



CIA Admits Role in Overthrowing Chile Government

ALLENDE: Victim of the CIA.

U.S.A.

Rat No. 2 Pardons Rat No. 1

Cuba

OAS States Move to End Sanctions

In Face of Ominous Evidence

Mounting Fear of World Recession

Dissidents Given Long Prison Terms

The conspiracy trial of 202 Tunisian youths (an early report in the August 10 *Le Monde* cited 222) ended August 24 in Tunis with heavy prison sentences against the leading defendants.

The 202 students, workers, civil servants, and high-school teachers faced charges ranging from conspiracy to defamation, belonging to a clandestine group, spreading false information, and insulting the head of the government.

The trial was notable not only because of the number of accused but because of the average age of the defendants, twenty-one, and the fact that at least sixty were women. They were alleged to belong to two illegal organizations—the Socialist Study and Action Group of Tunisia, and the Marxist-Leninist Group. The first of these, according to the August 10 *Le Monde*, was formed in 1964 by dissident students in the Paris section of the General Union of Tunisian Students.

All of the half-dozen lawyers sent by international defense organizations to observe the trial, which began August 5 before the State Security Court, were either expelled from the court or refused entry to Tunisia.

The defendants vehemently denied the charges and emphasized the contradiction between Article 8 of the Tunisian constitution, which assures "freedom of association," and the Law of November 7, 1959, which gives the minister of the interior discretionary power to outlaw associations. They also protested against the torture many had been subjected to, pointing out their torturers among the police present in the court.

Eleven of the defendants, alleged to be leaders of the two groups, were sentenced in absentia to terms of twelve years imprisonment.

Another fifteen defendants, already jailed, received sentences varying from five to ten years. Of the remaining defendants, 149 were sentenced to terms of up to four years, and twenty-seven were acquitted. □

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CIA Admits Role in Overthrowing Allende

By Michael Baumann

William Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has admitted that the Nixon administration authorized more than \$8 million between 1970 and 1973 to finance a secret CIA effort to topple the Allende regime in Chile.

The \$8 million, he testified before a congressional subcommittee, was in addition to \$3 million the CIA had spent earlier trying to prevent Allende from being elected.

Colby's admission of the CIA's role in overthrowing Allende was made in secret testimony April 22 before the House Armed Services Special Subcommittee on Intelligence. It did not come to light, however, until September 8, when portions of a congressman's letter quoting from the Colby transcript were made public in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*.

Neither newspaper reported how the letter, sent by Massachusetts Representative Michael J. Harrington to the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, made its way into their hands.

It is clear, however, why the White House sought to keep the information contained in Colby's testimony from circulating beyond a limited circle of trusted government officials. The CIA director's account of how Washington helped pave the way for the September 11, 1973, military coup in Chile shows how brazenly the White House and State Department lied in saying that the United States had nothing to do with the overthrow of Allende. And it establishes beyond any doubt Washington's direct responsibility for the thousands of deaths that accompanied the coup and the following repression.

Colby testified that Washington's efforts to block an Allende electoral victory went back as far as 1964. According to the report on the revelations in Harrington's letter published in the September 8 *Washington Post*, "A total of \$3 million in CIA funds was poured into the Christian Democratic Party in 1964 to support the successful candidacy of its nominee, Eduardo Frei, who was being op-

posed by Allende.

"Funding was provided to individuals, political parties and media outlets in Chile, through channels in other countries in both Latin America and Europe," Harrington related. "Mr. Colby's description of these operations was direct, though not to the point of identifying actual contacts and conduits."

In 1969, a year before the next presidential election, the CIA was given some \$500,000 to "fund individuals who could be nurtured to keep



KISSINGER: Claimed CIA had nothing to do with Chile coup.

the anti-Allende forces active and intact." An additional \$500,000 was paid to "opposition party personnel" during the campaign.

After Allende won a plurality in the 1970 election, Harrington's report of the transcript continues, the CIA was authorized to spend \$350,000 "to bribe the Chilean Congress, which at that time was faced with deciding a runoff between the candidates." According to the September 8 *New York Times*, the bribes were only part of a "much more complicated scheme intended to overturn the results of the election." After the bribes were paid, the overall plan was supposedly rejected as unworkable.

Following the confirmation of Allende's victory by the Chilean Congress, CIA money really started to pour in. From 1971 to 1973, \$5 million was authorized by Washington to finance clandestine CIA activities aimed at "destabilizing" the Allende regime. An additional \$1.5 million was provided to support the campaigns of anti-Allende candidates in the 1973 municipal elections. Some of the latter funds "were used to support an unnamed but influential anti-Allende newspaper," according to Harrington's account of Colby's testimony.

A CIA expenditure of \$1 million for "further political destabilization activities" was authorized in August 1973, one month before the coup. Did this money go to General Pinochet, who at that time had already laid plans for the seizure of power? Here Colby was not particularly helpful.

"The full [CIA] plan authorized in August was called off when the military coup occurred less than one month later," Harrington wrote. "He added, however," according to the *New York Times*, "that Mr. Colby had testified that \$34,000 of the funds had been spent—including a payment of \$25,000 to one person to buy a radio station."

Colby's testimony provides conclusive proof that high White House and State Department officials repeatedly lied about the U. S. role in overthrowing Allende.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for example, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year in a public session: "The CIA had nothing to do with the coup, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I only put in that qualification in case some madman appears down there who without instructions talked to somebody. I have absolutely no reason to suppose it."

Now compare the *New York Times* account of the testimony Colby gave behind closed doors: "Mr. Colby . . . maintained that all of the agency's operations against the Allende Government were approved in advance by the 40 Committee in Washington,

a secret high-level intelligence panel headed by Secretary of State Kissinger."

Times reporter Seymour M. Hersh attempted to verify Kissinger's role on the 40 Committee by checking with other Washington sources. "One fully informed official, told of *The New York Times*'s intention to publish an account of the clandestine C. I. A. activities in Chile, declared, 'This thing calls for balanced reporting to put the blame where it should be laid.'

"The agency didn't do anything without the knowledge and consent of the 40 committee,' he said, pointedly adding that the committee was headed by Mr. Kissinger, who was then serving as President Richard M. Nixon's National Security Adviser."

According to other Washington officials Hersh contacted, tactical differences over the best way to overthrow Allende at times divided the 40 Committee's members. Hersh reported:

"A number of officials whose information about such activities has been accurate in the past declared in interviews this week that there was a sharp split between some State Department officials and Mr. Kissinger over the 40 Committee's Chile policy. . . .

"In the period before the coup,' one official said, 'there was a pretty firm view on the part of the 40 Committee—which is Kissinger and nobody else—that the Allende Government was bound to come to destruction and had to be thoroughly discredited.'

"The State Department supported this, but in a different way,' the official recalled. 'It wanted to stretch out any clandestine activities to permit the regime to come to a political end.'

"The argument was between those who wanted to use force and end it quickly rather than to play it out. Henry was on the side of the former—he was for considerable obstruction."

All the officials Hersh interviewed claimed that the CIA had not been authorized to play a direct role in the coup. It seems clear, however, that these denials hinged on a very narrow definition of the word "direct"—that is, that no identifiable CIA operative drove a tank or fired artillery shells.

The officials, Hersh wrote, "noted that most of the subsequent denials of agency involvement in the internal affairs of Chile were made in the context of a direct United States role in the overthrow.

"On most of those you have to look at the language very carefully,' one

official said of the denials."

One of the most improbable soundings of the CIA denials comes from Colby himself. According to Harrington's account, Colby told Congress that the CIA had not helped finance the 1973 truck owners' strike, a key element in increasing the economic hardships that preceded the coup. Colby is said to have testified that a specific CIA request for \$50,000 to help finance the strike was turned down by the 40 Committee. It was widely believed in Chile at the time that the strike was financed, at least in part, by the CIA.

On the other hand, it is possible that Colby's denial was formally correct and that the 40 Committee was merely

seeking to avoid a duplication of efforts already undertaken by other interested parties.

Secret documents uncovered in March 1972 by nationally syndicated columnist Jack Anderson showed that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation worked closely with the CIA in Chile and at one point even offered the CIA \$1 million to help speed up the agency's efforts. At a closed hearing on Chile before a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee last October, Colby refused to rule out the possibility that some of the anti-Allende demonstrations may have been funded by subsidiaries of U. S. corporations in Brazil and other Latin American countries. □

And Nixon, of Course, Voices Gratitude

Rat No. 2 Pardons Rat No. 1

President Ford granted former President Nixon a full pardon Sunday, September 8. The decree, closing possible loopholes, covered all federal crimes Nixon "committed," "may have committed," or may have "taken part in" during his five and a half years in the White House.

Nixon, playing his part in the pre-arranged scenario, termed the pardon a "compassionate" act.

According to the September 9 *New York Times*, Ford later let it be known that he "had chosen the Sabbath . . . to emphasize that the pardon was an act of mercy, not justice."

While few partisans of equality under the law would disagree with the latter part of that statement, other motives have been suggested for the timing, such as inside knowledge that Nixon faced imminent indictment for his role in the Watergate conspiracy.

But whatever his motive, it is clear that Ford did not have the undivided support of the public (the latest poll shows 58 percent of the country in favor of trying Nixon on criminal charges). Some of his close associates were shocked at the unprecedented pardon and the ugly behind-the-scenes deal it implied. White House Press Secretary J. F. terHorst resigned the same day as a matter of "conscience." Even some of Ford's ruling-class

backers felt uncomfortable over the grossness of his action.

The *Wall Street Journal*, while refraining from editorial comment the following day, suggested pointedly in its news article that Ford could have at least waited longer. "Mr. Ford acted unexpectedly soon," staff writers Mitchell Lynch and Albert Hunt wrote September 9; "it had been assumed that he wouldn't do anything for Mr. Nixon until after the November elections."

As a matter of fact, a year ago when he was asked in Congress whether in the Watergate case he would exercise the power to pardon should he become president, Ford solemnly affirmed: "I do not think the public would stand for it."

Again, on August 28 at his first news conference as president, Ford pledged himself to respect the obligation of the special Watergate prosecutor to take necessary action against "any and all individuals."

The editors of the *New York Times* viewed the pardon as a serious public-relations blunder that did not even have the advantage of making Nixon any less of a liability. If, as appears likely, he is called to testify in the upcoming Watergate trial of six of his former aides, he will still have

to testify under oath.

"Because his pardon has immunized him," the *Times* pointed out September 9, "he cannot avoid testifying by claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination inasmuch as he cannot now be prosecuted."

On the other hand, "If he testifies falsely, he is still open to prosecution."

However, the question of Nixon's legal entanglement, serious as it is from the viewpoint of the *New York Times*, is not nearly as serious as the overall political repercussions of the pardon. The real difficulty with the pardon is that it knocks into a cocked hat the effort to present Ford

as "Honest John," just what the American people needed after Watergate.

Ford, the editors wrote, "probably could have taken no single act of a non-criminal nature that would have more gravely damaged the credibility of this Government in the eyes of the world and of its own people than this unconscionable act of pardon."

Little wonder the editors of the *New York Times* are squirming. They were among the most prominent in lending the resources and prestige of their influential newspaper to the dirty work of putting across a vintage Republican machine hack as a folksy man of the people unable to lie because he was

born that way. And this image cooked up by the hucksters hired to cover up Watergate vanished like a pricked bubble within a month after the paragon of civic virtue was sworn in.

The editors of the *New York Times* would have done better to invite the public to study ten times over the sly recommendation Nixon made of his appointee upon resigning and taking off for the easy life at San Clemente:

"... in turning over direction of the Government to Vice President Ford I know, as I told the nation when I nominated him for that office 10 months ago, that the leadership of America will be in good hands." □

In Face of the Ominous Evidence

Mounting Fear That It's a Worldwide Recession

By Dick Fidler

"The economic gloom is deepening in Western nations as stock markets crumble, bankruptcies rise, inflation rages and unemployment climbs toward what many fear will be unacceptably high levels this winter," *New York Times* business correspondent Clyde Farnsworth cabled from Paris August 25.

"For the first time since the nineteen-thirties," Farnsworth continued, "a slump has hit the major trading nations at roughly the same time.

"This convergence represents a dangerous new element, in the opinion of many bankers and economists, because of the possibility that it could touch off a process in which recessionary forces begin feeding on themselves."

The July report of the twenty-four-nation Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development spelled out the threat of a worldwide depression in graphic terms.

In 1973, the OECD reported, its member nations experienced the strongest economic upswing the industrialized world has ever seen. In the first half of last year, growth was running at an annual rate of 8.1 percent in the seven major "bellwether" countries, which account for 87 per-

cent of OECD output—Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United States, and West Germany.

But twelve months later, the economic activity of these nations was actually shrinking, with an average decline in the first half of 1974 of 1.5 percent.

For the first time in the postwar period, three of these countries—Britain, Japan, and the United States—are experiencing simultaneous slowdowns.

In the United States, industrial production has skidded from a 9 percent growth rate in 1973 to a current estimated 1.75 percent decline for 1974. In Britain, it has declined from 7.1 percent growth in 1973 to an estimated 3 percent decline this year. Japan's industrial production has plunged from a 17.6 percent increase last year to a 2.5 percent growth rate in 1974.

"And the indications for recovery in 1975 are not very bright anywhere," Condon Rodgers wrote in the August 18 *New York Times*, citing the OECD forecasts.

Farnsworth reported from Brussels September 4 that "Europeans are watching the anti-inflation maneuvers of the Ford Administration with more

than usual interest because of their worry that new policies in Washington may lead the world into a prolonged slump."

In an interview released August 24, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt took the extraordinary step of publicly warning the U.S. government that if it continues to pursue recessionary policies, the serious downturn in the United States could pull down the rest of the capitalist world.

"There is a danger," he told James Reston of the *New York Times*, "that if the United States as a whole goes deflationary . . . this will inevitably spread to the world markets. It will mean less demand from the U.S. on the world market, and it will mean that we can sell less.

"You have to fight inflation, but please don't enter into deflation policy, because you might incur too much unemployment, too much deflation in the world economy."

West European countries are highly vulnerable to fluctuations in world economic conditions. Schmidt noted that while exports amount to only about 5 percent of the U.S. gross national product, they account for al-

most a quarter of West Germany's GNP.

Schmidt's statements came in the wake of three West German bank failures within two weeks in August. And last June the Herstatt Bank, one of the country's biggest private institutions, failed, following heavy losses in foreign exchange transactions.

On September 2, it was revealed that Lloyds Bank of Britain, one of that country's most powerful financial institutions, had lost up to \$75 million in "irregular" currency transactions.

There are many indications that these bank failings are related to the acute economic and financial crisis in Italy. The Lloyds losses, for example, came in dealings with its branch in Lugano, Switzerland, near the Italian border.

To finance a trade deficit running at a rate of \$13,000 million this year, the Italian government has been borrowing heavily abroad, thus putting heavy pressure on the lira. Prices are currently rising at an annual rate of 20 percent. On September 5, the government announced a 23 percent increase in the retail price of pasta, one of Italy's staple food items.

Following a two-day meeting with Italian Premier Mariano Rumor, Chancellor Schmidt announced August 31 that West Germany would grant Italy a \$2,000 million loan, to be guaranteed by one-sixth of Italy's gold reserves, in order to help bail the Italian government out of its financial crisis. Italy was already paying more than \$700 million annually in interest on previous foreign loans.

Bonn's surprise decision would seem to indicate that other West German banks besides those that have already failed, and probably larger ones, have made loans to Italy, and that the Schmidt government is fearful of new failures. As Schmidt said, Italy "lies in Germany's own economic interests."

Nor is West Germany the only country to be thus affected by Italy's difficulties.

The *New York Times* reported September 3 that the U. S. Office of the Controller of Currency has alerted its bank examiners to view all medium- and long-term loans to Italian government agencies and Italian banks and companies as "problematical."

The European country with the

largest balance-of-payments deficit is Britain, with an expected deficit this year of \$10,000 million.

"The 'Sicily of the North Sea' or the 'Pakistan of Europe' — as the British have been referring to their island of late—is sinking into her deepest postwar recession against a background of apprehension, despondency and resignation," Clyde Farnsworth reported from London September 1.

"What Barclays Bank calls 'a contagious mood of pessimism' is undermining confidence, slashing stock market values and reducing incentives of corporate managers to invest. Now an upswing in unemployment has frightened the consumer and retail sales have turned down."

"We're like punch-drunk boxers," a stockbroker told the reporter. Share prices in Britain have plummeted by 60 percent in two years.

"An industrial consultant, Robert Robertson, reported that the market value of Britain's top 1,000 companies had fallen to \$50-billion [billion], which amounts to less than one year of surplus funds for oil-producing states."

"England: In Awful Shape, Getting Worse," was the headline on an article by London correspondent Alvin Shuster in the September 1 *New York Times*. "Inflation is now running at an annual rate of more than 17 per cent," he reported, "and is expected to reach 20 per cent. The experts say that unemployment, although only 2.5 per cent of the labor force, is now close to 700,000 and may well jump to a million in coming months. The pound is sinking about as fast as the stock

market. And the annual trade deficit, aggravated by the jump in oil and commodity prices, is expected to reach \$10,000-billion this year."


Shuster added that real wages in Britain are estimated to be falling at a rate of 2.5 percent this year.

Faced with an election in the fall, the Labour party leaders are trying to convince the capitalist rulers of Britain that only a Labour government, with the backing of the powerful trade unions, will be able to enforce the tough antilabor measures they are demanding to meet the crisis. When the prime minister addressed the annual conference of the Trades Union Congress September 5, Richard Eder reported in the *New York Times*, "Mr. Wilson's theme, which promises to be the keynote for his party, was that Britain faces years of hardship and sacrifice. He said that labor, industry and Government must cooperate in seeing that the sacrifices are shared fairly and in working to bring the country out of its crisis."

"The Prime Minister addressed an audience whose debates over the last three days have been much more militant," Eder added.

The TUC bureaucrats voted by a large majority to endorse Wilson's "Social Contract," the formula for voluntary wage restraint. But "the vote was more designed to return a Labour government to office in October than it was a pledge to cooperate with the government if it is elected," wrote Richard Burt in the September 6 *Christian Science Monitor*. Both the Tories and Liberals favor a legislated

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics



wage-control policy.

Other West European countries are not faring much better than Britain. France is still reeling from the impact of the fourfold increase in oil prices last year, which abruptly transformed the small trade surplus projected for this year into a deficit now running at a rate of nearly \$500 million a month. France's inflation rate is currently 14 percent (it is higher on food prices).

The rate of bankruptcies in France is up 23 percent this year, Clyde Farnsworth reported in the September 1 *New York Times*, and the Paris Chamber of Commerce has warned that some 500 businesses in the Paris region alone may go under in October, unless conditions improve.

Even West Germany, with the lowest inflation rate in Western Europe (7 percent), and a record trade surplus, faces increasing difficulties. Sales of Volkswagen autos, the country's largest industry, are off 25 percent this year, Craig R. Whitney of the *New York Times* reported from Bonn September 1. "Things are no better for Ford and Opel, or for the building industry. All are victims of the high interest rates, tax surcharges, and penalties on investment that then Finance Minister Schmidt put into effect last year to combat inflation."

For the Japanese, whose economy has been averaging a growth rate of 10 percent a year since World War II, the current situation is a disaster, the *New York Times* reported August 18. "The O.E.C.D. put growth at 12.9 per cent in the first half of 1973, dropping 10 percentage points in the second and going deep into minus territory—6.5 per cent—in the first half of this year.

"However, the official word from Japan on the first quarter put the G.N.P. drop on a year-to-year basis at a massive 18.5 per cent, seasonally adjusted on an annual basis, in the first quarter alone."

As for the United States, "The government still officially refuses to call it a recession, but the fact is, consumer purchasing power has already been much harder hit than in the past three recessions," wrote Dick Roberts in the September 13 issue of the revolutionary-socialist weekly *The Militant*.

"This significant information was revealed by the First National City Bank in its August economic newsletter: Measured in terms of what is

actually bought, rather than in prices, personal consumption has fallen 2.4 percent. This compares to a rise of 1.1 percent in the 1969-70 recession; a fall of 0.5 percent in the 1960-61 recession; and a fall of 1.4 percent in the 1957-58 recession."

Unemployment rose in July to an official rate of 5.3 percent; for Black workers it was 9.4 percent, for Black teen-agers, 35.3 percent. Consumer prices in July were 11.8 percent above a year earlier. "This made real wages 5.3 percent lower than a year ago," Roberts noted.

But the clearest indicator that the recession is deepening came when the Commerce Department issued new figures showing a much sharper rise in inventory stocks than had earlier been reported. "If many businessmen decide, at about the same time, that their stocks are too high, they are apt to cut their purchases, and this can lead to a sharp drop in the level of general business activity," Lindley H. Clark Jr. wrote in the August 16 *Wall Street Journal*.

The statistics, he said, have led "to increased worry among economists that the nation may, after all, be in for a classical case of what's known as an inventory recession. Coming on top of the current slump, this could mean that the economic downturn would be deeper and longer than had been expected."

Another significant indicator was the announcement by the Ford Motor Company that it will reduce its capital spending in 1975 by more than \$220 million in anticipation of reduced sales.

"So far capital spending elsewhere in the economy is continuing to rise," Roberts noted in *The Militant*. "But if cuts like the one announced by Ford were to spread, and if they coincided with the necessary reduction of inventories, it would cause the recession to take on truly crisis proportions."

Roberts outlined the economic measures the Ford administration has already taken, or is threatening to take in the next period:

● After repeatedly denying that he would adopt any kind of wage controls, Ford urged Congress to defer until Jan. 1, 1975, a 5.5 percent pay boost for more than 3.5 million government employees. This three-month wage freeze would cost the workers involved \$700-million. Comparable steps were taken by the Nixon ad-

ministration before and during the 'New Economic Policy.'

● Administration officials have given 'strong hints' that 'wage guidelines' will be developed, according to the Sept. 3 *Wall Street Journal*. . . .

● Secretary of Labor Peter Brennan indicated that the administration will not adopt a public works job program unless unemployment reaches 7 percent. Even then, what has been suggested is a program to hire only 800,000 workers. If the unemployment rate does reach 7 percent, which is not at all unlikely, it would mean nearly six million workers would be officially unemployed, with millions more than that jobless but discouraged from seeking work.

● The White House is seeking heavy budget cutbacks. A favorite of President Ford's is to reduce educational benefits for veterans by some \$300-million. . . ."

Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur Burns, a close adviser of the new president, is publicly advocating an immediate \$10,000 million cut in the federal budget.

All these measures and proposals add up to one conclusion: Washington intends to allow the recession to deepen. The ruling class hopes that this will ultimately force workers to reduce their wage demands; improve Wall Street's profit standings; and give U.S. capitalism a sharper edge in world competition.

Testifying recently before the Senate Budget Committee, Burns stressed the major preoccupation of governments today—the close interdependence of modern economies, particularly as it was highlighted by last year's oil crisis. The August 22 *Wall Street Journal* reported Burns's assessment:

"The 'real difficulty,' Mr. Burns warned, confronts entire countries, rather than just their banking institutions, and derives from the quadrupling in the international price of oil within the past year. Citing 'enormous increases' in the dollar value of imports for consuming countries and in the flow of funds to oil exporters, the Fed chairman asserted that the price boost 'has released financial forces on a scale that is virtually unmanageable.' This 'is the most important threat the world financial system faces,' he emphasized.

"The U.S. will 'come through all

right,' Mr. Burns predicted, but he said 'what happens elsewhere also affects us.'

Burns might just as well have stated the converse, too. What happens to the United States economy affects all other capitalist powers. The oil crisis is a case in point. It stemmed from the decision last fall of a few big U.S.-based multinational corporations, in collaboration with some Arab states,

to withdraw a comparatively small amount of oil from the world market. The resulting crisis confirmed the predominance of the United States in the world capitalist system, some of its sharpest effects being felt precisely among Washington's leading competitor-allies in Western Europe and Japan.

Burns's statement that the U.S. will "come through all right" may be wish-

ful thinking, but it accurately reflects the determination of Wall Street to pursue nationalist, protectionist policies to meet the current crisis. That this course may help precipitate a worldwide depression arouses apprehension even in American business circles. However, it will not cause them to change to a fundamentally different course. The workings of the capitalist system itself exclude it. □

Jumped by Six Cops at Athens Demonstration

Trotskyist Leader Acquitted of 'Resisting Arrest'

[Beginning Friday, August 16, Athens was swept with continual demonstrations. It was the first weekend following the new Turkish offensive in Cyprus. The government had announced Greece's withdrawal from NATO. Andreas Papandreou was returning. A group of Cypriot students were on a public hunger strike.

[The demonstrators were mostly young people—university and high-school students and working youth.

[This is how the Greek Trotskyist weekly *Ergatike Pale* described the tenor of these actions: "Along with the familiar anti-American, anti-imperialist, and antijunta slogans—removal of the bases, immediate withdrawal of all imperialist forces from Cyprus, and the demand 'Hand the junta over to the people!'—revolutionary slogans were fervently chanted, reflecting the revival of proletarian internationalism in our country. Dozens of times, the area resounded with the cry 'The Turks are workers too!' and 'Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey, forward to people's democracy!' The snappiest chant was 'One enemy—capitalism.' Nor was there any lack of slogans showing the great rise in the political consciousness of the youth, such as 'The people will not forget, they are organizing and they will win!' and 'People, remember November!'

["It is true that the daily papers, both bourgeois and reformist, and the mass media controlled by the state tried to present these vibrant demonstrations as chauvinist and as unconditionally supporting the Caramanlis government. The approval for the

government's decision to withdraw from NATO was obvious. But it was also obvious that the youth did not believe that this represented a real disengagement from the imperialist alliance. This was shown by the insistence with which the demonstrators demanded the immediate removal of the bases and of all NATO and U.S. facilities from the country."

[By the evening of Sunday, August 18, the police apparently felt that the time had come to put a stop to this sort of thing. They attacked a demonstration of young people, scattering the marchers with clubs and streams of water under high pressure. A number of demonstrators and passersby were arrested and beaten. Most were released within a day or so, but two were charged with various offenses under the martial law still formally in effect. One of these was Giannis Felekis, the editor of *Ergatike Pale*. The trial was held on August 29. The following is the account given in the August 31 issue of *Ergatike Pale*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

On August 29, the trial of the persons arrested in the incidents of Sunday, August 18, began in the Fifth Three-Judge Tribunal of the Athens Magistrates Court. The accused were Miltiades Karagiannakes, twenty-three years old, a carpenter; and Giannis Felekis, a lithographer and editor of the paper *Ergatike Pale*. The charges were (a) resisting arrest; (b)

insolence toward the authorities; (c) multiple assault and battery against officers of the law.

Felekis was represented by the lawyers Theodoros Theodoropoulos, Takes Pappas, and Georgios Griviatsos; Karagiannakes was represented by Bakratses. The counsel for the accused called for the dismissal of the case because of the vagueness of the charges. The court, however, rejected their objections.

Next, four policemen were presented as witnesses against Felekis. They testified that they had received orders to break up the demonstration of the youth and had taken part in breaking it up. But they knew absolutely nothing about the accused.

Witnesses for the defense were Felekis's fellow prisoners in the Gioura concentration camp: Paulos Giorgiou, a professor at the University of Athens; Stathes Panagoulis, a student of political science and an active opponent of the dictatorship; and Sofrones Papadopoulos, who in addition to his nine months in Gioura spent five years in the jails of the dictatorship. Also testifying for the defense were two participants in the demonstration, Kostas Abaves and Evgenia Kotsou. The latter was arrested and brutally beaten

Next Week...

The September 23 issue of *Intercontinental Press* will contain the feature article "The Developing Upsurge in Greece: What the Salonika Demonstration Showed" by staff writer Gerry Foley.

after the events of August 18. Another witness was the worker Kleantes Depapes.

Professor Giorgiou testified that he had an opportunity to get to know the accused very well in Gioura and that it was Felekis's firm conviction that the only effective way to achieve social change was through mobilizing the masses of the people in an organized way. Therefore it was excluded that he could have thrown bottles, as he was accused of doing, among other things.

Stathes Panagoulis testified that he came to know the accused in Gioura, that he was absolutely certain of Felekis's character and revolutionary principles, and that he had no doubt that the reason this activist was being prosecuted today was the same as that for which he had been tried, imprisoned, and sent into penal exile under the dictatorship.

Sofrones Papadopoulos, after explaining that he was an atheist, swore by his conscience that he would tell the truth. He defended the inalienable right of the people to demonstrate as a means of expressing their opinions and maintained that the specific assembly in question was a lawful one. He also said that the prosecution of Felekis was no accident but a continuation of the persecution he suffered in the previous period, which led to his being arrested at least ten times, to his being beaten, jailed, and sent into penal exile.

Kostas Abaves testified that he took part in the demonstration together with the accused and that the ones who committed assault were the police—not the demonstrators. As for the defendant in particular, it was the police who hit him and not vice versa.

The presiding judge asked him, "If you participated in the demonstration, why didn't they arrest you too?"

The witness answered, "What do you want to do, make a complaint against the police because they didn't arrest me? Do you want me to demand that they put me in the dock because I exercised by inalienable right to demonstrate my opinion?"

Evgenia Kotsou testified that the police arrested and beat her. She said that she met the accused in the police station where they were being held, and that Felekis's face and shirt were covered with blood. She testified that the behavior of the police was very coarse, especially toward the young

women they arrested.

Kleantes Depapes testified as to the character of the accused and defended the right of the people to demonstrate. He said that the police, not the demonstrators, were responsible for the violence.

In his testimony, Felekis said that he took part in the demonstration because he shared its views and aims and that he was there also in his capacity as a reporter for the paper *Ergatike Pale*. He condemned the violent police attack on the peaceable demonstration of the youth and the barbaric behavior of the police toward the persons arrested. The charges of resisting arrest and assaulting the police was laughable because when a man is thrown to the ground and six cops jump on him he is in no position either to resist arrest or commit assault and battery. The Greek people, Felekis said, had won the right to demonstrate, and their other freedoms, by their struggles and their sacrifices; no one had any right to restrict these liberties, and still less the torturers of the last seven years who were now being assigned to the same tasks by the new government.

It should be noted that the presiding judge did not allow any of the witnesses or defendants to refer to the details and demanded one-word answers ("yes or no").

The prosecutor said in his summation that today all of Greece is a demonstration and that in this climate it is understandable why young people took part in the demonstration in question. He added, however, that strong and responsible hands, which the God of Greece always sends in difficult times, were now at the nation's helm and that it was necessary to avoid irresponsible and dangerous actions.

The lawyer Theodoros Theodoropoulos contended that the trial had produced absolutely no evidence against the accused and that Felekis had been present in the demonstration as a reporter for his paper. Furthermore, no one had demonstrated that the march was an illegal one. The lawyer Georgios Griviatsos maintained that it had not been proved that the accused committed the acts with which he was charged and that he had been present in the demonstration in his capacity as a reporter for *Ergatike Pale*. The lawyer said, moreover, that the trial had not turned up

any proof that the demonstration was illegal and that the period is one in which demonstrations are daily occurrences.

The lawyer Takes Pappas pointed out that "as the prosecutor said, we have been through tragic times, but this has not prevented the formulation of provocative charges, which as this hearing has shown, are designed to harass the accused. According to the charges, he is supposed to have gone to different places in Syntagma Square simultaneously to inflict bodily harm on the policemen who have testified here. It is strange that the defendant has been singled out among the 1,000 demonstrators the witnesses have referred to.

"Of those arrested, only the defendant was sentenced by the courts of the dictatorship. Only he spent four and a half years in prison and was shipped to the Gioura concentration camp. In the period following April 21, he was arrested about a dozen times. It is outrageous to try to make a case against this man on the basis of martial law. Since the fall of the dictatorship not a day has passed without demonstrations, both indoors and outdoors. And it is all the more outrageous when the accused has done nothing but exercise his legal right. On the basis of these facts, I call for acquittal."

Next, the court took up the case of Karagiannakes.

The witnesses for the prosecution were the policemen Taganes and Iakonnakes, who claimed that the accused attacked them.

Ana Linardake, Vs. Skatzes, and Herakles Nakopoulos, who were friends and relatives of the accused, testified for the defense. Themes Katsoules, who had not known the accused before the day of his arrest, also testified for the defense. The first three said that on the day in question the defendant had gone to the beach and was arrested as he was returning from there. The proof was that when the police seized him he was still carrying his bathing suit.

Katsoules said that he had walked for a rather long while alongside the accused, who at the time was a stranger to him, and that when they reached the traffic island in Vasilese Sophias Street in front of the Megale Britannia, the strong array of police forces launched an attack. At that point, a

group of four or five cops jumped his neighbor and began beating him savagely. The next day he learned from the papers the name of the stranger and came to the trial only to refute the false charges lodged against Karagiannakes.

In his statement, Karagiannakes said that he had been returning from the beach and had been heading leisurely toward his home when he stopped for quite a while to eat at a restaurant on the edge of Plaka [the old district of Athens]. He said that a large number of policemen jumped him and beat him savagely, and that in the police station Iakonakes in particular had beaten him repeatedly, even in his cell.

The prosecutor called for a guilty verdict. Then the defense lawyer Bakratses made his summation, analyzing in detail the illogicality and untenability of the indictment.

The judges left the chamber. A few minutes later they returned and pronounced Felekis not guilty. But they sentenced Karagiannakes to *eight months* or a fine of 150 metallic drachmas for each day of the sentence.

Felekis made a strong statement that the court had "turned the victim into the culprit."

The hundreds of young people who had been coming since the morning to express their solidarity with the defendants and who did not stir until 2 a.m., broke into enthusiastic shouts and raised their fists to celebrate their partial victory. They immediately took up a collection and raised 2,450 drachmas [approximately US\$90] which they gave to Karagiannakes's brother, pledging their full support until Miltiades Karagiannakes is cleared of the false charges against him.

Karagiannakes's lawyer appealed, and the defendant was freed on bail. □

not yet arrived in Bissau, Johnson reported, Africans wearing shirts and dresses decorated with PAIGC slogans and pictures of Amilcar Cabral, the head of the PAIGC until his assassination by Portuguese agents last year, began to appear on the streets of the capital.

The estimated 17,000 Africans in the colonial army were discharged. Lorenzo Gomes, a leader of the PAIGC on the northern front, told Johnson on August 26, "We hope to win their support in building our new nation."

One Black soldier who had fought with the Portuguese explained, "We fought alongside the Portuguese because it was the law. We had no choice. Many ran away to join the independence party but they were mostly men without small children inside the Portuguese camps." Another former soldier said that he fought in the colonial army because he was paid \$90 a month. The average per capita income in Guinea-Bissau is \$100 a year.

Hundreds of refugees began to return to their country a few days before the signing of the agreement. Those from southern Senegal stopped at the PAIGC bases in Senegal to receive their passports. There are an estimated 300,000 refugees in Senegal and Guinea.

After signing the accord, the Spínola regime tried to play down the significance of Guinea-Bissau's victory. Writing from Lisbon on August 27, *Washington Post* correspondent Miguel Acoca reported, "Informed sources said that Gen. Antonio de Spínola . . . wants a low-key reaction. He was said to be miffed with PAIGC because it is acting like a victor and because it had refused to invite him to the independence ceremonies in Bissau, capital of the new republic."

Recognition of the independence of Guinea-Bissau was not what the junta originally aimed for. Following the April 25 coup, Spínola frequently stated that Lisbon favored "self-determination" for the colonies within the framework of a federation tied to Portugal. The form of this "self-determination" was to be decided through referendums organized by the colonial administrations.

However, the actual conditions in Guinea-Bissau, and the political ferment there since the coup, made it impossible for the junta to follow Spí-

But Cape Verdes Left in Portuguese Hands

Guinea-Bissau Gains Independence

By Ernest Harsch

The signing of a pact between the Spínola regime and the Guinea-Bissau rebels on August 26 in Algiers marked Lisbon's recognition that it can no longer simply use military force to uphold Portuguese colonialism. Guinea-Bissau is to become an independent state on September 10.

Following a three-day visit by United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, Lisbon announced August 4 that it would take this step and support Guinea-Bissau's admission to the UN. On August 12, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to recommend Guinea-Bissau's admission.

The signing of the August 26 accord in Algiers, by Foreign Minister Mario Soares and Guinea-Bissau Deputy Defense Minister Pedro Pires, followed a series of secret negotiations between Lisbon and the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde—African party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands).

According to the agreement, all Portuguese troops are to be withdrawn by October 31. However, neither the independence of the Cape Verde Islands nor their unity with Guinea-Bissau were recognized.

Even before the agreement was signed, the withdrawal of Portuguese troops had begun. Writing from Bissau on September 1, *New York Times* correspondent Thomas Johnson described the exodus: "Thousands of Portuguese soldiers from scores of bases in the interior of the territory clog the barnlike structures of the airport, where jet passenger planes are making continual four-hour runs to Lisbon.

"Ships sit in Bissau's harbors or anchor offshore waiting for the tons of military equipment that will be shipped out. . . .

"Eight passenger aircraft are shutting Portuguese troops from here to Lisbon. Two troop-transport ships capable of carrying almost 5,000 men are in the harbor."

Although the PAIGC soldiers had

nola's original scenario in that colony.

The Portuguese governor of Guinea-Bissau, Carlos Alberto Soares Fabião, admitted as early as June 29, in an interview with *New York Times* correspondent Henry Kamm, that a referendum was "technically impossible" because of the existence of two states. "Yes, of course the program [of the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement] talks of it," he said. "But we must think of the practical aspects. We must consider if it is possible or not."

The deterioration of morale within the colonial army further limited Lisbon's options. António de Almeida Santos, the Portuguese minister for interterritorial coordination, likewise admitted in a June 21 interview, according to Kamm, "that fraternization between the once-hostile armies had progressed so far that Portugal could not resume the war even if she wanted to."

The control by the PAIGC of most of the countryside, the recognition given the new state by more than eighty

countries since its proclamation in September 1973, and the lack of a large Portuguese settler population (there are only 2,260 whites among a population of about 600,000 Africans) were additional factors Spínola had to consider.

But while Lisbon had to retreat on mainland Guinea-Bissau, it is still trying to hang on to the Cape Verde Islands. Located 400 miles off the coast of Africa, the islands are of strategic importance to NATO, of which Portugal is a member. The islands also serve as a major air link between southern Africa and Europe.

On August 7, General Spínola chose a new governor for the islands, Henrique da Silva Horta. The general asserted that there was no war in the Cape Verdes and that the 250,000 Cape Verdians "can freely choose their own future" through a referendum.

Because of the economic, cultural, and historical ties between the islands and Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC leaders had demanded that Lisbon recognize their unity and grant both of

them independence at the same time. Many of the leaders of the PAIGC, including Amílcar Cabral, originally came from the Cape Verdes. The insistence of the PAIGC that the Cape Verdes and Guinea-Bissau be considered one entity was a stumbling block in the negotiations for Guinea-Bissau's independence.

Lisbon apparently enlisted the aid of the United Nations in pressuring the PAIGC to drop this demand. Following Waldheim's visit to Lisbon in early August, the UN sent Abdulrahim Farah, the under secretary-general for political affairs, to Africa for talks with leaders of the Organization of African Unity and of the various guerrilla groups in Lisbon's colonies.

Writing in the August 5 *Washington Post*, Miguel Acoca reported, "Farah clearly will be carrying a message about Cape Verde to PAIGC. . . ." The contents of the message were not made public, but three weeks later the PAIGC signed the independence accord that severed the Cape Verdes from Guinea-Bissau. □

While the War Drags On

Spínola Offers New Chains to African Colonies

By Tony Hodges

[The following article was written in late August. Since that time the Spínola regime has been compelled to make further concessions to the liberation movement in the African colonies, including an agreement to grant independence to Mozambique in June 1975.]

* * *

Lisbon

When the armed forces seized power in Portugal on April 25, their most urgent task from the capitalist point of view was to introduce more subtle forms of colonial domination in Africa. The wars in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique had dragged on for almost a decade and a half, tying up 150,000 troops, with no end in sight. Antiwar moods were spreading widely among the population and undermining the morale of the troops.

The wars had also become a tremendous drain on the country's meager resources and a political liability to Portuguese capitalism's long-term aim of integration into the Common Market. Military expenditure was accounting for up to 50 percent of the government budget. According to Mario Soares, foreign minister in the new government, the wars cost more than 150,000 million

escudos [about US\$6,000 million].

General Spínola, the Junta of National Salvation, and the provisional government have tried since the coup to find a way out of the crisis in the colonies—a solution that would not only remove the political and economic overhead cost of the wars but would also safeguard Portuguese and imperialist interests in Africa. Portugal's new rulers hope to be able to construct stable neocolonial regimes in the colonies.

At first Spínola tried to convince the liberation movements to agree to a cease-fire, lay down their arms, and participate in Portuguese-controlled referendums on the future of the colonies, without Portugal having to make any commitment to grant independence. Spínola and the junta calculated that if the liberation movements accepted this scheme, the colonial administrations would gain the time badly needed to cultivate a reliable neocolonial force to whom "independence" could one day be safely entrusted.

This scheme never really got off the ground. None of the liberation movements would go for it. They all insisted that the only solution was complete, immediate independence; and they refused to agree on a cease-

fire. The failure of the junta's ploy stood out in sharp relief after the breakdown of negotiations between Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique—Mozambique Liberation Front) and Soares in Lusaka, Zambia, in June.

'The Moment Has Come'

In a major speech on July 27, Spínola introduced a new twist to the junta's neocolonial plans, hoping once again to come to a deal with the liberation movements. "The moment has come," he announced, "for the President of the Republic to proclaim, once again and solemnly, the recognition of the right of the peoples of the Portuguese overseas territories to self-determination, including the immediate recognition of their right to independence."

This was the first time the junta gave verbal recognition to the right of the colonies to independence. But the "immediate recognition of their right to independence" did *not* mean their right to *immediate* independence. Spínola's speech was deliberately vague, designed primarily to maintain the illusions of the Portuguese people in the junta's program of "decolonization" and to encourage greater receptivity among the liberation movements to the junta's neocolonial plans. The speech committed the government to nothing.

The Spínola regime has made only one concrete concession: its announcement in Algiers on August 26 that it will recognize the independence of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on September 10 and withdraw the bulk of its occupation army from Guinea-Bissau by October 31.

This concession is no real loss in strategic terms for Portugal and has great political value in camouflaging the government's neocolonial plans in the more important territories of Angola, the Cape Verde Islands, and Mozambique. Unlike these colonies, Guinea-Bissau is an impoverished area with few significant economic or military benefits for Portugal or NATO. More than three-quarters of the country was controlled by the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde—African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands). And last September an independent republic was declared in the liberated zones, a republic that had won recognition from more than eighty governments before the April 25 coup.

The key aspects of the junta's colonial plans that have come to light since Spínola's deceptive discourse on the "right to independence" are the following: overtures to Frelimo to sign a cease-fire agreement and accept seats in a provisional government in Mozambique without immediate independence (overtures that up till now have been rejected by Frelimo); a declaration of the Junta of National Salvation that Angola will remain under Portuguese rule for at least two years, if not much longer; and refusal by the government to grant immediate independence to the Cape Verde Islands and allow their unification with Guinea-Bissau.

Frelimo's Conditions

Soares's talks with Frelimo in Lusaka in June broke

down because of the provisional government's unwillingness to make a clear commitment to independence for Mozambique. Frelimo refused to sign a cease-fire agreement, even though in some war zones local agreements were made between Frelimo and Portuguese commanders. The Lisbon daily *O Século* reported in its August 16 issue a statement made by Jorge Rebelo, head of Frelimo's Information Department, to *Notícias* of Lourenço Marques the previous day. "Our positions," explained Rebelo, "agreed on in Lusaka during the negotiations with the Portuguese government, are based on three fundamental demands: first, the recognition of the right of the Mozambican people to independence; second, the express recognition of Frelimo as the only legitimate representative of the people of Mozambique; and third, the transfer of powers that the Portuguese government still exercises in Mozambique."

O Século added: "Jorge Rebelo stated afterwards that a cease-fire agreement could only be reached after initiating the process of transferring powers. And that the cease-fire in existence in some regions of Mozambique is due to local agreements between forces of Frelimo and the Portuguese army, there being no agreement at the level of the executive committee (of Frelimo) and the Portuguese government."

On August 16, secret talks opened in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, between Frelimo and three ministers of the provisional government: Mario Soares; the minister for interterritorial coordination, Almeida Santos; and Melo Antunes, minister without portfolio, who was widely tipped to become head of a provisional government in Mozambique that would include Frelimo. The Portuguese delegation hoped to convince Frelimo to accept seats in this government and to sign an official cease-fire agreement, without Portugal having to grant independence.

Three days later the talks broke up. Antunes publicly announced that he would no longer be a candidate to head the Mozambican government and revealed that Frelimo had not "completely" agreed to their offer.

On August 28 Jorge Rebelo reiterated Frelimo's standpoint. In a message transmitted by Rádio Clube de Moçambique he stated that "it is necessary to make it clear to the people that contrary to a certain atmosphere created by the Portuguese authorities, there had not in fact been any official cease-fire agreement between Frelimo and the Portuguese government."

"The Portuguese government," Rebelo continued, "has still not accepted, and shows no signs of wanting to accept, the fundamental demands of the Mozambican people. Therefore the struggle must continue until these demands are accepted."

Samora Machel, president of Frelimo, announced in Dar es Salaam the same day, according to the Lisbon daily *A Capital*, that "Frelimo will continue its military and political struggle until the Portuguese accept its principles."

Sharpening Class Struggle in Mozambique

The breakdown of the junta's neocolonial proposals and the postponement of the formation of the coalition government have intensified the political and economic crisis in Mozambique. On August 21 a group of Mozam-

bican industrialists and businessmen sent an urgent telegram to Spínola demanding that he immediately appoint a provisional government to avoid social chaos. More than seventy ships have been paralyzed by a strike of thousands of dockers in Lourenço Marques. Guerrillas continue with daily regularity to blow up goods trains and passenger trains. Railway workers, public workers, gravediggers, garbage collectors, iron workers, and newspaper staffs have participated in the rash of strikes, particularly in Lourenço Marques. In Antonio Enes, on August 11 thousands of Africans, driven to despair by starvation wages, inflation, and scarcities of essential goods, rose in revolt, invading white and Asian farms and businesses.

Some right-wing bourgeois forces with sympathies for South Africa and Rhodesia are organizing to safeguard capitalist interests. Prominent among these are FICO ("I stay") and a sinister-sounding group that calls itself Dragões da Morte de Moçambique (Dragons of Death of Mozambique). Rumors of the recruitment of mercenaries in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Malawi abound. The most prominent right-wing group to have arisen is the PSDM (Partido Social Democrata de Moçambique — Social Democratic party of Mozambique), which controls three of Mozambique's most widely circulated newspapers.

But the Portuguese ruling class seems to see its interests best defended by trying to continue to come to some arrangement with Frelimo. Jorge Jardim, a millionaire Mozambican capitalist put it this way in an interview with the Lourenço Marques daily *A Tribuna* on August 17: "All the facts at our disposal lead me to have confidence—though not certainty—that a Nationalist government, which would be a government with a Frelimo majority, would not be an extreme left government, in the sense of a Marxist-Maoist government."

The urgent need for the Spínola regime to pull off a stable neocolonial solution in Mozambique is only too obvious. Mozambique borders South Africa, an advanced capitalist power whose industrial output is greater than that of the whole of the rest of Africa. U. S. and British investments in South Africa have been growing at record rates in recent years, attracted by cheap Black apartheid-controlled labor and high profits. The revolution in Mozambique, however, threatens to upset these profitable conditions. It threatens to inspire the South African masses into struggling for their liberation, adding a new impetus to the recent wave of strikes in South Africa.

A particularly important transmission belt for revolutionary ideas could be the 300,000 Mozambican contract workers employed in South Africa's gold mines. And there are other economic considerations: half of South Africa's seaborne trade is carried via the port of Lourenço Marques.

Angola—Crown Jewel of the Empire

Portuguese and Western interests are perhaps even more pressing in Angola. This country borders South African-controlled Namibia, a colony that has been rocked by strikes and demonstrations in the past year. The successful conclusion of the liberation struggle in Angola could be a great inspiration to the people of Namibia, sparking still more crises for the rulers of South Africa.

Besides, Angola is fabulously wealthy, a huge store of potential profits for imperialist monopolies. Producing 150,000 barrels of oil a day, mainly in Gulf Oil's Cabinda oil fields, Angola is the fourth largest oil producer in Africa. The Belgian oil monopoly Petrofina, the Compagnie Française des Pétroles (Total), Portugal's SACOR, and the American oil monopolies Texaco and Arco all have a stake.

Angola is rich in diamonds and iron and many other minerals, the German monopoly Krupp and the British Steel Corporation ranking high among the beneficiaries of this wealth.

On August 9 the Junta of National Salvation announced that it had no intention of getting out of Angola for well over two years. The junta demanded that the liberation movements lay down their arms and join a colonialist "provisional government of unity" with representatives of "all ethnic groups."

According to the junta's statement, "the provisional government will have the duty to achieve in a period of approximately two years the election of a constituent assembly," an assembly "that will have the responsibility of working out a constitution for the new state and of defining the links that it desires to have with Portugal." Portugal, the junta insisted, will only grant independence after the approval of the constitution, the dissolution of the constituent assembly, and the election of a legislative assembly.

Meanwhile the war continues. The August 14 issue of *A Capital* reported that the Portuguese army had killed ten guerrillas in renewed clashes with the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—National Front for the Liberation of Angola). *O Século* reported on August 16 that search and destroy missions were under way against FNLA guerrillas in the north following an announcement by Lieutenant-Colonel Ramos Gonçalves, commander of the Portuguese parachute forces. *A Capital* noted on August 20 that thirteen Portuguese soldiers had been killed in the war since the first of the month.

African workers in the *muceques* (suburbs) of Luanda have been the target of pogroms directed by extremist bands of white settlers. According to the July 27 *London Observer*, more than 300 were killed during violent clashes in the *muceques* in July, clashes quite reminiscent of Angola's past—in 1961 perhaps as many as 50,000 Africans were slaughtered during an indiscriminate wave of bloodletting by the settlers and the army.

More riots followed Spínola's July 27 speech. In some *muceques* Blacks took complete control and blocked entry to the gangs of armed whites massing on the access roads. The August 9 issue of *A Capital* reported that 40,000 Africans had fled Luanda for the countryside. A military communiqué reported by *O Século* on August 15 claimed that thirty had been killed and 200 wounded in the previous ten days in the *muceques*. Two days later *A Capital* put the death toll since Spínola's speech at thirty-seven.

Various extremist settler groups had a hand in these massacres: the Frente de Resistência Angolana (FRA—Angolan Resistance Front), the Resistência Unida de Luanda (RUL—United Resistance of Luanda) and the Exército de Salvação e Intervenção Nacional Angolana (ESINA—Army of Salvation and National Angolan

Intervention). A leader of the FRA openly admitted to the press on August 24 that his group was planning a coup. He compared the FRA to the Algerian OAS (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète—Secret Army Organization).

While extremist settler groups are organizing and launching pogrom-like attacks against African workers in the muceques, the major capitalist interests in Angola and Portugal are throwing their support behind Vice-Admiral Rosa Coutinho, president of the governing junta in Angola, who has the responsibility of constructing the provisional government of unity. Fernando Falcão, leader of the Frente de Unidade Angolana (FUA—United Front of Angola), an attempt to unite many of the neocolonial groupings that have sprung up in Luanda since April 25, is widely considered to be a key figure in Coutinho's planned government.

The August 16 issue of *A Capital* considered it probable that the FUA and Falcão would arrive at a common agreement with UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), a former guerrilla group that signed a cease-fire agreement with the Portuguese in June and that now appears to be receiving widespread financial and political backing from capitalist and settler groups. Coutinho's chances of convincing the MPLA (Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the FNLA to accept the junta's rejection of Angolan independence for more than two years and to participate in the "provisional government of unity" remain doubtful. Though both movements have indicated a willingness to negotiate with the Portuguese government, neither has so far accepted the junta's neocolonial plans.

Cape Verde Launching Pad

Spínola's neocolonial strategy embraces the Cape Verde Islands, too. These islands, tied historically and culturally to Guinea-Bissau, have been divided at Portuguese insistence from the new, independent republic. Why? Because the Cape Verdes, strategically located off the coast of Africa, could be an invaluable launching pad for imperialist intervention in continental Africa. NATO eyes are turned to the island of Sal with its airport facilities. Only last October the Portuguese Azores played a similar invaluable role for U.S. imperialism, when thousands of tons of war equipment were flown by the U.S. air force to Israel, using the Azores as a refueling stop.

In defense of the imperialist interests of the NATO powers, the right of the people of the Cape Verde Islands to immediate independence and unification with Guinea-Bissau has been trampled underfoot by the provisional government and the junta, despite all the "decolonization" rhetoric. These same imperialist interests have dictated the refusal to grant immediate independence to the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe.

Spínola's Judas Goats

The urgent task in Portugal today is to build a mass movement against the government's neocolonial policies, a movement that would demand immediate and unconditional independence of the colonies and the immediate and total withdrawal of Portuguese troops from Africa.

Instead of throwing their considerable influence and strength behind such a movement, the Communist and Socialist parties have done everything in their power to cover up for the crimes of the government in which they themselves participate. These parties have ridden roughshod over the right of the peoples of Africa to determine their own affairs. They act as servile apologists for the neocolonial plans of Portuguese capitalism and the imperialist powers.

Ever keen to bolster support for the provisional government and to maintain illusions in its decolonizing intentions, the CP welcomed Spínola's nebulous speech of July 27 on the right to independence. The July 29 issue of *Avante*, the CP paper, characterized Spínola's maneuver as a "historic decision that marks the irreversible drive toward the end of the colonial war."

Avante reported CP leader and government minister Alvaro Cunhal as saying at a rally the previous day in Evora that Spínola's speech marked a "historical decision and a historical moment that we can be certain will be remembered through the centuries."

Cunhal continued: "We can now affirm with absolute certainty that the end of the colonial war is in sight. The Communist party appeals to you, to the whole people, that in the coming days you demonstrate your support in all possible forms to the president of the republic for the decision that has been proclaimed."

On July 29 the Communist and Socialist parties assembled 20,000 people outside the presidential palace to "thank" Spínola for recognizing the right to independence.

A key question is whether the political forces to the left of the Communist and Socialist parties will be able to give leadership to a movement against the government's colonial policies and its continuation of the war. No real united-front movement that could reach out to the Portuguese workers and soldiers and mobilize them in action has yet emerged.

United Proletarian Front Needed

Several groups of the left, including the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League), a sympathizing group of the Fourth International, joined together in June to form the Comité para a Independência Imediata e Incondicional das Colónias (CIC). Its program calls on its supporters "to link the anticolonialist struggle as an integral part of the struggle for the socialist revolution in Portugal."

The Maoist groups have refused to work with the CIC and have organized another front, Unidade Anti-Colonial (UAC—Anti-Colonial Unity). The largest Maoist group, the ultra-sectarian Movimento Reorganizador do Partido do Proletariado (MRPP—Movement for Reorganization of the Proletarian party) refuses to work with any other groups at all and has an "anticolonial" front all its own.

It remains to be seen whether the sectarian obstacles can be overcome. What is needed is a united front based on a class-struggle program to press for immediate withdrawal of the troops and immediate independence. Only such a movement, able to mobilize masses of workers, soldiers, and students in action against the government, can stall Spínola's neocolonial plans. □

OAS Members Move to End Sanctions Against Cuba

By Dick Fidler

"The isolation of Cuba is slowly withering away, and the economic blockade of our country can't last much longer," Premier Fidel Castro told a mass rally of 20,000 Cubans in the city of Matanzas on July 26. "In view of the present conditions of international détente, it is increasingly obvious to all the world that it is an unfair, ridiculous, criminal, and untenable measure."

Argentina and Peru have recently renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba in violation of the sanctions voted at Washington's insistence by the Organization of American States in 1964. Mexico, an OAS member, never broke off diplomatic relations; nor did Canada, which is not in the OAS. The Caribbean states of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad-Tobago have also established diplomatic ties with Havana.

On August 22, Panama restored diplomatic relations, and reports indicate that Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela are preparing to follow suit in the near future. These developments logically pose questions about Washington's policy toward Cuba.

Only a few days after Castro's speech, two prominent Americans who recently visited Cuba offered their assessment of Washington's attempts to isolate and defeat the Cuban revolution.

Pat M. Holt, the staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met with Castro in July. He issued a report Aug. 2 terming the State Department's policy "a failure." The Cubans, he said, "are on the verge of making their system work—that is to say, of constructing a Socialist showcase in the Western hemisphere."

Arguing that "any initiative in improving relations will have to come from the United States," Holt proposed that Washington begin by ending its restrictions on U.S. citizens' visiting Cuba.

Holt's view is shared widely among Washington policy-makers. Last April, the influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to in-

troduce a resolution into Congress recommending an end to the embargo against Cuba and a resumption of diplomatic relations.

Frank Mankiewicz, director of Senator George McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign and now head of the National Executive Conference, also visited Cuba in July and filmed an interview with Castro. He returned with the message that the Cuban leaders were prepared to offer some unspecified "concessions" to Washington in return for diplomatic recognition.

But it was President Gerald Ford's first news conference, on August 28, that contributed most to current speculation about an impending resumption of relations between Washington and Havana. Ford did not rule out a possible change in U.S. policy toward Cuba, but simply asserted that "before we made any change, we would certainly act in concert with the other members of the Organization of American States."

That was a bit like a ventriloquist saying he would comply with the wishes of his dummy.

And that is how Ford's comment was interpreted in the U.S. capitalist press. A "rapprochement with Castro" is "now expected to be President Ford's first major foreign policy move," Jack Anderson wrote in his nationally syndicated column September 1. "Sources close to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger say he has wanted to normalize relations with Cuba ever since he began practicing detente diplomacy. It made no sense to him to seek friendship with Russia and China on the opposite side of the globe and remain hostile to Cuba only 90 miles from our shores."

Washington's 'Scenario'

A Washington dispatch by Laurence Stern in the August 30 *New York Post* reported that "a detailed diplomatic scenario has been prepared in full consultation with Secretary of State Kissinger" for ending the sanctions against Cuba "by November."

Stern said it had been discussed by

Kissinger and Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa in Washington August 29.

According to Stern, "the scenario envisioned the creation within the next few weeks of a 'commission of inquiry' of five OAS countries to study the issue." This commission would "find" that the Castro government is no longer actively promoting revolutionary movements throughout Latin America and would propose ending the sanctions.

On September 6, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela formally proposed to the OAS that it call an early meeting of foreign ministers to consider lifting the sanctions against Cuba. United Press International reported the same day that this meeting will probably be held November 11 in Ecuador.

A *New York Times* survey published September 7 found that fifteen of the twenty-three OAS members are "prepared to end the Cuba sanctions." This is only one short of the necessary two-thirds majority. Three other members—Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic—were reported to be "wavering," while only four governments (Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, and Bolivia) are "firm opponents" of lifting the sanctions.

Shift Began With Nixon

Although administration officials are trying to make the resumption of relations with Cuba appear as a Ford "initiative," it is clear that Washington has been moving toward a shift in its Cuba policy for some time.

The first formal agreement with Havana since the Eisenhower administration broke off diplomatic ties in January 1961 was the signing of the hijacking accord in February 1973. Earlier this year Washington officials looked the other way when subsidiaries of U.S. corporations in Argentina and Canada took advantage of loopholes in the Trading With the Enemy Act to sign multimillion dollar contracts with the Cubans for the sale of trucks, cars, and locomotives

in direct violation of the OAS embargo. The hemisphere foreign ministers' meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, in April agreed to Mexico's proposal to explore the possibility of inviting Cuba to their next meeting in Buenos Aires in March 1975.

Moreover, it has been obvious for some time that a majority of the capitalist class in the United States favors the resumption of trade and diplomatic ties with Cuba. The Spanish-language New York daily *El Diario* reported April 26 that 70 percent of 400 American firms polled privately in April by the National Association of Manufacturers declared they were opposed to continuing the ban on trade with Cuba. A government survey is said to show that 70 percent of American newspapers support a change in policy.

By quietly starting the move toward resumption of relations with Cuba, Nixon was simply recognizing reality—the growing disintegration of the OAS blockade of the first workers state in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, having opened diplomatic relations with Peking, how could he continue to justify the ostracism of Havana?

Why Nixon Hesitated

Why, then, did Nixon not follow up his détente with Peking and Moscow by extending it at once to Havana?

In part, Nixon's slowness was, as the April 22 *Washington Post* put it, "an attempt to offer symbolic reassurance to that part of his constituency which takes ideology seriously. It serves the national interest, according to the current definition, to trade with the Soviet Union and China but, in contrast, Cuba is a Communist country committed to world revolution. Therefore it is a manifest menace to international stability. . . ."

Or, as Fidel Castro explained in a recent broadcast over the Panama radio, referring to Cuban-born "plumbers" involved in the Watergate scandal: ". . . we must keep in mind that Nixon made the Cuban problem sort of personal, because Nixon was very closely connected to all the counterrevolutionary Mafia."

Another explanation for Washington's lack of haste is the divisions among its Latin American clients. In the May 6 *New York Times*, Washington correspondent David Binder

wrote that Kissinger "is strictly limiting further movement toward an eventual understanding with Cuba in the belief this would better suit the development of consensus in the hemisphere on the Cuban question."

Washington's delay has the added advantage of enabling some Latin American regimes to appear independent of U.S. imperialism by taking popular initiatives that don't actually conflict with State Department objec-



CASTRO

tives. Mexican President Luis Echeverría Alvarez, for example, is currently trying to establish himself as a hemispheric statesman. He recently concluded an extensive tour of Latin American capitals, advocating the creation of a regional business and trade bloc that could hold its own against imperialist competition in the world market. A key theme of his speeches was the necessity to "normalize" relations with Cuba. Echeverría plans to visit Cuba later this year.

Immediately after meeting with Ford and Kissinger in Washington on August 29, Mexican Foreign Minister Rabasa called publicly for "a positive attitude" by the United States toward moves to end the OAS sanctions.

These "independent" moves by Mexico, however, seemed to form part of a larger design, initiated in Washington. When Rabasa visited Cuba last

March, the *New York Times* correspondent in Mexico City reported that "Mr. Rabasa's trip—the first by a Mexican Foreign Minister to Havana since the Cuban revolution 15 years ago—has renewed speculation that Mexico is playing the role of mediator between Washington and Havana.

"Observers have noted that, since Mr. Rabasa is a close friend of Secretary of State Kissinger, it would not be surprising if he were carrying a private message from the Nixon Administration."

Havana's Assessment of Shift

The employment by various Latin American governments of a neighborly attitude toward Cuba to enhance an image of independence from Wall Street has not been hindered by the Cuban leaders. Havana's policy from the beginning of the Cuban revolution has been to maintain normal relations with all other governments. This was correct; but it has not been supplemented by the necessary political differentiation from "nationalist" capitalist regimes. In fact, the Cubans have even embellished some of them, the Allende regime in Chile being a case in point.

In his July 26 speech, for example, Fidel Castro characterized the countries that have opened or maintained relations with Cuba as countries "that refuse to obey imperialism."

"Today," he said, "the governments of this hemisphere are divided into a minority of lackeys that still blindly follow the dictates of imperialism and a majority of governments that are no longer willing to follow those dictates. . . . that are willing to practice an independent foreign policy. . . ."

Panama's decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba elicited the following assessment of its military-reformist government from *Granma*, the official organ of the Cuban Communist party: "Our people support the process of revolutionary transformations which were initiated in Panama in 1968. We watch with interest the efforts made by the Government of General Omar Torrijos to break the old socio-economic structure, his defense of natural resources, the break with the Yankee transnational concerns such as ITT and the banana companies, the organized participation of the masses in the destiny

of the country, and the work that is being carried out in the field of education and public health." (*Granma*, English-language edition, September 1.)

Kremlin Exerts Pressure

The Cuban leaders' tendency to adjust their *political* attitude toward bourgeois regimes in accordance with Cuba's diplomatic and commercial needs has been invoked by officials of OAS member-states as proof that the Cubans have given up encouraging socialist revolutions elsewhere in Latin America.

The main source of Havana's stance, however, is Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" policy and the *détente* with Washington. The Cubans conceded to the Kremlin in this because of their isolation and their need for economic aid from the Soviet Union.

Washington's trade embargo against Cuba, declared in February 1962, and its ban on the entry of Cuban products to the United States (in March 1962) were enormous blows to the Cuban revolution. These measures forced a drastic reorientation of Cuba's trade and provoked massive dislocations in its economy, already monstrously distorted by decades of imperialist exploitation. In view of the grave shortages that quickly developed, Havana had no choice but to appeal to the Soviet Union. Only massive Soviet aid enabled the Cuban economy to continue functioning.

Today, Cuba is heavily reliant on aid from the Soviet Union and other workers states. Soviet economic assistance alone amounts to more than \$1 million a day. According to Professor Leon Goure, director of Soviet studies at the Center for Advanced International Studies, Cuba's \$526 million trade with capitalist countries in 1972 accounted for only 25 percent of its total trade volume. Its total trade with Latin America that year amounted to less than \$10 million. This economic dependence on Moscow brings with it powerful pressures to conform to the Kremlin's line.

In addition, the Cubans have been affected by the failure of their "guerrilla strategy" to win revolutions in other parts of Latin America. The death of Che Guevara in Bolivia led them to cut down on active support of guerrilla movements. For a time

they showed willingness to see if Allende's popular-front experiment offered a more effective road, although Castro expressed doubts.

Today the Cuban press echoes the line of the pro-Moscow Communist parties, praising such governments as Velasco Alvarado's military regime in Peru and the Peronist regime in Argentina, which have a nationalist veneer.

During Soviet Communist party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Cuba earlier this year, Castro indicated his support of the major elements in the Kremlin's policy of *détente*. In his interview with Frank Mankiewicz, the full text of which has not yet been made public, the Cuban premier reaffirmed this position and "found words of praise for Secretary of State Kissinger and for the late President John F. Kennedy," according to the August 3 *New York Times*.

Noting this, the editors of the *New York Times* were moved to speculate September 1 that Cuba might even be induced to rejoin the Organization of American States, just as Peking, which had once denounced the United Nations, joined that body "once the door was opened."

The Cubans still seem to take a dim view of the OAS, however; in his July 26 speech, Castro described it as "a corpse in a complete state of decay."

If the Cuban leaders' adaptations to the Kremlin line reflect their failure to develop a consistent revolutionary strategy, the underlying objective causes lie in the isolation of the country and the siege it has suffered from the mightiest imperialist power in the world, located, moreover, only ninety miles from the island.

The Cubans' capacity to withstand the blows of the trade embargo — and, what's more, to achieve spectacular successes in reconstructing their economic and social life on the basis of a planned, nationalized economy — constitutes the fundamental factor behind the growing readiness of other hemispheric governments, led by Washington, to resume trade and diplomatic ties with Havana.

The resumption of trade relations between Cuba and other countries in the hemisphere can help ease the strains in the Cuban economy induced by Washington's hostile and punitive policy. The hard-won victory will be hailed by the oppressed everywhere. □

Left Peronist Deputy Machine-Gunned

Right-Wing Terror Escalates in Argentina

By Judy White

Right-wing goon squads, the police, and a fascist organization have been definitely linked with the series of terrorist attacks that occurred in Argentina in late July and August.

The most prominent victim of this escalating right-wing violence was Federal Deputy Rodolfo Ortega Peña. He was machine-gunned July 31 as he got out of a taxi in Buenos Aires. His wife was seriously injured in the attack.

The August 7 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *Noticias* reported having received a press release from the Alianza Anti-imperialista Argentina (AAA—Argentine Anti-imperialist Alliance, a fascist organization) taking credit for the murder. The AAA, which first surfaced publicly last November, promised to continue its terrorist actions.

Last November the AAA admitted that it organized the attack against Radical party Congressman Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen. It also sent death threats to Juventud Peronista (Peronist Youth) congressmen and said it had drawn up a "blacklist" that included the names of several other prominent liberals and leftists.

Now the AAA has announced that it has "resumed operations," and that the Ortega Peña assassination is to be followed by "the elimination of a long list of traitors in the pay of imperialism."

Ortega Peña's career as a left Peronist was detailed in the August 7 *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). He

was thirty-six years old, one of the new generation of radicals of middle-class origins that gained prominence in the 1960s. During the darkest days of the military dictatorship, as a lawyer and congressman he defended many political prisoners. He had recently begun legal action on behalf of twenty-seven metalworkers fired for union activities.

Avanzada Socialista said that Ortega Peña had drawn radical conclusions from the experience in Argentina since Perón's return. In his speech in June at the funeral of three members of the PST murdered by right-wing thugs at Pacheco, Ortega Peña broke with Perón, blaming the general for the wave of violence that had led to the murder of these militants.

However, Ortega Peña had not yet broken with the Peronist ideology when he was gunned down. He was for "workers and revolutionary Peronism" against Peronism from the top.

On the heels of Ortega Peña's murder came the August 1 bombing of the headquarters of the Lista Marrón (Brown Slate, the class-struggle opposition in the local metalworkers union) in Villa Constitución. Ortega Peña had provided legal assistance for this union grouping.

The following day, a group of workers at La Plata's Propulsora Iron and Steel Works were shot at while waiting in front of the factory for a bus. Another worker's car was fired upon, and two employees were beaten on their way home the same day. Propulsora has been a center of active opposition to the wage-freeze provisions of the antilabor Social Pact.

At the Tensa and Indiel metalworks, armed goons invaded the plants in an attempt to intimidate workers who were about to go on strike. A similar technique of intimidation was used at the Martín Amato Company in San Justo.

On August 6 and 7, four militants of the Juventud Peronista in La Plata were kidnapped and assassinated in a style reminiscent of the Pacheco murders. However, in this case the kidnapers identified themselves as police agents. Four days later the Buenos Aires headquarters of another Peronist youth organization was searched by federal police, on the pretext that arms had been stocked there. Thirty-nine prisoners were taken.

The impunity with which the right-wing terrorist forces operate was shown by the police attack on SMATA (Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor—Union of Automotive Mechanics and Allied Trades) workers in Córdoba August 26. Police were sent to the union headquarters to remove the elected union representatives and turn the local over to intervenors appointed by the union bureaucracy. When the workers learned of the police action, they marched to the union headquarters to defend it. They were then machine-gunned in broad daylight by uniformed police.

The PST has urged organization of a united-front defense. The idea is making headway despite obstacles.

One of the stumbling blocks has been the recurrence of ill-calculated guerrilla actions.

Eric Breuss, a top executive of the Acindar metalworks in Villa Constitución, was kidnapped July 23 by the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP—Revolutionary Army of the People). As ransom the ERP de-

manded 20 million pesos in cash plus improvements for the workers.

Avanzada Socialista pointed out:

"At that moment, the workers of Villa Constitución were fighting for a normalization of the status of their section of the UOM [Unión Obrera Metalúrgica—Metalworkers Union] and for a wage increase that they were on the verge of winning.

"Following the kidnapping, two things happened: first, the firm suspended negotiations for the raise. And then, various [rightist] 'commando groups' launched a campaign of threats and provocations against the leadership of the Lista Marrón, demanding that they secure the return of Breuss. At the same time, and with the same excuse, the police searched the homes of many workers and mistreated and insulted their families. . . .

"In this way, the kidnapping of Breuss, far from benefiting the workers of Villa Constitución, turned out to be a provocation whose beneficiaries are the bosses, the bureaucracy, and the fascists." □

Veteran Argentine Trotskyist

Rita Moreno

Rita Moreno, a twenty-nine-year veteran of the revolutionary movement in Argentina, died August 24 of lung cancer. She was forty-three years old.

Rita Moreno became a revolutionist at the age of fourteen; she was an apprentice typesetter at the time. She was a founding member of the Grupo Obrero Marxista (GOM—Marxist Workers Group), a predecessor of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing group of the Fourth International). In 1944 she participated in an important strike in the meat industry, in which the GOM was involved.

The GOM recruited some of the leaders of the strike, giving it a viable nucleus of cadres. But they were only a small handful, swimming against the stream. Their principled opposition to Peronist populism and their efforts to organize a Leninist combat party met with hostility and slander among Stalinist-controlled organizations of the Argentine working class.

These pressures were felt by Rita Moreno and for a time she limited



RITA MORENO

Intercontinental Press

her activity to that of an active trade-union militant. However, at all times she aided the Trotskyist party. In difficult crises during the long years of illegality, she dedicated all her energies to its struggle.

Rita Moreno remained a convinced Trotskyist to the end. This was reflected in something she said shortly before her death to her comrade and companion of twenty-nine years, Nahuel Moreno:

"If I could begin life all over again, I would follow the same path. Except I would try to be more of a Leninist and Trotskyist, and I would fight harder for the party than ever."

Comrades of Rita Moreno from eleven countries sent messages to the PST, paying tribute to her work. Her comrades in Argentina held a memorial meeting and mass funeral march in Buenos Aires. She will be sorely missed. □

DOCUMENTS

Stand of Greek Students on Cyprus Issue and the Battle for Democracy in Greece

[The following article and resolution were published in the August 31 issue of *Ergatike Pale*, a weekly paper published in Athens that reflects the viewpoint of the Greek Trotskyists. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Using the vacations as their pretext, the reformist student organizations Regas Feraios [the group controlled by the Bureau of the Interior faction of the Communist party] and the Anti-Ethnike Foitetike Enosis tes Ellados [Provisional National Student Union of Greece, the group influenced by the Moscow loyalist faction of the CP] have organized tight little meetings in private homes to establish a committee of "recommended" students in every school. The next step was for Tsatsos [the deputy minister of education] to recognize these committees.

The bureaucratic tactic did not produce the hoped-for result. Students with a respect for democratic procedures proposed instead that general assemblies be held to elect the provisional committees in each school. Under the pressure of these students, who combined their proposals in a document signed by fifty-six persons, Tsatsos did not dare appoint the "reliable ones."

However, "the fox always has another hole," as the proverb goes. Following a meeting of the SEKF [Syn-

tonistike Epitrope Kyprion Foiteton — Cypriote Student Coordinating Committee], the Regas Feraios and the Anti-EFEE set up the FEAKE [Foitetike Epitrope Allelengos ston Kypriako Agona — Student Committee for Solidarity with the Cypriote Struggle]. The FEAKE is collecting clothes and money. These really are needed by the Greek Cypriote refugees. But at a time when one-third of the island is under Turkish rule and in the other two-thirds there is junta-like rule and the EOKA-B is wreaking havoc, what Cyprus needs most of all from the Greek people is political aid.

On August 27, two weeks after the founding of the FEAKE, there was a general assembly of the student movement to organize political aid for the Cypriote people. It was held after 702 students had signed a request for use of the auditorium. The Regas and the Anti-EFEE opposed this project, refusing to sign the petition. Individual members of the Anti-EFEE who signed it because they thought it was correct were subjected to harsh criticism.

The assembly was held last Tuesday [August 27]. There was broad student participation (800 to 1,000 persons). The Regas and the Anti-EFEE took part, but with the aim of sabotaging it, since the predominant force in it was a kind of united front of the revolutionary left. At the start, the reformists questioned whether the meeting was really a general assembly of the student movement. The answer they were given was that the assembly did

not represent the entire student population but only those students participating and that it was called a general assembly of the student movement ["pamfoitetike"] because it included representatives of all the schools (as distinct from the assemblies in the separate disciplines).

The speakers condemned any attempt by these two organizations to claim to speak unilaterally in the name of the students and challenged Tsatsos's right to appoint any committee, whether provisional or permanent. They condemned the Stalinist reformist line of the International Union of Students, which recognizes the Anti-EFEE as the only representative of the student movement in an attempt to set itself over the movement bureaucratically. The speakers maintained that the real representatives of the students had to be elected by assemblies and could not be appointed by anyone. They condemned the FEAKE for its failure in the two weeks since it was formed to organize a single mass mobilization in support of the Cypriote people and for excluding in practice antidictatorial organizations (the PPSP).

A representative of the AASPE [Antifasistike Anti-imperialistike Spoudastike Parataxe — Antifascist, Anti-Imperialist Student Group] (who was present at the founding meeting of the FEAKE) stressed that the Anti-EFEE and the Regas were fighting over who could use the name of the organization and who got the posts.

A Cypriote student complained that the SEKF (which took the lead in the formation of the FEAKE) excluded progressive elements and collaborated with Grivasites.

Despite a walkout by the reformists, the assembly continued until late in the evening and approved the following resolution:

Resolution of the Assembly

The students gathered here today, August 27, 1974, in the law school, who have come from all the AEI in the country, approved the following positions:

1. The holding of this assembly demonstrates our determination to continue on the only course we consider correct for the student movement — the road of democratic procedures and mass assemblies.

2. We see holding such assemblies

in every school and making them more and more representative as the only proper way to elect provisional committees leading up to an all-inclusive general assembly.

3. We oppose all attempts to demobilize, split, or substitute for the student movement, and declare that only through the mobilization of the students in a democratic framework can our movement achieve a really representative orientation.

4. We condemn American imperialism, NATO, and the Greek junta as the main culprits responsible for the bloodbath in Cyprus, and we demand:

The immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from the island and a real withdrawal of Greece from NATO (expulsion of the foreign bases, abrogation of the bilateral treaties, and nationalization of American interests).

5. We condemn all attempts to represent the anti-imperialist struggle of the Cypriote people as a struggle against the Turkish people. We think the Turkish people are waging a hard fight against imperialism and its Turkish lackeys and we call for a common anti-imperialist struggle by the Cypriote, Greek, and Turkish peoples.

6. Elimination of the dictatorship on the island and removal of the fascist putschists of the national guard.

7. We salute the progressive forces in every country that support the struggle of the Cypriote people.

8. We hail the determination of the Cypriotes to continue their struggle by all means possible and to initiate revolutionary action by the popular forces, because we believe that freedom and national independence are not granted in meetings or guaranteed by international conventions and armies but won arms in hand.

9. Believing that the Cypriote struggle is directly bound up with the anti-imperialist struggle in our country, we demand:

a. The immediate abolition of martial law and the restoration of freedom of expression and assembly for the Greek people as well as the right to demonstrate.

b. The abolition of the reactionary laws that preceded the junta as well as the junta's own laws and decrees (590, 375, etc.).

c. Immediate introduction of democratic procedures so that real representatives can come to the fore in all trade-union organizations (workers', professionals', craft, and student as-

sociations). We call on all the working people to mobilize along with us and to work to win their inalienable rights.

d. We condemn all attempts to maintain the fascist institutions, mechanisms, and methods of oppression, as well as every attempt to set up a police state. We demand a deepgoing purge of the state machine, which remains untouched, and exemplary punishment of all those who collaborated with the dictatorship.

For the universities in particular, we demand immediate student control of the process of rooting out fascism in the AEI, which means:

— Abolition of the student branch of the secret police.

— Abrogation of the antistudent decrees (93, 720, 1347, etc.).

— Guaranteed inviolability of university grounds.

— Purging professors and assistants who were appointed by, or worked with, the junta.

10. We condemn the barbarism of the police against the demonstrators on Sunday, August 18, and point out the danger that arises from the systematic campaign of insinuations based

on stories about provocateurs and their activities. This rumor-mongering fits into the plans of the reactionaries, whose aim is to stop popular demonstrations in order to prevent the Greek people from pressing in a militant way to achieve their vital interests.

11. On the question of support for the struggle of the Cypriote people, this assembly does not recognize the FEAK as a representative body. That organization was formed without the participation of the mass of students, and among its members are persons falsely claiming to be elected student leaders. We believe that in order to achieve a united political expression of our struggle in solidarity with the Cypriote people, we must form a body representative of all the schools based on elected and revocable provisional committees. These committees must be elected by assemblies in the separate disciplines and committed to a concrete program of struggle.

12. This assembly took a collection and entrusted the vice-chairman with delivering 6,260 drachmas [approximately US\$225] that was collected to the Syntonistike Epitrope Kyprion Foiteton. □

Demand Arrest of Agents of Greek Junta

[The following resolution proposed by the Sozialistike Foitetike Parataxe (Socialist Student Group) was published in the August 31 issue of *Ergatike Pale*. It was not specified whether it was presented as a counter-motion in the August 27 general assembly described in an accompanying article, "Stand of Greek Students on Cyprus Issue and the Battle for Democracy in Greece." The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

We demand:

1. The arrest of those who murdered students at the Polytechnic [the center of the mass demonstrations in November 1973], of the slaughterers of the Cypriote people, of the provocateurs, and of all those who bear the guilt for the past seven years.

2. That these persons be turned over to people's courts.

3. That all persecution of student activists cease (e.g., the incidents of

Sunday, August 18). An amnesty for our brothers sentenced in Larissa. We did not shed our blood just to change the persons arresting us but to put an immediate end to all forms of oppression.

4. Complete independence of the student organizations from the state. No appointments, free elections!

We denounce:

1. The suspicious maneuvers of the Anti-EFEE and the Regas and their sellout of the student movement in the corridors of the ministries.

2. The campaign of slander by these organizations and the entire opportunist left against our movement under the pretext that provocateurs have been at work in the most recent demonstrations.

3. The combined attack of police and provocateurs on the demonstration of August 18.

We call on the Anti-EFEE, the Regas, and all other left organizations to take up the fight now, along with the mass of students, for the demands listed above. □

Perón's Real Heirs

[The following editorial, signed by Juan Carlos Coral, appeared in the August 20 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing group in Argentina of the Fourth International). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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For long weeks the specter of a political crisis haunted the capitol building. By any reckoning, Perón's heiress was unable to exorcise the interminable conflicts and traps that Perón himself had managed to overcome only by marshaling all his resources, including the dramatic threat to resign. Social Pact or uncontrolled inflation; Gelbard or López Rega [cabinet ministers representing different sectors of the bourgeoisie]; Miguel or Romero [trade-union bureaucrats vying for control of the national union federation]; state-owned or privately owned television; a fascist or a liberal university; the cattlemen or the industrialists; the orthodox Peronists, those who want to involve other political forces, the youth, the Montoneros [a Peronist guerrilla group], the loyal followers, or those who want to "return to the law of the jungle."

This infinite round of alternatives—facets of the critical situation—spun dizzily within an obvious power vacuum. A vacuum that was not accidental or unexpected, but a vacuum that was created by Perón himself in sustaining a sprawling, all-inclusive party, a heterogeneous and mediocre cabinet, and a successor whose only authority flowed from the confidence of her husband and the almost ritual respect of the Peronists. This bleak reality, we insist, was no accident. It had been anticipated by Perón himself when, shortly before his death, he stated repeatedly that his only heir would be the people. Coming from him, this abstract statement meant something like, "After me, the deluge."

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With the reorganization of the cabinet, this stage of grave uncertainty came to an end. The anxious floundering, the violent disputes over filling the gap left by the death of the chief, have reached a clear outcome. While the formal mechanisms of the constitution resulted in the designation of a new president, the real power struggles provided the name of the real heir—the armed forces. The new Bonaparte, the new arbiter capable of putting each wing of the ruling alliance of social forces into place, is not Isabel, nor the youth, nor the unions, nor the bosses, nor a combination of political parties, but the armed forces; that is, the armed guard of the capitalist system. The commanders in chief, believed by some innocents to have been buried under the mountain of seven million votes for Perón in the last election, have emerged intact—graphic evidence of the continuity of the repressive apparatus that we have tirelessly exposed.

It is not accidental that the slow and difficult reorgani-

zation of the cabinet was preceded by the speech by the commander of the air force. Nor is it a simple coincidence that it was the senior of the three commanders who spoke, coming forward as the representative of the armed forces as a whole. Nor is it fortuitous that a participant in the ceremony was Brigadier Rey, one of the commanders under the military dictatorship whom the Peronists boasted of having buried. Finally, the speech by Fautario [commander of the air force] had all the characteristics of a true "presidential message." He had the audacity to formulate in twelve points the "National Model" proclaimed by Perón, which the Peronists are still studying.

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On this very editorial page a few days after the death of Perón we forecast what would happen. Without wasting time, we said, the armed forces will move into the power vacuum that has just been created. "They will attempt to unite the various sectors of the bourgeoisie to ward off the uncertainty that is beginning to undermine the bases of the Great Accord of the bosses."

This objective underlies every word of Brigadier Fautario's speech and every measure taken by the government recently. To the cattlemen—who were threatening to pull out of the official accord—they granted an increase in the price of meat along with a reduction in the emergency tax. To the imperialists, who were disturbed by certain nationalist statements, they gave the gift of a projected law on oil guaranteeing their past and future holdings. To the "democratic" sectors worried over the fascist advance, they conceded an order closing down *Primicia Argentina* and they induced Abras [right-wing Peronist] to resign. To the orthodox Peronists, fearful of "Marxist infiltration of the university," they offered the ouster of Taiana [minister of education supported by the Montoneros and Peronist Youth]. And, as a final demonstration of "harmony," they found formulas making it possible for Gelbard and López Rega, the two poles in a warring cabinet, to coexist. With authority reestablished and the accord safeguarded, the dialogue with all political parties was resumed after Fautario's speech and plans for recasting the constitution next year were ratified.

By restoring order in this way, the bourgeoisie has succeeded in momentarily warding off the crisis. But the events also helped reveal the erosion of Peronism. Both the reorganization of the cabinet and the designation of intravenors were based on figures of "historic Peronism." The resurrection of Ivanissevich, the designation of Rocamora and Cafiero, the confirmation of Benitez, show the atrophy of Peronism. Not only were the younger generation branded as "stupid and beardless" [reference to Perón's May Day attack on the left-wing of his youth movement], but the so-called intermediary generation was brushed aside despite Licastro's efforts to use it to bridge "the generation gap." This

symptom of exhaustion or at least of stagnation, common to all the capitalist parties in Argentina, is the reflection in the leadership of the obsolescence of the various organizations.

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As a counterbalance to the crisis developing among ruling circles, the country witnessed a spectacular reappearance of guerrilla warfare much broader in scope than anything seen up to now. And once again the immediate results of such rebel actions have been exactly the opposite of what the organizers wanted. Faced with the threat of guerrilla warfare, all the internal disputes of the bourgeoisie were reduced to secondary importance. And at the same time the outbreak reinforced the leading role of the armed forces as the only organization capable of successfully handling encounters with irregular forces of such size.

That is the conclusion drawn by the press of the two most aggressive military dictatorships on the continent—Chile and Brazil. *O Globo* says that the guerrilla attack has given the armed forces "the political and moral basis that they lacked for a large-scale counterattack," adding that the Peronists delegated to them the "task of national salvation." *El Mercurio* of Santiago maintains that it is a "fortunate" coincidence that the armed forces have remained on the fringe of events, because now they can be converted into a great reserve force against terrorism and become "the only effective support for Mrs. Perón." Objectively, then, the latest guerrilla actions have helped decisively to cement the battered ruling alliance of social forces and have given a great stimulus to the armed forces' resuming the exercise of power at the top level.

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In short, during the past week calm has succeeded the political storm that began July 1. Forces have been realigned. Equilibrium has been reestablished. But of course this is the uneasy calm of a temporary recovery, of an unstable and precarious equilibrium. None of the structural causes, none of the problems underlying the general crisis of capitalism have been, nor can they be, resolved by the government.

The uncontrollable drive of inflation, the crisis of the meat export trade, the shortages of raw materials in many industries, the exchange rate of 1,800 pesos to the dollar, the rise in bank-interest rates, the progressive abandonment of price ceilings, the absolute impossibility of keeping wages frozen—constitute infallible signs of coming explosions, of new crises. The squabbles among the sectors of the bosses' accord have not been resolved but only postponed with difficulty.

But what will really make all the maneuvers at the top useless, what will make all the juggling of the bourgeoisie ineffectual in maintaining the equilibrium, will be the appearance in the political arena of the main protagonist—the working class. It is assimilating the latest experiences; it is maturing as the result of the latest political swindles at its expense. Actions of sectors as dissimilar as mechanics, sugarcane workers, and workers in the fishing industry are the precursors of the next upsurge. Neither the impatience of the guerrillas nor the swamp of popular frontism offer a solution. This will be achieved through mass mobilizations led by a workers party that sets objectives and leads the fight. Then the working class will be able to tip the scales definitively. Then we will find ourselves on the threshold of power, on the eve of socialism. □

For United Action Against Repression in Portugal

[The following statement was issued August 9 by the Executive Committee of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (Internationalist Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). It was published in the August 16 issue of the LCI's paper, *Luta Proletária*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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1. The Junta de Salvação Nacional's¹ arbitrary suspension of the paper *Luta Popular* for an indefinite period; followed by a ban on a demonstration by the MRPP² in defense of this

1. Junta of National Salvation.

2. Movimento Reorganizador do Partido do Proletariado—Movement for the

paper and the enforcement of this ban by the COPCON³ with a "violent" repression involving a veritable "man-hunt" for "leftists," as well as imprisonment of a number of persons who presumably intended to take part in the protest, are events that will have rather far-reaching repercussions on a national scale. No working-class political organization can fail to take a clear public stand on these developments.

All these things are very grave because we are witnessing at the moment an increasing number of provocative acts by the right. These are designed to win the support of strata of the middle class. By triggering the anti-

Reorganization of the Proletarian party.

3. Comando Operacional do Continente—Continental Operational Command.

Communist reflexes of these layers, the rightists hope to create a real "party of fear." The hue and cry about the "Communist menace," "coups d'etat," "attempts to seize power," "anarchy," "generalized disobedience," the campaigns by the international press linked to high finance that spread the most fantastic rumors with impunity, are now being followed up by direct provocations (signing up people in the churches in a provocative way) and physical violence (the attack in the town of Loures). The resumption of activity by the extreme right comes simultaneously with the installation of a strong government including leading officers in the Movimento das Forças Armadas [Armed Forces Movement].

The inclusion of these officers was hailed by the governing parties, in particular the Communist and Socialist parties, as yet another victory

for the progressive forces. This is a strange kind of victory! Less than a week later, three daily papers had been suspended; and this measure was lifted only after vigorous protests and a show of active solidarity by the journalists, who refused to let most of the other dailies appear. The strike laws in preparation have provoked criticism from the Intersindical itself [the CP-dominated trade-union federation structure], which a few days before had called for a demonstration of support for the provisional government. And then there was the August 7 "spectacular" in Lisbon. Deploying military and police forces of such strength in Rossio [the main square of the city] could have only one purpose—to create a climate of disorder and "ideological aggression," to create the impression of a "leftist" danger that would justify all the repressive measures. This is the standard operating procedure followed by all police forces: to create a climate to justify their intervention. Moreover, if the repression fell on the MRPP, it was not by chance. For some time the bourgeoisie has been carrying on a campaign to isolate this organization, spreading rumors that the MRPP is responsible for everything that has happened. And this job was facilitated by the blind sectarianism of the MRPP itself.

The differences between the MRPP and the Liga Comunista Internacionalista are profound. But this does not stand in the way of our supporting it today against capitalist repression, since we realize that this is not only an attack against the MRPP but an attempt to create a climate favorable to repression of the workers movement in general and the revolutionary left in particular. For, in reality, those responsible for the real disorders, those who have resorted to all the violence—including physical attacks—to restore a regime of terror against the working class and the toiling masses, remain at liberty.

2. The government, the Junta de Salvação Nacional, and the general staff of the armed forces knew how to pick the moment to act. Spínola's statement on recognizing the colonies' right to independence created illusions in the middle classes and in certain sectors of the working class as well about the character of the present government, illusions that increased its prestige and its margin for maneuver.

This factor was compounded by the long process of demobilization in the workers movement and the isolation of the militant workers struggles, a decline that has coincided with the resumption of activity by rightist groups.

The so-called Communist and Socialist parties provided a cover for these actions of the government, dividing the working class and even promoting mobilizations that have legitimized the junta's repressive measures in the eyes of the masses.

In this way the CP and the SP gave a blank check to the Movimento das Forças Armadas, building up its prestige and glorifying it constantly without making the slightest criticism. As pressure was mounted to beat down the workers' strikes and isolate them, the SP washed its hands like Pontius Pilate, issuing a communiqué designed to quiet any possible criticism by its most radical activists. And the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party] took the lead in the repression, whipping up the population against the struggles of the workers and against the revolutionists.

3. It is becoming easy to see now who the government, the Junta de Salvação Nacional, and the Movimento das Forças Armadas really serve. It is becoming easy now to understand their insistence on maintaining order at any cost, that is, the conditions for the preservation of capitalist exploitation, while the most faithful servants of this order—the members of the PIDE [Policia Internacional para a Defesa do Estado—International Police for the Defense of the State, the political police] and the Legião Portuguesa [Portuguese Legion, the Salazarist paramilitary organization] are beginning to be released!

The fall and winter are going to be difficult. The bourgeoisie needs to break all the centers of workers resistance and revolutionary agitation. This is the only way it can tame the working class and get the workers to accept the coming price increases, layoffs, and speedup in "peace" and "order." And such increased exploitation is the only way open to the bourgeoisie to bring a distorted and vulnerable economy into adjustment in face of international competition.

4. The workers have the capacity to respond to the capitalist offensive, and they will be compelled to respond.

This is all the more true inasmuch as the first wave of strikes gave many sections of the working class some experience in struggle and organization.

The task of revolutionists is to give impetus to building up the structures for an organized response by the class, always fighting against attempts by the bourgeoisie to reabsorb the workers' most important gains.

This means defending and promoting independent organizations of the class in all spheres, in the unions, in the factory struggles, and in the neighborhoods. It means always striving to build in all areas of work broad organizations grouping the maximum possible number of fighters around the most urgent demands of the proletariat and the toiling masses.

Thus, facing a step-up in capitalist repression, the real foundation of bourgeois democracy, it is essential for the workers to defend intransigently the *unrestricted right to meet and to organize in trade-union and political formations, the right to petition, to demonstrate, and to publish a working-class press.*

The LCI is appealing now to all workers and toilers, to all the revolutionary organizations, to organize the broadest possible front to struggle to defend the democratic rights of the working people against capitalist repression and against the attacks of reactionary gangs. We are calling immediately and in all struggles for *organizing workers self-defense*, because you don't get democratic rights by begging for them but by exercising them. But in order to do this, they have to be defended.

5. As for the leaderships of the PCP and the SP, which in contradiction to the interests of the workers are committed to the most shameless kind of class collaboration, we give them solemn warning. Don't think that you can remain in the comfortable position of helping to isolate the militant sections of the working class and the revolutionary organizations. When you have accomplished the role the bourgeoisie has assigned you, it will drop you from the government, after it has forced you to back down more day by day, decree by decree, on all questions!

For the unrestricted right to meet, to organize politically and in trade

unions, to strike, to demonstrate, to publish a working-class press!

Organize self-defense for the struggles!

Immediate release of all imprisoned revolutionists!

Lift the suspension of Luta Popular! □

Todos Conocemos al Multimillonario Rockefeller

Pero ¿Quién Diablos es Ford?

Por Ernest Harsch

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "But Who the Hell Is Ford?", que apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 9 de septiembre de 1974].

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El equipo de gobierno de la Casa Blanca ha sido renovado. Uno de sus miembros es el multimillonario Nelson Rockefeller, figura clave entre las sesenta familias que controlan Estados Unidos.

El otro miembro es un personaje obscuro. Antes de ser elegido por Nixon en octubre de 1973 para reemplazar a Spiro Agnew como vicepresidente, Gerald Rudolph Ford era poco conocido, aún en los Estados Unidos. Fue el hecho de que Ford no tenía una imagen pública claramente definida lo que hizo que la clase dominante lo viera como una buena alternativa frente a Agnew, el pillo que tuvo que ser echado, y frente a Nixon, el pillo que debía ser echado a causa del escándalo de Watergate. Como había sido planeado, una enorme campaña publicitaria ha convertido a Ford en "Mr. Limpio".

La conversión de Ford, el obscuro peón político, en una plausible alternativa frente a Nixon fue planeada detalladamente con meses de anterioridad.

El esquema para reemplazar a Nixon puede vislumbrarse en un artículo de primera página que apareció el 26 de agosto en el *New York Times*. "Los planes de transición", escribía el corresponsal James M. Naughton, "fueron iniciados por el mejor amigo del Sr. Ford, Philip W. Buchen, quien a principios de mayo llegó a la conclusión de que los acontecimientos que se venían desencadenando, obligarían inevitablemente a poner fin a la administración del tri-

gésimo séptimo presidente y a comenzar apresuradamente la del trigésimo octavo".

Buchen, que había sido socio legal de Ford en Grand Rapids, Michigan, reunió un "equipo de transición" que elaboró las medidas a ser tomadas. En el equipo estaban: Clay T. Whitehead, consejero de Nixon en telecomunicaciones, y otras tres personas cuyos nombres se desconocen, una de las cuales era un demócrata. Terminaron el primer borrador del guión en junio en la casa de William G. Whyte, un vicepresidente de la United States Steel Corporation y buen amigo de Ford.

El 5 de agosto, Nixon entregó las transcripciones de sus conversaciones del 23 de junio de 1972 sobre Watergate, que demostraban que él había sido uno de los primeros participantes en los intentos de encubrimiento.

El 7 de agosto, el "equipo de transición" se reunió desde las 5 p.m. hasta la media noche para arreglar los detalles finales de los primeros días del gobierno de Ford. Además de Buchen, Whitehead y Whyte, asistieron a la reunión William Scranton, exgobernador de Pennsylvania; Robert Griffin, senador por Michigan; John Byrnes, ex-diputado por Wisconsin y Bryce N. Harlow de la Procter and Gamble Company.

Decidieron que el Jefe de la Suprema Corte de Justicia Warren E. Burger, presidiría la inauguración. Dieron a un redactor la tarea de elaborar el borrador del primer discurso de Ford al público norteamericano. Decidieron echar al secretario de prensa de la Casa Blanca, Ronald Ziegler, y nombrar en su lugar a J.F. terHorst. Asignaron un equipo especial para que manejara a Ford en sus primeros días de gobierno. Este equipo estaba encabezado por Scranton

y Donald Rumsfield, representante de los Estados Unidos en la NATO.

"Y había acuerdo general", continuaba Naughton, "en que el Sr. Nixon no debería estar presente cuando el Sr. Ford presentara juramento; la ausencia del presidente saliente significaría un limpio comienzo para el sucesor designado".

Es así como se prefabricó con anterioridad el proceso de presentar la mejor imagen posible del nuevo presidente. Horas después de la renuncia de Nixon y de la inauguración del gobierno de Ford el 9 de agosto, los medios de difusión capitalistas se armaron de ingenio y se dieron a la tarea de pintar a Ford como el hombre "del pueblo", "popular" y "con los pies en la tierra" — un verdadero "chico bueno".

El *Daily News* de Nueva York acometió con gusto la tarea de vendar los ojos al público. "A Ford le queda bien el papel", declaraba el 9 de agosto. "La industria cinematográfica lo hubiera utilizado para representar el papel del muchacho bueno que se hace cargo de la residencia presidencial, después que los pillos fueron echados de ella. A los 61 años, él es el 'Marcelino Pan y Vino' de los Estados Unidos".

El *Wall Street Journal* en su editorial del 12 de agosto utilizaba el mismo tono con igual exactitud: "Modesto. Serio. De lenguaje sencillo. Diligente, con los hábitos de un legislador de larga experiencia, dispuesto a considerar como amigos a hombres de todos los puntos de vista políticos".

El *New York Times* hizo lo propio. "En lenguaje americano común", decía el *Times* en su editorial del 18 de agosto, "el presidente Ford presentó al Congreso y a la nación las tres tesis que aparentemente caracterizarán a su gobierno: sencillez personal, filosofía conservadora y actitud abierta ante las diferentes personas y las diferentes ideas.

"El nuevo presidente es directo, realista y de lenguaje sencillo. El país, cansado de duplicidad y demagogia, encuentra en su modo de ser franco y abierto una fuente de gran alivio. Ya ha ayudado a los norteamericanos a reconquistar el sentido de sí mismos como pueblo que gusta del trato y del hablar sencillos".

El mismo Ford hizo todo lo que pudo para ayudar a realizar el tra-

bajo de relaciones públicas. En una sesión conjunta del Congreso que se llevó a cabo el 12 de agosto, leyó un discurso prefabricado que incluía tales joyas del arte de escribir discursos para otros como las siguientes:

"Yo soy el hombre del pueblo, a quien ustedes representan, y acepté y comencé el nuevo y solemne deber que se me ha confiado con la promesa de servir a todo el pueblo y de hacer todo lo que pueda por los Estados Unidos.

"Cuando digo todo el pueblo, eso es exactamente lo que quiero decir.

"Dentro de los límites de mi fuerza y habilidad, seré el presidente de los americanos negros, cafés, rojos y blancos; de viejos y jóvenes; de las mujeres feministas y de los hombres machistas y de todos los demás que estamos entre ellos; de los pobres y de los ricos; de los hijos nativos y de los nuevos refugiados; de los que trabajan en los talleres, en las oficinas, en las minas o en los campos; y de los cristianos, judíos, musulmanes, budistas y ateos, si realmente quedan ateos después de todo lo que hemos pasado".

En medio de este mar de sensiblerías, destinado a convertir al más ordinario peón de la política capitalista en el opuesto total de Nixon o Agnew, podemos encontrar algunos artículos que nos indican el verdadero cuadro de la situación.

La edición del 17 de agosto del *Business Week*, refiriéndose a la afirmación de Ford de que él era el "hombre del pueblo", destacó correctamente: "Sin embargo, no hay ningún obrero en el restringido círculo personal del nuevo presidente. Sus asesores más cercanos son en su mayoría sagaces veteranos de las guerras políticas. Y sus amigos son, en número sorprendentemente grande, ejecutivos con éxito de compañías con sede en Washington y que comparten la pasión de Ford por hablar sin ambigüedades y por el golf.

En un artículo escrito por Michael C. Jensen publicado en el *New York Times* el 19 de agosto se hacía una lista de algunos de los "amigos" de Ford: Rodney W. Markley Jr., que es el principal encargado de conseguir mayores concesiones para la Ford Motor Company con los miembros del gobierno en Washington; Bryce Harlow, quien jugó un papel princi-

pal en la redacción de las últimas tres plataformas del partido republicano y fue un ayudante cercano del presidente Eisenhower; William Whyte de la United States Steel; Leon Parma, un ejecutivo de Teledyne, Inc.; Stark Ritchie, consejero general en jefe del American Petroleum Institute y Kimberley Hallamore, quien se encarga de conseguir mayores concesiones para la Lear Siegler, Inc. con los miembros del gobierno en Washington. Además, como anotaba Hallamore, "Este señor tiene miles de amigos..."



FORD

Hallamore, en particular, ha logrado transformar en capital contante y sonante las relaciones que tiene en Washington. Su compañía, que tiene una planta en el pueblo natal de Ford, Grand Rapids, recibió la concesión de un contrato con el Departamento de Defensa por 21.7 millones de dólares para producir allí instrumentos para navegación aérea.

Los veinticinco años que ha pasado Ford como miembro del Congreso demuestran lo bien que ha representado los intereses políticos de sus patrocinadores capitalistas.

Por ejemplo, la corresponsal del *New York Times* Marjorie Hunter informaba en un artículo que apareció el 9 de agosto en ese periódico: "Se

opuso virtualmente a todos los programas de bienestar social, incluso a los que se referían a la creación de un sistema de estampillas con las que los necesitados podrían comprar comida, a la ayuda federal para las escuelas primarias y secundarias, a los subsidios para las rentas, a los proyectos de ciudades modelo, a la atención médica para los ancianos y a la creación de una Oficina de Oportunidades Económicas..."

"En 1970 y 1972 se opuso a los intentos de derogar las leyes sobre el 'derecho al trabajo' [leyes destinadas a proteger a los rompe-huelgas], votó a favor de que se limitaran todos los proyectos de ley sobre el salario mínimo y votó por que se limitaran los proyectos de ley sobre la seguridad y el bienestar en el trabajo.

"... en 1950 votó a favor de una ley anti-subversiva, votó en contra de que se tuviera que pedir la aprobación previa de la corte para intervenir teléfonos, votó consecuentemente a favor de que se fundara el House Committee on Un-American Activities [Comité del Congreso sobre Actividades Anti-Norteamericanas] y su sucesor, el House Internal Security Committee [Comité del Congreso para la Seguridad Interna]..."

(Tratando de diferenciarse, sin embargo, de la práctica gubernamental de realizar un amplio espionaje político, que adquiriera tanta notoriedad bajo la administración de Nixon, Ford declaró en su discurso del 12 de agosto: "No se intervendrán teléfonos ilegalmente, no se escuchará tras de la puerta, ni habrá sistemas de micrófonos o robos políticos durante mi gobierno". Tuvo cuidado de incluir la palabra clave: "ilegalmente". La mayor parte del espionaje gubernamental es perfectamente "legal", al amparo de la vasta legislación anti-subversiva aprobada por el Congreso).

Ford ha apoyado siempre el que se aumenten los presupuestos destinados al armamento. El 11 de febrero dijo: "es indispensable mantener niveles adecuados de fuerza y primacia tecnológica mientras siguen las negociaciones... Si las negociaciones fracasan y la Unión Soviética trata de alcanzar una supremacía militar, los Estados Unidos deben estar preparados para aumentar sus fuerzas rápida y efectivamente".

Refiriéndose a las lecciones que se deben sacar de la guerra de Vietnam, afirmó, durante las audiencias que se realizaron para ratificarlo como vice-presidente, que se debe dar más ayuda económica y militar a regímenes como el de Saigón, de tal manera que fuera más flexible la introducción de tropas terrestres norteamericanas.

En un artículo publicado en el *Wall Street Journal* el 9 de agosto se valoraba la actuación de Ford mientras

fue miembro del Congreso. El redactor Norman C. Miller escribió: "El no era un dirigente congresista innovador, sino más bien un aburrido peón de partido que se afanaba por lograr objetivos que otros señalaban".

Para dar la mano al aburrido peón de partido ante situaciones difíciles, la clase dominante ha rodeado al nuevo presidente de una cuadrilla de expertos que incluye al Secretario de Estado Henry Kissinger y al Secretario de Defensa James Schlesinger.

Quizás la mejor recomendación en cuanto a la honestidad y merecimiento de confianza de Ford fue hecha por el pillo que lo nombró vice-presidente. Hablando por la televisión nacional la noche del 8 de agosto al anunciar su renuncia, Nixon dijo: "... al dejar la dirección del gobierno al vice-presidente Ford sé, como lo dijera a la nación cuando lo designé para ese cargo hace diez meses, que la dirección de los Estados Unidos estará en buenas manos". □

¿A Dónde Va el PST?

[La siguiente resolución, aprobada por el Secretariado Unificado de la Cuarta Internacional, apareció en el número del 26 de julio de 1974 de *Rouge*, semanario que refleja las posiciones de los trotskistas franceses organizados en el Front Communiste Révolutionnaire. El título con el que aparecía esta resolución era "Où Va le PST?" ("¿A Dónde Va el PST?"). La traducción del francés es de *Intercontinental Press*.

[Una respuesta por parte del Comité Ejecutivo del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, una organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional, aparece también en este número de *Intercontinental Press*, bajo el título "En Defensa del PST y la Verdad"].

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El 22 de marzo, el presidente argentino Juan Perón recibió a los representantes de ocho partidos políticos que así se lo habían solicitado: la Unión Cívica Radical, el Partido Revolucionario Cristiano, el Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, el Partido Socialista Popular, el Partido Intransigente, UDELPA [Unión del Pueblo Adelante], el Partido Comunista y la Democracia Progresista. Esta reunión no es un acontecimiento aislado. Forma parte de una serie de iniciativas tomadas por Perón con el objetivo de "normalizar" sus relaciones con los partidos reconocidos oficialmente (el 5 de abril se realizó otra reunión). Pero la reunión del 22 de marzo es la más importante hasta ahora, ya que al salir de ella los ocho partidos hicieron pública una declaración común:

"Los aquí presentes", afirmaba esta declaración, "han reiterado el propósito fundamental de no ahorrar actitudes y esfuerzos para mantener y consolidar el proceso de institucionalización del país, en el régimen de la democracia y en la práctica de la convivencia y el diálogo constructivos... Los momentos difíciles que esperan a la República, como consecuencia de su enfrentamiento a los poderes que desde antiguo la han sometido, se superarán victoriosamente con una acción solidaria de los sectores que respeten la voluntad mayoritaria y popular expresada en los comicios por la liberación y garanticen conjuntamente su derecho a seguir expresándose en el futuro para hacerla efectiva, terminar con las cargas de la dependencia y entregar a los trabajadores los beneficios de la riqueza creada con su esfuerzo.

"Como parte que somos de ese proceso", dijeron, "no asumimos actitudes opositoras a la concreción de esos propósitos. La entrevista, por la representatividad de sus participantes y el desarrollo de su contenido, debe ser considerada como un paso concreto destinado a materializar la conjunción de esfuerzos que asegure el curso de la institucionalización en los carriles votados por el país, coincidiendo—más allá de sus respectivos puntos de vista sobre la profundización y ritmo del proceso de cambio—en la inexorable necesidad de su realización. Los que buscan el fracaso del régimen constitucional o esperan la aparición de circunstancias que hagan posible una nueva aventura reaccionaria; quienes aspiran al manejo de sectores de poder para influir en alternativas futuras; quienes inducen

a prácticas totalitarias o corporativistas, en subterránea confluencia ideológica con las reivindicaciones fascizantes y los intereses de las corporaciones multinacionales que se proyectan y presionan sin solución de continuidad a lo largo de nuestras fronteras; todos deben saber que aquí ha estado reunido el país y en coincidencia fundamental, les ha dado su respuesta".

La declaración, que apareció el 22 de marzo en todos los diarios, fue reproducida en el número del 28 de marzo-5 de abril de *Avanzada Socialista*, órgano del PST. Pero *Avanzada Socialista* no se limitó a publicar el comunicado, lo comentó en dos editoriales.

El primer editorial, después de recordar el aumento de la violencia derechista, que alcanzó su punto máximo con el golpe del jefe de policía de Córdoba, Navarro, explicaba que la "participación (del PST) en el diálogo con el presidente de la República" era un "acto concreto en defensa de las libertades democráticas, heroicamente conquistadas por las movilizaciones obreras y populares que se desarrollaron a partir del cordobazo". Seguía diciendo que "la defensa de la estabilidad constitucional" no debía coincidir con la defensa política del gobierno, y sacaba la siguiente conclusión: "el que ocho partidos políticos hayan coincidido en solicitar la entrevista para exigir la institucionalización es de extraordinaria importancia. Pero, como siempre, seguiremos sosteniendo que para defender los márgenes democráticos seguirá siendo más importante todavía el camino de la movilización, como nos muestran en estos días Acin-

dar y Bancarios. Por eso, también, seguimos planteando la necesidad de que la coincidencia en defender las libertades democráticas se exprese en la acción, comenzando por un gran acto público de todos los partidos, juventudes políticas, y organizaciones obreras y estudiantiles". Al final del segundo editorial se abordaba el hecho mismo de convocar una reunión conjunta con los partidos burgueses. Ahí se explicaba la necesidad de dar "respuestas concretas y ágiles frente a cada coyuntura de la lucha de clases".

La dirección del PST debió darse cuenta de que su decisión de participar en una reunión que ofrecía una cobertura a las acciones de "normalización" de Perón, su firma de un documento común con los partidos burgueses (entre ellos la Unión Cívica Radical, el partido burgués tradicional y además la principal fuerza burguesa hoy en día exceptuando al peronismo), su proclamación de un "acuerdo fundamental" entre todos los firmantes para la defensa del proceso de "institucionalización", y la aceptación de "proyectos" aprobados por "el pueblo" (que son en realidad proyectos elaborados por Cámpora y Perón) y su tesis según la cual la lucha contra el fascismo puede y debe ser llevada a cabo con partidos representantes del enemigo de clase, todo esto podría provocar reacciones entre los militantes del partido.

Es por esto que en ese mismo número de *Avanzada Socialista* aparecía una carta firmada por un "Camarada F" (carta que los editores recibieron con sorprendente rapidez) y una respuesta a la misma que ocupaba casi dos páginas.

La carta parecía aceptar la colaboración de clases con los partidos burgueses. De hecho, afirmaba (falsificando una cita de Trotsky sobre la necesidad de formar un frente único con la socialdemocracia en Alemania a principios de la década del treinta), que "es admisible hacer frente único con el enemigo de clase e incluso con la abuela del diablo". Pero el autor criticaba que se hubiera firmado el documento de los ocho partidos porque, según él, el PST ayudaba así a Perón y apoyaba a un gobierno burgués que está al borde del colapso. La respuesta de los editores clarifica el problema central. Afirma que es necesario partir "de un hecho fundamental: que ha habido un golpe

semifascista que ha derribado a un gobierno provincial, que este golpe no es algo aislado, sino un salto dentro de una creciente escalada de la ultraderecha que está a la ofensiva y que no tiene la menor intención de detenerse". La conclusión es que, en el contexto dado, no se debe luchar por derribar al gobierno o a las instituciones existentes, sino que, por el contrario, es necesario defender la "institucionalización democrática y que, con ese fin, es correcto establecer un acuerdo con partidos burgueses firmando declaraciones comunes y llamando a manifestaciones comunes".

En el pasado, los dirigentes del PST han criticado las concepciones stalinistas del frente popular, y reafirmaron formalmente estas críticas en el número de *Avanzada Socialista* que hemos mencionado. Pero así como anteriormente han apoyado al Frente Amplio uruguayo, que estaba dirigido por el representante burgués SEREGNI, hoy firman una declaración común con partidos burgueses y llaman a realizar acciones conjuntas con ellos. Para justificar esta actitud ultraoportunistas, utilizan exactamente el mismo argumento empleado por los stalinistas a mediados de la década del treinta para justificar su adopción de la línea del Frente Popular, a saber, que es legítimo alinearse con la burguesía, o con los sectores de ésta que se dicen democráticos, para oponerse al peligro fascista. Con esta acción, el PST abre una nueva etapa en su evolución y rompe abiertamente con la concepción del frente único obrero, que se funda sobre la concepción leninista de la Tercera Internacional y que fue rescatada por Trotsky.

Al mismo tiempo, olvidan la diferencia fundamental que existe entre los derechos democráticos exigidos por el movimiento obrero y las estructuras de la democracia burguesa. Al firmar un documento que llama a la institucionalización del país y al presentarse al lado de los partidos burgueses, como "parte del proceso de institucionalización", contribuyen a mantener la principal mistificación de Perón, la farsa pseudo-democrática que la burguesía argentina viene representando desde hace tres años, y caen en la maniobra que trata de presentar a Perón como el garante de una "democracia" que abarca a todo

el mundo, menos a las organizaciones de extrema-derecha y de extrema-izquierda (Perón ha explicado abiertamente esta línea). La expresión que utiliza *Avanzada Socialista* en varias ocasiones—el diálogo con el presidente—dice mucho sobre las concepciones oportunistas de los dirigentes del PST.

El Secretariado Unificado de la Cuarta Internacional, que ha rechazado siempre cualquier forma de colaboración de clases con los "partidos democráticos" de la burguesía, considera que el deber de los revolucionarios en América Latina, aprovechando siempre los márgenes de maniobra legales o semi-legales que existen, es denunciar el fraude que comenzó con el Gran Acuerdo Nacional y que ha sido desarrollado por Perón, así como luchar sin compromiso y sin tregua contra el gobierno actual y el estado burgués.

junio de 1974

En el número de *Avanzada Socialista* del 26 de junio de 1974, se dice que el PST no firmó la declaración del 22 de marzo de 1974, "por subsistir todavía diferencias" con los otros partidos. El editor responsable cometió un error al publicar la información sobre la firma del documento. Pero el artículo del periódico en que se hace esta rectificación, contiene una reafirmación explícita de la validez de hacer acuerdos tácticos con los partidos burgueses, en la Argentina actual, para defender las libertades democráticas y las instituciones de la democracia burguesa.

La opción fundamental del PST se confirma aún más por el hecho de que tres días después de la publicación de este número de *Avanzada Socialista*, el 29 de junio de 1974, el PST firmó junto con los otros siete partidos, a los que los periódicos argentinos llaman de "centro-izquierda", una declaración en la que se apoya el "proceso de institucionalización del país" y "el funcionamiento de los mecanismos legales de continuidad constitucional" (*La Opinión*, 30 de junio de 1974). El 3 de julio, al día siguiente de la muerte de Perón, firmó en la ciudad de Santa Fe, a petición del presidente del parlamento provincial, una nueva declaración en favor del "mantenimiento de la estabilidad constitucional, como único medio adecua-

do de llegar a la justicia social en libertad, vencer a los intereses imperialistas y concretar la independencia" (*El Cronista Comercial*, 4 de julio de 1974).

Esto demuestra que se mantiene totalmente la divergencia fundamental del PST con la línea programática

de la Cuarta Internacional sobre el método que se debe utilizar para defender las libertades de los trabajadores, a pesar del artículo que apareció en *Avanzada Socialista* el 26 de junio de 1974.

El poner en claro esta desviación programática, por la cual la Cuar-

ta Internacional no puede tomar ninguna responsabilidad, no debe obstaculizar para nada el desarrollo de una vigorosa campaña de solidaridad con el PST ni la defensa de este partido contra los golpes de la represión y del terrorismo de la ultra-derecha.

12 de julio de 1974

En Defensa del PST y la Verdad

[La siguiente declaración del Comité Ejecutivo del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, una organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional en Argentina, es una respuesta a la resolución "¿A Dónde Va el PST?", que fue aprobada por el Secretariado Unificado de la Cuarta Internacional.

[El texto de la resolución del Secretariado Unificado aparece también en este mismo número de *Intercontinental Press*].

* * *

El Secretariado Unificado de la Cuarta Internacional, en una resolución aprobada a fines del mes de mayo de este año, formuló una severa crítica, que consideramos injustificada, a la dirección del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores.

Normalmente, la cuestión debería haberse discutido internamente en el seno del movimiento trotskista mundial, por cuyas actividades políticas estamos fraternalmente interesados (aunque no estemos afiliados a la Cuarta Internacional porque nos lo impiden las leyes reaccionarias que rigen en nuestro país). Sin embargo, la resolución fue hecha pública por sus autores, y ello nos obliga, por mucho que lo lamentemos, a responder también públicamente.

Hay varias versiones de la resolución. En esta respuesta nos referiremos a la publicada el 26 de julio de 1974 en *Rouge*, semanario que expresa las posiciones de los trotskistas franceses organizados en el Frente Comunista Revolucionario (*Front Communiste Révolutionnaire*). *Avanzada Socialista* publica más arriba una traducción al castellano de dicha versión, para información de los trabajadores argentinos.

No hay en *Rouge* ninguna información sobre la forma en que se votó

la resolución en el Secretariado Unificado. Allí la votación no fue unánime. La resolución fue presentada por representantes de la Tendencia Mayoritaria Internacional, que tiene mayoría en el Secretariado Unificado. Los representantes de la Fracción Leninista Trotskista se opusieron y votaron en contra de ella, proponiendo que se recabaran mayores informes en la Argentina, en particular al Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores.

Hay otro hecho que debemos señalar. La decisión de hacer pública la resolución fue aprobada en una reunión del Secretariado Unificado realizada el 3 de julio de 1974. La versión de *Rouge* incluye un post scriptum, fechado el 12 de julio, que no fue puesto a consideración en ninguna reunión del Secretariado Unificado.

El principal argumento de la resolución es que "el PST abre una nueva etapa en su evolución y rompe abiertamente con la concepción marxista revolucionaria del frente único obrero, que se funda sobre la concepción leninista de la Tercera Internacional y que fue rescatada por Trotsky".

Junto con ello se afirma que los dirigentes del PST han adoptado una línea de abandono de la política de clase y que, para justificarse, "utilizan exactamente el mismo argumento empleado por los stalinistas a mediados de la década del treinta para justificar su adopción de la línea del Frente Popular, a saber, que es legítimo alinearse con la burguesía, o con los sectores de ésta que se dicen democráticos, para oponerse al peligro fascista".

Para justificar estas graves acusaciones, los autores de la resolución alegan que los dirigentes del PST se unieron a representantes de otros siete partidos políticos, muchos de ellos

burgueses (incluida la UCR), para firmar un documento conjunto que fue presentado "al Presidente argentino Juan Perón" en una entrevista celebrada el "22 de marzo" (la fecha verdadera es 21 de marzo).

Para demostrar que el PST no podía firmar dicho documento sin abandonar la política de clase, los autores de la resolución citan varios de sus pasajes claves. Luego hacen lo mismo con dos supuestos editoriales del número correspondiente a la semana del 28 de marzo-5 de abril de *Avanzada Socialista*. (Decimos "supuestos editoriales" justamente porque sólo uno de los artículos citados como tales por *Rouge* es efectivamente un editorial. Es extraña esta confusión por cuanto *Avanzada Socialista* tiene en los últimos meses una norma explícita: publicar su editorial en letra cuerpo 12, en la página 3 de cada número y con la palabra "EDITORIAL" sobre su margen superior derecho. Los redactores de la resolución utilizan aparentemente el hecho de que la casi totalidad de los artículos de *Avanzada Socialista* no vayan firmados (una tradición heredada de veintiseis años de clandestinidad), para considerar cualquier artículo como una editorial. Y lo hacen pese a que el número de *Avanzada Socialista* que ellos citan cumplió con la norma, es decir, presenta un sólo artículo titulado "Editorial", ubicado en la página 3 e impreso en cuerpo 12. Y de dicho artículo, dedicado enteramente a la entrevista con Perón, los autores de la resolución no utilizan ninguna cita, a excepción de la siguiente frase: "respuestas concretas y ágiles frente a cada coyuntura de la lucha de clases").

Lo cierto es que con ese conjunto de citas, los autores de la resolución creen haber demostrado que los dirigentes del PST sostienen que, presen-

tándole a Perón un documento con una línea política burguesa firmado por una mezcla de partidos burgueses y proletarios, realizaron una acción ejemplar en defensa de los derechos democráticos y de lucha contra el fascismo.

Las acusaciones parecen irrefutables a primera vista. Pero hay una confusión. Parecería que el gobierno peronista no sacó la conclusión de que el PST había capitulado. El 25 de marzo, cuatro días después de la entrevista con Perón, el camarada Juan Carlos Coral fue arrestado y encarcelado por participar en una reunión con trabajadores en lucha en la puerta del Banco de la Nación. El mismo *Avanzada Socialista* que trata sobre dicha entrevista publica un artículo al respecto.

Tampoco parece que los matones de ultra-derecha, que actúan en complicidad con ciertos sectores del gobierno, hubieran sacado la conclusión de que el PST estaba cediendo a las presiones de la burguesía. Al contrario, consideraron que el PST, por su rápido crecimiento y su extensión a sectores cada vez más amplios, se estaba convirtiendo en una creciente amenaza potencial para el capitalismo argentino. De ahí la seguidilla de ataques contra los locales de nuestro partido y los asesinatos de nuestros compañeros.

Ahora bien, *el hecho es que los dirigentes del PST no firmaron un documento común con ningún partido político, y que ningún documento de ese tipo fue entregado a Perón en la entrevista del 21 de marzo.*

¿Cómo que los autores de la resolución del Secretariado Unificado sacaron la impresión opuesta?

Reconocemos que parte de la culpa recae sobre nosotros. *Avanzada Socialista* publicó el texto del supuesto documento conjunto en su edición del 28 de marzo-5 de abril, con una lista de supuestos firmantes. Se trata de un error del que nos hacemos responsables, así como de la demora en corregirlo. Pero el camarada Coral lo rectificó públicamente el 8 de mayo en una entrevista por televisión que tuvo difusión nacional, y el consejo editorial de *Avanzada Socialista* hizo lo mismo en la edición del 26 de junio.¹

1. El texto en español apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 22 de julio,

Sin embargo, este reconocimiento público de que habíamos cometido un error no satisfizo a los autores de la resolución del Secretariado Unificado. Aparentemente ellos consideran que las rectificaciones públicas no son más que una maniobra de encubrimiento.

Esto nos obliga a explicar más en detalle las circunstancias de la entrevista con Perón.

Su contexto fue el golpe ultra-derechista del 27 de febrero, en que el jefe de la policía de Córdoba, Antonio Domingo Navarro, derribó al gobierno provincial electo que encabezaba Obregón Cano. Este proceso alarmante, que amenazaba con detonar una reacción en cadena que podía conducir a un golpe similar en Buenos Aires y a la reimplantación de una dictadura militar a escala nacional, era muy peligroso. Para contrarrestar esta amenaza era indispensable que los trabajadores se movilizaran para la defensa de sus derechos democráticos, ganados en duras batallas, e impulsarlos hacia la solución socialista de la crisis económica y política que desgarraba a la sociedad argentina. Este era, para el PST, el objetivo central de todas sus acciones.

El golpe de Córdoba conmovió a otros círculos, incluyendo sectores de la propia burguesía. Por diversas razones, estos sectores temían el resurgimiento del dominio militar; también temían la posibilidad de un enfrentamiento que pudiera empujar a los obreros hacia la revolución socialista.

Desde el punto de vista socialista revolucionario, existían todo tipo de motivos para fomentar esta incipiente división de la clase dominante y tratar de aprovecharla. Aunque ésta era una consideración secundaria, tuvo cierto peso en la elaboración de nuestra táctica inmediata, fundamentalmente para ampliar la propaganda que pudiera ayudar a la movilización de los trabajadores.

La principal figura en la promoción de la entrevista con Perón fue Ricardo Balbín, de la UCR. Tenía, desde luego, sus propias razones políticas para hacerlo. Entre ellas el temor a las posibles consecuencias del golpe de Córdoba. El fue quien arregló la en-

en la página 1002. Publicamos también una traducción al inglés en nuestra edición del 15 de julio. — IP

trevista con Perón.

Perón concedió la entrevista como jefe del gobierno. Como afirman correctamente los autores de la resolución del SU, tenía interés en promocionar su imagen política como "garantía" de los derechos democráticos para todos los sectores, excepto la ultra-derecha y los protagonistas de la guerra de guerrillas. Así lo comprendimos, e hicimos todo lo posible por contrarrestar ese intento de Perón, denunciando el verdadero rol de su gobierno.

La proyectada entrevista tenía otro carácter: era un acto formal de gobierno, de características casi parlamentarias. Es decir, era una reunión oficial del presidente con representantes de partidos legalmente reconocidos y caracterizados como de *oposición*. En consecuencia, Perón exigió que dichos partidos de oposición presentaran un documento que formulara los objetivos que buscaban lograr en la entrevista.

Que en ese momento un partido de oposición se retirara habría significado un riesgo para su legalidad. Y para los leninistas el luchar por la legalidad y el mantenerla cuando se la ha obtenido es un problema de principios.

Oscar Alende, del Partido Intransigente, redactó un proyecto de declaración y lo puso a consideración de los siete partidos políticos restantes. Dicho documento nos resultó totalmente inaceptable, entre otras cosas, tanto por lo que planteaba (la defensa de un gobierno burgués y sus instituciones), como por lo que omitía (la movilización de la clase obrera en defensa de los derechos democráticos). En una reunión de los representantes de los ocho partidos, propusimos enmendar el documento eliminando toda mención de apoyo al régimen peronista y agregando puntos relativos a la necesidad de la movilización de los trabajadores. Muy pronto quedó claro, por supuesto, que era imposible que los ocho partidos se pusieran de acuerdo en torno a una declaración común.

Balbín comunicó este hecho a los funcionarios del gobierno peronista, y Perón hizo entonces una concesión: retiró su exigencia de que se presentara un documento conjunto.

De esta manera, la entrevista se realizó sin que se presentara a Perón ningún documento común, quedando

cada partido en libertad para plantear sus propias posiciones. Fue sobre esta base, y sólo sobre ella, que participamos en la reunión. Fuimos como representantes del PST y no como adherentes a un bloque sin principios o a un frente popular en ciernes.

Puede argumentarse que fue un error que concurriéramos. No creemos que lo haya sido, pero estamos dispuestos a discutir el problema y a reconocer nuestros errores si se nos presentan argumentos suficientemente convincentes. Pero esto nada tiene que ver con las acusaciones de los autores de la resolución del SU, en el sentido de que firmamos un documento sin principios en conjunto con partidos burgueses.

Reconocimos que nuestra participación en la entrevista con Perón, pudo no haber sido entendida por unos pocos militantes leales y malinterpretada maliciosamente por algunos de nuestros adversarios. De ahí que, por todos los medios a nuestra disposición—inclusive intervenciones en la televisión difundidas a todo el país—, tratáramos de disminuir esos peligros. Más aún, en el único verdadero editorial que citan los autores de la resolución del SU, sentamos claramente nuestra oposición política al peronismo y al régimen peronista. Por ejemplo, en relación a nuestro análisis sobre el peligro que significan las acciones violentas de las nacientes tendencias semifascistas, decíamos:

"Preservar en este período la estabilidad de las instituciones no significa apoyar la política peronista y su gobierno, sino que significa defender el derecho de utilizar todos los instrumentos democráticos, que aunque precarios, insuficientes y retaceados, permiten una relación más amplia y permanente con el conjunto de la clase obrera y el pueblo. Significa mantener el derecho—para nosotros y para todas las demás fuerzas políticas—de publicar periódicos, abrir locales, utilizar la radio y la televisión, organizar actos, asambleas, manifestaciones. Significa también el derecho de los trabajadores a perfeccionar sus organizaciones gremiales, liberándolas tanto de intervenciones militares como de la burocracia, como acaban de hacerlo los compañeros de Villa Constitución. Significa en fin, la posibilidad de gravitar en la elección de los gobernantes y en la crítica de sus programas y acción de gobierno.

"Todo eso no tiene absolutamente nada que ver con la *defensa de la política del gobierno*. Perón llegó al poder sostenido por una amplia alianza de todos los sectores patronales e imperialistas. Defender el gobierno de Perón sería defender el Pacto Social, destinado a congelar los salarios en los actuales niveles de explotación; a garantizar los privilegios de la oligarquía terrateniente y las inversiones de los monopolios extranjeros. Significa, en fin, defender la amplia gama de recursos represivos con que se pretende imponer esa política económica, desde las reformas al Código Penal hasta la aplicación de la Ley de Prescindibilidad." (Subrayado en el original).

Creemos que no nos está permitido, cualesquiera sean las circunstancias, dar apoyo *político* a ningún régimen, partido, coalición, estructura o representante burgués, y jamás lo hemos hecho en el más mínimo sentido. Siempre nos hemos opuesto al camino de la colaboración de clases, que lleva al frentepopulismo y al nacionalismo burgués.

También creemos que, ante un golpe de derecha, la amenaza o realidad de la guerra civil y el ataque a las libertades populares y los derechos obreros, nos está permitido, y a veces es imprescindible, organizar y realizar *acciones prácticas* en defensa de los derechos democráticos conjuntamente con organizaciones y tendencias no proletarias. Esa es la enseñanza de Lenin. Al mismo tiempo que recurre a ella, el partido revolucionario debe dejar bien en claro que esa táctica estrictamente delimitada de la acción conjunta para conjurar un peligro inmediato no entraña la menor subordinación política, acercamiento, acuerdo o complicidad con la falsa política de los circunstanciales aliados burgueses democráticos. Lenin forjó el principio de mantener la independencia de acción y expresión. Sólo se puede salvaguardar la democracia mediante la lucha constante e independiente de los obreros por el poder y el socialismo. El PST se ha esforzado por movilizar a las masas en ese sentido, y seguirá haciéndolo.

¿Qué llevó a los diarios a informar que se había firmado un documento conjunto? ¿Qué llevó a algunos de ellos (*Noticias, La Nación, Clarín, Mayoría*, es decir la mayoría de los diarios bonaerenses, informaron que

era una simple declaración a la prensa) a decir que el supuesto documento conjunto le había sido entregado a Perón?

Al informar a la prensa su versión personal de la entrevista con Perón, Balbín utilizó como ayudamemoria su propio proyecto de declaración, basado en las correcciones que había efectuado a los de Alende y Coral. Fue de este hecho, sin duda, que los periodistas recibieron la impresión de que se trataba de una declaración conjunta y, unos pocos de ellos, de que había sido entregada a Perón. A esta situación debe agregarse que los dirigentes del Partido Comunista habían estado presionando para la formación de un frente popular en la Argentina, y esperaban utilizar la entrevista con Perón para dar un paso en esa dirección. De allí que tuvieran interés en difundir la versión de que se había llegado a un acuerdo en torno a un documento conjunto.

Veamos ahora el intento de los autores de la resolución del SU de demostrar, por medio de citas cuidadosamente seleccionadas de dos supuestos editoriales de *AS* del 28 de marzo-5 de abril, que hemos efectuado un viraje político y ahora estamos a favor de integrar bloques sin principios con partidos burgueses en defensa de los derechos democráticos.

La resolución del SU afirma que nuestra posición consiste en que, en el contexto dado, no debemos librar la lucha por derrocar al gobierno ni a las instituciones, sino por el contrario, es necesario defender la "institucionalización democrática y que, con ese fin, es correcto establecer un acuerdo con partidos burgueses firmando declaraciones comunes y llamando a manifestaciones comunes".

Ni el verdadero ni el supuesto editorial citados por los autores de la resolución del SU contienen el párrafo que se nos atribuye. ¿Proviene esta "cita" de otra fuente? Nos gustaría saber cuál es.

Se trata de una cuestión importante, porque es en base a esta "cita", y a la interpretación que se hace de ella, que se nos acusa de repetir los argumentos que utilizaban los stalinistas en la década del treinta para justificar el frente popular. La verdad es que venimos haciendo una campaña consecuente contra el frente popular desde hace muchos años. El mismo

número de AS que tan buenos servicios ha prestado a los autores de la resolución, contiene vigorosas polémicas contra el frentepopulismo, que es un real peligro en la actual situación argentina. (Los autores de la resolución reconocen nuestras discusiones contra el frentepopulismo, pero las hacen a un lado calificándolas de una mera "reafirmación formal" de nuestra posición).

Así, por ejemplo, omiten mencionar la siguiente declaración, que forma parte de uno de los artículos citados por los autores de la resolución del SU:

"Nosotros . . . somos los más decididos adversarios de los 'frentes populares' o 'democráticos'. Es decir, de los frentes únicos entre obreros y patronos. Si hay algo por lo cual luchamos, es por la independencia política del movimiento obrero con respecto a partidos o frentes patronales. Por eso, no fuimos a elecciones ni con el Frejuli ni con la APR. Estamos, más que nunca, por el frente único clasista."

Los autores de la resolución del SU llegan hasta tomar frases del documento supuestamente entregado a Perón, colocarlas entre comillas y presentarlas como si fuesen una posición nuestra. Esto les permite decir:

"La dirección del PST debió darse cuenta de que su decisión de participar en una reunión que ofrece una cobertura a las acciones de 'normalización' de Perón, su firma de un documento común con los partidos burgueses (entre ellos la Unión Cívica Radical, el partido burgués tradicional y además la principal fuerza burguesa hoy en día exceptuando al peronismo), su proclamación de un 'acuerdo fundamental' entre todos los firmantes para la defensa del proceso de 'institucionalización' y la aceptación de 'proyectos' aprobados por el 'pueblo' (que son en realidad proyectos elaborados por Cámpora y Perón) y su tesis según la cual la lucha contra el fascismo puede y debe ser llevada a cabo con partidos representantes del enemigo de clase, todo esto podría provocar reacciones entre los militantes del partido."

Con semejantes métodos es fácil probar lo que uno quiera, por más lejano a la verdad que sea.

Las demás citas seleccionadas por los autores de la resolución del SU, son irrelevantes, en la medida en que

presumiblemente no defienden la famosa declaración supuestamente entregada a Perón. Tratan de la situación concreta planteada en torno al golpe ultra-derechista de Córdoba, de la amenaza cada vez mayor que ello representa hoy en día en la Argentina y de como la oposición de ciertos sectores burgueses a un posible peligro fascista en la Argentina podría utilizarse para impulsar la única respuesta efectiva al fascismo, es decir, la movilización de la clase obrera según el programa del socialismo revolucionario.

Por la forma en que se utilizan esas citas y por varias traducciones incorrectas, es evidente que los autores de la resolución del SU no comprenden la situación concreta en la Argentina o nuestra posición frente a ella. Así, por ejemplo, citan uno de los artículos de AS como si tratara sobre la "defensa de la estabilidad constitucional". El original, sin embargo, dice "defensa de la estabilidad institucional". La diferencia no es fundamental; lo fundamental es comprender que se refiere al *golpe en Córdoba y sus derivaciones*.

El uso ambiguo de la palabra "institucional" ha agregado sin duda un elemento de confusión (no estamos completamente libres de culpa en ello). Pero en este caso es difícil entender cómo los autores de la resolución del SU pueden interpretar tan mal el término, puesto que aparece inmediatamente después del párrafo inicial del artículo que reseña dicha situación concreta. El error de traducción (si es que realmente se trata de eso) se repite en otras partes. Por ejemplo, el artículo dice que el hecho de "que ocho partidos políticos hayan coincidido en solicitar la entrevista para plantear el problema institucional es de extraordinaria importancia". Esta frase se traduce así: "el hecho de que ocho partidos hayan llegado a un acuerdo para pedir la reunión, con el fin de exigir la institucionalización es de una importancia extraordinaria". Pero el artículo en cuestión se refiere a la lucha por el establecimiento de las garantías constitucionales de los derechos democráticos, proceso que se inició con el Cordobazo y la consiguiente caída de la dictadura militar. En otras palabras, los ocho partidos buscaron la entrevista para enfatizar el problema del golpe de Córdoba y el peligro de que

se revirtiera el proceso de establecimiento de los derechos democráticos. El objetivo del PST no fue rogarle a Perón, sino impulsar la movilización de los obreros argentinos.

Los autores de la resolución del SU formulan otra acusación contra los dirigentes del PST.

Según ellos:

"Al mismo tiempo, olvidan la diferencia fundamental que existe entre los derechos democráticos exigidos por el movimiento obrero y las estructuras de la democracia burguesa."

Reconocemos que algunas de nuestras formulaciones pueden haber provocado esta impresión. Hasta es posible que hayamos cometido el error de no distinguir cuidadosamente, en la situación actual por la que atraviesa la Argentina, la diferencia entre la defensa de una "estructura" burguesa dada y la defensa de los derechos democráticos. Puesto que se nos ha llamado la atención sobre el particular, lo estamos estudiando. Llamamos a todos los sectores del movimiento trotskista a considerar también esta cuestión, teniendo en cuenta la situación concreta de la Argentina, incluyendo el significado que ha adquirido la palabra "institucionalización".²

Si es necesaria una corrección, no vacilaremos en hacerla, como hemos hecho en el pasado en relación a otras cuestiones.

2. Las palabras "institucionalización" y "proceso de institucionalización" han adquirido un significado especial en la política actual argentina.

En 1949, durante su primer gobierno, Perón puso en efecto una nueva constitución. Después de que fue derrocado en 1955, los que lo sucedieron retomaron la constitución de 1853. La brutal dictadura militar que tomó el poder en 1966 convirtió la constitución en letra muerta, disolviendo el congreso, cambiando el sistema judicial, violando los derechos democráticos de la manera más arbitraria e imponiendo leyes.

Cuando volvió a asumir la presidencia en septiembre de 1973, Perón comenzó a elaborar una nueva constitución. Se suponía que sería presentada al público el próximo año.

La situación de la constitución en Argentina es, por lo tanto, muy poco clara.

Mientras tanto, los mismos traba-

Sin embargo, insistimos en que nuestro enfoque fundamental está en pleno acuerdo con la concepción leninista de la Tercera Internacional, en particular como la formuló León Trotsky. Este enfoque básico consiste en movilizar a los trabajadores y sus aliados en el camino de la revolución socialista a través de los métodos planteados en el programa de transición.

No vemos ninguna alternativa diferente de este enfoque. Se ha planteado como posible atajo la "estrategia de la guerrilla". La hemos rechazado porque no está de acuerdo con la concepción leninista de la Tercera Internacional, en particular como la

jadores argentinos, a través de una serie de grandes movilizaciones, que en ocasiones llegaron a ser semi-insurrecciones, minaron profundamente a la dictadura militar y restablecieron en la práctica cuando menos algunos derechos democráticos. Esto desató un amplio movimiento a favor de que se ampliara este proceso—por "institucionalizar" estos derechos; esto es, hacer obligatorio el que se respeten los derechos que han sido reconocidos formalmente y que se codifiquen algunos otros.

El PST ha apoyado activamente este movimiento, tratando de desarrollarlo a través de movilizaciones de masas. La posición que ha tomado el PST no es diferente de la que han adoptado los trotskistas de otros países en su lucha por los derechos democráticos.

En los Estados Unidos, por ejemplo, durante el periodo macartista el Socialist Workers party dió especial importancia a la lucha porque se respetara el Acta de Derechos, que es la parte de la constitución norteamericana que garantiza los derechos democráticos.

Hoy en día, el SWP apoya la lucha porque se reforme la constitución para que los mujeres tengan los mismos derechos que los hombres. Si se aprobara esta reforma, esto se calificaría, según la actual terminología política argentina, como la "institucionalización" de los derechos de las mujeres.

En Argentina, las fuerzas reaccionarias tratan de revertir el "proceso de institucionalización". Es por eso que este punto ha pasado a ser uno de los problemas más importantes de la lucha de clases en ese país.—IP

formuló León Trotsky. En la Argentina, la "estrategia de la guerrilla" ha demostrado ser un gran obstáculo para la movilización de los trabajadores y sus aliados en una línea socialista revolucionaria.

Señalamos al pasar que los autores de la resolución del SU introducen la acusación de que "anteriormente (los dirigentes del PST) han apoyado al Frente Amplio uruguayo, que estaba dirigido por el representante burgués SEREGNI . . ."

El objetivo de esta acusación gratuita resulta claro. Los autores quieren sugerir que apoyamos a la figura burguesa de Seregni y llamamos a los trabajadores a votar por el FA, un bloque de colaboración de clases. Este ataque no tiene fundamento en los hechos. De ahí que los autores de la resolución del SU no ofrezcan citas ni otras "pruebas". (Estamos dispuestos a discutir el carácter del FA uruguayo, de la Unidad Popular chilena o de la Unión de la Izquierda francesa y la táctica que había que adoptar ante ellos, pero no es éste el lugar apropiado).

Nos referiremos ahora al agregado fechado el 12 de julio. En él se reconoce la autocrítica pública que publicó el consejo editorial de AS en la edición del 26 de junio, pero sólo para desecharla por carecer de sentido. Si los dirigentes del PST no firmaron el documento entregado a Perón, eso no prueba nada—argumentan—porque los dirigentes del PST apoyan en general esa política! Pero el hecho específico de nuestra supuesta firma del documento, sobre el que gira todo lo que sostienen los autores del SU, también desaparece, y lo único que queda es su afirmación general, carente de toda base en los hechos, de que nuestro curso ha sido "oportunistas".

Además—dicen los autores de la resolución—si los dirigentes del PST no firmaron el documento supuestamente entregado a Perón, por lo menos firmaron otros documentos sin principios; por lo tanto, los cargos siguen siendo válidos.

La "evidencia" para esta argumentación—que es una argumentación extraordinaria, por así decirlo—es que el 29 de junio de 1974 el PST agregó su firma a las de otros siete partidos, en una declaración de "centro izquierda" en apoyo al "proceso de institucionalización del país" y "el funcio-

namiento de los mecanismos legales de continuidad constitucional". La fuente de esta "evidencia"—dicen los autores—es el diario burgués bonaerense *La Opinión* del 30 de junio de 1974. (Otros diarios dicen que no la firmamos, por ejemplo, entre otros, *La Nación*).

Además—sostienen los autores de la resolución—el 3 de julio, luego de la muerte de Perón, los dirigentes del PST, a pedido del presidente del parlamento provincial, firmaron en la ciudad de Santa Fe una declaración a favor del "mantenimiento de la estabilidad constitucional como único medio adecuado de llegar a la justicia social en libertad, vencer a los intereses imperialistas y concretar la independencia para siempre". La fuente citada para esta "evidencia" es un despacho desde Rosario publicado en el número del 4 de julio del diario burgués bonaerense *El Cronista Comercial*.

En ambos casos, los informes son erróneos. Ni los dirigentes, ni los militantes del PST firmaron ni apoyaron ninguno de dichos documentos. Sugeriríamos a los autores del agregado que tuvieran en cuenta que los niveles de veracidad de la prensa burguesa argentina son aún más bajos que los de *Le Monde*.

Por último: ¿cómo pudo ser que los editores de AS cometieran el error al informar sobre la entrevista con Perón del 21 de marzo? No es de interés público que entremos en detalles que tienen que ver con la organización y funcionamiento del equipo. Baste con decir que el problema específico es sólo uno de los muchos que enfrenta nuestra organización en un periodo de gran crecimiento. Las posibilidades de captación y extensión han exigido muy severamente a nuestros cuadros experimentados. Los nuevos militantes son integrados lo más rápido posible, pero la integración plena lleva tiempo. Mientras tanto, hay errores. Estamos seguros de que nuestra situación será comprendida por aquellos sectores del movimiento trotskista mundial que hayan experimentado periodos similares de crecimiento rápido. Lo que requerimos de la Cuarta Internacional en estos momentos es que comprenda nuestras posibilidades y problemas—y la colaboración leal para con nuestros esfuerzos por manejarlos en forma principista.

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