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Protests Begin Against Gandhi's Dictatorial Coup



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NEWS ANALYSIS

The FBI's Drive to Destroy the SWP

To Washington's political police, the American Trotskyists of the Socialist Workers party and the Young Socialist Alliance represent the wave of the future—a movement that is tiny now but could come to represent the will of tens of millions of revolutionary-minded workers.

Consequently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has devoted considerable resources to an effort to destroy or contain the American Trotskyist movement, particularly by trying to hound its membership into abandoning political activity.

Information contained in a new series of files released by the FBI June 19 confirms this conclusion. The files—98 dossiers totaling 256 pages—provide dramatic new facts about the FBI's campaign to disrupt the SWP and YSA. They reveal a consistent pattern of surveillance, harassment, and direct intervention into the lives and jobs of party and YSA members, often in collaboration with local police.

The material contained in these documents is instructive and should be carefully studied by all who are concerned with defending civil liberties and democratic rights. It provides invaluable evidence of the way the American political police operates in general against protest movements and labor organizations.

In 1969 and 1970, the documents show, the FBI collaborated with the Austin, Texas, police in a successful effort to get an SWP member fired from her teaching post in the local school district because she had previously run for public office on the SWP ticket.

In 1970, the FBI "confidentially advised" Tampa, Florida, police that a member of the YSA had cashed a check written against a temporarily insufficient bank balance. The FBI-supplied information led to the arrest of the YSA member at gunpoint. And, as the FBI bragged in an internal memorandum, the arrest "temporarily upset activities" of the YSA member, "afforded IU, PD [Intelligence Unit, Police Department], opportunity to visually inspect apartment" of the YSA member "where arrest was made." As a further benefit, "photographs

taken of WHITCRAFT in connection with arrest [were] made available to TPO [Tampa FBI office]."

In 1970 and 1971, the FBI assisted the Houston, Texas, police and former Texas Governor Preston Smith in an attempt to falsely portray the YSA as the instigator of a campus disruption. The aim was to "eliminate the YSA as a recognized campus group" at the University of Houston, according to the documents. The action, if it had been successful, would have deprived the YSA of the right to use campus facilities to publicize and hold public meetings, among other restrictions on its ability to put forward its views.

In 1969, the FBI provided Washington, D.C., police with information about the activities of a YSA member who was an elementary-school teacher in the District of Columbia school system. The effort to victimize the teacher included a scurrilous poison-pen letter to the superintendent of schools aimed at having "the subject separated from her employment." The FBI letter, which failed to meet its goal, was signed "A Concerned Citizen."

In 1969, an "anonymous" FBI letter from "A Shell customer" to the Shell Oil Company attempted to bring about the firing of a YSA member working in the company's mimeograph room.

In 1969, an "anonymous" FBI letter from "A Fed-up Taxpayer!" to a Michigan state senator attempted to secure the firing of a Wayne State University professor whose name had been associated with the Socialist Workers party.

In 1968, "anonymous" FBI letters from an "interested student" and a "concerned friend" informed parents of Oberlin College students of their sons' activities in antiwar protests.

In 1970, "at suggestion of agent handling Cointelpro [Counterintelligence Program] in Cleveland," a radio station conducted and broadcast an interview critical of the YSA and an antiwar group.

Also in 1970, the FBI sent an "anonymous" letter to the Atlanta Revolutionary Youth Movement, a split-off from Students for a Democratic Society, in an attempt to pit this group against the YSA and to sabotage a scheduled antiwar demonstration.

From 1968 to 1970, the documents reveal, the FBI carried out a program to disrupt the YSA and other radical groups at Indiana

University in Bloomington. The program included the use of informers, "anonymous" letters, attempts to encourage personal disputes among student activists, and publication of *Armageddon News*, an FBI-concocted newsletter that attempted to win students to a more right-wing point of view. Material on this program makes up almost half the new documents released by the FBI.

"If it takes 114 pages to detail the operation at Indiana University, imagine the FBI's work at Columbia or Berkeley," said Syd Stapleton, national secretary of the Political Rights Defense Fund, which is organizing financial and legal support for the SWP's effort to halt government disruption of its activities.

"Imagine the staggering volume of political police work carried out on the hundreds of campuses with active student movements, most of which is still being hidden from the American people."

A particularly instructive example of how the FBI works is provided by the case of Evelyn Sell, the SWP member dismissed from her teaching post in Texas. According to the documents, in 1969 FBI agents in Austin requested and received from the bureau's Detroit office information describing Sell's candidacy on the SWP's Michigan ticket in 1968.

The documents show that this information was made available to the Austin police, who promised to keep the source secret and who then passed it on to the local school district.

The result, according to the documents, was the decision by school officials "not to issue a new contract or consider the subject further for employment after the termination of her current contract."

This despite the fact that, as the FBI memorandum dated March 31, 1970, noted, Sell had a reputation as "an intelligent, excellent teacher who was well-qualified in her field."

In an interview with the *New York Times*, Sell explained that the FBI harassment continued long after she was driven from her Texas teaching position. She said that as late as January 1972 FBI agents continued to visit her subsequent employers to ask whether she was "still working here." The FBI has falsely claimed that its Cointelpro operation was ended in 1971.

These documents are the second installment of files the government has released in response to a \$27 million suit filed by the SWP and YSA against officials in the White House and Justice Department. More than 3,000 pages of similar documents were made public March 19. (See *Intercontinental Press*, March 31, p. 418.)

Taken together, these files reveal the most massive surveillance of any American political movement ever uncovered. Still to

Next Week . . .

"Report on Brazil." First of two parts. Part I: "The Geisel Government and the Economic Situation."

come, however, are more Cointelpro files; files from Military Intelligence and the Secret Service; and documents from the Central Intelligence Agency's top-secret "Operation CHAOS."

In an effort to offset the black eye it has received from the SWP's campaign to expose and halt its illegal methods of disrupting protest movements and political organizations, the FBI appears to be preparing a counterattack, cooking up a case to charge the SWP with violating the reactionary Voorhis Act.

This law, passed in 1940 in preparation for American entry into World War II, imposes prohibitive restrictions on organizations subject to "foreign control." It is the law that, for example, prevents the SWP from maintaining anything more than relations of fraternal solidarity with the Fourth International, the worldwide Trotskyist organization it helped found in 1938.

In soliciting "evidence" to prepare its case against SWP charges, the federal government has submitted a list of questions hammering away at alleged "connections" between the SWP and revolutionists in other countries.

In an interview with the American revolutionary-socialist newsweekly the *Militant*, SWP National Secretary Jack Barnes explained that the party would seek to turn the tables against the government by taking advantage of this "fishing expedition" to publicize the SWP's record of international solidarity.

"We're proud of our record of 'aid' to revolutionists and revolutionary movements in other parts of the world," Barnes said. "When the U.S. government threatened to militarily smash the Cuban revolution, we 'aided' the Cubans by helping to initiate the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

"When peasant leader Hugo Blanco was jailed in Peru, we came to his 'aid' by helping to build an international defense campaign. And when the United States invaded Vietnam and launched the most destructive war in history, we 'aided' the Vietnamese people by helping to organize a powerful antiwar movement. This doesn't mean the SWP is 'controlled' by the Cubans, Blanco, or the Vietnamese freedom fighters."

This, Barnes said, "is a crude attempt by the U.S. government, whose goal is to 'control' the world, to distort our international solidarity into some kind of 'foreign conspiracy.'"

The *Militant* is now publishing excerpts from the new files, along with articles filling in the background. This material deserves wide circulation, for it provides supporters of democratic rights with a priceless glimpse into the workings of the world's most powerful political-police agency. □

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Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Editor: Joseph Hansen.

Contributing Editors: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

Editorial Staff: Michael Baumann, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Caroline Lund, Judy White.

Business Manager: Reba Hansen.

Assistant Business Manager: Steven Warshell.

Copy Editor: Mary Roche.

Technical Staff: Robert Des Verney, Paul Deveze, Larry Ingram, James M. Morgan, Earl Williams.

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Protests Begin Against Gandhi's Dictatorial Coup

By Ernest Harsch

In a series of secretly plotted moves that began shortly after dawn June 26, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi abolished democratic rule in India and seized personal power, converting herself into a dictator.

In her first actions, she declared a state of emergency that in effect abolished the constitution and enabled her to govern by decree; she ordered the arrest of all opponents, whether they stood to the right or the left, who might offer a serious challenge to her coup; she set up a tight censorship of the press; and she mobilized the police and armed forces.

Caught by surprise, all opponent forces appeared momentarily stunned, giving the impression to some observers that the coup engineered by the would-be Empress of India was being passively accepted. Within a few days, however, it became clear from bits of information trickling through to the foreign press that protests were beginning and that demonstrations had flared in various parts of the country.

Demonstrations in the capital area began June 29 as hundreds of youths marched through the streets of the old city of Delhi chanting, "Indira Gandhi, get off your throne!" They poured onto the grounds of the Delhi city hall and shouted, "Down with Indira!" and "Indira Gandhi's rule will not last!" One youth shouted in English, "This is brutal murder of democracy by Indira Gandhi."

About 700 police, armed with lead-tipped clubs and bayonet-fixed rifles, charged the unarmed crowds, striking anyone within reach. "The frightened demonstrators sought refuge in homes, shops and alleys of the crowded ancient city, but the police charged in after them," reported a June 29 United Press International dispatch from New Delhi.

The police arrested at least thirty persons, dragging some of the youths by their hair to the waiting police wagons a block away.

A few hours after the proclamation of the state of emergency, Gandhi claimed in a national broadcast that the dictatorial measures had been taken to "save democracy" in India. "I am sure you are all conscious," she said, "of the deep and widespread conspiracy which has been brewing ever since I began introducing certain progressive measures of benefit to the common man and woman of India.

"In the name of democracy, it has been

sought to negate the very functioning of democracy."

But was there really a "conspiracy" involving thousands of persons? Gandhi's justification for the state of emergency, echoing the similar "conspiracy" stories that accompany almost every dictatorial coup, is a patent fake.

Gandhi's real intent was to hang on to power in the face of a developing Indian Watergate. Her coup came only two weeks after she was convicted of illegal campaign practices.

The growing popular distaste for the rampant corruption of Gandhi's ruling Congress party, combined with mass discontent over the deteriorating economic conditions, threatened to further erode the position of Gandhi and her cohorts. Instead of following Nixon's example in a similar situation and resigning, Gandhi decided to throw all those hot on her trail into prison.

President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, at Gandhi's orders, declared an internal state of emergency shortly after dawn on June 26 (India has been technically under an "external" state of emergency since December 1971, when the Indian regime went to war against Pakistani forces during the Bangladesh independence struggle).

The proclamation gave Gandhi powers to suspend democratic rights, censor the press, and conduct military operations "to maintain public order." Gandhi's directives cannot be legally challenged, no charges are required against those arrested, and all legal proceedings on behalf of the political prisoners have been barred. Using the state of emergency and the already existing Maintenance of Internal Security Act, Gandhi now has almost unlimited powers to arrest and detain indefinitely without trial anyone she "suspects" of planning to threaten "internal security."

As of June 28, government representatives admitted that more than 1,100 persons had been arrested across the country. But according to other sources, cited in a June 28 dispatch from New Delhi by *Washington Post* correspondent Lewis M. Simons, as many as 4,000 persons were under arrest by mid-afternoon on June 28. A.R. Baji, a government information official, claimed June 27 that "only around one-third were political workers." He said the rest of those arrested had been picked up "to prevent a breach of the peace." The Simons dispatch reported that students, teachers, and jour-

nalists were among those arrested.

Jaya Prakash Narayan, a leader of the Indian independence struggle during the 1940s and since 1974 the major political figure identified with the mass anticorruption movement in Bihar state, was one of the first opponents of Gandhi to be arrested. He claims no affiliation to any political party.

Among the other opposition leaders known to be in custody are Raj Narain and Samar Ghua, leaders of the Socialist party; Morarji Desai, a former deputy prime minister and the head of the Organization Congress, which split from the ruling Congress party in 1969; Jyoti Basu, a leader of the Communist party of India (Marxist); Piloo Mody, a leader of the rightist Bharatiya Lok Dal (People's party of India); and K.R. Malkani, editor of *Motherland*, the daily newspaper of the right-wing Jan Sangh.

In addition, Gandhi arrested thirty to forty members of her own party, including Chandra Shekhar, a member of the Congress party's top policy-making body, who had publicly criticized Gandhi's refusal to resign.

On the same day the state of emergency was decreed, the district magistrate of the Union Territory of Delhi (which includes the federal capital of New Delhi) issued an order prohibiting all meetings, the carrying of weapons, the shouting of slogans, participating in marches and demonstrations, and publishing or circulating literature "likely to cause disharmony amongst different sections of the community."

Orders were issued in various parts of the country banning public gatherings of more than four persons.

The most stringent censorship regulations ever applied in India were also put into effect. A list of "guidelines" issued to newspaper editors June 26 barred the printing of articles that dealt with, among other subjects, "any attempt to subvert functioning of democratic institutions," "anything relating to violence and agitation," "reports of false allegations against leaders," "anything denigrating an institution of the prime minister," and "any attempt to threaten internal stability, production and prospects of economic improvement."

The *Indian Express*, one of the few New Delhi newspapers that managed to put out an extra edition on June 26 reporting the

initial arrests (power had been cut off to some newspapers) was ordered by the police to burn its extra editions.

The new information minister, Vidya Charan Shukla, informed foreign journalists June 28 that they would be expelled from the country if they did not abide by the new censorship regulations.

A few reports of scattered opposition to the state of emergency appeared in Indian newspapers before the censorship rules went into effect. Other reports were admitted by government officials.

On June 26, Indian news agencies reported student disorders in Patna, the capital of Bihar, a state where the mass anticorruption movement has one of its strongest bases.

Baji told reporters June 26 that "a few acts of hooliganism, incidents of pelting of stones on city buses and putting up of road-blocks were reported" in Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarat state. He said police fired tear gas "to disperse unruly crowds." In a June 26 speech over All-India Radio, Gandhi admitted that there were "strikes in some places in Gujarat." A correspondent for the *New York Times* witnessed one peaceful march of several thousand persons held in Ahmedabad to protest the repressive measures.

According to Baji, the Jan Sangh led a march in Mehsana, Gujarat, which was followed by a bandh (general strike); in Poona, Maharashtra, about 1,000 persons demonstrated; and strikes took place in Haryana state and in parts of Bombay, the capital of Maharashtra.

A June 27 Associated Press dispatch from New Delhi reported that according to a government representative, "persons opposed to the emergency were also trying to hurt the economy by calling citywide general strikes. He said that four such strikes occurred today."

Baji stated June 28 that 500 protesters in Bombay had demonstrated June 26 and that in three towns in the southern state of Kerala demonstrations involving 300 to 400 persons took place. An earlier report noted that there had been demonstrations in Trivandrum, the capital of Kerala, and that members of the student union at the University College of Trivandrum had boycotted classes.

Jaya Prakash Narayan and Morarji Desai were reported to have started hunger strikes in prison.

Chief Minister Muthuvel Karunanidhi of Tamil Nadu state, which is ruled by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian Advancement Association), declared June 27 that Gandhi "has thrown democracy into the dustbin." He added, however, that he would carry out the directives of the federal government.

About 125 Indian reporters and editors met at the New Delhi Press Club June 28

and passed a resolution protesting the arrest of Malkani and other journalists.

Gandhi's assumption of dictatorial power came at a time when mass protests against corruption and against the country's wors-



SP LEADER NARAIN: Jailed by Gandhi.

ening economic conditions—famine, unemployment, inflation—continued to mount.

One recent indicator of the Congress party's declining support was the elections for a new state assembly in Gujarat two weeks before the state of emergency was imposed. The Congress party won 75 seats in the assembly, while an opposition bloc of right-wing parties won 87 seats. In the 1972 elections in Gujarat, the Congress party won two-thirds of the assembly seats. The Congress administration in the state was ousted in February 1974 after a massive upsurge that was sparked by food shortages in the government-run ration shops. (Because of the failure of the Communist parties to provide any leadership to the mass movements that developed in Gujarat and Bihar, the rightist groups were able to intervene to some extent and increase their influence.)

Gandhi's position was further threatened by the June 12 ruling of the High Court of Allahabad, her home town in Uttar Pradesh, which found her guilty of illegal campaign practices during the 1971 elections. The charges had been filed against her in April 1971 by Socialist party leader Raj

Narain, whom Gandhi had defeated for the parliamentary seat in the Rae Baraeli constituency of Uttar Pradesh. The court ruling barred Gandhi from holding any elected office for six years.

Gandhi's lawyers asked for a complete stay in the enforcement of the verdict until she had appealed, but the Supreme Court on June 24 stripped her of her right to vote in the Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament). The ruling, however, allowed her to keep her position as prime minister, pending the outcome of her appeal.

The opposition figures renewed their drive to force Gandhi out of office. At a rally of 50,000 in New Delhi June 25, Jaya Prakash Narayan called for a week of civil disobedience actions beginning June 29, which were to include a massive sit-down and hunger strike in front of Gandhi's official residence. He called on the police and army to ignore "illegal orders."

Although Gandhi used the announcement of the civil-disobedience campaign as a pretext for the imposition of the state of emergency, it appears that her plans were made at least ten days before the New Delhi rally. In a June 28 dispatch from New Delhi, *Washington Post* reporter Lewis M. Simons quoted an "informed source" as saying, "She had drawn up contingency plans as soon as the Allahabad court pronounced the conviction. The efficiency with which the police made the arrests all over the country makes this clear. They knew just where to find every one of the people on her list."

Gandhi attempted to win support for her repressive measures by claiming that the opposition forces were responsible for India's economic stagnation. In her June 26 speech she said, "The threat to internal stability also affects production and prospects of economic development."

Her Stalinist allies have portrayed the state of emergency as an attack against "reactionary elements" bent on undermining Gandhi's "progressive" regime. Although a significant number of right-wing leaders were included in the roundup, the real aim of the state of emergency—beyond the immediate goal of ensuring Gandhi's political survival—was to stifle the developing mass movements, which have not yet come under the clear control of any opposition party.

In case the Congress party's capitalist backers may have been confused about who the repression was directed against, Gandhi clarified the regime's intentions. In a June 27 speech, she attacked Narayan for "giving respectability to all kinds of forces, including Marxist Communists." Gandhi also stated that she did not intend to nationalize any industries (as had been rumored) or place new government controls on industry. □

Origin of the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA

By Ernest Harsch

[First of three articles]

The long Angolan struggle for national independence is entering a critical stage. A coalition regime of the three nationalist groups and the Portuguese was installed in Luanda January 31. Within weeks, Luanda and other cities and towns were rocked by fierce street battles, leaving hundreds dead, as the rival nationalist groups began contending for power in the oil- and mineral-rich country.

The threat of an engulfing fratricidal conflict—similar to that which took place in the Congo in the early 1960s after the departure of the Belgian imperialists—places in question the future of the Angolan struggle for independence.

The chief threat is that the Portuguese will renew military action in Angola either directly through the deployment of troops or indirectly through a United Nations "peace-keeping force." Such an outcome would be a major setback for both the Angolan liberation struggle and the African revolution as a whole.

The lineup of forces in Angola is complex. There are the three major nationalist groups, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA—Angolan National Liberation Front), and the União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

There are also a number of smaller nationalist organizations, as well as the Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC—Cabinda Liberation Front), a group that advocates the secession of Cabinda from Angola.

On the Portuguese side are the representatives of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA—Armed Forces Movement) administering the colony, as well as the Portuguese companies operating in Angola. The estimated 500,000 Portuguese settlers in Angola are also a significant force, although their interests do not necessarily coincide with those of the MFA.

The regimes in neighboring African countries, particularly in the Republic of the Congo and in Zaïre,¹ also have an interest

in the outcome of the Angolan conflict and may try to influence the actions of the Angolan nationalist groups.

Finally, there are the American, French, Belgian, and other imperialist interests that are eager to protect and to expand their exploitation of Angola's labor force and vast natural wealth.

The blame for the violent clashes between the Angolan nationalist groups is not easily pinpointed. Because of the many forces involved, caution must be observed in analyzing the conflicts.

An additional complication is the frequently biased reporting of foreign, particularly Portuguese, journalists in the country. Another is the mislabeling and slandering of the three nationalist groups by each other and their backers. Some of these slanders involve the rewriting of history for factional purposes.

For instance, the Stalinists, who back the MPLA politically, deny that the FNLA ever played any significant role in the independence movement. Vladimir Kudryavtsev, a political analyst for *Izvestia*, said in a Novosti Press Agency release published in the May 30 *Daily World*, newspaper of the American Communist party: "From the very beginning MPLA has been the main force in the armed struggle for the liberation of Angola from the yoke of the Portuguese colonialists."

William Pomeroy, another Stalinist, was more explicit. He claimed in the April 11 *Daily World* that the FNLA was "heavily financed and assisted by U.S. imperialism." According to him, "The FNLA kept to its base camps in Zaire throughout the liberation war in Angola, the main brunt of which was borne by the Marxist-led MPLA under Agostinho Neto."

Such misrepresentation of the facts only serves to obscure the real situation in the Angolan struggle.

Roots of the Nationalist Movement

The differences between the Angolan liberation organizations go back many years and are an integral part of the

cratic Republic of the Congo. It was a Belgian colony until June 1960. Many of the colonial names have been changed since then, including the capital, Leopoldville, which was renamed Kinshasa. Before the name change to Zaïre, it was popularly called Congo (Leopoldville) or Congo (Kinshasa).

nationalist movement's evolution and history.

The MPLA arose out of the nationalist currents that developed among the African intellectuals during the post-World War II period. Other nationalist groups also emerged from this layer, either in Angola's cities or among Angolan students in Portugal and other countries. Some of these groups still exist.

Viriato da Cruz and Mário de Andrade, two of the principal founders of the MPLA, were associated with the nationalist literary journal *Mensagem—A voz dos naturais de Angola* published in Luanda in the early 1950s. Agostinho Neto, like Cruz and Andrade, was a prominent poet in that period.

According to René Pélissier, in his contribution to the book *Angola*,² the Portuguese Communist party appeared to have worked within the Liga Nacional Africana (LNA—African National League) and other nationalist groups and recruited a few members and sympathizers during the 1950s. In 1955, Pélissier wrote, the Partido Comunista de Angola (PCA—Angolan Communist party) appeared in Luanda, although he noted that it was very weak. His account states that Neto and Andrade may have been members of the PCA at one time.

In December 1956, several of the Angolan nationalist groups merged to form the MPLA. The repression by the Portuguese security police forced Cruz, the secretary-general of the MPLA, to flee abroad. According to Pélissier, the MPLA's strength within Angola in the late 1950s was limited to a few clandestine cells.

The FNLA was built on a social base totally different from that of the MPLA. Its main roots are in the Bakongo nationalist movement in northern Angola, although it has sought to extend its influence among other social and ethnic groups in the country.

The Bakongo are descendants of the ancient Kongo kingdom, which was conquered and destroyed by the Portuguese, French, and Belgian imperialists and slave traders. They now live in the Republic of the Congo, Zaïre, and northern Angola. The Bakongo resisted the Portuguese invasion in sporadic wars and uprisings throughout the last half of the nineteenth century. Before the revolt of 1961, the last major uprising of the Bakongo peasants was in 1913-14, when they called for the ouster of the Portuguese-appointed Kongo king and for an end to forced labor. The Bakongo wanted to choose their own king.

Conditions similar to those that led to the 1913-14 uprising were still present in the 1950s and influenced the rise of the modern nationalist movement in the Bakongo

1. The Republic of the Congo is frequently called Congo (Brazzaville). Before its independence in 1960, it was part of French Equatorial Africa.

Zaïre, until October 1971, was called the Demo-

2. Douglas L. Wheeler and René Pélissier, *Angola* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971).

areas. In December 1955, there were public protests against forced labor. Three months later, the Portuguese launched a wave of arrests and deportations.

It was against this background that the União das Populações do Norte de Angola (UPNA—North Angola Peoples' Union) evolved into the União das Populações de Angola (UPA—Angolan Peoples' Union) in 1958, under the leadership of Holden Roberto. The UPNA had backed a Protestant candidate for king of the Kongo, but the UPA gave up any efforts to restore the Kongo monarchy, adopted a pan-Angolan nationalist perspective, and called for the independence of Angola. In 1962 the UPA merged with another group to form the FNLA.

Another major factor that heightened the nationalist sentiment among the Bakongo was the anticolonial struggle that was beginning to sweep the rest of Africa. Ghana won its formal independence in 1957. In 1960 the Bakongo in the French and Belgian colonies north of Angola also gained an end to direct colonial rule. This inspired the Bakongo and other peoples in Angola; and in 1959, after elections had been promised in Belgian-ruled Congo, demonstrations against Portuguese rule were staged in Angola.

1961: The Turning Point

In an interview published in the February 15, 1964, *El Moudjahid*, the central organ of the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN—National Liberation Front), MPLA leader Viriato da Cruz described the conditions in Angola that bred mass discontent against colonial rule.

"These masses," he said, "comprised around 800,000 workers in the rural zones, subjected to forced labor, around 350,000 Africans living in conditions of underemployment and joblessness in the urban zones, and around 1,000,000 Angolan émigrés, who were submitted in their turn to superexploitation by the Belgians, the English and the South Africans.

"In brief, more than 2,000,000 Africans torn from their social and geographical surroundings by the disintegration of the traditional societies, by violence and by the theft of their land, vegetating outside the traditional framework of their lives, in zones of insecurity and despair, deprived of their old ties."

These conditions fueled the steadily rising unrest that preceded the 1961 explosion.

In March 1959, the Portuguese authorities arrested hundreds of Africans, including leaders of the MPLA. The Portuguese air force and 2,000 troop reinforcements were sent to Angola. Again, in June 1960, there were mass arrests in Luanda, Lobito, Malange, and Dalatando.

The next month Portuguese troops terrorized the *muceques* of Luanda, burning houses and torturing women and children. When villagers from Agostinho Neto's home area protested his arrest at the



MPLA LEADER AGOSTINHO NETO

administration headquarters in Catete, troops opened fire, killing thirty demonstrators. In November, twenty-eight nationalists from Cabinda were slaughtered in a Luanda prison.

Although the MPLA continued to function from exile, issuing appeals and protests, the Portuguese repression further decimated its cells within Angola.

In the rural areas, unrest was also reaching a high pitch. In the Baixa de Cassange area east of Malange, about 30,000 African farmers had been forced to grow cotton for the Cotonang company. The peasants had to sell their crops at a government-fixed price well below that of the world market; the annual income for an African family was US\$20 to US\$30.

In November-December 1960, the African producers stopped work and refused to pay taxes. According to Pélissier, the MPLA, UPA, and the Congolese Parti de la Solidarité Africaine (African Solidarity party) may have had some influence among the cotton growers, although the "cotton revolt" itself was largely spontaneous.

The Portuguese moved in military forces and carried out a massacre of the African population. Pélissier wrote that "there were certainly summary executions and bombardment with napalm." It is estimated

3. Literally "sandy places," the African shantytowns that surround Luanda and other cities.

that as many as 10,000 Africans were killed.

On the night of February 3-4, 1961, small groups of Africans attacked several Portuguese prisons and installations in Luanda, suffering heavy losses. An armed white militia was formed and on February 5, after a funeral for some of the slain Portuguese troops and police, the whites began a bloody massacre of Africans in the *muceques*. According to Patricia McGowan Píneiro in "Politics of a Revolt,"⁴ more than 3,000 Africans were killed on that day alone. On February 10 there was another attack by a group of Africans, with similar results.

The MPLA claims that it initiated these attacks and dates the beginning of the "national revolution" from February 4, 1961. But according to Pélissier, it is not known who led the actions.

Whatever the case, the repression that followed nearly destroyed the MPLA within Angola. The MPLA headquarters in Conakry, Guinea, virtually lost contact with the survivors, some of whom managed to escape Luanda and reach the Dembos area, a mountainous region northeast of Luanda.

Next came an insurrection in northern Angola. The date of March 15 was apparently chosen by the UPA to coincide with a debate on Angola in the United Nations Security Council. A few weeks before, Holden Roberto told Frantz Fanon, the well-known anticolonialist intellectual, according to Fanon's wife, "Pay close attention to March 15, the day of the debate in the U.N.; some very important things are going to happen in Angola."

Unlike the isolated actions in Luanda the month before, the March 15 revolt quickly gained a mass character. The Portuguese referred to it as the "Great War."

The initial assaults against plantations and administrative and police posts took the Portuguese by surprise. Using battle cries of "UPA" and "Lumumba,"⁵ the rebels staged guerrilla actions along the northern border area, in Cabinda, and in the Dembos. According to Pélissier, the revolt in the southern Dembos reached the scale of a minor popular uprising.

"Since March 15, a large triangular slice of Angola—its base along the Congo frontier and its apex reaching 200 miles south, uncomfortably close to the capital city of Luanda—has come almost completely into the hands of African revolutionaries," Hamilton Fish Armstrong reported in

4. Published in *Angola: A Symposium* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

5. Patrice Lumumba, the outstanding Congolese nationalist leader who was murdered in February 1961.

the May 15, 1961, *New York Times Magazine*.

Pélissier stated, "The eastern corner of the Congo district [later divided into Zaïre and Uíge districts] was now Portuguese in only nine fortified posts; the rest was abandoned to the rebels. The UPA brought forward its commandos unopposed in the north-south central corridor, from the frontier down to the Dembos. It registered its greatest psychological success in forcing the Portuguese into the error of abandoning the powerful fortress of Bembe. . . ."

By June, the UPA began burning coffee crops and destroying plantations in the areas they held in the Congo, Cuanza-Norte, and Luanda districts in an effort to break the economic ties of the Portuguese settlers and force them to abandon the land they held in the north. The Portuguese counterattacks, in part, became a struggle to regain what could be salvaged of the coffee, which in 1961 was worth about \$55 million and accounted for 40 percent of Angola's foreign exchange earnings.

Although the UPA sent emissaries south, it was unsuccessful in spreading the revolt beyond the Bakongo areas, with the exception of some Mbundu.

The Portuguese reprisals against the rebels—and against the African population as a whole—were barbarous.

In the north, the Portuguese air force, with napalm, rockets, and machine guns, indiscriminately bombed and strafed rebels, villagers, and refugee columns. The Portuguese settlers, inflamed by exaggerated horror stories of massacres of whites by the rebels,⁶ swiftly organized into a "militia" and moved against the African population.

"They fired on sight," Pélissier wrote, "burned down villages and spared prisoners only until they had talked. . . . This was a frankly racial war, without pardon and without foreign witnesses. . . . Its victims were villagers who had nothing to do with the commandos and the more or less organised guerrilla bands. By this indiscriminate killing, the militia, and then the army, caused the Africans to unite on the side of the UPA."

But the massacres were not just limited to northern Angola. They were carried out against Mbundu in the Cuanza Valley and they even reached some parts of central and southern Angola. The Portuguese claimed they had smashed "terrorist plots" in those areas.

The white terror was just as devastating in the cities. The Reverend Clifford J. Parsons, a Baptist missionary and author of "The Makings of a Revolt,"⁷ who was in Angola at the time of the insurrection, described the situation. "Above all in

Luanda," he said, "three weeks after the outbreak of the revolt, I was myself the confidant of those who were witnesses to the nightly murder of innocent Africans in the outer suburbs. At that time there was no fighting within a hundred miles of Luanda, yet wanton killing went on in this way, and even in broad daylight."

In another report, Parsons said, "Thousands of colored people have been slaughtered and mutilated. Each night, the Portuguese secret police have broken into houses and dragged Africans into the streets, where they were shot."

Pélissier noted, however, that the killings were not entirely at random. ". . . every African *assimilado*⁸ regarded as a potential leader was suspect, and many were arrested and some were executed."

As early as May, a Portuguese officer estimated that 30,000 Africans had been killed. The number of deaths by October 7, when the Portuguese announced that their military operations were "complete," are thought to be as high as 50,000. Many of the dead were the victims of disease and famine caused by the war.

The Struggle in Exile

The defeat of the revolt, and the massive Portuguese reprisals, drove hundreds of thousands of refugees across the border into Congo (Kinshasa) and other countries. The estimates of the total number of Angolans in exile at present in Zaïre, the Republic of the Congo, and Zambia range from one million to three million (some had emigrated in search of jobs, and others fled from the fighting that continued sporadically during the decade after the 1961 revolt).

The areas of UPA strength within Angola were virtually depopulated by the war. In Zaïre district, for instance, there were 102,777 inhabitants in 1960. By 1968 this figure had dropped to around 30,000. The forced migrations of the Bakongo, and the continued Portuguese repression in northern Angola, forced the UPA to base itself among the Bakongo exiles, principally in Congo (Kinshasa). It still carried out occasional military operations in Angola, launched from its bases across the border.

In March 1962, the UPA joined with the Partido Democrático de Angola (PDA—Angolan Democratic party), a small group based among the Bazombo in northern Angola, to form the FNLA. A month later the FNLA set up the Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (GRAE—Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile).

8. The Portuguese used the term *assimilado* to describe those Africans who had been educated and "assimilated" into the Portuguese culture. A common imperialist practice was to try to pit the *assimilados* and *mestiços* (those of mixed African and Portuguese parenthood) against the *indegenas* ("natives").

Before the Congo won its independence from Belgium, the UPA's activities were officially banned in that country. But the UPA maintained ties with Patrice Lumumba before his assassination. And the support of Joseph Kasavubu, the leader of Abako (Alliance des Bakongo), saved the UPA from Belgian interference. When Kasavubu became president of the new Congolese Republic, however, he turned against the UPA.

In August 1961, Cyrille Adoula, a personal friend of Roberto, was recognized as prime minister, and the UPA was once again able to function from the Congo in relative freedom. It was allowed to open training camps in Congolese territory and in June 1963, the Adoula regime recognized the GRAE.

The reactionary Moïse Tshombe, who came to power in July 1964, employed government troops, Belgian paratroopers, and European mercenaries to crush Congolese rebels. Roberto described the harassment of the UPA in a 1965 interview with *Révolution Africaine*, a weekly journal of the Algerian FLN.

"The obvious collusion of the Portuguese with Tshombe," he said, "had grave consequences for us: confiscation of arms and munitions, acts of intimidation and harassment, blocking of the Angolan-Congolese border, tacitly giving the right to pursuit to the Portuguese army against our refugees on Congolese territory. Attacks against our rear bases, suppression of our radio broadcasts, open activity of the Portuguese secret police (PIDE)⁹ in the Congo."

On January 25, 1965, Roberto attempted to leave the Congo to visit Lusaka, Zambia, at the invitation of President Kenneth Kaunda. But according to a GRAE statement, he was formally forbidden from doing so by Tshombe's secret police. A February 2, 1965, Agence France-Presse dispatch reported that Tshombe had feared that the GRAE might try to contact Congolese insurgents abroad. On February 4, 1965, a GRAE representative in Brussels stated that the GRAE had been accused by the Tshombe regime of furnishing arms to the rebel forces of Pierre Mulele in eastern Congo.

Despite these difficulties, the FNLA and GRAE remained based in the Congo, according to the GRAE, because of logistics advantages and the presence of the refugee population. With the ouster of Tshombe in October 1965 and the coming to power of General Joseph Mobutu, the pressure on the FNLA eased somewhat. It later managed to get aid from the Mobutu regime.

Slanders of the FNLA had been circulated by the MPLA and other groups since the early 1960s. On December 16, 1964, Moscow

9. Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado—International State Security Police.

6. According to Pélissier, only between 200 and 300 Europeans were killed throughout the revolt.

7. Published in *Angola: A Symposium*.

joined the campaign to discredit the FNLA. An article in *Pravda* claimed that the GRAE was linked with U.S. imperialism and with the Tshombe regime. These slanders were repeated, with embellishments, in other countries over the years, particularly by the pro-Moscow Communist parties.

In 1974, the Soviet magazine *Novoe Vremya* offered a new twist to the old slander: "It looks very much as if the plans of the CIA and its backers, the monopolies, which have enormous capital investments in Angola, coincide with the plans of Peking aimed at strengthening the FNLA as a counterweight to the MPLA."

There is no hard evidence to support these charges. The most that João Baptista Nunes Pereira Neto, a Salazarist writer,¹⁰ could produce was that the UPA received some "aid" from the American Committee on Africa, was "openly supported" by various Protestant organizations, and had ties to the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations through the UPA's trade-union group, the Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (LGTA—General League of Angolan Workers).

It appears that Roberto may have had some hopes in the early 1960s that Washington would put pressure on Lisbon to negotiate with the nationalist forces.

For instance, in an interview published in the June 6, 1975, *Le Monde*, Roberto said: "When I was in the United States, I greatly admired President Kennedy, whom I met before his election. It was in 1961 that, for the first and last time, the Americans voted against Portugal in the [United Nations] Security Council. I returned to the United States in 1963, on the day of Kennedy's assassination. I couldn't meet him again. I have not set foot on American soil since then. I have never received aid from the United States."

In January 1964 Roberto said: "I came to the conclusion that the Western countries are hypocritical. They help our enemies. While paying lip service to self-determination, the United States supplies its North Atlantic treaty's ally, Portugal, with arms that are used to kill us." He also noted that G. Mennen Williams, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, had tried to convince the Congolese regime not to recognize the GRAE.

On July 8, 1965, Johnny Eduardo, the head of the GRAE official mission in Algeria, issued a statement condemning

10. In "Movimentos Subversivos de Angola," published in *Angola*, by the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Política Ultramarina, 1963-64. The author attempted to "prove" that the rebels within Angola had no base and only survived thanks to foreign interests. He hinted that the UPA was backed by the CIA and the MPLA by the KGB.

President Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War and Washington's plans to bomb Hanoi. A few months earlier, Eduardo said in an interview with *Révolution Africaine*, "The struggle of the Cuban, Vietnamese



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and Chinese peoples, for example, are a great inspiration to us."

Holden Roberto has frequently declared that the FNLA would accept aid from any source, as long as no political conditions were attached.

In the early 1960s, the FNLA had ties with the Nkrumah regime in Ghana. FNLA officers were trained in Algeria by the FLN under Ben Bella, and in 1964 the Algerian regime recognized the GRAE (it later changed its position and supported both the FNLA and MPLA, calling for their unification). The FNLA received some aid from the Tunisian regime. The Organization of African Unity recognized the GRAE in 1964, but lifted the recognition in June 1971, sending some aid to both the FNLA and MPLA and pressing for their unification.

On January 3, 1964, Roberto announced that the FNLA had decided to accept aid from Peking, which it has been receiving off and on up to the present. He said the FNLA would also accept aid from "other Communist countries." According to Nicolas Vieira of the FNLA in an interview published in the February 15, 1964, *El Moudjahid*, "We have increased armaments available thanks to the support of friendly socialist countries, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and People's China." The Soviet aid was presumably halted at the time of the *Pravda* attack on the FNLA later that year.

According to Kenneth L. Adelman, writ-

ing in the April 1975 *Foreign Affairs*, the FNLA also received medical supplies from the World Council of Churches and the World Health Organization in the early 1970s.

Unlike the MPLA and the UNITA, which use socialist terminology, the FNLA claims that it is purely nationalist, with no "ideology."

For instance, Henrick Vaal Neto, an FNLA representative during the negotiations with Lisbon in January 1975, said, according to the January 14 Lisbon daily *República*: "The FNLA has always tried to avoid affiliation with any ideological bloc. We think the Angolan people are mature enough to delineate their own ideology, always according to the Angolan reality. . . . What interests us Angolans, in respect to ideology, has nothing to do with 'isms.'"

Despite the FNLA's lack of a perspective for the Angolan independence struggle that could lead it to a successful conclusion—the ouster of all imperialist interests from the country and the overthrow of capitalism—it was still the only nationalist organization in the early 1960s that had any kind of mass base and was actively fighting against the Portuguese colonialists.

The United Secretariat of the Fourth International, noting the FNLA's active opposition to Portuguese rule and its participation in mass struggles, issued a statement on February 17, 1964, which said among other things: "The most effective way in which revolutionary Marxists can help the Angolan freedom fighters find their way to the program of socialism is to participate actively in the struggles led by the FNLA, to help them obtain material support in fighting against Portuguese imperialism, and to back them in resisting every neocolonialist maneuver, above all those emanating from American imperialism."

Livio Maitan, a leader of the Fourth International, pointed out in an article in the March 5, 1965, issue of *Intercontinental Press*, "As for the arguments being circulated about this or that Angolan leader rumored to be 'an agent of American imperialism' or a 'friend of Tshombe,' we repeat once again that aside from the fact that no serious proof has been offered up to now, this would not be of decisive importance. The real problem is to ascertain whether or not there is a movement that is struggling, whether it exercises preponderant influence among the masses at a given stage. If these conditions hold, then it is the duty of revolutionists to display active solidarity with those who are struggling, independently of the attitude or possible orientation of a leader or even of an entire leadership. . . ."

" . . . While not pretending to remain aloof from the fray like pious preachers,

they do not believe they are called on to mix into every factional dispute that develops."

During the early 1960s, when the FNLA was the only group carrying out any significant actions within Angola, the MPLA was in virtual disarray.

The Portuguese repression had eliminated most of its leaders in Luanda and other cities and the survivors in the countryside had to contend with the Portuguese troops as well as hostile FNLA guerrillas, who were reported to have occasionally attacked MPLA members.

It was cut off from much of the Angolan exile community when the Adoula regime officially expelled the MPLA from Congo (Kinshasa) in November 1963. The FNLA barred MPLA guerrillas from crossing Congolese territory to reinforce the remaining MPLA rebels within Angola.

The OAU conciliation committee's recommendation in July 1963 to the OAU member-states to recognize the GRAE was a political defeat for the MPLA.

The MPLA tried to bolster its support by forming the Frente Democrática para a Libertação de Angola (FDLA—Angolan Democratic Liberation Front), with a number of miniscule groupings, some of which had dubious backgrounds. The MPLA allowed this front to fade out shortly after.

The reverses experienced by the MPLA heightened differences within the organization. It began to fragment. In December 1962 Viriato da Cruz, one of its principal founders, left the MPLA after having tried to unify the UPA and MPLA. The majority of the MPLA's members also left. For a while, Cruz declared that his group represented the MPLA, but on April 22, 1964, he joined the FNLA.

Mário de Andrade, another main leader of the MPLA for years, resigned from the leadership in July 1963. Agostinho Neto and Lucio Lara then gained control of the MPLA's central leadership.

After its expulsion from Kinshasa, the MPLA moved its exile headquarters to Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo. "A conference of some fifty MPLA leaders at Brazzaville from January 3 to 10, 1964, took stock of the situation," Pélissier wrote. "They had only two or three hundred soldiers left."

Since the MPLA was blocked from moving its forces into northern Angola, it sent a few guerrillas into Cabinda in January 1963. But the Brazzaville regime of Fulbert Youlou hampered the MPLA's activities, its policy being to support the Cabindan separatists of the Movimento de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC—Cabindan Liberation Movement). The overthrow of Youlou in 1964 made it possible for the MPLA to function more freely.

In 1964, Neto visited Moscow, where he obtained financial support for the MPLA.

From the Stalinist statements attacking the FNLA and picturing the MPLA as the only significant Angolan liberation group, it is clear that Neto also obtained Moscow's political backing. The MPLA maintained contacts with the Portuguese Communist party through the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN—Patriotic Front for National Liberation), which was based in Algiers.

According to Pélissier, the MPLA had a military training camp at Brazzaville that was organized by Cubans. He noted that at one time the MPLA also received some backing from Peking. Basil Davidson, in an article in the January 7, 1972, *Le Monde*, reported that Peking, after a long interruption, had resumed arms aid to the MPLA.

The MPLA also managed to gain the support of various liberal and left-wing forces in Europe, primarily because of its Soviet backing and because its program was more concrete than that of the FNLA. Among other bourgeois-democratic demands, the MPLA called for independence from Portugal, agrarian reform, creation of a pan-Angolan culture, and eradication of illiteracy.

In 1964 the MPLA stepped up its action in Cabinda and moved a few leaders into sparsely populated eastern Angola, where they began military operations in May 1966. The MPLA had maintained its support among the Mbundu in the Dembos area and along the Luanda-Malange corridor. In June and July of 1966 the MPLA managed to send a column of 150 to 200 rebels through FNLA-controlled territory into the Dembos region to strengthen its forces.

From 1967 to 1969, the MPLA moved part of its military and political staff to Lusaka, Zambia, and then into eastern Angola itself. The Kaunda regime in Lusaka gave the MPLA some material aid, but threatened to cut it off if the MPLA forces attacked the Benguela railway, which Lusaka used to transport its copper to the Angolan port of Lobito. By 1970, the MPLA was claiming some guerrilla actions in the Dembos area and in the districts of Cabinda, Moxico, Cuando-Cubango, Lunda, Malange, and Bié.

Despite its early successes, the FNLA also faced setbacks. The pressures of trying to lead a struggle from exile resulted in splits from the FNLA and the GRAE.

In 1963 the União Nacional Angolana (UNA—Angolan National Union) was formed in Lubumbashi, the capital of Congo's Katanga Province. Led by Marcos Kassanga and André Kassinda, the UNA was composed of former UPA partisans, particularly Ovimbundus.

In July 1964, the GRAE Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Malheiro Savimbi and José João Lihuca, the director of the GRAE refugee aid service, resigned. Both



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denounced the GRAE's alleged inefficiency, lack of unity, and inadequate support to the rebels within Angola.

The departure of Savimbi, an Ovimbundu, and later of Alexandre Taty,¹¹ a Cabindan, was a reverse for the FNLA's perspective of broadening its social base beyond the Bakongo. However, according to Mangali Tula, the Bakongo now form only a minority on the FNLA's Central Committee. And according to Roberto in an interview in the June 6, 1975, *Le Monde*, only one of the FNLA ministers in the present coalition regime speaks Kikongo, the language of the Bakongo. What the proportions are within the organization as a whole remains unclear.

Tula also stated that from 1968 to 1970 the FNLA was reorganized. In 1970, the FNLA's two components, the UPA and PDA, were dissolved and the FNLA reconstituted itself as a party.

The FNLA, whose military actions had been at a lull for a few years, stepped up its guerrilla attacks again in 1968. It staged assaults in the districts of Cabinda, Zaire, Uíge, Cuanza-Norte, Luanda, and Malange, with occasional forays into Lunda and Moxico.

Another Contender Enters the Field

The third main Angolan liberation group, the UNITA, was formed by Jonas Savimbi in 1965. Its first guerrilla action was in December 1966 when 500 UNITA troops attacked the frontier town of Teixeira de Sousa on the Benguela railway, losing about half its forces.

In 1969, after the UNITA derailed a

11. A commando unit led by Taty and Kassinda attacked the UPA and GRAE offices in Kinshasa in June 1965.

freight train on the Benguela railway, the Kaunda regime, under pressure from the Portuguese, who temporarily closed down the railway, expelled Savimbi from Zambia. Savimbi then moved his entire headquarters into eastern Angola.

An OAU commission visited eastern Angola in 1968, but found little evidence that the UNITA was very active. However, the UNITA's strength appears to have increased by 1973, according to *Washington Post* correspondent Leon Dash, who visited UNITA-controlled territory that year.

Dash reported that thousands of Angolan peasants were living in UNITA-organized villages. "The UNITA guerrillas," he said, "... administer, apparently effectively, what appears to be a substantial area in eastern Angola."

The UNITA rebels claimed that they were fighting in Moxico, Bié, Cuando-Cubango, Huila, Lunda, and Huambo districts in central, eastern, and southern Angola.¹²

According to António Fernandes, the UNITA's secretary of information and publicity, in an interview published in the October 1974 issue of *Black World*, the UNITA was formed by dissidents from both the FNLA and MPLA who were opposed to trying to lead the independence struggle from exile.

Pélissier states that the UNITA's main base is among the Ovimbundu, who make up about 33 percent of the Angolan population. But according to Dash, the UNITA villages and guerrilla camps he visited included Chokwe, Lunda, Ganguela, and Luimbi. Dash also reported that Savimbi was the only Ovimbundu on UNITA's ten-member executive political bureau.

Dash attended the UNITA's third congress. He reported, "The congress brought together leaders from all parts of UNITA's 'liberated' territories, from the agricultural Luimbi and Ovimbundu tribal regions, in the central part, to the semi-nomadic Cuanhama tribes from the south, to the Chokwe in the northeast."

According to Savimbi, all the UNITA's weapons were captured from the Portuguese or in clashes with the MPLA and FNLA. Savimbi also claimed that the UNITA received no military or economic aid from any foreign state, although Dash noted that it did get some aid from the World Council of Churches and the U.S.-based African Liberation Support Committee. In addition, Savimbi was reported to have visited Peking in 1968 and to have received a small amount of Chinese aid.

Savimbi also told Dash that he had requested, in separate letters to the MPLA and FNLA, to join the Supreme Liberation Council, but was rejected. The Supreme Liberation Council was set up on December

13, 1972, in an effort to unite the MPLA and FNLA, but soon fell apart.

Both the MPLA and FNLA have charged that the UNITA collaborated with the Portuguese forces during the war. These charges stem from a series of four "letters" published in the July 8, 1974, issue of the Paris magazine *Afrique-Asie*, which backs the MPLA politically. The "letters," purportedly written by Savimbi and two Portuguese officers in 1972, discussed carrying out military actions against the MPLA.

On July 19, 1974, António Fernandes issued a communiqué from Lusaka stating that the documents published in *Afrique-Asie* were forgeries.

Many of the UNITA's military and propaganda statements are colored with Maoist terminology. Dash reported, after discussing the UNITA's long-term strategy with Savimbi, "The guerrillas' strategy in the first stage of the war, he [Savimbi] said, is to persuade more and more of the African population to join them in the forests, thus isolating the towns. In the second stage, which is to come when the guerrillas have won over enough of the peasant population, they plan to attack the towns—which by

then will be occupied primarily by the Portuguese, according to the plan."

Savimbi said, "We are in a war that might last for generations."

This strategy was repeated by Fernandes in the interview with *Black World*. "We could not start the war from the cities," he said, "because the majority of the people live in the countryside, so we have to go back to the countryside, from the countryside to town, so we started the armed struggle inside the rural area directing it to towns."

Fernandes also claimed that the UNITA was formed "within the Marxism/Leninism lines" and that the UNITA was aiming for a "socialist" regime in Angola after independence. Wilson Santos, a member of the UNITA's political bureau, later clarified this point. According to a February 18, 1975, Agence France-Presse dispatch, he said that the UNITA "wants to build a Socialist society" in Angola—not one modeled on China, Senegal, or Congo, he said, but one that "fits in with the history and realities of our country."

[Next: The Battle Against Portuguese Neocolonialism]

Sex Discrimination Major Issue at UN Conference

Women's Lot: 'Underfed, Uneducated, Pregnant'

More than 1,000 official delegates and about 5,000 unofficial participants went to Mexico City for the ten-day United Nations International Women's Year world conference that began June 19.

Whatever the other results of the gathering, it has put a spotlight on the oppressed condition of women throughout the world. UN background papers drew a picture of the kind of life led by one billion women, the majority of women in the world.

As summarized by James Sterba in the June 26 *New York Times*, a typical woman from among these one billion "wakes at 5 A.M., eats little or nothing, straps her baby on her back and walks a mile to a field. There, for 10 hours, she bends and stoops, planting or hoeing. At 3 P.M. she scavenges for firewood and carries it and her child back home. There she pounds grain kernels into meal and prepares other food. By 6 P.M. she is ready for another walk—this one, a three-mile roundtrip—to fetch water.

"At dusk, she kindles a fire, then cooks, serves and eats an inevitably bland and nutritionally inadequate meal—the only kind affordable."

These conditions, found predominantly in the capitalist world, affect men as well, but women are almost universally worse off.

Their lot, says a UN paper, is "to be underfed, ill, uneducated and pregnant from the day of their first menstruation until menopause."

Equal pay for equal work was a demand supported by conference participants from both advanced and semicolonial countries. In Japan women's wages are less than half of men's wages, and in most West European countries women are paid about two-thirds of what men are.

While men in twelve European and North and South American countries average a 10.6 hour workday, a working woman with a family averages 11.6 hours work on weekdays and another 5.7 hours of work on weekends while men are mostly at leisure.

The pervasive discrimination against women was reflected in the leadership of the UN conference itself. The president of the conference was a man, and males dominated the inaugural session of speeches. Only eight of the top 300 officials of the UN are women, although 70 percent of UN secretaries and clerks are female.

New York Lieut. Gov. Mary Anne Krupak revealed in a speech to the conference that the American delegation was not selected by women but by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. □

12. The military claims of all three groups are probably exaggerated to some extent.

25,000 March in Britain to Defend Right to Abortion

By Maureen Blackburn



Contingents included feminist groups, trade unions, doctors, students, Labour party figures, IMG, CP, and IS.

LONDON—Twenty-five thousand persons, mainly women, marched here June 21 in a demonstration organized by the National Abortion Campaign (NAC). The march, which was the biggest women's rights action since the days of the suffrage movement, called for the defeat of the Abortion (Amendment) Bill, which would roll back the limited rights won under the liberal 1967 Abortion Act. Five hundred persons marched on the same day in Glasgow.

The bill, if passed, would have the effect of outlawing two-thirds of the abortions now permissible under the 1967 act. It would limit health grounds for abortion to those involving a risk to the life of the pregnant woman; it would make it impossible for women from other countries to obtain abortions here unless they had conceived on British soil; and it would bring forward the deadline for obtaining an abortion from the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy to the twentieth.

Other clauses impose restrictions on doctors entitled to perform abortions; limit the types of agencies able to counsel and refer abortions; restrict freedom of the press to publish abortion-related material; and restrict the giving of advice on abortion to women under sixteen.

The bill is sponsored by Labour Member of Parliament James White. The Labour party has refused to take a stand on the right of women to abortion, calling it a matter of individual conscience for Labour

MPs. However, resolutions opposing the bill have been sent to NAC by twenty local Constituency Labour parties, the Labour party Southern Regional Conference, and more than forty trade-union branches.

The bill is now being examined by a Parliamentary Select Committee. Most of the evidence given to the committee has been hostile to the bill. The National Women's Advisory Committee of the Labour party gave evidence opposing the bill, stating that abortion is a decision that should be made by the woman herself. The British Medical Association has criticized almost every aspect of the bill.

The biggest blow to the bill so far was undoubtedly the massive turnout on the June 21 march, which the *Observer* described as "an overwhelmingly successful demonstration."

The *Sunday Times* reported: "It took nearly two hours for all the women to leave the starting point on the Victoria Embankment. Ninety minutes after the march began, the road alongside the Thames from Westminster Bridge to Blackfriars was still choked with demonstrators who had no hope of reaching Hyde Park in time for the main rally and speeches."

Spirits were high along the route of the march. Hundreds of banners could be seen, many of them brightly coloured trade-union banners. Many marchers wore green, white, and purple sashes in the style of the suffragists. A float organized by doctors

opposed to the bill illustrated the horrible alternatives to legal abortion.

The banners reflected the wide support for the demonstration. The Working Women's Charter Campaign, the Women's Abortion and Contraception Campaign, and women's liberation groups and NAC groups from scores of towns up and down the country were represented. Among the sponsors of the march were the International Marxist Group (IMG), British section of the Fourth International; International Socialists; Communist party; Young Communist League; Young Liberals; and Labour party Young Socialists.

Seventeen trades councils and more than forty trade-union branches sent contingents. There were marchers from twenty hospitals in London alone. Twenty-four colleges sent buses paid for by the student unions.

Marchers sang feminist songs and chanted slogans as they passed a feeble counter-rally of 300, which was all the anti-abortionists were able to muster.

The rally following the march was chaired by Toni Gorton of NAC, who hailed the demonstration as "an enormous demonstration of solidarity by women against the bill."

The central role played by the IMG in building the campaign contrasted sharply with that of most left-wing groups, who have given at most half-hearted support. Linda Smith, a leading NAC activist and member of the IMG, spoke at the rally on

behalf of NAC. She stressed the need for continued action to defeat the bill, declaring that "the campaign will continue until all restrictive legislation is abolished and abortions are freely available to all women, in terms of the law and in terms of National Health Service facilities." She scored James White as "a disgrace to the Labour movement" for his sponsorship of the bill.

Speaker Sally Hesmondhalgh from the Abortion Law Reform Association (ALRA) presented Labour MP Renee Short with a petition of 150,000 signatures which had been collected by NAC and ALRA. Short, who has been traveling around the country speaking at NAC meetings, is one of eleven women Labour MPs who sponsored the demonstration.

Sue Slipman, a representative of the National Executive of the National Union of Students, said that the recent NUS conference voted overwhelmingly against the bill and in support of NAC and the June 21 demonstration.

Isabel Pereira dos Santos of the newly formed Portuguese Abortion and Contraception Campaign told of the 2,000 women who die each year in Portugal as a result of back-street abortions and how women taken to hospitals with botched abortions were treated without anaesthetic as a punishment for their "sin."

An atmosphere of international solidarity pervaded the rally. Contingents from France and the Netherlands had come to march with their British sisters. Between the speeches, messages of solidarity were read from abortion groups and women's groups in Australia, the United States, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.

A message from Willie Mae Reid, vice-presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers party in the United States, was also read. The chairwoman announced that solidarity pickets were being held at British embassies that day in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, and Luxembourg, and that Italian women were picketing British consulates in Bologna, Turin, Pisa, and Florence.

A message was sent from the demonstration to Dr. Henry Morgentaler, a Canadian doctor imprisoned for performing abortions. The rally also passed a resolution demanding the release of Eva Forest, a Spanish feminist threatened with the death penalty by Franco.

The demonstration was the culmination of four months of active campaigning by NAC, including a June 9-14 week of action. During that week dozens of public meetings and local marches were organized, and leafleting and petitioning was intensified to build the June 21 demonstration. NAC is now building a conference to take place in October to plan future actions. □

CP Leaders Refuse Support

Italian Abortion Petition Tops 500,000 Signatures

By Estelle Cordano

NAPLES—"Does the question of abortion concern only women? No! It concerns all the exploited. Let's sign the referendum!"

This is the heading on a leaflet written by the Naples branch of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (GCR—Revolutionary Communist Groups, Italian section of the Fourth International). It is being distributed here as part of a national campaign in support of the effort to put a referendum annulling Italy's anti-abortion law on the ballot next fall. (See *Intercontinental Press*, February 17, p. 217.)

A total of 519,000 signatures has already been collected. Supporters of the referendum are continuing to collect signatures, however, to gain a large margin over the 500,000 required.

The Socialist party is the only major party that supports the referendum. The Radical party (a small bourgeois party) and all the smaller left groups (*Lotta Continua*, *Avanguardia Operaia*, *PDUP-il Manifesto**) also support the campaign.

The Communist party, the largest of the workers parties (1.5 million members), has no official position on the referendum. Instead it has introduced into parliament a law that would remove abortion from the criminal code but still forbid it.

Abortion is now punishable by a one- to five-year sentence in prison. The CP bill would make it punishable by a 100,000 lire fine (about US\$160). The CP proposal would allow abortion only under certain conditions—poverty, or danger to the health of the woman—and then only if a commission of doctors and social advisers grants permission.

The GCR leaflet says: "The fact is that the CP wants to confront the Christian Democrats and the Vatican as little as possible. Thus it did not find the conflict over the divorce laws pleasant, and it doesn't want a similar test of forces on the question of abortion either." This would only make it more difficult for the CP to bring about its "historic compromise"—a popular-front government based on a CP-Christian Democratic coalition.

Support for the abortion referendum is strong among Italian workers of all political viewpoints, including sizable numbers of CP rank-and-filers. I saw an example of

this in Naples as I watched members of the GCR passing out their leaflet at the Alpha Sud plant, an auto factory of 15,000 workers, where the CP has considerable strength.

A worker who identified himself as a CP member asked for leaflets to take inside and said he would bring his fellow workers to sign the petition. A few days later the factory Council of Delegates at Alpha Sud passed a motion to support the referendum. The CP delegates voted for the motion.

The same thing is happening in other cities. A worker in one of Milan's largest publishing houses told me, "On the day people came to petition, they collected 400 signatures in two hours. The Communist party couldn't hold its ranks. All the CP workers signed the petition and only a few of the CP delegates refused. Our Council of Delegates voted to support the referendum."

The requirements to get a referendum on the ballot are quite complicated. The 500,000 signatures must be collected in ninety days. They must be notarized at the time of signing, and then must be sent to each city hall for verification. Petitions can also be signed at the city hall where a person is registered to vote.

The problem now is to force the city halls to process the signatures. Officials in Rome and Naples say they can process only 500 signatures a day. This would make it impossible to meet the ninety-day deadline. Yet when the Christian Democrats were collecting signatures for the divorce referendum, 3,000 persons were hired in order to process the signatures in just two days.

The referendum is only the beginning of the fight for the right to abortion. Under Italian law, referendums can only be used to annul old laws. If the referendum wins, the Christian Democrats are prepared to introduce new laws almost as reactionary as the old fascist laws. The fight to make abortion legal and available to all women must continue. □

Greek Bishop Puts Curse on Women Who Have Abortions

A Greek bishop has placed a curse on women who have abortions. Bishop Augoustinos of the northern diocese of Florina said in his sermon June 8, "May women who have abortions be stricken with cancer of the womb." In the past Augoustinos has waged a campaign against birth-control pills.

* *PDUP-il Manifesto* is the fused grouping of the Partito d'Unità Proletaria (Party of Proletarian Unity) with supporters of the newspaper *il Manifesto*.

Portuguese Military Leaders Reassure Washington

By Gerry Foley

Although the capitalist press in the United States expressed relief at the Lisbon military government's statement June 21 denying that it intended to establish "socialism" by dictatorial means, the commentary in the week following was not especially flattering to the ruling junta.

In a column in the June 25 *New York Times*, James Reston suggested that the Armed Forces Movement was being brought to its senses both by the consequences of its folly and by pressure from "outside" sources, including Moscow.

London, Paris, and Bonn had "insisted," Reston wrote, "that, while the worst might happen, the moderate forces in Portugal still had a chance and should be supported, and also that the play of other forces outside Portugal would begin to influence the internal struggle."

Now these predictions were being borne out and Washington was reevaluating earlier drastic conclusions by Henry Kissinger, who wanted to "deal with" the "reality" of a radical regime in Lisbon.

Moscow and the local Stalinists were pressing for "moderation":

"Also, Alvaro Cunhal, the Communist party leader here, is being embarrassed by the cries of the Maoists, Trotskyists and others on the extreme left who want to abolish the political parties and the Constituent Assembly and establish a militant government of workers' councils.

"Even Moscow is apparently unhappy with this vicious conflict between the Portuguese Communists and the anarchists on the extreme left."

The Kremlin, Reston explained, "has larger political objectives of its own," that is, a new agreement with Washington on mutual noninterference in the two spheres of influence.

Although this article by Reston, an influential journalist close to the ruling class, was clear on some points—namely, that Moscow was expected to use its influence to maintain social stability in Portugal and was believed willing to do so—it was very confused on others.

Why, for example, should Moscow be "unhappy" with the alleged conflict between the Portuguese CP and the "anarchists"? Wouldn't its local supporters have to come into conflict with more radical elements in order to play their role?

Then, in the same paragraph, Reston suggested that the Communist party was

responsible both for the entire radicalization in Portugal and for imposing a moderate turn on the regime:

"It is not clear that Moscow is entirely responsible for the uprising here against over forty years of right-wing dictatorship. . . . Nor is it clear that these outside forces are responsible for the more moderate tone of the Portuguese military council in recent days. But something is changing their tune—some combination of outside economic, political and religious pressure."

What caused these contradictions was that Reston had a double objective. One side was to explain that Moscow and the Portuguese CP could and should be expected to shore up capitalist and imperialist stability in Portugal. The other was to score points against the Stalinists both as opportunists and tools of Moscow and as the manipulators of the military regime, to make them responsible for everything that goes wrong in the country.

Reston presented international Stalinism as a defender of the status quo, at the same time as portraying the very existence of its influence as the result of an international conspiracy against the "Free World" and the democratic institutions it claims to stand for.

This position was not logically consistent, and these contradictions made it impossible for him to give a coherent view of what has been going on in Portugal. However, in practical politics it is all too likely that capitalist propagandists like Reston can have their cake and eat it too.

The fact is that the Communist party was forced to attack the democratic rights of the workers and toiling masses in order to play its role as a guarantor of capitalist stability. Serving as the labor policeman of the government, it became unpopular among important sections of workers and could not win the confidence of other poor strata. Since it seemed to be the most powerful force in a government that could not solve the problems of the poor masses and came to preside over a deepening economic crisis, the CP became the focus of widespread resentment.

The resentment has become increasingly sharp, in particular because the Communist party has gained and held its influence by the power of its machine and through its alliance with unelected military rulers. It has not won the support of the masses but appears to have imposed its domination over them by manipulation and conspiracy.

Thus, the imperialists can rely on the Communist party as a guarantor of stability in Portugal; at the same time they can exploit the disappointment of the masses with the demagogic bourgeois government and the revulsion provoked by the CP's antidemocratic methods to reinforce their anti-Communist propaganda.

The rapid deterioration of the economic situation in Portugal and the failure of the government to impose labor "discipline" and austerity help explain why the Western capitalist press has offered so little praise for the military government's rejection of "socialist dictatorship." Besides, the obvious signs of disillusionment with the regime among larger and larger sections of the poor masses show that its usefulness is rapidly wearing out.

New York Times correspondent Henry Giniger drew this picture in the June 29 issue of the most authoritative American capitalist paper:

"It could well be that in the face of all the cumulating difficulties the military will be led into a dictatorship. Last week's document talked a great deal about the need for repression of challenges from the extreme right and the extreme left. 'One or more' newspapers are to be transformed into government mouthpieces, as in the old days, and the political parties are being put 'to a test' of their own capacity to govern. It is the armed forces that will be doing the testing but some time or other the armed forces will run out of people to blame: International imperialism, internal reaction, self-seeking politicians and pseudo-revolutionaries may not be enough in the end to explain the mess."

As an example of the government's failure, Giniger mentioned:

"Thus there is never ending trouble in TAP, the national airline which was completely taken over by the state last summer. Despite exhortations to win the battle of production and forgo unreasonable wage demands in the common interest, TAP workers still feel exploited enough to lock their managers in the office."

The government has not been particularly gentle with the TAP workers either. It has denounced them as counterrevolutionary provocateurs. It even sent troops to occupy the airport and establish "military discipline." In his address to the country after the failure of the March 11 rightist putsch, Premier Vasco Gonçalves took the occasion to accuse the organizers of a

threatened strike at TAP of being in league with the reactionary plotters.

Not only have such pressures and intimidation not achieved their objective, this kind of demagogy has produced an increasing malaise. More and more press controls have been necessary to maintain it. And the Stalinist journalists who have taken on the role of propagandists for the regime have not proved skillful.

This is the picture of the Portuguese press that Dominique Pouchin gave in the June 26-27 issue of *Le Monde*:

"To read the front page of the evening papers, you might think that June 19 [the day the government statement was made public in Lisbon] was not really a tense day.

"One of these papers did mention the demonstration [outside the offices of the closed daily *República*], another the communiqué of the Conselho da Revolução. But this seemed to have no more importance than the purchase of about a hundred boats by Poland—which was the headline of a third paper—or a round table on Angola announced by a fourth. None of these papers had to send its proofs to the third floor of the filthy building on the Rua da Misericórdia that was formerly occupied by the censors. . . .

"But why this silence, this refusal, this hesitation, to say that not everything was clear sailing on that day, that the country was going through a difficult phase, to explain it, to comment on it? The Armed Forces Movement denounced 'alarmist rumors,' and every paper conscientiously published this warning. But don't rumors inevitably arise when people feel that something important is being hidden from them? Self-applied chloroform is often more harmful than the scissors of the censors."

This kind of dogmatic thought-control also tends to lend credence to the crudest anti-Communist fabrications. One example is the reaction to the story that some of the editorial staff of *República* chose to print in space offered them in the June 23 issue of *Le Quotidien de Paris*. The story claimed that a top Kremlin official had given Western CPs a directive to take power by "gagging the press." The embittered former editor of *República* could defend the authenticity of this incredible story by saying that the Portuguese Stalinists were actually attacking freedom of the press in Portugal. The closing of his paper was proof of it, and so they were obviously following the directive.

If it were not for the sensation caused by the *República* case, moreover, this lame falsification could have aroused little interest. Reportedly it had already been published in other European newspapers and gone virtually unnoticed.

In reality, Raul Rêgo could not put all the blame on the CP for stifling the press. He

was the minister of information in the first provisional government when the slow strangulation of freedom of the press began. In fact, he presided over the application of



Jornal Novo

"REPUBLICA" EDITOR RAUL REGO

sanctions against his own paper, without making the slightest public protest.

Nor has Rêgo, as a leader of the Socialist party, protested against the SP's capitulation to the military government on the issue of democracy, although this party sank to the level of organizing a demonstration June 23 to thank the Armed Forces Movement for its devotion to freedom.

The only remaining paper in Lisbon close to the SP, *Jornal Novo*, hailed the June 21 declaration in the most abject terms: "An exemplary document, an indispensable document. The MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement] has assumed the fullness of its mission, of its calling, of its moral responsibility. The MFA analyzes, concludes, decides."

The military's attacks on democratic rights had nothing to do with the needs of abolishing capitalism. One of the most outspoken in denouncing "electoralism" and the SP's protests at the closing of *República* explained this clearly. A June 27 *New York Times* dispatch noted:

"Adm. António Rosa Coutinho, an influential member of the High Council of the Revolution, told a group of foreign and Portuguese businessmen . . . that they still had some time. 'While we are on our way to socialism, we are not yet a socialist coun-

try,' the admiral said at an American Club lunch. He added that socialism might take 30 years to achieve and, in the meantime, there was a place for private production.

"We are drafting an investment code which will establish clear rules,' he said. 'I think they will be very liberal.'"

The military and their Stalinist allies have simply been obliged to use a heavy demagogic cover for repressive moves required to maintain capitalism. In this they have aped the demagogic methods used in the Stalinized countries and by the one-party bourgeois nationalist regimes in Africa.

But while the capitalists need these opportunists at the moment to divert the mass upsurge, they are also determined to use their failures in order to discredit "socialism" in the eyes of the masses. In fact, not the least service the military demagogues and Stalinists have offered the imperialists and capitalists is the chance to avoid responsibility for the economic crisis in Portugal. And these interests are determined to seize the opportunity.

Democracy cannot be defended in Portugal in reality without supporting the struggles of the workers and poor masses against the results of the failure of the capitalist system and against the attacks of the bosses.

A Socialist leader in the Constituent Assembly, Lopes Cardoso, admitted this in effect when he said:

"No revolutionary constitution will come out of this hall unless we raise our voices to back the workers' struggles. . . ."

In fact, the only national body elected by the workers will be shoved to the side or eliminated unless it supports the struggles of the workers against the system and the class upheld by the military government and the reformist parties. Lopes Cardoso was right when he said: "Limiting the activity of this assembly to discussing . . . mere legalistic articles would mean hamstringing it socially and politically. Limiting our discussions to justifying this or that principle would be betraying the confidence the Portuguese people placed in us, believing that our democratic and revolutionary voice would be attentive to the daily struggles of this people."

The coming weeks will show if any leaders of the SP take their talk about democracy seriously. Hundreds of thousands of workers will demand that they represent them as they promised, or else they will put them in the same bag as the Stalinists and the military as demagogic betrayers.

The only way a disastrous demobilization of the Portuguese workers can be prevented is if they can find a way of asserting their will on the political level and ending the dictatorship of the military. □

Save Garmendia and Otaegui!

[The following are excerpts from the underground bulletin *Noticias del País Vasco*. The bulletin, which is published in Spain, provides detailed news on the political repression in the Basque Country. It first appeared May 28, 1975, six days after the Franco regime imposed a blackout on news from the Basque Country. The editors make an appeal that the information contained in the bulletin be publicized as widely as possible to break through this blackout.]

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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June 2 Bulletin

José Antonio Garmendia Artola and Angel Otaegui Echeverria, members of the Basque organization ETA [Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna—Basque Nation and Freedom], could be tried before a military tribunal at any time.

The deadlines given to the lawyers to read the indictments and prepare and present their case run out June 2.

The military prosecutor accuses them of having taken part in the killing of the first corporal of the Civil Guard in Azpeitia, Guipúzcoa—Gregorio Posadas Zurrón. He was chief of the information service of the Civil Guard in the Urola Valley and a known torturer. The prosecution is asking for death sentences: for Garmendia, as one of the alleged perpetrators, and for Otaegui because he let Garmendia stay at his home.

This trial will be a war council. It will take place in one of the towns in the Burgos military region, which encompasses the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, currently under a state of emergency.¹

The military prosecutor is not seeking any proof to support his accusation beyond the indictment and the questioning of those on trial. He has not requested an expert's report on the ballistic problems of the case, nor a psychiatric examination of Garmendia, despite the fact that included in the legal proceedings are the following:

• A medical report from Dr. Arrozola Sillio, head of neurosurgery at the Nuestra Señora de Arábazu Health Center of the National Preventative Institute in San Sebastián, where Garmendia was admitted after having been shot in the head by police and where he was treated by this doctor.

According to this medical report, Garmendia "shows motor disturbances, time-space disorientation, aphasia, and important thought-motor disturbances."

• A report issued by the medical administration at the Carabanchel Penitentiary Hospital that says Garmendia is suffering impaired reactions, responding with delay to orders. He is unable to read or write correctly and will not regain his mental powers.

In such physical condition, Garmendia, a totally disabled human being, was interrogated by the Civil Guard, the political police, and military judges. And the military prosecutor is using the statements obtained by such inhuman methods to accuse and ask death penalties for Garmendia and Otaegui.

A group of students who had passed the COU² decided to celebrate at the Venecia dance hall in Saturrarán, two kilometers from Ondárroa. En route home at about 1:00 a.m. they unavoidably had to pass the Civil Guard barracks. This they did in groups of three or four. As they were going past the barracks, Arriola and his two friends were called over by one of the sentries. Then he said that only Arriola had to report to the barracks and took him inside. At first his two friends continued toward home but suddenly they decided to return to check on their friend's situation. When they approached the barracks they heard a shot or two fired in rapid succession and they saw Arriola—clutching his chest with one hand—leaving the barracks only to collapse on the terrace adjoining the building. Later the body was carried to the morgue at the cemetery in a garbage truck.

Six thousand persons demonstrated May 29 in front of the Civil Guard barracks in Berga, eighty kilometers north of Barcelona. They demanded the release of two individuals arrested at an earlier demonstration.

The demonstrators remained near the barracks several hours. They carried Catalan and Basque flags along with red carnations—the symbol of the Portuguese revolution. Their chants referred to the situation in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

A delegation made up of a lawyer, an

2. Curso de Orientación Universitaria (University Orientation Course), which is taken between high school and university studies.

economist, and a journalist met with an officer of the Civil Guard and won the release of the two prisoners.

June 7 Bulletin³

Hipolito Bustinza Artabe of Guernica, Vizcaya, 69 years old, arrested May 14, held at the barracks two days. Currently in prison.

"For strictly humanitarian reasons I helped treat the wound of a fellow who approached my country house bleeding from the knee. Immediately afterward more than 200 Civil Guards arrived, and in spite of the fact that the fellow did not shoot, since he was unarmed, they killed him on the spot. I did not know that he was a member of ETA or anything about what had happened in Guernica. They took a neighbor, a 51-year-old widow; her 47-year-old sister-in-law; and her husband, Valentín Indchausti; and me to the headquarters of the Civil Guard in Guernica. Without any explanations they began to mistreat us, first complaining about not having also killed all of us at the country house. They kicked and punched us. They pointed at my stomach and ribs with rifles and pistols, prodding and threatening to fire and kill me."

According to official reports, Father Eustaquio Erkipia, a 31-year-old native of Lesaca, Navarra, was detained and beaten by ultraright groups. Subsequent facts and news have confirmed that this priest, *ikastola*⁴ teacher in the Santuchu section of Bilbao, was arrested by the police on May 8 and brutally mistreated in the offices of police headquarters. The information we are publishing here is based exclusively on medical reports about his state of health.

On May 10 when he was brought to the hospital he showed severe bruises below the eyelids and the remains of coagulated blood below the nostrils, which would lead one to believe that he had a head wound. Because of his serious condition, which made it impossible for him to be moved to the radiology department, he was X-rayed with a portable unit, which showed a cranial fracture caused by a blow, fall, or violent collision.

His body was bruised extensively all over. . . .

The medical opinion was that Father Erkipia had been beaten with soft, heavy objects, like, for example, damp towels,

3. The June 7 bulletin is a special issue on torture under the state of emergency. It contains the testimony of forty-two individual victims, ranging in age from 17 to 69, and a collective testimony by women political prisoners.

4. Schools where instruction is conducted in Basque.

1. The state of emergency was declared by the Franco regime April 25.

which leave marks that disappear in the course of a month, but which cause such a profusion of bruises, broken blood vessels, and clots that they seriously impair blood circulation. In particular, the clots can obstruct the vessels that bring blood to the kidneys for purification, causing, as happened in this case, a kidney dysfunction. For this reason, Father Eustaquio Erkicia now undergoes dialysis in an artificial kidney to achieve limited purification of the blood, which keeps his condition stable.

June 11 Bulletin

Call from the Garmendia, Otaegui, Eva Forest, Durán, Antirepression Committee in Madrid⁵

J.A. Garmendia and Otaegui, included in Indictment 74/74 of the military administration, are going to be legally assassinated very soon if we do not stop it with our determined struggle, achieving massive unity to save them.

The apparatus of the dictatorship is involved in a serious crisis and is undergoing rapid decomposition. That is why it redoubles its criminal policy of repression. The ever broadening pressure of the mass movement impels the state to use terror to the maximum as the only way of prolonging its survival.

In recent months the mass movement and its most combative and representative organizations have experienced increasing repression. Likewise the attacks against the most radicalized elements in the Basque revolutionary movement, fundamentally represented by ETA(V), have worsened.

This repressive drive is concretized today in the state of emergency, a real state of war imposed in Euzkadi. The bloody and terrifying repression unleashed on the Basque people involves an unimaginable mauling of all political and mass organizations and systematic violence carried out against the civilian population. There are searches and frisking in private residences or in the middle of the street. The arrests number in the thousands. Torture during interrogations carried out in police stations or any other suitable place is common. The gangs of armed fascists, with the support of the police, spread panic through the population with impunity.

Those suspected of belonging to ETA are not arrested; they are assassinated in the middle of the street, although they may be totally defenseless. Here are the cases that occurred in the space of seven days: Ignacio Garay, Blanca Saralegui, Jesús Marquiegui, Luis Arriola, and Mera F. Lackelt. They are not interested in arresting ETA

activists, since in order to condemn them, they would have to stage their habitual farce-trials with the risk that popular mobilizations might prevent subsequent



Rouge

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executions. They prefer to kill them on their feet.

They already tried to kill J.A. Garmendia on the street. A bullet pierced his skull. His life was saved, but he has lost his mental and physical faculties. Now, with a phantasmagorical trial as a justification, in an attempt to reassert their waning strength, they want to execute him along with Otaegui, who, it seems, sheltered him, protecting him briefly from the deadly repression.

Just as they killed Puig Antich,⁶ they will kill Otaegui and Garmendia if we do not stop them. And they will also kill Genoveva Forest, María Luz Fernández, Antonio Durán, and the others implicated in trials in which it is expected that the death penalty will be demanded. These trials have moved more rapidly with the state of emergency in Euzkadi.

Thus, with two of the most combative provinces affected by a wave of implacable repression, with a ban on publishing any type of information referring to the state of

emergency, the dictatorship is trying to assassinate two Basque fighters in the most discreet way possible.

But if the war council of Burgos in 1970⁷—thanks to massive popular mobilizations—was turned into a trial against Francoism, which had to put a brake on its bloody arbitrary acts, today we have all the more reason why we must respond in a united way. By fighting for the release of Garmendia and Otaegui, for the release of all political prisoners, against the farce-trials, against the repressive bodies, we will strike a hard blow against the dictatorship, depriving it of a fundamental instrument—repression. *We must create a new Burgos.*

We must achieve the broadest united action of all those willing to fight for the lives of these compañeros. No political or any other kind of difference can justify a sectarian attitude.

Today, abstentionism is a crime.

That is why the signers of this call are constituting a united front against repression. We call on the working class, the workers commissions and other sorts of class organizations, the rest of the working masses, all the different sectors and nationalities of the Spanish state, and the international proletariat and antifascist public to mobilize in solidarity to save Garmendia and Otaegui, to expose the tremendous judicial farce that is being staged about them, to convert it into a second and decisive trial of the Franco dictatorship, to convert it into a new Burgos.

Save Garmendia and Otaegui. Down with the farce-trials. Down with the state of emergency. Dissolve the TOP⁸ and the special courts. Dissolve the repressive bodies. Amnesty. Freedom for all political prisoners. Down with repression. Down with the murderous dictatorship! □

7. In the Burgos trial sixteen ETA members were charged with acts of terrorism. Six of them were charged with participating in the killing of a secret police officer. Widespread international outcry forced Franco to commute the death sentences given to the six to 30 years in prison.

8. Tribunal del Orden Público—Public Order Tribunal.

Zero Population Growth in Uruguay

From 1963 to 1975 the population in Uruguay has remained almost the same, according to a census completed in May. The 1963 census showed a population of 2,595,510; by 1975 the figure had grown only to 2,763,964.

The Uruguayan regime has achieved this Malthusian ideal through emigration. Taking into account birth and death rates, it is calculated that almost 800,000 persons have emigrated from Uruguay in the last twelve years.

5. Genoveva Forest and Antonio Durán were indicted November 13, 1974, in connection with the assassination of Spanish Premier Luis Carrero Blanco.

6. An anarchist, member of the Iberian Liberation Movement, who was sentenced to death for participating in an armed bank holdup and the killing of a policeman.

What Course for South Vietnam?

By Peter Green

What is happening in Saigon? Two months after the liberation from imperialist domination, confusion still exists over the intentions of the new regime. Will there be rapid reunification with the North, or will the South retain an independent existence for an indefinite period? Who is actually running things in the newly liberated areas? Will the new regime move to introduce a planned economy in the South?

At least on one matter the North Vietnamese leaders are quite frank: the new regime in the South is not socialist. In a report to a meeting of the North Vietnamese National Assembly that ended in Hanoi June 6, Premier Pham Van Dong categorically stated that while the regime in the North was socialist, that in the South was "advanced democratic."

Veteran Stalinist apologist Wilfred Burchett is also very clear on this point. In an article in the June 11 issue of the American Maoist weekly the *Guardian*, he quotes approvingly from an interview he had in 1965 with "leaders of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)—the Marxist-Leninist party within the NLF."

"Democracy for us means a real national, people's democracy, based on the unity of workers, peasants, intellectuals and patriotic bourgeoisie of all tendencies. We are carrying out a national-democratic revolution with the unity of all sections of the population as a basic element. We have to think of it at two levels: the present rather low level, based on an alliance between workers, peasants and the lower strata of the bourgeoisie, which we consider as a sort of people's democracy; and, on the higher level, of still broader unity which we are aiming at and which we would call a national democratic union to include the upper strata of the bourgeoisie.

"Our present people's democratic alliance must approve measures acceptable to this upper strata as well. It may seem strange for outsiders to find communists fighting for the interests of the upper class, but we understand the vital necessity for national union at the highest level, *not only now during the period of struggle but for the years of postwar reconstruction as well.*" (Burchett's emphasis.)

The development of the economy in the two months since the liberation of Saigon bears this out. The leaders of the new regime show little interest in introducing measures that are socialist in principle.

However, they are probably finding it very difficult rounding up enough members of the "upper strata of the bourgeoisie" to unite with. Most of these types packed their booty and fled with the Americans.

Although on May 1, the day after the liberation of Saigon, a decree was broadcast announcing the nationalization of factories, farms, and businesses, reports since then indicate that the new regime is intent on retaining capitalist enterprises. According to a United Press International dispatch in the May 29 *Los Angeles Times*, "the new government is jostling private firms to reopen businesses. Fears that private enterprise would not be permitted under the Communists have so far proved unfounded."

Nayan Chanda reported in the June 6 *Far Eastern Economic Review* that the Military Management Committee of Saigon was even providing credit to a number of factories in order to revive industrial activity.

As for foreign companies—which were mostly French and Japanese—Chanda reported that apparently only establishments abandoned by their foreign owners were being nationalized. Those foreigners who remained were allowed to stay in business.

The May 29 *Wall Street Journal* reported that two Japanese joint ventures in South Vietnam have resumed production of electric appliances.

French-owned businesses are opening up again also, James Laurie reported from Saigon for the June 6 *Far Eastern Economic Review*:

"Although there are many sceptics in the still fairly large Saigon-French business community, it appears, at least for the time being, that the Government wants the operation of foreign firms to continue. Several French business leaders were recently invited to Independence Palace and advised that some French firms would be asked to stay on indefinitely. Heading the PRG list was the Michelin and other rubber plantations in Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh provinces. Other major French firms in Saigon, such as Brasserie Glacier Indochine (BGI), Denis Freres and Lucia, will, apparently, also be allowed to operate."

With the overthrow of the puppet regime, North Vietnamese currency began to circulate. It has now been withdrawn, and the

piaster of the former regime is still the main currency.

Faced with the problems of acute unemployment and a consequent rise in crime, the new regime has responded by shooting thieves on the spot or else bringing them before a public tribunal.

The "reeducation" courses for officers and officials of the old regime are getting under way in Saigon. The courses last three days for minor officials and a month for those in the higher echelons. (Top leaders such as Duong Van Minh and Tran Van Huong have reportedly been excused from attending the courses.) Those attending are told exactly how much money to bring to cover food for the period of the course, as well as a detailed list of other items required—blanket, towel, mosquito net, pullover, toothbrush, paper, pen, and so on. According to persons coming from the central coast, army and police officers in reeducation camps in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam have been filling up bomb craters, clearing mines, and reclaiming fallow land, besides studying the PRG program and learning revolutionary songs.

A police clerk in the former regime said each student in the reeducation courses is required to tell of at least one crime he committed while working for the old government.

The Military Management Committee of Saigon launched its own "cultural revolution" on May 15 with a decree prohibiting the sale or possession of literature published "under the former regime." Films and music were also included in the ban. By May 22 most bookstores and stalls in Saigon had closed down, and sound trucks toured the city broadcasting the new orders.

Several hundred students marched through the streets on May 23 and May 27 in support of the campaign, exhorting residents to discard any copies of *Playboy* and *Oui* magazines and all other items identified with the "decadent culture" of the departing Americans. They carried banners saying: "Students and youth are determined not to read, not to keep at home, not to distribute, books and magazines, pictures and tapes that are reactionary and decadent."

The Saigon newspaper *Liberation Daily* reported a huge bonfire in a downtown residential sector of the city on May 25. It said residents tossed books, tapes, and magazines onto the fire. "The crowd applauded as a girl threw her hippie clothes onto the fire," the official newspaper said. Saigon radio said that from May 23 to 25 more than a thousand books were burned. According to Hsinhua News Agency, in a few days young people and students had "confiscated nearly 135,000 reactionary and pornographic books."

On May 28, however, the regime issued a new decree halting the burning of books.

Instead they were to be handed over to qualified organizations.

"We are a civilized people, we respect the culture of others, even that of the American people. We respect scientific research," said the Saigon management committee's chief of information and culture. The committee, he said, had only given the order to stop the sale of "decadent and reactionary" books. "We must abolish a culture of slaves and save the culture of our people by all methods, but we have never demanded the burning of books." He said that the "decadent and reactionary" books would be submitted to a qualified commission.

Although Vietnamese leaders have made it clear that the establishment of a workers state is not on the agenda in the South, they have been much more ambiguous in their pronouncements on a likely timetable for reunification of the country and on who is actually in control in Saigon.

In their more rhetorical moments, the leaders of North Vietnam and the PRG speak as though the country were already reunited:

"We hail the beautiful land of Vietnam, from now on whole again from Langson (on the Chinese border) to the Cape of Camau (far in the south), from now on completely independent and free," North Vietnamese Communist party leader Le Duan told a victory rally in Hanoi May 15, according to the May 16 *Washington Post*. The North Vietnamese army's newspaper printed a map showing all of Vietnam as a single country, with Hanoi as its capital. This line was echoed in the South:

"The division of the country no longer exists," General Tran Van Tra, president of Saigon's Military Management Committee, told a victory rally in Saigon May 15.

But estimates as to when the country will be reunified in reality have varied widely. A special United Nations envoy who spent three weeks in Hanoi said May 12 that although the "final aim" was reunification, North and South Vietnam might exist separately for a year or longer. A Saigon official said May 14 that reunification "might even take years."

United Press International correspondent Alan Dawson reported May 30 that after a three-week series of meetings, North and South Vietnamese officials agreed that political reunification is at least five years away. "The attitudes of the people, the manner of life in the two zones is completely different now, and it will take some years to bring them close enough to reunify the country," one senior official said. As for the people of Saigon, "It may take 20 or even 30 years to change their thinking," said another official.

In many practical ways links between the two areas have already been repaired. Communications have been restored; cadres and aid for reconstruction have been

flowing into the South from the North; both now even operate on the same time zone.

But the central question is whether a separate government will be retained in the South, whether the PRG will administer full control in its zone.

The revolutionists took power in the name of the PRG on April 30, but the PRG did not make the first announcement in its own name until May 10. It did not hold its first cabinet meeting in Saigon until June 6, and apart from that it has held one or two receptions.

Yet the president of the National Liberation Front, Nguyen Huu Tho, called on May 15 for diplomatic relations to be established between Saigon and other countries. And both Hanoi and Saigon have told UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim that they intend to apply for UN membership as separate delegations in time for next fall's session of the General Assembly.

The PRG's ambiguous status was analyzed by Jacques Decornoy in an article in the June 18 *Le Monde*, under the heading, "How Can One Be United and Divided at the Same Time?" What is the PRG? Decornoy asked.

"Or rather: what will it be—at the UN, for example, or in other international gatherings? A way for Hanoi to get two votes? Or a useful fiction the North will use to join, via the intermediary of the South, the nonaligned world, something very useful to anyone wanting to get a little respite from the subtle game, really quite tiring, of balancing between Moscow and Peking? Or else the transposition, onto the diplomatic level, of a local division that is difficult to resolve completely, like a bad fracture?"

"It is a delicate game to play. The Vietnamese have proclaimed thousands of times since the start of their fight that they are one people, one country. But their actual declarations on the subject of reunification are as imprecise as one could imagine. Basically, they would like the impossible: to be 'one' and 'two' at the same time. 'One,' because that corresponds to the historical analysis, to the political line, to common sense from the point of view of economics. 'Two,' because it is necessary to take into account the special features of the two zones, and because of the international considerations set out above."

The delay in the emergence of either a separate PRG government or a firm move toward reunification led to speculation among some observers of a possible rift between the PRG and Hanoi. According to "authoritative French sources" cited by Flora Lewis in the June 12 *New York Times*, as the North Vietnamese forces pressed ever closer to Saigon, the PRG asked France to arrange negotiations with ever more urgency. She said the PRG "preferred negotiations for fear of being



PHAM VAN DONG: Sees need for "advanced democratic" stage in the South.

eclipsed and left powerless by the North Vietnamese if the war ended with the entry of Hanoi's troops in the southern capital and without any agreement. . . .

"That is what did happen," Lewis said. "The new information is that the Provisional Revolutionary Government now has virtually nothing to say in the South."

But are there really any big disagreements between the North Vietnamese leaders and the leaders of the PRG? Certainly, the North Vietnamese Communist party is thoroughly in control of the situation in the South, exercising power mainly through the army at this stage, with some assistance from local committees that serve to implement directives.

Further confirmation of North Vietnamese dominance was provided by a high-ranking official in Hanoi, who told Japanese newsmen that the Communist parties and armed forces of North and South Vietnam have been merged.

The delays, confusions, and ambiguities in the situation in the South, however, are not the result of any rift, but the result of the contradictions between the objective dynamic of the situation, the needs of the Vietnamese masses, and the political line projected by leaders of North Vietnam and of the PRG that the revolution in the South stands only at the "democratic stage."

In face of the pressure to reunify the country and to move toward socialism it remains to be seen how long the leadership can succeed in holding the revolutionary process back. □

Wilson Steps Up Offensive Against Workers

By Tony Hodges

LONDON—Flushed with its success in achieving a 2-to-1 majority in the June 5 referendum for continued British membership in the Common Market, the Labour government is redoubling its drive to place the burden of the crisis wracking British capitalism on the backs of the workers.

British capitalism, long ago reduced to the status of a second-rank power, is less and less able to compete in world markets. With retail prices up 25% in May on a year ago—and rising in the past two months at an annual rate of more than 50%—British capitalist prospects on the world market are looking even gloomier. Britain now has an inflation rate well over double that of all its major competitors.

Reflecting Britain's weakened role, the pound is sliding downwards. By June 12, after several days of heavy selling of sterling, the value of the pound against major world currencies was down 26.5% from December 1971. The National Institute of Economic and Social Research now forecasts that the pound's devaluation will reach 32% by the end of next year.

Falling profit rates and business confidence brought an 8% decline in manufacturing investment from the last quarter of 1974 to the first quarter of this year. And the Department of Industry predicts that manufacturing investment will slump 15% this year. Symptomatic of the decrepit state of British capitalism was a decision by the Labour government in late April to salvage Britain's largest—and bankrupt—car company, British Leyland, with massive state handouts reaching £700 million [£1 = US\$2.25].

Successive Conservative and Labour governments have been plagued by the problem of how to restore British capitalism's flagging fortunes. The 1970-74 Tory government of Edward Heath tried by imposing statutory wage controls on workers in 1972. But the fierce resistance of the miners and the eventual defeat of the Tory government in the February 1974 general election forced the ruling class to turn to a new line of attack.

The reelected Labour government led by Harold Wilson announced a "social contract" between the government and the union bureaucrats under which workers would "voluntarily" keep their wages in check. Wilson hoped that the social contract, trading off the unions' loyalty to a Labour government, would succeed where the Tories failed in cutting real wages and



HEALEY: Sees higher unemployment as useful incentive to wage "restraint."

boosting the capitalists' profit and ability to compete.

But despite the near-unanimous support for the social contract at last September's congress of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the union bureaucrats have been singularly incapable of policing its observance by workers at a time of high inflation.

British workers, accustomed to a rising standard of living during the years of the postwar boom, are no more likely to accept drastic cuts in their living conditions today than the miners were in 1974. One sign of the potential for militant resistance came on June 2 when the National Executive Committee of the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) voted 21 to 3 for a nationwide rail strike by 130,000 British Rail workers beginning June 23. Three days before the strike was to begin, the NUR won a two-stage wage increase that will total 30% by August 4.

There are other signs of rising disquiet among workers about the runaway inflation.

- 40,000 seamen are demanding an 80% pay rise. They recently rejected a 30% offer by the employers.
- 65,000 workers at Imperial Chemical Industries are seeking a 70% pay increase.
- 120,000 steelworkers want a 30% pay

rise and a threshold agreement to defend themselves against inflation.

• Most revealing of all, perhaps, was a recent vote by delegates representing 400,000 local government workers, whose "professional" status has kept them strait-jacketed for years. They voted to call a strike ballot after rejecting an offer of a 21.7% rise in basic pay. If the local government workers vote to strike, they will hold a one-day national walkout, the first in their history. This will be followed by an indefinite strike in ten major regions, with ten more districts joining the strike each week.

Despite the failure of both the Tories' statutory wage controls and the Labour government's "voluntary" wage restraint, Wilson is now embarking on a tough new strategy to "tighten up" the social contract. According to Peter Jay, economics editor of the *London Times*, Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey "is looking for a norm for the next round of pay negotiations of less than 15 per cent."

Nora Beloff and Colin Chapman, writing in the June 8 *Observer*, said: "Mr Healey intends to warn trade unionists that he will slash public spending, allow unemployment to rise and introduce extra taxes unless they can assure him that ways will be found for keeping wage claims in the next round below a 15 per cent ceiling."

A 15% wage-rise norm at a time when inflation is running at more than 25% a year would obviously amount to a drastic slashing of living standards. TUC leaders have shown themselves open to such cuts. On June 11, the TUC Economic Committee gave a favourable reception to a plan from Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) General Secretary Jack Jones for a £10-£11 flat-rate raise for all workers in the next pay round. This would amount to a mere 20% increase for workers with average weekly earnings of £57, far less than what is needed to compensate for present inflation.

A key part of the government's offensive is a threat to allow unemployment to soar to over a million and to cut back social services if workers refuse to accept real wage cuts. As Jay put it in the June 7 *Times*: "Mr Healey is quite willing to see unemployment rise well into seven figures during 1976, if the lesson of pay restraint is not learnt soon enough."

Keith Harper and Simon Hoggart explained the government strategy this way in the *Guardian* on April 24: "The plan is to replace the Government's offerings under the social contract with steadily increasing warnings of mass unemployment and social service cuts if the unions do not honour their side of the bargain. Implicit in the strategy is the threat that the Government will refuse to increase public spending to pay for wage rises in nationalised indus-

tries, and will be prepared to allow huge lay-offs in the public sector if necessary."

They were proved right by Healey himself on May 1 when he warned that "the minority of workers settling well outside the social contract are putting other people and possibly themselves out of work."

The union bureaucrats too are attempting to cajole workers with threats of redundancies. Jack Jones, writing in the TGWU monthly *Record* in June, advised that "the interests of working people will be best served at the present time—and let me be frank about this—by sacrificing a few per cent extra in wage increases so that we can halt unemployment and defend the 'social wage.'" By "social wage," Jones meant the social services.

Implying that workers had been living it up in recent times, Tony Crosland, secretary of state for the environment, warned on May 9 that "the party is over" and that local authorities would have to curb increased spending. On April 23, Healey said that if workers did not accept the social contract, the government would introduce public expenditure cuts that "would slash at the very programme on which we all fought and won the last two general elections."

There is every sign that the Labour government will seek a "voting coalition" in Parliament with the Tories to push through these austerity measures. One Labour cabinet minister, Reg Prentice, even went so far as to call on June 1 for a "government of national unity" that would command the support of all "moderates" in the Conservative, Liberal, and Labour parties. Nothing could show more clearly the intentions of the class-collaborationist labour leaders in the government than this attempt to seek an alliance with the parties of big business to push through anti-working-class policies.

Wilson has taken advantage of his referendum victory to move against dissidents in his own cabinet who fear that the measures now being prepared will drive a dangerous wedge between the government and the ranks of the labour movement. On June 11, Tony Benn, the major leader of the anti-Common Market campaign and darling of the left Social Democratic *Tribune* wing of the Labour party, was demoted from his ministerial post as secretary of state for industry and given the lesser post of secretary of state for energy. *Tribune* Minister for Overseas Development Judith Hart was sacked from the government the same day.

In a letter of reply to Wilson forty *Tribune* members of Parliament said that they "reject the acceptance of coalition policies which embrace those of the CBI [Confederation of British Industry], the City of London financiers, the Conservative Party and the Cabinet as reflected in your shuffle of ministers. We cannot be satisfied that you now

have any resolute intention to implement the major parts of the election manifesto or to operate the principles which inspired them.

"Consequently, we serve notice that we shall oppose by all means and campaign within and without the House to ensure that the policies of the Labour movement are pursued with the utmost vigour. Having been elected to carry through manifesto policies we reject reductions in public expenditure and the drift towards mass unemployment as being incompatible with those policies."

Hart, after her sacking, said: "If the Labour government is going to side with the CBI and the Conservative Party on economic and industrial policy, that will spell catastrophe to the Labour movement."

Arab Village Razed by Bulldozers

How Israel Colonizes the Occupied Sinai

"While tens of thousands of Israeli children planted trees in cities and towns throughout the country during the traditional 'festival of trees,' huge bulldozers were uprooting thousands of blossoming fruit trees in parts of the region known as the 'Breach of Rafa,' in the northeast part of Sinai. The Arab owners of these orchards had been driven from their land and their houses have been destroyed to make way for Jewish colonists. After the trees, the local school and mosque were razed."

So began an account by Amnon Kapeliouk, special correspondent of *Le Monde*, of the Israeli colonization movement in the occupied territory south of the Gaza Strip.

"It was a gripping scene," he wrote in the May 15 issue of the Paris daily. "Women and children returning to their land, gathering for firewood the branches of almond trees and pomegranates they had been cultivating for years."

The model for these Israeli resettlement schemes was developed in 1967 in the occupied Golan Heights and on the West Bank of the Jordan, Kapeliouk explained. The Arab population is removed, and then the Jews move in. But in the Rafa region, a member of a neighboring kibbutz explained, "the problem is much more serious."

"Here," he said, "the inhabitants who have been expelled, whose homes and possessions have been destroyed, return to their lands to work as laborers for the *colons* who have come to replace them." The colonists enjoy substantial tax benefits and make large profits.

These belated protests by the *Tribune* wing of the party, which claims the support of about seventy Labour MPs, show that the "left" is trying to impress on Wilson that his probusiness policies run the risk of backfiring by sparking increased radicalization in the ranks of the labour movement. This, above all, is what the *Tribune* group wishes to avoid. That is why the group has done nothing to mobilize workers in *action* against the government offensive.

The coming weeks will show workers' response to the rising unemployment, the social service cutbacks, and the ever-rising rate of inflation. But at this time it seems unlikely that Wilson will be any more successful than previously in convincing workers to "uphold" the social contract and accept a severe cut in the standard of living.

The colonization of the Rafa region began in 1969, when 1,500 hectares of land were expropriated. In January 1972, troops commanded by General Ariel Sharon drove out almost 10,000 farmers and Bedouin herdsmen, bulldozed or dynamited their homes, tore down their tents, destroyed their crops, and filled in their waterholes.

Today there are already ten Jewish settlements in the region—four collective villages, five "paramilitary agricultural colonies," and the first houses of a proposed new town, Yamit.

These expropriations continued even during the October 1973 war. On October 8, Israeli soldiers arrived, arrested Sheikh Hassan Ali Al-Sawarqeh, expelled him and one thousand members of his tribe from Al-Jora, confiscated 36,000 hectares of fertile land, and erected barbed-wire fences around it. According to residents of neighboring kibbutzes, the Israeli authorities plan to establish about fifteen Jewish settlements on this land.

In some cases, the Israeli officials have tried to force Arab proprietors to sell their lands. When they refuse, various pressures are applied, ranging from halting the distribution of CARE packages from the United States to layoffs of workers and false arrests.

"We have been ruled by the Ottomans, the English, and the Egyptians, one after the other," an old man told Kapeliouk, "but none dared to touch our land. With the Israelis, their main activity consists in expropriating us." □

Shah Crushes Protests Marking 1963 Rebellion

By Majid Namvar



SHAH: Has begun hearing "strange slogans in university circles."

Confronted by the first substantial rebellion against the shah's regime since 1963, the government-controlled Iranian press reported June 10 that "street riots" broke out in the shrine city of Qum, ninety miles south of Tehran.

The demonstrations marked the twelfth anniversary of the massive rebellions in June 1963. They were said to have started at the theological schools of Faizieh and Dar al-Shafa, ending in street clashes with the police. No casualties were reported.

Tehran's two major evening newspapers, *Etelaat* and *Kayhan*, published identical reports, presumably handed out by the police. The report said the demonstrations began June 5 and continued June 7. "Shouting antipatriotic slogans and waving red flags," it said, the demonstrators "recalled one of the most shameful events in 1963, initiated by black reactionaries in our country." (The shah often uses the term "black reactionary" to refer to his militant Islamic opponents.)

Without disclosing further details, the shah's press reported that "all agitators and saboteurs were identified and arrested." Police searching the demonstrators' homes allegedly seized "a homemade bomb as well as a quantity of Communist books and documents."

Addressing a group of university professors summoned to his palace June 7, the

shah denounced the Qum demonstrations as a "renewed expression of the unholy union of black reactionaries and stateless reds."

Calling the protests a "strange phenomenon," he ordered the professors to prepare a study of the underlying causes of the growing popular unrest. He also referred to an incident that occurred June 5, involving university students in Tehran:

"It was the day before yesterday that we heard strange slogans in university circles, including the University of Tehran. Once again the stateless elements, together with black reactionaries, shouted, 'Long live the anniversary of Khoradad 15 [June 5, 1963].'"

A related protest by Muslim students took place June 5 at the Arya Mehr Industrial University in Tehran. Reporting this incident, the editors of *Kayhan* said: "These students who sometimes call themselves religious intellectuals are followers of a person who has always been an opponent of any reform in the country, particularly the land reform and the liberation of women."

The "person" referred to is apparently Ayat-Ollah Khomeini, a prominent Islamic figure whose arrest in 1963 led to rebellions in five major cities, including Tehran. These protests were brutally crushed, leav-

ing an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 persons dead or wounded. Khomeini, who was then expelled from Iran, is reported to be living in Iraq at present.

Following the shah's decree earlier this year proclaiming Iran a one-party state, Khomeini issued a statement denouncing the action and urging all Islamic organizations to boycott the new party. One indication of the shah's concern over this call for a boycott was the government's recent announcement that all eligible voters were required to cast a ballot in the June 20 parliamentary elections.

"Taking part in the election is a national duty," the prime minister said at a preelection rally. "And any individual's refusal to participate in them will be considered a breach of party discipline. Such individuals must be ready to answer to the party."

Despite the shah's claim that opposition to his repressive rule is confined to "black reactionaries and stateless reds," a more general discontent appears to be rising in Iran, particularly among the youth.

In part, this is because the regime has failed to meet growing expectations that increased oil revenue would improve the standard of living. There are no indications that the new revenues have benefited wide layers of the population.

The shah's main response to increasing unrest has been to further tighten his rule, going so far as to eliminate the political parties he himself established. The recent demonstrations indicate that this has only increased popular dissatisfaction with his dictatorial regime. □

'Tehran Economist' Reviews Persian Edition of Leon Trotsky's 'Permanent Revolution'

"Entesharate Fanus [Fanus Publications] has published a new book by Leon Trotsky under the title *The Permanent Revolution*."

This note, part of a brief review of the first Persian edition of Trotsky's *Permanent Revolution*, appeared in the "Book Evaluation" column of the November 30, 1974, issue of the Iranian weekly *Tehran Economist*.

The Persian edition was published in June 1974. It has an introduction, entitled "Permanent Revolution in Iran," by Javad Sadeeg, a contributor to *Intercontinental Press*.

In the introduction, Sadeeg examines the revolutionary history of Iran and outlines a general perspective for future developments, showing the applicability of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution to the objective conditions in Iran. The volume has stirred some interest in Trotskyist ideas among Iranian students abroad.

Because of the shah's strict censorship regulations, the *Tehran Economist* limited its comments on the book to praising the quality of the translation. "In translating this historic book, every measure has been taken to leave its original form and content intact," the review noted.

The review also mentioned that in November 1973, "Entesharate Fanus published *Nationalities and Revolution in Iran* by Javad Sadeeg." This book, a two-part study, provides a history of the revolutionary movements in Iran since the late nineteenth century and a critical evaluation of the leadership of those movements.

The Persian edition of *Permanent Revolution* and the book *Nationalities and Revolution in Iran* are available for \$3 each from Entesharate Fanus, P.O. Box 170, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10010 □

We Must Fight Against the Dictatorship

[The following article appeared in the January 21, 1975, issue of *Combate*, the underground organ of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario *Combate* (POR—Revolutionary Workers party, the Bolivian section of the Fourth International).

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

*Long Live the Strike at Catavi Siglo XX!
Do not leave the miners isolated. Extend
the movement!*

While we repudiate and condemn the attack on the four radio stations of the miners in Llallagua by the dictatorship's henchmen, we also hail the energetic response of the workers at Catavi and Siglo XX.¹ We must extend this movement to the masses as a whole. At Catavi-Siglo XX more than the fate of the four radio stations is at stake. It is the starting point of an all-out confrontation with the gorilla dictatorship to regain control of the unions, get rid of the Servicio Civil Obligatorio [militarization of labor policy], lift the ban on political parties, and win back the democratic rights of the masses. We must not leave the miners isolated. For an extension of the strike!

Trade-union militias must be organized again to prevent the entry of the army into the mines!

*The Entire Bolivian People Must Support
the Miners!*

*The Dictatorship Will Be Defeated! The
Masses and Socialism Will Win!*

A Plot Against the People

The dictatorship has denounced "subversive" plans it discovered. With this news as a backdrop it has launched new aggressions against the workers and people: (1) the attack and silencing of the four radio stations in the Catavi-Siglo XX mine district, followed by the imprisonment of leading miners and members of the Oblate order, who were accused of being involved in the conspiracy; (2) synchronized with this, the promotion by the gorillas of their economic package, which once again sacrifices the interests of the masses to those of the national and imperialist exploiters.

It is true that for some time there has

been a continuing conspiracy and plot—by the military dictatorship against the broad masses of the nation. A minority armed by the imperialists and backed by the North American monopolies conspires and plots, lowering the standard of living of the Bolivian masses, doing away with their democratic freedoms and rights. This minority of fascist military men is conspiring against the very existence of Bolivia, giving up its national heritage.

The broad masses of the nation resist and oppose the plans of this minority and for that reason they are attacked and persecuted.

The assault on the miners' radio stations, like the jailing of revolutionary militants, is an attempt to prevent the masses from showing their dissatisfaction, making their ideas known, and organizing to defend their wages and suspended democratic rights.

Price Freeze a Hoax!

Through its controlled press and radio, the dictatorship has launched a campaign to present its measures as favorable to the people. The dictatorship is lying, as we shall see:

The price freeze applies to a few food-stuffs and fuels produced domestically; everything else is exempt. Moreover, price controls under capitalism with its scarcities are nothing but a resort to demagoguery. Thus they do not benefit the people. We have had long experience in such matters.

But the government itself is aware of the hoax. The following measures show this:

1. The 66.7 percent increase for housing turned over by Conavi [Consejo Nacional de Vivienda—National Housing Council] has been maintained.

2. Transport charges on freight trains were raised 50 to 70 percent. This increase will soon be reflected in the prices of transported merchandise.

3. The lifting of price freezes in railroad general stores for 50 percent of the rail workers is becoming a source of increased living costs for this sector.

4. Imported goods, whose prices keep rising as attempts are made to overcome the crisis of the capitalist regime brought on by endless world inflation, are producing and will continue to produce a steady rise in the cost of living.

The Lowering of Customs Tariffs

This is not a measure that benefits the workers. It benefits one sector of the

bourgeois importers and well-to-do sectors of the middle class. For example, the lowering of the tariff on auto imports will mean that firms with less capital can bring in more vehicles and thus earn more, since transport costs for passengers and freight will stay the same or tend to rise. It is an illusion to think otherwise. Likewise, the tariffs on pharmaceuticals will not improve the purchasing power of wages. White- and blue-collar workers depend on the various social security funds to obtain medicines. The great masses of peasants are not familiar with either drugstores or doctors. The lowering of customs taxes will produce greater earnings for the capitalists, an objective Banzer faithfully carries out. Finally, the reduction of tariffs on householdwares, especially electric appliances, can only benefit moneyed sectors, not poor and working-class layers.

The Wage Freeze

With all the measures taken by the dictatorship, the only things that will not rise are wages and salaries. On the contrary, although they will have the same dollar value, their purchasing power will decline.

Wages were already frozen at the end of 1972. In October 1974 the freeze was lifted and authorization to negotiate raises was granted. But before this could occur we were faced with a new wage freeze. Meanwhile, prices have risen and today the worker must face them with wages at the old level, which every day buy less.

For example, the railroad worker must meet the lifting of the price freeze at his general store with his old, frozen wages. On the other hand, white- and blue-collar workers must pay increased housing costs of 66.7 percent.

The January 14 measures² attack the masses' standard of living and lower the purchasing power of their wages. Once again the dictatorship is showing its oppressive side, which serves the exploiting firms.

Reject the Wage Freeze


When the dictatorship imposed its "New Governmental Model," our party, the POR *Combate*, denounced the fact that in addition to its being politically repressive, such a model signaled an attack on the economic situation of the masses. We are faced with the first blow, others will follow later.

The workers, the people as a whole, must halt this offensive. We must launch a united national movement for a wage increase and a sliding scale, along with the political struggle against the military dictatorship. No to those who starve us! □

1. One-fourth of Bolivia's tin industry was shut down as the result of a miners' strike that began January 13. The strike was called after the Banzer regime raided and closed four radio stations on the grounds that they "had become centers of political agitation and subversion."

2. The wage-price freeze package previously described.

AROUND THE WORLD



President Ford 'Flexible' on Preemptive Nuclear Strike

At a June 25 White House news conference, President Ford made it clear that Washington would not rule out a preemptive nuclear strike. In answer to a question on that point, he said: "Well, the United States has the policy that means that we have the maximum flexibility for the determination of what is in our own national interest."

Asked specifically if Washington would drop nuclear bombs on North Korea in the event of another Korean war, he said, "We have a strong deterrent force, strategically and tactically, and of course those forces will be used in a flexible way in our own national interest." A reporter then asked, "You're flatly not ruling it out, though?" "I'm not either confirming it or denying it," Ford replied.

In a separate news conference, Pentagon chief James Schlesinger declined to "foreclose any option" on the use of nuclear weapons.

Argentine Workers Strike to Protest Austerity Program

Mounting economic problems in Argentina came to a head June 27 when the 2.5 million-member Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT—General Confederation of Labor) called a general strike. Tens of thousands of workers in major unions walked off the job for seven hours protesting the Peronist regime's new economic policy.

At a mass rally in front of Government House, workers called for the resignation of Economics Minister Celestino Rodrigo and Social Welfare Minister José López Rega. "To the wall with López Rega" and "Isabel, give us his head," they chanted.

Earlier in June the regime lifted price controls on all but twenty-seven items, raising fuel prices 300% and devaluing the peso 50%. Wage guidelines for national negotiations were set at under 50%, about half the current inflation rate.

During June, contracts were negotiated industry by industry, with important sectors of the union movement winning increases of between 80% and 130%.

What brought the unions out on strike was a June 26 government announcement

that it was rescinding all wage increases that exceeded the guidelines.

The June 27 strike ended when President Isabel Perón promised to consider labor's demands. But the following day she denounced the labor leaders as irresponsible and set a limit on wage increases of 50% now and 30% at the end of the year.

The CGT stance has been supported by the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union, the main bourgeois opposition party) and a number of Peronist senators.

Peronist Labor Minister Ricardo Otero resigned following the president's speech, and the armed forces announced that they would not back any attempt by the president to suspend the CGT leaders who called the strike.

Phalangists Reopen Attack on Palestinians in Lebanon

Street fighting has broken out again in Beirut as the militia of the right-wing Phalangist party continues its drive against the Palestinian resistance movement and its supporters. A police report issued June 29 put the toll of the previous week's fighting at about 90 dead and 350 wounded.

Five persons were killed and fifteen others wounded in an explosion at a building housing the offices of several Palestinian resistance groups. The offices were used by El Fateh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Brazilian Actors Protest Censorship

Following the banning of the play *Abajur Lilas* (Lilac Bedlamp) in May by the federal police censors, many theater groups in São Paulo canceled their performances for one night in protest.

In reference to the slight relaxation of press censorship in Brazil, the author of the play, Plínio Marcos, said, "The censorship could get better, but all censorship is immoral." He noted that dozens of Brazilian artists "are not able to work because of the problem of censorship."

Miroel Silveira, professor of art at the University of São Paulo, told a Brazilian congressional committee: "It is with enormous sadness that I see the prohibition of

hundreds of plays, especially those that portray the life of the people. In truth, as long as the Brazilian cannot practice his culture and speak his language, without repression, there will be no development."

Torture in Guatemala

Amnesty International has prepared a dossier on political torture and murder in Guatemala. Released June 29, the dossier provides details on the cases of 134 victims of government repression, as reported in the Guatemala press from July 1, 1974, to January 31, 1975.

"The real number of victims of political violence is, of course, considerably higher than press reports can indicate," a spokesman for Amnesty International said. "Although our dossier only covers a seven-month period to the end of January, we are still receiving evidence of continuing acts of terror."

Labour Loses British By-election

The Conservative party won a House of Commons seat from the governing Labour party June 26 in the first by-election since last October's general election. The Tory victory eliminates Labour's effective majority in the Commons. The result showed a shift to the Conservatives of 7.6 percent.

No TV Coverage of Senate Inquiry Into 'Sordid Story' of CIA Plots

Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, announced June 26 that he favored secret hearings on the CIA plots to assassinate Fidel Castro. He said he did not want to "hold up the sordid story and telecast it to every corner of the world."

A committee source explained that Church preferred a written report on the proceedings because he feared that "some witness might get out of control and go too far" if TV cameras were placed in the hearing room.

'Too Much' Fertilizer in India?

Government warehouses in India are "glutted" with fertilizer, according to Marcus F. Franda of the American Universities Field Staff in India. Because of the 90 percent increase in domestic fertilizer prices

since June 1974 and tighter credit restrictions, Indian farmers have been forced to cut their use of fertilizer from 2.5 million tons in 1972 to 2.1 million tons in fiscal 1974-75.

Government officials predict that unless they reduce fertilizer imports, they may have to slash prices in order to unload the stocks. Such a move would be contrary to the government's long-term policy of keeping prices high as an incentive to domestic production of fertilizer.

The Pentagon's Vietnam War 'Rules'

The Pentagon released June 6 forty-three pages of rules that U.S. military forces were supposed to follow during the Vietnam War. Pentagon chief James Schlesinger said that not all the rules were declassified because to do so "would disclose doctrinal patterns and operational concepts that could be of use to potential enemy nations."

The rules were released after a request by Senator Barry Goldwater, who denounced them as having endangered American lives. He said the rules had "as much to do with our casualties" as enemy action. "It is unbelievable that any Secretary of Defense or any President would place these restrictions on our forces. . . . I pray such foolish restrictions . . . will never be formed again."

The rules were ostensibly designed to place some restrictions on attacks on civilians. They usually had an escape clause, however, and could be waived if the commander thought they might jeopardize his mission.

One directive showed the Pentagon's sensitivity to the term "free fire zone," declaring that the term "will not be used under any circumstances." The accepted term, said the directive, was "specified strike zones." It meant exactly the same thing—shoot anything that moves.

Portuguese Official Calls For 'Updating' Pact With Franco

The Iberian Pact, the military and diplomatic alliance Salazar signed with Franco in 1939, should be "brought up to date," Portugal's Foreign Minister Melo Antunes said at the end of an official visit to Madrid June 10.

Melo Antunes said, however, that he had not discussed the pact with Spanish officials. "We discussed subjects of general interest, such as the role that Spain and Portugal can play at the European Security Conference [expected to meet later this year]. It was decided to increase our economic, trade, and scientific cooperation."

He said that the two governments had agreed to "reactivate joint commissions for Spanish-Portuguese cooperation."

One of Lisbon's major concerns in its

relations with Madrid is the threat posed by exiled officials of the Salazarist regime now living in Spain. "As long as Spain maintains its present attitude toward the Portuguese exiles," Melo Antunes said, "Portugal has no objections to make" with respect to Madrid's policy.

Vietnamese Refugees Want to Go Home

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam has said it will welcome those Vietnamese refugees who want to return, and some may be on their way home within a few weeks, a representative of the United Nations High Command for Refugees said June 17.

According to a UN report, more than 2,650 Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees have asked to go home. In addition, the report said, 247 Cambodians and 67 Vietnamese already had left the refugee camps to make their way home on their own.

These numbers are likely to increase. A report in the June 14 *Washington Post* gives a glimpse of the sort of life awaiting many of the refugees outside the camps.

Two Vietnamese families—a total of eleven persons, including a baby twenty-three days old—were installed by their "sponsor" in a sweltering two-bed mobile home without electricity, running water, or plumbing. It was located in the middle of an isolated orange grove in Florida. The "sponsor" hoped the refugees would share-crop hay and oranges, and pay a rent of \$166 a month on their "home." She gave the refugees a .22-caliber rifle when they arrived and told them to shoot at intruders.

"If these are the kind of people who are going to do this country any good, they've got to have the pioneer spirit," she said.

CIA Financed Force Ouvrière, Says Former Agency Official

The Central Intelligence Agency played a major role in financing the formation of Force Ouvrière (Workers Power), a conservative French labor organization, according to a former top official of the U.S. spy agency.

Thomas Braden, who was joint director of the CIA after the Second World War, revealed the CIA funding in an interview broadcast on Britain's Independent Television network June 16. The FO resulted from a right-wing split in 1947 from the Communist-led labor federation, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT—General Confederation of Labor).

Braden also said that many politicians, journalists, intellectuals, and trade-union leaders in Western Europe received "a lot of money" from the CIA to fight Communist influence in the postwar period.

His disclosures confirm longstanding charges in France that FO was a CIA-



"This one's not dead. He just doesn't want to see what's going on"

Herblock/New York Post

inspired project. André Bergeron, general secretary of FO, has several times stated that his organization was aided by the American AFL and CIO, as well as by labor bodies in other capitalist countries. But he has always denied having any relations with the CIA. The money FO received from the American unions, however, was apparently channeled from CIA sources.

At its last congress, in June 1974, Force Ouvrière claimed a membership of 850,000, compared with 2.3 million members of the CGT. A third labor federation, the Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail (CFDT—French Democratic Confederation of Labor) claims 650,000 members.

About 50 percent of Force Ouvrière members are in the public-service sector. The remainder are divided evenly between nationalized industries and the privately owned sector.

American Companies Use Prison Labor in Colombia

Multinational concerns have discovered a new source of cheap labor in Colombia. Container Corp. of America, Marcor Inc., and B.F. Goodrich Co., among others, are using 6,000 Colombian prisoners to do jobs that one company admits would not be profitable to mechanize.

These prisoners are paid far less than the average unskilled factory worker. They do not get any fringe benefits, which typically amount to 70 to 100 percent of the Colombian cash payroll. And they must surrender 10 to 30 percent of their pay to prison authorities for "administrative expense."

OUT NOW!

Chapter 4

SDS and the Breakthrough

By Fred Halstead

At the end of 1964 SDS was still formally a part of the Social Democratic wing of American liberalism, still affiliated with and in part financed by the League for Industrial Democracy. But significant strains in this relationship had developed in the early 1960s.

The nearly moribund Student League for Industrial Democracy—thirteen students attended its 1958 national convention—changed its name to Students for a Democratic Society in January 1960. This was partly to take some distance from the adult leadership of the League for Industrial Democracy which had no appeal to, and indeed little sympathy for, the new activism beginning to arise on campuses. Thus began the process of differentiation from the “old left.”¹

In 1961 SDS National Secretary Robert Haber convinced the LID leaders that SDS needed a certain organizational independence, particularly the right to join in united action with other student groups like the Southern-based Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, if it was to stay abreast of its

generation. But Haber succeeded only after a bitter fight in which LID first fired and then rehired him.

The tensions developed nearly to the breaking point immediately following the SDS convention held at the United Auto Workers FDR Camp at Port Huron, Michigan, in June 1962. That convention, attended by a total of fifty-nine persons, forty-three of whom had voting power, did three things that infuriated the LID leaders. It modified a clause in the old SLID constitution aimed at excluding communists, it seated as an observer a member of the Progressive Youth Organizing Committee, which was associated with the Communist Party, and it adopted the famous Port Huron statement.

The Port Huron statement proclaimed the method of “participatory democracy” and the strategy of building a “new left” of “socialists and liberals” in America. The document, the first draft of which was written by Tom Hayden, was designed to stimulate discussion and was basically liberal in content. It even contained a version of the theory of “realignment” of progressive forces within the Democratic Party, so dear to the hearts of SP-SDF figures like Bayard Rustin and Michael Harrington.²

But the statement captured some of the revulsion of the newly radicalizing youth against the stultifying atmosphere of cold-war liberalism. It said:

“Americans are in withdrawal from public life, from any collective effort at directing their own affairs. . . . The American political system is not the democratic model of which its glorifiers speak. In actuality it frustrates democracy by confusing the individual citizen, paralyzing policy discussion, and consolidating the irresponsible power of military and business interests.”³

It should be recalled that this was written during the administration of John F. Kennedy. It expressed a critical attitude toward the White House “Camelot” not shared by other Social Democratic circles.

What is more, the statement contained an explicit criticism of the anticommunism that preoccupied the Social Democratic milieu in the U.S.:

“An unreasoning anti-communism has become a major social problem for those who want to construct a more democratic America. . . . Even many liberals and socialists share static and repetitious participation in the anti-communist crusade and often discourage tentative, inquiring discussion about ‘the Russian question’ within their ranks” (p. 30).

2. The “realignment” theory was a variation of coalition politics, the idea of seeking progressive change through a coalition of liberals, labor, and civil rights forces within the Democratic Party. According to “realignment,” the most conservative sectors should be forced out of the Democratic Party and into the Republican Party, thus producing a meaningful two-party system with liberals dominating one party, conservatives the other. The overtly racist Southern Democrats were seen as the major obstacle to this development. The Port Huron statement called for the development of “two genuine parties” by “shutting of the Southern Democrats out of the Democratic Party.”

3. *The Port Huron Statement* (Chicago: SDS, 1966), pp. 11-12.

1. As used in SDS circles of the time, the term “old left” generally referred to the left of Marxist origin which had emerged from the 1930s. It was divided into three main tendencies: the Stalinists, the Trotskyists, and the Social Democrats. In the United States in 1960 the parties of these tendencies were respectively the Communist Party (CP), the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), and the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation (SP-SDF).

From the 1930s to 1956 the CP was by far the largest, most influential radical party in the U.S. In 1956, however, the CP lost most of its members in a crisis precipitated by the Khrushchev revelations of Stalin’s crimes and the Soviet suppression of the subsequent Hungarian revolt. Since then, no party has had hegemony on the American left.

There were groups other than these three which considered themselves socialist, but almost all of them were either splinters from, or in the milieu of, one of the three main historic tendencies. (An exception is the Socialist Labor Party, which predates all the others. The SLP, however, has consistently abstained from the existing trade unions, civil rights, or antiwar organizations. It played no role in the organized anti-Vietnam-war movement.)

With the advent of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Stalinists split into Moscow-oriented and Peking-oriented varieties. In the mid-1960s, the main Maoist group in the U.S. was the Progressive Labor Party (PL).

In Western Europe, Britain, Japan, Australia, etc., there are mass labor and Social Democratic parties based on the trade unions. The lack of this phenomenon in the United States of the period under discussion made the miniscule SP-SDF and its youth group YPSL appear almost irrelevant. The appearance, however, was superficial, for there existed a larger milieu of trade union officials and intellectuals calling themselves either liberals or socialists who had a common Social Democratic origin and ideology and were loosely associated through periodicals, foundations, and social service organizations such as the League for Industrial Democracy.

In the U.S. by the 1960s the Social Democracy by and large no longer held socialist pretensions, but constituted a more or less distinct wing of liberalism operating mainly within the Democratic Party. It included elements of the leadership of several important trade unions, including the United Auto Workers, the United Federation of Teachers in New York, and especially the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. The Social Democracy also had a certain overlap with the pacifist movement through such figures as Bayard Rustin and Dave McReynolds, both members of SP-SDF and proteges of A.J. Muste.

To top off its dissidence, the Port Huron statement implied the U.S. was to blame for the continuation of the cold war:

"Our paranoia about the Soviet Union has made us incapable of achieving agreements absolutely necessary for disarmament and the preservation of peace" (pp. 32-33).

This was too much for the LID leaders, who called Haber and new SDS president Tom Hayden to a hearing at which they were grilled by Harrington and others. LID changed the lock on the SDS national office and cut off funds to the youth group.

In his scholarly study *SDS*, Kirkpatrick Sale quotes SDS National Executive Committee member Bob Ross's comment on this attack:

"All of us felt our careers were going to be ruined, and America's best liberals were on the lip of red-baiting us out of existence. We knew we weren't communists, but the idea that our parent organization thought we were, was Kafkaesque."⁴

After lengthy maneuvers and negotiations during which Haber was replaced as national secretary, the near split was provisionally patched up. But the SDS leaders had had a lesson in the "democratic" morality of the Social Democratic leaders, and shed some illusions. From then on SDS tended more and more to practice nonexclusion—if not proclaim it. The pressures in this direction were particularly strong because of the SDS interest in SNCC which had adopted nonexclusion in the heat of the Southern civil rights struggle, where heavy red-baiting attacks by racists were frequent.

SDS was also deeply influenced by the unsuccessful attempt of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party to unseat the Dixiecrat state delegation at the Democratic Party convention in 1964. SDSers were particularly angered by the role played by Bayard Rustin in opposing the challenge. The anger was all the deeper because the attempt was not revolutionary, but essentially fell within the "realignment" strategy, so often pushed by Rustin.

During the 1964 presidential campaign, virtually the entire old peace movement threw itself behind Lyndon Johnson against Barry Goldwater. Johnson's campaign statements were carefully designed to leave the mistaken impression that he would not escalate the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Goldwater was more candid. Most of the radicals followed suit in backing Johnson, including the Communist Party. The major exception was the Trotskyists of the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance, who ran their own candidate, Clifton DeBerry. He denounced the "illegal undeclared war" being fought "because the corporations and billionaires who really run the U.S. believe that it is their divine, imperialist, white-supremacist right to control Southeast Asia" and warned that both "Johnson and Goldwater wholeheartedly carry out this dirty policy."⁵

The depth of the illusion in Johnson within the old peace movement, and the moral outrage that followed when the reelected president began the major escalation, was perhaps best expressed by Dr. Benjamin Spock, who had joined SANE in 1962 and became its most prominent and effective spokesman. Spock campaigned for Johnson and two days after the election the president made a personal phone call to thank him. Spock quotes Johnson as saying, "I hope I will be worthy of your trust."

"I was so embarrassed," continues Spock, "to have the President of the U.S. hoping to be worthy of my trust that I cried, 'Oh, President Johnson, I'm sure you will,' little knowing that within three months he would have betrayed me and the millions of other Americans who voted for him because he said he was the peace candidate."⁶

4. Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS* (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 65.

5. *The Militant*, August 10, 1964.

6. Lynn Z. Bloom, *Dr. Spock: Biography of a Conservative Radical* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), p. 253.

SDS's Political Education Project (PEP), under the leadership of Steve Max and Jim Williams of the "realignment" faction, also threw itself behind the pro-Johnson effort. They rallied around the president heedless of the Gulf of Tonkin affair that took place in the midst of his campaign. In August two American destroyers, under orders to patrol as close as eleven miles to the North Vietnamese shore, were allegedly fired upon by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on patrol against Saigon commandos who had repeatedly raided that area of the North Vietnamese coast. Johnson used this staged incident as the pretext to launch the first U.S. bombing raid on North Vietnam and to press through Congress the infamous Tonkin Gulf resolution that was subsequently used as the authority for the massive escalations of the next three years.

The resolution was adopted with virtual unanimity, only two senators, Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening, voting against. In the House only Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem registered a weak dissent by abstaining.

Support for Johnson was by no means unanimous within SDS. To differentiate from the official Democratic campaign slogan, "All the Way with LBJ," SDS national secretary C. Clark Kissinger put out a button that said, "Part of the Way with LBJ." This was widely assumed to have been the official SDS electoral stand. Kissinger says he put out the button on his own and that SDS as a whole had no position on the election, since a majority of the leadership by that time did not consider electoral activity a fruitful method of building a radical base. And it is true that the Political Education Project itself did not long survive the election campaign.

Nevertheless the general impression was left that SDS had supported Johnson as a lesser evil chiefly because of his advertised differences with Goldwater on the war.

For the duration of the election campaign this tended to obscure somewhat the depth of the alienation among SDS ranks from the older Social Democratic milieu.

This divergence is pointed up by an incident that took place within another sector of the Social Democracy. The Young People's Socialist League held a convention over Labor Day weekend—not long after the Gulf of Tonkin affair. The convention adopted a resolution opposing both of the capitalist parties in the elections. The national office of SP-SDF thereupon suspended YPSL for taking a position "outside the basic framework of democratic socialism."

The theory behind this was apparently that if YPSL members didn't support the Democratic Party candidate some of them might vote for the SWP candidate DeBerry, who was calling for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. The SP-SDF considered it sufficient grounds for expulsion for any member to support SWP candidates.

The action was the more galling in that the SP-SDF convention itself had not fielded a candidate and the pro-Johnson wing at the adult convention did not have a majority. Nevertheless prominent SP-SDF members, including Norman Thomas and Harrington, were campaigning for Johnson. The right to publicly express viewpoints different from party policy was in essence limited to the right wing. This violation of the professed democratic principles of the self-styled democratic socialists was a bit thick, and YPSL ceased to function as a viable organization just as the new antiwar movement was about to be born.

Relations between LID and SDS, on the other hand, went smoothly during the election campaign. This proved to be temporary, however.

Not long after the November election it became clear to any careful observer that the U.S. was preparing an escalation of the war. The November 18 *Wall Street Journal*, for example, reported:

"The decision on whether or when to 'escalate' warfare in Southeast Asia hasn't yet been made. But Governmental activity

which one lofty participant calls 'feverish' suggests the decision point is close at hand."

The essential reason for this was the near collapse of the Saigon regime. Mass desertions to the rebel side were occurring in major battles. It was obvious Saigon would not be able to hold out without a drastic change in the situation. General Maxwell Taylor, President Kennedy's favorite counterinsurgency expert and in 1964 U.S. ambassador to Saigon, requested U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam and Laos. The request was not kept secret, plainly as a test of public reaction.

Still the old peace coalition as a whole would not respond. An ad hoc formation, under the leadership of the pacifists, called emergency demonstrations for December 19. The one in New York drew a thousand people to Washington Square. Chaired by Dave McReynolds of the War Resisters League, the speakers included A.J. Muste, Norman Thomas, and A. Philip Randolph, the septuagenarian president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.

In this atmosphere the SDS National Council meeting was held in New York during the Christmas-New Year school holiday. This meeting marks the birth of the new antiwar movement because it initiated the first national march on Washington against the Vietnam war. Those present at the meeting, however, didn't see the decision as particularly historic. Other matters taken up by the meeting seemed more important to them at the time.

The Berkeley Free Speech Movement, which had dominated the fall semester, was a major preoccupation of the NC members. So were SDS's several ERAP (Economic Research and Action Project) community organizing efforts. Rennie Davis in Chicago, Paul Potter in Cleveland, and Tom Hayden in Newark were key figures in this work.

Even the SDS Peace Research and Education Project (PREP) was concerned centrally not with Vietnam but with plans for a civil-disobedience protest against the Chase Manhattan Bank over loans to South Africa. But PREP leaders Todd Gitlin and Paul Booth did invite I.F. Stone to the meeting for a talk on U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It deeply affected those present. The next day, December 30, 1964, a long session took place at which various proposals for action on Vietnam were discussed and the march on Washington for April 17, 1965, finally decided upon. Clark Kissinger recalls:

"It was at the Cloakmakers' [an International Ladies Garment Workers Union affiliate] Hall in Manhattan. I think it was the last time the social democrats provided a meeting hall for us. When we got into the room there was a giant, about 10-foot-high portrait of Lyndon Johnson, which we turned around and faced against the wall."⁷

The idea for the march was actually a compromise proposed by Jim Brook, an associate of Steve Max's, as a counter to Todd Gitlin's idea of a draft-refusal campaign that Brook thought too radical. Sale describes the climax of the debate as follows:

"Many ERAPers and the more alienated of the younger members oppose a march as too tame; others argue that the whole thing has too much of a single-issue focus to it and is not radical enough; while Kissinger and a number of campus-oriented people join with the PEP types in support of it because they see it as an effective way to organize among students and build up the organization on the campus level. Then, during a lull, a number of ERAPers leave the room. Kissinger, in the chair, calls for a vote on the march. It passes, with strong support from the chapter delegates, less enthusiasm from the NC members."

Kissinger recalls that the meeting specifically decided that the march would be organized on a basis of nonexclusion. "There was no opposition to this that I can remember," he says. The meeting

adjourned after midnight. SDS had just kicked over the traces.

Certainly no one there anticipated that the issue of the Vietnam war would assume such consuming importance for the U.S. and the world, or that the action they had just taken would catapult SDS into national prominence by next April 17. But to some extent the break with LID policy was deliberate. The SDS national office leaders were aware that a refreshing breeze of youthful radicalism was stirring. They wanted to get that wind in their sails and what they considered the irrelevant baggage of the "old left," including the exclusionism of the Social Democrats, just got in the way. SDS was to be master in its own house.

SDS was still not significantly larger than the other radical youth groups, but it considered itself the main group of the "new left." In a modest way—they expected perhaps two or three thousand—a nonexclusive march on Washington organized by SDS would allow it to take center stage for an action with some appeal on campuses nationally.

As far as the war itself was concerned, it was one of many equally vital issues and the march itself was viewed as just one of several projects to occupy SDS in the spring semester. SDS was not unique in this low-key approach to Vietnam at the time. None of the other radical groups considered it an overriding preoccupation either.

PL had founded M-2-M with Vietnam as a central concern but the M-2-M actions in the summer had failed to draw large numbers, while the Berkeley Free Speech Movement had captured national attention. In January, M-2-M leaders decided the group would become involved in student protest generally rather than emphasize Vietnam. When Clark Kissinger contacted the various radical groups early in January to invite them to join in building the march on a nonexclusive basis, M-2-M at first hesitated, endorsing only after support for the action grew beyond original expectations.

Observers from the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs, the new youth group associated with the Communist Party, had been present at the SDS National Executive Council meeting which called the action and had indicated interest, but once again with no special emphasis.

Even the Trotskyists, who would later be the most consistent advocates of mass anti-Vietnam-war demonstrations, were blessed with no special talent for prophecy. The YSA convention, which took place in Chicago at the same time the SDS council was meeting in New York, paid no special attention to Vietnam.

"We made a cold-blooded decision," recalls Jack Barnes, then YSA national chairman, "that we would not press any special, central campaign from the convention. We decided we'd have to let the incoming leadership see what pops, and go from there. We rejected initiating something ourselves, trying to suck it out of our thumb. And shortly after we got back to New York, Kissinger contacted us for a meeting. He told us about the march and said he wanted to show us the draft of the call to see what we thought about it. We said OK and he said, 'I'll meet you at the Jeff [the Jefferson Book Shop, a radical bookstore in Manhattan]."

"The main thing we raised with him was to make it clear in the call that the U.S. had no right in Vietnam, the call should be clear on Vietnamese self-determination. He agreed. Later he asked us not to carry our own signs. We didn't much like that. We wanted to advocate 'immediate withdrawal.' He said SDS would make up sets of signs with different slogans and at least one of them would satisfy us. We could carry that.

"We decided to acquiesce. As soon as we heard about the march, we knew that it could be a breakthrough. Our approach was not to form a special caucus or something like that but to throw the whole YSA into building committees to get people to go to Washington for the march."⁹

7. Author's taped interview with Clark Kissinger, October 16, 1973.

8. Sale, *SDS*, p. 171.

9. Author's taped interview with Jack Barnes, April 27, 1974.

In January SDS sent letters to all student political organizations and adult peace groups asking endorsement and inviting each group to appoint a liaison. The invitation was ignored by most of the peace groups. I.F. Stone, however, got Senator Gruening to agree to speak, and the American Friends Service Committee endorsed. SDS, then, was reasonably assured of a modestly successful action as it readied its call for release to the public early in February.

On February 7, 1965, Johnson announced a major escalation of the war, beginning with sustained bombing of North Vietnam. The U.S. would try to save the Saigon regime by massive increase of U.S. forces, including ground forces. The military manpower needs would be supplied by the draft rather than calling up the reserves.

Overnight, demonstrations were spontaneously organized, particularly at campuses, across the country. There were literally hundreds of them. In some places SDS chapters took the initiative, but there weren't very many SDS chapters then. Most were organized by ad hoc committees called together by individuals with some radical experience, or experience in the civil rights, free speech, Fair Play for Cuba, or old peace movement activities.

On February 8, SDS issued its call for the April 17 march on Washington, urging "the participation of all students who agree with us that the war in Vietnam injures both Vietnamese and Americans and should be stopped." The call said:

"The current war in Vietnam is being waged on behalf of a succession of unpopular South Vietnamese dictatorships, not in behalf of freedom. No American-supported South Vietnamese regime in the past few years has gained the support of its people, for the simple reason that the people overwhelmingly want peace, self-determination, and the opportunity for development. American prosecution of the war has deprived them of all three.

"The war is fundamentally a *civil* war, waged by South Vietnamese against their government; it is not a 'war of aggression.' Military assistance from North Vietnam and China has been minimal; most guerrilla weapons are homemade or captured American arms. The areas of strongest guerrilla control are not the areas adjacent to North Vietnam. And the people could not and cannot be isolated from the guerrillas by forced settlement in 'strategic hamlets'; again and again, Government military attacks fail because the people tip off the guerrillas; the people and the guerrillas are inseparable. . . .

"Well over half of the area of South Vietnam is already governed by the National Liberation Front. . . . Thousands of Government troops have defected—the traditional signal of a losing counter-guerrilla war. . . ."¹⁰

These facts were accurate at the time. But the next sentence in the call, set in capital letters in the original, indicates some illusion as to the war's duration: "HOW MANY MORE LIVES MUST BE LOST BEFORE THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION ACCEPTS THE FOREGONE CONCLUSIONS?"

The SDS authors were not the only ones who did not know then that the answer to that question would preoccupy the country for the next ten years and create a crisis in confidence in the government so profound that its effects are still reverberating.

The concluding sentences of the call caught the mood of youth who had become politically aware largely during the Southern civil rights struggle and had closely followed the community organizing done by SNCC.

"We are outraged that \$2 million a day is expended for a war on the poor in Vietnam, while government financing is so desperately needed to abolish poverty at home. WHAT KIND OF AMERICA IS IT WHOSE RESPONSE TO POVERTY AND OPPRESSION IN VIETNAM IS NAPALM AND DEFOLIATION? WHOSE RESPONSE TO POVERTY AND OPPRESSION

IN MISSISSIPPI IS—SILENCE? It is a hideously *immoral* war. America is committing pointless murder."

* * *

The quick demonstrations in response to the February escalation proved the existence of a reservoir of radicalized youth larger than had been previously manifest, but the outrage was still largely confined to radicals. The great bulk of the population was still confused on the war, still not ready to see their own government as being involved in shameful and immoral deeds.

Here and there, those in favor of the war—or rather those against the protesters—mustered more than the demonstrators. For example, at one small university set in a conservative Ohio community, the YSA organized a handful of students to protest the war on February 9. They were set upon by some 150 right-wing-instigated students who burned their picket signs and kicked and shoved them. Campus police stood by, refusing to intervene though one demonstrator, Barbara Brock, was kicked in the face. The campus was Kent State University.

* * *

Following these early demonstrations, the SDS march became the national focus for the entire protest movement. Endorsements came in from many figures prominent in other causes, even from persons only SANE had previously been able to approach with success.

One delicate problem facing SDS was the fact that the old peace movement traditionally scheduled peace walks on Easter weekend and April 17 was the day before Easter. There was a certain resentment, even among those traditional peace movement leaders now anxious to join a united protest against the Vietnam war, because SDS had preempted the period for a demonstration under its exclusive sponsorship.

Early in March, Ralph DiGia, the gentle, soft-spoken executive secretary of the War Resisters League who had spent years in prison for his pacifist principles, arranged a meeting with SDS and the traditional peace groups to iron out this problem. It was agreed to cancel the Easter walks and support the Washington march as the national focus of spring activity against the war. SANE had scheduled a "Walk with Dr. Spock" for New York on Saturday, April 17, and this was shifted to April 10, largely through the good offices of Women Strike for Peace.

The traditional groups proposed, however, that SDS give over direction of the march to an ad hoc committee of leaders from the several peace organizations. It was by no means certain that this group would resist demands from SANE and Turn Toward Peace to exclude the unrespectable radicals and ban the idea of "immediate withdrawal" from the march.

The SDS negotiators, Kissinger and Paul Booth, did yield to the extent of agreeing to ban "immediate withdrawal" signs provided placards for all other specific solutions were also banned. This was later changed to the arrangement where SDS printed up a variety of signs and asked other groups not to bring their own. (As it turned out, the promised "immediate withdrawal" placards never materialized and the Trotskyists had to be satisfied with placards proclaiming, "Self-Determination, Not U.S.-Imposed Dictatorship.")

Kissinger and Booth agreed to the joint sponsorship deal but explained they couldn't make the decision on their own. In mid-March the SDS national office sent out a mail ballot to the National Council on the sponsorship question. The results were: twenty-four for the ad-hoc sponsorship, nineteen against, two abstentions.

The whole matter was about to be thrown back to what amounted to the old peace movement coalition. But several members of the majority then changed their vote, including

10. SDS archives, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.

Kissinger, who explained in a communication: "Since, however, there were violent opinions on both sides, a number of votes were conditional, and the margin so close, a number of National Officers changed their vote from For to Against to avoid embarking on a radical change in plans without a clear organizational consensus."¹¹

Sale characterizes this as "in the best democratic traditions of the organization." The LID leaders had other words for it, but their reputation for strict adherence to majority votes was tarnished in SDS circles from the Port Huron incident. What was in all probability involved here was not a complicated and cynical maneuver—that would have been out of character for both Kissinger and Booth—but a series of reactions to different pressures from different parts of the movement. It left bad feelings, however, which contributed to pressures against the march.

During the final weeks of preparations SDS put up some subway posters in New York City showing a Vietnamese burned by napalm and the caption: "WHY ARE WE BURNING, TORTURING, KILLING THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM? . . . TO PREVENT FREE ELECTIONS." This angered many people in LID and the old peace groups who said it implied that if the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam free elections would follow.

In San Francisco, where a march was being organized to coincide with the Washington affair, Western Area Turn Toward Peace Director Robert Pickus issued a press release denouncing it. "It is time that someone within the peace movement challenged activity which is in fact more hostile to America than to war," said Pickus. Getting out of Vietnam, he continued, "is not the way to end the war in Southeast Asia" and such slogans are not the way "to help change America's mind about the use of national military power there. . . . America is involved in Vietnam. It should stay involved. The question is how. . . ."¹²

On Thursday before the Washington march, some fifteen prominent pacifist, peace movement, and Social Democratic figures, called together by Bayard Rustin, met at Turn Toward Peace Executive Director Robert Gilmore's house to discuss the upcoming event. Muste, who was present, later gave some of the details in an interview with Jack Newfield published in the May 7, 1965, *Village Voice*. As quoted by Newfield, Muste said Rustin "wanted to torpedo the march because he thought communists had taken over in some places."

Most of those at this meeting, however, were supporters of the march. In a debate lasting many hours they watered down Rustin's original proposal to a statement welcoming the march but dissociating from some of its participants and features. The statement referred to exclusion in the following terms:

"We welcome the cooperation of all those groups and individuals who, like ourselves, believe in the need for an independent peace movement, not committed to any form of totalitarianism or drawing inspiration from the foreign policy of any government."¹³

This part of the statement was downright laughable to radicals familiar with the Social Democratic milieu which contained "State Department socialists" who drew material support as well as inspiration from the foreign policy of the U.S. government, but who were not considered outside the pale.

The statement also characterized President Johnson's April 7 Johns Hopkins speech as suggesting "a healthy shift in American foreign policy." In this speech Johnson declared for "unconditional negotiations" on condition they took place from a position of

U.S. strength in Vietnam, and pointedly did not include the NLF as a party to the negotiations. It was also the speech where Johnson offered vast sums in American "aid" to North Vietnam if only they would settle on terms agreeable to the U.S.

Nevertheless, the statement had been changed from one attacking the march to what appeared to some of those who agreed to sign it late that tired night as one of critical support. Dave McReynolds and Ralph DiGia refused to sign. Dave Dellinger had not even been invited to the meeting. Those who signed included Rustin, Gilmore, Norman Thomas, H. Stuart Hughes, and even Muste. The last three later apologized for the way it was used.

Actually, if Rustin had called the meeting to cripple the march itself he acted much too late, since the statement didn't make the papers until the day of the event. More likely Rustin simply wanted the traditional peace movement to be clearly dissociated from an event he felt would be a fiasco from the point of view of appealing to the liberal establishment.

As it turned out, the march was unprecedented in size and completely orderly. What little hostile press it got was directly due to the statement Rustin had initiated.

This included an April 17 editorial in the liberal *New York Post* which began: "On the eve of this weekend's 'peace march' on Washington, several leaders of the peace movement have taken clear note of attempts to convert the event into a frenzied, one-sided anti-American show. Some of the banners advertised in advance are being carried to the wrong place at the wrong time."

The effects of this incident were minimal on the march itself, but its repercussions were a stunning blow to the Social Democracy and its chances to influence a new generation.

After the march Yale Professor Staughton Lynd, a pacifist friend of Rustin who had been director of the Mississippi Freedom Schools during SNCC's 1964 summer campaign, wrote an open letter in which he berated Rustin:

"The lesson of your apostasy on Vietnam appears to be that the gains for American Negroes you advise them to seek through coalition politics within the Democratic Party come only at a price. The price is to become a 'national civil rights leader' who delivers his constituency. The price is to urge 'jobs and freedom' for Americans only. The price, at a time when we desperately need to stand together and transcend old bitterness, is to set the stage for a government witch-hunt. The price is to make our brothers in Vietnam a burnt offering on the altar of political expediency."¹⁴

The spring 1965 issue of *Studies on the Left* carried a long editorial based on a taped interview with Clark Kissinger, though this was not acknowledged at the time, detailing the internal struggle within the old peace movement over the march on Washington. It concluded:

"The attempts to gain control of the March on Washington, and later to discredit it, like the attempts to force the MFDPP to compromise at Atlantic City, illuminate the growing divergence between the new radicals and those still caught up in the ideological concerns of the old left and the strategies of realignment and coalitions at the top. The continued refusal of sections of the peace movement to work with overt Communist and left-wing groups, even within a protest activity sponsored and controlled by a non-Communist organization whose principles and activity all respected, indicates a steadily growing isolation of the traditional peace groups from the new student movements. The difficulty these organizations found in functioning as supporters rather than as sponsors of the March grew out of this isolation and a concomitant ignorance of the extent and spirit of student alienation from the concerns of the Cold War."

[Next chapter: *The SDS March on Washington*]

11. SDS worklist mailing, March 21, 1965. SDS archives, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.

12. Cited by Dave Dellinger, "The March on Washington and its Critics," *Liberation*, May 1965.

13. Cited by Dellinger, *Liberation*, May 1965.

14. *Studies on the Left*, Spring 1965.

Prospects for the International Capitalist Economy

By Ernest Mandel

[The following article appeared in the June 5 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

The generalized recession of the international capitalist economy, which started at the beginning of autumn 1974, has continued to intensify since then. As of mid spring 1975 it holds sway in all the imperialist countries.

Experts, especially government experts, have been surprised by the recession and its cumulative development.¹ In June 1974, for instance, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was still predicting universal growth for the big imperialist powers for the first half of 1975.² In fact, however, it can be asserted with certainty that *none* of these powers will experience any growth during this period. And in view of the breadth of the recession during the first several months of 1975, it is not likely that there will be growth for the year taken as a whole, even if an upturn begins during the third quarter, an eventuality that is in any case improbable for most of the imperialist countries.

Actually, since it began, the recession has been more severe than has been recorded in current statistics. In March 1975 OECD gave the following figures for the reduction of industrial production during the fourth quarter of 1974, figures that are clearly higher than the predictions that were published at the end of 1974:

Reduction in Industrial Production—1974

(Fourth quarter of 1974 compared with preceding quarter)

United States	-3.0%
Canada	-1.5%
Japan	-5.0%
France	-6.5%
Italy	-7.5%
West Germany	-3.0%
Britain	-2.5%
Total of OECD countries	-3.5%

The Recession Deepens

Throughout the first quarter of 1975 the international recession deepened by cumulative development following the classical schema, which confirms that this recession is indeed a classical overproduction crisis.

Having eventually affected all industrial branches, the recession

1. On our own predictions and an initial analysis and explanation of the generalized recession, see "The Generalized Recession of the International Capitalist Economy," *Inprecor*, No. 16/17, January 16, 1975.

2. The OECD had predicted the following GNP increases for the first half of 1975: United States 3%; Japan 7.2%; France 5.2%; West Germany 4%; Italy 3.5%; Britain 1%; Canada 5.5%.

sion provoked first of all a *pronounced reduction in orders*. There were two reasons for this: First, all capitalist companies wanted to reduce their inventories because of slumping conditions; second, they limited and revised their investment programs (sometimes radically) because of excess productive capacity in all industry.

The pronounced reduction of orders has provoked a *reduction in employment*. Massive unemployment (both total and partial unemployment) has reduced the purchasing power of consumers in spite of the various social aid measures, which have limited but not eliminated these losses of purchasing power. There has been a consequent fall in sales of consumer goods (especially durable consumer goods), which has acted to accentuate inventory accumulation and therefore to reduce new orders, and therefore to further reduce current production.

This spiraling reduction of orders and industrial production has in its turn entailed a collapse in the prices of all raw materials, including foodstuffs. The combination of the fall of industrial production in all imperialist countries and the fall of raw materials prices has resulted in a *reduction in the volume of world trade*, for the first time since the end of the Second World War.

This reduction in exports has combined with the contraction of domestic demand to intensify in turn the *reduction in current production*, employment, and incomes. Hence, in May 1975 both the fall in industrial production and the number of unemployed widely surpassed the level that had been attained in December 1974:

Reduction in Industrial Production—1975

(First quarter of 1975 compared with first quarter of 1974)

United States	-12.1%
West Germany	-8.5%
Japan	-16.0%
France	-9.0%
Italy	-12.0%
Britain*	-4.5%
Canada	-4.0%

*In comparison with the preceding quarter, because the first quarter of 1974 coincided with the introduction of the three-day week by the Heath cabinet against the miners' strike.

The official unemployment figures for May 1975 show more than 16 million on total unemployment in the imperialist countries:

	Millions
United States	8.2
Japan	1.3
Italy	1.3
West Germany	1.1
France	0.9
Britain	0.9
Canada & Australia	1.0
Small imperialist powers of Europe	1.4

These figures do not include partial unemployment, but they do include big underestimations, particularly for Spain (the real figure of total unemployment in this country is undoubtedly more than 600,000 and not the officially registered 300,000).

The cumulative effects of the "national" recessions and the contraction of international trade have foiled all the "expert" pump-priming projects, especially in West Germany and France. At the very moment that the governments of these countries began to boost domestic demand moderately, the fall of exports (and of foreign orders) neutralized the effects of the anticrisis policy, at least in the short run.

The scope of the recession must be measured not only by the fall in current production, but also by *the spectacular increase in unutilized productive capacity*. To believe the magazines *Business Week* and the *Economist*, this figure now stands at some 8-10% in West Germany, about 15% in Japan, and not less than 33.5% in the United States.

Except in West Germany and Japan, long-term inflation has scarcely slowed down, in spite of the extent of overproduction. This is clearly indicated by the following figures:

Rate of Increase of Consumer Prices

	1973	1974	1975 (first quarter)
West Germany	6.9%	7.0%	6.0%
Belgium	7.0%	12.7%	15.3%
United States	6.2%	11.0%	11.4%
France	7.3%	13.7%	14.2%
Italy	10.8%	19.1%	23.5%
Britain	9.1%	16.1%	19.9%
Japan	19.1%	21.9%	10.0%

Most likely, these figures do not entirely take account of the slowdown of inflation in 1975 compared with the inflationary "peaks" of the first several months of 1974. But on the other hand it must be taken into consideration that the continuation of inflation at rates nearly equal or even superior to last year's coincides both with an exceptional accumulation of and attempt to liquidate inventories of commodities and with a spectacular fall in the prices of raw materials:

The 'Economist' Index for Raw Materials Prices

(May 19, 1975, compared with May 1974, in dollars)

All raw materials	-18.0%
Food products	-11.0%
Industrial raw materials	-33.2%
Fibers	-18.7%
Metals	-40.1%

If under these conditions the cost of living continues to rise in a pronounced manner, it must be stressed that responsibility for this lies with monopolies specializing in mass consumer goods (both durable and nondurable); these companies, using a time-honored technique, are *increasing* the price per commodity while the number of commodities being sold is declining.³ It must be

3. The big monopolist trusts program their investments over the medium term. Thus, each year they have to attain a more or less predetermined level of gross return (renewal of fixed capital plus new investment). If the same sum has to be raised through sales of a smaller number of units, it follows

added that the governments, central banks, and private banking systems are permitting these monopolies to act in this way, by ceaselessly increasing the money supply, especially the supply of paper money.

Contraction of World Trade

The contraction of world trade, which had not occurred at the beginning of the recession but could have been predicted as soon as the recession became generalized in all the important imperialist countries, seems to have indeed become a fact beginning with the first quarter of 1975. Although we do not yet have overall figures, it appears that exports are declining in nearly all countries. Thus, in the case of France they dropped from 59,800 million francs [1 franc=US\$0.25] during the fourth quarter of 1974 to 57,800 million francs for the first quarter of 1975; in April exports dropped another 1.3% compared with March.

In West Germany the fall of exports during the first quarter of 1975 in comparison with the last quarter of 1974 must be on the order of 4%. In the United States, exports dropped from \$9,400 million in January 1975 to \$8,900 million in February, \$8,780 million in March, and \$8,720 million in April. In Switzerland, the decline was more than 13% in comparison with the last quarter of 1974 and more than 7.2% in comparison with the first quarter of 1974. Only in Japan have exports continued to rise (and 50% of Japanese exports are now going to the semicolonial countries). The value of Japanese exports in April 1975 exceeded the value of exports in April 1974 by only 10.4%, which is less than the increase in prices during that period. And the value of foreign orders is already lower than last year. (*Japan Times*, April 23, 1975.)

This contraction of international trade is a result of three basic factors:

- It is a *direct effect* of the recession in that the fall in production and employment are reducing demand for imported raw materials, machinery, and consumer goods.
- It is an *indirect effect* of the recession in that the exporting countries (especially the countries that export raw materials, except for oil) are suffering sharp cuts in their currency resources because of the fall of the volume and prices of exports and have thus been forced to reduce their imports.
- It is the product of a *deliberate policy of import reductions* (that is, a partial return to economic nationalism and to scarcely disguised protectionism), especially on the part of the imperialist powers that suffered big balance of payments deficits during the first half of 1974.

This policy has generally been crowned with success. Japan, whose trade deficit during the first quarter of 1974 stood at an annual level of nearly \$10,000 million (and \$13,500 million for the period of March 1973-March 1974), had completely reabsorbed this deficit by the first quarter of 1975; its trade balance even showed a surplus again (of \$4,000 million for the period March 1974-March 1975). The same is true for the United States, whose annual deficit, on the order of \$8,000 million in the third quarter of 1974 (total deficit in 1974: \$5,700 million), was transformed into a \$1,300 million surplus for the first quarter of 1975. Italy succeeded in reducing its trade deficit by 75%, and even Britain's situation got very clearly better, the trade balance improving by \$7,000 million between autumn 1974 and spring 1975. In France the March 1974 deficit of 2,000 million francs was transformed into a 62 million franc surplus in March 1975.

This success was achieved with the aid of all sorts of import restrictions as well as modifications in exchange rates that

that the trusts will increase the unit sales price. The existence of monopoly explains why they are able to act in this way, but they cannot do so beyond certain limits nor for a period of indeterminate length.

favored exports to the detriment of imports (the most pronounced case being that of the pound sterling, which "floated" so as to decline in value by 25% compared to its value after the currency "realignment" of December 1971). Obviously, there have to be losers in this zero-sum game. Essentially, the losers are some of the smaller imperialist countries (among them Switzerland, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal) and the semicolonial countries, even including the oil exporters.

The balance of trade between the oil exporters and the imperialist countries has in fact changed dramatically. The 1974 trade surplus of the oil-exporting countries had initially been expected to exceed the 1973 surplus by \$80,000 million; but this figure must now be revised downward. It could be that the increase will be only \$60,000 million. And above all, it dropped rapidly during the first quarter of 1975 under the combined effects of the decline in world oil sales and the spectacular rise in the imports of the oil-producing countries, an increase that no one had expected to be on the order of 75%, after having been on the order of 70% in 1974. We will return further on to the implications of this reversal of the tendency.

The positions of the four major imperialist countries on the world market have not undergone big changes. For the whole of 1974 the United States occupied first place, with exports of \$98,500 million, followed by West Germany (\$90,000 million), Japan (\$55,500 million), and France (about \$50,000 million). But the United States preserved this position because the dollar was devalued by 40% compared with the deutschemark, which rendered many American commodities competitive again. And in spite of this enormous advantage, the position of the United States was broken through during the last quarter of 1974 and the beginning of 1975.

Monetary Reflation and the Upturn

Surprised by the scope of the recession, the leaders of the major imperialist countries decided to take measures of monetary pump-priming, that is, to eliminate the toughest measures of credit restriction and slowdown in the expansion of the money supply that had been taken in 1973 and 1974 in the framework of the "struggle against inflation." What is nevertheless striking about these "pump-priming" measures is their timid character, except in the United States. And even in the United States, where the economic upturn has been prepared by a colossal budget deficit (on the order of \$70,000-80,000 million for the fiscal year July 1975-June 1976), the authorities of the Federal Reserve System have been attacked for their alleged "moderation" by the advocates of more energetic priming, who are demanding an expansion of the money supply on the order of 9-10% a year instead of the 5-7% called for by the team around Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur F. Burns.⁴

The moderation and hesitation of the pump-priming measures are obviously explained by the fear of stimulating inflation again at a time when it is already much stronger than it was during previous recessions. It is thus confirmed that contemporary capitalism is incapable of escaping the dilemma: aggravated recession or aggravated inflation (and in any case, the latter choice precipitates even more serious recessions in the long run).

The problem is complicated by international interimperialist competition. To be sure, so long as the system of floating exchange rates prevails, the aggravation of domestic inflation no longer automatically involves a deterioration of the competitive position on the world market of the country concerned. It can even have the opposite effect. This is, moreover, one of the reasons for which some of the imperialist powers consider the system of

floating exchange rates a means of competition that ought to be proscribed.

Nevertheless, a rate of inflation in one imperialist country considerably in excess of the rate in competing countries continues to entail unfavorable economic consequences, even if exports are no longer directly threatened. The result of inflating domestic demand is the inflation of imports, which in any case grow automatically as a result of the very drop in the exchange rate of the national currency, which protects exports against the effects of inflation. Hence, inflation continues to spur on the balance of payments deficit, and thereby dependence on international credits, and thereby the overall weakening of the competitive position of the imperialist country in question. Having a rate of inflation higher than a competitor would constitute a valuable strategy in interimperialist competition only in the event of a sharp and simultaneous reduction of domestic consumption, that is, in the event of a radical modification of the division of the national income to the detriment of the workers and to the benefit of productive investment (largely guaranteed by internal resources). Such a situation does not prevail today in any of the major imperialist powers. Hence the timidity of the pump-priming measures, except in the United States, where the rate of inflation has been able to be reduced precisely because of the losses of purchasing power suffered by the working class.

Nevertheless, "timid pump-priming" still means "pump-priming." In view of the simultaneity of the pump-priming measures in all the big imperialist countries, it is not likely that the recession will continue to deepen through the rest of the year and into the beginning of next year. Logically, the moderate upturn that has already been manifested in Japan and the possibility of an upturn in the United States during coming months should allow us to predict that the downward trend of production, employment, and incomes will come to an end some time during the fourth quarter of 1975 or the first quarter of 1976.

The directors of economic policy in the imperialist countries—either through wishful thinking or through ignorance—are continuing to present things as though measures of monetary and credit expansion automatically entail an upturn of industrial production. They are, moreover, counting on the so-called technical effects of inventory fluctuation. After a phase of "destocking" (that is, of radical reduction of inventories), merchants and industrialists must at some point increase their inventories again, even if only to maintain their current levels of activity. This would entail an increase in orders, and therefore in employment, incomes, and production. Now during the first quarter of 1975, U.S. inventories were declining at an annual rate of \$18,000 million, whereas they had been increasing at the same rate during the preceding quarter. Thus, the theory runs, the new turn cannot be far off.

All neo-Keynesian reasoning of this type, as we have pointed out on several occasions,⁵ contains errors of manipulation of undifferentiated aggregates. The only definite conclusion that flows from a policy of vigorously stimulating demand by swelling the money supply is that it *will surely stop the fall in demand for consumer goods*. When the government distributes thousands of millions of extra dollars to consumers, it is difficult for the volume of current sales to go down.

Any other conclusion, however, remains to be demonstrated. It is not certain that sales will increase *in the same proportion* as the incomes of consumers, especially since fear of unemployment may lead some of the workers and petty bourgeoisie to immediately increase their savings in order to cushion an anticipated large reduction in incomes. In fact, the Shadow Open Market Committee foresees an increase in U.S. household savings from \$76,700

4. See the interesting polemic in this regard in *Business Week*, June 2, 1975.

5. See especially Chapter 14 of our book *Der Spätkapitalismus*, published in English in the *New Left Review*, No. 90, March-April 1975.

million in 1974 to \$80,000 million in 1975. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, March 29-30, 1975.) The growth of unemployment may also entail a more than proportional fall in buying on credit, for which an easing of credit terms may well be unable to compensate. Some of the increased money supply may thus swell bank deposits (or slow up their circulation) without increasing the volume of sales of commodities, and thus without stimulating an upturn of production.

Furthermore, the expansion of the money supply and of various subsidies to capitalist companies in no way entails an automatic upturn effect on productive investment. In order for the capitalists to make use of the expanded credit facilities placed at their disposal, they have to rely on an expansion of the market and a rise in the rate of profit. They do not increase production simply for the pleasure of doing so. They raise production in order to maintain or increase their profits. This requires above all that the increased production be sold, and moreover that it be sold under conditions that allow for reversing the fall in profits that characterizes every phase of recession.

Gross profits (before taxes) per share of all American companies dropped from an annual level of \$155,000 million during the third quarter of 1974 to an annual level of \$135,000 million during the fourth quarter of that year and to some \$100,000 million during the first quarter of 1975. For net profits (after taxes) the fall was from \$95,000 million to \$70,000 million, that is, more than 25%.

Net profit margins per transaction (total sales) declined continuously, dropping from 6% during the last quarter of 1973 to 5.8% at the beginning of 1974, to 5.5% during the third quarter of 1974, to 4.7% during the fourth quarter, and to 4.2% during the first quarter of 1975, according to the calculations of *Business Week*.

According to the statistical series of the Conference Board, these margins for nonfinancial corporations dropped from a level of 20-22% during the period 1959-66 to 12% during the 1970-71 recession, and then rose to about 15% during the period 1972-73, declining back to 11-12% at the beginning of 1975.

For Japan average gross profits for the 174 major corporations of the country fell by 35.5% during the fiscal year 1974-75, which ended on March 31, 1975, while net profits declined 20.9%. In the manufacturing industry profits fell 56%; the decline in the other sectors was only 19.3%. (*Japan Times*, May 4, 1975.)

But the reestablishment of the rate of profit is hardly automatic during a recession. It is thus perfectly possible that in spite of the more ample credit facilities, the fall in the discount rate, the reduction in interest rates, and the expansion of the money supply, the volume of credits to companies will continue to diminish, not because the supply of money-capital is diminishing, but rather because demand for this capital is lacking. In fact, on May 7, 1975, the total volume of bank credit to American companies (\$128,600 million) was lower than it was at the beginning of April (\$129,400 million), the beginning of March (\$129,700 million), or the beginning of January (\$132,800 million)—and this despite all the pump-priming measures that had already been taken.

Finally, account must be taken of the instances of contraction of exports. The policy of moderate pump-priming of the Helmut Schmidt cabinet in West Germany has failed up to now precisely because a modest upturn in sales on the domestic market has been more than counterbalanced by a decline in exports and especially in orders sold abroad, which fell 7.5% during the first quarter of 1975. Under these conditions, the upturn will be postponed until the combined effects of the upturn in domestic demand in several of the major imperialist countries (above all the United States, Japan, and West Germany) enable the regression of exports to be halted.

Although an upturn toward the end of 1975 or the beginning of 1976 remains the most likely prospect, bourgeois experts place this

upturn in the framework of two radically different *medium-term prospects*.

According to one group—which includes the editorial board of the British weekly the *Economist*—the scope of the recession implies a boom (more or less inflationary in any case) of an approximately equivalent compensating scope. Thus, in its issue of April 12, 1975, the *Economist* editors indicated that they expect a rapid expansion in the imperialist countries (at a rate of 5.5% a year or more) beginning with the end of 1976 and extending into 1977, an expansion that would increase the rate of inflation by 5-10% everywhere and would provoke a more serious economic recession in 1978 or 1979.

For the other group—which includes many bourgeois experts in the United States—it is not at all certain that the moderate upswing they are expecting toward the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976 will automatically turn into a boom. In fact, they fear, it could “collapse” beginning in the middle of next year, either because of the continuation of export reductions or because of a serious political or banking accident that would destroy “confidence” (a bank panic, a new war in the Middle East, a substantial new increase in the price of oil, a revolutionary crisis on the Iberian Peninsula, etc.), or because of a combination of all these factors.

The majority of the international bourgeoisie seem to have opted for the first of these two variants, as is clearly shown by the universal rise in the stock exchanges of all the major imperialist countries, a rise that has followed the sharp decline of 1974:

Stock Exchange Indices

City	Lowest Level in 1975	Level on May 20-21
New York	632.0	830.5
London	146.0	355.9
Tokyo	268.2	331.5
Paris	51.7	68.6
West Germany	573.5	688.5
Milan	86.0	97.4
Amsterdam	85.8	105.0
Toronto	159.4	186.1
Brussels	89.1	111.7
Stockholm	310.6	371.7

(Source: *Economist*, May 24, 1975.)

Obviously, this does not mean that this “bourgeois majority” may not be wrong, nor that the stock-market expectations—theoretically “correct” for, say, 1977—might not be belied by the famous “accident” in 1976.

As far as accidents are concerned, in the United States it is above all a bank panic that is feared. The publication of a book by Martin Mayer, a conservative observer, has made quite an impression on business circles in the United States.⁶ In the book Mayer describes the electronic techniques that facilitated the rapid upswing of “more aggressive” banking activity beginning in the early 1960s, which has been reflected above all in the massive utilization of short-term deposits to finance long-term loans and in an increasingly rapid expansion of the volume of credits, of which a growing mass of outstanding credits is of a dubious or speculative character.

Of course, the overall solvency of banks depends on the central bank, which in the United States is the Federal Reserve System. Mayer stresses the dilemma with which the central bank is confronted: It cannot refuse to grant banks enough credit to clean

6. Martin Mayer, *The Bankers*, Weybright & Talley, 1974.

up their own system of loans, because that sort of pressure would threaten to provoke a collapse and a bank panic. But without such pressure the private banks threaten not to correct their adventurist policy. And he concludes: "There are billions of dollars of potential loan losses in the system, and the clock ticks toward the moment of their detonation. The banking structure that is now building *can* collapse; the larger the regulatory apparatus permits it to grow, the more catastrophic the collapse will be."

There are some signs that the American banking system is returning to more conservative practices. But especially in the event of an upturn, pressure in the opposite direction will once again be exerted by companies.

Thus, of the two scenarios—the "pessimistic" one, which does not believe there will be a boom in 1977, and the "optimistic" one, which believes that there will be one—neither is confident about the future of the system beyond the "medium term." Those who expect an imminent "boom" see it as leading to an even more serious recession than the recession of 1974-75. Those who do not expect it foresee prolonged stagnation. In both cases, the very scope of the problem to resolve—Jacques Attali speaks of \$1 million million that must be injected into the international capitalist economy in the space of five years if the effects of the recession are to be halted in a lasting manner—will have obvious inflationary effects. And all observers admit that a new accelerated inflation could once again slow down growth in the medium term.

Evaluating the Long-term Effects

A judgment of the more long-term effects of the current recession must begin with an examination of the situation of the major industrial branches, the degree of excess capacity and overproduction in these branches, and the *particular cyclical motion* that is peculiar to them:

- **Automobiles:** This industry, together with the construction industry, was the real "detonator" of the current recession, just as it had been the central prop of the preceding phase of expansion, along with the construction and electrical appliance industries. The extent of the reduction of production in the auto industry varies between 25% and 35% for the major capitalist producing countries (except Japan, where the decline is 7%). Even the Brazilian automobile industry, whose production was still expanding at a rate of 17.5% in 1974 (while Argentine production was declining 10%), anticipates stagnation in 1975. (*Financial Times*, May 27, 1975.) Excess productive capacity on a world scale may be estimated on the order of 20-25% today. Under these conditions the continuation of an expansion of the type that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s seems excluded.⁷

- **Construction:** Together with the auto industry (and in some countries even more than the auto industry), this is the branch that has been hardest hit by the current recession, especially due to the effects of the policy of credit restrictions that was applied universally in 1973-74, which was compounded by a dizzying rise in the prices of materials and building lots (the effects of the speculation generated by inflation) and a decline in the household incomes available for this type of expense during a period of recession. In the United States the number of new construction starts has dropped by *nearly half*: from an annual level of 1,880,000 in February 1974 to 977,000 in February and March 1975 (with a slight increase, to 990,000, in April 1975). These figures should be compared with the record level that was reached toward the beginning of 1973: an annual rate of 2.5 million new construction starts. A new return to this level is improbable. At the most, optimists expect 1.6-1.7 million new construction starts in 1976.

In Japan and capitalist Europe, where the housing shortage is

7. See our article "Auto Industry: A Worldwide Crisis," *Inprecor*, No. 4, July 18, 1974 [*Intercontinental Press*, October 28, 1974, p. 1406].

more pronounced in some countries (like Britain, Italy, France, and Spain), the more long-term prospects could be better. But as soon as the upturn begins, accelerated inflation will inevitably exert pressure toward a rise in interest rates and a more restrictive credit policy, which makes a new "boom" in construction unlikely.

- **Electrical appliances:** Strongly linked to the construction industry, the electrical appliance industry has gone through a genuine depression, of the same scope as that of the automobile industry. In January 1975 sales in this branch in the United States were 39% lower than they had been in January 1974. For the whole of 1974 the decline had already been 13.4% in comparison with 1973. Manufacturers and merchants are more optimistic for the second half of 1975; they expect an overall 1975 sales decline only on the order of 4% as compared with 1974. But the downward revision of prospects for the construction industry probably makes these figures too optimistic.

It is difficult to judge the degree of long-term excess capacity in this sector, which is characterized by growing saturation of the market for "old" products, continuing technological innovation, and appreciable difficulties in "stimulating" new needs. Nevertheless, in view of its "link" to the construction industry, the electrical appliance industry will find it difficult to quickly regain its record levels of 1972 and 1973 on a world scale. A strong expansion of investment in this sector therefore seems improbable.

- **Textiles:** This industry has also been hit by the recession to a greater than average extent, although in a differentiated manner. The crisis of the textile industry is particularly severe in West Europe, Japan, and Brazil. For instance, it is reported that of 830,000 workers employed in this industry in Britain, 150,000 were on partial unemployment in mid-March; the figure could rise to 250,000 within several months.

In Brazil, where production of cloth and clothing in both natural and synthetic fibers had increased from 750,000 tons in 1970 to 1.1 million tons in 1974 (with an expansion of exports from 300,000 tons in 1970 to 500,000 tons in 1974), exports during the first quarter of 1975 fell by more than 50% compared with the level reached for the first quarter of 1974. Some 5% of the work force in the industry was laid off; investment was reduced by two-thirds. The two largest Japanese textile trusts ran at only 60% capacity during the first quarter of 1975. In this branch also, there can be no question of a long-term expansion of overall investment or of an increase in its share of world export (or production). Just the contrary, the industry's share of expenditures will tend to diminish, or in the best of cases will be stabilized. Investment will be primarily for purposes of rationalization, and the progress made in some countries will be primarily progress in substitution (compensated by declines in export or even production in other countries).

- **Petrochemicals:** In this industry, which is singularly affected by its "own cycle" (probably a four-year cycle), the transition from a situation of relative shortage (provoked above all by the speculative hoarding engendered by the rise in oil prices) to a situation of overproduction and collapse of prices was especially rapid in 1974. The price of polyester yarn fell from \$1.30 a pound to \$0.86 a pound. The restrictions on production and sales seem to have been strongest in January and February 1975. Since then, release of stocks has produced a certain upswing: The price of polyester yarn rose back to \$1.05 a pound. The capitalists of this branch are hoping for a real upturn during the second half of 1975. Nevertheless, the more long-term prospects remain uncertain. Several projects to construct new Japanese factories have been postponed or even canceled.

- **Chemicals in general:** Here we must differentiate among the various subsectors. The expansion of the pharmaceuticals industry is expected to continue, unless social and political upheavals take place. (The especially scandalous manner in which this industry profits from the social security systems in the

imperialist countries and the way it overcharges for its products in the semicolonial countries makes it particularly vulnerable to state interventions, which are demanded by working-class opinion, even reformist and "liberal," up to and including the demand for nationalization.) On the other hand, the chemical fertilizer industry, which one could have supposed would profit from a sustained worldwide effort to increase the yield of agricultural production, has fallen into a situation of potential excess capacity. Prices "exploded" during the 1973-74 period of shortage, practically doubling in the case of superphosphates and nitrates. Even though sales are continuing to rise—although at a slower rate (some 3-4% from July 1974 to July 1975 for the American industry)—trade prices are beginning to decline. The exceptional U.S. harvest will provoke a fall of agricultural prices and of incomes for farmers, which should reduce their fertilizer purchases in 1976. Also, this is an industry for which future demand, rapidly expanding in the semicolonial countries, will tend increasingly to be satisfied by new factories established in the oil-producing countries.

- **Steel:** The steel "boom" ended in the second half of 1974. The steel industry, like the petrochemicals industry and the textile industry, has experienced its own cycle during past decades, a cycle that does not entirely coincide with that of industry and employment taken as a whole. Orders for steel products in West Europe fell 33% during the first quarter of 1975 compared with the first quarter of 1974. In April 1975 steel production in the capitalist countries taken as a whole was down 9.8% compared with April 1974. The decline was 14.5% in the United States and Japan and 12.4% in the Common Market countries; but it was more than 30% in Belgium and Portugal. Prices fell 40-50%. Clearly, this was a consequence of the crises in the automobile, construction, and shipbuilding industries, which are big customers of the steel industry. In the longer run, the capitalists of this sector claim to be optimistic and are expecting a new expansion of demand, production, and investment, with a more than proportional expansion of new centers of production in the semicolonial countries.

- **Shipbuilding and aircraft construction:** These are branches that have been particularly hard hit by the current recession, for a combination of reasons. Predictions of a continuous expansion of oil sales had resulted in larger and larger orders being placed by

the oil giants. Then the fall in oil sales immobilized a part of the existing fleet (243 tankers with a total capacity of 13.5 million tons were idle as of mid-March), which entailed considerable losses for some firms (financial catastrophe for *Burmah Oil*). Massive reductions of orders followed. Generally speaking, the sudden halt in the growth of world trade has also weighed heavily on the volume of freight and therefore on the volume of current shipbuilding. From the beginning of the recession to mid-March 1975 construction orders were canceled for tankers with a total capacity of about 15 million tons, and orders are threatened for other ships with total capacity of about 4 million tons, which in all represents some 7% of current world shipbuilding. Japan, the United States, and the Scandinavian countries have been hardest hit. For their part, the airlines have been suffering growing deficits, which reduces the market for aircraft construction. It is true that there are always lucrative orders for military aircraft, but these orders are now provoking aggravated international competition, as is illustrated by the affair of the replacement of the Belgian, Dutch, and Danish Starfighters. Nevertheless, the firms of the American aerospace industry seem to be avoiding a recession by virtue of the increase in state orders (up 40% in two years).

- **Electronics:** A typical example of a branch that had been marked by virtually uninterrupted expansion during the two past decades, the electronics industry is now going through a phase of growing difficulties. A situation of pronounced excess capacity exists in the sector of transistors and semiconductors in general; in the United States this branch of the industry is working at only 50% capacity. A sales decline on the order of 17% is expected for 1975. This prediction is considered excessively optimistic by the major trust of the industry, Texas Industries, which anticipates a sales decline of 26%. In the realm of calculating machines, excess capacity has provoked a collapse of prices for small pocket and table models, and even in the computer sector the first price reductions have occurred. Phenomena of long-term saturation have begun to appear, combined with a general tendency toward investment decline determined by conjunctural conditions. The Japanese electronics industry, which specializes in consumer goods like television sets and small calculators, suffered a recession in 1974; a new reduction in production is expected for 1975. Phenomena of longer-term market saturation seem to be appearing, in spite of a rapid expansion of exports.

When pocket calculators were first introduced, Japan took the lion's share of the market. In 1973 it still produced 10 million units, as compared with 7 million units in the United States and Canada. In 1974 Japanese production amounted to 15.5 million units, as against 12 million units in the United States; for 1975 American production is expected to surpass Japanese production. The Japanese share of the European market fell from 80% in 1971-72 to 50% today. (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 14, 1975.)

- **Machine construction:** This is probably the only industry for which long-term expansion seems assured, especially because of growing orders from the semicolonial countries and the bureaucratized workers states. These orders are supposed to compensate for any long-term fall in investment in the imperialist countries themselves. While this perspective is generally accepted among experts, it must nevertheless be weighed against the general growth rate of the international capitalist economy that is anticipated for coming years. It is clear that if growth remains below current predictions, phenomena of excess capacity will coincide in a great number of sectors, and that could lead to a more than proportional fall in investment and orders for machinery, even though such a situation would incontestably stimulate certain types of rationalization investment and would lead to a more rapid elimination of companies working below the

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productivity levels of those companies that command advanced technology.

For the subsector of machine-tools precise figures are available. The major exporting and importing countries in 1974 were the following:

Machine-Tool Exports

	Millions
1. West Germany	\$1,980.0
2. United States	480.0
3. Switzerland	392.9
4. East Germany	392.0
5. Italy	302.6
6. Britain	251.0
7. France	250.8
8. Japan	230.0
9. Czechoslovakia	180.0
10. USSR	144.7

Machine-Tool Imports

	Millions
1. USSR	\$367.8
2. France	310.2
3. Poland	306.5
4. United States	258.0
5. East Germany	239.8
6. Italy	234.5
7. Britain	224.7
8. Japan	148.7
9. West Germany	100.0
Czechoslovakia	100.0

(The absence of China and Brazil from the list of importers seems unjustified.—E.M.)

The figures for overall production are also interesting:

Production of Machine-Tools

	Millions
1. West Germany	\$2,762.0
2. United States	2,100.0
3. USSR	1,824.0
4. Japan	1,533.0
5. Italy	756.4
6. France	591.8
7. Britain	537.8
8. East Germany	512.9
9. Switzerland	483.9
10. Poland	337.0

(The three tables appeared in the April 22, 1975, *Le Monde* and were reproduced in the *American Machinist*.)

Possibilities of Restructuring the World Economy

The question of the prospects for the major branches of production in the international capitalist economy is intimately linked to the question of the long-term restructuring of trade and the world economy itself. The economists who foresee a new international division of labor reason approximately in the following manner: From 1951 to 1971 the share of the semi-colonial countries in world trade fell from about 33% to about 17%. This had led to an accelerated reorientation of the international division of labor among the major imperialist countries, the rapid

expansion of the so-called multinational corporations being one of the sharpest expressions of this.

With the tripling and quadrupling of the price of oil, the share of the exporters of this raw material in world trade increased considerably. It went from 7% of world exports in 1973 to 14% in 1974. Even though the share of the other semicolonial countries declined slightly (from 12% in 1973 to 11% in 1974), the total share of the semicolonial countries in world exports nevertheless reached 25% in 1974.

Now, the enormous balance of trade surpluses of the oil-exporting countries—\$97,000 million in 1974—obviously stimulate industrialization activities and all sorts of investment in these countries. Thus, still according to these experts, a vast market is opened for the industries exporting machinery and equipment in the imperialist countries.

In fact, the accumulation of exchange reserves by the oil-exporting countries proceeded at a much slower rate than had been predicted by the panicky propaganda in 1973-74. This accumulation diminished first of all in the most populated countries and the ones most open to rapid industrialization: Iraq, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia among the Arab exporters and Iran, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela among the non-Arab exporters. But even in the exporting countries with the lowest population densities (primarily Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, and the Arab Emirates), internal and external investment projects have taken on such scope that the specter of the major part of world exchange reserves becoming concentrated in the hands of these countries rapidly evaporated.

As early as 1974 the balance of payments surpluses of the oil-exporting countries amounted to only \$50,000-55,000 million and not the \$60,000-80,000 million initially predicted. To this surplus corresponded a deficit among the imperialist countries of \$30,000-35,000 million, the remaining \$15,000-20,000 million of the worldwide deficit being distributed among the rest of the semicolonial countries and the bureaucratized workers states.

According to an estimate of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, the non-oil-exporting semicolonial countries showed balance of payments deficits of the following amounts in 1974 (in millions of dollars):

Brazil	7,000
Mexico	2,500
India	1,800
South Korea	1,800
Taiwan	1,200
Peru	850
Kenya	450
Chile	434
Turkey	400
Argentina	352
Philippines	290
Thailand	150
Zambia	100
Malaysia	100

In other words, of the total balance of trade surplus of the countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which was on the order of \$97,000 million, nearly half was placed in short-term or long-term investments abroad, where it was added to the "petrodollars" of 1973. The total of these petrodollars amounted to about \$60,000 million, and was divided in the following manner:

35.0	%	in European currency markets
15.0	%	in direct investments in Europe and Japan (including loans)

12.5	in bank deposits and state obligations in Britain
10.0	in state obligations in the United States
9.0	in loans to industrialized countries other than the United States and Britain
6.7	in bank deposits in the United States
6.0	in deposits and obligations to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc.
4.0	in loans to semicolonial countries
1.7	in direct investments in the United States (these investments, like those in Europe and Japan, include portfolio investments)

(Source: *Newsweek*, February 10, 1975.)

Paradoxically, it is precisely the expansion of the imports of the OPEC countries—that is, the reduction in their balance of trade surpluses—that is now threatening Britain's balance of payments, for massive withdrawals of the petrodollars deposited in London are involved. (*Economist*, May 17, 1975.) According to the latest OECD estimates, the overall balance of payments surplus of the OPEC countries could fall to \$40,000 million in 1975.

Studies published by the Brookings Institution and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, one of the largest American banks, reject the hypothesis of a fantastic accumulation of \$650,000 million in reserves in the hands of the member countries of the OPEC oil-exporting cartel. The peak figure of these reserves, these studies report, will be hit in 1978 (\$250,000 million, based on the assumption that the exchange rate of the dollar will remain more or less at its 1974 level); it will then gradually fall back toward \$179,000 million in 1980.

The calculations of the World Bank consider these estimates too low, and in any case postulate a strong accumulation of reserves in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the Arab Emirates, while the surpluses of the other members of OPEC could disappear completely.

Thus, all these estimates actually imply a twofold *distribution of resources, capital, productive capacity, and surplus value on a world scale*:

- *In the short and medium term*, a good part of the supplementary oil income will be used to import machinery, industrial and agricultural equipment of all kinds, and industrial consumer goods (and, to a lesser extent, raw materials and foodstuffs). This would involve a redistribution of capital and profits *within* the imperialist countries as much as and even more than a redistribution of surplus value between the imperialist bourgeoisie and the semicolonial bourgeoisie. The major beneficiaries of this redistribution apart from the semicolonial bourgeoisie would be the productive branches of machinery and all types of equipment. The essential losers, on the basis of the branch-by-branch analysis above, would be the automobile and electrical appliance industries, certain branches of the electronics industry, and the textile industry.

- *In the medium and long term*, the massive import of machinery and equipment by the members of OPEC would involve the creation of supplementary capacity for industrial production, especially in petrochemicals, fertilizers, oil refineries, and steel, a potential that would substitute for the capacity rendered excessive in the imperialist countries. There would be a shift in industrial activity within the imperialist countries, especially toward the branches of equipment manufacture and nuclear and other power sources, and, in part, toward services.

There are acceptable elements in this analysis. It seems obvious that the enormous concentration of money-capital in the hands of the owning classes of the members of OPEC and their governments could not but touch off a process of investment on a grand scale, domestically and abroad.⁸ These investments necessarily

lead to a beginning of industrialization, even if associated with imperialist capital through joint ventures.⁹

The international press continues to offer much information about these ongoing projects. The May 26, 1975, issue of the American magazine *Business Week* mentions notably the construction of a \$280 million petrochemical factory for synthetic fibers in Iran in association with American capital (Du Pont de Nemours); the construction of a steel factory in Ahvaz and of two brick-making factories in Asfahan in association with the German trust Thyssen; the construction of an oil refinery jointly with Thyssen and the Fluor Corporation of Los Angeles in Abadan; the construction of the new industrial city of el-Jubail in Saudi Arabia, where establishment of a big refinery and several chemical complexes is planned; the project of an enormous chemical fertilizer complex worth \$800 million in Iraq. Many other studies confirming the same tendency could be cited.

Likewise, it seems incontestable that exports of machinery, equipment goods, and entire factories will occupy an increasingly important position in world trade in the future. In its May 16, 1975, issue the *Far Eastern Economic Review* published a study on this branch of Japanese industry, whose exports rose from \$1,500 million in 1972 to \$3,000 million in 1974. It is considered the most expansive and dynamic sector of the economy and merits special protection from the government.

Finally, the increased importance of the OPEC countries and of the bureaucratized workers states as outlets for the imperialist countries also seems certain, even though their share of the total exports of these countries will remain modest. For West Germany and Japan, this increased share has already been indicated in current statistics. It is interesting to note that French exports to Algeria increased two and a half times in the space of two years, rising from 2,380 million francs in 1972 to 6,200 million francs in 1974.

Nevertheless, the projections outlined above suffer from two important imprecisions:

- The dynamic of oil sales and prices, which determines the import capacity of the OPEC countries, remains extremely fluid. It is already clear that a part of the gains that the owning classes of these countries made from the tripled or quadrupled price of oil has been wiped out by the rise in prices for their imports and by the devaluation of the dollar and the pound sterling (which is relevant for the portion of income held in liquid or semiliquid form). By demanding that the price of oil be indexed to the prices of manufactured products or that oil prices be expressed in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the member countries of OPEC are trying to escape this infernal logic of the international economy, which continues to be dominated by imperialism. But SDRs are only money of account, and payments can be made only in exchangeable currency, and not in "paper-gold." Any new and pronounced increase in the price of oil thus threatens to touch off compensatory processes (even more pronounced declines in exchange rates for the dollar and the pound sterling; even sharper reduction of consumption of the oil exported by OPEC; more accelerated development of alternative energy sources) that would neutralize the advantages in the medium and long term.

- The average growth of the international capitalist economy as a whole is not at all an "external" element in all these suppositions; rather, it constitutes a constraining framework. The appearance of new productive capacities for petrochemicals and steel in the OPEC countries will have diametrically opposite effects on the international conjuncture, according to whether one

article "An Arab and Iranian Finance Capital Emerges," *Inprecor*, No. 10, October 17, 1974 [*Intercontinental Press*, November 4, 1974, p. 1437].

9. The reasons why the monopolies that dominate today in the imperialist countries favor a (limited) beginning in industrializing the semicolonial countries have been outlined in our *Marxist Economic Theory*, end of chapter 13.

8. On investments abroad by the countries of OPEC, see especially our

assumes that there will be an average growth of 4-5% of the capitalist economy or whether one supposes on the contrary that the average rate will fall toward 2% or even lower in the medium term.

In the first case, the development of increased productive capacity in the OPEC countries would cause only minor perturbations in the economies of the imperialist countries, changes that could be "reabsorbed" by a redistribution of capital and the work force. In the second case (which is more likely, in our view), it would provoke major perturbations—relatively high structural unemployment and relative stagnation of internal consumption in these countries—which would in turn exert a depressive influence on all international capitalist activity, including the profitability and expansion of new sectors of heavy industry in the semicolonial countries.

Basic Causes of the Recession Not Eliminated

The generalized recession of 1974-75 is not the product of chance or of any "freak accident" of the international capitalist economy. It results from all the basic contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, which gradually rose to the surface after having been partially contained, thanks to inflation, for two decades of accelerated growth (two and a half decades in the United States).

In order to find out whether the current recession will be followed by a new prolonged phase of accelerated growth or whether, on the contrary, it marks the inversion of the long-term economic tendency, one must examine the repercussions of the recession on the major factors that influence the *long-term evolution of the rate of profit in the imperialist countries*.

1. A new decline in raw materials prices seems extremely improbable in coming years. Particularly in the realm of energy, the *common* interest of imperialist capital (with the possible exception of Japan and some minor countries) and the bourgeoisies in the semicolonial countries is to *prevent* the price of the oil exported by the OPEC countries from *falling below a certain level*. Any excessive price decline would render alternative energy sources uncompetitive (North Sea oil; shale and bituminous sand in the United States; Alaskan oil; nuclear energy), and the enormous capital investment needed to develop these sources would either be lost or would produce an insufficient return. Likewise, the fall of raw materials prices, even if it continued (which is not certain in the event of an industrial upturn), will not bring these prices back to the levels they were at before the 1972-73 boom.

2. The effects the third technological revolution had had in reducing the value of the elements of fixed capital—which meant that in spite of the expansion of semiautomation, the organic composition of capital rose much less rapidly during the period 1945-67 than could have been supposed at first glance—seem to be dying down in the long run. In fact, the rate of increase of the productivity of labor will slow down, as much in Department I as in Department II,¹⁰ which will entail both a progressive increase in the value of the increased mass of machinery put to work by industrial capital and a slowdown in the growth of relative surplus value (a growth that had been another striking characteristic of the third technological revolution).

3. The 1974-75 recession did not act—and, in an atmosphere of inflationary "reflating," could not have acted—to detonate a massive devaluation of capital, which is the role a crisis of

overproduction normally plays in improving the conditions of capital realization—that is, in permitting a high average rate of profit in the short term. To be sure, there have been some spectacular bankruptcies and some mergers. But the important firms that reached the end of their rope financially were bailed out by massive state subsidies. The lifting of taxes on investment, another form of subsidy, was applied in practically all the imperialist countries. What occurred was therefore a redistribution of the mass of surplus value over a roughly equal mass of capital rather than a massive reduction of capital parallel to a slightly reduced mass of surplus value. Many of these problems are obviously masked by inflation. But a beneficial effect of the recession on the rate of profit through the massive devaluation and destruction of capital seems henceforth unlikely.

4. The increase of the rate of surplus value by the internal mechanisms of the process of production is a usual effect of any overproduction crisis and of unemployment. It is now occurring again. Unemployment and fear of unemployment are increasing "labor discipline," reducing absenteeism and other phenomena of fluctuation in the work force, thus permitting the acceleration of the work pace and the intensification of the labor process. All these measures of capitalist "rationalization," which are going on in branches like automobiles, steel, electrical construction, chemicals, etc., will involve an increase in the rate of exploitation, which will have a beneficial effect on the rate of profit.

Nevertheless, the combination of these four factors will scarcely be able to provoke a genuine "upturn" of profits, particularly if account is taken of a slowdown, rather than an acceleration, in the turnover of capital, a slowdown typical of periods of recession and rather slow upturn.

Under these conditions, the conclusion is one that we have stressed continually for several years: The possibility of a new period of accelerated growth of the type that occurred during the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s is in the final analysis linked to a radical increase in the rate of surplus value through a sharp compression of the mass of direct and indirect wages. Only such a modification could seriously relaunch the rate of profit and the rate of self-financed investment by the big monopolist trusts (that is, investments that are made without massive resort to inflation). And such a genuine upturn in profit is indispensable for generating a new era of capitalist "prosperity." (It is unnecessary to insist on the fact that in the framework of a socialized economy, self-managed and democratically planned, full employment and rational growth could be reestablished by mechanisms other than those of the law of value.)

Now, if an initial balance sheet is drawn up on the effects of the generalized recession on the reciprocal relationship of forces between capital and labor in all the imperialist countries, it is clear that these relationships have in no way deteriorated to the point that the immediate possibility of inflicting a crushing defeat on the working class can be envisaged—and that is the only development capable of having an effect on the rate of surplus value comparable to the effect of the victory of fascism, the Second World War, or the cold war of the 1950s.

To be sure, the West German and Japanese working classes have both accepted nominal wage increases this year that are inferior to their real losses of purchasing power consequent to inflation. The deterioration of the conditions of the "labor market" in these countries has thus had repercussions on the division of the national income, not for automatic or mechanical reasons, but because of the class-collaborationist attitude of the trade-union bureaucracies and because of the degree of control these bureaucracies still exercise over the toiling masses.

But these are only marginal modifications in the division of the national income, modifications that can in any case be neutralized by a new outbreak of workers combativity, which will surely not be long in coming, on a greater or lesser scale depending on the country concerned.

10. "Department I: branches of capitalist production producing means of production (raw materials, energy, machinery and tools, buildings). Department II: branches of capitalist production producing means of consumption (consumer goods), which reconstitute the labour-force and contribute to the livelihood of the capitalists and their dependents." Ernest Mandel, "The Industrial Cycle in Late Capitalism," *New Left Review*, March-April 1975.—IP

On the other hand, the working classes of countries like Spain, Italy, Britain, France, Belgium, Australia, and Denmark are continuing to sharply defend all the gains they made during the previous period of expansion. Up to now they have succeeded in refusing to bear the costs of the recession. There is no sign that this situation is changing.

As for North America, while the workers of Québec are manifesting such a high level of combativity that the government has been led to propose the toughest antiunion and antistrike laws seen in several decades in that supposed bourgeois-parliamentary democracy, there are now certain signs of an awakening—slow, of course, but real nevertheless—among some sectors of the working class of the United States.

Under these conditions it is clear that a struggle for a substantial rise in the rate of surplus value—the sort of struggle that has marked the 1970s and will continue to mark the rest of the 1970s and the 1980s, just as it marked the 1920s and 1930s in

Europe—has only just begun. Increasingly tough tests of strength between capital and labor will occur in many imperialist countries. Prerevolutionary and revolutionary situations will arise in several of these countries.

The capitalist world will not be able to pass from its present phase of general social crisis and generalized economic recession to a new phase of lasting and prolonged expansion except by first inflicting a crushing defeat on the working class and by inflicting disasters in the form of appalling famines, new bloody dictatorships, and new murderous wars on all humanity. To grasp the current crisis of the imperialist system as the point of departure for an assault on the power of capital is not only to take advantage of an exceptionally favorable opening for the international extension of the socialist revolution, but is also and above all to work to spare the human race a new era of free fall toward barbarism.

June 1, 1975

'Portuguese Imperialism Robbed Us of Our Riches'

Massive Rally Celebrates Independence in Mozambique

On June 25 tens of thousands of Mozambicans celebrated the winning of independence after 470 years of Portuguese colonial rule. The ceremony, held in the Lourenço Marques football stadium, was described as jubilant.

Two days earlier a massive demonstration greeted Samora Machel, Mozambique's new president, when he arrived in Lourenço Marques from the interior of the country. Machel is head of Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique—Mozambique Liberation Front), which led the ten-year war of independence.

In his message to the nation following the independence celebration, Machel denounced the centuries-long rule by Portugal. "Portuguese imperialism and colonialism robbed us of our riches," he stated. "International concessionaries made fabulous fortunes while the people starved."

Machel also charged the Catholic church with "contributing strongly toward the oppression of the people."

The legacy of colonial oppression is reflected in Mozambique's illiteracy rate of 85 percent. The country has only about 100 doctors for its population of 9 million, and 70 of these serve the European settlements in Lourenço Marques and Beira. European farmers, who make up only 1 percent of the farming population, own 50 percent of the land under cultivation.

Machel said that the People's Republic of Mozambique (the country's new name) would become the "first truly Marxist state in Africa." The program of changes he outlined, however, does not call for any fundamental social transformation.

Private ownership of industry will be



FRELIMO LEADER SAMORA MACHEL

permitted unless it is thought to conflict with state interests. Machel made no mention of nationalization of industry. Foreign investment will be welcome. Mozambique is to be a one-party state, with Frelimo decreed to be "the vanguard of the revolution."

Machel made no mention of the new government's plans in regard to ending economic relations with the white-supremacist regimes in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa. More than 80 percent of Rhodesia's foreign trade is transported through ports in Mozambique. Before taking power, Frelimo had pledged

to carry out the United Nations-recommended economic sanctions against the Smith regime by cutting this lifeline to the sea.

South Africa also ships its goods through Mozambican ports. In addition, 100,000 Mozambicans work each year in South African mines. In all, more than 25 percent of Mozambique's foreign exchange comes from South Africa. According to a dispatch in the June 26 *Christian Science Monitor*, "various economic arrangements are already being made discreetly between the two countries, although formal diplomatic relations have lapsed." □

The Blood Business

Western companies, mainly American, are bleeding people to death in the semicolonial countries, according to the World Health Organization. WHO reported that companies trafficking in blood make huge profits, buying plasma for \$2 to \$4 a liter in semicolonial countries and selling it for at least ten times as much in the West.

In a May 16 report, WHO cited the example of a Filipino mother of eleven children who donated blood, sometimes several times a week, to keep her family alive. She finally died, having literally been bled to death.

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En Respuesta a los Cargos Stalinistas

Por Gerry Foley

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "In Reply to the Stalinist Charges in the 'República' Affair" que apareció en el número del 23 de junio de *Intercontinental Press*.

[La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Según los partidos comunistas francés y portugués, la disputa que causó el cierre del diario de Lisboa *República* el 20 de mayo fue tan sólo un conflicto laboral normal. El satélite ultraizquierdista del PC portugués, el Movimento da Esquerda Socialista (MES), dijo que la razón del cierre era "la lucha de los obreros de *República* contra la línea contrarrevolucionaria del periódico."

También ha habido informes de que algunos de los trabajadores gráficos que estuvieron en contra de la línea editorial del periódico pertenecen a la União Democrática do Povo (UDP) y a la antigua organización terrorista Liga da União e Acção Revolucionária (LUAR).

En un artículo del periódico del PS francés *l'Unité*, João Gomes, jefe de redacción de *República*, dijo que el cierre fue la culminación de una larga lucha entre las tendencias del PS y del PC en la redacción del periódico. Los stalinistas llevaron a cabo un "plan de sabotaje," dijo Gomes. La distribución del periódico fue bloqueada. Entonces, el director comercial, un simpatizante stalinista, afirmó que era la línea política de la publicación la responsable por el descenso de la circulación. Después de eso los trabajadores gráficos exigieron un cambio de línea. A esto le siguió el inicio de una lucha abierta entre los periodistas del PC y los del PS.

Durante esta batalla dieciocho periodistas, la mayoría miembros del PC, renunciaron. El 29 de abril los trabajadores impidieron la entrada de tres periodistas que habían sido empleados para remplazarlos. Un grupo de trabajadores gráficos propusieron publicar un ejemplar sin el equipo pero la proposición fue derrotada por la mayoría de los trabajadores.

"El director comercial anunció que se iba," escribió Gomes. "El mismo día [16 de mayo], el periódico publicó un documento que hizo detonar toda la presión que se había venido acumulando. Fue una lista de setenta personas, conocidos antifascistas, a los cuales el PC les estaba preparando su purga de la cadena de televisión.

"Este fue el pretexto para desatar el incidente. Los trabajadores demandaron la expulsión del editor, Raul Rêgo [miembro prominente del PS], e insistieron en que se quedara el director comercial, que es simpatizante del PC. Inmediatamente, en la mañana del 17 de mayo, el equipo editorial le dio a Rêgo un voto de confianza. El lunes los trabajadores imprimieron una edición 'pirata,' remplazando el nombre de Rêgo en la cabecera editorial por el del director comercial. El equipo editorial entonces decidió ocupar las oficinas del periódico. Las negociaciones continuaron durante la noche del lunes. A eso de las 5:00 de la mañana del martes, se pusieron sellos en la entrada, y una hora más tarde nos fuimos."

Esta versión plantea ciertas cuestiones. El 2 de mayo, el diario controlado por el PC, *Diário de Lisboa*, informó que debido a la oposición del sindicato de impresores a contratar periodistas, *República* no había aparecido ese día. El 3 de mayo *República* confirmó que esta historia se basaba en hechos. Sin embargo, la declaración decía que los trabajadores habían objetado porque pensaron que había habido consenso en la última asamblea general de los trabajadores de que se congelaría la contratación de empleados. La declaración negaba que los trabajadores objetaran a los periodistas o que fuera político lo que había estado en cuestión.

Sin embargo, no quedó claro si la declaración representaba el punto de vista de los editores o el de los trabajadores. Decía: "Los trabajadores de este periódico quieren aclarar este error e informar a nuestros lectores que la disputa que momentáneamente nos dividió tenía un carácter interno y no político, y que ahora hemos encontrado el camino que de seguro nos llevará a resolver las diferencias y a restaurar la unidad y la camaradería que son la fuente de la fuerza de este periódico."

La declaración rechazó específicamente las insinuaciones de los dirigentes del PS de que la publicación del periódico había sido impedida por las presiones del PC. Tales sospechas eran aceptadas generalmente por la prensa internacional, ya que el número del 2 de mayo hubiera sido el primero después de los incidentes entre el PC y el PS en el Estádio Primeiro de Maio, y *República* era el único diario en el que se esperaba que se expresara la dirección del PS. La mayoría de la prensa cotidiana o está controlada por el PC o tiene una fuerte influencia de

éste. El otro diario de Lisboa cercano al PS, *Jornal Novo*, tenía sólo un par de semanas que se había empezado a publicar en aquél entonces.

Según el número del 30 de mayo de *Combate Socialista*, periódico quincenal del Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT) de Portugal, la explicación que dieron los defensores de la acción de los trabajadores gráficos era que el periódico era "tendencioso," a lo que los trabajadores objetaban. Esta acusación, explicó el periódico socialista revolucionario, tenía obviamente malas intenciones, "ya que las juntas editoriales de otros periódicos también son tendenciosas."

Obviamente los eventos que causaron el cierre de *República* son complejos y según el tipo de acuerdo que ha hecho el PS con los militares, puede ser que éstos no se aclaren por algún tiempo.

Los Antecedentes de República

Sin embargo, la evidencia con respecto a los cargos políticos en contra de *República* se aclara bastante leyendo sus páginas. El periódico era un portavoz del PS y del grupo que le precedió. Esto era bien conocido desde antes de la caída del régimen salazarista. Inclusive, al igual que el mismo grupo socialista, el periódico tenía relaciones cercanas con la "vieja oposición republicana," que aunque había sido perseguida por el régimen salazarista, nunca fue liquidada o suprimida.

Este sector se unió al Partido Comunista en una serie de campañas electorales de oposición y en acciones de masas que empezaron desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. *República* al igual pudo sobrevivir y efectuar una actividad opositora mínima a pesar de las frecuentes victimizaciones que sufrió de la policía política.

Esto año, en el aniversario de la rendición nazi, por ejemplo, *República* pudo publicar el facsimile de la portada que había publicado en 1945 festejando la victoria aliada.

Por lo tanto, no es verdad en lo más mínimo el reportaje de "Daily World Combined Services," publicado en el número del 10 de junio del periódico stalinista norteamericano que informó:

"República tiene una historia interesante: fue fundada tres años antes del 25 de abril de 1974, cuando se derrocó al fascismo portugués y era el periódico de oposición 'simbólica' que permitía el antiguo régimen fascista."

En realidad, la censura de prensa se había aflojado en cierta medida antes de la caída del viejo régimen, y no sólo *República* estaba en la oposición, aunque era el periódico liberal más conocido. El derrocado dictador explicó su punto de vista sobre la situación de la prensa en su apología,

Depoimento, publicada en Brasil:

"En la tarde, el público tenía a su disposición el periódico socialista, *República*; otro de tendencia maoísta, *Diário de Lisboa*; y dos periódicos vespertinos, *Diário Popular* y *Capital*, en cuyas juntas editoriales, sobre todo en el caso del último, predominaban los comunistas o sus compañeros de camino."

El hecho era, y se hizo evidente poco después del 25 de abril de 1974, que al menos *Diário de Lisboa*, tenía bastante influencia del PC. Esto, parece ser, no era un secreto para Caetano, aunque lo malinterpretó. Inclusive no sólo se toleraban a los miembros del PC en ese periódico sino que un número de miembros del PC trabajaban en el mismo *República*.

La insinuación del *Daily World* de que había algo sospechoso en el hecho de que a *República* se le dejara publicar bajo el antiguo régimen no es otra cosa que un ejemplo más de las bien conocidas demagogía y calumnias stalinistas.

Al mismo tiempo que atribuye el cierre de *República* a una disputa laboral ordinaria, el *Daily World* planteó una serie de cargos políticos.

"Raul Rego, su editor, es miembro del Partido Socialista, y ha estado llenando las páginas del periódico con denuncias corrosivas, no sólo contra el PCP, sino también contra el Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas [MFA].

"República en realidad es propiedad de capitalistas burgueses y se publica supuestamente en base a la ganancia, a pesar de que su editor es socialista. Su circulación descendió considerablemente después de que atacó al MFA y al PCP, y los tipógrafos del periódico y otros trabajadores expresaron su preocupación al editor.

"Es importante señalar que las demandas de los trabajadores eran en primer lugar por la seguridad laboral y en segundo lugar en contra de la línea política del periódico que parecía estar poniendo en peligro sus empleos.

"Hay un total de cinco miembros del PCP en el periódico, aunque la prensa capitalista en los Estados Unidos dio la impresión de que todos los trabajadores de República son comunistas. Los trabajadores en su conjunto se rehusaron a imprimir el periódico, que no ha aparecido desde el 18 de mayo después de que el editor Rego quiso publicar un ataque virulento en contra del PCP y del MFA.

"En el Portugal nuevo, 'la libertad de opinión y expresión' se ha extendido al obrero ordinario, hecho que aparentemente ha indignado al editor Rego."

El PC norteamericano, superviviente seguidor de Moscú, eludió la cuestión del cierre de *República* hasta que el asunto parecía resuelto. En vista del carácter de este partido, el artículo del 10 de junio en su periódico probablemente refleja un tanto

fielmente las explicaciones que han dado al público el PCP y Moscú.

En Problemas Financieros

No hay razón para creer que *República* es un periódico más capitalista que los otros diarios cuyos consejos editoriales están actualmente controlados o bastante influenciados por el PC. En realidad, sus editores afirman que la propiedad está más extendida que en los demás periódicos ya que muchos liberales individuales compraron las acciones del periódico para mantenerlo vivo durante el período salazarista.

Los problemas financieros de *República* probablemente pueden ser investigados en su historia. Cuando toda la prensa diaria se volvió de izquierda, *República* perdió su puesto histórico. Ciertamente tenía menos base material que *Diário de Lisboa*. Su sistema de distribución era obviamente débil, ya que era más difícil de encontrar que cualquier otro diario.

Técnicamente el periódico era pobre y permanecía pobre. Inclusive, debido a su asociación con los "viejos republicanos" y los intelectuales socialistas, se especializaba en ensayos elaboradamente escritos de tipo un tanto anticuado. Debido a su composición, su estilo y recursos editoriales, era más difícil de leer y tenía menos información noticiosa que *Diário de Lisboa*. No podía competir por un público amplio con el *Diário Popular* que tiene forma tabloide. Y los lectores intelectuales jóvenes son bastante bien atraídos por *A Capital*, que presenta la información más completa de todos los diarios de Lisboa.

La puesta en marcha de *Jornal Novo*, también debió haber reducido la circulación de *República*, ya que es un periódico mejor escrito y mejor producido que atrajo a los seguidores del PS. Inclusive, el cierre de *República* se dio poco después de la campaña electoral, durante la cual una proliferación de periódicos partidarios redujo las ventas de los periódicos regulares.

Sin embargo, ¿era razonable creer que se *República* cambiara su línea para reflejar más a la de los otros cinco periódicos de la tarde, su circulación hubiera crecido sobre todo en un clima de crisis económica general en que la industria del periódico se enfrenta a desventajas particulares? Difícilmente esto es posible. En realidad, la posibilidad más inmediata para rescatar al periódico de sus problemas financieros hubiera sido pedir más ayuda al PS, el partido político más grande del país. Sin embargo, esto es exactamente lo opuesto, desde todos los puntos de vista, de lo que querían los trabajadores gráficos que forzaron el cierre del periódico. Tampoco estos trabajadores plantearon la cuestión de la nacionalización o el apoyo estatal como los trabajadores en otras empresas en bancarota.

La cuestión era claramente de línea política. Y sobre los cargos políticos que los stalinistas plantean en contra de *República*, nosotros por supuesto no hemos visto el artículo que Rêgo "quería publicar," que pudo haber molestado a los trabajadores gráficos. En el último número, el del 17 de mayo, no parece haber nada que pudiera específicamente ofender al PC. En la portada hay un informe sobre el fin de la huelga de pescadores, una declaración de la Organización de Unidad Africana, un informe sobre las afirmaciones del maoísta MRPP (Movimiento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado) de que habían descubierto una red terrorista de fascistas y una declaración del ministro de información sobre su viaje a los Estados Unidos. Las páginas centrales informan sobre las fábricas que se habían "distinguido en la Batalla por la Producción." En la tercera página hay una reseña del desenmascaramiento de la CIA de Philip Agee.

En la página 9, hay un comunicado del secretario laboral del PS que continúa la polémica sobre la ola de huelgas que siguió a las elecciones. En la página 13 hay un sumario del comunicado del Consejo Administrativo de la Facultad de Derecho de Lisboa, una fortaleza del MRPP, atacando a la organización juvenil del PC. En la página 16 hay un comunicado de los trabajadores gráficos de la Sociedade Nacional de Tipografia en el que explican por qué se rehusaron a imprimir el libro *Radiografia Militar*.

Más adelante hay comunicados de varios grupos con respecto a una manifestación en apoyo al Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). No hay nada raro acerca de esto o "interesante" para usar los términos del *Daily World*. Uno de los acontecimientos más positivos después del derrocamiento del régimen de Caetano fue que los diarios empezaron a publicar los comunicados de los grupos políticos.

En el número del 16 de mayo hubo una serie de cosas que pudieron haber molestado al PC, al igual que a ciertos grupos maoístas. El artículo de la portada informaba al respecto del regreso de una delegación del PCP (Marxista Leninista) de China. Iba acompañado con la fotografía de E. Vilar, secretario general de la formación maoísta, estrechando manos con el Vice Primer Ministro Tsi Tem Kuei. La información fue bastante generosa. Sin embargo, se espera que una discusión entre los dirigentes maoístas portugueses y funcionarios chinos sobre las relaciones entre Pekín y Lisboa despierte interés general.

El PCP(ML) causa una enorme antipatía entre los otros grupos maoístas portugueses, que por lo general son ultraizquierdistas. Este no es un grupo ultraizquierdista sino centrista de derecha, similar a los grupos pro Pekín en Alemania y Escandinavia, tal

como el grupo que se autodenomina Partido Comunista Sueco. Los otros maoístas han atraído a la juventud radical, la pequeña burguesía pobre y al sentimiento antisindical entre algunos grupos de obreros, mientras que esta formación ha dirigido al sindicato de trabajadores químicos y ha mantenido una estrecha alianza con el PS.

El hecho de que aparentemente el PCP(ML) ha recibido el respaldo en Pekín de los dirigentes del PC chino fue un factor al cual el PS le hizo propaganda. En un artículo en *Jornal Novo*, por ejemplo, se afirmaba que Pekín estaba apoyando a Vilar porque sabía que el PS era la única alternativa viable al PC. Esto encajaba perfectamente bien con la estrategia del PS. El partido está ansioso de evitar ser identificado con los partidos social demócratas de Europa Occidental y ha tratado de poner énfasis en sus contactos con partidos comunistas "no dogmáticos" e "independientes," entre otros el PC español, el PC rumano, los PCs italiano y yugoslavo e, inclusive, el PC chino.

El artículo de *República* ponía énfasis en la declaración de Vilar sobre que las relaciones entre la República Popular China y Portugal dependían de que Lisboa permaneciera independiente de las "dos superpotencias," es decir, sin acercarse mucho a la Unión Soviética y sus aliados. Sin lugar a dudas la propaganda dada al PCP(ML) irritó al PC, pero no era un acontecimiento nuevo y no tenía gran importancia, ya que Pekín no ha mostrado un gran interés en Portugal.

Por otro lado, este reportaje se esperaba que desatará una reacción fuerte de los maoístas ultraizquierdistas, que han denunciado a Vilar como un impostor social demócrata que se esconde bajo la boina de combate del maoísmo.

Lo que de hecho fue más importante para el PC fue la historia sobre un documento que se le entregó al Conselho da Revolução (organismo dirigente del Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas y el gobierno real del país). El documento fue entregado por la célula del PC de la red de telecomunicaciones. Según informes, éste planteaba argumentos para purgar a setenta personas del equipo de la red de televisión. Algunos de los argumentos en apoyo a la demanda fueron citados.

Una persona fue descrita como un "homosexual latente y posiblemente activo." Muchos fueron acusados de ser sospechosos debido a supuestos amigos o relaciones. Uno fue denunciado como "el amante" de una persona sospechosa. Otro fue descrito como "gran admirador de los círculos taurinos, y participante activo en televisar corridas de toros."

Uno fue descrito como "retrasado mental." Otro fue acusado de ser un "racista burgués" y de tener hábitos personales que eran "más que sospechosos." Uno fue

condenado como un "tecnócrata reaccionario, una persona arrogante y ambiciosa que quería remodelar a la Televisión Portuguesa a imagen de BBC o de otras redes de televisión burguesas." La televisión portuguesa es de notoria mala calidad y ahora está totalmente dominada por el PC.

El documento, según informes, incluía declaraciones como la siguiente: "Camaleones del 25 de abril abundan en RTP, muchos de los cuales también son 'héroes' del 25 de abril [1974] porque estaban de guardia ese día. Invariablemente algunos de los más importantes de éstos usan emblemas del PS en la solapa."

Otro escrito que probablemente no le gustó al PC fue un comunicado de la asamblea general del sindicato de metalúrgicos que se publicó en la portada.

Se ha dado una lucha muy dura en el sindicato de metalúrgicos entre la Comissão de Unidade Operária, que incluye a activistas asociados con el MES pero que difieren tanto sociológica como políticamente de los centristas pequeño burgueses que dominan la organización, y la Comissão Directiva controlada por el PC. *República* publicó un comunicado del primer grupo, que decía:

"Durante la asamblea, la ilegítima Comissão Directiva propuso una semana laboral de 45 horas, ya que era necesario para 'reconstruir la economía nacional.' Carlos Carvalho llegó a decir que las plantas que trabajan 45 horas no deberían trabajar 40 horas sino que las que trabajan 40 horas deberían trabajar 45 horas a la semana.

"Varios camaradas respondieron defendiendo la semana de 40 horas, ya que lo que se está discutiendo es si vamos a elevar el nivel de la economía y el de las condiciones económicas de los trabajadores, en cuyo caso el primer paso sería terminar con el desempleo dándoles trabajo a aquéllos que viven en la pobreza, o si vamos a continuar haciendo sacrificios en beneficio de los patronos y los enormes salarios que reciben los administradores y los técnicos, para lograr esto se tendría que aumentar la semana laboral a 45 horas en las plantas donde se trabajan 40 horas."

El comunicado no sólo denunciaba a la Comissão Directiva sino también al PC y al gobierno.

"Enfrentados a una revuelta, la presidencia compuesta de miembros de la ilegítima Comissão Directiva y elementos de la federación, entre otros, decidieron llamar a la policía militar, que nunca había intervenido en reuniones de este tipo ni siquiera bajo el régimen fascista. Y nombraron a elementos pagados con nuestras cuotas . . . para formar piquetes y denunciar a los 'reaccionarios' que apoyan la semana de 40 horas. Notablemente estaban en estos grupos activistas del falso Partido Comunista, que funcionaron con la policía militar de una manera que nos recordó de la

policía de choque y la policía política. Gritaban MFA mientras que golpeaban a camaradas."

Quizá esto es a lo que se refieren las fuentes del *Daily World* cuando dicen "ataques al MFA."

Rivales para Ser los Favoritos

Por otro lado, algunos artículos en *República* de mayo acusaron a los dirigentes laborales del PC de promover huelgas en un intento de recuperar la imagen combativa del partido después de la derrota electoral. Esto fue parte de la polémica entre los dos partidos reformistas sobre quién es el "mejor aliado" del MFA. Pero una de las huelgas dirigida por un sindicato del PC fue la de los trabajadores gráficos. De esta forma un periodista de *República* describió la confrontación entre los huelguistas y los militares en el número del 7 de mayo:

"Dos Chaimites [carros blindados] avanzaron hacia una de las puertas del Ministerio del Trabajo. Lo que hizo a los manifestantes gritar: 'Los fascistas aún usan la fuerza' y '¡Los soldados son hijos del pueblo!'"

"Al mismo tiempo, grupos de trabajadores gráficos continuaron llegando desde la Praça de Londres y aumentó la multitud. Corearon estribillos tales como 'El MFA no está con el pueblo.'

"Alrededor de nosotros oímos gritos que mostraban la justeza de la lucha en contra de la arrogancia y discriminación de los patronos en grandes sectores de la industria de publicaciones. Un hombre de mediana edad le dijo a un soldado: 'La gente está aquí porque tiene que alimentar a sus hijos, ¡de la misma manera en que te alimentó tu padre!' Otro—un joven con lágrimas en la cara—le gritaba a un oficial en una Chaimite: '¡No eres un soldado profesional, camarada! Eres un obrero igual que nosotros. No les hagas caso. Hay gente que tiene hambre.'"

En este período, *República* le dio un lugar prominente a los ataques de los representantes del PS a la política del PC en varias áreas. Sin embargo, también publicó respuestas largas de personas y grupos que estaban bajo fuego. Por ejemplo, en el número del 15 de mayo, publicó una declaración larga de la dirección de la federación sindical nacional, la Intersindical.

El documento, que ocupó media página, empezaba así:

"Tanto *República* como *Expresso* analizaron la ola de huelgas de la semana pasada en artículos aparecidos el 10 de mayo. Estos artículos representaron una acción coordinada por estas fuentes noticiosas 'independientes,' que representan respectivamente al PS y al PPD [Partido Popular Democrático—principal formación burguesa] y reflejan una continuación de su campaña contra

la Intersindical. Para este propósito, *Expresso* y *República* han recurrido a mentiras para calumniar a la Intersindical.

"Así *República* afirma que 'en los conflictos laborales que se están dando en algunas plantas tales como Plessy, ITT, Siemens o Cabos Avila, la Intersindical, por medio de sus delegados, organizó varias acciones para presionar a las negociaciones que se estaban llevando a cabo con el ministro de trabajo sobre los despidos sin causa.'"

Más adelante dice: "*República* y *Expresso* deben clarificar en sus análisis si quieren estar del lado de la unidad obrera, de la cual la Intersindical es expresión auténtica, o aliarse con el ELP [Exército de Libertação Portuguesa—grupo terrorista de derecha formado en España] y los contrarrevolucionarios que quieren destruir la Intersindical."

Al llamado a las elecciones en los sindicatos se le opuso este argumento: ¿Están interesados los que están hablando de elecciones en los sindicatos, en democratizar la vida sindical? No, aquéllos que están llamando a las elecciones en los sindicatos ahora saben que el proletariado es la clase democrática por excelencia, la clase que utiliza la democracia como la base fundamental en que se funda su unidad de acción.

"¿Qué quiere esta gente, entonces? Básicamente quiere distraer a los obreros de las tareas urgentes para avanzar el proceso democrático, que es la batalla por la producción y el control de los obreros de la producción."

Los editores de *República* contestaron: "La Intersindical considera que es una calumnia decir que organizó acciones en las plantas para presionar en las negociaciones con el ministro del trabajo. . . . Ese fue el informe que nos llegó y lo publicamos, de la misma manera que le dimos a la Intersindical un espacio prominente para que lo negara, que tal parece considera una 'calumnia' decir que organizaron acciones para presionar en esas negociaciones."

Los editores no necesitaron comentar mucho sobre el estilo de argumentación de la Intersindical o sus antecedentes históricos. El dogmatismo stalinista era tan obvio como la cola de una rata saliendo de un hueco. Tampoco, obviamente, tenían nada que temer de este tipo de argumentos.

Un intercambio similar se llevó a cabo en el mismo número con los editores de *O Século*, periódico matutino que el PS ha acusado de distorsionar las noticias para acomodarlas a la línea del PC. *República* le dio espacio a los editores de *O Século* para que contestaran.

"Es totalmente falso que las 'altas esferas' de *O Século* estén dominadas por el PC. Por otro lado, si hay elementos del PC en estas 'altas esferas' (para usar el lenguaje pintoresco del comunicado del PS), esto no es razón para crítica, ya que los miembros del PCP tienen el mismo derecho como los

otros de pertenecer a las 'altas esferas' y seguramente no obtuvieron sus puestos por otros medios que no sean los legales o democráticos. Por lo tanto, debemos repudiar el oportunismo que este comunicado muestra al tratar de explotar un lamentable incidente [la distorsión de una declaración del PS] para impulsar la campaña de calumnias que la dirección del PS ha conducido en contra de los medios de información, en particular en contra de la prensa.

"Es también inaceptable que el PS use este incidente para hacer propaganda política. De hecho, nosotros no clasificaríamos a ningún partido como el partido obrero más grande. No hay estadísticas que prueben que el PS sea el partido obrero más grande. Lo que se probó es que fue el que consiguió la mayoría de los votos entre un electorado de seis millones de personas, de las cuales sólo la mitad tiene empleo, y de las cuales sólo el 33 por ciento (aproximadamente un millón) pertenece al proletariado."

Los editores que tratan de defender su objetividad no tendrían ningún interés en argumentar si el PS representa a la mayoría del proletariado. Los stalinistas de *O Século* fueron casi tan burdos como la dirección de la Intersindical. De nuevo los editores de *República* no tuvieron nada que temer de este tipo de argumentos.

Pero ¿qué hay al respecto de que Régo, que de hecho es un moderado social democrata en el mejor de los casos, llenó las páginas de *República* con un anticomunismo corrosivo? Seguramente él hubiera sido lo más "corrosivo" después del incidente del Primero de Mayo. He aquí lo que dijo en el número del 3 de mayo:

"La manifestación de ayer en el estadio . . . se dio después de elecciones genuinas y libres de acuerdo con el programa del MFA, y ahora que sabemos que la voluntad del pueblo está por la unidad, pero la unidad dentro de los principios democráticos del pluralismo y de la libertad para todos, inclusive para minorías. Ningún partido o grupo de partidos puede afirmar que representa a todos. . . . Es por eso que el Primero de Mayo después de las elecciones del 25 de abril no podía tener otro objetivo que la verdadera unidad portuguesa con respecto a la opinión de todos los portugueses.

"La unidad sólo puede darse en base al respeto a todas las corrientes de opinión de Portugal, sobre todo cuando éstas fueron claramente establecidas y definidas por las elecciones que se llevaron a cabo en el primer aniversario de la revolución."

De hecho, en el mes de mayo, los editores de *República* no tomaron ninguna posición sobre la política nacional que diferiera de la del MFA o de la del PC. Lo único que diferenciaba al periódico era que sus editoriales y sus artículos al igual que el énfasis

que les daban, generalmente reflejaban las actitudes de la dirección del PS.

El argumento de que el cierre de este periódico no afectó el derecho del PS a propagandizar sus puntos de vista, ya que *República* no era el órgano oficial del partido, es totalmente engañoso. Los periódicos oficiales tanto del PC como del PS son órganos semanales partidarios, que contienen principalmente declaraciones y discursos de los dirigentes. Ambos partidos presentan sus posiciones esencialmente por medio de la prensa cotidiana. Y es un hecho que en Lisboa tres diarios están sólidamente controlados por el PC. *República*, el único periódico bien establecido aliado con el PS, fue cerrado precisamente porque el conflicto entre los dos partidos iba en ascenso.

Si el PC y sus aliados tuvieran el interés de asegurarle a la base del Partido Socialista que sus derechos no están en peligro o estuvieran interesados en evitar que las protestas del PS sirvieran como "pretexto para movilizaciones derechistas," pudieron haber debilitado en un instante estas protestas llamando a una campaña para asegurar una prensa genuinamente democrática, empezando con la demanda de que el gobierno garantice a toda tendencia el acceso a la opinión pública, de menos en proporción al apoyo que tenga entre las masas. La verdad es que aunque sacó dos veces y media más votos que el PC, inclusive más votos en los distritos obreros, el PS ha sido dejado con muy poca representación en los medios de comunicación.

Por otro lado, la mejor forma para despertar temores en la base del PS fue lo que hicieron el PC y sus seguidores, impulsar una campaña de calumnias en contra del PS bajo el tema de que la revolución estaba en peligro y que todos los "progresistas" tenían que ponerse del lado de la barricada ocupado por los stalinistas y los militares. □

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La Revolución Portuguesa y sus Peligros

Por Ernest Mandel

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "The Portuguese Revolution and the Dangers That Threaten It" que apareció en el número del 23 de junio de *Intercontinental Press*.

[La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

Uno de los principales aspectos del proceso revolucionario que se ha desarrollado en Portugal desde la caída de la dictadura de Caetano es el avance y profundización continuos de ese proceso. Esto se muestra en clara contraposición a la mayoría de las revoluciones proletarias incipientes que hemos presenciado en Europa desde la Revolución Rusa. Tanto en la revolución alemana de 1918-1923 o en la revolución española de 1936-37, tomando sólo dos ejemplos, el punto culminante de la revolución parece ser alcanzado un par de semanas e inclusive unos cuantos días después de que empezó. La revolución después pierde terreno casi inmediatamente, y aunque ocurren nuevos ascensos y repercusiones, los logros culminantes iniciales nunca se recuperan de nuevo.

En Portugal lo opuesto ha ocurrido. Al principio el proceso empezó un tanto lento y moderado. Adquirió fuerza de una manera contradictoria y a veces confusa. Pero desde diciembre de 1974, y sobre todo desde marzo de 1975, el movimiento revolucionario de masas ha dado tremendos pasos hacia adelante, por lo general en respuesta a las provocaciones y ataques del enemigo de clase. Ha llegado al punto en que la cuestión de la lucha por el poder de la clase obrera está a la orden del día. Los resultados de las elecciones para la Asamblea Constituyente confirman esto de manera prejuiciada e indirecta. Los partidos que se reclaman de la clase obrera, y que plantean el objetivo de construir un Portugal socialista como una perspectiva inmediata y a corto plazo, obtuvieron casi el 60 por ciento del voto popular. Este es el porcentaje más alto que jamás se haya obtenido en Europa bajo el sufragio universal, fuera de las elecciones para la asamblea constituyente de Rusia que coincidió con la toma del poder por los soviets.

¿Un Primer Revés?

Sin embargo, desde principios de mayo de 1975, han empezado a multiplicarse los indicios de que el continuo avance del proceso revolucionario se está parando. Si queremos evitar interpretaciones impresionistas de este amenazante punto decisivo, tenemos que tratar de entenderlo como una función de las fuerzas políticas y sociales básicas que están en juego en el Portugal de hoy.

En primer lugar, la situación económica se ha deteriorado seriamente. Los capitalistas han reaccionado a las conquistas masivas de la clase obrera, que ponen en peligro las mismas bases de su sistema, con una huelga masiva de inversiones y una fuga de capital. Están sabotando la producción tal como lo hicieron durante la Revolución Rusa, como siempre lo hacen cuando los trabajadores les cuestionan su "derecho" de dirigir la producción y distribución en búsqueda de la ganancia y la acumulación del capital. Como resultado, el costo de vida se ha remontado enormemente. El desempleo se está extendiendo rápidamente. Todos los logros materiales que los trabajadores obtuvieron después de la caída de la dictadura están siendo barridos. Varios sectores de la clase obrera están aun en peores condiciones que bajo la dictadura. Esto no puede mas que tener un efecto desmoralizante en sectores del proletariado.

En segundo lugar, la poderosa unidad en la acción de las masas trabajadoras, que fue decisiva para derrotar los intentos putschistas del aspirante a bonaparte, Spínola (y los aspirantes a Pinochet escondidos detrás de él), está ahora bajo seria amenaza. Tanto en

los incidentes de la manifestación del Primero de Mayo en Lisboa como en los incidentes relacionados con el periódico *República*, grandes sectores de masas fueron contrapuestos. Una división que se profundiza rápidamente dentro de la clase obrera pondría en peligro todos los logros de la revolución, y abriría una brecha por la cual podría incorporarse una contraofensiva victoriosa de la reacción y la contrarrevolución.

En tercer lugar, el próximo paso hacia adelante no es claro para las masas del proletariado. El proceso revolucionario que se ha desarrollado hasta ahora tiene una lógica interna propia. Pasó de la conquista de demandas inmediatas materiales y democráticas y el fin a la guerra colonial a la purga de los más odiados representantes de la dictadura desde el aparato del Estado y las empresas hasta la nacionalización de los bancos, grupos financieros e industrias claves, y la extensión del control obrero. Ahora, sin embargo, este proceso espontáneo ha entrado en un callejón sin salida. Reina la confusión en cuanto lo que se debe de hacer ahora. ¿Será la "batalla por la producción," como proponen la mayoría de los dirigentes del MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas] y el Partido Comunista? ¿Será la "batalla por la libertad," como sugieren los social demócratas y sus aliados burgueses? ¿Será "la lucha contra la indisciplina y la anarquía," como casi todos los partidos políticos y oficiales pretenden? ¿Será la "lucha en contra del social fascismo," como sostienen los irresponsables maoístas? Confrontados con esta cacofonía de proposiciones conflictivas—que todas tienen poca simpatía entre las masas debido a la aterrante situación económica, y que tienen todos los indicios de que el proceso revolucionario de alguna manera va a parar—la confusión, desunión y desorden rápidamente podrían hacer retroceder al movimiento de masas.

El Contenido Real del Incidente de 'República'

Es a la luz de estos acontecimientos en que deben ser analizados y entendidos los incidentes ocurridos en el periódico *República*. Somos muy escépticos, es lo menos que podemos decir, que lo que realmente estaba involucrado en ese incidente era un intento serio de evitar que el PS tuviera su periódico propio, es decir, un intento serio de destruir la libertad de acción del partido político más grande del Portugal de hoy.

Si esto en realidad fue el caso, sólo dos interpretaciones serían posibles.

Ya sea uno tendría que asumir que en Portugal estamos en la víspera de una toma de poder de la burocracia soviética y sus satélites portugueses, es decir, en la víspera de un *golpe de Praga* como el de febrero de 1948. Esta fue la manera en que el dirigente social demócrata, el mismo Soares, y en particular toda la prensa burguesa tanto internacional como portuguesa, no sin el apoyo activo de los maoístas, interpretaron el incidente de *República*. Sin lugar a dudas, esto implicaría la tesis grotesca de que los oficiales burgueses de Portugal se han convertido en el instrumento de la burocracia soviética, debido a razones misteriosas de naturaleza esencialmente ideológicas (el "poder de atracción" de las ideas del Kremlin, sin límites, concluiría uno).

O tendríamos que asumir que en Portugal estamos en la víspera del establecimiento de una dictadura burguesa militar y sangrienta, que está dispuesta a aplastar al partido político más fuerte del país, cuando éste acaba de obtener el 38 por ciento del voto popular y capturado casi la mitad de los puestos de la Asamblea Constituyente. Aparte del hecho de que tal medida también

implicaría la eliminación del PC, y no es obvio porqué la dirección del PC apoyaría activamente (no sólo como resultado objetivo a largo plazo de su política, sino activamente) tal medida para su propia disolución, tal interpretación entra en conflicto con todo el análisis objetivo de la relación actual de fuerzas en Portugal.

El ejército está dividido, no sólo entre las fuerzas pro y anti MFA, y entre el ala pro y anti Spínola, sino también entre las diferentes fracciones contrincantes dentro del ala "prosocialista" del MFA. Los soldados han despertado políticamente y están activando, alejándose independientemente de la disciplina militar. Las corrientes políticas obreras están empezando a conquistar influencia dentro de un ala del mismo MFA. El movimiento de masas es poderoso y está en ascenso. Bajo tales circunstancias los capitalistas no están en posición de aplastar inmediatamente al proletariado. No tienen ni la fuerza ni el instrumento adecuado para hacerlo. Su objetivo inmediato no es estrangular a todas las libertades democráticas para las masas en general, ni hablar de su partido reformista más moderado que está totalmente a favor del colaboracionismo de clase. Su objetivo inmediato es dividir y confundir al movimiento de masas, para poder detener al proceso revolucionario a un nivel compatible con la sobrevivencia de las relaciones de producción capitalista, e iniciar una represión prudente contra los pequeños sectores aislados. Sólo después de que hayan logrado estos objetivos podrán—más rápido de lo que creen algunos optimistas, por supuesto—planear el tomar una contraofensiva más general para aplastar al potencial anticapitalista de la clase obrera portuguesa.

Cuando estudiamos lo que en realidad pasó en la imprenta de *República*, entendemos como estos incidentes encajan con los planes fundamentales del capital portugués e internacional. Contraria a la versión que ha diseminado la prensa burguesa sobre estos incidentes, la iniciativa no vino por parte del PC y mucho menos de los oficiales del MFA, sino de los trabajadores mismos de esa planta entre los cuales los seguidores del PC tan sólo son una minoría. Se estaban enfrentando al rápido declive de la circulación del periódico, y a grandes pérdidas financieras en la imprenta. Estaban bajo la amenaza de los despidos y la sobreproducción. Y reaccionaron exactamente de la misma manera en que los trabajadores han reaccionado en cientos de otras fábricas y oficinas en todo Portugal ante tales amenazas: quitando al gerente y demandando una nueva estructura administrativa bajo control obrero, no importando el esquema propuesto, que difiere de caso a caso.

¿Un Conflicto Entre Dos Principios?

Que estas motivaciones se interlazaron con todo tipo de intrigas políticas es obvio. Que los burócratas del PC intentaron utilizar la iniciativa obrera para poder dar un golpe contra sus rivales social demócratas y asociados, que les acababan de dar una tunda en las elecciones, esto es sin lugar a dudas. Que el grupo de izquierda más fuerte dentro de la imprenta, la maoísta UDP [União Democrática do Povo], trató de utilizar su influencia para evitarle publicidad a un grupo rival maoísta "apoyado críticamente" por el editor social demócrata, también esto jugó un papel. Que algunos dirigentes militares del MFA, confrontados con esta situación confusa, trataron de crear hostilidad en contra de los "partidos políticos contrincantes," que ha sido uno de sus principales temas de propaganda durante muchos meses, de la misma manera no se puede negar. Sin embargo el resultado de toda la intriga nunca se puso en duda. Toda la lógica de la *presión burguesa de clase, tanto nacional como internacionalmente, juega a favor de que el Partido Socialista recupere el periódico*. La dirección burguesa del MFA no puede hacer otra cosa más que ceder a esa presión. Los afectados serán los trabajadores de la imprenta de *República*.

Somos defensores firmes y principistas de la libertad de prensa. Estamos convencidos que esto debe ser un principio básico no sólo bajo la democracia burguesa sino también en un estado obrero. Estamos absolutamente a favor de que el Partido Socialista Portu-

gués tenga a su disposición un diario propio. Creemos que los trabajadores de la imprenta de *República* cometieron un serio error al crear la impresión de que lo que querían era desafiar ese derecho.

El control obrero no significa ni quiere significar que un pequeño sector de la clase obrera—los trabajadores gráficos de una planta, o inclusive los trabajadores gráficos de todo un país—tiene el derecho de decidir qué corrientes políticas deberían tener acceso a los medios de comunicación y qué corrientes no. En un estado obrero, esta decisión debería tomarse democráticamente en el congreso nacional de los consejos obreros, es decir, por la clase obrera en su conjunto. Y nosotros los trotskistas lucharemos en tal congreso por el derecho a tal acceso a los medios de comunicación para todas aquellas corrientes que, independientemente de su programa político e ideología, en la práctica respetan la constitución socialista y la legalidad socialista, es decir, no participan en acciones armadas contra el poder obrero.

Como aún no tenemos un estado obrero en Portugal, sino que aún es un estado burgués, con un gran poder concentrado en las manos de los oficiales, que, cualesquiera que sean sus divisiones políticas, están socialmente atados en su mayoría a la defensa del orden burgués, la defensa de la libertad de prensa del Partido Socialista como un partido de la clase obrera (aunque tenga una dirección reformista y colaboracionista de clase) es por lo tanto muy importante para nosotros.

Sin embargo, somos consistentes, y no parciales defensores de la libertad de prensa. No aceptamos ninguna limitación ni ningún monopolio al derecho de acceso a los medios de comunicación, ni monopolio para los dueños de las imprentas, ni para los poseedores de grandes sumas de dinero, ni para los partidos políticos. Libertad de prensa real y generalizada significa que todo grupo de trabajadores, inclusive los trabajadores gráficos de *República*, tienen el derecho de que sus posiciones se impriman, independientemente de que posean su "propia" imprenta o no. Si esto debe hacerse en un periódico especial, publicado precisamente con ese propósito, o si debe hacerse en las columnas de cada periódico individual, es una cuestión secundaria técnica.

Por último, debemos oponernos firmemente a cualquier intento de contraponer el principio correcto de la libertad de prensa al del no menos correcto principio del control obrero, en este sentido el control sobre las condiciones de vida y de trabajo de la clase obrera. El Partido Socialista tiene el derecho de tener su propio periódico. Pero no tiene el derecho de despedir a trabajadores gráficos, o de reducir sus salarios, o hacer sus condiciones de vida más duras, bajo el pretexto de que son "indisciplinados" y están en desacuerdo con la línea política de ese partido. Todas las imprentas deberían convertirse en propiedad colectiva con salarios y condiciones de trabajo garantizados nacionalmente entre el gobierno y el sindicato de trabajadores gráficos (mañana: entre el poder nacional obrero y los consejos de obreros gráficos, junto con el sindicato de los trabajadores gráficos). Sólo bajo condiciones en que todas las cuestiones de presión material, privilegios, amenazas de represalias y miedo de perder el empleo sean eliminadas de la esfera de expresar opiniones y de luchar por ellas, habrá libertad de prensa real, substancial, y no sólo formal y parcial para las masas trabajadoras. ¡Y esto es válido para los obreros gráficos también!

Así, lejos de haber una contradicción entre la libertad de prensa y el control obrero, los dos principios se complementan una vez que éstos son interpretados en la forma correcta que acabamos de delinear.

Las Consecuencias Potenciales del Incidente de 'República'

Las implicaciones ominosas del incidente de *República* están en otro lugar que en donde las han buscado la mayoría de los comentaristas. Podrían empezar un ataque organizado contra los muchos intentos de control obrero que han dominando el proceso revolucionario durante los últimos meses en Portugal.

Que la presión del capital portugués e internacional va en esa dirección es evidente. Se llaman a los capitalistas europeos a sacar de apuros a la economía portuguesa en su más grande crisis.

Están dispuestos a ayudar, siempre y cuando logren sacar el máximo de concesiones del gobierno portugués. Y la concesión número uno que quieren es que se restablezca la disciplina en las fábricas! De otra manera, han dicho, sería como echar dinero a un barril sin fondo.

Que un importante sector de la dirección del MFA quiere actuar en este mismo sentido no es menos obvio. "Restablecer la disciplina" ha sido una de sus principales consignas propagandistas desde hace bastante tiempo. Algunos de ellos creen que es particularmente inteligente disfrazar tal maniobra con una proposición de crear algún tipo de comités de fábrica, pero bajo control militar y dirigidos esencialmente para "incrementar la producción."

Que la burocracia del PC está dispuesta a acceder a esta demanda, aunque su "giro de izquierda" implica ahora cierta propaganda también a favor del control obrero, esto es posible por el hecho de que la línea de Cunhal de "promover la producción" lo ha atrapado en una posición en que le es muy difícil oponerse a la campaña burguesa por esta misma posición.

Un nuevo elemento en la situación es el giro de la dirección del PS en esta cuestión. Antes de las elecciones, Soares trató inteligentemente de aprovechar el creciente resentimiento de los trabajadores contra las prácticas burocráticas de la dirección del PC fingiendo apoyar la democracia y el control obrero a nivel de los talleres (por ejemplo, en sus carteles del 1 de Mayo). Mientras que el PC se oponía violentamente a las huelgas salvajes, el PS les dio apoyo ocasional y fue acusado por Cunhal de "oportunismo de izquierda." Durante la campaña electoral e inclusive el 1 de mayo de 1975, el PS tenía carteles a favor del "control obrero."

De hecho, la victoria electoral del PS expresó la combinación de dos fenómenos: Por un lado, los trabajadores menos radicalizados votaron por ese partido como el más conocido proponente del "socialismo" en forma general, de la misma manera que votaron por los mencheviques en Rusia inmediatamente después de la revolución de febrero de 1917. Por otro lado, sectores de obreros más radicalizados votaron por el PS debido a su disgusto con las prácticas rompedoras y burocráticas del PC.

Sin embargo, ahora la situación está cambiando. El PC está hablando acerca del "control obrero" y disminuyendo sus ataques a las iniciativas de los trabajadores combativos. Y son ahora los social demócratas los que demandan "un alto a la anarquía," y el "restablecimiento del orden," "el imperio de la ley," un "período de asimilación" para las nacionalizaciones (es decir, parar la extensión de la nacionalización de empresas) y otras consignas de claro contenido contrarrevolucionario. *Ahora están tratando de oponer el proceso de consolidación de las instituciones del Estado democrático burgués y de la ley burguesa al desarrollo de la revolución, centrando sus ataques contra las iniciativas de control obrero, bajo la máscara demagógica de "defensa de la libertad."* Todo esto podría llegar a ser los principales resultados objetivos del incidente de República. Es obviamente la principal amenaza para que continúe el progreso de la revolución portuguesa.

El Próximo Paso para la Revolución Portuguesa

Si analizamos este peligro; si entendemos las presiones objetivas sociales, económicas y políticas que apoyan a este peligro; entonces también podremos entender la contramedida esencial que los revolucionarios portugueses deben proponer hoy en día: *La elección democrática, en base a un frente único, de consejos de trabajadores, de campesinos y soldados en toda fábrica, vecindad, villa y cuartel, y su coordinación y centralización a escala local, regional y nacional en una Asamblea de Trabajadores.*

Tal contramedida sería una respuesta efectiva a todos los peligros que amenazan el avance de la revolución portuguesa.

Contra la incipiente catástrofe económica y el creciente sabotaje a la economía, un sistema de control obrero al azar en base a cada fábrica es cada vez más fútil. El momento ha llegado para formar un sistema generalizado de control obrero. Pero esto significa un sistema generalizado de consejos obreros en las fábricas,

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que no solamente pueda parar los despidos, detener la remoción de maquinaria o fondos, revelar la acumulación de materias primas y evitar que la producción actual sea acaparada, sino que también empiece a desarrollar un plan económico de emergencia para garantizar el empleo total y satisfacer las necesidades más imperiosas de las masas, tomando control sin compensación de toda la industria y administrándola en beneficio de los trabajadores y por los trabajadores mismos.

Contra el peligro de la división y el desorden dentro de la clase trabajadora, los acuerdos entre los principales dirigentes de los partidos de la clase obrera, aunque necesarios, son absolutamente insuficientes. Después de todo, aunque se insulten mucho Cunhal y Soares en público, no debemos nunca olvidar que han estado en el mismo gobierno de coalición con la burguesía por más de un año, y que han apoyado y votado juntos, leyes que prohíben y restringen el derecho a la huelga, que comparten igual responsabilidad por las peligrosas divisiones actuales dentro de la clase obrera. Para poder restablecer la total y entusiasta unidad en la acción de la clase obrera, es necesario garantizarles a los trabajadores social demócratas total libertad política para su partido, y un alto a las maniobras burocráticas en los sindicatos y en los medios de comunicación. De la misma manera es necesario garantizarles a los trabajadores comunistas y revolucionarios el avance total del proceso revolucionario yendo más allá de los límites de la democracia burguesa y de las relaciones capitalistas de producción. ¿Y qué organismos serían más apropiados para lograr estas garantías que los consejos de trabajadores democráticamente electos que serían de pies a cabeza órganos de frente único más claramente definidos que nunca antes en ningún país?

La Asamblea Constituyente ha sido impotente desde un principio, atada por el "pacto" entre los partidos políticos y el MFA. Los dirigentes del MFA afirman que quieren estos vínculos para avanzar el proceso revolucionario. Algunos inclusive dicen que quieren órganos directos de poder popular. Tomemos sus afirmaciones literalmente, y llamemos a la *elección democrática de consejos obreros que no están atados a ningún pacto preliminar con los militares, que sean totalmente soberanos.* Inclusive aquéllos que creen que destruir las ilusiones en el MFA entre las masas es una tarea importante de hoy en día tendrán que admitir que no hay mejor forma de alcanzar ese objetivo que agitar en estos momentos por consejos de trabajadores soberanos y democráticamente electos.

Todos aquéllos que temen el desarrollo de la revolución proletaria en Portugal hablan de "restablecer la disciplina," atacar a la "anarquía" y a la "democracia directa de base." No es posible ningún proceso revolucionario en un país capitalista sin la explosión de tal "anarquía," "indisciplina" y "democracia." Todas las revoluciones del siglo veinte nos han enseñado esta verdad básica. Lo que está haciendo peligrar a la revolución no es la "anarquía," sino la *represión contra las iniciativas directas de las masas.* Un sistema generalizado de consejos obreros sería la mejor protección de las masas contra tal represión, el mejor instrumento para consolidar y extender el control obrero, la mejor manera para vincular a los trabajadores con los soldados y marineros, para proteger y extender las formas de autoorganización democrática del ejército y la marina, que son los primeros objetivos de la represión si la burguesía quiere restaurar un instrumento efectivo de poder. Tales consejos también serían la mejor garantía para la acción común de los trabajadores y soldados en contra a cualquier intento de un nuevo *putsch* reaccionario, serían la estructura natural para el armamento de los trabajadores vinculados a los soldados y marineros democráticamente organizados.

La lucha por los comités democráticamente electos y centralizados de trabajadores, campesinos, inquilinos y soldados es hoy en día la campaña decisiva que puede cambiar de nuevo la situación en Portugal a favor de la revolución. Es la medida principal para restablecer la unidad en la acción de las masas trabajadoras, que fue la principal fuente de su fuerza en los últimos nueve meses.

Estamos convencidos que los camaradas de la LCI [Liga Comunista Internacionalista—grupo simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional] serán los iniciadores audaces de esa campaña y que permanecerán constantemente a la vanguardia de ésta. De esa

manera mostrarán que luchan de una forma principista tanto por los intereses inmediatos e históricos de la clase obrera, como por un avance victorioso hacia la revolución socialista en su país.

junio 5 de 1975

DOCUMENTS

Appeal From Ukrainian Women Political Prisoners

[The following document, signed by Ukrainian women political prisoners incarcerated in Mordovian Prison Camp, has recently made its way abroad. In a press release accompanying the document, the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners* reports that the letter was written on the occasion of International Women's Year.

[The signers of the letter have become the focus of defense work in several parts of the world. They were sentenced to terms in prison camps after being arrested and tried in 1972 and 1973 for their opposition to Russification in the Ukraine and for their activities in defense of other opponents of Russification who had previously been arrested.

[Iryna Stasiv was sentenced to six years in camp and three years exile from the Ukraine. Stefaniya Shabatura was sentenced to five years in camp and three years exile. Their crime was to have made official requests, along with other persons, to be present at the trial of Ukrainian dissident Valentyn Moroz in 1970.

[Nadia Svitlychna was sentenced to four years in camp, to be followed by an unspecified term of exile from the Ukraine, for possession of samvydav writings.

[Nina Strokata was sentenced to four years in a strict-regime camp for her "bourgeois-nationalist attitudes" and for having "fallen under the influence of her husband," the prominent Ukrainian dissident Svyatoslav Karavansky, who is also serving a prison term.

[Odarka Husyak, who was released shortly after the statement was written, is a Ukrainian who was sentenced to a twenty-five year term in 1950 for being a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. She was in Vladimir prison until 1969. (*Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 33.)

[Additional information on the cases of Shabatura, Stasiv, Svitlychna, and Strokata is available in the pamphlet *Women Political Prisoners in the USSR* recently published by the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners.]

* * *

*P.O. Box 142, New York, N.Y. 10003.

To the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights at the United Nations Organization:

1975, International Women's Year, began on December 12, 1974, in the camp for women political prisoners. For attempting to mark Human Rights Day, they punished not only us, but also our young children, depriving them of their sole annual meeting.

In reply we refused forcible, compulsory labor, thereby protesting against laws that permit the degradation of human dignity and the punishment of children for their mothers [views]. Torn from our native land without any justification, we are entirely prepared to endure all the trials to which we are condemned (deprivation of visits, the right to buy provisions, incarceration in a punishment isolator for a term of thirteen to twenty-one days, in a cell-like room from three to six months), so long as we can

preserve in ourselves a feeling of internal freedom.

In October 1974 one of the women political prisoners, Raissa Ivanova, a healthy person in all respects, was declared mentally ill and transferred to the psychiatric hospital of the third corrective labor colony of Mordovian Camp No. 385 solely on the grounds that she did not renounce her convictions. At the beginning of this year, the same fate befell Vycheslav Menkushev, a political prisoner of the nineteenth corrective labor colony.

We beg representatives of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights to come here to meet us personally.

Iryna Stasiv
Stefaniya Shabatura
Nadia Svitlychna
Nina Strokata
Odarka Husyak

February 15, 1975

Special Offer



Larissa Daniel, anti-Stalinist dissident.

To help celebrate the tenth anniversary of *Intercontinental Press*, reproductions of sketches by Copain, artist for *Intercontinental Press*, were published by the New York Local of the Socialist Workers party and bound in an 8.5" x 11" book. The aim was to use the money gained from sales to help us begin publishing articles in Spanish.

The drawings, of various sizes, include portraits of Hugo Blanco, Malcolm X, James P. Cannon, Che Guevara, Cesar Chavez, Leon Trotsky, and many more, some of which are suitable for framing.

A limited number of copies of this collection of drawings are now available for only \$5.

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