



Turns provocative bombings to account.

Wilson Pushes Witch-Hunt Against Irish

Frame-Up Victim in Carrero Blanco Assassination Case

Genoveva Forest Tortured by Franco's Police

Police Terror in Bangladesh

12,000 Political Prisoners Rot in Mujib's Jails

Roy Medvedev

Problems of Democratization and Détente

León Trotsky

Peligrosa Táctica en la Lucha Contra los Fascistas

Doublespeak Finals

The first annual "Doublespeak Awards" were made in New Orleans November 28 by the Committee on Public Doublespeak, an organization set up in the United States in 1972 by the National Council of Teachers of English.

Colonel David H.E. Opfer, former air attache at the U.S. Embassy in Phnompenh, was given an award because of his complaint to reporters:

"You always write it's bombing, bombing, bombing. It's not bombing. It's air support."

Ronald L. Ziegler, Nixon's press attache, won with his statement about the safeguarding of Watergate tapes:

"I would feel that most of the conversations that took place in those areas of the White House that did have the recording system would, in almost their entirety, be in existence, but the special prosecutor, the court, and, I think, the American people are sufficiently familiar with the recording system to know where the recording devices existed and to know the situation in terms of the recording process, but I feel, although the process has not been undertaken yet in preparation of the material to abide by the court decision, really, what the answer to that question is."

Donald Jay Willower, professor of education at Pennsylvania State University, received a citation for the following:

"Yet, the most basic problems that arise in connection with knowledge utilization may be those that stem from the social and organizational character of educational institutions. A few university adaptations already have been highlighted. Public schools display a myriad of normative and other regulatory structures that promote predictability, as well as a host of adaptive mechanisms that reduce external uncertainties."

M&M/Mars, a manufacturer of candy, was singled out "for skillful use of the language of silence" in a commercial for children. The "bad guy" in tooth decay is plaque, said the commercial; and the "super cops" are toothbrushes and dental floss. The advertisement also said that the American Dental Association had reviewed the presentation.

The commercial did not mention that the ADA urges avoidance of sweets, pointing out that cavities are caused by the interactions of bacteria in plaque film and sugar. □

To Our Readers

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Witch-Hunt in Britain Against the Irish

By Gerry Foley

In the week following the November 21 bombings in Birmingham, which the Wilson government and the capitalist press blamed on Irish nationalists, sweeping repressive legislation was rushed through the British parliament.

"The bill completed its commons passage at 9 a.m. after an all-night session," a November 29 dispatch reported in the *Washington Post*. "Some 20 minutes later it reached the House of Lords and passed in minutes through all stages without dissent. A messenger rushed it to Buckingham Palace, where Queen Elizabeth signed it. . . ."

Describing the bill's provisions on November 25, British Home Secretary Roy Jenkins said that it would empower his office "to proscribe organisations concerned in terrorism or in promoting or encouraging it with respect to affairs in Northern Ireland.

"The Bill will specify the IRA at least, but additional proscriptions which may well be necessary will be made by Order. It will be an offence to belong to a proscribed organisation or to support such an organisation financially or in other ways.

"The maximum penalty will be six months' imprisonment or a £400 fine, or both, on summary conviction, and five years' imprisonment or an unlimited fine or both on conviction on indictment." (Quoted in the *Financial Times* of London, November 26.)

The bill was passed with only one change, the *Washington Post* reported: "This deleted a section stipulating that possession of a document addressed to an individual and naming him as an IRA member would be taken as automatic evidence of membership."

The law can be used to penalize anyone who sympathizes with the political objectives of militant Irish nationalists or even objects to the persecution of individual activists. It threatens not only those who maintain the Irish tradition of resistance to British rule in Ireland but any non-Irish citizen of the British state

who might defend the victims of imperialist repression.

"It will be an offence, punishable on summary conviction with a maximum of three months' imprisonment, or a £200 fine or both," Jenkins continued, "for a person to display in a public place any item of dress or other article so as to arouse reasonable apprehension that he is a member of, or a supporter of, a proscribed organisation.

"It will thus be an offence to wear clothing or armbands which are plainly IRA insignia but which fall short of the requirements for a successful prosecution under the provisions of the Public Order Act, 1936, which prohibits the wearing of political uniforms, and it will be an offence to carry banners in support of the IRA."

The main banner used by the Irish nationalists and their supporters is the national flag of Ireland. Display of this symbol was banned in Northern Ireland by the Flag and Emblems Act passed by the Belfast parliament in the 1950s. The largest attacks on the Catholic ghettos before 1969 were police pogroms aimed at suppressing the display of Irish national symbols.

In addition to threatening a ban on the symbols of Irish separatism, the British home secretary made it clear that persons born in the part of Ireland incorporated into the British state do not have the full rights of British citizens:

"An exclusion order may be made against a person if it appears to the Secretary of State that he is concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, or is attempting, or may attempt, to enter Great Britain for that purpose, or has knowingly harboured such a person or any person against whom an exclusion order has been made.

"It is to be an offence, subject to the same penalties as membership in a proscribed organisation, for a person to fail to comply with an order which has been served on him, or knowingly to facilitate the entry into Great Britain of a person subject to

an exclusion order or knowingly to harbour such a person."

This provision empowering the London government to deport Northern Irish British citizens from the island of Great Britain was defended in these terms November 30 by the "liberal" *Manchester Guardian Weekly*:

"The more practical change in the law is the provision to exclude undesirables from Great Britain. In effect this means that citizens of the United Kingdom may be confined to one part of it—the Province of Ulster. As a precedent the Home Secretary cited the Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1939, but whatever the precedents it will not be a popular measure throughout Northern Ireland because of the discrimination it entails between British subjects proper, as it were, and British subjects of grace. But here again it is a sensible way of limiting the spread of IRA (or of militant Protestant) activity on the mainland." (Emphasis added.)

Because of the importance of extended family and local ties for Irish persons forced to emigrate to England to find work, the provisions penalizing anyone associated with political "undesirables" (a large percentage of the Catholic population of Northern Ireland) seemed designed to intimidate the entire immigrant community.

The number of Irish driven to emigrate to Britain, as a result in the last analysis of British imperialist control of their country, is estimated at anywhere from a third to a half that of the population of Ireland as a whole. Because of the pattern of temporary emigration, too, a large proportion of workers in Ireland have worked for periods in Britain or can expect to be forced to do so in the future.

The new legislation also seemed to introduce something like the special powers long used by the Protestant colonialist police and the British troops in Northern Ireland:

"The police will be able to detain for 48 hours (and for five more days

with the consent of the Secretary of State) and to fingerprint a person arrested under these powers or for a major offence under the Bill.

"These powers will, among other things, enable the police to hold a suspected terrorist while they question him, investigate his background and check his fingerprints against their records."

The oppressed Catholic people of Northern Ireland have learned through long experience that a lot of things can happen to a person while he or she is being "detained" forty-eight hours, to say nothing of five days. In particular in the climate of chauvinist frenzy that has prevailed since the Birmingham bombings, any Irish person "detained" will be in danger of being brutally treated.

Jenkins admitted: "These powers are Draconian. In combination they are unprecedented in peacetime."

The justifications the British government and the big capitalist press gave for this legislation amounted to condoning chauvinist hatred of Irish nationalism. In the debate in parliament November 28 (quoted in the November 29 *London Times*), Jenkins said:

"I have never claimed, and do not claim now, that proscription of the IRA will as of itself reduce terrorist outrages, but the public should no longer have to endure the affront of public demonstrations in support of that body."

In an editorial November 27, the *London Times* said: "Proscription of the IRA, and power to proscribe its front organizations, will not cause them to disappear, but it is appropriate to the general feelings of indignation that they should [not] be permitted to exist within the law."

The *Manchester Guardian Weekly* of November 30 said: "These are outrages beyond endurance. . . . A liberal society cannot let its freedom, and its concerns for the rights of the individual, be abused in order that it shall be torn to pieces. Our society is suffering murder and mutilation and it must protect itself. . . ."

"The infamous James McDaid [a Provisional IRA volunteer] received his deserts when he killed himself in trying to kill others in Coventry. Yet in some eyes he is a hero, and for every McDaid who dies before he can get away, there are others who will plant a bomb and laugh at the results on television. Our laws and our police

procedures were not designed to handle men like this. It must be questionable whether these men—and women—have any purpose other than to bomb for bombing's sake. . . . Yet although their purposes are criminal



JENKINS: In charge of Wilson's witch-hunt against Irish activists.

to the point of mental derangement, they enjoy the support of people whose aim is avowedly political."

If the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* editorial writers were interested in the motivations of a man like James McDaid and those who sympathize with him, a clue was available on the front page of the November 29 issue of the Provisional paper *An Phoblacht*. The caption on a prominent picture read:

"Mrs. Esther McDaid, mother of James McDaid, in the living room of her home in the Ardoyne, Belfast. On the wall is a plaque in memory of her son Gerrard, who was shot dead by British troops, near his home in Belfast, three years ago. . . . As she waited at her home for the remains of her son, James, to be brought back to Belfast for burial she said: 'I think James deserved a hero's funeral. After all, he gave his life for his country.'"

The Ardoyne district has a reputation for being the bitterest Catholic ghetto in the North, the hardest hit

by chronic unemployment and military repression.

However, the British rulers and the capitalist press tried to use the hysteria created by the bombings to keep the public from learning anything about the feelings of the oppressed Irish people.

The way the special powers legislation was speeded through the parliament left no doubt about the lynching spirit of British ruling circles. The parliamentary leaders were obviously unconcerned about establishing responsibility for the bombings, which the Provisional IRA denied carrying out. No evidence was presented that any Irish organization was responsible.

However, the only opposition to immediate and unanimous passage came from the Conservatives led by the Tory shadow home secretary, Sir Keith Joseph (who gained notice recently by explaining the need to discourage what he thought were inferior human beings from breeding). The Tories wanted to take advantage of the situation to restore capital punishment.

It was clear that the new legislation was intended to be used indiscriminately against the Irish nationalist organizations. In the debate in the House of Commons November 28, Jenkins was asked if the provisions referred to both the Official and Provisional IRA. His answer was yes. However, the Official IRA has stressed for some years now that it is opposed in principle to a terrorist campaign in Britain.

The *London Times* tried to justify the witch-hunt against Irish nationalists in these terms in its November 27 editorial: "The IRA command spokesman in Dublin has disclaimed his group's responsibility for the Birmingham murders, and in past incidents some reliance could be placed on what their official spokesmen said. Against that is the intention recently declared by Mr David O'Connell [Daithi O'Connell] on behalf of the Provisional IRA to carry into Great Britain an enlarged campaign of bombing of military and administrative targets. And there are indications which suggest that IRA killing squads in Great Britain act without reference to the Dublin command. In that case IRA responsibility is indirect but sufficient, and exceptional counter-measures are in any case warranted whichever the precise faction of murder."

In other words, violent acts carried out by any persons of Irish origin who believe or say that they are striking a blow for their people can be used to condemn Irish nationalist organizations, regardless of whether these acts are carried out under their discipline or with their political approval. In the 1880s, the British imperialist press tried in a similar way to link the leaders of the mass land-reform movement to the Phoenix Park murders, the assassination of the British governor of Ireland and his secretary by a primitive lumpenproletarian terrorist group.

The conditions of Irish workers under imperialism tend to generate desperate actions by small groups that no one can control. In the first place, there is large-scale chronic unemployment. What employment there is often is not very reliable. Large numbers of workers are forced to move around from place to place to make a living, in particular to a foreign country, the imperialist center, which they have come to regard as hostile to them. In England itself, they tend to be concentrated in physically hard and unprotected lines of work, like construction.

The six men the police arrested on suspicion of the Birmingham bombings could be the scapegoats in a case similar to that of the Invincibles who carried out the Phoenix Park murders. They were listed in the November 26 *London Times* as: "Hugh Callaghan, aged 44, unemployed; Patrick Joseph Hill, aged 30, unemployed; Robert Gerrard Hunter, aged 29, unemployed; Noel Richard McIlkenny, aged 31, millwright's mate; William Power, aged 29, unemployed; and John Walker, aged 39, a crane-driver.

"All live in Birmingham. . . ."

In any case, these Irish laborers are not likely to be in a very good position to defend themselves against the hanging mood of the British authorities.

In the absence of any mass workers leadership in Britain with the courage and principle to oppose the anti-Irish campaign, there is a real danger that some backward sections of the British working class will be swept along by the witch-hunt.

"It is at work that naked passions are least easily contained," two correspondents wrote from Birmingham in the November 24 issue of the *London* weekly, the *Observer*: "One trade

union leader who described Friday's factory demonstrations as 'frightening,' compared them to the London dockers' marches in support of [the racist demagogue] Enoch Powell when dockers sang 'By-bye blackbird.'"

In view of the chauvinism brought to the surface by the Birmingham bombings, Daithi O Conaill's statements on Thames television in mid-November perhaps reflected a feeling of despair on the part of those closest to the victims of British repression. "For five years, Kitson's theory of leaning on the people has been done in the North of Ireland. What have we got from the British public, what have we got from the British people? Total indifference. They can wash their hands.

"We said last week in a statement that the British Government and the British people must realise that because of the terror they wage in Ireland they must suffer the consequences." (From the published text in issue No. 57 of the *Irish Republican Information Service* bulletin.)

Whatever the attitude of the masses of the British people, the objective fact is that they do not benefit from the imperialist domination of Ireland and have to underwrite the costs of maintaining it. Furthermore, it is an objective fact that the development of the world recession, and of the British economic crisis in particular, is opening up a deep split between British workers and the imperialist circles that are directing the campaign against the Irish people.

Nothing could be better calculated to re-cement "national unity" between the British masses and their rulers than the idea that the IRA intended to make the British public "suffer the consequences" of their government's actions in Ireland, actions which because of their indoctrination they cannot be expected to understand or even know about.

O Conaill's statements played perfectly into the British government's hands. They violated the precept, which every good soldier should know, that the objective of tactics is to divide your enemy's forces, not unite them.

On the other hand, the interview also reflected the force that has counterbalanced all the Provisionals' political errors—the determination of the most oppressed section of the Irish

people to strike back at British imperialism regardless of the cost.

This section is still a minority. The Irish people are considerably less prone to nationalist emotions than their British counterparts, since they know that they, all of them, will have to fight any war against Britain themselves and against tremendous odds, without any help from the Dublin regime.

However, the escalating imperialist repression and the more and more obvious inability of the neocolonialist system to offer any economic hope to the Irish workers are creating conditions in which the majority may become convinced that they have no choice but to fight.

The deportation of Irish people from the British "mainland" is no way to peace. The "undesirables" that have to be deported are the repressive forces maintained in Northern Ireland by British imperialism. That is the answer of young Irish workers in Britain to the witch-hunt whipped up by the imperialist government, an interviewer indicated in the November 29 *London Times*.

"Mr. Kelly and his friends agreed that they were making a good living in London and had encountered no hostility. 'The simple fact is,' he said, 'we believe in a United Ireland and the IRA are fighting to achieve it against an army of occupation. If you give us Northern Ireland, we will return Kilburn and Cricklewood* to you.'" □

*Districts in North London inhabited by Irish immigrants.

'Early Retirement' for Armenian CP Boss

The Soviet press agency Tass announced November 27 that Anton Kochinyan, the Communist party leader in the Soviet Armenian Republic, had been allowed to retire. It has been noted that at sixty-one, Kochinyan is rather young to be retiring from such a plush post. Among the possible reasons Western reporters have cited for his retirement were his apparent difficulties in stemming Armenian nationalist sentiment, as indicated by the number of recent trials of nationalists there.

In at least three separate trials earlier this year, eleven Armenian nationalists received stiff sentences for alleged "anti-Soviet activity" and participation in "anti-Soviet organizations," namely, the banned National Unity party of Armenia.

Peronist Regime Steps Up Attacks on Alleged Leftist Guerrilla Groups

Since declaring a state of siege November 6, the Peronist regime has stepped up its war of extermination against the left-wing guerrillas, most of whom are its own disillusioned former supporters. Almost every day for the past three weeks, the Argentine papers have carried lists of persons arrested on charges of guerrilla activity. In the process, it seems clear, the rightist regime of Isabel Perón has tried to settle some old scores against liberal and left Peronists.

On November 27, police announced the arrest of suspects in the assassination of federal police chief Alberto Villar and his wife. The persons accused were Antonio di Rosa, 58, and his son, Juan, 26.

"In their home at Almafuerte 251 in Villa Luzuriaga [a suburb of the Argentine capital], subversive pamphlets from the organization that outlawed itself [i.e., the Peronist Montoneros] were captured," the Buenos Aires daily *Clarín* reported. "Also found were documents that, according to a police spokesman, established a link between the persons arrested and the group that staged the fatal attack on the federal police chief. . . ."

Also on November 27, two other alleged Montoneros were arrested in Greater Buenos Aires. On the same day, five persons were arrested in La Plata, in Buenos Aires province, including Pedro Eugenio Lazabeborde, twenty-eight years old, former director of the local Banco Municipal under the liberal Peronist governor Oscar Bidegain. Presumably they were left Peronists. In Paraná, another six persons were arrested.

On November 28, the police in Mendoza city reported the discovery of a guerrilla operations center in a garage and the capture of six persons, including Juan Carlos Zárate, the former chief bodyguard of ex-Governor Alberto Martínez Baca, who was removed from office by the federal government.

Following the federal take-over of the province of Salta, the November 25 issue of the Buenos Aires daily

La Razón reported the arrest of seventeen former officials of the ousted liberal government, including the former Minister of Justice Farat Sire Salim and legislators who supported the deposed governor Miguel Ragone. They were charged with involvement in "subversive activities."

Continuing roundups of alleged guerrillas were reported in the December 1 issue of *Clarín*, which noted the arrest of two persons in Bahía Blanca, along with the capture of military equipment, and the seizure of a guerrilla arsenal in San Miguel in the province of Tucumán.

The most extensive arrests of alleged guerrillas have been in Córdoba, and most of those named have been identified with the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP—Revolutionary People's Army). In a news conference November 21, the provincial chief of police, Héctor García Rey, announced that 200 guerrillas had been captured during the previous twenty days. Among these was Juan Carlos Álvarez, allegedly the leader of the ERP's trade-union work in the area.

All the equipment taken by the ERP in its raids on the Villa María arms factory and the 141st Communications Battalion had been recovered, García Rey claimed.

The bloodiest incident so far in this series of "counterinsurgency operations" was also in Córdoba.

Early in the morning of November 20, a dairy truck driver spotted a car following him. He informed a radio-dispatched police unit. The police stopped the car and demanded that the occupants get out and identify themselves. "They were greeted with a volley of shots," *La Razón* reported, "to which the guardians of order responded in kind. Thus a brief but intense exchange of fire occurred, in which the unknown persons were gravely wounded. They were taken to Emergency Hospital but all died shortly afterward."

The three young men and a woman were identified as members of the ERP.

At an earlier stage, this organization publicized its aims by seizing dairy trucks and distributing milk free of charge in poor neighborhoods.

The capture of six members of the ERP in Rosario was reported in the November 21 *La Razón*. The first two members of the group arrested reportedly "were in charge of trade-union and student agitation, as well as of distributing the leaflets and tracts of their organization."

In Santa Fe, the November 22 *La Razón* reported, the police arrested two couples allegedly involved in the assassination of two military officers. The accused were said to be members of the ERP.

A dramatic incident in this wave of arrests occurred November 19 in Buenos Aires.

"After 7 p.m.," the November 20 *Clarín* reported, "a Third Precinct patrol noticed three suspicious vehicles. . . . They were apparently in a convoy. At the corner of San Martín and Donato Álvarez, the police intercepted the caravan. A chase began, which ended when the police were able to cut off the pickup truck and get the drop on its driver."

"Unexpectedly, the extremist in charge of the pickup truck took out a pistol and fired into the interior of the cabin; then he threw his weapon to the ground and surrendered to police. . . . When the officers approached they found that the driver had killed a man lying on the floor of the truck. The bullet struck him full in the face. . . ."

The dead man was Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Ibarzábal, captured by the ERP in a raid on the Azul base last January. The driver of the truck was identified as Sergio Gustavo Licowsky, twenty-three years old.

The police arrested two relatives of the owner of the pickup truck, in whose home they said they found "Marxist writings." Police also claimed to have wounded another two persons in the "convoy." □

New Set of Tapes for White House

Sixty-four tape cassettes were presented to the White House during Ford's junket to Vladivostok. They were accepted by presidential assistant L. William Seidman.

The gift, designed to publicize National Bible Week, contains a reading of the entire King James Version of the Bible by Alexander Scourby, an actor.

Genoveva Forest Tortured by Franco's Police

By Peter Green

Utilizing the assassination of the Spanish premier, Admiral Carrero Blanco in December 1973, the Franco regime has cooked up a frame-up of some of Spain's leading intellectuals.

On September 16, three days after more than ten persons were killed in the bombing of the Bar Rolando, a Madrid cafe, the police arrested some eight persons. Among them was Genoveva (Eva) Forest de Sastre, a psychiatrist and one of the country's best-known feminists. She is married to Alfonso Sastre, one of Spain's leading playwrights.

After subjecting her to brutal torture, Franco's police have now accused her of direct complicity in the Carrero Blanco assassination.

An international defense committee has been set up to defend Forest. In France, the committee has been endorsed by numerous organizations and 200 prominent figures, among them Simone de Beauvoir, Françoise Sagan, Delphine Seyrig, Michèle Vian, Jean-Paul Sartre, François Billeldoux, and Maurice Clavel.

According to a November 15 Europa-Press agency dispatch, the Franco regime's "inquiry" has named thirteen persons as suspects in the Carrero Blanco assassination. Eleven, all now in exile in France, were alleged to be members of ETA (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna—Basque Nation and Freedom), a Basque nationalist organization. The two others named were Forest and Antonio Durán Velasco, a construction worker.

Forest, accused of having been closely associated with ETA since 1972, is also accused of belonging to the Communist party. According to the police script, Forest was informed in 1973 of a plot to kidnap Carrero Blanco, then Franco's vice-president. The police allege that she agreed to collaborate and to provide information on Carrero Blanco's movements.

It was Forest, according to the police document, who asked Antonio Durán, also charged with being a Communist party member, to prepare an



Dagens Nyheter

GENOVEVA FOREST

apartment to hide the admiral. With the apartment ready, Forest is alleged to have informed Durán in December that the plot no longer called for the kidnapping of the admiral but for his death. The apartment would now be used to hide the members of the commando squad, who would find a safe refuge there while waiting to flee to France with false papers provided by Forest.

The cops also claim that Forest co-authored *Operation Ogre*, a best-selling book published in France that purports to give a documented ETA account of the Carrero Blanco assassination. They said they had found a copy of the manuscript edited in Forest's own handwriting. But an account of the case by Barbara Probst Solomon in the November 25 *New York Times* disputes the cops' assertions.

"I have read the book," Solomon wrote. "Clearly, it is written in the unique Basque argot, which a non-Basque, Madrid psychiatrist such as Dr. Forest simply would have had no access to. Dr. Forest is of Catalan origin."

Those familiar with the political differences between the Communist party and the ETA "consider linkage between the two groups lacking in credibility," Solomon pointed out. "Clearly, it is an attempt by extremists in the police to discredit the opposition."

After being kept incommunicado in solitary confinement for forty days, Forest managed to smuggle a letter out of prison to her attorney, describing how she is being treated. The de-

fense committee in France obtained a copy of the letter, and the November 17-18 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde* published an article by French feminist Gisèle Halimi recounting the facts.

"Arrested in Madrid at her home on September 16, by the political police. Dragged down to the headquarters of the chief of security after the methodical ransacking of her apartment. Turned over to a dozen 'young athletes with their sleeves rolled up,' Eva later reported [in her letter].

"Insults, obscenities. She is flattened against a wall and the 'athletes' set to work on her. Punches, kicks, butts with the head. No part of her body is spared. 'You'll tell the truth, then we'll throw you out the window. You'll have committed suicide, that's all. . . .

"'You'll lick up your vomit.' Eva refuses. She receives a blow worse than any previous one. She loses consciousness. Buckets of water, slaps, and an 'official doctor' force her to her feet again.

"The sessions were repeated, for hours on end. Eva passes out again. 'Speak, slut, speak . . .' For Eva, half unconscious, a flash of understanding: *no question had yet been put to her*. Simply a softening up, then, for the next stage.

"For this 'next stage,' a new setting. A luxurious office, with thick pile furnishings. Up front two very dignified-looking officials and a secretary ready at her machine. Eva is again beaten, but, it seems, in a more systematic way: a type of 'rabbit chop' (delivered repeatedly on the nape of her neck) at the same time as the cops are crushing her temples with their hands. Her hair is pulled out in tufts. Her skull feels as though it will burst. From time to time a question: 'Shit, how could you be a member of the Communist party and of ETA at the same time?'

"For the official referred to as 'Robert' it's time for the sexual interlude. 'I love you, you're pretty, let me make love to you,' with which he throws himself on Eva. A particu-

lar torture inflicted on women who take part in struggles in a dedicated way.

"Altogether, nine days of interrogation at the security headquarters. Mental torture supplemented the physical. Eva is informed that her husband (in hiding at the time but since arrested) had been wounded in a clash with the police. 'We had to finish him off,' the inspectors explain regretfully. Evita, her twelve-year-old daughter, was going to be imprisoned, and they offer legal arguments backing up the threat."

Forest wrote that she caught sight of other suspects at the security headquarters. They were barely recognizable after the treatment they had undergone. One of them, Lydia Falcón, had to be hospitalized after she was tortured. Three other women prisoners—María del Carmen Nadal, María Remedio López, and Rosalía López Pedrez—are in permanent solitary confinement.

Genoveva Forest's husband, Alfon-

so Sastre, gave himself up to the police in an effort to save the lives of his wife and the other prisoners. According to Spanish law, a husband is legally responsible for crimes committed by his wife.

The Swedish section of Amnesty International has denounced the regime's trumped-up charges against the prisoners. Amnesty sent an observer to Madrid, but neither the minister of justice, F. Ruiz Jarabo, nor the minister of the interior, José García Hernández, would even agree to a meeting. Nor was the observer allowed to visit Forest. The International Federation for the Rights of Man has also protested her arrest to the Spanish authorities.

The exiled Peruvian revolutionist Hugo Blanco has circulated an appeal from Stockholm calling for an international defense campaign. Playwright Peter Weiss issued an open letter to the Spanish minister of justice on September 26 that was published in the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyhe-*

ter. He demanded that the regime reveal what it had done with Forest.

More than 500 French feminists signed a half-page advertisement in the October 31 *Le Monde* calling for support to Forest and the other women imprisoned in Franco's jails. "We are in solidarity with the accused, women who are living in struggle against the oppression," they declared. "In solidarity with our comrades in Spain, we call on all women to mobilize massively. For Puig Antich [the Spanish anarchist garroted by the regime in March] international opinion was alerted too late.

"It is necessary to act quickly."* □

*Telegrams and letters of protest should be addressed to F. Ruiz Jarabo, Ministerio de la Justicia, Madrid, Spain.

Expressions of solidarity may be sent through the French feminist organization Librairie "des femmes," 68, rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris, France, or through the Swedish section of Amnesty International, Box 79, S-310 15 Ranneslov, Sweden.

Hold Government Responsible

40,000 Montréal Workers March Against Inflation

More than 40,000 workers marched in Montréal October 29 in a demonstration against inflation and government repression of the labor movement. It was the largest labor demonstration in Québec history, according to the Canadian revolutionary-socialist fortnightly *Labor Challenge*.

A huge banner at the head of the demonstration expressed the theme: "Against the Justice of the Bosses." Labor struggles in Québec have come under increasing attack recently from the courts, royal commissions, and the police.

The demonstration was led by workers from United Aircraft, who have been on strike since January. The company's transfer of some of the plant's operations to the United States, in an effort to smash the strike, has brought demands in parliament for its nationalization.

"There were contingents from the Firestone workers in Joliette, the Québec Telephone workers in Rimouski, and the workers of St. Lambert Hos-

pital, who have been locked out for five weeks. . .," *Labor Challenge* reported.

"Banners identified the unions of postal workers, machinists, construction trades, Hydro Quebec, bank workers and public service workers. They chanted, 'The bosses are to blame for inflation,' '[Québec Premier] Bourassa manufactures inflation' and 'Against the bosses' courts.'"

A key demand of Québec unions is that contracts be reopened and renegotiated with provision for "indexation," that is, automatic wage increases in accordance with rises in a cost-of-living index. Last April the three major labor federations in Québec reestablished their common front to campaign against inflation.

The upsurge of strikes and other labor struggles has been harshly resisted by the Québec government and courts. A recent example was the repeated use of court injunctions and the threat to pass a back-to-work law against the strike of the Montréal

Métro workers.

The October 29 demonstration was organized by the Québec Federation of Labor (QFL), which is linked to the major American labor body, the AFL-CIO. It was supported by the Québec teachers union, the Centrale de l'Enseignement du Québec. But certain leaders of the other major labor body, the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU), were barred by organizers from participating in the march. Despite their common front against inflation, the CNTU and QFL are engaged in a serious jurisdictional conflict in the construction industry.

Ironically, it is in the construction sector that the provincial government, taking advantage of labor disunity, has carried out some of its most extreme intervention against the unions. It has set up a commission of inquiry into violence and "trade-union freedom" in the construction industry. The inquiry is being used to carry out a smear campaign against the QFL leadership. □

Moscow OKs Pentagon Plan on Nuclear Arms Race

By Dick Fidler



Auth/Philadelphia Inquirer

Nuclear Ceiling

President Gerald Ford's campaign for the 1976 presidential nomination, launched with his Asian tour, got a major boost in Vladivostok. Ford was endorsed by none other than the general secretary of the Soviet Communist party, Leonid Brezhnev.

The deal was clinched in front of television cameras, as the two initialed a tentative "arms control" agreement hailed by Kissinger as a "breakthrough" that "put a cap on the arms race."

Pravda echoed this assessment: "No one has any doubt now," the Soviet CP daily wrote November 24, "that the people of good will on earth have wholeheartedly accepted the positive processes of our epoch."

The main purpose of the meeting with Brezhnev was to present Ford as a statesman able to "deal with the Communists," thus establishing his worthiness as Nixon's heir.

Just as in Nixon's first meetings with the Soviet leaders, the emphasis on both sides was on the importance of the "personal relationship" between the Kremlin leader and the head of U.S. imperialism.

"I have the impression that the two men got along excellently," Kissinger assured a 2 a.m. news conference November 24, following the preliminary get-together.

While awaiting Ford's arrival at the airport, Brezhnev told reporters that such "personal contacts" with the president are "very important."

Both leaders made sure that their first informal greetings were held within easy earshot of the assembled reporters and were on topics calculated to make an impression on American television audiences. Carroll Kilpatrick of the *Washington Post* reported a typical exchange:

"When someone mentioned football, the President remarked: 'I understand you're quite an expert on soccer.'"

"I haven't played for a long time,"

the Soviet leader replied.

"I haven't played football for a long time either," the President said. But he added, perhaps giving Brezhnev the first glimpse into his character: "I wasn't very fast, but I could hold the line."

(Brezhnev apparently refrained from asking the former gridiron star if the rumors were true that he had played without a helmet, thus suffering irreparable brain damage.)

In signing the tentative arms agreement, Brezhnev indicated his readiness to help Ford "hold the line" in Washington.

"The President will be returning home in triumph," White House press secretary Ron Nessen said. The agreement was "something Nixon couldn't do in three years, but Ford did it in three months. I don't know what it was. They hit it off."

Kissinger, who had set up the deal, cut in: "I think the President should be modest. The thing speaks for itself." He then crowed, "The back of this thing [the arms race] has been broken."

Arriving home November 24, Ford said his talks with Brezhnev had established "a sound basis for a new agreement that will constrain our military competition over the next decade."

The Vladivostok agreement actually does nothing of the sort. It simply approves the Pentagon's intention to continue the arms race.

The details have been kept secret, of course. But as the *New York Times* explained December 1, based on official "leaks," the agreement would set a ceiling on nuclear weapons stockpiles for the next ten years, "but at a level high enough to permit both nations to go ahead with their current arms development programs," and "possibly a little faster in some areas—legitimized, in fact, by international compact."

The tentative agreement is said to allow the United States and the Soviet Union each to have about 2,400 "offensive" delivery systems, using whatever combination of missiles and bombers each side may choose. About half of the missiles may be equipped with multiple-warhead missiles known as MIRVs.

"These ceilings are very high," the *New York Times* observed. "The United States, with about 2,100 delivery vehicles, including about 750 missiles with MIRVs, has about 6,000 warheads—enough, by

some Strangelove calculations, to destroy Russia 15 times."

The Vladivostok agreement "will not halt the qualitative arms race now under way," the editors of the *New York Times* pointed out November 29. They continued: "The United States will be free to deploy hundreds of B-1 bombers and ten Trident nuclear missile submarines. The Soviet Union will be free to deploy 1,300 of the new MIRV missiles it has been developing. There is no restriction on missile flight-testing to slow the qualitative arms race. Nor is there any bar to such other de-stabilizing developments as land-mobile and air-mobile ICBM's, cruise missiles launched from submarines and certain major improvements in missile accuracy."

Since the Vladivostok agreement in no way limits the Pentagon's nuclear arsenal, there was some speculation in the U.S. press as to why the Kremlin agreed to it. But Kissinger himself indicated the reason when he spoke with reporters November 24: "Ford has announced he will run again so he is not a lame duck." The secretary of state said that this may have influenced Brezhnev "because it created a longer political stability."

Stability is what the Kremlin leaders value above all else. This is so well established that the more informed—and cynical—reporters in Washington state it openly. Victor Zorza argued in the November 28 *Washington Post* that the Vladivostok agreement was "based on a tacit understanding between the White House and the Kremlin . . . to help re-elect Ford." According to Zorza, the immediate objective was to undermine the image of Senator Henry Jackson, a likely Democratic party contender against Ford in 1976. Kremlin propaganda paints Jackson as an inveterate cold warrior, unlike the peaceloving present occupant of the White House and his immediate predecessor.

"The last time round, Brezhnev's interest in Nixon's reelection made the Kremlin look the other way while Nixon resumed the bombing and mining of North Vietnam on the very eve of his Moscow visit," Zorza wrote. "Even Kissinger thought that Nixon had gone too far, but Brezhnev swallowed his pride, and announced that the summit was still on. The lesson was not lost on Kissinger—only this time he had to use Jackson as the threat." □

12,000 Political Prisoners Rot in Mujib's Jails

By Ernest Harsch

The Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD—National Socialist party) organized a rally of 75,000 persons in Dacca October 13. According to a report in the November 15 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, the demands of the JSD speakers included the unconditional release of all political prisoners, the withdrawal of all arrest warrants on political figures now in hiding, and a public investigation into the secret activities of the police Special Branch.

Although the regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman has released no official statistics on the number of political prisoners now held in the country's sixty jails, unofficial estimates put the figure at between 12,000 and 14,000, according to a report by Fazle Lohani published in the October 27 issue of the Dacca weekly *Holiday*.

Among the more well-known political prisoners are M.A. Jalil, president of the JSD and a leader of the Bangladesh liberation struggle in 1971; A.S.M. Abdur Rab, general secretary of the JSD; Wahidur Rahman; Chanchal Sen; Al-Mahmud, editor of the JSD daily newspaper *Ganokantha* (People's Voice); Mesbahuddin Ahmed, executive general secretary of the Opposition Sramik League; and Masihur Rahman, general secretary of the National Awami party (Bhashani). In addition, Maulana Bhashani, the leader of the NAP(B), has been under virtual house arrest since June.

Many of the political prisoners were arrested under repressive legislation passed in February giving the regime and its Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (National Defense Forces) greater powers against political opponents. The Rakkhi Bahini (Amendment) Bill 1974 and the Special Powers Act gave the regime legal authority to arrest, detain, try, and sentence anyone for acting, writing, or speaking against the "national interests." Any measures carried out under these repressive laws cannot be challenged in court.

In addition, informal press censor-

ship was instituted, and in September Dacca passed the Newsprint Ordinance, which gave it the power to ration paper to all newspapers. (The JSD's *Ganokantha* was consequently forced to slash its circulation and to cut its size from eight pages to four.) All strikes have been banned.

After being arrested, political opponents often undergo interrogation by the Rakkhi Bahini or the Special Branch of the police. Lohani cited the case of one young man, who, after his release from the Rakkhi Bahini's custody near Dacca, reported that he was clubbed and had pins driven under his nails during "questioning." The torture of three women, Aruna Sen (mother of Chanchal Sen), Rina Sinha, and Hanufa Begum was reported in the February 17 *Ganokantha*.

Even if the political prisoners survive their treatment by the Rakkhi Bahini, they may still have to face the hired goons of the ruling Awami League. In early 1974, for instance, a group of Awami League thugs forcibly removed four members of an opposition political party from the Pabna district jail and murdered three of them (the fourth was said to have gotten away). The authorities claimed that the political prisoners had been killed "while attempting to escape."

Moreover, there were many thousands of other political opponents that the regime didn't even bother to arrest. According to Lohani, up to 30,000 persons have been killed by the Awami League goon squads, the various police forces, and the Rakkhi Bahini since December 1971 (when Bangladesh won its independence from Pakistan).

"Over the past 34 months of Awami League rule," Lohani wrote, "the country witnessed an unbroken wave of political persecution of unsurpassed ferocity. Murder, abduction, beating, torturing, rape and arrest, organized almost in total freedom by the armed squads of various denominations, who were often fitted out by influential Awami Leaguers, polluted the po-

litical atmosphere so badly that fear and suspicion have almost become a permanent feature of everyday life in Bangladesh today."

Even children have not escaped the regime's political crackdown. Lohani mentioned the cases of Shampa, the 12-year-old sister of a peasant activist, who has already spent more than a year in police custody; Bakul and Mukul, two 14-year-old women held at Kushtia jail; and Shapan, the son of a revolutionary, who is seriously ill in prison.

Another report by Lohani, published in the November 10 *Holiday*, described the jail conditions of the political prisoners. Visits to political prisoners are often denied or restricted, and visitors are later harassed by the police.

Because of the bad food and lack of medical care, many prisoners have contracted chronic gastrointestinal diseases and about 80 percent suffer from various skin disorders. Most jails are totally without piped water and the prisoners are often forced to carry their water from miles away (an ordeal developed under British rule for persons sentenced to hard labor).

"The Dacca Central jail," Lohani wrote, "biggest and oldest in the country, with a capacity of 1,500 prisoners, is now bursting at its timeworn seams with an influx of inmates well beyond the recommended capacity. At night prisoners, convicts and detenus together, bed down on the floor of a dormitory, known as *khata*, lying in rows, like sardines in a tin, with hardly a six-inch gap between two sleepers."

Each "dormitory" in Dacca Central Jail holds about 300 prisoners, who are locked in for at least twelve hours a day, with tin cans in the corners as the only toilet facilities.

The detention of thousands of political prisoners and the barbaric conditions in the jails have sparked protests by some of the inmates themselves. In May, nine members and supporters of the JSD imprisoned in the Mymensingh jail staged a hunger

strike to protest conditions and the beating of prisoners (see *Intercontinental Press*, June 3, p. 696). On August 29, sixty-one prisoners at Dacca Central Jail were beaten by guards

after a protest over the lack of medical care. On September 3, eight political prisoners in the same jail began a hunger strike to protest their treatment. □

Inflation, Unemployment, Corruption

Beyond Tanaka's Downfall


By Ernest Harsch

Kakuei Tanaka, sometimes known as the "computerized bulldozer," became the first Liberal Democratic party prime minister to be driven from office under public pressure.

When Tanaka handed in his resignation November 26, he cited the recent disclosures of his financial dealings (see *Intercontinental Press*, November 4, p. 1426) as the reason for his "solemnly and serenely" stepping down. But while the furor over the business scandals and corruption charges provided the immediate impetus to Tanaka's downfall, it was the growing discontent over Japan's economic problems and its deteriorating standard of living that sealed his fate.

Since Tanaka took office in July 1972, Japan's inflation rate rose to the highest level of any imperialist power; wholesale and retail prices jumped by more than 50% during his twenty-eight months as prime minister. With the sharp increase in oil costs (Japan's economy is almost totally dependent on imported petroleum products) and the deepening worldwide recession, Japan's rapid industrial growth was curtailed and thousands of workers lost their jobs. The specter of even a "moderate" unemployment rate (projected to reach 1.7% by the end of the year) is a new hardship to a working class accustomed to more than a decade of rapid economic growth and a high level of job security.

This worsening economic crisis led to some of the largest strikes in Japanese history during the annual "spring labor offensive" and has sparked many demonstrations against inflation. According to the September 25 Tokyo *Mainichi Daily News*, Japan's largest labor federation, Sohyo,*



TANAKA: Threw in towel when popularity dropped to record low of 10 percent.

plans to press for wage increases of more than 30% next spring.

The issues of inflation and corruption, and the recent revelations that U. S. warships bring nuclear weapons into Japanese ports with Tokyo's approval, eroded support for Tanaka and the LDP. According to public opinion surveys published in September 1972, about 60% of those polled supported Tanaka. By early November 1974, the figure had dropped to 10%, the lowest for any prime minister since the second world war. This shift was also reflected in the July elections to the upper house of the Diet, in which the LDP barely retained its majority and the Socialist and Communist parties made significant gains.

The decline in support to the LDP, the only major bourgeois party in Japan, threw it into a crisis. The widespread criticisms of the lavish campaign contributions given the LDP by the major corporations and *zaibatsu* (financial conglomerates) forced busi-

ness interests to downplay their overt financial support to the LDP and compelled the party to try to revamp its public image.

The downturn in the LDP's fortunes also heightened the factionalism within the party. A few days after the July elections, Takeo Miki and Takeo Fukuda, the leaders of the two main factions opposed to Tanaka, resigned from the cabinet, citing the huge campaign contributions and calling for "reform" of the LDP.

With Tanaka's position already greatly weakened, the disclosures of some of his shady business dealings in the November issue of the magazine *Bungei Shunju* finished him. On November 13, the Communist, Socialist, Komei (Clean Government), and Democratic Socialist parties announced that they would launch a joint campaign to further probe Tanaka's financial dealings and force his resignation. At a mass rally held the same day in Tokyo by the Joint Struggle Committee for the 1975 Spring Labor Campaign, the general secretary of Sohyo, Shogo Oki, demanded Tanaka's ouster, as well as government measures to protect workers from inflation.

Although a successor to Tanaka had not yet been chosen when he announced his resignation (he has been allowed to stay on until a replacement is found), either another LDP leader will be named or a caretaker will be chosen as prime minister until the July 1975 convention of the LDP. But any long-range plans to refurbish the LDP's public image, rebuild its support, and halt the gains of the opposition parties face serious difficulties.

Fukuda noted the problems the LDP will continue to confront. He said after Tanaka's resignation, "The people's reliance on and trust in the Government has been greatly shaken. The nation also has strong misgivings about inflation and the economy. This is the greatest postwar crisis and it is the crisis of Japan." □

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*Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai—General Council of Japanese Trade Unions.

What Way Forward for French Workers?

[The following article appeared in the November 22 issue of *Rouge*, the French Trotskyist weekly. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*. The subtitles were in the original.]

* * *

In dozens of cities the demonstrations that took place during the November 19 strike were the biggest since 1968. The massive and militant marches were dominated by two sets of slogans: those indicating solidarity with the postal workers; and those attacking members of the government.

In the aftermath of those demonstrations, it is important to establish our bearings and to begin to draw a balance sheet on the way the November 19 strike was organized.

Three Central Questions

To evaluate the present relationship of forces, it is necessary to know how the trade-union leaderships responded to three questions that are decisive to the development of the current struggles: What demands should be put forward, how can the struggles be generalized, and what is their political direction?

1. *What demands should be advanced today?*

The post office workers began their struggle around clear demands: for a minimum wage of 1,700 francs a month [1 franc equals about US\$0.22]; a 200 francs across-the-board increase; hiring of more personnel; and the upgrading of auxiliary workers. These demands are in the interests of not only the postal workers but everyone in the civil service. It was possible to take that platform, forged in the struggle, and to fill it out, broadening it so that it could mobilize the whole of the working class, especially the workers in the private sector whose jobs are directly threatened. Such demands would include:

- *A sliding scale of wages*, revised each month on the basis of an index tabulated by the labor organizations and controlled by the workers. This



GISCARD: Sent cops in against postal and railway strikers.

would answer [Premier] Chirac's cynical comment about the inevitable erosion of wages by inflation.

- *A thirty-five-hour week with no decrease in wages*, counterposed to increasing unemployment and a halt to immigration.

- *Nationalization without purchase or compensation* of all companies that, under cover of rationalizing their operations, throw thousands of workers on the scrap heap, laying them off at a flick of the wrist. And what's more, these are often companies receiving subsidies from the government.

On the basis of this simple, clear program, it is possible to link together the struggles of the whole working class.

This is not the direction chosen by the trade-union leaders. They are now holding to only two of the union demands: the 200 francs increase, and more personnel. And even there, they have declared their readiness to compromise. The civil service strikes have followed one after another, sector by sector, on the basis of different platforms (the railway workers, for example, are demanding a 1,500 francs minimum wage).

As for the call for actions on November 19, it was issued on the most vague basis possible.

There is a big difference between fighting for a small number of clear demands until they are met, and demanding the reopening of negotiations.

2. *How to generalize the struggles?*

From the beginning of the postal workers' strike, the problem has been posed of extending it to the whole public sector. Instead of basing themselves on the most militant sectors like the railway workers, so that they would enter the struggle around the same demands and with the same forms of action as the postal workers and draw in behind them the rest of the civil service, the union leaders have chosen to mobilize in disorder, blowing hot and cold—mobilizing in the railways, only to stop short several days later; and launching four days of strikes, divided according to regions before and after November 19. In short, a conscious attempt at demobilization, and completely ineffective as a form of struggle. In the rest of the civil service the strikes of November 13 were "renewable,"¹ but in some places the union officials fought against their renewal. Only the Employment Agency, the Department of Supply, and the garbage collectors began an extended strike.

This is not the way to coordinate struggles and link them together into an overall movement of the civil service. The strikes are simply *juxtaposed*, without any links among them.

3. *What political direction?*

Confronted with the old scarecrow of "political strikes" brandished by Giscard and his cronies, a clear response would have been the following: If struggling against the state-as-employ-

1. The French word "*reconductible*," literally "renewable," refers to a form of labor struggle in which the workers on strike hold daily assemblies to determine whether to continue the strike. Such strikes are normally characterized by a high degree of mobilization and participation.
— IP

er is a political act, then yes, we are engaging in politics! If demanding wage increases that go beyond the restrictions of existing contracts is to challenge the government's policy, then yes, the workers are challenging it. And this is nothing new; five months ago, the overwhelming majority of the working class declared its opposition to that policy, by refusing to vote for Giscard d'Estaing.

If the leaders of the workers organizations really wanted to defend the interests of the workers who have placed confidence in them, they would say: Yes, we are fighting for their demands; but if this government does not yield, then it should resign; the workers certainly are capable of providing themselves with a government that can meet their needs.

But they have chosen to say exactly the contrary: "It is not a question of giving in but of negotiating"; "we must know how to make concessions if we (sic) want to get out of this situation," Séguy² wrote in [the Communist party daily] *l'Humanité*, on the eve of the national strike! It is remarkable how the more the workers understand that their struggle is counterposed to the government and its policy, the more the parties who five months ago presented themselves as candidates for government put their perspectives in mothballs.

"Giscard au rancart [Giscard, resign!]; "Ponia, facho, le peuple aura ta peau [Poniatowski,³ fascist, the people will nail your ass!]; "Valéry au tri, Anne-Aymone au téléphone [Giscard should be a mail sorter, and his wife a telephone operator]; "Giscard aux poubelles [Giscard to the ashcans]" — all this antigovernment enthusiasm expressed in the November 15 and November 19 demonstrations was ignored by *l'Humanité*, which mentioned only the traditional "Giscard, ça suffit, assieds-toi et négocie [Giscard, that's enough, sit down and negotiate]." Even the workers of Néogravure who chanted "Une seule solution, le Programme commun [The only solution, the Common Pro-

French Postal Unions End Strike

Delegates of unions representing France's postal workers voted November 28 and 29 to end the forty-five-day-old mail strike and called for a resumption of work on November 30.

The unions involved — the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and the French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT) — said the return to work was only a "suspension of the strike" and that they were maintaining their demands.

Termination of the strike, however, was widely regarded as a victory for the Giscard regime in re-

sisting the strikers' demands, particularly the key demand of a 1,700 francs minimum monthly wage (about US\$363). Had Giscard granted the concession, pressure would have mounted to extend it throughout the civil service, which includes about three million workers.

In addition, the government refused to pay wages for the period of the strike — contrary to normal practice in France.

The CGT and CFDT have called a one-day general strike for December 12 to protest rising unemployment and inflation.

gram⁴)" were discreetly censored.

Never has the reformists' distinction between struggles and their political implications been so clear. When the workers mobilize, the union leaderships talk the language of compromise and the reformist parties shut up. And if the struggle falters, they recover their voices to proclaim that only the Common Program will satisfy the workers' demands, and therefore they have only to wait until the next elections!

Increasing Pledges of Goodwill

Up to now the government and the bosses have taken a very hard line in the conflict. Chirac set the tone in his television interview when he called the post office strikers a "minority of agitators" and the unions "wreckers of the economy." Why this firm stance?

If they were to give in to the postal workers, that would mean jeopardizing their contract policy; it would mean giving in on wages at a time when the government's whole policy is aimed at restricting buying power, and above all, after five months in office, undergoing a political defeat in its first test of strength with the workers movement. Hence its obstinacy: letting things drag on for a

while, then sending the cops against the pickets, trying to divide the workers and separate out the "responsible" union organizations, unleashing a poisonous slander campaign, and so on.

Confronted with the government's intransigence, the union leaders are caught in a dangerous contradiction: without really wanting to give themselves everything they needed in order to win, they have put themselves in a position where it is impossible for them to lose. They advanced hesitantly toward the November 19 actions, increasing their pledges of goodwill. And, once the morning of November 20 had arrived, Séguy adopted the same old tone: "The prime minister may think that by slandering us, he will make us lose our composure and our sense of responsibility; but we will not fall into that trap. We will continue to speak the language of reason and to follow the only road that is consistent with the general interest, by proposing the opening of the necessary negotiations."

That is what explains the contradictory nature of the demonstrations on November 19: on the one hand, they had an extraordinary breadth, not seen since 1968, which stimulates militancy and restores confidence to the workers. But, at the same time — and while a test of political strength is taking place in which the government has doubled the stakes — they suffered from the lack of any unifying platform, and from the refusal of the

2. Georges Seguy, general secretary of the General Confederation of Labor (Confederation Generale du Travail—CGT), the Stalinist-led union. — IP

3. Michel Poniatowski, minister of state and minister of the interior, is a close confidant of Giscard. — IP

4. The reference is to the Common Program of the Union of the Left, the electoral coalition of the Communist party, the Socialist party, and the Left Radicals, a small bourgeois grouping. — IP

unions, the Communist party, and the Socialist party to take up the political challenge.

A Small Escape Hatch

Faced with the harshness of the government's statements, however, some voices have been raised even within the bourgeoisie asking Chirac not to play with fire: in such a tense situation, the slightest rough edge, the least provocation, can result in a mass reaction from the working class. The demonstrations after the cops' intervention⁵ and on November 19 showed that. Moreover, to try to inflict a complete defeat on the strikers would not only risk losing time, given the combativity of the postal workers. But it would also risk giving future struggles a very dangerous dynamic by singling out the government as the obstacle in the path of any demand of the workers, the bolt that must be sprung. Hence the insistent advice of *France-Soir*, which urges Chirac not to superimpose a social crisis on a political crisis; or the appeals for leniency by Ferniot, Barillon, and others. "Open the door just a crack to let the union leaders save face," they say, "they are not asking for anything more!"

And already *Le Monde* is mentioning rumors that the government could make a certain number of proposals when it presents the post office budget. (These are said to include upgrading of a certain number of auxiliary workers, and an expected salary increase of 3 percent in the civil service.)

To Strengthen the Relationship of Forces

After November 19, the situation is characterized essentially by three elements:

1. A continuing high level of militancy at the post office, where the strikers clearly have thick skins. (One of the slogans on November 19 was "*Nous tiendrons jusqu'au réveillon et*

5. On November 14, the police burst into the sorting-centers in Lille and Montpellier, as well as the post office in the railway station at Toulouse, evicting strikers. Demonstrations were held November 15 to protest this action in several cities, including Paris. — IP

*Lelong*⁶ sera le dindon [We'll hold out 'til the sheep come home, and Lelong will be the sheepish one]."

2. A tense political and social situation, where a false step by the government could set the match to tinder.

3. But also a very uneven degree of militancy in the working class: a public sector at fever pitch, while the private sector has hardly mobilized, even on November 19; and within the civil service, a whole potential for combativity wasted by walkouts with no perspective, especially on the railways.

It is still possible, however, to force the government to give in, provided the workers find the means to do so. That means fighting now on three fronts:

● *To strengthen and consolidate the movement in the post office by setting new objectives:*

A march on Paris of all the postal workers in France could be a demonstration of the strength of the movement and a rebuff to all Chirac's grotesque statements about a minority of agitators. It could end with a *national assembly of delegates* from all regions to evaluate their experiences and discuss what comes next for the movement.

● *To revive the perspective of a general strike of the civil service workers around a unifying platform of demands, and until those demands have been met:*

This perspective remains an urgent and necessary one. It is possible if the most militant sectors orient along that road. Those sectors include the hospitals, where a wave of prolonged struggles is developing; the Department of Supply, where for the second week the workers will strike for three days, from Tuesday to Friday; the Electricity and Gas Board, where many walkouts are scheduled; the National Employment Agency; and the garbage collectors, who are on a renewable strike.

By welding these sectors to the postal workers' struggle around common demands and common initiatives, it will be possible to begin an overall movement in the civil service that is something more than a mere sum of sectoral strikes.

● *To show all workers that the postal workers' struggle has become a political focus for the whole working*

6. Pierre Lelong is minister of the post office and telecommunications. — IP

class and that in each factory and neighborhood an all-out effort must be made to assure its victory.

That means an enormous effort to raise a solidarity fund. *The argument that there are too many postal workers for a collection to be useful does not hold water.* Massive collections are useful, in the first place, to help those strikers who are in the worst straits, but especially to lay the basis for the huge task of getting out the facts about the struggle in order to counter the lies of the bourgeoisie.

It is possible to weave around the postal workers the same network of solidarity as was done around the miners in 1963.

But we must go further: we must put the government on its notice, not only that it must give in, but that if it takes one more step it will have the whole working class on strike against it.

Beginning now, it is necessary, in all the factories where possible, to introduce a notice of immediate strike if the government goes beyond its still limited initiatives and makes massive use of the army in the postal sorting stations, or if it goes so far as to try to recruit scabs.

That is the only way to improve the relationship of forces, instead of letting it crumble away. It is the only way to tell Giscard and his clique that the government must give in, or give way. □

U.S. Advisers Select Targets for Cambodian Bombing Raids

In a dispatch from Bangkok, Thailand, November 21, *Washington Post* correspondent John Burgess reported that, according to a "well-placed U.S. military source," U.S. military personnel are serving as advisers to the Cambodian air force. About three reconnaissance flights a day, he reported, are carried out by U.S. Phantom jets belonging to the 432d Tactical Fighter Wing stationed at Udorn air base in northeastern Thailand.

Aerial photos from the flights are then analyzed at Udorn to identify targets and make recommendations for bombing strikes. The reports are sent to the U.S. Support Activities Group at the U.S. Air Force headquarters at the Nakhon Phanom air base in Thailand. From there they are passed on to the Cambodian air force.

The use of U.S. advisers violates a congressional ban on direct U.S. military activity in Cambodia, which went into effect August 15, 1973.

Grasping Tentacles of American Agribusiness

By Ernest Harsch

[Second of a series.]

Over the past half century, the United States has become the major producer of food for the international market—the "bread basket" of the world. It achieved this position not because it has superior soil or a superior climate but because of its highly industrialized mode of farming.

In his book *The American People* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1973), E.J. Kahn wrote, "In 1820, the average [U.S.] farm employee produced enough to sustain four people. In 1950, he could feed fifteen; in 1970, forty-five." This leap in agricultural productivity even surpassed that of industry: Since 1948 productivity quadrupled in agriculture but only doubled in the nonfarm sector.

The absence of small, private landholdings and of a class of landowners in the United States, Canada, and Australia, which were settled only relatively recently, gave them an edge over the European countries, where agriculture production was restricted by the form of land ownership. In the United States, as productivity increased, the agricultural surplus was reinvested, allowing for a rapid accumulation of capital and the introduction of mechanization; in Europe the landowners drained off much of the surplus in the form of ground rent.

The shift from extensive to intensive farming in the United States began during the first quarter of this century. The size of the agricultural work force peaked in 1910 at 11.3 million, but then dropped off as mechanization increasingly dominated farming. In the past twenty-five years, the size of the labor force employed in agriculture declined 50 percent, from 7.6 million in 1948 to 3.5 million in 1973.

The greater availability of agricultural capital made it possible to apply the most advanced techniques to farming. The development of corn (maize) hybrids, along with the use of extensive fertilization, doubled maize production in the United States between the 1930s and 1960, although cultivated land area was reduced by 13 percent.

Not only has agriculture as a whole been incorporated into the capitalist market, but even the methods of farm production are becoming increasingly tied to the industrial concerns. Industrialists (canners, food processors, exporters, equipment manufacturers) make advance contracts with farmers for purchases and sales in an attempt to secure stable supplies and outlets. As René Dumont and Bernard Rosier wrote in *The Hungry Future*, "they bring about an economic and contractual linkage between farms and industrial and commercial firms, a process similar to vertical integration in industry."

Taken to its logical conclusion, this has led to the increasing industrialization of agriculture itself. Dumont and Rosier described the pig and poultry industries in the United States, in which selective- and cross-breeding have developed high-quality species; carefully determined feed rations are mass produced; and efficient shelters are constructed on a large scale. "These measures," they wrote, "have made it possible to set up pig and poultry farms which, like a modern industry, can produce and deliver standard products in response to demand."

The enormous advantage of U.S. farms over those in the semicolonial world becomes obvious when the levels of productivity are compared. Average food grain output per acre in India is a mere 1,010 pounds, while in the United States it stands at 3,185. U.S. farmers use seven times as much fertilizer per acre as Indian farmers do.

The October 22, 1974, *New York Times* carried a striking description of rice production in the underdeveloped world: "In country after poor country," reporter B. Drummond Ayres Jr. wrote, "its production is an endless, almost ritualistic drudgery of stoop labor in the sun, whole families bent together on pitiful plots, men, women and children struggling to stave off starvation, pushing hand-grown shoots into sticky gumbo, one by precious one, row after tiring row, year

after year after year. . . ."

Ayres then contrasted the rice plantations of the United States: "Huge tractors throw dikes around massive fields. Gigantic pumps flood them. Specially designed airplanes speedily spread the seed, following up with potent insecticides. Then come the whirling combines, sweeping up as much grain in a single swath as one man can harvest by hand in a year."

Saving the World From 'Overproduction'

The productivity leap of the 1920s and 1930s created problems for U.S. farmers. More food was produced than the market could absorb, driving down agricultural prices and profits. Rather than seeing this boost in farm production as a tremendous advantage for those millions of workers who would have been able to afford more food and upgrade their diets, the agribusiness interests and their backers in Washington saw only a crisis of "overproduction."

The U.S. government stepped in to turn down the spigot, drive prices back up, and save the country from too much food—a policy it followed for the next forty years. In the words of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Washington's intervention into agriculture was designed "to maintain equilibrium between production and consumption."

During the worst years of the Great Depression, huge quantities of food were destroyed to get rid of the "surplus." In *Must Men Starve?* (New York: Abelard-Schuman Limited, 1957), Jacob Oser gave a few examples:

"Government agricultural policy contributed towards the decline in farm production during 1930-34. In the 1933-34 hog-slaughtering campaigns, 9,410,866 sows and pigs were slaughtered, and of these over 5,000,000 pigs were diverted to fertilizer tankage. The total pig population dropped 37% between January 1st, 1933, and Jan-

uary 1st, 1935. One-fourth of the cotton acreage was ploughed under before the harvest in 1933. The output of other farm products was restricted. For example, in 1933 the pack of California cling peaches was limited to 10,000,000 cases. All canning peaches below No. 1 grade and even some of the No. 1's were allowed to rot, unpicked, in the orchards."

Washington also moved to restrict production directly, by paying farmers *not to grow* certain crops.⁴ The Soil Bank, established in 1956, was designed to remove forty to forty-five million acres of farmland from cultivation, more than 10 percent of all cultivated land in the United States. Although Washington failed to reach its full goal, by 1958 twenty-eight million acres had been diverted from production. The November 2, 1974, London *Economist* estimated that the croplands withheld from farming in the United States and Canada in the 1960s could have produced 50 million to 80 million additional tons of grain.

Dumont and Rosier pointed out that while productivity in the United States has increased 5% a year since 1937, actual production gained only 2% a year.

Despite these measures to restrict cultivation, "surpluses" still developed. Import tariffs were set up to prevent foreign food from entering the United States and aggravating the problem. Washington bought up much of the domestic surplus and kept it in storage to prevent a flooding of the market.

The wheat and maize stored in U. S. government granaries were the only significant agricultural reserves in the world. In 1957 the government stocks of cereal grains stood at 150 million tons, or about one-fourth of the world's total annual production. Although the reserves kept surpluses off the market and helped maintain profitable prices, they also prevented sharp price fluctuations and acted as a buffer against bad harvests or other dis-

asters in the United States and internationally.

In the April issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Lyle P. Schertz wrote, "By maintaining large stockpiles of grain, the United States has in past years been able to moderate price swings—nationally and internationally. As international 'shortages' have developed—through increased demand, reduced supplies, or both together—the availability of U. S. stocks has dampened price changes in the international market while discouraging increases in domestic prices."

'Food for Peace'?

In his September 18 speech before the United Nations, President Ford declared, "It has not been our policy to use food as a political weapon. . . ."

Yet that is precisely what Washington has been doing since the end of the second world war. Rather than let the millions of tons of cereal sitting in its granaries rot, Washington has used them to buy allies, curry political influence, and support tottering puppet regimes throughout the semicolonial world.

U. S. food shipments played a vital role in the Marshall Plan, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and other post-World War II efforts to prevent the collapse of European capitalism and the overthrow of proimperialist regimes throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The increase of government grants and concessional sales of food abroad also served as an economically useful outlet for the greater U. S. agricultural capacity developed during the production booms of World War II and the Korean war.

In 1954, at the height of the cold war, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480), also known as the "Food for Peace" program, was passed. PL 480, in its own words, was designed "to make maximum use of surplus commodities in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States."

Under Title I of the act, Washington sold food to its political allies on extremely favorable terms; the purchase could be paid for in local currency over a period of forty years at very low interest rates. Speaking in the House of Representatives August 12, Representative Michael Harrington pointed out that Washington usually

granted these local currencies back to the regimes at the time of payment. Title II of PL 480 provided for outright grants, about half of the \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion in aid given each year through the program.

Harrington, in the same speech, noted the priorities that Washington put on its PL 480 aid to other regimes. "The allocation," he said, "of 43 percent, or close to \$500 million, of the fiscal year 1974 deliveries to just two countries, South Vietnam and Cambodia, clearly reflects the security-related priorities now given to certain countries. Through this program, administration officials have found a back-door way of providing aid to these two countries at the expense of the other 96 nations participating in the Public Law 480 program. . . . By comparison, the needy countries of the Sahel [sub-Saharan Africa] and Ethiopia, which together have a population twice that of South Vietnam and Cambodia and have a much more severe hunger problem, received only \$56 million in fiscal year 1974."

Harrington further noted that as the PL 480 allocations for Saigon and Pnompenh were increased, those for Dacca were slashed. Bangladesh was originally scheduled to receive \$64 million in aid, but this was cut back to \$34 million.

Writing in his February 4, 1974, column, syndicated columnist Jack Anderson explained how this U.S. food aid helped to militarily strengthen the puppet regimes: ". . . in Cambodia, President Nixon gave the Lon Nol regime special permission to use up to 80 per cent of the proceeds of the sale of American food for 'common defense' and 'internal security.' In South Vietnam, the Thieu regime is permitted to spend a full 100 per cent of the food proceeds on military build-ups."

Another current example of Washington's use of food as a political weapon has been in Chile. "Three days before President Allende of Chile was overthrown and killed last fall, his government said that the United States had refused to sell it, for cash, vitally needed supplies of wheat, because of a 'political decision of the White House'; less than a month after the coup, the United States approved a credit sale of wheat to the new Chilean government in an amount eight times the total commodity credit offered to Chile in the Allende years," Stephen

4. After the Supreme Court declared the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional in 1936, Congress passed the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, which provided federal funds for farm subsidies. In 1938 another Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed; it provided loans for grain stored in the government granaries and exacted penalties for "excess sales."

S. Rosenfeld wrote in the Spring 1974 issue of *Foreign Policy*.

Another purpose of the PL 480 program was to help expand foreign markets for commercial U.S. food exports. The Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture has spent millions of dollars a year to help promote U.S. exports abroad.

During the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II, Washington provided dairy and wheat grants, which helped cultivate a Japanese market for those foods. In fiscal 1973, Japan was by far the largest importer of U.S. agricultural products, accounting for 19.3 percent of all U.S. food exports.

Six years ago, the U.S. Feed Grains Council started a project to help develop the Spanish heavy lamb industry, offering technical and other assistance. It is expected that in five years Spanish lamb producers will have ten million heavy lambs, increasing Spanish feed grain consumption by a million metric tons a year, a rosy prospect for the U.S. grain exporters.

The channeling of domestic surpluses abroad at low prices also undermined the smaller agricultural competitors. The "Food for Peace" aid thus helped pave the way for a greater penetration of foreign markets by the U.S. agricultural interests.

The productive revolution in U.S. farming and the emergence of the United States as the world's major food exporter was accompanied by the nearly total monopolization of U.S. agriculture. The individually run dirt farms that characterized the previous phase were destroyed or absorbed as farming became mechanized. In a 1973 pamphlet published by the Agribusiness Accountability Project, Jim Hightower wrote, "Since World War II, corporate power and governmental programs have been at work to transform agriculture from a family farm base to a factory base." Since 1943, Hightower observed, more than three million farms were eliminated, and they continue to fold at a rate of 2,000 a week.

These small farmers were driven under both by the control that the corporations had over the market and by the competitive edge of the larger, mechanized farms. The productivity of the top 10 percent of the farms is 50 percent higher than the national average. According to the 1964 Census of Agriculture, the vast majority of farm laborers work on only 7 percent of the farms.

Those small farmers who weren't driven out of business came under the direct control of the corporations through contracting. The Department of Agriculture has reported, for instance, that 78 percent of all processed vegetables are produced under contract, while another 10 percent are grown directly by the companies. "In most cases," Hightower wrote, "vertical integration is being accomplished through contracts with farmers—the corporation does not become a farmer, it rents one. Enticed by the prospect of a guaranteed market, farmers sign an advance contract to sell to a corporation a certain amount of a certain commodity for a certain price."

Although the Agriculture Department has for years declared that its price-support policies were aimed at protecting the small farmer, in practice they have aided the large corporations. Income and price-support payments were based on volume and acreage, and Washington bought most of the "surplus" food from processors. Del Monte, for instance, was paid more than \$2 million in 1971 from its sales to the Agriculture Department.

As the individual farmers disappeared, the giant conglomerates moved in. Of the forty-five most profitable companies in 1972, twenty-five were involved to some degree in agriculture, including Standard Oil, du Pont, Tenneco, Bank of America, Dow Chemical, Chase Manhattan Bank, and Getty Oil. A 1966 Federal Trade Commission study showed that the 100 largest food manufacturers (0.3% of the total number) raked in 71% of the total profits of all food manufacturing firms. The fifty largest had 61%.

William G. Shepherd, an economist, has stated that in many food lines, four companies on the average control 55% of the market, a level of concentration as high as that of the giant oil monopolies. In some lines, the market share of the four largest firms is even higher: 87% of cereal preparations, 75% of bread and prepared flour, and 60% of fluid milk. The four largest farm machinery companies hold 70% of the market. About 90% of all U.S. grain exports are controlled by the five largest grain corporations.

Many of these companies are multinational. The three top grain dealers, Continental Grain Company, Cargill, and Cook Industries, all have offices

and grain reserves in other countries. Del Monte has investments in farming, processing, and marketing facilities in more than twenty foreign countries.

Sales of food products abroad account for a major portion of U.S. agribusiness profits. Speaking before the National Press Club in April, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz said, "We export two-thirds of our wheat, one-half of our soybeans, one-third of our cotton and one-fourth of our feed grains. The production from one harvested crop acre out of four goes overseas." Foreign food sales account for almost one-third of all U.S. exports.

These same food monopolies that control U.S. agriculture also control the international market. U.S. exports account for 60% of the world wheat trade, 75% of the maize trade, and about 90% of the soybean trade (the United States produces two-thirds of the world's soybean crop).⁵ Although the United States grows only 1% of the world's rice, it is by far the largest rice exporter. Canada and Australia also contribute an important share of the food on the international market. U.S., Canadian, and Australian agricultural interests together control 85% of the international wheat trade.

Lester Brown and Erik Eckholm of the Overseas Development Council commented in the September 15 *New York Times*: "In fact, North America today controls a larger share of the world's exportable supplies of grain than the Middle East does of current world oil exports."

The growing monopolization of the U.S. food industry thus led to an ever-greater capitalist concentration of power over world food production and supplies. The effects of U.S. agricultural policies are global. A bad harvest in the Great Plains or deliberate cutbacks in food production could upset the international market and drive millions toward famine. An increase in U.S. food costs would cause world prices to soar. With such a stranglehold on one of the world's key life-lines, the U.S. imperialists were in a strong position to cash in on the food crisis. □

[Next week: *Why They Slashed the Production of Food.*]

5. Soybeans are a major source of high-quality protein in livestock and poultry feed and are consumed directly by more than one billion persons in East Asia.

AROUND THE WORLD



Abortion Legalized in France

The French National Assembly passed a bill November 29 liberalizing access to abortion. The old law, passed in 1920, provided stiff penalties for women receiving abortions and for persons performing them. It was repealed after a stormy debate by a vote of 284 to 189.

A public campaign to secure the right to abortion began in 1971, when 343 prominent Frenchwomen announced that they had received abortions. The Ministry of Health itself admits that as many as 300,000 illegal abortions are performed in France each year. The actual number is believed to be several times higher.

The new law, while a step forward, contains reactionary restrictions. Abortions are to be made legal only during the first ten weeks of pregnancy, and then only for women who are permanent residents of France. Women under the age of eighteen are required to secure the approval of their parents. And the cost of the abortion has to be paid by the patient instead of by the national health system.

Japanese Student Deported from Australia

During the Australian tour of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in early November, a young Japanese man, Neotaka Iwase, was jailed for four days in Sydney and then deported by the Australian authorities as a "suspected terrorist." According to a report in the November 15 *Direct Action*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Sydney, police later admitted that the "terrorist" was merely a Tokyo student on his way to study in New Zealand. Iwase had a record of one arrest in Tokyo for participating in a demonstration.

Selassie Gives Up Fortune

The Ethiopian military regime announced November 30 that deposed Emperor Haile Selassie had signed a letter authorizing the transfer of "all his personal and family fortune" to the Ethiopian Drought Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.

Selassie's fortune would thus become available for famine relief. At least 400,000 Ethiopians have starved to death since 1973.

A dispatch from the Ethiopian news agency said that the transfer included Se-

lassie's assets "entrusted with corporations, companies, private individuals, long and short-term investment portfolios, bullion and other precious stones and, in general, all movable and immovable properties."

The Ethiopian press reported that Selassie's fortune may total as much as \$11 billion; Swiss sources said it was probably in the hundreds of millions.

In a communique to the U.S. State Department, the military regime denied reports that it was planning to execute the former emperor.

Rockefeller's Sense of Urgency

In testimony before the House Judiciary Committee November 21, Nelson A. Rockefeller explained "just what makes me tick"—that is, why he is so determined to become vice-president of the United States. It is not at all the whim of a walking moneybag, as one might expect.

Besides "altruism" and a "sense of duty," Rockefeller is driven by two other motives: "I also am simply a man who delights in tackling tough human problems," and "I like the challenge and excitement of trying to develop concepts within which new and complex issues can be interrelated and reconciled, and solutions can be found."

Traits of character as admirable as these are unusual in a person born with a diamond-encrusted spoon in his mouth. But Rockefeller was not exaggerating, as can be judged from the account of his private talk with Jawaharlal Nehru on November 9, 1961, when the Indian prime minister was visiting New York. J. K. Galbraith, the U.S. ambassador to India, asked Nehru how the meeting had gone.

"A most extraordinary man," Nehru said. "He talked to me about nothing but bomb shelters. Why does he think I am interested in bomb shelters? He gave me a pamphlet on how to build my own shelter."

16 Croats Tried as Terrorists

The trial of sixteen accused Croat nationalists began November 21 in the Croation city of Zadar. One was tried in absentia. The prosecution alleged that the defendants had conspired with emigre organizations in West Germany, France, and Canada to carry out a campaign of bombings and assassinations in Yugo-

slavia. They were said to be members of a grouping calling itself Hora (The Hour), allegedly associated with the Ustashi, a right-wing Croat nationalist organization that collaborated with the Nazis during the occupation.

The prosecution called the case especially serious because it involved "not merely . . . a few hotheads" but "a group that would have undoubtedly become even more dangerous had it been allowed to extend its ranks."

The Belgrade regime initiated sweeping purges of "bourgeois-nationalist deviationists" in the Croat republic section of the League of Yugoslav Communists two years ago. However, there is no indication as yet of a connection between the case of the sixteen and the general crackdown on nationalistic currents.

UNESCO Cuts Off Funds to Israel

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) voted November 21 to exclude Israel from its European regional group. While Israel is still a member of UNESCO, it is the only country to belong to no regional group.

Halim Said Abu-Izzeddin of Lebanon, speaking for the majority of the delegates at UNESCO's general conference in Paris, said, "Israel is a state which belongs nowhere because it comes from nowhere."

UNESCO also voted to cut off aid to Israel and to supply funds to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to African liberation movements.

West German Court Sentences Meinhof to Eight-Year Term

Ulrike Meinhof, an alleged leader of the West German urban guerrilla group Red Army Faction, was sentenced to eight years in prison November 29 by a West Berlin court. She had been charged with organizing the May 1970 prison escape of Andreas Baader, another alleged leader of the RAF. Meinhof and Baader, who were both arrested in 1972, are also scheduled to stand trial in Stuttgart next spring in connection with a series of bombings.

A second defendant in the West Berlin trial, attorney Horst Mahler, was sentenced to four years in prison. Mahler, who is already serving a twelve-year sen-

tence on a charge of bank robbery, will have to remain in prison a total of fourteen years, the court ruled. In the past, Mahler had provided legal assistance to alleged RAF members.

A third defendant, Hans Jurgen Baecker, was acquitted.

Meinhof and thirty-nine other prisoners held on charges of participation in RAF actions began a hunger strike September 13 to protest the conditions of their imprisonment. One of the hunger strikers, Holger Meins, died November 9.

Head of Moscow Amnesty International Arrested by Kremlin Police

Soviet dissident Andrei Tverdokhlebov was arrested in Moscow November 27 by plainclothes police. According to a report from Associated Press, his apartment was searched by authorities the same day.

Tverdokhlebov is the secretary of the Soviet branch of Amnesty International. He is also one of the three founding members of the Moscow Human Rights Committee, along with Valery Chalidze and Andrei Sakharov.

100,000 Danes Protest Unemployment

About 100,000 demonstrators massed in front of the parliament building in Copenhagen November 26, demanding a halt to rising unemployment and the resignation of the minority Liberal government.

The protest, which was organized by shop stewards, was timed to take place as the major trade unions and the employers association opened negotiations on a new collective bargaining agreement. Although the official union leadership condemned the protest, about 15,000 workers staged one-day unofficial strikes in solidarity with it.

According to a report in the November 27 *Financial Times* of London, unemployment in Denmark is currently running at more than 8 percent.

Exiled Dissidents Form Committee to Defend Political Prisoners

At a meeting held in Paris November 7 and 8, a number of recently exiled East European dissidents decided to form a liaison committee for the defense of all who suffer political persecution in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Participants at the meeting included mathematician Pavel Litvinov, Soviet writers Viktor Nekrasov and Vladimir Maksimov, and Czech physician Frantisek Janouch.

At a news conference attended by Soviet dissident Andrei Sinyavsky, among others, the committee appealed for solidarity in behalf of three Soviet political prisoners believed to be "in danger of imminent death":

●Valentyn Moroz, the Ukrainian historian who has been on a hunger strike in Vladimir prison since July 1.

●Leonid Plyushch, the Ukrainian mathematician confined to a psychiatric prison-hospital for his dissident opinions.

●Vladimir Bukovsky, the Soviet dissident confined in extremely harsh conditions in Vladimir prison.

In addition to the exiled dissidents, other members of the newly organized liaison committee include Laurent Schwartz, professor in the faculty of sciences at the University of Paris; Peter Reddaway of the London School of Economics; Jean-Marie Domenach, editor of the French magazine *Esprit*; and Michael Scammell, editor of the British magazine *Index*.

Mexico Cuts Diplomatic Ties With Chile

The Mexican government has formally broken off diplomatic relations with the Chilean military junta, a Foreign Ministry spokesman announced November 26. The Echeverria regime had withdrawn its ambassador after the 1973 coup that overthrew the Allende regime, leaving the charge d'affaires at the head of its Santiago delegation.

In a news conference November 27, Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa said that relations between the two governments had "died a natural death."

Kremlin Sentences Nationalist

Paruir Airakyan, a 25-year-old Armenian dissident, was sentenced by Soviet authorities in Yerevan November 22 to seven years in prison. According to Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, Airakyan was charged with taking part in organizing the National Unity party of Armenia.


More U. S. Auto Workers Laid Off

The Ford Motor Company announced November 27 that it will lay off an additional 25,200 workers during the week beginning December 2. About 3,800 were laid off indefinitely, bringing to 18,500 the total number of Ford employees with little immediate prospect of regaining their jobs. Along with the layoffs announced by Chrysler and General Motors, the total number of auto workers idled in the first week of December stood at 165,000.

Record Year for Strikes in Australia

Australian workers went on strike for a record number of workdays in the first eight months of 1974. The Bureau of Statistics announced November 26 that from January to August, 5.6 million days were lost through strikes, compared with 1.8 million in the same period in 1973 and 2.6 million for the whole of that year. The previous record was 4.7 million days lost in 1971.

Inflation in Santo Domingo



Since 1969, inflation has reduced the buying power of most families in the Dominican Republic by 65%, according to the November 5 issue of the Santo Domingo publication *La Noticia*. This figure was given in statistics released in the January-March bulletin of the central bank.

The majority of families in the capital city of Santo Domingo have incomes of 50 to 100 pesos a month (the Dominican peso is on a par with the U.S. dollar).

Half the income of the average family is spent on food and related items; 27.1%, for housing; 5.7%, for clothing; and 18.9%, for medical and social services, taxes, etc. It is the rise in the cost of these basic items that has cut real income by two-thirds in the last five years. The official rate of inflation was virtually nil between 1963, when the workers received their last significant raises, and 1969.

In 1966, wages were frozen by the Balaguer government after it won elections "supervised" by the U.S. military. At that time the incomes of the poorest families were also cut by the government austerity program.

Iranian Oppositionists Jailed in India

SAVAK, the Iranian secret police organization, is assisted by the Indian police in suppressing Iranians in India who oppose the shah's oppressive regime. Two Iranian youths were recently arrested in Hyderabad for posting stickers denouncing the shah on city walls during the dictator's visit to India in September.

According to a November 15 dispatch in *New Asia News*, the youths were detained for six days. When a lawyer filed a motion for their release, they were beaten. An Indian official informed the court that they had been arrested at the insistence of the Iranian consulate, which wanted to "teach them a lesson because they were learning communism."

Peligrosa Táctica Ultraizquierdista en la Lucha Contra los Fascistas

Por Leon Trotsky

[La siguiente carta, fechada el 2 de marzo de 1934, fue enviada por León Trotsky a sus partidarios en Francia. Fue extraída de un volumen de próxima aparición de la serie *Writings of Leon Trotsky* (1929-40). (Copyright 1975 by Pathfinder Press, Inc.) La traducción del francés fue realizada por Russell Block para Pathfinder Press. Apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 2 de diciembre].

* * *

Queridos amigos:

Desde que estoy en Suiza,¹ no puedo seguir de cerca los sucesos en Francia. Pero permítanme decir que antes de emigrar aquí, he acumulado una cierta cantidad de experiencia sobre estas cuestiones de Alemania. Y el asunto Menilmontant² me llena de los peores presagios. Si las cosas se desarrollan siguiendo esta línea la catástrofe es inevitable.

¿Cuál es el objetivo, no sólo para el momento, sino para todo el período venidero? Conseguir que los obreros tomen la lucha contra los fascistas antes de que esos elementos se hayan convertido en la fuerza dominante en el estado, conseguir que los obreros se acostumbren a no tenerle miedo a los fascistas, enseñarles cómo destruir de un golpe

1. La frase "estoy en Suiza", intenta ocultar la identidad del autor. En ese momento Trotsky estaba viviendo de incógnito en Barbizon, una villa cerca de París. Debido a la presión de las autoridades francesas y las amenazas provenientes de los círculos fascistas y stalinistas, no podía tomar posición pública en temas tan delicados como el que se discute aquí. Debido a estas condiciones Trotsky no firmó la carta.

2. Para obtener material sobre el asunto, ver "Background to Trotsky's Letter on Tactics in Fighting Fascists" de Gerry Foley, que apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 2 de diciembre.

a los fascistas, convencerlos de que ellos son más fuertes en número, en audacia y otros medios.

En este período es muy importante distinguir entre los fascistas y el estado. El estado no está aún listo para subordinarse a los fascistas, desea "arbitrar." Sabemos lo que esto significa desde un punto de vista sociológico. Sin embargo no es una cuestión de sociología sino de dar golpes y recibirlos. Políticamente es parte de la naturaleza de un estado "árbitro" pre bonapartista que la policía dude, se contenga y de conjunto esté lejos de identificarse con las bandas fascistas.

Nuestra tarea estratégica es aumentar esas dudas y temores de parte del "árbitro", su ejército y la policía. ¿Cómo? Demostrando que somos más fuertes que los fascistas, es decir asestándoles una buena paliza a la vista de ese "árbitro" sin, mientras que no nos veamos forzados a ello, atacar directamente el estado en sí mismo. En esto consiste todo.

En el caso de Menilmontant, según lo que puedo decir desde aquí, la operación fue efectuada de una forma diametralmente opuesta. ¡*L'Humanité* informa que no había más de sesenta fascistas en un barrio totalmente obrero! La tarea táctica o si ustedes prefieren "técnica", era bastante simple: agarrar a cada fascista o a cada grupo aislado de fascistas del cuello, hacerles conocer el pavimento unas cuantas veces, despojarlos de sus insignias y documentos fascistas, y sin llevar las cosas más lejos, dejarlos con su temor y con unas pocas buenas marcas negras y azules.

El "árbitro" defendió la libertad de asamblea (por el momento el estado está también defendiendo las reuniones obreras contra los ataques fascistas). En este caso era totalmente estúpido desear provocar un conflicto armado con la policía. Pero esto es precisamente lo que hicieron.

L'Humanité se regocija: levantaron una barricada. Pero, ¿para qué? Los fascistas no estaban del otro lado de la barricada, y era con los fascistas

con quienes peleaban. ¿Se trataba tal vez de una insurrección armada? ¿O de establecer la dictadura del proletariado en Menilmontant? Esto no tiene sentido. Como dijo Marx: "No se juega con barricadas." Aún cuando hay una insurrección, usted no va a levantar barricadas en cualquier momento. (Usted puede aprender algo de Blanqui sobre este punto, vea los documentos publicados en *La Critique Sociale*).³

Han tenido éxito en (a) permitir a la "Juventud Dorada"⁴ volver a casa en buenas condiciones; (b) provocar a la policía y conseguir que mataran a un obrero; (c) darle a los fascistas un argumento importante: los comunistas están empezando a construir barricadas.

Los idiotas burócratas dirán: "Entonces, ¿ustedes quieren que dejemos de levantar barricadas por miedo a

3. Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805-81) fue uno de los grandes revolucionarios de la clase obrera francesa. La *Critique Sociale* (Crítica Social), una colección de sus escritos, fue publicada en 1885. Blanqui pasó casi la mitad de su vida en la cárcel (treinta y siete años), debido a sus repetidas participaciones en la acción armada de pequeños grupos. En 1874 Engels dijo de él:

"Blanqui es realmente un revolucionario político, socialista sólo en sus emociones, que simpatiza con los sufrimientos del pueblo, pero sin una teoría social con proposiciones prácticas definidas para el cambio social. En su acción política es esencialmente un hombre de hechos, y opina que una pequeña, bien organizada minoría, que ataca en el momento preciso, puede arrastrar a las masas de la población y consumir una acción triunfante.

"Está claro que Blanqui es el revolucionario de una generación pasada."

4. "Juventud Dorada", eran los jóvenes de familias ricas que buscaban excitación, e incluso violencia en los movimientos ultra reaccionarios.

Hasta años recientes, era bastante raro para los jóvenes de "buena familia" inclinarse hacia la causa del proletariado. Referencias a la "Juventud Dorada" y su disposición a jugar el papel de "Jóvenes matones burgueses" se remontan a la literatura socialista de 1840.

los fascistas y amor a la policía?" Es una traición negarse a levantar barricadas cuando la situación política lo requiere y cuando se es lo suficientemente fuerte como para levantarlas y defenderlas. Pero es una provocación construir imitaciones de barricadas para un pequeño acto fascista, aumentar las cosas más allá de toda proporción política y desorientar al proletariado.

La tarea es *comprometer* a un número cada vez mayor de obreros en la lucha contra el fascismo. La aventura de Menilmontant sólo puede aislar a una pequeña minoría militante. Después de semejante experiencia, un ciento, un millar de obreros que hubieran estado dispuestos a enseñar a los jóvenes matones una cuantas lecciones dirán: "No, gracias, no deseo que me rompan la cabeza por nada." El resultado de toda esta empresa fue exactamente el opuesto de lo que se intentaba. Y sin desmenuzarlo mucho, no me sorprendería si después de un tiempo, los que gritaban más fuerte por barricadas, fueran agentes fascistas instalados en las filas de los stalinistas, fascistas que desean sacar a sus amigos de las dificultades, provocando un enfrentamiento con la policía. Si el caso fue este, tuvieron éxito.

¿Qué deberían haber hecho en su lugar los elementos más activos y perspicaces? Hubieran improvisado un pequeño Estado Mayor General, incluyendo a un stalinista y a un socialista de haber sido posible. (Al mismo tiempo se debería haber explicado a los trabajadores que el Estado Mayor General tendría que funcionar sobre bases permanentes la víspera de la manifestación). Este Estado Mayor General improvisado, con un mapa del distrito extendido frente a ellos, tendría que haber elaborado el plan más simple del mundo: dividir cien o doscientos manifestantes en grupos de tres a cinco, con un dirigente por cada grupo, y dejarlos hacer su trabajo. Y después de la batalla, los dirigentes se tendrían que haber encontrado para hacer el balance y extraer las lecciones necesarias para el futuro. Esta segunda reunión podría proveer un buen motivo para un Estado Mayor General permanente, una buena base para una milicia obrera permanente en el distrito. Naturalmente, tendría que haber habido volantes explicando la necesidad de un Estado Mayor perma-

nente.

Para los elementos revolucionarios perspicaces, el balance ofrece las siguientes lecciones:

- a. Deben tener vuestro propio Estado Mayor General para esas ocasiones.
- b. Deben prever las posibilidades y eventualidades en esos conflictos.
- c. Deben establecer unos cuantos

planes generales (varias posibilidades).

- d. Deben tener un mapa del distrito.
- e. Deben tener los volantes adecuados para la situación.

Esto es todo lo que puedo decir por el momento. Estoy seguro de que estas surgen ideas concuerdan completamente con vuestras ideas. Si es así mucho mejor. □

Brasil

Trotskistas Publican Periódico Clandestino

Un grupo trotskista ha comenzado a publicar en Brasil *Independência Operária*, periódico clandestino que va ya en su tercer número, correspondiente a octubre de este año.

A través de los artículos que se publican en el número de octubre, se pueden apreciar los intentos de este núcleo de revolucionarios por vincularse a los sectores que en estos momentos son el campo más propicio para la propaganda trotskista en Brasil.

Incluyen, por ejemplo, un breve análisis sobre la situación del movimiento estudiantil brasileño, en donde señalan que éste se encuentra actualmente en una lenta recuperación, "en un proceso que caracterizamos como de acumulación de fuerzas", después del período de reflujo que comenzó en 1968.

La recuperación de los estudiantes sigue ritmos desiguales, afirma *Independência Operária*; pero el proceso de ascenso es nacional, teniendo como ejes centrales las universidades de São Paulo, Guanabara, Rio Grande do Sul y Minas Gerais.

Este ascenso incipiente es aún más importante porque se inserta dentro del marco de un reavivamiento general del movimiento de las masas brasileñas. Esto plantea la necesidad de estimular las luchas de los estudiantes y de vincular las diferentes escuelas y universidades, para que se puedan comenzar a generalizar las luchas.

Para esto, *Independência Operária* plantea la formación de un frente estudiantil, que tenga su propio órgano y se base en la aceptación de un programa de cuatro puntos:

- "1. Enseñanza pública y gratuita;

"2. Derogación del 477;*

"3. Autonomía universitaria, y

"4. Completa independencia de los órganos de representación estudiantil en relación a las autoridades de la universidad."

Para la universidad de São Paulo proponen dos puntos más: "... lucha por una auténtica reforma universitaria, que responda a los intereses estudiantiles y populares, con la participación igual de profesores, alumnos y trabajadores no docentes; ... y amnistía para todos los presos políticos."

En ese mismo número de *Independência Operária*, aparece un artículo sobre la lucha de los trabajadores bancarios, que comenzó a principios de agosto, por aumento de salarios y algunos derechos sindicales. Afirman que la experiencia de esa lucha — en la que la burocracia del Sindicato de Bancarios, que está intervenido, maniobró las asambleas — plantea una vez más la necesidad de que los trabajadores luchan por recuperar los sindicatos y por que se ponga fin a la intervención del gobierno en éstos.

La publicación de este periódico trotskista en las difíciles condiciones de la clandestinidad bajo el régimen de la dictadura militar brasileña, es un paso alentador en la lucha revolucionaria en América Latina, y abre nuevas esperanzas para el trotskismo y el combate por la democracia y el socialismo en Brasil. □

*La Ley 477 permite al gobierno suspender o expulsar a los estudiantes a los que acusa de participar en actividades "subversivas."

Medidas 'Educativas' del Gobierno Portugués

Por Antonio Romero

Lisboa

Las clases no han comenzado realmente en Portugal, luego del período de vacaciones que este año se extendió más de la cuenta. Sin embargo, ya se han producido una serie de hechos que crean una tensión cada vez mayor entre el estudiantado y las autoridades del Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (MEC), empeñadas en una política que puede conducir las a un combate frontal contra el movimiento estudiantil secundario y universitario.

Los primeros roces han aparecido alrededor del problema del "saneamiento" de elementos comprometidos con el régimen derrocado el 25 de abril. El MEC, al igual que los restantes sectores del aparato gubernamental, han tratado insistentemente de *quitar poder de decisión* a los más directamente interesados en la eliminación de los reaccionarios: estudiantes, trabajadores y docentes de los institutos de enseñanza. Un ejemplo de esta posición se encuentra en un comunicado emitido por la Comisión Ministerial de Saneamiento y Reclasificación del MEC: "Recuerda con insistencia que el saneamiento resuelto por cualquier asamblea no tiene, por sí solo, validez legal . . ." (*A Capital*, 11 de noviembre).

Como contrapartida, en numerosas facultades y liceos, Asambleas Generales de escuela han insistido en la validez de sus resoluciones.

El dilema de a quién corresponde la autoridad se ha planteado aún más directamente en torno a los organismos de gestión o autogestión que surgieron al calor de las grandes movilizaciones de mayo, en reemplazo de las autoridades existentes durante el gobierno de Caetano. Las experiencias de democratización en la dirección de las escuelas han adoptado modalidades muy diferentes, aunque en casi todos los casos prima el criterio de que la autoridad máxima recae en la *Asamblea General de Estudiantes, docentes y no docentes*. Esto, por el momento es aceptado casi unánimemente, aunque en la práctica

los reformistas y las autoridades educativas oficiales tratan de convertir a la Asamblea General en una instancia carente de valor práctico.

Los choques han surgido y seguramente se intensificarán, con el funcionamiento de los órganos ejecutivos y con el intento del MEC de convertirlos en apéndices suyos, para lo cual un paso importante es liquidar las expresiones más avanzadas de integración de estos organismos, en las que estando representados *todos los sectores* (docentes, estudiantes y no docentes) con delegados electos en forma independiente, la mayoría de puestos y por tanto el control, *queda en manos del sector estudiantil*, poco dócil a las directivas centrales.

Pero el choque más espectacular entre las aspiraciones estudiantiles y las disposiciones gubernamentales se ha dado con los llamados "exámenes de aptitud." En efecto, la contradicción entre el elevado número de estudiantes que pretende ingresar a la universidad y las reducidas dimensiones de los institutos de educación superior pretendió ser resuelta a través de la imposición de un examen limitativo para los millares de estudiantes que no obtuvieron un promedio superior a los doce puntos en los exámenes finales del ciclo secundario.

El estudiantado portugués está en general bastante desorganizado y relativamente debilitado en sus posibilidades de lucha, por las maniobras burocráticas tendientes a imponer la pasividad y el apoyo al gobierno, llevadas adelante por la *Unión de Estudiantes Comunistas* (UEC) del Partido Comunista Portugués y por la *Comisión Pro-Unep* (Unión Nacional de Estudiantes Portugueses), que ellos formaron. El sectarismo y los métodos también burocráticos de las corrientes maoistas son otro factor de confusión. La indignación ante las mediadas restrictivas al ingreso en la Universidad fue sin embargo de tal magnitud que superó esas dificultades. En forma casi espontánea, los exámenes convocados para la primera semana de noviembre fueron boico-

teados de diferentes maneras en la mayoría de las facultades.

Sin embargo, el incidente del boicot a las pruebas de aptitud no quedó sin respuesta oficial y como parte de la ofensiva gubernamental contra el movimiento estudiantil se anunció con mayor claridad el propósito del Gobierno Provisorio.

El 11 de noviembre, el MEC largó un extenso comunicado anunciando que "el MEC decidió una nueva llamada a aquellas escuelas en que la prestación de las pruebas de aptitud haya sido perturbada." Las justificaciones comienzan por apuntar que "el número de candidatos a la educación superior excede este año ampliamente la capacidad de las escuelas", por lo cual, "si todos fueran admitidos, muy pocos podrían en realidad beneficiarse con una enseñanza útil, porque ni las disponibilidades en instalaciones, ni en número de profesores calificados, ni la cualidad de un equipo disponible pueden asegurar una enseñanza eficaz." Dado que a las autoridades del MEC ni les pasa por la cabeza la posibilidad de medidas de fondo que pudieran asegurar el derecho a la educación a todos quienes aspiren a ella, el comunicado confiesa, "Si se parte del principio de que debe practicarse una política de verdad, la solución no puede ser sino una: la de limitar el número de entradas en la Universidad."

Partiendo de tal premisa se declara la intención de "hacer una selección." En esta altura la resolución ministerial intenta el curioso recurso de denominar al atropello al derecho a la educación como *democratización*. Para dar esta ilusión se afirma primero el "deseo de contribuir a una corrección de la distribución social de la población universitaria" para lo cual la limitación deberá orientarse hacia "esta doble finalidad: valorar las capacidades y tener en cuenta los referidos objetivos de justicia social. Adoptando un criterio de este tipo se está marchando en el sentido de la democratización de la escuela." Casi podría hacerse una fórmula para

uso extensivo a los demás países: si a la eliminación de la mayoría de los estudiantes le sumamos la necesidad de tener en cuenta los objetivos sociales, da como resultado la democratización de la escuela . . .

"No basta establecer una cantidad de ingreso en la universidad; es necesario proporcionar a los jóvenes actividades socialmente útiles que sustituyan las actividades escolares" atendiendo a lo cual "está ya en estudio la organización de un servicio cívico que posibilite a los no admitidos luchar en otros frentes, por el progreso nacional en la colaboración en tareas sanitarias, el apoyo a las autarquías locales, la promoción cultural de las poblaciones rurales, el censo de la existencia de archivos y museos, la investigación de las condiciones de vida y trabajo de las poblaciones, el catastro del equipamiento social del país, etc." (Todas las citas del comunicado del MEC fueron reproducidas del vespertino *A Capital* del 11 de noviembre).

En declaraciones publicadas el mismo día 11 por el *Diario de Notícias* de Lisboa, el Ministro de Educación Pereyra de Moura suministró más detalles. Según el Ministro ni siquiera los que pasaran los exámenes podrían ser admitidos en su totalidad, por lo cual, "los alumnos postergados deberán prestar un servicio cívico anticipado, constituido por servicio militar y civil para los estudiantes de sexo masculino y sólo civil para los elementos de sexo femenino." Planteado con cierta suavidad, lo que se está proponiendo es la militarización del trabajo de vastos sectores de la juventud estudiantil, pues se aclaraba en el reportaje "ese servicio será orientado por oficiales milicianos." El plan es de largo alcance pues según Pereyra de Moura "aquellos que comenzaron ahora a concurrir a las facultades cumplirán el servicio cívico de aquí a uno o dos años según el curso en que estuvieran. En esa altura entrarán en las facultades alumnos que hasta entonces cumplirán el servicio y algunos estudiantes que hayan finalizado en ese año los cursos secundarios. Esto ocurrirá hasta que la situación en los cursos superiores se encuentre regularizada" para lo cual "serán necesarios tres o cuatro años." Según los planes detallados por de Moura, aún entonces el servicio cívico se mantendría, aunque dejaría de ser "anticipado." El servicio consistirá

en trabajar "en todo el país, principalmente al nivel de las autarquías locales, servicios de salud, de enseñanza, centros sociales y servicios regionales de agricultura."

Según el Ministro, así "la juventud tendrá un interesante conocimiento de vida práctica", y no podría pensarse en otro tipo de remuneración pues "es ilusorio pensar que el Estado podría pagar a funcionarios, por los sueldos corrientes, para ocuparse de los trabajos citados."

Según se informaba posteriormente en los diarios, "Cálculase en cerca de quince mil el número de alumnos postulantes a la Universidad que no podrán ingresar por falta de espacio y condiciones pedagógicas, según fue ayer a la tarde afirmado por el representante del MEC durante una reunión que transcurrió en el Ministerio de Trabajo. Estuvieron también presentes el Ministro Costa Martins, el Secretario de Estado de Trabajo y las Direcciones Asociativas de Estudiantes de Lisboa, Porto y Coimbra, convocados para el estudio del trabajo social estudiantil. La constitución de brigadas de trabajo, semejantes a las que fueron formadas para las campañas de alfabetización y educación sanitaria (experiencia intentada con poco éxito por la comisión Pro-Unep durante las vacaciones), para trabajar en distintas regiones del país o en los mismos centros urbanos en iniciativas como construcción de casas para reemplazar los 'barrios de lata', en electrificación y en trabajos sanitarios en los sitios en que se hace sentir su falta, la construcción de caminos, la fertilización y cultivo de baldíos u otras tareas de que el país carece, y de posible realización, constituirán formas de tratar de resolver las dificultades causadas por esa 'avalancha de estudiantes' en las universidades . . ." (*A Capital*, 12 de noviembre).

En un intento de justificar estos proyectos y de poner demagógicamente a la población trabajadora contra la previsible resistencia que estas medidas acarrearán entre el estudiantado, el comunicado del MEC sostenía que el boicot a los exámenes "es una actitud francamente reaccionaria y egoísta. En una altura en que es necesario que el pueblo de Portugal trabaje duramente en la reconstrucción del país, llega a ser inconcebible que se reclame el beneficio de no rendir cuentas del trabajo propio. Y, particularmente,

que lo reclame un grupo que dentro del todo nacional no puede dejar de ser considerado como un conjunto de privilegiados." Se pretende así pintar como vagos y parásitos a millares de estudiantes víctimas de la crisis de la enseñanza capitalista, para aislar su posible resistencia . . . y de paso, se arroja un manto de olvido y protección a la infima minoría que "dentro del todo nacional" es realmente privilegiada y parasitaria, es decir la minoría de un puñado de familias que controlan los siete grupos monopolísticos que manejan Portugal—CUF (Companhia União Fabril), Champalimaud, Spirito Santo, Quina, etc.—la minoría que no sólo aprovechó la dictadura para enriquecerse sin límites sino que aún ahora continúa embolsándose los recursos que harían posibles planes de educación, sanidad y viviendas para satisfacer las necesidades de las masas.

El engaño básico de todos los razonamientos del Gobierno Provisorio—repetidos fanáticamente por los dirigentes del Partido Comunista Portugués—es la afirmación de que trabajando más y mejor se resolverán los problemas populares y que por lo tanto el "trabajo social" no remunerado de la juventud será una efectiva solidaridad con los obreros. La realidad es completamente diferente, pues mientras los medios de producción y de cambio estén en manos de los capitalistas, el producto del trabajo favorecerá principalmente a los explotadores. Así, la superexplotación de que se pretende hacer víctima a los estudiantes sólo servirá en el mejor de los casos, a posibilitar que el Gobierno lleve adelante cierta acción social sin necesidad de disminuir las ganancias de los monopolios y los altos funcionarios de la burocracia estatal.

Pero los planes elaborados por el MEC, el Ministerio de Trabajo y los dirigentes estudiantiles del Partido Comunista Portugués no persiguen objetivos económicos. Constituyen también una forma de prevenir movilizaciones estudiantiles, de "disciplinar" a la juventud y volcar sus energías hacia tareas más o menos filantrópicas bajo normas militares.

Y junto a estos objetivos políticos volvemos a encontrar lo que es una constante en la propaganda del Gobierno Provisorio: imponer la convicción de que en el *Nuevo Portugal*, la conducción y resolución de los pro-

blemas debe dejarse en última instancia en manos del Gobierno y el MFA (Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas), la convicción de que el deber de los jóvenes es formarse como buenos técnicos que, llegado el caso, trabajen gratis para un gobierno burgués!

Estos son los ambiciosos planes del MEC. Los dirigentes estudiantiles comunistas se comprometieron a "promover en las escuelas diversas secciones de esclarecimiento de los objetivos de la campaña, al mismo tiempo que se organizará a los estudiantes para

poner manos a la obra, con la urgencia que las circunstancias imponen" (*A Capital*, 12 de noviembre). Pero, las masas estudiantiles todavía no han opinado y es posible que quieran hacerse escuchar: su voz puede llegar a ser muy diferente a las que se escucharon en el Ministerio de Trabajo o el MEC, y si el gobierno no quisiera escucharla, se oirán gritos. Muchos gritos. Desde el 25 de abril nunca la posibilidad de una explosiva lucha estudiantil con inmensas posibilidades de repercusión estuvo tan cercana. □

Mujeres Puertorriqueñas Comienzan la Lucha

¿Y los Aborteros Dónde Están?

[El artículo que reproducimos a continuación apareció en el número preliminar (septiembre) de la revista feminista puertorriqueña *El Tacón de la Chancleta*.]

* * *

Una mogolla. Así se podría describir el status actual de las leyes de aborto en Puerto Rico.

Hace poco, la Corte de Distrito Federal aquí, decidió que los hospitales públicos deben abrir sus facilidades y hacerlas disponibles a las mujeres que soliciten abortos.

En su decisión, la corte indicó además que ningún doctor puede ser obligado a realizar un aborto si su conciencia así se lo dicta.

Claro está, el gobierno del Estado Libre Asociado y el Gobierno Municipal de San Juan se han agarrado de esta última disposición de la ley para descubrir que los hospitales públicos sólo tienen médicos cuyas conciencias les dictan que no deben hacer abortos.

Mientras la mayoría de los hospitales tenga establecido por ley que solamente los doctores de su personal pueden practicar la medicina en la institución a que pertenezcan, los hospitales y los oficiales de gobierno podrán seguir obstaculizando cualquier intento de una mujer de obtener un aborto en una facilidad pública.

Recientemente Norman Maldonado, director del Hospital Municipal, recha-

zó la solicitud de una mujer que quería hacerse un aborto en dicha institución. Alegó Maldonado que todos los médicos de su personal estaban moral y religiosamente opuestos a los abortos.

El Hospital Municipal de San Juan fue el demandado en el caso y aunque los oficiales de la alcaldía habían dicho anteriormente que había varios doctores en el personal dispuestos a hacer abortos, Maldonado dijo que no sabía de ninguno.

Maldonado le dijo además a la mujer, que aún cuando hubiera médicos dispuestos a hacer abortos, el hospital no tenía fondos disponibles para el equipo y el personal necesarios.

El aborto es una de las operaciones menos complicadas si se la realiza durante las primeras doce semanas del embarazo y requiere muy poca inversión de fondos adicionales en un hospital bien equipado.

Hasta las primeras doce semanas, el método más comunmente usado para terminar un embarazo, es el método de succión. El proceso, que pocas veces toma más de cinco o siete minutos, envuelve dilatación o abertura cervical. El procedimiento no duele excepto por calambres leves en el útero.

Otro método usado más frecuentemente pero más obsoleto que el de succión, es la dilatación y curetaje, comúnmente conocido como D&C (dilatation and curettage). Este procedi-

miento que se hace a las mujeres por otras condiciones patológicas, envuelve la dilatación cervical y un raspe con cureta. La anestesia general es necesaria y la paciente necesita de seis horas a dos días para recuperarse.

De acuerdo con Maldonado, proveer servicios de aborto para algunas mujeres, es echar a un lado la atención médica de otros pacientes. Sin embargo, en su decisión la corte dijo todo lo contrario, que al rechazar las peticiones de aborto se estaba discriminando en contra de las mujeres que lo solicitaban y a favor de los demás pacientes.

El Secretario de Salud, José A. Alvarez de Choudens, continuó esta línea de pensamiento cuando dijo que sería discriminatorio para los hospitales públicos proveer servicios de aborto porque esto perjudicaría los pacientes en busca de otro tipo de tratamiento médico.

Alvarez dijo que el Departamento no haría ningún esfuerzo para emplear en los hospitales médicos que están dispuestos a hacer abortos. Según Alvarez el Departamento atiende todas las necesidades médicas sobre una base de igualdad.

Como están las cosas ahora, el gobierno ha podido exitosamente rechazar la decisión de la corte. No habrá abortos realizados en hospitales públicos porque no habrá doctores en los hospitales públicos dispuestos a hacer abortos.

Por muchos años Puerto Rico fue la meca del aborto, a pesar de las sanciones legales y sociales que entonces el aborto conllevaba. Las mujeres arriesgaban su salud y hasta su vida al tener que hacerse abortos en condiciones antihigiénicas y comercialmente explotadoras.

Para una mujer pobre el aborto le salía alrededor de doscientos dólares, en condiciones de salud pésimas. Para una mujer con mayores recursos económicos el aborto salía unos seiscientos dólares o más, pero en mejores condiciones higiénicas y bajo supervisión médica.

Ahora, aún con la aplicación en Puerto Rico de la decisión del Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos liberalizando las leyes del aborto, el cumplimiento de esta decisión en la isla se ha convertido en una mogolla legal y una contienda política, y el derecho de las mujeres se quedó guindando en el aire. . . . □

Problems of Democratization and Détente

By Roy Medvedev

[Leading Soviet dissidents of varying views, both those inside the Soviet Union and those who have emigrated, have been engaged in a vigorous discussion among themselves on the nature and consequences of the détente and the attitude to be taken toward this development. Andrei Sakharov, Vladimir Maksimov, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn all made statements that have appeared in the international press on this important question of world politics and its effects on internal Soviet life.

[The prominent oppositionist Roy Medvedev, author of *Let History Judge*, the only major study of Stalinism written by a Soviet citizen since the 1930s, has made several contributions to this ongoing debate. The first of them on "Problems of Democratization and Détente" was published in *New Left Review*, January-February 1974, pp. 27-40. We are reprinting the full text in this issue.

[The appearance of this article in the West German paper *Zeit* provoked a lively discussion in the foreign press as well as in various circles of the Soviet intellectuals. Medvedev's reply to his critics at home and abroad was first translated and published in the November 11, 1974, issue of *Intercontinental Press*, pp. 1499-1503.

[The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation of Britain is preparing a symposium of commentaries on Medvedev's position by such well-known political personalities and Marxist scholars as Jiri Pelikan, Tamara Deutscher, Ralph Miliband, E.P. Thompson, Ernest Mandel, Mihailo Markovic, Ken Coates, and others. It is hoped that Roy Medvedev will respond to their comments on and criticisms of his original article. This would be the first time that a fraternal dialogue of this kind has taken place between representatives of the socialist tendencies in the Soviet and East European opposition and figures on the left in the Western capitalist countries.

[George Novack, one of our editors, was among those invited to participate in this unprecedented exchange of views. We plan to publish his contribution in next week's issue.

[Spokesman Books, the imprint of the Bertrand Russell Foundation, will bring out the collection in English and Russian sometime in early 1975 under the title *Détente and Socialist Democracy*.]

Some four to five years ago the international situation was still a source of serious anxiety to all who cared for peace, democracy and socialism. The enormous scale of the continuous American intervention in Indochina, the incursion of the Warsaw Pact troops into the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the new Berlin crisis, the armed skirmishes on the Soviet-Chinese border, the acceleration of the arms race all over the world — all these were exacerbating international tensions to the utmost, and encouraging reactionary and extrem-

ist forces in every country. Major efforts were needed to change the trend of world events. Today, we know that such efforts were made and that they have achieved quite impressive results. We shall not enumerate here all the agreements and treaties which have critically altered the international atmosphere. It should not be overlooked, however, that the progress of détente over the last three years has been neither smooth nor easy. Initiatives of the USSR have played a very significant role in furthering it. We can assume that the development of the Soviet "peace offensive" provoked serious disagreements among our leaders.

The main reason for the elimination of Shelest,¹ for example, was certainly not because of his "nationalist" errors, but because of his objections to Nixon's trip to the USSR in 1972. The pensioning-off of Voronov² from the Politbureau was another major setback to rightist circles within our leadership.

International détente was not, of course, the outcome of the Soviet peace offensive alone. It was made possible by mutual concessions, and readiness to compromise on both sides. It is plain that in the Western countries this readiness for compromise likewise emerged only after prolonged and acute political conflicts. The diminution of international tension created conditions not only for limiting *increases* in strategic armaments, but also for *reducing* the military establishments of all the great powers and of many smaller countries, and thereby for accelerating the peaceful economic development of every continent. The improvement of relations between the largest powers on the planet has thus proceeded not at the expense of other countries and nations; it benefits all mankind.

In the past, the state of armed confrontation between the Great Powers, the "Cold War" and the debased anti-Soviet and anti-Western propaganda which they exchanged in no way helped to overcome the remnants of Stalinist totalitarianism nor to foster democratic reforms in the USSR. Today, however, we can likewise see that international détente and development of trade and other forms of cooperation do not automatically lead to changes in the political climate in the Soviet Union, to the growth

1. Petro Shelest was removed from the Politburo of the CPSU in April 1973. One year before, in May 1972, he had been ousted from his post as first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party, a post he had held for nine years. For a discussion of the role that Ukrainian national opposition to Russification played in Shelest's removal from his post as head of the Ukrainian Communist party, see *Intercontinental Press*, May 7, 1973, p. 530. — IP

2. Gennady Voronov was, like Shelest, removed from the Politburo of the CPSU in April 1973. Two years before he had been removed from his post as premier of the Russian Republic. — IP

of democratic freedoms, or to respect for the political and civic rights of the individual, either.

No country in the world has in this century undergone such dramatic and contradictory experiences as the Soviet Union. It was therefore natural that even the insignificant and limited degree of democratization which could be observed in our country between 1961 and 1967, awoke among thinking elements in our society the most diverse political currents, both within the framework of Marxism and without it. Although these trends involved only a minimal fraction of our intelligentsia, this awakening of political thought alarmed the Right within the leadership of the CPSU. This wing of the party is composed of functionaries promoted and formed in the epoch when Soviet society was plunged in utter political passivity and silence, when administrative rather than political methods, coercion rather than persuasion, were used to rule the country.

Various measures to constrict freedom of political discussion within the USSR were introduced by 1967 and at the beginning of 1968. They were notably tightened after August 1968. All political tendencies, "left" as well as "right," were attacked, although in differing degree; in recent years, for instance, the most blatant manifestations of Russian chauvinism and open exaltations of Stalin have also been condemned. Subsequent foreign policy successes of the Soviet Union and the slackening of international tension did not put a stop to the assault on "dissenters." In many respects, the pressure against dissent even increased; political trends that had only just started to emerge were stifled and social thought repressed. A considerable number of people, who had much to say, were forced into silence as they were not prepared to put at risk their own apparent freedom or the well-being of their relatives and friends.

This pressure from above in no way excluded recourse to straightforward judicial repressions or even to such inhuman methods of intimidation as shutting sane people up in psychiatric hospitals for patently political reasons. The words and deeds of broken men like Yakir and Krasin were exploited to disintegrate and demoralize oppositionists of past years. Many Western papers long presented Yakir and Krasin as "courageous fighters for human rights," although the unprincipled and objectively provocative character of their activity had been obvious to a number of people in our country for some years. The strength of various democratic tendencies was also reduced by the noticeable easing of emigration to Israel. Under the influence of the new situation, even those Jews and their relatives who not long before had actively worked for the enlargement of civil rights and liberties in the USSR and had no intention of leaving the country, began to emigrate. Very recently, dispatch abroad of dissenters from other non-Jewish nationalities has also begun, although still experimentally.

For the majority of ordinary "unorthodox" people or those inclined to be critical of certain aspects of our political and social life, the mounting administrative pressure against all dissent is, however, of the greatest importance. As is well known, in our country the State is not merely the main, it is in fact the only "employer." In the absence of all democratic checks or balances, this circumstance affords extremely simple and highly effective means of exerting pressure on people who per-

form their professional work irreproachably, but are not "loyal" enough in the opinion of one or another high official. Protests against the restriction of democratic rights in the USSR continues to this day, of course. In some respects they have even intensified and assumed new forms. These protests are, however, more and more made by individuals or at best by very small groups of people who are protected not so much by democratic traditions or institutions, as by their international reputation and fame. Such people now come forward in a much more active and resolute manner than was possible even for them some years before: they publish their artistic or scientific writings abroad, are interviewed by foreign correspondents, release public statements widely disseminated beyond our frontiers. The activity of these people now arouses a much greater political resonance than ever before, and has become an important element in our political life. Their courage cannot be doubted, and it deserves respect.

Recent Statements by Leading Dissenters

However, it is necessary also to be aware that many of these people live under constant and intense pressure, that they are subjected to crude and unjust abuse in the press and in propaganda by word of mouth, that they are painfully hurt by the persecution and arrests of their less famous colleagues and friends. Deprived of the previous support that had sustained them in a somewhat wider circle of intelligentsia, many of them have begun to express more and more extremist viewpoints, to put forward less and less constructive proposals, being moved more by emotions than by considerations of political efficacy.

One man, for instance, recently claimed that even blacks in South Africa are not subjected to such cruel persecution and constriction as "unorthodox thinkers" in the USSR. Another attacked Brandt bitterly and unjustly for his *Ostpolitik*, declaring that Brandt was betraying the interests of democracy in the West and in the East, and that he should be tried by a future Nuremberg Tribunal for war crimes. A third told his friends that Allende's government had led Chile into an impasse from which the only way out was either a "red" or a "white" dictatorship, and that in such a situation the military putsch, even with its excesses, was "the lesser evil" for Chile and its people. A fourth appealed to the American Congress not to encourage trade with the USSR until the Soviet Union conceded full freedom of emigration, as if this were the minimum demand of democracy. Yet it is perfectly obvious that, although the right to leave a country is an important civic freedom, it is much more important to create conditions in the Soviet Union such that its citizens should not desire to leave their own country.

Opinions and statements of this kind, widely publicized in the Western press, are now undoubtedly arousing not only reserve but reprobation among left-wing and democratic circles in the West. At the same time they are also being exploited by reactionary groups in the leadership of our country to increase the pressure on the intelligentsia, and to split and demoralize the ranks of the "dissenters."

The clampdown on the intelligentsia became pro-

nounced at the end of August and the beginning of September 1973, when the Soviet press launched a violent campaign against one of our greatest scientists, the atomic physicist Academician Andrei Sakharov. This assault was also partly directed against the outstanding Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn. What was the background to this campaign? Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, independently of each other, had given interviews to foreign correspondents in which they expressed their views on many topical questions of international politics and on some concrete internal problems of the Soviet Union. The opinions which the two men expressed were by no means incontrovertible. In itself, therefore, the mere fact that Soviet newspapers published letters from individual readers, or even certain collective communications, criticizing one or other of Sakharov's or Solzhenitsyn's contentions, was not extraordinary. What was objectionable, however, was the fact that in these "indignant protests" the statements and opinions of Sakharov were largely distorted, while the substance of Solzhenitsyn's declaration was simply suppressed altogether. The overwhelming majority of academicians, writers, workers, employees or technicians who signed these protests, were not acquainted with the full text of the interviews given by either Sakharov or Solzhenitsyn; at best they were shown only some sentences from them taken out of context. We know that many people who did sign the collective declarations were subjected to intense pressures, and that the majority of them had not the slightest idea why Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn gave these interviews to Western correspondents. The main aim of those who organized this vociferous campaign was not to silence Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn; their primary objective was to maximize pressure on other less known "dissidents" and on the bulk of the thinking intelligentsia. To some extent the campaign obviously achieved this aim, but it had far less success than its initiators had expected.

Explanations of the Clampdown

Of course, the aggravation of various forms of harassment of "dissidents" in the last few months was not a direct result of the gradual international détente. Yet it does seem that there was a connection between the two processes. It has been suggested, for example, that all the clumsy ideological campaigns of recent months were unleashed by right-wing dogmatic tendencies within the Central Committee of the CPSU independently of the main leadership in the Politbureau, and that the real purpose of these campaigns was to halt the Soviet "peace offensive" in the international arena, and in particular to disrupt the European Security Conference. This hypothesis rests on the belief that our own "hawks" sought to provoke a combination of domestic developments and foreign protests against them, of a sort that would inevitably put a stop to any prospect of rapprochement and break up international détente. The result would be to arrest incipient scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and the West, and to revive the acrimonious polemics with the West, which give the extreme Right of our leadership a particular feeling of well-being.

However, there is another interpretation of the campaign that is more plausible. Wide-ranging economic cooperation with capitalist countries, abolition of tra-

ditional barriers to trade and tourism, limitation and reduction of weapons and armed forces, winding down of the "Cold War," and in consequence improvement of East-West contacts, naturally demand more mutual confidence at least in international relations. This in turn cannot but affect the field of ideology. A real end to the "Cold War" and an improvement in the international climate is quite impossible—indeed unthinkable—without the liquidation of all discrimination not only in trade, but also in exchange of information and contact between peoples. The development of international collaboration cannot be achieved without broadening the exchange of men and information; and what is needed to achieve this is, in the first instance, a number of definite concessions on our part—for example, the elimination of such archaic remnants of the Cold War as jamming of foreign radio stations. As is known, the Soviet State broadcasts in all the main languages of the globe, giving its point of view on all world events and also presenting and interpreting developments in our own country. In these circumstances, jamming of Western radio stations which in their transmissions have a different ideological standpoint but a similar functional aim, is discrimination which hinders the process of détente just as much as the possible refusal of the U.S. Congress to grant us the status of "most favoured nation" in trade.

This concession has already been made: from 21 September 1973 the jamming of the Voice of America, of the BBC, and of the *Deutsche Welle* has ceased. Apparently more facilities will be granted to foreign correspondents in the USSR: they will be able to travel about the country and to make contacts with Soviet citizens. Journalists will have the same rights and facilities as all Soviet correspondents abroad have long had at their disposal. Next on the agenda for settlement will be the question of the reception of American television programmes on Soviet sets and vice versa, transmitted live by satellite; as also that of granting the Soviet people greater opportunities to read Western newspapers, journals, scientific literature, etc. The ratification—long overdue—of UN Charters of social, cultural, economic, political and civic rights is also a positive development.

Obviously, international exchange of ideas and persons calls for a modification of forms and methods of ideological work in the Soviet Union, a greater flexibility in our propaganda and a moratorium on antiquated and dogmatic pronouncements: in other words it calls for a development of Marxism. Under present conditions of ideological struggle, Marxism can only retain influence on the consciousness of people—let alone increase it—by uncompromisingly honest, open and truthful scientific analysis of the totality of contemporary social problems and of the whole unfalsified history of international events and revolutionary experiences of the 20th century.

It is a noticeable fact that the officials and organizations in our country which are in charge of economic questions, foreign affairs and external trade, have proved to be better equipped to work in new conditions than those assigned to ideological problems. Many of the latter have proved incapable of extending the Soviet "peace offensive" into the ideological arena for which

they are responsible. Clearly driven on to the defensive, with no prospects of influencing popular consciousness, our leading ideologues try to cope with new tasks not by adopting new decisions, but by strengthening "ideological discipline," by intimidating dissenters, by increasing political and moral pressure on Soviet citizens—in other words, not by persuasion but by duress, which in the end is fatal to any ideology.

Factional Struggles Within the Party

The contradiction inherent in this situation, and the discrepancies in the handling of external and internal problems (discrepancies which were virtually nonexistent in August 1968, but which are very evident today), provide the soil for polemical disputes and factional struggles within the higher echelons of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This type of conflict tends to generate internal mutual accommodation: it is possible that the heightening of pressure on "dissenters" and the recent laborious campaigns against unorthodoxy were precisely concessions made to the right wing of our leadership in exchange for acceptance of a foreign policy of détente and trade with the West. All this is no more than a hypothesis, of course. The possibility cannot be discounted that no such compromise has occurred, but rather that the entire Politbureau is convinced that only intensification of struggle on the "ideological front" can fortify this "front" at home against the prospect of a détente inevitably linked to increased international exchange of men and ideas.

The activity of rightist, reactionary and dogmatic forces in the USSR has not been confined to the "affair" of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn; it also left its mark on all the discussions of problems within the social sciences in the first half of 1973. We have been witnessing an obvious deterioration in the field of historical writing, in philosophy, in the debates on many economic problems, as well as in literature and art. This outburst of activity on the Right was undoubtedly occasioned by the détente, which not only seemed dangerous to reactionary forces but actually is dangerous to them, because it weakens their influence in all countries which pass from the phase of confrontation to that of cooperation. In the Soviet Union, however, where moderate and more sober politicians sit in the same Central Committee together with blatant reactionaries and where the struggle is conducted, unseen by society, behind closed doors in the "corridors of power"—in such conditions the conflict between various groups and tendencies is accompanied by an unmistakable "cooling" of the whole internal political atmosphere.

How can these regressive tendencies in our internal politics be overcome? In what way can the growing weight of reactionary forces of the Right on cultural and ideological life in the USSR be weakened? The answer to these questions is not easy. There are certainly no quick solutions to the problem. It is clear that the forces of the progressive intelligentsia, including the Party intelligentsia, are still too feeble to oppose the sharp swing to the right in our political and social life. It is also necessary to take into account the political passivity of the working class, of the employees, and even more so of the peasantry. In the apparatus of the Party and the

State there are not a few sober people who realize the necessity of changes in domestic politics, but these "party-democratic" groups have little influence and usually occupy the lower rungs of the official hierarchy.

Any shift towards a more consistent democratization, towards greater tolerance to the "dissenters," towards a more flexible and reasonable internal policy that would permit the existence of political minorities both inside and outside the framework of Marxism, is at present possible in the USSR only as a result of certain initiatives "from above" supported "from below," but not as a sheer result of pressure from "below." The need for a thoroughgoing democratization of Soviet society has long since arrived in the USSR. It is, in fact, the most important precondition for an acceleration of the economic, political, social and cultural development of our country. Only a genuine socialist democracy can give birth to the new motor forces that are necessary to restore health and life to the whole system of Soviet institutions and organizations. The political passivity of our population "below" is, however, equally obvious. People have learnt to become so silent, and have acquired such a sense of guilt, that no individual dissenters—not even small groups of dissenters—can give rise to a mass movement capable of bringing about any real political change. The masses could move only as a result of serious political or economic crises. Yet the prospect of such crises seems neither probable nor desirable. Soviet society can and will develop even within its existing political structure and economic conditions. Although its development is too slow by the yardstick of the real possibilities of socialism, it is nevertheless sufficient to avert any uncontrollable growth of dissatisfaction among broad masses of the people. The economic resources and the natural wealth of the Soviet Union are so great, and the State monopoly of foreign trade safeguards our domestic market so well from undesirable competition, that even under a weak and incompetent leadership, growth in all branches of the national economy will continue.

In such conditions a reorganization of social and economic management, an enlargement of political and civic liberties, an expansion of socialist democracy, can come—as we have said—not as a result of open pressure by the popular masses and the intelligentsia, but as a consequence of initiatives "from above." In effect, the exposure of the "cult of personality" of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU was in no sense the result of a simple pressure of the masses or the lower ranks of the party. This event, so important for the fate of the whole world communist movement, was the consequence of certain struggles "at the top" whose details have still to be fully clarified, and which reflected a growing dissatisfaction in the country only very obliquely. Likewise, the undeniable "liberalization," the noticeable loosening of censorship in all fields of intellectual and artistic creativity, as well as many other positive processes which unfolded for some years after the 22nd Congress, were in the first instance the work of the political "heights." Of course, the majority of our intelligentsia welcomed the "thaw," which warmed the atmosphere of our country. However, only a small section of the intelligentsia hastened to avail itself of this "liberalization," which was why in the sphere of creation of new spiritual values, the results were noticeable, but not very considerable. The

majority adopted a waiting attitude, fearing—as it turned out, not without reason—that the "thaw" might prove temporary and would soon be succeeded by a new period of "inclemency" in our cultural life.

But if today it is not the outlook of those "below" that is of decisive importance, but the moods and views of those "above," how can the political "heights" be impelled to proceed not towards a further "tightening of the screws," but towards an enlargement of socialist democracy? It is true, of course, that there exists among the broad masses as well as among the intelligentsia of the USSR a growing frustration and dissatisfaction with many aspects of our society: with the slow tempo of our economic, social, and cultural progress, with our over-centralized and bureaucratized system of management, with waste of resources and lack of information, with failure to catch up with the West in so many respects, and so on. This mass discontent has an effect in very complicated and roundabout ways on the leadership of the country too. However, the higher one goes in the ruling hierarchy, the less this pressure of popular dissatisfaction is felt; which is why it cannot lead to swift changes toward democracy.

Thus the idea of increasing pressure from outside tends involuntarily to occur. The impact and influence which international opinion has on the ruling circles of one or another big or small country should not be underestimated. The general indignation provoked in the West by the introduction of the "tax on learning" imposed on emigrants (at present, of course, the majority of emigrants are Jews), the numerous protests of public figures and organizations, the debate on the subject in the U.S. Congress, etc.—all these reactions led the Soviet leadership to drop this tax, although formally it has not been annulled. Likewise, it was not the remonstrations of Soviet scientists but the determined protests of Western scientists and academic institutions against the onset of a shrill campaign to discredit Academician Sakharov and prepare the ground for his expulsion from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (the demand for which had already appeared in many articles), that has saved this outstanding Soviet scientist, at least for the time being, from repression. Again, it was not public opinion in the USSR, still less our community of writers, but the enormous international prestige of Solzhenitsyn as a Nobel Prize winner that has restrained the right wing of the Soviet leadership from settling its accounts with this eminent Russian writer.

At the same time, it is only fair to remark that it was precisely the prolonged pressure not only of American, but also of international public opinion, that eventually helped to bring direct American military intervention in Indochina to an end. Equally, we should not overlook the connection between the recent amnesty granted to political prisoners in Greece and the long struggle of the progressive forces in Europe for the reestablishment of a democratic regime in Greece. Other examples of the genuine influence of international public opinion on the course of political events in one country or another could be adduced; although there is also still a very long list of sombre and tragic occurrences which the public opinion of the West, of the East or even of the whole world, has unfortunately proved only too helpless to avert.

But in one way or another, public opinion constitutes an important force with which any politician today must reckon, including the Soviet leaders. However, it would be a great oversimplification to suppose that it is only with the assistance of pressure from outside, let alone in the field of international relations and trade, that genuine concessions can be gained in the internal politics of a country like the Soviet Union. Pressure from outside can play both a positive and a negative role. It may in some cases restrain our agencies of power from certain deeds, and in other cases it may, on the contrary, provoke them into undesirable action and thereby hinder the democratization of Soviet society.

Thus, for example, it would be unreal to suppose that under pressure from the U.S. Congress the Soviet government would pass a special law allowing everybody who desires to do so to emigrate from the USSR. If the American Congress were to adopt the Jackson Amendment and withdraw the "most favoured nation" clause in trade relations, this would not improve but harm the prospects of further emigration. Soviet-American relations would also deteriorate. At present, work on the draft of a new Constitution for the USSR is in progress. Significant improvements in the sections concerning the civic and political rights of Soviet citizens, and the constitutional guarantees of these rights, are envisaged. The authors of the draft cannot now avoid dealing with such an important democratic freedom as the right to leave one's country and return to it at will. However formal many constitutional rights of Soviet citizens may be, the inclusion in the new Constitution, even with certain reservations, of rights of free entry and exit in the USSR would be extremely important. The adoption by the U.S. Congress of the Jackson Amendment would only lessen the chances of such a clause being included in the new Constitution. For this reason, we consider Academician Sakharov's appeal to American Congressmen to support this amendment to be a mistaken step, both tactically and substantively.

Appeals to the Western Right

In general, it would be wrong to overestimate the possibility of achieving results by exercising pressure on the USSR in the field of diplomatic or economic relations, and not merely because the Soviet side would reasonably object to interference in the internal affairs of the USSR. We very much doubt that the majority of leading Western statesmen are seriously concerned with the problems of political and civic rights in the USSR or in China. In the final analysis, Nixon, Pompidou and Heath are defending the interests of the ruling classes of their own countries, and it should by no means be assumed that capitalist circles in the USA, Britain, France or Western Germany are particularly interested in a rapid development of socialist democracy in the USSR or in accelerating the pace of economic, social and cultural progress in our country.

Thus when Soviet dissidents appeal for support in the Western countries, they must know exactly to whom they are addressing their appeals. To us, it is obvious that public opinion in the Western countries is extraordinarily polarized and reacts in very different ways to

events in the USSR and in the other socialist countries. In fact, those who are primarily interested in the development of a truly socialist democracy in our country are the left-wing forces of the West, in other words socialist and communist Parties, progressive intellectuals, and various leftist organizations. Right-wing circles in the West, on the contrary, exploit any shortcomings in the USSR and any acts of oppression by the Soviet State for their own demagogic ends; their aim is not to assist the victory of a "socialism with a human face" but to discredit both socialism and communism, and thereby strike a blow above all against the forces of the Left in their own countries.

Certain of our dissidents sometimes give the impression that they fully understand this. They transfer their dissatisfaction with the political practice of the CPSU to the whole Left in the West, and consider that there too a victory of the Left would yield no more than a new variety of totalitarianism. In their declarations, addresses and protests these dissidents have lately more and more appealed not so much to the Left as to the Right in the Western countries. This orientation offers no hope for the future, although, of course, every Soviet citizen should be free to choose his own political convictions and sympathies.

It is well known that the 1972 grain harvest in the Soviet Union was very poor. Since no large cereal stocks were available in our country from previous years, there developed a serious dearth of grain for human and animal consumption. This shortage was, however, minimized by unprecedentedly large purchases of wheat from the USA, Canada, and a number of other countries. Large consignments of other commodities were also bought abroad. It can naturally be assumed that if Western businessmen and governmental agencies had refused to sell grain and other commodities to the USSR, grave supply difficulties would have arisen in our country in 1972-73. This would undoubtedly have increased discontent among the masses, which might have had to be allayed by some kind of political concessions. All this is, of course, mere hypothesis. In any case, it would have become necessary to adopt economic measures to ensure a swifter development of our agriculture. But why on that account would American producers have denied themselves a lucrative deal? From their point of view, why should they give up their profits?

To help to develop Soviet agriculture, or to convert the USSR within a short space of time from an importer of grain, meat, and butter into an exporter of these goods is not the aim of the U. S. farm lobby. Of course, the ruling class in the USA may elect to break economic relations with any country, as it did with Cuba. The purpose of that decision was clear and the loss to U. S. economy from the blockade of Cuba was insignificant. However, if this kind of boycott did not achieve its purpose in the case of Cuba, it would be even more senseless if applied to the USSR, at a time when the development of trade relations with the Soviet Union promises no small advantages to the West. Naturally, trade with the West strengthens the economic position of the USSR. However, the West of course also derives self-interested advantages from it. At present, the Western countries seek to import raw materials from the Soviet Union for their industries—iron ore, timber, oil and gas. The USSR

also exports to the West and to Japan various metals and gold bullion. In their turn, the West and Japan export to the USSR various kinds of equipment—mainly, it would seem, for the oil, gas and timber industries, for coal mining and harbour installations—as well as light industrial goods, grains and foodstuffs. Significantly, the Jackson Amendment would make it difficult to import Soviet finished products into the USA, but it would in no way hamper either U. S. exports of equipment or grain to the USSR or imports of Soviet raw materials to the USA. This merely demonstrates once again that the emergence of the USSR on the world market as a strong industrial power, exporting high quality machinery, light industrial products, motor cars or aircraft to the Western countries as well as to the less developed lands, is a prospect which is far from being the dream of Western businessmen.

There are also limits to the efficacy of external pressures from public organizations and press organs. The Western public rightly protests against attempts to deprive a man like Sakharov of the possibility of freely expressing his views, or a writer like Solzhenitsyn of the normal conditions required for literary creation, against the imprisonment of Amalrik or the confinement in psychiatric hospitals of men like Grigorenko, Plyushch and others. On the other hand, no one could insist that Sakharov's declarations or interviews be given fully sympathetic treatment in *Pravda* or *Izvestia*, or that Solzhenitsyn's new novels be praised in *Novy Mir* or *Znamya*. At the same time it cannot be regarded as normal that Soviet citizens should learn of dissidents' statements or artistic works only from foreign broadcasts and newspapers. We have already had occasion to propose that some institutional machinery should be set up in our country for a dialogue with the various dissenting groups.

At present public opinion in the West reacts much more sharply and actively to negative events in the USSR than it did 15 or 35 years ago. Nevertheless, it would be an illusion to think that the Western public will become more preoccupied by the internal problems of the USSR than by those within their own countries. In this respect we do not consider that Solzhenitsyn's strictures in his address "Peace and Violence" are just. However important external pressure, in the last analysis the fundamental problems of any country, and especially of large powers such as the USSR, can only be resolved by the people and government of that country.

Solzhenitsyn writes: "Could a Negro militant in South Africa be detained and tormented with impunity for four years as General Grigorenko has been? The storm of world indignation would have torn the roof off his prison long ago." This position is mistaken. In the same address we find no such strong words of protest, of which Solzhenitsyn is so capable, against the odious apartheid system in South Africa. Unfortunately, no protests have yet torn the roofs off the prisons and camps where hundreds of thousands of South African blacks are incarcerated. No protests have yet flung open the gates of the concentration camps in Indonesia where hundreds of thousands are held without trial for their left-wing beliefs. No protests have yet halted the bloody terror in Chile. Of course, one's own pain always seems worse than that of others. Nevertheless, it is impermissible

to fall into a kind of "Moscow-Centrism" and fail to see that in many other countries there are political problems just as acute and very often even more acute than those of the USSR.

Global international détente, just as the lessening of tension in any area of the world, depends on the governments and leaders in power at this particular time. It is evident that at present the Soviet government is greatly interested in relaxing international confrontation and developing external cooperation and trade. To achieve these aims it is prepared to make certain concessions which it would not have contemplated a few years ago. The major Western countries are also prepared to make many concessions. Nevertheless, in neither case should important concessions on internal policy be expected. It would therefore be unrealistic and wrong for the West to deliver any ultimatum that the USSR should fulfill certain preconditions for diplomatic détente and economic cooperation. We believe that détente, cooperation, trade, and tourism are important benefits in themselves. More often than not, it is unreasonable to pose preconditions in negotiating these questions. For it is surely plain that in the past the high pitch of international tension drained the strength of the great powers by a futile arms race, and diverted their enormous resources away from the development of their productive potential into the accumulation of unprecedented means of destruction.

Hitherto the détente has not led to any enlargement of democratic liberties in the USSR; on the contrary, it has been used by certain groups to tighten suppression of dissent. However, in a more distant future—although this may not be a very comforting prognosis—détente will undoubtedly contribute to the extension of democratic rights and liberties in our country. For it is precisely in periods of détente that the efficacy of public opinion grows considerably in shaping the internal affairs of each major power. By contrast, a country which is isolated and cut off from the outside world by various Cold War barriers becomes insensitive to protests and

views beyond its frontiers. We can see the truth of this not only in the case of great powers, but even in the case of little Albania. In this sense, it must be said that the relaxation of international tension is in itself a very important precondition, though not the only one, for the development of democracy in Soviet society. For his reason, we believe that Brandt was justified to state that he would advocate détente even if Stalin were still in power.

In conclusion, we would repeat that no matter how significant the pressure of progressive international opinion may be, the prime impulse towards democratization in the USSR must necessarily come from within Soviet society itself, including its present and future leaders. The present regressive trends in our domestic political life are, of course, a disquieting symptom. But they do not in any way preclude the emergence of other trends and other situations, whose outlines are difficult to foresee now. During the last fifteen to twenty years a new generation has grown up in the USSR and with it a new levy of leaders, a significant number of whom may prove capable of an outlook on the problems and prospects of development that differs from that of the leaders of the outgoing generation.

It is clear that a majority of our leaders now increasingly understand that it is intolerable that the Soviet Union should lag so far behind the capitalist countries in the *material living standards* of its population—the production of the basic necessities of life for our people. Some effective steps have already been taken to remedy this. But the level of our production of spiritual values is extremely low, although the majority of Soviet people precisely regard spiritual nourishment as an ever more important component of their needs. At the same time it is obvious that without true democracy, without a free exchange of ideas and opinions, it is absolutely impossible to create any satisfactory spiritual values. Let us hope that in time all Soviet people, including the majority of their leaders, will make this simple truth their own. □

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Greek Soldiers Demand Discharge

[The following letter from three Greek soldiers stationed near the Turkish border was published in the November 23 issue of *Ergatike Pale*, the weekly paper that reflects the views of the Greek Trotskyists. The letter is dated "November" and deals with the continuation of the military call-up that began with the Cyprus crisis in July. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Since there is no trade-union organization that can take up our demands, we consider this a proper forum for putting them forward.

Our service to society has a special character and as a result there is no trade union to represent us.

What we are concerned about is more or less as follows:

Clearly we will not be the ones to decide when the army will be demobilized, how this will be carried out, and at what points in the country. Since there is a chain of command in the army, others will decide these things.

This aside, however, as citizens of this country, we have not only obligations (and by obligations in the present situation we mean serving our two-year term of military service as set by law); we also have rights. And by rights we mean that we are entitled to know what real conditions compel us to remain on duty more than 120 days beyond the time set by the law.

We recognize the full extent of the national crisis our country has experienced, and as soldiers we were in the front ranks from the first days of danger. We put our lives in the hands of our superiors, thereby guaranteeing the discipline and fighting capacity of the army.

There is a big difference between a part of society using a section of its citizens as "dumb animals" and the utilization of these persons as citizens fully conscious of their obligations and responsibility to society. So, our superiors must give a proper answer to the despairing question of thousands of youth: "When will we be discharged?" And this explanation should clarify why we are being kept mobilized and how much additional time we will have to serve.

It is on such a basis that we think the relationship between society and its responsible citizens should operate, not one of regarding the citizenry as a "flock of sheep," that is, the attitude that "we will consider the matter and make the decision for you."

In fact, we do not demand a voice in the decisions of our superiors—who in our situation issue orders that mean

literally life or death for us. Such a call would be out of line with the reality in Greece. But we do demand that they inform us of their decisions. The theory of discipline through obedience to superior officers also places obligations on them.

The lengthening of our time of service creates a terrible anxiety that takes on dramatic aspects when you consider that we have families waiting for us, career opportunities, and so on. However, besides this, it is our morale that has a more fundamental importance in our situation, that is of more immediate concern to society. After twenty-eight months of constant subjection to military discipline and constant confinement to base, we can testify that morale is nonexistent. Because of

Attorney for Defendants in Hugo Blanco Case

Demand Release of Laura Caller

A campaign has been launched to win the release of Laura Caller Iberica, a well-known Peruvian labor-defense lawyer imprisoned by the Peruvian military regime. Caller was one of the three attorneys who defended Hugo Blanco and others placed on trial for their role in the peasant upsurge of the early 1960s.

At present Caller is being held because of taking part in the legal defense of members of Vanguardia Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Vanguard, a group of Maoist coloration). They in turn are accused of being involved in "subversive" activities of the Confederacion de Campesinos del Peru (Peruvian Peasant Federation) in Andahuaylas in the department of Apurimac. The "subversive" activities, according to the charges, consisted of urging peasants to "invade haciendas."

The Movimiento Latinoamericano Para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (MOLADDEH—the Latin American Movement for the Defense of Human Rights) has called for protests.

In No. 3-4 of *Libertad*, the news bulletin of the organization, MOLADDEH said:

"Through a very brief item, buried in the October 11 issue of *La Prensa*, and through a letter published in *Correo* the following day, a very small part of the public will have learned of the imprisonment of Dr. Caller, an attorney who has served the working class for more than thirty years.

"Dr. Caller was seized by a heavy complement of police in Andahuaylas, where she was engaged in her professional duty of defending the peasants in that locality.

the frequent changes and internal instability of the last period, practically nobody gets a pass.

On the other hand, the assurance in the papers by a representative of the Ministry of National Defense that neither an extension nor a reduction of the period of military service was being considered seemed like a mockery to us. What can you call what has happened to us, if not an extension?

If the assurance given by this representative of the ministry means something, why haven't we been transferred to the status of active-duty soldiers and formally discharged? All these are questions that have been troubling our minds for quite a while. And if we do not get a prompt answer, we will have to think that "there is something rotten in our democracy."

Signed: F. G., N. K.H., A. K.

"At present she is being held in the State Security Women's Prison.

"MOLADDEH strongly protests this monstrous outrage and demands the immediate release of this consistent defender of human rights in our country."

Protests should be sent to President Juan Velasco Alvarado, Lima, Peru.

Protests can also be sent to the Peruvian mission, United Nations, New York. □

Washington to Give Thieu \$50 Million Through World Bank

A closed-door meeting of the World Bank in Paris on October 17 tentatively agreed to a loan of \$50 million to the Thieu regime in South Vietnam as an "initial annual lending program." At the meeting—billed as a routine "consultative" gathering and attended by representatives from fifteen countries—Washington's delegates pushed hard for acceptance of the loan proposal. Although most of the countries at the meeting didn't actively support the plan, and some strongly opposed it, the chairman announced at the end of the day that he would inform World Bank President Robert McNamara that his sense of the meeting was that a majority supported aid to both Laos and South Vietnam.

In fact the meeting was merely a formality, as will be the rest of the procedure implementing the loan. The decision had already been made after some not-so-subtle blackmail—Washington threatened to withhold \$1.5 billion in financing to the World Bank unless the loan to Thieu was approved.