

## New Revelations on CIA Role in Toppling Chilean Government

*Demonstrations Around the World in Solidarity With Chilean People*



## Tito Jails 32 in Pro-Moscow Group

Thirty-two members of the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC), the Yugoslav CP, have been sentenced to terms ranging from one to fourteen years in prison for trying to organize a clandestine pro-Moscow Communist party, official sources in Belgrade announced September 20.

The organization was called the "New Communist Party," according to Lars Ake Berling, the Vienna correspondent of the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter*. It held a congress in the resort town of Bar in Montenegro early in the year, where a resolution was adopted condemning Belgrade's course since the break with Moscow in 1948.

The thirty-two persons jailed were "mainly former secret police and war veteran types," according to a dispatch in the September 23 *Christian Science Monitor*.

The activity of the group was discovered when police found propaganda in the car of a member who was involved in a traffic accident. The material was reportedly printed in the Soviet Union.

The official communique mentioned only two names and did not specify their sentences. Dr. Branislav Boskovic, a university professor, was cited as the leader of the group. The other person named was Komnen Jovic, former editor of the Montenegrin LYC organ *Probjeda*. All of the accused were reportedly Montenegrins, although some lived in other Yugoslav republics.

The pro-Moscow group was said to have maintained contacts with a group of old Stalinist exiles in Kiev as well as with several embassies of Warsaw Pact countries. The LYC issued formal protests, Dusko Woder reported in the September 19 *Washington Post*, to the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian ambassadors in Belgrade. Yugoslav officials have not played up the case. "The incident is nevertheless known to have caused considerable concern in government circles and wide public apprehension," Woder wrote, "after Tito made public the details surrounding the affair. . . ." □

### Next Week

For the first time. A very rare document—the full text of a stenogram of a conference held in Coyoacán, Mexico, in 1938 in which Leon Trotsky and James P. Cannon discuss preparations for the founding congress of the Fourth International.

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## Protests Around the World

By Judy White



Part of demonstration of 33,000 in Frankfurt, West Germany, September 14.

In cities around the world during September, tens of thousands of persons have turned out in demonstrations denouncing the bloody rule of the military junta in Chile.

The actions marked the first anniversary of the September 11, 1973, coup that overthrew the Allende regime.

The protest consisted of marches, work stoppages, rallies, and news conferences.

One of the largest actions took place in Frankfurt, Germany, September 14. A correspondent of *Intercontinental Press* reported:

"Although the newspaper articles I'm sending from the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt* say 20,000 demonstrated, the official police estimate was 33,000.

"This is the largest Chile action ever in West Germany. It is also probably the largest demonstration of any kind for the last six years in West Germany, and the largest in Frankfurt since the end of World War II."

The Frankfurt demonstration was part of a national week of activities

in West Germany called several months ago by twenty-seven local Chile committees and the Federation of Latin American Students. It was supported by several political organizations, including the GIM (Gruppe Internationale Marxisten—International Marxist Group, the German section of the Fourth International), but did not have the support of the German Social Democrats or the pro-Moscow Communist party.

In Australia, actions took place in five cities September 11. A participant in the Sydney demonstration of 500 wrote:

"The Sydney action was not only the largest but perhaps the most important. One reason for this was that many exile and refugee members of Sydney's Latin American community took part in the action.

"The demonstrators marched off to the U.S. consulate and then to a rally organized in Martin Plaza. . . . It was one of the most spirited marches seen in Sydney in recent years.

"The rally at Martin Plaza was chaired by Dave Holmes of the So-

cialist Workers League, the convenor of the Chile Action Committee. Those who addressed the rally included a member of the Antorcha Latin American exile group, who spoke to the meeting in Spanish.

"The high point of the rally was a speech by Ernest Mandel, a well-known Marxist economist and leader of the Fourth International, who had arrived earlier that day to begin a lecture tour of Australia. His short speech was given a very enthusiastic reception."

In the United States, demonstrations were held in scores of cities September 11-14. According to representatives of the United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA), one of the principal organizers of the protests, some of the larger actions occurred in Boston (500 persons) San Francisco (300), Washington, D.C. (300), Minneapolis (250), and New York (800).

A September 7 meeting held in the Lisbon Sports Palace was addressed by Alvaro Cunhal, Portuguese cabinet minister and general secretary of the Communist party; and by Edgardo Rojas, vice-president of the Chilean CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores—United Federation of Workers).

In Colombia, a week of solidarity began with an eight-day march from Ibagué to Bogotá that culminated in a rally in the capital.

In Peru and Spain, government authorities banned scheduled protests.

In Venezuela, United Press International reported that the main trade-union federations called for a fifteen-minute work stoppage throughout the country September 18. □

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# 10,000 in London Voice Chile Solidarity

By Robin Hunter

London

More than 10,000 demonstrators marched through the center of London September 15 in a massive and spirited show of solidarity with the Chilean people on the first anniversary of the establishment of the military dictatorship. Almost the entire spectrum of the British left and working-class movement was represented in the demonstration, which was sponsored by the Chile Solidarity Campaign (CSC).

The action was a particular success in the face of the last-minute withdrawal from the campaign of the Labour party National Executive, whose willingness to defend the Chilean workers movement wilted with the approach of a general election. Not only did General Secretary Ron Hayward remove his name from the speakers list, but the party actually requested the CSC to call off the entire demonstration.

The CSC, a coalition of trade-union and political groups and activists, refused this request. Moreover, from the frequent appearance of constituency Labour party and Labour party Young Socialist banners in the demonstration, it was clear that Hayward's electoral opportunism was far from universally shared in the party's ranks.

Indeed, the main point of the demonstration was to demand of the Labour government that it enact the declared policy of the Labour party at the time of the coup, when Labour was in opposition. At that time the party conference went on record as favouring a break in diplomatic relations and a total embargo on all trade with Chile, particularly arms and military goods.

Since assuming office, however, Wilson's government has reneged on these commitments. Arms contracts made by the Tories have been fulfilled by Labour. British-built warships have been delivered to the junta and British-built planes have been repaired and serviced by British firms, with the cabinet looking on. In a dashingly gesture, direct aid to Chile (about £500,000 [US\$1,150,000] a year) was cut off, while at the same time—

and less flamboyantly—Labour in office concurred with the rest of the capitalist world in extending the terms of repayment of hundreds of millions of dollars in Chilean loans from the money markets of Europe.

Contrary to the demands of the Labour Conference, Chilean refugees have not been freely admitted to Britain, as was promised.

Not surprisingly, this betrayal provoked considerable response within the Labour party itself. Widespread discontent stimulated public criticism from cabinet member Eric Heffer, and from Hayward, who claimed to speak for the ranks of the Labour party. (See *Intercontinental Press*, May 27, 1974, p. 649.) Heffer, of the leftist "Tribune" grouping, has long since been silenced. Hayward's left face, while lasting longer, turned just as quickly when the electoral breezes began to blow.

More resistant to these pressures than the party bureaucracy, the trade unions were in clear evidence on the march. Banners marked the participation of at least a dozen trades councils, and of many unions, including the Miners, the National Union of Teachers, the Engineers, Transport and General Workers, and the Railway Workers.

The National Assembly of Women and several women's liberation groups were represented. International student groups, among them Iranian, Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot organizations, had their own banners. A grouping from the Spanish Communist party led the CP contingent.

Had the universities been in session, there is no doubt that the march would have had several thousand more participants. As it was, only a few dozen marched with the National Union of Students banner.

Besides sections of the Labour party, other political groups taking part in the campaign and march included the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International; the Communist party and YCL; International Socialists; the Revolutionary Communist Group; the groupings around the papers *Chartist* and *Militant*; and Big Flame, a rather dif-

fuse group based in the Merseyside, which considers itself to be a revolutionary-socialist tendency. Abstaining from the action, because of the CSC's allegedly "unprincipled" line, was the Workers Revolutionary party.

The rally, concluding in Trafalgar Square, was addressed by Hortensia Allende, who thanked the British left for its solidarity actions. She also thanked the British government for its "help," thereby endorsing the hypocritical tokenism of Wilson and Callaghan.

John Gollan, general secretary of the Communist party, spoke along the same lines, congratulating the government for what it had done. His only difference with Wilson's policy was implied in his call for a cessation of diplomatic relations with Chile.

It remained for Tariq Ali, a leader of the International Marxist Group, to clearly indict Labour's betrayal of its responsibilities to the international working class. □

## Ethiopia's Military Rulers Confront Students, Labor

Students and trade unionists in Ethiopia have already encountered resistance by the new military rulers to their demands.

On September 16, soldiers broke up attempts by about a thousand university students in Addis Ababa to demonstrate for an immediate end to military rule and a speedy court-martial and conviction of the deposed emperor, Haile Selassie.

Demonstrations were outlawed by the military earlier this month.

The students later held a rally on the university's science campus. Officers representing the government came to the rally and tried to assure the students that military rule was not meant to be permanent.

Also on September 16, the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions adopted a resolution calling for formation of a "civilian popular government" in which all layers of the population, including workers and students, would be represented. The Armed Forces Coordinating Committee responded with a long statement, carried in newspapers and over the radio, appealing to the ranks of the unions to get rid of their leaders. The statement included an implied threat that the labor federation would be dissolved if it did not cooperate with the regime.

The regime later moved to set up a joint military-labor committee together with the trade-union leadership.

The military rulers have not yet announced what they plan to do with the former emperor.

## CIA Funds Behind 'Strikes' Against Allende

In new sensational disclosures leaked to the *New York Times* from sources apparently within the Central Intelligence Agency itself, it has now been revealed that the sinister super-spy organization was the source of funds used to subsidize the anti-Allende "strikes" carried out in Chile by truck owners and shopkeepers in 1972 and 1973.

The money, disbursed "for more than 18 months" before the government was overthrown by force and violence, was used "to provide strike benefits and other means of support for anti-Allende strikers and workers," according to the September 20 issue of the *New York* daily.

The revelations give the lie to claims by White House representatives that the CIA's cloak-and-dagger operations in Chile were limited to financing opposition political parties and the news media.

"Among those heavily subsidized," Washington correspondent Seymour Hersh reported, citing "intelligence sources" that gave him the details, "were the organizers of a nationwide truck strike that lasted 26 days in the fall of 1972, seriously disrupting Chile's economy and provoking the first of a series of labor crises for President Allende.

"Direct subsidies, the sources said, also were provided for a strike of middle-class shopkeepers and a taxi strike among others, that disrupted the capital city of Santiago in the summer of 1973, shortly before Mr. Allende was overthrown by a military coup.

"At its peak, the 1973 strikes involved more than 250,000 truck drivers, shopkeepers and professionals who banded together in a middle-class movement that, many analysts have concluded, made a violent overthrow inevitable."

The truck owners' "strike" (in reality, a lockout) was directed against the government's plan to form a state trucking corporation in the south of the country to compete with private companies. During the lockout, Allende made major concessions to the truck owners, including a promise to

recognize the "private nature" of transportation companies.

(Few if any "workers" were actually participants in these right-wing anti-government protests. An American living in Santiago at the time has described the participants in a typical "March of the Empty Pots" action:\*

("... the right-wing women would come down from their houses in the Barrio Alto... in their Fiats and their Mercedes-Benzes and they would park them on a side street. Then they would all walk about half a block to the Plaza Italia—the main center—and then walk down the main street for two blocks with their signs, as though they had marched hungry and oppressed from the rich quarters further up in Santiago. . . . You would see their faces distorted with hatred, not so much against the actual concrete activities of the government but against the actual presumption of the poor—the idea that they could determine what was going to be done.")

The latest revelations provide further proof of Washington's efforts to disrupt Chile's economy under Allende. The *New York Times* had previously revealed, on September 15, that the 40 Committee, a high-level intelligence and security agency presided over by Henry Kissinger, had worked to cut off loans and credit for Chile after Allende's election in 1970.

Hersh reported in the September 20 *New York Times* that the money for the CIA's covert operations from 1970 to 1973, following Allende's election, was funneled into Chile through the black market, thus enormously increasing its "buying power."

"The unofficial exchange rate, sources said, was as much as 800 per cent higher than the official rate, indicating that the C. I. A.'s cash could have had a local impact of more than \$40-million."

The CIA's subsidization of opposition business and trade organizations

\*Jim Ritter, in *Chile's Days of Terror: Eyewitness Accounts of the Military Coup* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974), p. 24.

was pictured "as part of a broad effort to infiltrate all areas of Chile's governmental and political life. The sources said that by the end of the Allende period, the agency had agents and informers in every major party making up Mr. Allende's Popular Unity coalition."

They were unable to infiltrate the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), Hersh's sources claimed. While giving critical support to Allende's popular-front government, the centrist MIR did not join the Popular Unity coalition.

At his September 16 news conference, Ford admitted that the CIA carried out clandestine operations in Chile. However, he pictured these as benign actions intended only "to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspaper and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties."

The latest revelations by the *New York Times* show that Ford was covering up the job done on the Chilean government by the CIA.

"What we really were doing was supporting a civilian resistance movement against an arbitrary Government," a Washington official "with first-hand knowledge of the decision-making on Chile" told the *New York Times*. "Our target was the middle-class groups who were working against Allende."

The newspaper's sources said that less than half the CIA money was provided for direct support of politicians, newspapers, and radio and television stations. Most of the funds allocated for stimulating antigovernment propaganda went to *El Mercurio*, the main anti-Allende daily in Santiago.

Additional details concerning CIA activities in Chile were provided to a House of Representatives subcommittee September 16 by Richard R. Fagen, a professor of political science at Stanford University. Fagen, who had done research in Chile in 1972 and 1973, said he had been approached by the U. S. Embassy in Santiago and urged to help in covertly gathering information on left-wing

groups.

He testified that the request included an offer to help him exchange personal money "through the black market channels used by the embassy."

The *New York Times's* sources, hoping to deflect charges of direct CIA involvement in the bloody September 1973 coup and its aftermath, insisted that the Nixon administration's goal was not to overthrow Allende.

One official Hersh spoke with went so far as to call Washington's policy in Chile a "failure": "'We were not looking for a military take-over,' he declared."

It may well be that the CIA ordered its operators to stand by on the day the generals struck the blow they had been organizing together with the CIA from the time Allende took office. The fact that they were only spattered by the blood of the tens of thousands of victims does not lessen their complicity.

As *Intercontinental Press* pointed out during the 1972 truck owners' lock-out, the general strategy of the opposition was at that time to wear away the popular hopes inspired by the Popular Unity victory. They sought through confrontations to force Allende to abandon even the limited re-

formist program of his coalition, gradually turning him into a captive of the opposition parties and the army.

The first line of defense of both the Chilean bourgeoisie and imperialism was to rely on the class-collaborationist policy of the Popular Unity leadership, above all of the Chilean Communist party, as it retreated before the successive blows of the opposition, refusing to mobilize the masses along the path of anticapitalist struggle.

The opposition strategy—with the help of the CIA—was successful. When Allende hindered the masses from mobilizing in their own defense (for example, by imposing martial law during the truckers' strike) and capitulated to the demands of the truck owners and other opponents of the regime, he emboldened the right-wing opposition and enabled it to go increasingly on the offensive against the government.

By the time of the shopkeepers' strikes in July-August 1973, however, the opposition's strategy of attrition was becoming increasingly risky. On the one hand, the workers were responding to the right-wing attacks with mobilizations that the Popular Unity government could not control and that increasingly tended to under-

mine the base of the capitalist system.

Following the "Tancazo," or attempted coup, of June 29, 1973, for example, the workers carried through a wave of plant seizures and strengthened their *cordones industriales*, the councils they had established to administer such properties.

On the other hand, sectors of the ruling class and the far right wing showed an increasing proclivity toward panicky reactions that overstepped the bounds of a strategy limited to pressuring Allende. These elements, of course, had been encouraged enormously by Allende's previous retreats, as well as by Washington's support.

And so the time had come for a shift in tactics of the reaction.

"The people within the [U.S.] Embassy," a Washington official told the *New York Times*, "felt that they were engaged in a kind of warfare. . . ."

"There were a lot of people in Santiago on the far right who were essentially dedicating their lives to the overthrow of Allende—it was like a holy war,' the source said. 'These people were increasingly seen at the embassy in 1972 and 1973.'

"At the time, he added, 'just putting some resources at their disposal alone would be enough.'" □

## Revelations a Big 'Surprise' to Congressmen

# A Leash for the CIA or a Muzzle for Ford?

By Dick Fidler

Ford's attempt, at a September 16 White House news conference, to justify the Central Intelligence Agency's clandestine operations in Chile against the Allende government has been met with indignant statements from members of Congress and newspaper editors.

Clifton Daniel, associate editor of the *New York Times*, raised the question of the new president's intelligence. "Another kind of reply was possible," he wrote September 17. "The President might have said that he was not responsible for past activities of the C. I. A., but would be responsible for its future behavior, and would accord-

ingly review its policies and plans."

Instead, Daniel noted, "the President chose to defend the behavior of the old Administration rather than chart a new policy for his own."

In Daniel's view, Ford's statement that the CIA's subversive activities in other countries were justified "to help implement foreign policy and protect national security" seemed to conflict with CIA director William Colby's recent assurance that abandoning "covert action" would, "in the light of current American policy," "not have a major impact on our current activities or the current security of the United States."

The thrice-repeated use of the word "current" in the above statement, of course, enabled Colby to go on to justify CIA subversive activities in other contexts. It would be a mistake, he had told the Fund for Peace Conference in Washington, to "leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending the Marines."

Both Ford and Colby "seemed to take it for granted that the United States had the right to intervene in the affairs of other countries in its own interest," Daniel observed. Ford had even claimed that "such actions are taken in the best interests of the countries involved."

Ford's claim led Senator Frank Church, a liberal Democrat and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to wave a warning finger.

"It seems he declared that the United States respects no law other than the law of the jungle in its dealings with foreign countries," the senator said. "He equates us with the Russians. I thought there was a difference, and the difference is what it's all about."

In fact, the recent statements of top officials approving CIA activities have punctured the long-stated official rationale for U.S. foreign policy, through which the ruling class attempts to mobilize public opinion in support of Washington's counterrevolutionary role around the world.

The president himself has now admitted and defended what an increasing number of American people have come to understand and oppose: that far from supporting democracy, self-determination, and freedom, Washington's policy is to back, encourage, and inspire the most reactionary opponents of those ideals.

This "candidness"—less polite commentators call it stupidity—on the part of administration spokesmen has called forth troubled comments from other representatives of the ruling class, as Senator Church's remarks indicate. It has also, understandably, provoked unease in other world capitals, including among some governments not known for their opposition to Washington.

The *New York Times* reported September 13 that Daniel Moynihan, the U.S. ambassador to India, had sent a confidential cable to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger three days earlier warning that the recent revelations about the CIA's role in Chile had confirmed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's "worst suspicions and genuine fears" about Washington's policy toward her government.

"Her concern is whether the United States accepts the Indian regime. She is not sure but that we would be content to see others like her overthrown. She knows full well that we have done our share and more of bloody and dishonorable deeds," Moynihan said.

It is not known whether Washington has any immediate intention of overthrowing the Gandhi government. But Moynihan's cable will be of service to the growing number of congressional critics of Kissinger as a holdover of

the Nixon administration.

Many commentators expressed concern that Ford's defense of CIA subversion would tarnish still further the image that has been constructed of him as "Mr. Clean."

Typical was a September 20 column by Tom Wicker, Washington bureau chief of the *New York Times*, a newspaper that has done its share in presenting Ford as still a Boy Scout at heart.

Wicker noted a number of absurdities in Ford's remarks. Allende, contrary to what Ford had said, did not try to "destroy opposition news media . . . and to destroy opposition political parties." In fact, Wicker said, the opposition parties and press were never threatened under the Popular Unity regime.

And in any case, what about Washington's complete lack of concern for the opposition press and opposition parties in many other countries where they *are* suppressed—as in "South Vietnam, South Korea, until recently Greece, just to name a few," Wicker said.

"Aside from misleading the American people, Mr. Ford's statement was one of the most unfortunate ever made by the head of a supposedly law-abiding government. It claimed the right of this nation to go clandestinely into others and 'take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security.' That is a beautified way of saying 'to subvert legitimate governments by bribery, trickery and violence.' . . .

"The 'candor' of Mr. Ford's remarks, far from being praiseworthy, had the effects not just of admitting that international subversion goes on, but of giving it public, official approval, and from the President of the United States. What does this tell us about a man who in pardoning Richard Nixon said he believed that 'right makes might' and who has just called in the United Nations for a cooperative world order based on 'accommodation, moderation and consideration of the interests of others'?"

Wicker concluded that the "inexperienced" Ford, "an instinctive hawk," had "been sold a bill of goods by the C. I. A. and Secretary of State Kissinger, who presided over the national security body that authorized the C. I. A. interventions in Chile."

The way to handle this, he said,

echoing editorials in the major U.S. newspapers, is to strengthen the role of Congress in "overseeing" CIA activities.

Members of Congress, caught short by the unexpected exposure of the CIA, have used the convenient ploy of expressing "surprise." The most "surprised" seem to be those who were in the best position to know the full story from the beginning.

These include Senator Stuart Symington, a member of the Senate Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee; Senator John Stennis, the subcommittee's chairman and also chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee; and Representative Dante Fascell, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Latin American Subcommittee—all of whom claim to have been "unaware" of what the CIA was doing.

On September 17, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously to investigate the CIA role in Chile. Representative Thomas Morgan, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said they, too, would take up the Chile issue. "This is our one chance to get oversight of the CIA and we're going to grab it," he promised.

However, the *New York Times* reported, the senators favor only "a preliminary 'pulling together' of testimony and not yet a full-fledged investigation into the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration."

Moreover, the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations voted that same day to reject a staff report recommending contempt and possible perjury proceedings against State Department officials who had insisted at last year's ITT hearings that Washington followed a policy of "nonintervention" in Chile.

On September 19, senators Howard Baker and Lowell P. Weicker Jr. introduced a bill aimed at broadening legislative control over the CIA. It was cosponsored by eleven other senators, most of them Democrats. "But skeptics, including some members of current committees dealing with overseeing [the CIA], pointed out that over 100 similar proposals had failed in the past," the *New York Times* reported. A similar fate is thought to be in store for this bill.

Actually the current CIA revelations come as no surprise to anyone the least acquainted with the nature of the

U. S. government.

"Only a few of the C. I. A.'s overseas operations in the past 25 years are known," wrote Seymour Hersh in the September 22 *New York Times*. But Hersh's "partial list" of such operations that are already known was rather extensive. These included such exploits as:

- Financing the Chinese Nationalist army in Burma in the early 1950s.

- Organizing the overthrow of the Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953.

- Organizing the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954.

- Organizing the unsuccessful coup against President Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958.

- Helping to crush the liberation struggle in the Congo in the early 1960s.

To this can be added the CIA's well-known role in organizing the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961; its financing and directing of the secret war against insurgents in Laos beginning in 1962; and its "Operation Phoenix," the assassination program carried out during the Vietnam war — all of which have been documented.

The problem is U. S. foreign policy and the CIA itself, not the lack of "oversight" of CIA operations by Congress. This was acknowledged by the *Washington Post* in a September 22 editorial.

"Suppose," it argued, "just to take one hypothetical example, that the oil policies of Upper Araby, or whatever, had brought the United States to the brink of a disastrous economic collapse. We are not so sure that in a life-and-death matter of this sort American devotion to nonintervention and the diplomatic niceties should be so absolute as to preclude taking extreme and necessarily covert measures to protect vital American interests."

That is where the liberals are wrong, the *Washington newspaper* said. "If you are to conduct a foreign policy leaving open the option of covert operations, then you cannot avoid doing a certain damage — variously estimated — to the domestic process. To conduct prior public review of secret acts is simply impossible. Nor is it possible to conduct public post mortems on covert operations once they are held. The attempt to apply regular democratic procedures to dirty tricks can only produce the evasions, deceptions and embarrassments which we have seen in full measure in recent

days."

Yes, there must be oversight to ensure that such covert action is undertaken only where needed and effectively, the *Post's* editors wrote. "But as long as Congress condones a foreign policy served by secret deeds and delegates the oversight of these operations to a handful of members, it cannot groan when one goes sour and work off its chagrin in extremely damaging public examination of secret and sensitive operations, no matter how misguided these operations may have been or how badly they may have misfired."

Ford and Kissinger could not have put it more clearly. Even the *Post's* "hypothetical example" recalled Ford's speech to the United Nations the previous week, in which the head of U. S. imperialism threatened the oil-produc-

ing states, mainly Arabs, with dire consequences if they "failed to cooperate" in filling U. S. oil needs.

The members of Congress today expressing their "surprise" at the disclosures of CIA crimes are more concerned with getting at Ford, the Republican, and Kissinger, a holdover of the Nixon administration, than they are in exposing the evidence of CIA complicity in Allende's overthrow. But behind their expressed dismay at the CIA's role is something else — their awareness of growing public anger over the rottenness in government. They know that exposure of the lies about the role of the CIA adds a bit more to the widespread sentiment favoring a thorough housecleaning job in Washington, and it is this phenomenon in American politics that worries them. □

## Moscow Bureaucrats Put on Their Own Exhibition

### Censorship by Bulldozer

It all began when thirteen artists asked city authorities in Moscow for permission to hold an exhibition of paintings on a vacant lot. No objection being raised, the artists, who are not recognized by the official Artists Union because they are against the prescribed doctrine of "socialist realism," went ahead.

The paintings displayed by the twenty-four participating artists represented a variety of schools, including surrealism, abstract expressionism, formalism, and pop art.

No sooner had the exhibition been set up than the censors arrived in the form of a "vigilante squad" armed with appropriate tools of bureaucratic criticism — dump trucks, water-tank trucks used for spraying streets, and two bulldozers.

While uniformed cops looked on impassively, the vehicles were driven around the lot, scattering several hundred spectators and exhibitors, and destroying many of the paintings.

"The young men who appeared to be organized into teams, ripped up, trampled and threw more than a dozen paintings into a dump truck to be covered with mud and driven

away," reported an eyewitness, Christopher Wren of the *New York Times*. "Artists who protested were roughed up and at least five were arrested. An unknown number of angry spectators were taken to a nearby police station."

One of those arrested, Viktor Tupitsin, a mathematician, later reported that while at the police station, he saw some of the "vigilantes" who had broken up the exhibition go into a back room and re-emerge in police uniforms. He said he had also seen a notice on a bulletin board instructing "all the staff to report in civilian clothes" on Sunday morning, the day of the exhibition.

The next day, a municipal court convicted four artists and a photographer of "petty hooliganism" for resisting the attack on the art show, and imposed fifteen-day prison terms and fines on them.

The destruction of the exhibition received front-page treatment in the Western press, of course. Could there be more convincing evidence of the absence of freedom of expression in the Soviet Union?

Gus Hall, the general secretary of the U.S. Communist party, predict-



ably echoed a line of defense suggested in a Tass news agency dispatch. He claimed to see the "fine hand of the C.I.A." in the affair. (*Daily World*, September 21.)

The "fine hand," naturally, was seen by Hall in the artists showing their paintings and not in the drivers of bulldozers and dump trucks expressing critical reactions. Hall viewed them as "some local Soviet citizens" who "seemingly over-reacted" out of "honest indignation."

The bureaucrats, in suppressing the show, clearly failed to anticipate the genuinely honest indignation it would arouse internationally.

Embarrassed by the publicity, the authorities retreated, while continuing to defend their way of handling artists who want to paint as they please. Ten of the eighteen paintings were returned to their owners through unidentified persons. Those jailed were released after a few days.

At the same time, the Soviet newspapers in their first published account of the incident accused the artists of

having staged a "deliberate political provocation."

The authorities also turned down a request from the same group of artists to hold another showing on September 29. They were told they could display their works on September 28, a Saturday, in another part of the city far removed from the site of the original attempted exhibition.

The artists unanimously rejected this "concession." Saturday is a working day for most Soviet citizens, so few would be able to attend.

Once again, the ruling caste has demonstrated its acute sensitivity to any manifestation of independent thinking in the field of the arts. Let one artist get away with it and who knows where it will end?

Whatever the value of their work may be — and the bureaucrats are clearly determined to prevent us from being able to assess it — the dissident artists deserve international commendation for their courage in standing firm against the mindless bureaucratic censorship. □

of heading it in confrontation with the workers movement.

They say it is necessary to "Peronize" the government — that the "old Peronists" should make up the cabinet, because they are the ones who can solve problems. They cite the example of the defense minister, an old Peronist who, they maintain, magnificently filled the role of public servant in the job he did with the armed forces.

*Q. Do the latest shifts in the cabinet reflect this situation?*

*A. Precisely. The fact that an old Peronist with political expertise has come into the Ministry of the Interior indicates that *La Nación* used to say that [Benito] Llambi was a good minister of the interior for Perón, because what was called for was someone who would carry out Perón's orders without asking any questions. But now that Perón is dead what is needed is a minister of the interior who can involve other forces in discussions and who thinks politically. That is why they changed him.*

The essence of these changes is to involve old Peronists who do not upset the equilibrium of the cabinet — an equilibrium that has been described by *Avanzada Socialista* [weekly newspaper of the PST] as a standoff between [Finance Minister José] Gelbard and [Minister of Social Welfare José] López Rega.

These changes have not meant the predominance of either of them. They keep the equilibrium, trying to favor the most traditional Peronist elements — what they call "historic Peronism." And the armed forces at present are in favor of this kind of stability.

*Q. What is the bourgeoisie's situation?*

*A. The bourgeoisie continues to base its entire strategy on the Social Pact. To hold to this line, Gelbard, the theoretician of the Social Pact, makes it more flexible. That is, he tries to reach agreements with all sectors of the bourgeoisie.*

For example, the big landowners and ranchers had launched an offensive against the Social Pact because of cattle prices, particularly because Gelbard had imposed a land tax on them. To keep up support for the agreement, Gelbard reduced the

## How Argentine Trotskyists View the Situation

### Since the Death of Perón

[The following interview with a member of the Political Bureau of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST — Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Argentina) was held September 1. The translation of the interview, which was conducted in Spanish, is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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*Question. What will happen in Argentina now that Perón is dead? Is it possible that the military will take power immediately?*

*Answer. Many comrades have asked whether the military is going to take power now that Perón is dead. We do not think that this is the immediate perspective. A great deal depends on what happens in the labor movement. We also think that for the time being, the military prefers to go ahead*

with the bourgeoisie putting the Social Pact [the regime's wage-freeze agreement] into effect.

That is, rather than governing directly, the armed forces are for supporting the course the bourgeoisie has been following.

It is true that with the death of Perón, the bourgeoisie has lost its arbiter. There is a big vacuum and someone is going to have to fill it, but it is not going to be the armed forces alone that will do it. In Argentina, the armed forces are bound up with the bourgeoisie. They already went through the experience that ended up with the Cordobazo [the 1969 semi-insurrection that threatened capitalist rule in Argentina], and they are not about to repeat it.

In that sense we could say that they are more dangerous than if they took power directly, because they appear to be shoring up an entire process of strengthening the bourgeoisie instead

tax and raised the price of cattle.

This did not surprise us, since from the beginning we said that the pact was a question of agreements determined by the situation in the labor movement.

It seems to us that the bourgeoisie is trying in every possible way to follow the current rules of the game until the next elections. And we see [Ricardo] Balbín [leader of the Unión Cívica Radical — Radical Civic Union], the principal bourgeois opponent of the government, doing everything possible not to get involved in the errors of the regime, trying to maintain the "institutionalization" process until 1975.

In short, as long as the masses do not change their wait-and-see attitude, the bourgeoisie will be able to continue with the Social Pact. That does not mean that its internal contradictions, its frictions, and its confrontation with the labor movement will not get sharper when a big upsurge occurs. We view that upsurge as something latent that could come at any time.

*Q. Does that mean that the frictions within the bourgeoisie for the time being will not provoke a shake-up among the economic advisers to the administration?*

A. It is true that many sectors are attacking Gelbard, one being the cattle-raising landowners, another being [Arturo] Frondizi's *desarrollistas* [those favoring industrial development]. But in our opinion it is impossible for them—at least for the moment—to find a substitute for the current team of economists, because the opposition is not homogeneous. The Gelbard team, which is carrying out the Social Pact, is a homogeneous one. There is an opposition to Gelbard, but it is not united. Accordingly, we believe it will allow Gelbard to ride out the storm, although we do not know for how long.

In addition, in spite of the big deficit caused by the closing off of the European Common Market, the final result is not catastrophic. The situation compares favorably in terms of capitalist development with that faced by previous governments, although it is not as good as had been predicted.

*Q. What other political forces are*

*in motion in Argentina at the current time?*

A. I will try to indicate what the perspectives of these forces are.

Peronism, for example, is going through a crisis. We think the Peronists themselves know it is going to be very difficult for them to win the next elections alone. Two sectors are crystallizing in relation to Peronism—one for, the other against.

The sector supporting Peronism is headed by the Communist party. They say that Peronism is a party that fights against imperialism and that the exports to Eastern Europe and Cuba signify a second declaration of independence. Thus it must be supported by a front of progressive sectors.

On the other side is the opposition emerging from the Peronist movement itself—though not exactly from "within," because the most radicalized sectors of the Juventud [Juventud Peronista — Peronist Youth], the Montoneros [the main Peronist guerrilla group], cannot really be said to be inside.

These sectors speak of a national liberation front under working-class hegemony. For us the question is working-class leadership. We do not think that those sectors are for that. Rather they are for the working class integrating itself as one part of the front. The front would be composed of Montoneros, the Partido Comunista Revolucionario [Revolutionary Communist party], the Maoists, the FAS [Frente Antimperialista y por el Socialismo—Front Against Imperialism and for Socialism], and the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary People's Army].

This would be a leftist popular front. That is, with the crisis of Peronism, the labor movement faces two dangers—the popular front and fascism.

With regard to the latter, we must say that even though the fundamental features of fascism do not exist, fascist bands and the elements that can give rise to fascism certainly do exist. A large sector of the petty bourgeoisie is totally disillusioned after having voted for Perón. If no revolutionary party comes on the scene to convince that sector that it is the party of the revolution, these petty-bourgeois elements are liable to go over to the fascist forces.

That is why our party is carrying

out a tremendous propaganda effort on these two dangers, posing the need for the political independence of the labor movement and for workers self-defense against the fascist bands.

*Q. Does this mean that at this time the need for a revolutionary party becomes more acute than ever?*

A. Exactly, and we think that within this political panorama, we are the only clear alternative, although we are aware that we appear as an alternative for only one sector of the labor movement and not for its entirety. We are known throughout the country for our role in the struggles, and our centers function as gathering places for workers and students. When a fight starts, they come to discuss with us what steps to take. But we must be even better prepared in order to be that revolutionary alternative for the masses.

*Q. What is the situation now faced by the Argentine working class and what is the PST's policy in relation to it?*

A. I mentioned a wait-and-see attitude—we could even speak of an impasse—in the labor movement since the death of Perón. This does not mean that there are no struggles; at this moment there are conflicts in Villa Constitución and Propulsora Sidérgica. Our opinion is that this impasse is temporary, that we will soon see another upsurge.

What is new in these conflicts is that in almost all of them the problem of leadership is posed, and not only in terms of trade-union democracy, but in political terms as well. Today our working class is confronted with questions like the following:

Why does involvement with the government and the Social Pact make it impossible for any Peronist leadership to successfully lead any fight? What does socialism mean?

Thus, our party is now involved not solely in solving small problems in one or another section of a factory but in advancing trade-union formations and even more the party as such in this entire stage to a position of decisive importance in the conflicts. During the last fights at Bagley and Propulsora our presence has been as a party and not as a trade-union group-

ing, although such a grouping exists. We identify ourselves directly as socialists.

This is decisive for putting ourselves forward as a political alternative to Peronism. The crisis of Peronism that had already begun to manifest itself when Perón was still alive (this was the motive for his June 12 call for support to his administration) has deepened with his death.

In spite of the fact that the earlier wave of conflicts may have been bigger, what is new is that now they are beginning to be transformed into political conflicts. The vanguard arising from them is a political vanguard, and it is seeking a clear alternative to Peronism.

I am going to give some examples to show why the conflicts are political. In the case of SMATA [Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor—Union of Automotive Machinists and Allied Trades], they came out against the pact, but then they retreated. Tosco [Agustín Tosco, a leader of the class-struggle tendency in the Argentine labor movement] went so far as to say that it is not necessary to oppose the pact—it has to be changed; that is, we need one with better terms.

This means that they are avoiding a political confrontation. They do not offer a political alternative for the working class because, if they did, they would have to pose the question of political independence and offer the class a party. They speak of trade-union democracy against the bureaucracy, but they remain in the middle of the road on the fundamental political question.

It is correct for the auto workers to want to fight the Social Pact. But that would have required Tosco and Salamanca [René Salamanca, another leader of the class-struggle tendency in the Argentine labor movement] to place themselves in the forefront of a mobilization against the government—something they are unwilling to do. That is why they allowed a mobilization of some 10,000 machinists to simply run out of steam and why they brought the workers toward a possible defeat by not offering them a clear political alternative.

We want to make it clear that despite our differences with Tosco and Salamanca, we are in favor of encouraging the struggle in Córdoba as much as possible. We say all this to show

how in Argentina at present the trade-union arena is becoming deeply politicized.

In this situation we believe, as we have said before, that the PST is the only political current raising clear political positions in opposition to the government. That is why our campaign in the labor movement has a clear political content, in all the meetings, from the smallest to the largest. Hence the importance of the subscription campaign to our paper. There are factories like Del Carlo, Matarazzo, Acindar (Villa Constitución), and Propulsora where there are now more than seventy subscribers in each factory. This is an index of the political weight the party is acquiring in the labor movement.

*Q. What can you tell us about the violent attacks that go on day after day in Argentina, both by the ultraright and the ultraleft?*

A. Recently, the assassinations of [Rodolfo] Ortega Peña and [David] Kraiselburd (the director of a provincial daily paper) made headlines in the world press. Ortega Peña was executed by rightist gangs, the same ones—or at least from the same source—that assassinated our comrades in Pacheco. They are highly trained, very efficient gangs that propose to liquidate all sectors fighting in behalf of the democratic demands of the labor movement. Ortega Peña, for example, had played an important parliamentary role and served as defense attorney for political prisoners.

Another case is the assassination of two Juventud Peronista activists in Quilmes in the province of Buenos Aires. Along with a third person who survived, they were arrested by two persons who identified themselves as members of the police. After the daily paper *Noticias* interviewed the survivor and gave the matter prominent coverage, the government closed it down. Obviously these gangs of rightists are supported by the government, the trade-union bureaucracy, the police, and a sector of the armed forces.

The assassination of Mor Roig [minister of the interior under the dictatorship] lies at the other end of the scale. The Montoneros were credited with it. Evidently it was done with the object of creating problems for the government.

Although it is true that the Montoneros have not said that they assassinated Kraiselburd, it was Montoneros who were taken prisoner when the hideout was discovered. In this case it is not unwarranted to presume that the objective was financial, not political.

These acts create a dangerous confusion, above all among the petty bourgeoisie, who are opposed to assassinations whether by the right or the left; and the party has to indicate the difference in political content between the two. Although we make it clear that we are opposed to assassination as a method, we do not want to lump the Montoneros together with the rightist gangs, because they are two different things.

*Q. How does the PST propose to fight against the rightist goon squads?*

A. We say that we must prepare ourselves to meet these attacks. In the first place we call for unity in action of all political tendencies against attacks from the right wing. In this way, for example, we were able to convert the funeral for our comrades assassinated in Pacheco into a demonstration of more than 5,000 persons.

This was not the case with Ortega Peña. The Peronist leadership did not have our conception and organized a meager demonstration of only 1,000 persons, although Ortega Peña was a congressman and they could have held a huge mobilization. Sectarianism prevented them from making a big impact on the labor movement and its allies.

Also, above all in the Pacheco incident, we posed the need for self-defense. Of course, this is not absorbed overnight, but it is a problem that the rank and file of the labor movement is beginning to discuss.

It is a very important problem, since workers engaged in struggle have already been attacked. For example, compañeros at Propulsora were shot at the door of the factory. And the headquarters of the Lista Marrón [Brown Slate, the class-struggle tendency in the local metalworkers union] in Villa Constitución was destroyed. All this makes our demand for defense squads begin to be seen as a concrete necessity. We must win broad sectors of the vanguard to this concept. □

## Frelimo Agrees to Coalition Regime in Mozambique

By Ernest Harsch

Less than two weeks after an agreement was announced granting independence to Guinea-Bissau, an accord was reached September 7 in Lusaka, Zambia, between representatives of the Spínola regime and of Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique—Mozambique Liberation Front). A key provision was establishment of a "government of transition" composed of Frelimo leaders and Portuguese officials, which is to rule Mozambique until June 25, 1975, when Lisbon is pledged to grant Mozambique its independence.

Lisbon's "timetable" for the "decolonization" of its African empire was outlined by Major Victor Alves, a Portuguese minister without portfolio, in an interview published in the August 2 *Washington Post*.

According to Alves, Guinea-Bissau was to be given immediate independence, while provisional coalition governments were to be set up in Mozambique and Angola. Mozambique was to be given its independence in 1975, Alves said, and Angola "within two to four years."

The coalition governments were to be dominated by representatives of the Lisbon junta and were to include "local political parties" (neocolonialist groupings that were formed in Angola and Mozambique after the coup), and the guerrilla forces—if they decided to participate.

But developments in Mozambique forced the Spínola regime to deal directly with Frelimo and to scrap its plans to include the "local political parties" in the "government of transition."

Lisbon's decision followed months of political turbulence in Mozambique. In July, several thousand Portuguese troops and a number of junior officers refused to go into combat in northern Mozambique. Informal cease-fires were arranged with the guerrillas in local areas. The August 6 *Le Monde* reported that entire companies of Black soldiers in the Portuguese army defected and joined Frelimo, taking their arms and equip-

ment with them. (Of the 60,000 troops in the Portuguese army in Mozambique, nearly 40,000 are African.)

In the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Tete, Portuguese army control rapidly deteriorated. Philippe Decraene reported in the August 23 *Le Monde* that many of the large cities, including Beira, the country's chief port, were encircled by the guerrillas. "Not only are the Frelimo forces not slackening their military pressure, but they are putting the Portuguese troops on the defensive," he wrote.

The most ominous threat from the imperialist point of view was the broadening engagement of the masses in anticolonial actions.

Traffic through the port of Lourenço Marques was tied up for weeks by striking dock workers, tugboat employees, and pilots. In August about 4,000 railroad workers struck for higher pay for more than a week. Iron foundry workers walked off their jobs. The September 5 *Le Monde* reported that the police fired on a demonstration of several hundred African workers at a sugar-cane plantation about 200 kilometers north of Beira.

In the town of António Enes in northern Mozambique, thousands of Africans rose up in rebellion on August 10. Clashes with white settlers spread to the entire region east of Nampula and north of Quelimane. A Portuguese warship was sent to António Enes to evacuate the settlers and about 1,000 commandos were sent into the area to "restore order."

Besides António Enes, there were reports of sharp confrontations in Moma, Namatil, Naburi, Corrane, Dolela, Chalaua, and Iuluti.

Thousands of Portuguese fled northern Mozambique. The prospect of a Black regime coming to power prompted many thousands more to leave the country entirely. Despite calls by Frelimo asking the settlers to remain and cooperate with the African nationalists, about 1,000 left for Europe each week.

Another factor in forcing Lisbon to turn to Frelimo was the failure of newly formed neocolonialist groups in Mozambique to acquire a large enough base to offer a plausible alternative.

One of the larger of these "third force" groups, Gumo (Grupo Unido de Moçambique—United Group of Mozambique), which held rallies of up to 5,000 in the first month after the April 25 coup in Lisbon, suffered a series of defections. On July 6 an entire layer of the group joined Frelimo. Shortly after, Joana Simião, who has been trying to organize the Makua tribe against Frelimo, left to form Frecomo (Frente Comun de Moçambique—Mozambique Common Front).

On August 24, five of these groups joined forces to form the Partido da Coalizao Nacional (PCN—National Coalition party) with the avowed aim of challenging Frelimo. The Reverend Uria Simango, a former leader of Frelimo, was named chairman. Also included in the leadership of the new group were Joana Simião and Paulo José Gumane, the head of Coremo (Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique—Mozambique Revolutionary Committee, a former guerrilla group based in Lusaka, Zambia, which opposes Frelimo). But this move to regroup the openly neocolonialist forces was too little and too late to aid Lisbon.

As Frelimo continued to gain, the Spínola regime decided to reach an agreement with the guerrillas. In exchange for a few immediate concessions and the promise to grant independence in nine months, the Portuguese colonialists sought Frelimo's cooperation in bringing about an orderly transition from a colonial to a neocolonial regime.

Under the provisions of the September 7 accord, "The mission of the government of transition will be . . . to prepare for the independence of Mozambique," which Lisbon pledged to grant on June 25, 1975, the thir-

teenth anniversary of Frelimo's founding.

The provisions include:

- The new administration will have a high commissioner appointed by Spínola and a prime minister chosen by Frelimo.

- A joint military commission will be established to oversee the cease-fire. It will be composed of an equal number of Portuguese military personnel and Frelimo representatives.

- The cabinet will include nine ministers. (Not included among the cabinet ministries are defense and foreign affairs, both of which will remain in Lisbon's hands.) Six ministries are allocated to Frelimo and three to the Portuguese colonialists.

- Until the "government of transition" sets up a new police force, the present police will continue to function. They are under the control of the Portuguese high commissioner, who is empowered to take command of the police and other security forces "in the event of disorder."

At a news conference in Lusaka on September 5, according to a Reuters dispatch in the September 6 *New York Times*, Portuguese Foreign Minister Mário Soares "indicated that Portuguese troops would remain in Mozambique, at least during the transitional period." Frelimo's military forces will remain independent, being placed under the command of the prime minister.

Both Frelimo and the Portuguese military will be jointly responsible for defense of Mozambique's "territorial integrity."

One provision states that Frelimo is "prepared to accept responsibility for the financial obligations undertaken by the Portuguese government in the name of Mozambique, provided they have been made in the real interests of the territory." The September 8 *New York Times* said this provision is an allusion to the huge Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam project, which is being built on the Zambezi River by an international consortium dominated by French, German, and South African capital.

According to another provision, Lisbon is to transfer all assets and liabilities of the Mozambique department of the National Overseas Bank to a new central bank that is to be established in Mozambique. The extent of those assets and liabilities were not enumerated.

At a news conference in Dar es Salaam September 7, according to a Reuters dispatch of that date, Soares "said the two sides had agreed in principle on arrangements for Portuguese economic and financial aid for the new government. The amount of money to be provided will be subject to negotiation during the next few months. . . ."



SAMORA MACHEL

At an earlier news conference in Lusaka September 5, Soares stated that Lisbon would not allow the "transitional regime" to aid Zimbabweans fighting against the Rhodesian regime. In the past the Zimbabwean liberation forces have received aid from Frelimo and have been allowed to pass through Frelimo-controlled areas in Mozambique, particularly in Tete province. This was an important aid to their struggle against the white minority regime in Salisbury. If Soares's remarks reflect an agreement reached with Frelimo to curtail such aid, this would be a setback for the Zimbabwean liberation struggle.

The provisions of the accord clearly give the Spínola regime a strong hand in the "government of transition." The presence of Portuguese troops and continued Portuguese control of the police will aid Lisbon in the transition to an "independent" Mozambique, ensuring armed support

for its economic and political interests.

The Portuguese colonialists will certainly make every effort to use the "transition period" to pressure Frelimo and to strengthen the groundwork for continued neocolonialist domination after formal independence is declared. And if Frelimo proves uncooperative in these schemes, the nine months of the "transition period" will give the Spínola regime time to try to undercut the African nationalists and to build up forces more accommodating to the imperialists.

Spínola himself indicated the conditions for Lisbon's formal "departure" from Angola and Mozambique. During a radio and television speech broadcast in Lisbon September 10, he said, "Decolonization will not be fully achieved until the democratic institutions function to safeguard the interests of all the citizens."

At another point in his speech he said, "We must be able to distinguish between a real decolonization and the abandonment of the African populations to the domination of new dictatorships."

According to Spínola, these "new dictatorships" would be regimes dominated by only one party, an obvious reference to Frelimo's insistence that it alone represents the interests of the Mozambican masses and should therefore be handed control of an "independent" Mozambique without the participation of any "third force" groupings. Apparently Spínola still intends to install these groupings in positions of power within the "democratic institutions," if possible.

A number of factors undoubtedly played a role in Frelimo's decision to join the provisional government: the threat of "third force" groups being placed in positions of power, the threat of Mozambique being partitioned between Frelimo and the Portuguese settlers, the threat of South African intervention, and the threat of continued war with the colonialist forces.

Frelimo has cooperated with the Portuguese in arranging the cease-fire and setting up the provisional government. It has made special efforts to convince the Portuguese settlers to remain. Besides the appeals by Frelimo to the settlers assuring them that they have nothing to fear from a Frelimo-dominated regime, guerrillas have visited some of the "protected vil-

lages"\* to explain Frelimo's position to the Africans there.

A white administrator in Vila Gouvei told a reporter for the London *Times* on August 5 of these visits. "At present many of the Africans seem to think they must drive out the whites, but the Frelimo agents will tell them otherwise," he said.

The August 31 *Le Monde* reported that on August 28 Frelimo set up "people's courts" in Cabo Delgado to try groups of "looters," a reference to some of those who participated in the mass revolt against white settlers in northern Mozambique in mid-August. Also following the mass upsurge, Frelimo concluded an agreement with the Portuguese armed forces guaranteeing the safety of road traffic in central and northern Mozambique.

The Portuguese colonialists clearly hope that Frelimo's participation in the "government of transition" will be a moderating force on the African masses. An Agence France-Presse dispatch in the August 15 *Le Monde* described the attitude of some of the Portuguese settlers and military personnel in Beira during the clashes between the Africans and whites: "Paradoxically, Frelimo, which was previously characterized as a terrorist organization, is now considered as being in a position to reestablish law and order, together with the Portuguese army."

Many of the Portuguese settlers, however, saw things differently. The negotiations in Lusaka and the news of an impending settlement that would give Frelimo positions in a new administration sent a shock wave through the white-settler communities in Lourenço Marques and Beira.

On the night of September 6, Portuguese youths rioted in Lourenço Marques, attacking newspaper offices and overturning cars. The next morning a huge explosion rocked the ammunition dump just outside the city.

When the signing of the pact was announced September 7, a small clandestine group of former Portuguese soldiers, called the Dragons of Death (*Dragões da Morte*), seized Mozambique's main radio station in Louren-

ço Marques. The Portuguese troops guarding the station offered no resistance. Another rightist settler group, Fico (Portuguese for "I stay"), joined the coup attempt.

The rightists broadcast appeals to the Portuguese settlers and troops to rise up throughout the country, denounced the Lusaka pact, and warned Africans that the Dragons of Death had a list of 29,000 Frelimo supporters who were advised to "shut up."

At about the same time as the radio take-over, another group of whites entered the central prison and freed about 200 imprisoned agents of the PIDE (*Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado*—International Police for the Defense of the State), the former Portuguese secret police.

By September 8, the rightists had control of the radio station, post office, and airport control-tower in Lourenço Marques. In Beira, a group of whites tried to take the radio station there, but were repulsed.

The National Coalition party, led by Uria Simango, joined the settler revolt in Lourenço Marques. Simango said the agreement signed with Frelimo "was not valid because Frelimo does not represent all the people of Mozambique.

"We have been ignored by the Lisbon Government and we are here to see that this error is corrected immediately."

The white putschists and the PCN said they were in favor of "immediate independence," but without any "sell-out" to Frelimo. They called for the formation of a new administration composed of all the ethnic and political groups, in which Frelimo would have "equal rights."

After the initial reports of the attempted coup, Frelimo leaders in Mozambique broadcast an appeal urging Black Mozambicans not to "reply to any provocations that a small number of whites are attempting." Samora Machel issued a statement in Zambia September 9 calling the attempted coup the work of a "band of thugs" and promising to relaunch guerrilla warfare if that became necessary.

On September 8, Frelimo issued a statement in Lusaka pledging to smash the uprising with the help of the Portuguese troops. Although such cooperation was provided for in the accord, Portuguese Prime Minister Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves said that Lisbon did not need Frelimo's help.

He said the Portuguese troops in Mozambique had done everything to avoid bloodshed.

Reporting from Lourenço Marques September 9, *New York Times* correspondent Charles Mohr explained what this meant. "The Portuguese Army," he wrote, "has made no effort so far to crush the dissident whites here. . . ."

On the other hand, while rightist broadcasts claimed that much of the Portuguese army was in sympathy with the putsch, few troops actually joined it. The Spínola regime's inaction was apparently designed to give the rightist groups the chance, if they were strong enough, to set up their own "independent" Mozambique.

It soon became clear to Lisbon that the attempted coup was no more than an adventure. On September 8 General Francisco da Costa Gomes, Lisbon's chief of the joint defense staff, appealed to the settlers to accept the Lusaka accord, which, he said, "safeguarded the legitimate interests" of the Europeans in Mozambique.

In the face of a growing African backlash, the settler rebellion collapsed suddenly on September 10.

Two emissaries from Spínola arrived in Lourenço Marques September 9 and met with leaders of the white settlers. According to a report in the September 10 *Washington Post*, one of the spokesmen for the rightists said, "Their meeting with our representatives was brief. We obtained certain guarantees from them but not all the guarantees we wanted."

Those "certain guarantees" became clear the next day when the rightists said they would abandon the radio station if the army would "restore order" in the Black shantytowns that surround Lourenço Marques on three sides. "The Portuguese Army," the September 11 *Washington Post* reported, "which had stayed on the sideline while white settlers occupied the radio station for three days, moved only after the rebels broadcast an appeal for the army to intervene in black sections of the capital."

The rightists then left the station as Portuguese combat troops moved into the shantytowns to crush the African rebellion that had developed in response to the attempted coup.

On September 9, sporadic clashes between whites and Blacks took place in Lourenço Marques and Beira.

\* During the war, millions of Mozambicans were herded into "protected villages" to cut off their support to the guerrillas.

Early the next day gunfire could be heard from the shantytown near the Lourenço Marques airport.

In a September 10 dispatch from Lourenço Marques, *New York Times* reporter Charles Mohr wrote: "Minor disturbances and unrest began in the African neighborhoods—'townships'—last night. By this morning the situation was growing ugly.

"At midmorning today, black mobs began stoning cars on the airport road, which runs through the black neighborhoods.

"Then the mobs dragged scrap steel and pieces of scaffolding across the highway to form a barricade. They turned over and set afire a pickup truck and began looting shops in the black area."

The Africans set up numerous roadblocks and stopped cars carrying whites in order to search for arms. The highway to South Africa was blocked to prevent Portuguese living in South Africa from joining the rightist efforts. Small units of Portuguese troops in armored vehicles escorted convoys of cars carrying whites.

A September 11 dispatch from Lourenço Marques reported that 2,500 supporters of Frelimo had massed just outside the capital and that a smaller group had gathered near Beira. But the radio station, which was now in the hands of a joint commission of Portuguese and Frelimo troops, broadcast a coded order to stop fighting and to halt the march on the city.

A communiqué issued in Lisbon said that the Portuguese troops were having "extreme difficulty in preventing the spread of new clashes still breaking out in various parts of the city." The communiqué added, "During the morning, another company of commandos and two companies of jungle fighters were flown in from the north. More troops are expected."

The troops moved into the shantytowns in force, sealing them off from the rest of the city. "Truckloads of injured began arriving at hospitals," Mohr reported September 10, "and a pall of smoke hung over some black shantytown areas. It was difficult, however, to witness or to assess the violence."

The ferocity of the attack on the African communities became clear when Lisbon issued a communiqué September 11 putting the official toll

at 100 dead and 250 wounded in Lourenço Marques. Other estimates, however, put the number of dead and wounded at twice the official count. Only about a dozen of the dead were white.

After this threat to Lisbon's "government of transition" had temporarily been crushed, the Spínola regime pushed forward with its scheme. Admiral Vitor Crespo, whom Spínola appointed as Mozambique's high commissioner, arrived in Lourenço Marques. At a news conference September 13, Crespo warned, according to the September 14 *Washington Post*, "that he intended to put an end to the rioting, looting and civil disorders. . . ." He added that Frelimo troops would

arrive in Lourenço Marques to patrol the shantytowns, while the Portuguese troops would patrol the white sections of the city. He said that the Frelimo troops would be "really a great help" in maintaining "public calm."

Crespo also indicated that only about twenty leaders of the white-settler revolt faced possible prosecution.

On September 14, about 200 Frelimo soldiers arrived in the capital. The former guerrillas began patrolling the streets in the Black shantytowns. Two days later, fifty Frelimo leaders, including Joaquim Chissano, who was thought to be Frelimo's choice as the premier, arrived to begin setting up the provisional government. □

## 2,000 in Barcelona Protest Arrests

# Franco Jails 67 Catalan Oppositionists

Police invaded a convent in Sabadell, a textile town near Barcelona, on September 8 and arrested sixty-seven persons said to have been participating in a meeting of the illegal Assembly of Catalonia.

Those arrested, *Le Monde* reported September 11, included workers, students, professional persons, and artists and writers from the Barcelona region. Among them were Ramón Ballbe, a lawyer; Vidal Villa, an economist; and the novelist Francisco Curull.

Fifty of those arrested were reported to have been released on September 11. The remaining seventeen, who are still being held, appeared before a judge September 10. Four of them were fined 150,000 pesetas (about US \$2,650) each.

Two thousand persons demonstrated in the streets of Barcelona September 12 against the arrests and the continued detentions.

The purpose of the meeting in Sabadell, according to the police, was to decide whether the Assembly of Catalonia would affiliate with the opposition formation known as the Democratic Junta. Establishment of the junta was announced at a news conference in Paris July 30 presided over by Santiago Carrillo, general secretary of the Spanish Communist par-

ty, and Rafael Calvo Serer, a monarchist.

*Le Monde*, citing "reliable sources," reported that "only two of the groups in the Assembly of Catalonia, the Catalan Socialist party and the [monarchist] Carlist party," favor membership in the Democratic Junta.

The first reference was probably to the United Socialist party of Catalonia (PSUC—Partido Socialista Unificado de Cataluña), which is a branch of the Spanish Communist party in that province. The Stalinists are the dominant political tendency in the Assembly of Catalonia.

The "first assembly of the democratic forces of Catalonia," held in November 1971, adopted a program calling for amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, the establishment of democratic rights, and reinstatement of a 1932 statute providing for Catalanian autonomy.

An attempt to hold a second assembly, on October 28, 1973, was broken up by police, who arrested 113 persons.

The current arrests were said to indicate the regime's reassertion of a hard-line approach to opposition movements, coinciding with Franco's resumption of full powers following an attack of phlebitis. □

## Bureaucrats Adopt Belly-Crawling Election Plan

By Phyllis Hamilton and Patricia Fryd

[Since this article was written, Prime Minister Harold Wilson has set October 10 as the date for the next general elections.]

\* \* \*

London

"Stay united, avoid splits and give Harold Wilson and Jim Callaghan the inspirational platform they want from which to launch Labour's election campaign." This is what Eric Jacobs writing in the September 1 issue of the *Sunday Times* described as the "overriding preoccupation" of the trade unions assembled in Brighton September 2-6 for the 106th annual conference of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC).

The thousand delegates at the congress represented ten million organised workers in Britain, of whom eight and a half million are formally linked to the Labour party through their trade unions. Only about ten unions in the white-collar and civil service fields, with a combined membership of about one and a half million, do not have affiliation ties with the Labour party.

Since the general election last February, when Labour was elected as a minority government, Labour leaders have been able to claim their delicate governmental position as justification for not carrying out more of their election programme. And indeed the Tories have done what they could to prevent Labour from carrying through certain policies, such as changes in the law affecting trade unions. The labour movement, while still smarting from the memory of the last Labour government in 1966, considers it essential to elect a Labour government with a massive majority in the forthcoming general election if any pro-working-class policies are to be carried out.

The Labour party and trade-union bureaucrats (who have a different interest in winning the election, namely, to help their bourgeois bosses) believe that an electoral victory can best be

won by a dampening of the class struggle in Britain. Thus their main aim at the congress was to force through acceptance of the class-collaborationist "social contract," drawn up over a series of meetings between the Labour party leaders and the leaders of the TUC General Council, the executive body of the TUC.

The social contract involves an agreement by the Labour government to introduce various social reforms and to hold down price increases while the unions confine wage claims to keeping up with increases in the cost of living. (See *Intercontinental Press*, June 3, p. 690.) In other words, the unions are to cease fighting to maintain, let alone improve, the living standards of their members at a time when consumer prices are rising at a rate of 16.7 percent a year.

In April 1973, approximately one-quarter of male manual workers and one-tenth of male nonmanual workers earned less than £25 a week, excluding overtime but including piecework, bonuses, and similar payments. The situation today is almost unchanged. This figure is well below the TUC's minimum wage target for last year.

According to a report of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) published on the eve of the congress, personal incomes in real terms are expected to fall by 2.5 percent this year and by 1.75 percent in 1975, with consumers' expenditure falling by more than 1 percent both this year and next. NIESR expects unemployment to reach 675,000 by the new year and more than 900,000 by the end of 1975.

Even before the congress opened, leaders of Britain's three biggest unions—the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), the General and Municipal Workers Union (GMWU), and the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW)—issued a call for the return of a Labour government with a clear majority, following the meetings of

their delegations to make last minute policy decisions.

The General Council of the TUC had already approved a change in the conference agenda aimed at focusing the whole conference on the question of the election. As the August 30 London *Times* noted, "the resolution on returning a Labour government . . . is usually taken with other 'miscellaneous' matters on the last day of the congress and normally attracts scant attention. This year, after yesterday's decision, it will be put to the vote on Thursday afternoon [September 5] immediately after the Prime Minister's address." (And the day after the debate on the social contract.)

To achieve the unity necessary to launch the election campaign and ensure a smooth-running congress, a meeting was called during the previous weekend of leaders of all unions with resolutions on economic policy and the social contract, industrial democracy, and the European Economic Community (EEC). The subsequent wheeling and dealing was designed to achieve unanimity on all policies and to avoid public disagreements, which the unions feared could damage Labour's electoral chances. But despite all attempts, the bureaucrats could not reach agreement on the question of the social contract.

The delegates of the 1.4-million-strong AUEW refused by a vote of 37 to 13 to drop the resolution from its white-collar section opposing the social contract unless "substantial progress" was made in meeting eight points previously agreed to jointly by the Labour party and the TUC General Council.

These points were a large-scale redistribution of income and wealth; a massive increase in house-building with emphasis on homes for those in need and those on lower incomes; municipalization of rented property; public ownership of land required for housing; a wide-ranging and permanent system of price controls; vastly improved social services by the injection of necessary resources; sub-



stantial increases in public ownership coupled with public supervision of investment in large public corporations; substantial cuts in defence expenditure.

The TUC leadership had offered to incorporate these points as long-term aims rather than as a set of conditions for acceptance of the social contract. But the AUEW refused to accept this compromise and also voted against the TUC document which spelled out the wage-bargaining implications of the social contract.

Pressure on the AUEW to change its mind began to mount almost immediately. As reported in the September 2 issue of the *London Times*, TGWU General Secretary Jack Jones stated in Brighton the day before the congress opened: "Our delegation expressed the hope that our colleagues of the engineering union would reconsider their position with a view to getting a unanimous decision at conference." Explaining that his delegation expected an overwhelming majority for adoption of the TUC document, he added, "We naturally expect that everyone will support the majority decision of the conference."

By Monday, September 2, when the conference opened, three major unions had decided to back the social contract, while others were still undecided or opposed. Throughout the first day continual appeals were made for unity in face of the coming elections, and in delegation meetings on Monday evening most other unions agreed to toe the line, although in some cases there were substantial dissenting minorities.

The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) delegation voted 25 to 18 for the contract, and the National and Local Government Officers Association, which has been awarded big wage raises since the conference, voted 35 to 15 for the social contract. Under TUC rules, once a vote has been taken in a delegation, all the votes of that union are thrown behind the majority decision in a "bloc," leaving no democratic expression for minority views.

In a major speech on September 3, Labour party Chairman Jim Callaghan argued that "it is possible to reject the social contract, but what no one can do is to contract out of the consequences of that rejection. . . . (it) will make the task of the Labour government in arresting inflation and

preventing mass unemployment that much more difficult. . . . So far as the Labour party is concerned, the social contract is a means of achieving nothing less than the social and economic reconstruction of our country. We have already completed the short term programme which we set ourselves. We have now to embark on the long term programme, and our measures for the next stage of economic reconstruction are at an advanced stage of preparation."

Callaghan didn't give too many de-



WILSON: Prescribes "social pact" with bosses to cure inflation.

tails of these measures. But one came across loud and clear. Describing the social contract as vitally important, he told the delegates, "We have abolished statutory wage controls so the responsibility is now yours."

Wednesday, September 4, was the high point of the congress. The motion in support of the social contract was moved by the NUM's "left" General Secretary Lawrence Daly, which gave it the full authority of the militant miners who had brought down the Tory government last February. The AUEW motion opposing the social contract was moved by Ken Gill, the newly elected Communist party member of the General Council.

But toward the end of a lively two-

hour debate, characterized by doubts and warnings from delegates who nevertheless intended to vote for the leadership, there took place what Paul Routledge, writing in the September 5 issue of the *Times*, described as "the most highly charged scene at the annual Trades Union Congress for years." Following an unexpected speech from "left" AUEW President Hugh Scanlon, stating that his union would abide by the majority decision, TUC General Secretary Len Murray made a fervent appeal to the AUEW to withdraw its resolution on the understanding that its contents would be embodied in TUC policy—the same deal as had been offered before the conference opened.

The AUEW leadership seized with both hands this chance to get off the hook, and Communist party member Ken Gill announced the withdrawal of the resolution in the interests of unity, stating that just the same he still stood by all he'd said in the debate, expressing opposition to any form of wage restraint. As AUEW President Hugh Scanlon explained later, he did not want the engineers to be blamed as the "saboteurs" of Labour's election chances.

The AUEW abstained in the final vote on the TUC document and the miners' resolution, and only the 400,000-strong white-collar Civil and Public Servants Association, which is not affiliated to the Labour party, came out against class collaboration.

With the overwhelming vote accepting the social contract, the trade-union and Labour party bureaucrats had achieved their goal. The stage was set for Prime Minister Harold Wilson's appearance on the rostrum the next day.

Wilson was able to use his fifty-minute speech to launch the Labour party's election campaign from a united TUC (although he still did not reveal the election date). The central focus of his speech was, of course, the much-lauded social contract, which he described as "a way of life based on social and economic justice," aimed above all "at replacing conflict and confrontation with cooperation and conciliation." A Labour government, he explained, would be aiming for "a great partnership between government and industry and in and across industry."

What Wilson meant by this was

made clear later on, when he stated that an essential part of the social contract is pressing on with productivity agreements "on a basis of trust and responsibility." He stressed that where vast increases in prices had triggered off threshold agreements (small automatic wage raises tied to increases in the cost of living) unions must not then use the same increases in cost of living to justify wage claims in the following year. As South Wales Miners Union President Emlyn Williams wrote in the September 4 *Morning Star*, "once again wage restraint is the only part of the social contract which can be described as a programme for action rather than a formulation of intent."

Wilson's speech was accorded a standing ovation somewhat shorter than usual, and the delegates went on to pass without dissent the resolution calling on the unions to do everything in their power to return Labour with a high, overall working majority at the forthcoming general election.

Since the congress, several unions have started to organise their members to work actively for a Labour victory. For example, in the North-east of England the Transport and General Workers Union is sending canvassing teams to help the local Labour party campaign in marginal constituencies which might be won to Labour.

In the general atmosphere of "a Labour victory at any cost" and with all attention focused on the social contract debate and the Wilson speech, it is not surprising that the rest of the congress proceeded uneventfully.

The resolutions that were passed presumably form the basis of the programme which the TUC wants a Labour government to implement in return for voluntary wage restraint by the unions. Many of the resolutions, and certainly the rhetoric surrounding the debates, appear "left." But nowhere is any action plan mapped out for fighting against inflation, unemployment, low wages, and so on, or for any real action in solidarity with oppressed workers throughout the world.

Calls were made on the government to improve industrial training facilities; to abolish private-fee-charging employment agencies; to end provision of facilities for private patients in National Health Service hospitals; to introduce, stronger measures to prevent industrial accidents, including heavier

penalties against employers; to restore the Tories' cuts in education spending and to act more vigorously to improve education standards; to introduce stringent controls over the cost of essential items such as food, housing, and transport; to increase public expenditure; to act against tax evasion; to levy full rates on properties empty for six months; to carry out an urgent inquiry into Britain's energy needs and resources.

The only significant mobilization that took place around the congress was a 3,000-strong demonstration of old-age pensioners supported by union delegates, which demanded a pension of 75 percent of average male earnings. The congress passed a resolution that pensions should be related to average earnings with adjustments based on the cost-of-living increases.

The congress adopted as its policy a minimum wage target of £30 for a 40-hour week, and stressed the need for a 35-hour week in all industries. A statutory national minimum wage was rejected in favour of the collective-bargaining process. The TUC decided to campaign along with the Labour party to outline the benefits of public ownership, and to support Labour party conference decisions on this question.

An outstanding example of the bureaucrats' unwillingness to lead any real struggles was the resolution passed on the question of picketing rights. The Shrewsbury Six (building workers jailed under the Tory government for exercising the right to picket) are currently on bail pending their appeal against long sentences handed out by the courts.

Crying that "come what may, these lads must not be returned to jail," "left" AUEW President Hugh Scanlon seconded a weak resolution which demanded a review of the law on peaceful picketing and curbs on the use of conspiracy charges in a strike situation.

Bowing to rank-and-file sentiment, the mover of the resolution demanded that all of the resources at the disposal of the TUC must be used to ensure that the building workers are not returned to jail. But what resources, and how they were to be used, were not spelled out.

On international affairs the TUC leadership took a more militant stand. This was a concession to rank-and-file

pressure but was also a calculated effort to help cover up its policy of class collaborationism in the domestic class struggle. Thus transport leader Jack Jones, one of the architects of the social contract, in introducing the General Council's international report, called on the entire trade-union movement to join an international industrial action on September 18 and 19 in solidarity with the Chilean people.

The labour movement was urged to press for an end to the military regime in Chile by every possible means. But there was no emergency resolution on Chile, despite the scheduled national demonstration on September 15 at which leading trade unionist Alex Kitson was to speak.

Neither was there any resolution on Ireland, the key question facing the British working class.

Resolutions were passed calling for continued opposition to the Common Market; for complete British dissociation from all forms of nuclear weapons and the closing of all nuclear bases in Britain; for withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish troops from Cyprus and the restoration of democratic rights in Cyprus, and the reinstatement of Makarios.

Concern was expressed at the suppression of political liberties and trade-union rights in Brazil.

A motion was overwhelmingly passed calling for greater cooperation with trade unions throughout Europe, that is, all Europe, "from the Bosphorus to Donegal," for a more effective challenge to the multinational corporations.

On the final day of the congress, delegates unanimously supported a call for release of political prisoners in South Vietnam, and recognition by the British government of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The resolution also called for moral and material aid from the TUC for restoring peace and for the reconstruction of Vietnam.

There was unanimous support for a call to the General Council to investigate social and economic conditions and the state of industrial relations in Hong Kong.

The only point where the delegates came into real conflict with the General Council was on the question of South Africa. Delegates criticized the General Council for ignoring the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and trying to im-

pose its own solutions through a trade-union "institute" without consulting representatives of Black Africans.

Outside the congress a petition from the Anti-Apartheid organisation calling on the government to end all forms of military collaboration with the South African government was signed by 150 congress delegates and by several trade-union officials. Also signed was a petition urging the government to ban a projected march through London September 7 by the National Front and calling for a massive counterdemonstration by the labour movement if the fascist march was allowed to go ahead.

Despite the success of the TUC bureaucrats in treacherously misleading the rank-and-file delegates into support for class-collaborationist policies, the continuing radicalization of the labour movement was expressed in the delegates' language during the debates and in the rhetoric the misleaders were obliged to use to get their way. Also significant was the election to the new General Council of four "left" trade unionists, and an increased vote for other "left" candidates.

The Communist party made much of the election of party member Ken Gill from the AUEW but were obliged to issue a small public criticism only one day later when he withdrew the motion opposing the social contract. The September 5 *Morning Star* editorial stressed that the Engineers had enabled a vital debate to be held by keeping their resolution on the agenda despite all pressures. "But it was a mistake," it continued, "to withdraw the resolution under an erroneous conception of unity, and quite wrong to do so without the approval of the full delegation, who should have been consulted." Weak words indeed to describe the removal of the only focus for militant opposition to wage restraint at a time of mounting inflation.

But despite all the manoeuvrings and blackmail by the TUC and Labour fakers, which turned the congress into nothing but an election platform, the present holding-back of the unions is unlikely to last long after the elections, whatever the outcome. Even while the congress was meeting, union leaders of more than a million low-paid manual workers employed by local authorities were drawing up final details of a joint pay claim for raises of approximately 20 percent,

above the terms of the social contract. In addition, the unions want a five-hour reduction in the working week and equal pay for women from January. Similar demands are being made by other unions.

Education teachers have put in a claim for a 25 percent wage increase on September 14, and many unions have pay claims in the pipe-line. As shown in the debates at the congress, workers are increasingly aware that

wage raises are not the cause of inflation. The misleaders are able at present to use the workers' overwhelming desire for a majority Labour government to hold back the class struggle. However, in a situation of mounting inflation and unemployment, revolutionists who put forward a clear alternative programme of concrete demands that can take the movement forward will undoubtedly get a hearing in the working-class movement. □

## Barred From Sri Lanka Show Trials

### Tampoe Gagged by Bandaranaike Regime

The Criminal Justice Commission in Sri Lanka has banned Bala Tampoe, the defense counsel for many of the accused in the show trials currently being staged by the government against youths associated with the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP — People's Liberation Front), from making any further statements before the commission.

Tampoe is general secretary of the Ceylon Mercantile Union and secretary of the Revolutionary Marxist party, the Sri Lanka section of the Fourth International. These two organizations have consistently campaigned for the restoration of democratic rights and the unconditional release of all political prisoners since the Bandaranaike regime cracked down with a nationwide state of emergency in March 1971. More than 14,000 youths were imprisoned during the state of emergency and particularly after the events of April 1971.

The Criminal Justice Commission was specially set up in 1972 to conduct tribunals to try suspected members and supporters of the JVP who were arrested in the government's dragnet.

The order banning Tampoe was issued in early August while he was in the middle of an address to the commission.

"We have patiently tolerated for several months Mr. Tampoe's contemptuous conduct towards this Commission," the chairman stated when he announced the ban. "This morning he imputed that we incorrectly stated that his address so far lasted 18 hours even after we told him that this fig-

ure was based on the actual sitting periods. Again, he stated that the Chairman was 'getting away' with something. Such language is appropriate in the case of thieves and cheats.

". . . We will not permit Mr. Tampoe to address us further."

The servants of Bandaranaike's repressive apparatus were provoked probably not so much by alleged aspersions on their integrity as by Tampoe's success in establishing that the government had fabricated a series of "confessions" by jailed JVP members.

When Tampoe pointed out that removing him as attorney for the defense would affect the case of the defendants, who have been held for three years in prisons and concentration camps, the chairman said that the commission would look after the interests of the suspects.

Rohan Wijeweera, the main leader of the JVP, who is conducting his own defense, has refused to appear before the commission as long as the ban against Tampoe remains in force.

An international campaign of protest is needed against this blow to the legal defense of political prisoners in Sri Lanka.

In Britain, the Ceylon Solidarity Campaign has been established to organize such protests. The CSC has organized a number of pickets and public meetings, and publishes an information bulletin on the political prisoners' defense campaign.

The Ceylon Solidarity Campaign may be contacted at 9, Dennington Park Mansions, London NW6 1QR. □

# AROUND THE WORLD



## Army Official Charges Nixon Suppressed Mylai Report

A 1970 U.S. Army report on the Mylai massacre in South Vietnam was suppressed by former President Nixon, according to a high army official. The author of the four-volume report, Lieutenant General William R. Peers, has told reporters he learned of the White House suppression from Bland West, a retired colonel who was his deputy during the inquiry and who is now an assistant general counsel for the army.

Those directly involved in keeping the report secret were John Ehrlichman, John Dean, and White House attorney J. Fred Buzhardt. Some army officials are reported to be in favor of releasing most of the study, which investigated the initial cover-up of the 1968 massacre, but are opposed to releasing sections dealing with charges against officers who were never court-martialed. Only one officer, Lieutenant William Calley, was ever convicted on charges stemming from the massacre.

## Bubonic Plague Reported in Brazil

An outbreak of bubonic plague has occurred in the Brazilian state of Bahia, north of Rio de Janeiro. Five people have died from the disease so far and forty others have been hospitalized.

There is fear that the plague may be spread by Brazil's soaring rat population. Typhus, rabies, and other deadly diseases carried by the rats already account for an estimated 300 deaths and 2,000 hospital cases a year.

## New Delhi Defends A-Bomb Test

Homi N. Sethna, the chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, defended New Delhi's nuclear-research program September 18 at the annual conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. "My Government," he said, "has repeatedly declared categorically that we intend to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and that we are totally opposed to the development of nuclear weapons."

He denied the charge that New Delhi's atomic explosion last May in any way contradicted his remarks.

## Soviet Officials Report Moroz Is Still Alive

Dissident sources in Moscow reported September 17 that, according to Soviet officials, imprisoned Ukrainian dissident Valentyn Moroz was still alive. His wife, Raissa Moroz, had telegraphed Vladimir prison after hearing Western radio reports that he might have died. She received a telegram from the deputy warden of the prison stating that Moroz was living, but giving no details of his condition. Previous reports said that he was near death from a hunger strike he began July 1.

## Progress Report

Fewer people in the United States send telegrams these days. Figures gathered by the Federal Communications Commission show that since 1945, Western Union's telegram volume has dropped from 224.6 million a year to 21.7 million a year in 1973.

The decline may be due to the fact that it is now thirty-seven times more expensive to send a telegram (the minimum rate in 1945 was \$0.20 for a hand-delivered telegram; it is now \$7.75, an increase of 3,775 percent).

On the other hand, it may be traceable to a decline in service. According to a report to Congress September 16 by Representative Benjamin Rosenthal, the following results were obtained in a recent test in which volunteers throughout the country filed twelve telegrams:

None were hand-delivered within seventy-five minutes, Western Union's speed-of-service guideline.

Only seven were delivered within the refund limit (five hours).

Two of the twelve were never delivered at all—including one intracity message from Queens, New York, to Brooklyn, New York.

One of the telegrams was telephoned when hand-delivery was specifically requested and paid for.

Senders were never notified that two of the telegrams were never delivered, but were charged the full rate, including the delivery fee, for both.

As a result of late delivery, nondelivery, and incorrect billing, the senders were overcharged about 30 percent.

Seven of the telegrams contained errors in the texts.

## War Resisters Conference Rejects Ford's "Amnesty" Swindle

An international conference of Vietnam war resisters has rejected President Ford's "amnesty program" and called instead for universal unconditional amnesty. The conference called Ford's "amnesty program," which obligates war resisters to fulfill two years of "alternate service" in exchange for less-than-honorable discharges, "farcical, worthless, phony, unacceptable and a total affront."

The organizers said the aim of the conference, which opened in Toronto September 21, was to build international support for unconditional amnesty and to organize a boycott of Ford's program. A delegate from Winnipeg said that of all the known war resisters in that area, only one wanted to return to the United States under the Ford program. A Vancouver delegate said that all resisters there planned to boycott the "amnesty." The conference organizers estimated that there were between 15,000 and 25,000 war resisters living in Canada, and another 1,000 in Britain, France, and Sweden.

## Shah Negotiating Giant Arms Deal With Pentagon Merchants of Death

White House officials have reported that the Pentagon is negotiating an agreement for the sale of communications and "other" equipment to the Iranian regime. The deal, which will include communications satellites, is expected to total at least \$4,000 million. This would bring to \$10,000 million the amount of military and communications hardware the shah has bought from the Pentagon since 1973.

## Sign of the Times

For years, E. George Schaefer had pushed the view in his *Dow Theory Trader*, a newsletter for stock gamblers, that gold stocks constitute a good hedge against inflation.

On September 9, he suddenly reversed his position and sent out a special airmail letter to his subscribers advising them that now was a good time to sell their gold stocks.

Although Schaefer's newsletter has a circulation of only several thousand copies, news of his new theory flashed

through the grapevine. In the panic selling, gold and silver stocks plummeted.

As a consequence, subscribers to the stock-gambling sheet lost heavily. They bitterly accused Schaefer of having personally turned a booming market into a bust.

Schaefer's response was a sign of the times. On September 20, he followed the example of some of his predecessors who were caught in similar positions in the 1929 stock-market crash.

He opened a window in his fourteenth floor apartment in Indianapolis and jumped out.

### **Novel Criticized in Moscow for Exaggerating Stalin's Wartime Role**

A novel glorifying Stalin's role in World War II, published in two installments last spring and summer in the Soviet youth monthly *Molodaya Gvardiya*, has drawn critical comment from *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, organ of the Young Communist League.

In his review of *War* by Ivan Stadnyuk, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* critic Vadim Baranov called attention to the novel's "unrestrained glorification of an individual," its "subjectivism," and alluded to (unspecified) wartime errors by Stalin that Stadnyuk had overlooked.

While the review suggests continuing differences in the Soviet bureaucracy over what image of Stalin should be conveyed, others who have read the novel point out that its version of Stalin's wartime role is fairly close to the general picture of him as a brilliant leader presented in required university courses on the history of the Soviet Communist party.

### **South Vietnam Sets Up Monopoly on Booming Scrap Metal Industry**

Scrap metal has become one of South Vietnam's four largest exports, the others being fish, lumber, and rubber.

During the first five months of this year, Saigon received \$2.1 million in foreign exchange for the product.

The metal is obtained from the surface of the land where it was deposited in past years by American delivery systems.

Up until two months ago, private entrepreneurs were permitted to engage in search operations for the precious stuff. For example, collectors were paid a tenth of a cent for each 105mm. artillery shell casing, one of the most prized items.

In June the Thieu regime established a government monopoly of foreign sales of scrap. According to the decree, only the army can legally collect the material, the low-paid troops being exploited for this purpose. The government in turn sells it to private businessmen who then export it under government control.

One of the purposes of the government monopoly is to cut out competition from

individual collectors. Another purpose is to eliminate smuggling of war scrap, which is said to be thriving, with big payoffs from buyers in Japan, Korea, and Singapore.

There appears to be some substance to the repeatedly made charge that the war-scrap industry has become so lucrative that new military supplies delivered from the United States are sometimes handled as raw material to be processed into the highly demanded end product.

Thieu's advertising department, instead of presenting statistics on the growth in production of empty shell casings, cites the number of "Communists" killed. This know-how in advertising, like much else in modern South Vietnam, was of course imported from the United States.

### **Lebanon Curbs Right to Bear Arms**

The Lebanese regime announced September 18 that all licenses permitting civilians to carry arms had been canceled. Officials attempted to justify the measure, which is clearly aimed at the 10,000 Palestinian commandos living in Lebanon, by claiming concern over the rapid growth of private militias affiliated with two right-wing Christian parties.

### **Israel Seeking \$4,000 Million a Year in U.S. Military Supplies**

During Israeli Premier Itzhak Rabin's recent trip to Washington, it was widely reported that he had requested \$1,000 million in immediate military supplies, plus \$1,500 million a year in military credits for each of the next five years.

Nationally syndicated columnists Evans and Novak reported September 18 that Rabin had actually asked for much more in secret—an additional \$2,500 million in arms, to be paid for in cash, in each of the next five years. This would total \$4,000 million in annual arms purchases from the U.S.—a sum equivalent to 40 percent of the Israeli gross national product.

The size of the request, Evans and Novak reported, "is explained by the confidential estimate given to major American industrialists by Secretary of State Kissinger on Sept. 6: a new Arab-Israeli war 'within six to eight months' is a better than 50-50 proposition."

### **Pinochet Turns to Madison Avenue for Help in Polishing Up Image**

The Pinochet junta in Chile has hired a Madison Avenue huckster, the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency, to help spruce up its international image. "We'll be advising them on reporting more effectively and fully to the media. . .," a spokesman for the company's Washington office told reporters.

### **Until He Proves He's Innocent?**

Richard Nixon has been removed from the hall of world statesmen at Madame Tussaud's wax museum in London. According to United Press International, the museum's directors have placed the figure "in storage."

### **Bourguiba Made President for Life**

Tunisia's ruling Destour Socialist party named 71-year-old Habib Bourguiba president for life at its ninth congress in mid-September. Until now, he had been content to accept reelection to office every five years.

Delegates to the congress also agreed to overturn the eighth congress's decision providing for an elected sixty-member central committee that would in turn elect a political bureau. The congress reestablished Bourguiba's right to name the bureau's members.

The old central committee, which had been allowed to meet only once in the last three years, was not invited to this year's congress.

### **Christ Reborn in South Korea?**

Twenty thousand persons filled New York's Madison Square Garden sports arena September 18 to hear the message of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, the Korean evangelist who is considered by some of his followers to be the reincarnation of Jesus Christ. Thousands more waited outside for a chance at an empty seat.

Moon preaches that the second coming has already occurred, and that those too blind to recognize the new messiah are in danger of needlessly prolonging the restoration of God's perfect kingdom on earth.

Despite Moon's inability to speak English—a serious handicap for messiahs in the United States—he seems to have had little difficulty in convincing thousands that he is indeed holy. Only a few weeks were spent publicizing the Madison Square Garden meeting, and the U.S. branch of Moon's Unification Church—founded just two years ago—claims a membership of 25,000.

A more select group of 1,600, including businessmen and diplomats, showed up at the plush Waldorf Astoria hotel the night before the big show for a preview.

Some of Moon's competitors point out that his U.S. crusade has been made somewhat easier by the fact that the English translation of his theological work *Divine Principle* neglects to mention an important tenet in the Korean version—the doctrine that Korean will be the only language spoken in Moon's forthcoming kingdom of heaven on earth.

## Where UN Goes Wrong on 'Population Explosion'

By Ernest Harsch

The United Nations World Population Conference opened in Bucharest, Rumania, on August 19 and lasted for two weeks. Drawing about 3,000 participants from more than 130 countries, the international gathering sought to alert the world to the perils of a "population explosion."

The delegates from the imperialist powers, particularly those representing Washington, argued that "too many people" are a threat to humanity, that the fallout from the "population explosion" is more destructive than the radioactive kind. A recent State Department memorandum, quoted in the August 18 *New York Times*, summed up this position:

"Excessive global population growth widens the gap between rich and poor nations; distorts international trade; increases the likelihood of famine in the relatively near future; adds to environmental problems; produces unemployment; enlarges the danger of civil unrest; and promotes aggressions endangering peace."

UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, in his speech at the opening of the conference, echoed the same line. He linked population growth to coming scarcities of food, energy, and raw materials and to the present poverty in the underdeveloped world. "Never before," he said, "have nations or the international community been faced with such expanding demand for food, shelter, employment, education and health care." He declared that "immediate action" was needed to prevent a "population catastrophe."

The head of the U. S. delegation, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Caspar Weinberger, presented Washington's solution to the growing problem of feeding the hungry in the world. He proposed that the conference set a definite goal of lowering fertility to the replacement level by the year 2000 (which would mean an average then of two children per family).

Some of the delegates from the underdeveloped capitalist countries

took issue with Washington's contention that a "population explosion" exists and that "too many people" causes economic crises and famine. They pointed to the unequal distribution of the world's wealth as the cause of chronic hunger. The Chinese and Soviet delegations also backed this view.

The opposition of these delegates to the U. S. proposal blocked it from being incorporated into the final Plan of Action adopted by the conference on August 30. The imperialists, nevertheless, achieved part of their original goal. The Plan of Action called for the reduction of birth rates in the "developing countries" from 38 per thousand to 30 per thousand by 1985 and for an overall decline in world population growth from 2 percent a year to 1.7 percent by 1985. The U. S. delegates insisted on the 1985 target date.

Whatever the specific compromises were, the main fallacy of the document remained—that humans are multiplying to the point where food supplies are being outstripped.

This argument is not a new one. In 1798, the Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus published a pamphlet in Britain. In it he proclaimed that human populations grow much faster than their supply of food and that the world would soon not have enough to eat. He predicted that in two centuries the ratio of population to food would be 256 to 9.

While some believers may want to wait until 1998 to verify Malthus's prediction or to admit that he erred, it is clear from the leaps in food productivity brought about by the industrial revolution and subsequent economic developments that Malthus's theory was totally wrong. It neglected the revolutionary effects that science and intensified labor would have on the production of food. For example, writing in his book *The American People*, E.J. Khan noted that in the United States, "In 1820, the average farm employee produced food enough

to sustain four people. In 1950, he could feed fifteen; in 1970, forty-five."

At the Bucharest conference, the head of the delegation from China, Huang Shu-tse, explained how the rational planning and increased productivity made possible by the Chinese revolution were able to sustain the enormous growth of the Chinese population. At the time of the revolution, he said, China had about 500 million people. Today this figure has reached nearly 800 million. While the overall standard of living was still low, he noted, everyone received the basic necessities of life.

Under capitalism things are different. Not only is the enormous potential of agricultural productivity underutilized, but millions go hungry in the midst of plenty. Frederick Engels noted this disparity as early as 1844 when he wrote:

"[Under the competitive conditions of capitalism] a stage must ensue in which there is so much superfluous productive power in existence that the great mass of the nation has nothing to live on, so that people starve to death from sheer abundance. . . . If the fluctuations of competition become stronger, as they necessarily do in such a state of affairs, then we have the alternation of prosperity and crisis, of overproduction and stagnation. The economists have never been able to understand this crazy state of affairs, so in order to explain it they thought up the theory of population, which is just as nonsensical, indeed, even more nonsensical, than this contradiction of the coexistence of wealth and poverty."

An article in the August 25 *New York Times* by William Robbins illustrated the economic factors that lie behind such an irrational contradiction. "The United States," he wrote, "has substantial reserves of agricultural resources that could help feed the world's hungry if there were sufficient economic incentives and significant changes in traditional Federal farm policy, a number of leading agri-

cultural experts agree."

The traditional government farm policy that Robbins referred to was the practice of paying farmers to leave land uncultivated or to destroy "surplus" crops. The objective is to prevent "overproduction" and to keep agricultural prices and profits high.

Robbins cited various agricultural experts, including the U. S. Department of Agriculture's chief economist, Don Paarlberg, indicating that production of some crops could increase 50 percent in the next ten years—but only under "a favorable economic climate." The 50 percent figure itself is far below the actual potential, since even those capitalist economic conditions most favorable to increased food production place strict limits on production if profitability is to be maintained.

As Marion Clawson, the acting president of Resources for the Future, Inc., a private research organization, told Robbins, "Of all the factors involved, the major one is economic—the price has to be right."

Thus, in light of the real causes of food shortages and scarcity, the theories of Malthus and his latter-day disciples stand revealed as capitalist mystifications that divert attention from the system itself. For it is only under capitalism that such phenomena as "overproduction" and "overpopulation" are possible.

In the chapter of *Capital* entitled "The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation," Karl Marx pointed to the primary law that the size of the proletariat increases with the accumulation of capital. But as capital expands, as productivity increases, and as the ratio of constant capital (machinery, factories, raw materials) to variable capital (workers) grows larger, more and more workers become unemployed.

"The laboring population therefore produces," Marx wrote, "along with the accumulation of capital produced by it, the means by which itself is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a relative surplus population; and it does this to an always increasing extent. This is a law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of production. . . ."

Part of this "surplus population" is useful to the capitalists as a reserve army of labor, to be rapidly employed during periods of expansion and then



Too many people or too few buses?

to be dismissed just as quickly during a downturn.

In the age of imperialism and monopoly capital, however, the opportunities for rapid expansion become relatively fewer. The imperialist penetration of the colonial world prevents the economic development of scores of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and condemns their populations to constant impoverishment and periodic famine.

When the twentieth-century followers of Malthus speak of "overpopulation,"

it is these masses in the semicolonial countries they are referring to. Since under capitalism the colonial world is doomed to underdevelopment, or to extremely lopsided development, the imperialists don't see the unemployed as part of the productive system. They see "too many people," who might one day rise up and overthrow a system that consigns them to the "surplus" category.

The solution offered by the capitalists to their problem of a "population explosion" is the same today as it was more than a century ago. Engels wrote in 1844, "Now the consequence of this [Malthus's] theory is that since it is precisely the poor who constitute this surplus population, nothing ought to be done for them, except to make it as easy as possible for them to starve to death; to convince them that this state of affairs cannot be altered and that there is no salvation for their entire class other than that they should propagate as little as possible. . . ."

However, with the end of the capitalist system and the introduction of rational planning to fully utilize the productive capacity available to humanity, this "surplus" population would then become a valuable asset in the construction of a new society, the source of even greater wealth to banish forever the specters of poverty and hunger.

"There is, of course," Engels wrote in a letter to Karl Kautsky, February 1, 1881, "the abstract possibility that the number of people will become so great that limits will have to be set to their increase. But if at some stage communist society finds itself obliged to regulate the production of human beings, just as it has already come to regulate the production of things, it will be precisely this society, and this society alone, which can carry this out without difficulty. It does not seem to me that it would be at all difficult in such a society to achieve by planning a result which has already been produced spontaneously, without planning, in France and Lower Austria. At any rate, it is for the people in the communist society themselves to decide whether, when, and how this is to be done, and what means they wish to employ for the purpose. I do not feel called upon to make proposals or give them advice about it. These people, in any case, will surely not be any less intelligent than we are." □

## Naxalite Suspects Tortured in Calcutta

By Sharad Jhaveri

Jamnagar

Tens of thousands of political prisoners are being held in the jails of the Gandhi regime. A rough estimate puts the figure at 32,000.

Most of the political prisoners are alleged to be Naxalites and are being detained without trial under the notorious Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA). Several sections of this law were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in early 1973. The Court has also ruled for release of prisoners detained under the act. But the Gandhi regime has, under one pretext or another, chosen to flout this ruling.

The estimate of the number of political prisoners does not include those "Naxalites" who have been killed in "police encounters"—a term used to cover up cold-blooded murders of Indian youths alleged to be Naxalites. Reports have shown that in most cases no such encounters with police occurred.

Those "Naxalites" who have been detained continue to receive barbaric treatment.

One such case has recently been brought to light by members of the All-India Women's Association (which can hardly be said to be sympathetic to the Naxalites). On May 3 some of the association's members were ar-

rested in connection with the demonstrations against high prices organized by nine left parties in Calcutta. Because of overcrowding, some of the defendants were kept in a cell in the Calcutta Presidency Jail near women "Naxalites." They were thus able to gather facts about the treatment of the suspected Naxalites.

They reported that when authorities conducting interrogations found answers by such prisoners to be unsatisfactory, the "Naxalites" would be subjected to physical torture.

Part of their account appeared in the July 27 *Economic and Political Weekly*. It states that the "Naxalite"

women were stripped naked and made to lie on a table. "Then they would begin with burning by cigarette—neck, breast, stomach and other soft private parts not excluded—accompanied by all conceivable humiliation. And after this, if any of the girls refused to speak, an iron ruler would be inserted into her rectum. (As a result of repeated torture, the rectum and vagina of some of these victims have become one.) After this, the unconscious bodies of these girls were brought back to jail by police van." The same process would be repeated after a lapse of about three weeks.

The same issue of *Economic and Political Weekly* reported the estimate of the Legal Aid Committee of Calcutta that not less than 15,000 alleged Naxalites are still in prison in West Bengal.

A vigorous defense campaign for the release of these prisoners from the Gandhi regime's jails is an urgent necessity. □

## El Encubrimiento de Watergate Continúa

## Indulto de Nixon: 'Justicia' Capitalista

[Esta es una traducción del editorial de *The Militant* del 20 de septiembre de 1974, titulado "Nixon Par-don: Capitalist Justice"].

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Inmediatamente después de que Nixon renunció, el titular de *The Militant* decía: "Ahora comienza el verdadero encubrimiento".

Menos de un mes después el sucesor designado por Nixon, le concedió un "indulto completo y total", para evitar que fuera procesado por todos los delitos que cometió durante los cinco años y medio que estuvo en la presidencia.

Como parte del trato, Nixon puede destruir dentro de tres años todas las cintas grabadas que aún no han sido dadas a conocer.

De este modo, evitando todo juicio federal a Nixon o que más adelante se hagan públicas las cintas que no han sido requisadas, Ford espera poner fin a todo este proceso de abierta exposición de las mentiras y co-rupción de la clase dominante que

se ha dado en llamar Watergate.

Ford espera poner un telón sobre la verdad, parar de algún modo las continuas revelaciones (desde los documentos del Pentágono, hasta los juicios de Watergate y las cintas grabadas de la Casa Blanca) que han permitido al pueblo norteamericano tener un panorama sin precedentes de los manejos del régimen capitalista.

Pero a pesar de que a Ford le gustaría poner la palabra "Fin" en el caso Watergate, no puede hacerlo. El aluvión de protestas desatado por el indulto a Nixon, indica que el pueblo norteamericano no está dispuesto a aceptar más mentiras, engaños y encubrimientos de la clase dominante.

Ford no puede escribir la palabra "Fin" en el caso Watergate, porque la "falta de confianza" en el gobierno refleja los profundos problemas que enfrentan los gobernantes de los Estados Unidos. Esto es, la creciente dificultad para continuar la sangrienta represión de los pueblos del mundo colonial, y para seguir reduciendo el nivel de vida de los trabajadores norteamericanos, al mismo tiempo que

### Fe de Erratas

En el texto en español de la declaración "En Defensa del PST y la Verdad", que apareció en nuestro número del 16 de septiembre, debe hacerse una corrección en la siguiente oración de la página 1182, columna 1: "Por ejemplo, en relación a nuestro análisis sobre el peligro que significan las acciones violentas de las nacientes tendencias semifascistas, decíamos:".

Debe decir: "Y en uno de los supuestos editoriales, en relación a nuestro análisis sobre el peligro que significan las acciones violentas de las nacientes tendencias semifascistas, decíamos:". □



tratan de mantener la imagen de una "democracia" y la confianza del pueblo norteamericano.

De hecho, al mismo tiempo que Ford anunciaba el indulto de Nixon el 8 de septiembre, salió a la luz una nueva demostración de las mentiras del gobierno y del gangsterismo de su política exterior: la CIA gastó más de 8 millones de dólares para derrocar al gobierno electo de Salvador Allende en Chile.

Estas revelaciones han mostrado la verdadera cara de otro representante clave de la clase dominante, el Secretario de Estado Henry Kissinger. Los políticos demócratas y republicanos han hecho lo posible por ocultar el papel jugado por Kissinger en Watergate, dado que él es el agente central de la política exterior bipartidista.

Las revelaciones de Chile muestran que Kissinger es tan implacable y tan cínico como ellos, dispuesto a imponerle un régimen de torturadores al pueblo chileno, o sugerirle a Nixon en la Navidad de 1972 que bombardeara Hanoi y Haiphong.

El indulto de Nixon por parte de Ford y las revelaciones de Chile, evidencian el hecho de que deshacerse de Nixon, no ha significado un cambio básico en los gobernantes, o en los métodos de gobierno de este país. Tanto con Nixon como con Ford la conspiración continúa. Es la conspiración de una minoría de magnates y banqueros para dominar a la clase obrera.

Corrupción, secretos y mentiras han sido los métodos comunes de gobierno utilizados por Johnson, Kennedy, Eisenhower, Truman, Roosevelt, y los presidentes anteriores. Los secretos y el engaño son necesarios, porque el gobierno de Estados Unidos tiene el objetivo de servir a los intereses de la clase dominante, que son contrarios a los intereses de la mayoría de los norteamericanos o de los otros pueblos del mundo.

El último hecho agregado por Ford al encubrimiento de Watergate, es uno de los ejemplos más repugnantes de la hipocresía de la "justicia" capitalista.

Piensen en la enormidad de los crímenes cometidos por Nixon. Siguiendo la política de sus predecesores Johnson y Kennedy, continuó la no declarada guerra de Vietnam, intriguando todo el tiempo para ocultar al

pueblo norteamericano la verdad acerca de la guerra.

Las vidas de 50,000 jóvenes norteamericanos y probablemente un millón de vietnamitas fueron aniquiladas.

Piensen cómo usó todos los recursos y el poder de las instituciones de gobierno—el fisco, la CIA, el FBI—para acosar, desorganizar, robar e incluso asesinar a aquellos que se atreven a oponerse o a organizarse contra el gobierno.

Piensen cómo todo el equipo de gobierno de Nixon, desde los dos puestos más altos del país hasta el mismo jefe del departamento de "Justicia", han demostrado ser una guarida de bandidos y gangsters pagados por las más grandes corporaciones.

Y por tales crímenes, Nixon sale libre de culpa y se le prometen 850,000 dólares "para gastos" y una pensión de 60,000 dólares al año, que se sacarán de los impuestos que se le cobran al pueblo norteamericano.

Comparen esto con la forma en que se aplica la "justicia" capitalista en el caso de la gente pobre, los negros y otros que pertenecen a la clase trabajadora.

Miles y miles son víctimas de trampas abiertas y persecución política.

¿Cuáles fueron los supuestos crímenes de los sesenta y un Hermanos Attica, que ahora se encuentran ante la amenaza de ser juzgados por su participación en la rebelión de Attica en el año 1971? Su "crimen" fue organizar una protesta masiva para exigir el derecho a ser tratados como seres humanos y no como animales.

¿Cuáles son los "crímenes" por los que los trabajadores mexicanos que no tienen sus papeles son encarcelados y deportados por el gobierno de los Estados Unidos? Su único "crimen" es venir a buscar aunque sea los trabajos peor pagados, para poder mantener a sus familias acosadas por la pobreza.

O piensen en el "crimen" por el que miles de jóvenes que se negaron a ir a la guerra de Vietnam han sido obligados a abandonar el país. O el "crimen" de los cientos de miles de soldados que van a tener que sufrir toda su vida por haber recibido licenciamientos no honorables, por organizarse contra la guerra o contra el racismo en las fuerzas armadas.

Y en muchos otros casos, hay personas que se están pudriendo en la cárcel por pequeñas ofensas, por ro-

bar unos pocos dólares o por llevarse una blusa de una tienda. Sus verdaderos "crímenes" son pobreza, desempleo y desesperación.

El indulto de Ford a Nixon demuestra cómo los gigantescos crímenes de la clase dominante contra la mayoría no son considerados para nada como crímenes.

La "justicia" capitalista significa que el verdadero castigo va dirigido sólo a aquellos que se resisten u oponen al derecho de los ricos a mantener al resto del pueblo viviendo en pobreza e inseguridad. Su propósito es atemorizar a las masas para que acepten la desigualdad capitalista.

Para tratar de ocultar esta verdad, Ford ha tenido que hacer una verdadera comedia al absolver a Nixon.

Hizo su anuncio un domingo, después de comulgar en su iglesia, "para enfatizar que la absolución era un acto de misericordia", dijo el *New York Times*.

La palabrería de Ford sobre la "compasión" para Nixon y su preocupación por los "sufrimientos" del hombre que ordenó los bombardeos contra Vietnam, era suficiente para revolverle el estómago a cualquiera que tenga un poco de verdadera compasión hacia la humanidad.

El asunto de la amnistía es otro truco que Ford ha utilizado para tratar de hacer que su indulto a Nixon pueda ser más aceptable para el pueblo norteamericano. Pero esto es sólo más hipocresía, dado que Ford únicamente ha propuesto una amnistía condicional que mantendría el estigma de culpabilidad sobre quienes se negaron a ir a la guerra de Vietnam.

A pesar de todos los "adornos", en la declaración de Ford se traslucen algunas de las verdaderas razones del indulto. Dijo que si Nixon era llevado a un juicio "feas pasiones podrían despertarse otra vez, las opiniones de nuestro pueblo se polarizarían nuevamente y la confianza en nuestras libres instituciones de gobierno sería otra vez puesta en duda tanto en casa como en el extranjero".

Para comprender claramente esta declaración, hay que traducirla del lenguaje de la clase dominante. Por "feas pasiones", Ford simplemente quiere decir la indignación del pueblo norteamericano cuando conozca la verdad. El y los otros de su clase consideran que esta pasión es "fea" porque temen que la indignación de

las masas se dirigirá no sólo contra Nixon, sino también contra los crímenes de toda la clase capitalista y su gobierno.

Ford teme que "se polaricen las opiniones" del pueblo. Con eso quiere decir que las masas de trabajadores se vuelvan contra el puñado de capitalistas que controlan el gobierno. Y por confianza en "nuestras instituciones de gobierno", él quiere decir la confianza en el gobierno de la clase capitalista.

Algunos políticos demócratas y republicanos y otros portavoces de la clase dominante han criticado el indulto. Pero el desacuerdo es sólo táctico.

El *New York Times*, por ejemplo, se lamenta de que "más que calmar las pasiones públicas y restaurar un fundamental sentido de unidad nacional, el señor Ford ha encendido una nueva controversia".

El analista económico del *Times*, Leonard Silk, destacó las implicancias del indulto para la política de los capitalistas de disminuir el ingreso real de los trabajadores, a través de la inflación. Escribió que "si el estado de ánimo se vuelve cínico una vez más", será más difícil para los capitalistas aplicar "una política de moderación" cuando los trabajadores exijan aumento de salarios.

El *Times* también advierte a Ford, que su proposición de absolver a todos los acusados de Watergate para ver cómo reacciona la gente, minaría la racionalización capitalista de la ley y el orden.

"No se podría plantear ningún argumento convincente para mantener detenido a ningún funcionario público, juez u oficial civil convictos" dijo esta publicación burguesa. "Por cierto sería difícil explicar por qué todas las prisiones no son vaciadas y las cortes disueltas".

La manera de luchar contra el encubrimiento de Watergate y los métodos de gobierno, es ayudando a promover la acción política independiente de la clase obrera a todos los niveles, en las calles y en las elecciones, contra la política de los dos partidos capitalistas, el Demócrata y el Republicano. Watergate plantea la necesidad de construir una alternativa de *clase* frente al gobierno de las ricas minorías.

Las campañas electorales estatales de 1974 del Socialist Workers Party, concretizan esta perspectiva, y los candidatos del SWP están recorriendo to-

do el país educando en esto.

Esta perspectiva de construir una alternativa de clase al gobierno capitalista tipo Watergate, significa la participación en todas las luchas independientes que han surgido: contra la brutalidad policial, por salarios más altos, por los derechos de las mujeres, porque las minorías oprimidas controlen la educación de sus hijos y otras luchas. Esas luchas son parte integral del proceso de construir el poder independiente de la clase obrera y los sectores oprimidos.

Esta perspectiva también significa aprovechar las revelaciones de Watergate, para presionar y ganar la mayor cantidad posible de derechos de-

mocráticos para los movimientos obrero, socialista y los movimientos de los negros y otros pueblos oprimidos.

Llamamos a los lectores a apoyar los diversos procesos civiles contra Nixon, el gobierno y el FBI, por haber violado los derechos constitucionales de los opositores. El más global de estos procesos, es el llevado por el SWP y la YSA, que está apoyado también por el Political Rights Defense Fund [Fondo de Defensa de los Derechos Políticos].

Nixon continúa siendo un acusado en este caso y el SWP y la YSA no lo perdonarán en el juicio que le han iniciado. □

## Estudiantes Griegos Opinan Sobre Chipre y la Lucha Democrática en Grecia

[Esta es una traducción del inglés del artículo y la resolución publicados en *Ergatike Pale* el 31 de agosto, periódico semanal editado en Atenas que refleja el punto de vista de los trotskistas griegos. La traducción del original en griego al inglés apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 16 de septiembre].

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Tomando las vacaciones como pretexto, las organizaciones estudiantiles reformistas Regas Feraios<sup>1</sup> y la Anti-Ethnike Foitetike Enosis tes Ellados<sup>2</sup> organizaron pequeñas reuniones cerradas en casas particulares para formar un comité de estudiantes "recomendados" en cada escuela. El próximo paso sería el reconocimiento de estos comités por Tsatsos [el viceministro de educación].

La táctica burocrática no produjo el resultado esperado. En su lugar, los estudiantes respetuosos de los procedimientos democráticos propusieron que se realizaran asambleas genera-

les en cada escuela para elegir los comités provisionales. Bajo la presión de estos estudiantes, que formularon sus propuestas en un documento firmado por cincuenta y seis personas, Tsatsos no se arriesgó a nombrar a "los de confianza".

No obstante, "la zorra siempre tiene otra maña", como dice el proverbio. Luego de una reunión del SEKF,<sup>3</sup> el Regas Feraios y la Anti-EFEE formaron el FEAKE<sup>4</sup>. El FEAKE está recolectando ropa y dinero, cosas que realmente necesitan los refugiados grecochipriotas. Pero en este momento en que una tercera parte de la isla está bajo la dominación turca y las otras dos terceras partes están bajo un gobierno parecido a la Junta y la EOKA-B está destruyendo y asolando, lo que Chipre necesita del pueblo griego es principalmente ayuda política.

El 27 de agosto, dos semanas después de la fundación del FEAKE, tuvo lugar una asamblea general del movimiento estudiantil para organizar

1. Grupo controlado por la fracción del Buró del Interior del Partido Comunista.

2. Unión Nacional Provisional de Estudiantes de Grecia, grupo influenciado por la fracción del Partido Comunista leal a Moscú.

3. Syntonistike Epitrope Kyprion Foiteton — Comité de Coordinación Estudiantil Chipriota.

4. Foitetike Epitrope Allelengos ston Kypriako Agona — Comité Estudiantil de Solidaridad con la lucha chipriota.

la ayuda política al pueblo chipriota. Fue realizada después de que 702 estudiantes firmaron un documento en el que pedían permiso para usar el auditorio. El Regas y la Anti-EFEE se opusieron a este proyecto, rehusándose a firmar la petición. Los miembros de la Anti-EFEE que firmaron el documento individualmente porque consideraban que era correcto, recibieron una dura crítica.

La asamblea se realizó el martes pasado [27 de agosto]. Hubo una amplia participación estudiantil (de 800 a 1,000 personas). El Regas y la Anti-EFEE participaron, pero con el objetivo de sabotearla, ya que la fuerza predominante allí era una especie de frente único de la izquierda revolucionaria. Al comienzo, los reformistas preguntaron si la reunión era realmente una asamblea general del movimiento estudiantil. La respuesta que obtuvieron fue que la asamblea no representaba la población estudiantil en su totalidad, sino solamente a los estudiantes que estaban presentes y que se le llamaba asamblea general del movimiento estudiantil ["pamfoitetike"] porque incluía representantes de todas las escuelas (a diferencia de las asambleas de cada carrera o disciplina).

Los oradores condenaron cualquier intento de estas dos organizaciones de presentarse como los únicos voces del movimiento estudiantil ante la asamblea y cuestionaron el derecho de Tsatos a nombrar cualquier comité, ya sea provisional o permanente. Condenaron la línea reformista-stalinista de la Unión Internacional de Estudiantes que reconoce a la Anti-EFEE como la única representante del movimiento estudiantil con el objeto de imponerse burocráticamente. Los oradores sostuvieron que los verdaderos representantes de los estudiantes tenían que ser elegidos en asamblea y no podían ser nombrados por nadie. Condenaron al FEAK por su incapacidad al no poder organizar una sola movilización de masas en apoyo al pueblo chipriota en sus dos semanas de existencia y por excluir en la práctica a organizaciones antidictatoriales (PPSP).

Un representante del AASPE<sup>5</sup>

5. Anti-fasistike Anti-imperialistike Spoudastike Parataxe—Grupo Estudiantil Antifascista, Antimperialista.

(quien estuvo presente en la reunión de fundación del FEAK) remarcó que la Anti-EFEE y el Regas estaban peleándose entre ellos por usar el nombre de la organización y por los puestos.

Un estudiante chipriota denunció que el SEKF (que dirigió la formación del FEAK) excluyó a elementos progresistas y colaboró con Grivasistas.

A pesar de que los reformistas emprendieron la retirada, la asamblea continuó hasta tarde en la noche y aprobó la siguiente resolución:

\* \* \*

Los estudiantes reunidos aquí hoy, 27 de agosto de 1974, en la escuela de abogacía, provenientes de todos los AEI del país, aprobamos las siguientes posiciones:

1. La realización de esta asamblea demuestra nuestra determinación de continuar con el único curso que consideramos correcto para el movimiento estudiantil, — el de los procedimientos democráticos y las asambleas masivas.

2. Vemos que realizar tales asambleas en cada escuela y esforzarnos por hacerlas cada vez más representativas es la única forma correcta de elegir comités provisionales, para llegar a una asamblea general con la participación de todos los estudiantes.

3. Estamos en contra de todos los intentos de desmovilización, escisión o sustitución del movimiento estudiantil, y declaramos que solamente a través de la movilización de los estudiantes organizados democráticamente puede nuestro movimiento alcanzar una orientación realmente representativa.

4. Condenamos al imperialismo norteamericano, a la NATO y a la Junta griega como los principales culpables y responsables del baño de sangre de Chipre y exigimos:

El retiro inmediato de las tropas extranjeras de la isla y el retiro efectivo de Grecia de la NATO (expulsión de las bases extranjeras, derogación de los tratados bilaterales, y nacionalización de los intereses norteamericanos).

5. Condenamos todos los intentos de presentar la lucha antimperialista del pueblo chipriota como una lucha contra el pueblo turco. Consideramos que el pueblo turco está desarrollando

una dura lucha contra el imperialismo y sus lacayos turcos y llamamos a una lucha antimperialista común de los pueblos chipriota, griego y turco.

6. La eliminación de la dictadura de la isla y el retiro de los fascistas putchistas de la guardia nacional.

7. Saludamos a las fuerzas progresistas de cada país que apoyan la lucha del pueblo chipriota.

8. Aplaudimos la determinación de los chipriotas de continuar con su lucha por todos los medios posibles y de iniciar la acción revolucionaria a través de las fuerzas populares, ya que consideramos que la libertad y la independencia nacional no se consiguen en reuniones ni pueden ser garantizadas por las convenciones y los ejércitos internacionales, sino que son ganadas con las armas en la mano.

9. Considerando que la lucha chipriota está directamente ligada con la lucha antimperialista en nuestro país, exigimos:

a. La abolición inmediata de la ley marcial y la restauración de la libertad de expresión y de reunión para el pueblo griego así como el derecho a realizar manifestaciones públicas.

b. La abolición de las leyes reaccionarias que precedieron a la Junta así como las propias leyes y decretos de la Junta (590, 375, etc.).

c. El establecimiento inmediato de procedimientos democráticos de modo que los verdaderos representantes puedan ponerse al frente en todas las organizaciones sindicales (obreras, profesionales, de la marina, y asociaciones estudiantiles). Hacemos un llamado a todos los trabajadores a movilizarse junto con nosotros y a trabajar para conquistar sus derechos inalienables.

d. Condenamos todos los intentos de mantener las instituciones fascistas, mecanismos y métodos de opresión, así como todo intento de establecer un estado policiaco. Exigimos una purga cada vez más profunda de la maquinaria del estado, que permanece intacta, y un castigo ejemplar para todos aquellos que colaboraron con la dictadura.

Para las universidades en particular, exigimos el control estudiantil inmediato del proceso de extirpación del fascismo de las AEI, lo cual significa:

— Eliminación de la sucursal estudiantil de la policía secreta.

— Derogación de los decretos anti-

estudiantiles (93, 720, 1347, etc.).

—Garantía de inviolabilidad de los locales y terrenos universitarios.

—Purga de los profesores y asistentes que fueron nombrados por la Junta o que trabajaron con ella.

10. Condenamos la brutalidad de la policía contra los manifestantes del domingo 18 de agosto, y señalamos el peligro que encierra la campaña sistemática de insinuaciones basada en las historias sobre provocadores y sus actividades. Estos rumores encajan dentro de los planes de los reaccionarios, cuyo fin es parar las manifestaciones populares para evitar la presión militante del pueblo griego hacia el logro de sus intereses vitales.

11. Sobre la cuestión del apoyo a la lucha del pueblo chipriota, esta asamblea no reconoce al FEAK como cuerpo representativo. Esa organización fue formada sin la participación de la masa estudiantil y entre sus miembros hay personas que reclaman ser líderes estudiantiles electos, siendo esto falso. Consideramos que para lograr una expresión política unificada de nuestra lucha en solidaridad con el pueblo chipriota, debemos formar un cuerpo representativo de todas las escuelas basado en comités provisionales electos y revocables. La elección de estos comités debe realizarse en asambleas de las diferentes facultades, comprometiéndolos con un programa de lucha concreto.

12. Esta asamblea hizo una colecta

y confió al vicepresidente el envío de las 6,260 dracmas [aproximadamente

US\$225] que se reunieron, al Syntonistike Epitrope Kyprion Foiteton. □

## Denuncian a Agentes de la Junta Griega

[Esta es una traducción del inglés de la resolución propuesta por el Sosialistike Foititike Parataxé (Grupo Estudiantil Socialista) que fue publicada en *Ergatike Pale* el 31 de agosto. No se especificaba si fue presentada como una contramoción en la asamblea general del 27 de agosto, la que es descrita en el artículo anterior titulado: "Estudiantes Griegos Opinan Sobre Chipre y la Lucha Democrática en Grecia". La traducción del original en griego al inglés, apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 16 de septiembre].

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Exigimos:

1. El arresto de todos los que asesinaron estudiantes en el Politécnico [centro de las manifestaciones masivas de noviembre de 1973], de los verdugos del pueblo chipriota, de los provocadores y de todos los culpables durante los últimos siete años.
2. Que estas personas sean puestas a disposición de los tribunales del pueblo.
3. Que cese toda persecución contra los activistas estudiantiles (p.e.,

los incidentes del domingo 18 de agosto). Amnistía para nuestros hermanos sentenciados en Larissa. No hemos derramado nuestra sangre sólo para cambiar de torturadores sino para terminar de inmediato con todas las formas de opresión.

4. Completa independencia del estado de todas las organizaciones estudiantiles. ¡No a los nombramientos, elecciones libres!

Denunciamos:

1. Las sospechosas maniobras de la Anti-EFEE y el Regas y la entrega de las luchas estudiantiles en los corredores de los ministerios por parte de esas organizaciones.

2. La campaña de calumnias desatada por estas organizaciones y por toda la izquierda oportunista contra nuestro movimiento bajo el pretexto de que los provocadores han estado actuando en las manifestaciones más recientes.

3. El ataque combinado de la policía y los provocadores en la manifestación del 18 de agosto.

Llamamos a la Anti-EFEE, el Regas y a todas las otras organizaciones de izquierda a ir a la lucha ahora, junto con la masa estudiantil, por las demandas arriba planteadas. □

## DOCUMENTS

### 'Avanzada Socialista' Analyzes Turn of Montoneros

[The following document, signed by the Editorial Board, appeared in the September 9 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Argentina). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The foremost champions of mass mobilizations, who used to fill the Atlanta Stadium and occupy key spots in demonstrations and marches (much to the mortification of the union bureaucrats), and who before that fought

arms in hand against the military dictatorship, have just declared war against the very government they helped install through their quite weighty support and action.

Behind what appears to be a revolutionary affirmation lies hidden in reality the tacit confession of a colossal defeat—the defeat of the naïve effort to break up the so-called Miguel-López Rega<sup>1</sup> circle "from within"; the defeat of plans to replace the union bureaucracy; the defeat of the proclamations based on the brilliant strategy of the "Old Man" [Perón], who, on the day following

1. Lorenzo Miguel and Jose Lopez Rega, right-wing Peronist leaders.

his return, would "dump" the Gran Acuerdo;<sup>2</sup> the defeat of the promise to "bridge the generation gap"; and, finally, the defeat of the utopian project to expropriate imperialism and construct the "socialist homeland" with Perón and Peronism; that is, through the instrumentality of a bourgeois party that some time ago gave up its principal reformist projects.

### Montoneros Understood Too Late

After a year and a half of unfortunate experiences they have finally seen the absurdity of their pretensions. They came to this conclusion in quite a tragic way, it is true, through the torture and assassination of a number of militants. During the fifteen months of the Peronist regime the losses were much greater than during the entire period of the commanders in chief [the dictatorial army regimes], as Firmenich<sup>3</sup> himself pointed out.

Nonetheless, they have not understood how to convert their tragedy into a fruitful and positive experience. They have proved incapable of making a self-criticism that could save them from future popular-frontist adventures, from becoming slaves of another bourgeois leader. Far from that, they have opted to remain enamored of their earliest errors, at the same time trying to free themselves of responsibility for bringing to office a government that did not liberate the nation from imperialism and that continues to oppress the working class. Thus they have gone so far as to use the cover of their banned weekly newspaper to publicize such a leading question as "Who Voted for Isabel?"<sup>4</sup>

Leaving aside the heroism with which the young Peronists idealistically offer their lives, and leaving aside the democratic and anti-imperialist programs that inspire them to struggle and die, the recent declaration of war by the Montoneros,<sup>5</sup> in addition to being surprising and not thought out, is irresponsible and erroneous.

### Essence of Regime the Same

In the first place, it is difficult to see what changes have been fundamental enough in the orientation of the regime to justify such a violent zigzag, taking them from electoralism to guerrilla warfare. What has made them abandon the bass drum in favor of the machine gun?

The arguments that the Montoneros use to try to justify their action (enforcement of the Social Pact, bureaucratic control of the CGT,<sup>6</sup> campaign of violent attacks and

2. Gran Acuerdo Nacional—Great National Agreement, a class-collaborationist plan developed by the dictatorship to return Argentina to constitutional rule.

3. Leader of the Montoneros, one of the main left-wing Peronist groups.

4. Isabel Peron, former vice-president and wife of General Juan Peron, who assumed the presidency upon his death.

5. On September 6, the Montoneros announced they were going underground to resume armed struggle for the liberation of the Argentine people.

repression against activists in the mass movement and on the campus, closure of newspapers and magazines, etc.), far from being a recent surprise, were the essential bases on which the Peronist government was established. The Social Pact, for example—which lays the basis for the liquidation of the parity commissions,<sup>7</sup> the denial of the right to strike, a wage freeze, and an increase in the profits of the bosses—was signed during the days of initial euphoria by President Cámpora,<sup>8</sup> one of the traditional leaders who is still supported by the young Peronists.

The shameful Ezeiza massacre, much worse than the Trelew shootings and only comparable to the shootings in Patagonia or the tragic week of 1919,<sup>9</sup> also belongs to that period.

Furthermore, the reforms of the Penal Code, the Trade-Union Law, the Law on Redundancy, the assassination of activists, the destruction of headquarters, and the closing down of newspapers are practices that antedate by far the regime of Perón's wife. These are the repressive instruments of the government that the Montoneros and the JP [Juventud Peronista—Peronist Youth] campaigned for. They were designed for forceful implementation of the capitalists' plans to end the workers' resistance to greater exploitation.

But if the political position of the Montoneros was not thought out, the 180-degree turn they have taken in their methods of struggle is just as ill-considered. Scarcely twenty days ago in the pages of *La Causa Peronista* they warned that the guerrilla actions in Villa María and Catamarca<sup>10</sup> did not represent "the violence of the people" in contrast to all the "blows that the popular movements dealt the military dictatorship in conjunction with the massive uprisings of Córdoba, Rosario, Tucumán, Mendoza. . . . The lines then were clearly drawn. On one side Lanusse<sup>11</sup> and the armed forces signifying dependency; on the other Perón, the revolutionary organizations, and the liberation forces. Today's

6. Confederacion General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor.

7. Bodies made up of management and the workers to negotiate contracts and other work-related issues.

8. Hector Campora, Peron's stand-in in the March 1973 elections, served as president briefly in the summer of 1973.

9. Scores were killed and several hundred wounded in May 1973 while awaiting Peron's arrival at Ezeiza airport after his exile.

In August 1972 sixteen political prisoners were massacred at Trelew.

Twelve hundred rural laborers were shot down during a strike in Patagonia in 1922.

The tragic week of 1919 refers to the cold-blooded murder by police of workers attending the funeral of two strike victims in Buenos Aires.

10. In August 1974 guerrillas carried out an abortive attempt to take over a military installation in Catamarca and a successful attack on an explosives factory in the Villa María section of Córdoba.

11. General Alejandro Lanusse, final military dictator before the 1973 elections.

Lanusse has not come out openly on the scene. There are all sorts of trappings of legality to conceal him. And Perón is no longer in the other camp, the people's camp."

Leaving aside the political differences we have with this assessment, we have to ask the Montoneros if the Lanusse and the Perón they used to need to launch armed struggle were born during the last twenty days. Because we have not been able to identify them, nor have the Montoneros told us who they are. And, furthermore, because nothing essentially new has happened, no qualitative changes that would permit us to differentiate Isabel from her Peronist predecessors. So we maintain that the change in methods of struggle is also irresponsible and erroneous.

The Montoneros' turn to violence does not correspond to a change in the national political situation. It is the expression of their own internal contradictions, of the clash between the proletarian and anti-imperialist demands driving them into struggle and the reality of a government oriented to guaranteeing capitalist profits and preserving the continuity of the current system.

### Right Turn Began May 25, 1973

As long as the Peronists were in the opposition, the growth of all sectors of the movement was stimulated by the chief as a military tactic to rout the enemy. In those days each faction of the Peronist movement used to display its tape recording or letter from Perón approving the most contradictory positions—from the assassination of Aramburu<sup>12</sup> to the negotiations with Lanusse.

But, once the Peronists got into office, there was no longer any question of tapes or speeches. Each day they had to define their policy with laws and decrees, with government actions clearly and necessarily reflecting the class interests the regime defended and represented.

The Peronist movement and its leader came to office in 1973 presiding over a broad alliance of the bourgeoisie and the trade-union bureaucracy. Even imperialism participated in it, deeply involved in the nation's affairs through important economic investments. This powerful presence substantially reduced the Bonapartist arbiter's capacity to maneuver. It reduced the possibility of repeating the concessions that he had given to the working class during his first term in office. Thus the right turn that the Montoneros just discovered began May 25, 1973.

It is a lie to say that this right turn is simply the result of López Rega's personal influence or of Lorenzo Miguel's overtures. It is a lie to say that it began after the death of Perón. It was developing in keeping with Peronism's need to respond to the interests that had returned it to power. On May 1<sup>13</sup> the youth demanded clarity, and the famous dialogue "between Perón and his people," which the youth had stubbornly de-

12. Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, former president of Argentina, kidnapped and killed by the Montoneros in 1970.

13. A reference to this year's May Day rally, at which Peron spoke.

manded, finally took place. Perón called the bureaucrats who had supported Frondizi and Onganía<sup>14</sup> heroes and condemned the heroes who had fought against the military dictatorship to obtain the return of their leader as "beardless" and "stupid."

The institutionalization of the Peronist movement marked precisely the culmination of the right turn. With it the last illusion was demolished. The old guard was exhorted to bury once and for all the demagogic promise to "bridge the generation gap." The youths who had been driven out of the plaza<sup>15</sup> were now formally segregated from the Peronist movement.

And as part of that relentless siege, the youth were attacked on the university campus where they had retreated. With [right-wing Peronist Oscar] Ivanissevich in the Ministry of Education, and the threatened naming of Tecera del Franco [another right-wing Peronist] as rector, the offensive of the old guard against the bulwark of the Juventud Peronista threatened to liquidate the social and political base of the Montoneros.

The conclusions they had failed to draw from the Ezeiza massacre, the assassination of activists, the wage freeze, the encroachments on trade-union democracy, they now understood to the marrow of their bones when the government moved against the university. Suddenly, to the Montoneros, Perón's wife became the same as Onganía. With the instability typical of the petty bourgeoisie, they went from conciliation to guerrilla warfare, in as natural a way as the student generation of 1958 went from unconditional support of the "anti-imperialist" Arturo Frondizi to the "foquista" guerrilla warfare mounted by Fidel [Castro] in different conditions.

### 'De-Peronization' of the Middle Class

But the turn made by the Montoneros is not only a response to their internal contradictions. While the loss of the university fiefdom was the spur—the contradiction that forced the 180-degree turn—we must point out that the phenomenon expresses a deeper reality: the political frustration of broad sectors of the middle class.

The middle class, with its civil servants, teachers, students, and professionals was in the past profoundly pro-military and anti-Peronist. Its growing impoverishment brought it closer to the working class, and it joined the latter in its hatred of the Onganía take-over. The appearance of the phenomenon of the Juventud Peronista with its power in the student movement and in the public-workers unions reflected the hope those middle sectors placed in the Peronist variant of the "Gran Acuerdo Nacional."

One year of Peronist rule has been frustrating for them. Many sectors have become "de-Peronized," moving to the left. Their vacillations are expressed in the political oscillations of Alendeism<sup>16</sup> or in the warring tendencies

14. Arturo Frondizi and Juan Carlos Onganía, two of the presidents who served between Peron's first and second regimes.

15. A reference to the Juventud Peronista's exodus from the Plaza de Mayo after Peron's May 1 attack on them.

16. Oscar Alende, a leader of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria—People's Revolutionary Alliance, a centrist formation.

within almost all the parties.

The same frustration also pushes the volatile middle class toward the opposite camp. There are already signs of the "strong state" refrain from many Peronists or ex-Peronists, providing a base and foundation for fascist groups.

In this newly born social and political movement only the Communist party remains immune to the pressures and holds steadfastly to its official policy as watchdog and prop of the political and trade agreements between the USSR and the Argentine bourgeoisie.

The turn of the JP occurs in this very turbulent social setting. The JP, which grew in the setting of the struggles of the impoverished middle class and which was consolidated in the university, has been incapable of linking up to the industrial working class. Its new policy is the desperate response of a sector whose impatience separates it more and more from the methods and goals of the labor movement.

### Isabel—the Same as Onganía?

The call to begin a "revolutionary war" is a serious error of characterization and perspective.

The differences among the four Peronist governments that have followed one another since May 25, 1973, and the military dictatorship of Onganía are obvious. It is not necessary to look for them—as the young Peronists did until very recently—in official programs and actions. Because it is exactly in this sphere that the resemblances appear. Thus, what once was called a wage freeze is now called the Social Pact.

Nonetheless, the Peronist regime is diametrically opposite to the Onganía regime and also to Lanusse's, with the latter serving as a transition between two extremes. This is true in two respects:

First, Peronism has had to recognize many of the democratic conquests won in memorable struggles by the masses from the dictatorship. These conquests—among which is the relative legality once held by the Montoneros and which our party still holds—are trophies won in the Cordobazos. They belong to the masses and we revolutionists have the obligation to defend them jealously and to try to deepen them.

The decision of the Montoneros to close their headquarters and go into semiclandestinity, invoking a persecution that actually exists, implies giving up the conquests of the masses without a fight. Only the bourgeoisie gains by this surrender.

The Montoneros have shown that they are incapable of defending the democratic gains that make the Peronist regime infinitely superior to Onganía's, despite the fascist gangs and the daily attacks suffered by the working class and the people.

This is another contradiction in the politics of the Montoneros, because if on the one hand they supported Obregón Cano against the Navarro coup,<sup>17</sup> we do not understand why they now have a policy that in practice places the Onganía regime on a par with Isabel's.

17. The February 1974 coup that ousted the elected Córdoba provincial governor.

In short, why do they relinquish the conquest of legality as if Onganía were governing, when Onganía in his time—without asking anyone—closed down all the political parties by decree?

### The Seven Million Votes

But, in addition, the Peronist regime is different in another fundamental aspect, which a genuinely revolutionary policy cannot ignore—support from the workers. While the military dictatorship was hated by the masses, the workers still consider the Peronist government to be their own and they cherish it—despite attrition and frustration, the desperation of the middle layers, and the combativity of some sectors of the workers vanguard.

The political course of our middle class, so well reflected by the Montoneros, is rich in surprises. For a long time the young Peronists—with ironic and contemptuous remarks—brandished the "seven million votes" to justify their tail-ending the Peronist government and opposing those of us who have consistently stood in opposition to Peronism.

The turn of the Montoneros shows that all that was involved was an argument to justify opportunism and not a position of respect for the masses, because their current position shows petty-bourgeois scorn for the working class.

No one with that scorn can be considered a genuine revolutionist, even when raising apparently very militant proposals. For example, if in a workers assembly a *compañero* were to propose launching a "war" against the boss and this was rejected by the majority, yet he decided to begin the "war" on his own, no matter how valid his reasons were he would be dividing and confusing the workers and arming the enemy. Especially if the same *compañero* a few days before had insisted on supporting the boss. It is obvious that we who had tried patiently and respectfully to convince the majority (and especially this *compañero*) of the necessity of mobilizing against the management would have every right, along with the rest of the assembly, to distrust this *compañero's* attitude.

The first thing that must be stated clearly is that all guerrilla movements disconnected from the masses seriously injure them. A vigilante attack at Peugeot was used by the bureaucracy to obtain the factory's condemnation of SMATA<sup>18</sup> in Córdoba. The murder of an executive of IKA [Renault] a few days ago contributed even more to isolating the struggle of the Córdoba mechanics. It is practically inevitable that adventurist actions will contribute to unifying the enemy camp and to introducing division and confusion into the ranks of the labor movement. A golden rule applies here:

One learns only from one's own experiences and mobilizations and never from the external example of one's self-appointed saviors.

### A Mirror Image of the Tupamaros

An initial effect of the Montonero call is that it has

18. Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor—Union of Automotive Machinists and Allied Trades.

added to the psychological setting and climate favoring a coup. That broad fringe made up of the fascist groups (nourished in the ranks of the repressive apparatus and the frightened trade-union bureaucracy), the generals posing as "saviors," the military commands speculating on how to take over—all these counterrevolutionary circles have felt encouraged at the very least. If they do not prosper it will be fundamentally because the mass movement itself prevents it—with its threatening presence or its mobilization.

The perspectives opening up for the Montoneros and the rest of the guerrilla movements can be judged from the experience of the Uruguayan Tupamaros, which mirrors what has happened to similar movements elsewhere in Latin America.

We can see the Tupamaros from their massive ascent starting in 1968, lifted by the mounting struggles of the middle class, and in their turbulent fall—jailed, divided, infiltrated, and shot down—after the military under the influence of the Tupamaro "war" took full control.

The two sides of the Tupamaro coin must be examined:

One permitted them to become one of the most imposing guerrilla movements in the world.

The reverse at first made them go down on their knees at the bourgeois altar supporting the candidacy of Liber Seregni, the bourgeois "nationalist" military figure in the neighboring country who did not have time to arouse the frustration that Péron did here. And afterwards, it prevented the Tupamaros from denouncing and fighting against the military coup. Instead they endorsed it.

### 'Revolutionary War' or Electoral Operation?

We did not choose the Uruguayan example for lack of local ones. Montonero history already allows us to forecast the same reformist and probourgeois course for them that the Tupamaros followed. Didn't the Argentine guerrillas who fought the dictatorship cast their votes for the FREJULI?<sup>19</sup>

All the precedents enable us to say that the Argentine guerrillas with their slogan of "revolutionary war" have set in motion an electoral operation, spattered with blood, that will serve one wing of the bourgeoisie. Not much time will pass before some Cámpora, Obregón Cano, or Alende will come forth to call for a sacrifice like the one Perón called for, only to later get rid of the "beardless ones" who survive.

It is not by chance that the Montoneros are silent about the fact that the Social Pact was the most cherished offspring of Peronism in the Cámpora period. Nor is it by chance that the Montoneros omit naming Cámpora as one of their targets in the call to initiate "war." Why do they name the Radicals, the Socialists, the Communists, etc., and omit the Camporists?

### Argentinazo With a Revolutionary Workers Party

Our mentioning the Uruguayan experience above requires us to make it clear that we nourish no pessimism whatever about Argentina. We have a profound respect

19. Frente Justicialista de Liberacion Nacional—National Liberation Front for Social Justice, the Peronist electoral front.

for the aroused Argentine working class in whose depths an ideological battle is being waged. We are convinced of labor's imminent combative rise despite government attempts to slow it down, bureaucratic gags, aggressions of the fascist gangs, and the confusion aroused by its self-appointed "saviors."

We are convinced that the working class will soon take a path that the guerrillas do not envision—the path of the Cordobazos that already overthrew the military dictatorship and won the present democratic gains.

Those Cordobazos will culminate in a socialist Argentina when they are led by a great socialist workers party. Thus, the main task for Argentine revolutionists has the following two prongs:

To discuss and convince the masses themselves to play the leading role in mobilizations and struggles and to construct their own independent revolutionary party. It is the same task that Lenin posed as a priority just a few months before the great proletarian revolution, the essence of which is summarized in his phrase:

"Patiently explain."

And that is how it must be, because without the masses there can be no socialist revolution.

We are totally convinced that the combative upsurge of the working class and the construction of the revolutionary party will lead to a socialist Argentina. That is why we count on the process also saving from the swamp of reformism many young people who have taken up guerrilla warfare.

Since we recognize the anti-imperialist—and in some cases socialist—flame that has been kindled in them, our party is committed to recognizing them as honest fighters in the ranks of labor in spite of their error and irresponsibility. We will fight for them to be viewed as such—in death or in the courts. They should be judged by workers and people's tribunals and not by bourgeois justice, which out of class hatred and even fear, stigmatizes them as common criminals. We will struggle for that to be registered in the coming socialist constitution. □

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