

# Intercontinental Press

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## Rockefeller-Ford Pass the Buck on Assassinations



ROCKEFELLER: Tosses hot potato to Congress.

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## Portugal's New Political Prisoners

Confronted by mass protest demonstrations, the military government of Portugal promised June 6 to permit *República*, the newspaper that reflects the views of the Socialist party, to reopen. Another violation of democratic rights, this time of the right to freedom of association, has yet to be reversed. Hundreds of members and leaders of the Maoist Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (MRPP—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party) are now being held as political prisoners in Portugal.

During the night of May 28-29, security police units conducted coordinated raids on the headquarters of the MRPP in Lisbon and fourteen other cities. The MRPP announced that nearly 500 of its members, including central leaders, were arrested. The military later claimed that the number arrested was 269. Leaflets, files, and typewriters were confiscated.

An officer who led one of the raids said the MRPP had "exceeded itself" and that it "was time to put an end to its activities."

On June 2, security police fired over the heads of demonstrators who had gathered outside the Caxias prison, where the MRPP members were being held.

A military officer in charge of prison administration, João Zavier, later admitted at a news conference that MRPP prisoners had been beaten in their cells. He claimed that it was a matter of "vengeance." Guards who had supposedly been attacked by the Maoists had simply responded in kind.

The decision of the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) government to suppress an entire organization by imprisoning its members is a threat to all the other political parties in Portugal.

The demagogic argument of the MFA and of their echoers in the pro-Moscow Communist party is that the MRPP deserves to be suppressed because it plays into the hands of the rightists through provocative and adventurist actions.

### Next Week . . .

"The Growing Movement for Independence in East Timor." An eyewitness report from one of Portugal's least-known colonies. Don't miss it.

It is true that the MRPP has won the distrust of many workers because of its ultraleft and sectarian policies. For example, many workers would not agree with the MRPP position that the Communist party should be designated and treated as a variety of fascism ("social fascism"). Many would also disapprove of the MRPP's recent unilateral "arrests" and detention of persons they judge to be rightist plotters.

But workers who might disagree with the MRPP should not permit themselves to be duped into supporting its suppression.

The MRPP was attacked because, whatever its wrong policies, it was a vocal pole of opposition to the MFA rulers and their CP helpers. The raids and arrests took place on the eve of an MRPP demonstration in opposition to NATO. The military junta did not want any embarrassing criticism of their attempts to ingratiate themselves with the other European imperialist powers and with President Ford and Kissinger at the NATO summit.

The MFA feels it can get away with silencing the MRPP because of the group's relative weakness and political vulnerability. But if this repression succeeds, it will serve as a precedent for repression of other workers organizations that might voice criticisms of the MFA government.

A top leader of the MFA has already said publicly that the military has considered dissolving *all* political parties. A May 26 United Press International dispatch quoted Brig. Gen. Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho as saying that unless the parties cooperate with the military, "we will abolish the leadership of the parties and link ourselves directly to the people."

## French Stalinists Explain 'Pluralism'

A recent series of attacks by the Portuguese Communist party against the Socialist party—culminating in the closure of the pro-SP Lisbon daily *República* as a result of a provocation by the CP-led printers union—evoked an angry reaction from the Social Democrats in France.

Leaders of the French SP have charged that the Portuguese Stalinists are trying to exclude the SP from the political process,

What is this government that threatens to bar all freedom of political association and expression? It is not a government representative of, and controlled by, the masses of workers and peasants of Portugal.

While the MFA claims to support socialism, in practice it defends capitalism in Portugal and defends the capitalist military alliance, NATO.

In motivating the MFA's threat to dissolve all political parties, Brig. Gen. Saraiva de Carvalho complained that "the partisan fighting is creating immense divisionism in the working and popular masses." The ploy of the MFA and the CP is to call any disagreement with the MFA "divisionism." Workers who are for the right to strike are "divisive." Workers who think Portugal should get out of NATO are "divisive." Those who opposed the pact giving dictatorial powers to the MFA are called "divisive."

Sometimes this argument can be confusing because many workers know that their power to defend the gains they have made and to move forward to socialism depends on united mass action. But such united action can only be the result of full and open debate over what *program* to adopt, with freedom to hear all viewpoints. This is the only effective way to carry on the fight for socialism, which demands the *conscious* action of the vast majority of working people to change society. This kind of conscious mass action cannot be dictated to the workers by a self-appointed junta that thinks it can tell the masses what ideas and parties they are to be permitted to listen to.

Suppression of the MRPP by the capitalist MFA government does nothing to clarify the debate within the working class over the false policies of this group and over how to move forward to socialism. It only strengthens the hand of the military against the entire working class. All supporters of democratic rights, whatever their disagreement with the MRPP, have an interest in joining in a call for release of the members of the MRPP from prison and for return of all their office equipment. □

with the aim of ultimately suppressing it altogether.

In an interview with the daily newspaper *Progrès de Lyon*, SP leader François Mitterrand even suggested that such designs were not limited to Portugal. Mitterrand noted that the Stalinist Georges Séguéy, head of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT—General Confederation of Labor), had defended the *República* closure following his trip to Portugal. Séguéy had gone to

Lisbon, said Mitterrand, "to study on the spot the development of the single-party system—his dream for France."

The charge is not a new one in its substance. In the May issue of *Cahiers du Communisme*, its theoretical journal, the French CP attempted to clarify the party's attitude, in an article entitled "Reflections on the Multiparty System."

Marcel Zaidner, a member of the CP's Central Committee, affirmed that while the CP regarded itself as the "party of the working class," it held as a "position of principle" that there was room for "pluralism," or more than one party, in building a socialist society. It was only for "historical reasons" that this principle had not been applied in the Soviet Union, he said.

(Zaidner did not explain what those reasons were—or why they apparently also apply to the fifteen other countries where governing CPs wield a political monopoly.)

Tolerant toward the existence of other parties presumably representing other class forces, Zaidner made clear that the CP did not look as kindly on divergent views *inside* the "party of the working class." As he explained, "it is because it is united, because it has a single political line . . . that [the CP] can best guarantee adherence to its commitments and cooperation with other forces. For the Communist party there are not several possible policies, but one policy alone, to which it is completely committed."

The cornerstone of French CP strategy is its programmatic coalition, in the Union of the Left, with the Social Democrats and the bourgeois Left Radicals—an alliance that must of necessity limit its program to reforms within capitalism. What Zaidner is saying, in effect, is that the CP's internal monolithism is its way of guaranteeing its reliability within such procapitalist coalitions. The obverse of this is that the CP cannot tolerate a democratic internal regime because of its "policy of alliances"—that is, its class-collaborationist line.

Behind this "theory" is the underlying view of the Stalinists in countries where they do not hold power—that the workers must place their confidence in other class forces, rather than seek to emancipate themselves through their own efforts.

Thus in Portugal, the CP has preached reliance on the Armed Forces Movement, and used its disciplined apparatus to aid the military as it maneuvers to stabilize capitalist rule.

Zaidner's article in *Cahiers du Communisme* is yet another, "theoretical" demonstration that in proclaiming their solidarity with the antidemocratic practices of the Portuguese CP, the French Stalinists are not taking a more "revolutionary" line than the SP or other CPs. They are simply providing a cover for a line of conciliation with their own bourgeoisie. □

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## Some Damaging Admissions in Rockefeller CIA Report

By Caroline Lund

The Rockefeller Commission report on the Central Intelligence Agency, released June 10, confirmed once again the existence of a government conspiracy to spy on and disrupt the antiwar and Black liberation movements in the United States and to violate the democratic rights of masses of American citizens.

The report also reveals new facts about the functioning of the CIA as a law unto itself—disciplining its own members, imprisoning and “physically abusing” a person who “defected,” and testing dangerous drugs on unsuspecting persons. As the *New York Times* stated in its June 11 editorial, the report revealed “an embryonic police state.” An embryonic police state for which both Democratic and Republican administrations share responsibility.

Here are some of the major revelations of the Rockefeller Commission report:

- In a seven-year operation called Operation CHAOS, a secret CIA organization carried out espionage against dissident Americans. Dossiers were established on 13,000 individuals and computerized records were maintained on 300,000 persons and organizations. Undercover agents were sent into the antiwar and Black movements.

- The CIA carried out twelve illegal break-ins, and without court authorization tapped thirty-two phones and bugged thirty-two rooms, mainly during the Johnson administration. Telephones of six reporters were tapped to reveal their news sources. Three of these were during the Eisenhower administration, and three were ordered “with the knowledge and consent” of then Attorney General Robert Kennedy in 1962.

- For more than twenty years the CIA has illegally intercepted, opened, and photographed the mail of thousands of Americans. This was done with the knowledge of at least three postmasters general and one attorney general, John Mitchell. With the help of a special laboratory in New York “for the technical examination of letters,” the CIA was recently intercepting 4.35 million items of mail a year, of which about 8,700 were opened.

- In 1972 and 1973 the agency listened in on phone calls between the United States and Europe and Latin America.

- The CIA established secret relationships with local police forces, in which the CIA supplied police with undercover agents

and surveillance equipment, and local police departments provided the CIA with police badges for “cover,” as well as aiding in at least one CIA burglary. In appreciation of cooperation from the police, the CIA routinely used secret funds to buy candy, liquor, and vacations for police officials.

- The report revealed for the first time a twenty-year agreement between the CIA and the Justice Department whereby the CIA was given veto power over prosecution of any of its employees for criminal activities. This arrangement was motivated by the CIA’s fear that prosecution “would require public disclosure of sensitive agency operations and procedures.” Sure enough, no employee of the CIA was prosecuted during the entire twenty-year period.

- Since the late 1940s the CIA has been experimenting with behavior-affecting drugs like LSD. “The drug program,” says the Rockefeller report, “was part of a much larger C.I.A. program to study possible means for controlling human behavior. Other studies explored the effects of radiation, electric shock, psychology, psychiatry, sociology and harassment substances.”

In one series of experiments, humans were given LSD without their knowledge. “One person died in 1953, apparently as a result,” says the Rockefeller report. The report does not reveal how many persons were given dangerous drugs, saying only that those who were experimented on in that phase of the program are now either out of the country or “deceased.” All records on the drug program were ordered destroyed in 1973.

- In one case a “defector” was secretly imprisoned in a CIA facility for three years. He was held in solitary confinement “under spartan living conditions,” according to the report.

- The Rockefeller report concluded that there is “no credible evidence of any C.I.A. involvement” in the assassination of former President John Kennedy in 1963. Charges of CIA involvement in that assassination were linked to reports that former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt was present at the scene of the murder and that the CIA had links with both Lee Harvey Oswald and his killer Jack Ruby.

Some commentators have expressed surprise at the scope of these revelations, in view of the character of the Rockefeller Commission itself. The commission of nine is composed of millionaires, corporation

executives and lawyers, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, and a former university president, together with the secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO. Most have been closely linked with the CIA.

President Ford explained at the time the commission was formed that he had consciously picked persons who “could be relied upon to understand and respect the [CIA’s] national defense role” (as paraphrased in the June 11 *New York Times*).

The fact that even this pro-CIA commission felt compelled to come out with such damaging admissions indicates that the full truth about the CIA must be much worse.

Democratic Senator Frank Church called the Rockefeller report “the tip of the iceberg.” Church heads the Senate committee that is also investigating the CIA.

*New York Times* reporter Seymour Hersh cited numerous things that were omitted from the report, according to unnamed informants familiar with the CIA. One of the omissions, according to Hersh’s sources, dealt with “the destruction in late 1974 of between 150 and 200 C.I.A. domestic files on black dissidents. . . .” Did these files possibly contain evidence that CIA assassination plots were not limited to foreign leaders but were applied to Black leaders in the United States as well?

Another omission noted by Hersh’s sources dealt with CIA spying on members of Congress.

The Rockefeller report completely sidestepped one of the most explosive issues before the commission—the question of CIA assassination plots against leaders of other countries. At his news conference June 9 announcing the release of the Rockefeller report, Ford stated:

“Because the investigation of the political assassination allegations is incomplete, and because the allegations involve extremely sensitive matters, I have decided that it is not in the national interest to make public material relating to these allegations at this time.”

Ford said the information gathered by the commission would be passed on for evaluation by the Senate and House committees investigating the CIA, the most active of which is the Church committee of the Senate.

“Passing the matter to Sen. Church may

be President Ford's way of solving a delicate political problem," speculated Dennis Farney in the June 10 *Wall Street Journal*. "For if, as rumored, the CIA was involved in assassination plots under the Kennedy administration, the Democratic-controlled committee will have the final responsibility for deciding whether to publicize it."

The Rockefeller Commission limited its "incomplete" investigation to assassination plots with domestic implications—those against Fidel Castro and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. It did not even pretend to investigate the charges of plots against Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, and Salvador Allende of Chile.

Nicholas Horrock said in the June 13 *New York Times* that "it is unclear what foreign policy objective of the United States would have been served in 1961 by the killing of General Trujillo." Trujillo, a brutal dictator, was trained for his job by U.S. Marines during the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic that lasted until 1924. According to Horrock, "several sources" said the assassination of Trujillo "was part of a 'series of events' connected with the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba the month before."

The Rockefeller report's revelations on "Operation CHAOS" dovetail with previous exposés of government plots against the antiwar and Black movements dealing with the FBI's "Cointelpro" disruption programs, and the 1970 "Huston Plan" for centralizing domestic spying and disruption against dissidents following the upsurge in response to Nixon's invasion of Cambodia.

Operation CHAOS was begun under a different name in 1967, largely prompted by President Johnson's alarm at the Black rebellions that were sweeping the country at that time. It was set up by then Attorney General Ramsey Clark.

The CIA's pretext for getting involved in domestic spying was that it was looking for "foreign connections" of the protest movements in the United States. The CIA group drew up a series of reports for Johnson on such topics as "International Connections of the United States Peace Movement," and "Student Dissent and Its Techniques in the United States."

In mid-1968 the group stepped up its spying on radicals and was given the name Operation CHAOS. The increased activity, says the Rockefeller report, came "as disorders occurred in Europe in the summer of 1968." This apparently refers to the uprising by students and workers in France, which in turn inspired radicals in this country.

By October 1969 Operation CHAOS was sending undercover agents into antiwar, Black, and student organizations. The CIA called the planting of these informers

## The Sleuths on the Rockefeller Commission



'LOOK, FELLA — NOBODY'S PERFECT'

Herblock/New York Post

"All of the people have been checked," White House press secretary Ron Nessen told reporters in early January after Ford announced the names of the appointees to the Rockefeller Commission. Indeed they have been. Here are their credentials:

**Nelson Rockefeller**, chairman. As a member since 1968 of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a presidential committee that evaluates the effectiveness of government spying, Rockefeller is no stranger to CIA cover-ups.

**David W. Belin**, executive director. Before accepting the appointment, Belin said he would "leave no stone unturned until I find the truth." He had previously distinguished himself as counsel to the Warren Commission that investigated the assassination of John Kennedy.

"acquiring assets." The Rockefeller report says that in some cases the infiltrators were able to provide information on the views of "high-level leadership" of "dissident groups." Information on "planned violence" was of special interest to the CIA, the report added.

In June 1970 the CIA participated in the first meeting of the "Interagency Committee on Intelligence (ad hoc)." This was the coordinating body of the major U.S. "intelligence" agencies, set up by Nixon aide Tom Charles Huston. It was designed to intensify government disruption activity against

**John T. Connor**. As former president of the Merck pharmaceutical company, Connor collected millions of dollars in drugs and medicine to ransom CIA operatives and others captured in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

**Douglas Dillon**. When Dillon served as acting secretary of state, his office issued a report in 1960 that the CIA U-2 spy plane lost over the Soviet Union was on a "weather" reconnaissance mission.

**Erwin Griswold**. As a former U.S. solicitor general, Griswold argued in court the White House case defending army spying on American antiwar demonstrators. He also argued the government's case against allowing the Pentagon Papers to be published.

**Lane Kirkland**. A staff member of the AFL-CIO since 1948, Kirkland served as George Meany's executive assistant for eight years. He has been secretary-treasurer of the union federation since 1969. It is unlikely that he could have held either post without participating in the secret channeling of CIA funds to anti-Communist unions.

**Lyman Lemnitzer**. As head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the CIA organized the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Lemnitzer approved the plans for the operation. He called Daniel Ellsberg's release of the Pentagon Papers a "traitorous act on the part of an individual who didn't know what he was doing to the security of the United States."

**Ronald Reagan**. The former right-wing governor of California is noted for his brutal repression of student demonstrations.

**Edgar F. Shannon**. Shannon was president of the University of Virginia while Pentagon chief James Schlesinger taught there from 1955 to 1963.

the massive protest movement opposing Nixon's invasion of Cambodia.

The Rockefeller report says: "Huston made it clear at the initial ICI meeting that President Nixon wanted the committee to assume that all methods of gathering intelligence were valid. The President, Huston said, wanted the committee, in reviewing matters which 'obstructed' intelligence gathering, to consider that 'everything is valid, everything is possible.'"

The most detailed account of the work of Operation CHAOS dealt with CIA activity in Washington, D.C., where it worked hand in glove with the local police. CIA agents

were sent into a whole spectrum of organizations, from the pacifist Women Strike for Peace, to the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (which organized a mass demonstration in Washington in October 1967); and from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Black Panthers, to the more moderate Washington Urban League.

One of the objectives of the CIA was to find out information on the sources of funds of these groups. Its agents would follow prominent antiwar and Black leaders when they arrived in Washington to speak at demonstrations. In addition, of course, they would photograph participants in demonstrations.

The report says a total of 1,000 organizations around the country were harassed in this way through Operation CHAOS. In its lists of affected organizations the report does not mention the Socialist Workers party or the Young Socialist Alliance, although both organizations were clearly targets. Peter Camejo, the 1976 presidential candidate of the SWP, was recently able to obtain censored excerpts from his CIA files, through suing the government under the Freedom of Information Act. These documents indicate that he was spied on under Operation CHAOS.

The Rockefeller Commission report includes proposals for "reforms" designed to bring the CIA more into line with the current needs of the American ruling class. They center around giving Congress and the White House more "oversight" to keep the CIA under their control. Far from preventing the CIA crimes from continuing, some of the proposals would even strengthen the CIA's ability to continue its operations against dissidents in this country.

For example, one proposed executive order would explicitly allow the CIA to investigate anyone "suspected of espionage or other illegal activities relating to foreign intelligence." This would constitute explicit authority for domestic spying, something the CIA does not now have.

Another recommendation is to make it a criminal offense "for employes or former employes of the C.I.A. willfully to divulge to any unauthorized person classified information pertaining to foreign intelligence or the collection thereof. . . ."

As *New York Times* columnist Tom Wick-er noted June 13, this is "the commission's only recommendation that would impose criminal sanctions—and not on C.I.A. misdeeds at that, but on employes who might want to make public such misdeeds."

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# SO THEY SAY

## 'I Am Totally Opposed to Political Assassination'

**As Nixon would have put it.** "I have stated previously I am totally opposed to political assassination. This Administration has not and will not use such means as instruments of national policy."—President Ford at his June 9 news conference in the Rose Garden.

**To murder is wicked.** "I don't care who may have ordered it, murder is murder. The United States is not a wicked country and we cannot abide a wicked government."—Frank Church, chief of the Senate's investigation of the CIA, at a breakfast meeting in Washington June 4.

**One way to cool hot potato.** "Clearly the Rockefeller Commission had a choice. It could deal with the assassination problem or it could duck it. Evidently it has decided to duck it."—Senator Frank Church as quoted by David C. Martin in June 7 *New York Post*.

**Another way to cool hot potato.** "I would have to say that at this time the committee has no evidence that would directly link C.I.A. involvement in this kind of activity with Presidents of the United States during this period under investigation."—Senator Frank Church as quoted by Nicholas M. Horrock in June 14 *New York Times*.

**Termination with extreme prejudice a big help if . . .** "If somebody had knocked off Hitler in 1936 or 1937," Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, former Attorney General of the United States, remarked today, "I think it would have been a big help."

"However, Mr. Katzenbach, speaking by telephone from Armonk, N.Y., said that he questioned whether the United States itself should engage in assassinations because of the peculiar vulnerability of its own Presidents."—Washington report by Clifton Daniel in June 6 *New York Times*.

**Really?** "I think it is important in terms of the morality of our country, our way of life and the things we believe in, to say that it really is beyond the power of the President to order assassination."—



Attorney General Edward H. Levi, quoted in a dispatch from Washington in June 9 *New York Times*.

**In difficult times who's to judge?** "Those were difficult times," the White House official said in reference to alleged Central Intelligence Agency efforts to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro during the early 1960s. "Nobody here is going to second guess an administration of 15 years ago."—From a Washington dispatch by David C. Martin in June 7 *New York Post*.

**CIA trainee.** "Is this a dagger which I see before me, the handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee."—Macbeth as quoted by Shakespeare.

**Besides, the CIA swore off.** "I think all the things we learned of were long past history, and we received assurances [from the C.I.A.] that these things no longer took place."—Lucien N. Nedzi, chief of the House of Representative's investigation of the CIA, as quoted by Nicholas M. Horrock in June 5 *New York Times*.

**The answer is yes.** "Mr. Nedzi told a television interviewer, Lou Gordon, that he had been given briefings on C.I.A. activities for three years. 'There's been no effort to conceal,' he said.

"Mr. Gordon asked Mr. Nedzi if the C.I.A. gave him any information 'that would indicate they had under consideration, that they talked about, or that they even thought about some sort of assassinations.' Mr. Nedzi replied, 'Yes.'—From Associated Press dispatch datelined Detroit June 8.

**Throws away gavel.** Compromised by the disclosure that the CIA had "briefed him secretly more than a year ago on plans to assassinate foreign political leaders," and that he had taken no action, Representative Lucien N. Nedzi resigned June 12 as chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

Nedzi protested that a House Democratic caucus had decided to set up a subcommittee that would have cut into his powers. "I was unable to operate. I was left with a

gavel and a title."—From a Washington news dispatch in June 13 *New York Times*.

**Their sense of values is evidence, too.** Asked June 5 about the reports linking his two brothers, President Kennedy and Senator Robert Kennedy, to a CIA plot to assassinate Fidel Castro, Senator Edward M. Kennedy replied:

"I'm not privileged to any particular information. I'm just satisfied to a moral certainty that any kind of suggestion is inaccurate. . . .

"I think we have to judge on the basis of their lives, their sense of values. And that's the way I look at it.

"I'm not surprised that there are certain agencies that are trying to pass the buck."

**Incredible evidence disregarded.** "Numerous allegations have been made that the CIA participated in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

"On the basis of the staff's investigation, the commission concluded there was no credible evidence of any CIA involvement."—From the report of the Rockefeller Commission.

**Doctored testimony?** "A longtime critic of the Warren commission report has accused the Rockefeller commission on CIA activities of a 'gross misrepresentation' of his testimony in its report concerning medical data on the assassination of President Kennedy.

"Within the context of my entire testimony, the statement attributed to me and the manner in which it was used in the report are a gross misrepresentation and a most despicable distortion of my statements," Dr. Cyril Wecht, the coroner of Pittsburgh and a forensic specialist, told *The Post*.—From a report by Jared Kopel in June 11 *New York Post*.

**And digest it there, too?** "Dr. Cyril Wecht, saying that his views of President Kennedy's murder were distorted by the Rockefeller commission, wants the commission to release a transcript of his statements.

"If that transcript shows in any way I have withdrawn or revised my thoughts of the Warren Report, I'll eat the transcript on the steps of the White House," said Mr. Wecht, a forensic pathologist who is the coroner of Allegheny County.—Associated Press dispatch datelined Pittsburgh June 11.

**Peculiar sensitivity.** "You will, of course, be aware of the peculiar sensitivity which attaches to the fact that CIA has prepared a report on student activities both here and abroad."—From secret memorandum dated September 4, 1968, sent by CIA

director Richard Helms to President Johnson concerning illegal Operation CHAOS.

**Final amendment?** "During the early stages of the investigations of the agency, several of its former officials said that, though there may have been plots to assassinate foreign leaders, there had been no 'successful attempts.' Other intelligence sources said that that should be amended to 'no attempts where Americans actually became involved directly in the killing.'"—Nicholas M. Horrock in a Washington dispatch in June 13 *New York Times*.

**Lawmakers should keep mouths zippered like CIA.** "Former California Gov. Ronald Reagan, a member of the Rockefeller Commission, said yesterday that Congress should call off any further investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency, because he said, some lawmakers cannot keep secrets. . . .

"He went on:

"I have seen congressional committees which have seemed unable to prevent unwarranted leaks, and, in this instance, some have expressed a viewpoint that they are approaching this problem with an open mouth and a closed mind."—June 12 Associated Press dispatch.

**Danger of leakage.** "A strong and effective CIA is vital to our national security—and the CIA can be neither strong nor effective unless its plans and operations are kept secret. The more people who have access to hush-hush information, the greater the danger of leakage which would compromise agents and their activities."—From an editorial in June 12 *New York Daily News*.

**Insufficient intelligence no doubt.** "At a time when campus buildings were being bombed and burned, central cities were aflame and national leaders were being threatened with physical violence, should it be any surprise that an American President would want intelligence information? It should not, and the fears of both Presidents that they were not getting sufficient intelligence no doubt explains why the CIA was given an assignment that would normally and legally be the exclusive job of the FBI."—From an editorial in June 12 *Wall Street Journal*.

**Cyclical like spots on the sun.** "In a telephone interview this morning, the former [unidentified] C.I.A. operative—who depicted New York City as 'a big training ground' for undercover agents—expressed skepticism that a full account of all the C.I.A.'s domestic activities would ever be compiled.



Conrad/Los Angeles Times

"'It's so easy to cover up,' he said. 'You're never going to find out what really happened; all the details and all the people involved will never come out.'

"'They'll clean up their shop a little, but in 10 or 20 years it'll start again,' he added. 'It's all so cyclical.'"—From a Washington report by Seymour M. Hersh in June 12 *New York Times*.

**CIA knows its senators.** William Colby won his present post as head of the CIA because of his success in conducting "Phoenix," the operation in which CIA-trained and directed Saigon killers assassinated 20,000 persons suspected of being members or sympathizers of the National Liberation Front. Mentioning this in calling attention to the CIA's efforts to counter the current investigations, Adam Walinsky said in the June 13 *New York Times*:

"What the agency is really counting on, therefore, is less our gullibility than our indifference. And it may be right: After all, how seriously will the Senate quibble at the C.I.A.'s attempted assassination of one foreign leader thirteen years ago, when it routinely and knowingly confirmed, as director of the entire agency, the man who directed twenty thousand assassinations in Vietnam?"

**Specialty of the house: alphabet noodle soup.** "A blue-ribbon commission, with such prestigious members as Vice President Rockefeller and Senate Democratic leader Mansfield, is expected to recommend on June 30 that the embattled CIA should continue its controversial undercover operations under a new name.

"The staff has prepared a confidential study, proposing that the CIA start anew as the Foreign Intelligence Agency."—Jack Anderson in his column of June 11.

# OUT NOW!

## Chapter 2

### The Student Peace Union

By Fred Halstead

The rebellion of Youth SANE in 1960 was another sign of a different mood among young people. The direct witch-hunt attack had the effect of making a significant number of people stand up against it rather than run for cover, which had been the pattern of the 1950s. The youth turned off by SANE's attitude—this involved dozens, not thousands—gravitated toward the activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the Student Peace Union, or SDS. A not insignificant percentage of these youth were themselves

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children of "old left" radicals—"red diaper babies" they were sometimes called in movement circles. While they didn't necessarily agree with their parents they did have an edge on the general population in recognizing the hysterical nature of the witch-hunt.

They knew their parents were all-too-ordinary people, not the sinister conspirators painted by such sterling characters as Senator Dodd (later proven to have been embezzling money at the very time of his anticommunist crusade). What is more they did not share their parents' terror of the witch-hunt and in this they were more typical of their generation.

Within the peace movement itself Youth SANE tended to be replaced by the Student Peace Union. SPU was founded in 1959 by pacifists but in the early 1960s its national office was dominated by members of the Young People's Socialist League who held what is known in radical circles as the "Third Camp" position.

According to this theory there are not one but two imperialist "camps" dividing the world between them. The first was composed of the advanced capitalist countries of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. The second, according to this view, was the bloc of postcapitalist countries represented by the Soviet Union and China, which these people held equally to blame for the cold war. A "Third Camp" was supposed to be formed in opposition to the other two. In practice most of those who held this theory were neutral on the side of the capitalist world.

The SPU was very small in 1960, but grew rapidly until 1962. It was formally nonsectarian; members did not have to belong to any particular political tendency. It also had some orientation toward action, holding demonstrations from time to time. Students who wanted some peace activity on a campus could constitute themselves an SPU chapter without much formality.

SPU reached its peak in 1962 when it took the lead in organizing a demonstration of some 5,000 in Washington protesting atmospheric testing. Control of this event had, however, been taken over by Turn Toward Peace, which was concerned lest the youth raise embarrassing issues. The demonstration was held near the White House and President Kennedy sent hot coffee outside for some of the participants, a gesture of

goodwill that would have been inconceivable had the issues of U.S. intervention in Cuba or Vietnam been raised.

At its height SPU went into a crisis over the attempt of its national office to impose the "Third Camp" position on the activities of the chapters. The SPU leaders insisted that demonstrations on the issue of Cuba or Vietnam blame Russia and China equally with the U.S. Virtually all the newly radicalizing youth would agree that the Soviet Union had been wrong in crushing the revolt in Hungary in 1956, but that it was the U.S. that was at fault in trying to put down revolutions in Cuba and Vietnam. The SPU position made no sense to them.

During the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 an emergency ad hoc meeting was held at the Living Theatre in New York in which members of the traditional peace coalition sat in the same room with the excluded radicals and others to discuss a response. I was there and I remember that Bayard Rustin—who came with Muste—spoke with considerable effect against common action. The issue was not organizational rivalry, but a political position: The crisis, he argued, had been caused at least as much by Cuba, which had obtained missiles from the Soviet Union capable of reaching the U.S., as it was by President Kennedy, who threatened to bomb them and interdict Soviet ships on the way to Cuba unless Russia removed the missiles.

To Rustin, and some other pacifists, the question of Cuba's sovereign right to defend itself against U.S. invasion was irrelevant. The missiles were the essence of the matter.

My own position—and frankly, as a resident of the U.S. I was none too comfortable about the missiles—was that the cause of the crisis was the obvious U.S. intention to crush the Cuban Revolution by force, that Cuban sovereignty had to be respected, and that it was the duty of Americans to center their protest on their own government. I reminded people that U.S. missiles had been pointed at Cuba all along. In addition, those of us who held this position were willing to agree that the others should express their own views in the coming demonstration through speakers and signs. But for Rustin and others no association whatever with our "Hands Off Cuba" position was tolerable. The meeting failed.

Some of those present, however, adjourned to Hamish Sinclair's apartment and formed an ad hoc Committee to Halt World War Three. It sounds tendentious now, but considering what the Cuban missile crisis involved, it was not meant to be funny. It was an indication of the frustration in radical circles at the time.

This group, together with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, called an emergency demonstration at the UN plaza for Saturday, October 21. The old peace movement coalition meanwhile called a demonstration for Sunday. Then the Student Peace Union, even though it was accepted as a full participant in the Sunday event, also organized its own demonstration for the same place as the Saturday affair, insisting that the thrust had to be equal blame. Their slogan was: "U.S.-USSR, No War Over Cuba."

On Saturday the SPU leaders got there first. As the other group arrived—many of our signs said "Hands Off Cuba"—the SPU leaders insisted on separating the demonstrations. We set up a picket line with a chant, "One Line Against the War." Virtually all the 2,000 persons present joined a united demonstration. The



SPU leaders were left alone on the sidelines. In essence, this is what happened to SPU nationally during this period.

The Sunday demonstration, which the radicals decided to join as well, was the largest ever held at the UN up to that time—10,000. But the radicals were strictly second-class citizens, excluded from the speakers' list and prohibited from carrying their own signs.

In 1963 the SPU national office further alienated the radicalizing youth by attacking Dagmar Wilson of Women Strike for Peace for defending nonexclusion. Subpoenaed by HUAC, Wilson had refused to take the road of the SANE leaders in 1960. She stood up to the committee, proudly declaring that WSP accepted the support and activity of anyone who shared its aims.

For a time members of the Young Socialist Alliance participated in SPU, where they advocated a different policy. In the March 1963 *Young Socialist*, YSA official Barry Sheppard wrote: "SPU will be able to get out of its present stagnation and crisis only if it again reaches out, to really begin to build SPU. SPU must remain as broad as possible. Red-baiting, exclusion, internal witch-hunts: they are the death of SPU. A healthy SPU will look for new members from all political groups and recruit rather than exclude. It will not insist that any members adopt any particular political position as long as they are for peace."

The then very small YSA had little effect on SPU at the time, but the same approach was later to carry the YSA to a central role in the anti-Vietnam-war movement.

The Vietnam intervention became a public issue within the old peace movement coalition in 1963. The radical pacifists were themselves recruiting youth who reflected the new mood. These people were appalled at what the U.S. was doing in Vietnam and chafed under the agreements made with groups like SANE to keep the issue out of coalition actions. Symbolically, relations between two proteges of A.J. Muste—Bayard Rustin, who defended the old position, and Dave Dellinger, who sided with the youth—became increasingly strained.<sup>1</sup>

In the spring of 1963 a crack in the situation appeared at the traditional Easter Peace Walks sponsored by the old coalition in solidarity with the British Aldermaston "ban the bomb" marches. Shortly before Easter, Bertrand Russell, a key figure in the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, issued a statement declaring that the U.S. was conducting a war of annihilation in Vietnam. The question of Vietnam was once again excluded from these Easter walks in the U.S., but many of the marchers—there were 6,000 this time in New York City—appeared wearing buttons that said, "I like Bertrand Russell." The rank and file was forced to express itself in this indirect manner. Some of the youth, however, took a different way.

The SPU was a part of the coalition and its officers were part of the exclusion agreement, but they didn't bother to take a vote in the chapters. The New York City off-campus chapter—it wasn't based at a university but took in high school students and a few college-age youth who were not students—decided to take up the Vietnam issue. Its members appeared in the Easter Peace Walk with signs against the Vietnam war.

These youth were halted and told to remove their signs as they entered the UN plaza where the rally was held. Two of them, Bonnie and Debbie Weinstein, high school students and members of the YSA whom I knew, called me over and asked me what they should do. Although I had nothing to do with the organization of the event—indeed if I had tried to attend the organizing meetings

1. It is important to note a distinction here between the Third Camp position and that of the pacifists. For the consistent pacifist like Muste, opposition to the use of violence by any nation or side in a struggle is a moral imperative. But this does not necessarily mean that pacifists do not take sides. The real difference between Rustin and Dellinger was not that either changed his position on violence, but that Rustin sided with the U.S. in Vietnam and Dellinger with the revolution.

I would probably have been excluded as a member of the "totalitarian left"—I waved the group on past the marshals.

There was no physical intimidation involved. (I was even carrying one of my children in my arm at the time.) But there was a moral effect. At first the marshals were furious, but when I asked them if they opposed the war in Vietnam they said yes. When I told them that a peace movement that doesn't speak out against a war in which its own country is the aggressor is not much good, they agreed.

Those with the Vietnam signs proceeded to the wall at the back of the demonstration in full view of the crowd and speakers' stand, and held the signs high. Bayard Rustin was the chairman. He stopped the rally and insisted those signs be removed. The crowd sided with the signs, however, and Rustin's pleas went for naught. Similar incidents occurred in Chicago and Minneapolis where Easter Peace Walks were also held that year.

A.J. Muste was a speaker at the New York event. He devoted his speech to an effective denunciation of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. I was often asked later if I thought Muste had changed his speech because of what happened in the crowd, or if he had planned to make that speech beforehand. I never asked him, but I'm reasonably sure he didn't change his speech.

Muste was a person of principle who would not hide his views on such an important question out of expediency. But he avoided faction fights like the plague, not out of lack of character, but because they offended his philosophy of reconciliation. In my opinion it was one of his few weaknesses. When there are real differences over fundamental questions it is not possible to reconcile everybody all the time. Muste knew that, of course, but he always seemed to try.

It was perfectly in character for him to have avoided an organized fight within the coalition and to have planned such a speech on that occasion, acting as an individual. He could get away with it because no one in the movement—not even Rustin, who did not lack gall—would presume to tell Muste what he should or should not say.

The fact that both Muste and the off-campus chapter of SPU chose the Easter Peace Walk of 1963 as the occasion to interject the Vietnam issue into the old peace coalition was in one sense purely coincidental. But in a more profound sense it was not. The old peace movement was already pregnant with the new, and Vietnam was a subject of sharp discussion within it from then on.

[Next chapter: *The May Second Movement*]

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## Balaguer Jails 500 in Dominican Republic

By Judy White

The reason for the massive arrests in the Dominican Republic the first week of June became clear when frame-up charges were lodged against fifteen trade unionists and a leader of the Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD—Dominican People's Movement).\*

They were accused June 10 of attempting to overthrow the Balaguer government.

Of the estimated 500 persons arrested since June 5, the sixteen were the first to be charged. The pretext for the arrests was news the government had received of an imminent guerrilla invasion of the island. Claudio Caamaño Grullón, Torbio Peña Jáquez, Manfredo Casado Villar, and other unnamed Dominican rebels were said to be en route to the Dominican Republic "to perform terrorist acts, including kidnappings and sabotage, against public and private property."

Caamaño, Peña Jáquez, and Casado Villar are veterans of a guerrilla force that landed in the Dominican Republic in 1973. After the attack failed, they fled to Cuba, where they have remained. Caamaño is the nephew of slain Dominican freedom fighter Francisco Caamaño Deñó.

The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD—Dominican Revolutionary party) was apparently a central target of the drive. A majority of the party's local and provincial leaders were detained.

The PRD is the party associated with the brief period of constitutional rule in the country in 1962 and with the attempt to restore a constitutionalist government in 1965, which was crushed by the U.S. military invasion of the island.

Many other sectors of the opposition were also hit by the arrests. Those jailed included members of the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD—Dominican Liberation



JOAQUIN BALAGUER

party), led by former president Juan Bosch; the Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano (PRSC—Social Christian Revolutionary party); the Partido Comunista Dominicano (PCD—Dominican Communist party); the conservative Partido Quisqueyano Democrata (PQD—Dominican Democratic party); and many unaffiliated civil liberties lawyers, community activists, and journalists.

At a news conference June 11, the CGT denounced the indictments against its members as an attempt by the Balaguer regime to destroy the Dominican labor movement. The federation reported that two other top leaders—Dionisio Vargas and Aquiles Maleno—were being sought by the police, and that their headquarters is under constant surveillance. They fear for the lives of their imprisoned members.

The CGT accused multinational corporations on the island of being behind the arrests. They said that Gulf and Western, Falconbridge, and Compañía Dominicana de Alimentos Lácteos would like to see CGT leaders imprisoned with serious enough charges to keep them behind bars for years.

The CGT's fears for the lives of the prisoners are not unfounded. Apart from the reputation Dominican jails have for

inhumane conditions, a number of political prisoners mysteriously disappear or are shot "while trying to escape."

The situation of Onelio Espailat is especially grave. He is suffering from diabetes and must be treated with a special serum, since he is allergic to the medication normally used to treat the disease. In addition, he has pleurisy and a hernia.

When the guerrilla landing was first announced on June 7, the government said that guerrillas from Cuba had landed and were being sought near San José de Ocoa, about fifty miles west of the capital.

On June 11 the government announced that three Puerto Ricans had been arrested off the coast of the Dominican Republic. They were accused of having transported Caamaño and the others from Aguadillas, Puerto Rico, to the southeast coast of the Dominican Republic, where they were seized when their launch the *San Juan Cabo* ran out of fuel.

Angel Gandía (Sandic) and John T. Sampson (Semprún) have been identified to the press by their lawyers as supporters of Puerto Rican independence; the political convictions of the third arrested victim, Raúl García, are unknown.

As of June 14 the Balaguer regime had made no statement about the Puerto Rico story, officially sticking by the Cuba version it first issued. However, representatives of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation are reported to have said that the *San Juan Cabo* could be the boat the guerrillas arrived on. The FBI also confirmed that the boat is being held in the Dominican Republic along with its crew.

The lawyers for the imprisoned Puerto Ricans are well-known leaders in the Puerto Rican independence movement. They reported June 13 that they had gone to Santo Domingo but had been unable to obtain any information about their clients. Attorney Gilberto Concepción Suárez said that the three had left Puerto Rico a week earlier on a fishing trip in the Canal de la Mona, which separates Puerto Rico from the Dominican Republic.

"If there was a landing, the appearance of the Puerto Rican boat was a tragic coincidence," he said. "If there was no such landing, then it is a subterfuge of the Dominican government."

There are widespread doubts about the alleged guerrilla landing. The guerrillas have been sought to the east and west of the capital (in the west with major troop deployments); but one week after the reported landing no trace of them had been found.

Moreover, another participant in the 1973 landing, Hamlet Hermán, in a radio broadcast from Havana, denied that Caamaño and the others had left Cuba.

No statement has been issued by Caama-

\* Those named in the indictment were three central leaders of the CGT (Central General de Trabajadores—General Workers Federation): General Secretary Francisco Antonio Santos, Education Secretary Julio de Peña Valdez, and Grievance Secretary Eugenio Pérez Cepeda. Also named were David Onelio Espailat, a central leader of the MPD, and the following trade unionists: Jacinto Antonio García Frómata, David Baldemiro Lewis, José Francisco Suárez, César Félix Santana, Buenaventura Bueno Morillo, Braulio Rodríguez Payano, Luis Fernando Morillo, Pedro Martínez Gómez, Francisco de la Cruz Rosario, Luis Hernández Gómez, Sergio Luis M. Pérez, and José Solano.

ño himself, however, leading some persons to believe that a handful of the hundreds of deported Dominicans may have secretly returned to their birthplace. A clandestine return is the only option open to these political activists, who have been forced into exile by the Balaguer regime, many of them after completing long prison sentences under barbaric conditions.

Moreover, many Dominicans do not feel that the presence or absence of guerrillas on the island is the most burning question.

"What does seem important to us to confirm," said Margarita Cordero in her June 12 column in the Santo Domingo daily *El Sol*, "... is the current government's persistence in using repressive methods, the indiscriminate character of this repression, and the possible implications of its current escalation."

Juan Bosch, former president of the Dominican Republic, expressed the same sentiment. In a June 11 radio broadcast he said that even if the ex-guerrillas were in the country, nothing would justify the massive detentions and searches carried out by the regime.

The crime of those who have been arrested, said Bosch, was "to organize the workers so that they can defend their right to earn a better wage." □

### Kenyan Police Commander Implicated in Killing of Opposition Leader

A parliamentary committee in Kenya charged June 3 that it had encountered a "massive and determined cover-up campaign" to conceal the facts of the assassination of Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, a leading critic of the Jomo Kenyatta regime.

The committee said that Benjamin Gehti, the commander of the state security police, should be regarded "as a person who took an active part in the murder himself, or as an accomplice of the actual murderer or murderers." The report also said that the police team assigned to investigate the Kariuki killing had instead acted "to harass, threaten, intimidate and even torture witnesses who really knew something."

The committee proposed that several senior security and police officers be dismissed or suspended for their obstruction of the investigation.

It was reported that at a last-minute meeting between the committee members and President Kenyatta, Kenyatta ordered two names removed from the list of persons the committee intended to investigate for possible implication in the murder. The names were thought to be those of Kenyatta's closest political adviser and of a senior officer in his bodyguard.

## Informant Recalls He May Have Suggested Bombings

### Five Scottish Nationalists Railroaded to Prison

By Mattie Hussey

GLASGOW—A three-week-long trial ended here May 23 with five men being found guilty for allegedly conspiring to seize Scottish independence through an organization called the Army of the Provisional Government (APG). The individual sentences ranged from one to twelve years on charges of conspiracy, armed bank robbery, and possession of explosives.

The trial was given front-page coverage throughout by the Scottish press—both morning and evening—but got hardly a mention in the English-based dailies. It opened May 5 in a flush of hysteria with the High Court ringed with cops as the original seven defendants arrived under heavy police escort.

In evidence, the state produced a vast array of documents allegedly found in the homes or cars of the accused. These included diagrams of bridges, maps of the tourist areas around Loch Lomond with X's marked on them, plans for using bombs, lists of Scottish towns, an ultimatum to the Westminster government to hand over power, letters to Moshe Dayan and Idi Amin asking for aid and information, a letter to British troops seeking their support, plans for guerrilla warfare, lists of banks, and so forth.

There were various other sensational aspects to the trial. On the second day Gordon Airs, a journalist for one of the dailies, was jailed for contempt of court for refusing to identify a contact of his in the APG. On the third day of the trial Colin Boyd, the secretary of the APG, gave evidence of how he had worked for months inside the APG supplying the police with information.

Boyd categorically denied being an agent provocateur. But he admitted, according to the May 8 *Glasgow Herald*, that it was possible he had suggested that blowing up pipelines would be a dramatic way of bringing public attention to Scotland's plight.

The trial was marked with lurid details of searches for explosives hidden in the Scottish countryside near Inverness, of an armed bank raid in the Springburn area of Glasgow, and of alleged plans of the APG to punish enemies and execute traitors.

Then on May 20, during the final week of the trial, one of the accused, John Carlyle, was set free after all charges against him were dropped. The prosecutor could find no evidence to link him with the other accused.

Another of the defendants, Alastair Smith, was cleared May 21 of complicity with the APG. On the same day the charges against the remaining accused were drastically pruned down to conspiracy to further the aims of the APG, plus lesser charges.

It is not possible to get any clear estimate of the size of the APG. They seem to be the latest version in a fifteen-year series of allegedly armed, small, secret, and underground Scottish nationalist groups—the Scottish Republican Army, the Scottish Liberation Army, the Tartan Army, the Border Clan, and the Scottish Citizen Army.

But one thing did emerge clearly from the trial—the police and Special Branch (political police) knew almost every move made by the accused. Implicated in all the shadowy underground activities of the APG were agents of the state apparatus.

The May 24 issue of the Edinburgh daily *Scotsman* listed a number of "strange aspects" of the case:

1. The initial charging and subsequent release and disappearance of an eighth accused whose name was frequently mentioned in vital passages of evidence.
2. Police failure to swoop a full 16 months ago when they believed they could catch some of the conspirators in possession of explosives.
3. The release on bail of just one of the seven who finally faced the court—and he the one with the most charges against him. During his freedom he worked—as a security officer and enjoyed freedom to travel.
4. The apparent immunity and protection of Colin Boyd, the self-professed nationalist and long-term police informer whose telephone call began the investigation.
5. The astonishing coincidence that both the accused, Murray, already convicted of plotting a bank raid in England for the APG [in Blackpool in 1971—M.H.], and Lygate, a political extremist [Matthew Lygate was a member of the Maoist grouping Workers Party of Scotland (Marxist-Leninist)—M.H.] serving 24 years for Glasgow bank robberies, should share a cell in Perth prison from where they could launch a recruiting drive.
6. The apparent police ignorance, despite their meticulous surveillance, about a visit made to General Amin in Kampala by somebody or bodies, claiming to be from the APG.

As various police witnesses admitted under questioning, the orders came from higher up—and no matter how senior the policeman there was still a higher-up to give those orders. . . .

The APG were given enough rope and provocation by the cops to make themselves appear ineffectual, absurd, and far-fetched, and to provide the state with a smear on the rising nationalist sentiment in Scotland. □

## In Reply to the Stalinist Charges in the 'República' Affair

By Gerry Foley

According to the Portuguese and French Communist parties, the dispute that led to the closing of the Lisbon daily *República* on May 20 was just a normal labor conflict. The Portuguese CP's ultraleft satellite, the Movimento da Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left), said that the reason for the closure was "the struggle of the workers at *República* against the counterrevolutionary line of the paper."

There have also been reports that some of the printing workers who objected to the editorial line of the paper belonged to the Maoist União Democrático do Povo (UDP—Democratic People's Union) and the former terrorist Liga da União e Acção Revolucionária (LUAR—League for Revolutionary Unity and Action).

In an article in the French SP paper *l'Unité*, João Gomes, editor in chief of *República*, said that the closing was the culmination of a long struggle between the SP and CP factions on the paper's staff. The Stalinists carried out a "sabotage plan," he said. Distribution of the paper was blocked. Then, the business manager, a Stalinist sympathizer, claimed that it was the political line of the publication that was responsible for declining circulation. Following that, the printing workers demanded a change in line. This was followed by the outbreak of an open struggle between CP and SP journalists.

In the course of this battle, eighteen journalists, mostly members of the CP, resigned. Three journalists hired to replace them were refused entry on April 29 by printing workers. A group of printers proposed putting out an issue of the paper without the editorial staff, but the proposal was voted down by a majority of the work force.

"The business manager announced that he was leaving," Gomes wrote. "The same day [May 16], the paper published a document that was to touch off the explosion that had been building up. It was a list of seventy persons, well known antifascists, that the CP was preparing to purge from the television network.

"This was the pretext for unleashing the incident. The workers demanded the ouster of the publisher, Raul Rêgo [a prominent member of the SP], and insisted on keeping the business manager, who is close to the CP. Immediately, on the morning of May

17, the editorial staff gave Rêgo a vote of confidence. On Monday, the workers put out a 'pirate' edition, replacing Rêgo's name on the masthead with that of the business manager. The editorial staff then decided to occupy the offices of the paper. Negotiations continued throughout the night of Monday-Tuesday. At about 5:00 a.m., seals were placed on the entrance, and an hour later we left."

This version raises some questions. On May 2, the CP-controlled evening paper, *Diário de Lisboa*, reported that the printing workers' objections to hiring journalists had prevented *República* from coming out that day. That this story was based on fact was confirmed in the May 3 issue of *República*. However, the statement said that the workers had objected because they thought there had been a consensus at the last general assembly of the work force that hiring would be frozen. The statement denied that the workers had objected to the journalists or that any political questions had been involved.

However, it was not clear whether the statement represented the view of the editors or that of a group of workers. It said: "The workers of this paper want to clear up the error and inform our readers that the dispute that momentarily divided us had an internal and nonpolitical character, and that we have now found the road that will surely lead to resolving the difference and restoring the unity and comradeship that are the source of our paper's strength."

The statement specifically rejected suggestions by SP leaders that the publication of the paper had been prevented by CP pressures. Such suspicions were generally accepted by the international press, since the May 2 issue would have been the first following the incidents between the CP and the SP in the Estádio Primeiro de Maio, and *República* is the only daily that could be counted on to express the SP leadership's point of view. Most of the daily press is either controlled or heavily influenced by the CP. The other Lisbon daily close to the SP, *Jornal Novo*, had only been publishing for a couple of weeks at the time.

According to the May 30 issue of *Combate Socialista*, the fortnightly paper of the Portuguese Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT—Revolutionary Workers party), the explanation given by defen-

ders of the printing workers' action was that the paper was "partisan," and this was what the workers objected to. This accusation, the revolutionary-socialist paper explained, was in obvious bad faith, "since the editorial boards of the other papers are not nonpartisan nor anything like it."

Obviously the events that led up to the closure of *República* are complex, and depending on the kind of compromise the SP has made with the military, may not be clarified entirely for some time.

### República's Background

However, the evidence regarding the political charges against *República* is clear enough from its pages. The paper was a sounding board of the SP and the group that preceded it. This was well known long before the fall of the Salazarist regime. Furthermore, like the Socialist group itself, the paper had close relations with the "old republican opposition," which although persecuted by the Salazarist regime was never totally liquidated or suppressed.

This layer joined with the Communist party in a number of opposition election campaigns and mass actions beginning with the end of the Second World War. *República* was likewise able to survive and carry on minimum opposition activity despite frequent victimization by the political police.

This year, on the anniversary of the Nazi capitulation, for example, *República* was able to print a facsimile of the front page it had printed in 1945 hailing the Allied victory.

There was, therefore, no truth whatsoever in the report of the "Daily World Combined Services," published in the June 10 issue of the American Stalinist paper, which said:

"Republica has an interesting history: it was founded three years before the April 25, 1974, overthrow of Portuguese fascism and was the 'token' opposition newspaper permitted by the former fascist regime."

Actually, the press censorship had loosened somewhat before the fall of the old regime, and opposition was not confined to *República*, although it was the best known liberal paper. The ousted dictator explained his view of the situation in the press in his apology, *Depoimento*, printed in Brazil:

"In the afternoon, the public had at its disposal a Socialist paper, *República*;

another with a Maoist tendency, *Diário de Lisboa*; and two evening papers, *Diário Popular* and *Capital*, on whose editorial boards, especially in the case of the latter, Communist or fellow traveling elements predominated."

The fact was, and this became clear soon after April 25, 1974, that at least on *Diário de Lisboa*, there was significant CP influence. This apparently was no secret to Caetano, although he misinterpreted it. Furthermore, not only were CPers tolerated on that paper, but a number of CPers worked for *República* itself. The *Daily World's* suggestion that there was something fishy about *República* because it was allowed to publish under the old regime was, thus, nothing but an instance of the all-too-familiar Stalinist demagoguery and slander.

While blaming the closure of *República* on an ordinary labor dispute, the *Daily World* raised a number of political charges.

"Raul Rego, its editor, is a member of the Socialist Party, and had been filling the columns of the paper with vitriolic denunciations not only of the PCP but also of the Armed Forces Movement [AFM].

"*República* is actually owned by Portuguese capitalists and is printed on a supposedly profit-making basis, even though its editor is a Socialist. Its circulation diminished sharply after its attacks on the AFM and the PCP, and the paper's typographers and other workers voiced their concern to the editor.

"It is important to note that the workers' demands were first of all for job security and secondly against the paper's political line which seemed to be endangering their jobs.

"There are a grand total of five PCP members of the paper, though the U.S. capitalist press gave the impression that all *República* workers are Communists. The workers as a whole refused to print the paper, which did not appear from May 18 on after an especially bitter attack editor Rego wanted to print against the PCP and AFM.

"In the new Portugal, 'freedom of opinion and expression' has been extended to ordinary workers, apparently to the indignation of editor Rego."

The American CP, a superslavish follower of Moscow, avoided the question of the *República* closing until the issue seemed resolved. In view of the character of this party, the June 10 article in its paper probably reflects rather faithfully the explanations being given out by the PCP and Moscow.

#### In Financial Trouble

There is no reason to think that *República* is any more a capitalist paper than the other dailies whose editorial boards are at

present controlled or heavily influenced by the CP. In fact, its editors claim that ownership is spread more widely than in the case of the other papers because many individual liberals bought stock to keep the paper alive during the Salazarist period.

*República's* business problems can probably be largely traced to this history. When all of the daily press suddenly turned left, *República* lost its historic niche. It had less of a material base certainly than *Diário de Lisboa*. Its distribution setup was obviously weak, since it was more difficult to find than any of the other dailies.

Technically, the paper was poor and remained poor. Furthermore, because of its association with "old republican" and Socialist intellectuals, it specialized in elaborately written essays of a rather outdated type. Because of its layout, its style, and its editorial resources, it was more difficult to read and had less news coverage than *Diário de Lisboa*. It could not compete for a broad audience with the tabloid-like *Diário Popular*. And the young intellectual readership was pretty well captured by *A Capital*, which offered the most thorough reporting of all the Lisbon papers.

The launching of *Jornal Novo*, also, must have cut into *República's* circulation, since it was a better written and produced paper that also appealed to SP supporters. Moreover, the closure of *República* followed shortly after the election campaign, during which a proliferation of party papers cut into regular newspaper sales.

However, was it reasonable to think that if *República* changed its line to resemble more that of the other five afternoon papers that its circulation would have increased, especially in a climate of general economic crisis in which the newspaper industry suffered special disadvantages? That is hardly likely. In fact, the most immediate possibility for rescuing the paper from financial trouble would have been more help from the SP, the country's largest political party. This, however, is exactly the opposite, by all accounts, of what was wanted by the printing workers who forced the shutdown of the paper. Nor did these workers raise the question of nationalization or state support like workers in other failing enterprises.

#### What Did Stalinists Object To?

So, the question was quite clearly one of political line. What about the political charges the Stalinists raise against *República*? We of course have not seen the item Rêgo "wanted to print," which may have upset the printing workers. In the last issue, the one of May 17, there seems to be nothing that could especially disturb the CP. On the front page, there is a report of the end of a fishermen's strike, a statement by the Organization of African Unity, a



Last issue of Socialist newspaper "República" before it was shut down by MFA.

report of claims by the Maoist MRPP (Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party) that it had uncovered a fascist terrorist network, and a statement by the minister of information on his trip to the United States. The inside-page feature is on factories that had "distinguished themselves in the Battle for Production." Featured on the third page is a review of Philip Agee's exposé of the CIA.

On page 9, there is a communiqué from the SP labor secretary continuing a polemic over the strike wave that followed the elections. On page 13, there is a summary of a communiqué by the Administrative Board of the Lisbon University Law School, a stronghold of the MRPP, attacking the CP youth organization. On page 16, there is a communiqué by the printing workers of the Sociedade Nacional de Tipografia explaining why they refused to print the book *Radiografia Militar*.

Further, on, there are communiqués by several groups concerning a demonstration in support of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—Angolan People's Liberation Movement). There is nothing strange about this, or "interesting," to use the *Daily World's* term. One of the most positive developments following the overthrow of the Caetano regime was that the daily press began to run the communiqués of all the political groups.

In the May 16 issue, there were a number of things that could have upset the CP, as well as certain Maoist groups. The main front-page story was on the return of a delegation of the PCP (Marxist-Leninist)

from China. It was accompanied by a picture of E. Vilar, the general secretary of the Maoist formation, shaking hands with the Chinese Deputy Premier Tsi Tem Kuei. This coverage was certainly generous. However, a discussion between Portuguese Maoist leaders and Chinese officials on relations between Peking and Lisbon could be expected to arouse general interest.

The PCP(ml) is greatly disliked by the other Portuguese Maoist groups, which are generally ultraleft. It is not an ultraleft group but a right-centrist one, similar to certain pro-Peking groupings in Germany and Scandinavia, such as the group that calls itself the Swedish Communist party. The other Maoists have appealed to the radical youth, the poor petty bourgeoisie, and antiunion sentiment among certain groups of workers, whereas this formation has led the chemical workers union and maintained a close alliance with the SP.

The fact that the PCP(ml) was apparently given the nod in Peking by the Chinese CP leaders was played up by SP publicists. An article in *Jornal Novo*, for example, claimed that Peking was backing Vilar because it understood that the SP was the only viable alternative to the CP. This fit in very well with SP strategy. The party is anxious to avoid being identified with the West European Social Democratic parties and has tried to stress its contacts with "undogmatic" and "independent" Communist parties, including the Spanish CP, the Romanian CP, the Italian and Yugoslav CPs, and even the Chinese CP.

The *República* article emphasized Vilar's statement that relations between the People's Republic of China and Portugal depended on Lisbon remaining independent of "both superpowers," that is, not getting too close to the Soviet Union and its allies. No doubt the coverage given to the PCP(ml) irritated the CP, but it was not a new development and had no great importance, since Peking has not shown a lot of interest in Portugal.

On the other hand, this reportage could be expected to provoke a strong reaction from the ultraleft Maoists, who have denounced Vilar as a Social Democratic imposter hiding under a Maoist war bonnet.

#### Exposé of Proposed Purges

What was certainly far more important for the CP was the story about a document handed to the Conselho da Revolução (Council of the Revolution, the top body of the Armed Forces Movement and the effective government of the country) by the CP cell in the TV network. It reportedly argued for purging seventy persons from the network staff. A number of the arguments given to support these demands were quoted.

One person was described as a "latent

and possibly even active homosexual." Many were accused of being suspect because of their alleged friends or relations. One was denounced as "the lover" of a suspect person. Another was decried as "a great admirer of bull-fight circles, an active participant in arranging for the televising of bull fights." One was described as "mentally retarded." Another was accused of being a "bourgeois racist" and of having personal habits that were "more than dubious." One was condemned as "a reactionary technocrat, an arrogant ambitious person who wants to remodel Portuguese Television to conform with the BBC or other bourgeois TV networks." Portuguese TV is notoriously poor in quality and now thoroughly dominated by the CP.

The document reportedly included statements such as the following: "April 25 chameleons abound at RTP, many of whom are also 'heroes' of April 25 [1974] because they were on duty that day. Invariably some of the most important of these wear SP emblems in their lapels."

Another item probably not to the liking of the CP was a communiqué on a general assembly of the metalworkers union, which was featured on the front page.

There has been a bitter struggle in the metalworkers union between the Comissão de Unidade Operária (Workers United Committee), which includes activists associated with the MES but who differ both sociologically and politically from the petty-bourgeois centrists that dominate the organization, and the CP-controlled Comissão Directiva. *República* ran a communiqué of the first group, which said:

"During the assembly, the illegitimate Comissão Directiva proposed a 45-hour week, since it was necessary to 'rebuild the national economy.' Carlos Carvalho went so far as to say that it was not the plants working 45-hour weeks that should go over to a 40-hour week but those working 40-hour weeks that should go over to a 45-hour week.

"Various comrades responded by defending a 40-hour week, since what is under discussion is whether we are going to raise the level of the economy and the economic condition of the workers, in which case the first step would be to end unemployment by giving work to those who live in poverty, or whether we are going to continue to make sacrifices for the benefit of the bosses and the big salaries received by the administrators and technicians, in which case it would really be in order to increase the workweek to 45 hours in those plants that work a 40-hour one."

The communiqué not only denounced the Comissão Directiva but the CP and the government.

"Faced with a revolt, the presiding committee, made up of members of the illegitimate Comissão Directiva and ele-

ments from the federation, among others, decided to call in the military police, who never came into such meetings even under the fascist regime. And they appointed elements who are paid with our dues . . . to form pickets and point out the 'reactionaries' supporting the 40-hour week. Notable in these groups were activists of the false Communist party, who worked with the military police in a way that could not but remind us of the shock police and the old political police. They shouted 'MFA' as they clubbed comrades."

Perhaps this is the sort of thing the *Daily World's* Stalinist sources meant by "attacks on the AFM."

#### Rivals for Favored Status

On the other hand, some articles in *República* in May accused the CP labor leaders of promoting strikes in an attempt to recoup the party's militant image after its electoral defeat. This was part of the polemics between the two reformist parties as to which is the "best ally" of the MFA. But one of the strikes involving a CP-led union was by the printing workers. This is the way a *República* reporter described a confrontation between the strikers and the military in the May 7 issue:

"Two Chaimites [armored cars] advanced toward one of the doors of the Ministry of Labor. This led the demonstrators to shout: 'The fascists are still using force' and 'The soldiers are children of the people!'"

"At the same time, groups of printing workers continued to arrive from the Praça de Londres and swelled the crowd. They took up chants such as 'The MFA is not with the people.'

"Around us we heard shouts that showed the justice of the struggle against the arrogance and discrimination of the bosses in large sections of the printing industry. A middle-aged man told a soldier: 'The people are here because they have to feed their children, just like your father fed you!' Another—a young man with tears running down his face—shouted to an officer on a Chaimite: 'You aren't a professional soldier, comrade! You are a worker like us. Don't listen to them. There are people who are hungry.'"

In this period, *República* did give a prominent place to attacks by SP representatives on CP policy in various areas. However, it also published lengthy replies from the persons and groups that came under fire. For example, in its May 15 issue, it printed a long statement by the leadership of the national union federation, Inter-sindical.

The document, which took up half a page, began this way:

"Both *República* and *Expresso* came out with articles May 10 analyzing the strike wave that developed last week. These articles represent a coordinated action by

these 'independent' news sources, which respectively represent the SP and the PPD [Partido Popular Democrático—Democratic People's party, the main bourgeois formation] and reflect a continuation of their campaign against the Intersindical. For this purpose, *Expresso* and *República* have resorted to lies in order to slander the Intersindical.

"Thus, *República* claims that 'in the labor conflicts arising in some plants such as Plessy, ITT, Siemens, or Cabos Avila, Intersindical, through its shop stewards, organized various actions to exert pressure in the negotiations in progress with the Ministry of Labor over firings without just cause.'"

It went on to say: "*República* and *Expresso* must make clear in their analyses whether they want to stand on the side of workers unity, of which Intersindical is the authentic expression, or align themselves with the ELP [Exército de Libertação Portuguesa—Portuguese Liberation Army, a rightist terrorist group formed in Spain] and the counterrevolutionists who want to destroy Intersindical."

The call for elections in the unions was opposed with this argument: "Are those who are talking about elections by secret and direct vote interested in democratizing union life? No, those who are calling for elections in the unions now know that the proletariat is the democratic class par excellence, the class that utilizes democracy as the fundamental basis on which it founds its unity in action.

"What are these people after, then? Basically, they want to divert the workers from the urgent tasks for advancing the democratic process, which are the battle for production and workers control of production."

*República's* editors replied: "Intersindical considers it slander to say that it organized actions in the plants to exert pressure in the negotiations with the Ministry of Labor. . . . That was the report we got and so we published it, just as we gave a prominent place to the denial of Intersindical, which, it seems, regards it as 'slander' to say that they organized actions to exert pressure in these negotiations."

The editors did not need to comment at length on Intersindical's style of argument or its historical antecedents. The Stalinist dogmatism was as obvious as a rat's tail sticking out of the woodwork. Nor, obviously, did they have anything to fear from this kind of argument.

A similar exchange took place in the same issue with the editors of *O Século*, a morning paper that the SP has accused of distorting the news to suit the CP line. *República* gave space for a reply by *O Século's* editors.

"It is completely false that the 'top echelons' at *O Século* are dominated by the

CP. On the other hand, if there are CP elements in these 'top echelons' (to use the picturesque language of the SP communiqué), this is no reason for criticism, since PCP members have the same right as others to belong to any 'top echelon' and they certainly did not win their positions by means other than legal or democratic ones. Therefore, we must repudiate the opportunism this communiqué showed in trying to exploit a lamentable incident [the distortion of an SP statement] to step up the slander campaign the SP leadership has been conducting against the news media, and in particular the press.

"It is also unacceptable for the SP to use this incident to make political propaganda. In fact, we would not classify any party as the biggest workers party. There are no statistics to prove that the SP is the biggest workers party. What is proven is that it was the one that got the most votes in an electorate of six million persons, of whom only half are employed, and of these only 33 percent (about a million) belong to the proletariat."

Editors trying to defend their objectivity would have no interest in trying to argue whether or not the SP represented the majority of the proletariat. The Stalinists on *O Século* were almost as clumsy as the Intersindical leadership. Again, *República's* editors or the SP had nothing to fear from this kind of argument.

#### Rêgo in Camp of CP and MFA

But what about the charge that Rêgo, who is in fact a moderate Social Democrat at best, filled the columns of *República* with "vitriolic" anti-Communism? Certainly, he should have been at his most "vitriolic" after the May 1 incidents. Here is what he said in the May 3 issue:

"The demonstrations yesterday in the stadium . . . followed genuinely free elections in accordance with the MFA program and now we know the will of the people, which is for unity, but unity within the democratic principles of pluralism and liberty for all, even for minorities. No party or group of parties can claim to represent everyone. . . . That is why the May Day following the April 25 elections could have no other objective than real Portuguese unity, with respect for the opinions of all Portuguese.

"Unity can only come from respect for all currents of opinion in Portugal, above all when these were clearly established and defined by the elections held on the first anniversary of the revolution."

In fact in May, *República's* editors did not take any position on national policy that differed from the MFA or the CP. The only thing that distinguished the paper was that its editorials and feature articles, as well as its emphasis, generally reflected the attitude of the SP leadership.

The argument that the closure of this paper did not affect the SP's right to propagate its views, since *República* was not the official party organ, is completely specious. The official papers of both the CP and SP are weekly house organs, consisting mostly of statements and speeches by the leaderships. Both parties put forward their positions essentially through the daily press. And the fact is that in Lisbon, three dailies are solidly controlled by the CP. *República*, the only well-established paper aligned with the SP, was closed down precisely as a conflict between the two parties was escalating.

If the CP and its allies had been interested in reassuring the ranks of the Socialist party that their rights were not in danger or in preventing the SP protests from serving as a "pretext for rightist mobilizations," they could have defused these protests in an instant by calling for a united campaign to assure a genuinely democratic press, beginning with raising the demand that the government guarantee every tendency access to public opinion at least commensurate with its demonstrated support among the masses. The truth is that although it got more than two and a half times more votes than the CP, including bigger votes in workers districts, the SP has been gravely underrepresented in the media.

On the other hand, the way most likely to stir the fears of the SP ranks was for the CP and its hangers-on to do what they did, to launch a slander campaign against the SP on the theme that the revolution was in danger and that all "progressives" had to get on the side of the barricades occupied by the Stalinists and the military. □

#### Admiral Offers Solution to Canada's Unemployment

A high-ranking Canadian military officer has come up with a helpful solution for Canada's high unemployment rate—conscript the unemployed and use the money that would have been spent on unemployment benefits to buy more arms.

Vice Adm. Douglas Boyle, head of the Maritime Command and second-ranking officer in the Canadian armed forces, says Ottawa is spending just over 2 percent of its gross national product on the military, while the Pentagon absorbs almost 8 percent of U.S. GNP.

"Every time I go down to the States I hang my head in shame," he said.

Urging that the jobless be inducted into the military, he said: "I don't know why they don't give us [the military] the billion and half dollars they spend on unemployment."

The vice admiral's proposal is not a new one, however. In fact, it's standard procedure. For example, it was tried—with mixed results—by all the major capitalist powers between 1939 and 1945.

### French Left Debates Issues in 'República' Affair

By Dick Fidler

The Portuguese military regime's closure of *República*, the Lisbon daily that reflects the views of the Socialist party, was widely publicized throughout capitalist Europe.

Because it raised fundamental questions about the relationship between democracy and the struggle for socialism, the suppression of *República* called for an immediate response by all tendencies in the workers movement. The Communist parties felt the strongest pressure to declare their stand, as a result of the key role of the Portuguese CP in the events leading up to the military's evacuation of the newspaper's premises on May 20.

In Spain, where the Stalinists are allied with bourgeois elements in a "Democratic Junta" that is seeking to replace the Franco regime, the CP issued a statement calling the *República* seizure "regrettable."

"This measure could tarnish the international image of a democratic Portugal," said CP General Secretary Santiago Carrillo, "and I would hope that this daily will reappear without delay."

In Italy, where the biggest Communist party in Western Europe is seeking a "historic compromise" with the leading bourgeois party, the Christian Democrats, the reaction was similar. An editorial in the CP's daily *L'Unità* described the *República* seizure as a "counterrevolutionary coup" and suggested it had been engineered by "extremist agitators."

In France, where both the Communist and Socialist parties have mass support, the *República* affair immediately became the focus of an increasingly bitter debate between the two parties. The SP expressed full solidarity with the protests of its Portuguese cothinkers, pressing the theme it has been advancing for some time—that the Socialists are the party of democracy and freedom, unlike the Communists with their notorious affinities for the Kremlin dictatorship.

The French CP, which no doubt would have preferred to avoid this issue altogether, has responded defensively, within the framework of its support for "peaceful coexistence." To the charge that they are dominated by Moscow, the Stalinist leaders reply by proclaiming their commitment to France's "national independence."

When French SP leader François Mitterrand unveiled his party's "Charte des Libertés" (Charter of Rights) in May, the CP countered with its "Déclaration des

Libertés," which it would like to see entrenched in the Gaullist Constitution of 1958.

But the Union of the Left, the electoral coalition that includes the CP, the SP, and the Left Radicals (a small bourgeois formation), does not advance a program for the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of socialist democracy—the only way to guarantee the workers' democratic rights.

The *República* issue posed the question of freedom of the press very concretely. The debate quickly escalated from conflicting accounts of what happened at the newspaper to much broader, more fundamental questions raised by the incident.

#### Séguy: 'Just a Labor Conflict'

At a May 27 news conference in Paris, Georges Séguy, the general secretary of the Stalinist-led labor federation, the CGT,<sup>1</sup> just returned from Portugal, presented what is now the stock Stalinist version of the events. Echoing the claims of the Portuguese CP and the military, he said the *República* affair "is simply a classic labor conflict." Moreover, *República* is not the official organ of the Socialist party, "but a supposedly independent newspaper that in recent months has agreed to carry the statements and positions of the Socialist party.

"*República* thereby quickly became the daily newspaper in Portugal that specialized in anti-Communism and denigration, even slander, of the MFA [Armed Forces Movement].

"It must be clearly understood that in the present circumstances in Portugal, anything that tends to denigrate or slander the MFA is immediately suspected of ill intentions or hostility toward the liberators, that is, toward the soldiers and officers who had the courage to defeat fascism and colonialism."

The CGT leader argued that *República* had consequently lost "almost half of its readers," and that the workers intervened in order to save their jobs. (How the closure protected their jobs he did not explain.)

Although he has never been noted for his support of factory occupations and workers control in France, Séguy hailed the *República* workers' action in "occupying

1. Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor.

their company and taking over the management."

"The methods they employed can be discussed," he said, "but I am quite surprised that some fanatical supporters of workers self-management can take offense at this reaction, which has obvious overtones of self-management."

In any case, he concluded, the government's action in closing the newspaper was completely in accord with Portugal's labor laws, which provide that where management and the workers cannot reach agreement, "the conflict is referred for study and appraisal to the appropriate legal authorities, and meanwhile the appearance of the particular publication is suspended while the legal process follows its course."

The Socialist party was quick to reply, publishing a special supplement on Portugal in its weekly *l'Unité*. It featured an article by João Gomes, editor in chief of *República* and a Socialist deputy in the Constituent Assembly, replying to Séguy's charges. According to Gomes's version of what happened, the business manager of the newspaper, "who is close to the CP," pitted the production staff against the editorial staff, attempting at the same time to exploit conflicts between journalists belonging to the Socialist and Communist parties. The editorial staff voted full support to the publisher Raul Rêgo, a leader of the Socialist party. When the production staff put out a "pirate" edition, replacing Rêgo's name with the name of the business manager, the journalists occupied the office. Negotiations failed to resolve the conflict, and the military closed down the paper.

#### Mitterrand: 'Democracy Imperiled'

In an accompanying article, Mitterrand wrote that "freedom of expression stands in the front rank of elementary rights. From this standpoint, the *República* affair is straightforward, very straightforward. . . . In fact it calls for a yes or no answer."

Mitterrand called for a united response in defense of "imperiled democracy." The Communist parties of Italy, Spain, and other Western countries had already denounced the closure, he noted. "The French Communist party seems more embarrassed in its attitude."

Claude Estier, a leader of the SP, asked in an editorial whether "the CP can uphold for long an analysis of the Portuguese situation that contradicts the campaign it is trying to build in France around its proposed bill of rights. . . ."

"Even if there are obvious differences in the situations of the two countries, there cannot be one truth in Paris and another in Lisbon. One cannot be for pluralism here and against it there. . . ."

The CP replied to these criticisms in an editorial in *l'Humanité*. The main issue in



Portugal was not democratic rights but the threat of an economic collapse, the Stalinists argued. "Organizing production is the primary task." But the "friends and allies" of SP leader Mário Soares were busy "fomenting strikes and disorders," while the SP was not participating sufficiently in "the economic struggle, which is the prerequisite for the survival of democracy and freedom in Portugal."

Paul Laurent, a member of the CP's political bureau, accused the French SP of participating in an anti-Communist campaign "with the aim of trying to weaken the French Communist party."

*L'Humanité* protested as "inadmissible" the French SP leaders' reference to criticism of the *República* closure by the Italian and Spanish CPs. "By counterposing the positions of the Communist parties, the Socialist party challenges the freedom of each to determine its position in complete independence. . . ."

Obviously embarrassed by the stances taken by their foreign cothinkers, the French CP leadership tried to give a "left" veneer to its differences with them.

"Comrade Santiago Carrillo makes an alliance with the 'civilized right wing,' a component of the line of the Spanish comrades—that's the business of the Communist party of Spain. The Italian Communist party thinks it should seek a 'historic compromise' with the Christian Democracy—that's its affair. . . . We have no intention whatsoever of giving lessons in democracy and revolution to the Portuguese Communists and the MFA."

The Social Democrats' claim that they are the only real defenders of democracy and freedom within the workers movement was the theme of an international rally sponsored by the Italian Socialist party in Milan May 31. Among the featured speakers was the wife of Portuguese SP leader Mário Soares, who denounced the Portuguese CP for its "Stalinist" attitude.

Mitterrand, introduced as the leader of the "premier party of the French working class," told the audience of 6,000 persons that "the time has come to arouse the Socialist International in Europe. . . . The Union of the Left is marching toward socialism. (But) it has no meaning without an unremitting struggle for human rights. The election of the Socialists means more freedom, the capacity to express oneself, defense of the right to come and go as one pleases, to write and to speak as one wishes. Socialism is the people and the workers more than ever before masters of their own lives."

#### Marchais: 'An Inopportune Polemic'

In an editorial in the June 2 issue of *L'Humanité*, Georges Marchais, general secretary of the French CP, denounced the



Der Spiegel

MARCHAIS and MITTERRAND: Differences over Portugal no obstacle to collaboration.

"unexpected, inopportune, and unjustified polemic" by the SP around the *República* affair. Marchais thought the SP leaders should show more respect for their coalition partners.

"We ask ourselves, How is this attitude, so obviously at variance with the interests of the Union of the Left, to be explained?"

"Does it result from the pressures of the Socialist International? The leaders of some big Social Democratic parties, at a meeting in Vienna eight days ago, declared against any collaboration between Socialists and Communists, while the Portuguese Socialist leader Mário Soares appears more and more in the role of a traveling salesman for the forces of division. Is it a diversion intended to paper over some internal problems in the Socialist party? Has the Socialist party become dizzy from the few electoral victories it has recently scored, so that it now thinks it can take its distance from the Union? Is it a consequence of the persistent efforts of Giscard d'Estaing and his friends to smash the Union and make the Socialist party return [*sic*] to a class-collaborationist policy? By basing itself on the anti-Communist campaign of the right wing, does the Socialist party hope to strengthen itself at our expense, even if that harms the Union of the Left?"

The Socialists, of course, have no intention of breaking from the Union of the Left. Smaller than the CP, they see an electoral alliance with it as a key means of enlarging their own influence—with the long-run aim of displacing the CP as the main party in the French working class. Within that

perspective, Mitterrand and his friends seek to build the image of the SP as an "all-inclusive" party of "democratic" socialism. The international campaign mounted by the Portuguese SP in defense of its democratic rights jibes with that objective.

The CP's claim that the Socialist party is catering primarily to pressures from the right will impress those who identify the defense of bourgeois democratic rights—such as freedom of speech and of the press—with support of bourgeois rule. That is what the bourgeoisie would like us to believe. And, from a somewhat different perspective that was also the "reasoning" invoked by Stalin to justify his suppression of democratic rights in the Soviet Union in the interests of preserving the rule of the bureaucratic caste.

Revolutionary Marxists, on the contrary, recognize that such freedoms, while historically advanced by the capitalist class in its struggle against feudal privilege, are today seen by the bourgeoisie as an obstacle to maintaining their rule. The working class, however, has every interest in defending and extending such rights as part of its struggle for power.

For their own opportunist reasons, the French SP leaders have sensed that the defense of democratic rights is a good issue on which to score some points in their struggle for influence against the CP in the workers movement.<sup>2</sup> The reasons are obvious:

2. Mitterrand demonstrated his ability to pose as a defender of democratic rights on several

1. Workers, confronted with growing attacks on their democratic rights, see the question as an important one.

2. The French CP's well-deserved reputation as an apologist and stooge for the crimes of the Kremlin rulers, especially their violations of democratic rights, has earned it the healthy disdain of wide layers of the population.

3. Unlike its cothinkers in West Germany, for example, the French SP, as an opposition party, is not responsible for administering the bourgeois state, and hence has more latitude to indulge in "democratic" rhetoric.

Thus at a special conference of the Socialist party in early May that discussed relations with the Communists, the SP leadership singled out "respect for democracy and freedom during the period of transition to socialism" as one of the five major differences that they proposed to discuss with the Stalinists in the projected renegotiation of the program of the Union of the Left.

#### Was Léon Blum Right?

Addressing the conference, Mitterrand argued that it was the Social Democrats' support of "freedom" and their commitment to democratic methods that justified the historic division in the French left between Communists and Socialists. Léon Blum had been right at the Congress of Tours in 1920, he said. At that congress, the old Socialist party split, with a majority deciding to form the Communist party and to adhere to the Communist International. The followers of Léon Blum reconstituted the SP as a reformist party.

Yes, Mitterrand conceded, Social Democracy had its "old demons"—a reference to the belief some delegates expressed in the debate that Blum's faction had been wrong. But the CP had its demons, too, he said, called "Stalinism."

At the same time, the Social Democratic leader made clear that he was not countering any radical perspective to the program of the CP. He contended that the CP's "hard" line, including its inconsistent approach to democratic rights, was part of a "class against class" line. According to Mitterrand, the CP had reverted to a class-struggle line under the impact of the current economic crisis, just as, he said, the Communist parties had followed an ultra-

left line in the early 1930s, during the Great Depression.

"According to Mr. Mitterrand," Thierry Pfister reported in the May 6 *Le Monde*, "the Communists have regained confidence that the present difficulties will this time bring about the end of the capitalist system. He on the other hand did not have such an 'optimistic' analysis."

#### CP Denies It Is Stalinist

The CP leadership reacted defensively to the Socialists' charge of Stalinism. In a report to the CP's Central Committee, which met May 27-28, Georges Marchais said that Stalin's "serious errors," especially "with respect to socialist democracy in its various aspects," had been repudiated by the present leaders of the Soviet Union.

"Precisely because these conceptions and practices were completely foreign to their own ideals and policies," Marchais said, "the French Communists were very pained by the revelations of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party, in February 1956. They denounced these errors, these crimes, these tragedies, that had characterized a period of Soviet history, as soon as they became known."

(Reporting Marchais's speech, *Le Monde* noted in an editorial aside that he overlooked the fact that "it was not until 1973 that a Communist historian, Mr. Jean Ellenstein, stopped speaking of the 'alleged report of Comrade Khrushchev.'")

Marchais said he saw no reason to "point the finger over and over again at the only black pages in the glorious history of socialism. Only the adversaries of socialism have an interest in doing that."

The French CP, which had never been affected by "sectarian narrowness and dogmatism," had "exorcised" the "demon of Stalinism," Marchais said. But what about the "demon" of "class collaboration" that seems to afflict—the Socialist party?

Marchais was at this point treading on some rather shaky ground for the CP. This was obvious in another part of his report, where he attempted to reply to Mitterrand's speech at the SP conference. "Since the Socialist party claims the heritage of the ideas and policy of Léon Blum, it should be recalled that those policies included, to mention only the most important items, the pause in 1936-38 in the economic and social achievements of the Popular Front, enabling the bosses to regain the offensive; nonintervention in Spain, which left the field clear for the intervention of Hitler and Mussolini . . . , in 1947, the eviction of the Communist ministers from the government under the pressure of the United States; in 1956, the abandonment of the promises of peace in Algeria and the continuation of the war; in 1958, support for the establishment of a political system that reinforced the

domination of the big bourgeoisie. In short, the French section of the Workers [Second] International has drifted for long periods in what could be called a policy of 'loyally managing the affairs of capital.'"

Marchais's listing of SP crimes may have sounded like good campaign oratory to the CP's Central Committee. But this kind of demagoguery could raise questions among some workers who read his speech in *l'Humanité* or *Le Monde*. What was the CP doing in de Gaulle's government in 1947, after all? "Loyally managing the affairs of capital." And didn't the CP deputies vote "full powers" in 1956 to the Socialist Premier Guy Mollet, to carry on the war against the Algerian people?

As to the charge that the SP had failed to pursue a radical course in the Popular Front, it was just as easy for the SP to point out—as one of its leaders did in the party's May conference—that in 1936 "the Communist party had rejected the nationalization program proposed by the Socialists, because it thought the Popular Front government should be a government for the defense of the republic and not for the transition to socialism."

Few could be swayed by Marchais's complaint that Socialist party gains in the factories at the expense of the CP "would lead to turning the workers away from a consistent class position. . . ." The French CP has followed a class-collaborationist policy for some forty years now. That is why it is sheer demagoguery for Mitterrand to identify Stalinism, and opposition to democracy, with class-struggle socialism. How can the CP consistently defend democratic rights when it supports the repression of dissidents in the Soviet Union and follows a line of "peaceful coexistence" with the bourgeoisie in the West?

#### CFDT Invokes Luxemburg . . . Against Lenin

The debate between the CP and the SP over democratic rights is certain to have significant repercussions throughout the French workers movement. Pressured by the SP offensive, the CP has announced that it plans to distribute publicly ten million copies of Marchais's report and CGT leader Georges Séguy's remarks on the *Repubblica* affair.

The debate has already gone into the trade unions, as Séguy's remarks indicated. France's second biggest labor federation, the CFDT,<sup>3</sup> whose leadership is closely identified with the Socialist party, has sent four official delegations to Portugal during the past year. The CFDT issued a statement June 2 calling for the "reappearance of *Repubblica* under normal conditions."

previous occasions. A notable instance occurred in June 1973, when the Ligue Communiste, the French section of the Fourth International, was banned by the Pompidou government. While French police had a warrant out for the arrest of Alain Krivine, a leader of the League, the SP opened its headquarters to him for a news conference. And Mitterrand accompanied Krivine when he left the headquarters, forestalling police attempts to arrest the Trotskyist leader.

3. Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor.

Declaring its support for "the struggle of our Portuguese comrades for socialism with freedom," the CFDT said:

"The MFA played a decisive role in the overthrow of fascism. Today it remains a key instrument for overcoming the difficulties. Its historic mission will be fully accomplished to the degree that it gives way to the development of the process of self-determination of the workers and citizens to which it has contributed."

The Social Democrats of the CFDT leadership showed themselves to be, if anything, more adept than the Stalinists at engaging in leftist demagoguery.

"Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element." Rosa Luxemburg's reproach to Lenin and Trotsky,<sup>4</sup> confirmed by the whole of history,

4. The quotation is from *The Russian Revolution*, a pamphlet Rosa Luxemburg drafted in 1918 while in a German prison. The pamphlet, which was first published in 1922, three years after her death, did not express Luxemburg's final assessment of the Russian revolution. Although it was written in the framework of support for the revolution, it was critical of some aspects of the Bolsheviks' policies. Some of these criticisms reflected her lack of access to accurate information about what was happening in Russia. Others reflected real political differences that she had often debated within the international revolutionary-socialist movement. In this pamphlet, Luxemburg's basic error on the question of democratic practices in the revolution was to ignore the role of the Soviets, or workers councils, which were probably the most democratic institutions of modern times.

However, Luxemburg understood that enormous obstacles stood in the path of establishing full socialist democracy in the young Soviet republic. She also wrote in 1918: "It would be demanding something superhuman from Lenin and his comrades if we should expect of them that under such circumstances they should conjure forth the finest democracy, the most exemplary dictatorship of the proletariat and a flourishing socialist economy. By their determined revolutionary stand, their exemplary strength in action, and their unbreakable loyalty to international socialism, they have contributed whatever could possibly be contributed under such devilishly hard conditions. . . ."

Of course, the Soviet republic of Lenin and Trotsky is hardly comparable with Portugal, a bourgeois state in which nothing resembling soviets exists at this time. The role of democratic demands in a situation like that in Portugal today, in the wake of the overthrow of an extremely repressive right-wing regime, was discussed by Trotsky himself in a 1930 letter to some Italian Communists. (See "Problems of the Italian Revolution," in *Writings of Leon Trotsky* [1930].)

Trotsky insisted that the Italian workers, once they overthrew fascism, should not be content with establishing a "parliamentary and democratic state," but should fight for a proletarian socialist revolution.

"But does this mean that we communists reject

underscores the reasonableness of the desire expressed by the masses of Portugal to struggle against any return to censorship or conformity of opinion. . . .

"The workers should not be upset at the contradictions surrounding the passage from fascism to democracy and socialism. It is not the contradictions that are deadly but the attempt to deny them or to suppress them by force. It is through the free exchange of opinions that the necessary initiatives can be taken and the criticisms that are indispensable to the advance of the complex process of the socialist revolution can be exercised. There is no hierarchy of priorities between socialism and freedom. The one cannot be achieved without the other."

Rosa Luxemburg was a fervent advocate of the capacity of the workers to emancipate themselves through their own actions and initiatives. It is difficult, to say the least, to imagine her hailing a bourgeois military regime as a "key instrument" in the revolutionary process, contributing to the masses' independent struggles. All the more so when, in the current instance, Portugal, it was the MFA that struck an important blow at freedom of the press, by closing down *República*.

Nevertheless, leaving aside the question of their own credentials as partisans of "socialist revolution," the CFDT leaders were on firm ground when they stated that the struggle for democratic rights is a vital part of the struggle for a socialist society.

The CFDT followed up its statement with a news conference June 5 at which a leader of the federation, Jacques Moreau, reported on his recent visit to Portugal.

"The *República* conflict is not just a labor conflict," Moreau said, in reply to Ségué's claim.

To reduce it to a labor conflict, added Edmond Maire, CFDT general secretary, is to "cover over the basic problem, which is the right of all political currents to free expression."

Referring to the CP's "Déclaration des

in advance all democratic slogans, all transitional or preparatory slogans, limiting ourselves strictly to the *proletarian dictatorship*? That would be a display of sterile, doctrinaire sectarianism. . . . If the revolutionary crisis were to break out, for example, in the course of the next months. . . the masses of toilers, workers as well as peasants, would certainly follow up their economic demands with democratic slogans (such as freedom of assembly, of press, of trade-union organization, democratic representation in parliament and in the municipalities). Does this mean that the Communist Party should reject these demands? On the contrary. It will have to invest them with the most audacious and resolute character possible. For the proletarian dictatorship cannot be imposed upon the popular masses. It can be realized only by carrying on a battle—a battle in full—for all the transitional demands, requirements, and needs of the masses, and at the head of the masses."

Libertés," Maire noted that what is decisive in judging the program of a political formation is how it reacts in the face of real situations, as in the *República* incident.

### An Important Debate

While the Social Democrats have no doubt gained some political capital from their campaign in defense of "democracy," there are definite limits to the SP's ability to carry forward the debate beyond its present terms. These limits are determined primarily by the party's reformist program and by its commitment to the Union of the Left.

As a party that has no intention of abolishing capitalism, the SP necessarily is led in practice to support—and, in office, to carry out—restrictions on democratic rights. Mitterrand has a long record in this respect, as a former minister of the interior in many postwar governments.

As supporters of the Common Program, the SP leadership has little to gain from emphasizing the Stalinist and other reactionary features of its main coalition partner.

Likewise the CP is seriously restricted in its use of "left" demagoguery, if it wants its strategy of alliance with the SP around a procapitalist program to retain credibility with its members and supporters.

The key issue in Portugal, as Ségué indicated, is one's attitude to the MFA. Both the SP and CP participate in the military government. In this framework, the CP counterposes the "battle for production" to freedom of the press.

The incapacity of both the major parties in the workers movement to provide answers to the fundamental questions posed by the debate offers an important opening to the revolutionary Marxists. They have a responsibility to demonstrate that revolutionary socialism and democracy, far from being incompatible, are inseparably linked, and that a socialist society will be more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic. □

### Finnish Government Resigns

Finland's four-party coalition government headed by Social Democratic Premier Kalevi Sorsa resigned June 4, under the pressure of the country's severe economic problems. The inflation rate has been 17 percent for the last two years and the trade deficit has quadrupled in that time.

Documents discussed at 1974 Tenth World Congress of Fourth International. 128 pages, 8½ x 11, \$2.50

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## The Portuguese Revolution and the Dangers That Threaten It

By Ernest Mandel

One of the main aspects of the revolutionary process which has unfolded in Portugal since the downfall of the Caetano dictatorship is the continuous advance and deepening of that process. This stands in striking opposition to most of the incipient proletarian revolutions we have witnessed in Europe since the Russian revolution. Both in the German revolution of 1918-1923 or in the Spanish revolution of 1936-37, just to take these two examples, the culminating point of the revolution seems to come a couple of weeks or even days right after its start. The revolution then loses ground nearly immediately, and while new upturns and rebounds occur, the initial culminating gains are never again recovered.

In Portugal the opposite has occurred. In the beginning the process started rather slowly and on a low key. It gathered momentum in a contradictory and often confusing way. But since December 1974, and especially since March 1975, the revolutionary mass movement has made tremendous steps forward, generally in response to provocations and attacks by the class enemy. It has now reached the point where the question of the struggle for power by the working class is put on the agenda. In their own biased and indirect way, the results of the election for the Constituent Assembly confirm this. The parties claiming to speak for the working class, and presenting the aim of building a socialist Portugal as an immediate or short-term perspective, polled nearly 60 percent of the popular vote. This is the highest percentage ever attained in Europe under universal franchise, outside of the elections for the Russian constituent assembly, which coincided with the conquest of power by the soviets.

### A First Setback?

Since the beginning of May 1975, however, signs that this continuous progress of the revolutionary process is coming to an end have begun to multiply. If we want to avoid impressionistic interpretations of this threatening turning point, we have to try to understand it as a function of the basic social and political forces at play in Portugal today.

In the first place, the economic situation has seriously deteriorated. Capitalists have reacted to the massive conquests of the working class, which threaten the very basis of their system, with a massive investment strike and capital flight. They are sabotaging production as they did during the Russian revolution, as they always do when the workers challenge their "right" to gear production and distribution to the search for profit and the accumulation of capital. As a result, the cost of living is skyrocketing. Unemployment is rapidly spreading. All the material gains the workers made after the downfall of the dictatorship are being wiped out. Several sectors of the working class are even worse off than under the dictatorship. This cannot but have a demoralizing effect on parts of the proletariat.

In the second place, the powerful unity in action of the toiling masses, which was decisive in beating back the putschist attempts of the would-be bonaparte, Spínola (and the would-be Pinochets hiding behind his back), is now seriously threatened. Both in the incidents around the May 1 demonstration in Lisbon, and in the incidents around the *República* newspaper, large sectors of the masses were set against each other. A rapidly widening split inside the working class would endanger all the gains of the revolution, and open a breach through which a

successful counteroffensive of reaction and counterrevolution could make serious headway.

In the third place, the next step forward is unclear to the mass of the proletariat. The revolutionary process unfolded up to now according to an internal logic of its own. It went from the conquest of immediate material and democratic demands and the ending of the colonial war to the purge of the most hated representatives of the dictatorship from the state apparatus and the enterprises, to the nationalization of banks, finance groups, and key industries, and to the spread of workers control. Now, however, this spontaneous process has run into an impasse. Big confusion reigns as to what should be done next. Should it be the "battle for production," as most of the leaders of the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement] and the Communist party propose? Should it be "the battle for freedom," as the Social Democrats and their bourgeois allies suggest? Should it be "the fight against indiscipline and anarchy," as nearly all political parties and officers claim? Should it be the "struggle against social fascism," as the irresponsible Maoists contend? Confronted with this cacophony of conflicting proposals—which all have little mass appeal given the appalling economic situation, and which all seem to imply that the revolutionary process should somehow be halted—confusion, disunity, and disarray could rapidly throw the mass movement back.

### The Real Content of the 'República' Incident

It is in the light of these developments that the incidents occurring at the newspaper *República* should be analyzed and understood. We are very skeptical, to say the least, whether what was really involved in that incident was a serious attempt to prevent the Socialist party from having its own newspaper, i. e., a serious attempt to destroy the freedom of action of the largest political party in Portugal today.

If this was really the case, only two interpretations would be possible.

Either one would have to assume that in Portugal we are on the eve of a power grab by the Soviet bureaucracy and its Portuguese satellites, i. e., on the eve of a *Prague coup* like the one of February 1948. This was the way in which the Social Democratic leader Soares himself, and practically the whole Portuguese and international bourgeois press, not without active support from the Maoists, interpreted the *República* incident. Needless to say, this implies the grotesque thesis that Portugal's bourgeois officer corps has become a tool of the Soviet bureaucracy, for some mysterious reasons of an essentially ideological nature (the "power of attraction" of the Kremlin's ideas, one would presume, being really unlimited).

Or one would have to assume that in Portugal we are on the eve of the establishment of a bloody bourgeois-military dictatorship, which is ready to crush the strongest political party of the country, having just polled 38 percent of the popular vote and captured nearly half the seats of the Constituent Assembly. Apart from the fact that such a move would imply the elimination of the CP too, and that it isn't obvious why the CP leadership would actively (not only as an objective long-term result of its policies, but actively) support such a move for its own dissolution, such interpretation conflicts with the whole objective analysis of the present relationship of forces in Portugal.

The army is divided not only between pro- and anti-MFA forces, and between a pro- and an anti-Spínola wing inside the MFA, but also between different warring factions inside the "pro-socialist" wing of the MFA as well. The soldiers are politically awakened and are becoming active, departing independently from army discipline. Working-class political currents are beginning to capture influence inside a wing of the MFA itself the mass movement is powerful and in ascendance. Under such circumstances the capitalists are in no position to immediately crush the proletariat. They don't have either the strength or an adequate instrument to do this. Their immediate aim is not to strangle all democratic liberties for the masses as a whole, not to speak of their most moderate reformist party strongly in favor of class collaboration. Their immediate aim is to divide and confuse the mass movement, in order to stop the revolutionary process at a level compatible with the survival of capitalist production relations, and prudently start repression against small isolated sectors. Only after they have achieved these goals could they—more quickly than some optimists believe, of course—plan to take a more general counteroffensive and crush the anticapitalist potential of the Portuguese working class.

Now when we study what really happened at the *República* printing plant, we understand how these incidents dovetail with the fundamental plans of Portuguese and international capital. For, contrary to the version of these incidents spread by the bourgeois press, the initiative did not come from the CP, and even less from the MFA officers, *but from the workers of that plant themselves* among whom CP supporters are actually in a minority. They are faced with a rapidly decreasing circulation of the newspaper, and heavy financial losses at the printshop. They are threatened with layoffs and redundancies. And they reacted exactly in the same way in which workers have been reacting in hundreds of other factories and offices throughout Portugal to such threats—by removing the manager and requesting a new administrative structure under workers control, whatever may be the exact scheme proposed, which differs from case to case.

#### A Conflict Between Two Principles?

That these motivations became intertwined with all kinds of political intrigues is obvious. That the CP bureaucrats tried to use the workers' initiative in order to strike a blow against their Social Democratic rivals and associates, who had just given them such a beating in the elections, is undoubted. That the strongest left-wing workers group inside the printing plant, the Maoist UDP [União Democrática do Povo—Democratic People's Union], tried to utilize its influence in order to bar publicity for a rival Maoist grouping "critically supported" by the Social Democratic editor, also played a role. That some military leaders of the MFA, confronted with this confusing picture, tried to whip up hostility against "warring political parties," which has been one of their main propaganda themes for many months, is likewise undisputed. But the outcome of the whole intrigue never was in doubt. The whole logic of the *bourgeois class pressure, both nationally and internationally, plays today in favor of the Socialist party recuperating its newspaper*. The bourgeois leadership of the MFA cannot but go along with that pressure. The losers will be the workers of the *República* printing plant.

We are staunch and principled supporters of freedom of the press. We are convinced that this should be a basic principle not only under bourgeois democracy but in a workers state as well. We are absolutely in favor of the Portuguese Socialist party having at its disposal a daily paper of its own. We believe that the workers of the *República* printing plant made a serious error by creating the impression that they wanted to challenge that right.

Workers control does not mean and cannot mean that a small sector of the working class—the typographical workers of one plant, or even the typographical workers of the whole country—

have the right to decide what political currents should have access to mass media and what currents shouldn't. In a workers state, that decision should be taken democratically by a national congress of workers councils, i.e., by the working class as a whole. And we Trotskyists will strongly fight in such a congress for the right to such access to mass media for all those currents which, irrespective of their political program and ideology, *in practice* respect the socialist constitution and socialist legality, i.e., are not engaged in armed actions against workers power.

As we do not yet have a workers state in Portugal, but still a bourgeois state, with strong power in the hands of an officer corps, which, whatever may be its political divisions, is socially tied in its majority to defending the bourgeois order, the defense of freedom of the press for the Socialist party as a working-class party (be it with a reformist and class-collaborationist leadership) is all the more important for us.

But we are *consistent and not partial defenders of the principle of freedom of the press*. We do not accept any limitations on or any monopoly of the right of access to the mass media, a monopoly neither for the proprietors of printshops, nor for the owners of large sums of money, nor for political parties. Real and generalized freedom of the press means that *every group of workers*, including the typographical workers of the *República* plant, have the right to make their opinions known in print, regardless of whether they "own" a printing press or not. Whether this should be done in a special newspaper, published precisely for such a purpose, or whether it should be in the columns of each individual newspaper, is a secondary technical question.

Finally, we would strongly oppose any attempt to play the correct principle of freedom of the press against the no less correct principle of workers control, in the sense of control over the livelihood and the working conditions of the working class. The Socialist party has the right to have its own newspaper. But it has no right to lay off printing workers, or to reduce their wages, or to make their working conditions harsher, under the pretext that they are "undisciplined" and in disagreement with the political line of that Party. All printshops should become collective property with wages and working conditions nationally guaranteed by agreement between the government and the printers union (tomorrow: between national workers power and the printing workers councils, together with the printers union). *Only under condition that all questions of material pressure, privileges, threats of reprisals, and fear of losing one's job will be eliminated from the realm of expressing opinions and fighting for them* will there be real, substantial, and not only formal and partial freedom of the press for the toiling masses. And this goes for the printing workers too!

So, far from there being any contradiction between freedom of the press and workers control, the two principles complement each other once they are interpreted in the correct way we just sketched.

#### The Potential Consequences of the 'República' Incident

The ominous implications of the *República* incident are therefore somewhere else than where most commentators have sought them. *They could open the beginning of a concerted attack against the manifold attempts at workers control that have dominated the revolutionary process in Portugal during the last months.*

That the pressure of Portuguese and international capital goes in that direction is self-evident. The European capitalists are called upon to bail out the Portuguese economy from its greatest crisis. They are ready to make a gesture, provided they can wring the maximum concessions from the Portuguese government. And the No. 1 concession they call for is reestablishment of discipline in the plants! Otherwise, they indicate, they would be just throwing money into a bottomless pit.

That an important sector of the MFA leadership wants to act in

the same direction is no less obvious. "Restore discipline" has been one of its main propaganda slogans for a long time. Some of them believe it to be particularly clever to cover such a move by a proposal to create some kind of plant committees, but under military control and geared essentially to "increasing production."

That the CP bureaucracy would be willing to go along with this demand, although its "left turn" implies now some propaganda in favor of workers control too, is made possible by the fact that Cunhal's line of "promoting production" has trapped him into a position in which he finds it very difficult to oppose the bourgeois campaign along the above lines.

A new element in the situation is the turn of the SP leadership on this question. Before the elections, Soares cleverly tried to exploit the growing resentment of the workers against the bureaucratic practices of the CP leadership by appearing to support shop-level workers democracy and workers control (e.g., on its May 1 posters). While the CP violently opposed wildcat strikes, the SP gave some occasional cover to them, and was accused by Cunhal of "left opportunism." During the election campaign and even on May 1, 1975, the SP had posters in favor of "workers control."

As a matter of fact, the electoral victory of the SP expressed a combination of two phenomena: On the one hand, the less politicized and radicalized workers voted for that party as the best-known proponent of "socialism" in a general way, exactly as they voted for the Mensheviks in Russia immediately after the February 1917 Revolution. On the other hand, sectors of more radicalized workers voted for the SP out of disgust with the strikebreaking and bureaucratic practices of the CP.

Now, however, the situation is changing. The CP is talking about "workers control" and playing down its attacks on militant workers' initiatives. And it is the Social Democrats who now shout for "an end to anarchy," a "restoration of order," "the rule of law," a "digesting period" for nationalizations (i.e., a stop to the extension of nationalized enterprises), and other slogans of a clearly counterrevolutionary content. *They now try to oppose the process of consolidating bourgeois-democratic state institutions and bourgeois law against a further unfolding of the revolution, centering their attacks upon initiatives of workers control, under the demagogic cloak of "defending freedom."* This risks being the main objective result of the *República* incident. It is obviously the main threat to further progress of the Portuguese revolution.

#### The Next Step Forward for the Portuguese Revolution

If we analyze this threat; if we understand the objective social, economic, and political pressures which support that threat; then we can also understand the essential countermove that Portuguese revolutionists should propose today: *The democratic election, on a united-front basis, of workers, peasants, and soldiers councils in all factories, city neighborhoods, villages, and barracks, and their coordination and centralization on a local, regional, and national scale in a Toilers Assembly.*

Such a countermove would be an effective answer to all the dangers that threaten the way forward for the Portuguese revolution.

Against the incipient economic catastrophe and the growing sabotage of the economy, a system of haphazard workers control, on a factory-by-factory basis, becomes increasingly futile. The moment has come for a *generalized* system of workers control. But this means a generalized system of workers councils in the factories, which can not only stop layoffs, halt removals of machinery and funds, uncover stocks of raw materials, and prevent current output from being hoarded, but which can also start drawing up an emergency economic plan for guaranteeing full employment and satisfying the masses' most burning needs, by taking over the whole of industry without compensation and running it in the interest of the toilers, by the toilers themselves.

Against the threat of division and disarray inside the working class, agreements among the top leaders of the working-class parties, although necessary, are absolutely insufficient. After all, however much Cunhal and Soares insult each other in public, we should never forget that they have been sitting in the same coalition government with the bourgeoisie for more than a year, that they have together supported and voted censorship laws and laws restricting the right to strike, that they share equal responsibility for the present dangerous divisions inside the working class. In order to reestablish the full and enthusiastic unity in action of the working class, it is necessary to guarantee to the Social Democratic workers full political freedom for their party, and an end to bureaucratic maneuvers in the unions and the mass media. It is likewise necessary to guarantee to the communist and revolutionary workers full unfolding of the revolutionary process going beyond the bonds of bourgeois democracy and capitalist relations of production. And what organs would be more adequate to achieve these guarantees than democratically elected workers councils which would be more clearly united-front organs from top to bottom than ever before in any country?

The Constituent Assembly is impotent from the start, tied as it is by the "pact" between the political parties and the MFA. The MFA leaders assert that they want these ties in order to further the revolutionary process. Some even say that they want direct power organs of the people. Let us take their assertions at face value, and *call for a democratic election of workers councils which wouldn't be tied by any preliminary pact with the military, which would be wholly sovereign.* Even those who believe that to destroy the illusions in the MFA among the masses is an important task today would have to admit that there is no better way to reach that goal than to agitate for democratically elected and sovereign workers councils today.

All those who fear the unfolding proletarian revolution in Portugal talk about "restoring discipline," attack "anarchy" and "grass roots direct democracy." But no revolutionary process is possible in a capitalist country without an explosion of such "anarchy," "indiscipline," and "grass roots direct democracy." All revolutions of the twentieth century have taught us that basic truth. What is threatening the revolution is not "anarchy," but *repression against direct mass initiatives.* A generalized system of workers councils would be the best protection of the masses against such repression, the best weapon for consolidating and spreading workers control, the best way for linking up the workers with the soldiers and the sailors, for protecting and extending the forms of democratic self-organization in the army and navy, which are the first targets for repression if the bourgeoisie wants to restore some effective power instrument. Such councils will also be the best guarantee for workers-soldiers common action, against any attempt at a new reactionary *putsch*, the natural framework for the armament of the toilers linked to the democratically organized soldiers and sailors.

The struggle for democratically elected and centralized workers, peasants, tenants, and soldiers committees is today the decisive campaign which can turn the situation in Portugal again in favor of the revolution. It is the main means for restoring the unity in action of the toiling masses, which was their essential source of strength in the last nine months. We are convinced that the comrades of the LCI [Liga Comunista Internacionalista—Internationalist Communist League, the Portuguese sympathizing group of the Fourth International] will be the audacious initiators of that campaign and that they will constantly remain in its forefront. Thereby they will show that they fight in a principled way both for the immediate and the historical interests of the working class, and for a victorious breakthrough towards a socialist revolution in their country.

June 5, 1975

## The 'Battle for Production' in Portugal

[The following article appeared in the May 16 issue of *Rouge*, the French Trotskyist weekly. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The least one can say is that the Portuguese Socialist party's victory in the elections was not of modest proportions. Mário Soares held a news conference May 6. By all accounts, he went on the offensive with an eye to making full use of his electoral success.

He accused the Communist party of seeking to "minimize the results of the elections." At the same time, however, he stated his support for continuation of the coalition government, rejecting any effort to "marginalize" the PPD [Partido Popular Democrático—Democratic People's party]. He also proposed a series of conditions for future united relations with the CP.

Among these conditions was ending the CP's stranglehold on the mass media—the shift in editorial policy of the newspaper *Diário de Notícias* since the replacement of its editor and the way Radio Clube was managed were among the cases cited. Moreover, the SP left open the possibility of challenging the representativeness of certain union leaderships elected in the past year, as well as certain municipal councils set up during the process of purging former officials . . .

It is clear that for the Communist party, such a statement by Mário Soares must have seemed a provocation pure and simple . . .

Unless it had other fish to fry.

### The Battle for Production

By May 1, "the battle for production" had clearly been launched. Last week, the Council of the Revolution met with the parties in the coalition to study "the political conjuncture" and the social situation. It concluded by expressing its concern over the economic prospects and by appealing to the sense of responsibility of the workers.

At the same time, the Central Committee of the Communist party published a ponderous communiqué. Stressing "the social deterioration of recent days, visibly linked to intense activity by the forces of reaction and other elements seeking to paralyze the revolutionary process," the CP denounced "the artificial escalation of the forms of

struggle and the attempt to foment a big wave of simultaneous strikes."

The battle for production has some very clear consequences. The elections do not seem to have halted or even slowed down the forcefulness with which workers are pressing their demands. In recent weeks, workers in printing, the hotel industry, the fishing industry, and highway construction have gone on strike one after the other. Occupations and pickets continue, as at the Transval transport firm, either to demand a purge or to prevent threatened layoffs or bankruptcy, fraudulent or otherwise. Often the workers commissions are the initiators of these struggles.

Nevertheless, the battle for production is beginning to do its' job of dividing the working class. The clearest case is that of the chemical workers. In this industry, negotiations on the collective labor contract have to go to arbitration before the minister of labor. To support their demands, chemical workers went on strike in the north of the country, including in the Oporto area.

On the other hand, in the name of the battle for production, union locals of the chemical workers in Lisbon and the south opposed the strike, arguing that "46 percent of national industry depends on the chemical sector" and that the strike would therefore do "considerable damage" to the whole Portuguese economy.

### The Worst Thing Would Be to Stop Halfway

This situation poses a very real problem. It is clear that the workers can under no circumstances renounce their demands. Nor can they give up their struggle for the sake of an economy that remains capitalist, an economy in which private capital predominates and foreign capital has practically gone untouched. But it is true that the economic situation is precarious, that it has suffered from the combined effects of the counter-coup, the international capitalist crisis, and the investors' lack of confidence in the Portuguese situation.

In face of these contradictions, the worst thing would be to stop halfway. The workers are correct to press their demands, to struggle against the high cost of living and unemployment. But they cannot stop there; they must give their own answer to the crisis. This means demanding nationalization under workers control and without compensation of the key sectors of the economy (foreign capital included); establishment of a state monopoly of foreign trade; creation of a single state bank;

establishment of a planned socialist economy based on the extension and centralization of the committees of workers, tenants, and soldiers; the expulsion of the PPD from the government; and the formation of a government of workers organizations based on the committees.

### The Need for a Political Perspective

If the question of a political solution is not raised in this situation, the struggles will sag under the weight of the appeals to reason and responsibility. The workers will be divided between those willing to fight intransigently for their interests and those susceptible to reformist arguments about the seriousness of the economic situation—an estimate that is quite real—if no other solution than the battle for production is advanced.

More than ever the workers' struggles need a political perspective. That is our rejoinder in face of the battle for production, which is only the old bid for collaboration between exploiters and exploited, between capital and labor, that will continue as long as the system of exploitation and the bourgeois state endure. □

### 23 French Physicists Call For Halt to Nuclear Program

Twenty-three of France's leading physicists have called for "an immediate halt" to the government's nuclear-industry development program. Their appeal was issued in early May in a memorandum they sent to parliamentary deputies on the eve of a debate on nuclear policy.

The signers are members of the prestigious Collège de France, which has conducted much of the original research for the country's nuclear industry. They include the director of the physics laboratory, Marcel Froissart.

The physicists cite three factors in their position:

1. The effectiveness of the emergency cooling apparatus in the light water line of reactors has never been demonstrated.
2. Insufficient empirical research has been done into the means of preventing explosions in breeder reactors. "It is not impossible that a catastrophe without precedent might occur with this kind of reactor."
3. Insufficient account has been taken of the problem of disposing of radioactive wastes.

The twenty-three physicists were the initiators of an appeal to the population to support a moratorium on constructing nuclear power plants issued in February. (See *Intercontinental Press*, March 24, p. 403.)

## Behind the 'Yes' Vote in British Common Market Referendum

By Tony Hodges

LONDON—"A wonderful result." That was the verdict of the London *Times*, the most prominent mouthpiece of the British bourgeoisie, after the announcement of a 2-to-1 majority for continued British membership in the Common Market (EEC—European Economic Community) in a national referendum held June 5. A total of 17,378,581 persons voted "Yes" to British membership in the EEC (67.2 percent of those voting), and 8,470,073 voted "No" (32.8 percent).

The massive "Yes" vote was a big defeat for the labour movement. The Trades Union Congress (TUC), the Labour party, the Labour party Young Socialists (LPYS), and most major trade unions had urged British withdrawal from the Common Market. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Conservative and Liberal parties, and the ruling class press had all fought vigorously for Britain to stay in.

The "Yes" landslide was also a shot in the arm for Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, the Labour cabinet, and the right wing of the Labour party who violated the party's conference decision to oppose the EEC and hooked up with the Tories and big business to urge continued EEC membership.

The Tory government of Edward Heath signed a Treaty of Accession with the original six member states of the EEC in January 1972 against considerable opposition from the labour movement. The Labour party was committed in its manifesto for the February 1974 general election to renegotiate Britain's terms of membership.

Reelected to government, the Labour leadership opened "renegotiation talks" in Luxembourg on April 1, 1974. After winning a few minor concessions for British capitalism, announced this year at the Dublin EEC summit on March 11, Wilson rushed a bill through Parliament to hold a referendum to approve Britain's continued EEC membership on the new terms.

This was the first nationwide referendum ever held in Britain. Most Tories opposed holding it, charging that it undermined the authority of Parliament and set a dangerous precedent for the future. But Wilson and his class-collaborationist colleagues in the Labour leadership saw the referendum as a manoeuvre to rally greater public support behind the government's entire economic strategy.

"The Conservatives," Wilson claimed in a

speech in Cambridge on April 11, "succeeded only in taking the Establishment into the market." A pro-market referendum majority would mean that "industry, the unions, the whole national community, having had the right to vote, will accept the decision, and this will mean their full cooperation in working to solve the great problems facing our own economy and the world economy."

In urging a "Yes" vote, the Labour government was once again acting out its traditional role as a loyal servant of British imperialism. Reduced to second-rank status as a world power, outpaced by its rivals in the United States, Japan, and continental Europe, and battered by the world recession, the British capitalists have no option but to stay in the EEC.

Writing in the *Guardian* on May 9, Tory ex-Prime Minister Heath explained why British capitalist interests dictated the negotiation of British entry four years ago.

"It was becoming clear," he recalled, "like it or not, Britain would be directly affected by what went on in the European Community. We could no longer afford to go it alone. As our economic ties with the Commonwealth weakened, so we needed more than ever to have access to the prosperous markets of Western Europe. And as the world regrouped into new and massive power blocs, Britain could only hope to enjoy a renewal of her influence . . . within the new European Community."

The British capitalists' determination to stay in the EEC reflects the shift in their trading since the loss of the British empire. In 1958 more than 43% of British exports still went to the Commonwealth countries. These markets have now been invaded by Britain's imperialist rivals. Last year only 16% of British exports went to these countries.

More and more, British firms need access to the markets of Western Europe. While in 1958 only 19.5% of British exports went to the other eight states now making up the EEC, last year more than 33% of exports were sold to these countries. Outside the market, the British capitalists would face high tariff walls (the EEC's Common External Tariff) against their exports to Europe.

The British ruling class also needs to participate with continental capitalists in the process of fusion of capital in the Common Market countries to create giant

European firms capable of challenging their American and Japanese rivals.

In 1972 the Paris EEC summit urged "the elimination particularly in the fiscal and legal fields, of barriers which hinder closer relations and mergers between firms, the rapid adoption of a European company statute . . . and the promotion on a European scale of competitive firms in the field of high technology."

A CBI report, "Britain In Europe" stressed the need to create "fully integrated multinational European firms in the advanced technology industries."

The "free movement of capital" is a central tenet of the EEC, one which the British ruling class must take the advantage of if it is not to be ruthlessly squeezed by its imperialist rivals.

The Labour Research Department (LRD) has noted the importance of EEC membership to British capitalists' continued exploitation of the semicolonial countries. In a pamphlet, "The 1975 Referendum, the Common Market, In or Out," the LRD says that "the British state is no longer strong enough to protect the foreign trading and financial interests of British companies in the way that it used to be able in the days of the British empire. It is therefore necessary to become part of a West European trading bloc which can wield the power that Britain cannot wield on her own."

British capitalism needs to take part directly in determining the overall policies of the EEC by participating in the EEC Commission and the Council of Ministers.

Almost every British bourgeois politician and institution of any importance urged a "Yes" vote in the referendum. Margaret Thatcher, leader of the Conservative party, said in Parliament April 8 that "the Community opens windows on the whole world for us. It is already strong, and already a major influence in the world. Britain has always played a major role in the world. She still has a major role to play. I do not believe she can play it on her own."

The CBI stressed in a letter to Wilson on April 17 that membership in the Common Market was "even more essential now than it was in 1970." A survey of business attitudes to the EEC published in the London *Times* on April 9 revealed that out of 419 replies received from company chairmen, 415 were in favour of continued EEC membership. The *Times* commented that "the survey is perhaps the most



striking evidence yet of the extent of support for continued membership at the very top of Britain's largest companies."

Every major bourgeois newspaper in the country backed a "Yes" vote. And millions of pounds were poured into the coffers of the "Britain In Europe" campaign by the big corporations.

The right wing of the Labour party, led by Wilson and Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, stumped the country beating the drum of the capitalist class for EEC membership—in open disregard of a 2-to-1 vote against the EEC by a special Labour party conference on April 26.

Labour Paymaster-General Edmund Dell accused the antimarket majority of his own party of wanting "to convert this country into a funk hole, surrounded by high trade barriers."

Jenkins, leaping to the defence of the "West" against communism and subversion, warned on May 10 that "the political fragmentation and uncertainty in Western Europe, which would result if we were to pull out of the Community, would so undermine the cohesion of our alliance that our security would be more heavily at risk than at any time since the Marshall Plan and the foundation of NATO."

The British capitalists are finding it hard-going to compete with their rivals inside the Common Market. In fact Britain's trade deficit with the EEC eight leaped from £85 million [£1 = US\$2.30] in 1970 to £2,200 million in 1974. But the capitalist class and its right-wing Labour allies know full well that British corporations would face rougher times outside.

As right-wing Labour member of Parliament David Marquand put it: "I believe that if we withdrew, the horrific pictures conjured up are likely to come true. I think it very likely that there would be a catastrophic sterling crisis." Britain would be on its own "in a very cold and hostile world."

If British capitalism jumped out of the "European boat," Heath asked, "is there another boat for us to jump into for safety? No. Is there perhaps a small liferaft they [the antimarketeers] can offer? No. They can't even provide a bit of seaweed for us to clutch. We would be at the mercy of every wind, every gale, every hurricane."

The International Marxist Group (IMG), the British section of the Fourth International, denounced the Common Market as an imperialist bloc opposed to the interests of working people, the workers states, and the semicolonial countries. It campaigned in the run-up to the referendum for a "No" vote, counterposing a united socialist Europe to the Common Market of the bosses.

The EEC, the IMG explained, "represents above all the interests of the great trusts and monopolies which operate on a European-wide scale. Every trade unionist

is aware of the threat which these multinationals represent. They can transfer investment to low-wage areas, break strikes by shifting production from country to coun-



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try, and play off workers of one country against another."

In the IMG's opinion, "overall, the EEC seeks to unify the ruling classes of Europe against the common internal enemy—the working class—and the external enemy—the threat of world revolution." The British Trotskyists pointed out that the working class has no interest in supporting a bloc of one gang of imperialist thieves in their competitive drive for markets against their rivals in the United States and Japan.

As internationalists, the IMG condemned the Common Market as a new mechanism for maintaining the European imperialists' exploitation of the semicolonial countries. The IMG also denounced the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy, which through a system of "intervention" buying keeps food prices artificially high and is responsible for the storage and destruction of thousands of tons of edible food.

The IMG warned workers that the EEC, based on principles of "unfettered competition," would accelerate the decline of depressed regions like Scotland, Wales, and North East England. The Trotskyists recalled that even Wilson himself (in January 1973) had admitted that "the Common Market is a 'Magna Carta' for the barons of the multi-national mega-corporations."

The IMG urged the labour movement to mount a massive campaign to mobilize

working people against the EEC and win a "No" victory. But although the Labour party, the Labour party Young Socialists, the TUC, and most major unions came out against the market, the labour bureaucrats refused to launch a real campaign.

On April 30, just four days after the Labour party conference had voted overwhelmingly against the EEC, the party's National Executive Committee (NEC) decided against mobilizing the party's resources in a general-election campaign. No rallies or news conferences for a "No" vote would be held and the party's headquarters would distribute both pro- and anti-Common Market speeches to the press.

Ron Hayward, the party's general secretary, told the meeting that the party conference, while coming out for a "No" vote, "had not instructed him to organise the sort of general election campaign for withdrawal that some anti-marketeers wanted." One NEC member said after the meeting: "They have done the Grand Old Duke of York—marched the troops right up to the top of the hill and then marched them down again."

London *Sunday Times* reporter Stephen Fay reported the disquiet among many militant workers at the inactivity of the labour bureaucrats. After attending a rally of engineering workers in Liverpool addressed by Ernie Roberts, assistant general secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, Fay reported on May 18 that "there was unease afterwards about the campaign. The questioners reflected it. Why was there no literature available? Why had no emergency committee been established? Why were the local Labour Party, the trades council and the other unions in Liverpool doing so little?"

The trade-union officialdom did not make the slightest attempt to appeal to workers in socialist, class terms. Their opposition to the EEC was voiced in the narrow, backward manner typical of labour bureaucrats. For some, the Common Market and its system of high food prices would upset the social contract, the class-collaborationist deal between the Labour government and the union bureaucracy to hold down workers' wages.

Alan Sapper, general secretary of the Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians, complained May 2 that because of the EEC's effects on food prices, "we shall not be able to maintain our part of the social contract if we go into the market. Even if we tried to, our members would not let us."

Jack Jones, general secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, said in the *Sunday Times* on June 1 that "if we stay in the EEC I am very pessimistic about industrial relations." If there is a "Yes" vote, "the outlook for political stability

could be very serious indeed," this defender of the status quo lamented.

Most poisonous of all was the virulent chauvinism and jingoism of the trade-union bureaucrats and left Social Democratic *Tribune* group of Labour members of Parliament. These "left-wingers" wrapped themselves in the Union Jack and accused the promarketeers of surrendering British sovereignty to foreigners.

Barbara Castle, one of seven cabinet ministers who came out against Wilson's call for continued EEC membership, warned a crowd of 2,000 at a *Tribune* rally in Manchester that "Germany and France will walk into our markets under trading conditions that serve their national interests and not ours." She went on to claim that the EEC would undermine "our social democratic system—the 'model' for the world." If that happened, "cynicism would result and that would open the doors to Communism."

The National Referendum Campaign, an antimarket body backed by an alliance of ultraright nationalist Tories and the Labour "left," said: "The British people have fought to remain free and independent for centuries. They will never accept alien rule."

And a leading *Tribune* MP, Ian Mikardo, told a rally in London April 16: "Eurofanatics who say the British are too weak-kneed, stupid and incompetent to stand on their own feet are as wrong as Hitler was in 1940."

Is it any wonder that a campaign waged with such reactionary claptrap failed to rouse the support of the majority of workers? By working so hard to defend the "national sovereignty" of British imperialism, the Labour "left" allowed the Labour right to cloak their procapitalist support for the EEC in the mantle of "socialist internationalism." The Labour "left," by ardently defending the "British nation," suggested that the British workers have more in common with their domestic exploiters than their class brothers and sisters in the other Common Market countries.

"Our" parliamentary democracy was at stake too, these Labour patriots wailed, these labour misleaders who have counterposed reliance on Parliament to class-struggle methods of mass action and who, for all their talk of "democracy," have done little if anything to defend the democratic right of the Irish people to determine their own affairs, to fight for the release of the imprisoned Shrewsbury building workers, to defend a woman's right to abortion, or to oppose the erosion of civil liberties under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

But perhaps the biggest failure of the Labour "left" was its failure to propose any socialist alternative to the Common Market. All it could offer was the dismal prospect

of an isolated capitalist Britain "sovereign and free" amid the storm of the world capitalist recession.

*Sunday Times* correspondent Hugo Young predicted May 4 that the referendum would be a victory for the promarketeers because of the "gut terror of many people about what would happen to Britain at this moment of economic and political alarm if it got out of the EEC."

*Guardian* political correspondent Ian Aitken noted as early as April 11 that "already there are signs that the dire warnings of the possible consequences of withdrawal are frightening enough voters into the pro-Market camp to swing the vote for Europe."

One Liverpool shop steward in the engineering industry told *Sunday Times* reporter Stephen Fay: "A lot of lads come up and say that it is more trouble than it's worth now to vote against." The promarketeers succeeded in convincing large numbers of workers that a capitalist Britain outside the Common Market would suffer a run on the pound, cutbacks in investment, and mounting unemployment.

Only a clear socialist alternative could have countered these fears: To defend workers' living standards against inflation, which according to official figures for retail prices was running at nearly 35 percent a year between February and April and is expected to get worse, the labour leaders should fight for a sliding scale of wages that would automatically raise pay to match increases in the cost of living.

To combat unemployment, now over 900,000, the labour movement should fight for a crash programme of public works to provide jobs and needed public services and fight for a sliding scale of hours to spread work to all who need a job. Firms threatening redundancies should be nationalized.

The only real solution to the world capitalist recession is the nationalization of industry, the land, and the banks under workers control, and the establishment of a planned economy in a united socialist Europe.

The Communist party, like the *Tribune* wing of the Labour party, failed to put forward such a fighting socialist alternative to the Common Market. The Stalinist anti-EEC campaign was shot through with national chauvinism. Defence of national independence and Parliament were the two key issues.

"Is Britain," asked CP General Secretary Gordon McLennan, "going to be an independent, self-governing country, whose people will have the right to make their own laws and decide their own future through an elected Parliament and the pressure they exert on it? That, nothing less, is what we shall decide when we vote on June 5th in the referendum in the Common Market. We

have never before in peacetime had to face such a vital question."

Although unable to explain why Communists should leap to the defence of the national interests of an imperialist country, McLennan was at pains to refute the charge that the CP was "indulging in jingoism or narrow nationalism."

He went on: "The Labour movement cannot be indifferent to this issue. If Parliament loses its sovereign right to plan basic democratic changes, the whole fight for socialist advance would be far more difficult. The Communist Party's programme, the British Road to Socialism, is based on the aim of transforming Parliament into an institution serving the working class and its allies."

So the Stalinists fought for a "No" vote around two basic themes: defence of the national sovereignty of British imperialism and defence of the capitalist Parliament as an instrument for advancing towards socialism.

A third reactionary theme ran through the Stalinists' propaganda. The CP-controlled Labour Research Department argued that outside the EEC, "we shall have the power to impose selective import controls which have now become an absolute necessity." In this way the Stalinists urged British workers to fight for jobs at the expense of their fellow workers in other countries, instead of fighting for a sliding scale of hours, a public works programme, and nationalization of industry.

Like the Tribunites, the CP offered no socialist solutions to the problems of inflation and unemployment that are besetting workers in or out of the EEC. McLennan proposed merely freezing prices "for six months" as a "solution" to inflation. Not an ounce of internationalism was to be found in the Stalinist campaign—just flag-waving and import controls.

While the pro-Moscow Stalinists paraded around as the best patriots against the "take-over from Brussels," the pro-Peking Stalinists, of little consequence in Britain, urged workers to join Wilson, the Tory party, and the CBI in building a strong capitalist Europe against the "two superpowers": Soviet social-imperialism and U.S. imperialism.

"Say 'No' to Superpower Domination! Vote 'Yes' to Europe!" urged the London Marxist-Leninist Communists. Communists For Europe, another group of Maoists and dissident CP members, favoured British membership in the EEC to give the European ruling classes more "muscle." According to these class collaborators, "to be effective in world trade among the various blocs, the first essential is strong bargaining power and plenty of economic muscle. Britain can have that as part of Europe, and that is why membership of the EEC is in the

interests of the British working class."

The grotesque display of national chauvinism by the Tribunites and the Stalinists encouraged some sectarian grouplets claiming adherence to Trotskyism to advise workers to abstain in the referendum. While the International Socialists (IS), a quite large centrist group, favoured a "No" vote, some of its members and one of its long-standing leaders, Michael Kidron, publicly favoured abstention in letters to the IS weekly *Socialist Worker*. Their French supporters, the *Lutte Ouvrière* (Workers Struggle) group, accused the IS of abandoning internationalist principles by calling for a "No" vote and bowing down "to the deepest prejudices of the British working class." (*Class Struggle*, May 1975.) "Whatever one might say or think, it boils down to abandoning all internationalist propaganda worthy of its name."

According to the small sectarian grouplet *Workers' Fight*, the IMG added "its tin whistle to the cacophony of chauvinism" by urging workers to vote against British membership in the EEC. "The anti-EEC campaign," continued the lead article in *Workers' Fight* on March 29, "from the furthest left to the fascist right, is nothing but chauvinism and little Englishism." The article, entitled "The Great Yes/No Debate—What a Charade!" ended: "There is no real choice before us. The bosses keep their power, in or out. In or out, the fight goes on."

In the opinion of another small "Trotskyist" sect, the League for Socialist Action, the IMG's call "No to the bosses' Common Market—for a United Socialist Europe" in fact "tells workers—in the meantime—that they should support British as against European capitalism" because "there is little chance of getting a 'socialist Europe' by June 5th."

All these groups made the error of using a subjective criterion—the chauvinist views of many of those leading the antimarket campaign—to determine revolutionists' attitude to an objective phenomenon, the Common Market itself. Revolutionists cannot be neutral to the attempt by their "own" bourgeoisie to combine in an imperialist bloc against the interests of the workers, the semicolonial countries, and the workers states. Revolutionists can no more abstain on British membership in the EEC than they can on British membership in NATO or any other imperialist bloc.

The best way, of course, for revolutionists to challenge the reactionary chauvinist propaganda of the Stalinists and the Tribunites was to campaign unequivocally for a "No" vote, and simultaneously, to advance a programme of revolutionary socialism and internationalism.

This was the course followed by the IMG. The Trotskyists, while rejecting the capitalist common market, advanced a thoroughly

internationalist programme, proposing international action by workers against the multinational trusts (like the joint strike by the Italian workers of Pirelli and the British



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workers of Dunlop), international solidarity with workers in struggle (like the worldwide support given the British miners in their strikes against the Tories in 1972 and 1974), international solidarity with the Portuguese revolution, support for the political prisoners in Spain, and action to defend the Irish freedom struggle.

The IMG called for a real mobilization of the resources of the labour movement against the EEC and for socialist solutions to the crisis wracking the capitalist economy—against incomes policies, for a sliding scale of wages and hours, for nationalization of industry, and a Socialist United States of Europe.

The IMG held several rallies in major cities against the EEC and for a socialist Europe. Ernest Mandel, a member of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, addressed meetings of several hundred in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Bristol, and Oxford.

The victory of the capitalist class and the right wing of the Labour party on June 5 is widely expected to encourage Wilson to launch new attacks against workers' interests in the months to come. Retail prices in April were 21.7 percent higher than a year before and in the first three months of the year rose at an annual rate of nearly 35 percent.

With an inflation rate more than double that of its major competitors, British

capitalism will soon be forced to mount new attacks on workers' living standards. According to the June 7 London *Times*, the Labour government is "looking for a norm for the next round of pay negotiations of less than 15 per cent," which at present inflation rates would amount to a severe cut in the standard of living of British workers.

There is every likelihood that Wilson will be encouraged by the success of his close alliance with the Tory party against the majority of the Labour party in the EEC campaign to seek new alliances with the Tories to ram through other measures attacking the working class.

Labour Minister of Education Reg Prentice pointed to such an alliance June 1. Speaking in Leeds, he said that the Common Market campaign had united most "realistic and moderate" politicians of the Conservative, Liberal, and Labour parties. "We must not lose sight of this spirit of unity after June 5. Our continued membership of the Common Market will provide us with the best possible framework for success in our economic struggle. But we shall still have to win that struggle by our own efforts. We shall need national unity as never before."

But the Labour right cannot rest so assured that the easy victory of June 5 can be repeated in a head-on confrontation with the major battalions of the trade-union movement over the cost of living. The railway workers are now planning a nationwide rail strike to back up wage demands, a reminder to the Labour government that any direct assault on workers' living standards can spark a powerful response from the ranks of the labour movement. □

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
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# AROUND THE WORLD



## Israeli 'Troop Withdrawal' a Fraud

The Israeli government announced June 2 that it was withdrawing half of its troops and tanks from the "limited forces zone" established along the Suez Canal by the January 1974 disengagement agreement with Egypt. The announcement brought a spate of headlines and comments from Washington proclaiming the weighty implications of Israel's move for the cause of world peace.

A week later it was admitted by "Western military sources" that the forces Israel claimed to have withdrawn were actually withdrawn months earlier or in some cases had not been there at all.

The sources said that the Egyptian military command had full knowledge of the phantom nature of the withdrawal. They "decided against challenging the Israeli announcement because regardless of its military value it was considered a politically and psychologically important gesture," according to the June 10 *New York Times*.

## Lisbon Nationalizes Bus Companies

The Portuguese Transport Ministry announced the take-over of fifty-four bus companies June 14, in line with the government decree issued in April to nationalize transportation.

## Thousands Resettled in Guinea-Bissau

Almost 100,000 persons, about a quarter of the population, are to be resettled in Guinea-Bissau, according to a report in the June 12 *New York Times*.

Tens of thousands of persons in Guinea-Bissau fled into neighboring Senegal and Guinea to escape Portuguese bombing raids during Lisbon's thirteen-year war against the liberation forces.

Many more fled into the jungles, and others were placed in concentration camps called "strategic hamlets" by the Portuguese troops.

Erecting thousands of new homes and rebuilding entire villages is a top priority for Guinea-Bissau, which declared its independence on September 24, 1973, almost a year before the new regime in Lisbon recognized it.

A major job before the country is rebuilding from the devastation caused by Lis-

bon's colonial war. Guinea-Bissau had to spend about \$1 million this year to import rice, the staple food, because the war had virtually destroyed agriculture. During the war, rice production fell from an annual crop of 100,000 tons to 30,000 tons.

The *Times* reported that none of the few major industries, which include a bottling plant, peanut oil mills, and export and import companies, have been nationalized. It said that "scores of Portuguese and Lebanese traders" who fled before independence have returned.

## Honduran Army Shake-up

The Honduran army has retired twenty-nine officers in a reorganization reportedly forced by young officers demanding an end to corruption. Among those retired were two former Cabinet ministers and the army chief of staff, Col. Andres Ramirez Ortega.

## Gandhi in Hot Water

India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has suffered two severe setbacks. A court in her hometown of Allahabad on June 11 declared her election to Parliament invalid. The court found her guilty of corrupt practices in the 1971 election campaign for using a government official, local officials, and policemen to campaign for her. Suit had been brought against her by her Socialist opponent in the election, Raj Narain.

The judge's decision prohibited her from running in any election for six years. If her appeal is unsuccessful, she must resign her office. The decision spurred renewed calls for her immediate resignation by a bloc of three right-wing opposition parties—the old Congress party, Bharatiya Lok Dal (Peo-

ple's party of India), and Jan Sangh—and the Socialist party. These parties control 49 of the 523 seats in Parliament, whereas Gandhi's Congress party and its ally, the Communist party of India, have nearly 400.

Even more ominous for Gandhi was the poor showing by her party in the state elections in Gujarat. Seats held by the Congress party fell from 140 to 75, while the bloc of the three right-wing parties won 87 of the 182 seats.

## Demonstrators Arrested in Burma

Troops arrested 213 demonstrators on the steps of Rangoon's main pagoda June 11 and the government banned public gatherings in an effort to end a wave of protests by students and workers against high living costs.

The demonstrations were started at two schools June 6 by students who demanded the release of others arrested during demonstrations last December. They also demanded government action against inflation and unemployment. The following day 3,000 students burned effigies of President Ne Win and other officials during street demonstrations.

Public transport in the city was shut down, and workers in the industrial zone went out on strike. The government shut down colleges and universities, and evicted students from the main campus of the Rangoon University of Arts and Sciences.

## Thai Women Stage Militant Strikes

Two hard-fought strikes that had continued in Bangkok for more than a month ended June 7, following intervention by the government. Most of the strikers were women.

The workers of the Taiwanese-owned

## DOONESBURY



Standard Garment Company and Thailand's biggest hotel, the Dusit Thani, went on strike in early May. Among their demands was a wage equivalent to the legal minimum of about US\$1.20 a day.

The strikes were bitter, with frequent attacks on the workers by the police, as well as by right-wing students and private gangs hired by the bosses.

The settlement reached under government mediation met only some of the strikers' demands.

Inflation and unemployment are growing rapidly in Thailand, under the impact of the increased price of imported oil and the end of the Indochina war. War-related businesses are a major source of profits for the Thai ruling class.

The first unions were formed in October 1973, following the student demonstrations that led to the overthrow of the previous regime. Last year there were 357 strikes in Thailand.

### U.S. to Admit 1,000 Chilean Refugees

The State Department announced June 13 that it would admit some 1,000 Chilean refugees to the United States. However, applicants will be admitted on a "case-by-case basis" and no Communists will be allowed.

To date, 19 refugees from the Pinochet dictatorship have been allowed to enter the United States. In contrast, 131,210 Vietnamese refugees have been admitted.

### French Police Raid Churches to End Sit-in by Prostitutes

Police raided churches in Lyon, Marseille, Paris, Dijon, and Grenoble at dawn June 10 to eject prostitutes who had been staging sit-ins to protest police harassment.

In St. Nizier church in Lyon, police clubbed two leaders of the struggle so severely that they had to be taken to a hospital for treatment. The prostitutes left the church after an attack with police dogs was threatened.

In Grenoble, priests locked the church doors to prevent the expulsion of the prostitutes, but the police eventually forced their way in.

### White House Threatens to Continue Cuba Blockade

President Ford said in an interview released by the White House June 14 that he saw no prospect at present of any normalization of U.S. relations with Cuba, "because there has been no apparent change in the attitude of Premier Fidel Castro." Ford was interviewed by Pierre Salinger, a former White House press secretary under President Kennedy, for the French news magazine *L'Express*. Ford also said that if the Organization of

American States decides to lift the trade embargo against Cuba, the U.S. embargo would continue "until there is some change in policy by Cuba toward the United States."

### FBI Arrests Hijacker Freed by Cuba

Michael Lynn Hansen, a hijacker who had been jailed in Cuba since forcing a Western Airlines jet to land there in 1972 to dramatize his opposition to the Vietnam War, was arrested by the FBI when he landed in New York June 14. The Cuban government had released him a few days earlier and he arrived by plane in Barbados, where he reportedly turned himself over to U.S. consulate officials.

### Thou Shalt Not Interfere With the Running of a Scab Shop

The Roman Catholic Church excommunicated a magistrate and three policemen who entered a cloistered convent in Palestrina, Italy, to investigate union charges that nuns were illegally manufacturing clothing for a local company. The company recently laid off its workers as a result of production cuts.

### Marcos and Mao Clink Glasses

The governments of China and the Philippines established diplomatic relations June 9. The agreement was signed during President Ferdinand Marcos's visit to Peking, where he met with Mao Tsetung and Chou En-lai within hours of his arrival.

The joint communiqué announcing the step made no reference to Peking's previous support for Maoist rebels in the Philippines, who have denounced Marcos as a puppet of "American imperialism." Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, Marcos's director of intelligence and security, took part in the Peking negotiations.


### Cabinet Votes and Discussion Now 'Top Secret' in Portugal

Portuguese cabinet members have been barred from making public statements that conflict with official policy. A decree from that body June 13 added, "Cabinet sessions are private and it is expressly forbidden to give publicity to the discussions or votes."

### One Out of Four Blacks in U.S. Unemployed

The unemployment rate for Blacks in the first three months of the year rose to 25.7 percent, or a record 2.9 million persons, according to a report prepared by the National Urban League. This figure takes into account those who have given up looking for work and part-time workers who want full-time employment.

The report said that "Blacks accounted for almost all of the increase in unemploy-



Herblock/New York Post

ment in the nation during the latter half of the first quarter of 1975. Of the 49,000 new officially unemployed workers between February and March, 47,000 were black."

### Report 800 Million Persons Live in 'Absolute Poverty'

This year's annual report by the World Bank concentrates on the effects of the world depression on the poorest countries, which have been hit hardest. The year ending June 30, 1974, witnessed "momentous change . . . marked by a major upheaval in global economic relationships," the report says. ". . . the prospects for the economic and social progress of a large number of developing countries have been seriously jeopardized."

Without major international aid "800 million people around the world can expect almost no improvement in their condition of life for the rest of the decade."

Robert McNamara, president of the World Bank, says in his introduction to one of the studies that poverty "blights the lives of some 2,000 million people in the more than 100 countries of the developing world." Of these, 800 million are in "absolute poverty . . . life so degrading as to be an insult to human dignity."

McNamara notes the "sobering fact" that "although there has been encouraging economic growth in most of the developing countries over the past three decades, a very large proportion of their people have not shared in its benefits. On average, the poorest 40 percent of their societies is not much better off than it was."

## The Political Consequences of the Feud Between 'Official' Republicans and IRSP

[The following interview was given to Gerry Foley in Belfast on May 16 by Jim McCorry, one of the most prominent leaders of the Irish Republican Socialist party (IRSP).

[After the IRSP was formed in December 1974, drawing together primarily dissidents from the "Official" republican movement, a sharp conflict developed between the new organization and the "Official" Irish Republican Army. The "Officials" accused the IRSP of being a political cover for gangsters and "mad dog" elements who were determined to provoke a civil war between the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland. The IRSP accused the "Officials" of launching a campaign of extermination against them.

[Following the shooting of IRSP member Hugh Ferguson at the end of February in Belfast, several members of both organizations have been shot and some killed. In the cases of the assassination of Liam McMillen, the "Official" IRA commander in Belfast, and the attempted assassination of Seán Garland, the national organizer of "Official" Sinn Féin, the IRSP has denied that any of its members or supporters were involved.

[In the case of other shootings, the IRSP has not denied that its members or supporters played a part, although it has said they acted in self-defense. The "Officials" in Belfast have admitted only "punishment" of persons involved in attacks on them; for the most part this has consisted of shooting in the legs. According to "Official" leaders in Belfast, Hugh Ferguson was accidentally killed by a "punishment" detail.]

\* \* \*

*Question. Why did this kind of a conflict get started between you and the "Officials"?*

*Answer.* The only rational explanation we could think of was that it was in a way a reaction by the "Officials" to the Provisional split in 1969. At that time, there were a lot of people inside the "Officials" who thought that a hard line should have been taken with the Provisional split-off. Failure to do this, they thought, allowed the Provisionals to grow and in many ways to overshadow them, and to create conditions that stood in the way of revolution. So,

when the IRSP developed, they felt they couldn't allow the same thing to happen again.

But the fact is that we don't know for certain what is on their minds, because at this stage we can't get anybody to sit down to talk to us and explain what it's all about.

*Q. What do you think the results of the conflict have been for both the IRSP and the "Officials"?*

A. It has had a disastrous effect on the general struggle, both the national struggle and the hoped-for social struggle. But for some odd reason the "Officials" are either unable or unwilling to see this. As for the IRSP, it is certainly in a bad position. There is an organizational disarray that tends to lead to further disarray. Underground, we have no chance to organize, to develop internally, and to engage in the sort of productive discussion that would be necessary to advance as an organization and formulate both policies and tactics.

*Q. Why do you think it has been so difficult, as you say, to get the "Officials" to sit down and talk?*

A. I think it's a result of their theoretical position. They have accepted the idea that there has to be unity between the Catholic and Protestant working class before the national question can be solved. Our position is that the national question has to be solved before there can be any working-class unity. These two views are so contradictory that there is no way to reconcile them.

Perhaps, however, their reasoning is not so simple. There is also the question of their power-base within the Catholic communities. Then, too, the conflict between themselves and the Provisionals would have an effect on their attitude toward ourselves. If they feel that the emergence of any other sort of group would call into question their political credibility, they would also think that it would put in question their survival within the Catholic ghetto areas.

*Q. How do you propose to end the conflict? How do you think it can be ended?*

A. From last December on, we have taken

every initiative we could think of to try to get them to sit down and talk. We feel that this is the only way the trouble can be ended, with both sides agreeing to sit down at the table, discuss the differences, and agree to disagree. How we can bring this about, I haven't a clue. There's no avenue that hasn't been explored by ourselves.

*Q. How have you responded to attacks on your members?*

A. Initially we did not respond in any physical way at all—simply because we couldn't respond. After the death of Hugh Ferguson, we were faced with the reality that to exist physically, even as individuals, we had to make some attempt to defend our members, ourselves, and our families.

We had contact with a number of groups in the Catholic community. After the death of Danny Loughran, we said that we would accept the defense of those groups. That was the position, at least until two days ago. This has not been a mass defense but has consisted essentially of retaliation for the actions of the "Officials."

I'm not attempting to justify that in theoretical terms. But in realistic terms it seems to be the only method, even if it is against revolutionary principles, that has allowed us to exist as individuals.

*Q. Do you have any theory about who might have been responsible for the shooting of Liam McMillen?*

A. Yes. There are a number of groups in the Catholic ghetto of differing sizes and possibly with differing access to weapons. One of these groups may have been stalking McMillen or been planning some kind of operation directed at the top echelon of leadership in the "Official" republican movement.

It's difficult to try to name any group. There have been a lot of new names popping up—the Young Revolutionary Republicans, the Young Irish Citizens Army, the Irish Revolutionary Army, the Revolutionary Citizens Army.

If three or four people can come together with a gun and some sort of obscure political ideology, they can be reasonably effective in a limited sense in the Catholic areas. It seems to me that this is where to look for those who killed McMillen.

As far as we are concerned, his death was not only a tragedy, as all such killings are, but was catastrophic as regards our problems with the "Officials."

*Q. What is the attitude toward these armed groups in the Catholic communities? To what extent do they have the support of the people?*

A. Because of the republican tradition,

the people in the Catholic ghettos would certainly give limited, passive support in the majority of cases to the Irish Republican Army. But the smaller groups such as the Catholic Defense League in the Short Strand or Ardoyne areas would get support inasmuch as they are seen as being means of defense against possible Loyalist attacks.

*Q. How much political control is there over the armed groups in the Catholic ghettos?*

A. There is no organized control by the people's organizations. There's very little the people can do to control the armed groups in the context of the Catholic ghettos, and there seems to be no armed organization that is prepared to engage in creating structures through which the people could have an effective say in the actions of the armed groups. The more fragmented these groups become, or the more access the smaller groups have to weapons, the more difficult the problem is going to be.

What we have to do is to create new structures or use the existing ones to bring the armed groups under control, or if not under direct control at least make them susceptible to pressure.

*Q. Do you think there is a real danger of the activity of the armed groups in the Catholic ghettos degenerating into gangsterism and gang warfare?*

A. Yes, in time. Certainly such a situation would work very much to the benefit of the British or the state forces here and would be encouraged by them, either through their tacit acceptance of it, or through their initiating it with agents provocateurs. In the absence of any organizations to control the armed groups, this is what will occur, and in fact, it seems to be occurring at this stage. The problem is how to stop this development.

*Q. Has this conflict increased the willingness of the people to cooperate with the police and the British army?*

A. Yes. We have seen this in our conflict with the "Officials." In many cases, people can do nothing else to defend themselves or their families. They are forced into a position where they have to accept the limited protection of the state forces. In the doing of that, they create further antagonisms and become even more dependent on the protection of the state forces.

I think that this is going to be played on more and more by the British army and the RUC [Royal Ulster Constabulary], and that it will be another factor that will have

catastrophic effects on the overall struggle of the people here.

*Q. What kind of political work is the IRSP engaged in?*

A. At the minute our work is largely organizational, especially in Belfast. This means recruiting on a very clandestine level, political organization within areas, meeting with people, contacts, meetings to develop our own internal policy. With the exception of six public meetings here, one of which we were forced to abandon by twenty or thirty "Officials" with iron bars, we have engaged in very little public activity, simply because we haven't been allowed to because of physical threats.

At this stage, I don't think that it is necessarily bad that we had to proceed slowly. Earlier on, when it became known that there was at least an alternative organization to either the Provisionals or the "Officials," there were whole groups wanting to join. But the long-term effects of organizing slowly could be very beneficial to the organization.

*Q. What concretely has been the effect of this conflict on the organization?*

A. In Belfast we have something like eighty people who are out of their homes or staying in sort of groups in the Divis flats complex. I would say that there are something like 150 or 200 people in the Belfast area who have been affected in one way or another. That is, they don't work regularly where they have jobs or are not staying at home all the time. Because the situation can become more dangerous after a shooting or an incident in a specific area. In such cases they would leave their homes. I would say about 150 to 200 people were in this position of being on the run sporadically, unable to lead regular lives. As for the figure of eighty who are on the run all the time, that is a very precise figure.

*Q. Your comrades say that you have had to give up your job because of the conflict. How did that happen?*

A. I was threatened by three members of the "Official" organization as far back as seven or eight weeks ago that if I publicly criticized the "Official" republican movement, I was going to get a "nutting," which is their name for a "head job," or a bullet in the head. But I had heard more than three weeks before the shooting of Billy McMillen that myself and other people were on an alleged death list drawn up by the "Official" republican movement.

I continued working through that period, and after the shooting of Billy McMillen, we had a number of people burst into the house

carrying submachine guns. Later on that night a machine gun was fired through the window of this house where we are sitting now. So, I decided that discretion in this case was the better part of valor, and that I should take the opportunity to devote myself more to writing and organizing the party.

*Q. Were you threatened at your job as well?*

A. Yes. We run a cooperative garage in the Andersonstown area, where we took over an old building. The idea was to help get some sort of community transport system off the ground, provide a reasonable service, and at the same time get the freedom of action of being self-employed.

But unfortunately the place is raided continually by members of the "Official" scouts. From two houses nearby they watch with binoculars. There are people who come and sit in the car park, wearing leather jackets and dark glasses, to let us know that they're still active and looking for us. They go in and out every morning or afternoon.

It's not just something special in my case. There are quite a number of people they're after. If someone like Seán Flynn or Kevin Holland drives into an area and stays too long or their car is known, they're soon fired on. You can't stay in one place longer than ten or fifteen minutes. This is probably the longest period now that I have been in any one place for about three weeks.

*Q. Do you think there's any possibility of ending this cycle of retaliation for retaliation's sake?*

A. After the shooting of Billy McMillen we realized that any efforts at retaliation on our part were counterproductive. Although it hasn't been public knowledge until this time, there has been no retaliation by our defense groups after the shooting of Billy McMillen, and this is despite the fact that there have been a number of shootings, particularly of young people allegedly associated with the IRSP. One kid, a young lad, is going to have to have his leg amputated after being shot five times there by the "Officials" because he was supposedly sympathetic to us.

At a very long meeting of our people, we decided that this thing had to stop. We have decided that should I be shot, Séamus Costello shot, people maimed or injured, that we would try to make sure there was no retaliation and keep it from going any further. This applies even to the issuing of statements to the local press about the incidents.

We have tried to get out of the vicious circle of statement and counterstatement or

allegation and counterallegation. So, we have made no statements about the incidents to the papers. Whether this is going to be productive or not will probably be known by the end of the month. And if at that stage there has been no improvement, then more than likely we will review the situation and decide then what is the best position to adopt.

However, according to our position at the minute, there will be no retaliation taken; and the reason this was not made known before was that we felt it might have been regarded as a license to kill a member.

*Q. Do you think this conflict is attracting gangster elements to your organization or to the "Officials"?*

A. According to the information we're receiving about the "Officials"—I hate the kind of vilification that has been engaged in, but I'm trying to give you the facts as best we know them—many individuals suspended or thrown out of the organization have been brought back again.

In relation to our own organization, the impression given of it by the established press is that of a very militant organization with either sectarian gangsters or thugs or gunmen involved in it. This would have led to attracting many people who we would certainly want to keep very, very far away from the organization. In order to prevent this, about eight weeks ago we stopped recruitment to the organization in Belfast. Recruitment is done through Dublin. We have actually started associate membership.

We have a number of associate members who are not members of the organization. It was one of the ways we tried to deal with the danger you rightly point out of a gangster element being attracted to the organization. So, we have had no recruitment at all for six weeks in Belfast and possibly that situation will go on for quite a period of time more.

*Q. What's been the response of the "Officials" to your attempts to get discussions going and stop this thing?*

A. We've had no response except on a very personal level, a very individual level, with people inside the "Officials." Quite a large proportion of the membership are worried about a continuation of this conflict. At that level the response has been good, but as soon as they reach local leadership level, any attempts at settling it are immediately squashed.

Personally, this situation is very disturbing to me in human terms, in socialist terms. I can't understand how they can talk about socialism and at the same time completely ignore the realities of the situation as it is. Five people are dead and some

fifty-odd are either maimed, wounded, beaten up, and perhaps psychologically destroyed in many cases. And that is to say nothing of the effect on the morale of the people in the Catholic ghettos. Yet there is no willingness to even sit down and talk

## An Open Letter to the Metalworkers

### The Struggle for Democracy in Portuguese Unions

[The following open letter to the metalworkers was published in the May 30 issue of *Combate Socialista*, the fortnightly newspaper of the Portuguese Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT—Revolutionary Workers party). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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On May 15 we participated in a special general assembly of Lisbon metalworkers. Almost 4,000 workers came to discuss the problems of building an industrial union and the preliminary drafts of statutes and a contract. All these questions affect us and we should discuss them seriously. Moreover, the contract will cover 250,000 workers.

We knew beforehand that there would be a lot of different opinions on these problems. That's natural. There are many different currents of opinion in the working class. There are different ways of thinking. There are different political positions. That means that we have a lot of different ideas about how to fight the bosses, and how to struggle against capital. What the workers have to do is discuss how best to confront the bourgeois masters and to come to a single decision, to form a single fist to fight the enemy.

However, when some of our metalworker comrades tried to express their thinking, to speak in support of a 40-hour week, the Communist party and trade-union activists shouted: "Fascists out," "Go to work," "Reactionaries," and "Reactionaries out." In this way these comrades were prevented from expressing their point of view.

A supporter of the union leadership spit in a worker's face. The worker's crime was having a different opinion.

The Copcon\* was there and clubbed a

\* Comando Operacional do Continente (Continental Operational Command), the special military security force commanded by Brig. Gen. Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho. During the dispute over *República*, he was the one in the Armed Forces Movement leadership who spoke most strongly in favor of replacing the parties with "direct democracy."—IP

about our differences. There is no preparedness to discuss them rationally, or even irrationally, but at least to discuss them. That is the most disturbing aspect of the situation as far as I am concerned; it is what worries me most about the "Officials."

group of metalworkers who opposed accepting a 45-hour week. While these military men enforced "democracy," the presiding committee conducting the general assembly gave a vote of confidence to these noble "democrats."

Companheiro metalworkers: We don't believe that the workers who support a 40-hour week are fascists! If they were, then the French, Italian, and English workers, among others, would also be fascists.

Companheiro metalworkers: Workers spitting in the faces of other workers is not the best way to fight the capitalists.

Comrades: No Copcon can come into our assemblies and club people. Only our class has the right and duty to discuss and solve our problems. If Copcon appears without being invited, we should call for it to leave. If it is invited by the union leadership, we should say that this leadership has no confidence in the workers and is afraid of the working class.

Comrades: Just as we respect the decision of the majority of metalworkers present in the assembly, we demand our democratic rights as workers to express our ideas. Because we know that we are not going to win the Battle of Production with a 45- or a 50-hour week. The battle is lost. It is lost if we do not win the battle over the contract; the battle for workers control; the battle against capital; the battle for a government of the workers, soldiers, and peasants; the battle for socialism. □

### Final Payoff Went Up in Smoke

Before the last evacuation helicopter lifted off from Saigon, the U.S. embassy burned \$5 million in American currency so it would not fall into Communist hands, according to a General Accounting Office report issued June 13. The cash was part of an emergency shipment of \$12.5 million that Ambassador Graham Martin requested for severance pay to Vietnamese on the embassy payroll.

Government accountants said that as of May 30, \$2.7 million of the emergency shipment was still unaccounted for.



### Democracia: Fundamental para la Revolución

Por Gerry Foley

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Democracy—a Key Issue in Portuguese Revolution" que apareció en el número del 16 de junio de *Intercontinental Press*.

[Debido a razones de espacio publicamos la mitad del artículo dejando la otra mitad para ser publicada en el próximo número de *Intercontinental Press*.

[La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Al resistir el intento del gobierno militar y del Partido Comunista de restringir su influencia y su participación, el Partido Socialista Portugués no sólo causó una crisis de la autoridad del gobierno en su país sino que a nivel internacional planteó algunos problemas fundamentales sobre la naturaleza de la revolución socialista.

En el contexto de la crisis económica mundial y en el creciente renovado interés por el socialismo entre las masas de los países capitalistas desarrollados, sobre todo, los menos estables en Europa Occidental, la cuestión de la relación entre el socialismo y la democracia estaba destinada a tener una importancia crucial.

El cierre, por medio de la acción combinada del gobierno militar y del sindicato controlado por los stalinistas, del diario asociado con el partido que obtuvo, sin lugar a dudas, el voto mayoritario en las elecciones del 25 de abril, puso a la orden del día esta cuestión. La forma en que el gobierno, el Partido Comunista, el Kremlin, los partidos stalinistas de Europa Occidental y todo el espectro de los grupos de izquierda, respondieron a las protestas del Partido Socialista hizo que afloraran todas las implicaciones del problema.

Los argumentos que los militares y los stalinistas usaron contra los socialistas mostraron que el cierre de *República* el 20 de mayo, sólo puso al descubierto un conflicto político que había sido generado por la lucha de clases.

El Partido Comunista Portugués stalinista dio una clara respuesta a los problemas que surgieron, y su actitud encontró eco y fue apoyada por la burocracia soviética. Alvaro Cunhal, secretario general del PC portugués, fue bastante franco al explicar esta posición a los reporteros de *Le Monde* en Lisboa el 27 de mayo. Aparentemente él esperaba que la prensa capitalista europea

comprendiera lo "razonable" y lo "realista" de sus proposiciones.

Los periodistas le preguntaron que si los socialistas—que obtuvieron el 38 por ciento del voto en las elecciones de abril—eran excluidos del gobierno, se formaría una coalición de alternativa con los pequeños grupos satélites del PC tales como el MES (Movimento da Esquerda Socialista), que obtuvo un poco más del 1 por ciento de los votos en las mismas elecciones.

Mostrando realismo político, Cunhal se fue a lo fundamental del problema y descartó cualquier coalición que no incluya al PS. En tal caso, claramente, la fachada del gobierno parlamentario no podría ser mantenida y la alternativa de los militares compartiendo la responsabilidad de dirigir al país con el PC solamente, no era ni posible ni deseable.

"Yo no creo que en estos momentos cualquier coalición gubernamental que vincule al MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas] y otros partidos pueda dejar de incluir al PS. De la misma manera el PC tampoco puede ser excluido. Una coalición entre el PC y lo que se le llama la izquierda del MFA es poco probable."

Sin embargo, si el PS continúa siendo intratable, un gobierno netamente militar sería una solución aceptable:

"Si el gobierno de coalición se muestra imposible, se tendrá que encontrar una alternativa, por ejemplo, un gobierno compuesto de oficiales y civiles que no representen a los partidos como tales."

El secretario general del PC explicó que un gobierno instalado por las Fuerzas Armadas por encima del pueblo no necesariamente tiene que ser considerado una dictadura:

"En estos momentos no está en el horizonte un gobierno militar. Pero de todas maneras, tengo que clarificar que tal gobierno no sería incompatible con el ejercicio de las libertades en Portugal. De hecho, fue el MFA él que estableció las libertades que actualmente existen en este país. Es una calumnia el tratar de identificar una extensión del papel del MFA en el proceso que está viviendo el país con una dictadura militar."

El veterano dirigente stalinista también sacó claramente las implicaciones de esta posición. La más inmediata fue la de que si el PS no se subordina lo suficiente al

régimen militar, entonces la Asamblea Constituyente ya no tiene ninguna función.

"Hemos dicho que si los partidos en el gobierno de coalición rompen el pacto que firmaron con el MFA abandonando al gobierno, entonces la Asamblea Constituyente elegida en base a ese pacto no tiene más razones para existir. Si hay un gobierno de coalición, habrá una Asamblea Constituyente; pero, sin coalición, no habrá Asamblea Constituyente. Esa es nuestra opinión."

#### Por qué el PC Es Vulnerable

Cunhal les aseguró a los periodistas que el PC portugués está a favor de la democracia, la libertad de expresión y de reunión. Sin embargo, su verdadera actitud hacia la democracia se reveló cuando trató de explicar por qué se oponía a que se llevaran a cabo elecciones municipales de inmediato donde el PC ha obtenido muchos puestos debido a su maquinaria y a sus relaciones especiales con el MFA. Dijo:

"El Partido Socialista quiere establecer una santa alianza anticomunista. Los bloques que tienen el propósito de aislar al PCP [Partido Comunista Portugués] de hecho tienen toda la oportunidad de triunfar. Como ven, hay dos caminos que coexisten en el Portugal de hoy: el proceso electoral y la dinámica revolucionaria. Algunas veces caminan paralelas, otras veces divergen. En la revolución algunas veces tienes que defender una política que no siempre es popular. Apoyar demandas de aumentos que nuestra economía no puede dar, llamar a que se reduzca la semana de trabajo a treinta y cinco horas puede ayudarte a conseguir votos. Pero en vista del estado de nuestra economía, esto es demagogia, y puede llevarnos al desastre."

Cunhal usó un espartapájaros. No ofreció ejemplos reales de la "demagogia" que tiene en mente, porque el papel del PC de contener las luchas de los trabajadores y de romper huelgas para poder defender la política económica del gobierno se ha convertido en un escándalo entre los sectores más combativos de la clase obrera portuguesa. Esa es una de las principales razones de por qué "los bloques que tienen el propósito de aislar al PCP de hecho tienen toda la oportunidad de triunfar." Es por eso que el PC ha sido duramente derrotado en algunas elecciones por bloques que se oponen a la maquinaria stalinista. Esto ocurrió, por ejemplo, en un sindicato de empleados bancarios en Oporto, donde el ex ministro de trabajo del PC en el primer gobierno provisional fue derrotado por una votación de dos votos en contra por cada voto a su favor.

El PC francés aparentemente se vio en la libertad de referirse a casos reales donde sus camaradas portugueses habían mostra-

do más "responsabilidad" que el PS. En un editorial de *l'Humanité* dijo:

"Organizar la producción es la tarea principal. Pero a la vez que Mário Soares habla de todo y de nada, ha mantenido un silencio total en esta cuestión. Sus amigos y aliados han participado en fomentar las huelgas y los desórdenes bajo varios pretextos malos en TAP [Transportes Aéreos Portugueses] en la industria química y en otros sectores claves. Mário Soares permanece en silencio. Y en todo caso no toma medidas prácticas para hacer participar al Partido Socialista en la lucha económica, que es el requisito para la sobrevivencia de la democracia y la libertad en Portugal.

"Desde Washington a Bonn, están confiando en el colapso de la economía portuguesa. Están preparando el camino para un colapso financiero e industrial tal como ocurrió en Chile.

"Entonces, ¿de qué lado está Mário Soares? ¿De qué lado están los partidos socialistas y la Internacional Socialista?"

### La Respuesta del PS

En realidad, los dirigentes del PS no han permanecido en silencio sobre la "Batalla por la Producción." Han rechazado indignados la acusación del PC, mientras que responden con una lastimera defensa a cargos similares que les ha hecho el gobierno militar. Por ejemplo, Soares dijo en la conferencia de prensa del 22 de mayo en el Hotel Altis de Lisboa:

"Apoyamos la Batalla por la Producción. Y, al contrario de lo que se ha sugerido, los socialistas estamos participando en esta batalla por la producción. Pero para este propósito es necesario organizar la disciplina en el trabajo, tener un plan. Y el pueblo portugués debe estar consciente de las alternativas que se han tomado y no sentirse constantemente inseguro, sin saber qué es lo que la suerte le depara."

El mismo diario *República* enfatizó este punto en un editorial el 10 de mayo antes de ser silenciado:

"Nunca debe de olvidarse que una revolución no es una celebración. Es trabajo por parte de todos nosotros. Una de las formas en las cuales el sistema socialista es superior al capitalista no es que haya más celebraciones y manifestaciones sino que significa trabajar más, que todo mundo debe trabajar."

Por otro lado, Soares señaló (desde el punto de vista social demócrata) las contradicciones que surgen al tratar de emplear llamados que suenan socialistas a que la gente trabaje más para salvar la economía capitalista de Portugal, y la utilización de métodos stalinistas para imponer "disciplina obrera."

"Por otro lado, la Batalla por la Producción requiere la participación de todos los trabajadores, y si algunos trabajadores se

han convertido en policías de otros trabajadores y discriminan de una manera partidaria a otros trabajadores, obviamente esta batalla se debilita.

"Citaré un ejemplo que es altamente ilustrativo. En una fábrica de concentrados de tomate en Alvalade do Sado, donde hay 160 trabajadores, un trabajador, miembro del Partido Comunista, empezó a hacer la vida difícil a los demás por su intolerancia hacia otros trabajadores. Algunos trabajadores hicieron los preparativos para echarlo. Cerca de 2,000 obreros vinieron de fuera y forzaron la intervención de las fuerzas armadas. El resultado fue que 20 trabajadores del Partido Socialista fueron purgados. Ahora las purgas no pueden ser llevadas a cabo bajo la presión partidaria, y si sucede, es obvio que habrá división entre los obreros. Tales divisiones son dañinas y bastante serias en la Batalla por la Producción."

No sólo el intento de crear una "policía laboral" fue divisorio e inaceptable, los llamados a las necesidades de la "revolución socialista" y la "liberación nacional" usados para justificar tales métodos podrían ser peligrosos en sí mismos, si las limitaciones de la retórica no se delimitan.

"Sabemos que sin la inversión doméstica y sin la inversión extranjera," continúa Soares, "no será posible crear nuevos empleos. Pero para poder alentar la inversión doméstica es necesario inspirar confianza en el ahorro individual. Por otro lado, para poder obtener inversiones del extranjero, es necesario, como adecuadamente ha dicho el ministro de asuntos económicos Melo Antunes, crear un Código para los Inversionistas Extranjeros que les dé garantías a los inversionistas potenciales, y también debemos saber de dónde van a venir esas inversiones. ¿Vendrán del Tercer Mundo? ¿O vendrán del Tratado de Libre Comercio Europeo o de los países del Mercado Común? Ayer se hizo una pregunta por televisión—pero no fue contestada—con respecto a nuestro balance comercial con los países de Europa Oriental, si era favorable a Portugal, o como el entrevistador dijo, favorable a los países de Europa Oriental. No hubo una respuesta definitiva.

"Y es un problema que nos gustaría ver aclarado. ¿Cuáles son las fuentes potenciales de inversión?"

"Esto naturalmente plantea otro problema que es la viabilidad de nuestro experimento socialista. Porque ¿no queremos instalar un socialismo de pobreza aquí! No, definitivamente ¡no queremos reducir el nivel de vida del pueblo portugués! ¡No queremos 'albanizar' a Portugal! Queremos que nuestro experimento socialista contribuya al desarrollo de la economía ¡y a resolver los problemas esenciales del pueblo portugués! Y ¿cómo vamos a resolver estos problemas? ¿Buscamos una solución tipo

cubano, es decir, el modelo cubano? Entonces debemos saber quién va a pagar la cuenta. En el caso de Cuba sabemos que fue la Unión Soviética. Entonces, queremos saber si la Unión Soviética está dispuesta a pagar tal cuenta por nosotros. Tenemos buenas razones para dudarlo."

Obviamente los inversores potenciales de Portugal, ya sean internos o externos, se sentirían más seguros con el tipo de "disciplina obrera" que los stalinistas han tratado de imponer que con cualquier tipo de "código de inversionistas." De hecho, lo que Soares estaba tratando de decir era que ya que la ayuda financiera iba a venir de Europa Occidental, el gobierno estaría en mejor posición de conseguir los créditos que se necesitan para relajar la presión sobre la economía capitalista portuguesa si le dieran una mayor función al PS, con sus buenas conexiones políticas en Europa.

Al mismo tiempo, Soares quiso decir algo más profundo. Los trabajadores portugueses quieren alcanzar el nivel de vida de Europa Occidental; no les interesa el "gran esfuerzo nacional" o una "revolución socialista" que signifique descender a un nivel de vida aún más bajo que el de las democracias burguesas de Europa Occidental.

Esto significa que los métodos totalitarios del Partido Comunista, el control monolítico de la prensa y de los sindicatos, junto con la intimidación masiva de los obreros por el gobierno y los canales de transmisión del partido no pudieron "ganar la batalla por la producción" en Portugal. Y así el PS sería mejor socio político del gobierno militar que el PC. Podría conseguir los mismos resultados con métodos más flexibles.

Es difícil asegurar si Soares tiene la razón en esto, en vista de la crisis económica mundial y los estrechos límites en que tiene que operar el capitalismo portugués. Puede ser que en estas circunstancias y en condiciones de distensión, el Partido Comunista con sus métodos pueda defender mejor al capitalismo en Portugal. Lo que sí es claro, es que en realidad la política del Partido Comunista no es menos demagógica que la del Partido Socialista.

La demagogia del Partido Comunista ha sido tan obvia que el mismo dictador derrocado, Marcelo Caetano, pudo anotarse un punto a su favor en su apología que publicó en Brasil bajo el título *Depoimento* (Testimonio para la Defensa):

"Y de pronto surgió una demanda, promovida por un grupo de agitadores, cuyo propósito era el de debilitar cualquier esfuerzo razonable del gobierno, la demanda de un sueldo mínimo de 6,000 escudos [249 dólares al mes]. A partir de ahí, cualquier cosa que hiciera el gobierno era insuficiente. Lo peor fue que la maniobra con la que soñaban los elementos comunistas para desacreditar a mi gobierno y que daría resultados inesperados cuando los comunistas tomaron el Ministerio de Traba-

jo [en el primer gobierno provisional que se instaló en mayo de 1974]. Hubo algunos que lo tomaron en serio y demandaron que lo que habían manifestado era fácil y justo de otorgar. Luego se probó que ni era justo ni fácil. Era la justicia del destino."

De hecho, el PC abandonó la demanda de un sueldo mínimo de 6,000 escudos después que ingresó al primer gobierno de coalición que se instaló como fachada de los militares. No sólo se opuso a esto como un mínimo estatutario, sino que la maquinaria del PC en los sindicatos se opuso a esta demanda en las luchas por los contratos y luchó por un acuerdo lo más cercano posible al salario mínimo de 3,300 escudos (137 dólares), determinado por el gobierno militar.

Sólo después del surgimiento de masas provocado por el intento de golpe del 11 de marzo el gobierno aumentó el sueldo mínimo a 4,000 escudos (166 dólares), un aumento del 21 por ciento, mientras que la inflación ha permanecido por encima del 30 por ciento anual bajo el nuevo régimen.

Cuando entrevisté al dirigente del trabajo obrero del PS, Marcelo Curto, en mayo de 1974, me dijo: "Los comunistas piensan que los capitalistas no pueden pagar mejores salarios, pero yo creo que con todas las superganancias que han acumulado durante años de fascismo pueden pagar."

Curto estaba pensando como dirigente sindical. Y como tal tiene una buena reputación entre los obreros combativos. Es verdad que los monopolios portugueses pueden otorgar sueldos mucho mejores. También es verdad que un gran sector atrasado de hombres de negocios se han sostenido manteniendo los sueldos bajos. Pero al mismo tiempo, es verdad que en el contexto político e internacional, la sobrevivencia del capitalismo portugués depende en limitar lo más posible el aumento de los salarios. Los stalinistas tienen un claro entendimiento de las necesidades del capital y están más preparados a seguir la lógica del colaboracionismo de clase hasta sus últimas conclusiones, de la misma manera están más preparados para implementar esta línea con una consistencia despiadada.

También hay presiones opuestas en el PS y en el PC. Los stalinistas están obligados por las necesidades de la distensión y su estrategia de alianza con la burguesía "progresista" a mostrar que pueden ser los lugartenientes obreros del capitalismo. El PS no está bajo tanta presión en este aspecto. Aún más el PC ya tenía una maquinaria desarrollada en los sindicatos, mientras que el PS tiene que construir una. Pero no hay diferencia fundamental en la política de los dos partidos reformistas.

Ambos partidos están en el gobierno. Y al menos que el gobierno portugués estuviera dispuesto a abolir el capitalismo totalmente, establecer una economía planificada y promover una campaña revolucionaria en

Europa Occidental que pudiera movilizar a la clase obrera y al movimiento radical en su defensa y romper el aislamiento económico y político que inevitablemente resultaría de tales medidas, de hecho no hay ninguna esperanza real de elevar el nivel de vida de los trabajadores portugueses sustancialmente o de cambiar sus condiciones de vida. Esto es aún más cierto en un clima de crisis económica mundial.

Ni el PC ni el PS tiene ninguna intención de dirigir la revolución socialista. Esto fue específicamente excluido por los dos grupos, cada quien a su manera, el PS haciendo énfasis en la "imposibilidad de la democracia popular en Portugal," y el PC haciendo énfasis en que lo que está a la orden del día es la "liberación nacional vía al socialismo."

Sin embargo, el PC tiene tanto la capacidad como la voluntad de actuar como canal de transmisión y como policía del gobierno en el campo laboral; mientras que el PS carece de esto.

### Los Stalinistas se Oponen a la Democracia

El entrenamiento stalinista de los activistas del PC los hace resistentes a la presión de la base. Se les inculca la idea de que sólo una maquinaria omnipotente puede dirigir a los trabajadores hacia la transformación socialista. A pesar del electoralismo de los partidos stalinistas, su concepción fundamental sigue siendo la de que la revolución nunca puede obtener el apoyo de la mayoría de los trabajadores, que la política revolucionaria no puede ser popular, que se les debe imponer "disciplina" a las masas por medio de la maquinaria partidaria y del gobierno.

De otra manera, ¿cómo podría ser justificada la dictadura de puño de acero que existe en los estados obreros burocratizados, a la cual los partidos stalinistas están inseparablemente vinculados? La dirección y los miembros de los partidos stalinistas podrán idealizar la situación en la Unión Soviética y países similares, pero no son idiotas totales, ni están sordos, ni mudos, ni ciegos. Ellos saben que existen regímenes dictatoriales en esos países y el justificarlos es uno de los componentes fundamentales de su perspectiva política.

Esta actitud fue revelada claramente en las declaraciones de Cunhal del 27 de mayo a los periodistas de *Le Monde*. Las elecciones eran un instrumento de la derecha, porque los trabajadores sucumbirían inevitablemente a la "demagogia," inclusive en un país como Portugal, donde el Partido Comunista ya domina a sectores decisivos de la prensa y tiene una gran influencia sobre los demás.

La lógica de su actitud era ya clara cuando se dio la lucha por la ley de la "unidad sindical."

El régimen burgués es esencialmente un

aparato represivo, como debieran saber todos los que se dicen marxistas, a éste se le confió la tarea de evitar que los trabajadores sucumbieran a la "demagogia," es decir, los intentos de "dividirlos," estableciendo otra federación. Esta ley fue el primer ataque contra un derecho democrático fundamental bajo el nuevo régimen, el derecho de asociación. Fue complementario al ataque a los derechos sindicales que empezó con una ley antihuelga en septiembre de 1974. Era la indicación de la dirección antidemocrática en la cual tenían que moverse el régimen y sus defensores stalinistas para poder salvaguardar su dirección demagógica, es decir, el control que dicen ejercer en beneficio de los trabajadores pero que no fue subordinado a los trabajadores o a los intereses inmediatos históricos de los trabajadores.

La campaña demagógica en apoyo a la ley de la "unidad" momentáneamente fue efectiva. En primer lugar, las aseveraciones de que las supuestas maniobras del PS para establecer una federación rival representaban un complot de la CIA, provocaron el tipo de reacción "patriótica" que el gobierno trató de fomentar desde que tomó el poder. Esto encajó también con la estrategia de los gobernantes de presentar su gobierno como una especie de "frente de liberación nacional." La acusación que hizo el Admiral Rosa Coutinho a los socialistas muestra las ventajas de tales fórmulas. El aseguró que al hacer tales protestas ruidosas ante el cierre de *República* habían, al menos parcialmente, "traicionado a la nación."

En segundo lugar, hay una capa grande de trabajadores y de la izquierda fuera del Partido Comunista que comparten cierta perspectiva con las bases stalinistas. Quieren luchar contra el imperialismo y el capitalismo y están dispuestos a aliarse con las fuerzas vinculadas a estados no capitalistas y a oficiales insurgentes del ejército, contra los social demócratas que tienen vínculos con partidos abiertamente procapitalistas, algunos de los cuales han estado o están en el poder en países imperialistas. Esta tendencia que primero apareció cuando se dio la controversia sobre la ley de la "unidad" sindical, fue reforzada por el conflicto PC-PS después de las elecciones y se agudizó durante la crisis desatada por el cierre de *República*.

En última instancia, tal punto de vista resulta de las ilusiones en el stalinismo, similares a aquéllas que tiene la base de los partidos stalinistas, ilusiones reforzadas por el anticomunismo reaccionario. Sin embargo, tanto los partidos stalinistas como los partidos social demócratas representan fuerzas burocráticas dentro del movimiento de la clase obrera y como tales están aliados con el capitalismo a escala mundial.

[Continúa en el próximo número]

### La Reapertura de República, Importante Triunfo

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "The Reopening of República—a Significant Victory" que apareció en el número del 16 de junio de *Intercontinental Press*.

[La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Una importante victoria obtuvo la democracia obrera en Portugal el 6 de junio cuando el régimen militar burgués, obligado por la presión de masas, decidió permitir que se volviera a publicar *República*, diario de Lisboa que refleja los puntos de vista de la dirección del Partido Socialista.

Los dirigentes del Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas (MFA) habían cerrado el periódico y habían enviado tropas para llevar a cabo la evacuación de las instalaciones el 20 de mayo después de una provocación por parte de los miembros del sindicato de impresores que trabajan en *República*. El sindicato de impresores está dominado por el Partido Comunista Portugués.

Al haber suprimido el único diario que expresa los puntos de vista del Partido Socialista, que es la formación política más grande del movimiento obrero portugués, los militares asestaron un golpe a la libertad de prensa, sentando un precedente ominoso al poner una mordaza a los partidos políticos y tendencias que presentan aunque sea una semblanza de resistencia a los intentos del MFA de bloquear el desarrollo de la revolución portuguesa.

Los dirigentes del PS lucharon contra la supresión de *República* con medidas tales como retirarse de las reuniones del gabinete del gobierno de coalición, donde tienen puestos, y intentando movilizar apoyo internacional, sobre todo en los círculos burgueses y social demócratas.

Sin embargo, lo que fue decisivo en forzar a los militares a retroceder fueron las manifestaciones masivas que organizó el Partido Socialista en defensa del derecho a publicar *República*. Se llevaron a cabo manifestaciones en Lisboa que llegaron a reunir, según informes, 60,000 personas mostrando la agudeza del conflicto y la importancia que le daban muchos trabajadores. Que los dirigentes del PS, totalmente comprometidos con los métodos electorales, se hayan visto en la necesidad de movilizar a las masas en la calle es indicativo de la presión a la cual han sido sometidos como consecuencia de las medidas que se tomaron en contra de *República*.

A cambio de permitir la publicación de *República*, los dirigentes del Partido Socialista hicieron concesiones ante los militares del Consejo de la Revolución, una de ellas fue la de regresar a las reuniones de gabinete.

Se dieron dos argumentos a favor de los impresores cuya acción llevó al cierre de *República*:

1. Que les preocupaba el supuesto descenso en la circulación por la política editorial, que podría llevar a la quiebra del periódico y por lo tanto causarles la pérdida del empleo.

Lo falso del argumento es obvio. Con la medida del gobierno perdieron su trabajo de inmediato.

2. Por ser obreros honestos y revolucionarios, tenían el derecho a ser representados en la política editorial del periódico en el cual trabajaban.

Este argumento es tan falso como el primero. Donde tienen el derecho a expresarse es en la política editorial del periódico del Partido Comunista, *Avante!* ¿Estarían de acuerdo los dirigentes del PC en que los impresores cerraran *Avante!* porque éste estuviera perdiendo circulación o porque los impresores no estuvieran de acuerdo con su editor?

La lógica de este argumento lleva a resultados extraños. Si los impresores que emplea *Avante!* fueran miembros del Partido Socialista, ¿estarían de acuerdo los dirigentes del PC en que éstos tuvieran el derecho a cerrar el periódico si discreparan con su política editorial?

Obviamente toda tendencia política tiene el derecho democrático de determinar su propia política editorial. Y si tendencias políticas rivales trataran de intervenir bajo cualquier pretexto, estarían violando los derechos democráticos de los demás y sentarían en principio las bases para que se violaran sus propios derechos democráticos.

La supresión de *República* por el gobierno militar, apoyada con entusiasmo por el Partido Comunista, le permitió a una de las voces del imperialismo norteamericano, el *New York Times*, presentar el conflicto como una evidencia de la naturaleza antidemocrática del comunismo. El *Times* trató de sacar ventaja de la situación, de la misma manera en que ha sacado ventaja de los crímenes de Stalin en la URSS para calumniar a la Revolución Rusa.

Sin embargo, se necesita el descaro imperialista para que los críticos imperialistas del régimen portugués se planteen como defensores de los derechos democráticos.

Desde Vietnam del Sur hasta Brasil, España e Irán—y en el mismo Portugal por casi medio siglo—han demostrado sin lugar a dudas su preferencia por las dictaduras más viles, venales y brutales para defender y mantener el sistema capitalista. Este ha sido el principal componente de la política exterior de los Estados Unidos desde principios de siglo.

Las protestas de las publicaciones tales como el *Times* están confeccionadas como propaganda para difamar la imagen de la revolución proletaria y para proporcionar una cubierta democrática de mentiras para intervenir más directamente en Portugal si el MFA y el Partido Comunista se muestran incapaces de controlar el movimiento de masas y bloquear su desarrollo en una dirección anticapitalista.

Para la burguesía, los derechos democráticos no son esenciales para preservar su dominio de clase; de hecho, en el mundo de hoy, los derechos democráticos son un obstáculo para su dominio, es por eso que vemos tal erosión de la democracia del mundo "libre." Para la clase obrera, los derechos democráticos son un instrumento de gran valor en la lucha por la emancipación social.

La libertad de prensa—que estuvo bajo ataque directo en el caso de *República*—es un derecho democrático básico, que se obtuvo en luchas largas y duras, y que la clase obrera está totalmente interesada en defender. El método que utiliza el socialismo revolucionario en esta cuestión fue explicado por León Trotsky de una manera sucinta en 1938 en un artículo que hacía un resumen de la posición de principios de los bolcheviques. (Ver "La Libertad de Prensa y la Clase Obrera," en el número del 9 de junio de *Intercontinental Press*, p. 792.)

El principal argumento de Trotsky es el siguiente:

1. Los trabajadores no pueden liberarse de la influencia de las ideas reaccionarias por medio de la prohibición de las publicaciones reaccionarias. "En realidad, sólo la mayor libertad de palabra, de prensa y de reunión, pueden crear las condiciones favorables para el desarrollo del movimiento revolucionario de la clase obrera."

2. En la sociedad capitalista, las restricciones a la libertad de prensa arman al estado burgués con medios especiales para controlar la opinión pública. Aún más, las restricciones se revierten contra las publicaciones de la clase obrera.

3. "La lucha irreconciliable contra la prensa reaccionaria, es un imperativo. Pero los obreros no pueden substituir su propia lucha, que debe realizarse a través de sus organizaciones y su prensa, por el puño policiaco del Estado burgués."

Desde este punto de vista, el fracaso del régimen militar burgués al no poder suprimir la prensa del Partido Socialista debe ser

visto como una victoria de la clase obrera en el proceso revolucionario de Portugal.

La burguesía gobernó por medio de una dictadura totalitaria durante medio siglo. Actualmente está gobernando por diferentes medios, el Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas. El MFA se vale en gran medida del Partido Comunista para "disciplinar" al movimiento obrero, para controlar y desca-bezar las huelgas, y para contener en general las fuerzas clasistas que presionan por destruir al sistema capitalista y su estructura estatal. Mas la utilidad de los stalinistas está limitada por la creciente crisis económica que restringe el uso de tácticas reformistas. Además el PC se está desacreditando ante los sectores más combativos de la clase obrera debido a su política de colaboracionismo de clase y sus actitudes antidemocráticas.

El MFA está haciendo uso del tiempo que se le ha otorgado, debido al papel traidor de los stalinistas, para construir un movimiento político controlado por oficiales de las fuerzas armadas del estado portugués.

Un paso esencial en este camino es el de amordazar cualquier fuente real o potencial de oposición a este objetivo del MFA. El cierre de *República* es un ejemplo de esto. Señaló una nueva etapa en toda una serie de ataques del régimen del MFA contra el Partido Socialista, los grupos maoístas, las elecciones y la libertad de los sindicatos.

En este sentido, la acción de los sindicatos dirigidos por el PC de expulsar al editor de *República* y de censurar el contenido editorial del periódico, encajó con el curso que han seguido los militares. Cuando el Partido Socialista efectuó manifestaciones de masas ante las oficinas del periódico, protestando la violación a la expresión de sus puntos de vista, el régimen intervino y cerró el diario conflictivo.

La relación entre los derechos democráticos y la lucha proletaria ha sido encubierta sobre todo por los stalinistas, cuyo modelo de "socialismo" son los regímenes burocráticos de la Unión Soviética, China y las "democracias populares" en Europa Oriental. Por un lado, las prácticas antidemocráticas de tales regímenes desacreditan al socialismo, y por lo tanto constituyen un gran obstáculo en la lucha por el socialismo. Por otro lado, inclusive muchos críticos revolucionarios de los partidos comunistas en los países capitalistas han llegado a creer que la supresión de los derechos democráticos bajo los regímenes stalinistas es la norma para los estados obreros, y que esos derechos no tienen nada o muy poco que ver con la lucha revolucionaria por el poder.

El ataque de los stalinistas contra la democracia obrera en Portugal está directamente vinculado a su perspectiva estratégica que, a pesar de la demagogia "socialista" que emplean, tiene el propósito de mantener al movimiento de masas dentro de los

límites del sistema capitalista.

Los dirigentes socialistas, de la misma manera, no tienen ninguna intención de dirigir a las masas portuguesas en el derrocamiento del capitalismo. Utilizaron la movilización surgida del conflicto en *República* para tratar de reforzar su posición como sirvientes del MFA dentro del gobierno.

## Policía Detiene a Militantes del PST Argentino

Cuatro dirigentes nacionales del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), sección simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional de Argentina, fueron arrestados en la mañana del 17 de mayo en Rosario. Silvia Díaz, Eduardo J. Expósito, Alberto Lisandro Pujals y José Francisco Páez fueron arrestados mientras sostenían pláticas con miembros del partido, que participaron en la huelga de trabajadores metalúrgicos de Villa Constitución, ciudad cercana a Rosario. Páez es dirigente del movimiento obrero de Córdoba y fue el candidato del PST a la vicepresidencia en las últimas elecciones nacionales.

En la discusión sobre el curso que el partido debería proponer para solucionar la huelga estuvieron José Kalauz y Oscar Juárez, ambos miembros del PST, integrantes del comité de huelga de Villa Constitución. También fueron encarcelados.

La policía de la provincia de Santa Fe allanó la casa privada en donde se llevaba a cabo la reunión, arrestando a estos seis miembros del PST junto con Nilda Carbone, miembro del partido, y a Marta Brizzio, la dueña de la casa, que no tiene afiliación política.

El allanamiento ocurrió dos días después de que fue dinamitado el local del PST en Rosario.

Estos arrestos elevaron a veintiuno la suma de los miembros del PST y de la Juventud Socialista que están presos. Bajo el estado de sitio las víctimas pueden ser detenidas indefinidamente sin cargos o juicio.

La mayoría de los miembros del PST que están en la cárcel están ahí por su participación en la huelga de sesenta y un días en Villa Constitución. Sin embargo, el PST ha escogido el caso de Juan Carlos López Osornio para centrar una campaña. López Osornio fue arrestado y torturado en marzo durante la intervención federal del sindicato de azucareros de Ledesma al noroeste de Argentina. Es un miembro de mucho tiempo en el partido.

Además, hay cuatro miembros del PST que han permanecido en la cárcel desde poco tiempo después de que fue declarado el estado de sitio en noviembre de 1974: Luisa Segura, dirigente estudiantil de la Universidad de Tucumán; Silvio Dragunsky, conoci-

do representante del PST de Bahía Blanca; y los abogados Juan Llanos y Daniel Veiga. La lista completa de los miembros del PST que estaban presos hasta el número del 24 de mayo de *Avanzada Socialista*, semanal del partido, es la siguiente:

Gerardo Romagnoli, Guillermo Díaz, Nora Albanesi, Gloria Preiti, José María Fernández, Silvio Dragunsky, José Kalauz, Oscar Juárez, José F. Páez, Alberto L. Pujals, Silvia Díaz, Nilda Carbone, Eduardo J. Expósito, Juan Llanos, Juan Carlos López Osornio, Daniel Veiga, Luisa Segura, Néstor R. Sánchez, Ricardo Siam, Jorge Rodríguez y Juan Carlos Veiga.

La elevada moral de los presos políticos del PST se refleja en una carta abierta a los obreros metalúrgicos de Villa Constitución de José Kalauz y de Oscar Juárez. La carta está fechada el 22 de mayo:

"Desde la cárcel, en este momento la Alcaldía de Rosario, queremos hacer llegar nuestro más entusiasta abrazo a todos los compañeros con los que durante más de sesenta días escribimos una de las páginas más gloriosas de las luchas de la clase obrera.

"En este caso el gobierno nos obligó a salir a una huelga que tuvimos que afrontar en condiciones muy difíciles: nuestros principales dirigentes presos, la patronal y el gobierno en contra, y la burocracia siempre especulando a ver si con nuestra derrota podría volver a recuperar un sindicato que había perdido en una de las elecciones más limpias de la historia de la UOM [Unión Obrera Metalúrgica]. . . .

"Nosotros aquí estamos a disposición del poder ejecutivo nacional, creemos que nos van a trasladar a Coronda o algún otro lugar. Sea donde sea nos encontraremos con los otros compañeros. Desde ya vaya nuestro fraternal y combativo abrazo, y sepan que así como no nos quebró la represión, tampoco lo podrá hacer la cárcel. Al contrario lo único que están logrando es templar nuestro espíritu, que para cuando salgamos junto con Pichi [Alberto Piccinini, secretario general de la UOM de Villa Constitución, que se encuentra detenido desde la redada policiaca del 20 de marzo en Villa Constitución], continuemos esta grandiosa lucha que llevamos adelante los metalúrgicos de Villa Constitución. . . ." □

## Problems of General Concern in Soviet Dissident Movement

By Roy Medvedev

[The following article is scheduled for publication in June in the book *Detente & Socialist Democracy*, a collection of contributions to the discussion on Roy Medvedev's essay "Problems of Democratization and Detente." (See *Intercontinental Press*, December 9, 1974, p. 1657 for the text of Medvedev's original essay.) Other contributors to the volume include two of our editors, Ernest Mandel and George Novack, as well as Yvan Craipeau, Tamara Deutscher, Mihailo Markovic, Jiri Pelikan, and Michel Raptis. The publisher is Spokesman Books, the imprint of the Bertrand Russell Foundation.]

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### Disagreements Among the Soviet Dissidents

A year ago we were still debating whether controversy among the Soviet dissidents was at all needed. Today this problem does not even arise, because the process of differentiation among them, so painful in its initial stage, has gone already too far to avoid controversy. This was quite a natural process. In 1966-68, when we witnessed the first great eruption of the democratic movement in the USSR, we were all united by the same demands: an end to the political repressions, the defence of human rights, the availability of information, an end to the discrimination against the Crimean Tatars, against the Jews, and against the Volga Germans. We were also united in our protest against the invasion by the Warsaw Pact countries of the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and in our criticism of the Stalinist past still persisting in many spheres of the internal policies in our country. But no opposition movement can continue for long if it bases itself exclusively on the *criticism* of an unsatisfactory state of affairs; the need for putting forward and defending some *positive* programme led, precisely, to differences of opinion and to polemics among the dissidents which we are now witnessing.

Among the many currents of the intellectual opposition in the USSR I should like to mention the three most important: the movement for democratic and humanitarian socialism (the "liberal" Marxists); the movement for the spiritual renovation of society on the basis of religion; and all sorts of nationalistic movements. Of course, there still remain other kinds of intermediate currents and interests as, for instance, groups of Christian socialists. There are those champions of the Greek Orthodox Church who are for democratization; while there are others who would rather see Russia ruled authoritatively as before. Among nationalists there are some racist elements (who speak up, for instance, against mixed marriages). Apart from all these, still continuing the fight are such apolitical groups as "Amnesty" and the Committee of Human Rights headed by A.D. Sakharov. All these groups and trends have, of course, the right to exist. However, personally, I consider as the most important and the most promising in the Soviet conditions the movement for socialism "with a human face."

### On the 'Dialogue' of the Dissidents With the Ruling Hierarchy

A Western journalist asked me not long ago: "How is the

dialogue between the dissidents and the rulers developing at the present time?"

It seems to me that although the dissenters are scattered and not numerous, yet the Soviet hierarchy has to pay attention to them both in the internal and even the foreign policy of the country. This shows itself in its attitude towards such problems as the rehabilitation of Stalin, the emigration of Jews, Volga Germans, and some others.

However, we are very far indeed from a *dialogue* as this notion is usually understood in the West; such a dialogue simply does not exist. If a "dialogue" with the authorities occurs, then more often than not it takes the form of an *interrogation* to which practically every one of us is subjected from time to time either as a defendant or as a witness.

### Democratization and Public Opinion in the West

Soviet society is in need of many democratic reforms, and it is obvious that Western public opinion can provide quite important support for the movement for such reforms. At present, when as a result of administrative repression, Samizdat has shrunk considerably, it is precisely the Western media of mass communication which allow the views of various dissidents to become more clearly known to our own people. For a country like the Soviet Union, the influence of Western public opinion, including its left wing, will remain helpful; but it cannot have a decisive importance. The main, the substantial change can be achieved only by the country's internal forces. For us, it is important not only to have the support of Western public opinion but to create *Soviet public opinion* which, in truth, still does not exist or is only in the first stages of its awakening.

### Cooperation Between Governments and Democratization in the USSR

Of course, agreements between governments cannot by themselves lead directly to any political and economic reforms within the Soviet Union. Some bureaucratic methods can even be preserved by these methods, as our propaganda gives a great deal of publicity to such successes of the administration. However, a refusal to reach such agreements and to cooperate with our partners in the West could create an even worse situation of isolation and inadmissible pressure. This would play into the hands of the most reactionary elements in the Soviet leadership. In other words, in this respect there is no sensible alternative.

One should also consider that *in the somewhat longer run* many agreements on cooperation with other countries may become quite a weighty factor for change in the USSR, change which will depend on the extent of economic, technical, and cultural development of Soviet society. Apart from this, only the establishing of a wide and solid system of cooperation and of economic interdependence between East and West will increase the effectiveness of the influence of Western opinion on the political atmosphere in the USSR. The Chinese Academy of Sciences can protest as long as it wishes against the persecution of scientists-dissidents in the USSR. Nobody will pay the slightest attention to this. If our attitude to the protests of American scientists is

immeasurably more serious, this is due mainly to the fact that Soviet scientific establishments cooperate with the American ones on a series of important projects. And this cooperation is precisely the result of official agreements between the two governments.

#### **On the Pressure of the Soviet Union on Western Countries**

Economic sanctions as a method of pressure on the foreign or domestic policy of any country are, as we know, adopted as a system even by the United Nations Organization. The British government to this day applies sanctions against Rhodesia and the United States against Cuba. The European Economic Community applied economic pressure on the military-dictatorial régime in Greece. In 1973-74 the Arab countries quite effectively used oil as a weapon against the West.

In the past the Soviet Union too resorted quite often to this method, refusing, for instance, to trade with Spain, Portugal, Greece, the United Arab Republic, Israel, and later on, with Chile. In his time Khrushchev tried to exert economic pressure on China, recalling from there all of a sudden all economic advisers and specialists, which forced the Chinese to abandon work on many important projects. The advantages or disadvantages of economic sanctions always depend on the concrete situation: sometimes sanctions can indeed bring about the desired changes in the policy of a given country; but sometimes they only harden and preserve the existing reactionary régimes.

Of course, many-sided economic cooperation between the USSR and Western countries creates the possibility not only of Western pressure on the Soviet Union but also of pressure by the Soviet Union on Western countries. There is no doubt that in certain circumstances our country will resort to the same methods. This is quite often used as an argument against economic agreements with the USSR. I do not regard this argument as a decisive one. After all, economic cooperation and trade are practically always conducted on the basis of *reciprocity*. In other words, cooperation benefits not only the Soviet but also the Western economy. This is why one should, of course, reckon with the possibility of Soviet pressure on the West, but this should not, by any means, constitute a sufficient reason for refusing to enter into economic cooperation. However, it should be understood that even the most profitable commercial agreements between governments and private business should not stifle a critical approach from public opinion.

#### **The Strengthened International Situation of the USSR and the Weakened Position of the West**

If in the second half of the 1960s the international situation of the USSR was continually worsening, in the first five years of the present decade we are witnessing a contrary phenomenon: we see a gradual strengthening of the international position of the Soviet Union and of its influence abroad. This is a result not only of changes in many aspects of Soviet foreign policy which undoubtedly has become more flexible than it used to be (the so-called peace offensive of the USSR). The fact is that Western countries have suffered in the last few years a whole series of painful failures in their relations with the "third world," failures from which the Soviet Union was able to derive quite considerable advantages. Growing economic difficulties and internal contradictions between Western countries (for instance the conflict in Cyprus) also weaken the position of the West.

The Soviet Union was able to derive considerable advantages from the successes of the forces of the Left, which compensated by far for the Chilean defeat. However, one gets the impression that the most reactionary part of the Soviet leadership is interested in victories of Left and communist forces only in relatively small countries of the West which puts these countries into a state of economic and political dependence on the support of the Soviet bloc. This reactionary part of the Soviet leadership is not really

interested in (rather it fears) victories of Left forces in the major Western countries which might become an independent centre of attraction for democratic and left-wing movements. This became particularly noticeable last year during the Presidential campaign in France.

Anyhow, the weakening position of the West, and especially of Western Europe, which has occurred in recent years, should obviously serve as an additional stimulus for a movement of unification of Western European countries into a more tightly knit European economic and political community. In the last analysis, this process of unification is, from the socialist point of view, *progressive* regardless of the present capitalist forms of such unification. This is why I do not understand the attitude of those groups on the socialist Left which adopt an isolationist and nationalist position rather than an internationalist one. Until now the proletarian movements and proletarian organizations in Western Europe have shown much less ability to unite their forces than have all kinds of bourgeois-monopolistic organizations and groups.

The gradual process of unification of Western democratic countries not only creates better conditions for peaceful socialist transformation (for instance, by the enlargement of the nationalized sector of the economy), but constitutes also an important barrier against the development of reactionary political tendencies in the Soviet Union.

If today the Soviet Union is, in the first instance, in need of an enlargement of democratic rights, of freedom, and a series of democratic political reforms, then the West, because of the development of the economic crisis, is in need of sensibly devised social-economic changes. Today that much is understood also by many bourgeois economists (Galbraith and others). The unification of precisely these outwardly different trends can become the foundation on which a viable and flourishing community of nations can be built on our planet.

According to the old legend, the King of Gordium in Phrygia rode up to the temple in a carriage. An oracle declared that whosoever succeeded in untying the strangely entwined knot which bound the yoke to the pole should reign over all Asia. Alexander the Great, according to the story, simply cut the knot by a stroke of his sword. Political, economic, domestic, and other problems of big and small nations are now tied up into more complicated knots than the Gordian one; but nobody would now cut through the knot with the weapon of war. On the contrary, the main international problem consists in this that, under no conditions should the weapon of war be used. There is only one way: gradually, consistently, armed with patience and determination to untie one after another the knots of our contentious problems. In this the development of many-sided economic and cultural cooperation can be useful, not a return to confrontation and the cold war.

#### **Is the Soviet Leadership Capable of Making Changes?**

It is well known that the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism or of scientific communism justifies the use of force and the violation of many democratic rights only for the comparatively short period of the immediate revolutionary transformation of bourgeois society. But once socialism is victorious—and our propaganda maintains that we have already entered the period of "mature" socialism—full democracy and all the democratic rights of the individual must be guaranteed in a manner that should be incomparably better than this was possible under capitalism. Unfortunately, in this respect our performance still falls very far short of the requirements of our own ideological doctrine.

It is incorrect to ask, as Western correspondents in Moscow frequently do, "How far can Soviet communism go towards liberalization in the field of human rights without violating the requirements of Marxism-Leninism?" It would be more correct to

ask the question in a different way: "How capable is the Soviet leadership of introducing democratic reforms within the framework of socialist society and of getting rid of the various elements of pseudo-socialism and pseudo-communism?"

Even within socialist circles in the West many people imagine that there is complete uniformity within the Soviet establishment both as regards the Soviet system as well as its management which is said to operate without any "feed-back." This view is schematic and false. Of course, the Soviet establishment is united by a mass of material and other privileges which it holds on to tenaciously. But nevertheless it is not uniform, and it would be a mistake to think that our leaders do not realize what is going on "down below" among the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia. Their reaction to it is something else again.

Of course, because we have no free press or opposition, because political minorities are denied the right to free speech and free assembly, our country is deprived of many of the most important channels for "feed-back" and this weakens the influence of society on the policies of the leadership. But in one form or another "feed-back" exists in our system of government. And the leadership knows what is going on much better and more accurately than we, as ordinary Soviet citizens, do. We have no access to the official and secret information which includes an enormous amount of data which would not be considered secret in the West, beginning with the number of people killed and injured in industrial accidents and going on to the annual number of abortions performed on schoolgirls. As for the majority of shortcomings in Soviet life, including separate outbursts of mass dissatisfaction among workers in the provinces, the Soviet leadership is much better informed than the rank and file. We scientists, even though we specialize in social science, are no exception and our data about the processes going on in the country are too fragmentary and superficial.

With all their privileges the Soviet leadership is still subjected to quite a strong influence from below. By a whole variety of channels popular demands particularly in the economy penetrate to the very top, not to mention the growing tensions caused by economic competition with the capitalist countries. But all these influences from below and from abroad produce no single or uniform reaction in the leadership.

In the present leadership of the Central Committee of the CPSU there are nowadays no proponents of authoritarian government. Solzhenitsyn's worries for the rapid democratic changes demanded by Sakharov are completely groundless. One can clearly distinguish three main trends within the leadership.

The first of them is represented by a group of reactionaries, led apparently by Mikhail Suslov. They want a stiffening of internal policy. They are against any rapprochement or cooperation with their capitalist neighbours. In fact they would like to move backwards to a restoration of a slightly revamped form of Stalinism. In the ideological field typical representatives of this group are people like Trapeznikov and Yagodkin. Needless to say, a victory by this group in the inner-party struggle which has sharpened in recent months would have catastrophic consequences.

In the second group one can locate the more moderate politicians, whose main slogan over the last ten years has been "stability." Stability was what the Soviet establishment wanted. They were tired of the numerous changes and reforms of the Khrushchev era and were still quaking from the horrors of Stalin's terror, against which no one was secure. It was this that guaranteed the victory of the more moderate section of our leadership, Brezhnev, Andropov, Grechko, Gromyko, Kosygin, and Podgorny, over the Suslov group and the Shelepin and Semichastny group who were the main organizers of Khrushchev's dismissal.

It is impossible to deny that this group in the last five to six years has achieved certain successes, particularly in foreign

policy but less so internally. But progress in many fields, especially the economy, was too slow and the need for changes has grown so much that the slogan "stability" has now become a brake on our society's development. This has produced a significant strengthening of the so-called "technocrats" within the leadership. These are the comparatively younger leaders, who want to modernize the management of the economy and science, and would like closer links with the West and more tolerant internal policy. These people are without many of the prejudices and complexes of the older generation, and they are capable of bringing in reforms which, even if they will not change the basic face of our society, will open a wider road to progress and democracy.

There are nowadays quite a few of these people around Brezhnev, both among the leaders of the various union republics and area committees, and among the secretaries of the central committee and the ministers and their deputies. In the coming years and even months much probably depends on a possible alliance between these technocrats and the main representatives of the "moderate" group.

Precisely because we have no democratic system of leadership, the role of individual personalities is especially great even though this perhaps does not fully agree with Marxist doctrine. Every serious historian must be aware that if in 1917 the leader of the Bolsheviks had not been Lenin but Kamenev, as it was developing before Lenin's arrival from Switzerland, then the October Revolution would not have occurred, but instead there would have been a Constituent Assembly with a strong Bolshevik faction. If after Lenin the head of our party had not been Stalin but Bukharin, then there would not have been collectivization in the Stalinist form nor the terror of the Thirties and Forties. And if after Stalin's death Beria or Malenkov had emerged at the head of the party, there would have been no Twentieth Party Congress and no Twenty-Second Party Congress, nor that mass liberation of political prisoners about which even Solzhenitsyn writes as though it were the result of a "spiritual impulse" of Khrushchev's. So it is impossible to be indifferent about the possible changes in the Soviet leadership and think that détente will go on regardless of who becomes head of the CPSU and the USSR in the next few years.

#### **Liberalizing Emigration and the Prestige of the USSR**

I have often been asked recently "How can an intergovernmental plan for emigration from the USSR be worked out which will save Moscow's face?"

First of all, I think that even if the Soviet Union's frontiers were fully open, there would be no massive emigration; the capitalist countries themselves would not allow it. Unfortunately our authorities consider that any significant emigration from the country 57 years after the revolution would be "a loss of face." In his time Lenin said that considerations of prestige have no importance for the Soviet state and that when it comes to prestige issues "we are quite indifferent and ready to ridicule them" (*Collected Works* [5th ed.] Vol 45; page 239). This prediction however did not come true and the USSR like most other states remains highly sensitive to prestige issues. That is why the U.S. Congress and any other Western state institution has much less influence than Western public opinion.

When he produced his famous Amendment two years ago, Senator Jackson thought he would get from the USSR certain concessions towards freer emigration. But the Senator did not know how to maintain enough political tact and reasonable flexibility, as a result of which the USSR repudiated the 1972 trade agreement, even though it was very useful for both sides. As a result it was Jackson himself who lost face, all the more so since Jewish emigration is currently running at the same rate as in 1974. Senator Jackson thought he could prove his great influence over the Soviet Union as well as his personal influence in the



Senate. He forced the American and Soviet leaders to take account of his views. This was in itself a great achievement. But he then went on to make himself look like the old woman in Pushkin's story about the Fisherman and the Fish, and he ended up with a broken trough. The insulting remarks about me which Jackson made when he announced his candidacy for the Presidency (*New York Times*, 28 January 1975) only testifies to his short temper and inability to learn the lesson of a political failure.

#### The 'New' Emigration and the Democratic Movement in the USSR

Neither the wave of emigration from Russia before or after the Revolution, nor the so-called "non-returners" in 1945 and 1946, in spite of their size (each wave consisted of between two and three million people) had practically any effect on the life and development of Soviet society. Even simple correspondence with relatives was impossible for decades. Russian life, Russian organizations, and the Russian émigré press abroad were completely unknown to us. Only at the end of the 1960s when Soviet samizdat trickled out abroad did we learn of certain Russian journals and newspapers where these articles were reprinted and commented on.

It is quite different now with the present wave of Russian and Jewish emigration. A significant part of this emigration consists of people who are well known in the various circles of the Soviet intelligentsia. Many of them are people well-known in the West and for that reason their opinions, statements, and arguments are listened to with attention on both sides of the Soviet frontier. Only time will tell how far the new Russian emigration uses the advantages of its position.

So far we see that with all their differences of opinion, at times very sharp, most of the new émigrés continue to live for their motherland. Undoubtedly this allows the best representatives of the new emigration to make a contribution towards the development of the democratic movement in Russia, possibly an even bigger contribution than they could make when they were here.

#### About the Relations of the Dissidents in the Soviet Union to Solzhenitsyn

Today in all Soviet dissident circles, and indeed in the whole thinking section of the Soviet intelligentsia, people listen to Solzhenitsyn with attention and respect. *The Gulag Archipelago*, obviously, arouses the greatest interest. In spite of all the shortcomings of the author's conception, it will always remain the greatest testimony to the terrible tragedy our people lived through.

If however many dissidents now have a different attitude towards Solzhenitsyn, this is not because he now lives in Switzerland but mainly because of his own political and religious-political statements. The notorious "Letter to Soviet Leaders" which he published a year ago undoubtedly disappointed most dissidents. And many objections were called forth by his remarks in an interview in Zurich and Stockholm in November and December 1974 which only the Russian language journal *Russkaya Mysl* published in the West. And the collection of essays by Solzhenitsyn and Shafarevich, called *From Under the Rubbish Heap* produced a decisive protest by most readers among the dissidents. I must say with sorrow that in the recently published book in Paris, *The Calf Butted the Oak*, Solzhenitsyn distorted the picture of Tvardovsky, who is dear to me and to us all, not to mention his comments about other editors of *Novy Mir*. Solzhenitsyn also writes with insulting disdain about Sakharov. Besides this Solzhenitsyn reproduces in his book many private, even intimate conversations with Tvardovsky, Sakharov, and others. These conversations were never intended for publication and in many instances their contents have been distorted. Of course in the book Solzhenitsyn's artistic genius shines forth in all its brilliance. But when I read each new book or statement by Solzhenitsyn I frequently ask myself "Is he not one of those great

artistic people whose talent far surpasses his intellect?"

In the twentieth century Russia has given the world many geniuses. We have had not a few people who acted or wanted to act as prophets. But the conjunction of the powers of a genius, strength of will, and the complex of a prophet have only come together three times in the last hundred years: with Tolstoy, Lenin, and Solzhenitsyn. But it is clear that the main thing for Solzhenitsyn remains his work as a writer and not his political activity. As a writer Solzhenitsyn will always be one of the very greatest of Russians. But as a prophet he will have far fewer followers than Tolstoy.

#### From Under the Rubbish Heap

I personally cannot but welcome the rebirth of a free Russian press of various tendencies, even though it is published abroad. How regrettable, however, that the free expression of thought by authors published outside the Soviet Union is not accompanied by a deepening of thought; that the inquiry into the most important problems is conducted on such low levels that any serious debate is impossible; the lack of tolerance of differing viewpoints comes again to the fore, together with narrow-mindedness and dogmatism, which in the last analysis are analogous to a "party line" of the worst kind though with a new content. Solzhenitsyn, for instance, writes in his first essay: "For decades during which we were silent our thoughts straggled off in a hundred different directions, never hailing each other, and so failing to get to know each other, and so never to correct each other. The shackles which constrained our thoughts maimed all of us, leaving hardly any brains undamaged . . . and now, even when minds that are strong and brave try to stand up straight, throwing off that pile of crazy rubbish, they still bear the marks that were branded upon them, still suffer from the crookedness of those lasts on to which they were forced when immature—and owing to their intellectual isolation from one another, they cannot test their ideas against anybody else." (*From Under the Rubbish Heap*, p. 8, Paris 1974.)

There is a great deal of truth in this. But why is this description directed first and foremost against A.D. Sakharov, when it is precisely Solzhenitsyn himself and his coauthors who suffer from one-sidedness, from a tendentious subjectivity imprinted on their minds?

In the first essay of the volume, Solzhenitsyn, pronouncing on the "deadly sins" allegedly committed by political democracy in recent years in the West, advocates the reintroduction in Russia of an authoritarian-theocratic regime, of the *non-party* or *partyless* (Solzhenitsyn's italics) rule of a "spiritual elite," and adds that "the ways and principles of creating such an elite and of its functioning can have very little in common with contemporary democracy" (p. 23). But is it not clear that such a regime will be nothing but a dictatorship, precisely a dictatorship of the least influential *party* of our society?

The authors of the essays, contained in *From Under the Rubbish Heap*, especially Solzhenitsyn and Shafarevich, not only do not accept socialism and the socialist idea—they are full of hatred of socialism and are unscrupulous in the mode of their struggle against their opponents. The almanac *The Twentieth Century* already contained some essays criticizing the religious-ethical projects of Solzhenitsyn, Shafarevich, and their coauthors. As to their socio-political and economic pronouncements, there is simply no basis for scientific debate. For example, I. Shafarevich, criticizing Marxism, devotes a great deal of attention to the fabrication according to which Marx and Engels defended . . . the common possession of wives as an important socialist idea. It may be worth mentioning that in his article on principles of Communism Engels, answering the "lamentations of the highly moral burghers about the common ownership of wives under communism," wrote: "Community of wives is a peculiarity of bourgeois society; it is brought to its highest point of perfection by

the community of women called prostitution. Prostitution is rooted in private ownership: destroy the latter and prostitution disappears. Far from inaugurating an era of the common ownership of women, a communist organization of society puts an end to such a condition of things." (K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 336, London 1930.) In other, later writings (*The Origin of Family, Private Property, and the State*) Engels again showed how in socialist society the family would become more healthy and more stable than it had been under capitalism, and devoted quite a few pages to this. How can there be any basis for a discussion with Shafarevich!

Both Solzhenitsyn and Shafarevich are trying to maintain (without however adducing any proof) that in bourgeois countries "from the beginnings of industrial production," capitalists do not exploit workers, but, on the contrary, the workers, as a result of successful strike action, "are receiving an increasing part of the product which they do not produce." (Underlined by Solzhenitsyn, p. 10.) In other words, the workers exploit the engineers, the scientists, and the very capitalist-managers of the enterprises. How can there be a basis for any serious debate here!

Objecting to the socialist principle of equality, Shafarevich does not quote the famous words of Marx and Engels on how, after the victory of socialism "in place of the old bourgeois society with its classes and class antagonisms, there will arise an association [of free producers] in which the free development of each will become the free development of all." Shafarevich does quote, however, the crazy reasonings of one of the characters from Dostoyevsky's *The Possessed* about the destruction, under socialism, of all genius, all talent, about the lowering of the level of education, and so on, and so forth. How can there be any basis for a scientific discussion here!

In his preparatory work for *The Holy Family*, Marx took a number of excerpts from the writings of his opponents and his precursors in the camp of the so-called petty-bourgeois, bourgeois, and feudal socialism. Copying these excerpts from Marx's notebooks, Shafarevich names Marx himself as "the author of these brilliant thoughts." How can there be here any basis for polemic!

Referring to some rather controversial ideas of Freud on the death instinct which allegedly dwells in every one of us, and also quoting a song popular during the first years of the Soviet régime, "We shall courageously fight for the power of the Soviets, and as one shall die," Shafarevich at last comes to his main theme: "Life fully permeated by socialist ideals must lead to the universal result: the dying off of the whole of humanity, its death." (p. 66) And further: "To the imminent forces influencing the course of history belongs the yearning for self-destruction, the death instinct of humanity." And it is precisely "socialism, which takes possession and subordinates to itself millions of people, which constitutes this movement and its ideal goal: the death of humanity." (pp. 69-70, Shafarevich's italics).

It makes no sense to argue against such statements and prophecies, because they are not rooted in the logic of scientific analysis but in the emotions. In his article Shafarevich maintains that socialism not only threatens the very existence of humanity, but also paralyses its most hopeful weapon, namely the mind. But we see that his own mind is already paralysed to a considerable degree not by socialism, but by his blinding hatred of this one tenet which in truly scientific form can save humanity from many dangers really threatening it.

## Kontinent

In principle we can only welcome the appearance of *Kontinent*, a new journal which widens the margin of free discussion about contemporary topical problems. In any case, I have read with interest the two copies of the journal, though I do not share its ideological platform. However, on reading *Kontinent* one becomes

clearly aware that the journal is addressing itself in the main not to the East but to the West, and that its principal task is to turn Western intelligentsia and youth against Marxism and socialism. It is quite clear that the aim of the founders of the new journal was to supply anti-communist and anti-Marxist western ideologues and publicists with new squads of professional writers and publicists from the USSR and Eastern Europe who as eyewitnesses, so to say at "firsthand," unmask not only certain perverted forms or "models" of socialism, but socialism and communism in general. It was therefore perfectly natural and logical for Maximov to turn for support to the Springer concern. The claims made by Ionesco about the creation by *Kontinent* of a new Left ideology of which the West is allegedly in great need, are simply ridiculous and absurd. It was certainly not for the benefit of the Left that the new journal was founded. Its Editor Vladimir Maximov not so long ago was still a close collaborator and protege of V. Kochetov, for years the leader of the Stalinists in matters of literature.

I am convinced that the Western Left, including Marxists, have enough opportunity to reply to the challenge of *Kontinent*. A discussion would certainly help in clarifying many important points.

As far as the artistic side of *Kontinent* goes, there still remains a lot to be desired. The novel by V. Kornilov "Without Hands, Without Legs" was written some ten years ago and is not the best of his prose works. V. Maramzin's "The Story of Ivan Petrovich's Wedding" did not seem interesting to me. N. Korzhavin's "Essay in Poetical Autobiography" has been circulating a long time in typescript in the Soviet Union, but has not proved a great success in Samizdat.

The article by A. Sinyavsky "The Literary Process in Russia" is too superficial, though it contains some important reflections. The Memoirs of Cardinal Mindszenty, published earlier in the West, have not aroused the interest of the Soviet readers of *Kontinent*. To me the most serious article seemed to be that by L. Kolakowski "Three Main Strands in Marxism" and D. Anin's "Is Bukharin Topical?" These writings at least permit a discussion with the authors on a sufficiently high professional level which, unfortunately, cannot be said about the obdurate essay by Solzhenitsyn on "Sakharov and the Letter to the Leaders" (no. 2).

However, the worst material in *Kontinent* comes from the pen of its Editor-in-Chief, Vladimir Maximov. And it is not a question of his views or of his attitude, but of his conscious falsification of well-known historical facts. Already in the first editorial of the first copy of *Kontinent*, Maximov wrote that "in the dark epoch of reactionary Tsarism there came into being in Russia, and there developed without hindrance, one of the greatest literatures of mankind. In these times of 'slavery' nobody . . . had to look for a publisher abroad. All authors of some prominence, we are underlining all, were published in their country." (*Kontinent*, no. 1, p. 3). But all this is obviously misinforming the Western reader. Wasn't Radishchev exiled to Siberia for his *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*? Wasn't it from his suicide that our XIX century literature began? And the destruction of Rileyev, the exile of Kukhelbekker, the deportation of Shevchenko, of Chernyshevsky, the forced labour of Dostoyevsky, were they not the result of "political considerations"? And was Griboyedov's *Tis Folly to Be Wise* published during the lifetime of its author? Wasn't one-third of Pushkin's poems secretly circulated in manuscript till the author's death? Can one explain the suicidal death of Pushkin and Lermontov in duels by private reasons only? And the emigration of Herzen and Ogarev, and the whole epos of the *Polar Star* and *The Bell*? And the death of Polezhaev? Not long ago the libraries of Moscow and Leningrad made a list of those many hundreds of artistic works by Russian writers which were banned by the censorship of the XIX century and could only appear abroad. Not a few of Tolstoy's writings circulated secretly in manuscript and first saw the light of day in Europe.

In No. 2 of *Kontinent*, in the "Editor's Column," Maximov writes, addressing himself to Left-wing groups in the West: "Certain circles—with a flourish worthy of a better cause—have recently provoked a hysteria about repressions in Chile (two thousand prisoners!). . . . What would these zealots of freedom and humanitarianism say, for whom and in the name of what will they stir up the whole world now, when all, we repeat all, political prisoners in Chile have already been released." (No. 2, pp. 468-469) The clamour and insistence with which Maximov repeats this well-known lie is indeed worthy of a better cause. Of course, the defence of Soviet writers and Soviet dissenters against political repression (it is with this that Maximov begins his Editor's Column) is an important and noble action. But why should one at the same time minimize or even justify inhuman repressions in Chile and in some other countries of Western Europe? Such deliberate bad faith can in no way benefit *Kontinent*; it will only repel prospective contributors-oppositionists from both inside the USSR and outside it. This makes me think that with an editor like Maximov the failure of the journal is unavoidable.

### Against the New Messianism

Of course, the experience of Russia and the USSR is very great and other countries must take account of it. In addition that experience was gained at too high a price. But it is in no way Universal, and we are the ones who must make it primarily our own, here in our own country. And if it is right to reject the view that the solution of Soviet problems can come from outside as a result of foreign pressure, then it is even more necessary to give a decisive rejection to the attempt to revive a new form of Russian messianism: that is the view put out by some groups of Russian dissidents who say that only Russia because of all its suffering in the twentieth century can show the world the true way. On the jacket of the first issue of *Kontinent* there appear Solzhenitsyn's words that "the intellectuals of Eastern Europe speak with the combined voice of suffering and knowledge" and that Western Europe will soon meet its own sorrow "if its ear remains indifferent." But has not Western Europe in the twentieth century gone through the terrible experiences of two world wars, several revolutions, the fascist "New Order" with its totalitarianism, its genocide and its gas chambers, and the experience of several bloody colonial wars? Why cannot Europe find the solution to its own problems, without repeating Russia's mistakes?

How much of this self-confident messianism appears in Shafarevich's articles? "Russia's way of resurrection is the one on which mankind can find the way out of the impasse, find salvation from the mad race of industrial society, the cult of power, and the gloom of unbelief. We are *the first* to have reached the point where *the uniqueness* of this way can be seen. It is up to us to set off along it and *show it to others*. . . . The past half century has enriched us with an experience *which no other country in the world has had*. . . . Russia's position is this: it has gone through death and can hear the voice of God" (*From Under the Rubbish Heap*, pages 275-6. My underlining—RM). These attempts by Shafarevich, Maximov, and Solzhenitsyn to set themselves up as mankind's teachers seem bound to fail.

### One Should Not Ignore the Real Situation

How do Shafarevich, Solzhenitsyn, and their sympathizers propose to solve our difficult problems and cure society's social ills?

"The way to freedom," Shafarevich writes, "begins inside ourselves, by stopping the climb up the ladder of careerism and the search for material well-being" (*From Under the Rubbish Heap*, page 269). Any Marxist revolutionary can agree with this. The question is *why* should a person give up his material well-being. Shafarevich believes you should do this not for the sake of

art or literature or scientific knowledge, because even without all the millions of experts and expensive laboratories it is possible to get to know "the divine beauty of nature" and the "divine design." Solzhenitsyn and Shafarevich maintain that society's social ills can only be healed by religion, that only Orthodoxy can lead the way to freedom, and that only thanks to the Church should one make sacrifices. "One must not forget," Shafarevich writes, "that sphere of culture which can be more important than all others for a nation's healthy existence—religion. . . . Probably here is the key to the question: Russia's life, death, or resurrection depends on the efforts made in this field. This is our people's most important field of activity and it demands hundreds of thousands of heads and hands. Let us remember that before the Revolution Russia had 300,000 priests. And of course the only people who can work on this today are those that have renounced the system of values which life offers them now" (*From Under the Rubbish Heap*, pages 271-2).

Remembering that the collection *Landmarks*, whose spiritual descendants the authors of *From Under the Rubbish Heap* call themselves, was repudiated by the entire Russian intelligentsia from the Cadets to the Bolsheviks, Solzhenitsyn does not expect the present generation of the Russian intelligentsia to be more condescending towards *From Under the Rubbish Heap*. So in advance he calls our entire intelligentsia despicable, stupid, cowardly, soulless, and sunk in the worries of the petty bourgeoisie. It is not an intelligentsia but only "a superficially educated group." The "central" version of this group is how he describes the Moscow intelligentsia for whom Solzhenitsyn has a special hostility. In spite of its great material privileges and high level of information it continues to cringe before the authorities, he says. Solzhenitsyn sees no hope for a resurrection of Russia in this intelligentsia, but only a few small groups of religious young people, round which the shape of new structures may begin to form as though round tiny crystals. All these views are nothing but Utopian.

Of course, our intelligentsia has many faults, but also many achievements to its credit which the intelligentsia at the turn of the century did not and could not have. It consists of not only the leading section of our society but a rapidly growing and influential one. Without its active participation no serious changes in Soviet society are possible. But in order to arouse it to action, you have to start from its real position, its real interests and its present view of things.

Expressing his hope for miraculous changes in social awareness, Shafarevich recalls "the unknown monk Luther" who "took up the fight against the mightiest power in the world of that time, and apparently went against all social and historic laws." (*From Under the Rubbish Heap*, page 263.)

But no. Luther did not act against all social and historic laws. His fight four hundred years ago was not against the church and religion, but for reforms within the existing Christian church, for a renewal of its rotten structures and against the disgraceful practice of selling indulgences. Already the vast majority of German society of that time was ready to accept Luther's ideas, and precisely because of this Luther's popularity and influence grew unexpectedly rapidly even within the aristocracy. But Russia at the end of the 20th century is not Germany in the 16th century and our people remain for the most part indifferent to the religious preaching of Shafarevich and Solzhenitsyn, just as the burghers, peasants, and princes of 16th century Germany were indifferent or even hostile to the preaching of the atheists. The only chance of success with our intelligentsia or the working class lies with preaching that is based on the demand for reform, and not on the rejection of socialist society. No one can turn Russia or Europe back to the 16th century.

April 1975  
Roy Medvedev

(Translated by Tamara Deutscher)

## An Interview With Admiral Rosa Coutinho

[Adm. Rosa Coutinho, a representative in the Conselho da Revolução of the navy, the branch of the Portuguese armed forces where the radicalization of the ranks has gone furthest, first gained international notice in the period before the April 25 elections. In an interview with the French publication *Libération*, he said that it might be necessary to form a political arm of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA—Armed Forces Movement). Such an MFA-party, he said, should be a “truly socialist” party, should group together all the major parties that support the MFA, and should “stand somewhere between the Communist party and the Socialist party.”

[In an interview after the elections in the Brazilian magazine *Veja*, he explained that it was only a “coalition” he had in mind. However, he has remained the center of speculations about the MFA forming political structures directly subordinate to it.

[Coutinho also presides over the committee charged with liquidating the political police apparatus of the old regime. He was one of the most outspoken in the MFA in minimizing the importance of the April 25 elections. After the crisis broke out over the shutting down of *República*, he accused the Socialist party of “betraying the country” by raising an international protest over the incident.

[The following interview, obtained by Alain Krivine, appeared in the May 16 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

*Question. What is the MFA's political role in Portugal, and what are its proposals?*

*Answer.* The major political problem that exists in this country is the political vacuum created by the Socialist party's links with the Scandinavian and German Social Democrats. Because of this we lack a real Socialist party. The sterile struggle now taking place between the existing parties cannot continue. The MFA's role is to help overcome this vacuum.

It is true that at first we did not have a socialist perspective. The MFA was more intention than ideology, and our common concern was to end the colonial wars as quickly as possible. But when we began decolonizing the African territories we became aware that it was also necessary to carry out our own decolonization in Portugal, and so we have opted for a socialist solution.

*Q. You intend to set up a civilian party. Can it be defined ideologically, and what would be its components?*

A. It's true that our ideology is undefined. Nevertheless, it might be possible to have an electoral coalition of all the parties that claim to be for socialism and to be part of the working class. It could include the Socialist party, if it is no longer Social Democratic (this is an obsession of mine), the FSP,<sup>1</sup> the MDP,<sup>2</sup> the PC,<sup>3</sup> and the MES.<sup>4</sup> Thus it would be a coalition, or a front, or a socialist alliance. It would be good if each political party could defend its own program within this coalition, making it possible to have a debate throughout the country. I would like to see some rivalry among the parties in the factories and in the fields, with the people being able to choose the form of socialism most suitable for Portugal at its present stage of development, in the light of results in practice.

*Q. So you favor a very broad debate among the workers?*

A. Yes, a very broad debate, because the parties must debate, not fight each other. You spoke to me of a popular assembly made up of delegates from committees. That's worth considering, but there is no one model of democracy. At first, we might have a European-style democracy, but after four years that might change.

*Q. Today everyone is talking about socialism in Portugal, and some nationalizations have been carried out. But up to now foreign interests have not been touched and the question of compensation has not been raised.*

A. The multinational firms operating in our country are not very typical. We experienced a kind of colonization different from what occurred in Europe. Here the big companies plundered raw materials and exported manufactured goods. The only thing we got out of it was very low wages for the working class. Even the surplus value was exported, somewhat like Formosa. But we have already gone after the companies like Champalimaud. With respect to nationalizations of foreign companies, we will carry on bilateral negotiations. As to compensation for nationalized Portu-

1. Frente Socialista Popular—Socialist People's Front.

2. Movimento Democrático Português—Portuguese Democratic Movement.

3. Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party.

4. Movimento da Esquerda Socialista—Movement of the Socialist Left.

guese companies, we in fact intend to compensate them, but over an extended period. We can wait. . . .

*Q. In many companies, the workers are demanding workers control and raising questions about management. What is your position on this question?*

A. For us, workers control is something fundamental, but at the present stage we think that the workers should control, rather than manage. The workers must have control over investment decisions and the pace of work—we think that once that happens socialism has already begun. But we do not yet know what type of socialism we are going to build in Portugal. It will have to be adapted to the Portuguese situation through a permanent dialogue between the MFA and the workers.

*Q. In Portugal today there are workers committees, fishermen's committees, village committees, and so on. What do you think of a proposal to centralize all these committees nationally so as to build a power base for the workers?*

A. We support all these committees, because any form of direct participation of the workers should be encouraged; they are the ones who must be able to choose the type of socialism to be built. But it is impossible to say at this time that this form is the best one. We must try experiments and see which ones work in practice. Then we can think about giving legal form to the initiatives you're talking about, if they turn out to be successful. In agriculture, for example, we are open to the idea of cooperatives; but we don't want any kol-khozes [collective farms] Let me repeat: In making our decisions, we will always take into account the workers' reactions.

*Q. The MFA is certainly very popular throughout the country, but it includes only a minority of soldiers. What do you think of a democratic organization that would represent all the soldiers?*

A. That can be considered later, but for the time being it would be very dangerous. It would give rise to a class division within the MFA, between the rank-and-file soldiers and the officers. We prefer to have a vertical MFA. What's more, if there were elections in the army we would lose, because of the political backwardness of part of the country, a little like what happened in the civilian elections. Of course, the MFA is more to the left than the rest of the army. It is like the yeast in the bread. But you can't make bread without yeast, any more than you can make bread with yeast alone.

*Q. Everyone has in mind the example of Chile and the possibility of a coup. In that situation would you refuse to arm the workers, as Allende did?*

A. A coup today would have much less chance of succeeding, and I can assure you that as far as we are concerned, we will not hesitate one second to arm the workers. On March 11, I was in the arsenal at Alfeite and there I could count on the 3,000 workers who would have been armed if necessary. We are not going to lose this struggle without the people. On September 28 when the rumor of a coup went the rounds, the left went underground. But on March 11 it came into the streets and went on the offensive, and that's why the coup lasted only two hours. It was thanks to the popular upsurge that Spínola was driven from the Tancos base. If the people lose confidence we are lost. Today the biggest battle is the battle for economic survival.

*Q. What do you think of the wage demands put forward by the workers, especially in the private companies?*

A. This is an important question. Some of those demands are demagogic and could result in the company going bankrupt. As for the nationalizations, we are not going to continue them forever, for one simple reason: we lack capable managers. The workers will be capable of managing their companies in three or four years. Today, with some exceptions, that is impossible.

*Q. Do you think it is possible to build a socialist society with a bourgeois party like the PPD<sup>5</sup> participating in the government?*

A. No, but we must hope for a change. There are cadres inside the PPD and the SP who are more advanced than the ranks, who are backward, and it is these cadres who must be supported. At the governmental level the continuation of the coalition will depend on the result of the legislative elections. If we have a socialist coalition with more than 50 percent of the votes, then we will have no more problems.

In any case we have taken precautions, and the High Council of the Revolution will always be there with the right to dissolve the assembly. We could take power, but we prefer that the parties play their role and that socialism continues to make its way in the ranks. But this depends very much on the evolution of the SP. In this country there have always been attempts to exploit primitive anti-Communism. But in our opinion the PC has always been loyal and doesn't pose any problem for us.

5. Partido Popular Democrático—Democratic People's party.

*Q. Why has China not recognized Portugal?*

A. The People's Republic of China has a pragmatic international policy with no



Vida Mundial

ADMIRAL ROSA COUTINHO

relationship to the ideology it upholds. We have no problem with China about Macao. If it has not recognized Portugal, it is to differentiate itself from the Soviet Union.

*Q. Can the MFA remain neutral toward what is happening in its former colonies?*

A. It is difficult to intervene, especially in Angola. But it is true that we need to exert international pressure on Zaïre so that Angola can really be decolonized. We don't want to have delivered it from white fascism only to see it fall into the hands of black fascism. In the other former colonies, it was much easier.

*Q. You have taken repressive measures against the Maoists. Don't you think that could create a precedent against all those who claim to be socialist yet are critical of the MFA's policies?*

A. We have moved only against some organizations, although there are many others that continue to carry on negative propaganda. It is not a question of banning groups that criticize the MFA, but the MRPP<sup>6</sup> is a puppet group with a base

6. Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party.

among bourgeois students. These students are not working and have no workers in their ranks. There may be idealists among them with an ideology leaning more or less toward anarchism, but this group is infiltrated. They have a lot of money.

I should also say that if I were a reactionary military officer, I would attack from the left. The youth must understand our revolution and give it their support. Not the degenerate youth of the MRPP, but the working youth in the fields and the factories.

*Q. Don't you think that the revolutionary crisis that will explode in Spain with the fall of Franco will have repercussions on the revolutionary process in Portugal?*

A. Absolutely. For us, everything that happens in Spain is very important. □

### Britain's Inflation Hits Record 25%

Britain announced June 13 that its annual rate of inflation had risen to a record 25 percent in May, the highest of any industrialized country. Between April and May the retail price index rose 4.2 percent. If this rate continues it will mean an annual inflation rate of more than 50 percent.

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# German Trotskyists Hold National Congress

[The following article appeared in the April 16 issue of *Was Tun*, fortnightly newspaper of the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (GIM—International Marxist Group, German section of the Fourth International). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

The National Conference of the GIM took place in Frankfurt March 7 to 9 and April 6. One hundred seventy delegates were present, representing more than fifty local branches and supporter groups in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin, as well as sixty guest delegates.

The conference gave a special salute to comrade Georg Jungclas, who has been active for more than fifty years in the German and international working-class movement. Among other things, he took part in the Hamburg uprising of 1921 and was a member of the KPD [Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands—Communist party of Germany], the Leninbund,\* and since 1926, of the Left Opposition and later of the Fourth International.

Comrade Charles Udry brought fraternal greetings from the United Secretariat [of the Fourth International]. He spoke about the international development of the class struggle, especially on the Iberian Peninsula (Portugal, Spain), where the sections of the Fourth International are in the front lines of the struggle and are gaining valuable experience.

Greetings were conveyed from sections in many countries. Appearing personally were representatives of the sections in Mexico, Switzerland, Austria, England, and Greece, and observers from the United States.

A special salute was given to Pierre Frank, a longtime participant in the international workers movement who was formerly a secretary of Comrade Trotsky. He gave greetings from the French Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire [Revolutionary Communist League, French section of the Fourth International]. A salute was also

\* The Leninbund was the organization founded by Ruth Fischer, Arkadi Maslow, and Hugo Urbahns after their expulsion from the German Communist party in 1927. Until 1930 the Leninbund took positions close to those of the International Left Opposition, led by Leon Trotsky.

Documents discussed at 1974 Tenth World Congress of Fourth International. 128 pages, 8½ x 11, \$2.50

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given to Comrade Luis Vitale, a member of the Chilean section who was imprisoned in a concentration camp in Chile until the end of last year.

The conference was preceded by a discussion period of over three months. More than 100 written contributions appeared in nineteen internal discussion bulletins that served as the basis for the local discussions. Since before the 1974 conference, three tendencies have existed in the GIM, presenting their positions within the organization and thereby exercising a right guaranteed by the principles of our movement, which provide for the greatest possible democracy in internal organizational life along with unity in action in external work.

These tendencies are the Internationalist Tendency (IT), which has held the majority on the Central Committee since the 1974 conference and supports the majority leadership of the Fourth International; the Compass Tendency (KT), the second-largest tendency; and a third, small tendency, the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency (LTT), which supports the minority tendency in the Fourth International.

A separate organized political position arose on one agenda point. The basic documents of the three tendencies will be published in special issue No. 4 of the *Internationale* [quarterly magazine of the German Trotskyists]; the resolution of the 1975 National Conference appears below.

The central points of discussion were, first, the character of the SPD [Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—Social Democratic party of Germany] and the policy and election tactics to be taken toward it; and second, the analysis of the present conjuncture in the class struggle, and the perspectives and tasks for revolutionary Marxists. On these central issues, the three tendencies in the National Conference submitted resolutions for a vote. In the poll on the basic character of the SPD, the IT document received 85 votes in favor (77 against); the KT document, 77 in favor (85 against); and the LTT document, 18 in favor and 100 against.

In the vote on the political resolution, on the basis of which the new leadership body was to be elected, none of the tendencies received a majority; it was decided that the IT had the relatively strongest support.

The election of the new Central Committee was accompanied by a vote on a separate resolution that stressed the need for active collaboration among all tendencies in the leadership bodies and for building a collective leadership. After this resolution was accepted, the new leadership was elected unanimously. At the close of the conference, the delegates passed a message

of solidarity with the cement workers of Erwitte, who have been occupying their factory for three weeks.

\* \* \*

## Resolution of the National Congress

### I.

In the vote on the political resolution at the 1975 National Conference, none of the three tendencies in the GIM were able to win a majority. For a democratic-centralist organization, this is a situation as difficult as it is unusual. It means that no tendency has a mandate to lead the organization on behalf of a majority of the membership.

The National Conference asserts that in this situation it is all the more important to build up a multitendency collective leadership. To that end it is especially necessary that the two largest tendencies, which are almost equal in size, play an important part in the work of the leadership.

To give the new Central Committee an underpinning for such collaboration in the leadership, and at the same time to allow this body to operate with a clear majority, the National Conference has decided:

1. To adopt the sixteen-point agreement worked out in the "parity commission" for the National Conference.

2. To give an absolute majority in the new Central Committee to the IT, as the tendency with the highest number of delegate votes. The political resolution of the IT, as the document of the new Central Committee majority, therefore constitutes the public general line of the GIM.

The concrete line of the GIM on all remaining questions will be determined by decisions of the leadership bodies in accordance with the sixteen-point agreement.

### II.

#### 1. Factory and Trade-Union Work

In accordance with the priority given by our organization to work in the factories and trade unions, a correspondingly large proportion of the resources of the organization (in terms of personnel, materials, and finances) will be allotted for this work. This means:

a. At least three full- or half-timers from the central staff will be assigned on a priority basis to this work.

b. The Central Committee should reconstitute the factory/union commission and make every effort to keep the work of this commission functioning continuously and effectively.

c. Beginnings that have already been made toward work in the factories and unions will be promoted and supported materially and with personnel. The concrete

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form of this support—as well as of opening up new bridgeheads, and the question of placing cadres in factories—will be decided in the framework of the factory/union commission and the leadership bodies.

d. Comrades of the KT will play an active role in the bodies referred to in points a and b.

## 2. Work With Immigrants

The problems and the struggle of foreign workers takes on a special meaning today. Our work with immigrants is guided by the need for developing broad mobilizations and for organizing support for the foreign workers. To further this work the Central Committee will set up a commission, whose task will be to direct the establishment of systematic activity in this area.

## 3. Central Committee Commissions

There is agreement that other Central Committee commissions should be set up, such as, for example, on antimilitarist work, work with women, high-school work (possibly work among apprentices), and international solidarity work. Decisions on this will be made by the new Central Committee.

All tendencies in the GIM will participate actively in these commissions to the extent they are able.

All Central Committee commissions are subordinate to the Central Committee. Important questions will as a rule be brought from the commissions to the Central Committee and be submitted there for decision. In this framework of the GIM leadership having overall responsibility, the commissions will be given the necessary authority to carry out effectively their work in the organization.

## 4. Education

The leadership must immediately take up the task of organizing and directing national, regional, and local schools. A central element of this work in the next period must be to improve the membership's concrete understanding of the current struggle of the working class and the conditions under which it is taking place.

There was further agreement: (a) that it is important to establish regularity in the program of basic education in the local areas and to promote the development of a staff of "middle cadres"; and (b) to hold central, or centrally planned, schools on factory and trade-union activity, thereby acquainting as many comrades of the GIM as possible with the essentials of work in this area.

## 5. Initiating Mobilizations

The GIM's strategic goal is to mobilize

the working class and all oppressed sectors of the population; it has the task of translating this into practical steps toward mobilizing those who are directly or indirectly affected by the problems and struggles arising today around these specific focuses.

Most important in the present situation are mobilizations against unemployment, factory closings, wage cuts, youth unemployment and exploitative apprenticeship programs; the fight against Paragraph 218 [the statute outlawing abortion]; and mass struggles such as the one taking place now in Wyhl.

In addition there is agreement that the GIM has the task (and not least importantly because of its responsibility as a section of the Fourth International) to take the initiative in building mobilizations around important questions of the international class struggle and international class solidarity, even if it is not possible at the beginning to mobilize large masses.

## 6. Struggle Against Repression

The struggle against repression and in defense of democratic rights is an important starting point for mobilizing sections of the populace, in addition to the importance it has for defending the rights of the organization.

Thus the struggle against specific repressive measures hitting sections of the working class takes on the greatest significance.

## 7. Regroupment Process

The process of regroupment among the socialist organizations can be an important means for winning new forces to our program and to the Fourth International, and thus for advancing the work of building the party.

The GIM will therefore seize any opportunities for discussion and debate and will strive to take the initiative in such activities with other organizations with whom we share points of general programmatic agreement.

The GIM also considers it important to try to establish collaboration in practical activities.

## 8. 'Was Tun'

*Was Tun* is a key tool for building the organization, and should thus focus on the themes the leadership bodies have singled out as the central political questions. At the same time, it should take account of the points spelled out in this document, giving concrete direction and support to this work, as well as to the specific experiences in the various arenas of activity, regions, and groups. The GIM will strive to constantly improve the vital interchange between the editors and all regions and arenas of work

represented in the organization.

In terms of work in the factories and in the unions, this means making the newspaper more functional (choice of major themes, strengthening of concrete local coverage, campaigning around the key issues in important struggles, and so forth).

A *Was Tun* editorial board will be established in which all three tendencies will be represented. A comrade chosen by the Political Bureau will be responsible to this body for *Was Tun*. The Political Bureau will discuss as it considers necessary the themes to be taken up and the articles to be published in *Was Tun*, but in this it must take into consideration the demands of a regular publication schedule.

The Central Committee and Political Bureau are making every effort to assure that the local groups contribute regularly to *Was Tun* and increase their sales of the paper.

A changeover of *Was Tun* to weekly publication will be preceded by a full discussion in the organization as a whole on the experiences we have gained. To allow sufficient time for thorough preparation and discussion in the organization, the earliest date that could be set for the changeover is October 1975.

## 9. Regional Areas

In carrying out the line of the organization in the framework of national decisions, the regional bodies must be able to act with authority in their areas. It is necessary to strengthen our capacity for work at the regional level by reinforcing the regional leaderships, secretarial staffs, and offices, and by increasing correspondingly, insofar as the possibilities permit, the resources allotted to support this work. This involves regional supplements to *Was Tun*, perhaps regional factory newspapers or other such forms, where conditions allow.

## 10. Central Committee

The composition of the new Central Committee is as follows: 30 full members, comprising 16 representatives from the IT, 12 from the KT, and 2 from the LTT; 15 alternate members, comprising 7 from the IT, 6 from the KT, and 2 from the LTT.

Selection of representatives and their ranking will be determined by each tendency and proposed to the National Conference.

It is up to the central office to ensure that the Central Committee can perform its function as a political leadership to the fullest extent. The methods of informing members of meetings and the accommodations provided for the Central Committee sessions, mailing of material, and so forth, must assure the optimum performance of the Central Committee. For all Central Committee meetings, written contributions

must be sent in at least one week in advance (except in the case of events that may occur in the week prior to the Central Committee plenum).

#### 11. Political Bureau

To promote the integrated functioning of the GIM, the KT, as the largest minority, will be given about one-third of the seats on the Political Bureau. Representatives of this tendency will be assigned to the central staff of the GIM and will participate in areas of national leadership work on the basis of agreements to be reached in the Central Committee.

In accordance with the principles of collective leadership, all remaining questions are open for full discussion in the Political Bureau and will be decided on the basis of this discussion. This does not mean any infringement of the right of tendencies to hold their own discussions and arrive at their own opinions. Within the framework of responsibility and of the decisions of the National Conference, the Central Committee, and the Political Bureau, the members of the leadership who are assigned specific tasks have the authority of the leadership for this work.

#### 12. National Conference Documents

All major documents voted on at this National Conference (political resolution and SPD) will be published in *Internationale*.

13. There is no double recruiting in the GIM.

#### 14. 'Inprekorr'

There is agreement that the German-language *Inprekorr* should be published immediately following the National Conference.

#### 15. Discussion

The written discussion will continue.

#### 16. National Conference

The next regular National Conference of the GIM takes place at the beginning of February 1976. To prepare for the National Conference the Political Bureau will form a commission, which will begin its work no later than November 1, 1975.

The topics of the National Conference and the time limits for the preconference discussion will be determined by the Central Committee in October 1975.

The deadline for documents that are to be submitted for a vote at the National Conference is December 15, 1975, and the deadline for written contributions to the discussion for the National Conference is January 1, 1976. □

## Soviet-Made Auto Undersells Italian Model

### Fiat Takes Dim View of Competition From Moscow

When Moscow agreed in May 1966 to let the Fiat corporation of Italy build a \$800 million plant in the Soviet Union, it was the first major breakthrough for Western capital into the Soviet market. The Italian government advanced \$322 million in low-interest credit to Moscow to help clinch the deal. The Kremlin responded by renaming Stavropol-on-the-Volga, site of the new plant, Togliattigrad, after the late Italian Stalinist leader.

The plant was a success, turning out the sturdy Lada—a Fiat 124 modified for Soviet weather and road conditions—at the rate of 600,000 a year. Soviet auto production was increased fourfold.

Fiat is now having second thoughts about the venture, however. The Soviet Union is exporting the Lada to Western Europe, where it is underselling the Fiat. In Britain, for example, the Lada sells for about US\$2,571, including taxes, compared with \$3,274 for the Italian-made Fiat 124 and \$2,332 for the tiny Fiat 126.

Moscow is expected to export only 20,000 to 30,000 cars to Western Europe this year. But Umberto Agnelli, Fiat's managing

director, is said to be worried about what may happen when the Soviet Union carries out its plans to double auto-making capacity.

Fiat, of course, knew that the Soviet Union, with a planned economy and a state monopoly on foreign trade, could sell its production in the capitalist countries at cheaper prices than comparable Western models. But the Italian company thought the Soviet car, a relatively old model, would be unattractive in the West. Now, with a depression in Western Europe and auto prices at their highest levels ever, the Soviet cars look very attractive.

According to the free-enterprise textbooks, Fiat should lower prices to cope with the unexpected competition. Right?

But the company is apparently determined to deprive consumers of the Soviet-made bargain. Agnelli is calling for the Common Market to adopt protective measures against "dumping" of cars in Western Europe. And in its current negotiations with Moscow to supply more auto-making capacity, Fiat is demanding a clause restricting exports. □

## Special Offer



Larissa Daniel, anti-Stalinist dissident.

To help celebrate the tenth anniversary of *Intercontinental Press*, reproductions of sketches by Copain, artist for *Intercontinental Press*, were published by the New York Local of the Socialist Workers party and bound in an 8.5" x 11" book. The aim was to use the money gained from sales to help us begin publishing articles in Spanish.

The drawings, of various sizes, include portraits of Hugo Blanco, Malcolm X, James P. Cannon, Che Guevara, Cesar Chavez, Leon Trotsky, and many more, some of which are suitable for framing.

A limited number of copies of this collection of drawings are now available for only \$5.

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