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Civil Liberties

Under Attack in

West Germany



Rudi Dutschke at Holger Meins's grave.

How to Defend Irish People Against Witch-Hunt

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Recession in Italy in Full Swing

Win With WIN

In accordance with the state religion of the country—worship of the almighty dollar—the U.S. government is against a policy of encouraging artists.

Artists like everyone else, except the big corporations and their political representatives, are expected to live by the golden rules of free enterprise. If some artists starve, so much the better for their art.

The White House, however, has departed from this policy from time to time. Kennedy and Johnson, for instance, threw occasional parties to which worthy artists were invited. They also played the role of patrons of the arts by having their portraits done in oil, for which they paid a cash commission.

Ford, it now seems, has decided to follow this praiseworthy tradition, and extend it to poets and musicians. In October he called the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers and asked for a song for his campaign against inflation. They referred the request to Meredith Willson, and he came up with the "finished words and music" of *Win* (Whip Inflation Now) in nine days.

The song, on a marching theme, meets the exacting standards of capitalist realism to perfection. It begins with the crash of cymbals and a triple shout, "Win! Win! Win!" This is followed by the lines:

We'll win together,
Win together, That's the true
American way, today.
Who needs inflation?
Not this nation.
Who's going to pass it by?
You are, and so am I.
Win together.
Lose? Never!
If you can win,
so can I.

That WINning song came from giving top priority to fighting inflation. Ford is now giving equal top priority to fighting the recession. Another smash hit of still greater artistry is no doubt on the way. □

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Bonn's 'Antiterrorist Campaign'

By Gerry Foley

A little more than two weeks after the assassination of West Berlin Judge Günter von Drenkmann, police staged predawn raids November 26 on ninety-six "suspected terrorist hide-outs" in a dozen German cities, arresting twenty-four persons and "detaining" four others. On the following day, the Bonn government introduced legislation to abolish the right of privacy between lawyer and client in "terrorist" cases.

"The police's suspicions were apparently especially aroused by collective living arrangements," the West German weekly *Der Spiegel* reported in its December 2 issue. "In Kiel, Hamburg, Würzburg, and in Otterndorf in Lower Saxony, commune dwellers were yanked out of bed. But almost everywhere the results were as meager as in Hamburg, where not less than fourteen apartments were searched and 'nothing concrete was found' (as the police spokesman put it)."

The other prime target was political defense lawyers. In West Berlin the police carted off all the documents and correspondence of the legal collective called Eschen, Ströbele, and Comrades. "Apparently nothing concrete was found [there] . . . either," *Der Spiegel* commented. ". . . three days later all the papers and letters were returned."

Among those arrested in the raids, called "Operation Winterreise" (Winter Journey, a song cycle by Schubert) by Federal Interior Minister Werner Maihofer, were the political defense lawyers Eberhard Becker and Wolf Dieter Reinhard. The latter was accused of membership in a terrorist group called "June 2" and involvement in the execution of an alleged informer.

It quickly became clear that the "antiterrorist campaign" launched by the government in the wake of the Drenkmann assassination was aimed essentially at the political defense lawyers, specifically the attorneys for the imprisoned members of the urban guerrilla group, the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF—Red Army Faction), led

by Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. To justify the attack, the government tried to present the defense lawyers as accomplices of imprisoned terrorists.

In the week preceding the raids and the announcement that legislation would be sought for police supervision of communication between lawyer and client, the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA—Federal Criminal Bureau) released to the press the texts of confidential messages and writings of imprisoned RAF members. These were mixed up with other evidence obtained from interrogation of the prisoners and witnesses in order to produce the most "sensational" picture of the guerrillas' "plans."

For example, Baader was supposed to have listed a series of high officials for assassination. Gudrun Ensslin allegedly projected setting up "people's prisons" for kidnapped officials and establishing a group of pilots in Sweden to stage bombing attacks from the air. A three-stage program for guerrilla war leading up to "military assaults" was projected.

The BKA presented all this to the public with the following conclusions:

"The intelligence of this group's cadres, their political fanaticism, and their criminal energy even in prison represent a force that cannot be underestimated. Continued communication between the prisoners and the outside world carries with it the danger that we may have to face surprise strikes at any time."*

So, the biggest danger was the prisoners' lawyers, who were their main link to the outside world.

"The dubious defenders play a 'key role' in the BM gang's continuing their work from prison. Only with their help can the continuity of the RAF and the organizational coherence of its membership be maintained. These dubious defenders, some of whom must be seen as RAF members still working aboveground, are the biggest security risk as regards attempts to free the BM prisoners."

*Quoted in *Der Spiegel* of November 25.

Propaganda of this kind is intended to help railroad to prison individuals who may well be innocent of the accusations leveled against them by the police. The propaganda is also intended to whip up a witch-hunt atmosphere.

The authorities are even trying to present a normal increase in visits of lawyers to their clients as something sinister.

"As always, when a trial is pending, as is the case for the BM hard core . . . there is an increase in lawyers' visits," the November 18 *Der Spiegel* noted. From July to October, Baader's lawyer visited him 1,000 hours (a prison employee said)."

In the absence of habeas corpus in West Germany, persons can be held in prison for a prolonged period before trial. For example, Andreas Baader has been imprisoned since his arrest on June 1, 1972. The government promises to bring him to trial in early 1975.

Obviously, lawyers have to maintain regular contacts with their clients while the court case is being prepared. However, such visits are apt to inconvenience prison officials interested in keeping the outside world from knowing what is happening to a prisoner.

How much these officials have to hide was brought to light by the investigations that followed the death of RAF "hard core" member Holger Meins on November 9. He had been on a hunger strike since September.

"There is hardly any doubt that this anarchist knew he was near death, and insofar as possible sought it," *Der Spiegel* wrote in its November 18 issue. "However, in the conditions in which Holger Meins died, the authorities, the prison doctor, as well as the guards and medical personnel certainly bear a responsibility for his death."

The liberal magazine accused the Mainz city Ministry of Justice of deliberately lying when it said that Meins had not asked for a doctor of his own choice. The prison doctor, the weekly indicated, was guilty at least of a lack of concern for human life, and possibly deliberate torture. Meins was ignored in the final days of his life, when it was obvious he was in grave condition. For more than a month, he was force fed through a tube too large for his esophagus.

In Lingen prison in Hanover, Ronald Augustin was deprived of water

when he went on a hunger strike, the same report noted. This was a standard response of prison officials to hunger strikes. Protesting prisoners were given only salt water for washing.

Dehydration can cause irreparable damage even in short periods, *Der Spiegel* pointed out. After four or five days the kidneys fail to function.

"Despite this, denial of water is used in prisons as a means of breaking hunger strikes, in the well-founded belief that unlike hunger, thirst becomes more and more unbearable as time goes on. This is what the guards said in Straubing, where RAF sympathizer Rolf Heissler is on a hunger strike; they call denial of water a 'home cure of ours.'"

It is hardly surprising that lawyers with a social and professional conscience, the kind who normally defend unpopular political prisoners, have felt compelled to go to the public to denounce this kind of treatment and explain why their clients have resorted to such a desperate form of protest. At times they have presented their case quite effectively.

For example, this is how RAF defense lawyer Otto Schily explained in the November 18 *Der Spiegel* why his clients were ready to starve themselves to death rather than accept permanent solitary confinement:

"Prolonged isolation is as barbaric a torture of human beings as it is a useless measure in the struggle against crime."

"That is no quote from a press release by a defense attorney in the RAF case, but an observation by a critic of the Prussian penal system. It appeared in a pamphlet called *The Misery of the Penal System* [Elend des Strafvollzuges] published by the Social Democratic publisher Vorwärts-Verlag in 1905."

Schily continued: "When social communication is cut off in prison or reduced to an unbearable minimum, the prisoner is destroyed just the same as if he or she were denied food or put on inadequate rations."

"It is hard for us to understand this simple reality because very few have any experience of prolonged total or relative isolation."

"Long isolation limits the possibilities for human communication to such an extent that there is atrophy of the capacities of perception,

Statement by Rudi Dutschke on Holger Meins's Death

[The following letter from Rudi Dutschke, the best-known radical student leader in West Germany in the 1960s, was published in the November 25 issue of *Der Spiegel*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

"Holger, the struggle continues." For me that means that the struggle of the exploited and abused for their social liberation constitutes the sole basis of our political activity as revolutionary socialists and

communists. Our methods and the accomplishment of the present political tasks thus cannot be separated from the socialist goal of working-class victory. The political struggle against imprisonment in isolation cells has a clear meaning, and therefore we offer our solidarity. The killing of an antifascist Social Democratic presiding judge [Drenkmann], however, has to be regarded as murder in the reactionary German tradition. The class struggle is a process of political education. Terrorism, on the other hand, obstructs any learning process by the oppressed and humiliated.

thought, and emotion. . . . Progressive decay begins in the living body. Normally, prolonged isolation leads to complete physical collapse."

Such torture of prisoners is expressly forbidden by principles, codes, and conventions accepted by the West German government, Schily pointed out. Article 104, Paragraph 1, Provision No. 2 of the German constitution states, for example: "Persons imprisoned must not be either psychologically or physically mistreated."

Paragraph 119, Section 2 of the Penal Code says: "A person arrested should be housed in the same quarters as other persons held for trial, if he or she specifically requests it. . . . The prisoner should be put together with the other prisoners if his or her physical or psychological state requires it."

Paragraph 119, Section 3 of the Penal Code says: "Persons held under arrest will be subjected only to such restrictions as required by investigative detention or order in the prison."

Thus, Schily concluded: "The law draws an unmistakable line. Detention is to prevent the person under investigation from fleeing or destroying evidence; it is not intended to destroy the prisoner." He quoted a 1966 commentary on the Penal Code: "If association with other prisoners is necessary to safeguard the accused from illness (for example, depression), then granting this request is obligatory."

Provoked by the brutality of police and prison guards, as well as the hypocrisy of the courts, a few young lawyers may have lost patience with trying to explain the facts and sought to dramatize the way the authorities were violating the law. This is indicated by some examples cited in the November 18 *Der Spiegel*:

"On air mattresses and in court robes, the attorneys Becker, Bergmann, Lang, Cassel, Croissant, Demski, and Groenewold sat-in outside the Bundesgerichtshof [BGH — Federal District Court] in Karlsruhe to protest the 'isolation torture.' Their placards read: 'BGH equals *brauner Gangsterhaufen*' [Brown-Uniformed Gangsters], and 'Against torture, legal recourse doesn't help.'"

This type of protest opens the attorneys to attack and thereby injures the defense. While the social conscience of many lawyers has been sharpened by the radicalization among students and intellectuals, it seems that a few have also picked up some false concepts that are floating around in the general ferment. In particular, there is the one-sided idea that rebellion means simply individual daring, challenging the values of the system by courageous actions and by ringing personal denunciations.

This concept was in fact carried furthest by the RAF, and it would not be surprising if a few lawyers were also caught up in it. (Horst Mahler, sentenced to fourteen years for

alleged complicity in RAF bank expropriations, is often cited as an example of a "terrorist lawyer" by police and right wingers.)

The way this logic operates was illustrated by Holger Meins in his last letter, dated October 31, which was reprinted in the November 18 *Der Spiegel*. Although its incoherence could be a result of Meins's physical condition, since he was less than two weeks from death when he wrote it, two themes emerge quite clearly—the search for direct experience of fighting the repressive system and the primacy of individual moral witness:

"The only thing that matters is *struggle*—now, today, tomorrow, whether or not they smash you. What is important is what you make of it—a step forward, an improvement, learning from experience. This is what you have to make out of it. Everything else is crap. *The struggle continues*. Every new fight, every action, every *battle* brings new and previously unknown experiences; that is what the development of the struggle is. It develops in general only in that way. The subjective side of the dialectic of revolution and counterrevolution: 'What is decisive is being able to learn.'

"*Through struggle, for struggle*. From victories but even more from errors, booboos, from defeats. That is a law of Marxism.

"Struggle, defeat, struggle again, go down again, struggle again, and so on *to the final victory*—that is the logic of the people, the old ones have said.

"Furthermore: on 'matter.' Man is nothing but matter like everything. The *whole* person—body and consciousness is 'material' matter, and what individuals do, what they are, their *freedom*—that is the consciousness that matter determines itself and external nature and above all its own being. The one side of Engels is crystal clear. But guerrilla warfare materializes itself in struggle, in revolutionary action, endlessly, and thus struggle to the death, which naturally must be collective.

"This is not a question of matter but of *politics. Praxis*." (Emphasis in the original.)

Meins summed up his argument in blank verse: "Either a pig or a person, either survival at any cost, or struggle to the death. Either problem

or solution. There is nothing in between."

His conclusion: "Everyone dies. The question is only how, and how you have lived, and the answer is quite clear: Struggling against the pigs as



MEINS

a person for the liberation of persons — as a revolutionist, in struggle, loving life but despising death. That for me is serving the people."

Andreas Baader, one of the leaders of this group, was first arrested in 1968 for setting fire to a department store. That year was marked by the collapse of the main young radical organization, the SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund—German Socialist Students Federation).

After a series of bitter protests, provoked by the nearly successful attempt by a rightist to assassinate its leader Rudi Dutschke, this organization splintered into a large number of essentially in-turned propaganda groups. With the workers still generally passive, this small group seemed to face the full power of a reactionary bourgeois society in which even former Nazis still held positions of power. Very few were able to find any perspective for mobilizing masses of people against the German capitalist system. At the same time, the achievements of the guerrillas in Cuba and Vietnam were the strongest moral influence on the broad layer of young radicals.

The existence of an organized urban guerrilla group first came to light in 1970 when Baader was freed from

prison by a commando raid. A bystander was shot and severely injured.

Following Baader's escape, the RAF organized a series of bank expropriations. In 1971, a member of the group, Petra Schelm, was killed in a gun battle with police.

On May 11, 1972, a bomb exploded in the headquarters complex of the Fifth U.S. Army Corps in Frankfurt, killing Lieutenant Colonel Paul Bloomquist and injuring thirteen other persons. The German Press Agency in Munich received a letter from the "Petra Schelm Command" claiming responsibility for the explosion and saying that it was in retaliation for the U.S. bombing of Vietnam. The letter demanded that Washington end the mining of Haiphong harbor.

On May 15 a bomb exploded in the car of Judge Wolfgang Buddenberg, who was involved in an investigation of the RAF. It went off as his wife, Gerda, turned the ignition key; she was severely injured. On May 19 bombs exploded in the home offices of the right-wing Springer publications empire, where 3,000 employees were at work. Fifteen persons were injured, six seriously. There were a number of other bombings, ending with the explosion of two car bombs outside the U.S. Army's European headquarters in Heidelberg.

The German government responded with a vast "counterinsurgency" operation. On June 1, Baader and Holger Meins were seized in a raid in Frankfurt that was televised. On June 3, then Minister of the Interior Hans Dietrich Genscher released a report claiming a sharp rise in terrorism by both left and right-wing groups. In the anti-Arab hysteria that followed a Palestinian commando attack at Munich airport, there were attempts to link the RAF to El Fateh. In all this press hoopla, few seemed to notice that the RAF bombing campaign in May had not done anything to help the cause of the Vietnamese people.

To a large extent, sensational police operations against the RAF diverted attention from attacks on the right to freedom of thought. Fifteen members of the RAF were jailed in February 1974. In March, the federal cabinet approved a bill barring radicals from teaching.

As the government's brutal and vindictive treatment of the jailed urban guerrillas came to light, the "antiter-

rorist" propaganda campaign tended to boomerang somewhat, particularly after the death of Meins. But this was reversed again immediately by the assassination of the judge von Drenkmann on November 10. Although no guerrilla group claimed responsibility for this action and although Drenkmann was not involved in the prosecution of the RAF, this act was attributed to the guerrillas in a pattern that has become almost classical.

Once a guerrilla group publicizes its intention to wage war against the state by a series of terrorist actions and tries to counter repression with retaliatory terrorist actions, it finds itself unable to avoid responsibility in the public eye for any actions by frustrated individuals or common criminals that appear to have a political character. Deliberate provocations are easily laid at its door. Furthermore, almost inevitably a vicious circle of repression and retaliation leads to actions that provoke a strong public reaction against the guerrillas.

There can also be a kind of tragic illusion created by well-publicized guerrilla cases. At the very same time the bourgeoisie uses such examples to portray the left in general as a "dangerous criminal element," the publicity that such groups get and the sympathy they arouse as the victims of the massive brute force of the repressive capitalist state can create the impression that their actions are politically effective.

Even if this does not lead to imitation of their actions, it can lead some left currents to accommodate politically to the terrorists' conceptions. This makes it easier for the bourgeoisie to both wreak its vengeance on the misguided individual terrorists and widen its repression to other groups and layers.

The logic of this process is illustrated by the way the German government utilized the failure by a few defense lawyers to distinguish clearly between defending the victims of injustice and espousing their ideas and methods. It was made into an excuse for attacking the fundamental rights of legal defense. The example also shows, conversely, that the only way to expose the capitalist system and its repression effectively is to patiently point out the realities of capitalist justice, the contradictions be-

tween its claims and its practice, and the need for a mass campaign. This is absolutely incompatible with any concessions to terrorist concepts and

attitudes. It requires a struggle against terrorist ideas going hand in hand with defense of the victims of the capitalist system and its brutality. □

Not by Crawling Like the Bourgeois Elements

How to Defend Irish People Against Wilson's Witch-Hunt

By Gerry Foley

The first deportations from Britain under the new special powers legislation, which was passed November 29, have confirmed that the Wilson regime's intention is to launch a general witch-hunt against Irish nationalists.

The first person of Irish origin to be arrested was John Rafferty, identified by the press as being with the Provisional Sinn Fein, a nationalist political organization that supports the policies of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The second and third persons arrested, Gerry Doherty and James Flynn, were members of Clann na h-Eirean (the Irish party), an association of political clubs that supports the general political line of the Official republican movement in Ireland.

The Official republicans have long opposed the kind of terrorist actions in Britain that the special powers legislation was allegedly passed to prevent. The Provisional republicans, who do have a guerrilla warfare orientation, also have a tradition of claiming responsibility for their actions. They have denied that anyone under their discipline had anything to do with the November 21 pub bombings in Birmingham that were the pretext for the new repressive laws.

Despite this, the capitalist press and ruling circles have not only convicted the Provisionals out of hand; they have tried to use the bombing incidents to make a blanket indictment of all persons of Irish origin who oppose British rule in Ireland.

The treatment of the six Irishmen picked up in the police sweeps that followed the Birmingham bombings indicates the lynch-mob spirit encouraged by the British authorities:

"Five of the six men on the murder charge appeared in court with facial marks and were later reported to be having medical checks," Dennis Barker wrote from Birmingham in the November 29 issue of the *Guardian*. "One had a black left eye on Monday [November 25] and a cut on his nose yesterday. One had a black eye and cuts to the face. Another had a cut nose, a fourth, two

black eyes, a grazed forehead, swollen lips and a bruised jaw, and the last had a bruise over the eye."

The response of the Irish bourgeois elements both in Britain and Ireland to the wave of chauvinist hysteria was to crawl. In the debate on the special powers bill in the London parliament November 25, Gerry Fitt, the bourgeois nationalist SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour party) MP from West Belfast, said: "The overwhelming majority of Irish people, and the Irish race, will support the Home Secretary in the measures he has announced. In these circumstances as little inconvenience [as possible] should be caused to those decent people who have such a close relationship with this country."

Fitt also supported proposals to ban reporting of IRA statements from British television:

"However strong the objections may be to imposing a censorship on television that man's voice [i.e., the voice of Provisional leader Daithi O Conaill, who threatened to step up bombing of Britain on a television interview] as it came out on television indirectly led to the murder of 19 people in Birmingham and every effort should be made by the Home Secretary to prevent such a broadcast again. (Cheers.)"

In an editorial November 30, the *Irish Post*, a bourgeois weekly directed at the Irish living in Britain, noted:

"The Irish here have served Britain well in war and in peace and the vast majority of British people know it. Some of the most distinguished people in this country are Irish—industrial leaders, educationalists, communicators, doctors, entertainers, sportsmen—and police men. As many as 10% of London's police are Irish-born while the figure in Birmingham is almost as high."

The main Irish bourgeois institution, the Dublin government, followed the same line. New legislation calling for trying persons accused of committing "terrorist offenses" outside Dublin's jurisdiction was speeded up. The law was published on December 5 and expected to go before the

Dail (parliament) on December 11.

The second most important Irish bourgeois institution, the Catholic church, also responded to the attacks on the Irish people in Britain by launching a new attack on militant nationalists. Church representatives did not even have the "charity" to assume the Provisionals were innocent until proved guilty of the Birmingham bombings. In his sermon November 26, Cahal Daly, the bishop of Ardagh and Clonmacnois, displayed a hypocrisy unusual even for the Irish hierarchy, which has been a frank opponent of Irish republicanism for its entire history, not hesitating to denounce the liberation fighters of 1916-22 as "murderers."

"There is no historical continuity whatever between the present, largely faceless, leaders of the self styled 'Republican Movement' and their honorable forebears," Bishop Daly said. "There is no moral continuity between their methods and those of an earlier struggle for independence. One of the aims of the present 'Republican Movement' is to overthrow the very institutions of democracy which earlier Republicans sacrificed limb and life to establish."

Bishop Daly gave this sermon in Belfast, which has been under British military rule since 1969.

The reaction of the bourgeois nationalists and the Catholic church to the chauvinist attacks on the Irish people could have been expected. Historically they have sought the role of junior partners in British imperialism, have crawled before the British rulers, and have turned all their hatred and violence against the revolutionary nationalists who threatened to upset this relationship.

However, most of the organizations claiming to be socialist in Britain, starting with the ruling Labour party, also failed to stand firm against the British chauvinist propaganda offensive. The Labour parliamentary leaders defended the special powers legislation on the grounds that a show of toughness was needed to assuage "public feeling" against the militant Irish nationalists.

Most trade-union leaders who opposed strikes directed at Ireland and the Irish people, as well as attacks on Irish workers on the job, did so in the name of fighting the IRA more effectively.

Besides reflecting genuine chauvinist sentiments, such arguments no doubt seem "clever" and "effective" to "left" trade-union bureaucrats. However, in the long run bowing to chauvinist conceptions will only reinforce the prejudices of British workers and convince Irish workers that the labor leaders' talk about working-class unity is pure hypocrisy.

Fascist elements have already tried to exploit the labor movement's capitulation to chauvinist hysteria. The National Front tried to parlay the series of anti-

Irish strikes in Birmingham into a one-day general strike that could open the way for pogroms against the Irish population in Britain. Their campaign was reportedly a flop.

However, the walkouts in Birmingham were some of the most ominous reactionary mobilizations of British workers since the 1930s, and in the context of the deepening economic and social crisis in Britain, it is far from impossible that a significant section of the bourgeoisie will put its weight at some point behind an attempt to whip up antiforeignism in the unions. Such elements cannot be defeated by trade-union leaders claiming to know better how to defeat Irish nationalist "extremists."

In a statement published in the November 26 issue of the Communist party paper *Morning Star*, the National Council for Civil Liberties likewise opposed the new repressive legislation on the grounds that it played into the hands of the IRA.

"The main effect of massive police searches and arrests, when directed at particular sections of the community, has been to increase sympathy for extremists such as the Provisional IRA.

"Because the traditional policing relationship has been destroyed, it has become impossible for the police to get information about terrorists from the community."

A civil-liberties organization cannot be expected, of course, to express sympathy with a terrorist campaign or political opposition to the system as such. However, they cannot effectively defend human rights by trying to advise the capitalist repressive forces how to do their work better. If heavy police repression did prove effective in reducing IRA activity, would they, then, approve of it?

The Communist party statement in the same issue of the *Morning Star* made some good points. It explained that the ban on the IRA in Northern Ireland had not reduced violence but had increased it by aggravating the bitterness of the oppressed community. It stressed the dangers of such legislation to civil liberties in general. However, its support for the Irish was expressed in inadequate, ambiguous, and misleading demands.

"Internment without trial should be ended, and the Emergency Provisions Act repealed. A Bill of Rights should be rushed through Westminster.

"There should be an end to the repressive role of the army, and the troops should be brought back to barracks pending their complete withdrawal."

The demand for an end to internment was positive. As the most obvious denial of human rights, it is the strongest focus for a campaign against repression. However, an increasing proportion of those confined in the concentration camps and prison complexes in Northern Ireland

have been tried and sentenced on political charges. The intimidating effect of the repression can actually be increased if these persons are allowed to think they are being abandoned.

The demand for new formal guarantees of civil rights in Northern Ireland could serve a useful role if it were linked to concrete demands directed against the repression that is going on. However, the Communist party's constant projecting of a "Bill of Rights" as a panacea has not proved effective in mobilizing pressure against the repression. It enables bourgeois politicians and trade-union bureaucrats to avoid taking a position on the concrete issues by simply ascribing to a statement of general principles.

The demand for an end to the "repressive role" of the army is dangerously confusing. The role of capitalist armies, and the British army in Ireland in particular, can only be repressive. Raising such a demand is a typical example of the opportunist method of sacrificing education of the masses to short-sighted political expediency.

The largest group to the left of the Communist party, the International Socialists (IS), took a stronger position in support of the Irish people. It told some more of the truth that the Communist party found it inexpedient to say: "For more than 300 years those with wealth and power in Britain have brutally exploited, bled and butchered Ireland," the IS weekly *Socialist Worker* wrote in its November 30 issue.

"That 300-year-long 'civilising mission' started with Cromwell, and his massacre of 30,000 people at Drogheda. It continued with the plantation of the North with Protestant settlers, the development of rackrenting landlordism that laid waste the countryside and forced the Irish to farm stony mountains.

"It included the stage management of a famine that killed one million people while grain was being exported for profit.

"Throughout, it involved the most systematic violence, violence that Roy Jenkins [British home secretary] and his kind condone. . . .

"It involves Protestant murder gangs given free licence to operate by the troops. It involves the army itself with its Bloody Sunday and other killings.

"It is this appalling history that drives young people to the desperate planting of bombs. And until this history of repression stops, there will always be people driven to despair, some to the maiming and killing of their innocent fellow human beings.

"The possibility of more IRA bombings will continue until there is a widespread and powerful campaign for the withdrawal of the troops and for the self-determination of Ireland."

Although there were some inaccuracies

of historical detail (the Protestant settlement came before Cromwell), it was such things that had to be said to educate the British workers.

The front-page of the *Socialist Worker* called for: "Troops Out of Ireland!" However, the top headline read: "Stop the Bombings!" The message was thus rather ambiguous. Perhaps the editors meant that the way to end the violence was to end imperialist domination of Ireland. How could anyone promise, however, that the immediate problem of terrorist acts would be solved by calling for the withdrawal of British troops?

This juxtaposition of slogans was certainly confusing. And it raised a question about the determination of IS to stand firm against British chauvinist pressures. Until the IS eliminates any room for such doubt, it can hardly criticize the Provisional republicans for "nationalism."

Furthermore, the *Socialist Worker* did not condemn the lynch-law conviction of the Provisionals by the capitalist press and government for an act they said they did not commit. In fact, it printed a statement from IS's Irish affiliate expressing a logic identical to that of the capitalist press and officials:

"Even if the Provisionals were not responsible, their declared commitment to bombings in Britain would lead to such bombings."

That is precisely the same logic that the capitalists follow in attacking socialists for advocating "the overthrow of the government by force and violence." In the context of the kind of repression that exists in Ireland, it is inevitable that there will be terrorist incidents.

It is true that the Provisionals' statements and nuisance bombing campaign in Britain made it easier for the British bourgeoisie to use the Birmingham bombings to whip up chauvinist hysteria against them. However, the statements of the Provisional leaders did not justify the automatic assumption that they ordered or condoned these bombings. The fundamental factor in the wave of hysteria against the Provisionals was the chauvinism deeply rooted in the entire population of the British imperialist center.

The *Socialist Worker's* arguments that the Irish freedom fighters should look on British workers as potential allies were greatly weakened by a tendency to mythologize workers as such. One of its contributors, John Cullinane wrote: "Every worker must be horrified by the appalling outrage committed against mainly working-class people in Birmingham last Thursday. It must be obvious that the perpetrators of this bloodbath have no appreciation of the true class struggle."

On the front page, the editors wrote, "The bombings killed 19 workers in Birmingham. . . ."

Was the anti-Irish hysteria created by the fact that the bomb victims were "workers"? What would have been the reaction if the queen had been blown up instead?

The IS's calls for working-class unity were also weakened by a certain sugges-



WILSON: Begins arrests of Irish.

tion of resentment that the Irish question had intruded, in a peculiarly difficult form, into their routinist economic agitation.

"Public reaction to the bombings has meant that months of work by class-conscious workers has gone by the board," John Cullinane declared. "Longbridge workers who were beginning to look to the International Socialists have said to me that they would rather have a police state where they would feel safe than let the present situation continue. . . ."

"At Longbridge a large section of the Irish workers are active in the trade union movement, but now they feel they are threatened. How can we resist the constant attacks on our standard of living if we are not united?"

Obviously the influence of terrorist concepts in the Irish liberation movement—largely the result of the British left's failure to give effective support to the Irish people, as the *Socialist Worker* recognized to its credit—has enabled the imperialist bourgeoisie to set back the anticapitalist movement severely.

But the IS could hardly expect the class struggle in an old imperialist state to follow a regular course of trade-union and elementary propaganda activity. The hold of capitalist ideology on the workers cannot be broken without an attack on the

chauvinist prejudices rooted in the working class itself. And that means defending the Irish liberation movement, despite any errors it may make.

The fact is that at the present time, the majority of the British workers, as well as the rest of the British population, hold a wrong attitude toward the Irish people. For a time the Irish people will have to struggle to some extent against the "British nation."

Although this struggle will obviously cause problems for British trade-union bureaucrats and their "left" shadows, it is one of the main factors pushing the class struggle in Britain out of its dead-end economist rut.

It is correct to appeal for class unity but wrong to counterpose it—when it does not yet exist—to the actual struggle against imperialism and chauvinism on which British and Irish workers are divided. To do so only leads to self-deception and capitulation to the pressures of the ruling class. At best, it leads to passivity and isolation from the real struggle.

This process has been shown by the evolution of the Official republican movement. To some extent its economist political line reflects the influence of British "left" labourism that has reached the organization through various channels. This economistism has been reinforced by illusions in the Communist party "left" opposition to the Labour party bureaucracy on the British shop floors. The influence of Stalinist conceptions, in turn, has been strengthened by naive nationalist illusions about the extent of the Soviet bloc countries' support for "national liberation struggles."

On the other hand, nationalist militants moving to the left have had a tendency to slide over into vulgar Marxism. Moreover, as the largest organization for some years claiming to be socialist in Ireland, the Officials attracted a lot of young radicals affected by dogmatic concepts prevalent in the general radicalization.

The result of this economist line has been that as the crisis in Northern Ireland deepened, the Officials were unable to offer any way forward. They idealized the Protestant workers to the point of total self-delusion. Their increasingly dogmatic appeals to "class unity" failed completely to counter the rise of terrorism.

They lost their hegemony in the mass movement, became more and more isolated from the militant sectors of the population and incapable of offering leadership. They held the hard core of their traditional support by doing essentially the same thing on a local basis as the Provisionals. Their inability to defeat terrorist conceptions politically led to a blind factionalism, to making the Provisionals the scapegoat for the failure of their own utopian schemes.

This factional blindness was illustrated in the declaration on the Birmingham bombings by Official Sinn Fein Press Officer Sean O Cionnaigh in Dublin. This statement, in a contradictory way, also indicates the best in the evolution of the Officials.

Thus, O Cionnaigh made the most powerful political point against the new repressive legislation:

"The repressive legislation being introduced in Britain in the wake of the Birmingham bombs is of a type with repressive legislation affecting the North of Ireland, introduced since the beginning of the civil rights struggle there. It is a sign of the continuing deterioration of and restriction of the rights of individual citizens arising from the failure to deal with the root causes of violence in the North of Ireland.

"Westminster has always been careful to ensure that repressive legislation, heretofore, was confined to the area of Northern Ireland as were the repressive acts of the British Army and other so-called security forces. Now the continuing crisis, arising from the continuing refusal of positive civil rights legislation by Westminster, has caused the first repressive laws to be inscribed on the statute book in the home country itself. The legislation, aimed generally at the Irish community in Britain, will not, however, be confined to this area."

The effect of this was destroyed, however, by a wild swing at the Provisionals in the following paragraph: "While totally condemning the Birmingham bombs and their source in Fianna Fail-Government money. . . ."

The Officials have presented some evidence in the past that a section of the bourgeois party now out of power promoted the Provisional split to stop the development of socialist politics in the republican movement. Raising this old charge in such a context, however, was not likely to convince many nationalist-minded persons, and it could even look like a way of trying to join the antinationalist chorus of the capitalist press and governments.

As a means for educating nationalist militants of the ineffectiveness of terrorist tactics, such an approach was worse than useless. If it was based on the assumption that this failure was self-evident because of the immediate public reaction to the Birmingham bombings, this, as many previous such cases have shown, was a one-sided impression. Since the Irish people as a whole are under attack, it is highly likely that the sympathy of a large number will turn later toward the direct targets of this chauvinist wave and strengthen the very tendencies the Officials want to oppose.

While it is true that Marxists would

fail in their responsibilities if they did not point the way to more advanced and effective forms of struggle than terrorism, and while it is also true that they cannot offer any concrete help to the Irish struggle by accommodating politically to ter-

rorist notions, it is just as true that this process of education has to be based on support for the actual struggle against imperialism and on uncompromising denunciation of imperialist chauvinism in its "left" as well as right forms. □

Chilean Junta Permits Him to Go Into Exile

Campaign Wins Release of Luis Vitale

Luis Vitale, one of the leaders of the Chilean section of the Fourth International, has finally been released from prison. On November 28 the junta allowed him to leave the country for Germany, where a job had been offered him as professor in the social science faculty at Frankfurt University.

At the time of his arrest, Vitale was professor of history and geography at the University of Concepción.

Vitale's release followed a campaign in his behalf that was launched more than a year ago. At its congress in February 1974 the Fourth International named him its honorary chairman as a symbol of the revolutionary victims of repression around the world.

Vitale was arrested in Santiago shortly after the September 1973 coup that overthrew the Allende regime. For long weeks he was held in the National Stadium of that city. He was severely tortured. Later he was transferred to a concentration camp. For some time his life hung in the balance as the result of the brutal treatment to which he had been subjected.

The author of several books and essays, Vitale's best-known work is his history of Chile, *Interpretación Marxista de la Historia de Chile*. The work had only been partially published prior to the 1973 coup.

Vitale holds dual Argentine and Chilean citizenship. He was born in Argentina in 1927 but had lived in Chile for two decades. He married a Chilean and has a daughter who was born in Santiago.

He has a long record of activity in the Chilean labor movement. In the years 1959-62, Vitale was a national leader of the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT—United Federation of Workers). He helped draft the resolutions presented to the first and

second national congresses of the CUT, particularly those sections dealing with agrarian reform, the problem of imperialism, and industrial development in Chile.

The GIM (Gruppe Internationale Marxisten—International Marxist Group, the German section of the Fourth International) has announced a speaking tour for Vitale through the Federal Republic of Germany. □

FBI Admits Surveillance Plans for Young Socialist Convention

The federal government admitted in a New York district court November 20 that the Federal Bureau of Investigation plans to send undercover agents to the Young Socialist Alliance national convention scheduled for December 28 to January 1 in St. Louis. The FBI acknowledged that it intends to "request confidential informants to attend" the convention "for the purpose of obtaining information regarding the substance of what is said at the convention as well as individuals in attendance."

The YSA entered a motion in federal court October 29 seeking a preliminary injunction to bar the FBI from the convention. In the government reply, the U.S. attorney claimed that the YSA was the "youth arm" of the Socialist Workers party, whose purpose, the attorney contended, was the violent overthrow of the government.

Andrew Pulley, the national chairman of the YSA, answered the charges in a statement issued by the YSA national office. He said that the YSA was an independent socialist youth organization and that the government's insistence that the YSA was the "youth arm" of the SWP was designed to label the YSA "subversive," as the SWP was labeled more than thirty years ago.

Pulley said that "the YSA and SWP are completely lawful organizations. The government does not have even a shred of evidence to support its claim that we are 'subversive.'"

More Ethiopian Troops Sent into Eritrea

By Ernest Harsch

Ethiopia's new regime has begun preparations to escalate the thirteen-year war against the independence forces in Eritrea. In late November, the Dergue (the armed forces coordinating committee) deployed thousands of additional troops for a possible offensive against the Eritrean guerrillas, who control much of the countryside.

Charles Mohr reported in the November 29 *New York Times* that "army reinforcements reportedly continued to pour into Eritrea, passing through the provincial capital of Asmara. At least two battalions of the former imperial bodyguard had been seen there, a Western source said, and it was thought that two brigades of about 5,000 men were under orders to join the Second Division."

On November 28, the Dergue elected as its new chairman Brigadier General Tafari Banti, a former Ethiopian attaché in Washington and the commander of the Second Division. One of Tafari's first acts was to order the troop movements into Eritrea to seal the area off from the Red Sea and thus obstruct the guerrillas' access to supplies from Libya, Somalia, South Yemen, Iraq, and the Soviet Union.

The military rulers had begun moving in force against the guerrillas as early as the month before. On October 13 Tafari ordered massive air strikes against guerrilla positions. An October 17 United Press International dispatch reported that Ethiopian troops, backed by air force jets and artillery, had fought large-scale battles with the independence forces near Asmara.

According to a dispatch by John K. Cooley in the December 2 *Christian Science Monitor*, sources from both Eritrean guerrilla organizations—the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Forces (EPLF)—said that the new rulers in Addis Ababa now planned a head-on confrontation.

Osman Saleh Sabbe of the EPLF told Cooley that the military figures now in the leadership of the Dergue were Amharic, the dominant ethnic

grouping in Ethiopia upon which deposed Emperor Haile Selassie and his predecessors had also based their power. A key slogan of the Dergue, in obvious opposition to the nationalist aspirations of the Eritreans, is "Ethiopia first."

These new war moves followed a brief factional struggle within the Dergue over tactics. The former Dergue chairman, Lieutenant General Aman Michael Andom, himself an Eritrean, had reportedly favored "negotiations." EPLF spokesman Sabbe pointed out that in September, when Aman was still the titular head of the Dergue, the rulers in Addis Ababa sent an offer through the Sudanese regime to negotiate with the guerrillas.

Other figures within the armed forces committee, however, differed. In a November 17 speech, Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, the major figure in the Dergue, stressed that "separatism" would not be tolerated. On November 23, an official announcement declared that Aman had been deposed as chairman of the Dergue. Troops surrounded Aman's home and reportedly attempted to arrest him. After a two-hour battle, Aman and two of his aides were killed.

Shortly after Aman was killed, the Dergue executed almost sixty imprisoned generals, landlords, and government officials of the old regime. This gave rise to speculation that the move may have been an effort to offset the news of Aman's death. In a November 30 dispatch from Addis Ababa, *Washington Post* reporter David B. Ottaway quoted one low-ranking civil servant as saying, "The people are very happy to see them dead, but Aman is a different thing."

Besides preparing to crush the Eritrean independence movement, the new regime has banned demonstrations and strikes. It has arrested trade unionists and is attempting to disperse the volatile student movement into the countryside. The Dergue, like the deposed Selassie, has also been pressing Washington to send more military aid.

"We do not think that there has been

a revolution in this country. . .," the general secretary of the Addis Ababa University Students Union said in an interview published in the November issue of the London monthly *Africa*. "We hold illegal assemblies, illegal rallies and, sometimes, we try to demonstrate." The president of the students union said that he thought a clash between the military and the students was inevitable. □

Mexican Guerrilla Leader Killed

Lucio Cabanas, a well-known guerrilla leader, was killed December 2, reportedly during a battle with the Mexican army. According to the Interior Ministry, the shootout took place near the village of Tecpan, seventy-five miles north of Acapulco in the southwestern state of Guerrero. Another ten guerrillas died along with him, the Defense Department said, while two soldiers were killed and five wounded. In a battle two days before, seventeen guerrillas were killed.

Cabanas had a reputation as a Robin Hood figure, stealing from the rich to give to the poor. He was particularly famed in Guerrero, where popular ballads told of his exploits.

In one incident his group invaded the local government coffee institute after peasants informed him that "the scales are fixed." When he confirmed that the peasants were being cheated of twenty-two pounds per sack, he raided the safe, took about \$6,000, and said the money "would be returned to the coffee growers from whom it had been stolen."

Before taking up arms against the government, Cabanas had been a schoolteacher in Atoyac in Guerrero state. He led a campaign against compulsory school uniforms, arguing that the poor could hardly afford to feed their children, let alone buy them uniforms.

When police fired on a protest meeting he was addressing, killing eight persons, Cabanas took to the hills and joined the guerrillas led by Genaro Vazquez Rojas, another teacher-turned-guerrilla. After Vazquez was killed in a car accident in 1972, Cabanas took over leadership of the group. Called the "Party of the Poor," the group was estimated to have about 250 members.

Last May the group kidnapped Senator Ruben Figueroa, the millionaire transportation magnate, and demanded \$4 million in ransom, arms, and freedom for a number of political prisoners. In a battle on September 8, the Mexican army killed seventeen guerrillas and freed Figueroa.

For almost five months, nearly half the Mexican army had been mobilized to hunt down Cabanas. Apparently the government is even afraid of him dead. He was buried in secret.

Peronist Regime Demands New Powers

Exactly one month after its declaration of a state of siege, the government of Peron's heirs demanded a new increase in the powers of the presidency.

On December 6, the chief executive, Isabel de Perón, called on the Peronist-dominated congress to grant her the authority to create a superagency for national security and defense, a central intelligence committee, and a committee for internal security. The bill specifies that all bodies are to "depend on the President of the nation in direct and immediate form."

The bill would authorize the national executive to establish "security zones" in areas where it considers that "security" is threatened. "It recommends," according to a December 6 United Press International dispatch, "that the defense minister consider measures permitting take-over by Government and military authorities of natural, energy, and industrial resources in such zones.

"The same is recommended for 'communication media, public services, orientation of public opinion, and transportation.'"

Another provision states: "The national executive branch may send the armed forces on military operations when it comes to combating subversion or insurrection."

The rightist clique led by the president's personal secretary, José López Rega, has already concentrated almost absolute power in its hands. Its opponents in the Peronist movement have been driven to the wall. Dissident Peronist legislators have been purged. The most outspoken of these, Rodolfo Ortega Peña, was assassinated July 31 by the parallel police murder squads.

By the third week in November, the national executive had already removed the governors of six of Argentina's twenty-one provinces: Córdoba, Santa Cruz, Mendoza, Formosa, Salta, and Buenos Aires.

In Salta, all three branches of the provincial government were intervened, giving the appointed governor the right to rule by decree. Seventeen persons who had held positions in the



BALBÍN: Victim of assassination attempt by rightist murder gang.

deposed government were arrested, including two members of the provincial legislature who supported the liberal Peronist Governor Miguel Rago.

Other state governments were threatened. On November 26 the local leaders of the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor), which has led the attack on liberal Peronists in the provincial governments, began pushing demands for the resignation of the governor of Catamarca.

In the midst of these interventions the national executive was also framing a new statute on political parties that would deprive legislators of all independence. In its November 28 issue, the Buenos Aires daily *Clarín* commented: "According to reports, the bill will include provisions setting rules for holding certain elected offices, rules that are unprecedented here or abroad and that are highly questionable.

"It is proposed that the seats in congress must be assigned directly to political parties. The objective is to create a tighter link between the political formations and the legislators so as to avoid any differences that come up

from depriving the party of a seat and giving apostates positions they would not have held if their differences had been expressed earlier."

This would convert congressional seats into mere patronage posts dispensed by the right-wing Peronist bosses. Left-wing and liberal Peronists objected to the right turn in the regime on the grounds that this departed from the position of the "movement." But it was the right-wing figures in the circle around "el líder" who decided what the "movement's" position was. And anyone who disagreed could argue the point with the reactionary murder gangs the rightists unleashed.

In their grab for absolute power, the rightists appeared ready to use their death squads even against the leaders of the bourgeois parliamentary opposition. On November 16, an attempt was made to assassinate Ricardo Balbín, the leader of the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union, the bourgeois liberals).

The demand for new special powers on December 6 could no longer be justified by claiming that these were required to meet the "guerrilla threat." According to the government's own statements, the guerrillas were hard hit by the repression in November and their activity had diminished markedly.

However, if the activity of the guerrillas had diminished, the rightist death squadrons were still at work.

"In Tucuman Province today the police reported the fatal shooting of the son of a jailed leftist militant four days after his mother was assassinated," a December 6 UPI dispatch reported. "They found the body of 19-year-old Luis Manuel Montenegro in the street of a small town near Tucuman, 780 miles north of Buenos Aires. . . . The victim's father, Oscar, is in prison because of links with a Marxist guerrilla group, the People's Revolutionary Army."

On December 7, an AP dispatch reported: "Enrique Oscar Rosconi, 29, a member of the Revolutionary Communist party and a student at the University of La Plata, was dragged from his home and shot to death near a park by men said to be members of a right-wing death squad. Witnesses said he screamed for mercy as the killers opened fire with automatic weapons." □

What Ceiling in the U.S.-Soviet Arms Accord?

By Dick Fidler

At a December 2 news conference, President Gerald Ford made public for the first time the major features of the tentative nuclear arms accord that he and Soviet Communist party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev reached in Vladivostok.

Ford said that he and Brezhnev had agreed to put a ceiling of 2,400 on each country's total number of long-range offensive missiles and bombers. Each will be able to place "multiple independently targetable warheads" (the so-called MIRVs) on up to 1,320 land-based and submarine-based missiles.

The number of missiles that could be equipped with MIRVs was higher than had been previously reported in unofficial "leaks" to the U.S. news media.

Using the doublespeak characteristic of U.S. officials, especially when discussing "arms control," Ford praised the agreement. It "set firm and equal limits on the strategic forces of each side, thus preventing an arms race with all its terror, instability, war-breeding, tension and economic waste," he said. "We have in addition created the solid basis from which future arms reductions can be—and hopefully will be—negotiated."

In reality, the Vladivostok accord gives a green light to the Pentagon.

This was acknowledged by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger at a December 6 news conference in Washington. The war minister hailed the accord as "a major step forward." He said it "will entail some reduction in what we have assumed to be the Soviet program," while at the same time "the over-all forces of the United States in the strategic area will be larger than they would otherwise have been."

Schlesinger predicted "some upward adjustment" in the allocations for strategic arms spending in the U.S. war budget as a result of the Vladivostok accord.

Schlesinger's praise was significant, since he was originally skeptical of Kissinger's approach. In the Decem-

ber 3 *New York Times*, Washington correspondent Leslie H. Gelb gave an inside account of the top-level discussions in the Ford administration preceding the deal.

The key problem facing Washington's generals and politicians was how to get the Kremlin to reduce its planned production of MIRVs, while leaving the Pentagon free to build up its own offensive nuclear arsenal.

Each side already has the capacity to wipe the other off the map many times over, and take the rest of the world down with them an equal number of times. The huge and growing U.S. armaments program is continuing testimony to imperialism's long-range objective of "rolling back" the workers states. As for the Kremlin bureaucrats, they rely on a nuclear "balance of terror" while striving for deals with imperialism that they hope will maintain the "status quo."

A previous accord, signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow in May 1972, limited defensive antiballistic missiles (ABMs) to 200 on each side, and called for a freeze on offensive missiles at 1,710 for the United States, and 2,360 for the Soviet Union. It did not cover bombers or multiple warheads.

The Soviet Union is still testing MIRVs. The Pentagon is reported to have already put multiple warheads on about 800 land and sea-based missiles and has plans to go up to 1,200.

When Nixon went to Moscow last June, he proposed that the Kremlin agree to a substantial U.S. lead in MIRVs, in return for which Washington would agree to a Soviet advantage in total delivery vehicles (missiles plus bombers). The Kremlin leaders rejected this. They "wanted both a numerical advantage in delivery vehicles and almost as many missiles with multiple warheads," Gelb reported.

Soviet officials also insisted on taking into account such factors as U.S. and allied nuclear-capable forces in Europe, and the Pentagon's obvious

strategic advantage in being able to service submarines in allied ports.

Behind the cover of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), the Pentagon has been forging ahead in the development of a "new generation" of military hardware that would qualitatively increase U.S. "first-strike" capability. Among these new weapons of mass destruction are the \$42 million B-1 bomber and the \$1 billion Trident submarine. Each submarine would carry twenty-four MIRVed missiles with a range of 6,000 miles.

Following the Kremlin's rejection of the original U.S. proposal, "Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger debated over what to do next in a series of National Security Council meetings in October, with Mr. Ford presiding," Gelb reported. Schlesinger wanted to continue to pressure Moscow to cut back its planned deployment of MIRVs, with the threat that if it refused, Washington would step up its arms drive in a massive way.

"Mr. Schlesinger contended that 'we must face the Soviets down' on their desire to deploy a large number of missiles with multiple warheads or, failing that, 'buckle down for a five-year, all-out arms race.'"

Kissinger argued against the war secretary that there was no point in continuing to press Moscow for something it had already turned down. He cited an intelligence study showing that the Kremlin was planning to deploy at least 3,000 delivery vehicles and 1,500 to 2,000 missiles with multiple warheads over the next five years. He argued that the U.S. should try to get a deal that would publicly commit the Kremlin to lower these levels, while at the same time leave the Pentagon sufficient latitude to proceed with its own increased arms program.

Kissinger's formula was described by Gelb as "a step-by-step approach of high ceilings now, followed by reductions and controls on modernization later."

The talk of subsequent reductions and controls is just window dressing,

of course. According to Gelb's sources, the military brass supported Kissinger against their civilian head, the war secretary, since the secretary of state's proposal did not commit them to any reductions in arms development.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff backed Mr. Kissinger because his plan allowed for more new weapons than would Mr. Schlesinger's alternative."

The propaganda appeal of Kissinger's argument—that an agreement to escalate the arms race could be disguised as putting a "ceiling" or "cap" on nuclear weapons programs—appears to have eventually won Schlesinger over. At the last of these meetings he "began to soften his position," Gelb reported.

"With the President playing a still undefined role, the following proposal was agreed to: An equal delivery-vehicle ceiling of about 2,000; an equal number of missiles with multiple warheads at about 1,000; and sublimits on big Soviet land-based missiles and American bomber-launched missiles.

"If Moscow rejected this, Washington would then go back to the old proposal of a Soviet lead in delivery vehicles and an American lead in numbers of missiles with multiple warheads."

When Kissinger went to Moscow in late October, the new U.S. proposal got a favorable reception from Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. "They seemed to talk about American aircraft in and around Europe only rhetorically, and their stand on taking the nuclear capability of other nations and American geographical advantages into account also seemed to weaken," Gelb reported.

The outline accord agreed on "in principle" in Vladivostok provides for even higher ceilings than projected in Washington's proposal. The overall delivery-vehicle ceiling of 2,400 for each side is up about 300 from the U.S. proposal, Gelb wrote. The limit of 1,320 missiles with multiple warheads represents an increase of about 200 from the U.S. proposal.

Washington officials say that the overall ceiling of 2,400 "will require Moscow to eliminate about a hundred of its delivery vehicles," the *New York Times* correspondent wrote. ". . . United States officials say that in the absence of a new agreement the Russians could have had about 17,000 warheads. Now the number is expected

to be significantly lower."

At his December 6 news conference, Schlesinger announced that, in accordance with the Vladivostok agreement, the Pentagon would probably build two Trident missile submarines be-



KISSINGER: Got green light to step up nuclear arms production.

yond the ten already planned, keep ten Poseidon missile submarines in operation longer than planned, build a new strategic bomber, and deploy a larger intercontinental ballistic missile. The United States is already developing a bigger Minuteman ICBM with three to four times the "payload" capacity of the Minuteman III.

The allocation of these costly programs—a fleet of 240 B-1 bombers would alone cost an estimated \$18 billion—involves a shift in the relative budgets of the different (and often rival) branches of the U.S. armed forces. Schlesinger stressed at his news conference, for example, that the increasing reliance on submarine-based missiles, a responsibility of the Navy, would mean a reduction in the Air Force's land-based missile system. "If carried out," *New York Times* correspondent John W. Finney commented, "this would represent major realignment of strategic forces that would be certain to encounter resistance from the Air Force."

This rivalry is a factor in the disputes over arms policy within the U.S. government.

Republican party officials are presenting the Vladivostok accord as a triumph for Ford's personal diplomacy. But Gelb indicated that his sources "were not able to make clear President Ford's precise role in the Vladivostok talks." In the top-level strategy debates before the trip, Ford's role was "undefined," he added.

Nonetheless there was no mystery about Ford's purpose in going to Vladivostok. He announced on the eve of the junket that he intended to run for president in 1976. This apparently met with the approval of the Kremlin. "Mr. Kissinger," reported *New York Times* correspondent Bernard Gwertzman December 7, "believes that the Soviet leaders, perhaps to get relations with Mr. Ford off on a good footing, were unexpectedly conciliatory at Vladivostok. . . ."

The U.S.-Soviet arms accord has come under sharp attack from Senator Henry Jackson. He has charged that instead of "putting a cap on the arms race," as contended by Kissinger and Ford, the accord provides the basis for "a sustained 10-year arms buildup" and authorizes "astoundingly high" levels of multiple warheads.

The senator, who is a notorious "hawk," is simply trying to take advantage of an obvious opening. At the moment, he is one of the leading contenders for nomination by the Democrats to oppose Ford in 1976. As part of the grooming for his bid, he recently made a visit to China and took the stance that it is easier to deal with Mao than with Brezhnev. □

Worldwide Water Shortage Predicted

The next crisis facing humanity could be a worldwide water shortage, warned experts at the recent World Food Conference in Rome. They said the crisis may already have begun.

India, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Pakistan introduced a resolution asking international organizations and the more affluent countries to provide \$2 billion to \$4 billion a year over the next decade to find new sources of water and improve conservation of the water already available. It was pointed out that residents of Florida, for example, are able to use forty times as much water as people in Bengal.

The UN Food and Agricultural Organization calculated that world demand for fresh water will increase by 240 percent by the end of the decade.

Report on Prison Conditions Shocks Public

By Sharad Jhaveri

Jamnagar

"Don't Brutalise India" was the caption of a lead editorial in the *Hindustan Times*, a New Delhi newspaper owned by the Birla family. This article constituted perhaps the most eloquent reflection in the national press of the public reaction in India to the recent report issued by Amnesty International on India's political prisoners. (See *Intercontinental Press*, October 21, p. 1363.)

"Charges of brutal treatment and torture of political prisoners in West Bengal prisons have been levelled by certain organisations," said the editor B. G. Verghese, "and these have found an echo in several national forums. It is no answer to these to say that they cannot be true because India enjoys an open society in which such action would have attracted sharply hostile notice. The question in such cases is not whether these reports are regarded by the government as being politically motivated or fair. Indeed, there is imperative need to allay public suspicions if these be not warranted. The state government has unfortunately failed to do that."

In a previous editorial on West Bengal's prison conditions, Verghese said, "The ideal of a humane society is too precious to lose by default—even in prison."

Verghese has spoken forthrightly on other subjects. For instance, on the Sikkim annexation, he said, "If it is not outright annexation, it comes close to it." And, "Perhaps no need for the common man to ask for bread. He is getting Sikkim."

It is reported that in response to pressure from the Gandhi regime, the proprietors of the paper have asked Verghese to retire.

Other papers have also discussed the conditions in India's prisons. The editors of the *Times of India* stated, "It is precisely because India professes—and prefers—an open society that every care must be taken to ensure that even its prisons are not brutalised and that the rule of law and human justice prevail."



GANDHI: No shortage of funds when it comes to expanding police and army.

The controversy over the Amnesty report has focused attention on little-known facts about prison conditions in India.

The West Bengal government's official vocabulary, for instance, has no such expression as "political prisoner." In a statement to the press, the government explained that prisoners are classified as Division I and Division II by the court, and not by the police or the government, and the distinction lies primarily in the food supplied to the prisoners.

The West Bengal Jail Code Revision Committee states in a report: "All too frequently most jails have to operate over capacity and as a result the cells and dormitories are packed to suffocation."

According to this report, "In West Bengal, at present, the total daily average number of prisoners is about 20,000."

The report further states: "Many guards are hostile towards prisoners and want to see them serve the term

of imprisonment under the most rigorous conditions."

The first comprehensive study of prison problems in India was made during British rule by the Indian Jails Committee in 1919 and 1920. This was followed by several more such studies after independence was won in 1947.

In 1957, the All India Jail Manual Committee was appointed, and it drew up a model jail manual which was circulated in 1959. But the state jail manuals continue to be based on the Prisons Act of 1894.

Meanwhile, conditions affecting the entire prison system in India have changed significantly.

This is evident from the findings of the study team of the Home Ministry of the Government of India, which found the prison administration in the country "generally in a depressing state."

According to these findings, between 1961 and 1970, a 37% rise in the prison population—from 1,005,886 to 1,378,657—resulted in alarming overcrowding.

Most of the prison buildings are old, having been constructed from seventy-five to a hundred years ago. They are ill-equipped with sanitary and other basic facilities.

The admission of "under 16" prisoners increased steadily in the past decade, the percentage going up from 0.40 to 0.72. Prisoners in the age group 16 to 21 rose from 13% to 16%. These figures reflect the rising rate of juvenile delinquency.

Equally noteworthy is the rise in the proportion of undertrial prisoners. These exceed the number of those convicted. In India as a whole, those held in jail pending trial has risen by about 58%. Prolonged detention of undertrial prisoners is also quite general.

The total reported crimes under the Indian Penal Code has risen by 57.6% during the decade as against a population increase of 27.4%.

Meanwhile the Gandhi regime has continued to expend more and more funds on attempts to repress the mass struggles touched off by unbearable conditions.

Several alarming facts were revealed quite recently by the Public Accounts Committee (1973-74) in its comments on the report of the comptroller and auditor general for 1971-72 relating to the ministries of finance and home

affairs and the cabinet secretariat. The committee estimates that the central government's expenditures on the police increased fifty-two times in twenty-four years—from Rs. 3 crores in 1950-51 to Rs. 156 crores in 1974-75.*

This figure does not include Rs. 300 crores estimated to have been spent on the police by the state governments in 1973-74.

The bulk of the increase is for the Central Reserve Police (CRP), the Border Security Force (BSF), and the Central Industrial Security Force—all notorious repressive agencies often used to break strikes, bandhs [general strikes], and mass struggles, and to commit atrocities on the masses. The expenditure on the CRP increased from Rs. 13.54 crores in 1968-69 to Rs. 38.78 crores in 1973-74.

Up to 1964-65 there were only 16 battalions of the CRP; during the period 1965-66 to 1972-73, 16 new battalions were raised and 28 battalions of the Indian Reserve Police were merged with the CRP. Hence the total number of CRP battalions now stands at 60.

The BSF, originally meant for border security, is being used increasingly to maintain "internal security." In 1973-74 it was used in as many as thirteen states in addition to the Union Territories of Chandigarh and Delhi.

*A crore equals 10 million; 1 rupee equals about US\$0.125.

Significantly, however, this sharp rise in outlays for the police forces has failed to make any dent in the incidence of crime. The PAC comments: "In spite of heavy expenditure on the police in the Centre as well as in the states, crimes abound; particularly, economic crimes of various types are very much on the increase and the performance of the police has been far from satisfactory as large number of cases of atrocities on scheduled [untouchable] castes and scheduled Tribes continue to occur and mi-

norities continue to have a feeling of insecurity. What is more, there is involvement of police personnel (including senior officers) in serious crimes."

With the developing mass struggles in various parts of India, the repressive apparatus of the coercive capitalist state will be used more and more to silence political dissidence rather than for curbing crimes. In this way the problem of prison conditions is bound to become more and more acutely felt by the left movement in India. □

Voice Solidarity With Political Prisoners

Iranian Students in London Protest Torture Under Shah

London

About 150 people marched to the Iranian Embassy in London on November 24 in a demonstration against the police regime of the shah. The demonstration, sponsored by the Iranian Students Society in Great Britain (member of the World Confederation of Iranian Students), culminated a month-long campaign to publicize the current struggle of the Iranian people, to express solidarity with Iranian political prisoners and their families, and to counter the shah's recent worldwide propaganda campaign picturing conditions in Iran under his rule as being very favorable.

Some of the slogans chanted on the demonstration included "The Shah is a Murderer, Down with the Shah," "Stop Torturing Political Prisoners in Iran," "Palestine, Dhofar, Iran, One Struggle, One Fight," "Long Live the Armed Struggle."

The evening before the demonstration a public meeting was held in defense of the political prisoners in Iran. Over seventy-five people attended. The main speaker described the terror and repression in Iran, the torture of political prisoners and the conditions in Iranian prisons. An English translation of a chapter from a book by Ashraf Dehghani was read. Dehghani escaped from prison last year and wrote about her experiences as a political prisoner. The chapter describes how she was tortured by the prison

authorities and members of SAVAK (Iranian secret police).


Throughout November the Iranian Students Society in Great Britain distributed more than 10,000 leaflets in Persian and English to publicize their activities. Among the month's activities were exhibitions of photographs at six universities. The photographs showed poor social conditions in Iran and political prisoners who were executed. Other activities included a night for defense of political prisoners, held in Persian; a ten-hour seminar discussion on topics such as the struggle of Iranian workers, SAVAK, political prisoners, problems of nationalities and the struggle of the people of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, and the role of the Iranian Students Society in Great Britain. Money was also collected throughout the month for families of political prisoners. □

Mao Sends Nixon 'Get Well' Cards

Peking has sent Nixon at least two personal messages since his resignation, Reuters reported November 27.

"No details about the messages were disclosed," said the news agency. "But it is believed that they may have been sent in connection with Mr. Nixon's illness."

Reuters noted that at a banquet held for Kissinger November 25, Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, in speaking of the Chinese-American detente, "paid an unusual tribute to Mr. Nixon for 'the pioneering role' he played."



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The Real U.S. Plan--Keep Oil Prices High

By Dick Roberts

[The following article appeared in the December 13 issue of *The Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist news-weekly published in New York.]

* * *

The most repeated central point of U.S. propaganda against the Arab oil-producing countries and Iran is that they are responsible for high oil prices.

"The producers are able to manipulate prices at will and with apparent impunity," Secretary of State Henry Kissinger charged in Chicago Nov. 14. Kissinger said high oil prices threaten a "breakdown of international order."

But high oil prices are a long-term objective of the U.S. oil industry and the federal government.

This fact, which has been stressed by *The Militant* since the emergence of the energy crisis a year and a half ago, has been admitted by a top-level U.S. official and was repeated Nov. 27 in the financial section of the *New York Times* by *Times* international monetary expert Leonard Silk.

The U.S. official is Thomas Enders, assistant secretary of state for economic and business affairs. According to Silk, "Enders is regarded by insiders as the chief architect of Secretary of State Kissinger's energy policy." Enders disclosed the essence of the administration's oil policy at a forum at Yale University.

"The startling news broken by Mr. Enders at Yale," said Silk, "—startling against the background of repeated declarations of high American officials that OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations must reduce their exorbitantly high prices—is that the United States is now founding its strategy on the \$11 price."

The "\$11 price" is roughly the upper price for oil now prevailing in world markets.

Silk pretends to be startled by this news, and he writes his article as though the high-oil-price strategy is a "new plan."

But the fact of the matter is that higher oil prices have been the linchpin of the strategy of the oil trusts from the outset of the energy crisis. Through higher prices the oil companies considerably raise their profits on domestically produced oil and make it profitable for themselves to develop alternative sources of oil and other energy resources (oil shale, offshore oil, coal, and nuclear energy).

An explicit aim in developing these alternative energy sources is precisely to break the back of the Arab and Iranian hold on the world oil market. This has been true from the beginning—long before OPEC actually raised its oil prices.

In a typical article, which appeared in the Council on Foreign Relations quarterly *Foreign Affairs* in July 1973, coal-mining executive Carroll Wilson wrote, "The objectives of my proposal are to achieve, by 1985: first, the independence of the United States from critical reliance on imports of energy in any form . . . second, energy costs below some target level . . . I suggest as a goal keeping energy costs for premium fuels such as gas or oil below \$1.00 per million BTU [British thermal units]. This is equivalent to oil at \$6.00 per barrel, roughly twice present prices."

Before the October 1973 Mideast war, a doubling of the price of oil was all the energy executives dared hope for—at least in public. Now the oil companies have launched a global oil hunt. They could do this, as they had planned to, only when they got the high prices needed to make it profitable. This is what the State Department spokesperson Enders explained at Yale.

According to Silk, "Mr. Enders stated that the present high world prices—starting at about \$10 a barrel . . . for Persian Gulf crude—had started a worldwide oil boom.

"Substantial finds of oil have been reported from Mexico, Peru, China, Indonesia," he said, "and the wave of exploration is just beginning."

The alternative sources will ulti-

mately force OPEC to retreat on prices. Silk said, "OPEC members will try to sustain the high price by cutting production. They are now working at less than three-quarters of capacity, according to Mr. Enders. How long they can sustain the existing price will depend on how fast the world market develops for oil. . . ."

"Mr. Enders implied that the United States thinks the cartel could fall apart."

The hypocrisy of the oil trust's position on high oil prices was all the more revealed by the oil companies' concern that prices might fall before they built up their global reserves: "Paradoxically," said Silk, "the United States is worried that such a downward break in world oil prices could come too soon, and be devastating for heavy American and other Western investment in the development of alternative energy sources, based on the assumption of a continued 'real' oil price of \$11 a barrel."

But it doesn't stop there. To add insult to injury, the oil trusts envision that even when they have forced down foreign oil prices *they will be able to maintain domestic oil prices at the current high foreign rate.*

Unbelievable? Here's what Silk says: "What is important, Mr. Enders argues, is that all the major oil companies adopt policies having the effect of creating stable investment expect-

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tations at a level of return roughly equivalent to present oil prices. . . .

"This is what, in informal discussion, he called the Catch-22 of the United States position: It is designed to reduce Western dependency on foreign oil and ultimately break the OPEC oil price, *but when the oil price comes down, the United States and its partners will hold up their own oil prices. . . . [and] would continue to pay \$11 to their domestic producers.*" (Emphasis added.)

It sounds like Catch-22 at first hearing, but it is no more contradictory than the private profit system itself. If higher-priced alternative energy sources are developed now, and they succeed in breaking OPEC's prices, they will still be higher-priced in the future. Consequently, to protect the future profitability of these investments, the continuation of the current high price must be guaranteed. There would then be a "two-tier cost structure for energy."

Enders explained: "One [tier] that assures the consuming countries their desired degree of independence; the other balances a constant demand and growing supply for imported oil at prices that diminished, or even reversed, the accumulation of assets by producers."

What the first "tier" means is high prices in the United States, Europe, and Japan so the oil trusts can continue to gouge out profits while prices have fallen abroad.

The second "tier" means that the underdeveloped oil-producing nations will be deprived of this source of income, *even to the point of reversing their present accumulation of assets.*

It is hard to recall a more straightforward statement of the predatory character and aims of imperialism.

And it doesn't stop here either.

What about the open threats on the part of high U.S. officials that Washington may go to war in the Middle East if necessary to drive down oil prices? That is what Kissinger (advised by Enders) has been implying all along.

Silk explains, "Behind the United States position on energy, as developed by Mr. Enders, is the belief that the only way the United States can get a handle on the crisis is via its international dangers—and that is also the only way Americans can be brought to see the urgency of the crisis.

U.S. Oil Output Curbed to Boost Prices

The major U.S. oil companies are withholding offshore oil and gas production in order to restrict domestic supplies, bolster prices, and guarantee maximum profits.

Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina told reporters November 26 that evidence from two government agencies indicated that the oil companies had capped wells in areas of the Gulf of Mexico that are proved "producible zones"—that is, areas the U.S. Geological Survey considers capable of producing oil or gas in profitable quantities. Senator Hollings is chairman of the National Ocean Policy Study, a Senate body investigating oil leases on the Atlantic and Pacific continental shelves.

"Senator Hollings cited a study last June by the Geological Survey showing that shut-in oil producible

zones offshore had jumped from 853 in 1971 to 2,966 in 1972 and to 3,054 in 1973, while active oil wells fell from 5,704 in 1971 to 4,744 in 1972 and 3,814 in 1973," the *New York Times* reported.

Yet even while they were closing down active wells, the companies continued to develop new wells over this three-year period at the rate of 300 to 400 a year.

Senator Hollings noted that another federal study last January of 168 offshore shut-in producible gas leases estimated that these areas alone contained up to two and a half times the gas produced in 1973 from offshore wells.

He has promised to investigate what he terms this "speculative withholding" of production by the companies.

"The steady and vastly mounting flow of arms to the Middle East, from France, the United States and others, to pay for oil imports, is one dimension of the problem to which Mr. Enders did not address himself. But that may be the most critical dimension of all.

"And the most paradoxical aspect is that the United States, in fighting to bring down the OPEC price, means to keep its own price high."

In other words, the United States might go to war in the Middle East in the name of driving down high oil prices and yet never lower prices, because this is not its aim.

Without coming right out and saying so, Silk is calling the attention of his colleagues to the danger of admitting that they don't want to bring prices down: *it reveals their real aim, namely, to bring the semicolonial nations into line, to deprive them of a share in the take from their own oil resources.*

The imperialists do not favor nationalization of resources or any other form of government participation by the underdeveloped countries in the profits derived from the once-solid imperialist monopoly of raw materials.

On the economic front the imperialists are engaged in a global offensive

to weaken the profit-sharing attempt on the part of the OPEC nations.

But the imperialists are also preparing a military offensive, and they will go to war if they believe that the timing is right and they can get away with it. This makes it doubly imperative to expose the lies about Arab oil prices, which are the main underpinnings of the propaganda on both the economic and military fronts. □

British Economy: From Bad to Worse

Two of British capitalism's most authoritative economic advisory organizations issued gloomy assessments of the country's economic outlook December 4, predicting that unemployment and inflation would grow worse in the months ahead.

"The most disturbing feature of the present forecast," said the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, "is the continuation of a very high rate of inflation and the likelihood even of some acceleration into the 20 to 25 per cent range." The current rate of inflation is officially estimated at 17 percent.

The National Economic Development Council, made up of representatives from government, industry, and the trade-union bureaucracy, said that unemployment would rise to about 900,000 next year, compared with about 650,000 at present.

Banzer Sets Up 'New Order' in Bolivia

By Peter Green

Using an attempted coup as the pretext, Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suárez decreed a sweeping series of measures November 9 to clamp down hard on opposition to his shaky military regime.

As part of the "new order," the general outlawed all political parties, labor unions, and student and business associations. Heavy penalties were set for any public or private institutions that engage in political activity.

In addition, the dictator dumped his promise to hold elections. These are postponed "until 1980." Under mass pressure, Banzer had talked frequently of holding elections. In June 1973 he declared his intention of "moving toward constitutionalization of the state," and as recently as October 15 he announced that elections would be held in June 1975.

After banning all labor organizations, Banzer decreed in their place a system of forced labor in the regime's civil service. Any Bolivian over twenty-one years of age is now subject to government service, in effect, a draft into civilian work. Those who decline face a two-year prison sentence or exile.

Not only does the measure give the government total control over wages, enabling it to institute a wage-freeze, but it also allows it to remove possible political opponents from their jobs in newspapers, universities, or private organizations. Such individuals can then be put in posts where they would have no influence, or where they would be forced to serve the regime.

Banzer has already tried to draft union leaders into government employment as "labor coordinators." When six leaders of the miners union refused the honor, they were put in prison, according to the November 26 *New York Times*.

"My own personal opinion is that the Government is putting a lock on our mouths," said Demetrio Avendaño, the head of the Food Workers Union, after he was drafted as a "labor coordinator."

Another draftee was Augusto Céspedes, Bolivia's best-known novelist, who is not considered a government supporter. Apparently he was "less than ecstatic" over his appointment to a government public-relations job, the *New York Times* reported.

The major labor organization, the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana—Bolivian Workers Federation), reacted to the "new order" by calling a forty-eight-hour general strike beginning November 12. The clandestine Executive Committee of the COB declared that if by November 14 Banzer's government still "persisted in its attitude of shackling the Bolivian people, the strike will be prolonged indefinitely. . . ."

A communiqué signed by the COB's general secretary, René Higuera del Barco, denounced the armed forces' actions, saying that it put them "at war with the people and the institutions." The statement also said that "the absolute liquidation of all the liberties, rights, and guarantees," corresponds exactly to "the institutionalization in the country of a dictatorship on the Brazilian or Chilean model."

Confronted with this challenge, the military declared a state of emergency on November 11, and issued a further decree taking over the management of all union funds. The Ministry of Labor (under the "new order" it is to be called the Ministry of Labor and Social Development) ordered the abolition of full-time union posts and forced all union leaders back to their jobs. The ministry also announced the formation of "schools of union training," adding as a further enticement that "the most capable union leaders will be admitted to the school of advanced military studies."

Although the leaders of the miners union announced that they would not obey the COB strike directive out of concern for "the physical safety of its members," 5,000 workers went out on strike in the mining districts, and the regime sent in troops. On November 13 Banzer issued a new decree authorizing dismissal without any so-

cial security benefits for activists who encouraged strikes.

Many factory workers in Cochabamba also went out on strike, the Buenos Aires daily *Clarín* reported in its November 14 issue. The minister of labor responded to the strike by declaring on November 13 that any workers who didn't return to their jobs by the end of the day would be dismissed. The joint command of the armed forces demanded that Banzer declare all districts where conflicts occurred "military zones."

The coup attempt that the regime took as its excuse for tightening the screws was Bolivia's ninth in the past year. On November 7 in Santa Cruz de la Sierra—the city 350 miles east of the capital of La Paz that was the base from which Banzer launched his own coup—dissident members of the Twelfth Infantry Regiment and the U.S.-trained antiguerrilla Rangers Manchego Regiment seized key buildings and radio stations in the city. Rebel broadcasts announced that the uprising was led by General Julio Prado Montano, a former prefect of Santa Cruz, and by a former minister of health in the Banzer regime, Carlos Valverde Barbery. The rebels accused Banzer of condoning "corruption" and of attracting "lackeys" as followers.

According to a government communiqué, the attempted coup was crushed the same day by a force of paratroopers, air force units, and air force cadets under the personal command of Banzer.

In La Paz, the military declared a state of siege, instituted press censorship, shut down the foreign news services, and occupied their offices with troops. Banzer's cabinet resigned.

The minister of urban planning, Colonel José Patiño Ayoroa, was accused of directing the plot and was placed under house arrest. On November 12 the military announced that a tribunal had judged him to be a ring-leader of the coup attempt, along with another former minister, Colonel Javier Pinto Tellería. □

Printers Refuse to Set Caetano Book

Testimony, a book written by former Portuguese dictator Marcello Caetano and published in Brazil, has been boycotted by printers in Lisbon. The typesetting for a Lisbon edition of the book, which is Caetano's defense of his regime, was half completed when the printers stopped work on it.

Why They Slashed the Production of Food

By Ernest Harsch

[Third of a series.]

"The promised land for agriculture is near at hand," Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz declared in a speech before the National Agricultural Advertising and Marketing Association in May 1973.

The prophesy was a safe one if Butz had the U.S. agricultural monopolies in mind. As early as 1968 they had already made a major move in preparation for crossing the frontier into the "promised land."

Despite the restrictive policies of the U.S., Canadian, and Australian governments, world food production continued to climb, and prices threatened to fall. Between 1968 and 1970, these three governments, plus the Argentine regime, cut back the acreage of wheat grown in their countries from more than 120 million to 81 million acres.

A study conducted by the Economic Research Service of the Department of Agriculture, quoted in the October 21, 1974, *Washington Post*, described the effects of these wheat cutbacks: "Had these four countries maintained the wheat area they had in 1967 and 1968, yields obtained from 1969 through 1972 would have produced over 90 million more tons of wheat."

An article by Edwin P. Reubens in the March-April 1974 issue of the economics journal *Challenge* gave more detailed figures on the percentages of cropland kept nonproductive after 1968. Reubens explained that "the fluctuations in world production in recent years have paralleled fluctuations of crops in the United States, Canada, and Australia, and that these three countries obviously account for much of the variation. . . .

"The causes of the fluctuations in these countries are not to be found in any failure of yields, reflecting weather conditions or scarcity of inputs; actually, yields were rising steadily and strongly in almost all cases (except for wheat in Australia). The largest single factor appears to have been cutbacks in acreage. The most extreme of these was in Canada, where 1970 acreage of wheat was just half of the

1969 acreage, which in turn was slightly below that in 1968 and 1967. Australia's acreage of wheat in 1970 was only 60 percent of the 1968 acreage. The U.S. figure for 1970 was 80 percent of 1968, and only 74 percent of 1967; it was actually back to the 1948-52 level."

According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) *National Grain Policies 1969*, these cutbacks were ordered by the governments in order to cope with "production in excess of outlets."

"To put it more bluntly," Reubens commented, "the plentiful food supplies of 1968 were piling up surpluses and tending to drive prices down. . . . The U.S. Department of Agriculture . . . stepped up its system of 'required set-asides' and payments for 'voluntary diversions.' In Canada, too, the national Wheat Board induced farmers to cut their acreage sharply. In Australia, the Wheat Board, the sole marketing authority for this grain, being faced with 'the sharp growth of wheat stocks,' in 1969 established a system of quotas on deliveries of wheat from the growers. . . .

"Wheat output in Canada fell in 1970 to half the 1969 level, and in Australia, to little more than half the 1968 level. In the United States it fell by 14 percent below the 1968 peak, and as much as 26 percent below its full potential (1967 acreage times 1970 yields)."⁶

A 'Bull Market'

Against this background of restricted farm production, several factors contributed to an increase in the global demand for U.S. food. Washington's balance-of-payments problems in the

6. This estimate is very conservative. In calculating the "full potential" of wheat production in the United States, Reubens arbitrarily selected the acreage planted in 1967 as a "maximum" figure. However, fifty-one million metric tons of grain were not grown in the United States that year because Washington paid farmers to keep cropland idle.


late 1960s (largely resulting from its massive military spending abroad during the Vietnam war) prompted the de facto devaluation of the U.S. dollar in 1971, making U.S. exports cheaper and more competitive on the international market. The economic upswing in all of the advanced capitalist countries in the early 1970s, as well as the greater sales to the Soviet Union and China made possible by detente,⁷ added to the world demand for food, making it possible for the farming interests to raise their prices.

In 1972, the weather also turned in the monopolists' favor. Drought and typhoons decimated rice and maize crops in the Philippines, drought continued in sub-Saharan Africa, India's monsoon rains dropped below normal, wet weather cut into the fall maize and soybean harvests in the United States, and grain crops in the Soviet Union, Argentina, and Australia fell because of inadequate rains.

The bad weather, plus the previous cutbacks ordered by the U.S., Canadian, and Australian governments, caused total world cereal production to drop for the first time in more than twenty years. The absolute decline during the 1972-73 crop year, against that of the previous year, was 35 million tons, or less than 3 percent. But since world cereal demand increases between 25 and 30 million tons each year—owing to the rising population and the increased beef consumption in Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union—the actual shortfall against demand was nearly 60 million tons, or about 5 percent (out of a total annual production of about 1.2 billion tons).

While the *Wall Street Journal* and most of the other bourgeois periodicals blamed the disastrous 1972-73 crop yield almost exclusively on climate, the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, in

7. Since 1972, the Soviet government in particular has been attempting to meet pressure for a more adequate diet by making more beef available, a step that requires a sharp rise in the amount of feed grain.



In Niger: Backbreaking stoop labor.

Afrique-Asie

its April 29 issue, admitted the role that the market had played. "The output fall of 1972-73," Susumu Awano-hara wrote, "although largely the result of bad weather, was partly caused by the preceding downswing in prices, brought on by the still earlier surplus."

Because of the Soviet Union's bad 1972 harvest, Moscow bought about fifteen million tons of U.S. wheat and maize (one-fourth of the total U.S. crop) in 1972 and seven million tons in 1973. Some governments, Tokyo in particular,⁸ took advantage of the lower U.S. grain prices to "load up" and engage in speculative buying, further tightening the world market.

All this was good news to the U.S. agribusiness interests. Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Carroll G. Brunt-haver, speaking before the American Soybean Association, August 21, 1973, rejoiced over the bright prospects: "American agriculture is riding the crest of the wave—the biggest wave that any of us can remember. It is an exhilarating, somewhat anxious, experience.

"Most of you know the reasons behind the bull market in U.S. farm commodities. First, of course, we've had shortfalls in food and feed production around the world: drought in Russia with poor grain and sunflower crops; drought in India and in Africa with

poor peanut crops; drought in Australia, in South Africa; poor rice crops in Asia; heavy rains in the U.S. and South America; the failure of the fish-meal industry in Peru; severe livestock death losses among U.S. livestock herds last winter; and flooding and heavy rains that delayed planting here this spring."

The consequences of this "bull market" were immediate: Food prices shot up to record heights. In January 1974, the price for U.S. hard winter wheat in Rotterdam was \$6 a bushel, \$3.30 over 1973 prices. Maize was up \$1.40 a bushel. The price rises over the past seven to eight years have been even more dramatic. Since 1966, costs for wheat have soared 325% and for maize 220%; since 1967, rice prices climbed 361% and soybean prices jumped 233%.

The April 20 London *Economist* stated, "It is the unprecedented tripling of wheat prices, and the doubling of soybean, animal feed and beef prices over the past two years that, more than any other factor, has stoked up world inflation."

In India, where millions spend between 60 and 90 percent of their incomes on food, such skyrocketing food prices spell starvation and death.⁹ Shamsher Singh, the head of the commodity division of the World Bank,

said recently that the minimum imported food bill for the underdeveloped countries had climbed to \$10 billion a year. Their energy costs, he noted, had risen by a similarly enormous figure.

The Fertilizer Connection

The fertilizer crisis that has emerged since 1972 was another factor that further reduced crop yields throughout the world, especially in the underdeveloped countries, and led to an even sharper tightening of the world market. The development of this crisis closely paralleled that of the food crisis itself: cutbacks in production that created shortages and high prices.

New York Times correspondent Roy Reed wrote in the April 4 issue: "Fertilizer companies overexpanded during the nineteen-sixties to take advantage of the worldwide 'green revolution.' Fertilizer prices dropped when manufacturing capacity outran demand. The companies stopped building new plants and cut back on maintenance of the old ones."

After the lifting of fertilizer price controls in October 1973, the three major fertilizer producers in the United States raised their prices an average of 65 percent within three months. World fertilizer costs climbed even higher. The price of urea fertilizer, which sold at \$40 a ton in 1971, soared to \$260 on the world market by April 1974.

The higher prices for petroleum products also added to the fertilizer crisis. Natural gas, naphtha, or coal are key ingredients in the production of nitrogen fertilizer. Following the initial impact of the higher oil prices, Japan, which is a major exporter of nitrate fertilizers to Asia, cut its production in half.¹⁰ The Phillips Petroleum Company shut down a large ammonia plant in 1973.¹¹ Richard Kenyon, the Phillips marketing manager for fertilizers, told the October 6, 1973, *Business Week* that even if price controls were lifted on ammonia in the United States, Phillips would not reactivate its ammonia plant, since there were more profitable uses for its natural gas.

10. Japan is almost totally dependent on the U.S. petroleum companies for its oil and natural gas by-products.

11. Ammonia, a by-product of natural gas, is also a key ingredient in many fertilizers.

8. Japan imports 43 percent of its soybeans, maize, wheat, and barley. But it is a net exporter of rice, often buying rice from other producers for reexport.

9. In contrast, the average proportion of net income spent on food in the United States, Australia, and Denmark is less than 20 percent.



In the United States: Factories on the land.

U.S. Department of Agriculture

The underdeveloped countries import one-third of their fertilizer. In addition, many of the fertilizer plants in the semicolonial world run far below capacity because of the high prices of fuel and raw materials. The FAO estimated in September that ninety underdeveloped countries imported 8.2 million tons of fertilizer in 1974 at a cost of \$1.6 billion. The price tag for 8.6 million tons in 1975 would be up to \$5.4 billion.

At such high prices, many of the semicolonial countries could not afford even the minimal amounts of fertilizer they had been using. Writing in the August 28, 1974, *New York Times*, James P. Grant, the president of the Overseas Development Council, stated, "The ensuing fertilizer shortage in many developing countries, which is now being felt, was the principal reason for the seven-million-ton shortfall in India's wheat harvest this spring." The FAO estimated the drop in fertilizer use in the underdeveloped countries for the 1974-75 crop year at two million tons, which would cause a cut in grain production of twenty million tons. That much grain could feed 100 million persons.

The masses of the semicolonial world are thus caught in a vicious circle: Their countries can't afford the higher priced fertilizer, so crop yields plummet, requiring more food imports. Since food prices on the international market have jumped to astronomical

heights, these countries can't even afford to maintain their present level of imports, let alone increase them.

Only the industrialized countries can afford sufficient amounts of fertilizer at the current prices. Consequently, they tend to absorb more of the fertilizer available on the market. Because croplands in countries like the United States are already well fertilized, the proportional gain from the use of this extra fertilizer would be less than if it were applied to the nutrient-starved fields of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Grant estimated that the application of one additional pound of fertilizer on a crop in an industrially advanced country would yield only five more pounds of grain. In the underdeveloped world, it could yield an extra ten to twelve pounds. Grant also pointed out the irrationality of present fertilizer use: "Americans are applying some three million tons of nutrients to lawns, gardens, cemeteries and golf courses—more than used by all the farmers in India, and half again as much as the current shortage in developing countries." Such use, of course, is determined by who has the cash.

Nor is the fertilizer shortage expected to end soon. The tight market for world fertilizer supplies will continue through 1976, according to a forecast of the Department of Agriculture. Since investment decisions are usually

based on current profitability, not future projections, the fertilizer manufacturers have hesitated until now to build new plants.

"When demand began to catch up with supply two or three years ago," Roy Reed wrote in the April 4 *New York Times*, "the leaders of the industry remembered the economic pinch of the nineteen-sixties and balked at spending more millions on expansion until they could be sure it would be profitable." The reporter believed that the fertilizer producers had now overcome their fears but noted that it takes from two to four years to build a fertilizer plant.

But even if fertilizer production is expanded in a few years, there is no guarantee that the cycle of "overproduction" and shortage won't be repeated. In fact, Donald McCune, the head of the Agency for International Development group at the Tennessee Valley Authority fertilizer development center, has already sounded a warning over the possibility of another fertilizer "glut." Noting that new fertilizer plants were now being built, he said, "In fact, caution may be needed to prevent the pendulum from swinging so far that production may greatly exceed demand."

Draining the Reserves

Because of the rising global demand for U. S. farm products, Washington's policies of restricting production had by 1970 become an obstacle to the U. S. monopolies. They wanted a free hand to exploit the favorable market to the fullest. Washington obliged by scrapping its forty-year-old price-support policies and eliminating the government grain reserves. This move allowed the market to fluctuate freely and exposed the world's impoverished millions more directly to the ups and downs of price and weather.

The Agricultural Act of 1970 reduced Washington's direct intervention in agriculture. The Commodity Credit Corporation (the government body that bought and stored the "surplus" grain) auctioned off the majority of its granaries to private interests. As Susumu Awanohara wrote in the June 3 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "This change of policy came just when world demand for US grain began to soar, making the farm sector a major money-earner, and coincided with the

appointment of Earl Butz — an ardent proponent of laissez-faire and free trade — as Secretary of Agriculture."¹²

In 1961, world grain reserves, most of which were stored in North America, stood at 154 million metric tons, about 26 percent of the world's annual grain consumption, or enough for ninety-five days. As late as 1972, there was a sixty-six day supply in the granaries. But by 1974 most of these reserves had been sold off, leaving the supply at less than twenty-six days. Lester Brown of the Overseas Development Council said that as grain reserves dip below a fifty-day supply, their dampening effect on world food prices diminishes and costs start to soar.

This depletion of grain stockpiles has also exposed the world more directly to the success or failure of the current harvest, particularly that of the United States. The FAO observed in an April 19 report that "a crop failure in just one major producing region would be very serious in view of the very low stocks."

The seriousness of the danger is shown by current crop estimates. In an article in the September 22 *New York Times* based on Agriculture Department reports and interviews with officials, reporter William Robbins estimated that total world grain production for fiscal 1974-75 would be about 1.25 billion tons, or nearly twenty-seven million tons below the 1973-74 harvest. Two days later, on September 24, the Agriculture Department issued new projections for world wheat production, which were an additional nine million tons below the figures Robbins used for his estimate.

The department cited drought in the Siberian grain-producing areas, frost in Canada, and bad weather in the United States as the chief causes for this shortfall. Moreover, 66 percent of the world's wheat and feed-grain shortage was the result of poor U. S. crops, the department report said.

U. S. food aid through the Public Law 480 ("Food for Peace") program was likewise slashed. In 1972, Lester Brown estimated that ninety million persons around the world relied to some degree on the food bought by or granted to their governments through the program. He added, "An

12. Before taking this post, Butz was on the boards of directors of Ralston Purina, J.I. Case, Stokely Van Camp, and International Minerals and Chemical.

estimated 20 million nutritionally vulnerable people have been cut off from these programs in the past year."

H.J. Maidenberg wrote in the October 29 *New York Times*, "Now, with even greater numbers in desperate need of food, Washington is quietly winding down its so-called 'Food for Peace' programs.

"One such program had already ended. There were no shipments of powdered milk, upon which millions of children depended, during the fiscal year that ended last June 30."

In the mid-1960s, according to Lester Brown in his book *By Bread Alone*, famine was averted in India with nearly ten million tons of international food aid during two successive years. In 1974, by contrast, when India's import needs may reach a similar figure, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger promised October 29 a mere 500,000 tons of grain at reduced prices.

With the increase in world demand, and enough paying customers, Washington and its agribusiness backers no longer had any need to stockpile food or give it away. Dr. George Har-rar, a former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, hypocritically summed up the imperialist attitude: "Why should we feed countries that won't feed themselves?"

Harvesting the Profits

With the new incentive of higher prices and profits, the U. S. agricultural monopolies began investing in greater farm production in 1973. It had now become more profitable to plant additional crops than to leave the land idle. According to Dr. Quentin M. West, director of the Economic Research Service of the Agriculture Department, about twenty-five million acres of previously unused cropland were put back into production in 1973. He expected the figure to increase further in subsequent years.

The capitalist countries also increased their use of fertilizer to get larger yields, buying up scarce nutrients and canceling export contracts. This further limited the supplies of fertilizer available to the underdeveloped countries. Robert Steiner of the FAO told the *New York Times* October 20 that his office had received a number of offers from underdeveloped countries to buy fertilizer, but that they had not even received any bids.

The U. S. wheat crop for 1973 jumped to forty-seven million tons, five million tons over the 1972 crop. By 1974, the United States' wheat production had reached the record level of fifty million tons.¹³

Most of this higher crop yield was produced for the lucrative export trade. Out of the fifty million tons of wheat in 1974, about thirty million metric tons were destined for sales abroad. Total U. S. grain exports for 1973 stood at 73.5 million metric tons. Most of these exports were sold to customers in other industrialized countries. Japan, West Germany, Britain, and Italy now account for about 36 percent of all grain bought on the world market.

On the tight international market, the farming monopolies raked in fantastic profits. U. S. agricultural exports in 1973 netted \$17.7 billion, about twice the previous year's take. In 1974, the figure climbed to \$21.3 billion. The increase in profits for the largest monopolies was even more substantial. Cook Industries's profits for the first three quarters of 1973 were up 765 percent from those of the same period in 1972.¹⁴ Total disclosed U. S. agricultural profits for 1973 were \$5 billion more than the year before.

This explosion of export sales did wonders for the United States' balance-of-payments difficulties. The 1973 agricultural trade balance (the difference between farm exports and imports) of \$9.3 billion offset the non-agricultural trade deficit of \$7.6 billion. It is estimated that the agricultural trade surplus for 1974 will reach \$11 billion.¹⁵

As Susumu Awanohara wrote in the June 3 *Far Eastern Economic Review*,

13. Because of bad weather in the summer and fall of 1974, the maize and soybean crops were less than those of 1973.

14. Cook Industries is the only one of the top five U. S. grain-exporting companies that issues stocks and discloses its earnings and profits.

15. Emma Rothschild, in the May 16 *New York Review of Books*, gave a particularly graphic example of how farm exports helped U. S. trade: "The US paid for its oil imports, in 1973, with increased food exports: it spent \$14.1 billion on all imported minerals and fuels, and earned \$17.7 billion from selling agricultural products."

"The US is in the world food scene now, not as a major donor but as a major and aggressive seller."

Boom and Bust

The business cycles of agricultural production are similar to those of any other industry under capitalism. When too much is produced for the available market, the manufacturers cut back until prices start to rise again. They then scramble, in fierce competition with each other, to produce more and take advantage of the higher prices. Since future investment is usually determined by present profit, the capitalists invariably "overexpand" once more, repeating the whole chain reaction.

Washington's price-support policies modified this cycle in the United States—and indirectly throughout the world—for forty years. By the early 1970s, the U. S. agricultural monopolies were powerful enough to do away with them, allowing the ups and downs of the market to run their course. The elimination of the grain reserves enabled world market prices to fluctuate wildly and allowed food supplies to tighten or expand sharply.

Without the dampening effect of the grain stockpiles, sudden bad weather in one corner of the world can now make prices leap abruptly. The April 20 London *Economist* reported: "World prices in Chicago [at the commodity markets] are directly linked to the monsoon that sweeps across India and south-east Asia every summer. That monsoon which ripens 90 per cent of the world's rice crop did not come in 1972 and the world price of rice, which had fallen to \$80 a ton, flew up to \$600 a ton a year later, beating any rise registered on Chicago's trading boards."

Rice prices are particularly unstable, since only ten million tons of a total world production of 320 million paddy tons¹⁶ (in 1973) enter the world trade. Thus a drop in total production can wipe out the margin available for the international market.

"Chicago's prices," the *Economist* said, "are likely to stay far more volatile than they were throughout the 1960s when grain prices shifted only a few cents a month. Farmers as well as financiers have begun playing the

swings and roundabouts now that prices are unsettled; that means when the next downturn in prices does come, perhaps early next year if harvests go well, it will be as sharp as the rise since 1972."

At the crest of the cycle, the monopolies reap the greatest proportion of the profits, since they control most of the trade and production. When prices dip below the level considered profitable, the agricultural corporations simply hoard their grain until prices become more attractive.

"In Kansas," reported the *New York Times* October 8, "the nation's largest wheat-producing state, farmers still hold about 60 percent of this summer's crop. They are selling this when the price nears \$4 a bushel and holding it back when that price falls.

"Many corn [maize] and soybean farmers in Illinois and Iowa still have some of last year's crops in their bins. Most of them are still reported in excellent financial condition from last year's bonanza, and, despite the drought and early freeze, they can hold these crops as well as their new crops until they decide that the market is at its most profitable level."

These "farmers" are invariably the large companies that have the storage capacity to hold such large quantities of grain. The Agribusiness Accountability Project, for instance, reported in a 1973 pamphlet that just three companies—Cargill, Continental, and Cook—held up to 95 percent of the soybeans remaining from the previous year's crop.

While the food trusts can easily ride out a downswing in farm prices, the small independent farmers cannot. The ending of the Agriculture Department's price-support subsidies, which in the past helped many of the independents survive low market prices, also marked a new offensive by the monopolies to run even more of the small farmers out of business.

Don Paarlberg, the Agriculture Department's director of agricultural economics, said in a February 1973 report, "Complete removal of all production restraints and all price support activities in 1974 might cause substantial increases in production, sharp drops in net farm product prices, and even greater drops in net farm incomes in the immediate years after removal of controls. The result would be an increased economic squeeze on most farmers, with possible failure or withdrawal of many marginal farms."

James Ridgeway, in the July 18, 1974 *Village Voice*, provided an example of this monopolization process: "Now the almond business is caught up in a war that is polarizing California agriculture. On one side is the Almond Growers Exchange, a co-op of mostly small farmers, which provides about two-thirds of all almonds. On the other side is Tenneco, the oil company, which wants to monopolize the dried fruit and nut industry in the U. S. Tenneco is undercutting the prices of the Almond Growers Exchange and encouraging big agribusiness units to plant more and more almonds, thereby leading to a glut that will force the little growers under."

Even though the prices farmers receive may fall because of greater production, the monopolies, through their control of the market, can still keep retail prices artificially high. Treasury Secretary William Simon pointed out the widening gap between farm and retail prices at an October 31 news conference. "It greatly concerns me," he said, "that farm prices have declined 9 percent, while consumer prices for food have gone up 6 percent. In addition, the spread between the farm price and the retail price of food is expected to increase 21 percent between 1973 and 1974. This jump is three times larger than anything we have ever experienced before."

Thus, while the current food crisis threatens to confront millions around the world with famine, it aids the U.S. agricultural monopolies in entrenching themselves. In their ledgers, famine in other countries is reflected in profits, a greater degree of monopolization in the United States, and tighter control over the world market.

Lyle Schertz, writing in the April 1974 *Foreign Affairs*, indicated that these economic trends in the world food trade were expected to continue. "First," he wrote, "the role of the United States as the major supplier of food in international markets is expected to expand. Second, the dependence of the lower-income countries on food imports is expected, by 1985, to be nearly double the 1970 level."

He also observed that while the Common Market countries were initiating policies designed to increase their self-sufficiency in food production, Japan would probably become more dependent on imports. □

[Next: What Road for the Underdeveloped Countries?]

16. One paddy ton equals 0.6 to 0.7 milled ton.

Recession in Italy Now in Full Swing

By Livio Maitan

[The following article appeared in the November 14 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

The turn in the Italian economic conjuncture that had been universally predicted occurred this past summer. The new recession has begun and is now in full swing.

Aspects of the deterioration of the situation can be listed on all levels. Industrial production, which had gone through a noticeable increase during the first six months of the year, began to turn around in August; it fell by 4.6%. The negative conjuncture has fully penetrated the automobile industry (Fiat and Alfa Romeo have reported unsold units of 200,000 and 20,000 respectively), and the employers have begun to order heavy reductions in the workweek (about 71,000 workers are on a twenty-four-hour week at Fiat). The auto crisis is affecting a series of small and middle-sized industries that are linked to auto production. Other related industries like distribution and repair will most probably be dragged in too. (According to the National Federation of Metal Craftsmen, of the 21,620 small firms linked to the automobile industry only 20% are continuing regular production; 50% are in serious difficulty, and 30% find themselves "in extremely worrisome conditions standing on the edge of extinction." (*La Stampa*, October 27.)

In the textile industry the news for the month of October is no less grave. Some 20,000 workers were on partial unemployment at the end of September; today, according to the October 26 *Corriere della Sera*, the figure is 50,000. According to the secretary of the Filta textile union, affiliated to the CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori—Italian Confederation of Trade Unions, the country's second-largest union federation), there is an imminent threat of massive layoffs. There have been suspensions even in the chemical industry, which could be an indication of rising tension (at Snia Viscosa, Montefibre, and some petrochemical factories in Ferrara and Mantova). In the construction industry the crisis is nothing new. But the fact is that there is no sign of early recovery. Production of housing units fell by half between 1971 and 1973. During the first four months of 1974 the volume of planned construction projects



Le Canard Enchaîné

registered a 7% decline compared to the first four months of 1973. There was also a decline, although a more modest one (3.5%), in the number of projects on which construction was actually begun. (See *Rinascita*, No. 42.) It should be noted that in spite of this decline, construction accounted for 38.7% of all credits advanced to industry. (*Corriere della Sera*, October 27.) According to the predictions of the employers, 1974 and 1975 may see further reductions on the order of 10-15%. As for employment, Secretary Giorgi of the CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro—Italian General Confederation of Labor, the CP-led trade-union federation, largest in Italy), predicts that unless there is a change, unemployment in the industry could reach 25% or even 50%.

The saturation of the internal market for electrical appliances is nothing new. In the past, the foreign market has absorbed as much as 80% of the production of this industry. But now crises are beginning to break out in the French and British markets, and the 12% devaluation of the Australian dollar will make Italian exports more expensive there.

Toward the end of the month of October, total unemployment reached 800,000, according to official statistics (*Corriere della Sera*, October 25). This means that the real figure is significantly higher. (In any case, 800,000 means a little more than 4% of the active population.) As for consumption, it is enough to mention the fall in auto sales (3.4% for the first eight months of 1974) and the decline in sales of beef (which, according to the director

of the Italian consortium of industrial butcheries, has ranged between 30% and 35% during the past several months). The decline in auto sales becomes especially significant when it is recalled that sales were down even in 1973 and that the first eight months of 1974 actually coincided with an economic upswing.

Italy had already scored admirably among advanced capitalist countries in the race for higher prices during the first four months of 1974. Italy had annual increases of 15-20%, trailing only Japan, which racked up rises approaching 25%, but outstripping all other advanced capitalist countries, including Britain. By September, prices were 24.6% higher than they had been a year earlier; the increase for September was a record, 3.3%. (See *L'Unita*, October 26.) An additional element that deserves mention is the difficulty in making up the enormous balance of payments deficit, which is about to reach 6 million million lire.¹ These difficulties will be further increased by the reduced profits drawn from one of the sources that has contributed to equalizing the balance of payments in the past: foreign tourism. During the first eight months of 1974, the inflow of money from tourism stood at 837 thousand million lire, as compared to 960 thousand million during the same period of 1973. To complete the picture, it must be remembered that the Italian bourgeoisie has already run up a foreign debt of 11 million million lire in its efforts to avert major collapse. Of the total, \$3.6 thousand million is owed on loans taken out from various institutes and companies; \$8.2 thousand million is owed for loans taken by Crediop, IMI, Ferrovie, etc., to compensate for the estimated balance of payments deficit; \$1.2 thousand million, of which \$650 million has been used, is owed for stand-by loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); \$312 million is owed for "Oil facilities" of the IMF used to compensate for the oil deficit; \$1,889 thousand million is owed to the Common Market and is due to be repaid this December; \$2 thousand million is owed to West Germany, guaranteed in gold over a six-month period and renewable for two years. (See *Corriere della Sera*, October 22, and *Rinascita*, No. 42.)

A Long-Term Decline

But the present serious economic difficulties can be understood in their full im-

1. Just to give an idea of the depth of the crisis, in a study carried out in 1970, major Italian economists judged that in order for there to be sound economic progress, price increases should be held under 6% and the balance of payments deficit should not exceed 300 to 400 thousand million lire.

port only if account is taken of the more general context. The recession that is currently looming comes shortly after another recession whose first indications could be detected as long ago as the end of 1970. That recession was not overcome until the spring of 1973. What is perhaps even more significant is that even before the 1971-1973 recession, the long-term economic course had been marked by a tendency to decline.

Let us take a look at this latter phenomenon. Since the beginning of the 1950s, the Italian economy has gone through three cycles of generally equal duration: 1951-58, 1958-64, 1964-71. The general growth rate went from 5.1% in the first cycle to 5.7% in the second. In the third cycle it fell to 3.8%. If the statistics are based on a longer period independent of the cycles, the results do not change: In the period 1951-61 the increase stands at 5.8%; it falls to 4.7% for the period 1962-73; the average for 1951-73 is 5.4%. (See the magazine *24 Ore*, special issue of January 1974.)

Half of the decline in the growth rate can be attributed to decreases in industrial production, manufacturing industries being hardest hit. During the 1950s, industrial investments increased at an average annual rate of 7.3%. The rate of increase was higher in 1962-63. In 1963-65 the rate declined by 37% and continued at a reduced rate such that by 1969 industrial investments had only returned to the level of 1963. (In 1970, there was another upturn, but not in important sectors; then a new decline set in.) Further, since 1963 self-financing, on the basis of which the expansion would have been able to continue (within certain limits), has been in such a decline that expansion could be carried out only at the cost of increasing the indebtedness of the companies. Profits, which had remained high throughout the 1950s, began to decline at the beginning of the 1960s. (Taking 1953 as a base of 100, the level of profits on gross income in the manufacturing industries rose to 114.3 by 1960 and then progressively declined to 91.2 in 1964, the lowest level reached until 1970, for which the figure fell to 82.9.)

But even more significant—because of its obvious social effects—is the trend toward higher unemployment. In fact, motion on this field began to become noticeable even in the second phase (1958-64). While employment increased at an average annual rate of 0.5% during the first phase, it declined in the second and third phases (average annual declines of 0.5% and 0.3% respectively). It is scarcely necessary to recall that the decline in employment took place despite an imposing number of workers who found themselves obliged to go abroad in search of jobs. One point deserves special mention: After the 1964 decline, the level of industrial

employment took five years to recover (6,667,000 in 1963 and 6,750,000 in 1969; 6,920,000 in 1970). From the other side, the section of the work force seeking employment rose to about 3.5% during the period of recovery after 1964, after having fallen to 2.5% in 1963.

The so-called Progetto '80, a report that was issued in 1969 (that is, in a year that was not at all negative in terms of employment levels), sketched out long-term perspectives that were anything but exhilarating. Beginning from the relatively optimistic supposition of a total increase in the national income of 5% a year, the report projected two goals of development, based on two different hypotheses about productivity increases. One called for a total increase in employment by 1980 of 100,000 jobs, the other for an increase of 350,000. Total nonagricultural employment would be 1.1 million jobs or 1.4 million depending on which goals were reached; that is, it would in any case be insufficient to meet the increase in the number of people seeking jobs. (The increase is generated by the addition to the job market of young people now in school and by the continuing exodus from the countryside to the city.) In other words, Progetto '80 counted on a further reduction in the proportion of the employed population to the total population. That percentage has already declined significantly; between 1959 and 1968 it fell from 43.8% to 37.4%; by 1972-73 it had gone down to 35.4%.

Some apologists have claimed that this decline reflects the expansion of the tertiary sector and the modernization of the country. They claim that the reduction is due to the increase in the number of people in school, the lowering of the retirement age, the increase in life expectancy, and the fact that the families that are now moving from the countryside to the city are much less dependent on the labor of women. But this theory is only partially correct. To prove this it is enough to point out that the rate of employment among the total population is significantly higher in the North (38%) than in the South (31%); and no one can seriously maintain that the South is the most "modern" part of the country. Regional statistics are even more revealing: In 1968, for example, the rate was 42.7% in Piedmont and 31% in Sicily. Conditions in Campania, a southern region that nevertheless has zones of significant industrial development and of intensive agriculture, deserves particular attention. Between 1961 and 1971 total employment in the region decreased from 1,698,000 to 1,552,000. During the same period, industry's share of this employment declined from 565,000 to 538,000; agriculture's share declined from 581,000 to 419,000, while employment in the tertiary sector rose from 552,000 to 595,

000. In addition, it must be kept in mind that in many cases the increase in employment in the tertiary sector in the South results from an extension of underemployment rather than an effective shift of labor to other sectors of activity. (See *Rinascita*, No. 42, 1974.)

Some information about the recession that preceded the present one is in order as well. While the beginning of the previous recession can be dated from the end of 1970, some people have even spoken of it as dating back to the end of 1969. (For example, see *24 Ore*, January 1974.) At the time, the Confindustria (Confederazione Generale dell'Industria Italiana—General Confederation of Italian Industry) defined 1970 as a year of transition. It was a year of growth, but it did not launch a new sustained upturn. The growth occurred mostly in the first half of the year and represented increases compared to 1969, a year that was marked by huge strikes and consequent reductions in production.²

In any case, it is clear that 1971 was a year of recession. The gross national income increased by only 1.4%. The added value of industrial activity suffered a similar decline, 1.3%, with industry proper declining 0.4% and the primary sector almost remaining stationary (increasing 0.8%). Total employment fell by 63,000 jobs (47,000 in industry) and unemployment reached 3.1% according to official statistics. Underemployment also increased (up 62,000 for a total of 312,000). Total heavy investment fell by 10.3% (industrial investment remaining stationary). In 1972 the situation improved slightly as compared to 1971. Gross national income was up 3.2%, investments up 2%, industrial production up 4.3%. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that if 1970 is taken as an index of 100, industrial production dropped to 95.6 in 1971 and by 1972 had climbed back only to 99.8 (*24 Ore*, January 1974.) As for utilization of plant and equipment (which had fallen from 82.7% of capacity to 78.9%), it took another drop, to 76%. According to statistics released by CENSIS, total employment dropped by 500,000 jobs during the first half of 1972 (from 18.9 million to 18.4 million).

Recovery came only in the first half of 1973 and extended through the first half of 1974. The national income increased by 5.9% in 1973; investments increased 9.9%, and employment grew by 140,000 units. (Agriculture continued to decline, but the loss was compensated by growth

2. It has been correctly observed that if it were not for the events of 1969, the recession would have started even earlier. This is additional proof of the falsity of the claim that the current economic difficulties are a result of excessive social conflicts.

in industry and the tertiary sector. Between July 1972 and July 1973 employment variations among the three sectors were as follows: agriculture down 131,000 jobs, industry up 88,000, tertiary sector up 384,000.) The industrial index rose to 107 (with 1970 as a base of 100), while utilization of plant and equipment rose slightly, to 79% of capacity.

The final element, whose significance for the future was lost to no one, was that integration of the Italian economy into the world economy was further accentuated during 1973. The ratio of foreign trade to the national production, which had already been 52%, rose to 54%.

The Web of Contradictions

The web of structural and conjunctural contradictions emerges ever more acutely and explicitly from all the elements we have summarized above. Once again limiting ourselves to essentials, we should stress the following points:

1. The potential of the productive apparatus, especially in the most dynamic sectors, increased more rapidly than did the possibilities of expanding the internal market. At the same time, the international economic conjuncture resulted in sharpened competition, thus reducing the possibility of overcoming difficulties through increased penetration of the European and world markets. (It should be noted in passing that stimulation of exports—along with suspensions, layoffs, intensification of the rate of exploitation, and restriction of wage increases—was a decisive factor in overcoming the crisis of 1964.)

2. Contrary to the assertions of neo-capitalist theoreticians, the presence of a backward and parasitic sector of considerable dimensions was not necessarily in contradiction with economic development during a boom period. In fact, so-called parasitic employment (in the "useless" state institutions, for example) served to occupy not negligible sections of the active population. Furthermore, it was exactly this distorted development—distorted in the sense of diverging from "ideal" capitalist development—that fostered the spread of certain intermediary social strata that constituted a market for certain commodities (durable consumer goods, houses, etc.) and at the same time served as the political glue needed to hold the system together. Nevertheless, the "parasitic" or unproductive sector wound up provoking even more serious imbalances, generating dramatic tension. (It is enough to recall the urban chaos and the explosive situation in the sanitation sector.) The parasitic strata contributed to intensifying disorder in the political and administrative apparatus, threatening to disrupt even the minimum functioning necessary for the system's survival; these

strata began to represent an ever less tolerable weight as the exhaustion of the boom restricted economic maneuvering room.

Thus, today more than ever, Italian capitalism is suffering both from the contradictions of capitalism at its highest level (the automobile crisis, for example) and from the contradictions deriving from Italy's specific development during the past twenty years (among which the so-called phenomena of backwardness are an essential part and not an added excrescence inherited from the past). Furthermore, the weight of the structural contradictions is making itself felt ever more directly and immediately, while at the same time the contradictions of conjunctural origin are intensifying, all the more so in that ascending phases now tend to be less dynamic and of shorter duration and recessive cycles tend to coincide more closely in various countries.

Overcoming the crisis appears problematic if the existing contradictions are considered from another standpoint. Undoubtedly, inflation guaranteed the bourgeoisie certain margins for maneuver during the past several years and was the main instrument with which the relative upturn in profits was carried out in 1973 and at the beginning of 1974. But the result was that the rate of inflation got out of control, causing serious disorganization of the system. It must not be forgotten that the advantages that inflation may provide in terms of exports can be largely or even entirely wiped out by price increases on the internal market; further, inflation strengthens tendencies toward speculation and the search for "old reliable goods," which results in the immobilization of capital; it also deeply shakes the system of credit, and finally, it makes the constant resort to foreign loans more difficult.

Moreover, overcoming the crisis would require vast operations to restructure the economy; in most cases that would require massive investment. But with the decline in self-financing it becomes more difficult to obtain credit, and this provokes a competition that a great number of small and middle-sized companies cannot afford. In addition, the economic and political situation makes it more difficult to obtain funds through the stock market, for, as we have already mentioned, funds are being directed toward speculative operations or toward the search for "reliable commodities." Under these conditions, there is a threat that exactly the sort of investment that is most needed will not be made: long-term investment.

Finally, while on the one hand the Italian bourgeoisie needs to find new outlets in the external market and to receive more aid in various forms (like loans), on the other hand it is hastening to take measures of a protectionist flavor

(the law on obligatory savings being an example). This is a supplementary contradiction that is not restricted to Italy in this period; but it does take on particular acuteness and immediacy in Italy.

Alternative Solutions

In the abstract, the Italian bourgeoisie can consider two different ways of extracting itself from its crisis in the medium term.

The first would be to opt for an economic reconversion of broad scope based on: 1) singling out new, promising sectors (some sectors of the chemical industry, for example); 2) boosting production aimed at satisfying so-called social consumption (housing, transport, hospitals, etc.); 3) pumping aid into agriculture, which, by making production profitable again in a few given sectors could reduce the level of imports (with consequent benefits for the balance of payments) and slow down, if not halt, the rural exodus, which is assuming ever more irrational forms (even from the strictly economic point of view).

Such a project would undoubtedly run into serious difficulties. It remains an open question whether new advancing sectors can be found, especially when the many effects on employment are taken into account. (For example, it would be difficult for even a very impetuous development of certain branches of the chemical industry to play the role that was played in the 1950s and 1960s by the development of the automobile industry. In any case, reconversion, whether in industry or agriculture, would require time, in addition to other resources that are not very readily available. Far from diminishing, tensions would threaten to become even further intensified for a whole transitional period. But the major difficulty lies in the fact that a reconversion of the type proposed would require large-scale planning and therefore the existence of instruments able to carry out the plan in practice. Is it possible to believe that this condition could be met? The universal consensus on the total failure of even the most modest programmatic projects worked out ten years ago, and the recent resignation of Ruffolo in the midst of the economic and political crisis this autumn, serve as almost symbolic answers to this question.³

Nevertheless, if a number of social and

3. The failure of these projects has long since been admitted even by the very economists who were most involved in trying to carry them out (Ruffolo and Sylos Labini, for example). It should be noted that these economists sought to locate the cause of the failure in the economic, political, and cultural "backwardness" of Italy,

political conditions were met, in the final analysis such a project could breathe some life into the Italian economy, easing the weight of certain structural contradictions and postponing the outbreak of new explosions of these contradictions.

The second way out for the bourgeoisie would be to undertake a reconversion in a diametrically opposite direction, so to speak—a direction whose logic has in a certain sense been embryonically anticipated in the tendencies toward declining development and the contradictions in the realm of employment. This would amount to pushing for a new upturn in the economy on a more restricted basis, lending a privileged position to goods accessible only to given layers of the population. (For example, the automobile industry could seek a new equilibrium through production based on vehicles made for a social layer in position to guarantee a more stable demand.) Such a program would imply further reductions in the work force on the one hand (with a further decline in the rate of economic activity) and certain tendencies of an autarkic nature on the other hand. The difficulties and risks involved even from a strictly economic standpoint, are so obvious that there is no need to dwell on them. Nevertheless, a solution of this kind would not be impossible, at least for a certain period.

But both alternatives involve major obstacles of a political character. If the first road were taken, it would be necessary to impinge upon vast and solid constellations of interest whose strength has already been tested more than once since the beginning of the center-left government. If the second alternative were adopted, the ruling class would have to be in position to break the resistance of the working class. Exactly for these reasons (apart from

which they considered fundamentally atypical in capitalist Europe, particularly in terms of the subjective weakness of even the most modern of entrepreneurial groups and in terms of the enormous inability of the state apparatus to function. In his *Rapporto sulla Programmazione* (Report on Programming) Ruffolo indicates that "the conditions necessary for the success of programming are essentially social and political in nature." But in the first place, he does not draw the conclusion that is nevertheless partially implicit in his statement (namely that the social and political conditions are the breakup of the system as such); in the second place, the proposals he advances do not go beyond technical-institutional limits. It also appears strange, we may say in passing, that in 1965-66 Ruffolo considered "unpredictable" certain basic changes (such as those that have occurred in international integration, in the labor market, and in the structure of the industrial system) that were nonetheless easily foreseen and in fact predicted by Marxist scholars.

the internal contradictions they involve), the two solutions remain largely abstract. Likewise, the two political formulas that would be required to guarantee them appear extremely difficult to realize in the



Mark Padwall/New York Times

given context. The first solution would require the "historic compromise" proposed by the Communist party (or some equivalent formula); the second would require a conservative and authoritarian regime, if not an outright fascist or military dictatorship.⁴

Short-Term Prospects

What are the short-term prospects? Some people have insisted on the facts (in themselves incontestable) that the recession has not hit all sectors and that some particular sectors are even continuing on the rise. Others have expressed the view that the new recession may not be any worse than the 1964 or 1971 recessions, provided that a serious incomes policy is adopted and that big efforts are thrown into bolstering agriculture and the construction industry. Finally, it could be stressed that in spite of its chronic political crisis of leadership, the ruling class has succeeded before in reestablishing its profits by means of inflation; several months ago it succeeded in imposing a drastic redistribution of income by means of its fiscal decrees, and in the past several weeks it has managed to push through a reduction

4. It is clear that those who have most consistently and insistently proposed the first alternative have been the leaders and economists of the Italian Communist party. This is generally recognized by various economists who have been engaged in the economic program of the center-left and in economic planning.

of the workweek in many important factories, particularly in the workers stronghold of Fiat.⁵

This is not the place to deal with the critical problem that is confronting the entire world economy: Could the current recession have effects as devastating as those of the depression of the 1930s? In broad outline, at least for the moment, the response would have to be negative, especially given that despite everything, the ruling class today commands instruments for intervention that it lacked in the 1930s and that it is more difficult to fall back on exclusively national solutions. (The attempt of each capitalist class to take measures to save itself alone, and the inability to conceive of an international response, were factors that had a serious influence on the scope of the great depression.) From the other side, the working class commands guarantees that, while only relative, are nevertheless not insignificant, both from the standpoint of defending their immediate interests and from that of guarding against the economic effects of the recession (unemployment compensation, guaranteed income, etc.). But what is certain, and what we want to stress here, is that the tendency on a world scale will not be reversed through the end of this year, and probably through the first half of 1975. The situation will consequently become even more serious in the coming eight to twelve months than it has been up to now.

To return to the subject of assessing the scope of the recession in Italy, it should not be forgotten that while the automobile crisis is certainly a sectoral one, it concerns an industry that has greater specific weight in Italy than it does in any other capitalist country (a sector that involves between 800,000 and one million people, taking account of the related industrial branches). It must also be recalled that the difficulties in the auto industry are increased by the depth of the crisis of this sector on a world scale and by its largely structural character.⁶ Moreover, the problems of reconversion and diversification are not easily solved and, in any

5. It would not do to underestimate the import of the reduction in employment that can be achieved through putting a freeze on hiring. This is proven by what has happened during the past period at Fiat and, over a longer period, at Pirelli-Bicocca in Milan.

6. In the first nine months of 1974 registration of automobiles in Western Europe decreased by 16% on the average; registrations were down by 20% in West Germany and 25% in Britain. In the United States, auto production in the month of October 1974 was down 21.8% in comparison to October 1973, which was itself an unfavorable month.

case, are actually insoluble in the short term. (It would be no easy matter, for example, to carry out the project, announced by Umberto Agnelli, of reducing the weight of automobile production from 90% to 50% of Fiat's total activity.)

Second, it is certain that steel production has gone through a new increase and that Italsider of Taranto has received important orders. Nevertheless, some sectors of the steel industry will inevitably feel the effects of the auto crisis, and in a city like Taranto the positive situation of Italsider alone is not sufficient to avert 15,000 layoffs which will be imposed by 1975 in companies linked to Italsider. (Some

15,000 workers are already on partial unemployment.) As for the massive upturn in construction, it will not be easy to overcome the difficulties holding up investment (increase in interest rates, collapse of the real estate investment funds, etc.). It is also hard to see by what miracle the bottlenecks paralyzing public initiatives in construction can be eliminated (not to mention the availability of land).

The conclusion is that the ruling class has only a very narrow margin for maneuver and that in the long term and the short and medium term as well, the problem is posed in political terms: Will the ruling class be in position to impose on

the working class a drastic reduction in living standards and a contraction in employment levels? Will it be able to impose heavy sacrifices on broad sectors of the petty bourgeoisie? Will it be able to carry out its operation aimed at "cutting off the dead limbs" of small and middle-sized industry?

The very least that can be said is that in a country with the political and social conditions prevailing in Italy this year it is extremely unlikely that such surgical operations can be performed painlessly and without provoking reactions from the patients. □

Détente and Democratization Viewed From Within the United States

By George Novack

[The following article is a contribution to a discussion on Roy Medvedev's "Problems of Democratization and Détente," which we published last week. The discussion, consisting of articles by various political personalities and Marxist scholars is scheduled to be published early in 1975 under the auspices of Spokesman Books, the imprint of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.]

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The problems of détente and democratization appear in a different light to a revolutionary Marxist situated in the United States, the heartland of world imperialism, than to a dissident in the Soviet Union such as Roy Medvedev. Our immediate adversaries are different and so are our tasks and tactics. Moreover, while we have certain demands and aims in common, our respective programs and perspectives are not the same.

Nonetheless, an East-West discussion of these questions is a welcome precedent provided it serves to remove misunderstandings and clarify the points of agreement and disagreement between us. This kind of unofficial exchange of views ought to be expanded, regardless of the vicissitudes of détente.

The Nature of Detente

To begin with, what are the essential features of "détente"? This is a three-sided set of accords negotiated by Washington, the mightiest capitalist power, with the leaderships in Peking and Moscow, bureaucratic representatives of the largest workers states.

A reliable clue to the real character of these agreements can be deduced from their birth. The détente came into being at the height of U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia. The Nixon-Kissinger visits were designed to enlist the aid of Peking and Moscow in the efforts of the American interventionists to check

the Vietnamese revolution and forestall its victory in the south.

What did the different parties to this deal give and what did they get? The initiator, Washington, secured cooperation from Mao and Brezhnev in pressuring Hanoi to accept and abide by the terms of a cease-fire agreement in the civil war against Saigon. These were ratified in the Paris peace accords of January 1973 after final concessions were exacted from Hanoi under the impact of Nixon's mining of Haiphong harbor and the Christmas terror bombing of North Vietnam. Moscow and Peking went along with them.

The North Vietnamese Communists and their allies hailed the accords as "a great victory." But the accords were really a compromise that recognized the *de facto* military stalemate. The Vietnamese people have not yet won the national unification and self-determination they had been fighting so long and so hard for. Thieu's ugly capitalist dictatorship was kept in place. Eighteen months later the adverse aspects of the truce stand out more clearly than they did when the accords were signed. Despite the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops "with honor," the fighting continues unabated in the disputed zones of the country. Washington sends massive aid to bolster Thieu and holds the threat of "reintervention" over Hanoi's head if it fails to observe the terms of the truce. Such are the first bitter fruits of détente diplomacy in its place of origin.

At the time, we Trotskyists condemned the complicity of Moscow and Peking in this squeeze upon a sister workers state and the anti-imperialist National Liberation Front. It was a flagrant betrayal of the interests of the Vietnamese people and the world revolution, another blot on the record of the Stalinist regimes.

For this reason we would take exception to Medvedev's assertion that "the improvement of relations between the largest powers on the planet has thus proceeded not at the expense of other countries and nations; it benefits all mankind." The Vietnamese have already

paid a heavy price for détente. They are the first but will not be the last to do so.

Another sequel to the accords with their secret clauses has been the formation of a third coalition government in Laos, where the balance of forces is even more favorable to the revolutionary side.

Main Elements of the Deal

The détente is a momentous turning point in post-war world politics, especially in Washington's policy. It represents a pronounced tactical shift by the strategists of U.S. imperialism in their ways and means of policing the precincts of world capitalism and maintaining their international hegemony. From the end of the second world war Washington's cold warriors worked to halt further advances of the anticapitalist colonial struggles by any means necessary, to contain and isolate the Soviet bloc and China, and even spoke of "rolling back" the workers states.

A combination of factors has forced the political and military executives of the U.S. ruling class to alter their course. The most favorable precondition for détente was the persistence and deepening of the Sino-Soviet rift that had already undercut the possibility for common action in support of the Vietnamese. This enabled the American statesmen to play one capital against the other, extracting advantages for themselves from each while undermining both. How ironic that the White House has assumed the posture of being good friends of the bureaucrats in both Moscow and Peking!

However, the openings offered by the Sino-Soviet split were coupled with some serious reverses suffered by the almighty capitalist rulers. The heroic resistance of the Vietnamese prevented the Pentagon from smashing their liberation struggle by purely military methods. The mounting antiwar protests that drove Johnson from office threatened social stability at home. The worsening international economic situation impelled Washington to take emergency measures to counter the increased competition for markets from its main capitalist rivals. These circumstances led the U.S. policy-makers to cut their losses in Vietnam, withdraw their troops and reduce bombing, and rely more on the Soviet Union and China to pressure Hanoi. Kissinger praised the Russians before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 19 of this year for helping the United States "extricate" itself from Vietnam.

Nixon and Kissinger held out substantial inducements to both capitals. The Kremlin was anxious for closer diplomatic arrangements through periodic summit parleys. For internal and external reasons Brezhnev is as committed as Khrushchev to the improvement of relations with Washington, and his fortunes hinge to no small degree upon its success.

The huge grain purchases at a low price enabled the Soviet bureaucracy, as Medvedev points out, to overcome temporary food shortages and fend off domestic discontent. Moscow awaits larger down-payments in its quest for "peaceful coexistence." It wants access to American technology, scientific know-how and credits for long-term capital projects involving billions of dollars. It seeks passage of a trade bill awarding it favored-nation status.

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Peking for its part promptly received trade concessions from the United States, membership in the United Nations, the opening of diplomatic relations, support to its ally Pakistan in the conflict with India, and the windup of the farce of treating Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan retreat as the legitimate government of China.

Has Detente Assured Peace?

Nixon, Mao, and Brezhnev unanimously hailed détente as a great step toward world peace. The Soviet leader's trip to the United States in June 1973, as B-52s were dropping their deadly cargo on Cambodia, was acclaimed by the American CP as "a milestone on the road to a lasting peace." The last Nixon-Brezhnev summit talk was headlined on the front page of the July 5, 1974, *Daily World*, the U.S. Communist party paper: "Moscow Pact Greeted for Peace Assurance." The American followers of the Kremlin are now beating the drums for an all-out campaign around this theme. The national chairman of the CP, Henry Winston, described détente as "the main all-pervasive issue upon which the salvation of mankind depends," and all the party's activities are at present subordinated to this celebration.

The peoples of the world who are weary of the cold war want to believe that this is the case and that the easing of tensions among the Big Three has created a more relaxed atmosphere in international relations. If only we hadn't been regaled with the same propaganda in the days of Yalta!

The exorbitant Stalinist claims for the virtues of détente as a pledge of world peace fly in the face of some deadly facts. Détente hasn't yet brought peace to Vietnam. It hasn't achieved more than a temporary suspension of hostilities in the Mideast. When Moscow suggested that a joint Soviet-American force be sent to Egypt during the October 1973 war, Nixon called a full-scale nuclear alert. The two superpowers came closer to the brink of nuclear confrontation than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Détente has not tied the hands of the U.S. militarists and monopolists in either Southeast Asia or the Mideast, the focal points of conflict between the imperialists and the workers states today. Washington is ready to brandish its bombs any time the revolution threatens to upset the status quo and Peking or Moscow overstep the boundaries of the spheres of influence allotted to them.

Some Previous Experiences

Over the last forty years we American Marxists have had ample occasion to test the costs and consequences of similar pacts made between the occupants of the White House and the rulers in the Kremlin. Roosevelt's recognition of the Soviet Union in 1934 after Litvinov's visit led the American CP to support him and his reelection. This Popular Front turn cut off the possible formation of an independent labor party by the industrial unions and disoriented the widespread mass radicalism in the United States for the rest of that decade.

The Yalta agreements arrived at by Roosevelt,

Churchill, and Stalin not only contemplated a division of control over Eastern Europe but actually resulted in the decapitation of the revolutionary movements and the restabilization of the shaken capitalist regimes in Western Europe (a task accomplished with the connivance of the Communist parties at the close of the second world war).

The class-collaborationist line now being pursued by Moscow and Peking is therefore hardly a novelty in the history of Stalinism. It is the extension, the logical consequence, the implementation under current conditions, of the anti-Leninist concept of "socialism in one country" masked by the innocent designation of "peaceful coexistence," Stalinist style.

As revolutionary Marxists, we believe that every workers state from Havana to Hanoi, from Belgrade to Moscow, has the right to engage with capitalist governments in diplomatic, economic, and even military arrangements that protect and promote their own welfare. We tirelessly propagandized in this country against "containment" of the Soviet Union and, from 1949 on, for Washington's recognition of the People's Republic of China and the lifting of its blockade.

Our objections arise whenever and wherever such agreements are concluded by the government of one workers state at the expense of another, contravene the interests of the world working class, and injure the progress of the international anticapitalist cause. In a poem on détente, published with the seal of official approval in *Izvestia*, Yevtushenko wrote: "There is no contradiction with the laws of the class struggle." The rhapsody of the poet, exhilarated by a mixture of kvas and cola, does not harmonize with the realities of the case.

In return for economic and diplomatic concessions, the conservatized rulers in both Peking and Moscow have colluded with the imperialists to maintain the status quo against further revolutionary convulsions. In the Mideast, Moscow's search for good relations with the Arab bourgeois regimes is carried on to the detriment of the revolutionary forces in that area and even to the damage of the local CPs. Peking opposed national independence for Bangladesh; aided the Ceylonese bourgeoisie in crushing the youth rebels there; backed Nimeiry, the Sudanese butcher of the Communists; and welcomed the repressive shah of Iran. Its support for NATO and the European Economic Community shows that the needs of the class struggle in Western Europe count for nothing in its eyes.

A slackening of the nuclear arms race would benefit both the American and Soviet peoples. But it is fallacious to think that long-lasting peace can be achieved so long as imperialism endures. The disarmament negotiations that have been going on for ten years have produced negligible results. The SALT talks are stalled.

The major block to arms reduction, not to speak of total disarmament, is the Pentagon's refusal to yield the superiority America's monopolists' need to maintain their world domination. The United States possesses three times as many nuclear warheads as the Soviet Union, yet its military advisers insist that this margin must not only really exist but be so perceived by all other countries to keep them in order. Meanwhile the U.S. military budget, this year at \$90 bil-

lion, depletes the resources of the Soviet Union, which must scrimp to keep the balance of force at present levels, even though both sides wield "mutual assured destruction" (MAD).

This background is pertinent to the objections correctly expressed by Medvedev against the orientation of several prominent Soviet nonconformists who have looked hopefully to capitalist circles in the West and to American congressmen in particular to put economic and diplomatic pressure upon the Soviet officialdom to relax its repressiveness. They apparently do not understand what Jackson and his ilk are angling for. Jackson, the Senator from Boeing, the darling of the Chiefs of Staff, and the patron of Defense Secretary Schlesinger, is no friend of human rights.

Détente is a bipartisan policy supported by the majority of Republicans and Democrats alike, all staunch upholders of the interests of imperialism. The differences among them are purely tactical and subsidiary. Jackson, for one, is not opposed to agreements with the Soviet Union. He demands only that these be "mutually beneficial so that they can be implemented and carried out to the satisfaction of both countries." He and Schlesinger outspokenly champion "hard bargaining" to make sure that the Soviet "industrial-military complex" is not strengthened to the disadvantage of the American.

These capitalist representatives have as little concern about promoting civil liberties in the Soviet Union as they have in promoting them in South Vietnam, South Korea, Spain, or Latin America. They are primarily bent on protecting America's imperial power and profits. To further their hard bargaining they have seized upon the issue of emigration of the persecuted Soviet Jewry. This has the added benefits of catching votes and dovetails with their aim of increasing U. S. arms aid to Israel. They demagogically pose as patrons of civil liberties in the Soviet bloc to distract attention from the even harsher treatment of dissidents in Iran, Indonesia, Brazil, or Chile, and above all, to extract further concessions from Moscow. The Kremlin is disposed to liberalize Jewish emigration if the U. S. will drop its trade discrimination.

Moreover, the devout defenders of the dollar democracy have a stake in the maintenance of Stalinized police states, which they can hold up as the inevitable outcome of a proletarian revolution and as a true image of socialism. This is the heaviest handicap Stalinism imposes on the socialist movement in the West.

Who Are the Dissidents' Allies?

The Soviet dissidents are embarked on a heroic and historic struggle for democratic liberties. Their goals can be fully realized only through the overturn of the bureaucracy and the inauguration of socialist democracy. They need and deserve sympathy and support from everyone concerned with human rights and the cause of socialism.

We American Trotskyists, in accord with the policy of the Fourth International, have done our utmost to disseminate their demands, and to show our solidarity through public protests and university teach-ins, through publication of their statements, manifestos, and writings, and through publicizing the plight of the victims.

Our protests in behalf of the Soviet oppositionists find no common ground with anti-Soviet elements connected with the capitalist ruling class and similar forces who exploit the existence of dissent for their own reactionary aims. The Soviet dissidents would be well advised, we believe, to adopt the same guidelines. Roy Medvedev soundly criticizes Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov for their overtures to the Western right as an ally against bureaucratic repression. We agree with the *New Left Review* editors that the only trustworthy external ally "in the struggle for a genuine democratization in the USSR is the international working class and its collective organizations," especially those striving for socialism.

The Road to Socialist Democracy

The most significant fact about the Soviet oppositional movement is that, despite victimizations and capitulations, it has managed to survive and make its ideas known through various channels at home and abroad. This irrepressibility is itself a victory, a sign of the vitality and necessity of the urge for freedom. As Trotsky wrote prophetically in 1938, at the height of Stalin's terror that cost him his life: "the laws of history are stronger than the bureaucratic apparatus" that hopes to outmaneuver them.

The nemesis of the bureaucratic tyrants is at work. All their persecutions, arrests, imprisonments, and slanders can no longer clamp a grave-like silence upon the Soviet peoples. One way or another the voices of their authentic spokesmen will be heard.

The viewpoints of the oppositionists are politically heterogeneous and range from the far right to the extreme left, from religious reversion to Leninist revolutionism. Moreover, the "New Left" there is as variegated, confused, and fragmented as its counterparts in the West have been—and far smaller.

Roy Medvedev's reputation as a historian is as outstanding as that of Solzhenitsyn in literature and Sakharov in physics. But he occupies a different and more radical place in the spectrum of unorthodox tendencies than these other eminent figures. Unlike them, he is an avowed Marxist, a communist who aspires to revive the program of Leninism in the struggle for a socialist democracy.

Although expelled from the CPSU in 1969, Roy Medvedev identifies with the tendency aspiring to democratize the party from within. In his book *De la démocratie socialiste* this "party democratizer" has projected a platform that proposes to block off the re-Stalinizers in the leadership, support and put pressure upon the more liberal and moderate elements in official circles to grant greater reforms more quickly, and in this way gradually introduce "socialism with a human face."

He envisages an alliance between the most enlightened part of the apparatus, and the most active segment of the intelligentsia backed by the people. The process of democratization will be controlled from above by the CP and the government within the framework of the Soviet constitution, and the changes from the top will be induced by pressure from the party ranks and the masses. Medvedev cites Hungary and Poland as examples of a successful process of real democratization directed from above (see his note, p. 386).

His program appeals to the progressive natural and social scientists and academicians, philosophers, historians, high technical personnel, and other sectors of the Soviet intelligentsia. Their yearning for greater freedom of thought and access to information and knowledge, for the unobstructed exchange of ideas and opinions at home and internationally, is evidence of the growing contradiction between the expanding material and intellectual forces of production and the governing structure of the degenerated workers state. His ideas parallel those put forward by the intellectuals and technocrats in Czechoslovakia before 1968 who paved the way for the downfall of Novotny and for the "Prague Spring." His reformist, legalist blueprint copies the specifications of the Dubcek tendency.

The ideas and presence of these elements alarm the die-hard bureaucrats who come down on their heads, not only because of their importance to economic development, but because of what they reflect and portend. Beneath and behind this upper layer of critical intellectuals is the ferment of dissatisfaction among the broad masses that they obliquely articulate in premonitory fashion. "A rising wind stirs the topmost branches first." Their cries for democracy are a forerunner of more radical plebeian demands that can issue from the rising generation of workers and youth, a symptom of more profound psychological and ideological stirrings among the people.

It is a sad commentary that the degradation of the October Revolution under Stalinism has thrown the Soviet peoples back to a civil status below that attained by the revolutionary gains of the bourgeois era. They are obliged to fight for such elementary democratic rights as freedom of expression; the right to an individual opinion; freedom of association, assembly and publication, even to exhibit abstract art. This paradox is an expression of the law of the uneven development of historical formations in transitional periods.

At the same time, this ongoing struggle to restore the liberties promised by the October Revolution and inscribed in the Soviet constitution is inseparably intertwined with directly socialist tasks in the areas of economic construction and the democratization of state power. The achievement of these combined tasks, which is still in an embryonic stage, will inexorably culminate in a showdown between the bureaucratic oligarchy and the oppressed masses.

Roy Medvedev's position and proposals should be viewed in this context and perspective, in the dynamics of the unfolding of the inescapable political revolution in the USSR. In the name of morality and justice he wants the truth to be known, falsehood to be exposed, the rights and liberties of the people to be observed and amplified. These are worthy objectives.

However the means that he recommends are not suited to attain that end. He writes in the last chapter of his book on "The Forms and Methods of the Struggle for Socialist Democracy in the USSR," that "the transition from an autocratic regime to a democracy is always attended by the heightening of political struggle and the intensification of political passions" (p. 358). This observation does not augur well for his proposal that benevolent bureaucrats orchestrate and guide the process of transformation in a peaceful and gradual manner

without forceful and autonomous intervention from the insurgent masses.

When that stage eventuates, neither side will conform to the arbitrary stipulations and quarter-measures of the liberalizers. They never have in previous revolutionary situations. The entrenched totalitarians will fight to the death to defend the bases of their privileges and power while the workers and peasants on the offensive will hardly abide by the restrictions and edicts of the hated authorities they have risen up against. The clash of arguments will have to eventuate in a test of force.

Many of the nonconformist Russian intellectuals also look for their allies to the technocrats at home and to the liberal forces abroad. Unfortunately they pay less attention to the conditions and problems of the workers, peasants, and oppressed nationalities in the Soviet Union, or to the revolutionary forces in other countries. They present no specific proposals in behalf of the masses. Clearly their program for liberalization springs from the outlook of a Soviet elite. It reflects both their hopes and their fears, their aspirations for an end to Stalinist repression and for greater freedoms and faster progress, their fears of the "dark and unruly plebeian mob" that has haunted the Russian intelligentsia (and not them alone!) for over a century.

Their isolation from and distrust of the masses is evidenced in Medvedev's reservations on the possibility of a mass movement arising in the absence of a major crisis and bringing about thoroughgoing political changes, even though such movements have emerged—only to be misled and crushed—in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. He is not being consistently democratic, although his demands appear very audacious in the existing Soviet climate.

The balance sheet of the antibureaucratic movements from above in the Soviet bloc since Stalin's death attests to the unrealistic and erroneous character of his expectations. The Khrushchev flush of reforms proved to be restricted, came to a quick end, and has been succeeded by a greater intolerance of dissent. Solzhenitsyn's exile provides a measure of the extent of the bureaucratic concessions: his world renown saved him from being jailed or executed, as he would have been under Stalin's rule. The continued punishments inflicted on others—loss of work, imprisonment and torment in psychiatric wards—show their limits.

After the intervention of the Kremlin's troops and tanks, the neo-Stalinist leaders Kadar, Husak, and later Gierek, who replaced the used-up Rakosi, Novotny, and Gomulka, have kept a tight rein on the liberties of their peoples. Their regimes hardly provide a model of socialist democracy. In fact, this levy of reformists is held in reserve to rescue the Stalinist system in emergencies. In view of the manifest bankruptcy of bureaucratic reformism in Eastern Europe, one wonders how Medvedev holds fast to its efficacy and necessity for the USSR.

In his review of *The Gulag Archipelago* Medvedev does not gloss over his differences with the novelist's reactionary views. Yet he writes: "Solzhenitsyn has dealt a heavy blow to Stalinism and neo-Stalinism with this book. None of us has done more in this respect than Solzhenitsyn."

He is subject to a similar judgment. His staunch search for the truth about Soviet history despite its deficiencies,

his criticisms of the methods of the Soviet oligarchy, his campaign for democratic liberties, are courageous initiatives, notwithstanding his elitist outlook, reformist program, and utopian perspective. They are a progressive ferment in Soviet life and culture today that can serve to crack the bureaucratic crust and create openings for later oppositional breakthroughs by the more decisive social forces still to be heard from.

The harder and longer he and his cothinkers can press for democratic reforms, even under a more favorable relationship of forces, the sooner the limits of their line will be disclosed and the way cleared for the next and broader phases of the antibureaucratic struggle for socialist democracy.

The program and prognosis of the Fourth International for the regeneration and development of Soviet democracy is better known in the West than in the East, where it has been suppressed and shamelessly distorted since the defeat of the Left Opposition in the 1920s and Stalin's Moscow Trial frame-ups. It envisages the overthrow of bureaucratic domination through the independent organization, mobilization, and self-action of the rearoused workers, peasants, youth, and progressive intellectuals. This revolutionary struggle against social inequality and political repression cannot be waged along with or through any reformed section of the ruling bureaucracy. The possessors of power will not surrender the sources of their material and political privileges without a fight. The road to a full-fledged socialist democracy will have to arrive at the insurrectionary action of the oppressed masses, whatever preliminary and intermediary phases the process must pass through.

Its climactic point is unlikely to come about quickly or all at once. It will have to be prepared for and worked toward by partial measures that will enhance the self-confidence and self-reliance of the oppositional forces headed by authentic representatives of the working masses. Without concealing or yielding their own positions, program, and perspectives, the Fourth Internationalists will support whatever democratic demands and forward steps are proposed and fought for by other oppositional elements and act with them for their realization. That is the basis for a united front between us within as well as outside the USSR.

Medvedev has characterized his critics among the Soviet oppositionists to his left as "anarchists" whose provocations play into the hands of the most reactionary bureaucrats. This unjustifiable accusation has been directed by liberals of diverse persuasions against revolutionists many times before. Fighters such as Grigorenko appear to us as the most consistent Leninists and the most resolute and intransigent anti-Stalinists. They have no illusions about restricting the leadership of the democratic struggle to the regenerated officialdom that has already succeeded in derailing the antibureaucratic revolts in Eastern Europe.

Medvedev refers to "the political passivity of [the Soviet] population" as an irrefutable reason for disregarding and discounting their potential for generating a "mass movement capable of bringing about any real political change." This is a short-sighted outlook on the ways and means of democratizing the Soviet Union.

It is undeniable that the international class struggle has been fundamentally conditioned throughout the post-

war period by the parallel passivity of the Soviet and U. S. working classes. The pronounced absence of these potentially most powerful social and political forces in the contemporary world has permitted the Soviet bureaucracy and the U. S. monopolists to operate with a minimum of inhibition and to act in collusion against the development of the international revolution.

This situation has caused sincere socialists in both camps to take the prevailing state of affairs as fixed and final and to write off the revolutionary potential of these decisive sectors of the proletariat. They forget the force of the Marxist maxim that "the emancipation of the workers must be the task of the working class itself." When he says that action by the broad masses of the people can come "only as a result of serious political or economic crises" and that the "prospect of such crises seems neither probable nor desirable," Medvedev leaves out of consideration the fact that a crisis is not truly a crisis until it is recognized as such by the broad masses. Their level of political consciousness is a vital ingredient.

Has this historian forgotten how the independent action and soviet organization of the laboring masses under the Bolsheviks was responsible for the victory of October? Apparently under the blight of Stalinism this memorable lesson has faded from the consciousness of his generation.

But there are more recent manifestations of the capacity of the proletariat to throw off its political passivity and

to enter into struggle against their bureaucratic masters: Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1970-71. In Stalin's heyday many cold-war ideologists in the West insisted that the totalitarian tyranny in the Soviet Union was so airtight that its monolithism could never be broken from within but only smashed from without. The growing dissidence to date shows how superficial and myopic this prediction was.

The same applies to the United States. During the cold war, many mistakenly held that the future would not see any serious internal opposition to the course of the American imperialists. The Black liberation, student radical, and antiwar movements of the 1960s have demonstrated that discontent and dissidence among the masses can break through the strongest barriers.

The political passivity of the Soviet and the American workers is not everlasting. Specific conditions created their frame of mind: new conditions, now in the making, can and will change them. Genuine socialist democracy will not be delivered from the hands of benevolent bureaucrats and certainly not from the imperialists, who are the foremost enemies of democracy and socialism. It will have to be regained by the Soviet masses for themselves. That will be as glorious a day as October 1917 for the Russian people and for socialists all over the world.

September 23, 1974

Bill Collector's Answer to Inflation

Eat Now, Pay Later

Food chain stores in the United States have noted recently that their low-income customers are eating less.

According to R.H. Bruskin Associates, a market research firm in New Jersey, which recently polled 2,500 adults, "To cut down on total expenditures, almost half (47 per cent) of all people report they are buying less food now than they did a year ago."

The poll showed that "meat and dessert items are the basic foods that people seem to feel are expendable. Apparently, many Americans have either settled for substitutes or have completely eliminated these items from their menus."

Concerned about this sag in the standard of living, the supermarkets have decided that the cause is lack of money to cover skyrocketing prices, and they intend to do something about it. The solution they came up with is to accept credit cards for food purchases. Everyone entitled to credit can buy now and pay later.

The credit card companies are enthusiastic about the novel idea. "It's just a ripple now, but in two years it will really take off," predicts the vice-president of a

major credit card processing center.

This estimate has been confirmed by executives of the supermarket chains. They say that buying groceries on credit encourages a higher level of purchases—up to three times average cash purchases, according to one company.

Moreover, the supermarkets hope that credit-card buying will reduce the cost, the nuisance, and the losses that go with handling personal checks.

For the customer, of course, it's a bonanza. You can make a killing going into debt to purchase food for later use, in the opinion of one market analyst interviewed by the *New York Post*.

In fact, with the dollar's purchasing power deteriorating rapidly at the current rate of inflation, even a delay of thirty days between purchase and payment can offer a considerable saving.

The one detectable drawback is that the cost of servicing credit-cards will force the supermarkets to raise prices.

However, some very smart bankers have not only anticipated this snag but come up with a prize-winning solution.

The First National City Bank, for instance, has opened a branch office in

a supermarket on Long Island. It offers a full range of commercial banking services: checking and savings deposits, Master Charge accounts, loans—you name it, so long as your credit rating holds up.

Not only do banks pay rent, they eliminate the overhead cost to the supermarket of handling credit cards and collecting from debtors. Thus the stores don't have to raise prices for *those* reasons.


The banks, of course, do demand that consumers pay a modest fee for helping them out this way. But it's well worth it, seeing how much more you can eat by using a credit card. □

Smoke-Filled Plane

As is well known, the machine politicians reach their dirty deals in smoke-filled rooms. This perhaps explains the order put in by the Naval Research Lab for Air Force One and its backup plane, which are used by President Ford.

The order is for eighty ashtrays. Made of cast aluminum, each tray is about eight inches in diameter and costs the taxpayers \$50.

AROUND THE WORLD



Israelis Rattle Nuclear Bomb

Israel "has the potential" to make atomic weapons "and if we need it we will do it," Israeli President Ephraim Katzir said December 1. In response to questions from an international group of science reporters in Jerusalem, he said Israel does not have such weapons today but could produce them "within a reasonable period of time." He refused to explain what he meant by "reasonable," but estimates by experts of the time necessary for Israel to assemble a bomb range from days to months.

U. S. defense analysts assume Israel has had the components necessary for nuclear weapons for the past few years and could quickly assemble these into bombs. Dr. Theodore Taylor, a prominent U. S. scientist now working on nuclear safeguards, calculated that Israel has "plutonium for at least 10 atomic bombs." This material is thought to have come from an Israeli nuclear reactor built with French help at Dimona, in the Negev Desert. The Israelis could use either their F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers or their Jericho missiles to deliver their bombs.

Katzir said that Israel "will not be the first to introduce atomic weapons into the area." But he predicted that with the continuing tension in the Mideast, "our people will become more and more bitter." "If necessary, Israel will protect herself with all means possible."

When asked to interpret this in view of Israel's declared nuclear capability, he said "that is for the rest of the world to interpret."

French Army Head Warns of Unrest Among Soldiers

The chief of staff of the French army has warned the minister of defense that the ranks may revolt unless there is an improvement in soldiers' morale and living conditions.

In a confidential report made public by *Le Monde*, General Alain de Boissieu, son-in-law of former French President Charles de Gaulle, said that any serious economic and social disturbances, as in 1968, might involve participation by soldiers. In the May 1968 upsurge, the army stood aside from the agitation. Of the 330,000 men in the French army, 215,000 are conscripts.

Dissatisfaction among recruits, as well as commissioned and noncommissioned

officers, is widespread. About 4,000 soldiers have signed the Appeal of the One Hundred, calling for better conditions and recognition of basic civil rights, since the petition began to circulate in the ranks last May.

In September several hundred conscripts marched in the streets of Draguignan, a town in the south, to demand better conditions. Since then alleged organizers of the demonstration have been arrested and are to appear before military tribunals.

A soldier who stepped out of the ranks and addressed his comrades in support of the demands in the Appeal of the One Hundred was recently sentenced to a year in prison by a military court at Marseille.

General De Boissieu's proposed solution to the crisis in the army is to increase the military budget and create more openings in the officers corps.

OAS Observers Denied Access to Pinochet's Torture Centers

A delegation from the Organization of American States (OAS), sent to Chile last July to investigate violations of human rights, has revealed that it was not permitted to visit a number of places said to be torture centers.

According to a report in the December 5 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Razon*, the delegation cited in particular the Santiago office of national security, a section of the military hospital, and the schoolship *Esmeralda*. Each place had been named by prisoners as torture chambers.

The junta denied the OAS delegation access to them on the grounds that "they had just been declared military zones."

Pentagon Weighs Shah's Proposal To Buy Military Cargo Planes

The Iranian and U.S. governments held talks in Washington in late November on an offer by the shah to pay for re-opening the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's C-5A production line and to buy ten of the military cargo planes. The jets cost \$55 million each.

The Iranian proposal would involve an outlay by the shah of about \$175 million.

The Pentagon is reported to be interested in the shah's offer, since it may want to buy more C-5As itself. The C-5A, which is the world's largest aircraft,

played a major role in the U.S. airlift to Israel during the October 1973 war.

However, some U.S. air force generals are reported to be uneasy. They feel that any new demands for the C-5A would hurt chances for all-out production of the new B-1 intercontinental bomber.

The Pentagon has already approved the sale to Iran of eighty F-14A navy fighters, one of the world's most sophisticated military planes.

Ford's "Amnesty" Program Flops

According to the latest government figures, only 508 of at least 111,000 veterans holding less than honorable discharges have applied for President Ford's "earned amnesty" program. Of the 8,700 convicted draft resisters, only 234 have chosen "alternative service" in exchange for a pardon. Two thousand of the officially estimated 12,500 military deserters in the United States and abroad have applied for the amnesty. And of the 6,600 persons wanted for draft resistance, only 103 have turned themselves in under the program.

Latin American Sugar Producers Organize 20-Country Marketing Bloc

Twenty Latin American governments, including Cuba, have agreed to establish a cartel to set the price of sugar on the world market, United Press International reported November 28. According to Francisco Cano Escalante, executive secretary of the Mexican Sugar Industry Commission, initial plans call for the sale of fifteen million tons of sugar for \$24 billion.

Government sources told UPI that Mexico hoped to create other cartels for the joint marketing of coffee and cotton.

Out to Get God Back on Their Side

The clergy at Trinity Church and St. Paul's Chapel, the two houses of worship in the heart of the Wall Street district, report that business is booming, according to an article in the November 27 *New York Post*.

The number of Wall Streeters praying at the noon mass has about doubled in the past year. Financiers can be seen at all hours of the working day sitting in pews meditating.

George Bauer, the head verger at Trini-

ty Church, reported that a black limousine he has not seen before is now pulling up regularly. The driver waits while his employer enters the church and meditates for a few minutes before departing for the money marts.

Despite the upsurge in business, it appears that there has been no corresponding rise in the take. The Reverend Robert C. Hunsicker, the vicar of St. Paul's, said, "I don't find much optimism. I expect contributions have fallen off."

One of the Wall Street wolves who shows up at Trinity's noon organ recital, Robert H. Stovall, an executive with Reynolds Securities, Inc., said he liked to help people get jobs, but even with his extensive contacts he can do little. "I'm fangless, I can't help anyone."

Haitians Fighting Deportation Win Wide Support in Quebec

The Canadian government is proceeding with plans to deport hundreds of Haitians, many of whom emigrated to Canada to escape political repression under the Duvalier dictatorship.

Ottawa sources estimated that about 550 Haitians would be sent back. Already 118 refugees have lost their final appeals against deportation rulings.

Leaders of the Haitian immigrant community in Montreal say that as many as 1,500 Haitians are threatened with deportation.

Many organizations and individuals have protested the victimizations. Among them are the National Congress of Black Women, the Mouvement National des Quebecois, the Parti Quebecois, the Catholic archbishop of Montreal, and the Quebec Human Rights League. The League reports that the former Haitian consul for Montreal, who had reassured Haitians in Canada that no harm would come to them in Haiti, is now under house arrest in Port au Prince.

Zimbabwe Groups Unite

The four African nationalist groups in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) agreed December 8 to unite in preparation for possible negotiations with the white minority Rhodesian regime over the question of greater Black political representation. The unity moves followed a series of meetings in Lusaka, Zambia, among the leaders of the Zimbabwean organizations and the heads of state of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana.

The agreement provided that the leaders of the three guerrilla groups—the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi)—join for four months an enlarged executive of the African National Council (ANC), the only one of the four groups that has not been

banned by the regime. Although the chairmanship of the ANC will be held by its present leader, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the enlarged ANC is scheduled to hold a congress to adopt a new constitution and elect a new leadership.

Bogota Threatens State of Siege to Halt Inflation Protests

Government attempts to shift the burden of a growing economic crisis onto the backs of the Colombian masses have touched off demonstrations in major cities across the country.

The protests have been against an inflation rate of 35 percent, fuel shortages, government cutbacks in education, and a 120 percent increase in public transportation fares. They have involved students, workers, and slum dwellers. The demonstrations began in Cali the third week of November and spread to other cities after eight protesters were killed by a motor vehicle.

On November 26, a curfew was imposed in the southern city of Pasto. It came after a street demonstration in which more than 100 persons were arrested and fifty-eight policemen were injured.

On November 27, twenty-two students were wounded in Popayan as police used force to end a four-day occupation of a secondary school.

In Bogota, the principal highway from the countryside was blocked by thousands of slum residents for three days in late November.

Sectors of the government have threatened to impose a state of siege and to add 1,000 men to the federal police force if the protests do not stop.

Two MIR Militants Killed in Chile

The Chilean junta has reported killing two members of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) on December 4. Ana Maria Puga and Alejandro de la Barra, one of the MIR's top leaders, were said to have been shot in a gun battle outside Santiago.

According to a December 5 Associated Press dispatch, the junta is continuing its search for another MIR leader, Andres Pascal Allende, who is believed to be still in Chile.

Illegal Chinese Immigrants Deported by Hong Kong

Hong Kong's British colonial administration on November 30 reversed its policy of allowing illegal immigrants from China to remain. By December 4, thirty persons had been arrested and handed over to Chinese authorities across the border.

The new policy apparently results from the changed economic circumstances. As long as a labor shortage existed in Hong

Kong, the immigrants were welcome. But with a downturn in the economy, London persuaded Peking to return to the situation existing before 1968 and agree to accept the refugees back. Nearly 30,000 legal immigrants entered Hong Kong from China in 1974, while the illegal immigrants officially numbered about 6,500. It is estimated, however, that another 20,000 have entered undetected by the Hong Kong police.

Cuba and the Bahamas Set Up Diplomatic Ties

Cuba and the Bahamas agreed November 30 to establish diplomatic relations. The Bahamas, which won independence from Britain in July 1973, is the fourth Caribbean country to establish relations with Cuba. The others are Trinidad-Tobago, Jamaica, and Barbados.

Chen Po-ta Alive but 'Broken'

Chen Po-ta, once political secretary to Mao Tsetung and a leader of the Cultural Revolution, is still alive but broken politically and perhaps physically, according to a reference in a Chinese journal. Chen dropped out of sight in 1970.

"Lin Piao, who likened himself to the 'heavenly horse galloping through the skies,' died in a crash at Undur Khan in Mongolia," the journal *Study and Criticism* said. "Chen Po-ta has likewise fallen from the counterrevolutionary peak and has become a dog with a broken spine."

14 Million Italian Workers Strike to Protest Inflation

Fourteen million of Italy's eighteen million workers walked off their jobs December 4, demanding higher cost-of-living adjustments, higher social security benefits, and guaranteed employment. Inflation in Italy is currently running at 25 percent.

The general strike, which lasted from two to eight hours depending on the sector of the economy, was the second in two months.

Basque Protesters Demand Freedom for Franco's Political Prisoners

Actions in support of Franco's political prisoners took place throughout the Basque country in late November and early December. The demonstrations were timed to coincide with the fourth anniversary of the Burgos trial, which handed down death sentences to six Basque nationalists.

According to a December 4 Agence France-Presse dispatch, the protests were spearheaded by 20,000 striking workers in Guipozcoa. High schools in Eibar and Yurre were shut down following student protests.

American Intellectuals Protest Terror in Iran

By Peter Green

A delegation of prominent intellectuals and civil libertarians presented a petition with 2,000 signatures to the Iranian Embassy in Washington on November 22 demanding the release of Vida Hadjebi Tabrizi and Dr. Ali Shariatti—two of the many writers, intellectuals, and artists now in the shah's jails.

Neither the ambassador nor any of his aides would agree to see the delegation. An embassy staff member, who refused to identify himself, categorically denied requests for a future appointment and refused to accept a letter of protest written by members of the sociology department at Columbia University.

The delegation included Kate Millett, well-known feminist author; Ann Roberts of the National Organization for Women; Allan Silver, professor of sociology at Columbia University; Tristram Coffin from the American Center for PEN, the international writers society; David Weissbrodt, representing Amnesty International; and Fariborz Khasha of the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran (CAIFI), which organized the petition campaign.

CAIFI has focussed on the cases of Vida Tabrizi and Ali Shariatti in hope of breaking down the wall of silence with which the shah has attempted to hide the brutal repression of artists and intellectuals in Iran.*

Vida Tabrizi, a sociologist at the University of Tehran, was doing research on the living conditions of the peasant population of Iran when she was arrested by SAVAK, the shah's secret police, in July 1972. A secret military court sentenced her to eight years in prison. The torture she has received at the hands of the shah's agents has resulted in loss of feeling in her arms and legs. She also has a heart problem and meningitis.

Dr. Ali Shariatti holds a doctorate in sociology from the Sorbonne in Paris and has written many books and articles. He was educational director of Hossiniéh Ershad, an Islamic theological school in Tehran. But the regime decided that this institution was a center for political opposition and closed it on November 15, 1972. Dr. Shariatti was arrested by SAVAK in September 1973 and jailed in a dreaded Tehran prison complex called "The Committee."

In the efforts to intimidate writers, art-

ists, and intellectuals, more than fifty newspapers and magazines have been banned, and eighty journalists have been fired and forbidden to write. (See *Intercontinental Press*, November 4, p. 1436.) An estimated 25,000 political prisoners are at present in the shah's jails.

In the past year, two prominent writers, Khosrow Golsorkhi and Karamat Danehshian, have been executed.

Among the well-known figures being held in jail are Fereydoon Tonkaboni, a writer and teacher, and Dr. Gholamhossein Sa'edi, playwright, author, and editor of *Alefba* (Alphabet), a literary magazine published in Tehran. Sa'edi was arrested last June. After his arrest, his home was searched for what SAVAK called "misleading books."

A news conference was held after the Iranian Embassy refused to receive the protest delegation. Extracts from a letter written to the embassy by the president of the Canadian Sociological Association protesting the imprisonment of Vida Tabrizi were read.

"I should like to protest in the strongest possible terms this treatment by your government of one of our colleagues," he wrote. ". . . it is utterly abhorrent to us that academic researchers should be subject to arbitrary government control and arrest."

Professor Allan Silver of Columbia University told the news conference that a meeting of the American Sociological Association in August had adopted a resolution of condemnation and concern. It was expected that the association's executive council, meeting in December, would take further steps.

The Amnesty International representative spoke about the all-pervasive role of SAVAK in the shah's regime of repression—from investigation, through arrest, to prosecution before the military tribunals. The prisoners are even "defended" by military lawyers appointed by the military courts. But perhaps the most important denial of human rights, he said, was that the military tribunal accepts as evidence confessions of guilt that the defendants themselves have already repudiated in courts as having been made under torture.

Kate Millett praised the courageous work being done by Iranian students in the United States in defense of political prisoners in Iran. Because of SAVAK agents operating in the U. S., the students

run the risk of being forced to live in exile as long as the regime lasts. Once their political views are known, their families, too, are persecuted.

"The shah is a tyrant and one of the cruelest and most despotic rulers in the world today," she said. "Far from being the glamorous prince and playboy, which he's played up around the world as being, he is the master of a society run virtually upon terror." She condemned the squandering of billions on munitions in a society where the mass of the people live in poverty. Seven billion dollars were spent on arms in the last two years, she said.

Millett attacked the regime for failing to guarantee virtually any human or civil rights for women at all. "Women are chattels," she said. "A man is licensed to murder his wife, his daughter, or his sister if he suspects her of sexual relationships. Women are forbidden to work or travel without the husband's written permission. A daughter receives only half the inheritance of the son. Abortion is illegal and there is a three to ten year prison term with hard labor for it."

She called on feminists throughout the United States and the world to demand the immediate release of Vida Tabrizi.

"When you come up against things like a dictatorial and bizarre, insane, immoral regime such as the shah's, there the influence of world opinion, of mobilizing world opinion, is about the only recourse for the victims of this regime, until of its own corruption it falls. Until then to help these many thousands of prisoners, who are often tortured, it is an absolute necessity to marshal world opinion and to focus world opinion as strongly and consistently and effectively as we possibly can." □

Amnesty International Reports Names of 229 Jailed Union Activists

Amnesty International reported December 1 the names of more than 200 men and women jailed around the world for their union activities. The organization stressed that its list of 229 prisoners in seventeen countries was "far from complete and reflects only the state of Amnesty International's knowledge." A spokesman for the group estimated that the total number of jailed union activists could be more than 20,000.

*The address of CAIFI is 156 Fifth Avenue, Room 703, New York, N. Y. 10010.

Antecedentes de Carta de Trotsky Sobre Tácticas en Lucha Contra los Fascistas

Por Gerry Foley

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Background to Trotsky's Letter on Tactics in Fighting Fascists", publicado en *Intercontinental Press* el 2 de diciembre].

[La carta de Trotsky a la que nos referimos apareció traducida al español en *Intercontinental Press* el 9 de diciembre].

* * *

"Una provocación inaudita", decía el titular del número del 27 de febrero de 1934, de la publicación del Partido Comunista Francés, *l'Humanité*, "Van a llevar a cabo un acto fascista esta noche en el Distrito Vigésimo de París. ¡La Vigésima Sección del Partido Socialista rechaza un frente único de acción! ¡Los obreros contraatacan bajo la dirección del Partido Comunista!"


El acto en cuestión era una manifestación en el Distrito Tercero realizada por "grupos nacionales"—la Action Française [Acción Francesa], Jeunesses Patriotes [Juventud Patriótica], Solidarité Française [Solidaridad Francesa], la Fédération des Contribuables [Federación de Contribuyentes] y otros. Iba a efectuarse en el Salón de Prevoyants en la Rue des Pyrénées, en el centro del distrito obrero de Menilmontant.

El Partido Comunista llama a una acción antifascista bajo sus propias banderas y a la vez denuncia a las otras organizaciones obreras por no participar; fue típico del período ultraizquierdista del stalinismo desde 1928 a 1934.

El Comintern dijo que el mundo había entrado en el "Tercer Período", el período de la crisis final e inevitable del capitalismo.

Su concepto de "frente único de base" era una consecuencia natural de esta noción.

A partir de que la revolución estaba planteada en forma inmediata, el principal obstáculo eran las fuerzas reformistas en el movimiento obrero. Pero teniendo en cuenta el impulso de la crisis revolucionaria, el Partido Co-



TROTSKY

munista podía simplemente pasarles por encima.

En el período siguiente a la victoria nazi en Alemania, que se vió facilitada por las aberraciones ultraizquierdistas del Comintern y el Partido Comunista Alemán, el Kremlin efectuó un completo cambio de posición. Comenzó a llamar a un "Frente Popular" con los partidos burgueses parlamentarios que representaban los mismos intereses de clase fundamentales que los fascistas, y que se estaban inclinando al fascismo dondequiera que el capitalismo se viera amenazado.

El cambio tenía una cierta lógica. Era de hecho, la otra cara de la moneda del ultraizquierdismo. Mientras que la burocracia esperaba antes dejar de lado las leyes sociales básicas usando su "músculo", ahora estaba tratando de hacer la misma cosa a través de pactos diplomáticos con sectores de la clase dominante. Aún después de la victoria nazi en Alemania, le llevó a Stalin algún tiempo decidirse a cambiar su línea. Fue sólo en junio de 1934, por ejemplo, que el

Partido Comunista Francés proclamó formalmente el viraje de "unirse contra el fascismo".

Pero, el 6 de febrero de 1934, los fascistas ya habían estado a una pulgada de tomar el poder en el país, durante los motines de Stavisky.

Fue una suerte que la clase capitalista no hubiera sentido aún la necesidad de contar con los fascistas para "restaurar el orden." La policía del gobierno de Daladier abrió fuego sobre la manifestación fascista y los obligó a retirarse.

Altrapado por su línea ultraizquierdista, el Partido Comunista fue incapaz de responder a la amenaza fascista a través de proyectar una línea de movilizar a las masas. De hecho, se unió a las manifestaciones fascistas del 6 de febrero, coreando luego las quejas contra los "pistoleros policiales", aparentemente basándose en la teoría de que a partir de que la revolución estaba planteada en forma inmediata todo desafío a las instituciones de la legalidad burguesa abría la vía para la guerra contra el estado capitalista.

El intento fascista de tomar el poder provocó una tremenda alza entre los obreros. El mismo Partido Comunista fue arrastrado por un momento, a pesar de su línea sectaria. A último momento hizo un cambio repentino, y apareció apoyando el llamado a un día de huelga general nacional el 12 de febrero, que se convirtió en una manifestación masiva del poder potencial de la clase obrera.

El desarrollo de esas acciones de unidad de las masas por parte de los obreros fue una resonante confirmación de la línea planteada por la pequeña organización trotskista francesa, la Liga Comunista.

"En todo lugar en que la Liga tuviera un núcleo o aún un activista aislado" recordaba un participante, surgían comités de alianza obrera. Este fue el caso de Suresnes, Boulogne y Corbeil, donde estos comités incluían organizaciones decididas a luchar. En las provincias los trotskistas estaban al frente de las manifestaciones callejeras. La fuerza de sus consignas era tal que fueron aclama-

dos en el acto del Partido Socialista en Wagram, y por primera vez un representante de ellos pudo hablar durante diez minutos, en el gran acto comunista en Bullier.*

No obstante este alza no convenió al Partido Comunista de la necesidad de una acción unificada de la clase. Paradojicamente, puede haber aumentado la plausibilidad de la línea del tercer periodo.

Educados en el ultrazquierdismo y enriquecidos con esquemas, los cuadros del Partido Comunista deben haber pensado que ahora sólo se necesitaba una chispa para que se extendiera el fuego en la pradera.

En la primera fase de un alza, la bancarrota del ultrazquierdismo no es tan evidente como en tiempos más tranquilos, o en el momento decisivo.

Las iniciativas ultrazquierdistas pueden alimentarse en la radicalización general y atraer a los impacientes en particular.

Es precisamente en esas fases, que el ultrazquierdismo presenta sus más grandes peligros, amenazando con desorientar y destruir los elementos más avanzados y audaces y dispersar, en lugar de agrupar, las fuerzas requeridas para ganar una victoria decisiva sobre el capitalismo.

La operación Menilmontant fue un buen ejemplo de tamaña aventura ultrazquierdista:

"Los asesinos de los obreros intentan usar su fuerza para incendiar nuestro distrito", declaraba el artículo de *l'Humanité* del 26 de febrero.

"A pesar de esta amenaza, un dirigente de la Sección Vigésima del Partido Socialista se ha negado a discutir la organización de una contrademonstración conjunta con los comunistas.

"Pero los obreros del Partido Socialista del Distrito Vigésimo reconocen el peligro de la masiva embestida fascista y se unirán una vez más en un frente único de acción con los comunistas, como lo han hecho muchas veces en esta lucha. *¡Van a correr a los fascistas del Distrito Vigésimo!*"

Este tipo de argumento difícilmente podía convencer al Partido Socialista de que el Partido Comunista estaba

realmente interesado en la acción unificada; tampoco presionó a los dirigentes del Partido Socialista, partiendo de que esos llamados podían ser desechados como arrogantes ultimatus comunistas, o maniobras.

La táctica que emanaba de la concepción de un "frente único de base" apuntaba a arrastrar a la base del Partido Socialista detrás de las iniciativas del Partido Comunista, por el puro impulso y la fuerza del ejemplo. A pesar de que el Partido Comunista se comprometió en algunas negociaciones unificadas, se subordinaron a esa perspectiva.

Por ejemplo, *l'Humanité* del 27 de febrero informaba que tres delegados del Distrito Vigésimo del Partido Socialista, se habían encontrado con representantes del Partido Comunista antes de la manifestación del 26 de febrero y que se había redactado un volante común. Sin embargo, no había habido tiempo para informar esto en el periódico llamando a la acción. Así, fue la iniciativa del Partido Comunista la que fue considerada importante, el "ejemplo" de "alguien" atacando a los fascistas, no el logro de la unidad de la clase obrera contra la amenaza fascista.

Este hecho se hizo evidente en el carácter de la manifestación. El ultrazquierdista Partido Comunista consideró la acción como un triunfo propagandístico.

"La reunión [fascista] fue pequeña", proseguía el informe de *l'Humanité* del 27 de febrero. "Unos sesenta miembros de la Jeunesse Patriotes, Croix de Feu [Cruz de Fe], Solidarité Française, etc, desafiaron a la suerte en la reunión bajo la protección de más de cuatrocientos policías que bloqueaban las calles.

"Pero a pesar de la masa de policías protegiendo a los fascistas, la manifestación comenzó a las 8:30.

"Un grupo comenzó a manifestar en la calle Vitruve. Otro en la calle Bagnolet frente a la Brasserie George [el acto fascista fue trasladado aquí] donde se rompieron las ventanas. Mientras otro grupo manifestaba al otro lado del café de la Rue de Pyrénées. Los 2,000 manifestantes elevaban fuertes cantos: ¡Soviets en todas partes! ¡Unidad de acción! ¡Abajo el fascismo! ¡Prisión para Tardieu!"

"La policía trató de aislar a los manifestantes, pero ellos se las arreglaron para asaltar el lugar del acto fascista durante una hora y media.

"Alrededor de las 9:30 una nueva

columna de cuatrocientos a quinientos manifestantes marchó hacia la Brasserie. Fueron repelidos por una carga policial pero regresaron.

"A las 10:30, protegidos por las masas de policías, las cinco o seis docenas de fascistas comenzaron a retirarse de a dos después de apagar las luces. Muchos fueron reconocidos y recibieron una lección de los obreros.

"¡Fue una derrota!"

"La manifestación había conseguido una magnífica amplitud.

"Hacia las diez hubo una reunión de obreros alrededor de La Bellevoise. Una columna de mil obreros marchó por la Rue Menilmontant. En la intersección de Rue Parroyaux, dos carros llenos de policía cargaron contra la multitud. Fue una batalla.

"Inmediatamente la multitud tomó tablones de un mercado y levantó muchas barricadas. Un automóvil de la policía se acercó. Los obreros lo recibieron con una lluvia de piedras. El vehículo se vio forzado a dirigirse tras una barricada para escapar.

"Un automóvil policial que venía de la estación del metro Courronne fue recibido con una lluvia de piedras arrojadas por los obreros desde atrás de las barricadas. Por varios minutos, los obreros lucharon contra la policía, empujándola detrás del automóvil y arrojándole luego más piedras. En este momento fueron disparados cinco tiros de revólver contra los obreros. Hemos sabido que un camarada ha resultado gravemente herido de un balazo en la cabeza.

"Otro fue herido en el estómago, y otros dos también baleados . . ."

L'Humanité del 28 de febrero dió más detalles. Un obrero de la construcción de 19 años, H. Wilhemín, fue asesinado. Pero su funeral fue una manifestación aún más exitosa de "unidad de acción."

"Había 80,000 de nosotros detrás del ataúd de Wilhemín. Desde Belleville en las barricadas hasta el cementerio Pantin Parmila hubo un coro de rabia de sus hermanos, cien mil puños se levantaron.

"'Te vengaremos camarada.' '¡Los policías son asesinos!' '¡Prisión al jefe de policía Chiappe!' '¡Los soldados están con nosotros!' '¡Abajo Laval-Tardieu!' '¡Soviets en todas partes!'"

Esta acción fue otro claro ejemplo del curso ultrazquierdista contra el que León Trotsky luchó en el caso de Alemania. □

* Yvan Craipeau, *Le Mouvement Trotskyste en France: Des origines aux enseignements de mai 68* (El movimiento Trotskista en Francia: Desde los orígenes a las enseñanzas de mayo de 1968); Ediciones Syros, París, 1971, pag. 95-96.

Campaña Logra Libertad de Luis Vitale

Luis Vitale, uno de los dirigentes de la sección chilena de la Cuarta Internacional, ha sido finalmente liberado de la prisión. El veintiocho de noviembre la junta le permitió dejar el país rumbo a Alemania, donde le fue ofrecido un trabajo como profesor de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad de Frankfurt.

En el momento de su arresto, Vitale era profesor de historia y geografía en la Universidad de Concepción.

La liberación de Vitale siguió a una campaña en su defensa que fue lanzada hace más de un año. En el congreso de la Cuarta Internacional de febrero de este año, fue nombrado presidente honorario, como símbolo de las víctimas revolucionarias de la represión en todo el mundo.

Vitale fue detenido en Santiago poco después del golpe de septiembre de 1973 que derrocó al régimen de Allende.

Durante largas semanas fue retenido en el Estadio Nacional de esa ciudad. Fue gravemente torturado. Más tarde fue transferido a un campo de concentración. Por algún tiempo su vida pendió de un hilo como resultado del brutal tratamiento a que fue sometido.

Autor de varios libros y ensayos, el trabajo más conocido de Vitale es su historia de Chile, *Interpretación Marxista de la Historia de Chile*. El trabajo había sido publicado parcial-

mente antes del golpe de 1973.

Vitale tiene las ciudadanía argentina y chilena. Nació en Argentina en 1927, pero vivió en Chile durante dos décadas. Se casó con una chilena y tiene una hija que nació en Santiago.

Sustenta un largo récord de actividad en el movimiento obrero chileno. En los años 1959-62, Vitale era un dirigente nacional de la Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT). Ayudó a redactar las resoluciones presentadas en el primer y segundo congreso nacional de la CUT, particularmente las secciones referidas a la reforma agraria, el problema del imperialismo, y el desarrollo industrial en Chile.

El GIM (Gruppe Internationale

Marxisten— Grupo Marxista Internacional, sección alemana de la Cuarta Internacional) ha anunciado una gira de conferencias de Vitale por la República Federal de Alemania. □



LUIS VITALE

Defensora en el Caso de Hugo Blanco

Exijamos Libertad de Laura Caller

Se ha lanzado una campaña por la libertad de Laura Caller Iberica, una conocida abogada defensora laboral de Perú, detenida por el régimen militar peruano. Laura Caller fue uno de los tres abogados que defendieron a Hugo Blanco y otros, juzgados por el papel que jugaron en el alza campesina de principios de la década del sesenta.

Actualmente Laura Caller está detenida por tomar parte en la defensa legal de miembros de Vanguardia Revolucionaria, un grupo de orientación maoista. Están acusados sucesivamente de estar implicados en actividades "subversivas" de la Confederación de Campesinos del Perú, en Andahuaylas en el Departamento de Apurimac. Las actividades "subversivas" de acuerdo a los cargos, consistieron en incitar a los campesinos a "invadir haciendas."

El Movimiento Latinoamericano Para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (MOLADDEH), ha llamado a elevar protestas por este hecho.

En el número 3-4 de *Libertad*, el boletín de noticias de la organización, MOLADDEH dice:

"Por una brevísima nota, casi imperceptible, aparecida en la *Prensa* del 11 de octubre y por una carta publicada en *Correo* del día siguiente, un sector muy reducido de la opinión pública debe haberse enterado de la prisión de la Doctora Caller, abogado de más de treinta años de servicio a la clase trabajadora.

"La Doctora Caller fue hecha prisionera por una fuerte dotación policial en Andahuaylas, donde estaba cumpliendo su deber profesional en defensa de los campesinos de dicha localidad.

"Actualmente se encuentra presa en el Depósito de Mujeres de Seguridad del Estado.

"Ante este gravísimo atropello, MOLADDEH protesta enérgicamente y exige la inmediata libertad de esta consecuente defensora de los derechos humanos en nuestra patria."

Las protestas deben ser enviadas al Presidente Juan Velasco Alvarado, Lima, Perú.

También pueden enviarse a la Misión Peruana, Naciones Unidas, Nueva York. □

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Una Entrevista con Yohichi Sakai

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Impact of Radicalized Youth on Japanese Unions", que apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 11 de noviembre].

* * *

Pregunta. ¿Podría explicar cómo se desarrolló la radicalización de la juventud en Japón y qué impacto ha tenido ésta sobre el movimiento obrero?

Respuesta. Para responder eso, primero debo explicar que el movimiento obrero en Japón es bastante diferente al de los Estados Unidos, o digamos Francia, donde la burocracia sindical socialdemócrata en el primer caso, y la burocracia sindical comunista, en el otro, han tenido durante muchos años el control sobre los sindicatos.

En Japón hay más tradición de corrientes de oposición en los sindicatos. Y ésta es una de las razones por las que la radicalización estudiantil y la de los jóvenes obreros al final de los sesenta en Japón estaban más ligadas que en el caso de los Estados Unidos o Europa.

Antes del final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, no había una verdadera democracia burguesa en Japón, y los trabajadores no tenían el derecho de organizarse.

Los sindicatos existían antes de la guerra pero eran muy pequeños, comprendiendo tal vez sólo un diez por ciento de la clase trabajadora. O sea que no había una verdadera burocracia sindical como un fenómeno establecido.

Debido a eso, la burocracia sindical actualmente no tiene una larga tradición o experiencia en controlar a la clase obrera; ha surgido después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

De 1946 a 1950, la mayoría de los militantes activos del movimiento sindical japonés estaban bajo la dirección del Partido Comunista Japonés.

En ese período después de la derrota y el colapso del imperialismo japonés, el pueblo estaba profundamente desilusionado con el sistema y sus

luchas eran muy combativas.

Pero en 1949 y 1950, todos los obreros del Partido Comunista fueron despedidos de las fábricas y talleres bajo la presión del ejército norteamericano en Japón. Se llamó la "Purga Roja."

En los sindicatos aparecieron diferenciaciones políticas que reflejan el cambio en la política norteamericana. Desde 1945 a 1947, el imperialismo norteamericano quería debilitar a Japón como potencia imperialista; pero debido a la llamada guerra fría, y a la situación de China, el imperialismo norteamericano cambió su política y empezó a levantar al imperialismo japonés.

Y después de la expulsión de los miembros del Partido Comunista de los sindicatos, una nueva corriente reformista se apoderó del aparato sindical en una especie de golpe de estado.

P. ¿Era esa la dirección del Partido Socialista?

R. Sí. De 1946 a 1951, el PS estaba bajo la dirección de una mayoría derechista. Así en aquel tiempo, los sentimientos combativos de los trabajadores japoneses se reflejaban en el apoyo al Partido Comunista.

En 1951, los activistas sindicales de orientación reformista del PS organizaron una nueva federación nacional de sindicatos, llamada Sohyo. La conferencia de fundación de esta organización fue en 1951, bajo la protección del ejército de ocupación norteamericano. Esta conferencia apoyó la guerra imperialista norteamericana en Corea.

En 1951 el PS se escindió en un ala de izquierda y una de derecha. Esta última apoyaba abiertamente al imperialismo norteamericano, de la misma manera que la socialdemocracia de Europa Occidental había apoyado a la OTAN (Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte). El ala izquierda trató de desarrollar una especie de posición neutral, como el primer ministro hindú Nehru, a causa del profundo pacifismo de las masas japonesas.

Cuando ocurrió la escisión, el ala de izquierda estaba aún en minoría.

En 1952, cuando Sohyo realizó su segunda conferencia nacional, cambió su posición sobre la guerra de Corea. Bajo la presión de las masas adoptó una posición neutralista.

Así, el bloque que existe actualmente entre el Partido Socialista y Sohyo se originó en el bloque entre el ala izquierda de los socialistas y Sohyo en 1949, 1950 y 1951.

Después de 1954 hubo un ascenso económico entre los países capitalistas a escala mundial, y la economía japonesa también empezó a recuperarse de la crisis de postguerra. Como consecuencia de la recuperación económica, la base de Sohyo comenzó a mostrar una mayor militancia. Sin embargo, este alza no fue tan radical o militante como la de 1946-1949.

En 1954 ó 1955 se unificaron las alas de izquierda y de derecha del Partido Socialista. Para esta época las dos eran del mismo tamaño, aunque tal vez el ala de izquierda era un poco más grande. El ala de derecha tenía poca influencia en las masas.

Al mismo tiempo, aparecieron espontáneamente en el movimiento sindical, tendencias de izquierda, aunque sin coordinación nacional y sin dirección. Estas tendencias combativas de base amplias, incluían trabajadores que apoyaban al PC. Comenzaron también a desarrollar un estrecho contacto con el movimiento estudiantil de Zengakuren. El Zengakuren tiene una relación muy estrecha con el movimiento obrero.

Los dirigentes de Zengakuren en esa época, eran miembros del Partido Comunista, así como muchos activistas obreros de izquierda. Esta era la situación al final de la década del cincuenta. Usted puede ver que los sindicatos no estaban 100 por ciento burocratizados.

Pero desde 1960 hasta 1966 ó 1967, el movimiento sindical japonés se estancó debido a la rápida expansión de la economía combinada con varios fracasos de las luchas sindicales (de los ferroviarios en 1958, los maestros en 1959 y los mineros del carbón en 1960).

Desde su fundación hasta 1960, Sohyo fue una verdadera federación nacional de los sindicatos japoneses en los sectores público y privado. Pero en la década del sesenta, nuevos sindicatos de derecha surgieron muy rápidamente en el sector privado, es-

pecialmente en las grandes industrias y empresas.

De este modo, en el sector privado la gran mayoría de los aparatos sindicales están controlados ahora por burocracias de derecha. El sector público (ferrocarriles, teléfonos y telégrafos, trabajadores postales, maestros, empleados municipales) está aún en las manos de una dirección centrista, orientada por el Partido Socialista.

Así, por un lado, se dió el rápido surgimiento de una tendencia sindical de derecha en las industrias privadas en expansión; por el otro lado, hubo una profundización de la burocratización en el aparato sindical del sector público.

Al mismo tiempo, desde 1963, los jóvenes trabajadores comenzaron a aparecer como un elemento de oposición en los sindicatos, especialmente en el sector público. Están organizados en las juntas juveniles de los sindicatos, algo que yo creo que ustedes no tienen en los sindicatos norteamericanos.

P. Es cierto, no hay juntas juveniles en los sindicatos norteamericanos. Los trotskistas japoneses estaban trabajando como miembros del PS en esa época. ¿No es cierto?

R. Si, y nuestro trabajo en el PS y la organización juvenil socialista consistía en tratar de organizar a esas nuevas tendencias militantes entre los jóvenes obreros.

Luego, como usted sabe, de 1967 a 1970, se dió la gran explosión de la radicalización juvenil en Japón. Las fuerzas principales eran estudiantes, pero varias decenas de miles de jóvenes obreros se unieron al movimiento.

El Comité Nacional Juvenil contra la guerra se formó en 1965, inicialmente bajo la dirección del Partido Socialista. Era un frente único de jóvenes obreros independientes, radicales y de izquierda en los sindicatos. Se organizó bajo las banderas de la oposición a la guerra norteamericana en Vietnam, una consigna política que logró unificar a todos esos jóvenes obreros.

Los estudiantes crearon su propia organización nacional contra la guerra, la Federación Nacional de Comités de Lucha Universitarios, durante la gran explosión de las luchas universitarias.

P. ¿Cuál era la fuerza relativa de los dos comités?

R. Más o menos la misma. En la primer etapa de la radicalización, el Comité Nacional Contra la Guerra era más grande.

Pero fueron los estudiantes quienes explotaron como estrato social en 1968 y 1969. Después de esta explosión, cuando estudiantes y jóvenes obreros salieron a las calles en acciones combativas, el Partido Socialista ya no quiso participar en un movimiento tan combativo. Después de eso, el Comité Juvenil Nacional Contra la Guerra pasó a ser dirigido por las tendencias de extrema izquierda.

También para esta época los trotskistas abandonaron el Partido Socialista; esto fue parte del mismo proceso.

El movimiento obrero no explotó al mismo tiempo que los estudiantes, al final de la década del sesenta, y por eso los jóvenes obreros de izquierda quedaron aislados en los sindicatos. Pero después de 1971 y 1972, cuando se agotó la energía del movimiento estudiantil, los trabajadores comenzaron a moverse.

De tal manera que esos jóvenes obreros están ahora en una posición dirigente, aunque sólo a nivel local. La relación de fuerzas en los sindicatos ha cambiado en favor de los jóvenes obreros militantes. Pero aún ahora no tienen una dirección nacional.

P. ¿Cómo se reflejó esta nueva relación de fuerzas en la lucha anual de primavera por aumentos de salarios de este año?

R. La gran mayoría de la clase obrera se unió a la campaña por aumento de salario de la primavera pasada, con grandes huelgas. Alrededor de cinco o seis millones de trabajadores participaron en las huelgas por períodos de cuatro días hasta una semana en abril.

En la ofensiva salarial de la primavera pasada, vimos la oleada de huelgas más grande de la historia del movimiento obrero japonés de la postguerra.

Sin embargo los capitalistas decidieron hacer una transacción para postergar un enfrentamiento real con los trabajadores, por dos o tres razones.

La primera es que la clase capitalista pudo hacer concesiones económicas muy grandes, por ejemplo,

aumentos de salarios en el orden de los 20,000 ó 25,000 yens (entre 70 y 85 dólares) al mes, o un incremento del 23 al 30 por ciento. Los capitalistas pudieron dar estos aumentos debido a la acumulación de las grandes ganancias que les ha dejado la inflación y la llamada crisis del petróleo.

La segunda razón era política. Debido a la gran inflación de fines del año pasado y comienzos de este año, el descontento de la masas era muy profundo. Al mismo tiempo, la burguesía tenía que realizar en junio las elecciones para la cámara alta. La posición política del partido de la burguesía gobernante no era buena. Por esta razón la burguesía quería evitar un enfrentamiento serio justo antes de las elecciones.

Otra causa por la que no se desarrolló un enfrentamiento, fue la dirección con que contaba el movimiento sindical. Antes de la campaña por aumentos de salarios, la gran mayoría de la base obrera era muy combativa y deseaba llevar a cabo una verdadera lucha por sus reivindicaciones. Los burócratas sindicales vieron que su posición era muy precaria, por eso estaban ansiosos de realizar una transacción con el gobierno y la burguesía, de alcances nacionales, para evitar que los trabajadores se les escaparan del control.

Así, a pesar del apoyo a las huelgas y de que la combatividad de los obreros era muy alta, la base no tenía una dirección de izquierda independiente a nivel nacional.

Vemos que nuestro movimiento enfrenta dos problemas, en este momento. Uno es cómo planear y proyectar la próxima campaña de aumento de salarios de primavera. La segunda es cómo desarrollar una tendencia política independiente de oposición de izquierda a nivel nacional de la propia clase obrera.

P. ¿Cuál fue el papel jugado por la Liga Comunista Revolucionaria de Japón durante la última campaña por aumento de salarios?

R. Hicimos lo posible por intervenir en la campaña, el mejor ejemplo es el de la ciudad de Sendai. Tratamos de que las huelgas fueran activas, movilizando a los obreros a través de reuniones, piquetes, y ocupación de fábricas. Tuvimos éxito en ciertos sindicatos en varias ciudades; pero sólo en Sendai pudimos tener

un impacto sobre la huelga a nivel de la ciudad.

P. En los Estados Unidos la exigencia de una escala móvil de salarios para equilibrar la inflación se está volviendo cada vez más sentida. ¿Fue esto levantado como exigencia durante la ofensiva de primavera por aumento de salarios?

R. Sí, hubo mucha discusión sobre esta consigna, y nosotros planteamos esta cuestión durante la campaña. Pero hasta ahora la exigencia de una escala móvil de salarios no ha sido adoptada por el movimiento sindical en su conjunto.

Sohoy levantó la exigencia de una escala móvil de los salarios de los obreros retirados y lisiados, y que se den pensiones a las madres solteras. Y el gobierno hizo algunas concesiones a las demandas de escala móvil para los beneficios sociales, debido a que las presiones eran muy grandes a causa de la inflación.

P. ¿Es ilegal para los trabajadores públicos hacer huelga en Japón, y fue el derecho de huelga una reivindicación que se levantó en esas luchas?

R. Sí, los trabajadores del sector público no tienen derecho legal a hacer huelgas.

Pero en los últimos tres o cuatro años han estado haciendo huelgas "de facto."

En la campaña salarial, el gobierno trató de tomar represalias contra los trabajadores del sector público que hicieron huelga, pero las represalias fueron mínimas porque esto fue parte de la transacción entre los sindicatos y el gobierno.

Los trabajadores públicos fueron la verdadera vanguardia de toda la huelga general, una de las principales demandas fue la del derecho de huelga.

Pero en este punto también hubo una negociación, y la cuestión se pospuso para dentro de dos años. □

2. Los hacemos responsables porque sabemos que hasta el momento su Gobierno no ha intentado siquiera una sola acción de represión a las bandas fascistas, ni descubierto uno solo de los muchos crímenes cometidos contra nuestros compañeros argentinos, ni a los autores de los muchos asaltos, bombardeos, balaceras a los locales y miembros de las Organizaciones de Izquierda en Argentina. En cambio su "Gobierno Popular" se ha mostrado muy "hábil" en tratándose de localizar activistas sindicales y destrozando las sedes sindicales y de grupos políticos.

3. Denunciamos al conjunto de los patronos argentinos de apoyar directa o indirectamente estos crímenes. De los explotados bancarios colombianos sale un grito de repudio y protesta para el Gobierno Argentino, el Imperialismo USA y sus bandas de desclasados matones fascistas. La lucha de los trabajadores argentinos es también nuestra lucha.

4. Hacemos un llamado a todas las organizaciones políticas y sindicales colombianas que se reclaman del movimiento obrero, así como a todas las organizaciones democráticas del país, para que expresemos unitariamente nuestro NO a las actuales actuaciones represivas y reaccionarias contra el movimiento Obrero Popular Argentino.

Del Señor Embajador,

Unión Nacional de Empleados Bancarios, Junta Directiva Nacional.

Williams J. Meek G., Presidente

Eduardo Sossa Rojas, Srío. General
Luis Enrique Suárez L., Pres. Secc. B/manga.

Jorge Beltrán Franco, Tesorero

Orlando Quijano Q., Revisor Fiscal
Gustavo Liévano L., Srío. Educación

Oscar René Calvachi, Srío. Prensa y Propaganda □

Sindicalistas Colombianos Repudian Asesinatos y Represión en Argentina

[La siguiente es la reproducción de una carta enviada por la Junta Directiva de la Unión Nacional de Empleados Bancarios de Colombia, al Embajador de Argentina en ese país, Carlos R. Desmarás].

[Dicha carta se refiere al reciente asesinato de tres miembros del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional en la Argentina), entre ellos el dirigente nacional César Robles Urquiza. (*Intercontinental Press* informó sobre estos hechos el 11 de noviembre). Asimismo hay una referencia a los múltiples crímenes y represión de que son víctimas otros miembros de organizaciones sindicales combativas y de izquierda en ese país].

* * *

Noviembre 19 de 1974

Respetado Doctor,

Por medio de la presente queremos comunicarle que momentos después de haber conocido la noticia de la muerte brutal, el pasado 3 de noviem-

bre, en Buenos Aires, de tres jóvenes militantes del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), por parte de un grupo terrorista de derecha, de los que su Gobierno apaña, financia y apoya, hicimos conocer este hecho a amplios sectores sindicales de nuestro País, y de nuestro Gremio, en Asambleas efectuadas en diversas ciudades del país, acordándose por unanimidad repudiar públicamente estos asesinatos de las bandas fascistas, y cursar a usted un comunicado de repudio a tales actuaciones y a la actitud cómplice de su Gobierno que otorga la más insidiosa impunidad a los matones e inspiradores de dichos grupos de asesinos.

Expuesto lo anterior, somos enfáticos y firmes en lo siguiente:

1. Responsabilizamos a su Gobierno y al Imperialismo Norteamericano de tolerar y financiar los múltiples asesinatos de activistas y dirigentes políticos, peronistas de izquierda, comunistas, socialistas, dirigentes estudiantiles y activistas sindicales, ocurridos en su País en estos últimos meses del "Gobierno Popular."

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The Death of Holger Meins— Down With Solitary Confinement!

[The following article appeared in the November 20 issue of *Was Tun*, fortnightly publication of the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (International Marxist Group), the German section of the Fourth International. The translation for *Intercontinental Press* is by Russell Block.]

* * *

"Anger and sorrow over the death of a comrade"—that was the first reaction of the left following the death of Holger Meins, who went on a hunger strike in protest against the solitary confinement of political prisoners and died of "deterioration."

All measures that might have saved Comrade Holger's life were impeded or consciously sabotaged. The caloric content of his forced feedings was far below the minimum necessary for survival; there was no real medical treatment; he was denied an examination by a doctor he could trust; transfer to a hospital was refused.

In a transcribed telephone call to Dr. Prinzig, the judge assigned to the case, made a few hours after a visit to Meins, the prisoner's attorney informed the judge: "Holger Meins weighs less than 42 kg. [about 92 pounds]. . . . He is dying. He'll be dead in two days at the most. You are responsible for his death because you are the one who sets the conditions of his confinement. . . . The fact is that these conditions are aimed at killing Holger Meins through slow starvation. . . . You must allow a doctor he has confidence in to see him immediately!" The judge's cynical answer was that he was kept busy five days a week by "Baader-Meinhof"—on the weekends he didn't want to be disturbed.

In the first wave of actions, the revolutionary left protested against arbitrary justice with "sorrow and anger." But this anger was also directed against ourselves.

Holger Meins's hunger strike and death was the last political weapon of

an isolated prisoner. One who was doubly isolated. He was kept in prison in solitary confinement—a special method used by the state to break the will of political prisoners, to "take care of them" psychologically and physically. But he was also isolated on the left. This *political* isolation began with the urban guerrilla actions of the Red Army Faction (RAF), which we correctly dissociated ourselves from as individual terrorism. The isolation was deepened by the reaction of the bourgeois state—a massive buildup and extension of the forces of repression, the unleashing of a wave of hysteria against the RAF and the left in general. But then, when the RAF comrades were captured, imprisoned, and subjected to inhuman conditions—there was no excuse for it—the reaction of the left was as good as nil. The appeals of the political prisoners went for the most part unanswered.

Does Solitary Confinement Concern Just Prisoners?

It is not a moral question, a question of the inhuman conditions of confinement these particular comrades are subjected to. It is an issue for the entire left, for all anticapitalists and the workers movement as a whole. The handling of the RAF was and is a *practice drill* for the state in dealing with its enemies—regardless of whatever democratic constitution it relies on.

In the final analysis the enemy of the state is the working class itself. And in this country in particular, where judges now sitting often were judges under the Hitler dictatorship, where many judges acquitted, released, or delayed judicial action against the old mass murderers of the Nazi regime—here the connection is much clearer than elsewhere.

If today the RAF can be subjected to such conditions of confinement, then tomorrow it can be "ordinary demonstrators," the day after tomorrow strike leaders and class-conscious trade-

union leaders and so on until it reaches the proportions of the hundreds of thousands of organized workers who were imprisoned in concentration camps, tortured and killed, under Hitler's fascism.

At the same time, the treatment of the political prisoners was a *test*, a test to see how far the state could go at the present time, how long the revolutionary left would reply to solitary confinement with silence, how long the "liberal public" would remain relatively quiet.

How Did the Left React? What Are Our Tasks?

Considerably more than 10,000 comrades demonstrated, a few thousand more took part in actions, rallies, tribunals. Every one felt that a *political* answer was necessary. At the same time, the left proved incapable of seriously coordinating these actions and putting them on a political footing. Only in a few places were these difficulties overcome—for instance, in West Berlin (to be sure, in opposition to the sectarian politics of the KPD¹ and the KBW²), where more than 15,000 comrades took part in three demonstrations, a massive hunger strike in solidarity with the prisoners was organized, and more than 3,000 comrades attended a tribunal on political prisoners (November 16) aimed at addressing the "liberal public."

The left's response to the death of Holger Meins has demonstrated that a spontaneous answer, the short-term mobilization of 10,000 comrades, is not enough. What is necessary is to *unite* the revolutionary left in such an action. This must be done through action committees of all revolutionary organizations or by building defense committees for political prisoners. The basis for such united action committees must be the immediate demands being raised by the prisoners. The forms of action can include (in addition to the classical ones like demonstrations, teach-ins, etc.) organizing symbolic hunger strikes in support of the prisoners' hunger strike, organizing tribunals, and so on. Our long-term perspective is to build a

1. Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands—Communist party of Germany.

2. Kommunistbund Westdeutschlands—Communist League of West Germany.

"Red Help" committee as an organization providing aid for the *entire* left (as opposed to the "Red Help" committees of particular parties or tendencies).

Our fundamental principle in this is the following: In face of the repression of the bourgeois state, we are in solidarity with all sections of the left. Even if we have serious differences with the various currents in the left, we will not allow the bourgeoisie to decide these questions. On *this issue*, we will not allow ourselves to be divided.

If we mount a united campaign, we have a chance to win broader publicity for the demands of the prisoners, a chance to push through the immediate demands. This would be a victory not just for the prisoners, but

for the entire left. We still have a chance now, even though a completely irresponsible and insane act—the assassination of a West Berlin judge—has weakened our position, hurt the movement, and played into the hands of the bourgeoisie as nothing else could. Let us continue the struggle together with the political prisoners:

- End solitary confinement!
- End all forms of "special treatment"³ and discrimination against political prisoners!
- Withdraw the indictment against the defense attorneys!
- Freedom for all political prisoners!

3. For a description of the "special treatment" accorded West German political prisoners, see *Intercontinental Press*, December 2, p. 1632.

The Assassination of Judge Drenkmann— a Blow to Defense of Political Prisoners

[The following article appeared in the November 20 issue of *Was Tun*, fortnightly publication of the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (International Marxist Group), the German section of the Fourth International. The translation for *Intercontinental Press* is by Russell Block.]

* * *

Saturday [November 9]. The news of Holger Meins's death catches the state apparatus and its public-relations agencies in a state of confusion and embarrassment that is not just because of the weekend. The "proper authorities" refuse to make any statement. No one can be reached for comment. The attorneys for the RAF [Red Army Faction] prisoners, their press conference, and the serious and clearly justified complaints against the treatment meted out by the police and judicial system to the political prisoners on hunger strike have, via television, achieved an impact not approached by all the previous campaigns. The CSU* complaints about "biased" TV news coverage are only the delayed confirmation of the hopeless confusion that reigned among the rulers

*Christlich-Soziale Union—Christian Social Union, the right-wing Bavarian branch of the main bourgeois party.

that Saturday evening.

Sunday. Judge Günther von Drenkmann is shot to death in West Berlin. An act of revenge? An act of revolutionary justice? Exemplary punishment of an accomplice in a crime? Revolutionary violence or just counter-violence?

In any case, "the Holger Meins affair" is pushed into second place in the press headlines, the radio, and TV. The "cowardly, criminal murder of an innocent person," the "beginning of a new wave of terror" dominate the news media. Since Sunday: witnesses' accounts of the crime, descriptions of the flowers, a police artist's sketches of a bearded suspect, accounts of the life of noble Judge Drenkmann, meetings of the "authorities," warnings against attempting to hold solidarity demonstrations, security measures, indictments against the RAF attorneys, debates in the Bundestag. They've gotten hold of themselves again. The great law-and-order coalition is master of the situation again. They can order police mobilizations, ban demonstrations, show their strength.

For the Weyers, Maihofers, Schützes, Carstens, and whatever their names may be, who are suddenly once again available for indignant interviews, Judge Drenkmann could not have been shot at a more favorable time.

The assassination in Berlin was for them a welcome occasion for a diversionary campaign to distract attention from the judicial murder of Holger Meins. Had there been no Drenkmann assassination, they would have been obliged to invent one.

Revolutionary violence? The only violence that is revolutionary is that which serves the revolution. The Drenkmann assassination serves only the reaction; it harms the revolutionary forces and the hunger strikers themselves. The opportunity to take the scandal of how political prisoners are being treated by the state apparatus and make it the focus of an effective campaign—for once relatively unencumbered by the hysteria of the Baader-Meinhof witch-hunt—has been ruined. The state apparatus was off the hook again. The Drenkmann assassination was not *revolutionary* violence. It was also not a simple "tactical error." It was a crime against solidarity with the political prisoners.

Hardly ever has there been a single example that so clearly revealed the bankruptcy of individual terrorism. We are not pacifists. We are not shedding crocodile tears for Judge Drenkmann. Seeing the bourgeois law-and-order functionaries desert in the face of the news of Meins's death and then demagogically feign crocodile tears over Drenkmann makes one's fingers itch. But if we as revolutionists were to make our own moral indignation the basis for our actions, a justification for armed revenge, then we would have to spend all of our time—in the factory, in the school, in the university, and in the subway—running around with a loaded Smith and Wesson.

People who behave in this way are not revolutionists, but pacifists turned inside out. Just as the pacifist transforms his indignation over war and the violence of the rulers into impotent conscientious objection, which is useless in fighting the causes of war and violence, so the terrorist fires on easily replaceable figures in the state apparatus. Thus both pacifism and terrorism are petty-bourgeois (because they are individualistic) reactions that stand in contrast to revolutionary-proletarian methods of mass struggle and that generally have a destructive effect on such struggle.

If we, the entire left, are to avoid being forced completely onto the defensive in our struggle against sol-

itary confinement and judicial terror, in our solidarity and educational campaigns on political prisoners in the Federal Republic, then we must avoid the false alternative of those who claim that we must either support the terrorists at this given moment or differentiate ourselves from them.

Our attitude toward individual terrorism does not depend on the given situation. We have never given support to the activities of the original RAF or its "successors"—activities that were false, dangerous, and in effect

served the counterrevolution. The increased police persecution is also no reason for such solidarity. What we support is the struggle of *political* prisoners, that is, prisoners motivated by their opposition to the prevailing system, to repression by the state. The events of the last weeks that have raised this question in a more acute form are for us a reason for increasing our efforts in the struggle against solitary confinement, police and judicial terror, and the very institution of political prisoners, not for altering our political position on terrorism. □

Torture in West Germany

'A Red Stomach Tube Is Used'

By Holger Meins

[Holger Meins, a member of the RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion—Red Army Faction), the urban guerrilla group led by Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, died in Wittlich prison, Germany, on November 9, from the effects of a prolonged hunger strike and forced feeding. He had been protesting being held in permanent solitary confinement. On October 11, Meins wrote the following description of the forced feeding to which he was subjected. It was published in, among other places, the November 18 issue of the German weekly *Der Spiegel*. The translation for *Intercontinental Press* is by Russell Block.]

* * *

Since September 30 (twelve days) I have had forced feedings once a day. They take place in the prison hospital. The first week I put up different forms of resistance each day—flexible, at selected points. The orderlies grab, shove, yank you into an operating chair. Shackles: two handcuffs around the ankles; a strap about thirty centimeters wide around the waist; left arm—two broad leather strips with four straps from wrist to elbow; right arm—two, wrist and elbow; one across the chest. One of the orderlies or a male nurse grabs you from behind, both hands across your forehead, pressing your head against the headrest.

Mouth: On your right, the doctor on a stool with a little "crowbar" about twenty centimeters long. One end pointed, the other flat, wrapped with tape. This he uses to go through the lips, at the same time spreading them apart with his fingers, then between the teeth (relatively easy in my case since I have three teeth missing), and pries the teeth apart either by twisting or with direct pressure, then forcing the flat part against the palate. If you bite down hard, it is still rather difficult; this is one of the strongest points of defense but it can also easily cause damage to the teeth and gums.

They have three ways of countering the strength of your bite: forcing the jaws apart by hooking their fingers under the lips and simultaneously yanking down on your beard; strong pressure underneath the ears and against the maxillary joint, which is extremely painful; coming in from behind with their fingertips to encircle the muscle that runs diagonally from below up behind the ear, pinching, kneading, pressing the carotid artery, the jugular vein, and the vagus nerve back and forth against the muscle. Not only is this extremely painful at the time, but its effects last through the next day. As soon as the jaws are open far enough, the male nurse presses, forces, shoves the bit between your teeth from the left side.

Forced feeding: a red stomach tube is used (not a catheter). It's about the thickness of a middle finger. It is oiled, but in practice, it never goes down without automatically inducing choking since the tube is only one to three millimeters smaller than the esophagus (this can only be avoided by swallowing it down and completely relaxing). Even slight exertion causes choking and heaving, then spasms of the chest and stomach muscles, convulsions that spread with increasing force and intensity, seizing the entire body as it revolts against the tube. The more intense it becomes, the longer it goes on, the worse it is—a continual convulsion of choking and heaving accompanied by waves of muscle spasms.

Once the tube is in the stomach, a funnel is placed in the upper end and the broth is funneled in, slowly, in small doses, from a normal-sized cup. It's a kind of meat broth. They always pour the whole cup down no matter what—even when the choking becomes so strong that the whole body is racked with convulsions.

By the time the tube is withdrawn, the whole thing has lasted three to five minutes, depending. (With strong resistance you can prolong it to 20 to 30 minutes, but you can't prevent forced feeding by yourself.) Since the beginning of this week (October 8) I have hardly put up active resistance anymore, just passive resistance, "refusal to move voluntarily." This makes it more bearable, but it is totally dependent on me, not on the method of forced feeding. Under any circumstances the tube is a form of torture. □

Assassination Attempt in Peru

Peru's premier, Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, and two other officials in the country's military government narrowly escaped an assassination attempt December 1, the Ministry of the Interior announced the following day. According to the official statement, unidentified assailants fired from a vehicle that drew alongside the premier's car.

Mercado Jarrin, who is also war minister and commander in chief of the army, escaped injury. Two generals riding with him were wounded.

On December 4 the government introduced the death penalty for acts of terrorism that cause deaths or injuries. Such sentences are to be carried out within forty-eight hours.

Thirteen Days in Pinochet's Torture Chambers

[In his November 27 column, Jack Anderson printed extracts from a sworn affidavit by Amy Conger, an American art teacher tortured for thirteen days by the Chilean junta. We are reprinting below the full text of Conger's affidavit, which was inserted in the December 4 *Congressional Record* by Senator Edward Kennedy.]

* * *

I lived in Chile from April 19, 1972, until October 28, 1974. I was contracted by the University of Chile to teach History of Art in the Department of Fine Arts and Architecture in Santiago.¹ I taught in the University for more than a year before the coup of September 11, 1973, and for exactly 13 months afterwards. The History of Art and Art Education Department was purged after the coup and 64 of the 72 professors were dismissed. I was one of the 8 that remained.

From October 11th to October 24th I was imprisoned in the Academia de Guerra, a concentration camp run by the Air Force for political prisoners, for people who had already been condemned and others who were suspected of having at some time participated in subversive activities. The latter were considered guilty until they could prove their innocence. Everyone was incommunicado, in isolation. I was aware of about 60 prisoners but I knew there were more in other parts of the building.

I was brutally arrested October 11th about 7 p.m. by four men in street clothes with submachine guns. I was tightly handcuffed, repeatedly threatened and literally thrown in a car. I was never shown either identification or a detention order, contrary to the declarations which General Pinochet

1. I received a M.A. in History of Art from the University of Iowa in August 1966. In 1966-7 I taught at the University of Southern Illinois at Edwardsville and in February 1968 I passed my doctoral examinations at Washington University in St. Louis. Between 1968 and 1972 I studied and did research in Europe on 15th century fresco painting thanks to a Woodrow Wilson Pre-Doctoral Fellowship, a Fulbright Women Grant and an American Association of University Women Fellowship.

had made to the Chilean and international press. One of the men tried to pull off my sweater but it was impossible because I was handcuffed; needless to say I felt conspicuous passing through the city bare-breasted. They blindfolded me and drove me to an unknown place. Although I asked several times, they would never let me speak to the U. S. Consul. Later they categorically denied that I had asked. While I was blindfolded, they repeatedly interrogated and harassed me—frequently in English. Several of these Air Force officers had studied in the United States. Some of them were intensely anti-American: "I hate Americans—they are egotistical, stupid and selfish!" Two of them told me that, at the expense of the U. S. Air Force, they had toured the U. S. (Las Vegas, San Francisco, Disneyland, etc.) and had trained there (Florida, Colorado) for several months. I was impressed by the fact that two of the officers that were interrogating me were smoking U. S. cigarettes, one of them Kools, a brand not available even in the black market in Chile.

They threatened me with rape² and the DINA (Direccion de Inteligencia Nacional: a military group specialized in brute physical torture, particularly electric shock, the rack, choking or drowning in excrement and pentothal). They "let me" fall down the stairs while I was blindfolded. They tortured people at my side while I was blindfolded. I heard horrible, prolonged screams in the night. I stood for hours and hours against a wall. They gave me two cups of water each day to drink, 900 calories of food, a perfect starvation diet. I underwent it for only 13 days. Others have been there for more than 8 months.

The bathroom had running water for only about 15 minutes a day to serve the needs of about 60 prisoners. The unflushable toilets were teeming with flies (it is Spring in Santiago) and brimming with great quantities of blood and excrement. The three stalls were calf high with newspaper which had served as toilet paper. There were no windows in the part

2. E.g., while they had me lying on a bed one said: "You know it's impossible to rape a woman if she doesn't want it."

occupied by the prisoners, 24 hours of artificial light, constant noise; 1 officer, 1 sub-officer and 6 guards nervously playing and experimenting with their submachine guns, cocking them, changing to automatic, etc. And a cassette player that repeated Joan Baez's "Happy Birthday."

I learned to peek around my blindfold. I saw two officers slugging and kicking Juan, an 18 year old, ex-seminary student whose only crime was to have been with me when they arrested me. I heard his sharp quick screams of No and afterwards, long cries of No, like a dying animal. Finally he confessed to anything they suggested. He invented charges against his sister, who is a very close friend of mine and who had never had anything to do with politics, against his mother, who had just been cleared and freed after 13 months of imprisonment. (In the actual moment when they went to arrest the two, the daughter had gone to the Women's Prison to finally accompany her mother home. Upon arriving and being told about their "visitors" by the neighbors, they beat it.) Juan also invented a story about a doctor, a neighbor, whom consequently they arrested. The MD was still jailed during my last week there. They couldn't find the weapons that he was supposed to have but they came across three bottles of tranquilizers and assumed that he had a clandestine clinic. They questioned me about the doctor twice.

They left Juan standing up against the wall for entire days without food and water, handcuffed, blindfolded. Finally one day he fainted. They grabbed him by his handcuffs, dragged him along the floor, stood him up and leaned him against the wall. Since he had not regained consciousness, he fell again. So they repeated the same treatment three more times until they realized that it was hopeless and they threw him in a chair for two hours.

Finally they sent Juan to the DINA. When he returned his chest was covered with black and blue marks and with inflamed red points. His face was totally without color, as white as plaster—it seems, anemic because of blood

loss. He had a deep cut about five inches long, open and unbandaged on the inside of his left arm. I never knew if this wound was the result of torture or if he had tried to commit suicide. At this point, it's the same thing.

Another young man returned from his trip to the DINA with disks broken in his spinal cord, and another in a wheelchair with a broken leg.

Frequently they would seat prisoners at a table next to me to write their "confessions." They would scream and plead for water; often they fell asleep. I remember one that cried "Give me water! I haven't had water in 7 days. I haven't eaten. I haven't slept. Give me some water!" They answered him firmly "No. Later. We'll only give you water if you write a confession that we like." It seems that they have found this to be an effective technique for extracting confessions; however, it seems that they are almost always largely false.

As I witnessed all of this I remembered that only a week before General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte had repeated his declarations about torture in Chile: that in the first few days after the *coup* possibly there had been a few, isolated, accidental cases of torture, but now, it positively did not exist. And he promised adamantly to court-martial anyone involved in torture.

I was extremely fortunate. For them, I was a foreigner, a woman and a blond. I was offered two possibilities: signing a "confession" and being expelled from the country or being sent to the DINA and afterwards to a military court where I would receive a sentence of about 30 years. The officers knew perfectly well that my only transgression was to have known people whom they considered to be undesirable. For a Chilean this could have been worth a sentence of several years, or decades, but it is ticklish with a foreigner since it is commonly known that in March 1973, 44% of the country voted for the left, and consequently, today 44% of the country is undesirable.

On the 13th day I "confessed." I remember that the "confession" said something about extremist friends, a press for subversive literature and being a "front" for someone. The U. S. Consul arrived at the same time. He had been notified the day (30 hours) before that I was being held by the

Air Force. On October 12th, the day after my arrest, my teaching assistant had gone to my house, had been arrested, humiliated, witnessed the wanton and sadistic mass destruction of my apartment and had been threatened with possible death, sure torture and imprisonment if he told anyone what he had seen. He told friends. He refused to call the U. S. Consulate because he knew that he was the only one that knew, and having heard about the connections between the U. S. Consulate and the CIA, he assumed that the Consul was working with the military. Finally friends in Buenos Aires found out, called my father in Chicago and he called the Consul in Santiago.

Open Letter From Raissa Moroz

[Valentyn Moroz, the dissident Ukrainian historian who has been on a hunger strike since July 1 in protest of the brutal conditions of his imprisonment, was visited in Vladimir prison on November 5 by his wife, Raissa, his son, and his father. Moroz went on his hunger strike to back up his demand that he be transferred to a labor camp. He has announced that he will commit slow suicide if the authorities have not at the very least transferred him to a communal cell and allowed him to work by January 1, 1975.

[Raissa Moroz released the open letter printed below to foreign reporters in Moscow on November 10. The text was made available through the New York-based Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners.]

* * *

My husband, political prisoner Valentyn Moroz, has had a visit from his family and has completed the 128th day of his hunger strike. As always, there were guards present during the conversation and they repeatedly interrupted us, first forbidding us to speak about one thing, then another. But there was also something unheard-of in Vladimir: besides the guards, a correspondent of APN [Agentsvo Pechati Novosti—a Soviet press agency] was present during the visit. It was perhaps for this reason that the meeting took place not in a bare and ugly room but in a hall with furniture and a television set.

I was freed after 13 days, the most fortunate person in Chile. The nerve in my left thumb is still disabled (due to the tightness of the handcuffs on the first day and that they couldn't find a key for six hours), I had acquired an impressive vaginal discharge, I was somewhat black and blue, incredibly filthy and smelling not having changed my clothes or really washed in 13 days, badly dehydrated, 9 pounds lighter and with protein and cholesterol levels abnormally low. All totally insignificant. I cannot and do not want to forget the suffering of the Chilean political prisoners and the new-found misery of the Chilean people, all in the name of law, order and democracy. □

I do not know what information APN plans on giving about Moroz, so I intend to do this myself.

Valentyn is frighteningly emaciated (52 kilograms [114 lbs.] at 175 cm. [5'8"]). His face is puffed up and there are bags under his eyes. He complains of heart pain. But his greatest suffering is caused by the tube with the help of which they have been force-feeding him once every 24 hours since the 12th day of his hunger strike. This tube abrades the walls of the throat and the esophagus. When they withdraw it, it's all covered with blood. The pain which Valentyn at first had only during the feeding has become constant now. Valentyn is almost continuously semiconscious. In spite of this, he forces himself to get up on his feet from time to time, because he fears that they will atrophy. And such is the strength of this man that they did not carry him to the meeting—he came under his own power. But no matter how tough a person is, his physical capabilities have their limits.

And now, in order to save the life of Moroz, it is mandatory that he be placed in a hospital immediately and provided with extended, thorough medical care. But then the prison warden says that regardless of whether Valentyn continues his strike or ends it, he will remain in prison. This is equivalent to a death sentence. My husband understands this and has accepted the following decision: He will continue his hunger strike two more months, to January 1, 1975. If by

that time he does not succeed in getting out of the prison, he will find a way to end his life.

"The year 1975 in prison does not exist for me," he said, and I have no

doubt that he will carry out his decision just as he has with the decision for his continuous hunger strike.

Is it really possible that in today's world a person whose total guilt lies

in four journalistic essays, called anti-Soviet by a court, should pay for it with his life?

Raissa Moroz
November 5, 1974

Behind Caramanlis's Victory in Greek Elections

[The following editorial appeared in the November 23 issue of *Ergatike Pale*, the weekly that reflects the views of the Greek Trotskyists. The translation from the Greek is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The electoral victory by Caramanlis's Nea Demokratia,¹ which got 54 percent of the vote, was something that we expected, although not of course in its full dimensions.

The "renovated" parliamentary right cut deeply into the vote of the center and the political formations of the left—the Enomene Aristera² and PASOK.³ Not even Caramanlis's most optimistic partisans expected such a victory.

However, this development is not inexplicable. The exploited and oppressed working masses have been through a terrible seven years of military dictatorship, and exactly one year ago they saw the tanks go into action to mow down students and workers at the Polytechnic Institute.

The masses accepted Caramanlis's government of "national unity" as a genuine "change." They had seen the traditional political organizations that held their confidence ten years ago either participate in this government (as the Enosis tou Kentrou⁴) or praise it and seek to participate in it (as the two CPs and the EDA⁵).

The PASOK, which talked about "socialism" and put forward an advanced transitional program, did not show

the masses how these slogans were going to be carried out—it only sought their votes, like all the parliamentarist parties. (Its leader himself [Andreas Papandreou] had participated in bourgeois "democratic" governments that had bitterly disillusioned the masses.) The ultimatum—"Caramanlis or the tanks"—had its effect on the broad strata of working masses.

Caramanlis's democratic gestures (a climate of basic political freedoms, abrogation of Law No. 509,⁶ dissociation from the military side of NATO, etc.), along with the shameless demagoguery he directed at the peasants and the heavily taxed Greek people and his promises of a "new, progressive democracy," reinforced the people's illusions.

Fear of the tanks, Caramanlis's demagoguery, the political climate of the campaign, reinforcement of the masses' illusions, and above all the shameful obeisance of the traditional left to the "national salvation" brought about by the change from the junta were decisive factors in the outcome of this electoral test. And the result unquestionably represents a setback for the anticapitalist mass movement.

The new Caramanlis government will quickly disillusion the working masses who voted for it. It is going to strengthen the executive branch. It will strike at the economic, trade-union, and political rights of the workers movement. It will reintegrate the country into NATO and make a rotten compromise in Cyprus. It will defend to the best of its ability the interests of the capitalist state and the European and American monopolies. The resistance of the exploited masses to the ruling class and the capitalist government of Caramanlis will take

on greater dimensions. New popular struggles will break out against the monarchy (whose fate will be decided by the plebiscite in December) and against capitalism. And these struggles will need a new leadership.

In the recent elections the bankruptcy of the traditional left was revealed once again as its mass influence dropped. This occurred precisely at a time when the more general conditions both internationally and in Greece are creating a favorable framework for the growth of the anticapitalist and anti-imperialist mass movement. On the international level there is the upsurge of the European workers movement, the crisis of the European Economic Community, and the simultaneous recession in the big capitalist countries of Europe, North America, and Asia. And in Greece there is the fall of the military dictatorship, the "national crisis" over Cyprus, the radicalization of the youth, the resumption of the giant rallies of masses of working people and of demonstrations, the free circulation of the left press, the spread of strikes, and so on.

The crisis of leadership in the workers and people's movement is becoming more and more glaringly clear. The need for building a new revolutionary leadership of the masses is more imperative than ever before, in order to open the road toward proletarian socialist democracy.

This road runs through the day-to-day class struggles for higher wages and for doubling the miserable pensions that people cannot live on, for automatic cost-of-living increases in wages, for absorbing unemployment by establishing a seven-hour day, for equal wages for women, for the right to vote for eighteen-year-olds, for reducing the term of military service to one year, and for many immediate and transitional demands. Forming a united front for anticapitalist mass struggle is an immediate and urgent task. □

1. New Democracy, an expanded version of the traditional rightist party, the Ethnike Rizospastike Enosis (National Radical Union).

2. United Left, the two Communist parties and fellow travelers.

3. Panellenio Sosialistiko Kinema—Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement.

4. Center Union, the bourgeois-liberal party.

5. Enosis tes Demokratikes Aristeras—Union of the Democratic Left, the old CP electoral front, now controlled by the "interior" CP.

6. The legislation banning the CP.