

Intercontinental Press

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Ford OKs CIA Job on Allende

KISSINGER: Took personal charge of widespread plotting and use of millions of dollars to overthrow the government of Chile.

From Palace to Mud Hut

Ethiopia's Military Shows Selassie to the Door

¿El Patricia Hearst Mexicano?

El Viejo Cacique Supera a Sus Secuestradores

Mandel in Australia

Ernest Mandel, the internationally known Belgian Marxist economist, is making a speaking tour of Australia September 11-20, breaking a ban that had prohibited his entry there since early 1970. Mandel is a leader of the Fourth International, and his tour is being sponsored by the Socialist Workers League and the Communist League, two sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International in Australia.

In 1970, when Mandel was scheduled to come to Australia as a keynote speaker at the May 21-24 Socialist Scholars Conference, the then Liberal government refused him a visa. This act drew strong protests within the labor movement and academic circles in Australia. Several Labor parliamentarians attacked the ban. Labor's shadow Treasurer Frank Crean challenged Immigration Minister Phillip Lynch in parliament, demanding to know on what grounds Mandel had been refused entry. "The refusal made Australia look ridiculous," Crean said.

Lynch would not give a reason, saying only that the facts behind the government's refusal could not be given "in the national interest."

The Labor government elected into office in December 1972 has granted Mandel a visa. Some of the parliamentarians who protested his exclusion in 1970 are now cabinet ministers, among them Crean, who is federal treasurer.

The lifting of the ban on Mandel in Australia should help in the struggle to have bans lifted in several other countries from which he is excluded. Currently he is prohibited from entering the United States, France, Switzerland, and West Germany. These exclusions have brought widespread protest from intellectuals, students, civil libertarians, and the working-class and radical movement the world over.

In Australia, Mandel is scheduled to speak at public meetings in Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide, and Melbourne on the topic "Can Capitalism Survive?" He has also been booked to address meetings at universities on "What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going?" □

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Ethiopia's Military Shows Selassie to the Door

By Dick Fidler

"As from today, September 12, His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie has been deposed from office." With this decree, the rebel Armed Forces Coordinating Committee took complete control of Ethiopia, ending the fifty-eight year rule of its emperor.

As a crowd of young people outside the palace chanted, "Thief, thief," at him, the 82-year-old Selassie was taken away in a blue police Volkswagen. He was later reported to be confined in a three-room mud hut in the army's fourth division headquarters in Addis Ababa. Some 160 other members of the royal family, its household, and leading officials and aristocratic allies of the old regime were also confined at the headquarters.

The Armed Forces Committee did not abolish the monarchy, however. It asked that the emperor's only son, 57-year-old Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, return from Geneva to be crowned as a figurehead king with no powers. The prince, who suffered a stroke two years ago, is partly paralyzed.

The committee outlawed all strikes and unauthorized demonstrations. It dissolved parliament and announced that a provisional military government would rule Ethiopia until elections are held. Lieutenant General Aman Michael Andom, chief of staff of the armed forces and defense minister of the previous civilian government, was appointed to head both the cabinet and the Armed Forces Committee, in addition to retaining his former posts.

The new government also includes the outgoing premier, Michael Imru, as minister of information.

"In general, the committee asked other ministers and officials to stay on until the final shape of the provisional government emerged," Reuters news agency reported from the Ethiopian capital September 12.

"A good-natured populace appeared to greet the Emperor's overthrow with joy," Reuters said.

"Five thousand people staged a brief

hand-clapping demonstration outside the palace but then obeyed officers' requests to go home."

The *Times* of London reported from Addis Ababa September 13 that the Ethiopian Teachers Association had demanded that the former emperor be tried before a military tribunal. "But there were no widespread calls here today for action against the Emperor," it added, "though the press criticized the man who began his rule of Ethiopia as regent in 1916 and ascended to the throne in 1930."

The closing days of the emperor's rule were marked by a crescendo of public attacks against him and his entourage.

On September 1, posters directly attacking Selassie appeared on the streets of Addis Ababa for the first time. They showed the emperor feeding dogs in the palace grounds while, in an accompanying photo, an inhabitant of famine-stricken Wollo province lay dying of starvation.

The following day, students demonstrated in front of the parliament, demanding the emperor's removal. Agence France-Presse reported that some students called for hanging Selassie, because he had "run away to refuge in London" during the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in the 1930s. The demonstration was dispersed by police, and was followed by the military committee's ban on any more demonstrations unless authorized by the army.

However, the students union of the university of Addis Ababa had already declared on August 31 its "total support" for the Armed Forces Committee as "the spearhead of the people's movement." The committee responded on September 3 by announcing plans to send students and teachers to the countryside to teach reading, writing, and agricultural techniques to the peasants, in order to help the masses understand "the spirit of the revolution."

Meanwhile, arrests of former aides of the emperor continued. On Septem-

ber 4, six more persons, including Selassie's private secretary, were jailed.

An indication of the emperor's isolation came on the eve of his overthrow, September 11, when the patriarch of the Ethiopian Coptic Church effectively endorsed the armed forces movement.

"In a New Year's message today, the first day of 1967, according to the Julian calendar to which Ethiopia adheres, the Patriarch for the first time made no mention of the Emperor," Agence France-Presse reported. "Instead he asked the blessing of God on the revolutionary movement 'led by the armed forces with the support of the Ethiopian people.'"

The Coptic church hierarchy, whose nominal head is the emperor, had only three weeks earlier issued a protest against moves by the military to disestablish the church.

Also on September 11, the military sent troops to seize the palace of Selassie's daughter, and broadcast a denunciation of the emperor, repeating earlier charges that he had secreted huge sums in foreign banks and investments, and had refused to transfer them back to Ethiopia. The military said that the emperor's holdings abroad apparently totaled thousands of millions of Ethiopian dollars, which have about half the value of U.S. dollars.

The state television that evening broadcast films of starving children in drought-stricken areas of the country, contrasting the scenes with films showing the royal family's opulent way of living.

The next day, the emperor was deposed.

The New Rulers

Selassie's overthrow culminated a process that began last January. Successive mutinies by noncommissioned officers and enlisted men in Ethiopia's 55,000-man armed forces eventually gave rise to the formation in June

of the military committee that today rules the country.

Underlying the military revolt was a deepening political and social crisis highlighted by the regime's indifference to the disastrous drought and famine, which claimed the lives of at least 100,000 peasants, and the obvious failure to isolate and defeat the growing national liberation struggle in the northernmost province of Eritrea.

One of the few descriptions of the new ruling group to appear in the Western press so far is by the *Washington Post's* correspondent in Addis Ababa, David B. Ottaway.

"The official title of the group," Ottaway reported September 8, "is the 'Coordinating Committee of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, Police and Territorial Army,' which perhaps reveals the key role it plays in trying to bring together the disparate branches of the military."

According to Ottaway, the committee has changed its size and composition several times since it first appeared in late June. "It has had as many as 120 members and is believed to have 88 now.

"The highest-ranking members are majors, the lowest are privates. Many are American-trained, but most of the key members are believed to be graduates of Ethiopia's own military academies. Many members are lawyers."

The committee includes delegations from each of the army's four divisions and all other branches of the armed forces plus the police, the territorial army, and the military academies.

At the top of the committee, Ottaway said, "there is a kind of higher committee of 7 to 12 officers and a chairman who has been identified as Maj. Mengeste Hailemariam, a graduate of Holeta Military Academy outside Addis Ababa and head of the ordnance company of the 3d Division based in Harar in eastern Ethiopia."

The other major military figure is Lieutenant General Aman Michael Andom, the front man of the new military regime.

Struggle in Eritrea

One of Aman's first acts upon being appointed minister of defense in August was to undertake a "fact-finding" tour of Eritrea to attempt to convince the local population that the military rulers in Addis Ababa would

govern in their interests. Aman himself is of Eritrean nationality.

On August 28, the general addressed some 20,000 Eritreans in a stadium at Asmara, the capital of the province. Jean de la Guérvivière wired this report to *Le Monde*:

"Buttoned up tight in his uniform, General Michael Aman Andom . . . spoke consecutively in Tigrinya (the language of the orthodox population of Tigre and Eritrea), in Arabic (the language of the Muslims who constitute half the population of Eritrea), and in Amharic, to bring 'a message of peace,' to denounce the 'errors of the past,' and to affirm the desire of the 'people's government' to end the 'segregation' the Eritreans have suffered. He made no allusion to the emperor or to the Liberation Front."

For *Le Monde's* correspondent, "the minister's deliberately ambiguous speech recalled de Gaulle's 'I have understood you,' or the first declarations of General Spínola on the future of the Portuguese overseas territories.

"General Aman gives the impression of navigating by sight, caught between the desire to maintain the unity of the kingdom, if that is still possible, and the desire to get rid of a problem that he has said cannot be resolved by force."

The size of the audience at the August 28 rally was hardly decisive proof of the central government's control over Eritrea. Industries had been ordered to close down so that workers could attend; and the Eritrean Liberation Front itself had not advised against participation. Moreover, *Le Monde* noted, "the Asmara region, on the upper plateau, should not be confused with the rest of the province, which, especially in the North is controlled by the Liberation Front."

The extent of the liberation forces' control in Eritrea was indicated in a dispatch by de la Guérvivière published in the September 6 *Le Monde*. "The government," he reported from Asmara, "controls the regions of Mas-sawa, Asmara, and the road that links those cities together with Keren and Agordat, with extensions into Sudan. South of that road link, the rebels have infiltrated, especially along the coast, although the ELF is not dominant. But the North belongs to the rebels. Their headquarters is established close to Kerora, near the Sudanese border, and they have two 'advance bases' in the interior, near

Kafka and Biskia."

In the areas it controls, the ELF allows passage of freight provided "taxes" are paid regularly by shippers. The forty or so Italian plantation owners who grow fruit and vegetables between Keren and Agordat made regular tax payments to the ELF equivalent to the taxes they still pay Addis Ababa.

The ELF claims that it can mobilize up to 15,000 men, equivalent to the number of Ethiopian forces currently committed to operations in the province.

Instead of defusing the Eritreans' striving toward independence, the successive shifts of government in Addis Ababa seem so far to have strengthened the liberation movement. Even longtime collaborators with the Selassie regime in Eritrea have been pressured to take a proindependence stance. *Le Monde* interviewed one of the twenty-three Eritrean deputies in the Ethiopian parliament who resigned August 16 to protest the government's brutal repression in the northern province.

"I will never reconsider my resignation," he said. "As far as I am concerned, I want total independence, but I can't say so publicly, or I would be immediately arrested. I have no confidence in the military men who have taken power. The most they can propose is a federation. The Eritreans will never be satisfied with that, for they have suffered too much from Ethiopian domination in the past."

Somali Border Dispute

Another major concern of the officers in the Armed Forces Committee is the vulnerability of the Ogaden Desert region, which borders Somalia. The region is ethnically Somali and, like Eritrea, has a large Muslim population. Moreover, it is rumored to possess substantial oil reserves. Somali claims to the region have been played up by the new military rulers of Ethiopia as a rallying point for national unity.

The pending reopening of the Suez Canal to international shipping enhances the strategic importance of both Eritrea and Somalia, which lie along the Red Sea coast and the Gulf of Aden. Ethiopian officials have invoked an alleged threat of Soviet military assistance to Somalia to pressure

Washington to increase its aid to their own armed forces.

Washington has responded favorably. The September 9 *Christian Science Monitor* reported that "the U. S., which since 1952 has provided Ethiopia with \$10 to \$15 million worth of military assistance each year, shipped nearly \$22 million in military supplies, grants, and credits to the Ethiopians in fiscal 1974 and has budgeted \$16 million for 1975."

However, while the United States and other imperialist powers obviously hope that the new military rulers will be able to contain the process in Ethiopia with due respect for private property, particularly for foreign investments, the recent events cannot be reduced to a U. S.-inspired conspiracy.

The key factor sparking the social ferment was the 1973 famine. "... it is probable," Ottaway reported September 8, "that more people have died of starvation in Ethiopia than in all of the six West African drought-stricken countries put together." The famine ravages indicated not only the political bankruptcy of the Selassie regime, but also the urgent need to end the semifeudal conditions of Ethiopia's countryside.

Among the first to openly revolt were sections of the military, especially junior officers educated in the anti-imperialist, antifeudal agitation of the student movement. They were generally supported by the bulk of the army's ranks, who have their origins among the peasant masses.

In the eight months since the military movement began, Ethiopia has experienced a chain reaction of protests from wide sectors of the civilian population, ranging from students and priests to prostitutes and taxi drivers. In February the economy was paralyzed by the country's first general strike. It was these mobilizations as much as the military revolt that resulted in the replacement of two successive civilian governments this year.

The deepening class struggle made it clear that if the junior officers had not moved decisively to curb the emperor's powers, and ease him from office, other forces would come to the fore politically—forces that would not be content to stop with a mere change in the regime.

In the sense that the Armed Forces Committee represented a reliable alternative to the discredited Selassie,

it is probable that Washington and other imperialist governments "supported" and possibly even encouraged them. The same foreign governments, which themselves stalled on international famine relief efforts, are now cynically endorsing the military's efforts to paint Selassie as solely responsible for the famine deaths.

Military Rulers Dig In

Already, the new military rulers have shown a marked reluctance to respond to the more far-reaching demands and needs of the masses. They appear uneasy at the possible scope of student mobilizations, despite the students' pledge of allegiance.

Analyzing the fall of Selassie in the September 13 *New York Times*, Paul Hofmann noted that "big trouble was generally predicted for next Monday [September 16] when the university and other schools, closed since last winter, were scheduled to reopen. It appears plausible that the ruling military committee decided to proclaim the end of the Emperor's long reign yesterday to preempt student-led demonstrations that seemed imminent and inevitable."

The new military rulers have not shown any proclivity toward ideological statements. The "revolution" in Ethiopia is "searching for an ideology," Ottaway wrote in the September 8 *Washington Post*. "Its leaders have even contacted several Ethiopian intellectuals to write one," he added.

"To date, their verbose communiqués have stressed the need for national unity and accelerated economic development and have manifested a homespun populism, attacking the big money and corruption of the monarchical establishment."

The military have stated very clearly, however, that they have no intention of nationalizing imperialist interests operating in Ethiopia. On September 5, the Armed Forces Committee issued a statement denouncing rumors of pending nationalization of foreign companies as "malicious" and the work of "enemies of the revolution." It said foreign investors had nothing to fear and encouraged them to continue doing business.

This statement was followed the next day by a similar pledge in the government-run English-language daily, the *Ethiopian Herald*.

Foreign private investment in Ethiopia was estimated by the *Washington Post* on September 7 to be valued at about US\$300 million.

The Armed Forces Committee has explained that its current nationalizations are aimed only at companies owned by the royal family or the nobility. Ottaway reported September 8: "In its investigations into the emperor's private fortune, the committee has looked into the running of the major national companies and found the royal family's interests more often than not. Whenever it has felt that the monarchy has raided the public treasury for private gains, the military has nationalized (or renationalized) the company."

"The National Resources Combine, owning an enormous amount of real estate and subsidiary companies throughout the country, the General Ethiopian Transport Co. and the St. George Brewery have been taken over, and many more are expected to be nationalized."

On another key question—agrarian reform—the military has been remarkably vague. In a statement issued September 12, the day of Selassie's overthrow, the Armed Forces Committee promised to give priority to land reform, adding that the slogan of its domestic program would be "Land to the people." However, it provided no details. A thirteen-point manifesto the committee issued July 9 did not even mention agrarian reform.

In a country where more than 95 percent of the population are peasants, and where the whole social system is based on semifeudal relations of production, it is the regime's response to the agrarian question that will determine its future. In this respect, the new rulers' first steps have held out little hope for the great mass of the Ethiopian people. □

Kurdish Refugees Flee to Iran

More than 100,000 Kurdish refugees fleeing Iraqi bombing raids have streamed into Iran, according to a September 5 Reuters dispatch. More than 80,000 of them are living in a dozen crowded refugee camps.

The largest refugee camp, at Siryas, was built for 3,000 but now houses 12,600 in tents. More than 60 percent of the refugees are children under fifteen and most of the rest are women.

The Strange Pardon—Why Did Ford Do It?

By Michael Baumann

"... in turning over direction of the Government to Vice President Ford I know, as I told the nation when I nominated him for that office 10 months ago, that the leadership of America will be in good hands."

— Richard Nixon, August 8.

Richard Nixon's replacement by Gerald Ford was supposed to end the credibility gap. For a few weeks the maneuver seemed to work so well that Ford even began to talk about running for the presidency on his own in 1976. The honeymoon lasted thirty days.

When Ford pardoned Nixon September 8, the pretense came to an end. His image as a simple but honest soul congenitally incapable of telling a lie or taking part in a cover-up had been shattered beyond recognition.

The reaction was immediate. Letters, telegrams, and phone calls of protest flooded the White House. Demonstrators greeted Ford's public appearances with such signs as "'74 Ford, Just Another Lemon." Judges demonstrated by setting criminals free.

"... Ford, after a couple of clean weeks, is suddenly stinking with the familiar odor of deals, private arrangements and political payoffs," wrote columnist Pete Hamill in the September 9 *New York Post*.

"... the President is now seen for what he is—an ordinary pol," Joseph Kraft wrote in the September 10 *Washington Post*.

The editors of the *New York Times*, who are entitled to an ample share of the credit for picturing Ford as the opposite of Nixon, drew up an initial assessment of the damage done.

"With his signature on President Nixon's pardon a week ago today," they wrote September 15, "President Gerald R. Ford committed an act of monumental folly that insured the cover-up of a cover-up, subverted the spirit of the law and the Constitution, plunged the country once again into bitter political divisions and under-

mined Mr. Ford's own credibility as a man of judgment, candor, and competence."

Why did Ford pardon Nixon? Several explanations have been offered.

Ford is fundamentally stupid. Various reporters have suggested that limited mental capacities may have prevented the new president from accurately calculating the political consequences of pardoning Nixon.

Others were won over to this theory when it was announced September 10 that Ford was considering pardoning everyone involved in Watergate as a means of calming the public outcry over the "special treatment" for Nixon.

But one of Ford's old cronies in Congress pointed to the weakness of this explanation. "It is true that Jerry doesn't read too many books," he told *New York Post* columnist James Wechsler. "But don't underestimate his political shrewdness—or his ambition."

The White House camarilla put it across. This explanation has its supporters too. Ford, in making up his mind about the Nixon pardon, wrote William V. Shannon in the September 11 *New York Times*, "relied on Philip W. Buchen, his former law partner from Grand Rapids who is now White House counsel, and Benton L. Becker, a young Washington attorney who acted as secret intermediary between the White House and Mr. Nixon."

"In private practice, Mr. Becker recently represented two disreputable businessmen convicted of stock fraud who now accuse him of urging them to give false testimony, a charge he denies. Mr. Buchen's defense of Mr. Becker takes us right back to the heyday of the Nixon Administration: 'Becker is just as straight as he can be. He's a very savvy guy whose loyalty belongs to the Oval Office.'"

But since when is the Republican party run by a few hacks from Grand Rapids, Michigan, and their hired hands?

Ford was worried about Nixon's health. The White House played this one up to the hilt, hoping perhaps to

find some as yet untapped reserve of sympathy for Nixon. Administration sources and Nixon family members spread the tale that Nixon is a very sick man, that he is "in a deep depression," that a delay in the pardon might induce a nervous breakdown, that he might even commit suicide. Periodic medical bulletins were issued on the status of Nixon's phlebitis.

It did not work. The public knows Nixon too well. "Sudden bad health," William V. Shannon pointed out in the September 13 *New York Times*, is the "oldest dodge of the criminal defendant."

James Wechsler wrote in the September 13 *New York Post*: "... now, as members of [Nixon's] family and anonymous sources around Ford offer ominous portraits of Nixon's condition, a general impulse is to reserve judgment and even to wonder whether this is a stealthy, concerted Nixon-Ford counteroffensive against the public revulsion created by the unconditional pardon."

"... So widespread is the legacy of doubt that even a medical certificate offered in his behalf would arouse instant questions about the background of the doctor. . . ."

Ford just acted impulsively. "... the last four days," reported the September 12 *Wall Street Journal*, "have shaken the confidence of Ford allies inside and outside the administration. They are asking two basic questions: Does the new President know his own mind? And can he be counted upon to take major actions in an orderly manner?"

Those who believe that the pardon, or at least its timing, was an impulsive act point to supposed tactical advantages Ford could have secured by granting the pardon in a different way.

"In retrospect," columnists Evans and Novack wrote September 12, "some Ford intimates now deeply regret that the President did not embark on a major campaign in Congress for a resolution looking toward par-

don the minute he took office. . . .

"Even without such a resolution, one leading House Democrat said that if Ford had given advance notice to allies in Congress, a powerful backfire could have been built, partially offsetting the devastating political reaction of last Sunday's shocker."

Nixon faced imminent indictment and Ford had to act fast. Jack Anderson in his September 12 column said: "Special Watergate prosecutor Leon Jaworski would have sought an indictment against former President Nixon 'in a matter of weeks,' according to sources familiar with the plans, if President Ford hadn't intervened with a pardon."

"... Jaworski believed he had 'an iron-clad case' against Nixon and would get an 'almost certain conviction,' our sources report."

Nixon made a secret deal with Ford. A year ago, when asked if he would use the power of pardon when he became president, Ford replied: "I do not think the public would stand for it." At his first presidential news conference August 28 he pledged he would let legal proceedings against all Watergate figures take their course.

This was strictly for public consumption. Two days after the news conference, White House counsel Becker was in San Clemente, negotiating the final terms of the pardon arrangement with Nixon. Obviously the broad outlines of the deal had been worked out some time ago. Evans and Novack provided details in their September 12 column:

"... President Ford secretly informed intimates that a presidential pardon for Nixon—eventually—was an absolute certainty. . . .

"The bridge between Nixon and Ford was Nixon's White House chief of staff, Gen. Alexander Haig, and Secretary of State Kissinger. . . .

"... Nixon left the White House convinced that Ford was, indeed, committed."

"Nixon had one thought and only one on his mind during those last days and that was his pardon,' one highly qualified Ford insider told us. 'If he hadn't believed he had the pardon in his pocket he might have put the country through the torture of full impeachment proceedings.'"

Nixon knew his man. He hand-picked Ford as his successor because he knew that Ford, a congenital polit-

ical hack, would pay off the favor. The deal included, of course, a purse of \$850,000 to Nixon to cover the "transitional period."

Ford feels relieved at having honestly lived up to the deal, thus demonstrating that after all there is such a thing as honor among thieves. A friend of Ford's has reported how Ford's spirits have lifted.

"... although the political climate may be stormy for Mr. Ford just now," Dennis Farney wrote in the

September 12 *Wall Street Journal*, an "intimate believes that by getting the Nixon decision behind him, the new President has eased his mind and freed himself to move on to other matters. You could tell that, this friend says, just by the way the President played golf last weekend."

"He played a lousy game Saturday. I didn't know what was bothering him. But Sunday afternoon (after the pardon announcement), he was terrific, just terrific." □

Kissinger in Personal Charge of Plot

CIA Job on Allende Approved by Ford

By Dick Fidler

At a Washington news conference September 16, President Gerald Ford felt forced to admit that the Central Intelligence Agency had carried out clandestine operations in Chile against the Allende government. He indicated that similar operations are carried on in other countries, and he said he supported such efforts "to help implement foreign policy and protect national security."

Referring to recent revelations that the CIA had funneled millions of dollars into Chile in efforts to block, subvert, and overthrow the Allende regime, Ford said that these operations were intended "to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspaper and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties."

Ford said he would not "pass judgment on whether it's permitted or authorized under international law."

The president denied that the U. S. government was involved "in any way whatsoever in the coup itself." But his remarks put the lie to repeated statements by State Department spokesmen that Washington had not interfered in Chilean politics.

Ford's comments are certain to fuel the growing demands in Congress and newspaper editorials for a public investigation of the CIA's role in Chile. They will no doubt also stimulate some uneasy thinking in other world capitals about CIA operations.

The current furor began September

8 with the publication of secret testimony by CIA director William Colby before a congressional subcommittee that the Nixon administration had authorized more than \$8 million between 1970 and 1973 to finance secret CIA efforts to overthrow the Allende government. Since then, the story of Washington's subversive activities in Chile has continued to unravel. The growing accumulation of evidence indicates that Henry Kissinger took personal charge of the secret intervention in Chile's internal affairs.

On September 16, the day of Ford's news conference, it was revealed that the staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations had recommended that contempt of Congress charges be placed against former CIA director Richard Helms and three former officials of the Nixon administration because of misleading testimony they gave at last year's hearings on the ITT's role in Chile.

The staff's report, prepared at the request of Senator Frank Church, who is chairman of the subcommittee, singled out testimony by Charles A. Meyer, former assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs; Edward M. Korry, U. S. ambassador to Chile from 1967 to 1971; and William V. Broe, former director of clandestine activities for the CIA. All three, with Helms, had insisted that Washington followed a policy of "nonintervention" in Chile.

On the basis of their testimony, the committee had cleared ITT of charges that it actively solicited CIA intervention to overthrow Allende.

In addition, the September 17 *New York Times* reported, Helms, Meyer, and John M. Hennessy, former assistant secretary of the treasury for international affairs, might have committed perjury in testimony before the subcommittee.

The report noted Hennessy's sworn testimony that the Nixon administration's economic sanctions against Chile were based exclusively on that country's lower credit rating after Allende's election. This claim had been knocked askew on September 15 when the *New York Times*, citing "well-informed Government sources," revealed that Kissinger had "personally directed a far-reaching Nixon administration program designed to curtail economic aid and credits to Chile" after Allende's election in 1970.

According to Washington correspondent Seymour Hersh, Kissinger, "who was then serving as President Nixon's adviser on national security, took charge of a series of weekly inter-agency meetings at which Administration officials worked out a policy of economic sanctions—or 'retaliation,' as one source put it—against Chile. . . .

"The whole purpose of the meetings in the first couple of months after the election was to insure that the various aid agencies and lending agencies were rejiggered to make sure that [Allende] wasn't to get a penny," said one well-informed source."

Over the next two years, Hersh noted, the Chilean government was denied dozens of loans by the World Bank and by the Export-Import Bank, a U.S. government agency. "In addition, Chile's short-term line of credit with private banks fell from \$220-million in 1971 to less than \$40-million a year later."

A previous attempt to publish details of CIA clandestine operations in Chile was frustrated by the agency itself. In the September 11 *New York Times*, Hersh reported that many of the passages censored at CIA insistence from a book written by two former government intelligence officers, entitled *The C. I. A. and the Cult of Intelligence*, had contained "the first printed account of some of the agency's clandestine activities" against

Allende. After a lengthy court battle, the book was finally published last June with blank spaces where 168 passages were deleted.

As initially written, the book's chapter on Chile began with the following quote from Kissinger at a meeting of the 40 Committee on June 27, 1970, more than two months before Allende's election:

"I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."

This, together with much of the chapter, was deleted by the CIA.

The accumulating evidence of CIA, State Department, and White House complicity in Allende's overthrow has led to demands for a congressional inquiry. Figures supporting such an inquiry include Senator Edward Kennedy, who is chairman of a Senate Refugee subcommittee that is investigating violations of human rights in Chile; Senator Frank Church, who chaired the ITT hearings; and Representative Michael J. Harrington, whose correspondence with the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee led to the Colby testimony coming to public knowledge.

Harrington said he would formally request the House committee, of which he is a member, to summon Kissinger and Colby to testify.

Harrington told the *New York Times* that his initial reaction after reading the classified 48-page transcript of Colby's testimony to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, was one of "profound shock."

"I did not expect to see the documentation of theories I hadn't held myself," he said. "I'd never subscribed to the conspiracy theories" about the U.S. complicity in the overthrow of Allende.

The calls for congressional hearings have been backed by some of the most powerful newspapers, including the *New York Times*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and the *Washington Post*. The editors of the latter paper noted that the current revelations made nonsense of the State Department's attempts throughout the 1960s "to keep Cuba a hemispheric pariah" on the alleged grounds that the Castro regime supported "subversion" in Latin America.

". . . whatever Cuba has allegedly

done in the past is peanuts next to what the United States has admittedly done in Chile," they wrote.

Others have gone further. Tom Wicker, the head of the Washington bureau of the *New York Times*, suggested that the congressional hearings on Kissinger's confirmation as secretary of state should be reopened. The mood of many American liberals was captured by a former senior officer with the United Nations in Chile, who urged Kissinger's resignation. "If a resignation is not forthcoming," he said, in a guest column in the *New York Times*, "an honorable United States Congress must move to impeach."

Kissinger has adopted the stock response of every capitalist statesman when under fire: pass the buck. While refusing to comment on the revelations about his involvement in the Chile subversion, Kissinger "did authorize his spokesman, Robert Anderson, to volunteer to newsmen yesterday the fact that the 40 Committee only acted upon the unanimous approval of its five members," the *New York Times* reported September 11.

Moreover, this spokesman added pointedly, "all 40 Committee decisions must be approved by the President before being put into effect."

In the past, Kissinger was only too eager to take credit for his foreign-policy moves. And members of Con-

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gress and editorial writers were just as eager to praise this "superstatesman," who holds a Nobel peace prize.

Today, however, a different mood is developing.

In its September 11 editorial calling for a full congressional inquiry into the CIA's role in Chile, the *Washington Post* recalled that during Kissinger's confirmation hearing a year ago, he was asked if it wouldn't be better to take the CIA out of such clandestine efforts as overturning Latin American governments.

"There are certain types of these activities, difficult to describe here," Kissinger replied, "that it would be dangerous to abolish."

Such statements demonstrate that an inquiry into the recent revelations on U.S. intervention in Chile, if pursued, cannot be limited to the persons and policies involved in that country alone. Inevitably, it must pose fundamental questions about the whole record of U.S. intervention against foreign governments deemed hostile to the interests of Wall Street. □

Included Payoffs to Politicians, Military

Expose CIA's Role in 1967 Greek Coup

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been deeply involved in Greece's politics for twenty-five years, even providing direct financial subsidies to prominent political and military figures, according to information leaked to the *New York Times*.

Washington correspondent David Binder reported August 1:

"Until the last few weeks of the Athens military junta, according to high American officials and to Greek sources, American operatives remained quite close to the men in power in Greece.

"A United States specialist on Greece said that the C. I. A. continued to maintain about 60 full-time operatives in Greece and that some had been there 15 years or longer.

"The agency, the specialist said, had close contact not only with George Papadopoulos, the Greek colonel who led the 1967 coup, but also with his successor, Brig. Gen. Demetrios Ioannides."

The secret information made available to the *New York Times* confirms what many observers have deduced, that the CIA helped grease the way for the colonels' coup in 1967.

"Mr. Papadopoulos, who was deposed last November," Binder continued, "was among many Greek political and military figures who received personal subsidies over many years from the intelligence agency, two United

States officials said. Mr. Papadopoulos had received money from the agency since 1952."

The "operative closest to General Ioannides" was described as "Peter Koromilas, a Greek-American who also went by the name of Korom."

"An American official said Mr. Koromilas had been sent to Athens to confer with General Ioannides shortly before the July 15 coup in Cyprus, which was headed by Greek officers."

The CIA's station chief in Athens from 1968 to 1972, James M. Potts, was said to be on very close terms with Papadopoulos. Officially, Potts was listed as a political officer in the U.S. Embassy.

According to a State Department official, Binder reported, "when Mr. Potts left Athens in August, 1972, his farewell party was attended by virtually every member of the military junta. The American Ambassador, Henry J. Tasca, seeing who was present, turned and walked out, the source said, after which he sent a cablegram to Washington protesting Mr. Potts's action."

The ambassador, apparently, was trying to cultivate a somewhat less tainted image of Washington's relations with the Athens dictatorship and found his work made more difficult by the indiscretion of his "political officer."

The junta overthrew the Greek king,

as well as the parliamentary government. But the CIA had no grudge against the monarchy. Potts's predecessor in Athens was John M. Maury, the agency's station chief from 1962 to 1968.

"Maury worked on behalf of the palace in 1965," a State Department official told the *New York Times*. "He helped King Constantine buy Center Union Deputies so that the George Papandreou Government was toppled."

Maury, whose efforts did not go unappreciated, has been promoted. He is now Assistant Secretary of Defense for Congressional Relations.

Although the CIA helped overthrow George Papandreou, it previously had a friendlier relationship with the liberal politician. While "generally leaning to Greek conservative politicians," Binder reported, "the agency flirted briefly with the variant in Greek politics offered by George Papandreou and his Harvard-educated son, Andreas, in the early nineteen-sixties, a former Greek official said.

"In the beginning, say about 1962 or '63, the C. I. A. used Andreas as an agent, as a resource and supported him," the Greek said. "His buddy was Campbell," he added, referring to Laughlin A. Campbell, the C. I. A. station chief from 1959 to 1962."

Andreas Papandreou issued a statement August 2 accusing the *New York Times* of attempting to damage his reputation.

"We charge David Binder and The New York Times with being parties to attempted political sabotage in the internal affairs of our country, Greece," Papandreou said. However, the statement, as quoted in the *Times*, did not specifically deny the information in Binder's article.

Papandreou is today the leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement. Its program calls for Greece's withdrawal from NATO and the European Common Market.

A spokesman at CIA headquarters said he had no general comment on the *New York Times* information, Binder reported. "He did say, however, that C. I. A. agents follow orders approved at the highest level in Washington."

In a transparent attempt to diminish the impact of its revelations, the *New York Times* reported in the leading paragraphs of its article that the CIA

had been instructed by top officials of the Nixon administration "not to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece or to play favorites among Greek politicians." This was said to

"reflect the current thinking of Secretary of State Kissinger and of the Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby—that Americans should keep out of the politics of other

countries as much as possible."

Such reports should be granted as much credence as earlier Washington denials of interference in Greek politics. □

Pickets at UN Protest Murder of 14 Workers

Shah Spills More Blood in Face of Rising Unrest

By Majid Namvar



New York, September 13. Demonstrators carried coffin for each murdered worker.

A picket line of some 150 persons was held in front of the United Nations building in New York September 13 to protest the murder of fourteen Iranian workers by the regime of Shah Reza Pahlevi.

The protest, organized by the Iranian Students Association, later moved to the offices of the *New York Daily News* and the *New York Times* to call attention to the lack of press coverage of the shah's repressive measures.

The recent killings occurred in two separate incidents, one in Tabriz, the other in Tehran. In the first, Mohammad-Saleh Jahani, an elected representative of the Tabriz transport workers, was killed under torture by agents of SAVAK, the shah's secret police. In the second, thirteen strikers

at the Irana and Khavar manufacturing company were killed in a confrontation with SAVAK agents.

News of the death of another victim of the shah's regime has also recently come from Iran. The July issue of *Mardom*, the monthly newspaper of the Tudeh party (exiled Communist party) of Iran, reports that Parviz Hekmatjoo, a member of the Tudeh Central Committee, was killed under torture last June after eight years' imprisonment.

Despite the efforts of Hekmatjoo's family, the shah has refused to give up Hekmatjoo's body; marks left from years of torture would have proved too embarrassing to the regime.

Word has also been received from Iran that dissident playwright Gholam-Hosein Saedi has been arrested

by the secret police.

News of Saedi's arrest came in a letter sent by the Iranian Writers Union to the Imperial College Iranian Society in London. The letter, which was dated June 11, said that Saedi had been detained for more than twenty days and that nothing further was known about his fate. All of Saedi's writings are reported to have been removed from the bookstores.

The letter appealed to "the progressive organizations outside of Iran" to help free him. This is the first time in four years that the union, which is under severe pressure from the regime, has issued a public statement in defense of a colleague.

Food Shortages

Tensions in Iran have also been fueled by the uncertain economic situation, which even the government-controlled press has been compelled to acknowledge. The August 24 international airmail edition of the Tehran daily *Kayhan* gave the following account of the shortage in basic food items:

"Consumption of essential foods, reflecting rising prosperity, increased by 30 percent in the past year. Domestic production has not kept up with demand. The distribution system needs an overhaul. And the reaction of the government departments has been somewhat sluggish in the past."

Kayhan added that to meet the shortages, the government has recently had to import 1.5 million tons of wheat, more than one million sheep, and 100,000 tons of rice. It has also had to subsidize the price of basic food items, including meat, bread,

sugar, vegetable oil, and rice. More than \$3,000 million has been set aside to continue the subsidies until 1978.

Aside from passing drastic legislation providing for the death penalty for food hoarders and issuing frequent pledges to "eliminate corruption," the shah's regime has offered no solution to the problem of inflation.

For the masses, however, there must be a solution. With an official inflation rate of almost 16 percent and long lines in front of the supermarkets because of the food shortage, discontent is mounting, particularly among workers. Despite the severe repression and the total lack of trade unions, an increasing number of strikes are taking place.

Strikes Not Reported

Although there is no mention of these strikes in the shah's press, news about them has made its way abroad through reports by travelers. One such strike was staged by the oil refinery workers in Abadan and Tehran. During the strike, which is said to have lasted about five days, workers came to the refineries but refused to turn to. The strike was eventually crushed by the refinery guards and the shah's police.

The continuing boycott of the two major daily newspapers in Tehran is a further reflection of public discontent. Last May the prices of these government-controlled newspapers, *Etleat* and *Kayhan*, were doubled. People simply stopped buying them. Reports from Iran indicate that the boycott has cut the papers' sales by 70 percent.

The boycott is not confined to the capital. When a truckload of papers from Tehran arrived in Tabriz not too long ago, people who had gathered outside the city limits blocked the road, forcing the driver to take the papers back to Tehran.

In the midst of this climate of political repression and economic hardship, Tehran is holding the Seventh Asian Olympic Games. To prevent any protest actions during the games, the shah has deployed a large number of troops in and around the city's expensive new stadium, built especially for the games.

At the same time, the shah is squandering huge sums of money on the purchase of the most up-to-date mili-

tary equipment from Washington. Part of it is for use in his military intervention in Dhofar, where the Iranian army is attempting to crush the struggle for national liberation.

The shah's intervention in Dhofar has been strongly opposed by the student movement, both inside and outside Iran. In addition, the parents of soldiers killed in Dhofar have pro-

tested to the foreign ministry, demanding the return of their sons' bodies.

One indication of the war's growing unpopularity can be seen in the fact that graffiti voicing antiwar sentiments are beginning to appear on walls. One such slogan, seen in Raam-Hormoz in southern Iran, said: "Why send our children to death in Dhofar? Our soldiers must not die there!" □

A Mexican Patricia Hearst?

Wily Political Boss Outfoxes Kidnappers

By Eugenia Aranda

The most spectacular kidnapping to date in Mexico occurred August 28. During the morning 83-year-old José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández was abducted in Guadalajara. In addition to being the father-in-law of President Luis Echeverría Álvarez, Zuno is one of the ruling class's most important political bosses.

Zuno is a former governor of the state of Jalisco, a founder of the Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara [UAG—Autonomous University of Guadalajara], and a former president of the state's forestry council. Currently he is adviser to the Federal Electricity Commission (one of the two large bodies that administer the nationalized electrical industry). And, as if that were not enough, he is also a general.

But, leaving aside his officially recognized standing, Zuno Hernández is one of the sponsors of the Federación de Estudiantes de Guadalajara [FEG—Guadalajara Student Federation], the organization that has introduced a reign of terror at the UAG with gangster actions and armed attacks against leftists. The FEG has modern weapons and persons well trained in their use. Up to now at least, that has enabled it to maintain adequately enough the government's iron control over the university. José Zuno, one of twelve sons of J. Guadalupe, used to be president of the FEG.

Using this and other methods, the octogenarian political boss continues to wield considerable influence in the councils of his class in Jalisco, which is one of the most industrialized and

richest states of Mexico.

A group called the Frente Revolucionario Armado del Pueblo [FRAP—People's Armed Revolutionary Front] took credit for the kidnapping. Nonetheless, the Mexican daily *Excelsior* reported August 30 that Alejandro Hernández, attorney for several FRAP members who were arrested for their participation in an earlier kidnapping, stated that the kidnappers of Zuno Hernández did not belong to the organization. But all police reports, as well as two communiqués from the kidnappers, held the FRAP to be responsible.

The Mexican government maintained the position it adopted in October 1973—of not negotiating with the guerrillas.

The position dates from the kidnapping by another urban guerrilla group, the Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre [September 23 Communist League], of industrialist Fernando Aranguren and the honorary British consul to Guadalajara, Anthony Duncan Williams.

It turned out that the FRAP obtained neither the \$1.6 million nor the release of various political prisoners it had demanded. On the other hand, it did succeed in touching off a journalistic avalanche to be seen nowhere but in Mexico. What was interesting was that this time the target selected was U.S. imperialism.

In its August 30 editorial, *Excelsior* said, "Official North American agencies underwrite a true transnational enterprise to encourage unrest,

break the law, disrupt social institutions, intimidate political parties, and apply a range of operations extending in strict order from assaults on banks and businesses to kidnappings."

This imperialist plan, the editorial went on to say, has achieved its objectives in Uruguay, Bolivia, and Chile.

The scheme works this way, according to *Excelsior*:

Once the "emotional reaction to the kidnapping has worn off," people will "want the government to use armed force" against actions of this type. Once "the surreptitious work of the bands of assailants and assassins has been completed, the previously trained police and army emerge to impose the way of life that the United States government is introducing in Latin America—the fascism of dependency." The ultimate goal is "to shamelessly extend the borders of the United States to the ends of the earth."

The Zuno family itself contributed in an outstanding way to this "anti-imperialist" campaign.

Vicente Zuno told reporters interviewing him August 29 about the kidnapping of his father:

"This is an act that pollutes the atmosphere," because "our atmosphere is under assault by foreign imperialist interests, and particularly by North American imperialism." (*Excelsior*, August 30).

The situation reached such a point that newsmen hounded the United States ambassador to Mexico, Joseph John Jova, with questions about CIA intervention in the kidnapping. Of course, the ambassador replied that the idea was "impertinent and preposterous." In addition, he said that he did not know of a single case in which transnational enterprises or U.S. foundations were attacking Mexican institutions.

To appease the journalists and newspaper readers, he added that "in any case," if that were so, "the same thing would happen as it did in Chile, where the accusations were directed at the ITT."

It was J.G. Zuno himself, however, who gave the best performance in the show. And, at the same time, he was the first to affirm unambiguously that his kidnappers were leftist youth and not CIA agents.

The *Washington Post* of September 9 quoted him as saying at a news conference he granted the day after

he had been released by the guerrillas, "They [the guerrillas] gave me everything I wanted. They gave me my medicines, and I talked with them about philosophy, humanism."

He said he told them, "Boys, this is not the way to make your ideas known. Not by going around scaring families." He added, "They are clean-living boys, they're good boys, but they're mixed up. They want to change the world but they don't know how to do it."

That same day, the *New York Times* reported another part of Zuno's statement:

"The kidnappers, said José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández, were not nearly as dangerous to Mexicans as the United States Central Intelligence Agency and 'the Yankee imperialists and the capitalists who have no respect for anything.'"

"... Mr. Zuno said that the Government of his son-in-law had 'let itself come under control of the reactionary forces of the world.'"

But much more important than the verbiage of the government and the press is the witch-hunt that has been set in motion. The September 12 issue of *El Diario*, published in New York, reported that "the search for the kidnappers . . . continued today throughout the state of Jalisco with 'numerous' suspects detained, according to reports from the attorney general's office."

Now there is a new reason to intensify the "guerrilla hunt" that was launched May 30. That was when the Partido de los Pobres [the Poor People's party] kidnapped the 74-year-old Rubén Figueroa, who was running for governor of the southern state of Guerrero as the candidate of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional [PRI—Institutional Revolutionary party, the party that controls political life in Mexico]. Figueroa was "rescued" by the army September 7 after a confrontation with the guerrilla group.

Why did the FRAP release Zuno safe and sound without obtaining any of its demands and without having been apprehended by the police?

The FRAP—like all other guerrilla organizations in Mexico—is isolated from the struggle of the workers and students, and its actions have no relation to the strikes and mass mobilizations that are beginning to take place

once again in the country.

But, in addition, FRAP's political position—although it expresses itself in a very violent form—is not intransigent in its opposition to class collaboration.

When they freed Zuno, it was because they thought that they had committed an error in kidnapping a political boss who is also "fighting" against imperialism, and who has denounced the CIA and the transnational corporations.

And if Zuno is doing all that, isn't it possible to form an alliance with him, and with other political bosses like him, in a united front to fight against the common enemy?

The old chief turned out to be more foxy than the guerrillas. He talked with them about "philosophy and humanism" and convinced them that he was not one of the bad guys. He was able to convince them that he was not one of their political enemies.

This is not the first time the guerrillas have knuckled under in this way. When the Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre kidnapped Aranguren and Duncan Williams, it executed the former because he was an "exploiter," and freed the latter because he was only an employee carrying out orders that others gave him.

The comrades engaged in guerrilla warfare are off beam in two main ways:

1. They believe that their kidnappings, assaults, and executions are more effective than mass mobilizations in achieving national liberation, democratic rights, and better wages and working conditions. They do not believe that the proletariat can fight for itself; it needs outside help to do the work for it.

2. They hope that the "progressive" sector of the bourgeoisie—to which Zuno must belong, according to them—will be able to solve, or help to solve, the problems of the exploited. That is, they do not understand that the central prerequisite to success in the class struggle is maintenance of the proletariat's total class independence.

In this kidnapping, the only winners were the bourgeois politicians, like Zuno and his son-in-law, who were handed on a silver platter the chance to pose as anti-imperialists. The members of the FRAP ended up as "clean-living, good boys who want to change the world but who don't know how to do it." □

Peruvian Government Decries Torture

By Nestor Paz

[The following is a translation of the article "Gobierno Peruano Abre Campaña Contra la Tortura," which appears elsewhere in this issue.]

* * *

Lima

Continuing with a series of populist measures ranging from the nationalization of the International Petroleum Company, the agrarian reform, and the formation of the Industrial Community,* to the recent commutation of the sentences of leaders of the teachers union and the state take-over of the ultrarightist dailies, the Peruvian junta has startled the public with a campaign against the practice of torture by the police. The campaign was launched in the Lima press.

Articles in such dailies as *La Crónica* and *Ultima Hora* and in such magazines as *OIGA* and *Caretas* have denounced torture not only of common prisoners but also of political prisoners. (*Caretas* was closed down by the government but has recently begun to publish again.)

The minister of the interior has placed on trial four police officials accused of employing torture during interrogation. The general director of the Investigations Division of the Peruvian police has even been forced to resign. Since he obviously was the main individual responsible for the torture, his resignation was announced by the president of the republic himself.

Naturally the working class favors any measure that can lessen the harsh treatment and degradation of prisoners. This is a step forward compared to the killings carried out in

the past in full view of an entire penal colony. We cannot forget, for instance, the ghastly murder of "Ojón" and "Negro Hugo," two common prisoners, which Hugo Blanco denounced in the daily press from El Frontón [the island penal colony near Lima where Blanco was held for more than seven years.]

But it remains to be seen what benefits will be derived from the turn and whether the junta will carry out in a consistent way the campaign it has just launched.

The six years of the General Juan Velasco Alvarado regime have demonstrated that positive steps taken by the government have not been any obstacle to the employment of repressive measures whenever the government judged it convenient.

In 1969:

- The massacre of the peoples of Huanta and Ayacucho who were fighting for their right to gain an education. This left scores of dead and hundreds of wounded and imprisoned.

- The attacks with firearms, tear gas, and clubs on the numerous marches of workers at the Raúl and Cerro de Pasco mines.

- The police invasion of the University of San Marcos to impose Law 17437 [the university law, the most important provision of which was to rescind the autonomy of the universities].

In 1970:

- The armed invasion of the National University of Engineering resulting in numerous wounded.

- Systematic repression of all student mobilizations.

In 1971:

- The brutal repression of the national teachers' strike, after which five leaders of the union were deported along with Hugo Blanco and student leader Rolando Breña.

- The massacre of the Cobriza miners leaving twenty-three dead.

In 1972:

- The attack on the people of Puno when some 30,000 persons mobilized during the visit of the president's wife

to demand their rights. This time the death toll was five and many were wounded.

In 1973:

- Repression of the twenty-four-hour work stoppage in Chimbote demanding the dismissal of authorities and nonintervention from the government in the fishermen's unions. The work stoppage was respected by more than 40,000 workers affiliated to FESIDETA [Federación Sindical Departamental de Trabajadores de Ancash—Trade-Union Federation of the Department of Ancash]. A student and a worker were killed and four were injured by bullets.

In 1974:

- The repression last March of the marches of the Frente Unico de Rescatadores [Rescatadores United Front, a community organization in one of Lima's slums] and the FETIMP [Federación de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos del Perú—Federation of Miners and Metalworkers of Peru] resulting in four wounded and one dead.

Despite the regime's attempt to confuse the issue, it is clear that its moral stand against torture flows from the junta's need to polish its image in the eyes of the workers.

This becomes more and more difficult, since fundamental problems remain unsolved. The main problem is the growing inflation. It has become the major factor in the current series of workers' strikes and reawakening of the Peruvian students.

The Peruvian working class, with a dialectical vision of things, supports with all its energies each positive step taken by the junta. But for the working class and its revolutionary vanguard, it becomes more and more urgent each day to launch an inde-

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pendent struggle for the establishment of workers power. This is the only

way to guarantee a final solution to the problems of the masses, includ-

ing the problem of morality in public administration. □

Claim 'Primary Contradiction Has Shifted'

Swedish Maoists Shelve Defense of Vietnam

By Gunnar Wall

Stockholm

The Maoist bureaucracy's campaign against the "superpowers" has now begun to have its effects in Sweden as well. The Swedish Indochina movement has declared that it intends to transform itself into a "front against the superpowers," since the "main contradiction in the world has shifted" and "Vietnam can no longer be said to represent a flashpoint."

This movement, De Förenade FNL-Grupperna (DFFG—United National Liberation Front Groups), has been dominated by the Maoists since it began in the mid-1960s. In the upsurge of the student movement in the late 1960s, the Maoists succeeded in winning among the radicalized youth positions that were unusually strong for West European conditions. They maintained their control over a growing movement because no other leadership was present.

At the beginning of the war in Vietnam, the Social Democrats—who were in the government for this entire period—took a generally pro-U.S. position. The pro-Moscow Communist party, the Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna [Left party of Communists], presented a pacifist line. Trotskyism did not exist as a political force in the 1960s. Only in 1971 did the Swedish Trotskyists come together to form a united organization, the Revolutionära Marxisterna Förbundet [RMF—Revolutionary Marxist League].

The Maoists took advantage of the lack of competition to construct the movement according to their own sectarian interest. The DFFGs were built on the basis of individual membership, and admittance could be gained only by accepting a far-reaching political discipline, the primary objective of which was to eliminate any criticism of the leadership. Virtually all

criticism was labeled "trying to split the united front."

The Maoist conceptions of the character of the Vietnamese revolution, people's war, the cease-fire accords, and many other things were all promoted in the name of the DFFGs. This was described as "supporting the Vietnamese people on their own terms." Official statements from the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were produced to maintain this illusion.

Swedish radicalized youth, like youth in other countries, were strongly influenced by the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people and also tended to see the NLF/PRG as the revolutionary leadership that they could not find in their own country.

The Swedish Maoists managed to present themselves as the natural representatives of the Vietnamese in Sweden. Even when the scope of the demonstrations against Washington's war went far beyond the Maoists' sphere of influence, this situation persisted.

With the signing of the Paris accords, conditions changed. According to the Maoist doctrine, the war was as good as won. Consequently, at the end of 1973, the leadership got the Sixth Congress of the DFFGs to vote that the *main task* of the Swedish Indochina movement was to "study the world situation." Since that time a further directive for organizing these studies has reached the membership. The course of study is designed to "demonstrate" the DFFG leadership's contention in a statement to the ranks, namely, that what is now needed is an "anti-imperialist movement in Sweden based on the most important demands that go both against the superpowers and in support of the anti-imperialist struggle of the third world."

This turn got an extensive public airing in a debate conducted in *Aftonbladet*, the largest Social Democratic daily. The discussion was initiated by an open letter in the June 26 issue from Sara Lidman to De Förenade FNL-Grupperna.

Sara Lidman has become a well-known figure partly for her series of novels depicting life among the poor, rural population of Norrland and partly for her early opposition to the U.S. war in Indochina. Her hard work as a journalist and her many public appearances have been very important for the FNL movement, with which she has collaborated closely. Her eyewitness reports from Vietnam have also had a considerable impact on Swedish public opinion.

In her letter, she criticized the DFFG's new course very sharply. Among other things, she wrote:

"Just when Nixon, Kissinger, and Rockefeller would like nothing better than for people to start to talk about something else besides Vietnam, the DFFG leadership has called for talking about something else. 'Indochina is no longer the flashpoint,' they say. . . . 'Now the most urgent task is to study Soviet imperialism!' How the *Svenska Dagbladet* [the daily that openly represents the interests of the Swedish exporting firms] and the USA are going to like that! What a betrayal of the Vietnamese people! Dear FNLers and fellow demonstrators, have you taken leave of your senses?"

Furthermore, she maintained that the DFFG's view was not that of the NLF, and that "as before" the movement must base itself on the NLF's position. She also defended the Soviet Union's contribution, pointing to the material aid it has given.

In the July 5 issue of *Aftonbladet*, the DFFG national leadership an-

swered:

"The Paris accord was a victory for the Vietnamese people. Even if the U.S. imperialists are seeking ways to maintain their influence in Vietnam, this victory of the people is irreversible."

The DFFG leadership also dropped what had long been its trump card:

"The slogan 'Defend the Vietnamese People on Their Own Terms' does not mean that we have the same opinion as the DRV and the PRG on all political questions. It means that the Vietnamese are the ones who decide, and who know best, how the struggle should be conducted in Vietnam; we Swedes know best how the struggle should be conducted in Sweden." . . . "The prerequisite for a correct anti-imperialist policy is a good knowledge of the world situation. We ourselves must take the responsibility for our policy and carefully study who is our friend and who is our enemy." . . . "The Soviet Union's shipments of arms to Vietnam cannot deter us from studying the Soviets' role in world politics" . . . "In the UN conference on raw materials, the USA and the Soviet Union opposed the Third World's move for a new economic system. The superpowers have opposed the small nations' demand regarding the definition of territorial waters. In these changed conditions, the DFFG's congress in December 1973 decided to make studying the world situation an important task."

The debate continued with a series of contributions. In its July 23 issue, *Aftonbladet* published an article by Göte Kildén of the RMF. He wrote, among other things:

"Sara Lidman's decision to start an open fight against the DFFG leadership was motivated by the needs of the Indochinese revolution. She is fighting on the same ground as the Vietnamese people and against the same enemy. The new course the DFFG has announced has a completely different motive. It proceeds from the needs of the Chinese bureaucracy!"

Isoup Ganthay, the representative in Sweden of the FUNK [Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—National United Front of Cambodia] and the GRUNC [Gouvernement Royal Uni National de Cambodge—Royal United National Government of Cam-

bodia], made a sharp criticism of the DFFG leadership in a letter published in the July 30 issue of *Aftonbladet*. He wrote, in part:

"You have the right like any free person to criticize any country as you see fit, and even to conduct an anti-Soviet campaign."

"But you do my people a grave wrong in using my country to justify your anti-Soviet campaign. I have informed your comrades on many occasions that the Cambodian people will not tolerate any interference in their internal affairs. . . . You can, if you wish, continue to support the Cambodian people in their struggle against U.S. aggression. You should concentrate your efforts on this objective alone."

The longer the debate has gone on, the clearer has become the relationship between the DFFG leadership's new line and the special interest of the Chinese bureaucracy. The DFFG has definitely ceased being a broad united front against the U.S. war in Indochina. Its leadership denies the need for such unity. The resulting confusion is having far-reaching effects on radical opinion and on the possibilities for new mobilizations against the U.S. war in Indochina.

But the damage done by the DFFG leadership is not limited to cutting the throat of the Indochina movement. The Chinese leadership's campaign involves backing European chauvinism, a position that was reflected in its support for the European Economic Community. This aspect of Chinese foreign policy is dangerous not because European imperialism needs any encouragement from China to further its own interests but because such a position can influence radical groups in the European student and workers movement.

In the August 8 issue of *Dagens Nyheter*, a letter appeared from Jan Myrdal, a well-known writer and one of Swedish Maoism's ornaments:

"In recent months a discussion has developed that has been conducted primarily in *Aftonbladet* and *Ny Dag* [the VKP paper] but has also spilled over into other papers. The subject has been the orientation of the Swedish Vietnam movement. It is a discussion that will certainly prove of great importance, not only for pro-Vietnamese opinion in Sweden but in the long run perhaps also for Swedish foreign policy. Therefore, it would be dis-

honest not to take a position on it.

"Like it or not, the reason for the broad tide of opinion in favor of the Vietnamese people was the concern over our own future as an independent state—a concern that is natural in this world. In many countries in Europe there have been similar possibilities, but the public opinion favoring the Vietnamese people could not be made politically effective. In part, the cause of this is the fact that these countries were incorporated in a system of treaties that did not really leave any opening for such opinion."

"From what I read in periodicals from Vietnam, I am not sure that the foreign affairs department in Hanoi is entirely clear about how Swedish opinion and hence Swedish government policy was determined. But that is not very important, in part because all the foreign affairs departments I am familiar with are usually poorly informed and in part because what the foreign affairs department in Hanoi thinks about the state of affairs in Sweden has no effect on the situation here."

"Public opinion in Sweden has supported the Vietnamese people's struggle because it is closely bound up with our country's national existence. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are viewed, correctly, as permanent, more or less acute, threats to our national independence. . . . If public opinion became convinced that it was impossible to fight simultaneously against the Soviet Union's assault on Europe and the United States' assault on Asia, and if it was required to accept the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia for Vietnam's sake, then in a few weeks Vietnam would be forgotten."

"That seems right. That is the way it looks. I don't think that the people who are carrying on the discussion in *Aftonbladet* and *Ny Dag* have the least understanding of Swedish political realities. In general, this is not important, but in this case it can cost Vietnam dearly. It continues to be true that we must maintain our solidarity with Vietnam for the sake of our own security."

Myrdal's contribution shows the danger in the DFFGs' development. He himself has posed the question in the clearest way: For or against the Swedish bourgeoisie? And along with the Maoists he has answered: "For."

AROUND THE WORLD



Polish Dock Workers Strike

According to a report in the September 2 issue of the German newsweekly *Der Spiegel*, Polish dock workers in Gdansk and Gdynia, who brought down the Gomulka government with a militant strike in December 1970, were again engaged in a job action last summer.

The action, which paralyzed Poland's two major harbors during July, took the form of a massive slowdown. The usual loading and unloading time of up to three days per ship was stretched to ten days and more.

At issue was a new wage and "premium" system, which went into effect on July 1. Wage premiums include extra payment for overtime, Sunday and night work, hazardous jobs, and bonuses for meeting quotas in advance of deadlines. In the past, in certain job categories such premiums amounted to as much as 60 percent of base pay. Under the new law the workers were given a raise, but premiums were limited to 7 to 15 percent of base pay.

By August 7, the backlog in the two harbors amounted to 1.15 million metric tons in 173 waiting ships. After the government's pleas and threats failed to move the dockers, the government is reported to have sent in the army as strikebreakers. After three weeks, the "longshoremen in uniform" were able to reduce the backlog to 26 freighters, and the strike ebbed off, although none of the issues had been resolved.

No news of the strike appeared in the Polish press, but as word filtered through to the West, the government was forced to acknowledge the existence of a backlog of ships in the harbor. At the same time the existence of a strike was denied. The reason for the pileup, according to *Głos Wybrzeża*, was "the continual rain."

Hundreds Jailed by Israel in Occupied West Bank

Israeli security forces have jailed 896 Arabs from the occupied West Bank of Jordan in the last six months in an effort to smash a new resistance organization, the Palestinian National Front, that has emerged since the October war. Israeli officials claim the core of the new organization is the Jordanian Communist party, which is outlawed by King Hussein.

The prisoners, their families, and other

West Bank Arabs have accused the Israelis of mistreating the prisoners and using torture. They charge that the prisoners have been beaten, subjected to electric shocks, sprayed with chemical irritants, and forced to squat for long periods in cramped solitary confinement.

The charges have been supported by Felicia Langer, a member of the Israeli Communist party serving as lawyer for some of the prisoners. Israeli officials routinely deny they practice torture, but Langer reports that she has seen marks of beatings on several of her clients.

Thieu Gets Fertilizer Handout

South Vietnam is to get about two-thirds of the fertilizer purchased by the U.S. government so far this year for its overseas assistance, according to a study released in the U.S. Senate September 9.

Responding to the study, an official of the U.S. Agency for International Development said it appeared the figures were "incomplete" for the current fiscal year.

However, he confirmed that in the current fiscal year about half of the entire 700,000 tons of fertilizer shipped abroad under U.S. government assistance programs, about \$125 million worth, was earmarked for South Vietnam.

Bomb Blast in Madrid

A bomb exploded in a crowded restaurant near the national police headquarters in central Madrid September 13, killing at least twelve people and injuring more than forty. The restaurant is regularly frequented by policemen. The explosion came as General Franco was presiding over his first cabinet meeting since he fell ill nearly ten weeks ago.

Amnesty International Reports Torture Continues in Chile

On the anniversary of the coup that overthrew the Allende regime in Chile, Amnesty International has released an eighty-page report documenting the charge that torture of political prisoners continues there. The report estimates that 6,000 to 10,000 political prisoners are still held in Chile. "It is feared that the lives of many persons are still in grave danger," it said.

"The most common forms of physical torture," the report stated, "have been prolonged beatings with truncheons, fists or

bags of moist material, electricity to all parts of the body, burning with cigarettes or acid. . . . Such physical tortures have been accompanied with deprivation of food, drink and sleep.

"At times more primitive and brutal methods have continued to be used."

Tito Claims Attempt to Form New Stalinist Party Smashed

According to a September 12 Associated Press dispatch from Jesenice, Yugoslavia, "President Tito said today that about thirty foreign-inspired Communists had been arrested for a conspiracy to organize a new Stalinist-line Communist party in Yugoslavia." Tito said that "thanks to our blindness and insufficient alertness," the group had "even managed to hold some kind of congress." He did not disclose when the arrests had taken place.

Portugal Formally Grants Guinea-Bissau Freedom

At a simple ceremony in Lisbon September 10, Portuguese President Antonio de Spínola signed the document granting Guinea-Bissau its independence from Portugal. He handed it to Pedro Pires of the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde—African party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands), the two men shook hand, and he left.

In Guinea-Bissau, however, the event was ignored entirely, since the PAIGC dates Guinea-Bissau's independence from September 24, 1973, when the PAIGC declared it an independent state. Instead, leaflets were handed out announcing a week-long celebration beginning September 12 to mark the birthday of Amílcar Cabral, the head of the PAIGC until his assassination in January 1973.

Five Political Prisoners Released in Philippines

Five political prisoners were released in Manila September 11. The regime called the move an "act of compassion" by President Ferdinand Marcos, coinciding with his birthday.

Those released were former Senator Jose Diokno, a prominent opposition figure who spent nearly two years in prison for protesting Marcos's declaration of martial law; Eleuterio Advesoso, a former secretary of labor; Antolin Oreta Jr.; Ben-

jamin Guingona; and Angel Baking, a former member of the Communist party.

A military source described Diokno's release as temporary and said that he may still face charges of "subversion" later. Diokno was warned not to give interviews or leave Manila without permission.

Japanese Unions Set First 'Autumn Labor Offensive'

Officials of Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) announced plans September 6 for an "autumn labor offensive," to begin at the end of September and culminate in mid-November. The demands will include calls for lower railway fares and utility charges, and for counter-inflation allowances.

Plans include the holding of four nationwide "unified rallies" and various strike actions. The first walkout, tentatively set for September 27, is to be held by the public-sector wing of Sohyo, including Kokuro (National Railway Workers Union). In October, Sohyo plans to resume talks with the government over the issue of legalizing strikes by government employees. This demand was raised during the spring labor offensive this year, but was not won.

In November, national railway workers and other government employees are set to hold a coordinated strike lasting up to seventy-two hours on a scale similar to that launched in the spring. This is the first time that large-scale coordinated labor actions have been organized for the autumn.

Discover Earth's Ozone Layer Could Be Destroyed in Atomic War

A nuclear war could destroy the ozone layer in the earth's stratosphere, which protects all life from the sun's ultraviolet radiation, Dr. Fred C. Ikle, the director of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reported September 5. In addition to the immediate destruction and death, and the damage done by lingering radiation, the depletion of the ozone layer could upset or destroy the entire chain of life on earth.

"We do not know how much ozone depletion would occur from a large number of nuclear explosions—it might be imperceptible, but it also might be almost total," Ikle said. "We do not know how long such depletion would last—less than one year or over 10 years.

"And above all, we do not know what this depletion would do to plants, animals and people. Perhaps it would merely increase the hazard of sunburn. Or perhaps it would destroy critical links of the intricate food chain of plants and animals, and thus shatter the ecological structure that permits man to remain alive on this planet."

During studies conducted to determine

the effects on the ozone layer of the nitric acids produced by supersonic transport jets, it was discovered that the ozone layer had decreased 4 percent following the atomic tests conducted by Washington and Moscow in 1960 and 1961.

Cardiologists Convention Receives Report on Torture in Chile

A dossier reporting twenty-seven deaths, scores of arrests, and more than 800 firings of Chilean medical personnel—the direct outcome of the military coup of a year ago—was presented to the Seventh World Congress of Cardiologists held in Buenos Aires September 2.

Two of the cases described were the torture and resultant death of Dr. Daniel Rojas of the San Bernardo Hospital, and the arrest and torture of Dr. Hugo Boheme, who was fired from his post as director of the School of Public Health in spite of a lack of political involvement. Boheme was seized, held incommunicado for twenty days in Los Alamos Prison, and tortured before his family learned what had happened to him.

India Annexes Sikkim

New Delhi annexed the Himalayan state of Sikkim on September 4. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi pushed the bill through the lower house of parliament with a vote of 320 to 9 in favor of the annexation. The bill made Sikkim an "associate state" of India, giving it one seat in each of the two houses of parliament. On September 7, the upper house of parliament did likewise, voting 171 to 8.

This only formalized New Delhi's complete control of the country since April 1973, when it sent troops to Sikkim to put down an uprising against Chogyal (leader) Palden Thondup Namgyal.

Japanese Nuclear-Powered Ship Barred Entry Into Home Port

Leakage of radioactivity from the reactor of Japan's first nuclear-powered ship has led to the suspension of its initial test run. The ship was reported on September 13 to be drifting in the Pacific 420 miles east of Mutsu Bay. Angry protests by Japanese fishermen and opposition parties over possible radioactive contamination have prevented the ship, the 8,214-ton freighter *Mutsu*, from putting into its home port of Mutsu City.

A demonstration September 5 of 4,000 fishermen in Aomori, near Mutsu City, demanded the prompt suspension of the *Mutsu*'s reactor test and a firm date for the changing of the ship's home port to another location. The rally was the biggest ever held by fishermen in the area. They had previously prevented the *Mutsu* from leaving on its first test run for about twenty months after construction

was completed, fearing radioactive pollution in the Mutsu Bay would kill the market for the bay's scallops.

The September 6 *Mainichi Daily News* reported that the fishermen at the rally threatened to turn out their fishing boats to blockade Mutsu port if the nuclear-powered ship tries to enter.

Swatantra Party of India Votes to Dissolve

The national convention of the reactionary Swatantra party voted in early August to dissolve itself and join the proposed coalition of eleven rightist parties, initially named the Bharatiya Lok Dal. The August 10 issue of the *Calcutta Statesman Weekly*, however, reported that at least five state units of the party were not going along with the move and would continue to function in the name of the party.

The Swatantra party was founded fifteen years ago with the perspective of becoming the major party of the Indian bourgeoisie but failed to win much capitalist support away from the Congress party.

Summary Executions Continue in Chile

Information gathered from court records in Santiago reveals that summary executions continue in Chile. Socialist party member Hector Garcia and Communist party member Ruben Lamich were both shot to death in a small village south of Santiago August 13, the day of their arrest by junta officials. Their mutilated bodies were returned to their families through the Santiago morgue on August 14 and 15.

An August 29 dispatch on the executions written by *Washington Post* correspondent Joseph Novitski led to his temporary house arrest August 31 and to an order that he stop gathering news in Chile. Both orders were rescinded later that day.

U.S. Social Democrats Set Sights on 'Transforming' Democratic Party

Social Democrats, USA—the U. S. affiliate of the Second International—announced at its national convention in New York September 6 that it would continue to support the Democratic party.

Carl Gershman, former chairman of the Young People's Socialist League, the organization's youth arm, said that the aim was to "transform the Democratic party into the Social Democratic party." Gershman, who is expected to be named the SDUSA's national secretary, also explained why the organization had dropped the name Socialist party in 1972. "It was felt that the word socialist had become misunderstood in the context of American politics," he said.

A New Communist 'Offensive' in South Vietnam?

By Peter Green

In the last few months South Vietnam has undergone the heaviest fighting since the "cease-fire" agreement went into effect in January 1973.

In the Iron Triangle area north of Saigon, clashes have occurred since May 17, when three militia outposts near Bencat were captured by the liberation forces. Two have still not been retaken. Skirmishes have taken place only sixteen miles from the center of Saigon, and Bienhoa airfield, the largest military airfield in South Vietnam, was said to have been threatened at one point.

On July 1 the forces of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) captured Datrach base, twenty-five miles southwest of Danang in the north, and the nearby district capital of Thuongduc fell on August 7.

In Quangngai province, seventy-five miles south of Danang, ten Saigon positions were reported overrun on August 4, and on August 17 a district capital, Minhlong, was captured.

The increased fighting has prompted speculation that another "offensive" by the liberation forces is on the way. What are the facts?

Retaliation for Saigon Land-Grabbing

One of the most significant items is the rise in cease-fire violations by Saigon. The PRG has responded with defensive actions.

A Reuters dispatch in the August 2 *Christian Science Monitor* reported that officers in the PRG delegation to the two-party joint Military Commission in Saigon "scoff at the idea that their commanders plan any general offensive."

"They say their forces aim to take back territory said to have been seized from them by the government in the months following the January, 1973, cease-fire agreement. But they also say there are attacks on government bases to cut off activity against their zones."

Philip A. McCombs reported in the August 6 *Washington Post* that the

PRG had claimed in April that the Saigon government had shelled areas controlled by the PRG, and had, some months after the cease-fire, set up a series of hilltop outposts in PRG territory.

"Well informed, non-Communist sources," stated McCombs, "have confirmed that the government did, in fact, set up hilltop outposts after the cease-fire went into effect, and that this was a military measure intended to disrupt Communist efforts to gather the important rice crop in the Queson Valley area 20 miles south of here."

McCombs conceded that this "would seem to violate the agreement."

The August 8 *New York Times* cited "some foreign military observers" who believe the recent PRG actions "have been logical military responses" to sweeps by Saigon through PRG areas.

Daniel Southerland reported in the September 4 *Christian Science Monitor* that the PRG forces "have regained a good part of the territory they held in the northernmost region at the time of the cease-fire."

A similar explanation for the increased fighting was given in the July 30 *New York Times*. James M. Markham reported that since January, Saigon's commanders "had scored several remarkable victories." They had "cleared the Tri Phap base area in the northern delta—something that American troops had been unable to do while they were in South Vietnam."

Markham also mentioned Saigon successes in the Ho Bo Woods in Haunghia province, and inside Cambodia, with heavy casualties being inflicted on the PRG forces.

"In some ways I don't blame them, the Communists," he quoted one Western diplomat as saying. "At some point they say, 'Enough's enough.'"

'Offensive' Launched for U.S. Aid

The propaganda about the war heating up is also explainable as one of the ploys used by Saigon to give

the hawks in Washington an excuse to step up military and economic aid.

Thieu, of course, has been predicting an imminent Communist offensive for more than a year now. When debate began in the U. S. Congress on appropriating funds for the South Vietnamese regime, Thieu's propaganda machine went into high gear.

The U. S. ambassador to Saigon, Graham A. Martin, made a special trip to Washington to plead Thieu's financial needs before Congress. However, Congress decided to give \$700 million this year in place of \$1,500 million originally requested by the Nixon administration. The cut was a concession to the unpopularity of aid to the Thieu regime (1974 is an election year).

A staff report issued by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee August 5 criticized the U. S. Embassy in Saigon for "selective reporting," for being too closely associated with the Saigon government, and for tending "to play down or to ignore obvious cease-fire violations by the South Vietnamese armed forces."

The report cited the case of the fall of Tong Le Chan, a small outpost on the Cambodian border that had been under siege for more than a year. On April 12, Saigon announced that a "massive" North Vietnamese attack had overrun the garrison.

Within a few days, however, it became common knowledge in Saigon—and was reported in the U. S. media—that the Saigon forces had withdrawn voluntarily without losing a man. Nonetheless, the U. S. Embassy continued to report as late as April 24 on the "bombardment and fall" of Tong Le Chan.

The Senate study said that many diplomats in Saigon believed that the Tong Le Chan incident and others were "part of a deliberate effort by the Saigon Government, assisted by the United States Embassy, to impress the United States Congress of the necessity to authorize additional military assistance for South Vietnam."

An article in the May 13 *Far East-*

Intercontinental Press

ern *Economic Review* was more explicit:

"The current upsurge in fighting is widely thought in South Vietnam to have been 'ordered' by US Ambassador Graham Martin to justify the Administration's demands for increased military assistance. . . . It is even claimed that Martin advised President Thieu to yield up one of Saigon's isolated bases within territory held by the Provisional Revolutionary Government each week to convince the US Congress and the public that North Vietnam had launched offensives."

Creating a 'Suitable Atmosphere for the Aid Struggle'

Another side of the operation to extract more aid has been an attempt to spruce up the image of the Saigon regime.

The Thieu regime has labeled as a "monstrous lie that exceeds even the wildest imagination" the many reports that Saigon holds 200,000 political prisoners.

Testifying at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing July 25, Martin chimed in, denying that Saigon had *any* political prisoners. He claimed that a year ago there were just over 34,000 persons in South Vietnamese prisons and that the figure had now been reduced to 31,000.

As part of the same cover-up operation, Thieu released a prisoner for publicity purposes for seventy minutes and then whisked him off to jail again.

Tran Ngoc Chau, a former legislator and Thieu opponent, had been arrested in February 1970 and sentenced to ten years' hard labor. Philip A. McCombs reported in the June 17 *Washington Post* that on June 5, Chau's wife and children were allowed to see him for seventy minutes in their home in Saigon before police took him away again.

Vietnamese police, however, contacted the newspapers, urging them to write articles about Chau's "release." Many did, and the story was picked up by foreign publications. The June 17 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, for example, carried the story, billing it as a "spectacular move" by Thieu.

"Chau's 'release,'" wrote McCombs, "appears to be one of a number of orchestrated moves made recently by the Thieu government to 'create a suit-

able atmosphere for the aid struggle on Capitol Hill,' in the words of one government official."

In Washington, at the other end of the operation, some previously critical elements have jumped into line. The *Washington Post* announced in an editorial August 11 that it had had "second thoughts."

" . . . after having inclined the other



way during the past 20 months," said the *Washington Post* editors, they now thought the American commitment to Saigon should be "open-ended."

"Aid to Vietnam should be offered on the basis of what dollar levels and what forms of aid (economic or military) and what particular programs will enable Saigon to tend effectively to its citizens' security and welfare."

This formulation, they admitted, left "many loose ends," and Thieu's was "far from a model regime." Of overriding importance to the *Washington Post*, however, was the belief "that Americans would not like to live in a world where a small nation that had strong reason to rely on American steadfastness had been let down."

Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in the August 31 *Washington Post* could afford to be a little more blunt than the editors. They saw the threatened aid cutbacks as "peri-

lous" in the light of Hanoi's "cruelly perfected new tactics" and the increasing aid from the Soviet Union and China, which "seem still bent on fueling Hanoi's lustful conquest of the South. . . ."

As proof of Hanoi's subversive goal, Evans and Novak referred to "statistics" in Quangnam province showing that "the invaders forcibly uprooted more than 10,000 civilians settled there two years ago and moved them west to 'liberated' areas as virtual slave labor."

Three days later the *Washington Post* carried an article describing how the Saigon regime *forcibly prevents* people from returning to PRG-held areas.

The village chief of Hoaphung, three miles southwest of Danang, purportedly told a *Washington Post* reporter, "There are a thousand people in my village and 90 per cent of them are pro-Vietcong." He himself lives in Danang because it is too dangerous for him to spend nights in Hoaphung.

Last month eighty families in the village dismantled their houses and carted them off to rebuild in a nearby PRG area. To the village chief, this was "part of a Vietcong campaign to destroy all the refugee camps and get the people to return to their native hamlets," something to be prevented at all costs. Usually the Saigon regime would tear down the houses rebuilt in the new area, but the solution in this case was to move a platoon of airborne troops into the new village.

The highest-ranking U. S. military officer in Vietnam, Major General John E. Murray, also joined the chorus of protest against the cutbacks. "They're sacrificing blood for the lack of ammunition," he said in an interview in Saigon.

For those swayed by crude self-interest, there were other arguments. John T. Calkins, executive director of the Republican Congressional Committee, wrote a column in the August 30 *New York Times* extolling the advantages of investing in South Vietnam.

"She [South Vietnam] has a large labor pool of talented, industrious people whose cost of labor is far less than Hong Kong, Singapore or even Korea or Taiwan." He urged continued aid. In his words, "there is much profit to be made there."

To compensate for the cut in direct military funding, the White House will no doubt find additional ways of helping the Saigon puppet to live it up. Last April, the Pentagon miraculously

discovered \$266 million "left over" from last year's appropriations.

Another angle was revealed in Congress August 12 by Representative Michael Harrington. This year, he re-

ported, 43 percent (or nearly \$500 million) of the money budgeted for the "Food for Peace" program went to just two countries—South Vietnam and Cambodia. □

Pavel Litvinov, Raissa Moroz Issue Appeal

Valentyn Moroz Feared Near Death in Soviet Jail

[Pavel Litvinov, an exiled Soviet dissident living in the United States, addressed an appeal on September 5, 1974, to the writers organization PEN International on behalf of Ukrainian dissident historian Valentyn Moroz.

[Moroz is now in the third month of a hunger strike in the notorious Vladimir prison. He began the hunger strike on July 1 to back up his demand that he be transferred to a labor camp. It is feared that his life is in grave danger.

[Litvinov subsequently issued a press release that included an appeal from Raissa Moroz on behalf of her husband, written on the fifty-eighth day of his hunger strike. The text of Raissa Moroz's letter, addressed to V.S. Pritchett, president of PEN International, follows.]

* * *

Dear Mr. President,

This is my second letter to you, but as I have not received a reply to the first letter I wrote you, and as I don't know whether you in fact received it, I will write this letter as if it were my first.

I am turning to you because I am deeply distressed by the fate of my husband, Valentyn Yakovych Moroz, who was convicted for his publicistic activity. The court found his essays "A Report From the Beria Reservation," "Moses and Dathan," "A Chronicle of Resistance," and "Amidst the Snows," to be "anti-Soviet." It goes without saying that none of these works were ever published in the Soviet Union, but I have heard that they have been published abroad.

The harshness of his sentence—fourteen years of imprisonment—is magnified by the fact that he was condemned to an unusually long term in prison—six years (to be followed by

three years' labor camp and five years' exile). It cannot be ruled out that this was done deliberately, insofar as my husband's first term of imprisonment (during which he gathered material for "A Report From the Beria Reservation") showed that he found prison the most difficult [form of confinement] to bear. Of the six years of prison to which he was sentenced, he has already served more than four, two of them in solitary confinement.

During our last two meetings (the regulations at Vladimir prison, where he is confined, permit one visit every six months, each lasting two hours in the presence of a guard), my husband insisted repeatedly that he fears for his sanity, that he has visions of the prison walls moving in on him, that being in solitary confinement without anything to do, he is deprived of the only pleasure possible to a thinking human being under the circumstances—reading, and that, unable thus to concentrate his attention upon anything, he is tormented by inner anxiety. He declared to me that on July 1st he would begin a hunger strike demanding to be transferred to a labor camp—to be in the open, among people. He decided to refuse all food indefinitely, until he is transferred to a camp or until he dies, for he prefers death to insanity.

My husband has now been on a hunger strike for two months. And throughout this entire period, I have had no news of him. To my every attempt to learn anything, I hear the same reply: he feels normal and the law has not been violated in his case. This is the answer I am given by the warden of Vladimir prison and by the prison doctor. But how can I believe that a person who has been confined for four years to Vladimir pris-

on, which is known for its harsh regime, a person who is suffering from anemia and who has refused food for two months, can feel "normal"?

I requested permission to meet with my husband, or to be allowed to see him from a distance to make certain that he is still alive. I was refused.

I requested permission to have a doctor whom I trust examine my husband. I was refused.

Both requests were said to be contrary to prison regulations.

But even these regulations allow a prisoner to write one letter per month. However, I did not so much as receive a single line from my husband in July or August.

Not too long ago, Mr. Heinrich Böll's intervention helped Andrei Amalrik, who was confronted by a similar situation. Therefore, my only hope lies in intervention by the writers of the world. I, therefore, appeal to you, Mr. President, to bring the case of my husband to their attention and to support my plea with the high prestige of your position.

Respectfully yours,
Raissa Moroz
August 27, 1974

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The Developing Upsurge in Greece

By Gerry Foley

"Seven years of enforced silence, seven years of suppressed anger, seven years of struggles and hopes exploded in an outburst of popular fervor like nothing Salonika has ever seen before," G. Votses began in his report from Salonika published in the September 2 issue of the Athens daily *Athenaiki*. "More than 300,000 people poured onto the beach, covering it entirely for a distance of two kilometers—from the Leuko Pyrgo to the Markos Botsares."

The Salonika rally on August 31 was the first really massive mobilization since the fall of the dictatorship on July 23. It was the most powerful popular outpouring since the mobilizations of the mid-1960s that convinced the native bourgeoisie and its international backers that they had to put Greece "in a plaster cast," as one of the junta colonels expressed it.

The Salonika rally had many of the features of May Day in Lisbon. The march that was held in the Portuguese capital to celebrate the fall of the Salazarist regime brought out an estimated 500,000 to one million persons—between one-third and two-thirds of the total population of the city. Proportionately, the rally in Salonika was even larger. Greece's second largest city has a population estimated at something over 400,000.

Like the Lisbon May Day, the August 31 mobilization in Salonika was a key test of the chances of a bourgeoisie, forced abruptly to abandon an openly repressive form of rule, to weather the explosion of long-contained social forces it itself had been compelled to touch off. As their counterparts did in Portugal, the Greek ruling class and its reformist allies succeeded in channeling this upsurge, at least for the moment, into support for a pseudodemocratic bourgeois government.

However, the Salonika rally was by no means as firmly controlled politically as the Lisbon "festival of spring." Because of this, perhaps, the government presided over by the old

counterrevolutionary strongman Constantine Caramanlis did not seem willing to ride even temporarily with a strong democratic tide.

In the first place, the fact that the new Greek government had kept the broad masses off the streets for more than five weeks is an indication that it is determined to release the built-up pressure only slowly and in a grudgingly measured way. It could hope to do this because the dictatorship in Athens was persuaded to withdraw without a fight, making it possible for its successors to maintain the governmental structure and the repressive forces essentially intact.

Paradoxically, a peaceful change-over in the regime and thus the maintenance of the repressive machinery undamaged was possible precisely because of the greater militancy of the masses in Greece. The junta resigned meekly because it knew all too well that sharp conflict would immediately open the way for an uncontrollable mass explosion. This paradox has been the main factor distinguishing the process in Greece from the one in Portugal. It was graphically illustrated in the Salonika demonstration.

Furthermore, the fall of the Gizikis-Ioannides junta came as the result of a threat of full-scale war on Greek territory itself. In the context of a revival of old national antagonisms and deep-rooted historical fears, chauvinism has been a much more real force than in Portugal, where a long colonial war had thoroughly discredited bourgeois patriotism. Moreover, the fact that the Turkish government proved ready to take advantage of internal conflict in Greece to launch military attacks on Greek areas gave the new regime a strong argument for the need to rally behind the "government of national emergency."

Thus, the new Greek government has been notably less generous in granting concessions than its Portuguese counterpart. There has been no sudden collapse of repression and anti-Communism in Greece. Every effective democratic right has had to be

wrested from the regime by struggle and sacrifices.

Greek Trotskyists Attacked

Within a period of roughly two weeks after the fall of the junta, the Greek Trotskyists were able to begin bringing out a legal weekly reflecting their views. It continued the name of the monthly *Ergatike Pale*, which was published underground during the years of the dictatorship. The first issue of the new series was dated August 10.

But on August 12, secret police attacked activists selling the paper. They beat up and arrested two of them, including the editor, Giannis Felekis. Both were released after a short time, but the regime had rather forcefully made the points that the watchdogs were still on guard and that it would be a dangerous business to try to exercise any of the promised democratic rights.

On August 18, Felekis was arrested and beaten up again, the second time in a week, for participating in a demonstration broken up by the cops. He was released only after strong protests by the radical youth and by a number of well-known fighters against the dictatorship. Another person accused of participating in the demonstration was given a sentence of eight months in jail.

The junta's repressive legislation has remained in force under the new regime. Even the Stalinists, who gave the same political support to the Caramanlis government that their counterparts in Portugal did to the Junta of National Salvation, had to exert a certain degree of direct pressure on the regime to get a little democratic leeway.

"In Greece, all the former resistance organizations against the junta, together with the KKE (Communist Party of Greece), have demanded legalization of all parties, according to reports received here from sources in Greece," the *Daily World*, the newspaper of the American Communist

party, wrote in its August 17 issue. "They have demanded repeal of Law No. 509 which makes the KKE illegal and Law No. 375 which brands KKE members 'foreign spies.'"

The *Daily World* noted in particular: "Even now, Laws 509 and 375 are still being used; young people caught distributing KKE leaflets are arrested and detained."

The "KKE" referred to is apparently the Moscow loyalist faction, a group seemingly quite weak in Greece itself.

The article went on to explain that despite the continuation of repressive pressures, "the democratic movement is burgeoning." The Stalinist paper cited as proof: "New Greece, a progressive paper, has started publishing weekly; it was formerly underground."

Nea Ellada, or "New Greece," is the principal voice of the "orthodox" pro-Kremlin group, the KKE (exterior). The *Daily World* does not mention *Aughi*, the historic paper of the Greek CP, which reappeared as a daily in the first week of August, under the control of the more independent KKE (interior). The Greek bourgeois press indicates that the more independent faction is considerably stronger today in Greece than the "exterior" group.

Such a relationship of forces was prefigured by the two groups' exile papers. *Eleutheri Ellada*, the weekly of the "interior," reflected a good deal more vitality and contact with events in Greece than the weekly of the "exterior," *Eleutheri Patrida*. The latter was always a conspicuously dull paper filled primarily with news releases from the Soviet bloc press services, rather like a house organ in a rest home for retired Stalinists.

Thus the "young people . . . distributing KKE leaflets" that the *Daily World* referred to were working for only one of a number of groups of activists and not necessarily the largest or most vigorous. Their persecution was, therefore, symptomatic.

Informers Still at Work

In a report from the provincial town of Chalkis August 27, *Washington Post* correspondent Jonathan C. Randal indicated how extensively the apparatus of intimidation continues to function:

"'It's not so much we're afraid,' the

baker said, 'it's just we don't know what will happen in a year or five or ten and we're not taking any chances.' . . .

"The baker's nephew, a 17-year-old dressed in modish jeans, said he and his contemporaries worry about informers and the records kept by the gendarmerie, a constant source of anguish in Greece since the civil war of the late 1940s. The colonels developed the informers' work into a fine, if black, art.

"'It's crazy, crazy,' the teen-ager said, 'but they are still using informers to haul people into custody for questioning, and this is supposed to be a democracy.'"

Even in the most "respectable" Greek bourgeois journals, complaints have been published on how little Karamanlis has done to dismantle the apparatus of terror. For example, in the August 29 issue of the glossy picture magazine *Tachydromos*, an unsigned article pointed out:

"Quick measures are needed to deepen the purge.

"To be sure, the people understand that the conditions at the moment are not favorable for this difficult task. They have shown an understanding and a maturity that are truly astonishing. However, it is not only military men who need to be purged but also some persons in certain places in the state machine whom it would not be so difficult to put where they could do no harm.

"But the purge is still slow. And there are those who say that certain party formations are trying to hang onto the parapolic machinery that exists.

"The main responsibility for purging the armed forces is held by Evangelos Averoff, the minister of national defense. In this area, especially in the armed forces command, much has been done. The 'absolute dictator' D. Ioannides has been retired [!]. Nonetheless, many problems remain unsolved.

"Solon Gikas, the minister of public order, seems to have been the slowest in purging his department.

"Two names come to mind immediately, names that are on the lips of everyone who passed through the Genike Asfaleia [Headquarters of the Secret Police] in those years, Babales and Mallios. The former now works in the quartermaster department of the police; the latter in the health section.

They have simply been transferred.

"In the Tmema Syndikalismou [Trade-Union Branch], Mangavas has not been transferred.

"In the Dieuthynses Astynomias [Police Command], chief of police V. Lambrou has not been transferred. There have indeed been some transfers but no purges."

One of the persons interviewed in Chalkis by *Washington Post* correspondent Randal was still less impressed with the "purges":

"Next to him [the baker previously mentioned] the stubbly faced man in the green shirt gesticulated with his fork.

"'What do you expect when more than a month after the dictatorship ended the only junta-appointed official here who isn't still in place is the governor?' he exploded.

"'If you want me to believe that democracy is back—that free elections are again possible in this country—then change the head of the gendarmerie, fire all the secret-police detectives, the mayor, the bank directors, the local Orthodox churchmen because they were all appointed by metropolitans chummy with the colonels; and let's not forget the school teachers, those near-illiterates who took the jobs of decent men and women who were forced into retirement by the regime.' . . .

"There was not a single demurrer in the cramped side-street cafe in this city of 38,000, capital of the island of Euboea."

One of those present, the cafe owner, expressed a strong uneasiness about Karamanlis's promises.

"I keep telling myself we should be satisfied with the slow pace, but I fear I am just trying to kid myself into thinking everything will be okay."

The youth who complained earlier about informers continuing their work thought that perhaps more direct pressure could have brought faster changes:

"Maybe we should have had demonstrations or even painted slogans on the wall, but because of the Cyprus crisis everyone decided to follow Karamanlis's advice and keep calm."

Policy of Enforced Calmness

The new government made it plain from the very start that it was determined to enforce "calmness." The

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Epikaira

Part of demonstration of 300,000 that turned out in Salonika August 31.

police attacked a demonstration of young people celebrating the fall of the dictatorship in Athens on the very evening the junta announced its resignation.

But despite this attempt to keep the lid on, demonstrations multiplied, reaching a high point in mid-August on the weekend following the start of the second major Turkish offensive in Cyprus. On Sunday, August 18, the police violently dispersed a demonstration of about 1,000 young people in Athens' Syntagma Square.

The following day, August 19, Karamanlis took two important steps. He moved for the first time to change the military high command installed by the junta, removing ten of the dictatorship's most prominent supporters—including General Gregorios Bonanos, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces—from key posts. Secondly, he issued strong threats that any further street demonstrations would be suppressed. The assassination of Rodger Davies, the U.S. ambassador to Cyprus, the same day during a popular protest in front of the American embassy in Nicosia provided a handy pretext for clamping down on all mobilizations in Greece.

"Karamanlis seized on the ambassador's death to warn that the government intended to deal with any further street demonstrations with 'implacable severity,'" *Washington Post* correspondent Randal wrote from Athens August 19.

"All demonstrations and meetings have been banned under the contin-

uing state of martial law imposed last month.

"In an allusion to the extreme right-wing and left-wing agitators observed in Sunday night's battle with the police under his hotel windows, Karamanlis warned that such 'acts of violence and anarchistic demonstrations do not serve the national struggle but, on the contrary, undermine the government efforts to handle the issue responsibly.'"

Randal continued: "Except for a brief and small demonstration tonight, Constitution [Syntagma] Square, a favorite locale for political gatherings, was calm after its first day in almost a week without a serious anti-American demonstration."

The 'Mature' Ones

Most of the demonstrations were carried out by groups of radical young people similar to those that spearheaded the protests of November 1973. As at that time, these elements do not seem to have paid much attention to the traditional left parties, which were interested primarily in convincing Karamanlis of their "responsibility" and their suitability as government parties.

"So far the Communists are acting like saints," Randal wrote in the August 24 *Washington Post*, "in hopes of having a 1947 ban lifted so they can contest the elections. Even left-winger Andreas Papandreou has moderated his previous criticism of the Karamanlis government."

The *bête noire* of the rightists, who brought down his father's government, Papandreou gained a certain notice in the press during the years of the dictatorship by his strong denunciations of the alliance between the reactionary forces in Greece and U.S. imperialism. Thus the softer tone he assumed on returning to his country did not go unremarked by reporters, especially since the demonstrations reached their high point on the weekend of his arrival in Athens.

"Andreas Papandreou, one of the leading figures of the Greek left, does not intend to organize large public demonstrations here, because he fears they could bring back military rule," *New York Times* correspondent Steven V. Roberts wrote from Greece August 20.

"I am not prepared to provoke a return of the military," Mr. Papandreou said in an interview, adding: "At the same time I am not prepared to give up any of my positions. But tactically I shall give them no opportunities to throw the burden on our camp for any change. I won't give them that great pleasure."

"Seven years ago I led the demonstrations," added the political leader. "Right now I am not looking for demonstrations; times are different."

Asked what lessons he had learned since the 1967 coup, Papandreou replied: "Well, I have learned many things. First of all, we have seen the strength of this powerhouse [presumably the Greek army and police],

which is highly infiltrated by American intelligence services. We have seen the cost of a confrontation, and we know that we have to be more patient, but no less determined. We have all matured, not only me, but the Greek people at large."

The Two Stalinist Factions

Of the traditional left forces, the KKE (exterior) seems to take the most critical stance toward the Caramanlis government, a formally more militant position in particular than the KKE (interior). This is in line with its previous position during the abortive liberalization under the Papadopoulos junta in mid-1973. At that time, the pro-Moscow loyalists sharply criticized the "democratic" KKE (interior) faction for its willingness to participate in the phony elections offered by the junta.

Of course, the Kremlin-backed group had less to lose at that time from continued exclusion from legal political activity in Greece. It was less dependent on having a base within the country. Furthermore, it had to establish its "orthodoxy" with something more positive than just demonstrative loyalty to Moscow.

In contrast, the perspectives of the more independent group, hard-hit by the withdrawal of support from the Soviet bureaucracy, depended on the possibility of playing a parliamentary role in Greece. The democratic image that it gained by its criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and its relative independence from Moscow could only really pay off in that context.

There is nothing unique about the Greek CP splitting into a "liberalizing" opportunist faction tempted by the prospects of acceptance into the parliamentary game, and a Moscow-backed faction taking an apparently "tougher" position to justify its subservience to the Kremlin and its heavy-handed bureaucratism. A split of that kind is a rather common phenomenon in the decay of Stalinism.

But in the case in question the process has been greatly exacerbated by the prolonged and grave crisis of Greek Stalinism, which dates back to the defeat of the Stalinist-led armies in the civil war and which took a particularly acute form after the collapse of the CP in the face of the 1967 coup, the second decisive failure of the party

in a generation.

These pressures sharpened the split and intensified the factional warfare. The Kremlin and its recognized client group tried to excommunicate the "interior" faction in typical Stalinist style. These attacks apparently had little effect within Greece itself, although the Cypriot Communist party lined up with Moscow and the "exterior" group. At least for the time being, the Moscow-backed group seems to have been far outdistanced by its rival.

No Thunderbolts

In the wake of the Salonika demonstration, both Communist parties issued statements. The declaration of the "interior" faction, dated September 3, was more ambitious in its formulation. It was entitled "The Goals of the Nation in the Transition Period Leading to the Establishment of Democracy."

In the September 6 issue of *Aughi*, the editors tried to impart some of the aura of the Greek CP's most romantic period to this statement. They wrote: "Its form and context recall the integrity, completeness, and perfection of the thundering clarion call sent out by the unforgettable teacher Glenos with his 'What the EAM [Ethniko Apeleutheriko Metopo—National Liberation Front, the CP-controlled resistance organization] Is and What It Wants.'"

The September 3, 1974, statement was not distinguished, however, by its thunder but rather by its cooing. It did not make any embarrassing concrete demands on the government; instead it offered support to its essential institutions and program.

For example, one of the "central democratic goals of the KKE (interior) in the present transitional period," the statement said, is "to transform the armed forces into an organ of the nation with the sole mission of defending its independence and territorial integrity."

This aim had already been achieved, according to Caramanlis in his speech August 31 in Salonika. He said: "The return of the army to its tasks and its obedience to the political power has restored freedom to the people."

Point No. 5 of the KKE (interior) statement reads as follows: "The threat of a new dictatorship and the great

dangers that flow from the Cypriot situation require us to maintain a phalanx of social forces and the broadest possible alliance of classes and social strata, a fact that makes it possible to continue and to stabilize the policy of disengagement from NATO and from American domination, to consolidate the democratic course of the country. Therefore, we support the Caramanlis government, despite the fact that the left is not included in it and despite certain negative aspects of its policies.

"The KKE (interior) calls on the Greek people to work together on the basis of a broad unity of leftists, centrists, rightists, and patriots all together until our start on the democratic road is well under way and irreversible."

The "exterior" faction's statement, which was published alongside the "interior's" in the September 5 issue of *Athenaiki*, had a noticeably different emphasis. It stressed the failure of the Caramanlis government to make any real changes: "The machinery of the dictatorship and American rule remains essentially untouched." It assumed a critical tone:

"Nothing can justify the government's hesitating to restore the elected mayors and other leaders removed by the junta, to abolish the military decrees that banned the trade-union organizations, to enact a basic law to restore legality in the trade-union movement and other organizations of the working people, to permit free activity by the parties, and to abolish the ban on popular demonstrations."

The statement even contained a certain hint of a threat: "The hundreds of thousands of people from the popular strata and the youth that gathered last Saturday [August 31] in Salonika expressed their will in the most categorical way: 'The people are sovereign!' 'Get the bases out!' 'Turn the junta over to the people!'"

In essence, however, the "exterior" statement simply expressed the same program as the "clarion call" of the "interior" except in a negative way. It criticized the Caramanlis government for "excluding" from its coalition "the forces that for seven years were in the front line of the struggle against the dictatorship."

It warned: "Not only does this not further a transition to democratic life but it will also bring new dangers, and

will constitute a new grave element of instability."

That is, the KKE (exterior) was also calling on Caramanlis to include it in a popular-front government in which it would fulfill the same stabilizing function as the "interior" promised to carry out in its "Goals of the Nation" statement.

It is possible, since its main advantage over its rival lies in its better relations with the Soviet bloc countries and its links to the mainstream of the world Stalinist movement, that the KKE (exterior) will try to make a few more internationalist-appearing gestures.

Wrap Themselves in Greek Flag

In any case, it would be hard to outdo the social chauvinism of the "interior" faction. For example, the September 1 issue of *Aughi* featured an appeal to the Caramanlis government by a former commander of ELAS [Ethnikos Laïkos Apeleutherotikos Stratos—People's National Liberation Army, the CP-led force in the civil war] who has been living in exile in Yugoslavia. The commander, Theodoros Kallinos, wrote:


"I received the news of your historic decision to withdraw Greece's armed forces from the NATO military alliance with militant patriotic satisfaction. In order to defend the strategic and exploitative interests of the American and NATO imperialists, this alliance abandoned Greece at a crucial moment, encouraging the barbaric Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the aggressive moves of the Turkish militarists against the Cypriot republic and against Greece in the Aegean.

"Expressing my personal opinion, I salute with patriotic enthusiasm your patriotic action.

"Although I am more than sixty, I am ready to volunteer to serve in the front lines as a common soldier to defend the fatherland against any foreign attack. I believe that many thousands of political refugees are ready, if the government decides to permit this, to return within a few days to the fatherland and fight, with their crutches if necessary, to defend their native soil and help regain freedom, democracy, and prosperity for our people. Today the Greek people stands at your side, and it will remain there as long as the process of liberation and democratization continues."

The letter from the old nationalist guerrilla was no isolated note of nostalgia in *Aughi*. The August 31 issue carried headlines such as "The Turks Continue Their Atrocities." The September 1 issue headlined one story: "Vandalism by the Turks." The report described the alleged destruction of Byzantine mosaics by a Turkish force in Cyprus. The September 3 issue carried the headline: "The Turks Want Half the Aegean!"

On the other hand, there was no mention of atrocities by Greeks



CARAMANLIS

against the Turkish Cypriots, and the actions of the Greek authorities were described by headlines such as "Greeks Stand Firm."

Furthermore, in none of the issues in *Aughi* in September, at least, have there been any articles opposing the campaign in the Greek bourgeois press to whip up hatred against the Turkish people. Such articles are sorely needed, as this passage from the September 3 *Athenaïke*, usually considered a liberal-left paper, indicates:

"In the thousand years we have known them, the Turks have always

had one prevailing characteristic. Despite their efforts, they have remained the same wild and brutal Asiatics they were when they came out of Turkestan. The late Kemal made them take their fezzes off and marry one woman instead of fifteen but they remain the same. . . . Those who want the Turks for allies can have them! . . . As for us, no. They have been our enemies for a thousand years and they are still our enemies."

Of course, it could be argued that it is hard to oppose anti-Turkish feeling in view of the suffering that Ecevit's invasion has inflicted on the Greek people of Cyprus, especially in the absence of any apparent opposition to this chauvinist adventure in Turkey itself. But if the traditional left forces in Turkey have not offered very strong opposition to the government's policy, the Greek Stalinists should be able to understand their position.

"The Cyprus action has proved that Mr. Ecevit, a man of the Left in the Turkish context, can be an effective, patriotic leader," *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Joseph Fitchett wrote from Ankara in the August 5 issue of the Boston daily. Fitchett went on to point out:

"Left-wing Turkish factions, broadly speaking, have decided to adopt a low profile and quietly and informally support Mr. Ecevit as the most progressive man who can realistically be expected to retain power in present day Turkey."

With a few names changed, Fitchett could have written this about the Greek government and the Greek "left."

Polarization Shown by Slogans

What is different in Greece is that there a mass upsurge is underway that Caramanlis is obviously finding it difficult to contain, and there a radical student movement exists that was hardened under fire in the November demonstrations. Both of these factors were shown most forcefully by the August 31 mass rally in Salonika.

In the first place, it is apparent that a crowd of 300,000 persons, the overwhelming majority of the people in an important region, exert considerable pressure when they all shout for the punishment of the junta. ("Turn the junta over to the people" was the main

slogan, according to the September 2 *Athenaïke*.) The demand for a purge of the state apparatus, and in particular the repressive forces, seems to be developing a powerful momentum among the masses.

Secondly, it was clear that the revolutionary-minded youth were already a significant leaven in the mass movement in Greece. In the Lisbon May Day, the reformists were totally dominant, and the radical youth were shoved far into the background. In

Salonika on August 31 no one could ignore the veterans of November. In its September 2 report, *Athenaïke* described a demonstration polarized between the slogans of Caramanlis's followers and the slogans of the youth:

"On the one side": "Hail, great Macedonian leader!" "Macedonia is with you, savior of Greece!" "Caramanlis, the de Gaulle of Greece!" "Leader, save Greece, save Cyprus!" "Govern us, Ethnarch [father of the nation]!"

"On the other side": "The people have

not forgotten, they are organizing and they will win!" "Draft the junta's murderers!" "Investigate the crimes at the Polytechnic!" "Listen, our dead are speaking!" "Justice for our dead, for those sent to the prison camps, for those who were tortured, for Cyprus!" "The first dead were the fertilizer of freedom!" "People, go forward, the storm will not pass!" "Workers, farmers, hang the traitors!" "Burn the dossiers!" "People, remember November!" □

Another Bangladesh?

Bhutto Lowers Iron Curtain on Baluchistan

By Sharad Jhaveri

The Bhutto government has lowered an iron curtain on the reign of terror it has unleashed in Baluchistan.

Little news is trickling out. The main source of information has been the well-known Karachi weekly *Outlook*. But even this remaining independent journal has now been banned by the government. Its independent policy and especially its objective reporting of massacres in Baluchistan were unacceptable to the Bhutto government. Earlier, in its efforts to muzzle this magazine, it had blocked advertisements and its newsprint quota. Two other papers, *Chaltan* and *Jassarai*, have also been silenced.

The immediate cause of strife in this province of Pakistan was the ouster of a legally constituted, popularly elected majority government in the province.

Writing in the July 7 issue of *Outlook*, D. Shah Khan described the region: "The bleak semi-mountainous, semi-desert, inhospitable home for the Baluch population is hardly the type of terrain conducive for a successful swift political action, in which a quick decision could be reached. Due to the absence of roads and lack of water and food resources, the logistics present a formidable problem, stretching the zone of conflict across vast hostile areas."

He reported that armed tribesmen, possessing mostly antiquated weapons, are holding out in the inaccessible mountain fastnesses, sniping at Bhutto's forces, and at times am-

bushing them and even conducting surprise raids.

The occupation forces have exercised severe military repression in Bhutto's effort to smother the mass struggle for a democratic regime.

Khan Abdul Wali Khan, leader of the opposition National Awami party (NAP), said in the Pakistan National Assembly that the military retaliation was not confined to ground action but included "air strikes" by the air force, causing heavy loss of life, especially among the Marris. He claimed that as many as 700 Baluchi freedom fighters had been killed recently by the Pakistani army. These figures have been disputed by the government but not the fact that clashes have occurred.

Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan, a leader of the Pakhtuns, has charged that the Baluchis and the Pathans are suffering a military rule worse than that under Field Marshal Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan.

It has been reported that on the pretext of building bridges and roads and digging wells for the welfare of the people, the army continues to contaminate wells and destroy crops—a tactic learned in the school of U. S. imperialism in South Vietnam.

D. Shah Khan noted in his article in *Outlook* that for a population of only about 24 lakh [2,400,000 people], Baluchistan has a surprisingly large number of law and order defence agencies. His list included the Baluchistan police, Baluchistan reserve

police, Baluchistan constabulary, FSF, Frontier Corps, Coast Guards, Janbaz forces, and the armed forces.

Wali Khan reported that in a tour he made of the area he found that the military action had already cost the central government as much as rupees 200 crores [2,000 million rupees—about US\$205 million].

An editorial in the July 13 *Outlook* (a week before the journal was banned) remarked: "Baluchistan is burning." Time is fast running out, the editors declared.

Not only the Marris, Mengals, and Bizenjos, but almost all the Baluchi tribes have gone into the mountains to join the battle. The Pakhtuns and Pathans are reported to be considering giving active support. A leader of the Pakhtun Students Federation is reported to have said that the time has come when the Pakhtuns must throw in their lot with the Baluchi struggle for democracy and civil rights.

Bhutto has repeatedly said that another Bangladesh will not be permitted in what is left of Pakistan. Already plagued by the anti-Ahmedia struggle, he is attempting to conciliate the NAP but without giving any concessions. The opposition is holding to its two demands: withdrawal of the army and release of all detained politicians.

Bhutto has also once again raised the cry of a conspiracy hatched in New Delhi, Kabul, and Moscow to break up Pakistan. □

Mujib—Up to the Chin in the Latest Flood

By Malik Miah



The Bangladesh Times

A village in Noakhali district in southern Bangladesh.

For the past two months the great river system of the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Meghna has risen above the normal levels, inundating over half the 55,000 square miles of Bangladesh's territory. No fewer than eighteen of the nineteen districts have been affected by the floods.

I saw this in the first week of August—only some fifty days after the devastating flood waters began to flow.

Flying from the capital, Dacca, to a northeastern district, Sylhet, which could not be reached in any other way because of the flooding of railways and roads, I could see vast expanses of flooded land from the plane window—villages, towns, houses, farms, police stations, all swamped.

Bangladesh is now threatened with famine.

An English-language Bangladesh daily published a photograph of a child whose stomach was bloated because of lack of food. The accompanying article reported: "Death stares them in the face; yet they want to live. After the all-devouring floods have snatched everything that they had, they are left with only a will to live. They are a familiar sight in every relief camp in the flood ravaged Bangladesh today."

The exact toll of the floods is hard to estimate. But on the basis of local newspaper accounts and government reports, here are some of the initial figures: more than 1,200 dead; 400 crore takas in damages (US\$1 equals approximately 7.65 takas; one crore equals 10 million units); more than 23,000 square miles of inundated land; more than 25 million people affected; 500,000 homes destroyed and another 900,000 damaged; more than 90 lakhs acres (one lakh equals 100,000 units) of crops ruined. Cholera, smallpox, and other malignant diseases have broken out. Safe drinking water is difficult to obtain.

Devastating floods, unfortunately, are not new in Bangladesh. According to the *Bangladesh Times*, in 1954 10.23 million acres of land were flooded, ruining 120 crore takas of crops. In 1955, 12.48 million acres of land were flooded, the loss in crops being valued at 129 crore takas. Similar losses occurred in 1969 and in 1970.

The record is known by every government official. Yet the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did absolutely nothing during its three years in power to prepare for a repetition of these past disasters. When the new floods came, Sheikh

Mujibur had nothing ready except a speech calling on all Bengalis to come together as one to meet the crisis.

This appeal was for the record. After launching a special relief fund and asking for help from foreign countries, the Mujibur government proceeded in a highly partisan manner.

Attempts to mobilize help independent of the government but in cooperation with it did not meet with approval. For instance, the formation of a National Flood Relief Committee by eight opposition parties, three trade unions, a peasant organization, five student organizations, and a host of other people angered the official government relief agency. Efforts by the NFRC to solicit funds in the villages and slums have been hindered by the police. Nongovernment relief workers have been intimidated and threatened with jail sentences.

The regime's inadequate response to the current flood disaster has been exacerbated by the country's acute economic and political problems.

With 75 million people, the country is one of the most densely populated in the world. It has undergone continual economic and political crises under the Awami League regime, since winning its political independence from Pakistan on December 16, 1971. Today things are worse than ever.

The main cause is the poverty of the country brought about by years and years of imperialist exploitation. To this has been added three years of inefficiency and corruption under the Awami League government.

The masses have been hard hit by inflation. Last year alone prices went up more than 40 percent. Rice, the staple diet, was already in short supply before the floods came. Cooking oil is beyond the reach of most families.

Since independence was won, the economy has made little progress. The production of tea and jute, the country's major foreign cash products, has slackened since 1971. Overall industrial production is 20 percent lower today than under Pakistani rule. And most commodities—cotton textiles, fertilizers for food production, tools, etc.—are still being imported. The per capita income stands at approximately \$70 a year.

The five-year plan launched by the government last year has also fallen

flat. The 1973-74 economic plan was scheduled to reach a goal of Tk. 525 crores but only reached Tk. 400 crores. The government counted on foreign aid to provide 60 percent of its income.

According to Finance Minister Tajuddin Ahmed, this year's budget will show little improvement over last year's. Foreign loans or grants are expected to provide 75 percent of this year's income. But even this 75 percent figure is inadequate owing to the government's lack of preparation for

the flood season. Another Tk. 241 crores of foreign aid, it is estimated, will be needed.

Government corruption, losses in income through the smuggling of jute and other commodities across the Indian and Bangladesh border, unrestrained speculation, and similar evils have led to widespread discontent. How long the Mujib government can cling to office in face of mounting demands that something effective be done to ease conditions remains to be seen. □

Demand Decent Medical Care, Food

New Zealand Prisoners Strike for Basic Human Rights

By Claudia Mason

[The following article appeared in the August 30 issue of *Socialist Action*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Wellington, New Zealand.]

* * *

The strike by 181 Paparua prisoners was one of the best organized efforts yet to improve conditions in New Zealand prisons. More than half the Paparua inmates assembled in the exercise yard at 8 a.m. on August 19 and presented a list of grievances to the prison superintendent, Mr. H. W. Stroud.

"For the next eight hours," reported the August 20 *Christchurch Press*, "they sat and talked under the gaze of warders, while police dogs and a large number of policemen waited outside . . . all returned to their cells voluntarily by 4 p.m."

They were demanding better medical treatment, food, and clothing, the right to use telephones, an end to mail censorship, the right to have long hair and beards, an end to provocations by staff, and wages when wet weather prevented work.

The lack of medical care was one of the main issues that sparked the protest. Three weeks earlier one prisoner, Ms Gail Nikora, had died as a result of an acute asthma attack.

Project Paparua, a prison welfare organization, has released some of the details of the death, which it says the administration "hushed up."

They say that warders had paid little attention to Nikora's condition and had even accused her of faking illness. A few days before her death, Nikora was taken off privileges following an incident at the prison, and the night before the fatal attack she was locked in her cell at 5 p.m. and left there until the following morning. According to Project Paparua, "had she not been placed alone in her cell the night previously when she was already ill, she would not have suffered the emotional strain and fear for her own well-being that may well have induced the fatal attack." To make matters worse, the prison did not have on hand an oxygen cylinder, which was needed to save Nikora's life.

Project Paparua spokesman Mike Donaldson describes a second incident: "An inmate reported sick, was told by a doctor that he was a malingerer, and was taken early one morning from the prison sick bay to hospital with pneumonia a few days later."

There was a third case, a few months ago, when a prisoner known to the authorities to be mentally disturbed, was found hanged in his cell.

"There have also been prison officers who have picked fights with prisoners," said Donaldson. "One officer was discharged recently, according to the prisoners, and another inmate laid a charge of assault against a warder on Friday (August 16)."

Problems with mail are another common complaint, he says. There is censorship of some mail that is supposed to go straight through, "letters have gone missing in the mail, and one prisoner has been up for making allegations about officers, when the only place he has mentioned them has been in his letters."

"It appears that prisoners have very few rights which cannot be removed," continues Donaldson. "The small things which they do have, such as being let out of their cells to see visitors, and recreation, are privileges which can be removed if they misbehave."

He also spoke about the prohibition of telephone calls, and the hair and clothing regulations. (The Secretary of Justice, Mr. G. S. Orr, claims that long hair and beards pose security and hygiene problems.) Donaldson says, "It is difficult on the outside of a prison to appreciate the effects that such petty regulations have on an individual's self-concept of his own well-being. In a prison there are so few things that an individual can do to assert his own individuality, and such things as clothing and hairlength do become important."

"It is rather hard on prisoners not being able to make telephone calls, especially if one has a sick wife, or if their wife is going to have a baby. You would think they would permit them to call in such cases."

Another bone of contention is pay. The Secretary of Justice says that the prisoners' earnings should be considered more as pocket money than wages. Even for pocket money the pay is pretty miserable: an average of six cents an hour or \$2 a week. And out of that the inmates have to buy their cigarettes and similar things. There is no chance to save anything, and a common problem is that prisoners are flat broke when they get out.

The strike achieved wide publicity and a short discussion in parliament on prison conditions, but those who took part didn't escape penalty. The Penal Institutions Act deems that

"every inmate commits an offence against discipline who . . . without the permission of the Superintendent, combines with other inmates for the purpose of obtaining any alteration in conditions in the institution or of making any complaint."

All but nine of the 181 were convicted under this provision and lost their privileges for a period. The thir-

teen inmates "who proved to be very involved" received fourteen days in the cells, fourteen days loss of remission, and two months loss of privileges.

Superintendent Stroud came up with the standard slander that the strike seemed to be due to "outside influences," while his superior, Secretary of Justice Orr, hinted at a conspiracy

of "a few leading spirits there who have persuaded others." Mike Donaldson rejects these allegations and says the officials are trying to detract attention from the real issues in the prison.

And real issues there are. All the Paparua prisoners were demanding is that they be granted some very elementary human rights. □

Nab Veteran of the Canadian Mounties

Bomb Explodes in Hands of Police Provocateur

By Richard Poulin and Art Young

[The following article appeared in the August 19 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Toronto.]

* * *

On the night of July 23, a bomb exploded outside the home of the president of Steinberg's grocery store chain. Montréal police and newspaper reporters found a glove containing a finger, proving that the bomb was a weak one, and that it had exploded in the hands of the "presumed terrorist."

The police rapidly discovered a suspect in Montréal hospital. The man had burns across his body, a finger missing from his hand, and is of the same blood type as found on the glove found at the scene of the bombing.

The suspect was none other than Robert Samson, a seven-year veteran of the RCMP [Royal Canadian Mounted Police].

Québec Minister of Justice Jerome Choquette declared that it was "improbable and far-fetched" to say that the RCMP allowed its members to plant bombs. Yet there is ample reason to believe otherwise.

Federal Solicitor-General Warren Allmand confirmed that Samson is a member of the top-secret Security Service (formerly known as the Security and Intelligence Division) of the RCMP. The SS spies on labor, left-wing, and nationalist groups.

Samson, recovering in the hospital, is under twenty-four-hour police guard. Despite the considerable evidence linking him to the abortive

bombing, he has not been charged or suspended from the RCMP.

In an August 12 interview, Samson charged that the Montréal police were trying to frame him. The same day, Fernand Barre, a close friend of Samson who drove him to the hospital, claimed that he had been interrogated by police for twenty-four hours straight. He charged that the police had threatened and beat him.

This curious set of circumstances has provoked widespread suspicion that the police have been acting as provocateurs in the radical, labor, and nationalist movements in Québec. This was confirmed in an August 3 article in the Québec City daily *Le Soleil*, headlined "Political Infiltration and Provocation."

Based on a series of interviews with members of the RCMP, *Le Soleil* reported that the SS force spies on socialists, revolutionaries, members of the Parti Québécois, participants in protest movements, and others. "Many actions of members of this branch give the clear impression of pure and simple provocation," one officer told *Le Soleil*. For example, plain-clothed Mounties have joined major demonstrations, then engaged in violent actions to provoke arrests. The informants cited the Saint-Jean Baptiste demonstration in 1968, the Bill 63 (language bill) protests in 1969, and the *La Presse* strike in 1971 as examples.

"Sometimes, also, according to one of our police sources, the provocation is carried out in a more discreet fashion, through agents infiltrated into

groups or by collaborators (with the police) who work to create squabbles within left groups or political formations. As particular events, such as a convention, or elections, approach, police agents strive to disrupt these groups," the article stated.

"One of the policemen we questioned even stated that a special squad which specializes in provocation was formed in the spring of 1971 and has been at work ever since," *Le Soleil* informed its readers. The activities of this squad of about fifteen men are a closely guarded secret, kept hidden even from other top RCMP agents.

Officials have so far refused to say whether Samson was part of this secret RCMP plumbers squad.

Coming on the heels of earlier revelations of police infiltration and provocation, the Samson affair poses many questions. What, for example, was the role of the police in the FLQ [Front de Libération du Québec] kidnapping of British diplomat James Cross and Québec labor minister Pierre Laporte in 1970? What has been the specific role of police provocations in demonstrations and strikes in the recent past? What are the links between the police and organized crime in Québec? Are there similar provocation, disruption, and infiltration operations in English Canada?

The truth must be revealed! Documents and records of the RCMP must be made public. What is needed is a full public inquiry, controlled by the labor, socialist, and nationalist movements—the victims of the police provocateurs. □

Nuclear Bombs Open to Raids by Greeks or Turks

During the crisis in Cyprus Washington considered taking direct military action to remove its atomic weapons stockpiled in Greece and Turkey, Pentagon officials disclosed September 8.

"Concern in the Pentagon over the security of the warheads was so great," reported the September 9 *New York Times*, "that early in the Cyprus crisis, according to the officials, the Defense Department ordered special measures to protect the atomic stockpiles."

"Among the measures reportedly taken was an order to a United States carrier with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean to be prepared to send in a Marine detachment aboard helicopters to recover the atomic warheads."

The Defense Department said it was concerned not so much that the warheads might be seized by Greek or Turkish forces but rather, the *New York Times* reported, that "in the event of fighting between the two countries, some of the warheads might be damaged and cause radioactive contamination."

That might well be the case. The Pentagon has had accidents with their nuclear weapons that have led to radioactive contamination even in peacetime. But this wasn't what really worried the Pentagon officials.

Their real fear was that the Greek or Turkish generals might raid the stockpiles and use the bombs against each other.

Although the nuclear weapons in Greece and Turkey are under United States control, that control can be evaded. An official of the Atomic Energy Commission quoted in the September 11 *New York Times* said that "having the weapons remain in sole United States control" was "not effective."

U. S. officials admitted that the warheads had been in Greek and Turkish aircraft, and that after the Cyprus crisis they had been removed and "placed in American custody." Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger told reporters September 11 that some of the atomic warheads were assigned for

use by Greek forces in event of war. There is no reason to assume that similar provisions were not made for Turkey.

The U. S. officials claimed that "technical control" over the bombs always rested with the United States. Safeguard measures such as mechanical and electronic lock-and-key systems are supposed to prevent the detonation of a weapon without the approval of U. S. authorities. Defense officials described these safeguard systems as providing "a virtually foolproof guarantee" against unauthorized detonation of a warhead.

However, it seems that the Pentagon itself does not have very much confidence in its own safeguards. "... partly as a result of Congressional urgings," reported the September 9 *New York Times*, "it is proposing to move toward more modern and superior protective devices."

After a hydrogen bomb was lost off the coast of Spain in 1966, Dr. Hans Bethe, a leading U. S. nuclear physicist who was privy to all the secrets of the H-bomb, "said . . . that no extraordinary engineering skill would be required to detonate the weapon even without its own arming device." (*New York Herald Tribune*, January 30, 1966.)

Furthermore, as in several other NATO countries, Greek and Turkish planes, armed with atomic warheads fixed under their wings, were on "quick reaction alert" stationed near the ends of runways for swift takeoff. In this situation the warheads must have been very close to being functional.

The only conclusion possible is that Greece or Turkey could have taken over the weapons and used them. Washington officials knew this. That was why they were so worried.

Humanity is thus faced with a new danger from nuclear weapons. It is possible for Washington's allies to take over nuclear warheads stationed in their country and detonate them in a local conflict outside Washington's control. That could well touch off a global nuclear war.

Now that Greece has withdrawn from NATO, officials in Washington are debating whether they should remove the warheads. The terms of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and related secret bilateral arrangements call for such a measure.


Some, however, argue that the legal question is "subordinate to broader policy concerns." The September 11 *New York Times* reported that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff, backed by Secretary of State Kissinger's aide, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, contend that removal would drive Greece further from the North Atlantic fold."

Defense Secretary Schlesinger told reporters September 11 that the United States was "not at this time contemplating" removal of the atomic warheads. It is an issue, however, he said, "that will have to come up as Greece alters its bilateral relationship with the North Atlantic treaty alliance."

Schlesinger dismissed suggestions that there was any legal requirement. He said no legislation or treaty precluded placing atomic warheads in a nation that did not belong to NATO. □

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'War and an Irish Town'

Reviewed by Brian Lyons

From 1968 onward, ever since the upsurge of the Irish freedom struggle, an abundance of literature concerning Irish history and politics has appeared on the English-speaking market. The publication of *War and an Irish Town* has special significance in many respects.

First and foremost, the book was published within a specific political context of ebb in the mass movement in which the forces within and without the republican movement had the opportunity to assess the experiences of the past period and draw some fundamental conclusions about their political future.

Second, the author is a well-known activist in the struggle both in Britain as well as in Ireland itself. His book is the only work available so far that seeks to present a Marxist analysis of the rise and decline of the struggle over the past five years.

Last but not least, the book is published by Penguin, one of the largest publishing houses in Britain. With a ready-made international and national market, the distribution and readership of this title should be quite broad. For all these reasons *War and an Irish Town* deserves serious attention.

The often complex peculiarities of Irish politics that have dismayed many potentially revolutionary young people and workers are presented in a popular, readily understandable manner. The author has an extensive grasp of both contemporary and historical features of Irish politics and puts this knowledge to good use. Each section of the book is well researched and presents a variety of original source material to back up its arguments.

For instance, the coercion and trickery used by the Unionist and bourgeois nationalists to force the northern Catholics into acceptance of the six-county state are fully illustrated by

quoting Irish and British journals published in the period when partition was established.

Similarly, in the area of economics, unemployment, and emigration, McCann's compilation of facts, quotations, and statistics provides a useful source of reference to students of Irish politics, old and new alike. From the standpoint of balanced political analysis and conclusions, however, McCann's presentation of the problem

War and an Irish Town, by
Eamonn McCann. Middlesex,
England: Penguin Books, 1974.
255 pp. £0.40.

does contain a number of weaknesses.

One of the major features of Ireland's development was the integration of religion into the state. This varied both in form and degree according to each area. In the north it took the form of using the Orange lodge as a mass organization of the Protestants to preserve the caste mentality of the Protestant working class, promoting a common religious identification opposed to the mystical threat of "Rome Rule."

McCann goes to great pains to show that this fear of the Protestants was and is not without foundation in real life. As proof of this, examples of the dominance of the Catholic hierarchy in the twenty-six counties are provided at some length.

Referring to the debates in the Dáil (parliament of the twenty-six counties) of that period, McCann makes a convincing case that almost every single piece of reactionary legislation enacted after the civil war in 1922 was based on the constitutional supremacy of Catholic morality.

Quoting from a statement of the then Prime Minister Cosgrave, McCann

uses the following example: "Drastic laws are made only for the evil-doer, and there need be no fear of punishment in the minds of those misguided young men and women if they seize the opportunity to recognise that observance of the laws of God and of the State is the only sure means of achieving the ultimate happiness and prosperity of the people. The authority of the State comes from God, and every organisation that seeks to destroy the State is subversive of morality and religion."

The integration of the Catholic "moral code" into the twenty-six-county state was without a doubt an essential ingredient in cementing the reactionary laws against every form of social rebellion or progress. A major task of the Irish revolution will undoubtedly be to sweep away and destroy the moral and political influence the Catholic church currently enjoys. McCann's present emphasis on this is open to doubt, however, particularly in light of the conclusions he draws later.

In the past period, different workerist groups in and outside of Ireland have been preoccupied with the perennial problem of "uniting the Protestant and Catholic working class." Their recipe for solving this problem is simple: the Catholics and Protestants must get together and fight around their common oppression as a class.

The logic of this position in face of the upsurge in the national struggle by the Catholics has been an accommodation to the pro-imperialist caste consciousness of the Protestant workers. McCann's book runs the same risk.

Unlike many of the workerists, McCann is at least able to make a distinction between the Orange and republican tradition: "The fact was, and is, that the Republican tradition,



for all the distortions of history contained within it, stemmed from a genuine, if episodic, anti-imperialist struggle; the Orange tradition was, objectively, pro-imperialist."

Nevertheless, in his attempt to analyse the success of partition, McCann draws an equation sign between Irish nationalism and Protestant Unionism: "Protestant Unionism was based on the interests of the owners of land and industry in the North of Ireland. Nationalism was based on the interests of the owners and potential owners of industry in the South."

This equation of the nationalism of the oppressed with that of the oppressor ultimately leads McCann to adapt politically to the fears of the Protestants: "We were not part of a fight in the South against the set-up there and one cannot expect acceptance as an opponent of bourgeois nationalism if one is not seen to be part of a struggle against that section of the national bourgeoisie which is actually in power."

The second way in which this danger is expressed is in the balance sheet he draws of the civil rights movement. As a rationalization for his position, McCann actually justifies the conservative fears of the Protestants on the grounds that conceding civil rights to the Catholics would have led to a reduction in the standard of living of the Protestants.

His solution to the problem is consequently no different from that of the workerists: "In terms of strict economics the only programme with any potential to undercut sectarianism would have been one which linked the demands for fair distribution of the relevant commodities to demands to increase absolutely the number of jobs and houses available for distribution. . . . In a phrase, it would have involved the elaboration of a comprehensive anti-capitalist, not just anti-unionist, programme." This, as he views it, "might have enabled those of us in Derry at least to go on talking to Protestants in the Fountain in 1969."

The discrimination the Catholics have suffered in all spheres of their social existence has been the concrete form of their national oppression within a colonial, pro-imperialist state. The struggle against that discrimination therefore represented only the re-

newal of the age-old national struggle of the Irish people, although at a different juncture and in a different form. Moreover, this struggle could successfully be championed and concluded only by the working class in Ireland.

This was the central dynamic of the Irish revolution in the past and it remains so today. To neglect that, simply on account of "talking to the



EAMONN McCANN

Protestants," would have been extremely harmful to the struggle then; it is one of the factors leading to the paralysis of the oppressed minority in face of the Loyalist reaction now.

Ironically though, McCann's is the only book so far to give a comprehensive insight into the dynamics and organization of the civil rights movement. Hitting at the very heart of the Unionist system, McCann shows how the civil rights struggle set in motion a process that compelled the Catholics to organize and defend themselves with revolutionary methods that went far beyond the declared intentions of the movement's leadership.

"The only people more appalled than the government by the situation were the leaders of the C. A. C. (Citizens Action Committee). They had never intended barricades. But blood was up and there was nothing they could do about it."

Despite the Hunt report of October 1969 and the intervention of the British army, ostensibly as a "peace-keeping force," the anti-capitalist methods remained a constant feature of the struggle.

Accurately depicting the forms of this radicalization, McCann's book describes the day-to-day life of the Catholics in struggle. A well-detailed overall picture eventually emerges of a besieged minority, intolerant of their oppression and prepared to fight back by any means necessary.

The weaknesses of the movement are also indicated. Particularly evident at that time was the crisis of political leadership within the Catholic community. Out of the many forces contending for political hegemony, McCann himself was part of what he describes as a "left-faction." As a political formation aspiring to challenge the reformists, the left-faction had neither programmatic nor organizational cohesion.

Although McCann's description of the attempt to rectify this is often comical, the failure to develop a Marxist leadership in the heat of the immense struggle then taking place was of tragic importance for the struggle's future course.

The creation of the no-go areas symbolized by the writing on the gable-end of St. Columb's Street—"You Are Now Entering Free Derry"—produced laboratory conditions for the testing of different political perspectives. Another weakness of the struggle, however, was the lack of democratic organization. This prevented the contending political lines from being presented openly before the Catholic masses for discussion and adoption as a correct perspective for future actions.

In place of this, McCann reveals that the different wings of the republican movement pursued a sectarian policy. Each had its own self-appointed organizers, counsellors, and defence force for the community-controlled areas.

"Not all callers were on military business. People would come seeking advice, or with minor complaints—on the type of business which in Britain would naturally be taken to the welfare office or to a department of the local council. Provisional supporters would go to the Provisionals, Official supporters to the Officials. Neutralists had no choice."

McCann notes the attempt of the

Officials to rectify this error through proposals for broader and more independent organization. Unfortunately, these were blurred by much confusion and failed to cut across the prevailing sectarianism.

In the months between August 1971 and January 1972, the Irish struggle witnessed an upsurge of unprecedented scope and militancy. The introduction of mass internment and the brutal murder of thirteen unarmed civil rights marchers had the opposite effect from that intended. The Catholic masses North and South responded with mass mobilizations unheard of within their own generation. The effect was to increase their fighting power and to force the ruling classes of both islands onto the defensive.

The conservative leadership of the SDLP [Social Democratic and Labour party] was forced more and more to manoeuvre to try to gain the mantle of the nationalist cause. Although their threat to withdraw from Stormont and form an alternative assembly was only an expression of their opportunism, nevertheless the opportunity to credibly propose and organize such an alternative was enhanced.

To have done so would have automatically and directly involved a challenge to partition and the union with Britain. Given the de facto general strike in the South in response to Bloody Sunday and the compromised position of the Fianna Fail government, such a struggle was a realistic prospect. The future course of the struggle, particularly the growth of the Provisionals, should be viewed in that light.

Despite this political ferment, by early 1972 no revolutionary Marxist party or even the substantial nucleus of one had yet emerged. The movement of the Officials in the direction of developing a political strategy based on the teachings of Marxism was a positive step initially. The end result, however, has so far proved negative.

The growth of the militant nationalist current, the Provisionals, was the inevitable consequence of this vacuum. McCann expresses it this way: "The continuing inability of the left throughout 1970 and early 1971 to channel the aggression of the youth left the field open for the Provisionals, who, unlike us, had a perfectly coherent and stunningly simple answer to the

crisis—smash Stormont and unite Ireland."

By March 1972 the first of these two aims was realized when the British government suspended Stormont and instituted direct rule from Westminster. Whether or not this was a victory is still a contentious issue in republican and left circles in Ireland. Although incomplete, McCann's evaluation does draw attention to the dual character of direct rule:

"The instinctive reaction of the people of the area was unrestrained joy. . . . But to the crucial question which this raised—with what did we want the Stormont system replaced?—there was no easy or generally accepted answer. This resulted in a degree of confusion about what we ought to do now, a confusion which William Whitelaw, the new Tory Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, was not slow to recognise and use."

But with the removal of Stormont and the phased release of a substantial number of internees, the "stunningly simple answer" of the Provisionals proved unequal to the crisis of political perspective.

"They came naturally in the morning . . . unceasing lines of them in convoy, Ferrets, Whippets and A.P.C.'s, Land Rovers, Saladins and Centurions coming up Rossville Street past the high flats and into Lecky Road, search lights playing down from the city walls, bulldozers and earth movers beginning to grapple with the barricades, men shouting, machinery screaming, noise everywhere. 'Jesus Christ,' said Tommy McCourt, watching from Westland Street and getting his military parallels slightly crossed in his awe, 'it's like bloody Dunkirk.'"

So began Operation Motorman and the end of Free Derry. In deciding to liquidate the no-go areas the Tories had clearly sized up the situation from all angles. The political pre-conditions having been met, Operation Motorman became a simple military manoeuvre. In contrast to the first attempt of the army to quell the insurgent minority, the resistance to this operation was negligible.

Since that time there has been some downturn in the struggle of the Catholic masses, which has given the imperialists and their native collaborators greater room for manoeuvre. Although the collapse of Sunningdale

showed the limitations of this, the relationship of forces in Ireland since Operation Motorman has nevertheless shifted in favour of the Loyalist reaction.

However, what looks like an attempt by the Loyalists to inflict a crushing defeat against the Catholic minority will not automatically succeed. Such an attempt could have the opposite effect of acting as the catalyst for renewed mass mobilizations by the Catholic masses throughout Ireland.

To take advantage of such a revival requires assimilating fully the lessons of the past six years of the struggle. Despite McCann's intentions, the rise and decline of the Irish freedom struggle as he has recorded it raises more questions than it answers.

In the conclusion to his book McCann states: "To make a revolution we need a revolutionary party. This book is intended as a contribution to a discussion of how best to build it." Although McCann's book fails in this important task, nevertheless, given its broad readership, *War and an Irish Town* is a useful contribution which can with value be the subject of future comment and debate. □

New Polish Journal

The first issue of the Polish magazine *Na Lewo*, published in Paris, was announced in August. It included the following articles: "The Position of Women in Poland"; "How Is an Ideological Science Possible"; "The Lisbon Spring"; "The Presidential Elections in France"; "Vladimir Bukovsky — Statement of an Oppositionist"; and a review by Ernest Mandel of *Gulag Archipelago*.

The journal aims to explain to Polish readers the difference between genuine Marxism and the "caricature . . . the bureaucrats use to justify their rule," as well as to inform oppositionists in Eastern Europe about the revolutionary left in the West.

The magazine is open to contributions in Polish from those who accept the need for a "forum of free political discussion within the framework of opposing the bureaucracy from the left." Copies can be obtained from Société Internationale d'Édition, Département d'Europe Orientale, 10 Impasse Guéménée, Paris 75004, France. □

Cómo Mantiene Caramanlis la 'Ley y el Orden'

Por Giannis Felekis

[Giannis Felekis fue detenido por la Junta de Papadopoulos, puesto en libertad durante la fracasada liberalización de mediados de 1973, y encarcelado nuevamente durante la represión que siguió a las movilizaciones de masas de 1973. Fue puesto nuevamente en libertad el 23 de julio, con la amnistía para los presos políticos que siguió a la renuncia de la Junta encabezada por Gizikis.

[En el mes de agosto se convirtió en el editor responsable de *Ergatike Pale* (Lucha de Clases), periódico que refleja las posiciones de los trotskistas griegos, que aparecía regularmente una vez al mes, mimeografiado, durante los años de abierta dictadura. *Ergatike Pale* comenzó a aparecer como semanario legal de cuatro páginas con su número del 10 de agosto. En el número del 17 de agosto, el tamaño de las páginas había aumentado de 11 x 16.5 pulgadas a 13.5 x 19 (un aumento de casi 40 %).

[Desde que fue liberado en julio, Felekis ha sido arrestado dos veces más por la policía secreta griega. El 12 de agosto fue detenido por vender *Ergatike Pale* "sin permiso". Había ido con un grupo de tres activistas a vender el periódico en la Plaza Kotzia en Atenas. Luego de que los cuatro habían vendido 300 periódicos, la policía trató de arrestarlos, quitándoles los documentos de identidad. Pero los trabajadores vinieron en su ayuda y pusieron a la policía en retirada. Los policías decidieron esperar la oportunidad para agarrarlo solo y entonces actuaron. Esta es la forma en que *Ergatike Pale* lo describe, en el número del 24 de agosto:

["En la esquina de Kaningos y Veranzerou, los policías atacaron otra vez nuestro grupo de activistas agarrándolos del cabello, golpeándolos y dándoles patadas. Las personas que estaban alrededor corrieron en su ayuda y rescataron a dos activistas. Los otros dos, Giannis Felekis y Aleka Abave, fueron detenidos y gol-

peados en el trayecto a la cárcel. Allí un "caballero" de traje azul, el policía duro de turno, desafió a pelear a nuestro editor".

[El juez acusó a Felekis y a su camarada de "hacer dinero" vendiendo su periódico a tres dracmas (cerca de 10 centavos de dólar). Sin embargo los liberaron.

[Felekis fue arrestado otra vez el 18 de agosto. En el siguiente artículo, tomado del número del 24 de agosto de *Ergatike Pale*, él relata su último arresto. Esta es una traducción del artículo titulado "How Caramanlis's Cops Uphold 'Law and Order'", que apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 9 de septiembre].

* * *

El domingo 18 de agosto a las 7:30 de la tarde fui al centro de Atenas para tener una visión global de las diversas manifestaciones. Yo intentaba usar este material para un artículo de *Ergatike Pale*. En la esquina de Panepistemiou y Benake, corrí tras una gran movilización de jóvenes que se dirigían hacia la Plaza Omonoia. Como en general yo compartía las posiciones de los participantes en la movilización, inmediatamente me uní a ella. Además, ésta era la mejor forma de reunir información para un artículo correcto. Después de que la policía atacó la manifestación en la calle Estadio en una forma salvaje, prácticamente destruyéndola, me abrí paso hasta la esquina de Phillellon y Metropoleos, pasando por un sinnúmero de situaciones difíciles. Un gran número de manifestantes estaban reunidos allí, tratando de juntarse con los de la plaza Syntagma. La policía los atacó reiteradamente, arrojándoles agua con mangueras para dispersarlos. También trató de dispersar e intimidar a la multitud usando sus cachiporras y arrestando manifestantes.

Cerca de las 9:30, en una de las muchas cargas de la policía, fui arrestado mientras trataba de llegar al

pórtico del Elysée. Mi arresto debe haber aparecido como una de las más brutales escenas de la tarde. Por lo menos seis policías de uniforme y uno de civil me atacaron. Mientras me arrojaban al suelo, me pateaban y me golpeaban con sus cachiporras y puños, dirigidos sobre todo a mi cara. Estaban tan enfurecidos que a menudo se golpeaban entre ellos.

Luego, continuando conmigo, me arrastraron a lo largo de la calle hasta la esquina de la plaza Syntagma donde estaba estacionado el carro celular. Durante el viaje a la estación de policía del Distrito Primero, me tenían agarrado por los cabellos mientras continuaban pegándome en la cara, que estaba cubierta de sangre. En la estación de policía usaron el lenguaje más ofensivo y me amenazaban constantemente. Traté de no caer en sus provocaciones haciendo oídos sordos a sus insultos.

Mientras estaba sentado en silencio con otros cuatro prisioneros en el cuarto donde se reciben a los detenidos, justo en frente de la oficina de guardia, los tres guardias uniformados que nos estaban cuidando dieron vuelta sus placas, de modo que sus números no pudieran ser vistos. Dos de ellos vestidos de civil me atacaron furiosamente.

Una vez más me golpearon en la cara, que otra vez se llenó de sangre. Después de un rato me llevaron a un lavabo y hundieron mi cabeza en el agua para limpiarme la sangre. Metían mi cabeza dentro del agua cada vez que terminaban una rueda de golpes. Yo le dije al oficial de guardia en ese momento (su oficina estaba a sólo cuatro metros) que él era el responsable y le exigí que me diera la razón por la cual los agentes de las "fuerzas del orden" me estaban golpeando. Naturalmente, no me respondió.

Después nos llevaron a todos a las celdas y luego de aproximadamente tres horas, pusieron a todos en libertad excepto a Giannis Pekhlivani-

dis, Giannis Tsonis y a mí. Nuestras caras estaban magulladas y heridas.

Durante el tiempo que estuve en la celda, guardias y oficiales vinieron a amenazarme e insultarme, a mí, a mi familia y a la juventud en general de la manera más sucia. Dos veces pude oír por qué me estaban tratando así. Entre un montón de amenazas e insultos, un guardia dijo: "Caramanlis es un tipo muy duro y los hará tirar los guantes a todos ustedes, los 'sabelotodo'". Un inspector de policía dijo: "Todos estos jovenzuelos que salen a manifestar son unos jodidos". Cuando le contesté que recordaría lo que él había dicho y se lo iba a comunicar a la juventud y al público en general, dijo: "La policía y el público no están interesados en la opinión de gente como tú".

Yo cuento esto para informar una vez más a la gente sobre la catadura moral de los organismos de "la ley y el orden".

En la segunda tarde de arresto, Pekhlivanidis, Tsonis y Karagiannakis (este último estaba detenido en el Tercer Distrito), fueron llevados a la oficina del fiscal público. Los dos primeros fueron liberados. Karagiannakis comparecería ante el Quinto Tribunal el 29 de agosto. Al día siguiente, me llevaron a la oficina del fiscal, después de que las "marcas" de los malos tratos habían desaparecido.

Cuando estuve delante del fiscal Doris, él declaró inmediatamente que la sangre que había aún en mi camisa y pantalones era de las "cabezas de los policías que usted abrió". Le reclamé la "imparcialidad" de la justicia burguesa, señalando que todo esto no me sorprendía, puesto que ya estoy bastante familiarizado con el papel que juega la justicia burguesa en la sociedad capitalista.

Por fin me envió al Quinto Tribunal para ser juzgado el 29 de agosto por resistencia e insolencia frente a la autoridad, por organizar una manifestación ilegal y asaltar y atacar a los representantes de la ley.

Así, nos encontramos frente a otro caso clásico de justicia burguesa, donde se condena a las víctimas en lugar de los culpables.

Agradezco con todo mi corazón a los abogados y ciudadanos comunes que me apoyaron y rescataron de las garras de las fuerzas represivas, y espero que continúen dándome su solidaridad. □

En Pro de una Imagen Brillante

Gobierno Peruano Abre Campaña Contra la Tortura

Por Nestor Paz

Lima

Prosiguiendo con una serie de medidas de tipo populista que van desde la nacionalización de la International Petroleum Co., la reforma agraria y la comunidad industrial* hasta la reciente conmutación de las condenas contra dirigentes magisteriales y la estatización de los diarios de ultraderecha; la Junta de Gobierno pe-



VELASCO ALVARADO

ruana ha sorprendido a la opinión pública al emprender a través de los diarios de la capital una campaña contra la tortura policial.

Esta campaña ha venido incluyendo denuncias de tortura no solamente a presos comunes sino también a presos políticos en diarios como *La Crónica* y *Ultima Hora*, y revistas co-

*Nuevo organismo a través del cual se permite la participación del personal de obreros y empleados de una empresa en las ganancias de la misma; percibiendo de conjunto utilidades por el 15 por ciento de la renta neta anual de la empresa, sin poder ejercer la propiedad de las acciones correspondientes a este 15 por ciento sino hasta que el monto que le co-

mo *OIGA* y *Caretas* (esta última, que había sido clausurada por el gobierno ha vuelto recientemente a la circulación); la apertura de un juicio contra cuatro oficiales de policía acusados de aplicar tortura durante los interrogatorios, de parte del Ministro del Interior; y aún la renuncia del Director General de la Policía de Investigaciones del Perú, obviamente el principal responsable, anunciada por el propio Presidente de la República.

Naturalmente, la clase trabajadora felicita esta medida por lo que pueda contribuir a disminuir los malos tratos y la degradación de que son objeto los prisioneros. Considera que es un avance frente a las carnicerías que en el pasado se realizaban a los ojos de toda una colonia penal (no podemos olvidar los macabros asesinatos de los reos comunes "Ojón" y "Negro Hugo" en 1968, los cuales fueron denunciados a los diarios por Hugo Blanco desde el Frontón). Pero lo que queda por verse son los resultados reales de esta medida y si la propia Junta podrá ser consecuente con la campaña que acaba de emprender.

Durante los seis años de gobierno del General Juan Velasco Alvarado, hemos podido comprobar que las actitudes positivas, no han significado ningún obstáculo para el empleo de la represión cada vez que el gobierno lo ha juzgado conveniente.

Así tenemos, en 1969: los casos de la masacre de los pueblos de Huanta y Ayacucho que luchaban por su derecho a la educación, que dejó decenas de muertos y cientos de presos y heridos; los ataques con disparos, gases y cachiporras a las numerosas marchas de los trabajadores de las minas "Raúl" y "Cerro de Pasco" y la invasión policial a la universidad de

responde a la Comunidad alcance el 50 por ciento del capital social de la empresa.

San Marcos para imponer la Ley 17437.

En 1970: la invasión armada a la Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería dejando un saldo de numerosos heridos, junto con la represión sistemática de toda movilización estudiantil.

En 1971: la represión brutal desatada sobre la huelga nacional de los maestros, luego de la cual se deportó a cinco dirigentes magisteriales y junto con ellos a Hugo Blanco y Rolando Breña, este último dirigente estudiantil y la masacre de los mineros de Cobriza que dejó veintitrés muertos.

En 1972: la asolada al pueblo de Puno que, a través de movilizaciones que llegaron a reunir aproximadamente 30,000 personas, reclamó sus derechos con motivo de la visita de la esposa del Presidente; esta vez el saldo fue de cinco muertos y numerosos heridos.

En 1973: la represión al paro de protesta de 24 horas pidiendo la destitución de las autoridades y la no intervención del gobierno en los gremios de pescadores, acatado por más de 40,000 trabajadores de Chimbote afiliados a la FESIDETA (Federación Sindical Departamental de Trabajadores de Ancash), que deja como saldo un estudiante y un obrero muertos y cuatro heridos de bala.

La represión en marzo de este año de las marchas del Frente Unico de Rescatadores y de la FETIMP (Federación de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos del Perú) con un saldo de cuatro heridos de bala y un muerto.

Lejos de llevarnos a confusión, debemos encontrar el origen de estas medidas de moralización de la administración pública en la necesidad que tiene la Junta de mantener una buena imagen ante los trabajadores; cosa que cada vez se le hará más difícil en tanto que los problemas de fondo quedan siempre sin resolver. El principal, que es el de la inflación creciente, se ha convertido ya en la causa mayor de la serie de huelgas obreras y del redespertar estudiantil que vive el Perú en este momento.

La clase trabajadora peruana, con una visión dialéctica de las cosas, apoya con todas sus fuerzas cada paso positivo dado por la Junta; pero ante ella y su vanguardia revolucionaria permanece planteado cada vez con más urgencia el emprendimiento de una lucha independiente por la

toma del poder por los trabajadores; única forma de garantizar la plena solución de los problemas de las gran-

des mayorías, incluyendo dentro de ellos la moralización de la administración pública. □

¿El Patricia Hearst Mexicano?

El Viejo Cacique Supera a Sus Secuestradores

Por Eugenia Aranda

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Wily Political Boss Outfoxes Kidnappers," que aparece en esta misma edición de *Intercontinental Press*].

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El 28 de agosto se produjo el que ha sido hasta ahora el secuestro más espectacular en México. Por la mañana de ese día fue secuestrado en Guadalajara José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández, de 83 años, quien además de ser el suegro del Presidente Luis Echeverría Álvarez, es uno de los políticos más importantes de la clase dominante.

Fue gobernador del estado de Jalisco; fundó la Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara (UAG); fue presidente del consejo forestal del estado; actualmente es consejero de la Comisión Federal de Electricidad (uno de los dos grandes organismos que administran la industria eléctrica, que está nacionalizada) y, por si esto fuera poco, tiene el rango de General.

Pero dejando de lado sus méritos oficialmente reconocidos, el Sr. Zuno Hernández es uno de los patrocinadores de la Federación de Estudiantes de Guadalajara (FEG), la organización que ha implantado un régimen de terror en la UAG, a través de acciones gangsteriles y ataques armados contra las corrientes de izquierda. La FEG cuenta con armas modernas y gente bien entrenada en el manejo de éstas, lo que ha permitido que sea un instrumento adecuado—al menos hasta ahora—para que el gobierno mantenga un férreo control sobre esa Universidad. José Zuno, uno de los doce hijos de J. Guad-

alupe, fue presidente de la FEG.

A través de éste y otros medios, el político octogenario sigue teniendo mucha influencia sobre las decisiones que toma su clase en Jalisco, que es uno de los estados más industrializados y ricos de México.

En cuanto a los secuestradores, esta vez fue el grupo llamado Frente Revolucionario Armado del Pueblo (FRAP) el que se hizo responsable del secuestro. Sin embargo, el periódico mexicano *Excelsior* informaba el 30 de agosto que el licenciado Alejandro Hernández, defensor de varios miembros del FRAP que fueron detenidos por su participación en un secuestro anterior, declaró que los secuestradores de Zuno Hernández no pertenecen a esa organización. Pero todos los informes de la policía, así como dos comunicados de los secuestradores, afirman la responsabilidad del FRAP.

El gobierno mexicano mantuvo su posición de no negociar con los guerrilleros; postura que adoptó desde octubre de 1973, cuando la Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre—otra organización de guerrilla urbana—secuestró al industrial Fernando Aranguren y al cónsul honorario inglés en Guadalajara, Anthony Duncan Williams.

De tal forma, que el FRAP no obtuvo ni el dinero—1.6 millones de dólares—ni la libertad de varios presos políticos que exigía.

Logró, en cambio, desatar una avalancha del más puro barroquismo periodístico mexicano. Lo interesante fue que esta vez el blanco favorito fue el imperialismo norteamericano.

En su editorial del 30 de agosto, *Excelsior* decía: "Existe, a través de

agencias oficiales norteamericanas, una verdadera empresa transnacional para fomentar disturbios, romper el orden legal, disolver instituciones, amedrentar partidos y aplicar una escalada que va, en estricto orden, del asalto bancario y comercial a los secuestros".

El objetivo de este plan del imperialismo, seguía diciendo el editorial, ha sido alcanzado en Uruguay, Bolivia y Chile.

El esquema, en este caso, funciona de la siguiente manera según *Excelsior*: después del "rechazo emocional del secuestro" vendrá "el deseo de que el gobierno dé paso a la fuerza armada" contra acciones de este tipo. Una vez "cumplida la labor subreplicia de las bandas de asaltantes y asesinos, salen policías y soldados —los cuerpos previamente adiestrados —a imponer el régimen que el gobierno norteamericano está introduciendo en América Latina: el fascismo de la dependencia". El objetivo final sería "ampliar hasta la ignominia la *Norteamérica ilimitada*".

A esta campaña "antimperialista" contribuyó de manera destacada la propia familia Zuno.

Vincente Zuno dijo el 29 de agosto a los periodistas que lo entrevistaron sobre el secuestro de su padre: "Este es un acto de contaminación ambiental", porque "nuestro ambiente es agredido por intereses extranjeros nacidos en el imperialismo y, particularmente, en el imperialismo norteamericano". (*Excelsior*, 30 de agosto).

La situación llegó al punto de que los periodistas acosaron al embajador de los Estados Unidos en México, Joseph John Jova, con preguntas sobre la intervención de la CIA en el secuestro. Desde luego, el embajador respondió que la idea era "impertinente y descabellada". Dijo, además, que no sabe de ningún caso en que empresas transnacionales o fundaciones norteamericanas ataquen a instituciones mexicanas. Para tranquilizar a los periodistas, y a los lectores, agregó que "de cualquier manera", si ése es el caso, "sucederá como en Chile, donde las acusaciones fueron dirigidas a la ITT".

Fue el propio J.G. Zuno, sin embargo, quien se llevó las palmas en esta representación, al mismo tiempo que fue el primero en afirmar sin ambigüedades que sus secuestradores eran jóvenes de izquierda y no agen-

tes de la CIA.

El *Washington Post* del 9 de septiembre lo cita diciendo en una conferencia de prensa que concedió después de que el día anterior había sido dejado en libertad por la guerrilla: "Me dieron [los guerrilleros] todo lo que quise. Me dieron mis medicinas y hablé con ellos sobre filosofía, humanismo . . ."

Dice haberles dicho: "Muchachos, ésta no es la forma de dar a conocer sus ideas, andar por ahí asustando familias".

Añadió: "Eran muchachos limpios, buenos muchachos; pero equivocados. Quieren cambiar el mundo pero no saben cómo hacerlo".

Ese mismo día, el *New York Times* informa sobre otra parte de las declaraciones de Zuno: "Los secuestradores, dijo José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández, no son ni remotamente tan peligrosos para los mexicanos como lo son la CIA, 'los imperialistas yanquis y los capitalistas que no tienen respeto por nada'".

"... dijo que el gobierno de su yerno 'ha caído bajo el control de las fuerzas reaccionarias internacionales'".

Pero mucho más importante que la palabrería del gobierno y de la prensa, ha sido la cacería de brujas que se ha desatado. El *Diario* de Nueva York informa el 12 de septiembre que "la búsqueda de los secuestradores . . . continuaba hoy en todo el estado de Jalisco con 'numerosos' sospechosos detenidos, según informó la procuraduría".

Ahora hay una razón más para intensificar la "caza de guerrilleros" que se inició el 30 de mayo, cuando el Partido de los Pobres secuestró a Rubén Figueroa, de 74 años, candidato del Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI—partido que gobierna la vida política del país) para gobernador del estado de Guerrero, situado en el sur del país. Figueroa fue "rescatado" por el ejército el 7 de septiembre, después de un enfrentamiento con el grupo guerrillero.

¿Por qué el FRAP liberó a Zuno sano y salvo sin obtener ninguna de sus exigencias y sin que hubiera sido localizado por la policía?

El FRAP—como todas las demás organizaciones guerrilleras de México—está aislado de la lucha de los obreros y estudiantes, y sus acciones no tienen nada que ver con las huelgas y movilizaciones que se empie-

zan a dar nuevamente en el país.

Pero, además, su posición política—aunque se manifiesta de forma muy violenta—no es intransigente ante la colaboración de clases.

Si liberaron a Zuno fue porque consideraron que habían cometido un error al secuestrar a ese político que también está "luchando" contra el imperialismo, que ha denunciado a la CIA y a las empresas transnacionales. Y si está haciendo todo eso ¿no es posible aliarse con él, y con otros políticos como él, en un frente único para luchar contra el enemigo común?

El viejo cacique resultó ser más hábil que los guerrilleros: les habló de "filosofía y humanismo" y los convenció de que él no estaba con los malos. Los pudo convencer políticamente de que él no forma parte del enemigo.

No es la primera vez que la guerrilla toma esta actitud capituladora. Cuando la Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre secuestró a Aranguren y a Duncan Williams, ejecutó al primero porque era un "explotador" y liberó al segundo porque no era más que un empleado que obedecía órdenes que le daban otras personas.

Los compañeros de la guerrilla han tomado el camino equivocado en dos cuestiones centrales:

1. Creen que sus secuestros, asaltos y ejecuciones son más efectivos que la movilización de las masas para lograr la liberación nacional, las libertades democráticas y mejores salarios y condiciones de trabajo. No creen que el proletariado pueda luchar por sí mismo; necesita agentes externos que hagan el trabajo por él.

2. Tienen esperanzas en que el sector "progresista" de la burguesía, al que según ellos debe pertenecer Zuno, podrá solucionar, o ayudar a solucionar, los problemas de los explotados. Es decir, no entienden que el problema central para salir airoso en la lucha de clases es mantener íntegra la independencia de clase del proletariado.

De este secuestro sólo han salido ganando los políticos burgueses, como Zuno y su yerno, que recibieron en bandeja de plata una oportunidad para posar como antimperialistas. Los miembros del FRAP quedaron como los "muchachos limpios y buenos que quieren cambiar el mundo pero no saben cómo hacerlo". □

¿Fin de las Sanciones de la OEA Contra Cuba?

Por Dick Fidler

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "OAS Members Move to End Sanctions Against Cuba", que apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 16 de septiembre].

* * *

"El aislamiento de Cuba se va desmoronando, y el propio bloqueo económico contra nuestra Patria no podría durar mucho tiempo", dijo Fidel Castro en un acto al que asistieron 20,000 personas, el 26 de julio en la ciudad de Matanzas. "En las actuales condiciones de distensión internacional, ese bloqueo criminal aparecía cada vez más ante los ojos del mundo como un acto injusto, ridículo e insostenible".

Recientemente, Argentina y Perú reanudaron relaciones diplomáticas con Cuba, violando las sanciones que había aprobado la OEA a instancias de Washington. México, que es miembro de la OEA, nunca rompió relaciones diplomáticas; tampoco Canadá, que no está en la OEA. Barbados, Guayana, Jamaica y Trinidad-Tobago también han establecido relaciones diplomáticas con La Habana.

El 22 de agosto, Panamá volvió a entablar relaciones diplomáticas, y los informes indican que Colombia, Costa Rica y Venezuela se preparan a tomar la misma medida en el futuro próximo. Estos desarrollos plantean, lógicamente, el problema de la política de Washington hacia Cuba.

Sólo dos días después del discurso de Castro, dos norteamericanos destacados, que visitaron Cuba hace poco tiempo, hicieron un balance similar de los intentos de Washington por aislar y derrotar a la revolución cubana. Pat M. Holt, director del Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado, se reunió con Castro en julio. El 2 de agosto presentó un informe en el que calificaba la política del Departamento de Estado como "un fracaso". Los cubanos, decía, "están a punto de hacer funcionar su sistema; esto es, de construir un muestrario socialista en el hemisferio occidental".

Afirmando que "cualquier iniciativa para mejorar las relaciones tendrá que partir de los Estados Unidos", Holt propuso que Washington empiece por acabar con las restricciones a que se enfrentan actualmente los ciudadanos norteamericanos que desean visitar Cuba.

El punto de vista de Holt cuenta con



CASTRO

muchos seguidores entre los políticos de Washington. En abril, el poderoso Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado votó a favor de que se presente al Congreso una resolución en la que se recomienda que se levante el bloqueo contra Cuba y se reanuden las relaciones diplomáticas.

Frank F. Mankiewicz, director de la campaña presidencial del senador George McGovern en 1972 y actual presidente de la Conferencia Ejecutiva Nacional, también visitó Cuba en julio y filmó una entrevista con Castro. Regresó con el mensaje de que los dirigentes cubanos estaban dispuestos a dar a Washington "concesiones", que

no fueron especificadas, a cambio del reconocimiento diplomático.

Pero el hecho que contribuyó más para desatar la actual campaña de especulaciones sobre el inminente establecimiento de relaciones entre Washington y La Habana, fue la primera conferencia de prensa del Presidente Gerald Ford, realizada el 28 de agosto. Ford no descartó la posibilidad de un cambio en la política de los Estados Unidos hacia Cuba; dijo sencillamente que "antes de hacer cualquier cambio, actuaríamos, desde luego, de acuerdo con los otros miembros de la Organización de Estados Americanos".

Esto es como si un ventrílocuo dice que actuará de acuerdo a los deseos de su muñeco.

La prensa burguesa de los Estados Unidos interpretó de la siguiente manera el comentario de Ford: "Es de esperarse" que "un acercamiento con Castro" sea "una de las principales medidas de política internacional que tome Ford", escribió Jack Anderson en su columna de circulación nacional el 1 de septiembre. "Fuentes cercanas al Secretario de Estado Henry Kissinger dicen que éste ha querido normalizar las relaciones con Cuba desde que comenzó a practicar la diplomacia de la distensión. Le parecía que era necio buscar la amistad de Rusia y China, que están del otro lado del mundo, y mantener una actitud hostil hacia Cuba, que está a sólo 90 millas de nuestras playas".

Un artículo escrito por Laurence Stern desde Washington y que apareció en el *New York Times* el 30 de agosto, informaba que "se ha preparado una cuidadosa comedia diplomática, en consulta permanente con el Secretario de Estado Henry Kissinger", para levantar las sanciones contra Cuba "en noviembre". Stern dijo que Kissinger y el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de México, Emilio O. Rabasa, discutieron esto el 29 de agosto en Washington.

Según Stern, "la comedia prevee la creación, dentro de las próximas se-

manas, de una 'comisión investigadora' que estará compuesta por cinco países miembros de la OEA, y que tendrá el objetivo de estudiar el problema". Esta comisión "encontraría" que el gobierno de Castro ya no está promoviendo activamente movimientos revolucionarios en otros países de América Latina, y propondría que se levanten las sanciones.

El 6 septiembre, Colombia, Costa Rica y Venezuela propusieron formalmente ante la OEA que se convoque para fecha próxima una reunión de cancilleres en la que se considere la posibilidad de levantar las sanciones contra Cuba. United Press International (UPI) informó ese mismo día que esta reunión se celebrará probablemente el 11 de noviembre, en Quito, Ecuador.

La encuesta del *New York Times* que apareció el 7 de septiembre, muestra que quince de los veintitrés miembros de la OEA están "dispuestos a levantar las sanciones contra Cuba". Esto es sólo un país menos de los que constituirían las dos terceras partes que se necesitan para obtener la mayoría. Otros tres países—Haití, Nicaragua y la República Dominicana—están "indecisos", según la encuesta; mientras que solamente cuatro gobiernos (Brasil, Paraguay, Chile y Bolivia) "se oponen firmemente" a que se levanten las sanciones.

A pesar de que los funcionarios del gobierno tratan de presentar la reanudación de las relaciones con Cuba como una "iniciativa" de Ford, está claro que Washington había comenzado a cambiar su política hacia Cuba desde hace algún tiempo.

El primer acuerdo formal que se realizó con La Habana después de que el gobierno de Eisenhower rompió relaciones diplomáticas, en enero de 1961, fue el acuerdo sobre secuestros, que se firmó en febrero de 1973. A principios de este año, los funcionarios de Washington se hicieron los desentendidos cuando las subsidiarias de compañías norteamericanas en Canadá y Argentina se valieron de ciertos huecos que hay en el Acta Sobre Intercambio Comercial con el Enemigo para firmar contratos por varios millones de dólares con los cubanos, para venderles camiones, automóviles y locomotoras, con lo que violaron directamente el bloqueo de la OEA.

La reunión de cancilleres del conti-

nente que se celebró en abril en Atlanta, Georgia, aceptó la propuesta mexicana de que se explore la posibilidad de invitar a Cuba a su próxima reunión, que está programada para marzo de 1975 en Buenos Aires.

Más aún, es bastante claro desde hace algún tiempo que la mayoría de la clase capitalista de los Estados Unidos está a favor de reanudar las relaciones diplomáticas y el intercambio comercial con Cuba. *El Diario*, periódico que se publica en español en Nueva York, informaba el 26 de abril que el 70 por ciento de las 400 compañías norteamericanas que fueron tomadas en cuenta para la encuesta privada que realizó en abril la National Association of Manufacturers [Asociación Nacional de Industriales], declaró estar en contra de que se continuara con la prohibición de comerciar con Cuba. Se informa que una investigación del gobierno mostró que el 70 por ciento de los periódicos norteamericanos apoyan el cambio de política.

Al empezar a tomar estas lentas medidas para reanudar las relaciones con Cuba, Nixon estaba sólo reconociendo la realidad: la creciente desintegración del bloqueo de la OEA contra el primer estado obrero del continente americano. Más aún, habiendo iniciado relaciones diplomáticas con Pekín, ¿cómo se puede justificar el mantenimiento del ostracismo hacia La Habana?

¿Por qué, entonces, no siguió Nixon su curso de distensión con Pekín y Moscú extendiéndolo de una vez a La Habana?

En parte, la lentitud de Nixon era, como lo explicó el 22 de abril el *Washington Post*, "un intento por tranquilizar a esa parte de su electorado que toma la ideología en serio. Va de acuerdo con los intereses de la nación, según la actual definición de éstos, negociar con la Unión Soviética y China; pero, en cambio, Cuba es un país comunista comprometido con la revolución mundial. Por lo tanto, es una amenaza evidente para la estabilidad internacional . . ." O, como lo explicó recientemente Fidel Castro en un programa transmitido por una radio-difusora panameña, al referirse a los "plomeros" de origen cubano que se vieron envueltos en el escándalo de Watergate: "... debemos tener presente que Nixon veía el problema cubano como algo personal, porque es-

taba estrechamente conectado con toda la Mafia contrarrevolucionaria".

Otra causa de la falta de diligencia de Washington, es la división que existe entre sus clientes latinoamericanos. En la edición del 6 de mayo del *New York Times*, el corresponsal David Binder escribió que Kissinger "está limitando muy rigidamente las medidas que podrían permitir llegar a un entendimiento con Cuba, porque considera que esto iría más de acuerdo con el desarrollo del consenso en el continente sobre el problema cubano".

La tardanza de Washington tiene la ventaja adicional de permitir que algunos gobiernos latinoamericanos aparezcan como independientes del imperialismo norteamericano, tomando iniciativas populares que en realidad no chocan con los objetivos del Departamento de Estado. El Presidente de México, Luis Echeverría Álvarez, por ejemplo, está tratando de plantearse como el estadista de América Latina. Recientemente realizó una gira por varias capitales latinoamericanas, llamando a la formación de un bloque comercial regional para enfrentar la competencia imperialista en el mercado mundial. Uno de los temas clave de sus discursos fue la necesidad de "normalizar" las relaciones con Cuba. Echeverría tiene planeado visitar Cuba este mismo año.

Inmediatamente después de la reunión que tuvo con Ford y Kissinger el 29 de agosto en Washington, el canciller mexicano, Rabasa, llamó públicamente a los Estados Unidos a tomar "una actitud positiva" para levantar las sanciones de la OEA contra Cuba.

Estas medidas "independientes" que ha tomado el gobierno mexicano, sin embargo, parecen formar parte de un esquema más grande que tiene su origen en Washington. Cuando Rabasa visitó Cuba en marzo, el corresponsal del *New York Times* en la ciudad de México informó que "el viaje del Sr. Rabasa—el primero por parte de un canciller mexicano desde que tuvo lugar la revolución cubana hace quince años—ha renovado las especulaciones de que México está jugando el papel de intermediario entre Washington y La Habana.

"Los observadores han señalado que, como Rabasa es amigo personal del Secretario de Estado Henry Kissinger, no sería raro que llevara un

mensaje privado del gobierno de Nixon".

Los dirigentes cubanos no han obstaculizado el intento de algunos gobiernos latinoamericanos por utilizar su política amigable hacia Cuba para darse una imagen de independencia hacia Wall Street.

Desde el principio de la revolución cubana, la política de La Habana ha sido la de mantener relaciones normales con todos los gobiernos. Esto es correcto; pero no ha ido acompañado de la necesaria diferenciación política con los regímenes "nacionalistas" burgueses. En realidad, los cubanos incluso han ensalzado a algunos de estos gobiernos, siendo un ejemplo muy importante el caso del régimen de Allende en Chile.

En su discurso del 26 de julio, por ejemplo, Fidel Castro caracterizó a los países que mantuvieron relaciones con Cuba durante el bloqueo o que las han reanudado recientemente, como países que "se niegan a obedecer al imperialismo".

"Los gobiernos de este Hemisferio se dividen hoy entre una minoría de lacayos incondicionales de los dictados del imperialismo, y una mayoría de gobiernos que no están dispuestos a seguir obedeciendo esos dictados... que son capaces de llevar a cabo una política exterior independiente..."

La decisión de Panamá de restablecer relaciones con Cuba, hizo que *Granma*, el órgano oficial del Partido Comunista de Cuba, hiciera el siguiente balance de ese gobierno reformista militar: "Nuestro pueblo apoya el proceso de transformación revolucionaria que se inició en Panamá en 1968. Observamos con interés los esfuerzos realizados por el gobierno del General Omar Torrijos por romper la vieja estructura socioeconómica; su defensa de los recursos naturales; su ruptura con los intereses de las multinacionales yanquis, como la ITT y las compañías bananeras; la participación organizada de las masas en los destinos del país y el trabajo que se está llevando a cabo en el campo de la educación y la salud pública". (*Granma*, selección semanal en inglés, 1 de septiembre).*

* Esta cita se tradujo directamente del inglés, ya que no se pudo conseguir la edición en español correspondiente de *Granma* — IP.

Los funcionarios de los países miembros de la OEA, han invocado la tendencia de los dirigentes cubanos a adaptar su actitud política hacia los regímenes burgueses según las necesidades diplomáticas y comerciales de Cuba como prueba de que La Habana ha dejado de impulsar revoluciones socialistas en otras partes de América Latina.

El principal origen de la posición de La Habana, sin embargo, es la política de "coexistencia pacífica" de Moscú y la distensión internacional con Washington. Los cubanos cedieron ante el Kremlin en esto por su aislamiento y su necesidad de ayuda económica de la Unión Soviética.

El embargo comercial de Washington contra Cuba, que fue declarado en febrero de 1962, y su prohibición de que entraran productos cubanos a los Estados Unidos (en marzo de 1962) fueron golpes muy duros para la revolución cubana. Estas medidas obligaron a Cuba a reorientar drásticamente su comercio y provocaron desarreglos masivos en su economía, que de por sí ya estaba terriblemente resquebrajada por las décadas de dominación imperialista. En vista de la gran escasez que se produjo, La Habana no tuvo más alternativa que dirigirse a la Unión Soviética. Sólo la ayuda masiva soviética permitió que siguiera funcionando la economía cubana.

Actualmente, Cuba depende en gran medida de los otros estados obreros. Nada más la asistencia económica soviética equivale a más de un millón de dólares al día. Según el profesor Leon Goure, director de estudios soviéticos del Centro de Estudios Internacionales Avanzados, los 526 millones de dólares a que ascendió el total del comercio de Cuba con los países capitalistas en 1972, equivalían sólo a 25 por ciento del volumen total de su comercio. Su intercambio comercial con América Latina ese año fue de menos de 10 millones de dólares. Esta dependencia económica hacia Moscú trae consigo poderosas presiones para que los cubanos se adapten a la línea del Kremlin.

Además, los cubanos sufrieron un duro golpe por el fracaso de su "estrategia guerrillera" para ganar revoluciones en otras partes de América Latina. La muerte del Che Guevara en Bolivia llevó a que cortaran

toda ayuda activa a los movimientos guerrilleros. Por algún tiempo parecieron estar dispuestos a ver si la experiencia frentepopulista de Allende ofrecía un camino más efectivo, aunque Castro manifestó algunas dudas.

Hoy en día, la prensa cubana se ha hecho eco de la línea de los Partidos Comunistas pro-Moscú, alabando a gobiernos como el régimen militar de Velasco Alvarado en Perú y al régimen peronista de Argentina, que tiene una tendencia nacionalista.

Durante la visita a Cuba que realizó a principios de este año el Secretario General del Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética, Leonid Brezhnev, Castro dijo que estaba de acuerdo con los elementos centrales de la política soviética de distensión. En su entrevista con Frank Mankiewicz, cuyo texto íntegro no ha sido hecho público todavía, el Primer Ministro cubano reafirmó esta posición y "encontró palabras agradables para el Secretario de Estado Kissinger y para el desaparecido Presidente John F. Kennedy", según informa el *New York Times* el 3 de agosto.

Señalando esto, los editores del *New York Times* planteaban la especulación, el 1 de septiembre, de que incluso se podría inducir a Cuba a que entrara en la OEA, de la misma manera que Pekín, que había denunciado a las Naciones Unidas, entró a ese organismo "una vez que se le abrió la puerta".

Los cubanos, sin embargo, parecen tomar una actitud no muy favorable hacia la OEA. En su discurso del 26 de julio, Fidel Castro describió a este organismo como "un cadáver putrefacto".

Si bien las adaptaciones de los dirigentes cubanos a la línea del Kremlin reflejan su incapacidad para desarrollar una estrategia revolucionaria consecuente, las causas objetivas subyacentes son el aislamiento del país y el copamiento por parte del más poderoso imperialismo que hay sobre la Tierra, que se encuentra, aún más, a sólo noventa millas de la isla.

La capacidad de los cubanos para soportar los golpes del bloqueo comercial—y, lo que es más, para lograr éxitos impresionantes en la reconstrucción de su economía y vida social sobre la base de una economía planificada y nacionalizada—es el factor fundamental en la creciente disposición de otros gobiernos del con-

tinente, encabezados por Washington, para reanudar los lazos comerciales y diplomáticos con La Habana.

La reanudación de relaciones co-

merciales entre Cuba y otros países del continente puede aligerar las tensiones de la economía cubana que fueron producidas por la política hostil

y punitiva de Washington. Los oprimidos de todo el mundo saludarán con gusto esta victoria que se ha ganado con tanto trabajo. □

Entrevista con James P. Cannon

Discusión con un Joven Revolucionario Mexicano

[La siguiente es una traducción de la transcripción de una de las últimas entrevistas que dió James P. Cannon. Fue realizada por Emiliano, miembro del Comité Político de la Liga Socialista, organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional en México. La entrevista fue para *El Socialista*, el periódico de la Liga Socialista.

[Nos hemos basado en la traducción al inglés de las preguntas, realizada por Miguel Pendas, miembro del Buró de *The Militant* en el sud-oeste de los EUA.

[La entrevista tuvo lugar el 15 de agosto, menos de una semana antes de que muriera Cannon, el 21 de agosto, a los 84 años de edad.

[La experiencia de Jim Cannon en el movimiento socialista revolucionario se remonta hasta los años de su participación en el Partido Socialista y en la Industrial Workers of the World, antes de la Primera Guerra Mundial. Después de la revolución rusa se convirtió en miembro fundador del Partido Comunista de los Estados Unidos. Habiendo sido expulsado de este partido en 1928, por oponerse al stalinismo, fue uno de los fundadores del movimiento trotskista en este país y de la Cuarta Internacional.

[Cuando murió, Cannon era Presidente Nacional Honorario del Socialist Workers Party.

[Una versión en inglés de esta entrevista apareció en *The Militant* el 20 de septiembre].

* * *

Pregunta. Como sabes, la Liga Socialista es una organización muy joven y ninguno de sus cuadros tiene mucha experiencia en los movimientos obrero y revolucionario. Esta falta de experiencia crea muchos problemas

políticos y organizativos. Uno de los más importantes que hemos intentado resolver es el de la educación y el desarrollo políticos. Tratamos de ver cuál es la mejor forma de conducir el proceso de educación política sistemática del partido.

Una de las cuestiones espinosas es si se debe poner el énfasis en los clásicos marxistas, o si debemos enfocarnos más los problemas mexicanos e internacionales. ¿Tienes algunas sugerencias sobre esto?

Respuesta. Yo diría que ambos. El Socialist Workers Party tiene programas educativos para cada nivel de desarrollo. Tenemos clases sobre la historia de nuestro partido, clases sobre la historia de la revolución rusa, clases sobre economía marxista. No tienes que empezar con *El Capital*; puedes tomar el folleto *Salario, Precio y Ganancia* de Marx y hacer con él un curso extenso y muy útil.

El folleto de Lenin *El Izquierdismo, Enfermedad Infantil del Comunismo* podría ser un muy buen tema para una clase—no para verlo todo en una sola tarde, sino para una serie de clases.

Simplemente comienzas en algún lado. Una vez que se ha comenzado con el marxismo, uno sigue estudiando. Se vuelve adicto.

P. El problema es dónde empezar.

R. Bueno, la economía marxista, con *Salario, Precio y Ganancia* es un buen comienzo. Y si se empieza con los dos folletos de Lenin *El Izquierdismo, Enfermedad Infantil del Comunismo* y *El Estado y la Revolución*, se empieza a obtener la esencia de los pensamientos de Lenin sobre temas muy amplios.

Y son muy buenos para principiantes, especialmente para los que tien-

den a posiciones aventureras. Yo creo que en México hay una tendencia al aventurerismo. La gente joven quiere una revolución de inmediato.

P. Tienes toda la razón. Hay una tremenda tendencia hacia el aventurerismo en México. Ese es uno de los principales problemas con que nos enfrentamos.

Hemos dedicado una gran parte de nuestros relativamente limitados recursos a la publicación mensual de nuestro periódico, El Socialista. Al tratar de establecer un órgano nacional efectivo, estamos de alguna manera yendo contra la corriente de la tradición del movimiento radical en México. La mayoría de los grupos radicales mexicanos consideran que es más importante crear periódicos locales que tengan una mayor influencia sobre luchas particulares.

¿Cómo ves este problema del órgano nacional y del papel que puede jugar?

R. El punto de vista nacional tiene prioridad. Nuestro periódico debe dirigirse a toda la clase trabajadora y el campesinado de México. Eso es más fácil de decir que de hacer.

Como *The Militant*. Nunca consideramos a *The Militant* como un periódico de Nueva York. Desde el principio, en 1928, lo hemos considerado un periódico nacional e internacional. Nuestro periódico es de hecho el principal educador del movimiento. No se limita a pequeños acontecimientos locales. Así no se puede educar a un movimiento nacional.

Después de que se ha construido un movimiento grande y con un órgano nacional, entonces se puede tener ediciones locales, que traten de temas locales.

Esa es mi opinión. Definitivamente

el periódico de ustedes debe ser un periódico nacional, que trate los asuntos del gobierno, lo que hace el gobierno, lo que sucede en otras partes del país y lo que sucede en el mundo. Por ejemplo, ¿no sería un buen tema en México los levantamientos que han ocurrido en Portugal y Grecia?

No creo que ésa sea una tendencia progresiva—la idea de que un movimiento que aún no se ha creado una base nacional comience por los problemas locales. ¿No es eso poner la carreta antes del caballo? Si se cuenta con cuadros educados en los asuntos nacionales e internacionales, entonces les será muy fácil orientarse en las acciones locales.

P. El razonamiento usado por esta gente es que si sacan un periódico local tendrán una mayor influencia en un lugar determinado.

R. Pero el objetivo es educar a la gente, y si uno se concentra en asuntos locales, no se amplía el conocimiento y los intereses de la gente. No se les ayuda a darse cuenta de que los asuntos locales son solamente una parte de lo que sucede en todo el mundo, que afecta a todas las áreas locales.

Por ejemplo, en estos momentos las huelgas obreras y los ascensos locales están siendo acelerados principalmente por la inflación a nivel nacional ¿no es así? De modo que si se comienza explicando que los obreros locales son víctimas de los crímenes nacionales de la burguesía, de los banqueros y los usureros, esto no hace que disminuya la actividad local, sino que amplía los intereses de los que participan en la lucha y hace que ésta se profundice.

P. ¿Es en este sentido que Lenin se refirió al periódico como el organizador del partido revolucionario?

R. Sí, eso es lo que debería ser. Debe enseñar sobre algo más que incidentes locales; debe enseñar el programa íntegro del marxismo. No todo en un solo número, sino a plazos y por partes. La inflación . . . he ahí algo con lo que se puede comenzar ya.

Parece que tú entiendes más inglés que lo que yo sé de castellano.

P. Puedo leer inglés pero no entien-



JAMES P. CANNON

do mucho cuando la gente habla en inglés.

R. Esa es una debilidad de nuestro partido así como del tuyo. Más gente en nuestro movimiento debería saber más de un idioma.

Esta fue una de las cosas que me impresionaron mucho en los dirigentes de la revolución rusa cuando estuve allí en los primeros años. Habían estado exilados por toda Europa y todos ellos hablaban muchos idiomas. Lenin, Trotsky, Radek, Bujarin, Zinoviev . . . hablaban francés, alemán, ruso y aún algunos hablaban incluso un poco de inglés. Trotsky hablaba un poco de inglés.

P. Esto también influye internamente en México, ya que contribuye al desarrollo desigual de la dirección. Los que entienden inglés pueden desarrollarse más porque tienen más acceso a la literatura y a la conversación con compañeros que hablan otros idiomas.

Uno de los problemas centrales de todas las secciones de la Cuarta Internacional, y que es particularmente urgente para nosotros, es el desarrollo de un equipo de dirección calificado y con autoridad. Desafortunadamente, en México no hemos tenido una fuerte tradición en este sentido. De manera

que al tratar de desarrollar este equipo de dirección estamos, en cierta forma, abriéndonos camino en un nuevo terreno.

¿Sé que en tus escritos has tocado este punto ampliamente y que le das gran importancia. ¿Hay algún comentario que quisieras hacer sobre este problema y que pudiera darnos alguna orientación al respecto?

R. Es más fácil decirlo que hacerlo. Pero la mejor forma es leer la literatura que tenemos sobre este problema y luego discutirla. Ustedes deben hacer todo lo posible por traducir algunas de las obras básicas del movimiento trotskista y utilizarlas como tema para cursos educativos. Aún antes de eso, si hay camaradas que han leído material en otro idioma, pueden dar clases sobre ello y comenzar de esa manera.

¿Qué proporción de los miembros de su organización son estudiantes?

P. La gran mayoría. Probablemente el 90 por ciento son estudiantes universitarios o secundarios.

R. ¿Estudian idiomas en la escuela?

P. Sí, pero por lo general no los aprenden realmente.

R. Los revolucionarios deben apro-

vechar la oportunidad que tienen cuando están en el colegio. Concentrarse por lo menos en un idioma y aprenderlo. Esto sería una ventaja tremenda.

P. ¿Qué papel juega la autoridad política—es decir, en el sentido de autoridad moral—de los camaradas en el desarrollo de un equipo de dirección? En tus escritos destacas la necesidad de que la dirección del partido tenga no solamente capacidad, sino también una cierta autoridad moral. ¿Por qué es necesaria esta autoridad moral?

R. La autoridad no puede otorgarse; tiene que adquirirse. Cuando uno trabaja por un cierto periodo para el partido y hace un buen trabajo, uno adquiere cierta influencia, a la que llamamos autoridad moral. No se puede organizar como un juego de damas. Se está tratando con personas que son todas diferentes.

Lo principal en mi opinión es crear en el partido una atmósfera en la que todos sean valorados y todos tengan plena oportunidad para demostrar lo que pueden hacer por el partido. Y en el curso de ese desarrollo, cierta gente sobresale y se convierte en dirigente.

Y es muy afortunado si no es solamente una persona la que se convierte en el dirigente único, sino un grupo de gente que combina sus talentos así como sus errores y forma una dirección colectiva. Eso es lo que necesitamos en todas partes.

P. Tus escritos enfatizan la importancia de desarrollar un programa internacional y de ser parte de un partido mundial. Estamos tratando de absorber íntegramente esa tradición.

Consideramos que es de particular importancia para nosotros establecer estrechas relaciones de trabajo con los camaradas de la Cuarta Internacional en América Latina y también con el movimiento trotskista norteamericano. Consideramos que el papel que juegan los imperialistas norteamericanos en México dicta la necesidad de una colaboración política de este tipo.

También consideramos haber aprendido ya mucho de las tradiciones y enseñanzas del movimiento norteamericano y que podemos aprender aún más. ¿Cómo ves este asunto de colaboración entre los dos mo-

vimientos?

R. Primero, aceptamos la idea general tal como tú la has expuesto. Bien expresada, en mi opinión. Luego debemos buscar medios prácticos de funcionamiento. Considero que es muy importante que tengamos una estrecha colaboración a través de todo el continente. Una forma de hacerlo es a través de visitas directas.

Otra forma es que un círculo más amplio de camaradas aprendan otra lengua y lean la literatura y publicaciones de otros países. Esa sería una excelente manera de mantenerse informados. Luego esos camaradas pueden comunicar lo que aprenden al resto del partido en su propio país.

Viajar a reuniones nacionales de los partidos de otros países es otra buena forma de establecer contactos. Gradualmente se establece una relación fraternal en la cual cada parte aprenderá de la otra.

No se trata meramente de las conferencias, las resoluciones y las discusiones; se trata también de la fraternización al encontrar gente de nuestro mismo tipo—revolucionarios—de diferentes nacionalidades. Es una experiencia maravillosa, una influencia maravillosa.

Como tú sabes, las olimpiadas griegas no eran sólo un suceso deportivo, como se las pinta hoy. Eran una reunión de los griegos provenientes de todos los lugares donde se habían establecido, que se juntaban para fraternizar. Considero que los eventos atléticos eran solamente parte del espectáculo. Lo verdaderamente central era la fraternización, el contacto personal.

P. Hemos tenido algún contacto con otros camaradas latinoamericanos, y queremos desarrollar el mismo tipo de contacto con el Socialist Workers Party, particularmente para tratar de incorporar algunas de las tradiciones del trotskismo que están representadas en el Socialist Workers Party.

R. Creo que ello debe ser bienvenido y facilitado al máximo.

P. Uno de nuestros problemas es el económico. Somos un movimiento relativamente pequeño y la mayoría de nuestros miembros y simpatizantes tienen poco dinero. Esto dificulta la creación de un equipo profesional.

No tenemos dinero para mantener los profesionales que necesitamos. Por ejemplo, en estos momentos necesitamos un editor para nuestro periódico, un secretario político y un secretario de organización, que dediquen todo su tiempo a esta actividad. Solamente podemos reunir dinero suficiente para mantener a uno.

¿Se que al principio el movimiento norteamericano también tuvo duros problemas económicos. En base a sus experiencias sobre este problema, ¿nos podrías dar alguna recomendación?

R. Nuestra experiencia fue simplemente que sufrimos. Teníamos necesidad de profesionales, pero no teníamos dinero, de manera que de una forma u otra conseguimos tener unos cuantos profesionales sin tener el dinero. Si me preguntas cómo lo hicimos, no podría contestarte ahora. Es más fácil decirlo que hacerlo.

Se requiere un esfuerzo extraordinario, y algunas veces uno o dos compañeros del equipo tienen que ir a trabajar para pagar el alquiler y la comida. Otras veces algún camarada tiene que dejar su trabajo porque hay que llenar un hueco en el partido. No hay reglas ni leyes en este sentido. Es un problema de voluntad, determinación, necesidad, inspiración, sentimiento y varias otras cosas.

P. Quisiera poder hacerte muchas otras preguntas. Tenemos mucha curiosidad por conocer las discusiones que tuviste con Trotsky y otros dirigentes de la Comintern en los primeros años del movimiento. Hay un millón de preguntas más que desearía poder hacerte.

R. Ven de nuevo.

P. Lo haré. □

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Escritos de un 'Ucraniano Terco'

Comentado por Marilyn Vogt

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Writings of a 'Stubborn Ukrainian'" que apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 9 de septiembre].

* * *

"Un pequeño grupo de gente en Kiev esparció chispas por toda Ucrania y donde éstas cayeron el hielo de la indiferencia y el nihilismo, que se había acumulado por largos años, comenzó a derretirse inmediatamente". Es de esta forma como Valentyn Moroz describe el efecto que tuvo la "generación de los sesenta" sobre la vida política y cultural de la RSS de Ucrania, que había estado congelada por décadas de represión stalinista.

Describe la radicalización de los sesenta en Ucrania en su ensayo "En Medio de las Nieves", uno de los notables documentos en esta colección de escritos de Moroz, recientemente publicados por la Cataract Press, una nueva editorial que se especializa en los escritos de disidentes ucranianos. La publicación de la colección coincidió con el comienzo de la huelga de hambre de Moroz, que está incomunicado en una celda de la prisión de Vladimir.

Aunque él no estaba en Kiev como los otros, Moroz pertenecía a este "pequeño grupo de gente"—la "generación de los sesenta" en Ucrania. Y este pequeño grupo habría de producir alguna de la literatura antistalinista y prosocialista más sofisticada políticamente que se abrió paso hacia el extranjero en la última década.

Este ensayo en particular se ocupa de la actividad de la figura más prominente de esta generación de radicales, Ivan Dzyuba. En su libro *¿Internacionalismo o Rusificación?* Dzyuba criticó la política stalinista hacia los pueblos no rusos de la Unión Soviética—es decir, la rusificación—desde un punto de vista leninista. El contrapuso a la rusificación de Ucrania, que ha sido impuesta desde la época de Stalin, la política de ucr-

nización, que implementaron los bolcheviques bajo la dirección de Lenin (y Trotsky), en los años veinte en ésta, la más grande de las repúblicas no rusas de la URSS.

Escrito en 1965, *¿Internacionalismo o Rusificación?* fue una inspiración para los jóvenes ucranianos de la Unión Soviética (donde la obra circulaba sólo clandestinamente ya que estaba prohibida su publicación oficial), así como para los jóvenes de otros países. Fue un impulso para la

Informe de la Reserva Beria, de Valentyn Moroz. Traducido al inglés por John Kolasky. Cataract Press, Toronto, 1974. 162 pg. \$2.95.

lucha, en nombre de la democracia socialista contra la represión política y el chauvinismo ruso de la burocracia gobernante.

La mayoría de los que estaban en la primera fila de esta lucha cayeron víctimas de las olas de represión que han barrido Ucrania desde mediados de los sesenta. Moroz y Dzyuba figuraban entre los cientos de personas que fueron arrestadas.

Dzyuba fue arrestado en abril de 1972, y en noviembre de 1973, enfermo de tuberculosis, después de haber permanecido más de dieciocho meses en las prisiones de la KGB, sucumbió ante la implacable presión policial y firmó una declaración, que fue publicada en la prensa oficial, en la que renunciaba a las ideas de su libro.

"En Medio de las Nieves" es producto de los acontecimientos que rodearon la campaña represiva contra Dzyuba y su respuesta a ella.

En 1969, durante la campaña, Dzyuba, un crítico literario, fue amenazado con ser expulsado de la Unión de Escritores Ucranianos debido al "sabor nacionalista" de sus discursos y artículos y porque sus ideas se habían "convertido en alimento para los

enemigos del sistema soviético". Bajo presión, Dzyuba hizo una declaración en 1970 que satisfizo temporalmente a los burócratas. Como resultado de ello, no fue expulsado de inmediato de la Unión de Escritores, aunque fue finalmente expulsado en 1972, justo antes de su arresto. En esta declaración de 1970, Dzyuba dijo: "Yo rechazo el término 'nacionalista' no importa cómo sea interpretado. . ."

Moroz pensó que Dzyuba, en esta declaración, había hecho una peligrosa y dañina concesión a la burocracia stalinista. Moroz escribió: "Yo rechazo el término 'nacionalista' no importa cómo sea interpretado", escribe Dzyuba . . . Es difícil creer esto. El rechazo absoluto del nacionalismo 'no importa cómo sea interpretado', es la tesis de Stalin y no la de Lenin. Lenin nunca tomó esa posición. Lenin, como se sabe, interpretó el nacionalismo de una nación oprimida en sentido positivo. Aquí Dzyuba no solamente se aparta de Lenin, sino también de sí mismo".

Señalando que Dzyuba era el "símbolo" y la "inspiración" de la lucha, Moroz dice que la burocracia tiene que destruir a figuras como ésta anulando su efecto inspirador. El indicó que pensaba que Dzyuba había traicionado la lucha contra la rusificación al hacer esta declaración. A largo plazo, afirmó Moroz, esta concesión debilita no sólo la propia posición de Dzyuba, sino también la de otros oponentes a la rusificación en su lucha contra la burocracia.

"¿Realmente aún no ha comprendido Dzyuba la norma elemental de la policía, de que habiendo admitido A, le será aplicada una presión mucho mayor aún, para que admita B? Muchos, que han tomado esta vía, también han admitido B".

Los "realistas" sostuvieron que la declaración de Dzyuba era una medida práctica que le permitiría permanecer en la Unión de Escritores, y que condenar su declaración era dar muestras de "Quijotismo"—idealismo no práctico. Moroz escribe que es precisamente el "idealismo no práctico" el único camino realista a tomar. Ya que un compromiso "realista" lleva a otro. Lo que se necesita, sostiene él, es intransigencia—vivir de acuerdo a la frase "terco como un ucraniano" que polacos y rusos usan de manera despectiva.

Moroz es un ucraniano terco. El 1 de julio de 1974 comenzó su huelga

de hambre en la prisión de Vladimir. Está allí cumpliendo parte de una condena de catorce años que recibió por sus actividades, principalmente por sus escritos, en los que defiende los derechos democráticos y nacionales del pueblo ucraniano contra la política represiva de los chauvinistas burócratas gran rusos. (Según el Artículo 62 del código penal ucraniano, esto es un "crimen"—"actividad antisoviética").

Los burócratas intentan destruir a Moroz mental y físicamente porque es intransigente y no se retractará de sus puntos de vista. Además de la dieta de hambre de la prisión de Vladimir—donde tiene que cumplir seis de los catorce años—él ha sido objeto de las mayores atrocidades. Fue colocado en celdas con enfermos mentales, atacado y acuchillado por criminales que compartían su celda, y le fueron administradas drogas dañinas para el cerebro. Desde 1972 ha estado incomunicado.

Inició la huelga de hambre para respaldar su exigencia de ser transferido a un campo de prisioneros. Si no logra esto, dice, llevará adelante la huelga de hambre hasta la muerte, ya que teme que el tratamiento que recibe acabe por volverlo loco; y preferiría morir a perder la razón.

El *Informe de la Reserva Beria* contiene los principales trabajos de Moroz, escritos entre abril de 1967 y noviembre de 1970. Moroz no se autotitula marxista o leninista. Sin embargo, continuamente señala la hipocresía de Stalin y sus herederos. Aunque ellos se reclaman representantes del comunismo, sus prácticas no reflejan más que el esfuerzo coordinado y vicioso de reprimir cualquier idea que pueda trastocar el status quo, que es el que asegura su poder y sus privilegios.

"¿Podría el más arraigado anticomunista inventar medios más efectivos para minar la posición del comunismo en la lucha ideológica con el Occidente" que los burócratas del Kremlin, quienes identifican "el poder soviético con el chauvinismo, el stalinismo y el incumplimiento de las leyes?", pregunta Moroz.

La colección presenta varios aspectos diferentes del pensamiento de Moroz. Moroz escribió el ensayo: "Informe de la Reserva Beria"—que dió el título al libro—en abril de 1967, cuando estaba incomunicado cumpliendo una condena de cuatro años

después de su arresto en 1965 por actividades disidentes. Este ensayo explora la mentalidad de aquellos individuos que conforman el aparato represivo de la burocracia—el "imperio de los engranajes", la masa gris de los necios que se imponen por la fuerza. Lo que describe es un imperio de Rusanovs—el burócrata de *Pabellón de Cáncer* de Solzhenitsyn—cuya existencia es incompatible con el pensamiento no censurado y no controlado.

Pero aunque el terror de la era stalinista produjo estos engranajes, Moroz considera que la gente se está dando cuenta de que es solamente su propio miedo el que los mantiene en el poder. A quién le perjudicaría que las masas del pueblo soviético comenzaran a pelear por sus derechos democráticos, pregunta Moroz. Y responde: "A los que perderán sus privilegios cuando se barra por completo con el incumplimiento de las leyes establecido por Stalin: primero quenada a la KGB; luego al director de la granja colectiva que teme que se cumplan las leyes en forma efectiva, ya que en ese caso no sería designado siquiera para el chiquero; después al académico que trepó a su puesto sobre los cadáveres de los camaradas a quienes traicionó en 1937; y finalmente al chauvinista quien tendrá que abandonar su programa de rusificación. Estas son las fuerzas que defienden el pasado y bloquean el camino del progreso con su peso muerto. Solamente ellos necesitan que la gente sea un engranaje. A pesar de esto posan inmutables como protectores de la sociedad y defensores de la 'legalidad socialista'".

El "Informe" se ocupa fundamentalmente de describir las fuerzas que hay detrás de la represión masiva y la rigidez de las ideas; y lo que esto ha traído como consecuencia, el estancamiento de la vida soviética.

Uno de los ensayos más fascinantes de Moroz es la "Crónica de la Resistencia", escrito en enero de 1970. Se ocupa de Kosmach, una villa en la parte occidental de Ucrania, y de sus habitantes, el pueblo hutsul.* Moroz ve a Kosmach como un bastión de la resistencia ucraniana contra la dominación extranjera, la asimilación

* Los hutsuls son ucranianos étnicamente diferentes que viven en una región de los Montes Cárpatos.

y la aniquilación nacional. Documenta la resistencia y la tenacidad de que han dado muestras los hutsuls al enfrentar los intentos de subyugación por parte de polacos y rusos—de las variedades zarista y stalinista.

La piedra de toque del pensamiento de Moroz es su compromiso con los derechos del pueblo ucraniano y su oposición a los burócratas stalinistas que oprimen y destruyen la creatividad y el pensamiento independiente.

En una declaración del 15 de mayo de 1968, al jefe del Partido Comunista de Ucrania, al hablar de la creciente oposición a la rusificación en Ucrania, Moroz afirmó:

"No permitir una nueva tendencia es imposible. Esta surgirá de todas maneras, pero quizás en ropaje extranjero como argumento en las manos de un oponente. No permitir la entrada de un riachuelo en su canal significa dejarlo ir hacia el molino de algún otro. No lograr convertir una nueva tendencia en arma a nuestro favor significa permitir que caiga en las manos de un opositor. . .

"¿Lograrán los actuales comunistas ucranianos revivir la política de ucranización de Lenin y declarar una guerra a muerte contra el chauvinismo ruso en Ucrania? Esto será lo que determine el éxito de la lucha ideológica con el Occidente".

En sus escritos de 1939, León Trotsky, destacó este punto, y lo desarrolló aún más, al afirmar que si la vanguardia obrera, los revolucionarios, no hacían suya la lucha de los ucranianos contra la burocracia stalinista y la rusificación, convirtiéndose en la dirección política de la lucha por una Ucrania socialista independiente, ésta estaría condenada al fracaso. Ya que los enemigos "ideológicos" occidentales de que habla Moroz no harían más que llevar a Ucrania a las manos de las potencias imperialistas, que aniquilarían la vida ucraniana de manera no menos viciosa que los stalinistas (como lo probó la ocupación alemana de 1941-43).

Moroz está esforzándose por impulsar a otros para que luchan—para acelerar la erosión del terror burocrático. El considera que cuando la gente comience a levantarse y luchar por sus derechos, el "imperio de los engranajes" se derrumbará. Y cree que este proceso está en camino.

Los escritos de Moroz reflejan la

fuerza de la oposición ucraniana. Sus ensayos destacan el profundo daño que ha sufrido la vida ucraniana desde que Stalin se consolidó en el poder en los años veinte. Las prácticas de Stalin en Ucrania—la represión masiva al final de los veinte y comienzo de los treinta para parar la ucranización que amenazaba con debilitar su control, la colectivización forzada y la hambruna de los treinta, las ofensivas masivas contra la resistencia ucraniana en los cuarenta y cincuenta—todo esto tuvo consecuencias catastróficas en el pueblo ucraniano.

Muchos de los luchadores revolucionarios ucranianos de la nueva generación, como Moroz, han investigado los estragos perpetrados en Ucrania y otros pueblos no rusos por el régimen stalinista. Están desenterrando los hechos encubiertos por la falsificación stalinista de la historia

de la revolución. Ellos distinguen entre la política que implementaron los bolcheviques y el chauvinismo gran ruso que caracterizó tanto la era de Stalin como la política de los gobernantes del Kremlin que han venido después de Stalin. La exigencia de una Ucrania socialista independiente ha sido planteada por varias agrupaciones obreras y estudiantiles ucranianas, que son conocidas porque fueron aplastadas por la policía secreta en el periodo de la segunda postguerra.

Pero Moroz no es marxista y sus escritos muestran en muchos casos un alto grado de subjetividad. El está investigando y defendiendo lo que considera que son las expresiones genuinas de la cultura, tradición y valores ucranianos frente a la "cultura" prefabricada y la hipocresía que saturan la vida ucraniana actual bajo el gobierno de la burocracia stalinista. A pesar de las limitaciones de su pensamiento, el hecho es que él se opone

a la rusificación, y en esa lucha ha sido un modelo.

Moroz está profundizando el proceso por la construcción de un movimiento de obreros, estudiantes e intelectuales ucranianos que luchen para acabar con la represiva burocracia stalinista y por restaurar la democracia socialista en Ucrania. Es por eso que la burocracia quiere eliminarlo. Y es por eso que los revolucionarios debemos acudir en su defensa.

En 1939, Trotsky explicó cual debe ser la actitud de un revolucionario hacia la lucha del pueblo ucraniano contra la opresión de la burocracia stalinista: "Lo importante para mí es la actitud de ustedes hacia su destino nacional y no la retórica 'socialista' de la policía del Kremlin. ¡Yo respaldaré su lucha por la independencia con todas mis fuerzas!".

Lo mismo sigue siendo totalmente válido hoy. □

DOCUMENTS

'Shooting Irons' Not the Dividing Line

[The following article has been translated by *Intercontinental Press* from the August 20 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International) in Argentina. The subheadings appeared in the original.]

* * *

The guerrilla movements that exploded throughout almost all of Latin America in the last decade and that are now reappearing in force in our country (they have just carried out two important military operations in Catamarca and Córdoba¹) have one indisputable merit. In part they suc-

ceeded in destroying the repugnant pacifism and reformism dating from years of Stalinist and Social Democratic domination of the radical movement.

In the hands of the Stalinist and Social Democratic parties, Marxism was converted into a vile caricature designed to get the workers movement to support sectors of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. These parties argued that such support would make possible a peaceful evolution to socialism. Left for the distant and uncertain future was the violent phase of the transition, which as yet the Communists have not dared to openly reject.

"Someday we will have to take up arms," say these reformist continuators of the Social Democratic and Menshevik plague that hit the international Marxist movement. Their conception led to disasters like the recent one in Chile.

The guerrilla fighters, from the Castroists to the Tupamaros, the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left], or the Argentine group that we cannot name [a reference

to the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary People's Army, whom the Argentine government has banned the press from referring to by name] deserve credit for having broken one of the two pillars of this reformist concept. They made it clear that the class struggle is always violent. In that way an old truth that the reformists had trampled on was reaffirmed.

But they left the other pillar—class-collaborationism—still standing. Only in Cuba did the guerrillas break the nefarious "popular front" tradition of reformism. And thus it was that together with the masses in their struggles, they created the Cuban workers state. On the rest of the continent the guerrillas—even the Castroists—have continued to practice reformism or populism at gunpoint. The toughest guerrillas have gone along politically with reformism supporting the national bourgeoisie of Latin America. From Bejar [Peruvian guerrilla leader] to the Communist party, in the case of the Peruvian military junta. From the MIR to the CP in the tragic case of Chile. From the Tupamaros to

1. In mid-August the ERP suffered at least twenty deaths in an abortive attempt to take over a military installation in Catamarca. In Cordoba, guerrillas successfully attacked an explosives factory, carrying off a quantity of automatic weapons, explosives, and military uniforms.—IP

the CP in their support to the candidacy of Liber Seregni in the Uruguayan Frente Amplio [Broad Front]. In our country, from the proscribed organization [the ERP] to Firmenich [leader of the Peronist guerrilla group, the Montoneros] and the CP in the popular front, which does not yet have a definite bourgeois candidate.

How can this contradiction be explained? How is one to interpret the fact that the wake for the socialist guerrillas slain at Trelew² was held in the central office of the principal party of the Argentine bourgeoisie and union bureaucrats? What is the explanation for the guerrilla revolutionists serving the bourgeoisie? How is it explained that despite their differences they are found always in the same populist swamp with the reformists of all stripes?

Violence Becomes a Fetish

During the 1960s the Latin American guerrillas partially reflected a reality of the continent—brutal capitalist exploitation in a situation of relative lull in workers struggles. They singled out one side of this situation—the violence of the exploiters that demanded a defensive response, which the masses, at the time, were not politically, organizationally, or psychologically in a position to offer.

As a result, many young students became the avengers of the masses, the prophets, and the pioneers of a course that the masses would begin to follow, although by their own paths.

In 1969, the year of the Cordobazo, a new wave of militancy began among the Latin American workers. The guerrillas, far from linking up to this development and becoming part of it, continued in their role of prophet—advising and preaching armed struggle, even carrying it out with "armed units" or "revolutionary armies." In no case were these "armies" adopted by the masses, since they were totally unrelated to the trade-union and political organizations, in which the masses had begun to regroup.

Thus the guerrillas isolated themselves from the impressive mobilizations of the workers and their allies.

The guerrillas were not involved in the Cordobazo when the workers were discussing how to confront the military dictatorship politically and practically.

In August 1971 in Bolivia when the oligarchy and imperialism brought down the Torres government, the masses attempted to defend themselves with mobilizations and arms. Meanwhile, the guerrillas were miles away trying to create a rural "foco." They functioned outside the Popular Assembly, the centralized leadership that the workers had begun to construct.

In Uruguay in June 1973 the working class occupied all the factories to oppose the military coup, but by then the Tupamaros had already been annihilated in their vain attempt to construct their own army outside the CNT [Convención Nacional de Trabajadores—National Workers Congress] and the unions.

In September of the same year in Chile the isolation of the guerrilla vanguard from the masses reached tragic dimensions. When the workers clamored for leadership in the struggle and arms to defend themselves, the distant MIR was able to offer only their own armed cells unconnected to the Cordones Industriales [industrial belts], where the most combative sector of the working class had begun to organize itself.

All these developments demonstrate the same thing—that the guerrillas' attempt to pose the question of arming, without taking into account the degree of experience and organization of the masses, is completely at odds with the desired ends. As Trotsky said: "To counterpose the slogan of *arming the workers* to the reality of the political processes that grip the masses at their vitals means to isolate oneself from the masses—and the masses from arms."³

The great builder of the Red Army understood that the slogan of taking up arms must be part of a structured political program that takes into account the stage of the class struggle, because basically, as Trotsky said:

"It is neither locks nor walls which separate the proletariat from arms, but the habit of submission, the hypnosis of class domination and nation-

alist poison.

"It is sufficient to destroy these psychological walls—and no wall of stone will stand in the way. It is enough that the proletariat should want arms—and it will find them."⁴

Guerrilla Politics and Class Consciousness

Why did Trotsky say that to raise the slogan of arming or to launch armed struggle in separation from the program as a whole meant, in addition to becoming isolated from the masses, to deprive them of arms?

It is because the guerrilla strategy is not only incapable of showing the masses how to arm themselves, but that it impedes and, at times, derails the development of their political consciousness. In addition, this is the negative effect that all isolated vanguards provoke when they try, like the old Russian anarchists, to proselytize with the example of their own actions.

Each attempted exemplary guerrilla action converts the working class into a passive spectator. Of necessity it produces this paradoxical effect because it does not stimulate their confidence in their own strength. Instead it fosters the illusion that a Messiah will come to solve their problems. In this way, the guerrillas promote, along with bourgeois populism and reformism, the quiescence of the masses and their confidence in "a savior"—either an armed group or a "good boss." This was clearly evident when the deaths of union bureaucrats like Vandor, Alonso, Coria, and Kloosterman did not come near stimulating mobilizations of the rank and file, the only actions that can dispose of the bureaucracy.

But things are made still worse when the completely irrational character of a guerrilla action converts it into a confusionist element playing directly into the hands of the enemy. This is what has just happened, for example, with the attacks on the barracks at Córdoba and Catamarca. They only made it easier for the government, the bourgeoisie, and the CP to argue

2. The August 1972 massacre of sixteen political prisoners. See the September 4, 1972, issue of *Intercontinental Press*, pp. 915-20. — IP

3. "The Spanish Revolution and the Dangers Threatening It," *The Spanish Revolution (1931-39)* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973), p. 117. — IP

4. *Whither France?* (New York: Merit Publishers, 1968), p. 36. Also in forthcoming book *Leon Trotsky on France* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1975). — IP

that "it is the extremists' fault that we cannot govern."

This is criminal at a time when the workers are debating among themselves in an unclear way whether to launch a struggle against the government. At Peugeot, it made it possible for the bureaucracy to call an assembly to repudiate the guerrillas and take advantage of the occasion to force a vote of condemnation against Salamanca [a leader of the class-struggle tendency in the auto workers union].

Aiding Class Collaboration

By drawing a dividing line between revolutionists and reformists on the basis of their methods of struggle instead of their political program or goals, the guerrillas open the way for class collaborationism. Even those who declare themselves to be intransigent socialists end up supporting sectors of the bourgeoisie.

Such a dividing line based on methods is completely false. Armed struggle can be used—and strictly speaking is used at times—to defend capitalist rule. Latin America is full of cases of leaders, groupings, and bourgeois parties, which—in their internal disputes or attempts to blackmail the imperialists—count on the support of guerrilla youth. This is always less dangerous than mobilizing the working class.

The most recent example is provided by Peronism. In order to negotiate from a position of strength with the military dictatorship, it encouraged "special formations." Once it had obtained its goals, it cast them aside with the notorious affirmation that soldiers are essential in time of combat; but when it comes to governing, we turn to the politicians. That is how Perón transformed the Montoneros into "stupid" and "beardless" after they had served their purpose [a reference to Perón's May Day speech attacking his youthful supporters].

It is also easy for socialist guerrillas to cross the class line. Their old slogan—"unity of the armed organizations"—means no more nor less than indirect collaboration with Peronist policies. The same line has been crossed before. At the Plaza Vélez Sársfield rally in Córdoba the banned socialist guerrilla group acted as a cheering section for the speeches by

Firmenich and the CP. These speeches called for the defense of the Gelbard wing of the government against the Vandorist-López Rega wing.

'Shooting Irons' Not the Dividing Line

Clearly, armed struggle is no guarantee of your revolutionary credentials. Even with your "irons" in your hand you can still be serving some sector of the bourgeoisie.

The true dividing line between reformists and revolutionists is determined by political program and goals and the slogans required to mobilize the masses at all times.

There are two ways of confronting this crucial problem of program and objectives in the student and workers vanguard. One is the "popular front" or reformist approach. The other is the revolutionary approach, the course of the permanent revolution.

Popular frontism holds that the revolution against the oligarchy and imperialism must be led by a multiclass front, a "national liberation front," with the Argentine bourgeoisie. For example, the JP [Juventud Peronista—Peronist Youth] and the CP propose a front with Gelbard, Cámpora, Alende, Alfonsín [bourgeois liberals], etc. They call for the hegemony of the working class within this front, but they never say how this is to be achieved. Actually, they will never be able to say how it can be achieved. If a revolution is carried out against the oligarchy and imperialism but capitalist property is left intact, no one will be able to show how the working class came out on top. The workers groups and parties that participate in such a multiclass government will of necessity serve as guardians of the capitalist interests which they promised to defend beforehand upon signing their pact with the national bourgeoisie.

The revolutionary position, which we hold, is that there are no "good" and "bad" bosses. The same objective—making a profit and enriching themselves at the expense of the workers—drives all of them. Therefore, although there are differences between a Perón and Rojas [reactionary who succeeded Perón in 1955], between Torres and a Banzer [the current Bolivian military dictator], between local and foreign bosses, experience has shown that

at the hour of confrontation between the workers and imperialism, the national bourgeoisie sides with imperialism as Paz Estenssoro did in Bolivia,⁵ or it leaves the field open as Perón did in 1955.

It could be that at a given moment a bourgeois nationalist government would prefer to stand at the side of the workers against imperialism as Perón did in 1946. But that will be momentary, since in general the laws of economics induce the national bourgeoisie to reach agreement with the international bourgeoisie rather than permit the workers to threaten capitalist property.

That is why our strategy holds that the working class can and must in certain cases reach partial tactical agreements with the bourgeoisie, for example, in defense of democratic rights or of an anti-imperialist measure. But, to make the revolution and rule the country, and to socialize all the means of production now in the hands of the national and international bourgeoisie, the working class must rely solely on its own strength, taking power with the support of the middle class.

For us—and in our opinion this is the true axis of the revolutionary struggle—the most important task is to mobilize the working class and construct the tools it needs to take power: unions freed from the bureaucrats and a mass revolutionary workers party capable of steering a correct course toward permanent revolution. With such a party and mobilization of the masses, the necessary response to capitalist reaction can always be found, including the armed struggle that so preoccupies the guerrillas.

The real dividing line between reform and revolution lies between popular frontism and the permanent revolution. We appeal to the youth who may be serving reformism arms in hand to change their course. We ask them to learn to respect the power of the masses, to seek to raise the consciousness of the masses, and to help win them to a mass party capable of leading the way to a socialist Argentina. □

5. In 1952 Paz Estenssoro was brought to power in Bolivia in a massive workers upsurge, but his government remained loyal to the bourgeoisie, never going beyond partial anti-imperialist measures. — IP