

## Portugal

# Behind the Crisis Over Trade-Union 'Unity'

## Government Spying Scandal Mushrooms

***New Proof White House Bugged  
Martin Luther King***

***160 FBI Agents Spy on Movement  
for Puerto Rican Independence***



COLBY: Spy chief admits that CIA planted agents and informers in antiwar movement.

## Cops Get Ready for 'Food Riots'

Los Angeles police are preparing for the future. The January 26 *New York Times* reports that all 7,200 of them "will be taught to control labor strikes, student protests and other demonstrations that might occur in a recession."

However, Chief of Police Edward Davis firmly denied previous reports that the cops were also being trained to cope with food riots. "I do not think there is any reasonable possibility of any kind of food riots," Davis said January 23.

"America is the food basket for the world and California is the food basket for the nation so the last thing I would expect is a food riot," Davis argued. Unfortunately, he forgets that in the USA no matter how much food there is, those who can't pay for it don't get any. And the more food there is that people can't afford, the angrier they're likely to get.

Davis's denial came the day after Police Commander Frank Brittel explained to reporters that the department had started the training program in anticipation of food riots. Brittel said that many cops had joined the force since the Watts rebellion in 1965 and had never controlled a crowd.

"Food riots might be more difficult to handle," he observed, "because of the emotions involved. Our training stresses using reason rather than force and helps the officers to understand the people on the picket lines."

Perhaps a public relations campaign, using slogans such as "Starve with dignity," could be used to help make those going hungry view their plight less emotionally. □

### Solve Pollution: Cut Down Trees

According to a dispatch from United Press International, a Detroit executive told the Environmental Protection Agency January 21 that the automobile industry should be granted a one-year suspension of clean-air rules: "Even if cars were abolished, Chrysler Vice President Sydney Terry said, certain areas of the country would still exceed clean air rules because of hydrocarbons given off by plants."

### Next Week...

An interview with former CIA agent Philip Agee. Agee is the author of *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, an exposé of secret CIA operations in Ecuador, Uruguay, and Mexico.

## In This Issue

Closing Date: January 27, 1975

U. S. A.	130	Los Angeles Cops Get Ready for 'Food Riots'
	141	Actions Across U. S. Protest Unemployment
	142	New Facts on FBI, CIA Surveillance of 'Dissidents'—by Michael Baumann
	149	Witch-Hunt Committee Put in Mothballs—by Judy White
PORTUGAL	131	CP Backs 'One Union' Law—by Gerry Foley
PUERTO RICO	135	Independence Movement Spied on by 160 Agents of the FBI—by Jose G. Perez
ARAB EAST	136	Kissinger Plans New Diplomatic Offensive—by Dave Frankel
	138	Israel Spreads Death in Southern Lebanon
ANGOLA	139	Liberation Forces Enter Coalition Government—by Ernest Harsch
BRITAIN	140	Gay Rights Congress Held in Scotland—by Bob Olorenshaw
ITALY	144	Italy's Deepening Political Crisis—by Livio Maitan
FRANCE	160	Army Closes Breton Pubs
DOCUMENTS	159	In Defense of the Kalmuks
	159	Against Caramanlis's Draft Constitution
AROUND the WORLD	150	
DRAWINGS	129	William Colby; 133, Alvaro Cunhal; 145, Vito Miceli; 147, Giovanni Agnelli—by Copain
EN ESPANOL:		
	154	Hacia una Recesion Generalizada—por Dick Fidler
VIETNAM	152	¿Piensa el Pentagono Reabrir la Guerra?

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Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors,

which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

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Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

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## Portuguese CP Backs 'One Union' Law

By Gerry Foley

The third major crisis of the Portuguese popular front regime seemed to have ended on January 20 when the cabinet approved in principle a law to enforce national "trade-union unity." The measure will ban the formation of rival federations outside the Stalinist-controlled Intersindical.

The Socialist party and the liberal-bourgeois Partido Popular Democrático (PPD—People's Democratic party) had threatened to leave the government if the proposed law was accepted. Apparently they backed down. The decisive factor was support for the bill by the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA—Armed Forces Movement), the military lodge that dominates the government.

"Because of the AFM-Communist alliance on the issue," Geoffrey Godsell wrote in the January 21 *Christian Science Monitor*, "the Socialists' battle is an uphill one; but the Socialist Ministers are reluctant to resign from the Cabinet in protest lest this leave the field open and unimpeded to the Communists."

At the same time as it decided to impose a united structure on the trade-union movement, the MFA felt it necessary to reaffirm its intention to go ahead with the elections to the Constituent Assembly scheduled for the spring. Fears had been expressed by the SP in particular that a decision by a government elected by no one to establish a state-regulated national union federation had a logic that ran contrary to freedom of association and thus to the free play of parliamentary democracy.

These fears were increased by statements of MFA spokesmen in the week preceding the cabinet's decision that seem to point toward a kind of Bonapartist "guided democracy." An editorial in the MFA bulletin said that since the movement had begun the

revolutionary process in April it was responsible for carrying it out to the end, at least until the elections for a National Assembly and president are completed at the end of 1975.

In an interview with the liberal weekly *Expresso*, the chief of staff, General Carlos Fabião, said that the MFA could not dissolve since it was not just a military movement "but a spirit to which all the progressive forces that wish sincerely to renovate our fatherland have adhered." *New York Times* correspondent Henry Ginger noted in a January 19 dispatch that General Fabião "left open the possibility of military intervention whenever it was felt that the principles of the revolution were being betrayed."

In its January 18 issue, *Expresso* commented: "From the single union to the single party, the distance may be a short one." The resemblance of this kind of government regulation to the corporatist structures of the Salazarist regime no doubt helped to spark a strong reaction from Portuguese liberals.

The SP and the PPD, along with their allies, obviously had their own conservative, bureaucratic interests to defend. But what lay at the heart of the struggle over the trade-union bill, really, was the Bonapartist nature of the MFA, and the decision of the CP to base its hopes on an alliance with a "progressive" military junta.

Such a policy not only fits in with the CP's bureaucratic method of operating. In the difficult process of capitalist readjustment in Portugal, with a potentially explosive ferment among the workers and poor masses, this line reflects the need felt by the ruling class and, logically, by the forces in the workers movement committed to a class-collaborationist program, for an unassailable arbiter standing "above" the class struggle.

This need is felt in a particularly acute way in pro-Moscow Stalinist circles, where the argument has often been expressed that it was a lack of "discipline" on the part of the Chilean Communist party's coalition partners, especially the left wing of the Socialist

party, that "provoked" the military coup against Allende.

The SP, as such, is no less committed to class collaborationism than the Stalinists. But as a loosely organized parliamentary party embracing many tendencies, it would find it hard to operate within the framework of Bonapartist "guided democracy."

### It's Easy When You've Got Rich Friends

The decisive capitalist interests in Portugal supported the military coup in April precisely to remove the obstacles to modernization presented by the Salazarist regime and to head off the explosion they could see building up in the working class. It was this that permitted the MFA to win an easy victory on April 25.

As a result, the all-pervasive political-police apparatus that had maintained a brutal dictatorship for nearly fifty years through the pressures of the Spanish civil war, World War II, and the postwar upsurge, proved strangely ineffective against a conspiracy of a few hundred junior officers.

"The apparently so perfectly organized police apparatus was able only to carry out orders," J. Rentes de Carvalho explained in the January 18 issue of the Amsterdam weekly *Vrij Nederland*. "The PIDE [Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado—State Security Police] were unable to rouse the regime to action against the junior officers with their warnings—which were correct as it turned out—that these officers were preparing a coup."

"Here is an example to illustrate the powerlessness of the secret police: Some time before the coup, more than a hundred officers gathered in a banquet hall in a suburb of Lisbon to discuss the lack of logistic support that was threatening the success of their plan. The PIDE agents raised an alarm. But the only reaction from the authorities was to transfer to the Azores a corporal who had hired the hall."

The MFA included some young of-

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ficers with links to the CP and the SP. This was, after all, necessary to the success of the operation the big capitalists wanted to see carried through. But at the same time, it included reliably right-wing officers, whose presence was necessary to guarantee that the operation remained within the framework desired by the big capitalist interests like the Companhia Uniao Fabril that sponsored General Spínola and his book.

In this context, insistence on the unity of the armed forces meant in effect guaranteeing the essential capitalist interests in Portugal, since obviously any move beyond the big capitalists' project would immediately shatter this "unity."

In fact, the first step to preparing the way for a real "struggle against the monopolies" would have to be splitting the officer corps, since this would require organizing the ranks of the armed forces democratically and arming the masses. This, clearly, the MFA leaders had no intention of doing. Nor did the Communist party or the Socialist party want them to.

While all of the opportunist workers parties have subordinated themselves to the big capitalists' project and thus to the MFA, the Communist party has been the most conscious, consistent, and explicit in this. Following Spínola's attempted right-wing coup at the end of September, in which the MFA was almost destroyed by its contradictions, and the left parties with it, the CP general secretary, Alvaro Cunhal, explained the party's perspectives in a news conference October 8. The text of his remarks was printed in the October 11 issue of the weekly CP organ *Avante!*. Among other things, he said:

"I am going to tell you another secret too. The Communist party has no arms. But in Portugal there are arms to defend the democratic revolution, and there must be such arms to defend the democratic revolution. These arms are in good hands, in the hands of the Movimento das Forças Armadas. Our people do not need arms to defend the democratic revolution in our country under the present conditions."

When the Communist party called its supporters onto the streets January 14 in support of the "trade-union unity" bill, they coupled this issue with confidence in the MFA. In an editorial in the January 16 issue of *Avante!* entitled "The Lesson of January 14

Must Be Understood," the CP attacked the Socialist party for not subordinating itself entirely to the military junta:

"When the public sees the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party] attacked in an open or veiled way, when they see people publicly advocate the return of the MFA to the barracks and an attempt to reduce its political role in reinforcing, defending, and advancing the democratic process, when the public sees people take a position so hastily and unrealistically against the will of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese workers who support trade-union unity as a means of preserving, by law, the unity of the working class—the unifying link that binds the broad toiling masses together—when they see such people even evoking an artificial 'rank and filism,' it is obvious to all that the result of such a policy is not strengthening but weakening the process.

"The PCP sincerely hopes that the SP will overcome its difficulties. The SP has an important role to play in building a truly democratic state in Portugal.

"The policy of acting as an apprentice sorcerer releasing forces that cannot be controlled does not promote this role."

The PCP had evidently been disturbed by the SP's "undisciplined" attitude toward the MFA. In a report on the SP congress in the December 20 issue of *Avante!*, the following passages were singled out in General Secretary Mário Soares's address as especially significant:

"Elections, when they are free, are the direct expression of the will of the people, the only way of legitimizing political power. Thus, there is no way the Constituent Assembly can be composed of nonelected deputies chosen by some means other than popular suffrage.

"In opposition to this view, it has been argued that there is a need for keeping the MFA associated with the process of democratizing Portuguese society, even going beyond the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The SP—whose draft constitution will be one of the points on the agenda of this congress—agrees that there is such a need. But it does not draw the conclusion from this that elements chosen by the MFA and not elected by popular suffrage should have a right to sit in the Constituent Assembly.

Constitutionally speaking, this is an aberrant idea. Moreover, it would transform the MFA, in violation of its program, into a kind of party competing with other parties, and would inevitably lead to a split in the MFA, with all the risks this would involve for the future of Portuguese democracy."

## What CP Can Do for Military

The CP favors the inclusion of delegates chosen by the MFA in the Constituent Assembly. In line with this, the editorial in the January 16 *Avante!* indicated that the Portuguese Stalinists are looking forward to an alliance directly between the military and the mass organizations led by the PCP. This was the context, as the authors of this editorial saw it, of the debate over the "trade-union unity" bill:

"Strengthening and vitalizing the popular component of the Portuguese revolutionary process is a precondition for consolidating and broadening the rights that have been won and for confronting and overcoming the crisis in which the country finds itself as the result of the policy of sabotage by the more reactionary sectors of finance capital.

"This involves persistent work on two fronts: One is reinforcing active collaboration among the forces really interested in the democratic process by means of a dogged search for common roads to the practical and just solution of the difficult national problems. The other is a continued, many-sided campaign among the working people to organize and vitalize the mass people's movement in the broadest sense, which involves continually wider participation in the practical solution of the national problems.

"In the context of the originality of the Portuguese revolutionary process, there is no other way to constitute a genuinely democratic state in Portugal. When we say 'genuinely democratic,' we mean that this would be a state that would increasingly reflect the profound aspirations of our people and identify with them."

The present crisis, the writers of this editorial indicated, had shown that a coalition government by itself was not stable enough to handle the strains of the "process."

"We have maintained that reinforcing and vitalizing the popu-

lar component of our revolutionary process was indispensable for overcoming the unevenness in the tempo of the evolution of the military movement headed by the MFA and the evolution of the democratic movement, which has been dangerously weakened by the difficulties of the political parties in working together.

"The dizzy pace of events in recent days has yet again shown the political maturity and unity of thought and action that distinguish the military component, as well as a worsening of the crisis of unity among the political parties of the government coalition."

While they were apparently ready to admit that the popular front coalition was at least somewhat disappointing, the authors of the *Avante!* editorial thought that the CP could provide an indispensable partner for the MFA.

"Without the Movimento das Forças Armadas—we said in the last editorial in *'Avante!'*—the people's movement would be unable not only to advance democracy but even to assure its survival. Without the people's movement, the Movimento das Forças Armadas might be able to hold political power but never build a democratic society."

Responding to a charge by the SP Minister of Justice Salgado Zenha that the "trade-union unity" bill was "unconstitutional" (which presumably meant undemocratic, since the country as yet has no constitution), the editorial writers accused the Socialist party implicitly of "bourgeois legalism."

"There are forces and personalities who remain tied to conceptions of legality that do not come from the working class. In a democratic and revolutionary process such as the one we are experiencing today in Portugal, the real legality is what comes from the freely expressed will of the popular masses with the force that is given it by the military component of the democratic process."

This is a classic example of turning a revolutionary principle on its head. It is true that the highest political legitimacy comes from the direct, democratic organization of the masses in a revolutionary process. This kind of legitimacy, moreover, is incompatible by its nature with the survival of capitalism, since the rule of the few depends on the demobilization of the many.

However, capitalism has not been abolished in Portugal. In fact, the

"military component" of the "revolutionary process" has declared its admiration for, and its determination to protect, "productive" capitalists. While legal forms are subordinate to the



CUNHAL

directly expressed will of the masses under a revolutionary regime, under a capitalist government revolutionists strive for the maximum formal limitations on the power of the bourgeois rulers.

This invocation of "revolutionary legality" by the Portuguese Stalinists to justify a form of government regulation of the workers organization that they think will advance their specific bureaucratic interests is pure demagoguery. It is a very dangerous kind of demagoguery, moreover, for the PCP itself, because it is illusory to think that a capitalist regime will accept a permanent partnership with a Communist party, no matter how abjectly such a party subordinates itself and the interests of its supporters to "the needs of the nation."

### CP Beats Drums for Junta

The "will of the masses" had been shown by the giant demonstrations of January 14, the *Avante!* editorial claimed. But the description of these demonstrations in the same issue of the CP paper made it clear that they were organized as progovernment demonstrations, like the May Day march organized by the CP shortly after the April coup to channel the

mass upsurge behind the military junta.

"Group after group of workers marched by. The shouts 'PCP' and 'The people are with the MFA' inundated the whole length of the Avenida Almirante Reis." And further on in the same article: "'The people are with the MFA'—this vast shout was taken up by hundreds of thousands of voices. . . 'Where is the people if this is not the people?' the immense multitude of demonstrators asked with a single voice."

The article featured the speech of Carlos Carvalho, a member of the leadership of the metalworkers union and the secretariat of the Intersindical. "Interrupted by vigorous cheers for the MFA and by the shout of 'Down with reaction' chanted by the entire mass of demonstrators, Carlos Carvalho continued: 'The Provisional Government put the Trade-Union Bill up for discussion so that that most concerned could express their opinion on it. And we are the ones most concerned, we the Portuguese workers. And all of us have already expressed in a decisive and firm way what we think of this so-called trade-union freedom, because we workers don't want it.'

"Seconded by thousands of voices chanting 'death to the CIA' and 'down with the monopolies,' Carlos Carvalho went on to state that 'only the legal proscription of trade-union pluralism can safeguard our interests,' and then he stressed: 'The strategy of international imperialism is to hide under liberal language its real intentions toward the workers.'"

The CP used the opposition to enforced unity expressed by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), a body with well-known connections to the U.S. government, to rally support for the bill backed by the MFA. As an example of what could happen if such a law were not passed, the CP cited the U.S.-engineered split in the French trade-union movement during the opening phase of the cold war.

There is no doubt that the U.S. government's labor front as well as the Christian Democratic labor apparatus in Europe want to establish a foothold in the Portuguese unions. As bureaucratic organizations, they would naturally want to set up their own separate federations that they could dominate. They subordinate themselves to the anti-Communist ob-

jectives of the Western capitalist powers.

However, it does not follow from this that the way to combat such bureaucratic maneuvers is by another bureaucratic maneuver, by allying with a military junta and putting the union movement in the hands of the capitalist state. In fact, one of the things that greatly helped to bring about and maintain the split in the French labor movement was the undemocratic methods of the Communist party—its suppression of opposition and the crude subordination of the interests of the union membership to the opportunistic zig-zags of the party line.

In Portugal, the same Stalinist trade-union policy holds still greater dangers. Here also, the CP has subordinated the interests of the workers to the opportunist line of the party, even breaking strikes and slandering whole categories of workers in order to ingratiate itself with the military regime, to prove its capacities as a "stabilizing factor."

But this policy has inevitably involved complete reliance on a Bonapartist junta that in the long—if not the short—run will inevitably turn against the Communist party. And when the capitalists decide to cut the CP down to size, they will be able to exploit resentment against the party "establishment" among the workers themselves. There are precedents for this. This was how the proimperialist trade-union bureaucrats succeeded in totally crushing the CP in the American labor movement after the end of the U.S.-Soviet wartime alliance.

Unfortunately, the main group opposing the CP from the left in the trade-union movement, the Movimento da Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left), was drawn by the CP's demagogy into supporting the January 14 demonstrations. If this move was supported by the MES's union activists, it would represent an abrupt 180-degree turn for them. They were violently opposed even to joining the Intersindical when Hugo Blanco and I talked to them in June.

That, of course, was an incorrect position. In the interests of working-class unity, they should have joined the Intersindical and fought for a united, democratic movement. But accepting government-imposed unity is a completely different thing. It represents class collaborationism instead of uniting the workers against capital.

The most likely reason for such a flip-flop on the part of the MES was this centrist group's equivocal position toward the MFA.

From the military's point of view, the CP is an invaluable ally in the present stage, although some of the right-wing members of the MFA may have difficulty accepting this or may be reluctant to take the risks involved. While the Social Democrats in the long run are more assimilable into a capitalist parliamentary framework, they have one major disadvantage in a period of potentially explosive ferment. They lack the dictatorial regime of the CP and its dogmatic indoctrination. It is harder for them to present a solid bulwark against the pressures of the masses.

### SP Has to Shape Up

The CP has made no secret of its fears that the SP is not a reliable ally for the government. In its editorial December 6 *Avante!* said:

"What is happening at the University of Lisbon, where the SP organizations are supporting the reactionary provocation against the Government, against the MFA, and the democratic forces\* illustrates the degradation opportunism leads to. . . .

"What does the Socialist party want? Why is it acting this way? Why is it trying the patience shown by the Communists? Does it want to hang on to fiefs or create them? Does it want to meet the demands of foreign circles for divisive activity? What meaning could there be to Mário Soares's statement in Paris. . . that the participation of the PCP in the Government after the elections will depend on the vote? Will the SP, in turn, if it fails to get a high percentage of the votes, lose its right to a place in the Government? . . .

"The PCP is ready to examine all these questions together with the SP and seek a solution that, through co-

\*The CP has supported the Ministry of Education's plans for suppressing opposition political activity in the universities, including canceling the freshman year and substituting "civic service," i.e., work at low wages. It has attacked all opposition to these schemes as "ultraleft provocations." Of course, given the strength of the Mao-Stalinists in the Portuguese young left, some forms of opposition have been ultraleft and have facilitated the CP's betrayal of the student movement.

operation in word and deed, will remove the atmosphere that has been poisoning the relationship between these two parties more and more every day."

The condition for "removing this atmosphere," the editorial went on to clarify, was that the SP also subordinate itself completely to the junta:

"The alliance of the people's movement with the Movimento das Forças Armadas is an essential feature of the present democratic political situation. Any breach that opens up in this alliance is an important victory for reaction. Anti-MFA positions are the invariable mark of reaction. These are the positions of the fascist rags sent in from Spain and the ultraleftist rags produced in Lisbon.

"The ultraleftist provocateurs, who more and more play the role of the spearhead of the counterrevolution, are attacking the MFA and its alliance with the people, and have tried several times to provoke confrontations with the Armed Forces.

"Against such activities and maneuvers, it is essential to continue tirelessly to defend the alliance of the people's movement with the Movimento das Forças Armadas and to combat still more firmly activities aimed at disrupting this alliance."

For its part, the MFA declared in issue No. 7 of its bulletin: "The unity and cohesion of the Armed Forces is the primary condition for strengthening the indispensable unity between the Armed Forces and the people. . . . This is the condition for applying the 'National Reconstruction' plan to the whole of society."

The National Reconstruction plan is the junta's class-collaborationist project for advancing the interests of "productive" capital. □

### Havana Offers to Exchange CIA Agent for Lolita Lebron

Havana will release jailed CIA agent Lawrence Lunt if Washington frees Puerto Rican nationalist Lolita Lebron, Cuban officials announced January 22. Lebron has been in a U. S. penitentiary for twenty years, following conviction on charges of having taken part in an armed attack on the U. S. House of Representatives in 1954. Lunt was arrested in 1965 on charges of espionage. He is currently serving a thirty-year term. The White House made no immediate response to the offer.

## 24-Hour-a-Day Surveillance on PSP Leader

# Puerto Rican Independence Movement Spied On by 160 Agents of the FBI

By Jose G. Perez

[The following article appeared in the January 24 issue of *The Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

The FBI maintains 160 agents in Puerto Rico whose sole function is to persecute the proindependence movement on that island of 2.8 million people. This was among the facts revealed by a former FBI employee at a news conference in San Juan December 26, as reported in the December 27 issue of *Claridad*, daily newspaper of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP).

Gloria Teresa Caldas Blanco worked as a secretary for the San Juan FBI from July 1969 until the end of 1971, and during that time she held a top security clearance. After leaving the FBI she joined the Puerto Rican Independence Party and is now a member of the PSP.

Caldas Blanco revealed that one of the methods employed by the FBI is to send agents into proindependence organizations. "My sister Joan Caldas, who was a student at the University of Puerto Rico, was approached by agent Gordon McGinley. He offered her a monthly payment if she would join the FUPI and give them information on that organization." The FUPI is a university student group associated with the PSP.


Other FBI techniques included illegal mail tampering. "On various occasions I saw agents of the FBI bring in correspondence addressed to proindependence leaders and militants," Caldas Blanco said. "I was told that this correspondence had been obtained directly from the general post office in Hato Rey through an FBI contact there."

She noted that sometimes the FBI would return the letters to the postal system for delivery, but in other cases the intercepted communications would be put in FBI files and never reached their destination.

The FBI also obtained copies of

bank records of proindependence groups. The FBI would gather this material through a contact at the main office of the Banco Popular.

Among the organizations targeted



Claridad

Former FBI employee Gloria Teresa Caldas Blanco with Puerto Rican Socialist party leader Juan Mari Bras at San Juan news conference.

by the FBI were, in addition to the PSP, the Puerto Rican Independence Party, the Nationalist Party, the Socialist League, the Puerto Rican Communist Party, and other left-wing groups.

Caldas Blanco noted that "at no time did I gain knowledge that any work was done with respect to the Popular Party, the New Progressive Party . . . or any organization, open or clandestine, that promoted the status quo or statehood for Puerto Rico."

Particular targets for harassment were prominent leaders, such as Juan Mari Brás, general secretary of the PSP, and Rubén Berrios, a leader of the Independence Party who is also a senator in the Puerto Rican legislature. Their movements were followed on a 24-hours-a-day basis, not only in the United States and Puerto Rico, but even when they were visiting other countries.

Mari Brás, who also spoke at the news conference, pointed out that the FBI's actions violated the rights to freedom of speech and association. He said that sworn statements by Cal-

das Blanco would be submitted to the United Nations and other international bodies.

The PSP also pledged to defend the former secretary from any attempts to victimize her for bringing to light the FBI's activities. She has been threatened with a \$10,000 fine and several years in prison for revealing information related to her work for the FBI.

The latest information about the FBI's activities comes in the wake of a stepped-up campaign of harassment of proindependence militants related

to the recently concluded strike at the Aqueducts and Sewers Authority.

Earlier in December the PSP had responded to this harassment by filing a complaint with the Civil Rights Commission of Puerto Rico. The complaint charges the U.S. and Puerto Rican governments with a conspiracy to outlaw, disrupt, and discredit the party. A hearing on the charges will begin in February. □

### Poll Shows Majority Opposes U. S. Intervention in Arab East

The American public does not share the Ford administration's assessment of the "feasibility" of U.S. military intervention in the Arab East. A Gallup poll conducted January 10-15 found that although 61 percent of the U.S. population expects an Arab-Israeli war this year, 55 percent answered that the U.S. should stay out of the conflict.

The poll also found that only one in ten persons in the U.S. would favor military intervention in the event that the Arab states cut off shipments of oil to the United States.

## Kissinger Plans New Diplomatic Offensive

By Dave Frankel

Seizing on the cancellation of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Egypt, originally scheduled for mid-January, U. S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is planning a new diplomatic offensive in the Arab East. In the second and third weeks of January, the shah of Iran and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia worked the circuit as Kissinger's advance men. Kissinger himself is expected to arrive in the Arab East in early or mid-February.

The shah, who visited King Hussein of Jordan January 6 and 7 and Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat for the following five days, assured a warm welcome for himself by announcing \$30 million in aid projects to the two countries before his arrival. In addition, the shah turned over twenty obsolete F-5A jet fighters to Amman and promised Cairo future aid money and investment totaling as much as \$800 million.

Washington's stake in all this was spelled out by Jim Hoagland in the January 7 *Washington Post*.

"As a strong ally of the United States," explained Hoagland, "the Shah could be expected to put in a good word for American peace efforts. As a leader who supports both the return of Arab territories conquered by Israel in 1967 and the right of Israel to exist, he could also provide a boost for Arab moderates."

Although he was widely quoted in December as having said that "the next war [with Israel] will be our war," the shah took pains to dispel any idea that he would participate militarily. "Our sentiment certainly will be on your side," he told the Cairo daily *Al Ahrām*, while disowning his earlier statement.

"In the past," noted columnist Jack Anderson January 19, "Iran has been a secret ally of Israel, supplying 40 per cent of Israel's oil. Their secret services, Israel's Shin Bet and Iran's SAVAK, have worked closely together."

The shah has no intention of ending this relationship—he only wants to widen his influence and open collab-

oration with the more conservative Arab regimes. Hoagland reported in the dispatch cited earlier on one of the forms this cooperation is expected to take:

"Links between Iranian exiles and the Palestinian extremists, who also denounce Sadat, are thought to have been a major topic of discussion during a preliminary visit to Egypt last month by Gen. Nematollah Nassiri, the head of Iran's widely feared secret police, Savak."

### Faisal Arrives With Checkbook

On January 14, the day after the shah left Egypt, King Faisal arrived in Syria with his pockets bulging. During the next week he shelled out \$515 million in grants and loans to Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.

Faisal publicly endorsed Sadat's policy of relying on Kissinger to negotiate Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, and reportedly urged Syrian President Hafez el-Assad to go along with Sadat. Henry Tanner reported in the January 21 *New York Times*:

"For American diplomacy, at least in the short run, the Faisal visit to Egypt constitutes an unexpected favorable windfall, Western diplomats said today. It cleared the road, they said, for one more attempt by Secretary of State Kissinger to bring about second-stage disengagements on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts."

A series of intransigent public statements by both Sadat and high Israeli officials would seem to belie this assessment. Sadat insisted on January 14 that Israeli withdrawals in the Golan Heights and the West Bank of the Jordan River, as well as in the Sinai, were conditions for an extension of the United Nations buffer force in the Sinai. The following day Jerusalem announced a proposal that any Sinai withdrawal be followed by a ten-year period before any further territorial concessions were made. And on the day after that, Sadat said, "I will accept nothing less than an Is-

raeli move on three fronts—and within three months."

However, such manifestos are a recognized part of the game. In Sadat's case, furthermore, they serve to cover his left flank against charges that he is bent on making a deal with Israel regardless of what occurs on the other fronts.

The same day that Sadat set a ninety-day limit on the time he would wait for new Israeli withdrawals, Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, after three days of meetings with Kissinger in Washington, said, "Somehow . . . I have a notion that Egypt may be ready to start talks on a possible interim agreement between herself and Israel."

One possible scenario was outlined in *Newsweek's* January 27 issue:

"A ranking Israeli official said that Jerusalem is now willing to consider withdrawing from the Abu Rudeis oil fields and the key Mitla and Gidi mountain passes in return for a 'significant' Egyptian political quid pro quo. That could be forthcoming. Egypt reportedly will agree to the demilitarization of the strategic Sinai passes, including the presence of United Nations troops there. Sadat still would need an Israeli offer of at least a minimum pullback on the Golan Heights—to show other Arab states that he was not making a separate peace. But the Egyptian leader was believed ready to accept any Israeli assurance of a Golan withdrawal—no matter how vague—as a cover. Last week, diplomats in the Mideast said they felt that Allon had given Kissinger just that: an offer of a token Israeli withdrawal on the Golan Heights."

### A Preemptive Strike?

Despite all the talk about the Kissinger "peace" trip, the truth is that if Kissinger is successful in his shuttle diplomacy he will be creating the most favorable circumstances for an Israeli attack on Syria. It has long been an open secret that Israeli mili-



tary chiefs would like to launch a 1967-style blitz against Syria. What holds them back is Washington's fear of a wider war getting out of hand.

Washington hopes that the conclusion of a new deal between Cairo and Jerusalem, with the implication that Sadat could possibly regain all or most of the Sinai through diplomatic agreements, would work to keep Egypt out of the fighting even if a war does erupt this spring. But if the Israelis calculate that Sadat would stay out, it is a tremendous incentive for them to take the opportunity to attack Syria.

"Some observers speculate that Israel is planning to invade western Syria from Lebanon, entering the latter in hot pursuit of Arab guerrillas," wrote C. L. Sulzberger in the January 26 *New York Times*. A hint of what Sadat's attitude is was given in a January 22 interview with *Le Monde*. "Surprisingly," wrote the *New York Times*, "President Sadat went out of his way to say that Egypt's commitment to go to war in case of 'an aggression' against Syria did not apply to Lebanon, even if Israel sought to occupy the southern parts of Lebanon where Palestinian guerrillas were based."

The fact that the escalation of Israeli action in southern Lebanon over the last month is aimed as much against Syria as Lebanon was indicated in a dispatch from Tel Aviv by Francis Ofner in the January 22 *Christian Science Monitor*.

"According to semiofficial Israeli sources," Ofner wrote, "there are now several thousand armed men in southern Lebanon taking their orders from Syria."

"This situation, the sources say, makes a mockery of Lebanon's formal refusal to permit the stationing of Syrian troops on its soil. They warn that mutual cross-border incursions *might grow too big to remain localized.*" (Emphasis added.)

## Arming for War

While Kissinger's diplomatic shell game has begun to steal the news headlines and world attention, Israel continues to prepare feverishly for war. On January 20 an Israeli request for \$2.1 billion in U.S. economic and military aid was made public. Officials in Washington, according to Bernard Gwertzman in the January 21 *New York Times*, "said

this was not a one-time request. The Israelis have made it clear that they intend to ask for \$1.5-billion in military assistance not only for the fiscal year beginning July 1, but for the next two fiscal years as well."

Since the Israelis are buying an estimated \$2.5 billion worth of military hardware from the U.S. each year in addition to the grants and credits covered in their direct aid request, their total U.S. military package will be running at about \$4 billion a year. "No one at the Pentagon or State Department doubts that Congress will provide Israel with just about what it asks for," reported *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Dana Adams Schmidt January 24.

The figure of \$1.5 billion for military aid to Israel compares with \$500 million for the 1971-72 fiscal year, and \$300 million for June 1972 through June 1973. In a typical example of Orwellian doublethink, this enormous investment in war matériel is being explained as a means of ensuring peace. According to Schmidt, it "generally is accepted among high State Department officials as the price the United States is going to have to pay for continuing progress toward an Arab-Israel settlement."

The Israeli view was explained by Defense Minister Shimon Peres in a January 9 column in the *New York Times*: "The chances for peace will flicker and fade the moment the Arab states, some or one of them, think they are militarily capable of defeating Israel."

"Therefore," concluded Peres, "as absurd as it seems, Israel must make the greatest military effort especially at this time. During this transition phase we will have to establish the largest reserve army we have ever had, recruit the best of our sons for career service, fortify the borders of the country, rehabilitate vehicles and weapons, buy new armaments, broaden our independent production, and establish new positions along the new frontiers of the state."

The most ominous aspect of the continuing Israeli arms-buildup has been Jerusalem's emphasis on nuclear weapons. Professor Yuval Neeman, Israel's top nuclear physicist, was appointed early in January as scientific adviser to the defense minister, following President Ephraim Katzir's public statement that Israel possessed nuclear capability.

Then, on January 23, the Pentagon announced that it was planning to sell Israel 200 Lance missiles. "Thus far," reported John Finney in the January 24 *New York Times*, "the missile has been regarded by the United States army as primarily a nuclear weapon, largely because of Congressional doubts that the weapon would be effective, in terms of its cost, with a conventional warhead. . . ."

"According to weapons experts, it would not be too difficult for Israel to develop an atomic warhead to fit into the relatively small Lance missile."

## Moscow's Contribution

Although Moscow has maintained a low profile in the Arab East since the announcement that Brezhnev's trip to Egypt was off, President Ford insisted in a televised interview January 23 that the Kremlin officials "can play and have played a constructive role even under the present circumstances. . . ."

Sadat spelled out the Soviet role in his interview with *Le Monde*:

"First of all, they were and they remain hostile to any military action against Israel, even limited. They refuse to deliver the military matériel we need. That's how it was in 1971 — the year that I said would be decisive — they kept me from unleashing hostilities by a very simple means: they refrained from honoring the arms contracts that had been made. . . ."

"In the military field, they also refuse to replace the matériel we lost during the October war, or to deliver to us the sophisticated, latest model weapons they furnished to Syria without difficulty."

Although Sadat has an interest in blaming his refusal to confront the Israeli aggressors on Moscow's policies, his assertion that there have been no major Soviet arms deliveries since the October war is backed by Israeli intelligence estimates. The Israelis generally exaggerate the armaments of the Arab countries in attempting to justify their own war preparations before world opinion, so in this case Sadat is probably telling the truth.

A further indication of how the détente is operating in the Arab East was given by Henry Tanner in a dispatch from Cairo in the January 26 *New York Times*.

"When Mr. Brezhnev postponed his

visit," Tanner reported, "Communist diplomats here suggested that the Soviet leader's decision had been intended as a gesture of moderation. They said that Mr. Brezhnev as the highest Soviet official could not come to the Middle East without going a far way to satisfy the demands of Egyptian and other Arabs for arms support. The Communist diplomats went on to hint that this could have led to an exacerbation of Middle East

tension at a critical moment and that this was not desired by the Russians."

Such "gestures of moderation" are in keeping with Moscow's policy of détente. But far from ensuring peace, the Kremlin's decision to cut back its military aid to Egypt while Washington pumps billions of dollars worth of arms into Israel is only helping to encourage Jerusalem in its aggressive plans. □

## 'The People Will Find It Impossible to Live There'

### Israel Spreads Death in Southern Lebanon

"The lonely, potholed road that runs along Lebanon's southern border is a trail of fear and bloodshed for the villagers and farmers who live here within sight of Israel. . .," cabled *New York Times* reporter Juan de Onis January 7.

"The Israelis come every night," said Olya Hossein, a farmer's wife. "They have prohibited anyone from being out of his house after dark. We are not allowed to turn on lights."

Since New Year's Day, when an Israeli patrol blew up eleven houses in the village of Yarin and took three prisoners there, along with another three from a neighboring village, the Israelis have repeatedly attacked southern Lebanon with ground forces and artillery fire. In a protest submitted to the United Nations Security Council January 16, the Lebanese government listed sixty-one acts of Israeli aggression in the ten days between January 4 and 13 alone.

Hussein Sharafeddin, fourteen years old, described one such instance to de Onis. "The boy, with a head wound wrapped in bandages, said that his father had gone to the door last Thursday night when he heard noises.

"When he opened the door an Israeli shot him," he said. "My brother Abdullah went to help him and was also shot. Then my brother Falah took a gun and fired out the window. He was killed too."

Hudur Honnein, who was captured last year with his son, Saleh, described the treatment of those taken back across the Israeli border by the raiding parties. "We were held in jails in Haifa and Ramle. For 35 days we were in a dark hole, with nothing but

bread and water.

"We were tortured with electric shocks. First they would torture me, while my son had to watch. Then they would torture my son in front of me.

"They kept asking us to tell them about the fedayeen. 'You are working with the Palestinians,' they said. I said all I knew was how to work my land. Look at my hands."

"He extended his palms upward," wrote de Onis. "His hands were covered with callouses."

However, most Lebanese don't have to worry about going through such an experience. As one Israeli soldier explained to *Time* magazine reporter Daniel Drooz, "If they can get their hands up faster than I can pull the trigger, then I'll take them prisoner."

The Lebanese government has come under increasing pressure from the victims of the raids to resist the Israeli aggression. "Angered by the escalating scale of Israeli ground attacks, and seeking greater protection by Lebanese authorities," reported Jim Hoagland in the January 3 *Washington Post*, "villagers in the southern Lebanese town of Nabatiyah staged demonstrations, blocking roads around the town with barricades and burning automobile tires."

Although the Lebanese security forces have refused to use their weapons against the Israelis, they did use them against the villagers fleeing the Zionist raids, opening fire January 14 on a group of protesters in the town of Merj 'Uyun. The next day, reported *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent John Cooley, the refugees were still in the town, able to watch as Israeli troops blew up their homes.

When Syrian President Hafez el-Asad visited Lebanon January 7, Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres quickly warned that any stationing of Syrian units in southern Lebanon would be regarded as a warlike act.

"President Suleiman Franjeh's moderate government, which now runs the risk of being totally discredited unless it responds to the Israeli attacks, has put an urgent request to Washington for Vulcan 20mm., six-barrel anti-aircraft guns, one of the most effective air defense systems short of missiles," reported Jim Hoagland in a January 16 dispatch from Beirut.

"Libya and Syria," he continued, "are widely reported to have separately offered Lebanon Soviet-made ground-to-air missile systems this month, and government sources here suggest that supply of the Vulcan system would help Franjeh neutralize growing domestic pressure on this issue."

Although the Lebanese government has not responded to the attacks, the Palestinian resistance fighters have. Israel reported twenty soldiers wounded and one dead in the first twenty-one days of January.

The policy the Israeli regime has been following in southern Lebanon was spelled out last April by former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Responding to a Palestinian raid he claimed had been mounted from southern Lebanon, Dayan warned, "The people will find it impossible to live there. Their homes will be destroyed, and the whole area will be deserted."

Thus, in the village of Kfar Shouba, one of those the Israelis attacked, 166 of the 202 houses were destroyed or damaged so badly that they were no longer habitable. The 1,500 people who were still living there at the beginning of this year are now refugees.

"This is the way we left Palestine," commented a Palestinian employee of a private relief organization helping the refugees, who are Lebanese.

"I'm afraid we will never be allowed to go back," said one woman. □

#### When You Move...

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## Liberation Forces to Enter Coalition Regime

By Ernest Harsch

After nearly 400 years of direct colonial rule, the Lisbon regime agreed to grant Angola, its largest and wealthiest colony, formal independence as of November 11, 1975. By signing the accord with representatives of the three major Angolan liberation movements January 15, the Portuguese imperialists sought to end the 14-year-old war in Angola without losing their economic interests there.

The accord provides for the formation of a coalition regime made up of the three guerrilla groups and the Portuguese. It gives both Lisbon and the white settlers in Angola a strong position from which to try to impose a neocolonial "solution" on the country.

The authorities in Lisbon realized that for any coalition regime to succeed, they needed, at least for the time being, the participation of all three guerrilla organizations: the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—Angolan National Liberation Front), and UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

Although the Portuguese regime had concluded agreements with the liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique within a few months of the April 1974 Lisbon coup, negotiations with the guerrillas in Angola had been complicated by rivalries between the different groups. The rebels, who had been under pressure from the Organization of African Unity to shelve their differences and jointly negotiate with the Portuguese, signed a formal unity pact in Mombasa, Kenya, on January 5. This paved the way for the talks that began in Portugal five days later.

Under the provisions of the accord, the new Angolan regime is to take office January 31. It will be run by a presidential council of three members (one from each of the liberation movements) and a cabinet, in which the MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the Por-

tuguese settlers are each to receive three ministries.

A dispatch in the January 16 *New York Times* indicated that the Portuguese intend to keep a firm grasp on Angola's economic life. The *Times* wrote, "In recognition of the major economic role played by Angola's white minority of some 350,000 and by Portugal herself, the Ministries of Economy, Communications and Transport and Public Works will be headed by Portuguese." After the signing of the agreement, UNITA spokesman Jorge Valentim stated, "Everyone in Angola will be Angolan." The settlers' "headaches are finished," he said.

In addition, a Portuguese high commissioner, who is to "arbitrate" differences that may arise among the four forces in the regime, will have control over defense and security. According to the January 16 *Washington Post*, Brigadier Silva Cardoso, the commander of the Portuguese air force in Luanda and a member of the Angola military junta, has been chosen as the high commissioner. "Cardoso," the *Post* wrote, "will act as a watchdog and advisor to the presidential council."

The accord also provides for the formation of an "Angolan national army." Each guerrilla group is to contribute 8,000 troops to the new army, while the Portuguese forces are to have 24,000 troops. A ten-member National Defense Council will be headed by the Portuguese high commissioner and will include representatives of the Portuguese army, navy, and air force, the three members of the presidential council, and the three members of a "unified military command" that is to be set up.

According to a representative of UNITA, the guerrilla forces are to be integrated into the army gradually, depending on the "climate of confidence." Those guerrillas not drawn into the new army will remain in the areas they now control. The Portuguese troops are to stay in Angola until formal independence has been proclaimed and then begin withdraw-

ing. By the end of February 1976, all Portuguese troops are scheduled to be removed from Angola.

During the negotiations the liberation movements had pressed for elections following the departure of the Portuguese troops. The final accord, however, provides for the election of a constituent assembly *before* Angola receives its independence and while the Portuguese forces are still in the country. The constituent assembly is to draw up a new constitution and choose Angola's head of state.

The announcement of a date for formal independence is a victory for the liberation forces. Portugal, unable to continue to pursue its colonial war, has been forced to make substantial concessions in the hope of safeguarding its fundamental interests. At the same time, it is clear that Lisbon will try to use the participation of the independence forces in the coalition regime to control and dampen the mass struggles. The scenario outlined in the accords for Angola's "decolonization"—which all three liberation movements have agreed to—legitimizes the continued presence of the Portuguese troops for at least one year.

Lisbon can use the threat of military force to squeeze further concessions from the liberation movements, to oversee the "elections," and to ensure that the new constitution contains guarantees for the interests of the settlers and foreign investors. Moreover, if the coalition regime breaks down or any of the independence forces proves uncooperative to Lisbon's neocolonialist schemes, the imperialists will be in a position to quickly intervene.

Another force in Angola that can be used against the African population is the white minority, which is particularly strong in Luanda. In July and August 1974, at least 300 Africans were killed or wounded when white racist gangs attacked the Black shantytowns that surround Luanda. Because of the large size of the settler population, an attempted rightist takeover could prove more dangerous in Angola than the abortive coup in Mo-

zambique following the announcement of a coalition regime there in September.

*New York Times* correspondent Henry Giniger, in a January 15 dispatch from Portugal, reported that "many Portuguese experts expect it [the coalition regime] to break down eventually as rivalries, encouraged by outside interests, erupt." Lisbon may try to use the continued differences between the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, which in part reflect the competing national interests of neighboring regimes, as a justification for keeping the troops in the country and maintaining "order." These differences have sometimes led to armed clashes.

The Portuguese forces in Angola estimate that the FNLA is now the strongest of the liberation movements. According to a report in the October 20, 1974, London *Sunday Times*, it receives considerable support from the regime in neighboring Zaïre, whose president, General Mobutu Sese Seko, is the brother-in-law of FNLA head Holden Roberto. "Both Mobutu and Roberto have strong American sympathies," the *Times* wrote. Since 1962, the Mobutu regime has received \$376 million in loans and \$50 million in military aid from Washington.

Thomas A. Johnson reported in the November 24 *New York Times* that "American officials in Zaïre have denied they are in contact with or that they provide support to the National Front [FNLA]. Informed United States and guerrilla sources, however, have conceded that contacts have long been maintained and that, as one American put it, 'we would be fools not to back the F. N. L. A. with Russia so chummy with the M. P. L. A.'"

UNITA, the smallest of the three groups, is led by Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, who split from the FNLA in the mid-1960s. He has been accused by both the MPLA and FNLA of having collaborated with the Portuguese regime of Marcelo Caetano. UNITA was the first group to declare a cease-fire in Angola and has been allowed to operate openly since then.

The MPLA, whose president is Agostinho Neto, was founded in 1956. Of the three major Angolan liberation movements, it is reported to have the most support among urban Africans. During the war against the Portuguese colonialists, the MPLA had its headquarters in Brazzaville, capital of the Congo Republic.

The Portuguese regime, as well as

the other imperialist powers that have an interest in Angola, will try to advance their positions by maneuvering among the independence groups. They will attempt to use the coalition regime—and any neocolonialist regime that may follow—as a cover for their effort to retain control over the country's vast natural wealth.

Angola, with a population of six million, has vast deposits of gold, manganese, iron, copper, and diamonds. It is Africa's second largest producer of *robusta* coffee, and exports cotton, sugar, and other agricultural products. The Krupp industrial empire of West Germany controls a share of the iron mining industry and the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa has investments in Angola's diamond fields. In addition, the Mobutu regime in Zaïre relies on the Benguela railway to transport its copper to the Angolan ports of Lobito and Benguela.

The biggest prize, however, is the country's oil. The Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Gulf Oil, extracts 7.5 million tons of crude oil a year from its concessions off the coast of Cabinda, an enclave north of Angola proper. The potential oil production in Angola is thought to be many times larger. Oth-

er oil companies involved in the exploitation of Angolan oil are Texaco, Occidental, Esso, Petrofina, and Compagnie Française des Pétroles.

The existence of vast oil deposits in Cabinda has led to the formation of separatist currents within the enclave that have advocated Cabinda's "independence" from the rest of Angola. One such group, FLEC (Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda—Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave), is reported to have received some support from the regimes in Congo (Brazzaville) and Zaïre. In October 1974, FLEC supporters clashed with guerrillas of the MPLA, which has insisted that Cabinda remain part of Angola.

Following the declaration by the FNLA of a cease-fire in October 1974 (the last guerrilla group to do so), the October 20 London *Sunday Times* wrote, "In fact, the ceasefire marks the start of what could be an even more bitter struggle as a wide array of political and financial interests race to secure the resources of what is potentially one of Africa's richest countries. And all indications are that the Americans, with major defence and oil interests in the area, are still well in the lead." □

## Sets Up Basis for International Organization

# Gay Rights Congress Held in Scotland

By Bob Olorenshaw

Edinburgh

An International Gay Rights Congress, the first of its kind, was held in Edinburgh, Scotland, December 18-22. It was attended by nearly 500 homosexual men and women from most countries of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Puerto Rico, and elsewhere. The congress was thus an important expression of the resurgence of the gay liberation movement after the relative fragmentation of recent years, and of its steady spread from the advanced capitalist countries to the colonial and semi-colonial nations.

Another positive development was the attendance of gay working-class militants interested in raising the question of homosexual oppression in the workplace and in the labor movement. The growing realization that gay liberation is inseparable

from the struggles of the working class was reflected in the following motion adopted by the congress:

"1. The oppression which is exercised over homosexual men and all women forms part of the necessary measures of control for ensuring the exploitation of workers for the benefit of a dominant class.

"2. This conference urges its delegates to become involved in the working class movements in their own nations as the only practical means of eliminating sexist oppression in society through a socialist revolution and at the same time change the sexist attitudes often found in these movements."

Delegates also had the opportunity to discuss the problems which they encountered in their respective countries. A Spanish comrade recounted the atrocities,

such as castration and solitary confinement in prison, perpetrated by the Franco regime upon known homosexuals, let alone those trying to found a gay liberation movement.

A Puerto Rican delegate spoke of the increased police harassment and the recent introduction of repressive laws that placed the militant Puerto Rican gay liberation movement in jeopardy.

U. S. delegates reminded the congress of the repressive laws that oppress gays in their country and legislation that prohibits the entry of foreign homosexuals into the United States.

The congress set up the basic framework of an international gay organization. Representatives of various national

gay organizations will coordinate their activity through various task forces. One task force will be entrusted with centralizing educational material and propaganda on, for example, the murder of Chilean gay militants. This could be of interest to Chile solidarity movements.

Another task force will prepare material on the legal position of gays that could be employed in campaigns to repeal anti-homosexual legislation.

A third task force will publicize and help coordinate work in the trade unions.

The Edinburgh congress was an important meeting of homosexuals, testifying to a new level of consciousness and organization among an extremely oppressed layer of society. □

ment of undocumented immigrant workers, carried signs reading, "Illegal Aliens' Do Not Cause Unemployment."

Willie Mae Reid, the 1975 Socialist Workers party candidate for mayor of Chicago and the 1976 vice-presidential candidate of the SWP, was the only mayoral candidate at the Chicago demonstration. She had publicly called on the other candidates to participate in the protests, but none did. Campaign supporters carried a banner that read, "Willie Mae Reid says: Shorten the workweek—no cut in pay—to provide jobs for all."

Campaign supporters also passed out a statement by Reid outlining the socialist program for ending unemployment. Reid stated, "An emergency public works program should be launched to provide jobs through building homes, extending mass transportation, and constructing hospitals, parks, schools, and other social necessities—especially in Black, Chicano, and Puerto Rican communities, where they are most needed."

To raise the funds for these public works projects, Reid continued, military expenditures should be eliminated, taxes on big industries raised, and a 100 percent tax imposed on all incomes over \$25,000 a year. "Working hours should be reduced with no reduction in pay in order to spread the available work and achieve full employment," she said.

In Atlanta, 1,500 persons marched, demanding jobs, improvements in unemployment and welfare benefits, and increased food-stamp allotments. In Los Angeles, 300 demonstrators marched to the city hall in a protest sponsored by the Coalition for Economic Survival, an umbrella organization made up of about forty groups. Among the signs and banners in the Los Angeles march were, "We Need Jobs, Not Guns!" and "Roll Back Prices—Roll Back Profits." About 1,000 protesters turned out for a rally in Philadelphia and hundreds more attended demonstrations in other cities. □

### What About Eisenhower?

Replying to the question of whether he was bothered by talk that he is too dull-witted to serve as president of the United States, Gerald Ford explained on nationwide television that since he had always received good grades in school, "there must be an awful lot of people much dumber than I."

## Actions Across U.S. Protest Unemployment

### Thousands Demand 'Jobs for All'

Marches and rallies against unemployment were held across the United States January 15. The protests—held in more than fifty cities, according to the organizers—were initiated nationally by Operation PUSH, a Black community and civil-rights organization headed by the Reverend Jesse Jackson. The actions were also in commemoration of the birthday of slain civil-rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. In local areas, the protests were supported by a wide spectrum of labor, Black, student, and political organizations.

Unemployment in the United States is currently officially listed at 7.1 percent. The figure is substantially higher for Blacks and other oppressed minorities.

The largest demonstration took place in Washington, D. C., where 4,500 persons, the overwhelming majority of them Blacks, protested in front of the White House. Jesse Jackson addressed the crowd at the same time that President Ford was presenting his economic proposals to Congress in his State of the Union message. "President Ford says what we ought to do is get a tax rebate," Jackson said. "How can a man with no income get a tax rebate? We don't want a rebate—we want a job! Don't do us any special favors—just give us a job!"

Geraldine Boykin, the coordinator of the Washington, D. C., chapter of

the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, said, "I think this is the beginning of a number of marches until the situation changes in this country. As long as we have working people out of work, we're going to be marching and we're going to be protesting."

Supporters of the February 14-16 National Student Conference Against Racism, to be held in Boston, were also at the demonstration. They carried a banner that read, "Stop the racist attacks—Jobs for all—Defend school desegregation in Boston."

In Chicago, 1,500 protesters rallied at the civic center and marched to the federal building, demanding, "Jobs for all!" Among the trade unions and labor organizations present at the march were the Chicago Teachers Union; locals of the United Auto Workers and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; the United Farm Workers; the Coalition of Labor Union Women; and the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers.

Demands raised by the marchers included calls for cutbacks in military spending, reduced food prices, no increase in utility bills, and full employment. Signs and banners read, "Let the bosses pay the losses," "Stop the layoffs," and "Jobs for all—Preferential hiring of Blacks, women, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans." Supporters of CASA, an organization fighting against the deportation and harass-

## New Facts on FBI, CIA Surveillance of 'Dissidents'

By Michael Baumann

In new developments in the growing government spying scandal, it has now been revealed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, acting under the orders of President Lyndon Johnson, illegally bugged the hotel rooms and headquarters of civil-rights leaders at the 1964 Democratic party convention. The main target was Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

It has also been disclosed that a major service provided to the White House by the FBI is the gathering of detailed files on the sexual lives and drinking habits of members of Congress.

According to a report in the January 26 *Washington Post*, the information about the FBI bugging of Martin Luther King comes from a previously unreleased Senate Watergate committee study.

According to the Senate memorandum on the study, the *Post* wrote, "President Johnson during the 1964 Democratic National Convention received reports on the conversations or activities of senators and congressmen, on then Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and on key convention delegates from wiretaps and bugs installed by the FBI on civil rights leaders. . . ."

The memorandum, which summarizes a 1973 interview with Leo Clark, the agent in charge of the FBI's Atlantic City, New Jersey, office, "quotes Clark as saying the information was reported to Johnson from bugs and wiretaps installed in the hotel suite of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and in a storefront used by civil rights groups." According to Clark, the FBI bugging team was under the personal direction of Cartha DeLoach, then assistant to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover.

DeLoach in turn was the source quoted by the *Washington Post* January 19 in its disclosure that the FBI kept extensive files on the personal lives of senators and representatives.

It has also been revealed that the domestic CIA spying originally reported in the December 22 *New York*

*Times* was actually at least the *third* massive CIA investigation of the antiwar movement since the mid-1960s. A former high CIA official has now disclosed that two previous CIA spying drives were carried out, focusing on links between the U.S. antiwar movement and student movements in about a dozen other countries.

The source of these disclosures, an aide to former CIA director Richard Helms, told the *Christian Science Monitor* that the first two spying operations had been unsuccessful in turning up the sort of material desired by the White House.

According to the January 23 *Monitor*, "The official said the first study began after President Lyndon B. Johnson requested that the CIA set up within its counterintelligence office a unit to look into possible foreign connections with American dissenters."

The resulting "voluminous" study turned up "no evidence to suggest such links," so a second spying operation was ordered.

"Following President Nixon's election in late 1968, and the appointment of Henry A. Kissinger as national security adviser," the *Monitor* continued, "the CIA was directed to double-check the findings of its first investigation."

The results again failed to meet White House needs. The former CIA official explained that Nixon "wanted the CIA or the FBI to produce evidence (to) take the air out of the dissidents' balloon—and it just wasn't there."

The *Monitor* source attributed the subsequent order for domestic CIA surveillance to the "general hysteria" produced in the Nixon administration by "dissident movements."

### Colby Lifts the Lid

On January 15, William Colby became the first CIA officer to admit officially that CIA agents have spied on U.S. antiwar activists, searched the mail of U.S. citizens, and planted agents and informers inside protest groups. Testifying before a Senate subcommittee, CIA director Colby

also admitted the truth of the charge that as part of this counterintelligence program, the CIA had accumulated files on 10,000 American "dissidents." In a forty-five page prepared statement, Colby acknowledged:

- That at least twenty-two agents were recruited or planted in "American dissident circles" in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

- That former CIA director Richard Helms authorized in August 1967 the establishment of a special unit inside the CIA counterintelligence division "to look into the possibility of foreign links to American dissident elements."

- That "in the course of this program, files were established on about 10,000 citizens," and that while some of these files had been "developed" from "casual informants," at least 500 of the names had come from infiltrators in antiwar organizations.

- That physical surveillance on U.S. citizens was conducted "on rare occasions" until as late as 1972.

- That between 1953 and 1973 the CIA "conducted several programs" to open the mail of U.S. citizens carrying on correspondence with "two Communist countries."

- That one former congressman was included in the CIA's domestic counterintelligence files, and that the CIA does "have other files on current or former members of Congress."

- That the CIA tapped the phones of twenty-one U.S. residents between 1951 and 1965.

According to a report in the January 16 *Washington Post*, a separate Senate memorandum gives the names of some of the CIA surveillance targets. The memorandum, the *Post* said, "indicates that Colby has privately told senators that the CIA's surveillance in 1971 and 1972 of five citizens suspected of obtaining classified data included at least two journalists and an author—columnist Jack Anderson, Washington Post reporter Michael Getler, and Victor Marchetti, a former CIA official whose recently published book exposed many CIA secrets."

Although Colby's modest catalogue

of "questionable" CIA domestic spying can be safely said to be no more than the absolute minimum it was thought possible to get away with admitting, former spy chief Helms's testimony before another Senate subcommittee the following day amounted to a complete denial of any CIA wrongdoing.

Helms told the Senate January 16 that the CIA had become involved in domestic surveillance because of the "sudden and quite dramatic upsurge of extreme radicalism in this country and abroad," beginning in the late 1950s. "By and in itself," Helms said, "this violence, this dissent, this radicalism were of no direct concern to the Central Intelligence Agency.

"It became so only in the degree that the trouble was inspired by, or coordinated with, or funded by, anti-American subversion mechanisms abroad."

"In such event," he added, "the C. I. A. had a real, a clear and proper function to perform. . . ."

Apart from the crudeness of this attempt to return to the justifications for spying usually associated with the McCarthy witch-hunt period of the 1950s, there are two obvious holes in Helms's testimony.

First, secret government memorandums published in the Pentagon Papers in 1971 showed that the White House was fully aware that the driving force behind the U.S. anti-war movement was not any foreign "subversion mechanisms" but the massive public opposition to Washington's role in the war.\*

Second, his new version contradicts testimony he gave before the February 1973 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on his appointment as ambassador to Iran. Asked then whether the CIA had been involved in large-scale domestic spying in 1969 and 1970, Helms replied: "I don't recall whether we were asked,

\*One example is the top-secret memo prepared February 29, 1968, by the Clifford Group, a Pentagon study group made up of high military, cabinet, and State Department officials. The memorandum stated that if further escalation of the Vietnam war occurred, "it will be difficult to convince critics that we are not simply destroying South Vietnam in order to 'save' it and that we genuinely want peace talks."

It added: "This growing disaffection ac-



"Charity begins at home."

but we were not involved because it seemed to me that was a clear violation of what our charter was."

Although a January 17 Reuters dispatch reported that Helms may face perjury charges because of the discrepancy in his statements, he has already taken steps to forestall possibly more serious charges.

According to another as-yet unpublished Senate Watergate study, Helms destroyed a vast quantity of tapes only days before the 1973 Senate hearing. The *New York Times* reported January 17:

"On Jan. 24, 1973, Richard Helms, then director of the C. I. A., ordered the destruction of tapes of his personal office and telephone conversations dating back over several years. The tapes included conversations with President Nixon and other Administration leaders, according to [Senator Howard] Baker's Watergate report. . . ."

"Mr. Baker said that the volume of material destroyed was so great that 'it took them several days to scissor the tapes and burn them.'"

### 'Sherlock' Rockefeller

Meanwhile, Vice-President Rockefeller continued to pledge that his blue-ribbon CIA commission would "get to the bottom of this problem." However, when asked January 13 whether the

company, as it certainly will be, by increased defiance of the draft and growing unrest in the cities because of the belief that we are neglecting domestic problems, runs great risks of provoking a domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions." (*The Pentagon Papers*, Bantam Books, p. 601.)

One of the officials who helped draft that memorandum was CIA director Richard Helms.

commission intended to call on Kissinger, who as head of the super-secret White House 40 Committee is actually top man in the CIA and may have some interesting information, Rockefeller said he had no such plans. And when asked whether he would call on former CIA employees to come forward with information about domestic CIA spying, Rockefeller said that unfortunately, "to go out with a dragnet" would strain the resources of the commission's "very small staff and very small time."

One former CIA official who is not likely to be called to testify before the Rockefeller commission is Philip Agee, author of the recent book *Inside the Company: C. I. A. Diary*. Appearing before the Russell Tribunal II in Brussels January 12, Agee revealed one more link between the CIA and the Rockefeller empire: The Exxon Corporation, a company in which the Rockefeller family holds a major interest, used the CIA in 1960 to screen employees for its Venezuelan subsidiary Creole Petroleum.

According to the report in the January 13 *New York Times*, Agee "said he had been involved in the screening operations for Creole while working for the C. I. A. in Washington.

"It was his job, he said, to check if prospective employees of the company had left-wing connections, in which case they would not be hired. . . ."

"He said such screening was a general service the agency performed for large American-owned firms in Latin America."

Nelson Rockefeller himself was the director of Creole Petroleum until 1958, when he resigned to take over the stewardship of another family holding — New York State. □

## Italy's Deepening Political Crisis

By Livio Maitan

[The following article appeared in the November 28, 1974, issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

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The great wave of struggles and the vast processes of political maturation that began in 1968 had their roots in the profound changes in economic structure and composition of social forces that had occurred in Italy since the beginning of the 1950s. It is enough to recall that there was a gigantic rural exodus of more than four million people who moved to the cities between 1951 and 1967; that is, an annual average of 250,000. Between 1961 and 1967 this internal migration ran at an annual average of 100,000, while a nearly equal number of people were emigrating abroad. (Emigration from the country had been even higher between 1951 and 1961.) Taken as a whole, the size of the working class increased from 8,250,000 in 1951 to 9,060,000 in 1961, and to 9,400,000 in 1971. (The percentage of the active population made up by workers rose from 41.2% in 1951 to 44.6% in 1961 to 47.8% in 1971; in the northern part of the country, the figures were 44.6%, 49.1%, and 51.7% during these same years.) On a national scale the section of the active population made up by the "relatively independent" petty bourgeoisie fell from 44.4% in 1951 to 37.2% in 1961 and to 20.1% in 1971, while the figures for the white-collar workers for the same years were 9.7%, 13.1%, and 17.1%.<sup>1</sup>

### Situation of the Working Class

During the period of the boom and the big industrial development, the working class acquired a greater weight in society

1. These data are based on the census and other official statistics. They were summarized and analyzed in particular by the economist Sylos Labini in "Saggio sulle classi sociali" (Essay on Social Classes, 1974) and in "Problemi dello sviluppo economico" (Problems of Economic Development, 1970). In the former work, Labini makes some international

and also increased its cohesion as a class. It was not subjected to a process of political integration into the system, even during the period of great stagnation. In 1968 the workers began to question the hegemony of the ruling class on all levels and to contest the mechanisms of the system in struggle. The breadth of the differentiations within the working class was limited as a result of struggle; the separation between the blue-collar and white-collar workers was reduced; wage increases were won consistently; a favorable relationship of forces was imposed in many factories; new democratic rights were won.<sup>2</sup>

Beginning from the middle of 1971, after the absence of a revolutionary leadership had prevented full utilization of the general political openings created by

comparisons that demonstrate, among other things, that in Italy the size of the working class as a percentage of the total active population was inferior only to that of Britain (where it was 50.3% in 1966). In fact, the Italian figure is higher than the British if only those workers employed in industry properly so called, including construction, are considered. On that basis, the figure would be 33% in Italy and 31.6% in Britain. It must be noted, however, that the number of small and medium-sized factories is significantly larger in Italy. In Italy 43% of all companies had more than 100 employees; the figure was 46% in Japan, 61% in France, 64% in West Germany, and 74% in the United States. Finally, let us mention that in Labini's work the category "relatively independent petty bourgeoisie" includes farmers, merchants, and artisans, among others.

2. Calculating on the basis of 1971 lire, average real wages rose from 71,000 lire a month in 1960 to 122,000 in 1970, to 130,000 in 1971, and to 145,000 in 1973. (The increase in real terms between 1969 and 1970 was about 13%.) The proportion of white-collar salaries to blue-collar wages, which was 3.0 to 1 in 1960, dropped to 2.0 to 1 in 1970 and 1.9 to 1 in 1973. As for political gains, the most important element was most probably the emergence of the workers delegates; but from a juridical standpoint, the importance of amendments to the labor code limiting employers' powers to lay workers off must not be underestimated.

the great strike wave of 1969 and after the turn in the economic cycle, the working class found itself generally on the defensive. The bourgeoisie sought to concretize its attack by turning to a center-right government. But the contract battles between October 1972 and the spring of 1973, particularly the struggles of the metalworkers, concluded politically with a positive change—although the economic results were totally insufficient—in the sense that the workers manifested an increase in combativity (big successful strikes, massive demonstrations in Milan and Rome, occupation of Fiat Mirafiori and other Turin factories) and the bourgeoisie had to make a turn, returning from the center-right to the center-left.

Similarly, the bourgeoisie drew the balance sheet on the big contract disputes between autumn 1973 and spring 1974, which once again were marked by a high level of combativity, significant mobilizations, strong pressures from the rank and file, and dynamic initiatives by vanguard cadres. Furthermore, the results of the referendum on divorce last May 12 showed that the working class was responding in no uncertain terms to the insidious offensive of its class enemy on the political and ideological level as well. The 80% No vote by the workers of Turin was eloquent in this regard. The response to the fascist bombing in Brescia, with its unprecedentedly broad mobilizations, was a similar demonstration.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to underestimate certain negative social and political tendencies that have begun to appear. First, the decline in buying power resulting from the exacerbation of inflation is provoking a vast increase in overtime hours (a phenomenon that was sharply declining in the preceding period). Second, because of the lack of an overall response by the trade-union organizations, success in the defense (or partial defense) of living standards depends largely on the strength of the workers in each individual sector and company. Finally, suspensions and layoffs are on the rise, hitting various layers of workers in various forms. The consequence of all these phenomena is the emergence of widely different conditions among the workers, even within a given category. It is perhaps premature to postulate a real turn in the trend as compared with the post-1968 period. But let us repeat, concrete indications already exist and it is easy to understand the implicit dangers in the symptoms we have mentioned. It goes without saying that the situation would become extremely serious should the present bourgeois offensive against employment levels not provoke an energetic response in time; that would lead once again to the formation of a vast reserve army of labor.



## Petty Bourgeoisie: Radicalization or Reactionary Regression?

The social and political crisis that opened in 1968 has provoked a radicalization of wide layers of the petty bourgeoisie. The basis of this radicalization was the various changes that had occurred within this social layer. We have offered some data in previous articles. Other facts could be added. But all the statistics indicate that there has been a decline in the so-called old middle classes and a clear increase in the so-called new middle classes (private and public white-collar employees, professionals, certain categories of employees in commerce and transport, etc.). Considerable changes have continued to occur during the past few years. Here are two examples involving layers that are politically important: The number of teachers, which had already risen from 325,000 to 451,000 between 1951 and 1961, rose to 600,000 in 1971 and is approaching 700,000 today; according to CENSIS, the number of employees in public administration rose by 140,000 during 1971, while the number of small shopkeepers declined by 49,000 during the same year.

The radicalization was stimulated on the one hand by processes of declassing and disintegration of traditional layers and on the other hand by the aspirations of the "modern" layers more closely linked to production and administration; these layers wanted to improve their conditions, taking advantage of the favorable political conditions. The collapse of traditional values, which occurred in the context of the storms that shook the educational institutions, did the rest.

In the past, the crisis of the middle classes has quite often favored reactionary, fascist, or Bonapartist operations. In the Italy of those years of turmoil the road was opened for a relative—and temporary—broadening of the social base of the MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano—Italian Social Movement, the largest neo-fascist organization) and for some partial electoral success by the fascists in 1971. Should the present crisis become even more pervasive without any positive outlet being presented, some sectors of the petty bourgeoisie (small merchants facing bankruptcy, for example) could become susceptible to new, dangerous suggestions and could furnish a basis for an authoritarian turn. Up to now, though, this has not happened, or has happened only to a limited extent. The radicalization of the petty bourgeoisie and of some layers of the intelligentsia has not at all been co-opted. In fact, as a result of a perfectly explicable unevenness, some layers have radicalized only in a very recent period. This is the case, for example, with teachers, whose struggle has devel-

oped especially during the past two years as a by-product of the student movement. It is also the case for numerically less important but nonetheless significant layers, such as journalists, whose opposition to the merger of editorial boards and to the complete subjection of the press has



MICELLI: Italy's former spy chief, arrested after coup attempt.

given rise to conflicts that have generated a broad response, conflicts that in the last analysis are expressions of the ideological crisis of the ruling class.

Finally, one must not forget one massive phenomenon that has been at the root of remarkable political and social tensions and has provided the major contingents for the struggle in the neighborhoods and regions and for particular types of actions (against high rents and the housing shortage, for example). At the end of the 1960s, according to statistics that certainly do not err in the direction of exaggeration, the number of those marginally employed or underemployed stood at 3,700,000 (three-quarters of whom lived in the Mezzogiorno). The sub-proletariat at that time numbered about a million and a half.<sup>3</sup> Given the recessionary period that has opened up and taking account of the long-term tendency toward contraction of employment lev-

3. In his essay "Disoccupazione ed esercito industriale di riserva in Italia" (Unemployment and the Industrial Reserve Army in Italy, 1972) Luca Meldolesi evaluates the industrial reserve army for 1968 at 6.6 million to 7.7 million (including those unemployed and looking for work,

the mass of poor appears surely destined to rise, with all the political and social dislocations that inevitably follow.

## Stratification and Differentiation in the Bourgeoisie

For about two decades, and especially during the prolonged boom of the capitalist economy of Western Europe, private industry had taken on a predominant role, despite the noteworthy strength of the state sectors. In fact, in the absence of a determined plan and during the phase of leadership crises, the big capitalist groups (in the first place Fiat, Pirelli, and Montedison) had imposed their will, determining the type of development and, in the final analysis, assuring the relative dynamic equilibrium of the system. But with the exhaustion of the boom and the new situation that emerged after 1968, even these groups ran into growing difficulties, suffering serious crises at various times. Generally speaking, profit reductions, crises, and actual bankruptcies resulted in intensifying state intervention into the economy and thus further enlarged the part of industry under the total or partial control of the state. (As is well known, even a bulwark of private capital like Montedison now has a considerable dose of state participation.) At the same time, the accentuation of the process of supranational concentration has entailed a massive penetration of foreign capital. (Recall, for example, the events in the various domestic electronics companies.)

Schematically, then, the following stratification can be outlined: (1) the bourgeoisie of the big private industrial groups, whose weight has diminished for the reasons listed above; (2) the bourgeoisie linked to specific sectors, like petroleum, that are closely linked to international capital; (3) the financial and speculation-oriented bourgeoisie, whose weight, far from declining, has been increasing; (4) the technocracy, the leading bureaucracy of the public sector, whose positions have been further strengthened.

These distinctions are to some extent arbitrary, for there is an interpenetration, while not an identity, among some of the indicated strata. But the interpenetration is not total, and in any case the various strata and groups have different overriding interests; in times of crisis, when decisive choices have to be made, this fact can have a particular practical urgency. Another consideration must be taken into account, however. The exten-

the marginally employed, and the unemployed work force). Some of his quantitative estimates are debatable, but the importance of the phenomenon is difficult to contest.

sion of the public sector—even in the most radical form—does not entail a break with the system as a whole; in fact, it can even strengthen the system. Nevertheless, it does not involve a decrease in the weight of the bourgeoisie as such, which has inevitable political consequences. (The technocracy or state bureaucracy cannot carry out all the social and political functions traditionally handled by the industrial bourgeoisie with a view toward improving the operation of the system and lending it an overall balance.) Here another of the objective roots of the crisis of the ruling class must be delineated.

To what extent is it possible to establish a correspondence between the various sectors of the bourgeoisie and the political tendencies that are being manifested in the current phase? Is there any foundation to the interpretations being advanced in some quarters that there is an alliance between the financial and speculation-oriented bourgeoisie on the one hand and the bureaucratic "bourgeoisie" on the other? It is necessary to refrain from establishing connections that are too mechanical. This is all the more important during a period in which the fate of the system as a whole is at stake and in which political choices are determined generally by the need to defend the interests of the system as a whole. That said, however, it is impossible to disregard certain specific inclinations. The financial and speculation-oriented bourgeoisie can find broad agreement on a conservative basis with the state bureaucracy, all the more so in that it is not directly concerned with the problem of relations with the working class. The same can be said about the oil industrialists. These are the sectors of the ruling class most strongly inclined toward reactionary solutions; they are the sectors that have had the decisive weight in the right wing of the Christian Democracy in the past. The industrial sectors, which would need to continue to develop in a more "modern" and "rationalized" atmosphere and which employ larger sections of the work force, feel pushed in a different direction. International factors also come into play in some cases (Fiat's relations with the Soviet bureaucracy, for example). These are the sectors that favored the center-left government when it arose and, beyond conjunctural tactical political oscillations, they are the sectors that could end up accepting the "historic compromise" proposed by the Communist party.

But today there is an element that unites all the various strata of the ruling class, and that is their growing lack of faith in the instruments used to administer and defend the system in the framework of the institutions that emerged out of the fall of fascism. The Christian Democracy, the leading party for about thirty years now, is considered these days as an in-

strument that is too costly and at the same time too little effective. The same evaluation has been extended to the state and administrative apparatus. At a time when profit margins are tending to decline again and when what is needed is instruments that can act quickly and comprehensively, the bourgeoisie cannot passively resign itself to such a situation continuing to drag on.

### The Christian Democracy

The Christian Democratic (CD) National Council last July, which was advertised as an occasion of self-critical reflection, rather amply reflected the profound crisis of both the party and the ruling class. The most important speeches had to recognize very heavy liabilities, from failure of economic planning to cultural bankruptcy; many tears were shed over the deterioration in relations between the CD and the country's social forces. More concretely, the CD notables were forced to observe that the bourgeoisie no longer has confidence in them, that the middle classes, and even some small and middle-sized industrialists, were succumbing to the lure of the Communist party, and that the current ferment of discontent had spread even to the small farmers, traditional bulwark of conservatism.

Small and middle-sized industrialists had established good relations with the CP in the so-called red regions some time ago. Recently, representatives of these categories have paid visits to the CP federations in Lombardy and Sicily as well. More than 300 entrepreneurs participated in a meeting on small and medium-sized industry organized by the CP in early November. On October 30 representatives of the association of building contractors held a meeting with CP parliament members. These are all indications of the orientation being worked out by some sectors of the bourgeoisie and could constitute a prelude to the realization of the Historic Compromise.

The depth of the crisis was confirmed by the total inconsistency of the solutions that were proposed. With the exception of a few admissions uttered in a pathetic tone of grotesque lack of understanding, Amintore Fanfani's speech stressed preserving the status quo.<sup>4</sup> But the discussion—insofar as anything came out of

4. For example, Fanfani described the consequences of Vatican Council II, or its "interpretations," in the following terms: "It happened that new interpretations of the social apostolate induced many sheep of the old fold to regard themselves as shepherds and to devote themselves to converting supposedly lost sheep to these new interpretations. The result was that the great old fold lost a part of its flock, and the sheep already said to be lost

it at all—never went beyond totally vague projects for "social pacts," vacuous yearning for the New Deal or for the French planning system, and time-worn commonplaces about making the most of local bodies or institutions like the CNEL (Consiglio Nazionale dell'Economia e del Lavoro—National Council of Economy and Labor, a body containing representatives of both the employers and the trade unions and having only consultative powers). The sterility of the discussions need not be demonstrated. And the whole thing ended up with an outline of organizational proposals on the methods of selecting ministers and on the transformation of the Christian Democratic study center into a research institution.

The Christian Democrats were concrete on some points: They flaunted their own contradictions in the face of the industrial bourgeoisie; they revealed the ephemeral character of certain attempts at direct economic cooperation between the employers and the trade unions; and, above all, they revealed that while the old instrument had perhaps grown rusty, there was no new one on the market. Effectively, the relative strength of the CD lies in the fact that there is no available substitute for it so long as the democratic constitutional framework is maintained. The bourgeoisie is condemned to sustain the CD despite everything, even if the Historic Compromise is carried out. In fact, what other counterweight could there be to the strength of the CP, possibly united in a bloc with the Socialists?

### Authoritarian Solution or Historic Compromise?

In a context in which the parliamentary regime has suffered great erosion and in which the exploited classes and wide layers of the middle classes are compelled to bear the heavy costs of the crisis, the authoritarian solution presents itself to the ruling class as a possible way out almost as a matter of course.

Nevertheless, the conditions are lacking for a fascist solution of the 1920s Italy or the 1930s Germany type. The fascist

were considered to be on missions. These sheep who had transformed themselves into shepherds were in their turn lost, instead of carrying the lost sheep back to the fold and thereby increasing its numbers." And here is a real pearl of Fanfanesque interpretation of the demands of the new generation: "The youth today should take note of the fact that the satisfaction of the just demands they are raising often requires not revolution but only the reestablishment of the good old rules that have fallen into disuse, besides, of course, adding the new rules called for by experience."

movement has been able and will be able to polarize sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the subproletariat on the electoral level. Concurrently, it has been able to organize far-right nuclei to carry out paramilitary actions and terrorist undertakings. But it has not succeeded in gaining the political and ideological hegemony among substantial layers of the petty bourgeoisie that could permit it to appear as a credible alternative. Nor has it organized a substantial antiworker strike force. The failure during the past two years of the attempts to repeat operations of the Reggio Calabria type (when the fascists were able to generate mass mobilizations) has had especially negative implications for the fate of neofascism in the current period. At the same time, the conditions necessary for an operation of a Bonapartist type, whether classical or Gaullist, also do not exist today. Apart from clumsy figures more suited to musical comedies, no de Gaulle or other Bonapartist candidate has emerged — even in the remote distance.

It is exactly for these reasons that the attempts to break the democratic-constitutional system have been confined to attempts at a coup of the Chilean or Greek variety. It is now common knowledge that on several occasions such attempts have reached a stage of advanced preparation and even of momentary fulfillment. On December 7, 1970, a squadron organized by Borghese<sup>5</sup> actually penetrated the Interior Ministry; just a few weeks ago a "leftist" terrorist offensive of vast proportions was supposed to be set off with the aim of provoking a resolute intervention by the armed forces; there have been many intervening attempts as well. The people who have been behind these projects cannot be reduced to wizened old commanders yearning for the Mussolini era or the Salo Republic, nor to reactionary fringe groups headed by megalomaniacs who are more noisy than harmful. As we have mentioned, there are sectors of the bourgeoisie inclined toward an authoritarian solution, and given the impossibility of achieving this through fascism or Bonapartism, they could foment or support a coup. It is no big news that financial backers of the fascists are to be found among the oil men (the name of Monti is the best known in this regard, but it is not the only one). Among the backers of the so-called Rosa dei Venti (Points of the Compass), the clandestine far-right organization founded in November 1973, we find the industrialist Piaggio; and at the time of the Brescia massacre

5. Prince Borghese, noted for his military actions during the second world war, supported fascism even during the Nazi occupation of Italy (the period of the so-called Salo Republic, which was marked by antipartisan repression).

the existence of financial supporters of the fascists among the industrialists of the region was revealed. Orlandini, the building contractor, figured as one of the major suspects in the abortive coup of December 1970.

Moreover, supporters of authoritarian solutions and potential putschists are



AGNELLI: Fiat boss rejects, for time being, CP offer of popular front.

found in the very parties that define themselves as constitutionalist. The case of Edgardo Sogno, a former monarchist supporter and now a member of the leadership of the Partito Liberale Italiano (Italian Liberal party), is symptomatic. Sogno openly proclaimed himself in favor of the overthrow of the existing institutions; nevertheless, several months after this declaration, he has not yet been expelled from his party. In addition, no one doubts that infectious germs have spread widely within the ranks of the right wing of the CD, among leaders of a Mafia and Camorrist stamp. (Not only among these sectors, however. In a recent interview Senator Pastorino, one of the CD's major leaders in Genoa, did not hesitate to openly declare himself for a putsch.) Possible putschists could certainly find useful accomplices among the ranks of the Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Social Democratic party), a filthy bought-and-paid-for formation, one of whose parliamentary deputies associated himself with fascists to protest the arrest of Miceli and whose president Mario Tanassi, has been accused by Saragat himself of keeping quiet about what

was going on at the time of the Borghese adventure.<sup>6</sup>

The arrest of Miceli and the indictment of Fanali, former air force chief of staff, on charges of complicity with the fascist Borghese offered resounding confirmation of the fact that the putschists are far from insignificant. (According to the October 12 *Corriere della Sera*, Fanali's office wall features an autographed photograph of Vittorio Mussolini, the ex-king and ex-queen, and Kappeler, the SS official responsible for the massacre of the Fosse Ardeantine near Rome in 1944.) And there is no reason to doubt that foreign secret services, in the first place those of American imperialism, have close ties with the putschist sectors that could take the initiative under the right circumstances.

In its November 3 edition *La Stampa*, the Turin daily owned by Fiat, wrote in an editorial: "In spite of innumerable inquiries, we do not know enough about this great destructive design to be able to say how much of it represents foolish ambition or to identify the perhaps more hidden plots. But that part of the network that has come to the surface or been revealed is sufficient to require that we conclude that the dangers not only were, but also remain, real." The assertions of Agnelli's newspaper clarify the motives that led decisive sectors of the bourgeoisie and the government to finally opt for launching an attack on the putschists: They took account of the fact that these people have not at all been disarmed and even consider that further deterioration of the regime would create more favorable premises for the putschist initiatives.

The same article clearly indicated why the great majority of the ruling class continued to reject the putschist or dictatorial solution. "In Italy," the editorial concluded, "whoever attempts a coup is provoking civil war."

In other words, the relationship of forces between the classes remains such that any fascist or putschist attempts are extremely risky. The army itself, whose ranks are increasingly massively filled with youth who have been through the critical

6. Vito Miceli, former head of the Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID, the counterintelligence agency attached to the Defense Ministry), was arrested recently on charges of having been involved in various attempted coups and of having covered for the putschists when the coups failed. The SID, it should be noted, is in charge of preventing coups, among other things. Giuseppe Saragat, a leading member of the PSDI and president of the republic at the time of the 1970 attempted coup, charged recently that Tanassi, then minister of the interior, knew what was going on and did not report it to his president.

experiences of political struggle during these past years and within which ferment is on the rise, could be thrown into a grave crisis. The bourgeoisie is perfectly well aware of this, so much so that its major press organ, the Milan daily *Corriere della Sera*, wrote explicitly: "Even if, as has happened, a leader should concretely take to the road of sedition, his ruin would be certain. The soldiers, who come from all over the country, could not follow him. The tanks would stop in the middle of the road." (November 2, 1974.)<sup>7</sup>

The Historic Compromise represents a way out of the crisis in a diametrically opposite direction. This would be a large-scale political operation that would imply participation of the CP in the government and could create conditions more favorable both for the reformist plans of rationalization that the center-left government has proven incapable of carrying out and for an economic reconversion of the type we described in our previous article. [See *Intercontinental Press*, December 16, 1974, p. 1688.] But can the Historic Compromise be actually realized?

From the political standpoint, the conditions for the Historic Compromise are generally more favorable now than in any period in the past. We have already mentioned the open attitudes being taken toward the CP by layers of the small and middle-sized industrialists and the inclination toward dialogue among a category like the building contractors, who have traditionally lined up behind conservative or reactionary positions. And it is no big news that still more decisive sectors of the ruling class have an attitude toward the CP that is very different from the attitude they held during the 1950s and that they consider the participation of the CP in the government as a plausible hypothesis. From the international standpoint, the present context entails no absolute obstacles. Significant events of the past few years—from the policy of the French CP during the revolutionary crisis of 1968 to the participation of the Portuguese CP in a government of national union—have stimulated a further evolution of positions. And it must be added that the Italian CP has repeatedly offered serious guarantees. On the parliamentary and administrative level it has in fact collaborated with the parties of the government coalition, has allowed certain governments to survive, and has renounced parliamentary fights that, if they were carried on energetically, could have succeeded in blocking government projects. (A

good recent example is the fiscal decrees of the summer of 1974, which would have had a difficult time being approved within the time limit set by law had the Communist deputies resorted to obstruction.)

Nevertheless, it is improbable that the Rubicon will be crossed immediately or in the short term. The bourgeoisie and its parties are torn by very bitter polemics and are suffering continual vacillations. At its National Council the CD reacted to the CP's advances with a very clear rejection. Further, and perhaps even more significant, a "no" answer was given by Agnelli, the top leader of Fiat and head of the national employers organization, who has correctly been considered as one of the people most inclined to accept the Historic Compromise. Imperialist circles, already alarmed by the Greek events and concerned about strengthening the Italian NATO bases, have made no secret of their negative attitude. The unhealed internal crisis of the CD constitutes one of the major complicating factors. Would this party be in position to engage in such a daring operation without risking being overwhelmed or being threatened by multiple uncontrollable centrifugal tendencies?

For its part, the CP is hesitating and will hesitate further before taking the decisive step. (In fact, the CP might temporarily radicalize its criticism of the government, as it did for a short time last spring when it adopted the formula of "intransigent opposition.") In reality, the CP has to take care to preserve its links with the masses and it is not inclined to assume any heavy responsibility for the present state of affairs without getting something in return; that is, without receiving a guarantee that it is getting into an operation of broad scope. The difficulty lies precisely in the fact that in the present circumstances, the CP finds it hard to see what the reward would be. When the CP participated in the coalition government of 1944-47, it was able to present itself as the force restoring democracy and as the guardian of the immediate economic interests of the broad masses after the catastrophe of the war. (A similar reasoning applies for the Portuguese CP today.) The Popular Front government in France in 1936 could be justified by the CP because of a series of important gains won by the working class, even though in the final analysis the popular front allowed the bourgeoisie to extract itself from a critical situation. But in Italy today a government functioning within the system with a CP participation could not assure any new political gains for the proletariat, and given the economic situation, it would be difficult for it to guarantee even modest economic gains.

For all these reasons, the Historic Compromise appears difficult to realize, al-

though it is inscribed in the potential tendencies of this period. If the crisis of the system further sharpens on all levels and if the bourgeoisie feels it has reached the end of its rope, the terms of the problem will change. For its part, the bureaucracy of the CP could be driven to leap over the impediments in the conviction that it is its duty to do so given the extreme danger facing the institutional framework that it has every interest in maintaining because of its definitive acceptance of the traditional reformist logic of lesser evilism.

Could the Historic Compromise lead to a restabilization if it were realized? For a brief period the impact of the new situation could provide certain maneuvering room and could even ease political tensions temporarily. But in a more general sense, the answer to the question must be negative. The crisis the Italian economy is going through is simultaneously conjunctural and structural. It is so extensive and so deep that an early restabilization would not be possible even with the Historic Compromise. Insofar as the Historic Compromise were not just an ephemeral operation or a continuation of the old routine under a new label, insofar as it should begin to take the radical measures necessary for the reconversion we have described, and insofar as the masses should begin to demand something concrete, tensions would not only rise again very rapidly, they would also become even more acute. From this standpoint, it is not at all arbitrary to recall the situation in Chile during the Allende period. Once again, this conclusion is called for: A restabilization could come only after decisive battles between the main classes, and to the extent that these battles should develop, the very basis of the operation attempted with the Historic Compromise would evaporate.

The risks involved in a putschist or dictatorial solution combined with the persistent difficulties blocking the path of the Historic Compromise have had and are still having the effect of resigning decisive sectors of the ruling class to a chronic crisis of leadership. It would be inexact to say that the center-left still lives. As a comprehensive political solution, as a formula for effective leadership, the center-left is dead and buried. The ruling class is condemned to continue to flutter back and forth, to suffer perpetual crises of its government. It is condemned to seek ever more precarious governmental solutions whose only element of continuity with the past (except for the Andreotti period) lies in the fact that the parliamentary base is the same, or very nearly the same, as that of the center-left. The ruling class certainly knows very well that it can't go on this way. And yet, for the moment, it has no other choice but to do so. □

7. Obviously, the fall of the Salazarist dictatorship in Portugal and, perhaps even more so, the fall of the Greek military dictatorship have weakened the position of the supporters of the authoritarian solution still further.

## U.S. Witch-Hunt Committee Put in Mothballs

By Judy White

The U. S. House of Representatives on January 14 dissolved its witch-hunting Internal Security Committee (HISC), the current name for the "red"-hunting House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). At the same time, however, the House transferred some of HISC's functions, staff, and all its files on the "subversive" activities of more than 750,000 Americans to the House Judiciary Committee. HISC had a budget of \$725,000 and a staff of thirty-nine persons for 1974.

The history of HISC began in 1938 with the formation of a temporary House committee to investigate "un-American" activities under the chairmanship of Martin Dies. As window dressing, it started by investigating the fascist Bundists. But it quickly shifted to a witch-hunt of the labor movement when an American Federation of Labor official named 284 organizers of the rival Congress of Industrial Organizations as Communists.

During the wartime alliance between Moscow and Washington, the Dies Committee conducted few "investigations." But in 1945, when preparations for the cold war began in earnest, what had been a "temporary" committee was converted into a permanent standing committee of the House of Representatives—the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC).

By late 1947 HUAC was making headlines with its investigation of "reds" in Hollywood. The inquiry resulted in the blacklisting of ten screen writers and actors who refused to answer the committee's questions on their political affiliations. Among the Hollywood Ten were Dalton Trumbo, Ring Lardner Jr., and Albert Maltz. Scores of other Hollywood figures were also blacklisted after film bosses announced that the industry would hire no more "reds." They urged that the same step be taken in all industries.

In 1948 the Alger Hiss case made the reputation of HUAC junior mem-



Nixon, in pre-Watergate days, hunting headlines and "subversion."

ber Richard Nixon. Hiss, a former State Department official, was named by Whittaker Chambers as a Communist. When threatened by Hiss with a \$75,000 libel suit, Chambers accused Hiss of being a Soviet spy. On the basis of forged documents Hiss was eventually convicted of perjury and sent to jail.

In 1952 HUAC directed its fire at "un-American" activities in the Detroit area. Its central target was UAW Local 600, which has been pressing for the 30-hour week at 40 hours' pay and an end to the five-year contract. Following a scare campaign about the "communist menace" in the unions, United Auto Workers President Walter Reuther ordered Local 600 taken over by an administrative board. The board suspended all functions of the local and removed a number of its staff officials. It took a struggle of several months before the ranks were able to regain control of Local 600.

In late 1953, when HUAC attempted an attack on San Francisco unions, 6,000 longshoremen went out on strike in protest. Hearings, scheduled to last eleven days, were cut to five.

Although the witch-hunt committee

continued to function through the rest of the 1950s, 1960s, (it changed its name to the House Internal Security Committee in 1969), and into the 1970s, protests against its activities mounted as the new wave of radicalization began.

In 1959, when the committee subpoenaed 110 public school teachers in San Francisco, protests forced the outright cancellation of the hearings. When HUAC returned to the city the following year, student demonstrations involving up to 5,000 persons brought national attention to the committee's witch-hunt procedures.

During the 1970s HISC focused its smears on the antiwar movement. It published a report on "subversion" in the armed forces, approved a bill banning "unauthorized" trips by U. S. citizens to countries with which Washington was engaged in armed conflict (such as North Vietnam), and "exposed" the active role of communists and socialists in building the antiwar movement.

The December 17, 1971, issue of *The Militant* reported that out of a total of 174 hearings held by HUAC, two were investigations on the right wing. Of the 150,000 questions put to 3,125 witnesses over twenty-five years, 25 percent referred to events that took place at least five years prior to the hearing, often to incidents thirty and forty years old.

This is to say nothing of the seventeen persons who were hounded to death by the witch-hunting committee—dying prematurely from "natural" causes and suicides—or the thousands who were blacklisted and harassed for their political beliefs.

The abolition of the House Internal Security Committee is a step forward in the struggle to broaden civil liberties in the United States. At the same time, however, the transfer of HISC's files to another committee shows that the White House intends to remain prepared to mount a similar operation if the political climate makes large-scale witch-hunting possible again. □

# AROUND THE WORLD



## World Arms Spending Hits \$241 Billion

Worldwide military spending, measured in 1972 dollars, hit \$241 billion in 1973, according to a report by the U.S. State Department Arms Control and Disarmament Agency January 25. The imperialist powers in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization accounted for 45.6 percent of the global total, spending \$110.4 billion. The workers states in the Warsaw Pact spent an estimated \$94.3 billion, 39 percent of the world total.

The report did not include such items as veterans benefits, civil defense, civilian space activities, stockpiling of strategic materials, and public debt service in calculating military spending.

It found that the international arms trade had doubled since 1963, going from \$4.4 billion to \$8.7 billion. Of the total, the United States accounted for \$4.7 billion in exports and the Soviet Union, \$2.4 billion. American arms exports since 1973 have doubled again, reaching \$8.5 billion in the year ending last June.

Annual publication of the State Department report on world military spending was suspended in 1972 after Defense Secretary Melvin Laird objected that critics of the Pentagon were using it to compare military and social spending. Publication has now resumed, but without comparable data on world spending for health and education.

## Strike Paralyzes Indian Ports

Tens of thousands of dock workers launched a strike for higher pay January 16, paralyzing work at eight of India's nine major ports. At least 160 ships were idled at five of the ports.

The workers had originally demanded a wage increase of 100 rupees (one rupee equals US\$0.128) a month retroactive to January 1974. They later scaled down their demands to Rs 50 a month for 1974 and Rs 60 a month in 1975. The government, however, did not accept these demands. Makhan Chatterjee, the general secretary of the dock workers union, said after declaring the strike, "In spite of our best efforts, it [the strike] could not be averted because of the miserly attitude of the Government."

The regime of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi responded to the strike by invoking the Defence of India Rules to declare the strike illegal and to ban strikes at all the ports for six months. As a cover

for its strikebreaking efforts, the government said that ships carrying fertilizer and grain had to be unloaded.

Security forces moved in to guard the ports, and at a meeting in Calcutta local authorities discussed the possibility of using the Territorial Army to unload the ships.

On the first day of the strike, the Madras Dock Labour Board declared a state of emergency at that port and said those workers who did not return to their jobs by January 18 would "face serious consequences including prosecution in a court of law and summary dismissal from service." In addition, the commissioner of police banned all rallies and marches in the harbor area for one week.

## 20 Latin American Governments Protest New U.S. Trade Law

Representatives of twenty Latin American governments voted January 23 to protest the new U.S. trade law as "discriminatory and coercive." The vote was taken at a special meeting of the Organization of American States council after Washington failed to persuade the representatives that the new law contained more benefits than restrictions for their exports to the United States.

The most criticized provision of the trade law is one barring tariff preferences to governments that join cartels to protect the prices of their exports. Special targets of this measure are the governments of Venezuela and Ecuador, which belong to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

## Rahman Tightens Rule Over Bangladesh

One month after his declaration of a state of emergency, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman formalized his dictatorial rule over Bangladesh. The Jatiya Sangsad (National Assembly), which is overwhelmingly dominated by Rahman's Awami League, named him president on January 25. The new title gives Rahman all executive powers and authorizes him to declare Bangladesh a one-party state.

To create the new office (Rahman had previously been prime minister), the 1972 constitution was amended to make the Jatiya Sangsad subservient to the president, who is to exercise all executive authority "either directly or through officers subordinate to him."

Although the president is to be chosen by direct election every five years, Rahman, the "Father of the Nation," assumed the office by special decree. Echoing the same justifications he used for declaring the state of emergency, Rahman said the constitutional changes had been necessitated by the "chaotic situation," which, he claimed, had been caused by smugglers, black marketeers, hoarders, and "political adventurists."

## No Recession for Big U.S. Banks

Despite the growing recession in 1974, U.S. banks are reporting higher profits. Of the first 100 banks to report their 1974 take, seventy-three listed higher incomes than in 1973. The average increase in operating profits for all 100 banks was 11 percent. Citicorp, which owns the First National City Bank, showed a profit of \$313 million, the largest of any bank. Bank-America Corporation, the holding company that owns the Bank of America, had profits of \$257 million.

## 'FALN' Claims Responsibility for New York Bombing

Four people were killed and fifty-three injured—three critically—when a powerful bomb exploded in the New York financial district January 24. A group calling itself the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquena (FALN—Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation) claimed responsibility for the blast, which wrecked a dining room in an annex to Fraunces Tavern.

A note from the FALN, which had taken responsibility for several earlier terrorist bombings in New York, said that the action was in retaliation for the January 11 bombing of a restaurant in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, prior to a rally organized by the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP).

Juan Mari Bras, general secretary of the PSP, denounced the New York bombing and dissociated the PSP from it. "Indiscriminate and irresponsible terrorism obviously directed at the death of innocent persons is contrary to the practice of revolutionary warfare," he said. The bombing was also denounced by the Puerto Rican Independence party.

Nevertheless, the danger of the authorities using the bombing as a pretext to attack the independence movement as a

whole remains. At the time of one of the earlier bombing incidents a high New York police official said of the FALN: "This is a new name, but we feel it is affiliated with Puerto Rican independence groups in the past that are continuing into the present."

### **Pentagon Seeks Use of Oman Air Base**

Washington has asked London for landing rights to a British air force base on Masirah Island off the coast of Oman, according to a report in the January 21 *Washington Post*. The use of the base was discussed when Sultan Qabus of Oman visited Washington in early January. "The Sultan," the *Post* wrote, "who has the last word on American use of the base, was said to be amenable, provided there was no objection from the British." The reporter also noted that it would be unusual for London to deny the landing rights to its NATO ally.

A Pentagon source said that the base can accommodate all the usual cargo planes, P-30 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and fighter planes. Shortly after Qabus left Washington, it was announced that some TOW wire-guided antitank missiles had been sold to the Omani regime and that other sales may follow.

### **Iranian Oil Exports Decline**

The Tehran newspaper *Kayhan International* reported January 25 that Iranian oil exports have fallen more than 10 percent compared with those in December, and that the downward trend is expected to continue in the coming months. The revenue decline resulting from this decrease in exports was estimated at "over \$2.6-billion during the current year if the January trend continued." Oil production cutbacks in Venezuela and Kuwait have also been reported.

### **Nobel Laureates Call for Alternatives to Capitalism**

Seven American and European winners of the Nobel Prize released a statement saying that the current economic crisis "in the advanced industrial democracies raises serious questions about the very nature of the economic systems in these societies."

In a message to the convention of the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee held in New York over the weekend of January 25, the seven said that while not all of them were socialists, they all believed that "the exploration of alternatives to the prevailing Western economic systems must be placed on the agenda at once."

The seven Nobel Laureates were Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish economist who won the prize in 1974; Maurice H. F. Wilkins of London, medicine, 1962; Jan

Tinbergen of Rotterdam, economics, 1969; Alfred Kastler of Paris, physics, 1969; Mel Delbruck of the California Institute of Technology, medicine, 1969; Kenneth J. Arrow of Harvard, economics, 1972; and Heinrich Boll of Cologne, literature, 1972.

The Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, a social-democratic group led by author Michael Harrington, had about 350 people at its convention. They concluded that "the liberalism of the mass democratic left must turn now in a much more socialist direction," while maintaining their orientation of working inside the capitalist Democratic party.

### **Australian Unemployment Worst Since 1930s**

The number of unemployed in Australia has reached the highest level since the Depression of the 1930s. Clyde Cameron, minister for labor and immigration, announced January 12 that 266,998 were out of work, or 4.53 percent of the work force. The number rose by 75,989 in December.

### **Air Force to Discharge 'Misfit'**

A "gung-ho officer," as the military would say, Major Harold Hering had been in the U. S. Air Force for twenty years and volunteered for five additional tours of duty in Vietnam. But on January 12 an air force board of inquiry cited him for failure to discharge his assignments properly and for having a defective attitude toward his duties. The board ruled that he should be discharged.

It seems that Hering, who had been assigned to a missile crew at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California after returning from Vietnam, had "mental and moral reservations as to his ability to launch nuclear weapons," and demonstrated "failure to meet the duty performance required of an officer."

The major "never refused to launch a nuclear weapon, nor is he a conscientious objector," his defense lawyers explained. He just "asked what checks and balances there are to assure that a launch could not be affected by the President gone berserk. . . ."

### **Miners, Students Strike in Bolivia After Banzer Seizes Radio Stations**

One-fourth of Bolivia's tin industry has been paralyzed as the result of a miners' strike that began January 13. The strike is costing mineowners \$1.5 million a day in export losses.

The strike began when the Banzer regime raided and shut down four radio stations in important state mining centers. The government acted, according to Bolivian Press Secretary Javier Arce Vi-

llalba, because the stations "had become centers of political agitation and subversion."

In response, miners at Siglo Veinte, Catavi, and Llallagua declared a forty-eight-hour work stoppage. Two days later 12,000 students at the University of San Andres in La Paz staged a forty-eight-hour walkout in solidarity with the miners. The miners extended their stoppage to a strike of indefinite duration, and by January 26 their numbers had grown to 12,000.

Among those arrested in connection with the protests were five Catholic priests of the Oblate Order. The Oblates own one of the banned radio stations.

Persons arriving in La Paz from Llallagua reported that the Bolivian army participated in the seizures of the radio stations and that shooting accompanied the action. Arce Villalba denied both reports.

### **1.4 Million New Refugees Since Saigon 'Cease-Fire'**

The continued war drive of the U. S.-backed Thieu regime in South Vietnam has driven 1.4 million persons from their homes since the signing of the January 1973 cease-fire agreement. In addition, the U. S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees reported January 25, at least one South Vietnamese child in five is now an orphan.

In Cambodia, it was estimated that 3.3 million persons, more than half the population, were refugees at the end of 1974. In the first two weeks of 1975, an additional 60,000 Cambodians were forced to flee their homes.

### **Thai Governor's Home Burned Down in Protest Against Profiteering**

A student-led crowd burned down the governor's residence in the flood-stricken province of Nakhon Sithammarat January 22. The governor was accused of helping profiteers in the province, which was the worst hit by the flooding in Thailand. He was reported to have been in Bangkok, seeking a transfer, at the time of the protest.

### **25,000 Students March in Turkey**

At least 25,000 students marched through Istanbul January 25 in a funeral procession for Kerim Yaman, a 22-year-old student who was killed in a clash with rightists at an engineering and technical college. The students marched with clenched fists and chanted anti-American slogans. The protest, which was the largest student demonstration since the declaration of martial law in 1971, followed a sit-in at the University of Istanbul January 24. The university has been closed indefinitely.

## ¿Piensa el Pentágono Reabrir la Guerra de Vietnam?

Ultimamente Washington ha dado señales de sus posibles intenciones de reabrir las hostilidades en Vietnam. Esto se hizo más evidente con la declaración de Washington del 13 de enero, en la que previno a Hanoi de que "debe aceptar todas las consecuencias de sus acciones" al "cambiar el camino de las negociaciones por el de la guerra." El Departamento de Estado se rehusó a ampliar más el significado de "aceptar todas las consecuencias."

Esta escalada en las amenazas empezó con la liberación de Phuocbinh, capital provincial de Phuoclong, por las fuerzas del Gobierno Provisional Revolucionario. Los "halcones" en Washington utilizaron el incidente para iniciar toda una serie de maniobras militares.

De hecho, los planes para la escalada ya hacía tiempo que habían sido elaborados, antes de la toma de Phuocbinh. Según el *New York Times* del 9 de enero:

"Un memorandum del Pentágono, escrito ya hace varias semanas, llamaba a hacer una amplia campaña publicitaria para convencer al Congreso y al público de que era necesario un esfuerzo de emergencia, o a Saigón se le acabarían las municiones en 30 días."

La toma de Phuocbinh fue utilizada por el Pentágono como el eje de su campaña. El *Washington Post* del 12 de enero informó:

"Están exhibiendo a Phoucbinh como un feo ejemplo de la suerte que les espera a otros pueblos y ciudades más importantes de Vietnam del Sur, al menos que el Congreso dé más ayuda." La liberación de Phuocbinh fue mostrada como el inicio de una nueva ofensiva por parte de las fuerzas de liberación.

La realidad es bastante diferente. Phuocbinh era un puesto militar de Saigón aislado en una provincia controlada en su casi totalidad por el Gobierno Provisional Revolucionario.

"Los comunistas, de todas maneras, controlaban todo excepto los pueblos," dijo un analista citado por el *Washington Post* del 4 de enero. "Phuocbinh era como una fruta madura esperando ser arrancada, y esto lo pu-

dieron haber hecho cuando querían en los últimos dos años."

Aparte del incremento de las acciones bélicas que la misma estación se ca trae, una de las razones por las que se tomó Phuocbinh ahora y no antes la dio *Nhan Dan*, órgano oficial del PC norvietnamita, el 6 de enero. *Nhan Dan* acusó a Thieu de haber mandado tropas y tanques para combatir en el campo de la provincia de Phuoclong y en otras regiones, quemando las cosechas de arroz que el ejército de Vietnam del Sur no pudiera tomar.

En un comunicado desde Saigón que apareció en el *Washington Post* del 12 de enero, Philip A. McCombs informó que la mayoría de los "especialistas en Hanoi" estaban de acuerdo en que las fuerzas rebeldes no habían iniciado una ofensiva general.

McCombs informó que el número de soldados del GPR en Vietnam del sur era más o menos igual al que había cuando se suspendieron las hostilidades.

Según los analistas, dijo McCombs, la lucha actual "tiene objetivos militares limitados." También señaló la política actual de Hanoi de centrarse en su propio crecimiento económico. La opinión general era que Hanoi difícilmente ordenaría una escalada masiva de sus actividades militares en el Sur si este pone en peligro su desarrollo a largo plazo en el Norte."

Los mismos norvietnamitas negaron las acusaciones de Washington y Saigón de que se había lanzado una ofensiva general. En una declaración emitida por Radio Hanoi y citada en el *Washington Post* del 5 de enero, un vocero del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores dijo que los cargos eran "una maniobra destinada a confundir a la opinión pública y encubrir las violaciones sistemáticas por parte de los Estados Unidos y Vietnam del Sur, de los acuerdos de París respecto a Vietnam."

"También tienen el propósito de presionar al Congreso de los Estados Unidos para que éste aumente el subsidio a Vietnam del Sur," dijo la información.

Washington, en su escalada, movilizó un contingente de la Séptima Flota, encabezado por el portaviones *Enterprise* el día que cayó Phoucbinh. Un comunicado de la United Press International de Saigón citó fuentes diplomáticas estadounidenses diciendo que los barcos habían zarpado en aguas vietnamitas para dar apoyo a Vietnam del Sur y hacerle una advertencia a Vietnam del Norte. La Casa Blanca desmintió tal comunicado diciendo que la movilización del contingente compuesto de seis buques no está "vinculada con nada de lo que está sucediendo en Vietnam del Sur," afirmó un vocero del Pentágono. Sin embargo, las opiniones del Secretario de Estado, Henry Kissinger, como ya es costumbre, se filtraron a la prensa. Citando a "funcionarios del Gobierno", el *New York Times* del 11 de enero informó que Kissinger había "expresado contrariedad al Pentágono" porque el contingente naval "no se había usado para demostrarle a Vietnam del Norte la determinación norteamericana. . . ."

Hubo más señales de la "determinación norteamericana", entre otras:

Se transportaron arsenales de Tailandia a Vietnam del Sur, según un vocero del ejército norteamericano en Bangkok, citado por el *Washington Post* del 10 de enero. "No mandamos, por lo general embarques a Vietnam del Sur," dijo el vocero, "pero se están enviando algunos últimamente." Este informe también fue negado por la embajada norteamericana en Saigón.

Unidades de marines y de la fuerza aérea estacionadas en Okinawa, Japón, están en estado de alerta desde el 6 de enero, informó el *Washington Post* del 10 de enero.

Desde el 11 de enero Washington admitió que está llevando a cabo vuelos de reconocimiento sobre Vietnam del Norte. Esto se supo a partir de la denuncia hecha por *Nhan Dan* de que "aviones norteamericanos, tripulados y sin tripular, con base en Tailandia" habían dirigido bombardeos en represalia contra Locninh, centro administrativo del GPR a treinta millas de Phuocbinh. Según un vocero del GPR, se lanzaron 200 bombas



incendiarias sobre el poblado. Murieron docenas de personas, y fueron destruidas cientos de casas, dos pagodas y una iglesia católica.

El informe de *Nhan Dan* fue desmentido oficialmente por la embajada de los Estados Unidos en Saigón, informó el *Washington Post* del 12 de enero, "pero algunas fuentes admitieron que los aviones norteamericanos han estado haciendo misiones de reconocimiento sobre la costa norvietnamita y sobre Vietnam y Camboya desde que se acordó la tregua hace dos años."

El 13 de enero el Pentágono anunció que el portaviones *Midway*, junto con dos destructores y una fragata con cohetes teledirigidos, había salido de Japón con destino desconocido. El *New York Times* informó que algunos oficiales del Pentágono "indicaron que el *Midway* no tenía órdenes específicas de dirigirse a aguas vietnamitas, pero que el gobierno quería mantener esa opción abierta. . . ."

Según *Le Monde* del 15 de enero, el buque insignia de la Séptima Flota, el *Oklahoma City*, también había abandonado Japón una semana antes con rumbo desconocido.

Aún antes de la movilización de los buques de guerra, los Estados Unidos empezaron una operación de entrenamiento masivo en Okinawa el primero de enero. Esta operación según la prensa, fue mucho más grande que cualquiera que se haya llevado a cabo durante la guerra de Vietnam. Al mismo tiempo, varios millares de soldados fueron trasladados de Okinawa a las Filipinas.

Llevando adelante la preparación de una reanudación de la intervención militar directa de los Estados Unidos en Vietnam, el Departamento de Estado dijo el 14 de enero que Washington se sentía libre de romper los acuerdos de cese al fuego, por que Hanoi supuestamente ya los había violado. Este argumento fue usado para justificar los vuelos de reconocimiento sobre Vietnam, prohibidos específicamente por los acuerdos.

En una conferencia de prensa el 14 de enero, el jefe del Pentágono, James Schlesinger, de hecho admitió los vuelos. Cuando se le preguntó si se estaban llevando a cabo, dijo: "El hecho de que Vietnam del Norte no pueda cumplir los acuerdos ha creado toda una serie de circunstancias diferentes a las que existían cuando se firmó el tratado de paz de París."

Por otro lado, la prensa norteamer-

icana ha puesto de relieve historias sobre la situación del asediado Pnompenh en Camboya. Tales historias tienen el propósito de apoyar la campaña bélica de Ford. Han propagado la idea de que se está llevando a cabo una "gran ofensiva" por parte de los rebeldes en Camboya.

En realidad, la "ofensiva" no parece ser otra cosa que el acostumbrado recrudecimiento de las hostilidades que se da durante la temporada seca. El factor que ha cambiado está en el régimen corrupto de Lon Nol, que se está desmoronando, sin necesidad de mucha presión por parte del Khmer Rouge. En el *Washington Post* del 8 de enero se informó que "las fuentes diplomáticas estiman que una cantidad considerablemente inferior de tropas insurgentes han sido empleadas hasta la fecha" durante la estación seca de este año en relación al año pasado.

De hecho todo el campo y todas las carreteras a Pnompenh están controladas desde hace mucho por los insurgentes. El río Mekong, que fue la vía más importante de abastecimiento de Pnompenh con el mundo exterior, y que normalmente abastecía el 80 por ciento de las provisiones a la ciudad, ha sido cortado. El *Washington Post* del 16 de enero informó que ningún convoy con abastecimientos había podido hacer el viaje desde Saigón en los últimos 26 días. El control del régimen de Neak Luong, el último puesto que queda sobre el río, a 32 millas al sudoeste de Pnompenh, se informó que se encuentra en estado precario.

Enfrentado con el colapso de su títere en Pnompenh, Washington amenazó con volver a intervenir directamente en la guerra de Camboya, si es necesario.

Aunque ha sido forzado a avanzar con cautela por miedo a provocar protestas internas, Washington interviene cada vez más para sostener su régimen títere en Camboya.

El aumento en el subsidio es sólo parte del plan de Washington. Según un comunicado del *New Asia News* del 10 de enero, Noel Gaylor, comandante de las fuerzas estadounidenses en el pacífico, dijo al noticiero NBC News, que el uso de tropas norteamericanas en el Sudeste asiático no podía ser descartado.

De esta manera el gobierno de Ford está haciendo todo lo posible por obtener un presupuesto militar más ele-

"Los oficiales admiten en privado," informó el *Washington Post* del 14 de enero, que el gobierno "... está usando la reciente oleada de ataques para impulsar su política de incremento en el subsidio." Las amenazas de Washington y su justificación de los vuelos de reconocimiento fueron vistas por un corresponsal del *New York Times* que escribió el 15 de enero, como "parte de un esfuerzo acordado por el gobierno para persuadir al Congreso a que asigne más ayuda militar a Saigón."

El 8 de enero, el Presidente Ford anunció que le pediría al Congreso por lo menos 300 millones de dólares para ayuda militar extra a Saigón. Ahora, parece que pedirá también de 150 a 200 millones de dólares de subsidio adicional para Pnompenh, informó el *New York Times* el 17 de enero.

Según las cifras recopiladas por el diputado Les Aspin, el Congreso de los Estados Unidos ha autorizado a la fecha más de 6,000 millones en subsidio militar y económico otorgado a Vietnam, Laos y Camboya desde la "tregua" de enero, además de otros 2,000 millones adicionales gastados para sostener las fuerzas norteamericanas en la región.

"Esta debe de ser la tregua más cara en la historia de la humanidad", dijo Aspin. "También debe de ser la más falsa."

Washington ha declarado que no se siente atado por los acuerdos de París, y ya ha demostrado en otras ocasiones en el pasado, que las limitaciones impuestas por el Congreso pueden ser eludidas. Por esto, cualquier declaración por parte de Washington acerca de que no llevará a cabo ninguna intervención militar directa en Indochina sin que esta haya sido previamente aprobada por el Congreso, puede sólo ser considerada un engaño. En realidad, el hecho de que lo nieguen tiene la intención de condicionar a la opinión pública de la posibilidad de una nueva agresión de los Estados Unidos contra los pueblos de Indochina. □

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# Hacia una Recesión Generalizada

Por Dick Fidler

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Sliding Toward a Generalized Recession", publicado en *Intercontinental Press* el 30 de diciembre de 1974].

\* \* \*

Al finalizar 1974, la economía mundial capitalista apuntaba hacia la primera recesión generalizada desde la segunda guerra mundial.

A mediados de noviembre, la Organización para la Cooperación Económica y Desarrollo (OCED) predijo que el crecimiento promedio en la producción de las siete principales economías capitalistas sería del uno por ciento durante 1975. Sin embargo, muchos economistas creyeron que la predicción era demasiado optimista. En los últimos tres meses de 1974, la producción industrial de la mayoría de las economías de las naciones imperialistas más importantes se deterioraba. El crecimiento del volumen del comercio mundial declinó notablemente. El desempleo se incrementó rápidamente, llegando a ser oficialmente casi el siete por ciento de la fuerza laboral de los Estados Unidos y más del tres por ciento en los países de Europa Occidental. La predicción en todos lados es la de una profundización de la recesión para 1975, sin perspectivas de que se revierta este proceso antes de mediados de año, por lo menos.

Un síntoma del desarrollo de la crisis fueron los comentarios sombríos de la prensa capitalista. El columnista C. L. Sulzberger escribió desde París el 30 de octubre "parece que estamos a punto, o ya estamos" en un colapso como el de la década del treinta. "Francia, tradicionalmente el país más próspero de Europa, tiene más desempleo que nunca desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial y los paros se dan en todo el país. Inglaterra está en quiebra, vacilando económicamente y atrapada en un conflicto sin fin en Irlanda, la última batalla de las guerras religiosas del siglo diecisiete.

"Italia está empantanada en un

caos. Portugal se encuentra al borde de un tumulto y España pronto puede llegar a la misma situación cuando el Generalísimo Franco muera. El dinamismo de Japón muestra señales de disolverse como un fideo mojado; el sur de Asia se está desintegrando; gran parte de Africa se muere de hambre; y los Jeques del petróleo más ricos han acumulado tanto dinero que ni siquiera saben como gastarlo."

Sulzberger agregó que "es considerado un axioma por muchos de los supuestos expertos, que ninguna democracia puede sobrevivir por mucho tiempo con un promedio inflacionario que exceda el 20 por ciento."

Los ministros del Mercado Común, en su reunión de diciembre en París, discutieron la posibilidad de que la recesión en Estados Unidos provoque una reacción en cadena que arrastre a toda la economía de Europa Occidental, en el menoscabo del comercio y el incremento del proteccionismo, que podría derribar toda la economía del Oeste de Europa.

### *Fin del 'Boom' de la Postguerra*

El acontecimiento simultáneo de recesiones en los Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña y Japón señalan el final del prolongado "boom" de la postguerra.

En fases recesionistas previas, el impacto de los descensos en algunos países se atenuaba por los ascensos simultáneos en otros países. Pero el costo de estabilizar estos descensos cíclicos era una inflación permanente y creciente, mientras que los gobiernos se esforzaban por estimular sus economías expandiendo el crédito e imprimiendo más dinero. El incremento de la inflación del dolar llevó a la crisis y al colapso del sistema monetario internacional establecido en Bretton Woods en 1944, abriendo un periodo, al finalizar la década del sesenta, de creciente rivalidad en el comercio y las finanzas internacionales, y de declive en el crecimiento en todas las principales economías imperialistas.

Una característica peculiar de esta

recesión es que coincide con un alto nivel de inflación, que en algunos países continúa en ascenso a pesar de la recesión. Una inflación cuyo porcentaje fluctúa ya entre los números de dos cifras, ha golpeado a la mayoría de las economías capitalistas. La inflación en los principales países de Europa Occidental fluctúa entre un modesto siete por ciento en Alemania Occidental (de lejos, la economía más fuerte) hasta el 17 por ciento en la Gran Bretaña, y por encima del 20 por ciento en Italia. En los Estados Unidos, los precios al menudeo han ascendido casi en un 12 por ciento anual, y en Japón suben en un 25 por ciento.

La inflación mundial y la recesión que le acompaña son agravadas por la creciente rivalidad inter imperialista.

La competencia entre los consorcios multinacionales acelera la concentración de capital; las innovaciones constantes en la tecnología reducen el ciclo de existencia del capital fijo; la declinación de la tasa de ganancia (como resultado del incremento en la composición orgánica del capital) fuerza a las compañías a confiar cada vez más en el financiamiento "externo", endeudándose más y más para financiar la expansión de sus plantas y de su equipo.

La revista estadounidense *Business Week* estimaba en octubre que el monto total de la deuda de la economía del mundo capitalista podría ser de más de 10 billones de dólares. La cuarta parte de esta deuda corresponde a los Estados Unidos.

La inflación de la moneda disminuye la liquidez de los negocios. Esta se agrava enormemente por el gasto bélico, que, por ejemplo, en los Estados Unidos asciende aproximadamente a la tercera parte del presupuesto gubernamental.

Las crecientes dificultades con que se enfrentan las negociaciones para financiar la urgente expansión, han traído como resultado toda una cadena cada vez mayor de quiebras, descenso en la circulación del capital, reducción en la producción, y desocupaciones generalizadas. Estos desarrollos han llevado a un descenso global de la actividad económica.

El descenso se inició hace aproximadamente un año, en las industrias automovilística y de la construcción, y se extendió rápidamente a la industria de utensilios domésticos eléc-

tricos y de otro tipo, a la industria petroquímica, textil y del vestido, y de la aviación. La industria del acero que se mantenía (especialmente en los Estados Unidos) gracias a los pedidos no cubiertos de oleoductos, torres y refinerías, producto de la expansión de las nuevas explotaciones petroleras, también ahora comienza a sufrir la recesión.

#### *Depresión en la Industria Automovilística*

En la industria del automóvil la situación es grave. Actualmente las ventas han bajado en un 40 por ciento en comparación a las del año pasado en los Estados Unidos, en un 20 por ciento en Alemania Occidental, y en un 27 por ciento en Gran Bretaña. Aproximadamente 200,000 obreros de la producción en los Estados Unidos — más de la cuarta parte del total — fueron despedidos en diciembre, con la perspectiva de más desocupaciones en enero. En Italia, la Fiat ha puesto a más de 70,000 obreros en una semana laboral de tres días. Una depresión prologada en la industria del automóvil tendría un profundo efecto en la inversión y en la tasa de crecimiento en toda la economía capitalista.

La crisis en la industria automovilística es una expresión de la tendencia clásica del auge capitalista a producir más de lo que puede vender en el mercado. Cuánto más grande sea la superproducción, más se reducirán la producción y el empleo actuales.

Además de la recesión en la mayoría de los sectores, en algunos de importancia se ha manifestado una escasez pronunciada, en particular el sector energético (especialmente petróleo) y el alimenticio. Esta escasez es resultado de las políticas deliberadas del capital monopolista.

Un ejemplo en 1974 fue la "crisis de energéticos." Como represalia en contra del apoyo dado por los países de occidente a Israel en la guerra de octubre de 1973, los países productores de petróleo árabe redujeron su producción en un cinco por ciento mensual, imponiendo un embargo total a los Estados Unidos y a Holanda, y llevando a cabo una serie de aumentos en las regalías e impuestos que cuadruplicaron el precio del petróleo en el momento de su extracción. Este aumento de precios fue

transferido directamente al consumidor por las compañías petroleras que controlan el mercado internacional.

Al subir los precios del petróleo, los regímenes árabes que pertenecen a la OPEP (Organización de Países Exportadores de Petróleo) buscaron fortalecer su posición en las negociaciones con las potencias imperialistas en la conferencia de Ginebra. También buscaron mejorar su imagen nacionalista frente a las masas árabes, que se están movilizandando impulsadas por las victorias militares sobre Israel en la fase inicial de la guerra.

El aumento de los precios del petróleo, sin embargo, encajó a la perfección con la política de las corporaciones gigantes del petróleo. De las siete compañías petroleras más grandes, cinco son norteamericanas.

#### *La Política de los Consorcios Petroleros*

Los consorcios petroleros quieren aminorar su dependencia de los recursos del mundo semicolonial, donde se están enfrentando cada vez más a las amenazas de las nacionalizaciones — constantes para que reinviertan sus ganancias en los países productores en vez de exportarlas. Las compañías están buscando recursos que estén bajo control directo del imperialismo tales como los del North Slope de Alaska, del Mar del Norte, de las aguas litorales de Noruega, y de los pozos marítimos del Golfo de México.

Las corporaciones petroleras también están buscando fuentes de energía de reemplazo, tales como el carbón, la energía nuclear, y el aceite de pizarra bituminosa.

Mucho antes del embargo árabe y del aumento de los precios, las corporaciones tomaron medidas para crear escasez en el abastecimiento de petróleo en los Estados Unidos reduciendo deliberadamente la producción y limitando la construcción de nuevas refinerías. Esto hizo que se aumentaran los precios y las ganancias internas. Esto también impulsó la aparición de una psicosis de "crisis de energéticos" que permitió a los magnates petroleros derrotar al movimiento ecológico en áreas claves tales como Alaska, e incrementar la presión para abolir las restricciones que afectan a las perforaciones marítimas y el desarrollo y explotación de combustibles "sucios" como son el

carbón y la energía nuclear.

El embargo árabe les dio a las compañías la excusa para culpar a los árabes de la situación que ellas mismas habían creado.

La cuadruplicación de los precios del petróleo tuvo un efecto desbastador sobre los principales competidores capitalistas de los Estados Unidos.

Mientras que los Estados Unidos importan sólo el 15 por ciento del petróleo que consumen, Europa Occidental y Japón dependen de la importación del petróleo en un 65 por ciento y en un 98 por ciento respectivamente, proveniente principalmente del Este Árabe. El déficit de la balanza de pagos de los países de Europa Occidental, incluyendo a Inglaterra, Italia y Francia, (los más golpeados), se esperaba que fuera por lo menos de 20,000 millones de dólares en 1974.

Como resultado, el dólar norteamericano tuvo un aumento en relación a otras monedas, reflejando una recuperación de su fuerza. El siete de enero de 1974, el yen se devaluó en un 6.7 por ciento, y el 9 de enero, el gobierno de Pompidou anunció que el franco se dejaría flotar, de esta manera los gobiernos japonés y francés buscaban aminorar el déficit esperado en la balanza de pagos.

En octubre, el vice ministro japonés de industria y comercio internacional, Eimei Yamashita, predijo una depresión para 1975. La atribuyó en gran parte al aumento de los precios del petróleo, al que llamó "un golpe fatal a la economía japonesa."

El incremento de los precios del petróleo, fue uno de los factores que propiciaron el aumento general de los precios en el mundo, afectando el costo de muchos artículos de primera necesidad que van desde telas sintéticas hasta fertilizantes.

Para los países semicoloniales que dependen de la importación de petróleo, el aumento de precios ha tenido un efecto desastroso especial. El precio de productos de importación de primera necesidad aumentó, causando a estos países niveles de inflación de los más altos en el mundo. El enorme aumento en el precio de fertilizantes y en los alimentos de importación fue la causa directa de la hambruna que asoló grandes territorios del África y del subcontinente Indio durante 1974.

La exportación de alimentos constituye un ejemplo más de la política

agresiva de las corporaciones de los Estados Unidos en su intensa lucha por los mercados. Los Estados Unidos es, con mucho, el exportador más grande de alimentos en el mundo, y su política afecta en gran medida los precios mundiales. En el número del 29 de julio de *Intercontinental Press*, Dick Roberts enumeró los recientes aumentos de precios en las exportaciones de los Estados Unidos: maíz (los Estados Unidos proveen el 45 por ciento de la producción mundial), subió en un 220 por ciento desde 1966; arroz (los Estados Unidos proveen 31 27 por ciento), subió en un 361 por ciento desde 1967; soya (los Estados Unidos proveen el 94 por ciento), subió en un 233 por ciento desde 1967; trigo (los Estados Unidos proveen el 32 por ciento; Canadá el 21 por ciento; Australia el 12 por ciento); el precio en la ciudad de Kansas subió en un 325 por ciento desde 1966.

Estos incrementos en los precios fueron acompañados de un enorme aumento en el monto de la exportación alimenticia de los Estados Unidos desde 1972; de esta manera el reciente incremento en las ganancias es aún más grande. En otras palabras, mientras que los países asolados por el hambre fueron forzados a comprar más, los precios de los Estados Unidos se elevaron en la misma proporción.

#### *Las Limitaciones del 'Petróleo como Arma'*

Irónicamente, el creciente empobrecimiento de la mayor parte del mundo semicolonial que resultó de la recesión y la inflación, muestran la debilidad fundamental de los argumentos de aquellos que ven en el uso del "arma del petróleo" por parte de los países de la OPEP como un medio viable de remediar las condiciones desfavorables en el comercio que les imponen los países imperialistas.

Los dirigentes de muchos de los países de la OPEP argumentaron con toda justicia que sólo estaban haciendo con la materia prima lo que los imperialistas siempre han hecho con sus exportaciones al mundo subdesarrollado: cobrar lo que el mercado aguante.

El sha de Irán fue quizá quien expresó más claramente esta situación cuando declaró: "Si los precios mun-

diales bajan, bajaremos los precios del petróleo. Pero si éstos suben ¿por qué hemos de pagar la cuenta?" Propuso que el precio del petróleo se ligara a un índice basado en el precio de las importaciones de productos manufacturados seleccionados.

De hecho, para la mayoría de los productores de petróleo, los precios "inflacionados" de los bienes de importación, incluyendo los derivados del petróleo tales como los fertilizantes, y las importaciones alimenticias, a la larga minarán muchas de las ventajas de sus elevados réditos en concepto del petróleo. De todas maneras, sólo una pequeña parte, o nada, de los ingresos en concepto del petróleo, es probable que beneficien a las masas de la población de estos países, algunos de ellos regidos por gobiernos especialmente conservadores.

Tampoco es una solución para los países subdesarrollados en su conjunto, el aumento en el precio de determinada materia prima. Tal como lo prueba la suerte de los países semicoloniales *importadores* de petróleo, cualquiera sean las ganancias de los productores de petróleo por la demanda coyuntural de su producto, estas fueron obtenidas a expensas del creciente empobrecimiento de otros países semicoloniales, ya que los consorcios petroleros simplemente traspasaron el aumento del precio del petróleo, efectuado por los países productores, a los consumidores. Y las limitaciones del "petróleo como arma" en manos de la diplomacia árabe fueron evidentes cuando las compañías petroleras usaron su control del mercado capitalista para evadir el embargo, racionando, o si no, trasladando abastecimientos de fuentes no árabes para asegurar los envíos a sus clientes en Japón, Europa Occidental, y los Estados Unidos.

Al referirse a la estrategia de la OPEP de cobrarle precios más altos a los monopolios, el presidente venezolano Carlos Andrés Pérez dijo en una "Carta Abierta a Ford" del 25 de septiembre: "no vemos otra manera de enfrentar el totalitarismo que se ha venido advirtiendo en los negocios y el comercio mundial. . . ." Esta es una respuesta comprensible, pero revela las limitaciones de la burguesía nacional. La única respuesta efectiva es romper con el sistema capitalista mismo expropiando la industria privada e iniciando el desa-

rollo económico planificado bajo la protección del monopolio estatal del comercio exterior.

#### *Washington Amenaza con Guerra*

La respuesta del imperialismo al uso del "petróleo como arma" no tardó en ser formulada. Washington empezó a poner a prueba la reacción pública con respecto al uso de tropas en caso de que los países productores de petróleo del Golfo Árabe Persa decidieran ir más lejos "trastornando" la economía capitalista mundial con su política petrolera.

Estas amenazas se hicieron cada vez más explícitas conforme el peligro de una depresión mundial, (agravada por el efecto inflacionario de las inversiones de los petrodólares y por los problemas de la balanza de pagos producidos por el petróleo), se hizo más evidente. En septiembre, después de la decisión de la OPEP de mantener sus precios en el petróleo y posiblemente aumentarlos en unos cuantos meses, Ford y Kissinger aumentaron la ofensiva en contra de los productores de petróleo, insinuando abiertamente una posible intervención militar.

Nadie pudo dudar sobre la predisposición de Washington de pasar de las amenazas a la acción. La prensa publicó artículos citando "fuentes informadas" en Washington describiendo posibles "operaciones secretas" que involucrarían acciones tales como "asesinatos selectivos" de dirigentes árabes. Tropas estadounidenses fueron fotografiadas entrenándose para la guerra en el desierto.

Es una conferencia de prensa el 16 de septiembre, Ford defendió las operaciones secretas de la CIA para subvertir y derrocar regimenes considerados hostiles a los intereses de los Estados Unidos.

Uno de los objetivos principales de esta campaña era el de mostrar a los árabes como los responsables de la inflación y la recesión mundiales.

De la misma manera que la crisis económica de la década de los treinta fue atribuida, por algunos, en gran parte a los judíos.

#### *Los Estados Unidos Inducen a sus Aliados a 'Colaborar'*

Aparte de presionar a los países productores de petróleo para que bajaran sus precios, Washington buscó

frenar a Tokio y a sus competidores en Europa Occidental, en su intento de romper la unidad y tratar de mejorar su propia posición competitiva por medio de acuerdos unilaterales con los estados de la OPEP.

En la conferencia internacional de energía en Washington en febrero de 1974, Kissinger inició la formación de un "contra-cartel" de los estados consumidores de petróleo, que incluía un acuerdo común de restringir el consumo, acumular grandes reservas, y compartir provisiones en caso de una reanudación del embargo árabe o en caso de carestías similares.

Los europeos occidentales al principio fueron reacios a seguir ese plan. En una declaración conjunta del 5 de febrero, en vísperas de la conferencia de Washington, el consejo de ministros del Mercado Común apelaba a Washington para que les permitiera más libertad de maniobra en sus relaciones con los países productores. Pero al profundizarse la crisis económica, se fueron sometiendo gradualmente.

Kissinger aclaró que la alternativa de "compartir la energía" bajo la dirección de los Estados Unidos significaba toda una guerra comercial en la que aquellos tendrían todas las posibilidades de triunfo a su favor.

Una Agencia Internacional de Energía compuesta por 16 estados (ratificada el 15 de noviembre) fue establecida para acumular y "compartir" por medio de "decisiones mayoritarias." La mayoría de los votos de peso los tiene Estados Unidos.

La crisis de energéticos hizo evidente la relativa superioridad del imperialismo norteamericano en relación a sus principales competidores.

El intento de estructurar una integración capitalista pan europea más unida, por medio de la Comunidad Económica Europea, fracasó debido a la creciente rivalidad internacional. La fragil unidad del Mercado Común se rompió cuando Italia y Dinamarca le impusieron limitaciones a las importaciones de artículos producidos en otros países de la CEE. El gobierno de Wilson decidió renegociar las condiciones de integración de Gran Bretaña en el Mercado Común. Los esfuerzos de llevar a cabo una "flotación común" de las divisas de los nueve países fracasó.

Alemania Occidental fue el único país importante que no padeció de la balanza de pagos deficitaria que causa la importación de petróleo. Se de-

batía entre las exigencias de sus aliados para que diera "un nuevo impulso al Mercado Común," y la opción de rehusarse a respaldar a las otras economías de la CEE. La primera opción equivaldría a absorber tanto los déficits de las balanzas de pago como los efectos de la inflación acelerada de tres de sus socios principales: Francia, Italia y Gran Bretaña. La segunda opción causaría necesariamente un proteccionismo creciente en los otros países de Europa Occidental. Esto podría asestar un golpe decisivo a las exportaciones de Alemania Occidental, la base de su prosperidad.

El comunicado de Bonn del 12 de diciembre anunciando que cambiaba a una política económica expansionista y antirecesionista, destinada a "reinflar" su economía, significaba que había elegido la primera opción. Pero el comunicado iba acompañado de apelaciones hechas por el Canciller Helmut Schmidt de que Washington también le diera prioridad a la lucha contra la recesión, y no a la lucha contra la inflación. Una fuerte "reinflación" de la economía de Alemania Occidental incrementaría los precios de los productos de exportación alemanes, y al mismo tiempo, propicia-

ría la inversión y las importaciones por parte de sus competidores.

La preocupación fundamental tanto de Bonn como de los otros capitales europeos occidentales es que la profundización de la recesión en los Estados Unidos arrastrará sus economías a una depresión mundial. De esta manera se ven obligados a exigir medidas que mejorarían la economía de su rival capitalista.

El aumento en el proteccionismo y los esfuerzos agresivos por penetrarse entre sí, por parte de los mercados, fueron las respuestas comunes de todos los países capitalistas, que al mismo tiempo, buscaron transferir parte del peso de la recesión a sus competidores. Los primeros en ser atacados fueron los derechos y el nivel de vida de los trabajadores. Un preanuncio de las repugnantes medidas que se esperan por parte de muchos países es la restricción de la inmigración y la deportación de trabajadores extranjeros.

En Canadá, el gobierno de Trudeau hizo la primera prueba de sus restricciones en la inmigración, deportando a cientos de inmigrantes haitianos, mandándolos a las prisiones de la dictadura de Duvalier.

La posición nacionalista de Ottawa

## Special Offer



Malcolm X

To help celebrate the tenth anniversary of *Intercontinental Press*, reproductions of sketches by Cayman, artist for *Intercontinental Press*, were published by the New York Local of the Socialist Workers party and bound in an 8.5" x 11" book. The aim was to use the money gained from sales to help us begin publishing articles in Spanish.

The drawings, of various sizes, include portraits of Hugo Blanco, Malcolm X, James P. Cannon, Che Guevara, Cesar Chavez, Leon Trotsky, and many more, some of which are suitable for framing.

A limited number of copies of this collection of drawings are now available for only \$5.

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en respuesta a la crisis económica creciente, incluye planes de ir reduciendo sus importaciones de petróleo a los Estados Unidos (Canadá actualmente es la fuente de casi el 25 por ciento de la importación de petróleo de los Estados Unidos), y la prohibición de la importación de carne de los Estados Unidos.

El gobierno de Ford incrementó la deportación de inmigrantes mexicanos "ilegales". El gobierno de Wilson utilizó los bombazos de Birmingham para restringir la inmigración de Irlanda a Gran Bretaña.

Las mujeres, los inmigrantes, y las minorías nacionales fueron los más afectados por el incremento de los despidos. En los Estados Unidos, el desempleo entre los jóvenes negros llegó al 40 por ciento, llevando a algunos políticos a prevenir sobre la posibilidad de un reavivamiento de los disturbios en los ghettos, como los que arrasaron ciudades importantes en la década del sesenta.

Bajo el impacto de la inflación, cuyo porcentaje alcanza ya los números de dos cifras, en los precios al menudeo, el salario real de los trabajadores va en declive en la mayoría de los países. La clase dominante se enfrentó con un dilema: por un lado, el temor a las consecuencias sociales de un nuevo aumento masivo en la tasa de desempleos los inhibió de aplicar una política inflacionaria dura; pero, por otro lado, el mantenimiento de una alta tasa inflacionaria (que podría aumentar nuevamente cuando los gobiernos adopten una política expansionista), levanta también el espectro de la movilización de la clase obrera en defensa del nivel de vida.

El dilema fue expresado por los editores de *Business Week*, revista norteamericana, en el número del 9 de noviembre: "antes era posible pensar en términos de un intercambio entre la inflación y el desempleo. . . En la década del cincuenta y a principios de la década del sesenta, un pequeño aumento en uno correspondía a un descenso en el otro. Pero si tal intercambio aún existe, las cifras involucradas son tan enormes que son políticamente inadmisibles."

En primer lugar, aún pequeñas mejoras en el desempleo disgustan a los trabajadores que tienen grandes expectativas condicionadas por 25 años de expansión económica generalizada. Aún más, la recesión viene después de una década o más de radicaliza-

ción en todo el mundo capitalista—una radicalización que se ha extendido profundamente en la clase obrera.

#### *Los Trabajadores Responden a la Crisis*

Al comienzo de la actual recesión la clase obrera está ya poniendo en claro que no está dispuesta a pagar el costo de la "solución" capitalista a la crisis. Durante 1974 la combatividad de los trabajadores continuó en ascenso en Europa Occidental, y hubo presagios significativos de alza similar de las masas en Japón, Australia, Nueva Zelandia, Canadá y los Estados Unidos.

En Canadá, los sindicatos exigieron que los contratos se abrieran y se renegociaran para incluir cláusulas que nivelaran los salarios con el costo de la vida. Los sindicatos en Québec formaron el Frente Común para luchar por los "índices"—una cláusula escalafonada en todos los contratos colectivos. El 29 de octubre 40,000 obreros manifestaron apoyando esas demandas en Montreal. El gobierno de Trudeau fue derrotado en el parlamento en una moción que lo culpaba por su fracaso en la lucha contra la inflación; ganó las subsecuentes elecciones generales principalmente por la fuerza de su supuesta oposición al control de salarios, propuesto por el principal partido de oposición.

### **Huelga Minera y Estudiantil en Bolivia**

Una cuarta parte de la industria del acero boliviana está paralizada, como resultado de una huelga minera que comenzó el 13 de enero. La huelga está costando a los dueños de las minas, un millón y medio de dólares diarios, por pérdidas de exportación.

Comenzó cuando el régimen de Banzer allanó y clausuró cuatro estaciones de radio en importantes centros mineros. El gobierno actuó, de acuerdo con el Secretario de Prensa Javier Arce Villalba, porque las estaciones se habían "constituido en focos de agitación política y de subversión."

En respuesta, los mineros de Siglo XX, Catavi y Llallagua declararon un paro laboral de cuarenta y ocho horas. Dos días después, 12,000 estudiantes de la Universidad de San

En los Estados Unidos, una serie de huelgas militantes en los últimos meses de 1974—en especial la huelga de los mineros—indicó que la combatividad está aumentando entre los trabajadores.

La inestabilidad de los regímenes burgueses frente a la crisis económica fue más evidente en Italia, que experimentó una sucesión de crisis gubernamentales incitada por el fracaso de la coalición entre la democracia cristiana y la social democracia en su intento por contrarrestar una de las más altas tasas de inflación en Europa, y un déficit comercial de 10,000 millones de dólares.

El hecho de que la inflación se dé simultáneamente con un descenso en la economía fue un factor esencial en la inestabilidad política que caracterizó a Europa del Sur durante 1974.

Quizá la demostración más significativa de fuerzas entre el trabajo y el capital se llevó a cabo en Gran Bretaña. El gobierno de Heath, que enfrentó la lucha de los mineros por romper su política de control de salarios, puso a la mayor parte de la industria inglesa en una semana de tres días, que comenzó en diciembre de 1973, y preparó una confrontación electoral con el movimiento obrero. Pero las elecciones generales de febrero de 1974 resultaron una derrota de los conservadores, y el nuevo gobierno laborista negoció la huelga dándole concesiones importantes a los mineros. □

Andrés de La Paz, iniciaron un paro de cuarenta y ocho horas en solidaridad con los mineros. Los mineros extendieron su paro a una huelga por tiempo indefinido, y para el 26 de enero, el número de huelguistas había aumentado a 12,000.

Entre las personas detenidas en conexión con estos hechos, se encuentran cinco obispos de la Orden de los Oblatos. Los Oblatos poseían una de las radios clausuradas.

Algunas personas que llegaron a La Paz provenientes de Llallagua informaron que el ejército boliviano había participado en los procedimientos contra las estaciones de radio y que la acción había sido acompañada por disparos de arma de fuego. Arce Villalba negó ambos informes. □

# DOCUMENTS

## In Defense of the Kalmuks

[The following letter was published in the December 29 issue of the New York Russian-language daily *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

Dear Editor,

Please publish a reminder of the thirty-first anniversary of the bitter days when the Kalmuks were driven from their homes into the winter cold and sent off into exile.

Two of our older persons asked me to write how our people suffered in Siberia. I would like to do what they asked but unfortunately I can find no precise information about how the Kalmuks were sent to Siberia. Only one thing is clear. On December 27, 1943, a decree was issued for the liquidation of the Kalmuk ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. This was the final step of the Soviet government in liquidating the Kalmuk people as a whole. This decree did not say anything about how the Kalmuk settlements were surrounded by special units of the NKVD [Narodnyi Komissariat Vnyterennix Del—People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the secret police]. They gave the people only four hours to collect their things and allowed them to take only what they could carry. They crammed the people into trucks and later transferred them to freight trains. During the three-week trip, the people were given no water, no food, and were left without any sanitary facilities whatever.

The expulsion of the Kalmuks was directed by the notoriously bloodthirsty NKVD commanders Serov and Merkulov. The operation was carried out in December, in the winter cold, and the Kalmuks were scattered from Omsk to Alma-Ata, without any regard for immediate or more extended family ties. At each stop, they counted out the required number of heads and dumped these people in the open fields, in the snow. Some had to wait out in the open in the snow for three days until rough shelters were provided. The local inhabitants were told it was an enemy people that had been brought there, collaborators who had consorted with the Germans. And so they were very hostile to the newcomers.

I became interested in what motivated the Soviet authorities in their decision to liquidate small peoples like the Kalmuks,

Kabardintsy, the Volga Germans, and the Crimean Tatars, the most helpless and defenseless. Among them, there was no one who had any connections in Moscow, any link to the Communists holding power, and so there was no one who could raise a protest against such savagely cruel treatment of citizens and of national minorities.

I cannot understand what the Kalmuks did to arouse the anger of the Soviet authorities. Was it because three thousand Kalmuks formed a cavalry corps on the German side? But many tens of thousands of Russians went over to General Vlasov, constituting whole armies. And there were more in the Turkestani division than in the Kalmuk corps. So why was the guilt of the Kalmuks greater than that of the others? Why are they still being punished? Those involved in the Kalmuk corps were given summary trials and sentenced to ten years of hard labor in the ITL [Ispravitel'no-Trudovye Lageri—Corrective Labor Camps] of Siberia. But this punishment did not save the Kalmuks from Soviet persecution.

Throughout the entire world, there is a ten-year statute of limitations for all

crimes, but not in the Soviet Union. From time to time, the Soviet government arrests individual members of the ill-fated Kalmuk corps returning to their homes after serving ten-year sentences in the ITL. It brings them before kangaroo courts with stereotyped charges of treason, consorting with the enemy, looting, rape, and murder. This occurred in 1964 and 1968. There are reports that a trial is going on now against a former member of the Kalmuk corps. Probably the reason for this is to keep the Kalmuks under a dark cloud, in constant fear, so that no thoughts of freedom will enter their minds.

Kalmuks in the United States cannot stand by silently while our people are being treated unjustly in the Soviet Union. We must raise a voice of protest and show that the Soviet government cannot put the blame for three thousand collaborators on an entire people. It can punish the guilty, but not an entire people. Punishment of an entire people is an act of genocide.

Accusations of looting, rape, and murder cannot be lodged exclusively against Kalmuks. The fact is that members of the Red Army in those years committed many times more crimes, which are recorded in the archives of the Allied governments of Vienna and Berlin. These should be brought to the International Court of the Hague so that Soviet soldiers will be punished for such actions.

Signed: *Kodman Kul'dinov*

## Against Caramanlis's Draft Constitution

[The following editorial was published in the January 4 issue of *Ergatike Pale*, a weekly paper published in Athens that reflects the views of the Greek Trotskyists. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

With the draft constitution that Caramanlis has submitted to parliament, the full reactionary character of this new capitalist government, this notorious "New Democracy,"\* has become clear.

"Strengthening the executive branch"

\*"Nea Demokratia," Caramanlis's new party; it is essentially his old traditional rightist party, the Ethnike Rizospastike Enosis (National Radical Union), plus members of the liberal bourgeois party, the Center Union, who sided with the

has been the sole objective of all the bourgeois parties, starting with the Komma Phileutheron [Liberal party] of Eleutheros Venizelos [the historic political representative of the liberal bourgeoisie]; and the "strong state" has been the constant goal of all the bourgeois governments in the last forty or fifty years. Caramanlis picked up the same theme in Paris, and today, with a bloc of 220 members of parliament [a large majority], he wants to flesh it out with the provisions contained in the new constitution.

It is evident at first glance how reactionary these provisions are.

● Article 5 permits penal exile by executive decree (although this is pro-

palace, the army, and the rightest politicians in the campaign to topple the liberal government of George Papandreu in 1965.—*IP*

hibited by the Rome treaty for the protection of human rights).

● Article 11 bans strikes when they have political or other objectives that are regarded as illegitimate by the reinforced executive branch of the capitalist government. The same article bans any strike by employees of the public services, the local government bodies, or other public institutions.

● Article 12 outlaws the revolutionary parties ("those whose activities have as their objective the overthrow of the free democratic system of government or that endanger the territorial integrity of the country").

● Article 14 authorizes seizing publications that offend the religious sacred cows, insult the person of the president of the republic, or contain material "clearly subversive or which aims at the overthrow of the established government," and so forth.

● Article 22 makes it a felony to "misuse individual rights" (which means "opposing free institutions," and so on). This is a provision directed against the supporters and members of the revolutionary organizations.

According to the draft constitution, the president will be elected by parliament (and not by the electorate) for five years and will be eligible for a second five-year term. At the same time, the president will have a reinforced legislative and executive role, with the power to issue decree-laws, organizational decrees, and ordinances; with the power to veto legislation passed by parliament; the power to suspend governments supported by a majority in parliament, to dissolve parliament itself, to declare martial law in the event of "foreign dangers," and other powers that amount to a license for arbitrary rule,

Along with guaranteeing capitalist property and the bourgeois institutions of the church, the family, the educational system, and so on, the draft constitution confirms the untouchability of "foreign capital invested in the country in accordance with the provisions of Public Law 2687/1953" and makes the state responsible for safeguarding such investments. This legal provision can be adjusted by a new statute, but only "to provide better protection for the foreign capital concerned."

Thus, this draft is not simply a constitution, the legal framework for capitalist domination and the bourgeois state. It is also a law estab-

lishing the "strong state"; it limits the rights of the bourgeois parliament itself, it grants absolute powers to the president, and it reduces the anemic democratic rights that existed to suit the interests of the native oligarchy and the foreign monopolies.

Of course, we have no illusion that any bourgeois constitution (no matter how "democratic") can guarantee "popular sovereignty." Only the reformist leaderships of the two KKEs [Kommunistiko Komma tes Ellados—Communist party of Greece] believe that now or in the future the people can be sovereign in a bourgeois state. We must, however, do all that we can to assure that this archreactionary draft constitution *shall not pass*. And this cannot be accomplished just by

## French Army Closes Breton Pubs

[The following article was published in the January 16 issue of the *Welsh Nation*, the weekly English-language organ of Plaid Cymru (the Welsh Nationalist party).]

\* \* \*

French army officers, displaying a mastery of strategic irrelevance, ordered public houses to be closed during protest demonstrations attended by hundreds of people angry at army plans to occupy more and more land in Brittany.

Three thousand people were attending the protest at Ti-Voujered in the Autumn when army majors made their move. An earlier demonstration at Menez Kelc'h had attracted 1,000 flag waving Bretons.

The protests were a reflection of increasing concern in Brittany at the way the French army is taking over territory.

In Lanveur, Kerlouan, on the northern coast near Brest, the army recently took fifty hectares of land and installed a 300-metre-high aerial for the detection of submarines.

This was done with the complicity of the local establishment, but without the consent of local people.

Kerlouan is in the middle of an area characterised by its respect for authority—it records a high percentage support for the Gaullist Party—but it also has a very active Breton association, Kelc'h Sevenadurel Ar Vro-Bagan [Cultural Circle of the Area North of Leon].

On June 10, last year, five of its young members were charged before the Brest magistrates for having painted slogans on roads and walls protesting at the army

criticisms in the columns of *Rizospastis* [the daily of the orthodox pro-Moscow Stalinists] *Aughi* [the daily of the liberalizing Stalinists supported by the Italian and Yugoslav CPs], and *Exormesis*; or by verbal fencing on the floor of parliament.

What is needed is for the parties and organizations of the revolutionary and workers movements to organize extraparliamentary mass united-front demonstrations. There should be mass united rallies in the cities and in the villages. Every worker, every farmer, every housewife must take up the banner of the struggle to block the dictatorial draft constitution, to defend the democratic rights that are being strangled, and to broaden these rights. □

land-grab operation.

Three of the defendants refused to speak French during the trial and an ex-police inspector was brought in as an interpreter. The trial turned out to be more of a trial of the army than of the slogan-daubers, with denunciations being made both of its effect on conscripts and of its disruption of rural economic patterns.

For the first time, the right to speak Breton in court was given practical recognition, and this was hailed as a victory, but the standard of the translation was poor and pressure will continue to mount, as has already been the case in Wales, for the courts to become thoroughly national institutions in which the national language may be used without interpreters.

Pressure will also continue to halt the French army's take-over of Brittany. □

### Diplomatic Ties Established Between Cuba and West Germany

Cuba renewed diplomatic relations with West Germany January 18 after a break of almost twelve years. Bonn had cut off relations after Havana established ties with East Germany.

Havana is also seeking to increase trade with several Western countries, including Canada. In March, Alastair Gillespie, Canadian minister of industry, will head a trade delegation to Cuba. Partly as a result of the visit, Canadian exports to Cuba are expected to reach \$130 million in 1975, up from \$95 million in 1974 and twice the 1973 total. Before the Cuban revolution, trade between the two countries averaged about \$30 million a year.