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Livio Maitan

The Role of Portugal's Armed Forces Movement



Mundo

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Indian Maoists Criticize Peking

NEWS ANALYSIS

The Seizure of 'República'—a Bad Omen

The government of the Armed Forces Movement took a major step toward "institutionalizing" a populist military dictatorship May 20 when it took advantage of a Communist party power grab to silence *República*, the Lisbon daily most closely linked to the Socialist party leadership.

The paper had been a center of conflict between the two reformist parties for some time. The Communist party-controlled printers union refused to print two articles in the May 2 edition criticizing the CP-dominated union federation Intersindical for trying to exclude the SP from participating on an equal footing with followers of the Stalinists in the May Day demonstration.

On May 19, the printers union ousted the editor, Raul Rego, an SP minister in the first provisional government. The new editors published a statement saying: "We reject partisan deviations." Rego refused to leave his office, and a Socialist party mass demonstration surrounded the building. The government then ordered the paper shut down and sent troops to evacuate the premises. Clashes occurred between the military and the SP demonstrators, in which the troops fired into the air.

It is not yet clear what provoked this move by the CP-controlled union. *Le Monde's* correspondent mentioned the coverage given May 16 to the return of an AOC (Aliança Operária Camponesa—Workers and Peasants Alliance) delegation from China. The CP has said on several occasions that it regards this Maoist group allied with the SP as "counterrevolutionary." AOC was one of the groups banned by the military government from participating in the Constituent Assembly elections.

The other Lisbon daily identified with the SP, *Jornal Novo*, published an article in late April claiming that Peking had recognized AOC as the official Maoists because

of their alliance with the SP. The author claimed that the Chinese leaders realized that the SP was the only effective alternative to the pro-Moscow party.

The *New York Times* editors said that the move against *República* came "after Mr. Rego had published a secret Communist party document that urged the military to carry out yet another purge of Socialist employees in the state radio and television system."

The information media were singled out as one of the three areas for an offensive by the SP after its April 25 electoral victory. In the period since the fall of the old regime, the CP has used its apparatus plus its privileged position as the military's most reliable political agent to win overwhelming predominance in the press and broadcasting.

Furthermore, the CP has used its influence in the mass media in a crude and arbitrary way. Popular resentment against tendentious Stalinist reporting has been on the rise for some time. The Portuguese people remember too well what a "directed press" sounds like.

In his news conference May 5, following the May Day clashes between the CP and the SP, Socialist party leader Mário Soares told reporters that his party intended to cut "minority" forces down to size in the press; the unions; and in the local government bodies, where the Movimento Democrático Português, the CP democratic front for the "progressive petty bourgeoisie," has gained many positions.

Of these three areas, the unions were obviously the most important and potentially the most explosive. It is in this field that CP dominance is the strongest and it is here also that the CP has proved most useful to the military government. It has not hesitated to denounce strikers as "provocateurs" and "agents of fascism," and even to mobilize its members to break strikes in order to defend the government's economic policy.

On the other hand, the Socialist party obviously cannot make good its claim to be the best political transmission belt for the government unless it can win a strong organized base in the unions. In Portuguese conditions, a purely electoral party is at a great disadvantage. The Socialist party demonstrations May 2 were designed to show that the SP was not a normal Social Democratic party but a "mass party" able to mobilize tens of thousands of persons in

the streets. Even such limited shows of force, however, can quickly get out of hand, as the confrontation at the *República* offices has again shown.

It was obvious after the May Day clashes that the Intersindical congress scheduled for the end of May would entail a major confrontation between the two reformist workers parties. The SP offensive in the mass media is also linked to an offensive in the journalists union. It was equally obvious that the CP intended to preserve its bureaucratic positions in the unions at all cost. This was what led the Stalinists to provoke a sectarian clash with the SP in the May Day demonstration.

The Stalinist Intersindical leaders apparently feared that the SP contingents would take the occasion to protest the military government's confirmation of Stalinists in posts seized by them in the union movement.

Of the pro-Moscow Stalinist parties, the Portuguese CP has earned a reputation as the most dogmatic in Western Europe. It is the only one on the continent other than the "exterior" Greek CP that has driven out the liberal wing that exists in most of the others. The tens of thousands of new recruits that have flooded into the party since April 25, 1974, have been trained in a "tough" sectarian spirit reminiscent of the Stalinist parties in their ultraleft "third period."

However, material factors also promote sectarianism on the part of much of the CP membership. Since April 1974 the CP has been virtually the government party. As the only apparatus for mass organization, it has offered a path to advancement for thousands of new members in many areas of the society. Obviously they would react violently against any force that threatened such perspectives, even without specific directives from the party leadership.

At the same time, because of the role it has played as the main political instrument of the military government, the CP has tended to become the focus of resentment among widening sections of the population. Its unprincipled policy of class collaboration and subordination to the bourgeois military regime has put it in the position of taking responsibility for repression, censorship, and austerity, without holding the real power in the society. Its subordination to the government and its goal of serving as the privileged political partner of the regime has led it to split the working class and drive the SP ranks, infuriated by Stalinist methods, toward the right.

These tactics have also enabled the voice of U.S. imperialism, the *New York Times*, to present the conflict as one between an "anti-Communist majority" and a Communist "minority" imposing its control by intrigue and infiltration. The *Times*, of

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course, is preparing a democratic cover for intervention.

Even more dangerous is the possibility that the Stalinist tactics will provoke sections of the workers and poor masses to draw anti-Communist conclusions and thus promote the development of a mass base for counterrevolution.

In the most favorable of possibilities, the Communist party is still working for an ungrateful master. While the CP has been encouraged to take a hard line against the SP by the tacit support of the military government, the generals themselves have been using this conflict to discredit political democracy in general and to win acceptance for a paternalistic military regime that would "stand above parties."

The Communist party itself seems finally to have recognized this danger. In a speech published May 19, CP General Secretary Alvaro Cunhal warned the military that it would be "a grave error" to condemn political parties as such.

In fact, the crisis coincided with an assembly of the Armed Forces Movement where key leaders advocated setting up transmission belts directly subordinate to the military. Both the officers and the imperialist press had an interest in presenting this as a "soviet" structure. For the imperialists this is another argument for intervention if the mass movement "goes too far." For the military it provides a demagogic left cover for consolidating the kind of mass apparatus necessary to enforce the "labor discipline" Portuguese capitalism needs to weather the world economic crisis.

For its purposes, the military can also exploit the neofascist propaganda of the CP's ultraleft satellites, which have made a fetish of "grass roots organization" abstracted from political democracy and general political solutions. The prime example is the centrist Movimento da Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left), which has combined promoting "organs of direct democracy" with support for the populist military junta.

Trust in military "saviors" is common to all opportunist currents in Portugal. The correct road is, among other things, to consistently defend democracy, including freedom of the press. This is one of the key requisites in struggling for the political independence and unity of the workers and poor masses. □

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Mass Pressure on the Rise in Laos

By Caroline Lund

Since May 9, student-led demonstrations have spread through the major cities of Laos. The banners call for an end to the U.S.-administered Agency for International Development (AID) programs, an end to corruption by rightist government officials, and relief from soaring inflation.

The demonstrations have won strong support from workers and others, and have given an impulse to protests by sections of the armed forces against rightist commanders. They have accelerated the disintegration of the rightist forces and put pressure on the Pathet Lao liberation forces to move into territory previously dominated by the rightists.

The movement began when about 3,000 students marched through Vientiane May 9 protesting U.S. interference in the country and demanding the resignation of a number of rightist ministers. Four of the most powerful rightist ministers and one deputy minister resigned immediately. This included the minister of defense, whose functions were taken over by a Pathet Lao representative.


Most of the remaining right-wing politicians and generals fled the country. Rank-and-file soldiers and lower officers of the rightist armed forces, on the other hand, began to declare their allegiance to the Pathet Lao-dominated coalition government.

All 160 cadets at the officer training school just outside Vientiane took over their school May 11, refusing to obey their officers. They issued a statement denouncing those in the military whom they called "bandits who loot the people." They passed out leaflets to passersby saying, "We have taken this school over as a liberated area."

On May 14 students mobilized in two major cities, Luang Prabang and Savannakhet, demanding the disbanding of AID operations and an end to corruption and inflation. In Luang Prabang, the royal capital, radio reports said that 3,000 students, teachers, and pedicab drivers joined in the demonstration.

In Savannakhet, demonstrators at the home of the rightist provincial governor seized three American AID employees to dramatize their demands. They were released the following day but kept under "voluntary house arrest" pending the end of AID operations and talks with government officials on economic grievances.

Later, more than 5,000 demonstrators



Christian Science Monitor

occupied the offices of the city government to press for their demands. In another action, students seized stores of rice, which they subsequently sold at half price as a protest against prices that jumped by more than 50 percent last month alone.

Another demand of the students was that Pathet Lao troops be allowed into the city, which was a rightist stronghold. On May 20 Pathet Lao forces marched into Savannakhet, setting off what news dispatches called a "joyful celebration." *New York Times* correspondent David Andelman said: "The take-over of Savannakhet came without violence. More than 20,000 people [in a town of 200,000] reportedly lined the streets to greet the Pathet Lao soldiers, estimated to number fewer than 500."

According to Andelman, the Pathet Lao had begun "moving into virtually every major town in the Laotian panhandle area that previously was under rightist control." In a May 23 dispatch, Andelman described the troop movement as "filling the vacuum created by the flight of large numbers of right-wing officers and politicians."

Also pressing the Pathet Lao to advance were the student demonstrations that occurred in the two southern provinces of Thakkek and Kengkok.

Meanwhile unit after unit of the rightist armed forces went over to the Pathet Lao-dominated coalition government. On May 16, 1,000 troops from the rightist air force demonstrated at the Vientiane airport demanding dismissal of their commander.

The air force men grounded all military planes. On May 18 the Laotian navy withdrew its allegiance from the rightist government faction.

On May 22 students and Laotian AID employees took over the AID compound in Vientiane. The compound is a thirteen-building, multimillion-dollar complex with its own generators, supermarket, and movie theater. Two marine guards and another American were held inside.

The U.S. government agreed on the same day to terminate AID operations outside of Vientiane and to negotiate regarding ending the program completely. Subsequently the U.S. embassy announced that students in Savannakhet had released the Americans they had been detaining, whose number had grown to fourteen.

A full-scale evacuation of American AID employees was begun May 23, a move celebrated by demonstrations in Vientiane.

In the face of these growing protests against the rightists, the Pathet Lao leadership has insisted on continuing its coalition with these corrupt and parasitic forces. "We want the coalition to continue; it will continue," stated a top Pathet Lao official on May 13 prior to a cabinet meeting that was to consider the resignations of the five rightist ministers.

According to Andelman in the May 14 *New York Times*, "In the last few days, all the major powers represented here, including North Vietnam, have apparently been quietly expressing support for continuing the coalition concept." The coalition regime was set up by the 1973 cease-fire accords on Laos. It rules only the territory formerly controlled by the rightist Vientiane government; the Pathet Lao controls more than two-thirds of the country outright.

Andelman continued: "Interviews with Western diplomats and Government officials disclose that the major powers here—the United States, the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam—who urged the establishment of the coalition, continued to support it."

However, a continuation of the mass protests against the rightists, together with the disintegration of the rightist military and political forces, can cause the Pathet Lao to go further than they might like along the road to taking direct power.

In the May 9 demonstration in Vientiane one participant carried a placard referring to the recent victories of the liberation forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam. It read: "Phnom Penh—April 17, 1975. Saigon—April 30, 1975. Vientiane—??, 1975." □

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Calm in Saigon Punctures 'Bloodbath' Myth

By Peter Green

For years the warmongers in the Pentagon advanced the myth of a "Communist bloodbath" that would follow the liberation of Vietnam. The aim was to justify their own bloody aggression. Now, with that myth exposed as just one more of the many lies spun by imperialism, they have dummed up.

Not so the Western correspondents in Saigon, however. Many of them have filed glowing reports of the new regime and the liberation forces.

Not only was there no bloodbath, reported *Manchester Guardian* correspondent Martin Woollacott, but no one in Saigon "has ever seen such a well behaved group of soldiers."

"There are thousands of soldiers in the city," he said, "... yet no rape, theft, drunkenness, or accidental shootings have been reported. . . ."

"They smile and wave, although those who have been here for some time are getting a little tired of this routine since the population of Saigon and the entire communist army walked around for two days with permanent grins and right arms working like pump handles."

The courage and exemplary conduct of the liberation army have turned the soldiers into "instant heroes," reported Nayan Chanda in the May 23 *Far Eastern Economic Review*. Chanda said that since the troops of the National Liberation Front entered Saigon on April 30, "an almost unreal carefree and effervescent mood has set in."

"As one Vietnamese noted, the 'stupid anti-communist propaganda of the Saigon regime' that presented the communists as bloodthirsty monsters is now proving of immense help to the NLF. Having expected the worst, the average Vietnamese is now doubly impressed by the extremely well-behaved and disciplined soldiers."

Foreign correspondents in Saigon have been unable to report a single instance of retaliation. Soldiers and government employees were told to register with the new authorities and submit a report on their past activities. It appeared that senior officers and officials might be in for three-month periods of "reeducation."

The spontaneous demonstrations of welcome in the first week of liberation soon gave way to more planned victory celebrations. On May 7, the twenty-first anniversary of the capture of Dien Bien Phu, 100,000 persons crowded into the compound

of the Presidential Palace and the avenue and park in front for a victory rally. A three-day holiday victory celebration May 15-17, which also marked the birthday of Ho Chi Minh, included rallies, fireworks displays, an air show featuring North Vietnamese jets, and a reception at the Presidential Palace attended by leaders of North Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and the National Liberation Front. The An Quang Buddhist church formally welcomed the victory May 20 with a mass rally of more than 20,000 persons.

"Everybody supposes that the honeymoon here will soon be over," said James Fenton in a dispatch to the May 21 *Washington Post*. "They have been saying that since the beginning of the month, and yet it goes on."

Nevertheless, the revolutionary government still faces many difficulties.

Crime is a continuing problem. Saigon's street cowboys—hoodlums on motorcycles who specialize in bag snatching—are reportedly as brazen as ever. Adding to the problem are the thousands of former Saigon soldiers now wandering the streets, as well as the ordinary prisoners who were released along with all the political prisoners. A curfew has been reimposed in Saigon, and student militias have been organized to help keep order in the city. After a few weeks a Liberation Military Police was formed.

According to a Saigon radio broadcast, the new authorities feel that the most difficult task they face is finding work for the more than one million unemployed, the three million "parasite" civil servants, and 100,000 prostitutes and street urchins.

The expected food and gasoline shortages in the wake of liberation have been reported, but supply ships from Hanoi and the Soviet Union have begun to arrive. The government has started to distribute free rice to the needy, with each person entitled to two kilograms a week.

Thousands of refugees who fled to Saigon or other cities in the closing months of the war are now returning home. The PRG announced it had begun a program to provide transportation, land, and farming tools to those returning to their villages. It also said it was "encouraging small capitalists having some light industries producing the things that serve the life of the population to resume activities so as to afford work to workers."

Many of the refugees who fled the country in the panic of the final days, and some who were simply kidnapped, have expressed their desire to go home. A State Department spokesman admitted May 19 that about 150 refugees under U.S. control had asked to be sent back to Vietnam. Three days later, Dean Brown, the director of Ford's "task force" on refugees, said there were 1,000 Vietnamese who wanted to return.

Once they get a taste of what life is really like in the refugee camps and the United States, and once they realize that Washington's stories about a "bloodbath" were a total fraud, even more of the refugees are expected to want to go back.

The processing of refugees in the United States has practically come to a stop now that the easy-to-handle ones with gold hoards or good connections have been dealt with. Officials responsible for the resettlement of refugees acknowledge that most job offers seemed to be from people looking for live-in maids or chauffeurs at little if any salary. "They want cheap labor," said one official. "When you start pressing them, they say, 'Pocket money,' what I would call slave wages."

The director of another agency said that of the 300 offers of sponsorship his organization had received, "a lot of them are from nuts or perverts or people who want cheap labor."

Washington's security checks are also holding up the processing. The files of the FBI, the CIA, the Pentagon, the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Drug Enforcement Administration must each be searched for what one official called "derogatory information" about every refugee seeking asylum.

John Eisenhower, the chairman of Ford's advisory committee on refugees, said May 23 that many of the refugees in the United States may have to spend the rest of their lives in the camps because of security and literacy problems.

So far Washington has stalled on the requests by refugees who want to be repatriated. Returning them to Vietnam is "difficult," said the director of Ford's task force May 22, because of the "obstreperous attitude" of the PRG. But the revolutionary government announced May 11 that it would even provide the transportation for those who wished to return.

At Fort Chaffee in Arkansas, 107 refugees said they would hold a protest demonstration unless Washington arranged for their return to Vietnam by May 29.

"If the U.S. government does not do us the favor of taking us back, we will have a small demonstration," said a spokesman for the group May 23. "We will go on the streets and ask that we be taken back." □

More on the Evacuation of Cambodia's Cities

By Dick Fidler

Almost one month to the day after the forced evacuation of Cambodia's cities began, Radio Pnompénh announced May 16 that the new government was repairing the capital's airport and other facilities "so that the town can become active again." A broadcast monitored in Bangkok said some people had already been moved from the countryside into the city.

Radio Pnompénh indicated that the new inhabitants were not previous residents of the city. It said that troops and "revolutionary forces" were instructing them in basic urban hygiene.

Pnompénh's population, swelled to two million with the massive influx of peasants fleeing the U.S. carpet bombing, was evacuated to the countryside immediately following the April 17 take-over by the People's National Liberation Armed Forces. Similar action was taken in other cities and towns that had been held by the "Republican" puppet government headed by Lon Nol.

A Reuters dispatch from Bangkok May 9 reported that the new Cambodian government had announced "that the economy would still be based on agriculture but that intensive efforts were also under way to rebuild factories. . . ."

A Cambodian radio broadcast said, ". . . our soldiers and workers are now very actively devoting themselves to our industry."

The new Cambodian government has also announced efforts to repair the port of Sihanoukville, as well as factories, roads, and public buildings in Battambang, a city of 500,000.

These reports indicate that the decision to empty the cities and towns may eventually be modified. But many questions remain. What has happened to the millions of persons—possibly half of Cambodia's population of seven million—who were forced to leave the urban areas? Have they been given employment on the land, and medical care where necessary? How are they being housed and fed? Will they be permitted to return to the cities if they so desire sometime in the future?

It may be that the new leaders are not unanimous on their far-reaching urban policy. As its consequences become clearer, divisions among them may deepen.

The only reports on the situation inside the country are those the Cambodian

government itself provides. And it is reporting very little. All foreigners, without exception, have been ordered to leave the country.

The only eyewitness accounts published to date on what has happened in Cambodia are those provided by the Western correspondents who arrived in Thailand in early May after traveling overland from Pnompénh.¹

What they observed was summarized by Sydney H. Schanberg of the *New York Times*:

"The old economy of the cities has been abandoned, and for the moment money means nothing and cannot be spent. Barter has replaced it.

"All shops have either been looted by Communist soldiers for such things as watches and transistor radios, or their goods have been taken away in an organized manner to be stored as communal property.

"Even the roads that radiate out of the capital and that carried the nation's commerce have been virtually abandoned, and the population living along the roads, as well as that in all cities and towns that remained under the control of the American-backed Government, has been pushed into the interior."

According to Patrice de Beer of *Le Monde*, many persons began leaving Pnompénh voluntarily on April 17 even before the main force of insurgent troops arrived in the city. Driving north of the city during the morning, he found "tens of thousands of refugees clogging the road as they headed back to their villages." Further down the road, rebel soldiers had opened a storage depot and were distributing rice to the people. "It was a frenzied scene. Along the roadside were piled bags of rice, which only yesterday had been so rare and costly."

Long files of black-clad soldiers, many of them women, were advancing toward the city. They did not yet know that it had fallen, de Beer discovered.

Returning to the capital in the early

afternoon, de Beer found the road blocked near the city entrance. No one was being allowed to enter the city. The order to evacuate had been given.

"It seems that the soldiers who had entered the city in small groups during the morning had precise orders. The soldiers came from five different directions. . . . The evacuation continued systematically for about four days, neighborhood by neighborhood, house by house, before being extended into the suburbs. Some soldiers insisted on immediate departure, others were more accommodating."

The city's hospitals were emptied; about 25,000 patients, many of them seriously disabled, were forced to join the trek to the countryside.

There were reports that the water purification plant was heavily damaged.

All the correspondents reported incidents of looting by the rebel soldiers. But none portrayed it as a rampage. "When they looted jewelry shops, they kept only one watch for themselves and gave the rest to their colleagues or passersby," Schanberg reported. "Transistor radios, cameras and cars held the same toy-like fascination—something to play with, as children might, but not essential." Some soldiers who seized him for a few hours took some cigarettes and clothes, but passed up, among other things, \$9,000 in cash in a money belt.

The homes of some rich were burned, de Beer said. Jon Swain of the *Sunday Times* cited eyewitness accounts of the burning of "the records and millions upon millions of riels" at the head office of the Banque Khmer de Commerce.

The looting seemed to result more from peasant fascination with the curiosities of city life than from a breakdown of discipline. Schanberg described the troops as "firm, determined, well-trained, tough and disciplined. . . ."

"The thousands of troops we saw both in the countryside and in Phnom Penh, while they included women soldiers and boy militia, some of whom seemed no more than 10 years old, looked healthy, well organized, heavily armed and well trained."

In general, Swain said, "the Khmer Rouge make an impressive contrast to the soldiers we used to see in Phnom Penh, drinking and whoring every night."

"They are peasant boys, pure and simple—darker skinned than their city brethren, with gold in their front teeth," said Schanberg. "To them the city is a curiosity, an oddity, a carnival, where you visit but do not live. . . ."

"Often they would climb into abandoned cars and find that they would not run, so they would bang on them with their rifles like frustrated children, or they would simply toot the horns for hours on end or keep turning the headlights on and off until the batteries died."

1. These include Sydney H. Schanberg's articles in the May 9 *New York Times*; articles by Patrice de Beer in the May 8, 9, and 10 issues of the Paris daily *Le Monde*; Jon Swain's report in the May 11 *London Sunday Times*; and articles by Agence France-Presse reporters Jean-Jacques Cazeaux and Claude Juvenal, which appeared in the May 8 *Los Angeles Times* and the May 8 and 9 issues of the *Washington Post*.

The Western correspondents spent two weeks in the French embassy compound in Pnompenh, together with 1,500 other foreigners and Cambodians trying to flee the country. When they finally emerged on April 30, in a truck convoy en route for Thailand, they encountered a deserted city. Not one civilian was to be seen. Soldiers were sweeping the sidewalks and burning dead leaves and debris. Other soldiers were standing guard in front of stores that had been looted.

As they left the city, they passed hundreds of cars abandoned by the roadside, cannibalized for spare parts. "Motorised transport in Cambodia is now almost non-existent," Jon Swain reported. "We were to see no more than a half-dozen moving vehicles in our 260-mile journey."

They witnessed the extensive war damage in the countryside. Whole regions had been devastated by Pentagon bombing and the "scorched earth" policy of the puppet regime's troops.

Outside Pnompenh the journalists found that virtually every city, town, and village in territory that had been controlled by the puppet regime had been evacuated.

Driving toward the ancient capital of Oudong, they came upon thousands of refugees traveling along the road. "Some were walking in single file," de Beer said, "some were resting under trees, while others were looking for pagodas to shelter in, or seemed about to settle in the deserted rice fields."

The journalists were advised by soldiers accompanying them not to speak English, in order to avoid reprisals by the peasant victims of the American bombing. But they were received without hostility in the villages along the route.

They spoke to some refugees. "The situation varies from village to village," Patrice de Beer said. "Some exhausted refugees marched for days without knowing where to go. Others were permitted to return to a village where they had relatives. Everywhere, we came upon small groups of people who had been driven out of areas that remained Republican to the end."

Much of the journey to the Thai border was through territory that had been in the hands of the liberation forces for a considerable period of time. A few areas had escaped the saturation bombings.

Unlike the inhabitants of areas until recently under the control of Lon Nol's forces, de Beer said, the residents of these zones seemed to be in good health. Children were well fed and clothed. In some areas, the peasants reported getting more than one crop in a year from the irrigated land.

Schanberg noted "reservoirs, dikes, bridges—all built with hand tools. No machines or earth-moving equipment were visible."

"We also saw boy militia units on patrol everywhere and male-female work crews repairing roads."

The nature and composition of the new regime in Pnompenh remains unclear. It



SIHANOUK: Will wait till things settle down a bit before returning home.

appears that for the first few days following the take-over, the military forces had full responsibility, while civilian figures remained in the background. An officer who refused to identify himself told reporters April 17 in Pnompenh that political and governmental leaders had let the military enter first "to organize things," Schanberg said.

"One over-all impression emerged from our talk with the commander at the Information Ministry: The military will be largely in charge of the early stages of the upheaval, carrying out the evacuation, organizing the new agrarian program, searching for hidden arms and resisters, repairing damaged bridges."

The new government has not explained why it ordered the evacuation of the cities. Residents of Pnompenh were simply told the city had to be reorganized.

Western observers offered various explanations for the decision. The new rulers "appear to be remaking Cambodian society in the peasant image," Schanberg said, "casting aside everything that belonged to the old system, which was generally dominated by the cities and towns and by the elite and merchants who lived there."

Jon Swain drew a similar conclusion. "The Khmer Rouge are abandoning every-

thing connected with the defeated regime. They have no time for cities. . . . Salvation lies in the fields. . . ."

Jean-Jacques Cazeaux and Claude Juvenal of Agence France-Presse said the Khmer Rouge 'had long ago prepared a plan to move millions of inhabitants into their 'liberated zones' where they would be instilled with the spirit of service to the revolution."

Swain, on the other hand, thought the decision to evacuate the cities reflected "poor organisation, lack of vision and the brutalisation of a people by a long and savage war."

De Beer likewise seemed to think the measures taken in the first few days of the new government were ill considered. Part of the problem, he said, was that Pnompenh fell earlier than was expected.

"The revolutionists' strategists had foreseen a ten-day campaign," he wrote. "But it was all over at dawn of the fourth day. Some units had not yet arrived, nor had some top leaders. They had to be summoned over the radio. Thus some dissension seems to have emerged at the very beginning between the six divisions that participated in the attack."

The evacuation decision may be the subject of debate within the National United Front of Cambodia (NUFC), which is the political coalition behind the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (RGNUC). The latter is formally headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who has lived in exile in Peking for the last five years.

Sihanouk has on many occasions referred to his conflicts with the leaders of the insurgency inside Cambodia.² There have been reports that he is in sharp disagreement with policies being followed by the new government in Pnompenh, which has nonetheless proclaimed him chief of state for life. According to an article in the May 7 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*, Sihanouk has censored reports from the leadership of the RGNUC on the situation in Cambodia before passing them on to the press in Peking.

Sihanouk is apparently in no hurry to return to Cambodia. In an interview with the Algerian daily *El Moujahid*, published May 8, he said he had no desire to "interfere in the affairs of the Khmer Rouge." Since the formation of the NUFC, he said, it had been understood that the resistance fighters would be responsible for administering the new government. His role was to be "the symbol of national unity" and to handle Cambodia's international relations. □

2. For a description of the various components of the Cambodian rebel forces, see "Lon Nol Can't Find Address to Surrender To," *Intercontinental Press*, March 24, p. 391.

The Role of the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal

By Livio Maitan

[The following article appeared in the April 27 issue of *Bandiera Rossa*, the fortnightly newspaper of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist Groups, the Italian section of the Fourth International). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

One year ago the fall of the fascist regime in Portugal marked the opening of a new stage in the crisis of capitalist Europe.

Having realized that it was impossible to maintain the old economic and political structures of the dictatorship or persist in an all-out defense of the old colonial empire, the Portuguese bourgeoisie was forced to undertake a long-range reconversion operation. This reconversion was to include shifting from the traditional colonialism to neocolonialism; integrating the Portuguese economy into the more modern forms of the international capitalist economy, especially the Common Market; and a political restructuring that would provide Portugal with institutions similar to those of the bourgeois democracies in other West European countries.

This plan, which undoubtedly reflected the long-range objectives of the bourgeoisie and was prompted by needs that had become urgent, ran up against very serious obstacles in essentially three areas.

In the first place, the attempt at integration into the European economy came at a time when the world recession was hitting almost all the capitalist countries and was having very grave repercussions on the economy of Western Europe. Thus, a reconversion that in any case would have been burdensome, involving heavy general costs, proved extremely difficult to carry through.

At the same time, Portugal was to experience a notable weakening in various sectors of production, a drop in exports, and the closing of the outlets represented by emigration.

Secondly, for a bourgeoisie that had identified itself with Salazarism for nearly half a century, it was not easy to come up quickly with new political instruments, that is, a party or parties through which it could exercise its hegemony by the standard methods of bourgeois democracy, which most of all require an ability to consolidate a firm electoral base.

Finally, and at bottom this was the



CP LEADER CUNHAL: One-point program of full support to Armed Forces Movement.

decisive factor, strong mass mobilizations developed from the start—although with the inevitable unevenness from region to region and sector to sector and the inevitable ups and downs—and drew in broad sections of the working class and petty-bourgeois strata, in some cases the peasants. These mobilizations had a notable impact on the ranks of the armed forces themselves.

The scope and dynamism of these mobilizations in the recent months—the multiplication of strikes and factory occupations, the spread of revolutionary democratic bodies growing up from below, and political demonstrations such as those of January 14 and February 7, which although they had a different content (the first was called by Intersindical¹ and the second by the Workers Committees²) were equally an expres-

1. Intersindical is the national trade-union confederation controlled by the Communist party.

2. The Workers Committees in Lisbon that called the February 7 march were dominated essentially by Maoist groups.

sion of the fighting spirit of the masses—were what prompted the abortive coup attempt of March 11.

The more reactionary sections of the bourgeoisie linked with the "Spinoist" wing of the armed forces felt that it was urgent to halt a trend that they regarded as extremely dangerous and to impose a conservative-moderate turn that would necessarily have involved overtly repressive actions against the mass movements. In view of the level of combativity of the masses and the politicalization of growing sections of the army and the navy, the operation was clearly adventurist and could only end in a miserable failure.

The inevitable result has been an acceleration of the revolutionary process in Portugal. A new impulse was given to the mobilization and politicalization of the masses, whose impetuous and powerful action was the decisive factor in the rapid defeat of the putschists.

The leading group in the armed forces, represented by the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement], could not ignore that fact. It was driven to take more radical steps to cripple the old structures of the Salazarist dictatorship and to disarm the most conservative groups in the bourgeoisie that had resisted the April 25 operation and had been impelled to turn back, that is, to try to restore an authoritarian regime, by the dangers that the advance of a process of radicalization and politicalization posed for the vested interests.

To this end, even more than after April 25 and September 28, the MFA had to seek the collaboration of the organized workers movement, primarily the Communist party. This led to greater openings, including representation in the political apparatus, for the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party] and its ally the MDP [Movimento Democrático Português—Portuguese Democratic Movement], and to an explicit and systematic recourse to ideological themes, which were projected for essentially tactical reasons.

The process we are seeing today in Portugal shows clear analogies with those that have already occurred in neocolonial, or economically and socially underdeveloped countries. We should not forget, of course, the differences that remain and will

remain between imperialist and colonial or semicolonial countries. But this does not detract from the fact that in certain aspects these analogies are relevant.

In the case before us, this analogy consists in the following: In situations where the bourgeoisie finds itself unable to exercise its political hegemony by the normal means—the bourgeois-democratic parliamentary or presidential mechanisms, the formal or de facto dictatorship of a bourgeois party, and so on—in periods of deep political crisis, the military apparatus may emerge as the only force capable of running the state. More precisely, the army can play the role of a ruling party with the capacity to maintain the functioning of the essential mechanisms of the system. This need not necessarily take the form of a reactionary military dictatorship but can occur under the leadership of reformist or populist tendencies in the military (obviously the Brazilian dictatorship falls into the former category, while the Peruvian regime comes under the latter, to mention only the two most prominent examples in Latin America).

In Portugal after the breakup of the Salazarist regime and the explosion of the impetuous mass mobilizations we have noted, the situation has been characterized precisely by the growing inadequacy of the traditional political apparatus and the absence of a bourgeois party with a mass base sufficiently broad to allow it to exercise hegemony, say, in the manner of the Italian Christian Democracy or the English Conservative party. The only solid apparatus, the only relatively cohesive force, remains the armed forces, and precisely for this reason they are emerging as the dominant political force. The MFA, which arose and developed in this context, has thus become the real political leadership of the country.

Of course, as we have already noted, the MFA needed the collaboration of political forces capable of representing broad masses. This is why it has come to an agreement with the PCP, and the greater difficulties notwithstanding, with the PSP [Partido Socialista Português—Portuguese Socialist party] itself.

In Marxist terms, this form of exercising political hegemony is defined as "bonapartist." Such a characterization, which appears in the documents of our Portuguese comrades of the LCI³ (section of the Fourth International), is entirely justified in this case insofar as it cannot be said that the bourgeoisie exercises political hegemony directly today in Portugal but rather is obliged to resort to an intermediary. The

MFA is fulfilling this role, seeking the indispensable support of the masses, and on the international level, trying to exploit the margin for maneuver offered by the crisis of imperialism and the interest that the Soviet



TRALLEDO

Mundo

GONCALVES: Needs Stalinists' help to remodel Portuguese capitalism.

Union has in encouraging a certain dynamism and a relative independence of Portugal from the imperialist bloc.

The economic program the MFA has adopted, even after the recent developments (nationalizations of the banks and the insurance companies, the announcement of nationalizations in certain sectors of industry, and so forth), points, in the last analysis, toward a rationalization of the system aimed primarily at assuring the investments needed for reconversion, including foreign investments, and at guaranteeing the development of key productive sectors, for example, through aid to exporters. The mechanism of capitalist accumulation has not been put in question by the measures that have been carried out or those that have been projected. In fact, if these measures are successfully implemented, this mechanism will be put back on an even keel and gain a new—relative—stability. In this sense, the MFA in the last analysis is defending the fundamental interests of the bourgeoisie, even though its decisions may strike at sections of the bourgeoisie and often prevent the bourgeois

sie from exercising its political hegemony directly. We should not forget on the other hand that the program of the Portuguese government includes a substantial wage freeze, preaches austerity, and has imposed laws that seriously restrict the right to strike (the fact that it has been able to enforce them only very partially is another story).

The most recent political decisions topped off these measures. The MFA struck at the right, eliminating a national party with no real impact from the electoral competition. But above all it gave a warning to the extreme left by dealing a blow to the MRPP [Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party, the most extremist of the Maoist sects] and the AOC [Aliança Operária Camponesa—Workers and Peasants Alliance, a Maoist grouping allied with the SP]. Still more significant was its compelling the parties to sign an agreement that largely voided the Constituent Assembly and explicitly sanctioned the dominance of the MFA. Various military spokesmen have not hesitated to dot the i's and cross the t's. We cannot rely on the parties, we have no assurance that the people are mature enough, we do not want to take any risks, the control must remain in our hands (one even said that it was an error to allow the formation or reconstitution of parties after April 25!).

The working class and the revolutionists cannot endorse a political operation whose meaning cannot but be clear to anyone who has eyes to see. No elucidations or apologetics—and *il Manifesto* has once again taken the lead in this field with an article by Rossana Rossanda—can wipe out the fact of an economic program designed to rationalize the capitalist system, political methods inspired by a vulgar paternalism, voiding the political rights of the working class, and the repression already carried out or threatened against sections of the vanguard.

The Portuguese revolutionists mobilized against the March 11 "coup," and are ready to mobilize again whenever necessary. To oppose a fascist or authoritarian restoration, they are for a united workers front, a united front of all the organizations in the workers movement. But they cannot give their support to a class-collaborationist government, to a bonapartist political leadership. For this reason, the comrades of the LCI have waged a struggle, on the electoral front as on others, for a revolutionary strategy opposed to the strategy of the reformists. It was for this reason that they refused to sign the agreement drafted by the MFA, which was signed not only by the PCP but also by the PSP, the PPD [Partido Popular Democrático—Democratic People's party, the main bourgeois party], and other formations. □

3. Liga Comunista Internacionalista—Internationalist Communist League.

Argentine Workers Win a Number of Strikes

By Andrés Sánchez

[The following articles appeared in the May 1975 issue of *Revista de América*, a revolutionary-socialist monthly published in Buenos Aires. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

BUENOS AIRES—The trickle of labor struggles that began in early March became a torrent in the following weeks. The opening created by the victories at Rigol-leau glass factory and Centenera metalworks widened into numerous struggles waged in dozens of factories by all the unions. Many of these conflicts have resulted in important victories; in others the gains are less important; some have yet to be resolved.

There have also been defeats in these struggles: At the Ledesma Sugar Mill, where the union was placed under trusteeship by the government and the leaders are in prison or being hunted by the police, work was resumed after a five-day strike.

But the victories are more numerous and more important than the defeats. Some of the most outstanding examples, but by no means the only ones, are Propulsora Iron and Steel Works near La Plata, where employees won an emergency wage increase, and Indiel, a metal plant in Greater Buenos Aires that won the release of thirteen leaders and activists held by the police after an eleven-day work stoppage.

However, the most important struggle is the one still going on in Villa Constitución. In March 1974 an extended conflict at the iron and steel plants in that town of Santa Fe Province won recognition of the metalworkers' right to freely elect the local leadership of the Unión Obrera Metalúrgica [UOM—Metalworkers Union]. A fighting, class-struggle leadership committee was ratified by those elections. On March 20, 1975, the government struck a blow against that leadership and other militant sectors of the workers movement. The Ministry of Labor ordered the take-over of the Villa Constitución branch of the UOM and the union at the Ledesma Sugar Mill (in Jujuy). At dawn that day police detachments arrested dozens of leaders and activists at the steel and iron plants in Villa Constitución, the Ledesma Sugar Mill, and several factories in the Rosario area.

The outraged metalworkers of Villa responded with a strike, a strike that has

now lasted one month in spite of constant announcements by the government, which daily predict the imminent resumption of work. The Villa Constitución plants supply a very important part of the national market; their paralysis is creating a very difficult situation for the construction industry and threatens to bring on a shutdown of the automobile factories.

While this long and heroic strike was developing, a spontaneous work stoppage in Buenos Aires produced the biggest traffic bottleneck anyone can remember in the capital. The subway workers, tired of bad wages and worse working conditions, conducted a slowdown during the entire second half of March. Armed goons attempted to intimidate the strikers. This only succeeded in touching off a total strike. On Monday, April 7, the one million "Porteños" [residents of Buenos Aires] who use that means of transportation daily found themselves on foot, leading to a paralysis of movement in the city. The subway workers won the release of their jailed compañeros; and granting of the raise they demanded is imminent.

A common attribute of all these labor struggles was the role played by the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores [PST—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Argentina]. From Villa Constitución to the subways of Buenos Aires, from Indiel and Propulsora Iron and Steel Works to the Ledesma Sugar Mill, the PST played a front-line role in organizing and publicizing the conflicts, and as in the case of the current strike in Villa Constitución, in the tremendous task of assuring economic solidarity from workers all over the country. The bourgeoisie and its servants recognize this.

The following paragraphs reprinted from the daily newspaper *La Nación* of March 21 (as part of its reporting on the raids and arrests in Villa Constitución) provide the proof.

'Among the Unionized Metalworkers' according to *La Nación*, March 21

The trade union most affected by yesterday's denunciation from the Ministry of the Interior was the Unión Obrera Metalúrgica de la República Argentina, since a large number of the workers at the establishments mentioned in the official com-

munique belong to that union. In the city that was the center of the police proceedings, Villa Constitución (there were also proceedings in San Nicolás, Campana, and La Plata), the leadership of the regional UOM, whose membership is the personnel working at the Acindar plant, does not follow the line of the national secretariat of the metalworkers union, because the leadership is in the hands of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores.

In San Nicolás the local UOM represents the workers at the General Savio plant of Somisa. This body traditionally was socialist, which forced Augusto Timoteo Vandor to take it over and designate José Ignacio Rucci as delegate of the leadership council. Once the section resumed normal functioning, Rucci was elected its head.

Up until the time he was assassinated, Rucci kept that title, although he spent an equal amount of time as a national functionary for the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor]. With the death of this leader and the consequent reorganization of the secretariat, it was quite difficult for the Peronist candidates of the Blue Slate to win the elections against the candidates presented by the opposition slate of the PST.

At the Somisa plant there are numerous shop stewards who belong to this political grouping.

In Villa Constitución, on the other hand, the resumption of normal functioning by the UOM was accompanied by the election of a slate in opposition to the national leadership of the union. This was recognized by National General Secretary Lorenzo Miguel, who, joined by other members of his leadership council, received the new metalworkers union leaders with greetings. On that occasion the visitors alluded to the different political ideologies held by the two sectors—the national leadership and themselves—and emphasized their respect for the top metalworkers union governing bodies.

It could be added that at another important firm, Propulsora Siderúrgica S.A., located in Ensenada, Buenos Aires, the union factory committee representing the metalworkers there is ideologically identified with the PST and the La Plata section of the UOM, of which it is a part.

When the latter was ready to put the local under trusteeship for not obeying the union's national governing bodies, it voided the shop stewards' orders, above all those related to the Social Pact (not asking for wage increases). But it had to retreat and reinstate the stewards in view of the magnitude of the conflict that the step stirred up. It was practically paralyzing iron and steel production in the plant, something that affected the national security. □

Abortion Pickets Voice Solidarity With New Zealand Doctor



Direct Action

More than 100 persons picketed a court hearing in Auckland, New Zealand, April 28, demanding that all charges be dropped against Dr. Jim Woolnough. Woolnough is accused of performing "illegal" abortions at the Auckland Medical Aid Centre.

A second demonstration in defense of Woolnough, sponsored by the Women's National Abortion Action Campaign, was held the same day outside Parliament in Wellington. Speakers at the protest included Sue Green of the New Zealand University Students

Association; Kay Goodger, a leader of the Socialist Action League; and Nan Bailey, a leader of the American Young Socialist Alliance visiting New Zealand.

A petition demanding that the government halt prosecution of Woolnough was taken into Parliament. The minister of justice refused to accept it, however, on the grounds that the courts would have to decide the matter.

The hearing referred Woolnough's case to the Supreme Court.

Appeal for Jailed Members of Moscow Amnesty International

[The following is an international appeal in behalf of three members of the recently established Amnesty International group in the Soviet Union who were arrested within the past several months.

[One of the three, Mikola Rudenko, is reported to have been released April 20, two days after his arrest. The two others—Sergei Kovalyov and Andrei Tverdokhlebov—are still being held.

[Tverdokhlebov, who was arrested April 18, is being held in Moscow. Kovalyov was arrested in December 1974 and is being held in Vilnius in Lithuania. Both had been active for several years in the struggle for democracy in the Soviet Union.

[Tverdokhlebov worked with Sakharov, primarily through the Human Rights Committee in Moscow. Kovalyov is one of the

fifteen founding members of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR. At the time of his arrest he was one of only three founders who had not been silenced by the intensified crackdown that began in 1972.

[The translation was done for *Intercontinental Press* by Marilyn Vogt.]

* * *

To General Secretary of Amnesty International Martin Ennals, and the international public.

The secretary of the Amnesty International Group in the USSR, Andrei Tverdokhlebov of Moscow, and a member of the group, Mikola Rudenko, a writer in Kiev, have been arrested. Simultaneously, the

home of the chairman of the Amnesty group in the USSR, Valentyn Turchin, and the home of a member of the group, Vladimir Albrekhet, were searched. Earlier, a member of the group, Sergei Kovalyov, was arrested.

These actions by the organs of state security against Amnesty International are a challenge to world public opinion and a blow to the legality and the democratic and humanist principles that this organization and the members of its group in the USSR unalterably uphold. The persecution of its members in our country arouses indignation all the more. Determined and open activities by the international public are needed.

Andrei Sakharov
April 18, 1975

Gowon Tightens Screws on Nigerian Workers

By Ola Musa

LAGOS, Nigeria, May 2—At a March 3 news conference the federal chief spokesman, Mr Edwin Clark, made public the arrest and detention of five persons. They had been in detention for forty days.

Reporting the news conference in its March 4 edition, the *New Nigerian* said that the five were being held under the provisions of Decree 24 (detention without trial) for alleged subversive activities against the Federal Military Government.

Their names were listed as Anthony Engurube; Dr Gbolaga Akintunde of the Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria; Eddie Madunagu, mathematics lecturer at the University of Lagos; Charles O. Akinde, a Lagos lawyer; and Air Iyari, a graduate lecturer in Benin, Mid-West.

"Giving details of the detained five persons," the *New Nigerian* continued, "Mr Clark said Mr Anthony Engurube was found distributing copies of a leaflet entitled 'In Solidarity With the Nigerian Workers' on Feb. 24 at Lawanson bus stop, Surulere." The leaflet was said to contain a "strongly-worded statement accusing the Federal Military Government of neglecting and down-grading doctors."

The commissioner was reported as saying that Mr Engurube was accosted by vigilant soldiers who arrested him and handed him over to Military Police Headquarters. "Later on the same day, Dr O.A. Akintunde and Mr E. Madunagu visited Military Police Headquarters to secure the release of Mr Engurube, Mr Clark said."

The paper added, "following interrogations, Dr Akintunde and Mr Madunagu were held for 'further questioning and investigation.' The Commissioner recounted that in addition, Mr C.O. Akinde was apprehended shortly afterwards."

The *New Nigerian* went on, "The Commissioner told the news conference that 'it is known that these persons also have associations with others in various workers' organisations. . . .'"

He alleged that during the doctors' strike in the country, "The group maintained constant contact with junior doctors and helped to publicise their case."

Today after ninety-six days (the first arrest was made January 17), the fate of the five is unknown.

It all started last December when the Udoji salary award was made public. Udoji is the name of the chairman of the Public Service Review Commission set up Septem-



GOWON: Serves notice on "ill-motivated elements" protesting high prices.

ber 25, 1972. Among other things, this body grades posts in the public services and establishes salary scales for them.

In its December 1974 decision, the Udoji commission put wages for the lowest paid worker in the public service at 720 nairas [officially, 1 naira is equivalent to US\$1.60] a year. The highest paid were granted a salary scale of N11,040 to N13,950 a year.

The top levels of the government bureaucracy were granted salaries ranging from N14,000 to N16,200.

The salary scale was backdated to April 1, 1974, payment to be implemented in January 1975.

But the commission failed to take inflation into account. From January to April prices of goods rose as much as 200% in some instances. Foodstuffs especially were affected. In Western state, school fees increased by 50%.

Landlords increased rents as much as 120% and some ejected tenants on the pretext that they wanted to renovate their houses, and rented them out to those who were ready to pay them the demanded increase. This has been called the "Udoji Bonanza."

One of the landlords at Apapa Ajeguhle (in Lagos mainland) called a meeting of his tenants and told them that he was going to increase their rent as all of them would be getting their "Udoji Bonanza," and he would not like to be left out since he does not work in the public sector.

Strike actions flared in both public and private enterprises, those involved ranging from doctors, engineers, nurses, technicians, dock workers, railway workers, to bank workers.

One of the posters put up in front of an indigenous government-owned bank read: "Our father who art in Doddan Barracks, give us Udoji and save us from inflation and starvation." Doddan Barracks is where Gowon, the head of the government, lives.

The doctors were the first to start the "work to Udoji" action, as it was called.

Gowon gave them an ultimatum to get back to work within three days. But the doctors turned down the ultimatum and scored a solid victory. Other sectors followed their example.

Progressive organisations, especially the Anti-Poverty Movement of Nigeria (APMON), did a lot in exposing the true nature of the award. APMON is devoted to battling poverty, degradation, oppression, and exploitation in the country. It has an underground paper, the *People's Voice*. During the crisis over the Udoji award, APMON distributed leaflets throughout the country.

When Gowon saw them, he called a meeting of the top military brass. It was a closed meeting, but following it Gowon held a news conference on January 29 which was reported in the leading reactionary daily newspaper, the *Daily Times*, as follows:

"General Yakubu Gowon yesterday handed out a tough warning to those he described as ill-motivated elements. He said honest attempts of his government to better the lot of its workers were being deliberately misinterpreted by some ill-motivated elements. 'I will say no more at this stage than to serve notice that there is a limit to what any government can tolerate in the face of a calculated plan to disrupt the orderly progress of our nation,' he warned."

But Gowon issued his warning after arrests were already being made. Engurube, who had been followed wherever he went, was arrested at a bus stop on January 17.

Later, when Akintunde and Madunagu went to secure his release at the Military Police Headquarters, they, too, were arrested.

Their homes were searched, but nothing incriminating was found. According to an eyewitness, a typewriter belonging to Madunagu was seized.

In February, C.O. Akinde, a lawyer, publisher, and distributor of radical Marxist literature, who is also a member of APMON, was arrested at a printers work-

shop. His home was also searched.

In the February 23 issue of the *Daily Times* a colonel was quoted as saying that there would be no mercy for "traitors," and that anyone who tried to disturb the peace would be "ruthlessly dealt with."

The APMON office was also searched.

Since their arrest, the five have been held at a military detention camp behind Dodan Barracks in Lagos. This was disclosed when one of them, Madunagu, the lecturer, was produced in court as a result of students swearing an affidavit ordering the inspector-general of police to produce him and to show why he is being detained.

However, Madunagu was taken back because the court ruled that his detention without trial is legal.

After the news conference of the information commissioner, the APMON issued a press release entitled "The Lies of Edwin Clark on the Detained Members of the Anti-Poverty Movement."

The release pointed out that Clark's statement was a willful distortion of the facts. For instance, Engurube, who had few copies of the APMON leaflets dealing with the salary scale of the armed forces, was arrested on January 17 and not February 24 as contended in the commissioner's statement. The release also noted that the commissioner claimed that Dr Akintunde and Madunagu were arrested February 24. The actual date was January 22.

The APMON also denied any contact with the junior doctors. In addition, while a solidarity message was issued by the organisation in support of railway workers during their demand for Ani Award (a salary increase recommended by Chief Ani five years ago), this was not incitement. Nor had they incited the dock workers.

The press release also added that during the news conference, the name of the organisation to which four of the arrested belonged was never mentioned. The reason for this was that the administration cannot and will never "do anything fundamental to end poverty and give the masses a meaningful hope for the future. Blinded by their arrogance, deluded by their missionary role and surrounded by professional sycophants and careerists, these army boys can only continue to bully the Nigerian workers, peasants and progressive intellectuals." □

Michael X Hanged in Trinidad

Michael X (Michael Abdul Malik), a major figure in London's Black power movement in the 1960s, was hanged in his native Trinidad May 16. He was convicted on charges of murder in 1972 and spent two and a half years on death row while his case was appealed. Although an international campaign was waged for clemency, his final appeal was rejected on May 15.

Tortured in Nigerian Detention Camp

Four Political Prisoners Begin Hunger Strike

In a leaflet issued clandestinely April 30, the Anti-Poverty Movement of Nigeria (APMON) announced that four of its members detained by the Gowon regime had been on a hunger strike since April 26.

The four are Anthony Engurube, Charles Akinde, Eddie Madunagu, and Gbolaga Akintunde. They have been held in a detention camp since January. Demands for their release or trial have been ignored.

Since they were arrested they have been subjected to severe mental and physical torture. They have been beaten, denied meals, refused medical treatment, and tormented by specially bred giant mosquitoes. Their cells are under twenty-four-hour armed guard, and they are kept in total darkness around the clock. They are not allowed reading materials and are prevented from even writing poems.

The leaflet listed three reasons that prompted the hunger strike:

"(1) The patriots have been forced at GUNPOINT INTO A DARKER ROOM WITH ONLY A TINY WINDOW. The new cells are real death holes. With two to a dark hole, the new place is the real hell on earth.

"We ask, is this inhuman treatment essential for people who have not been

proved guilty in the Court of Law?

"(2) The Gestapo Police Officers have refused to take Anthony Engurube to the Hospital even when he is still VERY SICK. Tony was forced out of Creek Hospital while his condition was regarded as serious by the doctor. His first and subsequent appointments with the hospital doctor have been refused. Worse, Tony has been denied the use of drugs to relieve the pains of his stomach ulcer. . . .

"(3) Police brutality suddenly increased last week. The armed guards have been doubled—from two to four. The release of the specially bred mosquitoes has become frequent and the physical assaults have increased.

"We ask, what are the intentions of Gowon, Salem and the SMC [other] than the gradual and total destruction of our members?"

APMON appealed "to all patriotic forces to help work for the release" of its members. "Equally, we appeal to the country's elders, Church and Mosque organisations, student bodies, youth organisations, working class organisations, peasants associations etc. to help call on Yakubu Gowon, Kam Salem and other top military brass to RELEASE our FOUR members and Air Iyari NOW." □

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Deepening Fissures in Velasco's 'Revolution'

By Francisco Montes

[The following article appeared in the March issue of *Revista de América*, a revolutionary-socialist monthly published in Buenos Aires. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

LIMA—The sixth anniversary of the "Peruvian Revolution" in 1974 marked the end of a period of relative bourgeois stability and the opening of a new period marked mainly by crises. The two ministerial crises [President Juan] Velasco had to meet in the course of the past year showed that a critical stage had opened for the national bourgeoisie.

The first crisis was set off by the resignation of the naval minister, Vargas Caballero. This touched off a revolt among naval officers, who issued a public statement voicing solidarity with the former minister. A few days later the minister of housing, Arróspide Mejía, and the head of the Oficina Nacional de Integración (ONIT)¹ also resigned from the government. Behind this initial crisis were internal contradictions among the bourgeoisie that had been developing and that were reflected in the emergence of various camps in the military cabinet.

Vargas Caballero made statements in support of the Miró Quesada family, owners of the pro-oligarchy daily *El Comercio*. Velasco found this conduct unacceptable and publicly suggested that he resign. A few weeks later the government passed the decree expropriating the newspapers.

Less than five months later a second cabinet crisis confronted the junta. This one was set off by the discovery of a multimillion soles [1 sol equals about US\$0.02] fraud in a state-owned marketing company (EPSA—Empresa Pública de Servicios Agropecuarios²). The minister of commerce, Barandiarán Pagador, whose ministry held responsibility for the company for several months, mysteriously presented his resignation. And much the same thing occurred in the case of the minister of agriculture, Valdés Angulo, who was accused by sectors close to the government of being the main

political figure responsible for such a scandalous fraud.

These two cases are only the initial superstructural manifestations of the serious crisis that is undermining Velasco's nationalism. To all outward appearances, the Peruvian military junta seemed, in the Latin American context, a more solidly established government than its counterparts in Bolivia and Chile, the governments of Torres and Allende respectively, which were overthrown by bloody military coups.

The reformist Peruvian Communist party customarily said that this military regime had carried out a democratic and anti-imperialist revolution. That this revolution was building a new society, "neither capitalist nor communist." That the armed forces were completely integrated into the revolutionary process. And that the political, economic, and social crises that marked the previous regimes had been definitively overcome. To make a long story short, that Peru had taken the first step along the peaceful road to socialism.

The present situation itself is enough to puncture such mystifications about the Peruvian government. Even President Velasco himself has become more circumspect when he speaks about the situation and the outcome of the "revolutionary process." Thus in his message to the country on the completion of six years of the "revolution," he announced a campaign to "improve ethics" in the state apparatus. He said, among other things:

"The concentration of power, its nonparticipatory character, and the underwriting of the virtual privileges of those who make an excessive salary—all of these things pave the way for the emergence of interests that create and reinforce the danger of bureaucratization. They serve to create conditions that promote immorality and enrichment of a high bureaucratic strata that thrives at the cost of serious harm to Peru. The Revolutionary Government cannot permit the crystallization of a situation of this sort. It is urgent that steps be taken to counteract the tendencies I just called attention to. In reality, the destiny of our Revolution is much at stake here."

A few days later more than 100 high officials in the EPSA were dismissed and turned over to the military courts, and the two ministers handed in their resignations.

In the period before the opening of this critical stage, the national bourgeoisie had

gained a certain economic breathing spell. The budget deficit, for example, had been reduced from twelve billion soles to three billion soles. Foreign reserves, thanks to state control over the exchanges and currency, had grown from \$130 million to \$500 million. And national production had greatly increased, mainly in the industrial sector, where the rate of growth has shot up to 7.5 percent.

The government brought about this economic recovery by following a policy of reforms and nationalizations. A number of measures—including state control over the fishing industry, some sectors of the mining industry, and the marketing of copper and other raw materials; agrarian reform and the subsidies given to industry—all helped the government to overcome the economic stagnation that marked the previous regimes.

Because of the policy it followed, we characterize this regime as bourgeois nationalist. It implemented some measures aimed at reducing the imperialists' profits and displacing the oligarchic sectors so as to encourage the development of the incipient national bourgeoisie.

But this policy does not make it an anti-imperialist or revolutionary government. If the junta were to expropriate without compensation all the imperialist monopolies (Southern, Occidental Petroleum, and so forth), if it were to turn the factories over to the control of the workers and permit them to oversee the distribution and marketing of goods, if it were to turn the land over to the peasants without paying any compensation or imposing any control or "guidance"—then we would be able to say that Velasco heads an anti-imperialist and revolutionary government.

This is why the Peruvian economy was able to gain only a partial breathing spell, and was unable to shake off the structural crisis engulfing it. It is a crisis that has now reached new heights as a result of the accelerated rate of inflation on a world scale. Inflation has, for example, forced the state to spend vast sums of money to subsidize imports of certain food items. These subsidies have proved, however, to be absolutely ineffective in halting the increase in the cost of living.

Although the agrarian reform did enable the sugar-producing sector to double its production, the snail's pace at which it was applied, along with its inherent limitations, were reflected this year in a scarcity of food.

Another important indicator that reveals the opening of a political crisis is the fact that the contradictions among the different sectors of the bourgeoisie have begun to take on a definite shape and a broader scope. The first explosion of these contradictions occurred last year following the expropriation of the daily newspapers. For

1. Office of National Integration, the government bureau responsible for matters concerning the Andean Common Market organization.

2. Public Corporation for Agricultural Services.

the first time the right wing mobilized in the streets, demanding the return of the newspapers to their former owners, shouting slogans against the government, and calling for elections.

Later, in the pages of the right-wing magazine *Opinión Libre*, the various opposition parties called for the formation of a "Frente Civil Constitucional" [Civilian Constitutional Front] to press the government to hold elections. At the same time, the right wing adopted a policy of seeking new allies to come out against the steps taken by the government, taking advantage of all its difficulties. The Bar Association, for example, issued a statement criticizing a contract the Peruvian government signed with two Japanese companies to obtain a loan.

Other magazines, such as the *Peruvian Times* and *Oiga*—a weekly that shifted from support to the regime to harsh criticism—publicized the statement.

But what stands out the most in this entire phase of conflicts among the bourgeoisie is the inability of the national bourgeoisie to develop a consistent anti-imperialist and antioligarchical political line. In face of the right wing, the government oscillated back and forth, alternating between repression and concessions.

For example, it first suppressed the "gilded youth" who mobilized against the take-over of the dailies, but then it authorized the reopening of *Caretas*—which had been closed because of the reactionary campaign it was conducting. It also authorized the return of five leaders of Acción Popular³ who had previously been deported.

Then it closed *Oiga*, *Opinión Libre*, and the *Peruvian Times*, deported ten reactionary journalists, and jailed the Bar Association's entire board of directors. Next it granted amnesty to the jailed lawyers and to the young punks from Miraflores. And, to bring down the curtain, the government issued a communiqué banning mobilizations of any sort.

This policy of vacillation, of swinging back and forth, aids only the rightist sectors in the opposition.

As we said at the beginning, the resignation of the ministers last year testifies to the existence of distinct sectors in the cabinet and the armed forces. A more nationalist sector, headed by the young officers in the army, favors making concessions to side track the rise of the working class. They also want to adopt a more radical policy to serve as a brake on the right wing and the imperialists.

The other pole is more conservative, a sector headed by the naval ministry and

having support in the navy. This grouping stands for a more repressive policy against workers struggles and greater conciliation toward the right-wing opposition.

A third grouping, not as strong, lies



VELASCO: Organizing campaign to "improve ethics" of state bureaucracy.

somewhere between these two sectors. Its main concern is to prevent the internal contradictions from developing to their logical conclusion. To fulfill its role as arbiter—bonapartism, in Marxist terms—this sector favors a combined policy of concessions to both the right and the left, without defining itself as either one or the other.

This bonapartist game has been agreed to by all the sectors. This is why the nationalist sector did not take advantage of its recent gain in strength to push forward a greater radicalization of governmental policy, which would have polarized the right wing. And, in the same way, the navy has promised to maintain unity between the naval forces and the government.

This coincidence of views does not mean, however, that the contradictions have disappeared.

As an example to the contrary, we can cite the press campaign *Expreso* and *Ultima Hora* carried out around the Movimiento Laboral Revolucionario [MLR—Revolutionary Labor Movement]. At issue was a body, created by a sector of the government, whose purpose was to mount physical attacks on unions whose leaderships were classified as either class-struggle tendencies or not directly representative of the interests of the government.

Ultima Hora supported the MLR completely, reflecting the point of view of the bonapartist sector seeking to control the mass movement directly—without any intermediary whatsoever. This is why the new leader of Sinamos,⁴ Sala Orozco, declared his support to the MLR.

Expreso on the other hand, reflecting the point of view of the more populist sector, came out against the MLR, accusing it of being "fascist" and "divisive." Its campaign against the MLR was supported by the CGTP,⁵ the trade-union federation controlled by the Communist party; and by all the most important federations and unions in the country.

These disagreements have reopened an old discussion, which has now taken a more concrete turn: the question of the formation of a government political party. That is why President Velasco, after making clear that the MLR "is not and will not become the political party of the Revolution," declared that the formation of the government's own political movement was not under discussion, and that for the present, all Peruvians should "form their own groups, their own movements, and begin the task." □

4. Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social—National Network for Supporting Social Mobilization, the government social-service agency.

5. Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos—General Federation of Peruvian Workers.

Protest U.S. Plan to Dispose of Vietnam Defoliant in Pacific

Washington is planning to burn 2.3 million gallons of herbicide orange, which was used to defoliate the forests of Vietnam, in the Pacific Ocean, about 120 miles west of Johnston Island. The plan has been opposed by the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and a Hawaiian environmental group, Life of the Land.

Tony Hodges of the Hawaiian group said at an April 25 hearing of the Environmental Protection Agency in Honolulu that the residents of the islands in the area "would be strongly opposed to the burning of herbicide orange upwind of them." He added, "The people who used it in Vietnam should take the risks—not those in Micronesia."

Demei Otobed of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands said that the plan "may expose the islands and the people of the trust territory to dangerous health hazard and environmental contamination, the extent of which cannot be determined."

3. Popular Action, bourgeois opposition party led by Belaúnde Terry.

Cubans Hail Vietnamese Triumph

By Dick Fidler

While Moscow and Peking responded to the fall of Washington's puppet regime in South Vietnam with perfunctory and "restrained" commentaries, Havana made the victory of the Vietnamese liberation forces the theme of Cuba's May Day celebrations.¹

Leading the march of 125,000 persons in Havana's Plaza de la Revolución were "internationalist workers" recently returned from Vietnam, where they had helped repair the damage done by U.S. bombing. Marching with them were leaders of the National Committee of Solidarity with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The entire side of a large building overlooking the plaza was covered by a mural portraying Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one of the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, who was killed in Bolivia during an attempt to emulate the Cuban victory by initiating a guerrilla insurrection. In a message made public in April 1967, just six months before his death, Che had called for creating "two, three . . . many Vietnams"—that is, to open new revolutionary fronts in Latin America and elsewhere, and thereby facilitate the victory of the Vietnamese liberation forces.²

Roberto Veiga, the general secretary of the Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions (CTC—Confederación de Trabajadores Cubanos), gave the keynote address at the May Day rally. The Vietnamese triumph, he said, was the victory of "the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who laid down their lives in the struggle for their independence and liberation." It was also "the victory of socialist and proletarian internationalism, the victory of the strong solidarity of the peoples throughout the world. . . .

"The victory scored by the Vietnamese people represents a crushing defeat for Yankee imperialism and constitutes a source of inspiration and encouragement for all those who are building a new life and for those who are struggling to win their independence," Veiga said.

Prime Minister Fidel Castro and President Osvaldo Dorticós sent a message to the leaders of North Vietnam. "On hailing the culmination of the extraordinary Vietnamese epic," it said, "we reiterate, dear comrades, the unbreakable solidarity of the Cuban Revolution and we wish you new and great successes in the construction of socialism in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [North Vietnam] and in the realization of the most deep-felt aspirations of all the Vietnamese people."

Emphasizing the importance of the worldwide movement of solidarity with the Vietnamese, the message by Castro and Dorticós referred to the solidarity "of the workers of the capitalist countries and the encouragement and the sympathy of the progressive people in the United States who realize that the war unleashed by the imperialists was contrary to the very interests of the U.S. people."

Castro told leaders of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, at a reception at their embassy in Havana, "We welcome this victory as our own." Recalling the victory of the Cuban revolutionary forces in 1959, he said that "the only other emotion I've ever had in my life comparable with all that is this excitement I've felt in the past few hours upon hearing about the victory of the Vietnamese people."

The Cubans have every reason to greet the triumph in Indochina as their own. When Johnson first escalated the war, Castro appealed at once for a massive response to the imperialist aggression. The Cubans increased their efforts to aid the Vietnamese struggle by opening new revolutionary fronts in Latin America.

They organized brigades of workers to go to Vietnam to help in the task of reconstruction in the wake of the bombing. Solidarity with Vietnam's struggle was a key theme in their propaganda, both internally and internationally. Not least important, they campaigned for the formation of a united front of workers states in defense of Vietnam.

The Cubans' record stands in marked contrast to the policies followed by the Soviet and Chinese leaderships. The bureaucrats in Moscow and Peking failed to close ranks in defense of the embattled Vietnamese freedom fighters. Their stingy allocations of aid to the North Vietnamese workers state compared unfavorably with the rather generous aid they had given

some bourgeois governments in the semicolonial world.

(Peking, for example, gave \$300 million in military aid to Pakistan in 1972, compared with military aid to Hanoi of \$85 million in 1970 and \$75 million in 1971. In 1970-71, Moscow gave Egypt \$670 million in sophisticated weapons, while its military aid to North Vietnam totaled \$170 million.)

When U.S. imperialism was finally forced to negotiate a withdrawal from South Vietnam, the bureaucrats collaborated with Washington in imposing unfavorable terms on the Vietnamese through the Paris ceasefire accords.

The policies followed by Moscow and Peking alike were shaped by their desire for "peaceful coexistence" with imperialism, and their readiness to betray the Vietnamese revolution in exchange for modest trade and diplomatic concessions from Washington.

In the early years of the war, the Cubans were openly critical of the bureaucrats' approach. In his 1967 appeal, Che deplored "a painful reality: Vietnam, this nation representing the aspirations, the hopes for victory of an entire disinherited world, is tragically alone."

Describing the crimes of U.S. imperialism in Vietnam, Che added:

"But they are likewise guilty who at the decisive moment vacillated in making Vietnam an inviolable part of socialist territory—yes, at risk of a war of global scale, but also compelling the North American imperialists to make a decision.

"And they are guilty who keep up a war of insults and tripping each other, begun some time ago by the representatives of the two big powers in the socialist camp."

Unfortunately, some recent statements by the Cuban leaders tend to obscure Guevara's message.

In a May 8 speech marking the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, Castro said that the Vietnamese people, "like us, counted on the supply of modern weapons from the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese people, like us, in their struggle, received the support and solidarity of the USSR and the socialist camp. And as the B-52s unmercifully bombed Vietnam for the last time, scores of these planes were downed by anti-aircraft missiles made in the Soviet Union.

"These are the facts, these are the truths we are constantly wielding to offset the infamous slander of those who try to lessen the worthy and outstanding role played by the Soviet people in the big progress and victories which have been won in the past years by the peoples of the world. There is not one single just cause that has not received the solidarity of the USSR and of the socialist camp. . . ."

Castro may have changed his assessment of Moscow's role in Indochina under the

1. The May Day rally and Cuban reaction to the Vietnamese triumph were reported extensively in the May 11 issue of the English-language Weekly Review published by *Granma*, the daily newspaper of the Communist party of Cuba. Quotations are taken from this publication.

2. The full text of Che's message, entitled "Vietnam and the World Struggle for Freedom," was published in the April 28, 1967, issue of *Intercontinental Press*, p. 434.

influence of Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba—which has been far greater than that accorded to Hanoi. (It is estimated that this aid amounts to more than \$1 million a day in economic assistance alone.)

Exaggerating the role of Moscow and Peking, however, in no way serves the interests of the Cuban or Vietnamese

revolutions. Embellishing the image of the bureaucrats only aids their counterrevolutionary strategy.

Nevertheless, Cuba's enthusiastic acclaim for the Vietnamese victory indicates that its leaders continue to identify the defense of their own revolution with the extension of the world revolution. □

CIA's (and White House's) dirty business has a certain logic.

In the first place, the underworld could not operate without its solid connections with major politicians in both capitalist parties.

Second, the Mafia's former influence in Havana gambling and real estate would provide both a motive for getting rid of Castro, and a possible cover if the plot were exposed. It could all be made to appear like a Mafia job, and not what it really was—a joint White House-Mafia operation.

In addition, this latest link between the CIA and the underworld coincides with the disclosure that the FBI, which handles some White House covert operations within the United States, attempted to set the Mafia against the Communist party through a phony letter-writing campaign code-named "Operation Hoodwink."

The full details of what these "former intelligence officials" told the Rockefeller Commission may not be known for a long time. The commission, set up by President Ford to "investigate" disclosures of CIA covert operations, is meeting behind closed doors. The majority of its members are eminent Democratic and Republican party politicians and businessmen who have themselves worked for and with the CIA—and who no doubt have plenty to hide on their own account. □

Did CIA Recruit Mafia to Do the Job?

Report John F. Kennedy Behind Plots to Kill Castro

Former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency are reported to have told the Rockefeller Commission that the White House was behind the CIA's preparation of "contingency" plans to assassinate Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

According to a "former senior intelligence official," quoted in the May 24 *New York Times*, this "contingency" planning included proposals to involve two Mafia chiefs, Sam Giancana and John Roselli.

"The plans, one source said, were examined after top-level officials in the White House of President Kennedy indicated a desire to have the question of assassinating Mr. Castro examined as one possible solution to the growing Cuban problem in 1961 and 1962," the *Times* reported.

The former intelligence official said the CIA's planning resulted from informal discussions at the White House. "He emphasized that what White House officials might have regarded as informal remarks would have been treated as a formal request by the C.I.A.," the *Times* report said.

McGeorge Bundy, then assistant to the president for national security affairs, told reporters several weeks ago that White House officials did have discussions of "how nice it would be if this or that leader" were not around anymore.

One source who had seen the minutes of a meeting on August 10, 1962, attended by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, CIA director John McCone, and Bundy, told the Associated Press that "the subject of killing Castro was raised." Predictably, he added that it "was immediately dismissed."

These reports confirm disclosures made by columnist Jack Anderson as early as 1967, except that Anderson reported that the plot actually proceeded. According to Anderson's sources, the CIA recruited Giancana and Roselli, and Roselli made two attempts on Castro's life. One was an attempt to use poison capsules supplied by the CIA. The other was an attempt to

infiltrate rifle sharpshooters into Cuba to kill Castro during a public meeting.

There is written material to support Anderson's allegations, according to a "former top official of the Department of Justice during the Nixon Administration," who testified secretly before the Rockefeller Commission recently. According to the May 20 *New York Times*, he said that department files contain Federal Bureau of Investigation memorandums that confirm that the CIA was in touch with Giancana and Roselli, in a plot to assassinate Castro.

The use of Mafia figures to carry out the

Special Offer



Larissa Daniel, anti-Stalinist dissident.

To help celebrate the tenth anniversary of *Intercontinental Press*, reproductions of sketches by Capron, artist for *Intercontinental Press*, were published by the New York Local of the Socialist Workers party and bound in an 8.5" x 11" book. The aim was to use the money gained from sales to help us begin publishing articles in Spanish.

The drawings, of various sizes, include portraits of Hugo Blanco, Malcolm X, James P. Cannon, Che Guevara, Cesar Chavez, Leon Trotsky, and many more, some of which are suitable for framing.

A limited number of copies of this collection of drawings are now available for only \$5.

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The Mexican CP Steps Up Its Popular-Front Line

By Roberto Torres A.

[The following article appeared in the February 1 issue of *El Socialista*, fortnightly newspaper of the Liga Socialista (Socialist League), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Mexico. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Number 77 of *Oposición*, the newspaper of the Partido Comunista Mexicano [PCM—Mexican Communist party], dated October 26, 1974, carried a proposal "to all democratic and revolutionary organizations." The "proposal," signed by the PCM Central Committee, was dated October 24, 1974. The headline on the newspaper was "Unity in Action by the Left to Win Political Freedom."

Our rejection of such a worthy proposal might appear narrow-minded, hopelessly sectarian, and worthy of "Trotskyists" (this final adjective is one we accept with pride).

The fundamental problem presented by the PCM's proposal was that it did *not* call for a front "to win political freedom." Instead it called for a broad "democratic, anti-imperialist" coalition aimed at making an unprincipled bloc against "reaction." In other words, the PCM called for the formation of a "popular front."

In Number 80 of *Oposición* (December 31, 1974) the PCM proudly announced that it had begun discussions and reached agreement with some organizations: the PPS [Partido Popular Socialista—People's Socialist party], formerly headed by the late Lombardo Toledano; the PMT [Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores—Mexican Workers party], headed by Heberto Castillo; the PST [Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party], headed by Rafael Fernández, César del Angel, Rafael Talamantes, and others; and the MAUS [Movimiento de Acción Unificada Socialista—Unified Socialist Action Movement] of Aroche Parra. All these organizations are recognized as the farthest to the right of the groupings in Mexico that claim to be "socialist."

The Positive Side of the Proposal

The PCM's proposal, as it appeared in No. 77 of *Oposición* (it also, by the way, appeared in the Mexican daily *Excelsior*, October 26, 1974), poses a fundamental problem: the need of the left to win its democratic rights.

Fighting for democratic rights is a principle for socialists. Moreover, winning them is a necessity to enable us to reach broader sectors of the masses with our ideas. However, this positive side of the PCM's proposal creates confusion on two fundamental questions:

In the first place, the PCM does not say how it proposes to fight for such democratic rights. In our opinion, the only possible valid way is through mass mobilizations. To form a "democratic" bloc without specifying what *means* are required to obtain the end is extremely dangerous. It can create illusions about other ways of gaining freedom of expression and organization for the left.

In the second place, the proposal is ambiguous as to whether the fight for democratic rights is the only point on which the bloc is to be formed. Let us look at what the most important paragraph of the PCM's call says:

"For all these reasons the Central Committee of the Partido Comunista Mexicano proposes to democratic and revolutionary parties, groups, and currents the establishment of the broadest possible relations."

The Mystery Unravels

Note that they do not appeal solely to the currents that claim to be part of the workers movement to join the bloc. They speak of "democratic and revolutionary currents." Note, too, that they propose "the broadest possible relations." In other words, the struggle for democratic rights and the need to win them is nothing more than the camouflage hiding the real character of the bloc proposed by the PCM. The positive side of the proposition is transformed into a *form* aimed at attracting the attention of many left activists and currents.

Perhaps some PCM members became very distrustful of the formulas the party was using just a few years ago—"anti-imperialist people's alliance," "democratic, anti-imperialist revolution," and so on. These formulas became very unpopular among student activists after the 1968 movement.¹ Many of these activists joined

the PCM or influenced its members as a result of this movement. That is why Gerardo Unzueta, when reporting for the Central Committee at the last PCM congress, had to criticize even the formulas previously used by the Stalinists. So, in issuing their call, the PCM leaders tried to "sugarcoat the pill" for many of their own members.

The Art of 'Sugarcoating the Pill'

At the last PCM congress—the sixteenth—held at the end of 1973, the Stalinists adopted a "hard" line toward the government of LEA (Luis Echeverría Álvarez). The political resolution stated that the PCM had no confidence whatever in the Echeverría regime and that the government was totally tied to monopoly and imperialist capital.

As we have said previously in *El Socialista*, this was only an expression of the fact that the Communist party leadership had to bend to the pressure of some of its members influenced by the student radicalization.

Now, in order to propose a broad alliance between "democrats" and "revolutionists," the PCM has had to make a gradual reversal.

The new "turn" of the PCM, if we can call it that, began with a June 21, 1974, statement from the executive committee of the party's Central Committee (see the front page of *Oposición*, No. 70, June 22, 1974). There they also called for the winning of democratic freedoms as the priority task. Following the old Stalinist tradition, they posed this as the only task of the Mexican revolution today. Up to this point there was nothing strange, since the PCM has *always* had this line. But further on the statement said:

"... it is indispensable to concentrate the movement's forces on the task of blocking the most recalcitrant sectors of the oligarchy, isolating those inside and outside the government who are inciting violence and repression against revolutionary and democratic fighters. . . ."

Here there certainly is a change from the line of the sixteenth congress: One year ago the Stalinists did not yet notice these "recalcitrant sectors of the oligarchy" and directed their attacks at the "liberalizers." In the June 21 statement the PCM promised to promote "unity" with them.

This was only a preparation for the

1. The massive student movement that arose in July 1968 with strikes in the overwhelming majority of educational centers of Mexico City. The movement was smashed with the infamous October 2 massacre, in which hundreds of students were killed.—IP

second step—the sixth plenum of the PCM Central Committee (see *Oposición*, No. 71, July 10, 1974). We quote the resolution of that plenum:

"What can realistically be achieved in the current phase, given the forces of the revolutionary movement and the broad democratic-minded sectors, is not the elimination of the capitalist system. Rather, it is the conquest of political liberty." (*Oposición*, No. 71, p. 14.)

Further on, they provide the key to the entire matter we are dealing with in this article:

"The main thing now consists in finding forms in the presidential race² for a united participation by the broadest sectors of the left." (*Ibid.*, p. 15.)

To round out the picture, we will quote the editorial in No. 79 of *Oposición*:

"In addition to what may initially be limited unity in action in the short run, we think it is possible to move toward a more general agreement—for example, a common platform supporting coordinated action of left forces in the next federal election campaign—and even more far-reaching agreements."

What this means is evident: The PCM is calling for "unity" to form a broad electoral coalition. To accomplish this, it is meeting with the PPS, PST, PMT, etc. The PCM is calling for the formation of an "electoral front."

The Popular-Front Error

Up to now there has not been any sign of the possibility that some bourgeois political formation could be attracted toward the bloc proposed by the PCM.

But the PCM's call is explicit on keeping open the possibility and the invitation, as we have shown in the quotes referring to "revolutionists and democrats."

A coalition that invites joint participation with bourgeois forces in an electoral contest cannot represent the interests of the working class. Above all when its program revolves around "democratic" and anti-imperialist planks.


Let us examine the most recent step taken in the PCM's "turn"—the National Organization Conference of December 1974. Point 3 of its main resolution says:

"This unity can be the basis for a broad coalition, which in the coming general elections may represent the historic current that has promoted the fundamental democratic and anti-imperialist changes that have occurred in the country." (*Oposición*, No. 80.)

After having described the various gradual steps taken, we have reached a clear

confession of the true objective of the call for "unity."

These quotes have no resemblance to the ultraleft demagoguery the PCM used during 1971, 1972, and 1973 to lead independent



ECHEVERRIA

activists up the garden path to their organization. They have no resemblance to the "condemnation" of the "liberalizers" (ultraleft epithet for those the PCM considered were playing into the hands of LEA), whom the Stalinists are now coexisting with and even inviting as guests to the fifty-fifth anniversary dinner of the PCM (see *Oposición*, No. 79). They have no resemblance to the old slogan until recently chanted by the CPers—"We don't want liberalization, we want revolution." Finally, the quotes have no relation to the notion expressed in the resolutions of the sixteenth PCM congress that the government and the monopolistic sector of the bourgeoisie constitute a monolithic bloc.

The "popular front" called for by the PCM, one with purely "democratic" and "anti-imperialist" goals, is a formation designed to *muddle up* the aims of the working class. Its demands do not go beyond what the PRI [Partido Revolucionario Institucional—Institutional Revolutionary party, the ruling party] announces as its program. The very goals of the struggle of the working class and peasantry are missing. These objectives are postponed *until after* the struggle for democratic demands has been completed (see the end of Point 2 of the cited resolution from the sixth plenum of the Central Committee of the PCM, *Oposición*, No. 71).

This is the opposite of what Marxist theory has always pointed out: Democratic tasks can *only* be carried out by a workers and peasants revolution and *not* by an electoral coalition made up of all forces claiming to be for "democratic and anti-imperialist" demands.

The experience in Chile, where the CP entered an electoral coalition with "democratic anti-imperialist" aims, fully confirmed how mistaken the notion of such a *popular front* is. The Chilean working class was *disarmed* politically: Day and night the popular front repeated that it must not advance toward the destruction of the bourgeois state. Nonetheless, the popular front ended up destroying the Chilean workers movement.

In Mexico the PCM is creating illusions that the bloc it is proposing can lead to the conquest of democratic goals without a workers revolution having occurred first.

How Is the 'Turn' Explained?

The main resolution of the last National Organization Conference provides the key concerning the origin of the "turn." Its first point refers to the fact that in recent months links to the international "workers and communist" movement were strengthened.

Of course, this is a reference to the fact that, after having had some minor frictions (criticism of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia), its links to world Stalinism, especially to Moscow, have been strengthened once again. Ties have been reestablished. Delegations of Soviet Communist youth visit Mexico; the PCM congratulates Brezhnev more affectionately than usual on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution.

Given the world situation, nothing less could be expected. The Soviet CP is in a hurry to spread its position internationally, and it is pressuring the PCM to adopt a softer and softer line toward Echeverría. Brezhnev needs more allies for his détente plans, which are on the brink of failure. Since LEA is well known for his criticisms of imperialism, the PCM has to pave the way for Moscow to establish good diplomatic relations. If the PCM were to continue with a "hard" line toward LEA, all possibilities of tactical and diplomatic arrangements between Moscow and Mexico would be out of the question.

How Far Can the 'Turn' Go?

The fact that the leadership of the PCM has had to resort to "sugarcoating the pill" is quite indicative of the recent division in its ranks. But, at the same time, the fact that many "ex-ultraleft" youths are swallowing the medicine without a fuss or a row

2. Presidential elections will be held in Mexico in 1976. Although there are other parties participating, the PRI dominates, having ruled the country for almost fifty years.—IP

shows the deep disorientation to which they have been subjected.

In *Oposición* No. 79 there is a (social?) note where a great event is recorded—the fifty-fifth anniversary dinner of the PCM. There the broken hearts of young and old alike were mended in the midst of the hullabaloo. Old Stalinists (previously cast aside) like Dionisio Encinas were received warmly and considered worthy of conversation and comradeship by the youth—something that had not happened for a long time.

On the other hand, the PCM considers the assassination of one of its activists by the repressive forces and the persecution of twelve of its members as “a provocation” by the most reactionary forces of the Mexican bourgeoisie. A display advertisement signed by the PCM leadership in the January 12 issue of *Excelsior* explained the assassination of Hilario Moreno by the fact that Federal District chief of police, General Daniel Gutiérrez Santos, who has infiltrated the gate, is a member of an ultrareactionary clique.

Conclusion: The PCM knew how to bring many ultraleft youths from the crassest radicalism to the opportunism of a popular-frontist position.

How far will this ticket they have bought from the PCM take them? Much further, without any doubt. *Oposición* is already talking about “reinforcing” the foreign policy of LEA (*Oposición*, No. 79) without a single word of condemnation of the real character of this policy.

For the Stalinists the PRI government is not in the least way responsible for such actions [assassination and persecution of Communists]. Moreover, the PCM raises as one of the reasons for its call for “unity” the need to block that ultrareactionary wing of the Mexican bourgeoisie.

Where will it all lead? In the short run, to a policy of class collaboration, to forgetting that the workers revolution is the most important task of our time. In the longer run, to support for LEA, since he is being “attacked by the darkest forces of the oligarchy.” □

VW Reports \$336 Million Loss in 1974

Volkswagen, the leading West German auto company, announced May 12 a loss of \$336 million in its worldwide operations for 1974. It was the first time the company reported a loss. Toni Schmücker, the managing director, predicted a similar loss in 1975.

Worldwide sales dropped 12%. Sales in the United States, which usually account for one-third of Volkswagen's total sales, fell by 30%. The company has laid off 40% of its German work force.

Fall of Lin Piao Came As a Shock

Indian Maoists Criticize Peking

By Sharad Jhaveri

JAMNAGAR—A group of Naxalites who had been followers of the late Lin Piao have raised several questions about the role of the Chinese Communist party in Lin Piao's downfall. A report by this group charging that the “CPC owes an explanation,” appeared in the November 16, 1974, issue of the leftist West Bengal weekly *Frontier*, which often publishes material on discussions within the Naxalite movement.

The pro-Lin Piao group refuses to view the downfall of Lin Piao as an internal question of the Chinese CP. It says that Lin's downfall has caused severe divisions among the Indian Naxalites, because the Communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist) had based its strategy of guerrilla warfare on the “people's war” thesis propounded by Lin.

The report said, “Because a succinct formulation of the role of guerrilla warfare in mobilising the masses against the enemy is not there in any of the Chairman's [Mao's] works, Charu Mazumdar naturally had to defend himself and his thesis on the authority of Lin Piao.”

Until 1969, the dispatch pointed out, no Naxalites dared question Lin's authority. Charu Mazumdar had called on the CPI(ML) cadres to establish the authority of “Comrade Lin Piao” as the only means of establishing Mao Tsetung Thought on Indian soil. All was well so long as Lin Piao was firmly in the saddle. Authority flowed from the chairman through the vice-chairman to Charu Mazumdar.

Lin Piao's downfall was a severe shock to this Naxalite group. In an organization like the CPI(ML), engaged in armed actions isolated from the mass struggle and closely patterned on Mao's bureaucratized party, the influence of authority is quite strong.

In discussing the role of Lin Piao and Charu Mazumdar, the report said, “Authority is science, authority is the correct revolutionary politics and hence makes no mistake.” It further stated that, “the history of the party of Lenin and that of the Chairman teaches us that the revolutionary party grows only around a single individual and that the correct politics has always been associated with the thinking of an individual.”

This Naxalite group considered Lin Piao's emergence as Mao's successor the most significant outcome of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. It has therefore demanded from the Chinese CP more information about the “crimes” of Lin Piao.

The group also suspects that the issues behind Lin's downfall go deeper than the explanations given by the Chinese Maoists.

The report noted the sudden and continued silence of the Chinese CP and Peking Radio regarding the CPI(ML). “Since 1971 September till this day,” it stated, “the CPC has not had a single word to say about Naxalbari or about the CPI(ML) or about the martyrdom of our beloved leader,” Charu Mazumdar.

The report questions the policy of the Chinese CP in aiding the bourgeois regime in Sri Lanka to crush the JVP. It said that peaceful coexistence is subordinate to proletarian internationalism and that under no circumstances can the latter be sacrificed or ignored, even temporarily, in order to preserve the former.

The report charges the CPC with sacrificing proletarian internationalism. It asks, “How can one explain the fact that the CPC is less concerned about the fate of world revolution to-day than at any time before?”

The group thinks that “revisionists” have once again gained the leadership of the Chinese CP and criticizes the diplomacy of Chou En-lai.

The discussion among Indian Naxalites has not yet gone beyond the limits of Stalinist politics and practice. The Naxalites still do not realize that the manner of Lin Piao's elevation as Mao's successor and his sudden downfall is totally alien to the Leninist tradition and has nothing to do with real Marxism. Their utterly blind worship and reverence for authority prevents them from critically evaluating Lin Piao's thesis of “people's war” from a correct Marxist standpoint.

Nevertheless, this document is significant. It shows the extent to which many Naxalites have gone in questioning the credentials of the Chinese Communist party. □

U.S. Unemployment Will Hit 11.5 Percent, Meany Says

AFL-CIO President George Meany predicted May 6 that the U.S. unemployment rate would reach 11.5 percent before the current slump “bottoms out.” At present, unemployment is officially listed at 8.9 percent.

Intercontinental Press

India's Naxalite Movement Reviews Its Strategy

By Sharad Jhaveri

JAMNAGAR—Eight different groupings are reported to have existed in the Communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist), often known as the Naxalite movement. But at present, only three tendencies in this Maoist party are significant.

The diehard faction following the late Charu Mazumdar¹ ignores Peking's criticism of Naxalite strategy and believes the "annihilation tactic" is correct. That is, it continues to call for the "annihilation" of class enemies such as individual landlords, moneylenders, and capitalists. It rejects mass participation in revolutionary activity and the building of mass organizations.

The second faction is the Satyanarayan Singh group. It functions as the breakaway CPI(ML) and refuses to accept its share of responsibility for the left adventurism and left opportunism of the CPI(ML). The Singh group claims to lead the entire Maoist movement in India.

The third faction consists of supporters of six members of the Central Committee of the original CPI(ML) who have refused to identify with either of the present-day CPI(ML)s. This group is trying to reunite the party on a new basis.

The six leaders—Kolla Venkaiah, Chowdhary Tejeswara Rao (Andhra Pradesh); Kanu Sanyal, Souren Bose (West Bengal); and Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik and Nagabhushanam Patnaik (Orissa)—issued a statement accusing Charu Mazumdar of suppressing the Chinese CP's criticism of the CPI(ML)'s tactical line.² These leaders, followed later by Asim Chatterji, have accepted Peking's criticism.

According to their statement, the Chinese Communist party criticized the "secret assassination" line of the CPI(ML), stating that it needed "rethinking." Peking was also reported to have criticized the CPI(ML) "formulation that if a revolutionary does not make his hand red with the blood of class enemies, then he is not a Communist."

The Chinese leadership thinks that the CPI(ML)'s idea of a "united front" (that it

can be formed only after base areas are created) is based on a "mechanical understanding" of the Maoist strategy. Peking's "suggestion," according to the six Naxalite leaders, was that "the main understanding behind the United Front is the unity between the exploiter and the exploited (those exploiters who are not the main target of the revolution)."

In addition, the letter stated, the Chinese CP criticized the Naxalite "formulation that the open trade unions, open mass organizations and mass movements are out of date" and that "secret assassinations" are the best forms of struggle. "Without mass struggle, and mass organisation, the peasants' armed struggle cannot be sustained."

Moreover, the Chinese CP was said to have regarded the CPI(ML)'s application of Lin Piao's theory of "people's war" as "mechanical."

The letter also said, "No stress has been given on agrarian revolution and the slogan for the seizure of the state power is counterposed to the land problem. There is no agrarian programme."

In fact, however, the first theoretical denunciation of the CPI(ML)'s "annihilation" tactic was voiced as early as 1970 by the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee (the Nagi Reddy group), which had not joined the CPI(ML).³

The Nagi Reddy group was critical of the CPI(ML) from the beginning. While Kanu Sanyal, a main leader of the CPI(ML), characterized the 1967 Naxalbari uprising as a struggle for state power, the Nagi Reddy leadership in Andhra Pradesh viewed it as a struggle for land and not for state power in the immediate sense.

The Nagi Reddy group also opposed the attempt to impose the All-India Co-ordinating Committee of Communist Revolutionaries from above. It did not approve of converting the AICCCR into a party—the CPI(ML)—overnight without such minimal requirements as a programme and a constitution.⁴

3. The Nagi Reddy group, originally known as the Andhra State Co-ordination Committee, was affiliated with the All-India Co-ordinating Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR). When the AICCCR formed the CPI(ML) on April 22, 1969, the Nagi Reddy group disaffiliated itself from the main Naxalite movement and changed its name to the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee.—IP

4. According to a report in the March 8, 1975,

The Satyanarayan Singh group of the CPI(ML) and the Chandra Pulla Reddy group of the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee are reported to have discussed the problems of unity among Communist revolutionists in India. Their joint statement called for an end to antagonistic relations at once, for an exchange of documents and other publications, and for an earnest effort to form a new AICCCR.⁵ The Nagi Reddy group was not involved in these unity talks.

The statement poses rejection of the parliamentary path as the sole issue of the Indian revolution. It ignores the question of a programme for agrarian revolution.

Roots of the Naxalite Movement

Taking its inspiration from the 1967 tribal peasant revolt in Naxalbari, a small enclave of West Bengal, the Naxalite movement marked the return of the Maoist perspective after the Telengana upsurge.⁶ It has passed through several stages.

The first period covered the struggle in Naxalbari itself. This was suppressed by the United Front government of West Bengal, which was dominated by the CPI (Marxist).⁷

The second period, dating from the collapse of this struggle, lasted until the formation of the CPI(ML) in 1969. During this period the activities of various Naxalite groups were under the direction of the AICCCR.

The third period began in early April 1969. It saw the emergence of the CPI(ML) and the withdrawal of the Nagi Reddy group. This period lasted roughly up to early 1970. It was marked by the CPI(ML)'s attempts to form "red bases" in rural areas and by the adoption of "annihilation of the

issue of the *Bombay Economic and Political Weekly*, Kanu Sanyal also criticized the formation of the CPI(ML), calling it a "divisive act."—IP

5. The Satyanarayan Singh faction and the Chandra Pulla Reddy group have since merged.—IP

6. The peasant insurrection in the Telugu-speaking region of southeastern India lasted from 1946 to 1951, and was led by young members of the Communist party of India, despite the twists and turns in the CPI's political line in the rest of the country. According to Mohan Ram in his book *Maoism in India* (1971), the guerrilla actions in Telengana were called off in 1951 under pressure from Moscow.—IP

7. The first popular-front government came to power in West Bengal in 1967. It was formally led by the bourgeois Bangla Congress, although the CPI(M) was the largest component of the coalition. At the time of the Naxalbari uprising, CPI(M) leader Jyoti Basu was the minister of police.—IP

1. Charu Mazumdar was the main leader of the CPI(ML) until his arrest in Calcutta on July 16, 1972. He died in prison twelve days later.—IP

2. The letter by the six Naxalite leaders was written from prison and circulated among CPI(ML) members before Mazumdar's arrest and death. According to the six, the letter was based on criticisms the Chinese Communist party made of the CPI(ML) line in November 1970.—IP

class enemy" as the only tactical line for revolution.

This was perhaps the most important period in the history of the Naxalite movement in India. Armed struggles were launched in several places, including Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh, and Debra in West Bengal.⁸ It was during this period that the Srikakulam Girijan armed struggle in Andhra Pradesh was taken over by Charu Mazumdar and eventually destroyed by his "annihilation" line.

It was also during this period that the CPI(ML) began to ignore all forms of economic struggle on the ground that "to attempt agrarian revolution without first smashing the state machinery is straight-forward revisionism."

Even the task of organizing political campaigns was given a low priority in this period. Their policy implied the rejection of the "mass line" and the building of mass organizations in favor of forming a secret, elitist organization.

During this period the Naxalites went to the villages and ignored the mass movements and proletarian struggles in the cities. In fact, they had no programme for the city proletariat as such.

The fourth period was marked by the return of the Naxalites to the cities, especially Calcutta and the adjacent towns. They carried out raids on educational institutions, disfigured the statues of national leaders, and boycotted examinations. "Annihilation" tactics were also applied in the cities.

The last period saw severe repression by the government. The Naxalites were isolated from the masses and infiltrated by agents provocateurs, informers, and spies. Many of their supporters were arrested and tortured.

Throughout these ups and downs, the political ideology and strategy of the Naxalites has not changed much, despite the differences between the various factions. In their view, India is a semicolonial, semifeudal state ruled by the comprador-bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords.

The principal contradiction, they believe, is between feudalism and the masses of peasants. They compare the situation in India with the prerevolutionary situation in China before 1949 and want to carry out an anti-imperialist, antifeudal, and anticom-

prador New Democratic Revolution against the proimperialist, antinational capitalist class—but not against the national bourgeoisie.

This view completely ignores the capitalist development—by no means modest—of agriculture and industry in India. It is based on a mistaken appreciation of the class character of the Indian state, which is a classical bourgeois state and not a feudal formation.

The Naxalites think that the immediate tasks of the Indian revolution in the present phase cannot be defined in terms of a socialist revolution, that is, the overthrow of capitalist rule and the creation of a workers state based on the alliance of the proletariat with the poor and landless peasantry. Hence, its overall programme does not basically go beyond the limitations of a bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Two-Stage Theory

They hold a two-stage theory of revolution. They want to first complete the anti-imperialist and antifeudal tasks and then proceed to the "next stage" of anticapitalist, socialist revolution.

In their view, there can be no skipping over the first stage. Hence, their political strategy of forming a bloc of four classes in which the anti-imperialist bourgeoisie is to join hands with the antifeudal peasantry, the proletariat, and the landless peasantry.

The overall military strategy of Naxalism flows from and is subordinated to this political viewpoint. Since the thrust of the revolution is to be antifeudal, rich peasants opposed to feudalism are to be the allies of the landless peasantry.

The antifeudal character of the revolution also dictates, in their view, greater concentration on rural villages than on the cities. They believe that the villages of India will rise up and take advantage of the revolutionary situation and its potential for armed struggle. The villages will then engulf the towns and liberate them.

This conception patently ignores the ramifications of the massive development, both bureaucratic and military, of the centralized state apparatus since the period of British rule. This process has been stepped up considerably by the Indian bourgeoisie through panchayats,⁹ Community Development Projects, the National Extension Services, and so forth.

In addition, this conception ignores the vital and potentially revolutionary role of the Indian proletariat that has emerged from the massive industrialization drive launched by the Indian capitalist state since 1951.

The Naxalites also overlook (and this

proved fatal in their isolation and virtual suppression) the Indian capitalist state's capacity to isolate and ultimately destroy sporadic regional armed struggles or attempts at armed struggle that do not have the backing of mass struggles developed on an all-India scale. Their conception of armed struggle does not take into account the state's capacity for armed intervention at a moment's notice wherever such struggles erupt and threaten the stability of the bourgeois regime.

Because of its adherence to Peking, the Naxalite movement could not adequately come to grips with the Bangladesh crisis and Peking's support to the Sri Lanka capitalist regime's drive to suppress the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front).¹⁰ Both these events created considerable consternation among the Naxalites.

It is unfortunate that the Naxalite ferment has not yet called into question the basic political postulates of Maoism, both as an ideology and as a strategy applied to the case of India. The review of strategy now taking place is still being carried on within the overall political framework of Maoism. The Naxalites have retained Maoism's basic ideas of a two-stage revolution, a "bloc of four classes," and exclusive reliance on peasant armed struggle.

The historic contribution of Naxalism is that it voiced a powerful protest by sincere revolutionists—the flower of Indian youth—against the reformist abuse of youthful revolutionary idealism through the parliamentary aims of the Stalinist and left-centrist movements. In its original form, Naxalism represented a search for the correct road to building a nonparliamentary mass revolutionary party as the basis for a mass uprising against capitalist rule in India. □

10. Peking gave the Pakistani regime political support during the Bangladesh struggle for independence in 1971. The JVP was the main target of fierce repression launched by the Bandaranaike regime in March 1971.—IP

Washington's Blockade of Cuba 'Backfired,' Senator Percy Says

The U.S. embargo against Cuba has "backfired" and should be ended, Republican Senator Charles Percy said in a speech from the Senate floor May 6.

"The economic and political isolation of Cuba, initiated unilaterally by the United States, was never successful," he said, "despite the fact that 14 OAS [Organization of American States] nations subsequently joined us and agreed formally to the isolation of the Castro government. In retrospect, the policy backfired; instead of bringing down the Castro regime, it helped to unify the Cuban people in support of their revolutionary leaders."

8. Agrarian struggles by the Girijan tribespeople in the Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh began in 1959, leading to mass actions by 1967. In 1969, the state government sent in troops and declared many parts of Srikakulam "disturbed areas." The repression in Srikakulam still continues. (See *Intercontinental Press*, July 8, 1974, p. 896.) Guerrilla actions in the Debra-Gopivallabpur area of West Bengal were launched in October 1969, largely by students from Calcutta.—IP

9. Panchayats are local administrative units on the village level.—IP

Pressure Mounts for Take-over of United Brands

By Judy White

The bribery scandal in Honduras continues to unravel as students, union officials, and now the country's attorney general demand that the holdings of the U.S. multinational corporation United Brands be nationalized.

On May 15 deposed Honduran Economics Minister Abraham Bennaton Ramos was named as bagman for the \$1.25 million bribe paid by United Brands to ensure that banana export taxes in that country would be lowered by \$7.5 million a year. Bennaton was identified by a fact-finding commission set up by the new Honduran government. Three telegrams uncovered by the commission revealed that United Brands transferred the funds to Bennaton's Swiss bank account on September 4, 1974.

Jorge Arturo Reina, speaking for the fact-finding commission, said that Eli M. Black, former chairman of United Brands, went to the Honduran capital in 1974 to personally offer former President Oswaldo Arellano López "several hundred thousand" dollars "to fix the banana problem." The president reportedly refused the offer at the time. But when banana negotiations were "at a difficult point," Black received a phone call in New York "supposedly from Mr. Bennaton," suggesting another meeting on the same topic.

Bennaton was reported to have initially asked United Brands for \$5 million and then to have settled for \$2.5 million—\$1.25 million to be paid immediately after the export tax was lowered, the remaining \$1.25 million to be paid in the spring of 1975.

The commission said it had placed Bennaton with Harvey W. Johnson, a vice-president of the banana division of United Brands, in Miami in mid-August; and with John A. Taylor, senior vice-president in charge of United's banana operations, in Zurich on September 3 and 4—the date and place indicated in the telegrams regarding the transfer of funds.

López and Bennaton have both refused to allow the fact-finding commission to examine their Swiss bank accounts. They are the only two officials questioned by the commission to have done so.

In response to the commission's report, Honduran Attorney General Serapio Hernández Castellanos has called for the expropriation of all United Brands installations in the country. "The chief of state must make a decision to nationalize," he said. United Brands holdings are believed to be worth at least \$50 million, represen-

ting one of the largest U.S. investments in Central America.

United Brands faces court action in both Honduras and the United States. Hernández Castellanos announced that the company would be prosecuted for bribing an official of the Honduran government. The U.S. Security and Exchange Commission has filed a brief accusing United Brands of mounting an "effort to continue to conceal the true scope and extent" of foreign payments. It has requested examination of the company's records and a full report on "corporate funds which may have been used for improper payment to government officials, foreign or domestic, or for other improper purposes." □



Alternativa

Gulf Oil Under Fire in Bolivia

Less than a week after Gulf Oil denied having bribed any Bolivian officials, Gulf Chairman Bob R. Dorsey admitted May 16 to a Senate subcommittee that Gulf had made \$460,000 in "political contributions" in Bolivia between 1966 and 1969.

In 1966, Gulf gave Bolivian President René Barrientos a helicopter costing \$110,000. This was followed by two additional contributions, according to Dorsey: "the first apparently for \$240,000, and the second for \$110,000."

Dorsey said that there were "certain indications that various representatives of General Barrientos's political party may also have been involved," but pleaded ignorance of the details pending further "investigation" by Gulf.

On May 18 the Bolivian government made its third demand for an explanation from Gulf Oil. It requested that the company identify "without delay or ambiguity" all persons who had received political contributions.

Two days later, the regime placed Carlos Dorado Chopitea, Gulf's Bolivian representative, under house arrest. The government also ordered Dorsey to appear in court in Bolivia and said Gulf would be "criminally prosecuted" for making illegal political contributions.

Meanwhile, police in La Paz were placed on emergency alert to prevent a student-organized march "to defend the nation's dignity." The police—armed with clubs, dogs, tear gas, and guns—stationed them-

selves around the University of La Paz, the departure point for the march. □

Koreans Shocked at Gulf Bribe

Opposition leaders expressed shock at learning May 17 that Gulf Oil, the biggest foreign investor in South Korea, had made \$4 million in "political contributions" to the ruling Democratic Republican party of Park Chung Hee, \$3 million of the total just before the 1971 elections.

Kim Young Sam, president of the New Democratic party, said the bribe was a "national shame." "If Gulf did it, there is no reason why others may not have," he said.

U.S. Banana Companies Denounced in Costa Rica

Costa Rican Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio charged three U.S. fruit companies of conspiring to keep Central American banana-producing countries from raising export taxes. According to Associated Press, he said May 20 that he had unconfirmed reports that Del Monte, Standard Fruit, and United Brands set up a \$5 million fund to destabilize the governments favoring levies on banana exports.

Facio made the charge as the Costa Rican legislature prepared to vote on a bill that would expropriate uncultivated lands owned by United Brands and Standard Fruit. The two companies have \$200 million invested in Costa Rica.

The Student Protests in Malaysia

By Ernest Harsch

In the autumn of 1974, the students of Malaysia followed the example set by their Thai and South Korean counterparts. They took to the streets to protest political repression, government corruption, and deteriorating economic conditions. As in the massive social outburst that rocked Thailand the year before, the actions of the Malaysian students came at a time when sectors of the working class and peasantry had also begun to move.

In "The Student Revolt in Malaysia," published in the March 1975 *Young Socialist*,* the first issue of a new magazine of the New Zealand Trotskyists, Mike Treen outlines the factors behind the rising discontent in Malaysia and recounts the major events of the upsurge. The author is the welfare vice-president of the Auckland University Students Association and has been active in the defense of Khoo Ee Liam, a Malaysian student who had studied in New Zealand and who is now a political prisoner in Malaysia.

Treen points out that the wretched conditions of the Malaysian masses result from the same economic problems that face the other semicolonial countries, which have achieved formal independence without throwing out the imperialist interests and overturning capitalism.

Malaysia's foreign exchange earnings are heavily dependent on two main products, rubber and tin, which account for 40% of all exports. Moreover, 60% of the tin and 50% of the rubber exported is owned by foreign companies. Treen cites figures indicating the scope of the imperialist plunder:

"Between 1957 and 1966 over three thousand million Malay dollars [about US\$1.25 billion] were taken out of the country in the form of profits to these companies." This figure has increased each year, so that by 1970 the "capital outflow represents some fifteen percent of Malaysia's Gross National Product."

In addition, about 73% of the best agricultural land is owned by foreign-controlled companies. There are 350,000 peasant families with no land or not enough to sustain them. From one-half to two-thirds of the rice farmers are tenants, paying from one-third to one-half of their crops for rent. The concentration of investment in profi-

table extractive industries like rubber has reduced the amount of land used for food production.

The dependency of the neocolonial economy on a few exports exposes it, and the workers employed in those industries, to the price fluctuations of the world market. Added to this instability is the general tendency for the price of raw materials exported from the semicolonies to decrease in relation to the price of industrial imports. Treen notes that the amount of rubber exports needed by Malaysia to pay for one ton of imported steel rose 334% from 1951 to 1961.

Especially devastating to Malaysia's poor has been the rampant inflation. During the past two years, the prices of basic necessities, such as beef, milk, flour, and bread, have risen between 50% and 200%.

The resulting unrest has not been overlooked by the Malay-Chinese ruling classes. They inherited the repressive Internal Security Act from the period of direct British colonial rule and supplemented it with the Trade Union Ordinance, Trade Union Act, Sedition Act, Employment Ordinance, and University and University Colleges Act.

The regime has the power to jail anyone without trial for two years or more. Strikes by unrecognized unions are illegal, and in the words of the Sedition Act, "a tendency to raise discontent or disaffection among the subjects of the King or the ruler of any state" is outlawed.

"There are up to two thousand political prisoners in Malaysia," Treen writes, "including members of parliament, city councillors, prominent leaders of opposition parties, teachers, students, and trade unionists."

It was against this background that the Malaysian student movement developed. The initial student actions in April 1971 protested the introduction of the University and University Colleges Act, which restricts political activity on campuses. In October 1973, during the war in the Arab East, Malaysian students held a demonstration of 10,000 outside the U.S. embassy in support of the Palestinian struggle.

When the regime of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak attempted to abolish university autonomy at the beginning of 1974, the students and teachers responded with a ten-day wave of protests, demonstrations, and boycotts that forced Razak to back down.

By the fall of 1974, student protests began to be directed against inflation, unemployment, and government corruption. In September, Federal Reserve Units swept through squatters' settlements on the outskirts of Johore Bahru and began demolishing the shacks. The inhabitants protested this action and the University of Malaya Students Union rallied to their defense.

Students occupied the University of Malaya and some went to Johore Bahru to support the squatters. The regime cracked down, arresting student leaders and dozens of squatters. The UMSU was suspended.

Two months later, in the Baling area of northern Malaysia, widespread malnutrition among the rubber tappers, who make up most of the population there, sparked a series of demonstrations. On November 21, about 13,000 persons demonstrated against food shortages in Baling. They were attacked by riot police. Another protest, this time of 25,000 persons, took place December 1.

"These demonstrations," Treen writes, "occurring at a time when workers' strikes were becoming more and more frequent, were the major reason for the government sensitivity to the militant protests of students that were to follow."

When the news of the protests in Baling reached the students, they took to the streets in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, and Ipoh, protesting inflation, unemployment, falling rubber prices, and government corruption. More than 1,000 students were arrested, and paramilitary police occupied the two main universities in Kuala Lumpur. Student protests and rallies continued for several days, and boycotts of classes and exams were launched.

The Razak regime went on a propaganda offensive by trying to link student leaders with the underground Malayan Communist party, and by charging that they had been inspired by "alien elements."

Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn accused the Malaysian students abroad of spreading a "hate Malaysia" campaign. Khoo Ee Liam and Wong Siong Seng, another Malaysian student who had studied in New Zealand, were arrested upon their return to Malaysia.

Treen concludes his report of the Malaysian upsurge by noting that New Zealand's Labour government has close ties with Kuala Lumpur. It provides the Razak regime with millions of dollars in "aid," half of which is military, and refuses asylum to Malaysian students.

He points out that New Zealand students can help put an end to this collaboration by organizing a protest movement to demand the immediate withdrawal of all New Zealand troops in Malaysia, an end to aid to the repressive regime in Kuala Lumpur, and the release of all Malaysian political prisoners. □

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Capitalism Fouls Things Up

'We Will Not Be Guinea Pigs'

By Ernest Harsch

More than 20,000 persons demonstrated in Paris April 26, protesting the French government's plans to build dozens of nuclear power stations throughout the country.

A leaflet distributed at the demonstration said that "nuclear power stations destroy rivers and streams and contribute to the death of the ocean." One of the many chants was directed against Westinghouse and General Electric, the two main U.S. companies involved in the French nuclear program: "We will not be the guinea pigs of the multinationals."

The Paris demonstration was organized by Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth), Mouvement Ecologique (Ecology Movement), and Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU—United Socialist party). Participating in the action was a wide range of groups, including Comité Antimilitariste (Antimilitarist Committee), *Révolution!*, and the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist League, French section of the Fourth International).

Similar demonstrations took place in other parts of France. At Paluel, in Normandy, one of the sites chosen by the EDF (Electricité de France, the government electricity board) for a nuclear power station, about 2,500 persons demonstrated on April 26 and April 27. On the second day, the protesters tried to occupy the nuclear construction site, but were prevented from doing so by police.

In addition, 2,000 persons rallied at a nuclear construction site at Gravelines in northern France April 26. At Aramon, 300 demonstrators protested the construction of a thermal power plant in that area. An "antinuclear picnic" was held at Cheppes-la-Prairie, the site of another proposed nuclear power station, on April 27, drawing 200 participants.

The movement against the construction of nuclear power plants has spread to other European countries. A demonstration in Bern, Switzerland, was also held on April 26. Among the participants were members of the LCR, Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (GIM—International Marxist Group, German section of the Fourth International), and Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire

(LMR—Revolutionary Marxist League, Swiss section of the Fourth International).

The April 26 demonstrations followed the eruption of broad-based movements against nuclear power stations and other polluting industries in France, Switzerland, and West Germany. (See *Intercontinental Press*, April 21, p. 531.)

At Marckolsheim in France, residents recently forced the authorities to abandon plans for a polluting chemical factory, and at Wyhl, West Germany, villagers from both the French and German sides of the border halted construction of a nuclear power plant by occupying the building site. A nuclear construction site at Kaiseraugst, Switzerland, was also occupied.

Opposition to the construction of a nuclear plant at Fessenheim, on the French side of the Rhine River, has been voiced since 1971. A demonstration is planned there for the end of May.

The spreading protests threaten the French government's plans to build from forty to fifty 1 million-kilowatt nuclear power plants in France by 1980 and to enter the international market with its new liquid-metal fast-breeder reactors.

In addition to harmful nuclear waste, water pollution, and gas emissions, accidents at the proposed plants would also pose a serious danger. The planned French nuclear power stations are of the same type as twenty U.S. plants that were temporarily shut down in September 1974 after the discovery of cracks in their cooling systems. Moreover, the fast-breeder Phenix reactor that Paris plans to develop commercially lacks many of the minimal safety features required in the United States.

The French nuclear program has drawn criticism from the French labor movement. A union of agricultural workers called for a halt to the building of the Braud Saint-Louis plant, which had removed more than 600 acres of land from cultivation by the end of 1974.

Seventeen unions of EDF workers, belonging to the Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail (CFDT—French Democratic Confederation of Labor), passed a resolution March 20 calling on the government to "immediately suspend pres-

ent and planned construction in order to examine all uncertainties, shortcomings, and dangers involved in this program."

On March 15, the CFDT unionists of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS—National Center for Scientific Research) stated, "The danger of radioactive contamination concerns everyone. Yet it is particularly grave for those workers most directly concerned (mines, reprocessing plants, etc.)." The union then demanded "an immediate halt to the EDF program for the massive introduction of nuclear power plants" and called for a moratorium on their construction for several years. □

High Cancer Rate Found in Atomic Bomb Survivors

The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission reports that leukemia, a form of cancer known to be induced by radiation, has increased as much as thirty times among some groups of survivors of the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This increase reached a peak in 1953. But for those who received the most exposure to radiation, the leukemia rate was still higher than normal twenty-five years after the bombing.

Scientists have found that women exposed to the nuclear radiation suffered a higher risk of breast cancer; for women who were between the ages of ten and nineteen at the time of the bombing, the risk was six times greater than normal.

Micronesian delegates to a conference on nuclear bombs at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji Islands, charged that since a 1954 U.S. hydrogen bomb test near Rongelap island, 16 of 17 children born on the island have had surgery for thyroid tumors. One of the children died of myelogenous leukemia in November 1974. In addition, the rate of stillbirths was more than double the rate for the rest of the Marshall Islands, while the death rate for all persons on Rongelap stood at 13 per 1,000 in 1963 compared with 8.3 per 1,000 for the other islands.



AROUND THE WORLD



Mass Arrests in Basque Country

More than 1,300 persons have been arrested in Bilbao since the Franco regime declared a state of emergency in the Basque provinces of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya April 25. Roman Catholic spokesmen and civil-rights lawyers say that at least 2,000 persons were detained for questioning throughout the region in the first month of the decree.

The churchmen and attorneys said that several of those arrested were tortured.

The state of emergency was declared in a crackdown against Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA—Basque Nation and Freedom), but those arrested also include other Basque nationalists, Communists, Socialists, Trotskyists, Maoists, and Catholic priests. Lawyers report that most of them are teenage students and workers.

Vietnam Veteran's Reaction to Refugees

President Ford let it be known that he was "damn mad" at the hostile reception America gave to the refugees he had whisked out of Vietnam. "It just burns me up," he said.

Ford was not the only angry American, however.

"They are giving these people the red-carpet treatment," a Vietnam veteran in

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, near the refugee camp there, said in an interview with the *Chicago Sun-Times*. "I can tell you, the Governor of Arkansas didn't come out when I came home. And they didn't have no band music. . . ."

"I hear this guy Quang is in the camp at Chaffee. Boy, he was a big crook over there. Everyone knew about him, even us boonie rats. Course, that's the way it was in Vietnam, all corruption, everyone after a buck—the Vietnamese and the Americans both.

"That's another thing that stinks. You know these here refugees ain't the rice paddy farmers, the poor ones who never did have nothin'. These are the people who made the buck and spent it in the right place to get out. When I heard they was comin' over, I was damned mad, I'll tell you. . . ."

Czechoslovak Arms Supplier Has Second Thoughts on Sale to Chile

A Czechoslovak proposal to sell arms to the Chilean junta has been vetoed by the Soviet Union, according to a report in the May 11 London *Sunday Times*. Chile had negotiated to buy ten million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition from Prague.

The Czechoslovak supplier, Omnipol, decided to check with Moscow as a precaution following an earlier rebuke by the Russians over the sale of machine guns to Lebanese Phalangists.

Peking Leaders Laud Stalin, Compare Brezhnev to Hitler

In one of the most virulent attacks to date against the Soviet leadership, Peking charged May 9 that "the Soviet Union today is under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the German fascist type, a dictatorship of the Hitler type."

The Soviet leaders, said an editorial in the *People's Daily*, "are trying to embark on Hitler's beaten track of world domination."

Entitled "Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of Victory Over German Fascism," the editorial said: ". . . as a result of the usurpation of the party and government power by the Khrushchov-Brezhnev renegade clique, an historical retrogression has

taken place in the Soviet Union. . . . The world's first socialist state has degenerated into social-imperialism and social-fascism. The socialist bulwark which Hitler troops in their millions were unable to conquer has been captured from within by the Khrushchov-Brezhnev renegade clique. This handful of renegades has accomplished what Hitler wanted but failed to carry out."

The editorial said that the Brezhnev leadership only "pretends" to celebrate the victory over Hitler Germany. "They negate Stalin's world-recognized meritorious deeds in the anti-fascist war and, with ulterior motives, laud Brezhnev instead."

According to the Chinese leaders, "Stalin, as the leader of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people and as the supreme commander of the Soviet armed forces, led the war as a whole and all major battles and won final victory. . . . To negate Stalin's meritorious deeds in the anti-fascist war is to negate in fact the heroic exploits of the Soviet people and the Soviet army and nullify the socialist system under the dictatorship of the Soviet proletariat at that time."

The *People's Daily* said further that "the flaunting by the Soviet revisionists of the role of liberators" in Eastern Europe "is no more than a cover-up for their colonialist rule over a number of East European countries."


These "hegemony seekers will certainly meet the same fate as Hitler's Third Reich and will be consigned to the rubbish heap of history," it said.

Gandhi Forced to Drop 'Internal Security' Bill

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was forced to withdraw a repressive bill she had introduced in the lower house of Parliament after opposition members charged that she was attempting to impose a dictatorship.

The bill, proposed as an amendment to the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, would have allowed the government to detain persons in "disturbed areas" for two years without trial or the right to appeal to advisory boards.

Even without the amendment, New Delhi has used MISA against striking railroad workers, political dissidents, and students. The regime has admitted that 5,000 persons



America has a tradition of opening its doors to immigrants from all countries—President Ford

Interlandi/Los Angeles Times

are imprisoned under the act. Opponents of Gandhi say the figure is much higher.

The amendment was designed to eliminate a safeguard in the Indian constitution permitting prisoners to appeal to courts or advisory boards for their release.

Had the bill passed, virtually all civil liberties would have been suspended in "disturbed areas." The bill also allowed for the detention of anyone "likely to commit or attempt to commit prejudicial acts."

Minister of Home Affairs K. Brahmananda Reddy told the members of Parliament May 8 that the bill would be reintroduced in the fall.

New Nationalizations in Portugal

The Portuguese government nationalized the cement, paper, and tobacco industries May 14. Two days later it nationalized five unnamed manufacturing concerns, bringing to forty-eight the number of companies nationalized within ten days.

Lisbon also prohibited companies from declaring bankruptcy or distributing dividends without official approval. It said any businessman caught stripping companies of their assets faced eight years in prison.

In addition, the regime decreed that no one could earn more than \$1,458 a month and that wages above \$500 a month would be frozen as of June 1. The national minimum wage was raised from \$137 to \$167 a month.

Honduran Peasants Occupy Land

Ten thousand peasants who had occupied land in various parts of Honduras in mid-May demanding a speedup of agrarian reform decided to withdraw peacefully on May 23, according to a government statement.

The peasants are members of the National Union of Farmers. Reuters reported May 24 that the new military government had threatened to use force if they did not end their occupation.

The first concrete measure promised by the junta following its bloodless coup April 22 was the distribution of 1.5 million acres of uncultivated land to 120,000 families over the next five years. The land involved includes holdings of United Brands and Standard Fruit.

Greek Trotskyists in Canada Hold May Day Celebration

On May 10, the Group of Communist Internationalists, Greek supporters of the Fourth International in Canada, held its first public meeting in Toronto. About sixty persons came to a celebration of May Day where speeches were given in Greek and English.

The Group of Communist Internationalists distributes *Ergatike Pale*, the weekly paper of the Greek section of the Fourth

International. It also publishes its own bulletin called *Deltio*, the May issue of which contains several articles on the history of May Day.

This issue also includes a communiqué on the first conference of the Greek section since the fall of the dictatorship and the manifesto of the conference; a document adopted by a meeting of the Political Bureaus of the European sections of the Fourth International, "The Development of the Communist Parties in Capitalist Europe"; and an article by Leon Trotsky on terrorism. *Deltio* is entirely in Greek.

Information on the Group of Communist Internationalists and Marxist literature in Greek can be obtained from Vanguard Books, 334 Queen Street W., Toronto, Canada.

Storm of Protest in Britain Over Judge's Racist Remarks

After sentencing five Caribbean youths to five years in prison on robbery charges, London Judge Gwyn Morris declared in court that "ruthless and sophisticated footpads [muggers]" had become "a monotonous feature in the suburbs of Brixton and Clapham," two areas of London heavily populated by Black immigrants. The areas, he said, "within memory were peaceful, safe and agreeable to live in. But the immigrant resettlement which has occurred over the last 25 years has radically transformed that environment."

Following a barrage of protest, he qualified his racist remarks, stating that they were "confined to the facts and circumstances of the case I tried."

Argentine Police Torture Hugo Cores

Hugo Andrés Cores Perez, the former vice-president of the Uruguayan Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (National Workers Congress) and former president of the Asociación de Empleados Bancarios (Association of Bank Employees), was jailed by Argentine police April 14.

Cores is an Argentine citizen, having emigrated from Uruguay after political persecution made it impossible for him to continue living in his native land.

Although his arrest was witnessed by several Argentines, police initially denied that he was in jail. For five days he was brutally tortured and questioned by Uruguayan authorities.

Although a judge ordered Cores released since there were no grounds for holding him, the Argentine executive branch has kept him imprisoned.

Tuna From Mediterranean Is OK—Just Don't Eat Too Much of It

Recent tests carried out in the Mediterranean have shown that the amount of



Lutte Ouvrière

"Well, what do you want? There's still tuna in the mercury!"

mercury in fish, especially tuna, has surpassed the safety level.

The French Ministry of the Quality of Life dismissed these findings. It declared that "in view of the eating habits of Europeans, as well as the very broad safety margins taken into account in establishing the norms . . . it is excluded that the possible consumption of such products could, under present circumstances, cause poisoning."

Moscow Offers to 'Guarantee' Israel's 'Right' to Exist

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told the Syrian foreign minister April 23 that Moscow was prepared to guarantee the existence of the state of Israel. He said: "Israel may get, if it so wishes, the strictest guarantees with the participation—under an appropriate agreement—of the Soviet Union. These guarantees would insure peaceful conditions for the existence and development of all states of the Middle East."

On May 14, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat recognized Israel as a "reality of fact" within its pre-1967 borders. He said that Soviet officials made it clear to him when he visited Moscow in 1971 and 1972 that Israel's previous borders could not be touched.

"After [the] October, 1973 war," he continued, "the United States and Soviet Union showed me that they were working together for the continued existence of Israel inside its pre-1967 borders."

Protest Denial of Medical Treatment to Soviet Dissident Elena Bonner

The American Federation of Scientists has asked U.S. scientists to boycott a world scientific meeting in Moscow in July to protest the Soviet treatment of dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Elena Bonner.

A spokesman for the federation said the boycott was called because Soviet authorities refused to permit Bonner to travel to Italy for an eye operation. He said she may go blind without adequate treatment.

El Cierre de 'República': un Mal Augurio

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "The Seizure of 'República'—a Bad Omen" que aparece en este mismo número.

[La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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El gobierno del Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas llevó a cabo el 20 de mayo una medida importante tendiente a la "institucionalización" de una dictadura populista militar, aprovechándose de la maniobra burocrática del Partido Comunista que silenció a *República*, el diario de Lisboa más vinculado a la dirección del Partido Socialista.

El periódico había sido por algún tiempo el centro del conflicto entre los dos partidos reformistas. El sindicato de impresores controlado por el Partido Comunista se rehusó a publicar dos artículos en la edición del 2 de mayo. Estos criticaban a la federación de sindicatos la Intersindical controlada por el PC por tratar de excluir la participación del PS en igualdad de circunstancias con los seguidores de los stalinistas en la manifestación del Primero de Mayo.

El 19 de mayo, el sindicato de impresores expulsó al editor, Raul Rego, ministro del PS en el primer gobierno provisional. Los nuevos editores publicaron una declaración que decía: "Rechazamos desviaciones partidarias." Rego se rehusó a salir de sus oficinas y una manifestación masiva del PS rodeó el edificio. El gobierno luego ordenó que el periódico se cerrara y envió a las tropas a desalojar las instalaciones. Hubo enfrentamientos entre la tropa y los manifestantes del PS, habiendo la tropa disparado al aire.

Aún no es claro que fue lo que provocó que el sindicato controlado por el PC haya tomado esta medida. Un corresponsal de *Le Monde* hizo alusión a la información del 16 de mayo sobre el regreso de China de la delegación de la AOC (Aliança Operária Camponesa—Alianza Obrera Campesina). El PC ha dicho en varias ocasiones que considera que este grupo maoísta aliado al PS es "contrarrevolucionario." La AOC fue uno de los grupos a los que el gobierno militar prohibió la participación en las elecciones de la Asamblea Constituyente.

El otro diario de Lisboa identificado con el PS, *Jornal Novo*, a fines de abril publicó un artículo diciendo que Pekín había reconocido a la AOC como los maoístas oficiales por su alianza con el PS. El autor aseguró que los dirigentes chinos se perca-

taron de que el PS era la única alternativa real al partido promoscovita.

Los editores del *New York Times* dijeron que la medida contra *República* fue tomada "después de que el Sr. Rego había publicado un documento secreto del Partido Comunista en el cual instaba a los militares a llevar a cabo otra purga contra los empleados socialistas del sistema estatal de radio y televisión."

Los medios de comunicación son una de las tres áreas donde el PS ha iniciado su ofensiva después de su victoria electoral. En el período que va desde la caída del antiguo régimen, el PC ha utilizado su aparato y su posición privilegiada como el agente político de mayor confianza de los militares para obtener un dominio arrollador de la prensa y las comunicaciones.

Inclusive, el PC ha usado su influencia en los medios de comunicación de una manera descarada y arbitraria. Por algún tiempo se ha venido dando un resentimiento popular en contra de esta tendencia stalinista en la información. El pueblo portugués recuerda demasiado bien a lo que suena una "prensa dirigida."

En una conferencia de prensa el 5 de mayo, después de los enfrentamientos del Primero de Mayo entre el PC y el PS, el dirigente del Partido Socialista Mário Soares dijo que su partido pretendía reducir la influencia de las fuerzas "minoritarias" en la prensa, los sindicatos y los organismos gubernamentales locales; donde el Movimiento Democrático Portugués, frente democrático del PC para la "pequeña burguesía progresista," ha obtenido muchas posiciones.

De estas tres áreas, los sindicatos eran obviamente los más importantes y potencialmente los más explosivos. Es en este campo donde es más fuerte el dominio del PC y también es donde el PC se ha mostrado de más utilidad para el gobierno militar. No ha titubeado en denunciar a huelguistas como "provocadores" y "agentes del fascismo" e inclusive ha llegado a movilizar a sus miembros para romper huelgas en defensa de la política económica del gobierno.

Por otro lado, el Partido Socialista obviamente no puede hacer valer su pretensión de ser el mejor cordón de transmisión político del gobierno al menos que pueda obtener una fuerte base organizada en los sindicatos. En las condiciones en que está Portugal, un partido netamente electoral es una gran desventaja. Las manifestaciones del 2 de mayo del Partido Socialista tenían la

intención de mostrar que el PS no era un partido socialdemócrata común y corriente sino un "partido de masas" capaz de movilizar a decenas de miles de personas en la calle. Sin embargo, inclusive esta demostración limitada de fuerza puede salirseles de las manos rápidamente, como lo mostró de nuevo la confrontación en las oficinas de *República*.

Es obvio que después de los enfrentamientos del Primero de Mayo, el congreso de la Intersindical programado para fines de mayo implicará una confrontación de grandes proporciones entre los dos partidos obreros reformistas. La ofensiva del PS en los medios de comunicación está vinculada también a una ofensiva en el sindicato de periodistas. De la misma manera fue obvio que el PC pretende a toda costa preservar su posición burocrática en los sindicatos. Esto fue lo que llevó a los stalinistas a provocar un enfrentamiento sectario con el PS en la manifestación del Primero de Mayo.

Los dirigentes stalinistas de la Intersindical aparentemente temieron que los contingentes del PS aprovecharon la ocasión para protestar la confirmación por parte del gobierno militar de los puestos que los stalinistas tomaron en el movimiento sindical.

De todos los partidos stalinistas promoscovitas, el PC portugués se ha ganado la reputación de ser el más dogmático de Europa Occidental. Es el único, aparte del PC griego "exterior," que ha expulsado el ala liberal que existe en casi todos los demás. Las decenas de miles de nuevos reclutas que han inundado al partido desde el 25 de abril de 1974, han sido entrenados en el espíritu sectario "duro" reminiscente de los partidos stalinistas ultraizquierdistas del "tercer período."

Sin embargo, factores objetivos también promueven el sectarismo de una gran parte de los miembros del PC. Desde abril de 1974 el PC ha sido virtualmente el partido del gobierno. Como único aparato para la organización de masas, ha ofrecido en muchos sectores de la sociedad un mejoramiento a miles de sus nuevos miembros. Por supuesto, éstos van a reaccionar violentamente en contra de cualquier fuerza que amenace tal perspectiva, inclusive sin las instrucciones específicas de la dirección de su partido.

Al mismo tiempo, dado al papel que ha jugado como el principal instrumento político del gobierno militar, el PC ha tendido a convertirse en el centro del resentimiento entre sectores cada vez más amplios de la población. Su política sin principios de colaboracionismo de clase y subordinación al régimen militar burgués lo ha puesto en la posición de ser responsabilizado por la represión, la censura y la austeridad, sin siquiera tener el poder real de la sociedad. Su subordinación al gobierno y su objetivo de servir como socio político privilegiado del

régimen lo ha llevado a dividir a la clase obrera y ha impulsado hacia la derecha a la base del PS, enfurecida por los métodos stalinistas.

Estas tácticas le han permitido a la voz del imperialismo norteamericano, el *New York Times*, presentar el conflicto como uno entre una "mayoría anticomunista" y una "minoría" comunista que impone su control por medio de la intriga y la infiltración. Por supuesto, el *New York Times* está preparando la cobertura democrática para la intervención.

Aún más peligroso es la posibilidad de que las tácticas stalinistas provoquen que secciones de los trabajadores y las masas empobrecidas saquen conclusiones anticomunistas y promuevan el desarrollo de una base de masas para la contrarrevolución.

La más favorable de las posibilidades es que el Partido Comunista esté trabajando para un amo ingrato. Al mismo tiempo que el apoyo tácito del gobierno militar ha alentado al PC a que tome una posición dura contra el PS, los mismos generales han utilizado este conflicto para desacreditar la democracia política en general y obtener la aceptación de un régimen paternalista militar que esté "por encima de todos los partidos."

El mismo Partido Comunista parece que al fin ha reconocido este peligro. En un discurso del secretario general del PC Alvaro Cunhal, publicado el 19 de mayo, advirtió a los militares que sería un "grave error" condenar a los partidos políticos como tales.

De hecho, la crisis coincidió con la asamblea del Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas donde dirigentes centrales llamaron a establecer un cordón de transmisión subordinado directamente a los militares. Tanto los oficiales como la prensa imperialista tenían el interés de presentar esto como una estructura "soviética." Para los imperialistas éste es otro argumento más para la intervención si el movimiento de masas "se va muy lejos." Para los militares esto les da una cobertura demagógica de izquierda para consolidar el tipo de aparato de masas necesario para imponer la "disciplina laboral" que el capitalismo portugués necesita para enfrentar la crisis económica mundial.

Los militares también pueden sacarle provecho a la propaganda neanarquista de los satélites ultraizquierdistas del PC, que han hecho un fetiche de la "organización de base" abstraída de la democracia política y las soluciones políticas generales. El ejemplo principal es el centrista Movimiento da Esquerda Socialista (MES), que ha combinado la promoción de "organismos de democracia directa" con el apoyo a la junta militar populista.

Todas las corrientes oportunistas en Portugal tienen en común la confianza en los "salvadores" militares. El camino co-

recto consiste en constantemente defender, entre otras cosas, la democracia, inclusive la libertad de prensa. Este es uno de los

requisitos claves en la lucha por la independencia política y la unidad de los trabajadores y las masas empobrecidas. □

A la Luz del Incidente del Mayagüez

La 'Nueva' Política Exterior de Kissinger

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Kissinger's 'New' Foreign Policy" que apareció en el número del 26 de mayo de *Intercontinental Press*.

[La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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El 29 de abril, unas cuantas horas después de que el Presidente Ford admitió la derrota del régimen títere de Vietnam del Sur, Kissinger sostuvo una conferencia de prensa donde habló en términos suaves sobre una nueva política para Asia.

"Pronto consultaremos con muchos otros países en el área, entre otros Indonesia, Singapur, Australia y Nueva Zelandia," dijo Kissinger.

En esas pláticas, continuó Kissinger, "Esperamos cristalizar una política asiática que se adecúe a las circunstancias actuales."

No importa cuál sea el resultado de la política, dijo Kissinger, la nueva política debe ser realista y a largo plazo. "Efectivamente, otra lección que debemos sacar de la experiencia indochina es que la política exterior debe sostenerse por décadas si queremos que sea efectiva."

Los reporteros recibieron más información por parte de funcionarios "que hablaban en privado" tal como lo definieron los periodistas. Un comunicado de Associated Press de Kenneth J. Freed informó que "estos funcionarios dijeron que la política norteamericana en Asia ha sido vacilante en los últimos dos años."

La "elaboración de una nueva política asiática realista" es una de "las principales tareas del gobierno de Ford."

Al mismo tiempo que la nueva política estará alerta contra "cualquier aventura comunista," buscará también "fortalecer los antiguos vínculos y desarrollar nuevos basados en los intereses económicos y políticos mutuos en vez de basarse en acuerdos militares."

En las semanas subsiguientes, los medios de comunicación se hicieron eco de este tema. La propaganda de Kissinger obviamente tenía la intención de calmar las demandas de muchos de que se hiciera un balance de la costosa experiencia en el

Sudeste Asiático. De esta manera se oyó el dulce canto de botar a la basura la vieja política que fracasó y presentarle al mundo algo nuevo, un cambio total en la política de apoyarse en la fuerza militar y en regímenes dictatoriales y corruptos.

Con el incidente del Mayagüez, Kissinger y Ford no sólo mostraron al mundo su nueva política, sino que exigieron que el mundo la estudie y se dé por enterado.

Probablemente el incidente del Mayagüez pronto deje de ser el centro de atención. El Departamento de Estado va a decidir pronto que es mejor que se olvide el asunto. Las pruebas que están surgiendo a través de las mentiras encubridoras al estilo de Nixon y Johnson muestran cada vez con mayor claridad que hubo una provocación. Qué tan premeditada fue la provocación puede juzgarse por el simple hecho de que el Pentágono procedió, como lo tenía planeado, con sus bombardeos, helicópteros y el desembarco de infantes de marina a pesar de que el barco y su tripulación ya habían sido dejados en libertad por los camboyanos después de un registro rutinario.

Docenas de comunicados desde Washington así como todo el comportamiento del gobierno de Ford han indicado que el "rescate" de la tripulación y el barco, era lo que menos le importaba a Ford. Lo único que puso realmente en peligro a la tripulación fueron la metralla y los gases lacrimógenos lanzados por los "rescatadores" contra el pequeño barco en el cual los camboyanos transportaban a la tripulación.

El caso del Mayagüez debe ser colocado en el contexto señalado por la siguiente observación bastante típica del *New York Times* del 18 de mayo:

"Desde la evacuación norteamericana de Saigón, los funcionarios del gobierno han declarado francamente que para restaurar la imagen internacional de los Estados Unidos era necesario una demostración de fuerza. El Secretario de Estado Kissinger ha creído siempre que la diplomacia funciona mejor cuando los diplomáticos del otro bando saben que la fuerza militar de los Estados Unidos se usa cuando es necesario.

"Después de que se usó en el incidente del Mayagüez, el Sr. Kissinger dijo que otras naciones están ahora advertidas 'que la

paciencia de los Estados Unidos tiene su límite.”

Blandir el sable o más adecuado aún, blandir las bombas, es una característica bastante antigua de la política exterior norteamericana, aunque ésta contraste con las declaraciones de Kissinger de hace tan sólo unas cuantas semanas. En esta ocasión, si se le da crédito a los informes que se cuelan del Departamento de Estado, el blanco fue un país específico. Citando de nuevo el *New York Times* del 18 de mayo:

“El gobierno ha sido bien específico al respecto de una nación, Corea del Norte, a la cual le ha querido enviar, desde que fue derrotado en Indochina, un mensaje claro y enérgico. Ahora dicen, el mensaje ha sido enviado: no tomen ninguna medida contra Corea del Sur sin esperar una respuesta militar norteamericana. Hay 40,000 soldados norteamericanos en Corea del Sur, y el Pentágono considera vital la presencia norteamericana para toda su estrategia en el Pacífico del Norte.”

Evidentemente, esta política no tiene nada de nuevo. El “mensaje claro y enérgico” significa que si estalla la guerra civil en Corea, el gobierno de Ford se ha comprometido a intervenir militarmente *de la misma manera que Johnson y Nixon lo hicieron en Vietnam*.

De hecho, un contingente considerable de soldados norteamericanos ya están acampados ahí con ese propósito específico.

El “mensaje claro y enérgico” es también para aquéllos en el Congreso que, motivados por el sentimiento antibélico, han empezado a hablar sobre la conveniencia de retirar las tropas norteamericanas de Corea del Sur.

Es dudoso que Kissinger haya mandado el mensaje a Kim Il Sung, es más probable que ése haya sido para el dictador de Corea del Sur, Park Chung Hee. El mensaje fue: “Aférrate a tu puesto. El Pentágono aún está comprometido a apoyarte hasta el final. Con los B-52 y todos los accesorios.”

Park en realidad está en apuros, y éstos no se los crea Pyongyang sino fuerzas dentro de Seúl. Lo que le preocupa a Kissinger es el movimiento dentro de Corea del Sur, que se está fortaleciendo en la lucha por la reinstalación de los derechos democráticos. Este movimiento sin duda alguna ha sido alentado por las victorias de Camboya y Vietnam.

Una movilización popular lo suficientemente fuerte para derrocar la dictadura de Park y que restableciera los derechos democráticos en Corea del Sur lo más probable es que vaya mucho más allá. La situación es tal que si Washington retirara su apoyo, Park no duraría mucho, y las consecuencias serían quizá más importantes que las de Indochina.

De esta manera, el “mensaje claro y enérgico” era una reafirmación del compro-

miso del gobierno de Ford de respaldar a Park *precisamente de la misma manera en que respaldó a Thieu en Vietnam del Sur y a Lon Nol en Camboya*.

La nueva política exterior de Kissinger no es más que un ajuste militar impuesto por la



KISSINGER

derrota en Indochina. El imperialismo norteamericano ha retrocedido su frente de batalla a un nuevo perímetro. Este perímetro, indica Kissinger—y de eso se trata toda la celebración que se lleva a cabo en Washington—será defendido con los mismos métodos que se utilizaron algo más hacia el sur del continente asiático.

Por supuesto, el uso de la fuerza militar norteamericana para sostener a dictadores títeres como Park no agota los recursos que tiene a su disposición el Departamento de Estado.

En su estructura de alianzas militares de largo alcance, Washington busca “no ser muy notorio” en ciertas regiones. Esto depende de las fuerzas reaccionarias locales encargadas de la acción policiaca directa. Un notable ejemplo es la dictadura militar de Brasil. Entre otros está el sha de Iran y el estado colonizador de Israel. Las potencias europeas de la OTAN juegan un papel similar, aunque a un nivel más independiente.

Uno de los ingredientes más importantes en la receta del Dr. Kissinger para mantener a Wall Street a salvo de la revolución es la distensión con Moscú y Pekín.

A pesar de la propaganda sobre la amenaza comunista que lanzó Washington

en las semanas finales del colapso de Camboya y Vietnam, fue notable la moderación con que Washington trató tanto a Moscú como a Pekín. Kissinger insinuó una y otra vez que las dos potencias, sobre todo Moscú, estaban haciendo todo lo posible, tras bambalinas, para ayudar al gobierno de Ford en su apuro. Kissinger actuó como si supiera que tanto Moscú como Pekín estaban haciendo lo indecible, aunque bajo las circunstancias no hayan podido lograr todo lo que a él le hubiera gustado.

Lo que en realidad sucede es que en muchas partes del mundo—Portugal es un ejemplo conspicuo—Kissinger cuenta con las dos burocracias stalinistas para que lo ayuden a mantener el status quo; es decir, cuenta en que éstas hagan todo lo posible para detener o desviar las luchas que puedan convertirse en revoluciones.

La distensión sigue siendo uno de los elementos más importantes en la política externa de Washington.

Las necesidades políticas domésticas tuvieron gran importancia en las medidas que se tomaron durante el incidente del Mayagüez. Citando de nuevo al *New York Times* del 18 de mayo:

“El presidente, que dice que el próximo año va a ser candidato, ha tenido serios problemas con la derecha republicana y los conservadores en general. En parte, porque la nación aparentaba debilidad ante el comunismo. El despliegue de fuerzas de la semana pasada fue aclamado más ruidosamente por los conservadores.”

De esta manera la acrobacia de Ford hizo que los patrioter, los Buckley, Goldwater y Towers saltaran de gusto, tal como lo había calculado. Ford, con sólo una medida astuta, había restablecido el prestigio lastimero de los Estados Unidos. ¡Este sí es un verdadero presidente!

Los derechistas como Reagan, que han estado maniobrando para eliminar a Ford de la candidatura republicana de 1976, no les quedó más remedio que unirse a la celebración.

El costo de esta maniobra—hasta la fecha admitido—fueron cinco infantes de marina muertos, dieciséis desaparecidos (y lo más probable, muertos), y de menos setenta heridos. Aún no se sabe el número de bajas camboyanas.

Desde el punto de vista de un candidato formado en el molde de un gran presidente, como Nixon, fue un precio modesto el que pagó por una acrobacia publicitaria que pudiera ser un factor que le asegurara residencia en la Casa Blanca hasta 1980.

El pueblo de los Estados Unidos quizá se haga un juicio diferente. Un pueblo que ya se hartó puede empezar a usar un tono que aterra a los Kissinger y a los Ford: “Fuera los pillos. Pero esta vez sí, ¡fuera todos!”

Y la gente sencilla en el resto del mundo con toda seguridad aprobará esa demanda.

The Case of Czechoslovak Dissident Ivan Dejmal

[The following report was given to *Intercontinental Press* by members of the Czechoslovak socialist opposition in exile.]

* * *

One of the victims of the present regime in Czechoslovakia whose life is in danger is Ivan Dejmal, 28. Repression against him started in early 1970 when he was arrested and charged with being a member of the Revolutionary Socialist Party [an anti-bureaucratic, Marxist group]. At that time, he was about to complete his studies at the Prague School of Agriculture.

Together with about a score of others, he spent a year and a half in cruel conditions of investigation custody, before being brought to trial. His conduct was exceptionally courageous and he failed to give in to the psychological blackmail or to the physical torments inflicted by the investigators, the Czechoslovak secret police. Equally courageous was his behavior when facing the court where in the summer of 1971 he completely refused to testify and to participate in its pre-arranged farcical proceedings. He was sentenced to two years in prison.

The indomitable character and courage of Ivan Dejmal resulted in further repression. He suffers from consequences of hepatitis and has a gall-bladder condition; nevertheless, soon after completing his prison term he was drafted to the army. There he was treated not in the usual manner but as a "politically unreliable element." He was kept under close supervision, and his two years in the army amounted for all practical purposes to a continuation of his prison term.

The loss of perspective in life, constant curtailment of his personal freedom, spying and harassment of superiors and informers who followed his every step—all this drove Ivan Dejmal to a suicide attempt, in the summer of 1974. The psychological terror had apparently achieved its goal.

But even this tragedy did not appease the authorities. Ivan Dejmal was "treated" for several weeks in a closed section of the Psychiatric Ward of the Military Hospital in Prague (with conditions only marginally better than in prison). Then he was sent back to his unit. In less than a week, the secret police concocted a case for arresting him again, though. Dejmal's next trip thus led to the infamous Ruzyně prison in

Prague, where he is held now.

This time around, he is charged with "defamation of the Soviet Union and other friendly countries and of their leaders" and with "corrupting the morale and the military and political preparedness of soldiers" (articles 100 and 288 of the Czechoslovak Penal Code). Each count carries the maximum penalty of three years in prison. Given the present conditions in Czechoslovakia, there is no doubt that Dejmal will be found guilty. The verdict, the sentence, and even the type of prison conditions are usually determined in advance; the authorities will

An Appeal for Valentyn Moroz

[We print below an appeal in defense of Valentyn Moroz issued by Tatiana Khodorovich, one of the three remaining founding members of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR who has not been forced into silence by the KGB crackdown.]

[Moroz, who was sentenced to a fourteen-year term in 1970 for his writings against the Russification of the Ukraine, went on a 145-day hunger strike starting July 1, 1974, to protest the conditions of his confinement. He had been held in an isolation cell for more than a year.]

[Because of the international protests in Moroz's behalf, he was released from his solitary-confinement cell in November 1974 and placed in a cell with another political prisoner. By that time his health had seriously deteriorated. His father, who had been allowed to visit him before his release from solitary confinement, said that if he was not immediately released and placed in a hospital, he would not survive. To the best of our knowledge, he has been given no medical treatment since he ended his hunger strike.]

[The translation was done for *Intercontinental Press* by Marilyn Vogt.]

* * *

On January 3, 1975, Valentyn Moroz, who had not yet managed to regain his psychological and physical strength after his five-month hunger strike, was placed for two weeks in a special punishment cell in Vladimir prison. Again he was to suffer

easily find as many witnesses as necessary.

Fear for the life of Ivan Dejmal is inspired not only by the pending sentence but also, and particularly so, by the psychological pressure he is daily facing. It is unclear how long he will be able to resist, all by himself, the methods of the Czechoslovak police. He would not be the first Czechoslovak political prisoner of the Seventies to surrender his life "voluntarily," either in investigation custody or upon returning from prison. Fear for his life is further enhanced by the tenacity with which Ivan Dejmal has been persecuted even long after he was barred from any political or academic activity, even when he was reduced to waiting passively for any further repressive measures his tormentors might choose to subject him to.

It is quite clear that expressions of solidarity of the world's progressive and democratic public are urgently called for if there is to be any hope to save the life of Ivan Dejmal. □

from hunger; but still worse, added to the hunger was the cold, penetrating his body that was already so weak.

Those who have spent time in prison know well what such a punishment cell is like. This cell, a *kartser*, has water on the walls and an icy cement floor. It means sleepless nights on bare boards used for beds, in the threadbare prison clothes, without a blanket. It means sterile isolation, deprivation of letters or news about his sick son, his wife, or his friends. Is it possible that Valentyn Moroz, so worn from isolation, is again alone in deafening silence? Or is there yet another sufferer with him sharing the hunger and cold? The *kartser* is also secrecy, quiet, deadly silence. This is torture, safely hidden away in a cell where no sounds can penetrate.

What was the crime that Valentyn Moroz committed? There was no crime; there is only punishment. Punishment for words.

Tatiana Khodorovich

February 22, 1975

Denmark Reverses Gears in 'Operation Babylift'

The Danish government has decided to send 208 children back to South Vietnam. The children were taken to Denmark via the United States by Henning Becker, who had been operating an orphanage for them in Saigon. The Danish Ministry of Social Welfare ruled that Becker had not developed a satisfactory educational and training program for them.

FROM OUR READERS

We received a lengthy letter from Patrick Neary of Christchurch, New Zealand, in which he argues against turning valuable space in *Intercontinental Press* to consideration of figures like Gerry Healy, the general secretary of the Workers Revolutionary party in Britain. In his opinion, the 10,000 words used in the article "The Secret of Healy's 'Dialectics,'" which appeared in the March 31 issue, could have been put to better use.

"Actually Sadegh Hedayat in *The Blind Owl* (1936) perhaps was thinking about men like Healy when he wrote: 'There are sores which slowly erode the mind in solitude like a canker. . . .'"

The long quotation cited by Neary ends: "Will anyone ever penetrate the secret of this disease that transcends ordinary experience, this reverberation of the shadow of the mind, which manifests itself in a state of coma like that between death and resurrection, when one is neither asleep nor awake?"

Neary writes that besides having lived in Britain and thus knowing about Healy's record in the past, he has worked in the Middle East where he became acquainted with the Arab struggle. "I know just enough [about the Islamic problem] to feel convinced that *Intercontinental Press* must give more time to expositions of the basis of the real Arab struggle and that to waste time, paper, ink, and sustenance on Healy is an economical disaster and a completely unnecessary dribble of our world's ecological resources."

We have three reasons for dealing with Healy and others like him. (1) Some of those in his camp are there by mistake and can be led to see the mistake through reasoned argument and examples of correct methods of struggle. (2) It is of educational value to analyze and expose the positions and justifications advanced by the Healys. (3) While ordinary workers may be little interested at the moment in disputes of this kind, quite a few revolutionary cadres are interested and expect us to provide material of this kind.

C.K. Starr of Lawrence, Kansas, appreciates the coverage *Intercontinental Press* has been giving to Portugal. "I've just finished reading another of Gerry Foley's on-the-spot reports from Portugal, and I'm very enthusiastic. Such personal, subjective reports are a good complement to your analyses of the situation in Portugal. They give a feeling for what life is like and what people are thinking at such a critical time when the balance of forces could shift either

way. I look forward to more such reports by Gerry Foley and I only regret that you have no reporter in Vietnam at this time."

Vietnam . . . Yes, a series of objective, on-the-spot reports, including personal impressions, by a revolutionary journalist who knows what to look for would be of great interest.

If the South Vietnamese decide to follow the example of the Cubans and invite foreign correspondents of whatever political persuasion to come and see their revolution and report the facts, we will certainly be among the first to apply.

S.M. of Washington, D.C., has been checking up on our recent coverage of Scandinavia: "I am often asked about the Scandinavian countries, and other social-democratic states, of which I know very, very little about; I was wondering if you ever got any news from there, and if you could print some articles once in a while about these countries and their policies, economy, etc."

We have to admit that the Mediterranean

region, the Arab East, and Southeast Asia have been putting heavy pressure on our space. However, we'll pass the request on to our correspondents in Scandinavia. What's cooking there?

Recently the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, local of the Young Socialist Alliance organized a week of expanded sales efforts in conjunction with the newly formed branch of the Socialist Workers party there. The highest score was made by Ted—131 copies of the *Militant* and 38 copies of the *Young Socialist*; and he won the prize of a six-month subscription to *Intercontinental Press* by *first-class mail*.

We're glad to be placed in the prize category. Also we liked the idea of paid-up insurance for fast delivery.

Taking advantage of the offer to get a copy of a book of drawings by Copain, D.H. of Minneapolis, Minnesota, enclosed an extra dollar "for any expense I may cause you for changing my address again."

Thanks for the extra dollar. It went to a good cause. Dollar or not, however, we're glad to make a change of address at any time. Send it in early; helps beat the U.S. Postal Service, which does not automatically forward important mail like *Intercontinental Press*. □

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