

OIL PRODUCERS TELL OFF FORD

From Spinola to Costa Gomes

Mexican Workers Press for Wage Hike

Hot Debate in India Over CIA

The 'Il Manifesto' Regroupment

How to Make a Fast Buck Out of Starving Children

Error de la ONU Sobre la 'Explosión Demográfica'

MIR Leader Killed in Santiago

Miguel Enríquez, the 30-year-old leader of the Chilean MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left), was reported killed in Santiago October 5.

According to an October 5 Reuters news dispatch, "An official statement said that the body of Mr. Enríquez. . . was found when troops and policemen burst into a house in the San Miguel district after overcoming fierce resistance from automatic weapons.

"A woman with Mr. Enríquez, Carmen Castillo Echeverría, was wounded and taken to a city hospital."

Enríquez, a founding member of the MIR, was a physician by profession and the son of the former minister of education. Prior to the formation of the MIR in 1965, he played a leading role in the Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Concepción (Student Federation of the University of Concepción).

Following the September 1973 military coup in Chile, he was named most-wanted man by the ruling junta.

Enríquez explained his political line in an August 16 interview reprinted in the first issue of the MIR's news service for the foreign press:

"We revolutionists must accelerate the pace of initiating actions of armed propaganda, which can strengthen the resistance struggle."

Despite the difficult conditions imposed by the military coup, Enríquez remained in Chile. As he wrote in a July 1974 open letter to the editor of the daily *El Mercurio*:

"The revolutionists of the MIR—militants and leaders—remain in our country with the Chilean workers despite the partial setbacks we have suffered and already overcome. We are organizing and preparing the struggle that the Resistencia Popular [People's Resistance] has already begun, a struggle that will inevitably end in overthrowing and punishing the gorilla dictatorship and its paid lackeys, who are repressing and superexploiting our working class and people today." □

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Oil-Producing Countries Tell Off Ford

By Dick Fidler

The oil-producing countries have responded to Washington's threats of economic war over oil prices with a propaganda counteroffensive, including proposals to form a united front to meet the challenge.

Carlos Andrés Pérez, the president of Venezuela, the world's third largest oil exporting country and the largest source of U. S. oil imports, has called an emergency meeting of Latin American heads of state to discuss measures to confront Washington's "economic totalitarianism." The call includes the Cuban government. A meeting of "Third World countries" to form a "common front" on the "more general problem of raw materials trade" with the imperialist countries has also been projected by the Venezuelan president.

Andrés Pérez published an "Open Letter" to Ford as a full-page advertisement in the September 25 *New York Times*. In it, he defended the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a "direct consequence of the developed countries' use of a policy of outrageously low prices for our raw materials as a weapon of economic oppression."

The Venezuelan president noted how the terms of trade between imperialist and semicolonial countries consistently worked to the disadvantage of the latter.

"Each year we, the countries which produce coffee, meat, tin, copper, iron or petroleum, have been handing over a larger amount of our products in order to obtain imports of machinery and other manufactured goods, and this has resulted in a constant and growing outflow of capital and impoverishment of our countries."

The government's stance is supported by the General Confederation of Workers of Venezuela (CTV—Confederación General de Trabajadores de Venezuela), which has 1.5 million members. The CTV issued a statement September 27 calling Ford's position "overbearing." Alluding to recent revelations of U. S. Central Intelligence

Agency involvement in the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile, the CTV warned against "any action by the multinational firms similar to what they did recently in neighboring countries, destabilizing them and cutting short their attempts to emancipate themselves."

The Venezuelan Chamber of Deputies has scheduled a debate on CIA intervention in Venezuela. According to the September 29 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*, a special commission is to be named to "investigate fully" charges by two deputies of the People's Electoral Movement (MEP—Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo), Salom Mesa Espinoza and Siuberto Martínez, who "promised to present proof of CIA intervention in recent years and plans for future intervention, especially in relation to Venezuela's defense of its oil prices."

The Venezuelan government has announced its intention to nationalize the foreign oil companies operating in the country.

Ecuador's minister of natural resources, Captain Gustavo Jarrin Ampudia, the present chairman of OPEC, issued a statement rebutting the White House charge that oil prices are the main source of the world inflationary spiral. They account for less than 1 percent of the present yearly rate of 14 percent inflation for the "highly developed states," he said.

"If the industrialized states want to alleviate the burden of oil products on the final consumers, they should take control of the gigantic transnational corporations, which have been making excessive profits, and reduce or eliminate the taxes with which those states increase the price of the final product. We are only protecting the buying power of our oil, and the Americans' pressures and warnings, which they make in an outmoded neocolonial way, are therefore unacceptable."

The governments of other semicolonial oil-producing countries have de-

fended the increased taxes and royalties they charge the foreign oil trusts as a long-overdue measure against imperialist exploitation.

The foreign minister of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah el-Ahmad el-Jaber, told the United Nations General Assembly September 30 that for more than a quarter of a century "the oil companies, the interests they serve and the countries to which they belong" have deliberately frozen oil prices paid to producer states at a low level. During this period, he said, the prices of all basic commodities, manufactured products, and services exported by industrialized countries have been going up.

"Raising the price of oil was in essence the correction of an inequitable situation," he said.

The price of crude oil at the well-head is now \$10 to \$11 a barrel, compared with the \$1.50 a barrel that prevailed during the late 1960s.

Sheikh Sabah argued that the industrialized countries, by insisting on lowering the price of crude oil, aimed at "depleting the natural and economic resources of the developing countries" for their own benefit. It was they who had begun "the practice of classifying goods, treating some of them as strategic materials subject to special trade rules," he noted.

Sheikh Sabah turned charges of artificial pricing policies back on Washington itself. The industrialized countries, he said, had long followed a policy of paying subsidies to restrict production and maintain prices of agricultural products.

Even the shah of Iran, not generally known as being hostile to Washington, felt obliged to adopt an anti-imperialist stance. Iran is the world's second largest oil-exporting country, after Saudi Arabia.

"No one can dictate to us," he declared in Australia September 26, during a tour of the Far East. "No one can wave a finger at us, because we will wave a finger back."

At the same time, the shah took note that Washington was in fact shaking more than a finger at the oil producers. It was "absolutely vital" for Iran to stay on friendly terms with the White House, he said, because of its "arsenal of nuclear arms."

Referring to Ford's statement in Detroit September 23 that continued high oil prices "could threaten the breakdown of world order," the shah said,

"We will be ready to provide our energy resources against the Westinghouses and General Motors and General Electrics and all the other generals they have."

He stated, "If the world prices [of manufactured goods] go down, we will go down with oil prices. But if they go up, why should we pay the bill?"

Algerian President Houari Boumediene, in a message to United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim that was released October 5, charged that the imperialist countries were prepared to drag all humanity "to the brink of the abyss" in a confrontation with oil-producing countries. Their attempts to "dictate prices," he said, recalled the darkest periods of colonialism.

Egypt, which played an important role earlier this year in urging Arab oil producers to lift the embargo that had been levied against some countries during the October war, has shown its distaste for the saber-rattling engaged in by Ford and Kissinger.

In a September 28 speech to the Arab Socialist Union, President Anwar el-Sadat said that "those who invented the law of supply and demand have no right to complain when this law works against their interests."

"In private," the *Washington Post* reported September 30, "Egyptian officials say more pointedly that they will not intervene with oil producers on the price issue, as they did on the embargo, in return for Kissinger's efforts in getting disengagement agreements on the Sinai and Golan fronts with Israel." Kissinger is to visit the Arab East this month.

In an article published in the October 4 *New York Times*, Dr. M. T. Mehdi, the secretary-general of the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations, pointed to the absurd logic behind Washington's campaign against the oil-producing countries.

"Apparently the Arabs and other oil producers are expected to behave in a way that America has hardly ever behaved. . .," he observed.

"The fact is that the producing countries are capitalists, committed to the laws of supply and demand. . . . The Arabs and other oil-producers are doing with their oil exactly what America has been doing with its food and agricultural products."

What is surprising, Mehdi said, "is not that the producing countries have raised the price of oil but rather that

this was not done 20 or 30 years ago!

"During this long period and even up to the present, the oil companies, acting as the middlemen, have been reaping huge profits for which both the producing countries and consumers have paid."

Mehdi's arguments also indicate the limitations in the oil producers' position, however. Attempts by the semi-colonial countries to break the unfavorable terms of trade cannot be successful as long as these efforts do not include changing productive relations. Without the establishment of planned economies, the uneven contest of forces between backward and imperialist countries in the world market will inevitably result in the triumph of the latter and the imposition of even harsher conditions upon the semicolonial raw-materials producers.

In part, Washington is counting on the enormous economic weight of the imperialist countries to help counter the "cartel" of countries grouped in OPEC. An article by columnist Joseph Kraft in the September 26 *Washington Post* described this aspect of White House strategy.

The "old policy" on oil prices, Kraft wrote, was "to court Saudi Arabia with special offers of military assistance and investment opportunity" in return for which "the Saudis were supposed to work within the oil producers' cartel for an easing of the price which had quadrupled since last year."

But on September 12, OPEC took action to raise prices, the Saudi Arabian government going along with this under pressure from other Arab regimes. Washington now hopes to increase pressure on the oil producers by cutting world consumption of oil sufficiently to create a large surplus, which in turn would induce some OPEC members—"the obvious candidates are Venezuela and Iran," Kraft says—to agitate for a price cut.

"To be effective," Kraft said, "an American cut in consumption would have to be supplemented by similar measures in Japan and Western Europe. There would have to be a counter-cartel. The Japanese and Europeans would probably demand as condition for joining the United States that this country undertake to meet their emergency oil needs in a crunch, and further that there be an

end to discriminatory policies by which American companies have fenced foreign companies out of the international petroleum field.

"In an atmosphere of crisis, all these measures could be taken," Kraft added. The recent speeches by White House spokesmen were designed to create that atmosphere.

Washington's current offensive against the oil producers has little to do with the recent OPEC decision to raise prices—as is indicated by the fact that this counter-cartel was initiated last February, at the Washington Energy Conference. Since then, a draft agreement has been hammered out behind closed doors. Its tentative terms were revealed by the *New York Times*, which obtained a preliminary text.

"The 7,000-word draft, concluded in Brussels Sept. 20, commits the United States, Canada, Japan, possibly Norway, and all the Common Market countries, except France—nations that consume four-fifths of the world's petroleum—to create a new International Energy Agency by November" the *Times* reported September 30.

The draft agreement includes elaborate provisions to build up massive oil stockpiles and to share supplies and imports among the participating countries in an emergency. It provides for weighted majority decisions, binding upon participants, "on more than a score of specified subjects, including aspects of stockpiling, oil-sharing contingency plans, and relations with the oil companies," the *Times* said. The agreement includes an automatic "triggering" procedure for emergency action.

U. S. officials call the majority decision arrangements "a breakthrough in international organization," according to the *Times*.

"France—which has objected to the voting system but has not yet finally decided to stay out—has criticized the project as 'an energy NATO' because of its militant tone, its integrated staff and its American leadership. Actually, the draft agreement—which 12 governments, with the possible exception of Norway, are expected to approve formally by the agreed target date of Oct. 29—goes further institutionally than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which takes all decisions by unanimity. . . ."

"Even the Common Market, theoretically supranational, has been unable

to make majority decisions despite provisions for majority rule in less important matters in its founding charter."

Of the total 136 votes, the United States has the largest number, fifty-three—more than the combined total for all the Common Market countries. (Japan is second with eighteen.)

The U. S. imports only 15 percent of its oil from the Arab East, while that area is the source of 80 percent of oil consumed in Japan and Western Europe.


These moves will not lower oil prices for the consumer, despite Washington's claims to the contrary. In fact, by strengthening imperialist control over the world oil market, they can serve to boost prices still further. Other proposals, such as stepped-up domestic production of oil, or development of alternative forms of energy, would have the same effect. "The key to both," the September 30 *New York Times* observed, "is believed to lie in higher domestic oil prices—either by decontrol or through excise taxes. . . ."

However, it is the threat of military intervention, hinted at broadly by Ford and Kissinger, that serves as Washington's ultimate bludgeon to force the oil-producing countries to bow to its demands. In a suggestive article entitled "Thinking the Unthinkable," the October 7 issue of *Newsweek* discussed three "most talked-about options" for dealing with the Arab oil producers, based on interviews with "government officials, military strategists and experts" in Washington.

The first "option" is "psychological warfare" as expressed in recent White House speeches and the concerted effort to form a united front of oil-consuming countries.

The second is "covert operations" like the CIA's overthrow of Iran's Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, after he had nationalized the oil companies. *Newsweek* mentioned possible "terror squads to stalk traveling Arab oil barons. . . . Assassinations—accompanied by blunt hints to other Arab leaders that they could be next—might be carried out."

Third is "military intervention." "Beyond any doubt . . . an armed attack would have such enormous and frightening ramifications that only the imminent breakdown of Western society could spur Washington to launch



Newsweek

it," *Newsweek* said. It failed to mention that this is precisely the assessment of the world political situation being given today by the White House Dr. Strangeloves. Kissinger, for example, told the United Nations Sep-

tember 23, that "industrial civilization" itself was jeopardized by "the present level of prices" in oil.

Newsweek hinted at the disastrous results that could ensue from U. S. military action. "The Soviet Union might react with some military action of its own—on the side of the Arabs. And that could draw the two superpowers into a head-on confrontation that could turn into a nuclear showdown."

Washington's current course of action poses such a catastrophe as a very real threat. □

Pell and Javits Still Press for U.S. Recognition

Attack on Oil Countries Scored by Castro

In what was widely interpreted as a further step toward Washington's resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba, two prominent U. S. senators flew to Havana September 27 for a three-day visit and talks with Cuban government leaders.

Senators Jacob Javits (Republican) and Claiborne Pell (Democrat), both members of the influential Foreign Relations Committee, are sponsors of a Senate resolution calling for a review of United States-Cuban relations.

Following a three-hour talk with Fidel Castro, which the senators described to news reporters as "friendly, frank and warm," Senator Javits said, "We felt the Cuban Government, Premier Castro particularly, were interested in working for better relations with the United States—that was our impression."

The U. S. politicians also met with Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, Foreign Minister Raúl Roa, and Deputy Premier Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.

Before meeting with Castro, Javits said he was "disappointed" by the Cuban premier's speech to a mass rally in Havana September 28, celebrating the fourteenth anniversary of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. The senators refused to attend the rally but watched the speech on television in the Swiss Embassy, which handles U. S. affairs in Cuba.

Castro devoted most of his forty-

five-minute speech to attacking Washington. Referring to Ford's threats against the oil-producing countries, Castro said that international inflation resulted not from the prices they charged, but from the policies of the imperialists. Alluding to the "hundreds of billions of dollars" Washington has spent on its war budget, Castro said, "In these deplorable imperialistic policies are the roots of inflation, which emerged long before the oil price increases."

Castro also attacked Ford's defense of Central Intelligence Agency activities in Chile.

"The new President of the United States, to the surprise and stupefaction of Latin American public opinion, has declared that such actions were carried out in the best interests of the United States," he said.

"Thus, the Government of the United States proclaims openly the right to intervene by any means, regardless of how illicit, dirty or criminal in the internal processes of the nations of the hemisphere."

Castro also described the Organization of American States, which "suspended" Cuba at Washington's behest twelve years ago, as "shameless, discredited, and prostituted." He urged the formation of a new Latin American organization that would not include the United States, just as, he said, the Organization of African States does not include European

countries.

During their short stay in Cuba, the two U.S. senators also toured farms, housing projects, and public-health facilities. The achievements of the Cuban revolution in these areas

were recorded by some of the twenty-eight U.S. journalists accompanying the senators.

"They have made fantastic medical progress," Javits said. Pell added, "Cuba's medical services are all scot free."

The senators' trip was made with the tacit consent of the Ford administration. It was reported that Kissinger had dropped previous objections that the trip would "not be in the national interest." □

From Spínola to Costa Gomes

Portuguese Masses Move Against Attempted Coup

By Gerry Foley

"People still wonder what this means," a young Communist party member said worriedly. "General Spínola was presented to them as a liberator, and now he has suddenly left the stage."

The people, "who are still not tuned in to the mysteries of politics," Dominique Pouchin wrote in the October 2 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*, had "not yet understood" the sudden departure of Spínola. That was what the young Communist was complaining about.

Le Monde's special correspondent must not have been in Portugal in the first months after the April coup. Otherwise, she could not have written the following about the reception for Spínola's successor, General Francisco da Costa Gomes:

"On the night of Monday, September 30, the Portuguese left offered the new president what it had never given to the man who had just left this post—the cheers of a people celebrating its victory."

Pouchin asked: "Did these workers, these students, these tie-wearing clerks know that a few hours earlier the man whose name they were chanting had paid a tribute in taking office to his 'comrade in arms,' and his 'constant friend,' General Spínola? It mattered little. What the crowd was hailing was only the symbol of *their* victory against the *reaction*."

In the first months after the coup, Spínola also received the cheers of masses of people as the "symbol" of their victory over the Salazarist regime. In those rallies, the banners of the Communist and Socialist parties and the CDE/MDP (Comissão Democrática Eleitoral-Movimento Democrático Português—Democratic Election Committee-Portuguese Democratic

Movement, a CP-dominated popular-front formation) were prominent.

Spínola spoke as the representative of the Armed Forces Movement and the Junta de Salvação Nacional, to which the reformist parties gave their uncritical support.

In his inauguration speech, Spínola's successor did not indicate that any fundamental change had taken place. "'Order, work, and unity,' are what General Costa Gomes called for in taking office," Pouchin reported. "The words and the themes had not changed."

They certainly had not. Similar appeals dominated not only Costa Gomes's speech when he was installed as chief of staff of the armed forces on May 16 but the speeches that Spínola made throughout the country in May and June trying to build up his image as the "father of the nation."

Spínola's resignation, Costa Gomes explained, was based on "a personal and subjective analysis of the national situation." The new president denied that the "process of democratization" had gotten out of hand, as Spínola had indicated in his warning of a slide toward "anarchy and chaos."

In particular, Costa Gomes denied Spínola's assertion that the agreements with the nationalist movements in the African territories constituted a "betrayal" of the program of the Armed Forces Movement.

"In the decolonization, there has not been the slightest deviation from the program of the armed forces. In all political actions, we must not let ourselves be bound by rigid and preconceived plans. . . . I must say that all government officials and all those persons who have worked in the decolonization process have demonstrated their intelligence, devotion, and talent."

Costa Gomes seemed to be explaining to those who might share Spínola's fears that a neocolonial solution in the African territories could not be achieved in exactly the forms originally conceived but that the government was still defending the fundamental interests of Portuguese imperialism.

The new president's reassurances had a certain authority. He was the commander in chief of the Portuguese forces in Angola from 1970 to 1972. It was on the strength of his recommendation that the Caetano government permitted publication of General Spínola's book *Portugal e o Futuro*, which proposed a neocolonial "political" solution. Except for the five-week period when he was removed from his post as Caetano tried to head off the April 25 coup, Costa Gomes has been chief of staff of the Portuguese armed forces for the last three years.

According to Jean-Pierre Clerc, writing in the October 2 issue of *Le Monde*, Costa Gomes served as the intermediary between the "young Turks" of the Armed Forces Movement and conservatives like Spínola, with whom he was closely linked. This seems to indicate a certain flexibility on the part of the new president that could have been decisive in the struggle that culminated in Spínola's withdrawal.

The new president indicated in his first speech that the basis of the governmental crisis was a tactical question. Spínola thought the "democratization" and the "decolonization" were getting out of hand. Costa Gomes and the "young Turks" did not agree. They held that more flexibility and resilience were required.

In an editorial on the Portuguese crisis in its October 2 issue, the editors of the *New York Times* indicated that

they agreed with Costa Gomes.

"General Spínola was apparently among the more cautious of the military leaders that overthrew the dictatorship last April, but his withdrawal does not necessarily open the way to domination by the well-organized and disciplined Communist party—or any other group, for that matter. Nor is it yet clear whether in fact General Spínola was as strong a force in the military's inner councils as his towering public stature implied. There has long been a belief among observers that, in the classic coup-making model, the 64-year-old general was merely a front man for other officers yet to emerge."

This editorial took a considerably calmer tone than the *New York Times's* own coverage of Spínola's resignation a few days before. The references then to "leftists in control," recalled the kind of stories that helped to pave the way for the overthrow of a whole series of mild reformers in Latin America, notably Goulart in Brazil and Allende in Chile.

The editors appeared to feel that a certain leeway should be given to the new government:

"Unemployment is rising, inflation has taken hold at an annual rate of 30 per cent, highest in Europe. It is these objective facts, much more than any international or national conspiracies, that give rise to genuine worries for the future prospects of Portuguese democracy. Economic hardship across national frontiers is now a far graver threat to the stability of the industrial world than ideological shifts among governments.

"For the United States the only course is to respond with sympathy and generosity to the real needs for Portugal's economic development and participation in the world trading economy. In the era of cold war there might have been a temptation to intervene, overtly or covertly, to counter 'leftist' trends. Surely this country has learned enough from the recent and more distant past to understand that any such interventions would be foolhardy and futile."

The editors apparently had in mind the coup in Chile, which proved politically very expensive for U. S. imperialism and which has not, from their point of view, produced a sufficiently stable solution. In the conditions of a world economic crisis, an attempt at a violent coup in Portugal could have

dangerously explosive repercussions—particularly if it failed. So the *New York Times* took the side of "flexibility" as opposed to a quick crackdown:

"This is a moment of fluidity of Portuguese politics when it may be dangerous to use the labels 'rightist' and 'leftist' too rigidly; it is certainly premature to try drawing broad conclusions of continental trends from the factional maneuvering which is now bound to grip the Portuguese, just when they can least afford it."

However, the editors did not fail to note that even a purely tactical dispute in Portuguese ruling circles at the moment could have grave consequences:

"What is clear—and tragically so—is that Portugal, in common with other countries of the West, is undergoing a period of economic strain and unrest in which it can ill afford the luxury of political jockeying, especially when the foundations of its democratic regime are still so shaky after a half-century of authoritarian rule."

In this situation, the Armed Forces Movement, a military lodge of perhaps 300 officers, seemed tempted to try to elevate itself still further above the political parties. The structure of governmental authority has been vague and contradictory since the April coup. The country's leading weekly newspaper *Expresso* was even led in August to publish a long article trying to analyze where the actual power of decision lay.

"According to the captains," Pouchin wrote in the October 2 *Le Monde*, "the difficulties and crises they encountered since the 'revolution of April 25' may be due in part to the multiplicity and overlapping of centers of decision-making, to the competition of various 'organs of sovereignty.' So they seemed to have decided to do away with this confused structure by creating a 'Council of the Revolution' composed entirely of officers. This council will include 120 members, thirty for the navy, the same number for the air force, and sixty for the army. It will have an 'executive commission' of seven members."

The existence of such a project indicates that at least some elements in the Armed Forces Movement have been thinking in terms of permanent structures of military government.

Some of the leaders of the coalition parties, Pouchin explained, have ex-

pressed fears about the logic of such a trend. She quoted Rodolfo Crespo, one of the main leaders of the Socialist party as saying: "The resignation of Spínola, the logical result of his attitude, is a victory for the progressive forces. But it also presents dangers. It must not lead us down a slope toward a Peruvian-type regime based on the extreme lack of political experience among the people."

According to Pouchin, the leaders of the Communist party were more inclined than the Socialist party leader to favor a Peruvian-type solution during the governmental crisis in July. The ambitions of the Communist party are limited, in the last analysis, by the needs of the détente; and, since the coup in Chile, the main model of the pro-Moscow CPs has been the Peruvian one, a "progressive" nationalist military regime, strong enough to maintain "order," standing "above" parties and holding tight control over the society but ready to work to a certain extent with the reformist workers parties. Such a government, as the pro-Moscow parties see it, is in a much better position to carry out reforms without frightening the local bourgeoisie or imperialism than a government of the left parties.

A Peruvian-type regime might seem to the CP to have a better chance to carry out the reforms Portuguese capitalism needs at the moment without touching off an uncontrollable radicalization among the masses. It would have a chance to modernize the Portuguese economy and society in a cold way, steering a calculated course between the demands of the bourgeoisie on the one hand and the pressure of the masses on the other. While such an alternative would inevitably involve a strong dose of repression against the workers and the left parties, it would offer better conditions for avoiding a mass upsurge that would lead to a decisive conflict between the fundamental classes.

By their nature, political parties are more directly exposed to mass pressure than a semisecret military group like the Armed Forces Movement that counts up the divisions it can rely on.

It was notable, for example, that, to one degree or another, every one of the three coalition parties, including the bourgeois Partido Popular Democrático (PPD—People's Democratic party), opposed the repressive moves

the government made against the ex-tragovernmental left in August. Even the Communist party was forced to protest against the government's conciliatory attitude toward the jailed former secret police agents in the Lisbon penitentiary and against the police opening fire on anticolonial demonstrators in mid-August.

In early September, the Socialist party leadership was forced to make a direct attack on a piece of legislation that is fundamental to the perspectives of the Vasco Gonçalves government.

"In these last two centuries," said a Socialist party communiqué that was published in the September 3 issue of *Diário de Lisboa*, "the working class overcame obstacles, won its demands, and strikes were confirmed as an essential means of struggle to counterbalance the economic and social domination of the workers by the bosses.

"The recent decree-law on strikes and lockouts has tried to regulate this right, won in hard struggle by the workers, in terms that the Socialist party considers open to criticism. . . .

"The law declares illegitimate both solidarity strikes and political strikes, the two most important forms by which the working class demonstrates its unity and its strength. . . . The tactic of occupying workplaces during strikes is a worldwide advance by the workers under the capitalist system, one that has been even more consolidated by the Portuguese workers since April 25. The working class cannot abdicate this legitimate gain, which serves the purpose not only of demonstrating their strength and cohesion but also of guaranteeing their security of employment and preventing the destruction or removal of machines or tools, which for instance the bosses tried to do in Sogantal, in Timex, in Adegas Camillo Alves, and in other workplaces."

However, both the time and place seem unfavorable for a "Peruvian solution." The Portuguese society and economy are both more complex and centralized than the Peruvian. In particular, the difficulties of maintaining a weak imperialism make for very sharp splits in the Portuguese bourgeoisie. In a statement published in the September 19 *Diário de Lisboa*, the now semi-independent left wing of the Socialist party, the Movimento Socialista

Popular (MSP—People's Socialist Movement), noted that the Armed Forces Movement was being torn apart "under the pressure of the big Portuguese and international economic groups."

In this situation, the Portuguese military cannot rise above conflicts within the ruling class and represent it as a whole, as the Egyptian officers did under Nasser. It seems more likely to suffer a fate like that of some of the military governments in Latin America. At the end of the last period of military rule in Argentina, for example, every conflict within the bourgeoisie threatened to pit one section of the armed forces against another and point toward a civil war that would have destroyed the military as a repressive force.

Pouchin indicated, moreover, yet another source of division in the Portuguese military group, explaining that the "Council of the Revolution" might have been intended as a way of cutting down Spínola's role. Obviously, in a situation where a number of junior officers have gotten considerable political influence, it would be extremely dangerous for them to permit anyone to establish himself as the supreme commander.

Furthermore, the Peruvian junta managed to create a fairly stable regime by anticipating a mass upsurge and making important concessions before the momentum could build up. But it is apparent that the explosion of hopes touched off among the workers by the sudden fall of a forty-eight-year-old dictatorship has already outdistanced the concessions the Portuguese capitalists are willing and able to make.

In this context, even the bourgeois press most aware of the need for a reformist regime in Lisbon has been pessimistic about the new government's chances.

"The signs of economic crisis are accumulating," Henry Giniger wrote in the October 7 issue of the *New York Times*. "Many people fear that a crisis could sweep away the whole effort, begun last April 25 with a military coup, to renew the political and economic and social structures of Portugal."

The experts were predicting, according to Giniger, that by next year 10 percent of the total labor force would be unemployed.

"Small businesses are having trouble making ends meet because of sharp rises in labor costs and prices of raw materials and continuing low productivity.

"Everyone is talking about a need for investments now because of the time they take to show results. But neither the public sector nor the private sector has come forward with an adequate volume of investment projects and money.

"Moreover, a lack of confidence by those with money, which became evident after the coup, has been aggravated by last week's political crisis."

One of the reasons Spínola tried to stage a coup of his own was undoubtedly the failure of the Vasco Gonçalves government either to put the lid firmly on labor struggles or to restore full bourgeois dominance in the news media. For example, although the new strike law decreed at the end of August banned "political strikes," the government was unable to break the strike of the *Jornal do Comercio* workers demanding the removal of an editor identified with the old regime.

In fact, the strikers were able to bring out the workers on most of the major papers in the country in early September, leading to the first general strike of the press since 1926. Furthermore, they did this in opposition to strong pressure from the Communist party, which opposed the strike.

If elements of the bourgeoisie already feared that the Vasco Gonçalves government was not "tough" enough to restore "order," such fears must have increased dramatically when the masses went into the streets September 27 to block the rightist offensive, forcing the government finally to move against the plotters.

In addition, regardless of the policy of the new government and its allies, the new confidence the masses have gained from their victory will inevitably tend to produce a new rise in struggles by the workers and the people.

A similar combination of factors in Chile led the bourgeoisie to engage in a blood bath. The Communist and Socialist parties had been brought into the government to divert a workers upsurge into reformist channels. At the same time, the rise of a government that claimed to represent the

workers encouraged hopes in the masses, causing them to go further than the reformists wanted or the bourgeoisie would permit.

Moreover, by the time the bourgeoisie was prepared to turn to the Communist and Socialist parties as a means of controlling the workers, the authority of these leaderships was already eroded. Significant forces were looking toward more militant methods, although none of these groups was able to offer an effective alternative. The result of all these factors was that while the reformists held the workers back from creating any organization that could have offered effective resistance to the bourgeois crackdown, they could not convince the bourgeoisie that they could meet their commitments to "maintain order."

The sharpening polarization in Portugal has clearly reached a very explosive point. The very factors that led some influential bourgeois observers to call for maintaining the reformist course—that is, the world economic crisis and the general weakness of imperialism and especially West European capitalism—could lead the Portuguese bourgeoisie and its U.S. backers to move with even greater violence against the masses if they were convinced that things were really getting out of hand.

By allowing the ultraright to rally its forces and prepare an offensive, the Armed Forces Movement has proved its inability to meet a determined assault. Only the mobilization of the masses themselves blocked Spínola's projected coup.

That mobilization now appears to

have touched off an irreversible process. A decisive struggle between the fundamental classes in society has apparently begun. In this conflict, the Armed Forces Movement will almost certainly become divided. Some officers will go over to the side of the workers, if only because they have become too compromised in the eyes of the right.

But the fundamental force in the struggle against the right is the working class. The outcome depends on its level of organization and consciousness. It has to have its own independent organizations and a leadership completely committed to its historical interests, a revolutionary party. It would be suicidal for the workers to put their trust in a conspiratorial clique of "patriotic" officers trying to arbitrate between the classes. □

U.S. Ambassador Embarrassed by Kissinger's Cover-Up

Hot Debate in India Over CIA's Covert Activities

By Sharad Jhaveri

Jamnagar

President Gerald Ford's admission of Central Intelligence Agency involvement in clandestine operations against the Allende government has stirred a hornet's nest over the intriguing question of CIA activity in India.

U.S. Ambassador to India Patrick Moynihan in the past had assured the Indian government that the CIA was in no way involved in the Chilean military coup. Moynihan evidently had given this assurance on the basis of information supplied by the State Department.

Moynihan seems to have been so perturbed by the latest disclosures of CIA crimes that he is reported to have sent a strongly worded cablegram to Kissinger and the State Department, saying that the recent revelations of CIA activities in Chile had confirmed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's "worst suspicions and genuine fears."

After cabling Washington, Moynihan left for the United States. Various newspaper reports have indicated that he is reluctant to resume his post here.

At a September 19 Senate Foreign

Relations Committee hearing, Kissinger was asked about the CIA's activities in India. He replied heatedly that the U.S. government's policy was to avoid involvement in India's domestic politics. He said that he had assured New Delhi that any U.S. official engaged in questionable activities in India would, if singled out and named, be recalled within twenty-four hours. Later that same day at a reception at the Indian Embassy, Kissinger repeated this assurance.

Meanwhile, it has been reported in a recently published book, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, that the CIA has constructed large support facilities in Northeast India and has worked with guerrillas at a deserted army base in the mountains.

The book, which has been heavily censored by the U.S. government, was written by Victor Marchetti, a fourteen-year CIA veteran, and John Marks, a former State Department official. One-hundred sixty-eight passages—including the two on India mentioned above—have been censored

in whole or in part.

The authors report that from 1956 until the end of 1969 the U.S. Air Force "operated a huge base near Peshawar in Pakistan which was primarily an intelligence facility." U-2 spy planes used it as a principal take-off point for reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union.

The authors also report that the Asia Foundation, which was supposedly designed to promote academic and public interest in the East, was heavily subsidised by the CIA. The foundation's real purpose was to finance anticommunist academic figures in various countries and to spread throughout Asia a negative view of China, North Vietnam, and North Korea.

In addition, the book reports, Tibetans were secretly brought to the U.S. for special paramilitary training, as part of an attempt to reestablish the Dalai Lama as Tibet's ruler. Later the plan was abandoned as unworkable.

In view of Kissinger's lies about CIA involvement in Chile, his as-

surances about India cannot be taken seriously. On September 19, Gandhi told a Congress party meeting that last year at an All India Congress Committee meeting, when she had compared the "situation in Chile with the situation in India," she was ridiculed. Now, she said, she still holds the view that an attempt "to defeat or at least weaken the Congress" (both by internal and external reaction) is continuing. She seems to feel that the

main thrust of the activities of opposition parties is aimed at removing her from power.

But the situation in India can hardly be compared with that in Chile at the time of the overthrow of Allende. There is no popular-front government here. It is a classical bourgeois regime headed by a far-sighted and shrewd leader of the Indian ruling class. At present no explosive mass struggles are directly posing the question of

power. The initiative still lies decisively with the Indian bourgeoisie, and the various left parties — especially the Stalinist parties — have given the bourgeoisie considerable help in retaining it.

In view of the controversy raised by the recent disclosures and defense of the CIA's secret operations, further revelations about the agency's activities will receive widespread coverage here. □

Behind the Call for a General Strike

Mexican Workers Find They Need a Wage Hike

By Eugenia Aranda

Mexico City

At the beginning of August the Congress of Labor¹ issued a call for a general strike if the bosses did not grant a 35 percent wage hike to unionized workers. Carrying out the strike would have meant that eight million workers in about 200,000 factories and businesses would have walked off the job.

At the outset the bosses refused to even discuss the matter with the unions. They called the demand for a raise "absurd and excessive" and offered solutions from the class point of view to the problem of rising prices:

"Create a climate of tranquility, end strike threats from labor, make all Mexicans understand that we must work more and spend less, and increase production and productivity," said Jesús Vidales Aparicio, president of the Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio (CON-CANACO — Confederation of National Commercial Firms), according to the September 7 issue of the Mexico City daily *Excélsior*.

It is not necessary to point out that this solution has its flaws, since not "all Mexicans" can "work more and spend less."

"I haven't eaten meat in the last three months, because I can't afford

it," said Marcelina Jiménez Sánchez, a cleaning woman shopping in an open-air market," according to an Associated Press dispatch that appeared in the August 13 *Christian Science Monitor*.

And it is not easy to explain the thesis to the peasants in the state of Morelos, 60 percent of whom cultivate 500-meter plots of land that bring them \$80 a year to maintain families averaging nine members.

President Luis Echeverría immediately stated his agreement with the Congress of Labor. This can be easily understood if we keep in mind that one of the principal pillars on which the Mexican regime rests is trade unions controlled by a highly privileged bureaucracy.

However, the country remained calm, life continued its normal course, and no one was worried about the "imminent revolutionary general strike," as it was called by Fidel Velázquez, top leader of the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM — Mexican Workers Federation).

The reason for this peace is that almost everyone knew that neither the Congress of Labor, nor the CTM, nor any *charro* (trade-union bureaucrat) would dare to go as far as a general strike. Fresh in the minds of everyone were two similar experiences:

1. The threat of a strike leveled by the Congress of Labor in September 1973 if a raise of 33.3 percent were not granted and the final settlement of 22 percent that did not even extend

to all unionized workers.

2. The call by Fidel Velázquez in February 1973 for "a workers revolution within the Mexican revolution"² if the bosses did not grant the forty-hour week with fifty-six hours pay. This demand has been dropped.

Even the functionaries of the Conciliation and Arbitration Board recognized that the way had been paved for reaching a settlement. The chairman of that body stated September 5:

"The chairman of the board proposes to stop all hearings by September 13 and leave September 14-20 as open dates for settlements or for a union waiver of demands for agreements."

However, though the union bureaucrats were not about to fight for the 35 percent, *they did feel the need to obtain some improvement in wages*. This was the form through which they were trying to recover some of the control they had lost over the workers, who in greater and greater numbers have come to realize that starvation wages and bad working conditions cannot end while the unions are controlled by bureaucrats tied to the government. Wages and better working conditions had become synonymous in their eyes with union democracy.

There are rather compelling reasons for this discontent. For several decades the Mexican bourgeoisie was able to maintain stability in the standard of living of the main sectors of the prole-

2. The bourgeois revolution, which began in 1910. — IP

1. The Congreso del Trabajo. The body consists of representatives of the officially recognized union federations. All the large Mexican unions belong to it, including the Confederación de Trabajadores de México, the major trade-union federation.

tariat and even to give them concessions of a certain magnitude, like Social Security. The *charros* were able to make an appearance every two years, when contracts were to be reviewed, which helped them keep on top of the unions.

In contrast to this, the official price index now shows an increase of 22 percent in the last twelve months. Moreover, the price of many basic foods—like beans, corn, and cooking oil—has increased almost 100 percent in that same period, according to the government itself.

During the same period, ninety-four companies registered on Mexico City's stock exchange showed an increase of 23.3 percent in sales and 113.8 percent in profits.

This explains why a noticeable resurgence in working-class struggles has begun in Mexico. The struggle is already visible in important actions, many of which have been carried out against the desires of the *charros*, who are tending to lose their grip on the unions.

During the recent months more strikes have taken place in Mexico than during the last ten years. Among these labor struggles the following are outstanding:

- The strike against two metal plants—Compañía Industrial del Norte, S.A. and Compañía Industrial Fundidora del Norte, S.A.—where 6,500 workers were mobilized in the northern city of Saltillo. The main issues were higher pay and the workers' right to choose their own representatives instead of having designated bureaucrats negotiate a contract behind their backs.

- The strike of Section 67 of the miners union in Monterrey (in the north of the country), where the question of union democracy was also posed.

- The strike in central Mexico of the construction workers at the refinery in Tula, Hidalgo, where the powerful gun-slinging bureaucracy of the oil workers union was confronted. A solidarity movement was formed to support this strike, and the students of Mexico City played an outstanding role in it.

- The wildcat strike of 3,000 workers at the General Electric plant near the capital that began when the bureaucrats informed the workers that "they had already signed the contract."

These mobilizations forced the Con-

gress of Labor to raise the demand for a wage increase. It is not strictly demagoguery. Their heads are at stake.

The Liga Socialista (Socialist League), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Mexico, took the following position in the September issue of its paper, *El Socialista*:

"The attitude that we socialists must

take toward this demand is to support it, without having the slightest expectation that the union leadership will fight for it in any meaningful way."

The Liga Socialista also pointed to the need to fight for union democracy and for a sliding scale of wages, as starting points for organizing the proletariat's struggle to regain leadership of the unions. □

Extensive TV, Press Coverage of Tour

Thousands Hear Mandel in Australia

By Jamie Doughney

Glebe

The September 11-20 tour of Australia by Ernest Mandel, internationally known Belgian Marxist economist and one of the leaders of the Fourth International, has been the largest in terms of audience, impact, and press coverage of any tour by a left-wing figure for decades. A total of nearly 8,000 persons attended public and campus lectures, with many meetings having to turn people away at the doors.

The fact that the entry ban on Mandel, in effect since 1970, was lifted so that he could make the tour was a significant event in itself. With attempts being made to overturn similar undemocratic exclusions in the United States, West Germany, France, and Switzerland, the Australian precedent can be of importance.

The tour was jointly sponsored by the Socialist Workers League, the Socialist Youth Alliance, and the Communist League, which are all sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International in Australia.

The ideas of Marxism reached a wide number of people during the tour. Australian television audiences, with obvious sensitivity to current economic problems, saw reporters focus their attention on what a Marxist economist had to say about the questions of unemployment and inflation. And it brought its responses. The *Australian*, one of the most influential bourgeois dailies, even felt compelled to devote a sizeable editorial on September 13 to Mandel's views.

The first two days of the tour were

centred in Sydney, with lecture audiences of more than 1,400 persons on campus and 900 in the main public meeting. In Brisbane and Adelaide, the major public meetings drew 300 and 500 persons, and at two campus meetings, 400 and 700.

This was despite disruption of the two meetings in Brisbane. On campus the meeting was invaded by a group of Nazis, while a "bomb scare" caused the public meeting to be moved to a nearby park.

Mandel's Melbourne meetings were by far the largest, with about 2,600 persons attending three campus meetings and a capacity audience of 900 attending the public lecture. At the public meeting a further 200 had to be turned away at the door.

On campus, Mandel's main talk was on the subject "What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going?" In the public meetings, Mandel addressed himself to a question increasingly being heard in Australia today: "Can Capitalism Survive?" In answering this question, Mandel examined the present state of the world economy as it enters a recession, felt simultaneously in all major capitalist nations. He also pointed to the role of revolutionists in shortening the life of the capitalist system.

Throughout the tour the problem of dealing with inflation figured prominently in questions Mandel was asked. In one newspaper he was reported as replying to the question very concisely: "It is not an answer which is very pleasing to many people—do away with capitalism." □

How to Make a Fast Buck Out of Starving Children

By Ernest Harsch

Mass starvation; hundreds of thousands dead in the sub-Sahara countries of Africa; entire villages wiped out; millions threatened by famine in India, Bangladesh, Bolivia, and other semicolonial countries; smallpox, cholera, measles ravaging weakened populations; the shadow of perpetual hunger hanging over half the world's 3,700 million people. But for the food monopolists it means ever fatter profits and bumper dividends.

"Hunger: U.S. Agribusiness and World Famine," an article by Cliff Conner in the September issue of *International Socialist Review*,* explores the real cause behind the famine conditions in many countries of the world today. That cause is artificial food shortages created to drive up prices and profits. The cause is not "overpopulation," "bad harvests," or "natural disasters," as the bourgeois press would have us believe.

Of the three countries that produce enough food to export significant amounts—the United States, Canada, and Australia—the United States is far in the lead. U.S. food exports dominate the international market with 60 percent of the wheat trade, 75 percent of the corn (maize) trade, and about 90 percent of the soybean trade. This near monopolization gives the U.S. food industry a tight grip on world food production and sales.

This dominant position results from the high level of productivity in the United States, ascribable largely to the intensive use of chemical fertilizers and mechanization. In 1820 the average farm worker or dirt farmer in the United States produced enough food for four people. By 1950 it was fifteen, and by 1970, forty-five.

Instead of ending hunger, however, this growing productive capacity led to capitalist "overproduction," and the consequent threat to profits.

Conner notes that in the midst of

the great depression of the 1930s, the government stepped in to help "insulate" the food industry from the market. This meant destroying huge quantities of "overabundant" food, with the calculated happy results for prices and profits.

For the next four decades Washington continued this policy—grain was burned or purchased by the government for storage; cattle and poultry were slaughtered; and the big farmers were paid to withhold land from cultivation.

In the past two years, however, under pressure from the large food monopolies, who wanted an entirely free hand to undercut their smaller competitors and drive them out of business, Washington has temporarily shelved these "price support" policies. Conner cites an example of this, reported in the July 18 New York *Village Voice*:

"Now the almond business is caught up in a war that is polarizing California agriculture. On one side is the Almond Growers Exchange, a co-op of mostly small farmers, which provides about two-thirds of all almonds. On the other side is Tenneco, the oil company, which wants to monopolize the dried fruit and nut industry in the U.S. Tenneco is undercutting the prices of the Almond Growers Exchange and encouraging big agribusiness units to plant more and more almonds, thereby leading to a glut that will force the little growers under."

Once farm prices have been driven low enough to cripple the small farmers the monopolies cut back production to drive prices back up.

The grain stored in the United States under Washington's "price support" policy constituted the only significant reserves in the world, providing a safeguard against sharp cutbacks in food production or bad harvests. The virtual elimination of these reserves the past two years has exposed the world more directly to the fluctuations of food supplies and especially the ups and downs of current harvests.

At the same time, the depletion of

these reserves makes it possible for the monopolies to rake in even higher profits during a period of shortages. "The perverse nature of this system of agricultural organization," Conner wrote, "is underlined by the fact that the disastrously poor world harvest of 1972 was seen as a stroke of immense good fortune by American agribusiness, stimulating prices, exports, and profits beyond its most optimistic expectations."

The current stage of the food crisis has been exacerbated by the sharp rise in oil prices, which has driven the costs of chemical fertilizers beyond the reach of many of the underdeveloped capitalist countries. (See *Intercontinental Press*, April 1, 1974, p. 398.) India, for instance, is expected to use only 2.5 million tons of chemical fertilizer in 1974, a drop of one million tons from the amount it used in 1973. This will reduce its grain harvest by ten million tons, forcing it to import huge amounts of food at inflated prices.

The polarization represented by the agricultural wealth of the imperialist powers and the food shortages of the semicolonial countries results from the way capitalism operates on an international scale. Conner makes this point:

"The planned investment in agriculture under a rational social system holds the only promise of adequate world food supplies. This is most dramatically shown by an examination of the inability of the backward capitalist nations to keep pace with the food needs of their populations. The domination of their economies by foreign imperialist investment and the inflow of cheap mass produced goods is commonly viewed only from the standpoint of the barrier this erects to any serious industrialization. But it also means that under capitalism agriculture in the colonial world is doomed to continue indefinitely with antiquated, pretechnological methods that cannot produce enough to stave off hunger."

Thus the perpetual hunger and oc-

*14 Charles Lane, New York, N.Y. 10014. Subscription rate for one year (eleven issues) is \$5 in the United States, \$6 elsewhere.

casional famines that plague a large part of humanity are not the result of bad fortune or "overpopulation," but of the irrationality of a system

that produces cycles of "overproduction" and shortage, that gives the imperialist powers lush fields and the underdeveloped world exhausted land,

that systematically limits food production or destroys harvests while millions of children suffer malnutrition—or die of starvation. □

In Appeal to Nationalist Sentiment

Labour Party Votes for Scottish National Assembly

By Mattie Hussey

London

A special conference of the Scottish Labour party, held in Kingston near Glasgow on August 17, voted overwhelmingly for a resolution calling for a directly elected legislative assembly for Scotland. The conference was the culmination of some months of heated debate in and around the Labour party on the issue of devolution for Scotland. The debate was accompanied by ill-concealed glee on the part of the bourgeois press, which saw the prospect of a split in the party on the question.

The labour movement crystallised in Scotland with the foundation of the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) in 1897, which had a plank calling for home rule under the aegis, of course, of the imperial parliament in Westminster. The Scottish Council of the Labour party, formed in 1915, made home rule a major element of its election campaign in 1918.

The major Britain-wide reforms introduced by the Labour government immediately after the second world war under the leadership of Attlee—including extensive nationalisations and the setting up of the National Health Service—reduced the need for the Labour party to adorn itself with a nationalist stripe. The final gasp of devolutionist energy in the party until recent times was a conference on the question in 1958, which could only come up with a call for "maximum possible self-government within the United Kingdom."

A hard antidevolutionist line gained predominance in the party, and for over a decade was more than adequate to repel the electoral challenge of the proindependence petty-bourgeois Scottish Nationalist party (SNP). In the past few years, however, the continuing decline of the old heavy indus-

tries of west and central Scotland, the decay of the cities, and rampant inflation have served to spur rising discontent with Labour, and the SNP has attempted to turn this to account in the electoral arena.

The discovery of extensive oil reserves off the North Sea coast of Scotland has been picked up by the SNP, which has depicted the find as a panacea for Scotland's ills.

A rise in nationalist sentiment was reflected in the success registered by the SNP in the February general election. They captured 22 percent of the popular vote in Scotland and won seven seats—five up on their previous two. In the process, they won votes and seats mainly from Tories and Liberals in rural and suburban constituencies, but they did win two seats in urban areas from Labour. Further, they now pose a direct threat to Labour in at least nine marginal Labour seats.

Since it formed a minority government after the general election in February, the Labour party has been busy polishing up its image—before the working class and before the capitalist class—in preparation for a new decisive general election.

It settled the miners' strike that led to the downfall of the previous Tory government by yielding in the main to the demands of the miners.

It has been defusing the massive discontent among workers over the National Health Service with large wage increases to some and with large promises to others.

It has repealed the hated antiunion act passed by the Tories—the Industrial Relations Act.

Meanwhile, together with the leadership of the Trades Union Congress, it has developed a plan—the Social Contract—for extensive and long-term

class collaboration and class peace. It has pledged to keep the troops in Ireland "as long as they are needed."

Within this dual image-building project, however, Labour had to decide how to meet the threat of the SNP at the polls. Unable and unwilling to offer an anticapitalist policy, the Labour leadership opted for refurbishing a pronationalist tinge to the party in Scotland.

This manoeuvre could only be carried through with much soul-searching, agonizing, and even recriminations. After all, the Scottish party conference in March firmly rejected proposals for an elected assembly for Scotland, and many of the party leaders in Scotland had established themselves as firm opponents of any concessions to nationalist feelings.

William Ross, the Labour secretary of state for Scotland, is known in some quarters by the nickname "the hammer of the Nats"—it might be added, from an antidevolutionist standpoint.

But their "antinationalism" was not a radical policy but simply their belief that the working class in Scotland should be subordinate to *British*, and not specifically Scottish, reformism.

In May, the party tops in London began the public part of their manoeuvre to force the hand of the Scottish section of the party. They issued a government discussion document making proposals for an elected assembly for Scotland. Some of the Scottish leaders failed or refused to take the hint, and in June the Scottish Labour Executive voted 6 to 5 (only eleven out of twenty-nine members were present) to reject the concept of an elected assembly.

The National Executive Council countered in July with unanimous en-

dorsement of the elected assembly idea.

The special conference arose out of the close vote of the Scottish Labour Executive and the need for the party tops to reverse it decisively. They found the allies required in the Scottish wing of the trade-union bureaucracy. As part of their goodwill for the Social Contract, virtually all of the trade-union delegates to the special conference (each one wielding large bloc votes in the names of all the trade-union members paying the political levy to the Labour party) cast their votes for the elected assembly.

It would be wrong to assume that these were mandated votes after rank-and-file discussion in the unions. Very little discussion took place on the subject. The result was that ranged in support of the elected assembly were the bureaucracies of the following unions: Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, General and Municipal Workers Union, Transport and General Workers Union, National Union of Mineworkers, as well as the STUC as a whole. Only the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers and the Transport and Salaried Staffs Association voted against.

The conference voted by a 4-to-1 margin for a resolution "that this conference, recognising the desire of the Scottish people for a greater say in the running of their own affairs, calls for the setting up of a directly elected assembly with legislative powers within the context of the political and economic unity of the United Kingdom." The conference also opposed any reduction in the present Scottish representation in the Westminster parliament.

Naturally, the question of an assembly of the *working class* in Scotland, as opposed to a mere revamping of the capitalist state, was not even mentioned.

The threat of a split over the issue was never great, especially in the present political climate in the labour movement, which is being stampeded by the united bureaucracies of the trade unions and the Labour party into working for the election of a Labour government by any class-colaborationist means necessary.

Besides, any differences on the question could be easily accommodated in view of the proposed assembly's lack of any real power. The proposal is

a shoddy, demagogic veneer for the party image. It may help the immediate requirements of the Labour party tops in the next general election,

Italy

The 'Il Manifesto' Regroupment

[The following article appeared in the September 13 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The *Il Manifesto* congress, held in Rome in July, paved the way for a fusion with the PDUP [Partito d'Unità Proletaria—Party of Proletarian Unity] and the formation of a new party, the Party of Proletarian Unity for Communism. The political situation in Italy gives added interest to an event that the entire press presented as quite important. *Il Manifesto*, it should be noted, is a daily newspaper with a circulation of 25,000 to 30,000. It is also an organization formed by former cadres of the Communist party who left the CP under the dual influence of the student radicalization and the Czechoslovak affair of 1968. *Il Manifesto* claims a membership of 10,000.

Nothing was overlooked by the leadership in their effort to use the congress as a vehicle for political maneuvering; free and democratic discussion among the delegates suffered accordingly. About half of those scheduled to speak were never able to do so, since each contribution to the discussion lasted an average of forty-five minutes and dealt more with problems of a general nature than with defining a line for the party. Thus, apart from a polemic on the question of women's liberation and a heated discussion on the role of antimilitary work—two points that seemed to be of particular concern to the militants—the congress served more than anything else as the setting for a three-fold maneuver:

● Toward the PDUP, with whom the process of fusion has finally been brought to a conclusion. The PDUP is a group that, while hardly militant, has a number of trade-union

but it cannot be expected to answer any of the pressing problems of housing, jobs, cost of living, etc., of the working people of Scotland. □

cadres in the CGIL [Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro—Italian General Confederation of Labor].

It represents what remained following the crisis in the PSIUP [Partito Socialista Italiano d'Unità Proletaria—Italian Socialist party of Proletarian Unity] after the latter was torn apart by the Socialist and Communist parties. Its recruitment among radicalized Christian workers made it a less "rigid" movement than *Il Manifesto* and accounts for the fact that it is still hesitant about making explicit references to Marxism.

This meant that the *Il Manifesto* leadership had to fight to retain the word "Communism" in the name of the new party (the PDUP would have preferred "Socialism"). The *Il Manifesto* leadership also made several references to Lenin and Gramsci to establish the theoretical unity of the new party that is to emerge from the fusion. On several points—including participation in elections ("in all elections, even local ones"), the concept of the party and of the role of a revolutionary daily newspaper, and other tactical questions of a secondary nature—the numerically weaker *Il Manifesto* seemed anxious to make clear its political hegemony over the PDUP.

● In regard to *Lotta Continua* and *Avanguardia Operaia*, whose leaders spoke at some length at the congress, *Il Manifesto* in effect made an appointment for some time in the future, using for this purpose discussing the "restructuring of the left." Scoring a direct hit on *Avanguardia Operaia*'s opportunism and turns—and on the shortcuts and oversimplifications of *Lotta Continua*'s analysis of the political situation, which reduces to zero the influence of the reformists on the working class—*Il Manifesto* seemed to have in mind the relative state of crisis in the two organizations.

Lotta Continua's interpretation of the crisis in Chile, and the tasks for

Italy it deduced from this, will undoubtedly keep this rather consistently ultraleft current at some distance from the centrism of *Il Manifesto*. It is not possible to be quite so categorical with *Avanguardia Operaia*. *Il Manifesto* can, without bragging, view itself as the pivot for the regroupments that will take place in the Italian far left in the months ahead.

● In regard to the Italian CP, the congress enabled the *Il Manifesto* leadership to pursue a dialogue at the top levels that is still scarcely imaginable in France. Two journalists from *Unità* [the CP daily newspaper], who followed the discussion quite attentively, took note of the criticism of the "historic compromise" [the CP's offer to participate in the Italian government] and of the indictment against the CP's policy in the "red zones," such as Emilia.

Il Manifesto's aim is to play up to the hilt the uneasiness felt by many CP militants and cadres following the adoption of the "Berlinguer line" [Enrico Berlinguer, CP general secretary] of offering to collaborate with the Christian Democracy. Especially since the material conditions for starting to put this line into practice are lacking. The history of the social structure, of the Social Democratic organizations, and of the bourgeoisie's form of domination excludes any possibility of arranging an agreement with a reformist partner that would offer an alternative in the present crisis.

Furthermore, the grave difficulties of the Christian Democrats, difficulties that were made worse by the divorce referendum, have in no way led the bourgeoisie to lose sight of the extent of the social crisis. The widespread character of the crisis, the continuing high level of combativity, and the appearance of new vanguards in the very heart of the working class increase the weight of the far-left organizations and strengthen their role in the country's political life.

The initiative maintained by the working masses (summoned up in each response to murders by the fascists) provides a strong corrective for the effects sought by the "strategy of tension" [a series of terrorist acts carried out by fascist groups in the hope of provoking a reaction against the left].

This is the situation that was interpreted in a document from the ranks, "The New Character of the Crisis,"

which was written in preparation for the congress. But neither the report by [Luigi] Magri [a leader of *Il Manifesto*] nor the contributions to the discussion clarified what the tasks of revolutionists are. The debates, including those with *Lotta Continua* and *Avanguardia Operaia*, remained astonishingly abstract and general. The discussions on political line and the function of slogans in the mass movement, on the question of power and class alliances, remained quite confused. The term "workers hegemony," which seemed to turn up everywhere, did little to conceal the lack of precision in the analyses of Italian society.

It is true that according to *Il Manifesto*'s theses, "the proletariat can no longer be defined as the producer of surplus value, since the boundaries between productive and nonproductive work are less rigid than in the past. . . . From a sociological point of view, the proletariat in an advanced capitalist system is not a precisely definable reality." Apart from these negative definitions, it must be said that *Il Manifesto* did not bring any rigorous contributions to bear on this question.

If the debates were so lacking in concreteness, it is because *Il Manifesto*'s strategic hypothesis is one of a linear development of a political situation that has been evolving over several years, in the course of which it is hopeless to expect a significant change in the political relationship of forces between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between the reformists and the revolutionists.

Il Manifesto explains that however deep the crisis may become, its forces do not permit it to "deal with the crisis." The task therefore "is simply to build a party that will shift the axis of discussion in the entire Italian far left." Intervention in every struggle and the unification of existing forces on the basis of a minimum agreement on "the analysis of the crisis of the system" will, it is thought, make it possible to accumulate experience and forces.

The lever vis-à-vis the broad masses envisaged in this policy is "pressure" and "influence" on the CP. Accordingly, the CP's coming to power is foreseen in only one variant: the CP, recognizing the impossibility of a compromise with the Christian Democracy, forms a government with some secondary reformist forces and thus

expresses, in a distorted fashion but for an entire stage, the conquest of a small part of state power by the working class. This failure to take a position on the policy of class collaboration in reformist coalitions weighs heavily when it comes time to define the tasks of revolutionists.

The roots of this lack of clear strategic perspectives on the question of state power and the revolutionary crisis can be better understood if one recalls the origins of *Il Manifesto*, its historical links with the leadership of the Italian CP. Magri wrote in 1970 (in issue No. 10-11 of *Il Manifesto*): "We do not view the building of a new revolutionary force as a split that would separate the healthy elements from the opportunist ones. We are speaking, on the contrary, of a 'cultural revolution,' of a 'transformation from the ranks,' carried out in the mass struggle and accompanied by a critical examination of the entire past, in such a way as to profoundly change the method of operation of the party [CP], and above all of its best elements." This is still the assessment of *Il Manifesto*, and it clearly defines the group as centrist.


There are, therefore, differences with the comrades in *Il Manifesto* on the nature of the period and on building the revolutionary party, on the balance sheet of the international workers movement, and on the tasks of revolutionists on a European scale. That is to say, there is subject matter for a debate. A debate that one should not be permitted to sidestep in France because of any definitive or disenchanted assessment of the Italian situation, a debate that the Rome congress gives one a desire to pursue. □

Mao's Writings Next to Be Purged?

The writings of Chairman Mao may soon be revised to remove all approving references to Confucius, according to a document circulating among Western correspondents in Peking. Purportedly a directive of the Communist party's Central Committee, the document acknowledges that Mao's works contain many Confucian references but claims they were inserted during editing by Liu Shao-chi and Chen Po-ta.

A tally by *Time* magazine last February found that in Mao's four-volume selected works, "no less than 22% of his references to other writers are to the sage or his disciples—just short of the 24% devoted to Front-Runner Joseph Stalin."

AROUND THE WORLD



Dacca Forced to Halt Cuban Trade

The United States government has succeeded in blackmailing Bangladesh into closing its trade relations with Cuba.

This summer, U. S. officials informed the Bangladesh government that all credits under the Food for Peace program would be canceled unless the export of locally made gunny sacks to Cuba was halted. The sacks, one of Bangladesh's few exports, are used all over the world to transport rice, grain, sugar, and fertilizer.

The Bangladesh government has estimated that it will face a food deficit of 2.3 million tons owing to the recent flood.

Expanding Cuban-Argentine Trade

The Cubans have conducted \$537.3 million in trade with Argentine industry in the thirteen months since Buenos Aires decided to ignore the U. S.-imposed embargo on trade with Havana. Included in this figure are Cuban purchases of \$110.4 million in railroad locomotives and rolling stock; 14,000 trucks; 24,100 automobiles; and purchases of ships, food-processing plants, and irrigation equipment.

The head of the Cuban commercial mission to Buenos Aires recently announced interest in buying complete factories. He said that six poultry-processing plants, seven grain-processing and storage facilities, an industrial bakery, and a packing-house had already been contracted.

The mission also announced interest in cement and brick factories and has entered into negotiations to purchase materials needed to rebuild the Cuban tourist industry. The government is already in the process of building forty new hotels and refurbishing others.

Cancer Strikes Asbestos Workers' Families

During the last thirty years, thousands of asbestos workers have contracted cancer and other deadly diseases from continued exposure to asbestos-laden air. It has now been discovered that even the relatives of asbestos workers have developed cancer in a striking number of cases because of peripheral and often brief exposure to the mineral.

So far, of the 210 family members tested

by a New York-based medical team, nearly 40 percent were found to have developed lung abnormalities. Three persons in the 210-member group have already died.

In addition, a recent Canadian study has disclosed that the consumption of even small quantities of asbestos can cause a wide variety of malignant tumors.

In spite of this knowledge, a U. S. Court of Appeals has ruled that a Minnesota taconite processing plant (owned by Armco and Republic Steel corporations) can continue to dump up to 67,000 tons of asbestos-contaminated material into Lake Superior every day, thus affecting the drinking water of the people of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan in the United States, and the province of Ontario in Canada.

Israeli Economy in Trouble

Economists estimate that Israel will build up a \$3,300 million balance-of-payments deficit for this year, the bulk of which is caused by imports of arms, oil, and food. It is also estimated that Israel will need \$4,000 million in aid to offset next year's deficit.

Half of the \$4,000 million is expected to come in the form of arms credits and economic aid from the White House. The Zionists depend on immigration, contributions, and sales of State of Israel Bonds for the remainder.

Israeli industry has been affected by the international economic crisis, so that demand for Israeli-produced textiles, plywood, and electrical components has steadily declined.

Utility Workers in Puerto Rico Authorize Strike for Higher Pay

The Union de Trabajadores de la Industria Electrica y Riego (UTIER—Union of Light and Water Workers) of Puerto Rico has called for a strike if its demand for a \$100-a-month wage increase is not met. The Water Resources Administration has so far offered only a \$50 boost.

Unfortunately, the UTIER leadership has cut the union off from a potential source of support by claiming that a con-

sumer boycott of electricity bills has deprived the utility of funds that would otherwise allegedly be used to increase wages.

The boycott, which began six months ago, has been organized throughout the island to protest rate increases. According to the boycott organizers, electricity bills have jumped from \$12 a month to as high as \$94.35. Boycotters link the high cost of electricity to the extensive use of power at below-cost rates by U. S.-owned oil and petrochemical plants.

The Rest Can Starve

U. S. government officials have decided on a "tentative" list of countries that will receive priority in food requests in the coming months. These are South Vietnam, Cambodia, Egypt, Syria, Chile, and Bangladesh.

Not included on the list is India, which faces a food deficit estimated at six million tons this year.

Canada Moves to Restrict Immigration

Canada is preparing to impose stricter controls on immigration. A "preliminary study" on immigration is to be published by the federal government, as a prelude to the introduction of new legislation.

Reports indicate that the study will focus on a relative increase in the number of immigrants to Canada from Asian countries. Twenty years ago, according to official figures, more than 85 percent of immigrants were from Europe, while immigrants from Asia accounted for only 2.8 percent. Since then, the proportion of Europeans has dropped to 39 percent, while that of Asians has risen to 23.3 percent.

The government inquiry comes amid a growing racist campaign in Canada directed against persons of Asian descent.

Police Attack Frondizi Funeral

Police in Buenos Aires used tear gas to break up the September 29 funeral demonstration of more than 3,000 for Silvio Frondizi, a well-known civil liberties lawyer and brother of former Argentine President Arturo Frondizi.

The cops first halted the procession and seized the hearses carrying the bodies of Frondizi and his son-in-law, Luis Mendi-

buru. More than fifty persons were arrested in the attack that followed.

Fronzidi and Mendiburu were assassinated September 27 by members of the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance, an ultraright execution squad.

100,000 Voice Chile Solidarity in Rome

Additional demonstrations marking the anniversary of the bloody military coup in Chile have been reported. (See *Intercontinental Press*, September 30 and October 7, for earlier coverage.)

In Rome, 100,000 persons immobilized the center of the city September 14 with their protest march. In Milan, 60,000 persons took part in a Chile solidarity demonstration the same day.

In Bogota, Colombia, 50,000 persons attended a rally September 21, where Beatriz Allende, daughter of Salvador Allende, and Gladys Marin, a leader of the Chilean Communist Youth, spoke.

Demonstrations were also held in Brussels and Liege, Belgium; West Berlin; and Glasgow in mid-September.

In Hamburg, West Germany, longshoremen refused to load a Chilean freighter September 18 and 19 as part of a two-day international boycott called by the International Federation of Transport Workers.

Wave of Arrests in South Africa

The South African police launched a wave of arrests, searches, and interrogations after they broke up two rallies in support of Frelimo (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique—Mozambique Liberation Front) during the last week of September. The police raided homes near Durban and Johannesburg, and at Germiston, Kokstad, and Kingwilliamstown. Press accounts put the number of those arrested between twelve and thirty, in addition to those arrested previously at the rallies. The raids were aimed primarily at two Black groups, the South African Students Organization and the Black People's Convention.

Three Minutes Closer to Doomsday

The editors of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* have moved the hands of their doomsday clock forward three minutes. It is now set at nine minutes before midnight.

For twenty-seven years that clock has symbolized the threat of nuclear annihilation hovering over humanity. The minute hand, never far from midnight, has been advanced or moved back by the editors with the ebb and flow of the international political situation, registering their assessment of the likelihood of nuclear war.

In the September issue, the editors gave their reasons for advancing the clock. They said that the so-called Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States

and the Soviet Union have merely served as a cover for the development and deployment of new generations of nuclear weapons, each more efficient and more lethal than the last. They pointed to the growing tendency "to conventionalize the concept of resort to nuclear arms in contingency plans for war," that is, the concept of "limited" nuclear war. They also pointed to the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries.

Thieu Seizes Saigon Newspaper

Dozens of cops stormed the offices of the Saigon newspaper *Great Nation* September 28 and seized its entire press run. It was the fourth Saigon newspaper to have been confiscated within eight days.

The official reason given for the seizure was an article the paper had printed disclosing Thieu's approval of a plan called "Comet," a secret-police operation aimed at smashing the opposition political movements.

Opposition Rally Attacked in Saigon

Provocateurs and members of the South Vietnamese secret police force attacked a street rally of about 100 Buddhists, Catholic priests, and opposition political figures in Saigon September 29.

Among the demands raised by the demonstrators were the release of political prisoners, a halt to torture in Thieu's jails, and freedom of the press. The attackers were driven off after several minutes of scuffling, and the rally was able to continue for more than an hour.

Alexandra Lamas Tortured in Chile

Alexandra Lamas, daughter of U.S. actor Fernando Lamas and an activist among Chilean refugees in Australia, was arrested and tortured in Santiago, Chile, recently. A physician representing a group of 100 Australians who were working for her release said Lamas was believed to be mentally deranged because of the torture. Lamas, an Australian citizen, was in Santiago attending a training course for her job with LAN-Chile airlines.

The junta released her and expelled her from Chile on September 30.

Moscow, Peking Cut Hanoi Military Aid

According to Western observers in Saigon, the Soviet Union and China have stepped up their economic aid to North Vietnam this year while at the same time slashing military aid almost in half. They estimate that economic aid from all workers states will total \$1,200 million during 1975 if current trends continue. This would be a 50 percent increase over last year's aid figure. Military aid, however, is expected to run only about one-third to one-half the amount that Washington is supplying to Saigon.



New York Times

"Is there a country that won't be overthrown in the next 21 days?"

Two Killed in Police Attack on Inflation Protest in Mexico

Two persons were killed and more than 200 were arrested October 1 when Mexican police moved against a day-long protest in Oaxaca against the rising cost of living.

Sao Tome, Principe to Gain Independence

Portugal has agreed to move immediately toward relinquishing control over the islands of Sao Tome and Principe, it was announced October 5 in Libreville, Gabon, after a week of talks there between a Portuguese government delegation and the Sao Tome and Principe Liberation Movement.

A communique said a referendum on the islands was "unnecessary." The islands, which lie 125 miles west of Gabon in the Gulf of Guinea, have a population of 65,000.

Isabel Signs New 'Antisubversive' Bill

On September 30, Argentine President Maria Estela ("Isabel") Martinez de Peron signed a new law banning "crimes of terror." According to a report in the October 1 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinion*, the main "offenders" aimed at are those who "attempt to bring about or call for the disturbance of social peace or institutional order."

Also punishable is "the possession, display, publication, distribution, or dissemination of facts, pictures, or communications" related to such "disturbances"; the "use or possession of emblems or insignias that identify or represent subversive organizations"; and the "continuation of work stoppages that have been declared illegal."

Behind the Ultrarightist Attempt at a Comeback

By Gerry Foley

[This is the second of two articles. It was written before the latest crisis was precipitated by the resignation of President Spínola.]

* * *

Even after the second provisional government began a new wave of repression in early August with the one-day suspension of most of the major dailies, the banning of the largest Maoist paper, and a six-hour military occupation of Lisbon's central square, the Portuguese Communist party continued to help the authorities prepare the way for a witch-hunt against the left. With certain tactical adjustments, it is still continuing its policy of supporting the government's repression of critics from the left.

Nonetheless, it has become more and more obvious that the increasing repression against left-wing opposition groups has gone hand in hand with a bolder and bolder anti-Communist campaign by a rapidly reviving right. In its zeal to demonstrate its loyalty to the provisional government, the Communist party was clearly arming its enemies. In at least one case, in which CP members participated in an assault on a Maoist demonstration August 12, it seemed even to have set an example for goon-squad attacks against the left.

Anti-Communist posters and wall slogans began appearing in Lisbon in July; they became more and more numerous toward the end of the month. Yet in an interview on the front page of the August 9 issue of the Communist party organ *Avante!*, Alvaro Cunhal indicated that the main danger to the Communist party was from the left.

He was asked: "Could the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party] in the future find itself the victim of this same democratic order, which it says today it wants to build and respect?" The CP general secretary answered:

"If it were a real democratic order, such a danger would not exist. Democratic legality and order are favorable to the forces of social progress. If we build a democratic system, the PCP will be the first to respect the laws and demand that others respect them too.

"Naturally there are those who are dreaming about a future repression against the Party. The hysterical anti-Communist campaign being waged jointly by the ultraleftists and the counterrevolutionaries should be noted, and certain sectors of the state apparatus are not guiltless in this regard."

As for the most notable instance of repression up till that time, the military occupation of Rossio Square, the victims, Cunhal made clear, could expect no sympathy from the Communist party.

He was asked: "How should we regard the recent banning of a journal and the armed forces' breaking up a street demonstration?"

Cunhal replied: "We are sorry that things went as far as they did. But we should ask ourselves: Since broad democratic freedoms exist today, is it permissible for the freedom of the press to be used to insult, slander, and revile the Armed Forces Movement, the Provisional Government, and the democratic parties in such terms that crimes are committed on every page? Is it permissible that the right to demonstrate be used to carry out actions of sheer provocation against the present democratic course of Portuguese politics? Can we allow the fascists and the ultraleftists to seek jointly or in a parallel way to create a climate of unrest, agitation, and lack of confidence opening the way for counterrevolutionary plots? The persons who bear the main responsibility for the measures you refer to are those who refuse to understand the real situation in Portugal. . . ."

CP Attacks Maoist Demonstration

Some of the ranks were not long in taking Cunhal's hint: "Groups of counterdemonstrators armed with clubs and iron bars stopped an MRPP [Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian party] demonstration in O Porto yesterday," *A Capital* reported August 13. The report continued: "The incidents, which lasted about half an hour, left many persons wounded, including some tourists who happened to be passing by." *A Capital's* correspondent interviewed several of the attackers:

"Virgílio de Jesus da Silva Marques told us that he lives in Corujeira and is eighteen years old. Wielding a metal bar, he attacked the demonstrators. 'My party,' he said, 'is the CP and I would only like to kill some of those characters.'"

In the early morning of August 15, for the first time since April 25, demonstrators were fired on in the streets, and one person was killed; ironically he may have been a supporter of the CP, since he was known as an activist in the MDP (Movimento Democrático Português—Portuguese Democratic Movement, a CP-dominated popular-front formation).

The police had broken up a rally in support of the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) that an African student center, the Casa de Angola, had scheduled for the Pavilhão de Deportes. Some of the crowd filtered back to Rossio Square, where a small demonstration took place.

From 12:15 a.m. to about 1 a.m. when I was in the square, there was no hint that anything out of the ordinary was about to happen. There were just groups of people talking and arguing, the usual scene after demonstrations in Rossio Square.

"Nothing foreshadowed the gravity of the profoundly disturbing incidents that about an hour later would stain

Rossio with blood," *República's* reporter wrote in the issue that appeared the next day.

"After about an hour of waiting, the Military Police and the PSP [Policia de Segurança Pública—Public Security Police] started to withdraw. It was at this point that several persons in the crowd began to throw stones at the police cars. The situation became grave when the cars passed in front of the Teatro de D. Maria II after circling the square. The Policia de Choque responded to new barrages of stones with gunfire, aimed low.

The Way It Was Before April 25

"A feeling of profound surprise and an initial wave of panic swept Rossio. For the first time, the police were acting the way they used to, or worse; they were aiming directly at the people." Vitor Manuel Ferreira Bernardes, twenty-nine years old, was killed in the barrage. A German tourist was wounded in the leg. Many persons were taken to the hospital, *República's* reporter noted, to be treated "for more or less serious lesions caused by the very active clubs of the police."

After the first bloodletting, "the square emptied, but filled again with persons commenting on what had just happened. Later there were more shots, 'real barrages,' according to the witnesses. It is not known if there were further victims."

In Portugal, as in many other countries, there is no lack of ultraleft thrill-seekers. But in the kind of conditions the police faced that night in Rossio Square, they cannot really have felt threatened. According to the indirect reports I got from friends later, the police opened fire in a cool, deliberate way, completely without warning. There could, after all, hardly be a more direct way to discourage the kind of street demonstrations that have proliferated in Portugal since April 25 and that have been a feature of the "anarchy" Palma Carlos, the premier of the first provisional government, cited as his reason for resigning on July 9.

The shootings did rouse the CP to protest. A statement by the Political Committee in the August 16 issue of *Avante!* said:

"The PCP protests vigorously against the repression carried out by elements of the PSP, which resulted in the death of one person and the wounding of several others.

"These actions by the police do not reflect the policy of the Provisional Government and the Armed Forces Movement, whose prestige they have gravely damaged, and should be condemned unequivocally by all those who are for democracy and peace.

"While condemning these repressive acts, the PCP stresses that the ultraleftist intoxication and the violations of democratic order are playing into the hands of the reactionaries. The PCP condemns the provocative actions of the fascists and ultraleftists against the Armed Forces and the Military Police."

The two other coalition parties, the SP and the PPD (Partido Popular Democrático—People's Democratic party), also condemned the shootings. The differences among the political forces supporting the government came to the surface.

In the first place, in view of the more and more aggressive moves by the right, the Communist party leadership was beginning to become uneasy. The August 16 edi-

torial in *Avante!* began by mentioning repeated rightist acts of violence in Lisbon. The ranks of the CP must have been even more uneasy, since a large proportion of them have been recruited since the coup, and the party has not had time to educate them to the point that they cannot see what is happening around them.

The Socialist party had, probably, the greatest contradictions. It had obviously grown enormously since May, and was now close to becoming a mass party—a particularly loose and inconsistent one, which was by no means impervious to the revolutionary moods among an important section of the youth or to the aspirations of the militant workers. Furthermore, it had to differentiate itself from the Communist party essentially on the issue of democracy. With even the bourgeois liberals of the PPD condemning the atrocity in Rossio Square, the Social Democratic right wing could not have prevented substantial sections of the party from being drawn into active protests against the government repression.

Although no force has initiated a broad movement of protest, the fact that such a potential existed was no doubt a factor the government had to take into consideration.

Junta Defends Police Assault

It is true that the government claimed it had not ordered the shootings. This is not surprising, especially if the reports are true that the soldiers stationed in the square refused to join in the repression. But it did defend politically the actions of its repressive forces and thus gave the lie to the CP's claim that the incidents did not reflect official policy.

The communiqué issued jointly by the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the provisional government included the following points:

"1. The meeting in support of the MPLA . . . had been banned by the Provisional Government and the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

"2. The MPLA has so far rejected all the peace offers of the Provisional Government and declared its intention to continue the struggle indefinitely in Angola, thus showing disrespect for the desires of the Angolan peoples. The soldiers of Portugal will be obliged to remain on guard to defend themselves in Angola. The government and the General Staff cannot permit support for the MPLA to be expressed on the Portuguese homefront while this organization maintains its warlike attitude.

"3. Having been prevented from holding a meeting in the scheduled place, the demonstrators concentrated around the statue of the Marquis de Pombal and went down the Avenida de Libertade. At 11 p.m. yesterday they tried to organize a meeting in Rossio.

"4. In accordance with the ban issued by the Government and the General Staff, the forces of the PSP and the Military Police proceeded to that location. They made strong appeals to the demonstrators over loudspeakers, calling on them to disperse. When these appeals were not heeded, they had to act to control the situation.

"5. At about 1:15, the peaceable demonstrators had dispersed.

"When the personnel of the PSP and the Military Police had gotten into their cars and were already moving out, provocateurs in scattered groups stoned the vehicles of the

PSP, wounding five persons and causing considerable damage.

"Striving to limit the violence, the police with difficulty managed to neutralize the activity of the provocateurs.

"6. Shortly afterward, these provocateurs began to make attacks with firearms. [There was not the slightest confirmation of this claim in any of the accounts.]

"7. Afterward, the attackers made an attempt to mount an assault on the Eighth Squadron of the PSP, which was stationed near Rossio. They stoned and insulted the officers of the PSP, thus forcing them to intervene once again in a defensive way. . . .

"8. Situations of this sort are lamentable because of what they reveal but above all because of the upset, sorrow, and mourning they inflict on a people seeking the road of freedom and democracy. . . .

"10. The Government and the General Staff have confidence in the instinctive good sense of the Portuguese people, who have always come finally to recognize their real enemy and to condemn this enemy, in full cognizance of the hidden motives of the provocateurs.

"11. The members of the Government, who are part of the Portuguese People, recognize the importance of remaining vigilant, on guard, and calm in the face of a situation where mass demonstrations are being infiltrated by provocateurs whose aim is to block the process of democratization that is under way."

Police Ignore PIDE Prison Mutiny

The hypocrisy of the government's statement was all the clearer because of the very different attitude the police and military had taken toward the mutiny on August 11 of 600 PIDE (Salazarist secret police) agents jailed in the Penitenciária de Lisboa. No violence was used to quell this riot by a group of murderers and torturers who had terrorized the Portuguese people for many years. When the mutineers called on General Galvão de Melo, the most outspokenly rightist member of the junta, to negotiate for them with the prison authorities, he was quick to oblige. The riot was ended, but it was not clear on what conditions.

The military and the police did move into the area. But they functioned primarily to defend the PIDE veterans, since masses of people surrounded the prison to make sure that the hated bullies of the Salazarist regime did not get away with anything. It was the people the police attacked, not the mutineers.

"Without its being planned or organized by any political party," Fernanda Mestrinho wrote in the August 13 issue of *Diário de Lisboa*, "thousands of persons gathered at the Penitenciária de Lisboa. . . .

"'Vigilance by the people, vigilance by the people,' the persons present shouted. 'Death to the PIDE' and 'Galvão Out of the Junta' were chanted in unison by the crowd.

"At about 6 p.m., the numbers of people present increased considerably. They were pressing against the windows of the building. But all they did was protest against any concessions by the authorities to the PIDE agents. At exactly 6:15, the PSP charged the crowd, swinging their clubs. It was in the 'good old pre-April 25 style.' They clubbed people indiscriminately. A four-

year-old child was hit. Women were beaten. The demonstrators responded by throwing stones."

General Galvão de Melo's role in negotiating with the PIDE agents won him still more national attention. In its August 16 issue, the rightist weekly *Tempo Novo* ran a special interview with him, under the headline "Galvão de Melo Tells *Tempo Novo*: 'Communism and Fascism Are Very Similar.'" This was the same message that was expressed by thousands of expensively printed posters that appeared all over Lisbon in late July.

Comeback for Political Police?

The reactionary journal asked him: "As regards the former DGS [Direcção Geral de Segurança—General Directorate of Security] and its dismantling—which of course you approved of, general—doesn't the country need some service that will carry out the task of synthesizing information that was previously assigned to that body?"

The general replied: "Obviously I agreed with the dismantling of the ex-DGS, since I had always condemned its existence. But I did not condemn it as a national intelligence service. . . .

"It is my duty to make clear that from the standpoint of national survival, it is more of a problem to have no intelligence service at all than to have one such as has now been abolished."

The general seemed to be testing the ground for the government's logical next step, the restoration of regular surveillance of left political groups. One organization, the MRPP, had already been virtually outlawed; obviously some kind of political police force was needed to maintain this repression. The resumption of political spying would mark the full restoration of bourgeois "order."

While the rightist general discussed bringing back the hallowed institution of the political police, another old institution of the Salazar regime was being revived—the parallel police, or gangs of rightist toughs.

Flowers for Salazar

In the town of Santa Comba Dão in central Portugal, a gang of fascists surfaced on August 19. Holding the population at bay, they began provocatively to clean off the uncomplimentary graffiti that had been painted on a statue of Salazar since April 25.

"Later, at about 10 p.m., an incident occurred," *República's* correspondent wrote. "When an excursion stopped in the center of the town and people began to saunter nonchalantly toward the statue, fascists armed with clubs and pitchforks threatened them. The GNR [Guarda Nacional Republicana, the riot police] were called on to intervene. GNR officers came to advise the excursionists to leave the place so as to avoid disturbances.

"But the climate of emotional agitation continued into the night. Well-known local Salazarites paraded through the streets in a festive way. Some decided to offer a posthumous homage and placed wreaths of flowers at the feet of Salazar.

"Indignation prevailed among most of the population,

but a feeling of impotence stilled the voices that might have been raised. Around midnight, a donkey appeared at the foot of the statue, and that is when the most serious incident occurred. Someone warned the owner of the donkey to leave the square. When he refused, he was attacked with a knife. He died in the hospital a few hours later.

"Only then, at the insistence of the people, did the GNR pay some attention to what had happened."

A similar incident had occurred in Lisbon the day before. From the political standpoint, it was still graver.

A group called the União Democrática de Cabo Verde (UDC—Democratic Union of Cape Verde) had called a demonstration to support the continuation of Portuguese rule in the Cape Verde Islands. Students from the colonies called a counterdemonstration. The UDC group consisted of about a hundred lumpen types, nearly all Africans. The anticolonialist demonstrators, perhaps three times the number, were nearly all young people, about half Africans and half Europeans. They apparently were students.

Encounters in the Streets

The UDC demonstration, which had been heralded as an "unprecedented concentration" of Cape Verdeans, was a dismal failure. The counterdemonstrators had won an important victory. Unfortunately, they made some tactical errors.

The counterdemonstrators were not content with simply eclipsing the UDC rally and getting across their point to the Portuguese people. They tried to envelop the UDC group and prevent its representatives from speaking. When I came across the demonstration, the anticolonialists had about fifty UDC supporters pinned against the statue in the Praça do Comercio and were shouting slogans at them such as "Viva PAIGC," and "Amilcar Cabral, Heroi Nacional!" This continued for more than an hour.

In the meantime, other counterdemonstrators had overturned a car carrying UDC and procolonialist propaganda. They set fire to the literature. Smoke and ashes were swirled hundreds of feet high by the strong winds blowing off the River Tejo.

Eventually, the counterdemonstrators marched off to Rossio Square to hold a meeting to explain their action to the population. The UDC supporters re-formed, armed themselves with clubs and stones, and marched to the square. They circled in behind the anticolonialists, who were grouped around the statue of Dom Pedro IV in the middle of the square, and charged them, waving clubs and hurling paving stones.

There was a brief cross fire of paving stones, and then the anticolonial group retreated in fair order. It was a wise decision. If they had tried to hold their ground, some of them would certainly have been badly injured or killed, since by this time the UDC thugs had reached a murderous pitch of excitement. And in the eyes of the onlookers, a confrontation between the two groups would have looked like a fight between two African gangs. (A large part of the Europeans had left by this point.)

Groups of UDC supporters and fascist provocateurs

began to comb through the crowd of onlookers, seeking counterdemonstrators to beat up as well as opportunities to create incidents. Several times, barrages of paving stones were directed against the crowds of people gathered on the sidewalk opposite the statue. The windshield of one taxi was shattered; the driver maneuvered his car with difficulty to the curb. Traffic began to avoid the area. The main group of UDC demonstrators danced up and down in the center of the square, waving their clubs and threatening the crowd of pedestrians.

For four hours the main square of the city was paralyzed, masses of people were intimidated, and many persons were threatened with serious physical harm. And in this entire time, not one policeman of any kind showed his face.

Promises No More Lies

While official and unofficial political intimidation was being stepped up in this way, Premier Vasco Gonçalves stressed that the authorities could now have a new confidence in the people. In his speech August 18, the most important since his taking office, he said:

"The time is past of the government lying to the people. The country must know the real situation. Only in that way can it understand why it is being asked to accept sacrifices and austerity. . . . A country cannot leap in a moment from being one of the most backward in Europe to the level of a France or Italy.

"This is a process that requires a devotion and a patriotism that can inspire all, everyone, to greater sacrifices in the austerity we will have to get used to in our lives, or at work. We will have to dedicate ourselves to work, and all this in a climate of real democratic order and social peace, the indispensable conditions for national reconstruction."

In other words, the workers could expect no more raises. At the same time, the government began to remove the price freeze that was imposed after the April 25 coup.

But Vasco Gonçalves was apparently not convinced that patriotic enthusiasm was sufficient to inspire all sections of the Portuguese people to make the maximum sacrifice.

Stalinists See 'Positive Side' to Antistrike Law

At the end of August the government announced its long-expected antistrike law. In his interview in the August 9 *Avante!*, Alvaro Cunhal had promised that after the passage of the new legislation "we will not be worse off than most of the bourgeois democratic countries." He admitted that this was not a very "comforting comparison." But he stressed the "positiveness" of having the right to strike recognized by the law.

Actually, the implication of the CP's policy of supporting a "democratic stage" and of not raising the perspective of socialism is that the kind of freedom that is supposed to exist in bourgeois democratic countries is all that can be hoped for.

In point of fact, the government's new strike law is generally worse than the kind of legislation that has been in force in most of the countries that can still boast

of having bourgeois democracy, although perhaps not so far from what the ruling circles in a number of them would like to impose in the present period of economic crisis.

The law bans sit-in strikes and the take-over of factories by workers. The latter type of action has assumed special importance in Portugal, where some foreign companies, attracted by the low wage rates and "labor discipline" enforced by the Salazarist regime, have now abandoned their factories. This provision in particular made clear which side of the class line the government stands on.

Strikes for "political" or "religious" motives are outlawed. Sympathy strikes are outlawed. All work stoppages that seek to change the terms of collective agreements arrived at after April 25 are outlawed. Unless thirty days notice is given, a strike is illegal. Before any strike, workers must submit their claim to arbitration. Demands on the bosses must be approved by the officials of the unions involved, or by an assembly of workers in situations where the unions do not represent a majority of the personnel affected. Only if the bosses reject these demands totally or "in large part" can a decision to strike be taken.

The new law contains some rights for workers. For example, it bans lockouts except in "cases of illegal strikes or grave disturbances in the workplace." (Under normal standards of bourgeois justice, including those observed in Portugal in the preceding months, this right is likely to be honored in the breach.) It also formally denies employers the right to bring in strikebreakers.

However, this law has to be seen above all in the context of a situation created by fifty years of authoritarian rule. The labor movement is fragmented; there are more than 400 unions. In this situation, it is easy for local caudillos and bureaucratic combinations to dominate. In particular, the banning of sympathetic strikes is a grave obstacle to developing broader unity among workers.

Salazarists on the Move

Furthermore, the Portuguese workers once again face especially strong repressive forces. The COPCON (Comando Operacional do Continente—Continental Operational Command) units, which the reformists and "friendly progressives" expected to be used to "bar all the doors to a reactionary counter-coup," barely lifted a finger against the right in the first month and a half after their creation. And there was no lack of targets. It is really quite serious, for example, that only a few months after 500,000 to a million inhabitants of Lisbon demonstrated their joy at the collapse of an almost universally hated regime, that rightist and pro-Salazarist elements are already raising their heads again all over the city.

Threats have been painted on the walls of buildings near African student centers. And persons trying to tear down anti-Communist posters have been attacked by armed gangs. But so far the COPCON, like the other forces of "order," has been used only to break strikes and suppress demonstrations by the left.

Even before the government's new law against plant occupations was announced August 26, military forces

commanded by a COPCON major had surrounded the offices of the *Jornal de Comércio*, which were being occupied by the workers. At that time, the strikers were discussing publishing a journal of their own.

"If the strike journal comes out," the major told a reporter for *A Capital* August 26, "we will have to get new orders, which certainly will not be favorable to the workers. Such an attitude is bound to displease the Government and the General Staff of the Armed Forces."

In the case of the strike of Portuguese airlines workers that occurred about the same time, the authorities sent a force of ten armored cars to the Portela airport to "maintain order."

Furthermore, because of the importance of the class-collaborationist experiment in Portugal for the reformist parties in Europe and for the peaceful-coexistence policy of the Soviet Union, the Portuguese government has received considerable international backing for its "restoration of order." In one case already, the combination has reportedly been rather powerful:

Moscow Helps Break Fishermen's Strike

"A Portuguese fishermen's strike was broken last month," an article in the September 6 *Washington Post* noted, "after the targets of the strike got emergency help from the Communist Party of Portugal and the Soviet Union."

The fishermen in Matosinhos, a town near O Porto, struck against the sardine canneries June 15, demanding a fixed wage instead of one based on the size of their catch.

"Initially, other workers at Matosinhos were favorable to the fishermen's strike, according to well-informed sources," the article continued. "However, the Portuguese Communist Party, which is represented in the Lisbon government, urged the men not to strike.

"A strike, Communist officials said, would play into the hands of the capitalists.

"The cannery operators, according to informed sources, sent a delegation to a Scandinavian country where it arranged for the Soviet ship *Nachichevan* to bring 3,400 tons of frozen sardines to the Portuguese canneries.

"The Soviet ship arrived July 16, and at first stevedores threatened to refuse to unload the cargo. Well-informed sources report that the stevedores changed their minds after the Portuguese Community Party urged them to abandon their support for the striking fishermen."

Since the governmental crisis in July and the more and more pronounced offensive by the right, the Communist party has had to try to balance between supporting the government and supporting at least some struggles and demands of the workers. By focusing all its propaganda on "multinational corporations" and "capitalist sabotage" of the economy, it has been able to combine militant-sounding language with support for "patriotic labor discipline," the primary demand of Portuguese capital at this moment.

The CP apparently hopes to appeal to small-business owners by denouncing the banks for refusing credit to smaller enterprises. According to the CP, the unavailability of credit is part of a plot to wreck the "de-

mocratization."

The reason for the unavailability of credit to small business is quite clear. The cheap labor and protectionist policies of the Salazarist regime maintained a large sector of low-productivity enterprises. In order to safeguard their own competitive position internationally, the strong economic groups in Portugal had to sacrifice this sector. This was one of the main implications of the April 25 coup. It was precisely the monopolies that backed the coup, not an "antimonopoly coalition."

The government's talk about nationalizing the banks will probably strengthen the kind of illusions the CP is encouraging. Without the expropriation of the capitalists, the nationalization of the banks, even if it is carried out, can only be fictitious. It will not fundamentally change the credit structure as long as the investment funds remain in private hands.

Forecasts Not Borne Out

In a situation that remains essentially unstable, both the representatives of the Portuguese bourgeoisie and the leaderships of the reformist parties may make significant tactical shifts. But by the end of August, the basic objectives of all the forces in the government were absolutely clear to anyone willing to check the facts. Since all of these tendencies were committed, in their own way, to maintaining the capitalist system, they were forced inexorably to follow a certain logic.

Seldom have the prognostications of the reformists and their fellow travelers been so quickly disproved as

those that were made after the installation of the Vasco Gonçalves government. The rapid test of events is all the more impressive because of the generally optimistic reaction to the appointment of the coordinator of the Armed Forces Movement as prime minister. There were, however, enough voices raised in warning about the intentions of the new government to lead a commentator in the July 18 issue of *República* to write:

"An analysis by an extreme-left group of the situation in the Armed Forces suggested that since the captains and majors of the Armed Forces Movement are bourgeois democrats, they are likely to be sensitive to the 'red peril' argument and to orient toward solutions conducive to authoritarianism of the right, although exercised within the institutional framework of political democracy.

"But the events of the last week have refuted such an analysis, reinforcing the position of the democratic forces that have tried to link their future to that of the Armed Forces Movement."

The writer of this comment was apparently misled by a superficial view of politics, by a few concessions the Portuguese bourgeoisie was forced to make, and missed the underlying realities that asserted themselves so forcefully in the first full month following the installation of the second provisional government. If the government made some important (and possibly seductive) concessions to the nationalist movements in the colonies, it cracked down all the harder at home. And if it succeeds in getting the mass upsurge firmly under control in Portugal, it will be in a stronger position to maintain its essential interests in Africa. □

'La Crisis y el Caos Son Inevitables'

Spínola Renuncia Como Presidente

Por Gerry Foley

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Behind the Resignation of General Spínola", que apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 7 de octubre].

* * *

Cuando el hombre fuerte de la Junta de Salvación Nacional, General António de Spínola, renunció como Presidente de Portugal el 30 de septiembre, su discurso a la nación pareció un llamado a tomar las armas contra el régimen que había encabezado durante cinco meses.

El país estaba amenazado, dijo Spínola, "por una crisis económica hacia la que avanzamos rápidamente, por el desempleo, por la inflación descontrolada, por una recesión en los negocios, por la contracción de las in-

versiones y por la ineficacia de los poderes centrales."

Seguía diciendo: "En este clima general de anarquía, en el que cada cual dicta su propia ley, la crisis y el caos son inevitables. . .".

Spínola llamó a "confiar en el voto secreto." Pero su lista de las calamidades que amenazan a Portugal sugería la idea de que se requerían medidas más fuertes que las elecciones.

"Advirtió que el país se enfrenta a 'situaciones irreversibles' en las que se le puede privar del derecho de escoger", informó el corresponsal del *New York Times* en Lisboa, Henry Giniger. El General dijo incluso que el país iba hacia "nuevas formas de esclavitud."

Las quejas de Spínola incluyen los siguientes puntos: (1) que el gobierno

no pudo imponer una "disciplina" económica suficientemente estricta; (2) que pasar el poder directamente a los movimientos nacionalistas en las colonias era "antidemocrático"; (3) que el Partido Comunista era muy fuerte; (4) que la izquierda tenía demasiada influencia en la prensa y en los medios de difusión y (5) que los partidos reformistas no estaban controlando con suficiente rigidez a sus seguidores.

"El General Spínola dijo", informó Giniger, "que las fuerzas armadas habían . . . querido armonizar con todos los credos políticos, pero que mientras los jefes de los partidos políticos hablaban el lenguaje del sentido común, sus activistas ejercían 'coerción psicológica' al utilizar la radio, la prensa y la televisión para

calumniar a todos los que se les oponían."

El artículo del *New York Times* utilizaba el mismo tono alarmista del discurso de Spínola. El encabezado decía: "Los Izquierdistas Obtienen el Control de Lisboa." Sobre el nuevo presidente, el General Francisco da Costa Gomes, mano derecha de Spínola, Giniger escribió: "... es muy dudosa su habilidad para controlar la situación." Al mismo tiempo señalaba: "... se consideraba que los conservadores, aunque derrotados por el momento, podían reaccionar violentamente en el futuro."

El hecho de que el *New York Times*, uno de los principales voceros del imperialismo norteamericano, que es altamente sensible a las amenazas contra el sistema capitalista, utilice este lenguaje, es un indicador importante de la explosividad de la situación de Portugal.

Todavía no está claro cuál es la posición de los principales sectores de la clase capitalista portuguesa en esta escisión del gobierno de Lisboa, ni cuán profunda es la división. Obviamente, incluso diferencias tácticas entre la burguesía pueden desatar choques bastante violentos que pueden poner en movimiento amplias fuerzas de clase. El golpe del 25 de Abril fue una muestra de esto.

"Ayer por la noche los dos bandos midieron durante varias horas el apoyo militar con que cuentan respectivamente", dijo Miguel Acoca en un despacho del *Washington Post* fechado el 28 de septiembre. Señaló que los dos lados tenían más o menos la misma fuerza y que, al cambiarse al lado de los oficiales jóvenes "progresistas", Costa Gomes había alterado la balanza.

El problema más importante, sin embargo, es la amplitud de la movilización de masas en Lisboa. Esto es lo que parece haber obligado al gobierno a actuar e impedir que se realizara la marcha organizada por la "mayoría silenciosa" de Spínola en la capital portuguesa.

"... una especie de anarquía revolucionaria reinaba en las afueras de la ciudad", decía un cable de Giniger enviado el 29 de septiembre, "mientras grupos de estudiantes y obreros detenían a los automóviles y los registraban en busca de armas."

La burguesía portuguesa puede responder duramente ante una nueva erupción de las acciones masivas. En

abril se vió obligada a levantar sus controles tradicionales sobre las masas durante algún tiempo para poder poner en práctica un cambio estratégico que le era esencial. Para que éste tuviera éxito, había que cerrar rápidamente la apertura. Tan pronto como rompió el empuje del ascenso de masas, gracias a la ayuda del



SPINOLA

Partido Comunista, la burguesía planteó la "restauración del orden" y cortó las alas al mismo Partido Comunista.

La última ofensiva de Spínola fue un intento por garantizar su dirección. El primer paso tuvo lugar en julio, con la destitución del primer gobierno provisional. Aunque el gabinete encabezado por Gonçalves que resultó de esa crisis fue considerado como una victoria de la izquierda, no revirtió esta tendencia. Se hicieron nuevas concesiones a los movimientos de liberación de las colonias, pero se aceleró la "restauración del orden" en Portugal.

Durante las primeras seis semanas del gobierno de Gonçalves, se atacó duramente a la prensa, a las organizaciones que están a la izquierda del PC y al movimiento obrero. Al mismo tiempo, las autoridades no hicieron nada contra la derecha reaccionaria, que rápidamente recuperó la confianza. El gobierno tomó medidas para defenderse sólo cuando estuvo bien claro que se podía intentar dar un golpe de estado; esto es, después de que Spínola lanzó su llamado de septiembre para movilizar a la "mayoría silenciosa." Fue sólo entonces,

también, que la dirección del PC dejó de denunciar a los "provocadores ultrazquierdistas" y llamó a movilizarse para frenar la ofensiva reaccionaria.

Frente a la amenaza que todavía existe de un golpe ultraderechista, aún está por verse qué medidas defensivas adoptarán el gobierno y sus colaboradores reformistas ante la posibilidad de que éstas desaten una reacción en cadena de proporciones enormes entre las masas. Pero está perfectamente claro que las bases no pueden depender del gobierno provisional ni de ningún grupo de oficiales para derrotar a los golpistas.

Gracias al apoyo que dieron los reformistas a Spínola en los primeros meses, la derecha cuenta ahora con una figura prestigiada en torno a la cual aglutinarse. Incluso después de que Spínola amenazó con el golpe, los jóvenes oficiales "de izquierda" le permitieron transmitir su discurso demagógico a todo el país.

Y si la burguesía llega a preocuparse demasiado por la posibilidad de que el proceso se le salga de las manos, sólo una amplia movilización de masas, dirigida por un partido revolucionario y que tenga el objetivo de establecer un gobierno de obreros y campesinos puede evitar que haya un golpe derechista y quizás un terror reaccionario peor que el que padeció Portugal durante los cuarenta y ocho años de régimen salazarista. □

Murió el Preso Político Más Antiguo de América Latina

Según noticia que publicó el 18 de septiembre *El Radical*, periódico del partido burgués de oposición Liberal Radical, habría muerto Antonio Maidana, el preso político más antiguo de América Latina.

Maidana, que padeció durante dieciséis años los malos tratos y el siniestro régimen carcelario del Paraguay, estaba gravemente enfermo. Padecía de una seria afección cardíaca y se lo había internado en el policlínico policial. De allí fue retirado antes de restablecerse, por orden policial. En la gravedad de su estado la falta de atención médica habría provocado su muerte.

De confirmarse esto, nos encontraríamos ante otro incalificable crimen de la dictadura de Stroessner.

Acto Por Chile en Buenos Aires

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "3,000 at Chile Rally in Buenos Aires", publicado en *Intercontinental Press* el 7 de octubre].

* * *

Buenos Aires

El día 11 de septiembre, el Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores de Argentina, realizó en la Federación de Box de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, el único acto que en aquel país recordó el aniversario del golpe militar en Chile.

Más de tres mil personas se reunieron para manifestar su solidaridad con la clase obrera y el pueblo chilenos, superexplotados y oprimidos por la siniestra junta militar que hoy gobierna Chile; y para expresar su repudio por los miles de crímenes y persecuciones de que han sido y son víctimas los trabajadores chilenos.

También se reclamó la libertad de los presos políticos y se alzaron las voces para repudiar el golpe del imperialismo y la oligarquía.

Llegaron al acto entre otras, adhesiones de: Agrupación Revolucionaria de los Trabajadores del Paraguay; Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores del Uruguay; Delegación en la Argentina del Partido Socialista de Chile; Movimiento de Cristianos por el Socialismo; Comando de Resistencia Popular; Agrupación Revolucionaria de Estudiantes Peruanos; Agrupación Socialista de Estudiantes Bolivianos; un grupo de refugiados chilenos que recién habían llegado a la Argentina; Marcos, refugiado chileno; cátedra de Neurobiología y Teoría de la Inteligencia de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; miembros de la Comisión Directiva Provisoria de Docentes de las ciudades de Florencio Varela y Berazategui; Movimiento de Liberación Femenina; cuerpo de delegados de Carlo Erba; cuerpo de la interna de Ferrum; cuerpo de delegados de Calzado Cardón; y otros delegados y activistas de distintas fábricas, entre ellas de Propulsora Siderúrgica que acaba de ganar un importante conflicto que duró varios meses. También adherieron al acto un número importante de ar-

tistas, periodistas y personalidades.

Abrió el acto Eduardo Soranz, de la Juventud Socialista, quien expresó entre otras cosas:

"Nadie puede tener dudas de que las condiciones de los trabajadores y de la juventud chilena siguen siendo iguales a las del primer día del golpe. Que Pinochet y la junta militar siguen manteniendo los campos de concentración para los militantes revolucionarios y populares, que siguen reprimiendo a la clase obrera y a su juventud y que siguen entregando el país al imperialismo. También en nuestro país, desde el punto de vista de la juventud, hoy está planteado, en un sector importante como es la universidad el enfrentamiento concreto contra los sectores reaccionarios, que no están fuera del gobierno sino dentro de él, que están preparando el zarpazo final para hacer volver la universidad a la época de la dictadura."

Nora Ciapponi habló por el PST, denunciando la traición del reformismo; dijo:

"El diario del PC chileno decía: los grupos minúsculos de derecha pretenden distraer a las fuerzas armadas y de orden de su patriótica función de resguardo de las riquezas nacionales y de los trabajadores que las producen. Y no sólo con respecto a los militares; con respecto a la patronal chilena, decían: la democracia cristiana ha expresado en muchas oportunidades que no quiere que perviva la sociedad capitalista.

"¿Y qué decía el PST un año antes del golpe, seis meses antes del golpe? Las fuerzas armadas no son neutrales ni apolíticas. El ejército es el ejército de la burguesía chilena. Basta de ilusiones en la neutralidad de los militares. ¡Movilizar a los trabajadores! ¡Formar milicias obreras! ¡Ninguna confianza en patrones y militares 'progresistas' que preparan el golpe de estado junto al imperialismo! ¡Los trabajadores al poder para construir el socialismo! Defendamos incondicionalmente al gobierno de Allende ante el golpe de estado de la derecha y el imperialismo, pero no depositemos ni un gramo de confianza en el gobier-

no que defiende a la burguesía nacionalista. Sólo los trabajadores y las masas populares serán capaces de instaurar su propio gobierno y llegar al socialismo."

También habló un miembro de la comisión provisoria de Propulsora Siderúrgica que llevó al acto un saludo de sus compañeros de lucha:

". . . Nosotros creemos que, habiendo logrado hace dos días un aumento de sueldo, la reincorporación de todos los compañeros despedidos y el pago de los salarios caídos después de tres meses y medio de lucha, ése es el mejor homenaje que le podemos hacer a la clase obrera chilena.

"Pero, compañeros, si luchas como la que se gana en Propulsora, si luchas como la que se gana en Villa Constitución, si luchas como la que quizás se gane en Martín Amato, si todas las luchas que ganó la clase obrera chilena desde antes de asumir el gobierno la Unidad Popular, hubiesen tenido un partido obrero que las respaldara, que las organizara, que las llevara a la toma del poder mediante la movilización y quitándole todo el poder a la patronal, con toda seguridad el pueblo chileno no estaría sufriendo lo que hoy sufre.

"Y todos, compañeros, tenemos que tomar conciencia de esto, tomar conciencia de esta necesidad, tomar conciencia de la necesidad de crear en la Argentina el partido obrero, para no tener otro Chile . . ."

Cerrando el acto habló Juan Carlos Coral:

"Hay aquí un juego paralelo entre la guerrilla y el frente popular. El nuevo frente popular no amenaza sólo desde el elenco estable del Partido Comunista; ahora también hay gérmenes de frente popular en las propias estructuras de la guerrilla. No interesa cuáles serán los nombres que levanten. Lo que interesa es, tomando el ejemplo de Chile, saber que cualquiera sea la forma que tome, el frente popular se plantea como una de las máximas vías muertas; como uno de los próximos pantanos en los que se quiere inmovilizar las aspiraciones de liberación de la clase trabajadora y de amplios sectores explotados del pueblo. Y entonces, ¿qué queda, compañeros?"

"Queda una sola respuesta por desarrollar: la del partido obrero independiente de las corrientes burguesas y del estado burgués. Que fue jus-

tamente la respuesta que no estaba preparada en Chile. Por eso, cuando los militares consideraron que era el momento oportuno para el golpe, ni los partidos de la Unidad Popular, por un lado, ni las guerrillas del MIR, por el otro, fueron capaces de disputar el poder a los militares.

"Por eso estamos construyendo como cantan los compañeros, el gran partido obrero. Y por eso la presencia de la nueva generación obrera y estudiantil rodeando esta tribuna y todas las actividades militantes del

partido.

"Estamos organizando el gran partido obrero. Es decir estamos organizando abnegada y disciplinadamente a los militantes y a los cuadros que serán los oficiales de la revolución socialista en la Argentina."

Al finalizar, el Comité Ejecutivo del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores presentó un proyecto de declaración que fue aprobado por aclamación y expresa lo siguiente:

"El conjunto de los asistentes al acto de repudio al golpe militar chileno

convocado por el PST resuelven: Elevar a todos los partidos populares, organizaciones obreras, movimientos estudiantiles y a la Cuarta Internacional la propuesta de que a escala mundial, el 11 de septiembre se convierta en una jornada de solidaridad activa con el pueblo chileno y de repudio a la Junta militar y al imperialismo yanqui, hasta que los trabajadores y el pueblo de Chile derroquen con su movilización masiva a la dictadura militar que hoy los oprime." □

En Bucarest Se Reitera el Mito de que 'Hay Demasiada Gente'

Error de la ONU Sobre la 'Explosión Demográfica'

Por Ernest Harsch

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Where UN Goes Wrong on 'Population Explosion'" publicado en *Intercontinental Press* el 30 de septiembre].

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El 19 de agosto, comenzó en Bucarest, Rumania, la Conferencia Mundial de Población convocada por las Naciones Unidas, que duró dos semanas. Esta reunión—que contó con alrededor de 3,000 participantes provenientes de más de 130 países—trató de prevenir al mundo contra los peligros de una "explosión demográfica."

Los delegados de las potencias imperialistas, en especial los representantes de Washington, argumentaron que "demasiada gente" es una amenaza para la humanidad; que los efectos de una "explosión demográfica" son más destructivos que los de una explosión radioactiva. Un memorándum reciente del Departamento de Estado, citado en el *New York Times* del 18 de agosto, sintetizaba esta posición:

"El crecimiento excesivo de la población mundial agranda la brecha entre las naciones ricas y las pobres; desequilibra el comercio internacional; aumenta las posibilidades de hambruna en un futuro relativamente cercano; empeora los problemas ambientales; produce desempleo; aumenta el peligro de que haya descontento entre

la población; y promueve agresiones que ponen en peligro la paz."

El Secretario General de la ONU, Kurt Waldheim, en el discurso que pronunció durante la apertura de la conferencia, adoptó la misma posición. Relacionó el crecimiento de la población con los períodos de escasez de alimentos, de energía y de materias primas que se avecinan y con la pobreza actual de los países subdesarrollados. "Nunca antes", dijo, "las naciones o la comunidad internacional se han enfrentado a un crecimiento tan rápido de la demanda de comida, vivienda, empleo, educación y atención médica." Se necesita "actuar de inmediato", dijo, "para prevenir una catástrofe demográfica."

La conferencia de Bucarest se convocó para ayudar a los imperialistas a esparcir el temor al crecimiento de las masas de los países semicoloniales, donde se dice que la "bomba" demográfica amenaza con explotar más pronto. Los patrocinadores de la conferencia también trataron de utilizar la autoridad de las Naciones Unidas para poner en práctica varios esquemas que reduzcan el ritmo de la reproducción humana y evitar así la "catástrofe" contra la que prevenía Waldheim.

El jefe de la delegación norteamericana, Caspar Weinberger, Secretario de Salud, Educación y Bienestar, presentó la solución que propone Washington para resolver el problema de cómo alimentar a los hambrientos del

mundo. Planteó que la conferencia se debía fijar claramente la meta de que para el año 2,000 la fertilidad se haya reducido al nivel de sustitución (lo que significaría un promedio de dos niños por familia).

Algunos delegados de los países capitalistas subdesarrollados manifestaron su discrepancia con la posición de Washington de que existe una "explosión demográfica" y de que "demasiada gente" produce crisis económica y hambre. Señalaron que la causa del hambre crónica es la desigual distribución de la riqueza mundial. Las delegaciones china y soviética respaldaron este punto de vista.

La oposición de estos delegados a la propuesta de los Estados Unidos impidió que ésta fuera incorporada en el Plan de Acción Final que fue adoptado por la conferencia el 30 de agosto. No obstante, los imperialistas lograron parte de su objetivo original: el Plan de Acción llama a reducir la tasa de natalidad en los "países en desarrollo", del 38 por mil al 30 por mil para 1985; y a una reducción global del crecimiento de la población mundial, del 2 por ciento anual al 1.7 por ciento para 1985. Los delegados norteamericanos insistieron en que 1985 fuera la fecha límite.

Dejando de lado cuáles hayan sido los compromisos específicos, se mantuvo la falacia central del documento: que los humanos se están multiplicando tanto que ya no alcanzan los

abastecimientos de alimentos.

Este argumento no es nuevo. En 1798, el Reverendo Thomas Robert Malthus publicó un folleto en Gran Bretaña, en el que decía que la población humana crece mucho más rápido que los abastecimientos de comida y que pronto el mundo no tendría lo suficiente para comer. Predijo que en dos siglos más, la relación entre la población y la comida sería de 256 a 9.

Aunque algunos creyentes quizás quisieran esperar hasta 1998 para ver si se cumple la predicción de Malthus o para admitir que se equivocó, los avances en la producción de alimentos debido a la revolución industrial y a los subsecuentes procesos económicos de desarrollo, demuestran claramente que la teoría de Malthus estaba totalmente equivocada. No tomó en cuenta los efectos revolucionarios que tendrían la ciencia y la aceleración del ritmo de trabajo sobre la producción de alimentos. Por ejemplo, en su libro *The American People*, E.J. Khan señala que en los Estados Unidos "En 1820, el empleado agrícola promedio producía alimentos suficientes para cuatro personas. En 1950, podía alimentar a quince; en 1970, a cuarenta y cinco."

En la conferencia de Bucarest, el jefe de la delegación china, Huang Shu-tse, explicó cómo la planificación racional y el incremento de la productividad que se hicieron posibles gracias a la revolución china podían sostener el enorme crecimiento de la población. Cuando tuvo lugar la revolución, dijo, China tenía aproximadamente 500 millones de habitantes. Actualmente tiene cerca de 800 millones. Si bien el nivel de vida es aún bajo, señaló, todos reciben lo básico para vivir.

En el capitalismo las cosas son diferentes. No sólo no se aprovecha totalmente el enorme potencial de la productividad agrícola, sino que millones de personas padecen hambre en medio de la abundancia. Ya desde 1844, Federico Engels había señalado esta disparidad cuando escribió:

"[En las condiciones de competencia del capitalismo] tiene que llegar una etapa en la que haya tanto poder productivo superfluo que la gran masa de la nación no tenga nada para vivir, de tal manera que la gente muera de hambre a causa de la más completa abundancia. . . Si las fluctuaciones de la competencia se tornan más fuertes, como necesariamente su-

cede en un estado de cosas tal, entonces se alternan la prosperidad y la crisis; la sobreproducción y el estancamiento. Los economistas nunca han entendido esta extravagante situación, de modo que para explicarla elaboraron la teoría de la población, que es tan absurda, o mejor dicho, aún más absurda que la contradicción de la

CONFERENCIA SOBRE POBLACION

Bucarest, ago. 1974



Alternativa

coexistencia de riqueza y pobreza."

Un artículo de William Robbins publicado el 25 de agosto en el *New York Times* ilustraba los factores económicos que se encuentran detrás de una contradicción tan irracional. "Varios expertos agrícolas destacados están de acuerdo", escribió, "en que los Estados Unidos poseen grandes reservas de recursos agrícolas que podrían ayudar a alimentar a aquéllos que tienen hambre en el mundo, si hubieran suficientes incentivos económicos y cambios significativos en la política agrícola federal tradicional."

La política agrícola tradicional del gobierno a la que Robbins se refería, es la práctica de pagar a los agricultores para que no cultiven la tierra o para que destruyan las cosechas "excedentes." El objetivo es evitar la "sobreproducción" y mantener el alto nivel de los precios agrícolas y las ganancias.

Robbins citó a varios expertos agrícolas, incluyendo al principal economista del Departamento de Agricultura de los Estados Unidos, Don Paarlberg, señalando que las cosechas

podrían aumentar en un 50 por ciento en los próximos diez años. . . pero solamente bajo un "clima económico favorable". Esa misma cifra del 50 por ciento está muy por debajo del potencial real, ya que aún las condiciones económicas capitalistas más favorables para el incremento de la producción de alimentos limitan rigidamente la producción a la obtención de ganancia.

Como le dijo a Robbins el Sr. Marion Clawson, presidente interino de Resources for the Future, Inc. [Recursos para el Futuro S.A.], organización privada que realiza investigaciones científicas: "De todos los factores que hay que tener en cuenta, el principal es el económico: el precio tiene que estar bien."

De esta forma, a la luz de las verdaderas causas de la falta de alimentos y de la escasez, las teorías de Malthus y sus discípulos posteriores se revelan como mistificaciones capitalistas que tienen el objetivo de encubrir la culpabilidad del sistema, ya que fenómenos como la "sobreproducción" y la "sobrepoblación", son posibles solamente en el capitalismo.

En el capítulo de *El Capital* titulado "La Ley General de la Acumulación Capitalista", Carlos Marx señaló la ley fundamental de que el tamaño del proletariado aumenta con la acumulación del capital. Pero a medida que se acumula el capital, conforme aumenta la productividad y se incrementa el porcentaje del capital constante (maquinaria, fábricas, materia prima) en relación al capital variable (fuerza de trabajo), mayor número de trabajadores quedan sin trabajo.

"Por tanto", escribe Marx, "al producir la acumulación del capital, la población obrera produce también, en proporciones cada vez mayores, *los medios para su propio exceso relativo*. Es ésta una *ley de población peculiar del régimen de producción capitalista* . . .".

Parte de esta "población excedente" sirve a los capitalistas como ejército de reserva de mano de obra, que puede ser rápidamente empleado durante los períodos de expansión para luego ser despedido con la misma rapidez durante un período depresivo.

No obstante, en la etapa del imperialismo y del capital monopolista, las posibilidades de una rápida expansión se reducen relativamente. La penetración imperialista en el mundo

colonial imposibilita el desarrollo económico de muchos países de Asia, Africa y América Latina, condenando a sus habitantes a una pauperización constante y al hambre periódica.

Cuando los seguidores de Malthus en el siglo veinte hablan de "sobrepoblación", se refieren a estas masas de los países semicoloniales.

Como bajo el capitalismo el mundo colonial está condenado al subdesarrollo o a un desarrollo extremadamente desequilibrado, el imperialismo no considera a los desocupados como parte del sistema productivo. Ve que hay "demasiada gente", que un día puede levantarse y destruir el sistema que los confina a la categoría de "excedente."

La solución que ofrecen los capitalistas a su problema de la "explosión demográfica" es la misma que ofrecían hace un siglo.

Engels escribió en 1844: "Ahora la consecuencia de esta teoría [de Malthus] es que ya que son precisamente los pobres los que constituyen esta población excedente, no se debe hacer nada por ellos, más que facilitarles en todo lo posible el que se mueran de hambre, para convencerlos de que este estado de cosas no se puede cambiar y de que no hay otra salvación para su clase sino la de reproducirse lo menos posible. . .".

Pero con la destrucción del sistema capitalista y con la introducción de una planificación racional para utilizar íntegramente la capacidad productiva de que dispone la humanidad, esta población "excedente" se convertiría en un valioso instrumento para la construcción de una nueva sociedad, fuente de una abundancia aún mayor, que destierre para siempre el espectro de la pobreza y el hambre.

"Existe, por supuesto," escribía Engels en una carta a Karl Kautsky del 1 de febrero de 1881, "la posibilidad abstracta de que la cantidad de habitantes llegue a ser tan grande que haya que limitar su crecimiento. Pero si en alguna etapa la sociedad comunista se ve obligada a regular la producción de seres humanos, de la misma forma en que regulará la producción de bienes, será precisamente esta sociedad, y solamente esta sociedad, la que pueda realizarlo sin dificultad. No me parece que sería nada difícil en una sociedad de este tipo lograr mediatne la planificación un resultado que ya ha sido obteni-

do espontáneamente, sin planificación, en Francia y en Austria Baja. De cualquier modo, es a los mismos habitantes de la sociedad comunista a quienes corresponde decidir si lo hacen, cuándo y cómo hacerlo, así como qué

medios desean emplear para este propósito. No me siento llamado a hacerles propuestas o a aconsejarles sobre esto. En cualquier caso, es seguro que esta gente no será menos inteligente que nosotros." □

Kissinger Acusado de Complot

Ford Aprueba Trabajo de la CIA en Chile

Por Dick Fidler

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "CIA Job on Allende Approved by Ford", publicado en *Intercontinental Press* el 23 de septiembre].

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En una conferencia de prensa realizada el 16 de septiembre en Washington, el Presidente Gerald Ford se vio obligado a admitir que la CIA había realizado operaciones clandestinas contra el gobierno de Allende en Chile. Dijo que operativos similares se llevaban a cabo en otros países, y que él apoyaba esos esfuerzos "para ayudar a implementar la política exterior y proteger la seguridad nacional."

Refiriéndose a las recientes revelaciones de que la CIA había invertido millones de dólares en Chile con el fin de bloquear, subvertir y derrocar al gobierno de Allende, Ford dijo que esas operaciones tenían el objetivo "de ayudar y contribuir a la preservación de los diarios de oposición y otros medios de difusión y a los partidos políticos de la oposición". También expresó que él no "va a juzgar si esto está permitido o no por la ley internacional".

El presidente negó que el gobierno de los Estados Unidos haya participado "de alguna manera, en el golpe en sí". Pero estas afirmaciones prueban la falsedad de las reiteradas declaraciones de los voceros del Departamento de Estado acerca de que Washington no había interferido en la política chilena.

Los comentarios de Ford han dado lugar a crecientes demandas en el Congreso y en los editoriales de los diarios para que se haga una investigación pública sobre el papel de la CIA en Chile.

Sin duda servirán también para estimular preocupaciones en otras capitales del mundo acerca de las operaciones de la CIA.

El furor actual comenzó el 8 de septiembre con la publicación del testimonio secreto del director de la CIA William Colby, ante un subcomité del Congreso. El testimonio revelaba que durante el gobierno de Nixon se habían autorizado más de ocho millones de dólares entre 1970 y 1973, para financiar los manejos secretos de la CIA para derrocar al gobierno de Allende.

Desde entonces, la historia de las actividades subversivas de Washington en Chile se ha seguido desenmarañando. La creciente acumulación de evidencias indica que Henry Kissinger se hizo cargo personalmente de la intervención secreta en los asuntos internos de Chile.

El 16 de septiembre, día de la conferencia de prensa de Ford, se reveló que el subcomité del Senado sobre Corporaciones Multinacionales había recomendado que se acuse de perjurio ante el congreso al anterior director de la CIA, Richard Helms, y a tres ex funcionarios del gobierno de Nixon, por el falso testimonio que dieron en las audiencias del año pasado sobre el papel de la ITT en Chile.

El informe del subcomité, preparado a requerimiento del senador Frank Church, que es presidente de dicho subcomité, destacaba los testimonios de Charles A. Meyer, ex subsecretario de estado para asuntos interamericanos; Edward M. Korry, embajador de los Estados Unidos en Chile de 1967 a 1971 y William V. Broe, ex director de las actividades clandestinas de la CIA. Los tres al igual que Helms, habían insistido en que Wash-

ington siguió una política de "no intervención" en Chile.

El subcomité, sobre la base de estos testimonios absolvió a la ITT de los cargos que se le imputaban de haber solicitado la intervención de la CIA para derrocar a Allende.

Además, el *New York Times* del 17 de septiembre informaba que Helms, Meyer y John M. Hennesy, ex subsecretario de hacienda para los asuntos internacionales, habrían cometido perjurio al declarar ante el subcomité.

El informe destacó la falsedad del testimonio bajo juramento de Hennesy quien afirmó que las sanciones económicas adoptadas por el gobierno de Nixon contra Chile, se basaban exclusivamente en que la confianza de los bancos en la solvencia económica de Chile había disminuido después de las elecciones que le dieron el triunfo a Allende. Esta afirmación demostró ser falsa, cuando el *New York Times* del 15 de septiembre, citando "fuentes bien informadas" del gobierno reveló que Kissinger había "dirigido personalmente un programa de largo alcance del gobierno de Nixon destinado a cortar la ayuda económica y los créditos a Chile", después de la elección de Allende en 1970.

Según el corresponsal en Washington, Seymour Hersh, Kissinger, "que por aquel entonces estaba cumpliendo la función de consejero de Nixon sobre seguridad nacional, se hizo cargo de una serie de reuniones semanales entre las agencias de seguridad, en las que elaboraron una política de sanciones económicas 'vengativa' según una fuente de informaciones, contra Chile.

"El propósito de las reuniones de los dos primeros meses después de la elección fue asegurar que los distintos organismos destinados a prestar ayuda económica fueran reestructurados para asegurar que [Allende] no iba a recibir un centavo", decía una fuente bien informada."

Durante los dos años siguientes, señaló Hersh, el Banco Mundial y el Export-Import Bank, un organismo del gobierno de los Estados Unidos, le negaron al gobierno chileno docenas de préstamos. "Además, el crédito de Chile a corto plazo disminuyó de 220 millones de dólares en 1971, a menos de 40 millones el año siguiente."

Un intento previo de publicar detalles sobre operaciones clandestinas

de la CIA en Chile se vió frustrado por ese mismo servicio de inteligencia. En el *New York Times* del 11 de septiembre, Hersh informó que muchos de los pasajes de un libro escrito por dos ex oficiales del servicio de inteligencia titulado *La CIA y el Culto a la Inteligencia* fueron censurados a instancias de la CIA. Estos pasajes contenían "el primer recuento impreso de algunas de las actividades clandestinas de este servicio de inteligencia" contra Allende. Después de una prolongada batalla legal, el libro fue publicado finalmente en junio pasado dejando en blanco los espacios de los 168 pasajes que habían sido suprimidos.

El capítulo sobre Chile, tal como había sido escrito inicialmente, comenzaba con la siguiente cita de Kissinger de una reunión del "40 Committee" [organismo encargado de planificar las operaciones clandestinas], el 27 de junio de 1970, más de dos meses antes de las elecciones que le dieron el triunfo a Allende: "No veo porqué tenemos que quedarnos quietos y contemplar cómo un país se vuelve comunista debido a la irresponsabilidad de su propio pueblo."

Esto, así como gran parte del capítulo, fue suprimido por la CIA.

Las pruebas acumuladas sobre la complicidad de la CIA, el Departamento de Estado y la Casa Blanca, en el derrocamiento de Allende, han dado lugar a reclamos para que el Congreso realice una investigación.

Entre los que apoyan ese pedido de informes se encuentran el Senador Edward Kennedy, presidente de un subcomité del Senado, que está investigando la violación de los derechos humanos en Chile; el Senador Frank Church que presidió las audiencias sobre la ITT y el diputado Michael J. Harrington, cuya correspondencia con el presidente del comité de la Cámara para asuntos exteriores llevó a que el testimonio de Colby se hiciera público.

Harrington dijo al *New York Times* que su reacción inicial después de leer las cuarenta y ocho páginas clasificadas de la transcripción del testimonio de Colby ante el subcomité de inteligencia de la cámara, fue un profundo shock."

"Yo no esperaba ver la documentación de teorías que nunca he sustentado", dijo. "Nunca había apoyado teorías sobre la conspiración", en relación a la complicidad de los Es-

tados Unidos en el derrocamiento de Allende.

Los pedidos de una investigación del Congreso han sido apoyados por algunos de los periódicos más poderosos, incluyendo el *New York Times*, el *Christian Science Monitor*, y el *Washington Post*. Los editores de este último periódico señalaron que las revelaciones actuales hacen que carezcan de sentido los intentos del Departamento de Estado durante la década del 60, de "mantener a Cuba como el paria del continente", sobre la base de que el régimen de Castro apoyaba la "subversión" en América Latina.

". . . todo lo que se dice que Cuba hizo en el pasado son minucias al lado de lo que Estados Unidos ha admitido haber hecho en Chile", escribieron.

Otros han llegado aún más lejos. Tom Wicker, jefe del buró del *New York Times* en Washington, sugirió que debían reiniciarse las audiencias del Congreso sobre la confirmación de Kissinger como Secretario de Estado.

El estado de ánimo de muchos liberales norteamericanos se reflejó en la actitud del ex funcionario de más jerarquía de las Naciones Unidas en Chile, quien pidió la renuncia de Kissinger. "Si no renuncia pronto", dijo en una entrevista que concedió al *New York Times*, "un honorable Congreso de los Estados Unidos debe iniciarle un proceso."

Kissinger ha adoptado la postura típica de los hombres de estado capitalistas cuando son atacados: pasarle el muerto a otro. Al mismo tiempo que se negaba a hacer comentarios sobre las revelaciones de su participación en la subversión del régimen de Allende, Kissinger autorizó a su vocero, Robert Anderson, a informar ayer a los periodistas el hecho de que el "40 Committee actuó sólo cuando se obtuvo la aprobación unánime de sus cinco miembros", informó el *New York Times* el 11 de septiembre.

Más aún, este vocero agregó enfáticamente: "todas las decisiones del '40 Committee' deben ser aprobadas por el presidente antes de ser puestas en práctica."

En el pasado, Kissinger estaba muy ansioso por atribuirse el mérito de todas sus maniobras en la política exterior. Y los miembros del Congreso y los editorialistas de los periódicos estaban también ansiosos por elogiar a este "superestadista" que recibió un

Premio Nóbel de la Paz.

Actualmente, sin embargo, está surgiendo una nueva actitud ante esas acciones.

En su editorial del 11 de septiembre donde pide una investigación del Congreso sobre el papel de la CIA en Chile, el *Washington Post* recordó que durante las audiencias de confirmación de Kissinger hace un año,

se le preguntó si no sería mejor sacar a la CIA de acciones clandestinas como derrocar gobiernos latinoamericanos.

"Hay cierto tipo de actividades como éstas, difíciles de describir aquí", respondió Kissinger, "que sería peligroso abolir".

Esas declaraciones demuestran que una investigación de las recientes re-

velaciones sobre la intervención de los Estados Unidos en Chile, de realizarse, no puede limitarse a las personas y a la política del país de que se trate: debe inevitablemente plantear preguntas fundamentales sobre la historia de la intervención de los Estados Unidos contra gobiernos de otros países considerados hostiles a los intereses de Wall Street. □

DOCUMENTS

Big Struggles on the Agenda in Argentina

[The following editorial appeared in the September 17 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Since the Peronist government took office, workers have gradually and to varying degrees begun to understand that they must organize their own forces, that the response to each demand does not depend on how just it is but on the power, perseverance, and incisiveness that they can bring to bear.

The metalworkers at Villa Constitución¹ showed, for example, that a unanimously agreed-upon, disciplined factory occupation was more effective than months of endless appeals to the leaders and functionaries of the government of "national unity." Even unions without a tradition of struggle, like those of the teachers, gave up petitions and meetings with officials, taking the high and mighty government of the seven million votes² by surprise with their first national strike.

In short, the Peronist government—brought to power to slow down, paralyze, and demobilize the workers—was quickly compelled to come to

grips with the first indicators of the coming upsurge, the initial expressions of the class struggle that they thought they had "eliminated" with the Social Pact.³

Increasingly cheated by official measures, abandoned or even attacked by the union leadership, the workers were pushed more and more forcefully toward the arena of direct actions—leafleting, striking, occupying factories, working-to-the-book job actions. In each factory they began committing the "heresy" of demanding small wage increases in spite of the bureaucracy, which wanted to keep them in poverty in the name of achieving great-power status for Argentina by the year 2000.

With the plant assemblies squeezing small concessions out of each boss, the all-powerful bureaucrats were often left with no role to play, with nothing but the official seals and the buildings, the bank accounts and the bodyguards—their obsequiousness and corruption. They began to get a feeling of powerlessness even though they were nominally in command.

And the government began to feel the first fears that these still partial and spontaneous struggles could spread and end up overflowing all the barriers that the system possesses to hold back the advances of the working class.

Confronted with such a situation, the government could offer only false and artificial solutions, alternately try-

ing trickery and violence. It was trapped in the contradiction between getting the votes of workers and pursuing its bourgeois goals, between its populist program and the plans it adopted at the dictation of the capitalists. And when the tactics of the official machine became clear and lost their effectiveness, all that remained was the prestige of General Perón, which he dramatically gambled June 12, when he had to play every card he had.⁴

Today the attention of the nation is again drawn more and more strongly to the appearance of the first signs of the coming upsurge, the still isolated but promising expressions of class struggle. Now that the effects of the June 12 remedy have been exhausted, now that the uncertainty following Perón's death has passed and the government's orientation in the new balance of forces has become clear, the workers are resuming their struggles with vigor.

After 108 days on strike, the 1,200 workers at Propulsora [an iron and steel plant] are celebrating a spectacular victory over the bourgeoisie and the union bureaucracy.

In Córdoba, the machinists have kept their organization⁵ intact. Their

1. Site of an important recent strike victory.

2. The Peronists received seven million votes in the elections of March 1973.

3. The antilabor agreement between the bosses, the union bureaucrats, and the government.

4. On June 12, Peron threatened to resign if the working class did not unite behind his programs.

5. SMATA (Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor—Union of Automotive Machinists and Allied Trades).

ranks firm, they are going ahead—despite the fact that the bureaucracy and the government have robbed them of their formal union rights—to carry out the direct actions they adopted in assemblies.

In Tucumán, the sugarcane workers have launched a struggle in the midst of the harvest despite the vacillations of their leadership, encountering a government take-over of their union in response.

In addition, national strikes by railroad workers and teachers, strikes that have won mass support throughout the country, are demonstrating eloquently the quickening pace of the workers struggles that are laying bare the bourgeois essence of the Peronist government.

The depth of the process we are describing, the exhaustion of one after another of the government's possibilities of providing even transitory reformist solutions to the problems of the workers and the masses, has also found expression in the social crisis that is beginning to take shape within the ranks of the bourgeoisie. The almost timid criticisms the bourgeois parties were making of some of the government's actions a short while ago have begun to take on a sharper tone in recent days.

For example, the Radicals and Oscar Alende⁶ are calling for the resignation of Minister Ivanissevich,⁷ while the Peronists' partners in the FREJULI⁸ are being racked by internal crises and temptations to stage splits, both of which stem from the growing problems of official policy.

Moreover, even the union bureaucrats, those unconditional supporters of the bourgeoisie, were dragged along by the pressure of the ranks and forced by the workers' dissatisfaction and revolt to declare publicly that a wage increase was needed. Until very recently, they considered such a thing proof positive of treason to Perón and the fatherland. Maximiano

Castillo⁹ announced upcoming demands of the CGT, and [Minister of Labor Ricardo] Otero reiterated the promise that there would be no limitations on collective bargaining next year.

The working class finds itself in a situation favorable to its advance. Its enemies are divided to a certain extent and its own forces are united and in high spirits, looking forward to a fight. The doubts it suffers are political in nature. They lie in the reservoir of confidence and hope the workers who voted for the government en masse and with such enthusiasm a few months ago deposited in it, a confidence and hope that the regime is still able to play on. But the hard facts that strike at the workers' standard of living and shock their intelligence are taking precedence over other considerations. "We must defend ourselves," "We must fight," are beginning to be the dominant cry.

However, here another problem arises:

With what leadership? Who are our trade-union leaders to be? What is our political banner to be? What organization can unify our struggles?

We feel that these are the questions we must today give top priority. Because no matter how strong the arm of the working class, if it does not hold in its fist an instrument—an adequate tool—and in its head a correct program and goals, all its efforts will dissipate in a new defeat.

This question assumes a transcendent importance at this moment, when the Montoneros¹⁰ have issued their call for armed struggle and have begun it on their own. This is not a workers organization. It does not belong to the workers movement. Its leaders come from bourgeois currents and parties. But it includes hundreds of activists who work in the labor movement.

These activists, who are members of the JTP,¹¹ find themselves caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. If they follow the instructions of their

Montonero leaders, they will have to abandon the labor movement to take up guerrillaist armed struggle and go underground—precisely at the time when the workers movement is discussing how to organize and how to mobilize in the coming struggle.

The majority of the working class does not accept the need for armed struggle, and raising the question itself divides their ranks. Furthermore, the call for such an armed struggle has been launched in connection with extremely confused political goals. For example, those who have launched this appeal suggested, and have not denied, that they are relying on one section of bourgeois politicians to fight the others.

Some worker activists of the JTP, caught in a vice between an irresponsible, divisive political line that does not correspond to the needs of the labor movement and the coming mobilizations, may begin slowly to move toward class-struggle, revolutionary positions.

The case of the Peronist workers and youth at Propulsora is an example worth considering. There, fortunately, the compañeros did not abandon the mass struggle. Now they are joining in the call of the victorious labor leadership for forming a national coordinating committee of the militant leaderships and currents that are ready to fight—with the mandate of the rank and file—against the government, the bourgeoisie, and the union bureaucrats.

This is an essential step toward filling the vacuum of trade-union and political leadership in the workers movement—a trade-union coordinating committee beginning to pose itself as an alternative to the bureaucracy and to unify the struggles that are already starting to appear. A similar coordinating committee was proposed several months ago at Villa Constitución when more than 100 factory committees met in a large meeting.

Now the compañeros of Propulsora, including some members of the JTP who differentiate themselves from the official line of their leaders, recognize the necessity for such a coordinating committee.

A committee of this sort will certainly be the first product of this stage of struggle and of the coming militant upsurge. With it the labor movement will be able to unite and fight

6. Leader of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria—People's Revolutionary Alliance, a centrist formation.

7. Oscar Ivanissevich, an old-guard Peronist who is minister of culture and education.

8. Frente Justicialista de Liberación Nacional—National Liberation Front for Social Justice, the Peronist electoral front.

9. General secretary of the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor).

10. One of the main left-wing Peronist groups.

11. Juventud Trabajadora Peronista—Peronist Worker Youth.

for union democracy, against the Social Pact, for the restoration of collective bargaining, for the repeal of the reactionary legislation designed to smash the labor movement. With such an instrument, the labor movement will be able to break the pattern of superexploitation that has been maintained constant despite the changes of regime.

But this stage will also witness the rapid development of the other necessary instrument, the tool represented

by the best worker and revolutionary cadres. It is this tool that can give the mass organizations—the coordinating committee, the CGT, the unions, the factory committees, or other organizations that may be built—a socialist leadership that will not capitulate or put its trust in any sector of the bourgeoisie. This instrument, this tool, is the new workers and revolutionary party, of which the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores is the initial nucleus. □

newspaper of the "interior" faction of the Communist party]. His recommendation was as follows: "We must begin a phase of national forgiveness and reconciliation between the people and the army." He said that the Greek people "would like very much to forget what has happened."

So the line of the reformists of the EDA³ and the KKE⁴ is clear—*forgiveness* and *reconciliation*. It's strange that Eliou has not yet been taken into the cabinet for his services.

The workers, the poor peasants, the students, the toilers, and the progressive intellectuals must not forget for one moment that the army does not stand above class struggle but is instead an *organ of oppression* in the hands of the ruling class. As always, and still more so in the present period of a general structural crisis affecting all aspects of the capitalist system, it is the main counterrevolutionary factor. The class contradiction between the officer corps and the oppressed people, the contradiction between the brass and the common soldiers, is absolute. They stand in opposing social camps.

As long as the conscripts blindly and uncritically carry out the orders of their officers like puppets, the history of military interventions in social and political crises will be repeated, either in the form of coups d'état or bloody suppression of workers struggles and popular demonstrations. And this is true no matter how "democratic" or "parliamentary" a government the country has.

In order not to reopen this road, the proletariat and popular masses must orient toward creating a new *workers and people's government*. The soldiers, the children of the working people, must demand their democratic rights in their units. They must organize so that they can exercise a check on any arbitrary actions by their officers and so that they can bring *mass opposition to bear* every time the brass conspires to attack the people through dictatorial military coups, crushing workers strikes, or massacring militants of the students and the people. □

3. Enosis tes Demokratikes Aristeras—Union of the Democratic Left, the historic electoral front of the CP.

4. Kommounistiko Komma tes Ellados—Communist party of Greece.

No 'Reconciliation' With the Greek Army

[The following editorial was published in the September 14 issue of *Ergatike Pale*,¹ the weekly paper that reflects the views of the Greek Trotskyists. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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One of the main objectives of Caramanlis and his government of "national salvation" (that is, capitalist salvation), it was declared from the first day, is to bring about a "reconciliation between the army and the people." Of all the government's slogans, this one best expresses Caramanlis's reactionary goal and the role the leader of the ERE² has assumed as the life preserver of the capitalist system.

For the coup of April 1967, the bloody events of November 1973, and the coup that the officers of the National Guard carried out under the junta's aegis in Cyprus have opened an unbridgeable chasm of blood and ruin between the Greek people and the Greek army. (And when we say Greek army, we do not mean the ordinary soldiers, who are the sons of the people. We mean the officer corps, which is the main prop of the capitalist sys-

tem that exploits and oppresses the Greek people.)

With their sound sense, the ordinary people think: "The officers get fat salaries and big privileges that we couldn't even dream of. The state is taxing us to death for their benefit. But the officers create juntas; they re-establish monarchies; they set up military dictatorships with their tanks; they murder militant workers, students, and other people. Obviously they are parasites. The role they have played shows that peaceful coexistence between us is impossible. Either they are going to sit on us, or we are going to rebuild society on new bases, without exploitation and oppression, without parasites."

This split between the army and the people is a warning of the upheavals that will ultimately pose the question of a revolutionary transformation of society. For this reason, the basic mission of the Caramanlis-Mavros government is to bridge this chasm.

How? By removing a few of the representatives of the dictatorship who are most hated by the people (e.g., Ioannides). By writing off the crimes of the rest in the name of "national forgiveness." By declaring an amnesty for the "political" crimes of the dictatorial governments. By cultivating the idea in the minds of the people that the army has gone back to its job and will now give all the more complete obedience to the "democratic" government.

This endeavor by the government will be assisted by [Ilias] Eliou's article "Nation and Army" in the Sunday, September 8, issue of *Aughi* [the daily

1. Copies of the paper can be ordered from Giannis Felekis, *Ergatike Pale*, Emm. Mpenake 28, Athens, Greece. Six-month subscriptions cost 155 drachmas (27.7 drachmas equal US\$1) for Europe; 215 drachmas for the Americas; 155 drachmas for Asia; 215 drachmas for Africa; and 310 drachmas for Oceania.

2. *Ethnike Rizospastike Enosis*—National Radical Union, the main bourgeois conservative party.