

Argentina

Death Squads Slay 3 Trotskyists

Britain

Wilson Pushes
'Austerity' Plan

Vietnam

Growing Clamor
Against Thieu

Documents

Roy Medvedev
Debates Panin,
Solzhenitsyn

Mandel

Belgium Hit
by Recession



Avanzada Socialista

Argentine PST's La Plata headquarters, shattered by bomb blast at 2 a.m. October 19. Terror attack came in wake of police raid on PST's Cordoba headquarters, arrest and torture of fifteen PST members taken in raid, and bombing of party's Mendoza local.

Million Bengalis Starving

Famine Victims Locked Up in Camps

As thousands of famine-stricken refugees stream into Dacca and other towns in Bangladesh, they are rounded up by police and herded into government-sponsored "relief camps," also known as "gruel kitchens." The 4,500 such camps throughout the country were ostensibly set up to provide emergency relief to some of the more than five million Bengalis threatened with starvation.

In a dispatch from Dacca published in the October 21 *Washington Post*, however, correspondent Myron L. Belkind reported the real function of some of the camps. Describing three of them in Dacca, he wrote that they "have become, in fact, internment camps whose inmates are slowly dying."

"The government placed armed guards at the camps to keep those inside from roaming the streets causing social unrest."

Each of the three camps, Belkind reported, was crowded with 3,000 refugees, whose number was growing by at least 200 a day. (In early October, the number of refugees in Dacca had already reached 300,000.)

Samezuddin Sheik, a refugee from Myensingh district who fled to Dacca with his family, told Belkind: "We had no food. We came to Dacca last week by boat. Then we were brought to this place [a camp]. We are dying without enough food. We want to leave, but we can't because of the guards."

According to supervisors of one of the camps, about three persons a day do leave the camp—dead.

"Some diplomats," Belkind reported, "offered what they said were conservative guesses that a million Bengalis would die of starvation or related diseases within the six weeks before the autumn food crop is harvested."

A statement blaming the regime and its backers for the famine conditions in Bangladesh was signed in Dacca October 11 by seventy prominent intellectuals and professionals. The statement noted that the "gruel kitchens have come to be regarded as torture centres. . . ."

After explaining that the Bengal famines of 1769 and 1943 were caused by the ruling classes and the imperialists, the statement said: "We want to state in unequivocal terms that the famine in Bangladesh is man-made. A class of people who have no connection with production and who are the known hoarders, smugglers and black-marketeers flourishing under the protective wings of the ruling class are primarily responsible for this crisis." □

In This Issue

BANGLADESH	1458	Famine Victims Locked Up in Camps
	1470	Has Bangladesh a Future?—by Ibne Azad
ARGENTINA	1459	Death Squads Slay Three Trotskyists —by Gerry Foley
	1461	Ultraright Terrorists—a New Threat
BRAZIL	1462	Trotskyists Publish Clandestine Paper
INDIA	1463	New Right-Wing Party Formed —by Sharad Jhaveri
	1478	Millions Threatened by Famine —by Ernest Harsch
VIETNAM	1464	Growing Clamor to Get Rid of Thieu —by Peter Green
BRITAIN	1465	4,000 March in London for Troops Out of Ireland—by Robin Hunter
	1474	Wilson Pushes "Austerity" for Workers —by Tony Hodges
ARAB EAST	1466	Arab Summit Meeting Endorses PLO —by Michael Baumann
PORTUGAL	1468	Top CIA Men in Parleys With Portuguese Officials
	1481	Portuguese General Tells Inside Story of Putsch—by Gerry Foley
	1483	How High-School Students Joined in Struggle Against Dictatorship —by Antonio Romero
IRAN	1469	Shah Stung by "Newsweek" Charges —by Majid Namvar
PUERTO RICO	1473	UN Hears Testimony on Puerto Rico
	1480	20,000 Demand "Free Puerto Rico Now!"
BELGIUM	1475	For Belgium, Too, No Escape From Re- cession—by Ernest Mandel
SOUTH AFRICA	1477	Wilson's 21-Gun Salute to Racists —by Tony Hodges
FRANCE	1488	The French CP's Weekend Carnival —by Irving Herrera
JAPAN	1490	Impact of Radicalized Youth on Unions
DOCUMENTS	1499	Roy Medvedev Debates With Panin, Sakha- rov, Solzhenitsyn, and Others
	1504	GRS View of Left Unity in Martinique —by Edouard Delepine
DRAWINGS	1473	Juan Mari Bras; 1501, Valerie Chalidze —by Copain
EN ESPANOL:	1492	Nota Sobre las Trayectorias de Bejar y Blanco—por Gerry Foley
	1493	Blanco y Bejar Intercambian Palabras
MEXICO	1495	Surge un Nuevo Partido
ARGENTINA	1497	Asesinan Tres Trotskistas —por Gerry Foley

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Michael Baumann, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Judy White.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.

COPY EDITOR: Mary Roche.

TECHNICAL STAFF: Bill Burton, Art Gursch, James M. Morgan.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors,

which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemenee, 75004, Paris, France.

TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright © 1974 by Intercontinental Press.

Argentine Death Squads Slay Three Trotskyists

By Gerry Foley

Four persons were gunned down in Buenos Aires on the first weekend of November by rightist goons. Three were members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). The fourth, Carlos Alberto de la Riva, was a professor at the University of La Plata.

On Friday, November 1, during the night, a group of men who claimed to belong to the police force, took Rubén Bouzas forcibly from his home in the suburbs of the Argentine capital. His body was found on Saturday morning. He had been killed by blasts from a shotgun.

Bouzas, twenty years old, was a secondary-school student. He had been active in the Ramos Mejía branch of the Juventud Socialista (Socialist Youth) and a member of the PST for a year and a half.

Also dragged from his home that night was Juan Carlos Nievas. A few hours afterward, his body was found in the Villa Retiro area. He had been hit several times by blasts from a shotgun.

Nievas was twenty-six years old. He was a worker at the Nestlé factory and had become known as an outstanding activist in his plant during a sit-in strike. He attended high school at night. He had been a member of the PST for several months.

On Sunday, November 3, during the night, following the annual convention of the PST, César Robles stopped at an ice-cream parlor in Buenos Aires. From there he was taken by force by a rightist gang. He was driven away in an automobile. Two hours later his body was found in the Floresta area in the vicinity of Buenos Aires. It was riddled with machine-gun bullets.

César Robles was thirty-six years old. He was a member of the National Executive Committee of the PST and one of the most prominent national leaders of the party. During the Onganía dictatorship, he was one of the leaders of the dock workers'



PST headquarters in Chivilcoy after rampage by rightist goon squad.

Avanzada Socialista

strike, which was one of the first major challenges to the regime by the labor movement.

Robles was the organizer of the northern region of Greater Buenos Aires for the PST, where the party is very active in union work. He played a prominent role in the labor struggles in Córdoba while he was on assignment there to strengthen the national framework of the PST.

This new series of murders followed the assassination Friday, November 1, of Alberto Villar, the chief of the federal police, by left-wing Peronist guerrillas. The rightist goon squads have threatened many times to "avenge" the deaths of any right-wing government officials, in particular, members of the army and the police, for which they have expressed a special solicitude.

It is not yet clear whether the goons who murdered the three PST members and the professor intended to link their actions to the assassination of Villar. But regardless of this, it is clear that these killings are part of a wave of rightist terror whose scope has continually expanded.

As the reactionary goon squads have extended their targets from the leftist guerrillas and socialist activists

to bourgeois liberal political figures, teachers, and even nonpolitical artists, their behavior has begun to take on the aspects of the cult of sadism and obscurantism typical of fascist comandos.

Furthermore, this escalation of rightist terror has been closely coordinated with increasingly brutal and arbitrary repressive actions by the police themselves. One of the clearest examples of this was the October 9 raids in Córdoba.

The police used vague and contradictory claims about "arms" and "snipers" in the headquarters of the militant unions as a pretext to "mop up" the last resistance to the right-wing labor bureaucracy. But they were not satisfied with that. Without even offering a pretext, they took this occasion to raid the headquarters of the PST and the Communist party. All persons in these offices were jailed and beaten. The police were particularly brutal toward the Communist party activists, one of whom, Tita Clelia Hidalgo, died as a result of the beating she received at their hands.

The Communist party charges were summarized in the October 30 issue

of the PST weekly paper, *Avanzada Socialista*:

"All forty-eight persons were beaten without the slightest consideration for their age, state of health, or anything else. The men generally had bruises all over their bodies, especially on their shoulders and lower backs. And they had head and eye injuries caused by beatings. The women, who included a girl of fifteen, were beaten with the barrels of the guns and received serious wounds. A woman five months pregnant was forced to lie on the floor while the police beat her and stomped on her."

The Communist party bookstore was completely wrecked, and the "agents of law and order" took whatever money they could find. They covered the walls with threatening and insulting slogans, including the following, written in an illiterate scrawl:

"If you're Communists like Guarany, you'd better get out of the country, because we're going to kill you one by one; for every policeman that falls, we are going to get three of you Com-mie bastards."

This message was signed: "Las Tres A" (AAA—Alianza Anticomunista Argentina—Argentine Anticommunist Alliance). This is the death-squad organization that has threatened a wide spectrum of Argentine members of parliament, educators, and public figures of all kinds. In many instances it has carried out its death threats in the most brutal way.

In the PST headquarters, the initials of this rightist terrorist group were also written all over the walls.

At midnight on October 22, a rightist gang smashed down the door of a PST member's home in the Merlo district of Buenos Aires. There were twenty men in the gang, and they were heavily armed. They found the PST member's widowed mother and three of his brothers, who were not politically active. They threatened to kill his mother unless she told them where they could find "that bastard who was at the meeting in Ramos Mejía hall on Saturday night," that is, her son.

The three brothers, all building workers, were savagely beaten. One was struck on the shoulder with a tool of his trade, a four-and-a-half pound maul hammer.

"The three brothers had to be hospitalized," *Avanzada Socialista* reported in its October 30 issue. "They had

bruises and lacerations on the head and face that made them unrecognizable even to members of their family. The oldest one had a broken arm, and the next oldest had serious contusions around his spine."

The PST representatives had a hard time getting into the hospital to talk to the brothers. "Not even their brother—the one the goons were looking for—could get in. It was only when a relative with an important post in the security force of a state agency showed his credentials that we were allowed to visit them. In speaking with them, we learned that certain doctors—acting, they said, at the behest of the police—had advised them to 'say nothing.'"

On the same day, October 22, a group of thirty goons broke into the PST headquarters in the town of Chivilcoy in Buenos Aires province. They arrived in two minibuses that were part of the governor's cortege. Since it was the town's anniversary, the right-wing chief executive of the province, Calabró, was leading a parade around the area, holding rallies in various places. Part of the cortege passed the PST headquarters on the way to a barbecue.

"When they saw the party offices, they went crazy," an eyewitness told *Avanzada Socialista*. "Thirty heavily armed men piled out of the minibuses. One of them climbed up the wall and tore down the sign; others shattered the windows and broke the door down. Then they all went in."

Rightist commandos hit the PST national headquarters in central Buenos Aires on October 23. "The attack came at 5 a.m.," the October 30 *Avanzada Socialista* reported, "while the compañeros were cleaning the place. A burst of 9mm machine-gun fire struck the metal grating on the front window of the party bookstore. According to eyewitnesses, the shots were fired from a green Falcon carrying four individuals wearing dark clothing.

"When several compañeros came out on the balcony of the first floor, a person in another large automobile, probably a Dodge Polara, threw a grenade at the front window. The shrapnel struck several cars parked in the area, shattering their windows and windshields."

Eight leaders of the country's second largest party, the bourgeois liberal Unión Cívica Radical (UCR—Radical Civic Union), received threats

from the AAA, the October 30 *Avanzada Socialista* reported. The list included Raúl Alfonsín, one of the CRU's top national figures.

Two provincial dailies, *La Voz del Interior* and *La Voz del Concordia*, received ultimatums from the AAA.

Also threatened were a number of actors and actresses with no political connections. They were considered bad moral examples by the AAA.

On October 25, all the deans resigned at the University of Tucumán in the northern part of the country as a result of an AAA terror campaign.

Among other things, the rightist goons pressed their campaign of intimidation against the deans, the October 30 *Avanzada Socialista* noted, by machine-gunning the university cafeteria and later blowing it up. They also machine-gunned the home of Professor Orlando Bravo, the head of the Physics Department. They broke into the School of Philosophy, shouting that they were "from the police and the AAA" and that they were looking for the dean.

On October 24, the local daily *La Gaceta* reported that the summer home of the dean of the Department of Law and Social Sciences, Carlos Sanjuan, had been blown up by three powerful bombs exploding simultaneously.

In addition, the heads of chickens and the bodies of dogs with their throats cut were scattered around the area, along with leaflets that said, "This is an example of what you can expect if you do not resign."

La Gaceta reported the presence of other leaflets that said, "By these operations, the organization has given a small warning of the actions it will take in the future to cleanse our universities of enemy agents."

Avanzada Socialista pointed to a number of signs that a broad front was coming together to resist the reactionary terror. It cited one action in the southern port city of Comodoro Rivadavia as exemplary. In the second week of October, a number of leaders of the private-sector oil workers union received threats from the AAA. "Last Friday [October 25], the oil workers in the private sector held a protest strike. They met in an assembly and decided to march through the streets of the city to let the entire population see their determination to take on the fascist goons." □

Ultraright Terrorists—a New Threat in Argentina

[The following interview with Nahuel Moreno, one of the leaders of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Argentina), was obtained October 7 in Buenos Aires. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. What is the AAA?

Answer. First of all, I want to clear up a confusion that exists over these initials. According to some bourgeois newspapers, AAA stands for Alianza Anticomunista Argentina [Argentine Anticomunist Alliance], according to others, Alianza Antimperialista Argentina [Argentine Anti-Imperialist Alliance]. Whatever its real name is, there can be no doubt about its political character; it is a typical fascist terrorist organization. Its links to one sector of the government and to the repressive forces are evident, and there are facts to prove this.

A few days before the assassination of Silvio Frondizi by the AAA, twenty young members of the ERP¹ staged a "lightning" rally on the block where the headquarters of the Juventud Socialista² is located. Leaving aside the fact that objectively this was a provocation, we noticed that it took only five minutes for twenty police cars to reach the spot.

Exactly the opposite occurred when Frondizi was assassinated. He was dragged into the street in the midst of a battle between the murderers and his family (his wife, daughter, and son-in-law), who tried to keep him from being taken away. As a result of the fight, the son-in-law died.

Once in the street, the killers had to struggle fifteen minutes with Frondizi before they were able to overpower him. All the neighbors witnessed the fight. Traffic had been

stopped by the AAA. In spite of all the commotion, the police didn't show up.

Moreover, up to now not a single member of the fascist gangs has been arrested, tried, or investigated, but a great number of guerrillas are in prison.

The AAA's principal goal right now is to sow terror among the prominent persons who collaborate with the guerrillas, with the Montoneros,³ and with the Camporaist opposition to the current Peronist leadership.⁴

We must not confuse the AAA with other fascist terrorist organizations, like the goons in some unions, in the CNU,⁵ or in the C de O.⁶ There are ties between them, but at the moment they don't have the same targets. The goons focus on trade-union activists; the CNU and the C de O, on the Marxist left.

Q. What can you tell us about the guerrillas' actions?

A. Unfortunately, by declaring a mini-civil war against a government that has the support of 90 percent of the population and 98 percent of the working class, the guerrilla groups objectively tend to provoke violence from the rightists.

They also provide the pretext for rightist actions and for reactionary legislation by the government. By denying the legitimacy of the government, they brush aside the opinions of the workers movement and ignore the necessity to "patiently explain" in order to win the workers movement away from giving political support to a bourgeois party.

To put it in a nutshell, all bourgeois governments are illegitimate for

us as Marxists, but only in the most exceptional objective circumstances do we declare civil war against them.

If, on our own, we declare civil war, as the guerrillas do, our action takes on the character of an unfortunate adventure that aids the reactionaries.

More than ever what is needed is to mobilize and unite the working masses and the armed organizations so that we can defend ourselves in the streets against the attacks of paragonovernmental armed gangs. At the same time, we must systematically denounce these gangs to show that it is they, not us, who are using terrorist methods.

Q. What immediate likelihood is there of a coup?

A. If the guerrillas step up their actions considerably and the police can't cope with them, the possibility of a coup like the one in Chile or the one in Uruguay would soon arise. Most probably it would be the Uruguayan variant, except in an extreme, unusual situation.

At the moment we do not see any likelihood of a coup. We shouldn't forget that the current government is an indirect consequence of the defeat administered to the military dictatorship by the working class. This was not a total defeat; it was partial and negotiated. But it *was* a defeat.

Both the armed forces and the bourgeoisie have learned lessons from this experience. The most important is that they need bourgeois democracy and Peronism in order to be able to pull together a united front of the exploiters to confront and derail the workers movement.

This state of affairs is diametrically opposed to the situation in Brazil, Uruguay, or Chile before the military coups took place there. In those countries the military take-overs came after many, not just two or three, years of bourgeois democracy. In no sense does this mean that we will have many years of bourgeois democracy. It only means that up to now the bourgeoisie and the armed forces have

1. Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary People's Army.

2. JS—Socialist Youth, the youth group in political solidarity with the PST.

3. One of the main left-wing Peronist groups.

4. Campora is associated with the liberal Peronists.

5. Comando Nacional Universitario—National University Commando Group.

6. Comando de Organizacion—Organization Commando Group.

not decided to change course.

An abrupt change in the class struggle—which could occur in the near future, since the workers movement has kept its fighting capacity intact—would once again put the possibility of a coup on the agenda.

Q. What was the PST's position on the president's invitation to a national conference, which was extended to all political parties as well as trade-union and bourgeois organizations?

A. Of course we accepted. For several reasons.

First, it is an official meeting with a semiparliamentary character. Not to attend would mean risking the legality that our party won with such difficulty.

Second, 98 percent of the workers movement supports the current government. It is a critical support, and it is eroding, but it is support. We want, and we look for, opportunities to publicly confront a government that has the support of the workers movement. Our goal in such gatherings is to expose the government as the class enemy of the workers.

The third reason is that we consider one of the great advantages of legality to be the chance it gives us to publicize the party's positions within the working class. Such meetings are useful for this. Millions of workers learn our positions through the news media.

Q. What is the situation in the workers movement?

A. In recent weeks there was a wave of important strikes that in general were not successful. On the contrary, they provided the government with a pretext to get an ultrareactionary law through congress. Among other things, this law revokes the right to strike and provides penalties of up to three years in jail for activity in connection with strikes.

SMATA⁷ and Ongaro's printers union⁸ have been taken over by the government.

However, the sugarcane workers in

7. Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor—Union of Automotive Machinists and Allied Trades.

8. Raimundo Ongaro is head of the Buenos Aires printers union.

the north of the country have begun a hard fight. It appears that the negotiations the government has been forced into could lead to a victory that would more than compensate for the other defeats. The greatest capitalist development is in the Northwest, where Ledesma—the factory with the largest number of workers in the country—is located.

The teachers union is another one that has not been defeated.

Everything seems to indicate that no more big struggles will take place until next year but that the workers movement has its reserves intact—or rather, that they are growing as the movement learns from the partial defeats.

Q. How is the PST doing at present?

A. I have gone on too long already so I will give—almost in "telegraphic" style—three facts so that you can draw your own conclusions.

First, of the ten regions in which our party is divided, without doubt the northern region of Greater Buenos Aires has received the heaviest blows. That is where our comrades were mur-

dered. Because of the attacks by fascist gangs, we have been forced to close four of the five headquarters we had there. On Sunday, October 6, we passed a tough test in that region—organizing a general meeting of members and worker sympathizers in the Northern Zone.

For these general meetings we generally have a barbeque, because the sessions last all day. We sell tickets to members and sympathizers in advance. To come to the point, 800 tickets were sold, and 650 worker compañeros attended the general meeting—this in the region hardest hit by the reactionaries. It was a complete success.

Second, our party is now printing more than 25,000 copies of *Avanzada Socialista*. More than 22,000 of them are distributed to members and sympathizers, making the paper the most influential political weekly in the country. The percentage of renewals on subscriptions is very high.

Third, the top leadership of the Ledesma union is composed of party members. One of our members was the leader of the whole sugar strike in the north of the country. □

Brazil

Trotskyists Publish Clandestine Paper

A Trotskyist group in Brazil has begun to publish *Independência Operária*, an underground newspaper. Its third issue, dated October 1974, has just come out.

The articles in the October issue give an indication of the efforts of this nucleus of revolutionists to link up with sectors that at present provide the most favorable arena for Trotskyist propaganda in Brazil.

For example, the authors include a brief analysis of the situation in the Brazilian student movement today. They point out that it is slowly recovering from the downturn that began in 1968 "in a process that we characterize as the accumulation of forces."

The recovery of the student movement is proceeding unevenly, this issue of *Independência Operária* said, but the upswing is nationwide. The pivotal schools are the universities of São Paulo, Guanabara, Rio Grande

do Sul, and Minas Geras.

This beginning of an upturn is even more important when put in the context of a general revival by the Brazilian mass movement. The situation calls for promoting student actions and linking up the different schools and universities, so as to prepare the way for a united struggle.

To accomplish this, *Independência Operária* proposes forming a student front, with its own newspaper, based on agreement with a four-point program:

- "1. Free public education.
- "2. Repeal of Law 477.*
- "3. University autonomy.

- "4. Complete independence of the representative student bodies from the university authorities."

*Law 477 allows the government to suspend or expel students it accuses of participating in "subversive" activities.

For the University of São Paulo they propose two additional points:

"Fighting for an authentic university reform that meets the needs of the students and the people—with an equal share in decision-making for teachers, students, and nonteaching staff.

"Amnesty for all political prisoners."

The same issue of *Independência Operária* has an article on the bank workers' struggle that began in early August. What these workers fought for were wage increases and trade-union rights. The authors point out that the experience of this struggle—

where the bureaucracy of the bank workers union manipulated the assemblies—raises again the need for the workers to struggle to regain control of the unions and to put an end to government trusteeship of their organizations.

The publication of a Trotskyist newspaper under the difficult underground conditions imposed by the Brazilian military dictatorship is an encouraging step forward in the revolutionary struggle in Latin America. It kindles new hopes for Trotskyism and the fight for democracy and socialism in Brazil. □

of the parties—Swatantra and the BKD—counted for much in terms of political influence. Even these, however, had a predominantly local base, with little capacity for affecting national politics.

The merger of the seven parties came after several splits in a number of the parties. For instance, just a few weeks before the launching of the BLD, a majority of the BKD national executive voted to expel Charan Singh and to retain the party's independent existence.

The Swatantra party also split. Minoo Minai, its former president and a longtime associate of the Tata monopolies, declared that the rank and file of the party would not join the BLD. He said that coercion and intimidation had been used at the national convention of the Swatantra party to secure approval of the merger and the dissolution of the party. The Samyukta Socialist party split as well, since many of its members in Uttar Pradesh opposed the merger.

The far-right Jan Sangh party has not joined the new party, although it has been reported that the BLD leadership is making overtures toward it. Congress (Orissa), a splinter from the old Congress party that is now of little importance, has also kept its distance from the new party.

The bourgeois press has tended to question the significance of the new party, pointing out that right-wing alternatives to the Congress party based exclusively on the ideology of laissez-faire capitalism have failed to take root in India in the past. The Swatantra party's failure to win broad layers of the capitalist class is a case in point.

The Indian bourgeoisie simply cannot afford to promote classical free-enterprise capitalism. The development of the state-capitalist sector under the protection of the capitalist welfare state is a prerequisite for its very existence. Even to promote such capitalism, it has to talk about socialism.

The ruling Congress party's rhetoric about socialism has served the class interests of the Indian bourgeoisie very well. That is why even the Jan Sangh party is now talking about socialism—of its own brand, of course.

The new party, with its avowed opposition to socialism, can hardly hope to appeal to either the bourgeoisie or the masses. □

Calls for Return to 19th-Century Capitalism

New Right-Wing Party Formed in India

By Sharad Jhaveri

Jamnagar

A seven-party opposition bloc has merged to form a right-wing party called Bhartiya Lok Dal (BLD—People's Party of India). The formal launching of the new party took place in New Delhi August 29.

The initial move to form a rightist alternative to the ruling Congress party was made in April. (See *Intercontinental Press*, May 20, p. 627.)

The new party was formed by the merger of the following parties:

Bhartiya Kranti Dal (BKD—Indian Revolutionary party, a landowners party in Uttar Pradesh);

Swatantra party, an anticommunist formation that opposes state intervention into the economy;

Utkal Congress (Orissa Congress); Samyukta Socialist party (SSP);

Kisan Mazdoor party (KMP);

Punjab Khetibari Zamindari Union (Landowners party of Punjab);

and the Rashtriya Loktantrik Dal, a splinter group from the right-wing Jan Sangh party, led by Professor Balraj Madhok.

The founding convention elected Charan Singh of the former BKD as chairman of the new party.

Acharya Kripalani, a reactionary capitalist politician and a former close

associate of Mahatma Gandhi, gave the new party his blessing and advised it not to bother too much about ideology. Jaya Prakash Narayan, a former Socialist leader now playing an important role in the mass struggle in Bihar, has welcomed the new party's formation.

In his inaugural address, Charan Singh said that the BLD would seek to become a "national alternative," providing the country with a new leadership that could avert the danger of a totalitarian take-over.

The new party gives first priority to agriculture, second priority to small-scale industry, and lowest priority to heavy industry. It rejects Marxism, calling instead for wide dispersion of the ownership of property and the means of production.

Its political philosophy professes to follow Gandhi's doctrine of class reconciliation within the framework of capitalist private-property relations.

Of the seven parties that formed the BLD, four have had little if any impact on the country's political life. The Kisan Mazdoor party and the Khetibari Zamindari Union had hardly ever been heard of before. As the *Times of India*, the country's leading bourgeois daily, remarked, only two

Growing Clamor to Get Rid of Thieu

By Peter Green

Two thousand Catholic demonstrators, who assembled for a march from the suburb of Tan Sa Chau to the Supreme Court building in Saigon October 31, were beaten back by Thieu's police and plainclothes goons. About seventy-five civilians were reported injured. Two opposition deputies were seriously hurt, and a Catholic priest was knocked to the ground and bloodied, the November 1 *New York Times* reported.

The leader of the anticorruption campaign that has developed over the past few months, Father Tran Huu Thanh, was punched in the face and had his glasses broken by a plainclothes cop.

At a news conference after the events, Thanh demanded—for the first time in public—that President Thieu resign and turn over power "to the people for the sake of their lives and for the sake of the nation's survival." An end to corruption in government has been the nominal target of the Catholic campaign so far, but it has developed into a broad movement whose minimum goal is the ousting of Thieu.

The night before the demonstration, 3,000 Catholics gathered for a torchlight rally at Tan Sa Chau church. Thanh called on them to return in the morning for a dawn mass and the march to the city. But starting at 4 a. m. police ringed the whole neighborhood with barbed-wire barriers and forcibly prevented the march from proceeding.

The police also raided the Saigon Press Club in the early morning of October 31. There they beat up opposition deputy Dinh Xuan Dung, and dragged him and several journalists away. They returned later to arrest twenty-five more journalists. The journalists and deputies had been organizing for demonstrations that day.

A group of deputies and lawyers did succeed in penetrating the barbed-wire barriers. They marched on the Supreme Court building, where the trial of three opposition newspapers was due to take place. (The papers

are charged with libel for having printed Thanh's six-count indictment of Thieu.)

The government postponed the trial, with the excuse that the government prosecutor had not completed his brief, but the attacks on the press continued.

One of the papers charged, *Dai Dan Toc*, announced October 26 that it would suspend publication "indefinitely" because government confiscations had driven it into bankruptcy. The paper's press run had been seized eleven times in the last month.

The opposition daily *Dien Tin* was seized for reporting on the violence in the Tan Sa Chau neighborhood on October 31. Other papers were forced by the censor to delete references to the punch thrown at Father Thanh.

Thieu's crackdown on the opposition movement is in effect an admission that the various phony concessions he made the previous week had done little to rally support for his dictatorial rule.

His first gesture had been to remove four members of his cabinet, including his cousin, Information Minister Hoang Duc Nha, who was responsible for press censorship. They announced their resignations October 24. Nha and the departing commerce minister had been under strong attack from the anticorruption movement.

This move failed to satisfy Thieu's critics, however, as Catholics, Buddhists, publishers and lawyers vowed to continue their struggle. "The people demand peace and reconciliation, not a cabinet reshuffle," said Senator Vu Van Mau, a leader of the Buddhist National Reconciliation Force. "It's nonsense. It can't save President Thieu."

On October 25 Thieu announced that 377 army officers, including twenty colonels, would be fired for "corruption and dishonest activities." This step, too, failed to mollify the opposition.

"Why are the generals safe?" asked deputy Nguyen Van Binh, a leader of the Catholic anticorruption move-

ment. "If Thieu really wants to clean up the army then he's got to fire most of the generals."

Another deputy, Phan Xuan Huy, a leader of the National Reconciliation Force, went further. "If Thieu wants to eliminate corruption in the army he must fire himself first," he said.

On October 30, in a final effort to appease his critics, Thieu transferred three of South Vietnam's four corps commanders to teaching posts in military schools. Two of the three generals had been particular targets of the anticorruption campaign. Thanh rejected the transfers as a "maneuver." Addressing the torchlight rally at Tan Sa Chau church that night, where Thieu was hanged in effigy, Thanh declared:

"When a few province chiefs were transferred, I was asked whether the movement was satisfied. I answered, 'never.'"

"And when four cabinet ministers resigned, I was asked the same question and also answered, 'never.'"

"Now, after three corps commanders have been transferred, I was asked the same question. I still have the same answer, 'never.'"

The opposition campaign has now clearly focused on the demand for the ousting of Thieu. Duong Van Minh, the retired general who led the coup that removed Ngo Dinh Diem eleven years ago, and who has now associated himself with the Buddhist National Reconciliation Force, described the Thieu government in a statement issued November 1 as a "violence-thirsty" regime that "has completely lost the confidence of the people." He said that South Vietnam needed new leaders to bring peace to the country.

In a speech on National Day, November 1, the anniversary of the overthrow of Diem, Thieu took a tough stance. He vowed to enforce law and order "to the maximum" and described the opposition as political opportunists and "underground henchmen" of the

Communists. According to the November 2 *Washington Post*, Thieu's speech contained many bitter references to "Communist and colonialist" financial support to the protesters. Apparently in Saigon "colonialist" is a euphemism for Washington.

Publicly, at any rate, Washington is still backing Thieu. President Ford sent Thieu a National Day message reassuring him that the American people "continue to support your government."

But Thieu's position is becoming increasingly shaky. Besides the main forces, a dozen small fronts and committees have joined the attack. And the movement is spreading geographically. In Hue and Quang Ngai, the Bud-

dhists have held rallies to inaugurate local chapters of the National Reconciliation Force. In the Mekong Delta, a predominantly Buddhist area, the Catholics held a rally in which 10,000 persons participated.

On October 29 the head of the largest trade union in South Vietnam also came out against Thieu and called for the eradication of corruption, the implementation of the Paris truce agreements, and the establishment of democratic liberties. After a visit to Tay Ninh on November 2, Father Thanh claimed that the Cao Dai sect had also pledged to join the opposition.

A further focus for the opposition has been a petition demanding Thieu's

immediate resignation. It is being circulated in the National Assembly. Although Thieu has the assembly safely stacked with his own puppets, thirty-two deputies had signed it by November 2.

Thieu still has the support of most of his appointees in the National Assembly and of the police and the armed forces, but nearly every other segment of the population is demanding his removal.

"Few are willing to guess how much longer he will remain in power," wrote James M. Markham in the October 23 *New York Times*, "but it is almost impossible to find anyone who believes that he will be able to run for a third term next October." □

Support Irish People's Right to Self-Determination

4,000 March in London for Troops Out of Ireland

By Robin Hunter

London

"Troops Out of Ireland! Internees Out of Jail!" "A Victory for the Irish Is a Victory for Us All!" "For the IRA—British Troops Out Now!" These were some of the slogans chanted when 4,000 demonstrators marched through London October 27 to demand the withdrawal of British troops from Ireland.

The demonstration, which drew forces from a wide spectrum of the left, was the first major mobilisation for the withdrawal of British troops from Ireland in two years. Called jointly by the Troops Out Movement (TOM) and the British Peace Committee (BPC), the march upheld the right of self-determination of the Irish people and demanded "that Labour immediately implements a policy of political and military withdrawal from Ireland." Six Labour members of Parliament were among the sponsors of the march.

Participating groups included the International Marxist Group (IMG), the British section of the Fourth International; the International Socialists (IS); and most other groupings of the British left with the exception of the sectarian Workers Revolutionary party. Also much in evidence were Irish

groups, Troops Out committees, trades councils, and Black and women's groups.

In spite of its disciplined and peaceful nature, the march was obstructed and harassed by government authorities. The police attempted to deny access to a main artery, Fleet Street, on the basis of an archaic law barring disturbance of church services. The Department of the Environment banned the rally from Trafalgar Square on the grounds that no meetings concerning Ireland are permitted there. Later, at the end of the march, while the demonstrators were listening to speeches, the police charged the crowd at several points, following a scuffle which many believe to have been a provocation.

Speakers at the rally included Eamonn McCann, an early leader of the struggle in Derry and a spokesman of the International Socialists. He argued that the demonstration's theme was three years late in British politics, but that the forces now gathering behind the Troops Out demand were more solid than ever before. He stressed a point made by several of the speakers: that the techniques and methods of repression being developed

in Ireland are ultimately aimed at the British working class as well.

Alistair Renwick, speaking for the Troops Out Movement, emphasised the lack of enthusiasm for the war on the part of the British people, citing a *Daily Mail* estimate that 60 percent of the population favours withdrawal. He argued that this was reflected in the continuing low morale of the troops themselves.

Most of the speakers stressed that the basis of the demand for troop withdrawal was the right to self-determination of the Irish people, rather than the failure of the British to achieve a "stable solution." As Eamonn McCann put it, "It is not the *way* that Britain rules Ireland that we reject, but the fact that Britain rules."

Labour member of Parliament Joan Maynard spoke against the present "bipartisan" policy Labour follows hand in hand with the Tories. In support of the right of self-determination for the Irish people, she demanded the repeal of the Emergency Provisions Act. Urging "a change in the direction of the Labour and trade-union movement" on Ireland, she called for a special conference of the British trade unions to deal with the question.

Regarding the British army, Maynard said, the troops should be withdrawn. "Whether early or late, the government must set a date for the completion of the withdrawal." At this, a large section of the crowd shouted, "Now! Withdraw them now!"

This response to Maynard's call for a phased withdrawal was indicative of the division just under the surface throughout the crowd. It was given further voice by Michael Knowles, secretary of the Hackney Trades Council, who explained that Hackney had affiliated with the TOM and had endorsed the demonstration explicitly on two points: self-determination for Ireland and the *immediate* withdrawal of the troops. He urged a campaign throughout the trade-union movement on these two points to enlarge its representation on the next Troops Out demonstration.

The division within the movement is not surprising. It reflects the differences between those who are accommodating themselves to the interests of British imperialism, allowing it to buy time to leave Ireland on the best terms possible for big business, and those who stand firmly for Irish self-determination. In the former camp stand the Labour "left-wingers," the Communist party, and its stepchild the BPC. Against them stand the IMG, the IS, and some activists in the Troops Out Movement.

The TOM itself was organised initially around the demand for immediate withdrawal from Ireland. In agreeing to sponsor the action with the BPC, however, it retreated and accepted the BPC's demand for the immediate beginning of a *staged* withdrawal. It was criticised for taking this action by several groups on the left. The IMG's newspaper, *Red Weekly*, for example, explained that granting the British government *any* right to negotiate the terms of a gradual exit clearly negates the right of the Irish people to determine their own future.

The size and militancy of the October 27 action, in the wake of the renewed mass mobilisations against British rule in Northern Ireland itself, indicate that the issues raised will remain as long as British imperialism tries to hold its oldest colony. The debate on immediate versus staged withdrawal within the trade unions, the TOM, and the country as a whole will continue. □

Arab Summit Meeting Endorses PLO

By Michael Baumann

The twenty Arab heads of state gathered at a summit meeting in Rabat, Morocco, October 28 called unanimously for the creation of an independent Palestinian authority "on any Palestinian land that is liberated" from Israeli occupation.

The Arab rulers also unanimously recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization, the umbrella group to which most of the Palestine liberation organizations adhere, as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

The move came in the wake of a number of actions involving international recognition of the Palestinian struggle.

On October 14 the United Nations General Assembly voted 105 to 4 to recognize the PLO as the "representative of the Palestinian people" and invited it to participate in the Assembly's debate on Palestine. Only the United States, Israel, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia voted against the resolution.

On October 21, French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues met with Yasir Arafat, becoming the first high-ranking Western official to appear publicly with the PLO leader.

On October 25, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization voted 80 to 2 to admit the PLO to its general conference with observer status. Only the United States and Israel voted against the proposal.

The official recognition of the PLO reflects both the impact that the Palestinian national liberation struggle has had in recent years, and the awareness that this struggle has central importance in the politics of the Arab East. It has become increasingly difficult for most governments to maintain an official stance of outright denial of the existence and rights of the Palestinian people.

This official recognition of the PLO, however, is tied to attempts to sell the Palestinians short, to urge them to accept the Israeli colonial-settler state as something that is here to stay. Recognition of the PLO came only

after the organization dropped its demand to replace Israel with a democratic and secular Palestine on all territory that is currently under Israeli rule. In place of this, the PLO now calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, although the goal of a democratic and secular Palestine is still proclaimed to be a long-range objective.

The position of the PLO is not accepted by all Palestinian resistance organizations. On October 30, four groups, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, denounced the Rabat declaration as signifying acceptance of a Middle East settlement that implied capitulation toward Israel.

In 1969 and 1970, during the high points of the Palestinian struggle, the PLO rejected the idea of a rump state on the West Bank. It maintained that to call for such a state would amount to a denial of self-determination of the Palestinian people: it would mean recognition of Israel, which came into being and exists through the dispossession of the Palestinian people.

But after the defeat of the Palestinian resistance in Jordan in 1970, the mass movement went into decline. The resistance organizations moved to the right politically and tightened their ties to the Arab governments, which, in turn, put increasing pressure on the resistance organizations to moderate their position. After the 1973 war, when the prospect of negotiations developed, these regimes pressured the PLO to drop its demand for a democratic, secular Palestine. Strong pressure along these lines also came from Moscow. Under this pressure, the PLO retreated from its previous position.

The decision of the Arab heads of state does not appear to have been worked out in advance in Washington. As recently as mid-October, U. S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is said to have believed that his policy of piecemeal Israeli withdrawals and indefinite postponement of any settlement of the Palestinian question would

prevail at Rabat.

According to a report in the November 3 *Washington Post*, "Diplomatic sources suggest that Kissinger expected the leaders at the summit to support his plans for step-by-step negotiations and to leave the position of the Palestine Liberation Organization about where Egypt and Jordan had put it in a communique last July. At that time Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Jordanian King Hussein agreed that Jordan represents Palestinians living in Jordan."

Furthermore, at the preliminary foreign ministers meeting, the question of whether to recognize the PLO, over Jordan's objections, as the sole representative of the Palestinian people was debated for four days.

According to the October 26 *New York Times*, a "member of the Palestinian delegation told newsmen [October 24] that the Palestinian demands had been received in 'complete silence' by the foreign ministers and that Yasir Arafat, the head of the organization, might yet boycott the Arab summit meeting.

"The threat, interpreted as an attempt to put pressure on the conference, produced the desired results. But some delegates were still hoping today that a compromise between Jordan and the Palestinians could be worked out, once King Hussein of Jordan and Mr. Arafat sit at the same table."

"As conference sources explained it," Henry Tanner wrote in the October 25 *New York Times*, the Arab countries "would like to couple their recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization with practical concessions to Jordan that would avert a formal break between King Hussein and the other Arabs.

"The search for such concessions is the real issue before the conference, the sources said."

The search seems to have been successful. "Though details haven't been disclosed," Robert Keatley wrote in the October 30 *Wall Street Journal*, "it's evident that some behind-the-scenes compromises preceded the unanimous conference vote for the PLO—enough to permit even Jordan to approve the decision." Although the vote was a defeat for Hussein, "Jordan hasn't been excluded from future negotiations but will remain a main factor."

The picture became a little clearer the next day. ". . . King Hussein,"

reported the October 31 *New York Times*, "is understood to have obtained a promise of a subsidy of \$300-million annually from King Faisal as well as large shipments of military weapons. . . .

"The Saudi King also promised



YASIR ARAFAT

large subsidies to Egypt and Syria [\$1,000 million each] but it was understood that Jordan could hope to get Saudi financial assistance only as long as she remained part of the Arab front both diplomatically and militarily."

A more important question, however, seemed to be what position the PLO would take toward Hussein, the ruler who only four years ago killed or wounded 10,000 Palestinians in the Jordanian civil war. * Will the PLO continue to call for the overthrow of Hussein? Apparently not.

According to an October 30 *New York Times* dispatch from Rabat, "Yasir Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, said today that he would meet with the heads of state of Egypt, Syria and Jordan to coordinate Arab strategy on the 'military, economic and political level.' . . .

"The Palestinians' willingness to coordinate policies with Jordan as well

*Peter Buch, "The Palestinian Revolution and Zionism," *International Socialist Review*, January 1971.

as with Syria and Egypt to give King Hussein a role in future negotiations is thought to be the central concession that made it possible for the Jordanian king to accept the status given to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

"King Hussein thus gained 'coexistence with the Palestinians' in exchange for his concurrence in the decision to recognize them, a delegate to the summit said."

Israel's reaction to the Rabat decision was ominous: increased pressure on the White House for quick delivery of arms. Pentagon officials told *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Dana Adams Schmidt of "intense Israeli pressure to obtain rush deliveries of U. S. arms in great quantity—including laser-guided missiles not yet standard in U. S. forces."

These officials, Schmidt reported November 1, "now talk of the possibility that a Mideast negotiating impasse might lead Israel to resort to a new pre-emptive war. . . .

"The Israeli pressure to obtain U. S. arms over the past few months is described as equal to, or exceeding similar pressure at the time of the war last October." The pace of delivery has been so great that U. S. Army supply depots "have been required to draw down U. S. military stocks instead of waiting until new items come off supply lines."

William Safire, a former Nixon aide and now a columnist for the *New York Times*, suggested a more direct solution—U. S. military intervention in the Arab East similar to Washington's intervention in Vietnam.

". . . Arab extremists are in the saddle," Safire warned in the *Times's* editorial pages October 31, and the moderates need countervailing pressure. "That means," he said, "that the United States, in this period, should be less of a broker and more of a counterforce. As Mr. Kissinger learned in Vietnam, the application of power is an urgent reminder of the need for good faith in negotiations." □

South Africa Expulsion Vetoed in UN

A resolution submitted to the United Nations Security Council demanding the expulsion of South Africa from the UN was vetoed October 30 by the delegates from the United States, France, and Britain. The resolution was the first formal request in the UN's history for the expulsion of a member state.

Top CIA Men in Parleys With Portuguese Officials

Washington is giving events in Portugal anxious scrutiny, according to officials in Lisbon. Worried about Communist party influence in the government, and no doubt concerned about the possibility that forces further to the left than the CP might come to the fore in the future, the White House has recently dispatched top-level intelligence and diplomatic missions to make on-the-spot assessments of the situation.

Citing "informed sources," Miguel Acoca cabled from Lisbon to the October 27 *Washington Post* that "Kissinger dispatched Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to Lisbon in August for a 'personal appraisal.' The general, who speaks excellent Portuguese and is considered a specialist on Portugal, was in Lisbon from August 9 to 12th for meetings with high government officials and senior U. S. embassy staffers."

During his visit, Walters "met with Gen. Antonio de Spínola, then provisional president," Acoca reported. "At the time, Spínola, a conservative, was locked in a struggle for power with populist Premier Vasco Gonçalves and the coordinating committee of the Armed Forces Movement. . . ."

"Both U. S. and Portuguese government sources have privately confirmed Walters' meeting with Spínola, and a subsequent conference with Gen. Francisco DaCosta Gomes, the armed forces chief who succeeded Spínola."

Some officials in the Portuguese government and the Armed Forces Movement, which directed the April 25 coup, are apparently uneasy about Washington's attention. Acoca reported that "high-ranking revolutionary military officers have claimed repeatedly that there are at least 100 CIA agents operating in Portugal, striving to create 'another Chile.'"

After Spínola was forced to resign September 30, Kissinger sent a four-man State Department mission to the Portuguese capital. According to Acoca, "The group, headed by Alan Lukens, director of the department's



Mundo

SPINOLA: Recruited by CIA?

Iberian section, included Robert Ryan, a department monetary expert, and Michael Samuels, an authority on Portugal's African colonies. The identity of the fourth mission member was not disclosed. . . .

"While nothing could be learned of the thrust of Walters' report to Kissinger, sources said that the Lukens group diverged from the embassy's appraisal. The extent of the differences was not disclosed, but sources said that the embassy's reporting had grown more cautious as a result."

Previously, it was reported, the U. S. Embassy's reports had minimized the risk of a Communist party "take-over."

The *Washington Post's* correspondent said that, according to his sources, "Kissinger and others in Washington were obsessed with the fear that Portugal will be the first

country to go Communist in what was called 'a southern Europe domino theory' also involving Spain, Italy and Greece. This fear apparently has been fed by pessimistic intelligence assessments, press reports stressing the power of the left in Portugal, and the anxieties of multinational companies with interests in Portugal and its African colonies."

The "domino theory," it will be recalled, was used to justify American intervention in the Vietnamese civil war in the sixties.

Acoca's sources reported that CIA deputy director Walters had been in Madrid in early October, "when he had a briefing on Portugal with senior Spanish military and civilian authorities."

Another recent visitor to Madrid was CIA director William Colby. "One source," Acoca said, ". . . pointed out that visits to Iberia by high U. S. intelligence officials could become more frequent because the Mediterranean has risen in U. S. priority."

The chief of Portuguese military security publicly alluded to Washington's intervention in a recent interview published in the weekly magazine *O Século Ilustrado*. When the Communist party entered the provisional government set up after the April 25 military coup, the CIA "immediately focused their attention on us," said Brigadier General Otelo de Carvalho, commander of the Lisbon garrison.

"The Americans have a morbid terror of Communism and as you know have a series of specific organs to fight against it," the general continued. He suggested that the CIA was not the only vehicle Washington might use to impress its views on the Portuguese rulers.

"The C. I. A., which uses the most incredible methods—and you only have to look at the example of Chile—is probably the most dangerous, but it is not the only one: NATO is another example of an organization created specifically to fight Communism."

Columnists Rowland Evans and

Robert Novak reported in their October 25 column that "the U. S. has cut Portugal off from certain highly classified military and nuclear information commonly available to all members of NATO." They said the Pentagon's move occurred around the time the CP entered the Spínola government.

Whatever uneasiness some members of the Portuguese government may entertain about Washington's intentions, none of them are campaigning to get out of NATO or to loosen ties with the State Department. On the contrary.

When President Francisco da Costa Gomes returned to Lisbon October 20,

following a trip to Washington and the United Nations, he went out of his way to defend Portugal's membership in NATO.

"We have a geostrategic position that obliges us to make a choice," he said, adding that the "choice" of staying in NATO corresponded to "the wishes of the Portuguese people."

While Costa Gomes spoke, the Communist party was holding its first legal convention in more than fifty years. In an hour-long address to the congress, CP leader Alvaro Cunhal, a minister without portfolio in the government, carefully avoided mentioning foreign policy. □

always one of the shelters of protection of the rights of Iranian workers."

It should be noted, of course, that the shah's regime cannot tolerate the existence of any kind of independent workers organization, and that in Iran what is claimed to be a trade union is nothing but a SAVAK-dominated apparatus for further repressing the workers.

The "union" letter published by *Etelaaat* argued that anti-SAVAK publicity in the Western press is a result of the rise in oil prices. The letter concluded by stating that "all this talk won't bring oil prices down. . . ."

The Iranian parliament has also joined the attack on *Newsweek*. In a front-page article, the October 20 *Etelaaat* reported that a member of Majlis (House of Representatives) had attacked the *Newsweek* article and that his speech had been approved by all the other members.

The response of the shah to exposures of his repressive actions shows that he finds the pressure of international public opinion to be distasteful. He could be made to feel quite uncomfortable if a broad campaign could be mounted for the unconditional release of the political prisoners held in the jails of Iran. □

Claims Murder of Strikers Was a 'Misunderstanding'

Shah Stung by 'Newsweek' Charges

By Majid Namvar

Following a recent disclosure by *Newsweek* of some of the operations of SAVAK, the Iranian secret police, a number of other U. S. magazines have carried reports documenting the repression in Iran. According to the November 4 issue of *Time*, the shah's political police, "through a large network of informers, have been responsible for making countless arrests of leftists on occasionally vague anti-Shah charges and for at least 200 executions."

Writing in the November issue of *Harper's* magazine, Frances FitzGerald, who recently visited Iran, reported that private estimates put the number of SAVAK agents at 70,000. But, she reported, "SAVAK officials themselves say that they have more unpaid informers than paid agents."

During the spring of this year, she said, SAVAK reportedly carried out mass arrests of schoolteachers and taxi drivers in the city of Hamadan.

The increasing disclosure of facts about the shah's repression of oppositionists, combined with the growing support for the defense of Iranian political prisoners, has forced the government to adopt a defensive position.

In recent issues of the government-controlled press, several articles have denounced "reactionary circles" in the West. *Newsweek* in particular is under

fire because of an article in its October 14 international edition that gave the following account of the scope of SAVAK activities:

"... the agency's eyes and ears are everywhere: in hotels, taxis, schools, foreign embassies and companies, factories, doctors' offices, even in the dormitories and cafeterias where Iranian students live and eat while studying abroad."

As an example of SAVAK brutality, the *Newsweek* article mentioned the recent murder of striking workers at the Irana and Khavar brick factory. (See *Intercontinental Press*, September 23, p. 1194.)

In an attempt to refute the *Newsweek* article, the October 19 air edition of the Tehran daily *Etelaaat* printed the text of what it claimed was a letter to *Newsweek* signed by "Representatives and Members of the Irana Factory Workers Union."

"It is certain that in any workers unit, misunderstandings sometimes occur between workers and the boss," the letter said. "Such a misunderstanding occurred at the Irana factory, and the officials who are responsible for workers affairs tried sincerely to work it out. Irana workers firmly deny the allegations that security officials mistreated workers."

"SAVAK," the letter continued, "is

CIA Subversion Not 'Systematic,' Kissinger Tells Gandhi

On his recent visit to New Delhi, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was hard pressed by anxious Indian officials to allay widely held suspicions that the CIA has contemplated covert operations against the Indira Gandhi government.

Kissinger's response fell far short of a direct denial, however. "I reject the implication that the United States is engaged on a systematic basis in undermining any government, and, particularly, constitutional governments. Exactly the opposite is true," he told a news conference in New Delhi October 30.

This carefully qualified statement sounds as authoritative as Kissinger's statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year: "The CIA had nothing to do with the [Chile] coup, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I only put in that qualification in case some madman appears down there who without instructions talked to somebody. I have absolutely no reason to suppose it."

Since then, of course, it has been revealed that Kissinger personally directed the CIA operations against the Allende government.

Has Bangladesh a Future?

By Ibne Azad

[The following article appeared in the September 19 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

Nearly four years ago, on the night of November 12-13, 1970, an unprecedented cyclone and tidal wave ravaged the coastal districts of what was then East Pakistan. About one million lives were lost in that catastrophe. The Pakistani military regime made very little effort to save the lives of the cyclone-devastated people. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the present prime minister of Bangladesh, was then the leader of the opposition party in East Pakistan. He stated before a press conference on November 26, 1970:

"We have lived with floods and cyclones since Independence (1947 when the British left India). Today, after twenty-three years of shared nationhood, we are without even plans for flood control. . . . We are confirmed today in our conviction that if we are to save the people of Bangladesh we must attain full regional autonomy. . . . We must have plenary powers to manage our economy. It is only when we can wrest away from the ruling coterie and attain full regional autonomy . . . that we can expect to solve our urgent problems, be they those of economic development, flood control, or those of reconstructing the villages and rehabilitating the people ravaged by the cyclone."

Floods and cyclones are two major natural disasters that hit Bangladesh almost every year. Effective control of floods had been one of the pledges made by Rahman during the fight against the Pakistani military regime. On January 3, 1971, speaking before a gathering of nearly two million people in Dacca, Rahman promised, "Whenever the question of flood control was raised in the past, the plea of non-availability of funds was given. I shall show how money can be arranged for flood control."

(*Morning News*, Dacca, January 4, 1971.)

Rahman has been prime minister of Bangladesh for more than two and a half years now. When he became prime minister he promised the people a Sonar Bangla (Golden Bengal). But instead, Rahman and his henchmen in the ruling Awami League have converted Bangladesh into a graveyard. Limitless corruption, misadministration, and inefficiency reign supreme. Bangladesh is ruined. Its economy had collapsed long before the recent flood struck Bangladesh. Rahman has not fared any better than the Pakistani butchers. On the contrary, the toiling masses were in some ways better off during those days than at present. Now, few shout about "Joi Bangla" (Glory to Bengal). The most common question is: "Has Bangladesh a future?"

The June Flood

Floods struck Bangladesh this year in the month of June. The water level in the different rivers was rising steadily and the situation was aggravated by the heavy rainfall. By the beginning of August the country was in the grip of the worst flood in 150 years. Two-thirds of the country's 55,000 square miles were under floodwater. Nearly thirty million people were affected; 3,000 were killed; 3,500 miles of road were destroyed. As of this writing it is not possible to accurately estimate the real extent of the damage. The Bangladesh government has put it on the order of \$500 million. The sufferings of the people are indescribable.

Rahman has done very little to fight against the floods. Nor has his government done anything to protect people from the cyclones. In the current year's budget only 3 million takas (US\$1 equals 7 takas approximately) has been allocated, whereas the minimum requirement according to the Flood Control Ministry was 6.5 million takas (*Holiday*, Dacca, August 4,

1974). The first five-year plan has completely omitted the problem of flood control and has only touched upon flood protection. In the same issue of *Holiday*, N.M. Harun wrote, "Experts hold that there are two approaches to the problem of flood control and flood protection: a) effective flood control is possible on basin-wide planning and multi-national efforts; and b) labour-intensive projects within a comprehensive plan can be undertaken even with the existing resources of the country to protect vast areas from floods.

"The present administration is yet to consider the first approach. And, for the second approach, earnestness has not been shown."

Despite the unprecedented havoc created by the flood, the international response has been far from big. As soon as the floodwater started to engulf vast parts of the country, Rahman arranged for the heads of different diplomatic missions to be flown by helicopter over the flood-devastated countryside. The government appealed to the United Nations and other international agencies for help. But the international response was pathetic.

In the past, both during the cyclone of 1970 and during the first year after the liberation of Bangladesh, the government was provided with large assistance from abroad. In the first year of independence, the United Nations Relief Operation-Dacca provided more than £500 million. Yet at the time of this writing, very little has been offered to the government of Bangladesh. The U.S. government has donated only \$4 million. The United Nations Disasters Relief office in Dacca has donated only \$20,000. The World Food Program in Rome has announced an offer of \$2.5 million. These sums are far less than the \$500 million estimated as needed by the Bangladesh government. Commenting on this, Michael Hornsby wrote: "This parsimony undoubtedly reflects in part the disillusionment of international agencies and other aid donors at the way in which massive injections of relief funds over the past three years have been dissipated and embezzled by corrupt Bangladesh officials" (*The Times*, London, August 14, 1974).

A correspondent of the Bangladesh weekly *Deshbangla* reported that most of the foreign missions in Bangladesh

were aware of how the Bangladesh government had misused and squandered a good part of the foreign aid. The foreign offices in Bangladesh believed that about 50 percent of this aid found its way to India, 30 percent was misappropriated by the distributors, who were and still are solely the members of the ruling Awami League, and only 20 percent actually had reached the needy and the poor of Bangladesh (*Deshbangla*, Dacca, August 8, 1974).

After the November 1970 cyclone, Rahman accused the Pakistani military regime of criminal negligence because of its failure to launch an intensive relief and rescue operation. But how is the relief operation being carried out under the rule of the Awami League? According to a report by Ian Ward in the August 15 London *Daily Telegraph* there were only six helicopters in service. He narrates how the relief operation is being carried out: "I flew here today aboard a Russian-made helicopter with the Russian crew to experience at first hand some of the hopeless confusion which has engulfed trying to bring relief to the stricken areas.

"The flight was timed for 8 a.m. sharp. The Russian crew were standing by their craft on Dacca airport at 6 a.m. ready to load the trucks of packaged bread parked nearby along with a four ton consignment of drugs. But with no government official in attendance nothing stirred. At 8:15 a.m. the Dacca airport relief co-ordination officer strolled into his quarters. The telephone on his desk was out of order. Piles of receipts, documents, files and scraps of official notes lay under a paperweight awaiting his signature—testaments to the extraordinary bureaucracy and red tape that throttles every Government move here. When loading finally began the Russian crewmen requested destinations. The officials, who by this time outnumbered the loaders by two to one, were uncertain. Then the Russians sought cargo weights, but none had been taken. The officials did their sums and decided that the total cargo to be lifted was eight and a half tons. Later I made a boat trip to three flooded villages where families were living on rafts made of matted water hyacinth secured to the roofs of their waterlogged mud and thatched dwellings. Fishing families huddled in open boats which also floated beside their

inundated homes. Not one of the families had been visited by relief teams, nor had they received aid in any form."

In this time of national crisis Rahman should have taken up a united program to deal with such a calamity. Instead, he has played politics with flood. He is using his police force to obstruct the relief work carried out by the opposition parties. The message is clear. He and his henchmen want to divide among themselves all the aid that might flow into the country!

A Dying Economy

Long before the recent flood, the economy of the country had reached a point of collapse. Foreign reserves had dried up. Consequently, the import of essential commodities is being held up, and foreign importers are refusing to entertain Bangladesh letters of credit. The 1973-74 deficit in foreign trade has amounted to 44.5 million takas (*Deshbangla*, August 8, 1974). By the end of last June the foreign reserves of Bangladesh reached almost a zero level. Bangladesh sought a major loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to a report published in the *London Observer*, the IMF had granted only £16 million, whereas Bangladesh needed a sum of £300 million for the import of essential materials for the second half of the current year.

Now the flood has come, and this has put additional pressure on the already dying economy of Bangladesh. During the last two to three months Mujib has been sending his emissaries to various world capitals to procure some help. The foreign minister approached oil-rich countries like Iran, Bahrain, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi. The finance minister was sent to Washington. Two members of the Bangladesh planning commission were sent to Hungary, West Germany, Jordan, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Britain. A minister who is known to be very much Islamic-minded was sent to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iraq. The industries minister was sent to Moscow. Even before his departure, the Kremlin bureaucrats made it known that they had no intention of lifting Bangladesh out of the present crisis by offering aid in the form of hard currencies. It is believed that the Soviet aid would be based on a bar-

ter system to be repaid by industrial goods from an industry set up with the Soviet aid.

The economic situation is so bad that the Bangladesh planning commission has given up the idea of carrying out the country's first five-year plan. Instead there will be a developmental program on a year to year basis. Even the Rahman administration finds it extremely hard to service the foreign debts. On September 1, 1973, Mr. Hamidullah, governor of the Bangladesh Bank, pointed out that three factors had contributed to the collapse of the Bangladesh economy: the flight of capital, heavy smuggling to India, and production failure in mills and factories.

But who is paying for the economic collapse? The hardship of the toiling masses is indescribable. How are the people maintaining their lives when the per capita income is less than \$200 a year and when rice is being sold at 50 cents a pound and an ordinary men's shirt costs at least \$20 to \$25? Death by starvation is very frequent. During the period of Rahman's rule, prices have increased at least 500 to 600 percent. The toiling masses have been bled white. In the last four months alone, the price of rice has at least doubled. The price of cloth has gone up at least tenfold since the liberation of Bangladesh. The inefficiency of the Rahman administration is such that due simply to the lack of a signature from the Planning Commission a large project for cotton cultivation could not be put into effect. (*Dainik Bangla*, Dacca, July 4, 1974).

Corruption, blackmarketeering, hoarding, bribery, and all other anti-social activities are going unchecked these days. A section of the ruling Awami League has accumulated considerable wealth. It is popularly believed in Bangladesh that Rahman himself has accumulated enough wealth to become one of the ten richest persons in the country. Who comprises the new rich class of Bangladesh? Just to give one example, Rahman's own nephew, Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni (popularly known as Sheikh Moni), has become one of the richest men of the country. He has been openly criticized even by many Awami League members and is well known for his corrupt practices. His maternal uncle undoubtedly offers full

protection and immunity. Last year even Rahman's son was caught red-handed in antisocial activities.

Economics of Smuggling

The grim food crisis that prevailed in Bangladesh even before the recent flood was absolutely man-made. According to the official government estimate, the shortage was on the order of 1.8 million tons (*Holiday*, April 7, 1974). On the other hand, in 1973 the country registered a bumper crop. According to an estimate by a Commonwealth organization, Bangladesh produced 12.5 million tons of rice, which should have been sufficient for a population of seventy-five million. Why then should there be any scarcity of rice? The answer is simple. Rice is being smuggled across the border to India, where there is a chronic shortage of rice and other agricultural products.

The item most affected by smuggling is jute, which used to make up 85 percent of Bangladesh's foreign exchange earnings. Today the jute industry is facing a virtual collapse. Before 1971, India was deficit in raw jute to an extent of 500,000 bales a year. The Indian jute industry was steadily declining. In 1964-65 Indian jute production was 1,222,600 tons; by 1969-70 it had dropped to 953,000 tons (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 21, 1974). During the same period, Indian jute exports dropped from 843,600 tons to 466,700 tons. One can compare the decline of the Indian jute industry with the growth of the jute industry of what was then East Pakistan. In 1947, the jute industry in East Pakistan was almost nonexistent. By 1971, however, seventy-seven jute mills had been established. In 1964-65, the jute mills of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) produced 280,112 tons; by 1969-70 the figure had risen to 587,500 tons. During the same period exports rose from 218,629 tons to 496,300 tons.

In recent years, however, the picture has changed dramatically. It was recently disclosed in an Indian daily that India had accumulated one million bales of jute through smuggling and had set a goal of 500,000 bales of raw jute as an export target. (*The Hindustan Standard*, March 16, 1974). Since jute was procured from Bangladesh by the Indian jute industrialists through smuggling, the sixty-

two jute mills in West Bengal, India, are not only working at full capacity, but even on double shifts. On the other hand, the seventy-seven jute mills in Bangladesh are facing an acute crisis in production; many of them will be closed soon because of shortages of raw jute and imported material such as lubricants, spare parts, etc. The closure of jute mills would definitely throw thousands of workers out of work. At the same time, the foreign exchange earnings of the Bangladesh government through jute and jute products has dropped sharply—from 3.5 thousand million takas in 1969-70 to 2.6 thousand million takas in 1973-74.

The economics behind the smuggling are very simple. Officially, one Indian rupee is equivalent to one Bangladesh taka. But according to the unofficial exchange rate, one Indian rupee commands at least two Bangladesh takas. The price of one maund (82 pounds) of jute is 60 takas in Bangladesh, and the price is the same in India. By smuggling one maund of jute, a smuggler gets 60 Indian rupees, which can be converted into 120 Bangladesh takas. The 120 takas can be brought back to Bangladesh or a piece of cloth for 120 takas can be brought back and sold in Bangladesh for 150 takas. Because of this very simple economics not only jute but also rice, vegetables, and milk are smuggled out of Bangladesh, giving rise to a man-made food crisis.

Opposition Meets Repression

Since independence Rahman has promised on several occasions to use the armed forces to "stamp out corruption, hoarding, smuggling, and other antisocial activities." All these promises have turned out to be absolutely hollow. The reason is that very few persons in Bangladesh except the members of the ruling Awami League have access to licenses and permits to carry out both external and internal trade. The members of the Awami League have virtually monopolized all gainful offices, business, commerce, and industries. This meant that Mujib would have to use armed force against his own party men. Instead, he has used the army to suppress the opposition.

On February 5, 1974, the government issued a special powers act according to which the regime is entitled

to resort to measures such as preventive detention without trial, censorship of newspapers, proscription of objectionable publications, and prohibition of objectionable associations and organizations. Rahman has made full use of this "special powers act" to gag the voice of the people. It is worthwhile to recollect what he had pledged in the past. On October 28, 1970, in a broadcast to the people of Pakistan he said, "A real living democracy must be established, in which all the fundamental freedom shall be constitutionally guaranteed. Our manifesto outlines a framework for the healthy growth of political parties, trade unions, and local self-government. We do pledge to restore complete freedom of the press and academic freedom and to eradicate corruption which has grown like cancer in our society." (*Dawn*, Karachi, October 29, 1970). Events of the past few years have clearly demonstrated how empty Rahman's promises were.

Since the liberation of Bangladesh several leftist papers have been forcibly closed down. Freedom of the press has been greatly curtailed. The editor of the most popular daily of Bangladesh, *Ganakantha* (People's Voice), a newspaper of the opposition Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD—National Socialist party), has been put under arrest under the special powers act. Most of the daily newspapers are government controlled, as during Pakistani rule they belonged to the Pakistani government, people from what was then West Pakistan, or pro-Pakistani Bengalis.

Rahman has found a unique way of curtailing freedom of the press. The government has started to ration newsprint to the newspapers whose policies are not in conformity with those of the government. While most of the dailies are government-run, there are many weeklies that are opposed to the Rahman regime. In 1973-74 all the weekly newspapers were allocated 200 tons of newsprint. This quota has now been slashed to only fifteen tons. This has forced several weeklies to reduce their circulations. And the price of newsprint has gone up by 250 percent during the last eight months, dealing a heavy blow to the survival of the small newspapers.

On February 15, 1971, at the Bengali Academy in Dacca Sheikh Mujib declared: "We firmly believe in a so-

cialist economy and a society free from exploitation. We will not stay in power unless we can translate the hopes of the people that have been reposed in us. . ." (*The Pakistan Observer*, Dacca, February 16, 1971). A few days later he again repeated his promise: "Without a socialist pattern of economy, 70 million people cannot live in an area of 55,000 square miles." (*Dawn*, Karachi, March 1, 1971.)

Such were the promises of Sheikh Mujib before the people.

After the liberation of Bangladesh, banks, insurance companies, and big industries were nationalized and the government put a ceiling on investment in private sectors. The Awami League had no other alternative but to resort to such measures, since the Bengali bourgeoisie was very weak and was not at all capable of starting its activities by itself. It is worth noting that no foreign capital was affected by the Awami League nationalization program. On July 4, 1974, the national economic council of Bangladesh decided to lift restrictions on private investment, raising the upper limit from 2.5 million takas to 30 million takas. Restrictions on foreign investments have also been lifted, making Bangladesh suitable for direct neocolonial exploitation.

During its two years of outright monopoly in corruption, the Awami League has been able to create a new rich class (although not a very strong one) whose members have acquired their property primarily through illegal means. By lifting the ceiling on private investments, the government has made provisions for this sector to invest its capital accumulated from the black market.

From the very beginning Rahman's nationalization program was a big hoax. Badruddin Umar, a Bangladesh political scientist, put it in this way: "In Bangladesh there was nothing revolutionary in the various measures that the government has been following in respect to industry, agriculture, commerce, and every other sphere of national life. Their nationalization was not at all an attack on capital; it was not at all meant to be an attack on capital. It was a mechanism and an arrangement for the smooth transference of private property from some hands to other

hands, from the hands of those not in the Awami League to those of the Awami League or closely connected with them. That is the reason why no one really took any interest in promoting the nationalized industries and other concerns. On the other hand, they all saw to it that the nationalized industries were used in var-

ious ways for the accumulation of property in private hands; production in the nationalized sector did not pick up, and through a gross mismanagement of such industries the entire idea of nationalization, and with it of socialism, are totally discredited in the eyes of the people." (*Holiday*, July 7, 1974.) □

Juan Mari Bras Scores U.S. Aims

UN Hears Testimony on Puerto Rico



JUAN MARI BRAS

The United States is deliberately seeking to cut down the size of the native Puerto Rican population, Juan Mari Bras, the secretary-general of the Puerto Rican Socialist party (PSP), charged October 30.

Testifying before the United Nations special committee on colonialism, the Puerto Rican leader said that under a Washington-sponsored program, 200,000 Puerto Rican women—35% of those of child-bearing age—had been sterilized.

He said that Washington's plans also included inducing one million more Puerto Ricans to emigrate to the mainland in the next ten years. Two million, he said, had already moved to the United States, "expelled from the territory by deplorable

conditions of the colonial system."

Mari Bras's figures on sterilization were confirmed by Dr. Antonio Silva, assistant secretary of health for Family Planning in Puerto Rico, in an interview with the *New York Times*. Speaking as an official of the colonial regime, he claimed that the sterilization program was completely voluntary.

Mari Bras reported that the PSP, which urged abstention in the 1972 elections, had gathered 72,000 signatures of former voters to meet requirements to get on the 1976 ballot. He said that the 94,570 votes for Senator Ruben Berrios, the leader of the Puerto Rican Independence party (PIP), represented almost 10% of that year's vote.

The colonial "commonwealth" government, Mari Bras charged, advertised "without shame" that such industries as textiles achieved 6% profits on the island compared with 2.5% on the mainland; metals, 18.9% as against 3.9%; electrical machinery, 31.6% as against 3.9%—thanks largely to lower wages.

Senator Berrios, in testimony before the UN on November 1, said Washington was preparing to spend \$500 million a year—equivalent to 8% of Puerto Rico's gross national product—on welfare payments as a "demagogic means to win approval of the poor" and to undermine pressure for higher wages.

Berrios denounced the growing repression against supporters of Puerto Rican independence. He said that police forces have been increased from 2,895 in 1968 to 7,778 last year, with plans to add 2,000 more; 135 attacks on independence sympathizers occurred from August to December 1973; and eleven bombings, which he attributed to "right-wing groups operating under police protection," have taken place since August 1973.

Both the PSP and PIP leaders urged the UN committee to send a mission to Puerto Rico next year to seek an end to government plans for massive sterilization and migration. □

Wilson Pushes 'Austerity' for British Workers

By Tony Hodges

London

"There can be no opting out. That is what the social contract is about, and it is going to be more vitally necessary than ever in these months and years ahead that that contract be honoured, in the spirit and the letter."

That was Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson's warning to the unions in a nationwide television broadcast October 14, just four days after Labour's narrow victory in the British general election.

The social contract is a deal between the Labour government and the trade-union bureaucracy designed to convince workers to hold down their wages "voluntarily." It has been Wilson's remedy for the ailing condition of British capitalism since the miners defeated the Tories' statutory wage controls and strategy of head-on confrontation with the unions last February.

"... we have all agreed," Wilson told his audience, "that we cannot look forward over the next two years or more to any general increase in living standards." Why? Because "Britain is facing the gravest crisis since the war."

Wilson stated that "our central problem in conquering this crisis is inflation; higher costs, higher prices, hitting the living standards of every household and endangering our competitive position abroad." In Wilson's opinion, "fighting inflation is a matter of national survival."

He went on: "This world-wide crisis of inflation is the most formidable challenge we have ever had to meet—apart from the challenge of survival in wartime."

Wilson then laid out anew his well-tried "solution" to the crisis, the class collaborationism of the social contract: "We believe that our problems can be solved only by a partnership between Government and the whole of our national family, a partnership in which all of us should be partners, and all must play their part."

But it was evident that some members of the "national family" would be called upon to sacrifice a little more than the others. While warning the



WILSON: Promises British capitalists a boost in profits.

unions to stick by the social contract and not step out of line, Wilson reaffirmed his commitment to "a vigorous, alert, responsible, and profitable private sector." Wilson promised that the "Government is giving the most urgent attention to the problems of cash for industry and commerce. . . ."

Ronald Butt, writing in the *London Times* on October 17, said that "Mr Wilson's broadcast contained sterner and more explicit warnings to the unions than he has ventured at any time since they engaged the Conservatives in conflict." Congratulating Wilson for his bold challenge to the unions, Butt said that Britain needed "his courage to take a stand on firm and if necessary unpopular policies straight away."

Strong support for Wilson's stand came from Jack Jones, head of the Transport and General Workers Union, Britain's biggest union. Speaking at a conference of his union in Scotland on October 17, Jones, who has been dubbed "the architect of the social contract" for his consistent backing of Wilson's wage restraint plans, warned union members:

"It is simply no use pressing actions

which lead to the closure of the firms we work for. A wonderful wage agreement is of no value if the firm with whom we have negotiated doesn't employ people any more." In Jones's view, wage increases would lead to mass unemployment, and there was simply nothing that the labour movement could do about it.

Jones went on to urge workers to freeze their own wages voluntarily to avoid putting the Labour government in the embarrassing position of having to freeze wages by law. "Difficult times lie ahead," he cautioned, "and some austerity measures may have to be attempted. It will call for understanding by trade unionists so that Labour can fulfil its pledge of no wage freeze, no statutory controls over wages and resistance to unemployment."

The workability of the social contract—and the voluntary incomes policy at its heart—is now open to considerable doubt in view of the escalating inflationary threat to the standard of living of the mass of workers. Retail prices rose 1.1% in September, according to figures published October 18, one day after Jones's speech. The annual rate of inflation is now more than 17%. Wholesale prices, it was reported October 15, rose 1.5% in September and are now rising at an annual rate of around 20%.

Food prices, though, are rocketing up. A survey published by the National Federation of Consumer Groups on October 17 reported that "inflation is stampeding at the rate of 34 per cent on the staple groceries which we eat a lot of. That's the gloomy picture from our mid-September and mid-June surveys. Leading the stampede were bacon, eggs, canned fruit, evaporated milk, biscuits and pastries, not to mention sugar."

Workers are beginning to fight back to defend their interests despite the pleas of the union leaders to honour the social contract. The centre of the struggle is in Scotland, which has been swept by strikes since the elec-

tion. The October 19 *Economist* reported that "the worst" of Scotland's strikes "is a lorry drivers' strike which has stopped 40 per cent of all local road transport for the past two weeks." The magazine lamented: "Industry would usually expect to get round such a strike by hiring non-union lorry drivers, but the strikers are tightening the noose with flying pickets. Plants of all types are being picketed: computers, electronics, food manufacturing, container depots and steelworks. The strike is now two weeks old, and stocks are running dangerously low. Shortages are appearing everywhere, and several small companies are on the brink of going bust.

"In Glasgow sewage workers and dustmen have walked out over their own pay claim, and there are now 10,000 tons of rubbish rotting on the streets. They have been followed by teachers, who have begun sporadic strikes and are threatening more. Glasgow trains were in chaos last Friday after a one-hour manning dispute by drivers. Ship movements on the Clyde have been halted by a row in which 150 tugboatmen have been suspended. On Tuesday, workers at the city's slaughterhouse walked out, halting all meat supplies."

On October 20, Glasgow busmen and underground train crews joined the strike wave, halting the city's public transport system. Six thousand workers are on strike at Scotland's three Rolls-Royce factories; more than 4,000 workers are out at Vickers shipyard, Barrow-in-Furness; and 4,600 are on strike at the Hoover factory in Cambuslang. About 7,500 workers are disrupting whiskey production at Haig's in Fife.

Scottish workers have shown little interest in the class-peace appeals of James Jack, general secretary of the Scottish Trades Union Congress. On October 16 he issued a statement complaining that "the spate of unofficial strikes in the face of the Government's industrial and social achievements over the past eight months can only impose a painful and grossly unfair handicap upon the new Government by withholding resources they desperately need to fulfil their election commitments."

While the government has called on workers to sacrifice to bail British capitalism out of its growing economic difficulties, Wilson and Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey have

gone out of their way since the election to assure British businesses that measures will soon be taken to boost their profits. Three measures are in the cards and seem likely to be announced November 12 by Healey in his autumn budget. They are the following:

- The lifting of many of the price rise restrictions in the Price Code in order to allow companies to boost their profits by raising prices even further.

- Tax concessions for companies, in particular an easing of the corporation tax.

- The creation of a new investment bank to alleviate industry's growing cash crisis.

These steps follow promises made by Healey some weeks ago. On Oc-

tober 4 he said that "some action will be required (that is, in November) to improve both liquidity and profitability in the business sector." Signs of cash handouts, eased tax payments, and the lifting of some price rise restrictions have been eagerly welcomed by the leaders of big business. After meeting Wilson on October 15, Ralph Bateman, president of the Confederation of British Industry, said he thought that the Labour government now understood industry's problems.

The consequences of these procapitalist measures can only be further price rises. The only solution for working people is to force the Labour leaders to break with the social contract and wage restraint and fight for automatic wage increases to offset price rises. □

As Part of International Capitalist Economy

For Belgium, Too, No Escape From Recession

By Ernest Mandel

[The following article appeared in the October 4 issue of *La Gauche*, the weekly publication of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs (Revolutionary Workers League), the Belgian section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

At first sight, the situation seems paradoxical: everyone is calling it a serious crisis, and yet industrial production continues to grow in Belgium. While unemployment is increasing slightly, it still fluctuates around 100,000, which hardly signifies a recession in this country.

An even more obvious paradox is that while the Belgian economy is more integrated into the international capitalist market than the economy of any other imperialist country (that is, it is more dependent on exports), it seems to have avoided for the time being the general recession that has clearly begun in the international capitalist economy.

Yet if we take a closer look, the economic situation in Belgium is less paradoxical than appears at first

glance.

While the Belgian economy is very highly integrated into the international capitalist economy, its relations with the "Big Three"—the United States, Japan, and the Federal German Republic—are very unevenly developed. Belgium's exports to the United States and Japan account for only a small part of the country's industrial production, but its exports to West Germany play a significant and growing role in the national economy.

The situation becomes clearer if, in addition, we note that the economic integration of the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, the Netherlands, the Federal German Republic, and France is growing tighter, and that the latter three countries buy almost two-thirds of Belgian exports. In effect, of the "Big Three" in the international imperialist economy, West Germany is today the least affected by the international recession. And France is much less affected than Great Britain or Italy.

It must be added that until 1973, Belgium's inflation rate was one of the lowest in the imperialist world, which helped to stimulate the coun-

try's exports. Moreover, the Belgian economy, which has long played a "marginal" role in the world imperialist economy, retained reserves of productive capacity that scarcely existed beyond the Rhine or the French frontier. Hence the spectacular growth of Belgian exports in the first half of 1974, reaching the level of 100,000 million francs in exports per month [100 Belgian francs equal US\$2.60] in May 1974.

Since then, however, inflation has exploded in Belgium. Its rate is quite obviously higher than in West Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden. The growth in exports is therefore going to slow down, and even stop altogether. The recession will develop in Belgium, too, although with a certain delay compared with other imperialist countries.

According to a memorandum published by the Central Economic Council in mid-September, demand is already sagging in manufacturing, where several sectors have experienced a simultaneous decline in production and advance orders.

The sectors most affected include:

- *Automobiles*, where, despite an improvement in the market situation during the spring and early summer, production remains below last year's level. There have been layoffs at General Motors in Antwerp, a temporary suspension of production of the Taunus model at the Genk Ford factory, and so on.

- *Construction*, especially in the public housing sector. Public housing starts were 34 percent lower in the first half of 1974 than in the same period last year.

- *Clothing*, and consequently textiles. Several companies are in trouble in the Ghent region, and while the production of fabrics (especially cotton goods) remains less affected, it will soon suffer the repercussions of the slowdown in the clothing sector.

More generally, the volume of purchases by consumers in Belgium seems to be in sharp decline, after the surge of buying sparked by fears of shortages at the beginning of the year. In June 1974 the turnover of the big "downtown" stores was only 1.5 percent higher than in June 1973, which, considering that prices have increased by almost 10 percent during that time, represents a serious fall in sales volume.

We can therefore say that Belgium

is on the brink of a recession, or has already gone over the brink.

The unemployment statistics confirm this: The number of workers listed as unemployed—which is lower than the real number since the passage of the infamous Van Acker law, which excludes some categories of married women from receiving unemployment benefits—rose to 96,645 fully unemployed in August 1974, an increase of 11,360, or 13 percent, compared with August 1973. To which must be added the figure for partially unemployed, which has risen to 14,000.

It may have been noted that recently, commentators from a wide variety of professions—university professors, factory managers, bankers, bourgeois politicians, and even Citizen Genot, at the Congress of the Walloon regional sections of the FGTB [Fédération Générale des Travailleurs de Belgique—Belgian General Federation of Workers]—have described the economic outlook in extremely gloomy terms. One could even say they were scaremongering. To hear them, we are on the eve of an economic crisis as serious, if not more serious, than the crash of 1929.

It is true that share prices on the Stock Exchanges at London, New York, and several other important world capitalist centers have declined during the past year more than they did after the famous "Black Friday" of October 1929. But that simply means one thing: that the capitalists have become very pessimistic as to the immediate future of their economy. There is a big difference between that and concluding that industrial production and employment are going to tumble at the same rate as stocks.

The truth is that as long as capitalist governments do not all simultaneously practice a harsh deflationary policy that "smashes" inflation at the cost of massive unemployment; and as long as inflation doesn't reach the runaway point (that is, the point at which no one holds on to money, everyone stocks up on commodities, and prices are no longer declining in any sector), the recession will not become a "new 1929."

The fact that inflation is not yet raging out of control is shown clearly by the sharp fall in share prices on the Stock Exchange, the decline in land values in Great Britain, and the steep fall in the prices of many materials in the last few months.

The imperialist governments are unable to carry out harsh deflationary policies because of the relationship of forces between business and labor in most Western countries. This relationship of forces is radically different from what it was in 1929, not to speak of 1932.

Any rapid rise in unemployment will be sure to provoke sharp reactions from the workers: occupations of factories to prevent closures; rejection of unemployment; radical strikes and violent, politically radicalized movements. In view of the present world situation, the bourgeoisie cannot allow itself the luxury of fifteen million unemployed in the United States, three million unemployed in Great Britain, five million unemployed in West Germany, or a half million unemployed in Belgium. Those are the figures comparable to a "new 1929." They would finish off the capitalist system.

Thus, our prognosis is the following: there will be a generalized recession, more serious than anything we have seen since the second world war (no doubt with a total of between thirteen and fifteen million unemployed in all the imperialist countries), but with unemployment considerably below the number left jobless by the 1929 crisis.

As soon as the recession reaches a certain level, there will be an effort to reflate the economy again by increasing inflation.

Only a serious political defeat of the working class in the key countries of the imperialist world could provide the bourgeoisie with the political and social resources to apply the "horse medicine" that is necessary to cure inflation, and that it is unable to apply today.

The present carefully staged scaremongering is intended above all to raise a hue and cry against the unions and the workers, to create a climate that favors "national union for equal sacrifices"—that is, to confront the workers with a choice between voluntarily abandoning the defense of their buying power or facing the threat of massive unemployment. □

60 in U. S. Opposed to CIA Job in Chile

A Harris poll of 1,544 adults conducted in the United States in late September found that 60 percent of the population was opposed to the U. S. intervention in Chile that led to the overthrow of the Allende government.

Wilson's 21-Gun Salute to South African Racists

By Tony Hodges

London

The imperialist powers, threatened by the turn of events in Mozambique and Angola, are redoubling their efforts to safeguard imperialist interests in South Africa.

On October 14, eleven British warships sailed into Cape Town for a series of joint naval exercises with the South African navy. Patrick Keatley, diplomatic correspondent of the London *Guardian*, reported October 16 that "the British flotilla sailed in handsome formation into the magnificent harbour at Cape Town on Monday [October 14], firing a 21-gun salute which echoed and re-echoed across the city, thanks to the great rock wall of Table Mountain. The dramatic salute seems to have put the seal on the atmosphere of goodwill and cooperation which South Africa claims for the exercise."

The London *Times* noted on October 15 that "the visit comes only six weeks after the last series of joint exercises, which upset several Labour Party left-wingers; that it did not upset more was thought to be due to the impending election, and a desire not to split the Government's ranks at such a time."

Several South African ships were slated to participate in the exercises along with South African Buccaneer jets, delivered to South Africa by a British Labour government—shortly after Wilson's first election victory in 1964.

Protest from the "left-wing" Labour members of Parliament has been little more than token. On the other hand, the Tories have been full of praise for the government's willingness to collaborate openly with the South African racists. John Biggs-Davison, a Tory MP and chairman of the extreme-right Monday Club, congratulated the government for its action and called for its extension by ending Britain's current ban on arms sales to South Africa.

Michael Knipe, writing from Cape Town in the October 22 London

Times, commented that the joint naval exercises are "regarded by the South African Government and its supporters as a breakthrough in demonstrating the importance of the Republic's ties with the Western powers. They are seen as a tactical victory over the elements campaigning to increase the international boycott of South Africa."

A French naval force left Brest October 21 for the Cape. Indeed, the French government has never hidden its willingness to collaborate on the military level with South Africa, having never agreed to respect the international arms boycott passed by the United Nations in 1963.

The August 20 issue of the Swedish daily *Dagens Nyheter* gave a rundown of the military hardware supplied by France. The paper reported that France has sold South Africa helicopters, jets, and submarines. French Mirage aircraft will actually be produced in South Africa under license from 1976 at the Atlas factory near Pretoria. Forty-eight Mirage F-1 jet fighter planes are to be built at the plant. *Dagens Nyheter* also reported that Italy has supplied South Africa with a license to manufacture Impala jets at the Atlas plant.

A revealing account of Washington's support for the South African regime, based on a secret White House document, appeared in the October issue of the U.S. magazine *Esquire*. (See *Intercontinental Press*, October 28, p. 1391.)

In the article, Tad Szulc outlined the guiding principles of State Department policy for southern Africa, the strategy known as operation "Tar Baby" in the White House: "political stability and concurrent containment of Communist influences in Africa's southern cone; continued use of air and naval facilities in South Africa and the Portuguese colonies in support of United States naval presence in the Indian Ocean and other activities; easy access to South Africa's raw materials, notably uranium; and concern

with orderly trading in her gold."

Szulc could have given greater stress to Washington's primary concern: the defence of the superprofits reaped from the West's giant economic holdings in South Africa. By 1970, Sterling Area investments there totaled £1,983 million [£1 equals about US\$2.30], 58 percent of all foreign investments in the country. In 1971, more than 500 British companies and 300 U.S. companies had subsidiaries or associates there.

From 1965 to 1970 South Africa received a net total of £982 million in investments from the West. The average annual net inflow rose from £93 million in 1965-67 to £235 million in 1968-70, to £328 million in 1970. In 1971 it rose still further to £447 million.

British and United States investment has been flooding into South Africa. It is attracted by the large supply of cheap, apartheid-controlled labour and the consequently high profits to be made there. London, for example, earned more from its direct investments in South Africa between 1965 and 1968 than from any other overseas area—and invested more there than anywhere else, with the exception of Australia.

South Africa is also the key to imperialist domination of Africa as a whole. It is the only advanced industrial capitalist country on the continent, producing within its borders 30 percent of the continent's income and 43 percent of its mineral wealth. South Africa today produces twice as much electricity and six times as much steel as the rest of Africa combined.

The advances of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies in their drive to expel the colonialists from their countries are inspiring the oppressed Black masses of South Africa to step up their fight for liberation. The international significance of this development has not slipped the attention of such watchdogs as Harold Wilson. Hence the 21-gun salute by way of a warning growl. □

Millions in India Threatened by Famine

By Ernest Harsch

"People are dying in the countryside, dying for lack of food, dying in their hundreds. Many who are not yet dead will be, in the course of the next few days or the next few weeks. . . . They scrounge around, and eat whatever they can lay their hands on: grass, leaves, roots, stems, shrubbery. . . . There is no dignity in the manner people are collapsing in the villages, on railway platforms, on the way to towns, in the towns. They do not stand upon dignity, they merely want to live. But, it is an unequal battle, they die."

This account, which appeared in the September 21 *Bombay Economic and Political Weekly*, is only one of many. The first stage of what may become one of the worst famines in India's history has already begun. More than a quarter of the country's population of 585 million faces the prospect of slow death by starvation.

Severe malnutrition has lowered resistance to the ravages of smallpox, dysentery, cholera, and tuberculosis, as well as becoming a major cause of blindness in children.

A foreign relief worker in Calcutta told *New York Times* correspondent Bernard Weinraub, "You see some children eating grass, rats, the green scum off tanks." Entire families are reported to have committed suicide rather than starve to death.

In some instances, desperate parents have sold their children to secure money for food or have thrown them into rivers to drown. In a September 23 dispatch, Weinraub quoted a father of six who was begging in Siliguri, West Bengal: "My only hope is that death will strike fast."

Despite New Delhi's efforts to play down the severity of the famine, initial reports from some parts of the country indicate that hundreds have already succumbed and that millions more are in immediate danger of death.

● West Bengal Relief Minister Santosh Roy has estimated that fifteen million inhabitants of rural areas in the state are either starving or living

on only one meal a day. An article in the September 21 *Economic and Political Weekly* stated that people are dying of starvation in at least 5,000 villages in all fifteen West Bengal districts.

● In Assam, the general secretary of the People's Democratic party, Dulal Chandra Baruah, reported August 30 that 487 persons had starved to death there and that the "near-famine conditions" could wipe out a large part of the state's population unless New Delhi provides massive aid.

● Orissa Chief Minister Nandini Satpathy reported in September that food shortages there could "push millions to starvation, epidemics and death."

● The September 21 *Calcutta Statesman Weekly* reported that about one million persons were "on the verge of starvation" in one district of Bihar alone.

Hunger in the countryside has forced hundreds of thousands of peasants to flee to the larger towns and cities in search of food and jobs, further swelling the already enormous populations of unemployed and homeless in the urban areas.

The severity of India's present food crisis is only partially because of natural causes. Drought in some areas and floods in others have destroyed a significant portion of India's rice and wheat crops. (The 1974-75 kharif [autumn] crop is expected to be only about sixty million tons, seven million below that of last year and nine million less than the 1974-75 projections.)

Drought and floods, however, are nothing new in India. In 1965 and 1966 New Delhi averted famine with the help of foreign food aid. For the past two years, the Gandhi regime has postponed mass starvation by using up its grain reserves and by buying some food on the international market.

However, owing to rampant government corruption, widespread profiteering, lack of economic planning,

and indifference of the imperialist centers, the effectiveness of such stopgap measures has been reduced and the ever-present threat of famine is now becoming a frightening reality.

Because of the limitations imposed by the capitalist (and in some cases semifeudal) agrarian relations and the irrational and wasteful needs of the domestic and international markets, agricultural production in India continues to stagnate.

This stagnation has been exacerbated by the skyrocketing price of fertilizer, which more than doubled in the past year. The cutbacks in fertilizer production in the United States, as well as the higher costs of oil,¹ drove fertilizer prices beyond the reach of many Indian farmers.

The February 1974 issue of the U. S. business magazine *Fortune* pointed out that the present "fertilizer squeeze" was caused by the closing down of many fertilizer plants. During the 1960s, fertilizer prices dropped through "overproduction," and the present cutbacks were designed to drive prices and profits back up. In addition, Washington has placed restrictions on the export of fertilizer.

The use of one million tons of fertilizer in India can increase food grain production by 9 to 10 million tons. Its extensive use in Punjab, one of India's most important agricultural states, more than doubled food output there from 3.4 million tons in the 1965-66 season to 7.3 million tons in 1970-71.

With the rise in prices, however, farmers have been forced to cut back on fertilizer use. One farmer in western Uttar Pradesh, another key food producing area, described how the drought ruined this year's wheat crop. "I think the next wheat crop is going to be still worse," he told a *New York Times* reporter. "Even if we have rains we will not be able to afford fertilizer."

1. Natural gas and petroleum fractions, such as naphtha, are key ingredients of many fertilizers.

The current shortage of fertilizer in India is estimated at nearly one million tons, out of a previous supply of more than three million.

Even when food is available, its price has soared far beyond the means of millions of Indians. According to the September 20 *Washington Post*, food costs have gone up 37 percent since the beginning of the year. A September 3 *New York Times* dispatch from Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, reported that rice prices had doubled on the market in the previous two weeks. The September 21 *Economic and Political Weekly* reported that even in such "surplus districts" of West Bengal as Birbhum, a kilo of rice cost three rupees (one rupee equals about US\$0.12), while a daily worker, who on the average has four others to feed, rarely earns more than two rupees a day.

The Gandhi regime has used massive rationing to counter high food prices and fluctuations in supply. Between 80 and 100 million persons rely on this rationing system, in which the government buys rice and wheat from farmers and traders, selling the grain to impoverished sections of the population at less than the open-market price. In the greater Calcutta area alone, there are 8.5 million ration-card holders.

In 1973, New Delhi imposed state control on the wholesale wheat trade, requiring farmers to sell their wheat directly to the government at set prices. Last year, the Gandhi regime distributed 11.5 million tons of grain through the ration shops; projections for 1974 went up to twelve million tons. But, according to a September 23 dispatch by Weinraub, New Delhi had bought less than five million tons so far this year.

This decline in state grain purchases was reflected in the size of rations distributed. In 1972, before state control was imposed, an adult in Calcutta received almost eight pounds of grain a week. In 1973, the ration was cut to between 4.6 and 4.8 pounds, and in 1974 to 4.4 pounds.

The state efforts to control the wheat trade failed. Since the government prices were too low to satisfy the large farmers, they withheld their grain from procurement, either hoarding it or selling it at a higher price to private traders, who in turn sold the grain on the black market at exorbitant rates. Under such widespread



The Motherland/New Delhi

resistance from the farmers and traders, New Delhi retreated by scrapping its monopoly of the wholesale wheat trade in March and allowing the private traders back onto the market.

In an effort to appease the demands of the farmers and traders for higher prices and to lure their grain into the government granaries, New Delhi raised the price it paid for wheat from 76 rupees to 105 rupees per quintal (about 220 pounds). The price for a quintal of wheat in the ration shops consequently jumped from 90 rupees to 125 rupees. In addition, the government demanded that the traders continue to sell 50 percent of their wheat to the government.

But the higher prices of the open market were still more attractive to the farmers and traders. Rather than sell 50 percent to the state, they continued diverting large amounts of grain. Writing in the July 1 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, correspondent Jayanta Sarkar reported: "In the main wheat-growing estates of Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, many traders have entered into forward deals with growers, leaving the stocks on the farms or at undisclosed locations. The result is that stocks available at the grain markets have been thin, a scarcity has developed, and open market prices have soared."

The state governments, most of which are controlled by the Congress party, have in practice ignored the central government decrees on grain

procurement. As Bernard Weinraub reported in the August 13 *New York Times*, "State governments have failed to press wealthy farmers and traders to sell to the central pool, largely because they dominate the rural scene and contribute heavily to the governing Congress party."

Under public pressure, the Gandhi regime has made a few token arrests of prominent smugglers, who often finance the hoarding of grain and other essential commodities and transport them on the black market. But any effective campaign launched by the Congress party against the traders, food speculators, and wealthy farmers would be impossible, since the party represents the interests of this class and has no intention of seriously cutting into their profits.

Another government effort that has failed to meet the needs of India's starving millions has been the hastily set-up relief program in West Bengal. The state government announced that the relief centers would feed 600,000 out of the fifteen million Bengalis either starving or living on one meal a day. But so far, officials admit, only 50,000 have been fed through the state kitchens.

The September 21 *Statesman Weekly* reported, "While each kitchen or canteen is visited by about 2,500 starving people daily, it does not have the capacity to serve more than 600 meals. With the result a large number of people have to be turned away."

With the depletion of its grain reserves,² India may need up to eleven million tons of imports in the next six to eight months. Yet the tight international food market and the higher costs for rice and wheat put such imports far beyond New Delhi's reach.

According to the September 21 *Economic and Political Weekly*, the Gandhi regime has contracted 1.9 million tons on the international market and will receive an additional 1.7 million tons from the unused portion of a 1973 Soviet grain loan. New Delhi claimed that a further two million tons of imports would be required to operate the rationing system. The *Economic and Political Weekly*, however, stated that an additional five million tons were needed, and that "there is not enough foreign exchange with the government to arrange imports of this order on commercial terms."

Indian officials are reported to have made private requests for U.S. food aid. But Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz stated, "Our ability to deliver is limited this year." Commenting on Butz's remark, the September 8 *New York Times* said, "America's former stockpile of grains had been deliberately diminished by the Nixon Administration to boost farm prices. The view expressed by Mr. Butz is that grain reserves should be held in private hands."

Of course, with the U.S. food monopolists retaining almost total control of all grain reserves, they can manipulate the market to their benefit, selling as much grain to New Delhi as it can afford and the rest to other customers more capable of paying the high prices.

While Washington has agreed to provide some food aid to New Delhi, that aid will be far below the needed amount. According to a report in the September 28 *Statesman Weekly*, Alfred D. White, the Agency for International Development assistant administrator for Asia, said in Washington September 24 that any sizable amount of aid—like two million tons—would not be forthcoming. He hypocritically cited the "poor" U.S. harvest.

2. In early 1972, New Delhi had nine million tons of grain in reserve, but used up the bulk of it during that year's drought. It was unable to replenish the reserves, and by 1974 they had dropped to about two million tons.

The failure of the Gandhi regime to stop the widespread speculation by the food profiteers, to acquire international aid, or even to provide minimum rations to India's poor has further stimulated mass discontent with the regime. The upsurges that rocked Gujarat for two months and that toppled the state government there in February were sparked primarily by high food prices and scarcities in the government-run ration shops. Similar protests erupted in Bihar in March.

"Almost every day there are reports of hunger and violence in Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, West Bengal and Rajasthan," wrote Bernard Weinraub in the September 24 *New York Times*. Food protests have also been reported in Orissa, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu.

"There are reports from many parts of the country of hungry folk raiding hoarders' homes," Brahmanand Mishra wrote in the October 4 *Far*

Eastern Economic Review: "Near Bhopal [Madhya Pradesh], for example, villagers forced a rich landlord to surrender his grain. And a food train going to Calcutta was looted.

"The grain market at Ghatia Azam Bazar in Agra [Uttar Pradesh], the city of the Taj Mahal, was mobbed by several hundred hungry people after shopkeepers displayed notices saying stocks were exhausted. The shops were crammed with grain."

An article in the September 19 *New York Times* on the world food crisis by Boyce Rensberger stated, "The experts hold a range of views about how much social unrest growing food shortages might engender. It is already clear that the African famine has contributed to the downfall of governments in Chad and Ethiopia. The Government in India is reported to be becoming uneasy about social stresses developing there." □

Largest Independence Action in U.S.

20,000 Demand 'Free Puerto Rico Now!'

About 20,000 persons crowded into Madison Square Garden in New York October 27 in the largest action ever held in the United States in support of Puerto Rican independence. Most participants were young Puerto Ricans who came from many cities throughout the United States and Puerto Rico.

"Spirits were high during the entire rally with cheers, foot stomping, and applause interrupting many of the speakers and entertainers," wrote Sam Manuel in the November 8 issue of *The Militant*, the U.S. Trotskyist weekly. "As the rally began, chants of 'Viva Puerto Rico! Que Viva!' resounded throughout the auditorium. There were huge banners saying 'Free Puerto Rico Now!' 'Viva Puerto Rico Libre!' and 'Independencia Ya, Socialismo Ahora!' (Independence Now, Socialism Now)."

The rally, called last May by the Puerto Rican Solidarity Day Committee, was co-sponsored by many organizations and individuals. The national board of the Solidarity Day Committee included representatives of the Puerto Rican Socialist party, Chicano and Native American organizations, and political groups.

The principal speaker at the rally was Juan Mari Bras, secretary-general of the Puerto Rican Socialist party. Speaking in Spanish, he described how U.S. imperialism exploits and dominates Puerto

Rico. He criticized Puerto Rican capitalist politicians as "a clique of lackeys."

Mari Bras said that the Puerto Rican independence movement is growing, while U.S. imperialism is "on the defensive."

"Its defeats in Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam signal the accelerated pace of that fall," he said. "The inclusion of Guinea-Bissau among the sovereign nations of the world represents a great victory in the anticolonial struggles in Africa and the rest of the world."

Among the other speakers were Russell Means of the American Indian Movement; actress Jane Fonda; Angela Davis of the Communist party; Corky Gonzales of Crusade for Justice, a Chicano organization based in Denver; Owusu Sadaukai, former chairman of the African Liberation Support Committee; Irwin Silber of the *Guardian*; and Pedro Albizu Meneses, son of the famous Puerto Rican nationalist leader Pedro Albizu Campos.

Hanging over the speakers platform were large pictures of five Puerto Rican nationalist political prisoners held in U.S. prisons: Lolita Lebron, Irving Flores, Andres Figueroa Cordero, Oscar Collazo, and Rafael Cancel Miranda.

The large attendance at the rally was particularly noteworthy because the capitalist news media had excluded virtually all advance notice of the event. □

Portuguese General Tells Inside Story of Putsch

By Gerry Foley

In the aftermath of the September 27-28 crisis, when the Portuguese masses mobilized to block an attempted rightist coup, many questions were left unanswered about what happened inside the government in the eventful hours before General Spínola resigned and the rightist offensive, at least temporarily, was called off.

In the October 11 issue of the Lisbon afternoon paper *Diário de Lisboa*, one of the key figures in these events, Brigadier General Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho, the commander of the regime's special security force COPCON (Comando Operacional do Continente—Operations Command for Continental Portugal), tried to answer some of the questions that were of special interest to the public. The interview was headlined: "I Was Held Prisoner in the Government Palace."

"In the Palácio de Belém between 2 and 4 a.m.," the interviewer, Augusto Vilela, wrote in his introduction, "Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho experienced difficult moments, while uneasiness spread among the members of the Armed Forces Movement, an uneasiness that hours later was to lead to another great victory for progressive ideas."

The brigadier general explained that he arrived at the Palácio de Belém at 2 in the morning of September 28 in response to an emergency call.

"I had a certain presentiment that something was wrong," Saraiva de Carvalho said, "because I went in a private car, one belonging to a friend of mine, with two others following. At the entrance on the Calçada da Ajuda, a guard told me that he had orders to let only me pass, along with the person detailed to accompany me. That seemed very strange to me. My comrade insisted on going with me. Inside were a lot more people than should have been there.

"All General Spínola's civilian and military advisers were there. Practically all General Costa Gomes's advisers were there. General Silvério Marques's principal advisers were there. All the members of the Junta de Salvação Na-



Saraiva de Carvalho: Had a "certain presentiment something was wrong."

cional [Junta of National Salvation] were there. And later, after I had waited awhile, when I entered the Sala dos Conselhos, Brigadier General Vasco Gonçalves [the premier] was also there. He looked very downcast. The atmosphere was extremely tense. The faces of all the members of the Junta de Salvação Nacional were grim."

Spínola told Saraiva de Carvalho that General Gomes was assuming direct command of COPCON and that the command center would now be in the presidential palace (Belém) itself. The brigadier general called the COPCON staff to inform them of the change. However, the order aroused certain suspicions on their part.

"It was then that COPCON began to get uneasy," Saraiva de Carvalho said. "Why had there been this sudden change? Then General Spínola was informed that Rádio Clube Português [RCP] was about to broadcast an appeal to the people to go to the barricades. This alarmed him. He ordered the RCP and Rádio Renascença cut off the air immediately and sent instructions to the Emissora Nacional to broadcast only communiqués from the office of the president. He also gave orders to stop the newspapers from publishing on Saturday.

I heard that because I was standing beside him.

"He asked me if the stations were being guarded. I informed him that military forces had been standing guard at the radio stations since Friday afternoon [September 27]. He then ordered the military forces replaced by riot police. That was the third indication that he lacked confidence in us. The second was when he removed me from command of the military units.

"However, at this point I was anxious to avoid an open confrontation with our general. I telephoned the COPCON and informed them that all the military forces we had in the stations would be replaced by police and GNR [Guarda Nacional Republicana—Republican National Guard]. The uneasiness in COPCON about my situation began to grow rapidly, because the order seemed to come completely out of the blue. Why were the military forces suddenly replaced by special police? But I was not interested in getting into any confrontation, and so I obeyed the orders I was given."

Despite Saraiva de Carvalho's desire to avoid a "confrontation," the situation began rapidly to get out of hand: "They started to call me from the navy, from the air force; I got telephone calls from the most varied points in the country, asking me about my situation. But I could not be properly cool in talking to them because I began to feel that I was being watched. They were my comrades and friends, but I was really being watched. At a certain point, this state of unrest rose to a point of great excitement, and I could see that it was leading to a grave breakdown of discipline in the units. They were not obeying COPCON because I was not there, and they were on their way to Belém to rescue me from possible coercion or detention.

"At this point, I went to talk to General Costa Gomes and told him that I was going to COPCON, that I could not stay there because I had an operation at 5:30 a.m. [a planned roundup

of former secret police agents and members of the paramilitary Legião Portuguesa], and since a lot of unrest was brewing among the personnel, I was going there. The general did not do anything to stop me."

But the COPCON commander found that he could not get out of the palace. One guard told him he had to stay because there was a disagreement between Spínola and Gomes and it was his duty to maintain "equilibrium" between the two. Then he was told there was a problem between three of the generals on the Junta de Salvação Nacional and Vasco Gonçalves. Finally, he made another attempt to leave.

"I was intercepted by an element who was not from the presidential staff but was very close to General Spínola. He told me not to get offended, to remain calm, but that he wanted to tell me something that no one else had the courage to say. I had been called to Belém, he said, to be detained there because General Spínola had a terrible fear that I would stay with the military forces, carry out a coup, and remove him from power or 'grab him.' He actually went so far as to use such an expression. I replied that I had noticed that I was being watched extraordinarily closely, but that it would never enter my head that such a thing could happen.

"What upset me profoundly was that our general could think that I was there for any other reason than to solve a problem that no one was making any progress toward solving (and I wasn't either), that he continued to assume that I was a traitor and a Marxist when I had nothing but the purest of all possible intentions."

The "problem" Saraiva de Carvalho referred to was the masses going into the streets to stop the rightist march on Lisbon. He explained his feelings about this in detail later on.

The pressure from various military units increased and finally Spínola realized that he would have to let the COPCON commander go. At first, the president insisted that he and General Gomes would accompany Saraiva de Carvalho. But then he abandoned the idea.

"I don't know if he was afraid that we would take him prisoner," Saraiva de Carvalho continued, "but he said that after thinking it over he had decided not to go. We did have to solve a very grave problem. The units

would not obey General Spínola. A number of telephone calls had been made from the Palácio de Belém to the units asking them how things were and telling them that they should take orders only from the president's office. But the units refused to accept orders from anyone but me. Finally our general was convinced that he did not dominate the Armed Forces Movement, that it was something too big."

Spínola's chief lieutenant, Firmino Miguel, accompanied Saraiva de Carvalho to the COPCON headquarters. But apparently the man Spínola tried to appoint as premier in the first governmental crisis in July did not exercise much sway over the COPCON commander's decisions once the latter got back to his headquarters.

"I ordered the police removed and replaced by military forces," Saraiva de Carvalho said. "This is proof that the Movement is a force. I was always perfectly calm. I never felt upset, although the other people were profoundly agitated. I had complete confidence in what I was doing. In the first place, I knew that I was not really fighting against General Spínola. My intention was never that, and the idea never crossed my mind of opposing him or carrying out any coup to remove him from power. It was he himself who talked himself into believing this. My intention was to solve the problem that had arisen, the problem of the barricades."

There was a need to block a rightist march on Lisbon, Saraiva de Carvalho admitted, but COPCON had everything under control: "We already had the whole operation planned and arranged. It was just that we couldn't get authorization from above to 'push the button.' This created serious problems.

"We were bypassed by the people. This process was extremely dangerous in my opinion. Some of the people's brigades did conduct themselves with great tact, but they were doing the wrong thing, because civilians cannot maintain surveillance over civilians. That is the task of the forces of order. Other people's brigades got out of hand, got overexcited, and acted in a tactless way toward persons, toward officers, even men of the Armed Forces Movement, who, although they identified themselves immediately, were humiliated in public by these people's forces. . . .

"It is impermissible that the people's forces—which General Spínola was calling 'people's militias' when I arrived at the Palácio de Belém—came to take over a task that belonged to the forces of order. This was extremely bad and created a climate of enormous discontent among many people. In the final analysis, these people's brigades—and I thanked them in the communiqué I broadcast over television Saturday [September 28]—offered us effective help. I only regret that because of a decision from above we did not head off the formation of these brigades."

Despite a few bad moments, however, the COPCON commander said, no one need fear that basic "order" was breaking down in the country. "I don't think there is as much of a threat from the Communist party as is claimed. I read somewhere, I don't remember where . . . that somebody had made a poll or a study showing that the Communist party would not get more than 15 or 20 percent of the vote in the coming elections for the Constituent Assembly.

"I didn't say that the Communist party does not have the strength to start an open struggle. I said only that it is a well-organized party, but in my opinion it is not at present interested in initiating an open struggle."

Only a very narrow section of capital had anything to lose under the new regime.

"The legitimate interests of persons, of property, their possessions, are by no means threatened. I believe that a democracy—and we are not yet in a democracy, we are going to go through a parademocratic situation—I am convinced that in this stage or the next, with the achievement of democracy, the security of persons and property will be more real than ever. What is really in question is the possible loss of privileges by a section of a class that was privileged before April 25, that is, high finance. That class, as is known, is not ready to suddenly relinquish its privileges."

Capitalist interests that were "legitimate," that is, "productive," had nothing to lose and much to gain from the new regime.

"All the big capitalists who really want to work for the progress of the country they live in and do business in should be supported and treated with consideration so that they will use their capital to advance the coun-

try and fight for the real economic progress we want."

There was no truth in a report that the COPCON commander had expressed suspicion of António Champalimaud, one of the leading Portuguese capitalists, whose son was involved in the abortive September putsch:

"Personally, for example, everything I have ever heard said about António Champalimaud's work in the industrial field is very good. I consider him, just from what I have heard about him, to be an industrial genius. And since he has an extremely open mind on all questions, showing a bold flair in all his activities, I am convinced that he is one of the men who can do most to spark a resurgence of our industry, if he wants to. And I think he wants to."

This led the interviewer to the conclusion that "with respect to the financial groups, the Armed Forces Movement is separating the grain from the chaff."

"Exactly right," Saraiva de Carvalho said. "The big capitalists who are interested in genuine progress and who, with their open-mindedness and their intelligence, realize that it is time to stop holding on to total economic privilege, and who honestly want to contribute to the progress of the country, can count on the Armed Forces Movement as an ally and a loyal collaborator. As for those who hold back their investments and prove that they are not interested in the progress of the country, I think there is only one solution—nationalizing their companies, and if necessary expelling them from the country."

The (newly promoted) brigadier general had a certain understanding, it seems, of the need for self-defense against reactionary conspiracies financed by big business. It is true, of course, that if the uneasiness of the privileged groups leads to a rightist coup, the military group that launched the present experiment would suffer the effects directly. The fate of the "constitutionalist" officers in Chile who opposed the Pinochet coup is an indication of what could happen.

However, it is apparent that Saraiva de Carvalho is no more anxious for a "confrontation" with big capital than he was with General Spínola. And so, the workers who blocked the Septem-

ber 27-28 coup attempt, in the manner regarded as so improper by the brigadier general, might well wonder what would happen in the event of another coup if they were to wait for the "forces of order" to "perform their task."

By his own account, one of the most strategically placed of the Armed

Forces Movement leaders played a passive role at the decisive moments in September. Furthermore, despite the experience of this putsch, he is still determined to prevent the workers from doing what they must do to defend themselves—disarm the capitalists by taking control of the national economy from their hands. □

An Interview With Three Participants

How Portuguese High-School Students Joined in Struggle Against Dictatorship

By Antonio Romero

Lisbon

The collapse of the dam represented by the bloody Salazar-Caetano dictatorship on April 25 and the flood of struggles by the workers and toilers that followed created a new and explosive situation in the class struggle in Portugal. The following conversation with young compañeros from various high-school papers in Lisbon deals with the experiences and the mobilizations of the high-school students before and after the so-called revolution of flowers.

Outubro, *O Grito*, and *Impulso* were not just high-school papers but groupings or tendencies operating semilegally in the difficult conditions of the dictatorship. In recent months, they have taken up open activity. Their goal remains the same, to carry forward a struggle that, as they told me, "is and must be a continuous one until capitalism is eliminated and the socialist revolution has triumphed throughout the world."

Impulso was published by students at the Liceo Amadora; *Outubro*, in the Liceo Dom Pedro V; and *O Grito*, in the Liceo Dom João Castro. All of these schools are in Lisbon.

* * *

Question. In order to be able to estimate the changes that have occurred in the student movement in the recent period it would be interesting to know what kind of organization the fascists had in the high schools.

Impulso. There was a typically fascist organization, which even used uniforms similar to those of the Legião Portuguesa,¹ that paraded, conducted paramilitary training, and advanced a reactionary ideology. But some years ago already, this organization, which was called the Mocidade Portuguesa [Portuguese Youth], had lost all influence. Two factors were involved. Most important was the profound discredit into which the militarist and racist values propagated by the Mocidade Portuguesa had fallen among the youth. This was compounded by some conflicts in the government and the bourgeoisie, which came out into the open when Marcelo [Caetano] took over the government. The result was a partial shift in tactics by the Ministry of Education.

The Secretariado para a Juventude [Youth Secretariat] was created. This body tried to operate under a cloak of political neutrality, mainly through "cultural" activities, especially sports. But its roots were very shallow and it faded away, because since sports events brought a lot of people together, the students took advantage of them to discuss certain things and to try to achieve a certain democracy in this sphere.

Thus, the attempts to recruit youth to the National Guard for the colonial war, or to use up their free time, came to nothing.

So, in the period before April 25, while there was no left student orga-

1. An armed paramilitary organization of about 50,000 men maintained by the Salazarist regime.

nization with any appreciable mass influence, the influence of the organizations linked to the far right and the government was nil. Obviously, the left organizations did not operate openly as such but as informal groupings whose real character had to be completely hidden from the dictatorship; they could not present themselves as political movements. Sometimes this led to "legalist" deviations, to reformist activity in practice, however much the theoretical pronouncements might differ.

Q. What were the characteristics and the orientation of the high-school student struggles?

Outubro. As nearly as I can remember, before our organization was formed about two years ago, while we were still working in the MAE-ESL,² there were almost no struggles. This "movement," moreover, was not interested in mobilizing people but in bureaucratically perpetuating its structures and in claiming a franchise to represent the students.

The policy of the MAEESL was based on the following axiom: "It is necessary to defend the students' interests through student unionism, and this will be sufficient to get them to struggle." And so, chronically, they fell into apologies for the most backward and petty demands, which also had very little mobilizing effect.

At this point, our position was approximately as follows. As a group, the students had different social origins. They did not take part in production. Therefore they did not have the same class interest. On the other hand, they might face common problems created by the schools, or, as young people, even face common problems created by society; and their professional perspectives were more or less similar. It seemed to us that by presenting these problems as the result of the contradictions of capitalism as a whole we could develop a dynamic leading to mass struggle. So, we believed that, besides being utopian, the line of defending student interests by trade-union methods—and therefore organizing students in "unions"—was counterproductive.

Unfortunately, we were still carrying a heavy burden of ultraleft no-

tions, and although we raised some correct criticisms we did not succeed in offering an alternative that could mobilize students. Finally we left this bureaucratic structure and organized ourselves independently.

Impulso. I think we can divide the high-school struggles into three stages. The first is the period before 1972-73, when the movement, which was very weak, was virtually monopolized by the tendency called "For a People's Education" (Mao-Stalinists), and there were almost no struggles.

The stage after 1972-73 was marked by the appearance of *O Grito* and *Outubro* and by struggles in the Padre António Vieira, Dom João Castro, and Oeiras high schools, struggles in which *O Grito* and *Outubro* played a leading role. But all this had an ultra-left orientation, with a small group of activists and their collaborators issuing a series of politically very advanced leaflets, which caused a sensation and, because of their novelty, attracted a lot of people. But, of course, this soon led to a crisis.

These struggles were essentially for democratic rights. This was the only question at the time that did not seem reformist to us and that really was an issue on which you could mobilize people.

The third phase is the 1973-74 period, which is very interesting, including the part before April 25. We have been able to use the time given us by the vacations to discuss our very empirical experience last year and to formulate a line based on it for raising the consciousness of the students. It is a mass line, not one for a small section of the students. It starts off from the present level of consciousness of the broad masses of students, which is the only proper starting place, with the objective of impelling a process of mobilization that will enable us to achieve a broad politicalization.

This line reflects a whole process of evolution that took place during the last academic year, coming out of our discussion and also out of our experience at the Liceo de Amadora. This was a high school which had stayed out of actions before but which this year was in the vanguard of the struggles. *Here this line was applied from the beginning.*

We began to issue very careful statements there about very concrete

problems, such as the sexual segregation in the cafeteria, disciplinary restrictions, and compulsory uniforms for the girls. In this way a process developed in which many students participated, forcing the rector to yield on most points. This school then moved to the forefront of the struggle, with the activists' positions having solid support. In this way also, we developed a paper, another product of the discussions in *O Grito* and *Outubro*, in which we put forward a program of transitional demands.

We reached the conclusion that the mobilization would progress only if we were able to project student demands in combination—including some of a "partial" character, that is, ones that the rectors could meet (I am still talking about the period of fascism), as well as transitional ones.

Q. What kinds of slogans, for example?

Impulso. For example, abolishing disciplinary measures at the school, and establishing democratic freedoms such as the right to strike. Other demands were for abolishing exams and the disciplinary boards. Besides this, a discussion was started on student control, but we didn't come to any conclusion on this point. Paradoxically, a lot of the effort put into this discussion didn't lead to anything very much because April 25 came along and the situation changed completely!

So that *companheiros* in other countries can get a better idea of our work, it is worth going into a little more detail here. On February 14, we organized a rally that made considerable impact. For this purpose, ten *companheiros* came into our school from another area (so they couldn't be identified) and put up posters while another group stood guard so that no one would be arrested.

A great many *companheiros* gathered while the commotion was going on. The truth is that they understood practically nothing the speakers said. But in any case, this gave us a chance to organize the students who covered the group's retreat. So, when the police came in, they couldn't get any leads. After this we held several rallies in more or less isolated spots in the school, with good attendance.

Of course, the rally followed a whole period of work. In December 1973, there was a clandestine general as-

2. Movimento Associativo dos Estudantes de Ensino Secundario de Lisboa—Lisbon Secondary Schools Student Movement.

sembly of representatives of several high schools. Very few people came. But the meeting was discovered and surrounded by the police, who managed to arrest almost all the participants, about 150 companheiros. A half dozen were held in Caxias³ for a few weeks. The rest were only held for twenty-four hours. But it was a scandal anyway. Some of those arrested were only twelve and thirteen years old!

The agitation that this touched off in the high schools reached its highest point in Padre António Vieira and in Amadora. In the former a demonstration was held. People shouted, "Long live socialism!" "Down with capitalist exploitation!" "Power to the workers!" and so forth. And as a result all the work that had been done collapsed.

In Amadora, we preferred to go more slowly. We never got ahead of our support. We held meetings of 250 students for democratic rights, as well as other meetings demanding that there be no sanctions against those arrested. And in this way we stopped punishments from being applied against any companheiro, although more and more students were talking and distributing propaganda. So, when we held the rally in February we knew that we would have support.

Outubro. As regards the forms of struggle, in general the most advanced were rallies, which in some cases were held in front of the administrative offices. We never managed to hold a strike before April 25. That was something utopian. Only in Amadora did such a possibility exist. If companheiros had been suspended, there were possibilities for a strike in the seventh-year and sixth-year classes, and to some extent in the fifth and fourth years.

You have to keep in mind the great difference there was between the intense repression that existed in the high schools and the situation in the universities. In the universities, the mobilizations of 1962, 1965, 1969, and 1970 had established a tradition of struggle. Those battles had opened up many more possibilities for activity by the student movement.

Even though in the last period an extensive repression had taken place

in the universities, the situation in the high schools was much worse.

Q. What was the reaction in the high schools to April 25?

O Grito. On the first day, the reaction was one of surprise, bewilderment. Only on the second day did people begin to realize that a change had taken place and that a mass movement was building up. So, in Dom Pedro V (and the same thing happened in other high schools), the students began to pick out and arrest the agents of the PIDE⁴ and the *bufos* (informers) in the high schools.

In my high school, we held a meeting on April 27 to explain the need to mobilize, to take advantage of the fall of fascism to win and consolidate democratic rights. And, as was happening among the rest of the population, a regular hunt was started up for the PIDEs, the members of the Legião Portuguesa, and so on. It was the first time we got all the companheiros out to a rally.

Later we hunted down and grabbed the PIDEs, who wept and threw tantrums. We turned them over to the military police and called for a general strike and a march behind the car carrying the PIDEs. About 800 companheiros marched and afterward continued to demonstrate in the streets for several hours.

Q. What slogans did they shout at that time?

O Grito. They shouted, "Death to the PIDEs!" "Down with the colonial war!" "Independence for the colonies now!"; and sometimes, when they passed factories, they shouted, "Power to the workers!"

Impulso. And "Down with fascism!"

O Grito. Yes. That was continual. You heard it day and night everywhere in the city.

Q. How did the process develop?

O Grito. In the following days, the most basic freedoms were put into practice—the right of assembly, of discussion; and so people began to

discuss raising other demands. General assemblies were being held, and committees were also forming to discuss other matters, such as the real objectives of capitalist education, the meaning of the colonial war, and so on.

In Dom Pedro V and Amadora, the students mobilized also in support of the demands of the nonteaching staff. In the first school there was a quick victory, because the demands were very modest and in an assembly the rector was forced to grant them. In Amadora, it was different because one of the demands was for the resignation of the rector. This set off a lot of arguments. "If the rector is thrown out, who will replace him?"

Impulso. In the most militant high schools, classes were practically suspended because of demonstrations and rallies. The rectors were forced to grant all the demands that were put to them. At the beginning we had the impression that this situation could not last and that it would be followed by a more brutal repression. We put our main stress, especially in places we had chosen to be active in, on the need to completely eliminate the repressive apparatus—the PIDE agents, the informers, the reactionary rectors and professors, the disciplinary boards.

The problem arose also of organizing the student movement, since up until that time what existed (the MAEESL) was totally unrepresentative, and the only alternative was some "Comissões Unitárias" [United-Front Committees] in Padre António Vieira and Amadora. But in the new conditions, these committees (which might have served as a legal or semilegal alternative under fascism) were completely overwhelmed by the mobilization.

Q. What effects did the May 1 mobilization have?

Impulso. The high schools and the students did not participate under their own banners but joined the columns of the various organizations or participated as independents. That day everyone went onto the streets. It was obvious that May 1 marked the irruption of the masses into the process started on April 25.

After the May Day march there were no other demonstrations of hundreds

3. A secret-police prison with a reputation as a torture center.

4. Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado—International and State Security Police.

of thousands of persons in the street, but the struggles began in the factories and workplaces. It is very difficult, however, to separate out the specific effects of the demonstration on a situation where everything was new, where everything was all mixed up together and discussed at the same time.

Q. Was it then that the PCP⁵ called for a coalition government?

O Grito. The possibility of a coalition government was raised from the beginning. It is known that previous contacts and discussions between the Armed Forces Movement, the Socialist party, and the PCP occurred.

Impulso. But this perspective began to be raised especially after the rally organized to welcome back Alvaro Cunhal;⁶ and in the following days the slogan "Cunhal ao governo!" [Take Cunhal into the government!] was heard everywhere in Lisbon.

O Grito. This was also a central slogan in the May Day marches.

Q. What alternative did the other left currents propose?

O Grito. Sometimes the slogan was raised of "Power to the workers!" but this was very general.

Impulso. For all practical purposes, no alternatives were actually offered. We have to admit that we did not present one either. There is one thing, though, that is worth noting. To the south of Lisbon, in Barreiro, many members of the PCP were repelled by this campaign for a coalition and moved away from the party because they were opposed to sharing the government with military officers.

O Grito. There were also positions like the Maoist slogan "Neither Caetano nor Spínola, people's revolution!" or the one offered by the Liga Comunista Internacionalista:⁷ "Nei-

ther Caetano nor Spínola, socialist revolution!" But these slogans made no impact and were later withdrawn.

Q. Let's go back to the high schools. How did the strike begin?

Impulso. The call for a strike was raised in a sectarian, almost surreptitious way by an ultrasectarian and ultraleftist group called "Dare to Struggle, Dare to Win," a group backed by the Maoist MRPP,⁸ as a means of self-advertising, so that it could proclaim itself "the pivot of the mobilizations." This is a constant for the group, putting its own "advancement" ahead of the needs of mobilizing the masses in struggle and raising their political consciousness.

At the beginning, we were taken by surprise like all the other currents. But we got over this. One of the slogans raised was "Exemptions from examinations for everyone!" We considered this utopian and raised more cautious slogans such as reducing the average needed for exemptions and things like that. As a result of the general upsurge, the strike immediately won great support.

O Grito. It was launched in the second half of May.

Impulso. It is worth noting that the strike was launched first and the demands were discussed later. In every high school, specific lists of demands were drawn up and voted on in assemblies. It was only afterward that unification was discussed. The position of the reformists, as could have been expected, was to boycott the strike, claiming that before such action was taken the possibilities for negotiations and consultations with the provisional government had to be exhausted.

They tried to break the strike, and when they failed they resorted to slanders and exaggerated claims. They said the strike was "reactionary" and that the students only wanted to "go to the beach." Of course, not all the *companheiros* understood clearly that the strike represented an attempt to

drive a breach into the capitalist system of restricting access to education. But it was unquestionably a progressive movement.

On the other hand, the actual strength of the mobilization was relative, and therefore so were the gains that were won. There was a complete lack of organization. We raised the slogan of "student control," but in practice this "control" was exercised by very small groups, and the great majority of them rapidly broke up. Furthermore, the authorities made it quite clear that the concessions were only for this year, because they obviously wanted to avoid an immediate clash with the students that would have discredited them.

Q. How many high schools joined the strike?

O Grito. All, virtually all, the high schools and technical schools in Lisbon. There were also some in other places, Evora, Santarem, Aveiro, Torres Vedras. But there was no coordination whatever.

Impulso. In Amadora, we called from the beginning for student control and defense pickets (in order to prevent provocations, damage, and so on. We also put forward a series of points for discussion that were approved by a general assembly, such as the colonial war, the school in capitalist society, repression, family and sexual repression. Up to 300 *companheiros* participated in these discussions, and the debates often lasted as long as four hours. The occupation in Amadora developed rather well, perhaps as well as it could have.

What was impressive in the general situation is that there was no organization, and still there was a strike. Another failing was not linking up the strike to the population, which understood nothing about what was happening. You have to understand that these conditions will not be repeated; another impromptu strike could be a defeat.

But with this caution in mind, the strike was an important experience in the learning process for thousands of *companheiros*. It gave them a feeling of their power and of the potential for victory if they put all their strength behind common objectives. This, along with the general condi-

5. Partido Comunista Portugues—Portuguese Communist party.

6. The general secretary of the PCP, who had been living in exile.

7. International Communist League, a

sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

8. Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian party.

tions, is what made it possible to force the government to partially grant the demands.

Q. You said before that one of the questions that came up was who should run the high schools. How was this question answered?

O Grito. After April 25, the reformists began to call for removing the fascist rectors and replacing them with "Co-Management Committees." As we said, in Amadora we had started discussing this question before. We proposed a formula different from the reformists' "co-management" while we continued to discuss the problem among ourselves. You have to keep in mind that at this time we were completely ignorant of all the experiences of students in other countries on this question, and after forty years of fascism, we had no experience of our own.

Impulso. We started off from the principle that since the schools have very specific functions under capitalism—to serve the bourgeoisie—we could not agree to participate in co-management of these functions, nor in keeping a check on them to see that they were carried out correctly.

Furthermore, we suspected that the reformists would turn co-management into open "participationism" [that is, collaboration with the administration]. Nonetheless, we realized that if we didn't offer a concrete alternative the reformists would ride roughshod over us and the mass of students. So, we made a proposal for an Administrative Committee made up of eight students, five teachers, two members of the nonteaching staff, and one administrator. We got it passed by an overwhelming majority in a general assembly.

But in raising this proposal we were afraid of getting involved in discussing and carrying out the "practical tasks" of running the school, something that at this stage seemed to us to be completely reformist. And so it was proposed that the student representatives of the committee only present the resolutions passed by the general assembly of students.

Outubro. We acted empirically. We did not understand that "control"—although it could not be maintained

for very long, indefinitely—was an issue that could not only mobilize the students but also lead more or less broadly to an understanding that a more rational approach in the schools and a sense of social responsibility were incompatible with the survival of capitalist society. But in spite of our failure to see this at first, the needs of the mobilization brought us to make a proposal that in practice, in its operation, led to student control of the high school.

O Grito. It is important to expose the fact now that the government's present proposal, like many other measures it is taking, is designed to cut back or wipe out what has been gained. In the case of Amadora, for instance, the Ministry of Education finally recognized the committee—but only for the vacation months. And now they are arguing that you have got to prevent anarchy, have uniform standards, and things like that, in order to impose forms of administration that give a wide majority to the teachers and leave only a minority of positions to be distributed proportionately among the nonteaching staff and the students.

Furthermore, the students will have only a consultative role in the committee, or the function of relaying the decisions of the committee to the student assembly. Obviously we are going to fight against this or any other arbitrary reorganization that goes against the interests and the gains of the students. And it is almost certain that similar struggles will take place among the university students or have already begun to develop there.

Impulso. I think that it was an important step forward to understand the importance of the nonteaching staff. There were a number of prejudices against them, because traditionally the PIDE planted informers in all the high schools. But experience has shown that the immense majority in this category are superexploited and very militant workers, and that unity between the students and workers must start in the high schools themselves. Our experience is that this not only raises the consciousness of the students but improves the chances for an alliance with the workers against the more reactionary and conserva-

tive elements. And this alliance will be very much needed in the coming months. □

Supertanker Spilled 50,000 Tons of Oil


The potentially catastrophic effects of an oil spill that occurred off the tip of South America on August 9 were recently revealed in the U. S. Senate. More than 50,000 tons of crude oil spilled into Chilean waters when the supertanker *Metula* ran aground in the Strait of Magellan.

A coating of oil up to three inches deep fouled seventy-five miles of Chile's coastline. Bodies of several hundred penguins and other waterfowl were counted in one survey, and shellfish production in the area has been damaged. More than two months after the event no cleanup work has begun.

The ship—owned by a company of the Royal Dutch Shell group—had a capacity of 206,000 tons. Tankers of 500,000-ton capacity are under construction in Japan.

This
Publication
is Available in
MICROFORM

...from



**Xerox
University
Microfilms**

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

Xerox University Microfilms
35 Mobile Drive
Toronto, Ontario,
Canada M4A 1H6

University Microfilms Limited
St. John's Road,
Tyler's Green, Penn,
Buckinghamshire, England

PLEASE WRITE FOR
COMPLETE INFORMATION

The French CP's Weekend Carnival

By Irving Herrera



"I am a Communist, why not you . . ." The cover of the guide to the "Fete l'Humanite" is not modeled on the current sexist advertisement of the American airline that has a stewardess saying, "Fly me!" Instead, the artist stands faithfully in the tradition of Stalinist-style recruiting (and politics) as practiced for more than four decades—and not only in France.

Paris

On September 5 and 6, I attended the "Fête l'Humanité," the annual festival organized by *l'Humanité*, the central organ of the Parti Communiste Français (PCF—French Communist party). With its 400,000 members, the organization is the second largest Stalinist party in the capitalist world. It has between 30,000 and 50,000 full-time functionaries either paid directly by the party or by the many mass organizations, trade unions, and municipalities under its control.

The daily circulation of *l'Humanité*

is around a quarter of a million. Moreover, nearly one-quarter of the total vote in national elections goes to the PCF.

Notorious for its bureaucratism, the PCF nevertheless retains a strong base in the working class.

Political "fêtes," or festivals, are a tradition in France, particularly with the left-wing parties. They consist of a big weekend gathering marked by debates, sales of literature, and perhaps music and other cultural activities. Nothing, however, can compare with the "Fête l'Humanité," because of both

its size and its crass commercial atmosphere.

It was held at La Courneuve, one of the working-class suburbs that make up the "Red Belt" of Communist-controlled municipalities surrounding Paris. The festival grounds covered hundreds of acres. On September 19, *l'Humanité* reported that in the six weeks before the event, 619,370 tickets had been sold by Communist party members at the reduced rate of 9 francs (one franc equals about US\$0.20). This meant a take of more than \$1,110,000. Besides this, sales at the gate at the rate of 12 francs were brisk. The Paris daily *Le Monde* estimated that more than one million persons attended during the two days of activities—one out of every seven in the greater Paris area.

There were more than 500 political stands or pavilions, including 275 sections of the PCF. Each section is generally composed of 5 to 10 cells with between 10 to 40 members each. Almost all of these sections were from the greater Paris area. The 78 regional federations of the party were represented by stands also. A separate "International City" consisted of pavilions from Communist parties in 45 other countries.

Fifty-five stands were sponsored by groups listed as "democratic organizations." These included sections of the Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor), the Union of Young Communists, the Union of Communist Students, veterans of the French resistance movement during World War II, veterans of the Spanish civil war, and even veterans of the Algerian (!) war.

At "Cité Livre" (Book City) tens of thousands of books filled the nearly 20,000 square-foot area in the largest of several literary pavilions. The display was dominated by Editions Sociales, the French Stalinist publishing house. However, an additional 42 publishers showed their wares, while 325 authors were on hand to autograph them. According to *l'Humanité*, 4 million francs worth of lit-

erature was sold.

A special effort was made to appear "nonfactual"—Solzhenitsyn's book *The Gulag Archipelago* as well as two books by Leon Trotsky were allowed to appear in the display of a bourgeois publisher.

However, Maspero, one of the largest publishers of revolutionary literature in France, was not present, nor were any of the revolutionary groups or parties represented.

In addition to a circus, a troupe of Russian gymnasts, and a theater, a "Kiosque de Musique" featured well-known singing groups from around the world. At the "Grande Scène" about 100,000 persons, mostly young, listened to Mikis Theodorakis and Leonard Cohen. The next night a similar but older crowd attended Berlioz's *Requiem* performed by the Budapest Philharmonic Orchestra. Some 100,000 persons also viewed the exhibition of Impressionist art.

To top it off, at "Cité Commercial" major capitalist corporations displayed the latest in camping equipment, automobiles, fashions, and furniture. In short, something was provided for every taste.

Near the entrance to the festival grounds was "Cité Internationale" with pavilions set up by other Communist parties, ranging from the giant display of the Soviet Union to the little booth of the American Stalinist newspaper, the *Daily World*.

Under a banner calling for "Massive Signing of the Petition for Strict Application of the Paris Accords," the Vietnamese Communist party sold Vietnamese food and stickers inscribed, "Thieu must free all the political prisoners."

Nearby, the Portuguese Communists sold the pamphlet *Such a Model of Heroism: Salvador Allende*. The Cambodian pavilion had a big banner reading, "Long Live the Royal [!] Government of National Union of Cambodia."

A main theme of the "fête" was recruitment of new members. Attendants everywhere wore the large sticker "*Je suis Communiste, pourquoi pas vous. . .*" (I am a Communist, why not you . . .)

Posters proclaimed: "*Adhère ici*." (Join here.) "*Ici on adhère, ici on discute*." (You join here, you discuss here.) "*Bobigny PCF—déjà 25 adhésions*." (Bobigny PCF—already 25 new members.)

And everywhere was the central slogan of the fête—"For a Union of the People of France for Democratic Changes."

Later *l'Humanité* published the result of the recruitment drive: 5,574 new members. This, the editors said, "is testimony to the possibilities that have opened since the presidential elections. At the threshold of an absolute majority, the united left crystallizes more and more the hopes for change in the country. The Communist party must be made still stronger to assemble those who are interested in democratic reforms."

Who joins the Communist party in France? *L'Humanité* emphasized the youthfulness of the recruits: 80% (more than 4,000) were under 25, "proving" that the PCF is a "real pole of attraction for the youth." However, the "proportion of women has changed only slowly (it is 37 percent). . . ." According to these figures, workers and employees constitute 60%; unemployed, 6%; college and high-school students, 23%; teachers, 6.5%; and professional, technical, and management, 5%.

In addition, the Movement of Young Communists launched a separate recruitment drive during the fête. Their goal for the weekend was 15,000 new members, and their progress was recorded on a giant "thermometer chart."

The emphasis on youth was very strong. The banner headline describ-

ing the fête in *l'Humanité* was "Innumerable Youth." While many young people displayed their "*Je suis Communiste . . .*" stickers, a much larger number were clearly there solely for the music and entertainment. Although the statistics may be exaggerated, it is clear that even among the youth the PCF is hardly isolated.

During the fête the Central Committee of the PCF met and approved a draft resolution for a special congress to be held October 24-25. The course laid out in this document extends the line of the "Union of the Left," the "Common Program" agreed to by the PCF, the Socialist party, and the bourgeois Left Radicals.

The new PCF document calls for developing the Union of the Left into a "Union of the People of France for Democratic Changes," a formation that is compared to the Popular Front of the 1930s. That front, it will be recalled, included both the Communist party and major bourgeois forces.

The 49% vote received by François Mitterrand, the candidate of the Union of the Left last May, greatly encouraged the French Stalinists. They smell the possibility in the coming period of being included in a coalition government to help preserve capitalism in France. This was what the editors of *l'Humanité* no doubt had in mind when they chose as the banner headline under the picture of the huge throng at La Courneuve: "Un Courant Irresistible" (An Irresistible Current). □

How to subscribe

If you'd rather not cut up this issue by using the subscription blank . . .
Jot your name and address on any old piece of paper and send it with
\$7.50 for a six-month subscription.

Intercontinental Press
P.O. Box 116
Village Station
New York, N.Y. 10014

[] Enclosed is \$7.50 for a six-month subscription.

Name _____

Street _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Impact of Radicalized Youth on Japanese Unions

[The following interview with Yohichi Sakai, a member of the Political Bureau of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League (Japanese section of the Fourth International) was granted to Caroline Lund. The interview took place in Tokyo on August 7.]

* * *

Question. Could you explain how the youth radicalization developed in Japan and what its impact has been on the labor movement?

Answer. To answer that, first I must explain that the labor movement in Japan is quite different from that of the United States or, say, France, where the Social Democratic trade-union bureaucracy in the one case, and the Communist union bureaucracy in the other, have for many years had firm control over the unions.

In Japan there is more of a tradition of opposition currents in the unions. And this is one of the reasons why the student radicalization and the radicalization of young workers in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Japan was better connected than was the case in the U.S. or Europe.

Prior to the end of World War II, there was no real bourgeois democracy in Japan, and the workers were denied the right to organize. Unions existed before the war but they were very small, encompassing only perhaps 10 percent of the working class or less. So there was no real trade-union bureaucracy as a stabilized phenomenon.

So the union bureaucracy today has no long tradition or experience in controlling the working class—it has arisen since the second world war.

From 1946 to 1949 or 1950, the majority of the active militants of the Japanese trade-union movement were under the leadership of the Japanese Communist party. In that period, following the defeat and collapse of Japanese imperialism, the Japanese people were deeply disillusioned with the system, and their struggles were very militant.

But in 1949 and 1950, all the Communist party workers were expelled from the factories and shops, under the pressure of the American army in Japan. It was called the "Red purge."

Political differentiations arose in the trade unions that reflected the change in American policy. From 1945 to 1947, American imperialism wanted to weak-

en Japan as an imperialist power; but because of the so-called cold war, and because of the situation in China, U.S. imperialism changed its policy to building up Japanese capitalism.

And after the expulsion of the Communist party members from the unions, a new reformist current took over the trade-union apparatus in a kind of coup d'etat.

Q. Was that the Socialist party leadership?

A. Yes. From 1946 to about 1951, the SP was under the leadership of a right-wing majority. So the militant feelings of the Japanese workers were at that time reflected through support to the Communist party.

In 1951 the reformist-oriented SP trade-union activists organized a new national federation of trade unions, Sohyo. Sohyo held its founding conference in 1951 under the protection of the American occupational army. This founding conference of Sohyo supported the American imperialist war in Korea.

In 1951 the Socialist party split into left and right wings. The right wing openly support U.S. imperialism, just as the West European Social Democracy has supported NATO and so on. The left wing tried to develop a sort of neutralist position, like Indian Prime Minister Nehru, because of the deep pacifist mood of the Japanese masses.

At the time of the split, the left wing was still in a minority.

In 1952, when Sohyo held its second national conference, it changed its position in relation to the Korean war. Under pressure from the masses, it took a neutralist position.

So the present bloc that exists between the Socialist party and Sohyo originated in the bloc between the left-wing Socialists and Sohyo in 1951 and 1952.

So because of the expulsion of Communist members from the trade unions and factories and shops, the postwar trade-union movement was defeated very severely in 1949, 1950, and 1951.

After 1954 there was an economic upswing among the capitalist countries on a world scale. And the Japanese economy also began to recover from the postwar crisis. As a result of the economic recovery, the rank and file began to show greater militancy inside Sohyo. This upsurge was not as radical or militant, however, as in 1946-49.

In 1954 or 1955 the right and left wings of the Socialist party unified. But by this time they were the same size or perhaps the left wing was a little bit bigger. The right wing had little influence among the masses.

At the same time, in the trade-union movement spontaneous left-wing tendencies arose, although with no national coordination or leadership. This broad rank-and-file militant tendency included worker supporters of the CP. These tendencies also began to develop close contact with the Zengakuren student movement. The Zengakuren had very good contact with the workers movement.

The leading members of the Zengakuren at that time were members of the Communist party. And many of the leftist activist workers were also in the Communist party. This was the situation in the late 1950s. So you see there was no 100 percent bureaucratization of the trade unions.

But from 1960 to 1966 or 1967, the Japanese trade-union movement stagnated because of the rapid expansion of the economy combined with several defeats of the trade-union struggles—of the railway workers in 1958, the teachers in 1959, and the coal miners in 1960.

From its founding until 1960, Sohyo was a real national federation of Japanese trade unions, in both the private and public sectors. But in the 1960s, new right-wing trade unions rose up very quickly in the private sector, especially in the big industries and enterprises.

So now in the private sector for the big majority of the trade-union apparatuses are controlled by right-wing bureaucracies. The public sector—the railroads, telephone and telegraph, postal workers, teachers, municipal employees—is still in the hands of a centrist leadership oriented toward the Socialist party.

So, on one side, there was the quick rise of a right-wing trade-union tendency in the expanding private industry. And on the other hand, there was a deepening of the bureaucratization in the trade-union apparatus in the public sector.

At the same time, since 1963, young workers began to appear as an oppositional element in the unions, especially in the public sector. They are organized in the youth caucuses of the trade unions, something that I believe you don't have in the American trade unions.

Q. That's right, there are no youth caucuses in the American unions. The Japan-

ese Trotskyists were working as members of the Socialist party at that time, weren't they?

A. Yes, and our work in the Socialist party and Socialist youth organization consisted of trying to organize those new militant tendencies among young workers.

Then, as you know, from 1967 to 1970 there was the big explosion of the youth radicalization in Japan. The main forces were students, but several tens of thousands of young workers joined the movement.

The National Antiwar Youth Committee was formed in 1965, initially under the leadership of the Socialist party. It was a united front of radical and leftist independent young workers in the trade unions. It was organized under the banner of opposition to the American war in Vietnam, a political slogan. It was this political slogan that succeeded in unifying all those young workers.

The students created their own national antiwar organization, the National Federation of Campus Struggle Committees, during the big explosion of campus struggles.

Q. What was the relative strength of the two committees?

A. About the same. In the early stage of the radicalization, the National Antiwar Youth Committee was bigger.

But it was the students who exploded as a social layer in 1968 and 1969. After this explosion, when students and young workers took to the streets in militant actions, the Socialist party refused to participate anymore in such a militant movement. So after that, the National Antiwar Youth Committee came under the leadership of the far-left tendencies.

This is also the time when the Trotskyists left the Socialist party; it was part of the same process.

The workers movement did not explode in the late 1960s when the students did, so the leftist young workers tended to be isolated in the trade unions. But after 1971 and 1972, after the exhaustion of the energy of the student movement, the workers began to move. The workers as a whole began to move.

So now those young workers are in a leading position, even if only at the local level. The balance of forces in the trade unions has changed in favor of the militant young workers. But even now they have no national leadership.

Q. How was this new relationship of forces reflected in the annual spring wage-increase struggle this year?

A. The vast majority of the working class joined in the last spring wage-in-

crease campaign with huge strikes. About five or six million workers joined the strikes for periods of from four days to a week last April.

In the last spring wage offensive we saw the biggest strike wave in the history of the postwar Japanese working-class movement.

The capitalists decided, however, to make a compromise to postpone a real confrontation with the workers, for two reasons. The first is that the capitalist class was able to make very big economic concessions; for example, wage increases on the order of 20,000 or 25,000 yen [approximately US\$70 or \$85] a month, or 25 to 30 percent increases. The capitalists were able to pay these increases because of their accumulation of very big profits owing to the inflation and the so-called oil crisis.

The second reason was political. Because of the very big inflation at the end of last year and the beginning of this year, the discontent of the masses was very deep. At the same time, the bourgeoisie had to hold the upper house elections in June. And the political position of the ruling bourgeois party did not look good. So the bourgeoisie wanted to avoid a serious confrontation just before the elections.

Another reason a more serious confrontation did not develop was because of the leadership of the trade-union movement. Before the last spring wage-increase campaign, the vast majority of the rank-and-file workers were very militant and wanted to put up a real fight for their demands. The union bureaucrats saw that their position was very precarious, so they were eager for a nationwide compromise with the government and bourgeoisie to keep the workers from getting out of control.

So although support for the strikes and the militancy of the workers were very high, the rank and file had no nationwide independent leftist leadership.

We see two problems before our movement now. One is how to plan and to project the next spring wage-increase campaign. And the second is how to develop an independent, political, nationwide, left-oppositionist tendency in the working class itself.

Q. What was the role of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League during the last spring wage-increase campaign?

A. We did our best to intervene in the campaign, the best example being in the city of Sendai. We attempted to make the strikes active ones, mobilizing the workers through meetings, picketing, and occupation of plants. We had success in individual unions in a number of cities, but only in Sendai were we able to have

an impact on the struggle on a city-wide scale.

Q. In the United States, the demand for a wage escalator clause to keep up with inflation has become more and more popular. Was this raised as a demand during the spring wage offensive?

A. Yes, there was much discussion about this slogan, and we ourselves posed this question during the spring wage-increase campaign. But up till now the demand for a sliding scale of wages has not been raised by the trade-union movement as a whole.

Sohyo did raise the demand for a sliding scale for pensions of retired workers, handicapped people, and payments to mothers without husbands. And the government made some concessions to this demand for a sliding scale for social benefits, because the pressures were so big because of the inflation.

Q. Is it illegal for public workers to strike in Japan, and was the right to strike a demand of the spring wage offensive?

A. Yes, the workers of the public sector have no legal right to strike. But in the past three or four years they have been making strikes de facto.

In the spring wage offensive, the government tried to take reprisals against the public workers who struck, but the reprisals were very small because this was worked out as part of the compromise between the unions and the government.

The public workers were the real vanguard of the whole general strike, and one of the main demands of the campaign was for the real right to strike. But on this point too there was a compromise, and the question was postponed for two years. □

Covert Work in State Department

According to a report by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson October 30, more than one-fourth of the 5,435 State Department employees assigned to foreign countries are actually undercover CIA agents. Anderson's source, former State Department official John Marks, named one of the agents placed in the U. S. diplomatic mission in Peking: James R. Lilley, a "political officer" who has served in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

Of the 121 Foreign Service Reserve Officers whose appointments to important posts were approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year, seventy were CIA agents, Marks disclosed.

Nota Sobre las Trayectorias de Béjar y Blanco

Por Gerry Foley

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "A Note on Careers of Béjar and Blanco", que apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 4 de noviembre].

* * *

Recientemente, Héctor Béjar, que en el pasado fue dirigente guerrillero y actualmente es funcionario de un organismo estatal peruano, visitó Suecia, como invitado especial del gobierno sueco.

Como otro conocido ex dirigente guerrillero—que ha seguido un curso muy diferente al de Béjar—vive en Suecia, el principal diario del país, *Dagens Nyheter*, consideró que había material para un artículo interesante. Arregló una reunión entre Héctor Béjar y el dirigente campesino trotskista Hugo Blanco, que fue deportado de Perú en 1971; posteriormente, en 1972, fue deportado de Argentina; en 1973 escapó de Chile, y todos los países latinoamericanos le han negado el asilo.

El informe sobre esta reunión fue publicado en el número del 14 de octubre de *Dagens Nyheter*, con el titular: "El Funcionario se Reune con el Revolucionario."

Héctor Béjar era uno de los dirigentes del Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), grupo guerrillero que estuvo activo en Perú en 1965. Es más conocido, sin embargo, por el libro que escribió sobre su fracasado intento guerrillero, *Apuntes Sobre una Experiencia Guerrillera* (ver *Intercontinental Press*, 1970 del número 2 al 10).

En 1969 obtuvo el premio que otorga al mejor ensayo la Casa de las Américas, la editorial del estado cubano. Es uno de los libros que han circulado más ampliamente de todos los que se escribieron sobre las numerosas experiencias guerrilleras que fueron impulsadas por el ejemplo de la revolución cubana. Fue también uno de los más concretos y mejor pensados.

Béjar, como muchos de los guerrilleros de la década del sesenta, recibió su primera educación política de

los stalinistas. Se unió muy joven al Partido Comunista del Perú, y llegó a ser miembro del Comité Central y editor del periódico del partido. Fue expulsado del PC en 1958, porque había desarrollado diferencias con la línea de la "coexistencia pacífica y el camino parlamentario hacia el socialismo."

Como muchos otros de su generación y antecedentes, Béjar pasó de un partido que decía estar tratando de resolver los problemas de las masas por medio de la construcción de una delicada maquinaria política que fuera perfecta para realizar "delicadas" maniobras parlamentarias y negociaciones tras bastidores, a un grupo militar que tenía la esperanza de derrotar a los enemigos de las masas a través de la construcción de un ejército que las sustituyera en la batalla. En ambos casos, la estrategia era estrictamente antimperialista, no socialista, y tenía el objetivo de unificar a todas las fuerzas patrióticas.

Por lo tanto, Béjar no apoya—y aparentemente tampoco entiende—la línea aplicada por el dirigente trotskista peruano Hugo Blanco, que es la de movilizar a las masas en base a sus preocupaciones más inmediatas y educarlas políticamente a través de hacer avanzar la lucha.

Béjar atribuyó el éxito del gobierno en reprimir al sindicato campesino que dirigía Hugo Blanco, a ciertas ilusiones por parte de éste, aparentemente en relación a la organización de la lucha armada. Béjar escribió en su libro:

"Blanco aspiraba a que 'el Sindicato Campesino se erija paulatinamente en un verdadero organismo de *poder popular* democrático, que se enfrenta a cada paso y cada día con mayor vigor al *poder patronal*, representado por el gamonal y todas las fuerzas estatales a su servicio.' . . .

"El organismo fundamental de la lucha armada en el Perú sería, según esa tesis, la milicia del sindicato dirigida por el partido. Lo que no quería decir que hubiera llegado la hora de la lucha por el poder:

"Esta etapa, decía Blanco en 1964

desde su prisión en Arequipa, no tiene un objetivo inmediato de lucha por el poder o por el derrocamiento del gobierno de Belaúnde sino objetivos más modestos y defensivos: la defensa de las ocupaciones de tierras por los campesinos, del ataque de las fuerzas armadas y de los terratenientes.

"La tesis del poder dual y de las milicias podía tener éxito como consigna para las masas y podía ser difundida y obedecida bajo un régimen burgués que, como el de Prado, alternaba la negociación con la represión; pero ya después del golpe militar de 1962 no servía para hacer frente a un ejército que había asumido el poder para 'poner orden' en el país y para arreglar cuentas, entre otras cosas, con los campesinos de La Convención.

"Cualquiera que quisiera mantenerse junto a las masas a pesar de la represión debía recurrir a la táctica guerrillera. Pero esa decisión requería una absoluta claridad sobre la metodología a aplicarse.

"Esa condición no se dio. Y a comienzos de 1963, después de los encuentros de Pucyura, solo y abandonado, Blanco cayó en poder de la policía. Un resultado en el cual la izquierda en general y particularmente la izquierda revolucionaria, tenía seria responsabilidad.

"Por eso, las masas de La Convención y Lares no desembocaron en la lucha guerrillera que constituía la culminación lógica del proceso iniciado desde 1956 . . ."

En realidad, la resistencia armada del sindicato campesino que dirigía Hugo Blanco fue más amplia y prolongada que cualquiera de las otras experiencias guerrilleras que se realizaron en Perú en los años sesenta. El desacuerdo que tenía Béjar con la orientación de ese dirigente de masas campesinas lo llevó a centrarse sólo en el hecho de que la resistencia no pudo derrotar la represión lanzada por el gobierno.

La explicación que da Blanco para esa derrota, es que la lucha de La Convención se quedó aislada por la falta de un partido revolucionario que

estuviera organizado a escala nacional.

Un factor importante en el aislamiento de la lucha de La Convención fue el sectarismo del Partido Comunista y de las corrientes que se habían desprendido de él. Béjar, a diferencia de otros que compartían sus antecedentes y orientación, tuvo la capacidad de ver esto y fue lo suficientemente honesto como para condenarlo. También fue lo suficientemente honesto como para reconocer muchos de los logros de Blanco.

"La incorporación de Hugo Blanco a la actividad organizativa de los sindicatos produce una elevación en el nivel de la lucha. 1961 y 1962 pueden señalarse como los puntos más altos de la ola sindicalista.

"Pero la ideología revolucionaria de Blanco despierta el celo de los antiguos dirigentes de la Federación Provincial y su trotsquismo la desconfianza de los dirigentes comunistas de la Federación de Trabajadores del Cuzco. Cuando en 1962 es nombrado Secretario General de aquella, la elección es impugnada por algunos miembros. Mientras tanto, el gobierno de Lima ordenaba su captura.

"Sobrevino entonces el violento período de persecución que culminó al ser apresado en mayo de 1963. El gobierno se había librado de Blanco pero no había podido evitar la liberación de miles de campesinos, el quebrantamiento del poder de los hacendados y la alteración de la estructura social preexistente. Era la primera derrota del latifundio en esas proporciones: una reforma agraria quedaba realizada de facto."

Cuando se profundizaba la crisis en Perú, una junta militar reformista tomó el poder en 1968, en un intento por prevenir una explosión general. Una de las concesiones que dió fue la liberación de la mayoría de los presos políticos que habían sido encarcelados por el gobierno de Belaúnde, incluido Blanco.

El gobierno hizo una serie de maniobras nacionalistas, como la reforma agraria parcial con el objetivo de orientar el capital hacia la industria, y la nacionalización de algunas propiedades imperialistas. Estas reformas le ganaron al régimen al apoyo de la mayor parte de la izquierda, incluidos el Partido Comunista y muchos ex guerrilleros, varios de los cuales recibieron cargos en el gobierno o en organismos semigubernamentales. Béjar fue uno de ellos.

El nuevo gobierno siguió reprimiendo, sin embargo, todas las huelgas o protestas de masas que no encajaban dentro de su programa de levantar al capital nacional. Por ejemplo, reprimió la huelga de los maestros en 1971 deportando arbitrariamente a sus dirigentes. Este era el nuevo tratamiento que se iba a dar a los izquierdistas "que no cooperaran": el

Entrevista en Suecia

Blanco y Béjar Intercambian Palabras

[El siguiente artículo, escrito por Birgitta Nyblom, apareció en el número del 14 de octubre del diario sueco *Dagens Nyheter*. La entrevista fue conducida en español y traducida al sueco por *Dagens Nyheter*. El texto en español que presentamos a continuación fue corregido por Hugo Blanco. En el número del 4 de noviembre de *Intercontinental Press* publicamos la traducción al inglés].

* * *

En diciembre de 1970 dos líderes guerrilleros peruanos fueron puestos en libertad al mismo tiempo, cuando el nuevo régimen militar llevaba dos años en el poder. Ellos eran Hugo Blanco y Héctor Béjar. Habían estado en diferentes cárceles como presos políticos. Hugo Blanco pasó más tiempo en prisión. El sábado se reunieron en Hännösand, bajo condiciones totalmente diferentes. Hugo Blanco vive exiliado en Suecia, tras haber sido deportado de Perú en 1971. Héctor Béjar es un alto funcionario del organismo estatal Sinamos [Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social], que tiene como fin organizar el movimiento popular en Perú, especialmente los sindicatos.

La reunión tuvo lugar a iniciativa de *Dagens Nyheter*, y con ella terminó la visita de una semana a Suecia que hizo Héctor Béjar, quien estuvo en el país como invitado del Ministerio del Exterior y salió el domingo para la República Democrática Alemana.

* * *

"¿Cuándo se nos permitirá a los deportados regresar a nuestro país?" Esta fue la pregunta que Hugo Blanco

exilió en vez de la prisión. Blanco, que había denunciado la naturaleza de la reforma agraria realizada por la junta y apoyado a los maestros huelgistas, fue exiliado junto con los dirigentes de la huelga.

De esta forma, las diferencias entre Hugo Blanco y Héctor Béjar han continuado después de los cambios políticos ocurridos en Perú. □

planteó de frente a Héctor Béjar repetidas veces, cuando éste lo visitó en Hännösand. Héctor Béjar explicó que a esta pregunta debería responder el gobierno peruano. En lugar de contestar, prefirió referirse a lo que se ha hecho en los últimos años: la reforma agraria; la nacionalización de las minas, la banca, la propiedad privada y los medios de producción; así como al mayor nivel de conciencia política que se ha creado entre los peruanos. Personalmente, él quisiera que Hugo Blanco regresara a Perú y discutiera de política, tanto fuera como dentro del país.

Héctor Béjar estuvo aquí para estudiar cómo moviliza sus fuerzas en los sindicatos el movimiento obrero sueco, y los programas de educación para adultos. Su itinerario fue muy pesado: visitó las oficinas del Partido Socialdemócrata y de LO [Landsorganisation—Federación Sindical Nacional], el sindicato metalúrgico, el SSU [Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsförbund—Liga Juvenil Socialdemócrata de Suecia] en Estocolmo y Bommersvik, el ABF [Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund—Liga de Educación Obrera] en Estocolmo y Västerås, TRU en Stocksund, y el fin de semana pudo observar el funcionamiento de los ministerios y del gobierno municipal de Botkyrka.

Hugo Blanco, que antes había estado refugiado en Chile, llegó a Suecia el invierno pasado y consiguió un trabajo como maestro en Sandöskolan, una escuela para la asistencia al desarrollo situada en Kramfors, al norte de Hännösand. Actualmente está siendo tratado de una dolencia en la columna vertebral en la clínica ortopédica del hospital de Hännösand, y fue allí donde Héctor Béjar lo visitó. Hugo Blanco es trotskista, miem-

bro de la Cuarta Internacional (como muchos de sus compatriotas que han trabajado o estudiado en Argentina, como él).

Realmente no se estableció ningún diálogo entre Héctor Béjar y Hugo Blanco. El problema a tratar era el programa de reforma social y el profundo cambio político que se está realizando en Perú, y la discusión fue un intercambio de palabras entre uno que está excluido de este proceso y uno que está participando en él. El período que siguió a la guerra de guerrillas está marcado por este tipo de tensiones entre los que se quedaron en su país y los que huyeron, o fueron obligados a huir.

Blanco. "¿Hay todavía presos políticos y hay todavía deportados? Creo que toda discusión política sobre Perú tiene que hacerse dentro del país."

Béjar. "No represento al gobierno. Pero trabajo dentro del régimen con satisfacción, porque ha nacionalizado todos los recursos y ha realizado la reforma agraria por la cual hemos luchado los dos. También está construyendo un importante movimiento de masas, volviéndose cada vez menos exclusivamente militar y cada vez más un gobierno revolucionario. Se hace una integración de militares y dirigentes revolucionarios.

"Lo que define a un régimen no es su carácter militar, sino lo que hace contra el imperialismo y contra la oligarquía y los grupos que han dominado al país durante muchos años. La mayoría de los peruanos exiliados pertenecen a la oligarquía. Lamento que hombres como Hugo Blanco, quien ha participado en la lucha popular de nuestro país en una manera importante, también se encuentre entre los exiliados."

Blanco. "Parece que Héctor no ha entendido mi pregunta y su finalidad. Yo me refiero a deportados como el líder estudiantil Rolando Breña, que no ha salido de la oligarquía; tampoco el dirigente de la huelga de los profesores; o Napurí y Cuentas, que apoyaron la huelga minera; o Gustavo Ruiz de Somocurcio, que participó en la huelga de Arequipa. Estos camaradas no pertenecen a la oligarquía. Han participado en la lucha de los obreros. Están exiliados. En Perú no hay ninguna ley que autorice las deportaciones. ¿Ha terminado esa situación ilegal?"

Béjar. "¡Es increíble que Hugo Blanco se preocupe por la existencia de leyes burguesas! Si las hubiéramos

observado en su totalidad, no hubiera cambiado nada. Ahora hay un diálogo entre iguales en mi país. Entre ellos se encuentra el Presidente de la República, Juan Velasco; el Ministro de Minas, y los dirigentes sindicales de los profesores y los mineros.

"Entonces, ¿debemos discutir si tenemos exiliados, o si los militares ganan mucho o ganan poco? La cuestión central para los latinoamericanos y para los peruanos es si el gobierno y el pueblo de mi país están o no enfrentándose al imperialismo; si están o no haciendo grandes esfuerzos por la transformación social."

Blanco. "He hecho una pregunta y Héctor todavía no me ha contestado: ¿cuándo va a regresar el gobierno a todos estos luchadores antimperialistas que están deportados? Ellos se interesan por los problemas de su país. Por eso han luchado consecuentemente contra el imperialismo, y quieren regresar al país para seguir luchando. Están dispuestos a discutir sobre Perú con el régimen o con cualquiera.

"Pero quieren discutir en el Perú, no en Suecia. Porque todos nosotros somos peruanos, y se nos está quitando el derecho de conversar con nuestro pueblo. Estamos exigiendo que ese atropello termine. No se puede pedir a los refugiados chilenos que discutan con el gobierno la situación de su país. Sería como pedir a los judíos que estuvieron en los campos de concentración que discutieran con Hitler.

"Quiero saber breve y claramente si el régimen peruano está dispuesto a permitir que vuelvan los revolucionarios deportados o no."

Béjar. "He dicho que no represento al gobierno y que es el gobierno peruano el que debe contestar a Hugo. Eso no significa que no tenga opinión personal. Yo considero que Hugo Blanco y sus camaradas deben volver a Perú. Nunca he ocultado esta opinión.

"Hacer una comparación, o simplemente mencionar a Pinochet o a Hitler de manera que implique una comparación con el gobierno de Velasco me parece que refleja una confusión política muy grande. Hay algunas personas en mi país que dicen que lo que está ocurriendo no es una revolución, sino fascismo. Sin embargo, no vamos a permitir que ningún fascista regrese para luchar contra nosotros.

"Pero cuando Hugo y yo estába-

mos luchando, no pedimos permiso a ningún gobierno, ni siquiera reformista, como por ejemplo el de Belaúnde. Simplemente cruzábamos las fronteras. No pedimos permiso a embajadores para luchar por nuestro pueblo."

(Béjar se refería a un pedido hecho por Blanco al embajador peruano en Estocolmo la primavera pasada para que le permitieran volver a Perú. Escribió una carta al embajador donde le decía que es un deber para todos los peruanos enfrentar la amenaza de los países reaccionarios que rodean a Perú, y que por eso se debe permitir que regresen los refugiados izquierdistas. La carta fue publicada posteriormente en el diario de Lima *El Expreso*).

Blanco. "Pregunto: ¿cuándo va a regresar el régimen peruano a los revolucionarios que ha deportado? Nunca hemos dicho que éste sea un régimen fascista; lo que digo es que el régimen peruano no tiene ninguna autoridad moral para pretender discutir sobre política con gente a quienes ha expulsado del Perú."

Béjar. "Me alegra que Hugo se esté acercando poco a poco a la discusión política que quiere evitar. ¿Considera que mi gobierno no tiene peso o autoridad moral? ¿Por qué no había de tenerla? ¿Cómo no va a tener autoridad moral un régimen que ha expulsado del país a la mayoría de las compañías imperialistas, que ha expropiado casi todos los latifundios, que ha deportado a las familias oligárquicas que constituían la clase dominante de nuestro país?"

"Yo sé que en el proceso revolucionario peruano se está construyendo una nueva organización campesina. En ella participan muchos de los trabajadores agrícolas que lucharon junto con Hugo Blanco en las décadas del cincuenta y del sesenta. Yo quisiera que el tocara este problema y discutiera sobre política. Lo único que tengo que decir es que no es de revolucionarios adoptar una actitud altisonante."

Blanco. "Me parece ridículo que un funcionario del régimen peruano que nos ha deportado para que no discutamos, nos diga ahora que eludimos la discusión. Me parece ridículo que hable de aproximación quien nos ha alejado hasta Europa. Béjar sabe lo que es de revolucionarios y lo que no es de revolucionarios. Pero yo también sé que es muy propio de funcionarios no dar una respuesta concreta

y contestar con un discurso."

Béjar. "Las acciones de los grupos imperialistas son un peligro presente y futuro. Eso no es un discurso; es un hecho."

"Hugo sabe que no hablo sólo de la aproximación física — que es importante — sino de la animica y moral. En estos momentos, los revolucionarios peruanos tenemos el deber de declarar abierta y claramente si apoyamos el proceso que se está llevando a cabo en el país, tal y como éste se ha dado, con todos los cuestionamientos y las críticas que podamos hacerle, o si estamos contra él. Y esto no son discursos."

Blanco. "Veo que es imposible que me conteste. Por lo tanto, ya no tengo más que decir."

Béjar. "Lamento que Hugo no tenga nada más que decir."

Cuando la conversación enmudeció, el soleado cielo otoñal de Härnösand se veía todavía brillante. Kerstin Lindblad de Sandöskolan, que tradujo la discusión, salió apresuradamente para llegar a un seminario sobre América Latina. El Dr. Antemor Velasco, un boliviano que escapó de Chile y que trabaja en la clínica ortopédica, intercambió unas cuantas palabras con Héctor Béjar. Quisiera regresar a América Latina. ¿Podría ir a Perú, que tiene frontera con su país?

Dagens Nyheter preguntó a Hugo Blanco qué haría si fuera funcionario en Perú.

"Actualmente soy revolucionario", respondió. □

Surge un Nuevo Partido en México

Por Ricardo Ramos

[El artículo que reproducimos a continuación fue tomado del número 13 (octubre) de *El Socialista*, órgano de la Liga Socialista, una organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional en México.

[En 1972, algunos de los dirigentes del movimiento estudiantil de 1968 que estuvieron presos a consecuencia de la represión del gobierno contra ese movimiento, y Demetrio Vallejo, líder de las luchas ferrocarrileras de 1948 y 1958, y actualmente figura central del Movimiento Sindical Ferrocarrilero (MSF — grupo de oposición sindical), comenzaron a organizar el Comité Nacional de Auscultación y Organización (CNAO), con el objetivo declarado de construir un partido de los trabajadores.

[Al poco tiempo, sin embargo, comenzó a darse una lucha interna entre los dirigentes mejor conocidos del Comité y un grupo de jóvenes, la mayoría de los cuales habían sido activistas estudiantiles.

[Se produjo una escisión, que se consumó cuando los elementos jóvenes abandonaron el CNAO y realizaron una Asamblea Nacional de Balance y Consulta, en julio de 1973. Allí se llamó a la formación del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST).

[El otro grupo conservó el nombre de CNAO, hasta el 9 de septiembre,

en que se transformó en Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores, celebrando su congreso de fundación].

* * *

El pasado mes de septiembre se constituyó el Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (PMT). De esta manera el CNAO (Comité Nacional de Auscultación y Organización) se transforma en partido. Al congreso asistieron alrededor de 300 delegados (entre efectivos y fraternales) haciéndose notoria la presencia del hijo de Echeverría, como delegado fraternal. El número de delegados reunidos en el congreso del PMT se nos hizo muy reducido, ya que dicen tener alrededor de 45 mil miembros.

Creemos que si el PMT agrupara a tantas personas, habría superado con mucho la cifra de 500 delegados que el PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores), reunió en julio del año pasado.

Sin embargo, lo fundamental es hacer un balance crítico de la Declaración de Principios y de los puntos programáticos aparecidos en un desplegado de *Excelsior*, el día 20 de septiembre de 1974.

Es muy importante que el movimiento de izquierda discuta este programa a la luz de lo que plantea, y no que utilice el adjetivo fácil de "per-

turos", para sustituir la discusión política. El insulto en contra de Heberto Castillo (presidente del PMT) no puede ayudar en nada a unas de las tareas más importantes que tiene la izquierda en México: la clarificación política. Si hay una crítica, ésta tiene que ser programática.

Es alentador hacer notar que el PMT a diferencia del PST, no llama a una "alianza popular revolucionaria" con los elementos "progresistas" de la burguesía.

Es importante recalcar el hecho de que el PMT no propone alianzas con la burguesía nacional (o sectores de ella). No hay organismos más perniciosos para la clase obrera que estos frentes populares de conciliación de clases. Ha habido tantas derrotas por causa de este tipo de organismos en la historia del movimiento obrero, que es fundamental definirse con respecto a ellos.

Simplemente la derrota en Chile, se debió precisamente a la Unidad Popular, un organismo de colaboración de clases.

No hay peor traición que la de hacer confiar a la clase obrera en su enemigo de clase: la burguesía. Esperamos que los compañeros del PMT tomarán una posición al respecto de este punto tan importante.

En la introducción a su Declaración de Principios, los compañeros nos dicen que enarbolarán "las banderas de Hidalgo, Morelos, Flores Magón, Villa, Zapata, Cárdenas y de todos los mexicanos que han defendido los derechos de los humildes y con ellos, se enfrentaron a los poderosos...".

Se puede propagandísticamente decir: "seguir la tradición de Hidalgo, Flores Magón, Villa, Zapata" aunque ninguno de ellos haya tenido un programa bolchevique.

Con respecto a Cárdenas es de principios tomar una posición tajante, ya que se trata de un dirigente de la burguesía y, además, no de cualquier dirigente de esa clase, sino del que le dió al estado mexicano su actual contenido.

Cárdenas pudo, con la ayuda de Lombardo Toledano y del Partido Comunista Mexicano, colocar a la clase obrera detrás del estado burgués. No en balde la clase obrera mexicana ha sido de las más pasivas, si no la más pasiva de América Latina.

Es decir, la burguesía en México, por medio de Cárdenas pudo ilusionar

a la clase obrera y a los campesinos para así poder consolidar su estado recientemente formado.

No hay peor derrota para la clase obrera que cuando se le roba su conciencia de clase, cuando ésta es sometida voluntariamente a su enemigo de clase. Esto es peor que una masacre, en que se le derrota, pero queda viva la conciencia. No podemos más que ser tajantes en este aspecto: que los trabajadores volvieran a confiar en un gobierno reformista como el de Cárdenas significaría la derrota para el movimiento obrero. Cárdenas sólo puede ser la bandera para la burguesía, no para los obreros.

La Declaración de Principios y el programa del PMT, tienden a caer en ambigüedades. Hay puntos que nos hacen pensar que se lucha por el socialismo, pero también los hay que alientan la continuación del capitalismo. Por ejemplo:

En el punto 2 de su Declaración de Principios nos dicen que: "ningún ser humano tiene derecho a explotar en su beneficio el trabajo de otros seres humanos."

Y en el punto 5 de la misma Declaración: "El trabajo humano es el origen de toda riqueza. Por ello, esa riqueza debe pasar a poder de los trabajadores manuales e intelectuales, del campo y de la ciudad, quienes son sus verdaderos propietarios."

Acerca de estos puntos es difícil para un revolucionario estar en contra de ellos, en general.* Sin embargo, el punto 11 de la Declaración de Principios dice:

"Las empresas del imperialismo operan con grandes utilidades en México, sin resolver el creciente problema del desempleo. Muchas de ellas se cu-

* Decimos "en general", porque algunas formulaciones son imprecisas. Por ejemplo, para los marxistas la riqueza no es producto sólo del trabajo humano. Marx, en el primer capítulo de la primera sección de *El Capital*, sobre la mercancía, explica lo siguiente: "... las mercancías consideradas como objetos corpóreos, son combinaciones de dos elementos: la materia, que suministra la naturaleza, y el trabajo... El trabajo no es, pues, la fuente única y exclusiva de los valores de uso que produce, de la riqueza material. El trabajo es, como ha dicho William Petty, el padre de la riqueza, y la tierra la madre." (*El Capital*, Vol. I, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1973).

bren con apariencia de mexicanas gracias al anonimato de las acciones. Las acciones de las empresas deberán ser nominativas para acabar con los prestanombres."

A nosotros no nos debe interesar cómo sean o dejen de ser las acciones de las empresas; nos interesa que éstas pasen al control de los obreros. Un programa revolucionario dá soluciones a los trabajadores de la ciudad y del campo, al campesinado, e incluso a la pequeño burguesía. Pero nunca dá soluciones a la burguesía.

Hay algunos puntos válidos en la Declaración de Principios y en el programa del PMT, otros no tan válidos y algunos innecesarios. Pero el problema fundamental estriba en el método de plantear un programa revolucionario.

Por ejemplo, es sumamente necesario aclarar cuáles son los métodos de lucha; es decir: sólo la movilización independiente del proletariado y sus aliados puede imponer su poder. Hay que hacer notar también, que aún las demandas mínimas y las democráticas no pueden ser concedidas por un estado capitalista subdesarrollado y cada vez más en crisis económica. Que para llevar a cabo estas demandas es necesario establecer un gobierno obrero-campesino.

Por otro lado, el programa no menciona para nada la palabra socialismo. Se podría argüir que no se necesita hacer explícito lo que va implícito en los puntos antes mencionados. Sin embargo, debemos ser claros ante las masas y llamar a las cosas por su nombre. Si pretendemos instaurar un sistema socialista, así lo decimos. No tenemos nada que ocultar. Creer que hablar de socialismo nos aleja de las masas, es subestimarlas.

Otro punto en el que también es necesario hacer énfasis es el que se refiere a las nacionalizaciones y expropiaciones que propone el PMT. Esto es correcto, pero no hay que dejarlo ahí: hay que proponer el control obrero de la industria nacionalizada. De otra manera, terminaría controlándola el estado de la burguesía.

Siempre que se plantea un programa, es bajo la idea de gobernar con él. Si estamos convencidos de que la manera de solucionar los problemas de las masas explotadas, es por medio del cambio de estructuras sociales y económicas del país, que los medios e instrumentos de producción sean propiedad social y no de la burguesía,

entonces es necesario plantear qué tipo de gobierno proponemos y bajo la dirección de qué clase va a ser.

Es por eso, que hay que reafirmar la idea de un gobierno obrero y campesino con un programa de reivindicaciones para las clases explotadas, en contra de los explotadores.

Los planteamientos de los compañeros del PMT son un tanto ambiguos. Esperamos que una discusión seria pueda clarificar aún más la política de este movimiento. □

Policía Mata a Cordobesa

Los diarios argentinos del 20 de octubre, dan a conocer la noticia de la muerte de la joven militante del Partido Comunista Tita Hidalgo, a consecuencia de las torturas recibidas después de su detención en el local de dicha organización en la ciudad de Córdoba.

Como se recordará, el día 9 de octubre la policía realizó en esa ciudad un operativo represivo durante el cual fueron allanados los locales de Luz Y Fuerza, del Partido Comunista y del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores. En este último—como informáramos en *Intercontinental Press* del 21 de octubre—la policía cometió salvajes destrozos, y detuvo a los militantes de ese partido que se encontraban en el edificio. Luego les aplicó brutales castigos.

También en el local del PC fueron detenidos miembros de esta organización que se encontraban en el lugar. Las torturas aplicadas a una joven detenida, provocaron su muerte algunos días más tarde.

Esto es parte de una escalada represiva del gobierno dirigida hacia el movimiento obrero y sectores de izquierda, que culmina con la promulgación de la Ley de Seguridad, que entre otras cosas, anula el derecho de opinión y el derecho de huelga. □

Es fácil suscribirse...

Para recibir *IP* durante seis meses, envíe \$7.50 con su nombre y dirección a:

Intercontinental Press
P. O. Box 116, Village Sta.
New York NY 10014 U. S. A.

Asesinan Tres Trotskistas Argentinos

Por Gerry Foley

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Argentine Death Squads Slay Three Trotskyists", que aparece en este número de *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Cuatro personas fueron asesinadas entre el sábado 2 y el domingo 3 en Buenos Aires, por las bandas de derecha. Tres de ellas eran miembros del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, una organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional en Argentina.

La otra, Carlos Alberto de la Riva, era profesor de la Universidad de La Plata.

El viernes 1, por la noche, un grupo de hombres que dijeron pertenecer a la policía, sacaron de su domicilio por la fuerza a Rubén Bouzas, que vivía en el Gran Buenos Aires.

Al mediodía del sábado fue encontrado su cuerpo. Había sido asesinado con disparos de escopeta. Bouzas tenía 20 años, era estudiante secundario.

Hecía un año y medio que era miembro del PST. Militaba en la Juventud Socialista de la localidad de Ramos Mejía.

Juan Carlos Nievas fue también secuestrado en su domicilio el viernes. A las pocas horas fue encontrado en la zona de Villa del Retiro. Su cuerpo presentaba múltiples heridas de escopeta.

Nievas tenía 26 años. Era obrero de la fábrica Nestlé y se había destacado como activista de su fábrica, durante una ocupación que hubo por aumento de salarios. De noche concurría a una escuela secundaria nocturna. Desde hacía varios meses era miembro del PST.

El domingo 3, por la noche, después de la realización del Congreso anual del PST, César Robles se dirigió a una heladería. De allí fue sacado por la fuerza, por un grupo de individuos. Fue llevado en un auto; a las dos horas apareció su cuerpo ametrallado en Floresta, una



Avanzada Socialista

Uno de los tres hermanos del miembro del PST que fueron golpeados por los matones.

zona del Gran Buenos Aires.

César Robles tenía 36 años. Se encontraba entre los principales dirigentes nacionales del PST. Era miembro del Comité Ejecutivo Nacional. A poco de integrarse al partido entró a trabajar en el frigorífico Swift de Berisso, de donde fue despedido. Durante la dictadura de Onganía, fue uno de los dirigentes de la primera huelga obrera que sacudió al régimen militar, que fue la huelga portuaria. Fue el organizador de la zona norte del Gran Buenos Aires, donde el PST alcanzó gran influencia en el movimiento obrero. Fue pionero en la tarea de extender el partido nacionalmente. Esa tarea lo llevó a Córdoba donde junto con otros compañeros permitió que el PST jugara un papel destacado en las luchas obreras de esa provincia.

Esta nueva ola de crímenes siguió al asesinato, el 1 de noviembre, de Alberto Villar, jefe de la policía, por guerrilleros peronistas de izquierda. Las bandas de matones de derecha han amenazado muchas veces con "vengar" la muerte de cualquier funcionario gubernamental derechista, en particular, de miembros del ejército y la policía.

Todavía no está claro si los matones que asesinaron a los tres miembros del PST y al profesor actuaban en respuesta al asesinato de Villar. Pero, de cualquier manera, es evidente que estos asesinatos son parte de una ola de terror derechista que se viene haciendo cada vez más amplia.

Al mismo tiempo que las bandas derechistas han ampliado su blanco para incluir no sólo a guerrilleros de izquierda y militantes socialistas, sino también a políticos burgueses liberales, profesores e incluso artistas apolíticos, su comportamiento ha comenzado a tomar los aspectos del culto al sadismo y al oscurantismo típicos de los comandos fascistas.

Además, esta escalada del terror derechista ha estado estrechamente vinculada con acciones represivas cada vez más brutales y arbitrarias, cometidas por la misma policía. Uno de los ejemplos más claros fueron los sucesos del 9 de octubre en Córdoba.

La policía habló vagamente sobre "armas" y "francotiradores" en los locales de los sindicatos combativos, para justificar su ataque contra el último reducto de la resistencia contra la burocracia sindical derechista. Pero no quedaron satisfechos. Sin siquiera buscar un pretexto, aprovecharon la ocasión para invadir los locales del PST y del Partido Comunista. Todas las personas que estaban en estas oficinas fueron encarceladas y golpeadas. La policía fue particularmente brutal con los militantes del Partido Comunista, uno de los cuales, Tita Hidalgo, murió a consecuencia de los golpes recibidos.

Las acusaciones presentadas por el Partido Comunista fueron resumidas por *Avanzada Socialista*, semanario del PST, en su número del 30 de octubre:

"... los cuarenta y ocho detenidos fueron golpeados sin la más mínima consideración a su edad, estado de salud, etc. En general, los hombres presentaban hematomas en todo el cuerpo, especialmente en la espalda y zona lumbar, y muestras de gol-

pes y heridas en la cabeza y los ojos. Las mujeres, entre las que había una chica de quince años, sufrieron vejaciones especiales con los caños de las armas, que les provocaron peligrosas heridas. Una compañera, embarazada de cinco meses, también fue obligada a ponerse cuerpo a tierra, pisada y golpeada."

La librería del Partido Comunista fue completamente destruida, y los "agentes de la ley y el orden" se llevaron todo el dinero que encontraron. Pintaron insultos en las paredes, incluyendo el siguiente:

"Si son comunista como Guarany, mas bien bayanse del pais porque los bamos a matar, uno por uno, si cae un Policia van a caer tres de ustedes, bolches hijos de p...".

Este mensaje estaba firmado por "Las Tres A" (AAA—Alianza Anticomunista Argentina). Esta es la banda de asesinos que ha amenazado a varios miembros del parlamento argentino, profesores y todo tipo de personajes públicos. En muchos casos ha cumplido brutalmente sus amenazas.

En el local del PST también aparecieron escritas en las paredes las iniciales de las AAA.

La noche del 22 de octubre, una banda derechista derribó la puerta de la casa de un miembro del PST en un distrito de Buenos Aires. La banda estaba formada por veinte hombres fuertemente armados. Encontraron a la madre y a tres hermanos del miembro del PST, que no hacían ninguna actividad política. Amenazaron con matar a la madre si no les decía dónde podían encontrar al "hijo de p... que el sábado fue a la reunión en el local de Ramos Mejía"; es decir, su hijo.

Los tres hermanos, que son obreros de la construcción, fueron salvajemente golpeados. Uno fue golpeado en el hombro con una de sus propias herramientas, que es muy pesada.

"Los tres hermanos tuvieron que ser hospitalizados", informaba *Avanzada Socialista* el 30 de octubre, "con hematomas y heridas cortantes en la cabeza y en el rostro, que los hacían irreconocibles hasta para sus familiares. El mayor tiene el brazo fracturado y el siguiente serios golpes en la columna."

Los representantes del PST tuvieron problemas para entrar a hablar con los hermanos en el hospital. "Ni siquiera su hermano—el que buscaban los matones—tenía acceso a la sala.

Recién cuando llegó otro familiar que se desempeña en el cuerpo de vigilancia de una importante repartición estatal y mostró su credencial, nos fue permitido visitarlos. Allí hablando con ellos, nos enteramos que ciertos médicos—según dijeron, por consejo de la Policía—les habían recomendado que 'no contaran nada.'"

El mismo 22 de octubre, un grupo de treinta matones invadió el local del PST en la ciudad de Chivilcoy, provincia de Buenos Aires. Llegaron en dos autobuses que formaban parte de la comitiva del gobernador derechista, Calabró, que estaba encabezando un desfile en el lugar, y realizando una serie de actos. Parte de la comitiva pasó por enfrente del local del PST cuando iban al lugar en donde se haría un asado.

"... cuando vieron el comité del PST se enloquecieron", dijo a *Avanzada Socialista* un testigo de los hechos. "Se bajaron unas treinta personas armadas. Uno se trepó a la pared y arrancó el cartel del partido, otros rompieron los vidrios de las ventanas y otros tiraron la puerta abajo. Después entraron todos."

Comandos derechistas atacaron el 23 de octubre el local nacional del PST. "El hecho ocurrió a las 5", informaba *Avanzada Socialista*, cuando los compañeros estaban limpiando el lugar. "... se disparó una ráfaga de ametralladora calibre 9mm. contra la cortina metálica de la Librería 'Avanzada', perteneciente al Partido, y contra el frente. Según testigos oculares los disparos se hicieron desde un Falcon verde tripulado por cuatro individuos que vestían ropas oscuras.

"Cuando varios compañeros salieron a observar desde el balcón del primer piso, otro automóvil grande, probablemente un Dodge Polara, arrojó una granada contra el frente, cuyas esquirlas alcanzaron a los automóviles estacionados de varios vecinos, destruyendo vidrios y carrocerías."

Ocho dirigentes del segundo partido burgués más grande del país, la Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) fueron amenazados por las AAA, informó *Avanzada Socialista* el 30 de octubre. Entre ellos estaba Raúl Alfonsín, uno de los principales dirigentes nacionales de la UCR.

Dos diarios provinciales, *La Voz de Concordia* y *La Voz del Interior* recibieron ultimátums de las AAA.

También fueron amenazados varios

actores y actrices que no tenían vínculos políticos. Las AAA los consideraba malos ejemplos morales.

El 25 de octubre renunciaron todas las autoridades de la Universidad de Tucumán, en el norte del país, como resultado de la campaña de terror de las AAA.

Los matones derechistas impulsaron su campaña de intimidación contra las autoridades universitarias, además de por otros medios, ametrallando la cafetería universitaria y después volándola, señalaba *Avanzada Socialista* el 30 de octubre. También ametrallaron la casa del profesor Orlando Bravo, jefe del Departamento de Física. Asaltaron la Facultad de Filosofía, gritando que eran "de la policía y las AAA" y que buscaban al decano.

El diario local *La Gaceta* informaba el 24 de octubre que la casa de verano del decano del Departamento de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Carlos Sanjuan, fue volada por tres poderosas bombas que explotaron simultáneamente.

Además, desparramaron cabezas de gallinas y cuerpos de perros con la garganta cortada, junto con volantes que decían: "esto es sólo una muestra de lo que les espera si no renuncian."

La Gaceta informaba también que "en el lugar se encontraron impresos dirigidos al Rector de la Universidad, Pedro Amadeo Heredia, mediante los cuales la organización se atribuye haber volado los domicilios del Decano de Derecho 'al no haber cumplimiento por parte suya y de algunos de sus secuaces de renunciar en forma indeclinable a su cargo.' Asimismo es factible que con estos atentados la organización deja una pequeña advertencia de nuestras futuras acciones para limpiar nuestras Universidades de infiltrados traidores."

Avanzada Socialista decía que hay varios signos de que se está formando un frente amplio para enfrentar el terror reaccionario. Ponía el ejemplo de varios dirigentes del sindicato de petroleros privados, en la ciudad sureña de Comodoro Rivadavia, que recibieron amenazas de las AAA. "El viernes pasado [25 de octubre], los petroleros privados realizaron un paro de repudio. Reunidos en asamblea, decidieron posteriormente marchar por las calles de Comodoro llevando así a toda la población la decisión de enfrentar a los matones fascistas." □

Roy Medvedev Debates With Panin, Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and Others

[We print below an essay by Soviet dissident Roy Medvedev. Medvedev is perhaps best known for his extensive unofficial history of the Stalin era, *Let History Judge*.

[During the past year, Medvedev has been a central participant in an unofficial political debate of sorts. Other participants include physicist Andrei Sakharov, who, like Medvedev, is still inside the Soviet Union, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who was forcibly expelled from the Soviet Union in February 1974.

[The discussion was essentially initiated by the November 1973 release of Medvedev's long essay "Problems of Democratization and Detente."¹ In this essay, Medvedev took issue with the views Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn had expressed in statements issued in the late summer and fall of 1973.

[For example, Medvedev disagreed with Sakharov's statements to foreign correspondents on the subject of the detente. In August 1973, Sakharov had called on bourgeois governments and politicians to support the struggle for democracy in the USSR and urged foreign powers not to engage in detente with the Soviet rulers unless measures of democratization were instituted in the USSR.

[Medvedev said: "In the final analysis, [the heads of state in the West] are defending the interests of the ruling classes in their own countries, and it should by no means be assumed that capitalist circles in the USA, Britain, France, or West Germany are particularly interested in a rapid development of socialist democracy in the USSR . . . why should they give up their profits?"

[Medvedev also disagreed with some of the views Solzhenitsyn expressed in his "Peace and Violence" statement of September 1973.² In it Solzhenitsyn had chastized foreign public opinion, especially left-wing opinion, for not being sufficiently concerned with the political repression in the Soviet Union. Solzhenitsyn stated: "Could a Negro militant in South Africa



SOLZHENITSYN

be detained and tormented with impunity for four years as General Grigorenko has been? The storm of world indignation would have torn the roof off his prison long ago."

[Medvedev responded: "This position [of Solzhenitsyn's] is mistaken. In the same statement we find no such strong words of protest . . . against the odious apartheid system in South Africa. Unfortunately, no protests have yet torn the roofs off the prisons and camps where hundreds of thousands of South African Blacks are incarcerated. No protests have yet flung open the gates of the concentration camps in Indonesia, where hundreds of thousands are held without trial for their left-wing beliefs. No protests have yet halted the bloody terror in Chile. Of course, one's own pain always seems worse than that of others. Nevertheless, it is impermissible to fall into a kind of 'Moscow-Centrism' and fail to see that in many other countries there are political problems just as acute and very often even more acute than those of the USSR."

[Medvedev has been attacked from many sides, including by other Soviet dissidents, not only for his ideas but also for the very fact that he criticized the views of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. The essay below is Medvedev's response to

some of these criticisms.

[The translation was done for *Intercontinental Press* by Marilyn Vogt.]

* * *

My article "The Problem of Democratization and Detente" published November 1973 by the newspaper *Zeit* provoked a lively discussion in the foreign press as well as in various circles of the Soviet intelligentsia. Naturally, not all the participants in this discussion have supported the fundamental theses set forth in my article, which I myself do not consider irreproachable. Nevertheless, it seems to me that several of the comments require a public response.

On the Importance of Discussion Among the 'Dissidents'

The first of the reproaches addressed at me was that I am initiating among the "dissidents" a discussion that is supposedly inadmissible "for moral reasons." "There are too few of us," one of my friends wrote to me. "We are all under such strong pressure from the authorities that we cannot allow ourselves the luxury of open discussion."

I cannot agree with this point of view.

The democratic movement in the USSR has never been united, and the polemic within it has been going on for a long time. It is clear that we must all stand together when it comes to speaking out in defense of civil rights and protesting against tyranny and violations of legality. However, the ideas different groups of dissenters have on ways and means for—and mainly on the goals and the character of—the democratization necessary for our country, differ in many respects. Therefore, discussion on all these questions is inevitable and useful.

"The details of political views are truly immaterial at the present time," says one of the letters I received. But, in reality, what is involved is not details, but principles. A. I. Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Rulers of the Soviet Union," published recently in the West, bears witness to this. This document caused profound disappointment among the majority of people who sincerely respect Solzhenitsyn for his artistic talent and courage. And of course, personal respect for a man who is openly and uncompromisingly fighting against tyranny and violence cannot and *must not* compel people to be silent when they do not agree with the great writer's retrograde views on the history of Russia and perspectives for Russia's development and on the democratic institutions of the West. And it has long been known that truth is not born from the reverent memorization of the words of a "Great Teacher" (even if he is not persecuting but is being

1. For full English text, see *New Left Review*, Jan.-Feb. 1974, pp. 27-40.

2. For an English translation of the full text, see the *New York Times*, September 15, 1973.

persecuted). Truth arises only out of a clash of ideas and through arguments. Therefore, we who seek truth should not impose in our midst a mechanism whereby we must "copy" one another or prohibit ourselves from arguing.

"A major discussion among the dissidents," wrote V. Chalidze in his "Open Letter," "is no less valuable than the existence of dissent itself." I agree with this.

On Pressure 'From Below' and Concessions 'From Above'

In my article, I wrote about the mounting dissatisfaction and discontent among the broad masses of our people with many aspects of Soviet life. I contended, however, that given the obvious political passivity of the people, pressure from below is very, very weakly felt by "the top" and, therefore, cannot lead to rapid changes in the direction of democratization.

"You do not know our working class and peasantry," argue two Old Bolsheviks. "Our people are at present exhibiting a very high level of activity. Look at what kind of counterplans they are advancing in the factories and how socialist competition has been developed here. Many important initiatives are coming from the village. The problem is simply that we, the intelligentsia, are not yet able to take advantage of this mounting activity among the people and cannot direct it toward the struggle against bureaucratism and for the democratization of society."

"Roy Medvedev is an armchair scientist," D. Panin writes in an article published in several emigre newspapers. "He has spent his life studying books published mainly in the USSR. Hence his total lack of information. The population of the USSR has carried on and is carrying on year after year a continuous smoldering struggle against the hated regime of enslavement using the means available to them very effectively. . . . Roy Medvedev's statement about the political passivity of the workers and peasants does not correspond to reality. The rank-and-file toilers in the grip of terror do not appear openly signing, shall we say petitions, for example, but apply more effective means. They carry on a clandestine economic struggle." According to Panin's words, it is precisely this con-

scious economic sabotage by the people that not only explains the economic and technical difficulties of the USSR, but will lead, it seems, in the not too distant future to an "explosion of the system from within," the "overthrow of the class of party bureaucrats," and the "collapse of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism," which is in principle incompatible with democracy.

"Our government fully and organically fits our people," says one of the "Open Letters" I received. "Look at the people around you. The majority of them need nothing. They have a television, vodka, a few diversions, and they are totally satisfied. These people do not need any sort of democratization. The present generation of the Russian nation and intelligentsia only proves the correctness of the saying that every people deserves the government it has."

It goes without saying, I do not pretend to have a profound knowledge of the thoughts and moods of all layers of our people, a scientific study of which is not generally conducted here—in any case, not openly. But I also do not believe I am especially ignorant in this respect. And I do not believe any of the points of view cited above to be correct.

Of course, everywhere in our country there are people who are doing excellent work with enthusiasm in their areas, be it smelting steel, testing lasers, cultivating grain, or raising children. But people who love their work are everywhere. This is in no way a sign of political activism.

But just as mistaken is the conception of some sort of "smoldering and clandestine" economic struggle with a deliberate reduction of labor productivity, worsening of the quality of goods, and so on. And although dissatisfaction with many aspects of Soviet reality exists, on the whole the population of the country—even if only deep down and passively—supports the principal aspects of the foreign and domestic policy of the ruling circles.

Undoubtedly, this is explained to a large degree by the fact that they are misinformed. The state of affairs within the country and abroad is presented to the majority of our people in a distorted light. The most obvious example: August 1968, when the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic did not meet any objections from the overwhelming majority of our people. As a rule, the ordinary people in our country believed the version of events propagated by the Soviet press—that an invasion of Czechoslovakia was being prepared by the GFR [Federal Republic of Germany] or NATO forces, that a counterrevolutionary overturn in a fraternal socialist country was imminent, and so on. The officers and soldiers sent into the Czechoslovak SSR from the Soviet

military divisions were prepared to shoot these imaginary counterrevolutionaries. These soldiers and officers, upon receiving the order, would have advanced into the territory of any other country—for example, into the Near East—in the same efficient and disciplined manner. This is because even in such critical situations, we have practically no pressure from below when there is no crystallized public opinion. In any case, it is not a factor that the government must pay attention to.

For the time being, we have no mass movement, either openly or covertly, for the democratization of the country, much less a mass struggle for a change in the economic, social, and political system in the USSR. And it is difficult to anticipate how strong pressure "from below" in defense of democratic freedoms will be in the coming years. But what is involved here is in no way some peculiar feature of the Russian nation and the Russian intelligentsia.

Russia, as is well known, rushed through the stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution in several months. These several months, in the course of which Russia was—according to Lenin's expression—the freest country in the world, was not enough time for any sort of stable democratic traditions to come into being in the country or to consolidate in the people's consciousness convictions as to the enormous value of such democratic freedoms as the freedom of assembly and organization.

One must remember, besides, that the population of the USSR in its majority did not yet pass through a period of being saturated with basic material wealth, after which follows, as a rule, a clearer awareness of a short supply of spiritual nourishment, civil rights, and freedom as well as the demand to take part in the making of fundamental decisions concerning the life of the people and management of local affairs and production. It is not surprising that people are more indifferent to a shortage of democratic freedoms than they are to a shortage of meat and milk. It is natural that people react first of all to a shortage of those goods that they have already become accustomed to having.

All this, however, does not give anyone the moral right to contemptuously condemn the people instead of trying to bring home to them the indissoluble link between the democratization of the system of government and an improvement of the people's living standard. A lack of understanding of this link and an indifference to the problems of democratization are explained not by any peculiar attributes of the Russian people but by the historical route our country has gone through. That is why the pressure from below is so insignificant in our country and why the demands for a renewal of

When You Move...

Don't count on the post office forwarding your Intercontinental Press! It's against their rules.

Send us your new address. And in plenty of time, please.

our ideological and political institutions and for the establishment of genuine socialist democracy sound so weak. The weakness of pressure from below is especially striking when compared with the mounting administrative, ideological, and political pressure from the top directed toward the suppression of intellectual freedom, an even greater homogeneity of thought among the Soviet people, and the propagation of antiquated ideological dogmas and norms that more often than not have nothing in common with Marxism.

The political passivity of the broad masses is a sad but real fact that we cannot help but take into account in our discussions and prognoses. But I never believed that democratic freedoms could only be granted to us "from above" and that it was therefore necessary to fold up the democratic movement and wait for favors from the government. My thinking, perhaps poorly expressed, was that the expansion of the democratic movement, which unfortunately until now has been primarily the concern of individuals or small groups of intellectuals, will increase the chances for definite concessions from above; and this in turn will multiply the forms of the democratic movement and facilitate its activity.

However, some of my opponents do not want to hear about this interrelationship between pressure from below and concessions from above. "If it must come from above, then I don't need such democratization," one of them declared not long ago. But here one must say frankly that if we do not intend to call for revolutionary means or dream about some sort of coup d'etat, we can count only on pressure from below and—as a result of it—on concessions from above.

Of course, that which is given from above is comparatively easily taken back. The "liberalization" of the beginning of the 1960s and the reinstatement of a harsher course at the end of the 1960s was clear enough evidence of this. Only the presence of stable democratic traditions within the society can guarantee against such turns. But these traditions do not arise by themselves. They are built and consolidated only in the course of a mass political movement that cannot be simply a spontaneous movement. Such a movement demands the establishment of organizations, the advancement of leaders, the elaboration of different political conceptions, the struggle of opinions, and so forth. But all this can only emerge given the presence of a certain openness to express views and a certain minimum of democratic freedoms that do not exist now and which the democratic movement must secure. To assert that concessions from above are impossible in principle, to repudiate even the very minimal reforms that offer a potential for improving the political

climate in our country—such an orientation is unrealistic; it virtually closes off the most realistic course for the democratization of our society.

A Few Words on the Infrastructure of Present-Day Soviet Society

Soviet society as it is at the present time is a peculiar and still very-little-



CHALIDZE: Called for discussion among the dissidents.

studied phenomenon. The fundamental features and mechanisms for the functioning of our political and social organism are not sufficiently clear even to those who are at the top of the "pyramid." Hence, apparently, the shortcomings in their reactions to the most negligible manifestations of dissent and the pettiness that so often surprises foreign observers.

The undemocratic nature of the present political structure in the USSR is obvious and it is not difficult to outline the democratic reforms desired for our country. The implementation of such reforms, harmoniously combining socialism and democracy, would undoubtedly enrich our people both materially and spiritually and would make socialism incomparably more attractive to the peoples of all the world. But *how*, in the conditions we have, do we pave the way for such reforms?

Academician A. D. Sakharov considers his positions and demands as "purely moral." It is of considerable importance to declare moral demands, and this is natural for a learned physicist. But for people devoting themselves professionally to the political and social sciences moral indignation alone is not enough. While studying Soviet society, they must seek realistic possibilities and realistic routes for its democratic development.

From a purely moral position, one can, of course, not just hold "the elite" accountable for their actions but can also reproach the intelligentsia, if only for its political passivity. However, if we want not only to declare our feelings but also to secure real changes, we must proceed from the real state of things. In our conclusions and calculations we thus must bear in mind *this* people, *this* youth, *this* intelligentsia, *this* ruling elite, and *this* regime, which will not be routed by statements and books but which can (although this task is extremely difficult) be gradually transformed to secure the establishment of socialism "with a human face." For this to happen, of course, we need a better knowledge of *what it is* we want to change.

In the democratic countries of the West with their relative freedom of speech and press and the large number of different organizations, from the extreme right to the extreme left, the links between society and the state apparatus are very complex and indirect. The social infrastructure there is in many ways independent of the state. In addition, private ownership of a large part of the means of production, the firms in the service industries, and the mass media is not just a means of exploiting people; it does not just produce anarchy and disregard of the public interest. By meeting certain social needs, private production creates to a certain extent a self-regulating economic system. This not only relieves the state organs of many responsibilities but weakens their influence on public affairs. On the other hand, privately owned companies, while making good use of the state, remain in many respects independent of it. Thus, for example, while fully controlling the official activities of their employees, making their material well-being dependent upon their loyalty to the interests of the firm, these firms and monopolies are more or less indifferent to the nationality and the religious and political persuasions of their employees; at any rate, they have the option of being indifferent.

Soviet society does not have such a complex infrastructure at the present time. Of course, in the USSR, too, there are different social layers and groups with diverse interests that often do not coincide with one another, and there are people with different views. However, all these differences are hardly manifested at all in the system of social relations. Given the one-party system; the absence of genuine self-government in enterprises and municipal organs; and the absence of independent newspapers, journals, and publishers, almost the entire economic and social life of our huge country is run from a single center. All social organizations, including even some sort of society for cactus, canary, or dog fanciers, are not

independent but work under the control of corresponding organizations of the CPSU. The work of all the organs of the press and all publishing houses is controlled particularly closely.

The party and state organs are responsible for the work of the largest enterprises and the smallest repair shops, the huge restaurants and the tiniest snackbar. They look after the construction of new cities and after the work on elevators and waterpipes in each individual home. The party organizations, like a nervous system, penetrate into every cell of our social organism, while the state organs make up what could be considered its bone and muscle system. The entire system for maintaining the life of the Soviet people is dependent upon the activity of party and state officials, and they time and again make every citizen in the USSR concretely aware of this.

Such a cumbersome and unyielding structure of rule, devoid of any sort of democratic counterweight, undoubtedly serves as an obstacle to the economic, intellectual, and moral development of society. The tendency toward bureaucratization in the party and state organs is becoming almost insurmountable. Poor work by any institution of leadership has an extremely unhealthy effect on the entire social organism. In addition, the struggles— independent of social control—flaring up from time to time between different departments and individual leaders (arising more often than not around administrative interests or simply personal flaws rather than motives of principle) inflict tremendous material and moral damage upon the society.

Such a system can turn out to be extremely vulnerable given the emergence of some type of internal crisis, as we have seen to one degree or another in the examples of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, this inflexible, and in a certain sense even fragile, structure is extremely powerful. The social infrastructure that has taken shape in our country gives the leadership of the party and state a degree of power and opportunities for manipulation and control heretofore unparalleled in any society. This is precisely why it is difficult to expect any rapid and radical changes in our country.

What then remains? The course of slow and gradual evolutionary change remains the most realistic. Despite the growing pressure from above, the democratic opposition of all shades must secure the extension of freedom of speech and organization and the development of social control, i.e., the establishment of the democratic counterweights indispensable for society. Any initiative in this direction deserves attention. It is impermissible to let even the smallest chance slip by.

It is necessary to see clearly that the fear experienced by a majority of the

party leaders and ideologues at the thought of a possible democratization has by no means been produced by a concern for the preservation of Marxism and socialism. If one realistically assesses what exists, it is not difficult to demonstrate that the realization of even the most maximum demands of today's democratic movement (for example, on the creation of social and political organizations and organs of the press independent of the CPSU) would lead neither to the collapse of Marxism nor to the renunciation of the leading role of the CPSU, as our ideologues so fear and as the opponents of Marxism so fervently hope. On the contrary, it would make possible the cleansing and purification of the party and its ideology; a rejuvenation of its leadership; the lessening of bureaucratism in its apparatus; and, in the end, the development and enrichment of Marxism to make it conform to the conditions existing at the end of the twentieth century. A much greater danger for the USSR and for socialism as a whole emanates from retaining and deepening the violations of democracy that we have observed in our country in recent years.

On Pressure From Outside

While not too much concerned with the public opinion that is only just coming into being within the country, the Soviet leadership is much more sensitive to criticism from outside. For many reasons the political leaders of the USSR are interested today in good relations not only with the governments of the Western countries but with the social circles of these countries that exert influence on the policies of their governments. Therefore, critical statements from Western society against violations of civil rights in the USSR have great importance; in some instances they exert a pressure that the internal democratic movement is as yet incapable of exercising.

I wrote about this in my article, emphasizing that the support of left-wing, progressive circles of Western society is especially valuable for us. This does not at all mean that the leadership of the USSR is not sensitive to criticism from other influential social forces of East and West. Nevertheless, for the participants in the struggle for civil rights in the USSR, it is most natural to appeal for support to representatives of those social forces that in their own countries act in defense of civil rights. It is difficult to believe in the sincerity of support for Soviet "dissidents" from the Chinese or Spanish press or from the extreme right-wing circles of the West which serve as obstacles to the expansion of social, economic, and civil rights in their own countries.

Many different types of influences from the public in the Western countries are

exerted also on the positions of the political leaders of these countries—our partners in negotiations. In the end, any talks in our time are inconceivable without mutual pressure and also without mutual concessions. These talks reflect not only the serious conflicts between the different countries but the presence of some kind of minimal good will. Therefore, the mutual demands from the parties involved must originate from the real relationship of forces and must not take on the character of an ultimatum. And here it is appropriate to say a few words again on Senator Jackson's celebrated amendment.

Democratization and Detente

The refusal of the USA to trade with Cuba expresses very clearly the United States' disapproval of the Cuban regime and creates serious difficulties for the latter. However, a position like this on the part of the USA is not, strictly speaking, interference in the internal affairs of Cuba. Every country decides for itself with whom it will maintain economic and political relations and to what extent. The USSR does not extend credits to either Greece or Portugal, but this also is not interference in the internal affairs of those countries.

From this point of view, one can understand the feelings of those U.S. congressmen who speak out against granting the USSR American credits and most-favored-nation status. These people are accustomed to viewing the USSR as an ideological and political opponent of the USA, and they fear a growth of our economic potential resulting from our access to Western credits and technology. Moreover, the grievances of American legislators over the absence of freedom of emigration from the USSR are totally valid.

However, the number of such grievances can be very large, and if they are set forth in the form of obligatory preliminary terms, no real progress toward improving international relations will be possible. This was shown by the recent amendment of Senator Buckley demanding that neither credits nor most-favored-nation status be extended to the USSR until our country stops jamming the broadcasts of Radio Liberty.

Moreover, it is fully possible to lodge similar grievances against many Western countries, including the USA, where problems of civil and economic rights are being handled in ways that are far from always satisfactory, as one can see from the speeches of many American congressmen. Even in a country that takes pride in its centuries-old democratic traditions, like Switzerland, women did not have the right to vote until very recently and were not represented either in unions or in the cantonal parliaments. Until the

present time, however, this has not interfered with Switzerland's foreign trade.

It is necessary to take into account other important considerations as well. Not long ago the oil crisis clearly showed how vulnerable the West European countries and Japan are to economic pressure. The position of the USSR in this respect is far more stable. Trade with the USA and American credits very much interest the leadership in the USSR. However, this interest is not so great that the government of the Soviet Union would move toward a change in domestic legislation or toward any essential alteration of its internal policy. This is especially true since other Western countries and Japan, whose economic situations are not so stable as that of the USA, have been manifesting in recent years an ever-growing readiness for economic collaboration with the USSR.

In his article already referred to above, D. Panin, who not long ago left the USSR, tries to demonstrate that the material situation of the Soviet people is steadily deteriorating. Therefore, Panin calls on the West to stop granting economic aid and credits to Moscow because this supposedly postpones "the internal explosion and liberation of peoples." But this is obviously erroneous. In the Soviet Union a noticeable expansion of the production of consumer goods and services is taking place. One of the main factors motivating the majority of Soviet people today is the desire to improve their living standard, and this can be achieved fundamentally only by increasing production and the productivity of labor.

The absence of credits and economic aid from the West will not halt economic progress in our country and improvements in our people's well-being; these processes would in this case only be slowed down. The real hope for the democratization of Soviet society can only be linked with scientific-technological and economic progress, the interests of which come into conflict with our unwieldy bureaucratic administrative structure.

Therefore, the slogan "The worse it is, the better" that Panin and his cothinkers have advanced is absolutely inadmissible for those who actually want the best for the Soviet people and for all their neighbors on the planet.

The process of changing internal regimes, especially in the greatest countries of the world, unfortunately proceeds at a slow and often very agonizing pace. The expansion of international trade and international division of labor based on mutual concessions can hasten this process somewhat. But it is impossible to hasten it by ultimatums or by refusing to make compromises. Even a real threat of atomic annihilation will not force the USA to abandon today its exceedingly outmoded domestic institutions, which, un-

der the pressure of the progress taking place in this country, will in time be eliminated by the American people themselves.

Meanwhile, a confrontation of the great powers, fraught with the danger of the destruction of all humanity, has in the last ten years entered into a critical phase. The arms race will do colossal economic damage to people of all countries, no less than has been the case in the recent past. To save ourselves from or even minimize the damage is possible only through joint efforts. There is no other way.

The tremendous importance of the task of preserving the earth's biosphere also cannot be decided within the boundaries of individual countries or continents. It can only be resolved by joint efforts. Therefore, the course proposed by Solzhenitsyn for Russian national self-isolation and the "policy of isolated salvation amid the general confusion" can end up being no less destructive than the policy of mutual confrontation and competition. One example alone will suffice: The contamination of the upper layers of the atmosphere by certain harmful wastes can by the twenty-first century destroy the present structure of the troposphere and stratosphere, which will lead to a sharp increase in ultraviolet radiation and destruction of all the vegetation on our planet, including that in Siberia—in the development of which Solzhenitsyn sees Russia's salvation.

Competition of the great powers in the delivery of arms to the countries of Africa and Latin America cannot be tolerated. But it is just as intolerable for industrially developed countries "to leave South America to its own devices" or "to let Africa find out for itself how to begin an

independent course of state and civilization," as Solzhenitsyn proposes. In the contemporary world it is impossible to save oneself alone.

A little more than a year ago the GDR [German Democratic Republic] was not invited to the United Nations' world conference on the protection of the environment convened in Stockholm. This country had not yet joined any of the United Nations' specialized organizations. This was an example of how immediate and insignificant political aims of a few states have prevailed over the long-term interests of humanity. Unfortunately, the reaction of the USSR was just as mistaken: not limiting itself to a resolute protest, the Soviet Union altogether refused to take part in the Stockholm conference. If solving other problems concerning all humanity becomes dependent upon narrow political problems of the moment, very bad times await our planet.

The development of affairs in our world creates, nevertheless, the objective necessity for collaboration and compromise, first of all, among the great powers. Such collaboration does not exclude either ideological struggle or different forms of ideological pressure. However, in utilizing this pressure, it is always necessary to stay within intelligent limits which if exceeded could again give rise to an uncontrolled and destructive escalation of distrust and competition. This is why Brandt's logic seems to us, all things considered, preferable to Strauss's logic; and why Kissinger's logic is preferable to the logic of Senators Jackson and Buckley.

Roy Medvedev
April 15, 1974

Subscribe now
Read

Intercontinental Press

Intercontinental Press
P. O. Box 116
Village Station
New York, N. Y. 10014

[] \$7.50 for six months.
[] \$15 for one year.

Name _____

Street _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

GRS View of Left Unity in Martinique

By Edouard Delepine

[The following article appeared in the August-September issue of *Libération Antilles-Guyane*, the newspaper published in France by the émigré section of the Groupe Révolution Socialiste (GRS), Antilles section of the Fourth International. The author is one of the leaders of the GRS.

[The three-party "agreement" referred to is a sequel to a bloc originally formed around the candidacy of François Mitterrand, the candidate of the Union of the Left in the French presidential election last spring. Mitterrand lost by a narrow margin to Giscard d'Estaing in the second round of voting, held May 19. Citizens of the colonies, or "overseas departments and territories," are permitted to vote for the French presidency and legislature.

[The GRS campaigned in support of Alain Krivine, the candidate of the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire, the French Trotskyist organization. (See "Campaign Posed Issue of Self-Determination," *Intercontinental Press*, May 27, p. 657.)

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

We know that the sole fact of unity satisfies the workers, but it is a mistake to think that this immediate result is not too dearly paid for.

—Marx

The Martinique left—the PCM, the PPM, and the PS*—has finally reached agreement. At least that is what *Justice* and *Le Progressiste* have announced with the kind of sigh that comes when one has avoided the worst without saving the essential.

The worst was to once again permit the thousands of votes for François Mitterrand in May to be scattered, or to risk discouraging those voters by the distressing spectacle of election post mortems in which everyone picks on his neighbor for having contributed

*PCM—Parti Communiste Martiniquais (Martinique Communist party). PPM—Parti Progressiste Martiniquais (Martinique Progressive party, led by Aime Cesaire). PS—Parti Socialiste (Socialist party).

to the defeat.

From this point of view, the reformist organizations have drawn the lesson of the legislative elections of March 1973. The workers would not easily have forgiven their returning to those unprincipled quarrels that for more than a year filled the newspapers of the Martinique left.

But in Martinique it is easier today to agree on the Common Program of the French left than on a possible plan for the Martinique left, or even on what has taken its place for some time—the autonomist mini-program of Morne-Rouge.

Unity presupposes agreement on something essential. The essential thing up to now for the Martinique left, as for the left in pretty well all the Overseas Departments, has been the question of their status. "Not the grant of a new status, or a simple rearrangement of the present status, but a real change." That is what the left claimed to want. That was what distinguished it from the old assimilationist right wing, which was itself more or less won to the idea of necessary reforms . . . but within the French union.

It was difficult for all but the most seasoned veterans to present "the bloc of May 19"—that jumble of more or less convinced autonomists, shame-faced independentists, reforming regionalists, camouflaged assimilationists and integrationists, and even of authentic revolutionists—as a coming together of the Martinique left. To ensure Mitterrand an honorable electoral score, it was necessary to empty this left of its essential project—a change in status—and to swear on a stack of bibles that the vote for the single candidate of the French left had nothing to do with the question of status.

They didn't even hesitate to sell off the famous chapter 6 of the Common Program of the French left, which appeared to give a concrete content to the principle of self-determination—on the pretext that this concretization prejudged the choice of the peoples of the Overseas Departments! As if the Martiniquais had, in effect, chosen integration "democratically."

What, then, has the Martinique left agreed on? On the principle of self-

determination? It is no secret for anyone that this principle doesn't have the same content, or even the same form, for the PCM, the PPM, or the PS. Three years ago the signers of the so-called Morne-Rouge Convention were claiming to have upheld this principle so as to avoid bogging down the future of the Overseas Departments in an overly rigid, legalistic framework of autonomy. Some of them—"the left of Le Morne-Rouge," the PPM, and the REM, among others—even boasted of having sought thereby to leave the door open to all the anticolonialist currents, including the independentist currents.

Today it is doubtless a question of not closing the door to those "sincere anticolonialists" who are advocates of remaining within the French union but who want to participate in the inevitable adaptations of French law to the local reality. They will have taken care to exclude only those who give the principle of self-determination the only meaning it can have: the right to independence, that is, to separation.

There have been many political agreements within the Antilles left since 1960: the Conference of Guadeloupe; the motion of 1961; the 1963 Manifesto of the Round Table of residents of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion; the Guadeloupe Front for Autonomy; the 1966 Accord for the Tricontinental Conference of OLAS (Organization of Latin American Solidarity); the Morne-Rouge accord of 1971; and the Paris Accord of 1972. On each occasion, the reformist left was always careful to define its choices concretely. This is the first time that it has agreed on a negative definition of its plans, and that it has shown so obviously its scorn for whatever could be considered "national" in its intentions. It is a step forward toward the indispensable political clarification this country needs. But it is an important retreat for the Martinique left. □

Citroen Registers Big Losses

The Citroen automobile company, the third-largest car manufacturer in France, announced that it lost nearly \$90 million in the first six months of 1974. Citroen expects its total losses for 1974 to amount to \$200 million. The company made \$12 million in profits in 1973. Citroen is currently negotiating a merger with Peugeot. Both companies are expected to reach a decision in November.