition, and so on. Banzer's only more or less "popular" card—to win an outlet to the sea²—has not succeeded in unifying the bourgeoisie or giving it prestige within the armed forces. On the contrary, the failures and erosion of the oficialista position have given increased weight to the "institucionalistas" inside and outside the armed forces. Even the unconditional defenders of the oficialistas are beginning to seek another solution.

The opposition is made up of a wide range of parties, personalities, and institutions: from the main bourgeois party, the MNR³—party of the mining bourgeoisie with influence among the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and even among layers of the working class—and other smaller parties like the PRA, PDC, PSD, MNRI, and so

1. A Belgian and Canadian priest were expelled from Bolivia on March 14. The Justice and Peace Commission said the action was taken because of the two priests' role in publishing *La Masacre del Valle*, a description of a January 1974 confrontation that occurred between the army and the peasants of the Cochabamba Valley.—IP

2. Bolivia lost its outlet to the Pacific as a result of the War of the Pacific (1879–1884) with Chile. The issue has been a source of friction between the two countries ever since.—IP

3. Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—Revolutionary Nationalist Movement.—IP

forth; to the church, the Confederación de Abogados [Lawyers Confederation], the Cámara de la Minería Chica [Small Miners Bureau], and sectors of officialdom—above all of the army.


The position of the “institucionalistas” focuses on the need to initiate a bourgeois democratic course—or at least a nationalist one—right now, before the masses take the entire system apart. Thus they hope to be able to create illusions and false expectations that can derail the upsurge.

But the problem facing the opposition is the absence of a solid party or figure of sufficient prestige with the masses. This is the main problem of the entire exploiting class. The only real mass party, the MNR, is very discredited and divided by deep internal disputes. The most diverse positions are voiced within it: from the almost oficialista line of the Fortún Suárez sector, or the negotiators of its central core (composed of the two branches led by Paz Estenssoro and Ciro Humboldt, which are momentarily reunified under the leadership of Paz), to those of the “left,” who are supported by some sectors of the ranks linked to the workers movement or to the students. Not one of the other opposition parties has sufficient social, economic, or political weight to group the rest of the opposition around it or around a common program.

The opposition already has a body (a certain mass base, support in the armed forces and in the political parties) and legs (the support of some bourgeois sectors, like the mining sector), but it still does not have a head. And if the MNR at present cannot become its head, neither can any “nationalist” figure in the army. The only solid, prestigious institution with sufficient social and political weight left is the church. That is why the church has taken on a growing role as the shock troops of the “institucionalistas” against Banzer. The church, possessing an acute political instinct and centuries of experience in the art of protecting its interests, knows very well that Banzer is no longer any guarantee and that not only the opposition but also the bourgeoisie and the imperialists as a whole lack a sure card to play. The church is perfectly willing to try to fill the vacuum, but preferably not by itself.

The action of the “Justice and Peace” commission, along with the encouragement given to “radicalized” sectors like the Oblates, promoted by the ultrareactionary Catholic hierarchy, does not flow from

4. Partido Revolucionario Auténtico—Authentic Revolutionary party; Partido Demócrata-Cristiano—Christian Democratic party; Partido Social Demócrata—Social Democratic party; Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda—Left Revolutionary Nationalist Movement.—IP



Mundo

BANZER

sudden sympathies for the masses (whom they helped to smash in 1971). It flows from the need to create the conditions for a change that the church views as urgent.

Thus, there are two reasons why the dictatorship still has not fallen in spite of its weakness and all the sudden attacks it has been suffering. In the first place—and this is the essential determining reason—the masses have not yet totally recuperated from the consequences of the 1971 defeat. In the second place, the bourgeoisie as a whole does not yet have an alternative to the present deteriorating regime.

Up to now neither the opposition nor those in office have been able to find a solution to this dilemma. In addition, it is undeniable that imperialism and strong sectors of the bourgeoisie, lacking a better card to play, prefer Banzer for now. This, although it is very “costly” for them socially and politically (and also, in a certain sense, economically, given the luxuriating bureaucratic apparatus that has developed), assures them of fabulous profits, which they would have to share under another regime.

Aligned with these interests are the military hierarchy and the immense state and repressive bureaucracies, linked to those in office and to various sectors of that same bourgeoisie that stubbornly refuses any change.

In the last few days the confrontation between the church and the government seems to have reached fresh intensity. The Catholic hierarchy refused to invite mem-

bers of the government to Holy Week ceremonies. New pronouncements and the “discovery” made by the archbishop of La Paz, Jorge Manrique, that the government is a “military dictatorship” are added to the demands of the Confederación de Abogados for immediate elections and to the public reappearance of Colonel Miguel Ayrooa. Referring to his famous document “A Soldier’s Words”—a virtual call for a coup—Ayrooa ratified all its ideas and said that “what you write with your hand you don’t erase with your elbow.”

Offensive of the ‘Institucionalistas’

These are all very clear signs of a new offensive by the “institucionalista” sectors. Internationally the “freezing” of relations with Chile following the well-publicized Charaña meeting and the rapprochement with Argentina and Venezuela, and domestically the legalization of professional and academic groupings (although not of parties and trade unions), the proposal of the social pact, and the negotiations with the bureaucracy, reflect this new change in the relationship of forces between the two factions of the bourgeoisie, which favors the “institucionalistas.”

Undoubtedly, there is a greater chance for a coup giving rise, for example, to a new Ovando-type regime that would make populist concessions to the masses and engage in a certain anti-imperialist rhetoric in order to renegotiate Bolivian dependency with the Yankees. Above all, the chances of a coup are greater since the miners’ strike—this ought to be analyzed in detail—which has probably contributed to an important degree in bringing into question the stability of the Banzer regime.

The workers have shown with their struggles—from the peasant mobilizations in Cochabamba to the miners’ strike—that they are the only ones willing to consistently move against the dictatorship. To place any confidence in the bourgeoisie and military suddenly becoming transformed into “democrats” is to betray the workers and to aid in once again sharpening the knife of reaction, hiding the reality from the workers and contributing toward another August 21, 1971.⁶

The Bolivian working class must take up

5. On February 8 Banzer and Chilean President Augusto Pinochet met in Charaña. Following the meeting, Banzer shifted his line of demagogy on relations with Chile. Instead of the former saber rattling on the question of an outlet to the sea, Banzer spoke of the “brotherhood” of South Americans and said that Bolivia’s previous “recriminations against those who now possess those territories . . . has not been a good path.”—IP

6. On August 19–22, 1971, Banzer led a military coup that ousted the government of Juan José Torres.—IP

the struggle—and it has already begun to do so—against the dictatorship and for regaining democratic rights. On this path the working class must not write off unity in action with any forces amenable to such an objective. On the contrary, such unity must be promoted. But, at the same time, the Bolivian working class must remain alert to the fact that neither “revolutionary nationalism,” bourgeois democracy, nor any sort of “social pact” provides a radical solution to its problems. From this it follows that, while it is fighting the Banzer regime along with sectors that today are raising the banners of democracy and nationalism, it must not have the slightest confidence in them, nor form political fronts with them. Such fronts will sooner or later stifle their inner drive and energy for mobilizing in a revolutionary way.

A guide is needed on this road, a guide thoroughly aware that the workers' struggle does not end with the achievement of economic, democratic, and nationalist gains. The correct concept is that the struggle must go forward continually, permanently, toward the winning of a workers and peasants government that will begin the construction of a socialist Bolivia. Such a guide can only be a revolutionary party deeply rooted in the workers and mass movement. This party—as was shown by the failure of the entire left when it was confronted with the Banzer coup—is still to be built. That is the most urgent task for all who claim to be for the workers' cause. □

Report on Brazil

The Geisel Government and the Economic Situation

By Luiza Maranhão

[The following is the first of two parts of an article that appeared in the April issue of the revolutionary-socialist monthly *Revista de América*, published in Buenos Aires. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

RIO DE JANEIRO—The government of General Ernesto Geisel is taking on more and more characteristics of classic bonapartism. Faced with an economic crisis and the recovery of the mass movement, it has no alternative but to try to balance between the different discontented sectors of the bourgeoisie and the imperialists. Seeking a way out of the crisis, it tries at the same time to neutralize the middle class and to win over sectors of it and of the working class.

Under pressure of the economic situation and of export needs, the Geisel government was forced to join the chorus opposing the U.S. Trade Act. Brazil's response to the Trade Act was delayed, but it occurred.

According to the letter General Geisel sent to Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez, the new U.S. foreign trade law represents “a restatement of traditional positions tending to freeze the current international distribution of wealth and economic power.”

This tendency toward a more “left” position in international policy (relative to the totally pro-Yankee imperialist policy of Médici [Geisel's predecessor]) has already been pointed out by us—in the case of the Portuguese African colonies, for example—but now it has begun to be concretized clearly in relation to Latin America.

This change in foreign policy could exercise a considerable influence in the relationship of forces in Latin America, tending to strengthen the bourgeois nationalist governments like those in Peru and Venezuela.

On a national level, the principal government measures were related to the workers movement and had clear populist aims.

First came the 43% wage increase for all workers, readjustable in January. It came when collective bargaining in disputes adjudicated by the labor courts was winning at most a 37% increase. This increase was quite different from those of recent years, which ranged between 16% and 18%. It even confirmed the correctness of our line when in December, basing ourselves on the

metalworkers' demand, we asked for an across-the-board increase of 40%.

With this increase, the government managed to make wage norms for the whole country uniform, blocking adjustments resulting from free negotiations between bosses and workers and thus downgrading the role of the unions.

Although this wage rise was a victory for the working class, it in no way makes up for the buying power lost since the new wage system went into effect in 1965.

After the increase came other populist measures. Geisel personally visited trade-union vacation spots and chatted and ate with various leaders. Something unheard-of in the almost eleven years of dictatorship.

But this was not all. He began to rescind the take-overs of unions (for example, those of the metalworkers and bank workers in Guanabara) and promised to “morally reform” the INPS (National Social Security Institute), blaming the doctors for the notorious functioning of the state body.

In addition to these populist measures, a not very veiled attempt was made in accordance with the bonapartist policy to nationalize Light, the only big foreign-owned industry in the infrastructural sector. The government strengthened its position in the metallurgical field by loaning 1 billion cruzeiros [about US\$130 million] to Amazon Steel and Iron Works.

Justice Minister Armando Fação's “show” about the discovery of Communist party printshops and the arrest of some activists' occurred in this context.

Trotsky said that bonapartists always resort to demonstrative “shows” to maintain the class equilibrium and to intimidate specific sectors. And that clearly was the objective of the fascist-like spectacle shown on television, when the minister warned of “subversive” activities and denounced the activities of the CP and “totalitarian” tendencies.

As we said, a bonapartist policy consists of making concessions to the mass movement, repressing its vanguard, replacing its representative bodies, taking advantage of periods of downturn to behold it, since in

1. In a broadcast January 30, Fação reported the arrest of fourteen alleged members of the banned Communist party and the discovery of two printing plants where CP literature was being produced. He warned against those who attempt to “poison the minds of the uninitiated, disturb the peace, and interrupt our progress.”—IP

Intercontinental Press

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periods of mass mobilization or upsurge the political conditions for maintaining the repression do not exist. Thus, the denunciation of the CP's activity with its entire sequel of intimidation came after the 43% wage increase and two days before the Carnival.

At the same time, the accusation that the CP had participated in the November 15 elections specifically favoring some candidates had these aims: to raise the specter of bans, serving notice on the "auténticos" of the MDB [Movimento Democrático Brasileiro—Brazilian Democratic Movement, the official bourgeois opposition party] while holding the trump card of negotiations with the "adesista" wing of the MDB on collaboration with the government.

All these events of the first months of this year only confirm the tendency that has become more accentuated since Geisel took office in 1974. That year was marked by a worsening of the economic situation in the country with the exhaustion of the Delfim Neto-Garrastazu Médici model, the increase of internal contradictions among the bourgeoisie, and the recuperation of the mass movement. A more detailed balance sheet of what happened in 1974 will confirm this characterization.

Like all semicolonial countries, Brazil is economically dependent on imperialism.

Under the semifascist government of Garrastazu Médici (1969-73) that dependence increased in an extraordinary way. The tendency to turn the national economy over primarily to the North American imperialists deepened.

Under semifascist rule the bourgeoisie's "economic miracle" was based on several factors: heavy imperialist investments, superexploitation of the workers, credit extended to sections of the middle class to create a restricted internal market, stimulation of exports, foreign indebtedness (in 1974 US\$18 billion), and taking advantage of the unused capacity of industry. But the world crisis of capitalism has exhausted this model. This has brought an end to semifascist rule and the installation of what we characterize as a government in transition to classical bonapartism. In such a period structural characteristics are maintained, but on a conjunctural level many things begin to be modified.

These changes in economic policy put into effect by Geisel have been accompanied by increasing internal contradictions among the bourgeoisie and the recovery of the mass movement.

To prevent the international crisis from affecting the country, the government is favoring some sectors that were almost abandoned for the last five years (like the national bourgeoisie and part of the rural oligarchy). In that way Geisel is trying to adjust the relation between imperialist

industries and private national and state enterprises, the aim being to strengthen the second two and better diversify the former.

• With regard to imperialist industries, the government is providing less incentives



GEISEL

for automobiles and household electric goods, while it is stimulating the production of tractors and trucks and the penetration of the countryside by agrobusiness (for example, Volkswagen's investments in zebu production).

• With regard to national industry, further expansion is being attempted. It must be kept in mind that national capital is mainly linked to trade, civil construction, and soft consumer goods (foodstuffs, textiles, shoes, and so on). Essentially made up of small (5 to 100 workers) and medium (101 to 500) firms, national industry produces popular consumer goods almost exclusively and faces the problems of slow growth in demand and low profitability. Even so, in 1969, the last year for which statistics are available, these firms employed 63% of the work force and accounted for 56% of the value of industrial production. In addition, these firms comprise 98% of all industrial establishments. However, we must not forget that there are also some big firms owned by national capital.

An important fact to keep in mind are the denationalizations and bankruptcies of the Médici period. More than 3,000 national firms (small and medium-sized) went bankrupt.

Despite its economic weakness, the national bourgeoisie can play an important role in a period of international crisis.

Being aware of that, in 1974 the Geisel government took three fundamental steps to strengthen the national bourgeoisie: the creation of *Investibras* to provide federal resources for private national industries; *Embramec* to finance expansion plans of existing manufacturers and to create new national industries to produce machinery and equipment; and *Fibás* to provide up to 60% of the investment in national sectors handling certain minerals (aluminum, chlorine, sulfur, copper, etc.) that are more and more expensive on the world market.

Everything suggests that the steps taken up to now to strengthen some sectors of national industry are part of a tendency that will grow stronger in 1975.

• State industry, especially *Petrobrás* [Petróleo Brasileiro—Brazilian Petroleum], has, like private national industry, suffered constant pressure from imperialism. But in spite of that, the tendency is to strengthen *Petrobrás* as a state monopoly, to centralize the state industries handling semiprocessed goods (Usiminas, Cosipa, Siderúrgica Nacional, and Acesita) through *Sidebrás* or other entities, and to establish almost absolute control of the infrastructural sector.

Reforms carried out on the economic level by the Geisel government do not aim at liquidating dependency or at eliminating the structural disequilibriums of the Brazilian economy. The economy continues to be based on foreign debts, which, according to Finance Minister Mário Henrique Simonsen, was \$18 billion in 1974 and will be much bigger in 1975.

To adjust its balance of payments, the country will resort to foreign credit, using as a guarantee of payment not only its \$6 billion reserve but also fundamentally its mineral reserves, for example, the petroleum in Campos.

[To be continued]

Committee Formed in France to Defend Chilean Prisoners

A united committee for the defense of Chilean political prisoners has been established in France. The organization, *Amitiés Franco-Chiliennes*,* is an umbrella grouping that includes most of the Chile defense committees that have been active in France.

According to a report in the June 24 *Le Monde*, the committee is supported by all parties of the Chilean left and by the Chilean labor federation CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores—United Federation of Workers).

At a news conference in Paris June 20, a representative of the committee said that there are at present an estimated 6,000 political prisoners in Chile, including 1,000 women.

*3, rue de l'Abbaye, 75006 Paris, France.

Capitalism Fouls Things Up

Antinuclear Demonstrators Defy Clubs of Franco's Cops

By Judy White

Carlos Carrasco Muñoz, general secretary of the Asociación Española para la Ordenación del Medio Ambiente (AEORMA—Spanish Association for Environmental Planning), was arrested in León, Spain, June 14 at the order of the provincial governor.

No reason was given for the arrest. Carrasco had gone to the provincial capital to participate in a panel discussion on the environmental effects of nuclear power plants, scheduled to take place the following day.

The conference had been called by forty-four mayors of towns near Valencia de Don Juan (a city thirty-eight kilometers from León), where the Franco regime plans to build a nuclear plant. Invited to attend were neighborhood groups from all provinces affected by the proposed nuclear facilities.

AEORMA has spearheaded the opposition to nuclear-plant construction. At the end of 1974 it called a conference in Zaragoza, Aragón, to organize the campaign. One outcome of that conference was a protest march by several hundred farmers

in Huesca May 9 (see *Intercontinental Press*, June 16, p. 833).

On the eve of the León conference official permission by the governor to hold the event was denied, on the pretext that the request had been incorrectly addressed to "Whom It May Concern."

The response of the populace of Valencia de Don Juan was rapid and militant. On June 15, demonstrators poured into the streets calling for an end to plans to construct the nuclear plant, the governor's resignation, and Carrasco's release. Thirty mayors from another region met on the spot and drafted a declaration condemning the governor's actions. It said, in part:

"At no moment has there been any disturbance of public order, only a simple public display of our wishes. . . . We would be the first to decry any departure from our objective [to fill the information gap on the effects of nuclear power plants], and we specifically regret the whole series of prohibitions by the government that have only enhanced the possibility of such deviations."

Demonstrators decided to go in a car



caravan to León to continue the protest. One hundred vehicles carried them there, where they demonstrated at police headquarters, the governor's office, and on the main street of the city. At each place, armed police charged the protesters. More than twelve persons were injured, including the mayor of Valencia de Don Juan. Nine persons were arrested and fined from 10,000 to 25,000 pesetas (about US\$180 to \$450) each.

However, the protest won the release of Carrasco. He was freed June 17 after paying a 100,000 peseta fine, for allegedly having convoked the banned panel discussion. Carrasco pledged to continue the fight against the construction of nuclear power plants and to take action to prevent harassment of others interested in protecting the environment.

Residents of the province also expressed their determination to continue the struggle. The shopkeepers of Valencia de Don Juan circulated a leaflet warning that they would boycott big-business interests in León if they failed to support the campaign to prevent construction of the nuclear power plant. □



Mundo

Demonstrators in Valencia de Don Juan demanding release of Carlos Carrasco Muñoz.

The Cloud of Santo André

Air pollution has reached acute levels in São Paulo, Brazil's main industrial city. "Some days it's like night here, with smog that burns throats and eyes, withers plants and kills birds," Marvine Howe reported in the June 16 issue of the *New York Times*.

The city has nine million inhabitants and a growth rate of 6 percent yearly, yet lacks efficient pollution controls.

According to a report made by Nelson Nefussi, director of the São Paulo State Environment Agency, the giant city has "32,000 industrial establishments . . . mainly metallurgical, electrical, and communications, chemical and mechanical concerns," Howe said. More than a million vehicles circulate and there are "three municipal garbage incinerators, a thermoelectric plant, one commercial airport and two military airports."

Like Mexico City, Los Angeles, and

similar cities, São Paulo suffers from rather frequent atmospheric inversions in which polluted air becomes trapped at ground level. In the suburb of Tatuapé, for instance, an inversion occurred recently:

"The air was thick, white and acrid-smelling, with layers of smoke and dust. A visitor from out of town suffered a violent headache, dizziness and nausea. Residents complained of sore throats and smarting eyes."

For Tatuapé that was a record. The air pollution reached 54.9 percent—that is the percentage of polluted air in pure air. A still worse case occurred earlier:

"Pollution problems reached emergency proportions at the beginning of this month with what is referred to as the cloud of Santo André. Santo André is an industrial town of more than half a million inhabitants in Greater São Paulo, and has been plagued by problems of air and water pollution for several years.

"Around midnight on June 1, residents of Santo André recall, there was a terribly bitter smell that permeated all the houses. A black, stifling cloud was about 30 feet over the town.

"Firemen urged elderly people and children to leave the area. There was panic. Many fled their homes in nightclothes. Those who remained suffered breathing difficulties, fits of coughing and vomiting. About 3 A.M., the cloud disappeared. Later many pet birds were found dead."

The incident led to the National Environmental Agency deciding that there was "a need" for a national antipollution policy. It was announced that the agency's budget and staff would be increased.

It is dubious, however, that this will make any real difference. Francisco Fernando de Barros, a high official in the government, stressed that "viable technical and financial solutions must be found," Howe said, "and that they must 'not traumatize economic development.'"

UN Official Predicts Worldwide Epidemic

The world may face a global epidemic within ten years because of lack of urban planning.

The reason, according to the executive director of the United Nations Environmental Program, is that cities are growing so fast that sooner or later one of them will be unable to cope with water-supply and sewerage problems. The result will be an epidemic that will spread across the world.

The official, Maurice Strong, singled out fast-growing cities in the semicolonial countries as the places where a disaster was most likely to occur.

"Cities like Calcutta, Bombay, Lagos and cities in South America cannot continue the way they are going," he said June 3 at a news conference in Nairobi.

"The central services such as sewers and water supply in such places are just managing to cope and are postponing the day of reckoning by the skin of their teeth.

"It will take little in the way of a natural disaster such as a flood or human administrative breakdown to bring about catastrophe."

Too Much Free Coffee

Genoa, Italy, June 12 (UPI)—Coffee now and then is all right, but 150 cups a day is a bit too much, 300 residents of a suburb said today in a petition to Judge Mario Almerighi.

The citizens asked Almerighi to do something about a coffee-roasting plant in the area whose smoke has been giving many residents headaches and nausea. They said an analysis made by experts showed that each person living near the plant breathed an amount of caffeine fumes equivalent to 150 cups of coffee a day.

Almerighi said he would investigate.

Deadly Gas Forces Thousands to Flee Homes Near Munich

Thousands of persons had to be evacuated from their homes east of Munich June 16 as clouds of poison gas spread from blazing railway freight cars loaded with fertilizer. At least forty persons were overcome by fumes from the burning nitrophosphate fertilizer, which released a 500-foot-high cloud of deadly gas across the countryside.

More than 3,000 persons in the villages of Heimstätten, Feldkirchen, and Landsham were affected. Munich, a city with a population of more than one million, was spared. The wind happened to be blowing the other way.

Watch That Tap Water

Residents of Union, Connecticut, and the nearby town of Holland, Massachusetts, were advised June 13 to stop drinking tap water.

A reservoir and several private wells in the area were found to be tainted with toxic phenol. The source was 300 to 500 gallons of carboic acid spilled from a truck.

The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection saw no cause for alarm, since the phenol would eventually be dissipated in the water until it reached an acceptable level.

The Ozone Is Being Sprayed Away

Aerosol sprays using fluorocarbons as propellants should be banned. This is the conclusion of a federal study group formed in Washington to assess the threat from aerosol sprays to the earth's ozone shield.

In its report, made public June 12, the task force said that the threat from fluorocarbons was a "legitimate cause for con-



Pierotti/New York Post

cern." By depleting the ozone layer, aerosol sprays are allowing the more damaging wavelengths of ultraviolet light to penetrate the earth's atmosphere, thereby substantially increasing skin cancer.

The group recommended that use of these sprays be outlawed by 1978.

More Than 10 Persons a Day Die From Air Pollution in U.S.

The National Academy of Sciences estimates that air pollution causes 4,000 deaths and four million days of illness every year in the United States.

The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that, as of 1970, the monetary cost of air pollution in health and material damage probably amounted to more than \$12 billion a year.


Growing public pressure to curb this poisoning of the environment was revealed in a recent poll taken by the Louis Harris organization. Forty-six percent of those questioned in a national survey in March ranked air pollution fourth among "very serious" problems, after inflation, unemployment, and water pollution.

Brazil Signs \$4 Billion Agreement for West German Nuclear Reactors

The Brazilian government signed a \$4 billion nuclear pact with West Germany June 27. In exchange for supplying Brazil with nuclear-power-producing equipment, West Germany will gain access to Brazil's uranium ore. Brazil has the largest uranium reserves of any country in the world.

The pact was signed over Washington's objections that it could lead to a proliferation of nuclear weapons. Washington itself annually exports about \$2 billion in nuclear equipment and services.

AROUND THE WORLD



International Protest Planned to Demand Release of Plyushch

The International Committee of Mathematicians for the Defense of Leonid Plyushch has announced that it is planning an international rally for the release of Plyushch for later this year.

The committee says it has taken this step because Soviet authorities have refused to answer any correspondence about Plyushch, a Ukrainian mathematician imprisoned in a KGB-run psychiatric prison-hospital in Dnipropetrovsk.

The committee reports that a number of French trade unions and individual members of European Communist parties have urged the Soviet government to release Plyushch. Prof. Lucio Lombardo Radice, a member of the Italian Communist party, is among those who have protested to Moscow authorities.

Can't Rule Out A-Bomb 'First Strike' Against Soviet Union, Pentagon Says

Pentagon chief James Schlesinger said July 1 that Washington did not rule out possible first use of nuclear weapons.

"Under no circumstances could we disavow the first use of nuclear weapons," he said. For the White House even to hint that it would refrain from using the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons it has deployed

in Europe would have a "devastating effect" on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he said, because NATO depends psychologically and militarily on nuclear weapons.

Schlesinger also said that under certain circumstances, Washington "conceivably" would launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union, although he said there was "very, very low probability" of this happening.

Demonstration in New York Protests Trials of Garmendia and Otaegui

A picket line was held outside the offices of Iberia Airlines June 23 to protest the trials of two Basque nationalist political prisoners who face charges in connection with the assassination of an officer in the Spanish riot police. The prisoners, José Antonio Garmendia and Angel Otaegui, face the death penalty if convicted.

Sponsors of the protest included the Committee for a Democratic Spain and the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners.

Fighting in Beirut Leaves 300 Dead

Following the formation of a six-member "rescue cabinet" by Premier-designate Rashid Karami June 30, the heavy street fighting in Lebanon between right-wing Christian militia groups and the Palestinian resistance and its left-wing Muslim supporters appeared to subside.

The death toll in the previous week was estimated at about 300, with another 700 persons wounded. It was the third major outbreak of fighting since April 13, when the militia of the right-wing Phalangist party ambushed a bus and machine-gunned twenty-seven Palestinian refugees. Karami said a total of 900 persons were killed in the clashes.

The immediate cause of the clashes was an attempt by the Lebanese right wing to force the army to intervene against the Palestinian resistance movement. An issue that came more to the fore as the crisis continued was a demand by Lebanese Muslims for a more equitable say in the government.

According to some reports, the Palestine Liberation Organization has kept out of the most recent fighting, the main forces involved being Lebanese left-wing Muslim

groups and Palestinian groups in the "rejection front."

The new cabinet contains three Muslims and three Christians. Karami, a Muslim, in addition to being premier, is minister of defense, information, and finance. Former President Camille Chamoun—leader of the right-wing Christian National Liberal party, whose militia fought alongside the Phalangists—occupies the post of minister of the interior, in charge of police.

The halt in the fighting was arranged after a meeting between Karami and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat July 1. Arafat reportedly agreed to help Lebanese security forces stop any attempts by Palestinians to continue fighting. Also present at the meeting were Lebanon's armed forces commander and Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam. Khaddam announced his government's full support for the new Lebanese cabinet.

Israeli Stores Shut Down to Protest New Taxes

Tens of thousands of shops throughout Israel closed June 24 to protest a new value-added tax and a new income-tax law requiring all self-employed Israelis to keep bookkeeping records. The shutdown was declared 70 percent effective.

Taiwan Developing Nuclear Arms

The Kuomintang regime on Taiwan is in the process of developing a nuclear weapon, according to U.S. intelligence sources cited in the July 14 issue of *Time* magazine. *Time* said that the probable target date for the first weapon was 1980. The regime is reportedly also constructing a missile range as part of its program to develop a delivery system for the bomb.

Cape Verde Islands Gain Independence

The Cape Verde Islands won their independence July 5, after more than 500 years of Portuguese rule. In the June 30 elections to the fifty-six-member National Assembly, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde (PAIGC—African party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands) gained 95.67 percent of the vote. It was the only political group that ran candidates for the assembly, which has the tasks of writing a constitution and deciding whether



Herblock/Washington Post

the islands will unite with Guinea-Bissau. The two former Portuguese colonies are expected to unite shortly, since unity was a central plank in the PAIGC program.

The first session of the National Assembly elected Aristides Pereira president and Maj. Pedro Pires prime minister. Pereira is secretary-general of the PAIGC, and Pires is chairman of the party's committee for Cape Verde.

Workers Commission Candidates Sweep Spain's Labor Elections

More than 80 percent of the candidates backed by the clandestine workers commissions were elected in the vote held for factory-level representatives in the state-sponsored Central Nacional Sindicalista (CNS—National Federation of Syndicates). According to official figures, more than three-fourths of the incumbent union officers were voted out of power. More than 85 percent of the eligible workers voted in the elections, which were held during the last two weeks of June.

Arafat: Israel Preparing for New War

Israel is preparing a fifth war in the Middle East and "vowing the destruction of the PLO," Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir Arafat said in an interview with United Press International in Beirut July 3.

"They will launch this new war with a preemptive strike against the north, against Syria and the Palestinian revolution."

Comoro Islands Declare Independence

The Chamber of Deputies of the Comoro Islands voted 33 to 0 in favor of independence July 6, unilaterally ending French rule and apparently preempting a move that would have allowed France to retain one of the four islands. Six members were absent for the vote, including five from the island of Mayotte, which had voted against independence in the national referendum last December. An overwhelming 90 percent of Comoro voters favored independence.

Pinochet Refuses to Permit UN Group to Investigate Torture of Prisoners

Chilean dictator Pinochet announced the cancellation July 4 of the visit to Chile by the United Nations Human Rights Commission to investigate charges of torture. The commission—made up of representatives from Pakistan, Belgium, Austria, Sierra Leone, Romania, and Ecuador—had been scheduled to arrive in Chile July 10.

In Geneva, the International Committee of Jurists—which condemned human rights violations in Chile after a visit last year—declared that cancellation of the UN visit "inevitably leads to the conclusion that the Chilean government was not in a position to face an objective investigation."

State of Siege in Colombia

The state of siege imposed in three departments of Columbia June 13 was extended to the entire country June 26. All individual liberties were suspended and trials by summary courts-martial were instituted for anyone accused of disturbing the public order. Persons accused have no right of appeal.

The declaration of the state of siege followed more than a month of mounting protest in the country, principally centered in the universities. Government forces have attacked peasant protests and clashed with guerrillas, and cement workers were on strike for two months.

The university protests began in early June when President Alfonso López Michelsen fired Luis Carlos Pérez, rector of the Bogotá branch of the National University of Colombia. The president accused Pérez of "undermining institutions" for having supported the occupation of San Juan de Dios Hospital in the capital by students and the dean of the university medical school. They were demanding that the running of the hospital be turned over to the university.

Students in Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, and Barranquilla organized demonstrations to protest the firing of the rector, shutting down their schools.



Check. . . . State of siege!

Cochi/Alternativa

Honduran Troops Attack Peasant Demonstration

Five persons were killed, two wounded, and eighteen arrested as Honduran troops attacked a march of 12,000 peasants demanding land reform and the release of twenty-two peasant leaders arrested in May. The march on the capital began June 24. Organizers predicted the march would swell to 40,000 by the time it reached Tegucigalpa. One government source said the demonstrators would be stopped before they reached the capital.

Zambia Nationalizes Land

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda announced June 30 the immediate nationalization of land, movie theaters, private hospitals, and the country's main newspapers, the *Times of Zambia* and the *Sunday*

Times, both owned by a British company, Lonrho Ltd. Kaunda also earmarked a number of other areas for state control, including privately owned rented housing, tobacco factories, and the printing company Printpak, owned by Lonrho.

Farmers who previously owned land outright will be given 100-year leases. Vacant building lots and farmland not being used will be taken over immediately. Real estate agencies were shut down.

Movie theaters, most of which are owned by Lonrho, will also be controlled by local authorities. Kaunda said he was taking this step because "we cannot have cinemas reflecting the values contrary to Zambian values and interests."

The nationalized newspapers will become official organs of the governing United National Independence party. All of Zambia's outlets of mass communication are now completely under state control.

The Battle Against Portuguese Neocolonialism

By Ernest Harsch

[Second of three articles]

Before the April 25, 1974, coup in Lisbon, the independence forces in Guinea-Bissau had scored major military and political gains, and in Mozambique they were rapidly escalating their activities. But in Angola, the direct pressure against Portuguese imperialist rule was limited to occasional ambushes and sporadic clashes in the countryside. There were very few strike actions or other visible signs of unrest in the cities.

However, the low-level warfare in the rural areas did put a political burden on Lisbon and the economic and human drain of maintaining an estimated 60,000 troops in Angola and thousands more in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique added to the unrest within Portugal itself that finally led to the downfall of the Salazarist dictatorship.

The Lisbon coup, in turn, affected the course of the Angolan liberation struggle. It brought the prospects of formal independence closer, raised the conflict to a more clearly political level, heightened the anticolonial sentiment throughout the country, and drew broader sections of the Angolan population into active opposition to the Portuguese imperialists. Above all, it shifted the focus of the independence movement away from the rural areas. The struggle for control of the cities began.

In contending for political influence among urban Angolans, the MPLA appears to have had a head start over its two main rivals. According to Pélissier, the MPLA, in the late 1960s when it was increasing its guerrilla actions in several parts of the countryside, also began to rebuild its clandestine cells in some cities. "Undoubtedly MPLA networks have reappeared here and there in Luanda, in Lobito and its industrial zone, but towns as important as Nova Lisboa and Malange apparently have, for various reasons, only insignificant clandestine activity," he wrote.

Le Monde correspondent Gilbert Comte, in a series of reports from Angola published in the May 14 to 17, 1975, issues of the Paris daily, estimated that the MPLA's main strength (after the expulsion of Daniel Chipenda, who had commanded MPLA troops in eastern Angola) was in the cities, where it had been carrying out clandestine propaganda for years. He also estimated that the MPLA was the dominant national-

ist force in Luanda's muceques until autumn 1974.

The first indication that the FNLA had begun to recruit, or send members into Luanda's slum areas, was in July 1974, following attacks on the African population by white settlers. Portuguese military and government officials, according to the July 27, 1974, *New York Times*, "said agitators of the 'racist' National Front [FNLA] were hiding out in the shantytowns, secure in the knowledge that it would be virtually impossible for the armed forces to find them there.

"A military spokesman said that large numbers of National Front agents had infiltrated Angola from their bases in neighboring Zaire. . . .

"... some of the National Front's men have apparently slipped through the lines to Luanda and have begun a campaign to win Angolans away from the People's Movement [MPLA], which enjoys wide support here among blacks and whites."

The first public sign of the FNLA's presence was when its flags and banners, along with those of the MPLA, appeared at a funeral for several Africans who had been killed in the clashes with the whites.

The UNITA, despite its strategy of surrounding the towns through rural warfare, also took advantage of the new opportunities. The October 6, 1974, *New York Times* noted that the UNITA "has moved its key men into urban areas to build support among the Angolan Africans."

Spinola's 'Decolonization' Plan

The disunity and rivalry of the Angolan nationalist forces gave the Portuguese imperialists more of an opportunity to maneuver in Angola than they were able to obtain in either Mozambique or Guinea-Bissau.

In his book *Portugal e o Futuro*, Gen. António de Spínola proposed that a federation of four "equal states" be set up, with Lisbon in the dominant position. He repeated his proposal after coming to power. This was rejected by all the rebel groups in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique. The Spínola regime then stated in May that within a year it would organize "referendums" in all the African colonies so that the populations could exercise "their right to self-determination."

After being forced to backtrack some

more, Spínola and the MFA released a "timetable" on August 9 for Angola's independence. A proposal was included for a coalition regime composed of representatives of the three liberation movements and of the "most representative ethnic groups in Angola, including the white population."

A number of small "third force" groupings, which openly favored a neocolonial solution in Angola, had emerged. The most important of these was the Frente de Unidade Angolana (FUA—Angolan Unity Front),¹³ led by Fernando Falção, a white businessman from Lobito who was brought into the colonial administration in September.

Another force that entered into Spínola's neocolonialist schemes for the future of Angola was the white settler population, estimated at about 500,000, twice the size of that in Mozambique.

Many of the settlers were unskilled or semiskilled workers who had emigrated from Portugal to Angola to escape unemployment. They were thus less willing to leave the colony than the settlers in Mozambique, many of whom were highly skilled workers, technicians, and managers. The Portuguese imperialists may have also calculated that the Angolan settlers would be more intransigent in their opposition to the nationalists, since their jobs would be more immediately threatened by African workers after formal independence took effect.

In July 1974, armed white groups attacked Africans in Luanda's muceques. In the clashes that followed, hundreds of Africans were killed and thousands fled to the countryside. Two of the white extremist groups thought to have been involved in the clashes were the Resistência Unida de Angola (RUA—United Resistance of Angola) and the Frente de Resistência Angolana (FRA—Angolan Resistance Front), which openly compared itself to the terrorist OAS (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète—Secret Army Organization) settler group that operated in Algeria during the Algerian independence struggle.

Spínola also tried to pit the guerrilla groups against each other. In June, Lisbon officials said they would begin negotiations

13. According to a Salazarist account, FUA was actually formed in the early 1960s in southern Angola.

with those liberation movements "present within the country," a definition that from Lisbon's viewpoint included only the UNITA. They noted that "all other armed groups of African liberation movements have their headquarters in Kinshasa, Brazzaville, and Lusaka," an obvious reference to the MPLA and FNLA.

Furthermore, in his secret meeting with Zaïre President Mobutu Sese Seko on September 14, Spínola may have solicited help in pressuring the FNLA into accepting Lisbon's schemes.

'We Will Fight Another 13 Years'

But Spínola's plans backfired. The "third force" groupings remained too weak, relative to the main nationalist forces, to serve as effective political counterweights.

The rightist attacks against the African population met with a response in the muceques that signaled the potential power of Angola's urban masses. In some muceques the Africans took control, forming self-defense groups and blocking entrance to gangs of armed settlers. On July 15, after the initial attacks, Luanda was virtually paralyzed by a general strike of Black civil servants against continued Portuguese rule. The next day a crowd of Africans marched to the governor's palace.


The rebel groups also continued their pressure on Lisbon.

Although the UNITA signed a cease-fire agreement with the Portuguese in June, months before the MPLA or FNLA did, it nevertheless rejected the "referendum" proposal. A UNITA representative said at a news conference in Brussels August 29, "We cannot negotiate independence and this is why we refuse Gen. Antonio de Spínola's proposal to organize a referendum. It is out of the question. We have been fighting during 14 years for the principle of independence."

MPLA President Agostinho Neto, in an interview published in the May 27 issue of the Algerian daily *El Moudjahid*, stated: "For our people, the referendum solution is not acceptable. We reject a referendum organized by the Portuguese and carried out in Angola by the administration, the army, and the police. Because of that, it would not guarantee a serious result. We demand that Portugal purely and simply put an end to its domination of our country. The referendum would be no more than a means used by the Portuguese to prolong their presence in our country."

Holden Roberto, the head of the FNLA, stated in July: "We will step up our operations. This is the only alternative for our group. We will fight for another 13 years if necessary."

According to reports, the FNLA increased its recruitment and training of Angolan exiles in Zaïre and began to move steadily



into the coffee-producing areas in northern Angola. In June, 250 Chinese military instructors arrived in Kinshasa to train FNLA troops. In August, the Libyan regime began to send aid to the FNLA.

The Lisbon daily *A Capital* reported August 14 that ten FNLA guerrillas had been killed and in the August 20 issue noted that thirteen Portuguese troops had died since the beginning of the month. The August 16 *O Século* reported that search and destroy missions had been launched against the FNLA in the north.

Paul Touba, the FNLA's permanent observer at the United Nations, said October 1 that the FNLA had stepped up its offensive in the north. He claimed that a number of important villages had come under FNLA control, including Uíge and Carmone.

The incapacity of the MFA to bypass the three nationalist movements or to get them to agree to its plans forced the military rulers in Lisbon to deal directly with the guerrillas. This failure undoubtedly played a role in Spínola's downfall after the defeat of his September 28 attempted coup.

The new Lisbon regime pressed for direct negotiations with the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA. On October 1 the MPLA signed a formal cease-fire agreement and the FNLA signed one on October 8.

All three groups opened offices in Luanda. When the FNLA delegation arrived at Luanda airport October 30, it was greeted by a crowd estimated at between 4,000 and 5,000 persons. The MPLA was met on November 8, according to varying reports, by between 30,000 and 50,000 persons, and UNITA on November 10 by about 20,000 supporters.

The October 19, 1974, *Zambia Daily Mail* reported that the Organization of African Unity had extended de facto recognition to the UNITA by giving it 23,000 kwacha (about US\$14,800) in aid.

The internal differences within the MPLA, however, delayed the negotiations with the Portuguese and further complicated the rivalries within the nationalist movement. By mid-1974, at least two factions opposed to the leadership of Agostinho Neto had appeared within the MPLA.

One, called the "Eastern Revolt," was led

by Daniel Chipenda, the military commander of the MPLA for eastern Angola, who was based in Zambia. In an interview published in the August 22, 1974, *O Provincia de Angola*, Chipenda denounced the "presidentialism" of Neto and called for the unity of the MPLA and FNLA. He also said he favored a "multiracial" Angola in which whites would have full citizenship rights if they obeyed the law.

The other group, led by the Reverend Joaquim Pintó de Andrade and called the "Active Revolt," was composed of seventy well-known intellectuals and past and present leaders of the MPLA, including Mário de Andrade, a founder of the MPLA and brother of Pintó de Andrade; the Reverend Domingos da Silva, a vice-president of the MPLA; Eduardo Santos and Hugo Menezes, both founding members of the MPLA; and Floribert Monimamba, the chief of operations for the northern front.

In a document drawn up by the group on May 11, 1974, the Active Revolt also attacked the "presidentialism" of the Neto leadership, raised charges of "tribalism and regionalism" in the MPLA's functioning, and criticized the formation of the Supreme Liberation Council with the FNLA in December 1972. In June, Pintó de Andrade rejected the idea of negotiations between the MPLA and FNLA.

Neto denounced the dissidents within the MPLA, calling them "racists" and "tribalists."

At an MPLA congress in Lusaka in August the Neto faction walked out and Chipenda was elected president. The heads of state of Zambia, the Republic of the Congo, Zaïre, and Tanzania intervened in an effort to get the factions to unify. At a meeting in Brazzaville on September 13, Neto was named president with Chipenda and Pintó de Andrade as vice-presidents.

But the "unity" did not last long. Chipenda moved his headquarters to Kinshasa, Zaïre, and on October 29 denounced the cease-fire agreements that had been signed between the three groups and the Portuguese. He claimed that he would continue to fight against Portuguese rule. On November 9, the FNLA and the Chipenda faction threatened to renew the war if Lisbon recognized the Neto faction, which had set up office in Luanda the day before.

The Lisbon authorities intervened in the MPLA's internal dispute, backing Neto's faction against Chipenda's and Pintó de Andrade's. According to a report in the December 6, 1974, *Portuguese Africa*, published in Angola, Adm. Rosa Coutinho, a key leader of the MFA, said at a news conference that the MPLA was represented only by the Neto leadership.

Shortly after, the MPLA announced Chipenda's expulsion, charging him with

having been involved in "assassination plots" against Neto in 1972 and 1973 and denouncing his faction's opening an office in Luanda.

While it is not entirely clear, it appears that Chipenda took most of his estimated 2,000 supporters with him. However, the January 7 *República* reported that sixty members of the Eastern Revolt in the southeastern city of Serpa Pinto had dissociated themselves from Chipenda and had decided to rejoin the MPLA. Another report stated that 131 former Chipenda supporters in Ninda had either rejoined the MPLA or joined the UNITA.

The February 14, 1975, *O Século* reported that Neto said he was trying to "reintegrate" the members of the Active Revolt.

'Transitional' Regime

With the resolving of the MPLA's internal differences, at least for the time being, it became possible for the three liberation movements to sit down together and formulate a joint negotiating position to present to the Portuguese.

In December, Neto and Savimbi signed an accord in Luso, Angola, which provided for an end to hostilities and for collaboration between the MPLA and UNITA. One point stated that the MPLA and UNITA pledged to "defend constantly together the interests of the masses and peasants and the struggle for the extinction of the remnants of colonialism."

This was a switch from the MPLA's previous policy toward the UNITA. For instance, in an open letter released by the MPLA department of information and propaganda and published in the June 13, 1974, *Times of Zambia*, the MPLA stated: "Until the time of the coup that brought General Spínola to power, UNITA collaborated actively with the colonial Portuguese army. It is for this reason that MPLA, vanguard of the Angolan people in arms since 1961, cannot accept unity with an agent of the enemy."

Under pressure from the Organization of African Unity, which for years had called for the "unification" of the Angolan rivals, a formal unity agreement was signed by all three groups in Mombasa, Kenya, on January 5.

The agreement included a "declaration of principles," which stated that Cabinda would remain an integral part of Angola. The three organizations pledged to build a "just and democratic society, rejecting ethnic, racial, and religious discrimination, as well as all other forms of discrimination."

A few days later Holden Roberto noted that the three groups had only agreed to "a common platform for negotiations with Portugal." Each group would maintain its own identity, he said, and during elections

"the Angolan people will choose which of them will lead the country."

The accord signed between the FNLA, MPLA, UNITA, and the Lisbon regime in Alvor, Portugal, January 15, set up a coalition government. At the head of the coalition is a presidential council of three members: Johnny Eduardo for the FNLA, Lopo do Nascimento for the MPLA, and Jose N'Dele for the UNITA. Lisbon appointed a high commissioner, Brig. Gen. Silva Cardoso of the MFA, to "arbitrate" any differences among the three council members and to take control of defense and security. The FNLA, MPLA, UNITA, and the Portuguese regime were each granted three posts in the cabinet.

The accord also provided for the formation of an "Angolan national army," in which each liberation movement was to have 8,000 troops, while the Portuguese maintained 24,000 troops. A ten-member National Defense Council, headed by General Cardoso, was established with representatives of the three groups and of the Portuguese army, navy, and air force.

The nationalist troops were to be integrated into the new army gradually, depending on the "climate of confidence." In an attempt to temporarily freeze the military positions of the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, those rebel troops not absorbed into the army were to remain in the areas they already controlled.

The Portuguese troops were allowed to stay until the proclamation of formal independence, which is scheduled for November 11. They are then to begin withdrawing. The last of the Portuguese troops are scheduled to be out of Angola by February 29, 1976.

Although during the negotiations the nationalists had pressed for elections following the departure of the Portuguese troops, the Alvor accords provide for the election of a constituent assembly before Angola gains its independence and while the Portuguese troops are still in the country.

Point 54 of the accords states, "The FNLA, MPLA and UNITA undertake to respect the property and legitimate interests of Portuguese domiciled in Angola." And while Point 55 does not specifically mention the Portuguese imperialist interests in Angola, it does state: "The Portuguese Government on the one hand, and the Liberation Movements on the other, agree to establish between Angola and Portugal constructive and lasting ties of co-operation in all fields, namely technical, cultural, scientific, economic, commercial, monetary, financial and military, on a basis of independence, equality, freedom, mutual respect and reciprocity of interests."

The agreement on the coalition regime, by legitimizing the presence of the colonial army, gave the Portuguese imperialists a

strong hand in influencing the eventual transition to formal independence. It gave the MFA the opportunity to use the participation of the major nationalist forces in the regime to help control and dampen any mass struggles that might arise, to test the strengths and weaknesses of the three groups, and to determine their relative reliability in administering an "independent" Angola within the capitalist system. It also gave the MFA the chance to try to heighten the existing rivalries between the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA in order to weaken all three.

Preparing for the Showdown

The MFA's position that the FNLA, UNITA, and MPLA (under Neto) were the only groups that could participate in the talks and the coalition regime was a defeat for the right-wing and openly neocolonialist forces in Angola.

But it was also an undemocratic measure that sought to block the development of any political currents outside of the three main groups. Point 41 of the accords states that the only candidates to be allowed to run in the projected elections to the constituent assembly are those of the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA.

Although Lisbon has not abandoned the Portuguese settlers in Angola, its rejection of their demand for a role in the coalition regime served as a warning to the settlers not to try any adventurist bids to seize control, as the whites in Mozambique had attempted in September.

In the April 1975 *Foreign Affairs*, Kenneth Adelman reported: "The whites remaining are mostly waiting and hoping that the transition to independence is rapid and peaceful. Some are joining the liberation movements. . . ."

The extremist settler groups, while they may still exist, have virtually dropped from view. There was an attempt to regroup some of the right-wing Angolan parties in October, when five organizations merged with the Partido Cristão Democrático de Angola (PCDA—Angola Christian Democratic party). But after the accords were signed, the PCDA was dissolved and its leader, who had been implicated in Spínola's September 28 coup attempt, went into hiding.

The accords were also a reverse to FLEC, the Cabindan separatist organization, as well as to the Chipenda grouping, which had demanded inclusion in the coalition regime.

The three liberation movements all continued to strengthen their positions.

In December 1974, the Aliança das Populações de Angola (APA—Angolan Peoples' Alliance) merged with the FNLA.

On April 17, 1975, Roberto also accepted the membership of Chipenda and his estimated 2,000 troops into the FNLA. Chi-

penda was placed on the FNLA's National Council of the Revolution and on its Political Bureau. He was also named assistant secretary-general.

"Since November," Gilbert Comte reported in the May 15 *Le Monde*, FNLA "emissaries have traveled through the villages [in northern Angola], selecting youths to carry weapons. Each day, trucks filled with recruits leave Carmona for the distant camps of Kinkusu and Kotacoli, in Zaïre." The FNLA also reinforced its military position in Luanda and sent 500 troops to the port city of Lobito in central Angola.

By the end of April, 300,000 refugees had returned to Angola. Many of them were Bakongos who had been living in exile; thus part of the FNLA's base of support shifted back into the country.

In March, the FNLA bought a cable-television company, renaming it FNLA-TV. The FNLA said it would provide "political information," as well as paid advertisements and normal programming.

After the signing of the accords, the executive of the Frente Socialista de Angola (Fresda—Angola Socialist Front) dissolved the organization and called on its members to join the MPLA. The March 11 *República* reported that the Movimento Democrático de Angola (MDA—Angola Democratic Movement) had merged with the MPLA.

According to a report in the March 27 *Tanzanian Daily News*, the Liga Nacional Africana (LNA—African National League)¹⁴ now gives general support to the MPLA. Its leadership had previously been appointed by the Portuguese, but after the overthrow of the Salazarist dictatorship the old leaders were ousted.

The MPLA-affiliated trade union, União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola (UNTA—National Union of Angolan Workers) met with the National Union of Trade and Industry and other unions in December and reportedly passed a joint program of action.

The February 5 *República* reported that hundreds of thousands of persons attended an MPLA rally addressed by Agostinho Neto in Luanda on February 4, which the MPLA terms the anniversary of the beginning of the Angolan liberation struggle.

The MPLA has also been trying to strengthen its support within Luanda's muceques.

Following the clashes in July and August 1974 between Africans and white settlers, most of the settlers in the muceque areas, many of whom were shopkeepers, fled to the center of the city. According to Saydi Mingas, an MPLA observer to the United Nations, the inhabitants formed district

14. The LNA was originally formed in 1930 as a government-sponsored organization, in a Portuguese attempt to directly control some of the nationalist currents in Angola.

committees to organize the distribution of food and provide other services.

The April 8 *República* reported that Neto had called for greater participation of these committees in the "resolution of political problems." Minister of the Interior N'gola Kabanku, a leader of the FNLA, has called for their dissolution.

Comte reported in the May 15 *Le Monde* that the MPLA was also distributing arms to African youths in the muceque areas.

It remains unclear what role these "people's committees" play, how they function, or how independent they are of the MPLA. It is possible that the MPLA may be trying to use them as a base of support in its factional struggle with the FNLA and UNITA.

A major part of the UNITA's support, according to a dispatch from Luso by Charles Mohr published in the April 24 *New York Times*, is estimated to be in the central plateau region, where about 40 percent of the population, mostly Ovimbundu, live.

The March 19 *A Província de Angola* reported that Marcos Kassanga, the UPA's chief of staff before he left the UPA in 1962, had joined the UNITA.

The UNITA seems to have been little-known in Angola's cities before the April 25, 1974, Lisbon coup. But since then, Savimbi has been trying to build a nonfactional image for the organization. He has stressed "unity" between the three main nationalist forces. Before the Mombasa "unity" agreements were reached in January, he served as a moderator between the MPLA and FNLA. In an atmosphere of fratricidal warfare, where the political differences between the MPLA and FNLA are vague or nonexistent, such a posture for unity, or at least for an end to the fighting, could win substantial popular support.

UNITA's policy of pushing for "unity" has also been extended to the white settlers in the country. After the accords with Lisbon were signed in January, UNITA spokesman Jorge Valentim stated, "Everyone in Angola will be Angolan." The settlers' "headaches are finished," he said.

Such assurances to the settlers seem to have won the UNITA some support among the settler population, although whites are reportedly joining all three groups. According to Colin Legum, writing in the January-February 1975 *Problems of Communism*, Fernando Falção, the leader of the neocolonialist FUA, made overtures to the UNITA, but any alliance between the UNITA and FUA was publicly repudiated by Savimbi.

Although the FNLA was reported to have more troops than the MPLA or UNITA, all three groups have been besieged with new recruits. None of them appears to have a clear military or political superiority at this time.

[Next: A Fratricidal Struggle for Power]

OUT NOW!

Chapter 5

SDS March on Washington

By Fred Halstead

The crowd of 20,000¹ that bright Saturday in Washington, April 17, 1965, was double the number expected. Demonstrations much larger than that were later to be routine for the antiwar movement but at the time it was unparalleled. Considering the character of the march it was even more impressive. This was no innocuous "propeace" affair but a demonstration by Americans in their own capital against a specific war being prosecuted by their own government. Nothing like that had ever happened before in Washington on anything like this scale.

The demonstrators gathered on Pennsylvania Avenue to picket the White House,² then marched to the hill where the Washington Monument stands, for a rally at the Sylvan Theater on the South Slope. The cherry trees were still in bloom and the flags circling the monument were held full by a spring breeze. The holiday-like setting was in contrast to the seriousness of the crowd which felt

With this chapter we continue the serialization of **Out Now!**—A Participant's Account of the American Antiwar Movement by Fred Halstead. Copyright © 1976 by the Anchor Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed by permission. To be published by Monad Press.

not only a sense of great purpose, but, as I remember it, almost a sense of danger. Not the immediate, physical kind, but something impending.

Those present were trying to show that Johnson didn't have the consensus he claimed on the war. The turnout was exciting, but they knew they represented a minority of Americans who were ready and willing to challenge their own government on such an issue. This was Pentagon-FBI-big-money-lobby territory, inhospitable to radicals and steeped in superpatriotic pork-barrel politics, capital of the American behemoth at the height of its American Century, self-righteous and thoroughly convinced of its own invincibility. This crowd of hounded radicals, betrayed liberals, questioning youth, and a few busloads of Black Mississippi civil rights fighters was sitting in the middle of all that power and, however gently, telling it to go to hell.

"Don't you know there's a war on?" a man shouted from a passing car bearing a Confederate flag, as the last of the march

1. The figures cited in this work for the number of participants at demonstrations are my own responsibility except where otherwise stated. Disinterested objectivity hardly existed in connection with this very controversial movement and there is always a certain amount of guesswork in estimating the larger crowds. The figures cited by government agencies are particularly suspect, since it was the specific policy of two presidents to deny that the movement had any appreciable following. My own estimates are based on personal observation and, where I was not present, on an average of the available estimates. In any case the figures used here give a good idea of the relative size of the various demonstrations.

2. The president himself was not in Washington, but in Texas where local SDSers from the University of Texas in Austin sponsored a picket line of several hundred at the gate of Johnson's ranch.

crossed Constitution Avenue into the monument grounds.

At one point in his speech that day, I.F. Stone, that wistful little liberal with the steely dedication to journalistic truth, warned the crowd that this town was not going to be easy to change.

Staughton Lynd presided, invoking the spirit of Jean-Paul Sartre and the French intellectuals who had opposed the French war in Algeria. Other speakers included Senator Gruening and Robert Parris (formerly Bob Moses) of SNCC. In line with the SDS emphasis on community work, Iva Pierce, a member of the Cleveland ERAP Welfare Mothers Project, was scheduled, but couldn't attend because of an accident. Her speech was read to the audience. There were songs by the SNCC Freedom Voices, Phil Ochs, Judy Collins, and Joan Baez.

SDS President Paul Potter, tall, thin, close-cropped hair, wearing jacket and tie, spoke last, and it was his speech that most remained with those who heard it:

"Most of us grew up thinking that the United States was a strong but humble nation that . . . respected the integrity of other nations and other systems, and that engaged in wars only as a last resort. . . . If at some point we began to hear vague and disturbing things about what this country had done in Latin America, China, Spain, and other places, we remained somehow confident about the basic integrity of this nation's foreign policy. . . . The withdrawal from the hysteria of the Cold War era and the development of a more aggressive, activist foreign policy have done much to force many of us to rethink attitudes that were deep and basic sentiments about our country.

"And now the incredible war in Vietnam has provided the razor, the terrifying sharp cutting edge that has finally severed the last vestiges of illusions that morality and democracy are the guiding principles of American foreign policy. . . . The further we explore the reality of what this country is doing . . . in Vietnam, the more we are driven toward the conclusion of Senator [Wayne] Morse that the United States may well be the greatest threat to peace in the world today. That is a terrible and bitter insight . . . our refusal to accept it as inevitable or necessary is one of the reasons that so many people have come here today. . . .

"And it is only the kind of terror we see now in Vietnam that awakens conscience and reminds us that there is something deep in us that cries out against dictatorial suppression. The pattern of repression and destruction that we have developed and justified in the war is so thorough that it can only be called 'cultural genocide.' . . .

"What kind of system is it that justifies the United States or any country seizing the destinies of the Vietnamese people and using them callously for our own purposes . . . that consistently puts material values before human values—and still persists in calling itself free and still persists in finding itself fit to police the world? . . .

"We must name that system. We must name it, describe it, analyze it, understand it and change it. For it is only when that system is changed and brought under control that there can be any hope for stopping the forces that create a war in Vietnam today. . . ."³

In his book *The War at Home*, Thomas Powers notes: "Many of those in the crowd were old Socialists, Trotskyists, Marxists, and they all felt the answer to his [Potter's] question bursting from their lips: *Say the word!* They wanted to shout. *Say the word! Capitalism!*" The observation is, as I recall, accurate.

Potter later explained, "I did not fail to call the system capitalism because I was a coward or an opportunist. I refused to call it capitalism because capitalism was for me and my generation an inadequate description of the evils of America—a hollow, dead word tied to the thirties and a movement that had

3. SDS press release, "Text of Speech by Paul Potter, President of Students for a Democratic Society, March on Washington, April 17, 1965." Copy in author's files.



Militant

Part of crowd at April 1965 antiwar demonstration. "Nothing like that had ever happened before in Washington on anything like this scale."

used it freely but apparently without comprehending it."⁴

SDS at that time did not call itself socialist. Powers describes the attitude then prevalent in leading SDS circles: "When the New Left attacked the system, they were referring to cold, elitist bureaucracies and the powerlessness of ordinary people, not just private property. They were collectivist almost by instinct but at the same time feared that the old, sterile disputes of the left were simply waiting to be revived."

Potter ended the rally with a stirring appeal to build a new movement "that understands Vietnam in all its horror as but a symptom of a deeper malaise, that we build a movement that makes possible the implementation of values that would have prevented Vietnam, a movement based on the integrity of man and a belief in man's capacity . . . to tolerate all the weird formulations of society that men may choose to strive for . . . a movement that will wrench the country into a confrontation with the issues of the war; a movement that must of necessity reach out to all these people in Vietnam or elsewhere who are struggling to find decency and control for their lives."

The crowd stood and applauded, then moved down the wide, grassy mall between the monument and the Capitol.⁵ Those at the front of the march, looking over their shoulders, viewed a spectacular sight of the throng making their way, banners and placards aloft with the low afternoon sun streaming through them, down the long slope toward the steps of the Capitol. There the march stopped as a petition to Congress was delivered. Then the crowd dispersed.

The text of the petition accurately summed up the politics of the first national demonstration of the new antiwar movement:

"We, the participants in the March on Washington to End the

4. Paul Potter, *A Name for Ourselves* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), p. 101.

5. Subsequent major demonstrations in Washington were unable to take this route because of prolonged construction across the Mall.

War in Vietnam, petition Congress to act immediately to end the war. You currently have at your disposal many schemes, including reconvening the Geneva Conference, negotiation with the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam, immediate withdrawal, and UN-supervised elections. Although those among us might differ as to which of these is most desirable, we are unanimously of the opinion that the war must be brought to a halt.

"This war is inflicting untold harm on the people of Vietnam. It is being fought in behalf of a succession of unpopular regimes, not for the ideals you proclaim. Our military are obviously being defeated; yet we persist in extending the war. The problems of America cry out for attention, and our entanglement in South Vietnam postpones the confrontation of these issues while prolonging the misery of the people of that war-torn land.

"You must act now to reverse this sorry state of affairs. We call on you to end, not extend, the war in Vietnam."⁶

* * *

On the same day as the SDS March on Washington and the *New York Post* editorial red-baiting it, the reactionary *New York Daily News* carried an editorial dealing with the report that antiaircraft missiles were being installed around Hanoi:

"The sensible thing for our side to do is to make certain that these missile sites are being built, then give two hours warning to everybody in the area to get out of the way, then blow the whole layout to Kingdom Come with hydrogen or conventional bombs. . . ."

Daily News editorials were not noted for moderation, but the very fact that the largest circulation daily in the U.S. could make such a statement is an indication of the immense task that lay before the new antiwar movement.

[Next chapter: *The Teach-ins: Ann Arbor, Washington, Berkeley*]

6. The *Militant*, April 26, 1965. Full text.

FROM OUR READERS

London
20 June 1975

Dear Editor,

I have read your comment on the developments in Portugal in No. 22 (June 9) of the *Intercontinental Press*. On the front page you gave a picture which is supposed to show how the A.F.M. "seizes Socialist daily newspaper *República*." The caption as well as your subsequent comment give an erroneous impression that *República* is a paper of the Socialist Party. It seems to me that you should have made it clear that *República* is not the official organ of the Socialist Party; it is a paper privately owned by people who claim to be socialists. The paper was in existence, under the same ownership, at the time when the Socialist Party was illegal. Have the owners of the paper conducted their business according to their socialist beliefs? Or according to capitalist principles? The means of production have been in capitalist hands and the printers, who happen to be communists and have "seized" the paper, provided only labour. Soares' Socialist Party has been loudly advocating "workers' participation"—have the owners of *República* granted their employees the right to this "participation"? Has the management of the paper associated the workers in the running of the paper? Obviously not; if they had done so the whole crisis would not have arisen.

You fail to point out that *República* has been a purely capitalist enterprise and that, contrary to your caption, the newspaper "seized" was not a socialist paper.

I am as distrustful of the Armed Forces Movement and of its "alliance" with the C.P. as you are, but this does not prevent me from seeing facts as they are.

Yours fraternally,
Tamara Deutscher

The official newspaper of the Socialist party is, of course, *Portugal Socialista*. While *República* was not owned by the Socialist party itself, it did reflect the viewpoint of the Socialist party. This was the real source of the dispute, since it was less "loyal" to the Armed Forces Movement than the Stalinists. As Gerry Foley pointed out in an article in the June 9 issue of *Intercontinental Press*:

"The closing down of *República*, specifically the paper closest to the SP leadership, after a provocation staged by the CP-controlled printers union, was the high point of the military's counterattack

against any challenge to its bonapartist power based on the principle of popular sovereignty."

The questions raised by Tamara Deutscher were considered in subsequent articles in *Intercontinental Press*. We would call attention in particular to "The Reopening of *República*—a Significant Victory" in the June 16 issue (p. 802) and "Democracy—a Key Issue in Portuguese Revolution" in the same issue (p. 812). Also Gerry Foley's "In Reply to the Stalinist Charges in the 'República' Affair," which goes into the question of the printers' action, the role of *República* before the downfall of Caetano, and the meaning of the closure of this newspaper.

Dave Holmes sent us the following report from Australia:

"On May 23 at Glebe in Sydney the Socialist Workers League debated the Communist Party of Australia on the Portuguese revolution before about 100 people. The SWL put forward the views familiar to readers of IP. The CPA defended the Portuguese Stalinists and the Armed Forces Movement.

"The debate was a real tribute to the quality and comprehensiveness of IP's reportage of the events in Portugal. It goes without saying that IP is a major reference source for the Trotskyists of the SWL. But it was also used extensively by Denis Freney, the CPA speaker. In fact, Freney debated with a large stack of IPs in front of him and throughout the debate he made numerous references to its reports which seemed to be his main reference source.

"However, it was a hard task for him to find support in it for his pro-Stalinist views. At one point he made a sarcastic reference to the 'all-seeing and all-knowing Gerry Foley,' IP's main reporter on Portugal. We all smiled at this. We're sure Gerry wouldn't claim to be that good, but it is certainly a compliment to IP when someone holding diametrically opposed views can do no better than to base his case on its reports."

We continue to receive reports on the popularity of the interview with Israel Shahak "Israel Is About as Apartheid as South Africa," which was featured in the March 31 issue of *Intercontinental Press*.

Doug Lorimer dropped us a note from Glebe telling us that the interview has been "reprinted by practically every student newspaper in Australia."

In England, we should add, extensive

extracts were published in *Workers' Fight* (No. 96, May 10th to May 17th 1975.)

Israel Shahak occasionally sends us small items from the Israeli press. In the May 8 issue of *Ma'ariv* he noted a report of a miraculous happening that helped at an Israeli fund-raising affair in Dallas, Texas. \$40,000 had been collected. Rabbi Goren then went into action.

"He told how in the very midst of the Six Day War he ascended the Mount of Sinai with the scrolls of Law in his hands. The Mount was enveloped in a smoke, then, and the Rabbi felt a great urge to blow a Shofar [ritual horn blown in the synagogue on the Jewish New Year]. 'And then, suddenly, from the cloud—as he told it—a parachute came down and in the end of its ropes—a Shofar . . .' So that the effect would be complete, an aide of the Rabbi threw from above the speakers' stand an improvised parachute to which a Shofar was attached, and Rabbi Goren began to blow the Shofar before his hearers in Dallas, Texas, just as he did in the middle of the war on Mount Sinai . . . The result was an addition of a quarter of a million dollars to what had been collected before."

We gather from a letter from Stephen Schwartz, one of our readers in San Francisco, that he would not walk far for a dish of "Cod à la Française." (The title of the review of *The Counter Revolution in Ireland* in our June 30 issue.) He writes:

"Three cheers for D.R. O'Connor Ly-saght's stirring put down of Sartre's pseudo-revolutionary pupils Van der Straeten and Daufouy! I've wondered for a long time about 'revolutionists' who bait the IRA and mouth moonshine about the transcendental need of an abstract unity of Catholic and Protestant workers in Ireland before the Catholic proletariat are to defend themselves."

John Steele of Toronto, Canada, writes: "As you can see I'm once again almost late in renewing my subscription. It's not that I don't want my subscription to IP. I don't want to miss an issue. And it's not that I ignore your subscription renewal notices. Just the opposite. I don't want to miss one of them either. They're really pretty witty. Maybe you find this with other subscribers. I hope it's not a big problem."

Yes, we've suspected that some of our other readers do wait to send in their renewals out of curiosity to see what the next reminder might say.

In John's case, his timing was perfect. For some of the others who don't want to gamble on missing an issue, perhaps we could make a deal. Send in your renewal when you get the first notice—and enclose an extra dollar. For that we'll send you the rest of the series so you can find out all at once what was coming. □