

# Intercontinental Press

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Portuguese troops outside offices of Socialist newspaper "República," shut down by Armed Forces Movement with support and encouragement from Communist party. In June 21 state-

Informations Ouvrières  
ment, military junta announced projected laws that will permit "quick and decisive action" against journalists who "intentionally distort the news" and present a "damaging picture" of Portugal.

## The 'Republica' Affair:

- *What They Said in Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, Havana*
- *Sharpening Struggle Over Democracy in Portugal*

## The Pentagon Plans for Doomsday

Fresh from its debacle in Indochina, the Pentagon is gearing up for a new war of a far deadlier sort.

"Air Force bomber crews have been ordered to start training for fighting a limited nuclear war," a June 14 *Washington Post* dispatch reported. The armed forces will be prepared "for a small nuclear war, where destruction might be controlled, as well as for a war of massive incineration."

A first target has already been selected. "In the backrooms of the Pentagon," columnist Jack Anderson reported June 20, Pentagon chief James Schlesinger "has suggested striking North Korean targets with tactical nuclear weapons if the Communist forces attempt to cross the 38th Parallel."

Anderson said Schlesinger is urging readying of nuclear weapons "as the best defense against future Koreas and Vietnams."

The kind of war Schlesinger is proposing would be anything but "limited." It would certainly be more destructive than anything seen since World War II. In Vietnam, for instance, the Pentagon never got to test "controlled" nuclear destruction.\* They had to be content with techniques like carpet bombing.

And what happens when those being bombed, or their allies, retaliate? How "limited" would the nuclear attack have to be in order to avoid that?

Rather than "limiting" the arms race, the

\*Jack Anderson reports, however, that he has "established that some U.S. planes actually flew combat missions with tactical nuclear weapons. Competent sources told us that in the mid-1960s an F-102 pilot fired a nuclear missile by accident against some North Vietnamese gunboats in Haiphong Bay."

### Next Week . . .

- "Is Angola Headed for Civil War?"

First of a three-part series by Ernest Harsch tracing the roots of the fratricidal struggle in Angola today. Part I: "Origin of MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA."

- "Will the Big Slump Continue?"

Ernest Mandel examines the prospects for the international capitalist economy. Gloomy reading for Wall Street.

Pentagon is heating it up. The latest addition to its arsenal, reported to be in an "advanced state of development," is a highly publicized strategic nuclear missile that can fly at low altitudes for up to 1,500 miles and deliver a thermonuclear warhead with great precision.

Parallel with these dangerous developments, Pentagon propagandists are mounting a campaign to condition the public to the idea that nuclear war is feasible. The June 23 *Wall Street Journal* gave front-page billing to news that Pentagon strategists are drawing up plans for evacuation of American cities in the event of a confrontation between Washington and Moscow.

In Washington, it's called "thinking the unthinkable." But the objective is to make nuclear war appear "fightable."

The senators got into the act in early June with their self-styled "great debate" on U.S. foreign policy. They met long enough to put on record such facts as that the current U.S. nuclear stockpile is equivalent to 655,000 bombs of the type that devastated Hiroshima. Then they voted to

fatten the Pentagon's war chest by another \$25 billion.

The threats of "limited" nuclear war have several purposes. They are a reminder to Moscow, Peking, and their allies that Washington is prepared to employ all the destructive force at its disposal in defense of imperialist interests, wherever it deems they are threatened.

They are designed to bolster shaky allies like South Korean dictator Park Chung Hee.

And Schlesinger's nuclear-bomb rattling is also designed to build up pressure on Congress to vote still higher war appropriations—already at their highest level in history.

The Pentagon madmen must be taken at their word. They have drawn their "lesson" from the defeat in Indochina. Next time, they are saying, they won't monkey around with "conventional" warfare. Nuclear weapons will be at the top of their list of "retaliatory" measures.

In Korea twenty-five years ago, in Vietnam more recently, Washington came very close to using the bomb. Its hand was stayed by two main factors: the Soviet capacity to retaliate in kind, and fear of the reaction from the American people.

The use of the ultimate weapon of mass destruction will continue to be the stock response of the Dr. Strangeloves in Washington until they are disarmed—or until they have blown us all up in a "limited" nuclear war. □

## Free the Political Prisoners in Portugal

In a June 15 speech, General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho told a group of military men that one of the biggest problems of the Portuguese revolution was that just putting somebody like Arnaldo Matos in jail caused a "tremendous scandal." He was referring to the secretary of the Maoist Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (MRPP—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party).

On May 29, Carvalho's Copcon military security forces raided MRPP headquarters, jailing hundreds of members of this group. When the Maoist lawyers charged later that their clients were tortured, he did not deny that the prisoners may have been beaten by guards.

In the period since the arrests, demonstrations at the prison have been forcibly dispersed by Carvalho's troops as well as by other security forces.

The truth is just the opposite of what was alleged by the demagogic general on June 15. It is precisely because of mass protests and outcry against attempts at political

repression that the revolutionary process has been able to go forward and the Portuguese workers have gained confidence to demand their rights.

Unfortunately, the danger now is that there will not be enough of a "scandal" made about these jailings. The Maoists are very isolated. The group is quite sectarian, and in typical sectarian fashion has resorted to more and more provocative language in an attempt to impress an increasingly indifferent and hostile public. Moreover, following Peking's lead, it has made tactical alliances with rightists against the Communist party.

These arrests also came at a time when most groups to the left of the CP were trying to outshout each other in support for the military, mistaking its repressive moves for "revolutionary determination."

In this case, as in others, the left centrist Movimento da Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left) offered a clear expression of ultraleft opportunism. In the June 11 issue of its paper *Esquerda Socialista*, it said: "For a year the MRPP

has been stepping up its efforts to 'achieve' the repression that gives it a pretext for its periodic demonstrations 'against the military dictatorship' and 'for the release of the imprisoned antifascists.' Now it has been abundantly rewarded. It has 300 reasons to celebrate.

"The only unfortunate thing is that the MFA, which is so determined when it comes to 'rectifying' the Maoist Reorganizers, does not show the same decisiveness with the reactionaries in Angola, the Azores, Bragança (and tomorrow who knows where else) that really endanger the revolutionary process."

Nor have the other Maoist groups been quick to come to the aid of their cothinkers. The most widely circulated Maoist paper in the United States, for example, the *Guardian*, has barely noted the case. Its old Stalinist correspondent in Lisbon, Wilfred Burchett, is too dizzy from the MFA's "success."

Those Maoist groups not seeking a place on the MFA's bandwagon are generally too sectarian to show any solidarity. As for Peking, it is interested only in whether Moscow strengthens its international position through an alliance with the Lisbon regime. It is not going to risk antagonizing the military just to defend a few thousand young activists who swear by the "Helmsman."

Almost alone, the Portuguese Socialist party youth organization, Juventude Socialista, has taken a principled stand against the MRPP arrests, and opened a campaign that deserves the support of all defenders of democratic rights in Portugal and internationally.

In a May 29 communiqué, it said:

"Today the target of these arrests is the MRPP. Who knows who will follow tomorrow? The Juventude Socialista expresses its concern strongly about the possibility of an organization being eliminated from the Portuguese political scene solely on the basis of an allegation that it kidnapped three persons.\* This action by Copcon does not defend the revolution. It only harms it, because a climate of physical and psychological insecurity can only benefit reaction."

\*An incident in an MRPP operation to expose rightist terrorists. It was confirmed that some of the Maoists' claims were true, but aspects remain unclear.

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## Sharpening Struggle Over Democracy

By Gerry Foley

On June 21, the Conselho da Revolução, the leading body of the Armed Forces Movement and the real government of Portugal, formally issued a statement of position that was favorably received in the authoritative capitalist press.

"The document brought some relief to those in Portugal and other Western countries who have been worried by a trend here toward a 'people's democracy' of the Eastern European type," Henry Giniger wrote from Lisbon in a June 21 dispatch to the *New York Times*.

The statement also apparently reassured the figure who has been portrayed in the capitalist press as the leader of the "democratic opposition to Communism."

Giniger continued: "Today there is more hope for parliamentary democracy than yesterday," said Mário Soares, the Socialist party leader, who has been at odds with the Communist party and with the armed forces at times. Mr. Soares said that the document was very explicit in rejecting dictatorship of the proletariat and people's democracy for Portugal."

The document also reaffirmed Lisbon's support for NATO. "Alliances and obligations already established will be respected, namely the participation of Portugal in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, so as not to prejudice the political-military equilibrium of Europe."

James Reston, a vice-president of the *New York Times*, writing from Lisbon in the June 22 issue of his paper, explained that "the economic facts, or so it seems here, are beginning to bring this divided Government to its senses." He affirmed that "Portugal is so obviously, historically and at present, part of the West that writing it off as a new and menacing Communist enclave in Western Europe seems premature, if not actually ridiculous."

### Impressed by Cunhal

Reston was obviously very much impressed by Alvaro Cunhal, the general secretary of the Communist party, who has been portrayed as the mastermind of a plot to stage a "Prague coup" in Portugal: "Only a few days ago, Alvaro Cunhal, the strikingly handsome leader of the Portuguese Communist party, was spouting Communist ideologies and condemning the capitalist bourgeois exploiters to Oriana Fallaci of the magazine *Europeo*; but when I interviewed him he was calling for cooperation

among the parties, the military and the Church and inviting capitalist investment from abroad and love and brotherhood at home.

"Even on Portugal's membership in the NATO alliance and the U.S. bases in the Azores, Mr. Cunhal said that Portugal should carry out its international commitments."

These expressions of opinion in capitalist and procapitalist "democratic" circles indicate how little these elements were concerned about the democratic rights of the Portuguese people in the conflict that has pitted the Socialist party against the military and the Stalinists.

In fact, the document issued June 21 by the military junta represented a new escalation of the attack on popular sovereignty and freedom of expression in Portugal.

It ordered the only body elected by the Portuguese masses, the Constituent Assembly, in which the workers parties have an absolute majority, to cease its discussion of political questions:

"The council document said the Constituent Assembly . . . must limit itself to making a constitution," Giniger reported, "any other kind of official interference in national political or administrative life being forbidden to it."

Actually, the real structure of the government has already been established by the pact-program the military persuaded the major parties to sign before the April 25 elections. In effect a two-house legislature was established, with the military functioning as an upper house and reserving all fundamental powers to itself. The elected parliament was restricted to an essentially technical and formal role.

### A Coming Test

In the June 21 statement, the military junta continued its drive against political democracy, demanding in effect that the political parties accept the role of transmission belts for an unelected bonapartist regime:

"The council made it clear that although it wanted political parties and expressions of diverse opinions [*sic*], the parties were on trial. The economic program to be drawn up in a month 'will represent an extremely important test,' the council said, adding that the people had a right to expect that the parties would meet 'their historic duty.'"

The creation of an official press was proclaimed: ". . . the council announced that it intended to transform 'one or more newspapers, already virtually belonging to the state, into semi-official organs, whose news and doctrines naturally reflect the position of the Armed Forces Movement.'"

The statement, according to a report by Patrick Chapman in the June 22 *Washington Post*, also promised: "Laws are to be introduced that will enable the authorities to take 'quick and decisive action' against Portuguese and foreign journalists who 'intentionally distort the news' and present 'a damaging picture' of Portugal."

Such laws can hardly affect the coverage of Portuguese events in the international press. Their only purpose is to prevent uncensored news from reaching the Portuguese people through foreign sources. Already certain sensitive questions are dealt with more openly in the foreign press than in the local press. The dispute between the Armed Forces Movement and the Socialist party before the April elections is one example.

The statement linked the counterrevolutionary right and "pseudorevolutionary leftists," promising to repress "both" with armed action if necessary.

The military rulers reiterated their determination to deny democratic rights to the ranks of the armed forces and thereby maintain them as a pliant instrument of repression for the bourgeois state. This was linked to a ban on popular militias: "It said that it would not tolerate the existence of armed groups or the infiltration within the armed forces of political organizations," Giniger reported.

At the same time, the military body announced its intention to move ahead with its project for building a mass apparatus subordinate to the armed forces, essentially an auxiliary repressive force and a totalitarian-style political transmission belt.

"The council, while denying that it wished to question the legitimacy or role of political parties, also called for the formation of popular organizations that would be directly linked with the armed forces and would constitute a beginning of direct democracy." What kind of a "beginning of direct democracy" these formations would represent can easily be imagined, since they would be linked to a body from which political democracy, that is, the existence and free competition of organized currents of opinion, has been explicitly banned.

This concept has been supported both by the head of the military security police, Gen. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, and by the Communist party, although in somewhat different versions. The "direct democracy" sought by the charismatic general would be directly subordinated to the armed forces. The "people's organizations" the CP has in

mind would be an auxiliary to a coalition between the military and the mass organizations dominated by the Stalinists.

General de Carvalho explained his view of the next stage of the "revolution," in a speech to a group of officers, noncoms, and privates in the Mercado do Povo restaurant in Lisbon on June 15. His remarks were broadcast over Rádio Renascença, the station that has been seized by a "workers committee" similar to the one that forced the closing of *República*, and were published in the papers the following day. *Jornal Novo* gave long excerpts.

"The political parties, through their leaderships, have not done anything to enlighten the Portuguese people, to illuminate it, to really bring light to this people that has lived and continues to live in darkness. So that now in the less politicalized areas of the country, the people greet the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement] itself with rocks in their hands."

After describing himself as "purely MFA, without any party affiliation," the general went on to explain the need for "firmness."

"Let us hope that this climate of instability, of laxness, of a failure of decisiveness that exists at all levels, of a crisis of authority, will pass. I am convinced that it will."

#### 'Tough' Stance


Saraiva de Carvalho continued: "This is the most difficult kind of revolution precisely because it has been unleashed in a European country like ours. In Vietnam, which has just emerged from a tremendous struggle and finally driven the imperialist dragon out of the country, they are probably far ahead of us."

He concluded: "The PAIGC [Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde—African party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde] is a party with extraordinary grass roots, an extraordinarily powerful party. . . . When we left Guiné and the country became independent, the PAIGC immediately shot and buried dozens upon dozens of counterrevolutionists who opposed the revolution. They killed them and buried them. And there was not a line in any of the newspapers on this question. But all we have to do is arrest somebody, a member of the MRPP [Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party, a Maoist group], an Arnaldo Matos [secretary of the MRPP], for example, or something like that, and everybody thinks it is a tremendous scandal, to hold Arnaldo Matos prisoner, or counterrevolutionists prisoner, to hold members of the Espírito Santo family prisoner.

"I sometimes think that our revolutionary experience would have been better in April

1974 if we had sent a few hundred or a few thousand counterrevolutionists to the wall, or sent them to the Campo Pequeno bullfighting arena, crushing them in the egg."

General de Carvalho's "tough revolu-



CP LEADER ALVARO CUNHAL: Soothing words for envoy of "New York Times."

tionary" talk was followed up on June 17 by a demonstration of the Secretariado Nacional Provisório Pró-Conselhos Revolucionários de Trabalhadores, Soldados e Marinheiros [Provisional Secretariat of the Movement for Revolutionary Councils of Workers, Soldiers, and Sailors]. The main slogans, according to the June 17 issue of *Jornal Novo* were to be: "For a revolutionary nonparty government" and "For socialist revolution." At the demonstration itself, Dominique Pouchin reported in the June 19 *Le Monde*, a third slogan was added: "Immediate dissolution of the Constituent Assembly!"

The communiqué issued by the organization said: "From Trás-os-Montes to the Azores, reaction is attacking in force. The Constituent Assembly is a circus. The parties of the coalition, which are specialists in dividing and demobilizing the working class, have lost all initiative and shown clearly that they have nothing to do with the interests of the workers."

The organizers of the demonstration explicitly identified with General de Carvalho and his project of a nonparty "national liberation front" government. "It is no surprise that the revolutionary officers of

Copcon [Comando Operacional do Continente—Operational Command for Mainland Portugal] issued an ultimatum to the Conselho da Revolução, which met in special session over the weekend at Alfeite. Otelo made statements at the Mercado do Povo that, broadcast over Rádio Renascença, left no doubt about the road to be followed. He said: 'We wanted to carry out a humanist revolution, a very pretty revolution, with lots of carnations. . . . I hope we don't have to fill the Campo Pequeno with a lot of counterrevolutionists before they put us there instead.' Thus, the working class must advance resolutely toward taking power."

The organizers of the Conselhos Revolucionários apparently agreed with the military chiefs on another point. In a discussion on the revolutionary councils organized by the MFA coordinating committee at the Monsanto air force base on June 11, one of the members of the Secretariado Nacional Provisório said: "Our problem here in Portugal is not capitalism but imperialism." (*Jornal Novo*, June 12.)

The number of participants in the June 17 demonstration was estimated at from 4,000 to 10,000, including 2,000 workers from the Lisnave shipyards.

#### The Lisnave Workers

Lisnave is one of the most militant working-class centers in Lisbon. Virtually the entire work force turned out for a demonstration in September 1974 against the junta's no-strike law. For several months the factory committee there was dominated by the Maoists of the União Democrática do Povo (UDP—Democratic People's Union). This advanced section of the working class was led into isolation by the Maoists, who tried to counterpose the factory committee to the unions.

Now these workers have been led into supporting the aims of the most demagogic section of the junta by another ultraleft group, the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado (PRP—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat), the organizers of the Conselhos Revolucionários. As one of the most advanced sections of the proletariat, the Lisnave workers have suffered more than most from ultraleft misleadership and confusion.

Preceding the June 17 demonstration, an assembly of 4,000 workers, about half the work force at Lisnave, voted to support the action "for a nonparty revolutionary government and socialist revolution." *Le Monde's* correspondent Dominique Pouchin wrote that these workers voted "for communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and for the creation of a revolutionary council."

"It is no secret," Pouchin wrote, that Saraiva de Carvalho is "closely linked to some of the most radical far-left militants."

The Communist party and another section of the military regime, however, opposed this project. On June 17, the CP issued a statement implicitly attacking the Revolutionary Councils and the section of the MFA encouraging them:

"The pressures and intrigues aimed at provoking conflicts and divisions within the MFA must be condemned, whether they come from the reactionary right, reformist opportunists, or ultraleftist pseudorevolutionists. If some parties do not measure up to the revolutionary process, that does not mean that all should come under the same cloud.

"It is essential to distinguish between the parties that are with the revolutionary process from those that are against it. Failing to distinguish the former from the latter would be particularly dangerous.

"It is also necessary to be alert to the propaganda of small parties or groups without mass support, which, under the pretext of struggling against 'partisan disputes,' are trying to gain partisan positions of the most typically sectarian type.

"On this question, the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party] stresses that building democracy and socialism in Portugal will not be possible without the PCP and still less against it."

Obviously the Communist party fears that a part of the MFA sees the project of setting up a mass apparatus subordinate to the MFA as a way of bypassing the CP itself. The Stalinists expressed similar apprehensions also at a fairly early stage in the "antiparty" campaign.

The Lisbon correspondent of the British big-business weekly the *Economist* saw the Revolutionary Councils essentially as a front for General de Carvalho.

"The struggle within the Armed Forces Movement over the role of politicians in Portugal reached a new crisis point this week as General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and Copcon, the military security force he commands, tried to make an end to the fourth coalition government and to the constituent assembly. Copcon itself could hardly march through the streets shouting anti-party slogans. But its brains trust, the Revolutionary Proletarian party, did just that."

Up until now, the Communist party has served as the mass organizer for the military. However, it was inevitable that sooner or later a section of the military would try to build its own mass apparatus. Of all the figures in the junta, Saraiva de Carvalho is one of the best suited to play a bonaparte's role. He has proved capable of projecting the image of a guileless "nonpolitician" but has always managed to come out on top in political conflicts. "A sly fox may lurk under that naïve appearance," the

Italian radical magazine *Espresso* observed recently.

Saraiva de Carvalho is the "soft cop" of the system. His Copcon has tended to avoid head-on clashes with demonstrators and strikers and to play an intermediary, negotiator's role. But it appears armed at demonstrations and has not hesitated in certain situations to threaten to shoot demonstrators, although it usually prefers to leave the dirty work to other security forces. Because of its role as the political police of the system, it is more in contact with the social processes going on in Portugal than any other section of the repressive forces. The general himself has been an advocate of strong military authority and was firmly opposed to the popular vigilance groups that defeated the first rightist coup attempt in September 1974.

#### As Seen by Social Democrats

In the June 12 issue of the SP's weekly organ *Portugal Socialista*, Eurico Figueiredo described the two positions in the military government and presented his objections.

"The alternative of an MFA-liberation movement and a CP-people's democracy are both counterrevolutionary roads. They do not correspond to the level of consciousness rapidly being attained by the working class in Portugal, nor to the needs that flow from the profound crisis of world capitalism.

"The working class in Portugal has already shown that it does not confuse national ownership with social ownership. It is trying to take part in actually running enterprises. The revolutionary approach would be to extend the mobilizations of workers for control and management to all levels, creating centralized structures, controlled by the workers, to prevent the fragmentation and division that centralized bodies not controlled by the workers would use to impose their will.

"A so-called direct linkup between the MFA and the people would in reality be counterrevolutionary, because it would enable the MFA to hold on to all the central decision-making apparatuses, substituting them for the processes of the development of workers consciousness and control.

"With the parties eliminated, which still are the channels in which the most advanced class-consciousness has been developing, the MFA would emerge as an all-powerful body inclined toward secretiveness, arbitrariness, appeals to a pseudoconsensus, manipulation of the masses, and toward defending the privileges of the bureaucratic-military caste. . . .

"The CP-people's democracy line is more sinister, because it is ideologically more repressive, more authoritarian, more inclined to destroy the forms of rank-and-file

democracy that the MFA would respect at the beginning.

"The choice between these counterrevolutionary lines is a diabolic one."

The Socialist writer seemed to be misled by his party's rivalry with the CP as well as by illusions in the MFA. The Stalinists' project of "committees to defend the revolution" would more obviously be just an extension of the repressive apparatus of the regime. It does not have as much lure of "grass roots" democracy offered by the "national-liberation-front" concept. However, Saraiva de Carvalho's project could very well be more harshly repressive in reality. After all, he, and not the CP, has talked about the need for rounding up enough "counterrevolutionaries of the left and right" to fill the Campo Pequeno. Furthermore, he *has* rounded up about 300 Maoists of the MRPP.

As the auxiliary of a military government, the Communist party would have no interest in massive repression. That would be too dangerous, both in the national and international context. However, it would require strong restrictions on political life and on freedom of the press in order to safeguard its bureaucratic positions and the credibility of its bureaucratic ideology.

#### CP Opposes Free Press

In this field it has already played a clearly repressive role, apparently aided by the dogmatists of other tendencies. The campaign against freedom of the press, supported and encouraged by the Communist party, was carried a step further on June 14 in a motion voted by an assembly of the Sindicato Nacional de Artes Gráficas (National Printing Workers Union). About 200 persons were present, according to the June 16 issue of *Jornal Novo*. Of these 68 voted against the motion and 71 for. The resolution demanded:

"1. The immediate repeal of the present press law, which is clearly unsuited to the great tasks of the revolutionary process.

"2. Formulation of a new press law by a genuinely representative committee, including the unions in the press and broadcasting and Intersindical [the national union federation dominated by the CP].

"3. The new law must follow these principles:

"a. The establishment of control and participation by the workers and their representative organs over the content of news and the life of the enterprises.

"b. Creation of a system of defending the revolution that definitively prevents the bourgeoisie, the counterrevolutionaries, and their organizations from taking advantage of access to the news media to discredit progressive news reports and the revolutionary process, that prevents them from

spreading confusion and divisionism, from demobilizing the working masses and keeping them from carrying out the tasks of building socialism.

"4. Firm measures, without any yielding to pressure from any source, against the foreign bourgeois news agencies such as Reuters and France Presse, which are in the service of the international monopolies and international capital, to respond to their systematic and deliberate distortion of the reality of the Portuguese revolution."

The resolution ended with a statement of position that implicitly called for the banning of a series of papers:

"We denounce the openly sensationalist, counterrevolutionary, divisionist, and slanderous nature of innumerable provincial 'sheets' and papers as well as the two papers *Expresso* and *Jornal Novo*."

The weekly *Expresso* is edited by persons close to the liberal bourgeois party. *Jornal Novo* is a daily linked to SP circles. They are virtually the only national papers remaining that to some extent criticize the MFA and the CP.

However, Copcon has served more and more as the spearhead of the campaign to keep the closed daily *República* from being returned to its SP editorial staff. At first the reopening of the paper was delayed four days by Copcon, which claimed that it could not guarantee "security." Then, when the political police finally agreed to take the seals off the building, the commander on the spot turned the premises over to the "workers committee" that forced the closing, which reportedly then proceeded to burn the files it found in the building.

The commander, Major Ferreira, claimed that editor Raul Rêgo had violated the conditions laid down by the Conselho da Revolução by refusing to accept all the workers back. His main objection apparently was to the former business manager, Alvaro Belo Marques, who has been accused of being a CP agent. Rêgo claimed that Marques had tendered his resignation before the paper was closed. In its June 17 issue, *Jornal Novo* reported: "The Comissão Coordenadora dos Trabalhadores, on the other hand, gave a different version, stating that 'Alvaro Belo Marques did not offer his resignation but was forced to resign by the administration because it wanted to turn the paper over to the SP.'"

The *Washington Post* reported June 18: "The management wanted to fire 12 workers, then sought guarantees that they would not interfere in the editorial policy. No firings were allowed and no guarantees were given."

According to the *Washington Post* of June 22, the Conselho da Revolução's statement said that the task of the media was to "mobilize public opinion toward objectives of national interest."

In fact, the needs of preserving Portu-

guese capitalism in the deepening economic crisis seem to be impelling the military to crack down hard to restore "labor discipline" and suppress political ferment and workers struggles. "The officers of the MFA



COPCON LEADER CARVALHO: Spearheading campaign to keep "República" closed.

are well aware of the popular demobilization," José Rebelo wrote from Lisbon in the June 18 *Le Monde*. "The 'battle of production' officially launched by the premier, General Vasco Gonçalves, doesn't seem to have gone beyond mere rhetoric.

"June 10, a holiday in Portugal celebrated by the former regime as the 'day of the race,' was not the 'day of work' desired by Intersindical and the Conselho da Revolução. Rather than participate in the 'battle of production,' the Portuguese preferred the coolness of the beach or the peacefulness of the countryside. The combination 'people-MFA, driving force of the revolutionary process' is beginning to turn into a myth. The conditions have thus been assembled for a new offensive by the right—growing unemployment in the cities and serious discontent in the countryside where the peasants are still waiting for agrarian reform."

Rebelo's report gave a picture of a reformist experiment becoming exhausted, with the workers and peasants falling into indifference. The new government's concessions are rapidly being wiped out by inflation, which was estimated at 7.5 percent for May alone. The fundamental conditions of the masses have not changed, and hope of change is apparently fading.

The only way to halt this drift is to mobilize the workers and peasants behind a clear program of eliminating capitalism and giving the land to those who work it. These are the decisive measures that are needed.

In his remarks about filling the Campo

Pequeno with "counterrevolutionaries," however, General de Carvalho promised a different kind of decisiveness. He did not link the advancement of the revolution to gains for the workers and peasants but to ruthless repression.

In this context, the rehabilitation of arbitrary and strong-arm methods, the glorification of legal and extralegal repression exemplified by the seizure of *República*, of Rádio Renascença, the attack by ultraleftists on Catholics protesting the seizure of the church radio station, the attack on the SP headquarters in Santarém by the Frente Socialista Popular, can either prepare the way for a more repressive policy by the demagogic bourgeois regime, or serve as provocations justifying a rightist coup. In no way can this wave of antidemocratic, antirationalist actions further the cause of a workers government or socialist revolution.

The initiators of the "Revolutionary Councils," who relied on General de Carvalho to put the "workers" in power, were quickly disillusioned. On June 19, Copcon issued a statement denouncing "left political groups with a weak national base" who allegedly took advantage of Carvalho's statements to stage "reactionary and opportunist maneuvers." Copcon would only support "people's organizations of a completely unitary character committed to the revolutionary and nonpartisan spirit of the MFA."

Those who rely on the Socialist party as the defender of democracy may be disillusioned as quickly. Following the Conselho da Revolução statement, the SP called for a demonstration to "support the MFA" as the guarantor of democracy.

Of all the major political forces in Portugal, the Communist party has made the most precise and realistic calculations about the MFA. However, the pressures of profound political and economic crises can topple the most skillful and experienced tightrope walkers. If reformist measures fail to stabilize the situation in Portugal, the CP may end up as the biggest loser. □

### World Bank Solves Housing Crisis

A study by the World Bank of housing conditions in six cities around the world estimates that the percentage of households that cannot afford the cheapest housing being produced ranges from 68 percent in Nairobi to 35 percent in Hong Kong.

The World Bank experts offered a solution to the problem—build more slums. The way to provide more homes they said, is "to bring the price of housing down." Their study argues that this can be done by easing building codes to allow the use of lower quality materials, less living space, and "communal" kitchens and bathrooms.

## What They Said in Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, and Havana

By Dick Fidler

Leaders of the Portuguese and French Communist parties insisted that the dispute at the Lisbon daily *República* was "simply a labor conflict." But other sectors of the world Communist movement have made clear that political motivations lay behind their support of the military regime's closure of the newspaper reflecting the views of the Socialist party.

Moscow has not yet referred directly to the *República* incident. But an article in the June 11 issue of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, the weekly organ of the Writers Union, alluded to it without citing the name of the newspaper, and without recounting what had actually happened. Instead, the magazine came up with a novel version of the facts that, it apparently thought would be accepted by its readers.

According to *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, the conflict between the Socialist party and the Stalinist-led printers union had resulted from "the decision of the printing workers, who did not want to print Socialist leaflets calling for a demonstration . . . and who in addition categorically refused to set the type for Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* . . .

"For the Portuguese workers," the weekly continued, "the Soviet Union is the country where communism has triumphed, the country of their true friends. So naturally they have refused to lend themselves to peddling the kind of slanders frequently used by the overthrown fascist regime."

*Literaturnaya Gazeta's* solicitude for the feelings of the Portuguese workers, however, took a distinctly second place to another consideration—the military regime's attitude toward Moscow. The main point of its article, entitled "A Strange and Dangerous Rhetoric," was to harshly criticize Portuguese Socialist party leader Mário Soares, whose "cascades of anti-Communist statements to bourgeois journals," it said, are "in flagrant contradiction with the domestic and foreign policy of the Portuguese government of which he is a member."

Soares, it said, was trying to impose his conception of socialism on the Armed Forces Movement (MFA).

This theme had been developed at some length in a May 25 article in *Pravda*, the Soviet CP daily, which accused the Portuguese SP of "not holding to the commitments it made before the [April 25] elections." *Pravda* was apparently referring to

the "pact-program" that the SP, along with most other parties (the Portuguese Trotskyists were an exception), signed with the MFA on the eve of the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The pact-program, a sort of provisional constitution, gave decisive voice to the Armed Forces Movement against the elected assembly in all matters of "national interest."

"The activities of the Socialist party," *Pravda* stated, "coincide with counterrevolutionary provocations, and the attempts being made to undermine the social and economic situation with calls for strikes."

### Peking Warns the West Against Take-over by Moscow . . .

Pro-Peking groupings responded in various ways to the *República* affair. Some Maoist groups in both Portugal and France, for example, expressed unease at the attacks on the Socialist party, although not always for the same reasons. The French newspaper *l'Humanité Rouge* was critical of the "censorship" involved in the suppression of the SP newspaper. The Maoist paper has characterized the line of the Portuguese SP as "positive," emphasizing its view that Soares's conflict with the CP places it in a different category from the French SP, which is conducting "common action with the revisionists" of the pro-Moscow Communist party.

The Portuguese regime's attacks on some Maoist organizations, especially the Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (MRPP—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party), have led some other Maoist groups to take a critical stance in relation to the MFA. An additional factor in the Maoists' skeptical approach has been the conspicuous support of the regime by the pro-Moscow CP, since Maoist groups in the West tend to determine their political line through a reflex reaction against the policy of the pro-Moscow Stalinists.

The regime in Peking has maintained silence on the *República* affair. It apparently sees no advantage in defending the democratic rights of another current in the workers movement. After all, a campaign in defense of the Portuguese Socialist party's right of free expression might give some legitimacy to demands for similar rights inside China—a position that the Peking bureaucrats have no interest in encouraging.

What seems to be decisive in determining

Peking's attitude toward the situation in Portugal is its fear that Moscow may wield some influence with the government in Lisbon through the Portuguese CP.

The Peking rulers' first major commentary on events in Portugal since the April 25, 1974, coup that overthrew the Salazarist regime appeared in a June 14 Hsinhua dispatch from Peking. The article stressed the threat of "social-imperialist [Soviet] control" in Portugal.

"After the downfall of the Caetano fascist regime," the statement charged, "the Soviet Union displayed unusual concern over and interest in Portugal. Making active use of the changes in the situation in Portugal, the Soviet Union attempted to fish in troubled waters, striving to penetrate into the country by squeezing out the U.S. influence there."

The statement cited without criticism various statements by Washington officials, including Ford and Kissinger, expressing "concern" that the "evolution" of the situation in Portugal was "unfavorable to the U.S." and would open "a crack . . . on the southern flank of NATO."

It hailed the "vigilance and opposition by the Portuguese progressive forces" in the face of "the fierce contention between the two superpowers."

The statement made no mention of the MFA, but clearly implied that Peking would not look unfavorably on efforts by the military regime to restrict the role of the Communist party.

This position, of course, is consistent with Peking's current stance of encouraging any moves that bolster the "unity" of the West European capitalist governments against the Soviet Union. The Maoist line was spelled out in a June 3 Hsinhua dispatch from Peking that hailed "vigilance in the West" against the danger posed by the "Soviet revisionists."

In its analysis of the "contention between the two superpowers," Peking seems to lean toward a position of critical support to Washington against Moscow. The June 3 statement accused the Kremlin of "poisoning relations between West Europe and the United States."

The Soviet Union, it said, is "taking advantage of the economic crisis in the Western world" to "stir up trouble among the Western countries in an attempt to divide Western Europe and squeeze out U.S. influence there for their own ends."



The statement denounced Moscow for opposing "the strengthening of the Common Market. . . ."

### . . . But Doesn't Mind MFA

According to the peculiar interpretation of world politics put forward by the bureaucrats in Peking, the task in Portugal, as in other imperialist countries of Western Europe, is to struggle for national independence—from Moscow. Thus the June 9 Hsinhua reported approvingly a "recent article" in *Unidade Popular*, the organ of the Maoist Communist party of Portugal (Marxist-Leninist), describing "Soviet social-imperialism" as "the main enemy of Portugal's struggle for independence."

"The social-imperialists' attitude toward our country," the Portuguese Maoists charged, "is similar to that of any imperialist power toward one of its colonies. They are doing their utmost to prevent Portugal from becoming an economically independent sovereign state so that the new Soviet capitalist class will be able to plunder our country's wealth in the way that is most convenient, brutal and profitable."

Peking apparently endorses this absurd argument.

Yet for all its fulminations against Moscow, and, by implication, the Portuguese CP, Peking has nowhere indicated the slightest opposition to the MFA. In fact, its polemics could be interpreted as advice to the MFA—to break with the Communist party.

A slightly different variant of the Maoist line has been presented in the New York-based weekly paper the *Guardian*. Its current analysis of the situation in Portugal is offered in an article by staff correspondent Wilfred Burchett in the June 11 issue.

The main point in Burchett's analysis is support of the Armed Forces Movement, which, he says, "has negotiated a daring course steadily to the left."

For Burchett, the dispute at *República* "between the paper's management and the printers" was "a conflict that has taken place many times in various Lisbon newspapers."

"The printers maintained that it was their right not to process articles they believe to be contrary to AFM policy."

By shutting down the paper, Burchett said, the MFA-dominated government had struck a blow at the attempts by the SP, which "is little more than a front for the liberal bourgeoisie," to oppose "what it considers the far left policies of the AFM." The 240-member Armed Forces Assembly had criticized the SP's role in the affair, he noted. This meant "the AFM is saying that a position of nonrevolution, much less counterrevolution, is no longer politically

viable in new Portugal and that the Revolutionary Council has the backing of the majority of the AFM in leading the country in the direction of revolutionary social change."

Burchett was enthusiastic about the



Francisco Zambujal/O Século

### GONCALVES

implications, as he saw them. "The *República* incident has offered additional proof that what happened on April 25, 1974, was not simply a military coup against fascism but quite possibly the first step toward a revolutionary process such as Western European countries have not known for over a century."

### Burchett: MFA Won't 'Gamble' With Democratic Rights

Burchett saw positive implications in other manifestations of the MFA's antide-mocratic inclinations.

"It is a simple fact of political life that the AFM never had any intention of gambling the as yet unconsolidated achievements of the antifascist revolution on the uncertainties of the ballot box. As Premier Vasco dos Santos Goncalves declared just before the voting [for the Constituent Assembly], 'We are not going to risk losing by elections in one day what has taken so many years and great suffering to achieve.'"

Burchett was simply echoing the Stalinist theme that the workers must look to other class forces for leadership in the struggle for social change. This was clear in his description of the course of the MFA, a bourgeois military officers' lodge.

"In essence, it seems to me, what the AFM has done is to seize power in the name

of the people and to defend its power; to initiate the destruction of the state apparatus of the former ruling class and to launch the expropriation of the economic basis of that class. These measures, while not yet fully consolidated by any means, are a clear indication of the government's revolutionary direction. . . ."

The *Guardian's* correspondent did not indicate how the MFA regime had initiated the "destruction of the state apparatus"—and indeed such evidence would be hard to find. But he clearly felt that the military leaders have good intentions.

"I am convinced that the principal leaders of Portugal today—Prime Minister Goncalves; Brig. Gen. Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho, who leads military security forces, and Foreign Minister Melo Antunes, among other decisive figures in the AFM I have spoken with—have become dedicated revolutionaries."

In this context, Burchett thought even the Portuguese CP, which supports the MFA, is not so bad either. "The PCP—regardless of what some of its critics say—has not shown itself to be a run-of-the-mill revisionist party. It is completely behind the AFM and has not blanched even when the Revolutionary Council states it does not intend to lead Portugal into the Soviet camp."

Burchett even seemed unconcerned about the repression against the MRPP. It had, after all, "agitated against the AFM among the people and within the military," and "struggled against the PCP. . . ."

The real issue, he concluded, is "the leadership of the AFM, not the PCP, which is not in the driver's seat of the governmental vehicle steering Portugal out of the dark ages into a democratic future." And the MFA's record during its first year in office "has been remarkably good all told."

### Hanoi: MFA on 'Correct Revolutionary Road'

Not all the CPs around the world shared these estimates of the meaning of the *República* affair. The Italian CP, which has proposed a "historic compromise" with the leading bourgeois party, the Christian Democrats, was acutely embarrassed by the publicity surrounding the seizure of the Portuguese Socialists' paper. Its daily newspaper *L'Unità* condemned the seizure as a "counterrevolutionary coup."

The Spanish CP, allied with bourgeois elements in a "Democratic Junta" that is seeking to replace the Franco regime, issued a statement calling the *República* seizure "regrettable."

But most CPs lined up with Moscow and its Portuguese cothinkers. The Communist party USA, for example, defended the suppression of *República* on the grounds that the Socialist editor, a member of

Portugal's Constituent Assembly, "had been filling the columns of the paper with vitriolic denunciations not only of the PCP but also of the Armed Forces Movement."

The arguments dredged up by Moscow and Peking and their respective supporters in the *República* affair have been repeated by party and government leaders in other workers states. Particularly noteworthy is the echo they have received in Hanoi and Havana. Major targets of U.S. imperialism's efforts during the last decade to roll back the world revolution, Cuba and Vietnam have been looked to by many radicalizing youth as possible sources of leadership in building an international revolutionary alternative.

The Hanoi daily *Nhan Dan* attacked the Portuguese Socialist party in its June 13 issue for seeking to establish "a bourgeois democracy" while the CP and the MFA, it said, advocate "a correct revolutionary road." *Nhan Dan* said the CP and MFA are speaking in the name of "the real democracy of the majority" in Portugal.

The Cuban mass-circulation weekly magazine *Bohemia*, in its May 30 issue, attacked the Portuguese SP for "claiming to set itself up as sole interpreter of the people's desires" in opposition to policies of the government. *Bohemia* singled out as examples of the Socialists' obstructionism their criticism of the trade-union unity law, which established the Stalinist-controlled Intersindical as the sole legal national trade-union federation, and "more recently, the incidents provoked around the labor and political conflict at the newspaper *República*, linked with the Socialists. . . ." The Cuban magazine noted that the demonstrations protesting *República's* closure had been denounced as "inopportune" by the Portuguese military's High Council.

The June 6 *Bohemia* said that the workers had been critical of *República* because it "attacked the revolutionary positions of the MFA."

#### Havana: 'Politically Mature' to Support MFA

According to *Bohemia*, the level of political consciousness of the Portuguese masses is in direct proportion to the degree of support they accord the MFA. "The masses have demonstrated amazing political maturity in giving their unconditional support to all the measures adopted by the MFA and the coalition government," it stated in the May 30 issue. Likewise, the June 6 *Bohemia* attributed the large vote for the SP in the April 25 elections to "the effect on the people's consciousness of 48 years of fierce anti-Communist propaganda, which has led many apolitical persons who sympathize with the MFA's socialist program to vote for the party that goes by the name socialist."

All of these statements have one thing in common: They treat any criticism of the MFA and its antidemocratic practices as "counterrevolutionary." But their "unconditional support" for the MFA (if Peking hesitates to declare it openly, it is only because of its bitter hostility to the pro-Moscow Portuguese CP) is not support for socialist revolution. On the contrary.

This was made clear by Portuguese CP leader Alvaro Cunhal, in a lengthy interview featured in the June 15 issue of the English-language weekly selection of *Granma*, the Cuban CP newspaper.

Cunhal stated that "the alliance of the people's movement with the Armed Forces Movement" is "fundamental in our revolution. . . . The dynamics of the revolution now depends on the strength of that alliance."

Asked to define the CP's position on nationalizations, Cunhal said: "There is a rather broad private sector which must be taken into account. Of course, we expect to free ourselves fully from monopoly domination. The breaking up of half a dozen monopolies is, for us, fundamental in fostering the development of our economy's private sector. We guarantee private property and the benefits derived from it.

"The state sector may intervene to spearhead the economy, but it is not the only determining factor in increasing production."

The Portuguese CP is so thoroughly committed to the strategy of alliance with the MFA that Cunhal even indicated the CP would support a purely military government that did not include the CP or other political parties.

"A military government doesn't necessarily mean a dictatorship. A military government can safeguard freedoms that are in jeopardy. We feel that, in our country, given the features of the Portuguese democratic revolution, there is the possibility of a military intervention allied with the people as a whole in order to safeguard freedom, as was the case on April 25, and not to destroy it."

#### What It Really Means

What Cunhal means, of course, is that the objective in Portugal for the Stalinists is not "freedom," still less workers democracy, but the preservation at all costs of the bonapartist bourgeois military regime against the revolutionary upsurge of the mass movement. Any other course would endanger détente between Moscow and the West. The mobilization of the Portuguese masses is to be encouraged only within the framework of supporting a regime that, despite all its socialist rhetoric, has no intention of abolishing capitalist property relations.

Such a strategy is increasingly incompatible with maintaining and extending democratic rights such as freedom of the press and free expression in general—especially in a period of growing economic crisis, as the margin of maneuver narrows considerably for the petty-bourgeois reformists.

The closure of *República* was part of the regime's battle to restrict—and if necessary, suppress—the democratic freedoms established in the wake of the April 1974 coup. The subsequent arrest and imprisonment of hundreds of Maoist critics of the regime is further evidence of an ominous trend that is developing with the support of the CP.

In this context, the defense of the democratic rights of the Socialist party—although it involves defending the rights of a reformist and not revolutionary current—is a vital means of maintaining the forward advance of the Portuguese revolution. Censorship is an obstacle to this process.

In the past, the Cuban leaders showed they had some understanding of this point.\* Their resistance to Stalinist attempts to restrict basic democratic rights was one of the strengths of the Cuban revolution in its early years, contributing directly to its deepening and growing over from bourgeois-democratic to socialist tasks. In reiterating the line of the Portuguese CP, Havana goes against one of the important lessons of the Cuban revolution.

The attack on *República* signals a turn in the evolution of the situation in Portugal. If the offensive against the democratic rights of the Socialists and Maoists, currents in the workers movement, is not defeated, other tendencies will in turn be threatened—including the CP itself. And with them will be threatened the entire workers movement, and the future of the Portuguese socialist revolution. □

\*In 1962, Fidel Castro, in one of his most famous speeches, described the opposition between censorship and socialist revolution. During a reading of the political testament of José Antonio Echevarría, a student leader who was killed in the revolutionary struggle, someone omitted a reference to his religious beliefs. Castro seized on the episode, describing it as "A symptom! A wretched tendency—cowardly, warped—of someone who does not have faith in Marxism, of one who does not have faith in the revolution, of one who does not have faith in his ideas."

And he added:

"Into what is the revolution changed by this? Into a tyranny! And that is not revolution! Into what is the revolution changed? Into a school of docile spirits! And that is not the revolution! And what must the revolution be? The revolution must be a school of revolutionists! The revolution must be a school of courageous men! The revolution must be a school of unfettered thought!" (See "The Revolution Must Be a School of Unfettered Thought," text of speech by Fidel Castro at the University of Havana, March 13, 1962. New York: Pioneer Publishers. Distributed by Pathfinder Press.)

## A Day Behind Bars in the Dominican Republic

By Judy White

Claudio Tavárez is a native of the Dominican Republic who lives in New York. He was in Santo Domingo visiting his family when the recent mass roundup of opponents of the Balaguer dictatorship began\* and was himself arrested and held more than twenty-four hours by the Dominican secret police.

He described what happened to him in an interview with *Intercontinental Press*.

"I did not have any problem entering the country or all the time I was there until I was about to leave June 12.

"Just before I boarded the plane they searched me. I was carrying some clippings from the daily newspapers—*El Nacional*, *Las Noticias*, and others—along with an article given to me to read by a university professor, outlining his theoretical perspective on the situation in the Dominican Republic. I also had a tape recorder with one blank tape and one with a recording of a school program given on television in Santo Domingo.

"The person who searched my luggage saw the tapes and the papers and the name of the person who gave me the article, and let me pass through. But when I was just about at the ramp to the plane, they called me back. They grabbed me and began to yell that they had the communist, that they had Claudio. They shoved me into a room and began to scream that this was the end for me.

"They began to ask questions, and more police kept coming in until they realized that I was not Claudio Caamaño [accused of leading an alleged guerrilla invasion of the island June 7 to overthrow the regime] and that the secret agent had made an error of identification. But they still insisted that I was a communist who had come to Santo Domingo to give orders to leftist organizations, that I was dog, a thief, a dirty son of a whore, and so on. This lasted about two hours.

"Naturally, the thought of being assassinated passed through my mind, since that is what they have done to several persons there. They grab them off a plane; their passport shows that they have left the country; and en route from the airport they kill them and they never turn up. Luckily, this didn't happen to me. They took me to the national police headquarters and again asked me the same type of questions."

\*See *Intercontinental Press*, June 23, p. 858.

Tavárez, who has been an activist in the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA), described the general character of the repression in the Dominican Republic:

"It has two sides. At the universities demonstrations are held. You can buy Marxist literature in the bookstores. But, on the other hand, there is selective repression against persons who are members of left groups or of the liberal bourgeois opposition."

"During my stay in Santo Domingo I saw many things that confirmed my view that the Dominican Republic is not a Chile or a Brazil.

"For example, I went to see a basketball game at the sports stadium. There were about 10,000 persons there watching the game between Puerto Rico and Cuba. Among them were activists from the different left groups—from the Línea Roja del 14 de Junio [June 14 Red Line, a Maoist organization] and the PLD [Partido de la Liberación Dominicana—Dominican Liberation party, led by former President Juan Bosch]—who were openly collecting money for the struggle around the university budget. Left parties were openly selling their newspapers in view of the police, who didn't do anything.

"It is impossible for the regime to lock up the thousands of persons who talk against its policies and about the economic and political situation.

"But the same day the money was being collected in the sports palace they picked up a leader of the MPD [Movimiento Popular Dominicano—Dominican People's Movement] in San Pedro Macoris for having Communist literature in his possession."

I asked Tavárez if there had been any demonstrations on the island to protest the arrests of the approximately 500 persons rounded up since June 5.

"Many statements have been published in the press but there haven't been any marches or campus demonstrations where it is possible to hold them. The problem is that while all the groups have suffered from the repression, they don't get together in a united front to defend the political prisoners. Each holds its own separate activities, but there are no joint public demonstrations.

"Here in the United States part of our campaign will be to organize a united open campaign in defense of Francisco Santos,

Peña Valdez, and the others," he said, referring to the top leaders of the Dominican labor movement who are charged with subversion in the aftermath of the June 5 arrests.

Returning to his arrest Tavárez said that after he was questioned, they put him "in a cell—really a dungeon—with about 100 other common and political prisoners.

"It's a jail for common prisoners but you can't communicate with anyone outside. If someone brings you food from the outside you never see who it was, and if you don't have someone to bring you food you have to depend on the other prisoners who do get food to share with you.

"Every time they open the door to bring in a new prisoner, the police beat everyone near them with rubber truncheons.

"One young guy about fifteen years old was nearly starving. He had been in jail six days. No one was bringing him meals and the food the other prisoners gave him wasn't enough. He couldn't even stand up anymore. When we asked the guard to come to take care of him, he replied that he wasn't a doctor.

"The sanitary conditions are incredibly poor. At night cockroaches crawl over your body. There is no water to wash with. The toilets are used all day long and at night they give you a little water in order to flush them. In the afternoon the temperature reaches about 110 degrees and the stench is unbelievable. There is no medical care.

"But what impressed me most from my time in prison was the enormous solidarity among the prisoners. When I got there the first thing I did was talk to several prisoners to explain my situation and to give them my family's telephone number in case any of them got released and could notify them. They shared their food with me and got me a spot to sleep on the cement."

Tavárez credits his speedy release to the efforts of his family and friends in Santo Domingo and to a telegram campaign begun in the United States when USLA learned of his arrest.

"My family told the police that if I wasn't released by Sunday [June 15] or Monday, there would be major protests, that the headlines on my case had already been set by the newspapers, that a legal team was being assembled in the city, and that professors were planning to start a campaign."

Tavárez ended by making an appeal to all defenders of democratic rights to join in demanding the immediate release of Santos, Peña Valdez, and the other persons jailed in the roundup.

Telegrams of protest should be sent to Presidente Joaquín Balaguer, Palacio Nacional, Santo Domingo, República Dominicana, with copies to USLA, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010. □

## Rockefeller Suggests John Kennedy Knew of Plans

### New Revelations on CIA Plots to Kill Castro

By Michael Baumann

Questions about the CIA's role as a global assassination agency took a new turn June 19 with the murder of Mafia kingpin Sam Giancana. Giancana was killed within hours after he had been "located" by the Senate committee investigating the CIA effort to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Richard Bissell, former head of the CIA's "dirty tricks" section at the time of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, had previously identified Giancana and his Mafia associate John Roselli as key figures in the CIA plots to murder Castro.

But before Giancana could be questioned by the committee, he was shot seven times in the head and neck in his Oak Park, Illinois, home. Plainclothes FBI agents and Chicago police standing guard outside Giancana's home had called off their surveillance about an hour before the murder.

Chicago police took pains to portray the shooting as an internal Mafia affair, offering a number of suggestions as to why other gangsters might have wanted to kill Giancana.

Frank Church, chairman of the Senate committee investigating the CIA assassination plots, also appeared to view the shooting as a coincidence. A dispatch in the June 21 *New York Times* reported Church's claim that "there was 'no credence' to any notion that the Central Intelligence Agency might have profited from Mr. Giancana's death."

Church added, however, that the committee was prepared to supply "physical protection" to other Senate witnesses who might feel their lives are in danger.

Meanwhile, new information continued to be disclosed about the CIA plots to murder Castro.

Speaking before a nationwide television audience June 15, Vice-president Rockefeller suggested that both President John Kennedy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy knew of the CIA's assassination plans.

He said he had no "conclusive information," a fact he blamed on the assassinations of the two former White House officials and "a real problem of amnesia among those still around."

Rockefeller added: "No major undertakings by the CIA were done without either knowledge and/or approval of the White House." In practice, this means the Nation-



MALCOLM X: Victim of CIA? Spy agency investigated groups that raised questions.

al Security Council, the highest decision-making body in the U.S. government.

Under the Kennedy administration the National Security Council members included—in addition to the president—the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces, and the attorney general. Also, the director of the CIA sat in.

The White House has begun to review NSC records of meetings held from 1959 to 1963 (the end of the Eisenhower administration and the full Kennedy administration) in response to Senate requests for information on White House discussions of assassinations.

Some of this material is already being leaked. According to a report in the June 19 *New York Daily News*, "the White House has to be the source of the principal leakage, for it is there that staff members are combing the files of the National Security Council and, presumably, finding a hint here and there of presidential association with plots that eventually reaches the public prints."

Spokesmen for Senator Edward Kennedy, a leading Democratic hopeful for the 1976 presidential election, suggest that the leaks are being stage-managed to discredit the Kennedy name.

According to a report in the June 17 *New York Times*, "sources who have seen the [National Security Council] material" say "it is concerned with finding a way to deal with the rising threat of Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba. There are not only discussions of direct operations against Premier Castro, one source said, but also of operations that might have the effect of turning a group or country against Mr. Castro."

"According to one source," the dispatch reported, "the National Security Council material is a graphic history of United States policy in the Caribbean during the late nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties. 'Though there is no direct memo signed by President John F. Kennedy saying go assassinate Castro,' this source said, 'there is material in minutes taken between 1959 and 1963 which is important if the focus is on assassinations.'"

A former "highly placed" official in the Kennedy administration gave the *Daily News* further details June 20. "On the question of what might have been said about Castro in secret National Security Council deliberations, the authoritative source told The News that frequently statements such as 'We've got to get rid of Castro,' or 'We've got to get rid of the Castro regime,' were uttered by participants. 'There was plenty of that,' the source said."

It is preposterous to claim, as some Washington apologists have done, that this was no more than idle talk. CIA agents, like other hired killers, do not expect to receive their instructions on engraved invitations or in triplicate, countersigned memorandums. A word from the top is all that is necessary to set an assassination attempt in motion.

New information on how the CIA planned to kill Castro has become available. On June 18 a "source who claims direct knowledge" told the *New York Times* the details of a 1961 U.S. plot to poison Castro, his brother Raúl, and Che Guevara.

According to the *Times* account, the "triple assassination plot was conceived in the latter half of 1960 under the Eisenhower Administration and directed by Sam Giancana and John Roselli, two alleged organized crime figures recruited by the C.I.A. as middlemen for the job. . . .

"Mr. Roselli, the source said, was put in touch by the C.I.A. with a Cuban assassin on the island who agreed to attempt to poison in a single stroke the Castro brothers and Mr. Guevara. . . .

"The poison to have been used in the attempt reportedly was supplied to Mr. Roselli by the C.I.A. . . ." The plot failed, the source reported, because the assassin could not get close enough to the Cuban leaders to poison their food.

"One well-informed Government official," the dispatch continued, "said that the

C.I.A. had acknowledged to Administration investigators three separate attempts to murder Mr. Castro, two of them involving poison and the third a bullet from a high-powered rifle."

These revelations throw new light on the 1965 assassination of American Black leader Malcolm X. Just before his death Malcolm became convinced that the threats against his life—which he had attributed to the Black Muslims—were more than the Muslims could have organized.

When Malcolm tried to visit France twelve days before his death, French officials refused to allow him to enter the country. It was later reported that they feared he would be assassinated on French soil.

A report in the June 27 issue of the American revolutionary-socialist weekly the *Militant* points to a little-noted passage in the findings made public June 10 by the Rockefeller CIA commission. In a reference to the assassination of Malcolm, the chapter entitled "Protection of the Agency Against Threats of Violence—Office of Security" said:

"In 1966 and 1967, the Deputy Director for support ordered the Office of Security to prepare several studies relating to dissidents and dissident groups. One of the studies centered on the individuals and groups\* who were charging the CIA with involvement in the assassination of Malcolm X, the Black Muslim leader. The study provided background information relating to those accusing the CIA."

A footnote at the bottom of the page adds, "No such evidence was found which would support such a charge."

"If there was 'no evidence' of the CIA's involvement in the killing," the *Militant* asked, "why did the agency consider groups raising such charges a threat? Why was the 'Office of Security' involved? If a search was made and 'no evidence' was found, why wasn't this report made public? What does the CIA have to hide?" □

\* Although the Rockefeller report does not specify which groups were involved, the *Militant* and the American Trotskyists of the Socialist Workers party played a prominent role in raising questions about the official story on Malcolm's death. The *Militant* gave extensive coverage to the trial of the accused killers and pointed to the many suspicious events surrounding the assassination and trial. Week after week the *Militant* pointed to the possibility of government responsibility for the murder.

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## Was Lumumba Assassination a CIA Job?



Lumumba, hands bound behind his back, after capture by Mobutu's troops in December 1960.

The Central Intelligence Agency drew up a plan to assassinate Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba in 1960, according to "authoritative intelligence sources" quoted by Nicholas Horrock in the June 21 *New York Times*.

One informant said that an experienced senior intelligence officer was assigned by the agency to "examine the possibilities of assassinating Mr. Lumumba." Although this source admitted that the study was carried out, he claimed that no action was taken to put it into operation.

However, Horrock reported that another source "acknowledged that the United States had secretly supplied material support to Mr. Lumumba's enemies." Horrock's sources also said that the CIA was considering various methods of removing Lumumba at the time the assassination study was ordered.

Whatever the direct means, Washington's aim was soon carried out. Lumumba was deposed as premier of the Congo (now called Zaïre) in a coup led by President Kasavubu and Colonel Mobutu that began on September 14, 1960, just a few months after the country won its independence from Belgium. The coup had the support of Washington and the United Nations "peace-keeping force" that Lumumba had mistakenly invited in to help keep order.

Lumumba was arrested, and he and two companions—Maurice Mpolo, minister of youth, and Joseph Okito, the vice-president of the Senate—were handed over to the Belgian-backed government of breakaway Katanga Province headed by Moïse

Tshombe. The three were sent to Elisabethville (now called Lubumbashi) for "safe-keeping" aboard a DC-4 plane. *Time* magazine reported that they were blindfolded, shackled, and beaten savagely with rifle butts.

On February 10, 1961, Munongo, the Katangan minister of the interior, announced that Lumumba and his two companions had "escaped." On February 13 the government said they had been "massacred" by the inhabitants of an unnamed village.

Few believed this story. An article by Joseph Hansen in the February 20 issue of the American revolutionary-socialist news-weekly the *Militant* charged that they were murdered in cold blood. There were rumors for days before that they were already dead, and neither the Red Cross nor UN officials were allowed to visit them.

The account released by the Katangan government changed three times in three days. At first the three were said to have overpowered their two guards at an isolated farmhouse. The next story was that UN Moroccan troops with "light brown skins" appeared on the scene and ordered their release. When the killing was admitted, the Moroccan troops vanished from the script.

Later that year the UN appointed a commission to investigate. It concluded that the weight of evidence was against the official version. The commission said it believed Lumumba and his two companions were killed on January 17, not February 12, and that "in all probability," Munongo and Tshombe were witnesses to the murder. □

### The Case of the Iranian 21

[The following interview was given to Evelyn Smith in London June 9 by a member of the Committee for the Defence of the Iranian 21.]

*Question. What are the facts in the case of the Iranian 21?*

*Answer.* On April 19 the news was released by the Iranian press that nine prominent political prisoners had been shot and killed by the police "while trying to escape."<sup>1</sup> It was strongly suspected that the prisoners had in fact died under torture. The Iranian authorities have refused to turn their bodies over to their relatives or to allow an independent coroner to examine them to determine the cause of death.

To protest these brutal murders and to draw public attention to the appalling conditions of Iranian political prisoners, the Iranian Students Society in Great Britain began a daily picket in front of the Iranian embassy April 22.

Meanwhile, news coming out of Iran showed that inside the country, despite the climate of ruthless repression, the murder of the nine had led to the first signs of a mass protest. Amnesty International received reports that over 5,000 prisoners at Qasr prison in Tehran began a hunger strike in protest of the murders.

In Tehran and Isfahan, clashes took place between the police and demonstrators, leading to over 100 arrests. It is now suspected that at least six people were killed in the clashes. The minister of education, following the advice of SAVAK [the shah's secret police], ordered the closing of most major Iranian universities to avert student demonstrations.

It was in this context that on April 29, twenty-one members of the Confederation of Iranian Students, having picketed the Iranian embassy for over a week, staged a peaceful sit-in inside the embassy.

They demanded that the Iranian government allow an international medical and legal commission to examine the bodies of the nine prisoners and investigate prison conditions.

Within ten minutes a squad of armed British police arrested the twenty-one. They were taken to the Gerald Road police station and held there until May 1, when they were brought before the Bow Street Magistrate Court on charges of "conspiracy to trespass."

While they were in police custody their



Andrew Wiard/Report

London demonstration May 26.

homes were raided by the police, and a quantity of documents, pamphlets, and other literature was confiscated. They were refused bail and sent to Brixton prison until May 8, when they were to reappear before the court. In protest against their treatment and in solidarity with the hunger strikers in Qasr prison, they began a hunger strike of their own.

On May 8 they were freed on an unusually high bail of £500 each [£1=US\$2.28]. Their passports were held, they were not allowed to leave London, and they had to report to the police every day. On May 29 they appeared before the court once again. This time some of the restrictions imposed May 8 were removed, but the bail was increased to £750 each. They are to reappear before the court again July 16, when the committal hearings will begin.

*Q. What does "conspiracy to trespass" mean?*

A. In Britain it is not a crime to

trespass—just an "unlawful act" for which one could be sued or for which a court could issue a prevention order. By using the conspiracy laws the courts have been able to invent a new crime out of the blue. Trespassing is not criminal, but conspiracy to trespass is. It carries an unlimited prison term and fine, and it does not require much evidence to prove. The labor movement has learned the hard way through the Shrewsbury building workers case<sup>2</sup> what a powerful political weapon the conspiracy laws are in the hands of the ruling class.

If the twenty-one are convicted they would be liable to deportation under the racist Immigration Act. If deported they would face certain imprisonment and torture, and possible death at the hands of the Iranian dictatorship. Thus the repressive arm of the shah's dictatorship has now been extended to Britain.

*Q. What sort of campaign is being built to defend the twenty-one?*

A. Over twenty organizations are participating in the defense committee, including Amnesty International, National Council of Civil Liberties, National Union of Students, General Union of Arab Students, International Marxist Group, All London Squatters, International Socialists, All National Workers Committee, and Iranian Students Society in Great Britain.

Local defense committees have also been set up in many universities in London, including the London School of Economics, Chelsea College, Queen Mary College, Brunel University, Polytechnic of Central London, Imperial College, and the Architectural Association. Outside London local committees now exist in Brighton, Canterbury, Swansea, Birmingham, Bradford, Leeds, Reading, Sheffield, and Manchester.

The committee has organized two pickets in front of the Bow Street Court, on May 8 and May 29. A demonstration in London May 26 brought out several hundred people, some on buses organized by defense committees in other cities.

Public meetings have been held up and down the country with representatives of the defense committee. A meeting held in London May 21 drew over 100 people.

Many Labour MPs were lobbied, and a motion of support signed by nine of them is now being put to the House of Commons. We also had a good response from the trade-union movement. Resolutions of support have been passed in many union branches and trade councils.

*Q. What are you projecting for future activities?*

A. The defendants are to appear once

1. See *Intercontinental Press*, May 12, p. 616.

2. See *Intercontinental Press*, February 17, p. 220.

again before the Bow Street Court on July 16. If the director of public prosecution does not drop the charges—and we are organizing a wide publicity campaign leading up to a picket in front of the court to give him added incentives to do so—a date will

probably be set for the actual hearing. From now until that date we intend to organize an extensive defense campaign.

We are going to use the draft motion signed by Labour MPs and trade unionists as a petition to collect signatures of MPs,

trade unionists, and other prominent individuals. We are publishing a short pamphlet on the case, explaining the repressive nature of the shah's regime and details on the extensive collaboration of the British government. □

## New Zealand Young Socialists Hold First National Conference

The First National Conference of the Young Socialists held April 25-27 at Victoria University in Wellington marked an encouraging step forward for Trotskyism in New Zealand. About 130 young persons from the six main cities of New Zealand attended the plenary sessions, workshops, and panels. Ninety registered for the entire conference.

Outgoing National Secretary Mike Tucker underlined the significance of the occasion in his introductory remarks:

"Out of the youthful protest movement of the 1960s and '70s that grew up in response to New Zealand and United States interference in Indochina, and in solidarity with the Vietnamese national liberation movement, many different organizations have been established and joined by young people in this country who wanted to try and do something to make a better world. Most of these organizations remain little known, were based mainly on the universities, and have not lasted.

"The fact that the Young Socialists, since its formation as a nationally coordinated group almost three years ago, has managed to grow in size, and to be able to lead important political struggles, is testimony to the ability of revolutionary-socialist ideas to provide the answers to the questions that young people are asking about this world in which we live."

The conference participants discussed and adopted a political resolution entitled "The Continuing Radicalization of Youth." Outgoing YS National Coordinator Peter Rotherham gave the report on this resolution. A report on "How the Young Socialists Is Organized," given by Mike Tucker, was also adopted, together with a constitution for the organization.

Two important areas of concern to the YS were then discussed. Gillian Goodger reported on the women's liberation movement and the different political perspectives within it. Andre Raihman spoke about "The Fight Against Racism in New Zealand," describing the struggle of the Maori people against European domination from the earliest times to the present.

Attendance at the conference was boosted by a nationwide tour by Nan Bailey, a Black feminist and leader of the Young Socialist Alliance in the United States. Bailey spoke on the struggle for Black liberation, women's rights, and socialism,

and received widespread press coverage. Her talks at the YS conference were among the highlights of the three-day program. Participating in an international panel at the conference was Peter Conrick, a leader of the Australian Socialist Youth Alliance.

A panel discussion on Southeast Asia featured two Malaysian student leaders, Robert Pui and J.H. Chew, who discussed repression in Malaysia and Singapore and how New Zealanders can help defend democratic rights in that part of the world.

One of the most important items of the conference was a report on "Tasks and Perspectives for the YS" given by Tony Lane. He drew together many of the ideas proposed and discussed in panels, in workshops, and from the Socialist Action League's opening election campaign rally held the previous night (see report elsewhere in this issue). "The YS is pledging complete support for the Socialist Action election campaign," Lane said. "We see it as our number one priority from now until the end of the year."

Lane emphasized the need for consistent work on university campuses as the key to establishing strong YS branches in as many centers as possible. The report also projected an extensive education program and a fund drive for NZ\$1,000 (NZ\$1=US\$1.34) to sustain the YS national center.

## New Zealand Socialists Launch Election Campaign

The New Zealand Socialist Action League's campaign for the 1975 general elections was launched at an enthusiastic rally in Wellington April 26. The League is running four candidates for Parliament, and the campaign is also calling for the reelection of a Labour government.

The 100 persons who attended the rally heard speeches from the candidates and a series of guest speakers. Mike Treen spoke on behalf of the Young Socialists, who plan to devote major efforts to supporting the campaign in the coming months.

Peter Conrick of the Australian Socialist Youth Alliance, and Nan Bailey, who is youth director of the 1976 U.S. Socialist Workers party presidential campaign, gave greetings to the rally. John Colquhoun, a longtime socialist from Auckland, spoke of the early Labour party leaders' commitment

to socialism, contrasting it with the conservative attitudes and actions of their counterparts today.

At the end of the conference, a new national leadership was elected, consisting of a National Council of nine full and three alternate members. Mike Tucker was elected national coordinator; and Tony Lane, national secretary.

The conference heard greetings from a number of other young revolutionary-socialist groups—in India, Ireland, Germany, Japan, the United States, Australia, Greece, Canada, Ceylon, and China. The message from the Revolutionary Communist Youth of China, based in Hong Kong, pointed out the optimistic prospects for revolutionary socialism throughout the world today:

"The recent victory gained by the Vietnamese and Indochinese people has further indicated the characteristics of our epoch. The defeat of American imperialism in Indochina will surely inspire a new rise of struggle of the oppressed masses. We are heading towards a new stage of revolt.

"Our task is to bring this message to the youth. Our task is to convince thousands of youth fighting for their liberation. Our task is to educate and win young people to the banner of revolutionary Marxism.

"The foundation of the Young Socialists is a further step to that way. . . . Long live the Young Socialists!" □

A highlight of the evening was the appeal for campaign funds, which raised NZ\$4,282 (NZ\$1=US\$1.34) in cash and pledges for the campaign effort.

The socialist candidates—Kay Goodger, Russell Johnson, Brigid Mulrennan, and Matt Robson—are all running in strong Labour electorates. Johnson is opposing Labour Minister of Immigration Fraser Colman.

Ranging in age from twenty-three to twenty-eight, the candidates have long been active in the socialist movement and in the many movements of protest that developed in New Zealand in recent years, including the struggle against the Vietnam War, the women's liberation movement, and the fight for the right to abortion. □

## The Growing Movement for Independence in East Timor

By Jill Jolliffe

CANBERRA—East Timor is one Portuguese colony which has received little attention in the international press since the April 25, 1974, Lisbon coup, when the Armed Forces Movement (MFA—Movimento das Forças Armadas) declared a policy of decolonization. The Timorese themselves describe their country as a "forgotten country." Indeed, its small proportions (14,953 square kilometres) and population (650,000) make it easy to overlook.

It has, nevertheless, recently received some attention in the Australian press and has been the object of a number of demonstrations by students and workers.

Since the April 25 coup, this tiny country which has been colonized by Portugal for 450 years has had the unwanted attention of the Indonesian generals. In an incident earlier this year, 200 East Timorese were sent over the border at Atsabe for military training. They were sent by a chief who had been bribed by Apodeti (Associação Popular Democrática Timorese—People's Democratic Association of Timor), the local party sponsored by the Indonesians to advocate integration with West (Indonesian) Timor. They are now believed to be interned there.

Rumours of Indonesian military manoeuvres on the border are common in East Timor, and the Indonesians have recently announced a road-building programme for West Timor, which will involve construction of a main road between the capital, Kupang, and the East Timorese border (*Indonesia Times*, February 26). Construction will be by the army and appears to be the first attention Jakarta has paid to West Timor's moribund economy in many years. Radio Kupang now beams broadcasts into East Timor in the local dialects, threatening the people, accusing the leaders of the newly formed independence movement of being "Communist subversives," and telling them that they will be "lost" and helpless when the Portuguese withdraw. Each broadcast is prefaced with a burst of machine-gun fire.

Concern at the possibility of Indonesian aggression has not been allayed by the Australian government. In September 1974 Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam visited Indonesia, and in what is now regarded by Australian commentators as a massive diplomatic blunder, assured President Suharto that Australia would not oppose the incorporation of Portuguese Timor into the Indonesian Republic. He concurred with the Indonesian view that an independent East Timor would be a "threat to the stability of the region." He added the rather limp proviso that this must be done only with the agreement of the Timorese themselves.

If it was a blunder it was a consistent one—since coming to power in December 1972 the Australian Labor government has pursued and consolidated a no-political-strings-attached alliance with the Indonesian generals. Australian civil service libraries currently bulge with publications on Indonesia to feed the ever-increasing stream of trade delegations, advisers, and military personnel on Australian government business in Indonesia. Australian naval forces have recently conducted joint manoeuvres with Indonesian forces in the Java Sea. A few meek bleats of concern at Indonesia's treatment of its thousands of political prisoners have been Whitlam's only concessions to protests from the left of the Australian Labor party and the labour movement generally at his appeasement policies.

East Timor lies at the very eastern tip of the Indonesian archipelago, just 620 kilometres from Darwin, Australia. It is about the same distance south of Ambon, the centre of a movement in the South Moluccas for secession from Indonesia. The terrain is mountainous apart from coastal lowland in the southwest and on the eastern tip of the territory, and the vegetation tropical. Staple crops are maize and rice. Portuguese is spoken in most parts of East Timor, but especially in the cities. The main indigenous dialect is Tetum, spoken by approximately 80 percent of the population. Animist religions predominate in the villages, although the Portuguese presence has meant that Catholicism is now widespread.

East Timor was first colonized by the Portuguese for its now nonexistent rich forests of sandalwood. From time to time the Dutch have competed with the Portuguese for colonial domination. While they successfully ousted the Portuguese in some areas of the South Moluccas, they never succeeded in East Timor. The captain of a Dutch brig which called at East Timor in the 1830s to report on the state of the colony to the Dutch government wrote:

The land would produce abundantly were the indolent Portuguese to turn their attention to agriculture, or to encourage the natives to do so; but they prefer seeing the innocent natives carried off from their peaceful homes in the hills, that they may profit by their sale, to allowing them to better their condition by their labour and agricultural skill.

(D.H. Kolff, *Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga*. London, 1840)

The Portuguese governor offered the captain two Timorese children, in irons, for sale. Until the Lisbon coup, Portuguese attitudes to the Timorese had not altered drastically since that time. An official from the Australian War Graves Commission who visited East Timor in 1947 reported the existence of slave labour. Another Australian official who was stationed there more recently for some years reported that a Timorese was burnt at the stake under the orders of a Portuguese administrator, who was subsequently brought before a court for his action. His punishment was to be transferred to the customs department.

Cultural oppression and neglect have been largely responsible for the inability of agricultural production to meet the needs of the people. The Portuguese have cultivated coffee as a cash crop monoculture. Traditional tribal structures (caste systems) and accompanying primitive methods of cultivation (the digging stick is the main means of tilling the soil) also play their part.

The marks of poverty and malnutrition are widespread, tuberculosis and malaria being the main diseases. The average Timorese life span appears to be about sixty years and the infant mortality rate around 50 percent. No accurate figures are available because local record-keeping is inadequate and the Portuguese have for decades refused concerned international agencies like the World Health Organization entry into the country. Health facilities are almost nonexistent: less than twenty doctors serve the population of 650,000 and most of these are stationed in Dili, the capital.

In a country that cannot feed its own people, problems of malnutrition and health have been compounded by the colonialist administration's neglect of public works. There is no trafficable road system, and bridges—necessary to cross dangerously swollen rivers in the wet season—have either never been built or have fallen down and not been repaired. In 1973, 500 tons of corn was destroyed because it could not be transported. Famine in one part





March 15 demonstration. Banner reads: "Only one power: the people. Only one party: FRETILIN. Only one aim: independence."

of the island can coexist with overproduction in another area.

Illiteracy is judged to be around 90 percent. There are only two state secondary-educational institutions in the country and no tertiary institutions.

The average per capita income in East Timor is estimated to be 1,000 escudos or about US\$42 a year, probably the lowest in the Southeast Asian region. India's average per capita income, by comparison, is approximately \$135 a year.

There is a small work force, although the dominant mode of production is subsistence agriculture. Drivers, wharf labourers, building workers, and process workers in light industry like coffee processing and packing comprise the hard core of manual labourers. Administrative workers account for about 2,000 of the work force.

If income is low, prices certainly are not. Timorese shops are almost all owned by the Chinese merchant class and prices are at least as high as Australian prices. As a result, there is some anti-Chinese feeling. The Chinese jealously guard their privileged position. They operate their own school system, keep themselves socially apart, and wear a prosperity that sharply contrasts with local poverty. Politically, they are pro-Taiwan.

Glaring inequities of this sort abound, and examples of the Marxist law of combined and uneven development are common. Outside Baucau, the second biggest township, buffaloes loll in waterholes by the side of the road where peasants walk long distances to and from market; less than a kilometre away is a lavish international airport. Built by the local administration under pressure from Portuguese businessmen who wish to attract foreign capital to East Timor, its use is basically confined to the Trans-Australian Airlines Darwin-Baucau flights and the light


aircraft used for domestic travel. Similarly, it is quite common to see modern sewing machines in traditional thatched huts—a seemingly irrelevant luxury, especially as most traditional Timorese clothes are wrapped and tied, without seams. These machines cost about 3,000 escudos (US\$125) and are imported by Chinese businessmen.

\* \* \*

The Timorese have never accepted the brutalities of Portuguese colonialism; contrary to popular mythology a number of anticolonialist uprisings have taken place. In 1912 a Timorese chief, D. Bonaventura, led a movement of armed resistance against the Portuguese in the Manu-Fahi district in the southwest. The insurgents held out for two years, at considerable loss of life, and Bonaventura is now regarded as a folk hero by the contemporary anticolonialist movement. In 1959 an uprising against Portuguese rule occurred in the Viqueque region. It was associated with a number of political refugees from the South Moluccas secessionist movement which was at that time being crushed by the Indonesians. Local anticolonialists insist, however, that it was a genuine indigenous movement against the Portuguese, despite attempts to characterize it otherwise. There was a further insurgency in the early 1960s.

After April 25, 1974, the anticolonialist movement which had worked in the preceding years under conditions of illegality surfaced and began to work legally. Timorese who had thought deeply about the plight of their country emerged to assume leadership positions. The first strike of Timorese wage earners was organized by one such figure, José Ramos Horta. It won a

wage of 25 escudos (\$1.04) a day for lower administration workers in Dili. The group that won the strike was then known as the Committee for the Defence of Labour. A very small group then, it now wields enormous influence as the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (Fretilin—Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente). Early in its development it recruited



Washington Post

to its ranks Xavier do Amaral, a Timorese with considerable personal following. He has been active in the cause of his people since he left the Jesuit priesthood after the 1959 Viqueque uprising, in which his village was directly involved.

Aggressive Indonesian behaviour towards the possibility of East Timorese independence led the independence movement to attempt to inform and involve Australians in events there, in the hope that the Australian government could be influenced to take a strong stand against Indonesian interference. Timorese apprehensions were at their height in the period immediately after the Darwin cyclone of December 25, 1974. At that time both telecommunications and air travel between Australia and East Timor were cut, and some Australian observers felt that there was a very real possibility that the Indonesians would move. The independence movement invited a delegation of parliamentarians, trade unionists, students, and community representatives to visit East Timor to judge the political feeling of the people for themselves. The final result was two delegations: The first, visiting from March 12 to 20, consisted primarily of labour movement people—trade unionists, students, a representative from the Black movement, and other community representatives. The second, visiting March 17 to 21, consisted entirely of Labor party parliamentarians.

From their observations it was clear that the movement against colonialism and for independence was of massive proportions, based on deepgoing popular support. The first delegation was met at Dili airport by a Fretilin-organized demonstration of tens of thousands of Timorese, a pattern which was to repeat itself for the rest of the visit. In particular, demonstrations of similar size occurred in the territory of Oe Cussi, which is an enclave situated in West (Indonesian) Timor, and in Suai, close to the border in the southwest, an area of the rural poor. Everywhere the delegations traveled, they found Fretilin fever—against Indonesian colonialism, against Portuguese colonialism, for independence.

Fretilin's popular following is based on its comprehensive programme for social improvement. In a country where malnutrition is rife, where the people live at less than subsistence level, and have been culturally and psychologically intimidated for 450

years, Fretilin offers the possibility of economic self-sufficiency, literacy, cultural dignity, and self-respect. Its leaders are people of integrity who have deep roots among the people. They are intelligent, competent, and command enormous respect.

Xavier do Amaral in particular is a magnetic populist leader. A tiny, very dark man who has a habit of carrying a large cassette recorder around with him on which he alternates bad Western music with traditional Timorese music, he is mobbed by people wherever he goes. He cannot pass through a village in the Fretilin jeep without stopping to talk to people. When he speaks at mass demonstrations the whole crowd listens. After leaving the priesthood he became a schoolteacher and children proudly boast that Xavier used to teach them.

Whereas Xavier do Amaral's politics are based on an open rapport with the people, José Ramos Horta is a more inward-looking man whose influences have been predominantly intellectual, coexisting with a passionate nationalism. His greatest influence has been the anticolonialist experience of the Portuguese African colonies (he spent some time in political exile in Mozambique, where he worked as a journalist) and his relating it to Timor.

But to dwell on personalities is to downgrade the politics of the situation. If the personalities of the Fretilin leadership are important it is because of the popular aspirations they represent. They are the new Timorese—educated, urban-based.

The main aspects of the Fretilin campaign are a literacy campaign conducted in Tetum; the organization of students, youth, workers, and women; and the organization of a number of agricultural cooperatives. Fretilin also has its own radio programme. On Wednesday evenings from 7 to 9 p.m. it propagates its politics and plays traditional Timorese music on government Radio Dili.

The Fretilin literacy campaign is the key to its successful political organization. Conducted in Tetum and largely organized by student cadres, the campaign employs the anticolonialist methods of Paolo Friere. Friere argues that in attempting to achieve literacy among Third World people, the medium in which they learn to read—*what* they learn to read—ranks equally in importance with the fact that they learn to read. Thus the Fretilin literacy handbook is illustrated with drawings from Timor's history of colonial oppression. It ends with the Fretilin anthem "Ramelau." Mount Ramelau is East Timor's highest peak; the Portuguese used to boast that it was the highest peak in Portugal. Now Fretilin has returned Ramelau to the disinherited Timorese people. "Hey! Mount Ramelau!" run the opening lines, "What is higher than you? Why have the Timorese people always bowed their heads? Awake! The top of the mountain is light. Awake! A new day has come already." Everywhere one goes in East Timor the people now sing "Ramelau," and it is a symbol of the struggle against illiteracy as part of the struggle for a new life.

Fretilin has also organized the Workers Union. The first Australian delegation attended a 1,000-strong meeting of this union. Members of the Workers Union appear to be one of the most militant forces in the independence movement. It is organized on a One Big Union principle and includes all Timorese workers from wharf labourers to schoolteachers. This year the Timorese celebrated May Day for the first time in their history.

Of comparable political importance within the anticolonialist movement is Unetim (União Nacional Estudantes de Timor), the Fretilin-organized national union of Timorese students. The center of Unetim is the Technical School in Dili, where a number of dedicated and politically developed students distribute anticolonialist literature, organize demonstrations, and further the literacy campaign. Unetim delegates are organized throughout the country. Unetim tends to play a vanguard role at demonstrations, and the Unetim manifesto includes a number of demands



Mass demonstration March 15 to greet Australian fact-finding delegation invited by East Timor independence movement.

for antipaternalistic educational methods and staff-student control of learning institutions.

Fretilin is also pledged to establish a women's organization. This has not yet been done, although a number of militant women are involved in the education movement. Timorese women are faced with the problems of a traditional tribal culture in which polygamy is practised and marriage is arranged along dowry principles. This culture is in turn overlaid with the influence of Portuguese Catholicism.

There can clearly be no solution to the crippling social problems of East Timor without agrarian reform. Although Fretilin has piloted a number of apparently successful agricultural cooperatives, it does not appear to have coherent long-term notions of agrarian reform. In particular, it has not yet come to grips with the question of land ownership. This is partly because the party tends to operate politically through village chiefs, who are often avid Fretilin supporters, having had more access to education than most Timorese.

Fretilin is primarily a democratic, nationalist, anticolonialist party which advances a programme of social reform.

The party proposes, for example, to replace the present iniquitous poll tax (which places great hardship on the peasants) with a system of progressive taxation based on income. Similarly, Fretilin's internal notepaper bears the slogans: "Do povo, com o povo, para o povo" (Of the people, with the people, for the people) and "Por um Timor melhor!" (For a better Timor!).

The Fretilin leadership is still relatively unformed politically; the problem of isolation from the outside world is an enormous one. Internationalist influence has been fairly well confined to contact with Australians, with Lisbon, and with the Portuguese African colonies. The only comparable political experience which

has been absorbed has been that of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola.

As a national liberation movement Fretilin represents a massive popular movement. It has set in motion, and is part of, a social process that is now unlikely to be halted or reversed. It has struck a chord in the hearts of the Timorese people with its programme for social improvement, and the movement it represents is gathering momentum at an enormous rate. From a small group that organized the first strike in East Timorese history soon after the Lisbon coup of April 25, 1974, Fretilin has in one year grown into a political movement that effectively wields power in East Timor.

There is only one other party of any significance—the União Democrática Timorense (UDT—Democratic Union of Timorese). When it first emerged as a force after April 25 it had much wider support. Organized by people who are typically Portuguese/Timorese higher-level administration workers, small farmers, and coffee-plantation owners, it was initially pro-Portuguese. Its members had in common that they were the few who had prospered under Portuguese colonial rule. It probably also had a wider apron of support at that time from Timorese who feared the insecurity of Portuguese withdrawal.

When the Portuguese administration was insistent on the question of decolonization, it was no longer possible for UDT to remain pro-Portuguese. Hence its political platform now supports independence. As a result of this change of political stance it entered into a coalition with Fretilin in February and has subsequently adopted an increasingly anticolonialist rhetoric.

Despite the more radical tone of its leaders' speeches, the social base of UDT support appears to have dwindled rapidly during the past months. The most support it would have in any one region is

10 to 15 percent and that in areas of formerly greater Portuguese contact—where there were large administration centres or army barracks. Particular evidence that the situation has undergone rapid change was found by the first Australian delegation when it visited Maubisse, which they were told was formerly mainly pro-UDT. The welcoming demonstration March 15 displayed about 90 percent Fretilin support with only a few UDT banners dotted through the crowd (support for one party is in inverse proportion to support for the other).

Both Australian delegations found very little evidence of any indigenous support for Apodeti. It has all the hallmarks of an externally organized political grouping; the Indonesian consul in Dili is one of its main spokespersons.

The UDT-Fretilin coalition stemmed from the belief that a united front against Indonesian aggressive intentions was necessary. The coalition, however, is more of a popular front than a united front.

Active support for Fretilin is of massive proportions at the moment, whereas UDT support is rapidly diminishing. UDT appears to be a spent political force. Yet Fretilin, at the height of its power, seems to be voluntarily ceding that power to UDT through the coalition, which promises a disproportionate one-third of power to UDT in a transitional government. UDT represents the only semblance of a local bourgeoisie that can exist in a country like East Timor. The UDT leadership is making the most of a (for them) unfavorable political climate by coalescing with Fretilin. That climate is very changeable at the moment. The future of East Timor currently hangs in the balance, to be affected by many factors other than the will of the Timorese people—the expediencies of Australian foreign policy, Portuguese domestic politics, and factional power struggles in Jakarta. Fretilin reliance on UDT could have disastrous consequences in a changed political situation.

Fretilin leaders are tight-lipped about the reasons for the coalition and some probably hold serious private doubts about it. They are acutely conscious of their present desperate isolation internationally—if a rationale were given, it would probably be that. The future of the coalition, from latest reports, looks rather shaky. Ultimately Fretilin's only trusted ally in the struggle for social change is the Timorese people themselves. Likewise, on an external level, solidarity from the international working-class movement and in particular the Australian working-class movement will finally be more decisive than diplomatic promises extracted from the Whitlam or any other government.

One other major factor in Timor's future is its reliance on the outcome of events in Portugal. The Armed Forces Movement shows perhaps its best face in the Portuguese colonies, often leading to the assumption by local governments that the decolonization process is assured. After the elections, it must now be plain that power in Portugal is far from secure for the left.

It is conceivable that even a conservative MFA-dominated regime could continue support for decolonization, for its own reasons. One feature of the MFA is its belief that for the establishment of a "modern" regime in Portugal decolonization is necessary—the colonial war was an economic drain. This, however, does not take into account the possibility of a right-wing restoration.

The present governor of East Timor, Colonel Lemos Pires, is identified with the Spínola wing of the MFA, having served with Spínola in Guinea-Bissau. Recent reports indicate that a number of crack paratroopers were flown into East Timor on April 9. As members of the Portuguese air force they are responsible directly to Pires and not to the army hierarchy there. Ostensibly, they are there to keep order during the transitional process, but in the event of an Indonesian invasion, the Portuguese will have little choice but to fight on the side of the Timorese.

It is common knowledge in Australian foreign affairs circles at the moment that current policy calls for turning a blind eye to future Indonesian aggression in the area. The Whitlam government will not sacrifice its alliance with Jakarta for the sake of 650,000 Timorese.

Australian government policy will without doubt be a key determining factor for Indonesia, and the sounds that are now coming from Jakarta are ominous, after a period of temporary lull. Ali Murtopo has been appointed "Project Officer for the Acquisition of East Timor," and Australian observers in Jakarta report that it is regarded as a matter of course that "acquisition" will occur. The generals are extremely sensitive to rumblings from the outlying regions of the republic. The South Moluccas secessionist movement has never been successfully crushed; reports have also just come to hand of substantial guerrilla activity in West Irian, where the Indonesians have intervened militarily.

The history of Australian relations with East Timor is a shabby one, despite trumpeting about the mutual role of Timorese and Australians in Timor during World War II. At the close of the war in fact an influential parliamentary lobby argued for the annexation of East Timor. A Defence Department paper was written titled "Re-occupation of Portuguese Timor." Present attitudes are an extension of that history. Extreme right-wing circles within Australia, invoking the former military tie, are attempting to influence certain sections of the independence movement to come to an accommodation with Apodeti in order to appease the Indonesians on the one hand and to "fight Communism" in East Timor on the other.

There is mounting pressure within the Labor party for a changed policy. The six parliamentarians who visited Timor have constituted themselves as a de facto pressure group within the Labor party's parliamentary caucus. There is a small but growing extraparliamentary movement to support the independence movement, which is working to publicise the Indonesian threat. Suharto's April visit to Australia for talks with Whitlam (in which East Timor was low on the list of topics for discussion) was met by a militant demonstration of unionists and students in Townsville.

The presence of oil and probably other mineral resources upgrades Timor as a prize in international power politics. The London-based Woodside-Burmah Company made an offshore oil strike near Suai in March, and Australia's BHP has been conducting geological surveys for some time. Fretilin policy on mineral resources is to demand equity, a policy which will endear them less to potential interferers. The present policy provides open house for oil companies.

From William Lane onward, the leaders of the Australian labour movement (like the rest of Australian society) have traditionally ignored Asia and looked towards the great metropolises of Europe and America. They have shared complicity not only in the repression of the Australian Aborigines but also of the peoples of Southeast Asia.

In building links with the people of the colonial and semicolonial countries on Australia's doorstep, Australian internationalists must give new thought to their regional role. Identification with the vanguard of urbanized socialist movements in the metropolitan capitalist countries should not preclude working to extend the boundaries of the local movement. Not since the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Movement initiated by the Third International in 1926 (and which survived a mere four years) has any serious approach been made by the Australian socialist movement to build regional organs of socialist solidarity.

The need to build a campaign of working-class solidarity in Australia with the national liberation movement in East Timor is pressing. It is one step towards building a movement of international solidarity □

# OUT NOW!

## Chapter 3

### The May Second Movement

By Fred Halstead

The first wave of campus demonstrations against the war in Vietnam occurred in the fall of 1963 during a tour of the U.S. by Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu, wife of the head of the South Vietnamese secret police and sister-in-law of President Diem. The Buddhist demonstrations against the regime in South Vietnam earlier that year had affected the American population. Mme. Nhu was notorious for—among other things—using the term “barbeque” to refer to the self-immolation of Buddhist monks protesting religious persecution by the ruling Catholic family.

The campus demonstrations on the occasion of her visit took place when she appeared at universities as a guest speaker. It is a

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gauge of the times—and of the influence of Francis Cardinal Spellman, who was one of Diem's sponsors—that no opposition appeared to Mme. Nhu's visit at Fordham University. At Columbia, however, a group of 300 jeered her.

The number of demonstrators at other campuses—several organized by SPU chapters—varied from a dozen at Chapel Hill, North Carolina, to several hundred at Madison, Wisconsin, and Ann Arbor, Michigan. At that time there were 14,000 U.S. military personnel acknowledged to be in Vietnam

\* \* \*

In the spring of 1964, when the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam had passed the 20,000 mark, one significant attempt was made by radical groups to mount a united-front protest against the Vietnam intervention. On March 13-15 a symposium on “Socialism in America” was held in New Haven sponsored by the Yale Socialist Union, the first group of its kind to appear on that campus in many years. Some 400 students from East Coast colleges attended and the program included spokespersons from all the major groups in the U.S. calling themselves socialist.

When it became clear that a majority of those present were anxious to protest the war in Vietnam, the conference set up a steering committee to fix a date and organize demonstrations. The time was set for May 2, 1964. The coordinators of the protest, which was to take place in several cities, were Russell Stetler, a Haverford College student who had recently joined SDS; Levi Laub of the Progressive Labor Movement (later Progressive Labor Party); and Peter Camejo of the Young Socialist Alliance. The demonstrations attracted some 600 participants in New York City, 800 in San Francisco, and lesser numbers in several other places.

Following these demonstrations, Laub and other PL members who were on the original steering committee initiated a new organization called the May Second Movement (M-2-M). Its stated

purpose was to oppose imperialism and in particular the war in Vietnam.

In the summer of 1964 M-2-M and another small radical group, Youth Against War and Fascism, sponsored two demonstrations in New York City against the war in Vietnam. On both occasions the demonstrations were scheduled for Times Square in the face of an arbitrary police ban on marches or rallies there. Seventeen were arrested the first time, and a week later, on August 15, the 200 marchers were attacked by police as they attempted to enter the square. More than forty persons were arrested and several brutally clubbed.

Through M-2-M, PL was the first of the radical tendencies to focus on the Vietnam issue as a key to organizing the radicalizing youth. PL's quick eye for a hot issue—a talent its leaders exhibited on more than one occasion—was not sufficient, however, to compensate for the organizational methods they applied in M-2-M, methods taken—by their own acknowledgment—from Stalinist tradition.

While the May 2, 1964, demonstrations had been set up on a united-front basis—including all tendencies that wished to participate—M-2-M was strictly a PL front. It soon became clear that PL deliberately excluded all other organized tendencies from M-2-M, which they nevertheless advertised as a broad movement. There is a world of difference between a united front in which anyone who claims agreement with the matter at hand can participate while maintaining their own political identity, and a front in which one tendency attempts to impose its own particular multi-issue program on a whole movement which has no such homogeneity.

Parties with relatively overwhelming resources and hegemony in the radical movement—like the CP had in the 1930s—can get away with that for a time. (Even then the “success” is ephemeral and generally plays havoc with the cause the front is supposed to promote.) But PL had no such raw power. It attempted to build M-2-M as the student antiwar movement and remained largely isolated from the real mass movement as it actually developed. PL finally dissolved M-2-M early in 1966 when as a central orientation it sent the younger PL members into SDS.

As the saying goes, “There's no sucker like one with a little larceny in his heart.” PL had more than a little as SDS was destined to learn. But that was later.

[Next chapter: *SDS and the Breakthrough*]

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# AROUND THE WORLD



## 7 PST Members Freed in Argentina

Seven members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Argentina) were released from prison in early June. The seven—José Páez, Silvia Díaz, Eduardo Expósito, Alberto Pujals, José Kalauz, Oscar Suárez, and Nilda Carbone—were arrested May 17 during a meeting in Rosario discussing the Villa Constitución metalworkers' strike.

Fourteen members of the PST are still being held without charges by the Argentine executive branch. Some of them have been in prison for more than six months.

## CP Scores Big Gains in Italian Elections

Italy's Communist party scored sweeping gains in the June 15-16 local and regional elections, increasing its share of the total vote almost 6% to 33.4%. The Christian Democrats, Italy's ruling party since World War II, dropped more than 3% to 35.5%.

The CP has now become the largest party in the biggest cities—Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Genoa, and Florence. In the biggest advance made by any party since 1948, it elected 4,000 new town councilmen, 47 new regional councillors, and 163 new provincial representatives.

In addition, according to the government's own estimate, the CP won the vote of 60% of the nearly three million young people allowed to vote for the first time. The minimum voting age was recently lowered from twenty-one to eighteen.

CP General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer hailed the vote returns as an affirmation of the party's policy of "historic compromise" with the Christian Democrats. According to a June 17 dispatch to the *New York Times*, he "declared it was now 'unthinkable' to presume that Italy's many problems could be solved without his party."

## New York Demonstration Protests Arrests in Dominican Republic

A demonstration was held in front of the United Nations June 11 to protest the recent arrest of about 500 critics of the Balaguer regime in the Dominican Republic. Cosponsored by the U.S. Committee for

Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners and several Dominican groups, the action was the first step in a campaign to win the release of the prisoners. The groups intend to focus their efforts on the cases of sixteen trade-union and political activists who have been charged with trying to overthrow the Balaguer dictatorship.

## 500,000 in Zaïre Hold Anti-U.S. Protest

More than 500,000 persons demonstrated in front of the U.S. cultural center in Kinshasa, Zaïre, June 18 in response to reports that Washington had backed a coup attempt against President Mobutu Sese Seko.

The government newspaper *Salongo* reported that six high-ranking army officers and an unspecified number of other persons were arrested on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government. Zaïre ordered U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton to leave the country and is withdrawing its own ambassador from Washington.

## Workers Commissions Candidates Win in Spain's Labor Elections

Candidates supported by the outlawed workers commissions and Communist party made a strong showing in the first week of elections to the Central Nacional Sindicalista (CNS—National Federation of Syndicates). The elections, which began in mid-June, will continue until the end of the month.

Initial results in such key industries as automobile and electronics show the candidates supported by the banned organizations winning 50 to 80 percent of the posts in the Franco regime's substitute for a trade union. They are also reported making a strong showing in other industrial sectors in Madrid and Barcelona.

## 100,000 Basques Strike to Protest Repression

Close to 100,000 workers staged a general strike in the Basque region of Spain June 11. The strike was a protest against the repressive measures there since a state of emergency was declared in Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya April 25. Called by the workers commissions and several groups in the Basque nationalist movement, the strike at

the last minute was also supported by the Basque section of the Communist party and the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), as well as by a number of other left and liberal organizations.

A special focus of the strike was the upcoming trial of Basque nationalists José Antonio Garmendia and Angel Otaegui, who are accused of assassinating a member of the Spanish Civil Guard last year.

## American Mercenaries Fight in Rhodesian Army

About sixty U.S. mercenaries in the pay of the white supremacist Rhodesian regime are fighting African guerrillas in that country, Tapson Mawere, the U.S. representative of the Zimbabwe African National Union, has revealed.

The State Department's desk officer for Rhodesia, Temple Cole, confirmed this on June 21. He said that the recruiter of the mercenaries was Robert K. Brown of "Phoenix Associates," near Denver, Colorado. Brown, in a telephone interview with United Press International, admitted that about 300 persons had responded to his advertisements, but claimed he did not know how many had joined the Rhodesian army.

Mawere also said that the U.S. mercenaries, disguised as South African troops bound for Rhodesia, were being trained at the Quantico Marine base in Virginia. The State Department denied any knowledge of such training.

## Red Cross Confirms Torture of Thieu's Political Prisoners

Widespread torture of political prisoners held by the Thieu regime has been confirmed by a series of reports prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The documents, formerly kept secret at the State Department, were released recently after the government lost a two-year court battle to keep them from the public.

According to the Red Cross reports, between 65,000 and 70,000 political prisoners were held at the height of the war in Vietnam (other sources have put the figure at 200,000).

The ICRC cited cases of prisoners being beaten to death and women prisoners tortured to the point of recurrent hysteria. It

also documented torture by beating and electric shock at the prisoner "collecting points" attached to U.S. military units in the field.

Although no ICRC teams visited the infamous "tiger cages" at the Conson prison, they did find another variant of the "tiger cage" in each barracks unit at Phuquoc. Those cages were about the size of an office desk and were made of barbed wire. Prisoners were forced to crawl into them and remain squatting in the sun.

The ICRC also documented the standard U.S. military practice of taking civilian prisoners during operations and turning them over to South Vietnamese jailers. The reports found continued, systematic brutality against prisoners at the two principal prisoner of war camps, Phuquoc and Quinhon, where U.S. advisers had been stationed since 1967.

### Seven Venezuelan Trotskyists Jailed

The Liga Socialista (LS—Socialist League, Venezuelan section of the Fourth International) has reported a campaign of harassment against the organization. During the last week of May, seven of its members were arrested and questioned while carrying out completely public, legal activities.

One LS member in Valencia, three in Valera, and three in Caracas were arrested while selling *Voz Socialista*, the newspaper of the League, handing out leaflets in solidarity with miners and textile workers, or just walking on the streets near their homes.

The LS stated that it will seek the necessary support and legal defense to prevent the continuation of the harassment. "We will initiate rallies and mobilizations, with the support of other tendencies, among compañeros in the factories, high schools, and universities."

Linking the harassment campaign to the League's efforts to obtain full legal status, the groups said that it would not be intimidated. "We will continue using our legal status to serve the struggles of the workers and the people. We will continue working for socialism," the LS Executive Committee said in a statement on the arrests.

### Park Dictatorship Conscripts 3.5 Million in 'Civil Defense'

The South Korean dictatorship has taken more measures to "mobilize" the population against the "threat of a North Korean attack." In May, the Park regime announced the mobilization of all male high-school and college students into "student defense corps," which is to be carried out by June 30.

The formation of a "civil defense corps" has also been announced. All civilian men

between the ages of seventeen and fifty are to be conscripted, and women "volunteers" will be encouraged to join. The Ministry of Home Affairs estimated that 3.5 million men would undergo training and "education" for up to twenty days a year under the program.

The South Korean regime already has a standing army of 600,000, a reserve force of 2.7 million, and a police force of 40,000 persons.

Other measures designed to tighten control over and surveillance of the civilian population are also to be enacted. New administrative units will be formed on the sub-block level with one supervisor responsible for every five families. Residence card regulations are to be tightened and penalties for violations are to be increased.

### Dutch CP Back in Kremlin Fold

After more than a decade of relative isolation from Moscow, the Dutch Communist party has found its way back into Kremlin favor.

The party's twenty-fifth congress, held in early June, was attended by a delegation from the Soviet CP for the first time in ten years, and Moscow's greetings were read aloud to the delegates.

The estrangement began in 1963, when Paul de Groot, the uncontested leader of the party since 1930, refused to side with either Moscow or Peking in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The party's closest ties in subsequent years were with the Romanian and Korean CPs. De Groot was also critical of Moscow's détente policy, saying it would promote the growth of revanchist sentiment in West Germany—a preoccupation of the Dutch CP.

The reconciliation with Moscow is generally attributed to considerations of domestic policy. De Groot, now seventy-six years old, hopes it will facilitate relations with the Italian, French, and Portuguese Communist parties, and that they will assist the Dutch CP in its push to establish a Popular Front with the Socialist party.

A CP-SP coalition currently administers the municipal government in Amsterdam, where the CP has 16 percent of the popular vote. But in the Netherlands as a whole, the CP vote varies between 3.5 and 4.5 percent of the total.

### Morgentaler Has Heart Attack in Solitary Confinement Cell

Dr. Henry Morgentaler, the Montréal surgeon hounded to jail by the Canadian government for performing abortions, has suffered a second heart attack after being placed naked in an unlit solitary-confinement cell. He has been hospitalized under guard.

Morgentaler has twice been acquitted of



Labor Challenge

MORGENTALER

abortion charges by juries. The first time, in 1973, the Québec Ministry of Justice appealed to a higher court, which reversed the decision, sentencing him to eighteen months imprisonment. This decision was upheld by the Canadian Supreme Court. On June 9, he was again acquitted by a jury on a charge of having performed an illegal abortion. Again the government gave notice it would appeal and announced that he would also have to face ten additional abortion charges as well.

Three hundred persons protesting the Supreme Court decision attended a rally in Ottawa May 24 organized by the Canadian Association for Repeal of the Abortion Laws.

As well as setting off widespread protests over Canada's restrictive abortion laws, Morgentaler's case has also aroused concern over the status of jury verdicts. Former conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker called the proceedings against Morgentaler an "orgy of persecution," and "the grossest travesty of justice I've seen over the years."

The criminal-lawyers association in Ontario denounced the reversal of the jury acquittal. Joe Morris, head of the Canadian Labor Congress, said the Morgentaler case "puts Canada to shame among civilized nations."

### 16 Bangladesh Newspapers Closed

The regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Bangladesh has shut down sixteen of the country's twenty newspapers and has taken control of the last privately owned dailies, the *Washington Post* reported June 17.

# Capitalism Fouls Things Up

## 20,000 Demonstrators Say 'No' to Nuclear Plants

[The following article appeared in the June 2 issue of the Swiss revolutionary-socialist fortnightly *La Brèche*. The translation from the French is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

The international demonstration protesting the nuclear power plants in Fessenheim [in the French department of Alsace] drew 20,000 participants from France, Germany, and Switzerland Sunday, May 25. For most of the protesters it was probably their first demonstration.

Following on the heels of the actions in Marckolsheim (France), Wyhl (West Germany), and Kaiseraugst [Switzerland],<sup>1</sup> the Fessenheim demonstration was a new and concrete example of the regional struggle bringing together French, Germans, and Swiss in protest against nuclear power plants in the Rhine Valley. This is the area that is slated to be the site of the most immense concentration of nuclear power plants in the world, despite the fact that it is one of the most densely populated regions and thereby presents the greatest dangers.

In our opinion an international struggle like this, even though it is not yet linked with workers struggles, shows the way forward for the international workers

struggle against the world capitalist class. It ignores both borders and the color of one's passport.

The demonstration was organized by "associations in Baden [West Germany], France, and Switzerland concerned with protecting the environment." These include the Comité pour la Sauvegarde de Fessenheim et de la Plaine du Rhin (CSFR),<sup>2</sup> the GAK,<sup>3</sup> the residents of Kaiseraugst, and the "Burgerinitiativen" involved in the occupation at Wyhl.

It was the first time the CSFR organized a mass demonstration. The example of Marckolsheim, Wyhl, and Kaiseraugst led them to make this turn after years of protest through the courts, which, as one might expect, produced nothing.

The struggle against the Fessenheim nuclear plants poses problems that are different from the protests at Wyhl and Kaiseraugst. An occupation was out of the question. Construction work for two of the plants has already been completed, and the site for the six proposed plants is fenced off like a concentration camp.

In preparation for the demonstration a massive police apparatus was sent in to

2. Committee for the Protection of Fessenheim and the Rhine Valley.

3. Gewaltfreie Aktion Kaiseraugst—Kaiseraugst Nonviolent Action.

1. See *Intercontinental Press*, June 2, p. 745.



guard the sites. Its scope gave an indication of the capitalists' determination to carry out their nuclear program—three meters of rolled barbed wire behind the fence, a police patrol behind each clump of trees in the vicinity of the plants, armored vehicles, antiriot brigades in the fenced-off area, and reserves from Colmar.

At the end of the demonstration the organizers sent a letter to the authorities demanding the following:

- A halt to construction.
- Publication of all information on the environmental consequences of the Fessenheim nuclear power plants and the industries connected with them, from the uranium mines to the depositories where the radioactive wastes will be stored.
- That the final decision be taken by the people who live in the three countries along the Rhine Valley.
- That they receive a reply by June 15.

The demonstration was held in the afternoon. It consisted of a rally and a march.

In the morning several thousand persons visited the stands put up by various organizations, such as the Gironde-Charente-Dordogne Antinuclear Coordination Collective, which is protesting the Brand-St. Louis nuclear plant in the Gironde; the Belfort-Monbéliard Antinuclear Committee, which is protesting the Pluto



La Brèche

Demonstration in Fessenheim May 25 protesting nuclear power plants. Participants came from France, Germany, and Switzerland.



missile bases; and the PSU,<sup>4</sup> CFDT,<sup>5</sup> and PCF(m-1).<sup>6</sup>

The three sections of the Fourth International—the FCR, GIM, and LMR-RML<sup>7</sup>—distributed 7,000 copies of a joint

4. Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party.

5. Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor.

6. Parti Communiste Français (Marxiste-Léniniste)—French Communist party (Marxist-Leninist).<sup>†</sup>

7. Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire—Revolutionary Communist League (France). Gruppe Internationale Marxisten—International Marxist

leaflet, staffed a stand, and organized a small meeting that was quite successful. They pointed out that capitalist anarchy and the law of profit were responsible for the development of a premature and murderous technology, for the waste of energy, and for the lack of development of alternative sources of energy.

A revolutionary contingent made up of members of the PSU and the Fourth International marched in the demonstration. □

Group (Germany). Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire - Revolutionären Marxistischen Liga—Revolutionary Marxist League (Switzerland).

however, does not agree with reimbursement and even proposes penal sanctions in cases in which a woman places herself "outside the law." The Christian Democrats restricted themselves to favoring abortion in cases of rape, incest, and when the life of the woman is threatened. The PSI [Partito Socialista Italiano—Italian Socialist party] added to this list abortions for therapeutic reasons or social considerations.

On the other hand, the MLD [Movimento di Liberazione della Donna—Women's Liberation Movement] and the far left are organizing against the repressive law, sometimes drawing in the Radical party and the PSI. Demonstrations have been held against the police raid on the Radical party clinic in Florence. United abortion committees are now being set up in several northern towns. If they can be coordinated, it would be possible to mount a mass campaign on a countrywide scale.

In the Netherlands, the law is repressive (similar to the law of 1920). But abortion is tolerated, which has permitted the establishment of a number of private clinics that perform abortions on an assembly-line basis (particularly for foreigners) and thus make enormous profits.

In Belgium and in Luxembourg, repressive laws have forced women wanting abortions to either go abroad or obtain illegal abortions. In 1972, Doctor Peers of Belgium, who performed inexpensive abortions, was prosecuted. A defense campaign was carried out at the time, mainly by the Communist party.

In Spain, the fascist legal code outlaws abortion. The possibilities for mass struggle on this issue are limited, given the need to work under clandestine conditions.

In Portugal, the fascist anti-abortion laws have not been repealed. MLAC sent a team in April to begin training militants in the Karman method at the public hospital in Lisbon. The struggle is still in its early stages. It is being led by the women's movement and by a movement calling for free abortion on demand that has just been set up.

The April 19-20 meeting points to the possibility of campaigns on a Europe-wide scale. Already its participants are engaged in building the following:

- Support for the June 21 demonstration in Britain.
- A week of meetings in Portugal at the end of July, leading to larger actions.
- A mass meeting on a Europe-wide scale in Milan this autumn. □

## Women Demand Right to Choose

### Struggle for Abortion on Rise Across Europe

[The following article, signed Thalou, appeared in the May 2 issue of *Rouge*, the French Trotskyist weekly. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

The struggle for freedom of abortion has not ended in 1975. In fact, "International Women's Year" has witnessed a reaffirmation of women's struggle against their position in capitalist society.

In France, the mass mobilization organized by MLAC [Mouvement pour la Liberté de l'Avortement et de la Contraception—Movement for Freedom of Abortion and Contraception] has forced the government to retreat and grant a "liberal" law. But the problem is still far from resolved. An abortion costs 400 to 700 francs [1 franc=US\$0.25]; abortions are permitted only during the first ten weeks of pregnancy; minors and immigrants are excluded under the new law; and the hospitals are not complying.

In Britain, the law was liberalized in 1967. But today it is being threatened by a reactionary wing of the bourgeoisie that wants to restrict abortion to the first ten weeks of pregnancy and to women who have lived in Britain for at least twenty weeks. The counteroffensive is being led by SPUC (Society for the Protection of Unborn Children) with the support of Catholic circles, and is able to draw 60,000 to 80,000 persons to its demonstrations. It is linked, moreover, to the fascist National Front. The crisis is made worse by a 5 percent cut in the budget for social services. The result: the closing down of hospitals, particularly those in which women were treated.

The women's movement responded quickly. The National Abortion Campaign was

set up on the initiative of far-left organizations and Labour members of Parliament in disagreement with their party. The NAC is organizing a June 21 protest demonstration in London.

In the German Federal Republic, an abortion law was passed in the spring of 1974 after large mobilizations in 1971 and 1973. But a conservative group in parliament forced its suspension, and in March 1975 it was declared unconstitutional. Throughout Germany the movements again took up the fight and are moving to unify following the April 19-20 meeting.\*

In Switzerland, on the question of abortion, there is little that could be called liberal in the law. A petition with 50,000 signatures was filed in December 1971 demanding a referendum on the legalization of abortion. But it did not come to grips with either the question of a woman's right to choose or the injustice of the law. The federal draft legislation in fact reverts to leaving the decision to the doctors alone. At present the women's liberation groups are waging an educational campaign around the themes of a woman's right to choose, reimbursement by medical insurance, and equal rights for immigrant workers.

In Italy, the referendum on divorce in May 1974 gave rise to a new awareness of the oppression of women, along with a loosening of the grip of the Catholic church. A recent poll showed that 75 percent of Italian women favor the legalization of abortion. The PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano—Italian Communist party],

\* An international gathering in Paris that voted unanimously to organize picket lines on June 21 at British embassies in solidarity with the demonstration called by the National Abortion Campaign in Britain.—IP

## Cod à la Française

Reviewed by D.R. O'Connor Lysaght

As the cold nights get longer, what could be more agreeable than to sit in an easy chair, before a blazing fire, holding this pamphlet in one's hands, throwing it into the flames and watching it burn to ashes?

Regrettably, such a purely personal pleasure must be postponed. The nuisance value of this work is considerably greater than that of the normal piece of kindling. It has to be examined if only because it has impressive backing. It appeared first as an article in a special Irish issue of *Les Temps Modernes*, the French socialist theoretical magazine edited by Jean-Paul Sartre. That the French should be exposed to it (not, by all accounts, that it was even the worst of the articles in that issue) was bad enough. However, to compound the offense, to bring the work to circles in which it could do maximum damage, was left to the Americans of Michigan. Detroit's Black and Red Press has seen fit to get it




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*The Counter Revolution in Ireland*, by Serge Van der Straeten and Philippe Daufouy. Detroit: Black and Red Press, 1974.

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translated into English, and now presents it in a glossy format complete with a map and highly decorative (if mainly irrelevant) illustrations. The result has only one weakness: its content.

The packaged argument is summarized in its title. For Messrs. Van der Straeten and Daufouy, *The Counter Revolution in Ireland* is expressed currently in the struggle for that country's unification. Since the 1880s, they argue, when the "contraction of agriculture helped oust the English aristocracy from political power," Irish nationalism has been a reactionary diversion encouraged by the southern Catholic bourgeoisie. For Van der Straeten and Daufouy, Irish nationalist aims (including those of the various forms of republicanism) are, despite appearances to the contrary, in objective harmony with the Ulster Protestant capitalist government's policy of reliance on equivalent sentiments to preserve the local hegemony of the Orange Order. These two counterposed nationalisms, they say, serve to distract the Irish workers, North and South, from participating in a proletarian revolution for the whole of the British Isles (more accurately, a proletarian "movement," in view of their confusion about the nature of state power). So, for today:

"Working class interests lie in an alliance with England, whether it be with capitalism and the English State, which alone are able to provide unemployment assistance and to furnish jobs in time of social peace, or with the English proletariat which in recent years has begun to show through actions in Clyde [in Scotland!—D.R.O.'C.L.] and the coal mines, that intense struggles are beginning on the class front."

Unhappily, the misguided Irish proletariat shows little inclination to accept the advice of our well-meaning matchmakers:

"As in 1916 the radical segment of the proletariat defends nationalist positions favourable to the Republic. Once again its violent struggles works to the benefit of the State in the South. In 1916, it sacrificed itself so that the remnants of the archaic

classes' could set up this State. Its position at the time was destructive and aided the counter-revolution; the same is no less true to day. The Catholic proletariat is only claiming its place in a capitalism which sees the chance for new life through the 'release' of all of Ireland. This proletariat once again denies its very existence as a class even though the possibilities for building a communist society have multiplied enormously since the First World War."

Above all, a solution based on the independence and unification of Ireland must be shunned:

"It has been repeated over, and over, in all the newspapers, that the solution to the Irish 'problem' lies in the hands of the Catholic and Protestant liberals and the English. The solution will be a constitutional one and will have to deal with the whole political structure of Ulster. The main achievement that such reforms could bring about would be to abolish the proletariat's division into ethnic groups and to create the conditions, not for social progress, but for proletarian equality in poverty and its unification throughout all of Ireland. Whatever they are, these reforms will strike the death blow to the products of the counter-revolution: the Republic, Stormont [the Six-County parliament] and the frontier."

What, then, is to be done? We are told:

"For the proletariat, the best constitutional solution would be to simultaneously eliminate Stormont, the Republic, the frontier and to replace them by a federation with England."

This might have been considered a fair guess in 1972, when it was first written. But it cannot be defended today. It is now obvious that "the Catholic and Protestant liberals and the English" have only acted to thwart the democratic struggle for Irish national unification. As a result the violently reactionary Orange Order and the various groups of Loyalist Freikorps have become more and more dangerous forces. Meanwhile, in the Twenty-Six County Republic, the government is executing a policy of repression against those claimed by Messrs. Van der Straeten and Daufouy to be defending "nationalist positions favourable" to it.

All this makes "the best constitutional solution" merely utopian. Nor do the authors consider any alternatives. For them, the struggle for Irish unity is a counterrevolutionary diversion from genuine proletarian aims; its achievement, with the end of "the proletariat's division into ethnic groups," will not result in social progress. (They can't conceive that eliminating such "ethnic" illusions might in itself be a contribution to social progress.) Revolutionary action arising from, or allied to, the national struggle is just unimaginable to them.

The failure of Van der Straeten and Daufouy to grasp the revolutionary content of Irish nationalism is based on two errors, one methodological, the other factual. On the side of method, they do not understand or accept the elementary Leninist insistence on the progressive character of emancipation struggles by oppressed

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1. Under the circumstances the authors can't mean landlords. Presumably the "archaic classes" are the bourgeoisie and the small farmers.

nations in the age of imperialism. As for the facts, they dismiss the characterization of Ireland as a society in semicolonial dependence on British imperialism.

Their rejection of Irish nationalism is not unique on the left, although in its motivation it diverges from the more familiar varieties of this position. The Irish national unification struggle has been attacked both by Stalinists (the British and Irish Communist Organisation, a group with a line on nationalism akin to that of the American Progressive Labor party), and by reformist Social Democrats (the various Irish Labour parties, which, like Irish liberalism, depend heavily on their single British counterpart). Messrs. Van der Straeten and Daufouy differ from these: They are simply anachronistic abstract economic-determinist ideologues in the worst tradition of the Second International, frozen in the sterile and half-developed attitudes of those who have learned nothing since before 1917.

(Their pre-World War I outlook is neatly captured in one revealing aside. After stating—incorrectly—that the Twenty-Six County state had to nationalize credit, the authors pontificate: "It can be seen that the nationalisation is not necessarily the ultimate socialist weapon, but rather an effective instrument of administration in a situation of poverty. Nationalisation played the same role in 1919 in Russia. *The difference between Ireland and Russia is that, in Russia, it was in fact possible to develop heavy industry* [emphasis added].")

National independence struggles are viewed as having an unrelievedly negative impact on the movement for socialism. Lenin is denounced for failing to appreciate this point and accused of holding a "mechanistic evolutionary view of Irish history." He is rebuked for seeing something progressive in the National Rising of 1916 and not appreciating "the whole process of disintegration of the social classes, particularly of the proletariat" that the authors claim created the necessary environment for the rising. Van der Straeten and Daufouy dismiss the rising as a "nationalist putsch," disputing Lenin's characterization of it by simply repeating verbatim Karl Radek's ultraleft contemporary criticism of the event. (They don't seem to have heard of Lenin's reply to Radek<sup>2</sup> or, possibly, they feel that it was just part of his "mechanistic, evolutionary" analysis.)

Thus the authors of this pamphlet propose to make a socialist analysis of the Irish question while rejecting categorically such encumbrances as the Marxist theory of the state, and Lenin's theory of imperialism and nationalism. It should come as no surprise that they also ignore Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution. Without these aids, equipped only with Second International schemata eked out with empiricism, they sink, as they deserve, without trace in the Irish bog.

This brings us to their factual error. They aren't helped by their knowledge of history. Here they lose their way in the 1880s. They note (and overestimate) the relative decline of the British aristocracy because of the agricultural depression of that time. From this they conclude:

"1. The national revolution would not establish new social and productive relations, since capitalism was implanted in the North. Rather, the independence of the South would reinforce its agrarian backwardness.

"2. An independent State (even if united) would have retarded the development of the proletariat and the break up of the agrarian society by abolishing free trade.

"3. An independent State (even if united) would not have halted the emigration to England and the United States, which was a source of conflict between proletarian groups."

All this ignores one concrete fact: There was a real national oppression of Ireland by Britain simply insofar as the former's right to self-determination (even in the watered-down form of

Home Rule) was rejected by the latter. No British revolution could have achieved success without its vanguard mobilizing the Irish workers by recognizing the right of their embryo nation to independence—"although," as Marx wrote Engels (November 2, 1867), "after separation there may come federation."

As far as the agrarian problem goes, this was not merely a question of the relative backwardness of Irish society, but also of the exploitation of Irish agriculture by Britain, a form of national oppression that survived to spark the economic war of the 1930s. The pamphlet is characteristically contradictory about this: At one point it overemphasizes the evils of paying land annuities to the British state, as if these exceeded the amount of the rents that they had replaced; elsewhere it is argued that the payment of such annuities had made obsolete one of the key progressive measures of an impending bourgeois-democratic revolution (there was "no longer an agrarian revolution to carry out").

More directly relevant to the Irish working class, outside Belfast and its perimeter, was the need, endorsed by Marx, if not by Messrs. Van der Straeten and Daufouy, for protective tariffs to expand the supply of industrial jobs. Ideally, of course, this task could be accomplished by the creation of a workers republic of the British Isles. But, failing this, the only hope of stemming the emigration of Irish workers was by protecting the national market, a key point of identity between the goals of the nationalist movement and the requirements of a socialist revolution.

To argue, as Van der Straeten and Daufouy do, that the Irish struggle for national independence has meant denying "the aims and possibilities of the proletarian revolution" assumes that the Irish nationalist movement acted as a drag on more advanced revolutionary possibilities in the British Isles as a whole (leaving aside whether such a revolution would be conceivable if its English component proved hostile to the national aspirations of the Irish Catholic masses). In fact, however, the progressive character of the Irish independence movement is shown all the more forcefully by the greater militancy it has displayed in comparison to the English working class.

England, it should be remembered, was the first country to give rise to the contemporary phenomenon known as a labor aristocracy. The pamphlet itself notes this without full comprehension of what this meant. The British labor aristocracy, product of years first of industrial monopoly and, then, of imperial superprofit, has handicapped the British working class in executing its historic duty of smashing the capitalist state and order under which it was better off than most of its European brethren. Its mass political organization has never reached the political consciousness of German Social Democracy in its great days, let alone the Russian body. The only working-class interest in the United Kingdom which showed the ability to break (or at least break with) the state power was the Irish Catholic working class.

If this was true of the United Kingdom taken as a whole, how much truer was it of Ireland alone. Simply to equate Irish nationalism with Orangeism, as this pamphlet does, is to ignore the social bases of their working-class manifestations. The mass employment given by the industries of Belfast should have provided, all else being equal, a foundation for a mass socialist movement with (albeit, perhaps only rank-and-file) revolutionary potential. Instead it provided working-class support for Orangeism, one of the very few reactionary movements ever seen with a strong hold on major sections of the industrial working class. The reason for this was simple. It was not because the Protestant workers had a vested interest in the link with Britain and feared, accordingly, the tariffs of an Irish parliament (the Van der Straeten-Daufouy explanation). Irish tariffs were not allowed under the first Home Rule bills and were permitted only within narrow limits under the final act. They became objectively serious

2. In "The Irish Rebellion of 1916," *Critical Remarks on the National Question* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), pp. 144-48.

only after 1916, long after proletarian Orangeism was an established fact.

It is not true either (another theory of the authors) that the Protestants feared to be taxed to pay off landlords under the annuities scheme: The original Home Rule settlement allocated this charge to the imperial exchequer.

No, before any Home Rule bill was introduced the Orange Order had been developed as a body recruiting from the Protestant workers and reflecting the desires and prejudices expressed by them as a caste: literally, a labor aristocracy recruited by religion. The mass base of what became Unionism was motivated less by loyalty to Britain than by fear that its members would lose the miserable privileges that put them above the working-class Catholics in capitalist society. That only a proletarian revolution could win their support is a confused cliché. Probably they would never freely join such a rising, whether Irish or British, except at the impossible price of continuing their ascendancy (unless, of course, that ascendancy had been destroyed previously, or in the rising's early stages).

These circumstances were what limited the prospects for revolution in the British Isles in the first quarter of this century. The only immediate hopes for such a revolution required supporting Ireland's democratic demand for separation from Britain. As the struggle for such democratic demands deepened, socialist demands, which were originally voiced by only a part of the national revolutionary movement, would become increasingly important. Connolly hoped this would provide the spark for a European revolution; it is reasonable to believe that it could have led to a revolution in Britain, or at the minimum, in Ireland itself.

What was lacking was what is termed by Van der Straeten and Daufouy "the narrowly political organisation of the Leninist vanguard," an indispensable prerequisite for the success of such a permanent revolution. The pamphlet is incorrect to say that the Irish workers lacked even a party "conceived in the sense of a higher stage of self assertion than that of a class simply conscious of itself and its economic and social existence." Irish socialist parties had existed since 1890 and the Irish Labour party was founded in 1912. But they couldn't replace a Leninist body: The socialist groups were too small and, after 1912, too subordinate to the Irish Labour party. This last was itself too tied to syndicalism and too afraid of breaking the industrial unity on which it concentrated its hopes for political victory for it to act decisively in the national struggle.

That the objective potential did exist for a successful operation of the law of permanent revolution (and the establishment thereby of "new social and productive relations") can be seen in one fact. So far from developing inversely to the national struggle, industrial disputes increased in tempo with it and there was a similar growth in trade-union (and labor-political) organization until after the deal with Britain in 1921. At that time, in the Irish Civil War and its aftermath, the capitalists turned against both irreconcilable nationalists (the IRA) and trade unionists.

The authors of this pamphlet cannot admit these facts. Instead, they construct a model of the War of Independence period that caricatures what actually happened. For them the Irish working class was organized politically in the Irish Citizen Army (ICA) and 1916 was simply an expression of demoralization in which it got itself liquidated. They ignore both the Irish Labour party, and the petty-bourgeois Volunteers (of which even the number that fought in 1916 was many times larger than the Citizen Army). They don't seem to know that even the ICA (let alone the other working-class organizations) survived 1916, although, in 1922, it did indeed liquidate into the IRA under pressure of actual counterrevolution. But for Messrs. Van der Straeten and Daufouy, 1916 secures the position of the Irish national bourgeoisie against Britain, the workers, and, indeed, all but the Ulster Unionists. They pass over the industrial and military struggles of 1916 to 1923 in complete silence.

But how are the authors' historical failings connected to their current errors? Simply in this way: The actual position today is not qualitatively different from what it was fifty years ago except for two significant changes. On the one hand, British imperialism is fifty years weaker, and, on the other, the government ministers of the Twenty-Six Counties—the bourgeois heirs of the petty-bourgeois leaders of the last struggle—are now engaged consciously in trying to abort this one. Otherwise, from a proletarian viewpoint nothing has happened either to make Irish unity less desirable or to make Orangeism and British imperialism the more so.

Serge Van der Straeten and Philippe Daufouy may have tried to produce a work that would educate its readers as to the Irish question. They have failed. This pamphlet adds only to the already excessive confusion on that subject. It does not do them credit. It does not do M. Sartre credit. Nor does it do credit to the Black and Red Press of Detroit that it couldn't find anything better to publish. □

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### Democracia: Fundamental para la Revolución (II)

Por Gerry Foley

[La siguiente traducción es la segunda parte del artículo "Democracy—A Key Issue in Portuguese Revolution" que apareció en el número del 16 de junio de *Intercontinental Press*.

[La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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La alianza es contradictoria, sobre todo en el caso de los partidos stalinistas, que fueron formados históricamente en base a una revolución socialista y la abolición de la propiedad capitalista en Rusia. Pero esto no quiere decir que siempre estarán en un conflicto más agudo con el capitalismo que los partidos social demócratas. En algunas ocasiones lo opuesto ha sido el caso.

Debido a la búsqueda de un acomodamiento con el capitalismo mundial y debido a su naturaleza antidemocrática, el stalinismo puede subordinar totalmente los intereses de los trabajadores a los intereses de pactar con la burguesía de países individuales o con las potencias imperialistas. Durante el pacto nazi soviético, la prensa del Kremlin de hecho defendió al fascismo.

Un ejemplo de esta lógica fue la actitud del PC portugués hacia las huelgas a las que se oponía el gobierno militar. El PC también se opuso a ellas.

Otro ejemplo fue la promesa de no hacer huelgas del PC en los Estados Unidos durante la alianza soviético norteamericana en la época de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. En aquel entonces, los social demócratas, aunque eran totalmente proimperialistas y después se convirtieron en entusiastas anticomunistas y defensores de la guerra fría, fueron menos subordinados al capitalismo y más sensibles a las demandas de los trabajadores que los stalinistas. Esto se debió en gran medida a que los social demócratas dependían específicamente en su base del movimiento obrero en vez de identificarse con la Unión Soviética. Debido a esto se pudieron desarrollar luchas obreras en ese período.

De la misma manera es claro que los stalinistas han podido unir al movimiento sindical portugués bajo su control, ellos han podido—en tanto permanezcan como aliados del régimen—convertirse en la policía laboral del gobierno y purgar despiadadamente a las mismas fuerzas que los apoyaron bajo la falsa creencia de que eran más anticapitalistas o más antimperialistas que los social demócratas.

El peligro más inmediato es que al sucumbir a las ilusiones que tiene un sector de la vanguardia obrera en el Partido Comunista Portugués, estos jóvenes y trabajadores combativos que están rompiendo con el reformismo se aíslan de sectores decisivos de las masas.

La mayoría de los trabajadores y de la pequeña burguesía radical está buscando un nivel mejor de vida en estos momentos. Y no sólo un mejor nivel de vida sino también mayor libertad política y cultural, a lo que fervientemente se opone el PC en nombre de las necesidades de la "revolución nacional."

No es raro que tales sectores tiendan, al enfrentarse con las actitudes y prácticas antidemocráticas del PC, a sacar conclusiones anticomunistas y sospechen que el PC pretenda imponerles una dictadura como las que existen en los países de Europa Oriental. Es difícil esperar que las masas entiendan que el PC está usando sus métodos totalitarios precisamente para preservar el capitalismo en Portugal y mantener un gobierno capitalista. Todo tipo de demagogia reformista y proimperialista se enfoca para evitar que las masas vean esto. Sin embargo, este anticomunismo tiende a desatar un reflejo en los grupos a la izquierda del PC, que están acostumbrados a ser el blanco del anticomunismo, y por lo tanto los hace apoyar a los stalinistas.

Tal reflejo ayuda a asegurar que la respuesta de estas masas a la política de los stalinistas tome formas derechistas, ya que no pueden ver una alternativa democrática en la izquierda. Esta respuesta puede profundizarse en particular si la demagogia del PC y el MFA no es confrontada, y si al gobierno actual, que cada vez se vuelve más represivo, se le permite posar como un régimen revolucionario o potencialmente revolucionario.

El gobierno revolucionario de Lenin y de Trotsky explicó la necesidad de suprimir a la burguesía, que junto con sus aliados se habían levantado en armas contra la revolución apoyada por la mayoría de los trabajadores y contra un régimen democráticamente electo por la mayoría de los trabajadores. Si los stalinistas y los centristas logran usar con éxito los mismos argumentos para defender una dictadura burguesa, que no la eligió nadie, en contra de las demandas democráticas de la mayoría de los trabajadores y en contra del principio mismo de la voluntad popular,

obviamente los social demócratas van a inculcarles a amplios sectores de las masas, y probablemente al grueso del proletariado, una aversión feroz contra el leninismo.

Más aun, Mário Soares es mucho más astuto que la mayoría de los dirigentes social demócratas en Europa. Por un lado, él, al igual que muchos o quizá la mayoría, obtuvo su entrenamiento en el movimiento stalinista. Inmediatamente expuso la demagogia de algunos dirigentes del MFA que hablaban de basar al gobierno directamente en organismos tipo soviético para poder evitar fallas de la "democracia burguesa" y de los "conflictos partidarios" que han surgido con las "provocaciones" del PS.

En la conferencia de prensa en el Hotel Altis Soares dijo: "Se ha hablado mucho acerca de ciertos comités del pueblo, tales como los comités de inquilinos y varias asociaciones que nosotros pensamos deben de jugar un papel en el proceso revolucionario. Por supuesto, deberían hacerlo. Pero ¿qué acaso estos comités no están compuestos por defensores de partidos políticos? Obviamente que sí."

De hecho los soviets en Rusia estaban compuestos por todos los partidos obreros y al principio los social demócratas tenían mayoría. Los bolcheviques tomaron control de esos organismos precisamente por medio de elecciones, que tanto el PC como el gobierno militar consideran un medio inadecuado para determinar los deseos de las masas.

"Es un simple hecho de la situación política que el MFA nunca tuvo ninguna intención de arriesgar los logros aún no consolidados de la revolución antifascista en la inseguridad del voto," escribió el veterano apologista del stalinismo Wilfred Burchett en el número del 11 de junio del semanal maoísta norteamericano el *Guardian*.

El hecho es que cualquier democracia política es incompatible con la sobrevivencia del régimen militar, ya sea democracia burguesa simple o democracia obrera. Y aunque algunos elementos en el régimen han invocado la democracia obrera en contra del PS para contrarrestar el efecto de su victoria electoral, el hecho es que cualquier desarrollo hacia soviets genuinos estaría de inmediato en conflicto directo con la existencia del gobierno.

Algunos representantes del PC también han pretendido afirmar que fueron la pequeña burguesía y los obreros pasivos los que le dieron la victoria al PS. De hecho, la evidencia indica que el voto del PS no puede ser caracterizado tan fácilmente y, aun más, de ninguna manera se puede decir que todo el apoyo que tiene el PC es obrero. Pero si el PC realmente estuviera interesado en contraponer la democracia obrera a la "democracia burguesa," estimularía el desarrollo de organizaciones obreras unidas y democráticas en las fábricas, tendencia que

ha resistido con toda la fuerza de su maquinaria.

El PC portugués no es esencialmente diferente a los demás partidos stalinistas. Su ataque al electoralismo y por lo tanto a la democracia burguesa no significa que está tomando una línea más revolucionaria que los otros PCs. De la misma manera que el recurrir al terrorismo durante el régimen antiguo no los hizo más revolucionarios. Este cambio de política solamente representa las necesidades del reformismo stalinista en la situación específica portuguesa.

Tampoco el ataque del PCP contra el PS está en contradicción fundamental con la política de la distensión, a pesar de la manera en que Soares utiliza esta cuestión. Esto se comprueba con los ataques similares en la prensa soviética y los que hace el PC francés. Tales métodos son necesarios debido a la misma naturaleza del stalinismo y las necesidades de los partidos stalinistas en sus maniobras frente populistas, tal como lo han mostrado las recientes tácticas del PC francés. Estos partidos tienen que poder mantener un control férreo de sus bases para evitar que otros partidos obreros tomen ventaja de su conciliacionismo y sean rebasados. Aun más, para poder jugar su papel, el PC necesita mantener su imagen de ser más "izquierdista" que el PS.

Esto por supuesto no quiere decir que el PCP no les haya causado problemas a los PCs europeos. De hecho revivió una seria división entre ellos, pero eso se debe a las contradicciones internas del mismo stalinismo, a la naturaleza del oportunismo stalinista. No surge de ninguna tendencia que se esté alejando del amarradero stalinista. Esto se comprueba por el hecho, entre otros, de que mientras que los PCs español e italiano se vieron obligados a condenar al PCP por sus propias necesidades políticas, otros PCs "liberales" tales como el PC griego "interior," que permanece virtualmente excomulgado por el Kremlin y está totalmente dedicado a la perspectiva parlamentaria, ha evitado definirse en esta cuestión. El superleal PC norteamericano también ha eludido la cuestión.

La prensa capitalista se aprovechó de las operaciones antidemocráticas del PCP para repetir algunas de las viejas calumnias acerca del "pecado original" de las revoluciones socialistas y de las fuerzas que se identifican con ellas. Pero los mismos capitalistas han hallado a los stalinistas y sus métodos útiles en el pasado para detener el avance de las masas. Durante la alianza soviético norteamericana, algunos funcionarios importantes norteamericanos inclusive justificaron las purgas de Stalin.

Desafortunadamente, algunas de las debilidades de la revolución colonial tienden a darle credibilidad a la demagogia antidemocrática de los stalinistas y del MFA. La historia de la lucha colonial hasta la fecha ha tendido a reforzar el concepto

stalinista de la "revolución controlada."

La mayoría de las direcciones nacionalistas que han luchado en contra del imperialismo desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial han permitido menos democracia política que algunos de los regímenes proimperialistas. Aun más, ha habido una tendencia entre los militantes nacionalistas en los países coloniales y semicoloniales de considerar los derechos democráticos como un lujo para los ricos.

En primer lugar, debido a la extrema pobreza de los países coloniales, la dictadura stalinista no ha tenido el mismo efecto repulsivo en las masas como lo ha tenido en la clase obrera de los países más avanzados. De esta manera la democracia parece ser una bandera y argumento de los imperialistas. En los países coloniales y semicoloniales, los parlamentos y la prensa han sido por lo general controlados férreamente por los intereses proimperialistas.

Inclusive, la mayoría de estos regímenes nacionalistas han sido demagógicos, es decir, se basaron en la movilización de las masas bajo los intereses de un sector de la burguesía o la protoburguesía, que entendió que cualquier libre juego de las fuerzas políticas haría peligrar su equilibrio bonapartista. Los regímenes nacionalistas más radicales han tomado el poder después de una prolongada guerra de guerrillas, que no favorece a las formas democráticas de la organización de masas. El más prestigiado de esos regímenes que tomaron el poder de esta manera, los cubanos, han tendido a adaptarse a las ideas stalinistas.

Todo esto ha reforzado la noción, inspirada por el stalinismo, que la democracia y los derechos democráticos son un lujo de las naciones imperialistas y una trampa para los países subdesarrollados. De hecho, el aspecto atrasado de la revolución colonial tiende a ser identificado con la dinámica revolucionaria, ya que ésta ha sido la principal lucha contra el imperialismo y el status quo capitalista en los últimos treinta años.

Este error adquiere proporciones desastrosas en el caso de Portugal, que aunque atrasado en un país imperialista, no solamente por su control político de territorio ultramarino sino por la estructura de su economía, que está dominada por monopolios nativos. En este caso, una idealización del aspecto atrasado de los movimientos antimperialistas se utiliza para revivir al nacionalismo burgués en un país imperialista, donde el nacionalismo fue totalmente desacreditado por una dictadura reaccionaria y una larga guerra colonial.

Siendo que antes, el atraso del capitalismo portugués era un factor que desacreditaba al nacionalismo burgués, ahora se ha convertido en un argumento de colaboracionismo de clase en el "gran esfuerzo nacional" presentando al Portugal como un país

del Tercer Mundo oprimido por el imperialismo.

Inclusive, el proceso revolucionario de Portugal se está dando en un contexto diferente al de las luchas en los países coloniales y semicoloniales. Lo que representa este proceso es precisamente el cambio del eje de la revolución mundial, de los países subdesarrollados hacia los centros imperialistas, empezando con el imperialismo más débil y parasitario. El lado más positivo de esto para los revolucionarios portugueses es que ya ha habido una apertura más democrática y extensiva en Portugal que en cualquier país colonial o semicolonial.

Sin embargo, si el proceso revolucionario en Portugal se identifica con la represión y con los métodos totalitarios, los temores anticomunistas de los trabajadores europeos occidentales, temores que tienen su base en la realidad de los regímenes stalinistas, se multiplicarán al igual que los obstáculos que encuentra la revolución socialista en los países avanzados. Esto seguramente es una de las razones de porqué los capitalistas se han valido del caso de *República* para montar una pequeña campaña sobre el tema del "terror rojo." Es como invertir en el futuro.

#### ¿Es Revolucionario el Stalinismo 'Duro'?

Es casi inevitable que los partidos stalinistas se van a desacreditar más por el papel que juega el PC portugués. Sin embargo, también hay el peligro de que sectores de la juventud radicalizada que rompen con el stalinismo también se vayan a desacreditar al identificarse con un PC aparentemente más combativo que da la impresión de que está dando una lucha contra los defensores de la "democracia burguesa."

En el mismo Portugal, empezando con el conflicto sobre la ley de la "unidad sindical," grupos que anteriormente habían estado a la izquierda del PC, tales como el centrista Movimento da Esquerda Socialista, empezaron a ser atraídos a la estrategia del PC. Le han dado una interpretación de izquierda y romántica al dogmatismo y sectarismo stalinistas, y de hecho han sido usados como peones de ajedrez en maniobras sectarias. El papel del MES y de grupos similares con menos ataduras políticas, como el Frente Socialista Popular, ha sido evidente en casos como el del incidente del Primero de Mayo.

El FSP participó en el ataque contra los contingentes del PS. El MES denunció al PC por "hacer concesiones" al PS. Ha sido también el MES el que ha desarrollado la defensa de "izquierda" más extensa de la línea antidemocrática del PC, tratando de llevarla más lejos bajo la creencia de que un stalinismo "más duro" equivale a un método más revolucionario. Por ejemplo, en

el número del 28 de mayo del órgano del MES, *Esquerda Socialista*, dijeron:

"Efectuar elecciones para la Asamblea Constituyente, con los resultados previstos, fue una victoria para la reacción interna y extranjera, que está ahora usando el voto registrado en estas elecciones burguesas para revertir el proceso político. Con este objetivo han recurrido a provocaciones (como los incidentes del Primero de Mayo) y pretextos (tales como la lucha de los obreros de *República* contra la línea contrarrevolucionaria del periódico)."

Estos pequeños grupos centristas no tienen ninguna perspectiva de construir un partido revolucionario, no están ni tan siquiera interesados en eso. Por su misma naturaleza, son formaciones parasitarias que necesitan estar vinculadas de una manera u otra a corrientes reformistas más grandes. El FSP está compuesto de elementos descontentos del PS en búsqueda de puestos, que descubrieron que el partido era burgués después de que no pudieron obtener los puestos en la dirección que esperaban. Es claramente una formación oportunista de izquierda. El peligro, no obstante, es que estos grupos sirvan para conducir a la juventud radicalizada de nuevo bajo la órbita stalinista.

Este proceso podría también crear la impresión entre muchos sectores de la clase obrera en otros países de Europa Occidental de que los jóvenes que rompen con el stalinismo simplemente son stalinistas más agresivos, más impacientes, y que sus diferencias con los stalinistas son meramente tácticas.

Inclusive, no hay razón por la cual la juventud radicalizada les permita a los social demócratas o a la prensa burguesa utilizar el punto de la democracia. Si Soares quiere una alternativa más flexible que el PC y la dirección del MFA en estos momentos, esto no invalida que él está de la misma manera comprometido a apoyar al régimen bonapartista militar. Como reformista difícilmente podría dejar de hacerlo. Está comprometido con el colaboracionismo de clase, y el MFA en estos momentos es la única dirección política burguesa viable en Portugal.

En la conferencia de prensa en el Hotel Altis, Soares fue muy claro en el sentido de que a él no le importaría que hubiera una dictadura militar descarada con tal de que le permitiera al PS funcionar.

"Usa cosa que ha dicho el secretario general del Partido Comunista, que creo que es correcta, es al respecto de que si hay un gobierno totalmente militar, eso no quiere decir que se ha establecido una dictadura militar en Portugal.

"El gobierno puede ser militar, pero si se respetan las libertades públicas, si tenemos pluralismo en los medios de comunicación, en las elecciones de los sindicatos y de los municipios, etc., si la vida política continúa

operando normalmente hasta que haya una nueva constitución, y entonces, dentro de los términos del pacto programa [que le da el poder efectivo al MFA], se llevan a cabo las elecciones para la asamblea legislativa, entonces en mi opinión de hecho no habrá dictadura militar."

Es decir, una dictadura no es dictadura si se mantiene la vida cotidiana de los políticos. El respecto por la soberanía popular no tiene absolutamente nada que ver con este asunto.

#### La Actitud de Washington

Tampoco a Washington le interesa la soberanía popular. Uno de los consejeros del Presidente Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger, advirtió a los funcionarios norteamericanos que no hicieran mucho ruido acerca de las dictaduras a fin de que no redujeran sus opciones innecesariamente:

"El que Portugal se vuelva comunista no es una perspectiva feliz. También es una exageración considerable. La perspectiva inmediata, si las fuerzas democráticas no pueden mantenerse, no es una toma del poder comunista. Es en realidad el establecimiento de un régimen militar, tipo nazi y neutral en su política exterior, utilizando al Partido Comunista como consejero y defensor. Tal régimen podría negarles las bases militares a los Estados Unidos, pero no hay razón para suponer que, más que Egipto o Perú, se vuelva de la noche a la mañana, un satélite soviético. . . .

"Pero siendo que los comunistas le están dando apoyo incondicional al Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas, los socialistas, bajo la dirección de Mario Soares, han irritado a los militares con sus demandas de libertades democráticas."

Otros comentaristas burgueses bien informados han indicado que el conflicto entre los socialistas y los oficiales militares no está basado exactamente en diferencias irreconciliables de los principios políticos.

"Los enfrentamientos entre los oficiales y los socialistas han sido más conspicuos, pero las declaraciones privadas y públicas de la mayoría de los miembros dirigentes del Movimiento muestran fuertes sospechas de los esfuerzos comunistas para infiltrarse y una apreciación fría de la sed de poder del Partido Comunista," dijo Richard Eder en un cable desde Lisboa en el *New York Times* del 27 de mayo.

"La mayoría de nuestros miembros están más cercanos ideológicamente a los socialistas que a cualquier otro grupo," dijo un oficial dirigente no hace mucho tiempo. "Pero los dirigentes del partido nos causan problemas; nos critican y quieren hacernos a un lado. Los dirigentes comunistas nos apoyan consistentemente."

Inclusive, los militares aún no están en una posición para hacer al lado totalmente a los socialistas, tampoco van los dirigentes

más inteligentes del MFA a dejar que el PS le saque ventaja al desasociarse de alguna manera del gobierno en una época en que se está profundizando rápidamente la crisis económica. "Las huelgas y la agitación continúan a pesar de los llamados al trabajo y los militares están teniendo dificultades para hacer valer su autoridad," informó Henry Giniger en el *New York Times* del 30 de mayo. "El sentir es que el problema se agravaría si las Fuerzas Armadas se encontraran con los partidos políticos alineados contra las mismas."

Los reporteros de *Le Monde* dieron la siguiente explicación a la decisión del MFA de buscar la distensión con el PS en el número del 29 de mayo del diario parisino:

"Este moderado [el General Costa Gomes], que frecuentemente ha sido criticado por sus compañeros oficiales más avanzados por su moderación, pudo, debido a su sutileza, asumir una actitud hacia los socialistas que parecía combinar un firme llamado al orden con una flexibilidad fundamental. Hacer a un lado a los socialistas, argumentó, sólo serviría su objetivo, que es el de irse a la oposición. Si se les hace mártires, podrán ser considerados salvadores más adelante. Con ese lenguaje, el presidente ayudó considerablemente a promover la solución actual."

Los reporteros solamente no pudieron ver la ironía de esto, ya que cuando se dio el primer gobierno provisional, el PS había insistido en incluir al PC en el gabinete precisamente por la misma razón.

El hecho mismo de la existencia de dos partidos masivos de la clase obrera, que entre los dos no sólo tienen la abrumadora mayoría de los trabajadores portugueses sino también la absoluta mayoría de toda la población, es un factor que ha estado ausente en todos los países coloniales donde regímenes autoritarios bonapartistas se han establecido.

Inclusive, el aspecto más revolucionario del desarrollo portugués ha sido precisamente la apertura democrática, el fermento de las ideas, el desafío a la autoridad, a la tradición, a las reglas del juego. Hasta la fecha no ha habido luchas masivas en las industrias o movilizaciones de masas duraderas, u órganos permanentes de poder dual, real o potencial. El Partido Socialista, debido a sus propios intereses, ha obstruido los intentos de cerrar esta apertura. Y el anticomunismo de muchos de sus seguidores es obviamente una reacción a los intentos de reinstaurar un tipo de disciplina y autoridad "duras."

Sería trágico si la juventud radicalizada se aliara con las actitudes antidemocráticas y fundamentalmente reaccionarias del Partido Comunista en nombre de oponerse al "anticomunismo" o por que sacaron conclusiones sospechosas de las luchas de liberación nacional que serían totalmente falsas en el caso de Portugal. □

# FROM OUR READERS

One of our readers, working at present on an oil rig in the North Sea, wrote in to tell us how much he enjoys Intercontinental Press, which he reads "cover to cover." He would like to see an article on North Sea oil.

"I see the pieces of equipment going out and coming in every day, and all this operation is such a tiny share of Phillips North Sea venture. . . . it gives you a real glimpse of their size."

He is also interested in the question of Cambodia. "I wonder if there is going to be any treatment of it along the lines of Hansen's excellent piece; that is, how Cambodia fits in to the laws of the permanent revolution. On the one hand it is a perfect example of how in the imperialist epoch imperialism can cause an otherwise low-key social revolution to explode into a victorious social transformation. But the almost total part played by the peasantry in fighting and winning this victory seems to demand new refinements, or explanation from a theoretical standpoint."

Another reader, C.W. of Marion, Illinois, disagreed with the article on Cambodia ("The Forced Evacuation of Cambodia's Cities" in the May 19 issue of Intercontinental Press). He considers that the author revealed an apparently anti-peasant and anti-Maoist position.

Among other points, C.W. argues: "Marx spoke primarily of the industrial proletariat as the more 'advanced revolutionary class.' However Marx and, more specifically, Engels both analyzed peasant (semi-feudal) societies. Mao brought the analysis of capital accumulation and development developed by Marx and Engels as well as the understanding of imperialism as understood by Marx and extended by Lenin into play in the semi-feudal society of China during the anti-imperialist struggle and civil war and accomplished a Marxian class revolution of the peasantry. Hence, barring evidence to the contrary, Cambodia's actions follow a Marxian process—in the context of imperialism."

In his conclusion, C.W. holds that the article on Cambodia "must be considered as counter-revolutionary, non-Marxist and as a pseudo 'left-wing' hidden polemic while in reality expressing a bourgeois liberal reactionary outlook without any form of concrete analysis of Cambodia with a shoddy cloak of 'repudiating the liberal press.'"

Despite his disagreement, C.W. is obviously interested in what we have to say about Cambodia. In coming issues we hope

to present further material offering a theoretical challenge to C.W. and other readers who may hold a Maoist view.

From Toronto, we received the following letter signed by Phil Courneyeur of the League for Socialist Action (the Canadian section of the Fourth International):

"We think you would appreciate hearing of our recent solidarity initiative in defense of Chinese Trotskyist political prisoners in Toronto on May 7.

"The world premiere of the English version of Marcel Carrière's 'Images de Chine' (Glimpses of China) was held that evening—sponsored by Toronto Arts Production in co-operation with the National Film Board of China. Over 1,000 people came out, but over 500 had to be turned away for lack of space.

"The Toronto League for Socialist Action reprinted IP's April 7 article 'Let Mao Free the Trotskyists Still Held in Jail' and distributed some 500 copies to the audience. We noted genuine interest in the leaflet—people waiting in lines were reading it—and very few were to be seen thrown on the sidewalks after.

"We plan to take this leaflet to other such events in Toronto in the future."

The well-produced leaflet utilized the entire text of the article through photo-offset. The leaflet also carried an advertisement for Vanguard Books, offering some topical items on China. And naturally the address of the LSA was included, which we pass on: 334 Queen St. West, Toronto.

To savers of copies of Intercontinental Press: Our business office continually receives requests for back copies, particularly from new readers in foreign countries who can't afford microfilm. If you have extra copies that you would like to donate, please send them in. If you would like to trade for copies to fill in gaps in your own collection, a swap can be arranged—at least in certain instances. Drop us a note.

In a letter asking us to change his address, Vaughn Hogikyan of San Francisco included the following paragraphs:

"This is rather belated, however: A while back when I was in graduate school, I found my grad. seminars (in political science) to be quite boring and abstract. As a result I was always reading IP inconspicuously in a corner of the classroom. In one particularly boring class, two students whisperingly asked me what I was so

intently reading. I showed them the IP. They looked it over and each gave me fifteen dollar checks with their addresses for two subscriptions. Class dismissed!

"I especially enjoy Gerry Foley's coverage of the Portugal events. Would like to read more about any new developments in Eastern Europe, Greece and Turkey."

Tony Lane of the Young Socialists in Wellington, New Zealand (P.O. Box 3494), wrote us the following letter:

"The local student newspaper at Victoria University, Wellington, *Salient*, has just reprinted your Israel Shahak interview. Please find a copy enclosed.

"In 1974, there were several sharp debates, in which we participated, covering the Middle East question held on Victoria University. Being able to get the Shahak interview reprinted will help in the campaign to counter Zionist propaganda. You might also find it interesting that even though a Maoist, the editor of *Salient* overlooked his Stalinism to reprint an excellent interview."

Naomi Brooks of the Young Socialist (P.O. Box 517, Station A, Toronto, Ontario) dropped us the following note: "As one circulation manager to another, you are probably going to hate me; but I am moving again with only a few days notice. Feel free to move 6 times in 5 months to get back at me and I promise not to curse your address plates!

"Anyway keep up the good work, the I.P. is irreplaceable!"

We like to make changes of address. It saves red tape with the post office. So we remind everyone—there's no charge for this service. Just let us know as early as possible. If you can't do that we have a stop-go option. You're moving? You don't know what your new address will be? Tell us to stop IP until you find out. We'll hold your copies for you until you write.

Naomi Brooks added a postscript to her letter: "Please put *Boycott the Postal Code* on the envelope if possible. The postal workers sometimes get militant enough to refuse to deliver any mail without it!"

That's for mail to Canada, of course. Everyone please note.

Occasionally we get letters from readers telling about receiving Intercontinental Press in envelopes that show signs of having been tampered with. The envelopes are enclosed to show what is meant.

We are appealing to the U.S. Postal Service to put a stop to the CIA using steam to open envelopes; or, if they have nothing more sophisticated than that, to at least not use a steamroller to close them. □